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
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# OBSERVATIONS

ON

LIEUT.-COLONEL MALCOLM'S  
PUBLICATION,

RELATIVE TO THE

*Disturbances in the Madras Army;*

CONTAINING

A REFUTATION OF THE OPINIONS OF THAT  
OFFICER,

FROM THE EVIDENCE OF THE PAPERS LAID BEFORE  
PARLIAMENT:

CONTAINING ALSO,

*COPIES AND EXTRACTS*

OF

SOME INTERESTING LETTERS

ADDRESSED BY

THE LATE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS

TO

SIR G. BARLOW.



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LONDON:

PRINTED FOR BLACK, PARRY, AND CO.  
BOOKSELLERS TO THE HON. EAST INDIA COMPANY,  
LEADENHALL STREET,  
By E. Blackader, Took's Court, Chancery Lane, London.

1812.



## OBSERVATIONS, &c.

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**T**HE frequent publications on the subject of the late disturbances at the Presidency of Madras, having nearly exhausted the public attention, there was reason to hope, that events which must ever be the source of the most painful remembrance, would have been now permitted quietly to descend the stream of oblivion. This is manifestly the most salutary course that can be pursued, for the purpose of allowing those heated passions, from which arose such manifold evils, gradually to resume a state of settled tranquillity. We deviate from a course of this nature with reluctance: but the authority attached to a publication which has been recently given to the world under the name of Lieut.-Col. Malcolm, induces us to state some observations on a work which, however unintentionally on the part of that Officer, we think calculated to mislead the public judgment. It is to

be lamented, that an Officer so highly respectable as Colonel Malcolm, should have directed so large a share of his attention to such crude statements as are contained in numerous anonymous pamphlets, while the powerful evidence exhibited in the papers laid before Parliament, has been almost wholly overlooked. Those papers have been produced on the motion of an Honorable Member (Mr. Creevy), professedly as the means of establishing grounds for the crimination of Sir George Barlow. That Honorable Member has not hitherto ventured to persevere in his motion, and we may fairly presume that the papers now before the House of Commons, exhibit a very different view of facts from what he had anticipated. Whatever may be the feelings of the Honourable Member, he could not have served the cause of Sir G. Barlow more essentially than by the production of the papers he moved for, as they furnish a series of proof stronger than has perhaps ever appeared in any public question, and establish beyond contradiction, the wisdom, ability, and firmness with which Sir G. Barlow administered the important affairs committed to his charge, during more arduous times than any Governor of our eastern possessions ever before experienced.

Respecting, as we do, the character of Colonel Malcolm, we think it unlikely, if he had perused the Parliamentary Papers with attention, that he would have advanced those opinions which appear in his recent publication. The sentiments

which he has expressed are certainly calculated to fall in with the current of feelings and passions prevailing in a pretty wide circle; but we are willing to believe the mind of Colonel Malcolm to be superior to any popularity that can be obtained at the expence of justice.

The declared object of Colonel Malcolm's publication is *defensive*;—"to vindicate himself, not to attack others." If these limits had been observed, we should have followed equally our duty and our inclination, in abstaining from all comment; and should have rejoiced in seeing Colonel Malcolm preserve undisturbed that reputation to which a long course of public service had entitled him. But it is enough to refer to the publication to perceive that a very wide deviation has taken place from the proposed path, which seems indeed scarcely to extend to the close of the Prefatory Remarks. When we find the personal character of Sir G. Barlow attacked with great asperity, and the Government of Madras, on numerous occasions, charged, in terms sufficiently direct, with the excitement of the Mutiny; a new aspect is given to the subject; and whatever may be our feelings with regard to the author of the publication, and whatever our unwillingness to continue a discussion which it would be infinitely preferable to lay at rest, we are called on, by the most powerful motives, not to pass in silence, opinions which coming from a quarter in itself respectable, and conveyed in somewhat an imperative tone of con-

confidence,\* are calculated to carry with them a degree of weight, to which we assume not, we think, too much in stating, that they have not an intrinsic claim.

We shall spare ourselves and our readers the task of going, with any minuteness, over ground already abundantly traversed. Such minuteness

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\* Among many other examples of self-confidence, surely exaggerated, we find it assumed by Col. Malcolm, in the very outset of the work,—“ That if *any one* of the many slighted suggestions which I offered, had met with attention, the most serious evils would have been averted.” This is stated in opposition to the sentiments of every authority to whom it has belonged to consider and to decide, on the measures which Col. Malcolm has professed to discuss. It is, too, stated, in opposition to the evidence derived from the complete success which attended a course of proceeding, nearly the reverse of that which Col. Malcolm recommended.

In referring to the Preface of Col. Malcolm's publication, we are led to think that he can scarcely have been serious in the observations which he has introduced, as to the supposed inactivity of the press, relative to the affairs of India. We are inclined to the belief, that no part of the British possessions has afforded a more unceasing theme of discussion. Surely no proof of inactivity is to be found in the discussion of those events to which our attention is now directed; and if we had not been told the contrary, we might have been led to believe that the press had never chosen a subject for a more diffusive exercise of uncontrolled freedom:—perhaps, too, we might have thought, that there never was a case, in itself the plainest possible, which the perversion of that freedom had more tended to perplex.



cannot be necessary, as with respect to the origin and progress of the Mutiny, Colonel Malcolm has stated no new fact, and the conclusions which he has drawn, being generally unsupported by any reference to authorities, our own minds must decide the degree of confidence with which they are to be received. With every possible deference to the sentiments of Col. Malcolm, we may be allowed to observe that, they are opposed, in most cases, by a succession of opinions coming from the highest quarters, and founded on evidence which there has been no attempt to controvert. Most of the measures referred to by Col. Malcolm, have been discussed at great length by the Government of Madras, by the Supreme Government of India, by the Court of Directors, and in conjunction with them by His Majesty's Ministers; and the conclusions drawn by these authorities have been, on most points, in immediate opposition to the conclusions of Col. Malcolm. This is a preponderance of opinion which any unbiassed mind will not find it easy to resist. Still less easy must be such resistance, when we perceive that this preponderance is derived from no cursory, declamatory view of the question, but rests on the basis of a more perfect chain of evidence than perhaps ever before supported any matter proposed for public consideration. We quote from memory, but we think we have read in a distinguished writer (Mr. Burke), frequently quoted in the pamphlet before us, that "Public authority

“ carries with it great weight; but that Power,  
 “ armed with Reason, is irresistible.”

In proceeding to consider, with as much conciseness as possible, some of the topics adverted to by Col. Malcolm, we are induced to express some degree of surprise at the laconic mode in which that Officer has, after a few hasty lines, at once traced the Mutiny of Madras to the supposed origin of a “ quarrel which occurred between the  
 “ Governor, Sir G. Barlow, and the Commander-  
 “ in-Chief, General Macdowall.” We should have expected, from the large store of Oriental knowledge possessed by Col. Malcolm, a more comprehensive and just view of the great event which he has undertaken to describe, making at the same time, as we do, every possible allowance that can be desired, for the operation of trifles in the affairs of State. The perusal of the publication before us might suggest the idea, that if any predisposing cause leading to mutiny was in existence, it was of the slightest kind; and that “ petty  
 “ differences between the Commander-in-Chief  
 “ and the Governor,” was the soil in which this stupenduous occurrence at once took root and flourished. We think that a perusal of the Papers within the reach of most persons, must furnish a picture of a very different nature. Lord Minto, who receives from Colonel Malcolm the deserved appellation of an “ able and virtuous nobleman,” several months after the termination of the Mutiny, directed his attention with the utmost care, to

Pamphlet,  
 page 4—5.

Pamphlet,  
 page 7.

Lord Minto's Letter,  
 5th Feb.  
 1810.

the investigation of that important point—the “sources” of the evil which had occurred. The same subject has been investigated with great perspicuity in a Paper of distinguished ability, bearing the signatures of a large portion of the Directors of the India Company; and we should have thought that the information contained in those valuable papers would have satisfied any mind not wholly inaccessible to conviction. In the enumeration of causes that combined in the excitement of the Mutiny, Lord Minto observes:—“The Officers of the Company’s Army have been long in the habit of pursuing every object of personal interest, by artificial combination. They have learned to consider pertinacity, clamour, and violence, in the furtherance of such views, not only as legitimate means to attain the end, but as furnishing tests of professional spirit, which constitute a sort of public virtue, and give lustre to the individuals most distinguished for those military vices.” The effects which have followed have been perfectly true to the causes so accurately described by the above authorities. In the countries of Europe, mutiny is a rare occurrence. In England, a general combination among the Officers of the army, for the purpose of overawing the Government, is a thing unknown. In India, such an event is not only not unknown, but has been frequent. During the last half century, there have been two open Mutinies of that nature; the one which occurred in Bengal in 1766, under

Printed Papers—Letter signed by Mr. Grant, and Nine other Directors, 10th Sept. 1810.

the Government of the great Lord Clive, and that which broke out at Madras in 1809, both bearing the nearest features of resemblance in their origin, and in the circumstances which marked their progress and termination. In 1776, the Commander-in-Chief, at the head of the army, seized the Governor of Madras, (Lord Pigot,) confined his person, and subverted the Government. In 1783, a combination of the Officers of the Madras army compelled the Governor, Lord Macartney, to revoke his orders, and to re-establish certain allowances which he had judged it proper to discontinue. The events which occurred in the Indian army in 1795 and 1796, are of too recent a date not to be in remembrance. Lord Minto, and the authors of the able Paper to which we have already referred, both concur in ascribing the most pernicious consequences to the concessions of that period. Lord Minto terms them, “ a victory gained over Government by an imposing and compulsory mode of demand ;”—and says, that the regulations then passed, are usually claimed, “ as articles of a charter, constituting indefeasible rights, and protected by public faith, passed between equal and contracting parties.”\* The

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\* We have found some difficulty in collecting Colonel Malcolm's definite opinion as to these proceedings. In one part, that Officer apparently views them with complacency; as “ a course which certainly made many and important sacrifices of ordinary maxims of rule, but which led to a quiet and just

influence produced in the mind of the Indian army, by the success which had attended that, as well as former combinations, seems too apparent to be questioned. It would have been almost contrary to those principles which usually influence the actions of mankind, to expect a different effect, for it was sufficient to cast the eye back to the history of no remote times to see that every military combination in India had been successful, with one only exception—an exception which it had required all the vigour and ability of the illustrious Lord Clive, in the zenith of power, to produce. General Macdowall in his letter to Sir George Barlow, of the 16th May, 1808, recalls to mind that “the army having formerly gained so many points by representation, will naturally expect relief;” and significantly observes,—“You were in Bengal during the convulsions of the army (in 1796), and the subject must be familiar to you.” Lord Minto describes this kind of agitation as continuing in the army of

Printed  
Papers—  
quoted in  
the Direc-  
tor's Letter  
of 10th  
Sept. 1810,  
and in Lord  
Minto's  
Letter of  
5th Feb.  
1810.

Lord Min-  
to's Letter,  
5th Feb.  
1810.

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“settlement of all complaints,” as a matter where “most persons, when they contemplated the great end, would at least pardon the means by which it was obtained.” p. 57. At an earlier period, Col. Malcolm, in viewing the different modes of tranquillizing the rising tumults in the army, says, in a letter to Sir G. Barlow, “I need not state to you that any mode would be less injurious to the interests of Government, than that of its even entering (as it once did) into a discussion with the officers of its army, upon this great question.” (p. 132.)

Printed Papers—Letter from the Government of Madras to the Court of Directors, 21st Oct. 1807.

Madras, during a long period of time under various Governors and various Commanders-in-Chief, accumulating in its progress, and acquiring strength with “the habit of beholding authority “and rank insulted and degraded.”\* The precise state of the army of Madras in October 1807, two months before Sir G. Barlow received charge of that Government, is not matter of vague surmise, but was at that time, Mr. Petrie then presiding in the Government, brought under the attention of the Court of Directors in terms the most impressive. After stating various examples of proceedings in the greatest degree insubordinate, the Government expressly inform the Court, “that a spirit of insubordination and cabal has “lately shewn itself among several of your Officers, which must be dangerous to all armies, “and which, after the events that have agitated “the native army of this Presidency, might lead “to consequences of the most fatal nature. We “have been led to observe, that those persons are “frequently the most forward in such reprehensible “proceedings, who have most abundantly shared “the advantages of the public favour; and we “are satisfied that nothing but a firm determina-

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\* Lord Minto, in addition to the accumulating evils in the military branch of the service, describes the inflammatory proceedings of Sir H. Gwillim, one of the Judges at Madras, during the Government of Lord William Bentinck, as one of the fertile sources of the mischiefs which followed.

“ tion to resist, and to punish every appearance of  
 “ disrespect to the public authority, can uphold  
 “ that degree of discipline which is essential to  
 “ the existence of your army.” The Govern-  
 ment proceed to state, that they are “ strongly  
 “ impressed with the necessity of discouraging  
 “ by every means such factious proceedings as  
 “ generally lead to consequences of dangerous  
 “ extremity,” and warn the Court of Directors  
 “ that any encouragement of the groundless pre-  
 “ tensions (which had been urged) may be fatal  
 “ to the discipline and interests of their army.”

The Reader least informed relative to India, knows, that about this time, in consequence of the extreme embarrassment of the India finances, orders of the most peremptory nature were sent from England to the Indian Governments, calling on them to make all the reductions possible in every department of the service, as a measure essential to the existence of the Company. Lord William Bentinck and Sir John Cradock had made arrangements for carrying into effect these orders to a considerable extent; but their abrupt recall left the work incomplete, and its ultimate execution devolved to Sir G. Barlow, who succeeded to the Government in December, 1807. All the material reductions which he carried into effect had been proposed by Lord William Bentinck and Sir John Cradock, had been strongly recommended by Mr. Petrie, and had been sanctioned by the Supreme Government. No one however can

doubt the extent to which they operated, in giving a new impulse to the deadly poison already diffused in the army. In addition to these, and other predisposing causes to Military Mutiny, it is established on the same undoubted authority, that principles of the most seditious nature, had been widely disseminated in the civil department of the service. It is inconsistent with our limits to go at present into this subject. It is sufficient to say, that the adjustment of the debts of the Nabobs of the Carnatic, which commenced in 1808, was the signal for calling into full activity the operation of all those passions and intrigues which had for a series of years palsied every measure of the Government, and had repeatedly endangered its existence. To those were added, with united force, the dissatisfaction which the reductions in the civil department had not failed to excite; and those feelings of insubordination which previous circumstances had tended powerfully to create. There can, apparently, be little cause of surprise, that such sentiments as have been described, prevailing in a large portion of both the civil and military branches of the public service, united by common motives of action, and in a common cause, should have tended, by almost inevitable progression, to the excitement of the unhappy conflagration which ensued.

We might have expected that Col. Malcolm, with these and such other facts before him, as are to be found in the Parliamentary Papers, would



not have narrowed his view to the ground of a "quarrel" between the Governor and Commander-in-Chief; and that with a torrent of overwhelming evidence in sight, he would not have turned aside to seek in shallow streams for Reasons, which, like an airy portion of the element, must vanish on the slightest touch of examination. That the conduct pursued by General Macdowall had a fatal effect in applying the match to the charged mine, cannot be doubted; but this proceeded from no personal "quarrel;" from no "petty differences." We recur with feelings of sincere regret to any part of General Macdowall's conduct, which cannot be mentioned otherwise than in terms of condemnation. Greatly reluctant are we to dwell on the demerits of an Officer now no more! but whatever reluctance we may feel in this respect, still more reluctant shall we be to allow the clouds of error to throw their obscurity round the light of truth, without using the best means in our power to dissipate the delusion. We may be allowed to notice, generally, as an apparent defect in Col. Malcolm's publication, that circumstances, comparatively immaterial, seem to be ranged very much in front view, while facts of the first moment find a place, if not entirely out of sight, at least in the back ground, or in an obscure corner of the picture. There are, too, some events, regarding which it is not altogether clear, whether Colonel Malcolm intends to express praise or blame, or where condemnation is render-

ed inevitable by the redundancy of proof, the language of censure is, we think, not unfrequently so much softened as nearly to merge in that of approbation. As Colonel Malcolm evidently attaches great importance to the conduct of General Macdowall, as materially influencing the proceedings which he describes, we are called on, as far as possible, to supply the deficiencies which seem to exist in his Statement.

From the prominent feature which the conduct of General Macdowall forms in numerous pages of the Parliamentary Papers, there is much more difficulty (our limits being unavoidably narrowed), in selecting the facts most material, than in finding evidence to support the conclusions which no unbiassed mind can avoid forming on the subject. The question has been amply discussed in the dispatches addressed by the Indian Governments to the Court of Directors, and in the dispatches from the Court, all concurring in the same point : but it is sufficient at present to direct the attention to the Paper signed by ten of the East India Directors, to which we have already referred ; and to Lord Minto's letter, of the 5th February, 1810, as the subject has been there examined with great precision, and as the opinions expressed in these documents demand implicit confidence, being founded on incontrovertible evidence. We have already adverted to the reductions which were ordered in the civil and military branches of the service, and to the effect which those reductions produced.

They were received with great dissatisfaction throughout the Company's army on the establishment of Madras, and in a short time led to a general combination and correspondence on the subject of military allowances. This first appeared in the form of a proposed Memorial to the Supreme Government in Bengal, which was clandestinely circulated at certain military stations, applying for an extension to the coast army of the same allowances as exist in Bengal. The subject was brought to the knowledge of Sir G. Barlow, through an indirect channel, in May, 1808, and about the same time it was brought to his notice in a private letter from General Macdowall, who was then absent from the Presidency on a military tour. That letter, though written in the style of confidence, is much more calculated to intimidate, than to inform, or assist, the judgment of Sir G. Barlow, in the difficult circumstances which General Macdowall represented as existing. Lord Minto considers it a letter "which, if addressed in the same language to any other quarter, was calculated, not to repress a particular act of insubordination, but to excite a general mutiny." It states the reductions as the proximate causes of "the seeds of discontent being very widely disseminated; and almost every individual in the service, more or less dissatisfied." The letter is of a nature to require no comment in addition to what any one will find who refers to the Printed Papers. We shall therefore proceed to state, that Sir G. Barlow communicated to Ge-

neral Macdowall his sentiments, in a confidential form, as to the course proper to be pursued, in which that Officer, to all appearance, entirely concurred; and prohibitory orders of a very strong nature were circulated by General Macdowall against the further agitation of the question of military allowances. To adopt the words of the Paper recorded by the India Directors: "Could it have been conceived, that at the very time he was thus in appearance acting in concert with Government for the suppression of this prohibited, culpable, and dangerous proceeding, he was really co-operating with the insubordinate spirit of the army he commanded, and counteracting his own circular letter? The fact is now established." Lord Minto, in his letter of 5th February, 1810, states, that "at this very period, General Macdowall was acquainting the Officers in person, and convivial communications, that his circular letters were merely official, written at the requisition of Government, but not expressing his own sentiments; and that he wished them success in their pursuit." These proceedings took place in the course of 1808, and the sequel was such as there was abundant cause to anticipate. When General Macdowall was on the eve of embarking for England, in January, 1809, at the time when he had placed the Quarter-master-General, Lieut.-Col. Munro, in arrest, and was pressing on the attention of the Government other matters of the most embarrassing nature, the ques-

Para. 17.

tion of military allowances burst from its concealment, and was brought to the full view of the Government, in the shape of a Memorial, signed by a large portion of the Officers of the Madras army, and containing not only a demand of Bengal allowances, but a statement of various alleged grievances of an almost unlimited nature. The Memorial was accompanied by a letter from General Macdowall, supporting it with his warmest recommendation. The observations stated on this subject in the Paper of the India Directors are so clear and conclusive, that we are induced to insert an extract of some length on the subject. It is observed:—“ When the Memorial, projected in  
 “ May, which had for its object only the obtain-  
 “ ment of Bengal allowances, is compared with  
 “ the present, it will be evident that some powerful  
 “ influence must have operated upon the minds  
 “ of the Officers, to work them up to such an un-  
 “ precedented representation. It should be ob-  
 “ served, that not one of the articles of grievance  
 “ set forth in it, originated with Sir G. Barlow.  
 “ It condemns the acts of preceding Governments,  
 “ ratified by the Supreme Government and the  
 “ Court of Directors. It claims certain allowances  
 “ as *matter of right*; it interferes with the prero-  
 “ gative of the Court of Directors, in framing the  
 “ civil Government, requiring a seat in Council  
 “ for the ‘ Representative of the Army;’ thus in-  
 “ corporating the cause of General Macdowall  
 “ with their own; and all this is done at a moment

“ (we must be pardoned for repetitions) when the  
 “ well-known exigencies of the Company had im-  
 “ periously demanded a very general reduction  
 “ in their expenditure—when the resentment of  
 “ General Macdowall against the Court of Direc-  
 “ tors, and his hostility to the actual Government  
 “ of Madras, were notorious—and when the Go-  
 “ vernment had been deliberately attacked by the  
 “ arrest of Colonel Munro—and all this was done  
 “ by combination, in direct violation of the gene-  
 “ ral regulation, of which the Officers had been re-  
 “ minded by the circular letter of May.

“ After reviewing the different subjects of this  
 “ Memorial, and what has been said on them from  
 “ India, and by the Court of Directors, in the letter  
 “ to Fort St. George; and after considering the  
 “ time and manner in which it was brought for-  
 “ ward, hardly any one will be disposed to main-  
 “ tain that it is not animated by a vehement spirit  
 “ of insubordination and encroachment; neither  
 “ will it be contended that, if General Macdowall’s  
 “ part in this proceeding had been put wholly out  
 “ of view, the Government could have done other-  
 “ wise than express a decided disapprobation of it.

“ But was it possible to consider it distinct from  
 “ the share he took in it? That share gave a new  
 “ and alarming aspect to the whole—a combination  
 “ between the Commander-in-Chief, and the Officers  
 “ of an army, to press each other’s objects upon  
 “ the Government—objects not to be yielded—  
 “ and to endeavour to carry them by a general

“ attack, in violation of all the rules of subordina-  
 “ tion! And what an appearance does General  
 “ Macdowall make on this occasion! He who had,  
 “ but eight months before, as his duty required,  
 “ though the question was only about *one* of the  
 “ many points now contended for by the Officers,  
 “ warned them, by a circular letter, of the culpa-  
 “ bility of the course they were pursuing, and the  
 “ obligation which would attach upon him to bring  
 “ to punishment the leaders in such a proceeding,  
 “ he now comes forward, with the most indecent  
 “ inconsistency and disregard of the duty of his  
 “ high station, to abet all the discontents of the  
 “ Officers, and all the accumulations of their extra-  
 “ vagant pretensions, to do every thing in his  
 “ power to *protect their rights, and redress their*  
 “ *grievances*; and with a plain intimation that the  
 “ Government will not be *generous* or *just*, if it does  
 “ not also espouse their cause.

“ It was not possible, General Macdowall and  
 “ the army must not have been aware that the  
 “ Government could give no countenance to such  
 “ a proceeding; that it was a proceeding in defiance  
 “ of subordination and positive rule, at the most  
 “ exceptionable time which could have been cho-  
 “ sen; and that General Macdowall’s part in it,  
 “ was a flagrant insult to the Government.

“ If the Government had then proceeded to in-  
 “ flict punishment upon General Macdowall, and  
 “ to expose to the Officers, in General Orders,  
 “ their highly blameable conduct, they would cer-

“ tainly have still been within the line which  
 “ the case warranted ; but they took the least  
 “ notice of this proceeding that was possible, com-  
 “ patibly with their duty. They only stated, in  
 “ answer to the Commander-in-Chief, that they  
 “ could not view the sentiments contained in the  
 “ Memorial without extreme disapprobation, and  
 “ that they would suspend the final disposal of that  
 “ paper until it had been laid before the Supreme  
 “ Government. No notice whatever is taken of  
 “ the conduct of General Macdowall. Does this  
 “ look like harshness, severity, arbitrary oppres-  
 “ sive proceeding, of which so much is said in the  
 “ Dissents ? Like any desire to irritate or provoke,  
 “ or to indulge an unconciliatory spirit ? And we  
 “ wish those who see, in the proceedings of the Ma-  
 “ dras Government, on this trying occasion, a want  
 “ of conciliation, would be pleased to explain how  
 “ that principle could otherwise have been applied  
 “ here. Do they think it could have been hoped,  
 “ that solicitations on the part of Government, if  
 “ such could have been used to individuals, would  
 “ have broken the confederacy ? Or that soothing  
 “ speeches would have made the confederacy re-  
 “ linquish their objects ? To expect any thing of  
 “ this sort argues, in our opinion, a most erroneous  
 “ conception of the very serious nature of this case.  
 “ This was not, as we have remarked on another  
 “ occasion, the sudden ebullition of a new impulse ;  
 “ it was the progress of a long existing principle,  
 “ now much invigorated by additional influences,



“ and grown to a size truly formidable. The Government seem to have had a just idea of their situation and their duty; and to have had far higher and better objects than the indulgence of tempers and humours of their own. They appear to have been sensible that there was danger, and that they ought to maintain their legitimate authority with temperate firmness. In our humble judgment, this was the true line of policy in these circumstances, and will be so in all similar cases in our Indian Governments.”

The preceding extract is so ample as to leave nothing to be added. The facts, however, to which it refers, form a part only, and even an inconsiderable part, of the heavy offences charged against the conduct of General Macdowall. During the tour through the provinces in which he was employed, in 1808, he omitted no opportunity of disseminating doctrines of the most dangerous tendency. Lord Minto quotes General Macdowall's speech, addressed to the Company's European regiment at Masulipatam, on the 24th December, 1808, “ as one example of the means he employed habitually to ferment discontent in the army, and to exalt his own popularity with that body, at the expense of the most obvious duties of his station.” General Macdowall addressed the Commanding Officer at the head of this European regiment as follows:—“ Colonel Taylor, in performing a necessary part of my duty, by reviewing the different corps on this establishment, it

“ was my particular wish to see those in the Nor-  
 “ thern Circars, and particularly the Madras Eu-  
 “ ropean regiment. From many circumstances,  
 “ this regiment has, in a manner, been overlooked,  
 “ indeed, I may say, neglected ; placed in a corner  
 “ of this extensive country, it has seldom had its  
 “ practice of duty with the other corps of the  
 “ army.

“ Notwithstanding these circumstances, from  
 “ my knowledge of your zeal and ability, Colonel  
 “ Taylor, I was confident I should find this corps  
 “ in the high state of discipline it has this morning  
 “ evinced ; and it shall be my business, as much  
 “ as lays in my power, to let the service benefit  
 “ from this state of discipline, by calling it into  
 “ more general notice ; for I know that this state  
 “ of inactivity must be painful to the feelings of  
 “ honorable gentlemen and Officers, and painful  
 “ to the feelings of brave soldiers. Indeed I am  
 “ at a loss to know the reason for this neglect.  
 “ This regiment has always been forward for its  
 “ courage and loyalty ; you are composed of the  
 “ same materials as the other European corps in  
 “ the service, and I am certain that the same brave  
 “ and generous spirit actuates you.”

During this time General Macdowall maintained  
 with Sir G. Barlow, the appearance of confidential  
 intercourse, which continued until the return of  
 that Officer to the Presidency, about the end of  
 1808. It was then broken off, not from any per-  
 sonal disagreement, but on the systematic plan of

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opposition to the Government, which General Macdowall at that period openly avowed. Lord Minto states, that “from the period of his return, “he had chosen to discontinue all personal intercourse with Sir G. Barlow, to the extent of “omitting those outward marks of respect and attention which were due to the situation of the “Governor.” Sir G. Barlow was not discouraged by this circumstance from treating General Macdowall with every possible attention, both in his official and personal character. Of the latter disposition, the explanation given by Lord Minto affords abundantly clear evidence; and in proof of the moderation observed by the Government towards the Commander-in-Chief, it is sufficient to refer to the correspondence which took place at the period of General Macdowall’s embarkation for England, relative to the arrest of the Quarter-Master-General, and the various embarrassing topics then brought under discussion, as that correspondence evinces a degree of conciliation, of forbearance under accumulated injuries, and an earnestness to avert farther extremities, wholly unexampled.

Lord Minto's letter  
5th Feb.  
1810.

We are informed by Colonel Malcolm, that the discontent of the army was directed against the Government “by the proceeding of the Commander-in-Chief, very unadvisedly, and insidiously, however unintentionally.” There is scarcely any other than one point, on which there is concurrence of opinion between Lord Minto and

Colonel Malcolm, namely, the influence which the conduct of General Macdowall had on that of the army, and the consequent tendency “to exonerate the army itself of a very great portion of that guilt, which must otherwise have been laid exclusively to their account.” In viewing the many painful scenes which are opened by the present question, the mind derives some satisfaction in the idea of reaching, in part at least, the foundation of the evil; and while the *retrospect* is clouded by various dismal reflections, the *prospect* is gilded by the renewed hope that the returning loyalty, good sense, and discipline of the army, will for ever avert a repetition of those calamities by which the military character was for a time involved in so deep a shade.

Colonel Malcolm says, that the effect of General Macdowall’s conduct was “unintentional,” and that “few will accuse General Macdowall of more than want of reflection.” Here Colonel Malcolm, and Lord Minto, as well as the authors of the able paper recorded by the India Directors, decidedly differ; and as their opinion is given long after the termination of the mutiny, and is the result of a calm and minute examination of every point of evidence, it is nothing short of the weight of judicial decision. Lord Minto too, gives his opinion when fully possessed of all the information which Colonel Malcolm had furnished “with boldness and freedom.” His Lordship expressly charges General Macdowall with a “deliberate intention to make

“ the army an instrument of opposition and dis-  
 “ turbance to the Government ;” and with kind-  
 ling, “ with infinite industry, and no inconsider-  
 “ able skill, a flame, the destructive progress of  
 “ which, he could not fail to foresee, although  
 “ he did not stay to witness it.” If we are to  
 judge by the tenor of a private letter from Colonel  
 Malcolm (of the 11th February, 1809, from Bom-  
 bay,) quoted by Lord Minto, that Officer appears  
 himself to have entertained, at one time, sentiments  
 considerably more decided, than those which he  
 has lately expressed. We should have thought  
 that any subsequent enquiry which Colonel Mal-  
 colm may have made, would have rather tended to  
 encrease, than to diminish, the force of those sen-  
 timents. Colonel Malcolm observes ; “ I feel  
 “ obliged to congratulate myself at my absence  
 “ from your side of India ; for to be forced to wit-  
 “ ness, without having the power to remedy, such  
 “ scenes as you have had at Madras, must be  
 “ terrible. I judge only from report, and the Com-  
 “ mander-in-Chief’s Orders, particularly that about  
 “ Munro, which appears the boldest and most ex-  
 “ traordinary attack upon Government I ever  
 “ knew. It is all levelled direct at Government,  
 “ for they have evidently taken Munro’s cause  
 “ upon themselves.

“ I know not what others may think, but I can  
 “ find no excuse for a man in high station allow-  
 “ ing his private feelings, however much they  
 “ may have been wounded, to make him forget his

“ public duty, and set an example of that con-  
 “ tumely and insubordination which it is his par-  
 “ ticular duty to repress. There is no calculating  
 “ the mischief of such proceedings. It is waiving  
 “ a torch over a magazine.”

We shall leave every one to form their own conclusions on the preceding view of circumstances, comparatively with that exhibited in the pamphlet lately published by Colonel Malcolm.

Pamphlet,  
page 7.

Colonel Malcolm having disposed of the general observations contained in the first part of his late publication, proceeds to consider the “ first act “ which led to serious discussions,” viz. the placing the Quarter-Master-General, Lieut.-Col. Munro, in arrest. It being our endeavour to limit the Remarks, which we have deemed it our duty to make, to as few pages as possible, we shall not attempt to follow Col. Malcolm in any detail through his commentary. As, however, the observations relative to the case of the Quarter-Master-General stand first in order, and afford, we think, not an unfair specimen of the course of reasoning pursued by Colonel Malcolm, we shall state, as briefly as possible, such reflections as occur on the subject.

Colonel Malcolm says, that “ the nature of this “ case is well known.” But as the opinions given by Colonel Malcolm have left in our mind the impression of considerable doubt, whether it has been understood even by himself, it may be advisable to give a short and connected view of the

question. Lieut.-Col. Munro, an officer of distinguished talents and merit, was called on, by his Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Cradock, in his official capacity of Quarter-Master-General, to give his sentiments as to the reductions which were about to take place in the military department of the service. Among various papers of great ability, which the Quarter-Master-General in consequence prepared, he submitted to the Commander-in-Chief a Report on the system of supplying Camp Equipage, which had been established in the Madras army in 1802, under the denomination of the Tent-Contract, which system the Quarter-Master recommended to be discontinued, being in his opinion attended with unnecessary expense, and liable to other obvious objections. The Report was warmly approved by Sir John Cradock, who, in communicating it to the Government, where Lord William Bentinck then presided, observed that the sentiments expressed by the Quarter-Master-General, "were the result of their joint reflection on the subject, and were the issue of that experience which arose from their respective situations." The Report, in like manner, received the entire concurrence of the Governor, Lord William Bentinck; and of Mr. Petrie, who succeeded to the temporary charge of the Government of Madras, on his Lordship's departure for England, in September, 1807. It was, under these recommendations, referred to Bengal, where being also approved by the Commander-in-Chief in India,

Printed  
Papers,  
Letter  
from the  
Govern-  
ment of  
Madras,  
29th Jan.  
1809.

and by the Supreme Government, orders were finally transmitted to Madras (Sir G. Barlow being then Governor at that Presidency), for carrying the recommendations into effect. This measure gave great offence to the Officers commanding Native Corps, who held the contract for the supply of Tents to their Corps, and led to a very extensive combination against the Quarter-Master-General. It is now established that the Report having, in the usual mode of official intercourse, come into the hands of the Adjutant-General, Lieut.-Col. Capper, he forwarded to several Officers in his own and General Macdowall's confidence, all the passages in it that could be construed into an offence to the army; and that letters were immediately addressed by those Officers to the Commander-in-Chief (General Macdowall), transmitting to him the passages mentioned, and demanding justice for the insinuations contained in them." It has been seen that the Quarter-Master-General was expressly ordered to furnish the Report. It was confidential, and not meant for publication: but the expressions alluded to, have been pronounced, by every authority under whose observation they have come, to be of the most inoffensive nature. They are divested of all personal allusion, and merely suggest, in the course of general reasoning, the liability of abuse, under the operation of a system in various other respects objectionable. Lord Minto observes: "How is sincere and useful advice to be obtained; how is provision

Lord Minto's Letter,  
5th Feb.  
1810. Par.  
40.



“ ever to be made against abuse, if no man can  
“ hazard the allegation, in terms however general,  
“ that it exists, without the imputation of being a  
“ slanderer, and without incurring the disgrace of  
“ a prosecution.” If the expressions of the Quar-  
ter-Master-General had been altogether of a dif-  
ferent character, and had been directly criminatory  
in their nature, all legal authorities concur in  
thinking, that even in such case, he would have  
done no more than his duty demanded, in furnish-  
ing the best opinions that his information and judg-  
ment might dictate ; and that it was to his supe-  
riors, not to the Officers of the army, that he would  
have been responsible for their truth. The Quar-  
ter-Master-General had done no more than say,  
that certain *inducements* to abuse existed, under  
the system for the supply of Camp Equipage, which  
on general principles should not be allowed to  
constitute a part of any system. But even those  
expressions, unoffending in the letter and in the  
intention, that Officer used every means in his  
power to explain to the satisfaction of the army.  
So soon as a discovery was made of the miscon-  
struction attached to the words, he requested Gene-  
ral Macdowall to be allowed to address him publicly  
for the purpose of disavowing any injurious mean-  
ing. He made the request both personally, and  
through the intercession of a respectable Officer  
who stood high in the mutual confidence of the  
Commander-in-Chief, and of the Quarter-Master-  
General : but in both ways was the application re-

fused, on the ground alleged by General Macdowall, that the abolition of the Tent-Contract having been decided before he received the command of the army, it was a subject in which he did not intend to take a part. This passive line of conduct was manifestly incompatible with the duty of the Commander-in-Chief. But it not long after came to light, that General Macdowall, far from adhering even to that line, was himself the active promoter of the unexampled persecution of a meritorious Officer, who had done no more than his duty indispensably required, a persecution which he was bound by every tie of public principle, and of moral obligation, to have instantly repressed. The charge preferred against the Quarter-Master-General by the Officers commanding Corps, is understood to have been in the possession of the Commander-in-Chief a considerable time before he took ostensibly any step regarding it. He then referred it to his legal adviser, the Judge Advocate-General, who, in a report of great perspicuity and ability, condemned unanswerably the whole proceeding, as radically unjust and subversive of the first principles of discipline. More than two months again elapsed after the receipt of the Judge Advocate's report, before any public step was taken; and it was not until within a few days of General Macdowall's embarkation for England, that he announced the unexampled resolution of placing the Quarter-Master-General in arrest, for the purpose of his being brought to trial, telling

publicly that he did so, that a door might not be left open "to the possible introduction of undue influence and arbitrary power." The Quarter-Master-General in vain submitted to the attention of General Macdowall, "the extraordinary spectacle (which was exhibited), of an Officer holding one of the first situations under the Government, being placed in arrest by a Commander-in-Chief, for a Report prepared under the special orders of the preceding Commander-in-Chief, which the latter declared, upon record, to be the combined result of his own and that Officer's reflection." The Quarter-Master-General too, in vain requested the benefit of a reference to the Government, which was refused by General Macdowall as an "application extremely indelicate and disrespectful." After these repeated failures, the Quarter-Master-General, with great propriety, made a direct appeal to the Government, on a question immediately involving the most important public arrangements, and regarding which, in regard to the Government, General Macdowall had observed a profound silence, withholding all knowledge of his proceedings from the controlling authority, which was deeply interested in being made acquainted with them. The letter of the Quarter-Master-General fully explained the circumstances of his situation, and again strongly disclaimed all offensive intention. This letter was sent to General Macdowall, accompanied by an earnest recommendation of the Government, that

the arrest of that Officer should be removed. These communications failed to produce the least effect. The recommendation was repelled under circumstances of an aggravating nature, and in a high tone, the Governor in Council was informed by General Macdowall, that the appeal which had been made to his authority, was to be rendered a new ground of charge against the Officer who had been compelled to make it. No notice was taken of the satisfactory explanation offered by the Quarter-Master-General, and as Lord Minto has stated, “it was with this explanation before him that the Commander-in-Chief suffered the prosecutors to persist in their charges, and that he himself persevered in promoting so extraordinary a trial.” The sequel is sufficiently known. After every means of persuasion and of intreaty, conveyed in the most conciliatory terms, had been unsuccessfully tried, the Government had no resource, but to interpose the exercise of its power for the purpose of stopping the progress of an act of the most gross injustice, and of the most manifest public injury, that ever entered the contemplation of the human mind.

Pamphlet,  
page 7.

With the above facts in his knowledge, or within his reach, Colonel Malcolm has not questioned the *right* of the Government to order the release of the Quarter-Master-General from arrest, but he has questioned the expediency of exercising that right—observing, “that it is nonsense to say that it (the Government) would, by so forbearing

“ and moderate a proceeding, have abandoned an  
 “ Officer entitled to protection. This language, if  
 “ it means any thing, implies, that Government  
 “ did not conceive there were, at that moment,  
 “ thirteen Officers, either in the King’s or Com-  
 “ pany’s service, on the Coast, upon whose ho-  
 “ nesty and honour it could rely—a proposition  
 “ too extravagant for notice.” Colonel Mal-  
 colm suggests, that if Lieut.-Col. Munro had been  
 found guilty by the sentence of a Court Martial,  
 the Government would not have been “ in that ex-  
 “ treme case, deprived of the right to protect that  
 “ Officer;”—that, on the contrary, in such an  
 event, the exercise of that right would have  
 been “ much more apparent and unobjection-  
 “ able.”

It requires nothing short of the most express  
 terms to satisfy us that the above are really the  
 sentiments conveyed by Colonel Malcolm; senti-  
 ments which are, not in our judgment only, dia-  
 metrically opposed to all order and experience, and  
 to every established fact. We have, unhappily,  
 too many examples of the degree to which party-  
 spirit is capable of throwing a haze round the  
 clearest understandings, and of misleading the  
 most honest intentions. That such a spirit had  
 assumed a decided ascendancy in the army at that  
 period, cannot be a moment doubted. Eight  
 months before, General Macdowall had expressly  
 stated to Sir G. Barlow, his belief that “ almost  
 “ every individual in the service was more or less

“dissatisfied.” We have little doubt that the statement, then, was much exaggerated: but during the eventful interval, as has been proved, the most fatal intrigues were in active operation. The storm, which various pre-disposing causes, arising from the elementary constitution of the Indian service, and from a combination of collateral circumstances, had tended to create, had been collecting, with accumulated force, and at the period of General Macdowall’s embarkation, was ready to burst with fearful violence. The absolute impossibility of forming a Court-Martial consisting of Officers wholly untainted by the prevailing passions and prejudices of that period, and superior to the influence of the clamour which had been industriously excited, is not a thing susceptible of proof; but we may safely appeal to any understanding capable of taking an impartial view of the events which had then occurred, whether the chances would not have been greatly against the success of such an attempt. Much the same spirit was then prevailing in the civil department of the service; and we find the Chief Justice, a short time after, officially stating, that he was compelled to stop proceedings in the Supreme Court, as the Settlement of Madras was “in that state in which, under similar circumstances, in any town or county at home, any Judge would stop a trial, convinced that the mind of the place was labouring under an influence unfitting it for judging.” In truth, a

Printed Papers—Sir Thomas Strange’s Letter, 27th Feb. 1809.

numerous portion of the principal Officers of the army had, in the very act of preferring a charge against the Quarter-Master-General, declared pretty plainly their opinion; for, as to the fact itself, there was no kind of doubt; the doubt that existed, was concerning the construction of certain words, a subject, of all others, little fitting in the most placid times, for discussion in a public court; but, above all, least fitting at that time, when the public mind was greatly distempered, and when many of the leading persons in the army had already pronounced an unequivocal judgment on the question. It is not easy to imagine how the Government was to be justified in overlooking every difficulty of this nature, and in abandoning at once, to almost certain condemnation, an Officer of distinguished merit, whose opinions had been formally adopted by a succession of the principal authorities in India, and had been rendered the ground of their public acts. Would the Government have been justified in sanctioning a measure which, to say nothing of its manifest injustice, as affecting a deserving individual, was to strike at the root of all confidence, on the part of every Officer acting under its orders? for what was the fate of the Quarter-Master-General to-day, might on the morrow have been extended indefinitely to others, exposed to the same unmerited cry of obloquy. Would the Government have been justified in consenting to the humiliation of having its acts, and the acts of those high autho-

rities who had adopted the opinions of the Quarter-Master-General, submitted to the judgment of a Court-Martial? Would any Government have deserved the name, that could have been capable of sanctioning such injustice, and such degradation, even if the probability of an impartial trial had been greater, much greater, than there was the least reason to hope for? Colonel Malcolm has suggested the expedient of the Government interposing in the event of the sentence of a Court-Martial having pronounced the Quarter-Master-General to be guilty. But surely the time of interposition would then have been past. The stain of such a decision could not have been wiped away by any exercise of power, however just; and the Government would have been deservedly exposed to the charge of deception, if it had countenanced a trial destined to end in the mockery of justice.

We have the satisfaction to think, that the opinions which we have expressed, on the case of the Quarter-Master-General, are in perfect unison with those given by much higher authorities, the Supreme Government of India, and the Court of Directors. After an accurate examination of the circumstances, the Supreme Government observe, —“ The whole proceeding was monstrous; and  
 “ we repeat, in the strongest terms, our warmest  
 “ approbation of your just, legal, and indispen-  
 “ sable interposition, on that occasion, to vindi-  
 “ cate the honor of your Government, and to

Printed Pa-  
pers— Let-  
ter from  
Bengal to  
the Govern-  
ment of  
Madras,  
27th May,  
1809.



“ shield one of your best and ablest servants  
 “ from an arbitrary and oppressive abuse of power.  
 “ If you had omitted to do so, you would have  
 “ failed in the most sacred duties of your high  
 “ stations; and would have merited, because you  
 “ would have sanctioned, that long train of insult  
 “ and encroachment which was to follow, and of  
 “ which the prosecution of Lieut.-Col. Munro,  
 “ would have proved to be only the first experi-  
 “ mental step.” The Court of Directors, after  
 the same accurate examination, say,—“ It be-  
 “ came, in our opinion, the bounden duty of our  
 “ Governor in Council at Fort St. George, to in-  
 “ terpose the direct authority of Government, for  
 “ the protection of Lieut.-Col. Munro, by requir-  
 “ ing the Commander-in-Chief to release that Of-  
 “ ficer from the arrest in which he had placed him.  
 “ To have permitted Lieut.-Col. Munro to be  
 “ brought to trial for sentiments, and statements  
 “ delivered by him in his official capacity, in obe-  
 “ dience to the orders of our former Commander-  
 “ in-Chief at Madras, Sir John Cradock, by whom  
 “ they were adopted as his own, as they were also  
 “ approved, sanctioned, and enforced by the Local  
 “ and Supreme Governments, would have been not  
 “ only to withhold protection from a meritorious  
 “ Officer in the discharge of his indispensable du-  
 “ ties, but to have brought into question, and, in  
 “ fact, subjected to trial, the character and acts  
 “ of the former Commander-in-Chief, Sir John

Printed Pa-  
 pers—Let-  
 ter from  
 the Court of  
 Directors,  
 15th Sept.  
 1809.

“Cradock, and even those of the Government  
“themselves.”\*

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\* Colonel Malcolm has illustrated (if the term can be so applied), his opinion, as to the expediency of allowing the Quarter-Master-General to be brought to trial, by a reference to the history of Sir Francis Burdett and the House of Commons. The force of the allusion does not, we confess, appear very perceptible: but, as a reference has been made to European events, we may suggest for consideration the course which would have been likely to have been pursued by the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in this country, if the Officers of the army had combined in preferring Charges against the principal Staff of His Royal Highness, on account of opinions delivered in the performance of their duty, and which he had highly approved and acted on. Would His Royal Highness have consigned his Staff Officers to trial by a Court-Martial, to be selected from an inflamed army?—or, is it not more likely, that he would, if all expostulation failed (supposing such to have been resorted to), have quashed the proceeding with a strong hand; and that he would have done so rather before the experiment of a trial, than after the Staff Officers had been tried, and probably found guilty? Perhaps, too, His Royal Highness might have been disposed to have taken some notice of the conduct of those Officers who had been active in promoting the supposed proceedings, and of those, particularly, who had signed the charges. Possibly His Majesty might have been advised to order the discontinuance of their names in the list of the army. It is possible, much more than possible, that all this would have been done, with the warmest approbation of the nation; and if so, the course taken would have greatly exceeded in severity, any thing done by the Government of Madras, under circumstances of the like nature. No notice whatever was taken of the conduct of those Officers who signed, or who promoted the charges preferred against the Quarter-Master-General at that Presidency.

In stating that we differ wholly from every part of the opinion given by Colonel Malcolm, as to the case of Lieut.-Col. Munro, we trust that we make not this statement on light grounds, or on any other than such as are incontrovertible.

We have before noticed the reasons which induced us, at some length, to examine the conclusions drawn by Col. Malcolm, regarding the preceding question. It would be impracticable to follow that Officer, with the same closeness, through the other observations contained in the first part of his Pamphlet, without extending these sheets to an inconvenient degree; and it appears wholly superfluous to do so. There is scarcely one broken link in the chain of crimination attached by Colonel Malcolm to the conduct of the Government of Madras, while, with scarcely an exception, every one of the material measures which that Officer has seen cause to censure, the Supreme Government of India, and the Court of Directors, in conjunction with His Majesty's Government, have, after the most careful examination, seen cause to approve, in the warmest strain of eulogium. In the same tone as has been evinced in the case of the Quarter-Master-General, Colonel Malcolm condemns the cautious, but firm, conduct, pursued by the Government, in regard to the two Memorials which General Macdowall endeavoured to force on their attention, at the time of his embarking:—The suspension from the service of the Adjutant-General and his Deputy, whom the Go-

Printed Papers—Letter from Bengal to the Government of Madras, 27th May, 1809.

Letter from Lord Minto to the Sec. Committee, 12th Oct. 1809.

Letters from the Court of Directors to the Government of Madras, 15th and 29th Sept. 1809.

Do. 9th Feb. and 1st May, 1810.

vernment considered to have been actively instrumental in disseminating the seditious Orders of the Commander-in-Chief; \* and the suspension which

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\* As the proceedings relative to the Adjutant-General and his Deputy, form the only material question, regarding which, the least difference of opinion has occurred, between the Government of India and that of this country, in the course of the late important and difficult discussions, it seems material to say a few words on the subject. We may first observe, that it argues no ordinary share of wisdom, vigor, and ability on the part of any administration, which has so conducted the affairs committed to its charge, that during a period of unexampled peril and embarrassment, and during a long succession of the most important public measures, only one point has occurred, on which a diversity of opinion has existed among the authorities to whom the right of decision belongs. When the storm is over, when the winds and waves have subsided, and when the vessel which had encountered the tempest, is brought safe into port, nothing is more easy than calmly to criticise the conduct of the mariner, to make light of his dangers, and to reckon every shred that had suffered, and every nail that had been lost, in the effort to save the whole from destruction. This is an illiberal, but it is, unhappily, the usual course of judgment, and it has been largely applied in the case of the Government of Madras, whose measures, however, are of that firm and consistent texture as to bear any examination, near or distant, narrow or expanded.

In regard to the case of the two Officers in question, it has been so perplexed by a course of polemical discussion, that the actual circumstances attending it have been, in great measure, lost sight of. We know, from all experience, that nothing is more usual in seditious times, than to see a matter of no radical importance, raised as the rallying point of clamour, and the real motives of action screened behind such as are pretended. The

took place under the General Orders of the 1st May, 1809, of some of the Officers, who, on evidence of which, the validity cannot be questioned, were considered to have been actively engaged in the pursuit of plans which were directed to the immediate subversion of the Government. We

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machinations of Jacobinism in this country, at no distant period, sought refuge under the alleged grievance of a foreign war, of a war against the source from whence Jacobinism sprung; and even the unbending principles of the Great Minister, by the power of whose arm the hydra was subdued, were at times urged as a cloak for the shelter of the hydra's growth. The arguments stated, relative to the case to which we refer, have been much more suitable to the spirit of a debating society of forensic quibbling, than to the consideration of a measure connected with, and arising from, a system of other great public measures directed to the preservation of the Empire's nearest interests. But, as the circumstances connected with it, have been examined with critical accuracy, in a periodical publication (the Quarterly Review), of distinguished merit, which contains by far the most comprehensive and able account of the late commotions at Madras, that has yet appeared in any publication of the kind; a reference to that publication obviates the necessity of going into much detail. We shall therefore only state such an outline of the question, as will be sufficient to afford a distinct view of it.

Quarterly  
Review,  
No. IX,

There can be no doubt of the criminal nature of the General Order published by General Macdowall, on the 28th January, 1809, when on the eve of embarking for England. According to a Regulation of old date, established by the Court of Directors, all orders of the Commander-in-Chief at Madras are required to be communicated to the Governor twenty-four hours before they are issued to the Army, in order that he may see that

should have expected that, consistently with the liberality of Colonel Malcolm's character, some allowance would, in the course of his Statement, have been made for the great and acknowledged difficulties in which Sir George Barlow was placed, difficulties of which many had been be-

Printed Papers--Lord Minto's Letter, 5th Feb. 1810.

nothing improper is so published. This Regulation had not been rigidly enforced, but it had been the invariable rule in practice, that all orders of the Commander-in-Chief were communicated to the Governor *immediately when* published. Not one instance of a deviation from that practice had ever occurred, until the publication of the above General Order, of a nature manifestly directed to the excitement of sedition in the army. This Order was issued from the Office of the Adjutant-General to several Military Stations, on Saturday the 28th January: many more copies were circulated on the following day; but all knowledge of the Order was withheld from the Governor until Monday, the third day after it was issued to the Army; and it was not then communicated until the Ship on which General Macdowall had embarked had put to Sea. The evil which this seditious paper was, by its circulation, sure to produce, was then done, past the power of recal, or of remedy.

Printed Papers—Letters from the Government of Madras to the Court of Directors, of 31st January, and 3d Feb. 1809.

The copy of the General Order which was sent officially to the Governor, was signed by the Deputy-Adjutant-General, who, as the responsible person in signing and circulating a paper of that kind, was suspended from the service of the Company. The Adjutant-General afterwards, in a tone of exultation, avowing his share of the responsibility, was also suspended. The Government adopted these measures, under the impression that the Staff Officers had been acting in collusion with the Commander-in-Chief, and that his authority could not sanction them in abetting an act deemed treasonable against the civil power.

queathed to him as a succession from preceding Governments, and of which others arose in that course of events which the Government tried all means, in vain, to avert. But no allowance of this kind is made; and we must certainly lament, that in the whole course of the Pamphlet before us, acts which

The Supreme Government of India approved what had been done by the Government of Madras. The Court of Directors, when the question was brought before them, considering the Staff Officers to have been placed "in a situation of difficulty," were of opinion, that their removal from their Staff situations would have been sufficient, without removing them from the Company's service; and desired that they might be restored to the latter. The Court of Directors, however, in consequence of further information, modified this resolution, and directed that the Deputy-Adjutant-General should be again suspended from the service. These Resolutions passed in 1809; and in 1811, after long discussion, it was decided, that the Deputy-Adjutant-General should be restored to the service, but not to be permitted to return, for the present, to India.

Printed Papers— Letter from the Supreme Government, 27th May, 1809. Ditto, from the Court of Directors, 15th Sept. and 29th Sept. 1809, and 22d Feb. 1811.

The above is a correct outline of the facts, unaccompanied, however, by several circumstances, "the adjuncts of time, place, and situation," which would bring the subject more forcibly to view, but which want of room compels us to omit. The Reader may be enabled to judge, from what has been stated, whether the clamour raised, as to military responsibility, has been founded in Sense, or in Faction. That the proceeding involved a direct breach of established orders;—that it was flagrantly insulting to the authority of the Government, and was attended with the deepest injury to the public welfare, are points which have never been questioned. Whether the Government was, or was not, called on to notice the conduct of the Officers,

have appeared generally to others, wise in their purpose, and salutary in their consequences, soundly planned and ably executed, should have presented themselves to Colonel Malcolm, through the distorted, discoloured medium in which he has

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without whose co-operation those consequences could not, apparently, have ensued, is a point on which some have differed. On the part of the official authorities, they have concurred as to the existence of criminality, and as to the necessity of punishment, but have differed as to the degree of punishment. This, with all possible disposition to the most narrow inspection, has constituted the sole difference of opinion in the least material, that has occurred between the official authorities of India and this country, (so far as the Government of Madras is concerned) in the course of the late long and important discussions; a circumstance that may challenge an honorable comparison with the conduct of any administration the most wise, vigorous, and successful, in any country.

From the general tenor of Col. Malcolm's publication, there can be no room for surprise, that he disapproves the measures to which we have referred; and that without adverting to the preceding state of the army, and to the actual circumstances at the time, he at once pronounces that the army "underwent a complete revolution," in consequence of the suspension of the Staff Officers. On such an opinion we shall make no comment; but we may be allowed to express some surprise, that Col. Malcolm should have perseveringly ascribed to the Government a wish to ask for an apology from the Deputy-Adjutant-General, for his offence, in defiance of an express declaration of Sir G. Barlow, and of General Gowdie to the contrary. The palpable misconstruction, attached by other writers, to the conduct of General Gowdie, appears quite unsuitable to the motives of individual consideration, that seem wholly to have dictated it.



viewed them. \* Colonel Malcolm has dwelt somewhat fully on the Test imposed by the Orders of Government of the 26th July, 1809, and it cannot be matter of surprise that he disapproves it. It is a measure, notwithstanding, which has received elsewhere great and deserved approbation. On this, as on other points of consideration, no reference has been made by Colonel Malcolm to the abundant explanation contained in the dispatches of the Government of Fort St. George, relative to its motives of action—these “luminous writings,” (as observed by a high authority),

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\* We shall make no comment on some stories which we should have thought too futile for Colonel Malcolm to have honored with a place in his Pamphlet, as a proof of “provoking suspicion.” These stories were inserted in some of the early anonymous pamphlets, and we thought that they had long ago sunk into the oblivion belonging to them. We regret, however, still more, that Colonel Malcolm should have only given a “bare catalogue;” as a little further enquiry would have probably satisfied him, that none of the measures to which he alludes were adopted without the clearest necessity, unless the Government had been prepared to follow the course, which no doubt some would have approved, of overlooking all acts of insubordination, however manifest in their nature, and however distinctly brought to attention. In times of public ferment, it is unavoidable, that frequent examples should occur of disorderly proceedings, which will call for reprehension and punishment; but of which a “bare catalogue,” without a knowledge of the collateral circumstances, will be quite insufficient to convey any true idea.

Pamphlet,  
page 21.

Letter from  
the ten Di-  
rectors, of  
10th Sept.  
1810.

“ many of which, though produced in times of  
“ great disorder and peril, are, in reasoning, tem-  
“ per, and composition, surpassed by no State Pa-  
“ pers on the Records of the Company.”

Printed Pa-  
pers — Let-  
ter from  
the Govern-  
ment of  
Madras,  
10th Sept.  
1809.

The Government of Madras has fully explained the circumstances of the Test, and the extreme exigency which led to the necessity of imposing it. At a time when the most alarming symptoms of disaffection had appeared at every Military Station, and when a great part of the Army had openly mutinied, it was surely justifiable in the Government, it was surely indispensable, to ascertain who were the Officers on whom reliance could in that emergency be placed, and that “ those who were not dis-  
“ posed to support the authority of Government,  
“ should be no longer permitted to exercise func-  
“ tions which they were unwilling to employ in  
“ the service of their country.” This measure, so essential in its nature, was executed in a manner as conciliatory as was consistent with its success. It was explained that the Government did not “ suspect individuals ;” but that the urgency of affairs rendered it necessary to call for such a declaration of fidelity, as was required ; while those who might decline to subscribe the declaration, were permitted to withdraw on their usual allowances,  
“ until the state of affairs, and the temper of their  
“ own minds, should admit of their being again  
“ employed with advantage to the State.” Colonel Malcolm has given several reasons to shew that

the “ Government had no right to look to the  
 “ fidelity and attachment of the Native Troops,”  
 and that the chief resource was the loyalty and  
 good disposition of the Officers themselves. Such  
 reasoning, we confess, appears greatly overstrained;  
 and it is with infinite regret that we see such topics  
 again dragged into discussion; but it is nevertheless  
 essential that when opinions of this kind are forced  
 on attention, they should not pass wholly un-  
 noticed. The opposite proofs that might be ad-  
 duced, are almost innumerable. It is, however,  
 quite sufficient to quote the opinion of Lord Minto,  
 as the result of minute enquiry, many months after  
 the termination of the mutiny. After describing  
 the progress of that event, his Lordship says—  
 “ Such was the state of things, when the masterly  
 “ and decisive measure of the 26th July, gave at  
 “ once a death blow to the rebellion. The Native  
 “ Troops abjured the criminal designs of their Of-  
 “ ficers; the latter were separated from the only  
 “ force they had counted upon; the arms dropped  
 “ out of their hands, and they found themselves a  
 “ small band of defenceless and fugitive indivi-  
 “ duals, at the mercy of the Government they  
 “ were the day before confederated to pull down.”  
 The Government acted throughout this “ masterly  
 “ and decisive measure,” under the impression  
 that the Native Troops would not support their  
 Officers in rebellion against the State; and the  
 result manifested the wisdom of the opinion, for

Pamphlet,  
 page 36.

Lord Min-  
 to's Letter,  
 5th Feb.  
 1810.

at all the places where there were the means of making known to the troops, the actual situation of affairs, they hesitated not in their choice, but immediately “ranged under the standard of Government.” The measure was certainly of a bold nature, and there is no cause of surprise that some Officers, under an anxiety as to future events, hesitated in the execution of it. Those Officers acted, no doubt, under honorable, but they acted under mistaken impressions; for, when the orders of the Government were peremptorily required to be enforced, complete success was the effect. Colonel Malcolm has attached consequences to the “wisdom and forbearance,” to the “conciliatory efforts,” of those Officers, which we cannot believe that they themselves ever thought of, for they seem in our idea at variance with every recorded fact. Among the respectable names thus introduced, we should have expected some notice to have been taken of the highly distinguished characters, who proceeded with a firm undeviating step in the execution of the arduous duty confided to them. We think that such names as those of Colonel Wilkinson, Colonel Davis, and Colonel Hare, should not have been wholly omitted, names to which, with those of other meritorious persons, have already been attached the public thanks of the Representatives of the East India Company, which the future historian will record with satisfaction, as casting a ray of lustre round transac-

tions, which their loyal and vigorous exertions so essentially contributed to bring to a successful conclusion.

Colonel Malcolm, after condemning the measure of the Test, has stated, in prophetic strains, the series of consequences which are to arise from it. Some of these we must, with every deference, say, we do consider fanciful, and others, we humbly hope, as we firmly believe, will never be realized. That the necessity of recurring to the measure in question, was a great evil, no one will deny, and the repetition of it is to be deprecated as a public calamity; but it is not to the Government that the evil, whatever it may be, is imputable. The Court of Directors have observed, "It is one of the many melancholy, and perhaps, irremediable consequences of the disloyalty of the European Officers, for which they are so deeply responsible to us and to their country."

Printed Papers—Letter of the Court of Directors, 1st May, 1810.

In encouraging, however, the expectation that no permanent inconvenience is to arise from a measure, which, in the first instance saved the Government from overthrow, we feel satisfaction in recurring to the "lamp of life," historical experience exemplified, strikingly exemplified, in the Mutiny in Bengal, in 1766. Colonel Malcolm says, "To such as examine the particulars of these two important events (alluding to the Mutiny of Madras), and trace to its true cause the defection of the Officers of the Bengal army,

Pamphlet, page 55.

“ in 1766, and then observe, the open, military, and manly conduct of Lord Clive, there will appear much more grounds for a contrast, than a comparison.” We know not on what Colonel Malcolm has grounded such an opinion, as an examination of “ particulars,” seems to lead to precisely an opposite conclusion, and affords, perhaps, the most striking parallel of historical events that is any where to be found. The particulars of the Bengal Mutiny do not appear to have been in any one’s recollection, in the progress of the Mutiny at Madras : but the same causes were, notwithstanding, steady in their effects. The heated passions of the Madras army hurried them to far greater and more dreadful extremities, than occurred in Bengal ; but nearly the same system of combination, and of menace, was pursued in both cases : and on the part of the Government, the same manly vigor, energy, and wisdom, which signalized the measures of Lord Clive, were called into action, on a much more extended scale, and, if possible, with more signal success, under the administration of Sir George Barlow. But the distinguishing features of the course pursued by both Governments, are precisely similar ; both evinced a determination, equally strenuous, to reject all compromise of the public authority, and to accede to no terms short of entire submission to the lawful power of the State.

We are informed, in an Authentic Account of the Bengal Mutiny, that a "general peace" being established in the British Provinces in India, Lord Clive proceeded to carry "into execution the "Company's orders, relative to the reduction of "Batta," which was directed to take place from the 1st January, 1766. "The Officers had been "too successful in their remonstrances against "former orders of the like nature, to omit pre- "ferring them upon this occasion." But the com- mands were positive; and the Officers appeared to acquiesce. "But this was only the appearance of "submission: private meetings and consultations "were held, in each brigade; secret committees "were formed, under the denomination of free- "mason's lodges; and means of obtaining redress "devised." "A general resignation of commis- "sions," was the measure decided on. "A so- "lemn oath to secrecy was administered, and kept "so strictly, that even the Field Officers upon the "spot entertained not the least suspicion of what "was going forward." A fund was formed for the relief of such as might require assistance, un- der the loss of their commissions, to which "a "considerable sum is said to have been contri- "buted privately by gentlemen in the civil ser- "vice." The 1st of June, 1766, was the time agreed on for the resignation of Commissions; but the combination which was in progress came accidentally to light in the month of April, at which time Lord Clive was at Muxadavad, adjusting the

An authen-  
tic Account,  
laid before  
the House  
of Com-  
mons, in  
1772.

16,000*l.* is  
said to have  
been sub-  
scribed in  
this mode.

revenues of Bengal. This "premature discovery" made the Officers adopt the determination of resigning on the 1st of May, if their demands were not complied with. Lord Clive saw the danger of his situation; but he determined not "to grant a request, demanded, as it were, sword in hand;" and submission on his part, "would not bear a moment's deliberation." He accordingly proceeded to call into action all the resources in his power, and among other means of assistance applied to the Government of Madras for all the Officers that could be spared from the service of the Coast of Coromandel. He issued orders to the Officers commanding brigades, "to engage the attachment of the non-commissioned Officers, by assurances of reward;" to prepare "for detaching the troops in small parties," and for sending the refractory Officers prisoners to Calcutta. Lord Clive proceeded with the utmost dispatch a distance of several hundred miles, to Monghyr, the nearest principal military station, "where he had reason to think the whole scheme had been originally planned." Two days before Lord Clive reached Monghyr (15th May) a mutiny had broken out among the European troops at that station, who "got under arms, intending to follow their Officers." But this was promptly quelled by Captain Smith, at the head of two battalions of Sepoys, "with fixed bayonets;" and, "having neither subaltern, nor serjeant to assist him." Lord Clive, the day



after his arrival, paraded the European and native troops, and addressing them, separately explained to them the criminal views in which their Officers had engaged, and admonished them to do their duty. He highly applauded the native troops, "for the instance they had so lately given of their steadiness, and faithful attachment to the Company," and distributed among them honorary rewards and money. "A detachment of Sepoys was next day sent out in quest of the resigned Officers," who were waiting "the arrival of their associates from the other brigades," with eventual orders for conveying them to Calcutta by force; but they anticipated the necessity of executing these orders by their departure. Lord Clive having settled affairs at Monghyr, proceeded to the other military stations in the Upper Provinces, where his measures were attended with the same success. At Serajepor, an advanced station, where Colonel Smith then commanded a strong detachment, employed in watching a numerous body of Mahratta horse, the Officers had persevered in the confederacy, notwithstanding the most conciliatory efforts of their commander; and though in that critical situation, Colonel Smith determined to "trust wholly to the fidelity of the Black Officers." This firmness aiding the resolute conduct of Lord Clive, led to the most happy results. When the Officers of Colonel Smith's brigade saw the course which he pursued, and "that Lord Clive would not yield to their

“ demands;” “ that some of their associates were  
 “ in arrest for mutiny and desertion; that many  
 “ others were to be shipped off for England,” their  
 eyes were opened to the precipice, and they  
 “ made all possible submission for the irregulari-  
 “ ties they had been guilty of.” “ Repentance  
 “ and humiliation became general;” and the least  
 culpable of the Officers were restored to their  
 rank, while the others “ were kept in arrest, to  
 “ take their trials; and those, whose conduct was  
 “ in a less degree exceptionable, were ordered to  
 “ hold themselves in readiness to embark for Eu-  
 “ rope.” As observed by the intelligent Writer of  
 the Narrative, “ The army was thus, in a manner,  
 “ new modelled, and we may venture to assert,  
 “ became soon as complete, with respect to good  
 “ Officers and discipline, as any army of the Com-  
 “ pany in India ever was before that period.”

The above outline of the Bengal Mutiny is sufficient to enable any Reader to judge for himself; regarding the features of strong resemblance to which we have alluded; and must suggest many forcible reflections. The separation of the European Officers from the native troops; the employment of the native troops, not once, but repeatedly, to use force against their Officers, and the employment of the native troops to bring European troops to order, were all unquestionably great evils: but though they considerably exceeded in magnitude any evil of the like kind that occurred in the progress of the Mutiny at Madras,

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we have not heard that Lord Clive was blamed for the measures that subdued the Rebellion raised against his authority: nor, though our dominion in India did then, much more than now, depend on the "breath of opinion," have we heard that those measures have been followed by consequences injurious to the permanency of our power. Whatever predictions may have been then, with much more justice than now, conjured into view, like the Phantom Kings of our immortal Bard, have like them, long since vanished in their kindred vapor, "Come like shadows, so depart." We desire to be distinctly understood, that we consider the events to which we have been referring, as great misfortunes; but in dangerous maladies the physician is not blameable who applies strong remedies for their cure.\* We may, too, carry the view farther, and look to the hope that good will arise from the source of evil. The late events have afforded a lesson never to be forgotten, either by the army, or by future Governments of India.

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\* Colonel Malcolm, we observe, ascribes Lord Clive's conduct, with regard to the European Officers, to his being "actually engaged in war." The Narrative, on the contrary, states, that Lord Clive's measures were founded on the circumstance of the "war being ended;"—and the only *deviation* from the course which Lord Clive determined to pursue, was authorised in the case of Colonel Smith, who was employed in watching the movements of a body of Mahratta horse, and who, in the event of the renewal of hostilities, was empowered, if "reduced to the utmost extremity," to "make terms with the malcontent tents,"

They have taught, that military combination, if firmly resisted, will not be always successful, and they have established a recent and broad rule of precedent, from which no Government, however weak, will hereafter dare to depart.

The parting and friendly advice to the army, and to the Government, with which Colonel Malcolm concludes the first part of his Publication, might afford ground for more detailed comment than it is our wish to enter on. We shall only notice the concluding passage of the counsel to the army, where they are told, that the "last, and "worst of all," the evils of Mutiny, is the giving "popularity and character to those they deem their "enemies." We conclude that it is not the intention of Colonel Malcolm that such expressions should be taken in their full sense: but they are a specimen of what we think a predominant feeling, strong "in that moment as in all the past."

We wish that Colonel Malcolm had, in the advice which he confers on the Government, been a little more specific as to the mode of making retrenchments popular, "by evidently shewing, that "they are necessary, and that they are equitably "imposed on all classes." This is required to be done in a country where the frame of Government is necessarily very different from what we are accustomed to in our native land; where no deliberating voice can be allowed to the inhabitants, and still less to the army. We think that Colonel Malcolm's observations on this subject, however unintentionally, are a good deal calculated *ad cap-*

*tandum*; or, to use a more homely phrase, have a great deal more show than substance. Considerable reductions have been lately made in Bengal, but we have never understood that any particular means of explanation or deliberation, out of the usual course, were employed at that Presidency. Colonel Malcolm informs us that “no man of common sense will doubt that a popular Governor may reconcile men to retrenchments.” Yet we have seen a mutiny produced in Bengal under the great Lord Clive, from that very cause. Lord Clive, too, then uniting the civil and military authority in his own person, had no Commander-in-Chief to clamor against, and misrepresent every act of his Government; he was also supported by the decided unanimity of his Council, all of which advantages, on a late occasion, infinitely more trying than any difficulty Lord Clive was exposed to, were wanting.\*

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\* To prevent misapprehension, we think it right to record the names of Mr. Oakes and Mr. Casamajor, the two Members of Council who firmly and meritoriously supported the measures of Sir G. Barlow, through the eventful crisis of the Mutiny. In doing so, those Gentlemen have established the most lasting claims to public gratitude.

Colonel Malcolm having adverted to the name of a highly respected and distinguished Officer (General Maitland, late Governor of Ceylon), we may be allowed to observe, that the situation of the Governor of Ceylon bears no analogy whatever to that of the Governor of Madras. The Governor of Ceylon unites in his own person the most absolute civil and military powers, and from the limited extent of the island every inhabitant, civil and military, is almost under his immediate eye. The whole

Pamphlet,  
page 57.

Having, we think proved the most material of the premises contained in the first part of Colonel Malcolm's Publication to be radically wrong, we need not make much farther observation as to the conclusions drawn from those premises. We are however, induced to insert at length the last passage but one, in the part of the pamphlet to which we are now referring. Colonel Malcolm says, "It will be ascribed to the unbending temper of Sir George Barlow, that he did not perceive the probability of amnesty being at length granted, after open resistance, by the humanity of the British Administration in India and England, almost as general as that of which, before the sword was drawn, he treated the proposal as every thing but a crime."

Did we not know the whole temper of Col. Malcolm's statement we might have been disposed to construe the above into a sarcastic remark, on the proceedings of the Supreme Government of India, and of the Government of this country, relative to the Mutiny at Madras. The remark in that view would be assuredly unjust; but it is not less so in the view in which it is intended that it should be taken. It is impossible for the power of language to convey in terms more strong than Lord Minto has done, his warmest approbation of every part

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number of troops in Ceylon does not, we believe, exceed 3 or 4000 men; and the permanent revenues of the island do not, we believe, much exceed the amount of the *reductions* lately made at Madras.

of the conduct pursued by Sir G. Barlow. The Court of Directors have in like manner been as strong as possible in their commendation, and in the solemn assurances of their support. The Court, in their letter of the 15th September, 1809, addressed to the Government of Madras, after a careful consideration of the proceedings which had then occurred, say, “ We shall conclude our observations and decisions on this important reference by recording, as an act of justice, our complete and decided approbation of the conduct of our Governor in Council of Fort St. George, with respect to Lieut.-Gen. Macdowall, under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, in which they appear to have shewn no less moderation and temper in their several discussions with the Commander-in-Chief, than promptitude, energy, and firmness in supporting the just authority of Government.” In their letter of the 29th September, 1809, the Court say, “ We cannot conclude without expressing our high approbation of the firmness and temper with which you have maintained the just authority and dignity of Government amidst very unusual oppositions and difficulties; and whilst you continue thus to discharge your public duties, you may depend upon our support.” The Court, in a letter of the 9th February, 1810, observe, “ It now only remains for us to record the high sense we entertain of that firmness, energy, and wisdom by which the conduct of

Printed  
Papers.

“ the Governor-General and of your Government  
 “ has been distinguished throughout the whole of  
 “ this most unhappy, difficult, and dangerous  
 “ crisis of our affairs; and to assure you that we  
 “ shall continue to afford every support in our  
 “ power to your honorable and meritorious public  
 “ exertions.” There are other passages in the  
 dispatches of the Court of Directors full of similar  
 commendations, and the whole tenor of those  
 manly, energetic compositions, are such as to re-  
 flect lasting honor on their authors. If there have  
 been occasional aberrations from the high, digni-  
 fied tone which distinguishes the above dispatches,  
 they are but occasional, and do not affect the  
 firm foundation on which the sentiments they  
 convey immutably rest. To expect perfect una-  
 nimity on such a great question as that which has  
 been lately agitating the public attention, and  
 which is, above all others, calculated to call forth  
 the interests, the passions and prejudices of an  
 extended circle, would be to expect a degree of  
 excellence incompatible with the infirmity of hu-  
 man nature.

If it is the intention of Colonel Malcolm to in-  
 fer that the measures of the Government of Ma-  
 dras have been “virtually disavowed,” because  
 most of the Officers suspended by the General  
 Orders of the 1st of May, 1809, have been re-  
 stored by the Court of Directors, it may be well  
 to refer to the Resolutions passed by the Court on  
 that subject, as the terms of those Resolutions



convey as strong an approval of the act of suspension as it was possible to record. The Court of Directors have added to their Resolution, that the Officers in question are only to be permitted to return to India “ when the Court shall have declared their opinion that the complete restoration of order and military subordination at Madras shall have rendered such a measure justifiable, and consistent with that support which it is the paramount duty and determination of the Court, at all times, to give to the civil authorities.”

Having inserted this part of the Court's Resolution, we shall now state that we have done so with no invidious purpose; but have satisfaction in adding, from an unquestionable source, that Sir G. Barlow has, with the magnanimity belonging to him, taken the earliest opportunity of declaring his judgment, that from the tranquillity which now happily prevails in the Army of India, all obstacle has ceased to the immediate return of the restored Officers to their duty\*.

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\* What has been stated above must be sufficient, we think, to lay open the kind of grounds on which Colonel Malcolm has endeavoured to establish a “disavowal” of the proceedings of the Government of Madras. If it had been quite otherwise, and if the measures of that Government, instead of being warmly applauded and confirmed, had terminated in a result the opposite of this, still such a termination would not have given absolute grounds to infer that those measures were in themselves wrong. All that a subordinate authority can do, is to follow the

Pamphlet,  
page 55.


line of proceeding which may seem, in its judgment, most conducive to the public interests ; but though that course may have been perfectly wise and proper, various circumstances may arise to occasion counteraction on the part of the ruling power, for which that power will alone be responsible. It seems to have escaped the attention of Colonel Malcolm, that notwithstanding " the open, military, and manly conduct of Lord Clive," he was not supported in his measures ; and we find him vehemently complaining of the total abandonment of them. Lord Clive, in concluding his celebrated speech, in the House of Commons, in 1772, stated—" After the Court of Directors had, in the highest " terms, approved of the conduct of that Committee who re- " stored tranquillity to Bengal ; who had restored a Government " of anarchy and confusion to good order ; who had made a " peace with Suja Dowla, by which they obtained upwards of " six hundred thousand pounds for the Company ; who had " quelled both a civil and a military mutiny ; who had re- " established discipline and subordination in the army ; who " had obtained the Dewanny of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, " and which produced to the Company a net income of one " million three hundred thousand pounds ; who had paid off " the greatest part of a bond debt in Bengal, amounting to near " nine hundred thousand pounds ; who had left the treasury in " such a flowing state, that they drew few or no bills upon the Com- " pany at home ; who laid the foundation of investments so large " as were never before known or heard of ; and who had, by these " means, enabled the Company to assist Government with four " hundred thousand pounds a-year, and to make an encrease of " dividend to the Stockholders of two hundred thousand pounds. " One would imagine, that the Court of Directors would have " supported a system of government which had been so very " successful. But they acted upon very different principles ; " they dropped the prosecutions against those gentlemen in " Bengal, whose conduct the Committee had censured, and " fully represented. Thus they gave a stab to their own vitals. " From that instant they destroyed their own power abroad, and

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“erased from the minds of their servants in India every whole-  
“some regulation which the Committee had established. The  
“servants abroad were in anxious suspense to learn whether  
“they were punishable or not for misconduct. The lenity or  
“weakness of the Court of Directors removed the doubts. From  
“that instant all covenants were forgotten, or only looked upon  
“as so many sheets of blank paper; and from that instant began  
“that relaxation of Government so much now complained of,  
“and so much still to be dreaded.

“Their next step was to destroy the powers of that Com-  
“mittee, whose conduct they with reason so highly approved  
“of. They divided the powers; they gave half to the Council,  
“and left the other half with the Committee. The consequence  
“was, the Council and Committee became distracted by alter-  
“cations and disputes for power, and have ever since been at  
“variance, to the great detriment of the service. The Court of  
“Directors, as if this was not enough, restored to the service  
“almost every civil and military transgressor who had been dis-  
“missed; nay, they rewarded some of them, by allowing them a  
“continuation of their rank all the time they were in England.”

The above has been quoted without any reference to the late discussions; but stronger proof can hardly be given of the fallacy of the course of reasoning which Colonel Malcolm (contrary, we should have thought, to the dictates of his own clear understanding and experience), has been induced to pursue.



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WE have in the preceding part of these Observations taken a view of Colonel Malcolm's opinions regarding the general events of the late Mutiny at Madras; and we shall now proceed to state some observations on what is termed the *Narrative* of that Officer, being the part particularly referrible to Colonel Malcolm's own conduct. If Colonel Malcolm had confined himself to an exposition of his motives of action, we should have gladly spared ourselves the task of farther comment; we should have allowed the statement of that Officer to speak its own language; and though we might have differed widely as to the course of proceeding pursued, or recommended to be pursued, by Colonel Malcolm, we should have looked with respect to the principles of public zeal, by which we have no doubt that Officer, however mistaken his principles may have been, was actuated. The opinions of Colonel Malcolm have,

however, in the second, as in the first part, of his publication, taken a much more comprehensive range, than the narrow view of personal justification: and the shafts have been scattered, if not with discrimination, at least, with profusion. In that part to which our attention has been already directed, Colonel Malcolm appears, from the credit he has given to the vague statements of anonymous Writers, to have greatly overlooked the excellent rule adopted by Sir William Jones, "of requiring evidence for all assertions." In the part which we shall now consider as shortly as possible, there is more reference to testimony; but, contrary to the usual course of reasoning, the testimony, in a great measure, contradicts the inferences drawn from it, as we think any one who attentively peruses Colonel Malcolm's Narrative will have no difficulty in discovering.

Pamphlet,  
page 63.

The scene of the Narrative opens at Bombay; from whence Colonel Malcolm appears, in April, 1809, to have addressed letters to different distinguished personages, giving his sentiments on the state of affairs at that period at Madras. Colonel Malcolm appears, by his own account, to have founded his opinions on "exaggerated reports," and "to have been very imperfectly informed of "what had occurred;" but he, notwithstanding, pronounces with a degree of confidence, which nothing but the most accurate information could well justify, his sentiments, as to the weighty matters which were then at the distance of about a

thousand miles, occupying the deliberate attention of the Government of Fort St. George. Without any particular reference to the inflammatory conduct of General Macdowall, or to the other numerous collateral circumstances, to which we have already had occasion to advert, it is roundly stated in a letter addressed to Lord Wellesley, in England, that, “ All the reforms which Sir G. Barlow Pamphlet  
page 64.  
“ thought it his duty to make, might have been  
“ made without giving rise to any serious discon-  
“ tent, if he had proceeded with that caution, and  
“ that attention, to the temper of men, which the  
“ situation in which he found the army required.”  
Colonel Malcolm proceeds to say,—“ All these  
“ were subjects worthy of consideration; and re-  
“ laxation from a severe system, till an insubordi-  
“ nate spirit was somewhat subdued, and the  
“ ruling authority fortified, would have not merely  
“ been warranted, but have been wise. At all  
“ events, the means of suppressing a disposition  
“ to violence should have been correctly calcu-  
“ lated, before it was provoked to action. This,  
“ I fear, has not been the case; and it is most dif-  
“ ficult to discover any means by which such a ge-  
“ neral spirit of discontent, as that which now ex-  
“ ists, can be repressed.” Colonel Malcolm adds,  
“ It will probably, if met with a firm and dignified  
“ spirit of conciliation, correct itself.”

From the circumstances confessedly attending these communications, they cannot claim much weight; and we notice them only as exhibiting

the outline of that system to which Colonel Malcolm, in the midst of proofs innumerable of its utter danger and impracticability, continued with great perseverance to adhere; we notice them as the cradle which rocked those infant opinions that afterwards grew to greater stature. We shall only here observe, that although “ a disposition to violence ” was assuredly not “ provoked to action ” by the *Government*, we at least hope, that any “ fear,” which Colonel Malcolm may have had, as to the Government being taken by surprise, will have been proved, by the sequel, to have been quite unnecessary.\*

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\* The letters quoted in the first part of Col. Malcolm's Narrative, seem to have been entirely private; and considerable allowance is to be made for the freedom of private communication. But in the shape in which they are now given to the public, they assume quite a different character; and from the tenor of those papers, the propriety of their publication in such a shape, seems more than questionable. Entering fully, as we may do, into the feelings of a person desirous of placing himself in the most favorable view, we doubt, more than doubt, the propriety of such a disclosure of confidential conferences and opinions as we find interspersed in various parts of Col. Malcolm's Narrative. Still more doubtful are we of such a course of proceeding, when it is calculated to hold up to popular and undeserved odium, meritorious Officers, who, were at a time of great public danger, exerting themselves to the best of their judgment and ability, in the service of the Government, then placed in the most critical circumstances—(*Pamphlet, page 81—82*). This is so unsuitable to that generosity of mind, which we believe Colonel Malcolm to possess, that we cannot doubt, that in a calmer moment, it will receive his own condemnation.



Colonel Malcolm arrived at Madras from Bombay about the middle of May, 1809, at which period the discontents were hastening fast to the crisis of the Mutiny which afterwards ensued. From his arrival at Madras, until the revolt which broke out at Masulipatam, in the end of June, Colonel Malcolm appears to have been chiefly engaged in devising plans of accommodation with the army, to all which plans it is apparent, from the account before us, that Sir G. Barlow gave the most patient and mature attention; and, if he differed, which he diametrically did, in regard to the measures strenuously urged by Col. Malcolm, it is obvious that he did so from no hasty impulse, but from the calm conviction of those measures being radically incompatible with the public interests or safety. Colonel Malcolm informs us that he “not once, but a hundred times, repeated to “Sir G. Barlow,” that they (the Army) had “a more serious quarrel than that with Government—they had quarrelled with themselves; and, unless he could adopt some measure that would restore them to their own good opinion, every attempt to establish order and subordination would be vain, as they were goaded on to further guilt by a torturing sense of that into which they had already plunged.” In pursuing the schemes intended to settle this kind of metaphysical quarrel, and to “reconcile men to themselves,” we think that Colonel Malcolm very much overlooked those outrages, which the autho-

Pamphlet,  
page 67.

city of the Government had been long, and was then daily experiencing. The Address which Colonel Malcolm proposed, on this occasion, to be presented to the Government, will be read with different feelings, according as the Reader is more or is less impressed with the importance of every Government holding high its power, and with the danger of a Government descending to the expedient of courting an Address from an army standing on the verge of Mutiny, an Address, too, couched in terms far from respectful, and conveying in something more than the oblique language of insinuation, a pretty strong condemnation of the public measures. If such an Address had been voluntarily proposed by a considerable part of the principal Officers in the army, it might perhaps have been a question, whether, in the critical state of matters at that time, it should, or should not, have been received. But truly, we see no cause to concur in the blame which Colonel Malcolm is willing to attach to Sir G. Barlow, because he would not lend himself to the measure of *seeking* an Address, which it would hardly have been compatible with the character of the Government, under any circumstances, to receive. Supposing, too, every objection of this kind to be got over, the attempt was to be made without the least solid assurance of success, while, on the contrary, to judge from the failure of the conciliatory efforts which the Government had before made, and from the general phrenzy which Colonel Malcolm repeatedly

describes as then prevailing in the army, there appears to be the strongest reason to believe that it would have ended in complete disappointment, and would have been, to use Colonel Malcolm's words, "treated with scorn," a scorn, too, the more injurious, as it is impossible to say that it would not have been somewhat deserved. Colonel Malcolm, indeed, tells us,—“ I also took every pains to satisfy his (Sir G. Barlow's) mind, that it should never be known, that he had been con- sulted on the subject.” We need not, however, recur to very remote experience to know, that secrets of that kind are from some accident or other not easily kept; and we are not surprized that Sir G. Barlow should have felt hesitation in staking the reputation and safety of the Government on the chance of any such contingency, involving, as that contingency did, a long train of other almost insuperable obstacles, and eventually, in our judgment, a series of the most pernicious consequences.\*

Pamphlet,  
page 20.

Page 70.

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\* For the immediate reference of the Reader, we have thought it proper to insert Colonel Malcolm's proposed Address, as follows:

“ We, the undersigned Officers of the Madras establishment, trust, that the very extraordinary and unprecedented situation in which we are placed, by some recent occurrences, will plead our excuse for an Address, which has no object but that of vindicating ourselves, as a body, from those serious imputations to which we conceive it possible we may become liable, from the nature of late proceedings in the army to which we belong; and to assert our devoted allegiance to our

Respecting, as we do, the talents of Colonel Malcolm, we must view with surprize, the importunate eagerness with which the scheme, to which we have been referring, appears to have been pressed on Sir G. Barlow's attention. We are, indeed, at a loss to reconcile the kind of empiricism which is evinced in this and other parts of the

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“ King, our unalterable attachment to our country, and our  
 “ consequent respect and submission to the laws and acts of  
 “ that local Government under which we are placed, and whose  
 “ commands it is our duty, under all circumstances, to obey, as  
 “ those of a legitimate branch of the Constitution of our  
 “ country.

“ It would be painful to retrace all those events which have  
 “ led to the present unhappy state of feeling in the army, and  
 “ have compelled Government to those measures which it has  
 “ judged proper to adopt: we shall therefore content ourselves  
 “ with expressing our conviction, that, however far they might  
 “ have been carried by the warmth of the moment, none of our  
 “ brother Officers who were concerned in those proceedings  
 “ which have been deemed so reprehensible by Government, ever  
 “ harboured an idea in their minds that was irreconcilable to  
 “ their allegiance, as subjects, or their duty, as soldiers. Go-  
 “ vernment must be fully acquainted with the rise and progress  
 “ of all the proceedings to which we allude, and can refer to its  
 “ true cause any apparent excess, either in expression or act,  
 “ that may have marked the conduct of any individuals: and it  
 “ will, we are assured, separate actions, which have their motive  
 “ in generous and honorable, though mistaken, feeling, from  
 “ any deliberate design of showing a spirit of contumely and  
 “ insubordination to that authority which it is their duty to  
 “ obey, and whose orders they could never dispute, without a  
 “ total sacrifice of their characters as good soldiers and loyal  
 “ subjects: and we feel perfectly satisfied, there is not one Officer

Narrative before us, with that practical knowledge of public affairs which we believe Colonel Malcolm to possess. We will venture to say, that it is the part of every wise Government to adhere as closely as possible to established principles, and to prefer, in all practicable cases, the beaten path of experience to the airy regions of theory. Such is

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“ in this army who would not sooner loose his life than forfeit  
 “ his claim to such cherished distinctions.

“ We cannot have a doubt but it must have been with extreme  
 “ reluctance that Government has adopted the measures it has  
 “ done, against those of our brother Officers who have more  
 “ particularly incurred its displeasure, from the forward share  
 “ they took, or were supposed to take, in the proceedings which  
 “ have met with its disapprobation ; and though we never can  
 “ presume to question, in any shape, the acts of that Govern-  
 “ ment which it is our duty to obey, it is impossible for us to  
 “ contemplate the present situation of those Officers without  
 “ sentiments of the deepest concern: and when we reflect on  
 “ the general high reputation, and the well-merited distinction,  
 “ which some of them have, by their valour and ability, ob-  
 “ tained in the public service, we should be unjust to the charae-  
 “ ters of our superiors, both in India and England, if we did  
 “ not entertain a hope, that their case would meet with a favor-  
 “ able and indulgent consideration. But we feel restrained  
 “ from dwelling upon this subject, as we are aware its very men-  
 “ tion might be deemed improper in an Address, the great and  
 “ sole object of which is to correct misapprehension, and to  
 “ convey a solemn assurance of our continued and unalterable  
 “ adherence to the same principles of loyalty and attachment to  
 “ our King and country, and of respect and obedience to the  
 “ Government we serve, that have ever distinguished the army  
 “ to which we belong.”

the foundation on which every great empire must rest, and such the rule by which every great statesman will be guided. But throughout the opinions expressed by Colonel Malcolm, we see, with regret, a species of crusade declared against the “bug-bear principle of consistency,” and every thing like “common rule,” and a “reference to general principles, or to precedent,” is treated with almost bigotted intolerance. These opinions, too, we find reiterated in defiance of the most complete demonstration, that it was only by firm adherence to consistency of principle, united with the due exercise of vigor and discretion, that the Government was enabled, in the midst of the most imposing dangers, to preserve its power unimpaired, and to restore the tranquillity which now happily prevails in the establishments, Military and Civil, under its control.

Accounts of the Mutiny at Masulipatam reached Madras about the end of June, 1809. This event Colonel Malcolm, without any qualification from preceding circumstances, or the notoriously insubordinate state in which the Garrison of Masulipatam had long been, at once ascribes to “an imprudent measure of Government.” The circumstances are, however, more distinctly, and more justly stated, in the dispatch of the Government of Madras. The Government observes,—“Lieut.-Col. Innes found it necessary, immediately on assuming the command of Masulipatam, to exert his authority in checking the intemperate pro-

Pamphlet,  
page 134.  
Ditto, 133,  
70. &c.

Printed Pa-  
pers—Let-  
ter from  
the Govern-  
ment of  
Madras,  
dated 10th

“ceedings of his Officers. The violent and dis-  
 “respectful conduct of Lieutenants Forbes and  
 “Maitland at the mess of the Regiment, on the  
 “evening of Lieut.-Col. Innes’s arrival, obliged  
 “him to recommend to the Officer commanding  
 “the army in Chief, the measure of marking their  
 “misconduct, by detaching the former to a re-  
 “mote station, and suggesting the removal of the  
 “latter from the situation of Quarter-master; the  
 “Officers affected to consider this measure as an  
 “act of unmerited rigor, derogatory to the cha-  
 “racter of the regiment, and of the service.

“About this time an urgent application was  
 “received by us from the Naval Commander-in-  
 “Chief, for the services of one hundred Euro-  
 “peans, to act for a time as marines on board of  
 “His Majesty’s ships. It had for some years  
 “been customary to detach parties of troops to  
 “serve as marines on board of His Majesty’s  
 “ships, when required by the exigencies of the  
 “public service. Orders had, however, been re-  
 “cently received from His Royal Highness the  
 “Duke of York, prohibiting the employment of  
 “His Majesty’s troops on that duty, excepting in  
 “cases of the greatest emergency. His Majesty’s  
 “regiment had for some years furnished the par-  
 “ties required for this duty, and several of those  
 “parties had been nearly two years detached  
 “from their corps. The Madras European regi-  
 “ment had been long unemployed, and the ser-  
 “vices of the whole corps were not required at

Sept. 1809,  
 to the Sec.  
 Committee

“ Masulipatam; we determined, therefore, to  
 “ comply at once with the urgent application of  
 “ the Naval Commander-in-Chief, and the orders  
 “ of His Royal Highness the Duke of York, by di-  
 “ recting a detachment from the Madras Euro-  
 “ pean regiment, of three Officers, and one hun-  
 “ dred men, to embark on His Majesty’s ships.  
 “ The ships of war intended to receive those men  
 “ arrived at Masulipatam on the 24th June.

“ The Officers of the European regiment  
 “ being prepared for Mutiny by the concurring  
 “ causes already described, resolved to avail  
 “ themselves of this opportunity to execute their  
 “ purpose ; and to obtain the co-operation of their  
 “ men, they persuaded the men that the embark-  
 “ ation of the detachment was only a preliminary  
 “ step to breaking the regiment, and transferring  
 “ the men to the navy. They assured the men  
 “ that it was their intention to resist this unjust  
 “ and oppressive act of the Government, and call-  
 “ ed upon them in return to support their Officers.  
 “ A deputation from the Officers of the garrison  
 “ waited upon Colonel Innes ; informed him of  
 “ their determination to resist the orders for the  
 “ embarkation of the detachment, recommended to  
 “ him to wait the result of a reference to Madras  
 “ on the subject, and proceeded, on being ap-  
 “ prized of his determination to execute the or-  
 “ ders of the Government, to place him in close  
 “ arrest. Major Storey of the 19th Regiment of  
 “ Native Infantry, the Officer next in seniority at



“ Masulipatam, assumed the command of the garrison, to obviate as he pretended, the dangerous consequences which would have resulted from an attempt to enforce the embarkation of the detachment. It has been ascertained, that the whole of this proceeding had been concerted and communicated to the rest of the army some time previous to the period of its execution.”

The idea of disbanding the European regiment at Masulipatam appears to have been, not in the remotest degree, in the contemplation of the Government of Madras. But supposing that such had been the intention, Lord Minto observes, “ It will sound strange in England, that a garrison should mutiny, and put their commanding Officer in arrest, and take possession of the fortress with which they are charged, and that a whole army should revolt in its favour against the Government it serves, because it might be in contemplation to reduce a corps of a particular description.”\*

Lord Minto's Letter,  
5th Feb.  
1810.

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\* Colonel Malcolm appears to have recommended, in a private letter addressed to the Governor's Military Secretary, that the order for embarking a part of the European regiment on board His Majesty's ships, should not be dispatched. We deem it unnecessary to examine in any detail, the subject of that letter. But we shall generally observe, that the army had been during many months, advancing from one to another step in the course of sedition; and that matters had come to that crisis when the Government was called on, either to maintain vigorously and effectually, the powers belonging to it, or to surrender those powers.

Pamphlet,  
page 78.

On the receipt of the intelligence from Masulipatam, it was decided, on Colonel Malcolm's own suggestion, to depute him to take the command of that garrison. The motives which led to this nomination, appear to have been highly judicious, and the "warmth of zeal" with which Colonel Malcolm offered to proceed on this duty, perfectly accords with the ardor of character which he has evinced on many public and important occasions. Appreciating as we do the worth of public zeal, guided by ability and integrity of mind, we should be glad here to close the subject with a tribute of praise, sincerely given, as we believe it truly deserved. But the proceeding of Colonel Malcolm at Masulipatam, forms too prominent a feature in the publication which we have

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ers into the hands of those, who, by an unnatural state of things, had become its adversaries. Supposing that the Government could have reconciled itself to the humbled state of holding a mere nominal jurisdiction over the army, and should have timidly shrunk from the duty of issuing orders, lest those orders should have been disobeyed, there could not have been the least reason to hope, from the lawless violence then almost universally prevalent, that even this nominal appendage of authority would have been long permitted to remain. To use the words of the unfortunate Monarch, Charles the First,—“These twigs would not long flourish when the stock on which they grew was dead.”

The fear expressed in Colonel Malcolm's letter, that the garrison of Masulipatam might, in consequence of the stated order, be hurried by a sudden impulse, to further extremities, rested on no foundation, it having been ascertained that the plan of the meeting “had been concerted and communicated to the rest

been called to consider, not to require some observations regarding it.

One of the most authentic sources to which reference can be made for a distinct exposition of the views connected with Colonel Malcolm's appointment, is the official Report addressed by that Officer to Sir G. Barlow, after his return from Masulipatam, as the circumstances referrible to Sir G. Barlow himself, may be considered, from the nature of that communication, to have received, in some degree, the sanction of his concurrence. The following extract of that Report gives, accordingly, a distinct view of the feelings and intentions of Sir G. Barlow, at the period of Colonel Malcolm's departure. Sir G. Barlow reposed in

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"of the army some time previous to its execution." In addition to the authority of the Government on this point, we have the authority of Colonel Malcolm himself; who, in a letter to Sir G. Barlow, written the day after his arrival at Masulipatam (5th July), expressly says; "The question of the marines, and the removal of some of the Officers, had, I find, (for they have shown me all their papers,) been anticipated by the other Stations; and the opposition here was in part by instruction; and subsequent letters sufficiently show, that this case is no longer that one, nor of the garrison of Masulipatam, but of the whole army, and that they are most deeply pledged to the support of each other."

Pamphlet.  
page 129.

In such a state of things, it seems impossible for a moment to doubt, that if one pretext of overt Revolt had been wanting, others would have been speedily found, unless the Government was disposed to anticipate the further extremity, by an implicit surrender.

Colonel Malcolm the greatest confidence that it was possible to place in any public Officer ; to him he “ committed the dignity and interests of Government,” at a period of very critical emergency. The motives for doing so are here explained ; and while they must appear in a high degree honourable to Sir G. Barlow, the circumstance of such a selection, at such a time, certainly placed Colonel Malcolm on a very conspicuous theatre of public action.

Pamphlet,  
page 175.

Colonel Malcolm states ; “ I was repeatedly assured by you, at the last interview with which  
“ I was honoured, that you committed the dignity  
“ and interests of Government (as far as those  
“ were implicated on this occasion,) into my hands  
“ with perfect confidence, and that you gave me  
“ the fullest latitude of action ; adding, that I was  
“ fully acquainted with your sentiments upon the  
“ whole subject of the existing discontents among  
“ the Officers of the Company’s army. I certainly  
“ was, from the confidence with which you honoured me, fully aware of your sentiments. I  
“ knew that you were most solicitous to allay the  
“ ferment that had arisen in the army, and that  
“ you were at that moment resolved to use every  
“ means in your power to effect that object, but  
“ such as you deemed derogatory to the honour  
“ and dignity of the Government with which you  
“ were charged. You regarded, I knew, the occurrence of a rupture between the state and any  
“ part of its army, as one of the most desperate

“ evils that could arise, and thought every mo-  
 “ ment that such an event was delayed was of ul-  
 “ timate importance, as it gave time for reflection,  
 “ and the action of better feeling, and strength-  
 “ ened the hope that deluded men might yet re-  
 “ turn to that path of duty and good order from  
 “ which they had so widely departed.”

Being vested with those discretionary powers, Colonel Malcolm left Madras on the 2nd, and reached Masulipatam on the 4th July.

We shall give a short view from Colonel Malcolm's Correspondence and Journal of the events which occurred during the period of his command at Masulipatam. Having landed at that place, it became matter of violent discussion among the Officers, whether Colonel Malcolm “ should be re-  
 “ cognised, or not, as their Commanding Officer.” After this discussion had continued five hours, Colonel Malcolm was at length allowed to assume the command, on the ground of personal respect to his character. Colonel Malcolm dined in the evening with the mess of the European regiment, where inflammatory toasts were as usual given, to which, however, Colonel Malcolm did not accede without certain modifications, proposed on the spur of the occasion. The Officers of the garrison on that day, and afterwards, pressed strongly to obtain from Colonel Malcolm, the assurance of an amnesty for their offences, which he firmly refused. The communications which followed between Colonel Malcolm and the Officers, dur-

Pamphlet,  
 page 121.  
 Ditto, 155.

ing the period of his command, became quite confidential on both sides, both parties under a mutual understanding, freely imparting all papers and proposed plans of proceeding. Colonel Malcolm took every opportunity, verbally, and in writing, of impressing on the Officers better sentiments, by appealing to their reason, and by bringing in their view the desperate circumstances in which they had placed themselves. On the 15th July, being the eleventh day after Colonel Malcolm had assumed the command of the garrison, an incidental occasion was taken to inform publicly, the men of the European regiment, "that it never  
 " was in the contemplation of Government to dis-  
 " band or disperse the corps." The Address delivered on this occasion to the regiment, was not viewed without suspicion by many of the Officers, who thought it "calculated to excite the  
 " men against their Officers." Two days after Colonel Malcolm was formally called on to give an explanation of the disposition "of the Govern-  
 " ment of Madras to redress their grievances,"—it being signified that if he did not, "the confi-  
 " dence of the garrison would be withdrawn from  
 " him; and they would consider themselves re-  
 " leased from all promises they had made." Colonel Malcolm declining to make a "communica-  
 " tion of the nature required," it became, next day (18th), a matter of violent debate, whether the garrison should not have "recourse to imme-  
 " diate violence." After "a warm discussion for

“several hours,” it was decided among the Officers “to wait six days, when, if they heard no-  
 “thing favorable to their hopes, they meant to  
 “take such steps as they thought calculated to  
 “forward the objects they had in view.” Colonel  
 Malcolm rejected these resolutions as “nothing  
 “less than an open defiance;” and in an interview  
 with two of the senior Officers, pressed many ar-  
 guments on the subject. Colonel Malcolm says;  
 “I went immediately after this interview to dine  
 “at the mess of the regiment, and (strange in-  
 “consistency!) received every mark of respect  
 “and kindness from men who had been debating  
 “all the morning whether they should enter into a  
 “contest with me for the authority of the garri-  
 son!” On the 19th it was again decided, on the  
 ground of personal respect towards Colonel Mal-  
 colm, that the Officers would, for a time, abstain  
 from any further act of violence, “unless a rise in  
 “other stations was to take place.” On the fol-  
 lowing day General Pater took the command of  
 the garrison. About this time a Resolution was  
 passed by the Officers, “that the Garrison Com-  
 “mittee, which were mobbish meetings of the  
 “whole of the Officers, should be abolished, and  
 “the proceedings to be entirely carried on by the  
 “eleven senior Officers, by whose judgment all  
 “questions were in future to be decided.”

Having given the above, we hope, impartial out-  
 line, of the state of affairs at Masulipatam, while  
 Colonel Malcolm held the command, the reader

will naturally look with interest to the opinion expressed by the Government of Madras on that subject: this opinion is accordingly given in the following extract of a dispatch, addressed by the Government to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.

Printed Papers—Letter from the Government of Madras to the Secret Committee of 10th of Sept. 1809.

It is stated in that dispatch: “ On receiving the intelligence of the Mutiny, we appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, in whose zeal and talents we entertained the fullest confidence, to the command of the Madras European regiment and the garrison of Masulipatam, for the purposes of re-establishing the authority of the Government over the troops, enquiring into the causes of the Mutiny, and placing the most guilty of the offenders under arrest. Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm was not furnished with any written instructions; it was left to his discretion to adopt such measures as circumstances might render advisable, with the view to the accomplishment of the objects of his deputation.”

“ Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm immediately proceeded by sea to Masulipatam: on his arrival he found that the Officers of the garrison had formed themselves into a Committee, in which every Officer had a voice. The greatest anarchy and confusion prevailed, and it was with difficulty that he prevailed on the Officers to acknowledge his authority.”

“ As it was never in the contemplation of the Government to disband the European regiment,



“ it was expected that Lieutenant-Colonel Mal-  
 “ colm would have taken the earliest opportunity  
 “ to communicate to the men a distinct and pub-  
 “ lic disavowal of that intention on the part of the  
 “ Government, and have employed the most stre-  
 “ nuous exertions to recall the men to a sense of  
 “ their duty, by impressing upon their minds the  
 “ degree of guilt and danger in which their Offi-  
 “ cers, for purposes entirely personal to themselves,  
 “ had endeavoured to involve them. It was also  
 “ expected, that Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, by  
 “ establishing his influence and authority over the  
 “ troops composing the garrison, would have se-  
 “ cured their obedience, and by that means have  
 “ deprived the Officers of the power of prosecut-  
 “ ing their designs, and brought the leaders to  
 “ trial for their mutinous conduct.

“ Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm appears, how-  
 “ ever, to have adopted a course of proceeding  
 “ entirely different from that which we had in view  
 “ in deputing him to Masulipatam. He abstained  
 “ from making any direct communication to the  
 “ men ; and when we authorised him, with the  
 “ view of detaching the troops from the cause of  
 “ their Officers, to proclaim a pardon to the Euro-  
 “ pean and Native Soldiers for the part which they  
 “ might have taken in the Mutiny, he judged it  
 “ to be proper to withhold the promulgation of  
 “ the pardon, from an apprehension (as stated in  
 “ his letter to our President, dated the 18th of

“ July,) of irritating the minds of the European  
 “ Officers and driving them to despair.  
 “ To this apparently unreasonable forbearance  
 “ and attention to the feelings of Officers, who  
 “ had, by their acts of violence and aggression,  
 “ forfeited all claims to such consideration, may  
 “ we conceive, be ascribed Lieutenant-Colonel  
 “ Malcolm’s failure in the establishment of any  
 “ efficient control over the garrison ; and he ap-  
 “ pears to have been principally occupied, during  
 “ the period of his residence at Masulipatam, in  
 “ negotiations with the disorderly Committees,  
 “ calculated, in our opinion, to compromise, rather  
 “ than establish, his authority, and in fruitless  
 “ attempts to induce them, by argument, to return  
 “ to their duty, and abandon the criminal combina-  
 “ tion in which they had engaged. Lieutenant-  
 “ Colonel Malcolm’s reasons for pursuing this  
 “ line of conduct, and for recommending to us  
 “ the adoption of conciliatory and temporizing  
 “ measures, are detailed in his Letters to our Pre-  
 “ sident, of the 4th, 5th, and 6th of July. In  
 “ those letters, he states, that the Officers of Ma-  
 “ sulipatam had received assurances, from most  
 “ of the military stations of the army, applaud-  
 “ ing their conduct, and promising them their ef-  
 “ fectual support; that the whole army were unit-  
 “ ed in a resolution to oppose the authority of Go-  
 “ vernment ; that the combination was general ;  
 “ that there was not a single corps, from Ganjam

“ to Cape Comorin, which was not prepared to  
 “ break out into open rebellion. The measures  
 “ recommended by Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm,  
 “ as constituting, in his opinion, the only means of  
 “ averting the most dreadful calamities, consisted  
 “ of a modified repeal of the orders of the first of  
 “ May; the restoration to the service, and to their  
 “ appointments, of all the Officers whom we had  
 “ found it necessary to suspend or remove, with  
 “ an intimation to the army, that their claims to  
 “ Bengal allowances would be brought to the no-  
 “ tice of the Honorable Court of Directors.  
 “ Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm returned to Madras  
 “ on the arrival of Major-General Pater at Masu-  
 “ lipatam, to assume the command of the northern  
 “ division of the army, having succeeded no fur-  
 “ ther in accomplishing the object of his mission,  
 “ than in preventing the Officers from adopting  
 “ any flagrant acts of outrage to authority, during  
 “ his residence at Masulipatam.”

The Government, in expressing the above opi-  
 nion, laid before the Secret Committee all the ma-  
 terial correspondence and papers on which it was  
 founded;\* and the opinion has, we believe, ob-

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\* Colonel Malcolm alludes, in his Preface to the circum-  
 stance of the Government having recorded several of his pri-  
 vate letters; but adds, (a very sufficient explanation,) “ I do not  
 “ however conceive that I have any right to complain of this  
 “ act; the letters contain not one sentiment of which I am  
 “ ashamed; they were all on public subjects; and that alone

tained the perfect acquiescence of the official authorities, under whose observation the subject has been brought. The grounds on which it rests seem quite immoveable, and on all material points, the information contained in Colonel Malcolm's Journal and Letters, is in perfect accordance with the view of the question taken in the dispatch of the Government; an accordance not shaken by any reasoning contained in the Pamphlet. It was perfectly understood, that the idea of disbanding the European regiment had been used by the Officers, as an instrument to excite the men to mutiny. The Government naturally "expected that Colonel Malcolm would have taken the *earliest opportunity* to communicate to the men a distinct and public disavowal of that intention." That this was not done, Colonel Malcolm has himself shown; for he has stated, that no explanation of the kind took place till the eleventh day of his being at Masulipatam, at which time (combined with the course of proceeding which Colonel Malcolm had then decided to pursue), the explanation could not certainly be of much avail. Colonel Malcolm says, in a letter to the Military

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"when they were addressed to Sir G. Barlow, or his Secretary, rendered them public."

If the Government had expressed the opinion which it did, without a full explanation of the grounds on which it was founded, Colonel Malcolm would have had reason to complain, but not otherwise, as he has himself sufficiently explained.

Secretary, of the 18th of July; " You will satisfy Pamphlet,  
 " Sir G. Barlow, that one of the first things that page 89.  
 " I did, after I came on shore, was to satisfy the  
 " minds of the Officers, and *through them*, of the  
 " men, of the intentions of Government, in or-  
 " dering a party of marines from the corps : " that  
 is to say, Colonel Malcolm trusted to the Officers  
 for the removal of the main prop of their own  
 desperate cause, and looked to them, as the organ  
 for clearing away a deception, which they had  
 themselves deliberately created, in pursuit of pur-  
 poses to which they were daily giving to Colonel  
 Malcolm, the most decided proofs of their de-  
 termined adherence.\*

Colonel Malcolm refers to an approval of his

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\* Colonel Malcolm, in his letter to the Military Secretary of the 18th July, refers to an extract of the Address which he delivered on the 14th of that month, to the European regiment at Masulipatam, which extract appears not to have been recorded with the letter. It relates to the intended embarkation of a detachment of the regiment as marines. Colonel Malcolm says ; " I may ask, with great surprize, and some indignation, why the " extract alluded to in this letter, was not transmitted to the Ho- " norable Court of Directors ? " We however think, that there is not much room for either surprize or indignation. Under the desire which we have felt to state nothing in these sheets that might not be founded on accurate enquiry, we have ascertained, from a quarter that had abundant opportunity to be informed of the transactions of that period, that the omission of the extract was wholly accidental, and contrary to the intention of Sir G. Barlow, who gave special directions that every paper should be

measures by Sir G. Barlow. The only approval which we have been able to trace, is contained in the Military Secretary's letter to Colonel Malcolm of the 12th July, being an answer to a letter written by that Officer, on the very day of his arrival at Masulipatam. As the Military Secretary's letter is material, and as it has not been included among the letters published by Colonel Malcolm, we think it proper to be inserted here. The letter is as follows :

“ *Fort St. George, 12th July, 1809.*

“ DEAR MALCOLM,

Printed Papers— Enclosure No. 8, of the Dispatch of the Government of Madras of 10th Sept. 1809.

“ Sir George Barlow has received your letter of the 4th instant, and he desires me to express his entire approbation of all your proceedings, as reported in that letter.

“ The obedience to your authority, manifested by the Officers and men of the garrison, has afforded to the Governor the greatest satisfaction.

“ As it is possible that considerable delay may arise in the arrival of the other Members of the Committee, appointed to inquire into the circumstances which led to the late occurrences at

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laid before the Secret Committee. It was apparently overlooked among the great mass of voluminous papers then sent to England. A reference, however, to the facts stated above, must evince that the extract was scarcely of the least importance.

“ Masulipatam, the Governor authorizes you, if  
 “ the measure should appear to you to be advisea-  
 “ ble, to proceed in that enquiry by yourself, re-  
 “ porting the result for the information and or-  
 “ ders of Government.

“ In the mean time Sir George Barlow leaves it  
 “ to your discretion to grant a pardon to the Non-  
 “ commissioned Officers and Privates of the Ma-  
 “ dras European regiment, and to the Native  
 “ Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers  
 “ and Privates of the Native Corps, for any part  
 “ which they may have taken in the late irregu-  
 “ larities.

“ The Governor presumes, that you have ex-  
 “ plained the circumstances which led to the or-  
 “ ders for the purpose of performing marine duty  
 “ on board of His Majesty’s ships; and that you  
 “ have distinctly stated, that there never existed  
 “ any idea or intention on the part of Government,  
 “ to disperse or break the Madras European regi-  
 “ ment, and place the Officers on half-pay, or in-  
 “ flict any punishment, impose any mark of dis-  
 “ grace or disapprobation whatever, on that corps.

“ Sir George Barlow has also received your  
 “ letters of the 5th and 6th instant, and will re-  
 “ ply to them without delay.

“ I remain, &c.

(Signed)

“ R. BARCLAY,

“ Military Secretary.”

“ To Colonel Malcolm.”

It will be perceived by the preceding letter, that Sir G. Barlow was, from the earliest period, under the impression that Colonel Malcolm would, as matter of course, have made it one of his earliest objects to free the men of the European regiment from the delusion which had been the cause of their mutinying. As a further means of restoring the authority of the Government in the garrison of Masulipatam, Colonel Malcolm was empowered to grant a pardon to the non-commissioned Officers and privates. But the knowledge of this, Colonel Malcolm withheld from the men, "from an apprehension of irritating the minds of the European Officers, and driving them to despair." This apprehension, and feeling of delicacy, was entertained and expressed by Colonel Malcolm, in a letter addressed to the Military Secretary, on the 18th July, on which very day the Officers were again, in fact, in open mutiny against Colonel Malcolm's authority, it being matter of declared debate for several hours, whether they should not come "to extremes that day." We should have thought, that a letter, written by Colonel Malcolm, under such circumstances, would have breathed sentiments of a very different strain, from those we find in the letter to which we refer. The explanation given by Colonel Malcolm on these points, is, in our judgment, as remote as possible from a satisfactory conclusion. That the Government entertained a laudable anxiety to avert the necessity of resorting to extre-

Pamphlet,  
page 141.



mities, is apparent; but it was obviously not the intention of the Government, that this should be attained by the virtual surrender of all military control. It was part of the instructions communicated to Colonel Malcolm, that he should exert his influence and ability in "satisfying the Officers that it was not less for their interests, than it was consistent with their duty, to await the decision of the authorities in England;" but it was at the same time part of those instructions, to keep "the Garrison of Masulipatam firm to their duty."\*

Printed Papers — Enclosure No. 8, of Dispatch from the Government of Madras, 10th Sept. 1809.

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\* Colonel Malcolm lays some stress on the circumstance of his having dissuaded the Garrison of Masulipatam from executing their "design of marching to join the Hyderabad force, and prevented, from the 4th till the 22nd of July, their committing any outrage;" and complains, we think wholly without reason, that the Government had omitted to mention this fact. We beg to point out the concluding passage of the dispatch of the Government already quoted, it being there expressly mentioned that Colonel Malcolm had returned to Madras, having only succeeded "*in preventing the Officers from adopting any flagrant acts of outrage to authority, during his residence at Masulipatam.*" Colonel Malcolm no doubt accomplished a desirable object, in obstructing for a time the movement of troops from Masulipatam. At the same time, it is perfectly plain, that, if the Officers had rashly engaged in the proposed measure, and had marched to join the Hyderabad force, this combined movement could not have been effected without a march of several hundred miles; and long before it could have been completed, the Government would have had the most abundant means of meeting and subduing every hostile attempt.

Pamphlet, page 103.

In regard to another point, to which Colonel Malcolm seems

We have the fullest belief, that through all the difficult circumstances in which Colonel Malcolm was placed at Masulipatam, he acted with the purest intentions, and with strenuous exertion; and though the course on which he entered was radically wrong, he pursued it with address and ability. We cannot but feel some degree of pain in seeing that hilarity of mind, which, in a "happy hour of social pleasure," was calculated to gain all hearts, so misplaced, as it was in those scenes which we have been viewing. Throughout those scenes, Colonel Malcolm was the "safe companion, and the pleasant friend." But as to military command, it was the "*nominis umbra*," the shadow of a name, and nothing more. The garrison of Masulipatam was left by Colonel Malcolm in very near the same state as that in which he found it, with the exception, that the garrison, instead of being ruled by "mobbish meetings of the whole Officers," which Colonel Malcolm describes, was ruled by a more

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to attach some importance, namely, the circumstance of the Government having assembled a force near Madras, in consequence of the intelligence which he had communicated from Masulipatam, we shall only observe, that there was, unhappily, too much intelligence of the same kind daily coming from other quarters, to make it likely that the arrangements made by the Government were hastened more than two or three days, in consequence of any information that Colonel Malcolm may have furnished.

limited council: Keeping, in some degree, pace with the Revolution in a neighbouring country—the Convention had passed away, and was succeeded by a Council of Elders, a Council, however, which continued under the absolute dominion of its constituents. During Colonel Malcolm's residence at Masulipatam, he held the nominal command by the most slender of all tenures, personal favor; by a thread, ready every instant to be broken by the slightest breath. Though he had exhausted every effort of conciliation, Colonel Malcolm "could not put his foot over the threshold," without having his power disputed. So complete a proof of the nullity of the system which Colonel Malcolm earnestly recommended; of the utter danger, in times of great disorder, of trusting to a mere appeal to "mens' minds," cannot, perhaps, be more strikingly exhibited any where, than in the case before us. We again say, that we give Colonel Malcolm entire credit for his honorable intentions; but the times were times of great difficulty; and in the midst of the darkness of the night, of clouds and storms, that Officer evidently mistook his way; and, instead of maintaining triumphant the broad surface of the ocean, he got entangled among rocks and shoals, where every wind was adverse, and where even the gently fanning zephyrs of popular favor, the "*aura famæ popularis*," rather encreased, than diminished the danger.

A strong contrast was afforded of the efficacy

of a contrary system to that pursued by Colonel Malcolm, at all those Stations where a direct appeal was made to the troops, in opposition to the rebellious views of the Officers. We may, however, particularly select for comparison, a very memorable example, that of Colonel Close, at Hydrabad, as all parties have concurred in admiring the conduct of that Officer, and as Lord Minto has pointed it out as one of the great means by which the first link in the chain of rebellious confederacy was broken. The letter from Sir George Barlow to Colonel Close, requesting that Officer to proceed from Poonah to Hydrabad, is dated the 14th July, not many days after Colonel Malcolm's arrival at Masulipatam; both Officers were placed in circumstances of a very similar nature; and from the confidence reposed in their talents and experience, they had both discretionary powers to act according to the emergency of the case. We cannot give an account of the distinguished efforts of Colonel Close in better language than has been done in a periodical publication of deserved celebrity, from which we accordingly extract the following description :

Quarterly  
Review,  
No. IX.

“ The mutineer Officers had heard of the ap-  
“ pointment of Colonel Close; had divined the  
“ purposes of it; and dreading his known influence  
“ over the minds of the Sepoys, had originally de-  
“ termined to prohibit his approach within the  
“ distance of a stage from Hydrabad. This pro-  
“ hibition, had they persevered in it, they would

" have found it necessary to carry into effect by  
 " force; for Colonel Close had so fully entered into  
 " the mind of Government, respecting his mission,  
 " that he was resolved on obtaining, at whatever  
 " risk, an interview with the troops. Lieut.-Col.  
 " Montresor, however, prevailed on the Officers  
 " to abandon their purpose; but it was still doubt-  
 " ful whether they would permit Colonel Close to  
 " enter the Cantonment. Whatever might at that  
 " time be their intentions on this point, it is well  
 " understood that they employed every art and the  
 " greatest pains, to pre-occupy the minds of the  
 " native soldiery. Among other tales of a similar  
 " kind, they assured them that it was the deter-  
 " mination of Government to disband half the  
 " battalions, to reduce the pay of both Officers  
 " and men; and, in event of their resisting these  
 " arrangements, to march against them the King's  
 " troops, and deliver them to military execution.  
 " Colonel Close was represented as the instrument  
 " chosen for the perpetration of these monstrous  
 " acts, and of course, as an object of peculiar  
 " jealousy.

" Having travelled from Poonah with extraor-  
 " dinary celerity, Colonel Close arrived at the  
 " Residency in Hyderabad on the 3d of August.  
 " Here he was received by Lieut.-Col. Montresor  
 " and the Officers of the Staff, and the former  
 " resigned to him the command of the subsidiary  
 " force. Nor could this supercession at all wound  
 " the feelings of that excellent Officer, consider-

“ing the superior standing of Colonel Close, and  
 “his distinguished aptitude, derived from long ac-  
 “quaintance with the native troops, for the of-  
 “fice entrusted to him. At the Residency, the  
 “senior Major of the subsidiary force waited on  
 “him, announcing himself as the forerunner of a  
 “deputation of his brother Officers, who were on  
 “the road. Colonel Close observed, that he had  
 “been appointed to the command of the sub-  
 “sidiary force, and that a proper place for a con-  
 “ference with his Officers was the Cantonment,  
 “whither he was about to proceed. Being urged  
 “to declare the intentions of Government, he re-  
 “plied, he would declare them at the Cantonment;  
 “and that the communication would be such as,  
 “he hoped, might prove satisfactory. He then  
 “mounted his horse and rode to the Cantonments,  
 “accompanied by Colonel Montresor, the Gene-  
 “ral Staff, and some other Officers, and escorted  
 “by a troop of native cavalry from the Resi-  
 “dency.

“It is to be observed, that by this time, Colo-  
 “nel Close had received further instructions  
 “from Government than those with which he  
 “set out from Poonah. He was also enjoined to  
 “enforce the test of allegiance on the Compa-  
 “ny’s Officers, a measure which had been devised  
 “subsequently to his appointment : by this order,  
 “his anxiety to show himself in the Cantonment  
 “had been increased. At first it had occurred  
 “to him that he would do well to place himself,

“ on his entrance, at the head of the single King’s  
 “ regiment, contained in the enclosure, with a  
 “ view, not of using violence, but of command-  
 “ ing respect. Such a step, however, would have  
 “ excited the jealousy of the disaffected party ;  
 “ and, besides, was the less practicable, since the  
 “ regiment in question happened to be quartered  
 “ at a considerable distance from the entrance into  
 “ the Cantonments. The plan was therefore re-  
 “ linquished.

“ It had been expected, that the attempt of  
 “ Colonel Close to enter the Cantonment, would  
 “ have been resisted by the main piquet, but the  
 “ piquet saluted him respectfully, and permitted  
 “ him to pass. Then, halting in front of the  
 “ lines of a native battalion, he summoned the  
 “ Chief Officers of Corps ; he was joined, how-  
 “ ever, only by two Majors ; but of these one  
 “ was the Senior Company’s Officer with the  
 “ force.

“ These Officers he addressed strongly, but in  
 “ a temperate manner, describing to them the cri-  
 “ minality of their conduct, and the desperate  
 “ situation to which they reduced themselves.  
 “ Under present circumstances, it was necessary  
 “ (he said), for the Government to ascertain ac-  
 “ curately the sentiments of its armies, and to  
 “ distinguish the obstinately guilty from those  
 “ who retained, or who were disposed to resume,  
 “ their loyalty. He then tendered to them the  
 “ Test ; stating, at the same time, that, from a

“ consideration towards the feelings of such Offi-  
“ cers as might have entangled themselves in cul-  
“ pable engagements with their brethren, Govern-  
“ ment allowed them the alternative of a tempo-  
“ rary retirement from the exercise of their mili-  
“ tary functions, still drawing their allowances.”

“ The Officers were much affected by this Ad-  
“ dress, but replied, that a compliance with the  
“ wish of the Government, in either alternative,  
“ was impossible ; that the army had pledged it-  
“ self to the prosecution of certain objects, and  
“ could not desist from the pursuit. They then  
“ desired time to deliberate and to consult with  
“ their brother Officers ; but Colonel Close, who  
“ knew what would be the certain result of delay,  
“ refused to grant it.

“ A long and anxious conversation now took  
“ place, in which Colonel Close pressed every  
“ appeal to the reason and the feelings of the  
“ two Officers. He particularly addressed the  
“ Senior Major, reminded him of the long period  
“ of his service, his rank, and his particular situ-  
“ ation in the force, and implored him to embrace  
“ this last occasion of returning with honor to the  
“ bosom of his country. The Officers seemed  
“ deeply agitated, but finally refused to abandon  
“ their purpose.

“ Colonel Close, on this communication, alter-  
“ ing his tone, informed those Officers that their  
“ disobedience had left him at full liberty to fol-  
“ low his farther instructions. Then, turning to



“ the troop of Native Cavalry which had formed  
“ his escort, he accosted them in their own lan-  
“ guage, explaining to them the situation of af-  
“ fairs, the misconduct of their Officers, and their  
“ paramount obligation to obey him, as their au-  
“ thorised Commander. The Native Soldiers had  
“ long been acquainted with the name and ser-  
“ vices, if not the person, of Colonel Close. They  
“ listened attentively and *salamed* to him with  
“ great respect. The Mutineers perceived the  
“ danger of this crisis, and while Colonel Close  
“ was yet addressing the troopers, he observed the  
“ Sepoys of the battalion rushing to arms and form-  
“ ing with the greatest rapidity, under the direction  
“ of European Officers. Not a moment was to be  
“ lost. Beckoning to the troopers to follow him,  
“ he rode into the divisions, and with his breast at  
“ the points of their bayonets, expostulated with  
“ the Sepoys. He called on the native Officers to  
“ explain the cause of all this agitation and vio-  
“ lence. He told them, that he was himself an old  
“ Officer in the same service with them, that with  
“ them he had served and fought, that he was  
“ their leader and their friend, and that the Go-  
“ vernment was their benefactor and their support.  
“ He seized several of them with his hand, and  
“ entreated them to obey their Commander. The  
“ confusion and bustle, however, were now so  
“ great, that much of what he said was lost on the  
“ Sepoys. The Officers too, became more and

“ more enraged and urgent ; and the order was  
 “ given for the troops to *wheel into line*. This was  
 “ the critical point of the whole contest. An  
 “ Officer gave the word for his company to wheel  
 “ into line : Colonel Close opposed himself to the  
 “ order: the conflict was violent ; the Officer call-  
 “ ing on his men to march, the Colonel with  
 “ equal peremptoriness commanded them to stand  
 “ fast. The Sepoys confounded and agitated,  
 “ paused for a while, but, at length, delusion and  
 “ disobedience, for the time, prevailed. The com-  
 “ pany wheeled ; the other companies followed  
 “ the example ; and all primed and loaded. The  
 “ escort of cavalry drew their swords, and trot-  
 “ ting off, took their place in the line. The  
 “ other battalions had also in the mean while  
 “ formed, and thus the whole force, together  
 “ with the park of artillery, was arrayed in arms  
 “ against their commander, and prepared for  
 “ action.

“ Even this strange scene, disgraceful as it  
 “ might be to the principles of these misguided  
 “ men, left some little salvo to their fame, in the  
 “ credit which it did to their tactical discipline.  
 “ In the midst of so much agitation and confusion,  
 “ the troops formed with that perfect skill and pre-  
 “ cision, which have ever rendered the Madras  
 “ Sepoys the envy even of European warriors.  
 “ An Officer of the Staff of Colonel Close, on this  
 “ critical occasion, seems to have surveyed the

“spectacle, awful as it was, and has since de-  
 “described it, with the involuntary sympathy of  
 “a soldier. ‘The formation (he observes,) was  
 “completed with the greatest order and regulari-  
 “ty, and I never in my life saw a more beautiful  
 “line.’

“Colonel Close was not yet subdued, and made  
 “a last struggle to recover the Sepoys to their al-  
 “legiance. The Officers, at least the juniors  
 “among them, were incensed beyond bounds,  
 “and demanded permission of the Commander  
 “to fire on the Colonel and his Staff; but it was  
 “refused. The artillery-men, however, fell out  
 “in front of their guns and seemed marching  
 “to seize his person. Colonel Close perceiving  
 “that the contest was at an end, once more ad-  
 “dressed the Senior Major. ‘As you (he said,)  
 “are the Senior Officer present at the shameful  
 “opposition which has been shown to my orders,  
 “I shall consider you as particularly responsible  
 “for what has occurred. My authority has been  
 “openly and completely rejected: and I am your  
 “prisoner.’ The senior Officers, however, had not  
 “thrown off their long established feeling of re-  
 “spect for his character. In the strongest terms  
 “they disclaimed the intention of subjecting him  
 “to personal violence, and expressed their deep  
 “regret at the necessity which had driven them  
 “to insult his authority. The Colonel then retir-  
 “ed from the Cantonment; defeated indeed, but

“ as hereafter will be seen, not utterly unsuccessful.  
“ ful.

“ Surely the whole of this picture wants not  
“ clear traits of dignity and greatness; nor will  
“ the transaction misbecome the pages of that  
“ historic chapter which confers immortality on  
“ our Clives and our Cootes. The Officer whom  
“ we before quoted, accompanied his Account of  
“ it with the following interesting comment: ‘ I  
“ was within three yards of the Colonel during the  
“ whole time, and a more awful or a more anxious  
“ scene I never witnessed. Every mind, even  
“ those of the very persons who were resisting  
“ his authority, seemed filled with admiration, at  
“ the firm, manly, and soldier-like conduct of  
“ Colonel Close.’

“ Immediately after the departure of Colonel  
“ Close, the Field-Officers waited on him at the  
“ quarters of Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor, with  
“ an Address, respecting the grievances of the  
“ army. Colonel Close declined receiving it; and,  
“ being requested by them to proceed to Madras,  
“ where, by his influence with the Government,  
“ he might promote their interests and wishes, he  
“ replied, that his orders did not give him the op-  
“ tion of proceeding to Madras, and that he had  
“ no intention of undertaking the office they pro-  
“ posed to assign to him. On the following day he  
“ received from the Officers a letter, requiring that  
“ he would immediately leave the vicinity of Hy-

“drabad, on pain of their resorting to ‘ more un-  
 “pleasant, decisive measures.’ The truth is, that  
 “a reflection on the events of his visit to the  
 “Cantonment, acting on their conviction of the  
 “general estimation in which he was held by the  
 “Native Soldiers, had satisfied them that not  
 “only his presence, but even his neighbourhood,  
 “was dangerous to their usurped authority. This  
 “requisition, Colonel Close had expected, and  
 “had determined to remain in defiance of it; but  
 “receiving in the interim an intimation from Go-  
 “vernment, that in the event of the ill success of  
 “his mission, it was their purpose to place him at  
 “the head of the force destined against those in-  
 “surgents, whom he had failed to conciliate or to  
 “divide, he thought proper to comply.”

We shall not offer any of the many reflections  
 which the preceding account is calculated to sug-  
 gest. We shall only observe, that the efforts of  
 Colonel Close, by clearing away the delusion  
 which had been imposed on the minds of the troops  
 at Hydrabad, as elsewhere, shook the pillar on  
 which the mutinous confederacy, that so violently  
 opposed his authority, had rested, and the confe-  
 deracy, in a few days after, fell to the ground.

It has been seen, that the Government, in the Page 84  
 dispatch to the Secret Committee, already quoted,  
 referred to the conciliatory propositions, of which  
 Colonel Malcolm recommended the adoption, with  
 considerable earnestness. Our own time and pa-  
 tience, with that, no doubt, of our readers, being

nearly exhausted, we shall willingly abstain from any lengthened comment on this part of the question, and hasten to the conclusion of observations which have extended greatly further than the expected limits. We before noticed the premature opinions which Colonel Malcolm was led to express, in his private correspondence, on this subject, while at Bombay; then, as he has mentioned, in an uninformed state. It is impossible to peruse the Pamphlet published by Colonel Malcolm, without perceiving the glaring glances, on all occasions, directed to the same object. But at the momentous period referred to by the Government, the plan of conciliation was urged in a more formal manner; and we cannot but see, with concern, that the proposition came from the very centre and focus of rebellion. Being desirous of doing perfect justice to the arguments used by Colonel Malcolm, we shall, at the hazard of some prolixity, insert the whole of the letter which he addressed, on the occasion, to Sir G. Barlow, the day after his arrival at Masulipatam.

“ TO SIR GEORGE BARLOW,

“ *Masulipatam, 5th July, 1809.*

“ DEAR SIR,

“ I wrote you a hurried letter last night. I have  
 “ since come to the knowledge of many additional  
 “ facts, and have had some time to reflect on what  
 “ I have seen and heard; and I should be as want-  
 “ ing in my duty to you as to my country, if I

“ was withheld by any motive whatever, in stating  
 “ my sentiments in the most undisguised manner  
 “ on the present state of affairs : and whether you  
 “ coincide in my opinion or not, you can have no  
 “ doubt, regarding those motives that lead me to  
 “ express, in that sacred confidence, which your  
 “ knowledge of my character authorises me to use,  
 “ the conviction of my judgment on the steps ne-  
 “ cessary to be taken upon the present unfortunate  
 “ crisis.

“ I have now seen the concerted plans of almost  
 “ the whole of the army against the authority of  
 “ Government ; and can say, with almost an as-  
 “ surance that I am correct, that there is not one  
 “ Company’s corps, from Cape Comorin to Gan-  
 “ jam, that is not implicated in the general guilt,  
 “ and that is not pledged to rise against Govern-  
 “ ment, unless what they deem their grievances  
 “ are redressed. Be assured that no Commanding  
 “ Officer, whatever they may write, has any real  
 “ authority over their corps :\* and though in some  
 “ places (where there are King’s regiments), they  
 “ are more guarded, their resolution is the same ;  
 “ and they mean to act, the moment the example  
 “ is shown, by those parts of the army whom they  
 “ consider as most likely to be successful in their  
 “ first efforts. The Hydrabad and Jaulnah force,  
 “ are chiefly looked to, and the northern division  
 “ of the army ; and the European regiment has,

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\* *Note by Colonel Malcolm.*—This chiefly alludes to the Offi-  
 cers of the corps.

“ from what they style its regimental grievances,  
“ become the corps from which they expect the first  
“ act of opposition. Its late proceedings are ap-  
“ plauded and confirmed by the force at Hydrabad;  
“ and I know it was intended, if there had been  
“ the slightest indication of any coercive measures,  
“ or even had the Commander-in-Chief arrived, to  
“ have marched this corps, and the two Sepoy bat-  
“ talions, in the division, to effect a junction with  
“ the Hydrabad force, in order to organize an army  
“ to commence hostilities with Government.  
“ Their march was to have taken place as to-day ;  
“ and it was, for five hours after my arrival, a  
“ subject of warm discussion, whether I should be  
“ recognised or not as their Commanding-Officer ?  
“ And, after stating every thing a man could state,  
“ to reclaim them to better feeling, I was obliged  
“ to give them the choice of the extreme, of either  
“ immediately submitting to the order of Govern-  
“ ment, or of opposing it. They chose at last the  
“ former ; but placed it on the grounds of that  
“ general respect which was paid by them, and all  
“ their brother Officers, to my character. I did  
“ not think it necessary to fight, regarding the  
“ grounds of their obedience on this point, being  
“ satisfied with the substance, and particularly as  
“ I had received this proof after they were in-  
“ formed of my sentiments and intentions. Though  
“ an immediate open rebellion against Govern-  
“ ment has been prevented by my arrival at Ma-  
“ sulipatam, the danger is not past ; and we must



“ not deceive ourselves, or any longer evade this  
 “ serious question. The Officers of the Company’s  
 “ army on the coast are, no doubt, at this moment  
 “ in a state of actual insurrection against the Go-  
 “ vernment; and this combination against autho-  
 “ rity is every moment maturing and spreading  
 “ wider. I have seen the letter\* from the Bombay  
 “ army to that of the coast, and it is unqualified  
 “ in its condemnation of the orders of the 1st of  
 “ May, and its promise of support; several pri-  
 “ vate letters have been received from Bengal.  
 “ An Address from that army, to the same effect  
 “ as that of Bombay, is expected: at all events,  
 “ they appear certain, that no human power will  
 “ lead the Bengal troops to act against them.  
 “ They calculate upon opposition from the King’s  
 “ army, and their plans are concerted to meet it.  
 “ These deluded men are aware of the ruin they  
 “ are bringing upon themselves, but their infatua-  
 “ tion is so great, that they are reconciled to their  
 “ ruin, in the expectation that it will equally in-  
 “ volve that Government against which their rage  
 “ has been so industriously and so successfully  
 “ excited. All attempts to reason with men in the  
 “ state of mind they are in, appears vain. Even  
 “ the calculation of the able letter from Bengal is,  
 “ as I apprehended, likely to inflame, instead of  
 “ appeasing their passions. It is so true, that

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\* *Note by Colonel Malcolm.*—This was afterwards discovered  
 to be a forgery.

“ when men’s minds have gone completely wrong,  
 “ that which ought to put them right, has, in ge-  
 “ neral, a direct contrary effect ; and the fact is,  
 “ that all those correct principles and loyal feel-  
 “ ings, which are so eloquently expressed, in  
 “ the letter from the Supreme Government, but  
 “ serve to impress them more forcibly with a  
 “ sense of that guilt into which they have so pre-  
 “ cipitately rushed, and to render them more des-  
 “ perate in their proceedings, as they can (after  
 “ what has passed, and particularly late events at  
 “ this place,) only see individual safety in all being  
 “ equally involved in the deepest guilt. I in-  
 “ treat you to be persuaded, that these sentiments  
 “ are quite general ; or, at least, that the few who  
 “ do not entertain them, have neither the means  
 “ nor the courage to oppose their progress ; and  
 “ allow themselves, with an indefensible passiveness,  
 “ to be borne along with the tide. Under such  
 “ a state of circumstances, all hopes of this spirit  
 “ of insurrection subsiding must be at an end.  
 “ Some steps must instantly be taken ; and no  
 “ good can result from the application of any par-  
 “ tial remedy. The disease is general, and the  
 “ remedy must be so also. It remains with you to  
 “ decide on the measures that are to be adopted.  
 “ The first and most military, though not, per-  
 “ haps, the most political, that suggests itself, is  
 “ the employment of actual force. In such a con-  
 “ test, however, not only the means must be cal-  
 “ culated, but the result ; and, as far as I can

“ judge, success, even in this extreme, would not  
 “ save us from the most baneful consequences. It  
 “ seems, therefore, not wise to have resort to such a  
 “ measure, till every other that is possible for Go-  
 “ vernment to take, without the annihilation of  
 “ its own power and dignity, has been tried, and  
 “ failed. Unqualified concession to the demands  
 “ of the army, either in dismissing public servants  
 “ of Government, or in rescinding its orders, would  
 “ be a virtual resignation of its power, and cannot  
 “ therefore be made. It would, indeed, be better  
 “ and more honourable, if *matters were at the*  
 “ *worst*, that Government should fall by any hands  
 “ than its own. Should Government not resolve  
 “ on having immediate resort to force, one line  
 “ only remains that could, at the present moment,  
 “ afford a rational hope of the necessity of having  
 “ recourse to that extreme being avoided, or at  
 “ least, of its being resorted to with advantage,  
 “ which is, to meet the crisis at once, by a gene-  
 “ ral order to something of the following pur-  
 “ port :

“ “ Government finds, with concern, that it can  
 “ no longer indulge that sanguine hope which it  
 “ once entertained, that the irritation which a va-  
 “ riety of causes have combined to produce in the  
 “ minds of the Company’s army on the coast,  
 “ would subside ; and as it is satisfied, that the evils  
 “ which must result from the existence of those  
 “ combinations against its authority, that are now  
 “ formed in almost every Station, will, if suffered

'to continue, be as injurious to the public inter-  
 'ests, as if those by whom these proceedings are  
 'carried on, were in a state of open hostility to  
 'Government; it feels compelled to anticipate  
 'every extreme that can occur, and to publish to  
 'the army at large, the final resolutions which it  
 'has adopted under this extraordinary and unpa-  
 'ralleled situation of affairs: and these resolutions  
 'will, it is satisfied, be found to combine as much  
 'attention to the feelings of the army as it is pos-  
 'sible to show, without a sacrifice of the public  
 'interest, and an abandonment of the authority  
 'and dignity of Government. The Governor in  
 'Council can, and does make every possible allow-  
 'ance for feelings so strongly excited as those of  
 'the Officers of the Coast Army have been, and is  
 'disposed to refer that great agitation of mind into  
 'which they have been thrown by a concurrence  
 'of causes, which must greatly mitigate, if they  
 'do not altogether extenuate, that degree of cri-  
 'minality which must always attach to such pro-  
 'ceedings: and, under such impressions, he can  
 'view their extreme solicitude regarding those  
 'of their brother Officers, whom he has thought  
 'it his duty to suspend the service, with that consi-  
 'deration which is due to a highly meritorious  
 'body of Officers, acting under the strong im-  
 'pulse of warm and honorable, but mistaken,  
 'feelings. And with such sentiments, he cannot  
 'deem it derogatory to Government to state, that  
 'he intends, in the full confidence, that the Offi-

'cers of the Coast Army will abandon their present  
 ' dangerous course of proceeding, to recommend  
 ' to the Honourable the Court of Directors, the  
 ' restoration to the service, of those Officers,  
 ' whose suspension, and the reasons which led to  
 ' it, have been reported to them, and who are  
 ' consequently, the only authority by which that  
 ' act can be repealed: and he can have no doubt,  
 ' but the earnest desire of their brother Officers,  
 ' combined with the high character which most of  
 ' the Officers, under suspension, formerly held,  
 ' will induce the Honourable Court to overlook  
 ' their late conduct, and comply with this recom-  
 ' mendation. Acting upon the same principle,  
 ' Government is pleased to appoint Colonel Bell to  
 ' the charge of the battalion of artillery at the  
 ' Mount, and Colonel Chalmers to the command  
 ' of the subsidiary force, in Travencore. Lieute-  
 ' nant Maitland is appointed Quarter-Master of  
 ' the European regiment of infantry.

" " The Committee of inquiry ordered to as-  
 ' semble at Masulipatam is repealed; and no act,  
 ' either of any body, or of individual Officers in  
 ' the Company's service, of which no cognizance  
 ' has yet been taken, and which occurred before  
 ' the present date, will be made subject of future  
 ' notice, or even operate to the disadvantage of  
 ' such body of Officers or individuals, unless they  
 ' should by perseverance in the same course, and a  
 ' repetition of the same conduct, forfeit all claim  
 ' to such lenity and consideration. At a moment

• when Government has taken such steps to tran-  
• quillize the agitated minds of the army, and to  
• leave even the most mistaken without a plea for  
• perseverance in their present dangerous course,  
• it must declare its positive and final resolution,  
• neither to alter nor modify this proceeding. It  
• will yield no more to the intreaties or demands  
• of the army; and if any Officers are so infa-  
• tuated, and so lost to every consideration of the  
• public good, and the general prosperity of their  
• country, as not immediately, on the promulga-  
• tion of this order, to abandon their present course  
• of proceeding, Government must, however much  
• it may deprecate such an extreme, meet it  
• with that firmness and courage which becomes a  
• constituted authority of the Empire of Great  
• Britain. It has contemplated this possible,  
• though, it trusts, highly improbable event; and  
• the different Officers, entrusted with command,  
• are directed, should any spirit of turbulence and  
• insubordination appear among the Officers of the  
• troops under their command, to punish the indi-  
• viduals with all the severity of Martial Law.  
• And should the operation of the regular course  
• of justice be impeded, either by a combination  
• among the Officers or men, such will instantly  
• be proclaimed rebels against the legal authority  
• of Government and their country; as Govern-  
• ment is perfectly satisfied that the public inter-  
• ests will receive more injury from any effort to  
• conciliate men, who persevere (after what has

' passed) in principles so opposite to the restora-  
' tion of order and discipline, than it even can  
' meet from them as open enemies to their King  
' and Country.'

“ I am aware that a thousand objections may be  
“ made to an order of this nature; but it must  
“ only be tried by the times; matters have arrived  
“ at such a crisis, that something decided must  
“ instantly be done. There is not an hour for de-  
“ lay. And what I have suggested, is only the first  
“ proclamation in a war, that seems to me, even  
“ with this step, almost unavoidable. If human  
“ means could avoid it, this act will; for it holds  
“ out every motive that can incline men to good  
“ and deter them from evil. It concedes no doubt,  
“ in some points, but the case is urgent, and the  
“ spirit of concession is corrected by the firmness  
“ and resolution which is mixed with it. But your  
“ own mind will suggest every thing. I am, as you  
“ know, devoted to the cause of my country. It will  
“ depend upon you where I am to act, if matters  
“ draw to an extreme. I should prefer my situa-  
“ tion at Mysore, as that in which I have most  
“ influence, and could in consequence, contribute  
“ most to the support of the public interests. I  
“ cannot conclude, without again intreating you  
“ not to allow yourself to be lulled into security,  
“ and to be satisfied of the absolute necessity of  
“ taking some steps or another, to save the State  
“ from the imminent danger to which it is exposed.

“ But inaction, even dangerous as it is, may be  
 “ better than the commencement of a coercive  
 “ system, before steps have been taken to gain  
 “ more friends to Government than it has at pre-  
 “ sent in the army : and I confess, I can see no  
 “ mode of doing this but by a measure which is  
 “ completely decided and final ; and which, while  
 “ it grants every indulgence, even to erroneous  
 “ feelings, looks to the close of this great question  
 “ with a moderate and conciliatory, but a firm and  
 “ manly spirit. I shall be most anxious for your  
 “ sentiments as soon as possible, on the line I am  
 “ to pursue at this place. The question of the  
 “ marines, and the removal of some of the Offi-  
 “ cers, had, I find, (for they have shown me all  
 “ their papers,) been anticipated by the other sta-  
 “ tions ; and the opposition here was in part by in-  
 “ struction : and subsequent letters sufficiently  
 “ show, that this case is no longer that one, nor of  
 “ the garrison of Masulipatam, but of the whole  
 “ army ; and that they are most deeply pledged  
 “ to the support of each other. Indeed *there can-*  
 “ *not be a* doubt, but the punishment of any one  
 “ would cause the whole to break out. This I feel  
 “ it my duty to avoid, as well as to prevent their  
 “ marching, which was their intention, and which  
 “ they expect to be called upon to do ; till I know  
 “ the general line you mean to pursue,”

“ I am, my dear Sir, &c.

(Signed)

“ JOHN MALCOLM.”



The above Letter was followed, on the subsequent day, by another letter, from which we give the following extract :

“ After my letter of yesterday I have little to add.  
 “ I can only again implore your most serious consideration to the whole question, and your instant decision on the line that is to be pursued;  
 “ not merely here, but with the whole army. No half measures will at this moment answer : and unless some effort is made to appease the minds of the deluded Officers of this army, you must make military preparations to reduce them to order ; and these must be directed against every station under your Presidency ; for though success may be various, an effectual opposition will be made at all ; and none are more violent than some of those nearest the Presidency. If you adopt a measure of the nature that I recommended yesterday, it should be *quite final* ; and therefore embrace every concession and act of conciliation *that you can make* without a substantial sacrifice of the dignity of Government.

“ I can think of no improvement to this order, except you conceive the great object of avoiding hostilities, would justify the following addition to it.

“ ‘ Government received a representation from a number of the Officers of the Coast Army, in which they solicited the equalization of their allowances with those of the Officers of the Bengal Army. This is a subject, the consideration of

‘ which must exclusively rest with the Court of  
 ‘ Directors, under whose notice this application  
 ‘ will, *in course*, be brought, and by whose deci-  
 ‘ sion, it will be the duty of the Officers of the  
 ‘ Coast Army to abide.’ ”

Printed Pa-  
 pers.—Let-  
 ters from  
 the Govern-  
 ment of Ma-  
 dras, of the  
 24th Jan.  
 28th Feb.  
 10th Sept.  
 1809—with  
 their En-  
 closures.

If any thing could have shaken the fortitude of mind which Sir G. Barlow so strikingly displayed at this alarming period, Colonel Malcolm’s Letters were certainly of a nature to produce that effect; and the remedy which that Officer proposed, for the many urgent evils he had forcibly brought to view, was not likely to diminish the anxiety. The Government had, in every stage of the question, from the period of General Macdowall’s Letter to Sir G. Barlow of May 1808, until the latest moment, used every means of explanation, and had exerted the most conciliatory efforts to avert the excesses towards which the army were, during many months, visibly advancing. The letter, addressed by Sir G. Barlow, to General Macdowall, in May 1808; the subsequent correspondence with that Officer, relative to the arrest of the Quarter-Master-General, and other of his public acts; the General Order published to the army in Feb. 1809, after the removal of General Macdowall from the command; the explanatory letters and orders repeatedly circulated in the army, in the following months, all breathed the same amicable feeling and the same earnest anxiety, on the part of the Government, to prevent further extremities. The

Government took no strong step whatever, without the clearest proof of its necessity, and without having previously tried every means to obviate it. In order, too, that the army might be apprized that the sentiments of the Supreme Government, entirely accorded with those of the Government of Madras; and that all that had been done, was ratified by the Supreme Authority, different letters of the Governor-General in Council were published to the army; and added to the number of the many appeals which were made "to their reason, their discipline, and their patriotism." We know that there are some persons of great intelligence, who think that the Government went too far in the way of conciliatory effort; but Colonel Malcolm is among the few, the very few persons of an intelligent description, whose minds have been warped by impressions of an opposite kind. The efforts of the Government, though meritorious and proper, were, indeed, far from meeting an adequate return, for they seemed rather to embolden the assailants, and to invite new acts of aggression. Colonel Malcolm in numerous passages, describes the army as having been "completely infatuated," as in a state "where the voice of passion is alone heard, and every man that speaks with temper and reason, is condemned and calumniated,"—"as deluded men," in such a "delirium, as to desire the occurrence of the crisis that must end in their ruin." Colonel Malcolm had told Sir G. Barlow,

Pamphlet,  
page 140,  
149, & c.

Letter of  
the Govern-  
norGeneral  
in Council,  
to the Go-  
vernment  
of Madras,  
of 27th  
May, 1809.

that, "Even the circulation of the able letter from Bengal, is, as I apprehended, likely to inflame, instead of appeasing, their passions. It is so true, that when men's minds have gone completely wrong, that which ought to put them right, has, in general, a direct contrary effect." Under the full impression of all these circumstances, and in the knowledge of all the facts, stated in Colonel Malcolm's correspondence with Sir G. Barlow, did he feel himself justified in recommending, with great earnestness to the Government, not only a repetition of the conciliatory efforts, already notoriously unavailing, but the declared abandonment of the whole system of measures, which had appeared to the Government of Madras, as well as to the Supreme Government of India, indispensable to the public safety.—We cannot peruse the General Order proposed by Colonel Malcolm, on that occasion, without pain and surprize; and our surprize is increased by seeing that Colonel Malcolm proposed it under a strong impression of the danger of the Government yielding to the clamorous demands of the army, repeatedly declaring, "that the Government had better fall by any hands than its own." Persons of plain understanding must be quite unable to follow Colonel Malcolm through the wire-drawn refinements he has given as to concession and conciliation, where the bounds are divided by such thin partitions, as almost to elude the casuist's mole-eyed perception.

Pamphlet,  
p. 50, &c.

Colonel Malcolm proposed that the Government should place itself in the situation of publicly declaring to the army, that the struggle which it (the Government) had hitherto maintained, could no longer be carried on, in consequence of the formidable violence that the army had shewn, and that it was, therefore, prepared for submission on certain terms. Those terms were, chiefly, that the Government was to acknowledge, that the criminality of all the past proceedings, in which the army had been engaged, were, from concurring circumstances, "greatly mitigated, if not "altogether extenuated:" and the Government, under the influence of this new light, was to become an advocate with the Court of Directors, to obtain from the Court, the restoration of those Officers who had been suspended from the service, for conspiring to effect its overthrow;—Officers who had been removed from command on similar grounds, were to be publicly restored;\* and *pour comble de misere*, the Government was to declare itself the ready channel to bring before the Court of Directors the question of equalizing the Madras allowances with those of Bengal, the main

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\* It is impossible to say to what extent Colonel Malcolm meant to carry these re-appointments, as in a subsequent letter to the Governor's Military Secretary, he says, "I, of course, Pamphlet, page 137.  
"meant to include several that I did not mention by name."

point for which the Army had been all along contending.\*

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\* We are unable to reconcile what Colonel Malcolm has proposed on this subject in page 131 of his Pamphlet, with what he had before said in page 51, where he states it as an inadmissible *concession* on the part of the Government, "to promise an effort to obtain an equalization of their allowances with the Officers of Bengal." The Government of Madras had already referred the Memorial, received from General Macdowall on the part of the army, on this subject, to the Supreme Government, the only authority to which it was competent to the Government of Madras, to refer a question of the kind, involving, as it obviously did, not the allowances of the army of Madras only, but those of the whole Indian army, and the whole subject of the Indian finances. The countenance recommended by Colonel Malcolm to be given to the claim (according to what is stated in the latter part of his pamphlet), could not possibly be given without impressing the army with the idea of an implied sanction of the claim; if it was to be of any use at all, that was to be the effect. The obscurity of the whole proceeding is such, that the eye can scarcely see an inch before it: but we confess, that if the Government had pursued such a course, it would have, in our idea, betrayed its own duty; it would have betrayed the Supreme Government, who had declared, that the demand of Bengal allowances could not be granted; it would have betrayed the Court of Directors, who had told the Governments of India that the extension of allowances was incompatible with the existence of the Company; and it would have betrayed the army, by holding out fallacious hopes, which the Government well knew could never be realized. We are satisfied that these facts did not occur to Colonel Malcolm's mind, or that a course leading to such consequences would never have been recommended by him.

All this, and more than this, was conveyed in the General Order proposed by Colonel Malcolm. If what was proposed to be done was not concession—if it was not the Government falling by its own hands, we know not what the words mean. We know not what the words mean, if it was not establishing the Army in the character of a Judge of the acts of the Government, and compelling the Government to appear and to plead guilty at the bar of that tribunal. It was not even a surrender on terms; it was a supplication for mercy; for the Government had not the smallest assurance that the experiment, degrading and dangerous as it would have been, was to be in the least successful, while every preceding event seemed to make the reverse almost inevitable. Colonel Malcolm indeed contemplates the probability of the army viewing the proceeding as a “victory;” and that many would be led by a “hardened spirit of disaffection and turbulence, to continue in opposition:”—but this we are told was “*Nothing.*” If the army was still unreasonable enough to resist, the Government was then to measure back its way—to resume the high ground from which it had voluntarily descended—to redeem its character, and to do prodigies. Mr. Burke observes, “This is an experiment cautiously to be made. *Reculer pour mieux sauter*, according to the French by-word, cannot be trusted to as a general rule of conduct. To diet a man into weakness and languor, afterwards to give him

Pamphlet,  
page 100,  
&c.

Proposed  
Govern-  
ment Or-  
der.

“greater strength, has more of the empirick than the rational physician.”\* We shall only say further, that the whole of the proposed course which we have been considering, appears, in our idea, so derogatory to the character of the Government, so inconsistent with its honor, its interests, or its existence; so totally subversive of all future discipline or subordination; so fatally injurious to the interests of the army itself, and so boundless in its injurious effects on every part of the Indian Administration, that if the counsel leading to it had come from any unknown quarter—if it had come from almost any other quarter than Colonel Malcolm himself, we should have felt a difficulty in not ascribing it to motives which, however much we may have differed from him in opinion, as to the points under discussion, we are sincerely satisfied found no place in his mind. We have already stated, that we think Colonel Malcolm mistook the nature of the evil with which the Government was compelled to contend, in the per-

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\* Colonel Malcolm has quoted largely from this distinguished Writer; and we, too, have ventured to support some of our opinions by a reference to this oracle of human wisdom. We hold the writings of Colonel Malcolm in too much respect, to say with the Author of one of our best comedies, that the quotations which he has used, “lie like lumps of marl on a barren moor:” but placed as they are, we certainly cannot recognize in them any of the high-toned sentiments which characterises the original. They appear much less as volunteers, than as conscripts forced into a foreign service.



formance of its most sacred duty, and in defence of those rights which it was bound by the most solemn obligation to maintain: and the foundation being defective, the whole superstructure shared in its nature.

It remains, that we should close this head by briefly shewing the opinions expressed by Sir G. Barlow, and by the Court of Directors, regarding Colonel Malcolm's proposition.

The opinion of Sir G. Barlow was given in a private letter from his Military secretary, addressed to Colonel Malcolm, which is here inserted.

“ Fort St. George, 12th July, 1809.

“ DEAR MALCOLM,

“ You have received my letter of this date, in  
 “ reply to your letter of the 4th instant, which  
 “ related more immediately to the recent occur-  
 “ rences at Masulipatam, and to the measures  
 “ which you had adopted with regard to that  
 “ garrison.

Printed pa-  
pers — En-  
closure No.  
8, of the  
Dispatch  
from the  
Govern-  
ment of  
Madras, of  
10th Sept.  
1809.

“ I am now directed by Sir George Barlow, to  
 “ reply to your letter of the 5th and 6th instant,  
 “ respecting the state of the army generally, and  
 “ the course of policy which you recommend to  
 “ be pursued.

“ Sir George Barlow desires me to express to  
 “ you his thanks for the very unreserved manner  
 “ in which you have communicated to him your  
 “ opinion on this important subject.

“ After the maturest consideration, he cannot  
 “ satisfy his mind of the policy of the course of  
 “ measures which you have recommended to his  
 “ adoption.

“ You have, indeed, been long apprized of the  
 “ sentiments of Sir George Barlow, with regard  
 “ to that course of policy; and the information  
 “ which you have now communicated to him, in-  
 “ stead of altering those sentiments, has confirmed  
 “ him in his opinion of the necessity of maintain-  
 “ ing the authority of the Government with un-  
 “ shaken firmness and resolution.

“ You cannot now render a more acceptable ser-  
 “ vice to the public interests, than by exerting  
 “ your influence and ability in keeping the garri-  
 “ son of Masulipatam firm to their duty, and in sa-  
 “ tisfying the Officers, that it is not less for their  
 “ interests, than it is consistent with that duty, to  
 “ await the decision of the authorities in England,  
 “ on the several questions which have occasioned  
 “ so much agitation in the minds of a consider-  
 “ able portion of the army of this establishment.

“ Sir George Barlow entertains the fullest con-  
 “ fidence that your endeavors for this purpose will  
 “ prove successful, and that no extreme cases of the  
 “ nature of those to which you allude, will occur.  
 “ If, however, any such cases should occur, he  
 “ leaves it entirely to your discretion to adopt such  
 “ measures as you may deem best calculated to  
 “ meet the exigency of the occasion, and to enable

“ you to maintain your authority in the garrison  
 “ under your command.

“ In consequence of the information communi-  
 “ cated by you, Sir George Barlow has deemed it  
 “ expedient to assemble a considerable force, con-  
 “ sisting of His Majesty’s and the Honorable  
 “ Company’s troops in the neighbourhood of Ma-  
 “ dras, for the purpose of protecting the seat of  
 “ Government, and enabling the Government to  
 “ maintain its authority under all possible circum-  
 “ stances.

“ I remain, &c.

(Signed)

“ R. BARCLAY,

“ Military Secretary.”\*

“ *To Colonel Malcolm.*”

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\* The Resident at Hyderabad having submitted to Sir George Barlow, propositions, somewhat similar to those recommended by Colonel Malcolm, he was in like manner informed, that it was “ the firm and unalterable determination of Government not to compromise the public authority in the slightest degree: any such compromise would lead to evils of the greatest magnitude which would be irremediable.”

We have already noticed the striking similarity in almost every feature of the Mutiny in Bengal in 1766, with the late Mutiny at Madras, with the exception, of the last being greatly more formidable. The Reader will have no difficulty in tracing a close resemblance of the reply of Sir George Barlow, to that given by the late Lord Clive, under the like circumstances: they differ only in words; both being animated by the same spirit. Lord Clive states in a letter to Sir Robert Barker,—“ Will men, so abandoned to all sense of honor, and who still perse- vere in supporting acts of mutiny and desertion, when they

Printed  
 papers—  
 Enclosure,  
 No. 15, of  
 Dispatch,  
 of 10th  
 Sept. 1809.

The opinion of the Court of Directors is conveyed in a letter, addressed by the Court to the Government of Madras, on the 1st May, 1810, from which we insert the following extract:—

Printed Papers—Letter of the Court of Directors, 1st May, 1810.

“ We have observed, with peculiar satisfaction,  
 “ your undeviating adherence to the principle  
 “ which you first opposed to the factious proceed-  
 “ ings of the Officers, namely, that no concession  
 “ ought to be made to an armed combination ; and  
 “ it is to your uniform adherence to this unques-  
 “ tionable principle of policy that we ascribe, un-  
 “ der Providence, the early termination of a re-  
 “ bellion, which threatened at once ruin to its au-  
 “ thors, to the Company, and to the most valua-  
 “ ble interests of Great Britain.

“ We are the more forcibly impressed with the  
 “ merit of your conduct on this occasion, by

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“ have obtained one point, cease there? History can furnish  
 “ but few instances of that nature. For my own part, I must see  
 “ the soldier's bayonets levelled at my throat before I can be  
 “ induced to give way, and then not so much for the preserva-  
 “ tion of my own life, as the temporary salvation of the Com-  
 “ pany. Temporary only it can be, for I shall think Bengal in  
 “ the utmost danger when we are reduced to the necessity of  
 “ submitting the civil power to the mercy of men who have gone  
 “ lengths that will astonish all England.

“ With me it is beyond a doubt, that if the Officers do not  
 “ resolve to submit and acknowledge their crime, ruin and de-  
 “ struction must equally be their lot, whether they succeed or  
 “ not ; and if arguments of this kind can make no impression,  
 “ none will.”

“ observing that from many quarters, and some  
 “ of them of respectability, measures of concession,  
 “ under the name of conciliation, were pressed  
 “ upon your adoption.

“ We are unwilling to impute to these advisers  
 “ any but the most honorable motives ; but we feel  
 “ it to be our duty to declare our decided convic-  
 “ tion that no greater evil can exist in any State  
 “ than the submission of its Government to the  
 “ dictates of an armed association, and conse-  
 “ quently, that no such submission can ever with  
 “ safety be made.

“ Such submission would, in fact, amount to an  
 “ abdication of the Government, and that in the  
 “ worst possible form and manner. It would com-  
 “ promise the authority and power of Government,  
 “ not only in India, but in Europe, and might pre-  
 “ vent the measures absolutely necessary to vindic-  
 “ cate the insulted authority of the nation.

“ The line of conduct which you pursued, in  
 “ temperately, yet steadily, upholding the dignity  
 “ and authority of Government, by a refusal of  
 “ all compromise and concession to Officers in  
 “ open rebellion, proper at all times, was, in the  
 “ circumstances which we are now reviewing, im-  
 “ periously required of you. For the question  
 “ then at issue was not a question of grievance,  
 “ but of authority ; not one of a partial nature,  
 “ but, in fact, a question respecting the total dis-  
 “ solution of the Government.

“ The Officers demanded not a redress of griev-

“ances affecting themselves personally, but a formal revocation of the judgment of Government, deliberately and legally pronounced (on the 1st May, 1809) upon Officers serving under their authority. This was in fact, an attempt to take the Government into their own hands. It became, therefore, your unquestionable duty manfully to resist such a daring and treasonable usurpation.

“The modified recal of your Orders of the 1st May, which we are sorry to find was recommended to you by some of our servants, for whose judgment and integrity we in general entertain great respect, would, in our opinion, have been equally impolitic, and still more disgraceful than their entire revocation. For it would have evinced all the weakness of a timid and unqualified recantation: and would equally have admitted what never can be admitted, that Government have no power to suspend *or dismiss* their Military servants without the judgment of a Court Martial, a power which though seldom exercised, and which, as far as respects your Government abroad, is limited to suspension alone, is obviously necessary to the security and existence of every Government, and particularly of a Government so far removed from the supreme authority of the State.

“Upon these principles and considerations we entirely approve the line of conduct which you adopted and followed, as described in the 27th,

“ 28th, and 29th paragraphs of the letter to which  
 “ we are now replying ; the natural and happy  
 “ consequences of which so soon appeared in the  
 “ unconditional submission of the revolted Offi-  
 “ cers, and the restoration of legal authority.”

Colonel Malcolm's Narrative is not extended more than a few pages after the period of his return to Madras from Masulipatam. But though these pages might afford considerable matter for remark, we have no wish to dwell longer on the subject. One point only we shall concisely notice, namely, the refusal of Colonel Malcolm to sign the Address presented to Sir George Barlow by the principal inhabitants of Madras, at the time when the Mutiny was raging with the fiercest violence. A time more suitable for such an Address, or an Address more suitable for such an occasion, could not well be imagined.\* Every

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\*The Address will best speak for itself, and is therefore here inserted:—

“ We whose names are hereunto subscribed, impressed with a  
 “ deep sense of our duty to our country, and of the necessity of  
 “ good order and obedience to the constituted authorities, beg  
 “ leave to tender you, at this moment of difficulty and danger,  
 “ our assurances of support to the interests of Government, and  
 “ of our readiness to devote our lives and fortunes to the main-  
 “ tenance of the public tranquillity in any way in which to you,  
 “ in your wisdom, it may seem meet to command them.

“ We desire to take this opportunity of publicly expressing  
 “ our fullest disapprobation of that spirit of insubordination  
 “ which has recently shown itself amongst the Officers of the

community, in all countries, has, in times of public danger, chosen such modes for giving expression to the feelings of loyalty, and for conveying to the ruling power those pledges of support which must ever be valuable in the hour of need. It was wisely enacted by the Athenian Lawgiver, that when the country was in danger, there should be no neutrality: for who, in such times is not for, must be against. We have no doubt that the reasons which Colonel Malcolm has given, for not signing the Address, satisfied his own mind he was doing right; but we regret that we are very far from having the same feeling. We think the time in question was that, when all the respectability deservedly attached to the name of Colonel Malcolm, should have been ranged on the side of

Pamphlet,  
page 111.

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“ Honorable Company’s Army serving under the Presidency of  
 “ Fort St. George. Fully convinced, that it is the duty of every  
 “ good subject to yield obedience to the commands of those  
 “ whom the will of his Sovereign, and the laws of his country  
 “ have placed in authority over him, and patiently to await the  
 “ result of a reference to Europe for the redress of real or sup-  
 “ posed grievances; any conduct, impatient of the period of  
 “ such appeal, and backward to the calls of professional obe-  
 “ dience, we regard as subversive of all good order and disci-  
 “ pline, hostile to the Constitution of our Native Country, and  
 “ big with danger to the existence of the British Empire in  
 “ India.

“ And we therefore, Honorable Sir, beg to repeat the assur-  
 “ ances of our firm determination to resist the operation of such  
 “ principles, which we are convinced must be equally reprobated  
 “ and condemned by all good and loyal subjects.”



established order, and in defence of lawful Government.\*

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\* It is wholly unnecessary to follow Colonel Malcolm through the reasons to which we have alluded. The subject is in itself quite immaterial ; but from what we have heard, from the most authentic quarter, we are disposed to think, that Colonel Malcolm must have been misinformed, as to some of the points to which he has referred. We are not a little surprised, after the condemnation which Colonel Malcolm has pronounced in many parts of his Publication, regarding established rule, to see that he has grounded one of his objections to the Address on the circumstance of its not having been prepared agreeably to "common usage," at a time when the state of the settlement of Madras appears to have made the observance of that usage quite impossible. After the many aberrations which we have had occasion to notice, we see, with satisfaction, this return to the beaten and safe path of established principle.



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## APPENDIX.

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**T**HERE has been lately circulated a "Brief Sketch" of the Public Services of Sir G. Barlow, containing very ample testimony of the great services which he has rendered to his country, during a long public life of upwards of thirty-three years, passed in the most laborious and important occupations. The course of measures in which Sir G. Barlow was, in the later years of his administration abroad, compelled to engage, was of a nature to call forth a host of opponents, against whose clamorous efforts, unaided by political influence or connexion in this country, he has had nothing to oppose but the shield of virtue. The absence of Sir G. Barlow for so long a period of time from his native land, has debarred him from the benefit of that political support, which the corruption of human nature unhappily renders, in times of difficulty, too essential: but the purity and exalted excellence of his own character has supplied

the deficiency of extraneous aid. The question affects not Sir G. Barlow alone, but should come near to the view and feelings of every man of virtue or of honor in this kingdom: for, admitting the ties of obligation and gratitude towards a person, whose life has been, from his earliest years, devoted to the public good, to be for a moment suspended, it must be apparent, that the Nation cannot well expect to be faithfully served, if such a person should fall the victim of calumny, and be hunted down by obloquy, created in the honorable and able discharge of that duty which he had been expressly enjoined to execute.

The services rendered, in late years, by Sir G. Barlow, stand on a high eminence; and the facts connected with them are now so well known, that nothing requires, at present, to be added on that subject. The services which Sir G. Barlow was enabled to perform in his earlier years, though greatly important, are from their nature, less conspicuous and less understood; it is, however, proper, that they should be understood, in order that the Nation, and the East India Company may know that the whole course of that distinguished person has been marked by the same undeviating traits of the most ardent and successful devotion to the public interests.

Having obtained from an authentic source the following Copies and Extracts of Letters addressed by the late Marquis Cornwallis to Sir G. Barlow, we think it a duty not to withhold them from

public knowledge. They speak in language so very impressive the feelings of that great and virtuous nobleman, that they cannot fail to raise our admiration of the unsullied worth and purity of his fame, while they afford an honorable testimony of the extensive share which Sir G. Barlow had in the formation of that system of internal government, on the basis of which rests all the prosperity of our Eastern Possessions, and which has been one of the great means of conferring lasting security and happiness on a population of not less than fifty millions of our Indian subjects.

We judge it proper to notice, that the series of correspondence might have been extended, but all letters, or passages of letters, of which the publication could not be liable to any objection, have been omitted. A reference to the Correspondence will explain the times and circumstances connected with it.

*Extract from a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis to Mr. Barlow, dated Madras, 17th September, 1793.*

“ I shall ever consider the connexion and friend-  
 “ ship that I have formed with you, as one of the  
 “ most fortunate events of my life; and, although it  
 “ must be long before we can meet, I shall com-  
 “ municate with you constantly, not only on In-  
 “ dian affairs, but on all subjects in which either

“ of us may be in any way concerned ; as I know  
 “ you cannot be indifferent in matters that relaté  
 “ to me, and I shall ever be interested for your-  
 “ self and those that belong to you.”

*Copy of a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis to Mr.  
 Barlow, dated Madras, 1st October, 1793.*

“ DEAR BARLOW,

“ I am well aware of the great, and, indeed,  
 “ almost unreasonable task, that I imposed upon  
 “ you, when I requested that you would take the  
 “ charge of drawing up and framing the regula-  
 “ tions, in conformity to the resolutions which were  
 “ passed by Government, from the propositions  
 “ contained in my minute on the new judicial ar-  
 “ rangements. But I have seen so many instances  
 “ of your persevering industry, that I am san-  
 “ guine enough to hope, (notwithstanding your  
 “ official avocations) that your laborious work is,  
 “ by this time, nearly completed.

“ As I must naturally feel most warmly inte-  
 “ rested in the success of a measure, in which I  
 “ have so great a share of responsibility, and up-  
 “ on the proper execution of which, I think,  
 “ the future prosperity of our Indian empire so  
 “ much depends, I trust you will not blame my  
 “ anxiety when I beg that, before the regulations  
 “ are sent to the press, you will look them over  
 “ with particular care to see that they are perfectly

“ correct, and that there has not, from inadvert-  
 “ ence or mistake, been any deviation from the  
 “ spirit and true meaning of the minute, and of  
 “ the subsequent resolutions of Government.

“ I am, with great regard,

“ Dear Barlow,

“ Most sincerely yours,

(Signed) “ Cornwallis.”

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*Copy of a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis, dated  
 Madras, 9th October, 1793.*

“ DEAR BARLOW,

“ I cannot take my final leave of India, with-  
 “ out repeating my sense of the powerful assist-  
 “ ance which I have received from you, and  
 “ which alone enabled me to carry the most im-  
 “ portant acts of my government into execu-  
 “ tion.

“ I feel, at present, a mixture of regret and  
 “ anxiety at quitting this country, and of joy, at  
 “ the thoughts of seeing my children, after a se-  
 “ paration of eight years. As I advance in my  
 “ voyage, the latter will naturally preponderate,  
 “ but after the first hurry of spirits is over, my  
 “ thoughts will be often turned to the success of  
 “ the judicial regulations.

“ I am, with the most earnest wishes for your  
 “ health and prosperity,

“ Dear Barlow,

“ Your most faithful

“ and affectionate friend,

(Signed) “ CORNWALLIS.”

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*Extract from a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis,  
 dated Brome, 13th March, 1794.*

“ I have just learned that the fleet is to sail im-  
 “ mediately for India; and although the report  
 “ is probably not true, and I am much hurried, I  
 “ could not let the first ships have a chance of ar-  
 “ riving in Bengal without your being assured, un-  
 “ der my own hand, that I am perfectly recovered  
 “ from a slight indisposition, and that I shall ever  
 “ feel the value of your friendship, and the im-  
 “ portance of the services that you have rendered  
 “ me.”

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*Extract from a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis,  
 dated London, 4th July, 1795.*

“ Every thing which you have hitherto done is  
 “ universally approved, as far as it is understood;



“ and be assured, that the more it is understood  
 “ the more it will be admired.”

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*Extract from a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis to  
 Mr. Barlow, dated London, 23d Jan. 1796.*

“ I have received your letters to the 28th of  
 “ May, and have read them, with the inclosures,  
 “ with great attention, and with the warmest  
 “ gratitude to you, both public and private, for  
 “ upholding a system which is of such infinite con-  
 “ sequence to the cause of humanity, as well as  
 “ the British interests in India: and which with-  
 “ out your powerful support, could never have  
 “ been carried into useful effect. I request that  
 “ you will not be discouraged from persevering in  
 “ a conduct which must reflect the highest honor  
 “ on yourself, whilst it renders the most essential  
 “ service to your country; and, from which, your  
 “ benevolent mind will ever derive the most grati-  
 “ fying reflections.”

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*Extract from a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis to  
 Mr. Barlow, dated Paris, 18th Nov. 1801.*

“ After this preface, which will, I hope, in  
 “ some degree, save me from the suspicion of for-

“ getting, or neglecting, my friends in India, I  
 “ have now to express the sincere joy which I felt  
 “ on hearing of your appointment to the Supreme  
 “ Council; a circumstance so beneficial to the  
 “ public, so honorable to yourself, and which has  
 “ been so just a reward for your most able and  
 “ meritorious services.”

—◆—

*Extract from a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis to  
 Mr. Barlow, dated Brome, 7th Sept. 1802.*

“ I have now retired for ever from all pub-  
 “ lic situation, but my feelings are still alive  
 “ to the honor and interest of my country; and  
 “ I shall, to the end of my life, reflect with the  
 “ most heartfelt satisfaction, that, by adopting and  
 “ patronizing your suggestions, I laid the founda-  
 “ tion of a system for the prosperity of our Indian  
 “ empire, which has so gloriously flourished.”

—◆—

The last letter addressed by Lord Cornwallis to Sir G. Barlow, is dated 6th Jan. 1805. It explains, at considerable length, the circumstances connected with his Lordship's re-appointment to the station of Governor-General; an explanation which is, for obvious reasons, omitted. We insert, however, the following paragraph :

*Extract from a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis to Sir George Barlow, dated Culford, the 6th of Jan. 1805.*

“ Unemployed as I have been, and appeared  
“ likely to remain, in the line of my profession,  
“ and, in its present state, useless to my own fa-  
“ mily, I have consented to take the rash step of  
“ returning to India; by which, if I should be  
“ the means of ultimately placing the charge of  
“ our Asiatic empire in your hands, I shall feel  
“ that I have rendered an essential service to my  
“ country.”

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*FINIS.*

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