

TWO ESSAYS

ON

THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE.

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ON

THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE,

BY

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(*NOT PUBLISHED.*)

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE present Essays form part of a larger Work, to be entitled "The Ethics of Aristotle illustrated with Essays and Notes," which is now nearly complete. It is intended that this Work should contain a text of the Nicomachean Ethics accompanied by explanatory and critical notes; and also, in addition to these pages, Essays on the following subjects; On the history of Moral Philosophy in Greece previous to Aristotle; On the connection of Aristotle's Ethics with his Politics, Physics, and Metaphysics; On Aristotle's Method of Ethical enquiry; On the relation of Aristotle's Ethics to Plato; and On their relation to Modern systems of Morality.

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CONTENTS.

ESSAY I.

ON THE GENUINENESS OF THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, AND ON THE MODE OF THEIR COMPOSITION.

ESSAY II.

ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORMS IN THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE.

ESSAY I.

ON THE GENUINENESS OF THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, AND ON THE MODE OF THEIR COMPOSITION.

We cannot properly enter upon the consideration of the contents of any work of Aristotle, without a previous enquiry into the genuineness, the form, and the literary character of that work. The canon of Aristotle's writings is only now gradually fixing itself. Among the works once attributed to him, as many as twenty-seven are by the (1) latest enquirers stigmatized as either certainly spurious, or at all events of doubtful authorship. Such results of criticism must be received "not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, but to weigh and consider." On the one hand, they make much less difference to us than might have been expected; these works, if not Aristotle's, are Aristotelian, and the essential idea of the Aristotelian philosophy remains the same. On the other hand, they must to a certain extent alter our point of view, by taking away, in many cases, the conceit of verbal finish and dogmatic completeness; by shewing that we have often assumed a greater knowledge of the Past than was really possible,—that we have treated the Past too much, as if it stood on the same footing as the Present.

(1) Valentini Rose de Aristotelis Librorum ordine et auctoritate commentatio. Berlin, 1854. His table of spurious works is as follows: 1. Κατηγορίαι. 2. περὶ ἑρμηνείας. 3. περὶ ῥητορικῆς πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον. 4. ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμεια. 5. ἠθικὰ μεγάλα. 6. περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν. 7. οἰκονομικόν. 8. οἰκονομικὸν ἄλλο. 9. νόμοι ἀνδρὸς καὶ γαμετῆς. (Vers. Lat.) 10. διαιρέσεις Πλάτωνος. 11. περὶ Ξενοφάνους. 12. περὶ Μελίσσου. 13. περὶ Γοργίου. 14. περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν. 15. μεταφυσικῶν τὸ α' ἔλαττον, δ', κ', λ', μ'. 16. φυσικῶν τὸ η'. 17. περὶ κόσμου πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον. 18. περὶ τοῦ μὴ γεννᾶν. 19. περὶ χρωμάτων. 20. περὶ ἀκουστῶν ἢ περὶ φωνῆς. 21. περὶ ζώων κινήσεως. 22. περὶ πνεύματος. 23. φυσιογνωμονικά. 24. προβλήματα φυσικά. 25. μηχανικὰ προβλήματα. 26. περὶ θαυμασίων. 27. περὶ τῆς τοῦ Νείλου ἀναβάσεως.

The more one studies the works of Aristotle, the more one's eyes are opened to the fragmentary character of what has come down to us. This fact is naturally to be regretted, but it must be received as a fact. Having once so received it, we shall be free to meet the various hypotheses that can be brought forward respecting the present condition of the works of Aristotle; we shall be confident of finding at all events a considerable nucleus belonging, in every sense of the word, to Aristotle himself; we shall be able in some cases to pronounce decisively on the truth or falsehood of those hypotheses, in other cases we must be content to remain undecided for lack of evidence; finally, we shall go on to that which is infinitely more worth consideration, namely, the meaning and value of Aristotle's philosophy in itself, and in its relation to us.

Before coming to that which is our own immediate concern, the literary character of the Nicomachean Ethics, it will be not irrelevant to make some remarks upon our general position in relation to the works of Aristotle. For certain opinions have been held, and certain conclusions have been drawn, which, if substantiated, could not fail materially to influence our views of any particular book. The following topics then are worth a short consideration.

I. The celebrated story of the Fate of the Writings of Aristotle, given first by Strabo, and afterwards repeated by Plutarch.

II. The discrepancy between the present form of the works of Aristotle, and the ancient Catalogues of them still extant.

III. The opinion held by Julius Scaliger, with regard to *some* of the writings of Aristotle, but afterwards more or less vaguely entertained about his writings in general, and especially about the Nicomachean Ethics, (2) that "while the waters themselves are from the exhaustless spring of Aristotle, the pitchers in which they are preserved have been supplied by others;"

(2) Julius Scaliger, in Arist. de Plautis, i. p. 11. "Cujusmodi commentationes a discipulis exceptos ejus nomine circumferri videtis. Etenim qui commentarii contra Zenonem et Xenophanem tanquam ab illo conscripti leguntur, illius quidem inexhausti fontis perennes aquas sapiunt, alveos tamen aliorum esse manifestum est."

in short, that in the works of Aristotle we possess, not his own writings, but only notes taken from his oral lectures.

I. The story of Strabo, (3) given *apropos* of his account of Scepsis, a town in the Troas, is calculated to throw doubt on the purity of the entire text.

He relates, that the Library and MSS. of Aristotle, being in the possession of Theophrastus, were by him bequeathed to one Neleus of Scepsis, whose heirs, to elude the book-collecting zeal of the kings of Pergamus, concealed these treasures in a vault. There they remained for ages, till finally corrupted with damp and worms, they were sold for a considerable sum to one Apellicon, of Teos. By him they were brought to Athens, where he caused copies of them to be taken, himself filling up on conjecture the gaps in the text, not however happily, for he was more of a book-collector than a philosopher. Soon after the death of Apellicon, Athens was taken by Sylla, and this Library was seized and brought by him to Rome. There Tyrannio the grammarian obtained permission to arrange the MSS. At the same time the booksellers had numerous copies made by very careless transcribers. Hence it came about, (says Strabo,) that the earlier Peripatetics, being deprived of all the really philosophic works of Aristotle, were reduced to mere rhetorical common places in their philosophising; and the later ones, when the books came again to light, were generally compelled to resort to a conjectural interpretation of them, owing to their corrupt condition.

The same story is repeated by Plutarch, (4) who probably took it from Strabo, and who adds to it the further statements, that Tyrannio put almost the entire MSS. into shape; that Andronicus of Rhodes, getting numerous transcripts made, gave publicity to a generally-received text of Aristotle; finally, that it was for no want of personal zeal or ability, but from the loss of the original writings, that the Peripatetic school had previously declined.

This curious history having been sifted by the Germans, the following (5) may be stated as the residuum it leaves.

(3) Strabo, xiii. 1. 418. (4) Plut. vit. Sullæ, c. 26.

(5) Taken chiefly from Professor Brandis. "Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch-Römischen Philosophie." Part ii. Div. 2. p. 65—75.

1. There can be no doubt that Strabo's account is founded on fact. Strabo was the scholar of Tyrannio, and the friend of Andronicus (whose share, however, in the business he does not mention); he therefore had the history of Sylla's MSS. on the best authority.

2. The adventures recorded may have happened to the autographs, or to some of them, of Aristotle and Theophrastus. But restrictedly to these. Strabo deserts history for imagination when he says, that Aristotle's philosophical writings were lost to the earlier Peripatetics. For,

3. Investigations tend to prove as far as any thing can be proved about so dark a period, that all the important parts of Aristotle's philosophy were known to the world during the 200 years that elapsed between the death of Aristotle and the capture of Rome by Sylla. Some of his works may have been published in the philosopher's life-time; many were after his death not only edited, but also made the basis of fresh treatises and commentaries by his immediate followers, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Phanias, &c. It seems certain that a mass of writings under his name, some genuine, others spurious, were purchased by Ptolemy Philadelphus for the Alexandrian library. His logical works must have been known to the Stoics, who made a development of his principles. The allusions to him in Cicero do not indeed prove that Cicero himself was scientifically acquainted with the Aristotelian philosophy, but that there was a general acquaintance with it existing among the Greek rhetoricians and the educated Romans of the day. Cicero's way of speaking shows that he had no knowledge of the recovery of the philosophical books, as related by Strabo. Nor do the earlier Greek commentators mention this recovery. Boethius alone speaks of Andronicus as "Exactum diligentemque Aristotelis librorum et judicem et repertorem."

4. An examination of the works as we possess them, does not show them to be in that sort of condition, which the narrative of Strabo would imply. Some, as the Poetics, are imperfect; others, as the Metaphysics, seem patched together. But the absolute corruption of the text, where gaps are unskilfully filled up and the sense destroyed, appears indeed in the *Characters* of Theophrastus, and in parts of the

Eudemian Ethics, but not in the most part of the works of Aristotle.

5. The story then chiefly points to our ignorance of the history of the text we possess. How much of it comes to us from the copies in the Alexandrian Library; how far our edition is due to the recension of Tyrannio and Andronicus it seems impossible to pronounce. That posthumous editors had much to do with the works of Aristotle we may readily infer, but we may also conclude that corruptions of the text in detail and the conjectures of Apellicon are not the chief difficulty we shall have to contend with.

II. Turning from this point, we may advert for a moment to the ancient Catalogues of the works of Aristotle. There seem to be three at present in existence. One is Arabian, but it is merely a translation of the Catalogue given by a certain Ptolemæus, a Peripatetic philosopher of unknown date, who wrote on the life and works of Aristotle. This Catalogue appears not to differ very materially from the present arrangement of the books as we have them.

The other two Catalogues are of those of Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of the Philosophers, and of the so-called Anonymous Biographer of Aristotle, given by Menagius in his notes on Diogenes. These two are not independent of one another; the anonymous Catalogue makes some additions and corrections on the list of Diogenes, altering the number of the books in some cases, and introducing the name of the Nicomachean Ethics. But it is substantially the same list, and there appears to be some probability in attributing (6) it to Hesychius, who must have taken it from Diogenes.

The Catalogue of Diogenes Laertius exhibits at first sight an immense discrepancy from the edition of Aristotle to which we are accustomed. We miss the names of the great works, such as the Physical Lectures, the Ethics, the Metaphysics. Instead of these, we find a mass of apparently small and separate treatises enumerated, often apparently popular works in the form of dialogues, and even where more scientific works are specified, there seems often to be rather a coincidence of

(6) Valentine Rosc. De Ar. Lib. ordine et auctoritate, p. 48 sqq.

subject than an identity of the books with those which we possess. By a rough computation, it appears probable that the list of Diogenes would correspond to a mass of writings about four times the size of what remains at present. For Diogenes specifies the sum total as amounting to 445,270 lines, which at the rate of 10,000 lines to an alphabet or ream, would give 44 reams, whereas 10 reams is the utmost extent of the present aggregate. Granting, however, that the Exoteric writings and much besides are lost, the question is, How can we reconcile what we have remaining with the titles given by Diogenes? Take, for instance, the names of Ethical works scattered about in this list. *Περὶ δικαιοσύνης δ'. περὶ ἡδονῆς α'. περὶ τἀγαθοῦ γ'. περὶ φιλίας α'. ἠθικῶν ε'. περὶ ἡδονῆς α'.* (repeated). *περὶ ἑκουσίου α'. θέσεις φιλικαὶ β'. περὶ δικαίων β'.* Can we find any thing in what we call Aristotle corresponding to these names?

The question is more important than might seem at first sight, for if the list in question can be depended on, the result will be, that Aristotle wrote nothing but isolated treatises, and that the amalgamation of these into larger works is due to other hands. More than one writer has accepted this supposition, and has attempted to find in the works as we possess them, many of the treatises named by Diogenes. On the whole, however, it will be felt almost universally, that the weight of Diogenes as a writer is not such as to reckon against internal probability. Diogenes Laertius, who wrote about the end of the second century, is a mere thoughtless compiler. His work has been "preserved among the waves of ages, like a plank of a lighter and less solid nature." Out of the wreck of literature, his debris of anecdotes assumes a value beyond its merit. But no reliance can be placed upon his statements. And with regard to his Catalogue, the following points may be observed.

1. There is some likelihood in the conjecture, that Diogenes borrowed it from Favorinus, to whom he is mainly indebted.

2. It is not probable that Favorinus obtained it from Andronicus; for there is no classification or philosophical arrangement of the works. Rather it bears traces of having been copied from

the backs of the rolls in some library, without reference to, or verification of, the contents of these rolls.

3. The separate mode of treatment which Aristotle gave to different parts of his system no doubt favoured this mode of labelling. And transcribers may for shortness' sake have separated that which the author intended to be inseparable.

4. External authority earlier than Diogenes makes mention of entire works not mentioned by him. For not only does Cicero specify the Nicomachean Ethics, (De Finibus v. 5.) but also Atticus a Platonic philosopher, of the reign of Marcus Aurelius, cited by Eusebius, (Præparatio Evangelica, xv. 4.) speaks of the Ethical works, under their present titles, as follows; *αἱ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ ταῦτα πραγματεῖαι Εὐδήμειοί τε καὶ Νικομάχειοι καὶ Μεγαλῶν Ἠθικῶν ἐπιγραφόμεναι, κ. τ. λ.*

5. Internal evidence must therefore in the last resort decide upon the question suggested. The Catalogue of Diogenes may no doubt serve to remind us that there is much that is fragmentary and isolated in the works of Aristotle; but we cannot accept simply the hypothesis arising out of this Catalogue, for it totally ignores that which must be evident to the reader of Aristotle—the Idea of vast completeness and organic unity, which presents itself, constantly as an Idea, though by no means realized, throughout his works.

III. Let us now ask, have we in these works the product of the master's hand, or only an image of the master's thought? Is the theory to be accepted, that the so-called writings of Aristotle are in reality the notes of his disciples? This question is full of meaning in relation to a book said to be by Aristotle, but yet inscribed with the name of Nicomachus. The plausibility of the theory rests on the unfinished style of the writing, the looseness and inaccuracy of quotations, the apparent familiarity of many allusions, and the occasional mention of hearers. But, on the other hand, the works themselves do not by any means, on examination, bear out this sweeping account of them. The depth and subtlety of the discussions in many parts, and the manner in which they are set forth, not as results received, but rather as problems investigated, appear incompatible with the assumption that

these are the notes of hearers. The tone and character of the thought is that of a creative rather than of a recipient mind. Above all, in the style of a great thinker there is something so absolutely and entirely characteristic, that we are led intuitively to attribute the very words and the form of the sentences to the man himself. And about large portions of Aristotle's philosophy this is eminently the case, they seem to breathe the very spirit of their author. And if about other parts this marked individuality is to some degree lost, we shall be at all events only justified in adopting to a very limited degree the hypothesis above mentioned.

Too much stress must not be laid on the word *ἀκροᾶσθαι*. Partly, from a sort of ancient tradition, it corresponded to our conception of reading. Partly, it was used to denote more intimate and systematic study of a subject, as opposed to popular knowledge. Partly, Aristotle in making use of it had in view his own oral instructions in the gardens round the temple of Lycean Apollo. But it must not be supposed that it would be an entire account of his works to say that they are notes *for* lectures, any more than that they are notes *from* lectures. Aristotle was labouring to build up a mighty whole in philosophy, and death found him rough-hewing the separate stones. Or, to use another metaphor, his philosophy, which was to cover the world, was springing up and growing all at once, and nothing perfect. In its various parts therefore we must not be surprised to find the greatest inequality. We must not hesitate to apply different hypotheses to different portions. We must neither totally exclude nor entirely admit the influence of the handiwork of others. We must recognise to a great extent subsequent recension and arrangement. We must certainly not conclude against the genuineness of the actual writing from its incomplete form. But rather while we acknowledge that the "golden stream" of diction, which Cicero praised, is not to be found here, we may readily suppose that this belonged only to the exoteric dialogues, now lost, which perhaps constituted the main portion of Aristotle with which Cicero was acquainted. To us have descended those (7) "com-

(7) Cicero De Fin. v. 5.

mentaries" which Aristotle "left behind him." Harsh and incomplete in style, unequal in thought, sometimes obscure from brevity, at other times prolix and self-repeating, devoid of all artistic treatment, setting at nought the restrictions of grammar, these yet, in their rude and prematurely arrested form, contain, to use the words of Milton, "the precious life blood of a master spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life."

Taking leave now of these general considerations, we may proceed to discuss the genuineness, and criticise the composition, of the Nicomachean Ethics. The latter point depends entirely on internal analysis of the work itself; the former must imply some consideration of the other two Ethical Treatises, which appear among the reputed works of Aristotle, namely, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Magna Moralia. It is at the first glance highly improbable, that Aristotle, engaged as he was in pushing out philosophical analysis, enquiry, and speculation in all directions, and who from the immensity of his undertakings was forced to leave the greater part of his works in a fragmentary condition, should have been at the labour of composing three Treatises on the same subject, with the same scope and the same results. And this is the character of the three Treatises in question. There is, therefore, a strong *à priori* probability against their being all the work of Aristotle. Further enquiries and evidence, both internal and external, render the conclusion of Spengel (8) almost a matter of certainty, that in the Nicomachean Ethics we have on the whole the original work of Aristotle himself; in the Eudemians, a work by Eudemus of Rhodes, based on the former; in the Magna Moralia, a *resumè* of both these preceding works, compiled by some later Peripatetic.

Arguments towards establishing this position are,

1. General consent, which has always considered the Nicomacheans genuine, and has so far given them the preference over the other two Treatises, that while the Nicomacheans have

(8) Ueber die unter dem Namen des Aristoteles erhaltenen ethiscen Schriften, (in den Abhandl. der philos. philol. Klasse der k. B. Akad. 1841.)

been incessantly commented on, the others seem not to have been deemed worthy of a commentary. Both by the earlier Greek Scholiasts, and by Thomas Aquinas, and the succeeding host of Latin commentators, the Eudemians and the Magna Moralia have been left unillustrated. Schleiermacher was the first, by a strange piece of distorted criticism, to pronounce the Magna Moralia to be the original work and the source of the other two.

2. The style of the Magna Moralia is such as to strike the reader at once, by its complete unlikeness to that of Aristotle. Its short, decisive, and grammatical distinctness, is well adapted for setting forth its foregone conclusions. Take, for instance, the opening sentence. *Ἐπειδὴ προαιρούμεθα λέγειν* (9) *ὑπερ ἠθικῶν, πρῶτον ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον τίνος ἐστὶ μέρος τὸ ἦθος. Ὡς μὲν οὖν συντόμως εἰπεῖν δοκεῖ οὐκ ἄλλης ἢ τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι μέρος.* Of this style Spengel affirms, that it would lead one to ascribe a date to the work considerably later than that of Aristotle. Chronological references in the book itself do not afford any decisive evidences. It is observable, that the writer speaks as if standing as the representative of the Peripatetic philosophy. Thus, after mentioning the former systems of Ethics, those of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, he adds, *Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφήψαντο καὶ οὕτως, ἐχόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη μετὰ ταῦτα σκέψασθαι τί δεῖ αὐτοὺς λέγειν.* (i. 1, 4.) So also, *ἐπειδήπερ ἔστιν, ὡς δοκεῖ, μόριόν τι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ τρεφόμεθα, ὃ καλοῦμεν θρεπτικόν.* (i. 4, 1.) *ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ὡς ἡμεῖς ἀφορίζομεν.* (i. 35, 26.) *ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐντεῦθεν ἂν γένοιτο φανερὸν ὥσπερ ἔφαμεν* (10) *ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς.* (ii. 6, 17.) These expressions, how-

(9) It has been observed, that this use of *ὑπερ* is not in accordance with the practice of Aristotle, who always uses *περὶ* in similar cases. It is found, however, in Theophrastus. We presently come on the words, *πρῶτος μὲν οὖν ἐνεχείρησε Πυθαγόρας.* Aristotle always says, *οἱ Πυθαγορεῖοι.*

(10) There is a passage (i. 5, 4.) which seems at first sight startling. *ὅτι δὲ ἡ ἔνδεια καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ φθείρει, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν. Δεῖ δ' ὥσπερ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι.* One might almost fancy, that the writer was quoting Eth. Nic. ii. 2, 6. Spengel, however, acutely remarks, that the true reading must be not *ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν*, but *ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων*, confirming this conjecture by the words of Stobæus, who, with regard to the Peripatetic Ethics, says, *πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἔνδειξιν τούτου τοῖς ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων μαρτυρίοις χρῶνται.* The writer is therefore only borrowing, not quoting, from Aristotle.

ever, do not, as Schleiermacher thinks, tend to prove that Aristotle himself was the writer. They are a mere echo of his way of speaking.

It is only after some study of the Eudemian Ethics, that one is able to discern any difference between the style in which they are written, and the style of Aristotle. The phraseology and the turn of the sentences are almost entirely the same. One would say at first, if this book is not Aristotle's, it contains an astonishing reproduction of his manner. When, however, we consider the overwhelming influence that a great master exercises over the thoughts and mode of expression of his disciples, and how difficult it often is in the criticism of art to distinguish the hand of the Master from that of the School, we need not allow a similarity of style to be decisive with regard to the authorship of this work. But indeed, (unless this be an illusion of fancy or prejudice,) differences in the manner of writing, and those of a significant character, do seem to disclose themselves. We might almost say, that there are two styles in the Eudemian Ethics; one appears whenever the author is re-stating the conclusions of Aristotle, he then writes more clearly, because more summarily and dogmatically, and at the same time less philosophically, than Aristotle. His other style is when he enters upon new questions, not ready answered before him, as with regard to the voluntary Eth. Eud. ii. 9. whether it consists in knowledge or desire; with regard to the nature of good fortune, viii. 2. on *καλακαγαθία*, viii. 3. &c. And in these places the writer seems more indistinct, more involved, and more unsatisfactory than even the obscure parts of Aristotle. The obscurity too seems of a kind, which is due rather to weakness, than to depth of thought. Sometimes it seems attributable to a misuse of formulæ. Indeed throughout the Eudemian Ethics there occur (11) instances of formulæ slurred, so to speak; a fact which argues that the writer was not deeply penetrated by philosophy. The manner of the writing then is exactly such as might have been expected, on the one hand

(11) As, for instance, *αἱ διανοητικαὶ (ἀρεταὶ) μετὰ λόγου*, ii. 1, 19. whereas this is rather true of moral virtues, while the intellectual excellencies are *λόγοι*.

clear and didactic, compressing the results of Aristotle, and often bringing together points which had been developed separately; on the other hand exhibiting both the dryness of a scholar, and the indistinctness of an unsuccessful innovator.

3. It is not however so much separate arguments drawn from the style of these three Ethical Treatises which will prove their relationship to each other, according to the hypothesis of Spengel. The mind is placed in a better position for judging of them after a more general survey of their apparent nature and contents. Let us commence with a brief notice of Eudemus and the Eudemian Ethics.

Eudemus of Rhodes was one of the leading Scholars of Aristotle. It was doubted between him and Theophrastus of Lesbos, which should succeed their master in the guidance of the Peripatetic School. According to the story of Aulus Gellius, Aristotle decided the point by tasting some Rhodian and some Lesbian wine in the presence of his disciples, and by significantly declaring, "Both are good, but the Lesbian is the sweeter." We know that these (12) and others of the Peripatetics set themselves to compose Treatises on subjects already treated of by Aristotle. In this they were probably actuated by a desire of systematizing and making known his philosophy. They no doubt endeavoured to complete what was obscure, and to supply links in the arguments derived from their recollections of the oral teaching of the philosopher himself. They thus furnished a sort of (13) paraphrase or commentary. Of the writings of Eudemus the following are mentioned by ancient Greek (14) authorities; a history of Geometry; a history of Astrology; Analytics; Categories; De Interpretatione; *περὶ Λέξεως*; Physics; and lastly Ethics. These Ethics are quoted by Aspasius in

(12) Cf. Ammonius on the Categories (Brandis Schol. in Arist. p. 28.) *οἱ γὰρ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ Εὔδημος καὶ Φανίας καὶ Θεοφραστὸς κατὰ ζῆλον τοῦ διδασκάλου γεγραφήκασι κατηγορίας καὶ περὶ ἑρμηνείας καὶ ἀναλυτικήν.*

(13) Simplicius on the Physics, fol. 279. a. *καὶ ὅ γε Εὔδημος παραφράζων σχέδον καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους, τίθησι, κ. τ. λ.*

(14) The authorities for these works are given by Fritzsch in his edition of Eth. Eud. (Ratisbon. 1851.) Prol. p. xv.

a Scholium on Eth. Nic. book viii. p. 141. *λέγει δὲ καὶ Εὔδημος καὶ Θεόφραστος ὅτι καὶ αἱ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς γίνονται ἢ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ δι' ἀρετήν.* The reference is to Eth. Eudem. vii. 10, 9.

The Eudemian Ethics have suffered more from time than the Nicomacheans. The text is notoriously corrupt. Schleiermacher speaks of some pages of the 7th book as absolutely chaotic. Parts of the work are evidently lost, as, for instance, the 8th book refers to a previous mention of *καλοκαγαθία*, which is now not to be found. And so also there are numerous unfulfilled promises. As they stand, these Ethics consist of eight (15) books, of which the last is incomplete. With regard to their contents,

Books I. and II. correspond with Eth. Nic I.—III. 5.

Book III. corresponds with Eth. Nic. III. 5.—IV.

Books IV. V. VI. are *word for word identical* with Eth. Nic. V. VI. VII.

Book VII. contains in a compressed form Eth. Nic. VIII. and IX.

Book VIII. is a mere fragment, of which the beginning is wanting. It contains entirely new matter, namely, certain *ἀπορίαι* as to the possibility of misusing Virtue, and as to the nature of Good Fortune. After which it discusses *καλοκαγαθία*. Though very obscure, it contributes more than any other part of the work to show what is the point of view of the Eudemian Ethics, and in what they differ from the Nicomacheans. It appears as if Eudemus while accepting and reproducing, without originality, the conclusions of Aristotle on separate questions, had yet altered in some degree the grounds of the entire science. In the first place there is little trace in this work of the systematic connection between Ethics and Politics. The greatness of Aristotle's idea is accordingly lost; the treatise is one for the individual. For this separation no justification is given, it is an arbitrary application of Aristotle's results out

(15) Printed as seven books in Bekker's Edition. But in some MSS. the last three chapters are placed separate, and they certainly stand by themselves.

of their proper context. This same character pervades the whole treatise. It is like a modern system of popular morality, where, though the conclusions may be in themselves undeniable, yet no depth, nothing fine or philosophical is to be found in the entire view. In fact, the Eudemian Ethics might be said exactly to fulfil that conception which some persons by a mistake entertain of the Nicomacheans, namely, that they are a "practical" treatise; meaning by practical, moralising without philosophy. This accusation however is not to be pushed too far. It is only on a comparison with Aristotle or Plato that the work of Eudemus seems to fall short in philosophy. We have only to compare it with a work like the *Παραινέσεις* of Isocrates, to recognise how far it is above such a shallow system of prudential morality. There is no denying an interest and even a sort of beauty in some of those parts of Eudemus which are most entirely his own. Take for instance the concluding passage on *καλοκαγαθία*. Aristotle having represented Contemplation as the highest human good, Eudemus seems to have set aside this idea, and to have substituted for it that of *καλοκαγαθία*, the aggregate and perfection of moral virtues. The aim and standard of this perfect quality he makes the service and contemplation of God, so that the passions are to be subdued, and all external goods only chosen in so far as they may be subservient to that end. viii. 3. 15. *Ἥτις οὖν αἵρεσις, καὶ κτῆσις τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ποιήσει τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μάλιστα θεωρίαν, ἢ σώματος ἢ χρημάτων ἢ φίλων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, αὕτη ἀρίστη, καὶ οὗτος ὁ ὅρος κάλλιστος. Εἴ τις δ' ἢ δι' ἔνδειαν, ἢ δι' ὑπερβολὴν, κωλύει τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν, αὕτη δὲ φαύλη. Ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ οὗτος τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ ὅρος ἄριστος, τὰ ἥκιστα αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ ἄλλου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ τοιοῦτον. Τίς μὲν οὖν ὅρος τῆς καλοκαγαθίας, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν ἔστω εἰρημένον.* This elevated passage enters upon a subject which we do not find discussed by Aristotle; namely, the connection between religion and life. As far as we can judge of Aristotle's opinions on this question, the above passage gives a different view from his. The words *θεραπεύειν τὸν θεὸν*, imply a different conception of the Deity from that which we are accustomed to find in Aristotle. And the connection here made between moral virtue and theological contemplation, is opposed

to the great distinction made by Aristotle between the speculative and the practical side of human nature.

The so-called Magna Moralia consist of two books. The conclusion of the second seems wanting. Here very probably would have come in something analogous to the passage just quoted from Eudemus. The writer of this work seems to have had before him not only the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, but also some other source, perhaps the writings or the traditions of Theophrastus. To this latter authority we might attribute the slight novelties that occur, as, for instance, the sketch of the history of Morals, I. i. 4—8; an expanded statement of the import of the word *τἀγαθὸν*, I. i. 10. 2. 11. (which, in its arid logical clearness, forms a sort of Scholium upon Aristotle); the *ἀπορίαι* on Justice, II. 3; and certain other minor improvements and additions. Aristotle and Eudemus are both pretty equally followed; if there be a difference, the preference seems given to the latter, in the order and treatment of the separate questions. The point of view coincides, as might be expected, almost closely with that of Eudemus, though the writer in an unmeaning way announces that his treatise is a political one. In one case, however, where Eudemus had corrected Aristotle, the writer of the Magna Moralia repeats the original mis-statement, namely with regard to the doctrine of Socrates on Courage. Comparing then the three treatises together, we find in the Nicomachean Ethics an original system, in which human action is considered and analysed by the aid of those leading ideas which form the essence of Aristotle's philosophy. In the Eudemians, we have the results of the former treatise taken up, rearranged, and put out with an altered scope; the freshness of speculation has now disappeared, and an approximation is made to the popular way of thinking. In the Magna Moralia we find a dry system, a mere compendium of the preceding works, executed with terse clearness, but exhibiting the decline of the Peripatetic school; for the only originality here is one that exhausts itself in paraphrase and elucidation. The value of these two latter Peripatetic treatises, as explanatory of the Nicomachean Ethics, need not be underrated; but it consists mainly in the light thrown on particular passages, the Eude-

mians furnishing (16) learned references, and the Magna Moralia more than once supplying the office of a Scholiast. With regard to Aristotle's philosophical point of view, and all that is deeper in his Ethics, it is not too presumptuous to say, that by the study of Plato and of the earlier philosophers, and by comparing Aristotle with himself, we are placed in a position to form a truer conception than any we can find in what remains of Eudemus or of his Peripatetic imitator.

We have seen before, that as early as the second century the three Ethical treatises were ranked, *under their present names*, among the works ascribed to Aristotle. These names, at all events, require an explanation; and accordingly we find (17) Porphyry, in his Prolegomena to the Categories, gravely stating, that "Aristotle's Ethical works consisted of a treatise addressed to Eudemus his disciple; another, the great Nicomacheans, to Nicomachus his father; and a third, the little Nicomacheans, to Nicomachus his son." This guess or tradition, from whatever source derived, has been echoed pretty constantly since; and in almost all commentaries on the "little Nicomacheans," it is taken for granted that they are inscribed by Aristotle to his son Nicomachus. Samuel Petit, however, in his Miscellanea Critica, saw an improbability attaching to this story, owing to the fact, that Nicomachus must have been a young child at the time of the composition of the book. Petit remedies the difficulty by finding out in the list of Archons one named Nicomachus, and some other great man of the name of Eudemus, to whom Aristotle's books might be worthily dedicated. This is an explanation quite in accordance with the ideas of the 17th century. It is obvious, however, that not the slightest weight can be attached to the assertion of Porphyry. Aristotle's father died when he was himself quite

(16) The Eth. Eud. are remarkable for the number and explicit character of the quotations and references to poets and philosophers, which they contain. Thus they give in amplified form the Delian inscription; the saying of Anaxagoras on Happiness; of Heraclitus on Anger; a correct statement of the doctrine of Socrates on Courage, &c.

(17) Porphyr. Proleg. p. 9. *διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἠθικὸν γεγραμμένα αὐτῷ εἰσὶ τὰ Ἠθικὰ πρὸς Εὔδημον μαθητήν, καὶ ἄλλα πρὸς Νικόμαχον τὸν πατέρα τὰ μεγάλα Νικομάχια, καὶ πρὸς Νικόμαχον τὸν υἱὸν, τὰ μικρὰ Νικομάχια.*

young. And there is something absurd in the supposition, that *τὰ Μεγάλα Ἠθικὰ* means *τὰ Μεγάλα Νικομάχεια*, as being inscribed to Nicomachus the father, in opposition to *τὰ μικρὰ* those inscribed to the son. We do not find any work of Aristotle's composed with this sort of personal reference, for the *Ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον* has been proved to be spurious. Far less in the Ethics themselves is there any trace of a purpose of this kind. The stern (18) impersonality of Aristotle, and the purely scientific character of his enquiries, are quite opposed to the idea of a book composed for, or inscribed to, his son. Such an idea would imply a false view of the whole tendency of the treatise, which is not to be regarded as a practical compendium, but rather as a scientific enquiry into moral subjects. Such an idea, indeed, would have been suitable to Cicero. But it is especially remarkable that Cicero knew nothing of this story—of the Nicomacheans being addressed to Nicomachus. He knew them by their name as the Ethics *of* Nicomachus, and doubted whether they were by the father or the son (19). (De Fin. v. 5.) Indeed it is only natural that *Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια* should mean Ethics of, or by, Nicomachus, and *Ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμεια*, Ethics by Eudemus. Other works by Eudemus are quoted with a similar title; cf. Alexander Aphrod. on the Topics, p. 70. *ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἐπιγραφομένων Εὐδημείων Ἀναλυτικῶν (ἐπιγράφεται δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ Εὐδήμου ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν.)* And we can hardly continue to doubt, that the Eudemian Ethics are a treatise compiled by Eudemus on the basis of Aristotle. Those who wish against all probability to translate *Νικομάχεια*, as if it were *πρὸς Νικόμαχον*, appeal to the parallel word *Θεοδέκτεια*, mentioned in the Rhetoric of Aristotle, III. ix. 9. *Αἱ δὲ ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιόδων σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις ἐξηρίθμηνται.* They assume that this means "the Rhetoric inscribed to Theodectes." But, in fact, the contents

(18) Perhaps the most remarkable places in which this impersonality relaxes itself are, Eth. Nic. VI. 1. where his friendship for the Platonists is alluded to; and Soph. El. 33. where he speaks of his own discovery of the syllogism.

(19) In Diogenes Laertius also, the title seems to have caused a confusion with regard to the authorship. *Φησὶ δ' αὐτὸν Νικόμαχος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλους τὴν ἡδονὴν λέγειν τὸ ἀγαθόν.* (VIII. 8. 2.) This refers to the mention of Eudoxus. Eth. Nic. X. 2. 1.

of this book and the meaning of its name are equally unknown. In all probability, it was merely a treatise by Theodectes embodying some of the doctrines of Aristotle. The argument then falls to the ground. Although, according to all analogy, *Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια* must mean "Ethics by Nicomachus," yet it is impossible to consider this work in the same sense the work of Nicomachus, as the Eudemian Ethics are the work of Eudemus. It is quite certain, that if we possess any thing at all from the hand of Aristotle, the main part at all events of the Eth. Nic. are his. The share of Nicomachus reduces itself to an affair of editorship, to a redaction and publication of the MSS. How great that share has been, can only be approximately determined from internal evidence. Of the history of the life of Nicomachus, scarcely any thing is known. Eusebius (Præp. Evang. xv. 2.) quotes the following notice from Aristocles the Peripatetic. *Μετὰ δὲ τὴν Πυθιάδος τῆς Ἑρμείου τελευτὴν Ἀριστοτέλης ἔγημεν Ἑρπυλλίδα Σταγειρῖτιν, ἐξ ἧς υἱὸς αὐτῷ Νικόμαχος ἐγένετο. Τοῦτον δέ φασιν ὀρφανὸν τραφέντα παρὰ Θεοφράστῳ καὶ δὴ μειρακίσκον ὄντα ἀποθανεῖν ἐν πολέμῳ.* The fact of his being educated by Theophrastus, may have placed him in some connection with the MSS. of his father. But the statement that he died while yet a youth, in war, is not consistent with the notice of him by Suidas (sub voce), which speaks of him as a philosopher, the scholar of Theophrastus, and the author of six books of Ethics, and of a Commentary on his father's Physical Philosophy.

The name *Μεγάλα Ἠθικὰ* is an apparent anomaly, for in point of bulk this work is the least of the three treatises. Spengel thinks that the name may have been given in reference to the intended completeness of its scope. Perhaps however the most probable account may be, that the name is due to a merely external accident, to the humour of a copyist or librarian. The work may have been labelled "Great Ethics," to distinguish it from some adjacent Ethics in the library, just as we find the Hippias *μείζων* and *ἐλάττων* of Plato distinguished by these epithets from each other.

Having now exhausted some of the questions lying on the outside of the subject, we may proceed to consider the form and character of the work with which we are concerned, and

which is according to the only reasonable assumption the writing of Aristotle himself, edited by his son Nicomachus. The relation between author and editor might in cases like the present vary almost indefinitely. It is possible, on the one hand, that the editorship consisted in a mere mechanical transcription. On the other hand, it is possible that we have a mere nucleus or a mere collection of episodical fragments properly belonging to the author, while form, method, and the conception of the whole, are due to the editor. We may safely assert, however, that the latter hypothesis is not applicable to the Nicomachean Ethics. Taking the first book, and in connection with it the tenth book from the sixth chapter onwards, we cannot but feel that here is a systematic ground-work for a science conceived as a whole. In the first book the question is stated, What is the chief good or end for man? The end for the individual and the state being identified, the treatise is declared to be a part of Politics. Thus an introduction is made to the entire sphere of the Practical Sciences. And this point of view is taken up again at the close of book X. which in fact is a transition to Politics proper. But not only do the beginning and the end of the Ethics thus coincide. Besides this, we see other evidences of system equally strong in the preconceived idea of the method of the whole betraying itself in the first book. An instance of this may be noticed in the deferring of any discussion upon the Contemplative life. Had this first book been in any sense an isolated treatise, the discussion could not have been deferred. Again, Aristotle having given his definition of Happiness, and having compared it with the theories of others, the last chapter of the book opens a methodical analysis of the different parts of that definition. This analysis is based upon a distinction between Moral and Intellectual Excellence. The second book takes up the discussion,—defers the consideration of the λόγος or moral standard, and gives that table of the virtues which is afterwards followed in books third and fourth. On the whole, speaking roughly, there appears at first sight perfect logical sequence from the beginning of the first book to the end of the sixth, and between the first six books and the close of book X. Suppose we grant also

that Continence, Pleasure, and Friendship are subjects essential to Ethics, we might then say that the whole ten books possess a systematic unity,—though in truth the existence of two separate treatises on Pleasure suggests a difficulty, which some persons evade, by denying that the treatise in book VII. properly belongs to this work of Aristotle.

Further consideration must oblige us very considerably to modify these views. In the first place it soon becomes apparent, that whatever general idea of system they may contain, the Nicomachean Ethics cannot be regarded as a finished work of art. In the best of Plato's dialogues there is an organic unity, a sort of omnipresence of the writer's mind throughout the various parts of his work; there are subtle anticipations and subtle references backward; nothing seems redundant and nothing omitted. It would be in vain to look for any thing of this kind in the Ethics of Aristotle. Repetitions, unfulfilled promises, wandering from the point of view, unskilful joining of parts apparently written separate,—these things induce the conviction, that if there is an element of order and of unity in this book, there is also another element of irregularity, confusion, and patch-work. Not to leave these charges unsubstantiated, it may be as well to give some instances of each, and it will afterwards remain to state what seems the most probable hypothesis as to the composition of the work.

1. Under the head of "repetitions" may be comprehended all those parts of the book which seem unnaturally to ignore each other. The most striking instance of this is the coexistence of the two treatises on Pleasure, which the most strenuous partisan for the unity of the Ethics would never be able to justify. These treatises are absolutely independent of each other, and the latter partly repeats and partly contradicts the former. But even setting this aside, even on the supposition that only one of the two belongs to this work, how are we to justify on principles of art the arguments on the connection between Pleasure and Morals, which occur in the third chapter of book II? Would it not have been possible to find a more philosophical arrangement for this very deep and important question, the relation of Pleasure to Morals? Are not

the arguments in book II. shallow as regards the view of Pleasure, and is not the treatise in book X. too isolated as regards Morals? Another instance of repetition occurs in book V. where the voluntariness of an action is discussed in terms rendered unnecessary by what had preceded in book III. It is true that there is a reference backward, V. viii. 8. *Λέγω δ' ἑκούσιον ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, κ.τ.λ.* but this would be so natural an interpolation either of the editor or of some later hand, that no stress can be laid on it. The question is one not of external references, but of internal method and unity. Another instance might be pointed out at the beginning of book IX. The incidental mention there of proportion as determining value, constitutes a repetition, though a slight one, of the fifth chapter of book V. No writer having the earlier passage present to his mind would have in this way written the later one. Lastly, it must strike the reader as at all events strange, that the account of **Σοφία** in book VI. should contain no allusion to the discussion of Contemplation, as connected with Happiness, which is reserved for book X. and that in the latter discussion, there is no reference backward to all that had before been said upon **Σοφία**. The question raised at the end of book VI. as to whether **Σοφία** produces Happiness, is quite incompatible with any recollection of the mention of the contemplative life in book I. or any prescience of the concluding argument in book X.

2. Unfulfilled promises and fallacious references, forward as well as backward, may be genuine, or they may be interpolated. Where they are genuine, they testify to an *idea* of method, and of an extended scope. But they equally show that the idea has not been realized, that the last hand of the writer is wanting. Where they have the appearance of interpolations, they point to the composite character of the book, and to the meddling of the editor or the scribe. The first instance of the kind seems natural and genuine. I. 7, 7. *Τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον.* This question, as to where the circle is drawn round a man within which his *αὐτάρκεια* radiates, is never reconsidered.

The next instance to be noticed occurs II. 7, 16. *Ἀλλὰ περὶ*

μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν. The first part of this programme corresponds well enough to books III. IV. V. But it cannot be said that the last part corresponds to book VI. For is it there discussed, how the intellectual excellencies are mean states? On the whole, however, these last few words have so extremely suspicious an appearance, that we may almost confidently pronounce them not to have been written by Aristotle. The very phrase *λογικαὶ ἀρεταὶ* belongs to a later style than that of Aristotle. Whether Nicomachus is responsible for the sentence, is a different question. Another unfulfilled promise occurs IX. 9, 8. *Οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. Ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον.* Now "in what follows" there is no question about the nature of Pain, except so far as its nature is implied in its being the contrary of Pleasure. Certainly there is no explanation of the "indefinite" character of Pain, though in X. 3, 1. it is argued, that Pleasure is not indefinite. Probably a vague recollection of this latter point induced the editor or the copyist to introduce the reference. Viewed closely, the passage before us appears to have been written independently of book X. A reference of another kind, suggesting some difficulty, occurs in VIII. 1, 7. *Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἓν οἰόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, οὐχ ἱκανῷ πεπιστεύκασι σημείῳ· δέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει. Εἴρηται δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν.* The Scholiast on the passage observes, that something now lost appears to be referred to, *ἔοικε δὲ εἰρῆσθαι ἐν τοῖς ἐκπεπτωκόσι τῶν Νικομαχείων.* This is evidently a mere conjecture. Considering how separate the last words in the sentence stands, perhaps it is best to consider them not Aristotle's, but added on. Some commentators imagine that the reference is to the eighth chapter of book II. where the mean is shown to differ in degree and also in kind from the extremes. This may have suggested itself to the mind of a person interpolating the reference. But it is too vague and indistinct a resemblance to have been really alluded to by Aristotle. What the form of the reference would lead one to expect is, an abstract logical

discussion on the question, whether things differing in kind can be compared with each other in point of degree.

3. Much of the Ethics seems written, as if the author had first divided his subject into separate parts, and then had worked out the analysis of those parts without taking thought of their mutual relation. Thus zeal for the particular enquiries seems to overpower any consideration for the general harmonious impression. This is perhaps the extreme of the analytic tendency. The web of human life is divided into its component threads, and each thread is followed out in separation from the rest. Happiness, Pleasure, Virtue, Wisdom, Temperance, and Friendship, each have their turn. At one time Aristotle seems to speak entirely of Moral Virtue, at another time entirely of Happiness. Virtue is said to be necessary for Happiness; but in the discussion of Virtue, no allusion to Happiness is made. For Virtue, or the Mean, you must have a standard in the Practical Reason; but when the Practical Reason is defined, all mention of the Mean is omitted. This characteristic gives a disjointed appearance to the Nicomachean Ethics. Partly, it is attributable to an idiosyncracy in the mind of Aristotle. Partly, no doubt, this idiosyncracy has been aggravated by the really unfinished state of the present work. Not only in point of method do the different parts hang ill together, but there is also an inconsistency discernible in the manner of the writing. In tone and colour the first book and the tenth seem to harmonize. These seem to have been written together. Equal, if not superior, to these, both in moral elevation and in philosophical interest, we may place books VIII. and IX. In these four books, the prominence of the metaphysical conception ἐνέργεια is a token of their philosophical point of view. Books II. III. IV. seem hardly above the popular level of thought. Books V. VI. VII. are characterized by a confusion and indistinctness from which other parts of the work seem free. Books VI. and VII. are also marked by a prevalence of logical phraseology.

4. We now come to certain marks of joining and patchwork, which are so inartificial, that they need only be set down in order to be immediately recognised. VII. 10, 5.—11, 1. "The

nature of Continence and Incontinence, and the relation of these states to one another, has now been declared. But Pleasure and Pain are subjects for the consideration of the political philosopher," &c.

VII. 14, 9. "About Continence and Incontinence, and Pleasure and Pain, we have now spoken, and the nature of each, and how some of them are goods and some evils. Next we shall speak also about Friendship." VIII. 1, 1. "But after this it would follow to discuss Friendship," &c.

IX. 12, 4. "Thus far then let the discussion of Friendship go; it will follow to investigate Pleasure."

X. 1, 1. "But after this, perhaps the next point is to investigate Pleasure."

No one could imagine that such links as these would be employed to connect the parts of a work really written from end to end. The very collision between the beginnings and ends of books, the repetition in the first line of a fresh book of the same words which concluded the book before, is very awkward, and we do not find it elsewhere in Aristotle, though it is true that it appears in the Eudemian Ethics. But even passing this over, there is obviously something wrong about the arrangement of a work which first says, "Having discussed Pleasure, we may now discuss Friendship;" and some pages later, "We have now discussed Friendship, and it follows to discuss Pleasure." And the second treatise on Pleasure proceeds accordingly in the most *naïve* manner, to bring forward arguments why Pleasure should be discussed, on account of the importance of the subject, and its connection with Morals, just as though it had never been mentioned before.

The above then are some of the most salient indications of disorder and incompleteness in the Nicomachean Ethics. No hypothesis can entirely explain them away. You cannot, by dropping out so many chapters here and so many words there, make the work smooth and entire. The only course is to endeavour to form as fair an opinion as possible on the probable method in which Aristotle composed the work, and the condition in which he left it. And Nicomachus, or the copyists, may be answerable for the rest.

The most important question in this part of the subject is, as to the authorship of books V. VI. VII. We have already seen, that these books occur word for word in the Eudemian Ethics. The question is, to which of the two works do they originally and properly belong? There have been various hypotheses on the subject. The first and most moderate is that started among the moderns by Casaubon, that the treatise on Pleasure in book VII. is not by Aristotle but by Eudemus. This supposition, if we could accept it, would no doubt remove great awkwardness from the appearance of the Nicomachean Ethics But from grounds of *à priori* probability we may safely conclude that this supposition cannot be the true one. For though it is possible to conceive that the whole of these three books may have been introduced into the one treatise from the other, and may have brought along with them a superfluous discussion on Pleasure to a work already treating of the subject; it is not possible to believe that a treatise on Pleasure should be separated from its context in the Ethics of Eudemus, and unnecessarily transplanted into the Ethics of Aristotle. Moreover, if the last four chapters of book VII. were written by Eudemus and introduced here, how came it about that the remainder of book VII, and the whole of books VI. and V. written by Aristotle, were afterwards transferred to the work of Eudemus? Those who wish to operate for the benefit of the Nicomachean Ethics, must use the knife deeply or not at all. They must separate three entire books, or else leave the excrescence untouched.

The second hypothesis is that adopted by a recent editor of the Eudemian Ethics (Fritzsch), who maintains, that book V. belongs to the work of Aristotle, books VI. and VII. to that of Eudemus. For the same reasons as before, we may say that it is almost impossible to believe in this double transference. We can imagine that one treatise may have been left imperfect, or may have been mutilated, and that its deficiencies were supplied from the other. But it is hard to believe, without any external evidence, in the imperfection or mutilation of both works, and in a system of mutual accommodation arising out of the wants of each.

The only suppositions then which remain open to us, are either that the three books in question are by Aristotle, or that they are by Eudemus. If we can on other grounds allow them to be the work of Aristotle, there is no insuperable obstacle in the double treatise on Pleasure. We must at once conclude that *that* in book VII. is an earlier Essay, on which Aristotle afterwards improved. We might say, the treatise in book VII. is dialectical, merely opposing the Platonists. That in book X. is scientific, giving a more complete analysis of the subject. Instances occur in the Metaphysics of short discussions, which appear repeated in a more or less changed form. Of course a repetition of this kind is due to the editors of Aristotle. They were naturally reluctant to lose or omit any part of his writings. And hence it may have come about, that a treatise on Pleasure superseded and discarded by its author was afterwards revived and awkwardly grafted upon one of his works. It is not on the ground of these few last chapters that the genuineness of the whole three books is brought to an issue.

The chief arguments in favour of attributing these books to Aristotle are, 1. the fact that they are found in his treatise, and have been constantly received as part of it, and, in fact, are required to complete it. 2. That they appear to be quoted by Aristotle himself in the Metaphysics and Politics. 3. That at first sight they seem completely Aristotelian in style. Against these arguments might be pleaded, 1. That they are found in the work of Eudemus. And if we attribute them to Eudemus, we shall be only applying to these books the hypothesis which some would apply to the whole treatise, or even to all the works of Aristotle, namely, that they consist of the notes of his scholars. Moreover, the very name, "Ethics by Nicomachus," might suggest the probability that something might be found in a work so called, not coming purely and entirely from Aristotle.

2. An examination of the places where these books are said to be quoted, a little weakens the argument drawn from those quotations.

In Metaphys. I. 1. 17. book VI. appears to be referred to. *Εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς τίς διαφορὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν*

ἄλλων τῶν ὁμογενῶν· οὗ δ' ἕνεκα νῦν ποιούμεθα τὸν λόγον, τοῦτ' ἐστίν. κ. τ. λ.

In Politics III. 9. 3. book V. seems quoted. *ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισίν, καὶ διῄρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς.*

So too in Politics III. 12. 1. *δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ μέχρι γέ τινος ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις ἐν οἷς διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν· τί γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ δεῖν τοῖς ἴσοις ἴσον εἶμαί φασιν.*

We see about the last of these passages that it is no quotation at all, but merely an assertion that, with regard to Justice, people in general agree to a certain extent with the philosophic theory of Ethics, &c. In the second passage, there are all the marks of an interpolated reference. In the first passage, the reference is general, being to doctrine not to words. We possess no doubt the Ethical doctrine of Aristotle, as far as he had completed it, but do we possess it altogether in his own words?

3. As to the style, we must bear in mind the very close resemblance of the style of the Eudemian Ethics to that of Aristotle. Perhaps nothing in the present books might have struck us as remarkable, but for the fact that they already stand as part of the Eudemian Ethics. And this leads us to institute a closer scrutiny. And out of this scrutiny there becomes apparent something confused, and what we might call Eudemian, about the writing, and something about the philosophy, on the one hand later and more mature, on the other hand slurred and indistinct. To feel the subtle importance of the argument from style, it is necessary to be familiar with the Eudemian Ethics. Those who are so, may notice the peculiarity of manner in the following places:

(α) In the collision between the end of book IV. and the beginning of book V. *Νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν. περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον.*

(β) In the inversion of sentence V. i. 8. *δοκεῖ δὲ ὅ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης—ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἄδικος.*

(γ) In the indistinctness, V. 2. 9. *Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πλέον οὐ ταὐτόν, κ. τ. λ.* This Dr. Cardwell remedies by a change of the reading, but against the authority of the MSS.

(δ) In the obscurity, V. 8. 10. *Ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ, ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὔ.* The part of the subject in which the sentence occurs is promised, Eth. Eud. II. 10. 19. *Καλῶς διορίζονται οἱ τῶν παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια, τὰ δ' ἀκούσια, τὰ δ' ἐκ προνοίας νομοθετοῦσιν. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπισκέψει.*

(ε) In the confusion, VI. 13. 1. *Σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησὼς ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα· οὐ ταὐτὸν μέν, ὅμοιον δέ· οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν.*

(ζ) In the excessive darkness, VII. 7. 2. *ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν.*

As to the philosophy of these books, it is to be noticed that they contain the doctrine of the Practical Syllogism, which has evidently been entirely worked out since the writing of book III. or else why was it not there applied to the explanation of the Will? There is also something very mature in the formula given in book VI. for the definition of Virtue. *Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμιας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου.* Again in the use of the terms *ὅρος* and *σκοπός*, we observe something which has no parallel in other books of Aristotle, and which is apparently an innovation introduced into the system by Eudemus. Compare Eth. Nic. VI. i. 1. *Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰμημέναις ἕξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐστί τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν*—and, VI. i. 3. *ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον (δεῖ εἶναι) τίς τ' ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος*—with Eth. Eud. II. v. 8. *Τίς δ' ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὅρον ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.* As we have seen, Eudemus makes the great *ὅρος* to consist in the contemplation and service of God. Eth. Eud. VIII. iii. 16. *Τίς μὲν οὖν ὅρος τῆς καλοκαγαθίας, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔστω εἰρημένον.* Surely this new formula is a confusion of Aristotle's Ethical philosophy, for whereas before *ὀρθὸς λόγος* was made the standard of virtue, here a standard of that standard is introduced,—*καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος.* Again, does not the mention of *σκοπὸς* in this formal way (not merely in a metaphorical sense, as in Eth. Nic. I. 2. 2.) clash, as it were, with Aristotle's doctrine of *τέλος*?

Another piece of Eudemian philosophy shows itself in the theory that Virtue gives us the end, and Wisdom the means,

(or as they are here called, *τὸν σκοπὸν* and *τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον*). See Eth. Nic. VI. 12. 6. VI. 12. 10. VII. 8. 4. Whatever be the value of this doctrine in itself, it does not harmonize with the theory of moral faculties given in Eth. Nic. book III.; but it coincides perfectly with the Eudemian Ethics, where this very question is the subject of a chapter, (Eth. Eud. II. 10.) *Πότερον ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν*; With regard to the treatise on Pleasure in Eth. Nic. book VII. we may notice, that it opens with a reference back which is rather more applicable to the Eudemians than to the Nicomacheans. *Τήν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν.* This might indeed allude to Eth. Nic. II. 3. 10. *Ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ.* But the identification of Virtue and Vice with Pleasure and Pain is more definitely expressed in Eth. Eud. II. 1. 24. II. 2. 1. II. 5. 8. And it is more after Aristotle's manner to begin a treatise *without* such a reference, as we find him doing Eth. Nic. X. 1. 1. The distinctive characteristic of the treatise in book VII. as compared with the latter, seems to be, that it is less of a scientific account, and exhibits a more practical tendency. On the one hand, the formula for expressing Pleasure is less exact, and the relation of Pleasure to the Chief Good is less clearly enunciated. On the other hand, there seems to be some reference to the theory of Incontinence. While it is acknowledged that all Pleasure is not bodily Pleasure, bodily Pleasure is in reality almost exclusively discussed; and it is pointed out, how by necessities of nature and temperament men are led to run into bodily pleasures. *Καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι γίγνονται.* Not only is this practical and moral feeling characteristic of Eudemus, but also the materialistic tendency shown in these chapters, and indeed throughout book VII, was a tendency into which the Peripatetic scholars seem to have fallen, and which runs out into extremity in many of the "Problems" falsely attributed to Aristotle.

It may now be asked, Supposing our general impression with regard to these books is such as would induce us to attribute them to the hand of Eudemus, what alteration in our view of the Nicomachean Ethics will be effected? In fact, very little.

We shall still feel confident that we possess the essential traits of Aristotle's Ethical system. We shall only be led to set less value on particulars. Common sense, a knowledge of Aristotle, of philosophy, and of Greek, may soon set before us the alternatives with regard to any particular passage. And if difficulties and contradictions still remain, a just appreciation of the probable history of the composition of this work will make them seem only natural.

A comparison of the beginning and the end of the Nicomachean Ethics seems to show, that the work is constructed on a scientific frame. These first and last books seem to have been written by Aristotle himself. He probably drew out at the same time the entire plan for the intermediate books. The separate parts of his subject, divided according to this plan, he must have worked out according to his fashion at different times. And accordingly these parts have different degrees of connection with the whole, different degrees of completeness in themselves. Thus the treatises on the Voluntary, on Pleasure, and on Friendship, have all an introduction, showing that they are meant to form part of an Ethical system. But the treatise on Friendship in three places uses the phrase *καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται*, (VIII. 9, 1. VIII. 13, 1. IX. 3, 1.) to denote its own earlier chapters, as if being an independent work. It also uses the same phrase (IX 9. 5.) to denote the beginning of the entire Ethics. Thus books VIII. and IX. have a double nature; on the one hand they are a separate treatise, on the other hand part of a larger work.

Thus we see the way in which the Ethics as a whole must have grown up. Even if they are quoted in the Metaphysics or Politics, it does not follow that they were published before the death of Aristotle. Indeed it seems impossible to believe that they were so published. Probably he was carrying on the various works together, and thus would naturally refer from one which in conception was later, to one which was in conception first and in conception complete, though not actually all written down and given to the world. We have before noticed the unphilosophical appearance presented by the disconnected character of the

various parts in the Ethics, and their collisions with one another. These collisions for the most part disappear if we remove books V. VI. VII. and attribute them to another hand. Whether there was ever any thing written actually by Aristotle himself which stood in the place of these books, and from which they are paraphrased, is another question. It seems very improbable that this should have been the case. Most likely this part of Aristotle's doctrine never existed otherwise than as a conception imparted orally to his disciples. Eudemus putting it into language for the purposes of his own treatise, has introduced into it some of his own small deviations from the philosophy of Aristotle. And Nicomachus, taking these books as the nearest approach to the doctrine and to the very words of Aristotle, has accepted them just as he found them, and has grafted them on here with a view to the completion of the present system.

ESSAY II.

ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORMS IN THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE.

THE Ethics of Aristotle are different from a modern system of Morals. And the source of their peculiarity is twofold; first, that they are Greek of the age of Alexander; second, that they are Aristotelian. They not only represent the tone of Greek society, and a particular stage of the advancement of philosophy, but also they have an intimate connection with the whole of their author's system. It may indeed appear a mere truism to say, that Aristotle's Ethical views must necessarily be connected with his general views of Man physically and politically;—that they must also bear some trace of his opinions on still deeper questions, on Nature, on the Deity, and on the Human Soul;—that they must be studied therefore with some reference to his Physics, and Politics, and Metaphysics. The ideas here alluded to might be called the Material Ideas which pervade this work. They might be said to constitute, or at all events to mix themselves with, the Woof of the entire texture. Another set of ideas there is, another element, and what we might call the Warp of the fabric, and this consists in the Aristotelian Forms on which the Science is constructed. The Forms of thought which Aristotle worked out for himself are the most remarkable feature of his philosophy; he applied them to every subject; he essayed to explain every thing by them; to a great extent he has left them stamped on language ever since. The more deeply we study the Ethical treatise, the more completely we find that this too is built on the Aristotelian frame-work; that the analysis of human life and action is reduced to the scientific forms of the Aristotelian philosophy. Of these perhaps the most essential are the doctrine of the Four Causes; the opposition of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*; and the Logical Syllogism. That these forms occur repeatedly in the Ethics every one is aware.

But it may not have been remarked how deeply they influence the character of the Science, nor again how much these Metaphysical and Logical ideas are re-acted upon and changed by being brought into Ethics. Τέλος and Ἐνέργεια originally and in themselves mere Metaphysical forms, become substantive ideas full of Ethical meaning. And the Syllogism as applied to elucidate the operations of the Will, presents a new appearance. Another idea, which is now perhaps considered the most characteristic of all Aristotle's Ethical principles, namely Μεσότης, may be said to have been originally formal and of very general application. By taking the above-mentioned leading Ideas and examining them one by one, in their origin and in their application, we may learn not only to understand many a sentence that else would have remained written in an unknown language, but also to know better what was Aristotle's way of looking at Ethical questions. Out of the Parts we may hope to comprehend the Whole, and reciprocally from the Whole to throw light on the Parts.

I. Aristotle's doctrine of the Four Causes arose probably from a combination and modification of conceptions which occur separately in Plato, namely, the contrast of Matter and Form, of Means and End, of Production and Existence. Every individual object might be said to be the meeting-point of these oppositions; it is what it is by reason of the Matter out of which it has sprung, the Motive Cause which gave it birth, the Idea or Form which it realizes, the End or Object which it was intended to attain. Thus knowledge of any thing implies knowing it from these four points of view, or knowing its Four Causes. The End or Final Cause, however, as is natural, rises to an eminence beyond the other conceptions, and though it must always stand opposed to Matter, it tends to merge the other two Causes into itself. The End of any thing, that for sake of which any thing exists, can hardly be separated from the Perfection of that thing, from its Idea and Form; thus the Formal Cause or Definition becomes absorbed into the Final Cause, (*ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει.* Eth. III. 7. 6.)

In the same way the End mixes itself up with the Efficient Cause, the desire for the End gives the first impulse of Motion.

The Final Cause of any thing becomes identical with the Good of that thing, so that the End and the Good become synonymous terms. And this is not only the case with regard to individual objects, but all Nature and the whole World exist for the sake of, and in dependence on, their final cause, which is the Good. This existing as an object of contemplation and desire, though itself immovable, moves all things, (*κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε· τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον.—Ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις.* Metaph. XI. 7. 2—6.) And so the World is rendered finite, for all Nature desiring the Good and tending towards an End is harmonized and united.

In this way is the unity of Nature conceived by Aristotle, it is a unity of idea. The idea of the Good as final cause pervades the World, and the World is suspended from it. In the same form his Ethical philosophy presents itself. Human life and action are rendered finite by being directed to their End or Final Cause, the good attainable in action. The question of the Ethics is, *Τί ἐστι τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος;* And we might say, altering the words quoted from the Metaphysics,—From this principle, from the End of action, the whole of human life is suspended.

An End or Final Cause implies intelligence, implies a Mind to see and desire it. The appearance of ends and means in Nature is a proof of design in the operations of Nature, and this Aristotle distinctly recognises. (Phys. Ausc. II. 8.) When we come to Ethics, What is meant by an End of human action? For whom is this an End? Is it an End fixed by a higher intelligence? In short, is the principle of Aristotle the same as the religious principle, that Man is born to work out the purposes of his Maker? To this it must be answered, that Aristotle is indefinite in his physical theory as to the relation of God to the design exhibited in creation. And so too, he is not explicit, in the Ethics, as to God's moral government of the world. On the whole, we may say at present, that "Moral Government," in our sense of the words, does not at all form part of Aristotle's system. His point of view rather is that as physical things strive all, though unconsciously, after the Good attainable by them under their several limitations; so Man

may consciously strive after the Good attainable in life. We do not find in the Ethics the expression *τέλος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, but, *τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος*, (I. 7. 8.) *τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τέλος*, (X. 6. 1.) *τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν*. (I. 13. 5.) It is best therefore to exclude religious associations (as being un-Aristotelian) from our conception of the Ethical *τέλος*, and then we may be free to acknowledge that it is evidently meant to have a definite relation to the nature and constitution of Man. Thus Aristotle assumes that the desires of Man are so framed as to imply the existence of this *τέλος*. (Eth. I. 2. 1.) And he asserts that Man can only realize it in the sphere of his own proper functions, (*ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, I. 7. 10.) and in accordance with the law of his proper nature and its harmonious development, (*κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν*, I. 7. 15.)

Is man then, according to this system, to be regarded similarly to one of the flowers of the field, which obeying the law of its organization springs and blooms and attains its own peculiar perfection? This is no doubt one side, so to speak, of Aristotle's view. But there is also another side. For, while each part of the Creation realizes its proper End, and, in the language of the Bible, "is very good," this End exists not *for* the inanimate or unconscious creatures themselves, it only exists *in* them. But the Ethical *τέλος* not only exists *in* Man, but also *for* Man; not only is the Good realized in him, but it is recognised by him as such; it is the End not only of his nature, but also of his desires; it stands before his thoughts and wishes and highest consciousness as the Absolute, that in which he can rest, that which is in and for itself desirable. (*ἁπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἀεί*. I. 7. 4.) The Ends of physical things are for other minds to contemplate, they are Ends objectively. But Ends of Moral beings are Ends subjectively, realized by and contemplated by those moral beings themselves. The Final Cause then in Ethics is viewed, so to speak, from the inside. Or rather the peculiarity is that the objective and the subjective sides of the conception both have their weight in Aristotle's system, and are run into one another. The *τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν*, or Absolute End of Action, has two forms, which are not clearly separated; in the first place it is repre-

sented subjectively as Happiness, and in the second place objectively as the Right.

It has been said, that the ancient Ethical systems were theories of the Chief Good, rather than theories of Duty. And Kant brings against Aristotle the charge, that his system is one of mere Eudæmonism. It is true that the idea of Duty is not, and could not have been, a leading idea in the Ethics of Aristotle. Duty, as implying individual responsibility, and self-abnegation in obedience to a universal law, is a later notion than Aristotle. Partly this is due to the Stoics, partly to the deeper Psychology of modern times. Also it may be truly said, that there is not a very deep conception of Morality in Aristotle, and this we shall have occasion to notice more and more as we proceed. But if by Eudæmonism is meant, that Aristotle's system is based on the idea of human enjoyment; or that it approaches Epicurism; or that it recommends Virtue as a means to Happiness; neither of these accusations would be true. It is a mere popular statement of the main question of the Ethics to ask, What is Happiness? (Cf. Eth. I. 4. 2.) The question rather is, What is the Chief Good for Man? This Aristotle translates into his own formula, introducing the whole train of associations that this formula carries with it, and asks, What in human life and action is the End-in-itself?

The answer to this question is, that the absolute all-sufficient End-in-itself can only be considered as attainable in a whole life, (*ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ*, I. 7. 16.) This great End will be the sum of all means, the development and satisfaction of all powers and desires. But also in the separate parts of life, in the development of each of the various faculties, Aristotle considered that a *τέλος* was attainable. A good and noble act was an End-in-itself. And this in two ways, both as the perfection of our nature, and as a satisfaction to the mind. Thus he says, "the same qualities constitute the perfection of a moral act, as do the perfection of the formed moral character." (Eth. III. 7. 6. *τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν.*) Again, "In spite of painful circumstances, it would seem that the perfection of our nature in point of Courage is pleasant." (III. 9. 3. *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ.*) And a little further,

"It is not given us to act with pleasure in all the virtues, except in so far as a man is attaining to the perfection of his nature." (III. 9. 5. Οὐ δὴ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται.) We see here that the τέλος is not separated from the consciousness of the τέλος. It would seem more natural to say, that *the sense* of attaining to perfection is pleasant, but it is evident that Aristotle half uses τέλος to denote 'that which is in itself desirable,' and so he runs the objective and subjective sides of the conception together. In the pleasure which he speaks of as attaching to the moral τέλος, we see something which answers to what we should call the approval of Conscience. Only to say that Aristotle meant this, would be to mix up things modern and ancient. With him it rather is that a good action is an End-in-itself, as being that for the sake of which (οὗ ἕνεκα) our moral faculties before existed, and also as that in which the mind can rest pleased and acquiescent. To show how Aristotle confuses the notions of the Good as Right, and the Good as Happiness, we may compare the passage III. 7. 2. τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς, where "the Beautiful" is spoken of as the end of Virtue; with I. 9. 3. where Happiness is called the end and prize of Virtue, (τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἆθλον καὶ τέλος.) The same thing occurs VI. 2. 5. where it is said, that a moral act is an absolute end, ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου. "For doing well is an end, and this end is what we desire." Here εὐπραξία is an ambiguous word, meaning rather faring well, than acting well; and so a transition is made from the notion of the moral worth of an action, to that of the happiness attainable by it.

There is something fine in this theory, which acknowledges the worth of particular acts, and idealizes the importance of the passing moment. Each moment has a capability to be converted out of being a mere means, a mere link in the chain of life, to be an End-in-itself, something in which life is, as it were, summed up. Rarely, however, as Aristotle himself confesses, is this attained by men, and often they mistake for an end that which is truly no end. (Politics, VIII. 5, 12.) Ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀλιγάκις γίγνεσθαι. . . . . Συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδίας τέλος· ἔχει γὰρ ἴσως ἡδονήν τινα καὶ

τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν· ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην, λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ταύτην ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων ἔχειν ὁμοίωμά τι. "Now in fact men are rarely engaged with what has absolute worth. But they come to regard amusements as such, because the absolute good contains a sort of pleasure, which is really quite peculiar to itself; whereas men, being in search of this, seize in its place the pleasure derived from amusements, on account of this latter having some sort of resemblance to the satisfaction which the mind feels in an act which is not a Means, but an End-in-itself."

If in Action, and in an exercise of the moral faculties, an End is attainable, this is, according to the system of Aristotle, only faintly and imperfectly an End, compared with what is attainable in Contemplation by the exercise of the philosophic thought. Aristotle draws a greater line of separation between Action and Speculation than Plato had done. One of the main objects of these Ethics seems to have been, to distinguish what Plato had fused, to separate the Will from the Reason, Speculative from Practical Thought, Virtue from Philosophy. This course, while it serves the purpose of analytic clearness, tends also to impair the view of both sides of our nature. It tends to lower Morality, and to deprive Philosophy of its human character. It is closely connected with that doctrine, which we shall have to notice hereafter, that Moral Virtue is unworthy of being attributed to the gods. In both senses of the word τέλος, both as perfection and as happiness, Aristotle seems to have placed Virtue below Philosophy. Philosophy is in the first place the highest human excellence; it is the development of the highest faculty. (Eth. X. 7, 1. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὔλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου, κ. τ. λ.) In the second place, it contains the most absolute satisfaction, it is most entirely desirable for its own sake, and not as a means to any thing else. (X. 7, 5. Δόξαι τ' ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι' αὑτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι.) Whereas the Practical Virtues are all in a sense Means to this. Courage is for War, which is for the sake of the fruition of Peace; and in what does this consist? If the practical side of our nature be summed up in the one faculty Wisdom (φρόνησις), this may be regarded after all as subordinate

and instrumental to Philosophy (*Σοφία*), the perfection of the speculative side. (Eth. VI. 13, 8. *Ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνη.*) So too in Politics, the End, or in other words the highest perfection and the highest happiness, being identical for the State and the Individual, in what is this constituted? Not in the busy and restless action of war or diplomacy, not in means and measures to some ulterior result, but in those thoughts and contemplations which find their end and satisfaction in themselves. Philosophy, therefore, and Speculation are, according to Aristotle, the End not only of the Individual, but also of the State. (Pol. VII. 3, 8.) *Ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. Ἀλλ' τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, καθάπερ οἴονταί τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν γιγνομένας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πόλυ μᾶλλον τὰς αὐτοτέλεις καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις.* " If it be true to say, that Happiness consists in doing-well, a life of action must be best both for the State, and for the Individual. But we need not, as some do, suppose that a life of action implies relation to others, or that those only are active thoughts which are concerned with the results of action; but far rather we must consider those speculations and thoughts to be so which have their end in themselves, and which are for their own sake."

A moment of contemplative thought (*θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια*) is most perfectly and absolutely an End. It is sought for no result but for itself. It is a state of peace, which is the crown of all exertion (*ἀσχολούμεθα ἵνα σχολάζωμεν*). It is the realization of the divine in Man, and constitutes the most absolute and all sufficient happiness, (Eth. X. 8. 7. *ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία θεωρητικὴ τίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια,*) being, as far as possible in human things, independent of external circumstances. (X. 7. 4. *Ἥ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη.*) This then constitutes the fullest answer to the great question of Ethics, What is the Chief Good, or *Τί ἐστι τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος*; The End-in-itself renders Life a rounded whole, like a work of Art, or a product of Nature. The knowledge of it is to give definiteness to the aims, " so that we shall be now like archers knowing what to shoot at." (Eth. I.

2. 2.) In the realization of it we are to feel that there need be no more reaching onwards toward infinity, for all the desires and powers will have found their satisfaction. (I. 2. 1.) Closely connected then is this system with the view, (to be discussed afterwards,) that what is finite is good. "Life," says Aristotle, "is a good to the good man because it is finite." (Eth. IX. 9. 7.) Accordingly Life can and must realize its own End. In this doctrine is there not something hard? No place is left for what is the portion of many,—disappointed hopes, broken resolutions, frustrated purposes, the attitude of submission, and the trust that this is not all. No place is left for the feeling which seems natural to humanity, that there is no absolute End, for even the highest and purest satisfactions have the alloy, that they cannot last for ever; and that we cannot even wish them to last, for the Soul seems always necessitated to go on to something better. Let us then acknowledge both the good and the bad sides of this philosophy. Its good side is, that it is calm and joyous, that it accepts the present and recognises its worth, that it sees noble capabilities in the human soul. Its fault is that its view is too restricted; that it leaves too much of life unexplained; that it is a philosophy for the few and not for the many, a philosophy for the strong and not for the weak. For would it not be a mockery to point out to the weak and the miserable the all-sufficient End which is attainable in noble acts and philosophic thoughts? Aristotle in depicting the End-in-itself has drawn his own ideal of human good. Is this any thing more than an ideal? Does he himself consider that it can be realized? Practically he would say, that "Men are rarely in possession of the End." (Pol. VIII. 5. 12.) Practically, we must accept the caution of Solon, and abide the conclusion before calling a man happy, "Since happiness is something perfect and absolute." (Eth. I. 10. 15. *ἐπειδὴ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τέλος καὶ τέλειον τίθεμεν πάντῃ πάντως.*) "Philosophic thought will be absolutely perfect happiness if extended over a whole life. For in happiness there must be no short-coming." (X. 7. 7.) In similar sayings, Happiness or the End is represented as something to which we may be always tending, rather than as any thing ever actually attained. In this sense, as a whole,

Happiness must remain a pure ideal. But in its parts, in the separate moments of moral action and of thought, Aristotle no doubt considered the realization of an absolute End possible. And in his view of the philosophic consciousness, the hard lines of his theory as to the finite character of life are to some degree softened. For in a half-mysterious way he here represents a drawing near to the divine, and a rising out of the sphere of humanity.

II. "Actuality" is perhaps the nearest philosophical representative of the Ἐνέργεια of Aristotle. It is derived from it through the Latin of the Schoolmen, actus being their translation of ἐνέργεια, out of which the longer and more abstract form has grown. The word "energy," which comes more directly from ἐνέργεια, has ceased to convey the philosophical meaning of its original, being restricted to the notion of force and vigour. The employment of the term "Energy," as a translation of Ἐνέργεια, has been a material hindrance to the proper understanding of Aristotle. This is especially the case with regard to the Ethics, where there is an appearance of plausibility, though an utterly fallacious one, in such a translation. To substitute "Actuality" in the place of "Energy" would certainly have this advantage, that it would point to the Metaphysical conception, lying at the root of all the various applications of Ἐνέργεια. But "Actuality" is a word with far too little flexibility to be adapted for expressing all these various applications. No conception equally plastic with Ἐνέργεια, and at all answering to it, can be found in modern thought. And therefore there is no term which will uniformly translate it. Our only course can be, first to endeavour to understand its philosophical meaning as part of Aristotle's system, and secondly to notice its special applications in a book like the Ethics. Any rendering of its import in the various places where it occurs must be rather of the nature of paraphrase than of translation.

Ἐνέργεια is not more accurately defined by Aristotle, than as the correlative and opposite of δύναμις. He implies, that we must rather feel its meaning than seek to define it. "Actuality" may be in various ways opposed to "Potentiality," and the

import of the conceptions depends entirely on their relation to each other. Metaphys. VIII. 2, 4. *Ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα, μὴ οὕτως ὥσπερ λέγομεν δυνάμει. Λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει, οἷον, ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἑρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ τὴν ἡμίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθείη ἂν, καὶ ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἐάν δυνατὸς ᾖ θεωρῆσαι· τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ· δῆλον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ, ὃ βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντὸς ὅρον ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν,—ὅτι ὡς τὸ οἰκοδομοῦν πρὸς τὸ οἰκοδομικόν· καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς πρὸς τὸ καθεῦδον· καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ μύον μέν, ὄψιν δὲ ἔχον· καὶ τὸ ἀποκεκριμένον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὴν ὕλην· καὶ τὸ ἀπειργασμένον πρὸς τὸ ἀνέργαστον. Ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς θάτερον μόριον ἔστω ἡ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀφωρισμένη, θατέρῳ δὲ τὸ δυνατόν. Λέγεται δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ οὐ πάντα ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πρὸς τοῦτο. Τὸ δ' ἐν τῷδε ἢ πρὸς τόδε. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς κίνησις πρὸς δύναμιν, τὰ δ' ὡς οὐσία πρός τινα ὕλην.* "Now *Ἐνέργεια* is the existence of a thing not in the sense of its potentially existing. The term "potentially" we use, for instance, of the statue in the block, and of the half in the whole, (since it might be subtracted,) and of a person knowing a thing, even when he is not thinking of it, but might do so; whereas *ἐνεργείᾳ* is the opposite. By applying the various instances our meaning will be plain, and one must not seek a definition in each case, but rather grasp the conception of the analogy as a whole,—that it is, as that which builds to that which has the capacity for building; as the waking to the sleeping; as that which sees to that which has sight, but whose eyes are closed; as the definite form to the shapeless matter; as the complete to the unaccomplished In this contrast, let the *ἐνέργεια* be set off as forming the one side, and on the other let the potential stand. Things are said to be *ἐνεργείᾳ* not always in like manner, (except so far as there is an analogy, that as this thing is in this or related to this, so is that in that or related to that,) for sometimes it implies motion as opposed to the capacity for motion, and sometimes complete existence opposed to undeveloped matter."

The word *Ἐνέργεια* does not occur in Plato, though the opposition of the "virtual" and the "actual" may be found implicitly contained in (1) some parts of his writings. Perhaps

(1) Cf. Theætetus, p. 157. *Οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστί τι, πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι ξυνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι, κ. τ. λ.*

the only genuine passage now extant of any writer previous to Aristotle (2) in which it occurs, is Philolaus, apud Stob. Ecl. Phys. I. 20, 2. It is the substantive form of the adjective *ἐνεργής*, which is to be found in Xenophon. Memorab. III. 5. 11. and in Aristotle's Topics, I. 12. 1. But Aristotle, by a false etymology, seems to connect it immediately with the words (3) *ἐν ἔργῳ*. To all appearance the idea of its opposition to *δύναμις* was first suggested by the Megarians, who asserted that "nothing could be said to have a capacity for doing any thing, unless it was in the act of doing that thing." *Εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ φασιν, οἷον οἱ Μεγαρικοὶ, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι, οἷον τὸν μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν.* This assertion itself was part of the dialectic of the Megarians, by which they endeavoured to establish the Eleatic principles, and to prove by the subtleties of the reason, against all evidence of the senses, that the world is absolutely one, immovable, and unchangeable. We cannot be exactly certain of the terms employed by the Megarians themselves in expressing the above-quoted position, for Aristotle is never very accurate about the exact form in which he gives the (4) opinions of earlier philosophers. We cannot be sure whether the Megarians said precisely *ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι.* But at all events they said something equivalent, and Aristotle taking the suggestion worked out the whole theory of the contrast between *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, in its almost universal applicability.

At first these terms were connected, apparently, with the idea of (5) motion. But since *δύναμις* has the double meaning of "possibility of existence" as well as "capacity of action," there arose the double contrast of action opposed to the capacity for

(2) *Διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν κόσμον ἦμεν ἐνέργειαν ἀΐδιον θεῶ τε καὶ γενέσιος κατὰ συνακολουθίαν τὰς μεταβλατικᾶς φύσιος.*

(3) Cf. Metaphys. VIII. 8, 11. *Διὸ καὶ τοὔνομα λέγεται ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὸ ἔργον καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν.*

(4) Cf. Metaph. XI. 2. 3. *καὶ ὡς Δημόκριτός φησιν, ἦν δμοῦ πάντα δυνάμει ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὔ.* XI. 6. 7. *Διὸ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ ἐνέργειαν, οἷον Λεύκιππος καὶ Πλάτων.* In these passages Aristotle expresses the ideas of his predecessors in his own formulæ.

(5) Metaph. VIII. 3. 9. *Ἐλήλυθε δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια τοὔνομα, ἡ πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων μάλιστα, δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια μάλιστα ἡ κίνησις εἶναι.*

action; actual existence opposed to possible existence or potentiality. To express accurately this latter opposition Aristotle seems to have introduced the term *Ἐντελέχεια*, of which the most natural account is, that it is a compound of *ἐν τέλει ἔχειν*, "being in the state of perfection," an adjective (6) *ἐντελεχὴς* being constructed on the analogy of *νουνεχής*. But in fact this distinction between *ἐντελέχεια* and *ἐνέργεια* is (7) not maintained. The former word is of comparatively rare occurrence, while we find every where throughout Aristotle *ἐνέργεια*, as he says, *πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη* "mixed up with the idea of complete existence." As we saw above, it is contrasted with *δύναμις*, sometimes as implying motion, sometimes as "form opposed to matter."

In Physics *δύναμις* answers to the necessary conditions for the existence of any thing before that thing exists. It thus corresponds to *ὕλη*, both to the *πρώτη ὕλη*, or matter absolutely devoid of all qualities, which is capable of becoming any definite substance, as for instance marble; and also to the *ἔσχατη ὕλη*, or matter capable of receiving form, as marble the form of the statue. Marble then exists *δυνάμει* in the simple elements before it is marble. The statue exists *δυνάμει* in the marble before it is carved out. All objects of thought exist either purely *δυνάμει*, or purely *ἐνεργείᾳ*, or both *δυνάμει* and *ἐνεργείᾳ*. This division makes an entire chain of all the world. At the one end is matter, the *πρώτη ὕλη*, which has a merely potential existence, which is necessary as a condition, but which having no form and no qualities, is totally incapable of being realized by the mind. So it is also with the infinitely small or great; they exist always as possibilities, but, as is obvious, they never can be actually grasped by the perception. At the other end of the chain is God, *οὐσία ἀΐδιος καὶ ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως*, who cannot be thought of as non-existing, as otherwise than actual, who is the Absolute, and the Unconditioned. Between these two

(6) De Gen. et Corr. II. 10. 11. *συνεπλήρωσε τὸ ὅλον ὁ θεὸς ἐντελεχῆ ποιήσας τὴν γένεσιν.*

(7) Cf. Metaph. VIII. 1. 2. *ἐπὶ πλέον γάρ ἐστιν ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῶν μόνον λεγομένων κατὰ κίνησιν.* Eth. VII. 14. 8. *Οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας.*

extremes is the whole row of creatures, which out of potentiality spring into actual being. In this theory we see the affinity between *δύναμις* and matter, *ἐνέργεια* and form. Thus Aristotle's conceptions are made to run into one another. Another affinity readily suggests itself, and that is between *ἐνέργεια* and *τέλος*. The progress from *δύναμις* to *ἐνέργεια* is motion or production, (*κίνησις* or *γένεσις*.) But this motion or production, aiming at or tending to an End, is in itself imperfect (*ἀτελής*), it is a mere process not in itself and for its own sake desirable. And thus arises a contrast between *κίνησις* and *ἐνέργεια*, for the latter if it implies motion, is a motion desirable for its own sake, having its End in itself. Viewed relatively, however, *κίνησις* may sometimes be called *ἐνέργεια*. In reference to the capacity of action before existing, the action calls out into actuality that which was before only potential. Thus, for instance, in the process of building a house there is an *ἐνέργεια* of what was before the *δύναμις οἰκοδομική*. Viewed however in reference to the house itself, this is a mere process to the end aimed at, a *γένεσις*, or if it be called *ἐνέργεια*, it must strictly speaking be qualified as *ἐνέργειά τις ἀτελής* (8). In short, just as the term *τέλος* is relatively applied to very subordinate ends, so too *ἐνέργεια* is relatively applied to what is from another point of view a mere *γένεσις* or *κίνησις*. This we find in Eth. I. 1. 2. *διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δέ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά.*

Having traced some of the leading features of this distinction between *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, we may now proceed to observe how this form of thought stamped itself upon Ethics. We may ask, How is the Category of the Actual brought to bear upon Moral questions, and how far is it reacted upon by Moral associations? At the very outset of Aristotle's theory it appears. As soon as the proposition has been laid down that the chief good for man is only attainable in his proper work, and that this proper work is a peculiar kind of life, *πρακτική τις* (*ζωὴ*) *τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος*, Aristotle proceeds to assume (*θετέον*) that this life must be no mere possession (*καθ' ἕξιν*) of certain powers and latent tendencies, but "in actuality, for this is the distinctive form of the conception." *Διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ'*

(8) Metaph. X. 9. 11.

ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. He then transforms the qualifying term *κατ' ἐνέργειαν* into a substantive idea, and makes it the chief part of his definition of the supreme good. *Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον, κ.τ.λ.—εἰ δ' οὕτω τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετήν.* Thus the Metaphysical category of *ἐνέργεια*, which comes first into Ethics merely as a form of thought, becomes henceforth material. It is identified with Happiness, (I. 13. 1. *Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετήν.* Cf. I. 10. 1. IX. 9. 5. X. 6. 2.) In short, it becomes an Ethical idea.

In this connection (like its cognate *τέλος*) *Ἐνέργεια* becomes at once something mental. It takes a subjective character, as existing now both in and for the mind. Moreover, in an exactly parallel way to the use of *τέλος*, it receives a double application. On the one hand it is applied to express moral action and the development of the moral powers, on the other hand to happiness and the fruition of life. It is in its latter meaning that *Ἐνέργεια* is most purely subjective. Taken as a formula to express Aristotle's theory of Virtue, we may consider it as applied in its more objective and simpler sense, though even here it is mixed up with Psychological associations. We shall see how under newly-invented Metaphysical forms Aristotle accounts for the moral nature of Man.

Aristotle divides *δυνάμεις* into physical and mental. Metaph. VIII. 2. 1. *Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται, αἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονται ἄλογοι, αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου.* Of these mental *δυνάμεις* it is characteristic that they are equally capacities of producing contraries, while the physical are restricted to one side of two contraries. The capacity of heat, for instance, is capable of producing heat alone, whereas the *δύναμις ἰατρική*, as being a mental capacity and connected with the discursive reason, can produce indifferently either health or sickness. From this Aristotle deduces the first step of the doctrine of free-will, namely, that the mind is not bound by any physical necessity. For he argues, that given the requisite active and passive conditions, there is a necessity for a physical *δύναμις* to act or suffer in a particular way; but since the mental

δύναμις is equally a capacity of contraries, if there were any necessity for its development, it must be necessitated to produce contraries at the same time, which is impossible. Therefore there must be some other influence which controls the mental δύναμις, and determines into which side of the two contraries it shall be developed, and this is either desire or reasonable purpose. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον. Λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὄρεξιν ἢ προαίρεσιν. Metaphys. VIII. 5. 2. Connected with this point is another of still greater importance for the Ethical theory. Not only in the use and exercise of a moral or mental δύναμις is the individual above the control of mere external or physical circumstances, but also the very acquirement of these δυνάμεις depends on the individual. For the higher capacities are not inherent but acquired.

In considering how this can be, we may follow the logical order of the question according to Aristotle, and ask which exists first, the δύναμις or the ἐνέργεια? The answer is, that as a conception, in point of thought (λόγῳ), the ἐνέργεια must necessarily be prior; in short, we know nothing of the δύναμις, except from our knowledge of the ἐνέργεια. In point of time (χρόνῳ) the case is different; each individual creature exists first δυνάμει, afterwards ἐνεργείᾳ. This assertion, however, must be confined to each individual, for as a necessity of thought we are led to refer the potential existence of each thing to the actual existence of something before, (a flower, for instance, owes its potential existence in the seed to the actual existence of another flower before it,) and so the world is eternal, for an ἐνέργεια must be supposed as everlastingly pre-existing. But even in the individual there are some things in which the ἐνέργεια seems prior to the δύναμις; there are things which the individual seems to have no "power of doing" until he does them; he acquires the power, in fact, by doing them. Metaphys. VIII. 8. 6. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ἀδύνατον εἶναι οἰκοδόμον εἶναι μὴ οἰκοδομήσαντα μηθὲν, ἢ κιθαριστὴν μηθὲν καθαρίσαντα· ὁ γὰρ μανθάνων κιθαρίζειν κιθαρίζων μανθάνει κιθαρίζειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. This phenomenon gives rise to a classification of δυνάμεις into the physical, the passive, and the inherent on the one hand, and the mental or acquired on the other. Metaphys. VIII. 5. 1. Ἁπασῶν δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐσῶν τῶν

μὲν συγγενῶν, οἷον τῶν αἰσθήσεων· τῶν δὲ ἔθει, οἷον τῆς τοῦ αὐλεῖν· τῶν δὲ μαθήσει, οἷον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προενεργήσαντας ἔχειν ὅσαι ἔθει καὶ λόγῳ· τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν οὐκ ἀνάγκη. The merely physical capacities of our nature exist independent of any act or effort on the part of the individual. Eth. I. 13. 11. *τὴν ταιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς (τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι) ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τρεφομένοις θείη τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις—δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐναργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὕτη.* And so also is it with the senses, Eth. II. 1. 4. *τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν.* But the contrary is the case with regard to moral virtue, which does not exist in us as a capacity (*δύναμις*), in other words, not as a gift of nature (*φύσει*), previous to moral action; ibid. *τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν.* We acquire the capacity for virtue by doing virtuous things. It will be seen at once that a sort of paradox is here involved. "How can it be said that we become just by doing just things? If we do just things we are just already." The answer of Aristotle to this difficulty would seem to be as follows:

1. Virtue follows the analogy of the arts, in which the first essays of the learner may by chance or by the guidance of his master, (*ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου,*) attain a sort of success and an artistic appearance, but the learner is no artist as yet.

2. These "just acts," by which we acquire justice, are on nearer inspection not really just; they want the moral qualification of that settled internal character in the heart and mind of the agent, without which no external act is virtuous in the highest sense of the term. They are tendencies towards the acquirement of this character, as the first essays of the artist are towards the acquirement of an art. But they are not to be confounded with those moral acts which flow from the character when developed and fixed.

3. The whole question depends on Aristotle's theory of the *ἕξις*, as related to *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*. There can be no such thing, properly speaking, as a *δύναμις τῆς ἀρετῆς*. As we have before seen, a *δύναμις*, except it be merely physical, admits of contraries. And therefore in the case of moral action, there can only be an indefinite capacity of acting either this way

or that, either well or ill, which is therefore equally a δύναμις of virtue and of vice. The ἐνέργεια in this case is determined by no intrinsic law of the δύναμις,—(ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον, loc. cit.) but by the desire or the reason of the agent. The ἐνέργεια, however, is no longer indefinite, it has at all events some sort of definiteness for good or bad. And by the principle of habit (ἔθος), which Aristotle seems to assume as an acknowledged law of human nature, the ἐνέργεια reacts upon the δύναμις, reproducing itself. Thus the δύναμις loses its indefiniteness, and passes into a definite tendency; it ceases to be a mere δύναμις, and becomes an ἕξις, that is to say, a formed and fixed character, capable only of producing a certain class of ἐνέργειαι. Briefly then, by the help of a few metaphysical terms, does Aristotle sum up his theory of the moral character. Καὶ ἑνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. And it is quite consistent with his entire view of these metaphysical categories, that he defines Virtue to be not on the one hand a δύναμις, else it would be merely physical, nor on the other hand a πάθος, (which is here equivalent to ἐνέργεια,) else it be an isolated emotion,—but a sort of ἕξις. The ἕξις, or moral state, is on the farther side, so to speak, of the ἐνέργειαι. It is the sum and result of them. If ἕξις be regarded as a sort of developed δύναμις, as a capacity acquired indeed and definite, but still only a capacity, it may naturally be contrasted with ἐνέργεια. Thus in the above-quoted passage, Eth. I. 7, 13. διττῶς ταύτης λεγομένης means καθ' ἕξιν and κατ' ἐνέργειαν, as we may see by comparing VII. 12, 2. VIII. 5, 1. From this point of view Aristotle says, that "it is possible for a ἕξις to exist, without producing any good. But with regard to an ἐνέργεια, this is not possible." I. 8, 9. On the other hand, however, the ἕξις is a fixed tendency to a certain class of actions, and if external circumstances do not forbid, will certainly produce these. The ἐνέργεια not only results in a ἕξις, but also follows from it, and the test of the formation of a ἕξις is pleasure felt in acts resulting from it. (II. 3, 1.) When Aristotle says, that there is nothing human so abiding as the ἐνέργειαι κατ' ἀρετὴν—διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους, he implies, of course, that these ἐνέργειαι are bound together by the chain of a ἕξις, of which in

his own phraseology they are the efficient, the formal, and the final cause. It is observable, that the phrase *ἐνέργειαι τῆς ἀρετῆς* occurs only twice in the Ethical treatise. (III. 5, 1. X. 3, 1.) This is in accordance with the principle, that Virtue cannot be regarded as a *δύναμις*. Therefore Aristotle seems to regard moral acts not so much as the development of a latent excellence, but rather as the development or action of our nature in accordance with a law (*ἐνέργειαι κατ' ἀρετήν*). Virtue then comes in as a regulative, rather than as a primary idea, it is introduced as subordinate, though essential, to Happiness.

When we meet phrases like this just mentioned, we translate them, most probably, into our own formulæ, into words belonging to our own moral and psychological systems. We speak of "moral acts," or "virtuous activities," or "moral energies." Thus we conceive of Aristotle's doctrine as amounting to this, that "good acts produce good habits." Practically, no doubt, his theory does come to this, and if our object in studying his theory be *οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις*, no better or more useful principle could be deduced from it. But in so interpreting him, we really strip Aristotle of all his philosophy. When he spoke of *ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν*, a wide range of metaphysical associations accompanied the expression. He was bringing the mind and moral powers of man into the entire chain of Nature, at one end of which was Matter, and at the other end God. He had in his thoughts, that a moral *ἐνέργεια* was to the undeveloped capacities, as a flower to the seed, as a statue to the block, as the waking to the sleeping, as the finite to the undefined. And he yet farther implied that this *ἐνέργεια* was no mere process or transition to something else, but contained its end in itself, and was desirable for its own sake. The distinctness of modern language, and the separation between the various spheres of modern thought, prevent us from reproducing in any one term all the various associations that attach to this formula of ancient philosophy. As said before, we must rather feel, than endeavour to express them. Hitherto we have only alluded to those conceptions which *Ἐνέργεια*, as a universal Category, imported into Ethics. We have now to advert to those which necessarily accrue to it by reason of its introduction

into this science. It is clear that a Psychical *ἐνέργεια* must be different from the same Category exhibited in any external object. Life, the Mind, the Moral Faculties, must have their "existence in actuality" distinguished from their mere "potentiality" by some special difference, not common to other existences. What is it that distinguishes vitality from the conditions of life, waking from sleeping, thought from the dormant faculties, moral action from the unevoked moral capacities? In all these contrasts there is no conception that nearer approaches towards summing up the distinction than that of "Consciousness."

Viewed from without, or objectively, *ἐνέργεια* must mean an existence fully developed in itself, or an activity desirable for its own sake, so that the mind could contemplate it without seeing in it a means or a condition to any thing beyond. But when taken subjectively, as being an *ἐνέργεια* of the mind itself, as existing not only *for* the mind but also *in* the mind, it acquires a new aspect and character. Henceforth it is not only the rounded whole, the self-ending activity, the blooming of something perfect, in the contemplation of which the mind could repose; but it is the mind itself called out into actuality. It springs out of the mind and ends in the mind. It is not only life, but the sense of life; not only waking, but the feeling of the powers; not only perception or thought, but a consciousness of one's own faculties as well as of the external object. This conscious vitality of the life and the mind is not to be considered a permanent condition, but one that arises in us. (Eth. IX. 9. 5. *γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι.*) Oftenest it is like a thrill of joy, a momentary intuition. Were it abiding, if our mind were capable of a perpetual *ἐνέργεια*, we should be as God, who is *ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως*. But that which we attain to for a brief period gives us a glimpse of the divine, and of the life of God. Metaph. XI. *Διαγωγὴ δ' ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν· οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν (ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον) ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἴσθησις νόησις ἥδιστον, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα.* "The life of God is of a kind with those highest moods which with us last a brief space, it being impossible that they should be permanent, whereas with Him they are permanent, since His ever-present consciousness is pleasure

itself. And it is because they are vivid states of consciousness that waking and perception and thought are the sweetest of all things, and in a secondary degree hope and memory."

This passage seems of itself an almost sufficient answer to those who would argue, that Aristotle did not mean to imply consciousness in his definition of happiness. If our happiness, which is defined as *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*, gives us a conception of the blessedness of God, which is elsewhere defined as the "thinking upon thought," we can hardly escape the conclusion, that it is the deepest and most vivid consciousness in us that constitutes our happiness. The more this idea is followed out, the more completely will it be found applicable to the theory of Aristotle; the more will it justify his philosophy and be justified by it. But here it is necessary to confess, that in using the term "Consciousness" to express the chief import of *ἐνέργεια*, as applied to the mind and to the theory of happiness, we are using a distinct modern term, whereas the ancient one was indistinct; we are making explicit what was only implicit in Aristotle; we are rather applying to him a deduction from his principles than exactly representing them in their purest form. Aristotle never *says* "Consciousness," though we see he meant it. But one of the peculiarities of his philosophy was the want of subjective formulæ, and a tendency to confuse the subjective and the objective together. About *ἐνέργεια* itself Aristotle is not consistent; sometimes he treats it purely as objective, separating the consciousness from it; as, for instance, Eth. IX. 9. 9. *ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν.* "There is somewhat in us that takes cognizance of the exercise of our powers." Again, X. 4. 7. *τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐπιγνόμενόν τι τέλος.* "Pleasure is a sort of superadded perfection, making perfect the exercise of our powers." But this is at variance with his usual custom; for not only is pleasure defined in book VII. (whether by Aristotle or Eudemus) as *ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος*, but also Happiness is universally defined as *ἐνέργεια*. And if we wish to see the term applied in an undeniably subjective way, we may look to Eth. IX. 7. 6. *Ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἡ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἡ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἡ μνήμη*, where we can hardly help translating, "the actual consciousness of

the present" as contrasted with "the hope of the future," and "the memory of the past." In a similar context, De Memoriâ I. 4. we find, Τοῦ μὲν παρόντος αἴσθησις, κ. τ. λ.

In saying that the idea of "consciousness" is implied in, and might almost always be taken to represent, Aristotle's Ethical application of *ἐνέργεια*, we need not overshoot the mark, and speak as if Aristotle made the Summum Bonum to consist in Self-consciousness or Self-reflection; that would be giving far too much weight to the subjective side of the conception *ἐνέργεια*. Aristotle's theory rather comes to this, that the Chief Good for man is to be found in life itself. Life, according to his philosophy, is no means to any thing ulterior; in the words of Goethe, "Life itself is the end of life." The very use of the term *ἐνέργεια*, as part of the definition of Happiness, shows, as Aristotle tells us, that he regards the Chief Good as nothing external to man, but as existing in man and for man,—existing in the evocation, the vividness, and the fruition of man's own powers. (Eth. I. 8, 3. Ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος, οὕτως γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν γίνεται καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτός.) Let that be called out into "actuality" which is potential or latent in man, and Happiness is the result. Avoiding then any overstrained application of the term "Consciousness," and aiming rather at paraphrase than translation, it may be useful to notice one or two places in which the term *ἐνέργεια* occurs. Eth. I. 10, 2. Ἆρα γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ; Ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; Is a man *then* happy, after he is dead? Or is not this altogether absurd, especially for us who call Happiness a conscious state? I. 10, 9. Κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. "Happiness depends (not on fortune, but) on harmonious moods of mind." I. 10, 15. Τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα, κ. τ. λ. "What hinders us calling him happy who is in possession of absolute peace and harmony of mind?" VII. 14, 8. Διὸ ὁ Θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας. "God is in the fruition of one pure pleasure everlastingly. For deep consciousness is possible, not only of motion, but also of repose." IX. 9, 5. Μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς

ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον καθ' αὑτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾷον. "Now to the solitary individual life is grievous; for it is not easy to maintain a glow of mind by one's self, but in company with some one else, and in relation to others, this is easier."

The formula we are discussing is applied by Aristotle to express the nature both of Pleasure and of Happiness. By examining separately these two applications of the term, we shall not only gain a clearer conception of the import of *ἐνέργεια* itself, but also we shall be in a better position for seeing what were Aristotle's real views about Happiness. 1. The great point that Aristotle insists upon with regard to Pleasure is, that it is not *κίνησις* or *γένεσις*, but *ἐνέργεια*, (Eth. VII. 12, 3. X. 3, 4—5. X. 4, 2.) What is the meaning of the distinction? In Aristotle's (9) Rhetoric we find Pleasure defined in exactly the terms here repudiated, namely, as "a certain motion of the vital powers, and a settling down perceptibly and suddenly into one's proper nature, while Pain is the contrary." This definition is there given merely as a popular one, sufficient for the purposes of the Orator, who does not require metaphysical exactness. It corresponds with that given in Plato's (10) Timæus. It seems to have been originally due to the Cyrenaics; for these are said to be referred to by Socrates in the Philebus of Plato, (p. 53.) under the name of "a refined set of men (*κομψοί τινες*), who maintain, that Pleasure is always a state of Becoming (*γένεσις*), and never a state of Being (*οὐσία*)." Now in all essential parts of their views on Pleasure, Aristotle and Plato were quite agreed. Both would have said, (11) Pleasure is not the Chief Good; both would have made a distinction between the bodily pleasures, which are preceded by desire and a sense of pain—and the mental pleasures, which are free from this; both would have asserted the pleasure of the philosopher

(9) Rhet. I. 11, 1. *ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοὐναντίον.*

(10) Cf. Plato Timæus, p. 64. *τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γιγνόμενον ἀθρόον παρ' ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγεινὸν, τὸ δ' εἰς φύσιν ἀπιὸν πάλιν ἀθρόον ἡδύ.*

(11) Cf. Plato Philebus, p. 22. Eth. Nic. X. 3, 13.

to be higher than all other pleasures. The difference between them resolves itself into one of formulæ. Plato has no consistent formula to express Pleasure, he calls it "a return to one's natural state," "a becoming," "a filling up," "a transition." But all these terms are only applicable to the bodily pleasures, preceded by a sense of want. Plato acknowledges that there are pleasures above these, but he seems to have no word to express them. Therefore he may be said to leave the stigma upon Pleasure in general, that it is a mere state of Transition. Aristotle here steps in with his formula of *Ἐνέργεια*, and says, Pleasure is not a Transition, but a Fruition. It is not imperfect, but an End-in-itself. It does not arise from our coming to our natural state, but from our employing it. (Eth. VII. 12. 3. *οὐ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ χρωμένων.*)

Kant (12) defines Pleasure to be "the Sense of that which promotes life, Pain of that which hinders it. Consequently," he argues, "every pleasure must be preceded by pain; pain is always the first. For what else would ensue upon a continued advancement of vital power, but a speedy death for joy? Moreover, no pleasure can follow immediately upon another; but between the one and the other, some pain must have place. It is the slight depressions of vitality, with intervening expansions of it, which together make up a healthy condition, which we erroneously take for a continuously-felt state of well-being; whereas, this condition consists only of pleasurable feelings, following each other by reciprocation, that is, with continually intervening pain. Pain is the stimulus of activity, and in activity we first become conscious of life; without it an inanimate state would ensue." In these words the German philosopher seems almost exactly to have coincided with Plato. The "sense of that which promotes life" answers to *ἀναπλήρωσις*, and Plato appears to have held, with Kant, the reciprocal action of Pleasure and Pain. (Cf. Phædo, p. 60.) Kant's views, like Plato's, are only applicable to the bodily sensations, and do not express pleasures of the mind.

Aristotle in defining Pleasure as *ὃ τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν*, makes

(12) Kant's Anthropology, p. 169. The above translation is given by Dr. Badham in an Appendix to his edition of Plato's Philebus. London, 1855.

it, not "the sense of what promotes life," but rather the sense of life itself; the sense of the vividness of the vital powers; the sense that any faculty whatsoever has met its proper object. This definition then is equally applicable to the highest functions of the mind, as well as to the bodily organs. Even in the case of pleasure felt upon the supplying of a want, the Aristotelian (13) doctrine with regard to that pleasure was, that it was not identical with the supply, but contemporaneous; that it resulted from the play and action of vital powers not in a state of depression, *while* the depressed organs were receiving sustenance. To account for the fact that Pleasure cannot be long maintained, Aristotle would not have said, like Kant, that we are unable to bear a continuous expansion of the vital powers; but rather, that we are unable to maintain the vivid action of the faculties, (Eth. X. 4. 9. *πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν.*) Pleasure then according to Aristotle proceeds rather from within than from without; it is the sense of existence; and it is so inseparably connected with the idea of life, that we cannot tell whether life is desired for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life, Eth. X. 4. 11. *Συνεζεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή.*

2. If Happiness be defined as *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*, and Pleasure as *ὃ τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν*, what is the relation between them? Perhaps it is unfair to Aristotle to bring the different parts of his work thus into collision. Probably he worked out the treatise on Pleasure in book X. without much regard to the theory of Happiness, but merely availing himself of the formulæ which seemed most applicable. It is only in book VII. (13. 2.)—which we have seen reason to consider a later work, and the compilation of Eudemus,—that Pleasure and Happiness are brought together on the grounds that they both consist in "the free play of conscious life," (*ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος.*) This is a carrying out of Aristotle's doctrine beyond what we find in

(13) Cf. Eth. Nic. X. 3. 6. *οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἥδοιτ' ἄν τις.* VII. 14. 7. *Λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι.*

books I. and X. Aristotle had prepared the way in these for the identification of Happiness with the highest kind of Pleasure, but had not himself arrived at it. However, we can find no other distinction in his theory between Pleasure and Happiness, than that the latter is something ideal (*τέλος καὶ τέλειον πάντῃ πάντως*), and extended over an entire life (*λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τελείου*), and implying the highest human excellence, the exercise of the highest faculties (*ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην ἀρετήν*). We have before alluded to the ideal character of Happiness as a whole. This is shown especially by the fact, that while on the one hand Aristotle says that Happiness (*ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*) must occupy a whole life, on the other hand he speaks of brevity of duration as necessarily attaching to every human *ἐνέργεια*. A *δύναμις*, he argues, is not only a *δύναμις* of being, but also a *δύναμις* of not-being. This contradiction always infects our *ἐνέργειαι*, and like a law of gravitation this negative side is always tending to bring them to a stop. The (14) Heavenly bodies being divine and eternal, move perpetually and unweariedly, for in them this law of contradiction does not exist. But to mortal creatures it is impossible to long maintain an *ἐνέργεια*,—that vividness of the faculties, on which joy and pleasure depend. Happiness then as a permanent condition is something ideal; Aristotle figures it as the whole of life summed up into a vivid moment of consciousness; or again, as the aggregate of such moments with the intervals omitted; or again, that these moments are its essential part (*τὸ κύριον μέρος τῆς εὐδαιμονίας*), constituting the most blessed state of the internal life (*ζωὴ μακαριωτάτη*), while the framework for these will be the *βίος αἱρετώτατος* or most favourable external career. (Eth. IX. 9. 9.) In what then do these moments consist? Chiefly in the sense of life and personality; in the higher kind of consciousness, which is above the mere physical sense of life. This is either coupled with a sense of the good and noble, as in the consciousness of good deeds done (Eth. IX. 7. 4.); or it is awakened by friend-

(14) Metaph. VIII. 8. 18. *Διὸ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἥλιος καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ὅλος ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μή ποτε στῇ, ὃ φοβοῦνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως. Οὐδὲ κάμνει τοῦτο δρῶντα· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀντιφάσεως αὐτοῖς, οἷον τοῖς φθαρτοῖς, ἡ κίνησις.*

ship, by the sense of love and admiration for the goodness of a friend, who is, as it were, one's self and yet not one's self (Eth. IX. 9. 10.); or finally it exists to the highest degree in the evocation of the Reason, which is not only each man's proper self, (Eth. IX. 4. 4. X. 7. 9.) as forming the deepest ground of his consciousness, but is also something divine, and more than mortal in us.

III. As already remarked, it is only in books VI. and VII. that we find the Syllogism applied as a formula to express the operations of the Will, while in book III. where the theory would have been quite in place, it exists only implicitly; and though there is nothing contradictory to it, yet it is not drawn out. For clearness sake, it may be best to refer at once to a place in which the entire account of the Practical Syllogism is given. It occurs in the book (15) De Motu Animalium, chapters 6 and 7. The Practical Syllogism depends on this principle, that "No creature moves or acts, except with a view to some end." (*Πάντα τὰ ζῷα καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἔστιν αὐτοῖς πάσης τῆς κινήσεως πέρας τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα.* De Mot. An. 6. 2.) What therefore the law of the so-called "Sufficient Reason" is to a proposition of the Understanding, that the law of the Final Cause is to an Act of the Will. "Under what conditions of thought is it," (16) asks Aristotle, "that a person at one time acts, at another time does not act, at one time is put in motion, at another time not? It seems to be much the same case as with people thinking and reasoning about abstract matter, only *there* the ultimate thing to be obtained is an abstract proposition, for as soon as one has perceived the two

(15) This book is by some considered spurious; it must have been written at all events later than many parts of the Ethics, as it contains summarily what in them is being slowly worked out.

(16) De Mot. An. 7. 1. *Πῶς δὲ νοῶν ὁτὲ μὲν πράττει ὁτὲ δ' οὐ πράττει, καὶ κινεῖται, ὁτὲ δ' οὐ κινεῖται; Ἔοικε παραπλησίως συμβαίνειν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων διανοουμένοις καὶ συλλογιζομένοις. Ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ μὲν θεώρημα τὸ τέλος (ὅταν γὰρ τὰς δύο προτάσεις νοήσῃ, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνόησε καὶ συνέθηκεν,) ἐνταῦθα δ' ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίγνεται ἡ πρᾶξις, οἷον ὅταν νοήσῃ ὅτι παντὶ βαδιστέον ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ' ἄνθρωπος, βαδίζει εὐθέως, ἂν δ' ὅτι οὐδενὶ βαδιστέον νῦν ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ' ἄνθρωπος, εὐθὺς ἠρεμεῖ· καὶ ταῦτα ἄμφω πράττει, ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ ἢ ἀναγκάζῃ.*

premises, one perceives the conclusion. But here the conclusion that arises from the two premises is the action; as, for instance, when one has perceived, that Every man ought to walk, and I am a man, he walks immediately. Or again, that No man ought now to walk, and I am a man, he stops still immediately. Both these courses he adopts, provided he be neither hindered nor compelled. (17) . . . That the action is the conclusion, is plain; but the premisses of the Practical Syllogism are of two kinds, specifying either that something is good, or again, how it is possible." This then may shortly be said to be the form of the Practical Syllogism;

either (1) Major Premiss. Such and such an action is universally good.
Minor Premiss. This will be an action of the kind:
Conclusion. Performance of the action.

or (2) Major Premiss. Such and such an end is desirable.
Minor. This step will conduce to the end.
Conclusion. Taking of the step.

In other words, every action implies a sense of a general principle, and the applying of that principle to a particular case; or again, it implies desire for some end coupled with perception of the means necessary for attaining the end. These two different ways of stating the Practical Syllogism are in reality coincident; for assuming that all action is for some end, the Major Premiss may be said always to contain the statement of an End; and this we are told, Eth. VI. 12. 10. *οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον.* And again, any particular act, which is the application of a moral principle, may be said to be the means necessary to the realization of the principle. "Temperance is good," may be called either a general principle, or an expression of a desire for the habit of Temperance. "To abstain now will be temperate," is an application of the principle, or again, it is the absolutely necessary means toward the attainment of the habit. For "it is absurd," as Aristotle tells us, "when one acts unjustly to talk of not

(18) De Mot. An. 7. 4. *Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πρᾶξις τὸ συμπέρασμα, φανερόν· αἱ δὲ προτάσεις αἱ ποιητικαὶ διὰ δύο εἰδῶν γίνονται, διά τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦ δυνατοῦ.*

wishing to be unjust, or when one acts intemperately of not wishing to be intemperate." (Eth. III. 5. 13. *Ἔτι δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον.*)

The distinction between End and Means which plays so important a part throughout the moral system of Aristotle, comes out, as might be expected, very prominently in book III, where what must be called a sort of elementary psychology of the Will is given. But no application is there made of the scheme of the syllogism. Indeed a mathematical formula seems used in book III, where a logical formula is in book VI; for in the former, the process of Deliberation is compared to the analysis of a diagram; (Eth. III. 3, 11.) in the latter, error of Deliberation is spoken of as a false syllogism, where the right end is attained by a wrong means, that is, by a false middle term. (VI. 9, 5. *Ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τοῦτον ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι' οὗ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι.*) In one place indeed of book III. which is at present somewhat obscure, all seemed prepared for the introduction of the forms of the Syllogism, but they do not appear. Aristotle, in discussing that kind of Ignorance which renders an act involuntary, declares, that no form of Ignorance of the Good frees us from responsibility for our acts. (Eth. III. 1, 15. *τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὸ σύμφερον.*) He then seems to divide this Ignorance of the Good into two kinds, Ignorance in the Purpose, and Ignorance of the Universal. (*οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου, ψέγονται γὰρ διά γε ταύτην.*) These two kinds of ignorance appear to correspond to the two premisses of the moral syllogism. Ignorance of the Universal would be the same as ignorance of the Major Premiss, that is, it would be the same as not possessing the principle; e. g. that Temperance is good. Ignorance in Purpose would be identical with ignorance of the Minor Premiss; it would consist in not knowing how to apply a principle; e. g. in failing to observe, that "Now is the time to abstain." The first then would be Ignorance of Ends, the second Ignorance of Means. And this interpretation is confirmed by the fact, that *Προαίρεσις* is described by Aristotle as the faculty of Means. If this be the right explanation of

the above passage, *ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια* will answer to the state of the *ἀκόλαστος*, "whose major premiss is corrupted;" (*οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ διέφθαρται,*)—*ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια* will describe the state of the *ἀκρατής*, who fails through not rightly applying a minor premiss to the Universal principle which he has in his mind. It must be confessed, however, that the doctrine of *ἄγνοια*, as it appears above, does not contain, except implicitly, these various applications; and from the weak expression of blame, which is coupled with the Ignorance of the Universal, (*ψέγονται γὰρ διά γε ταύτην,*) it would seem, that Aristotle certainly had not the idea of utter corruption present to his mind when alluding to it. The passage, therefore, must remain indefinite.

It is to books VI. and VII. that we must look to see the use made of the Practical Syllogism. It is applied, first, to the explanation of the nature of Wisdom (*φρόνησις*), which is shown to contain a universal and a particular element. VI. 7, 7. *Οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν, κ. τ. λ.* VI. 8, 7. *Ἔτι ἡ ἁμαρτία ἡ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον.* 2. To show the intuitive character of moral judgments and knowledge. (VI. 11, 4. *Καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα, κ. τ. λ.*) 3. To prove the necessary and inseparable connection of Wisdom and Virtue. (VI. 12, 10. *Ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις—ἀρχάς.*) 4. In answer to the question, how is it possible to know the Good, and yet act contrary to one's knowledge? In short, how is Incontinence possible? This phenomenon is explained in two ways; either the incontinent man does not apply a minor premiss to his universal principle, and so the principle remains dormant; and his knowledge of the good remains merely implicit; or, again, Desire constructs a sort of syllogism of its own, inconsistent with, though not directly contradictory to, the arguments of the Moral Reason. (VII. 3. 6. *Ἔτι ἐπεὶ— οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ.* VII. 3. 9, 10. *Ἔτι καὶ ὧδε—κατὰ συμβεβηκός.*) Incontinence therefore implies knowing the good and at the same time not knowing it. It would be impossible to act contrary to a complete syllogism which applied the knowledge of the good to a case in point; for the necessary conclusion to such a syllogism would be good action. But

there is broken knowledge and moral obliviousness in the mind of the incontinent man, and the Practical Syllogism gives a formula for expressing this.

The foregoing references serve to show, that in itself this formula is only a way of stating certain psychological facts. The question whether people do really go through a syllogism in or before every action, is much like the question whether we always reason in syllogisms. Most reasonings seem to be from particular to particular, that is to say, by analogy; and yet some sort of universal conception, if it be only the sense of the uniformity of nature, lies at the bottom of all inference. And so too in action, most acts seem prompted by the instinct of the moment, and yet some general idea, as, for instance, the desire of the creature for its proper good, might be said to lie behind this instinct. Aristotle himself (18) says, that the mind constantly passes over one of the premisses of the Practical Syllogism, as being obvious; that we act often instantaneously, without hesitation, just because we see an object of desire before us. Thus it is merely a way of putting it, to say that we act from a syllogism. But granting the formula, it becomes immediately a powerful analytic instrument. It seems to suggest and clear the way for a set of ulterior questions, in which most important results would be involved. For now that action has been as it were caught, put to death, and dissected, and so reduced to the level of abstract reasoning, it seems that we have only to deal with its disjointed parts in order to know the whole theory of human Will. We have only to ask what is the nature of the Major Premiss, and how obtained? What is the nature of the Minor Premiss, and how obtained? The answer to these questions in the Ethics is not very explicit. This is exactly one of the points on which a conclusive theory seems to have

(18) De Met. An. 7. 4. 5. *Ὥσπερ δὲ τῶν ἐρωτώντων ἔνιοι, οὕτω τὴν ἑτέραν πρότασιν τὴν δήλην οὐδ' ἡ διάνοια ἐφιστᾶσα σκοπεῖ οὐδέν· οἷον εἰ τὸ βαδίζειν ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἐνδιατρίβει. Διὸ καὶ ὅσα μὴ λογισάμενοι πράττομεν, ταχὺ πράττομεν. Ὅταν γὰρ ἐνεργήσῃ ἢ τῇ αἰσθήσει πρὸς τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἢ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἢ τῷ νῷ οὗ ὀρέγεται, εὐθὺς ποιεῖ· ἀντ' ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἡ νοήσεως ἡ τῆς ὀρέξεως γίνεται ἐνέργεια. Ποτέον μοι, ἡ ἐπιθυμία λέγει· τοδὶ δὲ ποτόν, ἡ αἴσθησις εἶπεν ἢ ἡ φαντασία ἢ ὁ νοῦς· εὐθὺς πίνει.*

been least arrived at. With regard to our possession of general principles of action, there appear to be three different accounts given in different places.

(1) They are innate and intuitive, (VI. 11. 4. VII. 6. 7.)

(2) They are evolved from experience of particulars, (VI. 8. 6.)

(3) They depend on the moral character, (VI. 12. 10. VII. 8. 4.)

These three accounts are not however incompatible with one another. For as in explaining the origin of speculative principles (Post. An. II. 19.) Aristotle seems to attribute them to Reason as the cause and Experience as the condition; so in regard to moral principles we might say that they were perceived by an intuitive faculty, but under the condition of a certain bearing of the moral character, which itself arises out of and consists in particular moral experiences. This reconciliation of the statements is not made for us in the Ethics. There the different points of view stand apart, and there is something immature about the whole theory. So too with regard to the Minor Premiss in action; on the one hand we are told that it is a matter of perception, (VI. 8. 9.) as if it belonged to every body; on the other hand we are told that the apprehension of these particulars is exactly what distinguishes the Wise Man. (*πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος· τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις.* Eth. VII. 2. 5.) But it is unnecessary to attempt to go beyond the lead of the Ethics in answering these questions, for we should ourselves most probably state them in an entirely different way.

It only remains to observe, that the consideration of the Practical Syllogism has not, like that of the doctrine of *Τέλος* and *Ἐνέργεια*, shown us a principle influencing the whole of the Ethical views of Aristotle. On the contrary, we have rather had to notice its limited and imperfect application. But what we have chiefly learned is, to see how this logical formula became gradually grafted upon the Ethical system. This opens our eyes to the way in which Aristotle's philosophy grew up. By keen analysis the different abstract forms were separately worked out, and then afterwards there was an attempt to make them coalesce. The belief in these forms and their applicability shows something of the scholastic spirit. To reduce action to a syllogism dogmatically is a piece of scholasticism. Plato

would have put it in this way for once, and would then have passed on to other modes of expression. But it is remarkable that this formula is one of those that remains most completely stamped upon the language of mankind. When we talk of "acting on principle," or speak of a man's "principles," perhaps we do not reflect that this expression is a remnant of Aristotle's Practical Syllogism. "Principle" is no other than the ἀρχὴ or Major Premiss. There is however this difference, that while with Aristotle the Major Premiss contained the idea of a good to be desired for its own sake (τέλος), "Principle" often implies an expression of Duty, that is to say rather that which is Right in itself, than that which is Desirable in itself. This is a slight, not really a wide, distinction in the point of view.

IV. It would seem not to require a very advanced state of philosophy, in order for men to discover the maxim, that "Moderation is best," that "Excess is to be avoided." Thus as far back as Hesiod we find the praise of μέτρια ἔργα. The era of the Seven Sages produced the gnome, afterwards inscribed on the temple of Delphi, Μηδὲν ἄγαν. And one of the few sayings of Phocylides which remain, is Πολλὰ μέσοισιν ἄριστα, μέσος θέλω ἐν πόλει εἶναι. Now all that is contained in these popular and prudential sayings, is of course also contained in the principle of Μεσότης, which is so conspicuous in the Ethics of Aristotle. But Aristotle's principle contains something more; it is not a mere application of the doctrine of Moderation to the subject-matter of the various separate Virtues. We see traces of a more profound source of the idea, in his reference to the verse ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί. For here we are taken back to associations of the Pythagorean philosophy, and to the principle that Evil is of the nature of the infinite and Good of the finite (Eth. II. 6. 14. τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου.)

To say that what is Infinite is evil, that what is Finite is good, may seem an entire contradiction to our own ways of thinking. We speak of "man's finite nature," of "the infinite nature of God" from a contrary point of view. But by "finite" in such sentences we mean to express limitations of power, of goodness, of knowledge, each limitation implying an inferiority as com-

pared with a nature in which such limitation does not exist. But the Pythagoreans were not dealing with this train of thought, when they said "the finite is good." They were expressing what was in the first place a truth of number, but afterwards was applied as a universal symbol; they were speaking of goodness in reference to their own minds. The "finite" in number is the incalculable, that (19) which the mind can grasp and handle, the "infinite" is the incalculable, that which baffles the mind, that which refuses to reduce itself to law, and hence remains unknowable. The "infinite" in this sense remained an object of aversion to the Pythagoreans, and hence in drawing out their double row of goods and evils, they placed "the Even" on the side of the bad, "the Odd" on the side of the good. This itself might seem paradoxical, until we learn, that with Even numbers they associated the idea of infinite subdivision, and that Even numbers added together fail to produce squares; while the series of the Odd numbers if added together produces a series of squares; and the square by reason of its completeness and of the law which it exhibits, is evidently of the nature of the finite. The opposition of the Finite and the Infinite took root in Greek philosophy, and above all in the system of Plato. Unity and Plurality, Form and Matter, Genus and Individuals, Idea and Phenomena, are all different modifications of this same opposition. The Pythagoreans themselves appear to have expressed or symbolized matter under the term τὸ ἄπειρον, and (20) Plato seems to have yet more distinctly conceived of this characteristic of matter or space, saying that it was an "undefined duad," that is, that it contained in itself an infinity in two directions, the infinitely small and the infinitely great.

Assuming therefore that the principle of the Finite, or the Limit (πεπερασμένον or πέρας), may be considered as identical with that of Form or Law, we may now proceed to notice what appears to be the transition from the idea of fixed law or form (εἶδος), to

(19) Cf. Philolaus, apud Stob. Ed. Phys. I. 21. 7. καὶ πάντα γα μὰν τὰ γιγνωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι, οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνωσθῆμεν ἄνευ τούτω.

(20) Cf. Ar. Metaphys. I. 6. 6.

that of proportion or the mean (*μεσότης*), that is, to law or form become relative. It is to be found in the Philebus of Plato, p. 23—27. Socrates there divides all existence into four classes; first, the infinite (*ἄπειρον*); second, the limit (*πέρας*); third, things created and compounded out of the mixture of these two (*ἐκ τούτων μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν*); fourth, the Cause of this mixture and of the creation of things. The Infinite is that class of things admitting of degrees, more or less, hotter and colder, quicker and slower, and the like, where no fixed notion of quantity has as yet come in. The Limit is this fixed notion of quantity, as, for instance, the equal, or the double. The third or mixed class exhibits the law of the *πέρας* introduced into the *ἄπειρον*. Of this Socrates adduces beautiful manifestations. Thus in the human body the infinite is the tendency to extremes, to disorder, to disease, but the introduction of the limit here produces a balance of the constitution and health. In sounds you have the infinite degrees of deep and high, quick and slow, but the Limit gives rise to modulation, and harmony, and all that is delightful in music. In climate and temperature, where the Limit has been introduced, excessive heats and violent storms subside, and the mild and genial seasons in their order follow. In the human mind, "the Goddess of the limit" checks into submission the wild and wanton passions, and gives rise to all that is good.

Both in things physical and moral these two opposites, the Finite and the Infinite, are thus made to play into one another, and to be the joint causes of beauty and excellence. Out of their union an entire set of ideas and terms seem to spring up, Symmetry, Proportion, Balance, Harmony, Moderation, and the like. And this train of associations seems to have been constantly present to the mind of Plato. It suited the essentially Greek character of his philosophy to dwell upon the goodness of Beauty, and the Beauty of Goodness, on the Morality of Art, and the Artistic nature of Morality; so that words like *μετριότης*, and *συμμετρία*, became naturally appropriated to express excellence in life and action. Cf. Republic, book III. p. 401. *Ἔστι δέ γέ που πλήρης μὲν γραφικὴ αὐτῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη δημιουργία, πλήρης δὲ ὑφαντικὴ καὶ ποικιλία καὶ οἰκοδομία καὶ πᾶσα αὖ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων σκευῶν*

ἐργασία, ἔτι δὲ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων φύσις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων φύτων· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστιν εὐσχημοσύνη ἢ ἀσχημοσύνη. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀσχημοσύνη καὶ ἀῤῥυθμία καὶ ἀναρμοστία κακολογίας καὶ κακοηθείας ἀδελφά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου, σώφρονός τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἤθους, ἀδελφά τε καὶ μιμήματα.

This Platonic principle then Aristotle seems to have taken up and adopted, slightly changing the formula, however, and speaking of *μεσότης* instead of *μετριότης*. The reason for this change may have been, that the formula became thus more exact and more capable of a close analytic application to a variety of instances. Aristotle does not ignore the physical and artistic meanings of the principle. On the contrary, the whole bearing of his use of the term *μεσότης* is to show that moral virtue is only another expression of the same law which we see in nature and the arts. Life has been defined to be "Multeity in Unity," in other words, it is the law of the *πέρας* exhibited in the *ἄπειρον*. The first argument made use of by Aristotle to show that virtuous action consists in a balance between extremes, is drawn from the analogy of physical life; "for about immaterial things," he says, "we must use material analogies." "Excess and deficiency equally destroy the health and strength, while what is proportionate (*τὰ σύμμετρα*) preserves and augments them." (Eth. II. 2. 6.) Again, he points out that all Art aims at the Mean, and the finest works of art are those which seem to have realized a subtle grace which the least addition to any part or diminution from it would overset. (Eth. II. 6. 9.) "And Moral Virtue," he adds, "is finer than the finest art." But it is by a mathematical expression of the formula, by a reducing it to an absolutely quantitative conception, that Aristotle's use of Μεσότης is chiefly distinguished. He says, that all quantity, whether space or number, (*ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ,*) admits of the terms More, Less, and Equal. Or making these terms relative, you have Excess, Deficiency, and the Mean. The Mean then is in Geometrical Proportion, what the Equal is in Arithmetical Progression. The Middle term Arithmetically is that which is equi-distant from the terms on each side of it. Geometrically the Mean is not an absolute Mean, but a relative Mean, that is, if applied to action, it expresses the consideration of persons and of circumstances.

(Eth. II. 6, 4—5.) This opposition of the Mean to the too much and too little, becomes henceforward a formula of almost universal application. It is no mere negative principle, not the mere avoiding of extremes, but rather the realization of a law. When Aristotle says, that the *μεσότης* must be *ὡρισμένη λόγῳ*, he means, that our action must correspond to the standard which exists in the rightly-ordered mind. What is subjectively the *λόγος*, law or standard, that is objectively the *μεσότης* or balance. "Each of our senses," says Aristotle, "is a sort of balance between extremes in the objects of sensation, and this it is which gives us the power of judging." (De Animâ, II. 11, 17. *ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητός τινος οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά. Τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν.*)

Thus again he says of Plants, that they have no perceptions, "because they have no standard," (*διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα*, De An. II. 12, 4.) Again, he defines Pleasure and Pain to consist in "the consciousness, by means of the discriminating faculty of the senses, of coming in contact with good or evil." *Καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα.* (De An. III. 7, 2.) Each of the Senses then is, or contains, a sort of standard of its proper object. And it is clear that Aristotle attributes to us a similar critical faculty in regard of Morals. He says, that "it is peculiar to Man, as compared with the other animals, that he has a sense of good and bad, just and unjust." Pol. I. 2, 12. *Τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τἆλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν.* He seems to have regarded this "moral sense" as analogous to the "musical ear," which in some degree is almost natural to all men, but again exists in very different degrees in different men, and also may be more or less cultivated. Thus (Eth. IX. 9, 6.) he speaks of the good man being "pleased at good actions, as the musical man is at beautiful tunes." And in Eth. X. 3, 10. he says, that "it will be impossible to feel the pleasure of a just man if one is not just, as it will be to feel the pleasure of a musical man if one is not musical." In the Ethics, its proper objective sense is preserved to Μεσότης, which accordingly means a "balance," and not the "standard" for determining that balance, which is

expressed by the term λόγος. A moment's consideration of this point will give an answer to the somewhat superficial question, Why does not Aristotle make the Intellectual Virtues Mean States? In the original form of the principle of Μεσότης we have seen, that it consisted in the introduction of the law of the πέρας into the ἄπειρον. The passions and desires are the infinite; Moral Virtue consists in introducing limit (πέρας) into them,—in bringing them under a law, (λόγῳ ὁρίζειν,)—in making them exhibit balance, proportion, harmony (μεσότητα), which is the realization of the law. On the other hand, Reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος) is another name for the law itself. It is the standard, and therefore does not require to be regulated by the standard. The Intellectual Virtues are not μεσότητες, because they are λόγοι.

In asking what is the worth of this formula, as a principle of Ethics, we may notice at once the extraordinary analytic grasp which it affords upon moral subjects. All the phenomena of life and action seem to fall into separate divisions, to classify themselves under these three heads of Excess, and Defect, and the Mean. After a time, however, suspicion arises that this classification may not have expressed the whole truth; we begin to doubt whether this may not be a case in which system misleads.

The objection brought against this theory of Virtue by Kant, was, that "Aristotle made a merely quantitative difference between Virtue and Vice." To a certain extent, Aristotle may be said to have answered this objection by anticipation in the remark, that "according to an abstract and logical conception Virtue is a Mean between Vices; but from a moral point of view it is utterly and extremely removed from them." (Eth. II. 6. 17. Κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.) Aristotle might say—'logically speaking I allow that Virtue is a little less Vice, and Vice is a little more Virtue; but that makes no alteration in their moral relation to one another, for difference of degree at a certain point merges into difference of kind. Virtue is originally dependent on quantity and yet it is Virtue, just as Beauty of form depends on a little more and a little less, and yet is Beauty

after all.' We may concede that what is noble and beautiful is better than the elements out of which it springs; that the whole in these things is better than its part; that as a flower is better than root and soil and juices; so Virtue may be better than the passions and the law of quantity.

The question then reduces itself to this, whether Aristotle's theory of Virtue is the most natural statement of the moral facts,—and, what will be the tendency of such a theory as influencing Ethics in general? We see that this theory contains at all events the truth, (independent of the prudential maxim of moderation,) that the passions are meant to be regulated and not suppressed. It holds up an idea of Beauty to be aimed at in regulating them. Further than this, it cannot be said to be consistent with any deep view of Morality. It surely cannot be said, that in the best and noblest acts there is present to the mind, either of the actor, or of a spectator, any idea of quantity, of regulation, of balance. All that is deepest in Morality,—Truth, Self-Denial, Humility, Purity,—all these would lose their real import if we attempted to reduce them to Mean States between two extremes. What is it that is offended by extremes? Not our Moral judgment, but rather our taste. Thus we see that more than half the Virtues of Aristotle's list are Virtues of taste, rather than belonging to the Moral distinction between right and wrong. The principle of the Mean is too shallow a principle to express this distinction, it belongs to the region of Art rather than Morals. Hence in applying it to Virtue, Virtue is made too artistic. To some extent indeed Aristotle's doctrine of Μεσότης, or the Form of Moral Action, is counteracted by his doctrine of Τέλος, or the End of Action. But he has been too much led away by the desire to apply the formula of the Mean in all possible instances. And this has given rise to what must be called a superficial representation of Morality through a great part of the Ethics.

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