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
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


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8° B.S.P. 1824.





ESSAYS

ON

SUBJECTS OF IMPORTANT ENQUIRY,

IN

METAPHYSICS, MORALS AND RELIGION;

ACCOMPANIED BY REFERENCES TO PASSAGES IN NUMEROUS
AUTHORS, ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE SAME.

BY THE LATE

ISAAC HAWKINS BROWNE, ESQ.

Si quid hinc pietati, si quid bonis moribus, si quid sacris literis, si quid
ecclesiæ Christianæ consensui, si quid ulli veritati dissentaneum à me dictum
est, id nec dictum esto.

Grotius, Prolegomena in tres libros de jure belli ac pacis.

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PREFACE BY THE AUTHOR.

IN this age, when so laudable a zeal for education has displayed itself, and when we may indulge the pleasing hope, that every member of the rising generation will be instructed in the first principles of christianity, and be enabled to read the Bible; and when all who have leisure to read, have the choice before them of innumerable works in their own language, written in the two last centuries, or daily issuing from the modern press,—it is very material that there should be some guide to lead well-disposed persons to make an useful selection. The vicious read with no other view, than to gratify their corrupt and malignant passions; the idle read merely to pass an indolent hour, and reap no advantage from it. The virtuous may read for amusement, and to relax from the labours and cares of life; but the general object of their reading is, to improve their morals, enlighten their minds, animate their piety, and to acquire that knowledge which shall render them most acceptable to God, and most beneficial to man; which shall excite them most powerfully to the

performance of their duties in their respective stations, or enable them duly to perform them.

Although the virtuous, of superior education and elegant minds, will not neglect the cultivation of taste, and will grow more and more delighted with the genuine charms of poetry and eloquence, yet they will consider reading of this description, if it leads to no higher object, as only the ornament, and not the main business of life; as an indulgence in the hours of leisure, but not as a justifiable encroachment upon that time, which every man, whatever his rank or fortune may be, ought to devote to industry. There are, I believe, great numbers of both sexes, who are very desirous of employing some part of their time every day, and especially on a Sunday, in reading books which shall improve their knowledge of religion and morals, and excite them to practice; but in the multiplicity of books presented to their choice, they are easily bewildered, and incur great danger of chusing ill.

To this description of readers, there cannot be a better guide than the national Bible lately published under the direction of the Society for promoting Christian Knowledge, which contains much that is valuable in theology, and, by its references, brings us acquainted with the admirable writers of our church and nation on moral and religious subjects. In the great variety of notes there adduced, every rational and attentive mind will discover something of the character of

PREFACE.

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the author, and be able to discriminate their different kinds of excellence, as well as to determine how far he is likely to be edified by a deeper insight into their works.

The extracts in this copious selection will assist us to understand the holy scriptures, which *are able to make us wise unto salvation*. But the following Essays, and more especially the references annexed to them, are extended to a general view of moral philosophy, and of natural as well as revealed religion, never separating the foundation from the superstructure, and recommending to all philosophers or divines the advice of Milton, in his Tract of Education, that, “when years and good general precepts have opened the understandings of the pupils, their young and pliant affections may be led through all the moral works of Plato, Xenophon, Cicero, Plutarch, Laertius, and those Locrian remains; but still to be reduced in those nightward studies, wherewith they close their day’s work, under the determinate sentence of David or Solomon, or the evangels and apostolic scriptures*.”

A great treasure of philosophical and sacred learning is to be found in the references of Dr. Doddridge’s Lectures, which more directly supersede this publication; but many valuable works have been published since his time, and his references are adapted to the dissenting academy, over which he so ably presided. My arrange-

* Milton’s Prose Works, vol. i. p. 145.

ment was formed many years ago; and, having formed it, I was led, in the course of my reading upon theology or moral philosophy, to enter into a common-place book, those passages which appeared to me to throw a material light upon any of the subjects which I had intended to discuss. I entertained a hope that I might have entered fully into all those points which are comprised in the following chapters, but having now no expectation of being able to accomplish so great a work, I am unwilling that the references should be entirely lost, as they may enable others to write more at large than I have done upon any one or more of these valuable topics. They will likewise afford an useful assistance to a diligent enquirer, to examine what has been said by any writer here quoted, referring to such passages as his convenience may allow, or his inclination suggest.

In selecting these references, I have been governed more by the apparent value of the quotation than the eminence of the author, as reason ought to have more weight than authority; at the same time that I have been solicitous to peruse the writers of the most distinguished reputation, and to make extracts from them.

I have referred to no passage which I do not think deserving of serious consideration, and in general to few passages which I do not believe to be correct both in doctrine and reasoning, both in the premises and in the conclusion. But

upon some subjects there is room for diversity of opinion; and in these instances I have referred to authors who have some shades of difference in their sentiments, and who may not always be consistent with themselves.

My references are principally to divines or laymen of the church of England, though I have not omitted some dissenters and foreign writers. I have likewise often referred to ancient philosophers, and to classical writers upon natural theology and morality. In the essays on the immateriality and immortality of the soul, I have been happy to avail myself of the arguments which my father, in his admired poem, *de Animi Immortalitate*, has enforced with so much strength and eloquence, and clothed in such beautiful language. I have introduced many references to holy scripture, and to the notes upon it in the Society's Bible.

These references I have accompanied with a short essay on each subject. Into several of the essays I have incorporated passages to which I refer my reader, but I will not affirm that every thing which is not acknowledged is original. Upon these subjects little originality can be expected. New arguments and new arrangements are all that it is reasonable to desire; nor is it possible to recollect, at a distance of time, to what author we may be obliged for sentiments which we have adopted for our own.

I am very sensible how inadequate these essays are to the importance of the subjects on

which they treat; nor would I obtrude them upon the public, if I did not conceive that those imperfections will be amply compensated by the references, which may explain what the essays have left obscure; may limit what they have stated too broadly; and may correct whatever is wrong, either in position or in argument.

It has been my anxious wish, upon these most important subjects, to discover truth, by the exercise of my own understanding, by deference to the opinions of men greatly my superiors in learning and abilities; and to the doctrines of that pure and reformed church, in whose communion I have always lived.

It is my earnest desire to establish my own faith upon the most solid grounds, and in the deepest sincerity of heart to embrace that religion which is most acceptable to God, through Jesus Christ, and most agreeable to his holy word, relying upon his divine grace to "lead me to all truth."

My great object in these essays, and whatever I have written on moral and religious subjects, has been, to impress upon my readers the conviction which I feel myself; to enforce it by arguments, and to express those arguments in the clearest and most intelligible language.


ADVERTISEMENT.

THE References mentioned in this Introduction, were collected by the Author, in a course of extensive reading, during the last twenty-eight years of his life. In his common-place book they are arranged under twenty-five heads, agreeing with the titles of the Essays; and these are divided into Eleven Periods, occupying a space of two or three years each, during which they were collected. In this order they are printed, and are placed after the Essays to which they properly belong.

By the letter (n) is signified that the reference is to the note.


S. B. to the scripture references, means the notes in the Bible, published by the Society for promoting Christian Knowledge.

The Essay on Prayer, No. XVIII. has appeared before in a volume published by the Author in 1815, but occupies its present place by his direction, with additions and emendations made by him for this purpose.



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ESSAYS

UPON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY
AND RELIGION.

I.

ON REASON.

GOD, being perfect in intellect, discerns all truth intuitively. Every intellectual being, partaking of universal mind, has some degree of this intuition; and no animal, endowed with sense, is excluded from it. But all creatures designed to make a progress in wisdom, knowledge, or virtue, have the power of reasoning, by which, if they reason justly upon sound principles, they gradually approach truth; but if they reason accurately upon wrong principles, or illogically upon true ones, the more they reason, the farther they depart from truth. The power therefore of reasoning, is the source of vice as well as virtue, of folly as well as wisdom, of error as well as knowledge. The more we excel in true and just reasoning, drawing clear conclusions from well established premises, the more shall we exalt our nature; which being destined for immortality, may gradually improve through eternal ages. The highest perfection we can

conceive in man is the ability to acquire all useful and necessary knowledge from intuition or reasoning, and the firmness to act constantly according to his own judgment so formed. As far as man is governed by reason alone, the objects of his pursuit are his improvement in virtue, the performance of beneficent acts, the increase of his wisdom, the extension of his knowledge, a competence adequate to his station, that degree of power, which from his prospects in life may become a rational object of ambition, and that degree of praise, which every honourable and benevolent mind will naturally desire.

Reason may be considered in three points of view, as an original principle, as an instrumental means of the increase of knowledge, and as an exercise of skill and practical wisdom.

Reason, as an original principle, is employed in contemplating itself, and displaying its native energies. It is intellect reflecting upon intellect, mind revolving the nature of mind, and pursuing every abstract idea to its consequences. Reason in this sense is the parent of all the pure Sciences, Logic, Mathematics, and Metaphysics.

From these powers of just and sublime ratiocination, we are enabled to prove the being and attributes of God, and from his glorious attributes to lay the foundation of Religion.

We may infer upon the strongest ground, and therefore without presumption, that, if God were pleased to create such a creature as man, he

would become his moral governour, his protector, and his judge.

From Reason, as an original principle, we derive our notions of moral obligation, beauty, symmetry, and taste. From hence, too, we deduce that criterion which distinguishes good, both physical and moral, from evil, truth from falsehood, fair proportion from deformity; contrasting them in theory, although we may not know the subjects of them actually to exist.

Reason, employed as an instrumental means of the increase of knowledge, is exercised in reflecting upon the ideas of sensation. Intuitive knowledge is conveyed to us by the senses, and is so far independent of the understanding, that it is often possessed by inferior animals in a higher degree than by men, and among men by the savage more than by the civilized, by those, who are most immersed in the material world, rather than by those whose speculations remove them from it: but it is the understanding, which draws useful inferences from this knowledge, which deposits it in the great storehouse of the memory, collects, methodises, and arranges all the objects of sense, and by its own powers of abstraction, which are appropriate to itself, leads the patient inquirer from the individual to the species, from the species to the genus. It forms natural history into a science, and raises us from a view of nature to an exalted conception of her Divine Author, and excites for the greatest and best of Beings our highest veneration.

tion, and our warmest gratitude. Knowledge, derived from all other sources, as well as from the senses, is applied by reason, and it is reason alone which enables us to apply it, from whatever source it is derived. From our observations upon particular men known to us by history, personal experience, or by their immortal works, are drawn those innumerable facts, which display the human intellect in all the perfection, to which it has been actually raised ; and in all the degradation, by which it has been humbled, the human passions in their noblest, or in their most hideous forms, and human character and conduct in all the variety, which ages in their long succession, climate, country or government, can produce. It is Reason, when applied to facts, which convinces us of the divine authority of Scripture, fixes its sacred canon, translates it into our vernacular idiom, and enables us to understand the history it relates, the precepts it instills, the doctrine it inculcates.

Reason therefore is the source both of natural and revealed religion. But when we consider Reason in the third light, in which I viewed it, as an exercise of skill and practical wisdom, it enables us to apply every tenet of religion, natural or revealed, to the conduct of life.

By this application of every religious doctrine to its proper use, we add to faith, obedience, we purify our minds, we exalt our thoughts, we form our virtuous and pious habits, we acquire the true principle of devotion, we regulate our

deportment, we determine justly upon every object of deliberation, and we guide all our actions. It is Reason, when considered in this light, which ought to direct our whole conduct, not only with respect to Religion and Morals, but to prudence, and all worldly concerns, to innocent recreation, and every exercise whether of body or mind. It is Reason, when considered in this light, which displays the skill of every artist, who draws his materials from the corporeal world.

The theory of art, as well as of science, may be derived from Reason as an original principle ; but art very much depends upon the inferences which Reason deduces from actual existence. That exercise of it, which is termed skill, is identically the same with Reason as applied to practice. It is Reason applied to practice, which makes a man good as well as great ; good as a Christian, good as a moral agent, good in every character of life, and at the same time eminent in contemplative or active pursuits, glorious in war, beneficent in peace, the protector or guardian of his country, the framer of laws, or the admirable administrator of them. All the elevation of human nature, speculative or practical, depends upon Reason. None can be enemies to it, who are not ignorant, idle, or vicious. No one is adverse to Reason, unless he considers it as inimical to him, which he falsely supposes it to be, when it awakens his conscience, reproaches his conduct, or confutes his

principles. It must, however, be acknowledged, that the perversion of Reason is as mischievous, as the right application of it is beneficial, and that the danger of this perversion increases, in proportion to the difficulty and importance of the subject we discuss.

The abuse of reasoning gives scope to the imagination, is a powerful incentive of the passions, and the principal support of prejudice. Persons of brilliant imaginations, and violent passions, have the strongest temptations to reason ill; at the same time, unfortunately, false reasoning is pernicious in proportion to the prevalence of imagination or passion. We ought to cultivate our understanding more, and pay less regard to genius when separated from judgment. Imagination is a delightful and elevated endowment, if it is employed upon those subjects which belong to it. Let it be confined to its proper sphere; let it not expatiate upon politics, philosophy, or religion. Indulge it with poetry, upon all subjects of pure fancy, and with eloquence, when directed against those actions or principles which Reason has before proved to be vicious, or when employed in maintenance of a cause which the coolest and calmest arguments have shewn to be deserving of support.

We are not to assume the character of virtue from acting according to our opinion or conscience, unless we can assure ourselves, upon a strict examination of our hearts, that our opi-

nion is derived from a right principle. Vice consists more frequently in forming bad opinions, than in acting contrary to a pure and well founded principle. Truth and virtue have a constant mutual influence. Speculation leads to practice. Moral habits and a right temperament of mind establish the only solid basis for real knowledge in all subjects which concern human nature, and they are the true guides to wisdom. A man who is free from vice, or the turbulence of passion, and has no object but the impartial search after truth, and the performance of duty, will rarely reason wrong, if he confines himself to those speculations which his previous knowledge, and his degree of understanding, enable him to investigate. It is not rational to go further, and therefore it is not justifiable; human reason is limited, man is not a being omniscient, although we cannot define the limits of his Reason; for it is not to be estimated by the degree in which it is possessed by an individual, however eminent, because in the future progress of the world it may rise to a height indefinitely greater than it has yet attained. Human reason, as displayed in an individual of the present or a former age, is not to be considered as his Reason alone, but as the accumulation of the original efforts of his own intellect, and of all the advantages he has derived from the intellectual efforts of other men. Human reason is limited, in each individual, by the powers of that understanding which is peculiar

to him, and by his opportunity of availing himself of the assistance of other men. It is however by Reason alone, that these limitations can be discovered. They are known by a full inquiry into the nature of the subject, an inquiry which Reason alone can institute or pursue. They are known to each individual, by the exercise of reason in the most useful manner in which it can be employed, the discernment of his own deficiencies, and of the degree of perfection which he may have attained. The result of inquiry into the nature of the subject may be, that it is above the reason of the individual, above the age or country in which he lives, or above the comprehension of man. In many of these cases, it is desirable to dismiss the subject from our thoughts, but this may be impossible, or it may be inconsistent with duty. It may be a subject which will continually present itself to our view; or it may be one upon which we are obliged to act. It may create no difficulty where preliminary information by long habit has been obtained, yet may depend upon a knowledge of facts, which are not in our power to ascertain, although we must act upon them. What course will Reason then direct us to pursue? not surely to form a crude opinion, which must be the effect of prejudice, caprice, or chance. This would not be the exercise of reason, but the dereliction of it. Reason, therefore, herself would recommend us to have recourse to authority. She would judge of that

authority ; in the selection of it, in the constant adherence to it, in the watchful jealousy of its influence, she would be our sole guide.

Upon this principle we confide in every tradesman, manufacturer, or artist, whom we employ ; we place an implicit reliance upon our lawyer, or our physician, and, generally speaking, the greater that reliance is, if we make a good choice, the wiser will our conduct be. Upon this principle we place confidence in a minister, or in a leader of opposition ; we bestow unbounded applause upon a successful commander by sea or land, although we must confess ourselves very incompetent to form much judgment of his merit. Upon this principle we act in private life in the choice of friends or the nearest connections.

The Bible is the religion of protestants, the Bible proved by reason, and interpreted by it ; but the protestant does not abandon his right of private judgment, if being ignorant of original languages, ecclesiastical history, and theological controversies, he confines his religious studies to those parts of scripture, which he is most able to understand, and consults the best commentators, or any divines, to whose writings or persons he may have an opportunity of access. Reason, which teaches a protestant his own imperfections, as an individual, equally instructs him, that he is incapable of fully comprehending all divine truth, that although the topics of religion, which concern our present state, are

level to all capacities, those which principally regard the means of everlasting salvation, and the divine dispensations, may be rationally concluded to be incomprehensible by us. When Reason directs us upon the authority of Scripture, to believe in mysteries as far as they are there revealed, she does not abdicate her throne. It is the superior reason, which controuls the inferior. A doctrine may be true, which is above reason, when from its nature it must be above it; but no doctrine can be true which is contrary to it. Natural as well as revealed religion, requires us, from the dictates of pure reason, upon which alone her evidence depends, to believe doctrines above our comprehension. There are doctrines which reason approves, although they soar above it, and are therefore incapable of being elucidated by it. The providence of God, when viewed in its boundless extent and duration, must be above the utmost reach of our understanding. Whatever is true must be fully discerned by the Omniscient Being: but there are truths incomprehensible to every finite mind; there are truths above the human intellect, although proportional to the capacity of superior Beings; there are truths within the sphere of human reason, yet above that of an individual.

The same sense of duty, which leads us to the reception of religious truths, when from their nature they are confessedly above reason, forewarns us of the extreme danger of carrying

our investigation too far. While we justly think it our highest privilege to approach to God in the exercise of our understanding, in meditation and in prayer, we should always preserve an alarming sense of the perils which surround us, from rashness, presumption, and pride. When Reason is properly exercised in examining the evidence, or in explaining the nature of religion, she will teach us to reject no fact at first sight as incredible, but to inquire into the testimony adduced in its support; to reject no doctrine as absurd, but to investigate the proofs upon which it depends. She will never lead us to exclude the sublimest truths of Revelation, but inspire us with the firmest faith, and most pious gratitude, for those lights which the Gospel alone can afford.

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CICERO Orat. Phil. xii. s. 2; "Quid enim integrum," &c. to "solent esse," de finibus, lib. i. c. 9; "Itaque negat," &c. lib. ii. c. 12; "Privatarum litium," to "esse voluisti," c. 14; "Nescio," &c. lib. iii. c. 5; "Rerum autem cognitiones," &c. c. 9; "Sed sunt tamen," &c. lib. v. c. 4; "Quin etiam," &c. c. 20; "Itaque ut quisque," &c. c. 26; "An vero," &c. to "non habet," Tutculanarum, lib. i. c. 12; "Auctoribus," &c. c. 14; "Num dubitas," &c. c. 26; "Philosophia verò," &c. c. 30; "Nec vero de hoc," &c. lib. iii. c. 11, c. 28; "Philo-

sophi summi," &c. lib. iv. c. 26; "Sapientiam esse," &c. c. 27, at the beginning, to "erroribus," lib. v. c. 2, c. 3, c. 24, c. 25, c. 39; De Div. l. i. c. 51; "Nam ut aurum," &c. l. ii. c. 34; De legibus, lib. i. c. 5; "Nam sic habitote," &c. c. 7; "Animal hoc providum," to the end, c. 17; "sed perturbat," &c. to the end, c. 22; "Ita fit," &c. to the end, c. 23 and 24; De Officiis, lib. i. c. 4, 6; lib. ii. c. 2; "Quid est enim," &c. De Amicitia, c. 22; "Quocirca," &c. to "judicare."

Grotius, *Philosophorum Sententiæ*, p. 175, 176, 231; Barbeyrac's Grotius, pref. diss. par. 41, with the notes; par. 43. b. i. c. 2, s. 1. div. 2.

Seneca de Irâ, lib. i. c. 10, 11; lib. ii. c. 15; "Imperfectus," &c. De brevitate Vitæ, c. 19; De vitâ beatâ, c. 1, 2, 5; De otio Sapientis, c. 31, 32.

Monboddo's *Ancient Metaphysics*, vol. iv. p. 401, 14 to 19, 65 to 70, 74 to 81; vol. v. p. 88, 90 to 92, 106 to 111, 119 to 125, 143.

Loix de Platon, tome i. p. 87, 163, 223 to 225, 307; tome ii. p. 83, 429, 459 to 466.

Phedon de M. M. entretien i. p. 103 to 110, 192 to 197; entretien iii. p. 272, 273.

Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge*, p. 4, 5, 30 to 34, 63, 64, 67, 145, 149, (Nat. Phil. (*i. e.* part of reason,) p. 125, 126, 127, 128,) 277, 278, 284 to 291, 316 to 319.

Baxter on the Human Soul, vol. i. p. 363 to 366 in the note, p. 377, 382; vol. ii. p. 317.

Cudworth's eternal and immutable Morality, p. 69 to 72, 93 to 97, 101, 102, 109, 110, 125, 137, 153 to 187, 258, 272.

Pensées Philosophiques, tom. ii. art. 1, pens. 65, 72.

Burges's *Sylloge*, p. 11, s. 4, s. 6.

Casaubon on Enthusiasm, p. 5, 62, 116, 117, 173.

Cumberland's *Law of Nature*, ch. 5, sect. 12, from "There are required," to the end of the section.

Barrow's *Sermons*, vol. i. serm. 14, p. 11, div. 5;

serm. 16, p. 11, div. 5; serm. 20, p. 1, div. 3. div. 9; serm. 30, the second head of the conclusion.

Memoirs du Jacobinisme, par Barruel, tom. i. p. 404 to 411.

PERIOD THE FOURTH.

Seneca de beneficiis, lib. i. c. 15; "Crispus Passiens," &c. lib. vii. c. 1; "Egregie enim," &c. epist. xxvi; "Ita dico," &c. xlvi; "Hoc Lucili," &c. to the end, lxxxii; "Ego non," &c. to "ut imponam," xc, from the beginning to "inter homines consortium."

Luciani Hermotimus, c. 75; *ολιγοις αν πανυ εντυχοις*, Gillies' Aristotle, vol. i. p. 80 to 86, 92 to 96, 132 to 134; b. iii. c. 2; b. vi. c. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11; b. x. c. 4.

Lipsii Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam, lib. i. diss. 4; from "sed et opus Juventuti," to the end, lib. iii. diss. 8.

Harris's three Treatises, (8vo. 1744.) p. 28, 29, 38 to 42, p. 80, note (b), p. 86 to 89, 134 to 139, 162, 163, 286, 287, 296, 297, 343.

Harris's Hermes, p. 37 to 40, 107 to 112, 159, 160, 262 to 264, 351, 362, note (f), 425.

Harris's Philosophical Arrangements, (ed. 1775.) p. 9 to 11, 18 to 23, 106, 114, 150, 193 to 198, 202, 203, 342 to 345, 364 to 367, 393.

Harris's Philological Enquiries, vol. i. p. 107, 216, 217, 223, 225, 231, to the end; vol. ii. p. 438 to 441.

Stewart's Elements of Philosophy, p. 31, 51, 52, 116, 117, 124, 125, 151 to 158, *i. e.* the whole of the 1st section of the 4th chapter; p. 207, 208, 212, 213, 218 to 221, 231 to 233, 310, 311.

Bacon's Life, by Mallet, p. 33.

Bacon's Works, (Mallet's edit. fol.) vol. i. p. 3, 4, 6 at the bottom, and p. 7 at the top, "and for the conceit;" p. 13, 15, 16, 17, 21, 28, 35, "touching impossibility to endeavour;" p. 46, "for as in civil matters,"

&c.; p. 48 (de formis et finibus rerum), 51 (Mathematics), 54 the top of the page, 56 "the lawyer," &c. 67 "and lastly," &c. to "human judgment."

Warburton's *Divine Legation*, (ed. 1732,) vol. i. p. 395.

Puller on the Moderation of the Church of England, p. 148 to 165.

Sanderson's *Sermons*, s. xiv. div. 10, ad Aulam.

Robison's proof of a Conspiracy, p. 431 to 434.

PERIOD THE FIFTH.

DACIER'S *Plato*, vol. i. p. 11, 16, 73, 146 to 156, 191 to 193, vol. ii. p. 17, 133 to 135, 138.

Plutarch's *Lives* (Eng. Trans. 12mo. 1749) vol. iii. p. 153, 154, "Plato," &c.

Quintiliani, lib. i. cap. 1, sect. 1, p. 243, "affert autem," &c.; p. 258, "illud dicere," &c.

Sydenham's *Meno*, Arg. p. 9, 10; note 55, p. 75, 76, 77; note 77, p. 102, 103; note 78, 104 to 106; note 82, p. 108 to 111; note 85, p. 121 to 124; note 90, p. 131, 132; note 104, p. 159, 160; note 212, p. 238; note 214, p. 240.

Spens's *Republic*, p. 226, 266 to 271.

Philebus, a French translation, from Plato, vol. ii. p. 243 to 248, 345 to 349, 354.

Burlamaqui's *Natural Law*, vol. i. p. 6 to 10, b. ii. c. 14, sect. 10.

Bacon's *Essays*, 50.

Essais de Montaigne, (4to.) p. 97, 145, 208, 267, 377 to 392, (upon the reason of brutes) 405, 406, (upon brutes forming abstract ideas) p. 462, 463, 483.

Charron de la *Sagesse*, p. 123 to 126, 142, 144, 145, 221 to 224, 305, 650 to 654.

Fortescue de *L. L. A.* (ed. 1741) p. 9, 13, 14.

Couston's *Boethius*, p. 149, 150.

Turretini, *Diss.* vol. i. p. 42, 43, 48, 49, 56, prop. 24, 58, prop. 32, 33, p. 66, 116, prop. 55.

Foster's Nat. Rel. vol. i. p. 103, 133.

Grove's Morals, Introduction, part i. sect. 5 to sect. 14; part ii. chap. x. sect. 15.

Grove's Works, vol. iv. p. 43, 56, 65 to 70.

Grove's Sermons, vol. i. p. 116 to 119.

Cogan on the Passions, p. 306.

Bp. Taylor's Ductor Dubitantium, p. 42 to 48, 51, 54, 57, 58, 61, 164.

Scott's Christian Life, (fol. edit.) p. 183, 213 to 218, 257.

Bp. Sherlock's Discourses, vol. v. p. 269 to 276.

Whichcot's Discourses, vol. i. 153 to 160, p. 170; vol. iii. p. 31 to 33, 100; vol. iv. p. 339, 391, 401.

Barrow's Sermons, vol. iii. p. 210, 211, 249 to 251, 292, 298, 300, 304 to 307, 387 at the bottom.

South's Sermons, vol. i. p. 52, 239, 244; vol. ii. 126 to 128, 257, 258.

Malone's Dryden, vol. i. p. 2, 403.

PERIOD THE SIXTH.

LOCKE'S Essay, b. i. ch. 4. sect. 22, 23, 24; b. ii. ch. 1, sect. 5, 10, 20; ch. 9, sect. 10; ch. 13, sect. 28; b. iii. ch. 3, sect. 14; b. iv. ch. 3, sect. 36; ch. 15, sect. 4, 5; ch. 16, sect. 1, 6, 7, 8, 9; ch. 17, sect. 1, 2, 3, 7, 24; ch. 18, sect. 5, 6, 11; ch. 19, sect. 1, 2, 3, 4, 14; ch. 20, sect. 5, 6, 8, 15, 16, 18; ch. 21.

South's Sermons, vol. iv. p. 285 to 288, 291 to 293, 302 to 305, 341; vol. v. p. 135, 136, 144, 171, 180, 208 to 211; vol. vi. p. 14, 15.

Olivet's Thoughts of Cicero, (Eng. transl.) p. 17 to 22, 60, 62, 63, 70, 71.

Locke's Conduct of the Understanding, sect. 3, 6, 13, 18, 23, 30, 32, 33, 37, 38, 41.

Watts's Philos. Essays, Ess. 3, sect. 16; Ess. 4, sect. 3.

Lee's Antisepticism, Preface, b. ii. ch. 1, sect. 9, 10, 11; ch. 9, sect. 1; ch. 11, sect. 7; ch. 13, sect. 11;

ch. 17, sect. 5, 9; ch. 23, sect. 4; ch. 25, sect. 2, div. 7; ch. 29, sect. 2; ch. 31, throughout; b. iii. ch. 3, sect. 8; b. iv. ch. 4, p. 261; ch. 5, (except the divine veracity); ch. 7, ch. 9, ch. 14, ch. 15, sect. 3, 4, 5; ch. 17, sect. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9; ch. 18, sect. 3, 4, 5; ch. 19, sect. 5, div. 4, and the rest of the chapter, with some exceptions.

Bishop Taylor's *Ductor dubitantium*, b. i. ch. 2, rule 3, sect. 6, 7, &c. to 25, 31, 32, 37, 38, 44, 48, 49, 51, 54, 58, 61, 66; ch. 4, rule 2, sect. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; rule 9, sect. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10; rule 11, sect. 3, 4; b. ii. ch. 3, rule 3, sect. 8, 9; b. iii. ch. 4, rule 21, sect. 5, 6, 7; rule 22, sect. 1, 2, 3; rule 23, sect. 2.

Comte de Valmont, tom. i. p. 24 to 35.

Conybeare's *Defence of Revealed Religion*, p. 47 to 54, 348 to 357, 366, 371 to 374.

Monboddo's *Origin of Language*, vol. i. p. i. b. i. ch. 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, p. 119 to the end, 12, 13, 14; b. ii. ch. 5, 11; b. iii. p. 483, 484; ch. 8, p. 14; ch. 10, conclusion from p. 568 to 574; p. ii. b. i. ch. 2, 6; vol. ii. p. 302, 303, 443 to 460, 494, p. ii. b. iii. ch. 15; vol. iv. p. 249, 250; vol. v. p. 379 to 385, 428 to 436; vol. vi. p. 47 to 53, 276, 277.

Scott's *Christian Life*, vol. iv. (8vo. edit.) p. 11 to 18; vol. v. p. 4 to 6.

Maxwell's *Cumberland*, Introduction, p. 167; main work, p. 110, 202.

Bp. Ellys's *Tracts*, p. 16 to 19, 28, 29.

Hutcheson's *Mos. Princ.* b. i. ch. i. sect. 4; ch. ii. sect. 1, div. 4, sect. 4; b. ii. ch. 17, sect. 7.

Hutcheson's *Inquiry concerning Beauty*, sect. 1. div. 10, 11, 12, 13; sect. 6, div. 4, 8, 9, 10; sect. 7.

Beattie on *Truth*, (8vo. edit. 1773) p. 33, 36 to 56, p. i. ch. 2, sect. 9; p. ii. ch. 2, sect. 1, p. 258 to 263, (4to. edit.) 267.

Crousaz, *La Logique*, p. i. ch. 1, div. 3, 4; ch. 3, div. 11; ch. 4, div. 4, 5, 6, 7; ch. 5, div. 7, 10, 11, 12; ch. 9, div. 3, 5, 6; ch. 10, div. 4, 5; p. i. sect. ii. ch. 1,

div. 6, 7, 8, 9; ch. 2, div 7, 8, 9, 10, sect. iii; ch. 1, div. 1, 2, 5, 9.

Watts's Logick, p. i. ch. 3, sect. 1, 2, 3, 4; ch. 5, p. 113 to 116; p. i. ch. 6, sect. 9; p. ii. ch. 2, sect. 7, 8, 9; ch. iv.; ch. v. sect. 12.

Tillotson's Sermons, (12mo.) the whole of Sermon 21; vol. ii. p. 176, 184, 259; vol. iii. 292 to 295, the whole of Sermon 49; vol. iv. 296 to 302; vol. v. 38 to 41, 44 to 46, 114, 115; vol. vii. 126, 384.

The Spectator, No. 307.

PERIOD THE SEVENTH.

XENOPHON, Απομν. β. α, κεφ. α, —δ'. β. δ. κεφ. ε—ια, *αλλα τοις εγκρατεσι, &c.* ιβ'. κεφ. ε'. —ιγ'—ιδ'—ιε. Μενανδρου λειψανα, εκ της ασπιδος α—εκ της Θεοφορημενης α, β'. εκ των ιμβριων α—εκ τω πωλεμενε α—εξ αδηλων δραματων ις'.

Spens's Plato's Republic, p. 251, 271, 291, 292, 302 to 312.

Grotii Excerpta, p. 217, 219, 241, 331, from Σωφρονος to βροτῶις. Ex Sophocle 77, φρονειν γαρ οι ταχεις εκ ασφαλεις, p. 81, 83, Αναξ, &c.; 93, Οσω κραιιστον κληματων ευβελια. Extragicis qui perierunt, p. 439, τεχνη κρατῆμεν ων φυσει νικωμεθα. Ex Æschylo, p. 15, Αλλ' το χρονος.

Epicurus's Morals, maxim xi. xxxiv. p. 99.

Aristotle's Metaphysics, Αλφα το μειζον. Α'. Γ'. το Θ'. γ'.

Aristotle's Analytics, by Reid, ch. 2, sect. 2, 3, 4; ch. 4, sect. 1, 3, p. 82 to 95, 108, 126 to the end.

Duncan's Logick, introduction, b. i. ch. 4, sect. 1, div. 7, 14; sect. 2, 3; ch. 5, sect. 9; ch. 6, sect. 15, 19, 22; b. ii. ch. 1, ch. 6, div. 3, 6, 13, 14; b. iii. ch. 1, div. 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11; ch. 2, div. 1, 2, 8; ch. 3, throughout; ch. 4, div. 15, 16; ch. 5, throughout; b. iv. ch. 1, div. 4, 5; ch. 2, div. 3, 4, 5, 16; ch. 3, div. 9, 10, 11 13, 14, 15, 16, 24, 28, 29.

Paley's Nat. Theology, ch. 5, div. 7, p. 94 to 97.

Dunbar's Essays, p. 43 to 46, 77, 153, 158.

Trembley sur le Principe de la Vertu et du bonheur, p. 26 to 30.

Sir Wm. Temple, of Health, from "How ancient," to "the practice of physick."

Reimarus on Nat. Religion, diss. vii. sect. 10 to the end; diss. ix. sect. 5, p. 145, 146; diss. iv. sect. 6, 15.

Law's Considerations, p. 117, note A.

Elemens de Metaphysique, p. 90 to 92, 133, 134, 399, 412, 413.

Norris's Theory of the Ideal World, p. 1, ch. 2, sect. 1; sect. 38 to 42, 66 to 74, 82 to the end.

Bp. Taylor's Freedom of Thinking, sect. x.

Watts's Improvement of the Mind, introduction, p. 1, ch. 3, ch. 4, sect. 12; ch. 14, sect. 14; ch. 18, sect. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 26; ch. 20, sect. 15.

Hartley on Man, vol. i. p. 209, 233, 234, 332 to 353, 362, 363; vol. ii. p. 209, 210, 376, 377.

Wollaston's Religion of Nature, sect. iii. the nine first divisions; sect. ix. div. 3, subdiv. 6, div. 11.

Pluche's Hist. of the Heavens, vol. ii. p. 58, 59, 151 to 158, 222 to 224, 227, 247 to 251, 254 to 257, 260, 277 to 298, 303 to 305.

Blackburne's Hist. View, introd. p. xxxix.

Hutcheson's Thoughts on Laughter, p. 37 to 41, 45 to 52.

Reynold's Discourses, p. 9, 26, 36 to 42, 74, 98, 114, 123, 129 to 138, 141, 144, 148, 149, 150, 160, 196 to 198, 271, 272, 275.

Knight's Principles of Taste, p. 7 to 17, 37 to 42, 196 to 201, 237 to 252, 259 to 266, 395 to 400, 446, 454.

Stewart's Elements of Philosophy, p. 1 to 62, 157 to 159, 170 to 182, 188 to 191, 210 to 214, 226 to 234, 319, 324 to 328, 360 to 367, 436 to 447, 455, 461, 467 to 470, 482 to 490, 575 to 581.

Scott's Elements of Philosophy, Introduction, p. 61 to 68, 88 to 91, 98 to 103, 106 to 109, 110, 166 to 168, 218 to 223, 292 to 299, 305, 306 to 384, 391 to 414, 446 to the end.

King's Origin of Evil, ch. 1, sect. 1, note 1, 2, 3; 2d Sermon annexed, div. 1, subdiv. 2, 3, 4; postscript, p. 554, on the order of Ideas.

Stewart's Life of Reid, p. 19 to 23, 34 to 42, 56 to 94, 110 to 167.

Warburton's Divine Legation, vol. i. p. 395; vol. ii. p. 21, 206.

Hale's Origination of Mankind, p. 2, 3, 24, 50 to 52, 55 56, 57, 58, 61, 64, 129, 130, 153 to 159, 361 to 367.

Lucas on Happiness, vol. i. p. 19, 20; vol. iii. p. 173, 174.

Bp. Taylor's Polemical Discourses, p. 895, 896.

Bp. Patrick's Pilgrim, p. 31, 417 to 428, 495 to 498.

Clarke's Sermons, vol. ii. p. 369, 370; vol. iii. p. 119, 120, 145 to 155, 337 to 341, upon the use of reason in interpreting Scripture, and the true construction of language; vol. iv. p. 359 to 365; vol. vii. p. 196 to 199, 220 to 226; vol. viii. p. 163 to 166; vol. x. p. 84.

Tillotson's Sermons, (12mo.) vol. ix. p. 255, 256; vol. xi. p. 145 to 149, 160 to 164, 172, 173, 186 to 191, 212 to 215, 243.

Arthur's Discourses, p. 40, 41, 306 to 312, 365, 372, 408 to 414.

Sprat's Sermons, p. 5 to 14, 28 to 30.

Hoadley's Sermons, vol. i. p. 284, 285; vol. ii. p. 129 to 144, 158, 159.

PERIOD THE EIGHTH.

LIVY, lib. 22, c. 29, "Sæpe ego" to "esse."

Cicero de Inventione, lib. i. sect. 29, "probabile autem est id quod fere fieri solet," to "præcipiendi quoque summa difficultas;" from "Idque ex iis, quæ sumpserant, non conficitur," to "in ipsis argumentationibus esse implicitas." Lib. ii. cap. 1, 2, 5. De Officiis, lib. i. cap. 4.

Grotius, *Opera Theologica*, tom. iii. p. 223, "Nos vero respondemus," &c. p. 226, from "Quamquam ergo" to the end of the section, p. 228, sect. iii.

Le Clerc's Grotius, p. 139, 269.

Limborchii *Theologia*, lib. ii. cap. xv. sect. 7; lib. v. cap. ix. sect. 21, 22, 23.

Knight on the Being and Attributes, p. 135, 200 to 202, 220, 221.

Fiddes on Morality, ch. ii. sect. 3; ch. xx. sect. 16, 17, 18.

Lux Orientalis, ch. iii, sect. 1.

Bishop Rust on Truth, sect. 1, 2, 9.

Epistola H. Mori ad V. C. sect. 32, 33, 34. More's Antidote against Atheism, b. i. ch. 2, 5, 6; ch. 8, sect. 14. Appendix to the Antidotes, ch. 2, 11, sect. 1. More on the Immortality of the Soul, ch. 2, the first nine sections. More's Preface to his Cabbala, div. 3.

Cogan's Treatise on the Passions, p. 88, 152 to 154, 169 to 172, 175, 179 to 186, 195, 196, 209, 210, 212 to 217, 333, 334.

Jortin's Remarks on Eccles. History, preface, p. vii. vol. i. p. 135, 136, 352.

Bryant on the Truth of Christianity, p. 207 to 210, 276, 277.

Kirwan's Metaphysical Essays, vol. i. preface, p. 1, 6 to 14, 23 to 36, 277, 287 to 289, 366 to 368, 370 to 380, 398 to 404.

Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetorick, vol. i. p. 19 to 21, 25, 26, 72, 87 to 108, 112, 113, 121, 123 to 125, 134, 135, 152, with the note, 405, 406; vol. ii. p. 1, 57, 68 to 79, 88, 102, 115 to 117, 290, 353, 376, 377.

The Protestant System, vol. i. p. 501, 502, 553 to 557; vol. ii. p. 105, 109, 110, 386, 422 to 424, 507, 508, 518.

Priestley's Heathen Philosophy, p. 198 to 204.

Enfield's History of Philosophy, preface, p. viii. to x; vol. i. p. 4, 7 to 10, 160, 186, 248, 249, 251, 252, 272, 273, 291, 309, 323 to 327, 383, 428, 440, 459 to 462,

496 to 499 ; vol. ii. p. 17 to 20, 93, 207, 216, 283, 284, 386 to 398, 472, 547 to 549, 576, 577.

Le Clerc against Indifference, b. ii. sect. 1.

Burnett on the 39 Articles, p. 175 to 177, 182, 183.

A. Smith's Essays on Philosophical Subjects, p. 16 to 22, 26, 36, 39, 46, 73, 81 to 84.

Barrow's Mathematical Lectures, (by Kirkby, 1734) preface, p. 28 to 32 ; p. 3, 4, 39, 41, 48 to 51, 53 to 66, 90, 99, 102, 105, 107 to 117, 295, 296, 311.

Memoirs of Lord Kaimes, vol. i. p. 279, 281, 284, 296 to 298, Appendix, p. 20 ; vol. ii. Appendix, p. 48.

Kirwan's Logick, vol. i. ch. 2, sect. 1, div. 239 to 243, 273 to 275, 303 to 318, 324, 328 to 332, 346 to 378, 393 to 396, 399 to 422 ; vol. ii. div. 628, the whole of sect. 19, div. 651, 663, 672, 680 to 685, 692, 730 to 733, 739, 746, 747, 748, 762, 790, 797 to 799, 900, 960, 961, 965 to 968, 970 to 974, 998.

Bacon's Essays,—of Studies.

Lord Clarendon's Essays, p. 196 to 199, 218, 239, 272, 276, 277.

Bp. Taylor on Repentance, ch. viii. sect. viii. div. 80 ; Polemical Discourses, p. 870, 871, 882.

Lowth's Lectures, (translated by Gregory) vol. i. p. 263 to 265.

Bentley's Sermons, (edit. 1735) p. 307 to 312.

Bp. Newton's Works, vol. iii. p. 8, 218, 223, 371 to 380, the 34th Dissertation ; vol. ii. p. 550, 552.

Mrs. Carter's Memoirs, p. 610.

Clarke's Sermons, vol. ix. p. 61, 62.

Horberry's Sermons, p. 13, 257 to 259.

Milton, (Newton's) Paradise Lost, b. xii. 82 to 104, 555 to 560 ; b. vii. 112 to 130 ; b. viii. 167 to 178, 186 to 197.

PERIOD THE NINTH.

EPICETUS, (Stanhope's) p. 5 to 7, 23, 24, 315, 316, 406 to 409.

- Juvenal, (Gifford's) p. 408.
- Cicero de Finibus, lib. ii. c. 14; "Homines enim," &c. lib. iii. c. 5; "Rerum autem," &c. lib. iv. 1, 2, 4, 8, 9.
- Lord Kaimes's History of Man, vol. ii. p. 51, 394 to 418, 420, 422; vol. iii. p. 24, 27, 30 to 35, 86 to 102.
- Magee on Atonement, vol. i. p. 189, 190; vol. ii. p. 46 to 60, 307.
- Butler's Analogy, Introduction, p. 3 to 7, 31, 201, 216, 252, 266, 267, 292, 294, 314, 324, 336.
- Price's Morals, p. 15 to 57, 80 to 86, 112, 121, 122, 147 to 167, 348, 400, 458, 459.
- Dunbar's History of Mankind, Essay 1st, N. B. 68 to 72, 92 to 94, 272, 273.
- Ferguson's Moral Philosophy, Introduction, vol. i. p. 56 to 61, 78 to 87, 93 to 119, 205 to 207, 251, 271 to 284, 296 to 299; vol. ii. p. 112, 113, 129, 130, 133, 403, 404.
- Cudworth's Intellectual System, ch. i. sect. 10, 27; ch. iii. sect. 29; ch. iv. sect. 1, 24, par. 9; ch. v. p. 634 to 638, 649, 650, 693 to 695, 716 to 721, 731, 736, 737, 835, 850 to 857.
- Cogan's Theological Disquisitions, p. 11, 12, 21, 22.
- Hill's Lectures, p. 35 to 40.
- Domat's Civil Law, vol. ii. p. 506 to 510, 660, 661.
- Inquiry concerning Virtue and Happiness, p. 143.
- Scott's Christian Life, (8vo.) vol. v. p. 379 to 383.
- Sir K. Digby's Observations on Rel. Med. p. 88, 98, 99.
- Browne's Vulgar Errors, b. i. ch. 6, 7, the latter part of ch. 9.
- Barrow's Sermons, vol. i. p. 1 to 4, 8 to 12, 395, 417; vol. ii. 21 to 24, 55.
- Sprat's Sermons, p. 6 to 9, 13 to 15, 27 to 30, 256, 257.
- Abernethy's Sermons, vol. i. p. 170, 190 to 192; vol. ii. p. 115 to 122, 137, 138.
- Smalridge's Sermons, p. 83, 84, 147 to 149, 154, 248, 338 to 345.

Grove's Posthumous Sermons, vol. i. p. 38, 39, 90, 110, 111, 185, 290.

Bp. Horseley's Sermons, vol. iii. p. 240 to 242.

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ESSAY II.

ON THE PASSIONS.

IF man were solely governed by Reason, he would be constantly in pursuit of what he thought good, and unremitting in his endeavours to attain it; he would be influenced by real good alone, when he had all the knowledge which the occasion required, and reasoned justly. He would be deluded by the vain semblance of good, whenever he was ignorant or mistaken in the grounds of his reasoning, or whenever he reasoned wrong, he would in proportion to this ignorance, or this paralogy, be influenced by apparent instead of real good.

But man is not solely governed by reason, he has many other principles of action. Imagination, and passions of all kinds have a powerful sway. When we deliberate upon our actions, imagination and passions may be substituted for reason, and assume its place. We are often conscious that we act irrationally; and when we most persuade ourselves that Reason directs our conduct, we are frequently the least governed by it. The passions, therefore, must be deemed very principal causes of human agency; they are connected both with the body and the mind; and probably could not subsist, except in a

created being who had some relation to the corporeal, as well as to the intellectual world.

All animals which approach in their nature to man, and which man has opportunities of observing, betray passions similar to our own, often excited by the same causes, and directed to the same objects. We cannot suppose these animals divested of will; and wherever there is will, there must be some species of mind. On the other hand, if disembodied spirits are supposed to retain the passions which they acquired in this life, it is to the corporeal state, which they once possessed, that the existence of these passions is to be ascribed.

If the passions belong to the mind, it is to the lower faculties, the concupiscible and the irascible propensities, not to pure intellect, that they must be considered as attached.

The highest perfection in intellect or morals, which we can conceive, is wholly exempt from passion; but whether human nature, in this life, can reach this perfection, while we are compounded of body and soul; or whether it is a perfection consistent with all the duties which we are now called upon to perform, are questions which the most judicious moralists would answer in the negative. In this state of trial, it is our duty to eradicate some passions, and to render others the instruments of virtue, by never suffering them to be excited without a justifiable cause, nor allowing them to proceed farther than the cause from whence they origi-

nated shall require. Passions are not the necessary instruments of virtue in abstract, because Reason may be conceived to produce every good effect which can arise from passion; but they may become indispensable to human virtue by supplying the defects of Reason in an imperfect nature; and calling into action that latent power, which our imbecility has not, without their aid, sufficient force to exert. Passions in their literal sense mean sufferings; and we are at first passive in our reception of them, whether they proceed from the internal state of the mind or body, or of both combined; or whether they are produced by external occurrences. They generally assault us from an union of all these circumstances. Something occurs to excite them, and the mind and body are susceptible of this excitement. When the mind and body are in a state of sensibility, the passions which take possession of us are strong or weak in proportion to the degree of this sensibility, and to the magnitude of the object which operates upon it.

The violence of passion arises from the object which is presented to the imagination, and the power of the imagination over the temperament of the human frame. If our ruling pursuit is profit, honour, or pleasure, we feel our interest more immediately involved in whatever obstructs or advances any of these pursuits, and the imagination paints in the most extravagant colours,

or describes with the most absurd exaggeration, all the external circumstances which engross our thoughts. The more the subject is removed from sensation, the larger is the scope for imagination to expatiate. Suspicion, therefore, or wounded feelings, more excite passion than real injury. Future hopes and fears have the greatest power over us. Religion, upon which we conceive our own everlasting salvation, and that of all the world, to depend, is, when not duly restrained by Christian principles, a greater incentive to passion, than any temporal concern, in the proportion which eternity bears to time.

The most amiable sensibilities of our nature will expose us to the inroads of passion as much as the most reprehensible and complete depravity; but the more amiable and the more truly pious we are, the more will our passion accord with Reason, and the more easily will it be governed by it; on the contrary, the more depraved our feelings are, the more will our passion be opposed to reason, and the more impatient will it become of all restraint.

When Passion is employed in the pursuit of real good, her object, and the object of Reason, are the same; but Passion will not pursue real good through the same course which Reason takes. She will be more ardent and intemperate in the pursuit. She will defy all opposition, scorn all obstacles, and though she will sometimes find herself obliged to yield to them,

when Reason, by her calm and judicious conduct, would have removed them; yet, on the other hand, it will often happen that the impetuosity of passion shall prevail when reason fails. When passion, although actuated by self love, pursues real good, virtues may be displayed, which dignify the human character, or exalt the human mind; but when the real good of other men is the object of our ardent desires, then every affection is exercised which bespeaks the warmest heart and the most enlarged views. Upon this supposition real good is as much pursued by passion as by reason; nor do the energies of reason more demand approbation, than those of passion excite admiration and love. Passion, however, is more liable to be deluded than reason, and therefore more frequently is enamoured of a fallacious phantom, which she mistakes for real good. She very often, when actuated by virtuous self-love, mistakes the semblance of good for the reality; and when infatuated by depraved selfishness, plunges us into the most dismal calamities, though she really means to promote our welfare. In the same manner, when actuated by benevolence, she forms some plan for the supposed advantage of those whom she loves, which, perhaps, is at the moment very mischievous to them; or, if affording transient pleasure, is the source of the most lasting sorrow. From hence arises the false indulgence we shew to our nearest relations, our children, our servants, or our

friends. From hence arise all the zealous schemes of political or religious fanatics, all the allurements which vice spreads to flatter and betray her votaries, all the hypocritical arts which the pretence of virtue contrives, all the fond delusions which superstition inspires. In this state of trial Reason herself, when misinformed or misapplied, may become a source of temptation. But passion is much more dangerous, and that very passion may prove a fatal snare, which, if it had been directed to real good, might have been the principle and the enforcement of the most admirable virtues, those which are most eminent and beneficial, magnanimity, courage, fortitude, patriotism, friendship, and charity. Reason paints every object in its real colours, and places it in its true light. Passion is a magnifying glass, enlarging every object of which it has a true discernment; but it more resembles a glass of another description, distorting the image, and transforming it into a shape extremely different from that which properly belongs to it. It clothes it in an unnatural dress, and disguises it with artificial colours.

Whether we are governed by reason or by passion, wealth, power, or fame, may be the objects of pursuit; but if we are governed by passion, they will be suggested by caprice, with no regard to propriety or prudence; they will be pursued with violence, carried to extravagant excess, and excite insatiable appetite. If we are governed by reason, these pursuits will be

considered only as *means* proportioned to certain *ends*; if we are governed by passion, they are the final cause of our actions; when they are means alone, they have their assigned limits; but when they become ultimate objects, they are infinite, and the more they are indulged, the more the desire of farther gratification is increased.

Passions are more frequently displayed, and more strongly impressed, in the abhorrence of evil, than in the pursuit of good. If the object of abhorrence is real evil, they are rational, and are almost identified with the understanding; but the evil is often imaginary; has either no existence, or ought not to be thought an evil, on the contrary, may be a real and substantial good. By the melancholy delusion which produces an imaginary evil, or transforms good into evil, our passions become the principal source of the calamities of human life; under their fatal influence we recal all past occurrences which we imagine to be evils, dwell upon the present, and anticipate the future, and all real evils we magnify beyond measure; we lament those disappointments which ought to be the subjects of complacency and of pious gratitude; we form visionary conceptions of what is most uncertain with respect to our future prospects, or most remote from those feelings which a cool judgment would allow us to entertain.

If we could suppose a human being entirely divested of passion, he would indeed still be

susceptible of pain, for there are many causes of sorrow, many corporeal sufferings, of which the most pure and enlightened understanding must be sensible; but pain would be less frequently felt, less violent, less durable, and more easily cured. A large portion of those afflictions which we do not by indulgence bring upon ourselves, is to be ascribed to the passions of other men; in nations and in families, passions are the great disturbers of public and private peace. Passion therefore, as the very term implies, is the radical cause of pain.

But are not the passions likewise the principal promoters of pleasure? I readily acknowledge that many passions are the principal promoters of pleasure; but the passions in general produce more pain in their disappointment than pleasure in their gratification; and many of them are incapable of affording pleasure, and even incompatible with it. Ungratified desire is always painful, and when carried to its greatest excess is the most excruciating torment which the mind can endure. When the desire is gratified, the pleasure of the gratification is always far inferior to the expectation which passion formed, and in many cases is a delight, which vanishes into air in the moment of enjoyment. The heart must be dreadfully malignant, if the pleasure of revenge exceeds the pain.

But what pleasure do many passions afford? where are the gratifications of fear, hatred, envy? Grief affords a melancholy species of

satisfaction ; and as far as grief is rational, this satisfaction is more productive of pleasure than of pain ; but when grief has no rational cause, or is indulged, although there is a reasonable foundation for it, to an extravagant excess, the delight arising from the indulgence is a symptom of insanity.

Indeed the exhilaration, which flows from inordinate passions, very much resembles the joy of the insane : nor does irrational passion differ from insanity in many of its essential characters. It is indeed of shorter duration, and arises more from a visible cause ; but passions, while they rage with unrestrained vehemence, approach to insanity, and if unsubdued, terminate in that dreadful malady. Passion assumes the shape of madness, when it reduces the human intellect to be the mere instrument, instead of the director, of our conduct, and man becomes so degenerate, as to derive all his motives of exertion from this blind and usurping tyranny. It is true that passion, in its most depraved state, must gratify that active principle which raises us above matter ; and this active principle is generally gratified by what is called pleasure, however disgusting to reason and to pure sentiment ; but some passions appear to have no other object in view, than the pain they inflict. Grief, anger, envy, and malice, in many of their extravagant excesses, prove this assertion. If therefore passion may be so predominant as to destroy the very principle of self-love, and to

render us consciously and intentionally the inflictors of misery upon ourselves, it is not surprising that she should extirpate, during the paroxysms of her fever, every feeling of benevolence. The love of mankind is not more the natural fruit of the amiable and generous passions, than the hatred of our fellow-creatures is the effect of the opposite ones. From hence arises malignity in the human heart. The seeds of malevolence may be as deeply sown in our corrupt nature, as the seeds of benevolence are in the original frame of our creation. A large portion of all the natural, as well as moral evils, which we can ascribe to any known cause, are obviously derived from our own malignity, or the malignity of other men.

Excess of good or bad spirits is some derangement of reason ; it is denominated madness when it arises to a certain pitch, and seems to become permanent or habitual. If the excess consists in exhilaration, the natural tendency of the mind to good remains, although it is generally apparent, not real, good, which is the object of pursuit. But if the excess consists in depression, we lose all appetite to good, and prefer evil, knowing it to be evil. This is the case of gloomy madness, and of all those weaknesses, depravities, or vices, which approach towards it, and sadly partake of its baneful nature.

If there were not this perversion in the human character, we could never depart from the great principles of benevolence and self-love ; we

could never torment others and ourselves for the sake of inflicting torment. We should be incapable of these sad and gloomy impressions, which occasionally attack the best men, and plunge too many miserable victims into the deepest distress. The melancholy passions are all symptoms of this disease, while apathy and indolence are in a lower degree infected by it, for under their dreadful influence we see good within our reach, which we have not the resolution to stretch forth our hands and to enjoy. In Milton, "*evil be thou my good,*" is an admirable illustration of this sad disorder. It is the wish of those who are most degenerate and depraved, if at the same time they are not wholly unenlightened. It is, therefore, as our great poet applies it, the exact characteristic of Satan himself.

We pursue evil, knowing it to be evil, when reason entirely loses its authority, if at the same time our spirits are depressed, and passion or imagination, or both combined, are the sole principles which give an impulse to our desires, and actuate our conduct.

The passions may all be analyzed into the primary ones of love and hatred; and in proportion as they arise from love, from self-love, or benevolence, rightly moderated, and well directed, they are the sources of pleasure; but when they are the effects of inordinate self-love, or excessive benevolence, or when they proceed

from hatred, either of ourselves or other men, they are the sources of pain.

The greater part of the pleasure which we enjoy, and the pain which we suffer, is to be ascribed to our passions. Reason may often be the foundation of mental pain and mental pleasure, but it is passion alone which infuses animation, which gives to pain and to pleasure their pungency and their zest. Real good, viewed as existing in a rational being, procures mental gratification when it excites esteem, and raises in us a more sublime delight when that esteem advances to veneration. The highest of all intellectual felicity is attained by those who do not confine their regard to their fellow creatures, but adore the infinite perfections of God. Religion, however, ceases to be rational, and consequently to deserve its name, whenever passion is suffered to proceed beyond the strict limits which reason has assigned. When social virtues alone are to be exercised, passion may bear a stronger sway. The esteem which reason dictates is the best foundation of love, but may be entirely absorbed by that most natural and most powerful of all our passions. From whatever cause passions arise, whether from the exercise of reason, which apprehends approaching good or evil, from ideas impressed upon the memory, from the senses, or from corporeal affections, they are accompanied with emotions, which generally are conspicuous to those with

whom we converse, but would be always felt by ourselves, if we properly attended to the operation of our own hearts.

Some passions consist in sudden emotions alone, as surprize, which is considered as a passion by some writers; and as it removes restraint, is often the proximate cause of passions; and when it does not produce them renders them more visible. Astonishment is a greater degree of surprize; admiration is identified with it, if we only admire what is rare or unexpected. Admiration excited by real excellence is not a passion, nor an emotion, but an exercise of the understanding. When a passion takes full possession of the soul, and pervades our whole nature, there is a succession of violent emotions, which every thought generates, the wildness of imagination strengthens, and all our corporeal or intellectual energies inflame. When passion is directed to a right object, is under the government of reason, and becomes habitual to us, it may be justly stiled the best affection of the mind or heart; it is the parent of friendship and of love; it is the most copious source of virtue and of happiness. When once those good affections are firmly established, and brought to their full maturity, then will arise the happy tranquillity of an innocent mind, and the secure composure of an unruffled temper.

It is not true that the bad passions, or the

sudden ebullitions of the best passions,* *maintain the balance of the mind*; but that balance is preserved, and the true *strength* and *colour* of a moral life displayed to the greatest advantage, when we have all the knowledge requisite to the discharge of our respective duties, when reason teaches us how to apply that knowledge, and when the warmest affections are actuated by the coolest judgment.

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CICERO Orat. Philip: lib. xi. sect. 3, "Ac Dolabella," to the end of the sect.; De finibus, lib. i. c. 13, "Sapientia enim est una," to the end; lib. ii. c. 8, "Is hæc loquitur," to the end; lib. iii. c. 1, "Aut pluris," to "constantiam;" c. 10, "Nec vero perturbationes," to the end; lib. v. c. 1, "Naturæ nobis," to the end; c. 10, c. 15, "Quam similitudinem," to "putandum est;" c. 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, "non perfecti," to "lætentur;" lib. iii. c. 22, "Rectius," to the end; Tusculan, lib. iii. c. 1, 2, 3, to "elaborandum," 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 34; lib. iv. c. 6 to 26, 31 to 38; De divinatione, lib. i. c. 37, to "videretur"; De senectute, c. 12; De officiis, lib. i. c. 4, "huic veri," to "contemptio"; c. 8, "Nam quicquid," to "peccetur;" c. 25, "modo ne laudarent," to the end; c. 28, "Duplex est," to the end; c. 35, "hanc naturæ," to the end; c. 38, Paradoxa, v. vi.

Seneca de Irâ, lib. i. c. 1, 3, 8, 9; lib. ii. c. 3, 5, 15, 18 to 21, 26, 35, 36; lib. iii. c. 1 to 4, 8 to 10, 32 to the end, "Circa pecuniam," &c.; De tranquillitate animi, c. 12, "Non industriâ," to "convenit;" De clementiâ, lib. i. c. 17; lib. ii. c. 4, De brevitate vitæ;

c. 6, "In primis," to "labes est;" De beatâ vitâ, c. 14.

Grotius (by Barbeyrac) Diss. prelim. par. 46. b. ii. c. 1. sect. 5. div. 1.; c. 5. sect. 12. div. 5.; c. 20. sect. 5, 29.; c. 22. sect. 2, 17.

Grotius, *Philosophorum Sententiæ*, p. 65, 250, 251, *Loix de Platon*, tome i. p. 5, 6, 8, 27, 31, 32, 34, 35, 161, 162, 194, 195, 308, 365, 366, 372, 373, 391; tome ii. p. 8 to 13, 106 to 108, 120 to 135, 203 to 205, 362, 364 to 367, 419.

Phedon de M. M. Entretien iii. p. 262, 263, 269.

Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge*, p. 28.

Waring's *Principles of Human Knowledge*, ch. on the Faculties of Man, sect. 5; ch. on Feeling throughout, p. 188 to 194.

Stillingfleet on the Sufferings of Christ, ch. 1. sect. 7.

Nicholls's *Anima Medica*, p. 14, "Ea sæpe est," &c. to p. 19; *Pensée's Philosophiques*, tom. ii. Art. ii, Pens. 14, 28; Art. iii, Pens. 8, 9, 13, 19, 21, 22, 58; Art. iv, Pens. 40 to 43; Art. vi, Pens. 45 to 56.

Newcome on our Lord's conduct, p. 370, 371.

Burges's *Sylloge*, p. 13, s. 5, 31, s. 2.

Balguy's *Appendix to his Divine Benevolence*.

Barrow's *Sermons*, vol. i. beginning of 2d and 4th Serms.; first part of the conclusion, to the 9th Serm. "In such cases," &c.; 16th Sermon, to the end of the 1st part; 19th Serm. 1st part, particularly towards the conclusion; the beginning of the 20th Serm. and 2d division of the first part; the 3d part of the 22d Serm.; the 3d, 4th and 5th divisions of the 1st part of the 26th Serm.; the 30th Serm. division 2d and 6th.

Le Nouveau Siecle, tom. ii. p. 299.

Memoirs du Jacobinism, tom. i. p. 316 to 320; tom. ii. p. 45, 46, 69 to 71.

Necker, *de la Revolution Francaise*, tom. ii. p. 35 to 43.

Lord Monboddo's *Ancient Metaphysics*, vol. v. p. 51, 52, 57, 58, 78, 156, 165 to 189, 226.

Wilberforce on Christianity, p. 100 to 107.

Whichcot's Discourses, vol. i. p. 49.

Sherlock's Discourses, vol. iv. p. 196 to 206, 220 to 223.

Balguy's Discourses, p. 7, 8.

PERIOD THE FOURTH.

SENECA de Beneficiis, lib. i. c. 10, from the beginning, to "proditores;" lib. iii. c. 3, 4. c. 28, the conclusion; lib. vi. c. 25; lib. vii. c. 3, from the beginning, to "congeras;" c. 26, "Adspice," to the end; Epist. v. "Desines, inquit," to the end; vii. x. the beginning, to "iracundiam instigat;" xi. from the beginning, to "discedunt;" xxxix, from "Habet enim hoc," to the end; xlvii, "Alius libidini servit," to the end; l. "Nemo se avarum," to the end; lvi. "Animum enim," to "onerique timentem;" lvii. "Non de me nunc tecum," to "timor spectat;" lix. "Illud præcipuè impedit," to "ex gaudio de esse;" lxiii. "Quæris unde sint lamentationes," to "quo est acrior, desinit;" lxix. "Cito rebellit affectus," to "vivendum est;" lxxiii. "Nec ullum habet malum," to "semper à fine;" lxxiv. "Inhonestæ est omnis trepidatio," to the end; lxxxiii. "Omne vitium ebrietas," to the end; lxxxv. from the beginning, to "hæc diversitas mentis;" lxxxvii. "Qui sordido vehiculo erubescit, pretioso gloriabitur;" xciv. "Inter insaniam publicam," to "manentium verba,"—"Nulla ad aures nostras," to "populis laudantibus;" xcvi. from the beginning, to "vacavit a culpâ,"—"ad deteriora faciles," to "fortuna displicuit;" cv. cxiv. "Non potest alius esse ingenio," to "legem petit;" "Rex noster est animus," to "Cessat," cxvi.

Aristotle's Ethics, (Gillies) b. i. conclusion of 13th ch. and the last note in this book; b. ii. c. 3, 5; b. iii. c. 6, 8, 10, 11, 12; b. iv. c. 3, 4, 5, 9; b. v. c. 7, from the beginning to "tyrannically;" b. vi. c. 2, 13; b. vii.

c. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10; b. x. 4, 5, 6, the beginning of ch. 9.

Aristotle's *Politics*, (Gillies) b. i. conclusion of 2d ch. vol. ii. p. 42, 82; b. ii. c. 5, p. 105; b. iii. c. 11, 12; b. iv. c. 7; b. v. c. 4, 5, 6, 7; b. vi. c. 7; b. vii. c. 2, 3, 10, "the causes of revolutions," to the end.

Lipsii *Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam, &c.* lib. iii. diss. vii; *Physiologia Stoicorum*, lib. iii. diss. xvii.

Des Cartes, *Ethica*, ch. i. sect. 2, "Voluptatum autem duo," to "pœnitentia;" ch. ii. sect. 1, 2, 3; ch. iii. sect. 1, 4.

Lord Bacon, (small fol. edit.) vol. i. p. 54, 55, "The former of these hath begotten," to "handled apart;" p. 79, 80, "to resume private," to "a question not inquired;" p. 82, "So that we are much beholden to Machiavel," to "versantur in corde ejus," 84, 85.

Harris's *Three Treatises*, (8vo. 1744) p. 86, note c. p. 96, 97, 325 to 331, (upon the Stoic apathy.)

Harris's *Hermes*, p. 57, 290, 296 to 299.

Harris's *Philosophical Arrangements*, p. 118, 172, 417 to 419, 427, 428.

Harris's *Philosophical Enquiries*, vol. i. p. 150 to 157, ch. 8, of part the second; vol. ii. p. 370 to 373, 516 to 520, 523 to 540.

Warburton's *Divine Legation*, vol. i. p. 63 to 69.

Stewart's *Elements of Philosophy*, p. 183, 184, the last paragraph of p. 403, 499 to 507.

Mitford's *History of Greece*, vol. iii. p. 68, 77, 324, 459, (the Thebans and Orchomenians,) 469, 477, 478.

Sir G. Staunton's *Embassy to China*, vol. i. p. 424, 425, 452, 453; vol. ii. p. 313 to 317, 348.

Robison's *Proof of a Conspiracy*, p. 452, 453.

Barrow's *Sermons*, vol. i. p. 437, "Do we not grossly collude with sin, when we restrain the sensual appetites of the body, but foment the soul's more unreasonable desires?"

South's *Sermons*, vol. iv. p. 101 to 110, 116 to 119.

Sanderson's Sermon's, S. ii. ad aulam, div. 4; Serm. iv. div. 13; Serm. v. div. 44; Serm. vi. div. 28; Serm. x. div. 27; Serm. xiv. div. 5; Serm. xv. div. 19; Serm. xvi. div. 17, ad magistratum, 2d part; Serm. xi. div. 18, 19, 20, 21, ad populum; Serm. iii. div. 18.

The Spectator, No. 19, 38, 54, 55, 73, 76, 86, the beginning of 90, 99, 101, 125, 128, 152, 162, 163, 164.

Thomson's Seasons, Spring, 271 to 307, 611 to 699, 763 to 835, 960 to 1109.

PERIOD THE FIFTH.

PLUTARCH'S Lives, (Eng. transl.) vol. iii. p. 271, 272.

Plato Dacier's, vol. i. p. 54, 226, N. Example of Alcibiades, 281, 282; vol. ii. p. 98.

Quintilian, lib. i. c. 3, sect. 2; lib. vi. c. 2, sect. 3; p. 376, on Homer; 380, 381, on Euripides and Menander.

Horace, lib. i. Ode 1, 8, 9, 13, 19, 22, 27, 36.

Bacon's Essays on Truth, part 1st;—Death;—Love; Boldness;—Suspicion;—Ambition, part 1st;—Anger;—Characters of Julius and Augustus Cæsar.

Spense's Republic, p. 4, 6, 7, 161 to 170, 240, 317, 318, 323 to 326, 329 to 332, 337 to 342, 357 to 362, 403, 404 to 407.

Sydenham's Meno, Arg. N. P. 175.

Burlemaqui's Natural Law, b. ii. c. xi. s. 5; vol. ii. p. 140.

Essais de Montaigne, liv. i. chap. 2, ch. 17, p. 68, 69, "Platon tarse un enfant," to "tromper;" p. 75, 149 to 152; ch. 37, beginning of ch. 38, p. 188, "Toute opinion est assez forte, pour se faire espouser au prix de la vie;" p. 190, 192, 194 to 200; ch. 43, p. 243, "Nos forces," to "fort mal;" liv. ii. ch. i. p. 304, 356, 358, 259, 367, 394 to 397, (on the passions of brutes,) 413 to 418, 470, 473, 482, 488 to 492, 499, 517 to 519, 541

to 543, 591, 607, 608, 613 to 616, 634, 637, 644, 648, 652, 682, 700, "c'est la Crainte," &c. 711, "Ils attisent
"la Guerre," &c. 743, 747, 748, 750 to 756, 760, 764, 784, 785, 795, 797, 798, 828, 835, 943, 980.

Charron de la Sagesse, p. 16 to 20, 40, 43 to 51, 149 to 152, 156 to 170, 178, 180 to 201; liv. i. ch. 44, from the end of 405 to 408, 672, 673.

Grove's Morals, part ii. ch. 7, sect. 2, 3, 15, 16, 19, 20; ch. 8, sect. 3, 10, 11, 17 to 20; ch. 9 throughout; sect. 3, ch. 4; sect. 2, 4.

Grove's Works, vol. iv. p. 65.

Cogan on the Passions, p. 6 to 12, 23 to 52, 73 to 116, 146 to 151, 161, 164 to 177, 184, 188, 191, 194, 202, 223 to 226, 244 to 251, 259, 260, 262, 263, 269, 282 to 299, 301, 307.

Bp. Taylor's Ductor Dubitantium; vol. ii. p. 481, 516.

Mede's Works, p. 129, 188.

Raleigh, Sir W. History of the World, b. iv. p. 293, 319, 320; b. v. ch. 2, sec. 2, p. 321, 322, 325, 326, 327, 358, 397, 398, 466 to 471, 501, 610, 620, 653, 666, 667, the conclusion of the whole work.

Bp. Taylor's Sermons; Serm. v. p. 59 to 62; Serm. viii. div. 1. p. 94, p. 98 to the end; Serm. xiv. last division, p. 181, 182.

Whichcot's Discourses, vol. iii. p. 260, 261, 265, 333, 334; vol. iv. p. 207.

Barrow's Sermons, vol. iii. p. 124, 125, 153, 187, 188, 198, 309, 310, 317, 318, 321, 327 to 332.

South's Sermons, vol. i. p. 6 to 12, 443, 444, 449, 453, 454; vol. ii. p. 192 to 200, 225 to 228, 336, 337, 364 to 367, 382; vol. iv. p. 30, 31; vol. iii. p. 67, 68.

Grove's Sermons, vol. ii. p. 7.

Spectator, No. 219, 224, 226, 229, 231.

Dryden, (Malone's) vol. ii. p. 269, 270, 284 to 289, 296, 309 to 312, 404.

PERIOD THE SIXTH.

HORATII Carminum, lib. ii. ode 10, 11; lib. iii. ode 27, v. 34 to 64, ode 28; lib. iv. ode 1, 4 to v. 32; lib. v. conclusion of 2d ode; ode 7, v. 10 to 16; Satirarum, lib. i. sat. i. to v. 76, 92 to the end; sat. iv. v. 25 to 33; lib. ii. sat. ii. v. 23 to 36; sat. iii. v. 46 to 60, 91 to 102, 108, 224 to 287; sat. vi. to v. 19; sat. vii. v. 6 to 82.

Terentii Hcaut. A. i. sc. 2. "Verum ubi animus," &c.

Olivet's Thoughts of Cicero, p. 51, 52.

Locke's Essay, b. ii. ch. 10. sect. 7, ch. 21. sect. 69, ch. 33; b. iv. ch. 20, sect. 11, 12, 18; Locke's Conduct of the Human Understanding, sect. 44.

Watt's Logick, p. i. ch. 6, sect. 12; p. ii. ch. 3, sect. 3, div. 3 to 6.

Bp. Taylor's Ductor Dubitantium, b. i. ch. 4, rule 4, sect. 5; b. ii. ch. 3, rule 7, sect. 8; rule 16, sec. 18; b. iv. ch. 1, rule 7, sect. 2.

Hutcheson, Moral Philosophy, b. i. ch. 1, sect. 7; ch. 2, sect. 4, 13; ch. 3, sect. 2, 4, 5; ch. 5, sect. 2, 3; ch. 6, sect. 3, 4; ch. 8, sect. 3, 6 to 9; b. ii. ch. 9, the conclusion of the 5th sect. ch. 10, the last division.

Hutcheson's Six Letters, p. 17, 18, 40 to 55, 60 to 63.

Hutcheson's Inquiry concerning Beauty, sec. 1. div. 15; sect. 8. div. 1.; do. concerning Moral Good and Evil, sect. 4, div. 4; sect. 5, div. 8.

Monboddo's Origin of Language, vol. i. p. 177, note from the Philebus of Plato, p. 396, 397, 451 to 454, 462, 463; vol. iii. p. 8, 124, 301 to 304, 446, 447; vol. vi. p. 82 to 86, 365 to 372.

Symes's Embassy to Ava, p. 329, 330.

Le Comte de Valmont, tom. i. p. 228 to 231.

Scott's Christian Life, part ii. vol. i. chap. 1, sect. 2, div. 3; vol. iii. p. 331, 378; vol. iv. 175 to 179; vol. v. p. 400.

Bentley's Sermons, p. 31, 32.

South's Sermon's, vol. iv. p. 39, 101 to 105, 106, 338, 390 to 392, 418, 437 to 444, 445 to 458, 512 to 524; vol. v. p. 13, 14, 26 to 31, 420 to 435, 550; vol. vi. p. 4, 5, 6, 9, 45, 46, 98 to 103, 112 to 115, 347, 348, 350, 443 to 450.

Spectator, No. 170, 171, 377.

Spencer's Works, vol. vi. p. 1555 to 1560, and 1577 to 1581, 1653.

PERIOD THE SEVENTH.

Μενανδρῆς λειψανα, —εκ των ἀδελφῶν, ιβ', —ιγ', —ιδ', —ιε'. Εκ τῆς Ανδρίας, ἀ, θ', ιγ', ιδ'. Εκ των ἀνεψίων, δ. Εκ των ἀφροδισίων, ἀ, β'. Εκ τῆς Εὐκλειδίδε, ἀ. Εκ των ἐπίρεποντων, δ'. Εκ τῆς Ηρώος, ἀ. Εκ τῆς Θεσαυρῆ, β'. Εκ τῆς Μισογυνε, ιβ'. Εκ τῆς Ναυκλήρῆ, ἀ. Εκ των ὀμοπαίριων, ἀ. [Εκ τῆς παρακαλάθητις, γ'. Εκ τῆς Ψευδοπρακλέε, β'. Εξ ἀδῆλων δραματῶν, μθ', ν', νὰ, νβ', ρτ', ρλς', ρμὰ, ρξέ, ρξτ', ρξζ'.

Φιλεμονοῦ λειψανα, εκ των ἀδῆλων δραματίων, ζ', ις', μδ', με, μς', ν', ξε'.

Xenophon, Απομνημ. β. α'. κεφ. β'. κβ'. β. β'. κεφ. Α'. α', β', γ', δ', ε', ς'. β. γ'. κεφ. γ'. ιβ'. ιγ'. ιδ'. κεφ. ε', ς', η'. κεφ. θ'. ζ', η', κεφ. ι, η'. κεφ. ια. β', γ', ι, ια, ιβ', ιγ', ιδ', β. δ'. κεφ. α, γ', δ'.

Grotii excerptæ, ex Æschylo, p. 15, fr. εἰως το χρεων— from αὐθαδία το δένει; p. 23, from τραχὺς το κακά; p. 25, from φίλοι το τυχῆς; p. 31, fr. παυροίς το γενεῖ; p. 43, fr. καὶ παρθενῶν το νικῶμενο; p. 57, fr. Θάρσει, πόνε το χρόνον; p. 181, fr. παλαί το εχει; p. 183, fr. εἰπερ το χρεων; 205, fr. χρη το θεε; 207, 208, fr. Τροίξηνια το γραμματῆ; 231, fr. το γαρ το δακρυ; 233, fr. Γυναικοῦ το κατθανεῖν; 247, from το γαρ το παθο; 251, fr. Απώλεσας το ταδε; 259, 261, fr. Ἐλπίς το πολιν; 269, fr. Πάρι το θωπευμαία; 285, fr. Ὅι δυστυχεῖς το Ευ— fr. φίλα το ηκει; 299, fr. αἰς ἡδὺ το εχει; 301, fr. Αὐτῆ μεν το κλυδων—fr. Ἦν ε το βροίοι; 307, 309, fr. κακείνο το εἰ; 311, fr. Οργας το εροίοι; 323, fr. πρῶτον το κακά; 327, Κερδοῦ το κακά; 333, fr. Ἀλλ' αἰδεμεθα το μονο; 337, Ου ταυτον το Ορωμενων; 357, fr. Γυναικεῖς το φίλαι; 395, fr. πασα το παθει; 401, fr Μυσικῆν το πρι; 429, Σπουδαζομεν το ειδότες—fr. Αἰδοῦ το πεδαίς. Εχ

Sophocle, p. 81, fr. εἶδεν γὰρ τὸ εἶδεναι; 83, fr. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ σωτηρίας; 91, fr. Ἐρως τὸ μεμνηνεν; 101, fr. Θυμὸς τὸ θάνατον; 109, 111, fr. τὸ γὰρ νεάζον τὸ φοβούμεν; 113, fr. ὡς σκόλω τὸ πρῶτῃ; 147, fr. Ὀργὴ τὸ ἀμείλυνεται. Ex tragicis qui perierunt, 437, 439, πρὸς τὸ τέτραχορδον τὸ κέαρ; 441, καὶ θνητοῖσι τὸ ἀμπελον; 455, fr. Θυμὸς τὸ μετοικισσας; 459, τὸ συγγενες γὰρ καὶ φθονεῖν ἐπιστάλαι; 461, fr. πημά τὸ ηρεθίσμενον; 463, fr. Μισοῖς τὸ ατιμιαν—fr. Δεινὸν γε ταυλον τὸ εἶναι; 465, fr. Δημοσ τὸ καλεπιεν; 467, fr. Ἀργὸς τὸ τις ἦ—fr. Ὅι γὰρ περα τὸ μισῶσι.

Epicurus's Morals, max. 14, 15.

Aristotelis, Metaphysica, τὸ Δ. κεφ. α.

Spense's Republic of Plato, p. 4, 14, 15, 168 to 172, 317, 325 to 343, 364 to 369, 404 to 409.

Scott's Elements of Philosophy, p. 248 to 255.

Stewart's Elements of Philosophy, p. 510 to 535.

Trembley, sur le Principe, &c. 64, 65, 307, 308.

Dunbar's Essays, 20, 21, 56, 68 to 71, 84, 85, 218, 349 to 353, N. D. p. 159, 411 to 417.

Hutcheson's Thoughts on Laughter, throughout.

Paley's Natural Theology, p. 484.

Watt's Improvement of the Mind, pt. i. ch. v. sect. 7, 8; ch. xv. sect. 6; chap. xx. sect. 20.

Hartley on Man, vol. i. p. 65, 368 to 372, (excepting the will) 390 to 398, 414, 428 to 432, 435, 436; vol. ii. p. 291, 320.

Whitby's Necessity of the Christian Revelation, p. 253 to 266.

Hale's Origination of Mankind, p. 46, 47.

Lucas on Happiness, vol. i. p. 143 to 146; vol. ii. 5, quotation from Apuleius, 31, 43 to 48, 170, 171, 181, 182.

Protestant System, vol. i. p. 131, 308 to 310, 472.

Wollaston's Relig. of Nature, sect. vi. div. 17; sect. vii. div. 3, par. 1; sect. ix. div. 3, par. 3.

Campbell on Virtue, p. 26 to 31.

Ward on the Law of Nations, vol. i. p. 75 to 86, 241, 242; vol. ii. 155 to 158.

King's Origin of Evil, ch. v. sect. 1, sub. 5, appendix ; sect. 2, div. 10, 11, 12, 14.

Tillotson's Sermons, (12mo.) vol. ix. p. 65, 70, 95 to 97, 131 to 134; vol. xi. p. 78, 94, 95; vol. xii. p. 137, 138, 187, 189, 190.

Arthur's Discourses, 350, 351, 356, 383.

Reynolds's Discourses, p. 78, 79, 146, 147, 167, 261, 270, 299.

Sprat's Sermons, p. 153.

Sherlock on Providence, p. 80, 81.

Clarke's Sermons, vol. vii. p. 121 to 128; vol. viii. p. 214, 215, 220; vol. ix. p. 239 to 245, 298 to 302; vol. x. p. 25.

Bp. Taylor's Polemical Discourses, p. 870, 871.

Bp. Patrick's Pilgrim, p. 67, 74 to 78, 180, 181, 324, 379, 380, 381, 382.

Hoadley's Sermons, vol. i. p. 6 to 13, 346, 347, 399 to 401, 438 to 448; vol. ii. p. 60 to 63, 69, 254 to 261, 300 to 303, 377 to 380.

Spectator, No. 250, 252, 255, 256, 438.

Commines, liv. vii. c. 2. p. 205, jamais homme cruel ne fut hardi.

PERIOD THE EIGHTH.

SALLUSTIUS, *περι Θεων και κοσμου*; κεφ. η', from *Εστιν αρα ψυχη το Κακιαν ποιει*.

Cicero, ad Herennium, lib. i. s. 4, "exordiorum duo," to "deprimemus;" De inventione, lib. ii. cap. 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 2d par.; Cicero de Officiis, lib. 1. cap. 8.

Puffendorf. de Officio præf. sect. vi; sect. xii. with note 34; sect. xii. xiv. with note 36; cap. iii. sect. iv. v. vi.; cap. v. sect. xi. n. 3, div. 5; lib. ii. cap. i. sect. ix. xi.; cap. ii. sect. xi.; cap. viii.; cap. xvi. sect. iv.

Grotii Excerpta, p. 747 and 755.

Ασθησιαν εχει τιν, ο σκληρος βιος.

Ανοητος ευτελης υπερβολη ο δ' ασωλος πολυλελης.

Limburchi Theologia, lib. ii. cap. xiv. sect. 1; cap. xx. first paragraph of sect. 25; lib. iii. cap. iii. sect. 4; cap. iv. sect. 22; cap. vi. sect. 2; lib. v. cap. xv. sect. 15; cap. xxxvii. sect. 2, 21; cap. xlv. sect. 4; cap. liv. sect. 20.

Cogan's Ethical Treatise on the Passions, preface from vi. to x. Treatise p. 6 to 24, 35, 42 to 49, 54, 55 59 to 70, 204, 205, 276 to 279, 290 to 296, 312 to 315, 406, 407, 423 to the end.

Burnett's Lactantius, p. 11.

Kirwan's Metaphysical Essays, vol. i. p. 153 to 155.

Kirwan's Logick, vol. i. dis. 473, 645.

Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, vol. i. p. 28 to 32, 50 to 55, 74 to 81, 155, 173 to 190, 214, 260 to 266, 273, 274, 280 to 283; vol. ii. p. 183, 188 to 190, 195, 196.

Priestley's Heathen Philosophy, p. 175.

Enfield's History of Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 552, 553.

Douglas's Criterion, p. 150 to 171.

Fiddes on Morality, ch. xii. sect. 5 to 8, 14 to 17.

Sir W. Temple's Works, vol. i. p. 235, 243.

More's Antidote against Atheism, b. ii. ch. xii. sect. 11, 12.

More on Enthusiasm, sect. 59, 60; on the Immortality of the Soul, b. ii. ch. 15, sect. 11; b. iii. ch. i. sect. 10.

Bacon's Essay's, of Revenge; of Love; of great place (the beginning); of Boldness; of Goodness; of Ambition (the beginning); of Anger; of the vicissitudes of things; "but to leave these points," to "bitterness."

Lowth's Lectures, (translated by Gregory) vol. i. p. 8 to 23, 35, 36, 307 to 310, 365 to the end, *i. e.* the whole of Lecture 17; vol. ii. p. 126, 202, 424 to 429.

Memoirs of Lord Kames, vol. i. p. 279, 281, 284, 299 to 308, Appendix, p. 98, 99; vol. ii. p. 35.

Protestant System, vol. i. p. 524, 525; vol. ii. p. 279, 280, 369, 525, 540, 541.

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ESSAY III.

ON FREE AGENCY.

I HAVE shown the nature of reason and of passion, which are essential to man, and the great ruling principles of his life.

It is impossible to conceive either reason or passion without agency, for although passion is a sufferance, yet through suffering it excites to action. Agency implies free agency, for we must either be the prime movers of our action, or we must be only acted upon, in which case we are merely instruments of some other being, which is the real agent. There can be no degrees of agency ; for we must either act for ourselves, or be entirely subservient to another's will. The power which enables us to act, is susceptible of an infinite gradation, from the least conceivable power, which is sufficient to produce agency, to Omnipotence. Human agency is manifested in actions, words, and thoughts. Actions display our power over the material world, and in the first place over our own bodies. When a criminal is dragged to execution he exerts no power himself, he is no agent, but as strictly an instrument, as if he were a mass of inanimate matter ; but the minister of justice, who drags him to execution, is an agent, whatever motive

operates upon his mind. Motives are so far from destroying agency, that they appear as necessary to it, as the laws of mechanism are to the motions of the corporeal world. These motives may be so powerful as to preclude all resistance ; but they do not for that reason preclude agency. No ; they constitute it. The non-agency of the criminal dragged to execution is equally distinguishable from the agency of the minister of justice, whether the latter acts from the most absolute compulsion operating upon the mind, or from the most voluntary zeal in the public service. When a man is an instrument, he is subdued by external force. When he is an agent, he is actuated by motives, which may excite him to action as cogently as any external force, or may be so weak in themselves, and so countervailed by other motives, as to leave him a large scope of choice. But it is not in this scope of choice that free agency consists, which equally belongs to an intelligent, or to a self-motive, being, if conscious of his own self-direction, whether he is governed by reason, passion, or caprice, or by any combination, which they, in their various ramifications, may produce. I shall illustrate this position by examples. If I am upon the edge of a precipice, and that precipice is the Tarpeian rock, from whence I am hurled down by the command of the Roman senate, I am no agent, but a passive sufferer. I fall, upon the same mechanical principle as a stone would fall, and am dashed to pieces ac-

ording to the texture of my frame. If in a fit of despair I throw myself down the precipice, I am the agent, and the author of my own destruction. The sad impulse in the state of my mind, may be as irresistible as the force applied in the former instance, but it is not inconsistent with free agency, because it proceeds from internal feelings, however incompatible it may be with reason or natural passion. If I have that self direction which belongs to a rational creature, or if the sad irregularity of my propensities is restrained by principle, I shall walk with care by the edge of the precipice, and earnestly endeavour to prevent the fatal fall. In this conduct I shall have as little choice as in the two former instances, but I shall be perfectly free, and I may be exercising my freedom in the best manner, by exerting all my faculties to subdue passion, and to act right. But the man who is most exempt from temptation, has the same liberty as one who struggles with it, and who is so happy as to obtain an entire victory over it. No agency belongs to a man who is under the power of another, as far as that power extends ; but agency belongs to a man who is governed by himself alone, whether, having the use of reason, he always applies it to the best purposes, or abuses it to the worst ; whether reason or passion has the power over him, whether he yields willingly to the dominion of reason, or passion, or whether there is a perpetual conflict between them.

External circumstances do not affect free agency; when they operate upon the mind, they can only affect it by depriving the body of its active powers. A prisoner may be plunged into a dungeon, or he may have the advantage of air and exercise within the walls which confine him. In the last case he is capable of more corporeal exertion, than in the former; but in both cases the impatience of restraint is the same. If he is a prisoner upon *parole*, honour must oblige him, and prudence may induce him, to remain a prisoner; but he has the same free agency, as if he were wholly unrestrained; for while he is influenced by honour or prudence, all his restraints arise from himself, from his own mind, his own principles. It will be said, that actual liberty is very different, if we feel ourselves in a situation which enables us to act, or forbear to act, by our own uninfluenced choice; or if we feel ourselves under those restraints, which religion, morals, honour, prudence, or passion of any kind impose upon us. How can any of these considerations impose restraints upon us, except by the influence they have over our minds or hearts? And how can this influence operate, except by our own free agency? If we have no motive to guide us, how can we be agents, how can we act at all? If we have what is called a liberty of indifference, the choice we make becomes a motive, and we shall act upon a motive, although it is a motive not suggested by reason or passion, but by mere

caprice. Although our agency remains the same, our power is indeed diminished by the prevalence which any one motive may obtain. The least degree of understanding will deprive us of the power of committing a great absurdity. The higher we ascend in the intellectual scale, the more incapable we shall become of acting wrong; but we shall not therefore have less liberty to act right.

On the other hand, the prevalence of passion will overpower the finest understanding, and pervert the best principles; and the more we yield to this fatal delusion, the more we shall be carried away by the foaming torrent, and the more impossible we shall find it to resist its inundating force; but though our power to act right will be lamentably destroyed, yet we shall not be less free in acting wrong, or less responsible for our own voluntary depravity. Motives are equally compatible with liberty, whether they appear at the moment to issue from the most unaccountable determination, or are the result of reason, mature deliberation, knowledge, habit, or inveterate passion. From some or all of these principles arises every motive to a virtuous or to a vicious action, and, upon these accounts are the actions good or evil. The mere power of acting or forbearing to act is a natural perfection, but there is no moral good or evil in it, abstractedly from the motives, which incite our conduct. It is therefore very immaterial to the moral philosopher, whether liberty of indif-

ference shall be asserted or denied, because wisdom and virtue must arise from a prevailing motive. We are justly convinced, that we are free beings, because we are conscious that we can do as we please ; but in what consists doing as we please, if it does not consist in acting according to that motive which is most agreeable to our inclinations ? Our happiness, in an enlarged and true estimation of it, arises from doing as we please, that is, from the exercise and enjoyment of liberty, when our desires are regulated by the best principles, and directed to the best objects ; but immediate gratification is obtained from doing as we please at the moment, however depraved or irrational our inclination may be. Liberty is so congenial to our feelings, that every diminution of power appears a grievance, although there is no diminution of agency. We are therefore impatient under the restraints of discipline or education from our earliest infancy, and, at a mature age, under those of prudence, law, or religion, until our minds become conformable to them, and we really wish from our hearts to be wise and good.

The restraints which sickness or poverty imposes are of a different kind, for these are diminutions of our power operating by external force ; but the pain we suffer from them is mitigated in proportion as we reconcile ourselves, by our own voluntary exertions, to the irremediable calamity.

The power, which enables any created being

to exercise its free agency, must be limited. It depends upon the degree of understanding and knowledge, which the free agent possesses, and upon the external circumstances in which he is placed. As the understanding and knowledge, which a reflecting and enlightened man possesses, are capable of increase by his own exertions during the whole course of a healthy life, his degree of power depends in some measure upon himself; nor is he quite passive with respect to external circumstances, for they very often arise from his own industry or wisdom.

It is said, that we must be actuated by the strongest motive. It is not, however, the strongest motive in itself which actuates a weak or vicious being. For the strongest motive in itself is the wisest and best motive, and that is the motive which does not prevail in an imperfect nature. The strongest, and therefore the most prevalent motive in Man is, that which at the moment most engages his affections, or appears most reasonable to his dispassionate judgment; in one word, that which constitutes his will.

If free agency consists in acting agreeably to our will, or as we will, it consists in being actuated by that, which is, at the time we act, our strongest motive.

It is said, that since every thing must have a cause, this motive must derive the power it has over us, its strength, and its very existence, from some cause without the mind, and that from another, and so on *ad infinitum*; but as it is a con-

tradition to suppose an infinite series of dependent beings, there must be some independent being, and this being must necessarily have a principle of acting, for no being can be independent, unless it derives its powers from itself, and is a prime mover. To be free, to have a principle of acting, to be a prime mover, are identical. Liberty therefore is not impossible, but must necessarily exist somewhere. Does it subsist in the Creator alone? It implies no contradiction to suppose, that the creator should communicate it to the creature, therefore this communication is within the compass of Almighty Power. It appears most congruous to the moral attributes of God, that he should communicate it, when a creature, devoid of liberty, can neither be wise or virtuous, is equally incapable of being beneficial to his fellow-creature, or of praising and obeying his Creator.

The question however is, whether God has actually conferred liberty upon a created being. It is reasonable to suppose, that this estimable blessing is conferred upon every intelligent creature; nor is it possible to conceive the existence of intelligence without liberty, or liberty without intelligence. Spontaneity implies both liberty and intelligence; in the case of man, we can prove both his intelligence, and his freedom, by consciousness. If we attempt any other proof, we shall be bewildered in an intricate maze of subtlety. How can we argue in support of intelligence, but by exercising that intelli-

gence? consequently, by supposing the existence of it, which is the very point we are endeavouring to prove, if intelligence is inseparable from liberty, the same consciousness which proves one, must equally demonstrate the other.

It will be said, that consciousness may deceive us, and be the parent of vulgar errors, in the same manner as we are deceived by the apparent motion of the sun, and many other delusions of sense; but it is from the apparent motion of the sun, that the astronomer discovers the real motion of the earth. It is the exercise of the understanding, which corrects the delusions of sense, and avails itself of them to establish important truths. In the case of intelligence or liberty, for I cannot separate them, the more we reflect, that is, the more conscious we are, and the farther we investigate our mental powers, the more shall we find, that we are rational beings, capable of wisdom, and that we are free beings, capable of being trained to virtue. If we never attempt to separate intelligence from liberty, we shall be more convinced, that we are free as well as rational beings. From whence does our intelligence arise? the proximate cause is some idea involuntarily obtruding itself upon our minds, or some object of sense. But if we refuse to dwell upon the idea, or the sensation, it will be hardly perceptible, and flee from us, leaving little or no impression. The human will must be exercised before we fall into a train of thought, and this exercise must be continued

during the whole progress of it, whether it be the reveries of the idle, or the study of the industrious, whether it is a fond imagination, or a deep research, whether it is the flight of the poet, or the contemplation of the philosopher. The human will must be exercised, before a sensation affords more than momentary pleasure or pain. If we are only at the instant affected, we have no more sensation than belongs to animal life. The understanding is as dormant as the will. As rational beings, we have the power of anticipating sensations, of dwelling upon them, of pursuing the long investigations to which they lead, and of recalling them to our remembrance at a considerable distance of time. But we cannot exercise this power of the understanding without the concurrence of the will. The more the understanding shall be exercised, the more actively shall our will be employed.

When in a subject of abstract speculation, many modes of ratiocination, many distinct arguments present themselves to our mind, it is the will, enlightened by the understanding, which discriminates them, and leads us to select the best. When we are called upon to act, and a variety of motives begin to operate, it is the will which determines which motive shall prevail. The greater the perplexity, the more conscious we may become of the power of the will, because the doubts we feel, the difficulties we encounter, agitate our spirits, and, by withdrawing us from external objects, render us

more sensible of what passes in the recesses of our hearts ; but if we know ourselves, and accurately trace the causes of our conduct, we shall find our will equally powerful when actuated by a single motive, as when governed by a combination of them, or by one which after a long struggle obtains the victory. When a ruling passion, which is become habitual to us, impels us with irresistible fury, shall we not be convinced, if the violence of the storm allows us a moment of reflection, that all our faculties are hurried away by the impetuosity of the torrent, and that our will is as deeply, but more violently and obstinately engaged, than it would be in the perplexing resolution of doubts, or the calm pursuits of tranquil meditation? The intelligent being which always acts right from the purest motives, and is above all temptation to act wrong, is risen to the summit of moral liberty. The man who is proof against many temptations, and is so happy as to resist them all, if this perfect being can be conceived in human shape, is more morally free than any other man. On the other hand, the man who is the most abandoned slave to sin, is entirely deprived of moral liberty. The degrees of moral liberty, between these two descriptions of men, are innumerable ; but all men, from the best to the worst, are equally endowed with physical liberty. It is the abuse of this physical liberty, which has sunk the latter into the lowest state of moral slavery. It is the right use of it which

has exalted the former to the height they have happily obtained of moral liberty.

Upon the whole, we know from experience, that, when we associate ourselves with our fellow men, we may speak, or we may forbear to speak ; when opportunities for action present themselves, we may act, or forbear to act, and in the choice of these alternatives we are governed by the prevailing motive.

The more rational we are in our principles and our conduct, the more will that prevailing motive arise from reason ; but whether it arises from reason, passion, habit, or erroneous opinion, it depends upon the actual state of our minds at the time we think, speak, or act. The actual state of our minds depends upon our voluntary exertion, at the present, or at some preceding time, in the regulation of our thoughts. A total inability to regulate them would be absolute distraction. Free agency, therefore, and intellect, are either identically the same, or inseparably connected. This is the solid ground, upon which we should defend physical liberty. It applies equally to God, and man, to the most perfect, and the most imperfect, intellect.

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 Grove's Ethics, p. 2. c. 3; p. 2, sect. 8, 9; c. 3, p. 4, sect. 5.
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 Barrow's Sermons, vol. iii. p. 207.
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 Monboddo's Origin of Language, vol. i. p. 408, 417, 458, 459; vol. ii. p. 2.
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 Locke's Conduct of the Understanding, sect. 44.
 Watts's Logick, p. 11, introduction; essays, xii. sect. 5.
 Beattie on Truth, p. 2, ch. 2, s. 3.
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 Maxwell's Cumberland, introduct. 91 to 111; main work, p. 108, 109, 183; on Practical Propositions, 194, 195, 202.

Lee's Anti-Scepticism, b. ii. ch. 21. sect. 3, 12; ch. 22, s. 3.

Egaremens de l'Esprit, vol. i. p. 41 to 43, 151, 356 to 359, 438 to 441.

Bp. Taylor's Ductor Dubitantium, b. i. ch. i. rule i. sect. 14; ch. iv. rule 5, sec. 3; rule 6, sect. 1, 2, 3; b. iii. ch. 4, rule 1, sect. 7; b. iv. ch. i. rule 1 throughout; rule 3, sect. 1.

Conybeare, (Bp.) on Revealed Religion, p. 376.

Scott's Christian Life (12mo.) vol. i. p. 181, 182, 292, 293; vol. iii. p. 198; vol. iv. p. 117, 123, 184 to 186, 250 to 253, 256, 257.

Tillotson's Sermons (12mo.) vol. ii. p. 190; vol. v. p. 241; vol. vii. p. 384, 385; vol. viii. p. 183, 202.

Bentley's Sermons, p. 78.

South's Sermons, vol. iv. p. 339, 340; vol. v. p. 220, 221; vol. vi. p. 306.

PERIOD THE SEVENTH.

Μενανδρου Λειψανα, εκ της κνιδιας α, with the note.

Φιλεμονος Λειψανα, εκ των αδηλων δραματων ε'.

Xenophon, Απομν. β. α, κεφ. β. ιθ', κα—κ. γ'.

Aristotle's Metaphysics, το Δ. α, η δε ε καλα προαιρεσιν κινειται τα κινεμενα.—διὸ η δε φυσις αρχη, και το σοιχειον, και διανοια, και η προαιρεσις. β.—οιον ο βελευσας αιλιος. Ε. Αναγκαιον, &c. το λογισμον. ια, fr. τα δε καλα δυναμιν το αρχη.

Grotii Excerpta, p. 357. fr. Αργος το πονε; 429. fr. Αιδε; το πεδοι; 97, ex Sophocle, fr. Ηνεγκον το εδεν; 133, fr. Ουκ εστι το τυχη; 147, fr. Ουδε θεοι; το αρχην; Ex tragicis qui perierunt, 437, fr. και μην το προσγινηται; Ex tragicis incertis, 459, fr. Επιπερ το χαριν.

Spens's Republic of Plato, p. 127, 128.

King's Origin of Evil, ch. i. sect. 3, par. 7, the conclusion of r. d. at the end of sect. 3; ch. v. sect. i. sub. 1, 2, 3, 4, without the notes, and sect. ii, sect. v, sub. 2, div. 6, sub. 4, div. 9, 10, 11, sub. 6, div. 6.

Stewart's Elements of Philosophy, p. 106 to 132, 146, 147, 331 to 336, 343, 571, 577.

Scott's Elements of Philosophy, p. 242, 256 to 268, 352, to 355.

Duncan's Logic, b. i. ch. 4 the beginning, and sect. 1, div. 14.

Paley's Natural Theology, ch. v. div. 5, p. 175, 220.

Elemens de Metaphysique, p. 54, 251 to 253.

Bp. Taylor on Original Sin, p. 66, 67, the whole of sect. v. 79; his farther explication of Orig. Sin, sect. iii. on Sins of Infirmity, sect. vii. div. 10.

Pluche's History of the Heavens, vol. ii. p. 21, 127 to 129.

The Protestant System, vol. i. p. 8 to 12, 218, 258, 259.

Bossuet's Variations (Eng. transl.) vol. ii. p. 323, 333, 334, 478 to 482.

Knight on Taste, p. 136 to 146.

Wollaston's Religion of Nature, sect. iv. p. 100, 107; sect. ix. div. 5.

Hartley on Man, vol. i. p. 105, 108, 177 to 179, 211, 256 to 263; vol. ii. p. 53 to 55, 422, 423, 431.

Whitby's Necessity of the Christian Revelation, p. 113 to 125.

Dunbar's Essays, p. 10, 280, 293, 373, 374, 378, 379.

Trembley sur le Principe, &c. p. 93, 94.

Warburton's Divine Legation, vol. i. 64.

Hale's Origination of Mankind, p. 3, 28 to 31, 58 to 60.

Bp. Wilkins on Prayer, p. 7.

Lucas on Happiness, vol. i. p. 9, 10, 133 to 138; vol. ii. 52, 76, 118 to 149, 153 to 158, 183, 184; vol. iii. p. 206 to 216.

Sherlock on Providence, p. 66 to 68, 95.

Reynolds's Discourses, p. 245.

Bp. Taylor's Polemical Discourses, 874, 875.

Patrick's Pilgrim, p. 356, 358.

Tillotson's Sermons, (12mo.) vol. ix. p. 99, 100, 153 to 155, 164, 165, 167 to 170, 222, 234, 239; vol. xi. p. 196 to 203.

Clarke's Sermons, vol. ii. p. 276 to 278, 290 to 293, 298; vol. iii. p. 7 to 21, 71 to 74, 107 to 114, 203; vol. vii. p. 3 to 15; vol. viii. p. 3, 4, 21, 119, 217 to 222; vol. ix. p. 164, 224, &c. 447; vol. x. p. 297.

Spectator, No. 438, Description of the D. of M. as I suppose, "one of the greatest souls," &c.

PERIOD THE EIGHTH.

CICERO de Inventione, lib. ii. sect. 33, par. i, sect. 57.

Grotius, *Ordinum Hollandiæ Pietas*, p. 107, *μονον θελησον, και θεος προ απαντων*; (Basil) *ὁ δε εληων βελομενον ελκει*; (Chrysostom), *Liberum arbitrium est facultas homines applicandi se in Gratiam*; (Melancthon citans Veteres), *De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra. cap. 5. sect. i. "est imperare voluntatis."*

Puffendorf de Officio, &c. lib. i. c. i. sect. ix. cum notis, sect. x. &c. ad xviii. lib. ii. cap. v. sect. iv.

Grotius, *Le Clerc's*, p. 76, (n. a.) 83, (n. b.) 140, 186.

Epistola H. Mori ad V. C. sect. 5, fr. "Postremo" to "movendi;" sect. 18, *Des Cartes's Maxim*, "liberum nostrum arbitrium nos Deo quodammodo æquiparare."

More on Enthusiasm, sect. 67. More on the Immortality of the Soul, b. ii. ch. 2, sect. 11, 12; ch. 3; ch. 5, sect. 6.

Limborchi *Theologia*, lib. ii. cap. 9, sect. 1, 8; cap. 12, sect. 14, 22, 32; cap. xv. sect. 8; cap. xviii. sect. 13, 14, 21, 27; cap. xx. sect. 8; cap. xxiii. throughout, with some exceptions; cap. xxvii. sect. 18; cap. xxix. sect. 5, 11; lib. iv. cap. ix. sect. 2; cap. x. sect. 3; cap. xiii. 16 to 19, 22; cap. xiv. sect. 5, 6, 8; lib. v.

cap. ix. sect. 23; cap. xi.; cap. xii. s. 6; cap. xvi. sect. 4; cap. xxxv. sect. 13; cap. lxx. sect. 4.

Le Clerc, upon the Choice of Religious Opinions, b. i. s. 8.

Enfield's History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 252, 253; vol. ii. p. 173, 174, 176.

Lowth's Lectures, translated by Gregory, vol. i. p. 347.

The Protestant System, vol. ii. p. 17, 18, 57, 61, 62, 537, 538, 540, 541.

Cogan's Ethical Treatise on the Passions, p. 218 to 236, 254, 339 to 341, 477 to 481.

Budæus, 668, 743.

Memoirs of Lord Kames, vol. i. Appendix, p. 41 to 46, 66.

Kirwan's Logick, vol. i. div. 243, 656 to 663. vol. ii. div. 693 to 696, 717 to 723, 805 2d paragraph, 844, 848 2d par.

Kirwan's Metaphysical Essays, vol. i. p. 60, 70 to 75, 79, 87 to 96, 152 to 159, 162, 168 to 170, 394, 395.

Bp. Taylor on Repentance, ch. i. sect. 2, div. 34; ch. v. s. i. div. 3; s. 3, div. 4, 20; sect. v. div. 52, 55; ch. vi. sect. 5, throughout; sect. 7, div. 88, 89, 90; ch. vii. sect. 3, throughout; sect. 5, 18, 19; ch. viii. sect. 7, div. 52, 62, 63; Polemical Discourses, p. 870, 871, 874, 875, 912.

Abp. Newcome's N. T. Note on Ephesians, vi. 12.

Reimarns on Natural Religion, p. 300, 301, 313, 314.

Knight on the Being and Attributes, p. 71, 72, 166, 167, 172, n. t. 189, 229, 232.

Fiddes on Morality, ch. ix. sect. 18; ch. xv. sect. 8; ch. xvii. sect. 6, 7.

Lord Bacon's Essays, the beginning of that on Truth.—Upon Marriage, "But the most ordinary" to "Shackles."—Of great place, from the beginning to "commanding ground."

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- Bp. Newton's Works, vol. iii. p. 216, 251, 275.
 Jortin's Remarks on Ecclesiastical History, vol. i.
 p. 262. Sermons, vol. i. p. 199.
 Horbery's Sermons, p. 162 to 168, 174, 175.
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 238, 524 to 543; b. viii. 333 to 336, 635 to 643; b. ix.
 349 to 356; b. x. 9 to 16, 43 to 47; b. xii. 79 to 104,
 524 to 530.

 PERIOD THE NINTH.

- EPICURETUS, (Stanhope's) p. 8 to 36, 156 to 159, 214,
 215, 226 to 231, 257.
 Cudworth's Intellectual System, ch. i. sect. 4, 27;
 ch. iii. sect. 33, 34, par. 2; ch. iv. sect. 36, par. 28 to
 31; ch. v. p. 851, 852.
 Butler's Analogy, p. 129 to 133, 340 to 342.
 Price's Morals, p. 305 to 309, 317, 318, 360, 403,
 422, 432.
 Lord Kames's History of Man, vol. i p. 217, 218;
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 Dunbar on Mankind, p. 354 to 361, 379, 391.
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 to 60, 122, 152 to 156, 225, 233, 234, 314, 315, 330;
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 to 43.
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 35.
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 Petitpierre, plan de Dieu, p. 89.
 Sir J. Davies on the Soul, sect. 27.
 Buffier's First Truths, p. 37 to 40, 121 to 125, 215 to 229, 278 to 282, 283 to 302, 405, 406, 407.
 Leland's Deistical Writers, vol. i. p. 252 to 256, 279; vol. ii. p. 228, 229, 351, 352.
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 Baxter on the Soul, vol. i. p. 176, 431; vol. ii. p. 13, 14, 27, 100. On the Immortality of the Soul, p. 94 to 97.
 Jortin's Life of Erasmus, vol. i. p. 120, 121, 334 to 336, 431; vol. ii. 269 to 273.
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 De Stael, de l'Allemagne, tom. iii. p. 324, 325.
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 Cogan on the Passions, vol. i. p. 264, 265.
 Price's Morals, p. 305 to 310, 357, 358, 360.
 Scott's Christian Life, (fol.) p. 69, 70.
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 Bp. Watson's Tracts, vol. vi. p. 158; vol. iii. p. 476.
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Smalridge's Sermons, p. 154.

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Calamy's Sermons, p. 359.

Grove's Posthumous Sermons, vol. i. p. 42 to 46.

PERIOD THE ELEVENTH.

JEREMIAH iii. v. 21 to the end; iv. 1, 2; vii. 3; xiii. 10, 11, 16, 23; note in S. B.; xviii. 7 to 10; notes in S. B. 11, 12, 13; xxv. 3 to 8; xxvi. 13; xxxvi. 3.—Hosea xi. 4.

Matt. iv. 7; note 2d S. B.—John vi. 37 to 45, with notes S. B.; ix. 31.—Acts xvi. 14, with note S. B.; xxvii. 31; note in S. B.—Romans ii. 8; note 3d S. B.—James i. 13, 14; note S. B.; iv. 8; note in S. B.—I Pet. i. 22; note in S. B.; ii. 8; note in S. B.—II Pet. i. 10; note in S. B.;—I John ii. 2; note 6th S. B.—I Tim. i. 12, 13; notes S. B.—Rev. xxii. 11.

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ESSAY IV.

ON SOCIETY.

HAVING considered man as a rational being, as subject to passions, and as a free agent, I shall no longer investigate his character as an individual, but view him in the relation which he bears to his own kind, as a member of society.

Modern philosophers have supposed society to be the result of human wisdom, or artificial contrivance fabricated by man, for his own protection, convenience, or gratification, to supply all his wants, to indulge all his appetites, and to exalt his nature by all the powers of civilization. This hypothesis is equally inconsistent with history and experience.

There is no reason to suppose, that man ever did exist in an insulated state, and there is abundant proof of the extreme improbability, if not impossibility, of such a state. There are no savages so barbarous, as not to assemble in herds, or form themselves into tribes ; they are as truly members of society as the inhabitants of the most polished countries. The solitary hermit expects to be visited in his cell, and retires from the world in hopes of attracting admiration.

The absolute dereliction of all social inter-

course, and of all regard to the opinion or concerns of mankind, would amount to a dereliction of reason. When we speak of the understanding, the passions, or free agency of man, we exclude from our observations the idiot and the lunatic; and we equally exclude the solitary hermit or savage, if, in the strictest sense of the term, *solitary*, such a being should be found. Man is so helpless a creature, when he comes into this world, that he could not live a day without a mother or a nurse. The mother or the nurse could not be supplied with food for themselves, nor for the infant, when it requires more than they can administer, unless there was a father, who could contribute to their wants, or some member of society, who would act from motives of compassion, as a father. If we treat man merely as an animal, there is no animal which so long requires the fostering care of parents, or of those who will discharge the duties, which parents may unnaturally neglect, or be obliged, by cruel necessity, to abandon. If the great founder of the Roman empire were nursed by a she wolf, the she wolf herself became a partaker of human society, when she was the nurse of man.

That we all sprung from one pair, is a fundamental article of Christian faith. It is likewise a Pagan tradition; and if history afforded no light to guide us, it would be the most probable hypothesis which a philosopher could frame. Man, therefore, was created to be a member of society, although that society consisted only of two per-

sons ; for the creation of Eve immediately succeeded the creation of Adam. When the first pair had offspring, the sphere of society was enlarged, and gradually widened, until it comprehended a larger compass than the necessities of a simple age required, than could be conveniently accommodated, wisely regulated, or comfortably enjoyed. From hence divisions took place, divisions to which man would have been obliged, in his most virtuous state, but which the malevolent passions prematurely created, and multiplied to an extravagant excess. From these malignant sources arose wars between distinct societies, which were now become different nations ; and the sense of common danger incorporated each society more closely within itself, and more firmly rivetted in each individual a mutual attachment. Society, therefore, originally arose from the relations which marriage produced, from parental love, from filial piety, from conjugal affection, from fraternal feelings, and all the amiable sensations which consanguinity inspires. All these sentiments, the wise and benevolent Creator deeply implanted in the human heart, and gave them, at the first dawn of reason, ample scope for unremitting exercise. Our internal frame of mind was so constituted, as to render us dependent upon society for all our intellectual pleasures, and mental improvements ; while our external situation obliged us to seek the protection of society in our own defence against absolute want,

and every surrounding danger. If we consider ourselves as sentient beings, society is essential to our enjoyment ; if we consider ourselves as rational beings, society is necessary to our education, and to every exercise of our understanding. If we view our external situation, society is equally necessary to procure us every adventitious advantage, and to secure all the acquisitions we have made, all the blessings, which a gracious Providence has showered upon us.

We are attached to society, not only from these internal feelings and external advantages, but from every laudable principle. We are endowed with the power of speaking, and have a peculiar delight in communicating our sentiments to other men, and receiving from them the information they can give us.

We have not only the faculties of speech, but several other modes of expression. There is no passion which is not conveyed by the sudden transformation of the features, the eyes, the voice, and various gestures, as well as words. All these are natural instruments, which we have a strong native desire to employ, and it is by social intercourse alone that employment is found for them. We are conscious of our own individual power, which we are eager to exercise by exerting our influence over our fellow-men ; we delight their imaginations by poetry, we acquire an ascendancy over their understanding by persuasion, we inflame their passions by eloquence. From hence arises a new attachment

to society; we feel a strong predilection for individuals, when we find them of similar dispositions to ourselves, devoted to the same pleasures, engaged in the same pursuits, easily wrought upon by our arguments, or able to fascinate us by their own oratory. By these means particular friendships take place, and a new division of society is created, by combining persons who have a similitude in politics or in religion.

It must be remembered, that whatever is a cause of union is likewise a source of discord. If human nature were quite perfect, the original society, begun by our first parents, would subsist until it become so numerous as to render separation necessary. But whenever any virtue is misapplied, or carried to excess, or whenever any vice, or corruption, or malevolent passion prevails, there is an adventitious cause for separation, and society is split into innumerable fraternities, producing, in some cases, migrations, new settlements, or divisions of old nations; and in other cases, denominations of men separated from each other by their principles or prejudices, although incorporated into the general mass of one community. These associations are always inimical to the public tranquillity, and lay the foundation of civil wars, if they do not immediately produce them. All voluntary fraternities are dangerous; they lead to idleness, vice, and neglect of duty. When formed with the best apparent views, and perhaps with the

pursest intentions, to promote charity, morals, or religion, they are too often seminaries of enthusiasm, pride, sedition, and hypocrisy. An ecclesiastic community, if independent of the civil power, has been justly reprobated as a most dangerous anomaly in a state.

However large an extent is given by the legislature to toleration, it is indispensably necessary for government to preclude secret confederacies. But if the mischiefs which these self-instituted societies have a tendency to create, can be effectually suppressed, and the worst of their passions calmed, I acknowledge that they ought not to be discouraged, for they may promote the greatest good. Ferguson* maintains, that "*the rivalship of separate communities, and the agitations of a free people, are the principles of political life, and the school of men.*"

Almost every virtue, and every vice, as well as every quality of an indifferent nature in man, leads him to society, which is the strongest proof that Providence has designed him for it. Hatred of solitude discovers itself in the earliest infancy, and generally continues till extreme old age, unless disease overpowers the mind, or dejection, arising from other causes, renders us incapable of social enjoyment.

Whether our pursuit is business, study, or pleasure, whether we are employed in daily labour, or in anxious schemes of uncertain profit,

* Ferguson's Essay upon the History of Civil Society, p. 93.

we seek for companions in our exertions, however selfish our views may be, and even though retirement may appear more adapted to them. Idleness, and every species of dissipation, leads us into society. Vanity is a most prevailing motive. Our interest is generally promoted by it.

The most valuable affections of the heart lead to friendship, nor is the judgment ever more usefully exercised, than when friendship is founded upon a well-placed esteem. While our most virtuous sentiments lead us to society, it is society which affords the opportunity of carrying every beneficent scheme into effect.

Society may be confined to two individuals, as in the cases of marriage, love, and friendship, or it may be extended to our acquaintance, our neighbourhood, the community, or the nation, to which we belong; to the church of Christ in all nations, to the whole body of mankind, to past, as well as present ages, and to posterity. The advantages of it are not to be measured by its extent. A well selected acquaintance is preferable to a more general one, if we do not suffer narrow prejudices to interfere with the candour and benevolence which is due to all mankind. By aiming at too enlarged a sphere of benevolence, we may neglect those duties, which we are most called upon to perform; we may sacrifice our patriotism to a mistaken notion of humanity. But there are occasions, when no limit should be set to human exertions. Opportunities may arise, when the able writer may hope to instruct

the latest posterity ; or when the zealous propagator of the christian faith may spread to the most distant regions, the bright beams of sacred truth. The great exaltation of human nature which has arisen from society, has not been the work of one nation, nor of one age ; but has been, with some retrograde movements, progressive from the earliest ages of the world. The general knowledge diffused over the earth is much greater now than in the most splendid periods of Greece and Rome, or of Europe in later times. It is to the civilization of every learned nation, and of every enlightened age, that we owe the present height which science has reached.

As learning involves all ages, so commerce extends itself to all nations. The meanest cottager in England enjoys in his tea, sugar and bread, the produce of three quarters of the globe. But commerce has far nobler objects, than the indulgence of a pampered appetite. By the intercourse which she alone produces among mankind, she renders us acquainted with human nature, in all its various forms ; she enlarges our knowledge of all the works of God, excites our compassion, animates our benevolence, affords a variety of new relations with their correspondent duties, which it calls upon us to discharge.

The view which we are now enabled to take of human nature, is a very enlarged one. We see man descended from Adam and Eve after their expulsion from Paradise, and from eight

persons after the Deluge, exhibiting every diversity which can be conceived, yet retaining marks of one common nature; the same depraved passions, the same consciousness of superiority over the rest of the visible world, the same love of society and dependence upon it. We may discern in the lowest degradation of men some glimmering of intelligence; and whenever there is the least exercise of understanding, there is a sense of right and wrong, a dread of some invisible power, a faint notion of a future state. There is, therefore, a principle which unites in one social band all the sons of Adam. All our contemporaries are connected with us by commerce and navigation. All ages by the art of writing. The art of writing is as much improved by the invention of printing, as navigation is by the discovery of the magnetic needle; how amazingly have these two productions of the fifteenth century extended human society and enlarged our knowledge, and our means of beneficence! how many new duties have they required us to perform!

The advantages of society in its more confined sphere, as they respect a particular division of it, whether a family or a state, are education, instruction, government, and public worship.

While society is confined to one family, the parents ought to attend to the corporal wants of their children, to form their minds, discipline their tempers, regulate their passions, restrain

their vices, cultivate all their good dispositions, and implant the principles of virtue.

Whatever they know themselves, they may communicate, instruction may be imparted at all ages; and many of the duties of the parent, may be performed by the elder branches of the family, when they grow up, until they have a progeny of their own, which engrosses their whole care. This was probably the origin of government, which was not an usurpation of the tyrant, nor the formal agreement of the multitude, nor the immediate designation of God; but was so far of divine authority, that it proceeded from that frame of being, which God had given to man, and from the external circumstances in which he had placed him. Society was, by the divine appointment, made necessary to man, and government is essential to society, and inseparable from it. Government alone can secure all the rights of man by just and equal laws, can provide for the due execution of those laws, and can frame a system, which, as far as human wisdom can foresee, will infallibly preserve the spirit of them. It is the establishment of this system, which distinguishes a free from an arbitrary government. That state is not theoretically free, which has not wise and just laws. That state is not practically free, where wise and just laws are not duly executed. Nor is there freedom, although the laws are most perfect, and the administration of them the most

excellent, unless there is some security for their permanence. It is in this security that liberty consists. The greater the security is, the greater degree of liberty will any nation enjoy, the laws being considered as the same in all essential points.

The preservation of personal liberty is the first object of government, that of property the second. Property is acquired by the cultivation of land. Whatever land a man has first occupied, and rendered fertile, belongs to him.

Government requires a division of society into different ranks. This is not an artificial division. It arises first from nature, in the subjection of the child to the parent, of the wife to the husband, of the younger to the elder branches of a family, of the ignorant to the instructed, of the weak in mind or body to the more wise or the more robust.

In the progress of society, especially when the young were to assist the infirmities of the aged, the healthy to nurse the sick, when some were to labour, and others were to direct how that labour was to be performed, terrible disputes upon these subjects would arise, if there were not a power in government to assign to each man his own work, and to determine the various orders which discriminate society. These orders become more numerous as civilization is more advanced. In this country, twelve orders may be enumerated, though it may be difficult to settle the precedence in several cases: 1. The

king.—2. The royal family.—3. The nobility, which I should confine to those persons who have an hereditary seat in the house of lords.—4. The gentry, under which description I include all persons who have no emolument in view, to the exclusion of all those who are obliged to make profit the immediate object of their pursuit.—5. Those who serve the state in the most honourable employments, depending upon those employments, in a great measure, for their support. This order includes the greater part of persons in the army, the navy, or civil departments, though there are many of the nobility and gentry, who, from the most patriotic and honourable motives, are engaged in the same line of life.—6. The learned professions.—7. Men of capital, engaged in commerce.—8. Artists.—9. Master-workmen, or men of skill in mechanics, manufactures, or retail trades.—10. Farmers.—11. Day-labourers, or mere manufacturers.—12. Beggars, and all persons who subsist, without work, by dishonourable means. These last are certainly the lowest of mankind, however we may class the rest; and every man rises in the real scale of subordination in proportion as his mind is cultivated, his sentiments liberal, his spirit noble, his views disinterested, and he has a heart so animated for the public good, so warm in the cause of his country, that he would devote all his mental powers, and all his corporal strength, in peace and war, to her service; that to her he would

sacrifice every private desire, every personal consideration, and wish for no other pecuniary reward, than such as would enable him to be most actively useful. Every virtuous employment is apparently advantageous to mankind ; but however admirable the division of labour may be, the respective gradations of society, from the highest to the lowest, will produce pernicious effects, if there is not a wise and good spirit of patriotism pervading the whole community.

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“it is of no use, after procuring the means of living.”

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Pisonem, sect. 10, “Tu etiam,” to the end; sect. 11,
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XENOPHON, *Απομ.* Β. β. κεφ. γ' throughout; κεφ. δ' throughout; κεφ. ε'—ε—κα. κγ', κδ', κε, λα; κεφ. κ. ζ', ιγ', ιδ'; κεφ. η, ς'. β. γ'; κεφ. β' throughout; κεφ. γ'. η. θ', ια; κεφ. θ'. ι, ια, ιε, β. δ'; κεφ. δ'. ιβ', ιγ', ιδ', ιε, ιη; κεφ. ζ. α, β, γ; *Apologia κ'.*

Grotii excerpta, ex Euripide, p. 173, *εικότως*, &c. *Δεινον* το *αει*; p. 233, *τοιμίον* το *θελει*; p. 245, το *συγγενες* το *φιλει*; p. 249, *Σοφον* το *δεδοικεναι*; p. 257, 259, *ουδεν* το *νυμφευείαι*; p. 269, *Ἡδίστος* το *κραινοι*—Ω *δυσπαλαισίον* το *νεοις*; p. 273, *Συνσωφρονειν* το *σοννοσειν*; p. 291, *Ειθ'* το *καλως*; p. 295, *τριβων* το *ωφελδι*; p. 311, *χρησίοισι* το *δεσπότων*; p. 317, 319, *Ου γαρ* το *πεισομαι*; p. 321, *Εμοι* το *δοκνήτων*; p. 333, *τρεις ευγενεις* το *οι πενοι*—Γνοιη το *ευγενεις*; 335, 337, *Ἵπερβαλλισας* το *εχοιμαν*; 403, *Ην χρονος* το *εξαμαρτανοι*. Ex Sophocle, p. 73, *χρην* το *πολυ*; 87, *Ουίω* το *εστανοι*; 87, 89, *Εν τοις* το *πειθαρχια*. Ex incertis tragicis, p. 465, *Μηδεποτε* το *βροτοις*; 465, 467, *Ου χρυσος* το *νοησις*. Ex Æschylo, p. 17, 19, *πειθαρχια* το *λογος*; p. 29, *Γυναικα* το *δυσφροσιν*.

Μενανδρος λειψανα, εκ των αδελφων, γ', ς'; εκ της *βοιωτίας* α; εκ της *γεωργας*, α, with the notes; εκ της *Θρασυλεονίος* α; εξ *αδηλων δραματων*, θ', ς', ιθ', ρ', ρξ', σνξ'; *φιλεμονος λειψανα*, εκ των *αδηλων δραματων*, πα, πδ'.

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Jortin's Sermons, vol. i. p. 15 to 19, 46 to 49, 69, 114 to 116, 119; vol. ii. p. 304 to 308.

Milton's Paradise Lost, (Newton's edit.) b. iv. 750 to 770; b. viii. 379 to 451; b. xii. 22 to 39, 64 to 71, 79 to 104.

PERIOD THE NINTH.

CICERO, de Finibus, lib. ii. cap. 14, " Qui auctoritatem minimam habet, maximam Vim, *populus*;" " Eademque ratio," to " relinquatur," lib. iii. cap. 19, 20.

Juvenal, (Gifford's) p. 265, note, 462.

Epictetus, (Stanhope's) p. 242 to 250, 252 to 263, 322, 328, 329, 357.

Brown's Religio Medici, part ii. sect. 3.

Cudworth's Intellectual System, ch. v. p. 890 to 898.

Life of Knox (M'Cries) vol. i. p. 181, 182.

Inquiry concerning Virtue and Happiness, p. 163 to 166.

Cogan's Theological Disquisitions, p. 106 to 110.

Butler's Analogy, p. 70 to 79.

Magee on Atonement, vol. ii. p. 60, note; 68, note.

Lord Kames's History of Man, vol. i. p. 281, 282, 302, 386, 410 to 419; vol. ii. p. 3, 4, 18 to 22, 35 to 50, 66, 69 to 80, 90, 91, 108, 128 to 132, 189 to 191, 192, 233, 242, 245, 295, 336 to 338, 375, 386, 387, 388; vol. iii. p. 129, 130, 157 to 161.

Dunbar's History of Mankind, p. 17, 48 to 53, 127, 128, 149, 150, 159 to 200, 235 to 237, 257 to 263, 420 to 456.

Domat's Treatise of Laws, ch. ii. sect. 2, 3; ch. iii. sect. 2, 3, 4; ch. iv. sect. 4; ch. v. sect. 10; ch. x. sect. 1 to 10; ch. xi. sect. 17, 39.

Domat's Civil Laws, vol. ii. p. 638, 639, 642, 643.

Ferguson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 152 to 156, 195 to 202, 218, 244, 245, 262 to 270; vol. ii. p. 55, 56, 180, 232, 233, 240 to 247, 250 to 252, 255, 256, 260, 273, 276, 278, 291, 292, 309, 349, 379 to 381, 430, 436, 457 to 466, 470, 477, 479 to 481, 494, 503, 509 to 512.

Smalridge's Sermons, p. 289, 290, 407, 448, 486, 487, 490 to 492, 498, 533.

Barrow's Sermons, vol. i. p. 114 to 116, 129, 130, 342, 362, 363, 373, 388, 399, 400, 406, 407, 416, 443, 444.

Hill's Lectures, p. 245, 246.

Abernethy's Sermons, vol. i. p. 211, 212; vol. ii. 228 to 232, 379, 380.

Grove's Posthumous Sermons, vol. i. p. 387 to 392.

Bp. Horseley's Sermons, vol. iii. p. 100 to 102, 280 to 283, 290, 291.

PERIOD THE TENTH.

XENOPHONTIS Anab. (edit. Hutchinson) b. i. p. 96,
*Ωστε φαινεσθαι τας μεν αγαθας ευδαιμονεσίδους, τους δε κακας
 δελας τελων αξισθαι.*

Cicero, de Legibus, lib. i. c. 9, 10, 11; de Officiis,
 lib. i. c. 4, 7, 11, 13, 16, 17, 25, 28, 31, 32, 38, 41 to
 45; lib. ii. cap. 3 to 5, 21, "Hanc enim," to "quære-
 "bant;" 22, from "Nullum," to "continentiâ."

From Jortin's Life of Erasmus, vol. i. p. 195, 514.

Erasmi Enchiridion, opiniones Christiano dignæ;
 Lex te punit, si quid alieni sustuleris, non puniet si
 tuum fratre egente subtraxevis? At utrumque puniet
 Christus; "Nihil prohibet in obeundo principatu," to
 "se cogitet esse, non dominum."

Locke on Civil Government, ch. vi.; ch. vii. sect.
 89 to 91; ch. viii. sect. 95 to 97, 107, 110; ch. ix.;
 ch. xi. sect. 135 to 138; ch. xiii. sect. 149, 151, 155;
 ch. xiv. sect. 163; ch. xv. sect. 170, 172; ch. xvi. sect.
 175, 176, 181 to 183, 186, 192; ch. xviii. sect. 202 to
 204, 209; ch. xix. sect. 211, 220, 223, 226 to 228, 239,
 240, 243.

Ferguson on Civil Society, p. 6 to 15, 93 to 98, 110,
 111, 129, 151 to 160, 187, 214, 231 to 233, 238, 239,
 254 to 256, 261, 277 to 280, 320, 338, 339, 353, 373,
 374, 404 to 418.

Cogan on the Passions, vol. i. p. 131, 221 to 226;
 vol. ii. p. 20, 56 to 59, 76 to 81, 89 to 98.

Gisborne's Familiar Survey of the Christian Religion,
 p. 252 to 255.

Gisborne's Principles of Moral Philosophy, p. 76
 to 81, 163 to 168, 231 to 307.

Stewart's Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. ii.
 p. 449 to 452.

Mrs. Cockburne's Works, vol. ii. p. 98, 99, 149 to
 152.

Stewart's outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 68 to 74,

96 to 90, 318. Supplement to Encyclopædia Britannica, vol. i. p. 47, 55 to 58, 129 to 147.

Sykes on Natural and Revealed Religion, p. 413, 420 to 422.

Paley's Moral Philosophy, p. 133 to 139, 159 to 178, 190, 122 to 208, 241 to 267, 294 to 296, 301 to 303, 355, 399 to 407, 441 to 448, 456 to 462, 470, 503 to 506, 524, 525, 535, 536 to 538, 615 to 618, 648 to the end.

Bacon's Essays, vol. i. p. 58; Essay 14th, p. 82 to 93, 128, 129.

Butler's Analogy, p. 73, 75, 76.

Leland's Deistical Writers, vol. i. p. 123 to 125.

Eloge de Montesquieu, xxii. to xxvii. xlv. xlvii.

Analyse de l'Esprit des Loix, par d'Alembert, lviii. lix. lxiv. to lxix.

Petitpierre, Plan de Dieu, p. 336, 337.

De Stael, de l'Allemagne, tom. iii. p. 120, 121.

Buffier's First Truths, p. 363 to 370.

Millot, Elemens d'Histoire Moderne, tom. i. p. 94, 95, 214, 215, 234, 235, 281, 282, 300, 301, 316 to 319; tom. iii. 121 to 125, 138, 344, 345, 400, 401; tom. iv. p. 18, 19, 63, 213, 223, 225, 232, 233, 293, 294; tom. v. 55 to 60, 170.

De Thou, (French translation, 4to.) tom. i. p. 331.

Taylor's Comment on Romans, p. 252, 253.

Smalridge's Sermons, p. 259.

Scott's Christian Life, (fol. 1729) p. 53, 54.

Barrow's Treatise on the Pope's Supremacy, p. 38 to 41, 130, 131, 132, 191; Sermons, vol. i. p. 44; ii. 102.

Life of Ridley, p. 102 to 104, 186, 313.

Sumner's Records of the Creation, vol. ii. p. 46 to 53, 151 to 164.

Abernethy's Sermons, vol. i. p. 301.

Chalmer's Discourses, p. 56 to 60.

PERIOD THE ELEVENTH.

PROVERBS xxiv. 11, 12.—Ecclesiastes iv. 8 to 13.—
Zechariah viii. 16, 17, 19.

Acts xiv. 23 ; note in S. B.—II Thess. iii. 7, 9, 10 ;
notes in S. B.—I Tim. iii. 2 ; notes in S. B. vi. 1—6 ;
notes in S. B.—Heb. x. 25 ; S. B.—I Pet. ii. 18 ;
notes in S. B.

Phileleutherus Lipsiensis, p. 157, 158.

Barrow's Sermons on the Creed, vol. ii. p. 102.

J. H. Browne, De animi immortalitate, lib. ii. 188
to 199.

ESSAY V.

ON MORAL OBLIGATION.

A SUBJECT of moral obligation is one, who can distinguish right from wrong, and can act agreeably to that distinction.

Such a person complies with all the claims which moral obligation demands from him, when from a sense alone of his duty, as a moral agent, a duty, well understood, and accurately ascertained, he acts, or forbears to act, he pursues, or he avoids, he places himself in a certain situation, determines upon some line of conduct, suppresses one train of thought, encourages another, regulates a third, and having an alternative, is guided in his choice by true principle, with regard to his external conduct, and the internal operations of his mind*.

Moral is wholly distinct from physical obligation, and bears no analogy to it. When we are

* It is from the understanding alone that a sense of moral obligation can arise. Some moralists have derived it from the good affections; but how are the good affections to be distinguished from the bad, without a previous sense of moral obligation? How are the affections to be properly moderated, or rightly directed? How are the passions to be exterminated in some cases, diminished in others, and regulated in all? How are these cases to be distinguished, without a strong impression of duty to guide our paths?

physically obliged, we cannot be morally obliged. The inanimate parts of nature, the vegetable, and the animal, as far as unconscious instinct prevails, are governed by physical obligation. So is man, with respect to those subjects where he has no free agency.

We cannot separate, even in idea, the three characteristics of our intellectual nature, reason, liberty, and the sense of moral obligation. Where there is reason, there must be ideas; there cannot be intellect without objects upon which it may be constantly exercised, for it is an active power. These objects are truth and falsehood, right and wrong. Right and wrong are truth and falsehood applied to morals. The intellect discerns truth from falsehood, right from wrong, when the subject is fairly and fully presented to its view, with the same certainty as the eye distinguishes light from darkness, or the taste discriminates sweet from bitter.

When the understanding discerns right from wrong, and we are conscious of our liberty to do what is right, and to forbear what is wrong, we must have a sense of moral obligation. We cannot know what is right without being sensible that we ought to act according to our knowledge.

If we had neither good affections, nor bad passions, and were free from all temptation to vice, we should infallibly and invariably perform our duty from the sole operation of our intellectual nature.

Reason would teach us our duty, liberty would enable us, and moral obligation would compel us, without any invasion of our liberty, to perform it; for our will would be in constant conformity to the law of perfect rectitude.

This is the highest idea we can frame of goodness and of wisdom, as far as it regards morality. In a perfect nature, moral obligation operates as powerfully as physical obligation, but operates upon different principles. The knowledge of what is right, and the determination of the will to act accordingly, are inseparable from a perfect nature; the departure from these principles in so exalted a being would be impossible in itself—a contradiction in terms. Although moral obligation is inseparable from intellect, we do not apply the term, except to an intellectual being in a state of trial: where there is an obligation to act right, but a possibility of acting wrong.

Our internal and external temptations are so formidable, that powerful motives for virtue must be awakened in us before we can hope to act right. These motives are drawn from religion, benevolence, honour, decency, reputation, and prudence. But these motives are not to be confounded with the original principle of moral obligation, any more than the means by which we acquire knowledge, are to be identified with knowledge itself. No motive could impel us to the performance of duty, unless we had previously an idea of duty, that is, a sense of moral

obligation. The absence of any one of these motives, or of all of them, if that were possible, would not justify us in the violation of a duty, which we are conscious that we ought to perform. An atheist is not excluded from moral obligation, although a christian has not only more motives to duty, but has higher duties to discharge. Moral obligation is the essential foundation of religion, and of all the other motives I have enumerated, as far as they are principles of virtue. It is moral obligation which creates our duty to God, to our fellow-creatures, and to ourselves. How can a created being, destitute of all sense of moral obligation, be obliged to obey his creator? He would be obliged, and not obliged, which is a contradiction in terms. Almighty power cannot reconcile a contradiction. God cannot create a being which shall be at the same time, and in the same respect, rational and irrational. Yet this he must have done, if he has made that right which reason convinces us is wrong, or that wrong, which reason convinces us is right. He cannot make the same proposition true and false, the same action right and wrong; consequently he cannot change truth to falsehood, right to wrong. The very notion of God implies the necessary, essential, eternal, and immutable difference between good and evil. When we say, that God is wise, just, and good, we must suppose that the difference between wisdom and folly, moral good and moral evil, is as eternal and unalterable as the divine nature

itself. Moral obligation is a principle so simple, it is so original and uncompounded an idea, that whatever illustration we use may be apt to lead us from the true definition of it. It cannot be denied, that every rational being has a sense of right and wrong; and that it is right for the rational part of the creation to govern the irrational. It cannot be denied, that we have reason, accompanied with various other faculties; and that it is right that the faculties unendowed with reason, should be subject to the rational faculty; that what Milton says of corporal strength, is true of all faculties *unendowed* with reason,—

————— not made to rule,
But to subserve, where Wisdom bears command*.

The more we advance in reason and knowledge, the more we shall understand wherein our duty consists, and be enabled, upon every emergency, to act the right part. The first principle of duty is the most simple and clear which can present itself to the mind; the application of this principle to particular cases may require the most enlarged views of all our relations to God and man, and the most accurate discernment of all circumstances which ought to influence our conduct. It may require all the knowledge which God has graciously bestowed upon us by the light of Revelation, or enabled us to acquire by the due exercise of our understanding. It may therefore involve the most complex ideas.

* Sampson Agonistes, lines 56, 57.

All the knowledge we can attain of religion, or philosophy, of abstract ideas, or of facts, is applied to its best use, when it directs us to our duty, and excites us to the most judicious and active performance of it.

The obligation of gratitude, like that of piety, is derived from moral obligation, but is very distinct from it, arising from the best affections of the heart, rather than the judgment of the mind; and, as far as it is connected with the understanding, being an application of our sense of duty to a particular case, a case often very complicated, and depending upon a great variety of facts and circumstances.

The more rational we are, and the more we exercise our reason, the stronger will our sense of moral obligation become; but the difference of our understandings, whether arising from birth, climate, education, or personal culture, is more conspicuous in the application of this principle, than in the strength of the principle itself, which may be very firm and powerful when it is lamentably misapplied.

The bigotted supporters of tyranny and superstition, the factious, the rebellious, or the enthusiastical, are fully convinced that they are acting right, although their sense of rectitude displays itself in the most flagrant offences against society, and in the commission of the most horrid crimes.

Our ideas are enlarged, raised, and improved, diversified and indefinitely augmented, by example, authority, education, society, and habit,

by all our commerce with books or the world; but they are likewise narrowed, depressed, confused, and sadly degraded by the same causes.

The most powerful adversary to true moral theory, is immoral practice.*

The principal source of error is the depravity of mankind. What contributes more to wickedness of every description, what encourages more the perpetration of every crime, than bad example, the authority of the tyrannical, corrupt education, licentious associates, and the habitual indulgence of bad passions? If there is no species or degree of iniquity which may not originate from any of these causes, or be aggravated by them all, it is not wonderful that they should have the same tendency to produce those moral delusions, by which, imposing upon ourselves and other men, we substitute wrong for right, through a voluntary perversion of our own understanding.

* Yet immoral practice does not so far obliterate all the traces of rectitude in the mind, as to render us insensible of the remorse of conscience. Nor do all the arts we employ to allay the pangs of reflection, all the flattering unctions we lay to our souls, how ever fatally they may operate upon ourselves, prevent our viewing our own sins in a true light, when we see them committed by other men, when we have been unhappily successful in persuading ourselves that we are innocent of any particular sin, although deeply guilty. This will be the very sin against which we are most inexorable, when the crime is not our own. "*As the Lord liveth*" (says David, in the beautiful parable of Nathan,) "*the man that has done this thing shall surely die.*"

I am convinced that the misapplication of the great discriminating principle, which distinguishes right from wrong, has arisen entirely from the fatal effects of these moral delusions, unless where the understanding itself is inevitably depressed, by climate, slavery, or a savage life.

The variety of notions which has unfortunately affected moral subjects, is to be imputed to these causes, unless where the diversity is more apparent than real; which may often be the case, for the same invariable rule of moral conduct may produce different actions, when the peculiarities of an age, a country, or a government, require it.

If it be true that there is scarcely a single vice, which in some age or nation has not been countenanced by public opinion, it is still more clear, that the grossest errors, in philosophy, in religion, in government, or in political economy, have very frequently prevailed. If we are to reject moral obligation upon this ground, we must deny the sufficiency of reason to teach us any science, or to direct our steps in the prudential conduct of life.

This is an argument which would lead us to universal scepticism; but as it is possible to be mistaken in our reasoning, so it is possible to avoid mistakes; and there is no species of knowledge more solid and substantial, there is no species of truth more generally acknowledged,

than moral truth.* Wherever there is to be discovered the least spark of intellectual light, there likewise is to be traced a proportionable sense of virtue in speculation, and some conformity to it in practice.

If it were true that in some age or country in the world every vice has been countenanced by public opinion, it would not follow, that the distinction between right and wrong has not prevailed as universally, as the distinction between truth and falsehood. Wherever there appears the smallest glimmering of human reason, some facts, and probably some opinions, are considered as true, and some as false; and whenever there is this degree of discernment, I contend, that there is a similar knowledge of the distinction between right and wrong.

The facts indeed may be all false, which men, in the darkest state of the human mind, deem true. Whatever they think right may be wrong; but the power of discriminating right from wrong is manifested, although in the exercise of that power the grossest ignorance or depra-

* Sincerity and disinterestedness are the most universal characteristics of virtue. Is there any nation or age in which they are not approved and esteemed? Do not men of all descriptions pretend to them? The vicious assume that external garb of disinterestedness, which is suitable to the virtuous alone, and which they becomingly wear. And why do they assume it? Because they are conscious to themselves, that they ought to be disinterested, and they know that private regards, which interfere with social duties, are considered by all mankind as destructive of true worth, shameful, and dishonourable.

vity should be displayed. Whenever the human understanding is exercised, by an individual, a collective number, a country, or an age, it cannot proceed beyond certain limits. It must be restrained by all the disadvantages which belong to its external situation. Those disadvantages may be so great as entirely to preclude the light of truth ; but, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that, as far as reason can be exercised, right and wrong, in all important instances, are distinguished ; and that our intellectual faculties are of a very large extent, formed for making great and wonderful discoveries, and capable of being for ever enlarged and improved. We may therefore readily suppose, that human reason, assisted by revelation, and by the divine grace, may discover every moral and religious truth, may teach us our duty, and enable us to perform it.

We may imagine one description of mankind to be plunged into inevitable darkness, and others to be the dupes of their own voluntary ignorance, while those to whom the Gospel is taught in its purity, and who gladly receive the sacred word, have a sure light to guide their paths. They are, more fully than any other men, convinced of the immutable distinction between right and wrong, and never err in the speculative application of it, however lamentably their violent passions, or bad habits, may betray them to act contrary to what they know is right.

The more perfect we are, the more shall we

be actuated by a pure sense of rectitude or moral obligation. The more perfect we are, the more deeply will that sense of rectitude be impressed upon our minds, the more accurate and the more enlarged will be our ideas of virtue.

On the contrary, as we grow more depraved, the more insensible we become of these moral obligations which ought to influence our minds, and to fashion all our external conduct. But if we are so sunk in corruption as to be totally blind to our own vices, we still shall admire virtue in other men. There are some virtues which excite universal esteem and admiration, and some vices, such as cruelty and perfidy, which are universally abhorred. If any virtues are esteemed, or any vices condemned, it can arise only from a sense of moral obligation, for we do not esteem what is merely useful, as the bread we eat, or condemn what is by nature pernicious, as the poisonous herb, or savage animal. That no flagrancy of deliberate crimes can entirely eradicate the sense of duty, is manifest from the laws which banditti impose upon their own confederates, and the rigour with which they adhere to them.

In the several degrees of imperfection which belong to human nature, we descend from the purest to the most impure motives of conduct.

The object of a wise legislator is to enforce obedience, when the will refuses her consent; and when obedience cannot be enforced in opposition to the human will, to avail himself of all

motives, bad or good, which can influence it. But the lowest degree of virtue cannot commence until the will is influenced by good motives. The sanction therefore of a law can only compel the outward act, while virtue must reside in the heart. For this reason, moral obligation cannot arise from the sanction of a law. To illustrate this subject more clearly, I will imagine a lawful and excellent sovereign, whom it is the duty of all his subjects to support and to obey. I will suppose this sovereign to have bad subjects, as well as good. The discrimination between the loyal and the disloyal must always be the same, whether their monarch is in the zenith of prosperity, or reduced to the most abject state. This discrimination depends upon our ideas of right and wrong, which are wholly independent of extreme circumstances. If this sovereign is in high prosperity, the number of apparently good subjects will increase; many of them will become really faithful; but they are not loyal from true principle, while they are solely actuated by hopes of reward, or fear of punishment. While they are actuated by these motives alone, they have no pretence to genuine loyalty; but I will suppose, that these hopes and fears will not conquer the obstinacy of all the mal-contents; still, if the sovereign has sagacity to discern his enemies, and power to punish them, his government will be as secure as if universal affection to it, from the purest attachment, had prevailed. His best subjects

will be those who obey the law from the original principle of moral rectitude, and would obey it equally with or without a sanction. His worst subjects are those who are compelled to obedience by invincible and irresistible authority.

But if moral obligation arose from the sanction of a law, the reverse of this representation would be the true statement of the case. The best subject would be the state prisoner; the honestest man would be the felon in irons. For upon these men would the law most forcibly operate; they would most sensibly feel its power. When the commission of a crime is prevented by force, physical evil is proportionably diminished, but moral evil remains exactly the same, for that is brought to its full maturity when a deliberate intention is formed.

If we suppose two men determined, each of them to commit a murder; but one of them is restrained from the crime by a capital punishment, which he has every reason to expect, and the other completes his horrid design, from the assurance of impunity; these men are equally murderers in a moral sense, and in the view of our Almighty Judge.

We are not actuated by a sense of moral obligation, while the sanction of any law, the authority of any governor, restrains us from a crime which we desire to commit.

All that human law can achieve is to protect society from the physical evil which arises from moral evil, from the contagion and the pernicious

effects of vice ; and to prepare the individual, by suppressing his external acts of iniquity, for the reception of virtue.

The legislator may exterminate the weeds, and prepare the soil, but the good seed must be sown, before we can expect to reap. We must be actuated by real principle, before the first germ of virtue can appear. The penalties inflicted by human laws can impose a physical necessity, but cannot form the heart and mind to a sense of moral good.

When laws reward the virtuous, or punish the wicked, the distinction between virtue and vice is the foundation of those laws. Reward implies the previous existence of the virtue to be rewarded ; and punishment implies the previous existence of the vice which is to be punished.

The framers of human laws, and the administrators of them, proceed upon the principle for which I am contending, that if any human being is endowed with reason, and with liberty, he is a moral agent, responsible for his conduct, capable of virtue, liable to guilt, and deserving, according to his behaviour, of reward or punishment. If lunacy can be pleaded, or absolute compulsion, no offence will be imputed to him. But how would a court of justice treat the defence, which a criminal might bring forward, founded upon the systems of those philosophers, who contend, that the source of moral obligation is *expediency*, or the *arbitrary will of God*, or the *awful denunciations of religion* ?

A thief might urge, that distress obliged him to cheat or rob, and that if murder accompanied the robbery, it was instigated by self-defence. If the judge were to reply, that private interest were too confined a view of expediency, the thief might answer, that the preservation of his own life was dearer to him than any other consideration, and the only *expediency* which he was able to understand. The conspirator would justify himself upon the most enlarged view of *expediency*: for he would maintain, that upon the success of his traitorous designs, upon the overthrow of a government, which he is pleased to call tyrannical, depended the happiness of his country, of posterity, and of all mankind.

The assassin, the persecutor, and the wildest enthusiast, would plead *the will of God* as justifying, in their behalf, the violation of his known and everlasting laws, and sanctifying the most enormous crimes.

The hardened villain would contend, that if moral agency arose from *religion*, and moral obligation from its *awful menaces*, he was exempt from all duty, because he denied a God and a future state. He would scorn to invent an apology for his crimes, but boldly avow his rapine, and his thirst for blood, and disclaim his responsibility for the most enormous offences. All these pleas might be urged with the full conviction of the criminal. In very few cases indeed could a court of justice deny the since-

urity of the defence, or detect its falsehood. In general, criminals work up their own minds to a belief that there is no truth in religion, or in the great sanctions of morality ; unless they can persuade themselves that the end they have in view will justify the nefarious means by which they pursue it, or that their particular circumstances will excuse the crime. No court of justice, however, could admit any of these pleas, which is a plain proof that the universal sense of rational creatures is repugnant to them. The jury will be satisfied in their verdict of guilty, if the fact is proved, and the criminal is not void of understanding, and was a free agent at the time of committing the offence.

The scripture assures us, that the great ruler of the moral world proceeds in his dispensations upon the same principle, whether they are dispensations of justice or mercy. The Canaanites and other idolatrous nations were severely punished, because they transgressed those eternal laws of rectitude, which no human being could violate without conscious guilt. The whole Gentile world, when the gospel was preached to them, were nearly as criminal as the Canaanites, and could not obtain mercy, but through the great atonement which our blessed Saviour made for all mankind. They received baptism and remission of sins, as the reward of faith and penitence, upon an avowal, that they were determined to lead new lives, confessing them-

selves “*without excuse,*” and by the habitual practice of sin, justly described “the children of wrath*.”

If justice were to be administered with regard to the moral or religious sentiments assumed by the criminal, and not in strict conformity to these established principles for which I am contending, all society would be dissolved. This is a proof of the common sense of mankind upon the grounds of moral obligation, and the necessity of firmly establishing these principles, if we would support any government, or preserve the civilization of the world. Every feeling heart must revolt at the idea of a madman being tried, convicted, and executed; and every mind, imbued with a due sense of justice, must abhor the punishment of an innocent person, although his freedom from guilt should have arisen only from invincible ignorance. But the justice of punishment depends, and society subsists, upon the universal sense of moral obligation which all men, free from idiotcy or insanity, and living in a certain state of improvement, may fairly be supposed to possess.

Unless from the corruption of their own hearts they have refused instruction, and criminally perverted their own understanding, this sense of moral obligation will convince them, that laws do not acquire their claim to obedience by the punishments they inflict, or the rewards they confer, but by their promulgation. Human laws

* See Romans i. 16. 32; Ephesians v. 6.

are indeed superseded by divine laws, but why ought we to obey God rather than man? From every pious affection and every moral consideration, but principally because the will of God must be consistent with perfect rectitude. If we have a right conception of our duty to God, our ultimate object must be to please him. Whatever other beings it is our duty to love and obey, that love and obedience must be in subordination to him. If the will of any moral agent is rightly directed, it must be identified with the divine will. The will of God must be in conformity to the purity and holiness of his nature : he must will what is right. It is not right, because he wills it : but he wills it, because it is right. It is the goodness of God which creates our obligation to obey him. If it were derived from the power of God, it would be a physical, not a moral, obligation. Power may enforce obedience, but cannot produce right. When God creates a moral agent, he gives him the opportunity of performing certain duties, but he does not create the duties. They arise from the situation of the moral agent ; from the trials with which God has permitted him to be assailed ; from the advantages which God has bestowed upon him in the dispensations of providence, and of grace. When the Omnipotent Creator of the material world launched a planet into the ocean of space, he adjusted the centrifugal with the centripetal force, in such a manner as to determine the exact ellipsis in which the planet should

perform its revolution ; but the nature of that curve was eternal and immutable, its mathematical properties were always present to the divine intellect, and independent of the divine will. The truths of morality are equally independent. As every being, endowed with the faculty of vision, throughout the solar system, must fix its eyes upon the same sun, so must every intellectual being contemplate the same abstract truth, and every good being assimilates his will to the same law.

The nature of every thing, and of every relation, is an abstract truth. All abstract truths are eternal and immutable. Whatever is good, or evil, or indifferent by nature, cannot be changed by the will of any being. When positive law changes what is indifferent into good, by command, or into evil, by prohibition, there is no change wrought in the indifferent action itself, but in the circumstances attending it. If I promise to do, what I might, antecedently to my promise, do or forbear, my obligation arises from my voluntary act. In the same manner, if I am commanded to do, what otherwise I might do or forbear, my obligation arises from the authority of a superior. The obligation of honour, in one case, and of obedience in the other, forms part of the law of universal rectitude. Whatever being is capable of discerning truth, must discern the same truth ; for truth is one and indivisible. Whatever being is a moral agent, must be convinced, that he ought to apply to practice

every moral truth he discerns, which is within the scope of his power. The more a moral agent advances towards perfection, the more shall his will be conformable to the law of perfect rectitude; and the more it is conformable to that law, the more it is assimilated to the divine will. No moral agent performs his duty, unless he brings to that performance the full consent of his will. When we know our duty, and are, with the concurrence of all our powers and faculties, with our whole hearts and minds, desirous of discharging it, and of making a constant progress towards moral perfection, we are united in our intellectual pursuits, with the highest orders of created beings, and approach, with awful reverence, to God himself.

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Sir Wm. Temple, of Heroic Virtue, sect. 2, "The chief principle," to "should obey."

Watt's Improvement of the Mind, p. i. ch. xvi. the 4 first pages of sect. 3d.

Campbell, on Virtue, p. 96 to 106, with some exceptions; "there is a fallacy in what relates to man."

Bolingbroke's Works, vol. ii. p. 291, 297; vol. iii. p. 384, 397, 398, 402, note, 415; vol. iv. p. 39, 97, 101 to 103, 155.

Warburton's Divine Legation, vol. i. p. 33 to 58; Q. If Reason, in general, is a mere *abstract notion*, and if it may not be an *obliger*?

Hale's Origination of Mankind, p. 57, 58, 60 to 64, 317, 318, 352 to 355, 364, 365, 367.

Lucas on Happiness, vol. i. p. 61, 62; vol. ii. p. 29, 58, 59; vol. iii. p. 225, 226.

The Protestant System, vol. i. p. 32 to 36, 90 to 92, 143, 146, 151, 167, 241, 259, 278, 279, &c. to 310, (the whole of Dr. Chandler's admirable Sermon on this subject) 312.

Scott's Elements of Philosophy, p. 36, 37, 202 to 206, 382, 383.

Roscoe's Leo X, vol. ii. p. 46.

Knight's Principles of Taste, p. 9 to 18, 233 to 235, though highly objectionable in many parts.

Hartley on Man, vol. i. p. 493 to 499; vol. ii. p. 171, 337 to 340.

Whitby on the Necessity of the Christian Revelation, p. 3, 10, 11, 12, 16 to 36, 100, 247 to 249.

Sherlock on Providence, p. 79.

Bp. Law's Considerations, p. 6.

Tillotson's Sermons, (12mo.) vol. ix. p. 101, 102, 243, 270, 271; vol. xi. p. 165; vol. xii. p. 79, 124, 125.

Arthur's Discourses, p. 119, 199, 207, 436.

Clarke's Sermons, vol. i. p. 167, 168, 204, 205, 236 to 239, 325; vol. ii. p. 124, 126 to 129, 169, 170;

vol. iii. p. 92 to 95, 107 to 110, 152 to 154, 170, 171, 196, 211 to 222, 344, 345; vol. iv. p. 40, 59, 60, 349 to 353; vol. vii. p. 125, 133 to 148, 154 to 158, 176 to 178, 206 to 210, 334, 335, 361 to 364, 392, 393; vol. viii. p. 23 to 27, 91, 92, 119, 199 to 208, 248 to 262; vol. ix. p. 133, 134; vol. x. p. 45 to 48, 200 to 205.

Hoadley's Sermons, vol. i. p. 269 to 275; vol. ii. p. 53, 117, 119, 171 to 175, 182 to 186, 286, 413, 416.

Bp. Taylor's Polemical Discourses, p. 625 to 630.

Doddridge's Lectures, p. 60, 61.

PERIOD THE EIGHTH.

CICERO, de Inventione, lib. i. s. 5, "officium," to "appellabimus"—"Honestum Genus," to "Animus"—"Anceps," to "offensionem"—"Anceps Genus," to "Augeatur"—"Turpe est," to "videtur"—"Aut si quis," to "dicat;" s. 54, "Sextus locus est," to "prohiberi conveniret;" lib. ii. sect. 22, "Ac naturæ quidem jus est," to "aut futurum sit;" sect. 32, "horum trium generum," to "neglecta sit," sect. 52, "53; Cicero, de Officiis, lib. i. cap. 4, "Nec vero," to the end; cap. 9, "Quocirca bene præcipiunt," to the end; cap. 10, from the beginning, to "Nonnulla legibus;" cap. 13, "cum autem," to "digna majore."

Aristotle, Top. lib. i. cap. 9, *Ἀπορνήεις πόλερον δει τις Θεος τιμᾶν, και τις γονεις αγαπᾶν, η ε, κολασεως δεονται*

Grotius, de imperio summarum potestatum, &c. cap. iii. sect. 2, 3, 4, 11, "Neque enim quicquam potest ad salutem credi, fieri ve nisi quod Deus ut tale patefecerit;" sect. 13; cap. iv. sec. 6, "Qui declaritur negunt, non *obligant propriè*, sed obligationi occasionem præbent, quatenus notitiam alicui imprimunt quæ obligationem parit aut auget," sect. 7; cap. v. sect. 1, 6, 11; cap. vi. sect. 14; cap. vii. the latter part of sect. 2; sect. 14, "Omnem actum, ut rectus sit, præcedere debet agentis iudicium."

Grotius, *Le Clerc's*, p. 215, 216, 221 n. a.

Puffendorffii *prefatio*, sect. vii.; *de Officio*, &c. lib. i. cap. i.; cap. ii. sect. 12, 16; cap. iii. sect. 1, n. 1, 2, sect. 9; cap. v. sect. 18, to the end; cap. vii. sect. 1; cap. xi. sect. 6; cap. xvii; lib. ii. cap. i. sect. 8; cap. iii. sect. 1, 2, 3, 11, 12; cap. v. sect. 8, 9; cap. xii. sect. 8, 9; cap. xvi. sect. 6, 9, n. 12; cap. xviii.

Limborchi *Theologia*, lib. ii. cap. xii. sect. 18, 19, 21; cap. xv. sect. 7; cap. xxvii. sect. 16; lib. iii. cap. vi. sect. 2; cap. viii. sect. 13; lib. iv. cap. xiii. sect. 27; lib. v. cap. i. sect. 3, 4; cap. ii. 1, 2, 3, 8, 9; cap. iii. sect. 5, 10; cap. iv. sect. 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 11, 28, 29; cap. vii. sect. 2, 3; cap. xxx. sect. 12; cap. xxxi. sect. 8.

Enfield's *History of Philosophy*, vol. i. p. 154, 252, 343, 347, 353, 497; vol. ii. p. 261.

Cogan's *Ethical Treatise on the Passions*, p. 1 to 4, 143 to 150, 176, 182, 240, 241, 245 to 254.

Barrow's *Mathematical Lectures*, p. 54, 333, 334.

Fiddes on *Morality*, *preface* 17 to 61, 83, 84; ch. i. throughout; ch. iv. sect. 1, 2; ch. v. sect. 1, 2, 3, 12; ch. ix. sect. 9, 10, 20, 22, 23, 24; ch. x. sect. 5, 6; ch. xiv. sect. 11, 12, 13; ch. xviii. sect. 11, 12, 16, 17, 24, 25; ch. xix. sect. 1, 4, 15; ch. xx. sect. 6, 7.

Lux Orientalis, ch. 7, sect. 2.

Memoirs of Lord Kames, vol. i. appendix, p. 43, 44 to 46, 78 to 81, 87, 91 to 94, (288 note); vol. ii. p. 127 to 131.

Kirwan's *Logick*, vol. i. div. 257 to 260, 335, 475; vol. ii. div. 664 to 668, 725, 770 to 787.

Kirwan's *Metaphysical Essays*, vol. i. p. 368, 415, 416, 435 to 446.

Knight on the *Being and Attributes*, p. 109 to 115, 174, 175, 202, 204,

Campbell's *Rhetoric*, vol. i. introduction, p. x. "all have in them some rudiments of taste," p. 255; vol. ii. p. 3, 121.

The Protestant System, vol. i. p. 563, 564; vol. ii. p. 55, 56, 268, 269, 568 to 571.

Lord Clarendon's Essays; of Human Nature, the whole first Essay, p. 165, 166.

Locke on the Epistle to the Romans, ch. i. v. 32, n. (h.) ch. ii. v. 26, n. (e.); ch. iii. v. 20, n. (w.) v. 31, n. (q.)

Bp. Butler's Charge, (1751,) p. 13, note *.

Bp. Rust on Truth, sect. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, (with annotations, p. 254, 255) 10, 11, 12.

Bp. Newton's Works, vol. ii. p. 332 to 337, 355 to 361.

Hunt's Sermons, vol. i. p. 114 to 124, 175, 176, 181, 220.

Bp. Taylor on Repentance, ch. vi. sect. 4, div. 67; ch. viii. sect. 1, div. 1. Quotation from Plutarch, sect. v. div. 30; Polemical Discourses, p. 875.

Clarke's Sermons, vol. ix. p. 133.

Jortin's Sermons, vol. i. p. 200, 204, 207, 222, 223.

Milton, (Newton's edit.) b. vi. ver. 172 to 188; ix. 651 to 654, 978, &c. with the note.

PERIOD THE NINTH.

CICERO de Finibus, lib. ii. sect. 11, 14, "ego autem existimo," &c. sect. 15, 18, 19, 23; lib. iii. cap. x. from the beginning, to "Valet;" cap. xi. xx. "Sic inter," to "locus;" lib. iv. cap. vii. xxvii. "ecce autem;" xxviii. the beginning.

Epictetus, (Stanhope's) p. 48, 56, 82, 83, 140, 412, 413, 415, 416.

Juvenal, (Gifford's) p. 391, 408 to 410, 412, 461, 462.

Lord Kames's History of Man, vol. i. p. 153, 154, 157, 256, 263 to 265, 407 to 410, 420, 421; vol. ii. p. 319; vol. iii. p. 110 to 113, 115 to 122, 143, 165 to 171, 202 to 205, 246 to 250.

Butler's Analogy, p. 3, 4, 67, 120, 134, 157, 181, 183 to 189, 216, 217, 267, 340 to 342.

Price's Morals, p. 57 to 59, 69 to 86, 93, 98 to 107, 115 to 118, 125 to 135, 144, 168 to 216, 223, 226 to 229, 232, 233, 247, 248, 255, 258, 259, 262, 263, 265, 267, 277, 282, 283, 284, 287, 291 to 293, 295, 296, 298, 300, 307, 313 to 322, 336, 337, 356, 357, 364 to 375, 401 to 406.

Chandler's History of Persecution, preface, p. xxiii. xxiv.

Ferguson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 166, 167; vol. ii. p. 116 to 134, 144 to 148, 169, 171, 192, 206, 215 to 225, 315 to 322.

Cudworth's Intellectual System, p. 718 to 720, 890 to 894, 896 to 898.

Cudworth, (Mosheim's) s. 11, p. 619, 620.

Inquiry concerning Virtue and Happiness, (anon. 1751.) p. 2 to 6, 10 to 13, 47, 48, 58 to 78, 84 to 86, 89, 90, 115 to 116, 135, 136, 148, 169 to 172.

Domat's Treatise of Laws, ch. i. sect. 2; ch. iv. sect. 5; ch. v. sect. 4, 7; ch. vi. sect. 3, 4; ch. ix. sect. 5; ch. xi. sect. 1, 2, 11, 13, 20 to 25, 28, 29, 34, 39, 44, 47; ch. xii. sect. 1, 12, 22, "Our mind will unavoidably esteem what is virtuous and worthy."

Barrow's Sermons, vol. i. p. 9, 28, 29, 58, 59, 461; vol. ii. p. 12, 13, *i. e.* sect. 14; vol. iii. p. 42, 421, 422.

Smalridge's Sermons, p. 83, 132 to 136, 202, 225, 454 to 458, 548.

Abernethy's Sermons, vol. i. p. 74 to 85, 88, 89, 92 to 94, 155, 158 to 169, 173, vol. ii. p. 46, 55 to 62, 141 to 144, 239, 240.

Grove's Posthumous Sermons, vol. i. p. 75, 76, 429, 430; vol. ii. p. 4, 96 to 103; vol. iii. p. 48 to 52, 58 to 62.

Bp. Horsley's Sermons, vol. iii. p. 57 to 59, 92, 93, 251 to 256.

PERIOD THE TENTH.

CICERO de Legibus, lib. i. cap. 7, 10, "sed omnium," to "esse jus;" c. 11, "Quæ autem Natio," &c.; c. 12,

148 REFERENCES TO ESSAY V.

14, "Tum autem," to the end; 15 to 19, de Officiis, lib. i. c. 4, 16, 17, "Illud enim honestum," &c.; lib. ii. c. 11, "atque iis," &c.

Erasmi, (Enchiridion) Opiniones Christiano dignæ, "Non protinus jus esse putato, quod vis; sed id tantum velis quod jus est."

Stewart's Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. ii. p. 473 to 483, 546 to 549.

Gisborne's Principles of Moral Philosophy, p. 19 to 26, 37 to 41, 64, 66, 67, 70, 90, 224, 225, 227.

Buffier's First Truths, p. 50 to 54, 402, 403.

Leland's Deistical Writers, vol. i. p. 207, 208; vol. ii. p. 334 to 336.

Cogan upon the Passions, vol. ii. p. 20.

Stewart's Outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 117 to 125, 126 to 153, 164, 165, 222, 246 to 249, 266, 267.

Locke's Works (fol.) vol. ii. p. 162, 173, 174, 193, 194, 196, 211.

Analyse de l'Esprit des Loix, par D'Alembert, p. 64, 65.

Price's Morals, p. 13 to 15, 57 to 86, 91 to 107, 111 to 117, 134, 135, 144, 168 to 216, 300 to 303.

Free Discussion between Price and Priestley, p. 143, 144.

Cudworth's Immutable Morality, p. 13 to 27, 38.

Baxter on the Immortality of the Soul, p. 52, 55 to 59, 98, 422, 423.

Ferguson on Civil Society, p. 49 to 53, 96, 97, 133, 134.

Supplement to Encyclopædia Britan. vol. i. p. 30 to 32, 64 to 68, 131, 132, 136, 140.

Sykes on Natural and Revealed Religion, p. 5 to 28, 35 to 37, 42 to 46, 48, 49, 357 to 362, 403 to 411, 420 to 423, 505.

Boyle's Lectures abridged, vol. iii. p. 46 to 48, 52; vol. i. p. 82, 135, 146, 174, 222 to 230, 281 to 287.

Mrs. Cockburne's Works, vol. i. p. 56, 57, 62, 100 to 104, 402 to 435, 440, 441, 443 to 445; vol. ii. p. 34, 35, 39 to 48, 57, 63 to 65, 86 to 88, 97, 100, 102, 106, 107, 130, 131.

De Stael, de l'Allemagne, tom. iii. p. 20 to 24, 85, 94, 95, 199 to 209, 251 to 253, 325.

Ashley's Institution of Cyrus, from Xenophon, vol. i. p. 13 to 18.

Scott's Christian Life (fol.) p. 67, "So that," &c.

Bp. Watson's Tracts, vol. iii. p. 457.

Adams's Tracts, p. 137 to 195.

Barrow's Sermons, vol. ii. p. 106, 107.

Abernethy's Sermons upon the Attributes, vol. i. p. 83 to 95, 273 to 277; vol. ii. p. 2 to 4, 10, 16, 17, 43.

Smalridge's Sermons, p. 132 to 136, 235, 236.

Millar's Prescience of God, p. 13, 14.

Twenty-one Sermons of Dissenters, vol. i. p. 278 to 304.

Hill's Sermons, p. 23 to 36.

Sturges's Fourteenth Discourse.

Foster's Sermons, vol. i. p. 4 to 9, 85 to 90, 104, 105, 109, 116.

Ille bonus verè est, quem, spes si nulla futuri,
Ad pulchrum atque decens per se super omniâ ducit
Morum dulce melos, et agendi semita simplex.

Esto; nec ille malus, qui non hîc hæret, at illam,

Quò natura trahit, metam scit ritè tueri,

Semper et innatis ultra mortalia votis,

Fertur ovans, pulchrumque petit sine fine supremum.

I. Hawkins Browne de Animi Immortalitate, lib. ii.

PERIOD THE ELEVENTH.

ISAIAH v. 20, notes in S. B.—Hosea xiv. 9.

Romans ii. 1. S. B. note 3; v. 8, S. B. note 2;
v. 12, note in S. B.; v. 14, S. B. note 1; v. 15, notes S. B.;
c. iii. 6, notes S. B.; v. 8, notes S. B.; v. 20, S. B. note 5;
c. x. 10, notes S. B.

ESSAY VI.

ON VIRTUE.

THE virtue of any being is the excellence of its nature, the highest perfection which it is capable, in its present state, of attaining.

If our taste is pure, we shall consider the most perfect being to be the most beautiful, whether that being is corporeal or intellectual; and if it is composed of body and mind, whether we view the perfection and beauty of the body, or the beauty and perfection of the mind. If we had an unlimited knowledge of the universe, both in its duration and its extent, we should know that the being which is most perfect and the most beautiful, is likewise the most beneficial; but the real and complete beneficialness of any being, in all its bearings and dependencies, seems the object of Omniscience alone.

In the view of Omniscience, perfection, beauty, and utility are united; but they may all be separated by the human mind; and one of them may be discerned, when the others are imperceptible. The virtue of man, in his present state, comprises perfection in all those faculties which belong to his original creation; not in reason alone, upon which moral obligation has been shewn entirely to depend; but likewise in

imagination, in pure and laudable affections, even in corporal strength and health; in the powers of the body, as far as they are instrumental to the operations of the mind.

There must be some ultimate good, something which is good in itself, and for itself alone; this something stamps the character of good upon whatever is subservient or instrumental to it.

If there be any good, for which virtue, in its largest sense, must be considered as instrumental, that good must be superior to virtue. Are wealth, power, honour, fame, superior to virtue? if they are not, they may be instrumental to it, but virtue cannot be so far demeaned as to be instrumental to them.

Virtue therefore alone is the ultimate good. The ultimate good is the sole object of every rational pursuit.

When virtue is possessed according to the universal definition of it I have given, by an insensible being, it is the object of admiration to those who behold and examine it, and leads us to contemplate that excellence in the Creator, which is manifested in the creature.

When it is possessed by a living creature, capable of sensation or affection, but not a moral agent, it excites feelings more numerous and more complicated than those of admiration alone; but still the creature itself cannot rise, by its own powers, or by its own conscious exertion of them, to greater perfection than it has already obtained.

If it be possessed by a being endowed with liberty, it cannot have attained the state in which we view it, it cannot subsist a moment in that state, without an exertion of moral energies.

A free agent, in proportion to the virtue, which he knows, or which he may reasonably presume, that he possesses, is conscious that he is approved by all good men, and in some degree by the most vicious; that he is acting according to his duty, and rendering himself, by all the means in his power, acceptable to God. If he is truly virtuous, he must be conscious that virtue alone, and for her own sake alone, is his ultimate end, his supreme good, the unremitting object of his pursuit.

He is at the same time conscious that all his virtue is so far the gift of God, that it arises from his existence, which he derives from God; from his preservation, which he owes to the same Almighty Protector; from the faculties which God has graciously bestowed upon him at his birth, and benignantly continued to him; from the knowledge, with which God by reason or revelation has illuminated his mind; from the divine grace, which has extirpated his bad passions, subdued and renovated his heart.

If from the earliest dawn of infancy he has constantly pursued this course of virtue, he will enjoy the highest delights in reflecting upon his past life.

If he has happily recovered from vicious habits, he will look back with sorrow and con-

sternation upon the dangers he has escaped, and be awakened to a sense of the most pious gratitude to his divine deliverer.

In the moral history of his mind, in the virtuous or religious transactions of his life, he will discern the co-operation of divine grace with human agency; and while he is always mindful of his dependent creature-state, he will never erase from his mind a consciousness of free agency, of responsibility, and of the powers which God has committed to his charge.

The higher idea we entertain of our rational nature, and of the moral powers which God has given us, and by his gracious aid enables us to exercise, the more we shall be excited to the practice of virtue; the more will our pious gratitude be raised to the author of all moral as well as physical good; and the more exalted will be our conception of his divine perfection.

It is generally supposed, that the first symptom of virtue appears in the restraint of vice; but the mere absence of vice does not constitute any part of virtue, which is of a positive, not a negative, character. The motives which operate upon a vicious mind, in the restraint of vice, are motives from which no virtue can arise. If we have any corrupt principles, or corrupt habits, they must be eradicated before the virtuous principles or habits, which are directly opposed to them, can be firmly and consistently established. Every motive should be applied to this salutary object, if the motive is not in

itself vicious ; in which case it will only operate by changing one vice for another ; but the best cure for disease, whether affecting the body or the mind, is the renovation of health.

It is impossible to say how much good the bare cessation from doing evil would produce. If (as the prophet commands) we have "*ceased to do evil**," we have made a great progress towards virtue ; but we have not arrived at it, we cannot have the happy consciousness of performing our duty, we cannot be partakers of that holiness to which every christian must aspire, until we have obeyed the latter part of Isaiah's injunction, "*Learn to do well, seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow.*"

The most effectual restraint of vice is virtue, whether it displays itself in principle, habit, or disposition, or in that happy combination of them all, which will either remove us to an infinite distance from temptation, or empower us to resist its force. Virtue must be positive. It consists originally in a quick discernment of truth, and a perfect knowledge of all those truths which are necessary to direct our conduct. Abstract practical truths are the guides to abstract duty, they inform us what is right for any man in given circumstances to do. But these truths will not teach the individual what is right for him to do upon all occasions, unless he has that knowledge of facts, which his particular

* Isaiah i. 16, 17.

situation requires. He should have primarily a knowledge of himself, of his understanding, his affections, and his powers ; and secondarily, a knowledge of those persons, with whom or against whom he is called upon to act. It is essential to virtue to think right. If from negligence, voluntary ignorance, or perverseness, we are defective in the knowledge of truth, we must be, in the same degree, defective in virtuous principle.

If we have all the knowledge of moral or sacred truth, which it is possible for us to attain, it is very essential that this knowledge should not be merely speculative. We must meditate upon it, delight in the contemplation of it, and implant it in our minds. The speaking truth, and acting in constant conformity to it, is the most important exertion of social virtue ; but we can neither speak truth, nor act agreeably to it, unless we know what is truth. This knowledge is therefore the foundation of all virtue : in a christian, it is faith ; in a pagan moralist, it is true philosophy ; in all existing circumstances it is the knowledge most requisite to conquer temptation, to warm the heart, to regulate the will, to direct our conduct, and to teach us that particular duty which we are immediately called upon to perform. Perfect knowledge would lead to perfect virtue, if the will followed the best dictate of the understanding, or if virtue could be considered as belonging to intellect alone ; but, according to the

definition I have given of it, it comprehends every species of human perfection, as far as man is a moral agent. The knowledge we may reasonably acquire of human nature will impress our mind with a just sense of its dignity ; but this impression must be made upon the affections, before it will be so constantly present to our hearts, as to display itself upon all proper occasions, to teach us to reverence ourselves, to feel a deep sense of shame whenever we are conscious of moral degradation, to be humble from reflection upon our own infirmities, and not proudly exalted by that elevation, as men, which we have not preserved as individuals.

It is not knowledge alone, which will enable us to exert all our powers in a virtuous course of life. We may know that we ought to be pious, just, benevolent, brave, temperate, and liberal ; but our whole heart and affections must be engaged in the practice of these virtues, before our will is ready to obey what the intellect commands. Until the will is fully and uniformly virtuous, we cannot claim that appellation. The virtuous man feels his duty to be his most sincere and entire choice. He feels no restraint, no awe of man, no fear of an earthly superior, no appetite leading him a contrary way, no temptation to subdue ; but is conscious that he is following all his inclinations in the practice of virtue, gratifying every object of desire, exercising the most unbounded liberty, and making a free-will offering acceptable to God. Every

principle of virtue takes its due possession of his mind in its just proportion and harmony.

With respect to virtue in general, he will be always aiming at a perfection which, in this life, he can never hope to attain, knowing that no limits can be assigned to this perfection. But with respect to each particular virtue, he will be sensible that its perfection does not consist in the magnitude, to which a warm imagination may enlarge it, nor in the magnificence of its ostentatious display, but in the calm and sober sedateness, in that retirement from the public view, in that temper and moderation, in that freedom from excess, which renders it most genuine, and precludes its interference with other virtues. There are indeed virtuous actions, which from their nature must be most conspicuous; but in these cases, their splendour is not produced by the exertion of the virtuous, by his desire of brilliant grandeur; but by the applause which courage and wisdom, disinterestedness and beneficence, in the highest stations, will naturally excite. If, however, the ingratitude of the world, or envious misrepresentation, prevent the virtuous hero or patriot from receiving these rewards; his virtue is so far from being diminished, that he has new opportunities of exercising it, moral qualities perhaps more valuable to display, and his name descends to posterity with higher admiration and esteem. A virtuous man will always act upon the conviction, that there is no event in life, no situa-

tion, which does not afford some opportunity of improving his own mind, or doing good to others. In every exertion he makes, whether to improve his morals in the recesses of his own heart, or to demonstrate by external conduct his love of God and man, he is actuated by no motive but a sense of duty, and an irrefragable attachment to what is right. He derives every active impulse from virtue alone, and requires no other reward during any stage of his existence, than the happiness which she bestows; for he knows how highly she gratifies his feelings, fulfils his wishes, accomplishes his desires. He knows the satisfaction of a good conscience, that perpetual feast, which she most abundantly supplies. He trusts that this satisfaction is not presumptuous or vain; but that "*if his own heart condemn him not, he may have confidence toward God.*"

A virtuous man may be actuated by motives drawn from a particular virtue, or by motives drawn from virtue in its most general sense, as comprising, in their just proportion, all descriptions of duty. In the former case he may carry a particular virtue to excess, and may be deficient in others. If his piety leads him to act from no other motive, than a desire to promote the glory of God, he may neglect those human or social virtues, which God not only requires him to perform, but requires him to perform them with sincerity of heart, from a principle of benevolence, as well as from a principle of piety. Moral perfection, therefore, would not

be carried to its greatest height, although virtuous motives were the sole principle of conduct, unless these motives were properly harmonized, so as to form one beautiful and consistent whole. Virtue, in its most enlarged sense, as comprising every duty, every right sentiment, every good disposition, should be the great object of pursuit; all other pursuits should be in strict subordination to it. But in this strict subordination, every pursuit is lawful which reason dictates, or nature points out, or which our affections, when properly regulated, prescribe.

Virtue and interest, as the ultimate ends of our conduct are inconsistent. We must abandon one or the other. They must be incompatible, as principles of action, although they may, and when properly understood, will, coincide in their final result.

There cannot be a more vulgar adage, than *honesty is the best policy*. It is vulgar for this very reason, that it is most congenial to the common sense of mankind. But the most ordinary understanding would spurn at the idea of honesty, if it were founded upon policy alone. The adage considers honesty as totally distinct from policy; though they may appear, from the events they produce, to be inseparably united. The truth is, that honesty will frequently direct us to the best policy, when the highest worldly wisdom fails.

It is the duty of a good man to die for his

country, or in attestation of an important truth salutary to all mankind. The highest of all rewards in this life, and the sublimest of all feelings are found in the sacrifice of individual inclination, and temporal happiness, to private, and still more to public, duty. This is, therefore, the interest of a good man even upon the supposition, that there were no future state; but it would be an interest which, unless he made duty his sole principle of conduct, could never operate upon him. Why would it be his interest? because by the hypothesis he is a good man; and to such a man the total extinction of being, in a great and glorious cause, is more advantageous than the protracting a few years of life with the bitter remorse of conscience, the loss of honour and reputation, the desertion of friends, and the detestation of enemies. This is the principle upon which men act, who have no pretensions to exalted virtue. Why does the duellist risk his life, and the criminal brave death, when by dishonourable conditions he might escape from danger? because he prefers honour to life. Yet his very conduct shews a contempt of death, incompatible with that firm belief of a future state, upon which every good man relies as his support in all the trials of life. An action performed with no other view than external advantage, must be either vicious or indifferent. It cannot be virtuous.

If we aspire to a great public office, with no other view than to obtain honour or emolument,

the most worldly-minded men will reprobate ambition, so originating, and so directed. It must be more or less vicious, and may be highly criminal. A true patriot aspires to a public situation, purely for his country's good, not his own. His patriotism is most proved, when he not only serves the public gratuitously, but makes large sacrifices of time, or ease, or fortune, or health. But he may receive pecuniary remuneration; yet this emolument may be inadequate to the labour he must undergo, or the charges he must incur; and if it is ever so great, he may be assured, in his own heart, that all the pleasure he derives from his exalted station, arises from ardent principle and patriotic zeal.

No religious person will allow that a layman can enter into holy orders innocently, if he is not actuated by an earnest desire of rendering essential service to the souls of men. This is an act which cannot be indifferent, it must be virtuous or vicious.

In subordination to virtue, all temporal advantages may be sought. Due provision must be made for ourselves and families. This is an act of virtue, and any increase of riches may be in our view, as the reward of industry or skill, under certain circumstances, without the least deviation from the strictest rules. But when we perform any act, when we indulge any desire, and, most of all, when we deliberate upon the ruling pursuits of life, our principal objects

should be, discharging our duty, obeying the divine will, and doing good to all men. If we act upon this enlarged view alone, we are perfectly virtuous; if other views incorporate themselves, our virtue is imperfect, in proportion to the influence which these inferior views have over us; and if we entirely lose sight of the true principle of moral conduct, we wholly abandon virtue, and it is very fortunate if we do not substitute vice in its place; if the same selfishness, which alone induces us to accept a trust, does not lead us to betray it.

An object of desire, which we pursue without any view to external advantage, from the gratifications we expect it to afford, considering it as an absolute, not an instrumental good, may be virtuous or vicious, or indifferent.

If virtue be not the sole object of our pursuit, we must ascertain those limits which the laws of moral rectitude have given to human power, and confine our thoughts, words, and actions, within those bounds. By the observance of this rule we shall avoid vice; but virtue must be the primary and constant object of our pursuit, before the highest idea which we can conceive of moral perfection is completely realized. However unattainable by man this perfection may be, the advances towards it are the sole measures of our progress in virtue.

It may be supposed, that this high standard of perfection, militates with the exertion of talents, the pleasures, and the duties of life.

A gloomy and perverse fanaticism has too often assumed the garb of visionary philosophy, or the more specious name of religion; and under these false semblances has plumed itself upon a preposterous appearance of perfection, which is a contrast to real virtue.

This enthusiasm alienates the mind from domestic and social offices; withdraws the subject from his allegiance, the patriot from his public zeal; eradicates all sense of pleasure, all taste of beauty, all love of learning or rational improvement.

This is the principle of the ascetic or solitary life, and of monastic institutions, which can never be reconciled to any just conceptions of religion. The more rigid they are, the more indefensible.

This enthusiasm is founded upon a principle, the direct reverse of the true object of moral ambition, which is the practice of active virtue in all its various branches. What is virtue? the habitual practice of duty. If we analyze it into its three great component parts, it is our duty to God, to our fellow-creatures, and to ourselves. Whenever we think, speak, or act, whenever we form any scheme of future conduct, we should have these three great duties always combined in view; and our constant object should be our improvement in the discharge of them.

While we fix our attention upon our duty to God, we have a firm belief of his constant pre-

sence, of his intimate knowledge of all that passes within the recesses of our own hearts. We have at the same time a deep sense of his purity, holiness, and justice, of his government of the moral world; we must, therefore, deeply impress upon our minds an awful reverence and filial fear of the supreme ruler of the universe, of the judge of all mankind. We shall, however, derive support in every affliction from a trust in his gracious providence; and while we have the fullest conviction of the divine goodness, and are not conscious of an habitual transgression of the divine will, we shall consider the superintendence of God, as the source of all our comforts and all our tranquillity of mind. We shall feel every pleasure which we enjoy, to be a subject of pious gratitude. We can neither employ our senses, nor exercise our understanding, we can neither contemplate, nor converse, without finding abundant occasion to acknowledge the mercies of God, to admire his wisdom, and to proclaim his praise.

The knowledge which we acquire, the power which we obtain, the increase of strength which our understanding may receive, are arguments of the divine bounty, and ample materials afforded us for the divine service. When our minds and hearts are imbued with the true spirit of piety, all our habits and all our particular actions are directed to the promotion of the divine glory.

While we have a just sense of our duty to our

fellow-creatures, we feel our hearts warmed with all those generous affections which are displayed in the strong emotions of love and friendship, or in the milder graces of tenderness, courtesy, kindness, and good humour; we raise our minds to the true conception of real good, and we measure our acts of beneficence by the purity of those intentions from whence they flow, by the claims which our station creates, and by that degree of real good, which our exertions produce.

When we have a just sense of our duty to ourselves, we find our improvement in virtue, and the total subjugation of passion to reason, the constant object of our pursuit. We do not abstain from vice merely because it is prohibited, much less because it may happen to be injurious to our fortune, health, or reputation, but because it has no allurements in our eyes, it is the object of our detestation and horror.

When the love of virtue is once established as our ruling principle, a greater variety of pleasures may be innocently indulged, our capacity of enjoying them will be enlarged, our real delight will become more exquisite. We shall neither abandon the amusements, nor relinquish the occupations, of life; but we shall not rest in them, as the sole end of our being. We shall consider them as means of rendering ourselves and others happy; as occasions of moral duty, and themes of religious gratitude.

Mankind are placed in an infinite variety of situations. There is a long series of subordina-

tion in the moral scale, obvious to the most superficial view, but fully discerned by God alone. No rational being and moral agent is placed so low, as to be incapable of virtue. Persons in the lowest moral depression may perform the duties required of them, as completely as those in the highest stations. But an ambition directed to raise us in the moral scale is highly laudable, it bespeaks an ardent desire of approaching nearer to God, and of rendering more extensive service to man. We improve in the actual exercise of virtue, as we advance in knowledge, in abilities, and in external prosperity, if our practical piety rises with our speculative theology, if our morals become more pure as our understanding is more enlightened, and if our beneficence is enlarged in proportion to our encrease of power. Virtue therefore leads us to aspire to eminence in whatever is praise-worthy, and in whatever augments our opportunities of doing good. She restrains us indeed by a just sense of the responsibility which great talents and high situations create; but when we are called upon by the dispensations of providence to cultivate great talents, or to aspire to elevated rank; or when we are born to fulfil the most arduous duties, she will not teach us to flee from responsibility; but to entertain a serious sense of it. She will not teach us to despise wealth, honour, power, reputation, or fame; but to be excited by the hopes or possession of them, to splendid and beneficent deeds; to be contented under the severest disappointments in worldly pursuits;

and to sacrifice them all, while they are most justly dear to us when she requires it. Although she impresses upon our minds the real value of prosperity, she brings the obedience of her votaries to the true test, when they sacrifice it in her cause. She teaches us that an adversity, supported by her precepts, is far superior to a vicious prosperity, independently of a future state; and that in every period of our existence, whatever may be our external situation, those, who are truly her disciples, will have all the felicity she can bestow, and through the merits of our Blessed Saviour, will be partakers of everlasting glory.

The hope of future happiness is the vital principle of the christian religion. But when we consider the nature of that future happiness, which the gospel has revealed to us, we shall never aspire to it, until we love virtue for her own sake. We shall never place our felicity in acts of piety and charity, unless we really love God and love man. We shall never love God, unless we love virtue, and implant in ourselves some faint transcript of his moral attributes. We shall never love man unless our benevolence is disinterested; nor shall we "*fix our affections on things above,*" and ardently desire to spend eternity in the sublime delights they afford, unless *all things below* derive their sole value from their being the instruments of virtue, and the means of grace,

ESSAY VII.

ON VICE.

VICE is directly opposed to virtue. The difference between them is greater than any other difference which can be conceived. Moral philosophers have maintained, that there is no distinction to be compared to it. All other kinds of difference are, they say, so insignificant, as hardly to be considered as differences, when we duly estimate the important discrimination of virtue and vice. The wisdom of God has made that distinction the most evident, in which our duty and happiness are most directly and essentially concerned.

Vice is not to be called the negation of virtue, nor virtue the negation of vice. They are both of a positive nature, proceeding from distinct principles, dispositions, and habits, and producing distinct thoughts, words, and actions. They are not fictions of the imagination, but real ideas, when viewed in abstract; and, when operating upon the conduct of a moral agent, they are efficient, and most powerful causes, whose influence extends to the remotest consequences. But although most directly contrasted in themselves, they are generally blended in the virtuous or vicious agent, no moral agent, as far

as our experience reaches, being perfectly virtuous, nor wholly the reverse.

Notwithstanding the total repugnancy between virtue and vice, there are some points in which they agree. They exclusively belong to free agents; and appear in their greatest magnitude, when they wholly engross the will. They are both considered as the ultimate objects of our desires. No man can be virtuous or vicious any farther than he proposes to himself gratification from virtue or from vice. A particular vice may be indulged, as instrumental to some other vice. A man may be avaricious, that he may obtain the means of sensuality; but sensuality, not avarice, in this case, is the vice which rules his heart. Vice must spread her allurements for her own sake. The truly avaricious man is one who aspires to wealth merely as wealth, without any view to the uses to which it may hereafter be applied.

Both vice and virtue are qualities easily communicated, spreading, by example, fashion and imitation. I do not believe that vice disseminates its contagion more generally than virtue diffuses her charms; but some vices are only practised in society, or owe their chief support to it. Such are intemperance, profane or indecent language, rancorous dispute, personal provocation, fraud or injustice. Society presents the chief temptation to these vices, and affords the opportunity of indulging them. The sympathy of passion is so striking, that it is

hardly possible not to feel some emotion, either in unison with the passion of the person with whom we converse, or in opposition to it. The very air and countenance is affected, not only by the passions which we feel ourselves, but by those which we see others feel.

There are vices to which society is a powerful check. Under this class may be ranked all those which proceed from pride, ill temper, malice or perfidy. No persons, who are not so unhappily depraved as to confine their social intercourse to the worst of mankind, would not be restrained from many vicious sallies in their private thoughts, if they supposed them to be known to their general associates. A friend would be a sufficient restraint in most cases. Upon the whole, society must be very corrupt indeed, and so corrupt, that it could not long subsist, if it were not more propitious to virtue than to vice, did not encourage the former, and restrain the latter. Custom contributes greatly to virtue and to vice. The customs of the age and country in which we live; the customs of the persons with whom we associate; peculiar customs, if we take a fancy to them, and imagine them to be marks of distinction. Customs, when they lead only to the neglect of external observances, or to reverence for them, have often a remote effect upon our conduct in points much more material than the observances themselves. Whatever customs we adopt, must influence our own habits, and in these habits our vice and

virtue are placed. Our power of acting right is capable of being increased or diminished to an indefinite extent ; it is diminished by the power evil men or evil spirits have over us ; by every indulgence of internal passion, and by every act of voluntary sin.

Vice and virtue may be compared in many other respects. The greater superiority we have over the mass of our fellow-citizens in wealth, honour, power, abilities, knowledge or practical skill, the more splendid and more extensively beneficial will our virtues become ; and in a similar proportion will the enormity of our vices be increased, and the malignity of their influence be extended. A vicious man may have a powerful understanding, great resolution, and a strong heart ; and by a misapplication of those powers which God has given him, or an abuse of that authority to which his own ambition may have raised him, will be the most noxious of all human beings, the most mischievous certainly to mankind, and probably the author of his own destruction. A high station may confer dignity, even upon virtue itself, by affording more opportunities for the exercise of it ; but in the view of the wise, will make vice more odious and contemptible, by rendering it more conspicuous. Although virtue and vice are both considered as the ultimate objects of our desires, there is a total dissimilitude between the consciousness which the virtuous and the vicious possess in the exercise of their liberty. The virtuous feel that

they are employing, of their own accord, and for their own gratification, their highest powers, their most exalted faculties, and that all their principles, habits and dispositions are in strict conformity with their reason and their knowledge ; and that their conscience bears witness to the propriety of all they think, say, or do. The vicious feel that they are indulging their passions in opposition to their judgment, their knowledge, and their conscience ; that they have a momentary delight in this indulgence ; but never the approbation of a calm, cool, deliberating mind, either in their plans for the future, or their reflections upon the past transactions of their lives. While they rejoice in their emancipation from external constraint, they are sensible of the weight of that oppressive yoke to which they have voluntarily bowed, and feel the tyrant within imposing more cruel fetters than any which an external force could have imposed. No slavery is so complete and so dreadful, as the slavery of reason to passion. Vice is the tyranny of passion, contrasted with the lawful government of reason.

In the examination of our own hearts, the surest criterion of vice, as well as of virtue, is derived from the manner in which we are affected by a review of our past conduct. Some part of it will afford to all men pleasure : some part will create pain ; but the pleasure and the pain, which the wicked feel, will form a direct contrast to the sensations of the virtuous.

The grief of the man who is hardened in his iniquity, will be excited by every disappointment in his favourite pursuits, however unlawful they may have been. He will not regret that he has harboured revenge, but that he has not satisfied it. He will not deplore the crimes which he has imagined, but his inability to perpetrate them. His indignation will not be excited by the malicious, the fraudulent, or the sensual schemes which have engrossed his mind, nor by the passions he has indulged; but by the obstacles he encountered preventing the enjoyments he had in view, and defeating his most sanguine hopes. If he is concerned for his loss of character, that regret does not arise from the value he sets upon a good name, but from a consciousness, that by having lost his reputation, he is deprived of power. If he aspires to any praise, it is that bestowed by the most indiscriminating part of mankind, the superficial, the vain, and the corrupt; unless his object be to obtain a character of a higher sort, that he may more effectually deceive the world. Upon the whole, he regrets restraint more than folly, folly more than vice; nor can his past vices be displeasing in his sight, unless he considers them as proofs of folly, and of that species of folly which has impeded his main designs. He may regret the indolence which has defeated some nefarious plan, or the cowardice which alone prevented him from the commission of the blackest crimes. But while he

feels all this pain from the disappointment of his views, he has rarely pleasure, never real and substantial delight, when he reflects upon the gratification of them.

If he is as warmly attached to vice for its own sake, as the best man can be devoted to virtue from an admiration of its internal excellence, he may be led from the prevalence of diabolical passions, to place all his happiness in his subjection to them; but he must suffer severely from them. He patiently submits to cruel deprivations, and endures the acutest pain of mind, rather than summon up resolution to throw off his disgraceful bondage, or own to the world the sufferings he feels. If we suppose every spark of social, as well as intellectual, virtue to be extinguished, we cannot conceive any real gratification to arise from the success of the most iniquitous schemes; though we may imagine the bitterest pangs to attend the disappointment of them. Those passions which originate in painful sensations, and have no tendency, but to enflame the feelings from which they spring, must deprive us of pleasure, and torment us with the exacerbated severity of pain. Violent impetuosity, and passionate attachment to vice, leads us to endure many evils, although we feel their pressure. This is particularly the case when we indulge grief, anger or impatience.

Although virtue and vice agree in being the acts or habits of moral agents placed in a state of trial, they are in their own nature directly

opposed. They originate from opposite sources, and are supported by opposite affections of the mind and heart. Virtue arises from deep and calm reflection; vice from inconsideration. By abandoning all thought, all moral or religious principle, all care for our present safety, all concern for our future interest, we destroy the great bulwarks of virtue, and open the widest sluices for a torrent of overwhelming iniquity. Vice takes possession of that understanding which she finds vacant and unemployed in its proper work, and prostitutes to all manner of wickedness those intellectual powers which were intended to lead us to all good. Vice, as well as virtue, exercises the mind. She, as well as virtue, has her objects of selection and choice. She deliberates before she decides, and having resolved upon a particular pursuit, exerts all our rational faculties for the attainment of it. A small portion of the intellectual energy, which she employs for the promotion of her nefarious designs, would, if properly directed, have convinced her unhappy votary that he was pursuing his own destruction.

Virtue is supported by reason, and reason founded upon knowledge. Vice is supported by passion, and passion founded upon ignorance. Virtue is identified with truth, vice with falsehood. Virtue is defective whenever there is an erroneous judgment in principle, that is, a departure from reason in abstract; or whenever there is a mistaken

practice from ignorance of facts, which is a departure from reason in the concrete. If this ignorance were so entirely involuntary, as to be free from blame, the agent is innocent, though the action is in itself unjustifiable. But ignorance is rarely a complete vindication. We ought not to place ourselves in a situation which requires more knowledge than we possess; and we ought to qualify ourselves for all the ordinary duties of life, by obtaining that knowledge of general principles, and of particular facts, which is necessary for the right performance of them. This is no difficult task, especially when we have enjoyed the advantage of a good education. When we have sufficient preparatory knowledge, before we are called upon to act, all, which at the moment is demanded from us, will be readily supplied by a calm, composed, and firm mind. While the mind is in this happy state, and we have a noble command over ourselves, we are well guarded against sins of surprise, and it is scarce possible for us to view premeditated wickedness without horror and detestation.

Whatever is opposed to reason in moral principles or conduct, as prejudice, passion, imagination, or delusion of any kind, is opposed to virtue. In whatever degree passion prevails over reason, imagination over judgment, ignorance over knowledge, falsehood over truth, in the same proportion will vice prevail over virtue. Virtue, like truth, is one and uniform,

it is expressed by the direct line of rectitude. Vice, like falsehood, is multifarious, both in its nature and degree, from the smallest obliquity, to those extravagant excesses from which no man can ultimately secure himself, if he once departs from the true principle of duty. A corrupt theory is the sure foundation of a corrupt practice; it proceeds in every enlightened mind, from a voluntary dereliction of reason; it is the first incentive to wickedness, its most efficient instrument, and its most powerful support. Vice has her most fatal influence when she clothes herself with the garb of virtue. The incipient sinner makes his firm advances in guilt, when he finds some softening name to disguise vice, and to present it to his own deceitful imagination, or to the deluded view of other men, under the shape of that virtue, to which it bears a superficial resemblance, though it is infinitely removed from it.

Virtue and vice are contrasted in the estimation of mankind; the former is the object of universal approbation, when once it is fairly presented to the mind; the latter is the object of universal censure, when it appears in its native colours. The higher our moral character, the more shall we penetrate into the real nature of virtue, cherish, esteem, and love her; but the human intellect must be obliterated before we become incapable of discerning the distinction between virtue and vice, and before we refuse the claim which virtue has to our decided

preference. The pre-eminence of virtue will be acknowledged in many cases, through thick clouds of mental depravity*.

What nation is there so barbarous and corrupt, as to have no regard for social manners, humanity, kindness, and gratitude; no detestation of pride, malignity, cruelty, ingratitude †? What, in the opinion of every rational being, is more sordid than avarice? more outrageous than unbridled passion? more contemptible than cowardice? more disgraceful than that wilful stupidity, or folly, which renders us incapable of performing the common duties of life?

Virtue is not venerated, nor vice reprobated only for the consequences they produce; but the former for its own excellence, the latter for its native deformity.

The principal contrast between virtue and vice appears from the several duties which virtue requires us to perform, whether considered separately, or arranged in the large classifications of them. The love which a virtuous man has for God, is changed by vice into a total alienation from him. Acts of pure devotion, or grateful obedience, instead of being regarded as the highest privileges, and the sublimest delights of an intellectual nature, are viewed with abhorrence, and treated with scorn. The heart is hardened, and every trace of the divine being obliterated from the mind. In many cases

* Cicero de Legibus, lib. i. cap. xi.

† Cicero de Legibus, lib. i. cap. xix.

thoughtlessness, predominant passions, stupidity, and a constant round of worldly pursuits, may exclude all sense of religion, without that systematic infidelity, which is the natural fruit of sin. But in many cases a total disbelief of religion is produced by habitual transgression; and in many more the most noxious thorns and briars overrun that ground which the neglect of culture has left vacant for them. Sin of every denomination, having corrupted our nature, and extirpated the genuine principles of religion, lays the true foundation, and becomes the bulwark of superstition. The fear of God is changed into a servile dread of imaginary beings, to whom we ascribe, in our terrific dreams, every folly and every crime, whatever is most opposite to wisdom and to virtue. When the fear of these beings influences our lives, the conduct which we pursue will be directly opposite to that which arises from the fear of God. The contrast between sin and holiness is never more manifest, than when the fruits of sin, infidelity and superstition are opposed to true religion, which is the fruit of virtue, and the great improver of it. Profaneness and blasphemy are connected with superstition, as well as with infidelity; and are strong contrasts to reverence and veneration, to devotion and piety, to thanksgiving and praise.

If we take a view of the duty we owe to our fellow creatures, the principle of social virtue is real love, pure and disinterested benevolence.

If we live in a constant violation of this principle, our whole attention will be engaged in the pursuit of our own private interest, in the gratification of our appetites, or in the indulgence of our most enormous passions.

In the common intercourse of society, there is the same distinction between the virtuous and the vicious, as between the best of princes, and the worst of tyrants. The former acts always with a view to the public good, the latter invariably for his own. The former considers all his fellow-creatures, in their various degrees of relation to him, as the objects of his affection and beneficence. The latter regards them only as the subservient tools of his designs, the passive instruments of his personal gratification.

If we take a view of the duty we owe to ourselves, the object of the virtuous is the subjugation of passion to reason; the object of the vicious is the subjugation of reason to passion, indulging every inordinate appetite without check or control, and employing reason as the instrument of passion, teaching her to excite new desires, to invent new objects of gratification, and to promote the accomplishment of all our wishes.

Virtue is the supreme good of a virtuous man, the polar-star which directs all his steps as far as his virtue is exercised. Vice is equally the constant object, which a vicious man, as far as he is vicious, never fails to pursue. If it is impossible that he should so far deceive himself, as

to suppose vice, under all circumstances, to be conducive to his real advantage, he exclaims in a transport of rage, "*Evil be thou my good;*" and shews the true satanic temper, which Milton so finely describes in preferring evil for the sake of evil, to that good which virtue alone, and obedience to God, can bestow. Wealth, honour, power, fame, and even pleasure itself, will cease to be the objects of the wicked man's idolatry, and will no longer have charms in his eyes than while he conceives they can be obtained by the indulgence of the worst passions, or the perpetration of the greatest crimes.

A mind thoroughly depraved is incapable not only of virtuous, but even of innocent, pleasure. All the pleasures of the wicked must arise from sin. The delusiveness of the pleasures of sin, the uncertainty of obtaining them, their inanity at the very moment of enjoyment, the dreadful consequences which they produce in this world, and to all eternity, have been the favourite themes of the best philosophers and divines.

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b. iv. canto 2, st. 35, 36; canto 3, st. 2; canto 4, st. 1, 11; canto 5, st. 1, 2, 3; canto 6, st. 21 to 24; 33; canto 8, st. 29 to 31; canto 9, st. 1, 2, 19; b. v. st. 3, 9, 10, 11; canto 1, st. 1; canto 2, st. 1; canto 5, st. 38; canto 9, st. 27 to 38; canto 11, st. 49 to 57; b. vi. 4; canto 1, st. 1, 2, 3, 26; canto 2, st. 1, 2; canto 3, st. 1, 2; canto 5, st. 1, 2; canto 6, st. 14, 15; canto 7, st. 1; canto 10, st. 21 to 29.

Milton's *Comus*, v. 210 to 225, 329, 359 to 384, 454 to 463, 589 to 601, 1015 to the end.

Akenside's *Pleasures of the Imagination*, b. i. (first edition) v. 150 to 222, 194 to 280; (last edit.) 430 to 515; b. ii. 150 to 199, 336 to 415; (last edit.) 598 to the end; b. iii.

PERIOD THE SECOND.

CICERO, pro leg. Manil, sect. 13, 14; pro L. Murenâ, sect. 2, "M. Catoni Vitam," &c.; 4. "Quod si licet de-sinere," &c.; "Ego vero, judices," to the end of the section; sect. 9, throughout; sect. 27, "Accusat M. Cato," &c.; sect. 29, "Finxit enim," &c.; sect. 30, "Nostri autem," to "moderatas;" pro Flacco, sect. 12, "Quæritur enim," &c.; pro P. Scyllâ, sect. 25, throughout; and for the same reason, the 26th, 27th, and part of 28th sections; sect. 31, "Sed ut ad sceleratorum," &c. to "deducor;" pro Archiâ P. sect. 7, "Ego multos homines," &c. to "contulissent;" post reditum in Sen. sect. 9, "Non est mei temporis," &c. to the end of the section; post redit. ad Quir. sect. 8, "Mihi, quod," to "permanebit"—"Quanquam ille," to the end of the section; and the whole of sect. 9 and 10; pro Cn. Plancio, sect. 12, from the beginning to "Ædilem factum esse miraris?" In L. Catilinam, orat. iv. sect. 1, "Mihi quidem," to "pariatur;" sect. 6, "Cùm verò mihi proposui," to "subeunda est;" pro Ligario, sect. 11, 12; pro Rege Deiotaro, sect. 2, the beginning, to "Velis judicare;" sect. 3, from the beginning,

to "Senserit;" Tuscul, lib. i. s. 40, to "ponamus;" sect. 45, "Nemo parum diu," to "munere;" pro Sextio, sect. 21, 22, "Neque enim," to "malui;" sect. 38, "Ac si tunc," to the end; sect. 40, "hoc sentire," to "Virtutis"—"Agebat auctoritate," to the end; sect. 41, 45 to 49, 66; pro Balbo, sect. 4, 5, "Athenis," to the end; sect. 6; In Pisonem, s. 24, "Nam ut levitatis," to "repudiare;" sect. 32, the last sentence; pro Milone, sect. 12, "Et si boni," to "parvo;" sect. 23, from beginning, to "peccarint;" sect. 24, the beginning, to "pouisset;" sect. 30, the beginning, to "fecisse pœniteat;" sect. 34, "Etenim si," to "debemus;" pro Raber. Posthumo, sect. 2, the beginning, to "videretur;" sect. 15, the beginning, to "omnibus antepono," in second paragraph of sect. 16; pro Marcello, the six first sections.

Taylor's Civil Law, "Law and Right;" second head, Justice.

Sherlock's Discourses, vol. ii. p. 382, 383.

Jortin's Sermons, vol. i. p. 87; vol. ii. p. 22 to 25, 47 to 50.

Waterland's Sermons, vol. i. p. 277, 278.

PERIOD THE THIRD.

CICERO, Orat. Phil. iii. sect. 11, "Hodierno die," to the end; sect. 13, "Hunc ego diem," to the end of section 14; Phil. iv. sect. 5, "Quamquam mortem," to the end of the section; Phil. ix. sect. 3, "At ille," to "perseveravit;" sect. 4, throughout; Phil. x. sect. 1, "Declarasti," to "invidere;" sect. 10, "Omnes nationes," to "patriæ reddere;" Phil. xi. sect. 3, "Est enim sapientis," to "Si evenerit;" Phil. xiii. sect. 3, "At incertus exitus belli," to the end of the section; sect. 8, "Bonos," to "apparet;" sect. 21, "Optatissimum," to "Cupiditate;" de Finibus, lib. i. c. 9, "Quærimus," to "nusquam;" lib. ii. c. 9, "Et quidem illud," to "mediocritate vitiorum;" c. 14, "Honestum

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“igitur,” to the end; c. 16, the beginning, to “Teste
 “moveamur;” c. 20; c. 25; c. 34; lib. iii. c. 3; c. 4,
 “Cum enim virtutis,” to “sustulerunt;” c. 8, “Quod
 “vero negari nullo modo,” to the end; c. 15, “Sed
 “quanquam,” to “putant”—“Quod si de Artibus,” to
 “Videamus;” c. 16, “Sequitur ille,” to the end;
 c. 21, 22; lib. iv. c. 19, the beginning, to “Vocabulis
 “nascitur;” lib. v. c. 2, “Ista studia,” to “imitari velis;”
 c. 14, 15, “Est enim,” to the end; c. 21, c. 22, c. 23,
 c. 24, c. 25, to “summi boni;” c. 32, to “beatior;”
 lib. i. c. 1, “Qui autem,” to the end; lib. ii. c. 15,
 “Videsne,” to “honeste;” c. 18, “Si Scieris, inquit
 “Carneades,” to the end; lib. iv. c. 24; Tuscul. lib. i.
 c. 1, “Jam illa,” to “comparanda?” c. 37, “Cur igitur,”
 to the end; c. 38, the beginning, to “consequatur;”
 lib. ii. c. 4, c. 5, the beginning, to “uberrimos ferant;”
 c. 2. “Sed videsne,” to the end; c. 17, 18; lib. iii. 7.
 8, 16, 17; lib. iv. c. 13, “Atque ut in malis,” to the
 end; c. 14, the beginning, to “tollantur;” c. 15, 16,
 17, 18, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 36, 38; lib. v. c. 13, c. 16,
 “Qualis,” to “Vitam;” c. 18, 25, 28; de Senectute,
 c. 13, “Norat,” to “sequeretur;” de Legibus, lib. iii.
 c. 14, c. 19, “Intercessor,” to “esto;” de Officiis, lib. i.
 c. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, “Meminerimus,” to the
 end; c. 14 to 23, 25 to 39, 41, 43; lib. ii. c. 5, “Et-
 “enim,” to the end; c. 15, 16, 19; lib. iii. c. 3, 8,
 “Quamobrem,” to the end; c. 13, “Neque enim,” to
 the end; c. 25, 27, 28, 29, 33, 34; de Amicitia, c. 2,
 “Rectè tu quidem,” to the end; c. 3, c. 5, “Agamus
 “igitur,” to “vivendi ducem;” c. 8, 9, 16, 18, 21, 22,
 “23, 24, 25, 26, 27; Paradox, i. c. 3, “Tu cum,” to the
 end.

Seneca, de Irâ, lib. i. c. 5 to c. 14, the last sentence
 of the book; lib. ii. c. 6; “Necesse est,” in c. 12 to the
 end of 13th; c. 24, 25, 27, “affecti sumus,” to the
 end; lib. iii. c. 5, 6, 36; ad Helviam, c. 13; de Tran-
 quillitate Animi, c. i. “Puto,” to “Assentatus est,”
 c. 3, 4; de Constantiâ Sapientis, c. 8, 10; de Clementiâ,

lib. ii. end of c. 1, c. 3, 5, 6, 7; de Vitâ Beatâ, c. 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 23, "Donabit," to the end; c. 24, c. 26, "Suspiciate virtutem," to the end.

Grotius, *Philosophorum Sententiæ de fato*, p. 198, 199, 211, 252, 276 to 280.

Grotius, (Barbeyrac's) *Prelim. Dissert.* par. 44, with the notes; 45, 46, with the notes; b. ii. c. 13, sect. 21, div. 5, sect. 22; c. 16, sect. 29; c. 18, sect. 7; c. 19, sect. 5, div. 2; c. 20, sect. 1; sect. 4, div. 3; sect. 5, 7, 8, 19, 20, div. 2; sect. 21, 22, 23; c. 21, sect. 1, div. 2; sect. 5, div. 1, 2; c. 24, sect. 3; c. 25, sect. 6; b. iii. c. 1, sect. 20; c. 4, 5, 18, 19; c. 11, sect. 7, div. 1, 4; sect. 13, 14, 15, 16; c. 12, sect. 1, 4, 5, 6, 8; ch. 14, sect. 4, 5; c. 15, sect. 1; c. 21, sect. 1, div. 1.

Loix de Platon, tom. i. p. 21, 22, 54 to 58, 68, 72, 77, 109, 163, 181 to 184, 190, 201, 202, 252 to 267, 346, 347, 375 to 379; tom. ii. p. 53, 124 to 128, 188, 218, 316, 380, 398.

Phedon de M. M. p. 122 to 125.

Lord Monboddo's *Ancient Metaphysics*, vol. v. p. 110, 111, 125, 135, 137, 138, 144 to 147.

Dr. Nichols's *Anima Medica*, paragraph 1st, 2d, and 3d.

Necker, de la *Revolution Française*, tom. ii. p. 22.

Cumberland's *Law of Nature*, *Introduct.* sect. 24, 25, 30; ch. v. beginning of sect. 5; sect. 47; ch. vi. sect. 8; ch. viii. sect. 7, 11, 12, 13.

Rutherford on *Virtue*, p. 21, 24.

Burges's *Sylloge*, p. 15, s. 3; p. 16, s. 5; p. 17, s. 1; p. 20, s. 5, 6; p. 26, s. 6; p. 29, s. 1; p. 33, s. 4.

Newcome, on *Our Lord's Conduct*, p. 399, 409, 412, 413.

Barrow's *Sermons*, vol. i. *Serm.* ii. par. 2, (p. 16) "it hath all relations;" *Serm.* iv. (p. 44, 45,) "We might," to "common sense;" *Serm.* ix. part ii. (p. 119); *Serm.* xiii. p. 1, div. i.; *Serm.* xv. div. 8, "*εκ ανδρος*," to "the name of Christians;" *Serm.* xix. part 1, div. 1, 3, (p. 263, 264,) part 11, div. 4; *Serm.* xxi.

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the peroration; Serm. xxiv. part 4, div. 11; Serm. xxv. 3d div. in the conclusion; Serm. xxvi. part 1, div. 3, 4, 5; Serm. xxvii. part 9, 10, 11; Serm. xxviii. p. 4, 17, 18.; Serm. xxix. part 1, 2, 3, div. 5, 9; the beginning of Serm. xxx. and div. 7, *ibid.* p. 414.

Hill's Sermons, p. 56 to 59.

PERIOD THE FOURTH.

PLUTARCHI Vitæ, Pelopidas,—

Ὅτι δε θανον, & ζῆν δεμενοι καλον, & δε το θνησκειν,

Αλλα το, ταυτα καλως αμφοτερ' ἐλελεσαι.

Lucian, Hermotinus, c. 78, 79.

Aristotle, (Gillies) Ethics, b. ii. c. 1, 2, 3, 4, these in particular, but the whole book is very useful; b. iii. c. 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 12; b. iv. throughout; b. v. c. 6, 8, 11; b. vi. c. 11, 12, 13; b. vii. c. 1, 8, 9, 10; b. viii. c. 3; b. ix. c. 4, 5; b. x. c. 1, 2, 3, 4. Politics, b. i. c. 8; b. iii. c. 3; b. iv. c. 14; b. v. c. 3; b. vi. c. 8; b. vii. the beginning of c. 9.

Seneca de Beneficiis, lib. i. c. 2, "Ne cessaveris," to the end; c. 5, 6, 7, 13, "Quid enim illi," (sc. Alexandro) to the end; c. 15; lib. ii. c. 6, 11, "Si gratos," to the end; c. 18, "Toties admoneam," to "contumaciter parrent;" c. 22, 34, "Fortitudo," to "Angustias;" lib. iii. c. 28; lib. iv. c. 1, 2, 3, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 26, 27; lib. v. c. 2, 3; lib. vi. c. 7, "Beneficium nullum est," to the end; c. 11, c. 12, 13, c. 29, c. 34, "Male de te existimas," to the end; lib. vii. c. 14, "At mehercule to the end; c. 15, c. 26, from the beginning, to "pœnitet;" epistola v. the beginning, to "inspexerit propius;" vi. the beginning, to "videt;" xi. "Aliquis vir," to the end; xvi. "plus operis," to "dirigit cursum;" xx. the beginning, to "Solus intelligas;" xxxi. "Quemadmodum," to "noscantur;" xxxiv. "Pars magna bonitatis," to the end; xxxv. "Quoties experiri voles," to the end; xlv. "Vitia nobis sub virtutum nomine," to the end; lxi. lxiv. lxvi. lxxiv. "Honestam vitam," to "non potest effici;" lxxx.

“ Cogito mecum,” to “ ut sis bonus? velle;” lxxxii.
 “ Concedo tibi ita,” to “ sui repugnavit”—“ Vides
 “ quam simplex et imperiosa virtus sit,” to the end;
 lxxxiv. “ Talem animum,” to the end; lxxxv. “ Huic
 “ enim propositum,” to “ Sapientia imperat;” lxxxviii.
 “ unâ re consummatur animus,” to “ subsidium habet;”
 xc. “ Non enim dat natura virtutem,” to the end;
 xcii. “ Quid ergo inquit,” to “ meum, non ipse.” xciv.
 “ Duæ res plurimum,” to “ transfiguratus est.” xcvi.
 “ Nam ut Dii immortales,” to “ quemadmodum
 “ fiat;” cxviii. “ Quidam ita finiunt, bonum est,” to
 the end; cxx. the beginning, to “ Qui unde venerit,
 “ meminit.”

Lipsius, *Manuductio ad Stoicam*, &c. lib. ii. diss. x. xxii.; lib. iii. diss. iv. xviii. div. 2, “ Sapientem non
 “ insanire,” to “ præter naturam;” diss. xix. xxix. *Phy-
 “ siologiæ Stoicorum*, lib. iii. diss. iii. the quotation
 from “ Agapetus ad Justimanum;” *ibid.* *Monita et
 exempla Politica*. Quotation from Æschylus, in the
 beginning of chap. 7.

Des Cartes *Ethica*, ch. i. sect. 1, 2, “ Secunda est,” to
 “ quæ refertur;” sect. 3, “ His nihil est quod addam,”
 to the end; ch. ii. sect. 3, “ Unum autem duntaxat,” to
 “ dedignationis.”

Harris’s *Three Treatises*, (8vo. 1744) p. 168 to 175,
 209, 210, 214, 219, 236 to 240, 298, 299, 335 to 340, 350.
 —Hermes, (ed. 1751) p. 302, 303, 407.—*Philosophical
 Arrangements*, p. 30, 57, 154, 157 to 160, 281 and
 note, 480; *Philological Inquiries*, vol. ii. p. 434 to 436,
 (the sentiment, that felicity excels virtue, and ought to
 be our ultimate object, is very objectionable.)

Puller on the Moderation of the Church of England,
 p. 7 to 21.

Stewart’s *Philosophy of the Mind*, p. 20, 516, 517.

Camille Jourdan, à ses committans, “ Voyez ici les
 “ proscriptions renouvelées,” p. 127 to the end of the
 book.

Lord Bacon’s *Works*, (fol.) vol. i. p. 73, “ and there-
 “ fore as Plato,” to “ the will of man;” p. 80, the

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defence of virtue, at the bottom of the page ; p. 82, " Now, " therefore," to p. 88, " the strength and vigour of it."

Sanderson's Sermons ; Serm. i. Ad Aulam, sect. 23, 24, 25, 30 ; Serm. vi. sect. 21 ; Serm. viii. sect. 37, 38, 40 ; Serm. xvi. div. 18 ; Serm. xvii. div. 37, 38, 44.— Ad Clerum, the beginning of Serm. iv. commenting on Aquinas's Definition ; part ii. Ad Magistratum, Serm. ii. div. 8, 9, 10.

Spectator, No. 79 ; the Character of Eudosia, 93 ; the conclusion of 94, 139, 152, 230 ; the beginning ; 243, 248, 340, 349, 350, 368, 373, 374, 375.

PERIOD THE FIFTH.

PLATO (Dacier's) vol. i. p. 66, 77 ; vol. ii. p. 60, 99, 202, 203, 228, 229, 325.

Philebus of Plato (French Translation of some of Plato's Dialogues), vol. ii. p. 362 to 366.

Quintilian, Proœmium, div. 2, lib. ii. c. 4, sect. 3 ; lib. x. c. 2, sect. i. p. 416, " Studendum," to " perfectum," (by Analogy), p. 473 to 476, 482, 483, 520, " Sed et copia," &c. ; 522, 525, " Quinimo si," to the end.

Plutarch's Lives, the Proœmium of P. Æmilius. The character of Marcellus, vol. iii. p. 61.

Boethius, (Constan's translation) p. 133.

Turretini Dissertationes. tom. i. diss. 7, prop. 8, p. 305 to 309, 313, 314.

Sydenham's Meno, Arg. p. 15, 16 ; n. 60, p. 82 ; n. 67, p. 90, 91 ; n. p. 122, 123, 126 ; n. p. 174, 175, 177.

Burlemaqui, vol. i. p. 31 ; b. i. c. xi. ; sect. 4 to 10 ; b. ii. c. ix. sect. 4, to the end of the chapter.

Montaigne, Essais de, liv. i. the beginning of ch. 12, ch. 36, " Il ne se reconnoist," to " la plus belle que se puisse ;" ch. 38, " Presentezvous," to the end ; liv. ii. p. 247, " C'est un mot de Demosthenes," &c. ; p. 286, 287, 288 (en Suicide), p. 350, 532, the end of p. 553, " Je ne veux pas," &c. ; ch. xxi. 635 ; ch. 36, particularly the character of Epaminondas, 679, 680, 719, (Praise of Epaminondas) 720, (the same) 721, 734, 942, 962, 973, 977, 1031, 1032, 1033.

Charron, sur la Sagesse, liv. i. ch. 47, p. 203, 323, 324, 326 to 332, 340, 374, 375; liv. ii. c. 11, sect. 3, 4, 12, 16; p. 608, 609; liv. iii. c. 11. Fortescue de L.L. A. (edit. 1741), p. 7, 10.

Bacon's Essays, 38, of Nature.

Spens's Republic, p. 42, 43, 100 to 103, 110, 111, 122, 172 to 175, 231, 232, 240.

Cogan on the Passions, p. 133 to 138, 310, 316, 335, 351, 371.

Foster's Natural Religion, vol. i. p. 117.

Grove's Morals, vol. i. Introduct. sect. 4, p. 253, 254; part. ii. c. 7, s. 13; ch. 8, s. 25; vol. ii. part ii. sect. 3, ch. 1, sect. 2, 3, 11, 15; ch. 3, s. 1, 2, 4; ch. 4, s. 3, 4, 5, 8; ch. 5, s. 1, 2, 7, 8; ch. 7, s. 11, ch. 14; s. 2, 4.

Bp. Taylor's Sermons, Serm. vi. p. 69, 70; Serm. xi. p. 134; Serm. xv. p. 187, 188, 195; Serm. xvi. p. 203, 204; Serm. xvii. p. 210, 211; Serm. xx. p. 252 to 254; Serm. xxiv. p. 302, 307, 310.

Whichcot's Discourses, vol. i. p. 343 to 345; vol. ii. p. 88, 400 to 405; vol. iii. p. 222 and part of 223, 426, to the end; vol. iv. p. 88 to 94, 120 to 128, 233, 429 to 433.

Barrow's Sermons, vol. iii. p. 170, 185, 193, 203, (Def. of Industry), 211 to 213, 227 to 231, 349, 390 to 396.

PERIOD THE SIXTH.

PLUTARCHI Parallela, vol. iv. p. 9, 10, *ἐπὶ δὲ ὄντος* to *παραλαβεῖν*.

Horatii Carminum, lib. iii. ode 5, "Neque amissos colores," &c.; lib. iv. ode 9, v. 29 to 44; Satir. lib. ii.; sat. ii. v. 63 to 69.

Olivet's Thoughts of Cicero, p. 65, 66.

Browne's Religio Medici, p. 23, "When life is more terrible than death, it is then the truest valour to dare to live."

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Monboddo's Origin of Language, vol. i. p. 439, 440; vol. ii. p. 423, 424; vol. iii. p. 124; vol. iv. p. 367; vol. v. p. 341, 342; vol. vi. p. 79 to 82, 194 to 199, 370 to 373, 380 to 388, 458.

Crousaz la Logique, p. i. s. 1, ch. 6; div. 7, s. 2, ch. 3, div. 5, par. 5, 6; par. ii. ch. 2, div. 3; p. 4, ch. 13.

Cumberland (Maxwell's) introduct. p. 48, 49, 138 to 141. Main work, p. 31, ch. i. sect. 35; ch. ii. sect. 2, 3, p. 275, 308 to 311, 330 to 340. Appendix, p. 69 to 75.

Hutcheson, (Leechman's) pref. p. 18, 19; Mor. Phil. b. i. ch. 3, sect. 4, div. 3; ch. 9, sect. 10, latter part; c. 11, sect. 2; b. ii. ch. 3, sect. 3; ch. 5, sect. 1, div. 4; sect. 4, 5, 6; ch. 16, sect. 8, 9; ch. 17, sect. 1, 7, 8, 9; b. iii. ch. 1, sect. 2, the latter part very good.—Inquiry concerning moral good and evil, sect. 2, div. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10; sect. 3, div. 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15.

Beattie on Truth (4to.), p. 271 to 287.

Bp. Taylor's Ductor Dubitantium, preface, p. x. xiii.; b. i. ch. 2, rule 4; b. ii. ch. 1, r. 3, ch. 3; r. 6, sect. 1, 6, 7, 8; r. 3, sect. 4 to the end; r. 5, sect. 19, 20; r. 6, sect. 18; b. iv. ch. 1, r. 1, sect. 7, 8, 9, 18; r. 2, sect. 30, 31, 32, 38, 39; r. 3, sect. 1; r. 4, sect. 1; r. 5, sect. 16; ch. ii. r. 2, sect. 10.

Lee's Antisepticism, b. iv. ch. 12, sect. 5, 6, 7.

Scott's Christian Life (8vo.) vol. iii. p. 32; part i. ch. 3, sect. 1, div. 3, on Fortitude; vol. iii. p. 240, 241.

Tillotson's Sermons, (12mo.) vol. iv. p. 35, 36, 268 to 278; vol. v. p. 358, 373; vol. vi. p. 163 to 166, 253; vol. vii. p. 32.

South's Sermons, vol. i. p. 378 to 381, 393, 397, 423, 424; vol. iv. p. 186, 187, 215, 216, 446; vol. vi. p. 166.

PERIOD THE SEVENTH.

XENOPHON, *Απομν.* Β. ἀ; κερ. ἀ, ἰ, ς.; κερ. β. ζ'; κερ. γ. ιγ', ιδ'. Β. β'; κερ. γ. ις'. εκ, ορας, &c. ιζ'; κερ. ς'.

κβ. κγ. κδ. κε. λθ. Β. γ. ; κεφ. δ. ; κεφ. ε. κη. ; κεφ. θ. α. Γ. γ. δ. ε. ιδ. ιε. ; κεφ. ι. γ. δ. ε. ; κεφ. ιδ. ζ. Β. δ. ; κεφ. α. ; κεφ. β. κδ. κέ. κς. κς. κς. ; κεφ. γ. α. ; κεφ. η. ; Απολογία, θ. ιθ. λγ. λδ.

Μενανδρου Λειψανα ; εκ τε ανδρογυνου, α. β. ; εκ τε γεωργου, α. ; εκ τε Ηνιοχου α. ; εκ τε Ηρωου β. ; εν τε παρχηδοου α. ; εκ της κνιδιας β. ; εκ τε κολακου α. ; εκ των συνεφηδων α. ; εξ αδηλων δραματων κη. ξ. ξε. ξς. ξθ. ; Φιλεμονου Λειψανα, εκ των αδηλων ι. νε, ξη πα. ; Βασιλεις Ομιλια προς νεου, αριστον μεν το απαντα.

Cicero, Orat. pro Archiâ, “ ego multos homines,” to “ contulissent.”

Cicero, paradox iii.

Aristotelis Metaphysica, το Δ. ις. ιθ. κ. κβ. ει το μελαξυ.

Epicurus's Morals, p. 4, Maxim 28, 36.

Grotii Excerpta, ex Sophocle, p. 61, Ανδρι το Ατηρ ; 77, Αλλ' εν το μιã ; 97, τις γαρ εσθλου εκ αυτω φιλος ; 115, 117, Εξοιδα το πρεπει. Ex Euripide, p. 157 to 159, Ουκ εν το μαθων ; 189, ε μην το κακως ; 225, χρη το νενομισται ; p. 229, το γαρ τοπραξειν ; 261, φιλειν το προμηθεια ; p. 277, τροφαι το αυξει ; 279, Ύψηλοφρων το εξωκωμενοις ; 295, φιλω το τομα ; 297. φευγειν το δυσκλεες ; 307, Προς σοφου το ευεργησιαν ; 321, εν δε το τομα ; 329, 331, Αφρονες το πολεις ; 349, Εγω το κακον ; 383, τας χαριτας το δυσγενεσθιροι ; 457, Αιδω το δορυμαχε ; 461, Ω Παϊ το αι ποτε ; 465, εν γης το καλον.

Spens's Republic of Plato, p. 100 to 103, 110 to 113, 121, 122.

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to "pro verissimis rebus admirantur"—from "non
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ESSAY VIII.

ON THE BEING OF GOD.

THE first object which presents itself to the senses, gives us the idea of identity. The second object gives us the ideas of number, sameness, difference, diversity, variety and uniformity. These ideas are infinitely multiplied, as the number of objects increase which come under our observation, and as we consider the relations between them. If objects of vision move before the eye in succession, we acquire the ideas of priority and posteriority. If two objects are viewed, one in motion and the other at rest, and the one in motion impinges upon the one at rest, and disturbs the quiet of its position, we are apprized by the visual faculty, that the former body has influence over the latter, and from hence are enabled to form the abstract idea of cause and effect.

When we have once formed this idea, we cannot see the motions of a series of distinct material substances, without supposing, that each of these bodies has influence over the one which is subsequent to it, and that there is a prime mover; unless we imagine that each body is independent of the other, and being endowed with a soul, has a principle of motion within itself.

If any substance appears to have no properties, but those which arise from matter and motion, we cannot conceive such a body to have a principle of motion within itself, and we often know, from intuition or experience, that one body receives its motion from another. This is evident to the eye in the case I mentioned, when one body impinges upon another. It is evident to every other sense in other cases. We can verify it by experience, whenever we raise our arm, pour water out of a pitcher, form our mouth to speech, stop a body in motion, or exercise any corporal faculty.

We are therefore certainly assured that motion may be communicated, and that it cannot belong, without communication, to any substance merely material. The original power of communicating it must belong to mind alone. Mind alone can be a prime mover.

When we observe the relations which objects of sense mutually bear, we find that they must be referrible to time, and with respect to each other, synsynchronous, prior, or posterior. What is posterior may be caused by what is prior; those objects which are synchronous, may be both of them the effects of the same cause.

We do not, however, pronounce one object to be a cause and another an effect, solely because the former is prior to the latter; nor do we conceive two objects to be the effects of the same cause, because they are synchronous.

We do not conceive even the possibility of

that relation subsisting, which we style cause and effect, unless the first appears to have a power of producing the second.

This power, when once proved, only shews the possibility of the first being the cause, and the second the effect. It does not convince us, that this is really the case. This actual efficiency of any cause to produce an effect, must be proved by such evidence as is suitable to existing circumstances; by the senses upon many occasions; by testimony in others; by rational conjecture, which may be as convincing as intuition; or by what may be called, the method of exhaustion; when we prove every hypothesis inadequate to the phenomenon except one. If this can be fully proved, this one hypothesis must be admitted as a satisfactory solution.

All medical skill, all moral and natural philosophy, all wisdom displayed in public or private life, the most valuable knowledge we possess, even that of our own hearts, depends upon the system of causes and effects. If we were incapable of arguing from an effect to its cause, we should cease to be rational, and be degraded below the brutes.

We must not however suppose, that every single effect is produced by a single cause. On the contrary, the causes may be innumerable, which are required to produce a single effect, and they must all of them be actually employed. This complication, great as it is, is more diffi-

cult to unravel, because a long series of these causes may be physical, and only instrumental, and at the same time a large proportion of them may be moral.

Moral causes are likewise extremely complicated, for they may originate from the determination of the highest beneficence and wisdom, or any inferior degree of it, from the malignity of the most depraved agents, from folly, caprice, or they may arise as natural causes do, from the collision of incompatible designs, each rendered abortive, yet each producing some effect.

When human knowledge is confined to those objects which are presented to the senses, it is merely numeration ; when extended to individual objects made known to us by testimony or by history, it is only an exercise of memory ; when individuals are ranged under the artificial divisions of species, genera, or classes, it is an exercise of combination, which is an assistance to the memory, and constitutes the science of natural history ; for a science it may be called, as it is conversant with abstract ideas, there being in nature no species, genus, or class. These are terms invented by the combining powers of the human mind. But while memory alone, or combination, are employed, although the understanding is improved, no knowledge is acquired, which can be considered as real wisdom, for it can neither be the source of new speculations, nor our guide in active life.

Neither the higher nor the most useful ener-

gies of the mind are called forth, until they are connected with the investigation of causes.

The human understanding is in a constant state of advancement, while in its contemplations it ascends from the most proximate to the supreme cause, whether it ascends through a long series of gradation, or at once acknowledges the powerful agency of that God, who is not remote from any intellectual creature, and, as the moral governor of man, is * “*about his path, and about his bed, and spieth out all his ways.*”

We have not an intuitive knowledge of God, for it would be incompatible with his spiritual nature; nor have we that innate idea of him, which would preclude the exercise of our understanding, and supersede free agency. There is a degree, not of idiotcy and lunacy alone, but of folly, ignorance, and stupidity; there is a depravity and hardness of heart, which, when indulged, would produce atheism. Faith in God, the first principle of religion, as well as of every subordinate species of faith, is accompanied by an act of the will, which implants a desire in us to be enlightened upon sacred truth, and to pay proper attention to the evidences which support it. The higher we soar in knowledge, and the more widely we extend it, the greater our capacity, the more solid the foundation of our reasonings, and the more accurately they are pursued; in the same proportion will our conception of God

* Psalm cxxxix. 2.

be raised, and the belief of his existence firmly established in our minds.

To the most untutored minds, if they exercise the least reflection, the glorious phenomena of the material world, the sun by day, the moon and unnumbered stars by night, the vicissitudes of day and night, of summer and winter, the temperature of the atmosphere, thunder, winds and storms, hurricanes, earthquakes and volcanoes, the general face of this terraqueous globe, with its infinite variety of unorganized bodies, upon the surface, and within the bowels of the earth, are invincible proofs of some unknown cause, powerful and intelligent. The power and intelligence far exceeds our comprehension upon the first superficial view, when we only open our eyes and look around us. Our astonishment is constantly increasing, as we proceed in our knowledge of the solar system, and discover that every one of the fixed stars, which are literally beyond any number that man can ascertain or imagine, is itself a sun, the centre of a system like our own. Our astonishment is constantly increasing, by microscopical as well as telescopical discoveries, when we find a drop of water as well prepared for the sustenance of insects, and as harmoniously adjusted, as the Atlantic Ocean for its innumerable inhabitants, or for the navigation of men; when we are convinced that a very small portion of the material world is of equal importance to a vast variety of animals, rising above each other in their

diminutive scale, as the solar system to ourselves. I speak now only of unorganized matter. Could this subsist without a cause? Yes, says the atheist, it has subsisted from all eternity without one. If there were any difference between gross absurdities, it would be still more extravagant to assert, that the most splendid monuments of design could subsist through all eternity, without an intelligent cause, than to suppose that they could subsist without one at the present moment. But eternity cannot be predicated of any material substance, neither of the whole, nor of any portion of the material world. Whatever is material must be divisible. Whatever is divisible cannot be infinite, either with respect to time or space.

Eternity, if applied to the material world, must mean infinite duration. There would, therefore, be an infinity of moments surpassing an infinity of minutes as sixty to one, and so on of hours, days, months, years, or centuries. The material world certainly subsists in time, and the revolution of some of its component parts, whether the planets or the wheels of a watch measures time. It therefore cannot have subsisted from eternity. There must have been a finite commencement of its duration, however extended you may suppose the series of succession to have been.

The atheist, being driven from this ground, seeks for a refuge in mechanism, necessity, or chance; and supposes, that from one or other of

these three causes, or all of them combined, the material world has arisen. Gravitation is decisive against mechanism, for matter cannot act upon matter except by contiguity and impulse. Every particle of matter is attracted by every other particle in the universe, as far as it is not overpowered by some stronger attraction ; every particle in the centre of this globe, with every particle in the centre of Saturn. Can gravitation be an inherent quality of matter ? or can it be impressed upon it without an external agent ? Gravity alone will not explain the revolution of primary planets round the sun, or of secondary planets round any of the primary ones. There must be, fitly-proportioned to each planet or satellite, an impulsive or transverse force, which is equally inconsistent with mechanism. The whole material world, therefore, originated and subsists by one great pervading principle ; and the revolutions of the planets, which operate upon the whole of our solar system, depend upon a counteracting principle of equal power and extent. Neither of these principles can arise from mechanism, because they derive all their influence from another source, and whatever we call mechanism arises from them.

If the universe is deducible from necessity, it must be eternal, which has been shewn to be impossible, nor could any part or any phenomenon of it, or any change of which it is susceptible, be conceived different from what it now is ; nor could it have that vicissitude, or variety,

or combination of powers, which is essential to its frame. Motion cannot be eternal, nor inherent, in matter; or, if you suppose either of these hypotheses possible, it could never at any period have produced such a system, as this material world.

Chance can never be considered as an original cause; for, as I before stated, it proceeds from a collision of prior agencies.

So far I have considered the evidence of the being of God, as arising from a very general and comprehensive view of the material world by our senses, with the assistance of glasses indeed, but without any investigation of organized matter, or of the uses for which the universe was designed. Our admiration has hitherto been solely excited by those amazing objects, which common experience, mineralogy, and astronomy, so forcibly obtrude upon us. The study of natural philosophy, chemistry, and anatomy, though still confining us to the material world, will enlarge the mind to far higher conceptions.

When we ascend to organized matter, and examine the structure of a plant and animal, we shall be still more convinced, that the succession of plants and animals could not have been continued from all eternity, or, commencing at any period of time, have been the result of blind unconscious mechanism, necessity, or chance. The impossibility is clear, when we examine only the mode in which every vegetable, or insect, or bird, or beast, is formed;

and it becomes more and more conspicuous, when we explore final causes, and see the uses for which every part must have been designed; the mutual dependence of one part, whether solid or liquid, upon the rest of the body; the wonderful assortment and concatenation of the whole; the importance of this mechanism, to the growth, the health, the preservation of the individual, and the propagation of the species. The proof of an intelligent cause is farther confirmed, if it can be supposed to acquire more strength than the harmony of the internal structure affords, by the uses to which every plant and animal may be applied, and by the mutual connection between plants and animals.

The harmony of the internal structure corresponds with those laws of nature, by which the species is continued and preserved in its essential characters, although there may be great diversity in culture or in discipline. Equivocal generation is now universally exploded. The atheist allows that every part of the animal frame is adapted for those uses which are generally assigned; that we see with our eyes, hear with our ears, and conserve our health and life by the regular state of our vital functions; but he says, that these parts of the corporeal frame were not intended for the purposes to which we apply them. But is not this an assumption of the point in debate?—And can the cause of atheism appear more desperate, than when it depends upon the truth of such an assumption?

If we suppose that it is chance alone, which preserves the human species, and supports life by all those internal operations in the human body which are constantly in action, although we are unconscious of them; and if we suppose that we see, because we happen to have eyes; I do not conceive any barrier which can be opposed to universal scepticism. Why do we imagine that the greatest conquerors in the world, or the wisest legislators, acted with any design, or had any view to the gratification of benevolent or selfish passions? Why do we suppose that a medal, with a workmanship and inscription to mark its age, is not a sport of nature, or that the finest work of art, or the most splendid production of genius, is not the result of chance; unless upon a principle, which must as fully convince us that the whole organized frame of nature, the plants, the animals, which occupy every space in this terraqueous globe, and man himself, as far as he is an animal, was originally created, and is still preserved by one supreme intelligence, having at the same moment the whole in view, and harmonizing all the parts by their mutual and correspondent relations.

The view of unorganized matter convinces us that it arose from a powerful and intelligent cause. When we consider all matter as designed for the sustenance and comfort of sentient beings, and know how admirably it is contrived for that purpose; when we are duly apprized of

the relation which sentient beings bear to inanimate matter, of the inconceivable extent of that matter, and the indefinite variety of modification which directs every particle of it to its destined end; when we learn to appreciate the blessing of existence, and the actual enjoyments which every sentient being feels, we shall be assured that there is one great first cause, as admirable for his goodness, as for his wisdom and power.

But the material world (if we use the term in its most capacious sense, and extend it to all the produce of this earth, and to all the animals which it sustains, even to man himself, as far as he partakes of the animal nature) vanishes, when compared with the intellectual world. It is the intellectual world alone, which affords the idea of a rational or a social being, of free agency, responsibility, religion, and relation of the creature to the Creator. A rational being is placed as a spectator in this noble theatre of the universe, to view and applaud these glorious scenes in earth and heaven. Man is powerfully excited to offer praise to God for the irrational part of the creation. But when he withdraws his eyes from objects of sense, and contemplates his own mind, his talents of unbounded extent, his liberty to improve these talents by exercise, or to ruin them by neglect; his capacity, of knowledge, of virtue, and of religion;—when these speculations lead him fully to comprehend his own intellectual nature, he will be convinced

that he was created in the image of God; that all the highest faculties he possesses, are faint transcripts of the Deity.

If a being is endowed with any intellectual or moral quality, however imperfect it may be, that being may conceive the possibility of this quality existing in the highest perfection. The lower scales of intellect are inadequate to the conception of superior excellence, and probably no created being can ever arrive at a full knowledge of the divine nature; but a created being endowed with imperfect reason, will imagine a reason more perfect than his own; and as man pursues this delightful speculation, he will discern a regular gradation of excellence to which he can set no limits. He obtains, therefore, some idea of the incomprehensible God.

When God created the material world by his almighty word, by the efficiency of his power, directed by his wisdom and his goodness, he produced an astonishing work, but totally dissimilar to himself. When he created man, he produced some faint transcript of his own mind, in the same manner as the real artist displays his genius in the beauty of a statue, in the glowing expression of a picture, in the magnificence of a stately edifice, in the composition of a poem or oration, and in all the walks of taste, erudition, or science.

Nothing can come from nothing. If there ever was a time in which there was nothing existing, no production or creation could ever have taken

place ; but when we suppose mind to exist, we introduce a principle which may be considered as infinite in its operations, for it extends to whatever does not imply a contradiction. If mind is defective in power, it must be imperfect. The obstruction to its power must arise from some deficiency in its own knowledge or wisdom, or from a failure in the external materials which it is obliged to use. The works of an intellectual being are not produced from nothing ; but from the archetypal idea conceived in the mind of the opificer. If materials are employed, they have an existence exterior to mind, and prior to the work. The pure marble of the statuary is prepared for him, but the statue, carved out of it, is a new creation of the artist's mind. In the highest works of human genius, the execution may be complete, before there is any recourse to the material world. The philosopher may have finished his dissertation, or the inspired bard his poem, by the sublimest reach of creative genius, before he commits it to paper. The orator may have exhausted his rich stores of eloquence in his private meditations, before he clothes them with the graces of a fascinating elocution. If the human mind can so entirely in this life divest itself of matter, as to create independently of it,—can there be any difficulty in supposing the supreme cause to have created matter in its rude state, and afterwards to have formed and fashioned it in that admirable beauty, and those nice adjustments of its several parts,

which is now presented to all our senses in the external world? Astonishing as that world is, it bears no proportion in real excellence to those powers with which we know man to be endowed.

If the hypothesis of an infinite independent succession, without any first commencement or intelligent cause in the corporeal world, has been shewn to be impossible, it surely cannot be less absurd to imagine, that there has been an infinite succession, without any original cause, of the human race, composed, as that race is, of mind as well as of body, and every individual of it uniting in his own person the intellectual and the corporeal world. If the least particle of unorganized matter, if the organized frame of man requires a creator, surely his mind must have originated from a mind like his own in nature, although infinitely superior in capacity, knowledge, wisdom, purity, and holiness.

Whatever intellect there is in the universe, manifested in the productions of human genius through all successive ages, or very imperfectly conceived by us, though probably subsisting to an unimaginable extent in the invisible world; it must all be derived from one supreme cause—the Deity, whose wisdom far surpasses the intellectual powers of all his creatures. The Creator must be more perfect than the creature. But a Creator endowed with perfect intellect, and perfect liberty of action, may create any intellectual being, and bestow upon him any limited portion of intellect and liberty. He may enable

his creature to be a prime-mover, which every free agent must be, in his appointed sphere. He may exert any power when no contradiction is implied; and that he has exerted the power of creating a free agent in our own case, we know from consciousness and experience, we are equally assured of our conscious liberty as of our existence, and next to our own existence, there is no fact of which we can have so strong an evidence as of the existence of the Creator.

The arguments which I have been urging, are all derived from the actual existence of this universe; but if we were to withdraw our thoughts from all we are taught by consciousness, experience, or observation, and confine ourselves to the most abstract speculation, we should find the being of God a subject of the strictest demonstration. We cannot divest our minds of the idea of eternity. Something, therefore, must have existed from all eternity; for there cannot be an eternal nothing. That supposition would be a contradiction in terms. There would be eternity, and no eternity. The being, which has existed from all eternity, must be immutable and independent; he must be self-existent, that is, he must be a being, the supposition of whose non-existence is an express contradiction. To this being must be ascribed unity, and every moral or intellectual perfection which exists in the universe; for every excellence must originally have been derived from him. The idea of this being is the simplest

which we can possibly frame ; or rather, unless we forbear thinking at all, it is an idea which we can not extirpate from our minds. This being does not exist by an antecedent necessity, but by the same absolute necessity which is the foundation of all our reasoning. No man can argue in defence of atheism, or of scepticism itself, unless he admits the force of argument, and the stability of some known truth.

The necessity by which the Deity exists, is the same necessity by which two and two make four ; by which the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones ; and by which every abstract truth, mathematical or metaphysical, is demonstrated. We could not be rational beings if we had not an idea of some eternal and immutable truth.

This idea is the sole foundation of argument, science, and knowledge. It is therefore antecedent to the Deity in the order of our conceptions, not as a cause to produce the first cause, but as the means of proving his existence, or manifesting him to our view. If we have a clear idea of an eternal self-existent immutable being, of which we find it impossible to divest ourselves, such a being must exist ; for we can have no idea of a being which cannot possibly exist ; and if the self-existent being can exist, he must exist.

The different arguments for the being of God strengthen each other. I appeal, for a proof of theism, to the nature of intellect and reason,

and the original ideas of the mind. I appeal to the phenomena of the natural and moral world, and, from all these sources combined, raise my thoughts to the fullest conviction, and the most sublime contemplation of that perfect Being, from whom all truth and knowledge, all wisdom and virtue, all power and happiness, are derived.

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ESSAY IX.

ON THE INCOMMUNICABLE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

HAVING proved the being of God, from the irresistible conviction in the human mind, that something must have existed from all eternity—and from the frame of the whole universe, whether we consider it as a whole, or analyze it into its component parts; whether we contemplate the intellectual or the material, the invisible or the visible world—I proceed to enquire, what the nature of that being is, to which we ascribe the name of God. This inquiry has been thought too arduous for human reason. It certainly ought to be pursued with reverential awe, with deep humility, and with a constant sense of human infirmity. Calmness and composure, temper and moderation, distrust of our own understanding, and charity to other men, ought always to accompany this investigation; but however difficult it may be, it is necessary; for without some conception of God, we should have a faint idea of his existence, and without a firm and clear conviction of this important truth, there can be no foundation for religion, either natural or revealed.

If an inquiry into the nature of God is the most arduous of all inquiries, it is the most im-

perative of all duties, it is the most sublime exertion of the mind, and has the most immediate operation in exalting those faculties which it exerts, in raising us more and more to higher degrees of advancement in the glorious scale of intellectual and moral beings. From hence we derive an infinitely larger compass of duty than belongs to beings, if such there are, merely moral and incapable of religion. From hence arise the powerful restraints upon vice, the active encouragements to virtue. The heathen world by these contemplations, attained some knowledge of God; and if the christian were to forbear the pursuit of them, he would not only deprive revelation of its strongest evidences, but would be criminal in neglecting those serious duties, which result from meditation upon the sublimest parts of scripture: for, as there is no other exercise of human reason, however elevated, which approaches to the contemplation of God, so are there no parts of scripture so worthy of our admiration, so dignified, and so exalted, as those wherein God has graciously condescended to reveal to us some notion of his all-perfect nature. These representations of God in scripture are more congenial to the mind, when we find them conformable to the highest ideas of unassisted reason. A pious and enlightened christian will wish, with due reverence, to obtain all that knowledge of God, to which the most improved understanding can lead him by the light of nature, to meditate deeply and fre-

quently upon all which revelation, upon this most edifying subject, has unfolded to our view, and to frame his own ideas from the brightest light, which natural and revealed religion, when properly combined, shall afford.

In this inquiry, so instituted, and so pursued, we shall not only avoid the oscitancy, which arises from scepticism, or from superstitious awe, but shall escape the danger of presumption, of artificial theology, or of false philosophy; we shall endeavour to divest our speculations of mere terms, and to acquire the most pure and simple ideas.

I am unwilling to adopt any divisions, which the elucidation of the subject does not appear to require.

I allow the distinction between the incommunicable and the communicable attributes of the divine being; but I think unnecessary difficulties arise from distinguishing the incommunicable attributes into self-existence, eternity, infinity, immensity, ubiquity, unity, simplicity, immutability, omnipresence, omniscience, prescience, omnipotence, and incomprehensibility.

If we do not bewilder ourselves with vain imaginations, these attributes may be reduced to self-existence, from whence absolute perfection and unity are necessarily derived.

In my last Essay, I proved that the universe, as it is now constituted, could not have existed from all eternity without an external cause of its existence; and I proved that something,

which had no external cause of its existence, must have existed from all eternity. This something, therefore, must be distinct from the universe, and must be self-existent.

All beings exist contingently, whose non-existence, implying no contradiction, can be conceived possible.

Whatever might, or might not, have existed, requires a cause of its existence. The cause of all which exists contingently, must exist necessarily, therefore it must be self-existent.

The necessity of God's existence implies, that his non-existence cannot be conceived without a contradiction; his existence is necessary, not merely as an efficient cause of other existence, but to the very conception of all other existence. Were there any beings, to the conception of whose existence this being is not necessary, such beings might be conceived to exist alone; that is, they might be conceived to exist without him, which is the same with conceiving him not to exist, and consequently with the possibility of his non-existence. All other beings may be supposed not to exist at all, consequently no other being, or beings, can be necessarily existent. Nothing can be supposed to exist, without pre-supposing and including antecedently the existence of that which is necessary.

There is no truth which is not either necessary or contingent. If there were no necessary truths, we should be incapable of reasoning, for

from them, and from the due application of them, all the powers of ratiocination arise. Every abstract idea, which is formed by mature reflection, and is congenial to an enlightened mind, is a necessary truth; but every object of sense is a contingent truth, if we have sufficient proof of its existence. Whatever is the subject of science is a necessary truth. Whatever is the application of science to practical use is a contingent truth. That one and one make two is a necessary truth; that there is one, or that there are two beings of any description, objects of sense, is a contingent truth.

The demonstrations of Euclid are necessary truths; but that Euclid himself existed, was, before the event took place, a contingency. The intellectual powers of Aristotle, or Alexander, belong to intellectual and necessary truths; but that such a philosopher, and such a conqueror, should have existed, were contingencies. We know that a certain degree of power, wisdom, and goodness, is possible; we know from history that it has existed; from observation and consciousness that it now exists. We can conceive a higher degree of all these endowments, until we raise our minds to absolute perfection, an idea of which we cannot divest ourselves when we have once acquired it, however incomprehensible it may be. We cannot suppose absolute perfection, without supposing that there is some being in whom it resides, and that being must have been uncaused, for the cause must be more

perfect than the effect. Every being which is imperfect must have a cause, which limits its perfections. The perfect being can have no superior. Every limited being must be contingent, the characters from whence its limitations arise, being contingent, and forming an essential part of its nature.

Necessity is not the cause of God's existence. His nature, like that of abstract truth, admits of no reason to be given for its existence. It is identified with our conception; it is essential to mind. You do not inquire why a contradiction is not true. Science depends upon primary truths. If there were no primary truths, reasons would arise out of each other in an infinite succession; consequently there would be no reason or truth at all. Upon the same principle, if there were no self-existence, there could be no existence. The first cause requires no cause, as a primary truth requires no proof. By the very act of endeavouring to banish from our minds the idea of God, we have an experimental proof, that the belief of his existence is unavoidable. Where an absurdity would follow, from supposing any being not to have existed at any moment of past time, or not to exist for the future, that being is self-existent; for its very nature and definition implies existence. Self-existence does not denote any positive principle of existence, whether external or internal, but precludes the supposition. The belief that God cannot be conceived not to exist, is very different

from pretending to conceive how, or why, he actually does exist. This attempt is absurd. It is endeavouring to shew how a first cause is a first cause, or why truth is truth.

We consider abstract truths as eternal and immutable; but it would be more accurate if we said, that they had no relation to time or change. They are not self-existent, for they have no relation to existence. They are the conceptions, or the contemplations, of mind. Mind cannot exist without them, nor can they be separated from mind. The most imperfect mind must conceive some abstract ideas, and the all-perfect mind must at one moment, and one view, or rather, without the least reference to time or place, comprehend every abstract truth. An imperfect mind acquires knowledge by investigation. In this pursuit a progress is made. The progress depends upon a succession of ideas. A succession implies the lapse of time, and may be a measure of it. But time, in this case, is applicable to the imperfect mind which thinks, not to the abstract ideas, which are the objects of thought. Every created mind is imperfect, and therefore, from the succession of ideas, has reference to time. But the all-perfect mind, having no succession of ideas, has no reference to time, and if it be a pure spirit, has no reference to place. We can form no idea of time without the succession of abstract ideas, or the successive appearance of objects of sense, either as really presented to the mind by

the operation of the body, or as recalled to our recollection by the will. Being habituated to apply time and place to creatures, we rashly apply them to the Creator. But what idea can we form of time or place, if we suppose God to exist alone? There could then be no succession of ideas, consequently no time. How could there be place, for place implies expansion, which is incompatible with the simple essence of God? His simple essence, and his pure spiritual nature, have no more relation to place or space, than wisdom, power, or absolute perfection have.

It has been considered that we attain a sublime conception of the Deity, if we imagine him to fill all space; but when we examine the subject, we shall find, that we cannot entertain this idea without some departure from the divine spirituality.

While we preserve an accurate idea of the divine spirituality, we can only conceive God to be present where he discerns or acts. He is present as the spectator of all that passes in the material or in the moral world, of all the operations of nature, of all human works or actions, of all the intentions and secret thoughts which occupy the hearts of men. He is present in energy, whenever his wisdom and goodness lead him to sustain, or to supersede, the laws of attraction, or to influence the will of free agents. He is present whenever he graciously condescends to assume a relation to a created being

endowed with intellect, and to grant to that created being an union with the eternal mind.

Wisdom, power, knowledge, holiness, and goodness, while they are in their highest perfection the attributes of a pure spirit, can have no relation to space or time; they acquire that relation when in an imperfect degree; they are possessed by a created being not purely spiritual, but united by its corporeal frame to the material world. Space has no real existence, being merely the negation of matter, or an abstract idea of extent. The sublime idea of the Deity which metaphysicians have in view, is, that no distance, not the utmost bounds of the universe, nor the infinite space imaginable beyond those bounds, can limit the divine wisdom, goodness, and power. Although these attributes exist as abstract ideas, and the Deity, endowed with them, exists without reference to time or space; yet the operations which these attributes produce, since the creation of the universe, in the material world, must have a reference to time and space; for the material beings, or the spirits united to matter, which are the subjects of these operations, and so gloriously display the wisdom, goodness, and power of God, exist in space, that is, have some local habitation, and their duration is measured by time. Materiality, union with matter, expansion, and duration, are imperfections, which cannot belong to an all-perfect being, but may be conferred by him, the Creator, upon the creature; for he may create

by communicating any degree of those perfections which are not exclusively inherent in his own nature. Absolute perfection is incommunicable, but any measure of perfection, which bespeaks some degree of imperfection, may be the effect of the divine will.

It is impossible to understand this subject, without distinguishing negative from positive infinity. The former consists in the addibility of parts, which the latter precludes. There is no length or breadth, distance or time past, or future, with God. All this is applicable alone to what is finite and temporary, not to mind, even to created mind, in those operations which are purely intellectual. Expansion and time are capable of being measured, and infinitely divided. Whatever is the subject of multiplication or division, cannot be positively infinite. Whatever is the subject of measured duration, cannot be positively eternal. The self-existent being, who alone is from everlasting, cannot be conceived to exist in reference to time, either successively or instantaneously.

We cannot conceive that abstract truth should exist with reference to time. We cannot conceive that truth ever had a beginning, or that it ever will be annihilated. Nor can we conceive truth to exist, unless some mind exists capable of discerning it.

Mind cannot exist without the knowledge of some truths, nor can all abstract truths exist, unless there exists a mind adequate to the full

comprehension of them ; a mind which has no more reference to space and time, than these abstract truths have ; a mind pure, perfect, and omniscient. If we cannot conceive the commencement, or the annihilation, of truth, we cannot conceive the commencement, or the annihilation, of that mind which discerns all truths, and is the receptacle of all ideas.

The human mind, in the contemplation of the Deity, cannot be insensible of the lapse of time, because we proceed in the investigation of all truth by a progressive series. There must, therefore, be a priority and a posteriority in our ideas. Abstract truths, although they cannot be conceived to exist independently of the existence of mind, yet some of them must be known to us before we can attain to the belief of God. In the succession of our ideas, intellect must be the object of our apprehension, before we can acknowledge an intellectual being. Power must be understood, before we can conceive a being endowed with power. Wisdom, before we can conceive a wise being. Goodness, for the same reason, must precede our idea of God. Without the idea of intellect, we cannot be rational beings. Without the idea of power, we cannot be conscious of our own free agency. Without the idea of wisdom, we cannot direct that free agency. Without the idea of goodness, we cannot be capable of virtue or vice, of holiness or sin. Intellect, power, wisdom, and goodness, are all abstract ideas. The more we raise and

enlarge our conception of them, the more capable we shall become of forming an idea of God. Abstract ideas convey truth to an enlightened mind, as forcibly as any impression conveys sensation to a merely sentient being.

The reality of moral qualities is necessarily acknowledged by the mind, though they have no other subject than the affections of the soul, or actions proceeding from them. The distinctions between the active exertion of the understanding and its torpid stupor, between wisdom and folly, goodness and malignity, between all the moral or christian virtues and their opposite vices, are as clearly discerned as the difference between light and darkness, pleasure and pain. We are not more convinced when we suffer acute pain, that some external cause or internal disease operates to produce it, than we are convinced of the serenity which is diffused by a good conscience, and the horror of self-condemnation. We are not more assured, that our ideas of colours, tastes, and sounds, are real, than we are assured that our ideas of pure, true, just, honest, and virtuous, are so far from being merely phantasms of the imagination, that they are realities, independent of space and time, incapable of annihilation or change, and, like all other immutable truths, constantly present to the divine mind.

Man is so immersed in the affairs of the world, so habituated to objects of sense, that abstract ideas are not familiar to his conception; yet

they alone raise him above the rest of the animal world. His capacity to form them, and to contemplate them, and to draw inferences from them, distinguishes him from a brute. A well-educated man, in his childhood, has learned arithmetic and grammar, which consist entirely of abstract ideas ; his mind, as it advances to maturity, is employed in speculations equally abstract, in logic, mathematics, ethics, and metaphysics. The imperfection of human reason betrays itself chiefly upon logic, ethics, and metaphysics ; it is displayed by minute subtlety, or still more manifested by the delusive flights of imagination. In the strict pursuit, however, of an accurate train of reasoning upon all these subjects, even upon pure mathematics, we may soar above human comprehension. Upon no subject does reason sooner disclaim its own powers, than in the contemplation of the divine nature ; yet at the same time it proceeds upon solid foundations, and obtains a full conviction of the self-existence, while it humbly and devoutly acknowledges the incomprehensibility of God.

If we contemplate the self-existence of God, and the propositions which flow from it, we raise the human mind to speculations which are *above* human reason ; but if on the other hand, influenced by the difficulty of the subject, or by the vain suggestion, that all truth is level to our capacities, we are led to deny the divine self-existence ; we discard indeed what is *above* human

reason, but we are compelled to embrace what is *contrary* to it. We must suppose the universe to have subsisted in its present state from all eternity, although we know that the material part of it is incompatible with eternity, and are conscious of the gradual progress of human intellect. If we suppose that the universe has undergone vicissitudes, we must believe these changes to have taken place without a cause. We must believe that motion could arise, and has arisen, without a mover. If we suppose that neither the whole nor any part of this universe has existed from all eternity, we must believe that there was once a time when nothing existed, and that every thing which now exists arose from nothing, without any productive cause. We must believe that something came from nothing, or that there is an effect without a cause. We must suppose, that all truth had a fictitious origin; that there was a time when the three angles of a triangle were not equal to two right ones; or, we must believe, that truth subsisted without mind, that all abstract ideas were really existent, but that there was no receptacle of those ideas, no being capable of perceiving them.

We must not only suppose that the time has been when nothing existed, but we must believe that the time may come when nothing shall exist; when the same chance, which created the universe, may at a moment extinguish it, and when all truth and intellect shall be annihilated.

All these contradictions to reason must be admitted, if we deny the relation between cause and effect; or if we assert that which exists to be both cause and effect; or if we maintain the doctrine of an infinite series of caused or successive beings, without a self-existent cause. All parts of this infinite series, being successive, must once have been future; and therefore non-existent. If some one part does not come under this description, then there is the absurdity of one being added to infinite, or a part distinct from the whole; or there is a commencement, and however long, and to our conceptions infinite, the series may be, there is a first, a self-existent cause.

Self-existence is identified with all the incommunicable attributes of God. Whatever is limited may be communicable, and every effect must be limited, for it must be inferior to the cause, whether the cause is the self-existent Deity, or a created being acting within its appointed sphere. It is impossible in idea to separate self-existence from eternity, and from that immensity which alone is applicable to a spiritual being, the power of discerning and acting every where, that is, from omniscience and omnipotence. If we conceive a being to be self-existent, omniscient, and omnipotent, we must ascribe to that being absolute perfection.

Perfection belongs to spirit alone, and consists in the highest summit of power, wisdom, and knowledge, of holiness, purity, and beneficence.

The more elevated our conceptions are of these excellencies, the more we approach to the true idea of God. Unity is essential to absolute perfection. Every necessary truth is one. It is contingent existence alone, which admits of diversity and multiplicity. Self-existence, therefore, is not only identified with the eternity and the immensity, but with the simplicity and the unity, of God.

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ESSAY X.

ON THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

HAVING proved that the self-existence of God is identified with his absolute perfection, and that his absolute perfection consists in spiritual excellencies, I shall endeavour to state what idea human reason is capable of forming upon this sublime and most interesting object of speculation. In order to form *this* idea, we must banish every conception derived from matter, or connected with it.

It is therefore clear, that the divine greatness does not consist in corporeal magnitude, nor is his spirituality compatible with a corporeal form. His immensity has no relation to space; infinite expansion is inapplicable to him; for space, if it has any existence, must be material. It can be divided or enlarged by human imagination, however infinite we may conceive it to be.

When we first ascend from the material to the intellectual world, the idea which most immediately presents itself, is the idea of power. Original power is a higher object of admiration than derived power. Original power belongs to God alone. But it does not convey the idea of perfection, unless it be directed by wisdom, and the end to which it is directed, be dictated by goodness.

Intellect is a nearer approach to perfection than power. But intellect, separated from goodness, is defective in the most essential part ; for the intellect must be overspread with the darkest cloud of ignorance, if it has no knowledge of the essential difference between right and wrong. Its contemplations must be confined to mere matter, or to dry, jejune, and abstract theories, when it soars above matter ; unless it can distinguish moral good from moral evil, and become a guide in active life.

The superiority of original power, or of a prime mover, to a material being, which is either in a state of torpor, or a mere instrument in the hand of the mover ; the superiority of intellect to power ; the superiority of moral goodness to intellect, must produce conviction in every enlightened mind ; for they are eternal and necessary truths, and arise from the permanent nature of things.

The proof of the divine existence, and of every other existence, depends upon the acknowledgement of some eternal and necessary truths. The divine felicity arises from God's possessing in himself all good, all perfection, all that is beatifying. Truth is the proper object of the divine mind. The more perfect a being is, the more constantly and the more universally is all truth laid open to his view ; and moral truths, which are in themselves the most valuable of all truths, must not only be the objects of contemplation to a perfect mind, but the spring of all its energies.

If we were to make moral truth dependent upon the divine will, we must, from the same course of argument, make intelligence and knowledge dependent upon it. We should by this means render all science factitious, all truth fluctuating, and plunge ourselves into universal scepticism. When we ascribe goodness to God, we ascribe to him the perception of rectitude; and when we conceive that he must act agreeably to it, we establish the infallibility of that perception, and the certainty that the will of God is always directed by his perfect understanding.

This doctrine does not interfere with the full conviction of the divine sovereignty; for what is sovereignty but perfect freedom? The highest perfection of freedom is attained, when the will chuses what is most reasonable, from a boundless knowledge of all truth, and when the action is conformable to the will. The sovereignty of God consists in a right of dealing with his creatures according to his own infallible wisdom. He cannot make good evil, or evil good, for he cannot make any thing to be, and not to be, at the same time. He must know what is best, he must be able and willing to do it, and therefore actually do what is best.

The moral attributes of God are plainly deducible from the natural ones. *Absolute perfection must arise from infinite goodness, and be identified with it.* All the attributes of God are subordinate to, and regulated by, this one brightest ray of the divinity.

It has been much disputed, how far goodness in God is of the same nature with goodness in man. Truth must be the same in every intellectual being; but the knowledge of truth is capable of infinite diversity, and the application of it is susceptible of infinite variety; it must be, in every being, proportional to the knowledge and the power of that being. Man is endowed with an immaterial, a rational, and an immortal soul. He is a free and moral agent, capable of perceiving the distinction between right and wrong; able to choose the one and refuse the other, and obliged to prefer good to evil.

All these terms, immateriality, rationality, immortality, liberty, right, wrong, good, evil, have a clear, distinct, and immutable meaning, which is essentially the same, to whatever being or on whatever occasion they are applied.

Until we have ascertained the accurate meaning of words, we cannot reason upon them. The attempt to reason upon them would be as absurd, as to criticise an author whose language we did not pretend to understand. To deny that goodness in God has the same essence as goodness in man, is, in fact, to deny the divine goodness; that is, to deny the fundamental principle of theology; for neither natural nor revealed religion could have a stable foundation, if we considered the Creator of the universe as guided by no principle but his own capricious will.

If we say that we have no idea of the divine

perfection in a moral view, and can only conceive God as the original Creator of the universe, endowed with power and wisdom equal to that stupendous work, we must exclude him from the moral government of the world, and consequently be incapable of religion.

If goodness in God is not the same in *kind* as goodness in man, however superior in *degree*, it must be different from it; and whatever is different from goodness must be, in the proportion in which it differs, a deviation from it. Whatever deviates from good, must be, more or less, bad. Of such deviation the all-perfect being is incapable.

It may be urged, that although divine goodness is the same in kind as human goodness, yet as human goodness bears no more proportion to divine than a grain of sand to the universe, we cannot conceive a similitude between them.

A grain of sand is of the same nature as the whole material world; and if the powers of the microscope were as much enlarged as those of the telescope have lately been, the minutest particle might appear a system, as stupendous as our imagination can conceive.

Every individual atom, of which the universe is composed, bears a definite proportion to the amazing whole: so does human goodness to divine. Human goodness has the same similitude to divine goodness, as human wisdom has to divine wisdom, human power to divine power.

Wisdom and power, as well as goodness, when

ascribed to God, embrace an infinite variety of objects, and are exerted in an infinite variety of modes, of which it is impossible we should entertain the least conception; but they are likewise exerted in a manner which must make a vivid and forcible impression upon every intelligent mind; must animate the stupid, convince the infidel, and warm with gratitude the coldest heart.

There are likewise many of the dispensations of the divine benignity, which are neither inscrutable nor obtrusive upon our view; but such as we may fully comprehend by diligent investigation, by using all the means of grace, and by the light of revelation, that sure and unerring guide.

Whatever concerns our duty in this life, we may, by due diligence and the divine assistance, understand.

Whatever concerns our fellow-men will be more or less known to us, according to the knowledge we have of them, whether that knowledge is acquired by experience or by history.

Whatever concerns man in his corporeal frame, inferior animals, vegetables, or unorganized matter, will be more or less subject to our view, according to our progress in physical science.

In all these ways, the most ignorant persons, who reflect at all, must discern conspicuous proofs of divine goodness, as well as of divine wisdom and power. The more learned we be-

come, the more clear and bright will these glorious attributes appear.

But we are not beings confined to this present world. No! on the contrary, if guided by the best philosophy, and, far more, if enlightened by revelation, we raise our exalted views to a future state; a new scope for these sublime and delightful speculations will arise; we shall discern, that in all visible phenomena these attributes are displayed in an extent, bearing as small a proportion to the whole of that dispensation which regards ourselves, as the present life bears to the whole of our existence.

We can form no idea, in any degree proportionate, of the divine goodness, without a full comprehension of the moral and intellectual world. Power and wisdom may be most conspicuously displayed in the arrangement of inanimate matter; but goodness acts upon sentient natures alone, and can never be brought to its true test, unless the creatures, upon whom blessings are showered, are not only sentient, but rational and moral.

The goodness of God, as constituting an essential part of his absolute perfection, has been shewn to be commensurate with his power and wisdom, and to be the sole animating principle which calls them into action.

There is not in the universe a particle of matter which is not a proof of the divine power and wisdom. There is not, therefore, in the universe a particle of matter which is not an

instrument of the divine benignity. How will our ideas be exalted, if we extend this view to the whole of that immense space, which Newton has shewn not only to exist, but to be filled with an infinity of systems! In these speculations how inconsiderable does man, at first sight, appear! yet how falacious is that idea! The importance of man does not depend upon the paucity of those created beings, who, resembling him in external circumstances, probably resemble him in mental endowments, in dignity and in power. The importance of man arises from his intellect, his ardent desire of knowledge, his progressive improvement in virtue, his susceptibility of religion, and his glorious hope of immortality.

If we suppose, not only every small portion of the material world which we know, but the remotest regions of creation to be fully peopled with beings destined for immortality, and contemplate the eternity of the soul on the one hand, and the boundless universe on the other, we shall have before our view time and space immeasurable. These are speculations which may too easily lead us into the regions of visionary presumption; but however immeasurable the future duration of time, or the present expansion of space, may appear, we are assured that the divine goodness is equally inexhaustible.

Absolute perfection in goodness can not belong to a created free agent, because there is a possibility of improvement or decline. But the

more any created free agent approaches to this absolute perfection, the more he will attain the knowledge of the divine goodness, which is the true knowledge of God. The more we obey God, the more sensible shall we become of his real excellence, and the more deeply shall we be convinced, that God is full of all perfection in himself, the fountain of all good, the author of all the happiness we can enjoy or hope; that his bounty is unconfined, that his purity is unblemished. The more we think of God, the fuller and clearer conceptions we have of him; the more excellent in himself, the more beneficial to us he will appear.

Upon this most interesting and important object of contemplation, it is our duty to avail ourselves of all the lights which reason and revelation afford.

Let us often contemplate the divine goodness, that we may every day become more conformable to it, in the temper of our minds, and in the actions of our lives; but let us always remember, how far the subject, which extends to infinity, both in time and space, exceeds our comprehension.

God has given us, in some measure by reason, but much more by revelation, such rules of action as are best accommodated to our present life; but he has not, either by reason or revelation, unfolded to us his own designs, which are so complicated, and of so vast a compass, that our minds are wholly unable to form a conception of them.

We know from reason that there is a God, a being of absolute perfection ; we know that moral excellence is essential to absolute perfection, and that from a being perfect in goodness, nothing which is absolutely evil can originate. We know from reason and revelation, that God is the creator of the universe. No rational creature can act without motives ; and in the all-perfect Creator those motives must be the wisest and the best. God, therefore, could have no motive for creating the universe, but a desire of rendering every sentient being in it as happy as his nature would admit.

Unassisted reason can go no farther ; but we may learn from scripture, that before the angels rebelled, and “left their first estate,” there was a period, a period perhaps of innumerable ages, when there was no created free agent who abused his liberty ; when every creature in its proper sphere, obeyed the divine will, and acted in strict conformity to it. During that happy æra, there was no moral, and probably no physical evil. The moral attributes of God were displayed in diffusive benevolence, in the constant preservation of his creatures in their state of felicity ; and in communicating to them new modes, or an increase of happiness. Upon the revolt of the rebellious angels a new æra arose, in which moral evil and its attendant physical evil entered into the world. Man was, from his first creation exposed to one temptation ; he yielded to it and fell ! He was expelled from Paradise, and became the father of the

human race, in this lapsed state, in this region of sin and sorrow, in this vale of tears, and of the shadow of death.

The Redeemer was promised as soon as Adam fell. Every son of Adam has had abundant cause to be grateful for the blessings he has received in this life, and by faith and repentance, or by acting agreeably to such lights as are afforded him, may become an heir of a glorious immortality.

But while we remain in our present state, amidst all the sin and misery with which this state abounds, the goodness of God is not displayed by diffusive benevolence alone. It is manifested in holiness, in justice, in mercy, in protection from innumerable evils, in all the dispensations of providence and of grace.

Before sin entered into the world, the sole object of the creator and preserver of the universe was the happiness of the creature. In our present state, it is not simply nor immediately our happiness, which the moral governor of the world has in view, but our virtue, and our happiness through virtue, which is its only genuine and legitimate source.

The holiness of God removes him to an infinite distance from malice, envy, hatred, revenge, cruelty, and tyranny. It creates an abhorrence of all sin and depravity. It produces an entire conformity of the divine will to the perfect law of rectitude. It determines God who is an omniscient being, viewing all

our actions, and penetrating into our most secret thoughts, to regard every moral agent in exact proportion to moral character; and to exercise his power, as the ruler of free agents, in the manner which will be most effectual to exterminate sin, and lead the creature to resemble the holiness of the Creator. Without holiness, power would be oppression; wisdom subtlety; sovereignty tyranny. Whatever affords us the most perfect idea of human government, will lead us to form some conception of the divine administration.

The justice of God is displayed in his upholding the interests of right and truth, and in distributing all rewards and punishments according to the exact difference between good and evil, of which difference he is an infallible judge. However imperfect this distribution of rewards and punishments may be in the present life, we have sufficient evidence of it, even here, to convince us of the divine justice, and to prepare us for that glorious and awful discrimination, which the scripture assures us shall be made at the last day. No sinner will be punished more than he deserves, nor more than is requisite to maintain the law of God, and to support his moral government.

After the introduction of sin into the world, the goodness of God is directed by infinite wisdom to pursue its proper end, which is the greatest and most absolute good of all rational beings, with that diversity which their different

behaviour and circumstances require. As far as justice is exercised, the degree of unhappiness, and no more, is allotted to every man, which bears an exact proportion to his offence.

But mercy often prevails over justice. Through the redemption which our blessed Saviour has purchased for us, the original corruption of our nature is exterminated, and every offence is pardoned upon sincere repentance. Every hour, while we are permitted to live, and an opportunity of repentance is granted to us, affords a theme of pious gratitude. Nor does any hour pass of this frail and transitory life, in which the mercy of God is not showered upon us in temporal and spiritual blessings. All the evils to which we are obnoxious, give ample scope to divine beneficence, which, if this were a scene of unmixed good, would not have the same opportunity of exerting itself.

Every man has experienced personal deliverances from a hand invisible indeed to sense, yet easily discernable to a pious mind. While we are provoking God every day by our offences, he is protecting us from dangers, to which we must know ourselves liable, and from infinitely more which we little apprehend.

Is not the planet upon which we live, in constant peril from internal convulsion, or from external force? If we are so happy as to enjoy the blessings of society under the protection of a good government, how precarious may that tenure be! how suddenly are the best govern-

ments overthrown by foreign invasion, or by civil broils!

How little change would convert our food to poison, the air we breathe into a pestilential vapour! Would not our frail bodies if unsupported by a gracious providence, at every moment engender pain and disease, or precipitate their final dissolution? When the body is preserved, how often are the powers of the mind suspended, or for this life destroyed? Do not the lives and understandings of those most dear to us, hang upon as frail a thread? Great as our temporal dangers are, they bear no comparison with our spiritual ones. Our eternal felicity depends upon this state of trial, we are continually assailed by the corruption of our own hearts, by our vicious habits, by the allurements of evil men, by the influence of the powers of darkness. From all these calamities are we preserved by the constant interposition of the divine mercy.

Upon the whole, all the good we enjoy, all the good which we are capable of enjoying, and which we actually should enjoy, if we were more wise and virtuous than we are, originates from God; it is either his immediate act, or results from the obedience of moral agents to his laws. All our temporal blessings are to be ascribed to his providence, all our spiritual advantages to his never-failing grace.

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ESSAY XI.

ON THE WISDOM OF GOD.

THE most perfect happiness, and the most universal knowledge, must be ascribed to God. These perfections naturally coincide; for knowledge is required to enable us to understand what happiness is, what constitutes it, and to feel when it is really possessed by us.

But wisdom, which consists in choosing the best ends, and pursuing them by the best means, is as necessary to happiness as knowledge.

Whenever there is a deficiency in that knowledge, which speculation or action requires, there must be a natural or supervenient imperfection; and all imperfection is infinitely removed from God. He who presides over all, and is the great self-original from whence all things proceed, must have in himself absolute perfection, from which every real perfection, scattered through the world, is derived. He certainly is unlimited in wisdom, speculative or practical, and in every energy of mind.

Although knowledge is distinct from wisdom, which may be considered as the application of it, yet God must be perfect in knowledge, as well as in wisdom; for whenever there is a deficiency of knowledge, there must be a propor-

tionable deficiency of wisdom; and whenever there is a defect of wisdom, there must be a diminution of happiness. But God is perfect in knowledge, wisdom, and happiness.

He who conferred all the various intellects which are possessed by created beings, beings of the highest order in the spiritual scale when man may be considered as the lowest, must himself possess all the understanding, and all the powers of imagination, which he bestowed, and infinitely more.

Nothing can be ascribed to God which is not consistent with the divine wisdom, as far as it is possible for us to discern that wisdom, which infinitely indeed exceeds our comprehension, in its accuracy and its extent, in the most minute details, as well as in the unbounded variety of the objects to which it is applied, their mutual relations and indiscernible dependencies. "We may," says Tillotson, (Sermon 83,) "discover something of the wisdom of God, though it be infinite. As the effects of infinite power may fall under our senses, so the designs of infinite wisdom may fall under our reason and understanding." God is omnipotent. The more power any being possesses, the higher degree of wisdom is required to guide and direct that power.

The small portions of wisdom, knowledge, and happiness, of which man is conscious, assure him that he is capable of larger portions of them all than he has yet attained, or than he can hope to attain in this life; and these improve-

ments, which may become the most delightful and the most animating objects of human contemplation, rise before him in a continual progress, without any termination of his glorious view. There must, therefore, be a being infinitely wise, happy, and omniscient, and this being must be God. When we consider his excellent nature, we must be satisfied by reasoning, which is fully convincing, without considering his works of creation and providence, that he is, and necessarily must be, infinitely wise.

Practical wisdom may be defined, an habitual faculty of judging aright about matters of practice, choosing according to that right judgment, and conforming our actions to such good choice. It is therefore very nearly connected with moral agency ; nor can we suppose God to be perfect in goodness, unless he is perfect in wisdom. Knowledge considers the objects of knowledge as they are in themselves. Wisdom considers them under the notion of means and ends. Knowledge implies the bare understanding of things. Wisdom the skill of ordering and disposing them. A right order and beneficent distribution, of whatever is committed to our trust, is the essence of moral duty, in the active discharge of all the offices of life. Goodness, therefore, is almost identified with wisdom.

However, when we compare divine wisdom and goodness with human wisdom and goodness, there is a very material distinction. Divine goodness is proposed to us as the object of

our imitation ; we are required to be "*perfect, as our Father in Heaven is perfect.*" We are, therefore, enabled to form a more adequate idea of the divine goodness, than we can form of the divine wisdom. The former attribute is in some degree within our comprehension, and is in some degree imitable by us. Of the latter, our conception is very imperfect. The sphere within which we move, within whose limits we exercise our power and employ our wisdom, is so infinitely small when compared with the universe, that consciousness and experience cannot be expected to afford the same ideas of the divine wisdom, which they present of the divine goodness, to a pure mind, illuminated by true religion, and by that grace which our blessed Saviour has promised to all his sincere disciples.

By the due exercise of our faculties, and the performance of all moral and christian duties, through the assistance of the divine grace, we advance in holiness ; and in proportion to the happy progress we make, we are enabled to raise our minds to a juster conception of the divine goodness ; but it is not designed, that we should acquire the same conception of the divine wisdom, for that must depend upon a knowledge wholly beyond our present station, quite unnecessary for the duties which we are now called upon to discharge, and of a nature which man cannot be conceived competent to attain. It is true indeed that a larger compass of knowledge is within the scope of human capacity than is

generally imagined. There are few individuals, in an enlightened age and country, who might not acquire more knowledge than they actually possess; and no certain limits can be set to the discoveries of future ages. Rapid in its progress has been the advancement of physical science in our own times. Our first object should be, our internal improvement in religion and virtue. Our second object, the performance of those external duties, which are particularly required from us. Our third object, subordinately to the two former, ought to be real knowledge. There is no valuable knowledge we can acquire, which will not be an improvement of our understanding, or useful to us in active life. There is no valuable knowledge we can acquire, which will not, if properly directed, raise a religious mind to a higher conception of God, and a more enlarged view of the divine wisdom.

Every successive discovery, in the natural or in the moral world, affords a new proof of it, and unfolds more and more the dispensations of an all-gracious providence.

The works of God, rising from a fossil to man, shew, not design alone, but an admirable adjustment of means to ends. Every system is in itself complete, and equally excellent in its relations, as far as we trace them, to every other system.

If we take up a pebble or a straw, we may discern the chemical and mechanical principles

upon which the nature and existence of these minute objects depend. Minute indeed they are, and trifling they appear to unreflecting persons, but the formation of a pebble, will lead the geologist to explore the whole substance of this terraqueous globe ; and the formation of a straw will instruct the naturalist in the system of vegetables, their origin, growth, and decay.

The wisest works are most complicated in their parts, and simple in their operations. How complicated is the material world, if we contemplate all the operations of unanimated nature, through her chemical processes, and her movements directed by the laws of mechanism ! Yet how simple the principle from whence all these operations proceed ; for whether nature alone appears to act, or acts as an instrument in the hands of man ; whether the uncultivated field is overgrown by noxious weeds, or the most improved land produces the finest crops ; all the changes in that world, which is void of life, as well as all its permanence and stability, arise from gravity, acting at distances immeasurably great, and uniting the whole universe ; or from the attraction of cohesion, acting at distances which are imperceptible, from being infinitely small.

If we ascend to vegetable life, we contemplate higher degrees of divine wisdom, in the flower adapted to produce the seed, in the seed framed to preserve to all ages the genus and the species, whether the plant itself, like the British oak,

defies the ravages of time, or whether its frail texture perishes in a summer, a month, or a week.

The divine wisdom is not only conspicuous in the flower and the seed, but in the whole formation of the plant, from its general aspect to the circulating fluid, and the minutest fibre. It is still more manifest in the purposes for which every vegetable is designed, in each of its respective parts, as well as in the admirable whole. The seed is not only intended to preserve the kind, but to sustain by wholesome food the human race, or the most valuable animals, or the fowls of the air, or innumerable tribes of insects. How small a proportion of the wheat, rice, barley, or oats, which are sown, is employed to reproduce the plant! If we could trace all other seeds, as easily to their respective destinations, as the grains of corn, we should probably find a similar proportion. The flower is not only necessary to the production of the seed, but adapted to a variety of other uses. Every flower and every leaf has an insect appropriate to it, which claims it as its own, as much as man can claim this earth, or the habitation where he dwells. The flower which affords honey to the industrious bee, is, as food and medicine, salutary to the human body; or by its beauty and fragrance delights and cheers the intellectual mind. Nor are the flower and seed more beneficial than the root. No species of grain is more

valued by the farmer, than the turnip and potatoe, from the food they afford to cattle and to man.

The destruction of every vegetable is as salutary as its growth. The former spreads fertility over a barren land, while the latter purifies the surrounding atmosphere.

If we ascend from vegetables to animals, we find, that all the display of wisdom in the vegetable is strongly conspicuous in the animal, and that its organization is more perfect. The power of locomotion opens a new and extensive field for action; the passions by which the animal is excited to action, the unvarying instincts which guide its whole conduct; the passions and instincts which govern man, as far as his animal nature extends, are all illustrations of the divine wisdom. However inscrutable the ultimate designs may be, the object immediately in view we may always discern; we may admire the provision which is made for the aliment of the animal, for the protection and defence of the individual, and for the preservation of the kind; we may admire its internal structure and its external character, though we possess a very limited knowledge of the various uses for which any particular species of animal was designed.

While we contemplate the material world, as brute matter, or as endowed with vegetable or with animal life, we must not confine our speculations to one of these great divisions; but endeavour, as far as human faculties can reach,

to contemplate the astonishing harmony, which pervades the whole; that harmony which constitutes the plan of the material universe, formed in God's all-comprehending mind.

The anatomy of the smallest insect, discernable only by the microscope, is as admirably adapted for its support, its food, and its defence, as the anatomy of man, which in its principal features it resembles; and the insect itself is cherished and preserved by the same sun as spreads its light and influence through the whole of our system, and in some measure through the regions of unbounded space.

If we ascend in our speculations from the beings which are composed of matter alone, or whose immaterial principle is so connected with matter as to be born and to perish with it, which is the case of plants and animals, and raise our minds to the contemplation of intellect, we shall form ideas of the divine wisdom infinitely more sublime than those which proceed from objects of sense. There is no object of sense which does not derive its principal value from becoming by reflection the object of intellect. Brute matter would be of no estimation, if there were not some one or more sentient beings, who found in it their sustenance, protection, or support. Nor would these sentient beings, innumerable as they are, be known or valued, if there were no intellectual being capable of discerning their nature and operations.

There is every reason to believe, that the in-

tellektual world is as extensive, and as various, as the material one. There are no two corporeal substances which are exactly the same, or which are not changed in the course of ages. Some are continually growing or decaying. There is no animal, or vegetable, which remains stationary, in the whole and in all its parts, for the smallest portion of time. The inanimate world is more permanent; but even the primitive rocks are unable to resist ultimately the force which assails them, however long they may struggle against it. Yet all corporeal substances are homogeneous in the matter of which they are composed, while in those essential properties which flow from it, they have an exact similitude to each other; and they are in these respects immutable. There is, therefore, the most striking uniformity accompanied with infinite variety. This is still more conspicuous in the intellectual world, where one mind pervades the whole, and the variety does not only depend upon the original distinctive character of each individual, but upon all the changes and modifications of that character which the exertions of the will produce, or which continually arise from the improvement, or depression, of the understanding. The greater the variety, if there is unity of design, and regular contrivance, the greater the wisdom of the divine Creator appears.

But our knowledge of the created beings in the intellectual world, unassisted by revelation,

does not soar higher than man,—his excellencies and defects, his passions and anomalies, his eccentricities and follies: and this is a species of knowledge which indeed we may pursue through life, yet never perfectly attain. But as far as the intellect of man alone is exercised, abundant proofs are exhibited of its divine origin. We have a distinct comprehension of an astonishing variety of objects as Tillotson observes; “our thoughts pass from heaven to earth in a moment, we retain a memory of things past, take a prospect of the future, and look forward as far as eternity. The great miracle of the world is the mind of man, and the contrivance of it an eminent instance of God’s wisdom.” (Sermon 83.)

By the investigation of the human mind we discern the source of human powers, which all arise from the determination of the will. When these powers are employed in speculation, abstract ideas are formed, and may be pursued through the longest series of which the human understanding is capable. From hence proceed all the theorems of science, the demonstrations of the mathematician, the principles of grammar, rhetoric, logic, ethics, metaphysics, law, and theology.

The higher we advance in our speculations, or the higher ideas we form of true science, when we venerate it in the most distinguished ornaments of the present or former ages, the more exalted will be our conception of that God,

who gave to man all the intellect he can claim, and whose own wisdom is displayed by every intellectual power, with which a created being is endowed, and by every exertion of that power in the works of art, which as justly excite our admiration as the works of nature, and whose origin is equally divine.

The theoretical philosopher is, to a mind capable of discerning his intellect, a more decisive manifestation of the glory of God than the whole of the material world, although it may be imagined to fill all space.

These high speculations can be the employment of few. Man in general was designed for action. When his mind directs his external conduct, its operations vary, as that conduct is connected with society; that is, with other men similar to himself, or with the material world, or with both united, which is generally the case. In a prudential and virtuous conduct, human wisdom is universally displayed; nor is it ever more connected with divine wisdom, or a more certain proof of it, than when it obtains its natural influence over us by teaching us what is right for us in every emergency to do, and persuading us to act agreeably to our duty; nor are there any duties of so high value, nor any employments of the understanding so conducive to its improvement, as those acts of elevated piety to which we raise our minds, when we contemplate the wisdom of God in all his works, and praise him for the inestimable blessings which

he has so liberally showered upon man, by rendering those works subservient to his use.

Man finds every part of the material world, as far as human power can extend, an instrument in his hands, to be employed for his purposes, to be framed and fashioned according to his will. What region is there, what portion of land or sea, which, if it is not already subservient to the views of enlightened nations, does not hold out some prospect, that hereafter it may become more connected with them?

What alterations in the whole face of the earth, and in the temperature of the atmosphere, are effected by man! How does human labour destroy some vegetables and promote the growth of others! How many animals depend for their food and their existence upon these operations of man, even when he does not intend their support or their destruction! How extensive is the power of man over all the inferior part of the creation, by his rearing some animals or vegetables, and extirpating others; by the discipline which he exercises in order to improve their nature, and render them more subservient to his use! All this inconceivable variety of effects proves the power of the human understanding, and enables us, by contemplating the operations of it, through all this progress in the formation of an actual work, and all the improvement which art has received in a course of ages, to obtain some idea of the works of nature, and of that divine wisdom, which is the

author of them ; a wisdom producing from a few simple principles, particularly that of attraction, the most astonishing and the most complicated phenomena. God manifests his power by efficient causes, and his wisdom by the final causes, for which this efficiency was designed ; final causes, which we can only discern, as far as our confined sphere of knowledge and limited faculties extend. A sense of the divine power alone will not produce pious resignation ; but a sense of the divine wisdom, identified with the divine goodness, must have that happy effect.

The divine wisdom, as I have deduced it from natural reason, but infinitely more as it is unfolded and manifested in the word of God, demands from us the most devout trust, adoration, and praise. The glory of God arises from the union of perfect wisdom and perfect goodness, which cannot be separated. Power in man is not the source of legitimate sovereignty, or of true glory. The glorious sovereignty, indeed, of the Creator, proceeds from the power, as well as the wisdom and goodness displayed in the creation. But this is a sovereignty, which is not more founded in power, than in wisdom and goodness. It is upon the union of power with perfect wisdom and goodness, that the right of absolute sovereignty depends.

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ESSAY XII.

ON THE POWER OF GOD.

THE first idea, which reflection produces, is the idea of power. It is an idea, to which every being is led, who is capable of reasoning, or conscious of free agency. If we reflect at all, we must know ourselves to be rational creatures, and free agents. In the first commencement of reasoning we proceed from effects to causes, and we cannot form a conception of causes and effects, without discerning the power of the cause to produce the effect. We cannot raise our arm, walk, or exert any voluntary motion; we cannot pursue a train of thought, without consciousness of a power to act or to forbear; that is, without consciousness of liberty.

Atheism is contrary to universal experience. We know that the universe exists. Upon the atheistic system, we discern no cause of its existence, nor of the numerous changes which are constantly taking place without the agency either of man, or of any inferior animal. Every effect produced by an unknown cause is an argument against atheism. Every effect produced by man, or any other animal, is an argument against atheism; because, upon the atheistic principle, no cause can be assigned of the existence of

man, nor of any other animal, nor of the powers they possess.

If every inferior cause has a power assigned to it adequate to the effect produced, and in the great scale of subordination every cause has more and more power in proportion to its efficacy, the one self-existent being, the supreme cause of all things, must be unlimited in power; for from this cause do all things proceed, all the distinctive characters they possess, all the prerogatives they claim, all the faculties they exercise. The highest measure of power must belong to the first cause; a power which goes far beyond the actual production of the universe, for it extends to the remotest possibilities.

We derive likewise this idea of omnipotence from the divine perfection, as it is essential to the divine nature, without reference to the existing world. God was Almighty before the creation.

Infinite as the universe appears, it is not really infinite, but of a determinate extent, and might have been greater than it is; for the powers of a voluntary agent are superior to the effects, which he actually produces.

We do not readily conceive the creation of matter, because in human operations we only change the nature of some material substance; we do not originate the substance itself; but though the human artist does not create the instruments with which he works, there are other

efforts of human genius, where the powers of creation, as well as of formation, are displayed.

The human mind ranges through all the regions of imagination, invents the most delightful scenery, and expatiates in the sublime flights of poetry, or the animating glow of eloquence. What is creation, but the causing that to be, which did not before exist? and is it more difficult to conceive a commencement of being, than a self-existence from all eternity?

The creation of matter to the most indefinite extent, with all its various connections and dependencies, is not so striking an evidence of Almighty power, as the creation of the intellectual world. The highest of the angelic host derives all his holiness and purity, the fervour of his piety, the sublime comprehension of his intellect, his knowledge of the divine will, and the celerity with which he executes it, from God.

There is no power of the speculative, or the active mind, inferior to omnipotence or omniscience, which may not be imparted by the Creator to the creature. Innumerable to our conception, as material beings are, the intellectual ones may exceed them, even in number, and may rise from the lowest powers of self-motion to the highest summit of created perfection.

How high must our astonishment soar, when we contemplate this material universe; and consider every part of it, as well as the amazing

whole, designed for the use of sentient and intellectual beings !

If God created the universe from nothing, he must have created it by his will and his word, by one great omnipotent fiat ; he said “ *Let there be light, and there was light.*”

If God created the universe from his own divine will and pleasure, he may, at any moment, by the same divine will, annihilate it ; he may destroy or suspend, he may overpower, or direct, all the operations of the physical world, and all those faculties which he has conferred upon free agents. “ The Creator,” says Tillotson, “ would pass through all the resistance, which created power could oppose to him, with more ease, than a man would pass through a net of cobweb.” Even this is a degrading comparison, for all resistance is impossible. To suppose an obstacle to divine power, unless produced by sin, the abuse of free agency, would be to suppose an effect without a cause ; for the first cause could not operate against itself ; nor could a subordinate cause act in opposition to the supreme, except when permission is granted to moral evil.

The power of God is not more really exerted in extraordinary interpositions, than it is in the ordinary dispensations of providence, nor in the occasional phenomena of nature, more than in its regular and constant course.

We are capable of forming some idea of Omnipotence, from the power we possess ourselves ; for divine and human power are alike,

as far as each of them is simply a power. Human power is unlike divine power as far as it is defective. Human power is shewn by overcoming obstacles, divine power by having no obstacle opposed to it. Finite and infinite suppose the same common nature, kind, or sort; and they differ only in extent.

Power is the attribute which most directly designates the presence of God; for though goodness and wisdom are as essential to the absolute perfection of divine nature, yet it is by power alone, that goodness and wisdom are brought into action, and are enabled to display themselves.

The power of God is manifested by the authority which he maintains over the whole universe; and by the actual exercise of that authority, whenever his goodness and wisdom require it.

Omnipotence is not in constant and unremitting energy. If it were, God would be the only agent in the universe, and, as far as we can conceive, the sole intellectual being; for agency and intellect appear inseparable.

Omnipotence extends to whatever is not impossible in itself, or impossible as the act of God. God cannot make the same thing to be, and not to be, in the same respects, and at the same time; for that would be a direct contradiction, an impossibility in itself, a mere phantom and delusion of the brain. Nor will he do any thing which a good and wise being will

not do, because he is good and wise. Some writers would call the former a physical, and the latter a moral impossibility ; but I see no propriety in this distinction, as applied to God ; for it is equally impossible for God, a perfect being, to do that which implies imperfection, as it would be for him to do that which implies a contradiction ; in both cases, indeed, a contradiction is equally involved. We cannot suppose any act to be within the compass of divine power, while it appears to us inconsistent with the divine attributes. Whatever God does, he does freely, voluntarily, without controul ; but every being, capable of acting for himself, acts agreeably to his will ; and if that being is perfect in goodness and wisdom, the will must be good and wise ; it must be in strict conformity to those attributes.

Human power is carried to the highest perfection, when it is guarded and directed by the best and wisest laws. Divine power forms no part of divine perfection, if separated, even in idea, from divine goodness and wisdom, for from those attributes it derives all its value.

We cannot imagine that omnipotence can destroy the nature of things, make true false ; good evil ; for that is as direct a contradiction as it is possible to state. If omnipotence cannot destroy the nature of things, it cannot alter that which is most immutable, the nature and perfection of God.

Omnipotence extends to the creation of intellectual beings and free agents ; for the wisdom

and active power of the Creator may be communicated in some subordinate proportion to the creature ; but omnipotence does not extend to the creation of a being, which shall have an intellect and no intellect, agency and no agency, at the same time. The existence of every creature is constantly dependent upon the Creator ; but while God pleases that it should exist, it must retain its appropriate character ; it must act within its appointed sphere, if it has a power of acting ; it must think within the limits of its capacity, if it has a power of thinking.

Whenever, therefore, God has imparted to the creature a portion of his own knowledge, of his own intellect, or of his own power ; or has graciously bestowed upon the creature the means of acquiring, by its own exertions, any degree of knowledge, intellect or power, this knowledge, intellect, and power, belongs to the creature, as derived from the Creator, and is exercised by the creature according to its own will and pleasure, however depraved it may be, and however pernicious the effects which it may produce. For what reason God has given powers, which may be so lamentably abused, or why he permits the abuse of them, it is not for man to know ; but we may presume that the same reasons, wise and good as they undoubtedly were, which induced God to bestow those powers, lead him to permit the exercise of them, until the accomplishment of that dispensation to which they belong.

Whatever power the creature possesses, or

exercises, is derived from the Creator; and, before the creation, it subsisted in him alone; but when delegated to the creature, it is to be considered as the power of the creature, and no longer the power of the Creator. Whatever we know to be the work of man, we cannot consider, at the very time we know it to be the work of man, as the work of God. Our own consciousness convinces us, that we are in some cases prime movers, and are the efficient causes of some effects.

When we see other creatures endowed with similar powers to our own, whether they are rational or animal powers, we conclude, that these powers are delegated to them from the same Almighty Creator; that they are designed for similar purposes, and produce correspondent effects.

When we discern no visible agent, we ascribe the effect to the supreme cause; but as there are invisible agents, who are intermediate between God and man, it is impossible for us, by the exercise of our own reason, to be certain, that any effect is wrought by the immediate hand of God, when all we know is, that it is not the work of man.

The only means we have of distinguishing divine operations from the energies of created free-agents, are those which revelation affords. We derive, however, from unassisted reason, as well as from scripture, one infallible criterion, Whatever we know to be absolutely evil, we

know must proceed from the abuse of liberty in a created free agent, and cannot be ascribed to the pure, the holy, the wise, and gracious God, who is all-perfect, and the source of good alone. The question is, what is absolutely evil? There is no physical evil, which can be pronounced to be an absolute evil, however justly we may reprobate the system of the stoics, and however strongly we may paint the miseries of this world; for the severest and the most interminable evils which we can feel in this transient life, may be no more than the deserved punishments of our sins, or the salutary trials of our virtue. Absolute evil therefore must be confined to moral evil. What is moral evil in some cases can only be known by revelation; but in general it will be clearly discerned by one, who discharges every branch of what he knows to be his duty, and is assiduous in enlarging that knowledge.

We must be fully assured, that God cannot be the author of sin, nor of those evils, which sin alone has brought into the world, unless they are relative, not absolute, evils, arising from a state of punishment, or a state of trial.

Whatever, therefore, is free from all imputation of sin, and is not assignable to any known cause, may be the exercise of divine power; but human knowledge is so imperfect, that it is rash and presumptuous to assert, without the authority of revelation, that God interferes in a specific instance. We know that God will always do what is right; but whether it is right that he

should interfere upon any particular occasion, or whether he actually has interfered, revelation alone can determine. Revelation assures us, that he does interpose in the constant superintendance of an especial providence, in the illumination, and co-operation, of grace.

The powers of the creature, various, extensive, and ascending in an indefinite gradation, afford a more magnificent idea of the power of the Creator, than if it were manifested in himself alone. By having delegated active powers, virtuous and intellectual energies, to an infinite variety of creatures, dispersed through all space, and endowed with immortal souls, he displays his absolute perfection in goodness and wisdom, as well as his omnipotence; and becomes the father of all spirits, the fountain of all real excellence, the protector of all who trust in him, and the moral governor of the universe.

Omnipotence is the attribute, which is most easily impressed upon the human mind, and whenever it is separated from wisdom and goodness, becomes the source of the most dreadful superstition.

The general calamities of the social world arise from power being possessed and exercised by persons, who are either devoid of goodness and wisdom, or who have not those excellent qualities in that perfection which their station requires. Without goodness, we shall employ whatever power we possess to the most selfish, malignant, or capricious purposes; and without

wisdom, we shall often produce the worst mischief, where we design the greatest good. From hence arise wars, seditions, cruelty, tyranny, and oppression, in public and private life. When we constantly feel these calamities, proceeding from the disproportion which power unhappily bears to the qualities necessary for the due exercise of it; how dreadful must be the idea, that we may be through all eternity under the absolute dominion of an Almighty Being, of whose goodness we have no assurance, and in whose wisdom we can place no trust!

The power of God is more forcibly felt by the generality of men than his moral attributes, because every object of sense brings it to our mind. We can neither view heaven nor earth, we cannot hear, feel, taste, nor smell, without being convinced of the power of God. His goodness and his wisdom are discerned by abstract reasoning, or by reflection upon the ideas of sensation. We are all sensible of our own power, and many of us, I fear, have little consciousness of goodness or wisdom. We are more ambitious to obtain power, than to improve ourselves in virtue or understanding; and we are apt to value ourselves more upon external superiority, than upon real excellence. Whatever we most esteem, we naturally ascribe to God. It is not therefore wonderful, that the power of God should have been so exalted in a depraved and unenlightened world, while the divine nature, in its more admirable perfections,

has been so blasphemously degraded. The full conviction however of the divine omnipotence is essential to a just conception of God; and, when never separated from goodness and wisdom, it is of great practical importance in a religious life.

Power, when united most strictly with goodness and wisdom, is an attribute, which must strike every careless man with terror, and inspire the most pious with reverential awe; while the moral attributes shew the baseness of offending God, this attribute impresses upon our minds the extreme peril of it.

This attribute teaches us to engage in no unwarrantable design; it depresses all confidence in ourselves; it mortifies pride, it nourishes faith in God, and affords the highest hope of success in all proper undertakings; for it teaches us that while God by his omniscience discerns every thought of the heart, he is ready with his omnipotent arm to succour us in all our efforts which he approves, and to dash to pieces at a moment the best concerted project, when it appears most prosperous, if it is not consonant to his will.

The moral attributes are the great foundation of religion, and afford to a pure heart, to a generous temper, and to an exalted mind, the strongest motives for conforming our wills to the will of God; but the obedience of a depraved and sinful creature cannot be secured, without some hope of reward, and fear of punishment.

Rewards and punishments power alone can dispense.

What can be a more powerful incentive to holiness and restraint from sin, than rewards and punishments awarded by a judge who is perfect in wisdom and goodness, as well as in power?

We must have no expectations from the power of God, which are not equally derived from his goodness and wisdom. We must not hope for partial favour, nor fear punishment beyond our deserts. But let us resolutely determine to act right, that the divine power may be employed for us, and not against us; and that we may place ourselves, with humble confidence, under the divine protection, relying upon the gracious promises of the gospel, with full assurance of that everlasting felicity, purchased by the atoning blood of our blessed Redeemer for all his faithful followers.

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ESSAY XIII.

ON THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

THE omnipotence of God was exerted in the creation of the universe, and may at any time be exerted in the destruction of it. The particular dispensations of providence are proofs of the extraordinary interpositions of divine power.

When God was pleased to reveal his will to mankind in the patriarchal, the jewish, or the christian dispensations, a supernatural power was manifested. The same power shews itself in all the extraordinary operations of external or internal grace, in all the blessed influences which, by peculiar energies of the holy spirit, are shed abroad, in any period of successive time, upon nations or individuals. But when we speak of the moral government of God, we should discard from our thoughts that omnipotence, which, if it were in constant energy, would render God the sole agent in the universe, and those extraordinary interpositions which manifest his all-ruling providence, and his supernatural grace; and we should consider him as acting under those limits which he himself appointed, and which could be derived from no other source than his own will. These limits are the laws, which he assigned to the instrumental powers of

matter, and to the active powers of free agents. He acts *as moral governor of the universe*, in strict conformity to his own laws, without the violation of any prerogatives which he has given to the creature within its respective sphere.

This moral government extends to every responsible being; but in treating of this subject, I shall confine my views to man. Final causes are not more manifest in the creation, than in the government of the world. These final causes, as they are the motives from which God acts, would display all his attributes, if we could perfectly comprehend them; and the more diligently, with pious reverence, we explore them, the more shall we approach to a knowledge of them, which is the most excellent knowledge we can attain.

The government of the natural world is subservient to that of the moral world. As the inanimate world must be governed by the laws of mechanism, the animal world by those laws which are applicable to beings, endowed with no higher faculties than those of sense; so must the moral world be governed by those exertions of power in the Creator, which are perfectly consistent with the liberty of the creature, and adapted to all the principles of its nature. God has created man, not only a free agent, but has conferred upon him certain degrees of understanding and knowledge, capable of being variously improved by his own industry. He has implanted in him passions and affections. He

has deeply impressed upon his mind self-love and benevolence, as excitors of action. He has combined these several principles in the most perfect harmony, so that during their natural operations they are in due subordination and subjection.

It may justly be presumed, that the motives which induced God to create such a being as man, will induce him to continue his existence by the regular succession of innumerable individuals until all the ends of his creation are fulfilled. Man is placed in a state of trial, surrounded by an infinite diversity of temptations, both external and internal, capable of yielding to these temptations, or resisting them; but extremely liable to an abuse of his liberty, and to all those perversions of his original nature, which that abuse must bring upon him.

The moral government, therefore, of God over man, must consist, first, in legislation. God will prescribe to him those laws which his situation requires. These laws may be written in his heart; they may be identified with his understanding; or the knowledge of them may be acquired by personal exertion, and by docility in receiving instruction; or they may be promulgated by revelation. In all these several ways is God the legislator of mankind. Whatever we know to be the law of God, is equally obligatory upon us, whether we derive our knowledge from a natural or a supernatural source.

Law must have a sanction in reward and punishment. When this sanction flows from the original frame of the creation, it is as much an exertion of the divine power, as when it is the immediate act of God. Every internal or external reward, which virtue is naturally adapted to confer, is to be ascribed to the author of all good, and to be considered as an essential part of his moral government. In the same manner, every internal or external punishment, which is the natural effect of vice, is an awful manifestation of the divine justice. God convinces us that he is our moral governor, by his works, as far as we are affected by them; by the internal operations of our minds; by the influence which society has over us; by the supremacy of conscience and its dreadful remorse. By all the evils of this life, not only by those which are obviously the effects of sin, but those which awaken serious reflection, and bring us to a due sense of human misery, does God excite in the sinner an awful dread of the just punishment awaiting him, and which will undoubtedly be inflicted upon him if he continues impenitent, either in the present or in a future state. Although our experience can proceed no farther than to teach us the moral government of God in this life, yet the same principle will extend to all eternity.

We know, in this life, that repentance, though it may in a great measure heal the wounds of conscience, and expel the terrors of a guilty

soul, yet will not exempt us from a large portion of those calamities, which sins of omission as well as of commission are naturally designed to produce. We are led, therefore, from reflection upon the events of this life, to suppose, that the divine justice will require some atonement for sin before the most penitent can be admitted to perfect felicity. Whenever we indulge a vicious passion, or commit presumptuous sin, we depart from conscious rectitude; we offend God, and alienate our hearts from him. We shall, therefore, by every sinful compliance, become more depraved; we shall find it more difficult to resist temptation; our desires will more strongly urge us to licentiousness; and every virtuous principle, opposed to the favourite vice, will be weakened. Our sins will not only for this reason be more frequent, but they will be more degrading to our moral character; they will increase in magnitude, as well as in number, until we are sadly plunged into the deepest corruption, the most infatuated blindness of understanding, the most inveterate obduracy of heart. Sin is the appointed punishment of sin. It naturally results from it, and is the severest punishment it can receive.

But if this is adduced as a proof of the moral government of God, it may be objected, that God will be the author of sin; not indeed of the first offence, but of the second, and every subsequent one, as far as it arises from the first; of all the accumulation and aggravation of moral evil which I have been describing.

Sin ceases to be sin, unless it is a voluntary act. A frail creature, therefore, may commit sin, or forbear to commit it. While God affords the means of resisting temptation, we are under no necessity of yielding to it; and these means are always supplied by the ordinary operations of divine grace, while our free agency and responsibility, that is, while our capability of sin remains. In this case, God is no more the author of sin, by making the increased danger of our state of trial a punishment for our transgressions, than a human lawgiver is the author of death to a citizen, whose life he is anxious to preserve, by the enactment of capital punishment. His object is not to execute the offender, but to prevent the offence. So the final cause, which the divine lawgiver has in view, is not to harden the heart of the sinner, but to deter him, by the prospect of this dreadful consequence, from his sinful propensities, and from the first indulgence of them.

If from indulgence the temptation becomes so strong, that it is absolutely impossible to resist it, the responsibility for this particular crime ceases, although it is terribly aggravated in respect to those inveterate habits, which have reduced the sinner to this deplorable state.

The more accurately we reflect upon our conduct, the more shall we be convinced, that the greater part of our external calamities, and almost all our internal complaints, are to be imputed to ourselves; and much more to our

voluntary transgression of what we know, or might have known, to be the divine will, than to worldly ignorance or natural imbecility. It is probable that if we knew the full extent of moral causes and effects, we should be convinced that physical evil was always the result of moral evil; and whenever the physical evil is felt by the person who produces the moral evil, (that is, who commits sin,) the physical evil is so far proportioned to the moral evil, as to be the exact punishment it deserves, and is therefore the strongest declaration of the moral government of God. But this moral government is not more conspicuously displayed, although it was wisely intended to be more alarming, in the punishment of sin, than in the reward of holiness. If it is probable, that physical evil arises from moral evil, it is equally probable, that all physical good arises from moral good, and is in all cases the reward of it. For if we obtain physical good ourselves in consequence of a virtuous action, the reward is manifest; and a benevolent heart may have a greater satisfaction in conferring benefits than in receiving them. There is no virtuous action which will not cause physical good, to ourselves at least, if not to others. There is no just temperament of mind, no right principle, no contemplation of truth, or accurate investigation into it, which will not be the source of personal happiness, producing the immediate sensation of pleasure; as well as lasting comfort and satisfaction, calm complacency,

and solid delight. As the severest punishment of sin is the increase of it, so the highest reward, which can be bestowed upon any single virtuous act, is its natural tendency to produce more acts of the same kind. If every indulgence of vice increases the passion, every resistance to temptation strengthens us against the next assault. If this is the case in negative, it is much more strikingly true in positive acts of virtue. Every act of piety confirms our religious principles, and exalts our spiritual nature. Every act of true benevolence warms and purifies our best affections. Every act of real heroism enlarges the mind, inspires genuine patriotism, and animates us in the most laudable pursuits.

The more fully we are convinced, that virtue is the reward of virtue, the more glorious will the moral attributes of God appear, the more shall we be persuaded that *he ruleth in the earth*, and that notwithstanding the obliquities of our present imperfect state, one great end is pursued,—the indissoluble union of virtue and happiness, through eternity, in all those moral agents, who have not, by their own voluntary transgression, rendered themselves unworthy of immortal life.

We cannot discern what is fittest for God to do; but we may discern what he has done, and trace the harmony, which appears in the stated laws of his moral government. We may learn by experience the exact proportion, which re-

ward bears to virtue, and punishment to sin, as far as their natural tendencies are not counteracted by the malignity of evil men, or evil spirits; or by other causes unknown to us.

Although God is immutable, his ordinances are mutable; because the measures, by which he proceeds are not his own perfections, but the infirmities of his creatures. The wisdom of a lawgiver is conspicuously displayed, when he consults the circumstances of his subjects. If we diligently observe the general method of divine administration, we must be convinced, that we shall obtain a reward, or receive a punishment proportioned to our conduct, and that this reward or punishment is to be ascribed to the general course of nature, which necessarily implies an operating agent; for rewards and punishments regularly produced by the established system of the moral world, constitute the divine government.

A civil government must depend upon those particular exertions, which are within the power of man, and which cannot be exactly proportioned to a guilt impossible for man to ascertain. The most perfect laws are those which execute themselves, and no laws fully execute themselves, but those which are enacted by a being perfect in wisdom, goodness, and power.

The evidence which we have of the moral government of God, arises from four sources. First, from the abstract view which we are enabled, by contemplation, to take of the nature of God

and man, and of the relation between them. Secondly, from our own experience as applied to our own hearts and actions. Thirdly, from our observation of the events passing in the world, in the present or in former ages. Fourthly, from revelation.

Without authority from the declared will of God we must not pronounce any particular calamity, merely because it is a calamity, to be a judgment upon a nation or an individual; but being assured, from the first principles of religion, that God will reward virtue, and punish vice, whenever we know by reflection upon ourselves, or by our more imperfect penetration into the views of other men, that virtue produces happiness, and vice misery, we are chargeable with no degree of presumption by fixing our minds upon this established connection, and applying the serious consideration of it, to the great and important purposes for which it was designed.

It was principally intended to raise in our minds higher conceptions of the Deity, and to impress upon our hearts a more awful sense of his constant inspection, accompanied with the earnest desire of conforming our wills to his holy laws.

Although the power of God was exerted in the creation of man, in the constitution of his nature, and in the establishment of a moral government over him, yet it is not in the attribute of power, that the principle of this moral

government is to be sought ; no ! it is founded in the perfect purity, holiness, and beneficence, as well as in the consummate wisdom, of God. Every act of justice is, in the great ruler of the universe, an act of mercy. Every punishment of a criminal is a blessing bestowed upon the person, who by that punishment is deterred from sin.

The government of God over mankind may affect other innumerable orders of intelligent beings in a manner we cannot comprehend, and, as we know man to have an immortal soul, may become to the individual sufferer the ultimate source of unmixed unfading joy. When divine blessings are bestowed antecedently to the conduct of the persons, upon whom they are bestowed, which seems to have been the case in the selection of the Jews, as the peculiar people of God ; they are always dependent upon the moral use which is made of them. Superior knowledge aggravates disobedience. Those who, having far inferior knowledge of religious truth, set out behind us in the great race of duty, may, by their diligence or our slothfulness, overtake us in this world, and be placed far above us in the next.

External circumstances may produce the *appearance* of spiritual illumination, religious knowledge, or worldly felicity ; but it is our voluntary obedience to God, which alone can produce the *reality*, or which can enable us to enjoy any of the blessings we possess. God de-

signed by holiness to lead us to happiness. The grand object of his moral government is (in the words of a prayer of an eminent divine of the seventeenth century*,) "That man in the use of his liberty may present," Almighty God! "thy majesty with a free-will offering, and bring unto thee the consent of his mind; that so he may become altogether thine; that, as he is thine, by thy creation of him, by thy maintenance and preservation, by thy constant providence over him, by thy gracious assuming of him into a relation to thyself by thy son, making him the adoption of thy grace; so he may be also thine by his voluntary dedicating and devoting himself to thy fear and service."

* Dr. Whichcote. See his prayer at the end of the fourth volume of his Sermons.

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* Before the year 1803, when the Author began the Seventh Period of his common-place book, he had not entered "the Moral Government of God" as one of the heads under which to class his references; and it is in consequence of this alteration in his plan, that this part of his work begins with the Seventh Period.

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ESSAY XIV.

ON INFIDELITY.

INFIDELITY in its most enlarged sense comprehends all unbelief of religious truth. In this sense, Pagans, Mahometans, Jews, and corrupt Christians of every description may be deemed infidels. Few, indeed, are there, or ever have been, of the sons of Adam, exempt from this sad calamity or severe reproach.

But in treating upon this subject, I see no utility likely to arise from taking into consideration the large and melancholy number of our fellow-creatures, who are infidels because they never had an opportunity of knowing or believing the essential doctrines of religion; and in whom unbelief is of a negative, not of a positive, nature, and must be deemed no crime, however great the misfortune.

I shall therefore confine my views of infidelity to that species of it, which either apparently is, or at least may be deemed, voluntary; to infidelity as an act of the mind, and therefore more or less an act of the will; for whenever the mind really acts, whenever she proceeds beyond simple perception, there is not only an energy of intellect, but of will. The attention must be applied to the subject; every free agent

may excite his attention, or suffer it to lie dormant, and he may exert any degree of it he pleases. I shall therefore assume, as an abstract proposition, that infidelity is voluntary whenever it is manifested by the rejection of a religious truth, which the divine providence has enabled us to embrace.

How far an individual in the circumstances, in which he is particularly placed, is criminal, I shall leave to his own conscience, and to the great searcher of all hearts; unless his obstinate impiety is so notorious, that it is impossible to put a favourable construction upon it.

Infidelity, therefore, may be considered as voluntary, when the patriarchal revelation was slighted, and the world, in the primitive ages, lapsed into that idolatry, with which it was at an early period, overwhelmed.

Infidelity may be considered as voluntary, when the children of Israel violated the pure worship of Jehovah; when, before the captivity, they forsook the Lord of Hosts, or paid him outward honours at the same time that they adored strange gods, or when, after the captivity, they superseded the law of Moses by their traditions.

The strongest proof of impious wilfulness in the rejection of religious truth, was the obstinate self-determination of the Jews to refuse the acknowledgment of the true Messiah, when he came into the world exactly at the time, and under the circumstances, predicted by the prophets;

when his mission was confirmed by an audible divine voice, by the most unquestionable and public miracles, by his resurrection from the dead, and his glorious ascension into heaven.

In every christian country, and in all the ages of the church, infidelity may be considered as voluntary, because the gospel has been constantly taught; and although every impurity, which corrupted it, obscured the evidence, it did not destroy it.

There is no corruption of religion, which deserves to be stigmatized by the opprobrious name of infidelity, however enthusiastical or superstitious it may be, unless it necessarily overthrows some true doctrine, in which case, although merely enthusiastical or superstitious in its origin, it becomes a species of infidelity in its effect.

Thus popery, with her innumerable mediators, and her continual sacrifice of the mass, overthrows the christian doctrine of one mediator, and one great atonement for the sins of the whole world; rigid calvinism overthrows a future state of rewards and punishments, and anti-nomianism the first principles of morality.

In the dark ages of the church, before the art of printing was acquired, when manuscripts were difficult to procure, and when few persons could read even their native language, and antient learning was almost extinct to the large bulk of mankind, there was no alternative between believing all the corrupt tenets of popery,

or rejecting christianity on their account ; and this is even now in some measure the case in Roman catholic countries. But in the worst times, and under the most unfortunate delusions, the light of the gospel was not wholly extinct ; many of its doctrines were preserved, and universally maintained ; and by the special protection of divine providence, the Bible remained in its original ; and in a Latin translation authorized by that very church, whose corruptions it most irrefragably opposed.

In pagan countries, before the æra of christianity, infidelity was manifested in a voluntary idolatry, for the one supreme God *had not left himself without witness* in every nation. There has been no display of human intellect, no degree of advancement in civilization, which has not been accompanied with the knowledge of one God ; yet idolatry very generally prevailed, and was frequently most contemptible or most flagitious, where learning, taste, and science, were chiefly cultivated, and where the understandings of men were admirably enlightened, not only upon all other subjects, but upon religion itself ; for the most exalted ideas of the divinity, which unassisted reason can attain, are to be found, not only in the precious remains transmitted to us of the platonic and stoic schools, but in their dramatic writers, whose object must have been to advance those sentiments which were most pleasing to the audience, and most in unison with public opinion.

Idolatry, under these circumstances, was certainly a species of voluntary infidelity; because the idolater denied the God, whom he might have known, and substituted the most depraved creature, which his prostituted imagination could suggest, in the place of his great Creator.

Infidelity, however, was not only manifested in the antient world by the prevalence of the popular superstition, but by the epicurean and pyrrhonic philosophy; the former denying all religion, the latter all truth.

The disciples of the atheistical or sceptical philosophers were voluntary infidels, by rejecting those great truths, which nature had implanted in all minds, and which their superior understandings, or habits of speculation, would have enabled them, if they had been truly wise, to have illustrated and confirmed.

All who after the sixth century apostatized from christianity, by preferring the crescent to the cross, may be considered as voluntary infidels; for they rejected the gospel, when they had been assured of its truth, and when they might have had that assurance more fully than ever established in their hearts, by all the extraordinary phenomena which attended that great apostacy; if they had compared the credentials of Mahomet with those of Christ, and placed in its true view the striking contrast between the most bloody and tyrannical impostor, and the most meek and lowly, the most unprotected and suffering son of man; the former spreading his

religion by the sword, the latter by appeals to reason and to sense.

The last class of infidels, to whom I think it material to advert, are those born and bred christians, who since the revival of learning, and the Reformation, call themselves free-thinkers. These are atheists, sceptics, irreligious or religious deists, or those who, admitting the divine mission of Christ, reject doctrines which are not of human invention, but may be clearly proved from scripture. There is no truth of religion, which, after careful examination, can be rejected by a sound mind, unless there is a corrupt heart and perverse will; nor is there any religious truth which is not salutary, and which has not a material efficacy in promoting our present and future happiness, being productive of that *Godliness*, or rather an essential part of it, *which is profitable unto all things, having the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come.**

A person, therefore, who is ignorant of religious truth, is the object of pity, for he is in a lower scale of moral and intellectual dignity. But if he voluntarily rejects it, he must be criminal. He cannot voluntarily reject it without some neglect of duty, if he refuses to examine the evidence; or some depravity of will, if having examined it, he is not convinced by it; for truth is so congenial to the mind, that, when

* *Εὐσέβεια* (1 Tim. iv. 8.) translated *Godliness*, that is, piety to God, includes faith as well as obedience.

once properly presented to a rational being, its validity must be acknowledged, unless some intervening cloud obscures the light, which it may do of the mid-day sun, if there is a wilfulness, an obstinacy, or a tumult of passion*.

It has been contended, that we are quite passive in our belief, therefore infidelity cannot be criminal; and that the human mind is so differently framed, that the same evidence which convinces one man has no effect upon another. Both these theories are unfounded, or supported by false principles. The former supposes that we are not free agents in our thoughts, whatever we may be in our words and actions. The latter supposes, that mind in every rational being is not the same, but capable of a diversity destructive of its very essence. This is a position which would lead to universal scepticism. Upon the same principle, that we are supposed passive in our belief, we may imagine ourselves passive in all moral and social virtues. It is difficult, I allow, to conquer an inveterate prejudice, especially the prejudices which pride and licentiousness indulge against religion; but not more difficult than to subdue an inordinate passion. The fastidious declare that they find it impossible to sympathize with any man. The capricious and conceited feel an invincible reluctance to accommodate themselves to company they dispise, or to enjoy that society into

* See Locke's Essay, b. iv. the last paragraph of c. 13, and c. 20, sect. 3.

which they must naturally fall ; but are these difficulties, or these impossibilities, as we fondly call them, pleas, which any wise or good man will allow, for the violation of every duty which benevolence, gratitude, or natural affection demand? Can the misanthrope or the infidel plead an insuperable necessity at the tribunal of an omniscient judge, who knows the free agency he has bestowed upon man, and the responsibility flowing from it? Every truth, when it is brought before the mind, becomes self-evident, and must be universally received. But the difficulty consists in bringing truths properly before the mind, when they are not evident at first sight. No religious truth is evident at first sight; it must, therefore, be brought before the mind by some voluntary exertion of the intellectual agent, that is, of the being who contemplates it. No instructor can teach a pupil, without some active energy of the pupil's own mind. It is, therefore, in our power to refuse to make this exertion, and if we do not decline the effort altogether, the intenseness or remission of it, the time we employ in it, all depends upon ourselves. As ignorance depresses us in the moral and intellectual scale, so we raise ourselves, not only in the moral and intellectual, but in the religious scale of being, by all the conviction which we are enabled, through our own voluntary exertions, to obtain of divine truth. I am ready to acknowledge, that we cannot investigate the truth of any theological position, nor

have it properly presented to the mind, if there is a great deficiency of natural capacity, or education, or learning, or leisure; but these advantages are not required in an eminent degree, if we confine our examination to the fundamental doctrines of natural or revealed religion. These qualifications become chiefly necessary, when some subtlety of human invention, supported by sophistry, is to be exploded; or when we enquire into the true interpretation of a particular passage in scripture; or when we attempt to explore the regions of eternity and immensity, or the nature of that Being who, in his full perfection, is incomprehensible to every created mind. If, however, in our inquiries after divine truth, we are properly sensible of our defects, whatever is wanting in knowledge or ability will be supplied by an humble and a docile temper, and our right of private judgment will be best exerted in the choice of an enlightened guide. Although we advance towards perfection, and gradually ascend according to the number of true propositions which we believe, if we act correspondently to them, yet we shall not, at the day of judgment, be rewarded or punished exactly in this proportion; for the number of true propositions, which we believe, depends upon a variety of unavoidable circumstances. Our reward or punishment will be awarded in conformity with our laudable diligence or culpable neglect.

The faith which christianity requires, is not

credulity, but assent founded on willing enquiry and rational conviction. The works of nature and the words of revelation, display to mankind the great truths of religion, in characters so large and visible, that those who are not quite blind, may in them read and see the first principles, and most necessary parts; and from thence, as they have time and industry, may be able to go on to what is more abstruse, and penetrate into those infinite depths, filled with the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.

Faith would be divested of its excellency if the objects of it were evident to sense, or demonstrable by reason. This would take from our judgment its noblest exercise, confounding the wise and foolish, the virtuous and the wicked, the industrious and the slothful. As the taking away the freedom of human will would destroy the very nature of moral virtue, so likewise, as to faith, there would be nothing worthy of praise and recompence in it, if there were left no possibility of doubting and denying.

Whenever a proposition requires investigation, before it can be pronounced true or false, we shall be very apt to pursue the investigation, with more or less impartiality and perseverance, as we feel ourselves interested in the result.

If we are very anxious to draw any particular conclusion from the premises, it is too probable that this conclusion will be drawn, however contrary it may be to the strict rules of reasoning. A good man, therefore, will be very desirous

that every doctrine should prove true, which confirms, strengthens, and improves his virtue, and leads him to expect immortal felicity as his reward. A bad man will be equally desirous, that a doctrine shall prove false, which awakens his remorse of conscience, militates with his pursuits, is adverse to his habits, and affords him no alternative, but the sacrifice of all his gratifications in this life, or everlasting misery in the next.

All vices are destructive of true faith, especially those which are most clearly condemned by it, most notorious to the world, and of which the sinner must be himself most conscious. When the understanding is led by the will, and the will is biassed by the consciousness of crimes, by habitual immorality, or inclination to impiety, we can hardly forbear saying, with "the fool in his heart," that "there is no God;" and from wishing there were none to believing there is none, will be too short and easy a transition. When men are resolved to be wicked, atheism is the refuge, to which they are lamentably forced to flee in their own defence, to avoid the clamours and the persecutions of their consciences.

As wicked actions, so may wicked speculations, be the effect of an obstinate and depraved will, not of an erroneous judgment.

The will of the sinner must be deeply engaged on the side of infidelity, when he considers the assurances which she gives him, that he shall avoid shame and pain, that he shall neither

be discovered nor punished, and that the reins shall lie loose upon all his appetites. As much deviation as there is from the eternal rules of right reason, or from morality in the soul, so much there will be in it of darkness. Although when the understanding apprehends a truth clearly and distinctly, it is not in the power of the will to countermand its assent to it, yet the will can antecedently hinder it from taking that path into full consideration; nay, every consideration the understanding gives it, must be accompanied by a free act of the will. There are other causes of infidelity besides conscious guilt; but they may all be traced to vice or folly, as their radical source.

There are many vicious springs of action of which we are insensible, and many more, which only become known to us by serious reflection. Pride, obstinacy, conceit, and vanity, conceal themselves from our view, and are often mistaken for virtues or accomplishments; yet are there no vices which more pervert the judgment, or more disqualify us for an impartial examination of sacred truth.

From the corruption of our nature, there is a perverse opposition of the human will to the will of God. If we have a just sense of his moral perfection, we feel an alienation from him in our depraved propensities, and tremble at the distance, to which we are removed from his consummate holiness; and if, on the other hand, we depreciate and disparage his

goodness, we view him as an object of terror, and find that terror so oppressive to our imagination, that we eagerly snatch at any twig, which we vainly think may serve us; avail ourselves of any speculative difficulty, which may dissipate the gloom spread over a dejected and superstitious mind.

Misapprehensions concerning God, by blending truth with falsehood, are a very general cause of infidelity. So is precipitate rashness, in prescribing to and prejudging the divine providence.

Neglect of religion is a vice of which many men are little aware, and into which they fall, from their education, situation, and habits of life; yet it has a sad effect in blinding our perspicacity, and dissipating our thoughts upon serious subjects. If we do not enter deeply and frequently into the consideration of religion, we shall not be able to render a reason for our faith; and if we take up an opinion without examination, and can give no reason for it, it is wholly with the will we believe, not in any degree with the understanding. Although our faith must be accompanied with the will, yet if it depends upon the will alone, it stands upon so sandy a foundation, that it will be shattered to atoms by the first violent assault, whether it be a storm of licentiousness, or a blast of delusive argument.

If we entirely neglect the public worship of God, we shall be less disposed to private prayer; and if we fall into the habitual disuse of com-

munication with God, we shall lose all sense of our relation to him ; and the practical disbelief of the first principles of religion, will pave a ready way for speculative infidelity.

Upon the whole, there is no sin of omission or commission, whether we are sensible or insensible of it, which may not shake our religion, and by degrees lead us to hardened atheism. We shall begin with doubting, then proceed to denying some of the doctrines of the gospel, until we reject revealed religion, and find, in the fatal progress, that natural religion itself is wholly obliterated from our minds.

Although sins, whether of omission or commission, may not be the sole causes of infidelity, at least not always the proximate ones; yet voluntary infidelity, in all cases, arises either from actual sin, or from that depraved disposition, which must be ascribed at the present moment, or at some former periods of our lives, to wilful negligence, or wilful violation of the divine law.

This is apparent, when infidelity is occasioned by a desire of being in the fashion, by a fear of ridicule, by a wish to raise oneself above the vulgar herd, by a love of singularity, or by the various Protean forms in which is displayed that spirit of caprice, which leaves our faith at the mercy of humour and inclination. The taste for drollery and ridicule will never be applied to sacred subjects, unless there is a propensity to irreligion ; but when there subsists that profane

propensity, no subjects are more liable to become the instruments of scoffing wit ; nor is the virulence of the scorner ever more malignantly, or more successfully employed. The habit of disputation, and the perverse disposition of criticising or refuting whatever we are taught, leads to infidelity. When we are emancipated from the restraints of education, and become immersed in the employments or recreations of life, when no objects are presented to our thoughts but objects of sense, we find it difficult to believe an invisible world, especially to impress that belief strongly in our minds.

By abandoning all divine worship, we sink into atheism ; by directing it to objects of sense, we become idolaters.

The great bulwarks against the fatal inroads of unbelief are, virtue, knowledge, and cheerfulness. Knowledge establishes our faith upon the authority of reason, by teaching us the great truths of natural and revealed religion, and the evidences upon which they depend.

Cheerfulness disposes us to gratitude to God, the author of all blessings, which is the animating principle of religion.

From the view I have taken of this subject it appears, that infidelity is often a voluntary act, impious with respect to God, and most destructive of the best interests of man.

It originates from vice, meanness, ignorance, and melancholy, all brought upon us by the abuse of those rational powers which God gave

us for the most opposite purposes, to promote his glory, the happiness of every sentient being within our sphere of action, and our own everlasting salvation. It appears, also, that wickedness and infidelity reciprocate as cause and effect ; and that infidelity, as the cause of sin, produced all the mischief which history records, or which now prevails in this unhappy world.

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ESSAY XV.

ON RELIGION.

RELIGION, if speculative, is the knowledge of God ; if practical, is obedience to his will.

Religion arises from the nature of that relation, which the creature bears to the Creator.

Every created being bears a relation to its Creator ; but if it is merely an insensible clod of earth incapable of voluntary motion, the relation it bears arises from its being a link in that great chain, upon which the organization of the material world and all its phenomena depend.

If this created being is sentient, it feels not only evil, but probably a large superabundance of good, which is a manifestation to an enlightened mind of the divine goodness ; but that goodness cannot be discerned by the creature itself, when endued with sensation alone.

If this created being has the power of locomotion, it probably is not devoid of the influence of motives, and may, by its internal feelings, discover the various influences of instinct, passion, or caprice, which govern its conduct, which render it savage and untameable, or domesticated, and subject to man. The degree of liberty which it enjoys stimulates all its sensations, and increases the pungency of pleasure or pain.

But still it is man alone, of the inhabitants of this globe, who appears capable, as the high priest of nature, to celebrate the praise of that God, who is the sole author to all the inferior parts of the creation, of the various advantages they possess; advantages, which render them at once more happy and more useful.

There must be reason, before we are capable of knowing God in the most imperfect manner; and there must exist this capacity, before we can have that relation to God which is essential to the first germ of religion.

Wherever there is the least glimmering of reason, there is a proportionable approach towards religion. The more our natural understanding is improved, and the more it is enlightened by revelation, the higher will be the state to which we shall ascend in speculative religion, and the higher we ascend in speculation, the greater religious excellence may be expected from us in practice.

But it is not from reason alone that our knowledge of God, even by natural light, is derived. By the conflict between reason and passion, in all our worldly thoughts and transactions, we find ourselves accountable for our conduct, and by conscience are led to the awful dread of some unknown invisible being. Consciousness is the strongest of all proofs, through which God has been pleased to convey to us the knowledge of our own existence, of our duty, and our duty sanctioned by some idea of our great invisible

judge, and of our future state. By consciousness we feel our own free agency, which renders our responsibility more certain. If we deny free agency, we lay the axe to the root of all religion. Without free agency, it is impossible to investigate religious truth, to pursue a pious thought, to indulge a devout affection, or to perform a christian duty.

We are more convinced of the immutable distinction between right and wrong, than of any other truth discoverable by the internal powers of the mind; and by exercising our understanding upon those speculations, by that knowledge of ourselves which is independent of all external circumstances, we may form the sublimest ideas of virtue, and the most hideous image of whatever is opposed to it.

It is, however, man in a higher character than in his individual capacity, it is man as a member of society, as incorporated with a large body of his fellow-creatures, resembling him in reason, in passions, in free agency, in moral responsibility, who is capable of applying right and wrong to all the events of life, and of establishing upon its true basis the rectitude of virtue, and the enormity of vice.

When the nature of man, as an individual, and as a social being, is fully investigated, we discover the relation, of which he is capable, to God.

We find that man is a rational, a free, and moral agent, and that he may exalt his intel-

lectual and his moral character to the highest summit, or depress them to the lowest abyss, which imagination can conceive.

When we can frame some idea of the nature of man, let us compare it, with humble reverence, but as far as our faculties will admit, to the nature of God. It is from this comparison alone that the relation can be understood, upon which all religion is founded.

We have proved, in the foregoing Essays, that God is a being of infinite perfection ; that true perfection consists in consummate holiness and beneficence ; without which, power and wisdom could claim neither love nor obedience, veneration nor praise. We have proved, also, that this perfect being is not only our creator and preserver, but that he is the moral governor of man. From his moral government, from his divine nature, and from the nature he benignantly bestowed upon man in his original creation, and to which he has restored him by redemption and grace, it follows, that there must be that relation between God and man, which is the great corner stone of natural religion, and from which revealed religion must derive its most staple support.

Religion arises from right apprehensions of God, which teach us what services he requires, and excite in us that love of him which is the true principle of obedience, and enables us to serve him with a free will, an ardent affection, and a cheerful heart.

These right apprehensions of God teach us, that his glory is inseparable from our happiness. When we consider God as above all want, the only end we can propose in serving him is, to derive to ourselves happiness and perfection from him, and to please him by our conduct. By right apprehensions of God, we acquire every convincing argument for religion, which is founded upon the reverence due to his majesty, respect to his holiness, conviction of his justice, gratitude for his mercy, not mistaking it for blind pity, and for his goodness, as separated from partiality.

If we are ignorant of any of these divine perfections, we shall have fewer motives to act right; if we entertain false notions of God, we shall be encouraged in our rebellions against him. Religion is described in scripture by styling it the remembrance of God. Remembrance is the actual thought of what we habitually know. To remember God, is frequently in our most retired thoughts to consider seriously, that there is such a being, and that he is our legislator and our judge.

Whatever knowledge a man may possess, he is an ignorant person, who does not know God, the author of his being, the preserver and protector of his life, his sovereign and his judge, the giver of all good, his surest refuge in trouble, his hope in death, the source of his future happiness, and his portion for ever.

No other principle but religion, firmly believed, and that belief sustained by a correspondent

practice was ever able to administer true consolation, either under the calamities of life, or the pangs of death.

The religious man depends upon a Being whose power qualifies him to make him happy, whose goodness engages him to promote his permanent felicity, and whose unchangeableness secures this happiness to an immortal being through all eternity.

Devout affections are the chief occupation of rational souls in their most serious hours of reflection; they are their highest joy in prosperity, and their sweetest refuge in adversity. A firm trust in the perfections of God is the only certain and undisturbed source of human happiness. Without religion, we forget all the blessings which God has graciously bestowed upon us, and dwell solely upon evils arising from ourselves, from our fellow-creatures, or from some unknown cause. We see in nature supposed imperfections, in men vices, in ourselves contradictions and calamities. We plunge ourselves into a darkness, which we first endure and then love. Religion stands in the breach against all that despair, violence, and impiety, which would otherwise irresistibly break in upon mankind, and is the strong cement which upholds and sustains society. This is an irrefragable proof of its truth. Falsehood cannot be the permanent bond of society, nor the source of lasting happiness to the individual or to the community. Religion not only overcomes the evils of this life, but

convincing us that they are all permitted for our good. To be truly religious, we must deeply impress upon our hearts the inseparable union between God and goodness.

Natural and revealed religion accord; both deriving their authority from God, who has one great and uniform plan of benevolence towards mankind. We ought to fear God, and him alone, and to search for his will in the revelations he has given us, and in the exercise of all those powers of our minds, which enable us to understand, and to apply divine truth.

The objects of true saving faith are more or less extensive, according to the light any man enjoys. Whoever believes that there is a God, having a just conception of his attributes, and comes to him by an obedient life, as far as he knows his duty, is a true believer. It appears from the second chapter to the Romans, that true religion is of universal nature and extent.

The rejection of natural religion forms some of the principal prejudices against christianity. Revelation leaves all those proofs of religion, which are drawn from reason, in their full force, and adds to them the attestation of supernatural phenomena. The idea which is presented to our minds of the divine being, in the holy scripture, is the sublimest which can be conceived, and the most efficacious to produce pious affections. There are the patriarchal, the mosai- cal, and the christian dispensations, all rising

above each other, but consistent in the great immutable principles of religion.

The duties required by christianity are summed up by our heavenly teacher in love of God, and charity towards mankind, accompanied with real purity of heart and life. True piety, charity, and purity, formed that powerful union, which subjected to the dominion of our blessed Redeemer, in the primitive ages of the church, the pride of philosophers, and the sceptre of princes.

A man may be very learned, deeply skilled in medicine, or in law, he may be distinguished for his genius, or for his ability in public life, without being a good man; but without this essential requisite he cannot be a good divine. He who most resembles God, will attain the truest knowledge of his moral perfections, and of his will. Theological knowledge is beyond comparison the most excellent of all knowledge, and apparently the greatest blessing which can be bestowed upon man; but it ceases to be a blessing, and becomes a most awful subject of responsibility, if it does not produce in us that which is the great end of all religion, a resemblance to God; particularly in those amiable and excellent qualities, which constitute the glory of the divine nature itself, benignity and goodness, mercy and patience.

The knowledge of religion, as well as every other blessing in this life, is bestowed by Divine

Providence upon each individual in an infinite variety of proportions. No two persons have the same measure granted them, nor any one man at different periods of his life. Nor does this diversity depend upon the frame of our mind alone. It arises, in a very considerable degree, from the external circumstances in which we are placed; education, society, corporeal constitution, and climate; but most of all from our own personal exertions, when we have an opportunity of improving our understanding and heart, our principles and our habits.

God requires that we should reject no sacred knowledge, which he has placed within our reach, that we should examine the truth, form our belief upon that conviction which arises from enquiry, and act according to our belief. Truth is so secure and confident of her own strength, that she offers herself to the severest trial and examination. No man can judiciously embrace the true religion, unless he be permitted to judge whether that which he embraces be true religion or not. We are enabled to defend our faith to others by an examination of its grounds, and are so much confirmed in it ourselves, that we are armed against persecution.

We should always be prepared to suffer for religion, however little probability there may be of our being exposed to this severe trial; and the less we are called upon to suffer, the more our feelings of gratitude for present mercies should be awakened, the more cheerful should

our obedience be, and the more fruitful our faith in every good work.

It is highly improbable that a man should die for his religion, when he cannot be persuaded to live according to it; that he should voluntarily relinquish his life, when he cannot subdue an appetite.

He only is truly religious, who unites, in the daily progress of a holy life, the most impregnable conviction of a free and enlightened understanding, with the full and zealous concurrence of the will; whose whole design is to be pious without affecting to be thought so; who lives and acts by a mighty principle carrying him on to a course of obedience for the duration of it constant, for its effect universal; who allows not himself in the omission of the least duty, nor in the commission of the least known sin.

He who performs a duty from a principle of pure piety, finds his desires animated, and his strength increased for a more vigorous prosecution of it.

Our religion, however, is not in this transient and imperfect state, to be confined alone to the understanding and the will. We cannot entirely subdue our passions, or extirpate our feelings. Our fear, our hope, our self-love, our more amiable and disinterested affections, will assume their natural power over us, and may be laudably indulged, while they are subordinate to reason and revelation, and directed to religion, which by their means will be more

deeply impressed by producing an active and lively faith, and will have a more constant influence over our moral conduct. Fear flows immediately from the principle of self-preservation, and when applied to God, is directed by the strongest reason. Fear works where shame, from the want of virtue, is extinct. By fear religion makes its first entrance. "*The fear of the Lord, (says Solomon,) is the beginning of wisdom.*" Religion begins when we dread the displeasure of God; but it is only the first germ of that principle, which is not sufficiently opened and displayed to be distinguished from superstition, unless we are sure, that it is not merely the omnipotence of God, which we dread, but a power always directed by justice, a power which can never punish any moral agent beyond the infliction of that chastisement, which is justly due to a voluntary offender. Fear alone must produce servility, not rectitude, piety, or holiness. When impressed with a true sense of the divine nature, *we fear God, and not man*; it is the fear of the divine justice which actuates us, not the fear of uncontrollable power. We must never consider ourselves under any relation to God, nor make mention of his sacred name, without a due sense of his moral attributes, and adoring his perfect holiness and beneficence, as well as his supreme power. But when we are deeply impressed with that moral excellence, in which alone true perfection consists, a fear

of the divine justice will arise from a steady opinion of the constant superintendence of God, and a full conviction, that in the deepest solitude there is one remaining with us, whose presence singly must be of more moment than that of the greatest assembly upon earth. This faith in the divine omniscience will not produce fear alone, but the highest of all comforts, the hope of approving ourselves to the wisest and best of beings, the confidence which his gracious promises in the Gospel inspire, to every sincere and penitent heart, and the satisfaction that he, who knows all our offences with their aggravations, knows likewise all our infirmities, with every extenuation they afford.

Hope is the animating principle of a holy life; and while our hope is confined to our progress in holiness, the joys of heaven, and the favour of God through Christ our Saviour, it is a false refinement in philosophy, it is contrary to the first principles of christianity, to maintain, that the hope of what we must more ardently desire, in proportion to our advancement in religion and virtue, is a diminution of that moral excellence from which it proceeds, and a disparagement of our piety.

It is true, that we may expect, in a future state, fear and hope to be swallowed up in love; at the same time there never can be a rational creature, to whom the divine supremacy is not an object of reverential awe; nor is it probable,

that a created being should be so perfect as not to aspire to higher degrees of purity or happiness.

The love of God, however, arising from the love of virtue, is the best principle of religion. He, who heartily endeavours to please God, and searches what his will is, that he may obey it, certainly loves God. What the heathens called loving virtue, for virtue's sake, the christian calls loving God for his own sake. The love of God does not supersede any inferior principle of morals or religion, which ought all to have their due weight ; but it is the highest and most excellent principle which can rule our hearts, and supplies the ablest, the wisest, and the best men with new motives to act right.

Upon the whole, to constitute true religion all causes must concur ; knowledge and practice, faith and good works, right opinions and real virtues, an orthodox profession, and a holy life.

The respective branches of religion should be subordinate to one another ; knowledge and faith are in order to practice ; the means of religion to the end. External religion derives its value from its being a declaration of our faith ; and from its displaying and improving the finest affections of the heart.

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 p. 300, prop. 26.
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 129, 130, 163, 164.
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 c. 19, s. 1, 2, 3, 9, 10.
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 337, 338, div. 11.
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 throughout; part 2d, the first head; part 3d, 7th and
 8th heads; Serm. iii. p. 41, 42, 49; vol. iii. p. 399, 400,
 416 to 418.
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Bentley's Sermons, p. 78.

South's Sermons, vol. i. p. 455, 484, 485; vol. iv. p. 402, 403; vol. vi. p. 139 to 142, 301 to 304, 340, 460.

Clagett's Sermons, p. 227, 325, 409 to 416, 422 to 429.

PERIOD THE SEVENTH.

XENOPHON, *Απομν.* Β. α. κεφ. α. ιθ'.; κεφ. δ'. throughout; Β. β'. κεφ. β'. ιθ'. the first paragraph; βδ'.; κεφ. γ', from the beginning, to *της συνωνίας, ιζ'.*

Grotii Excerpta, p. 321, Ω Ζευ to εχω; p. 327, Εις τ' αυλο to δομοις; p. 235, Οσον to δεξομαι; p. 355, Θεου to θελη; p. 361, Θεου to υπηρετην; p. 403, Επειδ επειδη to ενεσθη; p. 429, Ο νησ to Θεου; p. 433, Ολβιος to μελεχουσα. Ex Sophocle, p. 67, Θαρσει to Θεου; p. 83, Ου γαρ τι μοι to οφλισκανω. Ex incertis Tragicis, p. 465, φοβος to βροτων;

p. 467, *ἄδεις καμάτος εὐ σεβειν Θεος*. Ex *Æschylo*, p. 27, *Ζεὺς τὸ ἡμενων*.

Μενανδρου Λειψανα, εκ των αδελφων, δ'. ; πο γαρ τρεφον, &c. ε. ; εκ τε ανδρουγυε, γ'. ; εκ των αρρηφορων, δ'. ; εκ τε γεωργε, β'. ; εκ τε Διφιλε, α. ; εκ τε Ευνεχε, β'. ; εκ των χαλμειων, α. ; εξ αδηλων δραματων, σλγ'.

Φιλεμονος Λειψανα, εκ των αδηλων, δραματων, ε.

Republic of Plato, (Spens's) preface, from xviii. to xxiv. xxxiii. xxxiv.

Wollaston's Religion of Nature, p. 126, 211.

Pluche's History of the Heavens, vol. i. p. 261, 263, 283; vol. ii. p. 27.

Whitby on the Necessity of the Christian Revelation, p. 13 to 18, 24 to 27, 36 to 49, 236 to 245, 256, 319 to 335, being an admirable summary of the evidences for Christianity.

Trembley sur le Principe, &c. p. 2 to 9, 16 to 18, 21, 22, 288 to 291, 306, 415 to 421.

Warburton's Divine Legation, vol. i. p. 79 to 82, 86, 87, 124, 125 from Teleuchus, 129, 130 from Cicero, 444, 445, 449; vol. iii. p. 517.

Hale's Origination of Mankind, p. 5, 61 to 64, 347, 354, 355, 366, 367, 372.

Lucas on Happiness, vol. i. p. 25, 26, 48, 49, 56 to 59, 67 to 70, 115; vol. ii. p. 14, 15, 83 to 88, 176 to 178; vol. iii. p. 93 to 98, 130 to 134, 145 to 147, 173 to 192.

Watts's Improvement of the Mind, ch. xiv. sect. 8; ch. xv. sect. 7; ch. xx. sect. 22; p. 360 to 370, the character of Eugenio.

Patrick's Pilgrim, p. 32, 90, 164, 215, 216, 227 to 234, 338, 464 to 470.

Hartley on Man, vol. i. p. 366, 367, 398, 403; vol. ii. p. 45 to 48, 176, 177, 179, 192, 316 to 330, 356.

Wilcox's Roman Conversations, vol. i. p. 16 to 41.

Sherlock on Providence, p. 210 to 213, 353, 354.

Reimarus on Natural Religion, diss. vii. sect. 13, 14, 15; diss. ix. sect. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22.

Law's Considerations, p. 33, 76, 80, 193.

Duncan's Logick, b. i. ch. 4, sect. 3, div. 3.

Paley's Natural Theology, p. 475, 576 to 579.

Stewart's Elements of Philosophy, p. 367 to 370.

La Religion des Mahometans, preface de l'Auteur,
p. 125 to 131, 146 to 151.

Bp. Taylor's Exemplar, p. 313 to 315, 318, 321 to
323. On the Necessity of Repentance, sect. iii. div. 55,
56. On the Nature of Repentance, sect. ii. div. 7.
Polemical Discourses, p. 685, 787, 788.

Tillotson's Sermons, (12mo.) vol. ix. p. 34, 69, 106
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to 343, 353; vol. xi. p. 31 to 34, 39, 51, 60, 141 to
143, 156, 157, 188, 204 to 212, 292, 293, 297 "that there
" might be to practise," &c.; vol. xii. p. 76, 134 to
137, 187 to 194.

Calamy's Sermons, Serm. i. div. 1, subdiv. 3, p. 23, 24.

Clarke's Sermons, vol. i. p. 11, 34, 35, 40, 43, 123,
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Hoadley's Sermons, vol. i. p. 151 to 154, 175 to 182,
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226, 237 to 247, 390, 391, 415.

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CICERO, de Inventione, lib. i. "Nondam," to "Satellitibus."

Lactantius, p. 5, "Cujus Scientiæ," &c.

Grotius, Opera Theologica, lib. iv. p. 110, "Ipsa jurisprudentia, sine cognitione rerum, non humanarum duntaxat, sed divinarum quoque, manca est et mutila;" p. 124, "existimamus," to "poterant;" p. 125, "Ne illud quidem," to the end.—De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra, cap. i. sect. 13; cap. iii. sect. 10; cap. v. sect. 8, 9; cap. vi. sect. 9, 10, 11; cap. viii. sect. 6.

Grotius, (Le Clerc's) p. 125, 201 to 207, 215, 277 to 286.

Priestley's Heathen Philosophy, p. 5 to 7, 16 to 19, 45, 53 to 58, 108, 115 to 119, 243.

Enfield's History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 53, 54, 141, 235, 236, 392; vol. ii. p. 37, 176.

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Limburchi Theologia, lib. ii. c. 1, sect. 2; c. 8, sect. 27, 36; lib. iii. c. 4, sect. 2; lib. iv. c. 7, sect. 16, 17; c. 11, sect. 7, 8, 9; lib. v. c. 6, sect. 8, 9, 10, 11; c. 7, sect. 6; c. 8, sect. 5, 6, 7; c. 9, sect. 20, 26, 27; c. 10, throughout; c. 12, sect. 6, to the end of the chapter; c. 13, sect. 3, 13; c. 20, sect. 2, 3; c. 23, sect. 6; c. 24, sect. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; c. 31, sect. 1, 11; c. 32, sect. 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11; c. 40, sect. 4 to sect. 10, sect. 15; c. 43, sect. 12 to sect. 19; c. 51, sect. 4, 5, 6; c. 54, sect. 3; c. 61, sect. 4 to 8.

More's Utopia, (Burnet's translation) p. 113, 191, 193.

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Locke's Works, (fol.) vol. iii. p. 256, 258, and note x.

Cogan's Ethical Treatise on the Passions, p. 153, 154, 360, 361, 383 to 393, 396 to 398.

Knight on the Being and Attributes, p. 193 to 195, 282, 283, 288, 289, 293 to 308, 353, 354, 379.

Reimarus on Natural Religion, p. 204, 205, 443, 444, diss. ix. sect. 20, 21, 22.

Fiddes on Morality, ch. xiv. sect. 15, 16, 19, 20.

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Bp. Taylor on Repentance, ch. i. sect. 2, div. 32, 37; sect. 3, div. 46, 47, 51; ch. ii. sect. 1, div. 7; ch. v. sect. 5, div. 68; ch. vi.; ch. ix. sect. 5, div. 47; ch. x.

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JUVENAL, (Gifford's) 408 to 413.

Cicero, de Finibus, lib. iii. cap. 22, to "moveri possit."

Epictetus, (Stanhope's) p. 263 to 270, 305 to 309, 416.

Cudworth's Intellectual System, ch. iv. sect. 25, par. 10, 11, 12; ch. v. p. 661, 664.

Mosheim's Cudworth, tom. i. 618, note (g); 642, note (q.)

Newton's Chronology, p. 189, 190.

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Magee on Atonement, vol. i. p. 37, 38, 485 to 488; vol. ii. p. 127, 128, 271 to 273. Qu.

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Cogan's Theological Disquisitions, introduction, p. 58, 98, 114 to 120, 129, 130, 136, 137, 371 to 375, 392, 393, 412, 413, 425, 426.

M' Cries Life of Knox, vol. i. p. 186.

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vol. v. p. 14 to 27, 47 to 56, 99, 282, 319, 320, 529, 639; vol. vi. p. 62, 69, 70, 82 to 85, 95, 98, 99, 125, 125, 126, 199, 200, 489, 490; vol. vii. 128, 183 to 198.

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Bp. Horsley's Sermons, vol. iii. p. 52, 53, 54, 260.

Mant's Bampton Lectures, p. 391, 392.

PERIOD THE TENTH.

CICERO, de Legibus, lib. i. cap. 7, 8, 15, " Neque solum," to the end; lib. ii. cap. 7, cap. 10, " Quod autem," &c.; cap. 11.

Erasmii Enchiridion, cap. viii. canon i. can. iv. " Literas amas rectè, si propter Christum; sin ideo tantum ames, ut scias, ibi consistis, unde gradum facere oportebat;" canon vi. " Noli in malis con- formari huic seculo, sed reformare in novitate sensus tui, ut probes, non quæ mirentur homines, sed quæ sit voluntas Dei bona et bene placens et perfecta."

380 REFERENCES TO ESSAY XV.

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Foster's *Sermons*, vol. i. p. 17 to 19.

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Petit Pierre *Plan de Dieu*, p. 7 to 12, 25 to 28, 260, 261, 264 to 270, 313 to 329, 332, 346 to 348, 356.

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ESSAY XVI.

ON ENTHUSIASM.

MAN is governed by reason, imagination, physical influence, and passion.

While we are constantly directed by reason, that extraordinary emotion of soul, which creates religious enthusiasm, is the natural effect of a firm faith, and the incentive to true piety.

Who can contemplate the divine nature, as unfolded to us by natural and revealed religion, without feeling every faculty of his mind, every affection of his heart, animated with love and gratitude, overwhelmed with admiration and delight? Who can apply to himself the gracious promises of the Gospel, and have the full assurance that he shall, by faith, penitence, and sincere obedience, however imperfect, after this short and transient life, be received with joy, by the whole angelic choir, into the regions of everlasting glory; that he shall obtain, through the merits of our blessed Saviour, the means of grace in this state of trial, and an immortal felicity, inconceivable both in duration and magnitude, without an elevation of mind and glowing warmth of heart, incomprehensible to the unbeliever, and anticipating, even in this vale of tears, the joys of heaven?

The enthusiast, when he is under the strict control of reason, has a trust in God, which never fails him in the deepest adversity. No! not when exposed to the severest persecution. His trust in God arises from the certainty, that a being, perfect in holiness, justice, and mercy, that the God of all truth, will perform every promise he has made to man, and will never permit a moral agent to suffer more than he deserves. He applies to himself these gracious promises from a consciousness of faith, repentance, and sincere endeavours to please God, and to render himself acceptable in his sight, knowing that no real and permanent evil can fall upon one who truly loves God.

He may indeed be charged with arrogance and presumption; but while he is governed by reason, and deeply impressed with a humble sense of his own infirmities, this charge must be unjust.

The christian dispensation, and the hope of everlasting life arise from grace freely bestowed by the voluntary act of God, when man, by sin, was most alienated from him; but every act of God proceeds from consummate wisdom and goodness, as well as from the most original and independent power. God created man in innocence, because it was right. He redeemed him from sin and misery, because it was right. He acts constantly by his gracious providence, his moral government, and his supernatural interpositions, towards man, according to those unerring rules

of rectitude, whose principle we understand as rational creatures, but whose magnitude and extent are infinitely beyond our comprehension.

Governed entirely by reason, we shall love God above all things, and shew that love by the earnest desire of promoting his glory, and of approving ourselves to him; but we shall be convinced that a virtuous habit, or a religious disposition of mind, founded upon serious reflection and sober judgment, with a constant endeavour to obey all God's commands, is the best proof that we please him, and are acceptable in his sight, and alone can afford the most settled peace and lasting comfort.

Religious enthusiasm, when under the strict control of reason, will be consistent with regular piety, and an uniform course of obedience; will be quiet, peaceable, and orderly; not noisy nor ostentatious; not assuming nor censorious; not factious nor tumultuous. Our understanding is never exercised with so much advantage to ourselves, as when it is employed to direct our spiritual pursuits; whether in acquiring divine knowledge, or in applying that knowledge to practice.

No true christian will deny that the glory of God should be the supreme and ultimate end of whatever we do; but every good man will be anxiously solicitous that his zeal for the divine glory may not transport him beyond the strict bounds of duty, which will inevitably be the case, if he is not constantly directed by reason

or revelation. The genuine love of God can only be attained by a calm and serene state of mind, when our hearts are fully possessed with a deep sense of his love and goodness, of his presence and providence, of the reasonableness of his precepts, and the certainty of future rewards. While we are governed by reason, we shall always preserve our consciousness of free agency, and never imagine, that we have no power to act for ourselves, that all our thoughts are suggested by supernatural influence, that all our words are spoken, and all our actions performed by the strength, immediately imparted to us, and by that alone.

It is true, that without a belief of the divine agency there can be no religion; but it is equally true, that without the supposition of human agency, there can be no morality; and without a sense of moral good and evil, there can be no true knowledge of God, and no obligation to obey him. If these three positions are fully established, it follows, that religion must arise from the union of divine with human agency. Whenever the former is unwarrantably rejected in any particular case, we fall into infidelity; whenever the latter is wholly denied, we are involved in the dark cloud of irrational enthusiasm; an enthusiasm of pagan origin, though too often incorporated with christianity.

We are not only to trust in God, but to use all the means which he has graciously bestowed upon us of improving our understanding, our

knowledge, and morals, and of promoting our real felicity by every innocent pleasure, as well as serious pursuit.

We must look up to God with the highest veneration and warmest gratitude, as the sole author of good, and acknowledge, with the purest devotion, his co-operation in all our religious practice. But whether we rely upon his grace to enlighten our minds, to ameliorate our hearts, and to teach us upon all occasions to act right; or whether we rely with the same humble confidence upon his providence, to protect us in danger and support us in adversity, we must never suffer that reliance to supersede our own activity; and while we are convinced that it is God who "*worketh in us both to will and to do,*" we must be more earnest and assiduous "*to work out our own salvation.*"

The theory of genuine piety is not more advanced by a conviction of the divine agency, than the practice of it is improved by a consciousness of human agency, and a continual exertion of all those powers of which we are conscious, in prayer and all other holy exercises, and in the direction of all our pursuits, according to the purest conception which we can frame of what is acceptable to God, and conformable to his will.

There is no degree of piety, however exalted, within the reach of man to attain, which we may not acquire with the strictest subserviency to calm and considerate reason; nor would it be

possible to acquire it without her happy and constant influence, her guidance and direction.

There is a danger even in the most rational enthusiasm, arising from its natural tendency to excite and elevate the inventive powers of the mind.

When we are governed solely by imagination, enthusiasm will carry us to every excess of extravagance and delirium; it will lead us to the commission of every crime against God and man.

It will confound the natural activity of our fancy with supernatural illumination. It will produce a full persuasion that God inspires us, while it is imagination alone which deludes us; for the sudden emotion of natural or animal spirits, are often mistaken by the imagination for divine and spiritual operations. A strong fancy, impregnated by a heated melancholy, forms the very essence of irrational enthusiasm. Imagination, inclining to sadness, changes the very countenance. Absorbed in gloom, the enthusiasts deny themselves all innocent pleasure, even the smell of a rose or a violet; they preach up self-renunciation, and an annihilation of all our faculties; the austerities, the scourgings, and the tortures, to which enthusiasm has brought its most determined votaries, are incredible; almost as incredible to our understandings, as they are abhorrent to our feelings. Imagination exalts a fanatical preacher, especially an original broacher of absurd paradoxes,

and much more the founder of a sect, beyond all bounds. Under this sad delusion, enthusiasm becomes as hostile to religious liberty as the most tyrannical government.

Imagination, heated by rapid ideas, by the volubility of language, and the flights of eloquence, has been the fatal source of the most violent convulsions in church and state.

But while any spark of reason remains, the imagination does not act irresistibly in the production of enthusiasm. Man does not cease to be a free agent, and therefore does not cease to be responsible for those opinions which in some degree he voluntarily entertains, nor for the crimes which are their natural consequences. The force of enthusiasm will depend upon the degree in which our imagination overpowers our understanding.

There will be enthusiasts of all nominal religions ; but the more corrupt any religion is, the more prevalent will enthusiasm become, and the higher ascendancy will it obtain.

Enthusiasm has been carried farther, and has been more generally spread among pagans and mahometans than among christians, and has been longer supported, and more widely diffused by the religious orders of the church of Rome, by her legends, her pilgrimages, and her miraculous images, as well as by her cruel wars and persecutions, and frantic crusades, than it has been by all the fanaticisms of the reformed churches.

A disordered brain produces at once that obstinacy in a false religion, which custom and education work by degrees. Enthusiasm is very infectious; for voice, gesture, and language, have an irresistible effect upon the imagination of those with whom we converse. If we view only the extravagances of enthusiasm, we shall be apt to pronounce whole nations and ages insane; but however powerful imagination may be in one point, especially if that point regards religion, infinitely the most momentous of our concerns, in all other respects the mind may be sound. The more our imagination is fixed upon religion, the more we fancy, that it is communicated to us by supernatural means, which distinguish us as the peculiar favourites of God. The more we consider our particular religion as the effect of a special revelation, when it is really the crude spawn of a distempered fancy, the more furious shall we be for it, and the more zealous to impose it upon the world.

In the ordinary dispensations of grace, it is by mind and conscience, not by oracle, voice, or whisper, that the spirit of God bears witness with the spirit of the faithful. As truth can receive no evidence from our imagination, it should receive no tincture from it. If reason must not examine an opinion by something distinct from the persuasion itself, inspiration cannot be distinguished from delusion, nor truth from falsehood.

We ought to have good and solid grounds for

our belief. The resolving all faith into acts of confidence, turns all religion into a strong fancy.

The enthusiast declares that his belief arises from feeling and sensible experience. He describes the christian life as consisting in a succession of private revelations, and considers his own fond caprices as divine oracles. He presumptuously measures his acceptance with God by this arbitrary standard. Some enthusiasts expect to find all religion, speculative and practical, in an indolent indulgence of their own imagination ; they have no great esteem for the labour requisite to real knowledge, nor for works of industry or charity, by which a genuine faith is manifested. They prefer contemplations, meditations, inward recollections, and experiences, to an active life ; they are, as they ignorantly conceive, to wait in silence for the divine energy within them ; they, in themselves, being totally void of energy, sunk in nothingness, or an abyss of misery ; yet, notwithstanding their deplorable situation, they deem themselves to have arisen to a state of perfection, and condemn as carnal and reprobate all the rest of the human race.

I come now to the third description of enthusiasm, that which arises from physical influence. It is difficult to say when we are governed by imagination, setting reason at defiance, or by physical influence, the effects are so much the same. This is conspicuously the case with the insane ; and all enthusiasm, not founded in reason, nor excited by passion, may be consi-

dered as an approach to insanity, or as a symptom of it. When the enthusiast hears audible voices, or sees visions, it may be the excrescence of a wild imagination, or it may be a delusion arising from the state of the nerves.

There are, however, many cases when physical influence evidently produces enthusiasm. Religious melancholy, or violent impulses of religion, are peculiar to some constitutions, to some corporeal habits, or to some climates. Fresh air, medicines, or exercise, may be efficacious remedies, when the strongest arguments are of no avail. The pride of man leads him to ascribe his principles and his conduct to the mind, when the corporeal instrument, by which the mind acts, or is impeded from acting, is the sole cause of all his errors and deceptions in theory and in practice.

The spirit which wings the enthusiast, is so far from being the emanation of the all-perfect mind, that it is wholly unconnected with understanding, even in the lowest intellectual being, and is often a mere physical flatulency. Enthusiasm is a natural inebriation. Enthusiasm, waking reveries, dreams, and deliriums, are very similar in their nature and origin; they arise from the mind attempting to act without the energies of the higher faculties, and in a disabled state of body.

Visionaries, like dreamers, exalt what is low, applaud what is base, give a vain importance to what is of little worth, bring together events

which are far separated, and consider every thing as essential, but that which really is essential to a rational faith.

When an object of sense excites enthusiasm, it operates probably upon the nerves alone. An object of sight, like Peter, the hermit, preaching the crusades, operates upon physical feelings, by which feelings he, and many more fanatics, have fascinated mankind.

The most general delusions of man arise when he is ruled by passion. These delusions are often as adverse to whatever has the appearance of religion, as they are to reason; but though passion, emancipating itself from the control of reason, must always be opposed to true religion, yet it can easily incorporate itself with every species of irrational enthusiasm, strengthen its natural violence, animate and direct its course.

It has not only the power of increasing enthusiasm in an individual, but it is active in spreading the contagion. When grief, joy, indignation, feelings of any kind, are forcibly expressed, passion is propagated; and the most tumultuous perturbations in the speaker or hearer are called divine unction, and though founded only upon absurd chimeras, assume the character of irrefragable truth. Enthusiasts, under the dominion of passion, conceive themselves empowered to shake off all laws, and invade all property.

Passion is gratified in a wide and anomalous variety of ways. Pain is an indulgence of it as

well as pleasure. Our pride is cherished by ostentatious austerity. Our imagination will be always working, inflicting misery upon ourselves, upon other individuals, or upon society at large.

Enthusiasm leads to the destruction of all natural desires ; such as love of life, of health, of safety, of personal dignity, of pleasure, or of property ; and plunges us into the most extravagant hatred of every rational pursuit.

The enthusiast, when he is under the dominion of gloomy passions, believes himself doomed to eternal misery, by an irreversible decree, and is driven to every mad act suggested by despair, to hatred of all mankind, which he shews by tyranny and savage barbarity, but chiefly of himself, too sadly manifested by the torments he inflicts upon his own body or mind, and lastly by suicide.

On the other hand, when he is hurried away by the rapid stream of sanguine emotions, he believes himself one of the elect, and assured of everlasting salvation, in spite of any sins he may commit ; and considers the suggestions of his own depraved will, assuming the semblance of supernatural inspiration, as a sanction for the most horrid crimes. Whatever he has a mind to do, he thinks must be lawful, and even a duty incumbent upon him, which he has a heavenly call to perform. In his melancholy or cheerful moments, in his excesses of despair or presumption, he equally withdraws himself from the

moral government of God, and annihilates those rewards and punishments, which are the awful sanctions of the divine law.

Upon the whole, *rational* enthusiasm affords a powerful aid to the mind, in framing the highest conceptions of God, and infuses into our souls an earnest and cheerful zeal to perform all he commands, to render ourselves acceptable in his sight, and to form an union with him by all holy exercises. On the contrary, enthusiasm when excited by an *irrational* imagination, by physical influence, and most of all, by passion, alienates the mind entirely from God, and from a real obedience to his will, as made known to us by reason, or by scripture; produces every corruption of which the human heart is capable, and leads to the most flagrant crimes.

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ESSAY XVII.

ON SUPERSTITION.

WE become superstitious when we deny professedly, or in our secret thoughts, any of the divine attributes, or when we perform any external acts of devotion which are incompatible with them.

The polytheist is superstitious, because he denies the unity of God.

The manicheon, because he denies his omnipotence.

The idolater, because he denies his wisdom, and his spirituality.

The pagan, the mahometan, the modern jew, and too many corrupt christians, because they maintain doctrines repugnant to the divine holiness or goodness, if not totally subversive of it. By the divine holiness I understand the perfection of the Divine Being as a moral agent, by which he is removed to an infinite distance from impurity, injustice, malignity, or cruelty, from every kind and degree of moral evil. By the divine goodness I understand that unlimited beneficence which is diffused over the universe; that mercy which is extended, as far as justice allows, as far as the happiness of the whole creation admits, to every individual sinner.

If we deny none of the divine attributes, but do not in our habitual regards for them, or in our sublimest contemplations, lay equal stress upon them all ; if we exalt the power of God to the disparagement of his wisdom and goodness, or raise our ideas of his consummate holiness so high, as to depreciate his mercy, we shall incur the guilt of superstition.

A conviction of the power of God, a confidence in his wisdom, an admiration of his moral perfection, in which alone true perfection consists, and a full reliance upon his mercy, are the firm bulwarks against superstition. If we neglect to arm ourselves with this impregnable force against so dangerous and powerful an adversary, we shall be terribly exposed to its cruel inroads upon our peace and happiness, our understanding and our virtue.

Infidelity may mitigate superstition, but though carried to its greatest height, it will not eradicate it. It will remove far from our mental view all hope of invisible protection ; but it will not convince us that we do not want a protector ; it will not assure us of the impossibility of a future state ; nor can the atheist know what calamities to expect, in any stage of his existence, from his deities, inexorable fate, and capricious chance.

The human mind cannot divest itself of all belief in some sort of invisible power, by whatever name it may be called ; and some degree of superstition must arise whenever that invisible power is conceived irresistible, and thought de-

fective in wisdom or goodness. It will increase in proportion to the idea conceived of that deficiency; and will shew itself in its blackest colours when the invisible power is entirely divested of all traces of wisdom and goodness, and becomes a most deformed monster of folly or of wickedness. This is not an exaggerated description of heathen gods, nor of the universal objects of pagan idolatry.

Reason, in its sublimest energies, and illuminated by revelation, leads us to true religion. When more imperfectly exercised, or when involved in gentile darkness, it affords a light more or less steady, in proportion to the progress it has made, and leads us by degrees to a knowledge of sacred truth. Every passion, on the other hand, especially that of fear, leads us to superstition.

Virtue and religion reciprocate as cause and effect: so do vice and superstition.

If we are ourselves devoid of virtue, we can never bring our minds to a conception of the divine purity; we can have no admiration of holiness, no love for goodness, no desire of imitating the true God, by transcribing in our own hearts a faint image of his moral perfection, or of pleasing him by obeying his laws.

On the contrary, our own habitual corruption having perverted every kind affection, every good principle of our nature, every sound dictate of our understanding, the worst things will appear the best; we shall imagine wickedness of every

kind the most pleasing to the invisible power we adore; we shall suppose that power to be in itself wicked, and the patron of all iniquity. The love of evil leads us to the love and admiration of an evil being. This superstition, therefore, originates from vice, and is the most powerful promoter of it. A pagan, sincere in the worship of an amorous or cruel god, must himself be amorous or cruel, and the more devoutly or the more frequently he worships his idol, the more will he increase his lascivious or ferocious disposition.

If a worshipper of such deities could be supposed a good man, the object of his worship must be the object of his indignation and abhorrence; his obedience to his god must be accompanied with hatred to him. Religion is not a more powerful promoter of virtue than superstition is of vice.

The greatest violations of purity, modesty, decency, civilization, and nature herself, have been incorporated into pagan worship, were practised by the most enlightened nations before the blessed advent of Christ, or their conversion to his religion; and are at this hour esteemed sacred by the Gentoos. The cruelty of pagan worship is more conspicuous and more universal than its lasciviousness.

Superstition, nursed in ignorance, and arising from the barbarous manners, as well as depraved passions, of those nations, which in the earliest times migrated from their original country and

patriarchal stock, has been always savage and cruel, inflicting the severest torments upon its miserable devotees, and exciting them to every ebullition of hatred and extravagance of revenge, to sanguinary desolation and exterminating wars. The superstitious paint their gods as delighting in cruelty, consequently they must conceive no worship so acceptable to them, as that which gratifies their ferocious temper in the excruciating tortures of their own votaries, and in all the sufferings which these votaries can force other men to endure.

They eagerly inflict severe evils upon themselves and others, in order to avoid more horrid and more universal calamities, which their affrighted imagination conceives the gods ready to pour upon them. The heathens despaired of obtaining good from gods, whom they painted as the authors of evil alone; which was particularly the description of the infernal deities, and therefore the earnest pursuit of the most ardent devotee was the averting evil. From hence arose human sacrifices, not only the sacrifices of prisoners taken in war, or of the aged or deformed, but of tender innocent children, and those the most healthy and beautiful, and most beloved by their infatuated parents. Such a sacrifice was esteemed greater, and more acceptable to the gods.

The abominable wickedness of mankind, whether displayed in sensual passions, in diabolical fury, or in obduracy of heart, has never been

carried to so great excess, as when originating from superstition, or when inflamed by it.

Although from the imperfection of our present state, and the innumerable circumstances which lend a baneful aid to superstition, it is a darkness which could only be dispelled by evangelical light; yet the horrors I have described could never have disgraced Greece and Rome in the most splendid periods of paganism, nor Indostan at the present day, if a maxim had not become very unhappily prevalent, that the most enlightened ought to worship the gods according to the laws of their country, while the vulgar were kept in servile awe.

This doctrine is to be found in the writings of very ancient Indian sages, as well as in the philosophy of the peripatetics and stoics. It is a doctrine cruelly uncharitable to our fellow-men, as it deprives them of all the advantages which the superior genius or knowledge of the more enlightened can afford. While philosophers made considerable advances in the discovery of divine truth, they left their countrymen, and those whom the feelings of humanity ought most to have endeared to them, in a state of dreadful depravity. The laws of the country, derived from dark traditions and barbarous times, gave a fatal sanction to all which was most abominable. The idea, that we ought to conform our worship to those laws, sunk Greece and Rome into the foulest idolatry, in the most splendid periods of their history. From this idolatry, in-

deed, we have no reason to suppose, that they could have emerged by the light of philosophy alone; but if the teachers of human wisdom had diffused among the people all the light which illuminated their own minds, and if legislators had framed their codes of religion from the purest motives, availing themselves of all the knowledge they could attain, the horrors of paganism would have been mitigated, and superstition greatly repressed.

If we believe the deity whom we worship to be devoid of goodness, we cannot sincerely love or venerate him. Whenever a ray of reason pierces the dark cloud of superstition, there must be a secret hatred for a malevolent being, and a contempt for a lascivious one.

This hatred and contempt were often manifested in gentile worship; the gods were assailed by imprecations and menaces, and exposed to every indignity which the rancor of impotent rage could suggest.

This was a treatment these gods amply deserved, who were framed after the model of the worst human passions, in times of licentiousness, anarchy, and violence.

But although sudden provocation naturally excited the keenest resentment against deities, who were before the objects of hatred; yet a deep awe of the divine power, and a constant dread of the manner in which at any moment it may be exerted, is the predominant feeling of the superstitious. The fear of God,

when separated from the love of him, produces superstition ; as the love of God, when unaccompanied with filial reverence, constitutes one species of enthusiasm. When we fear a being whom we cannot love, we must be impressed with a constant gloom.

For this reason, all places of idolatrous or superstitious worship have conveyed melancholy ideas, from the sombrous cavern or the tremendous grove, to the solemn darkness of the pagoda. Every calamity of life is enhanced by the supposition that it proceeds from some malignant invisible power, capable of inflicting unknown and unlimited misery upon mankind. A future state, which to the truly religious is the highest source of comfort, and anticipation of joy, to the superstitious becomes the spring of the most dreadful terror ; for the passion of fear has an infinite object to excite alarm.

If we divest the deity of moral attributes, our belief of his unity will aggravate our horror. If we feel any actual good, we shall discern no principle from whence it can be derived. The pagans, therefore, were generally polytheists, and had good as well as evil deities ; they had not only infernal, but celestial, aerial, and terrestrial gods. The best, however, of these imaginary deities were far from being perfectly good, and they were rather exemplifications of different vices, than of sublime virtues.

The pagan religion was almost always at vari-

ance with morals, nor did the general idea of a future state afford any sanction to virtue; for the gods could not be expected to punish the depravity which was conspicuous in themselves, or to reward that holiness which was most adverse to their own nature. A future state of rewards and punishments derives its credibility, and its importance, from the most exalted conception of the divine attributes, and a full conviction of human responsibility.

Malignity to mankind, softened by partial favour to individuals, is the general idea of divine agency, as impressed upon a superstitious mind. The most natural and innocent species of idolatry, was the worship of the heavenly bodies; yet this worship chiefly prevailed in those regions where the heat of the sun was more oppressive, than its warmth invigorating; where the stars were supposed to influence human affairs; and to them was more frequently ascribed a dangerous, than a benign aspect.

Religion represents God as the giver of all good, as delighting in the real enjoyments of his creatures, as desirous of promoting their happiness, if moral agents, by their virtue, and as being offended by sin alone.

Superstition supposes, that the gods envy human happiness, and that if a propitious deity bestows blessings, a malicious dæmon will be sure to counteract their influence; that prosperity is always, by divine control, balanced by adversity; and that no sin is offensive to

God, which does not consist in a direct disobedience to his arbitrary will.

Perjury may bring down divine vengeance, because the deity may consider it as a personal insult, and because that very vengeance is invoked, while sins equally heinous may be supposed venial.

If the superstitious are desirous of engaging in any undertaking, they cannot know, by rational indications, whether it is agreeable to the will of God. That can only be known by success. If we obtain the object of our enterprise, however flagitious it may be, or however nefarious the means by which we accomplish our design, under the baneful influence of superstition, we rest satisfied that we have performed the divine will. The success proves it. But as we cannot, by human wisdom, foresee this success, we flee to the oracle, to the necromancer, or to any monstrous absurdity which tradition has sanctified; to the flight of birds, the entrails of beasts, the position of heavenly bodies, the atmospherical phenomena, and innumerable charms, spells, or incantations, in order to raise the veil from the secrets of futurity, and by discovering the final issue, by penetrating into the counsels of God, to learn how we are likely to obtain his favour, or to pacify his wrath.

The religious man knows that he shall please God, by his obedience to those commands which are identified with the everlasting laws of righte-

ousness, or revealed by scripture ; and that if he offends him it will be by a transgression of known duty, and that he can only obtain pardon by that true and sincere repentance, which consists in an internal change of mind and heart. Amidst all the calamities of life, he views the dark scenes of futurity without appal, knowing that no evil shall ultimately fall upon those who love God ; and that whatever thick clouds may now involve the sky, he is assured that the sun retains its meridian splendour, and will shine again with invincible brightness. He, therefore, is contented with an humble hope and assured trust in God, and aspires to no other knowledge of futurity than that which arises from the promises of the gospel, and from his ability to apply those promises to himself, by the testimony of his own conscience.

The superstitious man, on the other hand, although he is unconscious of guilt, can have no anchor of hope, because he conceives himself the slave of a tyrannical deity, or the sport of a capricious one ; a deity whose power is irresistible, guided by no principle, restrained by no law, from whom little good is to be expected, and every mischief to be feared.

Under the dominion of the horror, which the imagination of such a deity must impress, every refuge is madly sought, every species of propitiation eagerly solicited, every weak reed challenged for support, every glimmering ray of hope encouraged ; and if no hope can be indulged,

despair itself is anxious to be transported into futurity, and to learn the full extent of the miseries she is destined to endure.

From hence arises the corrupt influence of priests, in all superstitious nations and ages, men who were not the original authors of superstition, but generally in some measure the victims of it. For as individuals, they have the same passions as other men, and often are as ignorant as their followers. Their power, however, arises from the weakness and wickedness of mankind, of which they avail themselves, by pretending that they can unfold the mysteries of futurity, that they can interpret the will of Heaven, and propitiate the divine anger. They obtain, by the credulity of the multitude, not only a dominion over their minds, but a direction of all superstitious rites, and the possession of all superstitious emblems.

They are the ministers of the former, and the sacred guardians of the latter.

They affix an inviolable sanctity upon their own persons, exempt themselves from the obligations of society and the jurisdiction of laws; and by raising to the highest energy the wanderings of a wild imagination, the horrors of real or supposed guilt, and the most ungovernable passions, they acquire such a fatal ascendancy over the secret recesses of the human heart, that they engross to their own fraternity a large share of all that power which naturally belongs to man in his individual capacity, as a rational creature, or in his social character, as a father, husband,

son, patriot ; as a master, a magistrate, or a sovereign. They avail themselves of this power to acquire large emoluments ; and, in some cases, the lands of a whole country have been consecrated to them, or to the idol whom they served. The sacerdotal, when not united to the civil power, has often co-operated with it in enslaving mankind. Superstition is either the source of all evil, or the great promoter of it. Its agents, whether evil men or evil spirits, are the most mischievous and the most miserable of all created beings.

I have been describing superstition in its most horrid form ; by which means we may discern its real nature, and guard against all approaches to it. If the denial of the moral attributes produces this hideous monster, every deviation from the highest conception of the divine holiness is in its degree an approach to it, because it is a departure from true religion.

Superstition, in its native deformity, reigned the absolute monarch over the world till dethroned by revelation.

Not genius and learning, resplendent as they were, but the gospel alone dispelled it from Greece and Rome. Paganism was not extirpated by the sublimest contemplations of Plato ; it pervaded the mind of Socrates, at the moment of his exemplary death ; it animated Cicero in the forum, and pursued him to his Tusculan retreat. It afforded the chief support to M. Antoninus, when marshalling great armies in defence of the Roman empire ; he commanded

every idolatrous rite, and flew for refuge to every heathen god. If the light of revealed truth had never shone upon this happy island, we should now have been celebrating the bloody rites of druidism.

But let us not imagine, that because we are christians and protestants, it is impossible that we should be superstitious ; the very deist is not exempt from superstition, if he depreciates the moral attributes. Let every member of the purest church examine himself whether he is free from it in faith, worship, and practice. This is a happy state of which he cannot be assured, if his conscience accuses him of any apprehension of God, which is unworthy of the divine nature ; if he ascribes any operation or any event to God, which he believes to be really evil ; if he fears the anger of God, without a conviction of guilt ; or if he wishes to disarm that anger by any other means in his power than that of an humble and contrite heart, and a firm faith in the atoning blood of his blessed Saviour.

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PERIOD THE SEVENTH.

XENOPHON, *Απομν.* Β. α. κεφ. α. γ'. ιδ'. ιε'. ; Β. β'. κεφ. ε'. η. ; Β. δ'. κεφ. ε'. β'. γ'. δ'. ; κεφ. ζ'. ε'. ι. ; κεφ. η. α. ε. *Απολογία*, ιβ'. ιγ'.

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Μετανδρου Λειψανα, εκ *τε δυσκολω*, γ', with the note δ'. ; εκ *τε Ηνιοχη*, β', with the notes ; εκ *της Ιερειας*, α. ; εκ *της καρινης*, α. ; εκ *τε Μήραγυβις* γ'. ; εκ *της παρακαλαθηκης* δ'. ε. ; εκ *της Ῥαπιζομενης*, α. ; εξ *αδηλων δραματων*, β', γ', δ', ε, ε', ζ', η, σμά.

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ESSAY XVIII.

ON PRAYER.

PRAYER may be distinguished into nine acts of religious duty,—adoration, praise, thanksgiving, confession, supplication for pardon, petition for spiritual blessings for ourselves, intercession for spiritual blessings for others, petition for temporal blessings for ourselves, intercession for temporal blessings for others.

These different exertions of a pious mind have all a mutual relation, and naturally arise from each other ; they may be considered in the order in which I have enumerated them.

1. Adoration is the most sublime employment of an exalted intellect ; the more pure the conception which we entertain of God, and the more we meditate upon his attributes, the more perfectly will this duty be performed. We cannot raise our minds to a pure conception of God, unless we have previously a knowledge of real good, and are aware that true excellence consists in mental, not corporeal superiority ; in power, when employed by intellect, not in mechanical or brutal force ; in wisdom much more than in power ; and, most of all, in purity, holiness, and beneficence.

2. When we have a true notion of real excellence, and contemplate the divine nature as the

highest perfection of it, we may justly be said to *praise God*.

3. The duties of adoration and praise might be performed by a heathen philosopher, who had no clear idea of the relation between God and man. But when God is fully acknowledged to be our creator, our preserver, and constant benefactor, and to exercise a superintending providence, not only over empires and communities, but over each individual, in every period of an immortal duration,—when all his attributes are displayed in the moral government of the world,—what a glorious theme is opened of the most grateful, the most exuberant *thanksgiving!* The more cheerful our temper, the more considerate our mind, the more warmly our social affections are indulged, the larger the sphere of our benevolence, in the same proportion shall our pious gratitude be extended, in the same proportion shall be poured out to God, our all-gracious Father, the fulness of a thankful heart.

4. When we reflect that man, as an intellectual and a moral agent, is made “in the image of God;” that he may aspire to imitate, though at an immeasurable distance, his adorable perfections; when we reflect upon the advantages which we have enjoyed, and the use which we have made of them; when we recal to our thoughts the past errors and miscarriages of our lives, all our imperfections and infirmities; and when we compare our frequent deviations from duty with the gratitude which we owe to God

for the innumerable blessings which he is continually showering upon us ; although we may be so happy as not to charge ourselves with wilful or deliberate crimes, or with inveterate indulgence of our bad passions, yet we shall have ample cause for humiliation before God, and *confession* of our utter unworthiness.

5. If we are conscious of habitual sins, or particular transgressions, and who, alas ! can plead an exemption from them ? we have another duty to perform, the imploring pardon with a penitent and contrite heart. The higher idea we frame of God, in his relation to man, the more sensible shall we become of our own offences, the more eager shall we be to supplicate for the remission of our sins, and the more confident in our hope, by sincere repentance, of obtaining it through Christ our Saviour.

We cannot perform any of the five duties which I have been stating, without experiencing the efficacy of devotion, in the melioration of our morals and the elevation of our understanding.

6. But the immediate efficacy of devotion is most sensibly perceived, when we pray for spiritual blessings to ourselves. The desire of moral or religious improvement is in itself an exercise of virtue. We cannot desire moral good without advancing a considerable way in our progress to it. If we impart that desire to a friend, it is a confirmation of it. If we profess it publicly, it more strongly compels us to act right. But if we declare that desire before God ; if we appeal

to the searcher of all hearts for our *sincerity* ; if the most earnest request which we offer to an almighty being is, that he would exert his power to renovate our moral nature ; if we strengthen our own resolutions of amendment by supplicating the divine assistance, and determine to act right, while we place ourselves in the immediate presence of our all-perfect judge, surely reason will teach us to expect, from this exercise of prayer, that result which our blessed Saviour has promised, and which the experience of every truly pious person confirms.

7. The love of God and of man will both unite in exciting us to extend this supplication for spiritual blessings to our fellow-creatures. We cannot have a true sense of religion, without feeling a lively interest in the propagation of it. We must wish all mankind to know the truth, to believe and profess it, and act according to it. We must, however, be mortified in considering to what narrow limits, in this view, the influence of our beneficence is confined, and how great danger we incur of doing harm, when we are most anxious to do good. We readily, therefore, avail ourselves of the glorious privilege which belongs to us as religious beings, and gratify our benevolence by supplication to the Father of universal mercy, to the Almighty Governor of mankind.

This devout exercise will certainly, as an exertion of charity, be acceptable to God, and will have a beneficial influence over ourselves, by

enlarging our hearts and warming our affections. We shall not only animate, but moderate our zeal, and regulate our emotions of benevolence, if we indulge them with an immediate reference to the dispensations of providence, to the inscrutable will of the greatest and best of beings, if we cherish them in our devout approaches to him, when the mind is deeply impressed with those humble dispositions which are the best preparations for prayer, and its most suitable accompaniments.

8. Although in our supplications for ourselves and others, spiritual blessings will be the great object of serious concern, and the more we advance in our knowledge of true religion the higher value, both absolutely and comparatively, we shall set upon them; yet there is no real comfort, no innocent gratification, however trivial, in this life, which we may not enjoy under a sense of the divine goodness; and if we ascribe it to the supreme Author of every blessing, with a grateful heart, it may inspire the most fervent devotion.

But every subject for thanksgiving is not a proper subject for prayer. There is no incident in the course of the day which, if it affords pleasure to a good mind, may not properly become a topic for praise; but it would be irreverent to pray for any particular gratification which was not sufficiently important to be the object of serious pursuit. Whatever we may laudably endeavour, by deliberate or habitual

exertion, to obtain, we may lawfully make the object of prayer. We ought, however, to be very cautious in selecting proper objects of prayer, when we pray for temporal blessings. We should be certain that we are led to desire them by the most justifiable motives; that we are free from selfishness, avarice, and ambition; that we have all imaginable reason to suppose that the good for which we pray is a real good; and that if we possess it, it will not expose us to new or dangerous temptations.

All the intellectual improvements which become our station, the education of ourselves and children, may be properly the objects of prayer. So are civilization, the liberty, the internal peace and independence of our country, and the prosperous issue of lawful war, as far as is connected with these objects. So are health, competence, success in the efforts of regular industry and in honourable pursuits, personal freedom, the enjoyment of friendship, or of conjugal, filial, and parental affections. So is general reputation. Every wish which we may rightly entertain, and habitually cherish in our minds, must be acceptable to the omniscient God, and may therefore be addressed to him in the form of prayer.

While we consider ourselves as constantly under a superintending providence, our most genuine and laudable feelings prompt us to pray for protection from all danger, as well as for deliverance from all calamity.

There is, however, one important distinction

between prayer for temporal, and prayer for spiritual blessings. In the former case we must always pray with this reserve, *if it be agreeable to the will of God*. In the latter case, we know that the moral good, or the religious improvement for which we pray, must be agreeable to the divine will.

In the common course of human life, when existing circumstances do not require special requests, our prayers for temporal blessings may be comprised in a petition, that God would preserve us, and those in whose welfare we are deeply interested, from every real evil, and bestow upon us, and them, every needful good ; that we may enjoy all the pleasures which he allows us with cheerfulness and composure ; and that we may bear all the evils with which he permits us to be tried, with resignation and fortitude.

To enjoy prosperity, and to support adversity, reasonably and piously, constitute the supreme felicity of this life, and comprehend a large compass of moral and religious duty. Under the general summary, therefore, which I have recommended, of prayer for temporal blessings, when particular circumstances do not require another mode, there is a great union between our supplication for spiritual assistance and for temporal protection.

9. The two great principles of human nature, in its highest purity, are self-love and benevolence. The former does not more impel us to pursue our own happiness, than the latter excites us to *do*

good to all men as we have opportunity; to our relations and friends, to those with whom we most associate or are most connected, to our country, and to mankind.

If we *love our neighbours as ourselves*, we shall be as earnest in our endeavours to promote their happiness as our own. If we are truly benevolent, we shall feel our happiness to be identified with theirs. Every desire, therefore, of temporal good, which we may indulge for ourselves, we shall extend to each individual of the human race, as far as it is possible for our thoughts to enter into his concerns. If we wish our own country to be enlightened and free, we shall desire that the same blessings may be enjoyed by every country in the world. If we are anxious for our own health and competence, for our own freedom from pain, protection from danger, or deliverance from affliction, we shall feel a similar solicitude, that those whom we love may share the same felicity. We shall be conscious, that these emotions of philanthropy are pleasing in the sight of God, and that we cannot perform a service more acceptable to him, than by supplicating for others all those blessings which we desire for ourselves.

We prove most effectually our *sincerity* in prayer, when we exert our utmost endeavour to obtain for ourselves or others those spiritual or temporal blessings for which we implore the Father of Mercies. Our prayer for our daily bread should excite us to gain an honest livelihood.

Our prayer for divine illumination should animate us in the pursuit of religious knowledge. Our prayer for improvement in moral virtue should determine us to subdue every bad propensity, and to cultivate every good one. Our prayers for the poor, the distressed, for our friends, our country, and mankind, should warm our hearts with every social affection, and engage us in every active duty. We cannot expect that our prayers will be efficacious for pardon of sin, or progress in holiness, or knowledge of true religion, or that we shall obtain any petition from the throne of grace, unless we are active in the discharge of those duties which God requires from us, and employ, in obedience to his will, the intellectual powers he has committed to our trust.

All the considerations I have enumerated are such as reason dictates. But they are strongly confirmed by revelation, which has greatly enlarged our sphere of devotion, and afforded, by the promulgation of evangelical truth, new and ample themes of adoration, praise, and thanksgiving. The efficacy of prayer, so far as it is proved by the nature of things, and by experience, is within the scope of natural religion; but it is much more fully discovered and ratified by divine revelation, which assures us of pardon for sin, upon repentance, through the merits and mediation of our blessed Saviour; which promises us the assistance of the Holy Spirit in our devotions, and in our sincere endeavours to

advance, in a constant progress, towards moral and religious excellence ; which teaches us to pray for temporal as well as spiritual blessings ; which commands us to supplicate for others, as well as for ourselves ; and impresses upon us the firmest conviction, that whether God shall grant or refuse our humble petitions, we shall not lose an everlasting reward.

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PERIOD THE EIGHTH.

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Θεός ἐστὶ τοῖς χρηστοῖς αἰεὶ

Ἵνος ἀρ' ὡς εἰκε τοῖς σοφώτατοῖς.

p. 709.

Παντ' ἐστὶ τῆ καλῶ λογῶ

Ἱερὸν ὁ νῆς γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ λαλήσων Θεῶ.

p. 713.

Τὸν ὄντα παντῶν κυρίον γενικώτατον

Και πατέρα, τῆτον διαλεγει τιμῶν μόνον

Αγαθῶν τοῖσιν εὐρέτην και κίσιτορα.

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ESSAY XIX.

ON A STATE OF TRIAL.

A STATE of trial does not necessarily result from moral agency ; for we can conceive created beings whose minds are so enlightened, whose hearts are so pure, and who are so happily free from every irregular propensity, that however limited their sphere of contemplation or action may be, it is within that sphere morally impossible for them to think or to act wrong. We have the ardent hope that this will be the state of all good men in the regions of immortal felicity.

We can conceive created beings so lamentably and horribly depraved, as to be incapable of thinking or of acting right, and plunged into an abyss of corruption, from whence it is morally impossible for them ever to emerge. We have just reason to fear, that this will be the sad state to which the hardened and impenitent shall be consigned at the day of judgment.

But while our continuance in this life is granted to us, we are far removed from either of these states ; although by our original faculties, and by innumerable circumstances over which we have no control, as well as by our voluntarily rejecting, or availing ourselves of all the means of grace,

we may be constantly approaching nearer to one or other of them, until death decides our fate. But if we are capable of personal exertions, or have any power over our own minds, or co-operation with the Divine Spirit, if, as free agents, we can make any progress in faith or holiness, in the knowledge of religious or moral truth, or in practising what we know; and if, on the other hand, we can forbear to cherish and improve the spiritual blessings which God has bestowed upon us; if we can, by an act of our own will, deny the true faith, or any particular doctrine it contains; if we can deviate from the right way, as well as steadily pursue it; if we can blind our eyes, harden our hearts, and act in direct opposition to what we know to be the will of God, or the law of perfect rectitude; if we are capable of obedience or disobedience, of virtue and vice, we are in a state of trial.

Scripture assures us that this state of trial originates in the fall of man, and in the power which evil spirits have obtained over us. Every christian must believe what scripture has clearly revealed. But upon a subject of pure revelation let not a roving imagination invent what has not been revealed, and substitute the tremendous clouds of gloom and horror for the shining light of the divine word. We should adhere firmly to what scripture really teaches, but advance not a step farther, lest we shall be guilty, by a fond and impious presumption, of daring to lift up the impenetrable veil.

Experience upon this interesting subject will enable us, in all practical points, to apply what scripture has taught, as well as to confirm our faith.

We cannot reflect upon our present situation without discerning the clearest indications, that this life is not the whole of our existence. Every thing we know in the intellectual world has reference to something unknown or imperfectly comprehended. Whatever is present seems to have a relation to something which is passed; and still more evidently to something which is to come. We appear to be in a state of punishment; but we certainly are in a state of discipline and preparation. “*This life, (says the learned Doctor Barrow,) is not a time of reaping, but of sowing; not of approbation, but of trial; not of triumph, but of combat. This world is not a place of enjoyment, but of work; our condition here is not a state of settlement, but of travel.*” Experience fully manifests our state of trial, although it can hardly in any case be supposed to extend to the whole of our lives, to every thought and every action; for there is no heart so corrupt as to feel a propensity to every vice, and the necessity of restraint upon all occasions. Nor, on the other hand, is any mind so pure, that it is incapable of being deluded by false views, or of yielding to some depravity.

But the more we know of human nature, and the stricter guard we keep over ourselves, the more readily shall we distinguish between the

situation in which we are placed when we are assailed by opposite motives of conduct, and when we are sensible of no internal conflict; but are either absorbed in the vortex of pleasure or passion, or are carried gently and habitually down the clear even current of consistent virtue.

Moral agents act from motives which are absolute, antecedent, concomitant, or mixt. As far as we are in a state of trial at the moment when we act, we act from concomitant or mixt motives. The efficient causes of any event, brought to pass by a created free agent, are probably more numerous than the efficient causes, (instrumental causes of course I mean,) which combine to produce an effect in the material world.

Many of these causes may operate by physical or metaphysical necessity; yet if any one of them is within the power of the free agent so entirely, that the free agent is capable of being wrought upon by one or other of opposite motives, there must be a contingency in that event. If, therefore, there are moral agents placed in a state of trial, there must be contingent events; and the degree of contingency will be in proportion to the extent of that choice which constitutes the state of trial.

Without entering farther into abstruse questions, which human wisdom can never fully explore, and which have but a remote influence upon practice, I shall employ this discourse chiefly in considering what those temptations are, which

daily experience and observation present to our view.

They are usually distinguished into internal and external temptations.

I shall begin with the former, which are often fatal, when they have no aid from the latter ; and which, when combined with the latter, are most dangerous and powerful.

Internal temptations arise from our corporeal as well as intellectual nature. High spirits and low spirits, which depend upon the body as well as upon the mind, afford their respective temptations. To high or low spirits we have at all times some inclination. The temptation is in proportion to that propensity. It may be so weak, as to be scarcely discernible, or so strong, as to be almost irresistible. Indeed, insanity itself, by which we cease to be moral agents, or responsible beings, is shewn by high or low spirits being carried to the greatest extreme. Every disease of the body, every degree of uneasiness, from the slightest discomposure to the most excruciating torment, produces an internal temptation proportioned to its strength. The excitement to impatience, malignity, and impiety, arising from corporeal pain, is, under certain circumstances the greatest trial which can be conceived.

There are very few maladies which may not affect the mind, if we do not exert our reason in opposition to them ; and there is hardly any disease so strong, which, while we have the use

of our understanding, may not be calmly borne by one who is endowed with the best principles, and exercises them to the greatest advantage. Indeed, there is no corporeal calamity which may not by this means be converted into a blessing; and if we are not authorized, which we only are under peculiar circumstances, to consider the pain we suffer, as inflicted by divine justice, we have always reason to acknowledge to God the fortitude with which we are enabled to bear it, as a gracious dispensation of his divine mercy.

The principal sources of internal temptation, independently of our corporeal nature, are the understanding and the passions. When the understanding is originally defective, habitually debilitated, unenlightened, or misinformed, it becomes as powerful an incentive to vice, as it naturally would be an excitement to virtue.

Whatever is most excellent in itself, may be most lamentably depraved. What was designed to be a vigorous instrument of good, is, alas! as strong, as active, and as conspicuously efficacious, in the production of evil. The more irregular our understanding is, the more apt are we to have confidence in it; and when the *light, which is in us, is darkness*, we lose all guidance, all restraint, all check of conscience; nay, the very principle which should curb our headstrong iniquity, gives it a full rein, and stimulates it to every powerful exertion.

When our misconduct arises from an in-

superable defect of understanding, or from invincible ignorance, we are so far removed from a state of trial. But this is an extreme and rare case.

There are very few persons, enjoying the advantages of civilization, who have not sufficient light to direct them, if at any period of their lives they make a good use of it. Our duties and our trials are in proportion to our natural understanding, and to the improvement we have made of it; to the knowledge we have, or ought to have acquired. Ignorance will be no extenuation of our guilt when it is wilful; in some cases it will be an aggravation of it. As a delusive and misinformed understanding is the most irresistible of all internal temptations, no duty can be conceived more peremptory than that of acquiring knowledge, and of improving all our intellectual powers.

It is by knowledge we learn what is our duty in each particular case, and what are the motives for the performance of it. It was by knowledge that the wisest heathens obtained their ethics and their natural religion. It is from knowledge that the christian derives his faith.

Ignorance, and the defects of understanding, are not the only trials arising from our intellectual faculties. A very strong and active mind leads to pride, ambition, rashness, irreligion, contempt, and malignity, if not employed in the assiduous cultivation and improve-

ment of humility and benevolence. These are the virtues which ought particularly to be cherished by every one, who is eminent for his knowledge and ability. But the passions are the most copious and diversified source of internal temptation.

No being can be conceived so corrupt, that his discernment of a reason against an action shall become a motive for doing it, or whose regard to truth and right will not be sufficient to render it certain, that he will determine agreeably to them when he has no temptation to violate them. Unless, therefore, the understanding were perverted, or some power inferior to reason prevailed over it, we should never act wrong. This power is passion, in the most extensive sense of the word. It is passion which produces the internal temptation, and this internal temptation gives force to every external one, and enables it to assume a fatal dominion over our hearts.

The passions may be considered as unnatural, vicious, or virtuous.

When unnatural passions obtain an ascendancy over us, we are sunk in the deepest corruption. We have then no object but the gratification of a propensity which proposes no enjoyment, independent of the gratification itself.

All those passions which cannot be indulged without the manifest and avowed design of bringing misery upon ourselves or others, may be truly styled unnatural; for we can never

act agreeably to our original and unsophisticated nature, when we do not desire to obtain happiness for others or ourselves; that is, what we call happiness, how egregiously soever we may err in our conception of it.

It must, however, be confessed, that these unnatural passions are dreadfully prevalent; that revenge, envy, and malice, the original cause of wars, private feuds, and domestic animosities, often engage us in designs, which have no other view than inflicting misery upon our fellow-creatures, and sometimes upon those endeared to us by the tenderest ties.

Anger alone, when ungovernable, will produce the same horrid effects. Benevolence is so strongly implanted in us, that self-love itself has not a more powerful claim; and we see self-love fundamentally violated, when we seek our own misery, and pursue our own destruction, by sacrificing our ease, our property, our health, our reputation, and our lives, rather than conquer a passion, which preposterous indulgence has rendered almost irresistible. Whatever incentive hurries us on to the known violation of benevolence or self-love, I call an unnatural passion. While we are actuated by benevolence or self-love, but grossly misunderstand and misapply them, I call the passion which prevails over us, a vicious passion. This affords a temptation to a heart much less corrupt. I suppose, however, in this case, that we are conscious of the sin we are committing, and

are convinced that we are transgressing the divine law ; but we lay some flattering unction to our souls, and are so wholly absorbed by passion, as to allow no scope for deliberation.

We think that we cannot more clearly prove our regard to our own interests, or our benevolence, than by promoting, to the utmost of our power, our own enjoyments, and the pleasure of all around us. We think nothing can be more natural than this system of conduct, and fancy, therefore, that such indulgence must be at worst a venial sin.

Not only vicious propensities or foolish ones, or natural ones, afford temptation, but even those which are most amiable, virtuous, and pious. The love which we have for others may lead us to palliate, to view with indifference, and perhaps with complacency, their vices, drawing a veil over their deformity, and persuading ourselves, that they are not so unjustifiable as to every impartial and strict judge they must appear to be.

We are by this means induced to contaminate our own minds, or deprave our own habits by associating with them. If we have power or patronage we are disposed to recommend them to situations, or place them in offices of trust, for which we ought to know that they are unqualified.

Friendship, while we are enjoying the society of friends, in the sanguine hour of prosperity, leads to these evils ; and, in the sad days of

adversity, produces immoderate grief, when we partake of their calamities or deplore their loss.

If friendship, which claims so high a place among the virtues of private life, exposes us to these temptations, the greatest of all public virtues, patriotism, is a still more dangerous seducer. It led the Romans, and almost every people distinguished for it, into injustice, with respect to foreign nations, and into sedition against their own government.

From hence, benevolence has been confined to one country, and too often, by a sectarian spirit in religion or politics, to a very small division of that country. Benevolence itself, although pure and disinterested, has become under this baneful influence, the source of malignity to the great bulk of mankind.

The severe virtues are more inimical to a right conduct, when not in strict subjection to reason, than the benevolent ones.

Justice is changed to oppression ; delicacy of sentiment to unnecessary suspicion ; watchfulness to moroseness ; exemplary conduct to ostentation ; economy to avarice ; frugality to meanness. Piety will lead to enthusiasm ; the love of God, when it operates as a passion, to fanaticism ; the fear of God to superstition. Zeal will lead to persecution. Even the spirit of devotion may produce unsocial habits, and neglect of public and private duties.

Internal temptations, therefore, arise from the understanding, when defective, when unenlight-

ened, or when directed to any object, which separates it from the assiduous cultivation of humility and benevolence.

They arise likewise from the passions, whether they are unnatural or natural, whether they are vicious or virtuous, if virtuous passions are not regulated by a pure and discerning mind.

Impatience of restraint is another source of internal temptation. We are naturally more attached to moral liberty than to any other principle of the human character. For it is the principle, which raises us above the inferior part of the creation, and is the sole source of every species of exertion. But it easily degenerates into licentiousness, and a tumultuous opposition to all authority. This temptation will be completely extinguished whenever licentiousness is exchanged for true moral liberty; whenever the human will is so directed by reason or revelation, so purified, and so exalted as to be in all things conformable to the divine will; when we submit cordially and sincerely to the dispensations of Providence, however severe; and voluntarily surrender all our desires to the everlasting law of rectitude, to the commands of God, and of those human jurisdictions which he has ordained.

Internal temptations of every description afford a fatal energy to external ones, which we should hardly be able to avoid, if we could be supposed free from internal temptations, surrounded as we are with objects, exercising

a constant influence over our minds, removed from abstract speculations, and immersed in sense. To continue immoveably faithful to our duty, however courted by the world, allured by pleasure, deterred by fear, excruciated by pain, oppressed with sorrow, what an arduous task is this ! What unwearied diligence does it require ! And how much of it, after our utmost care and labour, must remain undone !

We derive external temptation from all the circumstances attending our progress in life, from the ignorance, the infidelity, or the superstition, in which we are nurtured ; from the government and climate of our country ; from the society in which we are necessarily placed, and the associations, which we voluntarily form.

Prosperity has great temptations ; adversity itself has hardly more. Every intermediate state has its appropriate trials. There is no occurrence or event which does not occasion them ; no habitual course of life, which does not create some temptations ; no interruption of that course, which does not produce new ones. Sin is infectious ; and when men dare openly to be profane, it spreads like a contagious disease ; the untainted lose their abhorrence, feel virtue to be a restraint, long to be free, change all their good dispositions, and "*follow a multitude to do evil.*" We must arm ourselves against temptation ; we cannot in this world hope to escape it. We cannot by fleeing to solitude, to the wilderness, or the convent, annihilate that state of trial,

which is as experimentally felt in retirement and obscurity, as it is in the tumult of dissipation, or the splendor of greatness.

A state of trial is commensurate with reason, and shews itself in every application we make of knowledge, in every exertion of ability. We feel it in our progress in science, in all prudential conduct confined to this transient life; but above all, in whatever we do with reference to our everlasting happiness.

The duties which a state of trial requires do not consist only in the resistance of temptation, but in the improvement of every good and pious disposition; not merely in the extirpation of weeds, but in the fertilization of the soil, and the production of the most salutary fruits.

We can never guard effectually against vice, but by the cultivation of virtue.

Hope is the animating principle which ought to actuate us in all the lawful pursuits of this life, where we may expect the divine blessing in proportion to our own exertions; while our most ardent affections should be fixed upon that immortal felicity, purchased by our blessed Saviour, and the unremitting object of our desire should be, through the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the attainment of that "*purity of heart,*" which alone will enable us to "*see God.*"

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PERIOD THE SEVENTH.

ΧΕΝΟΡΗΘΝ, Απομν, Β. α. κεφ. γ'. γ'.

Μενανδρου Λειψανα, εκ της βοιωλιας, γ'.; εκ της Θαϊδος, β'.; εκ της κιβαρισιας, ε'.; εκ της Μηραγυρτης, α. β'.; εκ της Ολυνθιας, β'.; εκ της πλοκιας, ς'.; εκ της υποβολιμαιας, ζ'.; εξ αδηλων δραματων, ρζη. ρογ.

Φιλεμονος Λειψανα, εκ των αδηλων, μβ'.

Stobæi Excerpta, κεφ. ζ'.

Grotii Excerpta, p. 177, πανιαχια το σωφροσιν; p. 203, Οι μεν το επιβαλλειν; p. 271, 273, θνητων το αλυπος; p. 297, των δε το θανη; p. 335, πολλαι το βιω; p. 359, φευ το ευψυχια; p. 425, Ω μολυμοχθος το τελευτα; p. 429, Η βροτων το λυπουμενων. Ex Sophocle, p. 79, Μηδεν' το παθων; p. 87, 'Α γαρ δη το εκλος αιλας; p. 91, 93, Ταυι' εν τεκνον το κερδος λεγει; p. 97, Ω φιλατ' το φιλα; p. 105, 107, Οστις τε το απο ριπαϊν; p. 109, λογος το κακος—φαμι το σιρεσθαι; p. 119, Ως πανια το λαθη; p. 123, Ω ταν το κακοις. Ex Tragicis qui perierunt, p. 437, φαυλοι το ερωσι; p. 445, Σαφης το γυναικος; p. 453, Ανθρωπω το βαινειν; p. 463, 465, Μηδ' ευλυχημα το πυρι. Ex Æschylo, p. 25, Ανθρωπεια το προσω; p. 55, Ως ου' το κακων.

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" inscitiam, cæca et temeraria dominatrix animi
" Cupiditas, ad se explendam viribus corporis abuteba-
" tur, perniciosissimus satellitibus;" lib. ii. cap. 10.

Sallustius, *περι θεων και κοσμου*, κεφ. ιθ.

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Ἀρ' ἐστὶ συγγενὲς τι λυπη καὶ βίος·

Τρυφερῶ βίῳ συνεστὶν ἐνδοξῶ βίῳ

Παρῆσιν ἀπορῶ συγκαίταγγρασκει βίῳ. p. 729.

Ἄνθρωπος εἰ,

Οὐ μείλαβόλη θάπτου πρὸς ἕψος καὶ παλιν

Ταπεινότητα ζῶον οὐδὲν λαμβάνει·

Καὶ μάλα δίκαιως ἀσθενέστερον γὰρ οὐ

Φύσει μεγίστοις οἰκονομεῖται πραγμάτων·

Ὅταν πέσῃ δὲ, πλείστια σὺντρίβει καλά. p. 573.

Ἄνθρωπος ὧν μηδεποῖε τὴν ἀλυπτιαν

Αἰεὶ παρὰ Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ μακροθυμῶν·

Ὅταν γὰρ ἀλυπτος διὰ τέλος εἶναι θέλῃς

Ἡ δὲ Θεοῦ σε εἶναι, ἢ ταχὺ δὴ νεκρῶν·

Παρηγορεῖ δὲ τὰ κακά δι' ἑτέρων κακῶν. p. 763.

Limborchi Theologia, lib. ii. cap. xxiii. sect. 21; cap. xxviii. sect. 9; lib. iii. cap. iii. sect. 4; lib. iv. cap. xiii. sect. 16, 17, 18, 19; lib. v. cap. xv. sect. 16, 19; cap. xvi. sect. 3.

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ESSAY XX.

ON THE REWARD OF VIRTUE.

AS we are here placed in a state of trial, virtue cannot be supposed in this life to attain its real perfection, or to receive its natural reward. It is sufficient, to silence all objections to the moral government of God, if we discern that connection between virtue and happiness, which proves, that there is universally a tendency in the former to produce the latter, and that this tendency would have its due operation, if it were not thwarted by the imperfection which pervades all human energies, and by the external circumstances which surround us. If we inquire how far in this life happiness is the reward of virtue, we must first determine wherein happiness consists. Happiness does not consist in the pleasing sensations of the moment, nor in the mere gratification of appetite, much less in the indulgence of ungovernable passions, but in the internal state of our minds, or in the permanent influence of external circumstances.

I shall go through the several sources from whence happiness may be well supposed to be derived, and shew how nearly all of them are connected with virtue or practical religion.

In the first place, happiness is derived from self-satisfaction, and peace of mind.

If self-satisfaction proceeds from adulation and vanity, it is of a very shadowy and fluctuating nature ; liable to be overthrown by every wind of popular fame ; dependent upon the breath of man ; subject every hour to innumerable mortifications, and always regulated by the flow or depression of animal spirits. But if it proceeds from a real knowledge of moral truth, and of our own hearts, it is the habitual consciousness of virtue, which we cannot have without the possession of it.

Nor will our sense of deficiency impair this satisfaction, if we are assured of our sincere endeavours to conquer every bad propensity, and to make a daily progress in virtue. The more earnest these endeavours are, and the greater the success of them, the higher will be our enjoyment, and the more perfect our morality. When there is a particular danger of acting wrong, a firm resolution, constantly opposed to that danger, is a continued act of virtue. Vicious indulgencies deprave, virtuous self-government improves, the inward constitution and character ; and by raising us to a greater eminence in the moral scale, renders us more capable of self-satisfaction. The more accurate, the more enlarged, the more elevated our conceptions of duty are, the happier we shall be, if we act according to our knowledge of what is right. Duty and happiness are inseparable from virtue ; the former as the principle, the latter the result ; the former the guide, the latter the re-

ward. A bad mind is the sorest adversity which can befall us; for in the most accumulated distress, the comfort of a good conscience will afford a pleasure, far beyond any delightful sensations which prosperity the most unbounded, without a good conscience, can bestow. The want of this true principle of self-satisfaction renders all pleasures insipid, if we partake of them; at the same time that they become necessary to dispel our mental gloom, and we cannot endure the calamity which their deprivation inflicts. We cannot bear their absence, yet have no enjoyment of them when present. I acknowledge, that self-satisfaction, though arising from the most frivolous fancies and absurd pretensions, will furnish some transient gratification. The very madman is happy while he thinks himself a king; but the happiness, which self-satisfaction produces, the peace of mind which it creates, must be in proportion to the solidity of the foundation upon which it stands. The firm and impregnable rock, which alone can afford it an adequate support, is the full conviction, that we have brought no calamities upon ourselves, and that our conduct has always been directed to the wisest and best ends; and that to obtain these ends we have been diligent in prayer, and have used all the lawful means which it has been in our power to exert.

In the second place, happiness arises from an assurance of the divine favour.

Without the belief of true religion, the satisfaction which a good conscience affords is terribly

overthrown by the melancholy consideration, that invisible causes operate to an inconceivable extent; that they appear to be the original sources of all the phenomena in the natural or moral world, and that they have an immediate influence over them. Without faith in true religion, we do not know how these causes may operate, and what effects they may produce, if our existence shall be extended beyond the grave. What real comfort can the best of mere moralists enjoy, if he may be, through eternity, for all he sees to the contrary, the sport of malignant or capricious spirits; liable to the infinite revolutions of blind chance, or the victim of inexorable fate? or if he acknowledges a Being perfect in wisdom and power, but of whose sovereignty alone he has a conviction, not of the justice and benignity with which that sovereignty is exercised, what consolation will the belief of such a being afford? It is the knowledge of true religion alone, added to the testimony of a good conscience, which can give us assurance of the divine favour.

A full and firm faith in the moral attributes of the Deity, and in the gracious promises of the gospel, is the most valuable of all blessings. It speaks peace to that mind which can reflect with humble comfort upon its own principles, and upon the general conduct which these principles have inspired. It awakens us to a sense of guilt, and summons all the powers of our souls to a sincere penitence, while it assures

the most obdurate transgressor, that through the merits of Christ he shall be received, upon true change of mind and amendment of life, to the favour of that God, who is equally perfect in mercy and in justice, who is "about all our paths, and spieth out all our ways," who is constantly protecting us by his providence, guiding us by his grace, and preparing us for a glorious immortality.

Those unhappy persons who are hardened in iniquity, must wish that there were no God. What misery can be conceived greater, than that which reduces man to the sad necessity of averting his eyes from the Being, who is the object of the sublimest contemplation, the author of all good, the source of every consolation we can enjoy here, and of every hope we can entertain of everlasting felicity?

In the third place, happiness consists in the right direction and improvement of the understanding, from whence all intellectual pleasures proceed. A virtuous man is most likely to direct his understanding aright, as his passions are duly regulated, as he is a sincere lover of truth, and anxious to discover it. The understanding is most improved by the calmness and industry which are congenial to virtue, and by the enlarged views which are essential to it. Moral philosophy, in the hours of serious meditation, or the exalted strains of pure eloquence and poetry, in the more lively exertions of genius, are the most exuberant sources of intellectual delight;

and they are as nearly connected with virtue, as theory is with practice. The very pursuit of these studies is an exercise of virtue; and has a natural tendency to advance us, by improving our taste to higher degrees of perfection. This happiness, arising from virtue, bears a proportion to our progress in it.

But a sense of religion will still more augment our felicity. The most eminent of merely moral philosophers will feel a very different sensation, when he emerges, by an enlightened faith, from infidelity, scepticism, or superstition, and acquires a knowledge of the amiable, the holy nature of the supreme mind; when he is convinced, that the highest conception which he has been accustomed to frame of goodness, is but a faint transcript of this all-perfect Being, and that he, from his intellectual soul, is advancing to a relation to God, and will, in every period of his existence, be a subject of the divine government.

Wisdom, nearly identified with virtue, is justly said by Dr. Barrow, to be "delectable in various ways, as a discoverer of truth, and a detector of error, as disposing us to enjoy all good, as satisfying us that we act right, as creating a well-grounded hope, as preventing discouragement, and mollifying disappointment, as in the sad hour of affliction imparting every topic of consolation, as conferring ability in active life, and determining the manner in which, under all circumstances, we should act. It discovers the relations

we bear to other men, and teaches us the true measures of persons and things.”

It is, indeed, a lamentable truth, that brilliant talents are often employed to undermine and ridicule wisdom and virtue, instead of supporting them; and that the most vigorous understanding is too ready to be perverted to this sad abuse of its powers. I allow that the mind can never be exerted, though in the most depraved manner, without some pleasing sensation. Vice has her gratification as well as virtue, but it is a gratification suited only to a vicious taste, and infinitely inferior to those virtuous pleasures, with which it is wholly incompatible, which it precludes and renders us incapable of enjoying.

All the pleasures of virtue are superior to those of vice; they are more exquisite when enjoyed, more secure in their possession, and more durable when possessed; not only durable, but continually increasing and improving, invigorating that mind, ameliorating that temper, and exalting those sublime conceptions from whence they spring.

The fourth source of happiness is social affection; this is a very general source of happiness to all mankind. There is hardly a rational creature which can be supposed devoid of every degree of social attachment, and a proportionate share of the happiness resulting from it. Social affection is essential to all the virtues of the heart; and though in many instances it proceeds only from natural feeling, it is a right and laudable

feeling, which it is our duty to cherish within certain limits; and while those limits are preserved, the more we cherish it, the more pleasing sensations shall we derive from it. While therefore we are allowed the full enjoyment of social affection, and while we restrain it within the bounds which reason prescribes, happiness is identified with virtue. It must, however, be admitted, that from social affection, not only the pleasures, but the severest calamities of life are derived. When love and friendship become inordinate and irregular passions, they are more likely to plunge us into the depths of sorrow, than to afford a calm and solid delight; but at the same time they cease to be virtues, and the misery they inflict is an example of the divine government of the world; so far is it from being an objection to it. But I must acknowledge, that even when social affection is tempered with moderation, and never pursued farther than our conscience will justify; when we view it in all its bearings, and reconcile it with the various claims which God and man have upon us, it still may involve us in calamity, and call forth our tenderest sensibilities. But is there a man, who in this vale of tears would wish to be so exempt from grief, as to have no relation in the world, whom he would not lose with indifference, no participation in another's woe? If he can entertain so hardened a thought, must he not sacrifice innumerable joys from the dread of encountering sorrow? Is it not happiness he

flees from much more than misery? Is it not annihilation he courts, a species of suicide he is ready to commit? Is it not the perfection of a stone to which he aspires?

The fifth source of happiness consists in the *opportunity* of indulging and cultivating social affections.

This opportunity must depend in some measure upon external circumstances, over which we have no control. It is not every man who has the happiness to be a husband, a father, or to have parents educating him to mature age; and when we have these near connections, it is very uncertain, whether they are to be considered as rewards of our virtue, or as trials of it. There can, however, be no doubt, that the blessing of good relations is more likely to be obtained by our own virtuous conduct, than by any other means in our power. By perseverance in kind offices, we shall probably conciliate affection, and excite gratitude. The worst tempers will be softened by prudent management. The most corrupt propensities in a child may be checked by discipline, and subdued by precept and example. In the determination to marry, and in the choice of a wife, that man who is influenced by pure affection, accompanied by a well grounded esteem, has a vast advantage over him, who is actuated by avarice, ambition, vanity, or cold calculating prudence. The latter will generally be happier in a state of celibacy, or is more fortunate

than he deserves, if having a very different object of pursuit, he attains conjugal felicity.

In the choice of friends, or of general associates we select, as far as is in our power, persons, whose morals are similar to our own ; and assuredly virtuous is preferable to vicious society. A large portion of social virtue is displayed in amiable manners and conciliating conversation. The more we cultivate this disposition, the more we shall recommend ourselves to all descriptions of people, for there are some virtues, which the worst men approve. The more we recommend ourselves, the more easy we shall find it to select our society, and the more able we shall be to form those friendships which are honourable, estimable, and permanent ; friendships which are the delight and consolation of our lives. Valuable associations, as far as they are in our power, are the fruits of virtue, and among all worldly advantages the highest which she can bestow.

The sixth source of happiness consists in having some active employment, suitable to our birth, education, and strength of body or mind.

In the lowest orders of society this is constant labour ; in the highest ranks, it is that which calls forth knowledge or talent, and exercises the understanding. If we are under the dominion of avarice, malignity, or ambition, no limit will be set to the excessive fatigue of body or mind we shall be ready to undertake. But virtue, in the common course of life, will lead us precisely

to the same point, to which we shall be led by regard to our own happiness. In either case we shall be desirous of employment, but not of a responsibility beyond those powers which we are conscious of possessing.

As far as such an employment is an object to which we may reasonably aspire, is it not more likely to be obtained by a good than a bad character? The necessary qualifications also are often the fruits of our former industry. The duties of it in general cannot be performed, nor probably the situation retained, without integrity, submission, and content. Happiness depends upon the exertion of the body and mind, and upon that temperament of the soul, which unites modesty with a proper sense of dignity, and patience with laudable ambition. Happiness too depends upon those external circumstances which do not preclude us from air and exercise, although engaged in sedentary occupations, and which afford us a reasonable degree of recreation to mitigate the severity of a laborious life.

The seventh source of happiness is prosperity, whether it consists in riches or honour, in power, or in all the pomp and parade of pleasure. If the attainment or preservation of prosperity be unconnected with virtue, it is virtue alone, which can derive happiness from it. She alone can render it the instrument or dispenser of real good. A man, centering in himself by universal empire, the riches and honours of this world, if his virtue were equal to his greatness, might excel all the

human race as far in happiness as in power; but he would be placed in a tremendous state of trial; and, if he were actuated by bad passions, instead of virtuous principle, he would be the most miserable, as well as the most mischievous of mankind. Prosperity is only the source of happiness, as it administers to beneficence, or supplies the means of rational self-enjoyment.

We cannot be truly beneficent, without a large portion of wisdom, as well as of benevolence; nor can we derive happiness, beyond the titillation of the moment, from the gratification of sensual pleasure, when it is unaccompanied with temperance. No external circumstances will contribute to our felicity, any farther than as they are instruments of virtue, or subservient to it, or consistent with it: for real and lasting enjoyment must arise from a well directed understanding and pure affections. There are no pleasures, which will not be more conducive to our happiness, when enjoyed with moderation, than when carried to an unreasonable extent. Those are most happy, who fill their proper place in society; who have a competent measure of what they really want, and do not encroach upon the just pretensions of other men. Our own happiness is most complete, when it is most compatible with the general happiness of the community, or most conducive to it. Reflecting upon the situations in which other men are placed, we see abundant reason to be satisfied with our own.

The eighth source of happiness, though a nega-

tive one, is much more solid than positive prosperity. It is freedom from adversity, from pain, particularly that pain which arises from disease, mental or corporeal, from extreme poverty and inevitable calamities. These are the afflictions of human life, which no exertion of our own, no degree of virtue or piety can absolutely subdue. But they may be mitigated by patience, they may be overbalanced by the pleasures which true religion affords, and more immediately by the satisfaction arising from that fortitude and pious resignation which in a good man they excite. They are by this means so far overbalanced, that the wisest persons will hardly wish to pass through this state of trial, without an opportunity of discharging those duties which adversity demands; at the same time that they apply their minds to foresee all those circumstances which may hereafter affect their worldly happiness, and endeavour to guard themselves from the danger. A prudent man will employ, in the hour of calamity, all the forces afforded him to extricate himself from his misfortunes; but when good is placed beyond his reach, or evil unavoidable, he will not, by brooding over his melancholy state, or complaining of it, wilfully heighten his woe.

In this life, pleasure and pain arise from the same sources. Would we annihilate the former to secure ourselves from the latter? when we are considering how far virtue is rewarded in this world, virtue should be opposed to vice, not to apathy. Vice, as opposed to virtue, is the tyranny

of passion, contrasted with the lawful government of reason. Vice embitters every calamity, whether she produces it or not, and renders it irremediable. Virtue, by being often the source of competence and the support of health, will frequently prevent our suffering from external causes. She will, however, sometimes plunge us deeply into sufferings of this description, but in these, which are extraordinary cases, she accompanies the bane with powerful antidotes; and in the general course of life, she more than any other principle of conduct, combines the avoidance of pain with the enjoyment of delight.

I allow, that if we were so depraved as to receive no pleasure from any virtuous or innocent gratification, we should be incapable of virtue, and consequently of any reward which the moral governor of mankind has thought fit to bestow upon it. But in this case every spark of goodness must be extinguished in us, every trace of sound intellect effaced, we should be degraded to the sensations of a mere animal, and in the indulgence of inordinate passions, sunk even below the bestial race.

But there is no situation in which a good man can be placed, where he will not more promote his own happiness in this life, by the discharge of that duty, which under existing circumstances, he is required and enabled to perform, than by any other means which wit or wisdom can suggest, or which knowledge, wealth, honour or power can supply. Nor is there any situation

in which a bad man can be imagined, where it is not his immediate and imperative interest to become good, however difficult the task.

The farther a good man is removed from sin, and the nearer he approaches to the true christian character in faith and practice, the more he will disarm adversity of its stings, the more he will enjoy prosperity; the more likely he will be to attain the real blessings of life, health, peace and competence; the more opportunities he will acquire of indulging his social affections; the more by cultivation will they be increased and improved; the more will his taste be refined, his knowledge enlarged, and his understanding enlightened; the more assured he will be of the divine pardon; the more he will experience the blessed influences of the divine grace, and from the testimony of a good conscience, look forward with firm and animating hope to a glorious immortality, purchased on the cross by our blessed Redeemer for all his faithful and virtuous followers.

ESSAY XXI.

ON THE PUNISHMENT OF VICE.

GOD governs the world, which he created, by appointed laws, arising out of the constitution of each individual being, and the class to which, according to that constitution, it belongs.

He governs mere brute matter by the powers of mechanism ; whatever is capable of sensation by excitements of more uncertain efficacy ; animals by instinct, if they have only locomotion, or by a higher principle, if they approach, through their appetites and passions, to human nature. Intellectual beings, as far as they are guided by their intellect, must be governed by motives addressed to their understanding. Free agents, of every description, must be ruled in a manner consistent with their free agency ; in a manner which leaves them at entire liberty to act as they shall choose. They must be ruled by influencing their passions or their incentives to action, without controlling their will.

We know by experience, that the terror of punishment alone supports human government, that this terror can only be maintained by the occasional infliction of it ; and that if government were not supported we should sink into barbarism ; society would be dissolved, and universal

anarchy prevail; every man would be a tyrant, and every man a slave.

Although the divine government is infinitely removed from all the imperfection which attends human councils; yet while the subject of government is the same, the means by which government can be supported will not essentially vary.

Punishment therefore is necessary to maintain the divine laws, to give the sinner a chance of being reclaimed, and to deter even the best men in this corrupt world from sin.

As far as punishment is conducive to the prevention of sin, and still more, if it has that salutary effect, great as the relative evil may be, it must be deemed a positive good.

In the execution of human laws, we consider the infliction of punishment as the duty of the magistrate, as an act of beneficence to the public, and very often as a real blessing to the criminal himself, even in the case of capital crimes; for it is infinitely better to die penitent, than to live abandoned.

Every punishment which God, as the great lawgiver of the universe, either threatens or inflicts, is an act of beneficence, having an efficacy more extensive than we can conceive, and felt as a real blessing by every moral agent who makes a right use of it.

Every punishment proceeding from God, which is the case with all just punishments, either immediately or remotely, displays the moral attributes in their full extent; for the hatred of sin

is a manifestation of the divine holiness; the prevention of it, or the desire of preventing it without superseding human will, is equally a manifestation of the divine benevolence.

The wisdom of God is displayed in that intimate penetration of the human heart, by which the exact measure of guilt is discerned, with all its extenuations and aggravations; while the justice of God is conspicuous in the proportion of the punishment to the offence.

The secret thoughts, affections, and purposes of man are exempt from human judgment; because we have no capacity of judging, no power of cognizance; but God discerns the deep recesses of our hearts; and the time will come when all the thoughts and designs of the wicked, however concealed from the public view, shall be openly declared in the presence of those innumerable multitudes, whose own moral conduct may be affected by the judgment pronounced, and who shall be witnesses of the righteousness of God.

At the great day of final retribution, the exalted wisdom, the discriminating justice, the perfect goodness of God will be displayed to the full satisfaction and conviction of all the human race, and of all the hosts of heaven; God's honour will be fully vindicated; every cause will be rightly tried; every work will be duly recompensed; the whole system of the moral government of God in this life will be explained; every latent connection between sin and misery will be unravelled; and it

will be universally acknowledged, that the infliction of punishment does not arise from the original will of the Creator, but from a necessity superinduced by the voluntary depravity of the creature.

Divine punishments are of three kinds ; those inflicted in this life by the operation of established laws ; those inflicted in this life by extraordinary interpositions ; and those which are reserved for a future state of rewards and punishments.

I shall confine this discussion to the first kind of punishment ; of which we may attain a considerable degree of knowledge, by history, observation, and experience. It will lead us also, by an obvious analogy, to form some idea of the punishments of a future state.

But concerning these punishments we must not dogmatize without the authority of scripture ; nor can we, without the assistance of that divine light, interpret the extraordinary interpositions of Providence. Sacred history displays, with more or less detail, the miraculous powers which were exerted, and the immediate intercourse which was maintained, between God and man under the patriarchal, the mosaical, and christian dispensations ; and foretels many events, which it does not record, events, connected with the state of the church in successive ages. All these events are proofs of supernatural interpositions.

It would be very rash to suppose that there were now a similar interposition to that which subsisted during the theocracy of the Jews, or

during the subsistence of those miraculous powers which were conferred upon the first disciples of Christ; at the same time that it would be still more presumptuous to deny the divine interference in human affairs. We ought firmly to believe all that revelation teaches upon this subject, and, where the scripture affords no other light, to suspend our faith; for it is not a topic upon which we can trust our imagination.

Not however farther to anticipate what will be treated in the next essay, I shall proceed to examine what we can discern of the divine justice, in the punishment of sin by established laws, executed during this transitory life.

The established laws of the divine government are discerned by the natural connection between the crime and the punishment.

The more we reflect upon the calamities we suffer ourselves or commiserate in other men, the more we shall discover of their criminal origin, and the more able shall we be to derive, by a regular chain of efficient causes, all the sufferings of mankind from their breach of the divine law.

In the last essay, I have shewn the happiness produced by virtue in the ordinary course of events, or in the internal operations of the mind. Of all this happiness vice deprives us. This alone would be a severe punishment. But the moral laws, by which God governs mankind, require a much stronger sanction than the mere negation of felicity. Natural evil is not only the

deprivation of pleasure, but the actual and often the severe endurance of pain.

There is probably no natural evil which is not in the hands of God, a punishment of vice, or a trial of virtue ; and very frequently the same calamitous event which is a trial of virtue, is likewise a punishment of vice.

Natural evil therefore is, in the view which an omniscient Being forms of it, not indeed an absolute but a relative good, being an instrument of the divine justice, and a means whereby we are restrained from vice and improved in virtue.

External calamities are the punishments of vice, when they arise from our placing ourselves in a situation, which would never have been our lot, if at every period of our lives we had been actuated by virtuous principles.

There are no external advantages resulting from virtue, of which vice barely deprives us, without substituting in their room the afflictions which are most opposite to them, and generally of a stronger pungency.

Vice does not only deprive us of competence, but produces poverty and distress, changes reputation to ignominy ; health to disease, freedom from pain to the most acute sensations of it ; the kindness of friendship to the bitterness of enmity ; the joys and comforts of good society to the riot of debauchery, and all the quarrels excited by malignant passions.

Pain or misery, from whatever source it imme-

diately arises, originally springs from vice. If it proceeds from a just cause of sorrow, the violence of it will be removed by patience, while it is sadly exasperated by the indulgence of grief or anger. If corporeal affections are the cause of it, how often do those very affections owe their existence to vice! how constantly are they stimulated by it! on the contrary, they may be so far assuaged by fortitude and resignation, as to be borne with calmness and composure.

If mental disease overwhelms the mind, or suspends the exercise of the understanding, it is, I allow, the most dreadful calamity to which we are exposed in this life, and from which the best men are not exempt; but it is a calamity, which in many cases may be traced to unlawful or excessive passions, or to some of the effects of vice; and if not prevented, may be frequently cured by a judicious application of moral and religious principles.

It is vice which exposes us to all the terrible inroads of corporeal or mental disease, and often precludes mitigation or recovery. When by intemperance we have brought on tormenting maladies, or reduced ourselves to the very verge of the grave, how impossible is it found to retreat, even with death and judgment before our eyes! Vice corrupts all the three principles of human conduct, reason, imagination and passion, rendering them sources of evil instead of the good they were designed to produce.

She employs *reason*, not to discover what is our real duty, and to devise means for performing it; nor what is our real happiness, and what the best method of attaining it; but she renders reason the servile instrument of sensual and immediate gratification; makes it the source of every mischief to ourselves and our fellow-creatures, the pander of every crime. From the exercise of his understanding, the villain in private life contrives the seduction of the innocent, the oppression of the poor, or the spoliation of the opulent: while the greater villain, in a more enlarged sphere, fomented discord and rebellion, betrays his country to her most implacable foe, and spreads rapine and desolation over the world.

But though these miscreants inflict misery upon others, as far as their power extends, they are still more miserable themselves.

While our own interest is the sole or prevailing motive of our conduct, we shall be incapable of virtue, and never attain that happiness which disinterested benevolence and true piety afford; that happiness which is most enlarged and exalted, most independent of external events, most firm and durable; which alone defies the darts of death, and not only survives the grave, but in the future periods of our existence will be elevated far beyond all which we can now conceive. If we desire to be happy, let us pursue virtue and virtue alone, without any other

regard to our own interests, than that which arises from a firm reliance upon the divine goodness, with the full assurance, that by persevering in this course, we shall obtain our just reward.

Vice employs *imagination*, in the vivid colouring of all which captivates the sanguine, or depresses the disconsolate; places before the former the most alluring pictures, the most magnificent images of pleasure and honour, of power and of wealth; while she torments the latter with every horror, which melancholy or malignity can implant.

But above all, vice has a commanding and fatal influence over our *passions*; she identifies herself with our worst passions, and perverts our best; until they become so depraved, as to be fit instruments for her designs.

Passion, under the direction of an enlightened mind, is a copious source of happiness, and a powerful incentive to virtue. The agitation which it creates, may expose us to danger, and naturally excites us to encounter the greatest perils in a good cause; but when social affections, when love and friendship, courage and patriotism inflame our passions, the pleasure far out-weighs the pain. When the severest calamities fall upon us in consequence of that noble warmth and generous zeal, which true principle inspires, how deeply we feel this truth! how infinitely superior in real happiness is the martyr, dying under the most excruciating torments with

the glorious hope of a blessed immortality, than the cruel persecutor, living in pomp and luxury, reproached by conscience, lacerated by his own malignity!

But when the best affections are so corrupted as to change their nature, and the bad passions rage without control, it is impossible to form an idea of greater misery than is felt by the individual who is the slave of these passions, and by those unhappy persons, over whom his influence extends, to make them the instruments and the associates of his crimes. Far happier are the victims of them; for they, if they preserve their innocence, may retain a considerable degree of happiness; they may enjoy the unspeakable comfort of a good conscience, and an humble submission to the divine will.

It is far better, indeed, to be the victim of a crime than the associate of it, however severe the misery which it inflicts. So perfect is the punishment of those who are slaves to outrageous passions, and who have entirely abandoned the use of their understanding, that they have no pleasure except in suffering or inflicting torment. The excess of grief, envy or malignant passions, will actually lead men to prefer the most poignant agitations of mind to calmness and repose. How wretched must a society be, which is composed of none but these malicious, mad, and froward spirits! If God should inflict in this life, or in a future state, no positive torment upon sinners, yet, as Tillotson remarks, "*they could not spare*

themselves, but would be their own executioners and tormentors.”*

If any situation can be conceived more deplorable than the society of the most depraved, it is that of a being doomed to solitude, and delivered over, in this dismal exile, to his own turbulent passions, his obdurate mind, his sad thoughts, his rancour and despair.

When a man first begins to emerge from this melancholy state, he conceives some desire of happiness, and places it in vain pursuits, or sensual gratifications. As he becomes less vicious, his punishment is less severe; but still he is punished by disappointment in the objects of his gratification, which perhaps he can never attain, or if he does attain them, finds them vain and unsatisfactory.

He is punished in proportion to the unlawfulness of his pursuits; for the more inexcusable his conduct, the greater sufferings will it produce. If he rises to a higher scale of moral agency, he may make real good the object of his laudable ambition, yet continue very defective in virtue, if he errs in his discernment of what is real good, or if in choosing right he does not adhere to his choice with steadiness and perseverance. Whenever he fails in these points he will encounter some evil, and whatever evil is naturally the result of imperfect conduct, must be esteemed a punishment inflicted for the most wise and salutary purposes, by that Being, from whom all good,

* Serm. xxxiv.

and no real evil proceeds. Whatever may be the magnitude of the wickedness we contemplate, we shall find the punishment proportioned to it, by the established laws of the moral world. It is a punishment of which, however great or small it may be, the sinner, while he continues a sinner, is too apt to be insensible. He must be awakened to a sense of his sin before he discerns it fully as the cause of his suffering. Those persons are most deserving of punishment, and are in fact most miserable, who have the best principles, and act contrary to them; for they are the most sensible of the loss they sustain by voluntarily depriving themselves of the highest privileges which they were capacitated to enjoy, at the same time that they receive from vice a gratification inferior to that which the more dissolute enjoy.

No man can be justly liable to punishment for acting wrong, if from ignorance or imbecility he has no opportunity of acting right. Those who have the most frequent opportunities of acting right, and the most enlightened minds, are more inexcusable for acting wrong, or neglecting their opportunities of acting right, and are more severely punished for it. Self-condemnation cannot be separated from the remembrance of having done wrong. The peace of conscience is of the greatest importance to a being who cannot flee from reflection, unless he sacrifices by that flight his nature, his dignity, and his most substantial delights.

When we commit a crime, the pleasure of it is short and transient, but the trouble and sting which it leaves behind remain for ever. Whenever we are wilfully and consciously criminal, we act contrary to the clearest dictates of our reason, to our plain and true interest, and to the strongest obligations.

No evil bears any proportion to the evil of sin, if we have a true sense of it. The sense of guilt is never more fierce and raging than in the hour of distress. How poignant must our grief be, when in the dreadful conflict we have to sustain with real affliction, we feel it as the consequence of our sin, as the punishment affixed to it by the established laws of an offended God! When we know that the calamity has been brought upon us by our own misconduct, however great the calamity may be, we feel a severer pain extraneous to it, in the reflection it forces upon our mind. When a son, instead of being the comfort of our age, is bringing down our grey hairs with sorrow to the grave, how does it embitter all our thoughts, when we know, that his enormities are to be ascribed to the fault of education or to parental example!

A man completely wicked has no consolation in adversity, and in the height of prosperity can enjoy no positive good; for his bad temper, his malignant passions, his hatred of all which is most amiable or most estimable, his voluntary dereliction of reason, his impiety to God, will poison the only sources from whence happiness

can flow, amidst all the abundance of the most lavish fortune. The miseries which wickedness produces in this life, from the natural connection between sin and pain, cannot be fully enumerated, without taking into our consideration the belief, which can never be eradicated, of a future state. The fear of punishment in that state is more deeply implanted in a degenerate mind than the hope of reward. The ideas of merit and demerit are connatural to the human understanding. We readily acknowledge that the lot of bad men ought to be widely distinguished from the lot of good men, and that he who designs, or wantonly inflicts, evil upon others, should himself experience the pain he deserves to feel.

We have a strong conviction that this discrimination will be conspicuous in a future state, and that an entire separation will take place. What we see here must convince us how dreadful that society will be which shall consist of the most hardened criminals, or of those enslaved to the worst passions, passions to which we can assign no limit either in their scope or their duration.

These terrors, which nature dictates, experience authorizes, and revelation confirms, add a dreadful weight to all the calamities of this world, and are a burthen, even here, too heavy for a man to sustain, if, after he is awakened to a true sense of his guilt, he continues hardened in impenitence.

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PERIOD THE SEVENTH.

ΧΕΝΟΡΗΘΝ, Απομν. Βιβ. α. κεφ. ε', η, ι; κεφ. ζ. δ', ε.; Βιβ. β'. κεφ. α. ιη. ιδ'. κ'; κεφ. ε'. λγ'. λδ'. λη. λθ'.; κεφ. ζ'. ζ. η, θ'.; Βιβ. γ. κεφ. ε'.—ιγ'.—ιδ'.—ιη'.; κεφ. θ.—ιβ'.—ιγ'.; κεφ. ιβ'.; Βιβ. δ'. κεφ. α.—γ.—δ.; κεφ. β'.—κη.—κθ'.—λδ'.—λε.; κεφ. δ.—ιζ'. κδ'.; κεφ. ε. throughout; κεφ. η.—α.—ε'.—ι.—ια. Απολογία η.—ιη.—κδ'.—κε.—κς'.—κη.—λβ'.

Grotii Excerpta, p. 161, fr. πασι to αἰεις; p. 163, Ἀλλ' ἐπει, &c.; p. 175, ἔδεν το δῆλον προς το μη δῆλον γένος; p. 183, 184, Ω τεκνον, &c. the whole of the speech; p. 199, Ἐρωτες to θεων; p. 201, θυμος to βροτοις; p. 211, φευ, φευ, to κομιξεται; p. 259, φευ to ευ; p. 261, θαρσει to λογεις; p. 269, Ω ταλαιπωροι to διεκπεραῖν; p. 271, Ζηλω to διεκναισαν; p. 275, 277, Μακαρες to αιει; p. 329, Ουδεις to σωτηριας τι ποί to λεγω; p. 335, 337, Ὑπερβαλλισσας to εχοιμαν; p. 339, τυραννιδος to εχειν, (28 lines); p. 341, Οιμοι to σοφωτερον; p. 355, ταις συμφοραις to βελος—Οσις to φρονει; p. 361, Η χρη to ὑπερτερα; p. 363, εχει to σθενος; p. 365, Οσις to λεχη; p. 421, Παιδευμα to ελθη. Ex Sophocle, p. 63, Οιγαρ to εκβαλη—Δεος to επισιασο; p. 71, Ορα to ευτυχει; p. 79, τῶν δε πημονων to αυθαιρετοι—το γαρ to γλυκυ; p. 93, Οσω κραλιστον βλαβη; p. 97, Ω μαρε to ξυμφερον—Ἀλλ' ο νῆς to τὰ πειλημαία; p. 119, ὅπε to δομῳ—τοισι to ευκλεες; p. 121, 123, Ανθρωποισι to τινα; p. 123, Οις γαρ to κακα—ως τ' αλλα to απολλυται. Ex Tragicis qui perierunt, p. 437, τεχνη to τεχνην; p. 461, Οδ' εν εκ to εχει; p. 465, πημα to αυλω—Τοδ' εστι to πεση—της δειλιας to τεκνα. Ex Æschylo, p. 25, Ες' αρ' to ασφαλες—Ἀλλ' οταν to συναπτεται; p. 25, 27, Ὑμεις to ωφελει; p. 31, και το το δῶρον; p. 33, Ἀλλ' ευκλεως to βροτω; p. 57, ὅπε to καριερωτερα.

Μενανδρου Λειψανα, εκ των αδελφῶν, θ'. β'.; εκ τε δυσκολε α, β'.; εκ των κατηφορων, α. β'.; εκ των κυβερνητων, α.; εκ της Ρα-

πιζομενης, α.; εκ τε τροφωνι, α. β.; εκ τε φιλαδελφει, α.; εξ αδηλων δραμαλιων, ιη, μα, μβ, νγ, ο οα, οβ, ογ, πδ, πε, ρε, ρλα, ρε, σγγ.

Φιλεμονος Λειψανα, εκ των αδηλων δραμαλιων, ια, λη, λθ, να, νγ, ξθ, ση, πη.

Cicero, Paradoxa ii. iv. "Nihil neque meum est," to "injuriam."

Epicurus's Morals, maxim 1, 2, 5, 6, 17, 22, p. 111 to 113, Qu. 132 to 142.

Spens's Republic of Plato, p. 5 to 7, 364 to 388.

La Foi Mahometane, par Reland, p. 234.

Scott's Elements of Philosophy, p. 52, 265, 266.

Wollaston's Natural Religion, p. 110 to 113, 177.

Knight's Principles of Taste, p. 153, 324, 325, compare 325 with 368, 383.

Paley's Natural Theology, p. 542 to 545.

Hartley on Man, vol. i. p. 240, 241; vol. ii. p. 211 to 218, 229, 238 to 240, 245, 246, 253, 270, 307, 314, 323, 343 to 346, 363.

The Protestant System, vol. i. p. 167 to 169, 190 to 194, 301, 302, 305, 306, 362 to 368, 541 to 546.

Patrick's Pilgrim, p. 88 to 93, 240 to 263, 289, 290, 403 to 417.

Sherlock on Providence, p. 111, 252, 253, 366 to 374.

Reimarus's Natural Religion, diss. viii. sect. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17; diss. ix. sect. 11, 12, 20, 21, 22.

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King's Origin of Evil, p. 216, note N; ch. v. sect. 2, 4, div. 7, appendix, sect. 3.

Dunbar's Essays, p. 21, 52, 53, 375, 376.

Arthur's Discourses, p. 112 to 118, 441, 442.

Trembley, p. 309 to 323, 327 to 355, 366 to 370.

Sir Wm. Temple,—of Health, "Let philosophers," to "trumpet."—"If a rich man," to "countries."—"What I have said," to "it is time to leave them."—of Heroic Virtue, sect. ii. "The sum of his writings," to "instruct him."

Bp. Taylor's Exemplar, p. 310, 312, 313.

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Taylor on Original Sin, p. 91, 101. Polemical Discourses, p. 652, 661, 663, 664, 780.
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- CICERO, de Inventione, lib. ii. sect. 39, 52.
Grotius, (Le Clerc's) p. 85, (n. 6) p. 101 to 105. Ad Herennium, (apud Ciceronem) lib. iii. from "Virtutem," to "non posse."
Puffendorf, de Officio, lib. i. cap. 7, sect. 6, "Gloria et estimatio, cujus integritate et vigore omnis animi voluptas consistit;" lib. ii. cap. 14, sect. 13.
Limborchi Theologia, lib. ii. c. v. sect. 10; c. xiii. sect. 2, 3; c. xxvii. sect. 19; lib. v. cap. iv. sect. 17; cap. liv. sect. 21; cap. lv. sect. 16, 17.

Cogan on the Passions, p. 49 to 55, 92 to 98, 117, 118, 241, 243, 279 to 281, 321 to 325, 346 to 348, 387 to 398, 443, 444.

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Bacon's *Essays*,—upon Truth, throughout—upon Adversity—upon Envy, the last paragraph—upon Wisdom for a Man's self, the last paragraph—upon Regimen of Health, "to be free-minded," to "Nature"—upon Suspicion.

Knight on the Being and Attributes, p. 125, 289, 290.

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More's *Antidote against Atheism*, b. iii. ch. xiv. sect. 8, the beginning. More on the Immortality of the Soul, b. iii. ch. viii. sect. 4; ch. xi. sect. 7; ch. xvii. sect. 17.

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Bp. Taylor on Repentance, ch. vi. sect. 7, div. 91.

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Milton, (Newton's edit.) *Par. Lost*, b. xii. ver. 549 to 551, with the note, 576 to 587.

Warburton on Pope's *Essay on Man*, p. 3.

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CICERO, de Finibus, lib. ii. sect. 8, 28, at the end; 29, at the end; lib. iii. sect. 12, "Mihi autem," to the end; sect. 22, "quam gravis," to the end; lib. iv. sect. 21. De Senectute, cap. 14.

Juvenal, (Gifford's) p. 266, 393, 420.

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Lord Kames's History of Man, vol. iii. p. 153, 170.

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Ferguson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 185, 186, 223, 224, 250; vol. ii. p. 20, 21, 33, 49, 50, 53, 56, 61 to 69, 70 to 83, 92, 98 to 105, 326 to 329, 398, 405, 412, 502, 512.

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Smalridge's Sermons, p. 192 to 198, 214, 219, 282, 293 to 297, 330, 362 to 364, 394 to 396, 436, 437, 472, 556, 559 to 563, 594, 595, 598, 606 to 616.

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Grove's Posthumous Works, vol. i. p. 265, 266, 360, 368 to 371, 424, 425, 436 to 439, 453; vol. ii. p. 26, 54 to 59, 75, 92 to 94, 123, 132 to 143, 150.

Bp. Horsley's Sermons, vol. iii. p. 106.

Tatler, No. 146.

PERIOD THE TENTH

CICERO, de Legibus, lib. i. cap. 23, 24. De Officiis, lib. i. c. 27; lib. ii. c. 7, 8, "Nec vero," to "compa-randas;" c. 9, 10, 11.

Erasmi Enchiridion, cap. viii. canon iii. canon vi. "Non id protinus dulce est, quod sapit, sed quod sane sapit," &c.; canon xx. Adversum Irritamenta Avaritiæ, "Etenim si," to the end; canon xxii.

Jortin's Life of Erasmus, vol. i. p. 515.

I. Hawkins Browne, de Animi Immortalitate, poema :

Virtuti tribuo quantum licet, ut mala vitæ
 Quæ prohibere nequit, doceat lenire ferendò,
 Spe recreat meliore, hominem sibi conciliatque,
 Irarum et tumidos et amorum temperet æstus.

Lib. ii. 20.

Nec nullas, dum vita manet, des, improbe, pœnas,
 Quanquam homines fallas, haud te tamen effugis
 ipse ;

Te diræ ultrices agitant, te cura remordet,

Sæva comes, memorique habitat sub pectore vindex.

Lib. ii. 235.

Petitpierre, Plan de Dieu, p. 96, 97, 234, 235, 304,
 305, 313.

Mrs. Cockburne's Works, vol. i. p. 434 ; vol. ii. p. 78,
 82, 85, 101, 131, 133.

Buffier's First Truths, p. 199 to 203.

Sykes's Natural and Revealed Religion, p. 84, 85,
 110, 111.

Leland's Deistical Writers, vol. i. p. 89 to 99 ; vol. ii.
 p. 613 to 617, 620 to 634.

Paley's Moral Philosophy, p. 27 to 34, 526, 527, 530,
 531.

Life of Ridley, p. 353, 582, 671 to 673.

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 252 to 254.

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 393, 402, 404.

Scott's Christian Life, (9th edit. fol. 1729) p. 9, 10,
 22, 23, 26, 28, 38, 40 to 43, 54 to 59, 62, 63, 65 to 67,
 71, 73, 74.

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Boyle's Lectures abridged, vol. i. p. 268, 308 to 310, 334, 355; vol. iii. p. 307 to 310, 529, 530.

Amory's Dialogue on Devotion, p. 52 to 56, 60 to 64.

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Foster's Sermons, vol. i. p. 11, 12, 19 to 22.

Adams's Tracts, p. 150 to 154, 173 to 177.

Abernethy's Sermons on the Attributes, vol. ii. p. 278 to 281.

Secker's Sermons, vol. v. p. 265 to 270.

PERIOD THE ELEVENTH.

I. H. BROWNE, *de Animi Immortalitate*, lib. ii. ver. 222 to 341.

Woodhouse on the Apocalypse, p. 346.

1 Kings, xxii. 19—23, S. B. 34, S. B.—Proverbs, iii. 11, 12; vi. 11, 15; xi. to ver. 14; xii. from ver. 14; xiii. 21, 22; xiv. 32, to the end; xviii. 10, to the end; xxv. 28; xxvi. 13—18; xxviii. 2.—Ps. xv. xvi. lv. 22; cxxv. S. B.—Jer. xxii. 15, 16; xxx. 15; xliv.—Joel, ii. 12, to the end; iii. 16, 17, 20, 21.—Hab. ii. 4, with Newcome's note.—Zeph. i. 13—16, 18; ii. 1—3; iii. 5—8.

Matth. iii. 15, to the end; iv. 1; v. 3—11, S. B.—
John, v. 24—29; xi. 25, 26; xvi. 22, 23, S. B.—Acts,
vii. 55—60; xx. 35, S. B.—Rom. ii. vi. 19, to the end;
xi. 6, 7, 10, 11, 26—29, S. B.—1 Tim. iv. 8, 9, S. B.;
vi. 6, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19.—2 Tim. ii. 11, 12.—Heb. xi.
13—16, S. B.—James, i. 12; iii. 18, S. B.—1 Pet. i.
3—9; iii. 8—13, 21, 22.—2 Pet. i. 11, S. B.—1 John iii.
2, 3, S. B.—Rev. ii. 7, 10; vii. 9, to the end; xxi. xxii.
1—5, 7, 12—14.

ESSAY XXII.

ON PROVIDENCE.

WHENEVER human reason is in any degree exerted, some idea of Divine Providence is entertained, and the more our minds are enlightened, the more enlarged and sublime that idea becomes, and the more deeply is it impressed. All men, in all ages and nations, have believed a superintending providence, if they have given proofs of natural intellect, however lamentably they may have been sunk in the darkness of pagan idolatry.

The assurance of a Divine Providence is founded upon the conception we have of God, and of man, and of the relation between them.

We derive our belief of it from all the attributes of God, particularly from his moral attributes, and his moral government of the world. But his omnipresence alone is identified with his watchful providence; for how can a pure spirit be conceived to exist any where, but where he contemplates, he discerns, he wills, he acts? How can he exist, but with a reference to the objects of his contemplation, his discernment, his will, his acts? if his essence is unlimited, can these objects admit of limitation?

Our ideas of cause and effect elevate our minds

to the great first cause, render us capable of religion, and confer upon the human mind a relationship to the divine. The three distinguishing prerogatives of man, free agency, intellect, and a capacity of religion, are immediately connected with each other, rising gradually from the same principle, for they all imply the idea of power, which cannot be obtained without a conscious exercise of it.

When a perfect being has exercised a creative power, he will view all things which he has created with unerring wisdom, and govern them according to the strictest rules of pure beneficence; a beneficence infinite, both in its extent and duration. It cannot be conceived that a being, perfect in wisdom and goodness, has entirely withdrawn his benignant influence from the intellectual world which he created; and that having given to man a moral character essential to his nature, having placed him in a state of trial, that he has entirely deserted him, and does not continue to be his perpetual protector and support, his guide, and his final judge.

The Creator has an unlimited and underived, the creature, if a free agent, has a derived and dependent power; but the Creator, and the creature, if wise and good, are restrained by their wisdom and goodness. The more perfect any being is in intellect, the more incapable will he be of thinking or of acting wrong.

God is immutable; but as he has been pleased to create, he governs, and he will judge, mutable

free agents. He therefore must treat them as being what they are. The strong immutable principles of wisdom, justice and mercy, will be perpetually varying in the application of them, when they are exercised in the government of mutable beings; for if they did not vary in their application, according to existing circumstances, they would not be in principle immutable. Creatures are as *nothing*, if we could suppose a Creator, whose irresistible power was guided by an unrestrained will; but they are *every thing* in the sight of a Creator, whose wisdom and goodness are equal to his power; they are *every thing* in his view; they are the manifestations of his wisdom and goodness, the only objects upon which these glorious attributes can be displayed.

Subjects are as *nothing* in the caprice of an African tyrant; they are *every thing* in the contemplation of a wise legislator, a virtuous and benevolent sovereign.

God frequently interposes, from the impulse of perfect goodness, guided by a wisdom equally perfect, either to supersede the laws of the natural and moral world, or to direct them to some particular object.

He frequently interrupts the regular course of events, the chain of moral causes, and their effects by extraordinary dispensations; often, imperceptibly to us, he rewards virtue, and punishes sin in this world.

We ought to fix permanently in our minds the conviction, that "not a sparrow falls to the

ground without our heavenly Father," and "that the hairs of our head are all numbered;" yet to be very cautious in deciding when God interposes by his active energy; for we cannot in general distinguish between the operation of stated laws and the direct acts of divine power, nor is it necessary that we should be enabled to make this distinction; for the feeling of gratitude to the divine being is the same, and every pious emotion as warmly awakened, when God confers a blessing upon an individual man, through a long series of second causes, as when he bestows it by a special act.

The providence of God signifies the exertion of his perfections, whether mediately or immediately in the preservation and government of the universe. But as the wide dependencies of the several parts of the natural and intellectual world are in a great measure unknown to us, it is impossible for man to dive into the comprehensive designs of the divine providence. The more of these stupendous designs, natural philosophy, history, or moral penetration can discover, the more consistent and beneficent will they appear. So would the whole, if we had capacity large enough to discern it.

A wise and good providence is a most delightful subject of contemplation; it diffuses peace and serenity through the soul, and disposes it to bear its proper part in the universal harmony. It is no more in the power of a rational being not to admire wise design, when presented to its

view, and not to be disgusted at the contrary, than it is in the power of a sentient being not to feel corporeal pleasure, and not to suffer from corporeal pain.

The principal support of religion is the firm persuasion, that we are under the supreme, constant, and unerring government of a being infinitely wise and good, as well as powerful. Every disparaging notion of the divine wisdom, goodness, or power, unhappily insinuated into the mind, becomes, in a depraved and corrupted heart, the baneful source of superstition or impiety. When we are afflicted with acute pain, or a severe disease, or when we endure the sad extremity of mental sorrow, we are accustomed too frequently to exclaim, "All this evil is the work of God." The impious break out into the most dreadful blasphemies; those who have a sense of religion, endeavour to calm and compose their minds. In proportion as we approach to piety, we become more and more submissive, first, in our external behaviour, and ultimately in the secret recesses of our thoughts. The more pious we are, the more entirely shall we acquiesce in the divine will, and be assured, that whatever proceeds from God, however it may wear the appearance of evil, must be real good. But that the hand of God is particularly manifest in calamitous events, is an idea, however prevalent, wholly unauthorized by natural or revealed religion. The more pure, salutary, beneficial and separate from all evil any event ap-

pears to us, the more reasonably may we ascribe it to God, whose gracious interposition may naturally be supposed, when we receive positive good, or when we are rescued from adversity, not in the unhappy moment when we sink under its weight. If God is pleased to render us sensible of his presence, it is not displayed in the thunder of a Jupiter, or the wrath of a pagan deity; it is not manifested in that delight which the stoic attributes to his gods when they behold a good man struggling with calamity: the true God is not seen in "the earthquake, the strong wind which rends the mountains, or the fire;" but his divine presence is felt by the genuine Christian in that "still small voice" of his holy spirit, which bespeaks comfort, excites fortitude, implants patience, establishes a firm faith, creates a full trust in providence, inspires an ardent hope, and convinces us that all the sorrows of this transitory world are not as a grain in the balance, compared with "the glory that shall be revealed," when "all things" shall be proved to "work together for good to those who love God and keep his commandments." Whenever God has been pleased to bestow that degree of intellect upon a creature, which is displayed in the superior faculties of man, he has made this creature sensible of his presence, given him a relation to himself, conferred upon him a capacity of religion, and constituted him a subject of the divine government in every stage of his existence.

We approach nearer to the presence of God and the blessed influences of the holy spirit, as we advance in wisdom and virtue, in holiness and piety.

The belief of the constant presence of God warms and cheers the heart; it affords a never failing comfort, an inexhaustible source of satisfaction and joy, supplying the defect of all other pleasures, and mitigating the violence of pain.

If we have a deep impression of providence, we can hardly be discontented, having thus a constant conviction, that we are under the care of a powerful guardian, who will support and establish us in all our ways.

If we extend the actual exercise of the divine power to the production of absolute evil, we must derogate from the wisdom or the goodness of God. No, let us always remember, that whenever the divine being calls forth his omnipotence into energy, he is directed by unerring wisdom, and by unlimited goodness; that he will never suffer any innocent person to be unhappy, nor the punishment of criminals to exceed their guilt; unless the misery he permits is of so transient a nature as to prove ultimately a real good. From this principle arises our trust in God, and our duty of submission to his will. We know, indeed, from a contemplation of the divine power, that the free agents who produce evil, by the abuse of the faculties conferred upon them for the most opposite purposes, are the creatures of God, and exist only by his permission. But we know, from

a contemplation of the divine wisdom and goodness, that God will not permit the existence of any free agent, if by the abuse of his free agency, he produces a larger mass of natural evil than can be rendered subservient to the dispensations of providence, as the punishment of sin, or an instrument of virtue.

We must therefore believe, that all powers were originally derived from God, and that he will not permit any of those powers to be so abused as to produce real evil to any innocent creature, or more evil to a guilty one, than is the just punishment of his sin; and we must ascribe whatever appears to us evil, either to our own abuse of free agency, or the abuse of it in some other created being; and not dare to ascribe it to our great Creator, who is perfect in wisdom and goodness.

We are so ignorant of the real distinction between good and evil, that we consider death as the greatest of all evils. It is often the highest blessing; and never deserves the name of calamity, but when it is the terrible warning of offended justice, the harbinger which summons us before the God of all mercy, to receive from him the punishment which his holiness and impartial equity oblige him to inflict. Death must present a most awful consideration to every reflecting mind; but must be acknowledged to be the design of providence, as well as life. Every individual in this mortal state, must, sooner or later, yield to the preservation of the species.

That the decay of age in every animal or vegetable shall give way to the vigour of youth, is so far from an evil, that it is an established law of the creation, and a proof of the Creator's beneficence. God is not the author of evil; but he, or creatures acting agreeably to his will, are the cause of all the good which can be elicited from evil. The production of good out of evil, is the employment of every good man, and the object to which divine providence is unremittingly directed in every part of the universe, where the contagion of sin has spread and matured its pestiferous fruits, that is, wherever evil exists. If we maintain, that "whatever is, is right," with an exception to sin, and its necessary consequences; but contend, that whatever flows from the polluted source of our corrupt nature, or from our voluntary depravity, is, and must be wrong; we shall have a full and rational conviction of the power and providence of Almighty God. All events, however, which God permits, afford materials, from whence, evil as they may be in themselves, his wisdom can produce good. They become, under divine direction, the exercise of virtue, the trial of patience, or the punishment of guilt.

When we are attempting to explore subjects so far above reason, as the divine dispensations, in their full extent, we should place constantly in our view these great land-marks of truth, which are firm and immovable. One of these impregnable bulwarks is, the certainty that sin is dis-

pleasing to God, contrary to his will, diminishing and obstructing the happiness which he intended man through virtue to obtain, and the whole of his sentient creation to enjoy. This great landmark of truth is established by the divine holiness and benevolence. Another, which I shall mention, depends upon the nature of things, or the first principles of reason, which render it impossible for a contradiction to be true. God may create, or forbear to create; but when he has created a free agent, he and that free agent may act in opposition, or in concurrence, but they cannot perform the same act. It is as impossible for two distinct minds to think the same individual thought, or for two distinct agents to exert the same active power, as it is for two distinct bodies to occupy the same space. God therefore cannot do the same things which he has enabled and permits the creature to perform, while that creature is actually performing them. If in the examination of our own hearts, we are able to trace the progress of a malignant passion, through all the indulgence we have given it, until it increased to an enormous depravity, and are conscious that this passion was the cause of our involving our country, or a larger portion of mankind in dreadful calamities; we must be equally assured that these evils are our own acts, not the acts of God, although permitted for wise and good reasons by his unerring will.

All things come from God as the original cause. He is the constant spectator of all the

effects which created powers produce ; and as his wisdom directs, or his goodness excites him, he may concur with them, change, suspend, or annihilate them.

All the actions of human beings, or of invisible free agents, good, bad or indifferent, form that vast system of materials, which are framed and fashioned by the divine power in a manner equally consistent with the moral attributes, and with created agency. So framed and fashioned, they constitute the dispensations of providence respecting mankind, in our present frail and transitory state.

All events depend upon so intricate a complication of causes, that the Creator in some respects may be the immediate agent, though in a vast variety of other relations, the creature endowed with liberty may be the sole prime mover.

It is not in the same exertion, but in the combination of movements, that we are "workers together with God," and that the same effect may be produced by divine and human agency. Although all things, with respect to the general constitution of the universe, are dependent upon God, many events, and various phenomena in this life, have a subordinate dependence upon man.

When we do not discern the connection between the cause and effect, we have no proof that the effect makes part of an established system ; it may therefore be ascribed, if it appears good, to a particular providence.

God, by his penetration into the human

mind or heart, from whence innumerable events arise, can influence it in a variety of ways, and become the concurrent author of what we may deem the work of man. This influence in some cases is an extraordinary interposition, in other cases one of the secret laws of the creation forms a particular providence of prodigious extent and astonishing efficacy. The collision of the counsels of created free agents, producing something totally undesigned by them, may be the act of providence. Through all these means, God may be supposed to influence and control those distinguished persons upon whom the fate of empires depends.

Societies subsist only in this world, and must receive their reward or punishment here. They are indeed rewarded when there are only external acts of virtue; while individuals deserve and receive their reward, in proportion as virtue flows from the heart. A community requires a wise government, more than an individual; but the universe infinitely more than the largest empires.

What a magnificent idea of divine providence is presented to the mind, when we contemplate it as embracing the whole universe in an unlimited extent of time, and an unbounded expanse of space! an universe, which by the constant progress of science is more and more unfolded to our view, whether we elevate our thoughts to the innumerable systems which appear to our conception infinite, or analyze the bodies which surround us into their invisible parts! But what

is that material universe which the telescope and microscope discover, compared to the intellectual world? How vastly more are we astonished when we reflect, that matter, in all its modifications and unbounded extent, was only created to afford a receptacle for beings endowed with various degrees of sense, reason and liberty. All these beings are the creatures of one God, the subjects of his government, the care of his providence.

By divine providence, I mean that knowledge from which no fact is concealed; that penetration which explores the secret motives of action, although the actor himself is unconscious of them; that wisdom, which foresees whatever is the object of prescience, combined with a power capable of subduing all resistance.

God may be supposed to have given to every created being, at its creation, whatever was necessary to support it. It is not therefore reasonable to imagine, that he will for his pleasure annihilate it, though there can be no doubt of the power of annihilation in the Creator, and of the exercise of that power when wisdom and goodness require it.

These speculations being the sublimest energies of the human mind, are necessarily encompassed with many difficulties, and naturally soar above our conceptions.

We shall be more profitably employed in descending from these exalted regions, and applying our theory to practice. The examination of our

own hearts, and a frequent retrospect of past occurrences, are not more essential in a moral or prudential view, to direct our conduct, than they are to enable us to discern the hand of providence for our own protection, when subject to known and unknown evils, and for our deliverance from innumerable dangers, of which we are too little aware. We are, alas! too insensible of the benignity and justice which God exercises, suitably to our deserts and our necessities, encouraging and assisting, blessing and rewarding the virtuous, relieving the distressed, controlling and chastising the impious.

To point out in particular cases, when a good man is rewarded, or a wicked man punished, would lead to presumption and uncharitableness; but in our reflections, upon our own lives, and the events which have befallen us, we should not be careless observers of the dispensations of providence. Whatever real good we possess, is to be ascribed to God, or to free agents acting according to his will. If we cannot trace it to a visible cause, we ought to consider it as a divine interposition in our favour.

Whatever we receive from God, whether it be a reward or punishment is a blessing, and will become good to us if we make a right use of it. It is a grateful, and, when accompanied with christian humiliation, it is a profitable task to contemplate the mercies we have received, and to consider how far we may be assured, from the testimony of a good conscience, that they are

the rewards which God has graciously bestowed upon our earnest endeavours to please and to obey him.

Immersed in the sensations which external objects produce, we discern only immediate and visible causes, while the traces of divine agency are unperceived, being too fine and subtle to be descried with a transient glance.

We are not therefore so apprehensive as we ought to be, of the presence and mercy of God, though upon extraordinary occasions we are apt to be too presumptuous in our belief of supernatural interposition. It is not fit to charge upon God any event, wherein special ends of wisdom or goodness do not shine; nor, on the other hand, to judge of his counsels by their congruity to our own opinions, because many of God's proceedings depend upon grounds inaccessible to our apprehensions. We ought not, however, to be brute spectators of the government which God administers over his noblest creature, man.

Meditation upon God's special providence is a means of nourishing our faith and hope, a ground of thankfulness and praise, an incentive to the best affections, holy joy, humble fear, and heartfelt love. We may discern the hand of God, and escape the temerity of unfounded presumption, when a just cause prevails without human means; when rewards and punishments follow human actions without a natural connection with them; and when there is an harmonious conspiracy of various accidents to one good end.

Whenever the divine energy appears, and we discern the hand of God, we ought to fear him, to acknowledge the display of his perfections, to express religious joy, and to have a perfect trust, that the mercy we experience here, will be displayed to us through all eternity.

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ESSAY XXIII.

-ON THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL.

IT is of great importance, when we investigate religious or philosophical truth, to distinguish the ideas of sensation from the ideas of reflection; and, by placing an insuperable bar between them, to divide the material from the intellectual world. We comprehend the former under the general notion of matter, and the latter under the general notion of spirit.

Neither matter nor spirit are real existences; they are abstract ideas, constituting ultimate *genera*, beyond which there can be no classification. Nothing really exists but the individual being, whether material or spiritual, or both united.

The geologist examines a clod of earth, a fossil, or a primitive rock; he finds, that the individual substance which he examines, has some peculiarities, upon which he establishes its definition. Every other substance, which agrees with it in all these particulars, he assigns to the same species. He finds other characters more generally diffused, which may constitute a genus; many *genera* may be discovered, which may be conveniently arranged in the same order or class, until he arrives at those characters,

which are common to every individual, every species, every genus, every order; and these he considers as essential to all matter. We do not know all the qualities of matter; but we know what we designate by the term, and we know that to this complex idea, inconsistent and contradictory qualities cannot be assigned.

Matter affords only the idea of substance, with magnitude, figure, situation, and a capacity of being moved or divided.

All the varieties and changes in matter, all the abstract ideas of species or genera, all the individual substances, or actual beings, which are arranged under matter, and considered as parts of the material world, arise only from the modification of magnitude, figure, situation, and the application of the *vis inertiae*, or power of resistance to motion or to rest.

All material substances, or individual bodies, have a determinate motion according to the degree and direction of their external impulse, their inward principle of gravitation, and the resistance of other bodies with which they concur. This resistance, therefore, may be exactly foreseen, and provided for, by sagacious artists. Extension is essential to matter; whatever is extended, must be infinitely divisible. Although we do not know all the properties of matter, we know that it cannot be a self-mover, for then it would have contradictory qualities.

Matter, as it is a resisting substance, cannot move itself.

If it were unresisting, it could move nothing else. In the notion of *body*, a moved, and not a mover, is implied.

By the same process through which the geologist arrives at the idea of matter, the logician, the moralist, the metaphysician, and the divine, arrive at the idea of spirit.

Their field of science is totally different, but the progress of it is the same. The mere naturalist contemplates those ideas alone which are derived from sensation; the moralist builds his reasoning upon the ideas which are derived from reflection. Consciousness produces as strong and solid a conviction as can be derived from sense, and, in many cases, a superior one. This consciousness convinces us that we have a soul; that is, that there is something within us which we never saw, but which we know by its effects. It is the principle whereby we perceive such and such objects, whereby we think and remember, whereby we reason about any thing, and freely choose or refuse such things as are presented to us. By the consciousness of what passes in our minds and hearts, we acquire a knowledge of reason and of appetite. This knowledge is enlarged by our observation upon other men, by the history of past times, and the experience of our own. We form by this means as accurate a notion of a character, as the naturalist forms of a fossil. We distinguish Alexander from Cæsar, Socrates from Cicero, as clearly as the geologist distinguishes a primitive

from a secondary rock ; we frame, from our discernment of the individual, a definition of the species, and acquire, by mere abstraction, the ideas of every principle which actuates the human race. We contemplate these principles as separated from every real being, and argue upon all the sources of intelligence, of passion, and of will. We describe every virtue and every vice, every process of deliberating reason, every infatuation of versatile folly, every ebullition of inordinate appetite. From hence we form an idea of the human mind, of the high perfection of wisdom and virtue, of religion and holiness, which it may attain, the innumerable errors and paralogisms to which it is exposed ; the refinement of its thoughts, the acuteness, of its sensibility, the force of its aversions, the strength of its desires, and the excessive violence of those passions, which these aversions and desires excite.

When the moral philosopher contemplates all these several phenomena, and arranges them into species and genera, he finds that they may all be classed under the complex and abstract idea which he forms of spirit ; or, if he has a difficulty in forming this idea, the most intellectual which can be conceived, he is at least convinced that all these phenomena, the lowest, as well as the highest of them, are incompatible with the abstract idea of matter. The meanest understanding may be convinced of the negative proposition, that the soul is immaterial, though

to attain a full conception of its spiritual nature, must require the exercise of our most vigorous faculties, and may be even beyond their reach.

The knowledge of material objects could not be conveyed to us by the senses, if the soul were itself material. If one power did not both see and hear, our sights and sounds would be always double. The organs which produce sensation, are indeed material, but sensation itself is a quality of the mind. If it depends upon our voluntary attention, it is an exercise of the will; and if attention is forced upon us, that attention is still the act of the mind.

All the ideas derived from sensation are intellectual, although the objects of them are material. The pain which we feel when cut by a sharp instrument, is not in the instrument, but in ourselves; neither is the colour of the rose in the flower, but in the mind, which views it with complacency, and a complacency arising to delight, according to the taste for natural beauty which the mind possesses, and its grateful admiration of the works of God.

The idea of beauty is immediately suggested by colour, form, and motion; all three of them we discern by the first act of sensation, but the idea of beauty is immaterial. The senses without mind could teach us nothing; there would be no capacity of receiving the impression they make. If we could suppose such a capacity in matter, the impression would be of a different nature from that which we now expe-

rience. It is mind, forming a habit, which corrects vision, which teaches us the shape and bulk of objects, and their distance, without which the mere sense of vision would be of little use.

The nature of spirit consists in a capacity of perceiving, and a power of acting. It is impossible that matter can perceive; for as it is infinitely divisible, there would be an infinity of perceptions. It is the conscious individual who perceives, and who knows himself to be one being, and to have one power of perception, applicable to every impression which the various organs of sense can make upon him. It is this consciousness of unity which constitutes the personal identity of every man, and distinguishes him from every other individual. This consciousness is as necessary to the rational mind, as respiration to the vital body. If it is impossible for matter to be endued with sense, it is equally impossible for it to begin motion, or to place itself in a state of rest, unless acted upon by a superior force; which superior force, however mechanical it may be in its first operation, or in a long series of operations, must ultimately be resolved into the agency of some immaterial being. If, therefore, we can perceive, by any of the senses, if we can see, hear, taste, feel, or smell, or if we can move, or put to rest, our whole body, or any part of it, or if we can set in motion or stop any other body which we can bring into contact with our own, or can reach

by art, however distant it may be, we must believe that we have an immaterial soul. Whatever use we may make of corporeal organs, and however admirably they are adapted to the powers of the soul, it is from the soul alone that all actions proceed, which may be styled the actions of man; by her influence are they conceived, resolved upon, modified and directed. If those powers of perceiving and acting, powers which are exerted in our earliest infancy, and which belong to all mankind; if the lowest powers we possess, cannot arise from the configuration of atoms, how much more incredible does it appear, that the modifications of matter, which are confined to the disposition of corporeal forms, shall produce the higher energies of human intellect! How extensive and various are the treasures of memory! Can they be deposited in the minutest fibres of the brain, or called at pleasure from them by an effort of passive matter? How vast are the powers of invention! from thence proceed all arts, language, civilization, the spirit of eloquence, and the true genius of poetry, unfolding scenes much more exalted and perfect than our experience can present to the mind. Can these powers arise from matter? Can the astronomer derive from thence alone his knowledge of the heavenly bodies, their affections and revolutions? Are the moral philosophers, the metaphysicians, or divines, actuated by material impulses alone in all their speculations, or the

mathematicians in their problems and theorems, or those who frame or execute the laws? those who command armies, or who plan the most daring schemes of ambition, or the most salutary improvements of human happiness? those who govern, or instruct, or persuade mankind? those who are the scourges of the earth, or its most enlightened benefactors? Do not they all derive their conspicuous characters from the intellectual world, from their own industry, and virtuous or corrupt principles, from their own malignant passions, or from that wisdom which God originally bestowed upon them, or that powerful grace, with which he continually supports them? Do not all their active powers originate from these or similar sources? are they not all of a spiritual nature, however that nature may be depraved? They cannot arise from the juxta-position of mere atoms. Can atoms invent arts and sciences, make leagues and confederacies, devise methods of peace, and stratagems of war?

Texture, figure, magnitude and motion, cause every difference in body; can any change of them operate to the production of a single thought? In what modification of body subsists ambition, or any other passion? In what disposition of corporeal parts is truth distinguished from falsehood, conviction from doubt? Is there more wisdom in the immense body of the sun, than in the smallest grain of sand? or in a solid metal, than in the parts of that metal, separated

by attrition or by fire, or evaporated into gas? Is the subtlest matter more spiritual than that which is most gross? Is the Apollo Belvidere less material than the marble out of which it was framed? or would the rapid motion of a comet generate more intellect than the slowness of the solemn dirge?

“ Let any part of this corporeal mass,” says Barrow *, “ be refined by the subtlest division, let it be agitated by the quickest motion, let it be modelled into what shape or fashion you please, how can any man imagine either knowledge, or appetite, or passion, thence to result? Can a cluster of atoms, a combination of elements, a contemporation of humours, an implement made up of I know not what fine springs, become the subject of so rare capacities and endowments, the author of actions so worthy, and works so wonderful, capable of wisdom and virtue, of knowledge so vast, and desires so lofty; apt to contemplate truth, and affect good, able to recollect things past, and foresee things future, to search so deep into the causes of things, and disclose so many mysteries of nature; to invent so many arts and sciences, to contrive such projects of policy, and achieve such feats of prowess; briefly, should become capable to design, undertake and perform all those admirable effects of human wit and industry,

* See his works, vol. ii. p. 95, 96.

which we daily see and hear of? how senseless and absurd conceits are these! How can we, without great indignation and regret, entertain such suppositions? No, no, it is both ridiculous fondness, and monstrous baseness, for us to own any parentage from, or any alliance to, things so mean, so very much below us."

The assertion that the soul is material, is equivalent to asserting that we have no soul, which would amount to a denial of our own existence; of which, if we were entirely excluded from the intellectual world, no consciousness could remain. This idea is finely expressed by Dr. Arbuthnot:

"This frame, compacted with transcendant skill,
Of moving joints, obedient to my will,
Nurs'd from the fruitful glebe, like yonder tree,
Waxes and wastes. I call it *mine*, not *me*.
New matter still the mould'ring mass sustains;
The mansion chang'd, the tenant still remains,
And from the fleeting stream, repair'd by food,
Distinct, as is the swimmer from the flood."

Whoever knows that he thinks, and that he may think, and forbear to think, as he pleases, or is sensible that he can move his own body, or any other piece of matter, which is subservient to his will, must be assured of the existence of his soul. This assurance arises from the first dawn of reason, is common to all men, however uneducated, to all nations, however savage.

“ The soul a substance and a spirit is,
 Which God himself doth in the body make,
 Which makes the man ; for every man from this,
 The nature of a man, and name does take *.”

A being purely spiritual, is as much the object of the human intellect, as a being purely material. The one may be as easily defined as the other, and comprehended with equal facility, if it can be brought within the sphere of our knowledge ; but the difficulty arises, when we examine the nature of that complicated being, man, who is a portion of the material world by his body, and of the intellectual world by his soul.

As there is no point of resemblance between the soul and body, the manner in which they operate upon each other must be unknown to us. Their union, therefore, is only known by experience, and must not be presumed, when experience affords no evidence of its taking place.

There are various principles in man, which prove the operation of something immaterial.

1st. The vital principle.—2d. The power of locomotion.—3d. Instinct.—4th. The senses.—5th. The affections. — 6th. Passion.—7th. Reason. The lower of these principles may exist independently of the higher. Man has the first of them, in common with vegetables and animals ; the second, the third, and fourth, in

* Sir J. Davies on the Immortality of the Soul, p. 19.

common with animals, although with some diversity, and often with inferior powers of sensation ; the fifth and the sixth in common with many animals ; but reason seems to be his distinguishing prerogative. He has likewise memory and imagination obedient to his will. The memory which he has in common with brutes, is only passive, not called out at pleasure, but necessarily arising, when an object, once seen and consigned to oblivion, is again brought to view.

The human soul is peculiarly known by the intellect and will, which are inseparable from it. When we meditate upon the most abstract subject, the will is exercised in commencing and pursuing the speculation. When a rational creature wills, it is always for some reason, good or bad, presented to it, or for some reason which it creates for itself. When the soul perceives or discerns, it is called intellect ; when it inclines to one object, preferring it to another, it is styled will. The soul, in the exercise of both these faculties, acts by its own immediate impulse.

In the vital principle, and many exercises of those powers which the human soul has in common with brutes, it is so united with the body, that it cannot be considered as acting separately from it. The organs of the body convey the requisite knowledge ; the body is the necessary instrument for carrying into effect the wishes of the soul ; the body is the final cause for which the design is planned, and the execution de-

sired. But when man exercises his highest intellectual powers, all proof of the instrumentality of the body disappears. It is indeed manifest in ideas of sensation ; but what connection has it with reflection, or with drawing inferences ? The body presents an object to our view by an external impulse ; but no external impulse will produce an exertion of the soul, although, when the object is present to the mind, reason or passion may be stimulated by it. We think, and apprehend, reflect and deliberate, determine and doubt, consent and deny, without the instrumentality of the body, as far as we are taught by experience. All abstract ideas, all enquiries into the causes of things, all elections of the will, all reflections upon past, or anticipations of future events, may be, and generally are, independent of the body. The body is confined by place, the soul must be wholly free from this restraint. When swifter than lightning she flies from one extremity of the globe to another, or expatiates to the remotest regions of the universe, in all her purest energies she has no relation to place, which is essential to body. The musical composer has no aid from corporeal powers, until he attempts to perform what he has composed ; he then depends upon his voice in vocal music, and in instrumental, requires some external assistance. If he loses his voice, or his fingers are disabled, he cannot sing or play. If his instruments are defective, his art, however perfect, must fail in the pleasure it is

intended to excite. But the finest instrument will not improve the musician; it will only afford him, in proportion to the excellence of its workmanship, more opportunity of displaying his genius. It is not his own intellectual conception, but the conveyance of his ideas to others, which requires the intervention of corporeal organs, whether natural or artificial. In many energies of the mind, the body has no share, although they cannot be displayed without the body; without corporeal organs we can neither speak nor write; we can have no communication with society. In these exertions of intellect, when the soul cannot act conspicuously without the body, we must not suppose that the disorder of the body entirely disables the soul. The lyrist does not cease to be a lyrist because his lyre is out of tune; nor does the orator lose his intellectual powers, because he is deprived of speech.

If every particle of matter were annihilated, the theorems concerning quantity would remain the same; it would be their practical use which would be destroyed.

The power of thinking, which is the essence of the soul, may be suspended, but cannot become extinct.

When, therefore, the body is a necessary instrument of the soul, we must not deem the soul to be entirely dependent upon it. That dependence must be confined to those operations of the soul which we have in common with

brutes, and which only prove an inferior immaterial principle, without proving intellect or will. In these operations of the soul, the union with the body is so complete, that one never acts without the other. We are therefore liable, as all other animals are, to maladies affecting the soul through the body, and terminating in death. It is with reference to these operations alone, that we may be said to advance in our faculties from infancy to mature age, to survive those faculties, and to lose them entirely by disease or death. The intellectual powers of the mind do not grow with our growth, or decay with our strength, but improve by exercise or degenerate by neglect. All knowledge of them in others, or consciousness of them in ourselves, may indeed be obscured or obliterated by corporeal infirmity; but this is so far from identifying the body with the soul, that it cannot be adduced as an argument even for the instrumentality of it. On the contrary, the same phenomena would appear, if the body were an impediment to the energies of the soul. A passive resisting substance may impede the power of an active being, but never can produce it.

Upon the whole, as we are animals, we are composed of soul and body, two substances of an opposite nature, but constantly united in all those phenomena which they present to our view.

As we are rational creatures, formed for society, and for those various employments,

which have no view or connection beyond the present life, we have a body which is a necessary instrument of the soul. When the body, therefore, is imperfect or defective, or disabled, the soul is proportionably affected. But as we are intellectual beings, capable of forming abstract ideas, and of exercising a deliberate will, we have a body, which is an humiliating obstruction to all the energies of the soul, especially those which are most pure, and most exalted. In its fullest vigour it affords no assistance to the pure contemplations of the mind; and in health, as well as in disease, is frequently an impediment to them. There are some corporeal maladies, which a strong mind is able to surmount, but there are many others, to which the wisest men must yield. Sleep, delirium, superannuation, idiocy, and insanity, completely overpower the mind, and many approaches to these prove the obstruction which the body is to the soul.

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ESSAY XXIV.

ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

THE soul, being immaterial, is as different in its nature from the body, as thought is from extension. It is true, that we cannot perceive what is not an object of sense, nor speak nor act without employing the body as an instrument ; but when the body becomes incapable of being so employed, these inferior faculties of the soul are not destroyed ; they are suspended or indiscernible. When both our legs are amputated, the consciousness that we possess naturally a power of walking still remains. When we awake from sleep, or a swoon, when we recover from any disease which affects our corporeal organs, the vigour of the mind returns without any exertion to restore it. A cloud may obscure, and a total eclipse will intercept all the rays of the sun, but will not diminish in other regions the brightness of the solar light, nor prevent its shining upon this earth with its inherent splendour, as soon as the obstruction is removed.

But when the soul thinks, the body affords no assistance. There is no corporeal organization which confers superior excellence upon the internal frame of the mind, or diminishes its purest energies. Any part of our material system, and

even of the brain, may be found wanting without the appearance of the least failures in the powers of the mind*.

It is indeed true, that drowsiness, langour, repletion, and many more serious disorders, impede the active powers of the intellect; and the flow of animal spirits, which health produces, may be still more obstructive. Idiots and insane persons have often admirable constitutions; and superannuation lengthens life. But there are other diseases which gradually bring us to the grave, without disturbing, even in their last stages, the tranquillity, nor lowering the elevation of the mind. In idiotcy and insanity the senses are not impaired, unless there is some other malady which affects them. The natural mortality of the body is not more evident than the natural immortality of the soul, which will never cease to exist while it is the pleasure of the Creator that it shall continue in being. The soul can only perish by annihilation. The power which creates can alone annihilate. But neither philosophy nor scripture give us reason to suppose that God will ever annihilate what he has created.

Annihilation, indeed, is inconsistent with the divine immutability, unless it is a punishment for the abuse of free agency; and we have no authority for believing that sin will ever be punished in this manner.

Death is totally different from annihilation;

* See Sir Everard Hume's paper in the Philosophical Transactions upon this subject.

the death of a material substance implies only a dissolution of its parts; but although the parts of every material substance may be dissolved, we confine the term death to that dissolution of the parts of an organized being, a plant, or animal, which changes its whole character, and extinguishes the individual. When a plant or animal loses the whole of its organic structure it is deprived of its identity, and, as a particular plant or animal, it ceases to be, although all the particles of which it is composed remain, and assume an infinite variety of forms.

We say that those material substances which have in them the seeds of their own dissolution, are naturally mortal. There can be no doubt that all plants and animals, with respect to their bodies, are naturally mortal; that the lives of no individuals among them can in the course of nature be preserved beyond the utmost limit of that duration which is assigned to their respective kinds; and that in general they are prematurely cut off by disease or external violence. Our experience affords us a less perfect knowledge of minerals, and of the various bodies which compose the solid parts of this terraqueous globe; but this globe itself, and the primitive rocks, which seem essential to it, are all composed of parts which may be dissolved, whenever any force, physical or supernatural, shall be applied, which has a power adequate to the effect.

On the other hand, an immaterial substance is so created as not to have in itself any principle

of corruption, and to be incapable of dissolution, because it is single and uncompounded. Plants, animals, and many fossile substances, are naturally mortal, because they contain the principles of their own decay ; and the great foundations of the stability of this globe are capable of being destroyed. If we do not style them mortal because we see in them no tendency to their decay, yet we must allow them to be destructible. But the soul, which is purely immaterial, is neither mortal nor destructible ; but is immortal in its own nature, because, although it may be annihilated by almighty power, it cannot be dissolved by it ; for the separation of the parts of a being, which has no parts, is a direct contradiction in terms. The immateriality, therefore, of the soul, is a proof of its natural immortality.

When we speak of the health, the strength, and the vigour of the body, we mean something totally different from what the same terms imply when they are applied to the soul. The body is raised to its highest perfection by the operation of climate, food, exercise, and medicine. This perfection may be acquired and maintained through a long life, without any improvement of the mind, any knowledge, any religious or moral principle, any affection of the heart. The health, the strength, and the vigour of the soul arise from the energies of the intellect, the acquisition of knowledge, the practice of moral virtue, benevolence to man, piety to God. The life of the body can no longer be supported than

while some degree of health or strength may remain; when they fail, or are destroyed, the body yields to death. So does the soul, during our corporeal life, sustain a spiritual death, whenever it is deprived of all religion, wherein its real life consists; for the highest degrees of intellect only sink us lower in the scale of the creation, if they do not lead us to a knowledge of God, and obedience to his laws.

It is very clear, that the human body, being material, perishes by death: it is as plain to experience as to philosophy. We can discern where all the parts of the body are scattered; but have no intimation of the departure of the soul. We cannot believe that the soul is annihilated, because we feel an invincible repugnance in conceiving any thing to be reduced to nothing. We have no evidence that the Creator will exercise this his sole prerogative, but have abundant arguments to the contrary.

It may be demanded, how we know that the union of the soul and body does not produce the destruction of the former by the dissolution of the latter?

We know that nothing can come from nothing; that every effect must have its appropriate cause; that what destroys a material substance cannot destroy an immaterial one; and it is reasonable to believe, that whatever has once existed, continues in existence, if there is no evidence of its being destroyed.

If all the energies of an immaterial principle,

which we appear to possess, were entirely confined to the body ; if they were solely excited by corporeal organs, and had no object in view but the defence or preservation of the body, or the continuance of the species ; if our vital principle, like that of a vegetable, depended entirely upon soil and climate ; if we were governed by a blind irresistible instinct, we should not be certain whether we had the least participation in the active part of the universe ; we might be wholly passive ; the appearance of immateriality might be delusive ; and we might be mere machines.

The Cartesians supposed that this was the case with all brutes. In the higher orders of them we have strong proofs of activity, feeling, passion, affection, and something approaching to reason ; but the vegetable world may be wholly material : nor is locomotion a proof of spirituality, unless we are convinced that the animal is a prime mover. Wherever there is the power of originating motion, by thought and will, there must be something immaterial ; and whatever is immaterial must be naturally immortal. If this immaterial principle does not rise higher than the sentient soul, and in all its operations depends upon the body, as its necessary instrument, and regards it as its ultimate end ; we see, indeed, no efficient cause for its destruction, but we can discern no final cause for its conservation : our speculations fail for want of data, upon which we can proceed. It seems probable that the

sentient soul is in the animal world so identified with the body, that when the body perishes, it remains in a dormant state, until it is united with some other body equally adapted to it. We can trace the worm we tread upon, through its aurelia or chrysalis, to the most beautiful papilio, expatiating in the bright beams of the sun, and the purest region of the atmosphere. The identity is preserved in all these changes. May there not be similar transmigrations in every animal, which has its sphere of action by the union of its sentient soul and body, however narrow the limits may be in which that sphere is confined?

But if the identity of the meanest worm is preserved, when its vermicular state is dissolved, how preposterous is it to suppose, that man loses his identity when the parts of his body are separated, and that the identity, of which we are conscious, and which consists in mind alone, is to be extinguished by death!

The natural immortality of man does not arise from his sentient, but from his intellectual soul. It is proved by his intellect, his free will, his sense of moral obligation, his responsibility, his being placed in a state of trial, his fears and hopes, his innate impressions, and natural desires.

By the immortality of the soul I mean, that when we die, there is still something remaining, which did belong to us, and, after the termination of this mortal life, retains the power of understanding, thinks, reasons, and remembers freely.

Conscience, or the law of God written in our

hearts, is the characteristic excellence of the human soul, and the foundation of its immortality. We must firmly establish the natural judgment of the human mind, in distinguishing right from wrong, before we can argue for the recompense of virtue in a future state ; and the higher idea we entertain of the exalted nature and salutary effects of virtue, and of the odious depravity and pernicious consequences of vice, the more shall we be led to a conviction that there will be a state, where virtue shall be amply rewarded, and vice justly punished.

If there were no future state, how could we interpret the judgments of God, when a whole nation is punished, however innocent numerous individuals may be ? Or how could we reconcile the permission of natural evil with the divine justice, when in the ravages it makes, there is no discrimination between the most virtuous and the most abandoned ? But when famine or pestilence sweep a whole land, and death stalks triumphant with all its horrors, the calamity, most dreadful to the wicked, is the highest blessing which can be bestowed upon the good. They change this state, at best very imperfect, for the realms of perfect felicity. If they are not released by speedy death from the miseries of this world, they are called upon, by transient sorrow, to exercise those virtues which have the most salutary influence in strengthening and exalting the mind, and preparing it for everlasting glory.

Whatever indication we receive here, from

daily experience and from internal reflection, of a state of trial, must convince us that this state of trial is a state of preparation for immortal happiness, if we make a right use of it ; or must prove, if we are so infatuated as to pursue a contrary conduct, the tremendous harbinger of never-ending woe.

If we maintain, as we may fairly do, that all external circumstances being the same, our happiness is proportioned to our virtue in this life, a case may easily be supposed, where the misery arising from external circumstances shall appear to overbalance all the felicity which virtue or reason can bestow.

The more we can penetrate into the designs of Providence in this transitory world, the higher idea shall we entertain of the moral government of God. The conviction of that moral government, arising from reason or revelation, instead of weakening our belief of a future state, strongly impresses it upon our minds, when we see ourselves, from our intellectual nature, created for immortality, and know that in our immortal state alone, from the perfection and duration of that state, the moral government of God can be conspicuously manifested. The same train of reflections which convinces us that God governs the world, leads us to the animating hope, that the reward which good men receive here, is only the commencement of an infinitely more perfect remuneration.

The more pure our morals, the more exalted

our sense of religion, the more perfect will be our conception of true happiness in this life; but we must frame a much higher idea of our immortal felicity in a future state, when pain, sickness, and death shall be no more; when we shall have no passions to subdue, no errors to correct, no sins to deplore, no difficulties to encounter, no temptations to resist, no dangers to avoid, no wants to supply, no corporeal desires to gratify; when our negative happiness shall be impregnable, and our positive happiness shall be of the most exalted nature, and derived from the purest sources, the kindest affections, the most enlightened intellect, and the most fervent devotion. In that state, the soul must employ itself, with its whole energy, upon those benevolent exertions, or delightful contemplations, wherein its true felicity consists. While we are incarcerated in this corporeal prison, we are constrained to submit to the temporary yoke imposed upon us; but when death puts a happy period to this servile state, the soul becomes truly wise and pure; no longer impeded in its search after truth by an insipient body, no more contaminated by the corruption which now surrounds us, and to which, from the depravity of our own hearts, we so easily become a prey.

The love of knowledge is so natural to the mind, that we cannot endure the idea of our progress in it being terminated by death, and of an universal oblivion overwhelming all our faculties, perhaps at the very moment of their most

powerful exertion, and when we appear to be advancing rapidly to higher degrees of excellence. The senses indeed are soon satiated; but the desire of what is brave and generous, of love, esteem, honour, and fame, has no limits; it is founded upon immutable principles, and extends to all eternity.

The desire of improving in virtue, holiness, and religion is more predominant in an exalted mind, than the desire of knowledge.

If we are deeply impressed with a sense of duty, with the importance of subduing all evil propensities, and of making every day a greater progress in the cultivation of moral excellence, if we have a reverential awe of God, and, animated by the love of him, feel in every act of devotion to which we can raise our minds, a more firm faith in his glorious attributes, and in the sublime truths which he has revealed to us, our hope of future happiness will be the ruling principle of our hearts; we shall be convinced, that in all our serious meditations, and in all the actions of a pure and holy life, we are approaching nearer to the divine majesty, and rendering ourselves more and more qualified for that state where we may adore and obey God to all eternity.

Can we suppose that God is really a being perfect in holiness, that he is the moral governor of the world, the omniscient judge of every created free agent; and that he has implanted in the best and wisest men this desire of immor-

talities, founded upon a conscious progress in knowledge and in holiness; or even that he permits this hope to remain in the most enlightened minds; if it is a delusive phantom, if we are all doomed to perish by the stroke of death, and are never to be heard of more; if God does nothing in vain, nothing without a design worthy of perfect wisdom and unbounded goodness, can he be supposed to have created such a being as man, and placed him in that state of trial which conscience and experience prove, if he had intended that this life should comprehend the whole of his existence? The power of forming abstract ideas, of recalling objects by a voluntary exercise of memory,—powers which no inferior creature possesses, have no final cause, if we perish by death. But in that improvement of intellect and virtue, which is congenial to an immortal spirit, they are most essential. So is likewise the anticipation of the future, which would only prove the inanity of human life, when its tenure is so very uncertain, if all our schemes and future prospects were not parts of our present state of trial, and deserving punishment or reward.

How imperfect would be the system, if a state of trial and formation by discipline constituted the whole existence of moral and intellectual creatures; if we were designed to be annihilated as soon as we had conquered with great exertion the difficulties of a moral life! Do we not see enough of order, wisdom, and goodness in this

world, to be certain that it is a part only which we discern ; and that the nature of man will be as unlimited in its duration, as the intellectual and moral improvement of which he is capable is unlimited in its extent? The mind, freed from the body, may assume new ideas, as the body, dissolved by death, is susceptible of new forms.

A future state has been believed by the great body of mankind, through the darkest clouds of superstition and idolatry ; but the more enlightened men have been, or the more they have excelled in piety and virtue, the stronger has been this belief. When we learn nature from the most perfect models, we may be certain that her voice is the voice of truth—truth imparted to the creature by the great Creator, who “*never leaves himself without a witness.*” The wiser we are, the more shall we be convinced by argument of the immortality of the soul ; the better we are, the more readily shall we embrace this important truth ; and the more inflexibly shall we adhere to it. Hope and fear are passions very congenial to our nature, and appear to have belonged to it in its uncorrupted state. They both lead us to a future life, which is not more ardently desired by the good, than it is dreaded by the wicked. The guilty conscience of the atheist shews that the belief of a future state is too natural to be eradicated by philosophy. The secret shame, fear, and horror which seize upon the mind, when we are meditating or committing a wicked

action, indicate our immortal nature. The sudden rise of those passions shew how congenial they are to our frame ; for the first thoughts are the most genuine offsprings of the soul. These sad forebodings may lead to superstition, and are more easily assuaged by it than they are by infidelity, which proves the firm root they have taken in the mind. But if they arose from superstition, they would never prevail most where there is the most rational ground for them, nor could they have a beneficial tendency ; for truth alone is salutary, falsehood is always pernicious. I acknowledge that the dread of future punishment is a most powerful engine of superstition ; but it is founded upon those natural notions of which superstition avails itself, and is not only consistent with the purest ideas of religion, but is the great bulwark of them. If all belief of a future state could be extirpated, man, as an individual, would be the most unhappy of all creatures, and society would want its firmest support.

When God created man a free agent, assailed by innumerable temptations, he placed him in a state of trial, made him a subject of his moral government, and gave him every motive to virtue, which the hope of everlasting felicity could excite, every restraint from vice which the dread of everlasting misery could impose.

A future state of rewards and punishments was not only the most powerful sanction of the

divine law, but it vindicated the divine justice, in the permission of moral evil.

By the abuse of free agency the virtuous, even for their virtue, are exposed in this life to every evil which tyranny and cruelty can inflict ; and the wicked may attain the highest degree of worldly and fallacious prosperity. But in a future state, to which the present bears no more proportion than a moment to eternity, the oppressors shall receive their due punishment, and the oppressed an ample recompense for all their sufferings.

A firm faith in a future state of rewards and punishments ought not to lead us to rash judgments, or dangerous speculations, concerning the nature of that state, but should restrain us from all vice, lead us to every virtue, and, above all, to a full conviction of the justice and goodness of God, through the several dispensations he has designed for us, fixing our affections on things above, and directing our views to that felicity, which is most consonant to the "pure in heart, who alone shall see God."

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ESSAY XXV.

ON THE EVIDENCES OF THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION.

THESE Essays upon the first principles of moral philosophy and religion, are chiefly founded upon natural theology, though I have frequently referred to the sacred scriptures, and kept their doctrine constantly in view. Natural theology leads the mind to a conviction of christianity. Of this conviction it is the legitimate source, and the firmest support. If we believe natural religion, in the full extent to which these Essays have carried it, and act agreeably to our principles, I cannot conceive it possible that we should reject the glorious gospel of Christ, when preached to us in its purity; and when we consider the external proofs of its divine authority, we shall be prepared for an examination of those proofs, by knowing the extent of human *reason*, by placing a just confidence in it, and assigning to it its true limits.

We shall be guarded against the influence of *passion*, which, when it is vicious, spreads a thick cloud of darkness over sacred truth; and when it is most venial, or even laudable, has a power over the imagination, which precludes calm and impartial inquiry.

We shall be aware that our *free agency* extends to thoughts as well as to actions ; that truths, which are founded upon the clearest evidence, or are even demonstrative to the man of science, appear dubious to the superficial mind ; and when a doctrine appears dubious, we have it in our choice to receive or reject it, and we are responsible for the choice we make in proportion to the importance of the doctrine ; very deeply and awfully responsible indeed, if the question is, whether we shall abjure christianity, and apostatize from that holy religion, in which we have been baptized and educated, and which we have long professed.

We shall not only feel ourselves responsible in our own consciences, but reproach ourselves as bad members of society, if we oppose a religion which has long proved the cement of social union, and the great civilizer and improver of mankind.

If we have that high idea of *moral obligation*, which, in the essay upon that subject I have endeavoured to inculcate, our natural sense of good and evil, of the eternal and immutable difference between them, will afford a certain test by which every pretence to revelation may be examined ; and the more accurately and fully this test is applied to christianity, the more will its lustre shine.

The higher idea we entertain of *virtue*, or the deeper our abhorrence of *vice*, the more will our hearts be prepared for that glorious gospel which

was revealed from heaven "against all the unrighteousness of man." I acknowledge, however, that the most exalted conception of moral virtue will not prepare our minds for the belief of revealed religion, if we do not cordially embrace the fundamental truths of natural theology. If we have not a firm faith in God, from the dictate of nature, and from the evidence of reason, we shall find an insuperable barrier to all our religious inquiries. "*He that cometh to God, (says the apostle*) must believe that he is.*"

Atheism extinguishes all the means of internal or external grace. If we believe God to be the creator of the universe, but suppose man to be infinitely removed from him, and inconceivably beneath his care, we shall be as obdurate in our infidelity, as incapable of all ideas of religion, as if we ascribed all things to necessity or chance.

The more sublime our conceptions are of the *power and wisdom of God*, as applied to human affairs, the more ardent our gratitude to him for his beneficence, or our admiration of his *moral attributes*, from our own sense of holiness, the more devoutly we shall sympathize with the description given of the Divine Being in scripture, and the more earnestly shall we believe that God has, in that sacred book, revealed himself to man.

The belief of a deity, and his attributes, naturally lead us to an acknowledgment of his *moral government*, and of his particular *provi-*

* Heb. xi. 6.

dence, of his watchful eye over all our concerns, and of his active energies in illuminating our minds, in showering spiritual and temporal blessings upon us, in hearing our prayers, relieving our wants, and protecting us from danger.

The conviction that the present life is *a state of trial*, that it is a preparation for eternity, that we have *immaterial* and *immortal souls*, unfolds to us, from the exercise of natural reason, a stupendous scene, infinitely beyond our faculties to comprehend ; and raises our souls to contemplations the most delightful and the most sublime, at the same that they are the most interesting and the most important. Upon the astonishing prospect now placed before us, we feel how much we want a guide. The wisest and the best of men are the most desirous of being more enlightened, and most sensible of their own deficiency.

These are not speculations which rest in theory, and may only gratify our thirst after knowledge. *Future rewards and punishments* may decide our fate to all eternity, and in every view we can take of them, are of an importance beyond all proportion to the most serious concerns of this life. They afford the strongest motives to conduct, animate our highest hopes, or depress the soul with the most alarming terrors. They are the most powerful guards against sin, the most active incentives to all holiness and virtue. What we know of them, from the moral government of God, will render us very

eager to have their nature pointed out by revelation, and to be assured of those conditions by which we may escape punishment and obtain reward.

Upon all these points natural religion is so far from leading us to acquiesce in the truths she teaches, and to require no more, that the farther we proceed in the instruction she can afford us, the more earnest we shall be to make a greater progress, and to be more intimately acquainted with the divine dispensations, with what God requires of us, both to believe and do, from his own immediate authority; an authority which will clear all obscurities, remove all doubts, and teach to the meanest capacities those saving truths, which we are all equally interested to know and believe, though they surpass the conception of the most enlightened philosopher. We shall be led therefore to wish for a revelation, and be prepared to acknowledge its truth, from our veneration of natural theology, and a conviction of its exact conformity to it, as far as human faculties can discern. Our Saviour did not come to destroy the law of nature any more than the law of Moses, but to fulfil it, to render it more perfect in itself, and to spread its light over all mankind.

It may be said, that there are doctrines of pure revelation, and mysteries contained in scripture, which are indefensible upon principles of reason, because unintelligible; but does not natural theology teach us, that there are limits to the

human understanding? If God reveals to man dispensations, which refer chiefly to our immortal state, is it wonderful that there shall be mysteries in them *above* reason, though not *contrary* to it, and such as exercise a faith, derived from authority, but founded originally upon argument and the regular deductions of the understanding?

The conformity of natural and revealed religion, in points within the reach of our faculties, is all we can desire to confirm our belief in both. They are mutually strengthened and elucidated by this comparison.

It is pretended, however, that there is not this conformity. In proportion as christianity has been corrupted, this conformity has been of course obscured. But no system of christianity in the darkest ages has so lamentably prevailed, as to extinguish the belief of the essential attributes of God—of his providence, and of a future state of rewards and punishments. I grant that doctrines have been promulgated which I cannot reconcile with these principles, but they were reconciled by the sophistry of those who supported them. The principles themselves were never directly denied. However dreadfully the church has been corrupted, the Bible has remained as a confutation of those corruptions, and a witness against them.

It may, indeed, at first sight appear that there are parts of the Bible at variance with natural religion. If this were really the case, the Bible

would be at variance with itself; and the more we should study it, the greater variance would be discovered. If it were solely the work of man, considering the number of persons of every description, and in a long succession of ages, who composed its several parts, the variance would be considerable. But the fact is, the more critically we examine it, the more will this apparent variance be reconciled, and the more any particular text is investigated, the more will the objections to it be removed.

The Bible, well understood, affords no colour for the corrupt doctrines which have been grafted upon it. The original inspiration, and a special providence preserving it, have established scripture as a rule of faith, notwithstanding the various readings, and the uncertainty of some passages, which do not affect the general scheme of scripture divinity. Whenever enthusiasm or imposture prevails, the investigation of the subject will soon produce a confutation of it; but when the light shines more clearly, the more it is exposed to view, we may be sure that it will guide us right, and not prove a delusive meteor.

The prejudices entertained against christianity by a man who "loves darkness rather than light, because his deeds are evil*;" or by a man who is so immersed in objects of sense, that he cannot raise his thoughts to abstract truths, an invisible world, or a future state; or by a man who is totally ignorant of pure christianity, and forms

* John iii. 19.

his idea of it from the most gross perversions of fanaticism or superstition, are indeed so strong, that they account for the rejection of the gospel when it was first preached, and for the prevalence of irreligion in all ages. But if we have purified our minds, and regulated our conduct according to the best light which nature affords, and have a just conception of religion, both natural and revealed, we are prepared to listen attentively to the external evidences upon which the truth of revelation depends.

These external evidences arise chiefly from miracles and prophecies recorded in scripture. The authenticity, therefore, of holy writ is the first point to be established. This authenticity is of two sorts: The first question is, are the writings authentic which have transmitted the miracles and prophecies to us? Secondly, if the writings be authentic, are the miracles and prophecies credible?

The atheist, when he denies an intelligent Creator, thinks himself obliged to give some account of the existence of the world. It is equally incumbent upon the deist to account for the existence of the Bible. I never heard of any hypothesis to solve this difficulty.

Was the Bible written by Luther? or imposed upon the world when printing was first invented? or was it the progeny of the dark ages? If of prior date, at what time was it produced? The time assigned by divines for every book of the New Testament, is as well established as any fact

which depends upon historical evidence. Cæsar and Tacitus are less authenticated; nor is there any nation upon earth whose records may be more relied upon than the Jewish records, which comprise the Old Testament. The Old Testament has been preserved for eighteen centuries by the Jews, though it contains the severest testimonies against them, and proves them inexcusable for rejecting the Messiah.

The whole of scripture has been preserved unmutated by the church of Rome, although the rulers of that church found themselves obliged to suppress the circulation of it, because they knew how directly it militated against their usurpation over the souls and consciences of men. If we should allow that some books of the Old and New Testament have not the same undisputed authority that the rest have, those disputes about the canon of scripture by no means affect any essential articles of faith.

The authenticity of the Bible, however, is so well established by external proofs, that the unbeliever generally admits it, but contends, that the supernatural facts which the Bible contains, ought to be rejected as incredible.

It has been much disputed, whether any testimony will authorize the belief of what is contrary to universal experience. It appears to me, that there is nothing which testimony cannot prove, however contrary to experience, unless it should affirm what in the nature of things is absolutely impossible. We often find, in common

life, that something happens which is highly improbable ; and that events seem extremely improbable to those persons who know only the events themselves, and yet would be very probable, if all circumstances were taken into consideration.

The deist, who believes the divine omnipotence, must admit, that God may do any thing which is not strictly impossible. What God can do, he certainly can communicate to man.

If he can raise the dead, he may give infallible proofs of their resurrection.

If we fancy any thing to be improbable, which fancy often arises from our ignorance or narrow views, we require indeed stronger evidence ; but this very disposition of mankind betrays them into fatal errors. How many states have been ruined, merely by the incredulity of shallow politicians? With respect to the miracles recorded in the Gospel and Acts, upon which the truth of christianity depends, I should say, in the first place, that however incredible they may appear, testimony may overcome that incredibility ; and that the attestation of their truth by the evangelists, and by the innumerable converts to christianity in that age, was as sufficient and as ample a testimony as it is reasonable to expect. But, in the second place, I should maintain, that the miracles themselves were not incredible, because if you believe the constant superintendance of divine providence, nothing is more probable than that God should reveal his will to mankind,

and that he should attest that revelation by miracles. Nothing, on the other hand, is more improbable, while you keep all the great truths of natural religion steadily in view, than that God, the moral governor, the protector of mankind, should permit such myriads of persons, as christians of all ages, and such good men as they were in early times, to have been so plausibly and innocently deluded, as they must have been, if these miracles had not been really performed.

The propagation of the gospel, without the power of working miracles, or the gift of tongues, would have been a greater miracle than any recorded in the New Testament, yet would not have been incredible, if we had reason to suppose it the work of God, who may act without as well as with the instrumentality of second causes.

If the origin and progress of christianity did not proceed from the divine interposition, they were effects without a cause.

Nothing can be more incredible, than that the miracles recorded in the Gospel and the Acts should not be real, for if they were supposititious, we must believe that the evangelists were deceived, or that they attempted to deceive the whole world, and were successful in that wild attempt. The miracles they record were not wrought in private ; all of them before many witnesses, who were not prone to belief ; many of them before thousands of spectators. The pretended miracles which have imposed upon

the credulity of man, have not been obtruded upon public notice till a considerable lapse of time had intervened, or have been first published in countries remote from the scene of action. They have been adduced, not to oppose, but to flatter and strengthen the prejudices, the follies, the passions, and vices of their partizans. Many of them may be resolved into false perceptions, or explained by natural causes, or shewn to be delusive frauds, or accounted for by lucky coincidences.

After all, the christian religion is the only one which ventures to rely upon miracles as its great external support ; and can appeal to persons who assert, that they are the original witnesses of miracles recently and publicly performed ; and who have passed their lives in labours, dangers, and sufferings ; and have willingly exposed themselves to the most cruel and ignominious deaths, in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and in consequence of their belief of the truth of those accounts. The evangelists must have been insane if they had been deceived, or had attempted to deceive ; and this is an hypothesis which is confuted by their whole conduct, and especially by the clearness and simplicity of their writings ; a simplicity equally repugnant to enthusiasm and to fraud. They did not suffer for *opinions*, where the imagination operates, and passions enslave the mind ; but for the *reality of appearances*, which every man of sound understanding must know to be true or false.

Strong as this evidence has been shewn to be, the unbeliever may contend that it might have been much more irrefragable. Christ might have appeared to all the world after his resurrection, as he will do when he comes to judge the earth. Every inhabitant of the globe might have been converted by Christ or his apostles; but let us remember, that we should have been taken out of a state of trial, if the evidence of natural or revealed religion had been thus irresistible. It is sufficient to convince the wise and good, while it leaves to the wicked a fatal scope for wilful infidelity.

Having proved the authenticity of scripture, and the credibility of the miracles recorded in it, I am now to consider the other great external support of revealed religion, *the fulfilment of prophecy.*

“ To the prophecies of the Old Testament, (says Barrow,) describing the personal character, circumstances, and actions of our blessed Saviour, did he himself frequently refer incredulous persons. Prophecy manifests the great worth and weight of the christian revelation, as implying the peculiar care of God concerning it, who designed it so anciently, laid such trains of providence for its establishment, and prepared such evidences for its confirmation.”

The evidence of prophecy is designed for a succession of ages. When the event foretold soon follows the prediction, it is a proof of the divine mission of the prophet to his contempo-

raries ; but to succeeding generations no farther than the event is known, and the respective dates of the prophecy and event ascertained.

The prophecies of the Old Testament fulfilled in the New, are most clearly known to us, because we have divine authority, both for the prediction and the completion; they corroborate the evidence both of the Old and New Testament, and display the beautiful harmony between them.

There are three other descriptions of sacred prophecy. The first is, when the prediction appears in the Bible, and the completion (taking place after the lapse of several years, when inspired writers had ceased) is only known by profane history. The second is, when the prophecy has been fulfilling from a very early period, perhaps from the date of the prophecy itself, and is still fulfilling before our eyes. The third is, when the prophecy contained in scripture remains unfulfilled. Some prophecies have a primary and a secondary completion, and therefore belong to two of the five classes I have enumerated. The final accomplishment of these prophecies is secondary in the order of time; in the order of our ideas it is of far greater importance than the primary.

From all these descriptions of prophecies evidence arises, not only credible, but, in its due season, admirably calculated to produce the most cogent conviction. It will often be gradually unfolded, and acquire an accumulation of force

from length of time, during the whole progress of supernatural dispensation, until the consummation of all things, when the great scheme of our mysterious redemption shall be accomplished. The completion of prophecy will not only confirm the truth of christianity, but will more fully explain its nature and design.

From all we know we may acquire a practical faith, fruitful in good works, and in holy obedience.

From all which is not yet fully revealed, or which may exceed human conception, or the capacity of any created being, we may learn humility and acquiescence in the will of God.

Let us devoutly implore the Father of all Mercies, through the merits of our blessed Saviour, that, by the gracious gift of his Holy Spirit, he may be pleased to enlighten us in the knowledge of truth, and prepare us, by the discharge of christian duties, for that great day, when the secrets of all hearts shall be revealed.

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THE END.

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