

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

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

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



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


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
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

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


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

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VOL. I.

THEORY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE.

AND

HISTORY OF THE

GREATEST-HAPPINESS PRINCIPLE.

Shortly will be published,

MINOR MORALS

FOR

YOUNG PEOPLE:

BEING AN APPLICATION OF THE GREATEST-HAPPINESS PRINCIPLE TO EARLY INSTRUCTION.

ILLUSTRATED IN TALES AND TRAVELS,

BY JOHN BOWRING.

DEONTOLOGY;

OR,

THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY:

IN WHICH THE HARMONY AND CO-INCIDENCE OF

DUTY AND SELF-INTEREST,
VIRTUE AND FELICITY,
PRUDENCE AND BENEVOLENCE,

ARE EXPLAINED AND EXEMPLIFIED.

FROM THE MSS. OF JEREMY BENTHAM.

ARRANGED AND EDITED BY

JOHN BOWRING.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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PREFACE.

This work was in the course of preparation for the press when its great Author's earthly labors were suddenly closed. He had, up to the latest period of his existence, been accustomed to record the desultory thoughts which occurred to his mind on the important subject of which the volume treats; and I had the advantage, in my intimate communion with him, of seeking such guidance from him as was necessary for the understanding and arrangement of the mass of undigested fragments which he from time to time placed in my hands. It was a happy and an interesting task to follow him through those investigations in which benevolence and wisdom were mutual handmaids,—and emphatic indeed was the instruction which was so beautifully exemplified in every thought, and word, and action of

the Instructor. I took up my pen with alacrity —I pursued my task with ever-new delight— I end it with feelings of gloom, for which I can find no adequate expression. The charm is gone—the voice is silenced which conducted and gladdened me on my way. These pages as I turn them over seem to have the solemnity of a sepulchral echo. I shall find a fitter occasion for speaking of him who suggested them, who 'was himself the virtuous man he drew,'—and I deliver them to the world,—my first offering in discharge of those duties which have devolved upon me as the legatee of those literary treasures which he, my Friend and Master, has confided to my keeping and to my care.

J. Bo.

INTRODUCTION.

If it be assumed that *virtue* should be the rule, and *happiness* the object of human action, he who shows how the instrument may best be applied to the production of the end, and how the end may be accomplished in the greatest obtainable degree, is undoubtedly engaged in the exercise and entitled to the recompense of virtue. No small service will be done to mankind, if moral laws can be discovered suited to all the circumstances of life,—if the habitual power can be communicated to the honest inquirer of answering well and wisely that so often embarrasing question, which occurs to every one of us every day—every hour of our existence,—How shall I act? and why? The pages which I have the privilege of now introducing to the world, are calculated, I trust, to illumine the dark parts of the field of morals—

to unravel many entanglements, to solve many doubts,—and to contribute much satisfaction to the searchers after truth and virtue. The MSS. were put into my hands without reservation or restriction as to the manner of their publication. The extreme indifference of their extraordinary author to what is denominated literary fame, stands out in prominent contrast to that anxiety which he has never hesitated to express, that his opinions might go careering through the world. He has always been rather desirous of digging out and refining the ore than of stamping it with his own 'image and superscription.' Not that futurity will forget its benefactor, or fail in honor due to him who must and will exercise a mighty influence on its condition. Of Bentham's writings, that may fitly be said which Milton proclaimed of one of his almost forgotten volumes, that it 'numbered high intellects.' Our author's doctrines have strongly moved the philosophic few, and their course is rapidly opening and widening downwards among the improving many. Scoffers may have insulted him in his progress, but

where is the sage who has scorned, or who having listened has been wanting in reverence and gratitude to the man who first made legislation a science?

The course which Bentham has taken is to employ such language as would convey his ideas with the greatest precision to inquirers. A vague phraseology is necessarily the parent of vague ideas. In the minds of the well disposed it is a source of confusion—in the hands of the ill disposed, an instrument of mischief. Right and wrong—justice and injustice, are terms susceptible of very different interpretations. They may be used — they have been used, according to the caprice or the selfish interest of men for the production alike of good and evil. When closely examined they will generally be found nothing more than the expression of the opinion more or less influential of him who employs them; and their value and fit application will depend on their capacity to stand the test of some other principle. The language of common parlance must, before it can be made use of for the communication of

correct ideas, be translated into the language of happiness and unhappiness—of pleasures and of pains. Into these elements all moral results ultimately resolve themselves. Here is a point beyond which there is no advancing. If there be a greater good than happiness, let him who has made the discovery produce it as a reward; if there be a greater evil than misery, let its inventor employ it for the ends of punishment. In the dictionary of pain and pleasure, our moralist has found all the machinery of his craft.

Fiat experientia was the axiom of Bacon; an axiom which has been recognized as the foundation of all genuime science. *Fiat observatio,* is Bentham's apophthegm. What experiment is to the philosopher, observation is to the moralist. Bentham has examined human actions through the pleasures and pains which are consequent upon them, and has grounded all his reasonings upon this examination. In such pursuit truth can hardly have escaped him; for truth and utility must go together hand in hand; and he who discovers what is useful

cannot be far off from that which is true. It is, in fact, more easy to overtake truth by pursuing utility, than to reach truth at all without utility for a guide; since that which is useful is matter of experience, while conjecture is busied in asking, What is Truth?

To those who are acquainted with Bentham's 'Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,' and who have pursued the train of reasoning there brought forward, the present work may offer little that is new; and perhaps there are some who will think its contents have been already anticipated and its utility superseded by that masterly monument of analytical and logical power. But for universal acceptance the principles therein laid down assume too much the shape of axioms, and certainly wanted—as the inconsiderable circulation of the volume has evidenced—the attractions of popularity. The present work, whose especial object it is to approve itself to the general reader, is more desultory and diffuse, and seeks to win its way by a style less stern and severe. The former was written for the meditation of the profound thinker

—this looks to a wider and more popular, but less elevated sphere of usefulness. Besides, the 'Introduction' has a more extensive and ambitious character, and is mainly occupied with a developement of the true principles of Legislation, whose discussion, spite of its importance, can have few fascinations for mankind at large. In the volume before us it is not intended to enter on the inquiries of jurisprudential science. Our concern is with private morality, and that has a claim to the attention of every body, on every occasion in which thought, word, or action is engaged.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL STATEMENT—ALLIANCE BETWEEN INTEREST AND DUTY.

He who in a deliberative assembly volunteers to bring any motion forward, confers on himself a distinction, in which his prominency cannot but be contrasted with the equality of the rest; —so, he who in the republic of letters chooses to range himself among the few who write, becomes necessarily contradistinguished from the many who read, and both speaker and writer take upon themselves no inconsiderable responsibility. But, while in the case of a meeting for discussion, every impropriety of the speaker has the chance of immediate correction—in the case of that fictitious and never assembled body which creates the tribunal of public opinion, no instant removal of error has place;—secured for the most part against contradiction, the public writer is liable to assume a confidence unwarranted by his position. He has a motive to avoid giving to his doctrines and precepts the support of adequate reasons, the production of which would interfere with his love of ease, and the

developement of which would demand an additional exercise of intellectual effort. The public legislator, with all his powers, is generally less despotic in his phraseology than the public writer—that self-constituted legislator of the people. He makes laws without giving reasons,—laws which generally convey only his sovereign will and pleasure. It is indeed a misfortune that men come to the discussion of important questions, predetermined to decide them only in one way. They are pledged, as it were, to their own minds, that certain practices shall be wrong, and certain other practices right. But the principle of utility allows of no such peremptoriness, and requires, before any practice is condemned, that it be shown to be derogatory to human happiness. Such an investigation suits not the dogmatical instructor. With the principle of utility, therefore, he will have nothing to do. He will have a principle of his own to do his own business. He will convert his own opinion into a principle for its own support. 'I say these things are not right,' he proclaims with a sufficient portion of positiveness—*ergo,* they are not right.

It is plain this setting up of an opinion as the true foundation and sufficient reason for itself, must put every imaginable extravagance upon an equal footing with the most salutary persuasion;

nor does it offer any other or better standard of right and wrong than the violence with which it urges its pretensions, or the number of those who agree in them. But if violence be the standard, as there is no possible way of measuring the intensity of conviction but by its visible influence on actions,—the opinion of him who knocks down his opponent is better grounded than that of him who only asserts his opinion vehemently,—of him who cuts his opponent's throat than of him who only knocks him down, —and of him who tortures before he destroys his opponent than of either; so that, in truth, the opinions of the Inquisition bid fairest of any yet known for being the very perfection of truth and right reason, and morality may be graduated according to the miseries inflicted by persecution. If numbers decide, Idolatry would drive Christianity from the field,—and truth and morality would be in a state of everlasting vibration between majorities and minorities, which are shifting with all the vicissitudes of human events.

He who, on any other occasion, should say, 'It is as I say, because I say it is so,' would not be thought to have said any great matter: but on the question concerning the standard of morality, men have written great books wherein

from beginning to end they are employed in saying this and nothing else. What these books have to depend on for their efficacy, and for their being thought to have proved any thing is, the stock of self-sufficiency in the writer, and of implicit deference in the readers; by the help of a proper dose of which, one thing may be made to go down as well as another. Out of this assumption of authority has grown the word *obligation*, from the Latin verb, *obligo*, to bind,—while such a cloud of misty obscurity has gathered round the term, that whole volumes have been written to disperse it. The obscurity, notwithstanding, has continued as dense as before, and it can only be dissipated by bringing in the light of Utility with its pains and pleasures, and the sanctions and motives which spring out of them.

It is, in fact, very idle to talk about duties; the word itself has in it something disagreeable and repulsive; and talk about it as we may, the word will not become a rule of conduct. A man, a moralist, gets into an elbow chair, and pours forth pompous dogmatisms about *duty*—and *duties*. Why is he not listened to? Because every man is thinking about *interests*. It is a part of his very nature to think first about interests; and with these the well-judging mo-

ralist will find it for *his* interest to begin. Let him say what he pleases,—to interest, duty must and will be made subservient.

To place prominently forward the connection between interest and duty in all the concerns of private life, is the object now proposed. The more closely the subject is examined, the more obvious will the agreement between interest and duty appear. All laws which have for their end the happiness of those concerned, endeavour to make that for a man's interest which they proclaim to be his duty. And in the moral field it cannot be a man's duty to do that which it is his interest not to do. Morality will teach him rightly to estimate his interests and his duties; and examination will show their co-incidence. That a man ought to sacrifice his interest to his duty is a very common position,—that such or such a man has sacrificed his interest to his duty is a frequent assertion, and made the ground-work of admiration. But when interest and duty are considered in their broadest sense, it will be seen that in the general tenor of life the sacrifice of interest to duty is neither practicable nor so much as desirable; that it cannot, in fact, have place; and that if it could, the happiness of mankind would not be promoted by it. It has been almost invariably the usage in treating of

morals to speak of a man's *duty*—and nothing more. Now, though it can scarcely be said with truth that what is not a man's obvious interest is not his duty, it may be safely pronounced unless it can be shown that a particular action or course of conduct is for a man's interest, the attempt to prove to him that it is his duty, will be but a waste of words. Yet with such waste of words has the field of Ethics been hitherto filled. 'It is your duty to do this—it is your duty to abstain from doing that;' and this is easy travelling for a public instructor. 'But *why* is it my duty?' And the answer if sifted will be found to be,—'Because I bid you—because it is my opinion—my will.' 'Well, but suppose I do not conform myself to this will of yours?' 'O then you will do very wrong,'—which being interpreted means, 'I shall disapprove of your conduct.'

It will scarcely be denied that every man acts with a view to his own interest—not a correct view—because that would obtain for him the greatest possible portion of felicity; and if every man, acting correctly for his own interest, obtained the maximum of obtainable happiness, mankind would reach the millenium of accessible bliss; and the end of morality—the general happiness—be accomplished. To prove that the immoral action is a miscalculation of

self-interest—to show how erroneous an estimate the vicious man makes of pains and pleasures, is the purpose of the intelligent moralist. Unless he can do this he does nothing:—for, as has been stated above, for a man not to pursue what he deems likely to produce to him the greatest sum of enjoyment, is in the very nature of things impossible.

The object then of these pages is to promote human happiness—the happiness of every man. Your happiness, reader, and that of all besides. It is to extend the dominion of happiness wherever there is a being susceptible of its impressions; nor is the sphere of benevolent action bounded by the human race. For if the animals we call inferior have no title to our care, on what foundation stands the claim of our own species? The chain of virtue will be found to girdle the whole of the sensitive creation—the happiness we can communicate to lower natures is intimately associated with that of the human race,—and that of the human race is closely linked to our own.

It were, indeed, greatly to be desired that some benevolent moralist should take the animal creation under his patronage, and establish their claims to the protection of legislation and to the sympathies of the virtuous principle. Perhaps this event is hardly to be anticipated, while so

large a portion of the human race itself are excluded from the influences of beneficence—and treated like the inferior animals—not as *persons*, but as *things*. True, the animal tribes have little power to act upon human sensibilities—few means of inflicting misery as a punishment for injustice and cruelty, and fewer still of recompensing humanity and beneficence by the communication of pleasure to man. We deprive them of life;—and this is justifiable—their pains do not equal our enjoyments—there is a balance of good. But why do we torment,—why do we torture them? It would be difficult to find a reason why law should deny to them its interference. The real question is—are they susceptible of pain? Can pleasure be communicated to them? Who shall draw the line,—and where is it to be drawn between the gradations of animal life, beginning with man, and descending to the meanest creature that has any power of distinguishing between suffering and enjoyment? Is the faculty of reason, or that of discourse to determine? 'But a full-grown horse or dog, is, beyond comparison, a more rational, as well as a more conversible animal than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month old. And suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they *reason?* nor, Can

they *talk?* but, Can they *suffer?*'—*Introduction to the Principles of Morals, &c.* chap. xvii. p. 309.

But, of sensitive beings, the human are the nearest and naturally the dearest to us. And how can their happiness be best provided for by you? How but by the exercise of the virtues — of those qualities the union of which is *virtue?* Virtue divides itself into two branches —prudence* and effective benevolence.† Prudence has its seat in the understanding. Effective benevolence principally in the affections; those affections which, when intense and strong, become passions.

Prudence again has two divisions—that which respects ourselves, or the self-regarding,‡ which

* There is a narrow and exclusive meaning attached to the word prudence, and attached in a sense disassociated from any moral quality, namely, the apt application of means to an end. It is hardly necessary to say that it is not used in this confined sense here.

† It has been necessary to create a compound, as no single word in our language conveys the idea of benevolence in a state of activity, or of benevolence and beneficence united. Benevolence without beneficence is a fruitless tree, adding nothing whatever to happiness; and beneficence apart from benevolence is no virtue; it is no moral quality—it belongs to a stock or a stone, as well as to a human being.

‡ This is used instead of selfish, which conveys an idea of a vicious preference.

might have been exercised by the prototype of Robinson Crusoe, Alexander Selkirk, in his uninhabited island;—and that which respects others, and which may be denominated extra-regarding prudence.

Effective benevolence is either positive or negative. Its operation is by action, or by abstaining from action. Its business is either with the augmentation of pleasure or the diminution of pain. When it operates positively by the production of pleasure, power as well as will must be possessed. When it operates negatively by abstaining from action, nothing but the will is required. The power of benevolent action is limited—the power of benevolent abstaining is unbounded; and abstinence from action may involve a quantity of virtue or vice equal to that growing out of action itself. There are cases in which a man might as properly be punished for murder who had failed to do what he was bound to do in order to prevent murder, as the actual murderer himself.

It is a sad reflection withal, that the quantity of happiness which any, even the mightiest, can produce, is small compared with the amount of misery he may create by himself or others. Not that the proportion of misery in the human race exceeds that of happiness; for the sum of misery being limited, to a great extent, by the

will of the sufferer, he possesses, for the most part, some power of relief.

But the tendency of effective benevolence is to increase by exercise. The more we pour out its wealth upon others, the greater does the stock of wealth become which we ourselves possess. The diffusion of its riches is the very source of its opulence. He who secures for himself a pleasure, or avoids for himself a pain, influences his own happiness *directly*;—he who provides a pleasure, or prevents a pain to another, indirectly advances his own happiness.

What is happiness? It is the possession of pleasure with the exemption from pain. It is in proportion to the aggregate of pleasures enjoyed, and of pains averted. And what is virtue? It is that which most contributes to happiness,—that which maximises pleasures and minimises pains. Vice, on the contrary, is that which lessens happiness, or contributes to unhappiness.

The first law of nature is to wish our own happiness; and the united voices of prudence and efficient benevolence, add,—Seek the happiness of others,—seek your own happiness in the happiness of others.

Prudence, in common parlance, is the adaptation of means to an end. In the moral field that end is happiness. The subjects on which pru-

dence is to be exercised are ourselves, and all besides; ourselves as instrumental, and all besides as instrumental to our own felicity. To obtain the greatest portion of happiness for himself, is the object of every rational being. Every man is nearer to himself, and dearer to himself, than he can be to any other man; and no other man can weigh for him his pains and pleasures. Himself must necessarily be his own first concern. His interest must, to himself, be the primary interest; nor, on examination, will this position be found unfriendly to virtue and happiness; for how should the happiness of all be obtained to the greatest extent, but by the obtainment by every one for himself, of the greatest possible portion?

Of what can the sum total of happiness be made up, but of the individual units? What is demanded by prudence and benevolence, is required by necessity. Existence itself depends for its continuance on the self-regarding principle. Had Adam cared more for the happiness of Eve than for his own, and Eve, at the same time, more for the happiness of Adam than for her own, Satan might have saved himself the trouble of temptation. Mutual misery would have marred all prospects of bliss, and the death of both have brought to a speedy finale the history of man.

And what is the important deduction from

these postulates? Are they *anti-social* in their consequences? Nay! they are in the highest degree philanthropic and beneficent. For how can a man be happy, but by obtaining the friendly affections of those on whom his happiness depends? And how can he obtain their friendly affections, but by convincing them that he gives them his own in exchange? And how can he best convince them, but by giving them these friendly affections in reality; and if he give them in reality, the evidence will be found in his words and deeds. Helvetius said, that 'in order to love mankind, we ought to expect little from them.' We must be moderate in our calculations—moderate in our exactions. Prudence requires that we should not raise too high the standard of our hopes; for disappointment will diminish our own enjoyments, and our good will to others: whereas the unanticipated service done to us, coming with the charm of surprise, will bring with it a greater sum of pleasure, and strengthen the benevolent dispositions in our relations with others.

The principle of utility, then, in order to preserve its influence, must be habitually kept in view; and to this end, in the expression of every maxim subordinate to it, let its relation to that principle be seen. Let it not be thought sufficient that the reason assigned for a practice is in itself

in conformity with an estimate of a supposed result of happiness,—or with a vague notion of some useful object to be accomplished; but let such conformity be constantly dwelt upon, be brought forward for examination and approval and traced into all its consequences of future good and evil. This is the only expedient to prevent persons not sufficiently imbued with the principle—persons who have not climbed those heights on which utility has fixed its throne—from being led astray by the despotic dogma of asceticism, or the sympathies of a miscalculating and misdirected benevolence. Let the moralist regard the great Deontological Law, as steadily as the Turnsole looks upon the sun.

CHAPTER II.

DEONTOLOGY EXPLAINED—TERM WHY ADOPTED.

Deontology is derived from the Greek words, το δεον (that which is proper) and Λογια, knowledge—meaning the knowledge of what is right or proper; and it is here specially applied to the subject of morals, or that part of the field of action which is not the object of public legislation. As an art, it is the doing what is fit to be done; as a science, the knowing what is fit to be done on every occasion.

But the inquiry, as applied by the individual to his own rule of conduct, resolves itself into a question as to what he himself approves—what can be made to appear to himself as fit to be approved on the given occasion. And why should he declare his approbation of a particular course of conduct? Undoubtedly, because the approbation may lead to its adoption. And it will be thus conducive to it. Public opinion is made up of individual opinions; and public opinion is that which constitutes the popular or moral sanction. A

large quantity of recompense to act upon our hopes, and a large quantity of punishment to influence our fears, are in the hands of popular opinion. Of this influential power, every individual in the community forms a part; and may exercise and apply his portion of reward or punishment, — reward for the acts which merit his approbation—punishment for those of which he disapproves. He has thus a power over motives, and that to the extent in which he can dispose of the matter of pleasure and pain. These motives may sometimes be brought into operation by merely indicating their existence; at other times they may be created: and under both circumstances they will influence human conduct; nor can the effect be always foreseen. The affections and the will are touched by the motives prescribed to them, just as the Eolean harp-strings vibrate to the passing wind. By presenting motives, we necessitate acts; by awakening expectation of eventual pain or pleasure, we influence character. In proportion to the confidence felt in the opinions and friendly disposition of the teacher, will be the deference of the learner; in proportion to the pain or pleasure excited by the disapprobation, or approbation, which the instructor may be able to attach to different actions, will be the power of the instructor to

enforce or to prevent those actions. And the test of the value of the work he enters upon will be its harmony with some recognised principles, by which he consents that his instruction shall be tried.

The business of the Deontologist is to bring forth, from the obscurity in which they have been buried, those points of duty, in which, by the hands of nature, a man's interests have been associated with his enjoyments,—in which his own well-being has been connected, combined, and identified, with the well-being of others; to give, in a word, to the social, all the influence of the self-regarding motive. He is to use, for the production of the greatest sum of happiness, those elements of happiness which exist in the breast of every man; to extend the domain of felicity, by developing the principles which are co-extensive with the existence of man—the self-regarding principles being necessarily, and happily, the strongest. For such an artist, there is no want of work,—there can be no want of work, while remediable evil is to be found in the world. His business is to establish his propositions, by bringing a balance of happiness, out of each of them,—a balance to somebody—a balance to the one, or to the many.

The principle, then, on which Deontology is

grounded, is the principle of *Utility*; in other words, that every action is right or wrong—worthy or unworthy—deserving approbation or disapprobation, in proportion to its tendency to contribute to, or to diminish the amount of public happiness. And that the public sanction will, in as far as the subject is understood, be given to that line of conduct, which most promotes the public happiness, is a corollary requiring no arguments for its establishment.

Three very obvious inquiries grow out of these remarks, and will be constantly kept in view during the progress of our investigations. 1. What does the public happiness require? 2. Is public opinion in harmony with the public interest or happiness; and 3, as the practical application, What line of conduct ought to be pursued in each individual case which presents itself for consideration?

The end being marked out, and acknowledged to be wise and good, it becomes the primary object to ascertain, whether that end is best promoted by the opinions held, and the conduct pursued in accordance with these opinions; whether, in a word, what the world calls morality, is really that happiness-producing instrument which it ought to become. And the question must be asked, and the test applied, in every portion of the field of conduct.

Morality, Religion, Politics, can indeed only have one common object.

If the politician, moralist, and divine, all know what they are about, their purposes can be no other than the same.

The politician's end is universally allowed to be happiness—the happiness of the state—the greatest happiness possible among the individuals of a state, during the present life.

To the politician, as such, licence is given to make this his end, by all parties, whatever may be their opinions on religion or morals, by all parties, without one dissenting voice.

This being the case, it were strange if the ends of the other two were allowed to be different. For were they so—if different and, upon occasion, opposite were pursued—if the Divine and the Moralist contemplated results contrary to those intended by the Politician, they would be in a state of universal warfare. Each would be reduced, for his security, or for the furtherance of his end, to fight against the other two with such weapons as he is master of. The divine would denounce his antagonist to the vengeance of the Celestial Tribunal; would imagine, or would forge decrees from it, and endeavour to persuade the by-standers to execute them. The moralist would thunder out the anathemas of his self-erected Court Moral, or,

as some affect to denominate it, common sense; would call his enemy fool, and villain, and hypocrite, and nonsense-talker; and make interest with the by-standers to treat him as if he were so. And the politician, if incommoded by such sort of artillery, would be driven to defend himself by such means as he is provided with. And, indeed, if things were to come to this, the politician would be found rather too hard for the other two; and the upshot of the fray would be, did not his own principles, and the consciousness of their value restrain him, that he would set his arms a-kimbo, and, like Lord Peter in the history, kick his obsteperous brethren out of doors. Not that this is a conduct by any means to be recommended to him,* (though upon the score of what is commonly called justice, they certainly would have no reason to complain) because, if anything can be predicated of the future, it is that, in this country at least, such violence never can be needful, needful to his own purpose; a purpose which this volume is intended to forward. Here no

* The tranquillity and good temper of a disputant is in proportion to the inward consciousness of the aptitude of his arguments to produce conviction. Accordingly, mathematicians, so long as they confine themselves within the province of their science, cannot be, and accordingly never have been, otherwise than tranquil.

lesson will be given which persecution is to enforce. It were better far to join the ranks of the antagonists; for nothing is so likely to frustrate the ends of truth, as to league it with the infliction of useless suffering. This the Deontologist will not recommend to the Politician; but what may be safely recommended to him (and it will be perfectly competent to the purposes as well of punishment as of defence) is, to let the talkers talk on, and never to give himself any trouble about what they say. Let him but pursue his end industriously, and show that he pursues it, he need not fear but that in a free and enlightened country (indeed in any country, if he give such an example) the majority of the people will ultimately lend him their concurrence, and in the Deontologist he will find a mighty ally.

The line which separates the dominions of the Legislator from those of the Deontologist is tolerably distinct and obvious. Where legal rewards and punishments cease to interfere with human actions, there precepts of morality come in with their influences. The conduct which is not given over to the tribunals of the state for judgment, belongs to the tribunals of opinion. There are a variety of acts in which judicial punishment would be unprofitably wasted, but which may be safely and properly transferred to

extra-official punitory visitations. Of conduct injurious to the community, a large portion necessarily escapes the cognition and the visitation of penal law, while it falls under the observation, and is submitted to the award of, the more extensive and penetrating cognizance of popular retribution. Thus the crimes which are recognised by the penal code, if they escape detection and punishment, whether from want of sufficient evidence, or any other cause, may be brought into the field of Deontology. But it is not of these that it is proposed to treat. It is desirable, no doubt, to widen the field of moral, and to narrow that of political action. Legislation has intruded too far into a territory which does not belong to it. It has frequently interfered with actions, when its interference has only produced a balance of evil; and, what is worse, it has interfered with opinions, particularly on religious topics, where its interferences have been in the highest degree pernicious. In a word, Deontology, or Private Ethics, may be considered the science by which happiness is created out of motives extra-legislatorial—while Jurisprudence is the science by which law is applied to the production of felicity.

The object of every man's wish and of every man's endeavour, from the beginning of life to the end of it, is to increase his own felicity:—

his felicity— as connected with pleasure and disconnected with pain.

But again what is pleasure—and what is pain? Does every man form the same estimate? Far from it. That is pleasure which a man's judgment, aided by his memory, recommends and recognises to his feelings *as* pleasure. No man can allow another to decide for him as to what is pleasure,—or what is the balance or the amount of pleasure. And hence a necessary consequence, that every man of ripe age and sound mind ought on this subject to be left to judge and act for himself—and that the attempts to give a direction to his conduct inconsistent with his views of his own interest, is no better than folly and impertinence. And the more closely the matter is examined the more decidedly will this be found to be the case.

The business of the moralist, what then does it become? He can place before the eyes of the inquirer a sketch of the probable future more correct and complete than would have presented itself to his view in the midst of present influences. The moralist may assist him in making reflections and drawing conclusions—in taking a more comprehensive audit of the past,—and from thence deducing calculations or conjectures for the time to come. He may point out *ends* which had not suggested

themselves,—and *means* by which they can be accomplished. He may enable him to wisely choose between balancing pleasures or pains. He may mark out occasions where enjoyments may be reaped or sufferings avoided. And thus far he will be labouring in an honest and honourable vocation. In fact, to be most useful he will be employed somewhat in the character of a *scout*—a man hunting for consequences—consequences resulting from a particular course—collecting them as well as he can, and presenting them for the use of those who may be disposed to profit by his services. His task is humble—his labor is great—his reward can only be the anticipation of good to be done.

It is not thus that public instructors have generally proceeded. They have erected for themselves, in the field of moral action, a high throne; thence, in the character of absolute and infallible monarchs, have they dictated to the world below, and sent out their commands and prohibitions for prompt and peremptory recognition. The wantonness of a political ruler has often been the topic of animadversion; the self-erected arbitrator wielding like the madman in his cell his imaginary sceptre, is, in truth, more egregiously wanton. A certain sense of responsibility—a fear of reaction may control the despotism of an acknowledged tyrant, but where

is the control which is to check the waywardness and presumption of the self-elected dictator of morals?

His tone is the tone of the pedagogue or the magistrate; he is strong and wise, and knowing and virtuous. His readers are weak, and foolish, and ignorant, and vicious;—his voice is the voice of power,—and it is from the superiority of his wisdom that his power is derived.

And if all this were so without prejudice to to the public, it might be the gratification of pride to the individual—pleasure to him—and so much pleasure gained. But the misfortune is, that the assumption of this authority has for its natural attendants—indolence and ignorance. Even where precepts are founded on good reasons, the development of those reasons is a matter of considerable exertion and difficulty—it is a task to which few have been found competent. But to set up laws and precepts is a task of no difficulty at all—a task to which all men are competent, the foolish as well as the wise,—a task which the foolish indeed are most eager to engage in,—for ignorance has no more convenient cloak than arrogance.

The talisman of arrogance, indolence, and ignorance, is to be found in a single word, an authoritative imposture, which in these pages it will be frequently necessary to unveil. It is

the word 'ought'—'ought or ought not,' as circumstances may be. In deciding 'You ought to do this—you ought not to do it,'—is not every question of morals set at rest?

If the use of the word be admissible at all, it 'ought' to be banished from the vocabulary of morals.

There is another word, which has a talismanic virtue too, and which might be wielded to destroy many fatal and fallacious positions. 'You ought'—'you ought not,' says the dogmatist. *Why?* retorts the inquirer—Why? To say 'you ought,' is easy in the extreme. To stand the searching penetration of a Why? is not so easy.

Why ought I? Because you ought—is the not unfrequent reply;—on which the Why? comes back again with the added advantage of having obtained a victory.

It cannot, may it be answered, be the mere love of ease that drives the instructor to adopt this phraseology; the love of ease would not induce him to write even thus glibly and unwisely, but would keep him from writing at all.

But motives there are stronger than the love of ease. There may be advantages of many sorts growing out of a particular line of argument. Out of conformity with public opinion grows reputation—out of reputation, wealth and

power. A man must keep well with public opinion. To oppose current prejudices, to bend back an established bias, can hardly be the conduct of him who desires to present himself in fair proportions to the world.

The world's judgment is on the side of severity; for in the restraints imposed upon his neighbour, every man feels an increase of his own power—a gratification of his own pride. He easily prepares for himself an exemption that shall satisfy his own mind, while, by indulging in the strong language of animadversion, he gives evidence that he is free from the offence which he so vehemently reprobates—for who would be forward in passing condemnation on himself? From laxity he has nothing to hope—everything to fear; from severity everything to hope, and nothing to fear—and so, with 'ought' and 'ought not' for his instruments, he goes on laying commands and prohibitions upon his fellows—imposing chains and burthens—not the less galling and afflictive because they have their source in metaphors and fictions.

In all this there is seemingly much profit, and little pain. Little waste of toil—little waste of thought. Observation, inquiry, reflection—these are all superfluous, as superfluous as they are laborious. Folly and arrogance—the blindest folly and the most assuming arrogance—find them-

selves altogether at their ease. By these caterers to the moral taste, pleasures are ordered off the table—pains ordered on instead of them, just as by the word of the physician of Barataria, the meat was marched away from the presence of the famished Sancho; but the physician of Barataria did not replace it by poison.

Sacrifice—sacrifice is the demand of the every day moralist. Sacrifice, taken by itself, is mischievous, and mischievous is the influence that connects morality with suffering. Little does he seem to be aware how far morality may be effective without any thing painful. Its associations are cheerfulness and joy—not gloom and misery. Certain it is, the less the sacrifice made of happiness, the more must there be of happiness remaining. Let it be obtained *gratis* where it can—where it cannot be had without sacrifice, let the sacrifice be as small as possible; where the sacrifice must be great, let it be ascertained that the happiness will be greater. This is the true economy of pleasure—this is the prolific cultivation of virtue.

DEONTOLOGY, or that which is proper, has been chosen as a fitter term than any other which could be found, to represent in the field of morals, the principle of *Utilitarianism*, or that which is useful. Utilitarianism offers too vague and undefined an impression to the mind. If the

term could be immediately and directly associated with the production of felicity, it might be appropriately and conveniently employed.

The occasions on which the deontological principle is called into action, are either permanent or transient—public or private. Public occasions are those which exist between man and man, as members of society in general—a large proportion of which occasions, which may be properly called political, do not come within the scope of this work. Man's private relations are either natural or factitious—those which may be considered as having birth for their source, and those which are accidental. These divisions will be found convenient on the demand for the practical application of the moral code.

The word *utility*, with its conjugates, useful and useless, uselessness and usefulness, has not been found applicable to all the cases where the principle itself is brought into operation.

In some instances it appears too weak to express the force of the obligation of which it is desirable to give the idea. The mind will not be satisfied with such phrases as, 'It is useless to commit murder'—or, 'it would be useful to prevent it:' and so of incendiarism and acts of great magnitude of mischief. Hence its insufficiency in the field of legislation.

The principles of asceticism and sentimental-

ism being in a state of rivalry with the principle of utility, the employment of the term might be made, on every occasion, the ground for rejecting propositions which otherwise would be admitted. It pre-supposes, as it were, the truth of the doctrine of utility.

In the word propriety, with its conjugates, proper and improper, the desideratum appears to have been found. It is a natural emanation from Deontology, or the knowledge of what is proper.

There is no objection to it in respect of intensity of import: no crime, however heinous, but will be admitted to be improper. It is true, that to the rhetorician, an expression thus used may appear unsuited to the occasion, and he may deem the word itself *improper*. His object being to put others in a passion, his course is to appear to be in a passion himself; while, by so unexciting a term, not passion, but the absence of passion is expressed. But to the logician such an objection will not be formidable; and it is for logical, and not for rhetorical purposes, that the word is wanted.

It has, too, the usefulness of *impartiality*. It does not of itself decide between any of the systems—and may be applied with equal propriety to the developement of each. Probably neither the ascetic nor the sentimentalist will

regard it as inappropriate, unless on the ground of its coolness. Both will certainly admit to be proper that of which they approve; both that of which they disapprove, to be improper. It will, at all events, serve to express the two characters of an act, leaving any additional language of praise or blame to be applied at will. It is the announcement of a judgment formed, and that without any intimation of the affections with which that judgment has been accompanied, or the ground on which it has been determined.

To the Utilitarian it will have the convenience of covering the whole domain of action, and giving expression to the sentiment of approbation or disapprobation, to whichever part of the field of duty the act may belong.

CHAPTER III.

ANTI-DEONTOLOGICAL PROPOSITIONS REMOVED —SUMMUM BONUM.

Before the édifice of moral truth can be erected it is needful to clear away a vast heap of rubbish which obstructs the progress of the moral architect. Motives different from those which utility recognises—ends hostile to those which utility proposes, have been and are the topics of self-elected moralists. When these are disposed of, the path of the Deontologist will be clear; until they are disposed of, his path will be perplexed with their intrusions.

The end of the Deontologist—it cannot be too often repeated—is happiness. Something that is not happiness, something different, something contradistinguished from happiness, was proposed by ancient philosophers. It was the *summum bonum*.

And the summum bonum, the sovereign good, we can hardly better trace than in that accredited history of it, to be found in the Oxford Compendium, once the text-book and authority of that famous university.

In what does the summum bonum consist? The question was debated by multitudes, debated from generation to generation, by men assuming to themselves the dictatorship of right and wrong.

The summum bonum, in what does it consist? What does the term signify? Nonsense, and nothing more.

The summum bonum,—the sovereign good—what is it? The philosopher's stone that converts all metals into gold—the balm Hygeian that cures all manner of diseases. It is this thing, and that thing, and the other thing—it is any thing but pleasure—it is the Irishman's apple-pie made of nothing but quinces.

If it were any thing, what would it be? Could it be anything but pleasure? A pleasure, or the cause of pleasure? Supreme pleasure—pleasure without pain—happiness maximised? What fool has there ever been so foolish as not to know that by no man, in no time, at no place, has such a prize been ever found?

In every walk of discipline error is a sort of vestibule through which men are condemned to pass on their approaches towards truth.

While Xenophon was writing history, and Euclid giving instruction in geometry, Socrates and Plato were talking nonsense under pretence of teaching wisdom and morality. This morality of

theirs consisted in words,—this wisdom of theirs was the denial of matters known to every man's experience, and the assertion of other matters opposed to every man's experience. And exactly in the proportion in which their notions on this subject differed from those of the mass of mankind, exactly in that proportion were they below the level of mankind.

The people who took no pleasure in the uttering of any such nonsense; the people were contented to reap common pleasures under the guidance of common sense. They were called ignorant and the vulgar herd, yet they crowded into their existence a balance of well-being, and most of them now and then a portion of happiness. Well-being their ordinary fare, happiness, a slight taste of it for an occasional feast. This was good enough for the ignorant vulgar; not so for the learned sages,—men, who by whatever name they called their own sageships, were called by others wisest of men (σοφισται), wise men (σοφοι), or lovers of wisdom (φιλοσοφοι), who held their heads aloft and poured forth their streams of sophistry.

To the profane vulgar they left the enjoyment of any such pleasure as might fall in their way. For their own disciples they reserved a thing—a beautiful thing which they called τὸ ἀγαθόν the summum bonum—the sovereign

good. What was it? was it pleasure? Oh no! pleasure was not good enough for them; it was something better than pleasure, and it could not be better without being different from it.

Now had their practice been what their preaching was, it could only have been said that they resembled the dog who, snapping at the shadow, lost the substance, But theirs was no such folly. Pleasure was good for one thing—summum bonum for another: pleasure was to be enjoyed, summum bonum to be talked of. While they were all of them chattering about the summum bonum, each was amusing himself with the gross enjoyments of sense. They had their favorites, without number, some whose names are known, others whom no history has canonized.*

It is as amusing to look at some of the contests among men called sages, as it is instructive to trace their results. While in later times a set of physical philosophers were hunting for the universal panacea, the moral philosophers were running after their summum bonum. Ex-

* Dependent as were the philosophers on public opinion, they knew better than to allow themselves to be governed, as James the First was, by those who administered to their pleasures. The uncontrollable character of the passion of Socrates—of Socrates, the most prudent of the whole—is admitted by himself in a very extraordinary confession.

cellent objects both, and all agreed that both were in existence — both were findable, but they did not agree as to where they were to be found.

'The idea of good,' said one,—there it is,—there the summum bonum is to be found. Catch the idea of good, and you have caught the summum bonum. And now, having caught it, are you a bit the happier? are you, with your summum bonum, happier than the happiest of men who has not got it? But when you have got it, what will you do with it?—you need not perplex yourself with the question — it is time enough to know when you have managed to get it.

Two sets of philosophers took to this view of the matter: the Platonists and the Academics; the Platonists, including, of course, the master-manufacturer of nonsense, from whom his followers took their nonsense and their names.

Nonsense is very like an eel: when you think you have it fast, it slips through your fingers, and in comes another lot of nonsense in the stead of it; for after giving the summum bonum of these philosophers—the idea of good, as if this were not unintelligible enough—in the same breath, in the same sentence, and in the very next words, in comes the compound matter with a *sive—sive visione et fructione Dei*—i. e. the

vision and fruition—the seeing and enjoying of God.

Two things are these—two separate things, and these separate things are synonymous with 'the idea of good,'—the sight of God—the enjoyment of God. The God of Christianity, the God of the Bible—this cannot be, for he is not to be seen—he is invisible; what can, indeed, be meant by the God of the Platonists and Academics? which of their Gods, as they were all heathens, and had Gods by thousands—which of them did they ever enjoy? and how did they enjoy them?

But we are still at sea, and another set cry out, 'The habit of virtue,'—the habit of virtue is the summum bonum: either this is the jewel itself, or the casket in which it will be found. Lie all your life long in your bed with the rheumatism in your loins, the stone in your bladder, and the gout in both your feet—have but the habit of virtue, and you have the summum bonum. Much good may it do you. Your condition will be no impediment—negative virtue is virtue no doubt. It will not be easy to fall into the practice of vice—and of your summum bonum, the seat, if it be any where, must be in your head; now, would you be content to have the stone in your bladder, the rheumatism in

your loins, and the gout in your feet, even though you could get your head crammed with summum bonums?

Lest the sense of this nonsense should be mistaken, behold the Oxford Instructor, with a remark of kindred sagacity at his fingers' ends: 'For,' says he, 'reason shows that a naked habit is not of any, the least value, unless it be referred to *observation*, and brought forward into act and exercise.' A habit without an act? A habit in existence, and not so much as a single act in it! A habit formed, and out of the acts, which make the habit not so much as a single act ever done! and so, lest you should fall into any such error, and, in consequence, any such misconduct, as that of persevering in the habit of virtue, without ever having performed a single act of virtue,—the valuable information thus given is benignantly bestowed.

But, to know where the summum bonum *is not*, is of little service enough, unless you can also learn where it is. And we have at last Virtue—virtue itself, that is the summum bonum.

Ponendum est igitur summum hominis bonum in *ipsâ virtute*. What? In the habit of virtue? Oh no! not in any such thing: that is the very error against which you have just been warned—have virtue, you need not trouble

yourself about the habit of it. You may, indeed, have it, if you like, but no summum bonum will you get by it.

Ponendum est igitur summum hominis bonum in ipsâ virtute. Nothing can be more positive, nothing more decided: whereupon, immediately upon the back of this concise nonsense comes a torrent of diffuse nonsense, by which every thing that was settled is wasted away.

'And therefore,' continues the instructor, 'and therefore in acting according to the best and most perfect virtue, consists the essence of human felicity.' Yet, to entirety and perfection of human felicity are required certain 'good things of the body and fortune; and, moreover, that serene pleasure of mind which is born' (though it should seem in a sort of sly way)—is born, '*subnascitur*, from the conscience of things well done.'

'And this felicity,' he goes on to assure us, 'is a steady kind of good, and not easily can it be lost.' With the assurance you have the grounds and reasons of the assurance:—'For,' says he, 'virtue, in which its foundation is laid (the summum bonum being itself the virtue), neither can it be snatched out of hands unwilling to part with it; nor, when the good things of the body and fortune are gone, does it immediately go along with them. In a word, by the loss of

external good things the essence of felicity is not taken away; all that happens to it is to be diminished, and to have its integrity mutilated.'

But there was another class of philosophers; hogs indeed, who did not see the visions, nor enjoy the enjoyments of the Platonists and Academics, with their divinity or divinities; nor stumble, with the Stoics, on their habits of virtue—the sensual hogs—the Epicureans. The summum bonum being the thing sought—where did they look—who would have thought it? They, hogs as they were, looked for it in pleasure. So says the Instructor. It was in pleasure, yea! in bodily pleasure. Yet on the very face of the story there is incorrectness in this account of them. That to them pleasure was pleasure, is highly probable; that if they had been sent to hunt for summum bonum, they would have looked towards pleasure, that, too, is very likely: but that in their account of pleasures, pleasures not bodily were omitted, is neither probable, à priori, nor is it true in fact.

Some pleasures have their seat in the body—others in the mind. To whom is this most obvious fact unknown? By whom is it unexperienced? Could these philosophers be ignorant of that with which every body is acquainted?

But having started the subject of bodily pleasure, the Instructor tells us that, at all events, the summum bonum is not there. And why?

'Because the part of the human frame to which they belong, is the ignoble part;' and, secondly, 'They do not last'—they are short: and, thirdly, 'Every now and then, when they are over, they leave unsavoury recollections, and bring blushes.'

They are ignoble. The life of A. is filled up with pleasures, all of them ignoble, all of them intense—none of them alloyed with pains. In the life of B. such pleasures as there are, are of the noble kind, but all of them mingled and outweighed by pains. Whose lot of the two would a man in his senses choose?

The part—the semi-ignoble, be it what it may—is it less necessary than any other part? Ignoble as it is, would the compendium-writer—would his master have liked to have been without it? But, as thus applied, ignoble means any thing but ignoble; the sound of the word is all there is in it. Let it mean, however, what he will have it mean. Take two men, Felix and Miser. The life of Felix is crowded with pleasures—with ignoble pleasures—pure pleasures; i.e. pleasures unalloyed with pain. The life of Miser has pleasures too—noble pleasures; each pleasure faint, and each of them outweighed by

pains. Felix or Miser, tell us philosopher! which would you rather be?

Alas! alas! this all a mistake. It is not the particular organ, it is the body, the whole body, which is the ignoble thing. The organ may be subservient to the pleasure, but the pleasure is subservient to the body. Well, allowing ignoble, though it means nothing, to mean any thing, and that the body is as ignoble as heart can wish—what then? The seat of the pleasure, be the pleasure what it will, is it not in the mind? Did any body ever see a body that felt pleasure when the mind was out of it?

Again, the duration of bodily pleasure is short. Good again; and what if it be? Take each by itself, there is but little of it. Well, and what of that? Take a guinea out of your pocket, and get the change for it—shillings—farthings: which is worth most, the guinea or the change? Which is the heavier, a pound of gold or a pound of feathers? When you have answered these, you shall be told, if you like, whether the objection about shortness has any thing in it but words.

Once more: the recollection of bodily pleasures is unsavory, and demands blushes. When enjoyed in an improper manner, let the recollection of them be ever so unsavoury, those enjoyed in a proper manner, will they be the worse for

it? Let those which have been bought with a balance of pain, bring blushes—no blushes need there be for those which have left a balance of pleasure.

All these summum bonumists have their respective names; there are three sets, however, without names: the denominated being all in the wrong, the undenominated equally so. True! they are all in the wrong, if the Oxford Instructor be in the right. Greatly in the wrong are they, even though they obtain what they desire, should they suppose they had obtained the summum bonum; and greatly in the wrong, again, if, having possessed themselves of what they value, they should value it at its worth.

First comes the *vulgus*,—Anglice, the mob. These place their summum bonum in riches—riches in great quantities. These are all in the wrong box, though so many of them there be. And reason good; for this wealth of which the vulgar are so fond, is but of small value, be there ever so much of it. In the first place, 'it is slippery and unsteady;' in the next, 'it is not loved for its own sake,' but for the sake of something else that is to be obtained for it; and, in the third place, whom does it belong to? 'Not to the owner, but to Fortune.'

It is slippery and unsteady; which is, in plain English, the varnish being stripped off, it is

liable to be lost. But the question is, what is it worth, not to him who has it not, but to him who has it? And, as is well observed by Adam Smith, in England at least, the country where the tutor wrote, for one man who has lost what he had, you have a good thousand who have not only kept it, but added to it. But these blindfold travellers in the paths of common place, are wholly heedless of the history of man—heedless of the changes which time has introduced into the value and security of wealth. That treasure, which in ancient days was with great propriety associated with uncertainty and mutability, might now be made to represent possession in its maximum of security. In the heart of Greece—in Athens, when Aristotle wrote, land was at two years' purchase; in England it is worth thirty years' purchase.

It is not desired for its own sake—it is only desired because something which *is* desired may be obtained in exchange for it. And if by it, and for it, a man gets what he wants, in what respect is it the less valuable? If a man obtain the object of his desire, what more would he have? and if he has not the summum bonum itself, has he not something just as good as ever the summum bonum would be?

But, worst of all, it is not ours—it is not in our possession but in the temerity of Fortune.

'Non in nostrâ potestate, sed in Fortunæ temeritate.' In this beautiful union of rhetoric with poetry—in this dance of Fortune between the two *tates*, lies the strength of the argument; which strength, by the way, in the process of being decanted out of Latin into English, mostly evaporates. And what remains but this, which was told us before, that wealth is a slippery sort of thing—that it glides out of people's hands —that it may glide out of ours? for such news, once telling might well have sufficed.

There may be something more. Yes! we learn that Fortune is a woman, and that woman a rash one. Good in rhetoric—but this is a book on Ethics. Good in rhetoric? No! not even this; for where design is not, neither can rashness be.

Next come your politicians and votaries of ambition. In honor and in power, in the one or the other, and nothing better, do these men place their summum bonum.

The reasoning, if such a thing it can be called, the reasoning is pretty much as before; the language a little changed, for it was necessary to say something new, and nothingness as well as other matters may vary its shape. Riches were slippery and unstable. Honor and power are uncertain and deciduous; — depending for the most part on popular breath

or pretended favour. And, to add to the chance of the discovery, Horace is called in to sanction by his poetry the prose of our philosopher.

When it was of riches that our moralist had to speak, he told us that it was not for themselves, but for the sake of other things that they were sought after. But neither in honor, no, nor yet in power, whatever their votaries may fancy, is there any intrinsic dignity; or, if there be intrinsic dignity, it is not of that sort which should cause them to be either desired or praised.

As to caducity, has not the objection been answered when the objection of unsteadiness was answered? But has it a meaning at all? If it have, he who has found a meaning for it, is not the Oxford Instructor. Honore? what means honore? Honor or honors; good reputation, or political and factitious dignity: for in England thus wide is the distinction between singular and plural. Good repute—reputation—is it that? By accident, no doubt, may good repute attend upon ill-desert; and ill-repute upon good. But if this disastrous state of things be possible —if it sometimes be witnessed, its continuance is of rare occurrence. Were there even more truth in it than there is, the use of such an argument little becomes a moralist; to underrate the

power of the moral sanction, seems a strange way of advancing morality: to throw his weight into the scale of false opinion, and employ that false opinion as an instrument in his craft, is a sad exhibition for the moralist to make. Others may undervalue, and cast aside the moral sanction; but is this fit for him to do? To undervalue it is to undervalue his own occupation—to become a tradesman flinging undeserved discredit on his own wares.

Is it *honors*—factitious reputation—the plural meaning? Here, as in the case of riches, the worse it is to lose, the better it is to have them; the continuation of their enjoyment must be contrasted with the cessation of their possession. It is in the keeping them, and not in the parting with them, that any body would look for the summum bonum, who expected to find them there. To keep them, to increase them, is the ordinary course; to lose them is but the accidental one.

But whether it be honor, or whether it be power, what does *pretended*, what does *simulated* mean? If favor has advanced a man to honor or dignity, why should it be called insincere; and in what respect would be a man who is benefited by it be the better or worse, if, instead of a degrading title, it had all the adornings which the finest phraseology could gather around it?

Last of all come a band of men, whom, supposing them to exist, he calls theoretics. These men look to contemplation—to contemplation alone for the summum bonum.

Contemplation? To reach the summit of human felicity, a man has nothing to do but to contemplate. Who would not be a theoretic? Crede quod habes et habes. Believe you have it, and it is yours; and if there be any case in which the truth of this maxim is exemplified, it is this;—for between being happy, and fancying one's self happy, where, as long as the fancy lasts, where, what is the difference?

Of these men surely may be said, and with no less propriety, what Cicero said of another set of men. 'Istos viros sine contumelia dimittimus: sunt enim boni viri, et quandoquidem ita sibi ipsis videtur beati.' They are a good set of men; and forasmuch as they are blessed in their own opinion,—blessed are they.

Not so our moralist. Happy though they may dream themselves, it is all a mistake of theirs. He will show them why.

Why then? 'We are born for action,' he says; for action; and in order to prove it, he summons 'the fabric of our nature' to give evidence: whereupon he observes, that 'if' in our actions no action—'no action of offices (or duties) takes

place, then the highest knowledge on arts or sciences is in a certain sort defective, and will be of little service to mankind.' This is rather a roundabout way of coming at a matter of fact. If *scribere est agere,* better proof was he giving while scribbling his philosophy. And there are only two objections to be urged—the first, that all this means nothing: the second, that if it did, it is nothing to the purpose.

But let the theoretic be produced, wrapt up in his contemplations, thinking about any thing else, or nothing else, and fancying himself happy—so happy as to have found the summum bonum,—and let our philosopher come with his 'fabric of our nature' to batter down the theoretic's felicity. Will the theoretic believe his own senses, which tell him that he has got the summum bonum, or our philosopher who assures him he has not?

In fine, let him fling away the Platonists, Academicians, and Stoics; they shall be as much in the wrong as he pleases; but for the rest, there is not one of them so completely in the wrong as he. Every one of the others—whether he found the sovereign good or not, found some good, but not an atom of good has our philosopher found where he looked for it. How should he? It was not there. They might

have been wrong, but they did not contradict themselves — did not bring out one sentence just to have it annihilated by another.

His summum bonum—any summum bonum, must amount to nothing without a dose of those other things on which he pours out his scorn and drags through the kennel. But what dose? This he does not pretend to know; it is a moderate dose, and that is all he can say about it. With any other summum bonum than his you have at all events something—with his you have nothing but moonshine, and not moonshine enough to show you your way.

It may be urged, after all, that however bad the logic of these different pretenders, their ethics were good—that the effect was good, whatever may have been the cause; and that the badness of the argument matters little, if the effect were good. Were you to choose for your friend, between two men, one of whom always reasoned well and acted ill towards you —while the other reasoned ill but acted well; should you hesitate in the selection? Certainly not. But of the antique sages, much of their logic has come down to us, and few of their actions. Arguing as they argue, their conduct might have been good or bad: nothing is more common than for men to have two theories; one

for show, and another for use. If bad logic, however, be any where mischievous, it is in the field of morals. Such doctrines as we have been exhibiting, could never have been held but at the expense of the understanding; and deep indeed must be the prostration of the understanding, enfeebled indeed must its strength have become, ere trash like this could have mastered it.

But these are valuable articles of ammunition in the hands of those who think for the public, to let fly among men whom precedents serve instead of brains, who, knowing or caring little about what had best be done in future, will hear of nothing but what has been done before.

There is great ground for suspicion in the meantime, that in all this there is but little honest advocacy. He who loses sight of the only true and useful morality, that which leaves a balance of pleasure as its results—he who seems rather desirous of leading a conversation, than of finding a rule for action; he, in a word, who puts forward, on all occasions, the silly and baneful fallacy that what is good in theory is bad in practice; he is not really entitled to that attention which implies respect. When philosophy is meant for talk and parade, its absurdities may serve as decorations; but if morality be good,

and if happiness be good, no nonsense will make them bad. The moral sanction, understood and developed, will take them under its wing; and the common interest will give more and more efficiency to truth and reason — those great allies by whose aid it will establish its own sovereignty.

CHAPTER IV.

OF PLEASURE AND PAIN—THEIR RELATION TO GOOD AND EVIL.

EVERY pleasure is *prima facie* good, and ought to be pursued. Every pain is *prima facie* evil, and ought to be avoided.

The fact, that after experience of its enjoyment a man pursues a pleasure, is in itself evidence of its goodness.

Every act whereby pleasure is reaped is, all consequences apart, good.

Every act by which pleasure is reaped, without any result of pain, is pure gain to happiness; every act whose results of pain are less than the results of pleasure, is good, to the extent of the balance in favour of happiness.

Every person is not only the best, but the only proper judge of what, with reference to himself, is pleasure, and what pain.

To say, that 'If I do this, I shall get no balance of pleasure, therefore if you do it, you will get no balance of pleasure,' is mere presumption and folly.

To say, that 'If I do this, I shall get no pre-

ponderant pleasure; but if you do this, you may get a preponderant pleasure, yet it is not proper you should do it,' is absurdity; and if I apply evil in any shape to prevent the act, it is injustice and injury; and if I call in the powers of government to prevent the act, it is tyranny.

Keeping out of view future contingent consequences, the fact of the long continuance of the free and habitual exercise of any act by an individual, is evidence that it is productive to him of pure or preponderant good, and therefore fit and proper to be pursued; that is to say, by the *free* exercise of the act, it is here implied, that it is not of a character to be visited by reward or punishment from any extraneous source.

To warrant the assumption that any given act is an evil one, it is incumbent on him who impugns it to shew, not only that evil will be the result of it, but that the sum of evil will be greater than the sum of good which it produces.

If, by misrepresentation of consequences, or erroneous reasoning, and still more by fear of punishment, whether physical, popular or moral, political or religious, a man is prohibited from the enjoyment of any pleasure, an injury is inflicted on him, equal in amount to the balance of pleasure of which he is deprived.

The amount of delinquency of such an injury will be graduated by the state of the delinquent's

mind with reference to the consequences of the act. Absence of evil consciousness will diminish the offence, though it will not diminish the injury. The offence will be maximized when the *mala fides* is maximized in the breast of the offender.

The amount of injury done by the inhibition of a pleasure which might have been enjoyed, is equal to the infliction of a pain to a similar amount, which otherwise would not have been suffered.

Penal legislation throws its protection over property, solely on the ground that property is an instrument for the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain. Except where pleasure and pain are concerned, legislation is wasted.

If, by erroneous reasoning, another man is debarred of pleasure, there is no sufficient reason for visiting the erroneous reasoner with punishment, for erroneous reasoning is best met and most successfully extinguished by sound reasoning: and it is not by punishment, or the fear of punishment, that its erroneousness can be proved and exposed. In proportion to the erroneousness of an opinion will be the demand for punishment in its support; and there can be no more presumptively conclusive evidence of the erroneousness of an opinion than that it should

employ, or seek to employ, punishment as its auxiliary.

He who, for the purpose of obtaining wealth, reputation, or power for himself, endeavours to debar others from those acts which leave a preponderance of enjoyment to them, resembles the man who, in an upper story, should with one hand be piling guineas, and with the other be flinging nuisances on the heads of passengers below. And he who, on the subject of morals, deals out at random, without any specific reasons, his 'ought,' and his 'ought not,' may be properly compared to the careless housemaid, who empties her receiving-pail from a chamber-window, indifferent to all who may chance to be going by.

The value of pains and pleasures must be estimated by their intensity, duration, certainty, proximity, and extent. Their intensity, duration, proximity, and certainty, respect individuals; their extent the number of persons under their influence. The greater amount of any of these qualities may counterbalance the lesser amount of any other.

A pleasure or a pain may be fruitful, or barren. A pleasure may be fruitful in pleasures, or fruitful in pains, or fruitful in both; and a pain, on the contrary, may be fruitful in plea-

sures or pains, or both. It is the province of Deontology to weigh them, and to draw the rule of conduct from the result.

The estimate of pain and pleasure, then, must be made by him who suffers or enjoys the one or the other. Even the short-sighted and unreflecting multitude are better satisfied to trust to their own experience and observation, than to take the word of they know not whom.

Accordingly, the only way of turning the idea of pain in this way to any account, is to fix it to some known species: and it is by this that those religious teachers who deal most in specific images and lively portraitures of the pains of hell, owe that superiority of influence which they possess over regular divines. The ecclesiastic who, by study and critical research, should satisfy himself that the language of scripture is metaphorical with regard to the peculiar character of the future pains of the wicked, necessarily employs, if acting according to his conviction, a much less efficient instrument of terror than he who introduces the material sufferings created by unquenchable fire, and burning brimstone, and gnawing worms, and all those objects which most vividly appeal to the senses.

Even the pleasures with which the more popular religious instructors embellish the man-

sions of the blessed, are pleasures of love, which, though separated in their descriptions from their earthly basis, fail not, under favour of a certain confusion of terms and ideas, to draw, secretly and imperceptibly, much of their force from the regions of sense. To figure to themselves the transports of heaven, they aid their conceptions with associations of transports they have experienced upon earth: transports which, although seemingly removed from the sexual passions, could not, for all that, have existed, but for those sexual passions. A proof of this is, that no word, such as friendship, which offers to the mind the affection entirely separated from this basis, is among those which they have chosen to dwell on, as the best adapted to the creation of those lively impressions they design to produce.

In the analysis of pleasures and pains, or rather in the separation of pleasures and pains into their different classes or kinds, it may be necessary to travel over the ground again which was laid out in the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Chapter V).

First on the list stand the pleasures and pains of sense; comprising those of taste, smell, touch, sound, and sight, those derived from the sexual organization, from health or indisposition; the pleasures of novelty, and the pains of weariness.

Secondly, The pleasures of wealth, whether

of acquisition or possession; the corresponding pains of which, being pains of privation, must be referred to other heads.

Thirdly, The pleasures of skill, and the pains of awkwardness.

Fourthly, The pleasures of amity,* and the pains of enmity.

Fifthly, The pleasures of good reputation, and the pains of ill repute.

Sixthly, The pleasures of power.

Seventhly, The pleasures of piety, or the religious pleasures, with their contrasted pains; pleasures derived from the belief of possessing the favour of the Divine Being,—pains derived from an apprehension of his disapproval.

Eighthly, The pleasures and the pains of sympathy or benevolence.

Ninthly, Those of malevolence.

Tenthly, Those of memory.

Eleventhly, Those of imagination.

Twelfthly, Those of expectation; and

Lastly, Those of association.

One general class of pains there are which must be resolved into all the classes of corresponding pleasures. These are the pains of privation,—the pains arising from the absence

* The pleasure of love is a mixed pleasure, composed of the pleasures of amity, superadded to those of sex.

of enjoyment. Some of these vibrate, as it were, between the regions of pain and pleasure. Desire, for example, may belong to either; its long continuance, without being satisfied, makes it almost invariably painful. When enjoyment seems so adjacent, or so certain as to create assurance, and the expectation of its arrival suddenly ceases, come the pains of disappointment. When an enjoyment is over, and its return cannot be anticipated, come the pains of regret. Pains there are grounded on pleasures, and pleasures grounded on pains—as the pleasures of relief, when pain ceases or abates. Of the whole list of pains and pleasures, two classes only regard others—they are those of benevolence and malevolence. All the rest are self-regarding.

These pleasures and pains—the obtaining the pleasure, the avoidance of the pain—are the sole motives of human conduct. To most of them a phraseology has been adapted, conveying a bad, an indifferent, and a good sense; for instance, the love of reputation, in a bad sense, is denominated false honor, pride or vanity; in an indifferent sense, ambition,—a word susceptible of interpretation, leaning towards either virtue of vice; in a good sense, honor, or the love of glory: the religious motive takes all the shades of zeal, piety, devotion, superstition,

enthusiasm, fanaticism. But, however varied the phraseology, these motives will be found, it is believed, to belong to one or other of the above classes of pains and pleasures.

There are many pleasures and pains which, though capable of acting, and acting, in fact, as motives to conduct, have only a remote connection with the subject. The pleasure of novelty, for example, is the anticipation of an undefined, or only partly defined, enjoyment: it is the acquisition of a new article of knowledge; it may even be a sort of pleasurable disappointment; it sometimes takes the shape of a difficulty overcome—the pleasure, and the cause of the pleasure, it is frequently very difficult to link together.

The pleasure of memory is the pleasure of power—the power over things which promise utility, through the medium of ideas. To recall what we desire to recall, is a sort of triumph both of the will and the intellect; for amidst the strange workings of the human mind, we frequently seek to recollect what we cannot, while we recollect what we would not; that which we most desire to repossess glides away from our memory, while that which is most disagreeable to us hangs about it with strong influence and power. The pleasures of conception or imagination depend, for their connection

with vice and virtue, on their subject and their source.

The susceptibility of any individual to the influence of pain and pleasure in general, or to the influence of any particular pain or pleasure, depends on bodily and intellectual organization—on knowledge—habit—domestic and social condition—sex, age, climate, government; in a word, on circumstances so various and intricate that, to develope the exact extent and character of each, is 'perhaps, if not absolutely the most difficult, at least, one of the most difficult tasks within the compass of moral physiology.'* Nor would it repay the toil of following the investigation into its boundless ramifications, since, after all, every man must be the best judge of his own sensibilities, and of the pains and pleasures which act most influentially upon them. In the penal field such considerations are highly important, because the amount of crime and the quantum of punishment will, to a great extent, have to be estimated by them. But, in the Deontological field, a man stands constantly at his own tribunal—far less frequently at that of others.

Into these regions, then, of pain and pleasure, it is the business of the moralist to bring

* Introduction to Morals and Legislation, p. xlii.

all human actions, in order to decide on their character of propriety or impropriety, vice or virtue. And, in truth, it will be found on examination that, from the beginning of time, men have, often imperceptibly, and in spite of themselves, been applying this utilitarian standard to their actions, even while they have been boldly decrying it.

The world has, indeed, seen men who have imagined that, by the infliction of misery on themselves, they were acting wisely and virtuously. But their motives, after all, were the same as those of the rest of mankind, and they scourged themselves, or starved themselves, on the same calculation of a result of happiness. But they reasoned, that the harvest of future pleasure was to grow out of the soil of present pain, and in the anticipation of that harvest— bountiful and boundless in their eyes — they found the result of enjoyment. And then they argued farther, that patience was a virtue, and courage was a virtue, and that a just being would find a recompense for their exercise. It seems not to have occurred to them that the Divine Being, if just and good, could never desire that any happiness should be thrown needlessly away, or any suffering be uselessly inflicted. Their asceticism was utilitarianism turned

upside down; they imagined they approved of actions, because those actions brought misery with them; disapproved of actions, because they were pregnant with felicity. Perhaps a certain portion of mystery and difficulty was intentionally mixed up with their theory. The Divine Being they worshipped they were unwilling to invest in attributes of the same character with those which they could not but call justice and wisdom, and prudence and benevolence in men; for mystery naturally likes to revel in the regions of imagination. Hence they framed and fancied other principles of conduct for the Deity, and amused themselves by setting up their authority, and exercising their ingenuity to reconcile the irreconcilable, and prove the impossible. They introduced impostures, and called them pleasures, while genuine pleasures took to themselves wings and flew away from their frown.

The ascetic principle then is but the misapplication of the greatest-happiness principle, while every other standard of morals will be found to be despotism and egotism. Lord Shaftesbury's *moral sense* is but a declaration that the opinion—the moral sense—of the actor is the true rule of action. To assume its existence is, after all, but begging the question.

If men have it, it is well: but it is their not having it that makes it necessary to look for it, or to find something instead of it.

The danger of assuming it as the principle or originator of right actions, and the adoption of its pretended decisions, is, that they would either exclude or interfere with all other principles—the principle of utility itself. Where is the line to be drawn? How is the discordance to be reconciled? Opposing forces might negative each other. From thenceforward all is in confusion. Caprice itself is erected into a rule.

Its utter incapacity ever to become practically serviceable should alone, one would think, be sufficient to give its patronizers a disgust to it.

Dr Beattie's *common sense* is a pretension of the same character, since he would reckon no common sense a fit standard which differed from his own. Dr Price's *understanding* would rebel against the understanding of the man that was guided in a career of morals unlike that he was embarked in; and so the whole round of arrogance may be seen—*reason, right reason, nature,* and *nature's law, natural justice, natural right, natural equity, good order, truth*—all are but the dogmas of men who insist on implicit obedience to their decrees. And, indeed, nothing can be more flattering to the indolent, the disingenuous, the domineering spirit which

lurks, more or less, in all men, than a pretence for uniting, in one's own person, the characters of Advocate and Judge.

The moral sense, say some, prompts to generosity, but does it determine what is generous? It prompts to justice, but does it determine what is just?

It can decide no controversy—it can reconcile no difference. Introduce a modern partizan of the moral sense, and an ancient Greek, and ask each of them whether actions deemed blameless in ancient days, but respecting which opinions have now undergone great change, ought to be tolerated in a community. By no means, says the modern; as my moral sense abhors them, therefore they ought not. But mine, says the ancient, approves of them; therefore they ought. And there, if the modern keep his principles and his temper, the matter must end between them. Upon the ground of moral sense there is no going one jot further; and the result is that the actions in question are at once laudable and detestable. The modern, then, as probably he will keep neither his principles nor his temper, says to the ancient, 'Your moral sense is nothing to the purpose; yours is corrupt, abominable, detestable: all nations cry out against you.' 'No such thing,' replies the ancient; 'and if they did, it would be nothing

to the purpose; our business was to inquire, not what people *think*, but what they *ought to think*.' Thereupon the modern kicks the ancient, or spits in his face; or, if he is strong enough, throws him behind the fire. One can think of no other method that is at once natural and consistent, of continuing the debate.

If you can persuade them both to take the principle of utility for their guide, the discourse will take another turn; the result will be either that they will agree, or that if they disagree, it will be about some facts; and there is no occasion for supposing either of them to be so unreasonable as to be angry with his opponent for entertaining a different opinion from his own concerning a matter of fact; they will separate with a resolution to make inquiries that tend to clear up some of the facts, if they are in their nature capaple of being cleared up to the satisfaction of the inquiring party, or in the conviction of the impossibility of coming to an agreement, with the resolution of each acting up to his own opinion, satisfied, at least in some degree, with seeing upon what the point of the dispute turns.

Thus the subject of their disagreement, when they came to a conclusion, would be certain facts, and such must be the only conclusion;

for such, if they proceeded on the principle of utility, would all along be the object of inquiry; the only object at least that can give room to imagine a disagreement.

Men there are who think the cause of truth betrayed by exposing it to doubt, by making it the object of inquiry. Let them say whether they think an inquiry of this calm and unimpassioned kind, could possibly end in the justification of murder, robbery, theft, devastation, malicious mischief, perjury, or any of those crimes which are generally dreaded as mortal to the peace of society? If not, then either the actions in question are not of the same malignant nature; in which case there is no reason why they should be treated as if they were, or if they are of the same malignant nature, the inquiry will show them to be so.

Though it should be sentiment, and nothing else but sentiment, that leads men to perform certain actions which we call virtuous, it must be something else than sentiment that would lead a person instructed in all the circumstances of the case—that is, in the whole sum of its influence on pains and pleasures, to approve of it.

Disappointed of knowledge, men look for screens to hide their ignorance.

The moral sense is not pretended to be any

thing more than a propensity in a man, first, to do a certain action—and secondly, to approve of it.

But that propensity in its two shapes may exist with respect to many actions, which the partizans of the moral sense are as ready to condemn as any one else.

It is to be hoped that a time is arrived in which the translation of vague generalities and of arbitrary assumptions into the simple language of pains and pleasures, will gradually banish a phraseology which, more than any other, tends to cover all questions of vice and virtue with impenetrable mists. Conduct, for example, is called *unnatural*, and therefore it is reprobated, and this language is used very frequently by those who contend that all the *natural* tendencies of mankind are towards profligacy; but, if the meaning be thoroughly sifted, it will be found, in many instances, that nothing is intended more than that the conduct is unusual or uncommon. But this of itself predicates neither vice nor virtue, neither merit nor demerit. The sublimest acts of virtuous heroism draw their lustre from their rarity—they may be called uncommon, unnatural—is that a ground for reprobating them? Far from it.

The word *purity*, it is proper to add here, is employed in this work solely in the mathemati-

cal or arithmetical sense. This is necessary to be stated, because rhetoric very frequently attaches a meaning to the word, as it does to many others, which can only engender confused or mischievous ideas.

A pleasure is considered pure, in the degree in which it is unaccompanied by counterbalancing pains — a pain is pure, in the proportion in which it is unaccompanied by counterbalancing pleasures.

In the amount of well-being, purity and impurity are what profit and loss are in the commercial balance. Purity is profit, impurity loss. A pleasure, preponderantly impure, corresponds to the case of a money account, when the balance is on the side of loss. A pain, preponderantly impure, corresponds to an account, when the balance is on the side of profit. In medical practice, in domestic rule, in political government, when, for its purpose of good, pain is produced, it is produced with the design and endeavour that it shall be as *impure* as possible.

The original idea of purity is the absence of every other substance from the substance to which the attribute is meant to apply. Whatever is different or foreign brings with it impurity. Water, for instance, employed for drink, or in the preparation of food, is liable to

be combined with a variety of substances, many of which would render it less fit, and some more fit for these purposes. Its purity will then be in proportion to their absence. Flour would be rendered impure by a mixture of coal dust, and coals would lose their purity by being mingled with flour or hair powder. The quality of unwholesomeness or offensiveness, whether to the senses or the imagination, adds to the intensity which is ascribed to the impurity.

CHAPTER V.

OF WELL-BEING AND ILL-BEING.

It is desirable, it is even necessary, that some word should be found to represent the balance of a man's pains and pleasures, as spread over any considerable portion of his existence.

Well-being will fitly denote the balance in favour of pleasure. *Ill-being* the balance, if in favour of pain.

The word *happiness* is not always appropriate. It represents pleasure in too elevated a shape; it seems associated with the idea of enjoyment in its superlative degree.

Comparatively speaking, there are few who would not admit that they had, in their progress through life, enjoyed a portion, more or less considerable, of *well-being*. Much fewer, perhaps none, would admit the enjoyment of happiness.

The quantity of well-being depends on general sensibility,—its quality upon particular sensibility, the being more alive to pleasure and pain from some sources than from others.

But by competent attention and observation every man will be best acquainted with the

character of his own sensibilities. By countenance, gesture, deportment, contemporaneous or subsequent conduct, he may give indications to others; but no evidence will be so complete, no testimony so direct, as that of his own feelings: thence it follows that, with the benefit of experience, every man is a more competent judge of what is instrumental to his own well-being than any other man; and hence it would be absurd to prescribe the same line of conduct to be invariably observed on the same occasions, without any reference to the particular sensibilities of the party concerned.

Taking the whole of mankind together, on which side of the account does the balance lie? Beyond dispute, it is on the side of well-being; of well-being existence is in itself a conclusive proof, for small is the quantity of pain at the expense of which existence may be terminated.

True it is, and melancholy as true, that the name of religion has been employed to introduce an Almighty being, whose delight is in human misery. Men have been found, who, shutting, their eyes to all the evidence around them—the unbounded evidence of goodness and of power—have introduced final misery—hopeless, limitless, interminable misery, as the consummation of his awful dispensations. The dreadful dogma is not to be found in Christianity. It is a most

vain, most pernicious, most groundless conceit. The Christain Scripture lies open to every eye. In no one part of it is intimation given of any such doom.

The unfrequency of suicide is irresistible testimony to the fact that life is, on the whole, a blessing. And though the popular and sympathetic sanction bear strongly upon the question, it cannot be said that suicide is forbidden by Jesus Christ. His own example, indeed shews that, at all events, a possible case of justification may exist; for possessing, as he possessed, the power of exempting himself from death, he spontaneously subjected himself to it.

Maupertuis, however, tells us that the balance of pains and pleasures is on the *ill-being* side. Horace's *Qui fit, Mæcenas,* or something like it, is the burthen of his strain. Man desires to better his condition; to acquire, for the future, something not possessed by the present. Well! and what does this prove? Why, that to the balance already existing in favour of well-being, there exists in the breast of every man one element more of well-being, the pleasure of expectation, the pleasure of hope. But no, it may be said; it is not for the increase of a balance on the side of pleasure that a man looks forward, and labours for a change of condition; it is for the diminution of a balance on the side of pain.

Among those whom Horace had in view, this, at any rate, could not have been the case. For among them suicide was not regarded with horror, but with the highest praise and admiration.

> 'Sit Cato, dum vivit, sanè vel Cæsare major
> Dum moritur, numquid major Othone fuit?'
>
> MARTIAL, vi. 32.

By an ill-considered expression, Locke, a man worth a hundred Maupertuises, has given countenance to a most false, uncomfortable, and pernicious sentiment. He says that every action has its source in *uneasiness*. If this be true, uneasiness is the necessary accompaniment of action; and a man, as often as he acts, and as long as he acts, must be ill at ease. But what is the feeling which Locke calls uneasiness? It is anything but a painful one. It is the sense, the presentiment of a capacity for enjoying, at some future time, a pleasure not then present. Pleasure may be springing from a thousand sources, while anticipation is looking to the opening of many more. The present may be bright with enjoyment, while the door of a brighter future is unlocked; and to the pleasures of possession may be associated the pleasures of hope.

If Johnson were to be believed, every man is occupied with the thoughts of dinner till dinner

comes. And according to Locke, every man who is not at dinner is uneasy for the want of it. Every moment not employed in eating must be a moment of uneasiness. Yet this is not true: it was not true even of Johnson himself. Beyond every thing else Johnson loved his dinner; but, thinking thus amorously of his dinner, what prevented him from sitting with his *Titsey* on his knee, with a nosegay under his nose, another Titsey at the harpsichord, enchanting him with a song, and the work of a favourite author in his right hand?

CHAPTER VI.

END OF ACTION.

If the balance of pleasure be really the intense, constant, and sole object of pursuit,—if it must always continue to be so, from the very constitution of our natures,—if there is no occasion in which it ceases to be so,—for what object, may it not be asked, for what end is this or any other discourse on the subject of Ethics? Why urge a man to pursue that which he is always occupied in pursuing?

But the position is denied; for where, if the position be true, where, cries an objector, where is sympathy? where is benevolence? where is beneficence? Answer, exactly where they were.

To deny the existence of the social affections would be to deny the evidence of all experience. Scarcely in the most brutal savage would they be found altogether wanting.

But the pleasure I feel in bestowing pleasure on my friend, whose pleasure is it but mine? The pain I feel at seeing my friend oppressed by pain, whose pain is it but mine? And if I

felt no pleasure, or felt no pain, where, where would be my sympathy?

Why, it is asked again, waste time in enforcing conduct which every man, on every occasion, adopts for himself,—namely, the pursuit of good?

Because, consideration will enable him more correctly to estimate what conduct will leave the greatest results of good; for though, under immediate impressions, he might be disposed to pursue a particular course for the purpose of securing his well-being, a calmer, a more comprehensive view might show him that the course would not, on the whole, be the best and wisest; because he would sometimes discover that the nearer good would be outweighed by remoter, but associated evil, or that a greater pleasure might be obtained, in time to come, for a lesser pleasure abandoned now.

Because, it might happen that the act which promises the present pleasure might prove prejudicial to others in the society to which you belong, and they, having sustained an injury at your hands, would, were it prompted by self-preservation alone, seek to avenge themselves, by the infliction of pain, equal, or greater in amount than the pleasure enjoyed.

And again, the act under contemplation might

possibly be productive of displeasure in the breasts of the community at large, and the loss of their good opinion, consequent on the act, might outweigh in value the pleasure it produced.

Yet it may be said, a man's well-being *ought not* to be the object of his pursuit. This *ought*, like other *oughts*, is a mere covering for despotic, unsupported assertion, and only means that the objector *thinks* a man's well-being ought not to occupy his attention. The argument is just where it was; it is all the stronger, if nothing can be brought upon it but dogmatical assumption. The objection is at best only the declaration of an opinion; and a declaration, without a reason, leaves matters pretty much as it found them.

Illuminated by the Deontological principle, the field of action will assume a new appearance. The parade of wisdom, the solemn mootings, the curious distinctions, the cobweb reasonings, the scornful dogmas of intolerance and ignorance, will vanish into nothing. Stripped of the mysteries and perplexities with which casuists and churchmen have involved the standard of duty, it will be found of daily use and daily comfort. Vague and declamatory generalities will lose their power, and become, as they are, fit objects of ridicule and lamentation: ridicule, considered in themselves; lamentation, when considered in their consequences.

The understanding and the will are alike operative on the ends of action. The will or the intention of every man is directed to the obtainment of his well-being. Deontology is called upon to enlighten the understanding, so that it may guide the will in its pursuit of happiness, by furnishing the most efficient means. The will has always the end in view; it is for the understanding to correct the aberrations of the will, where the will employs other than the fittest instruments. The repetition of acts, whether positive or negative; that is, acts of commission or abstention, having for their object the production of the greatest accessible balance of pleasure, and being judiciously directed to that end, constitutes habitual virtue.

CHAPTER VII.

SANCTIONS.

Respice finem. The end of action being defined, that end must be steadily kept in view, and no inquiry can be more important than as to the most efficient means of promoting that end. Those means present themselves in the shape of the inducements which operate on conduct. They bring conduct and its consequences into the regions of hopes and fears—of hopes which present a balance of pleasure, of fears which anticipate a balance of pain. These inducements may be conveniently called sanctions.

The strength of a temptation to a misdeed is in the ratio of the excess of the pleasure of the misdeed (as it stands in the idea of the person tempted) above the intensity of the pain which is to follow, compounded with its apparent proximity and probability.

Sanctions, as has been said, are inducements to action. They suppose the existence of temptations. Temptations are the evil; sanctions the remedy. But neither are sanctions nor

temptations any thing but pains and pleasures, acting singly in the case of temptations, acting as sanctions in groups.

But in order that a sanction should exercise its influence, it is not necessary that a man should be conscious of the existence of the inducement. Balaam was stopped by the power of an angel that was invisible to him.

Cases there are where necessity is and must be admitted as an excuse for conduct; cases which are thus taken out of the ordinary rules. This excuse, when thoroughly sifted, will be found to be a confession of the inefficiency of punishment to prevent such conduct. The inefficiency of punishment has been seldom alleged by moralists or legislators as the reason why certain actions cannot be controlled; but it is the only true and tenable ground; it it the real, but unperceived cause of the influence of necessity. Why, in such a case, did a man decide on a given action? He felt a repugnancy to doing otherwise; he could not resist the despotism of the repugnancy; he could not even explain its cause—a common case. What then? No punishment was near enough and great enough to restrain him.

Sanctions are arrangeable according to their nature, or according to their sources. According to their nature, they are either punitory by

pain or loss of pleasure, or remunatory by pleasure or exemption from pain. They are divisable into the physical, the social, the moral, the political, and the religious. From all these sources proceed both penalties and recompenses, both pains and pleasures.

1. The physical sanction concerns a man's person physically and psychologically considered, as experienced in the pains and pleasures affecting the body. It is derived from the physical construction of man in general, and will be modified by the peculiar sensibilities of the individual. Generally speaking, the physical sanction may be considered as that influence growing out of the ordinary course of things, which is brought to bear upon any action or actions, without reference to the will of others. It is that influence which is independent of motives derived from sources foreign to the individual: it is the sanction which would exist, in all its force, if a man were isolated from the world, if he had no communion with his fellow-men, and no belief in the superintendence of Providence. It represents those pains and pleasures which do not directly emanate from his social, political, or religious position; though it is the ground-work of the power of all other inducements, for it is only by their influence on man's physical organization, only by their power

of producing suffering or enjoyment in the individual, that they can become motives to action.

2. The social or sympathetic sanction is that which grows out of a man's personal or domestic relations; it is a sort of mixture of the selfish with the social regard. To some extent its judgment is created by his own influences; it is the application to himself of that domestic code of which he has been one of the framers. If he be a father, his children will, in the ratio of their respect for his opinions and practice, recognize his authority, and adopt his standard of right and wrong. The domestic sanction may be more or less efficient, more or less enlightened than the popular sanction: its operation is more direct and immediate than the popular can be, in as far as a man's happiness, for the most part, depends more on those who are near him, habitually or frequently, than upon those who are remote. The social and the popular sanction act and re-act upon each other; the popular sanction being, in fact, the great recipient of all the social sanctions.

3. The moral or popular sanction is that which is commonly called public opinion; it is the received decision of society on conduct. The popular sanction may be divided into two branches—the democratic and aristocratic—awarding a very different portion of recompense

or punishment to acts of a similar character. A sanction, by every instance of its execution, constitutes and gives effect to a law; and the laws constituted by the aristocratic branch are over a great portion of the field of conduct, in repugnance to those constituted by the democratic. In misdeeds affecting *persons*, for example, the democratic sanction tolerates boxing, the trying to hurt; not duelling, trying to kill: while the aristocratic tolerates and rewards trying to kill. Of misdeeds affecting *property*, the democratic sanction gives preference to the debts due to a tradesman over those due to a gamester; the aristocratic sanction decides directly the reverse: the democratic sanction punishes swindling in all its shapes; the aristocratic rewards it in the case and situation of a man of landed and entailed estate. In the democratic scale of reprobation, the mischievous stands above the ridiculous; in the aristocratic, the ridiculous above the mischievous. The democratic refers, or is at least constantly tending, more and more, to refer every thing to the standard of utility, to the greatest-happiness principle; the aristocratical, as much, as far, and as long as possible, to the standard of taste,—constituting itself the arbiter of taste.

Among the pleasures and pains growing out of the moral or popular sanction, and exercising

a vast influence on virtue and vice, and thence on happiness and misery, are a group of factitious entities, which demand attention. Reputation, honour, renown, fame, glory, and dignity, may serve as a sample of them. They have this in common, that they are, though factitious, the objects of possession. They are distinguished from other objects of possession in this, that pursuit of them, to any extent, is not deemed improper. The love of money, every one admits, may be carried to excess, but not so the pursuit of these attractions.

But in the mistakes made respecting them, in the eulogiums poured on those who pursue and those who possess them, will be found one of the most fruitful sources of improbity and mischief. The means a man has at his disposal he will employ, not only to keep that which he possesses, but to obtain that which he desires. These possessions are the instruments of influence, and that influence is liable to be baneful, according to its extent. The mischief is at its minimum where confined to an individual; it is at its maximum when it operates on a national or international field.

Applied to private life, the principal mischief of which any of these appellatives is likely to be productive, is danger to life from *duelling*. The good proposed is the repression of offensive

deportment; a good obtainable, much more effectually obtainable, by less expensive means; but there is this good to set against the balance of evil.

But applied to national and international concerns, they become incentives to misrule, in the shape of usurpation of power; and to war, that is, to ravage, rapine, and destruction, on the largest scale. And the amount of evil will depend on the amount of influence exercised by him who puts these elements of misery into action.

Suppose him to be a sovereign: his domain of action is national or international. If it is at the expense of his own subjects that he seeks this honour, glory, fame, dignity, and so forth, the mischief to which the language in question leads is, invasion of popular rights; in case of non-resistance, oppression and misrule; and in case of resistance, civil war. If it is at the expense of other nations that he seeks these distinctions, then comes foreign war, which, being interpreted, is murder, rape, devastation, on a vast scale, at the expense both of his own subjects and those of the foreign state.

Though of this all-comprehensive mass of wretchedness and profligacy a sovereign alone cannot be the actual perpetrator, yet, as an instigator before the fact, every subject may

operate influentially, according to his position. An official cabinet counsellor, a member of a popular assembly, a member of an unofficial association, a writer in a public newspaper, each in his different sphere.

The quantity of these influences which a sovereign may hold will be in proportion to the quantity of power he possesses; the power which he and his subjects possess with reference to other nations—the power which he himself possesses with reference to the nation to which he belongs. Now the desire to possess these acquirements being boundless, the efforts to obtain them become boundless too. Hence foreign conquest, aggression, usurpation; depredation at home, depredation abroad, and acts which, if committed by unofficial hands, would bear the name, and be visited with the punishment of *crimes*, are unchecked in their misery-creating career.

That instances may be found in which power will not have been abused, but have been employed for the public good, is most true: where, for example, it has been used for the establishment of wise laws at home, or the maintenance and manifestation of the virtues of justice abroad.

But these cases are rare; and rarer still are the cases where glory, fame, and these other

brilliant possessions, have been sought or acquired from such a beneficent source. Rarely, indeed, that honor and renown are spoken of but in connection with murderous or mischievous deeds. The reputation acquired by benevolence shrinks into absolute insignificance when compared with that which abominable and atrocious enterprises have obtained for monarchs.

What is to be done? What, in the melancholy case, where of these gorgeous things so little is to be had by innoxious means, so much by flagitious means? What, but to present the portraits of vice and virtue in their contrasted hideousness and beauty? What, but to paint in their true colors those malefactors, in comparison of whom a common incendiary is as much inferior in the scale of mischievousness, as a small quantity of mischief, in one shape, is inferior to the greatest quantity of mischief, in all shapes, capable of being perpetrated by foreign or domestic war.

It may be said that these tinsel baubles are, in fact, all made subservient to interest—to national interest. Not so! for those who preach up their value disclaim the vulgar and the sordid dream of interest. What declaimer would ever talk about giving up renown to interest? of sacrificing honor to prudence? Fling down the substance to catch the shadow, cast away

the real, in order to possess the imaginative; in this you have the clamour of patriotism and nationality.

Not but that national interest might be more undeviatingly and unexceptionably pursued, without danger to probity or prudence, than private interest. By acquisition of territory private interest may be increased—not so the public interest—not by conquest, not by colonization; the interest of the ruling few, undoubtedly, may be served, but not that of the subject many.

Strange it is, that the misery produced by those influences which have been described, misery on so vast a scale, of such intensity and such duration, should be looked on, for the most part, with the composure of indifference or the excitement of admiration; and yet more strange, that such composure and such admiration should sometimes flow from minds who would visit acts, or even thoughts which do no mischief, with unbridled abhorrence, popular punishment, or even penal visitation.

The popular sanction assumes very various names. For instance, an author, describing the fortitude of the American Indians under torture, says—

'The constancy of the sufferers in this terrible scene shows the wonderful power of institutions

and a thirst of glory, which makes men imitate and exceed what *philosophy*, or even religion can effect.'*

Philosophy is here nothing but the force of the popular sanction, applied in a peculiar manner. It must mean the desire of appearing a philosopher, and thus acquiring or preserving the respect attached to that character. It cannot mean the art of correctly calculating pains and pleasures, for that would not, on such an occasion, dictate exertions of heroism under a pain known to be at once transient and unmitigable.

The moral sanction owes its highest efficiency to the progress of intelligence.

In a state of barbarism, men are governed in every thing by sudden impulse, and in nothing by reflection. The experience of preceding is lost to the succeeding ages. The moral sanction has, then, just influence enough to give credit to the virtue of *courage*, a virtue of prime necessity, that opens itself a passage to the hearts of men. The virtues of veracity and integrity come afterwards. Last of all comes that of toleration.

Hence a universal rule may be deduced—that the more enlightened the body of a nation,

* European Settlements in America; vi, p. 200.

the stronger is the influence of the moral sanction.

The case of the Romans is no exception. Virtue, it is said, characterized the infancy of that state; depravity the decline. Yet was it more enlightened at the latter of those periods than at the former.

To this it may be answered, in the first place, that the body of the people could never be said to have been enlightened, even at the last. Literature was copious, but not diffused. Works were many, but copies of them were few.

In the next place, the depravity which strikes so much in the history of the declension of the Roman state was not the depravity of private life, but of a few public men, corrupted by the abuse and evil adjustment of the political sanction. The influence of the moral sanction is not traceable in the mutilated and imperfect portraits of the times that are handed down to us.

Examples enough have reached us to shew that the little virtue there was in the early ages of that state was more owing to the influence of the political sanction than the moral. The political sanction was so disposed as to produce a certain portion of public virtue, at the very time that private virtue was at as low an ebb as can be conceived. Witness the

poisoning mentioned by Livy. From that same account, it appears that private depravity did not become an object of notice till it had arisen to such a height as to shake the very existence of the state.

The popular sanction, when enlightened by Deontological principle, corrects the aberrations of individual judgment, and takes the wrong-doer out of those regions where the interests and passions of the sufferer make vengeance, not justice, the grounds of his award. Vengeance cannot be allowed to be the end of punishment; for if vengeance be the *end*, the resentment of the person whose vengeance it is, must be the measure; there is no other. But the resentment of any man against an act mischievous to society is sometimes greater, sometimes less, than in proportion to that mischievousness. It will sometimes be bestowed on acts not mischievous. It is different in different men; it is different in the same man; nor in either case, otherwise than from the principle of utility, can any rules be laid down, or expedients devised to bring it to a level.

At one time greater punishment will be inflicted than is necessary for the determent of the offender; so that a portion of happiness will be destroyed in waste. At another time, not so much punishment will be inflicted as is necessary for that purpose; so that the punish-

ment will be inflicted, and the mischief still continue.

Those who have the dispensing of the moral sanction are contented with less proofs than it is necessary for those to require who have the dispensing of the political sanction. The proofs which the nature of the act furnishes they can more easily come at. For a construction to put upon a single act, they call up the whole series of actions in a man's life. They examine all witnesses, competent and incompetent.

It were to be wished that every man's name were written upon his forehead as well as engraved upon his door. It were to be wished that no such thing as secrecy existed—that every man's house were made of glass. There would be the less reason to desire windows to his breast. Actions are a tolerably adequate interpretation of sentiments, when observation has furnished us with the key.

The more men live in public, the more amenable they are to the moral sanction. The greater dependence men are in to the public, that is, the more equality there is among them, the clearer the evidence comes out, the more it has of certainty in its results. The liberty of the press throws all men into the public presence. The liberty of the press is the greatest coadjutor of the moral sanction. Under such

influence, it were strange if men grew not every day more virtuous than on the former day. I am satisfied they do. I am satisfied they will continue so to do, till, if ever, their nature shall have arrived at its perfection. Shall they stop? shall they turn back? The rivers shall as soon make a wall, or roll up the mountains to their source.

There is but one thing, and that far out of the sphere of probability, that can arrest the tide of improvement. It is a sudden and universal over-ruling of these moral influences by physical necessity.

A whole kingdom, the great globe itself, will become a gymnasium, in which every man exercises himself before the eyes of every other man. Every gesture, every turn of limb or feature, in those whose motions have a visible influence on the general happiness, will be noticed and marked down.

The constitution of the human mind being opened by degrees, the labyrinth is explored, a clue is found out for it. That clue is the influence of interest; of interest, not in that partial and sordid sense in which it is the tyrant of sordid souls, but in the enlarged and beneficent sense in which it is the common master of all spirits, and especially of the enlightened. It is put into the hands of every man. The designs by which

short-sighted iniquity would mask its projects, are every day laid open. There will be no moral enigmas by and by.

Who knows but even I, an instrument so mean as I, may be found to have done something towards a work so glorious, and this my prophecy itself, like so many others, be in a certain degree the cause of its own completion?

4. The political, or legal sanction. It has two branches, the judicial and the administrative. The judicial acting almost exclusively by punishments, the administrative mostly by rewards. This sanction becomes law, and is called into operation upon all those acts which legislation makes penal, or those which legislation deems worthy of public recompense. In other words, the political sanction belongs to those vices which, being deemed misdemeanors or crimes, are taken cognizance of by the official authorities, as meet subjects for penal visitation, or to those virtues which are marked out for state reward. It is the legislator, rather than the moralist, who is armed with the political sanction; but it was necessary to mention it as one of the sources of action.

Scandal is to the moral sanction what perjury is to the political.

5. The religious or superhuman sanction. It has two principal sources of influence, which,

when they can be brought to bear upon human action, necessarily invest the sanction with high authority and power. For, first, it supposes the Divine Being to be thoroughly cognizant of the existence of every misdeed in question; and, secondly, to have perfect knowledge of the exact quantity and quality of its malignity, from the knowledge of all the aggravating and extenuating circumstances. Thence all those chances of escape from observation or from punishment, which diminish the efficiency of the other sanctions, are removed from this, which at once brings the offender into the presence of an all-seeing, all-knowing, all-weighing, and equitably-awarding judge.

To teachers of religion, however, it belongs to treat of the pains and pleasures which religion holds out for those acts of forbearance or of indulgence which it prescribes or forbids. It is for the Deontologist to inquire how far they accomplish all the ends which morality proposes, to endeavour to ascertain the causes of their inefficiency, when they are inefficient, and to bring his instruments to cultivate that part of the field of thought and action which they have left barren. And it is to be hoped that, while thus labouring with the teachers of religion in the service of virtue and the pursuit of happiness, the Deontologist will be consi-

dered, not as a rival to be supplanted, but as a coadjutor to be loved. The beneficent influences of the religious sanction cannot but be strengthened by calling in every other sanction to its aid. Its inefficiency has been often the subject of lamentation, even among those who would fain arm it with its greatest power. To friendly auxiliaries it cannot then be hostile.

And if any religious opinions are unfriendly to human happiness, surely that circumstance must be taken as evidence of their erroneousness. The province of true religion can never be to seal up the fountains of felicity, or to open those of misery.

If a man is less happy than he might be, it is no matter whether he is made so by others' acts, or by his own opinions: a religion, therefore, would carry the same evidence of its falsehood in its opposing that share of happiness which a man might otherwise acquire for himself, as by favouring or conniving at that share of unhappiness which he may suffer at the hands of another.

If there were no other ill effects attendant on superstition, or the misdirected religious sanction, this consideration alone would prove it to be one of the bitterest rods mankind were ever scourged with, that, by bestowing the denomination of offences on acts indifferent to the

happiness of society, it creates new and artificial crimes, it introduces among men fresh occasions of division and disgust: thus adding to the but too numerous ones which must ever subsist. It weakens the horror due to real crimes, by spending it upon *nominal* ones. It confounds men's ideas of right and wrong; they discover the emptiness of those denominations, as applied to many subjects, and become disposed to consider them alike indifferent, as applied to all.

If it had not been for a slight tincture, at least, of superstition yet remaining, there could not have appeared a work with the title of 'Private Vices Public Benefits.'

One might fill a book with the testimonies given by divines, of the necessity of strengthening that sanction, the influence of which it is their province to superintend, with sanctions borrowed from other sources. Look at the examples of Louis XI, Philip II, and Muley Ishmael, all three prodigies of devotion and monsters of depravity. And, whatever may have been the case with the Moorish Emperor, the French and Spanish tyrants were devoted to a religion which, whatever duties it may prescribe besides, professes to prescribe all those which are demanded by the established religion of our own country. Theirs, like ours, was a compound of moral duties, useful to be observed;

of moral duties, useless; of ceremonies to be performed; and of dogmas to be believed. In theirs, indeed, the useless duties, the ceremonies, and the points of faith, bore a much larger proportion to the useful duties than in ours; accordingly it is not for ours, nor, it may be confidently hoped, ever will be, to produce examples of a depravity so enormous.

Every instruction which contributes to strengthen the attachment to the three last of these classes of observances, contributes to weaken the attachment to the first of them. They are three branches in a lever, on the same side of the fulcrum, contending against one on the other side: the elevation of any of the three is the depression of that one.

To what is the inefficiency of the religious sanction to be attributed? for if its power be as it is represented, it ought to be the most influential of instruments, inasmuch as infinite is greater than finite, and the pains and pleasures it proposes are intense and permanent beyond all others; and let it be said, once for all, that it is not intended here to supersede its authority, but merely to supply auxiliaries which may add to its beneficial influence. The enjoyments and sufferings of a future life being inaccessible to experience, whether our own or that of others, no man having hitherto reported, for the infor-

mation of his fellows, what had happened to him beyond the grave, and no man having hitherto learned it for himself, those enjoyments and sufferings represent nothing which our experience has shown to be either pleasurable or painful. Being remote as to distance, uncertain and unimmediate as to their contingency on any particular action, undefined as to their character, and invisible in their operation, it is not to be wondered at that they so often lose their power in the presence of adjacent, certain, palpable influences. Events placed so far beyond the limits of life and knowledge are not, it must be admitted, susceptible of being brought into the mind with the vividness of that which is propinquous. As in receding from the loftiest and sublimest objects, however substantial, they gradually diminish, till they are lost in the increasing distance; so the tremendous hopes and fears with which it is the province of religion to agitate us, fail in their influence, and become obscured in the remoteness of eternity.

The religious sanction would be greatly strengthened by the belief in a particular Providence, a belief often asserted and insisted on, but which appears to operate little even upon those who proclaim it. Did the sanction exist, were there the constant interference of the Divine Being to punish or reward, appropriately, acts of vice or virtue, it is clear that all human

legislation would be supererogatory and intrusive; pernicious on all occasions where not useless; useless on all occasions where not pernicious. The belief in a particular Providence would make the religious sanction *present,* but no one has sufficient confidence in the belief to deliver society over to its solitary influences.

Another main quality on which the effect of a punishment depends is its celerity. No man ever thrusts his hand into the fire. Why? Because the suffering follows instantaneously upon the act.

There are certain consequences which follow almost as certainly the acts calculated to produce them, as the pain of burning from thrusting the hand into the fire. Yet these acts are committed. Why? Because the penal consequence is distant.

Delay gives room for obstacles to intervene. Apparent diminution of *certainty* therefore follows necessarily from abatement of celerity.

And in the interval a man takes the chance of death, which removes him from the penal visitation.

Pity, too, has more time to operate, to prevent or mitigate the punishment. And pity destroys a proportion of its effect.

The religious sanction is eminently deficient in the article of celerity.

Locke does not hesitate to allow the inefficacy

of the religious sanction. And he partly gives the reasons of it. Men do not, in fact, give heed to it, he says, so as to determine their conduct by it: and it is their nature not to do so. And yet they *ought*, he says, and their not doing so is folly. For did they but duly reflect, they would find that, in every instance of transgression, the punishment, after all abatements, must be greater, and that in any given proportion, than the profit of the crime. For the stores of divine justice being supposed infinite, God can, and it is to be supposed, will, inflict as much, in the amount of intensity and duration, as shall suffice to make up the deficiency, whatsoever it may be, in the other elements of its *momentum*.

He does not consider that it is the apparent value of a future pain, and not the real value, that constitutes the momentum of it in the mind; and that no addition in quantity can make up for the diminution which uncertainty, distance, and delay produce. It is the belief, and not the reality of punishment, that operates beneficially; and the strength of the political sanction consists in this—that the constant presence of the reality induces the belief, and makes that belief influential.

From these and similar considerations, or rather, perhaps, from some obscure preconcep-

tion of their bearings, and to clear themselves from the embarrassment growing out of the undoubted inefficacy of the religious sanction when standing alone, some divines (Dr Price, for example) have supposed punishment to be *due* to guilt, i.e. past guilt, not as a means of preventing guilt, i.e. future guilt of the same kind; but, as it were, of congruity. This congruity, when it comes to be examined into, is no more than a disposition in these divines to believe or to declare that such punishment ought to be consequent upon such guilt. For this arrangement, in which neither wisdom nor benevolence can have been consulted, they attempt not so much as to assign any grounds. Why should they? The punishment will, and ought to ensue; not for any use there is for it, but because they say so. And the demonstration of their proposition is to be found in their own infallibility. They are disposed, they cannot tell why, nor will they condescend to inquire why, that is, to what end, or for what purpose; but, however, as it happens, they are disposed to believe as much, and therefore it must be so. This stout ignorance, and resolute rejection of the means of knowledge, namely, inquiry and argument, being better and surer, it seems, than knowledge, is to supersede it and take its name. As to the party himself it may do very well,

and answer his purposes, if he is pleased with it, and convinced by it. But what good can be expected from mentioning it, or from the attempt to impose it upon others, is what may deserve to be considered. If he, to whom it is mentioned, is already of that mind, he wants nothing that it can do for him; but if he is of another mind, it does nothing for him that he wants: it gives him not, nor so much as pretends to give him, any reason for change.

These considerations, be it remembered, are wholly apart from Revelation. It is assumed, without reference to any revealed authority, that there is a disposition in the Deity to produce pain to no *end*, and for no result of good that is to be attained by it.

It is even assumed that this is a fit medium to prove his moral qualities; and his moral qualities, so described, are to be the medium to prove a revelation.

How mischievously these fallacies hang together! How fatal to the beneficial influences of the religious sanction to place it in contradiction, in opposition to all the undoubted motives to action—to all the dictates of experience—to all the influences of pain and pleasure! And into what does such a theory resolve itself? Into the mere assumptions—the theories—the dogmatisms of the theorist.

There is a class of ecclesiastics, whose end is anything rather than the improvement and exercise of the reasoning faculty; to overwhelm it, to fling it into the dust, is their constant task and toil. They dare not encourage thought, or lend a helping hand to philosophy. They know better: those that are penetrating and discreet among them (and the dull follow the rest by instinct), know there is a power between which and themselves there is a natural enmity, which, if exerted liberally and universally, cannot but be exerted to their discomfiture. They remember well, and make due application of the fable of the Man and Serpent.

They know and see with horror and confusion how apt sound science is to make men rebellious to their doctrines. That expansion of mind which the acquisition of it confers, that habit of inquisitiveness to which the pursuit of it gives birth, is mortal to those delusions by which the credit of their systems is supported.

They know they have every thing to fear from philosophy, and thus it is that there is not a track they would not invite men to in preference to that of moral science; and of all tracks, that best answers their purpose for men to be engaged in, which, encircling the foot of the mountain, and obscuring the approaches to the summit, offers flowers to fascinate the eye of

the wanderer, and to keep him for ever lingering round the base.

That walk is the walk of Classic Literature: there grows the lotus which has fixed the footsteps of so many a young adventurer to those regions of unfruitful beauty, and made him drink oblivion to every nobler distinction.

If, after all, God be infinitely wise and good, what service can be rendered him so acceptable as to obey his laws, which can propose or intend nothing but that which is the great, the necessary, the sole result of wisdom and goodness, namely, the production of happiness. Is not the duty we owe to God necessarily involved in the circle of duties we owe to the human race—ourselves included? And if benevolence be more prominently an attribute than pride in the divine nature, must not the duties we owe to our neighbours be, in his view, pre-eminent over the services claimed by him? And can any service claimed by him be more urgent than that which he claims on behalf of the whole family of man?

To prove that the Divine Being had prohibited pleasure, would be to implicate, to deny, to disprove his benevolence. It would set up our experience in opposition to his benevolence.

That such or such a thing is a cause of pain or pleasure, is a matter of fact and experience:

that the use of it has been prohibited by the Deity, is a matter of inference and conjecture.

That the use of it is allowed by him who was able to have prevented it if he had pleased, is a matter of fact and experience; that it is prohibited any otherwise than in virtue of its impurity, is a matter of inference and conjecture.

Infinite are the points that a man must have been satisfied of, before he can justly be satisfied that any pleasure, not impure, can have been prohibited by that Deity, who has implanted in our bodily and intellectual frame such a capacity and desire for pleasure.

The proofs that such a prohibition has been issued by the Supreme Being, can never rise to be so strong as to equal the proofs of its being inconsistent with his benevolence.

The notions which commonly prevail as to a future state, are neither consolatory to benevolence, nor encouraging to virtue.

Because few are to enjoy happiness in comparison of those who are to suffer misery, therefore, with respect to every man, the presumption, antecedently to any examination, of the chance a man may have of placing himself in the former class, by means that are in his own power, is on the side of misery.

Nor is the prospect mended by the consideration of the power he may have, by means de-

pendent on his own will, to ensure himself to be of the number of the happy.

Upon the predestinarian scheme, he has no such power—the matter is already determined, and was so before he was born: his chance depends upon events he can know nothing of, and that are out of the reach of his influence; the chance, therefore, that he has for escaping misery is simply in the ratio of the number of those who are to be happy, to that of those who are to be miserable; and suppose those numbers are as one to ten, it is ten to one in every man's case against his being otherwise than miserable.

Rejecting the predestinarian, and admitting the commonly received theory of future punishment, whatever power any given man has of avoiding future misery, the same has every other man; and yet more, many more, after all, are to be miserable than happy.

Again, the means of escaping misery are represented as consisting of faith and good works: either of faith alone, or of good works alone, or of both together.

As to faith, after all the sophisms and devices that have been employed to conceal the truth of the matter, there is no one but has every now and then perceived, that the act of believing is not in his power; that, in the same man-

ner as he is unable to believe that to be black which he sees to be white, so is he unable to believe any thing to be one way when he sees greater evidence to believe it to be another.

As to good works, to take them in the largest sense, they consist in evil actions avoided, and in good ones done.

And what, after all, can determine what is good and what evil, but the standard of utility?

It is not pretended that any assurance with respect to the ratio, either in number or quality of evil acts omitted, to evil acts done, or of good acts done to good acts omitted, necessary to ensure a man against future misery, can be obtained.

A man with *ten* chances for ten thousand a year, or any greater sum for ever, to *one* for a perpetual fit of the cholic or stone, could hardly be easy, could hardly be any otherwise than under great anxiety; but here are ten chances —perhaps a hundred, perhaps a thousand,—for the cholic or the stone, to one for the ten thousand a year.

Hence, it appears, that whatever sanctions or motives to virtue the commonly adopted opinions as to a future state afford, they are to be found alone in such portions of these opinions, as are consistent with the Deontological principle; that the doctrines generally received are inconsistent

with that principle; inconsistent with human happiness; and therefore cannot be true.

Nothing is farther from the intention and conviction of the writer than to deny the existence of a scheme of future rewards and punishments, whose object shall be to maximise happiness, and to develope the benevolent attributes of the Divinity. It is only intended here to show in some particulars the inconsistency of some orthodox opinions with the true principles of morality, and their incompatibility with the production and progress of that felicity which it is the object of morality to accomplish.

The religious sanction is founded, and can only be founded, on the moral attributes of God, and those moral attributes cannot oppose happiness.

Justice is of use no farther than as the handmaid of benevolence.

Justice is one of those means for compassing the ends that benevolence proposes.

If God is just, it is because he is benevolent.

If there is no benevolent Being that looks to us, we must look to ourselves; we must procure our own happiness by ourselves, as far as we can. What other resource is left to us?

If there is a Being that watches over us, but is not benevolent, he is not just: there is no guessing what will please him; there is no

guessing what will not please him; there is no knowing how to please him: our only wisdom is to please ourselves.

If there is a benevolent Being that watches over us, that rewards and punishes in the exercise of that benevolence, he, at least, cannot be displeased at our procuring our happiness to the utmost; for the disposition to contribute to it is what we mean by benevolence, when we mean any thing, and in the very proportion of our love and reverence will our conviction of his benevolence be.

By a given instance, however, the operation of the different sanctions upon conduct may be best traced.

Timothy Thoughtless and Walter Wise are fellow prentices. Thoughtless gave into the vice of drunkenness; Wise abstained from it. Mark the consequence.

1. Physical sanction. For every debauch, Thoughtless was rewarded by sickness in the head; to recruit himself he lay in bed the next morning, and his whole frame became enervated by relaxation; and when he returned to his work, his work ceased to be a source of satisfaction to him.

Walter Wise refused to accompany him to the drinking table. His health had not been originally strong, but it was invigorated by tempe-

rance. Increasing strength of body gave increasing zest to every satisfaction he enjoyed: his rest at night was tranquil, his risings in the morning cheerful, his labor pleasurable.

2. Social sanction. Timothy had a sister, deeply interested in his happiness. She reproved him at first, then neglected, then abandoned him. She had been to him a source of great pleasure—it was all swept away.

Walter had a brother, who had shown indifference to him. That brother had watched over his conduct, and began to show an interest in his well-being—the interest increased from day to day. At last he became a constant visitor, and a more than common friend, and did a thousand services for his brother, which no other man in the world would have done.

3. Popular sanction. Timothy was member of a club, which had money and reputation. He went thither one day in a state of inebriety; he abused the secretary, and was expelled by an unanimous vote.

The regular habits of Walter had excited the attention of his master. He said one day to his banker—The young man is fitted for a higher station. The banker bore it in mind, and on the first opportunity, took him into his service.

He rose from one distinction to another, and was frequently consulted on business of the highest importance by men of wealth and influence.

4. Legal sanction. Timothy rushed out from the club whence he had been so ignominiously expelled. He insulted a man in the streets, and walked pennyless into the open country. Reckless of every thing, he robbed the first traveller he met; he was apprehended, prosecuted, and sentenced to transportation.

Walter had been an object of approbation to his fellow-citizens. He was called, by their good opinion, to the magistracy. He reached its highest honors, and even sat in judgment on his fellow apprentice, whom time and misery had so changed, that he was not recognised by him.

5. Religious sanction. In prison, and in the ship which conveyed Timothy to Botany Bay, his mind was alarmed and afflicted with the apprehension of future punishment—an angry and avenging Deity was constantly present to his thoughts, and every day of his existence was embittered by the dread of the Divine Being.

To Walter the contemplation of futurity was peaceful and pleasureable. He dwelt with con-

stant delight on the benign attributes of the Deity, and the conviction was ever present to him that it must be well, that all ultimately must be well, to the virtuous. Great, indeed, was the balance of pleasure which he drew from his existence, and great was the sum of happiness to which he gave birth.

CHAPTER VIII.

CAUSES OF IMMORALITY.

THE causes of immorality have been glanced at in our progress. They may be comprised under the following heads. False principles in morals, misapplication of religion, preference of the self-regarding to the social interest, and lastly, preference of lesser present to greater distant pleasure.

False principles in morals may be classed under the two heads of asceticism and sentimentalism, and both demand the useless sacrifice of pleasure, the sacrifice of pleasure to no purpose of greater pleasure. Asceticism proceeds farther than sentimentalism, and inflicts useless pain. Both avoid the putting forward reasons, and act, as far as it is possible to act, upon the affections. Asceticism generally on the antipathies, by fear and terror; sentimentalism on the sympathies. They both would dispense with the assistance of books of morality, and confirm men in the notion that bad morals are all that are fit for practice; good

ones only for discourse and parade. They both shun the application of the tests of morality, and exist, in their highest exercise, where morality is at its lowest point. Asceticism then becomes the immediate and close ally of misanthropy, and sentimentalism of helplessness. False morality can never be cultivated but at the expense of true morality.

Out of the ascetic principle—the principle of antipathy—grows the wish to punish vindictively; to make punishment minister to dislike. Men punish because they hate, and they imagine that the law itself is but the inflicter of the vengeance of the law. The more intense men's hatred, the more severe would they fain make the punishment with which they visit the objects of their hatred. Crimes, they are told, they ought to hate. Crimes it is made a matter of merit in them to hate. Crimes it is a matter of merit, more, perhaps, of merit than of necessity, to punish. They are to hate them, they are to punish them. It is their hating makes them wish to punish. How, then, should they punish, but as they hate? The more they are disposed to hate, the more they are disposed to punish. What wonder? To ordinary apprehensions no mischief from this is visible. Yet more, no mischief, in many cases, exists.

Since, in many cases, it is true, that the cause of hatred and the demand for punishment—the cause which makes hatred rise, and the reason which makes punishment expedient—increase together.

If the quantity of punishment, in any case, is greater than it need be; if of punishment for any act there be more than is needful, it is either because there is too much of it where the case wants some, or there is some of it where the case wants none. What harm in a man's suffering, who does an act I hate? What harm in the man's suffering whom I hate? When a man suffers whom I hate, when confessedly he ought to suffer, what matter whether it be a little less or a little more?

Such is the reasoning of the multitude of men.

How should they punish but as they hate? What other standard than their hatred should they assume? It is the clearest standard, at least at any given time when it is applied, though at different times its decisions are so apt to vary. What standard clearer? To know whether they hate an act, to know which of two acts they hate most, what have they but to consult their feelings?

What standard should they take? Even this

or none. For to this hour, except in here and there a solitary sentence, dropped, as it were, by accident, no other has been brought into use. Another, and here and there another, has been indeed set up, but these have not themselves been rectified by the grand standard of utility. They clash. Nobody has yet attempted to mark out to each its limits, and to arrange them under harmonious heads.

What marvel, then, that ignorance of the only real standard of right and wrong should administer to immorality? What marvel that men, given over to their prejudices and passions, should eagerly make those prejudices and passions the rules of conduct? And while antipathy, on the one side, deals out unmerited punishment, it is natural that sympathy should, on the other side, shield misconduct from deserved blame.

This tendency to make your own antipathies or predilections the standard of morals is easily encouraged, by keeping out of the way the standard which utility furnishes. Hence those who dread the light which its radiance throws upon human *actions*, are fond of engaging their votaries in the chace of an inaccessible, wandering will-o'-the-wisp, which they call *motive*—an entity buried in inapproachable

darkness, and which, if it were approachable and produceable, would be of no value whatever.

The search after motive is one of the prominent causes of men's bewilderment in the investigation of questions of morals. The search is grounded on a vague notion that in the spring of action, rather than the act itself, the real quantity and quality of vice and virtue might be found. But this is a pursuit in which every moment employed is a moment wasted. All motives are abstractedly good; no man has, ever had, can, or could have, a motive different from the pursuit of pleasure or the shunning of pain. The motive which produces no act, is merely speculative and immaterial, offering no topic either of praise or blame. But be motives what they may, and they always must be the same, that is, pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding, it is not on them that the moralist is called to deliver his award. He has to do with conduct—with conduct, when its consequences invade the regions of suffering and enjoyment. He is but a despotic intruder elsewhere.

Next to the misapplication of false principles to morality, the misapplication of religion takes its place among the causes of immorality, and

its misapplication will be traced wherever its sanctions are applied to the diminution of the balance of pleasure or the production or increase of the balance of pain. And there can be no stronger test of the truth or falsehood of any religion than its conduciveness or repugnancy to the greatest human happiness. To understand religion is to understand the will of God. God is a being among whose attributes is benevolence; benevolence not imperfect, not limited, but infinite benevolence. And how can he be benevolent, but in proportion to the quantity of happiness which it is his wish to see enjoyed by those who are subject to his power? And if that happiness be not an empty name, of what can it be composed but of pleasures? Be the pleasure what it may, to demand its abandonment, without the substitution of a greater pleasure, or to supersede it by a more than equivalent pain, cannot be an act of benevolence. To speak of a being as benevolent, and to represent him as producing, or intending to produce, a balance of misery, is a contradiction in terms. And by the use of no phraseology can the character of things be altered. Neither actions nor persons change their nature, because their nature is falsely designated by words. If a stab be called a kiss, it does not therefore become an act of kindness.

To draw a distinction between the attributes of God and the attributes of man, to say that God's benevolence, though different from man's benevolence, is still benevolent, is mere mocking. Except as applied to human conduct and to human feelings, how did the word benevolence acquire its meaning? Be it what it may, an effect is still the same; it is still itself, whatsoever be its author or its cause. To ascribe to God, under the name of benevolence, that which, ascribed to man, would not be benevolence, is, on the part of him whom terror or prejudice has not blinded, an act of fraud: under the name of a fish it is to sell a serpent. By being called a silk-worm, would a scorpion become harmless?

And what is true of any one attribute cannot but be true of any other. Any other than as man is just, can any other being be just? And so of knowledge, and veracity, and power. From what but from the observation of human conduct or human feelings, can the idea of justice—the idea for which the word justice has been found—from what can it have been derived?

That portion of the field of thought which religion, as unconnected with ethics, occupies, it is no part of our present purpose to explore. Ethics, not religion, is the subject of this work.

Religious discussion would be here superfluous and irrelevant.

The prevalence of the self-regarding over the social interest, as a cause of immorality, it belongs, in a great measure, to the ruling powers to remove. Wise legislation would be directed to their identification, to the production of an accordance between the popular and the political sanction. This accordance is strengthened by every law that is good; weakened by every law that is bad. A legal penalty, for example, attached to an act in which a man's interest is associated with the public interest, as where prohibition is attached to the circulation of that which is an instrument of enjoyment or an object of virtuous desire, not only produces immorality, not only offers a premium on immorality, but destroys the power of the political sanction, by disassociating it from the popular interest. Topics like this, however, belong rather to public than to private Deontology, and it is only to the latter that this volume has reference.

It may, however, be not amiss to advert to the fact, that out of the clashing of the popular interests with those sinister interests which are too often protected by legislation, misery and immorality frequently grow to a frightfully baneful extent. The fiscal regulations of many countries—

monopolies established by law—frequently present cases in which the violator of the letter of the statute can scarcely be considered other than the benefactor of the public. Cases occur in which the popular sanction is outraged by the political; and the popular sanction, in consequence, takes acts under its protection which are held up by the political sanction as offences and crimes fit to be visited by penalties more or less severe. The triumph over despotism, where the many have been engaged against the one or the few, is the triumph of the popular over the political sanction. Every step in the way of social improvement, which is made by the subject against the government, is a similar victory. Good government is, in a word, the harmony established between legislation and enlightened opinion. But the subject is too vast for discussion in all its bearings on this occasion.

The last cause of immorality which remains to be mentioned, is the preference of the present lesser good to the distant greater good; the avoidance of the present lesser evil when a greater distant evil will be the consequence. This is the peculiar topic of our present attention: and the source of the error may be traced to erroneous education, intellectual and moral.

Vice may be defined to be a miscalculation of chances: a mistake in estimating the value of pleasures and pains. It is false moral arithmetic; and there is the consolation of knowing that, by the application of a right standard, there are few moral questions which may not be resolved, with an accuracy and a certainty not far removed from mathematical demonstration.

CHAPTER IX.

ANALYSIS OF CONFUSED PHRASEOLOGY, BY THE DEONTOLOGICAL TEST.

THERE are some terms, employed not unfrequently by the legislator and the moralist, which appear to require a few sentences of explanation. As long as they are made subservient to the Deontological rule, the principal mischief which results from their use is this—that more perfect and convenient expressions might be found; so that words are wasted, and a round-about way is taken in the pursuit of truth. Some of these terms have, however, obtained such complete possession of the field of ordinary expression, that the attempt to displace them would be almost hopeless. In fact, the general imperfection of language is one of the great impediments to the the progress of philosophy. Correct ideas find great difficulty in discovering appropriate terms. Language lags behind science, and too frequently refuses its aid to knowledge. The innovations of philosophy upon long-received expressions are slow and difficult. Philology is

apt to refuse the contributions of the other sciences. It prides itself on its poverty. And this is the more to be regretted, inasmuch as all languages had their birth in a period when moral and intellectual cultivation could only be in their infancy. A time will come, it is earnestly to be hoped, when morality, like chemistry, will create its own fit nomenclature.

Nothing is more fatal than the misuse, or rather the abuse of language. Qualities the most opposed frequently shroud themselves under the same phraseology. If there were a language peculiar to innocence, it would only be so for one moment, the next it would be usurped by guilt.

Principle is a term in frequent use, to express moral qualities. A man of principle—a man of no principle—a man of bad principle. What is the meaning of the phrase? What is the ground of the estimation in which the man is held, who obtains the benefit of a reputation for acting on principle? It is that he is supposed to have laid down for himself a certain rule of conduct, and acts constantly and steadily in conformity to it. This were indeed well, if his rule of conduct were a good rule; if its end and object were the general well-being: but supposing his rule of conduct to be a bad rule, that it has not for its object the general well-

being, surely he is entitled to no approbation. A man is said to act habitually on principle, who unswervingly pursues his own course, notwithstanding all solicitations to the contrary. These solicitations are temptations, administered in the shape of pleasures to be immediately enjoyed, and pains to be immediately avoided; and, undoubtedly, he will have learnt to master these solicitations in proportion as he has proved himself able to forego these pleasures and to suffer these pains. But if his resistance be such that the sum of happiness is diminished by his conduct, if his rules are not in conformity with the demands of utility, his principle, or in other words, his pertinacity, will be useless or pernicious, to the extent in which he fails to give adherence to the Deontological law. It is by contrast with him who is called a man of no principle that a man of principle obtains approbation. A man of no principle is a man who, without regard to consequences, allows the solicitations of present pleasure, or the apprehension of present pain, to direct his conduct; while a man of bad principle is one who has laid down for himself a rule, that the welfare of others shall on no occasion form a part of his consideration.; as, for instance, when he determines to do mischief to every man whose opinion on any par-

ticular subject differs from his own. In such a case, those who do not join him in the observance of his rule, will concur in the propriety of affixing on him the title of a bad-principled man. It is possible, however, for the man of bad principle to be less pernicious than the man of no principle; the one will, on all occasions, make his line of conduct subservient to his immediate ends; he has no principle to prevent his doing so: the other may have some good principle, operating at times to correct or counteract the bad principle. Independently of which, the bad principle may be sometimes inert from want of excitement or opportunity of exercise; while the mind of the man of no principle being open to every impression of present influence, will in most cases be seduced by temptation.

Right is, for the most part, a recognition by law of something claimed by one or more individuals. It is that to the enforcement of which the legal powers lend their sanction. It enters little into the Deontological field, where the business consists chiefly in the proper distribution of obligations. Deontology endeavors to give to obligation the efficiency of action, and where different obligations clash, it determines which should preponderate. It is true that the legal sanction has obligation attached to it, obligation in the most perfect form, obli-

gation co-existent with right; but it will also sometimes appear that the obligation produced by the legal sanction is superseded by the Deontological, as where, for example, the infraction of a law may be attended with greater good than its observance.

The demand of rights sometimes takes the most extensively-baneful range of all the sources of action. The right of empire, for instance, has been made the ground-work of unbounded profligacy and consequent misery; the plea for rapine and murder on the largest scale. It may be a concupiscense of the most atrocious and horrible character, and has been put forward by men like the Prince de Condé, as an excuse and a sanction for every species of iniquity.

Left to itself, wandering about without the Deontological chain to bring it back to its fit abode, it is one of the most pernicious of pretenders. In the political field despotism, with all its horrors, takes its stand upon it. In the religious field, persecution; in the popular, injustice; in the domestic, parental, marital, or other tyranny.

Subservient to utility, there is no objection either to the word or the thing; that which is useful is *right:* a right is that which grows out of the application of the greatest happiness

principle. Such a right cannot be shaken by argument; but no such right can be *assumed* in any given case. Weigh pains, weigh pleasures; and as the balance stands, will stand the question of right and wrong.

Conscience is a thing of fictitious existence, supposed to occupy a seat in the mind. A conscientious person is one who, having made to himself a rule of conduct, steadily abides by it. In the common use of the phrase, it is implied that his rule of conduct is the correct one. But only in so far as his rule of conduct is consistent with the principles of utility can his conscientiousness be deemed virtuous. Whenever his conscientiousness takes a direction opposed to the general well-being, it is pernicious in the very proportion of its influence.

Good and evil conscience are sometimes used to represent the tribunal before which a man tries the merits of his own actions in his own mind, and the recompense or punishment which he attaches to those actions. A good conscience is the favorable opinion which a man entertains of his own conduct; an evil conscience is the unfavorable decision of a man on his own conduct. But the value of the judgment given must wholly depend on its being subservient to, or rather on its being an application of the greatest happiness principle.

CHAPTER X.

VIRTUE DEFINED.

VIRTUE is the head of a large family. The virtues are the members of it. The scene offered to the imagination is that of a parent followed by numerous offspring. Latin being the source whence the word is derived, and the word being of the feminine gender, the image presented is that of a mother, surrounded by her daughters. An appellation gives an idea of existence, but virtue is a fictitious entity,* growing out of the

* What, it will be perhaps said, deny the existence of virtue? Virtue an empty name—no such thing as virtue! Horrible! What an opinion must such a man have of human nature! What good, what useful information can be expected from him? What, of any sort, but the most pernicious? If virtue is an imaginary thing, so also must vice be; and thus virtue and vice will be on a level—alike creatures of the imagination, alike objects of indifference! It is thus, sometimes, that a novel form of expression is met, vituperated and dismissed; but no clear idea can possess the mind, until a separation has taken place between that which is real and that which is fictitious. The fictitious may be an instrument which the unsatisfactory state of language compels us to employ, for the purposes of introducing realities. Virtuous deeds, virtuous propensities, are existent things, and

imperfection of language—of language created long before the phenomena of mind were studied or understood.

Virtue not having a superior genus is not susceptible of what is commonly meant by a definition, which is a reference to some generic appellation embracing it. By the medium of its conjugates it is capable of being expounded; and when the words, a virtuous act, a virtuous habit, or a virtuous disposition, are used, a tolerably determinate conception is conveyed by them to the mind.

When a man says of an act that it is virtuous, he merely conveys an opinion that it merits his approbation, and thereon comes the inquiry, what is the ground of that opinion?

On looking closely into the matter, it will be found that the ground, in different places, is very different, so that it would not be very easy to give a general answer. If the answers be correct, they will be different, and to collect them all, intricate and all-comprehensive as they are, boundless must be the researches in the field of geography and history. And thus it is, that when it is demanded why an act is virtuous, or what constitutes the virtue of an

for all practical purposes the result is the same. Two persons may employ a very different phraseology, though their meaning may be identical.

act, the only response to so important an inquiry will be, when thoroughly sifted—It is virtuous because I think it to be so, and its virtue consists in its having my favourable opinion.

A new ground is put forward here. The ground of approbation will be the tendency of an act to increase happiness; the ground of reprobation the tendency of an act to diminish happiness.

The attempt is here made to develope this principle to its fullest extent. Wherever there is a particle of happiness, however small, without any counterbalancing evil, there will be ground for approval, though not necessarily evidence of virtue. Virtue is the effort, the conquest of a difficulty, leaving, as its results, a balance of happiness. There may be, there is much good in the world, which no virtue has been concerned in producing. But there is no virtue where there is no balance of happiness.

Conduciveness to happiness being then the test of virtue, and all happiness being composed of our own happiness and that of others, the production of our own happiness is prudence, the production of the happiness of others is effective benevolence. The tree of virtue is thus divided into two great stems, out of which grow all the other branches of virtue.

Since the time of Aristotle, four virtues, Pru-

dence, Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice, have taken the names of the cardinal virtues;—*cardo* being the Latin for a hinge, and these became the *cardinal* virtues, because on them, as doors on hinges, all other virtues were said to turn. But do they turn on these four hinge-like virtues? By no means. The list is excessive; but does it not embrace the whole? By no means. For in Aristotle's catalogue the virtue of benevolence—effective benevolence—is forgotten, and there is nothing in its stead but *justice*, which is but a portion of benevolence in disguise. The list consists of three virtues, which regard the actor only; while, for all the rest of mankind, there is a virtue, which is a very small part of a virtue indeed.

It will, however, be seen, that it is only with reference to pains and pleasures that any clear conception attaches to the words virtue or vice. Familiarly as their different titles sound to the ear, any part of the meaning which cannot be brought under the influence of their relation to happiness and unhappiness, will and must continue unsettled and confused.

Only, in so far, then, as it produces happiness or misery can an act be properly called *virtuous* or *vicious*. Virtue and vice are but useless qualities unless estimated by their influences on the creation of pleasure and pain.

They are fictitious entities, spoken of as real, for the purposes of discourse, and without fictions of this character, on subjects such as these, discussions could hardly be carried on. The application of the principle of Deontology will alone enable us to discover whether deceptive impressions are conveyed by the employment of the terms, and it will be found on a close examination, that virtue and vice are, as has been stated, but representatives of two qualities, namely, prudence and effective benevolence, and their contraries, with the different modifications springing out of them, and which regard ourselves primarily, and next, all besides ourselves.

If the effect of virtue were to prevent or destroy more pleasure than it produced, or to produce more pain than it prevented, its more appropriate name would be wickedness and folly: wickedness, as it affected others; folly, as respected him who practised it. And if the influence of vice were to promote pleasure and to diminish pain, vice would be entitled to the names of beneficence and wisdom.

Virtue is the preference given to a greater good in comparison with a less; but it is called upon for its exercise when the lesser good is magnified by its adjacency, and the greater good diminished by its remoteness. In the self-

garding part of the field of conduct, it is the sacrifice of a present inclination to a distant personal recompense. In the social part, it is the sacrifice of a man's own pleasure to the obtaining a greater sum of pleasure for the benefit of others. The sacrifice is either positive or negative—positive when it is the abandonment of pleasure, negative when it is the subjection to pain.

The terms *sacrifice* or *self-denial*, are appropriate where virtue consists in the abstinence from enjoyment; but they are less properly employed where the good sacrificed is of the negative kind, and the virtue is found in self-subjection to suffering. But it will be obvious that though the idea of virtue may be sometimes included in the idea of *sacrifice*, or *self-denial*, yet these are by no means synonymous with virtue, nor are they necessarily included in the idea of virtue. To the character of virtue, in a great number of cases, no doubt, the quality of courage is indispensable; but courage, in so far as it consists in exposure to pain—to bodily pain, for example, unaccompanied by danger to life, cannot be fitly called *sacrifice*—so *self-denial* cannot be said to have place in cases where a man abandons nothing which he might have obtained.

Virtue has not only to struggle with indivi-

dual inclination, it has sometimes to struggle against the general inclination of the human species, and it is when it triumphs over both that it exists in its highest degree of perfection.

In proportion as a man has acquired a command over his desires, resistance to their impulse becomes less and less difficult, till, at length, in some constitutions, all difficulty vanishes. In early life, for example, a man may have acquired a taste for wine, or for a particular species of food. Finding it disagree with his constitution, little by little, the uneasinesses attendant on the gratification of his appetite become so frequent, so constantly present to his recollection, that the anticipation of the future certain pain gains strength enough to overpower the impression of the present pleasure. The idea of the greater distant suffering has extinguished that of the lesser contemporaneous enjoyment. And it is thus that by the power of association things, which had been originally objects of desire, become objects of aversion; and, on the other hand, things which had been originally objects of aversion, such as medicines, for instance, become objects of desire. In the case above referred to, the pleasure not being in possession could not, of course, be *sacrificed*—it was non-existent; nor was there self-denial in the case, for as the de-

sire which had originally been calling for its gratification was no longer in existence, there remained no demand to which denial could be opposed. When things are in this situation, the virtue, so far from being annihilated, has arrived at the pinnacle of its highest excellence, and shines forth in its brightest lustre. Defective indeed would that definition of virtue be, which excluded from its pale the very perfection of virtue.

Effort, undoubtedly, is needful to virtue, and the seat of that effort, in the case of prudence, is principally in the understanding; in the case of effective benevolence, mainly in the will and the affections.

I meet an adversary in the road. He aims a blow at me with a stick. I spring aside and escape the stroke. Here is usefulness—self-preservation; but here is no room for prudence.

I hear that an adversary is laying wait for me at a certain spot. I avoid the path that leads to it, and repair to my place of destination by a more circuitous or expensive road. Here is usefulness by self-preservation; but here, too, there has been exercise of the understanding, and room, at least, for prudence.

And so, when the seat of the effort has been the will. I purchase at the baker's shop a loaf for my own dinner; there is double usefulness—

usefulness to myself by the preservation of life; to the baker by his profit on the loaf.

I am accosted by a famished beggar. He has more need of the loaf than I. I give it him, and lose my dinner. Here, too, is usefulness; but here, also, is virtue: for, to subject myself to pain, as here,—to pain in the shape of hunger,—requires an effort, and that effort I have made.

But, though the test of virtue be usefulness, or, in other words, the production of happiness —virtue being, as above, that which is beneficial, and vice that which is pernicious to the community,—there is no identity between virtue and usefulness, for there are many beneficial actions which do not partake of the nature of virtue. Virtue demands effort. Of all the actions of man, those which preserve the individual, and those which preserve the species, are undoubtedly the most beneficial to the community. But there is no virtue in these. As regards effort—though effort is needful to virtue, and to the production of virtue, it is not needful that the time of the effort should be the very moment when the virtue is practised. All that is necessary is, that the virtuous act should be of that character for the production of which, in the conduct of most men, an effort is required. For the habit, whose formation re-

quired an effort, acts at last without requiring such an impulse. Take, for instance, the confining anger within the limits prescribed by prudence and benevolence. If there could be no virtue without contemporaneous effort, then would virtue, arrived at its consummation, cease to be virtue.

It is curious enough that in the Aristotelian school an exclusion is put upon virtue when it is exercised in the highest degree—where any thing remains of inclination to be subdued, however perfect the subjugation may be, then the title of virtue is refused, and to the decidedly superior claim, the inferior title of *semi-virtue*, or half virtue, is awarded.

These half-virtues are called by the author of the Oxford Compendium, 'only rudiments,' and evidence of 'good dispositions' towards 'a habit of virtue;' but 'entire virtues,' he says, they are by no means to be denominated.*

He will, however, have them subject to 'mediocrity' or moderation (*mediocritas*†) as the dominant virtue, after all.

According to him, virtue consists in doing, without the cost of any sacrifice, what is right

* Compendium, p. 69.

† The allusion here is to another Aristotelian tenet, that, in every case, virtue consists—that every species of virtue consists—in mediocrity.

to be done, and for every whole virtue there is a half-virtue. And, with a limitation, for which it is not very easy to discover the reason, the half-virtues are paired off with the whole virtues.

The half-virtues, he avows, have as many classes as the whole ones, but they must be grouped under certain *genera.*

And so he goes on to arrange his half-virtues under two heads—continentia et tolerantia, continence and tolerance,—corresponding, he says, with the concupiscent and irascible appetites; continence being taken in hand by concupiscence, and tolerance by irascibility. Now the difference between the whole and the half virtues being constituted only by the presence or absence of reluctance, there seems no reason why the same division should not apply to every part of the field of virtue. But the farther he proceeds the deeper is the darkness gathered round him, and the imperfection of his classification becomes palpable. Does he mean by *tolerantia,* the subjection of one's self to bodily pain? Truly does he, if he is to be believed. In fact he says so, in so many words.*

But this tolerance, he continues, is a *virtus imperfecta* (an imperfect virtue) whose value

* Page 70.

certainly he hesitates to put too prominently forward, and whose influence, he fears, may be interfered with through imbecility of mind.* Tolerance, by which he means the power of suffering—and not the virtue of candid and benevolent judgment—will, after all, be found to have been too much honored by the Oxonian's eulogy. It is not a half-virtue. It is no virtue at all. It is the physical disposition to resist the influences of pain, which nature has given to some men and denied to others, without adding to or subtracting from the virtues of those who have it, or those who have it not.

The irascible appetite is that which seeks to visit with its ill-will the object of its anger—the appetite seeking its gratification by the production of pain in the breast of him who is the subject of its visitation. But the seat of the pain produced by anger is really the heart of the angry person. Does this make him virtuous, which it ought to do, according to the Aristotelian definition?

Yet, according to the view of the Oxford teacher of morality, this subject, which he has left involved in such midnight obscurity, is important in the very highest degree. On it depends the dreadful difference between salvation and damnation. Yet these very qualities—this

* Page 71.

continence and tolerance, which Aristotle dismisses with the light character of imperfect virtues—are, in a theological point of view (so says the Oxonian moralist), not only among the most perfect, but among the most arduous virtues. According to Aristotle's morality, half is no more than half; a half-virtue is but a half-virtue. According to Oxford theology, half is equal to, if not greater than the whole. But in this, mystery is made out of every thing, and out of nothing; and the more mystery the more merit.

It would, indeed, have been well, if to the Aristotelian appetites, the appetite for mystery had been added by the Oxonian; an appetite which may be described as being always in the forest of so-called religion, hunting for absurdity and nonsense, and feeding upon its aliment with a relish directly proportioned to its grossness.

Before the title of virtue is demanded for an action, its conduciveness to happiness must be proved. According to Aristotle and his Oxford disciple, virtue consists in *mediocrity*—so in Latin, at least; for it may be thought that moderation is the more fit translation of *mediocritas;* but, at all events, it is *mediocritas*. And here let it be remarked, by the way, that if *morality* had been intended for use—if it had been thought good enough for the business of

life, a living language, and not a dead one, would have been employed for teaching it: the language of the many, not the language of the few. Now what is the value of a definition? That we may know the thing defined. Of a description? Clearly that we may recognize the thing described. And let us see whether the end is accomplished here.

The virtue is named, it is stuck between two qualities of the same character, which are not virtues; in one of which the qualities of the virtues are deficient, in the other they are excessive: here is your designation of virtue, here is the example, running through the whole string of virtues. The only thing, then, needful, is to show what, on each occasion, is the exact quantity of the quality out of which virtue is made, to produce it ready for use, correctly weighed out, neither too much nor too little; for if you get it not in the exact quantity, get what you may, you will not get virtue.

But for this all-important object you will find no help from our moralist. There are, he tells you, three doses of the moral medicine: there is the proper dose, the excessive dose, and the deficient dose. In the proper dose there is health and safety; in the others peril and perdition. Has he not noted down the sanatory quantity? Not he! Are there no

figures, no means of estimate in his prescription? Nothing like them.

If a physician treat of diseases, he does not satisfy himself with scribbling down their names, but thinks it useful, finds it necessary, indeed, to record their symptoms. Not so our moralist. His virtues are names, without symptoms: he talks of virtue; but how virtue is to be separated from that which is not virtue, forms no portion of his care.

Even common phraseology, the accustomed use of the terms of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have, in their habitual employment, a more decided bearing upon the welfare of society than is given to the virtues by the ethical Oxonian. All men have a sort of notion that government and legislation, and religion and morality, have, or ought to have, a beneficial influence upon the public happiness. On what other ground, indeed, can they be recommended? But on that ground the Oxford moralist makes no stand.

But the Oxford Compendium offers a series of definitions for virtue, out of which a man may take which he pleases.

1. 'Virtue is an elective habit, consisting in mediocrity (or in a medium) in regard to ourselves, and as a prudent man would prescribe it.'

Let who can make sense of this. If it have

any meaning, the meaning is, that there are two virtues, mediocrity and prudence, and that these two are one.

2. 'Virtue consists in the conformity of our actions to the divine will.'

Good. But the difficulty is to know the divine will on every occasion. The phraseology of the Bible is general, not particular; sometimes, too, the meaning may be doubtful, and subject to dispute. And what *is* the divine will, as taught in the Bible? What is it, what can it be but to produce happiness? What other motive, what other end has it proposed to obedience? The divine will is benignant, benevolent, beneficent. What do these terms imply but happiness-intending, happiness-producing? So that, if the Oxford moralist has any meaning—if the words are not used for the mere purposes of delusion—his meaning must be our meaning. And, in that case, he might have avoided all ambiguity of expression.

3. 'Virtue consists in the conformity of our actions to right reason.'

Right reason? That very reason which the authorities of Oxford so often declare to be at variance with the divine will. Human reason, that is the standard, is it not? *Whose* right reason? Mine, or the man's who differs from me? Mine, of course; for I cannot hold any

man's reason to be right which I hold to be wrong. And I hold his to be wrong, because I differ from him. Mine, or the Oxford man's? Mine. The question is settled. And now let me dogmatize like the rest.

4. 'Virtue consists'—the divine will and right reason consist—'in mediocrity.'

Here, at last, we have a standard by which to measure the divine will and right reason too, and virtue, as the child of both. And now, reader, all doubts and difficulties being removed, your moral principle is put into your hand, that with it you may work your wonders. So says Aristotle, so says Oxford.

But what says utility? What are the really valuable virtues, what the subservient virtues which grow out of them? Taking for the standard and the test of virtue its conduciveness to well-being, it is believed, as has been said above, that all the modifications of virtue may be arranged under the two heads of prudence and beneficence. Beyond these there is no intrinsically valuable virtue. To one or other of these every useful moral quality will be found to belong. These, then, may be called the *primary virtues*. Take away prudence, take away benevolence, from the tree of morals, you strip it of all its flowers and fruits, of its strength, its beauty, and its use. You have a

worthless, unproductive trunk, smitten with barrenness, the mere cumberer of the ground. The value of the whole tribe of ancillary or secondary virtues depends altogether on their subserviency to these two primary virtues. Hence it follows—1. That if the primary virtues were not useful, neither could the secondary virtues be so. 2. That their utility must consist in advancing the same ends which it is the object of the primary virtues to advance. 3. The tendency of the primary virtues is invariably towards usefulness, in the case of some person or other on whom they are exercised, whether useful or not to human society on the whole. 4. The usefulness of the secondary virtues is to be measured by their tendency to produce those effects which it is the tendency of the primary virtues to produce. 5. Their usefulness must be measured by the degree in which they contribute to advance those ends, which are the ends of the primary virtues. Occasion will be found to bring the whole of the secondary virtues under review, and to test their value by the principles which have been here developed.

The modes in which the various virtues may be brought into operation—by discourse, by writing, or by deportment—belong to the practical branch of the subject.

CHAPTER XI.

SELF-INTEREST, OR SELF-REGARDING PRUDENCE.

Nature, artless and untutored nature, engages man in the pursuit of immediate pleasure, and in the avoidance of immediate pain. What reason can effect is to prevent the sacrifice of a greater distant pleasure, or the visitation of a greater distant pain in exchange for those which are present; in other words, to prevent a miscalculation in the amount of happiness. In this, too, consists the whole of virtue, which is but the sacrifice of a smaller present satisfaction, in the shape of a temptation, to a satisfaction of greater magnitude, but more remote, which is, in fact, a recompense. What can be done for morality, in the field of self-interest, is to show how much a man's own happiness depends upon himself, how much on the effects his conduct produces in the breasts of those with whom he is connected by the ties of mutual sympathy; how much the interest which others feel in his happiness, and how much the desire to promote it depend on his own doings. Suppose a man wedded to intoxication. He

will be taught to consider and weigh the amount of pleasure and pain growing out of his conduct. He will view, on one side, the intensity and the duration of the pleasurable excitement. This will be the account on the side of profit. Per contra, he will be led to estimate— 1. Sickness and other effects prejudicial to health. 2. Future contingent pains, growing out of probable debility and disease. 3. The loss of time and the loss of money, and these in proportion to the value of time and money in his individual case. 4. The pain produced in the minds of those who are dear to him; as, for instance, a parent, a wife, a child. 5. The disrepute attached to the practice; the loss of reputation in the eyes of others. 6. The risk of legal punishment, and the disgrace attaching to it; as when the public exhibition of that temporary insanity, produced by intoxication, is visited by the laws. 7. The risk of punishments attached to crimes which a man is liable to commit while gratifying the propensity to inebriety. 8. The misery produced by apprehension of punishment in a future state of being.

All these will probably lead him to discover that he purchases the pleasures of intoxication at too great a cost. He will see that morality, which is virtue, and happiness, which is self-

interest, counsel him to avoid excess. He has the same motive to subdue his intemperate propensities that a man has, who, in the pursuit of wealth, can choose between gaining much and gaining little. Deontology asks no ultimate sacrifice; her lessons propose a balance of enjoyment to the man with whom she reasons. He is in search of pleasure; she encourages him in the search, she allows it to be wise, honorable, and virtuous; but she entreats him not to err by an erroneous arithmetic; she represents a futurity, a probably adjacent futurity, with its pleasures and pains. She asks whether the enjoyment which is taken to-day will not have to be repaid to-morrow, or the day after, with usurious and intolerable interest. She implores that the same prudent calculation which every wise man applies to his daily concerns, may be applied to the most important of all concerns, those of felicity and misery. Deontology professes no scorn for that very selfishness to which vice itself appeals. She surrenders every point which cannot be proved to be beneficial to the individual. She consents even to set aside the code of the lawgiver and the dogmas of the divine. She takes for granted that these cannot be unfriendly to her influences, that neither legislation nor religion are hostile to morality; and she insists that morality shall

not be opposed to happiness. Make out to her a case against human felicity, and she is smitten with silence and with helplessness. She acknowledges that even the drunkard is proposing to himself a proper end; but she is able to show him that his end will not be accomplished by drunkenness. She assumes nothing but that which no man will deny—namely, that all men wish to be happy. She has no purpose to answer by despotic dogmatizing. Her mission is to invite to a sober reckoning of good and evil. She has no interest in this or that course of action, in one result or another, but in so far as there is to be something of happiness abstracted from the whole. All that she proposes is to put a bridle upon precipitancy, to prevent rashness from taking irrevocable steps, and entering upon foolish bargains. She has no quarrel with any species of pleasure which does not associate itself with a more than counterbalancing portion of pain. In a word, she ministers to selfishness, and, like a wise and active steward, makes the most of every man's rent-roll of felicity.

But she is not blind nor thoughtless. She knows that the present will soon be the past, and that the opinions of this hour will be modified by the experience of the next. Hence she desires that the important element of that *which*

is to be may not be left out of the calculation of that which *is*. The teaching is—Weigh every thing, weigh every thing well that belongs to the bargain. Make the most of what is given you to enjoy now; but if suffering is behind, if enjoyments greater than those you are grasping are to be surrendered, as the payment for them, where is your prudence? If, for the purchase of the enjoyment you covet, you inflict pain upon others greater than your enjoyment, where is your benevolence? And if, from the infliction of that pain upon others, they retaliate on you with interest, or abstract from your enjoyments a greater sum than that of which you deprived them, where, again, is your prudence?

In fact, the self-esteem which takes not into account any thing future, has as little in it of prudence as of benevolence. It is truly the killing the goose for the golden egg. 'Myself,' 'myself,' is but the cry of insensibility to happiness or unhappiness from external sources; and insensibility to the pressure of evil is a clear advantage to its possessor, provided that insensibility brings with it no re-action from others.

Phocion's self-esteem lessened his sense of his own misfortune. There was no benevolence, no courtesy in his representing himself as an

object of greater admiration to his fellow-sufferer than his fellow-sufferer was to himself. This was mere arrogance.

Vitellius's self-esteem led him to demand respect, because he had possessed the highest portion of prosperity. If that consoled him, so much the better for him, and nothing the worse for others.

But self-regarding prudence is not only a virtue—it is a virtue on which the very existence of the race depends. If I thought more about you than I thought about myself, I should be the blind leading the blind, and we should fall into the ditch together. It is as impossible that your pleasures should be better to me than my own, as that your eye-sight should be better to me than my own. My happiness and my unhappiness are as much a part of me as any of my faculties or organs, and I might as well profess to feel your tooth-ache more keenly than you do, as to be more interested in your well-being than in my own well-being.

There are, however, many who so exaggerate the selfish principle as to think that, by swelling their notions of themselves, they are still serving their race.

But how? Does a man's pride or vanity make others happier? If so, there is double gain. We have got hold of a pleasure, and so

have others. Does it not affect others, either for better or worse? Still there is a gain, for man has a pleasure in his own glorification. Does his pride or his vanity bring annoyance to the bosoms of others? There is something thrown into the other scale; the calculation must be made; all the annoyances suffered by all those who are annoyed, must be added together, and weighed against the pleasures of the man's pride or vanity. It will be, perhaps, found that the annoyances caused to others are proportioned to the intensity of his own self-gratification. It is clear that, in such a case, the balance will be increased in proportion.

The sun of Deontology irradiates the adjacent regions of prudence and benevolence. By it light is substituted to darkness, order to chaos. It solves all intricate problems, and all perplexing difficulties vanish before it. By it alone can be traced out the affinities,—from it alone can be deduced the relations between the several classes of moral qualities; through it alone can the limits between virtue and vice be discovered. All anomalies may be reduced by it, and by it alone, to harmony and regularity. By it, and by it alone, a variety of distinctions, which have stood in an unintelligible or insulated shape, may be brought into connection or contrast. It is the spear of Ithuriel, by which evil and

good may be detected, and made to present themselves in their own true characters.

There has been among moralists a vehement disposition to shut out the influence of the self-regarding principle from the mind. Why this reluctance to admit, as a motive, that which is and must be the strongest of all motives—a man's regard for himself? Why is not self-love to be brought into the field? It is from a sort of bashfulness—a disposition to consider that principle to which all the actions and passions of men owe their birth, as the *partie honteuse* of our nature.

But with the recognition of the principle, that an enlightened regard to self-interest is the best guarantee for good conduct, the knowledge and the practice of morality have undoubtedly made considerable progress, and delightful it is to trace the slow but visible march of virtue. It will lose nothing of its stability, nothing of its power, when it is discovered to be founded on interest. That interest some men will not see, and others will turn away with scorn from the contemplation of it. Declaimers would ask whether, in an age like this, which they call degenerate, a man would sacrifice his life for the benefit of his country. Yes!

There is many and many a man, who, upon

such calls as have formerly met with the like obedience, would, for his country, surrender his existence with pleasure. Does it follow that, in this or in any thing else, he would act without an interest? No such thing. Nothing like it: it is not in man's nature.

And precisely the same argument holds good in man's aberrations from duty. They are the miscalculations of interest.

'There is no man doth a wrong for the wrong's sake; but thereby to purchase himself profit or pleasure.' This grand truism was not hidden from Lord Bacon. His was a mind to be struck with the beauty of truth wherever it met him; but his was not an age when to pursue it to the utmost was either practicable or safe.

Yet he could not fail to draw the deduction, that if vices were upon the whole account profitable, the virtuous man would be the sinner.

The sacrifice of interests presents itself abstractedly, as something grand and virtuous, because it is taken for granted that the pleasure one man flings away must necessarily be gathered up by another. And supposing no pleasure were lost in the transfer, and no pleasure gained, it is clear that the whole sum of happiness would continue just as it was, notwithstanding a million shiftings from one possessor to another. But in the commerce of

happiness, as in that of wealth, the prominent question is, how to make circulation assist production. Hence, it is no more fit to call disinterestedness a virtue in moral economy, than to call expenditure a merit in political economy. Disinterestedness may exist among the rash and the reckless; but a man disinterested on reflection is happily seldom to be found. Show me the man who throws away more of the elements of felicity than he creates, and I will show you a fool and a prodigal. Show me the man who deprives himself of more good than he communicates to another, and I will show you a man ignorant of the elementary arithmetic of morality.

Out of self-regarding prudence, as a primary virtue, grow temperance and continence, as secondary virtues. The breach of them brings the actor into the regions of pain; the habitual breach of them leaves a result of unhappiness, upon which the eye of prudence cannot turn without discerning the balance of suffering that is left behind.

CHAPTER XII.

PRUDENCE AS RESPECTS OTHERS, OR EXTRA-REGARDING PRUDENCE.

Though it belongs to Government to give increase and extension to the connection which exists between prudence and effective benevolence wherever the political sanction will apply, it is the duty of the public teacher of morality to point out their accordance, and to give to that accordance all the action and effect of which it is susceptible through his influence.

It is to public opinion, or in other words, to the popular or moral sanction, that we must mainly look for the action of the social on the self-regarding feelings. Of the tribunal of public opinion every individual of the community may be a member; every one who gives to his estimate of the conduct of others any expression by words or deeds is an acting member, and every man who takes upon himself to write is a leading member; his influence will be proportioned to the approbation he receives from his readers, and the strength of the impression he conveys to their minds; and again, on the

number and influence of such readers. To their concurrence and co-operation he must turn for the measures of his own success.

A man is prompted by ill-will to aim a blow at another. His ill-will may be restrained by the apprehension that the blow will be returned by the person at whom it is aimed, or by a third party who is a looker-on; or, secondly, he may be restrained by the apprehension of legal punishment. In one case the physical, in the other the political sanction is operative; and there is in neither any demand for the application of the Deontological principle. But where these fail, where they provide no adequate remedy, come the popular and the social sanctions, to fill up that portion of the field of action which is unoccupied by other motives. These two sanctions are intimately and closely allied, for the social relations stretch naturally and necessarily into the whole frame of society. By some social link, more or less efficient, almost every man is bound to the great body of the public. The circle widens, the intimacy strengthens as society becomes more and more intelligent. The interest in a family extends to a tribe, from a tribe to a province, from a province to a nation, from a nation to mankind. And as political and Deontological science become better understood, the depend-

ence of every man upon the good opinion of all besides will be increased, and the moral sanction grow stronger and stronger. Its strength too will be greatly heightened by a more correct appreciation of its own power, so that a period may be anticipated in which the public mind will not err in its estimate of duty, and when the moral will supersede a portion of the political sanction.

But to be a little more particular. The influence of an act upon others whose happiness is affected by it, may be fitly considered with reference to the particular case. It is assumed, that a man by a blow inflicts corporal injury upon another. He who gives the blow has, in the first place, to apprehend retaliation in the shape of the same or similar personal injury. This apprehension is the physical sanction. The political or legal sanction, the risk of the interference of the magistrate, may, and probably will apply here, though that interference can in fact be safely grounded on no other principle than that on which Deontology itself rests, namely, the greatest happiness principle. But whether or not the political or the physical sanction are called into exertion, the moral sanction will, at all events, be put into operation. For, as experience and observation have taught that such deeds of violence are the sources of

suffering, disapprobation will have place, depending for its amount on the degree of suffering inflicted. Nor can the sympathetic and social sanction be without its effect; for though in the rude states of society that sanction may be so weak as to produce no restraint, and though in every state of society it is susceptible of great variation, as between individual and individual, yet in a period of civilization like that to which these thoughts are addressed, the social sanction becomes highly operative, and it will be operative in cases where the more general moral sanction may sometimes fail of its effect. He who would show indifference to the happiness of those with whom he is wholly unconnected, might be less disposed to show indifference to that of his friends or family, on whom he more immediately depends for his own happiness. As far as it exists, though spread over a narrower field, the sympathetic sanction must be stronger than the moral. For as few persons can contemplate altogether without uneasiness the sufferings of a fellow creature, especially if presented in a particular manner to their perception or imagination, still less can they witness with indifference those of a friend. The sense of sympathy is universal. Perhaps there never existed a human being who had reached full age without the experience of

pleasure at another's pleasure, of uneasiness at at another's pain. It may be narrowed to a domestic circle, and that circle may be as it were at war with mankind. Community of interest, similarity of opinion, are sources whence it springs. This sympathy then will operate as a restraint against the giving pain. It will always operate except where some stronger counter-motive acts in a contrary direction. And all these sanctions act with accumulating power; for as the mind of individual man, if looked at from generation to generation, will be found increasing in strength and steadiness, in the knowledge of, and the command over its several faculties, and in the amount of observation and experience which it accumulates for its own use and guidance, so it may reasonably be expected, that the several sanctions which are associated with the universal mind will obtain more and more of their fit developement; and so with the species. There is a period in which the self-regarding principle is the only one in very active operation; it occupies the whole sphere of mind, scarcely going beyond the mere physical sanction; so that conduct is little more than a grasping at immediate enjoyment, without any calculation of remote happiness or unhappiness. This is the mere sensual state, in close association with which come the irascible

or dissocial affections (as they are called by Aristotle), which, though so distinct in character, operate towards the same end. The sensual affections are checked by the operation of the irascible excited in those among whom the sensual seek their gratification; by the fear of retaliation and retribution as the natural consequences of resentment. It has been remarked that, as in the individual, so in society at large the affection of sympathy is in its weakest state during the earliest period of existence. As age and experience advance it receives additional force and efficiency. It extends its influence for the most part with the extension of existence, beginning with the small immediate relations where the ties of consanguinity, affinity, domestic contract, or friendly intercourse, are strongest, and advancing with experience and mental culture into a widening field of action. Its links become multifarious, and capable of great extension and increase. They spread into divers circles, domestic, social, professional, civic, provincial, national, ultra-national, universal; some independant of and others connected with each other. And in so much and so far as the sympathetic affections can be called into action, their tendencies must be to increase the happiness of him who exercises them; while if these happiness-producing tendencies lead to

no consequences of a contrary effect, or to no consequences of equal amount, the result is a clear accession to the general stock of happiness. And thus even the self-regarding affection, employed as a source of selfish enjoyment, brings into action a great mass of public happiness. The very contagion of the self-regarding principle is beneficent. A man witnessing the services rendered by his neighbour, to his neighbour's neighbour, contracts and catches, as it were, a propensity to requite the friendliness with his own friendliness, to bestow upon the author of benefits, benefits like those *he* has bestowed. The cheapest mode of requital, and considering its extreme facility not the least efficacious, is on all occasions to give to to the benevolent affections an outward expression, to bring into conversation as frequently as practicable the language of goodwill. To praise the virtuous doings of another man is to dispense a positive recompense to virtue, and at the same time to direct the popular sanction to the encouragement of similar acts, and thus does the principle of self produce the social affection, and the social in its turn the popular; and all combine together to increase the general good.

But the sympathies excited in favor of an individual, *are* they dependent on the influence

of his actions upon the general good? Is a man judged of by the conduciveness of his conduct to the public happiness? Alas, not always, for sympathy to a great extent, approbation to a vast amount, have frequently been excited, not by acts productive of good, but by acts productive of evil; not by conduct favourable to human happiness, but detrimental and destructive to happiness in the highest degree:—by victory and conquest for example, by depredation, devastation and slaughter on the widest scale, or by the acquisition or possession of power; power in unbounded quantity, however obtained, however exercised.

And even with respect to acts whose consequences have been in some respects beneficial to the community, it may have happened that the benefit was neither pure nor preponderant. Now as the tendency of sympathy is always to produce a repetition of the act which it approves, the moral sanction may be misdirected to the creation of acts pernicious on the whole to the well-being of society. An act which in its earliest and most obvious effects is beneficial, may, when the whole of its effects are seen together, and calmly calculated, be upon the balance pernicious. So an act, whose instant and apparent consequence is pernicious, may upon the balance be beneficial. In both cases

it is clear that the sympathy which should lead to the production of the one act, and the antipathy which would prevent the production of the other, would be alike injurious to the public happiness, and thence at variance with the sound principles of morality. To detect the fallacies which lie hid under the surface, to prevent the aberrations of sympathy and antipathy, to bring to view and to call into activity those springs of action whose operation leads to an undoubted balance of happiness, is the important part of moral science.

The Deontologist, it must always be remembered, has no coercive power, and it may perhaps be somewhat too hastily inferred that all his occupation will end in the putting together a number of sentences, inoperative in their influence on human conduct.

But it is presumed that three favorable consequence, at least, may result from his labors. Where he cannot create a motive he may point out its existence. He may bring to view, and show the bearing upon human felicity, of those springs of action which form a part of every man's mind, however hidden from observation, or inert in operation. He may point out consequences of action and forbearance which had not presented themselves to the actor.

Again, he may give more efficiency to the popular moral sanction; he may proclaim its ordinances; and if he is unable to do this, he may take upon himself the initiative of its laws, and propose for public consideration appropriate topics to aid its recognition. Motions, at least, in favor of the public weal may emanate from him with the chance of approving themselves to the minds of those to whom they are addressed.

And lastly, he may influence those in whose hands are the powers of legislation, or the executive powers of the state, to give to the popular sanction the stronger influence of the political, wherever it is applicable to the production of that end, which cannot be too often brought to view—the maximization of the public happiness.

Intimately connected with the dictates of prudence are those of beneficence. To a great extent, the prudential considerations prescribe benevolent action. The self-regarding calculation cannot leave out of view the happiness of others.

CHAPTER XIII.

EFFECTIVE BENEVOLENCE.

Effective benevolence has been already introduced to notice, as consisting of two branches, the *positive*, or pleasure-conferring branch; the *negative*, or that which abstains from pain-giving to others. The word benevolence implies the disposition to do the acts of beneficence. The field of benevolence, therefore, is co-extensive with that of beneficence; not that either of them has necessarily the other for its companion; there may be benevolence, without the power of bringing its impulses into action, and there may be beneficence, without the slightest portion of good-will.

The good produced by effective benevolence is small in proportion to that produced by the personal motives. The sympathetic affections are not, cannot be, as strong as the self-regarding affections. The wealth transferred, the means of subsistence circulated, the abundance produced for the sake of others, are trifling, when weighed against the amount of that which is set in motion for our own sakes. That which

is given without equivalent is little indeed as contrasted with that which is paid for or bartered in the way of commerce. The voluntary contributions to government, for the public benefit, bear a small proportion to the sums which are levied by compulsory requisitions.

In the eye of the sentimentalist, benevolence, whether followed or not by beneficence, is apt to engross the greatest portion of his favor, and his efforts are directed to obtain for it the greatest portion of public applause. But benevolence is a useless tree, unless it bears the fruits of beneficence; and feelings, by whatever names they are called, are wholly valueless, unless in so far as they are the prompters of beneficent actions. Benevolence standing alone is but the shadow of virtue; it is only when it becomes efficient that it partakes of the substance of virtue.

To a great extent, it must be added, the dictates of prudence prescribe the laws of effective benevolence, and occupy, in mutual harmony, the same part of the field of duty. A man who injures himself more than he benefits others by no means serves the cause of virtue, for he diminishes the amount of happiness. Benevolence, or sympathy, may be a cause of fruitless pain, where it cannot exert itself in acts of beneficence. It is no part of the re-

quirements of virtue that a man should expose himself to witness pains, on whose removal or diminution he can exercise not any the slightest influence. No good is done to yourself, and none to others, by throwing yourself in the way of suffering, unmitigable in itself, or of which you are certain that it cannot be mitigated by you.

Efficient benevolence is action; it supposes the existence of good which is susceptible of increase, or of evil susceptible of being lessened or removed. The life painted by the poets of Elysium, where every man is sufficient to himself, must be dull and dreary indeed. It must be intolerable—it must be pure selfishness, disassociated from benevolence. Take the elements of pleasure away, and of what is left behind you may make happiness, when you can make a palace out of smoke and moonshine.

With a man's elevation in society, the influence of his vices and virtues in society extends. The powers of beneficence and maleficence increase together. The amours of Henry the Fourth produced an incalculable mass of misery. He made war upon Spain for the purpose of getting hold of the wife of another. He sacrificed, every now and then, a portion of his army, for the sake of having his pleasure with his belle Gabrielle. Let those who will, give

their sympathy, their approbation, to such a nuisance as this monarch was; but why should we? If he had lost an arm or a leg while pursuing his pleasures, great would have been the clamour, unbounded the expression of interest and sympathy. His partizans lost their lives by thousands, and what cared he?

To the power of situation the power of intellect may be added, to give sanction to good or evil. Charles the Twelfth would have been more mischievous, had he not been mad. His obstinacy, in doing mischief by wholesale, was just as bad as Henry the Fourth's amours. For selfish enjoyments in one shape, Henry sacrificed his thousands; for selfish enjoyments in another shape, Charles did the like. When the laws of morality are understood, when the popular sanctions become properly enlightened, the misery-spreading freaks of monarchs will be no longer practised on mankind.

As in the political field of action many of the claims of prudence are under the control of the legislator, so many of the claims of effective benevolence scarcely belong to the empire of the Deontologist private. It may not be out of place, however, to remark, that nothing but the light of utility will convey the patriot safely through the mazes of politics. Here, as elsewhere, the dogmatism about right

and rights has often led men astray, confused their honest purposes, and nullified their benevolently-intended heroism. Opposition, revolt, may, or may not be a public virtue. To *allow* of resistance, on the score of a greater general utility to be obtained by resistance than by submission, is to put a buckler in the hands of liberty. To *enjoin* resistance, on the score of some imaginary injunction of the law of nature or revelation, is to place a torch in the hands of fanaticism.

When effective benevolence is brought into the realms of Deontology, when the greatest good, the universal happiness, is made the central point round which all action revolves, the golden era of moral science will commence. When its presence becomes universal, its influence omnipresent, the demand for punishment will be superseded, to a great extent, by the powers of reward. No pleasure will be unnecessarily wasted; no pain unnecessarily inflicted. Hitherto a feeble ray of universal benevolence has thrown an uncertain glimmer over the field of human action. Sometimes it has been absorbed in unfruitful meditation; at others it has exhaled in periodical discourse, clouded too oft in mystery, or dispersed by the storms of selfish passions.

The negative branch of effective benevolence is the abstinence from action, where that absti-

nence either removes a pain or creates a pleasure in the minds or persons of others. This branch of virtue presupposes the power of inflicting suffering or of conferring enjoyment; and its operation is to arrest the consequence of that disposition which, if allowed to act, would increase the sum of misery or lessen the sum of happiness.

Its object is to arrest the word or the deed which would inflict evil on another, and, if possible, to check the thought which would create or excite the evil-inflicting or evil-intending word or deed. In order to give it efficiency, it will be well to trace up to their origin the motives which are unfriendly to this class of virtues. And they will be found to have their source—

1. In the interest of self, which may on some occasions be indeed in hostility with the benevolent sympathies, and on such occasions the benevolent sympathies must succumb. There is no help for it; they are the weaker. Happily such cases are rare, for misery is seldom inflicted without a reaction on the part of the sufferer. A man cannot hate another without exciting some portion of hate in return. He cannot visit another with unfriendliness without curtailing the friendly affections of that other towards him. There is no voice, whether

of malevolence or benevolence, without an echo; no act, whether of good or evil, without a vibration. And this brings the benevolence of forbearance into the domains of self-regarding prudence, to which, after all, benevolence must make its final appeal.

2. The love of ease, heedlessness, is another cause of the absence of the abstential principle. There are men who will not take the trouble of avoiding to give pain to others. They have no particular desire to intrude an annoyance, but will not bestir themselves to prevent that annoyance. Their laziness is, in a word, stronger than their benevolence. They would rather sleep on their pillows than rouse themselves to exertion. They give precipitate opinions to avoid the labors of investigation. They do hasty deeds, as if for the very purpose of compromising themselves. They do not choose to ask themselves whether they ought to doubt; still less are they willing to apply the old aphorism—'If you doubt, abstain.' Their love of ease is flattered by a prompt decision—by getting rid of a question, the discussion or examination of which would have been a demand on their attention. They fancy they have relieved themselves of an embarrassment by a peremptory verdict.

3. The interests of pride and vanity often

check the dictates of abstential benevolence. These may be called the interests of the trumpet, in whose sounds are drowned the voice of philanthropy.

Pride and vanity dictate dogmatism. They assume superiority, and that superiority is always seeking to break out into speech. In some act of another they find cause for reprehension. Regardless of consequences, they reprehend.

Benevolence would ask whether the reprehension was likely to do good either to the reprehender or the reprehended; but pride and vanity are too proud and vain to seek or to take advice from morality.

Sometimes they intrude inappropriate or ill-timed advice. There benevolence might have taught them to refrain. It might be a waste of words on their part, producing on the mind of the advised person an impression of uncompensated pain; pain far greater than the pleasure which the pride or the vanity felt on giving their lecture.

There are other occasions where pride and vanity volunteer information, neither desired nor welcomed. The information may look like a reproach to him whom it pretends to instruct; it often assumes the garb of assumption and

of dogmatism. What wonder it should be rebelled against!

In all these cases, and there are many more such, effective benevolence puts in its *veto*.

4. The interests of ill-will or antipathy. These take many forms, and require to be doubly bridled, for they are pernicious to both parties, and leave on every side a balance of evil. And they are the more pernicious, because they do not always exhibit the malevolence of their origin.

They are sometimes moved by the rival position of another. There is a clashing of interests, producing coldness, dislike, or hatred. Hence a desire to inflict pain upon a rival.

Ill-will may have grown out of injuries done by another. He may have interfered with your love of ease; he may have wounded your pride or your vanity; he may have wronged your friend; he may have misrepresented your political or religious opinions. These are no reasons that you should do him mischief. Morality requires, your own interest requires, that you should forbear from doing him mischief. Cast up the results—the pains of ill-will, the pleasures of revenge, and then the re-action of revenge upon yourself, and possibly upon others. You will find the balance against you, as

concerns your own account—the self-regarding account; and as respects the object of your ill-will, it is an account of suffering without deduction.

Besides, you are giving evidence not only of immorality, but of weakness. You have no power over the mind of him who is obnoxious to you: so you exhibit, at the same time, a want of self-control and a malignity of intention,—proofs of mental weakness and moral defects.

In difference of taste, ill-will may find another motive for acts which benevolence would check. Such differences have often been made the plea for words of hatred and deeds of hatred. And into no part of the field of action has malevolence rushed with greater malignity. Here, especially, is there a demand for the avoidance of pain-giving. The demand is, indeed, everywhere where the pain-giving is useless or baneful, and it is eminently so here.

In fine, effective benevolence, in its negative requirements, exacts that, on all and every occasion, the infliction of evil shall be abstained from, except where its infliction shuts out a greater evil, or brings with it a more than counterbalancing good.

Its action being the avoidance of annoyance to others, it is important, for the correct and complete estimate of its operation, that all the

sources of annoyance should be studied. In order to provide the remedy, the cause must be known. And this is the more necessary, as there are multitudinous evils, of whose existence, or at all events of their pain-giving consequences, men seem to be too little aware.

Consult the various classes of pain and pleasure; consult their modifications; look to the annoyances of which the bodily senses are susceptible, those, of course, which it does not belong to penal legislation to visit—the pains of privation, the pleasures of good reputation; in a word, the whole store-house of satisfaction and of suffering. Take into account the general susceptibilities of men, and, as far as can be ascertained, the peculiar susceptibilities of the individual.

Secondary virtues, growing out of this branch of Deontology, are the virtues of good-breeding, which correspond pretty nearly to that class which the French call 'la petite morale.' Good-breeding is that deportment, on occasions of inferior, and when separately taken, of trivial importance, by which those acts are abstained from which give annoyance to others. Where, on similar occasions, the acts are done which give pleasure to others, they belong to the positive or active, not the negative or abstential branch. But it is to the latter that most of the

laws of good-breeding must be referred, and here the demand for its exercise is constant, and the field of its action wide. The most ordinary and indispensable personal prudence operates as a bridle upon rudeness and ill manners. The disposition to contribute, in all unforbidden shapes, to the gratification of others, and to refrain from all that can annoy them, is true politeness.

CHAPTER XIV.

EFFECTIVE BENEVOLENCE—POSITIVE.

THE negative branch of effective benevolence comprises, as we have seen, those acts, or rather that absence of action, by which the giving pain to others is avoided; the positive branch consists of those acts by which pleasure is communicated. This branch is far less extensive than the other, inasmuch as the powers possessed (by the majority of the community at least) to communicate happiness to others, are far less extensive than the powers of causing misery to others. Nearly every man has over nearly every other man around him the power of inflicting injury in various forms. There are many pains which a man can cause another to suffer which have no corresponding pleasures that he can offer to that other to enjoy. We have no sense which may not be offended at the will of another, but those senses are not equally subject to him who seeks to gratify them against or without our will. Any man may strike, or wound another, but it is not the privilege of every man to be able to add to another's happi-

ness. The limitation of this power is the necessary consequence of the fact, that man is, to a very great extent, the creator and the guardian of his *own* happiness. That portion for which he depends on others is small—that for which he depends only on himself is great; and in this power over his own happiness, that happiness greatly consists. Who would judge of pains and pleasures as accurately as he who experiences them? Who, if it were possible, would put the dominion of his enjoyments and sufferings into another's hands? To whose never-ceasing watchfulness—to whose self-devoted sympathies—to whose omniscient wisdom, would any man give over, for a single day, all the sources of pains and pleasures within and without him? One moment of forgetfulness, one moment of malevolence, one moment of ignorance, and the fabric of felicity might be shattered. Happy, indeed, is it for man that he is the master of his own well-being, and that, with few and rare exceptions, he has nobody to thank but himself if he fail to obtain it.

But this positive effective benevolence—what does it demand but deprivation? In as far as it is called into action, is it not *impoverishment?* Does it not take away more than it substitutes in return? Not so; for then it gets into the regions of imprudence; and prudence is man's

primary virtue. Nothing is gained to happiness if prudence loses more than benevolence wins.

There is, however, a large portion of benevolence which may be called into activity without any sacrifice at all. Men there have been, and are, who deem all services done to others as something lost to themselves;—a narrow and a baneful sentiment; for it is the lot of every one to have the power of conferring favors at no cost at all, or at so small a cost as not to be worth a calculation. To *make* a favor of that which should be a spontaneous, or at all events a willing contribution to the happiness of another, is, in common parlance, to give evidence of a low-toned spirit of philanthropy, while, on the other hand, no beneficence looks so bright in the popular eyes, none is, in fact, so praiseworthy as that which avoids the parade of its sacrifices. And the popular sanction is here in accordance with the Deontological principle.

Benevolence and beneficence are maximized when, at the least expence to himself, a man produces the greatest quantity of happiness to others. To lose sight of his own happiness would not be virtue, but folly. His own happiness forms, or ought to form, as large a portion of the whole mass of happiness spread among the community, as does the happiness of any other individual.

Now, suppose any man to confer upon others a smaller portion of happiness than he himself sacrificed—that is, suppose him, in order to give a certain amount of pleasure to another, to give up a greater amount of pleasure of his own, this would not be virtue—it would be folly. It would not be effective benevolence, it would be miscalculation; by it the whole amount of happiness would clearly be diminished.

This, indeed, is a course of action which could not intentionally have place. No sane person wastes, or desires to waste, happiness, still less his own happiness.

Every man's necessary impulse is towards the economy of happiness. If he made a sacrifice of his own happiness to the happiness of others, it could by possibility be in no other interest than that of economy; for unless in some shape or other he derived more pleasure from the sacrifice than he expected to derive in abstaining from making the sacrifice, he would not, he could not make it. Suppose other pleasures equal—that is, the pleasures sacrificed and the pleasures conferred—suppose nothing is lost in the transfer, then come the pleasures of sympathy, pleasures which form as large a portion of a man's happiness as any merely self-regarding pleasure. They turn the scale; and of their magnitude the man who seeks

them is the most competent, not to say the only judge.

His miscalculation does not alter the question. The province of Deontology is to teach him a proper arithmetic, is to lay before him a fit estimate of pain and pleasure—a budget of receipt and disbursement, out of every operation of which he is to draw a balance of good.

And here, be it remarked by the way, that the Deontological teacher, whether engaged in discourse or in writing, is himself an example of the application of the principle of positive effective benevolence. Let his exertions be encouraged by the thought, that he is perhaps producing more happiness at less expense than could be produced by any other means. At a cost of a few well-timed words is he not expanding the domains of happiness? Are not the truths, which he circulates at the waste of a little breath, or at the trouble of recording them on the permanent tablets of the press, are they not likely to extend the dominions of felicity into regions bounded only by that portion of infirmity which must hang about the destinies of mortal man? It is a positive act of effective benevolence to sow seeds of useful fruits, or beautiful flowers, where none were ever sown before; but how much more efficiently benevolent is he who sows those seeds

out of which happiness directly springs—happiness prolific, multiform, permanent.

Nor let it be forgotten that, in proportion to the poverty of the receiver, will be the value of the gift conferred. The greater the want, the greater the boon will be. Now certain it is that erroneous standards of action have produced much moral poverty, much misery in the world—poverty and misery which the intelligent moralist is called upon to remove. What higher mission than his? What nobler pursuit? Rendering services of incalculable value to others, he establishes a claim—a claim which will be felt to be irresistible—of other services to be rendered to himself in return. He exercises power, in itself a source of pleasure,—that power, of all power the most delightful, the power of beneficence. He exercises it towards all, without distinction or exception.

In this there is no sacrifice, no sacrifice of self-regarding interest; and by these and similar means every man may advance the progress, and accelerate the triumphs of happiness. Every man has more or less of time on his hands. On many hands how heavily it hangs! Would they improve it, would they enjoy it? Let them engage it in beneficence!

The field of beneficence is the whole world, those parts of it more particularly in which a

man exercises his peculiar influence—whether personal, domestic, or social. The occasions it may find for its exercise are somewhat dependent on these influences. Towards inferiors and equals the occasions are permanent, towards superiors transitory. In the practical part of these volumes, these relations will come particularly under review.

CHAPTER XV.

ANALYSIS OF VIRTUES AND VICES.

THE ground has now been cleared, and the foundation laid for the moral edifice. What remains to be done is, to sweep away the surrounding rubbish, or to take from the ruins such portions as will assist the builder in the erection of the temple of virtue. Wherever prudence presents itself, wherever effective benevolence presents itself, they will be rescued from the huge heaps which have hitherto encumbered the ground of ethics. Where neither of these is discoverable, let who will turn the impostor virtue to account. No acceptance will it find here.

And so as to vice. No quarrel have we with any action that neither injures the actor himself, nor any body else; in a word, that takes nothing away from happiness; still less with any action, which, be it called by what name it may, leaves a balance of enjoyment on the whole.

Virtues and vices are voluntary habits. If they are not voluntary, the words of the moralist might as well be flung to the winds. To the

two branches of virtue, prudence and benevolence, correspond two branches of vices;—Imprudence, the vice in a man which is primarily hurtful to himself,—Improbity, the vice which is hurtful primarily to others.

It matters little in what order the self-called virtues or vices present themselves. There is no marshalling them; they are susceptible of no arrangement; they are a disorderly body, whose members are frequently in hostility with one another. Most of them consist of a portion of good, a portion of evil, and a portion of matter indifferent, Most of them are characterised by that vagueness which is a convenient instrument for the poetical, but dangerous or useless to the practical moralist.

The three commonly called cardinal virtues, however, naturally present themselves first to the mind.

To what action does the praise of fortitude commonly attach? To that by which a man voluntarily exposes himself to a danger he might have avoided,—to danger, to bodily pain, to death.

In proportion to the magnitude of the danger—to the intensity and duration of the pain, or the probability of death, is he considered to possess the virtue of fortitude.

Is it desirable for the ultimate good of society that he should so expose himself? In this is

the measure of all merit. Will he advance his own well-being or the well-being of others? If the two interests, his own and that of others are incompatible, to which is it desirable the preference should be given? This may be difficult, but too difficult to know, yet this is something to be known, and if it can be known it is well worth knowing.

The thing to be purchased is benefit to a man himself or to others. The danger to which he is exposed is the price he would pay for the benefit. Is the benefit worth the cost? This is the question, the only question deserving an inquiry or a thought. Whether his exposing himself to the supposed danger is an act of fortitude or not, is a query not worth the words expended in the proposing it.

And the question is not merely useless, it is positively pernicious; for such questions only throw men's ideas into confusion, entangle their minds in irrelevant discussions, and lead them away from the proper, the only proper topic of inquiry, namely, the union between interests and duties.

Now,—suppose an act injurious to those interests, and that this act is understood to merit the appellation of fortitude. What is the practical consequence? That fortitude, being a virtue, the injurious act is that which ought to be done.

And suppose the line of conduct most conducive to the general happiness, not to deserve the appellation of fortitude? What then? Why if fortitude be a virtue, the act which most promotes the general happiness must be an act of folly or of vice.

Wonderful is the absurdity, dense the blindness, palpable the self-contradiction of the Oxford Instructor on the subject of Fortitude. According to him, on what does it depend? On the magnitude of the pain which a man continues to endure? No such thing. On the magnitude of the danger, that is, the eventual suffering to which he voluntarily exposes himself? No, not that. Upon what then? Upon the nature of the occasion on which the suffering is endured or the danger incurred. If the occasion is approved by the Instructor, there shall be fortitude; if the occasion have the ill-fortune not to have his sanction, no fortitude shall there be.

In battle or otherwise, a man risks, or even loses his life. Was he a brave man? Was his act an act of fortitude? Go and ask the Instructor, and he will not tell you till he knows on which side he fought. Inform me, he will say, of the occasion of his death. If I approve of the occasion, then it is an act of fortitude; if not, not.

The Instructor makes four special and un-

doubted exceptions,—self-slayers, duellists, robbers, and men who devote themselves to danger or death in defence of their liberty. These are not men of fortitude; their doings deserve not any of its praise.

A man who puts an end to his own existence, cannot be a man of fortitude. Would you know why? Because suicide is unlawful.

A man who slays another, or is slain by another in a duel, cannot be a man of fortitude. Why? Because he ought not to have fought.

A man dies defending his own liberty; he must be a coward; justice was not on his side.

A robber plays the hero. Is he a courageous man? Not he; for what business had he to be on the highway?

But if consistency were looked for, if in orthodox or fashionable faith, nonsense were an impediment to the reception of that faith, one might suggest that it would be well to apply the principle to practice. Among the whole tribe of conquerors, where would the man of fortitude be found? Your Alexanders, your Cæsars, your Ghenghis Khans, your Napoleons, what were they all? Any thing but men of fortitude.

When the protection afforded to absurdity is such that no one dares open his mouth against it,—its march is bold and imposing. You may

grant or deny, at your pleasure, the praise of fortitude to those who voluntarily thrust themselves upon danger or death; they shall be called brave men, or cowards according to your bidding.

Temperance has for its object the pleasures of sense. Though commonly used to express abstinence from the enjoyments of one or two of the senses, there seems no sufficient reason for such a limitation to the term. The question of virtue must be decided by the influence of the enjoyments of sense on ourselves and others.

Intemperance, when mischievous to a man himself, is a breach of prudence; when mischievous to others, it is a breach of benevolence. Preponderant enjoyment, or preponderant suffering, is the only standard by which the moral merits of fruition can be estimated. Abstinence, which leaves no balance of pleasure, partakes not of the character of virtue; enjoyment, which leaves no balance of pain, cannot justly be stigmatised with the reproach of vice.

There exists in the world a great unwillingness to allow a man to be the curator of his own pleasures; there is a vehement disposition to decide on what, in the breast of another man, may be allowed to be a pleasure, and what not.

The words impropriety, unlawfulness, and such like, are flung at particular actions, in order to excite odium, as if they were evidence of depravity; such words being, in fact, only a part and portion of that phraseology, by which a man seeks to shelter his own dogmatism from the analysis which the doctrines of utility would apply to it.

Prudence and effective benevolence, it cannot be too often repeated, being the only two intrinsically useful virtues, all other virtues must derive their value from them, and be subservient to them.

Is justice, then, a subservient and inferior virtue? And if so, to which is it subordinate? Before the art of logic was understood, and especially before the business of arrangement, in any thing like correctness or completeness, was accomplished, ideas respecting virtue, and names designating those ideas, were introduced. The relations between virtue and virtue were vague and obscure; the descriptions of them confused—the points of coincidence and of difference indeterminate or undetermined. Logically speaking, they were *disparate;* mathematically speaking, they were incommensurable.

Of the virtues, the Aristotelians introduced the definitions and classification we have seen. Of these virtues several have been divided into

species. But, on examination, it will be found that under the same generic names virtues are classed which have no assignable relation to each other; and some, in which the character of the genus under which they are arranged is not discoverable. The modifications put forward under the head of one virtue, not unfrequently belong to another, and on a glance at the whole, the appearance is one of strange entanglement and perplexity. Though the Linnæus of Natural History has appeared in the world, and restored its chaos into order and harmony, the Linnæus of Ethics is yet to come.

Justice, under the system of utility, is a modification of benevolence; it belongs to the present work wherever the political sanction, or the power of the law does not apply; it belongs to it wherever the sanction of moral obligation is unenforced by penal visitation.

The inadequacy and imperfection of the political or legal sanction is experienced in a considerable part of the field of morality, and a demand will be created for the dictates of the moral sanction, as guided by utility, in the following cases:—

Where the legal sanction is silent, or, in other words, makes no provision for the case in point.

Where the legal sanction is inconsistent with, or opposed to the greatest happiness principle.

Where the dictates of the legal sanction are confused, or unintelligible.

Where they are impracticable.

In all these cases, the dictates of justice will be the dictates of benevolence, and the dictates of benevolence the dictates of utility.

It would assist clearness of conception, if the word probity could take place of the term justice, with which it is pretty completely synonymous; at least, if there be a difference, it is rather grammatical than ethical; for though a man says with propriety, I will do you justice, he cannot say, I will do you probity, though every act of injustice done would be an act of improbity, and, conversely, every act of improbity an act of injustice.

The word justice is clogged with other significations, which render it less efficient as an ethical term. It may, for example, be employed as a substitute for the term *judicature*. He by whom the powers of judicature are administered, is said to administer justice. But on such an occasion it is never said that he administers probity, nor does the association of probity necessarily attach to the phrase.

Hence a great evil, and a source of error; for if, in the exercise of his office, he be most truly and manifestly chargeable with improbity, not the less will the language be employed that he

administers justice. The improbity will still be clothed in the garb of justice. Himself and his friends will say he administers justice, and it will be a matter of great difficulty and perplexity for those who think ill of him to impugn the phraseology. Yet by no one will he be said to administer probity, scarcely by any one will it be said that he exercises probity. This is one of the thousand cases in which vague and undefined expressions become places of shelter for insincerity and immorality.

The pleasures and pains of amity are those of the popular or moral saction, in miniature;—in the one case their source is a determinate individual, in the other an indefinite multitude.

When is it desirable that the pleasures of amity should be reaped? Whenever they may be reaped without the production of preponderant evil,—without violation of the laws of self-regarding prudence. To what length may their pursuit be carried? To exactly the length which is consistent with the cardinal virtues of prudence and benevolence, and it will be found that between these and the pleasures and pains of amity there is rarely any competition.

To obtain the favor—the amity of another, the obvious course is to do him services—these services limited only by the considerations of benevolence and prudence. The limits which effec-

tive benevolence applies to the exercise of amity are the same as apply to the pursuit of wealth. If the services derived from him whose amity you court be the conferring on you a portion of wealth,—the pursuit of wealth is the pursuit of amity: and in precisely so far as the pursuit of wealth, with the enjoyments and exemptions derivable from it, is repugnant to benevolence, so is the pursuit of amity.

The pleasures derivable from this pursuit have this distinctive and interesting character:—that prudence and benevolence are almost equally concerned in their production.

For however selfish the desire may be,—however unrelieved by the social sympathy, the effects of it are not the less purely beneficial to the parties concerned. The interest of him who courts the amity of another, may be served or not served as may happen—the person courted has his interest served to an extent nearly equal to that he would have obtained for himself if he had himself sought the pleasure conferred. And though it is not sympathy,—not benevolence that has produced the pleasure, yet it is not the less produced—and thus the good, though not arising from a primary virtue, is as valuable as if it arose from it. The sole value of benevolence itself consists in its tendency and aptitude to produce beneficence,

and no evil can grow from the excess of the friendly affections, except when they interfere with the primary virtues.

Proportioned to the value of the services which a man is deemed able and willing to confer on others, will be the number of competitors in those services. In this, as in every other case, competition may produce jealousy, and each competitor who is believed to have obtained a greater share than another, may be to that other an object of envy. This envy will endeavor to produce a reaction of ill-will on the person who is the object of envy, and one of its immediate effects, will be to lower the envied receiver of favors, in the eyes of him who confers them.

Nevertheless, there exists a tribunal, that which deals out the decisions of good repute, or general esteem, before which this contention for benefits is always carried on; and every man is a member of this tribunal who chooses to take a part in its awards. Before this tribunal every man who seeks to detract from the merits of another man acts the part of an informer; and his conduct is usually attributed to a sinister and disreputable motive. Be his motives what they may, dishonorable or dislogistic phrases will probably attach to his conduct, and thus the popular sanction be brought to bear upon the self-regarding impulse.

Servility is one of the terms most commonly employed on these occasions. Its synonymes and quasi-synonymes are very numerous, and the impression it conveys is of an exceedingly vague and indeterminate character.

So much the worse; no precise idea being attached to it, the accusation becomes the more impressive. If closely looked to, it will be found to mean the habit of rendering to a superior, services which, according to the received notions of propriety, ought not to be rendered. As a rule of conduct, the so often repeated principle of balancing pleasures and pains will apply here, as every where.

To render to every man every possible service, where neither prudence nor benevolence has aught to object, is the obvious dictate and duty of beneficence; and in the case before us, the dictates of benevolence are in their full force without any counteracting or diminishing force on the side of prudence.

But here, as on most other occasions, are two sets of antagonizing forces, the impelling and the restraining; the only limits to the proper influence of the compelling force being that which is exercised by the restraining power.

The virtue of beneficence, though its objects embrace all mankind, can be exercised to a very limited extent, and as applied to any single indi-

vidual yet narrower is its sphere of action. And this is well; for if every man were disposed to sacrifice his own enjoyments to the enjoyments of others, it is obvious the whole sum of enjoyment would be diminished—nay destroyed. The result would not be the general happiness, but the general misery. Prudence therefore sets its limits to benevolence, and those limits do not, on ordinary occasions, embrace a large space.

In the case before us, prudence so far from prohibiting, prescribes the obligation of rendering services to the superior—services in the utmost quantity that can be rendered under a sufficient assurance that the value of the services received in return will not be less than that of the suffering, self-denial, or sacrifice incurred, in order to obtain them. Prudence makes a sort of commercial bargain—the sort of bargain on which all commerce is founded. The expenditure is expected to bring back something more than its cost. No outlay is detrimental that returns an equivalent—no expence fails to be beneficial, which brings back an equivalent and something more.

Here then is prudence acting in two directions—prescribing expenditure, in as far as it promises a beneficial return, inhibiting expenditure where the beneficial return cannot be reasonably anticipated. But here, as elsewhere, no law of

benevolence must be violated while prudence seeks the beneficial return in question.

And how are the dictates of self-regarding prudence to be ascertained? by what are they determined? By the balance of an account embracing the different heads under which pleasures and pains are capable of being arranged. Prudence on all occasions supposes and requires the sacrifice of pleasures and exemptions on the one hand, to pleasures and exemptions on the other. Between the rival amounts the decision must lie, and the decision of wisdom must be with the larger of the two.

In the present case the rivalry is between the pleasures of amity and the pains of the popular sanction. There are certain services rendered by which a man exposes himself to the loss of reputation, even services which are by no means inconsistent with the primary virtues. Fashion makes multitudinous exceptions which it would be difficult to get confirmed by any correct views of the demands of prudence and benevolence. In different stages of civilization these exceptions have undergone many modifications. The higher the scale of rank,—the greater the distance between the most elevated and the least elevated spheres,—the less has fashion introduced of restraint. In proportion as equality takes possession of society is the latitude allowed to such

services diminished, and the restrictions upon them increased. Going back into the field of *time,* we shall find that deportment, and especially in language, was in use, of a character so obsequious, that it would not now be tolerated at all—that habits of submission and expressions of humiliation were then deemed proper—prudent—and even demanded by good breeding, which now would be placed to the account of servility, meanness, and even baseness, and draw down on him who should venture to use them a full measure of popular contempt. Go forth into the field of *space;* visit any Mahomedan—any oriental nation. In these countries, under their governments, the distance between the highest and the lowest degree is almost infinite, and between the different degrees enormous. Thus no measure of obsequiousness is out of place—none is checked by opinion. To those in the lower ranks self-abasement is self-preservation, and the most prostrate servility is demanded by prudence.

Bending, or as the phrase is, cringing or fawning to his superior, the same man is stiff, and even insolent to his inferior. It is an every day case and a very natural one; for the suffering to which he subjects himself in the one case, he seeks to counterbalance by enjoyments of the same character in the other. But by thus gra-

tifying his pride he provokes enmity, and through enmity ill offices, and through ill offices suffering in all imaginable shapes. Is he on the whole a gainer by this indulgence? That will depend partly on his idiosyncratic taste, and partly upon accident.

Pride and vanity are dispositions of mind not necessarily or even ordinarily manifested by single acts. So intimate is the relation between pride and vanity, that to uncover them together is likely to facilitate correct ideas of both. Both are the desire of esteem, taking somewhat different directions, and employing different means of gratification. To the proud man and the vain man the esteem of those on whom they believe their well-being to depend, is the common object of pursuit.

And in both cases the important question is,—This pride, this vanity,—is it of the nature of virtue, or of vice? If of virtue, of what virtue?—if of vice, of what vice?

In the proud man, the desire of esteem is accompanied with contempt, or disesteem for those whose esteem he desires to obtain. In the vain man this is not the case.

The value of the esteem being less in the eyes of the proud than of the vain man, a greater portion of that esteem is required to give the proud man equal gratification with that

which the vain man would receive from a lesser portion. And thus the state of the proud man's mind is generally that of dissatisfaction—a dissatisfaction which may be read even in his countenance.

Melancholy and malevolence, one or both, are thence the usual companions of pride, sometimes acting as causes, sometimes as effects of pride, sometimes in both characters. Hilarity, on the contrary, is the common accompaniment of vanity—hilarity and oftentimes benevolence. From a small manifestation of esteem, vanity receives a great gratification; and the smaller the manifestation the more easily obtained; hence the more frequently, and the more frequently, the more frequent are the causes of exhilieration.

Pride is naturally conjoined with taciturnity; vanity with talkativeness. The proud man sits still and waits for those demonstrations of esteem which he desires to obtain. Their value to him depends on their being spontaneous. He will not call, or at least will not appear to call for them; he will rather tarry for their arrival, and thus must possess the faculty of self-command to enable him to do so. Esteem is the food he hungers for, and his meal must be a full one—but he is able to fast.

Not so the vain man. His appetite is still

keener than that of the proud man. No quantity of its food will definitely satiate it, though a small quantity will gratify, and for a time will satisfy it. He therefore goes from door to door and at every door craves those supplies for which he has a perpetually self-renewing hunger.

Taken by itself, *pride* is scarcely ever used but in a bad sense, as descriptive of vice; with an adjunct it may be used in a good sense, and become a virtue. Witness honest, becoming, dignified pride. But even here a feeling attaches to it, that such phraseology is not strictly proper, and a sense of something figurative or rhetorical hangs about it.

But as for the adjective *proud,* when applied to a man, the idea it conveys is unfavorable. When proud is employed to denote the cast of a man's mind, intimation is given that that part of his mind is vicious.

A proud day, a proud situation, may be used; and thus, indirectly, you may connect a man with an event, and disconnect him from the idea of vicious pride.

Vanity is still worse dealt with. It can hardly be ascribed to a man without making him the object of contempt and derision, and a fit object too. It would scarcely be possible to speak, certainly it would not be possible to speak with propriety, of honest, becoming, dignified

vanity. A proud day you may have, and think well of such a day; but you could not do so, were you to call it a vain day.

But for practical purposes, the great object is to distinguish what there is of virtue and what of vice in these qualities of pride and vanity. If there be virtue, it is prudence, benevolence, or beneficence. If there be vice, it belongs either to imprudence or maleficence. And thus, and for the first time, perhaps, shall we find clear ideas attaching to appellations which are, every day in the year, in the mouth of every body.

Were the principles of morality thoroughly understood and obeyed; in other words, were the popular sanction in every respect that which, for the interests of mankind, it is desirable it should become, any portion remaining of pride would not be in the nature of vice. But as it is, where public opinion has not utility for its foundation, pride must frequently be classified among vices.

The quantity of virtue or of vice growing out of pride and vanity, seems to depend in some manner on the station occupied in the scale of society by the proud or vain man. In the station of the ruling few, pride is more likely to dispose the mind to vice than to virtue; but not so vanity.

Pride, when it runs into vice, is the charac-

teristic vice of the ruling orders, they being, from their situation, less dependent than other men on spontaneous services; to a man so elevated, spontaneous services from others become comparatively objects of indifference, and he is consequently indisposed to obtain those services at the cost of any services rendered by himself, even the inexpensive services of urbanity. Pride, therefore, in such elevated situations, draws men away from benevolence and beneficence, and presents these virtues as rivals to the self-regarding interest.

Vanity suggests another course. Its ever-craving appetite demands continued services, the services which manifest esteem. And here its tendency is towards benevolence. Thus acts seemingly benevolent, acts bearing upon them the impress of social sympathy, whether reflective or sentimental, may have their source in the self-regarding affection of vanity. The acts being produced, the object is gained to human happiness. Will not vanity, then, answer the purposes of utility, by producing the good which utility proposes as its end? No! not unless opinion, not unless the popular sanction be, on all points, in accordance with the teachings of utility.

But the display of vanity, on whatever titles to esteem it be founded, produces competition,

increasing with the increase of that esteem of which display is made, and this competition produces uneasiness. Vanity in one breast calls into existence, and thence into action, the emotions, the affections, the passions of envy and jealousy, in many breasts.

In elevated life, the higher a man's station the less likely is it to awaken envy or jealousy on the part of the subject many; for envy and jealousy can hardly exist except where competition exists, and the greater the distance between rank and rank, the less room is there for competition.

At the same time, the higher a man's station the wider is the field in which he can exercise his beneficence; and in so far as, by acts of beneficence, his vanity seeks its gratification, the esteem which he obtains serves to counterbalance, if not to outweigh, the pains and dangers which are produced by the envy and jealousy of others, whether as acting upon him, or upon those in whose minds the envy and jealousy have place.

The effect will be different among the subject many; for as the power of beneficence is less, the envy and jealousy will be greater. Here the assumption of superiority, under the influence of vanity, will be more offensive, and 'the best wrestler on the green' may excite

feelings of envy and jealousy in the breasts of all the other wrestlers, while he can produce no counterbalancing pleasure. Pain he may clearly awaken; but what sensible addition to happiness can he make to the happiness of any individual not comprised within his own domestic circle?

The vain man exaggerates to himself the value of the services of others, and is occupied in undue exertions to obtain them. The proud man diminishes, to his own mind, the value of the services of others, and measures his right to claim them by the inverse ratio of his need of them,—of the esteem in which he holds them. Activity is the companion of vanity; immobility of pride. Every addition to the affection of vanity adds something to the power of sympathy towards others. Every addition to the affection of pride excludes a portion of sympathy towards others.

Yet the denial of the good offices sought will awaken the hostility both of the proud and the vain man. The proud man's hostility will be more open, undisguised, and conspicuous. He gives you to understand that he cares not whether your dispositions towards him be friendly or adverse. His importance is such, that, from respect or fear, others are engaged to render him the services, or more services, than

you can offer him: but the vain man appears to exercise no despotism over you in order to obtain your good-will; the greater his vanity, the greater his desire, the more strenuous his efforts to secure it.

Pride is thus accompanied with a sense of independence; vanity, not. The proud man is persuaded that he shall receive from others as much respect as he stands in need of; he therefore will not take the trouble of courting them, that is, of employing exertion in order to administer to their gratification. He will not, himself, put forward the titles he believes himself to possess to their esteem. He assumes that they are obvious, and will be recognized as a matter of course. In as far as he succeeds, his pride conveys to the minds of others a sense of his own importance; he causes them to think that, in some way or other, their comfort depends upon his favor, which favor, he would have them believe, is difficult to gain. Hence, on their part, there exists towards him a sort of fear—the fear of not being able to gain it. Now this fear is necessarily attended with suffering. Of this suffering he has himself a perception, yet will not do what depends upon him to remove or to lessen it. By mixing condescension with his pride, he might lessen it. [illegible] aside his pride, and dealing with

them on a footing of equality, he might remove it altogether.

On the whole, then, vanity is more nearly allied to benevolence; pride to self-regard and malevolence.

The vain man, feeling himself comparatively ill-assured of the esteem he desires, is proportionably anxious to do his best to obtain it; he endeavors to display those qualities which are likely to win it; and seeking to gather the good-will of others, he must sow the seeds which produce it. And the object of the display he makes will usually be, in some degree at least, effected. He will excite some admiration; admiration brings surprise, surprise awakens curiosity, in whose gratification there is pleasure.

There are two causes, however, by which this effect is liable, not only to be counteracted and diminished, but even to be reversed. First, when the superiority displayed is such as to produce humiliation, or a painful sense of inferiority, in the breasts of those before whom the display is made; and, secondly, this effect will be heightened if the endowment displayed be one in which any particular competition exists between the persons exhibiting it, and him before whom it is exhibited.

When this is the case, both prudence and

benevolence concur in recommending that the exhibition should be abstained from; prudence, because the passions of envy and jealousy will awaken ill-will towards himself; ill-will, tending to ill offices or to the abstinence from friendly offices; and benevolence, because the exhibition will produce pain in the breast of another.

Associated with the subject of pride are many terms, the value and bearing of which can only be determined by the application of the great principles so constantly brought forward in this volume. Meanness has for its opposite not so much pride as a compound appellation—elevation of mind—high-mindedness. But there is, and must be, much of indistinctness in these qualities. Pride, separately taken, is rather dyslogistic; high-mindedness, eulogistic. So again, humility is supposed to be creditable; meanness discreditable. And the obscurity is much increased by the sense which has been given to these terms by writers on religion. Independence of mind is another term susceptible of very different interpretations. The rule, the test, the standard, must be the conduciveness of these qualities, in every particular case, to happiness, the happiness of the individual and of the rest of mankind. Every thing else is a mere fruitless question about words, of no

practical, no real importance; a question as to phrases whose meanings are perpetually liable to change and perpetually changing; and whose discussion, unless with a reference to some rule of right and wrong, is mere waste of time and labor.

For the purpose of *exposition*, then, as well as for the purposes of instruction, the sole effective mode is to ascertain the association of moral terms with the terms of pain and pleasure. Apply any other test to vanity, apply any other test to pride, and it will be seen, that to their import and their value this is the only key. And what is true here is true in every other part of the moral region.

Envy and jealousy are neither virtues nor vices.

They are pains.

Envy is pain emanating from the contemplation of pleasure possessed by another, especially when that pleasure is derived from a source whence the envious person desired to derive it; if the *desire* was accompanied with the *expectation* that it would have been so derived, the pain becomes stronger still; and strongest of all when he supposes that the possession of the pleasure by another has led to his exclusion from it.

Jealousy is pain—the pain of apprehension derived from the same or a similar cause.

Prudence and benevolence are equally concerned in suppressing both envy and jealousy: prudence, for the purpose of ridding ourselves of the pains they cause us; benevolence, inasmuch as envy and jealousy are associated with the desire to rid ourselves of the pains they create, by evil deeds to others. Envy and jealousy are very closely allied to, and very instrumental in creating maleficent dispositions, and thence maleficent actions. The disposition, without the action, is indeed not a vice; it is an infirmity; but infirmity is a soil in which vice is very easily planted, and in which it very luxuriantly grows.

CHAPTER XVI.

HUME'S VIRTUES.

BUT, in order to discover how vague are the ideas of virtue, and how unsatisfactory the definitions, even emanating from minds of high intellectual capacity, where the standard of virtue has either not been discovered or not employed, it will be well worth while, even at the expense of some repetition, to go over the ground, accompanied by Mr Hume's list of virtues; and, upon a close examination, we shall learn how easily a scene of confusion, entanglement, and perplexity, may be reduced to order, harmony, and beauty, by the instruments which, in the shape of prudence and benevolence, utility has put into our hands. And this course seems the more desirable, because it is not long since the *Edinburgh* Reviewers, in calling attention to Hume's classification of the virtues, seemed to consider that he had done every thing which it was necessary to do, in order to introduce a perfect moral system.

There is a fundamental objection to his classification of the virtues into useful and agreeable

qualities. Useful is here altogether ambiguous; it may mean conducive to pleasure—it may mean conducive to any other end. Usefulness has no value, but in so far as it is pleasure-producing or pain-preventing, leading, on the whole, to a balance of happiness, calculated not only out of the pleasure which is adjacent, but of that which is remote; not only out of present, but of future pleasure. Strange indeed is it that moralists are so afraid of the *word* pleasure; the thing itself—the enjoyment, the happiness—they do indeed profess to pursue; but called by its own name—its proper, its essential name—they run away from it, they refuse to grasp it; any nonsense, any confusion, rather than the name of pleasure.

It may be said that Hume does not employ the word virtue as the *genus generalissimum*, and that thence his discernment is not implicated by the fact that some of his virtues have, in reality, no virtue in them.

But if virtue do not mean something that is useful, or productive of that which is useful for the increase of well-being, what does it mean? What is its value?

In the very constitution of virtue, it must be admitted there is evil—some suffering, some self-denial, some sacrifice of good, and consequent uneasiness—but as the practice of virtue

grows into a habit, the uneasiness becomes less and less, and at last may vanish altogether.

Virtue is a moral quality, in contradistinction to an intellectual quality: it belongs to the will—to the affections—not to the understanding, except in as far as the understanding acts upon the volition. And this premised, a correct estimate of Hume's desirable qualities may be much assisted by distinguishing and grouping them under the following heads:—

First. Qualities not belonging to the will, but to the understanding, such as discretion, order, quickness of conception.

Second. Qualities of the will, the quality being neither a virtue nor a vice exclusively, but either a virtue or a vice, or neutral, according to the object towards which it is directed, as sociability, secrecy, constancy, mercy, generosity.

Third. Qualities which are always virtues, and consequently belonging to one of the two classes, prudence or benevolence.

Fourthly. Qualities which are always virtues —modifications of, or subordinate to the two primary classes—such as honesty, justice.

Now it is really only in the third and fourth classes that the virtues, the undoubted virtues, are to be found. Qualities there are, in the first and second class, which, when associated

with prudence and benevolence, may be highly important auxiliaries. That tact, for example, which has the gift of following actions to their consequences, and which is sometimes called the virtue of discretion, how invaluable may not its co-operation be in the moral field? So the alliance of a sociable spirit with prudence and benevolence, naturally gives to each of them an attraction which must add to their beneficial influences; but, at the same time, who fails to see that the quality called discretion depends much on mental organization,—that no efforts will introduce into an inferior mind a quantity of it equal to that which directs a superior mind? While, again, the quality which is called sociability, far from being a co-adjutor of virtue, may be, and frequently is, the companion of vice—aye, and sometimes the very instrument by which vice accomplishes her most fatal triumphs.

Though Hume has brought forward his virtues in a strangely disassociated and disjointed state, it will be, perhaps, most convenient to take them in the disorder in which he leaves them. No classification of them will make what is not virtue, virtue; and such virtue as is really in them will be found marshalled under the appropriate heads to which the virtue belongs.

Sociability. It is a disposition to seek the society of others. It is good or bad, virtuous or vicious, according to the purpose and the conduct of the social man. It has only so much of virtue in it as it has of benevolence, and if it be combined with benevolence, it becomes friendliness — friendliness, which stands in Hume's list as a distinct virtue. A disposition to avoid maleficence is generally a concomitant part of the social character, and thus far it is in accordance with the laws of negative effective benevolence. But sociability may be accompanied, and is so not unfrequently, particularly where exercised towards persons of different conditions, with tyranny or maleficence; often it has wit for one of its instruments, wit of a pain-giving or pleasure-destroying character. Sociability may be used for the purposes of insolence, of which many examples are to be found in the writings of Cicero.* It may ally itself with scorn, as it did in the case of Burke; so that a man, hunting over the field of sociability for morality or happiness, may find neither. Sociability then, standing alone, says nothing for good or evil. It may represent self-regard

* 'I was not thirteen,' said Mr Bentham, on one occasion, to the writer, 'when the abominations of Cicero shocked me.'

in an offensive shape, and become an instrument of self-eulogium for evil-producing qualities. It may be the associate of fraud and rapine, and lend the fascinations of its presence to every project of folly and vice and crime.

Good-nature. It is nearly allied with sociability, but is, with reference to virtue and vice, completely ambiguous. So much of it as is natural, or part of the distinctive individual character, cannot be deemed a virtue. That portion of it which is acquired, which is the result of reflection, supposing it can be distinguished and separated from the rest, may be virtuous. Associated with benevolence, it is, like sociability, nearly synonymous with friendliness. It has in it a greater mixture than sociability of the natural with the moral character. If wholly constitutional, it is no more a virtue than beauty or strength is a virtue; it adds agreeableness to social intercourse, whether conduct be virtuous or not. That part of good-nature which, independently of physical tendencies, has become effective benevolence, that, and that alone, is virtue; but it is not the good-nature that is the virtue, it is the effective benevolence. So, again, good-nature may lend itself to the service of imprudence or improbity. The disposition to please another has not unfrequently been the cause of misconduct. Even

in common parlance, a man is sometimes said to have been led astray by his good-nature. It may be the weakness upon which temptation acts; and the pleasure of gratifying the person who appeals to it may close the eyes to the consequences of every consequent evil.

Humanity. It is effective benevolence, or a disposition towards effective benevolence, specifically directed to a particular case of suffering. Its object is the removal of some positive and weighty evil. It is very like good-nature under excitement. It implies the exercise of not inconsiderable power of relief on the part of the humane man, and, for the most part, supposes that, but for the exercise of his humanity, the relieved object will be subjected to greater evils than those humanity seeks to remove. But to this there are some exceptions; the humanity of a king would lead him to pardon at the expense of penal justice; the consequence of which would be good on a small scale, and evil on a large one: the balance being a great public loss; and the exercise of humanity not a virtue, but a vice. It may therefore be, or may not be, praiseworthy. Its title to the name of virtue can only be judged of when the pains it removes are weighed against the pains it creates. It is apt to commit errors under present impulses. Where, for example, the

discipline or punishment attending imprudence is likely to correct that imprudence, and humanity steps in to ward off that punishment, so that the imprudence will be repeated in consequence of being unvisited by punishment, the humanity, far from being a virtue, is really a vice. And such cases are of frequent occurrence. Many of our institutions, called humane and charitable, whose object is to screen misconduct from its penalties, do, in fact, only minister to human misery. Indiscriminate almsgiving may, in the same way, be a premium to idleness and profligacy. It is pernicious wherever it weakens the moral sanction to such an extent as to produce, by the deterioration of character, a quantity of future pain, greater than that which it immediately removes. The lesson to be taught humanity, in order to make it virtuous, is that of calculation. Its disposition is always to remove a pain, and to forget the salutary influence of that pain upon the time to come. It is only, therefore, as connected with prudence and benevolence that humanity is entitled to approval.

Mercy. It is humanity; but it supposes the object of it to be more directly dependent on him who exercises it. The party served is here in the hands of the party serving; their mutual position more contrasted by the help-

lessness of the one party and the power of the other. To form a right judgment of the cases in which mercy may be exercised with a view to the greatest happiness principle, depends on the intellectual part of man; the disposition to its exercise, on his moral part. Attached to it are ideas of power, associated with vague conceptions of tyranny. These grow out of the distance between the dispenser and the recipient of mercy. In the political field, the law which has been laid down in the case of humanity applies here. The mercy—the favor to the individual—must be weighed against the evil done to the community. The demand made upon mercy is usually greater than that made upon humanity. Its value, in the estimate of virtue, must be calculated by its effects. The portion of it which has virtue in it belongs to effective benevolence.

Gratitude is effective benevolence, in act or disposition, in consideration of services received by the grateful person, or some person connected with him by the ties of sympathy. Its efficiency is not a necessary consequence of its existence; it may be a state of mind remaining inoperative for want of occasion. It grows in the mind of the grateful person, out of benefits conferred on him. But it is not necessarily virtuous; for virtue, doing a small

quantity of good, may be accompanied by vice, doing a large quantity of mischief. A man has conferred on me a service. He is in prison for a flagitious crime. To rescue him would be gratitude, but it would not be virtue.

Gratitude is a subject of great laudation. Every body is fond of gratitude, because every body who does a favor likes to receive favors in return. Yet effective benevolence may be more efficient where no gratitude has place.

Gratitude is a most popular virtue; it is fed by self-regard: and ingratitude is represented as a very hideous vice. All men are interested in endeavoring to obtain repayment for benefits lent. And the public-opinion tribunal has affixed a special stigma upon him who, upon occasion, does not make the return of services he has received. He who does a benefit is supported by the concurrence of society in anticipating the fruits of gratitude, or a benefit in exchange. And every man has greater expectation of good services from an acquaintance than from a stranger. A refusal of services from an acquaintance, and especially from one you have obliged, produces more annoyance than the refusal of services by a person unknown to you.

In fine, gratitude, in so far as it is under the guidance of utility, may be ranked among the

virtues, but it may be so counterbalanced by evil as to belong to the regions of vice.

Opposed to gratitude is ingratitude, of which resentment is one of the forms. Gratitude produces good deeds, and resentment evil deeds. Resentment may be used in an ambi-lateral sense; a man may resent a kindness as well as an unkindness. Resentment in action is maleficence.

It was the sign of a certain degree of advancement in morality, to *think* of making ingratitude a crime: but it was the sign of an era but little advanced in wisdom, not to see that it was impracticable to designate it as a crime on all occasions.

How long and intricate an account must it not often be necessary to take between two persons who have lived much together, before it can be known, in point of good offices, which of them is the debtor?

The fortunes, the necessities of each must be known. The most generous, the most worthy, would stand always the worst chance. The most crafty, the least sincere, would be sure to gain the cause. What he gave he would give before witnesses; what he received he would receive in secret: there would soon be no such thing as either generosity on the one hand, or gratitude on the other.

Friendliness is effective benevolence on a small scale. Like good-nature, it is a disposition to confer benefits; but the disposition is principally directed towards those with whom the friendly person has had intercourse. It is ready to act whenever the opportunity may present itself. It imports somewhat more than a disposition to acts of kindness, and is accompanied by sympathy in a state of considerable activity. The notion of friendliness involves with it that of sympathy, at least in the common relations of life. In some of the higher walks, particularly the political, though the language of friendship is used, the sentiment is hardly supposed to exist. Its connection with effective benevolence is, as has been stated, intimate; it is also sometimes produced by the self-regarding affections. To the two branches of morality, all in it that constitutes virtue must be referred. Its good and its evil may be considerably modified by the application of right principles to its operation, which, in fact, is the only reason for its admission into the field of inquiry. Morals are not made for application to that which is unchangeable, but to that which may be modified or changed by a more correct view of things.

Aristotle has made friendship a sort of cousin to the virtues. It is a state or condition of life

constituted by a certain sort of relation analogous to maritality, uxoriality, paternity, maternity, filiality. It is a species of marriage, without sexual communion for its bond, or progeny for its consequence, and is thence not for life or for a specific term.

Generosity, where a virtue, is effective benevolence,—friendliness on a larger scale; it is friendliness not bounded by the circle of acquaintance, but extending to persons in general. Friendliness implies a preference. Generosity is diffusive.

Generosity, without the guidance of prudence or benevolence, is vice and folly. He who gives away all that he has to another, who wants it less than himself, and thus confers less pleasure than he sacrifices, does a very generous, but a very foolish act. So he who lavishes money, or money's worth, for a pernicious purpose, however generous the expenditure, is doing a vicious deed.

The benevolence must be judged of by the sacrifice made. A small sum of money, for example, given by a poor man, would be evidence of generosity; while the giving a considerable sum would scarcely be so from a man extremely opulent. The generosity of the poor is generally visible in personal services, in the dedication of their time, in the exposure of their

persons, in the risks they run. That of the more privileged classes in a mixture of personal and pecuniary services. As the value of money becomes less, and the station of the generous person is higher, money becomes more and more the instrument of generosity. At every stage, however, the same tests apply.

Beneficence, it has been already remarked, is not necessarily a virtue. To render services, to do good to others, is not always a virtuous act. Every man who spends money is beneficent, a doer of good; but there is no virtue in doing so. To discharge the common functions of nature is beneficent; to eat and drink, to sleep, to dress, anything by which good is done. Where beneficence differs from effective benevolence, though it may be a good, it is not a virtue. The distinction has been so frequently drawn in the course of this work, that it is needless to repeat it here.

Justice is effective benevolence, wherever it deserves the credit of virtue. It is the rendering of services where they are expected, on adequate grounds. It is the doing good where disappointment would attach to its not being done, and the public-opinion tribunal sanctions the expectation that it will be done.

In civil matters and in penal matters justice is a very different thing. In the social field,

justice is that which secures a man from the disappointment which would deprive him of objects to which he has a right, recognized by society. It is the application of the disappointment-preventing principle. If it is not this, it is what any person chooses to call justice. The law, 'Do unto another as you would he should do unto you,' does not apply here, nor would it serve as a definition of justice, because no one would willingly inflict punishment on himself, and the infliction of punishment is often necessary to establish the claims of justice.

Justice in penal matters is the application of penal remedies. The best justice is the best application of remedies against the evils of maleficence. It has only to do with acts, and not with dispositions. The dispositions belong to the moral, the acts to the political field.

In the class consisting of eleven qualities useful to ourselves, there is a jumble of qualities almost identical, though called by different names. It would be difficult to distinguish in what respect, as to virtue, *discretion* and *caution* differ from *prudence*, *honesty* and *fidelity* from *justice;* how *economy* and *frugality* are to be disassociated from prudence; why *industry* and *assiduity* are disunited? But a few words upon each may serve to remove some of the mists which are gathered round the temple of morality.

Discretion is the right judgment formed for the purpose of action, in cases of more or less difficulty. It is the quality of mind which makes for itself a correct estimate of probable results. It is the forethought which marks out the most appropriate line of proceeding in a given course. It is intellectual aptitude directed to conduct. But this is no more a virtue than the power of solving an arithmetical problem is a virtue, or than the possession of animal strength is a virtue. It is cleverness, derived either from birth or from education.

Industry is an ambiguous word; supposing labor applied to purposes not illaudable, it includes activity with a view to profit. It may be an instrument in the hands of other virtues; it is no virtue of itself. In another language, if not in our own, the word is sometimes employed in an unfavorable sense, *chevalicr d'industrie* meaning a swindler or cheat, the expression implying that diligence is used in furthering the purposes of fraud.

Frugality imports action positive or negative. It is prudence employed in the pecuniary field; self-regarding prudence, for the most part. It is the check which prevents from being wasted or needlessly diminished, those pleasures which are purchaseable by wealth. It is adjacent, as Hume remarks, to two vices—to prodigality,

which is imprudence; to avarice, which is opposed to effective benevolence.

Honesty is subordinate to justice. It is sometimes an ambiguous phrase. Montaigne says every body ought to be *honest* in talking of his own virtues. He forgets that such talk will be likely to wound the self-love of another. A man may to himself prefer himself, but such self-preference is not very likely to be recognized by a second person.

Fidelity is also subordinate to justice. It is the manifestation of an active faculty, and implies the observance of a contract, specific or understood.

Truth is not a human quality—is not a virtue. Veracity is a far more convenient word; and veracity is a virtue which occupies a very inappropriate place in the public mind, and the breaches of which are in consequence protected, to a great extent, by the popular sanction. Thucydides says, that in his time one hero would ask another, 'Are you a robber?' The days are come in which a man might ask another, 'Are you an advocate?'—an advocate being one whose power is in his tongue, and who sells that power to the first comer—to the right side or the wrong side, as may be; to advocate justice or to defeat justice. The old days were days of force; the present are days of fraud.

The powers of the body had once the mastery, now those of the mind. It was physical force that then ruled,—it is now mental fraud.

Lying has to a great extent introduced itself into the daily forms of society; useless always, and frequently pernicious. It may not on every occasion do harm to others, but it invariably does harm to the liar himself. It will inevitably lower him in the opinion of others, unless, as in the case of some of the professions, he is specially endowed with the privilege of lying.

The Spaniard who says, 'Esta casa es de V.' 'This house is your's,' when you quit him after a visit, tells a lie to no purpose whatever. The Frenchman who says, 'Je suis enchanté'—'je suis desolé'—'I am enchanted'—'I am desolated,'—though he preserves all the while his tranquility, lies to no purpose whatever. The Englishman who says 'Not at home,' though he is at home, lies to no purpose whatever. In the terms of politeness, so called, mendacity occupies a leading place.

The confusion of ideas between truth and veracity has often created great ambiguities of expression. Brissot was misled by it. He wrote a book on *La Verité*, which verity marched him about as if it had been a will-o'the-wisp he was running after. Sometimes it was a knowledge of things, sometimes it was veracity, correctness

of statement—the truth; sometimes it was the love of truth, in resistance to religious tyranny; by which he meant that knowledge which is the result of evidence, as opposed to those declarations of belief which do not grow out of evidence, but out of authority. He sometimes used it to represent the substantial fact of the real existence of certain objects. In fact, *truth* in the abstract, and with the vague associations which attach to it, is a very strange entity, and slippery as an eel.

Veracity is the disposition of a man to give to others the exact impression of his own mind; it is the avoidance of misrepresentation, and that growing out of attention, intense in proportion to the importance of the representation itself.

Veracity being wholly subordinate to prudence and benevolence, is its exercise a virtue in a case where neither would be violated by its infraction, or would such infraction be a vice? No! but to find such cases would be no easy task. Veracity is not indeed of any value but with a reference to the circumstances that surround it. In the case of lying, it may be seen how insufficient the often employed religious sanction is for restraining childhood from vice. A child has it said to him, 'If you tell a lie you will go to hell;' he tells a lie, the menaced pu-

nishment does not fall upon him, and the menace soon ceases to have any influence. If the child believe, his next thoughts may naturally be— 'I may as well tell a hundred lies, it will not make the matter worse.'

Sincerity has a wider import than veracity. It is a breach of sincerity *not* to state a fact; it is no breach of veracity. There is much less scruple in not stating things than in stating things falsely; it is the contrast between what is negative and what is positive. To state what is annoying to another when no purpose is answered of corresponding pleasure, chance of pleasure, or exemption from pain, is the contrary of virtuous. Where there is a solemn demand for truth, the cases are few where it should not be disclosed.

The importance of veracity must also be considered with a reference to the number of persons interested in it. He who deceives two commits a greater crime than he who deceives one. Falsehoods are susceptible of a classification which will serve to point out the extent of their mischievousness and consequent immorality. Malicious falsehoods are flagitious; they should be avoided for the sake of others. Interested falsehoods are mean; a man should avoid them for his own sake. So falsehoods to excite

astonishment are to a certain extent interested falsehoods, which for his own sake a man should avoid.

Falsehoods of humanity, falsehoods to avoid hurting the self-love of others or exposing the persons or property of others to injury; as where, for instance, an assassin is in pursuit of his intended victim, and is misled by a falsehood told him as to the direction taken by the person he is pursuing; these may be innocent and benevolent, as long as they do not give cause to suspect a general indifference to veracity. If lavishly employed this will infallibly be the result; thence the demand of prudence that their employment should be most rare, as in fact the demand for them is rare.

Falsehoods of necessity; such as are and must be used to madmen; falsehoods of self-defence, against lawless violence, come under the same conditions.

Equivocation differs from falsehood, and is preferable to it, inasmuch as it gives the chance that if the equivocator cannot immediately discover terms sufficiently ambiguous for equivocation, he will tell the truth.

An equivocation is a falsehood in ideas, not in words.

A lie is a falsehood both in ideas and words.

The having recourse rather to equivocation

than to a lie direct, shows a certain regard to truth; for though an equivocation might be preferred to truth, truth may be preferred to a lie.

Truth may be had from a person who deals in equivocations; for he may be taken on a sudden, before he has time to put together an equivocation.

If a man is known only for an equivocator, it is also known that there is a method of dealing with him. It is to press him with distinctions upon the terms of his answers, till you get him to terms not susceptible of ambiguity. You by this means force him at last to take his chance between simple truth and downright falsehood.

An equivocator gives evidence of a disposition to keep upon terms with truth.

Perjury is lying in the case where the religious sanction is put prominently forward as the guarantee for truth and the check upon falsehood. The force of the religious sanction depends wholly upon the state of the mind of the individual to whom it is applied. It will add nothing to the power of eliciting truth in cases where the popular sanction is in full activity. In the cases of oaths and vows the sanction is the same. The profanation of a vow diminishes the force of the sanction as applied to promises of future conduct; it therefore diminishes the force

of the same sanction as applied to relations of past conduct or past events.

There are cases where a vow, though an undertaking for future conduct, may be violated in the act of taking it. Such is that of a vow taken to believe a proposition, of the truth of which the person vowing has no conviction at the time.

The guilty of this profanation are those who insist on this sacrifice of principles to prejudices, on pretence of securing a tranquillity of mind which would be far better compassed by that liberty which takes away the motives to debate.

As a means of this tranquillity their own voice is in favour of these forced professions; the voice of experience in every country where this liberty is perfect, and of every country in which it has been admitted at all, as far as it has been admitted, is against them.

Among the Romans, while the undertaking was confined to respect things at once useful and practicable, such as obedience to the order of a general, the force of this sanction was stupendous.

Veracity and mendacity are less immediately connected than the other virtues with pleasure and pain. Hence the difficulty of assigning to their modifications the character that belongs to them. Sincerity and insincerity, ingenuous-

ness and disingenuousness, are more or less pernicious, more or less virtuous or vicious, as the particular case may exhibit them. Silence itself may have all the mischief and culpability of mendacity, where, for instance, the conveyance of information is a matter of *duty*, where prudence or benevolence require that the information should be given. Veracity, in some cases, demands fortitude for an ally, and fortitude becomes a virtue when the alliance is to further the ends of sound morality.

Caution is near akin to discretion, but has more timidity in it, and is applied to subjects from whence greater danger may arise. It is prudence wherever there is virtue in it.

Enterprize is activity, combined with comparative fearlessness with reference to evil results; it is one of the forms of activity, and may be considered a species of intellectual courage, either facing danger (*i. e.* probable evil) or turning aside from it. This may be either the result of the will, or of the non-application of the will to the subject. Attention is the applicaction of the will, when the will is acted on with a considerable degree of force.

Assiduity is a continued enterprize, applied for a considerable length of time to the same subject, without any long interruption.

Economy is frugality combined with good

management, which is an intellectual attribute; it is sometimes used without reference to economy, and implies a self-denial which is not necessary to economy. Temptations to dissipation surround every man; and here, as on other parts of the field, the continued practice of self-denial is a habit of virtue.

Follow a list of qualities, fourteen in number, of which Hume says nobody can for a moment refuse them the tribute of praise and approbation. Of these *temperance*, *sobriety*, and *patience* are but emanations from self-regarding prudence. *Constancy*, *perseverance*, *forethought*, and *considerateness*, when virtues, are modifications of prudence, but are not necessarily virtues,—nay, they may be vices. *Secrecy*, when a virtue, belongs to prudence or effective benevolence; while *order*, *insinuation*, *address*, *presence of mind*, *quickness of conception*, and *facility of expression*, are, for the most part, intellectual attributes, and in no wise entitled to be classified either as virtues or vices, except in as far as they are regulated by the will.

Sobriety is temperance applied to any thing producing intoxication.

Patience may refer either to sensation or to action; it is the non-indication of suffering equal to the actual suffering, and the more

patient a man is, the less is his suffering increased by duration.

Constancy has many meanings; constancy, in a bad cause, would be vice, as, in a good cause, it is virtue: it is perseverance in a cause, whether right or wrong; it is perseverance, in spite of temptation. It is vicious, virtuous, or neuter. A man *constantly* eats, drinks, and sleeps; but his eating, drinking, and sleeping are not acts of vice nor virtue.

Perseverance rather imports continuity of action: like constancy, it may, or may not, be virtue. It calls attention into exercise.

Forethought is imagination applied to future contingent events: it is necessary to the proper exercise of self-regarding prudence. Its value depends on the remoteness and complexity of the objects towards which it is directed.

Considerateness is the bringing together all the ideas that bear on a subject with reference to the end in view; the end constituting the merit or demerit of the quality.

Secrecy is a negative quality. It is negative effective benevolence, applied to the case where the disclosure of facts would be prejudicial to others; it is self-regarding prudence when the disclosure would be prejudicial to the individual himself. When a secret is committed to you,

and the divulging it would do no harm to yourself or others, the divulging it is a breach of contract.

Order is a modification of method; it is the putting things one after another, so that some particular end is answered by the arrangement. Order is an abstract word, which you cannot do without any more than you can do without the word *time:* it is the placing things in a line; it is a compound non-entity, growing out of our ideas of space and time.

Insinuation is the faculty of recommending oneself to another by action or discourse, accompanied by a desire that the faculty should not be detected. It is the art of ingratiation—the making oneself an object of sympathy, with a concealment of the purpose.

Address is an instrument of insinuation; it is insinuation in a wider field of thought and action.

Presence of mind is a power over one's own mind; it is the faculty of readily bringing into view all the several considerations necessary to correct decision: it is that which takes prompt measures for the prevention of evil.

Quickness of conception should have preceded 'presence of mind.' It is a simple idea; it is implied in the idea of presence of mind.

Facility of expression can be no virtue; it is quickness of conception giving language to its thought.

The qualities agreeable to ourselves are, according to Hume, *cheerfulness, dignity* or *magnanimity, courage* and *tranquillity.*

Cheerfulness, in so far as it is a natural disposition, is not a virtue: in so far as it is acquired, it is prudence. It is the being pleased, and the giving expression to the sense of pleasure. It is, to a very great extent, an endowment of a particular constitutional temperament. Virtue is something which can be excited by effort; it is something which obeys our commands: but a disposition to sadness, or a disposition to gladness, does not obey our commands. By study we may diminish the one and increase the other, and by so doing we give evidence of, and exercise to, self-regarding prudence. By far the larger portion of cheerfulness is inherent, though enjoyment acts upon it, and tends greatly to its increase. 'The habit of doing good,' as benevolence has been called, is the best instructor how to make instruments of cheerfulness. Every being who is the recipient of benevolence may be a source of future pleasure, and of exemption from future pain.

Dignity, when a virtue, is extra-regarding

prudence; it may be exhibited in behavior, or it may be the exhibition alone of the instruments of dignity.

Courage may be a virtue or may be a vice. To a great extent it is a natural quality: it does not always imply self-denial, nor always exhibit benevolence. It may be, perhaps, more properly said that courage is neither a virtue nor a vice, but an instrument of either, its character depending wholly on its application.

For a man to value himself on his courage, without any reference to the occasions on which it is exercised, is to value himself on a quality possessed in a far higher degree by a dog, especially if the dog is mad.

Tranquillity is insensibility to external causes of suffering, and particularly of remote suffering. Every man desires to keep in view objects that are agreeable, and out of view objects that are disagreeable.

The qualities which Hume introduces, as agreeable to others, are *politeness, wit, decency*, and *cleanliness*.

Politeness is more of a negative than a positive quality. It is the avoidance of actions or behavior which may be disagreeable to the person with whom you have to do. Its positive branch is the doing whatever it may be agreeable to others that you should do. In all

cases where the laws of prudence and benevolence are not opposed to the usages of society, self-interest demands attention to them. The highest order of politeness is the application of the rules which are recognized in high life. But here there is mingled with it so much mendacity, and that of a useless, even when not prominently pernicious character, that the analysis of politeness must be thoroughly made before its character can be determined. It easily degenerates into self-esteem, and instead of an instrument of pleasure, becomes one of annoyance. Many men intend to communicate enjoyment,—for example, by stories, by excessive attentions, and other efforts, which are the cause of weariness to those whom they really desire to gratify. Fashion is the competition for admiration, and its vices begin where annoyances are caused to others for the purposes of selfishness. In some cases, as in the courts where etiquette is carried farthest, the sacrifice of the many to the one, of the comforts of the many to the pride of the one, is striking. Under the Bourbons at the Tuileries, etiquette required that, until the King sat down to cards, every body must stand, however weary. This was politeness, this was etiquette, but it was absurdity and folly.

Wit is a very ambiguous virtue. Locke says

that wit consists in discovering resemblances; judgment, in discovering differences. Wit confers power, and is thence an object of desire: it is the power of giving pleasure to some, but often at the expense of pain to others. If the subject of malevolent wit is present, his pain is immediate; if absent, he suffers from losing a portion of the good opinion of others, and the quantity of his suffering cannot be traced.

One of the merits of wit is that it should be unexpected. There is a species of it which may be produced from a dictionary by the mere juxta-position of words. Quidlibet cum quodlibet may be applied to its production.

Wit has no existence except where the analogy elicited is brought to view; it may be by contrast, but the analogy or the contrast should be suddenly produced.

Decency is a term vague and unsatisfactory. It means, as generally used, the avoidance of bringing forward what is disagreeable to others. This is a negative virtue. When it comes in a positive shape, it is frequently only an ecclesiastical virtue, employing wealth for the purposes of delusion. Decency is to cover the throne with crimson, to carve the pulpit, to provide lawn sleeves; it is to do that which it is agreeable to the ruling few to have done. Delicacy is one of the branches of decency, but

more commonly referring to the avoidance of physical annoyances. It is not an unusual thing for men to take merit to themselves for being disgusted with that which does not disgust people in general, and to imagine that this affected sensibility is a mark of their belonging to the aristocratic classes. Decorum is another of the forms of decency; it refers, for the most part, to the avoidance of matters of small moment, the non-avoidance of which would expose us to the contempt of others.

Cleanliness acts through the medium of the imagination; it is a negative virtue. It is the avoidance of practices by which disease, or the apprehension of disease, is produced. The neglect of salutary attentions to the person is immediately associated with the idea of disease. Dirt, for example, left on the body, calls up the thought of unhealthiness. It is a sort of mislocation of matter in small particles; and attention to cleanliness is demanded by prudence, in as far as inattention to it is injurious to ourselves; by benevolence, in as far as inattention to it is offensive to others. The impression of its absence may be produced where the intrusive substances are not in themselves disagreeable. Gold-dust sticking to a man's face would give nearly the same impression of a want of cleanliness as any other substance, just

as the finest white powder on a scuttle of coals would give a notion of impurity.

And Hume concludes his list by the introduction of two virtues, classified as good qualities in society. They are *chastity* and *allegiance*. *Chastity* is the refraining from sensual enjoyments where indulgence is improper, where their gratification would be productive of more pain to others than of pleasure to him who indulges in them. Modesty is not necessarily a branch of chastity. There may be constant unchastity without immodesty. Gross language—language in the highest degree immodest, may be unaccompanied with an unchaste act; and acts of unchastity may be indulged in without the utterance of an immodest word.

Allegiance is vagueness itself, unless the special subject be shewn, and then it is effective benevolence on the largest scale, provided the object of allegiance is conformable to the greatest happiness principle. All depends on the character of that government for which allegiance is claimed. Allegiance may be an obvious virtue, it may be a very pernicious crime. A good government is that in which the influence is placed in the hands of those who are interested in the exercise of benevolent power. Allegiance is a term employed instead of obedience. Obedience is good when the govern-

ment is good,—bad when the government is bad. Opposition to institutions friendly to human happiness is vice proportioned to the amount of their excellence. Opposition to institutions unfriendly to human happiness is virtue proportioned to the amount of their mischief. So far, at least, is the teaching of effective benevolence; but if the sacrifice made to overthrow bad governments exceeds the chances of good to be produced by their overthrow, then virtue demands abstention. No case can be conceived in which virtue will allow the dictates of self-regarding interest to attempt the overthrow of good institutions; for the amount of evil with which others would be visited must completely absorb the amount of good which the individual could obtain for himself.

The examples given by Hume are, for the most part, mere assumptions that he, the moralist, is to decide on all the cases that come before him. He occupies a pulpit whence he deals out his moral dogmas, and speaks as if he were the representative of higher virtues than the man to whom he is speaking. When he gives no examples, it is mere idle trumpetting, tantarara and fiddle-de-dee. He draws no intelligible distinctions between pleasure, passion, and pain: he makes distinctions where there are no differences, and dreams of settling

moral points by phrases, such as 'It is becoming,' which are the mere *sic volo* despotism of an instructor. Pleasure and pain are the only clues for unravelling the mysteries of morality. Fly where you will, fumble about as you please, no other master key shall you find, to open all the doors which lead into the temple of truth.*

How does it happen that so many vague words, with vague ideas, or no ideas at all attached to them, have so long kept possession of the field? It is because we imagine we thoroughly comprehend the terms which are familiar to us.

What we are continually talking of, merely from our having been continually talking of it, we imagine we understand. So close an union has habit cemented between words and things, that we take one for the other, and when we have words in our ears we imagine we have thoughts in our minds. When an unusual

* The services of Hume, in many parts of the field of moral and mental philosophy, were immense. He first drew a clear distinction between impressions and ideas, a distinction, without which it is hardly possible to obtain any clear notions on many topics of leading importance. The distinction is obvious when pointed out:—I see a man—it is a perception: I close my eyes, but imagine myself to see him still—it is an idea.

word presents itself, we challenge it; we examine ourselves, to see whether we have an idea annexed to it; but when a word that we are familiar with comes across us, we let it pass on, under favor of old recognition. The long acquaintance we have had with it makes us take for granted we have investigated all its meaning; we deal by it, in consequence, as the Custom-house officers in certain countries, who, having once set their seal upon a packet, so long as they see, or think they see their seal upon it, reasonably enough suppose themselves dispensed with from visiting and examining the contents of it anew.

CHAPTER XVII.

FALSE VIRTUES.

THERE are other qualities which have been put forward by different writers on morality as virtues, and as entitled to the praise and the recompense of virtue. In most cases they are of ambiguous character, and as they present certain points of contact with prudence and benevolence, they obtain the character of virtue, not so much on account of their essential attributes as of their accidental association with qualities really virtuous. The very defect of character may in this way be made to present an aspect of virtue: and the affections may be so engaged with one side of a question, as to interfere with a right judgment of its moral merit. A mother steals a loaf to satisfy the hunger of a starving child. How easy it would be to excite the sympathies in favor of her maternal tenderness, so as to bury all consideration of her dishonesty in the depth of those sympathies. And, in truth, nothing but an enlarged and expansive estimate, such as would take the case out of the regions of sen-

timentality into the wider regions of public good, could ever lead to the formation of a right judgment in such matters.

Contempt for Riches. Socrates' contempt for riches was mere affectation and pride, just as meritorious as it would have been for him to have remained standing for a long time on one leg. It was only denying to himself the doing the good which riches would have enabled him to do. The desire of wealth is the desire, in a vague form, to possess what wealth can obtain. So again, his denying himself assistance from others was a mere self-regarding calculation, it was only to excite their self-esteem for other purposes; it was a calculation to receive more than he would otherwise obtain —it was a refusal of 100*l.* in order to get 200*l.*

So Epictetus,—he had more pleasure in pride than in benevolence. He paid himself out of the testimonies of respect with which he was surrounded. He calculated on getting more from self-denial than he could get without it. But he was less meritorious than the Oriental fakirs, who suffer more than he. His conduct was that of the miser who stores his wealth, that, on any future occasion, he may command what he pleases by the exercise of that instrument of power. He pays himself with the

pleasures of imagination, which are greater to him than those of actual fruition. Misers, as they grow older, have less sense of present enjoyment, and become, therefore, more and more disposed to avarice, which is an anticipation of a future reward.

Love of Action. Love of action, without an object, is nothing: it has in it neither vice nor virtue. Such part of it as proceeds from the will, and is directed to the production of happiness, is virtuous. Such part as is intellectual is neutral; where it is the act of the will, and is directed to the production of evil, it is vicious.

Attention. It is the quality which distinguishes the botanist who carefully gathers the flower, from the clown who tramples it under his feet. *Fixed attention* has been lately brought forward as a virtue, and a pretty virtue it is; so that if I purpose to murder a man, and fix my attention upon it, that is a virtue!

Enterprize has also been honoured with the title of virtue. Enterprize, which may be as bad a vice as any in the calendar. And *dispatch* has reached the same laudatory elevation.* Dispatch is the employment of the least quantity of time sufficient for the attain-

* Most of the above are introduced as virtues by Jevons, in his Principles of Morality.

ment of an object. It is quickness without precipitation. It is a prudent means, which may be used for an end either of good or evil.

But, having established a general rule, which every one may apply for himself to the estimate of those qualities of which he desires to form a judgment,—having shown that unless they can be classed under the heads of prudence and effective benevolence, they are not virtues,—that only such parts of them are virtues as can be so classed,—it is scarcely needful to pursue the subject farther.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE PASSIONS.

Passion is intense emotion—emotion is evanescent passion.

The nature of the passions can only be understood by their division into the different heads of pleasure and pain: for the principles by which they are to be governed, reference must be made to the list of virtues and vices.

Let the passion of anger be analysed, and its consequences traced. When under its influence, a man is suffering pain—pain produced by the contemplation of the act which has excited the passion. An immediate consequence is, a desire to produce pain in the breast of the party who has awakened the anger. Anger, then, has in it two constant ingredients—pain suffered by the angry man, and a desire to give pain to the person by whom he has been made angry.

And now to the question of virtue and vice. As there is no anger without pain, the man who draws pain upon himself without the compensation of a more than equivalent pleasure, violates the law of prudence.

Next comes the desire to produce pain in the

breast of the object of anger. This desire cannot be gratified without malevolence and maleficence. Here is an obvious violation of the law of benevolence. And here we have an exemplification of the relationship between passion and pain and pleasure; between passion and virtue and vice.

Cannot anger then be indulged without vice in both its shapes, without imprudence, and without maleficence?

It cannot! It cannot, at least, whenever it rises to the height of passion. And here a more remote, but more mischievous result presents itself to view, as a violation of the law of self-regarding prudence. The passion cannot be gratified but by the production of pain in his breast by whom the anger has been excited, and pain cannot be produced there without a counter-desire to retaliate the pain, or greater pain on him who has produced it. To the pain in the breast of the angry man there is a termination, and most commonly a speedy termination, but to the remote pain, which may be considered the third link in the chain of causes and effects, who can put a limit? Anger may have had what is called its revenge, but the exercise of that revenge may have created the durable passion of enmity, to whose consequence it is impossible to affix a boundary.

Since anger cannot exist without vice, what

is to be done? Can a man exist without anger? Without anger can injuries be averted, can self-defence, can self-preservation be provided for?

Certainly not without the production of pain to him who has inflicted the injury. But to the production of this pain anger is not necessary. Anger is no more necessary than to the surgeon by whom, to save suffering or life, a painful operation is performed. No anger is excited in his breast by the view of the agony he inflicts, or by the contemplation of the greater evil which would follow but for his interference. That anger should never have place is not possible; it is not consistent with the structure of the human mind. But it may be said, and that on every occasion, and without any exception, that the less there is of it the better: for whatever pain is needful to the production of the useful effect, that pain will be much better measured without the passion, than by it.

But, it may be said, there are circumstances in which not only pain—the natural effect of anger — pain purposely produced, but anger itself, the passion of anger, is useful, and even necessary to the existence of society, and that these circumstances in our own country, extend over the whole field of penal jurisprudence. I have been robbed. The offender,

on conviction, will be capitally punished, or transported in a state of servitude. Shall I prosecute him? Not if self-regarding prudence is alone to be my counsellor; for her counsels would be—Add not to the loss inflicted by the robbery, the farther loss inflicted on you by the prosecution. Not if I consult benevolence, for she would say, the punishment is too great for the offence. And such is the response which in the knowledge of every body, and especially when the punishment of death is menaced, frequently determines a man's conduct.

But, were the matter rightly considered, the response, it might be said, would be—Yes! prosecute; for the good of the community requires that neither the suffering of the offender in the shape of punishment, nor the suffering of yourself, the prosecutor, in the shape of vexation and expence, should be grudged. Good! but I can ill afford it: the pecuniary burthen to me will be greater than that uncertain, unestimated, and remote benefit which will grow out of the prosecution and its results. Again, the responses of benevolence have no influence with me. Be they ever so decisive, they have not a preponderant weight in my mind.

In this case, neither prudence nor benevolence will produce action; and yet, if action were not produced, the security of society would suf-

fer a serious shock—a shock serious in proportion to its frequency; and, if constant, security would be wholly destroyed, and the general ruin of property would immediately follow. The supposed virtue in both its forms, is insufficient to preserve society, and anger, however dissocial its character, is indispensably necessary.

It is not easy to refute this reasoning, under the present state of our penal code. But it will be immediately seen, that the necessity of the passion does not arise out of the nature of the case, and that it is produced, to a great extent, by the imperfections of our laws: for if those imperfections were removed, the demand for the passion of anger would, at all events, be very greatly diminished. Were the needless expence and vexation attending a prosecution removed, the answer of self-regarding prudence might be opposite to what it now is. Were the pernicious excess of punishment taken away, the answer of benevolence would be opposite to what it is. And if you suppose a state in which the passion of anger were subjected to the demands of prudence and benevolence, how few would be the occasions in which the passion itself could find field for its exercise.

The legislator, indeed, whose purpose is to keep delinquency within bounds, and whose

conduct is to produce effect on the national scale, has a claim upon him somewhat different from that on the individual. The self-regarding motives are, in his case, not the prominent ones, and while the inhibition of the passion in the breast of individuals seems demanded by virtue, benevolence requires from the legislator such an exercise of it as will lead to those inflictions of pain, which are likely to minimize the quantity of crime.

Anger has the quality of being increased by giving vent to itself. He who swears because he is angry, only becomes the more angry in consequence. The appetite is increased, not satisfied, by the aliment it feeds on.

What has been said of anger applies to envy and jealousy. They both imply the presence of pain. To suppress them in our own breasts is demanded by prudence; if they exist there in an inoperative state, it is prudence alone that requires their suppression. If they are likely so to be awakened as to produce a maleficent influence upon others, their suppression is called for by benevolence.

But why is reason inefficacious against passion?

It cannot raise up images lively enough.

What is called reason, as applied to the government of the passions, is the making the

scale turn in favor of a greater pleasure in preference to a less.

The will necessarily yields to the solicitation of the greatest apparent good.

And the causes why the influences of passion domineer over the influences of reason are—

1. Want of apparent intensity in the distant pleasure which reason promises—want of vivacity in the idea of it.

2. Want of apparent certainty — want of ready discernment to trace out, at the instant, the train of effects and causes that promote or impede the production of the distant pleasure.

Hence the use of the expedient, which has been frequently recommended, of playing off one passion against another.

Habitually to exercise the mind in the application of the true standard of morality, will be habitually to train the affections and the passions to virtuous tendencies and virtuous conduct. And the occasions are infinite—they are occurring every hour of our existence, nor is any occasion to be despised. Like flakes of snow that fall unperceived upon the earth, the seemingly unimportant events of life succeed one another. As the snow gathers together, so are our habits formed. No single flake that is added to the pile produces a sensible change; no single action creates, however it may exhibit, a

man's character; but, as the tempest hurls the avalanche down the mountain, and overwhelms the inhabitant and his habitation, so passion, acting upon the elements of mischief, which pernicious habits have brought together by imperceptible accumulation, may overthrow the edifice of truth and virtue.

CHAPTER XIX.

INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES.

Between the intellectual faculties and virtue and vice there exists an intimate relation. Wherever the will has any influence on their direction, they belong to the moral field; and, in as far as it is in the power of the will to add to their efficiency, they become instruments of pain and pleasure, and important in the proportion of the amount of pain and pleasure which their exercise is able to produce.

The faculty of invention, for instance, belongs to the understanding—it is intellectual; but, whether it is an instrument in the hands of virtue or vice, depends upon its application to purposes beneficent or maleficent.

But the influence of the understanding upon the will is yet more important. It is to the understanding that every appeal must be made, and unless it can be associated with the demands of morality, there is little prospect for the success of the Deontological teacher. His reasonings, his persuasions must be addressed to the intellectual faculties. He must win them to his

side before he can influence conduct. It is by their assistance that he is to teach the arithmetic of pains and pleasures. By them he is to show what are the penalties to be paid by vice, and what are the recompenses to wait upon virtue. He reasons; and his reasons are prophetic of inevitable evil to imprudence and improbity; of infallible good to prudence and benevolence. Passion appeals only to that which *is*,—the intellectual faculties bring what *will be* into the thoughts. They, in fact, constitute the main difference between the virtues of beasts and those of men. The lower animals, for the most part, are unchecked in their search of pleasure by any anticipation of future pain. No apprehension of consequences would lead them to abstain from any present enjoyment. Except among a few of the more intelligent, all the lessons are lost even of experience: the waste of experience being, perhaps, attributable to the imperfections of the recollecting faculty. But the mind of man stretches before and after. Reason brings events that are passed to bear upon the future. It not only draws upon experience, but on imagination. The field of its influence is boundless as the range of thought. Observant of consequences, it presents them to the inquirer. It abstracts pains and pleasures from the dross that surrounds them; it analyses

their value by dividing them into their component parts, or gathers them up into a whole in order to ascertain the sum total. It compares them one with another when they are arranged on different sides, generalizes out of the collected elements, and deduces the ultimate result. In this way do the intellectual faculties become the most important servants of virtue, leading men into the true and trust-worthy paths of felicity.

Hume introduces his intellectual faculties without any arrangement or order. They may, however, be conveniently classed.

First: Passive Faculties. § I—Those which operate, without need of much attention or comparison, on more than one object.

1. Perception—the source of all the other faculties.

2. Memory—becomes active when attention is applied to it.

3. Imagination—a passive quality, for it is busy even in dreams; when active, it becomes invention.

§ II. Operating on two or more objects, but still without need of much attention.

1. Judgment—as in the case of vision.

Second: Faculties active—volitional.

§ I. Operating without need of the judgment on more than one object.

1. Attention.

2. Observation—which is attention applied to a particular object.

§ II.—Requiring the assistance of the judgment, and the presence of more than one object.

1. Abstraction.
2. Analysis.
3. Synthesis, or combination.
4. Comparison.
5. Generalization.
6. Deduction.

§ III.—Requiring the presence of two or more of the active-volitional faculties, and of two or more objects.

1. Distribution.
2. Methodization.

Invention is performed by the use of the other faculties, including attention in an intense degree, under the direction of the judgment, and having for its object the discovery of some new fact, the production of some new effort, or the formation of some new combination of ideas.

Communication, with which Hume closes his list, seems to have no right to be classed among the intellectual faculties.

When the intellectual faculties are not, or cannot be called into operation, conduct is taken out of the regions of virtue and vice. In

infancy, for example, before the mind is brought into action; in insanity, where the thinking powers are overthrown, there is no responsibility, and, consequently, no title can be made out to praise or blame. In the case of temporary aberration of the reasoning powers, as under the influence of intoxication, the actor is not responsible for the act committed, while his judgment is, as it were, extinguished. It is a secondary consequence of a primary imprudence. In the case of insanity, the course to be pursued by society is clear,—the power of voluntary action must be taken away. In the case of infancy, the demand for impunity must depend on the quantity of mind which is developed; and it will be found that, at a very early age, the influence of pain, which is made to visit misconduct, may be brought into operation, and from the moment that such discipline becomes operative, there is a demand for its application. In the case of acts committed under the influence of inebriety, there is no claim to impunity, nor can any general rule be laid down which shall be applicable to every case. All the sanctions must be consulted, in order to exact the sufficient penalties for the past, and to obtain the most appropriate securities for the future.

CHAPTER XX.

CONCLUSION.

To what does all we have been advocating tend? To the development of two principles,—first, the greatest happiness principle, or the diffusion of good,—and, secondly, the disappointment-opposing principle, or the prevention of evil. Out of these two items all the branches of morality grow.

It may be objected, that all our reasonings have not brought our principles into the field of demonstration. What then! If our arguments should so regulate conduct as to produce a result which will leave no regret behind it, what more have we reason to desire? Are they strong enough to communicate that balance of pleasure towards which they tend, and to which alone they look? What better should they do?

Whether they be of that kind to which we have been accustomed to give the name of the intuitive, or of the demonstrative, or only of the probable, it is no matter; the satisfaction they

give us is perfect; and, whatever be their name, their success could be no more.

Give them the name of demonstration or any other, what matters it? It is not the name we are concerned in, but the thing.

There is however something at the bottom of all this anxiety. What men want to know is, the degree of assurance they are warranted to indulge. What evidence is there that this morality is the true morality?

Call the sort of proof men have of a proposition, demonstration, they may be positive without being exposed to accusations of rashness either from themselves or any one else.

No one can have present to his mind the proof of every proposition, how true soever, which he believes. It is for want of the thing, that men are so anxious about the word.

No man, how philosophical, how scrupulous soever, but believes infinitely more propositions upon trust than upon perception: the only difference in this particular between the philosopher and the no-philosopher, or in short between the wise man and the weak is, that the latter rests upon authority conclusively, in the last as well as in the first instance; the former always keeps open the appeal to reason, that is, to his own perceptions. The judgments of the first, upon hearing the report of authority, are

provisional; the judgments of the latter are definitive.

But of demonstration certain propositions are not susceptible. The proposition that happiness is better than unhappiness cannot be subjected to mathematical proof. But let him who impugns the doctrine impugn our reasonings. It is the only axiom we desire to have taken for granted, and this is to make a very small demand upon confidence or upon credulity.

The march of utilitarian principles has been obvious. They have made their way by their native strength and excellence. How should men be better occupied than in tracing the consequences of conduct? Observation brought with it its corresponding results.

Men perceived such and such actions were useful; they perceived such and such other actions were mischievous. They took a particular action, of the sort, for instance, that was mischievous: by abstracting the particular circumstances of time, of place, of parties, they formed a general idea; to that general idea they gave a name; that name constituted a genus to which other acts of the same nature were referred in common. If any one took into consideration that genus or species of action (no matter which we call it) and said of it that it was mischievous, the proposition in which he said as

much,—the proposition in which he predicated mischievousness of action—formed a maxim of utility.

But it is not probable that people put the quality of an action that affected them upon this conspicuous footing, in the early times of which we are speaking; those times which preceded the formation of laws. Men in general are not arrived so far even now. They expressed their sentiments in some such obscure terms as 'right' or 'fitting,' terms which served only to express their disapprobation, and not the ground of it. It is one thing (how strange soever the proposition may appear, experience has taught the truth of it),—it is one thing for men to feel pain from an act, and mark that act accordingly with a sentiment of disapprobation; and another thing to fix explicitly upon that pain as the cause of that disapprobation.

Nothing can be idler than the appeal to antiquity as authority. In the midst of some truths there are a thousand fallacies. The light to be found shines by contrast with surrounding darkness. Of instruments of delusion, erudition has frequently made use of the most baleful. True, such language was held, such opinions were professed by self-styled philosophers. What then? For, if from their language no practical conclusion can be drawn,—if from their

opinions no result of good can be elicited, where is their value? Men there are whose preaching comes to this:

'Read modern books less and ancient more. Go for the moral sciences to Aristotle, to Plato. For metaphysics, not to Locke, but still to Aristotle. For Botany, not to Linnæus, but to Theophrastus—to Ælian.'

This is precisely the way to talk of everything and know nothing;—to be as much farther from knowledge in almost every science as a child who cannot tell his letters is from the most intelligent professor.

Life is not long enough to store the mind with the facts that form the stock of the several sciences, were no propositions presented but what are true and those dressed in their simplest garb. Yet many men would send us to rake in books in which, for ten propositions evidently false, and ten times the number of unintelligible ones, you will scarcely find a single one that is true, and that one dished out over and over again in the meanest modern compilation on the subject you can lay your hands on: you may turn over whole volumes of antiquity without discovering a solitary truth to make you amends for your pains.

To make this any but the most absurd as it is one of the most pernicious species of prejudice, the whole order of nature must be reversed.

The acorn must be larger than the oak it will become. A man must be wiser in his mother's womb than in the vigour of his manhood. Every thing must be supposed to grow backwards. New experiences added to the subsisting stock must lessen the number there existed before.

It is scarcely possible to believe a man to stand bona fide on so noxious a system. If he do, grieve over him, but treat him as an enemy to knowledge, and to that happiness which is founded upon knowledge. The public interests demand that his notions rise not into credit.

A man thinks not so highly of Plato as he deserves. What is the consequence? Nothing. A man thinks more highly of Plato than he deserves. What is the consequence? He goes and reads him. He tortures his brains to find meaning where there is none. He moves heaven and earth to understand a writer who did not understand himself, and he crawls out of that mass of crudities with a spirit broken by disappointment and humiliation. He has learned that falsehood is truth, and nonsense is sublimity.

Of all the works that can be imagined, there could scarcely be a more useful one than an 'index expurgatorius' (but the composer of it must be a writer of sufficient eminence to give law to men's opinions) of the books which have bewildered and betrayed mankind.

If the theory of morals which has been here developed, has in it any value, that value will be found in its simplicity, intelligibleness, and universal applicability. But let it not be supposed, because a standard has been recommended by which the multitudinous questions of right and wrong are measured and decided, that the discovery of this standard, and of its all-comprehensive fitness has been unattended with laborious meditation and inquiry. The merit of deep thought consists, not in compelling the reader to descend into the profound well of truth, there to draw for himself of its healthful and refreshing waters, but in its having enabled the writer to descend and to bring up for the use of others the invigorating draught. There is little due to the man who sends another forth in search of undiscovered truth; but *he* has established some claim to the good opinion of his fellow men who, having gone forth in pursuit of the treasure, brings it home and delivers it over to the keeping of all who are willing to receive it at his hands.

Of the merits of a work of which truth is the object we cannot have an adequate idea nor a perfect relish without some acquaintance with the errors against which it is levelled and which it is calculated to displace. With respect to many, the apparent merit of such a work will

be apt to be in an inverse proportion to the real. The better it answers its purpose of making an abstruse subject plain, the more apt it will be to appear to have nothing in it that is extraordinary.

A single observation that seems to contain nothing more than what every body knew already, may turn volumes of specious and formidable fallacy into waste paper.

The same book may succeed ill with different sorts of people for opposite reasons: by the ignorant, who have no opinion about the matter, it may be thought lightly of, as containing nothing that is extraordinary; by the false learned, who have prejudices they cannot bear to have questioned, it may be condemned as paradoxical, for not squaring with these prejudices.

HISTORY

OF THE

GREATEST-HAPPINESS PRINCIPLE.



HISTORY

OF THE

GREATEST-HAPPINESS PRINCIPLE.

If the intentions of the Author and of the Editor have been accomplished, this volume will be found to be nothing but an application of the Greatest-Happiness Principle to the field of morals. When the principle first presented itself to Mr Bentham's mind, he denominated it the Utilitarian Theory; but he soon discovered that the phrase did not immediately present to the views of others, the ideas which he attached to it; namely, that any thing is useful only in as far, and in as much as it promotes the happiness of man. Happiness being the end and object to be kept constantly in view, the word Utility did not necessarily bring with it felicity as its associate. It can hardly be without interest to trace the influences of the Greatest-Happiness Principle upon Mr Bentham's philosophy, from the period when it first occupied his seri-

ous thoughts, until it became the master-key which he applied to unlock all the intricacies of moral and political science.

It was indeed his directing post, which he consulted in all the walks of life, whether public or private; the oracle, to whose voice he unhesitatingly and on all occasions deferred, both in his individual capacity, when seeking guidance for his own steps, and as one of the community endeavoring to mark out for others the path of popular wisdom and virtue. In every part of the field of thought and action he invoked its aid and counsel: he appealed to it for its laws, and for the reasons of those laws, and registered its responses for the use and government of his fellow men.

To himself he suggested it, and to others he recommended it, not only as an end to be proposed, but as a means of attaining that end, and as a motive to impel men to its pursuit. It was to him a storehouse of arguments, objects, instruments, and rewards.

He did not leave his purpose clouded in a vague, misty and general phraseology, but drew forth from the regions of happiness and misery all those pleasures and pains of which happiness and misery are composed, and of which man's nature is susceptible. In the pleasures which the human being can enjoy, in the pains from

which the human being can be exempted, he found the elements of the science he taught. To calculate their number, to weigh their value, to estimate their results, was the object in which he was perpetually engaged; and to gather up the greatest possible quantity of felicity for every man, whether by alleviating suffering or increasing enjoyments, was the great business of his life.

These pains and pleasures when applied to the business of government, whether legislative or administrative, are but so many elementary parts of the stock employable by rulers in the manufacture of human happiness.

The history of the Utilitarian Principle, is the history of contributions to the stock of happiness; it is the history of what has been done, from time to time, to improve and perfect the operations of which enjoyment is the result. The finished work is felicity, and every instrument and every workman assisting in its production, or producing it in a more complete and enduring shape, is intitled to the honor of cooperation or of discovery.

Those literary works which have led to the efficient application of the instruments of happiness,—those instructions by which advances have been made from the speculative and unemployed principle, towards its use in the business

of life, must be considered among the most important auxiliaries in the furtherance of the triumphs of felicity.

The earliest known mention of the principle is to be found in the 3rd Satire of Horace (book first), written a few years before the birth of Christ. The poet speaks of the opinions held by the Stoics, that all misdeeds (*peccata*) stand on the same level in the scale of ill desert, or rather should be visited with the same amount of blame, and thus pursues the topic—

> Queis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant
> Quum ventum ad verum est: *sensus moresque repugnant;*
> *Atque ipsa utilitas justi prope mater et æqui.*

Men's feelings, customs, and utility itself are, he declares, in hostility with the Stoic theory. And he is right: the observation, as far as it goes, if not profound, it is at least correct. It proposes an end; the end to which justice and equity lead and are subservient; and yet more, he avows that, if our ideas of justice and equity are right, they will have their source in utility.

At a somewhat later period than that in which Horace flourished, Phædrus taught a somewhat similar doctrine.

> Nisi *utile* est quod faceris, stulta est gloria.
> Your glory is foolish, unless it is obtained by *usefulness.*

But, in both Horace and Phædrus, the men-

tion of utility as a motive to conduct appears rather accidental than otherwise. Neither of them seems to have understood the value and importance of the doctrine they put forward. In neither case does it occupy the position of a great and important principle. It was adopted by no sect; it was avowed, followed, worshipped by no votaries. It was wholly in an embryo state. It had no influential, no presiding power; it had not obtained a place in the Elysian fields, among those aphorisms, written in letters of light, which Æneas found Anchises passing under review. Unvalued and unheeded, it remained, like the truth which dropped by chance from the heedless pen of Aristotle,—that all ideas have their origin in the senses; another magnificent principle whose consequences were hidden from the perception of many, many generations. Locke was the first to discern the value of an observation, whose development enabled him to subvert the universal empire usurped by so-called logic, under the command of Aristotle himself, while David Hume, in 1742, gave importance to the word *Utility*.

Hume's Essays recognised *Utility* as a *principle*. He employed the word with much indistinctness, sometimes representing the idea of usefulness—usefulness considered as conduciveness to an end, no matter what; sometimes as

synonymous with conduciveness to happiness as an end. On no occasion does he intimate, that the idea of happiness is to be inseparably connected with the idea of utility. He speaks of it as 'inhering' to 'a machine, a piece of furniture, a vestment, a house,' where these are useful by being conducive to the end that is sought. He mentions *pleasure* and *pain*, but no where does he present pleasures and exemptions from pains as the elements, whose aggregate is designated by the word happiness. He introduces, without any attempt to show their relationship or dependence, pleasures, pains, desires, emotions, affections, passions, interests, virtues, vices, and other entities, in the direst confusion, looking like so many equestrians in the ride called Rotten Row; or dancing before the eyes, as atoms in the sunshine, undefined and indistinct. The reference to a pleasure is like the reference to utility, vague and unsatisfactory; the reference to pain, exemption from which is at least as necessary to happiness as is the presence of pleasure, is even more vague and distant. No trace is visible of that analysis by which one sort of pleasure or pain is distinguishable from another. Of the elementary component parts of every mass of good and evil, whether pure or mixed, no account is taken; no criterion of right or wrong is advanced; no answer found for the

question, 'What ought to be done, and what left undone?' And so as to virtues,—of particular virtues, names in great abundance are scattered here and there; but as Horace's Satires placed misdeeds (*peccata*) all on the same level, so Hume arranges his virtues in the same line, drawing no boundary between them, giving no rules by which they are to be distinguished from one another. Classified, indeed, they are, but their classification is of no assistance to the great and only important inquiry, as to the proportions in which they are conducive to happiness. The propositions that Hume has put forward are thus, for the most part, *vague generalities*, a dangerous and unsatisfactory result, affording no information to the ignorant, and no comfort to the perplexed inquirer.

From a mind so acute, and with no interests opposed to the interests of truth, something better might have been expected. If, in the field of law, the whole herd of ordinary writers are rather engaged in ascertaining what *was* or *is*, instead of what *ought to be*, their pursuit is not to be wondered at. The practice, and not the philosophy of law, is to them the source of gain; but it is sorely to be lamented, that David Hume should have so missed his mark as not to have seen that pains and plea-

sures were susceptible of different estimates; that they represented different values; that *good* and *evil* were undefined, and really unintelligible phrases, until they could be divided into their component parts; that happiness itself was but a chimera, until the elements of which it is made up could be rendered accessible to investigation. Hume has left the great moral questions in the regions of speculation; no part of them has he made applicable to useful purpose by intelligible and distinguishing marks. He has exhibited his theory like a mist in the air, a cloud floating at different levels; but never in the form of dew or rain descending on the earth: it tantalizes the weary traveller, without contributing any thing towards his relief.

Hume, however, did this great service. He pointed out utility as the foundation or corner-stone of a system of morals. He put it forward, in contra-distinction to the ground-work on which another set of philosophers built their ethical theories; that ground-work being what they denominated the *moral sense.* It was something to bring the two principles into contrast. When thoroughly investigated, they were far as the poles asunder, the moral-sense principle being only one of the forms of dictation and dogmatism, resolvable into the moral

sense or opinion of the individual; while the principle of utility almost certainly directed the thoughts towards, if it did not necessarily lead them into, the regions of pain and pleasure; and hence of vice and virtue.

In 1749, Hartley published the first edition of his work on Man. In it he gave the true meaning of happiness, by showing that it is composed of those elements which the different pleasures furnish. He translated, so to speak, the language of felicity into the language of pain and pleasure. He made out a list of pleasures and a parallel list of pains, but saw not the bearing of the whole on the Greatest-Happiness Principle, nor referred to it under that name, nor under the name of utility, nor under any other name, as the all-directing guide in the walk of public and private life. He advanced beyond his forerunners, and then stopped short in sight of the shore, upon which he never landed. This work of Hartley's, Dr Priestley popularized to a certain extent in an after edition, from which he expunged what, in the quaint phraseology once in vogue, was called the 'quisquilious matter.'

Helvetius wrote, in 1758, his work *De l'Esprit*, a title for which no adequate translation has been found in our language; the word, unfortunately, having no English equivalent.

Great indeed was the contribution which that book brought to the science of morals and legislation; but it would be most difficult, in a few sentences, or even pages, to convey a correct estimate of all it did, and all it left to do. For sometimes it blazes forth in the splendor of a mid-day sun, throwing light and truth over the whole domain of thought and action,—anon that light is veiled in clouds of darkness, leaving the gazer to wonder how it should be so suddenly withdrawn. There are to be found flashes of eloquence, rather than the steady lustre of reason; the lightning that dazzles, for a moment, with more than needful splendor, which the oppressed eye would often fain exchange for that regular and quiet illumination which the ordinary lamps of evening provide.

To that book, however, Mr Bentham has often been heard to say he stood indebted for no small portion of the zeal and ardor with which he advocated his happiness-producing theory. It was from thence he took encouragement, flattering his efforts with the assurance that they would not be useless. It was there he learned to persevere, in the conviction that his power would strengthen, and his field of usefulness extend. Not that Helvetius had done the work, which remained to do. He had not marshalled pains and pleasures, nor

classified them according to their value; but he had brought prominently into view the influence of interest on opinion, and this was a point overflowing with important consequences. He laid bare many of those springs of action, the knowledge of which is absolutely essential to any thing like a right estimate of conduct or character. And in showing the subserviency of opinion to interest, he demonstrated not only that the opinions publicly advocated were subservient, but those privately and even clandestinely formed. His list of the causes of misconduct, especially in public men, is as profoundly philosophical as it is sagaciously observant. Sinister interest, interest-begotten prejudice, authority-begotten prejudice, and primeval or inbred weakness,—in these he saw, and in these all men may see, the sources of human infirmity.

Helvetius thus applied the principle of utility to practical use; to the direction of human conduct in the ordinary course of life. On that 'airy nothing,' happiness, he conferred a substantial existence by identifying it with pleasures, to which he gave 'a local habitation and a name.' He made utility pregnant with pleasure, and thus it gave birth to ideas in abundance; ideas of a positive and intelligible character; ideas so successfully elicited, so attrac-

tively recommended, that they could not but be continually present and familiar to the most inattentive, unobservant, and scantily-instructed minds.

Dr Priestley published his Essay on Government in 1768. He there introduced, in italics, as the only reasonable and proper object of government, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number.' It was a great improvement upon the word utility. It represented the principal end, the capital, the characteristic ingredient. It took possession, by a single phrase, of every thing that had hitherto been done. It went, in fact, beyond all notions that had preceded it. It exhibited not only happiness, but it made that happiness diffusive; it associated it with the majority, with the many. Dr Priestley's pamphlet was written, as most of his productions, *currente calamo,* hastily and earnestly.

'Somehow or other,' to use the words taken from Mr Bentham's lips, when he was talking over with the writer what he called the "Adven-
" tures of the Greatest-Happiness Principle, its
" parentage, birth, education, travels, and his-
" tory,"—'Somehow or other, shortly after its
' publication, a copy of this pamphlet found its
' way into the little circulating library belonging
' to a little coffee-house, called Harper's coffee-
' house, attached, as it were, to Queen's College,

'Oxford, and deriving, from the popularity of 'that college, the whole of its subsistence. It 'was a corner house, having one front towards 'the High street, another towards a narrow lane, 'which on that side skirts Queen's College, 'and loses itself in a lane issuing from one of 'the gates of New College. To this library 'the subscription was a shilling a quarter, or 'in the University phrase, a shilling a term. 'Of this subscription the produce was composed 'of two or three newspapers, with magazines 'one or two, and now and then a newly-pub-'lished pamphlet; a moderate-sized octavo was 'a rare, if ever exemplified spectacle: composed 'partly of pamphlets, partly of magazines, half-'bound together, a few dozen volumes made 'up this library, which formed so curious a 'contrast with the Bodleian Library, and those 'of Christ's Church and All Soul's.

'The year 1768 was the latest of the years in 'which I ever made at Oxford a residence of 'more than a day or two. The motive of that 'visit was the giving my vote, in the quality of 'Master of Arts, for the University of Oxford, 'on the occasion of a parliamentary election; 'and not being at that time arrived at the age of 'twenty-one, this deficiency in the article of age 'might have given occasion to an election contest 'in the House of Commons, had not the majority

'been put out of doubt by a sufficient number of
'votes not exposed to contestation. This year,
'1768, was the latest of all the years in which
'this pamphlet could have come into my hands.
'Be this as it may, it was by that pamphlet, and
'this phrase in it, that my principles on the sub-
'ject of morality, public and private together,
'were determined. It was from that pamphlet
'and that page of it, that I drew the phrase, the
'words and import of which have been so widely
'diffused over the civilized world. At the sight
'of it, I cried out, as it were in an inward ecstasy,
'like Archimedes on the discovery of the funda-
'mental principle of hydrostatics, Ευρηκα. Little
'did I think of the correction which, within a
'few years, on a closer scrutiny, I found myself
'under the necessity of applying to it.'

Long before this period, the mind of Bentham had been taken possession of by the Utilitarian principle. At a very early age, he had been annoyed beyond measure, and scarcely less annoyed than disgusted, by what he then called 'Ciceronian trash.'

'I had not completed my thirteenth year,' to use his own words, 'when at Queen's College,
'Oxford, the task was imposed on me, not, in-
'deed, by my academical instructors, but by a
'not less irresistible authority, the task of ren-
'dering into English that work of Cicero which

'is known by the title of The Tusculan Ques-
'tions, or Tusculan Dissertations. Pain, I there
'learnt, was no evil. Virtue was, and is, of
'itself, sufficient to confer happiness on any man
'who is disposed to possess it on these terms.
'What benefit, in any shape, could be derived
'from impregnating the memory with such non-
'sense? What instruction from a self-contradic-
'tory proposition, or any number of any such
'propositions? When it happens to a man to
'have a pain, whether in the head or the great
'toe, or any intermediate part of the bodily
'frame, can he, by saying to himself or to any
'body else, that pain is no evil, drive the pain
'away, or diminish it at all?

'As to virtue,—to have shown in how many dif-
'ferent ways, or though it were but one way, it
'contributes, as it really does, to happiness, this
'would have been of some use, and might have
'been made of great use. But to say that vir-
'tue is of itself to produce and maintain happi-
'ness, whatsoever be a man's condition in other
'respects, is merely giving utterance to a
'position directly in the teeth of universal and
'constant experience. To have given a definition
'to the word virtue would have been something,
'and this is what the Greatest-Happiness Prin-
'ciple will enable a man to do. But if you see
'a man suffering under a fit of the gout, or the

'stone, or the tic-douloureux, to inform him that
'he is happy, or that if he is not, it is for want of
'virtue, would this be any relief to him? Would
'it not rather be a cruel mockery and insult?

'This was the sort of trash which a set of men
'used to amuse themselves with talking while pa-
'rading backwards and forwards in colonnades,
'called porches: that is to say, the Stoics, so
'called from *stoa*, the Greek name for a porch.
'In regard to these the general notion has been,
'that compared with our contemporaries in the
'same ranks, they were, generally speaking, a
'good sort of men; and assuredly, in all times,
'good sort of men, talking all their lives long
'nonsense, in an endless variety of shapes, never
'have been wanting; but that, from talking non-
'sense in this or any other shape, they or their
'successors have, in any way or degree, been
'the better, this is what does not follow.'

Mr Bentham's Fragment on Government was published in 1776. It produced no little sensation in the world. The fame of Blackstone's Commentaries was at its very height, and it was the first successful attempt to lower the reputation, and curtail the influence of that eloquent flatterer of all English abuses; that indiscriminating worshipper of good and evil. Dr Johnson attributed the work to Dunning; and Mr Bentham confesses that he had, to a great

extent, made Dunning's style the model of his own, having been struck by its 'precision, correctness, clearness, guardedness in expression, and closeness in argumentation.' The immediate object of the 'Fragment' was, to destroy the foolish fable of 'original contract,' upon which lawyers had been long in the habit of raising the edifice of government; and the instrument used for the overthrow of an assumption so groundless was the principle of utility, and with that principle in hand complete was the demolition of the great Commentator's theory. In the 'Fragment,' however, the language of *happiness* is not substituted to that of *utility*,—both terms are employed, as if convertible, and translated, as it were, one into the other. Beyond this primary step the 'Fragment' did not proceed. Neither was the word utility, nor the word happiness analysed into its component elements. Pains and pleasures are not brought into view, still less are they divided into their different species, or classified according to their separate or com parative value. Mr Bentham has often said, so intimate in his own mind was then the association between utility and happiness, that he could scarcely fancy the ideas separated in the mind of any man. Whatever was left undone by the 'Fragment,' it succeeded in annihilating the 'original contract' scheme. Mr

Bentham's first quarrel with the dogma grew from his observation of the purposes to which it was turned, in order to justify law-abuses, and to oppose the most necessary reforms in the administration of justice. The dogma had been introduced into the world under the sanction of John Locke's great name; but before Bentham had attained the age of sixteen he was disgusted, while sitting at the feet of Blackstone, by the use which that smooth sophist made of it in his lectures for the justification of the abominations of misrule. 'I determined to grapple with it,' he says, in one of his memoranda; 'I determined to fling it to the ground,—I did so, and no man has since ventured to raise it up, and give support to it.'

The ascetic philosophy received a mortal wound from Mr Bentham, by his exposure of it in the 'Introduction to Morals and Legislation.' No man is, perhaps, now to be found who would contend, that the pursuit of pain ought to be the great object of existence, however he might deem the infliction of certain pains upon himself meritorious and virtuous. No man will now deny, that there are occasions on which pleasure may reasonably and morally be pursued as an end, or on which the avoidance of pain may be alike an interest and a duty. But he who contends that the pursuit of a balance

of pleasure is an offence in any case, is bound to produce that case, and to show the grounds of its exception from the general rule. On him the *onus probandi* rests with all its force. In the monkish ages the demon of asceticism ruled in his sanguinary power. That demon was alike the creator of misery and the father of lies. Come what may of the Greatest-Happiness Principle, its open antagonist is silenced for ever.

In fact, asceticism is characterised by every thing that is mischievous, absurd, inconsistent, and self-contradictory,—all heightened in the very proportion in which the ascetic principle is called into action. What is mischievous, if it be not mischievous to create misery? What is absurd, if not the doctrine which would induce its supporter to dash his head against the wall, since, according to him, to create suffering is the proper ultimate end of human action? What is inconsistent, unless a creed be so which is belied by every practice of a man's existence? And what is self-contradiction but absurdity and inconsistency, exhibited in their most flagrant forms, and pushed to all the extremes of folly and delusion?

But to dispose of the indirect antagonists of the Greatest-Happiness Principle is not quite so easy. Ipse-dixitism is a very Proteus, assuming every conceivable shape which caprice and

arrogance can form or fancy. Its progenitor is despotism; its offspring every species of absurdity.

John Locke's misconceptions of the end and object of government were not only exhibited in his 'original contract' theory, but in the extremely narrow view taken by him of the regions of pains and pleasures, and by that notion of his that morals and politics are explainable by the mere exhibition of the relations which one word bears to another. Again, his doctrine respecting *uneasiness* as the cause of action—as if a man enjoying certain pleasures could not seek other pleasures in addition, shows how vaguely the ideas of pleasure presented themselves to his mind. By his theory of the 'original contract,' an end of government is advocated independently and in preference to that of its conduciveness to the felicity of the community. And this end, even were it a fact, and not the fable, the fiction, and the falsehood which it is, would be wholly unworthy to compete with the Greatest-Happiness Principle. For though in most cases observance of contracts is demanded by that principle, yet their observance in every conceivable case would be destructive of it. Suppose a contract entered into by one individual for the commission of a crime, must *that* contract be deemed sacred?

And what must be said of the contrivance by which every body would be bound to a contract, the operation of which might be the destruction of pleasures, and the continuation of pains, even after experience had proved that the pleasures might be preserved and the pains alienated by setting the contract aside?

It is by thus substituting a partial and subordinate, to the only legitimate and comprehensive end of government, that misrule has found a terrible instrument of power. By this sort of appeal to promise, and to contract, adherence and support have been given to principles and conduct the most deleterious and maleficent.

By fear or hope, in a word, by corruption in any shape, exercised by a ruler or rulers, declarations are extorted to which the sanction of an oath is frequently given, that a particular line of conduct shall, at all events and under all circumstances, be maintained. Such promises are among the strongest holds that despotism has upon its devotees, and hence the quarrel of despotism with the Greatest-Happiness Principle. As a matter of history, such engagements have rarely been entered into between rulers and nations, and if they had they would be of no value; no more binding on posterity than the engagements of a drunken man. If the engagement were consonant with the Greatest-Happiness Principle,

the recognition of that principle would be far better than the engagement; if opposed to it, if the object or practical end be the production of crime, evil, or human suffering, removable by its removal, who will contend for its continuance?

If there be cause for mourning in the world, it is that men of powerful talents, comprehensive minds, and generous affections, are so often engaged in closing their own eyes, or the eyes of others, and keeping them closed against the light of reason and experience!

In holding up to view the rights of property as the sole foundation for justice, Locke had lost sight of a great variety of other topics, upon which maleficence might be exercised by individuals—that maleficence requiring in consequence to be inhibited by governments. Power, reputation, condition in life, exemption from pains, and other possessions, (for language does not give an apter word) which demand protection from the civil and the penal code, are passed over in silence.

Sad, unguarded, infelicitous, was in truth that ill-considered definition,—that attempt to lay with such loose materials the foundation of human happiness, as resting alone upon justice and the rights of property. Sad the triumphs which, by a designing and uncandid antagonist,

might on this occasion have been reaped over that honest, candid, and in every respect amiable mind! Property the only thing intitled to be the object of care to government! Possessors of property, accordingly, the only persons intitled to be objects of that same care! The possessor of property the only person intitled to be represented in and by a representative body forming part and parcel of the sovereign authority! The poor, in a body, held up as a community which the rich, in a body, are intitled to make slaves of, and for ever treat as such! Corporeal slavery, a state of things still worse, perhaps, than political slavery; a state of things the production and maintenance of which is a proper object of government! The meridian of the West Indies is the meridian where the supposed champion of liberty and good government would find a striking application of his theory! For, indeed, with but too much reason might the theory of John Locke have been employed for the defence of slavery,—for the defence of boundless mischief,—for the defence of boundless misery.

The case is, that in the mind of this philosopher,—to whom, after all, the debt owed by mankind is so indisputable, real and extensive, —experience had not at that time at least, gone beyond *aristocracy*, the opulent rulers and influ-

ential few; the people, the unopulent and subject many, had not as yet fallen within the sphere of his observation, or arrived at an apparent importance necessary to the being numbered among the objects of his care.

That, in respect of experience, such was the state of his mind, that in the application of that experience his views of morals, politics, and legislation, as the consequence, were very limited and imperfect, is evidenced in and by his constitution for one of the Carolinas: a performance which from that day down to this has never been spoken of in any other character than that of a failure.

He is, accordingly, the most adored of all the idols which, within the temple of British devotion, lay claim to the worship of those whose political Bible is the matchless and all-perfect constitution emanating from the glorious Revolution of 1688, with Protestant despotism and Catholic slavery among its immediate blessings.

It was in 1785 that Paley published his Elements of Moral and Political Philosophy. He mentions the principle of utility, but seems to have no idea of its bearing upon happiness. And if he had any such idea, he was the last man to give expression to it. He wrote for the youth of Cambridge, of one of the colleges of which he was tutor. In that meridian, eyes

were not strong enough, nor did he desire they should be strong enough, to endure the light from the orb of utilitarian felicity. Insincere himself, and the bold, oft-declared advocate of insincerity, what could be expected from his courage or his virtue? Over his bottle, those who knew him, knew that he was the self-avowed lover and champion of corruption, rich enough to keep an equipage, but not (as he himself declared) to 'keep a conscience.' For the remaining twenty years of his life, his book was the text-book of the universities; but he left the utilitarian controversy as he found it; not even honoring the all-beneficent principle with an additional passing notice.

It was in the year 1789, that the 'Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation' appeared. Here, for the first time, are pains and pleasures separately defined, and regularly grouped; and the classification and definition of them is so complete for all ordinary purposes of moral and legislative investigation, that Mr Bentham, in after life, found little to modify or to add to in the list. By the side of the pains and the pleasures, the corresponding motives are brought to view, and a clear and determinate idea attached to the springs of action by showing their separate operation. And, moreover, the author uncovers and sifts that phraseology which

has done so much mischief in the field of right and wrong by the judgment of *motives*, instead of the judgment of conduct, so that the same motive is frequently spoken of in terms opposed to and incompatible with one another. Sometimes the eulogistic form is adopted, to convey sentiments of approbation; sometimes the dyslogistic, to communicate sentiments of disapprobation; sometimes the neutral, to avoid the expression of either praise or blame; but in all cases these irrelevant and delusive adjuncts serve to bewilder inquiry, and to distort truth. Of this truly extraordinary and philosophical volume, it has chanced to the writer to hear the opinion of several of the most acute and distinguished men of the present day (not of the Utilitarian school) who, after a discussion as to what literary work ought to be considered the most remarkable intellectual production of the last century, unanimously decided that the 'Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation' was intitled to that honor. In the later years of Mr Bentham's life he was far from deeming it complete. He had not taken man's interests and man's desires into his list, and he employed the phraseology of utility instead of that of happiness.

The first part of *Chrestomathia* was published in 1810, the second part in the year following.

Its principal object was, to bring together the several branches of art and science, and to exhibit their conduciveness to happiness; to point out their relationship to each other through this their common property, and to give the whole that direction which, as a result, should produce the maximization of felicity. It was as early as 1769 that Bentham's mind was occupied with this topic. Even then he fancied that happiness might be made the common trunk to support all the branches of knowledge, forming together a perfect encyclopædical tree. In Lord Bacon's writings he found planted the pristine tree; it was in some sort improved by D'Alembert; but neither the English nor the French philosopher had taken any notice of that most useful of properties, to which all arts and sciences tend, and to which alone they are indebted for any value they possess. The trees they sought to plant had, however, never taken root, and, in the presence of Bentham's nobler production, must be considered as mere cumberers of the ground.

It was in 1817 that 'The Table of the Springs of Action' appeared. The purpose of the author was to facilitate comparisons of and observations on the mutual relations between pains and pleasures, inducements or motives, desires and interests. He endeavored to make

the list complete of all the elements that influence conduct. While, in his previous writings, pains, pleasures, and motives had been the principal topics of inquiry, Mr Bentham added, on this occasion, the corresponding desires and interests, proposing, as a means of consistency and completeness, the designation of each interest by a particular name. Helvetius had in some cases attached names to interests, and Mr Bentham proposed to perfect the nomenclature, and to assist the association between all the points of comparison, by presenting the topics in a tabular form. To these Tables he subjoined notes, explaining and giving determinate expression to other psychological terms, such as passions, virtues, vices, moral good, moral evil, and so forth, showing their connection with the objects displayed in the Tables. Though the Greatest-Happiness Principle was constantly in view—the now all-ruling influence in Mr Bentham's mind—no reference is made to it by name in 'The Springs of Action.'

This volume is, however, the evidence of a great progress in utilitarian philosophy. The operations of motives on conduct had been most lucidly explained in the 'Introduction to Morals and Legislation.' Motives, the source of action in all its modifications, are brought into association with all the pleasures and pains

they are able to influence: a motive, in fact, being only the fear of some pain from a certain mode of action, which pain the will is urged to avoid, or the hope of a pleasure which the will is urged to create. The 'Springs of Action' did for interests what the 'Introduction' did for motives; they also drew the distinction between motives and desires. To each desire Bentham attached the adjectives by which the desire had been qualified, in order to suit the purpose of the speakers or writers who had occasion to refer to it, either in terms of praise or blame, the very same desire having ordinarily three designations, one laudatory, one vituperatory, and the other neutral.

Having observed the prodigious extent to which these collateral adjuncts are in use, as instruments of delusion and deception, especially in the hands of interested deceivers, it occurred to him that it would be a useful service to mark out, and, as it were, give warning of the characteristic difference between the three classes, by means of appropriate denominations. Accordingly, for the designation of the case in which, to the idea of desire the idea of disapprobation, as existing in the mind of him who is speaking of it, is attached, he employed the epithet *dyslogistic;* as a synonyme, he might have added *disapprobative:* and, for

the designation of the case in which, to the idea of desire, the idea of approbation, as existing in the mind of him who is speaking of it, is attached, he employed the epithet *eulogistic*; as a synonyme, he might have added *approbative*.

Mr Bentham has mentioned, that, in all his pursuits and inquiries, one idea was constantly operating on his mind. If Bacon, with his 'Experimentalize!' was justly honored for doing more than any man who had preceded him, for the diffusion of the philosophy of physics, Bentham, with his ever-present maxim—'Observe!'—is intitled to the first rank among those who have successfully labored for the advancement of the philosophy of morals.

The phenomena of the material world, not only as they present themselves, but also as they can be made to present themselves, together with the relations in the way of cause and effect that appear to have place between them, may, without reserve (so as injury to persons and things be avoided) be taken for subjects of experiment as well as observation, when applied to the material world: in the case of moral and political science, the proper subject-matters of observation are pains and pleasures, as they respectively result from the several modifications of which human con

duct, or say human agency, is susceptible. Without reserve, these may be taken for subject-matters of observation: but, not without great reserve and caution, for subjects of experiment; especially in the case where the institutor of the experiment is any other person than the sovereign, or a person or persons constituted for the purpose, in authority under him. Accordingly, it is by the observation of the occasions on which, and shapes in which pain and pleasure result from the modes of agency respectively productive of them—pains more especially—that Mr Bentham ascertains the quantity and quality of the applications necessary as remedies for the evils which actions of the maleficent class bring in their train: and while the graphic pencil is engaged in the delineation of their respective qualities or forms,—scales, with weights and measures, are at the same time to be kept employed in giving intimation of their respective quantities.

In the application of legislation to the purposes of life, the legislator has only the choice of evils. There can be no government without coercion; no coercion without suffering; and, separately considered, that coercion must be an evil. The punitory functions of government consist in the application of that evil to the individual misdoers, for the purpose of obtain-

ing, in the interests of the community, an exemption from greater evils, or a production of pleasures of greater value than the sufferings created by its coercive interposition.

It is thus that the Greatest-Happiness Principle brings the legislator into the field of particular pains and pleasures, and the first emanation of that principle is the 'disappointment-prevention,' or, as Mr Bentham more habitually called it, the 'non-disappointment' principle. Upon this the laws of property have their sole foundation; for if no disappointment were felt—no pains suffered from the loss of property—no demand would there be for penal visitation in cases of the violation of what are called the rights of property. Let disappointment, as far as possible, be prevented. Why prevented? Because disappointment cannot have place without pain. Inseparably connected with the idea of disappointment is that of expectation—of agreeable expectation. The disappointment prevents the expectation from being realized. The legislator's business is to protect the subject from the sufferings of that disappointment.

An observation made to Mr Bentham by Lady Holland produced a great impression upon him. She said that his doctrine of utility put a *veto* upon pleasure; while he had been

fancying that pleasure never found so valuable and influential an ally as the principle of utility. It was clear, therefore, that the word 'utility' not only failed in communicating to other minds the ideas which Bentham attached to it, but that to some minds it communicated ideas wholly different and opposed to them. And true it is, that unless the Greatest-Happiness Principle be recognized as the end, the doctrine of utility might be represented as *useful* to some other end. And if the pursuit of pleasure were assumed as worthy of disapprobation, *utility* would teach abstention from that pursuit. Dissatisfaction, therefore, with *utilitarian* phraseology, gradually increased in Bentham's mind.

The phrase 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' was first employed by Mr Bentham in 1822, in his 'Codification Proposal.' Every suggestion there put forward is made to turn upon the requirements of the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number.' In this work, happiness, utility, pains and pleasures, are constantly introduced for the purposes of explaining one another; and the augmentation of the felicity of all, by the increase of pleasures, and the exemption from pains, is the constantly present theme.

In our language, and in every known language,

the advance of philosophy is greatly retarded by the want of appropriate expressions. If with the word 'utility' the idea of happiness could have been habitually and irrevocably associated, 'utilitarianism' would have conveniently represented the Greatest-Happiness Principle, and 'utilitarians' its advocates and supporters. And hitherto it has been almost necessary to use the terms which have indeed received a certain currency. Bentham once thought of proposing the employment of the word *Eudaimonology*, to represent the utilitarian doctrines, and *Eudaimonologians* its professors. To those acquainted with Greek the meaning would be sufficiently obvious; but that acquaintance is so rare, that he did not venture to recommend the terms to general adoption. Besides, custom must be departed from in not rendering the word *Eudæmonology;* and in such a shape umbrage might be given to men of pious minds, who would possibly associate with it the idea of a doctrine, art, or science, of which devils were the subject. Hereafter, when the principle shall have made new conquests in other lands, and especially in those, the roots of whose languages are Latin, some terms may be found making way to general acceptance. *Felicitism,* or *Felicitarianism,—Felicitists,* or *Felicitarians,* may then put forward their claim. The word 'felicity' has

already two conjugates, to *felicitate*, and *felicitous*. The increase of the number of conjugates would be of important assistance to language; but for our purpose the idea of 'greatest' is needful, and the *Felicity-maximizing* principle will, perhaps, be found the most convenient of all the terms hitherto employed.

The Gothic branch of our language unfortunately does not lend itself to the wants of the utilitarian. There is no making one word of 'Greatest Happiness;' still more difficult is it to extract from its roots the substitutes for those conjugates which the Latin will supply.

The antagonist to the felicity-maximizing is, the ipse-dixit principle, and there is no reason why the ipse-dixit root should not produce all the branches necessary to discourse,—as *ipse-dixitists*, and *ipse-dixitism*.

It is scarcely out of place, by the way, to state here, in answer to those who have so frequently animadverted on Mr Bentham's unusual terms, that there is no topic on which his mind was more habitually occupied than in the search of fit terms to convey his ideas. No man was ever more impressed with the importance of appropriate nomenclature, as the necessary instrument for logical reasoning, for introducing and disseminating correct ideas. It was the ambition of a Roman emperor to plant a word

which should be allowed by after times to grow. Two words, at least, have been planted by Bentham, and adopted into our language,—the adjective *international*, the noun *codification*, with its conjugates, to codify and codifiers; and though he can hardly be said to have introduced the verbs to *maximize* and to *minimize*, with their correspondent nouns, he has certainly given them that currency, and attached to them that value, which afford the assurance of their escaping the doom of oblivion.

But even the words which are every day in the mouth of every man are constantly employed without any accurate understanding of their precise or real meaning. *Virtue* and *vice*, *justice* and *injustice*, what are they? By nothing but in connection with the Greatest-Happiness Principle can any clear or useful application be made of them, or any of them. Whenever, indeed, they are employed, there is some reference, implied or expressed, to one of these principles,—the Greatest-Happiness Principle, or the principle directly opposed to it, that is, the ascetic principle, or the dogmatic principle of ipse-dixitism. For the end in view, the standard of right and wrong must be either happiness or unhappiness, or else some opinion which is put forward as sufficient in itself to determine the standard. The appellative of *ipse-*

dixitism is not a new one; it comes down to us from an antique and high authority,—it is the principle recognised (so Cicero informs us) by the disciples of Pythagoras. Ipse (*he*, the master, Pythagoras), ipse dixit,—he has said it; the master has said that it is so; therefore, say the disciples of the illustrious sage, therefore so it is.

When the 'Introduction to Morals and Legislation' was published, Bentham imagined that the principle of sympathy and antipathy was to be considered the groundwork of one of the theories of morals. In after life, he discovered that this was only the dogmatic, or ipse-dixit principle divided into two branches:—the branch of sympathy applying reward, that of antipathy, punishment; but, wherever disassociated from the Greatest-Happiness Principle, being really nothing but the authority of the ipse-dixit doctrine.

The principle of caprice was the appellative that afterwards occurred to, and has been employed by him for the designation of that branch of the ipse-dixit principle which applies to the civil, or non-penal branch of law, including every portion not comprised within the denomination of the penal; the civil, or non-penal, over which, in his view of the matter, the non-disappointment principle presides.

To return to virtue and vice. By virtue,

under the direction of the Greatest-Happiness Principle, is understood that line of conduct and correspondent disposition, which is conducive to happiness: by vice, that which is conducive to unhappiness. In the case of the virtue one addition, however, and that productive of a limitative effect, requires to be made; this is that of the sort of action denominated virtuous, the exercise requires more or less of self-denial: that is to say, of a sacrifice made of the present good, whether pleasure or exemption from pain, to some greater good to come. For keeping the position in question within the pale of truth, this limitative adjunct is altogether indispensable. And the evidence that it is so is irresistible. Among the actions, by the exercise of which the existence of the individual is continued, and among them of those by which pleasure is experienced, or pain averted and excluded, small is the proportion of those by which virtue, in any shape, can with propriety be said to be exercised. Why? Because, in the exercise made of them, no self-denial, no sacrifice of the present to the future good is made. Thus it is, for example, with the pleasures of sense in general.

But here comes in an objection. Suppose a man to have his appetites and desires of all sorts, in such complete subjection, that, in the

sacrifice of the lesser present to the greater future good, no uneasiness is experienced, nothing that can be called *self-denial* is practised. Of such a man will you say, that, in his mental frame virtue is on a lower level, in the scale of perfection, than in the case of one in whom the contest between the lesser present and greater future good, or, according to Dean Swift's emblem, the game of leap-frog between flesh and spirit, is continually renewed? No, assuredly. But for this not less true is it, that to the applying with propriety to a man's *habit* and *disposition* the appellatives virtue and virtuous, the supposition of the existence of reluctance and *self-denial* in the character of an accompaniment of an ingredient in the habit is indispensable; at the time in question no such unpleasant sensation has place, but at some anterior point of time it had place; only in the intervening space of time it has been gradually worn away; as a laborious exertion by long habit becomes pleasurable.

The Greatest-Happiness Principle is not only attacked by principles openly and professedly opposed to it; it has had to suffer from covert and influential usurpers of its name and authority; and from such sources it has perhaps been most injured. Reference has been made and homage paid to it by principles

which have claimed alliance with it, while they have, in fact, been only subordinate to ipse-dixitism. This has been too often the position of the preachers of 'Justice,'—men, who, under the cloak and covering of an attractive title, have generally strung together their directions precepts, mandates—call them what you will—saying to every body who will listen, 'Do so and so, for this is what is required by justice.' Two assumptions are here, and both are representatives of the ipse-dixit system:—first, that justice is the proper and sufficient standard of reference; and second, that this which you are required to do is dictated by justice,—assumptions (need it be said?) both unsupported by argument, both gratuitous and dogmatical.

When Mr Godwin took 'Political Justice' for the title of his well-known work, he committed an act of insubordination, not to say rebellion, or high treason, against the sovereignty of the only legitimate, all-ruling principle.

Justice is subservient to the Greatest-Happiness Principle, or it is not: its dictates teach the minimization of misery, and the maximization of happiness, or they do not. If they do, and as far as they do, they are in accordance with that principle, and they represent it.

But, suppose their dictates differ, suppose there is dissonance, hostility between the two,

which is to succumb? Justice or happiness,—the end or the means?

In order to a proper intelligence and application of the meaning of the word justice, it must be divided into its two branches, civil and penal; for nothing can be more vague, obscure, and unsatisfactory, than the ideas attached to the word justice, as it is ordinarily applied.

Civil justice is the recognition of proprietary rights in all their shapes, whether as objects of desire, or of possessed value. To invade the proprietor of them in his expectations or possessions, or to deprive him of them, is to create in his mind the pains of disappointment,—pains, which the felicity-maximizing principle requires to be averted. This disappointment-preventing principle stands second in importance to the happiness-creating principle.

The penal branch of civil justice presents a different aspect. Its purpose is to minimize wrongs. Its means are preventive, suppressive, satisfactive, and punitive. It is only in as far as wrongs are the cause of unhappiness that there is any demand for penalties. To reduce the aggregate of wrongs, and thereby the sources of suffering growing out of them, and to do this at the least cost of pain, is the demand of that justice which is in alliance with the Greatest-Happiness Principle. But under

the name of justice very different objects, and those to be accomplished by very different ends, are frequently proposed.

In the later years of Mr Bentham's life the phrase 'Greatest happiness of the greatest number' appeared, on a closer scrutiny, to be wanting in that clearness and correctness which had originally recommended it to his notice and adoption. And these are the reasons for his change of opinion, given in his own words :—

'Be the community in question what it may, 'divide it into two unequal parts; call one of 'them the majority, the other the minority; lay 'out of the account the feelings of the minority; 'include in the account no feelings but those of 'the majority,—you will find, that to the aggre- 'gate stock of the happiness of the community, 'loss, not profit, is the result of the operation. 'Of this proposition the truth will be the more 'palpable, the greater the ratio of the number of 'the minority to that of the majority; in other 'words, the less the difference between the two 'unequal parts; and suppose the undivided parts 'equal, the quantity of the error will then be at 'its maximum.

'Number of the majority suppose 2001, 'number of the minority, 2000. Suppose, in 'the first place, the stock of happiness in such 'sort divided, that by every one of the 4001 an

'equal portion of happiness shall be possessed. 'Take now from every one of the 2000 his share 'of happiness, and divide it any how among the '2001: instead of augmentation, vast is the 'diminution you will find to be the result. The 'feelings of the minority being, by the supposi- 'tion, laid intirely out of the account (for such, 'in its enlarged form, is the import of the propo- 'sition), the vacuum thus left may, instead of 'remaining a vacuum, be filled with unhappiness, 'positive suffering, in magnitude, intensity, and 'duration taken together, the greatest which it is 'in the power of human nature to endure.

'Take from your 2000, and give to your 2001 'all the happiness you find your 2000 in pos- 'session of: insert, in the room of the happiness 'you have taken out, unhappiness in as large 'a quantity as the receptacle will contain: to 'the aggregate amount of the happiness pos- 'sessed by the 4001 taken together, will the 'result be net profit? on the contrary, the whole 'profit will have given place to loss. How so? 'because so it is, that such is the nature of the 'receptacle, the quantity of unhappiness it is 'capable of containing, during any given portion 'of time, is greater than the quantity of hap- 'piness.

'At the outset, place your 4001 in a state of 'perfect equality, in respect of the means,

'or say, instruments of happiness, and in par-
'ticular, power and opulence: every one of them
'in a state of equal liberty; every one indepen-
'dent of every other: every one of them pos-
'sessing an equal portion of money and money's
'worth: in this state it is that you find them.
'Taking in hand now your 2000, reduce them
'to a state of slavery, and, no matter in what
'proportions of the slaves thus constituted, divide
'the whole number with such, their property,
'among your 2001; the operation performed,
'of the happiness of what number will an
'augmentation be the result? The question
'answers itself.

'Were it otherwise, note now the practical
'application that would be to be made of it in
'the British Isles. In Great Britain, take the
'whole body of the Roman Catholics, make
'slaves of them, and divide them in any pro-
'portion, them and their progeny, among the
'whole body of the Protestants. In Ireland,
'take the whole body of the Protestants, and
'divide them, in like manner, among the whole
'body of the Roman Catholics.'

The danger of putting forward any proposi-
tion as a leading principle, other than that
which would maximize felicity, consists in this
—that if it coincide with the greater principle
it is supererogatory; if it do not coincide, it is

pernicious. Any principle that is not subordinate to it may be opposed to it, either diametrically or collaterally. The ascetic principle, if all-comprehensive and consistent, may be evidenced as one of direct opposition,—the ipse-dixit principles of all sorts may be ranked among the indirect opponents. Qui non sub me contra me. 'He who is not under me is against me,' may be said with figurative or metaphorical truth by the Greatest-Happiness Principle, and with literal truth by every one of its partisans. And let not this declaration be taken as the result of arrogance of disposition: it grows out of the nature of things, and the necessities of the case. Let it not be considered to bespeak unkindness towards any advocate of the opposite opinions, for such unkindness is neither its necessary, nor even its natural accompaniment.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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