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
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112.

DID THE GLADSTONE GOVERNMENT ABANDON GENERAL GORDON?

NO.

The Evidence of the Blue Book



BY

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The argument that follows will be better understood from the following

BRIEF CHRONOLOGY.

- 1839, May 5.—Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, begins a successful revolt against the Sultan.
- 1841, January 11.—Mehemet Ali is compelled by the British Government to hold Egypt as a tributary of the Sultan.
- 1874–1879.—General Gordon in the Soudan as Governor-General, for the Suppression of the Slave Trade.
- 1876.—The Debt of Egypt amounts to £91,000,000, bearing from 12 to 26 per cent. interest on what was actually lent to Egypt.
- 1876, November.—The Governments of Mr. Disraeli and M. Gambetta establish the Dual Control in Egypt.
- 1876–1879.—Cruel exaction of Taxes from the impoverished people.
- 1879.—The Khedive (Ismail), influenced by the general suffering and discontent, dismisses the Control Ministers.
- 1879.—Deposition of Khedive by the Sultan, on Lord Salisbury's demand; Tewfik succeeds him.
- 1879, November.—Liquidation of the Debt of Egypt.
- 1879.—General Gordon leaves the Soudan in despair of reforming its government.
- 1880.—Beginning of Arabi's revolt.
- 1880, April 23.—Mr. Gladstone's Administration begins.
- 1881–1882.—Rise and successes of the Mahdi.
- 1882, September 13.—Battle of Tel-el-Kebir.
- 1883, February 6.—Lord Dufferin's Report on Reforms in Egypt.
- 1883, April 29.—Colonel Hicks' great victory over Mahdi, at Gebel Ain.
- 1883, November.—Annihilation of Hicks' force in the Soudan.
- 1883, December.—The Gladstone Government insist on the abandonment of the Soudan by Egypt.
- 1883, December 22.—Sir E. Baring, at Cairo, asks for an English officer to withdraw Egyptian garrisons from Soudan.
- 1884, January 8.—*Pall Mall Gazette* urges the sending out of General Gordon.
- 1884, January 18, 3 p.m.—Gordon, arriving from Brussels, sees Lord Granville.
- 8 p.m.—Gordon leaves for the Soudan.

DID THE GLADSTONE GOVERNMENT ABANDON GENERAL GORDON ?

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

THOSE who have read my pamphlet, "*The Financial Tyranny in Egypt, under the Conservatives, 1876—1880,*" will remember that Lord Salisbury said at Plymouth, in June, 1884, that he handed Egypt over to Mr. Gladstone in 1880, "*in a state of smiling prosperity.*" The inaccuracy of that assertion has been exposed; and yet, while no one has had the hardihood to defend it, Lord Salisbury has had the temerity to repeat it.

But Conservative statesmen are now circulating another statement. Their cry is, "*Who abandoned Gordon ?*"

Sir Stafford Northcote, at Appledore, June 2nd, 1885, said :

"Gordon's name would long call a flush to the cheeks of Englishmen, as they thought of how he had been ABANDONED during the last months of his life."

This is the charge which I hope to meet and refute in the following pages.

I.—GENERAL GORDON'S OPINION OF EGYPTIAN RULE 1879. IN THE SOUDAN.

GORDON did not go out to re-establish Egyptian rule in the Soudan. He detested that rule. He had been Governor-General of the Soudan from 1874 to 1879, and he threw up his appointment in the latter year in these words : "The Government of the Egyptians in these far-off countries is nothing else but one of brigandage of the very worst description. It is so bad that all hope

1879. of ameliorating it is hopeless; so I do the only thing possible, that is, vacate them.”—(“Colonel Gordon in Central Africa.” G. Birkbeck Hill. Third Edition, p. 349.)
1884. Nor had his opinion changed in the interval. Four days after leaving London, on January 22, 1884, he wrote, on board the *Tanjore*: “Her Majesty’s Government are fully justified in recommending the evacuation.” “A good Government is impracticable at any cost.”

II.—WHAT GORDON WAS SENT OUT TO DO.

In a letter from the “Foreign Office, Jan. 18, 1884,” Lord Granville ordered Gordon “to report upon the best mode of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan.”

On January 26, the Khedive of Egypt drew up a proclamation, which he ordered General Gordon to publish on his arrival in the Soudan. It contained these words:—
“We have decided to restore to the families of the kings of the Soudan their former independence, and we have now appointed Gordon Pasha to proceed to the Soudan as our representative, with full powers to arrange with you *friendly means* for the evacuation of these provinces by our troops.” (P. P. Egypt, 12, 1884, p. 28.)

General Gordon suppressed that proclamation, no doubt from a sense of duty, but, as we believe, with evil results.

January 25.—Sir Evelyn Baring, at Cairo, also gives Gordon instructions. He is to “spare no effort to secure the retreat” of the garrisons. “The main end to be pursued is the evacuation of the Soudan.” There can be no mistake about this. Other instructions accompanied those quoted, indicating as among Gordon’s duties the resettlement of the Government of the country *after* the garrisons and *employés* had been brought away. But measures of resettlement were to be contingent upon evacuation.

III.—GORDON’S MISSION ONE OF PEACE.

The *Pall Mall Gazette*, in its “Too Late,” says: “Gordon was only fettered by his own discretion.” “War against the Mahdi the moment he arrived would not have been exceeding his instructions.”

This is wholly inaccurate.

Gordon was to evacuate "by friendly means."

On Feb. 6, Sir E. Baring forbids Gordon visiting the Mahdi. Gordon replies: "I understand your desire to be the pacification of the country without bloodshed." (Eg. 12, 1884, p. 88.)

Feb. 12.—Mr. Gladstone said, in House of Commons: "We are resolved to do nothing which would interfere with this great *pacific* scheme."

Feb. 13.—Mr. Gladstone expressed, in Parliament, a fear that even the relief of Tokar, near the Red Sea, might compromise the pacific character of Gordon's mission.

Feb. 14.—Sir Chas. Dilke said: "Gordon will have any support which he can need in the prosecution of his mission."

Feb. 18.—Gordon arrived in Khartoum, and in his address to the people said: "*I come without soldiers.*" "*I will not fight with any weapons but justice.*"

His appearance confirmed this. He was accompanied only by Col. Stewart, and armed with a walking-stick.

No further proof is needed that General Gordon was not sent out "to smash the Mahdi."

IV.—GORDON CONFRONTED BY TREMENDOUS DIFFICULTIES.

It was far from certain whether even a pacific mission was practicable. Certainly a warlike mission was not.

The Mahdi's insurrection had been preparing six or seven years before 1884. (Forbes, "Chinese Gordon," p. 222.)

This insurrection, like Arabi Pasha's further north, had been stimulated by the tyranny of the Dual Control in wringing money from the people for the Bondholders. (Lord Dufferin's Report, Feb. 6, 1883.) This is further proved by Gordon's conduct on arriving at Khartoum. He made a bonfire of the kourbashes, whips, bastinado, rods, and books of debts. (*The Times.*) Such a propitiation implied bitter memories of past wrong.

The Soudan, over which the garrisons were scattered, is larger than all Germany, France, and Spain.

The Khedive said to Baron Malortie, on Jan. 29, two

1884. days after Gordon left Cairo: "To tell you that he will succeed is more than I or any mortal could prognosticate, for there are *tremendous odds against him.*"

On Jan. 9, nine days before Gordon left London, Col. Coetlogon, commanding at Khartoum, telegraphed that the garrison should be immediately withdrawn. He said: "*One third of the garrison is unreliable.*"

On the next day, Jan. 10, Coetlogon telegraphs: "*Escape is now possible, but it may not be later.*"

On Jan. 14, four days before Gordon left London, Lord Granville wired Sir E. Baring to ask what measures had been taken for the retreat of the Khartoum garrison and civil servants. Nothing could be plainer, therefore, than the aim of Mr. Gladstone's policy. The garrisons were to come away at the earliest moment possible.

V.—GORDON ARRIVES AT KHARTOUM, AND FINDS EVACUATION OF THE SOUDAN IMPOSSIBLE.

The Soudan rebellion was too widespread and formidable to permit the withdrawal of garrisons from points 400 to 1,000 miles south of Khartoum.

Feb. 18.—Gordon reached Khartoum. *Next day* he telegraphed Sir E. Baring to send Zebehr Pasha—a great Soudanese ruler and slave-hunter—who had been in exile in Cairo since 1876, by Gordon's former orders. The telegram said: "He alone has the ability to rule the Soudan." (P. P., Eg., 12, 1884, p. 72.)

Feb. 27.—Gordon telegraphs: "The evacuation of the Soudan is impossible" until troops are sent. "You must send Indian Moslem troops to Wady Halfa."

Feb. 29.—Gordon telegraphs: "Every chance of improving is getting worse." And he had been in Khartoum only eleven days!

March 1.—Gordon wires: "Zebehr is the only chance."

March 2, 3 and 4.—Gordon sent a series of telegrams. He said: "I must have Zebehr." "My weakness is that of being foreign, and Christian, and *peaceful.*"

March 8.—Gordon says in a despatch to Lord Granville: "If you do not send Zebehr, you have *no chance* of getting the garrisons away."

VI.—LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES ALIKE RESPONSIBLE 1884.
FOR REFUSAL TO SEND ZEBEHR.

Great indignation was displayed by the Conservative Opposition at the idea that Zebehr should be appointed. They claimed the right to refuse this assistance to Gordon, though they afterwards challenged the right of the Government to refuse an expedition for putting down the Mahdi!

On February 22, Lord Granville announced that "in any case public opinion would not stand Zebehr."

VII.—WHY A MILITARY EXPEDITION TO KHARTOUM WAS
REFUSED IN MARCH, 1884.

The Government did not want to fight the Mahdi. They refused to be led into an armed expedition for the release of the garrisons, involving a prolonged campaign for British troops 2,000 miles south of Cairo in the hottest season.

Gordon thought the mere presence of Indian troops at Wady Halfa would disperse the Mahdi's forces. The military advisers of the Cabinet took a different view (Eg. 12, p. 140), which subsequent events confirmed. General Graham, in pursuance of a policy called for by *both parties* in Parliament—viz., the retention of Suakim, twice severely defeated the Arabs of the Eastern Soudan—at *El Teb*, Feb. 29, and at *Tamai*, March 13. Did these defeats, well known at Khartoum, frighten the Mahdi?

VIII.—GORDON MIGHT HAVE SAVED HIMSELF AND THE
KHARTOUM GARRISON.

Gordon's task should have been the removal of such of the Khartoum garrison and people as desired to leave.

This he could have done.

This Lord Granville ordered him to do.

This would have saved his own life, and many hundreds of lives, now lost.

This he declined to do.

I adduce the following proofs:—

March 8.—Gordon wrote Lord Granville that he had already "sent down from Khartoum all the sick men, women, and children of those killed in Kordofan."

1884. March 9.—Gordon telegraphs: “If you determine on neither (troops nor Zebehr), then I can see no use in holding on to Khartoum, for it is impossible for me to help the other garrisons, and I shall only be sacrificing the troops and employés HERE.” “Your instructions to me had better be that I should evacuate Khartoum, and, with all the employés and troops, remove the seat of Government to Berber. If the immediate evacuation of Khartoum is determined on, irrespective of outlying towns, I would propose to send down all the employés and white troops with Colonel Stewart to Berber. This is my idea. If you object, tell me.” (Eg. 12, p. 161.)

Gordon thus admitted he could save the Khartoum garrison by sending them with Stewart. Lord Granville at once sent him a message which showed common sense and their anxiety for Gordon’s safety. Here it is:—

March 13.—“Let Gordon conduct the garrison himself to Berber without delay.” He is “on no account to proceed to the Equatorial Provinces.”

The delirious criticism in “Too Late” makes much of Lord Granville’s refusal to send troops. “This sealed Gordon’s hopes.” Lord Granville “caged his victim.” But such criticism can only be regarded as nonsense, when Gordon had, but a few days before, sent 2,600 men, women, and children away in safety. Soldiers could have been sent more safely still.

So far, indeed, was Gordon from being “caged” that he wrote the following to his brother:—

March 15.—“We are all in capital spirits here. The enemy are entrenched nine miles off, 6,000 strong.” (*Contemporary Review*, June, 1884, p. 873.)

But the best proof of Gordon’s power to get away from Khartoum was afforded on

March 21—ten days after the “caging of the victim.” Gordon then marched out of Khartoum, fought a battle at Halfiyeh—a town at least six miles north of Khartoum—rescued the garrison, and returned.

IX.—GORDON ADOPTS A VIOLENT POLICY.

Gordon’s character, as a man of Christian honour and heroism, is not for a moment impeached in this publication. I narrate facts; I do not impute dis-

honourable motives. My contention is that Gordon was not *abandoned*, but that he was *self-sacrificed* through departing from the letter and spirit of his instructions. He was just the man to take a bold course, to break with the past, to follow his own eager initiative. He did so, and upon himself the responsibility rests. 1884.

On Feb. 6 he had accepted "*the pacification of the Soudan without bloodshed*," as an official description of his task by Sir E. Baring. (Eg. 12, 1884, p. 88.)

Twelve days later he arrived at Khartoum, where he at once announced himself as *Governor-General of the Soudan*, thus giving the impression that the Khedive's government would be maintained. This could not fail to exasperate the Arabs, to whom the Khedive's name was an abomination. Further, Gordon suppressed the Proclamation of Abandonment, dated Jan. 26, in which the Khedive announced that he had sent Gordon to give up the Soudan to its native rulers and to evacuate the country.

Gordon's account of this step is as follows (Eg. 12, 1884):—"It has been impossible to publish or allow any one of the Soudan to read it." "If this Firman is read to them they would imagine that *the Turkish Government had ceased to exist*, and that there is now no Government here except that of the Mahdi." "On my arrival here I showed that, without doubt, *the laws of the country would remain as they were*, and that a military force would come for the maintenance of order." "When it was at last known by them THAT THE SOUDAN WOULD NOT BE ABANDONED, and that troops were coming to Khartoum, the Mahdi did not move from his position."

I might rest my whole case upon these extraordinary words. They ought to convince any just man that Gordon, for reasons which appeared to him sufficient, CONCEALED FROM THE PEOPLE THE PRECISE OBJECT WHICH THE GLADSTONE GOVERNMENT HAD SENT HIM TO ACCOMPLISH.

X.—GORDON PROPOSES TO "SMASH THE MAHDI."

Gordon was willing that the Soudan should be abandoned, but not at once. He wanted one thing to be done first, which Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues would neither

1884. sanction nor assist. HE WANTED TO "SMASH THE MAHDI."

He had been in Khartoum only nine days when, on February 27, he wrote a despatch to Sir E. Baring, containing these words: "If Egypt is to be quiet, Mahdi must be smashed up. Mahdi is most unpopular, and with care and time [he might have added, with loss of *British lives*] could be smashed. If you decide on smashing the Mahdi, send £100,000 and 200 troops to Wady Halfa."

These words prove that General Gordon wanted to proceed upon lines opposite to his pacific instructions.

He said he could not evacuate if Zebehr was refused him.!

He then asked for instructions to come away.

He was ordered to come away.

He might have done so—with the garrison.

He preferred to stay and "smash the Mahdi."

The Gladstone Government and General Gordon were now travelling on different roads.

On March 12, Mr. Gladstone, speaking in the House of Commons, asserted that Gordon's mission was peaceful. He denied that he had ever received "*power to make war as he pleased.*" "*Gordon received nothing of the kind.*"

XI.—WHY BRITISH TROOPS WERE NOT SENT TO KHARTOUM.

It is easy to say that General Graham, after his second defeat of Osman Digna, at Tamai, on March 13, could have sent a squadron to Berber or to Khartoum.

1. A squadron would not have sufficed, either for meeting an enemy or for getting to Khartoum.

2. British soldiers would have imperilled Gordon's retirement by exasperating the Arabs.

3. Troops sent at that time, when Gordon was meditating the "smashing of the Mahdi," would have led to larger military enterprises.

4. Sir E. Baring, March 24, reports opinion of military authorities that "there would be great difficulty (as to climate, water, &c.) in troops getting to Berber" from Suakim.

XII.—REFUSAL OF TROOPS DID NOT ENDANGER
GORDON'S LIFE.

1884.

On March 13 Lord Granville telegraphed to Egypt: *Gordon should evacuate Khartoum, and save that garrison by conducting it himself to Berber without delay.*" (Eg. 12, 1884, p. 162—3.)

On the same day Gordon wired Baring that unless he could release the Halfiyeh garrison (some miles north of Khartoum) there was "no hope of extricating the Khartoum garrison, except by a retreat to the Equator." (Eg. 18, 1884, p. 9.) Well, eight days later (March 21) Gordon *did* release the garrison of Halfiyeh, and brought it to Khartoum. He thus showed his power to make his way northward.

On March 29 Gordon reported to Baring: "The rebels do not number more than 1,500."

But he would not leave Khartoum. Why? Because he would have been in danger? No; but because the civil population of Khartoum would at once (as he tells us) have gone over to the Mahdi, which they had a perfect right to do, especially as we had announced the abandonment of the Soudan by Egypt. (Eg. 12, 1884, p. 150.) In short, General Gordon stayed in Khartoum to give effect to his own personal policy as to putting down the Mahdi, not because he was in danger.

April 9.—Gordon writes his brother: "All going on well." The latter told the writers of a magazine article that his brother was in no danger. "He would not withdraw, though you were to order him to withdraw. (This was done by Lord Granville, March 13.) *You may do what you like with him, he would not withdraw. He could leave to-morrow if he were so minded.*" (*Contemporary Review*, June, 1884, pp. 873—8.)

The last telegram Gordon sent to the Government before the wire was cut, dated April 16, proves at once Gordon's safety, and his uncontrollable independence. It said: "You will not send troops or Zebehr. I consider myself free to act according to circumstances. *If I can suppress the rebellion I shall do so.*"

Then follow the hot words about "indelible disgrace," and the prophecy that the British Government will be "forced to smash up the Mahdi." Surely it would

1884. have been a disgrace to "smash up the Mahdi" for trying to secure that independence of the Soudan which the British Government had determined to grant.

XIII.—THE GOVERNMENT SHOW PROPER CONCERN FOR GORDON'S SAFETY.

On April 23, four days after Gordon had stated that he had provisions for five months (Eg. 18, 1884, p. 13), Lord Granville ordered messengers to be sent to ascertain his position, and the best route for a rescuing force. In the same telegram (April 23), Lord Granville used these words, which should be well weighed before the Gladstone Government is condemned: No Turkish force would be sent, "such being beyond the scope of the commission Gordon holds, and *at variance with the pacific policy* which was the purpose of his mission to the Soudan." "If with this knowledge he continues at Khartoum, *he should state to us the cause and intention with which he so continues.*" (Eg. 13, p. 15.)

May 10.—The British military authorities in Cairo are ordered to prepare for the despatch in the autumn of an expeditionary force for the relief of Gordon. 12,000 camels to be purchased. Active war preparations begun in England. (This was twenty-one days after Gordon reported Khartoum to be provisioned for five months.)

XIV.—MR. GLADSTONE'S POSITION.

The Prime Minister's reluctance to take military measures against Osman Digna is well known. This reluctance has often been ridiculed by Lord Salisbury. Mr. Gladstone has never been ready enough to shed blood to please some of the Tories, who, however, as soon as he has set soldiers to work, have almost called him a murderer.

When one of General Gordon's relatives was asked (see *Contemporary Review*, June, 1884): "Have you any idea why the Government are not willing to send instructions to General Gordon?" he replied: "I think they cannot order General Gordon to govern. It would put them under the necessity of taking the Soudan." This is the whole question.

May 12.—Mr. Gladstone speaks in the House of

Commons: "The right hon. gentleman says the sooner 1884.
the Mahdi's movement is put down the easier. In other words he advises us to carry the line of conquest by British and Christian arms among the Mahommedan people struggling for their liberty in the Soudan. It would be *a war of conquest against a people struggling to be free. Yes; these are a people struggling to be free, and they are rightly struggling to be free.*"

It was impossible, therefore, for Mr. Gladstone to be a party to "the smashing of the Mahdi."

XV.—WHY THE RELIEF EXPEDITION WAS NOT SENT EARLIER.

July 8.—Lord Hartington said, in the House of Commons: "It is not our intention to despatch an expedition to the relief of General Gordon, unless it is clearly shown that it is the only means by which General Gordon can be relieved."

July 13.—Gordon sent out five letters to this effect: "*All well. Can hold out for four months.*" (P.P. 53, 1884, p. 67.)

On July 29, M. Herbin, French Consul, wrote: "We are in a strong position at Khartoum. No need for alarm, unless it be want of provisions. The Mahdi at Obeid is, perhaps, in as bad a situation as we are." (Eg. 1, 1885, p. 22.)

July 30.—Gordon replies to Lord Granville's message of April 23. This is important, as showing Gordon's position at the end of July. The letter says: "The troops and people are full of heart. *I should say that about 2,000 determined men alone keep the Arabs in the field. We have sent down over 600 soldiers and 2,000 people.*" "*The route from Wady Halfa along the right bank of the Nile is the best.*"

July 31.—Gordon writes Baring: "We continue, thank God, to drive Arabs back up Blue Nile. We hope to send expedition to surprise and recapture Berber."

These letters prove that—

1. Gordon was safe at the beginning of August.
2. The Arabs were not then strong.
3. The longest route, which delayed the expedition, was Gordon's choice.

1884. 4. So far from being in personal danger, he was about to operate against places far distant from Khartoum.

Mr. Gladstone's Government delayed the expedition only through the months of terrific heat.

The conclusion is irresistible that when, on August 5, Mr. Gladstone proposed a vote of £300,000 to provide for a relief expedition, there had been no delay such as placed Gordon in peril.

XVI.—CONTINUED SAFETY OF GORDON.

August—December, 1884.

On August 10, Gordon won a great victory over the Arabs.

August 23.—Wrote Baring: "Hope shortly to take Berber."

In the next few weeks three things happen worthy of note.

Sept. 9.—Colonel Stewart and party leave Khartoum by steamer for Egypt.

Sept. 10.—Lord Wolseley arrives at Cairo.

Sept. 24.—Gordon writes in his Journal (q. v.) :—"As for myself, I could make good my retreat at any moment, if I wished."

This is confirmed by the fact that on

Oct. 17.—Gordon bombarded Metammeh with three steamers and eighteen nuggars (P.P. 49, 1885, p. 66), thirteen days after Wolseley had reached Wady Halfa.

Nov. 2.—Wolseley's expedition reached Dongola.

Nov. 4.—Gordon writes Baring that there are five steamers awaiting Wolseley at Metammeh, and that he can hold out forty days with ease, after which it will be difficult. (P.P. 82, 1885, p. 84.)

XVII.—WOLSELEY'S EFFORT TO RESCUE GORDON

was brilliantly made. If it failed, this was neither his fault, nor that of the Government.

Dec. 12.—The headquarters were at Korti.

Dec. 31.—Messenger from Gordon brought Wolseley message on a scrap of paper :—"Khartoum all right, Dec. 14, 1884. C. G. GORDON."

Jan. 8, 1885.—Stewart left Korti for Metammeh under orders to communicate with Gordon WITHOUT DELAY. 1884-1885.

Stewart hoped to reach the Nile on January 16th; but his brave 1,500 had rough work in the desert. They were four days late, and not a thousand strong, when they arrived weary at the river. Here another message from Gordon raised their hopes:

“Dec. 29.—Khartoum all right; could hold out for years.”

XIX.—THE FOUR DAYS' DELAY AT METAMMEH.

Stewart had been severely wounded, and Sir Charles Wilson, who now took command, read far too literally Gordon's words that he “could hold out for years.” Mr. Charles Williams, who was present, assures us (*Fortnightly Review*, May, 1885) that by three o'clock of January 21st, the steamers were ready to start for Khartoum. This is what took place:—

Jan. 21.—No start made.

Jan. 22.—No start made. Reconnaissance on Shendy.

Jan. 23.—No start made.

Jan. 24.—Start made at noon, 69 hours after steamers had been *reported* ready.

Jan. 25.—Wilson's expedition on way to Khartoum.

Jan. 26.—Fall of Khartoum through the treachery of one of Gordon's lieutenants, Farag Pasha.

Jan. 27.—Wilson still on his way.

Jan. 28.—Wilson finds Khartoum taken, and returns.

An escaped Greek, who was in Khartoum when it was taken, and saw Wilson's steamers arriving from Metammeh on the 28th, told the *Daily News* military correspondent at Dongola, that had the steamers come three days earlier the English would have taken Khartoum easily. For their non-arrival the Gladstone Government is not responsible.

XX.—GORDON'S JOURNALS.

These were published on June 24th, 1885, and they cover the period from September 10, 1884, the day after Stewart left Khartoum, to the despatch of the steamers by Gordon to Metammeh.

1884- As these Journals are quoted by the Tory Press to
1885. discredit the Gladstone Government, they call for notice. With profound admiration for General Gordon's character, it is impossible not to dissent from some of his statements. I have contended that he was sent to Khartoum for one purpose, and that he remained there for another. I have tried to show that his continuance and ultimately his death in Khartoum were due to his repudiation of Government advice. His Journals confirm these opinions.

He says, Oct. 13: "England was made by adventurers, not by its Government." That may be true, but the adventure of reconquering the Soudan the Gladstone Government had never authorised.

Oct. 5.—He admits he cannot leave men "*whom he has egged on to fight for the last six months.*" But those six months of fighting did no good. Lord Granville had requested him, on March 13, to *evacuate Khartoum and save that garrison by bringing it himself to Berber without delay.*" (Eg. 12, 1884, p 162-3.) But, in spite of this, and of his own declarations of March 9, 1884—that it would be useless to hold on to Khartoum and impossible to help the other garrisons—General Gordon chose to stop at Khartoum, and to "*egg on his men to fight for six months*" in an attempt to "*smash the Mahdi.*"

I am ready to honour General Gordon as one of the noblest of England's sons; but it would be sheer idolatry of a great name to say that Gordon was not mistaken, insubordinate, and violent in his Soudan policy of 1884. There is more than one great name for whose honour Englishmen are jealous. The attempt to cast dishonour upon a greater name than Gordon's—that of Mr. Gladstone—by charging the latter with having abandoned Gordon to ruin and death, is as cruel as it is unsupported by documentary testimony.