



Bodleian Libraries

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD


This book is part of the collection held by the Bodleian Libraries and scanned by Google, Inc. for the Google Books Library Project.

For more information see:

<http://www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/dbooks>




This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0 UK: England & Wales (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0) licence.





600023021E







THE LIFE

OF


JULIUS CÆSAR.







THE LIFE
OF
JULIUS CÆSAR.





THE LIFE
OF
JULIUS CÆSAR.

BY
THE VEN. JOHN WILLIAMS, A.M.
ARCHDEACON OF CARDIGAN;
AUTHOR OF "ALEXANDER THE GREAT,"
"HOMERUS," AND OTHER WORKS.

"The foremost man in all the world."



LONDON:
G. ROUTLEDGE & CO., FARRINGDON STREET.
NEW YORK: 18, BEEKMAN STREET.
1854.

221. c. 28.

LONDON :
SAVILL AND EDWARDS, PRINTERS,
CHANDOS-STREET.

PREFACE.

IN writing the following Life of Julius Cæsar, it was the wish of the Author to give the modern reader as truthful a view of the thoughts, words, and deeds of the chief character of his opponents and supporters as could be presented within the narrow limits prescribed for the work. For this purpose he has been far more anxious to represent facts, their causes and consequences, as they were represented either by Cæsar himself and his contemporaries, or by ancient writers of a later day who had access to sources of information no longer extant, than to exhibit them as coloured by modern writers, more anxious to discover in the bearing of past events a confirmation of their own prejudices, than the conclusions which an unbiassed judgment must necessarily draw.

It would be a great political mistake to regard the career of Julius Cæsar, and the conduct both of his friends and foes, as a picture of the legitimate struggle in a free state between the aristocratic and democratic parties, which necessarily, in some form or other, must be its constitutional elements.

The century which elapsed between the death of Tiberius Gracchus and the battle of Actium constituted a revolutionary

period, varied by intermittent calms and constantly renewed paroxysms; so that it was a rare occurrence for any leading Roman, during that period, to die peaceably under his own roof.

The constitution was utterly disjointed and unfit for its legitimate work. Rome had outgrown all her political edifices, which no longer offered protection and liberty to the citizens, but, when occupied forcibly by banded intruders, were converted into strongholds of tyranny and oppression, alternately lost and won by the two contending parties.

The great object which a provident statesman ought to have kept in view during such a state of periodical anarchy, should have been the reconstruction of the political edifice in a wider area and on broader foundations, and not, like Sylla, to have secured a short truce by consigning to the hands of his immediate partisans an oligarchal government established on the ruins of Italy, and on the banishment, proscription, and civil degradation of all Roman opponents.

Cæsar from his boyhood was a distinguished member of the party defeated and crushed, and seems to have devoted himself from the commencement of his career to its restoration to equal rights, privilege, and power; and it was his singular good fortune to find that every step taken by him in this path led also to the general good, the improved security of the state, and the greater diffusion of the blessings of peace and order in the conquered provinces. If, in pursuing this course, he had to encounter civil war, it was assuredly his misfortune and not his fault, as it was illegally forced upon him by his enemies.

It would be now vain to speculate as to what might have been the final result, if his enlarged views for the reconstruction of the state and the improvement of the empire had been carried into execution, and received the consolidation

which a longer life on his part would have afforded them. It may, however, be safely affirmed that his premature death was fatal to all its authors, a sad blow to Rome and her citizens, and a calamity to all the then known world. It was not only a foul crime, but also an atrocious blunder.

The close connexion between Julius Cæsar and the Celtic nations rendered it necessary to advance some statements respecting them which are not generally current. Should the reader wish to see an account drawn from ancient and comparatively unknown sources, respecting the history, language, and literature of the genuine Gauls, a race cognate with the ancient Britons, he may find something worth his attention in the works of the Author, which are entitled "Gomer," Parts I. and II.

With respect to the comparative geography of the various countries traversed by Cæsar, it was thought more advisable, as a general rule, to retain the original name, than to mislead the reader by always affixing modern names to ancient positions often not sufficiently ascertained. The index will furnish some further particulars respecting the modern names connected with ancient geography.

In Cæsar's time many parts of Gaul, and even of northern Italy, seem to have been covered with forests and extensive marshes, although both the sea-coast and the banks of large rivers were densely planted with towns and villages. The sieges of Avaricum and Massilia are alone sufficient to show that the inhabitants of Gaul had nothing to learn from the Romans in connexion with the means of defending cities, whether the proper materials and instruments, or skill in applying them, be taken into consideration.

The parts of Africa and Spain which were visited by Julius Cæsar teemed with cities of which many were well fortified; and should any archæological societies be at a future period

established in Spain, the ruins of many of the fenced cities of the Turduli and the Turdetani may furnish the world with monuments of their arts, habits, and general civilization, before either the Carthaginian or the Roman made any fixed settlements in the peninsula. These rich, literary, and yet pugnacious occupiers of the lower vales of the Bætis and Anas, and their inclosing mountains, were colonies of the Homeric Sidonians, a people whom the historic Tyrians, as described by Herodotus, disclaimed as their ancestors, or as in any way closely connected with them. Carthage, the undoubted daughter of Tyre, owed her first conquests in Spain to Hamilcar, the father of Hannibal, who found in southern Spain a country full of men and money.

The Author read with great interest Professor Airy's learned paper on the Localities of Cæsar's Passage from Gaul to Britain, but was not induced by it to make any change in his own narrative. A visit to Pevensey in person, and an examination of its vicinity, especially its inland portion, which in that day must have been a dense forest, convinced him that it was not through Sussex that Cæsar advanced from the sea-shore to the point where he crossed the Thames. Amidst some great errors which disfigure Cæsar's geography, it is difficult to account for the comparative accuracy with which he describes the figure of the island, and the length of the three sides. It continued long to be the measurement nearest the truth. With Cæsar's account before him, it is not easy to discover the origin of Ptolemy's enormous error.

BOGNOR,

August 1, 1854.

THE LIFE OF JULIUS CÆSAR.

CHAPTER I.

BIRTH, FAMILY, AND YOUTH.

IN the year, B.C. 100, and on the twelfth day of the month, Sextilis, which in honour of that event received the name Julius (July), was born Caius Julius Cæsar, the greatest name recorded in Roman history. His prænomen, Caius, was a favourite first name among the Romans, and in ancient times was equivalent in meaning to "pater familias," the father of the family. His nomen, "Julius," he traced from Iulus, the son of Æneas, the founder of the royal house of Alba, whence, with other families, the "Gens Julia" had been transferred to Rome by Tullus Hostilius, and enrolled among the high patricians. The origin of his third name has been a subject of dispute; one tradition stated that it was first bestowed upon an ancestor whom the Cæsarean operation introduced into the world; others recorded that the first Cæsar in the Julian family was a Sextus Julius, who, when prætor in Sicily, in the second Punic war, had with his own hand slain a war elephant, which according to them was called "Cæsar," in the Punic language. The great Julius himself evidently adopted this tradition, as the more honourable source of his inherited cognomen, for there are still extant medals and coins struck by him, bearing on the reverse

the figure of an elephant, in one case with the name Cæsar below it, in another case, with an inscription in Punic letters above the figure. It is added, that the name given to infants born as above mentioned was Cæso, not Cæsar. Also, that no Roman proper names end in "ar;" while, on the contrary, it was a favourite termination among the Carthaginians, as may be exemplified in the names of Hamilcar, Bomilcar, and others. Previous to the adoption of the cognomen, Cæsar, the Julii had ranked among the most distinguished statesmen and warriors in Rome. And Caius was entitled to place in the hall of his house the statues of no fewer than thirteen ancestors, who had borne curule offices; nor could he have expected to introduce any new honours into his family, for it was already ennobled by the prætorship, the consulship, the censorship, and the dictatorship. He could show a master of the horse, a legislating decemvir, and a tribune of the soldiers with consular power, and many other office-bearers of less distinction. The unsullied purity of his patrician blood, and the honours won by his ancestors, were birthrights to which he succeeded without any merit on his own part, and which, nevertheless, entitled him to privileges and high vantage ground, which no plebeian by descent and position could possibly enjoy. That he was conscious of these advantages, inherent as it were in his own person, is evident, from a passage in a speech which he delivered when quæstor, over the body of his aunt Julia, the widow of the great warrior, Marius: it was a public funeral, and it was in these words that he spoke of his own and of her family—Julia's mother had been a daughter of the Marcian family, which traced its origin to Ancus Martius, the fourth king of Rome:—"My aunt Julia on the maternal side sprung from kings, on the paternal side she was connected with the immortal gods—for the Marcii Reges, the name of my aunt's family, are descendants of Ancus Martius, the Julii, of which family I myself am a member, have sprung from Venus—in her, therefore, and her race were united both the sanctity of kings, who among

men have the chief power, and the honours of the gods, to whom kings themselves are subject." On the mother's side, Cæsar himself was descended from the Aurelii Cottæ, a plebeian family of Sabine origin, but ennobled by the number of curule offices with which many of its members had been honoured. Aurelia was an accomplished woman, devoted to her son, and affectionately loved and dutifully honoured by him; his grandfather, on the father's side, although the son of a consular Cæsar, bore no public office, and died undistinguished. His son, Caius Julius Cæsar, married Aurelia, and left by her three children,—the great Julius, a Julia, who at an early age married Mamercus Emilius Lepidus Livianus, who was consul in the year before Christ 77, and another Julia, who married M. Atticus Balbus. It will be necessary to keep these facts in memory, as Cæsar, like other great men, seems to have placed great confidence, especially during the latter part of his career, in his relations and connexions. His father, who held the office of prætor under the despotism of Cornelius Cinna, died at Pisa, in the course of the ensuing year, B.C. 82, leaving his son Julius an orphan in his sixteenth year.

Having thus introduced Julius Cæsar, his family and connexions, to the notice of the reader, it will be necessary to give a brief and popular sketch of those facts in Roman history, which must be carefully studied by him who wishes thoroughly to understand the life and character of the real founder of Imperial Rome.

The destruction of Carthage and Corinth had left Rome without a rival in the civilized world. Asia Minor, Macedonia, the whole of Greece and its dependent islands, Crete excepted, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, the north of Italy, the south of Gaul, the richest and most fertile portions of the Spanish peninsula, and of the northern coast of Africa, were carved out into the form of oriental satrapies, established for the use and for almost the sole emolument of the Roman nobility. The wholesome practice of sending forth colonies regularly constituted, and comprising representations of every

class of Roman citizens, and thus at once relieving the city of her surplus population, and strengthening the outworks of the empire, had fallen into disuse. Even the extensive tracts of land, with the loss of which the senate had punished those states which had joined Hannibal in his war against Rome, were left in the possession of the great families, who paid for the use of them a merely nominal rent, and converted them chiefly into pasture grounds for their flocks and herds, or tilled them by their slave gangs. The only advantages derived by the majority of the people from their distant and wealthy conquests, were a personal immunity from taxation, and a considerable advance in the pecuniary value of their elective suffrages. The decrease in the value of money caused by the influx of the precious metals, in consequence of their conquests, and the increasing luxury of the age, had ruined the petty freeholders of earlier times, who were the strength of primitive Rome, and from whose ranks even the preservers of the Republic had in the hour of need been more than once selected.

Their small freeholds had passed into the hands of the great proprietors, whose lucrative offices and provincial extortions enabled them to purchase land in Italy, at any price, however extravagant. The ruin of the rustic yeomanry, on whom above all the stability of the Roman constitution depended, increased the number of needy citizens in the capital. For Rome had no manufactories, consequently no commercial activity, nor the means of absorbing, into new shapes of active enterprise, these unfortunate outcasts. And even should they be willing to work for hire, on the farms possessed by their ancestors, they could find no employment, because the preference was given to slave labour, as the slave was held to be both less self-willed and more productive. It is not therefore to be wondered at, that the city population, thus deprived of all healthy action, should form an uneasy class, vicious in morals, and ready for revolution. Thus Rome, at the commencement of the seventh century from the foundation of the city, exhibited a

body of nobles powerful, wealthy, and united; an equestrian order, a secondary nobility as it were, increasing in wealth, by farming the public revenues, but without political weight of a legitimate character; a mass of citizens, landless, poverty-stricken, and discontented; and, finally, a fierce slave population, not indigenous to the soil, but imported from every savage nation in Europe, Asia, and Africa.

The allies of Rome in Italy, essentially warlike in their character, and who continued as important constituents of the Roman legions, had partially recovered from the exhaustion and ravages caused by the long continuance of Hannibal's Italian campaigns; and being discontented with the inferiority of their political position in the Roman world, were anxiously awaiting an opportunity, either to procure an equality of political privileges from either the good will or the fears of Rome, or (should they fail) to dissolve the union and establish an independent empire in Italy. Such was the state and difficulties of Rome, when, in the year B.C. 133, a movement was commenced under the auspices of a man of no common mind, and who was destined to originate a system of agitation, which, with intervening lulls, never ceased, until the battle of Actium gave to both the contending parties of the aristocracy and democracy a lord and master, who, by the potency of his charms, consigned both spirits to a long death-like slumber, from which neither awoke until Rome fell among the crash of nations.

The time intervening between the tribuneship of Tiberius Gracchus, B.C. 120, and the date of the battle of Actium, includes one hundred and two years, and may be characterized as a revolutionary period, in which the struggles between the many and the few were carried on with a spirit which has never been exceeded, and with a series of victories and defeats which alike tried the endurance and irritated the ferocity of either party, and eventually proved equally fatal to all.

Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who was the first man to propose a remedy against the impending dangers, and to

infuse new vigour into the decaying frame of the Roman constitution, was a worthy representative of the Sempronian family, which in splendour and renown yielded to none of the plebeian nobility. His father was for many years the leader of the popular party, and the personal opponent of the first Scipio Africanus: their feud, which threatened to disturb the peace of the city, was stanchèd for a time by the marriage of Sempronius with that daughter of the house of Scipio, who is known historically as Cornelia, "the mother of the Gracchi."

Her elder son, who, as well as his brother Caius, had been carefully educated by the mother, and taught by the best teachers which Rome and Greece could furnish, was one of the first Romans who cultivated with success the art of oratory, and the charms of his eloquence were enhanced by the suavity of his disposition and the polish of his manners.

Few men of his rank, and with the brilliant prospect of honours which lay before him, have been found willing to forego the natural advantages of their position, and to undertake the dangerous task of attacking that system of things, of which they themselves were constituent and flourishing members. His father, it is true, was a leader of the popular party. But the popular party of that day was almost confined to those plebeian families who, ennobled by curule offices, were anxious to place themselves on a level with the proud patricians, who prided themselves more upon their descent than upon the honours conferred upon them by the votes of their fellow citizens.

But Tiberius Gracchus regarded himself as aggrieved by the dominant oligarchs. He had been the quæstor of the consul Mancinus, who, in the wars of Numantia, had been compelled to purchase the safety of himself and army by concluding with the enemy a disgraceful treaty of peace. Even this concession would not have saved him, had not his quæstor, Gracchus, interposed his own personal guarantee, that the consul's deed should be ratified by the senate. The peace was concluded, the army was saved, but the senate dishonourably annulled the treaty,

and tried to satisfy the calls of conscience by delivering up to the Numantines the unfortunate and degraded consul. It is said that the quæstor was deeply offended by this conduct of the dominant party, not the less so, perhaps, because he was conscious that nothing but his family connexions had saved him from sharing the fate of his principal.

Feelings of irritation and disappointment are supposed in general to open the patient's eye to a keen perception of existing abuses, or even to imagine them if non-existent. These might in part have incited Tiberius Gracchus to adopt the course upon which he boldly entered. We know however, on the testimony of his brother Caius, that a tour through Italy, which brought under his personal inspection the small and daily diminishing number of the free cultivators of the soil, the continuous increase of slave labour, and the conversion of a great part of Italy from arable ground to pastoral domains, were the leading causes which impressed upon his brother the necessity of adopting remedial measures.

Tiberius himself, in a speech recorded by Appian, adduces, as a strong argument in favour of his plans, the desperate insurrection of the Sicilian slaves during the course of the preceding year—an insurrection which was not quelled without an incredible waste of lives, as ancient historians calculate that the two servile wars in that island proved fatal to more than a million of human beings.

Part of the plan of Tiberius was to enforce that clause of the Licinian laws, which forbade any single person from renting more than five hundred acres of the public land. This wise provision, although shamefully violated in practice, still remained unrepealed by legislative enactment. He proposed to take away from the illegal possessors all public land held by them, beyond the prescribed quantity, and to divide it among the poorer citizens, provided they should remove from Rome, and become resident cultivators of the ground allotted to them. A declaratory law, confirming the still existing validity of the Licinian provision, was passed, and extensive

domains thus became recoverable at law, and liable to be distributed among the poorer citizens.

To carry this measure into effect was no easy matter, for almost all the great families were illegal possessors to a smaller or greater extent, and could hardly be brought to regard the loss of lands long their possessions, if not their properties, in any other light than as actual robbery. Hence it is not to be wondered that they were prepared to resist the execution of the law by every means in their power.

Tiberius himself, his brother Caius, and their brother-in-law Appius Claudius, had been appointed joint commissioners, or, as the Romans called them, "Triumvirs," for the avowed purpose of putting the whole scheme into execution. But before this could be effected, the tribuneship of Tiberius was drawing to a close. And it appeared, both to himself and to his adherents, that his re-election as tribune was absolutely necessary to the success of his measures—perhaps such a re-election was contrary to law, perhaps only not sanctioned by any statute; at all events, the opposite party protested against its legality, and when the popular party persisted in their resolution, and the magistrates refused, or at least hesitated, to act against them, Cornelius Scipio Nasica, on the very day of election, placed himself at the head of the most violent members of the oligarchical faction, rushed into the comitial assembly, murdered Tiberius and three hundred of his adherents, and cast their bodies into the Tiber. This bloody deed was perpetrated without the slightest shadow of legal right, without the slightest intervention of any lawful magistrate, and without even that doubtful authority, a decree of the senate.

Private individuals dipped their hands in the blood of a tribune, whose person was sacro-sanct, and could not be violated without subverting the very fundamental laws of the constitution; and yet no legal inquisition was held, no process instituted against the shedders of blood. The evils originating in this act of violence were incalculable. The

fatal precedent of substituting might for right was successfully established, and the murder of a political opponent came to be regarded as the shortest and most vigorous method of securing the triumph of a party. The same feelings and principles which caused even Cicero to applaud and almost deify the murderer, Nasica, would necessarily lead the party to which he attached himself to imitate his deeds, should party interests render it expedient.

It has been said, but not truly, that this was the first blood shed in civil dissension by Roman citizens, yet it was the first time that private individuals, without the shadow of authority, put magistrates to death, and remained unpunished.

Ten years had scarcely elapsed, before Caius Gracchus, undeterred by his brother's fate, and stimulated, as it was reported, by the advice of his mother Cornelia, took up the cause, which had dropped from the hands of his dying brother. He was superior in energy and eloquence to Tiberius, and had been, as Cicero says, "thoroughly taught from his very boyhood." His success was immediate and complete, and nothing, perhaps, but the want of greater moderation on his part prevented him from carrying into execution great and beneficial reforms. But the bitter feelings roused in his breast by his brother's death, hurried him into excesses in the desire of taking vengeance on the senatorial party.

He re-enacted his brother's agrarian laws, passed an act enabling him to plant a Roman colony on the ruins of Carthage, and to divide the public domains of that city, which, after the conquest, had been confiscated, between the new colonists. But in his attempt to secure the affections of the populace, he perpetuated by law a measure which hitherto had been only of occasional recurrence, and gave every needy citizen a claim to receive corn gratuitously from the public granaries—a ruinous largess, which eventually converted the great body of Roman citizens into a mass of clamorous paupers.

As the equestrian order had lately increased in wealth, and in the influence naturally accompanying its possession, and seemed destined to hold the balance between the two contending parties, Caius transferred the judicial functions from the senators to the knights. As these, on entering into public life, renounced honours, offices, and provincial governments, he supposed that they would be more impartial jurymen, especially in the trials of magistrates impeached for provincial extortion and misgovernment, than the senators (who had a fellow-feeling for the culprits) had of late showed themselves to be.

For two years his career was uninterrupted, and he continued to carry out his measures with a bold spirit and a high hand, but at the commencement of the third, he and his followers were condemned by a decree of the senate, and were mercilessly slaughtered, to the number of three thousand, many of them men of rank and station, by the consul Opimius, who thus won golden opinions from the leaders of his party, and was enrolled among the heroes whom they delighted to honour as their benefactors. Opimius even set a price upon the head of the popular leader, and rewarded the assassin who brought it to him with its full weight in gold.

All the agrarian laws were again repealed, although, to save appearances, the possessors of the public domains agreed to pay into the treasury an advanced rent, which was to be divided individually among the poorer citizens. But these payments were soon remitted, and affairs again returned to their ancient condition. The wholesale massacre of Caius Gracchus and his adherents by the hands of the relentless Opimius, prevented any champion of democracy from distinguishing himself for the ensuing ten years. But in the year B.C. 111, the Jugurthine war broke out, during the course of which the nobility disgraced themselves by the most shameful venality—to such a degree that the democratic party rallied once more, and succeeded in raising Caius Marius, a man of no common mould, first to the consulship, and sub-

sequently to a height of power which no Roman republican had hitherto attained. The success with which he conducted a series of wars, first against Jugurtha and his Numidians, secondly against the aggressive invasion of the Teutones and Cimbri, a horde of savage warriors which the north had sent forth to ravage and depopulate the fairer regions of southern Europe, secured safety to Italy, and to Marius himself the appellation of Second Founder. In his sixth consulship, he undertook to repay his obligations to his party, by reviving the Gracchian laws, and introducing other democratic measures. But his skill as a statesman was not equal to his military capacity, and the prætor Glaucias, and the tribune Saturninus, the tools selected for the accomplishment of his purpose, became unmanageable in his hands, and he was obliged to join the senate in repressing their intemperate proceedings. When condemned by the senate, they had taken refuge in the capitol, but after a short siege, surrendered themselves to Marius, on condition of being allowed a fair trial, before the ordinary tribunals. This was promised, but as soon as they had descended into the Forum, they were slain by some partizans of the oligarchy, in the very presence of the consul.

In this sixth consulship of Marius, B.C. 100, C. Julius Cæsar was born.

But before our attention is called to him in his individual capacity, it will be necessary to conclude our general view of Roman affairs, and bring it down to the formation of the new constitution by the victorious Sylla.

As with the extension of the empire the freedom of the city had risen in value, the eagerness of the Italian allies to participate in this privilege had increased in proportion. But in the year B.C. 95, Rome had the misfortune to raise to the consulship two great lawyers, Licinius Crassus and Mucius Scævola. It has often been asserted that the peculiar studies of a lawyer often lead him to regard, not what may be expedient, not what may prove beneficial, but what is legal and

established as the great rule of right. In accordance with this principle these two great lawyers, seeing that the franchise was exercised by many Italians, whose names had been surreptitiously placed on the censor's list of citizens, passed a stringent law, rendering it imperative on every citizen to prove his legal right to enjoy the franchise. The natural consequence was, that an immense number of citizens who could plead only a prescriptive right were not only disfranchised, but actually banished from Rome. These taking refuge in the various states of Italy, and smarting under the penalty, fomented the disaffection which was already very prevalent, and impressed the Italians with a conviction that force alone could induce their haughty masters to do them justice. Cicero ascribes the social war to the irritation caused by this ill-timed measure. For the allies, perceiving that the dominant powers were more eager to narrow than to widen the basis of the constitution, despaired of securing their object by legitimate means, and began to prepare for war. The hopes held out to them by the measures of the tribune Livius Drusus, who was apparently acting in concert with the chiefs of the senate, were at once destroyed by his secret assassination, which brought affairs to a crisis.

The social war burst out in the year B.C. 91, and at once reduced Rome almost within her original limits: she was thrown upon her own domestic resources, and had to contend, single-handed, against the strength and energy of the most warlike tribes of Italy. Nominally the mistress of the civilized world, she had to struggle for existence at her own gates. It was a contest in which even victory procured no advantages, and defeats inflicted both loss and humiliation. Reluctantly, therefore, although gradually, she admitted the various members of the confederacy to the privileges for which they had been contending. The war lasted for three years, and it was calculated that it had proved fatal to three hundred thousand warriors, all the sons of their common mother, Italy,—all men of cognate origin and race. Of the leading Roman generals who

were employed in conducting this war, the most distinguished were the veteran-warrior, Caius Marius, his early and constant rival the aristocratic Cornelius Sylla, and Cn. Pompeius Strabo, the able although unprincipled father of his more renowned son, who won for himself the doubtful honour of being called Pompeius Magnus (Pompey the Great). Of these, Marius, perhaps from principle or from party feelings, had not carried on the war with the spirit and energy displayed by him in former campaigns. Hence his measures partook more of the defensive than offensive character. But in Sylla the nobility found a willing, able, and decided soldier. The glory of the war devolved principally upon him, and nearly at its close, when the Samnites alone persisted in maintaining the struggle, he was elected consul, and commissioned at its termination to avenge the wrongs and insults which Rome had endured from the unprovoked aggressions of Mithridates, the Hellenistic king of Pontus. That able monarch, who represented a dynasty which neither Alexander the Great nor his successors had conquered, united in his own character the unscrupulous energy of the oriental despot, and the tact and cunning of the Asiatic Greek. He had taken advantage of the weakness of Rome, caused by the dissensions in Italy, had massacred the Romans in the province of Asia, had invaded Europe with powerful fleets and armies, and had been welcomed by the great majority of the states of southern Greece as a benefactor and deliverer.

Marius, now in his seventieth year, grudged the conduct of so great a war, and the glory which would be the certain result of its successful termination to Sylla, his great political antagonist and personal enemy. Perhaps he was anxious to prove that the inactivity which had marked his operations during the social war, had proceeded more from dislike to the cause than from physical incapacity, the natural effect of age.

The tribune Sulpicius, a man of noble birth, great talents, and overpowering eloquence, had placed himself at the head of the popular party which was engaged in actual hostility to

the state. The senate, in admitting their allies to the freedom of the city, had greatly diminished the value of the concession, by forming the new citizens into new tribes, who would not be called upon to give their votes until the opinions of the previously existing thirty-five had been obtained and registered by the presiding officer.

Should, therefore, the old citizens come to an agreement among themselves, which was certain to take place from the jealousy with which they viewed the intruders upon their privileges, it would be an useless farce to call for the votes of the new tribes. Sulpicius therefore proposed a law, according to which the new citizens were to be amalgamated with the old in the different tribes, which were not to exceed the original number, thirty-five.

But as both the old citizens and the senate were hostile to this measure, it was hopeless to expect to carry it by peaceable means, and the tribune, backed by the influence of Marius, and by the presence of a bodyguard of three hundred gladiators and a chosen band of young knights, proceeded to carry it by violence. In vain did Sylla, still consul, have recourse to the aristocratical sophism of proclaiming the rest of the year a series of holidays. Both he and his colleagues were seized by the myrmidons of Sulpicius, and compelled to save their lives by revoking their prohibitory edict. The law was then passed, and the thirty-five tribes thus reconstructed met in their comitial council, and expressed their gratitude for the favour shown to the party, by revoking Sylla's commission, and authorising Marius to assume the command of the army destined to make war on Mithridates. The senate, probably under the influence of terror, had the baseness to ratify this unjust appointment.

But Sylla was made of sterner metal: he was still consul, and was perfectly justified in vindicating the majesty of the law, which had been grossly violated in the person of him, the chief magistrate. He was not a man to be deterred by words or empty forms; his first step after having escaped from the

hands of the satellites of Sulpicius, was to visit the army, then in the vicinity of Nola, to appeal to the soldiers, to invoke their protection, to call upon them to march with him to Rome, and deliver the city from the lawless bands which domineered over both people and senate. These soldiers were principally that portion of the legions which had served under him during the social war. They were attached to their general, and also expected wealth, glory, and pleasure from the campaigns and easy service which the Mithridatic war seemed to promise. Fearing, among other things, that Marius would select other troops to follow him into the East, they answered his appeal by consenting acclamations; and Rome soon heard, perhaps without astonishment, that her own consul, at the head of an army of citizens, was marching with hostile standards against her sacred walls. What better hopes could have been formed, respecting men who had been employed as these legions had lately been. The social war had brutalized their feelings; men accustomed to destroy their kinsmen, the Marsi, Peligni, Frentani, Hirpini, &c., would feel no scruples in directing their arms against their fellow-citizens, should they act in opposition to their inclinations and interests, and would naturally expect greater advantages from the liberality of their general, than from the gratitude of their country. It is said, however, that the higher officers of his army were alarmed at the boldness of the measure, and that of these his quæstor alone was found daring enough to accompany Sylla at such a crisis. Rome was taken by storm, the Marians scattered in flight, Sulpicius overtaken and slain, Marius himself, his son, and nine leading senators of their party proscribed, and rewards promised to their murderers. This is commonly regarded as the commencement of that terrible series of proscriptions which makes the reader of Roman History shudder with horror, and which, although originating with the nobility, was destined to end in their destruction. The Sulpician laws were of course repealed, and the supreme power was lodged in the hands of Sylla's friends.

But the army alone had enabled them to seize upon the reins of government: as soon as it was known that Sylla had removed the troops and commenced his expedition, the signal for new commotions was raised. The consul, Cornelius Cinna, whom Sylla had vainly attempted to bind by solemn oaths, violated these without scruple, and proclaimed himself the leader of the popular party.

In his colleague, Octavius, he met a powerful antagonist. The two factions, each headed by a consul, fought desperately in the forum. The streets of Rome were drenched with blood, and the lives of ten thousands citizens were sacrificed in the struggle. Cinna defeated, driven from the city, and degraded from the consulship, appealed not in vain to the Italian allies, and to bodies of troops lodged in various parts of Italy. These soon enabled him to gather a considerable force, and to resume the consular fasces. He was soon after joined by Papirius Carbo, and by Quintus Sertorius, one of the greatest warriors of the day. Supported by these, and strengthened by the arrival in his camp of the fugitive Marius, who, after many extraordinary escapes from death, had returned to his native land, irritated, but not subdued by his misfortunes, Cinna marched upon Rome, and, after a long blockade, starved the senate and its adherents into submission.

It is clear from the results of this campaign, from the capture and destruction of many Latin cities, from the indiscriminate massacre of Roman citizens that took place as soon as the gates were thrown open, in violation of the terms of capitulation granted by Cinna, that the dominant force acting under him was composed of Italian allies, who wreaked their vengeance, irrespective of party, on all their Roman and Latin opponents. The question, indeed, may be advantageously raised respecting the character and views of Quintus Sertorius, one of the leaders of Cinna's army; and whether he was not rather an Italian than a Roman in his political principles, nor in prosecuting this work should this question be forgotten.

Marius gorged, but scarcely satiated, with the blood of his enemies, lived to enter upon his seventh consulship, but, on the seventeenth day, died of an acute fever, generated by excessive fatigue, long-continued hardships, and mental excitement. It is to be lamented that so agreeable a writer as Plutarch should have been so totally reckless respecting the accuracy of his statements.

The youthful reader should be warned, that if Plutarch wishes even to point a moral, he never hesitates to sacrifice the truth of the fact to the exigency of the moment. Thus, according to him, Marius was terrified to death by the return of Sylla, after completing the Mithridatic war; while in fact Marius died before Sylla had seriously commenced operations, and had been in his grave for three years before Sylla's return actually took place. Whatever lessons the youthful Cæsar might have imbibed from the grim old warrior, his uncle, he could not have learned from him to dread any danger, however instant, much less to flinch at the sullen roar of "the distant lion."

Little is known respecting the measures of Cinna during his triennial supremacy. The new citizens were certainly again embodied in the thirty-five tribes. Some signs may still be discovered, of a wish on his part to consolidate the union between the Italians and Romans; among these was the conclusion of peace with the Samnites, and the admission of those hereditary enemies of Rome to the privilege of the franchise.

Every step taken in this direction must have served more and more to alienate the nobility, and, as we know from Cicero, that there was peace in Rome during those three years, it may be possible that not so much persecution as discontent at the proceedings of Cinna, incited so great a body of senatorial rank to flee from Italy, and take refuge in Sylla's camp.

It is said that from these he might have formed no inadequate image of the real senate at home.

It is recorded that a law sanctioning some extension of the

right of suffrage, was not confirmed by the senate until after Cinna's death, when Papirius Carbo was sole consul; and that the Libertini were not embodied in the thirty-five tribes, except under the same auspices.

One of the strongest proofs of the innate vigour and life-tenacity of the ancient aristocracy of Rome, is the simple fact that their *chief*, disowned by his own government, and superseded in his command by a democratic successor and his army, should nevertheless have, after a three years' contest, brought the war against Mithridates to a successful termination, and all this without concealing his intention to invade Italy, and to make war upon his political adversaries, as soon as the foreign enemy should be reduced to terms of submission.

When this event arrived, he conveyed his army from Asia into Greece, marched across the Peninsula to Dyrrachium, there embarked his men, and landed them safely at Brundisium. It is said that, when he mustered them on the shores of Italy, their number did not exceed thirty thousand, while his enemies, in possession of all the strongholds of the country, could bring nearly two hundred and fifty thousand into the field.

Cinna had been slain by his own soldiers at Ancona, while he was attempting to force them to embark on board a fleet of transports, in order to cross over into Greece and attack Sylla in his own province.

At his death, Papirius Carbo, young Marius, C. Julius Norbanus, Cornelius Scipio, and Quintus Sertorius became the leaders of his party.

These names would lead us to suppose that the high nobility, who had still continued in Italy, had formed a union with the democratic leaders. If so, it could not be very firm. Scipio at least betrayed his allies, and suffered his army to go over to Sylla. Nor could Norbanus be accused of offering a very desperate resistance; Quintus Sertorius fled from the scene of helplessness or treachery, and retired into Spain,

where he had before served and gained great popularity among the native tribes.

Young Marius, after suffering a defeat on the borders of Latium, took refuge in the strong fortress of Præneste, where he was besieged by Sylla. Carbo, at the head of the Etruscans, attempted in vain to relieve him; so did Pontius Telesinus, the last of the Samnites, with his brave warriors, amounting to forty thousand in number, who, when baffled in this object, marched against Rome with the intention of utterly destroying it. Such was the spirit of some of the coadjutors of Cinna and Marius.

In a desperate battle, fought close to the Porta Collina, Sylla with difficulty defeated Pontius, and saved the city. "Rome," writes Velleius Paterculus, "did not encounter a greater danger when she saw Hannibal's camp pitched within the third milestone, than on that day when Telesinus, flying around the ranks of his army, told them, with a loud voice, that the last day of the Romans had arrived, that their city was to be overthrown and razed to the ground, and added that the wolves, the destroyers of Italian liberty, would never be found wanting, unless the forests into which they were wont to fly for refuge were extirpated."

The defeat of the Samnites, and the death of their leader, decided the fate of the war, but it lingered long in various parts of Italy, and many of the Italians withdrew into strongholds, which they defended to the last possible moment, and then perished among the ruins. The Samnite race was exterminated, and not only their towns, but also their villages, were laid in ruins. The Italian cities, Præneste, Sulmo, Spoletum, Interamna, Florentia, Nola, Volaterræ, and others, in many of which the Roman democrats had cordially united with their Italian allies, were, when captured either by force or famine, razed to the ground, after their inhabitants had either been slain or sold into slavery. When at last Sylla had either destroyed or expelled from Italy all his opponents, and when he was legally dictâtor, for the

purpose of reducing the political chaos to a settled form of government, he determined to remodel the constitution, and to render it far more oligarchical than it hitherto had been.

It must have been evident to a man of Sylla's sagacity, that the old republic was thoroughly defunct, that nothing but a strict enforcement of the Licinian laws, followed up by other Gracchian measures, could restore it, even in appearance. But perhaps he felt no love for a popular form of government. The people had not been eager to recognise his great talents. He obtained his honours late in life, and not without repulses. Perhaps, also, he must have known, that a system calculated for the narrow limits of the earlier republic, was by no means applicable to the imperial magnitude into which it had gradually swollen; that an assembly of five hundred thousand citizens could never be gathered into one spot, much less become a deliberating council; that it would be difficult even to collect their votes; and that a desperate minority, say of twenty thousand men, might always prevail over the more inert majority. He was also deeply read in Grecian literature, and the bias of the majority of their political writers is likely to have influenced him in choosing his ultimate measures. We may doubt concerning his motives—not concerning his actions. These were of the most decided character; and his plan, once formed, was carried into execution with an unswerving will. The popular party in the senate was annihilated. The knights, who had rendered themselves peculiarly obnoxious by their adherence first to Sulpicius, and after his death to Cinna, were reduced to their former political insignificance. More than two thousand of the wealthiest of their order had been proscribed, and that the surviving members might not recover any political weight under his system, they were deprived of the judicial power, which was restored to the senate. But the most fatal blow given to the democracy consisted in the limits assigned by him to the tribunician power.

According to these, persons once elected tribunes were

disqualified for bearing any higher office in the state; and they were deprived of the right of initiating laws in the popular assembly. The power of intercession alone was left to them, that is, they still retained a right to prevent any law from being enacted, even should only one of their number place his "veto" against it.

Sylla also partially curtailed the elective rights of the people, by transferring the choice of the priests and augurs from them to the members of the respective colleges. Having taken these steps in order to depress his opponents, he devised other measures equally well calculated to establish the power of his own party. He filled the senate with his satellites, loaded them with riches, and confined to that body the sole right of initiating laws. He distributed the lands of the conquered Italians among a hundred thousand of his veteran soldiers, who were embodied in military colonies in all parts of Italy. He selected ten thousand able-bodied slaves, from gangs belonging to the proscribed, named them *Cornelii*, after himself, gave them property and the freedom of the city, and settled them at Rome as resident life-guards for the dominant party.

To crown the whole, and, as he thought, to prevent the possibility of any future innovations, he enacted a law, which pronounced the children of the proscribed incapable of holding any public office. After taking these precautions for the establishment of the new form of government, he abdicated the dictatorship, without giving up his power, as, on the very day preceding his death, he ordered the chief magistrate of Puteoli, on suspicion of intended peculation, to be strangled in his presence, and thus closed his blood-stained life with an act of illegal violence. He died B.C. 78.

It has been justly said that the circumstances amongst which men are born, the society in which they are brought up, the opinions and characters of parents, friends, and guardians, even the course of public events, which first arrest the youthful attention, are all strong predetermining causes,

and powerful agents in influencing the will and forming the character of every young man before he enters on life. Julius Cæsar, like others, would naturally be subject to the influence of these causes, and it will not be irrelevant to examine his position with respect to them.

From his prætorian rank, under Cinna's despotism, it is clear that his father's political opinions coincided with those of the democratical party, to the leadership of which Cinna succeeded on the death of Marius.

Without inquiring more nicely into the reasons which induced a Julius, one of the proudest patrician families, to adopt this course, it is sufficient to remember that his sister Julia had married the peasant warrior, the conqueror of the Cimbri and Teutones, the uncompromising opponent of the aristocracy, and the fosterer of all the elements of the democracy.

The very fact that the heads of the Julian house should have bestowed the hand of a Julia upon a low-born native of Arpinum, proves that admiration of his character, or sympathy with his political career, or the splendid position which he had won, despite all opposition, caused them to forget everything, except that he was the most distinguished and powerful Roman of his day. But although they might have thus judged, yet it is known that patrician ladies thus intermarrying with the plebeian race were supposed to have lost caste, and no wealth, no splendour of position, could compensate them for the haughty contempt with which the patrician matrons, unsullied by plebeian contact, would be naturally inclined to regard them. This would alienate them from their race, and lead them to sympathise with that class to which their sons must necessarily belong. For in Roman law the son inherited the status of his father alone, irrespective of his mother's rank. It was perhaps some spirit, arising from such a position, that caused the high-born Cornelia to exclaim, that "she was tired of being called the daughter of Africanus, and longed to be hailed as the mother of the Gracchi."

It is known that her two sons were brought up under her own eye, and their subsequent career shows that the principles which they imbibed in early life were more in accordance with the creed and practice of their father Sempronius, than of their grandfather Africanus. It is even difficult to account for that foul suspicion that the second Africanus was strangled in his bed by the hands of assassins, whom his wife Sempronia, the sister of the Gracchi, had herself introduced into his bed-chamber, without supposing that her political principles were known to be in direct opposition to those of her husband. It is recorded that Cornelia herself, undeterred by the fatal end of her elder son, never ceased to urge Caius Gracchus to follow in his brother's steps, to carry his measures, and to avenge his fate.

That Julia, the wife of Marius, also admired her husband's political principles, may be inferred from the unflinching adherence to his party of her son, the younger Marius, and more immediately from the fact that her nephew Julius, when anxious to raise the spirits of the depressed Marians, pronounced her funeral eulogy in the forum before an applauding assembly of citizens. His mother's relations, the Aurelii Cottæ, were not likely to have much influence with the young Julius, when opposed to the principles and party of his uncle, the great Marius. Nor were they persons of extreme opinions, but, as a family, aimed at holding a middle course between the two parties. And though they were nominally adherents of Sylla, they were the first, as will be seen, to sap and undermine the very foundation of the Syllan constitution.

As Julius Cæsar was born on the 12th of July, B.C. 100, and as Marius lived until the 13th of January, B.C. 86, the nephew had ample opportunity of hearing the sentiments and imbibing the principles of his uncle from personal intercourse; and the times were full of excitement, and necessarily agitated the public mind, and compelled the topics of the day to be the subjects of daily conversation. When he was ten years old, the proceedings of Marcus Livius Drusus took

place, which drew to Rome nearly the whole male population of the Italian allies, for the purpose of supporting their patron, and hearing his spirited declamations. His secret murder, and the mystery in which it was enveloped, a mystery which has never been revealed, must have roused the attention of even the youngest to the various reports upon the occasion. The social war, which began in his eleventh year, brought the actual scenes of war under the immediate eyes of the young Romans of the day; for the Romans, as they always did when danger approached their doors, changed their dress, threw aside the "toga," and put on the "sagum," the military garb. Even the magistrates doffed their civil robes, and discharged their magisterial duties with their swords by their sides and the helmet on their heads. The attention of young Cæsar must have been particularly excited, as his near relation, Lucius Sextus Cæsar, was one of the consuls when the war broke out, and it was he who passed the law which at the time probably saved Rome from destruction.

By this law, all the Latin allies and the Italian colonies were admitted to the full privileges of Roman citizens, and placed on an equality with the freemen of the city. His uncle, Caius Marius, was one of the lieutenant-generals appointed to serve under the consul during this war; and although he was successful in all his operations, yet he did not display the same alacrity, nor pursue his advantages with the same success, which marked the career of his rival, Sylla, also appointed a lieutenant-general. The two generals who inflicted the greatest loss on the enemy, and most effectually maintained the honour and glory of Rome, were Cneius Pompeius Strabo, who crushed and almost exterminated one division of the Marsi; and Sylla, who repeatedly cut to pieces Samnite armies, although he did not succeed in vanquishing the nation. That young Marius, the cousin of Cæsar, served under his father may be well inferred from the fact that he was in his twentieth year when the war broke out, and the probability that his father would not lose such an opportunity

of giving him a few lessons in the field concerning that art of which he was consummate master. In the last year of the war, Marius resigned his command; and the consul, M. Porcius Cato, put himself at the head of his army, and, after gaining some advantages against the enemy, fell in the attempt to storm their camp. If we can believe Orosius, there was a report that the consul was slain by young Marius, who remained under his command, and, being indignant at Cato's language, who boasted of having surpassed the actions of Caius Marius, gave him a fatal wound in the confusion of the assault.

Cæsar was in his fourteenth year, and his cousin was in his three-and-twentieth, when the fatal quarrels between Marius and Sylla broke out. It is recorded that, in the Sulpician tumult, Sylla would have been murdered by the satellites of the furious tribune, had he not taken refuge in the house of Marius, who saved him from his enemies, and permitted him to depart and join his army. If this was the case, Sylla was not equally generous, when victory placed the Marians in his power; and whatever might be the feelings of others respecting the first Syllan proscription, it cannot be doubted, that Julia would regard and describe the deadly enmity with which her husband and son were persecuted as outrages against everything that was noble, great, and renowned; and such also would probably be the feelings, not only of the Marian party, but of the majority of the unprejudiced citizens. They had not yet been accustomed to see a price set upon the heads of the great leaders of either party, nor large sums paid to those ruffians who enriched themselves by such murders.

Then the picture was reversed. The Marians triumphed in their turn, and massacred and proscribed their enemies with unrelenting cruelty. Marius soon died, and in the course of the succeeding year died also C. Julius Cæsar, the father of the great Julius. As he died at Pisæ, it may be supposed that his son was with him, and removed from the horrors of the terrible contest which took place in the first consulship of Cinna.

The young Julius was too distinguished a person to be neglected by the dominant powers; and although he was already betrothed to a young lady of great wealth, whose name was Cossutia, the contract was annulled, and he married Cornelia, the daughter of Cinna, and soon after was appointed flamen dialis, or priest of Jupiter, probably as immediate successor to Cornelius Merula, who had perished in the capture of Rome by the Marians.

Thus the young Cæsar for no short period lived as the favourite son-in-law of the despot, Cornelius Cinna, who, as he had broken faith with Sylla himself, ceased not to persecute his adherents and depress his party. In the commencement of his fourth consulship, B.C. 83, he was killed in a mutiny, leaving the supreme power principally in the hands of Papius Carbo and the younger Marius. These leaders roused not only their own party and the Italian allies, but also the Cisalpine Gauls; and Sylla had to conquer not only detachments of these Gauls in Campania, but also to encounter Celtiberian cavalry in Etruria. Even when Italy was partially pacified, Sicily and Africa had to be reconquered, and Sylla died with the consciousness that his work of extermination was left unfinished, that the camp of Sertorius had proved a city of refuge to the proscribed and their families, and that he left the Roman empire to his oligarchical senate shorn of half its strength by the loss of the whole of Spain, and of the southern parts of Gaul.

It is difficult to say where Cæsar was, or what was his conduct during the continuance of the war. He was old enough to serve in the army; nor is it likely that one of his temperament would have remained inactive when he saw the rising fortunes and pre-eminence of his cousin Marius, who in his twenty-seventh year became consul and chief commander of the armies. The only inference we can draw from Sylla's acts at the conclusion of the war, and when he was preparing to restore order and establish his constitution, is that Cæsar's conduct had not been such as to place him beyond the reach of

pardon or even of grace. One of the steps which he took to detach young men of promise from the opposite party, was to order them to divorce the wives whom they had taken from Marian families.

Thus Pompey, when commanded so to do, divorced Antistia, whom her father Antistius had betrothed to him when low in fortune, and the subject of prosecutions by the dominant democrats. Calpurnius Piso he had found equally compliant when ordered to part with his wife, Annia, Cinna's widow. Cæsar also was called upon to act in a similar manner, and to repudiate his Cornelia. Had he complied, he would necessarily have been equally favoured with Pompey and Piso. His high lineage, and the remembrance that his two cousins, Lucius Sextus Cæsar of consular, and Caius Julius Cæsar of ædilitian rank, had been put to death by the Marians, would be powerful recommendations to the favour of Sylla, to whom Cæsar's position among the Marians might naturally appear the result of accidental affinity, not of principle and choice, and who might expect him, as soon as the connexion was dissolved, to resume his natural place among the patricians of Rome.

But the dictator did not know the character of him to whom such a mandate was issued; that spirit and strength of will which enabled him at a later period to become a greater monarch than Sylla himself, ill-brooked such tyrannical interference with his domestic arrangements; and Cæsar clung to his wife amidst the ruins of her family and fortunes, with as much fidelity and affection as when her father's word was the law of Rome. From the expressions of Suetonius, we gather that Sylla made repeated attempts to induce him to swerve from his resolution, and to comply with the dictatorial demand. "He married Cornelia, the daughter of Cinna, fourth time consul, who soon after gave birth to his daughter Julia, nor could he by any means be compelled by the dictator to divorce her."

Hence he was pronounced by Sylla a Marian in heart, and deprived of his priesthood, of his wife's dowry, and his own

inheritance. He had also reason to believe that his life was in danger, if not from Sylla himself, at least from some of his satellites. He therefore disguised himself, left Rome by night, and took refuge among the Sabine mountains. There he had to live a wandering life, continually shifting his quarters, although labouring under a severe fever, and as yet unused to hardships. On one occasion he was discovered by one Cornelius Phagita, who was hunting after proscribed persons, and who threatened to take him before Sylla, but on receiving a bribe of two talents, allowed him to remain unmolested.

In the meantime, his friends at Rome were exerting themselves in his favour, and pressing Sylla to pardon so young and high-born an offender. These were especially his uncle, Aurelius Cotta, and his brother-in-law, Mamercus Lepidus, both Syllans, who were anxious to restore so powerful a relation and connexion to his proper position. Even the vestal virgins adopted his cause, and made a solemn appeal for mercy to the dictator. It would be pleasing, could we state that this intervention of the votaries of chastity originated in their admiration of the constancy with which the young Julius had maintained the sanctity of the marriage bond. Such a feeling would be strengthened by the thought, that their services were to be exerted in behalf of the sole survivor of the elder branch of the "Julia Gens," whose brows had been but lately crowned with the sacred cap of Jove's own priest. Their united efforts prevailed, and Sylla, from whom the pardon was almost extorted, is said to have addressed the petitioners with these prophetic words,—“Have then your way and take him with you, but be assured that this young man, whom you are so anxious to preserve in all his rights, will, at a future period, be the destruction of the aristocratic party which you have assisted me to defend. For in Cæsar there are many Marii.”

If we could believe that Sylla had a personal interview with the young Julius, and had tried to intimidate him by threats, which we might perhaps infer from the words of Velleius,

that Cæsar could not be compelled "by any terrors"—and what could be more terrible than "the frown of the threatening tyrant"—to part with the daughter of Cinna; the display of unshaken firmness, of cool defiance, the flashing eye, the compressed lips, and perhaps an irrepressible look of hate and abhorrence, might have enabled the long experience of the dictator to prophesy the future from the past, and to infer that the vanquished Marians needed nothing but a leader like him who then stood before him, to make them once more the conquerors.

The caution given by Sylla, to beware of "the carelessly-girded young man," must have been of late invention, for Sylla assuredly could never have seen young Julius in any careless mood.

CHAPTER II.

EARLY STRUGGLES AND PROGRESS.

CÆSAR's friends who rescued him from the fangs of Sylla made themselves, of course, answerable for his immediate good behaviour. He was therefore sent to serve his country in the camp, according to the law, which required that every citizen should for a certain number of years be an active soldier. The young nobility used at this period to commence their military duties by serving on the staff of some general actively employed. The favourite Latin name for them was "adolescentes." They had no commission, but were often delegated by their generals on very important employments. They lived in that portion of the camp which was set apart for the general, who furnished them with a table, and with lodgings in his tents. It therefore became necessary to determine under what general it would be most advantageous for young Cæsar to serve. He could hardly take service under any general in the West, as that would bring him in contact with

his old friends, the Marians, who were still able to make head in that quarter against their enemies.

But the remains of the Mithridatic war were still lingering in the East. The Greeks in Asia had shown the most determined hostility against the Roman residents, when Mithridates had issued his mandate to them to massacre all Roman citizens, of every age and condition. Among other states, the Mitylenians of Chios had distinguished themselves by the atrocity of their actions. They had not only murdered unoffending Italians, but had laid violent hands upon Marius Aquilius, who had been sent into Asia as an ambassador or commissioner to treat with Mithridates respecting the disputes between him and the allies of the Roman people. He had, however, excited rather than allayed the flames which he had been sent to extinguish, and had been the main cause of the war which burst out. Driven from the continent, he had taken refuge in Chios, where, by command of Mithridates, he was seized, thrown into chains, and delivered to the king's officers. Finally, he and his suite had been tortured and slain by these ministers, who expressed their opinion of his character by filling his mouth with melted gold.

When Sylla concluded peace with Mithridates, his Greek allies were left to their fate, and to submit to the terms imposed upon them by the victor. But the Mitylenians could not expect any terms, and Minutius Thermus, one of the lieutenants of Sylla, was employed to invade Chios, and inflict signal vengeance on the Mitylenians.

To serve under one of his own lieutenants could not give any offence to Sylla. Hence, Cæsar joined the camp of Thermus. The details of this war are unknown. The few facts discoverable seem to be these. Thermus could not capture Mitylene, a strong city, situated on the seashore, without the aid of a fleet. He, therefore, sent Cæsar into Bithynia to bring the fleet of king Nicomedes to assist in capturing the town. His enemies asserted that he had not exerted himself with sufficient activity on the occasion; that, charmed with the pleasures of an oriental court, he had neglected his duty, and

lingered longer than he ought in the royal city. But certainly other reasons might be assigned for the delays of an Asiatic court, than the want of sufficient energy in a young officer in stimulating it to action. The accusation, however, it was said, received additional confirmation, because, after bringing the fleet to Chios, he had obtained leave to return to Bithynia, under pretence that his personal presence was wanting to enable a certain freedman, a client, to obtain the payment of a debt long due, but the payment of which was withheld. This account also may well be believed, without supposing Cæsar guilty of a dereliction of duty, or a desire to exchange the toils of a camp for the gaieties of a court. He could not afford, in his degraded position, to neglect the duties which a Roman patron owed to a rich client, and had he not then exacted payment, the money would probably have been lost, for Nicomedes died soon after, and his kingdom was thrown into utter confusion.

It is one strong proof that his enemies had not many charges of an incriminating nature to bring against Cæsar, that they never ceased, even to the end of his life, to bring forward these obscure stories in connexion with the court of Nicomedes. Cæsar, however, soon returned, distinguished himself in the final assault of the place, and received from Thermus a civic crown for saving a Roman life.

Mitylene was taken by storm, plundered, and destroyed, probably in the beginning of the year B.C. 79.

As soon as active operations under Thermus had terminated, Cæsar transferred his services to the camp of Servilius, a Syllan partizan, who, after his consulship, was appointed proconsul of Asia, with a commission to suppress all piracies in the adjacent seas. Suetonius writes, that he did not serve long under Servilius, but that he hurried into Italy on receiving the news of the death of Sylla, which occurred B.C. 78.

The great dictator's death had been immediately followed, or, perhaps preceded, by a rupture between his immediate partisans. Marcus Lepidus, one of the most profligate and

audacious of the Syllans, had proclaimed himself the redresser of the wrongs suffered by the Marians and their party. He proposed that all the laws of Sylla affecting the condition and property of those proscribed by him should be repealed, and that all exiles and degraded citizens should be restored to their full rights and properties.

In all probability Cæsar had been summoned by his party, and perhaps by Lepidus himself, to take advantage of the opportunity, and to restore the Marians to their proper place in the commonwealth. All writers agree that, after a full examination of the question, he determined to stand aloof, and leave things to take their chance. In so doing, it cannot be doubted that he gave deep offence to many of his party, who were more eager for immediate action than prepared for cautious deliberation. One strong proof of this is, that his brother-in-law, Cornelius Cinna, and other friends, joined Lepidus in his premature and ill-advised attempt. It failed, and only served to strengthen the authority of the oligarchy.

This is the proper name which ought to be applied to the dominant party after Sylla's death. They had no elements in common with the ancient aristocracy of blood, nor even with that well-tempered union of the high-born, the noble, the wealthy burgher, the successful warrior, and able lawyer, who all found their place and held it with credit to themselves and advantage to the republic, in the constitution which was the final result of the Licinian laws.

This was the development, gradual, yet sure, of free institutions, which, having their roots deeply fixed in the past, needed nothing but a peaceful future to make them shoot forth into the full proportions of which their nature was capable. But the Syllan oligarchs were merely the victorious party, the survivors of two atrocious civil wars, first, between the Romans and their allies, secondly, between Sylla's armed force and the Marians, supported by the Italians and their allies, and which ended in the subjugation of the Marian party, and the destruction of the Italian allies.

These two wars are said to have carried off more than four hundred thousand of the flower and strength of the youth of Italy. On the ruins thus caused was raised the Syllan constitution. Its strength lay in the great power given to the senate, and which they could delegate to any of their chiefs, whether a war abroad was to be vigorously waged, or disturbances at home were to be speedily checked: in the Cornelian band of new citizens, prompt of hand and loud of tongue, were it necessary to force any measure through the assembly, and in the colonies of veterans, judiciously located in the most commanding positions in Italy. So secure did the leaders feel in the strength of their party, that rather than permit the proscribed Marians to recover their rights and resume their full duties as citizens, they preferred to wage an expensive and disastrous war against their leaders in the wildest parts of Spain.

In truth, however, the whole system was unsafe: the basis of Sylla's institutions had not sufficient breadth. A large body in the state, depressed, but not destroyed, was continually on the watch for the recovery of lost rights, and for the day of vengeance. This body may be divided into three classes, first, the ancient democracy in Rome; secondly, all the Italians who had survived the wars, and who had either partially or entirely been deprived of their lands; thirdly, the children of the proscribed, a gallant band of rising young men, many of them descendants of the best families in Rome and Italy, who were deprived not only of their property, but of their civil rights, and of the hope of bettering their condition without some revolution. The multitude of discontented spirits thus placed under the ban of the constitution, and always ready to act against it should an occasion be given, presented to the most profligate and desperate portion of the oligarchs an opportunity (whenever they were thwarted by a majority of their own party) which they could not resist. "Lightly won, soon gone," was a proverb, the truth of which was exemplified in the conduct of many of Sylla's par-

tizans, who, although gorged with private and public spoils, soon found themselves as needy as when they commenced their revolutionary career. Whole bands of the Syllan colonists had undergone a similar process, and were ready again to resume the trade of war, conquest, and confiscation. Had Cæsar no other object except the selfish wish to remain at the head of his party, it would have been his policy to discountenance any attempts made by Syllan leaders to excite the Marians against the government. But probably he had better reasons for refusing to co-operate with these reforming apostates, who, in their declamations against their abandoned friends, forgot that every reproach with which they were then loading them was true respecting themselves. This may be seen from the two speeches which Sallust has ascribed, one to Lepidus, then consul, even before Sylla was dead, the other to Lucius Philippus, a leading Syllan. Lepidus thus speaks: "This savage Romulus detains from us our liberty, our homes, our equality before the laws, as if he had wrested them from strangers. Not satisfied with the destruction of so many armies, nor with the death of the consul, and other chiefs whom the fortune of war had carried off, but becoming more cruel at the very time when success changes most men from wrath to clemency. Nay, he alone of all men within the memory of man has imposed penalties upon the unborn, whose wrongs are to commence before their birth The Roman people, a short time before this the ruler of nations, deprived of empire, of glory, of their rights, unable even to agitate, and despised, has been deprived of the provisions allowed even to slaves. The great body of the allies and of the Latins are prevented by this one man from exercising their privileges as citizens, which you conferred upon them for many and distinguished actions; and a few of his satellites have occupied, as the reward of those crimes, the paternal homes of the guiltless commonalty But I, forsooth, as Sylla says, am a seditious agitator, because I complain of the rewards secured by civil disorder, and desire war because I claim the rights

of peace. Because in truth you will not be safe and secure in your empire . . . unless you approve of all the proscriptions of the guiltless, merely on account of their wealth, of the tortures of illustrious men, of the city desolated by banishments and murders, of the property of wretched citizens either sold or given away. But he objects to me that I am in possession of the property of the proscribed, and yet this is even the most atrocious of his own crimes, that neither I nor any other man was safe were we to have acted uprightly Consequently, his victorious army begets in me the utmost confidence, seeing it has gained by its wounds and labours nothing but a tyrant, unless perchance they proceeded in arms to overthrow the tribunician power, which was established by their ancestors that they might extort for themselves rightful trials by law, with this compensation, forsooth, that when banished into marshes and forests, they might understand that the odium was all their own, the rewards all given to a few."

The rupture threatened by these proceedings of Lepidus was not immediately completed. By the intervention of the more moderate party men, he and Catulus, his colleague in the consulship, came to a mutual agreement not to take up arms against each other, and Lepidus was allowed to depart and enter upon his duties as pro-consul of Cisalpine Gaul. When once at the head of an army, he proclaimed himself the rescinder of the laws of Sylla, and the restorer of the proscribed, both to their properties and civil rights; and being joined by multitudes of Etruscans and other Italians, marched, according to late numerous precedents, to impose his terms upon Rome and its occupiers.

In the senate convoked to deliberate upon the best means of resisting this new invasion, Lucius Philippus, according to Sallust, delivered a speech, of which the following passages are extracts:—"O ye good gods, and you who, regardless of your duties, are still the rulers of this city! Marcus Æmilius, of all low criminals the vilest, respecting whom it is difficult to determine whether his wickedness or his cowardice be the

greater, is at the head of an army for the purpose of crushing our liberties: from being contemptible he has made himself formidable. You, I say, by hesitating and pondering the words and predictions of old bards, wish for, rather than maintain, peace; and do not understand that by the softness of your decrees you lessen both your own dignity and his fears, and that not without reason, since by his plunder he gained the consulship, and by his seditious practices a province with an army. What would he have obtained for benefits, seeing you bestow these great rewards on his crimes? . . . I for my part from the beginning, when I understood that Etruria was conspiring, that the proscribed were called to his camp, that the commonwealth was being distracted by lavish bribes, thought that it was high time for us to act, and with a few others, approved of the advice of Catulus . . . There have flocked to him the most corrupt individuals of every class, excited by poverty and wants, haunted by a consciousness of guilt, who in civic broils are inert, in peace brawlers. These men connect insurrection with insurrection, war with war; in former times satellites of Saturninus, afterwards of Sulpicius, Marius, and Damasippus, now of Lepidus. Besides, all Etruria and the still slumbering remains of the war are roused to action. The Spains are disturbed by armed bands. Mithridates, on the flank of the only revenues by which we are still supported, abides his time. In short, nothing but a fit leader is wanted to overthrow the empire . . . But the mandates of Lepidus disturb your minds. He says that it is his pleasure that every man should recover his own, and yet he retains the property of others. That the rights acquired in war should be annulled, while he himself attempts to impose these terms on us by force of arms. That the freedom of the city should be restored to those deprived of it, although, at the same time, he says that it had never been taken away from them. That, for the sake of concord, the tribunician power, the very cause and source of our discord, should be re-established. O you, the most wicked and impudent of men!

you indeed pity the poverty and sorrow of our countrymen—you, who have no property at home except what has been obtained by arms or illegal means, you claim another consulship, as if you had given up the first. You aim at establishing concord by the very arms by which that already obtained is going to be destroyed. A traitor to us, faithless to your own supporters, the common enemy of all good men. . . . We have an army newly raised, moreover the colonies of veterans, all the nobility, excellent generals. Fortune follows the better party. . . . I therefore move that, since Lepidus, on his own authority, having raised an army composed of the worst characters, and of public enemies, is leading it to this city, in opposition to the authority of this order, Appius Claudius, the interrex, together with Quintus Catulus, the pro-consul, and all others vested with military command, be commissioned to protect the city, and so to act as to prevent the commonwealth from receiving any damage.”

Catulus defeated Lepidus, who withdrew with part of his troops into Sardinia, where he soon after died. M. Perpenna succeeded him in the command, and conveyed the army, and among others Cornelius Cinna, the brother-in-law of Cæsar, into Spain, where they joined Sertorius and his allies.

As soon as the public tranquillity was secured at Rome after this disturbance, Cæsar, according to the practice of young men at Rome who were ambitious of distinction, and of fixing the attention of the people upon themselves, determined to impeach Cornelius Dolabella, one of the chief Syllan leaders, and who had lately returned from the government of Macedonia, where, as it was reported, he had despoiled the province with more than the usual rapacity of the pro-consuls of the day.

A state prosecution of this nature was no trifling enterprize, as can be seen from Cicero's extant orations against Verres. It required great care in gathering and selecting materials, in arranging the criminatory facts under distinct heads, and in supporting them with trustworthy witnesses, and other

evidences. It required also a vigorous style of eloquence, a freedom of language in reprehending, and powerful appeals to the feelings, whether the object might be to excite the indignation of the jury against the outrages of the accused, or to make them sympathize with the wrongs and injuries of the oppressed provincials.

All this Cæsar, as yet only in his twenty-third year, was supposed to have executed in an admirable and splendid style; and to have displayed proofs that, had he chosen to devote himself, like many other statesmen of the day, to the study and practice of eloquence, he might have rivalled, even if not surpassed, those consummate speakers and rhetoricians, Cicero and Hortensius. That no ingenuity merely natural could be adequate to such an effort, may easily be inferred, but no record remains descriptive of his previous training, nor of the masters under whom he studied. But he had not to travel out of his own family for examples of a pure and elegant style of speaking, as his uncle, C. Julius Cæsar, excelled, according to Cicero, all men of his own and preceding ages in easy wit and humour; he was not indeed an overpowering speaker, but no man lived whose speeches were better seasoned with urbanity, brilliant wit, and sweetness of expression. But as he fell in the first Marian massacre, it cannot be expected that Cæsar derived from him an example of purity and elegance of style which, nevertheless, is a great advantage, even to boys of an early age. But in C. Aurelius Cotta, his maternal uncle, he had not only, after the fall of Cinna, a kind guardian and friend, but also an example and a model, both of the success in life which attended the powerful orator, and of the necessary qualification of such a character.

“For,” writes Cicero, “Cotta’s arguments and illustrations were ingenious, his style of speaking pure and flowing. . . . There was nothing in his speech but what was genuine, terse, and healthy, and this was his greatest merit—that as he could scarcely have bent the inclinations of the jury, according to his own will, by the earnestness of his pleading, and even

never attempted to speak in that manner, yet nevertheless, he so guided them by gentle management, that they came to the same result, when influenced by him, as when roused by Sulpicius."

Cicero, in his estimate of Cæsar's eloquence, alludes to the advantages derived by Cæsar from the study of domestic examples, when he says, "That of all the orators, Cæsar spoke Latin with the greatest elegance, nor did he acquire this power by home habits alone, as was the case with the families of the Mucii and Laelii—although I believe he enjoyed this advantage also—but the perfection to which he attained in the art of speaking well was the result of extensive learning, distinguished by depth and research, and the result of the greatest study and diligence."

The impeachment ended, as might be expected, in the failure of the accuser, and in the acquittal of Dolabella, who was probably defended by Hortensius, the great protector of the Sylla partizans against the legal assaults of their opponents.

The applause of his own friends and party might have satisfied most men, that the principles of the art of speaking had been sufficiently mastered by one whose first appearance as a public speaker had been attended with such marked success, but Cæsar thought otherwise. Either he was conscious in himself of a want of a complete theoretic knowledge of his art, or he had discovered from, perhaps, the speeches of Hortensius, that he had much to learn, and he therefore quitted Rome for a time, and betook himself to Rhodes, then the favourite university to which young Romans resorted, and where he had the benefit of the rhetorical and philosophical instructions of Apollonius Molo, the most popular professor of the age. In his voyage to the coast of Asia, he fell into the hands of one of the bands of pirates who at that time infested the whole Mediterranean seas. According to Plutarch they offered to release him on receiving twenty talents for his ransom, and that he, indignant at the

small value set upon his person, volunteered to double the sum. While his friends were sent to raise the money, Cæsar with one friend and two attendants, remained with these rovers, who scrupled not, for the merest trifle, to embrue their hands in the blood of their captives. But Cæsar treated them as if he were their master, and they were his guards and not his keepers. Perfectly fearless and free from cares, he joined in their amusements and gymnastic exercises; he even wrote poems and orations, and insisted on reciting them to his rude audience, and when they expressed no approbation of his effusions, he would call them illiterate barbarians. At other times he would threaten them with crucifixion, as soon as he gained his liberty and gathered force enough. Velleius gives a different account, and says, that during the whole time which he spent among the pirates, he neither put off his sandals nor loosed his girdle. He was ransomed by money raised by the Asiatic cities; he nevertheless, would not allow the money to be paid over to the pirates, until they had given hostages for his own release.

When this took place, he suddenly gathered together some ships, manned them as well as he could with irregular crews, and in the course of that very first night sailed to the spot where the piratical fleet was at anchor, put to flight a part of it, sunk another part, and captured several vessels with their crews, and brought these to the place whence he had set out. Then having committed the prisoners into safe custody, he paid a visit to Junius, the pro-consul both of Asia and Bithynia, and called upon him to execute the law against the pirates. But he, like Verres and other such governors, more anxious to gain money than to enforce the utmost penalty of the law, proposed that the prisoners should be sold into slavery, as a sufficient punishment of their guilt. Cæsar, when he understood this, suddenly quitted the court, returned to his head quarters, and using his own discretion, crucified every pirate.

After this act of extra-judicial vigour, he seems to have

made an incursion into the inland parts of Asia Minor, in order to oppose some of the emissaries of king Mithridates, who were even then disturbing the peace and harassing the allies of Rome. He is said to have succeeded in preserving these from any serious attack, deterred the enemy, and also to have alarmed the pro-consul himself, by the magnitude and vivacity of his irregular enterprizes.

It is difficult to ascertain whether some of these desultory proceedings were not rather episodes, by which his studies at Rhodes were diversified, rather than a succession of events antecedent to the peaceable commencement of his studies.

Doubtless these were interrupted by an announcement, that his excellent uncle, C. Aurelius Cotta, who was a member of the Pontifical college, had died suddenly in Cisalpine Gaul, and that Cæsar had been chosen to succeed him. But the transactions in Italy during Cæsar's absence require some notice.

The tumults and insurrections had left the Roman government in a very enfeebled state, and the war in Spain was draining all their resources. The feebleness of the two consuls for the year B.C. 75, had compelled the senate to send Pompey into Spain, with pro-consular power to aid and assist Metellus Pius in conquering Sertorius and his followers. The united generals met with no great success, and there are still extant dispatches of Pompey, in which he bitterly complains of the neglect of the senate, the destitution of the provinces, and the immediate danger that the whole war would be rolled back upon Italy.

C. Aurelius Cotta, when elected consul for the year B.C. 74, thus explains to the people the state of the commonwealth: "Romans, you have elected me consul, when the state is labouring under the greatest difficulties, both at home and abroad; for our generals in Spain are loudly calling for money, soldiers, arms, and provisions, and they are compelled to do so, because, since the revolt of the allies, and the escape of Sertorius over the mountains, they cannot either engage

in battle or procure the materials necessary for the war. We have to maintain large armies in Asia and Cilicia, on account of the overgrown power of Mithridates. Macedonia abounds with enemies, and so do the sea-coasts, both of Italy and all the provinces; while in the meantime, our revenues diminished and irregularly paid, owing to the wars, meet but a small portion of our expenditure; and so, even the fleet which furnishes Rome with provisions, is smaller than it has hitherto been. If the evils have been the result of either our treachery or want of energy, since it pleases you, inflict punishment upon us; but if our common condition is more difficult than can be successfully managed, why do you commence proceedings unworthy of yourselves, of us, and of the Republic."

Amidst these dangers and distress, the voice of the democracy became louder and more irrepressible; and Cotta had himself to propose that the portion of the Syllan laws which rendered a tribune of the people ineligible to the higher magistracies should be repealed, and the old career thrown open to the agitating demagogues. Thus within two years of Sylla's death, fell, before the popular cry, that regulation which he regarded as the very bulwark of his institutions. Peace was restored for the time, and Cotta, at the conclusion of his consulship, went as governor into Cisalpine Gaul, where he had to conquer a peace from the insurgent provincials, and to acquire claims to a triumph, which was decreed to him, but prevented by his death.

The election of Cæsar as his successor in the pontifical college, proves that he had still patrons amongst the Syllan party, or perhaps the system of co-optation, which vested the election in the whole body, might, by mutual concessions, render each member in turn a nominator to the successive vacancies. That such was the plan in the college of Augurs, we know upon the express testimony of Cicero, who represents the augur, Laelius, as nominating the husband of his eldest daughter to a vacant seat, rather than an older son-in-law who had married a younger sister.

When Cæsar heard of his appointment, he hastened back into Italy, fearing, doubtless, that steps might be taken by the dominant party to prevent his nomination from being confirmed. Velleius does not mention by what road he reached the eastern coast of the Adriatic. But when he arrived there, he found the regular passage between Dyrracchium and Brundisium watched and beset by pirates. In truth, nothing can more clearly betray the extreme weakness to which their civil wars had reduced the Romans, than that they could not command the strait which formed the only link between Italy and their eastern provinces. Nay, according to Cicero, the very fleets which conveyed the Roman troops across were compelled to wait until the winter storms made it unsafe for the pirates to linger on those shores.

Cæsar, whose temperament brooked no delay, resolved, under the circumstances of the case, if possible to steal a passage. He procured a row-boat, in which he embarked with two friends and ten attendants, and avoiding the narrow sea, chose the broadest part of the Adriatic, as being thus less likely to be discovered by the pirates, from whom, if again captured by them, he would scarcely expect mercy. On discovering what he imagined to be the masts and yards of a piratical fleet, probably somewhere on the Italian shore, he prepared for the worst, stripped off his clothes, and tying a dagger to his thigh, waited the result. But a nearer and clearer view showed that some trees had been mistaken for the masts and yards of the pirates.

On his return to Rome, he was elected tribune of the soldiers, the first of the numerous offices in the gift of the people.

Although this was a pure military appointment, being the highest rank in the legion, next to its commander, yet it was necessary that it should be held by every one who aimed at the higher offices. In rank he was something like a lieutenant-colonel in command of a regiment; and were six of the British regiments formed into one brigade under a lieutenant-general, it would give some resemblance to a Roman

legion, without its auxiliaries. The duties of the tribune were however judicial, as well as military, when in the camp or in the field, and he was expected, with some legal acumen and knowledge, to decide all the cases of litigation which might arise between the soldiers on active service. And from his office the turf seat, which on hasty occasions served as his judicial bench, was called the tribunal. Not a vestige of evidence remains to prove that Cæsar ever discharged in person the duty of this office. We are only told that, when vested with this commission, he actively lent all his weight, and gave all possible aid to those parties whose great aim it was utterly to overthrow the Syllan constitution, especially that portion of it which restricted the free action of the tribunician power.

The following speech, attributed by Sallust to the tribune, Licinius Macer, will show the main facts of this struggle. It was spoken in the year B.C. 72: "Romans, if you did not rightly estimate the difference between the freedom which you inherited from the Romans and this system of slavery established by Sylla, it would be my duty to discuss at large, and to inform you for what wrongs, and how often, the armed commonalty seceded from the patricians, and how it procured for itself tribunes of the people, the protectors of all their rights. My present duty is to encourage you, and to advance myself along that path by which we are likely to recover our liberties. Neither am I ignorant of the immense power of the nobility whose despotism I alone, powerless, vested with but a shadow of magistracy, am preparing to attack, nor of the greater safety with which a faction can act, than powerless individuals Although all the other magistrates, created to defend your rights, being induced either by favour, hope, or rewards, have directed against you all their force and power, and think better to offend for rewards than gratuitously to perform their duty. Consequently, all have yielded to the despotism of a few, who, vested with military power, have taken possession of the armies, realms, and pro-

vinces, and have constructed their citadel from your spoils ; while in the meantime, like a flock of sheep, you, a helpless multitude, allow yourselves to be seized and devoured individually. Deprived of all the privileges inherited from your ancestors, with this exception, that you, by your votes, appoint your despots, while they choose their real leaders. Therefore all have passed over to them ; but, should you recover your rights, the majority will soon return to you, for few people have spirit enough to defend their opinions. The great body of mankind are of the party of the most powerful. Have you any fear that they will be able to inflict damage on you, advancing against them unanimously, seeing they dreaded you when languid and spiritless ? Unless, forsooth, C. Cotta, one of their thorough partizans, restored in his consulship a few of their rights to the tribunes from any other principle than terror ; and although Lucius Sicinius, who was the first to speak concerning the power of the tribunes, was crushed while you were hesitating to express your sentiments. Nevertheless, they become more anxious to avoid popular odium, than you to be impatient under your wrongs. And I, O Romans, cannot sufficiently express my wonder at such conduct, for you must have learned that the hope had been entertained in vain.

“ When Sylla, who imposed this shameful slavery on your necks, died, you believed that an end of your calamities had arrived. But Catulus arose, a far more savage master. A civil war in Italy broke out in the consulship of Brutus and Mamercus Æmilius, the consuls. After that C. Curio domineered to that extent that he destroyed an innocent tribune. You witnessed the violence with which L. Lucullus last year attacked L. Quinctius. You also see what troubles are now being prepared for me, and yet these would fail in their object, were they to cease being tyrants before you ceased to be slaves ; especially as in these civil wars various pretences were used, but the real contest between the two parties was, which of them was to be your master. Consequently the

evils arising from license, hatred, avarice, have blazed for a time and been extinguished. But this evil, the loss of the tribunician power, has become permanent. Both parties have equally aimed at the destruction, and struggled against the revival, of that instrument which our fathers especially forged for the protection of liberty. And I warn you and beseech you to attend to this,—do not, changing the meaning of words to suit your cowardice, call your present slavery peace and tranquillity; for even should your servility overpower all truth and honour, you are not now in a condition to enjoy them—you might perhaps have enjoyed them had you been quiet. Now observe this. Unless you are victorious, they will tighten your chains, for wrongdoers are safe in proportion to their severity Neither do I exhort you to avenge your wrongs, but rather to rest yourselves for a time; nor is it from a desire to inflame our discords, as they falsely assert, but from a wish to terminate them, that I now demand satisfaction for wrongs, according to the laws of nations; and, should they obstinately refuse to restore us our rights, I ask you only to withhold from them your personal services; let them hold and manage at their own pleasure their military commands; let them try to procure triumphs; let them, with the statues of their ancestors, follow up the war against Mithridates, Sertorius, and the rest of the banished Marians. Do you, who have no share in the advantages, refuse to participate in the danger and the toil: unless perchance your services are sufficiently remunerated by that corn-distribution law which they have suddenly passed. And yet by it they estimated the liberty of all at five bushels per month to each individual, a quantity not exceeding the common gaol allowance. For as the death of prisoners is barely prevented by their scanty diet, while their strength decays, so the trifling monthly dole does not free the citizen from domestic cares, and every man amongst you, in proportion to his idleness, is deluded by unsubstantial hopes. Yet, were the allowance ample, it would be only a proof of your deadness of spirit to

be thus deluded, seeing that it is held forth as the price of slavery, and to be grateful for your own property, which they thus insultingly bestow upon you. Without these bribes, they have no power against your united force, nor will they attempt to resist you. But you must beware of their tricks. Thus, at the same time they prepare soothing measures, and postpone the final settlement until the arrival of Cn. Pompey, whom they first raised upon their shoulders, then feared; and now, as their fear has been removed, they assail. Nor are the protectors of liberty, as they call themselves, and numerous as they are, ashamed to confess that they dare not, without the aid of an individual, either redress our wrongs, or maintain their own rights. I, for my part, feel certain that Pompey, a young warrior of such distinguished renown, would prefer, with your good will, to be the chief man in the state, than to be a sharer of their despotism, and that he will prove himself the restorer of the tribunician power."

The only other transaction with which Cæsar's name was connected during this period of his life, was the enactment of a law according to which those Marians who had joined Lepidus, and after his death had retired to the camp of Sertorius, in Spain, were restored to their country. It was impossible for Cæsar to sympathise with the later transactions of the life of Sertorius.

That commander had lost all feelings of patriotism, according to the ancient definition of the word, and evidently entertained a fierce spirit of hostility against the Rome of his day. In fact he attempted to establish a rival empire. For this perhaps he might have been excused, but no one who was truly Roman in heart could have entered into a treaty, offensive and defensive, with the blood-stained Mithridates, according to which Italy was to have been simultaneously attacked by Mithridates from the east, and by Sertorius from the west.

It became, therefore, necessary for all parties in Spain who still hoped for a final return to Rome, to withdraw from the camp of Sertorius, and take advantage of a law supported

earnestly by Cæsar, which enabled many exiles, among others his brother-in-law, Cornelius Cinna, to return into the bosom of their country. The death of Sertorius, and the final dispersion of the Marian chiefs in Spain, opened a new career to Cæsar, along which he could safely march, without on the one hand incurring the odium of heading a party hostile to Rome, or on the other hand without leaguings himself with any portion of the discontented Syllans, who from disappointed feelings might wish to overthrow the government.

It was perhaps to this period of his life that we ought to assign his impeachment of Caius Antonius for corruption. According to Plutarch the cause was brought before Marcus Lucullus, prætor of Macedonia, and Cæsar pleaded it in so powerful a manner, that the defendant was forced to appeal to the tribunes of the people, alleging that he was not upon equal terms with the Greeks in Greece. The anecdote may be valuable, at least to this extent, that Cæsar's command of the Greek language was accurate enough to justify Antonius in classifying him with his Greek accusers. But Plutarch is wrong in his statement of facts. Marcus Lucullus was at Rome, Prætor inter peregrinos, immediately after Dolabella's impeachment.

In the course of the year, B.C. 72, burst out the servile war in Italy, of which Spartacus was the leader, a war in which a terrible and summary vengeance was exacted from the tyrants who had reduced so large a number of prisoners of war to a state of slavery, and made them the victims of a system most iniquitous and atrocious. Italy, from one end to another, was devastated, the open country was for two years in the possession of the slave-bands, many cities were captured, set on fire, and destroyed. Not a province in the whole peninsula which was not signalised by bloody battles between the slaves and their former masters, and victory often crowned the desperate valour of the less guilty combatants.

A fragment of Sallust will give a graphic description of the usual scenes which accompanied the assault of the slave insurgents upon a Roman villa or village, or unfortified town.

These are the words : "Sometimes leaving the mangled bodies half alive, they would throw fire into the houses ; and many of the slaves of the locality, whom their disposition made accomplices, dragged from their places of concealment, either the hidden property or their own masters. Nor did the angry barbarians and exasperated slaves regard anything as holy, nor scruple to commit the most detestable crimes."

The circumstance that the slaves separated into different parties, according to their nations and clans, seems alone to have saved the Romans from destruction. When thus separated, they fell in succession before the Roman troops. Marcus Crassus, the future triumvir, who was the prætor, had the honour of vanquishing and dispersing the principal bodies ; while Pompey, on his return with his army from the conquest of the Sertorians, intercepted a body of five thousand Gauls and Germans, who were attempting to force their way to their distant homes, and cut them to pieces, thus, as he boasted, putting an end to the servile war. The name of Cæsar is not to be found in connexion with this war. The highest office he could have held was a military tribune.

The friendship which seems to have been contracted at this time between Crassus and Cæsar, and the great military skill displayed by Crassus in his last campaign, a skill which he certainly did not personally possess, might lead us to suppose that he had been benefited by the military genius of Cæsar. The immense ditch and wall across the isthmus, between the Tarentine gulf and the Sicilian sea, within which Crassus cooped the troops of Sparticus, looks like the precursor of those extraordinary works of the soldiers, which were such favourites with Cæsar. We are expressly informed that several of the nobility served as volunteers in the camp of Crassus.

At the close of the year, B.C. 71, the victorious commanders, Pompey and Crassus, met under the walls of Rome, and were elected consuls for the ensuing year. In their joint consulship the Syllan institutions were overthrown, the tribunes of the people restored to their full power, and the laws concerning

the judicial power regulated anew. But the severe laws affecting the status of the children of the proscribed, and the infamy attached to the name of Marius and his party, were allowed to remain in full force. Men are far more tenacious of property than of political rights, perhaps the claims of the children of the proscribed to the property of their fathers were too strong, the rights from proscription as yet, from the recency of the confiscation, too weak, to allow the oligarchy to overlook the chance of their being enforced.

Although the wrongs of the Marians were thus left unredressed, we find a curious passage in a fragment of the fourth book of Sallust's history, from which it may be inferred that in the course of this year the Syllan laws of property were partially attacked by one of the two censors. "His colleague, Lentulus, surnamed Clodiamus, a man equally distinguished by his folly and vanity, proposed a law for exacting from the purchasers of the property of the proscribed those sums which Sylla had remitted." This proposal did not become law. The probable intention was to make certain compensations to the families of the proscribed from the funds thus raised. The attempt itself shows the depressed state to which the defection of Pompey had reduced the faction.

Cæsar must have viewed with singular delight the fatal schism between the Syllan leaders; but their voluntary destruction of the best safeguards of the oligarchal institutions must have exceeded his utmost hopes. His way was now clear. Time and opportunities were alone wanting. He had only to keep his present path, to secure the affections of the people, and honours, offices, provinces, and extraordinary commissions would be as open to him as they were to the Metelli, the Catuli, the Luculli, the Crassi, and the Pompeii.

At this time the popularity of Pompey was apparently boundless, and when with pardonable vanity, he, although then consul, led his horse as a simple knight in front of the censors sitting on their bench, the citizens, who had flocked from all quarters to Rome for the purpose of being registered,

rent the air with their acclamations. But his popularity rested upon no solid basis. It was the noisy applause with which a party welcomes the apostacy of a powerful antagonist, whose services, and not whose character, they applaud. Pompey, still reeking with the blood of the chiefs of the Marian faction, the murderer of Carbo, and of Junius Brutus, the riveter of the shackles of the children of the proscribed, could never permanently place himself at the head of the popular party, especially when in Cæsar were concentrated every element to make him the favourite of the people.

The armies of the two consuls still lingered at the gates of Rome, although Pompey had triumphed, and Crassus had entered with the honours of an ovation. And various disputes having arisen between the two colleagues, threatened Rome with another civil war. Under these circumstances, a Roman knight of known probity, but who took no part in the politics of the day, suddenly appeared in the public assembly, mounted the rostra, and announced to the people "that Jupiter himself had appeared to him in a dream, and commanded him to tell the consuls that they must be reconciled to each other before they laid down their office." The assembly seconded the divine admonition, and loudly called upon the two chiefs to obey the commands of Jupiter. Pompey remained stately and unmoved. But Crassus, after a short time, rising from his seat, presented his hand to his colleague, adding, "That he did not disdain to make the first advances to the man whom the public voice had surnamed 'great,' and who, while yet a knight, had been honoured with two triumphs." The reconciliation was apparently cordial, and this important consulship terminated in peace.

CHAPTER III.

QUÆSTOR—ÆDILE.

THE next year, B.C. 69, was the thirty-first of Cæsar's life, and probably that of his quæstorship. According to Tacitus, "There were quæstors, even under the kings of Rome, as is shown by the 'lex curiata,' re-enacted by Lucius Junius Brutus. The power of appointing them remained with the consuls, until the assembly elected to that office also. The first were Valerius Potitus and Æmilius Mamercinus, elected in the year 63, after the expulsion of the kings, for the purpose of attending on military expeditions. As business increased, two were added to act at Rome. Soon after, their number was doubled, when Italy became tributary, and the provincial taxes increased. Afterwards twenty were created to supply the senate, according to Sylla's law, who had transferred the right of judging from the knights to the senators."

To this account little can be added, except to mention that the original quæstors were the commissioners of the treasury, and that the military and provincial quæstors were answerable for the receipts and disbursements of the money assigned to the armies to which they were attached.

At this period, the quæstorship, to which no one was eligible until his thirtieth year, opened the senate to statesmen. After filling that office, a Roman became eligible into that body, and even if not enrolled by the censors, had a right of delivering his sentiments on public questions.

In his quæstorship, Cæsar had the misfortune to lose his beloved Cornelia, as well as his aunt Julia, at whose funeral procession the statue of her husband, Marius, was solemnly carried. On both occasions, he delivered funeral orations from the rostra, and the applause with which the addresses were received by the people would lead us to infer, that the military exploits and great renown of Marius would be commemorated among the events which reflected honour and distinction on

Julia, and that the anti-aristocratical career and domination of Cinna would not be forgotten among the claims which entitled Cornelia to their sympathies. The speeches produced a strong sensation, and were apparently prompted as much by a desire to produce a political effect, as to do honour to the memories of those whom he loved. It had been the established practice to honour aged and distinguished matrons with funeral orations, but according to Plutarch, Cæsar was the first who paid his graceful tribute to a young wife, cut off in the bloom and vigour of life.

It was Cæsar's lot to become the quæstor of Antistius Verus, the pro-prætor of Western Spain, and in addition to the regular duties of his office, Cæsar was vested with prætorian power to administer justice in the province, a duty for which his acuteness, sagacity, and forensic practice peculiarly qualified him. During the whole of his life he was an excellent judge, and his unwearied attention to his judicial duties, and the strict impartiality of his sentences, are praised by Suetonius.

Cæsar respected the tie which in general, according to Cicero, used to bind the quæstor to his principal in after life, and ever honoured Antistius, whose son he made one of his principal lieutenants during the Gallic war.

The Roman provinces were, like England, divided into judicial circuits, the courts were itinerant, and moved in succession to the chief towns in each department. Nor does the Latin word "conventus," differ much in meaning from the English "assizes." Among other cities, his duties led him to "Gades" (Cadiz), then, as at this day, one of the principal cities of Spain. Originally a Phœnician colony, it had passed, first into the hands of the Carthaginians, and then of the Romans, without siege or violence.

Among other objects worthy of inspection, there was a temple of the Tyrian Hercules, and one of its decorations was a statue of Alexander the Great. We know not by whom or at what period the destroyer of Tyre and the terror of Carthage was thus honoured. Perhaps the priests, grateful for

the veneration displayed by the Macedonian for their god, and eager to reckon the greatest of men among his votaries, had erected and consecrated the statue of the conqueror of the eastern world on the shores of the Atlantic in the furthest confines of the West.

Cæsar, it is said, entered that temple in which nearly as great a man as himself had before him registered his vows. It was in the same temple that the great Carthaginian, Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, had, previous to his invasion of Italy, bowed before the image of his god, and called upon him to aid him in his attack upon the Roman world.

But the statue of the great Alexander principally attracted the attention of the Roman, and pausing to contemplate the form and features of the son of Philip, he concluded his survey with a deep sigh. The contrast between his ignoble course and the splendid career of Alexander, between a judicial quæstorship in Spain and the crown and sceptre of the king of kings, won by wisdom and valour, and worn with honour, was too much for his philosophy. His feelings were embittered by the thought, that he, at the age which had terminated the life of the great Macedonian, had performed no action worthy of being recorded in the page of history.

It is an undoubted fact that most of those men, whom God in his wisdom has called forth to do wonderful things and to change the face of the world, have commenced their course in the morning of life, with all the energy and activity of youth still exciting them to never-ceasing action.

Such was Alexander, on whom supreme authority devolved before he had completed his twentieth year; such was Hannibal, who, in his twenty-fourth year, was master of the army with which he all but overthrew the Roman empire.

Such was his great antagonist, Scipio, on whom, ere he had completed his twenty-eighth year, had devolved the burden of sustaining, and finally delivering, his native country; and such also was the case with Cn. Pompey, the great opponent of Cæsar's house and party, who, commencing his career in his twentieth year, had passed on from one extraordinary com-

mission to another, until now, released from all the demands of the regular law, he remained at Rome, the sole civil dictator of Rome and the Roman world.

Disgusted with his petty duties in the province, Cæsar is said to have eagerly petitioned for his recall, and hastened back to scenes which would at least enable him to keep himself before the eyes of the public. The time which he spent in Spain is not mentioned by any historian.

On arriving in Italy, he made a rapid progress through the Italian States, for the purpose, according to Suetonius, of stirring them up to make certain demands of a democratic character. He is said especially to have excited the population between the Po and the Alps, with whom, undoubtedly, he had a very close connexion, although it would be difficult to mention the links of the chain. His object, probably, was to canvas on a broad scale for the approaching ædileship. But the favourable manner in which he was received, and, perhaps, the tone of his electioneering speeches, alarmed the government to that extent, that two legions ready to embark for Cilicia were detained until the effervescence excited by his appearance and political movements had subsided.

During his absence in Spain, or, as some write, after his return, the insolence and depredations of the pirates attained their greatest height. They cut off all communications between Italy and her transmarine provinces, interrupted the conveyance of provisions, and threatened Rome itself with famine.

Nothing can give a more vivid representation of the wretched state to which their intestine divisions and consequent feebleness, had reduced the Roman world, than the following passages from Cicero's oration in support of the Manilian law :

“What place on the sea-coast had, during late years, a garrison strong enough to protect it, or was so concealed as to escape their visits? Who sailed without exposing themselves either to death or slavery, as the only alternative was either a winter voyage, or over seas overrun by pirates? What pro-

vince of late years did you keep free from pirates? What tribute was safe from them? What ally did you defend? Whom did your fleets protect?

“Shall I conclude that, of late years, the sea was shut against your allies, seeing our own armies never crossed from Brundisium, except at mid-winter; shall I complain that deputies from foreign nations were captured when coming to Rome, seeing that Roman ambassadors have been ransomed from captivity? Shall I say that the sea was not safe for merchants, seeing two prætors fell into the hands of the pirates? Shall I mention that the celebrated cities, Cnidos, Colophon, or Samos, and others without number were captured, seeing the very harbours by which you live and breathe were in their hands? Are you ignorant that the very harbour of Caieta, when full of ships, was plundered under the prætor’s eyes? or that the children of the very man (C. Antonius) who had waged war against the pirates were carried off by them from Misenum? For why should I complain of the disaster at Ostia, and that blot and disgrace of the Republic, when almost in your sight, the fleet commanded by the consul of the Roman people was captured and sunk by pirates?”

Things were in this state when, B.C. 67, the tribune Gabinius, one of Pompey’s creatures, proposed a law, according to which, Pompey was invested with extraordinary powers for the suppression of this great and increasing evil. His authority was to extend over every part of the Mediterranean and fifty miles inland. He was to have unlimited credit upon the treasury, the power of raising troops and equipping fleets at his own discretion, and the right of delegating his authority to fifteen lieutenants, nominated by himself. The consuls, Calpurnius and Acilius Glabrio, encountered such a proposal, which derogated so seriously from their character and authority, with all the opposition which they could offer, and they were supported by the two great Syllan leaders, Catulus and Hortensius. But their struggles were vain, the law passed triumphantly, and Pompey was invested with a military

power and an extent of commission the greatest ever given to a citizen of any state, either in ancient or modern times. Two tribunes attempted, in vain, to prevent the bill from passing, by virtue of their intercession. The popular will was too strongly expressed to render this a safe proceeding. They were threatened with deposition, and withdrew their veto.

The people judged better in this case what were the true interests of the state than either Catulus or Hortensius. Nothing but an unlimited commission and boundless authority could have, within reasonable time, eradicated this deeply-rooted evil. The pirates were the gentlemen of broken fortunes, who had been ruined by the Roman conquests in Greece, Macedonia, the Archipelago, and the whole Asiatic coast. They swept the seas with a fleet of a thousand sail, and four hundred cities and strongholds, on different shores, owned them as their masters. If overpowered in the West, they took refuge in the East. Should one or two provincial governors take active measures for their extirpation, abundance of others were found willing to harbour their ships, and, for a share in the spoils, to connive at their outrages. A commission of a similar nature, but not equally extensive and effective, had been granted to Marcus Antonius, the father of the triumvir, who was defeated by the Cretan pirates, and compelled to sign a dishonourable peace. Servilius had carried the war into their fortresses in Pamphylia, Isauria, and Cilicia, had taken two of their strongholds, Olympus and Phaselis, yet, during a five years' contest, hardly abated the nuisance.

Pompey discharged the duties of the commission assigned to him with admirable skill and decision. First, he cleared the western seas of every piratical vessel, and then, by the judicious disposition of the means placed at his command, drove all the fleets and forces of the pirates to their common centre in Cilicia. There, not far from their principal fortress Coracesium, they ventured upon a naval engagement, and were utterly defeated. He then landed his forces, and easily conquered the whole country possessed by them; he treated all

who surrendered with great mercy and judgment, and gave homes and settlements to more than twenty thousand of them, in localities where they might live without either the necessity or the temptation of recurring to their former lawless life. If tradition can be trusted, the "ancient Corycian," whose garden and horticultural success have been so beautifully described in the "Georgics" of Virgil, was an old pirate, who had been allowed to occupy some waste ground under the walls of the citadel of Tarentum.

Pompey, whose ambition was as minute as it was lofty, sullied the glory of these undoubtedly great achievements, by taking advantage of the letter of his commission, and attempting to wrest from the son of his old colleague, Metellus, the honour of the conquest of Crete, which, with the exception of one city, had been completed. In this attempt he failed, and Metellus had the honour of vanquishing the Cretans, the only people of the Hellenic race which had, up to that time, remained independent of the Roman empire, and of adding "Creticus" to his other names.

Pompey's commission had been drawn up for three years, but as he had finished all that required to be done in less than six months, and he was unwilling to divest himself of his kingly authority, some other field for action was to be sought. The war against Mithridates had been waged with great success by the Syllan chief, Lucullus, who was, however, accused, and not without some reason, of being more anxious to gain victories and capture wealthy cities than to bring the war to a close. The popular party at Rome, therefore, proposed that Lucullus should be recalled, and that Pompey, who was then in Cilicia with a powerful army, should be appointed to succeed him. The usual steps in such transactions were taken, the tribune Manilius was put forward, and Pompey's appointment carried by acclamation, amidst the unavailing protests of Catulus, Hortensius, and the rest of the Syllans. Catulus could urge the illegality and impolicy of extraordinary commissions, and the folly of placing all the hopes of Rome in one man.

But the hoary oligarch, like all party men in every age and nation, could see only one-half of a political truth. Lucullus had been for six years acting under an extraordinary commission, and it was assuredly no hardship for a Roman constitutionalist to be recalled, in the seventh year, from the management of a single war.

Had Pompey's claim needed any extraneous support, it would have found it in the spontaneous exertions of the great orator, Marcus Cicero, who being that year prætor elect, came forward, and in his first speech from the rostra addressed the people in favour of the Manilian law, with all the powers of polished and persuasive eloquence. The speech remains to this day an unrivalled model of the mode in which a favouring audience should be addressed.

Cæsar is supposed to have furthered the progress of both the Gabinian and Manilian laws, and he might have been justified on political grounds in doing so. But neither his name, nor that of Marcus Crassus, is mentioned by Cicero among those who were supporters of Manilius. B.C. 67, Cæsar married Pompeia, daughter of Quintus Pompeius, and grand-daughter of the dictator Sylla.

The absence of Pompey during the remainder of the Mithridatic war, and the consequent settlement of his Asiatic conquests, left Rome and domestic policy to the management of the dominant party in the senate. The chief man was undoubtedly Crassus, whose immense wealth and personal influence were the sole counterbalance to the dictatorial power of Pompey. But, gorged as Crassus was with the spoils of the proscribed, it was very difficult for him to place himself in close connexion with the democratic party, whose interest was in direct opposition to his. It was, therefore, among discontented Syllans that he would naturally seek for trustworthy supporters.

At the close of the year B.C. 67, a conspiracy was said to have been hatched at Rome, of which no better account can be given than the following passage from Sallust: "But before

this, a few people had entered into a conspiracy, and amongst them, Catiline; and concerning this I will speak as truly as I possibly can.

“ In the consulship of L. Tullus and M. Lepidus, the consuls elect, Publius Antonius and Publius Sylla, being prosecuted for bribery, had been condemned and degraded from their office. A short time after this, Catiline, being accused of provincial extortion, had been prevented from becoming a candidate for the consulship, because he had been unable to give in his name within the legal time. There was at Rome at this period Cn. Piso, a noble youth of consummate audacity, needy, yet powerful with his party. Poverty and profligacy incited him to throw the state into confusion. Antonius and Catiline, having entered into communication with this Piso, about the nones of December, were prepared, on the calends of January, to slay in the capitol the two consuls, L. Cotta and L. Torquatus, to seize upon the consular fasces for themselves, and to send Piso, at the head of an army, to occupy the two Spains. As their intention became known, they transferred the murder to the nones. But, on this second occasion, they were preparing to destroy not only the consuls, but the majority of the senators. And had not Catiline, while standing in the front of the senate-house, been in too great a hurry to give his associates the signal, the foulest deed since the building of the city would have been perpetrated on that day. But as the conspirators, when the signal was given, had not assembled in sufficient numbers, the whole plan failed. Afterwards Piso, then quæstor, was sent to Spain with pro-prætorian power, by the influence of Crassus, because he knew that he was an enemy to Pompey; and even the senate willingly granted him the province, both because it wished to remove a dangerous character from the city, and because many of the aristocracy looked to him for future protection, as the power of Pompey to them was already a source of fear. But Piso, while travelling into the Spains, was slain by some Spanish horsemen whom he had in his escort. There are

many who say that the barbarians were unable to endure his unjust, haughty, and cruel command; while others state that those horsemen, being old and faithful clients of Pompey, had by his commands put Piso to death. They add, that Spaniards never before were guilty of such a crime, although they had previously endured many savage commanders. I leave the matter undecided."

The persons mentioned in the foregoing extract were all Syllans, willing, at every hazard, to seize upon the public spoils, and to wade to power through the blood of the leaders of their own party. The only fact, perhaps, which we can regard as historically true is, that a young nobleman of quæstorian rank was entrusted by Crassus and the senatorial party with the government of the whole of Spain, the most important charge at the time in the Western World. The fate of Piso was a warning to the senate not to interfere with those provinces which Pompey regarded as peculiarly entitled to his patronage.

The youthful reader of history may perhaps be gratified with a comparison of the account given by Suetonius of this same first conspiracy attributed to Catiline, and for his version of which the historian gives his authorities, now known to be utterly worthless.

"A few days before he entered upon the ædileship, Cæsar was suspected of having entered into a conspiracy with the consular Marcus Crassus, also with Publius Sylla and L. Antonius, who, after their election to the consulship, had been condemned for bribery, for the purpose of making an attack upon the senate; so that, after massacring all on whom they might fix, Crassus might assume the dictatorship, and Cæsar be named master of the horse; and after the government should have been reconstituted according to their pleasure, the consulship should be restored to Sylla and Antonius.

"This conspiracy has been mentioned by Tanusius Geminus, in his History; by Marcus Bibulus, in his Edicts; by Caius Curio the father, in his Speeches; and Cicero seems to allude to it in a letter to Axius, when he writes that Cæsar in his

consulship had established the kingdom which he had meditated upon during his ædileship. Tanusius adds that Crassus, either from change of mind or fear, did not attend on the day appointed for the murder, and that Cæsar consequently did not give the signal agreed upon, and which he was to have given.

“According to Curio, this signal was for him to drop his toga from his shoulders. Curio also, as well as M. Antonius Naso record that Cæsar had also entered into a conspiracy with Cn. Piso, a young man to whom, because he was suspected of conspiring in the city, the province of Spain was spontaneously offered and granted, as an extraordinary appointment. That the two had agreed, Piso abroad, Cæsar at Rome, to rise and cause a revolution by means of the Lambrani and Transpadani.”

It is peculiarly instructive to see how Catiline, in the version given by Suetonius, totally disappears from the scene, and how his place is occupied by Cæsar, who had neither principles nor party feelings in common with any of the conspirators. Cicero's allusion, in his letter to Axius, evidently alludes to the great expense incurred by Cæsar during his ædileship, which had induced his inveterate enemy, L. Catulus, to say, “That his expenditure was only in proportion to the object in view; for while others, by their ædilitian magnificence proposed to secure the consular fasces, Cæsar's aim was to purchase sovereign power.”

Cæsar had been long making preparations for magnificent shows and games; and his ædileship, B.C. 65, formed an epoch in the history of these displays. The whole space of the comitia, the forum, and the broad street leading up to the capitol, were occupied by temporary buildings, erected for the more complete exhibition of the wonders prepared for the gratification of the people. The wild beasts, collected at great expense and from distant regions, fought with each other and bled on stages of solid silver. They were hunted through temporary forests, where scenes were represented with all the

varieties which could strike the eye or please the imagination. He was also prepared to exhibit a more extensive gladiatorial show than had ever been witnessed before, but the senate took the alarm, lest he might avail himself of the arms of his assembled gladiators to make some attack upon the state. A law was therefore passed, limiting the exhibition to three hundred and twenty pairs. His colleague, Bibulus, had agreed to defray an equal share of the expense, but complained that the honours and popularity had all devolved on Cæsar; and he compared their case to that of the twin deities, Castor and Pollux, whose temples, although equally dedicated to both brothers, bore the name of Castor alone. If this anecdote be true, why should Cæsar be so exceedingly blamed for his outlay, seeing Bibulus was as extravagant as his partner?

While the admiration of the public was still warm, Cæsar attempted to procure an extraordinary commission for himself. The Alexandrians in Egypt had lately expelled their king, Ptolemy Auletes, who had applied to the Romans to assist him in recovering his kingdom. The people were anxious to gratify his wish, and he was strenuously supported by Crassus, who was then censor. But the project was defeated by the oligarchs, headed by Catulus, the colleague of Crassus. If they could thwart him, he in his turn could annoy them. As ædile, it was his duty to superintend the public buildings, and to repair those which had fallen into decay. It appears that the state, in its gratitude for the matchless services of Caius Marius, had dedicated in his honour certain trophies of his Jugurthine, Cimbric, and Teutonic victories. These, which by the Roman laws and custom were sacro-sanct, had been demolished by Sylla. Cæsar, however, now replaced them in their former seat, and added several exquisite statues of the stern old warrior. It is said that he managed his measures with so much secrecy, that the erection and dedication took place in one night. This was a bold and dangerous step, and had the oligarchy possessed its ancient vigour, the author would have been severely punished. In former times

they had banished one man for retaining in his possession a picture of Saturninus, and another for bewailing his death. The interest produced by this public defiance was intense. The Marians crowded from all parts into the citadel to view the features of their ancient chief. They kissed the statues and shed tears of joy. Their numbers and still-existing strength surprised even themselves, and revived their long depressed spirits. The war, the proscription, exile, and persecution had thinned their ranks, but a numerous body of active young men had now grown up, whose legal disabilities only strengthened their attachment to the old cause. Thus all recognised their natural leader in the man who had dared to restore the honours of their great champion and chief.

On the other hand, the Syllan faction viewed the act and its effects with indignation and alarm. Catulus brought the affair before the senate, and, among other accusations, said "That Cæsar, no longer content with sapping the outworks, was preparing to take the constitution by storm." The senate, however, refused to interfere, and the affair ended with adding to Cæsar's popularity, and exposing the weakness of his enemies.

In the year B.C. 64, he was appointed a criminal judge (*judex quæstionis*), one of the assistants of the city prætor. Even this office afforded him an opportunity of strengthening his party and annoying his opponents, and of gaining the approbation of all good men.

The mercenary wretches who, during the calamitous times, had been rewarded from the public treasury for taking away the lives of the proscribed, had hitherto lived undisturbed under the protection of Catulus and his colleagues. But Cato, whose fate it often was in political life to strike his friends when aiming at his foes, had lately brought them before the public, and compelled them to disgorge the reward of bloodshed, as far as the public treasury was concerned. These doubtless were worthy members of society, according to the Syllan laws, and had well earned the wages of which Cato,

probably acting upon the principle of a supposed unwritten and irreversible law, deprived them. But wilful homicide cannot be an indifferent deed. It must be either a public service or a great crime. Therefore to deprive an executioner of his fees is to proclaim him a murderer. When, therefore, Cato had been allowed by the oligarchy to deny that the murder of the proscribed Marians had been a state service, Cæsar instantly took advantage of the precedent, seized upon the perpetrators as gratuitous murderers, brought them before his tribunal, and condemned them to banishment. He attacked no one uncondemned by Cato, and regarded the latter's order to refund the reward as a proof of the crime, and the ground of his own sentence. If, therefore, the Syllan indemnity was valid against Cæsar's criminal condemnation, it ought to be equally valid against Cato's civil proceedings. Cæsar acted in this cautious manner, as he did not feel himself strong enough to condemn simply upon the merits of the case. Those therefore who were not convicted of receiving money from the treasury for their deeds of blood, were not molested by him. Even that Cornelius Phagita, who had hunted him in the hour of distress, and extorted two talents as the price of his leniency, was not troubled by him either now or afterwards.

About this time Titus Labienus, a friend and adherent of Cæsar in after life, was elected a tribune of the people.

There can be no doubt that, in discharging the duties of his office, Labienus acted in concert with Cæsar. His first step was to conciliate Pompey and his partisans, by passing a law, according to which Pompey was to be permitted to wear a laurel crown and the complete dress and ornaments of a triumphing general at the spectacles in the circus, and in the theatre to wear the magistrates' robe of office.

He next passed a law, according to which Sylla's innovation respecting the mode of electing the members of the pontifical and augural college was repealed, and the right of election restored to the people.

By the death of Metellus Pius the office of Pontifex Maximus soon after became vacant, and gave Cæsar an opportunity of measuring his strength against the oligarchs, and ascertaining the extent of his influence among the citizens. His competitors were his old general, Servilius Isauricus, a Syllan more by position than principle, and his own ever watchful and bitter opponent, Quintus Catulus, the senatorian leader of the uncompromising Syllans. The mode of election was to choose by lot seventeen of the thirty-five tribes, and to leave the decision to the majority of the selected number. Cæsar, according to report, carried the election by the most profuse bribery. But how a man depressed like him and loaded with debts could vie with either Catulus, the wealthiest of the Syllans, or with Servilius, who had the pillaging of Asia for five years, in bidding for votes, is a difficulty which cannot be easily solved. Plutarch has another report, that Catulus offered Cæsar large sums of money, provided he would withdraw from the contest, but that Cæsar answered, "that he was more inclined to borrow large sums, in order to carry on the contest." Cæsar's popularity was so overwhelming, that he obtained more votes in the tribes of Catulus and Servilius than they did in the remaining fifteen.

It is absurd to think that he should have thought it necessary to bribe such an immense majority. Persons who bribe are generally more judicious in the distribution of their favours, and more inclined to adopt the principles of that worthy Roman, who, when accused before thirty-three jurymen, found fault with his agent for securing eighteen, when seventeen votes would have ensured his acquittal. The truth seems to be, that the people were proud to place their favourite at the head of the priesthood, from which office he had been degraded by Sylla. Cæsar, on the morning of the election, was not certain that the oligarchs would not have recourse to violence to prevent his success. When, therefore, he was taking an affectionate leave of his mother Aurelia, before he descended into the Campus Martius, he told her that she

would see him that day Pontifex Maximus, or never after. The office was not only of great dignity, but of adequate emolument. Among other advantages, there was attached to it a mansion in the "Via Sacra," which henceforth he made his home.

The result of this election must have rendered it evident that whatever the people could grant, would not be refused to him, and that the road to the highest honours lay straight before him. But still the fate which had befallen the Gracchi, the Drusi, the Saturnini, and others, must have been continually before Cæsar's eyes. A serious tumult in the forum, the intemperance of hot-headed associates, or the suborned riots of pretended adherents, might be seized upon by the senate as an excuse for passing their ultimate decree, and for putting him to death, either with or without the intervention of a magistrate. He therefore determined to try the question as to the right of the senate to suspend the Porcian and Sempronian laws, and to put citizens to death without the forms of trial or the privilege of appeal. For this purpose he induced Titus Labienus to lodge a charge of murder against Rabirius, who, thirty-seven years before, had distinguished himself as an aider and abettor, if not the principal, in the slaughter of Saturninus. The case was tried before Julius Cæsar and his relation, Lucius Sextus Cæsar, who both, without hesitation, found him guilty of murder. Rabirius appealed to the people, and the trial was appointed to take place before the "comitia centurtia," early in the year B.C. 63, when Cæsar was prætor elect and Cicero consul. The senate became alarmed for the safety of that prerogative which of late they had regarded as the brightest jewel of their order. Not only Hortensius, their standing counsel, was employed to defend Rabirius, but the aid of Cicero was invoked—the new man, the then popular consul—and he consented to take a share in the defence. Hortensius, without entering into the question, denied that Rabirius was the slayer, and proved that one Scæva, a slave belonging to Quintus Croto, had received

his liberty for slaying Saturninus. The substance of the charge of Labienus was this, that Saturninus had been put to death after the tumult had subsided, when he was amenable to the laws, and ought to have been brought to trial; that a promise to that effect had been pledged to him, and that by his death the public faith, as well as the common law, had been violated by his murderers. The defence made by Hortensius apparently did not prove that Rabirius, although not the actual slayer, was not aiding and abetting.

Cicero, in the fragment of his speech which has come down to us (although, perhaps, it is all that was spoken; for the tribunes limited the defenders to half an hour each, and he could not, with all his fluency, have spoken more within the restricted time), entirely avoids the real charge, but declaims eloquently on the advantages and value of the ultimate decree. The only passage which appears to bear on the point is the following:—after enumerating various distinguished citizens who had taken up arms by the command of the consul, he says, that the condemnation of Rabirius would involve them in the same sentence. “Shall we,” adds he, “include in this disgraceful and ignominious death-sentence, the name of Caius Marius? Shall we find guilty of felony and atrocious parricide, even *after* his death, that Caius Marius whom we can truly call the father of his country, the parent of your liberty and of the present constitution? For if Labienus thought it was his duty to erect a cross in the Campus Martius for Rabirius, because he took up arms, what punishment should be invented for him who summoned him to arms? And, granting that a pledge was given to Saturninus, a statement repeatedly urged by you, it was C. Marius, therefore, who violated it, seeing he did not keep his promise. And yet, O Labienus, how could that pledge be given without a decree of the senate? Are you such a stranger in this city, so ignorant of our discipline and practice, that you know not this? So that you seem to be a foreigner in an alien state, not to be a magistrate in your own.” This sophistry could not have imposed upon the people, neither the declamation of

the defenders, nor the influence of the senate, could have saved the accused, had not Metellus, the presiding prætor, foreseeing the probable termination of the case, torn down the standard from the janiculum, and by this not uncommon oligarchal sophism, dissolved the assembly.

In the infancy of the republic, whenever the citizens marched according to their classes out of the city into the Campus Martius, Rome was liable to a sudden assault from the Etrurian side of the river. Hence, on all such occasions, a guard was stationed on the janiculum, whose duty it was to keep within sight of the assembly a large flag, flying, as long as there was no danger. But should the enemy be seen approaching, the flag was lowered, and all the citizens hurried back into the city. The form still lived, although the substance had long before perished.

The accusation was not renewed. Cæsar was probably satisfied with showing that the law was not so clear on this point as the senate might have wished it to be. In fact, although in open disturbances, when the law loses its force, such an authority is absolutely necessary for the preservation of public order; yet assuredly, when order is restored, and offenders are placed within the grasp of the law, to massacre them is nothing but murder.

The great evil under which Rome was labouring at this time, was the great poverty of the majority of the citizens, and the total neglect of the oligarchy on this point. Italy was full of public domains. The confiscated territories of Capua, Carthage, and Corinth, were amply sufficient to drain the surplus free population of Rome, which alone was dangerous to the public peace, and to augment tenfold the revenues of the empire. But the leading oligarchs chose to regard these spacious domains as the support of the treasury, and the scanty rents which were paid for their possession as the main support of the government. Sallust writes: "After Pompey was sent to conduct the maritime and Mithridatic war, the power of the commonalty was diminished, the power of the few increased. These were in possession of the magis-

tracies of the provinces and everything else; they themselves, liable to no damage and flourishing, spent their lives without fear, and terrified others with judicial prosecutions, that they might manage the commonwealth with greater ease."

If any statesman more than others was guilty of grave delinquencies respecting the peace and safety of the republic, it was Cicero. It is impossible to study his conduct during his consulship, without coming to the conclusion that he mistook the outward symptoms for the inward disease; that in his opinion the demagogues were the real evil; that the masses of poverty-stricken and discontented citizens were not proper objects for curative treatment. Hence his conduct at the commencement of his consulship, when the tribune, Rullus, proposed an agrarian law, which if carried into execution, even in a modified degree, would in all probability have obviated the bloody scenes and civil war by which its termination was unhappily rendered famous. But he had deeply imbibed the opinion, that all the evils against which he could not shut his eyes, originated in the laxity and remissness of the chief magistrates, and that they would all vanish before the energy and vigour of a consul who should be conscious both of his power and his duty.

It is thus he addresses Rullus in the senate, after his law had been promulgated:—"You have mistaken, Rullus, and that greatly, both you and your colleagues, in hoping that you, in opposition to, in truth and not in show, a popular man, could become popular by overthrowing the republic. I challenge you, I call you into the public assembly; I wish to let the Roman people decide between us. . . . You have handed to me the state anxiously suspicious, in doubt and in fear, disturbed by your laws, speeches, and seditious practices. You have held out hopes to the reprobate; you have struck terror into the good; you have destroyed credit in the forum, and the dignity of the state. In this general disorder of men's minds and events, when the voice and authority of the consul shall have flashed in the deep darkness before the eyes

of the Roman people; when he shall have proved that there is no cause for fear—that during my consulship there shall be no cause for fear—no army, no armed band, no new colonies, no sale of the public revenue, no new military power, no legal decemviri, no second Rome, no other seat of the empire; but that there shall be the profoundest peace and tranquillity, I ought forsooth to fear that your excellent agrarian law will be more popular.”

Rullus, among other provisions, had proposed that a colony of five thousand needy citizens should be settled at Capua. According to Cicero, this was a deep plot to transfer the seat of government from Rome to Capua, to establish a rival city, which would certainly outshine and finally overthrow the more ancient seat; that the needy citizens would become a formidable army, that their leaders would become the masters of Italy and the antagonists of Pompey. “What,” said he to the senate, “what will be secure in the state, what position of liberty and dignity will you retain, when Rullus, and those whom you fear much more than Rullus, shall have occupied Capua and the adjacent towns, with all their bands of needy reprobates, with all their wealth, with all their silver and gold. Conscript fathers, I will vehemently and sharply resist all these attempts, nor will I permit these people in my consulship to bring forward their plans against the republic.”

Yet with all these violent declarations, he insinuates to the people that all agrarian laws were not disliked by him, and that if Rullus and his party had admitted him into their council, some advantages might have been secured. These are his words:—“For I will speak the truth, O Romans, I cannot blame every kind of agrarian laws. For I recollect that Tiberius and Caius Gracchus, two men most illustrious, most talented, and most devoted to the Roman commonalty, settled the common people on the public domains. All those lands were previously in the possession of private individuals. Nor am I a consul of that character that, like the majority,

I think it a crime to praise the Gracchi, as I know that many parts of the constitution were settled by their wisdom and laws." But after this empty compliment to their memory, he took care to remind the people that he would maintain things as they were, without calling on them to support him in making any alterations.

When the hope of any amelioration in their position was taken away, it is not to be wondered at that the desperate and the indigent portion of the citizens would lend a willing ear to those who should hold out to them at least the promise of better days. Such a man was found in Catiline, one of the Syllan party, a patrician of high birth and active temperament, who aimed at power for the sake of wealth, at wealth as a means of satisfying unbounded desires. Intimately connected as he was with the leading oligarchs, he had found the legitimate road to high offices blocked up against him by the infamy of his character, and especially by the cruelty he had exercised against the proscribed Marians. His party had undoubtedly attempted to carry him through all his difficulties, but had found the task too heavy for their united efforts. Hence his desperation and attempt to force his way to power by the most atrocious measures.

To suppose that Cæsar, to whom all the highest honours were open, should have entertained any views similar to those with which Catiline has been charged, is irreconcilable with common sense. His brilliant prospects were well-nigh clouded for ever by the discovery of Catiline's conspiracy, by the national alarm it excited among all ranks, and by the unlimited authority it threw for a time into the hands of the existing powers. Yet Cæsar's position was not only difficult, but dangerous : it was impossible for him to approve of Cicero's dictatorial consulship, while any opposition might render him liable to be regarded as a favourer of the revolutionary party who were supposed to be preparing conflagration for the city, and utter destruction to the social and political order of the empire.

Sallust, after enumerating the various classes of needy and desperate citizens, who were naturally inclined to follow Catiline, adds the two following bodies:—"Besides these, those men whose parents, on Sylla's victory, had been proscribed, whose property had been torn from them, and whose rights and liberties had been curtailed, expected the issue of the war in a similar spirit. Moreover, all those who belonged to any other than the senatorial party were more willing that the commonwealth should be thrown into disorder, than that they should be the less powerful faction." It would be Cæsar's interest to prevent these two classes from making common cause with the Catilinarians, and to reserve them for a more legitimate struggle against their opponents; and he seems to have completely succeeded, although most authors have delighted in implicating Cæsar's name with Catiline's atrocious plot. With them the passage of the Rubicon was a confirmation of every calumny against his character in early life. But the chief of the Marians could not have acted under the most bloody and reckless of Sylla's satellites, nor with the other conspirators, who, with the exception of Cethegus, were the ruined profligates of that faction, without forfeiting his position and character with his own party.

In examining the conspiracy, as far as Cæsar was concerned, by the most trustworthy evidence it will be seen that he acted not only with the greatest boldness, but also with consummate prudence. After Catiline had been driven from the senate-house by the eloquent invectives of Cicero, and the strongly-expressed feelings of abhorrence exhibited by the senate, he went home and penned the following letter to L. Catulus, his old friend and patron:—"Lucius Catiline sends health to Catulus. Your extraordinary good faith, known to me in deeds, and grateful to me in my great dangers, gives confidence to my recommendation. I have therefore determined with my present views not to prepare a defence, nor, as I am not conscious of any fault, am I ready to give any explanation. And, by Jove, you may, along with

me, recognise the truth of this. Stimulated by injuries and insults, because, deprived of the fruits of my labour and industry, I could not support the dignity of my station, I in conformity with my habits have undertaken the public cause of the poor; not but that I could with my own property pay the debts contracted in my own name, and the liberality of Aurelia Orestilla would pay from her own and her son's wealth the money raised by me on the security of others; but because I saw that unworthy characters were honoured with high offices, and felt that I, from some false suspicions, was thrown aside. For this reason I have adopted a course honourable enough in my present circumstances, and calculated, as I hope, to preserve my remaining status. As I was anxious to write more at length, word is brought that force is to be employed against me. I now recommend Orestilla to you, and deliver her to your protection. I beseech you, by your children's names, defend her from all injury. Farewell." This letter was undoubtedly confidential, and intended for the eye of Catulus alone, for other letters written after he had commenced his journey were delivered to most of the consulars, and to every leading aristocrat, stating that the writer, overwhelmed with false charges, as he was unable to withstand the faction of his enemies, yielded to fortune, and was going to Massilia into banishment, not because he was conscious of the great crime imputed to him, but in order that the commonwealth might be tranquil, and that no civil disturbance might arise from his resistance.

Soon after, the whole conspiracy was detected by the agency of the Allobrogian ambassadors, to whom Lentulus and Cethegus had applied for military assistance. Sufficient evidence was adduced that these two, together with Statilius, Gabinius, and Ceparius, had engaged in a treasonable correspondence with the Gauls, and had excited them to invade Italy. Lentulus, therefore, being deposed from the prætorship, was committed to the care of Lentulus Spinther, the ædile, Cethegus to Q. Cornificius, Statilius to Julius Cæsar,

Gabinus to Marcus Crassus, Ceparius to Cn. Terentius, a senator. This distribution of the chief conspirators by the senate, and with the approbation of Cicero, proves that, up to that moment, there could not have been the slightest suspicion that either Cæsar or Crassus had any connexion with the conspiracy. This was on the 3rd of November. Before the senate separated, it passed a vote of thanks to Cicero, and ordered a supplication in his name, because Rome had been preserved from conflagration, the citizens from massacre, and Italy from civil war.

The intentions of the conspirators were said to be these—“On learning that Catiline and his troops had reached Fæsulæ, Lucius Bestia, the tribune of the people, was to summon an assembly, and to prepare the populace for insurrection by bitterly inveighing against Cicero and his acts. During the night following, Statilius and Ceparius were to set fire to the city in twelve places, and, amidst the general confusion, to assassinate all obnoxious individuals. Cethegus was appointed to slay Cicero, and the numerous young noblemen in the plot were to cut their fathers' throats.” The whole band were then, amidst the general massacre and conflagration, to break forth and join Catiline.

The senate assembled on the following day, being the 4th of December, when rewards were decreed to the Gauls, and to their companion Vulturcius, who had given the above-mentioned information. In the course of the day, Lucius Tarquinius, arrested, as it was said, on his road to Catiline, was brought before the senate. He, like Vulturcius, claimed the senate's protection, and promised important information. On being ordered to say all he knew, he agreed in his evidence with Vulturcius, respecting the conflagration of the city, the massacre and the motions of the armed bodies; but he added this important announcement, that Marcus Crassus had commissioned him to join Catiline, and to tell him not to be alarmed by the detection of the conspiracy, but to hasten his march in order to rescue his arrested accomplices, and to con-

firm the courage of the rest. But when Tarquinius named Crassus, a nobleman of the greatest wealth and power, some thought the charge incredible, others, although they might regard it true, yet because at such a crisis so influential a person ought to be softened, not irritated, the majority, because they were individually dependents of Crassus, called out that the witness was forsworn, and demanded that a motion should instantly be made to affirm this. The crowded senate, when the question was put by Cicero, decreed, "that the testimony of Tarquinius appeared to be false, that he was to be kept in chains, nor have another opportunity of addressing the senate before he confessed at whose suggestion he had invented that gross falsehood." Some persons at the time said that this evidence was suborned by P. Autronius, in order that, by charging Crassus as an accomplice, his power, from a common sense of danger, might the more easily protect the rest. Others said that Tarquinius had been suborned by Cicero, that Crassus might not, according to his usual fashion, advocate the cause of the offenders, and throw the commonwealth into disorder. "I (Sallust speaks, at a later period) heard Crassus loudly declaring that Cicero had inflicted this disgrace upon him. But at the same time, L. Catulus and C. Piso could not induce Cicero, either by their personal influence, or by their prayers, or by bribes, to allow Cæsar to be falsely accused, either through the Allobroges or any other witness. For both these were his bitter enemies. Piso, because he had been impeached for provincial malversation in punishing unjustly a certain Transpadanian; Catulus was inflamed with hatred, in consequence of the pontifical competition, when he, far advanced in age, after filling all the highest offices, had been defeated by Cæsar, comparatively speaking a young man But when they could not excite the consul to commit such a grievous wrong, they themselves, by visiting different circles, and by disseminating their own false charges as information received from the Allobroges and Vulturcius, caused many to regard Cæsar with heavy suspicions.

In the course of the day, various attempts were made by the freedmen and clients of Lentulus to stir up an insurrection, for the purpose of rescuing him and his fellow-prisoners. Cethegus, also, it was said, had sent orders to his gang of slaves to arm themselves and force their way into the house of his detainer. These proceedings excited great alarm, and loud cries for more vigorous and decisive measures of repression and intimidation were raised.

Consequently, on the 5th of December, Cicero convoked the senate, and asked their advice respecting the ulterior measures to be adopted against the conspirators in custody. D. Silanus, the consul elect, being first asked his opinion, proposed that they should suffer the last punishment; when it became Cæsar's turn to give his opinion, which as he was prætor elect, would be early in the debate, he delivered a studied speech, of which, if we have not the very words, we have at least the substance and the arguments, embodied according to the best rhetorical skill of Sallust. Perhaps it would have been prudent in him to absent himself, like many others, from this invidious debate, or if present, to abstain from taking any part in it. But he was too bold a man to conceal his sentiments, and silently to acquiesce in a sentence of death, to be executed on prisoners in custody, without any trial or the regular forms of law. His past life and well-known principles compelled him to give all possible opposition to a senatorial decree for taking summary vengeance on arrested conspirators. Had he acted otherwise, he would have betrayed his principles, and have recognised the legality of that authority, which he had lately, in the case of Rabirius, pronounced contrary to law. But it required no common nerve to stand up in that moment of public terror and unassured safety, and to uphold his consistency at the risk of his character as a loyal citizen, and the loss, perhaps, of his life. Perhaps he was aware that not a man among the oligarchs in reality believed him guilty of any connexion with Catiline, whose success must have been fatal to all Cæsar's prospects. For his success would

have been the signal for a second Syllan war against Rome, a second invasion of Italy from the east, and most probably a repetition by Pompey of the wars, victories, and proscriptions of Sylla. In such a struggle, Cæsar must have foregone all hopes of profiting by the favour of the people, and have either remained neutral or been reduced to serve as an unwilling subaltern, either in the camp of Catiline or of Pompey. Catiline was not a man to work evil for the advantage of others. He was an excellent soldier, hardy and experienced, with great talents and energy of character, and had he once attained supreme power, he would have probably secured it with a vigorous and tenacious grasp.

Cæsar's arguments were directed, not against punishment, but against the punishment of death. His sentence was for perpetual imprisonment in various cities of Italy, with a super-added clause that it should be penal even to bring their case before the people or senate. Cæsar seems to have been greatly shocked by the cruelties which had of late years marked the alternate victories of either party, and to have been anxious to render civil dissensions less bloody. He well knew that party spirit was a natural product in free states, and that the contest for power would always be fierce and obstinate; but he was sufficiently acquainted with Greek history to know that the liberties of the different states had not been destroyed, until the opposing political parties had been taught to regard each other with internecine hatred and a deadly spirit of revenge, and alternate bloody retaliations. He protested against the first bloodshed on such occasions. He refers to the example of the thirty tyrants at Athens, whose first vigorous slaughter of known malefactors was received with applause; and to the Syllan times, which he remembered so well. He reminds them, that all had approved of the massacre of Damasippus and other reprobates. Their language was that such depraved and turbulent persons, who harassed the commonwealth with intestine broils, were justly put to death. But that was the beginning of great disasters " Yet, I fear

no such result in the consulship of Marcus Tullius (said he), nor in the present times. Under another consul, with an army, perhaps, under him, some false charge may be believed to be true. When in accordance with this precedent, the consul shall have once drawn the sword, who will limit his acts, or who will regulate them. Our ancestors, conscript fathers, were not deficient either in wisdom or boldness, nor did pride prevent them from imitating the institutions of foreign nations. Their arms, offensive and defensive, they borrowed from the Samnites, most of the ornaments of magistrates from the Tuscans But at the same time, imitating the practice of the Greeks, they punished citizens with the lash, and inflicted death on the condemned. After the commonwealth had attained its full growth, and owing to the multitude of citizens, parties had become powerful, the innocent were crushed under false charges, and other evils of the same kind began to prevail. Then the Porcian and other laws were passed, according to which condemned citizens were permitted to withdraw into banishment. I look upon this as the especially strong argument why we should not adopt new measures. Assuredly, they who from small beginnings founded this great empire were both better and wiser men than we are, who with difficulty retain what they gloriously won."

If we can trust the speeches of Cicero, as they were published by himself, the fourth Catilinarian oration was delivered in answer to Cæsar's arguments, for according to it, Cato's speech and motion had not been heard when he spoke. However that may be, we have recorded in it Cicero's then opinions, with regard to Cæsar's proceedings, which may be collected from the following passages: "I see that two motions are as yet before the senate, one by D. Silanus, who proposes that the men who attempted to destroy this state, should be punished with death; the other by C. Cæsar, who withdraws the punishment of death, but embraces every other bitter penalty. Both of them, in accordance with their own dignity, and with the importance of the crime, are for exercising the

greatest severity. Silanus judges that the men who have endeavoured to deprive of life all of us, the Roman people, and to abolish the name and extinguish the empire of Rome, ought not for one moment to enjoy life and the air which we all breathe, and he recollects, that this kind of punishment has often been inflicted in this commonwealth on reprobate citizens. Cæsar holds that death was not appointed as a punishment by the immortal gods, but either as a necessity of nature or a repose from toil and misery. Wise men, therefore, have never been reluctant to meet it, brave men have often courted it. But chains (he says), and those perpetual, have been found to be a punishment singularly adapted for atrocious crimes. He orders them to be distributed among the municipal towns Now, conscript fathers, I see what my interest is, should you adopt the proposal of C. Cæsar, because he in public life has followed what is called the popular course, I perhaps, with such a proposer and advocate of this punishment, will have less to dread from popular attacks We have on Cæsar's part, as his own and the renown of his ancestors demanded, a proposal which may be regarded as a pledge of his perpetual attachment to the commonwealth. We all understand the difference between unstable declaimers and a truly popular spirit, anxious to provide for the safety of the people. I see that not one of those men who wish to be called popular is to-day present, lest forsooth he should have to pronounce a capital sentence on Roman citizens. Cæsar, both the day before yesterday committed Roman citizens into custody, and yesterday decreed a supplication in my honour and ample rewards to the informers. Now no man can doubt what he who commits the accused to custody, who decrees a vote of thanks to the manager of the inquiry, and rewards to the informers, thinks concerning the whole case. But Caius Cæsar undoubtedly knows that the Sempronian law was passed by way of protection to Roman citizens alone; and that the man who is proclaimed an enemy to the commonwealth, can in no wise be a citizen. Finally, that the

very enactor of the Sempronian law paid the penalty of death, by the people's command. Nor does he think that Lentulus, lavish and prodigal as he is, after so bitterly and cruelly planning the destruction of the Roman people and the ruin of the state, can be called a popular character. Therefore he, the mildest and gentlest of men, hesitates not to commit P. Lentulus to eternal darkness and chains, and guards beforehand that no one hereafter shall be able to distinguish himself by relieving Lentulus from punishment, nor become popular by the destruction of the Roman people. He adds the confiscation of his property, so that want and mendicity shall accompany all the tortures of his mind and body.

“Therefore, should you adopt this proposal, you send as my companion to the assembly, a man dear and acceptable to the people. But should you prefer the sentence of Silanus, you will easily protect both me and yourself from the charge of cruelty; and I will so manage as to make such a charge still lighter.”

It is to be feared that Cicero's creed, which he consistently held to the last, and to which he finally fell a sacrifice—that public order was to be secured by a rigor beyond the law, and that every private citizen was justified in slaying any man, whom his party called a tyrant—has exercised a most mischievous influence on the minds of men. But he had imbibed it with his mother's milk from the Greeks of a degenerate age, and was convinced not only of its justice, but of the remedial efficiency of his system. “Think,” says he, “that one night nearly destroyed the empire, founded by immense labours, our liberties established by great virtues, our wealth increased and accumulated by the great kindness of the gods. You are this very day to take measures which will prevent any such deeds, not only from being accomplished, but also from being thought of.”

The consul's speech was seconded by Marcus Cato, all whose arguments went to prove that the salvation of the state depended on the execution of the prisoners, that there was no time to deliberate; but that they must decide between their

own preservation, and a necessary act of vindictive justice. Sallust records, that Tiberius Nero had moved that the guards upon the prisoners should be increased in strength, and the motion be renewed on a future day. Silanus, who had explained away his first motion, by saying that by the last punishment he did not mean death, but the utmost punishment allowed by law, finally supported Tiberius Nero. But the majority voted for Cato's motion, upon which Cicero acted, and put all the prisoners to an ignominious death.

The excitement caused by Cæsar's opposition to the immediate punishment of death, was so strong among the knights who served as a body-guard to Cicero, that they shook their swords at him as he quitted the senate house; and if we may believe Suetonius, he was only saved from being slain by the intervention of friends, who crowded around him. Thus closed the most critical day in Cæsar's life, and on which he must have looked back with unmingled satisfaction, as he then laid down principles from which he never swerved in after life. Suetonius writes that he did not resume his seat in the senate house during the remainder of Cicero's consulship. Plutarch, on the contrary, states that he attempted on a subsequent day to remove the suspicions to which the inventions of Catulus and Piso, and perhaps his own speech, had rendered him liable, and that his defence was received with loud cries of indignation and reproach. So that, as the sitting was more prolonged than usual, the people beset the house, and demanding Cæsar with violent shouts, insisted on his being sent out to them.

CHAPTER IV.

PRÆTOR, PRO-PRÆTOR, ETC.

ON the calends of January, B.C. 62, Cæsar entered upon his prætorship, and signalized the very first day of his new office by an attack upon his inveterate enemy, Catulus, from whose

venomous slanders he was still suffering. This great consular had been for seventeen years sole commissioner for rebuilding the capitol. Immense sums of money had passed through his hands, yet the structure had not been finished, nor any accounts rendered as to how the public money was expended. Cæsar proposed that he should close his accounts, and that Pompey should be commissioned to finish and dedicate the work. But the whole party took up the defence of their leader with so much vigour, and were prepared to support him with all their powers, that Cæsar was compelled immediately to drop all proceedings with regard to that matter. Nor was Catulus content with this defensive victory, but took an opportunity of retaliating upon his opponent.

After Catiline's defeat and death, strict inquiries had been instituted against all persons suspected of having participated in his conspiracy. The accused were tried by the Plotian law, which made it a capital offence to offer or to premeditate any violence to the supreme law in the persons of actual magistrates. The number of convictions under this law became very great, so great indeed as even to render it difficult for Cicero, when himself an exile, to find a spot where he might be safe from their vengeance. The principal witness under all these prosecutions was Cicero himself, who was consequently reproached with having ruined more as a witness than he had saved as an advocate. But the thorough-paced informer was one Vettius, a personage as famous in his day as Titus Oates was in English history. After many individuals had been condemned on the testimony of this wretch, the senate had called upon him to give in a list of all those with whose guilt he was acquainted. This was done, but he soon after requested to see the list, that he might insert some names which had been omitted in the first. In the meantime, suspicions had arisen that some of the leading oligarchs had been tampering with him, in order to induce him falsely to accuse their own private enemies; his request was therefore refused, but he was allowed to give in a list

totally new, which, however, on being compared, was found inconsistent with the former. Although this discovery ought to have proved fatal to his credibility, he had the hardihood to prefer a regular charge against Cæsar, as a party to the conspiracy, before Novius, a judicial quæstor.

But the suborners of Vettius were unable to protect a creature whose infamy had become public. Cæsar, who could not legally be prosecuted during his prætorship, availed himself, with his usual decision, of the mistakes of his opponents. He visited Vettius with a heavy fine, brought him before the people, who nearly tore him in pieces, and threw into prison both him and the quæstor Novius, who had violated the law in attempting to subject a superior to an inferior jurisdiction. Having thus justified himself in the forum, he prepared to meet the same charge legally made against him in the senate. His accuser was Curius, the profligate gallant of that Fulvia who first communicated to Cicero the existence of the conspiracy. He had himself, at a later period, become an informer, and now, while claiming the rewards due to the first discoverer of the plot, openly accused Cæsar of being an accomplice, and said that he knew it from Catiline's declaration. Cæsar, indignant at this charge, appealed to Cicero, and after proving that he had himself revealed some portions of the plot to the consul, succeeded in depriving Curius of the rewards promised to him. These accusations, although unsuccessful, must have paralyzed the prætorian exertions of Cæsar. The very charge carried danger with it, and a sword of lead was sufficient to cut down a suspected adherent of Catiline. The oligarchs showed no mercy in the hour of victory; any opposition to their measures was sufficient to draw down slanders, accusations, and condemnations, upon the opposer's head. The channels through which the information respecting the conspiracy was drawn were polluted, and it is impossible that the truth alone could have been conveyed through them. The informers were the refuse of the conspiracy, traitors to their sworn brethren, and eager to

purchase the attention and the confidence of the consul by the atrocious nature of their disclosures. This fact is placed beyond the reach of doubt.

Fabius Gallus, one of Cicero's most zealous instruments during his consulship, joined the Pompeians during the great civil war, and was banished. He wrote frequent and impudent letters to Cicero, from whom the following answer has been preserved: "I wonder that you accuse me, seeing you have no power so to do; and if you had the power, you ought not to do it. 'For I (you write) had diligently waited on you during your consulship,' and you add that 'the time will come when Cæsar will restore you.' You indeed say many things, but no one believes you. You say that you were a candidate for the tribuneship of the people for my sake. I wish you were always a tribune, you would not then need an intercessor. You say that I dare not declare my sentiments: as if I was not bold enough in answering your impudent demands. I have thus written to you, that you may know that you are nobody even when you think you are strong. Had you, like a gentleman, laid your complaint before me, I would willingly and easily have justified my conduct to you. But I wonder that I, by whom everybody else is free, do not appear free to you. For if the information which you revealed to me was false, what are my obligations to you? But if true, you are the best witness of the obligations of the Roman people to me."

Cæsar saw no defence at this critical period, for himself and others, against these false accusers and their party, except in the return of Pompey, whose authority alone could check the tyranny of the oligarchs. In this attempt he had a powerful auxiliary in the tribune, Metellus, the brother-in-law of Pompey, the very same man who had prevented Cicero from closing his consulship with a speech, on the pretence that he who had put Roman citizens to death, without allowing them an opportunity of defending themselves according to law, ought not to be allowed unlimited liberty of speech.

The prætor and the tribune would have succeeded in their measure, had not the senate, now in the plenitude of power, suspended both from their offices. Metellus instantly left the city, stating his intentions to take refuge in the camp of Pompey. Cæsar, according to his principles, looked on the senatorial decree of suspension as illegal, refused to obey, and proceeded to administer justice as usual in the forum. But on hearing that the senate had passed their ultimate decree, and that the consuls were prepared to use force, he prudently gave way, divested himself of the robes of office, and withdrew as a private character into his own house. Had he not acted thus, it is more than probable that he, like the Gracchi, would have been slain.

Two days after his retirement, the people came in crowds to his house, and offered him their aid in recovering and upholding his dignity. But he was too wise to trust his life and hopes to the protection of a feeble mob, who, in other times, had shown their utter inability to protect their favourites from oligarchal violence. He therefore thanked them for their goodwill, and besought them to retire quietly to their respective homes. Moved by this apparent moderation, the senate recalled their ultimate decree, repealed the order of suspension, and permitted Cæsar to discharge his judicial duties during the rest of the year.

Whatever his external actions might have been, every person at Rome seems to have been aware that Cicero was the secret mover of these violent proceedings on the part of the senate. His friend, L. Metellus, the brother of the tribune, and to whom, at the end of his prætorship, he had secured the government of Cisalpine Gaul, complains, in a letter still extant, of the ex-consul's severity to his brother. His words are: "I had thought that, in accordance with our mutual affection and renewed attachment, neither I in my absence would be injuriously exposed to contempt, nor my brother Metellus, for a sharp saying, be assailed by you, to the danger of his life and property. And if no respect for

himself was sufficient to defend him, both the dignity of our family, and my love both to you and the commonwealth, ought to have preserved him from this evil. Now I see that he has been wrongfully crushed, and I abandoned by those whom it least became."

Cicero's defence is both open and honest. He says that Metellus had, from the commencement of his office, directed all his efforts to assail him, and to impugn his consular actions, and that it was necessary for him to prove that, as a senator, he was ready to act with the same energy and determination which had marked his consulship, that nevertheless, although he might have spoken bitterly against the tribune, yet he had never moved nor supported a vote of censure against him. In his own words: "As often as any measure was taken, I gave my assent without rising, to those parties who appeared to me the mildest in their censure. I will also add this, although I had nothing to do with it, and yet was not sorry it was done—I took my share in drawing up that decree of the senate by which my enemy was relieved from all censures, and that I did because he was your brother."

Cæsar's name is not mentioned in this correspondence, but it would be difficult to draw any distinction between the two offenders, and as they were condemned by the same decree, so also they were included in the same remission. This year and the last month of the preceding were the most critical periods of Cæsar's political life. His powerful enemies, whom his previous and present conduct alike irritated, exerted every nerve to crush him. We have before seen how Catulus and Piso had spared no solicitations to induce Cicero to include Cæsar's name among the list of Catilinarian conspirators, and we may be certain that it was Cicero's answer to Cæsar's appeal that enabled him triumphantly to baffle the suborners of Vettius and Curius. Cæsar's unwearied kindness to Cicero, except when they clashed respecting the legality of the ultimate decree, seems to have arisen from a consciousness that, although he was himself innocent, circumstances had placed

his life and fortunes at the disposal of Cicero. He therefore felt grateful because he had not abused his power for the destruction of a formidable adversary, a virtue of no common occurrence during that deadly struggle.

The following letter, written about this time, by Cicero to Pompey, will give no inadequate idea of the relation between these two statesmen, and the caution exhibited by the absent general in giving his opinion respecting the transactions at Rome, especially respecting Cicero's consulship.

“From your public despatches I, along with all others, have derived incredible delight, for you have shown us that hope of peace which, in full reliance on you, I have always held out to all. But you should know that your old enemies—your new friends—have been much alarmed by your despatches, and are miserably disappointed in their hopes. But the letter you sent to me, although it but slightly indicates your feelings with regard to me, was, be assured, acceptable; for it is my custom to derive the greatest pleasure from the attentions paid by me to others, and if these do not meet with an adequate return, I am quite content that the balance should be on my side. Of this I doubt not, if my earnest desire to gain your favour should fail to unite us, that the commonwealth will make us close and intimate friends. But that I may tell you what I miss in your letters, I am going to write openly, as my own disposition and our common friendship demand. I have performed certain actions, for which, owing to our intimacy, and the good of the commonwealth, I expected to receive in your letter some congratulation. My own inference is, that you omitted to do this from a fear you might offend certain persons, but be assured that the actions performed by me, for the safety of our country, are receiving the approbation and testimony of the whole world; and you will learn, when you return, that all has been done by me with that prudence and magnanimity, that you, a much greater man than Africanus, will be glad to unite to yourself, both by political and friendly ties, one who is not much inferior to Lælius.”

In reading ancient history we sometimes meet with events,

which, however trifling they may appear to us, were, from the feelings and habits of the age, productive of the most important consequences. Of this kind is the consternation caused at Athens by the overthrow and mutilation of the Hermes, the consequent recall of Alcibiades, and the failure of the Sicilian expedition. Of a similar class of offences was the sacrilegious profligacy of Publius Clodius, a younger son of the great and powerful Claudian family. It is difficult to account for the boundless toleration with which the Roman democracy viewed the mad pranks of a young patrician of such a character. There was hardly a crime against the laws of purity and chastity with which Publius Clodius had not been charged. But he aimed at a higher pitch of impiety than any to which the reprobates of Rome had hitherto attained.

The mysteries of the "Bona Dea," commonly supposed to be the same with the goddess Ceres, were annually celebrated by matrons alone, in the house of the Pontifex Maximus. All males, even those connected with the chief priest's household, were religiously excluded. Nevertheless, into this sanctuary did Publius Clodius steal in a female dress, but not without detection. It is difficult to say in what manner this took place. The alarm was undoubtedly given, but the interloper escaped without being apprehended and legally identified. The announcement of the fact, that a male had been detected in the house of the Pontifex Maximus spread like wild-fire, and convulsed the whole republic. Cæsar, whose honour was principally concerned, contented himself with divorcing his wife, Pompeia, with whom Clodius was supposed to have an intrigue, and without whose connivance it was difficult to suppose that a man could have either been admitted or dismissed. But the matter did not end thus: the senate officially inquired into the matter, and commissioned the college of priests to institute an inquiry, and to make their report.

This was accordingly done; and a report was drawn up, stating that Publius Clodius was the principal offender. Upon this, orders were given by the senate that he should be tried

for sacrilege by the people. But these were changed, and the trial took place before fifty-six judges. Clodius pleaded in his defence an alibi, which, had the testimony of Cicero been believed, could not have been established. But the wealth of the Claudian family was great, their influence greater, and both were unsparingly used on this occasion.

Owing to certain causes which ancient writers do not explain, the prosecution was most unpopular; the whole body of the people was for Clodius; and not only the prosecutors, but the judges, were supposed to be in danger. The latter consequently claimed an armed guard for their protection. But if we can believe Cicero, the whole bench was one mass of corruption, and Clodius was acquitted by a majority of thirty-one to twenty-five. "What," said Catulus to one of them, at the close of the trial, "what made you claim a guard? Were you afraid you would be robbed of your bribe-money?" Cæsar was one of the witnesses summoned against Clodius, but testified that he had no knowledge upon the subject. When, therefore, he was asked why he had divorced Pompeia, his answer was, that "Cæsar's wife ought to be free from all suspicion." The answer has become a proverb; but it is doubtful whether he did not claim this unstained purity for the wife of the Pontifex Maximus rather than of the individual.

Clodius, who, up to the public scandal and consequent prosecution, had been one of the staunchest adherents of the oligarchs, and one of the most conspicuous of the young nobility who had supported Cicero during his consulship, now changed sides, and became the open impugner of the oligarchs, and the bitter enemy of Cicero.

At the close of his prætorship, Cæsar had to defend a young African nobleman, whom Hiempsal, a king by the grace of the Syllan party, claimed as a tributary vassal. The case was pleaded with great contention before the senate, when Cæsar is said to have seized young Juba, king Hiempsal's son, by the beard, and shaken it roughly. The senate decided in favour of the royal claim, and Masintha was ordered to be delivered up to Juba and his party. But Cæsar interfered,

hurried him away to some place of concealment, and smuggled him out of Rome in his own litter, when proceeding to Spain to act as pro-prætor of the Western province.

It is said, that before he could leave Rome, he was compelled to give security to his clamorous creditors for the final payment of their demands; and that Crassus willingly undertook to give them this satisfaction.

It was when passing the Alps on this journey that, according to Plutarch, he and his staff had to lodge in some miserable village, when one of the party, mindful of the fierce party contests which they had left behind them, said, "Can there be here, as in great cities, the same struggles for office, the same exertion to win the foremost place, and the same spirit of envy and ambition?" And that Cæsar answered, seriously and soberly, "I assuredly would prefer to be the first man here, than the second in Rome."

He found his province in great distress. Credit, both mercantile and public, was entirely ruined; and the incursions of the mountaineers from the northern provinces of modern Portugal devastated the wealthier portions of the south. His admirable habits of business and order enabled him soon to remedy the pecuniary disorders; and a considerable increase of the troops, together with renovated discipline, enabled him also first to check the barbarian incursions, and then to carry the war into their strongholds among the mountains of Lusitania and Gallicia. His success was important enough to induce the soldiers to salute him as imperator; and the booty, it is said, was ample enough not only to enable him to pay his debts, but also to lay aside large sums for future purposes.

After spending the greater part of two years in Spain, with great success and greater reputation, Cæsar returned, towards the close of the year B.C. 60, to Rome, with the hope of being allowed by the senate to triumph for his military achievements, and of receiving the honours of the consulship from the votes of his friends the people.

When he arrived under the walls of Rome, he petitioned the

senate both to allow him the triumph and to dispense with his personal presence in the city, while his friends were canvassing the voters in his behalf. The dispensation under such circumstances was almost a thing of course, but in Cato, Cæsar had a personal enemy whom nothing could mollify, and who would spare no trouble to mortify him. On the present occasion, being unable to prevent the dispensation, he wasted the senate's patience and time by one of those long-winded harangues which no impatience could check nor interruptions terminate. If ever there was an uncompromising spirit, who made his own will the measure of right and wrong, that spirit was Cato. The day was thus protracted, and the senate's decision prevented. Before another opportunity could be given to obtain the dispensation, the time necessary between the profession of a candidate and the day of election would expire. Cæsar therefore sacrificed his vanity to his interest, gave up all thoughts of a triumph, and entered the city.

During his absence, few events of importance had taken place. Pompey had returned from the east, B.C. 61, and had triumphed with great pomp and splendour over innumerable kings and nations. But the Syllan oligarchs, headed by his enemies, the Luculli and Metelli, had prevented the confirmation of all those acts by which, according to his own will and judgment, he had regulated and arranged the affairs of the eastern world. They had also succeeded in opposing certain laws proposed by him, for the settlement in colonies of the old soldiers who had served out their time under him and various other generals.

Although in the year, B.C. 60, he had raised his own lieutenant, Afranius, to the consulship, yet he had found him too weak to force his measures against the will of the oligarchs. The eyes, therefore, of all parties hostile to these were turned to Cæsar, who seemed the only person capable of carrying through the measures necessary for the free action of the government. The tribune Flavius, supported by Pompey,

had renewed, with some modifications, the agrarian law of Rullus. Cicero, in a letter to Atticus, gives the following account of the business:—"The agrarian law was lately violently agitated by Flavius, a tribune of the people, under the influence of Pompey, and yet it had nothing popular in it but the author. I, with the full assent of the assembly, proposed to remove from this law everything that encroached upon the rights of private persons. I relieved from all burdens all that had been public domain in the consulship of Mucius and Calpurnius. I allowed the Volaterrani and the Arretini, whose territory Sylla had confiscated, but not divided, to retain their lands. I proposed to ensure to the Syllans the ownership of the lands assigned to them. I was not for rejecting one clause, that lands should be bought with all the sums accruing to the state from the newly acquired revenues for the next five years. The senate was opposed to the whole agrarian proposition, as it suspected that one object was to invest Pompey with some new power, while he himself was much inclined to carry through the law. But I, with the full consent of the agrarians, was anxious to ensure their possessions to all private persons (these, as you know, are my troops of the rich men), and yet willing by purchasing lands to gratify the people and Pompey for I wished to do that also. And if all this were carefully arranged, I thought that both the dregs of the city might be drained off, and the solitudes of Italy be once more rendered populous. But all this business having been interrupted by the war, has grown cold." The serious student will do well to contrast these real views of Cicero, with his rabid oration against Rullus.

The war to which he alludes in the above passage was a Gallic war, of which he gives the following account in the same letter:—"As public news, we are at present in great fear of a Gallic war. For our brothers, the Ædui, are fighting. The Sequani have fought most disastrously, and the Helvetians are undoubtedly in arms, and are making incursions into our province. The senate has decreed that

the consuls should draw lots for the two Gauls ; that soldiers should be raised, all furloughs and immunities be suspended, that ambassadors should be commissioned to visit the states of Gaul, and to take the necessary steps to prevent them from uniting with the Helvetii."

It was evident that the ensuing consulship would be a most interesting and important one, and both parties exerted all their efforts to secure the office for their own partisans. Cæsar's own election appears to have been safe, even Cicero seems to have favoured his claims, as he tells Atticus :—" What even, if I am attempting to make a better citizen of Cæsar, whose gales are at present very prosperous, am I likely to injure the commonwealth ?" But Cæsar was very anxious to have a colleague who would support him in his consular measures. As he had no money of his own, he promised his influence to Luceius—a man distinguished both by great wealth and literary taste—provided he furnished the sums necessary to secure this joint election. The oligarchs, alarmed at the prospect of two popular consuls, strained all their strength in order to exclude Luceius. They subscribed large sums of money, and were thus enabled to out-bribe their opponents. Even Cato is said to have consented to the work of corruption, which served to secure the return of his son-in-law, Bibulus.

There can be no doubt that, during the proceedings antecedent to this election, a secret compact had been formed between Cæsar and Pompey, and that through Cæsar's instrumentality, Crassus was induced to join them, and thus to constitute what has been called in history the first triumvirate.

But before entering upon Cæsar's consulship, it will be necessary to give a short account of the working of the Roman constitution at this period. There were two bodies—the people assembled in the Comitia Tributa, and the senate in their own house—which claimed the right, and at times exercised it, of legislating for the whole community. On the proceedings of both bodies there were sharp checks in the

power vested in a single tribune, to arrest, by his veto, either a *senatus consultum* or a *plebiscitum*—the legal terms for a consultation of the senate, and a resolution of the commonalty.

When the senate was strong enough, it laughed at the tribunician veto; passed resolutions proclaiming that any tribune venturing to intercede would act against the state, become a public enemy, and be lawfully put to death under the authority of the ultimate decree. With respect to the check upon a *plebiscitum*, two doctrines were held; the popular party taught that the tribunician veto was the only legal barrier against the will of the people, and that the oligarchal sophism, and the supposed necessity of senatorial authority and sanction, were not legal obstacles to a decree of the people. This was Cicero's doctrine when urging Manilius to persist in carrying the law for assigning the conduct of the Mithridatic war to Pompey. These are his words:—"And since this is the case, O, C. Manilius, in the first place, I greatly praise and approve of this, your bill, and will and resolution. In the second place, I exhort you, supported as you are by the Roman people, to persist in your determination, and not to dread the violence and threats of any parties." But there were those who held that no *plebiscitum* was good in law, except it received, either as an initiatory process or a subsequent confirmation, the senatorial ratification. When either or both of these were wanting, the popular leaders used to pass an additional law, which made it compulsory on the great leaders of the senatorian party to take an oath binding them to obey the law as passed by the people, or to submit to a sentence of banishment. This was practically the state of the legislative power at Rome at the period; and the wonder is, that two such antagonistical powers should not have, at a much earlier period, shattered the constitution to its very foundations. But the Romans were essentially a practical people, and were content with remedying a pressing evil, without troubling themselves about principles which, if acted upon, would not have left them a fragment of a constitution.

CHAPTER V.

CONSULSHIP OF CÆSAR, B.C. 59. ÆTAT 40.

As soon as Cæsar entered upon his consulship, he announced his intention to support the agrarian laws. He sent his confidential friend, Cornelius Balbus, a native of Gades, in Spain, and a man of great talent, to inform Cicero that he relied upon his support, that he did not intend to propose any measure without the full consent of Pompey and Cicero, and that he would spare no exertion in attempting to reconcile Pompey and Crassus. Cicero's answer was far from decisive; and he hesitated long between active opposition, cautious co-operation, and retirement into the country during the impending struggle. But young Clodius breathed nothing but vengeance against him, and was willing to purchase his revenge by degrading himself from his patrician rank, and thus qualifying himself to become a tribune of the people. But Cicero relied upon Pompey's patronage, and remained long ignorant of the strict alliance formed by the great leaders. He however waved active opposition, and retired to the country, scarcely even appearing at Rome, except as the defender of some accused person.

During his consulship he had formed a close union between the equestrian and senatorian orders; nor was there any measure, the defeat of the conspiracy excepted, upon which he more prided himself. But as consular, he had failed to preserve this union. The public revenues were farmed by different companies, the members of which belonged to the equestrian order. The company which then farmed the revenues of Asia had agreed to give more than the province, harassed by continual agitations, and threatened by Mithridates, could afford to pay. The company had therefore petitioned the senate either to relieve them from their contract, or to diminish the amount of the sum payable into *the*

treasury. The request was reasonable, and numerous precedents for similar remissions were to be found in the financial records. Moreover, the whole equestrian body made the case of the Asiatic Society their own. Cato, however, the sleepless dragon of the treasury, would listen to no such petition. He argued that if they over-estimated their probable gains, they should be made to suffer for their want of prudence, and not ask the senate to relieve them from the effects of their own folly. Cicero in vain pleaded their cause. The senate was in vain inclined to be indulgent; for Cato, adding insult to refusal, suspended the whole business of the state for three months of the preceding year, that the senate might not have an opportunity of deciding the case.

One of Cæsar's first measures was to bring this cause before the senate, and to propose the remission of a third part of the stipulated sum. Cato, on perceiving that a majority was preparing to grant the indulgence, had recourse to one of his usual artifices, and commenced one of his interminable harangues. He was an adept at this work, and could hold forth for a whole day without weariness or interruption. But there was lodged with the presiding magistrate a discretionary power, in the exercise of which he might commit to prison any individual, however high his rank, who should vexatiously persevere in preventing a question from being put to the vote. With presiding officers of less nerve and decision, Cato's plan had often proved successful. But Cæsar, without any hesitation, exercised his presidential power, committed the endless speaker to prison, and thus enabled the senate to divide, and to sanction the remission.

Before this decree could assume the regular form of a law, it was necessary that it should be confirmed by the assembly. But when Cæsar had convoked the people, and was preparing to submit the decree to their consideration, his colleague, Bibulus, supported by his father-in-law and the more bigoted oligarchs, came forward and declared that the bill should not be proposed to the assembly. There was a tradition among

the aristocracy, that one consul had a veto upon the proceedings of the other, in all transactions between them and the people. Hence the maxim, that no damage could be done to their oligarchal institutions as long as one consul was their firm supporter. But the popular party denied this suspending power, and, in accordance with this principle, Cæsar declared to Bibulus and his supporters that he would take the sense of the assembly on the question proposed to them. All Rome was in a state of alarm, and expected to witness a pitched battle between the two consuls and their respective partizans. But finally Bibulus gave way, and the law was passed. Cæsar thus attached the equestrian order to his interests, and exhibited the spirit with which he intended to exert his consular authority.

His next measure was to induce the senate to recognise Ptolemy Auletes as king of Egypt, and to declare him the friend and ally of the Romans. It was said that he received for this service a large sum of money, a very probable case, as the sums paid by kings ambitious of the honour were immense, and formed one of the most productive sources of consular remuneration. Bibulus, on the comitial day on which this law was to pass, sent notice to Cæsar that he was observing the heavens—that is, that he was engaged in a religious duty, which rendered all comitial business illegal. Cæsar's argument would be, that the "comitia tributa," with which he was transacting business, had nothing to do with the augurs or their observations. He therefore proceeded with his law without paying the slightest attention to his colleague's obnunciations.

Pompey had enlarged the terms of the law, by which he originally proposed to reward his veterans, by including a considerable number of poor citizens, who were to profit by the distribution of land. The scheme, as brought forward by the tribune Flavius, had been subjected to Cicero's revisal, who, forgetful of one of his strongly-urged objections against the agrarian law of Rullus, confirmed the Syllan assigna-

tions, and proposed to strike out every clause that could be regarded as obnoxious. It is difficult for us, at present, to conceive how the party that called themselves the good could so pertinaciously resist a measure so necessary and salutary—so necessary for their own safety in the city, so salutary to the commonwealth—and continue to prefer slave to free labour, and take pleasure in the desolation of Italy. Cæsar was anxious to reconcile them to the only efficient remedy. He waited upon the leading senators individually, listened to their advice, or met their objections. He did not, like Gracchus, reserve the distribution for himself and friends, but proposed that twenty commissioners should be chosen from among those senators who had borne the highest offices of the state, and that with them the whole management should rest.

But no modifications could render an agrarian law palatable to the oligarchs. Either their own encroachments on the public lands were too extensive, or pastoral solitudes in the neighbourhood of their villas were more to their taste than the close vicinity of an agricultural population. Parks and shrubberies were preferred to vineyards and oliveyards, and spacious lawns and wide plantations of foreign trees were more agreeable to the eye than the short-lived beauty of waving corn. The measure was therefore pertinaciously and even successfully resisted in its very first stages.

Cæsar, thus baffled and irritated, adopted bolder and more comprehensive measures. He withdrew his bill from before the senate, and brought it in an amended state before the assembly. The Flavian bill had not included the valuable and fertile territory of Capua and the adjacent towns, which, since the war of Hannibal, had become state property, the back-bone of the treasury, as Cicero would argue, but really, at the time, more regarded as the peculium of the magistrates of the day, than as a regular source of revenue. There the gladiators were trained to the performance of their combats, there the wild beasts were congregated and fed before their appearance in the arena. Cæsar proposed to convert this

much-abused domain into the seat of a splendid colony, and to lead forth and settle upon it twenty thousand of the poorer citizens, who were the fathers of three children or more. This was the best answer to the sophistry of Cicero, who had represented the five thousand colonists proposed by Rullus, as the nucleus of a revived Capua, which would necessarily be the deadly enemy of Rome.

The limitation of the colonists to the fathers of three children and more, indicated strongly the class which Cæsar wished to relieve—the frugal, cautious citizen with domestic cares and habits, and not the reckless, immoral, and dissolute populace. What was thought of this and the measure, may be best known from the following letter of Cicero to Atticus: “On the last of April, after I had supped and was preparing to sleep, your letter was handed to me, in which you write about the Campanian territory. It first made so deep an impression upon me, that it deprived me of sleep—more, however, from thoughtfulness than annoyance All the expectation of agrarian liberality is now centered on the Campanian territory, and yet this, granting ten acres to each individual, will not maintain more than five thousand. All the rest of the multitude will consequently be alienated from them I know not of what our friend Pompey can be thinking, that he could be induced to approve this measure; for hitherto he used to excuse himself, by saying that he approved of Cæsar’s laws, but that Cæsar himself must carry them through: that the agrarian law met with his approval; that he had nothing to do with the question, whether the tribunician intercession would be valid against it or not; that he was pleased that the affairs of the Alexandrian king were at last to be arranged; that it was not his duty to inquire whether at the time Bibulus was observing the heavens or not; that he could not have guessed, what the result would have been, had Bibulus then descended into the forum.” In another letter Cicero again refers to the same event: “I entirely agree with your written communication. Sampsice-



The famous Triumvirate—Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus.—p 101..

is inclined to turbulence. We have every-
thing a tyranny. For

l
i
e
y,
ot
ut
ue
he
tly
nal
rim
e by
ould
d to
l his
This
mous

was the first appearance before
triumvirate.



The famous Triumvirate—Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus.—p. 101..

ramus (Pompey) is inclined to turbulence. We have everything to fear. He is confessedly establishing a tyranny. For what else means that sudden marriage-contract with Cæsar's daughter? What else means the division of the Campanian territory, and the reckless expenditure of the public money?"

But the period of dissimulation had passed, and the oligarchs saw with dismay that Cæsar had not only secured the cooperation of Pompey, but also the cordial support of Crassus, whom, with all his wealth and influence, they, since the death of Catiline, had treated with slights, and something approaching to contempt. On the day appointed for submitting the newly drawn up agrarian law to the consideration of the assembly, Cæsar addressed the people on the subject, and then asked Bibulus if he disapproved of any particular clause. He evaded the question, by saying that no innovation should take place in his consulship. Cæsar then besought him to withdraw his opposition, and called upon the assembly to join him in deprecating the conduct of his colleague. This was, of course, in vain, and savoured very like mockery. Bibulus, therefore, contenting himself with a loud assertion:—"If you were all to a man for this law, it shall not pass while I am consul," abruptly descended from the rostra, and quitted the assembly. Cæsar then introduced Pompey to the assembly, and asked his opinion respecting the proposed law. He not only approved of it as a salutary and necessary measure, but stated that nothing but the distressed state of the revenue had prevented the senate from enacting it at the close of the Sertorian war, and that since the revenues had been so greatly increased by the conquests in Asia, there could be no rational nor tenable objection to the measure." Cæsar then asked him whether, should its opponents seek to resist its enactment by force, he was prepared to support it. He answered, "Should any one lift the sword to oppose, I will raise my shield to defend it." Crassus next came forward, and expressed his approbation of all that had been said by Pompey. This was the first appearance before the public of the famous triumvirate.

In the meantime, Bibulus had again been observing the heavens, but on perceiving that his colleague totally disregarded these checks upon the free action of the people, he determined to make a final trial of the strength of both parties. On the decisive day he appeared in the assembly, where he could rely upon the support of three of the tribunes. But when he had forbidden any further proceedings, and had declared the day a holyday, a tumult took place in the forum, the opposing parties fought, not with weapons, but with the instruments furnished by nature. Bibulus was thrown down from the steps of the temple of Castor, and the fasces of his lictors were torn to pieces, and the rods broken. As soon as peace was restored the bill passed into a law, nor did one of the three tribunes, who had been gained over by Bibulus, venture to incur the popular odium by the intervention of his veto.

Bibulus complained to the senate of these violent proceedings, and of the outrages committed against his person and dignity, and called upon the venerable body to vindicate his cause. But the senators, at least the majority of them, either overawed by the triumvirate, or conscious of the untenable grounds on which Bibulus had based his opposition, wisely abstained from exposing their weakness, and refused to pass their ultimate decree. Bibulus, thus baffled and mortified by the timid behaviour of his party, retired from the public duties of his office, and contented himself with launching forth against Cæsar and his laws certain virulent edicts, which Cicero honoured with the epithet of Archilochian, although we find it difficult to find the aptness of the word. While Bibulus was thus employed in his retreat, the wits at Rome amused themselves with striking his name from the dated transactions of the year, and writing instead, "Julio et Cæsare consulibus." Suetonius has recorded one of the epigrams of the day,—

"Non Bibulo quidquam nuper sed Cæsare factum,
Nam Bibulo fieri consule nil memini."

But Cæsar had more serious business to transact. The only

mode of giving stability to a measure thus carried, was by adding an oath to the bill, which was to be taken by all public men, and bound them never to disturb the Julian agrarian laws. This oath was therefore added to the bill.

“In our common oppression (writes Cicero to Atticus) conversation, but only in certain circles and dinner parties, is less restrained than it has been. Grief begins to overpower fear, but so as to leave everything full of despair. The Campanian law has a curse appended to it, to be invoked upon themselves by all future magistrates, should they propose that the Campanian territory should be held by any other tenure than that established by the Julian agrarian laws.

“Everybody else hesitates not to swear, but Laterensis is thought to have acted magnificently, because he has ceased to stand for the tribuneship of the people, that he may not be forced to swear.” According to other authorities, Metellus Nepos,—the former associate of Cæsar—and Cato, with his imitator, Favonius, were rash enough to announce that they would never take the oath. But their resolution gave way when it was presented to them, with all the accompanying penalties in case of refusal, and even Cato condescended to swear.

Soon after this event, Rome was astonished by the sudden marriage of Pompey, with Cæsar's only and beloved child, the lovely and accomplished Julia. The young lady had been before this betrothed to Quintus Servilius Cæpio, who, like many of the young nobility, had been a staunch supporter of Cæsar, and had displayed great activity in the warfare, which the consuls had waged against each other during the preceding four months. But great as his services were, and powerful as the influence of his mother Servilia was with Julius Cæsar, state necessity was still more powerful, and the hand of the fascinating Julia was consigned to a much older and more distinguished husband. It is not generally known, but it is quite true, that the disappointed bridegroom was the famous Marcus Junius Brutus, who, with the property, had for a time adopted also the name of his uncle, Quintus Servilius Cæpio, a

patrician noble, who was half-brother of Cato. When we remember that Pompey had put to death the father of Brutus, and that, as was alleged, most illegally, all men must allow that these events were likely to chafe the temper of the most apathetic stoic.

It would be curious to calculate what effect this serious disappointment might have produced on the fervid spirit of Brutus, who, according to Cæsar's well known observation, "strongly willed, whatever he willed." A poet might easily take advantage of this fact, to paint Brutus with very different lineaments from those with which he has hitherto been placed before the public.

About the same period, Cæsar married Calpurnia, the daughter of the Piso who was to succeed him in the consulship. The coalition and measures of the triumviri naturally excited a strong sensation of hatred against them in the breasts of the lately dominant oligarchs. The odium fell principally to Pompey's share, who was regarded not only as a traitor, but also as the tyrant of his former partizans, and some of the followers of Bibulus seemed so determined on vengeance, that early in the month of May, Pompey was by him warned to be on his guard against the dangers of an assassination. Among the leaders of this opposition were Metellus Nepos, C. Memmius, the friend and patron of the poet Lucretius, and young Curio, at this period of his life the most furious of aristocrats.

Cæsar, in compliance with the terms of their compact, proceeded to obtain the sanction of the law for all the important arrangements adopted by Pompey, while settling the affairs of the Eastern world. This act was strenuously opposed by L. Lucullus, who had various causes of personal complaint against Pompey. But a threat on Cæsar's part of an immediate impeachment for his mal-administration and shameful extortion and peculation, during his seven years' government of Asia, caused him not only to withdraw all opposition, but brought that luxurious and philosophic consular to the feet of

Cæsar. Terrible must have been the demonstration of power which could bring a man like Lucullus thus to degrade himself, and drive him into retirement for the remainder of his life. His conduct, perhaps, betrays incipient dotage, which, gradually stealing on him, ended in the helpless idiocy of this most fortunate of generals.

Cæsar had enjoyed ample opportunities of witnessing the shameful extortions to which the provincial subjects of the empire were liable. He therefore passed a law, intended to protect them from the oppressive exactions of their temporary governors, and their ravenous cohorts. This was drawn up with the greatest care, and in after times became the basis of the imperial regulation, respecting the conduct of provincial governors. It specified every allowance that a governor could claim, and abolished, as far as it was possible, all perquisites and arbitrary exactions. In order to make their administrations more responsible, and their malversation more easily proved, it compelled all governors to lodge detailed accounts of their receipts and expenditure in the highest provincial courts, and to transfer authenticated copies of the same to the treasury.

Most of the Hellenic states in various parts of the world had submitted to the Romans on condition of being allowed to govern themselves, according to their own laws, and to assess themselves by their own officers, provided nothing was done to impugn the imperial supremacy of Rome. But the provincial governors had of late violated all these privileges to an incredible extent, so that nothing but a shadow of power was left to the native magistrate. Cæsar passed a law, which made it a high crime and misdemeanour to violate the privileges conceded to any free city, or to interfere with the rights enjoyed by prescription. In order to make all such offenders really answerable for their wrong doings, a clause was added, enabling the prosecutors for damages to pursue the property of the condemned wherever it could be found. This was to remedy a common device, by which rich delinquents, likely to be condemned to pay heavy sums for mis-

government, used to alienate their wealth in favour of some friend or relative, and thus to frustrate the intention of the law, and prevent the recovery of damages.

These last measures were more calculated to increase human happiness and diminish human misery than all the laws passed since Rome had become an imperial power. Their motives, also, were without any base alloy; for Cæsar could not expect any political support from the oppressed classes whom it was his object to protect. They had no votes nor influence in raising their lords and masters to honours and high offices; and could repay their benefactor with gratitude alone. He seems the only statesman of the age who practically testified the slightest interest in the happiness and amelioration of the neglected population of the provinces, and who could forget that Rome was only the central seat of dominion, and not the empire itself.

By a very simple regulation, which made it imperative upon the senate to publish a journal of its proceedings, on the same principle according to which the acts of the assembly were published, with the least possible delay, he struck a deadly blow against one of the greatest sources of oligarchal corruption. Originally, many of the most important exercises of power by the senate had only been allowed to pass with the expressed proviso that they were to be confirmed or ratified by the people. In the process of time, the proviso was dropped, and the whole power practically devolved upon the senate. This abuse had been exposed by a very honest and energetic tribune, known to history under the simple name of Cornelius. "He," writes Asconius, "proposed a law by which he diminished the authority of the senate, so that no person should receive a legal dispensation from his ordinary duties except through the people. And this principle was established by the ancient law, consequently, in all decrees of the senate by which they anciently granted dispensations to any individuals, it was usually added, that the whole case should be referred to the people. But that practice gradually

fell into disuse, so that finally the original addition about referring to the people disappeared, and the decrees of the senate were passed by a very few senators. The most powerful of the senators were highly indignant at this bill of Cornelius, because by it their influence was greatly diminished." Again, "Cornelius a second time brought forward a bill, forbidding the senate to grant a dispensation from the ordinary demands of the law to any man, unless there should be two hundred senators present; and that no man thus favoured should be allowed the benefit of an intercession, should the people refuse to confirm the senate's decree. All this took place without any disturbance. For no one could deny, that such a law tended to increase the dignity of the senate. But, nevertheless, Cornelius carried the law against the will of the Optimates, who, even in very few numbers, were wont to make such decrees."

Cornelius was prosecuted for his very useful reforms, as he had been guilty, in the course of his proceedings, of certain irregularities, which were testified against him at the trial by the leading Syllans, L. Hortensius, L. Catulus, L. Metellus Pius, L. Lucullus, and M. Lepidus. Cicero, then a candidate for popular honours, made a popular speech in defence of Cornelius, to which he afterwards appealed as a strong proof of his popular principles. In spite of these proceedings, the abuse still continued; and decrees of the senate were often passed, of which nothing was known except the regular signatures of a sufficient number of members and officials to make the paper a legal document.

Cæsar thought that this abuse would be radically removed by making it imperative upon the senate to publish, without loss of time, their daily transactions; and so it would have been, if honestly carried into effect; but we find, at a later period, convincing proofs of a continuance of the old system.

Every step hitherto taken by Cæsar had been in the direction of salutary reform, without any symptom of a revolutionary tendency; and he was now prepared to receive his

reward. The tribune Publius, one of Cæsar's adherents, a man of action, if not of very high character, proposed a law to the people, by which the government of Cisalpine Gaul and of Illyricum, for the space of five years, together with an armed force of three legions, was conferred on Cæsar. The people were delighted to reward their energetic and successful champion, and passed the bill by acclamation. Thus, without the aid of military power, and in despite of the opposition of the oligarchs, Cæsar advanced himself to the highest office in the state, secured the affections of the knights and of the people, protected as far as he could the provincial subjects of the empire, carried the measure which had proved fatal to the Gracchi; which Marius, in the plenitude of his power, had not dared even to propose, and which, in a very modified state, had failed under the patronage of Pompey. His career between the desperate defiance of the boy of seventeen given to the dictator Sylla, and his consular position and acts, is one of the most remarkable in history, and requires far more consideration than it has hitherto attracted. It is the interrupted foot-marks that we can alone trace, but they are the foot-marks of a giant.

Soon after, the senate generously added Transalpine Gaul and a fourth legion to the government of Cæsar. Some ancient historians write, that their motive for this extraordinary conduct, was a fear that the people, alarmed by the continued rumour of a Gallic war, were preparing to anticipate them. The policy of the measure might have been justified on these grounds. The senate could not repeal the law already passed by the people, nor take away what the assembly had once given; but it could at any time reverse its own decree, and recall a commission delegated by itself. By thus bestowing Transalpine Gaul upon Cæsar, they made him, to a certain extent, dependent upon their good will and amenable to their decrees. The result to him was the same; he received the command of the two provinces best adapted to ensure his safety, to watch the operation of his numerous reforms, and

to promote any views of future power. In Transalpine Gaul a field of boundless action was opened to his ambition, and from Cisalpine Gaul, he could learn and direct the intrigues of the city with as much facility as if he were present.

The serious business of the civil year was usually terminated at Rome by the end of August. The remaining months were principally occupied by the festivals, the games, and the theatres. It was the people's wish to decide the elections early, as there was no social enjoyment until the annual struggle of the parties was over. This year, however, the elections were repeatedly postponed by the edicts of Bibulus, and, if we can believe Cicero, with the full consent of the people. The second book of the great orator's letters to Atticus is most interesting and instructive, not only as reflecting the transient feelings of the day, but as proving how a man of first-rate ability, and even genius, may be so blinded by self-interest and party prejudices, as not to see the true character of the circumstances by which he is surrounded. According to Cicero, Cæsar and Pompey were most unpopular, and young Curio the idol of Rome. The reception of Cæsar at the theatres and circus was cold and cheerless, that of young Curio warm and enthusiastic. Cæsar, in his wrath, writes by express to the absent Crassus, and complains bitterly to Pompey of this change in the public feeling. He goes further, secretly denounces vengeance both against the knights and the people, and threatens to deprive the former of their privileged benches at the theatre, and the latter of their public allowance of corn. This is no wilful exaggeration, for Cicero was writing confidentially to a cool and sagacious man, but is the pure creation of party feeling. Every faction, be it wide or narrow, is to itself the whole world, and its members, if malcontent, pronounce all wrong, and discover discontent written on every brow.

Cæsar never lost his popularity for an instant, much less indulged in senseless threats against the masses of his supporters. But the oligarchs, deeply offended and eager for

revenge, listened with complacency to every calumny, and even professed to believe that the triumviri were going to carry into execution the plots of Piso and Catiline, and to slaughter all their opponents. An aged senator, by name Considius, complained publicly in the house, that the fear of being coerced by violence prevented many senators from attending in their places. "Why, then," said Cæsar, "has not the same fear kept you also at home?" "Old age," answered the veteran, "is my defence. The short remains of my life deserve not much care or precaution." From one of Cicero's letters, we may infer that Cæsar took the opportunity of dispelling the foolish rumours of an impending massacre, when an untoward event occurred which served to renew the alarm.

Caius Scribonius Curio, one of the Syllans, and the least gifted of the seven whose usual denomination was the "seven tyrants," sent information to Pompey that Vettius, the notorious informer, had communicated to his son, young Curio, that he and his slaves were to fall upon Pompey in the forum, and there to murder him. Upon this, Vettius was apprehended and brought before the senate. "In the first place he denied that any intercourse had ever taken place between him and the younger Curio, but suddenly withdrawing his denial, he claimed the public protection, that is, that any confession which he might make should not be converted to his prejudice. He then declared that there was a band of young men under the leadership of Curio, to which, from the beginning, had belonged Paullus and L. Cæpio (our friend Brutus), and Lentulus, the son of the Flamen, with his father's knowledge. At a later period that Septimus, a secretary of Bibulus, had brought him a dagger." So far, we learn from Cicero what took place in the senate. He does not mention Curio's defence, but states that the result was a decree of the senate, condemning Vettius to be thrown into prison, because he had confessed that he had been in the city, armed with a weapon, and adding, that if any man discharged him, such a person would be an enemy to the state.

This decree was then read in the assembly. "Cæsar, however, next day brought Vettius before the people, who, from the rostra, in the first place, entirely withdrew the name of Cæpio, whom he had violently accused in the senate (so that it appeared that a night and a nocturnal deprecation had intervened);* then he named others, on whom he had not thrown the slightest suspicion in the senate, namely, Lucullus and Domitius, from whose house the conspirators had agreed to sally forth. Me he did not name, but said that a certain consular, who was a fluent speaker and a neighbour of the consul, had told him that it was necessary to find out a Servilius Ahala or a Brutus. At last he added, after the assembly was dismissed, when he was recalled by Vatinius, that he had heard from Curio, that my son-in-law, Piso, and M. Laterensis were privy to the plot. At present, Vettius is to be tried before Crassus Dives, for violence, and should he be condemned, he will likely claim to be heard as an informer, and should this be granted there will probably be many legal prosecutions."

Such is the very confused account given by Cicero to Atticus of this dark transaction. He evidently suspected Cæsar of having concocted the whole plot, and of having induced Vettius to become his instrument. He says:—"That fellow, Vettius, my well-known informer, has, as I clearly see, promised Cæsar that he would so manage as to bring the younger Curio under the suspicion of some great crime." Again, "Men are inclined to think that it was intended that Vettius, armed with a dagger, should be arrested in the forum, and his slaves, also equally armed. That then he was to claim the right to reveal a plot. And this would all have taken place, had not the two Curios mentioned the affair to Pompey." Cicero's hypothesis labours under a considerable difficulty in one point. It is not unlikely that Cæpio Brutus, between whom and Pompey there was a death feud, irritated by the loss of his young bride, the first match in

* Cicero, by these expressions, insinuated that Servilia, the mother of Brutus, had induced Cæsar to suppress the charge against her son.

Rome, might have been easily induced to join in a plot for the destruction of Pompey. But it is very unlikely that Cæsar, with whom Brutus was a favourite, and who had been one of his warmest supporters, should have suborned Vettius falsely to accuse him to the senate. It is, on the other hand, very natural that, when Cæsar took the matter into his own hands, he would exert himself to induce Vettius to suppress the name of Cæpio Brutus, both from the friendship he entertained for the young man, and whom he had certainly wronged in depriving of his betrothed, and from the well-known friendship and close intimacy existing between himself and Servilia, the mother of Brutus. Most people who take a lively interest in the history of these times and characters, will be far more inclined to suspect a plot against Pompey's life, than be induced to believe that Julius Cæsar was guilty of the meanness imputed to him by Cicero. All the persons named by Vettius were in great terror, and not perhaps without cause; but before he could be again brought before the public, the informer was found dead in prison, with every reason to conclude that he had been strangled by unknown hands. Such was the fate which, had the means been legal, might have appropriately closed his career of infamy. The whole transaction was calculated to throw a heavy responsibility upon all, and especially upon Cicero, who had used the testimony of such a wretch for the condemnation of many illustrious citizens.

The truth respecting this plot must remain among the obscure passages of history. A wretch like Vettius, seeing that Cæsar's "winds were prosperous," and that his enemies were nearly aground, might have proffered his services as a discoverer of a new plot, "an excellent plot," against the life of the chief triumvir, whose position was certainly critical. For we know, from Cicero's letters, that for some time previous to this disclosure he was in daily expectation of some act of violence on the part of those whom he calls "the bloody-minded young men" (*sanguinaria juvenus*).

The account given by Dion Cassius of this transaction, proves that there were persons at Rome who had no doubt of Cicero's knowledge of some act of treachery intended by Vettius; for Dion, a faithful compiler from the works of others, never invents a story of his own. These are his words—"Cicero and Lucullus being displeased by these proceedings, attempted to slay both Cæsar and Pompey by means of one Lucius Vettius, and very nearly insured their own destruction. For he being accused and apprehended, before he could perpetrate the deed, named these two, and had he not included Bibulus as being a participator with them in the plot, they would have been utterly ruined. But as he was thought, from a spirit of revenge, to have included Bibulus, who had already communicated to Pompey the existence of the plot, it was suspected that he might not have told the truth respecting the other two, and that he had been wickedly suborned by their adversaries thus to calumniate them. Now various reports were spread by different persons respecting this transaction, nor was the truth ascertained. But Vettius having been brought before the assembly, and having accused the before-mentioned alone, was thrown into prison, where he was soon after murdered."

The triumviri would certainly know the sentiments which Cicero held respecting their conduct and persons, and could not but be conscious of his deep hostility to all their proceedings. He allowed himself, even in the forum, to express his sentiments with a freedom which was scarcely compatible with the respect and friendship which he still professed to feel, especially towards Pompey. His old colleague, C. Antonius, had lately returned from the government of Macedonia, where he conducted himself most oppressively and without military success, which often varnished over the malversations of provincial governors. He was impeached by Marcus Coelius Rufus, then a young orator of rising fame, and distinguished for the bitter invectives with which he assailed his victims. Antonius was accused, not of provincial malversa-

tion, but as an accomplice in Catiline's conspiracy. Cicero was one of his defenders, and in the course of his speech lifted up his voice, and deplored, in eloquent terms the wretched condition of the enslaved commonwealth. His defence of Antonius was unavailing, but his lamentations proved injurious to himself. His sentiments were uttered at twelve o'clock: an account of the political digression was immediately conveyed to Cæsar, who, at three o'clock of the same day, admitted into the plebeian order Publius Clodius, who, for the two preceding years had failed to carry this point. Even Pompey, as augur, condescended to take the auspices, while the act was taking the forms of law. The version of this transaction given by Dion Cassius is worth transcribing, especially as it is accompanied by certain characteristics of Julius Cæsar, which seem borrowed from some author of better note, although not favourable to Cæsar. Here follows the passage:—"Cicero, who pleaded the cause of Antonius, because he had been his colleague, made a sharp attack upon Cæsar, as being the originator of the prosecution, and even reviled him to a certain extent. Cæsar, as was natural, was offended at this, but refrained from any insulting words or deeds against his assailant, although he was the consul; for he was used to say, that the masses (*τους πολλους*) studiously abused their betters, from a spirit of rivalry, in order that, should they be abused in return, they might seem to be their peers and equals. He therefore would never condescend to enter into a personal contest with any such person; and this was his usual conduct to such as reviled him, as it was to Cicero on the present occasion. As he saw that the abuse proceeded not so much from a wish to revile as to be reviled in return, which would place the two on an equality, he thought little of it, and treasured up in his memory none of the abuse, but permitted Cicero to indulge as copiously in reproaches as he did in his own self-laudation. However, he did not altogether overlook such conduct; although his natural temper was essentially placable, nor was his anger easily

roused. Nevertheless, when conducting important transactions, he took vengeance upon several such offenders; not however that he acted from anger, or instantaneously. His principle was never to gratify his anger. He therefore looked out for a convenient season, and requited most of them without allowing them to discover whence the blow came. For it was not his object to appear vindictive, but to convert every circumstance to his own advantage with the least possible odium. On this account, also, he inflicted punishment secretly and by unexpected process, both for the sake of his reputation, that he might not appear passionate, and also to prevent persons from guarding against dangers if foreknown, and from attempting to inflict rather than suffer a blow. Nor did he care for past offences against himself, but that in future he might be free from attacks. And consequently he either entirely forgave, or slightly corrected, many who had given him the greatest annoyance, because he trusted that they would not in future offend against him."

But although Cæsar thus silently retaliated the blows aimed at him by Cicero, he never ceased to warn him of his approaching danger, and to offer him the means of honourably retiring from a contest in which he was sure to be worsted. He had at an early period asked him to become one of the twenty commissioners for administering the agrarian law. He now offered to make him one of his own lieutenants in the provinces, without insisting upon much active duty; or to use his influence to procure him what was called a "free legation," that is, a commission which would enable him to travel into all the provinces as a public character, to whom all respect and attentions were due. He rejected all these advances, trusting, first to his own supposed popularity, and, secondly, to the patronage of Pompey, who, according to the tenure of Cicero's communications to Atticus, had certainly pledged his word and honour that he would exert all his influence to save him not only from condemnation, but also from prosecution.

CHAPTER VI.

FIRST YEAR OF CÆSAR'S PROCONSULAR GOVERNMENT
IN THE TWO GAULS. B.C. 58. ÆTAT. 42.

As soon as the new consuls, Calpurnius Piso, Cæsar's new father-in-law, and Gabinius, one of Pompey's creatures, had entered upon their duties, and while Cæsar was still under the walls of Rome, Clodius, now tribune of the people, commenced his proceedings against his bitter enemy, Cicero. The time which had elapsed between the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy and the actual prosecution of Cicero, had been productive of many events which had a tendency to shake the public belief in the prudence, or even expediency, of the means adopted by Cicero. Had the public peace and security been purchased by the death of Lentulus and his four companions, and this act of vigour been followed up by a general amnesty, it might have been natural to forget a deed which, even if it went beyond the letter of the law, had been so beneficial in its consequences; but the execution of the five chiefs in the city had been followed by a bloody contest in the field, in which Rome had lost thousands of the very bravest and boldest of her soldiers and officers; for the victory over Catiline and his men had been dearly purchased by the consular army; and this carnage in the field had again been succeeded by a merciless prosecution against the suspected adherents of the conspirators and rebels. So that Cicero's success, instead of bearing the mild and peaceful character in which he always loved to paint it, had not been secured without a great effusion of blood on the battle-field, and the ruin and condemnation of innumerable citizens in the courts of justice. We need not, therefore, wonder that the private enemies whom he had provoked by being the instrument of ruin to so many of his fellow-citizens of all classes

should necessarily seek to gratify their resentment by taking vengeance on their persecutor.

Even had these been more placable in their enmity than was usually the case with Roman antagonists in the political strife, Cicero himself never allowed them for one moment to forget their own disasters or his victory; and he seems to have flattered himself that, by repeated boasts of his patriotic services, by his continued assertions that his actions were the most glorious, the most splendid and memorable in the records of Rome, he might eventually persuade, if not the Romans of his own day, at least their future descendants, that the scenes through which he had passed were such as he loved to describe them—nay, more, he had actually persuaded himself that he was the most popular man of the day, that all his cotemporaries, whose opinion was of any value, agreed with himself in regarding him as the saviour of the city, the second founder of the state, and the true father of his country.

A more searching examination into ancient records will tend to show, that these opinions were all the result of self-delusion, and that the most unpopular man of the day was the great consular Marcus Tullius Cicero, who, from the close of his own consulship to the commencement of that of Cæsar and Bibulus, had ruled the senate with almost despotic sway, and yet had never attempted to introduce a single law which might have benefited either his fellow countrymen or the Roman world in general.

Greek authors are, in general, favourable to Cicero. His great genius, his theoretical love of philosophy, his known and loudly expressed admiration of the great poets, orators, philosophers, and historians of Greece, were all strong titles to their love and admiration. But even they could not resist the evidence which lay before them, nor come to any conclusion more flattering to his personal character, than can be drawn from passages similar to the following:—"Cicero's authority in Rome (says Plutarch) was undoubtedly great, but he rendered himself obnoxious and hateful to many, not by evil deeds, but

by continually praising and magnifying himself. He never entered the senate, the assembly of the people, or the courts of judicature, but Catiline and Lentulus were the burden of his song. Not satisfied with this, his writings were so interlarded with self-laudations that, although his style was elegant and pleasing, his sentiments were disgusting and nauseous to the reader, for this evil habit stuck to him like an incurable disease."

In Dion Cassius we find this striking description of Cicero's position at the time:—"Now as Clodius did not think it would be an easy task to degrade a person who was very powerful in the state, owing to his eloquence, he proceeded to conciliate the favour, not only of the people, but also of the knights and of the senate, by whom Cicero was principally supported, as he hoped, should he gain over these to his side, easily to ruin a man whose power rested more upon fear than affection. For by his speeches he gave great pain to most men, and those who were benefited by his orations were not so much conciliated as those who were injured were alienated. For most men are more inclined to be violently angry, when offended, than to be grateful for kind actions, and to think that his fee is a sufficient compensation to their own advocate, while they would willingly take every possible vengeance upon him who has pleaded against them. Moreover, Cicero created the bitterest enemies against himself, both by attempting always to take the lead of the very first men in the state, and by indulging a public freedom of speech alike intemperate and disgusting, because he was anxious to acquire the reputation of being able both to understand and to explain what no other man could, and rather to seem, than to be, a useful citizen. In consequence of this, and because of all men he was the most extravagant boaster, and thought no man his equal, but from his inmost thoughts and by his outward conduct despised all, and would not live on a level with other men—he was both a bore and an annoyance. Thus he was both envied and hated, even by those who approved of his political principles."

When Clodius therefore proposed a law, according to which all men who had put to death a Roman citizen, without a formal trial, were to be outlawed, Cicero, instead of waiting to be attacked personally, for his name was not in the bill, assumed the garb and demeanour of an accused criminal, and became as servile in his adversity as he had been haughty in his prosperity. But he met with no sympathy, none of his friends seconded him in the more desperate course which he vain would have adopted, of arming his friends and well-wishers, and of preventing his trial and condemnation by force and violence.

The consul Gabinius, the mere creature of Pompey, was both insolent and tyrannical, and threatened those members of the equestrian order who had most distinguished themselves as the satellites of Cicero during the Catilinarian crisis, with a legal inquiry into their conduct on the famous nones of December. The other consul Piso coldly advised him to bend before the storm, and, by a prudent retirement, once more to save his country from the horrors of a civil contest. His appeals to Pompey were in vain, and vain were his attempts to procure a personal interview with his fair-spoken patron, who at last stopped all further communication by a message, stating that he was irrevocably bound to act in concert with Cæsar in the whole transaction.

Clodius soon enabled the public to ascertain what Cæsar's sentiments were, for he convoked an assembly of the people on a spot outside the walls, at which Cæsar, now at the head of his army, could legally be present. Here being asked by Clodius what was his opinion respecting the law, he expressed it, with a distinction. He condemned, as illegal, the execution of Lentulus and his companions, but did not approve of the punishment which was, according to the present bill, to be inflicted. He added, that all knew what his sentiments respecting the affair were, for he had given his vote for sparing their lives. He did not, however, think it expedient to pass such a law respecting past events. These were almost the

only civil words which Cicero, on the occasion, heard from men in power, but they were only words. The law, in all its stringency, was sure to pass, and Cicero anticipated the blow by voluntarily going into banishment. Soon after that event, tidings arrived which rendered the presence of Cæsar immediately necessary in his Gallic province.

But before the reader commences the history of Cæsar's Gallic campaigns, it will be very useful for him to have some accurate idea of the manners, history, topography, and other peculiarities of the nations with whom he came in contact, and on whose subsequent career he exercised such an extraordinary influence. These nations, bounded by the natural boundaries of ancient Gaul, the Western Ocean, the Rhine, the Alps, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Pyrenees, had, for centuries, been the scourge of Western Europe. They had crossed the Pyrenees, and founded powerful states of their blood in the upper vales of the Douro and Ebro, where the Celtiberian nation recorded both the conquered and the conqueror's name. Eastward, nearly five hundred years before the invasion of Julius Cæsar, it had swarmed across the Alps, conquered and occupied the whole of the vale of the Po, spread along the coast of the Adriatic, burst into Etruria, invaded and captured Rome, and for seventy years after that period extended its devastations over Campania and Magna Grecia. About the same period it had moved northwards across the Rhine, vanquished the opposing Teutons, and established a Celtic kingdom in the upper vale of the Elbe, the mountain-encircled basin of the modern Bohemia. Two or three centuries later it had crossed the high ground between the upper Rhine and Danube, descended along the right bank of the latter river, vanquished all who resisted, turned down to the right, and invaded and devastated Greece, moved eastward to the Hellespont, which it crossed under bold and enterprising leaders, and won broad and fertile provinces in the heart of Asia Minor. At a still later period they are supposed to have crossed the channel into Britain, and to have compelled many

tribes in that island to acknowledge the sovereignty of the chief whom the Gauls recognised as their temporary sovereign.

A central power capable of sending forth such powerful expeditions was not to be despised, even when time had apparently blunted their original activity, and the Romans of Italy had rolled back the tide of war upon their own territories. They were still, in Roman records, the exterminating invaders of Italy, the captors of Rome, the inviters and supporters of the hateful Hannibal, and always ready to take advantage of Rome's weakness and their own opportunity to degrade her and exalt themselves. Even some four or five years before, the Allobroges, an allied nation, had entered into communications with the Catilinarian conspirators, and after it was suppressed, kindled in the Roman province a sudden and sanguinary war.

Other reminiscences also warned the Romans that Italy was peculiarly vulnerable on her Gallic frontier. The fierce and savage warriors of the Cimbri and Teutones, after descending from their northern settlements, had crossed the Rhine, overrun Gaul and Spain, and would willingly have added Italy to the list of nations devastated by them. It was to Marius, the chief of the Roman democracy, that Italy owed her safety. At both extremities of the then Alpine frontier their divided masses sought to force a way, and the result of both invasions was the same—the utter defeat and dispersion of the invading hosts. But it was only a temporary repulse of the northern hordes. Strong bodies of German troops had, within the last fifteen years, entered Gaul, and were preparing apparently to establish themselves as conquerors in the country, and to become the nucleus of an ever-increasing and encroaching band, when Cæsar took the field against them. Perhaps the senate would not have taken the alarm at so early a period, had not the Helvetii, a Gallic nation, wearied with resisting the German attacks, and seduced by their example, sought to seize more fertile lands in more southern climates.

When the senate assigned the government of Transalpine Gaul to Cæsar for five years, and only voted one legion for the service of the province, it was either a mockery, or there must have been a secret understanding between him and the leaders that he was not to be bound by any such limitation. We have before seen that a commission had been at least named and ordered by the senate to visit Gaul, examine the state of affairs, and especially to prevent the other nations from uniting with the Helvetii in their emigration. The senate must therefore have been fully aware that, should the Helvetii persevere in their plans, and be either joined or supported by other nations, a great war must necessarily arise in Gaul, in which the Romans would be as necessarily involved, for the tribes in their own province would have readily joined in any great Gallic movement. The Allobroges, to whose ambassadors Cicero owed the proofs necessary for the conviction of the Catilinarian conspiracy, received no rewards from the great consular and his party, and soon after that event took up arms, and offered a desperate resistance to the Ciceronian prætor Pomptinus, who, after heavy losses, nearly exterminated their warriors, and thus gained a triumph.

At a later period, Rome had been visited by the Ædian Divitiacus, a chief man of his nation, who, after the defeat and partial conquest of his people, had sought aid from their ancient allies and acknowledged kinsmen, the Romans. Cicero, in his first book concerning divination, puts the following passage in the mouth of his brother Quintus, who is thus made to address him:—"Nor has this system of divination been neglected even by barbarous nations, since there are Druids in Gaul, one of whom, Divitiacus the Ædian, your own guest and eulogist, I myself well knew, and he both used to declare that the science which the Greeks call natural history was well known to him, and to say that he could discover future events both by augury and the observation of other omens."

This early visit of their chief to Rome was a subject on which Æduan tradition loved to dwell; and after a lapse of more than three hundred years, we find the rhetorician, Eumenius, addressing the great emperor Constantine in the following words:—"Finally, when the neighbouring nations, grudging to the Æduans not their glory, but their bond of fraternity with Rome, and by their hatred, excited even to their own destruction, had called in their German allies to be their masters, the Æduan chief entered the Roman senate, and when, at his public audience, he had assumed a less honourable attitude than was offered to him, leaned upon his shield, and finished his long address."

Gaul, at this period, showed every symptom of a decaying nation. The seeds of dissolution were germinating rapidly. Tribe warred on tribe, and nation warred on nation. The bonds of social faith were rent asunder. Between a factious nobility and a degraded populace there was no real union; and the national faith, which had once been strong and lively, was evidently on the wane. The justice, soberness, and temperance of the hierarchal order were only respectable traditions. The Druids of the highest order had thrown aside their peaceful studies and habits, and taken an active share in the strife of parties and actual warfare. It is plain that the time had arrived when apparently their only choice was either to be exterminated by the Germans, or subjugated by the Romans. If it be asked why the latter people, who were labouring under similar evils, should not have been equally paralyzed, the only satisfactory answer that can be given is, that it was the will of Divine Providence, that a succession of great men arose among the Romans, who vigorously repulsed the continued aggressions of the northern barbarians, and did not permit these latter to triumph until southern Europe was ready not only to absorb, to instruct, and to civilize, her rude conquerors, but to react upon those members of the dominant race, whom an attachment to their own habits and localities had retained in the bosom of the north.

The Romans had with wonder gazed upon the lineaments of the great Cimbrian chief, Teutoboccus, whom Marius led in triumph up the Capitoline hill, and whose gigantic stature overtopped even the tall trophies which were carried in the procession. And in the consulship of Cæsar, Rome had seen German warriors, deputed by the victorious Ariovistus, the Suevian chief, who had invaded Gaul, defeated the Ædui, and was taking measures for permanently settling in Gaul. Cæsar had treated these envoys with great attention, honoured them and their chief with liberal gifts, and enrolled the German warrior in the archives of Rome "as king and friend."

Whatever, therefore, might have been the imaginations of the Romans in general, Cæsar and Pompey, and their own circle, must have been conscious that great wars were at hand, and that the ensuing five years would be distinguished by great events; that these wars would have eventually to be carried on against nations inferior in valour, in wealth, and resources to no other then on the face of the globe,—whose country abounded in wine, oil, figs, bread-corn of various kinds, rich pastures abounding in flocks and herds, and famous for an excellent breed of horses, furnished with linen, woollen, and iron manufactories, and with gold and silver mines. Cæsar, therefore, would know what he might expect, and made his preparations accordingly. His great resources must be drawn from his own mind and the provinces committed to his care. He left powerful enemies behind him, who, should they regain their supremacy, would have no hesitation in crippling his means, or even in declaring him an outlaw and a public enemy. Of this he had early received ample warning. As soon as his consulship had expired, and the new magistrates had entered upon their offices, two of the prætors, C. Memmius and L. Domitius, being personal enemies of Cæsar, moved, in the senate, that an inquiry into the legality of the consular acts of the preceding year should be instituted. Cæsar instantly submitted the whole question to the jurisdiction of the senate, but as it refused to adopt it,

the matter, after three days' altercation, was dropped. He was then accused by the tribune Antistius, but procured the intervention of the whole college, protecting him from prosecution while absent on public duty.

He left Rome about the end of March, B.C. 58, whither he was not destined to return for many a year. With this event commence his own Commentaries, which, with some subsidiary notices, must henceforth be the guide of his biographer.

CHAPTER VII.

THE HELVETIC AND GERMANIC WAR.

IF we had authentic memorials recording the histories of the Gallic tribes, we should probably find that, like the Romans, their principal movements were guided by the chiefs of a few great families, who brought their influence to bear, not only on domestic, but foreign affairs. Among the Helvetii, Orgetorix, a nobleman of high rank and great personal weight, combined with a chosen body of the nobility to induce the state to emigrate from their narrow homes, confined as they were on the west by Mount Jura, the river Rhine on the north, and the Alps, Rhone, and Lemman Lake on the east and south, where nevertheless they were harassed by continuous wars against their German neighbours, sometimes in their own, and other times in the enemy's, territories. They were easily induced to believe that, with their warlike habits and overflowing numbers, it would be in their power to select the most fertile province of southern Gaul, dispossess the owners, and convert their new settlements into the seat of Gallic supremacy. With these hopes they proceeded to supply themselves with innumerable cars and wagons, sowed larger crops than usual, that they might lay up a store of provisions, and by law fixed upon the third year for the final abandonment of their ancient homes.

Anxious to secure, at least, the neutrality of their powerful neighbours, the Sequani and Ædui, they deputed Orgetorix to make the necessary arrangements with these nations. He, however, preferred to enter into a conspiracy with some of the chief families, than to form alliances with the constituted authorities. Among the Sequani he fixed upon Casticus as a proper instrument, whose father, Catamantaledus, had for many years reigned over that tribe, and promised to assist him in recovering his father's kingdom. He held out the same lure, and with the same success, to Dumnorix the Æduan, a younger brother of Divitiacus, and the most popular man in the nation, to whom he also gave his daughter in marriage. According to his own statement, he was to be appointed the Helvetian sovereign, and would feel no difficulty with his two associates, and the resources of the three most powerful nations of Gaul, in securing to themselves undisputed predominance.

The Helvetian magistrates received information of this compact, which threatened them with a despotic master. They impeached the chief conspirator and compelled him to plead his cause in chains before the grand council of the nation. On the appointed day, the appearance of ten thousand of his clansmen, and multitudes of other clients and dependents, prevented the trial from being prosecuted. When the magistrates, thus irritated and baffled, were preparing to call the nation to arms to vindicate the majesty of the law, Orgetorix suddenly died, not without being suspected of suicide. If he fell by his own hand, he chose the gentler death, for a legal condemnation would have sentenced him to be burnt alive.

His death caused no alteration in the determination of the Helvetii. At the appointed time they consumed in the flames their towns, twelve in number, their villages, amounting to four hundred, all their scattered habitations, and such provisions as they could not carry with them. They persuaded their neighbours, the Raurici, Tulingi, and the Latobrigæ, to make common cause with them, to burn their towns and villages, and quit their homes. They also invited from Nori-

cum the Boii, whom the Germans had driven from their homes, and made them their associate in the enterprize.

They had only two lines of road by which they could march into southern Gaul, one through the country of the Sequani, difficult and easily rendered impassable by opponents. The other through the country of the Allobroges, which, by the recent victories of Pomtinus, had been added to the Roman province. The Rhone for a certain space, after issuing from the Lemman Lake, formed the boundary between the Helvetii and the Allobroges. At Geneva, an Allobrogian town, a bridge united the two nations, and lower down the river was fordable in many places. As the Helvetii thought they could easily induce the Allobroges, who were not as yet well disposed to the Romans, at least to connive at their passage through their country, they appointed that portion of the Rhone, and the 28th of March, as the place and day where the emigrating horde was to assemble. But before that day arrived, Cæsar reached Geneva. In his passage through the province, he ordered large levies of troops to hasten to join him, and with the one legion then at his command in Transalpine Gaul, he prepared to defend the neutrality of his province. His first step was to break down the bridge at Geneva which communicated with the Helvetian territory.

The Helvetii, on receiving tidings of his arrival, sent a deputation, headed by Numerius and Verodoctius, two of their noblest countrymen, to tell him that it was their intention to march through the Roman territory without inflicting the slightest injury on the inhabitants, that they were compelled to do this because they had no other outlet, and asked permission so to do with his consent. Cæsar, without giving immediate answer, told them that he would take time to consider their request, and that his final decision would be announced to them if they returned to him on the 12th of April. He had no real hesitation on the subject. He says himself, that he was moved by the remembrance of a serious defeat, inflicted by the Helvetii some fifty years before in that very loca-

lity, when L. Cassius the consul was slain, and his army compelled to march under the yoke,—perhaps the last disgrace of this peculiar character which befel a Roman army. Without recalling the injuries of past ages, it was clear enough to a common observer that it was impossible for a Roman proconsul, who had the slightest regard for the peace and welfare of his government, to allow it to be traversed by an undisciplined band, which, whatever might be the good intentions of its chiefs, would infallibly inflict great loss and damage on the country through which it might pass. He was aware that the prepared provisions which they were to carry with them would not suffice for more than three months' consumption, after which the whole horde would be naturally let loose upon the ripening harvests of the invaded tribes. No time was therefore to be lost. With his one legion, probably the tenth, and with the new levies continually joining his camp, he faced the bank of the Rhone with a wall nineteen miles in length, and strengthened it by towers at regular intervals.

When, on the appointed day, the Helvetian deputies returned, he briefly informed them that he could not, on Roman principles, permit them to pass through his province, and that if they attempted force, he was prepared to resist them. When their leaders received this answer, disappointment first led them to attempt to force a passage, some on large rafts, others by the fords, but being repulsed in all their attacks by the Roman soldiers, acting behind their temporary fortifications, they gave up all hopes of succeeding in this quarter. The road through the territories of the Sequani again recurred to their thoughts, and as they sought in vain for permission from the magistrates of that state, they applied to the Æduan, Dumnorix. His influence was great among the Sequani, and under his auspices a treaty was ratified between the two nations, according to which the Helvetii were to pass through the territories of the allies, without doing any damage, and the Sequani were to insure in return a peaceable passage.

When the news of this compact reached Cæsar, he acted

without hesitation. He left his lieutenant, T. Labienus, the very man who, in civil affairs, had been his trusty partizan, in command of the fortified lines, and hastened himself into Cisalpine Gaul. There he levies two new legions, and leads forth from their winter quarters, near Aquileia, the three legions assigned to him as governor of that province; with these five legions he crossed the Alps by the shortest roads. In his march from the neighbourhood of Aquileia to Ocelum, the modern Usseau, we have no means of tracing his progress. He had to fight his passage through the Alpine tribes of the Centrones, Garoceli, and Caturiges, and on the seventh day after leaving Ocelum, reached the limits of the Vocontii, thence passed into the Allobrogian territory, and crossed the Rhone, into the country of the Segusiani, at some point above the modern Lyons. We have often heard of the passage of the Alps by large armies, and much has been said respecting the difficulties of such an enterprize. This march of Cæsar and his five legions seems to surpass them all, and in ancient history is only comparable to that march of Alexander of Macedon which suddenly transferred his victorious phalanx from the mountains of Illyricum to the plain of Thebes. With respect to the advantages of extreme activity and dispatch, one soul seems to have animated these two great captains.

The Helvetian hordes had by this time passed through the defiles of Mount Jura, crossed the Sequanian territories, and were now ravaging the territories of the Ædui. The object, evidently, was to make this state adopt the enterprise, according to the private arrangements with Dumnorix. But the Æduan magistrates withstood the internal pressure, and appealed for protection to Cæsar and his now efficient force. The same appeal was made by the Ambarri, a client tribe of the Ædui, and by the Allobroges, on the right bank of the Rhone, who had been despoiled by the emigrating host of all their movables. That host had for twenty days been conveying, in boats and on rafts, across the deep and slow moving

Arar, its long line of troops and baggage. Three-fourths had already crossed, but a fourth still lingered on the left bank, guarded by the Tigurini, one of the four cantons of the Helvetii. Against this division, thus separated from the main body, Cæsar suddenly marched with three legions, surprised and cut in pieces, or dispersed, the whole detachment. The Tigurini were the principal party in defeating the consul Cassius, and disgracing his army. By their defeat, Cæsar not only vindicated the tarnished honours of Rome; but also took vengeance for a private injury, as they had slain Piso, the grandfather of his father-in-law, Lucius Piso.

Having gained this victory, he caused a bridge to be thrown across the Arar, and led over his forces in one day. His chief engineer, during the whole of his campaigns, and the most trusted of all his counsellors, was Cornelius Balbus, a native of Gades, probably of Phœnician descent, and who eventually rose to the highest honours of the Roman state. His name, however, does not occur in Cæsar's Commentaries on the Gallic war. The bridge was probably constructed of planks, thrown over anchored boats and barges, with which the inland navigation of the river amply supplied him. The Helvetii, alarmed by this rapid advance upon the traces of their hosts, sent an embassy to him, of which the chief was Divico, an aged warrior, who in the Cassian war, had been the leader of the victorious troops. We may admire the boldness, if not the prudence, of this choice. Divico proposed, on the part of the Helvetii, that if the Romans would conclude a peace with them, they would march and settle in the district prescribed by Cæsar; but should the Romans persist in their hostile aggression, they ought not to forget their own defeat, nor the ancient valour of the Helvetii: that Cæsar ought not to ascribe the destruction of the Tigurini, surprised and unsupported, to the superiority of his own troops, nor be thus induced to despise the Helvetii. That they had been taught by their fathers to trust to valour rather than deceit. He should therefore beware, and not risk the hazard of signaling

the spot where they might halt by the ever memorable destruction of a Roman army.

Cæsar's reply was in the same spirit. He reminded Divico that the Cassian war was to the Romans an unexpected surprise, for which no previous transactions had prepared them. But, even were he willing to forget the ancient affront, could he throw aside the remembrance of later injuries? How they had attempted to force their way through his province, how they had plundered the Ædui, Ambarri, and Allobroges. Yet after all, if they would give hostages for the performance of their promises, and make satisfaction to the Ædui and Allobroges for their losses, then he would make peace with them.

Divico answered, that it was an established principle among the Helvetii, to accept, and not to give, hostages, of which the Romans were themselves an example, and then immediately withdrew.

Next day they decamped and were followed by Cæsar, who sent forward to observe their motions his cavalry, consisting of four thousand horsemen, gathered together from the province, and from the Ædui, and their allies. These pressing too close on the Helvetian rear, were suddenly charged, on disadvantageous ground, by five hundred Helvetian horse, and were disgracefully put to flight. Emboldened by this success, the Helvetii feared not to await the Roman advance, and with the troops in their own rear to attack the van of the pursuers. Cæsar avoided a general engagement, and exerted himself principally to check their plundering, foraging, and devastating excursions. For fifteen days they thus continued to march with an interval of five or six miles between the two armies.

In the meantime, Cæsar's provisions began to fall short, and not only the ripening of the corn, but also the grass crops, were later than his Italian experience had led him to anticipate. He, therefore, pressed the Æduan magistrates to furnish him with the necessary supplies; and when their

reiterated promises were as repeatedly broken, he assembled their chiefs, who were in his camp, and among them Divitiacus, and Liscus, their vergobret, or chief magistrate, who was invested with the power of life and death. From this officer he extracts a confession, that there was a popular party among the Ædui, headed by Dumnorix, who were powerful enough to thwart all the measures of the magistrates,—that they were in favour of the Helvetii, and would much prefer them for their masters, being a cognate race, rather than the Roman foreigners,—that the defeat of the cavalry commenced with the wilful cowardice of Dumnorix, their chief,—that by them all Cæsar's plans and movements were communicated to the enemy, and that the established authorities could not restrain these practices.

This confession of Liscus was confirmed by Divitiacus, who first bewailed the conduct, and then besought Cæsar not to inflict any punishment upon his brother, as all the Gauls would regard such an event as the result of fraternal hatred, and not of Roman policy.

Cæsar contented himself with privately rebuking Dumnorix, and placing him under special observation.

Soon after this he lost an opportunity of fighting advantageously, owing to the blunder of an old Syllan general, of great military skill by reputation. His name was Considius, and at a very critical moment, he had reported to Cæsar as seen what he had not seen. This is the first and last mention in the Commentaries of any high officer not trained in Cæsar's own school.

After this disappointment, when the corn in the camp was reduced to a supply for only two days, and as the Helvetii had moved from the Arar, up which stream provisions from the province had been hitherto conveyed, the only remaining resource was to be found among the Æduans. He therefore ceased from pursuing the Helvetii, and directed his march upon the city Bibracte, the wealthy capital of the Ædui, whence he was determined to procure provisions. This change

was immediately notified to the Helvetii, who instantly reversed their own order of march, and went with all their host in pursuit of the enemy. When Cæsar became aware of this movement, he sent forth his cavalry to check the enemy's advance. He then withdrew his infantry to the nearest hill, halfway up which he arrayed his four veteran legions in the usual triple line. Above them, on the summit, he stationed the two legions newly levied, with all the allied troops, with orders to gather the baggage into one spot, and to surround it with a ditch and rampart.

The Helvetii, in like manner, collected their baggage into one spot, then forming their main body into one dense phalanx, first drove back the Roman cavalry, and then advanced up the hill against the first Roman line. Their repeated charges were repulsed by the disciplined valour of the legions. Being finally repulsed, they gradually retreated to another hill, distant about a mile. They were pursued by the legions, who in their turn were advancing to storm the enemy's new position, when their left flank was suddenly charged by fifteen thousand of the Boii and Tulingi, who had formed the enemy's rear-guard, and were now brought to bear upon the Roman's exposed wing. The Helvetii on the hill, seeing that not only the flank, but also the rear, of the enemy was thus threatened, resumed their own offensive operations. Cæsar caused the first and second lines to persist in their commenced career, drew up the third line so as to face the assailants in the flank, and thus brought on a bloody and desperate contest. The battle began at one o'clock in the evening, and continued far into the night. The Romans never saw, during the whole struggle, the back of a single enemy, but they drove back their gallant opponents, the one party up the hill, the other to their cars and wagons. There also a fierce resistance was made, until finally the hill, the baggage, the cars, and wagons, were all won by the perseverance of the legionaries.

For three days the Roman army encamped on the field of

battle, and devoted this time to the care of the wounded and the burial of the slain. In the Helvetian camp was found a register, drawn up in Greek characters, containing a list of the Helvetian host, according to their clans, and distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants. Their united numbers amounted to three hundred and sixty-three thousand, of whom ninety-two thousand were registered as able to bear arms.

The four veteran legions, which alone had been employed in this hard-won contest, could not have amounted to more than twenty thousand men, and owed their success to their discipline alone.

The remains of the defeated host, still amounting to one hundred and thirty thousand, fled from the field of battle, and on the fourth day halted in the country of the Lingones. Here, in consequence of Cæsar's despatches, forbidding all relief to be given them, they halted, and sent deputies to Cæsar, humbly beseeching him to grant them peace. He ordered them to await his arrival, when they should know his decision. When he arrived he exacted from them their arms, all the hostages in their possession, and the deserters. Six thousand warriors, disdaining these conditions, retired from the host, with the hope of reaching Germany. These were brought back and treated as enemies. On the petition of the Ædui, the Boii were assigned to them, to whom they gave lands, and finally made them their own fellow citizens.

The remaining multitude were ordered to reoccupy their ancient homes, and to rebuild their destroyed towns and villages. The Allobroges were commissioned to supply them with provisions, until they could raise their own crops. Cæsar was unwilling, he writes, to leave Helvetia unoccupied, lest the Germans should enter it, and become formidable neighbours to the Allobroges and the province. Probably, however, his policy did not succeed, as in Livy's time the whole country was occupied by what he called semi-German

nations, and who, according to his theory, must have been there in the days of Hannibal. But Cæsar's history of the Helvetii seems to disprove that supposition. The Suevi, during the Helvetian depression, would gradually creep in, and finally give their name to modern Switzerland.

This great victory gave the decided predominancy to the party of Divitiacus among the Ædui, and through him to his adherents in the various states of Gaul. Leading men consequently, from nearly every Gallic state, waited upon Cæsar, and, after congratulating him on his success, testified that the defeat of the Helvetii was as beneficial to Gaul as it had been useful to the Romans. But they asked that they might be permitted secretly, but with Cæsar's consent, to hold a general assembly of all the Gallic states, the members of which they hoped would be induced to join them in preferring certain requests to him. Permission was given, the assembly held, and a deputation, of which Divitiacus was the mouthpiece, was commissioned to address their complaints to Cæsar. He explained that all Gaul was divided into parties, the one led by the Ædui, the other by the Arverni. While they were for many years struggling for the supremacy against each other, the Arverni at last, in common with the Sequani, hired the services of a body of Germans. That, in the first place, only fifteen thousand of these mercenaries had crossed the Rhine; but when the fierce barbarians had coveted the lands, the comforts, and the wealth of the Gauls, more were brought over; that there were then in Gaul a hundred and twenty thousand Germans; that the Ædui and their allies had twice engaged them in battle, and had been disastrously defeated; that they had lost all their nobility, all their senate, all their cavalry; that they had been compelled to give as hostages to the Sequani the noblest of their race, and bound by an oath never to demand the restoration of these hostages, nor Roman aid; that he alone had refused either to give his children as hostages, or to take the oath, and had fled to Rome to demand the senate's aid; that the victorious Sequani had, however,

fared much worse than the vanquished Ædui, because Ariovistus, the German king, had established himself within their territories, and taken to himself a third part of their lands, some of the richest in Gaul; that he was then calling upon the Sequani to give a second third, as he had to procure lands and homes for four-and-twenty thousand Harudes, who had, a few months before, joined him; that, in a few years, all the Gauls would be driven from their possessions, and all the Germans would cross the Rhine, as there was no comparison between the soil and climate of the two countries, nor between their mode of living; that Ariovistus, after he had once defeated the Gauls in a great battle, fought at Mageto-bria, had domineered over them with pride and cruelty; that, finally, they all must, like the Helvetii, emigrate beyond the reach of the barbarous, wrathful, and reckless German, unless Cæsar interposed to protect them.

This eloquent appeal was not necessary to persuade Cæsar that it was the Roman policy to protect the Gauls from being conquered by the Germans, and to prevent these foreigners from settling in the immediate vicinity of the province. He therefore promised to interfere in their behalf, although perhaps he might feel some difficulty about the special cause with which he should colour his intended rupture with one so lately hailed by himself as the friend and ally of Rome. His first step was to send a civil embassy to Ariovistus, which was commissioned only to request him to name some place, midway between the two parties, where they might meet and discuss some questions of great importance to the public and private interests of both parties.

Cæsar does not favour us with a single observation respecting the conduct of Ariovistus during the course of the Helvetian emigration and war. As it was in his power to prevent the Sequani from granting them a passage through their territory, we must presume that he was not opposed to the movement; and the attempt made by the six thousand warriors to take refuge in Germany, shows that they at least

thought that they were entitled to his protection. He could, therefore, have scarcely regarded with complacency the defeat of their plan, and their consequent return to those possessions which he had probably intended for the home of fresh swarms of his countrymen. His answer to Cæsar was, therefore, hardly civil. He refused the conference, and wondered what business either the Romans or Cæsar could have with his portion of Gaul.

A second embassy conveyed to Ariovistus, Cæsar's demands—first, that he should not introduce any more Germans into Gaul; secondly, that all the Æduan hostages, whether held by himself or the Sequani, should be restored; thirdly, that he should in future abstain from acts of hostility against the Ædui and their allies. Should he not comply with these demands, he reminded him (which was true enough) that there was a decree of the senate, calling upon the proconsul of Gaul to defend the Ædui and the other allies of Rome from all injuries.

Ariovistus replied that he would neither restore the Æduan hostages, nor, without just cause, war against them. But, should they refuse to fulfil their contract, and keep back the tribute due to him, that the title of brothers given to them by the Romans would little avail them; that in answer to Cæsar's implied threats, he begged to remind him that no one had ever combated with him, except to his own destruction; that he might attack when he pleased, and would then be taught what the valour of his invincible Germans, most practised in arms, and who for fourteen years had not slept under a roof, could achieve.

At the same time that this answer was delivered to Cæsar, he heard from the Ædui that the Harudes had been let loose to plunder their territories, and from the Treveri, that detachments from the hundred cantons of the Suevi had encamped on the right bank of the Rhine, with the intention of forcing a passage.

Cæsar, alarmed by these reports, determined to come to a

proper understanding with Ariovistus before he was joined by those reinforcements; and set out with his troops, hastily provisioned, to find out the Germans. After a three days' march, he heard that Ariovistus, with all his forces, was marching upon Vesontio, the capital of the Sequani, and had already advanced three marches beyond his own limits. Cæsar, induced by the materials for carrying on war laid up in that town, and also by its very strong position on the river Dubis, which almost encircled the town, pressed on by forced marches, and reached and garrisoned that important post.

While the army was refreshing and reprovisioning itself at this town, the soldiers were seized with a sudden panic. Both from their own inquiries and the communications of the native and foreign merchants, they were led to entertain the most exaggerated ideas respecting the bodily strength, incredible valour, and terrific looks of their new enemies. The first to take the alarm were the tribunes of the legions and the præfects of the allies, whose previous education had been rather civic than military, and whose object in serving was more to qualify themselves for higher honours than to encounter the stern realities of actual warfare. Many of these young noblemen—for such in general was their rank—had no hesitation in asking leave of absence, under various pretences. Others who, from a sense of shame, remained in the camp, could neither command their countenances nor refrain from tears. Either concealed in their tents, they bewailed their fate in solitude, or, mingling with their intimates, mourned the common danger, drew up their last wills and testaments, and signed them with all due formality.

The infection spread wider and deeper; even the old soldiers and veteran centurions of the infantry, and the decurios of the cavalry, the children of the camp, and brought up amidst the perils of war, caught the alarm. They, of course, feared no enemy in the field, but there were deep defiles and extensive forests, and danger of starvation from want of supplies, which ought to make the boldest pause. Some even went so far as

to report to Cæsar that the signal to decamp would not be obeyed, nor the standards be brought forth.

These symptoms were not to be disregarded; Cæsar therefore summoned a council, to which every officer in the army was admitted. He censured them strongly for presuming to encroach upon their general's duty, and to discuss the wisdom of his proceedings. That even if Ariovistus (which he did not expect) should continue contumacious, and refuse the very reasonable terms which he should propound to him, yet they ought not to shrink from a contest with his forces. That their fathers, under Caius Marius, had, in their battles against warriors of the same race, the Cimbri and the Teutones, won glory for their general, and renown for themselves. He then reminded them that the rebel slaves of Spartacus and his comrades were mostly men of the same race, and had proved unequal to the contest against the Romans, even after their early victories had given them the weapons and arms which, originally, they possessed not. That the Helvetii, whom they had lately overcome, had often defeated those same Germans in the recesses of their own forests; that he could express no sympathy with those officers who, by pretending the dangers of the country, and the want of provisions, betrayed their want of confidence in the skill of their general; that, finally, he had no fear that the soldiers would disobey the order to march, that even in that case he would march forward at the head of the tenth legion, to whom he could trust, and which, thenceforth, should be his prætorian cohort.

The speech had all the intended effect—all fears were disclaimed, proper apologies made, and the army was hurried forward in the direction of the German quarters. At the end of the seventh day's march, the reconnoitring parties announced that the head quarters of Ariovistus were only twenty-four miles distant. It was now the turn of Ariovistus to propose a conference, which took place on an eminence between the two armies, where Ariovistus was attended by a body of cavalry, Cæsar by the soldiers of the tenth legion, mounted on

the war-steeds of the Gauls, whom Cæsar feared to trust upon so critical a service. A soldier of the tenth legion remarked, with some wit, upon the circumstance, by stating that Cæsar, who had only promised to make them his prætorian cohort, had been better than his word, since he had made them knights.

The conference had no beneficial results. Cæsar in vain attempted to impress the "barbarian" with a sense of gratitude for the honours conferred upon him by the Roman senate and people, principally through his instrumentality. He concluded with renewing the demands previously communicated by the ambassadors. The reply of Ariovistus was not deficient in the probable and plausible; that he had sought the alliance of Rome, not to be a check on his career, but to be a defence and an ornament. Should this not prove to be the case, that he would renounce it as willingly as he sought it; that he had his Gallic province, as the Romans had theirs, and that unless Cæsar withdrew his troops, he would, without hesitation, treat him as an enemy. He even communicated to Cæsar the not very agreeable information, that he, the German, had received confidential messages from some of the leading nobility of Rome, stating that he would highly gratify them by slaying Cæsar, whose death would ensure their favour and friendship; that, however, should Cæsar withdraw, and give him free possession of Gaul, he, Ariovistus, would amply remunerate him for his compliance, and spare him the toil and dangers of finishing any war which he might wish to undertake.

While Cæsar was stating that he could not, with honour, recede from any of the demands which he had advanced, and was attempting to prove the prior right of the Romans to the occupation and sovereignty of Gaul, the conference was interrupted by the violence of the German cavalry, who, by throwing darts and stones, wished to provoke the legionaries to a combat. But the challenge was refused, and Cæsar withdrew with his escort from the place of meeting.

After a lapse of two days, Ariovistus sent again to Cæsar,

and proposed that either the conference should be resumed, or a person in his confidence be sent into the German camp. As Cæsar could not again trust himself to a meeting, and was afraid to risk the person of any Roman of rank on such a perilous mission, he commissioned a young provincial nobleman, by name Caius Valerius Procillus, a son of Caius Valerius Caburus, whom Valerius Flaccus had made a Roman citizen, to wait upon Ariovistus. The young Gaul, a man of great merit and accomplishments, had already been trusted by Cæsar to interpret for him at the confidential meeting between himself and the Æduan vergobret, and was now selected for this service, both for his trustworthiness and because Ariovistus, from long practice, spoke the Gallic language with facility. One Caius Mettius, probably a merchant who had benefited by the hospitality of Ariovistus, was desired to accompany Procillus. But as soon as they reached the presence of Ariovistus, he asked them, in a loud voice, "Why they had come to him? Was it as spies?" and without entering into any explanation, threw them into chains.

Soon after he marched his whole army past Cæsar's camp, and took up a position two miles southward, that he might intercept all supplies furnished by the Sequani and Ædui. Cæsar, for five successive days, drew up his army in battle array, in front of the camp, but Ariovistus contented himself with making desultory attacks with his six thousand cavalry, to whom six thousand infantry, trained to fight among the horsemen, were attached.

When Cæsar discovered the German's unwillingness to engage, he, in his turn, moved his whole army southward, and having pitched upon a convenient spot, six hundred paces from the position of Ariovistus, he there fortified a smaller camp, where he left two legions and a portion of the auxiliaries. The other four legions were brought back to the larger camp. Next day Ariovistus, having waited his own time, made a desperate attack, with a part of his forces, upon the smaller camp. The assault lasted from mid-day until the evening,

when the German retired, after inflicting and suffering a heavy loss. From prisoners captured on this occasion, Cæsar learned the cause of the enemy's unwillingness to risk a battle. Their matrons were the augurs whom they chiefly trusted. To them the gods, as they believed, immediately revealed their will, or enabled them to discover it by lots and omens; and, according to Plutarch, especially by studying the movement of rivers, their eddies, and the various sounds sent forth from their channels. On the present occasion, they had predicted victory to their countrymen, should they not hazard a battle before the new moon.

This information determined Cæsar immediately to adopt measures calculated to force the enemy to an engagement. He would be certainly aware that superstitious people would be demoralized by the belief that they were fighting during a time forbidden by their deities, and that they could hardly hope for success in such a case. But the Roman, perhaps, had no faith in any auguries, and might reasonably believe that it was the expectation of the arrival of the Suevian host which induced Ariovistus to postpone the engagement.

Next day, having left a sufficient force in either camp, and having drawn up all the auxiliaries in front of the smaller one, he advanced, with his legions drawn up in the usual triple line, against the enemy, who was thus compelled to lead out his forces and risk an engagement. The Germans arrayed themselves in separate bodies, according to their clans. There stood in battle order, each under their own chiefs, warriors of the Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, and Suevi. Behind them was drawn up a semicircle of cars and wagons, on which were placed their wives and daughters, who, weeping, and with extended arms and dishevelled hair, besought their protectors not to allow them to fall into the hands of the Romans.

Cæsar himself took the command of the right wing. Each legion was commanded by its own lieutenant, and the quæstors exercised over them a general superintendence.

Young Publius Crassus, the son of the triumvir, commanded the cavalry, and was posted in the left wing.

The hostile lines instantly closed, and with such rapidity, that the legionaries had no time to discharge their pila. The Germans rushed forwards in dense bodies, completely protected both in front and overhead by interlocking their huge shields. Some of the Roman soldiers are described as springing, sword in hand, upon the pavement of bucklers, and tearing them asunder, and thrusting their swords into the helpless mass below. Cæsar on the right was already victorious, but the left wing, borne down by the superior numbers of the Germans, was rapidly giving way, when young Crassus brought up the veterans from the third line into the front, who soon restored the battle in that quarter. Then the flight of the Germans commenced, the whole army broke up in disorder, nor did they cease to fly until they reached the Rhine, fifty miles from the field of battle. Ariovistus had with him two wives and two daughters; these were either captured or slain; he himself reached the Rhine, and escaped into Germany, where he soon after died, either from his wounds or vexation. The Gallic cavalry did good service in the pursuit, and were led by Cæsar himself, who was fortunate enough to fall in with his young friend, Procillus, whom, secured with a triple chain, his guards were dragging along. This circumstance, says Cæsar, gave him no less delight than the victory itself; when he saw that a high-born Gallic gentleman, his own intimate friend, was thus rescued from the enemy, and that fortune had not diminished by the death of such a man his gratification at the victory.

We read in Tacitus, that it was a practice among the Germans, when preparing to wage war against an enemy, to seize any individual belonging to the hostile nation, and to cause him, and a champion selected from their own number, each armed after his own fashion, to engage in single combat, and that they regarded the victory of either champion as prophetic of victory to his own nation. Tacitus writes, that

in such a case they were not scrupulous about the mode in which they were to secure the person of a foeman who was to undergo the ordeal. Perhaps it was from such a wish that Ariovistus (whose Germans had not hitherto met the Romans in the field), sent his last message to Cæsar, requesting, if not an interview, at least the presence of some of his leading officers. The sight of Mettius, to whom he was known, must have convinced Ariovistus that, in the deputies sent, there were no Roman officers of rank, and hence, perhaps, his violent burst of indignation.

But, if Procillus was not a fit subject for the battle ordeal, he might however serve as an agreeable victim to the wardities of the Germans, and thrice, according to his own account, the gods were consulted, whether he was immediately to be destroyed in the flames, or reserved for a future day. By the kindness of the lots, says Cæsar, perhaps by the merciful management of the matrons, he was thrice preserved from death.

It has been remarked before, that few Romans, comparatively speaking, are mentioned by name in the Commentaries; and it is a striking fact that, while no mention is made of the many gallant warriors who must have fallen in these two great wars against the Helvetii and Germans, so long an episode is devoted to the dangers and rescue of a provincial Gaul. But it was a principle with Cæsar to conciliate the affections of all the provincials by kind and liberal treatment, and by placing them as much as possible on a level with the Romans. It was by such conduct, which receives a striking illustration from the policy of the great Alexander in a similar situation, and which was in strong contrast with most of the haughty oligarchs of Rome, that Cæsar established that empire of the affections which long outlived his dictatorial power.

Cicero, while defending M. Fonteius, a prætor, who, for three years, had oppressed the Gallic people, and who was impeached for his malversation among the Volcæ and Allobroges, by an accuser countenanced by the head of the Fabian family,

their peculiar patron, might have been heard, if not by Procillus himself, at least by his father, while he thus expressed himself in the forum:—"Now, is a Gaul, however high his rank, to be compared for a moment to the lowest citizen of Rome? Do you imagine that their nation, in giving evidence, is influenced by the sanctity of an oath or by the fear of the immortal gods, since it differs so much from the habits and dispositions of other nations? These undertake war in defence of religion; the Gauls against the religion of all men. These pray for peace and pardon from the immortal gods; the Gauls wage war upon them. They are the people who, formerly setting out from their distant homes, marched as far as Delphi to persecute the Pythian Apollo, and to despoil the oracle of the world. By the same people, pure, forsooth, and scrupulous in their evidence, our capitol was besieged; and that Jupiter defied by whose name our ancestors determined that the faith of evidence should be confirmed. Finally, can anything be regarded as holy and religious by men who, if in a fit of terror they wish to appease the gods, pollute their altars and temples with human victims; so that they cannot discharge a religious duty without first violating it by a crime? Who does not know that, up to this very day, they retain that inhuman and barbarous custom of human sacrifice?"

Supposing such sentiments were not Cicero's own, but adapted for the occasion, they still proved that he judged them the best he could bring forward to procure a popular verdict. It was Roman provincials and his own fellow-subjects that the orator thus proceeded to describe:—"Do you doubt, jurymen, that all these nations both entertain and cherish an inherent spirit of hostility to the very Roman name? Do they, I ask you, dressed out as they are in their 'saga' and 'braccæ,' conduct themselves with that low and humble spirit which usually characterizes those who, suffering under wrongs, claim as suppliants the protection of the law? Far from it; with cheerful looks, and heads erect, they swagger about the forum with loud threats, and harsh and

horrid intonations—a fact I would not believe had I not, along with yourselves, heard the accusers repeatedly warn you, jurymen, not to excite, by the acquittal of Fonteius, a new Gallic war.”

It was not to barbarians alone that Cicero felt himself justified in using such insulting and irritating language. The Greeks, as a nation, received no better treatment, even when the senate, and not the Roman populace, formed the audience. In his thirteenth Philippic, while reading Antony's despatch, and indulging himself with uttering a verbal commentary upon it, he came to a passage in which Antony complained, to Hirtius and Octavius Cæsar, that they, including Cicero, had joined in approving of the murder of two Greeks, friends of Julius Cæsar, and admitted by him to the freedom of the city, whom some of the partizans of Brutus and Cassius had, contrary to law, beheaded. “No,” adds Cicero, “we did not approve of it, for we did not even hear of it. It was our bounden duty, forsooth, in the midst of the general confusion, to trouble our thoughts with two rascally Greeklings!” Another Greek, of the same class, by name Theopompus, had been stripped naked, and expelled from Asia by Trebonius, one of Cæsar's assassins, and for want of due protection been compelled to fly for safety to Alexandria. Cicero thus comments upon this complaint:—“A heavy charge against us senators: we have been negligent in our duty to Theopompus—that very great man. Now, who cares or knows where in the world he is, what he is doing; finally, whether he is alive or dead.” But Antony who urged the complaint knew that neither Hirtius nor young Cæsar could be ignorant of what Julius Cæsar would have thought of such oppression.

The summer was scarcely drawing to its close, when Cæsar, after terminating two great wars, placed his legions in winter quarters among the Sequani, left T. Labienus in command, and went to Italy, where he had to discharge his civil duties as governor of Cisalpine Gaul.

It has been very sagaciously observed by a philosophical

historian, that it is very unfair to judge the character of any nation by those migrating adventurers who, compelled by war, poverty, or any other necessity, go forth to seek new settlements in foreign lands. These, when not constituted on the plan of the Greek and Roman colonies, which were, as it were, the microcosm of the mother state, being formed of the restless, the daring, and discontented members of the community, who acknowledged no law but that of superior might, rather encamped upon the soil than peacefully colonised the countries overrun by them. The Gauls who, some five hundred years before Christ, crossed the Alps, and swept victoriously over Italy, seem to have partaken of this adventurous character. We read of no Druids among them, nor of any institutions other than military. They quickly dispossessed the Tuscans of their possessions in the lower vale of the Po, and expelled most of the natives from the coasts of the Adriatic, as far as Picenum. But here their exterminating process closed. The large and fertile province, afterwards called Venetia, was not acquired by them. Its inhabitants, the Veneti, are described, by Polybius, as an ancient race, differing in a small degree from the habits and manners of the Celtic race, but using a different dialect.

In the upper vale of the Po, and on the enclosing ridges of the Alps and Apennines, the Ligurians maintained their ancient seats, while many of the Tuscans, and their once-powerful rivals, the Umbrians, were still to be found in the delta of the Po. Against the Gallic invaders, Rome, supported in every attack by the ancient inhabitants, waged a war of extermination. First, the Senones were either expelled or destroyed, and then the Cispadan Boii, whose fate the Transpadan Boii did not long survive, but were compelled to quit the country in a body, and seek a new settlement in Illyricum. A portion of the Insubrians alone were allowed to remain, rather as a monument of the victor's magnanimity, than a memorial of the Gallic predominance in Italy. It was Cæsar's duty to amalgamate all these ancient materials

with Roman colonists, and to make them one people. He succeeded almost entirely in producing this beneficial union by his impartial government of nine years' duration. Strabo, who had personally examined their country himself, after describing its great fertility and riches, says, that "The Veneti always fought with the Romans, even before, during, and after the wars of Hannibal. That once the greater part of the plains of the Po was possessed by the Boii, the Ligurians, the Insubrians, and the Gæsataë. That after the expulsion of the Boii and the extermination of the Gæsataë and Senones, there are left the Ligurian tribes and the Roman colonies; but mingled with the Romans are the Umbrian race, and, in some localities, the Tuscans. When the Romans became masters of the country, and settled colonies in many spots, they carefully preserved the remains of the original races; and now they are all Romans: nevertheless some settlements are still called both Tuscan and Umbrian, in the same manner as the Eneti-Ligurians and Insubrians still keep their ancient denominations."

It is a remarkable fact in the history of Italy, that the original races, amidst the recesses of the Apennines and Alps, should have resisted, with equal pertinacity, the conquerors and possessors of Magna Græcia and the savage usurpers of northern Italy; that without being subdued by the refinements of Hellenic civilization, or being deterred by the reckless valour of the Cisalpine Gauls, they persevered in the struggle until the peninsula, from the Alps to the Sicilian sea, was once more Italian. But Julius Cæsar did not think that northern Italy would be injured by an intimate acquaintance with the literature and arts of Greece, for, in the course of this or the preceding year, he had strengthened the Roman colony of Comum in a most extraordinary manner. The fact is thus described by Strabo, who could not be mistaken:—"Comum," says he, "was but a small settlement, but Pompeius Strabo, the father of Magnus, colonized it when it had been ruined by the Rhætian mountaineers; afterwards, Cor-

nelius Scipio added to it three thousand citizens; and lastly, Julius Cæsar founded it anew, and settled in it five thousand citizens, of whom five hundred were the most illustrious of the Hellenes. To these he gave political equality, and registered them as colonists. But they did not make it finally their home, but still they left their name to the foundation, for all the citizens were called Neocomitæ. For, as Strabo rather hints than explains, *novum-comum* and *neocomè* mean the same thing,—“a new village.”

This account renders it very probable that Julius Cæsar, foreseeing a long absence from Rome, and a want of intellectual excitement among the troubles of war, sought thus to create a new Athens, on the delightful shores of the Larian Lake, where, in his leisure hours, he might refresh himself with the poetry, the philosophy, and language of a high civilization. We may lament the failure of such a plan, but we know not what cause disgusted the Hellenes with their new settlement. Perhaps they continued there while their patron continued to govern the province, and only abandoned it amidst the terrors of the civil war.

By the Vatinian law, passed in Cæsar's consulship, he had been empowered to found this colony, and to endow it with certain privileges, the extent of which, and the manner in which they were regarded by the oligarchs at Rome, may be estimated from the following passage in Appian's "History of the Civil War." The Alexandrian, of course, has no respect for chronology. "Cæsar had founded, with the rights of Latium, a colony at *Novum Comum*, close at the foot of the Alps, of which the annual magistrates became, at the termination of their offices, entitled to the Roman franchise. For the Latian right gives this privilege. Now, Marcellus, by way of insulting Cæsar, seized upon a certain Neocomite, who had served as a municipal magistrate, and who was consequently by law a Roman citizen, lacerated him with the lictor's rods, although Roman citizens are not

liable to such indignities, and told him in his anger to receive these, his hospitable tokens, and to go and show them to Cæsar." So insolently acted Marcellus. We may be sure that this respectable magistrate was, like the two Greeks of Antony's epistle, nought but "a rascally Greekling." But years intervened between the Cæsarean colonization of Comum and the intemperate proceeding of Marcellus.

Cæsar does not mention that any notice of his great victories, in the course of the summer, was taken by the Roman senate, and probably they were allowed to pass without any public acknowledgment.

CHAPTER VIII.

PROCONSOL. B.C. 57.

IN the spring of the year, B.C. 57, Cæsar, while yet remaining in Cisalpine Gaul, received despatches from Labienus, stating that a fresh war in Transalpine Gaul was ready to break out, that all the Belgian states had formed an armed confederacy, with the intention of resisting the Roman encroachments, and, if possible, compelling them to retire into their own province. As Cæsar had heard much of the warlike spirit and power of the Belgæ, his first step was to strengthen his forces by raising two new legions in Cisalpine Gaul, of which one was probably the famous legion, designated from one of its ensigns, the Lark (*Alauda*), and every member of which eventually became Roman citizens. He gave the command of these legions to Quintus Pedius, the grandson, by a daughter, Æmilia, of one of his sisters, Julia, who had married Marcus Lepidus, one of the Æmilian family. When he himself arrived in Gaul he found that, as usual in such confederacies, one state, the Rhemi, was more ready to brave the displeasure of their confederates than join in any hostile proceedings

against the Romans. They had consequently proffered their services, and given all the requisite information respecting the character, the intentions, and forces of the Belgæ—that, most of the Belgæ were of German origin, who had crossed the Rhine, and seized the lands of the Gauls; that they alone had repelled the attacks of the Cimbri and Teutones; that the most powerful tribe were the Bellovaci, who had promised to join the confederates with sixty thousand warriors; that next in power were the Suessiones, whose king, Divitiacus, as the Romans might remember, was not long before the most powerful chief in all Gaul, and exercised military supremacy, not only over the greater part of those regions, but even over Britain; that their present king was Galba, to whom the chief command of the war was entrusted, on account of his reputation for justice and prudence; that their contribution was to be fifty thousand men; that the same number was raised by the Nervii, the most savage and least civilized of the confederates; that the Atrebates were to furnish fifteen, the Ambiani, the Morini, twenty-five, the Menapii, nine, and the Caleti, ten thousand; that the Velocasses, and the Veromandui, had also promised the same number; that the Atuatici, a people sprung from six thousand warriors left by the Cimbri and Teutones to guard their baggage and booty in a stronghold, could supply twenty-nine thousand; and that it was calculated that the Condrusi, Eburones, Cærasi, Pæmani, who bore the common name of Germans, would send forth forty thousand. Against this formidable force, exceeding three hundred thousand men, Cæsar marched his eight legions, leaving the strictest orders to his allies to enter the country of the Belgians, and to cause the diversion of a part at least of this powerful force. He acted on his usual principle of occupying a position unassailable by the enemy; until want of provisions, and the danger threatening their homes from the incursions of the Ædui and their allies broke up their formidable array, and urged them to return each to their homes, and there to combat their invaders.

His lieutenants, Q. Pedius and Aurenculeius Cotta (both blood relations of Cæsar), at the head of the cavalry, supported by T. Labienus with three legions, overtook them in their retreat, and dispersed them with immense loss. He then invaded the detached tribes in succession, and reduced most of them to subjection, after more or less resistance.

It was now evident that it was not in the power of the Gauls, with their innumerable multitudes, valiant as their warriors individually were, to match the Romans in the open field, and that their strongest holds could not long resist the scientific attacks of Cæsar's engineers, and their only alternative was resistance to the death or submission. Perhaps the general reader would not be displeased to read a clear account of the elements of a Roman legionary army, and the discipline and organization which enabled it to traverse hostile countries with comparative safety. Josephus, the Jewish historian, gives us in the following passages a picture which he had ample means and opportunity, both as a friend and foe, of accurately observing, and which embraces both the camp and field life of a Roman army. "The exercises of a Roman army are truly calculated to give them muscular strength, and every soldier is daily exercised, as if actually employed in war. Hence they suffer but slightly in battles, for they are not driven from their array by want of discipline, nor does fear terrify, nor toil wear them out. Hence follows a certain victory over those not equal to them, and one may venture to say that their parades are bloodless battles, or the battles bloody parades. For they are not easily surprised by a sudden attack on the part of their enemies. For as soon as they enter a hostile country, they attempt not to give battle before their camp is fortified. And this is not done at random, nor on uneven ground, nor by all, nor by any without a previous distribution of their several works. If the ground be not level, it is levelled, and a regular square is marked out by measure. The army is accompanied by masons and carpenters in great numbers, with all the tools necessary for building

purposes. The inside of the square is marked out for the different tents, while, on the outside, the circumference has all the appearance of a walled fort; for it is furnished with bastions at equal distances, and the intervening curtains are mounted with scorpions, catapults, stone throwers, and every other missile machine, ready to be instantly discharged. In the circumference four gates are built, one facing each of the cardinal points. These are so formed as to give an easy entrance to the beasts of burden, and broad enough for the sallies of the soldiers, when necessary. The streets of the camp are all drawn in straight lines, the tents of the officers are in the middle, but the centre spot is the general's tent, in shape like a temple. Thus as it were, extempore, a city and a forum are completed, with shops for the operatives, and tribunals are raised for the tribunes of the legions and the præfects of the allies, whence justice is distributed to all litigants. But the circumference is fortified, and all within prepared, almost instantaneously, owing to the skill and numbers of those employed. Should the case require it, a ditch is sunk on the outside of the wall, six feet in breadth and depth.

“Having thus protected themselves, they lodge for the night, according to their divisions, peacefully and orderly. Everything else is arranged by them with the same regard to discipline and safety; firewood, provisions, water, are all supplied, when necessary, by bodies detached for such services. Neither the morning nor the evening meal is left to the discretion of individuals, but is taken by all at the same time. Their sleep, their watches, their uprisings, are all indicated by the trumpet, nor is there anything done without an order. With the dawn, the soldiers repair to their own centurions. The centurions then wait on their own chiliarchs, and these, with the tribunes and præfects, wait on the chief commander. He then gives them the word for the day, and all other orders to be communicated to their subordinates . . . When it is necessary to decamp, the trumpet gives the signal. Not a man is unemployed, but with the sound they strike the tents,

and everything is made ready for departure; and again the trumpets sound the signal for packing up everything. Then the baggage is instantly placed upon the mules and other beasts of burden, and the men stand ready for the start . . . Then the third signal for setting out is sounded to hasten the slow, and prevent any stragglers from being left behind. Then a herald, standing on the right of the officer of the day, asks thrice, in the Latin tongue, if they are ready for battle, and the answer that they are ready is thrice returned in a loud and eager voice. They then anticipate the herald, and filled with a martial spirit, they, with their voices, raise also their right hands. Then going forth, they all march quietly and in order, each, as if on the day of battle, keeping his own post. The infantry, well defended with cuirasses and helmets, and wearing a sword on each side. The weapon on their left is much longer, as that on their right does not exceed a span in length. The chosen infantry attendant upon the general bear a lance and round shield, but the body of the legion is armed with the pilum and an oblong target, also a saw and a wine-flask, a bill hook and an axe, with a thong, a reaping hook, and a chain, also three days' provisions, so that the infantry has not much need of the baggage-bearing mules. The cavalry have, on the right side a long sword, and a long lance in their hand, with a shield across the flank of their horse, and in a case are placed three or four javelins, with broad points, not much inferior in size to spears. They also, like the infantry, have helmets and corslets. But the chosen cavalry, attendant upon the general, differ not in their arms from their regular squadrons. The precedence of the legions is daily settled by lot . . .

“So great is their obedience to their officers, that it is in peace an ornament, and on the day of battle makes the whole army one living body. Thus their ranks are unbroken, and their wheelings regular, their ears are sharp in catching the verbal orders, their eyes in recognising signals, and their hands quick in action, whence they are swift in inflicting, although they rarely suffer, severe blows.”

In a subsequent passage, he describes the entrance into Judea of Vespasian and his legions, which will give not an inadequate idea of Cæsar's advance into new countries in Gaul, as Vespasian was brought up under generals whose pride it was to observe the military institutions of the great Julius.

“Vespasian having set out with the intention of invading Galilee, leads forth from Ptolemais his army, drawn up in the usual marching order of the Romans. The light-armed auxiliaries and the archers formed the van, that they might repel any sudden onset of the enemies, and might explore suspicious places and woodlands calculated for ambuscades. These were followed by a heavy-armed band of Roman cavalry and infantry, next to them came ten soldiers from every company, who carried their own baggage, and camping tools, and measures. And after them, the road-makers, to make straight the windings of the public ways, and to level steep places, and to clear the way through thickets, that the army might not be wearied by difficult marches. Behind these were arranged the baggage of the emperor himself, and of the high officers attendant on his person, and a considerable body of cavalry for its protection. Next to these he himself rode, having with him a select band of cavalry and infantry, and also lancers . . . These were followed by the mules, which conveyed the besieging artillery and other engines. Then came the leaders and commanders of the cohorts, together with the tribunes of the soldiers, all surrounded by picked men. Then came the banners, all grouped around the eagle, which is the chief standard of every Roman legion, and is the king of birds and the most courageous; and it is the mark of their supremacy, and the omen of their victories in all their enterprises. The standards being sacred, are followed by the trumpeters, and behind them the main body, marching with six in front. A certain centurion is employed to superintend their march and preserve order. But the whole body of military attendants belonging to each legion follows the infantry, and conveys the baggage of the

soldiers upon mules and other beasts of burden, and behind the legions come the camp followers; behind whom, for their protection, marches the rear-guard, composed of a numerous body of both infantry and cavalry, heavy armed."

This description will make it unnecessary, during the remainder of this work, to enter into minute details concerning military events, which must chiefly depend upon the necessary movements of this admirably-constructed machine. But it will be desirable to describe, in Cæsar's language, the furious onset made by the Nervii upon the marching column of the Roman army, and the dangers which both Cæsar and his men had to undergo. When he had advanced three days' march into the country of the Nervii, he discovered from the captives that they had chosen a position behind a river, ten miles distant, and that, along with their allies, the Atuatici and Veromandui, they were preparing to meet the attack of the Romans. On learning this, Cæsar sent forward the precursors of the army, with their centurions, with orders to choose the ground for a camp. The ground chosen by them was of this description: a hill with a gentle declivity, sloped down to a river, three feet deep. On the other side of the river commenced another hill, equally sloping, open for two hundred paces from the stream, but crowned with a wood, which was dense enough to screen from the eye of a reconnoitring party whatever operations might be preparing under its cover. Within its recesses, the whole Nervian force was drawn up, without being visible. A few cavalry outposts were stationed along the river bank. Cæsar, having sent forward his cavalry, advanced with the six older legions in battle array, and free from all encumbrances. Behind them followed the baggage of the whole army, and the two newly raised legions brought up the rear.

The Roman cavalry, accompanied by the slingers and archers, crossed the river, and charged the enemy's cavalry, who retired up the hill into the wood, whence they in their turn charged the Romans. While these skirmishes were

going on, the six legions, for whom the ground had already been marked out, began to throw up the camp fortifications. They were thus employed when the baggage train, turning the crest of the hill, became visible to the Nervians on the opposite high ground.

They had fixed upon its first appearance as the signal for the assault, and, dashing down their own hill, and thrusting back the Roman cavalry, they crossed the river, advanced up the opposite hill, and assailed the legionaries engaged in fortifying their camp.

Cæsar had to do everything at once,—to raise the purple cloak, the token of an impending battle, to signify the same fact by the trumpets, to recall the soldiers from their work, to send messengers to those who had gone far for materials, to form the line, to address the soldiers, to give the word, which the immediate presence of the enemy made almost impossible. Two circumstances were of great use to them in these difficulties, the first was the experience of the old soldiers, which suggested to them the very measures which skilful officers would have advised. The other was, that Cæsar had forbidden the commanders of each legion to quit the ground before the camp was fortified. These, therefore, without waiting for Cæsar's orders, adopted the measures best suited to meet the emergency. The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions, as they had taken their stations on the left wing, had repelled the Atrebates, their immediate opponents, driven them with great slaughter across the river, and pursued them with success into their original position. The eleventh and eighth legions, also, in another quarter, had driven back the Veromandui, and were combating with them on the banks of the river. The Nervii brought all their forces to bear upon the twelfth and eighth legions on the Roman right. They forced a passage between them, and reached the summit of the hill where the camp had been marked out. This success not only terrified all the camp servants, who had pressed forward on seeing the success of the ninth and tenth legions, as to a certain

booty, but also induced the cavalry of the Treveri, reckoned among the bravest in Gaul to quit the field, and to report to their friends that the Roman army had been cut to pieces. But Cæsar himself, with great personal risk, restored something like order and self-confidence among the soldiers of the twelfth and seventh legions, who, thus reanimated, maintained the contest until the victorious legions on the left, receiving notice of their commander's danger, wheeled round and attacked the Nervii in the rear, while, at the same time, the two rear-guard legions appeared upon the crest of the Roman hill. Then ensued a slaughter, such as is not usually recorded in history. The Nervii neither gave nor received quarter. The deputation from the old men of the tribe, which threw themselves on the mercy of Cæsar, stated, that out of six hundred senators only three survived, out of sixty thousand warriors only five hundred. Cæsar, after his victory, described the Nervii as the bravest of mankind, threw the broad shield of his protection over the survivors, secured to them all their lands, and forbade any of their neighbours to harass them in their enfeebled condition. This might be the result of policy, or of feelings of compassion and mercy. This may be a doubtful question, but it is a fact, that Cæsar in such acts of forbearance has found but few imitators. The Atuatici, who after an apparent surrender made a treacherous attack upon the Roman army, met with a different fate. They were all treated as slaves, and sold by auction.

The stirring events of the campaign against the Nervii seem to have made a strong impression upon the poetic imagination of Shakspeare, who thus alludes to the event:—

“ You all do know this mantle: I remember
The first time ever Cæsar put it on;
'Twas on a summer's evening, in his tent,
That day he overcame the Nervii.”

What boots it to say, that a camp robe made eight years before could not have been worn as a state dress in the senate; that Mark Antony was not present in the Nervian war; that the

battle was fought early in the spring, and not in summer; and of those who were supposed to be all cognizant of the identity of the two garments, not one probably had ever seen the dress which Cæsar wore on the evening of the battle. The poet's empire is so far more potential than the narrow sphere in which the historian moves, that future commentators may arise to prove that all that Antony said on the question is the truth and nothing but the truth.

While Cæsar was thus employed in reducing the several Belgian states into due submission, young Publius Crassus, with only one legion, had received the conditional allegiance of a number of states, whom Cæsar does not include among the Belgian confederates. These were the Veneti, the Unelli, the Osismii, the Curiosolitæ, the Lexovii, the Aulerici, and Rhedones; all, according to him, maritime states, and bordering upon the ocean.

The conquest of the Belgic confederacy being duly announced to the Roman senate, met with a gracious reception, and a supplication to the gods for fifteen days, a number hitherto unprecedented, was voted to express the gratitude of the Romans for his great success.

In consequence of the violent proceedings of young Clodius, and of his rupture with Pompey, Cicero was recalled from banishment, but not without stringent engagements that he would keep the peace, as far as the Julian laws were concerned. These engagements were entered into by his brother, Quintus, the unwearied solicitor for his return, and communicated by Pompey to Cæsar.

CHAPTER IX.

B. C. 56.

CÆSAR having expelled the Germans, and subdued the Belgæ, seems to have anticipated a quiet year, but in this he was disappointed by the tidings that the maritime states, which

had submitted and given hostages to Publius Crassus, had suddenly seized the public officers sent amongst them to purchase provisions, and stated that they would not surrender these until the hostages given by them to Crassus were restored.

The Veneti were the leaders in this movement; their influence was paramount along the whole sea-coast, on both sides of them, "Because they had a numerous fleet, with which they used to visit Britain, and excelled all their neighbours in the science and practice of navigation; and as the sea on that coast is violent and open, and good harbours are rare, they exact tribute from all who frequent that sea. These form a confederacy of all the maritime states, and exhort them to continue in the liberty inherited from their ancestors, rather than to endure the Roman supremacy." When Cæsar was apprised of their preparations, he determined to carry on the war against them with great vigour, ordered ships of war to be built in the Liger, and rowers and ship-masters to be drawn from the shores of the Mediterranean. He was aware of the great difficulties of the undertaking, and that the Veneti were conscious of the strength of their position. The movements by land were interrupted by the æstuaries; the navigation difficult, both from Roman ignorance of the locality and from the scarcity of harbours. They trusted "that Cæsar could not long maintain his troops in their country, and even should their affairs not be prosperous, that, nevertheless, their naval superiority would still remain; that the Romans could never cope with them in their own seas, for want of ships and of local knowledge." The tribes which joined the Veneti were the Osismii, the Lexovii, the Nannetes, the Ambiliati, the Morini, the Diablintes, the Menapii; they also sent for auxiliaries to the opposite coast of Britain.

Cæsar's reasons for undertaking this war, are fairly stated by himself: "The wrongs of the detained Roman deputies, the war renewed after a voluntary submission, the revolt after the delivery of the hostages, the combination of so many

states, and especially the consideration that, were the offences of the Veneti overlooked, other nations would imitate their example. Therefore, as he understood that all the Gauls are eager for political changes, and easily roused to war, and that all men naturally love independence, and hate a servile condition, he determined to make a wider distribution of his forces, to prevent other nations from joining the confederacy. He sends Labienus, with the cavalry, to the Treveri, with orders to visit the Rhemi and the remaining Belgæ, and to keep them quiet, also to prevent the Germans from crossing the Rhine." Young Publius Crassus was sent with a strong force into Aquitania, principally to prevent any auxiliaries from that quarter from entering Gaul. Titurius Sabinus, with three legions, was sent against the Unelli, Curiosolitæ, and Lexovii. Decimus Brutus, a young officer, was made commander of the fleet, which was to be brought together from the Liger, and the rivers and harbours of the Santones and Pictones, and other friendly tribes. He himself entered Venetia by land; the situation of its towns was singular, "they were built either on low projecting spits, or on promontories, which were insulated at high water, and could not then be approached, nor could ships reach them at low water, but grounded in all such attempts. Even when the Romans threw up immense mounds, and were thus enabled to approach them, the moment they thought themselves in danger, they went aboard the numerous ships which, in such cases, crowded to the post endangered, and conveyed the defenders into similar strongholds. This they were enabled, with the greater facility to do, during the greater part of the summer, because the Roman fleet was detained by foul weather, and experienced the greatest difficulty in sailing on that vast and open sea, with its mighty tides, and few or no harbours. For the Venetian ships were thus built and equipped. They had far flatter keels than the Roman, and were thus better suited to encounter the shallows of an ebbing sea. Their forecastles were raised very high, and

also their poops were formed to stand the violence of the waves and winds. The ships were entirely made of oak, for the purpose of enduring any force and shock. The cross timbers, one foot broad, were secured to each other by iron bolts as thick as a man's thumb. Instead of ropes they used iron chains to secure their anchors; and instead of canvass for their sails, they used hides tanned and finely dressed, either for want of flax, or ignorance of its use, or which is more probable, because they thought that lighter materials could not withstand the violence of their ocean storms, and the great burden of their vessels." "In the contest against such a fleet the Romans had one advantage, the use of the oar gave them superior speed; everything else was, on account of the violent storms and dangerous navigation, better adapted for the Gauls. For our gallies could not injure them with their beaks, so firmly were they built, nor could missiles easily reach them, on account of their height: and for the same reason they were kept less in check by the rocks; for when a storm began to rage, they both sailed more easily before the wind and better resisted the tempest, and subsided on shallow ground with greater safety, and when left by the tide, feared not rocks and breakers, while the Roman fleet had to dread accidents from all these causes."

When Cæsar, after capturing many towns, understood that it was labour in vain, and that the enemy's retreat from the places captured could not be prevented, nor the inhabitants injured, he determined to wait for the fleet. When this had assembled, and was descried by the Veneti, about two hundred and twenty of their vessels in the very best order, and furnished with all kinds of naval instruments, sailed from the harbour and offered battle to the Romans.

The Venetian fleet was disabled by the skill and gallantry of Decimus Brutus and his row gallies, their rigging was cut by sharp hooks with long handles, and their sails rendered useless; and in a dead calm which suddenly accompanied the close of the engagement, almost all the Gallic ships were

boarded, carried, and finally destroyed. The Venetian senators were put to death, and the population sold into slavery. Cæsar talks learnedly about the necessity of teaching barbarians to revere the sanctity of the ambassadorial character, but he had stronger reasons for this act of merciless cruelty. He could not afford to keep a fleet to restrain any future outbreak on their part; and Strabo, who gives us a few observations not to be found in Cæsar, says, that one cause of offence given by the Veneti, was an expressed intention to resist an invasion of Britain, which Cæsar was even then meditating. Soon after, Cæsar heard of the success of his lieutenants: Labienus, who pacified the Treveri for a time; the Unelli and their allies were defeated by Sabinus, while young Crassus, after a brilliant campaign, induced most of the Aquitanian tribes to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome. The Morini and Menapii alone remained contumacious, and although Cæsar pursued them into their cities of refuge, in their marshes, he was compelled for the time to postpone their subjugation. On his return to Italy, he seems to have appointed Lucca, on the verge of his province, as a place for meeting Crassus and Pompey. Thither, also, posted most of those who had cause to fear or hope from the deliberations of the triumvirate. Plutarch says, that above one hundred and twenty lictors attendant upon the magistrates, and more than two hundred senators, were present upon the memorable occasion.

Pompey, who had been vested with an extraordinary commission, for the purpose of supplying Rome with corn, and which was as ample as his former commission for suppressing the pirates, had, in discharge of his duty, visited Africa and Sardinia, whence he crossed over to Lucca. The domestic transactions at Rome had not been very interesting in the course of the year. Squabbles between Cicero and Clodius, and between Clodius and Milo, were the most considerable events, if we except an attack more than once made upon that part of the Julian agrarian law, which assigned the territory

of Capua to a colony of Roman citizens, and which had hitherto been delayed. Even Cicero, after his return from banishment, made one speech upon this subject, about the necessity of again referring the question to the consideration of the senate. The best account of the proceeding is to be found in this passage of a letter from Cicero to his friend, Lentulus Spinther, to whom he is justifying himself for giving a qualified support rather to the triumvirate than to the oligarchs. It is a very useful key to many of the proceedings of that day. "I, while Cn. Pompey was present, and Vatinius being a witness, had said that I, alarmed by the prosperity and good fortune of C. Cæsar, was anxious to become his friend, said, that I preferred the fortune of Bibulus, low as Vatinius might estimate it, to any man's triumph and victories. I said, also, in another place, that the same persons who had detained Bibulus in his house, had driven me from mine. Nor was it in this cause alone that I thus spoke; it was my regular language in the senate. Nay, more, in the consulship of Marcellinus and Philippus, on the nones of April, the senate agreed with me that on the ides of May, the senate should be summoned to take into consideration the state of the Campanian territory. Could I have made a more violent assault on, as it were, the citadel of that party? Could I have more forgotten my misfortunes or remembered my glorious deeds? When this motion was made by me, a great sensation was created both among those who had a right to take the alarm, and those who in my opinion had none; for, after this decree of the senate had been drawn up according to my suggestion, Pompey, without signifying to me that he had been offended, set out for Sardinia and Africa, and during the voyage visited Cæsar at Lucca. There Cæsar made heavy complaints against my conduct; and before this Crassus had visited him at Ravenna and inflamed him against me. It was clear that Pompey was seriously annoyed by the business, and this I not only heard from others, but learned the whole particulars from my brother, whom Pompey had

found in Sardinia a few days after he had left Lucca. 'The very man,' said he, 'I want to see; nothing could be more lucky. Unless you carefully manage your brother Marcus, you will have to pay to me the heavy engagements into which you entered on his part.' Why multiply words? He complained grievously, mentioned his own kind acts, recalled to my brother's memory what he had so often repeated to him concerning Cæsar's acts, and what promises my brother had made to him on that subject. He also reminded my brother that every step taken by himself in my favour, was with Cæsar's full consent. He therefore besought my brother to ask me to respect Cæsar's cause and dignity, and not to assail it, if I had not either the will or the power to support it. When my brother brought this account to me, and as Vibullius had been before sent to me by Pompey, with a message requesting me to leave the Campanian question where it was, until he himself returned, I collected my thoughts, and asked the commonwealth, as it were in person, to permit me, who had suffered and done so much for her service, to discharge my debt of gratitude to my benefactors, and redeem my brother's pledge, and that she would permit Pompey, whom she had always esteemed a good citizen, to be also a good man. Now in all these, my actions and speeches, which seemed to offend Pompey, the language of certain persons, whose names you will probably guess, used to be reported to me. But although they always held, and continued to hold, those political principles, according to which I was then acting, yet they ceased not to say that they were delighted to see that I, while dissatisfying Pompey, would certainly make Cæsar my enemy. I was grieved at this, but much more, because they courted and cherished my enemy (Clodius)." He then proceeds to explain why, finally, he had been induced "to make a slight change in the expression of my opinions, and to submit myself to the guidance of a truly great man, my benefactor. Cæsar, as you see, was necessarily comprehended in this compromise, because his

cause and dignity were the same as Pompey's. And here great weight was attached to the ancient friendship which once, as you know, existed between my brother Quintus myself, and Cæsar, and also to his great attention and liberality, which he has lately shown towards me, both by letter and in other ways. The state of the commonwealth also had great influence with me, for it seemed to me unwilling, especially after Cæsar's great exploits, to come in collision with those men, and even, indeed, to forbid all aggression. But the weightiest argument in inducing me to move in that direction, was both Pompey's word, which he had pledged to Cæsar in my behalf, and my brother's similar pledge to Pompey." The reconciliation was outwardly complete, intimate communications were renewed between Cæsar and Cicero. The patronage of the former was freely offered to the latter, and as freely accepted; and, among other results, Quintus Cicero became one of Cæsar's lieutenants in Transalpine Gaul.

Of the private engagements which were concluded by the triumviri during the conference at Lucca, the most important are supposed to be those which were at least fulfilled without much loss of time. Pompey and Crassus were to be joint consuls for the ensuing year; Crassus, at its termination, was to receive the government of Syria, with the necessary means to carry on a great Oriental war; and a law was to be passed, which should secure to Cæsar, at the close of his present commission, the government of the two Gauls and Illyricum for five additional years. Plutarch adds, that large sums of money were also to be voted to Cæsar, for the sake of carrying on the wars in Gaul. This is not likely, except it be meant that Cæsar was to be entitled by law to convert the revenues of his governments to the maintenance of the civil and military establishments there required.

The consular elections for the ensuing year were prevented by the intercessions of C. Cato, a turbulent tribune of the people; but it is difficult to say at whose instigation he thus acted. At the commencement of the year B.C. 56, after violent

contentions, in which much force was used to drive Marcus Cato and his son-in-law, Domitius, from the Campus Martius, the scene of the consular elections, Pompey and Crassus were returned consuls by the interrex of the day.

Cato had lately returned from Cyprus, whence he had brought the treasures of the late king Ptolemy, who was deposed and robbed by the Romans, without any sufficient cause, except his inability to defend himself be decreed sufficient.

CHAPTER X.

PROCONSUL. B.C. 55.

CÆSAR, on returning into Gaul, found that an overwhelming horde of Germans, under the tribe names of Usipetes and Tenchtheri, had, in the course of the winter, passed the Lower Rhine, and taken up their habitation in Gaul. The setting in of the autumnal rains had alone preserved the Menapii from the conquering arms of Cæsar; and the ensuing winter witnessed the invasion and occupation of their country by this invading tribe. According to their own account, they had been expelled from their own lands by the encroaching Suevi, who allowed no tribes to reside in the vicinity of their territories, which they surrounded by a broad belt of ruin and desolation.

After wandering in various parts of Germany for three years, they finally entered that portion of the Menapian territory which lay on the right of the Rhine. The inhabitants fled across the river to their fellow tribesmen on the left, removed all vessels to the same side, and for a time successfully resisted all the attempts to force a passage. But the Germans, thus baffled, had recourse to stratagem. They made a feigned retreat into the inland regions of three days' con-

tinuance. Then suddenly sent back their cavalry, surprised and slew the Menapians who had returned to their homes, captured their vessels, and before tidings reached the left bank concerning their sudden return, transported troops enough across to surprise and overpower the Menapians of the left bank also, and taking possession of all their villages and houses, lived upon their stores for the rest of the winter. The Menapians, who had joined the Veneti in their struggle for independence, would gladly have exchanged that much prized boon for the solid advantages to life and property derivable from Roman protection. We know not whether in their extreme misery they applied for it or not. Cæsar merely informs us, that on learning of the occupation of the country by the Germans, he thought it was his duty immediately to meet the pressing evil. He was not without his suspicions that the Germans had been invited to cross the river. On further inquiries, he was satisfied that some of the Germanizing states had sent embassies to them, and called upon them to leave the banks of the Rhine, and advance into the interior. The invaders being thus encouraged, enlarged the sphere of their incursions, and had already entered the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi, who were clients of the Treviri. Cæsar presided at a general assembly of Gallic delegates, and without alluding to any treacherous communications, soothed and strengthened their minds, and demanded a strong body of cavalry to support his efforts in driving back the invaders. When all due preparations had been made, he led his army into that quarter where he expected to find the Germans. But when still distant from them three days' march, he was met by a deputation, who were commissioned to tell him, "that the Germans would not commence the war against the Roman people, nor on the other hand would they decline the contest should they be provoked. That it was a custom inherited by them from their ancestors, to resist all assailants and not to propitiate them by supplications; they would, however, say this, that their visit was not volun-

tary, but the result of an expulsion from their homes. Should the Romans choose to patronize them, they felt that they could be useful, and hoped the Romans would either assign lands to them or permit them to retain what they had acquired in arms. That they yielded to the Suevi alone, to whom in their opinion even the immortal gods were not a match, that there was no other nation on earth which they could not overcome." As their numbers exceeded four hundred thousand people, it was impossible for Cæsar to comply with their request, which he openly stated in his answer:—"That there could be no friendship between him and them should they continue in Gaul, and that it was absurd for men unable to retain their own, to seize upon the property of others. Besides, that there were no lands in Gaul which could be distributed, especially to such a multitude, without inflicting wrong. But if they wished, they might withdraw for a time into the territories of the Ubii, whose ambassadors were then in his camp complaining of the conduct of the Suevi, and requesting his aid." He added, "that he would procure this permission for them from the Ubii." The deputies said that they would report his answer, and after ascertaining the pleasure of their chiefs, would return in the course of three days. They begged him in the meantime to suspend the advance of his army. This he refused to do, as he had been informed that the principal part of their cavalry had been detached to plunder the country on the right bank of the Mosa. To him the petition for delay seemed only the result of a wish to await the return of their cavalry before active hostilities were commenced. He, therefore, continued to advance. When within twelve miles of their head quarters he was again met by the deputies, who addressing him on his march, again earnestly entreated him not to advance. When he persisted in refusing, they besought him to send orders to the cavalry of the vanguard and forbid them to make any attack upon the Germans. They declared their willingness to agree to his proposals respecting their retreat into the territories of the Ubii, provided they received

a sufficient guarantee from the Ubii that they would fulfil Cæsar's engagements. For this purpose they again requested a truce for another three days. Cæsar, although he thought that this request originated solely from a wish to gain time, yet complied with it to this extent, that he promised that the main army should not advance on that day more than four miles, and that he would send orders to the vanguard cavalry not to attack the Germans, and if themselves attacked, to act on the defensive, until the legions arrived to support them.

But this paction was too late. The five thousand Gallic cavalry of the advance had been attacked, overthrown and utterly routed by eight hundred German horsemen, who still remained with the main body. Cæsar is very pathetic on the death of a very gallant cavalier of Aquitania, named Piso, of high birth, whose grandfather had been king of Aquitania, and recognised by the Roman senate as a friend and ally. He, in an attempt to rescue his brother from the hands of the enemy, was successful in enabling him to escape, but his own horse was killed under him, and although he resisted bravely, he was at last cut down by the enemies who surrounded him. His brother, although safe among his friends, on seeing the disaster, rushed back into the thickest of the enemies, and there was slain. It was necessary, by some such compliment, to salve the wounded honour of the Gallic horsemen, who never relaxed their flight before they came in sight of Cæsar's legions.

He, on seeing their broken ranks and complete disorder, could see nothing but treachery on the part of the Germans, and cowardice, perhaps something worse, on the part of the Gauls. He called his lieutenants and quæstors into council, which he very seldom did, and, with their unanimous approbation, resolved not to lose a day in attacking the main body of the Germans, from whom next morning a large and respectable deputation came into the Roman camp, both to make excuses for the assault committed by their cavalry on

the preceding day, and also to make fresh petitions for a truce. Cæsar, without the slightest "respect for the ambassadorial character," ordered their instant arrest, led the legions out of the camp, and sent the defeated and terrified cavalry into the rear.

He pressed forwards, with his legions drawn up in triple array; and when the first line had broken into the German encampment, protected by cars and wagons, he perceived a long line of women and children retiring from the dangers, upon whom he let loose the Gallic cavalry, who slaughtered and cut them down without mercy. The warriors who still were defending the encampment, on turning round and seeing this fearful execution among their helpless pledges, lost all presence of mind, threw down their arms, abandoned their standards, and quitted the camp. One only road was open to their retreat, and that led them to the confluence of the Mosa and the Rhine, into which the remnant whom the sword spared precipitated themselves, where they perished, overpowered by fear, weariness, and the force of the stream. This is a fearful picture, and yet one fearlessly painted by Cæsar himself.

It would be idle for us to criticise his conduct on such an occasion. But he could not recognise any right in the Germans to invade the Gallic soil without cause or declaration of war, nor to dispossess the harmless Menapii of their lives and homes, without professing the justice of the law of retaliation when the superior force passed from them to their opponents. They acted on the principle of "war on the weak," without any provocation, and were struck down in the moment of their triumph by a still stronger, if not a more justice-loving power. The deputies whom Cæsar had arrested were told, after the affair was decided, that they might depart whithersoever they pleased; but, dreading the vengeance of the Gauls, they begged to be allowed to stay with him, and he was graciously pleased to permit them so to do.

The time may come when some great statesman will under-

take to interpret the esoteric doctrines deducible from the fact-records of Cæsar's Commentaries. If ever there was a manifesto addressed to all times, present and future, it is to be found in that commonest of school-books, which tells mankind a broken tale, not what Cæsar was, but what he wished to appear.

The cavalry of the Germans, which was absent on a plundering excursion, on receiving an account of the slaughter of their countrymen, crossed the Rhine and took refuge with the Sicambri, a powerful tribe, on the right bank of the river. Cæsar sent messages to these people, and called upon them to deliver up to him the men who had waged war upon himself and upon Gaul. The Sicambri answered, that the Rhine was the boundary of the Roman empire: that if he thought that the Germans had no right to pass over into Gaul, why should he claim any authority over Germans? The Ubii, however, were earnest in soliciting him to aid them, as they were grievously harassed by the Suevi. They said that even the sight of a Roman army on the left bank of the Rhine would ensure to them present safety and future hope; that the name and renown of that army, since the expulsion of Ariovistus and the recent defeat, and the reputation of Roman friendship, would effectually protect them. They promised abundance of boats for the purpose of transportation.

But Cæsar declined the boats, and thought it more advisable to astonish the German nations by a work which had not before been seen in those regions, and which was certainly calculated to give the barbarians a striking proof of the skill, activity, and resources of the Roman general. He ordered timber to be prepared and brought to one spot, where, in ten days, he built a bridge broad enough and strong enough to furnish a safe passage to his army and all its materials.

The Sicambri, whose territories he first invaded, fled before his face, and took refuge in the solitude of their forests. Some few tribes sent messages to ask for peace and alliance; but the Suevi gathered their warriors into one spot in the centre

of their possessions, where, after bestowing their wives and children in safety, they determined to wait the attack of the invaders. But Cæsar declined the contest; and, after remaining eighteen days in Germany, re-entered Gaul and broke down the bridge. He thought a sufficient demonstration had been made to convince the Germans that, in case they renewed their invasions of Gaul, their broad river would be no protection against the attacks of the Roman forces. He closed the campaign with his first expedition into Britain, the account of which will be given when the time arrives for describing his second and most important invasion of the great island of the ocean. In the meantime, the final subjugation of the Morini and Menapii was achieved by his lieutenants, Labienus, Sabinus, and Cotta. His despatches announcing the defeat of the Germans, the passage of the Rhine, and the invasion of Britain, were received with acclamations by the senate, and a twenty days' supplication was decreed.

After the conference at Lucca, Crassus and Pompey returned to the city, but found the senatorial party completely unmanageable, and prepared to resist all their proceedings, under the leadership of Cato, Domitius, and the consul Marcellinus. Some idea of the boldness, if not the recklessness, of their intended opposition may be derived from the speech of Cicero, still extant, upon a motion, respecting the provinces to be assigned to the consuls elect, at the termination of their offices. From the following passages it will be seen that it was proposed to strip Cæsar of his appointments, and assign either one or both Gauls to successors, irrelative either of the decree of the senate, or the popular law which had secured the government to him for five years. It will also be seen that Cicero was desirous to fulfil the pledges given by his brother Quintus.

“As yet, conscript fathers, opinions, as I understand, have been given respecting four provinces, the two Gauls, at present under one government, and Syria and Macedonia. . . . The senator who decrees the two Gauls to the two consuls elect,

thereby retains Piso in Macedonia, and Gabinius in Syria. He who decrees either Gaul, Syria, or Macedonia to the incoming consuls, thereby leaves his own province either to Piso or Gabinius, although their crimes are equal. A third senator says, I will make both Macedonia and Syria prætorian provinces, so that successors may be immediately given to Piso and Gabinius. Yes, if this tribune will permit you; for a tribune can put his veto upon the appointment to a prætorian province, not upon a consular appointment. Therefore I, who now decree Syria and Macedonia to those consuls who will soon be designated, will also move that they shall be prætorian for the present, both that prætors may preside over each province for one year, and we may as soon as possible see the recalled governors, whom, nevertheless, we cannot see without painful feelings. . . . But if Piso and Gabinius were the best of governors, I would not propose that a successor to C. Cæsar should as yet be appointed. . . . Wars of the greatest importance have been waged in Gaul; powerful nations have been vanquished by Cæsar, but they have not as yet been secured by laws, fixed right, or certain peace. We see that the war is enfeebled, nay, that I may speak truly, nearly finished. And should he who has thus commenced be allowed to complete his work, we shall soon see it accomplished. If we appoint a successor, beware lest we hear of the remains of the war restored and renewed. I, therefore, a senator, an enemy (since you will so have it) to Cæsar, ought to be as I have always been, a friend to the commonwealth. If certain persons love not Cæsar, they make a mistake in recalling him. A recal will instantly exhibit his glory, will display triumphs, honours heaped upon him by the senate, the gratitude of the equestrian order, the love and attachment of the people. But if he in this distinguished position is not, from views of the public good, anxious immediately to realize these brilliant expectations before all be accomplished, what ought I, a senator, to do, whose duty it is to provide for the public good without even consulting his wishes. . . . The Gallic war,

conscript fathers, has been aggressively waged by C. Cæsar, which previously had only been repelled. Our generals have always contented themselves with repulsing, rather than provoking these nations to war. The great C. Marius himself, whose divine and distinguished abilities relieved the sorrows and avenged the slaughter of the Roman people, drove back the mighty forces of the Gauls which were rushing into Italy, but he did not penetrate into their homes and cities. But I see that Cæsar's plan is far different, for he has thought it his duty, not only to war on those who took up arms against the Roman people, but to reduce the whole of Gaul under our sway; and so against the very valiant and powerful nations of the Germans and Helvetii he has fought with the greatest success. Other tribes he has crushed, subdued, and accustomed to the Roman sway. Regions and nations which neither written nor oral evidence, nor even report itself had made known to us, have been victoriously traversed by our general, our army, and by the arms of the Roman people. Hitherto, conscript fathers, we only had a path through Gaul, the remainder was occupied by nations hostile to our empire, or faithless, or unknown; or at least fierce, barbarous, and warlike. There never was a Roman who did not wish those nations to be struck down and subdued. We never had a wise statesman who was not convinced, from the very origin of Rome, that Gaul was the most formidable enemy to our empire. But, owing to the strength and multitude of those nations, we never before fought against them universally. We, when attacked, resisted them. Now, finally, this result has been achieved, that the boundaries of our empire and of those nations are the same. Nature, not without a beneficent providence, had guarded Italy by the rampart of the Alps. For, had the road been open to the fierce multitudes of Gaul, this city would never have become the home and seat of empire. Now the Alps may subside, for there is nothing between those lofty mountains and the ocean which Rome has now cause to dread."

Cicero then proceeds to argue against two proposals—one for depriving Cæsar of Cisalpine, the other, of Transalpine Gaul; and proves that either attempt would not only be offensive to Cæsar, but also impracticable and impolitic. Both proposals were rejected by the senate.

The year ended without any consuls elect, and Pompey and Crassus having been elected in the commencement of January, proceeded to carry into effect the result of the conference at Lucca. Whatever we may think of the purity of their conduct, or the extent of their ambition, or the wisdom of their measures, we ought not to forget that their strength was the consequence of a coalition of parties of which the three triumviri were the respective heads, that they possessed a majority both in the senate-house and in the assembly of the people, and that all attempts to resist their proposed laws sprung from a minority, who, unable to meet their antagonists upon the merits of the question, harassed them with all the vexatious opposition which the forms of the constitution placed in their hands.

We need not doubt that the triumviri carried their measures with a high hand. Laws were passed continuing his government to Cæsar for five additional years. Syria, and the conduct of the Parthian war, were bestowed on Crassus. To Pompey were assigned both the Spains with their usual contingent of troops. To Pompey himself, four new legions were voted, two of which he afterwards allowed to serve with Cæsar in Gaul.

Dion Cassius, who seems to have had before him the memoirs of some bitter enemy of the Triumviri, during this portion of his history, accuses Pompey of bad faith towards Cæsar, and writes that all the laws conferring extraordinary powers on the two consuls, were passed before any mention was made of Cæsar. That, finally, Trebonius, a friend of Cæsar, was allowed to propose to the people the continuation of his government in Gaul, which was resisted with extreme violence and virulence, especially by Cato, who, as usual,

attempted to wear out the time of the assembly by endless speaking, a manœuvre which was despised by Trebonius, who having restricted each speaker to one hour, ordered Cato, who persisted in violating the regulation, to be led to prison.

Then followed the dedication of the theatre of Pompey, and the magnificent games and spectacles with which the dedication was celebrated. Concerts of music, gymnastic games, chariot races in the circus, were usually exhibited on similar occasions. But the combats of wild beasts far exceeded what had hitherto been exhibited at Rome. In five days, in Dion's quaint language, "the combats consumed five hundred lions. Eighteen elephants fought against armed gladiators; some of these huge animals died immediately of their wounds, others not long after. For the people, in opposition to Pompey's wish, took pity upon a few of them, who being wounded ceased from the combat, and walking round the arena, lifted up their trunks to heaven and moaned so piteously, that a report spread abroad that they did not do this accidentally nor without a cause, but that they were invoking the protection of those oaths, in reliance upon which they had crossed over from Africa, and calling upon the Divinity to avenge their cause. For it is said that they refused to embark on board the transport ships, before they had received a promise confirmed by oaths that they should suffer no harm. I know not (adds Dion), whether this be true or not. However, some have said that the elephants understood the language of the Africans, and also the movements of the heavenly bodies."

Either at the close of the preceding or early in the beginning of this year, some persons, jealous of the favour which Cornelius Balbus, the Gaditan, enjoyed both from Pompey, who had made him a Roman citizen, and from Cæsar who had made him, Phœnician as he was, his master of the engineers, and one of his most trusted friends, suborned one of his own countrymen to prosecute him, for discharging the duties of a Roman citizen, which, according to the fundamental laws of Gades, he could not duly become. His

case was defended by Pompey, Crassus, and Cicero; Pompey began, Crassus seconded, and Cicero concluded the defence. It was an exhibition to the people as well as to the senate, that the Triumviri had secured the support of the eloquent oligarch, who had, from the first day of his consulship, been the most vigorous if not judicious maintainer of his adopted party. Here are a few of the professions of his new creed: "Why should we not rather uphold, than tear down those regulations which we cannot change? The senate has honoured C. Cæsar with a most distinguished supplication, for an unprecedented number of days. The same senate, although the treasury was not rich, has decreed money to pay his soldiers, has assigned to him ten lieutenants, has refused to supersede him under the Sempronian law. I was the leader and mover in passing those decrees, nor did I think it a wiser plan to indulge my former quarrels, than to study the present peace and interest of the republic. My plan does not please others. They are, perhaps, firmer politicians. I blame no man, but so agree with all persons. I do not think it unworthy of a consistent character to modify one's opinion, as it were, nor to veer the course of a ship according to the shifting of the breeze." Nor does his private correspondence differ much in tone from those sentiments expressed in public. In a letter to Lentulus, written about this time, the following passage is found: "In answer to your wish to know the present state of the political world, I have to state that party spirit runs very high, but that the contest is not equal. For the party predominant in resources, in arms, and in power, seems, by the folly and inconsistency of their opponents, to have the superiority in moral influence also; for it has obtained from the senate what it did not expect to have obtained even from the people without seditious practices. For additional pay for Cæsar's soldiers has been voted, together with ten lieutenants, and it easily succeeded in preventing a successor being appointed to him, according to the Sempronian law. And I describe these events the more briefly, because our present political state does not please me."

His observations to his friend Marius, who did not attend the games and spectacles of Pompey, are worth transcribing, as they convey a striking picture of the debasing effects of scenes of mere excitement: "On the whole, the games were most magnificent, but not to your taste; I guess at yours from my own. For, in the first place, to do honour to Pompey, those actors had returned to the stage, who, in my own opinion, had retired to save their own honour. Your old favourite, my friend Æsopus, acted so wretchedly, that all are willing to give him a retiring licence. When he had commenced the solemn oath, his voice failed him at the words: 'If knowingly I violate my oath.' Why should I mention other things to you? For even the rest of the plays did not furnish that agreeable pleasure which they do when acted in an ordinary manner; for the magnificent spectacle destroyed all rational amusement, and I doubt not that you are quite satisfied without having seen it. For what pleasure can the exhibition of six hundred mules in the 'Clytæmnestra' give, or three thousand targeteers in the 'Trojan horse,' or the variety of the armour of the horsemen and footmen in any battle? These, though they excited the people's wonder, could have had no charms for you I do not think that you regret missing the Greek and Oscan plays, especially when you can always enjoy the Oscan in our senate, and you love the Greeks so little that you will not even visit your 'villa' by the 'Via Græca.' For why should I suppose that you are sorry not to have seen the exhibition of Greek 'athletæ,' seeing you refused to witness the gladiatorial show? Even Pompey himself confesses that the expenses on the 'athletæ' were completely thrown away. There remain to be described two hunting exhibitions, continued for five days, magnificent no one can deny; but what rational amusement can a well educated man derive from seeing a feeble man torn to pieces by a more powerful brute, or a gallant brute thrust through by a hunting spear? Even were such desirable sights, you have often seen them, nor have we who did view them seen anything new. The

last day was devoted to the battles of the elephants. It certainly excited great wonder amidst the vulgar crowd, but there was no rational amusement in it; nay more, it was followed by sentiments of pity, and an idea that this huge animal had no small portion of human feelings."

CHAPTER XI.

PRO-CONSUL. B.C. 55.

BEFORE we enter upon the subject of Cæsar's invasion of Britain, it will not be amiss to give a slight account of the varieties of race whom Cæsar encountered in Gaul, and to inquire whether they can be identified with still existing representatives. Cæsar himself confines the races to three, differing in language, institutions, and manners. The first described as Aquitani, between the Garonne and the Pyrenees; a second, as Belgæ, in the north-western part of Gaul, confined by the Lower Rhine, and the rivers Sequana and Matrona; the remainder he assigns to the Galli or Celtæ. This is only a general, not a scientific, description, for the lines of demarcation were far from being decisive. But it will partially suit our present purpose. We may, therefore, assume, that the Ædui, the Arverni, the Sequani, the Helvetii, the Bituriges, the Senones, and the Carnutes, were some of the leading tribes of the pure Gallic breed; and who, at least, claimed for themselves a right to the supremacy over the whole of Gaul. They acknowledged no earthly progenitor, and traced their origin to the God whose realm was the invisible world, called Πλουτων (the rich one) in Greek, and Dis, an equivalent term in Latin.

The Belgians, according to their own account, were of German origin, and foreign settlers in the country. Possibly they might have taken a sufficient colouring from their new

location to imprint a difference between them and their ancestors. Some of their tribes bore more recent marks of their paternity. Such were the Nervii, and Atuatuci. The Condrusi, Eburones, Cæراسى, and Pæmani still retained their generic name of Germans. Their neighbours, the Treviri, perhaps a Gallic tribe originally, had borrowed so much of the spirit and habits of their neighbours, as to pride themselves, as we are told by Tacitus, upon a supposed German descent. Cæsar, in one place, enumerates the Morini and the Menapii among the Belgæ; but it was after a qualification that the great majority of the Belgæ had sprung from the Germans. In other passages he repeatedly excepts both these tribes from the rest of the Belgæ. There were also distinct tribes which, in one passage, he characterizes as belonging to "Armorica," who, nevertheless, in his general division, were classed with Galli. These very same people, being the Veneti and their confederates, are by Strabo classed with the Belgians; and nothing but some strong evidence could have induced him thus to differ from Cæsar. The historian Thierry has, from this and some other causes, been led to conclude that both the Belgæ proper and the dwellers in Armorica were Cimbri, and the same race as the modern Welsh, who have always called themselves Cumri; and this supposition has found favour with some scholars.

Concerning Cæsar's third division, the Aquitani, there never has been any rational doubt expressed; they undoubtedly were, and still are, the Basque nation, one of the oldest of the inhabitants of south-western Europe, and probably of the same race as the ancient Iberi.

Within the Pyrenees, the Alps, the Rhine, and the two seas, Strabo thought he could discover a certain unity among all the remaining nations, which would justify him in denominating them Galatic. But he still recognises a difference of language, although he does not mention the number of dialects. We now know that, within the historical period three languages have been used between the Garonne and

the Rhine, and that, nevertheless, only two sources in addition to those introduced along with the Roman Conquest have usually been taken into consideration; these two being generally called the Celtic and Teutonic. But it was not ascertained until a recent period, that under the general word Celtic were comprehended two distinct forms of speech, bearing something of the same relation to each other as the Greek and Latin languages bear to each other. These are the Cumric and Gaelic tongues, still spoken with certain corruptions, the first by the Britons of Wales and Brittany, and the second by the Gathelians of Ireland and the Scottish Gaels. According to the testimony of Polybius, the Veneti of Italy were, in habits and institutions, Celts, but spoke a different dialect. Strabo, who had personal knowledge of both tribes, had no more doubt of the Celtic character of the Adriatic Veneti than he had of that of their neighbours, the Boii, Cenomanni, and Senones. He even supposes them to have been an offshoot from the tribe of the same name, on the borders of the ocean. If we cannot agree with him in this conclusion, it proves, nevertheless, that he was convinced of their identity of race; while the very circumstance that he ranked the Veneti of Gaul with the Belgæ, shows that he had good reasons for distinguishing them from the Galli, with whom Cæsar had apparently confounded them.

It appears to me, that here I may speak in the first person, a fact which can be clearly proved, that the Veneti of Gaul were the same race as the Veneti of Italy. Polybius calls these latter Celts, and Strabo assumes that cognation. We know from ancient documents that they worshipped the same god, Apollo Belinus, and this of itself is no light proof of cognation. We have a list in Livy of all the Gallic tribes who passed at different times into Italy. These are the Bituriges, the Arverni, the Senones, Ædui, the Ambarri, the Carnutes, the Aulerci, who all contributed their portion to that fierce band of invaders, who, under the command of Bellovesus, burst into Italy and made war on no other prin-

ciple than that of superior might, and who, at a later period, answered the Roman question, as to what right they had in Cisalpine Gaul, by saying, "That the sword was their right, and that everything belonged to the brave."

This first horde was followed at various times by bands of Cenomanni, who seized the territories where Brixia and Verona were afterwards built. After them, the Salluvii, who settled near the ancient nation of the Ligures, dwelling on either bank of the Ticinus. These entered Italy through the Taurini, and by difficult Alpine passes descended into the upper plain of the Po, and, having defeated the Tuscans not far from the river Ticinus, built the city Mediolanum on a spot which was called the territory of the Insubres. This they were induced to do, because one of the subdivisions of the Ædui bore the name of Insubres. Then the Boii and Lingones crossed by the Penine pass, and crossing the Padus on rafts, drove not only the Etrusci, but also the Umbri, from their possessions. They, however, confined themselves within the Apennines. Then the Senones (perhaps for Senones in the first list, we ought to read Sequani), the freshest of these adventurers, extended themselves from the Utens to the Æsis. I have ascertained that it was this nation which invaded first Clusium and thence Rome. It is not certain whether it was done by them singly, or they were aided by the whole Gallic nation.

But so far were the Veneti from making common cause with the Galli in this invasion, which was Strabo's supposition, that neither their name nor that of any of their confederacy, is to be found among the invading tribes. On the contrary, we have this singular attestation on Livy's part, that the Veneti of Italy were on the Adriatic, not only before the Gauls, but before even the Tuscans had entered the vale of the Po. "The Tuscans," says he, "bordering on both seas, settled their territories in each locality in twelve divisions or cities. First on the south, secondly on the north, of the Apennines, having sent thither as many colonies as they had

leading cities ; and they occupied the territories between the Padus and the Alps, except the corner of the Veneti, who dwell round the upper gulf of the Adriatic. The Alpine nations also have undoubtedly the same origin, especially the Rhæti, whom their localities have barbarized so that they retain nothing of their ancient origin, except the tones of their language, and not even these without corruption." With all due respect for Livy, we cannot for a moment believe that, while the Ligures of the Upper Po and on the southern side of the central Alps, resisted successfully the furious and repeated attacks during the long continued invasion of the Gauls ; while the Umbri, in the marshes around Ravenna, and the Veneti in one of the most delightful parts of Italy, resisted the same exterminating influence ; the Tuscans, whose supremacy in the plains of the Po was of foreign origin and apparently of no long continuance, should have been able to dispossess the native possessors of the Rhætian and Carnian Alps, and have succeeded them in their native holds. Such an event must, I believe, be historically pronounced impossible. There is rather every reason to suppose that the Rhæti, Vindelici, Breuni, Brigantes, Carni, &c., were of that Celtic race of which the Veneti, both in Italy and Gaul, were the most civilized type. Indeed, the Briganticus Lacus in the very heart of these Alpine nations, was also called Venetus. When Scymnus of Chios wrote, the Veneti could boast of fifty cities, and were a highly commercial nation. They lived in peace with the Romans, and when the storm which had long threatened the southern nations, swept their cities on the main land with merciless destruction, they carried their commercial habits with them and founded another Venetia amidst the waters of the Adriatic, doomed, perhaps, like the first, to perish under Hunnish tyranny.

It must strike every thoughtful reader that the Venetia of Armorica bears a singular similarity to the second Venetia of the Adriatic. Cæsar describes a people who, having despaired of defending themselves by land, looked to marshes, head-

lands, and islands, for their protection, and trusted to their commercial fleets and naval superiority for wealth and riches. Cæsar was guilty of a heavy crime against posterity, if he willingly refused to record the sources of the commercial wealth of the Veneti. He merely mentions Britain as the destination of their commercial navy. Perhaps the Phœnician policy of concealing marts from jealous eyes had been inherited by these ocean-sailors. We have seen from Polybius that the merchants of Gaul persisted in telling Scipio that they had no knowledge whatever of Britain; and the same class, when questioned by Cæsar, an abler man than the second Scipio, professed an equally myterious silence. We are informed by Cæsar of the close connexion between some of the Gallic tribes and Britain; and it is certainly a subject of wonder that, with all his resources, he was not able to extract more knowledge than that which he confesses to have received from the Armorican merchants trading to Britain. I feel convinced, for my own part, that the Veneti of Gaul and their confederates were by blood and connexion the same people as their opposite neighbours in the island of Britain; that the inhabitants of the counties of Somerset, Dorset, Devon, and Cornwall, retained to a very late period the manners, customs, and language of the Veneti of Gaul, and their confederates. They were a commercial people, fond of the sea, and of marine life; they worshipped the same god, Belinus, and never, during the dark ages, allowed the strong tie between them and their continental brothers to be once forgotten. The idea of a conquest of modern Brittany by the Cumbrians, driven out of the island by the Anglo-Saxon invaders, is a day-dream, invented partly to account for the similarity of language and habits on either side of the Channel, and partly to satisfy a still later prejudice on the part of the Franco-Gallic powers, who thought it derogatory to the dignity of the Frankish king, that there should be a people within the natural limits of his kingdom who could claim a right from ancestral natives to a separate and independent

crown. The controversy on this point has filled folio volumes, and yet the whole case lies within a nutshell. The Armorican states, gently ruled by the Romans, who made very few settlements in their country, passed in peace through the period of Roman supremacy; but when the moment came when Rome could no further protect them, they, without offence to their old masters, set up a new Armorican confederacy, the success and influence of which form no small portion of the history of western Gaul from that day to this.

It is a fact worth observing, that the chief city of the Veneti is still called by the natives Guenet, the classical mode of writing "Gwyned," "North Wales;" which, in the form of Gwent, or Latinized form "Venta," accompanied the Cumri in all their migrations. Nor is it less worthy of notice that, in ancient Armorica, there was a great city on the sea coast called "Vorganium," an undoubted antitype of the Morgan-wg of South Wales.

There is also another fact which requires examination, and this is, that among the Romans two of the four colours of the circus were called "Prasina," and "Veneta." Now, all agree that the colour of the "Prasina factio" was a vivid green, compared to that of the garden leek; while the "Veneta factio" was distinguished by a light sky-blue colour. Hence Vegetius says, "in order that the vessels on the outlook may not be betrayed by the whiteness of their sails, both the sails and ropes are dyed a 'venet' colour, like in hue to the waves. The sailors also wear a 'venet dress.'" When we remember that many writers have supposed the Britones themselves were so called from a similar blue dye, we are again reminded that, under the two names, Veneti and Britanni, the same people may be comprehended, and that the "true blue" of the British sailor may perhaps still represent the favourite colour of our Venetic ancestors.

Many of the above opinions have been hazarded rather as suggestive of the truth than as comprehending the whole of it. But the extraordinary fact recorded by Cæsar of the

build, size, and equipment of the fleet of the Veneti requires a far more profound explanation than has hitherto been given to it. What I would wish the general reader to infer from the loose ideas thus thrown out, is this, that the Gallic or Celtic tribes were the ancestors of the greater part of the modern French; that they were of a race cognate with the modern Irish of Ireland, and with the Gaels of Scotland; that the Belgic tribes were a mixed race, partly of Gallic and Cymric blood, but still with a predominance of the German spirit and language; that the Veneti and their confederates, including the Morini and the Menapii, were of the Cymric race, without much intermixture of blood, and intimately connected with the Cymric race in Britain; that they had no immediate connexion with that part of Britain which Cæsar invaded, which was principally in the hands of Belgic conquerors; for Divitiacus, a king of the Suessones, had reduced a considerable part of the island under his domination; and when the leaders of the first war of the Belgæ against Cæsar had disappeared, it was said by the Rhemi that they had taken refuge in Britain. The influence of race in determining the political affections and aversions of nations, renders this question of paramount importance, even in understanding the transactions of Cæsar in Britain.

After this digression, which will not be without its use, we come next to Julius Cæsar's invasion of Great Britain, not of so much importance from its immediate results, as from its being a worthy introduction into the actual history of the world of that British nation which has been called by Providence to act so wonderful a part in the manifestation of God's providence, according to which the curse of the dispersion of nations was to be recalled, and the whole earth be subdued, and made a fit home for the residence of civilized man. The account of this great event is so accurately given by Horsley, in his "Britannia Romana," that it is here, with few alterations, submitted to the perusal of the general reader, who must be struck by the light which learning and science

can throw upon the darkest pages of antiquity. Some observations of my own will close the extracts from Horsley :—

“Julius Cæsar was the first Roman who made an hostile attempt upon Britain, as we are informed by Tacitus; and the same author afterwards seems to insinuate that Britain was unknown to the Romans before Cæsar discovered it. Suetonius also affirms that Cæsar made an attempt upon the Britons, who were before unknown. Diodorus Siculus speaks also in the same strain, and informs us that, according to their own accounts, the Britons, in ancient times, were entirely free from foreign power; for that neither Bacchus nor Hercules, nor any other hero or potentate had made war upon them. Suetonius further informs us that, according to some, Cæsar was moved to this expedition by the hope of getting large pearls there; and no doubt Tacitus, from such hints as these, formed that part of his description of Britain where he speaks of its yielding gold, silver, and some sorts of pearls; but in reality we need seek for no other motive of Cæsar’s undertaking than ambition and glory. Cæsar himself, in his Commentaries, has, under the head of the Gallic wars, given us a very curious and elegant account, both of his first and second descent upon Britain; and the reason he there avows for his expedition against Britain is, that in almost all the Gallic wars the Britons had been aiding the enemy. The reason which he gives for entering upon it when the summer was far spent is, that in case the season of the year should not allow him to carry on the war, yet it would be worth while to go to the island in order to discover and know the people and the havens, of which even the merchants could give him but a very imperfect account, and that only of the sea-coasts that were nearest Gaul. So true is what Suetonius says, that the Britons were unknown before

“Having got together eighty transports, which he thought sufficient for the foot of two legions, and for the cavalry eighteen more, which were at another port, eight miles distant, he set sail with the foot, and ordered the horse to

march to the other port, and follow him as soon as they could; but they did not proceed with any great expedition. Cæsar himself, with the foremost of the ships, arrived on the coast of Britain about ten o'clock in the forenoon, where he saw the enemy in arms on the rising ground. Not thinking this place proper for landing, because the hills were so near to the shore that the enemy could reach it with their darts, he came to an anchor, and waited till three in the afternoon for the rest of the fleet. . . . Weighing anchor, they sailed about eight miles farther, and then came to a plain and open shore, where he ordered the ships to lie. The inhabitants being apprized of the design of the Romans, sent their chariots and horse before, and bringing up the rest of their army, endeavoured to prevent their landing. Here the Romans laboured under great difficulties, for the greater ships could not lie near the shore, and the soldiers were compelled to leap down from their ships, encumbered as they were, and loaded with their arms, and to contend at the same time both with the waves and the enemy. On the other hand, the Britons fought with great advantage, standing either upon dry ground, or but a little within the water, and where they knew they might have good footing.

“The Romans, being under such disadvantages, did not behave with their usual bravery. Cæsar therefore orders the gallies to approach, and lie along the other shore, and by all manner of missile weapons to drive off the enemy. This did great service, and the enemy was forced to give ground. The eagle-bearer of the tenth legion, observing the backwardness of the soldiers, sprung himself into the sea from the ship, and advancing with the eagle in hand, called upon the soldiers to follow him. This was done, and as soon as the Romans, supported by the missiles of the boats and pinnaces, had gained sure footing, the Britons retired; but the Romans, for want of horse, could not pursue them. The Britons, after this, sent ambassadors to treat of peace, and with them Comius the Atrebatian, whom Cæsar had sent as his deputy to them,

and whom they had detained. Cæsar demands hostages, and they gave some and promised more; and the princes, assembling from all parts, recommended themselves and their states to Cæsar's protection. And thus the peace was concluded.

“ Upon the fourth day after his arrival, the eighteen ships with the cavalry set sail from Gaul, and came in sight of the Roman camp, but were by stress of weather driven back to the continent. On the same night it was full moon and a spring tide, and as the Romans were not prepared for the magnitude and violence of this, the galleys, which had been drawn ashore, were filled with water, and the ships of burden which rode at anchor were partly damaged and partly destroyed by a storm. When the British chiefs perceived the extent of Cæsar's loss, and conjecturing from the smallness of his camp that his forces were not formidable, they resumed the offensive, and flattered themselves that should they be able to vanquish Cæsar under his present difficulties, their island would not soon be liable to another invasion. Cæsar, anticipating this conduct, took all the steps necessary both to procure provisions and to repair his damaged vessels.

“ For this purpose the seventh legion was sent forth to cut and carry some ripe corn which the Britons had left undestroyed, and who made a sudden attack upon the soldiers employed in their work. They were so far successful, that had not Cæsar come up to the rescue, the legion would have been greatly endangered. Encouraged by their success, and by Cæsar's continuance in his camp, the British chiefs assembled their warriors, and made a vigorous onset upon the Roman camp, but were soon repulsed by the legionary infantry, who, assisted by Comius with thirty horsemen, pursued the defeated Britons as far as prudence permitted them. Deputies again waited on Cæsar, and petitioned for peace. This was granted on condition that they would double the number of hostages to be given according to the first treaty; but as he could not wait for them, he ordered them to be sent after him to the continent. He himself lost no time in em-

barking his troops, and, sailing at midnight, reached Gaul early in the morning without much loss. Thus ended the first expedition.

“In preparing for his second expedition, the first steps were to build a sufficient fleet: a work which he entrusted to the legionary soldiers, who, in the course of one winter, built about six hundred vessels, adapted for transporting cavalry, infantry, and beasts of burden, and twenty-eight ships of war. These were ordered to rendezvous at Portus Ictius, where the straits were only thirty miles broad. At the appointed time they assembled, and were met by four thousand horsemen of Gaul and all their chiefs, as Cæsar was anxious to take with him all whom he could not trust. The Æduan, Dumnorix, was suspected of disaffection, and in vain attempted to induce Cæsar to dispense with his attendance. Finally, at the very moment of embarkation, he disappeared with the Æduan cavalry, but was pursued, overtaken, and, on refusing to surrender, cut down while exclaiming in vain ‘that he was a free man, and a citizen of a free state.’ Cæsar then, leaving Labienus in Gaul with three legions and two thousand cavalry, embarked himself with five legions and the remaining two thousand horsemen. The vessels were more than eight hundred in number, and presented so formidable an appearance, with the ships of war leading the way, that the Britons, who had first determined to oppose their landing, disappeared from the shore, and allowed the Romans to disembark at their leisure, and to fortify a camp for the troops left behind to guard the vessels, which were allowed to ride at anchor, off the gently sloping and open shore. He then marched into the country, and found the Britons, horsemen and war chariots, posted on a river, of which they disputed the passage, but were driven off by the cavalry; and when they had taken refuge in a stronghold surrounded by woods, they were charged by the infantry of the seventh legion, who took the place by storm. Next day, while preparing to resume his advance, he was overtaken by a messenger, who announced

that a heavy storm had partly destroyed and partly driven ashore most of the vessels, and that very serious damage had been suffered by the whole fleet. Cæsar returned himself to the scene of disaster; and, after giving orders for repairing it as effectually as possible, drew the fleet up the beach, and enclosed it within the rampart of the camp. Ten days were thus lost: when he returned to the head of the army he found that a much greater force had been assembled in front of them, and that the Britons of the coast had selected as commander-in-chief Cassibelaunus, the confines of whose dominions were eighty miles distant from the sea, and who previously had carried on continual wars against the maritime states. When the army advanced, the cavalry in the van came in frequent collision with the horsemen and chariot warriors of the Britons, whom in general they drove into the woods. On one occasion they suddenly rallied, and slew many of the Romans; and, waiting until the latter were busied in fortifying their camp, made a fierce onset on the cohorts on guard, who, as well as two additional cohorts sent to reinforce them, were pressed very hard, and finally relieved by the arrival of a greater number of cohorts to their support. On that day fell Quintus Laberius Durius, a tribune of the soldiers. To translate Cæsar's own words: 'From this combat, which was fought in front of the camp, and before our own eyes, we perceived that our men, on account of the weight of their armour, as they could neither pursue the retreating enemy nor dare to quit their standards, were not well adapted to meet this enemy. Our cavalry also encountered them with great danger, because the Britons in general retired before them, and, after having designedly drawn them to a distance from the legions, they would spring from their chariots and fight with great advantage on foot. Thus, whether our cavalry retired or advanced, they were equally exposed to danger. Moreover, as the Britons never fought in a dense body, but in open order, and with large intervals between them, and had bodies so distributed that one could succeed the other regu-

larly, and thus replace the wearied with fresh and vigorous successors. Next day the enemies posted themselves on some hills not far from our camp, and showed themselves in detached bodies, nor did they assail our cavalry with the same spirit as on the preceding day. But at mid-day, when Cæsar had sent Caius Trebonius, his lieutenant, with three legions and all the cavalry on a foraging excursion, they suddenly flew from all quarters upon the foragers with so much fury as to close up with the standards of the legions. Our men, having as furiously charged them, drove them back and pursued them, until our cavalry, trusting to the support of the legions who were close behind them, scattered them in headlong flight; and, having slain a great number of them, allowed them no opportunity either of rallying and halting, or yet of leaping down from their chariots. From this flight the auxiliaries, who had collected from all quarters, departed to their own homes, nor did they ever afterwards engage us with their full force.' ”

During these operations, Cæsar does not appear to have moved far from Durovernum. He now determined to invade the territories of Cassibelaunus, which he could not do without crossing the Thames. This could only be done at one place, by infantry, and there not without difficulty. The enemy was posted on the opposite bank of the river, which was defended by sharp stakes. The Romans, however, waded across, though up to the neck in the water, with so much activity and resolution, that the enemy did not await their charge, but quitted the bank and fled. Cassibelaunus then reserving only four thousand war chariots, dismissed the rest of his forces, and contented himself with watching the movements of the enemy, and especially attacking the Roman cavalry, whenever it moved far from the legions. This plan was so far successful, that the ravages of the Romans were confined to those places which they could reach with their legions. In the meantime the Trinobantes, almost the strongest state in those districts, send ambassadors to Cæsar. Mandubratius

a young chief of that state, had visited Cæsar in Gaul, and claimed his protection, as his father, Imanuentius, the reigning king, had been slain by Cassibelaunus. The Trinobantes promised to surrender, and to execute the commands of Cæsar, and requested him to act as protector to Mandubratius, and to send him to them, that they might make him their king. Cæsar sent him, and required forty hostages and a supply of corn, which he immediately received. The Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci, and Cassii, also surrendered to Cæsar. By these he was told that the stronghold of Cassibelaunus was not far. The British strongholds were in general in the midst of forests, chosen for their natural strength, which was increased by ditches and ramparts. Cæsar found the fortress of Cassibelaunus admirably fortified, both by nature and the hand of man. The legions, however, attacked it in two quarters, carried it by storm, and drove the enemy out, after capturing and slaying many. A great booty of flocks and herds was there taken.

Cassibelaunus had, in the meantime, sent orders to four Kentish kings, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segonax, to gather their forces and attack the shore-camp of Cæsar. These orders they obeyed, but were repulsed with great loss; among others, Lugotorix, a noble chief, was made prisoner. Cassibelaunus, on hearing of this defeat, and dispirited by the desertion of his allies, sent, through Comius, the Atrebatian, an offer to surrender on terms. As Cæsar had determined to winter in Gaul, and as much of the summer was already passed, as he was aware that Cassibelaunus could easily hold out during the remaining portion, he accepted the proposal, and after indicating the number of hostages to be given, and the tribute to be paid by Britain to Rome, he returned to the sea-shore, where he found his fleet repaired. In this, at two embarkations, he safely transported into Gaul, both his own troops and immense multitudes of captives. Thus ended the second expedition.

The chronology of his proceedings in Britain is thus de-

scribed by Horsley, according to the admirable observations of the astronomer and mathematician, Halley, who read to the Royal Society of London a paper upon the subject. After proving that the first expedition took place, B.C. 55, Horsley says:—"And the year being fixed, the very day, and almost the very hour, when he landed, can be determined with some certainty. For Cæsar says, that on the night of the fourth day after his landing there was a full moon. He had before mentioned that the summer was far spent, and the æquinox not come, hence, the full moon must have been either in July or August. But that year there was no full moon in July but in the beginning of the month, whereas there happened two full moons in August, one on the first day, a little after noon, which, therefore, could not be the full moon to which Cæsar refers; and the other a little after midnight, on the thirtieth, or on the thirty-first, before day, and Halley thinks this must be the full moon to which Cæsar alludes. Whence it is plain that he landed on the 26th of August Since he did not land before August 26th, and returned before the æquinox, his stay in this country must have been very short. For when allowance is made for the anticipation of the Julian Calendar, we can by no means stretch out the time to a month. He sailed 'when the day of the æquinox was near,' probably about the 20th of September, which will allow three-and-twenty days for his stay. The first week might well be spent in repairing his shattered ships; in the second might have occurred the contest between the seventh legion and the Britons; and in the course of the last week the attack upon the Roman camp, which, according to Cæsar, was some days after the former fight. This was the last action, for on the same day the British ambassador came to Cæsar to ask for peace, which was quickly conceded, and in a day or two after that event, Cæsar seems to have taken his leave of the island for that time."

Next year, B.C. 54, it is not probable that he came over before the vernal æquinox, for by all his observations he found the nights shorter in Britain than on the continent,

and yet it appears that Cæsar had been some considerable time in Britain before the 10th of August ; because Marcus Cicero, in answer to a letter from his brother Quintus, then serving in Britain under Cæsar, says that the fourth of the letters of Quintus was dated the 10th of August, and that he received it the 13th of September. This letter was then the fourth that Quintus had sent from Britain to his brother Marcus ; and it is in the first of the four that he gives a general account of their success in Britain, so that they must have been long in Britain before even that first letter was written, probably two or three months before the fourth letter was dated, and sometime in the month of May. It also appears that Cæsar left Britain before the middle of September, for, in the same letter, Cicero says that he had on the twenty-eighth of that month received a letter from Cæsar, dated on the first, and stating that he had returned to the sea-shore ; and it is not likely that he lingered there long before he conveyed his army across. He might have done so in the middle of the month, which would still enable him to avoid the æquinox, which fell at that time on the twenty-ninth.

Horsley, still taking Halley as his guide, is as minute in following the course of Cæsar as a topographer and geographer. But as this is better known, it will suffice to say, that with him Portus Ictius is Calais. Cæsar guessed the passage to be thirty miles. Halley, by accurate admeasurement, found the distance to be twenty-six English miles, equal to twenty-eight and a half of Roman miles. He sailed at night, and early on the following morning arrived near the cliffs of Dover, towards the South Foreland, off which shore he waited till three in the afternoon ; he then sailed with both wind and tide in his favour. Now, it is known that, on that coast, it was low water before two in the afternoon of that day, and that consequently at three the flood-tide was pretty well made up, which, setting to the north, must have carried Cæsar in the same direction. The plain open shore, about eight miles from the place of anchorage, must therefore have been in the

Downs, at the mouth of the river that goes up to Richborough Cæsar, then, in his expeditions sailed, as I suppose, from Calais, and landed near Richborough, though the particular spot on which he landed and encamped may now be washed away by the sea.

In his first descent, Cæsar kept close to the coast, and as he never advanced into the country, so there are no movements in this first expedition further to be traced out.

In the second expedition he marched twelve miles from the coast, and found the Britons posted on a river, whence they attempted to check his advance. This river was the Stour, and the strong fortress which the seventh legion captured was probably the Roman Durovernum, the modern Canterbury. The next locality which the scanty information furnished us by Cæsar enables us to identify, is the spot where he forded the Thames, which must have been somewhere in the vicinity of Kingston, although the exact ford may not be ascertained at this time. The probability is, that the town of Cassibelaunus, which was stormed by Cæsar, was Verulamium, the modern St. Albans. Upon the submission of Cassibelaunus, Cæsar withdrew his army to the sea-coast, probably by the same way along which he had come, and so left Britain entirely. These are the main facts deducible from Cæsar's account, and are undoubtedly of a very meagre character; unfortunately we have very few contemporary documents by which we can check Cæsar's own description of his operations, and yet they have their value.

In the last letter of the second book of Cicero's letters to his brother Quintus, we have a description of the anticipations entertained by Cæsar and his friends respecting the advantages to be derived from the invasion of Britain; it was evidently written in answer to a letter of Quintus, giving an account of their successful landing. Cicero writes thus:—"I now come to that, which ought, perhaps, to have been first noticed. Oh! what a pleasant letter you sent me concerning Britain. I dreaded the ocean, I dreaded the shores of the island. I, for

my part, do not slight the dangers still awaiting you, but still there is more of hope than fear in these feelings, and my anxiety is caused more by the expectation of good than the fear of bad tidings; at all events, I see that you have an excellent subject for a poem: what capital situations you have, what a field for the description of nature and her appearances, what manners, what nations, what battles, finally, what a splendid general! I, as you request, will willingly assist you with all my power, and will send you the verses for which you ask."

But in the first letter of the four to which Horsley alluded, we find that Quintus had informed his brother that their success in Britain had not been very great. Cicero's words are these: "I learned from your letters, that there was no cause, why we should either be afraid or joyful." In the same letter he adds, that he had received from Cæsar a letter, dated September the first, and from the sea-shore, which he describes as "satis commodas," a difficult expression, of which, perhaps the best English translation is "not very unfavourable." Cicero had recommended to Cæsar a learned jurisconsult, Trebatius, who ultimately consented to stay in Gaul, and follow Cæsar's fortunes. We have some letters from Cicero to this friend, addressed to him in Britain, whither, however, the learned lawyer had never gone. It was written at a time when the description of the war chariots of the Britons had evidently made a strong impression at Rome. Most of Cicero's letters to Trebatius are written in a jocular tone, of which the following is a specimen:—"I wonder at this, that I do not hear from you as often as I do from my brother. I hear that in Britain there is neither silver nor gold. If that is the case, capture a war chariot, and drive back to us as soon as you can. But as we can attain our point, even without Britain's help, take care that you secure a place for yourself among Cæsar's intimates."

But, without dwelling upon evidence like this, it is clear to every unprejudiced reader, that Cæsar's attempts upon Britain

were signal failures. Without dwelling upon the first expedition, which might be regarded as only tentative, the progress of the army during the second campaign was far from corresponding with the usual success of the general, the valour and discipline of his veteran legions, and the extent of the preparations for the invasion of a world hitherto unknown. A more efficient army than that which Cæsar transported into Britain, is scarcely to be found in the records of history. It probably amounted to thirty thousand foot soldiers, supported by two thousand cavalry. A force superior to that with which Hannibal descended into Italy, and almost equal to the gallant army which Alexander conveyed across the Hellespont, and which swept through Asia with the velocity and force of an irresistible torrent; nay more—it was a force far superior in numbers, and equal in discipline and valour to the army which Cæsar led into the field on the decisive day of Pharsalia, and whose victory gave the empire of the world to the Cæsars. Yet it failed to make any impression worth mentioning among the trophies of the great Julius. During a whole summer's campaign it never was enabled to advance a hundred miles from the shore, and its path through Britain was as narrow as it was short. It would be useless to impute this slow progress to the want of provisions, or to the barbarous habits of the enemies. The country was extremely populous, covered with human habitations, the fields teeming with corn, and, according to Halley's demonstration, ripening in the fields of Kent at the same period with the present harvests of that district. There were flocks and herds in abundance, and these, with plenty of corn, are the principal requisites for the maintenance of a hostile force. Even when the cautious general of the Britons discovered, from experience, that his infantry could not cope successfully with the skill and disciplined valour of the legions, he dismissed them all, and reserved only four thousand war chariots and their equipment. But four thousand war chariots mean eight thousand warriors and eight thousand horses, and the field service of

this irregular force was so effective as absolutely to check all the demonstrations of the Roman cavalry, and to confine the operations of the invaders to the ground which their infantry could traverse. Success, to a certain extent, was obtained by the Romans, but not that success to which Cæsar and his army were accustomed. The first proposals for accommodation advanced by Cassibelaunus were accepted with pleasure, on the express grounds that he could not be forced to submit in the course of one campaign. There was an idle parade of exacted hostages and a tribute demanded, which could not impose upon any one. The great chief was left in possession of his power; and the only means by which Cæsar could protect the rebellious Trinobantes and their prince, was an order from Cæsar, forbidding him to meddle with the clients of Rome, an injunction not likely to be long observed when the patron's arm was withdrawn.

What Cæsar saw during this expedition, and described from knowledge, is worthy of all attention; but what he has stated on the report of others, often perhaps misunderstood, is to be placed in the same category with all other hearsay evidence. Of his liability to be misled there cannot be more convincing proof than the fact that he has described tin as the produce of the interior part of the island. If he could be led astray on this point, which had always been supposed the great attraction of foreign traders to the British islands, we can have no certainty for the secondhand information which he has transmitted to us on subjects of less importance.

He had destroyed the Venetian fleet, according to Strabo, because he feared that the Veneti might interfere with his intended invasion of Britain; and he evidently was prepared to meet with opposition from a naval force, otherwise he would never have built eight-and-twenty war galleys, which were not of the slightest service to him.

The part of Britain which he invaded was evidently the scene of the Belgian conquests in Britain. As he had sent his young friend, Procillus, to converse with Ariovistus, who

had learned the Gallic language from the Sequani, so it was Comius, the Belgian chieftain of the Atrebates, that served for Cæsar's medium of communication with his kinsmen in Britain; and it was, doubtless, on his testimony, that Cæsar assigns the palm of superior civilization to the Kentish Belgæ.

Cassibelaunus was evidently a chief of another race, whose wars against the aggressive Belgæ had been continuous up to Cæsar's invasion, and to whom, nevertheless, the chief command in the war against the stranger had been unanimously entrusted. But his allies on the sea coast soon abandoned his standards, and permitted him to finish the war with his own resources.

Had Cæsar wished to find the kinsmen and commercial allies of the Veneti, he ought to have sought them in the western part of the island.

Even his own contemporary, Diodorus Siculus, who wrote an account of these very wars of Cæsar, has, in his fifth book the following passage:—"Now we will treat of the tin which is produced in this island. For those who inhabit that part of Britain which lies towards the promontory, called Belerium (the Land's End), are both exceedingly hospitable, and, on account of their intercourse with foreign merchants, civilized in their mode of life. These are they who manufacture tin by skilfully mining the ground which produces it. This ground is itself rocky, but contains veins of earthy ore, which they dig out, and, after smelting, purify it; then moulding it into the shape of dice, they convey it to a certain island lying off the coast of Britain, which is called 'Ictis.'"

Himilco, a Carthaginian, was employed, some five hundred years before Christ, in exploring the Northern Ocean along the coast of Europe, in the same manner as Hanno had been sent to explore the African coast. Festus Avienus, in his poem, called "*Ora Maritima*," embodied many of Himilco's observations, which are certainly the most curious and remarkable geographical fragments in existence, one portion of which is here translated for the general reader:—

“ Here is the city, Gaddir, formerly called Tartessus.

Here are the columns of the persevering Hercules,
Abila and Calpe. * * *

* * * * * *

And here rises the head of a promontory

(The ancients called it *Æstrymnis*),

And a lofty mass of a rocky eminence.

The whole of it principally faces the warm south ;

But under the summit of this promontory

The *Æstrymnic* bay opens to the inhabitants,

And in it the islands *Æstrymnides* raise their heads,

Widely spread, and rich in metals

Of tin and lead. Here dwells a numerous nation :

Their spirit is proud, their skill productive ;

All are continually busied in mercantile occupations,

And in their well-known barks they cut the boisterous sea,

And the deep eddies of the monster feeding ocean.

They know not how to form their ships of pine-wood,

Nor of maple ; nor yet with larch, as is the common use,

Do they rib their frail barks, but in a wonderful manner

They always furnish their vessels with continuous hides,

And often cross the spacious sea, borne on a skin.

From hence, two days' voyage will bring the ship

To the island surnamed Sacred by the ancients.

It raises, amidst the waves, its far-stretching turf,

And the nation of the *Hiberni* broadly inhabit it

Close to it, the island of the *Albiones* is open to the view.

The *Tartessians* into the confines of the *Æstrymnides*

Were accustomed to trade. So did the colonists of Carthage,

And the community dwelling within the columns

Of Hercules, used to frequent these seas.

Himilco, the Carthaginian, says : ‘ scarcely in four months,

As he found by his own experience,

Could the voyage (from Carthage) be accomplished.’ ”

The ships of the *Veneti* prove that they at least had, in the long interval between Himilco's voyage and Cæsar's invasion, availed themselves of the arts and skill of their Tartessian visitors.

It is a curious fact that Cornelius Balbus, the inseparable companion of Cæsar during all his Gallic campaigns, and who was himself a native of Gades, should not have been able to

have given more accurate information to his commander respecting the intercourse of the Phœnicians with Western Britain. Possibly the trade had decayed after the conquest of Spain by the Romans, and Tartessus had lost her former wealth and prosperity. There is, however, every reason to suppose that the knowledge obtained by Balbus during these campaigns, enabled him finally to restore the trade to his native city, and make it once more a flourishing emporium. This he probably did when he was pro-consul of Africa. The following passage, from the third volume of Strabo, will throw some light upon the subject:—"Outside the pillars is Gadeira . . . concerning which there are many reports. For these are the men who, equipping the most numerous and powerful fleets, sailed both into the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Although they inhabit but a small island, and possess but a small territory on the continent, not yet having the command of other wealthy islands, but for the most part dwelling at sea, as few stay at home or reside at Rome. In population it does not seem inferior to any city but Rome itself. I have heard that, in a census drawn up in my days, five hundred of the Gaditani were registered as members of the equestrian order, being a greater number than was enrolled in any of the Italian cities, with the exception of Patavium. Yet being so numerous, they occupy an island not much more than a hundred stadii in length and about one in breadth. At first they inhabited a very small city; but Balbus the Gaditan, he who triumphed, added another, which was called the 'new city,' while both together were called Didymo (the twin city), not exceeding a circumference of twenty stadii, while nevertheless the population was not crowded, for few make their homes there, because in general they are all out at sea, and many dwell on the continent, especially that part of it which is close to the off-lying islet, on account of its natural beauty. The inhabitants being delighted with the spot, have built another city as a rival to Didymo; but few, in comparison, even inhabit this and the naval docks, which Balbus

constructed for them on the continent over against the city."

But although Strabo speaks thus favourably of the wealth and population of the Gaditani, he nevertheless had a very confused idea of the position of the tin islands, the great source of their wealth, as is evident from the following passage, in which he arranges them with the Spanish islands:—"Now the Cassiterites are ten in number, and lie close to each other in the deep sea, to the north of the Haven of the Artabri. One of them is uninhabited; the rest are inhabited by men in dark cloaks, with tunics reaching to their feet, who wore girdles across their chests and walk with staves in their hands, like the furies in a tragedy. They live rather a nomadic life, on the produce of their flocks and herds. As they have the metals tin and lead, they exchange both these and hides for the earthenware, salt, and brazen vessels which they receive from merchants. In former times, the Phœnicians alone managed this trade from Gadeira, and concealed it from all others; and when some Romans were once following one of their shipmasters, that they also might discover the marts, the Phœnician, grudging this knowledge to them, willingly wrecked his vessel on a shoal, and, having brought the same destruction upon his pursuers, returned safe home, and received from the State the full value of his ship and cargo. The Romans, however, repeatedly renewing their attempt, at last discovered the route to the islands, especially since Publius Crassus, having crossed over to them, ascertained that the mines were not sunk very deep, and that the inhabitants, on account of their wealth, were peaceable, and discovered these seas to those who wished to frequent them. Thus much respecting Iberia and the adjacent islands." Who this Crassus was, and when he performed his voyage, is unknown; it must, however, have been after Julius Cæsar's expedition.

It may be asked whether the ancient inhabitants of the British islands preserved any traditions respecting this famous

expedition against their country, led by one whose fame extended from east to west, and north to south, wherever the name of Roman was known; and the answer is that there are distinct traditions, independent of the strong imaginations of Geoffrey of Monmouth, which prove the deep impressions left upon the minds of the Britons by the visit of the great captain. These are embodied in those ancient triads, which preserve the remembrance of past events, if not with historical accuracy, at least with sufficient adumbration of the truth to induce us to accept them as a copy of it reflected from the popular mind of the Cymri. They are documents of great antiquity, and bear the impress of their origin in something very like the truth. The following triad will remind the reader that Cæsar had complained of the frequent assistance sent over to Gaul by the Britons, and that this was the main cause of the invasion:—"A second emigrating host was conducted by Caswallawn (Cassibelaunus), the son of Beli, with his nephews, and the number of men were sixty-one thousand, and they went with Caswallawn against the Cæsarians, across the sea, to the land of the men of Llydaw (Armorica), who were of the original race of the Cymri, and there did not return into this island one of them or their descendants, but they stayed in the country of Gwasgwyn, amongst the Cæsarians, where they are to this day; and it was to avenge this invasion that the Cæsarians first came into this island."

Among all nations who have suffered from the violence of foreigners, that native who was the first to summon them to his own aid or that of his party has always borne the character of unmitigated infamy. The same part which in Spanish history is assigned to Count Julian, the associate of the Moors, in later British history to Vortigern, the friend and patron of the Saxons, is, in the earlier collision between Cæsar and the Britons, borne by Avarwy, the son of Lud, the son of Beli, who, according to this pedigree, would be the nephew of Caswallawn.

He is thus described in a triad.

“The three infamous traitors of the isle of Britain. The first was Avarwy, the son of Lud, the son of Beli the Great, who invited Iul. Kaisar and the men of Rome into this island, and was the cause of its oppression by the Romans, because he and his men became the guides and spies of the men of Rome, and received from them, yearly, an allowance of gold and silver.”

- And in another triad thus:—


“The three traitorous meetings of the isle of Britain. The meeting of Avarwy with the outlaws, who gave to the men of Rome room to land on the British island at the point ‘Rocks and green’ or ‘Rock green;’ and the end of this was, the men of Rome conquered the island.”

There is another tradition, not bearing the same authentic shape as the above, according to which Caswallawn was, at the time of Cæsar’s landing, waging war against the Gaels of Ireland, who had invaded Great Britain; that he defeated the enemies, and returned instantly to encounter the new invader from the South.

The communications which Julius Cæsar made to his contemporaries in his Commentaries ought to be regarded rather as bulletins than as trustworthy documents. Hence it is that he very often surprises us with the relation of a fact which we feel we ought to have known before. Thus, while describing his difficulties respecting procuring information with regard to the island and the inhabitants, he never told us that he had in his camp a young prince, the rightful owner of the crown of the Trinobantes—one of the most powerful nations in South Britain—and that he might rely on the co-operation of his friends. The sudden resolution not to attempt any opposition to the disembarkation of the Romans, savours more of treason than of prudence; and perhaps, had not the disaster happened to the fleet, which reduced Cæsar to a twelve days’ inaction, he would not have encountered that vigorous opposition with which he was certainly met after the maritime states had selected their inveterate enemy, Cassibelaunus, as their com-



The Meeting of Avarwy with the Outlaws.—p 206.



mander-in-chief. Their allegiance seems to have partaken more of the character of fear than affection, for they fell from him at the first decisive victory achieved by the Romans. Nor is it likely that he could have kept the field with such marked success were not his eight thousand chariot warriors old soldiers, inured to war, and thoroughly acquainted with their business. And here, perhaps, is the best place for introducing Cæsar's graphic account of their skill and activity:—
“This was their mode of fighting from their war chariots. First, they ride about in every direction, and hurl their darts; and thus, by the very dread caused by the charge of the horses, and rattling of the chariot wheels, they throw the ranks into disorder; and when they have once worked their way between the squadrons of cavalry, they spring down from their chariots, and fight on foot. In the meantime, the charioteers gradually retire from the battle, and place themselves in such a situation with their chariots, that if the warriors on foot be overpowered by a multitude of enemies, they furnish them with the means of a rapid retreat to their own troops. Thus they exhibit in battle the activity of cavalry and the stability of infantry, and they acquire so much skill by daily use and practice, that on steep and precipitous declivities they can rein in their horses when at full gallop, and instantly guide and turn them; they run along the pole, perch themselves on the yoke, and thence as rapidly as possible return to their seats.”

It may also be asked whether a knowledge of the original languages of Gaul and Britain is likely to prove useful in illustrating the life and actions of Julius Cæsar, and the answer will undoubtedly be, should the questioned know the subject, that such a knowledge is indispensable, and that it would be vain for any other than a profound Celtic scholar worthily to edit and explain even the Commentaries of Cæsar. The very question which has been so much agitated respecting the harbour from which Cæsar sailed in his expeditions to Britain is still in dispute; and although Halley and Horsley were undoubtedly right in fixing on the right spot, they

would have further confirmation had they known that one of the commonest names of a harbour is, in Gaelic, Cala; and that the Portus Ictius of Cæsar still retained its old name of Cala-is. The old Irish form is *Kaladh*, the *dh* being quiescent. The favourite name of the Romans for a harbour was Port-us, a name also used both by the Cymric and Gaelic races, while "Aber" is peculiar to the former, and Cala to the latter. It is not uncommon to find them both conjoined, as in the well-known name of Port-in-gal, the old name for the great harbour of Oporto; which remains a lasting token of the first part of the word, while the conjoined parts designate the present kingdom of Portugal.

It was in thinking upon the various combinations of this radical word in the Gaelic language, that I (to resume the first person) thought that, in reasoning upon the word *Burdigala*, the Gallic name for the modern Bordeaux, I had discovered something like a useful principle. As we are told by Strabo, that *Burdigala* was the emporium of the Bituriges; and we know that the ancient *Avaricum* of the Bituriges *Cubi*, is, in modern French, Bourges, it appeared to me clear that, even in very early times, the Gauls had in pronunciation shortened Bituriges into Bourges, and that in the old form, *Burdigala*, we had the abridged form of the full, *Biturigum-cala*. Exactly on the same principle that the *Butyrus* of the ancients, the Butter of the English, becomes in French *Beurre*. It also struck me that if this was the truth, it would almost necessarily follow that there was, in the time of the ancients, a sad disruption between the written and the vocal word; and that, in fact, the modern pronunciation of the names of Gallic localities is far more in unison with the older sounds than scholars have hitherto been inclined to suspect. This truth, if it be one, will receive great illustration from a fact well known to all Irish scholars, who pride themselves in retaining the original orthography of words, which, when pronounced, have little apparent connexion with their written representatives. If, therefore, we suppose that Cæsar availed

himself of the services of his friend Divitiacus, or of persons commissioned by him, we may well account for the accurate orthography in his Commentaries of words like *Matrona*, *Sequana*, *Rhodanus*, which yet in modern mouths are *Marne*, *Seine*, *Rhone*. But of this enough—I ought to add that the word *Cala* was not confined to a seaport, but that it indicated any passage by vessels across a river or a frith, and that in the Spanish Peninsula it is still in frequent use. Even the *Callao* of Lima is the original name of a port, which degenerating in modern mouths into the form of *quay*, is still to be found in all parts of Europe once possessed by the great Celtic nation.

Cæsar did not leave the British coast in a manner calculated to impress the Gauls with any very high idea of his success. This will be clear from his own account of his final departure. He had already sent across one moiety of his troops and prisoners, when misfortunes happened to derange his final operations. Of all the transports sent across full, and which were to return empty, in addition to sixty new vessels built by Labienus, very few were enabled to reach Cæsar's camp, and take on board the remainder of his forces. Almost all were thrown back upon the Gallic coast. Cæsar, therefore, after having long waited for them, fearing that they might be prevented from sailing at all by the season of the year, for the equinox was close at hand, was compelled by necessity to crowd his soldiers on board the ships still remaining at his command. We may safely infer that, under such circumstances, many of the prisoners, and much of the booty, were left on the north side of the British Channel. We need not therefore wonder that Lucan thought himself justified in placing in the mouth of Pompey, the famous line:—

“*Territa quæsitis ostendit terga Britannis,*”

Which may be thus adequately translated into English:—

“He sought the Britons, felt their force, and fled.”

He does not at the time seem to have been conscious that in

a career like his, want of great success was something like a great failure. His reception, on landing among the Morini, might have taught him to expect this; for, when three hundred of his soldiers had been forced to take to the shore not far from his main encampment, they narrowly escaped being massacred by a sudden insurrection of the peasantry. But his continued success had rendered him less cautious than he ought to have been; and, as the crops in Gaul had been but scanty during the preceding harvest, he divided his army among a large number of winter quarters.

One legion, under Caius Fabius, was placed among the Morini; a second, under Quintus Cicero, among the Nervii; a third, among the Essui, under Lucius Roscius; a fourth, under Titus Labienus, among the Rhemi, on the confines of the Treviri. Three, under the Lieutenants Marcus Crassus, Lucius Munatius Plancus, and Caius Trebonius, in Belgium, a term supposed to comprehend the Bellovaci, the Atrebates, the Ambiani, and perhaps two or three more tribes of no great note. An eighth, lately levied in the Transpadan territory, with five additional cohorts, among the Eburones, principally occupying the country between the Mosa and the Rhine, and subject to the two chiefs Ambiorix and Cativulcus. The Lieutenants Aurunculeius Cotta and Titurius Sabinus were appointed to the command of these fifteen cohorts.

There can be no doubt that the failure of the expedition against Britain had inspired the Belgians of the continent, with their German allies and kinsmen, with the hope that they also, by a vigorous effort, might prevent their country from being made the head-quarters of the Roman armies. But the first demonstration did not begin with them. Cæsar had raised to the chief authority among the Carnutes, Tasgetius, a high nobleman, whose ancestors before him had been kings of their tribe. This ally of Rome had been suddenly put to death by his own subjects. When the affair was reported to Cæsar he immediately ordered Lucius Plancus to lead into the country of the Carnutes one of the legions in Belgium, and to inquire into the whole of the case.

But, before the matter could be investigated, the Eburones, led by Ambiorix and Cativulcus, and excited by Indutiomarus, the powerful chief of the Treviri, made a sudden and treacherous attack upon the cohorts of Cotta and Sabinus, while engaged in taking the first steps for fortifying their winter quarters. The soldiers were young, the two commanders not very united in council. Ambiorix, an old associate of the Romans, was plausible and fair-spoken. The Roman cohorts, induced to quit their quarters, with the hope of being conducted to one of the nearest winter camps of the Romans, were deceived, surrounded in difficult passes, and, together with their generals, finally massacred. This was as heavy a loss as an army could well suffer without being destroyed. It could scarcely have fallen short of nine thousand men, with all the chief officers and centurions.

Elated by this success, Ambiorix roused to arms the Nervii and the Atuatici, who, joining the Eburones, made a fierce onset on the legion commanded by Quintus Cicero. But he defended himself with valour and judgment, refused to listen to any treacherous propositions, and found means of informing Cæsar of the critical position in which he was placed.

Fortunately Cæsar had not left Samarobrivæ, which he had of late made the head-quarters of his government, in Transalpine Gaul, when Cicero's messenger reached him. He lost no time in hurrying with his available force of only two legions, not exceeding seven thousand men, to the relief of the beleaguered legion. He was encountered on his road by an immense multitude of infuriated insurgents, whom he signally defeated, and thus delivered his soldiers from their great danger.

In the meantime the Treviri had risen in arms, and so beset Labienus, that he was prevented from aiding his general in relieving Cicero, but the news of Cæsar's success relieved him for the time from any attacks in that quarter.

But the whole of Gaul was so excited by the destruction of Cotta and Sabinus, that Cæsar, who was compelled to winter

there, was not allowed to have a moment's peace, as he was continually harassed by communications announcing fresh insurrections and new combinations, so that his trustworthy allies were reduced to the two nations of the Rhemi and Ædui, among whom he had divided the patronage derivable from Roman influence. "And," adds Cæsar, very naturally, "I do not know whether we ought to wonder at this, both for other numerous reasons, but especially because they felt the greatest pain that they who bore the reputation of excelling all other nations in martial valour, had lost so much of this renown, that they had to endure the military supremacy of the Romans."

But a signal victory won by Labienus over the Treviri, accompanied by the slaughter of their great chief, Indutiomarus, allayed the irritation for a time, and prevented the Carnutes and Senones, who had given undoubted tokens of a spirit of resistance, from breaking out into immediate action. The loss of the fifteen cohorts under Cotta and Sabinus was more than replaced by a new legion levied in Cisalpine Gaul, and by the loan of two legions raised in the same province for the service of Pompey. It was when Cæsar was absent on his second British expedition, that his daughter Julia had died in childbirth, and had been soon followed to the grave by her infant child, one of the strongest bonds between the two leading Triumviri.

The third, Crassus, had, at the expiration of his consulship, taken possession of his Syrian province, where he spent a whole year in corrupt exactions, and in plundering, among other sacred places, the Temple of Jerusalem.

CHAPTER XII.

PROCONSUL. B.C. 53.

THE whole attention of Cæsar was, during this campaign, fixed on one great object—the determination to wreak a merciless vengeance upon the Eburones and their chiefs, Ambiorix and Cativulcus, for their treacherous assault upon, and the massacre of Cotta, Sabinus, and the fifteen cohorts. We are told that he even had taken a vow, never to cut his hair, nor shave his beard, before this vengeance was signally fulfilled. His first step was to consider what tribes would be likely to harbour the Eburones in their distress, and enable them to escape the severity of the blow. These he inferred would be the Menapii, who, not deterred by the assaults of either Germans or Romans, still maintained their independence amidst their thickets and marshes; and, on the eastern side, the Treviri, whose strength was still unbroken, and who were continually intriguing with the Germans on the north of the Rhine, and soliciting them to aid the efforts of the Gauls to shake off the Roman yoke. He himself entered the country of the Menapii, who, after suffering great losses, were compelled to sue for peace, and agree to give no countenance to any of the enemies of Rome. He thence hurried into the country of the Treviri, where he found that Labienus, who had been left to watch their operations, had succeeded in signally overthrowing them before they could be joined by their German allies. These were a second time visited on their own side by Cæsar, who also built a second bridge. But the sudden retreat of the Suevi, the objects of his displeasure, into the interior forests, again induced him to return into Gaul without coming into collision with that formidable foe. He then devastated with fire and

sword the whole territory of the Eburones, drove Cativulcus to extremities, who committed suicide by drinking some preparation from the yew-tree. Nevertheless he failed in seizing Ambiorix, who, after many hairbreadth escapes, finally saved his life.

While the legions were thus scattered over the country, a body of Sicambrian cavalry, who had crossed the river with the intention of joining in hunting out and plundering their unfortunate kinsmen, on finding themselves in the vicinity of the baggage of the whole army, which was but slightly guarded by a Roman detachment under Quintus Cicero, could not resist the sudden temptation, but, making an unexpected onset, destroyed two cohorts, nearly took the encampment by storm, and retired in safety with an immense booty. When he had converted the territories of the Eburones into a desert, Cæsar returned to Durocortorum, where he held a council of all the chiefs of the Gauls; and, as some of the leading men, both Carnutes and Senones, had entered into a conspiracy with the enemies of Rome, he had them impeached before the council, and, according to its sentence, executed after the Roman fashion, Acco, king of the Senones, and many others, who declined appearing at this assembly, were excommunicated, with all due form. His legions were now ten in number. Two he quartered near the Treviri, two among the Lingones, the other six at Agendicum, the capital of the Senones, now Sens, a few miles below the confluence of the Yonne and the Seine. He then hastened into Cisalpine Gaul, from which he had now been nearly two years absent. On his arrival he heard that Publius Clodius had been slain by Milo; that, in consequence of the ensuing tumults, the Senate had passed a decree, empowering, among other regulations, Cn. Pompey to hold a general levy all over Italy. Cæsar, taking advantage of this, raised troops in the whole of his own province also. Pompey, either from sinister motives, or from a want of ability, had failed to manage the home politics in any satisfactory manner. Either the machine had proved unable to

discharge its necessary functions, or its superintendents were employed in bringing its action into discredit. The two consuls, of the year B.C. 53, had entered into a shameful compact with two of the candidates, C. Memmius and Domitius, according to which, if these should be appointed consuls, and pay their predecessors a certain sum of money, a forged decree of the Senate should be prepared, with all the necessary forms, conferring upon the two candidates certain provinces, on which they should enter at the close of their magistracy.

As something had gone wrong, Memmius himself read the document in the Senate. Yet, after all, Domitius and Messala were elected, although late in the year, principally by the united exertions of Pompey and the Senate. As this year was drawing to a close, Cicero writes thus confidentially to Atticus, respecting his feelings towards Cæsar :—“ Of the two consuls, Appius is still the same man ; his character could not suffer any further damage ; but Domitius Ahenobarbus had a sad fall, and is still prostrate. Memmius, however, after breaking off the coalition with Domitius Calvinus, against the latter’s wish, had lost all hope of success, and was on that account in favour of a Dictatorship, or of a suspension of all public proceedings, or even for a general licence. Consider well my equanimity and amusement, and my contempt of the Syrian province, and, by Hercules, my most affectionate connexion with Cæsar. For this is the only plank from the shipwreck which delights me. For he treats my brother Quintus with extraordinary marks of honour, dignity, and favour, even as if I was his general. He gave him his choice of his winter quarters, as he writes to me. Ought you not to love him ? And can you love one of *that* bad set ? ” But, alas ! the bad set were Cicero’s “ good men ; ” by them he eventually stood, and with them at last he fell.

Milo had slain Clodius at the close of the year B.C. 53 ; and, after a long interregnum, the Senate could devise no better mode of securing the public tranquillity than, on the motion

of the Consular Bibulus, by conferring a sole consulship upon Pompey, whose proceedings in the course of it will be described at the close of the year.

CHAPTER XIII.

B.C. 52.

THE internal disorders under which Rome was labouring must have been well known to the Gauls, and have led them to an expectation that, if by one combined effort they could vanquish the Roman legions, they would for ever free their fine country from the domination of a foreigner, against whom they and their ancestors had combated for so many centuries.

The failure of Cæsar's expedition into Britain, and the policy by which the British commander-in-chief had baffled the Romans, and confined their victories to the ground traversed by the legionary standards, must have been detailed to them in all its parts by the Atrebatian Comius, who had been in immediate communication with Cassibelaunus. Other tales from the Eastern world would also reach them about this time, and produce no slight impression upon their minds. Young Publius Crassus, after having with great distinction served under Cæsar in Gaul, had been summoned by his father to join him in the Parthian campaign, This he had done, but he had not left Gaul single-handed. He had taken with him a thousand horsemen, the choice and flower of the Gallic chivalry, most of whom had perished with himself in the plains of Mesopotamia. But the survivors could describe to their countrymen how a Roman army, in no degree inferior to the forces which Lucullus and Pompey had triumphantly led through Asia, had been first outmanœuvred and finally destroyed by the Parthian horsemen. Nor could they forget

that they also were strong in cavalry, and that Cæsar in all his campaigns had been supported by Gallic horse.

The chiefs, therefore, met each other in woods and remote spots, and deliberated upon the state of affairs. The recent death of Acco was felt as a national grievance, and they were not slow in convincing each other that his fate might soon be theirs. Their great want was leaders, and they promised boundless rewards to those parties who should commence the war, and secure the independence of Gaul at the hazard of their lives. The first great object was to cut off all communication between Cæsar and his army before their secret plans were revealed. That this would be easy, as the legions would not dare to quit their winter quarters in the general's absence, nor could he join them without the protection of a strong force. Finally, they affirmed that it was better to fall in the field of battle than not to recover their ancient glory in war and the liberty which they had inherited from their ancestors. In this general agitation of minds the Carnutes stepped forward and professed their willingness to commence the enterprise. There can be no doubt that this movement among the Gauls had the sanction of the Druids. These, in Cæsar's words, settle all public and private disputes. If any crime is committed, a murder perpetrated, or an inheritance or boundary be litigated, they decide the case, and assign both rewards and penalties. If any one, whether a private individual or a magistrate, refuses to stand by their adjudication, he is excommunicated. This is the severest punishment among them, for the excommunicated are held to be impious felons. All avoid them, nor will they admit them into their society or conversation, for fear of being polluted by coming in contact with them. They are excluded from the benefit of the law and from their civil rights. The Druids have a president, who holds supreme authority among them. At his death, if there be one of great pre-eminence, he becomes the successor. But if there be a parity among many, the president is elected by the vote of the Druids. Sometimes

they even contend in arms for this chief office. These, at a fixed period, annually meet within the boundaries of the Carnutes, on a consecrated spot, which is regarded as the centre of all Gaul. They are the officiating ministers in all sacrifices, whether of a public or private nature, and are the expounders of religious doctrine and practices. The Carnutes, on this occasion, professed that they would not refuse any danger in defence of the common safety, and that they would be the leaders of the war; and as, in present circumstances, they could not give mutual hostages as pledges of good faith, lest the design should be thus revealed, they requested that the compact should be ratified by a solemn oath over the military standards of the nations gathered into one place (and this, amongst them, is a religious compact of the most binding nature), that no one nation, after the commencement of the war, should be admitted.

Then, when the Carnutes had been praised by all, and a mutual oath had been taken by all present, and the time for commencing operations had been fixed upon, they all departed from the council.

When the day came, the Carnutes, under the guidance of two men of desperate characters, Cotuatus and Conetodunus, give the signal, and rush into Genabum, where they put to death many Roman citizens who had settled there as merchants, and with them Caius Fusius Cita, a Roman knight, attached to Cæsar's commissariat, and plunder all their property. The report of this deed was instantly spread over all Gaul. For when any extraordinary circumstance occurred, they passed it from mouth to mouth through the whole country, so that, in this case, the deed done at the rising of the sun at Genabum became known before nine at night within the Arvernian boundaries, distant one hundred and sixty miles.

At the same time one of the conspirators, Vercingetorix, an Arvernian chief of great influence, collected his own dependents, and set up the standard of revolt. He had been

a favoured officer in the service of Cæsar, and was the son of Celticus, who was once the chief magistrate of all Gaul, but had been put to death by his own nation for aiming at sovereign power. He was opposed at the commencement by his father's brother, Gobanitio, and the rest of the chief men who were unwilling to hazard the common safety in such a contest. But the cry of independence and liberty was too strong to be thus drowned: the people crowded to the patriot standard, and soon enabled Vercingetorix to defeat his antagonists, and expel them from the state. He was hailed as the King of the Arverni, and immediately sent messengers in every direction, calling upon his fellow-conspirators to fulfil their pledges. He was instantly joined by the Senones, Parisii, the Pictones, the Cadurci, the Turones, the Aulerci, the Lemovices, the Andes, and all the Armorican states, and acknowledged as the commander-in-chief. No time was lost in fixing the contingencies to be furnished by each state, and the time for acting. His great object was to raise and equip as large a cavalry force as possible. To the greatest activity he added the greatest severity against all military delinquents. And one of the strongest proofs that he was acting under the authority of the chiefs of the Druids, arises from the fact that the highest delinquency—most likely the abandonment of their standards by those who had taken the great oath—was punished by torture and the flames. Those guilty of lighter offences had their ears cropped or one eye plucked out, and were sent home to remind their countrymen of the punishment which awaited dastards and laggards.

When he had collected a large force by these and other means, he sent Lucterius, a Cadurcan, a bold and active adherent to the Ruteni, with orders to act upon the western frontiers of the Roman province. The Cadurcan soon roused to arms the Ruteni, the Nitiobriges, and the Gabali of that vicinity, and prepared to make an incursion into the province, and especially to threaten Narbo.

Vercingetorix himself led his army into the territory of

the Bituriges Cubi, and threatened to attack them if they refused to join the national movement. The Bituriges, who were under the protection of the Ædui, implored their assistance, and they, by the advice of the Roman officers commanding the winter quarters, sent a considerable force to protect them. But this force refused to cross the Liger, and returned with an account that they had received trustworthy information, according to which, should they have crossed the Liger, they would have been massacred by the united force of the Arverni and Bituriges. Their retreat threw the Bituriges into the arms of Vercingetorix.

Such were the tidings which reached Cæsar while yet in Italy. With his usual activity he hurried to the Rhone, where he felt himself placed in the greatest difficulty. He was very anxious to join the legions, but saw that, should he, on the one hand, summon them to come to him, a battle would most likely be fought in his absence, and should he, on the other hand, attempt to join them, he ran the greatest risk of being seized, even by tribes which at present appeared friendly. The success of Lucterius, however, demanded his first care. He therefore hurried to Narbo, lined the whole western side of the province with a defensive force, and ordered the remaining provincial troops, together with his new Italian recruits, to meet him in the territory of the Helvii, the southern neighbours of the Arverni. The ridge of the Cevennes arose like an insurmountable wall between these two nations, and, at that season of the year, was deep in snow. But nothing could resist the skill and daring activity of Cæsar. He opened a way through the mountain recesses, although in some places he had to cut through the snow a passage six feet deep. He burst upon the panic-stricken Arvernians of the upper valley of the Elaver, and ordered his cavalry to spread as widely as possible over the country, and multiply the scenes of devastation. The Arverni lost no time in reporting this sudden invasion to Vercingetorix, and summoning him to rescue his countrymen from impending de-

struction. He, unable to withstand their prayers, marched back his army to the scene of devastation. Cæsar had anticipated this movement, and, telling his own troops that he was going to procure reinforcements, and that he would not be absent for more than three days, hastened across the country to Vienna, where he found a body of cavalry fresh and vigorous, which he had caused to assemble there some days before; and, attended by these, traversed safely the territories of the Ædui, and reached the head-quarters of the two legions, who were wintering among the Lingones. On his arrival he summoned the other legions, and united them all in the same camp, before Vercingetorix even heard of his presence. This is, perhaps, one of the most wonderful operations recorded in military history, and reminds us of what Cicero, in no complimentary mood, called Cæsar, "a monster of activity and energy."

When Vercingetorix discovered the state of things, he led his army into the territory of the Boii, whom at the close of the Helvetic war Cæsar had assigned to the Ædui. Their chief town, the name of which is not well ascertained, was assailed, and hard pressed by Vercingetorix and his troops. Cæsar, although the winter was not over, and he foresaw great difficulties in provisioning the army in the field, determined to raise the siege at every risk, rather than submit to be judged incapable of protecting his allies. He therefore took the field at an inclement season of the year; captured Vellaunodunum, a town belonging to the Senones; forced a passage across the Liger, at Genabum; took that town itself by storm, and allowed the soldiers to plunder it. He then advanced to Noviodunum, a city of the Bituriges, which was surrendered to him.

In consequence of this rapid success, Vercingetorix summoned his chiefs to a council, and explained to them the only plan, which, in his judgment, could secure to them the victory. Cæsar thus describes it: "That the great object to be accomplished, was to intercept the forage and provisions of the Ro-

mans. That this was easy, both on account of their numerous cavalry, and the season of the year. That there was no forage in the fields fit for cutting; that it was only to be procured by scattered bands from the farm-houses. That such bands could daily be cut off by the Gallic cavalry. That private property ought to be sacrificed to the public exigencies; that all the villages and farm-houses within the reach of the Roman foraging parties should be consigned to the flames. That it mattered not whether the Romans were themselves slain, or only deprived of their baggage and cattle, without the aid of which the war could not be carried on. Besides, that all the towns which were not strongly fortified, either by nature or art, ought also to be burned, that they might not serve either as retreats to skulkers, or an enticing booty to the Romans. That should they regard these measures as grievous and bitter, they, nevertheless, ought to remember that they were far lighter calamities than to see their wives and children carried away into slavery, and themselves slaughtered, which, nevertheless, would necessarily be their fate, if vanquished."

An universal consent was given to this magnanimous measure. More than twenty towns of the Bituriges were burnt down in one day, and the example was followed by the adjacent states. But an exception was, unfortunately, made. Avaricum, one of the most splendid cities in all Gaul, was the capital of the Bituriges. Its gallant inhabitants were unwilling to burn with their own hands the pride and protection of their state, and pledged themselves to a successful defence, if they were allowed to make the trial. Their petition was granted, and Avaricum was spared.

Then followed a most desperate struggle between the Romans, intent upon taking, and the Gauls, equally intent on defending this important position. It was so well protected on many sides by the river Liger, and its marshes, that it was impossible to encircle it with a continuous line of wall. Cæsar, therefore, selected the least defensible point, and ad-

vanced against it a huge mound, which gradually, of broad dimensions and great height, approached the walls. All that valour, skill, and unbounded zeal could effect, was exhibited on both sides.

Vercingetorix, posted not far from the city, was in constant communication with the besieged, and as constantly on the watch to prevent the necessary supplies from reaching the Roman camp. When the defenders within the walls were beginning to be worn out, they were relieved by ten thousand of the bravest troops of the Confederacy. Hunger, extreme hunger, was enfeebling the strength of the legions; but, amidst much cold and hunger, they toiled on with a desperate fidelity, and would not listen to any proffers on Cæsar's part, that he was willing to raise the siege and recruit their strength.

This perseverance, backed by superior science, finally succeeded. In vain did the garrison and the male population attempt to retire, when they judged the place no longer tenable. The very women, in their extreme despair, announced their intention to the Romans, and Avaricum was taken by storm, and all its inhabitants, without respect to age or sex, were ruthlessly massacred. The reader, who wishes to know the exact degree of progress in the arts both of peace and war, to which the Gallic tribes had attained, will do well to study carefully the siege of Avaricum, as described by their conqueror.

The loss of forty thousand men, who, according to Cæsar's estimate, perished in this siege and assault, did not shake the confidence of the allied army in the prudence and skill of their chief. He had used all his influence to induce the Bituriges to acquiesce in the sentence of destruction, and forewarned them of the probable result. He gave them, also, cause to hope that negotiations were going on, which would combine all the nations of Gaul in one great league; which, if accomplished, might easily resist the whole world in arms. He finally called upon them to be advised by him, and to imitate

the wisdom and prudence of the Romans, by fortifying their camps, and adopting the other military works of their enemies. He was obeyed in everything; and soon, by his diligence and activity, restored the army to its former efficiency, and supplied it with an extraordinary number of archers, calculated to act as light troops. In the meantime, he was joined by Tritomarus, the son of Ollovicus, king of the Nitiobriges, whose father had been pronounced the friend of the Roman people by the Senate. He led into the camp of the confederates a large force of his own cavalry and other horsemen, raised in Aquitania, and paid by him.

The captured town was full of corn and provisions of every kind; with these the exhausted soldiers soon recruited their strength, and were again fit for the field. But Cæsar was prevented from immediately resuming operations, by the necessity of visiting the Ædui and settling a serious quarrel, which threatened that nation with a civil war. Their chief magistrate was annual; but at the last election two equally claimed to have been legally chosen. The one was Convictolitanus, a young man of a flourishing fortune and of illustrious birth. The other, Cotus, a man of very ancient family, and himself distinguished by his power, and the number of his kinsmen. His brother, Valetiacus, had been chief magistrate for the preceding year. The whole state was in arms, the Senate was divided, the people divided, each party had a long list of client followers.

After duly examining into the case, Cæsar decided that the election of Cotus was vicious for many reasons. It had not taken place either at the appointed place or time; and, according to the fundamental laws, so far were two brothers from being eligible to the chief magistracy while both were still living, that they could not even sit together in the Senate. The election of Cotus was therefore annulled, and Convictolitanus declared chief-magistrate. As the Ædui had been extremely negligent in supplying the Romans, while besieging Avaricum, with the provisions which they had promised to

supply, we may be certain that Valetiacus and his brother Cotus were inclined to join the national confederacy, and that the capture of that city had alone prevented them from openly professing their inclinations.

After advising the Ædui to forget their civil dissensions, and to support him in the present war, for which conduct, at its close, they should receive rich rewards, Cæsar requested them to send to his camp, as soon as possible, the whole of their cavalry, and ten thousand infantry, to protect the conveyance of provisions, and other stores. He then detached Labienus, with four legions, against the Senones and Parisii. He himself, with the remaining six, proceeded to assail the Arverni in their own country. Before he could approach their capital, Gergovia, he had to pass the Elaver, which was not an easy task, because Vercingetorix had broken down all the bridges, and, by presenting himself on the left wheresoever Cæsar marched on the right bank, long prevented him from either building a new bridge, or repairing any of the broken communications.

Cæsar, however, out-manœuvred the Gallic general, and transferred all his forces to the right bank. Vercingetorix, to avoid a battle, rapidly retreated to Gergovia, which he had chosen as the place where he was determined to stand and await the Roman attack.

This citadel of the Arverni occupied the summit of a lofty hill, difficult of access, and strongly fortified. Midway down the steep declivity the Gallic general had built a stone wall six feet high. Between this wall and the outworks of the city he had pitched his camp. On the fifth day after crossing the Elaver, Cæsar approached the place, and examined from the plain the formidable position of the Gallic general. The space between the city and the outward wall was covered with the warriors of the different states, separated by short intervals, and distinguished by their peculiar standards and devices. The order of Roman discipline was closely imitated. In the morning the various chiefs were seen moving from their own

quarters to the Prætorium of Vercingetorix, where reports were duly made, and the plan of operations for the day determined and explained. Strong detachments of cavalry, supported by light troops, were daily sent forth to harass the Romans, and accustom the Gauls to face them in the field.

Cæsar confesses that when he had carefully examined the formidable array, the strong position, and the regular discipline of the Gauls, he despaired of being able to carry the place by force. Neither had he the magazines necessary to enable him to commence a blockade with any hopes of success. As he, however, saw that the Gauls had neglected to occupy with a sufficient force an isolated hill lying between his camp and the city, he seized it by a night movement, fortified it, and having connected it with his camp by a road between a double ditch, stationed there two legions for its defence.

In the meantime Convictolitanus, the new Æduan Vergobret, had joined the national cause, and was only waiting for a convenient opportunity to induce the state to take the same part. This step, according to his own view, and probably that of all Gaul, was to seal the destruction of the Roman army. He arranged his plans with several of the younger chiefs, and, as the Æduan cavalry had already joined Cæsar, he gave the command of the ten thousand infantry intended for the same service to Litavicus, a young nobleman of great influence, and one of his accomplices.

This officer halted within thirty miles of the Roman army, and having convoked the troops, informed them with many tears and expressions of sorrow, that Viridumarus and Eporedorix, the commanders of the cavalry, had been massacred, with their men, by the Romans, on a charge of treasonable communication with the Arverni. Witnesses were brought forward to attest the truth of the massacre, and proclaim that they alone had escaped in the general confusion.

The soldiers, struck with terror, besought their generals to

save them, and were told by Litavicus that their only place of refuge was the camp of the confederates, under the walls of Gergovia. He warned them, that in all probability the Romans were then marching against them for the purpose of completing the work of destruction. "Let us," he finally said, "if we have any spirit, avenge the death of our countrymen, and put these robbers to the sword."

There was a bitterness in this struggle which had not hitherto characterized the contest between the Romans and the Gauls. On the part of the latter it was "war to the knife," and in accordance with this principle, Litavicus pointed out to the excited soldiery some Roman citizens, who superintended a convoy of provisions, which the Ædui were to have safely conducted to the Roman camp. These were massacred with every circumstance of cruelty. The convoy was plundered, deputies sent home to explain all the circumstances to the magistrates, and the soldiers led in the direction of Gergovia by Litavicus. Secret communications reached the Æduan cavalry announcing these events. The brothers of Litavicus, with their friends, immediately left the camp; but Eporedorix, one of the commanders, entered Cæsar's tent at midnight, and announced the alarming intelligence. No time was lost; Cæsar immediately commenced his march with four legions, unencumbered, and after a forced march of twenty-five miles, came in sight of the Æduan infantry. Eporedorix, with the other commanders of the cavalry, were sent forwards to explain the falsehood, and to give a personal contradiction to the fact of the alleged massacre. They succeeded in their efforts, and the infantry, finding themselves within the grasp of the legions, threw down their arms, stretched out their hands, and loudly called for mercy, which of course was granted. Litavicus, followed by his clansmen, in whom it would have been infamy to betray their chief, reached the camp of the confederates in safety.

Cæsar's first step was to inform the Æduan magistrates that the treason had miscarried, and that their troops, although punishable by the law of nations, were safe in his camp, and

kindly treated. But this information came too late. The first message received from Litavicus, as yet successful, had excited popular outrages: many Romans were slain, others sold as slaves, and the property of all was plundered. But all was changed on receiving Cæsar's letters. The pillagers of Roman property were made amenable to law; Marcus Aristius, a Roman tribune of the soldiers, who had been arrested on his road to join his legion, shamefully treated and nearly murdered on the preceding day, was now sought out and courted by the chief men, who threw the whole blame upon the rude populace. They even confiscated the property of Litavicus and his brothers. But these were only temporary measures: they felt that the state was compromised, and began to prepare for an open declaration of hostilities: the precarious situation of the troops in the power of Cæsar alone postponed the decisive event.

The night march of the four legions had not escaped the vigilance of Vercingetorix, who made a furious assault upon the two left in the camp under the command of Caius Fabius: with difficulty the defence had been made good until night separated the combatants. The attack was to be renewed with the returning day; but the extraordinary exertions of Cæsar and his legions relieved the anxious Fabius, for the rising sun gleamed upon the arms of the returning legions.

But the position of Cæsar was now extremely critical; the convoy of provisions had been destroyed, the position of Vercingetorix was unassailable, and loud rumours of the approaching defection of all Gaul compelled him to prepare for a retreat and a reunion with Labicuis and his forces. Still he was anxious that his retreat should not assume the appearance of flight.

One day, on viewing the enemy's encampment round Gergovia from the summit of the hill, fortified by him, he saw that it was left almost bare of troops. On questioning the deserters, who daily passed over to him, he found that the hill

on which Gergovia was built, had a long and level ridge, stretching southwards, which, if seized by the Romans, might endanger the communications of Vercingetorix with the countries in his rear. That consequently the Gallic general daily employed the greater number of his troops in making this ridge impregnable. It occurred to Cæsar that a false attack on this ridge might induce Vercingetorix to withdraw the flower of his troops from Gergovia, which might thus be exposed to a successful attack from the front.

During the following night a few horsemen were sent into the vicinity of the suspected ridge, to ride about and blow their trumpets, and thus to make the enemy suppose them a formidable force. At daybreak the soldiers' servants and other camp followers, with helmets on their heads, and mounted on mules, were sent by a long circuit to the right, with the apparent intention of concentrating a strong force for an attack upon the suspected spot.

Vercingetorix, to whom, from his position on the hill, all these movements were visible, although the minuter details were not distinguishable, thought he could foresee a desperate assault upon the ridge in the rear, and employed almost all his forces in strengthening that position with new works. To increase this feeling, Cæsar sent one legion in the same direction, and ordered it to conceal itself in the woods on the low ground. When Cæsar saw that the camp was nearly deserted, he ordered the remaining legions, with their armour covered, and their standards muffled and lowered, that they might not attract the eyes of the townsmen, to pass in small detachments from the greater to the smaller camp. He explains to the commanding officer of each legion his intended operations, that a surprise, and not a battle, was his main object; and that they should keep their men well in hand, and by no means permit them to be implicated too far in such broken and dangerous ground. The distance from the edge of the plain and the commencement of the rising ground, to the walls of Gergovia, was, in a straight line, twelve hundred

paces; but the steepness of the hill made it difficult to ascend without deviating from such a course. The signal was then given to the Romans for an immediate sally from the smaller camp, and to the Æduan troops who were posted on the right, to ascend the hill in their own front.

The Romans rapidly crossed the intervening space, scaled the stone wall, six feet high, and made themselves masters of three of the camps placed between this wall and the city. Teutomarus was surprised in the middle of his siesta, and narrowly escaped without his corslet, upon a wounded charger.

Cæsar, satisfied with this success, ordered the trumpet to sound a retreat. But the tenth legion, which he himself commanded, alone obeyed; the rest, separated from him by a broad ravine, did not hear the signal. Their officers, however, attempted to restrain their ardour, but their men, elated with success, and eager for booty, rushed forwards to carry the city itself by storm. Their leading champions were already at the gate, and close to the walls, when the cry arose within, that the enemy were victorious, and the city captured. A panic seized the garrison, and the soldiers hurried to escape by the opposite gate. The Gallic matrons appeared upon the walls, with their hair dishevelled and bosoms bare, and casting over their ornaments and other valuables, besought the captors to spare their lives, and not, as at Avaricum, to massacre all, without regarding age or sex. Some of them even dropped down from the walls into the arms of the Roman soldiers.

Lucius Fabius, a centurion of the eighth legion, was the first, with three of his own men, to scale the city walls. He had told his company in the morning that he was roused by the rewards distributed to the leading champions at Avaricum, and that he would spare no effort in being the first to enter Gergovia. But Fabius was not destined to succeed.

Vercingetorix, undeceived by the cry in his rear, and by the fugitives of the garrison, hastened to repair his mistake, and galloped into the town at the head of the cavalry, leaving

orders for the infantry to follow as rapidly as possible. Their arrival soon changed the face of affairs. The matrons now implored their countrymen's protection, pointed, according to custom, to their locks hanging loose down their shoulders, and brought forth their children before the soldiers' eyes. The Gauls proved victorious. Fabius and his comrades were slain, and cast over the wall. Marcus Petreius, who had been in vain attempting to force open a gate, was surprised to see it suddenly thrown open from within, and himself and detachment exposed to almost certain death. He ordered his men to save their lives, and rushing forwards himself, made the gateway good until the soldiers joined the legion. Hitherto the Romans, although hard pressed, were not beaten, when the appearance of the Ædui, advancing up the hill on their right, led them to mistake them, from their arms and appearance, for Gallic enemies, although they had bared their right shoulders, which it seems was a sign of friendship. Perhaps the soldiers had reason to suspect that even if they *were* Ædui, much assistance, at such a crisis, was not to be expected from them. Be that as it may, they turned and fled, and were pursued to the foot of the hill by Vercingetorix. Further advance was checked by Cæsar and the tenth legion, and the cohorts of the camp who had been drawn out to cover the retreat of the assailants. Forty-seven centurions fell on this disastrous day.

After remaining in his position for two days, partly to encourage and reassure his soldiers, and partly to avoid the appearance of flight, immediately after receiving so serious a check, Cæsar marched back by the way he came, and in three days reached the repaired bridge, although five days were spent in advancing over the same ground. Vercingetorix did not harass his retreat, but sent a powerful force under Litavicus to detach the Ædui from the Roman alliance.

After crossing the Elaver, and encamping on the right bank, Cæsar was visited by the two Æduan chiefs, Eporedorix and Viridumarus, who told him that they had received a secret

communication, stating that Litavicus, accompanied by all the cavalry, had set out from the camp of Vercingetorix to instigate the Ædui to join the national cause, and that nothing but their own presence could prevent his success. Cæsar, although convinced of their intended treachery, allowed them to depart, and thus to leave them without any excuse for hostility to him. He, however, advised them to remind their countrymen of the fallen state in which he had found them, and of the wealth, power, and influence they had acquired under his protection.

The two chiefs left Cæsar's camp, marched down the Elaver, crossed the Liger, and entered Noviodunum, an Æduan city on the right bank, and commanding an important passage across the river. Here were deposited Cæsar's magazines, his military chest, a great part of his own and soldiers' property. Hither he had sent an immense number of horses, bought up in Italy and Spain, for the purpose of remounting his cavalry. Above all, here were detained those hostages which the Romans held as pledges of the fidelity of the Gallic states. The two leaders were here informed that Litavicus had entered Bibracte, among the acclamations of the Ædui; that he had been met by the magistrates, headed by the Vergobret Convictolitanus; that deputies had been already sent to conclude an alliance with Vercingetorix.

Unable to withstand the national feeling, and overpowered by the magnitude of the temptation, the Æduan chiefs forgot all their pledges of fidelity, suddenly assailed and slew the Roman garrison, seized and divided the money and horses among themselves, and sent the hostages under escort to Bibracte. They then burnt the town, as not being tenable, destroyed the provisions which they could not carry away, broke down the bridge, and took all necessary precautions to prevent Cæsar from crossing to the right bank of the Liger.

The massacre of Genabum on the one hand, and the indiscriminate slaughter at Avaricum on the other, seem to have annulled all the conventional rules of war, and to have left no alternative between victory and death.

Cæsar's position was very critical. Behind him was a victorious and infuriated enemy, around a country devastated by friend and foe, in front the deep and rapid Liger, with its right bank occupied and guarded by the enemy. But he was not at liberty to choose his line of action, even could he expect to lead his legions in safety to the south, through the passes of the Cevennes, or force his way eastward into the valley of the Rhone and the Allobrogian territories. He could not think of abandoning Labienus and his four legions to the combined hostilities of all Gaul. Marching, therefore, by day and night, he arrived on the banks of the Liger before the enemy was able to gather any considerable force to oppose him, and passed it by a deep ford, the force of which he broke by forming lines of cavalry above, while the legionaries crossed below, with the water up to their shoulders. He seems to have saved nothing but his soldiers and their arms, but the right bank was a land of plenty, and his wearied and famished soldiers, thus recruited, were led into the territories of the Senones.

There Labienus had already arrived. This great officer, inferior to Cæsar alone in a thorough knowledge of the practice of war, had, after adopting offensive measures against the Parisii, Senones, and Aulerci, and other tribes in that vicinity, who were under arms under the command of an old military chief, called Camulogenus, had met with considerable success, and crossed to the northern bank of the Seine, where he had gained possession of the island which afterwards formed the nucleus of the great city of Paris. But here his further progress was arrested by the tidings, which soon spread in every direction, that the Romans had been driven from Gergovia; that the Ædui had revolted, and that the insurgents were everywhere successful; that Cæsar himself, unable to cross the Liger, was marching into the province; finally, that the Bellovaci were in arms, and ready to fall upon the rear of Labienus.

This great general immediately retraced his steps, defeated and slew Camulogenus, and his troops, who in vain attempted

to detain him on the right bank of the Seine, and after a most masterly retreat, reached Agendicum, where he left his baggage; whence marching, he soon brought his legions into Cæsar's camp. The prospect of the united force was excessively gloomy, for all Gaul, with the exception of the Rhemi, Lingones, and Treviri, had rallied round the national standards. The first two refused to join because they were attached to the Romans; the Treviri, because they were threatened with a German invasion. A general assembly of all Gaul was convoked at Bibracte, the capital of the Ædui. Here thronged the deputies from all Gaul, and the chief command of the united confederacy was almost unanimously bestowed upon Vercingetorix. The Ædui alone viewed this aggrandizement of their ancient rival, the Arvernian nation, with reluctance. The commander-in-chief soon resumed his active habits; he ordered the cavalry, fifteen thousand in number, to assemble at Bibracte; and a brother of Eporedorix to lead ten thousand Æduan infantry, with eight hundred cavalry, to approach the confines of the Allobroges; to stir up the slumbering hostility of that warlike nation against their Roman conquerors; and to hold out to them the promise of the supremacy over the whole province, should the Gauls be victorious. He orders the Gabali and the nearest cantons of the Arverni to make incursions among the Helvii, and the Ruteni and Cadurci, and to infest the boundaries of the western part of the province. The sole means of defending the province were twenty-two cohorts, under the command of the lieutenant, Lucius Cæsar. The Helvians, having attacked the Arvernians, were defeated, with the loss of their chief, Donotaurus, the brother of Cæsar's friend, Caius Valerius Procillus. The Allobroges refused to listen to the proposals of the confederates, and carefully guarded the fords of the Rhone.

In the meantime, Cæsar, conscious of the inferiority of his cavalry, had sent agents into Germany to procure a body of German horsemen, and of infantry trained after their fashion,

to act along with him. As their horses, when they arrived, seemed small and feeble, he took all the chargers which he could find in his army, and distributed them among his German auxiliaries.

He was moving southward along the confines of the Lingones, and into the Sequanian territory. It was apparently intended to quit the hostile country, and to proceed to defend the province. His former laurels seemed destined to be withered on Cæsar's brow, and his great victories appeared likely to produce no beneficial result to himself or country, beyond the casual spoils of war. But Vercingetorix was not willing to allow the Romans to retire with impunity. He threw himself on their path, and having convoked his officers, told them that the moment of victory had arrived, that the Romans were quitting Gaul and retiring into the province. But this ought not to be allowed, their march must be impeded, their communications interrupted; and, if permitted to escape, it must be at least with the loss of their baggage, and with every mark of defeat, and that the superiority of the Gallic cavalry rendered this an easy process, should they act with their usual courage. This address was received with acclamations, and the chief said that it was necessary that a solemn oath should be administered, binding all not to receive under their roof that man who should not have twice ridden victoriously through the enemy's cavalry; nor to allow him to approach his parents, children, wife. But all these religious bonds and fiery zeal were of no avail against Cæsar's legions, and his German auxiliaries, guided by the skill of their matchless commander.

The Gallic cavalry, in the very first serious attempt to impede the Roman march, were utterly defeated and scattered by the united Germans and Romans, and in their confused retreat struck terror into the infantry, which also fled panic-struck.

Vercingetorix took refuge under the walls of Alesia, the chief town of the Mandubii, with eighty-four thousand

infantry and ten thousand cavalry. Of this city Diodorus gives the following account:—"Here (the Tyrian Hercules), from the vast multitude who accompanied his expedition, founded a considerable city, which, from his wandering, he called 'Alesia,' and with his own soldiers he allowed many of the native inhabitants to become citizens. Now as these exceeded the strangers in number, the whole population became finally barbarized. But the Celtæ, even to the present time, have always honoured this city as being the hearth and mother city of all Celtica, and it continued ever since the days of Hercules free and un plundered until our time. But at last it was captured by Caius Cæsar, who, for the greatness of his exploits, was deified, and compelled, with the other Gauls, to acknowledge the supremacy of the Romans."

From Cæsar himself we have no hint respecting the sacredness of the site, although, on this point, Diodorus is excellent authority; and it increases the interest of the scene, if we imagine that Vercingetorix took refuge under the walls of the sacred city of his country, which had hitherto remained invincible, and around which he could confidently trust to gather the whole force of Gaul; to save from pollution the hearthstone of their race.

This rock fortress was placed, like Gergovia, on the summit of a hill, but a loftier and a steeper hill. Its foot on two different sides was washed by two streams, which enclosed between their confluence a plain some three miles long. The whole valley, in which the town was situated, except at this point, was surrounded by two eminences, equal in height, and only broken here and there by narrow passes. The eastern front of the hill, between the city walls and a ditch, with a stone wall six feet high, was occupied by the Gallic army.

Cæsar, having thoroughly examined the nature of the ground, determined, as there was no prospect of carrying such a position by storm, upon blockading the immense force within their impregnable fortifications. As this would require, in the first place, a wall of circumvallation eleven

miles in length, he began to raise on the different eminences a succession of forts, which were finally to be connected.

Vercingetorix saw what was intended, and sent his cavalry into the plain above described, where, after a severe contest, they were completely driven back upon the intrenched camp. Next night, while the roads were yet open, Vercingetorix dismissed this now useless force, with orders to return to their several nations, and call upon them to rescue him and the flower of the warriors of Gaul from impending danger. That he could hold out for thirty days, and perhaps some time longer, by sparing the store of provisions.

Cæsar, who received from deserters daily accounts of the Gallic transactions, redoubled his efforts, and prepared to secure his legions from an external attack by a second wall of circumvallation, fourteen miles in length, and adopted all the plans which the ingenuity of Balbus and his corps could invent, both to prevent Vercingetorix and his troops from breaking out, and the expected reinforcements from forcing their way within his external wall of circumvallation.

In the meantime, the Gauls, roused by the messengers of Vercingetorix, called a general assembly of the chiefs, in which it was determined to rescue Vercingetorix with an overwhelming yet limited number of warriors. The Ædui and their clients were ordered to furnish five-and-thirty thousand, the Arverni the same number; the Senones, the Sequani, the Bituriges, the Santones, the Ruteni, the Carnutes, twelve thousand each; the Bellovaci ten, and the Lemovices the same number: the Pictones, the Turones, the Parisii, and the Helvii, eight thousand each; the Suessiones, the Ambiani, the Mediomatrici, the Petrocorii, the Nervii, the Morini, the Nitiobriges, and the Aulerci Cenomanni, five thousand each. The Atrebates, four thousand, the Bellocassi, the Lexovii, the Aulerci Ebuovices, three thousand each; the Rauraci and Boii thirty thousand, and the Armorican states six thousand. The Bellovaci alone refused to send their quota, as they said they would war on their own account, and under their own

auspices, upon the Romans. Comius the Atrebatian, the once favoured friend of Cæsar, and whom he had found so useful in his British campaigns, prevailed on them to send two thousand men under him to join the confederacy. So universal was the Gallic feeling in favour of recovering former independence, and vindicating their ancient glory, that benefits and friendship were alike forgotten. The contingents of the several nations met in the Æduan territory, and on being reviewed and mustered, were found to amount to two hundred and forty thousand infantry, and eight thousand cavalry. Here they chose four commanders—Comius, the Atrebatian, and Viridumarus and Eporedorix, the Æduans, all three friends and war pupils of Cæsar, and the Arvernian Vergasillaunus, the near kinsman of Vercingetorix. Then they marched in full confidence that nothing could resist their numbers and valour.

The condition of their beleaguered countrymen was in the meantime deplorable. The different contingents could not be levied, armed, and mustered, within the appointed time, and famine and hunger were making sad ravages among the besieged. Some were for throwing themselves on the mercy of Cæsar; others for attempting to break forth while their strength and vigour were still unimpaired. But the speech of Critognathus, a noble Arvernian of great influence, determined them to undergo all extremities, rather than adopt either of these desperate proposals. “What, then, is my advice?” said he. “It is to do what our ancestors did in the war against the Cimbri and Teutones, which is not to be compared to the present struggle. They, when driven into their cities, and labouring under similar want, prolonged their lives by subsisting on the bodies of the non-combatants, and refused to surrender themselves to the enemy. And if we had not this precedent before us, we nevertheless ought to establish such example, and transmit it to our posterity. For what comparison is there between the two wars? The Cimbri, after devastating Gaul, and inflicting great calamities upon it, after

a time quitted our territories, and went forth to other lands. Our rights, laws, and liberties, were left to us. But what else is the object and intention of the Romans, except to settle in our country, and impose eternal slavery upon us, whose renown and power in war they both acknowledge and envy. Nor have they ever warred, except with such a purpose; and if you know not what is going on in distant lands, look at your neighbours in their province, whose rights and laws have been changed, and who, reduced to military obedience, are crushed with everlasting slavery." The result of this advice was scarcely more humane. The non-combatants, together with all the Mandubii, were driven forth to perish in the interval between the hostile lines.

At last the troops of the confederacy appeared in sight, and encamped upon a hill distant about a mile from the exterior circumvallation of Cæsar. Next day they poured their cavalry and light armed troops, principally archers, into the plain before described. Cæsar, keeping his main body within the lines, to prevent Vercingetorix from breaking out, sent forth his cavalry to meet them. Again, after a severe contest, the Gauls were defeated, principally by the German auxiliaries.

After one day's interval, Comius and his colleagues attempted, at the head of the infantry, to carry the outworks by storm, but were driven back with a heavy loss, even before Vercingetorix could bring his troops to act simultaneously with them.

On the north of Alesia rose a hill which Cæsar had not embraced within his lines, but had drawn them along its side, so as to leave on the outside a considerable eminence which commanded them. Sixty thousand chosen warriors, under Vergasillaunus, were detached from the Gallic camp to make a circuit, and at midday, the usual hour of repose, to ascend that hill from the rear, and thence from the vantage-ground to break through the Roman lines. This was done, and at the same time the cavalry and infantry from the camp assailed the lines on the plains in various quarters. Vercingetorix,

also, who could see the whole proceedings, concentrated all his forces opposite that part of the lines which Vergasillaunus was to assail. The assault took place, the struggle was long and desperate, but at its close a sally, planned by Labienus, and led by him and Cæsar in person, drove the Gauls from the hill, scattered them in flight, and captured Vergasillaunus himself. Probably these were the only soldiers whom the Gallic leaders could trust, for, as soon as their total defeat was witnessed, Vercingetorix withdrew his men from the fortifications, and the rabble in the camp, brought in a hurry to the field, broke up in disorder and dispersed, each man to his own home.

Next day the army, cooped in Alesia, despairing of further succour, surrendered as prisoners. Cæsar distributed the greater number among his soldiers, who each received a captive for service, sale, or ransom. He reserved all the Arvernians and Æduans, as he expected to recover those two great states by sparing them. Having thus arranged the whole affair, he marched into the Æduan territory, where the whole state submitted without further resistance. So also did the Arvernians. He exacted a large number of hostages from both, and restored to them twenty thousand of their citizens, whom he had captured. Thus the mainsprings of the national confederacy were snapped asunder, and Gaul, in its aggregate character, was subdued. The vigour, energy, skill, toil, perseverance, and dauntless intrepidity exhibited by Cæsar and his ten legions during this campaign, are not to be surpassed in the records of nations. An army which could not have exceeded fifty thousand men, without money, without magazines, without a line of communication with any friendly point, or a chance of reinforcement, withstood a gallant nation in arms, and utterly subdued, first their bodies, and then their spirits. "Cæsar," says Paterculus, "at the siege of Alesia, undertook such operations as a mere mortal would hardly dare to undertake, and which almost no one but a God could have achieved."

When the dispatches announcing this great success were received at Rome, another supplication for twenty days was decreed, being almost the last friendly act shown by the senate to Cæsar.

The sole consulship of Pompey was distinguished by many acts of legislation which, if they tended to the restoration of order, were supposed to bear hard upon the friends of Cæsar. These regarded the sole consulship as a bribe given by the oligarchs to Pompey for breaking from the democratic party and returning to his original position among them. "They made him sole consul," says Dion, "from a fear that Cæsar would be chosen as his colleague. They introduced a novelty, indeed, hitherto unknown to the constitution, and thought that they had acted rightly; for he did not court the people as much as Cæsar did. They hoped therefore to detach him entirely from Cæsar, and to secure him to their own interests; and such was the result. For Pompey, being elated with this novel and unprecedented honour, adopted, after this event, no measure in favour of the people, but acted entirely according to the will of the senate." Yet Pompey, not willing entirely to break his connexion with Cæsar, allowed a law to be passed, according to which Cæsar should be permitted to stand for the consulship in his absence. But this was the only concession. He soon after married Cornelia, the widow of young Publius Crassus, and daughter of a Scipio Nasica, whom a Metellus Pius had adopted. The marriage ceremonies were, according to Plutarch, a source of annoyance to his more prudent friends, who thought the bride a more suitable match for his son than for himself. "It grieved them to see him crowned with garlands, and offering sacrifice among the marriage festivities, when he ought to have considered his consulship as a public calamity, since, had not the republic been in distress, it would never have been granted to him in opposition to the laws."

He reconstituted the judicial tribunals upon a more equitable basis, and passed some salutary laws for the repression

of acts of violence and bribery. Milo was brought to trial for the murder of Clodius, and was condemned and sent into banishment. Hypsæus, another candidate for the consulship, was condemned for acts of bribery, and underwent the same fate. The third candidate, who was equally guilty, was Pompey's new father-in-law, who, instead of being punished, was protected by his son-in-law, and adopted as his colleague in the consulship for the remainder of the year. Other gross acts of his corrupt partiality are mentioned by various authors. Hence the bitter censure of Tacitus:—"Then followed the third consulship of Pompey, who was elected to reform the prevailing corruption, but whose remedies were more grievous than the diseases. He was both the author and subverter of his own laws, and lost in arms what by arms he attempted to maintain." He took care that his Spanish provinces, with the due number of men and supplies of money, should be prolonged for another quinquennial period, although he passed a law that thenceforward no magistrate should enter upon this office until five years had elapsed after the termination of his magistracy, and that the provinces vacated under this law should be administered by members of the consular bench. Under this law, Cicero, at a very interesting period of the approaching crisis, was, in his own language, banished to Cilicia.

The author of the second letter to Julius Cæsar, which is ascribed to Sallust, and usually appended to his works, and which was undoubtedly written before the commencement of the civil war, describes the consequences of this sole consulship in very bitter, if not exaggerated, terms:—"I am fully convinced," says this writer, "that no profound observations can be invented which do not occur to yourself; nor have I written to you my thoughts concerning public affairs from an over-estimate of my own advice and abilities, but because I thought it my duty to explain to you—occupied with the labours of warfare, and busied with battles, victories, and the responsibilities of your command—the present state of our

domestic affairs. For if you only have this object in view—to save yourself from the attacks of your enemies, and by every means to preserve against a hostile consul the rights bestowed upon you by the people—your plans are not in accordance with your high character. But if you have the same spirit, which at the commencement of your career confounded the faction of the nobility and restored the Roman commonalty from grievous slavery into liberty, which in your prætorship, although unarmed, wrested from their hands the weapons of your enemies, and which has achieved, both in peace and war, deeds so great and illustrious that even your enemies cannot complain of anything but your greatness, pray listen to my account of our present political position, which, if not altogether true, you will find to be something very like the truth. Now, since Cn. Pompeius, either from a wrong spirit or because his greatest object was to thwart you, has so falsely committed himself as to put weapons in the hands of your enemies, the commonwealth must be restored by the same means by which he subverted it. In the first place, he vested in a few senators the power of regulating the revenues, the expenditure, and the judicial department. By these laws he left the Roman commonalty (in whom before was vested the chief authority) and our order (the equestrian) in utter servitude. The judicial power was, however, as before, vested in three commissions, composed of members of the senatorial and equestrian orders, and of the tribunes of the treasury. Nevertheless, the nobility, by their party influence, rule everything, give what is to be given, and deprive obnoxious individuals of their rights. They overreach the harmless, and raise their own creatures to the highest offices. Neither wicked deeds, nor disgraceful conduct, nor moral degradation prevent them from entering upon the highest offices. They seize with a rapacious hand whatever they regard as conducive to their own interest. Finally, as if their own will and pleasure were the sole rule of right, they domineer over the city as if captured from the enemy. . . . For what

civil broil and party quarrel has ruined utterly so many and such illustrious families? or whose vindictive spirit, in the moment of victory, has ever been so destructive and unrestrained? Lucius Sylla, who, according to the laws of war, might have, in the moment of victory, allowed himself every licence, nevertheless, although he well knew that Sulpicius was strengthening the position of his opponents, yet, after putting a few to death, was more anxious to gain the remainder by kindness than to deter them by fear. But now Cato and Domitius, with their partizans, have sacrificed, as victims to their gods, forty senators, and, in addition, many of the most promising young statesmen of our times. And yet their hatred is not satisfied; neither orphan children nor aged parents, neither the sighs of men nor the wailings of women, have influenced their inhuman spirit; nay, more, they proceed with greater bitterness, by injuries and slanders, to deprive some of their dignities, others of their native land. For what shall I say for yourself, whose disgrace these most cowardly of men would purchase by the sacrifice of their own lives. In truth, their present predominance, which they certainly had no right to expect, is less a source of pleasure to them, than your high position is a source of pain. They are more eager to have the national safety endangered by some great disaster to you and your army, than that the Roman empire should, from its present high position, be placed on the very highest pinnacle by your success. Therefore you must be very cautious in providing those measures by which you may be able to re-establish all things on a firm and steadfast basis."

This is a sad, but very true, picture of the position of Cæsar with respect to the city oligarchs. Their hatred increased in proportion to his great services to the State, and their secret doctrine among themselves was, that with him there was to be no peace, that, rather than witness a second consulship of Cæsar, it was better for them to perish among the ruins of their detested oligarchy.

But, as we are now to take leave of Cicero for a long time, we may here record the last sentiments known to us respecting Cæsar and his conduct, until he was unexpectedly plunged amidst the rising waves of the civil war. Here is a passage from one of his letters to his brother Quintus, then in Gaul with Cæsar, and written during the supremacy of Pompey, sole consul:—"My dearest brother, I am vexed that there is no commonwealth, no free courts of justice, and that my period of life, which ought to be distinguished by senatorial authority, is either annoyed by pleading at the bar, or only consoled by home literature. But that maxim, which, from a boy I had cherished,

"Always to excel and to outstrip all competitors,"

has now no place for its display, so that my enemies have partly been not assailed by me, and partly have even been defended. That not only my kind affections, but not even my hatred, are allowed a free course; that Cæsar, of all men, is the only one who loves me as much as I wish to be loved, or, as some think, alone wishes so to do. Had I defended Gabinius (his old and inveterate enemy), as Pansa thinks I ought to have done, I should have ruined myself. Those who hate him (and they are of all ranks) on account of him whom they hate, would have hated me also."

In the numerous prosecutions of this year, Cicero, contrary to his usual character, acted the part of an accuser. After the murder of Clodius by Milo, some of the adherents of the former had burnt his body in the forum, and also destroyed, in the same conflagration, the ancient senate house, the "Curia Hostilia." Among the leading rioters, one Plancus Byrsa, a partizan of Clodius and a reviler of Cicero, was very conspicuous. He gives his friend and kinsman, M. Marius, the following account of the transaction:—"I am well assured you are delighted with the condemnation of Byrsa, but you are too sparing in your congratulations. For you say, I ought not to rejoice much, on account of the man's mean

condition. Believe me, I am more delighted with his condemnation than with the death of Clodius. For, in the first place, I prefer striking an offender with a judicial sentence rather than with a sword. . . . I was especially delighted with the zeal with which I was supported, by all good men, against the incredible exertions of the most illustrious and powerful individual (Pompey). Finally, I am stating what is scarcely credible: I hated this fellow much more bitterly than I did Clodius himself. For, in the case of the latter, I myself had been the assailant, while I had defended Byrsa. And Clodius, who saw that the State itself would be endangered in my person, looked forward to a great achievement. Nor was it entirely his own act, as he was aided and abetted by those who could not stand except I fell. But this monkey, for his own amusement, selected me as his peculiar object of attack, and had persuaded not a few who hate me, that he was a wild beast, whom they could always let loose upon me. Therefore, I request you to be especially glad, a great victory has been won. Never were there more gallant citizens than those who dared to condemn him against the immense influence of him who had made the judges, which they never would have done, had they not sympathized with my indignant feelings. At Rome I am so distracted by the number of trials, the crowded courts, and the new laws, that I pray daily that no intercalation may take place, in order that I may as soon as possible see you."

Dion Cassius says that Cicero's accusation of Plancus was as confused and spiritless as had been his defence of Milo, because the courts were still guarded by soldiers, and the exertions of Pompey were as strenuous to ensure the acquittal of Plancus as they had been to procure the condemnation of Milo. It was only the barefaced violation of his own laws, and a wish on his part, as Dion says, to exhibit them as his slaves, that incited the judges to this one act of rebellion against their patron and maker.

The consuls chosen for the ensuing year, B.C. 51, were

Servius Sulpicius Rufus, a good and great lawyer; and Caius Claudius Marcellus, who, although married to a grand niece of Cæsar, was his bitter enemy. Cato, whose authority was now very great with Pompey, was a candidate, but not an eager one, and, after receiving a repulse, would not accept the office at a later period, either from injured pride, because he had not obtained it before, or because he felt that he had more power as an independent member of the senate, who could always reside at Rome, and keep the government in check.

From this time, Cæsar's victories and public services were utterly disregarded: his consulship was alone remembered, and the oligarchs were preparing to welcome his return, not with triumphal processions and future honours, but with accusations, trials, banishment, and perhaps death. Cato, who hated him with a fierce and measureless hatred, is said to have solemnly sworn that he would bring him to a trial for his consular acts; and the report at Rome was that Pompey, as at the late trials, was to guard the court with an armed force, while Cato prosecuted him before the judges, selected from their common partizans. The event of such a trial could hardly be doubted. It was Cato's personal enmity that Cæsar had most to fear, for, by his family alliances, he was become the most powerful among the oligarchs. The representatives of the Bruti, the Luculli, and the Servilii, were his nephews. His wife was one of the Marcii Philippi, the wealthy Domitius was his brother-in-law, and Bibulus was married to his daughter; and when he had no more daughters and sisters to give in marriage, he, with philosophical calmness, spared his own wife to the younger Hortensius, and again took her to his home when enriched by the dying testament of that young nobleman.

CHAPTER XIV.

B.C. 51.

CÆSAR had, during his last campaign, employed the services of a very rising character—his kinsman, Marcus Antonius, better known as Mark Antony. He was the son of Caius Antonius, who carried on the war against the pirates, and who assumed the name of Cretensis, and of Julia, the daughter of Sextus Cæsar. He joined Cæsar's army as quæstor, and was already highly distinguished for his military services.

It was he who, under Gabinius, suppressed the rebellion of Aristobulus in Palestine, and who was the principal actor in forcing the expelled Ptolemy Auletes upon the reluctant Ægyptians—a connexion which began at so early a period, and was eventually doomed to end in his destruction. At the termination of the preceding campaign Cæsar had thus distributed his army: Titus Labienus, with Marcus Sempronius Rutilius, was stationed, with two legions, among the Sequani; C. Fabius and L. Minucius Basilus, also with two legions, among the Rhemi, with orders to watch the Bellovaci; C. Antistius, with one legion, among the Ambiivareti; Titus Sextius, with one, among the Bituriges Cubi; Caius Caninius, with a third, among the Ruteni; Q. Tullius Cicero and P. Sulpicius, at Cabilonum, and Matusco with two legions, to superintend the supply of provisions along the Arar and Rhone. He himself, with Mark Antony and the remaining troops, selected Bibracte as his winter quarters.

But he was not allowed to enjoy a long leisure. Disturbances among the Bituriges required his personal attendance, and, in a rapid course of operations, which lasted forty days, he returned to his winter quarters, after thoroughly pacifying that warlike and wealthy nation. The soldiers who

served on this winter expedition received liberal gratuities. But he had not continued more than ten or twelve days at head quarters, when he was summoned again to the field by a message from the Bituriges, who complained of being harassed by the Carnutes. Two fresh legions were led by Cæsar himself against them, who finished the devastations already inflicted upon that tribe. He lodged his troops amidst the ruins of Genabum, whence he harassed the Carnutes, until they deserted the country, and took refuge among the neighbouring nations.

In the meantime, he heard that the Bellovaci were preparing to assail their neighbours, the Suessiones, probably because they would not join them and other Belgæ in waging war, according to their promise, against the Romans. No time was to be lost; for the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Vellocassi, and Atrebatas, had already joined the Bellovaci, who, under the command of Correus, an able veteran, and sworn enemy to the Roman name and nation, had selected a strong position on an intrenched hill, surrounded with marshes, as a place where all the enemies of Rome might safely rally.

Correus had for an associate, Comius, the Atrebatian, who had gone into Germany to induce some of the hardy warriors of that nation to take service with their Belgian kinsmen.

Cæsar forgot to tell us a circumstance which, as detailed by Hirtius, reflects no great credit upon Labienus. When Cæsar was in Cisalpine Gaul, during the preceding winter, Labienus became cognizant that Comius, among others, was busy in organizing that immense confederacy which soon after waged an internecine war against the Romans. Unwilling, therefore, to place him on his guard, by summoning him to head-quarters, he sent a certain centurion, named Volusenus, with orders to procure an interview with the Atrebatian, and then and there to kill him. This was partly effected, and Comius left on the spot for dead. But he had recovered, and taken a solemn oath that he never would thereafter willingly hold personal converse with any Roman.

Cæsar, leaving two legions at Genabum, marched against the Bellovaci with the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions; all trusty veterans, as Hirtius describes them, and with the eleventh, not equally to be trusted, for this was only the eighth year of its service, but formed of young and vigorous soldiers. Cæsar's wish was to entice the enemy to take the field by diminishing the appearance of his force, little baggage was consequently taken. The three veteran legions led the van, followed by the baggage and attendants, while the eleventh legion brought up the rear. When he arrived at the intrenched camp of Correus, he threw up, on the opposite side of the deep marsh, behind which it was placed, nearly as strong a fortification; whence he in vain attempted to allure or provoke the enemy to a fair trial of strength. In the various skirmishes, the Belgæ had often the advantage; and, in one case, they succeeded in striking a severe blow against the contingent of the Rhemi, who were defeated, with the loss of Vertiscus, their aged chief, who, although extremely old, still led his men to battle.

The arrival of Comius, with five hundred German horsemen, gave Correus new courage; and now bands of German auxiliaries served in both camps, and skirmished against each other in the field, and were equally trusted by both parties. In the end, Correus was out-manceuvred; and in laying an ambuscade against the Romans, fell himself into a trap skilfully prepared; and was himself, with most of the cavalry, and the most gallant part of the infantry, cut to pieces. The quarter, which was repeatedly offered, was scorned by the Belgian chief, who compelled the Roman soldiers to dispatch him with their missiles. The whole nation was then allowed to return to their former condition, without any further punishment than they had brought upon themselves. Comius fled into Germany. Having thus subdued the Belgians, Cæsar, after indulging in another vain pursuit of Ambiorix, whose territories he again wasted with fire and sword, sent Titus Labienus, with two legions, against the Treviri; who,

almost as barbarous as their German neighbours, could never remain quiet, except from compulsion.

In the meantime, Cæsar's lieutenant, C. Fabius, had defeated, with great skill, Dumnacus, the chief of the Andes, who had gathered a considerable force from his own tribe and neighbouring nations. From this battle, Drapes, the Senonian, who, during the last eighteen months, had, if we believe Hirtius, acted as the chief of a lawless banditti, fled to the head-quarters of Lucterius, the Cadurcan, whence, as it was reported, they intended to make an incursion into the Roman province. C. Fabius sent the lieutenant, Caninius, with two legions, to prevent this misfortune, and entered into the country of the Carnutes, who, worn out with the struggle, and despairing of further aid, at last consented to petition for peace, which was easily granted. Induced by their influence, all the Armorican states agreed to perform all that was required from them by Fabius.

In the meantime, Caninius arrived among the Cadurci; soon enough to prevent Lucterius and Drapes from invading the province. They, however, occupied with their joint forces the impregnable fortress of Uxellodunum, which they constituted into a last refuge for the still resisting members of the great confederacy. But, fearing the fate of the blockaded army at Alesia, the miseries of which had been personally experienced by Lucterius, they first prepared to supply the fortress with abundance of provisions, in which they partly succeeded, and were partly baffled by Caninius, who finally surprised and captured Drapes. This Senonian chief, scorning to submit himself to the judgment of Cæsar, abstained from food, and resolutely starved himself to death. His colleague, Lucterius, fled in despair into the mountains of the Arverni, where he fell into the power of Epasnactus, an Arvernian nobleman, most friendly to the Romans, who sent him in chains to Cæsar. His fate, probably, was the same as that of Cotuatus, the Carnutian; whom Cæsar, having entered the territory of that people, demanded as a peace-offering. He was sought out,

delivered, and put to death, according to the Roman fashion. He was first beaten with the lictors' rods, and then beheaded with the axe.

But Uxellodunum still held out against the united efforts both of Caninius and of C. Fabius, who had joined in carrying on the siege. This was so difficult, and the resistance so prolonged, that Cæsar, fearing the example might spread, and other states furnished with strongholds might also proclaim their independence, especially as all the Gauls knew that Cæsar's command was only to last another year, hastened to superintend the operations himself. He also found the place impregnable by force; but succeeded, after much difficulty, in preventing the garrison from receiving its supplies of water from the stream flowing at the foot of the hill on which the fortress was placed. Still there remained a fountain within the place, which scantily supplied the defenders. The vein, however, through which it flowed upwards in the rock was scientifically broached by a mining party, employed for that purpose, and through this breach gushed into the plain the water which was wont to fill the well. The inhabitants were then compelled to surrender at discretion. Their lives were spared, but the right hand of every man who had borne arms was cut off, and the men, thus maimed, were sent forth, to testify the punishment inflicted upon them for their obstinate defence. Hirtius, however, calls them "reprobates."

Labienus, in the meantime, had, in a cavalry engagement, defeated the Treviri and their German allies, and had captured many of their chiefs, which had induced them to accept terms of submission. Cæsar, for the first time, visited Aquitania, with two legions; but arms were not necessary, as the whole province, without exception, acknowledged his authority, and gave hostages for future submission. He then went himself to Narbo, and ordered his lieutenants to conduct their legions into winter quarters. Four were stationed in Belgium, under Mark Antony, C. Trebonius, P. Vatinius, and Quintus Cicero. Two among the Ædui, two among the Turones, the

remaining two on the western confines of the Arverni, that thus all the important positions in Gaul might be fully occupied. After staying a few days in the province, he crossed into Cisalpine Gaul; and when he had hastily performed all his civil duties, he honoured with peculiar favours all those who had exerted themselves to aid him, during the tremendous struggle of the preceding summer. He gratefully confessed that he owed his final success to the countenance and support which he had received from this attached province. He then returned to the head-quarters of the legions, at Nemetocenna, where he spent the winter. His usual residence, in this vicinity, had been Samarobrivæ, which had assumed something of the appearance of a Roman city, owing to this patronage. Probably it had been destroyed during the violent exasperation of the insurgent warriors of the grand confederacy.

There he learned that the Atrebatian, Comius, although his state was submissive, continued a guerilla warfare against the Romans, whom he seriously annoyed by his desultory attacks upon straggling parties and their lines of communication.

Antony employed the same Volusenus, who had before in vain attempted to assassinate Comius, to pursue, and capture, or slay him. It appears that there was great personal enmity between them. Volusenus came upon the track of the hunted Atrebatian; and when on the point of overtaking him, with a body of horsemen, was suddenly encountered by his foe, who, wheeling round, thrust his spear through the Roman's thigh, left him there half-dead, and saved himself by the speed of his horse. After this satisfaction, he wrote to Antony, stating his willingness to live where he should prescribe; and live peaceably, provided he was not compelled to violate his oath. Antony thought this request very reasonable, granted him a free pardon, and received his pledges.

In the city, Marcus Marcellus, an able man and eloquent orator; made in the senate his much threatened motion, or rather, series of motions. First, that the two Gallic provinces

should be vacated by a certain day, and that successors should be given to Cæsar, previous to the expiration of the five years, during which these provinces had been secured to him by a law passed in the second joint consulship of Crassus and Pompey; secondly, that he should immediately dismiss his army, and not be permitted to stand for the consulship, unless he should personally attend, a duty from which he was exempted by a law passed in the sole consulship of Pompey; and, finally, that the privileges which had been conferred by the Vatinian law on the colony, which he had planted at Novumcomum, should be forfeited.

All these proposals were so evidently the result of private hostility, that they were opposed, not only by the other consul, Sulpicius, and several of the tribunes, but even by the great body of the senate; so that, when the question was put, Marcellus was left without any supporters. They even refused to take the case into their serious consideration. But still, ground was broken, and Pompey and his party, while refusing to countenance Marcus Marcellus, hinted that his motion would be resumed on a future day, when the senate would be allowed to come to a deliberate decision, and have that decision respected and enforced. Of the feelings with which Cæsar was now regarded by some at Rome, we have an excellent description in the first letter written from Rome by Marcus Cælius, a very clever man and powerful orator, written to Cicero, after his departure from Rome to his Cilician province. Cicero reached Ephesus about the twentieth of July: the letter of Cælius was written before the first of June:—"If you come across Pompey, as you wished, what was his apparent disposition, what was the nature of his conversation, and what inclinations did he display? For, in general, his sentiments and language do not agree, and yet he is not clever enough to prevent his secret thoughts from being discovered. Pray detail all this to me. As to Cæsar, we have numerous, and by no means favourable, reports. But whispers alone come from Gaul. One says that he has lost his cavalry,

and this, in my opinion, is a certain fact. Another says that the seventh legion has been sadly beaten; that the Bellovaci have surrounded him on all sides, and cut off his communications with the rest of the army; and yet there is nothing certain; nor are these flying reports spread among the people, but are only whispered aloud among the set whom you well know. Domitius never alludes to them without holding his hand above his mouth."

Cicero himself, before he had received this letter, had written to Cælius in the following terms, after complaining that he had not received from him any interesting or confidential information:—"Yet I have no great cause to accuse you, for you could not peep deeper into the future than any one among us. I myself, especially, had for many days been engaged in discussing the state of the political world with Pompey himself. The result of these conversations cannot, and if they could, ought not, to be written. But hold this for certain, that Pompey is an excellent citizen, and well prepared, both with measures and determination, to meet every emergency with which the State may be threatened. Therefore, trust yourself to him. He, believe me, will give you a hearty welcome. He now views with the same eyes as we do the good and bad citizens." In other words, Pompey had confided to Cicero his intentions to resist the future course of Cæsar, even by force of arms, should it be necessary; and Cicero had given in his unhesitating adhesion to the plan laid down by Pompey. He saw his path clear before him, and from this period, until his return from Cilicia, we hear no more concerning Cæsar or his friends from Cicero, whose great object thenceforth was to court the favour of the oligarchal party, of which Pompey had now constituted himself the leader.

The consuls elected for the ensuing year were C. Claudius Marcellus, a cousin of his predecessor Marcus, and Æmilius Paulus, both supposed to be bitter enemies to Cæsar. The party turned their attention to young Curio, a son of one of

the Syllan seven, but far superior to his father in capacity, business habits, and practical eloquence. He had lately returned from a long residence in Greece and Asia, and was welcomed home as one of the rising luminaries of the oligarchal world. He was fixed upon as the tribune of the people, who was to do good service in putting down Cæsar from his high position. Cicero was not fortunate in his young friends. Curio and young Publius Crassus were among his special favourites and admirers, yet, when both had fallen by a premature death, it is in these words that Cicero in the Brutus writes their epitaph:—"Curio expressed with so much ease and freedom the clever ideas with which he abounded, that nothing could be more elegant nor more ready. And he, although not well instructed by masters, had a great natural power of speaking. I cannot answer for his industry. He was certainly eager to learn; and if he had listened to me, as he once did, he would have preferred honours legally gained to power suddenly acquired. Had he done so, he, like his father, and our other more illustrious citizens, would have gradually ascended to the highest honours which our State can bestow. This was my advice to Publius Crassus also, who, when he had courted my friendship, at a very early period of his life, was often warned and exhorted by me to follow that path to fame which had been smoothed for him by the feet of his ancestors. He had been thoroughly instructed, and was an accomplished and complete scholar. His natural temperament was keen, and his fluency of speech not deficient in elegance. Besides this, he was dignified without haughtiness, and modest without inactivity. But he also was carried away by the desire of military renown, an usual feeling of younger men; and because he had done good service under a great general, wished immediately to be himself a great commander.; and so, by his very grievous fall, proved very unlike his grandfather, Lucius Crassus, the orator, and many other of the Crassi."

CHAPTER XV.

PROCONSUL. B.C. 50.

CÆSAR, during the principal part of this year, had only one object in view, and that was to win golden opinions from all the inhabitants of Gaul. He addressed the different states in the most honourable terms. He loaded their leading men with honours and gifts. He avoided all new burdens. And thus, by improving their social and political state, made obedience a source of happiness. His success was almost miraculous; he absolutely became the idol of the conquered, and, although it is difficult to account for this wonderful change, yet we should remember that, although he might have injured the Gauls, he had never insulted them. They were with him always the bravest of the brave; and, more than that, he proscribed none of their great families nor did he confiscate their property for the benefit of his soldiers. He might have been a savage conqueror, but he was a kind master. Gaul was not taken from the Gauls, but, from the moment of conquest, became an integral part of the Roman empire. Undoubtedly their Celtic laws and tenures, perhaps incompatible with the highest form of civilization, were replaced by Roman institutions; but this was gradually and easily done, through the instrumentality of their own chiefs, who were taught to appreciate the superior comforts of Roman life, and to look back without regret upon the rude abundance, the boisterous enjoyments, and the continuous quarrels of their fathers and grandfathers. Plutarch remarks, that had the movers of the great confederacy only waited for two or three years, success must have been almost certain, and they might have rolled back the tide of war upon Italy with all the power, and perhaps without sharing the fate, of the Cimbri and Teutones. But it was not so, and it will be very difficult

to account for the contrary result, without ascribing it to a will superior to that of man, and which, from great apparent evils, still evolves a greater good.

Cæsar then, at a very early period of the year, crossed over to Cisalpine Gaul, with the intention of canvassing the municipal towns and colonies in favour of Mark Antony, who was then a candidate for the augurship. "He exerted himself to the utmost, both for a man so closely connected with him, whom, but a short time before, he had sent to the city to present himself to the citizens, and because the oligarchy were anxious to defeat Antony, and thus disparage his friend Cæsar." But the favour of the citizens had elected Antony augur before Cæsar's personal exertions could avail him. He, however, waited upon most of the voters within the limits of his province, both to thank them for their support of Antony, and also to press upon them his own claims to the consulship for the ensuing year.

Cæsar's arrival among the Cisalpines was everywhere welcomed with feasts, rejoicings, triumphal arches, public holidays, and all the usual indications of a popular triumph. "So great," says Hirtius, "was the magnificence of the wealthier and the zeal of the lower classes." In fact, Cæsar's government had been to them a season of uninterrupted peace and prosperity. They had been preserved from the plundering incursions of the mountain tribes, and, what was still more important, from the grasping exactions of greedy pro-consuls; and were thus practically taught to believe that one Cæsar was better for the provincials, at least, than a band of Roman oligarchs, whose great political object seemed to be how they were to compensate for their metropolitan expenditure by extortion in the provinces.

Under pretence of a fear of a Parthian war, the senate decreed that both Pompey and Cæsar should each detach a legion from their armies, and send them readily equipped for a Syrian campaign; but both legions were actually abstracted from Cæsar; for Pompey required him to send, as his con-

tribution, the legion which he had borrowed from him after the death of Sabinus and Cotta.

Although Cæsar was now conscious that his enemies were bent upon his degradation, he complied with this requisition, and sent to Rome the first and the fifteenth legions, who, when they arrived in the neighbourhood of the city, were first detained, and finally handed over by the consuls to Pompey. His opponents in the transaction undoubtedly treated Cæsar with bad faith; but perhaps they did not gain much by it, for those two legions could never be brought to act zealously against their old commander.

Cæsar still lingered in Gaul, and, having convoked all the legions from their winter quarters, reviewed his congregated forces, now consisting of twelve legions, on the confines of the Treviri. He wished to display to this restless nation and their German neighbours the facility with which he could repair any diminution of his forces; whether by an enemy's violence or the bad faith of his countrymen. There was no other military duty this year but change of locality, both for the due exercise and the health of the soldiers.

He had made Titus Labienus his lieutenant in Cisalpine Gaul, principally that he might further his views in procuring the consulship, for which this officer had now professed himself a candidate; but his position brought him within reach of the oligarchs, who spared no solicitations to induce him to join their party, and abandon his old general. Labienus was merely a soldier of fortune, like Pompey's officers, Afranius and Petreius, excellent officers, but hardly regarded as equals by the members of the Roman aristocracy. Cæsar's confidence in him was unlimited; he had always most generously shared the honours of victory with him, and had permitted him to accumulate a magnificent fortune: but the temptations held out to him were stronger than he could resist. He abandoned his general, and went over to his enemies, a fatal step both to himself and to them; for there is every reason to believe that his conduct served to mislead his new friends,

and induce them to trust that the rest of his army would, like his most distinguished officer, abandon Cæsar, rather than encounter the hostility of the senate. The following passages from a letter written soon after Antony's election to the augurship, and sent by Cælius to Cicero, still remaining in Cilicia, will give a fair statement of the political feeling at Rome about this time:—"Even the capture of Arsaces, or the storming of Seleucia, would not compensate for your loss in not being a spectator of our home transactions. The comitial assembly was very large, and party feeling strongly marked; very few voted from private considerations. Therefore Domitius is most hostile to me; nor did he ever before hate one of his old friends as he now does me, and the more because he thinks that the honour was wrongfully wrested from him, and that I was the main instrument. He now raves, because all the world is delighted with his repulse, and because I am now a more zealous friend of Antony. I have often written to you about our political state, that, according to my views, peace cannot continue for another year, and the nearer that struggle, which must take place approaches, the clearer appears its great danger. Those who are in power, are determined to fight on this point. Cn. Pompeius has determined not to allow C. Cæsar to become consul, unless he shall have first delivered up his army and provinces. Cæsar, on the other hand, is convinced that there is no safety for him, should he withdraw from his army. He, nevertheless, proposes that both he and Pompey should deliver up their armies. Thus their attachment and odious alliance are not destined to end in secret calumnies, but to break out in open war. Nor do I clearly see my own interest in the struggle, and, I doubt not, but you are disturbed by the same difficulty. There are strong bonds of union between me and the Pompeians: but then I only hate Cæsar's cause, not himself and friends. I am sure you are aware that in party struggles, as long as the contest is carried on without arms, men ought to choose the more honourable side; but the stronger, when recourse is had

to war and battles; in fact, to regard the safer as the better party. In this quarrel, I see that Cn. Pompey will have with him the senatorial and judicial powers: that all who live in fear and without hope will join Cæsar: that the trained forces are not to be compared with each other. I wish we may have sufficient time to estimate duly the strength of each party, and then to choose our side. . . . You ask me to explain briefly my views of the future. If either of the two leaders does not undertake the Parthian war, I see that a great quarrel is at hand, which nothing but violence and the sword will decide. Each party is resolute and prepared." The reader of this letter will not be surprised to hear that the unprincipled writer, M. Cælius, after due consideration, went over to the Cæsarean party.

Curio, the eloquent and influential tribune, the hereditary oligarch, had also transferred his services to Cæsar. Both he and the consul, Æmilius Paulus, are said to have sold themselves, for large bribes, to their future master. It might have been so: but Curio's conduct was, nevertheless, very moderate and judicious. He was authorized to propose, or, acting in his own person, proposed repeatedly, to the senate a fair compromise between the two parties. He said that "if, on the one hand, the senate and their friends really dreaded any violence from Cæsar's army, they should, nevertheless, remember that the Roman forum itself was overawed by the presence of Pompey and a large military force; that, consequently, both generals ought to withdraw from their military commands and dismiss their armies; that the deliberations of the State would then be free and uncontrolled." He not only promised this on Cæsar's part, but made a motion that the senate should adopt this proposition as the groundwork of a compromise. But the consuls and Pompey's friends prevented the question from being put; so the senate was deprived of an opportunity of becoming the mediator between the two parties, and, perhaps, of compromising the dispute, without deciding it by an appeal to arms.

The consular elections for the ensuing year, B.C. 49, were keenly contested. L. Lentulus, and Caius Marcellus, a brother of Marcus, both of them keen partisans rather of Pompey than the senate, were chosen; and Sergius Galba, Cæsar's partisan and quondam lieutenant, was defeated, although, if we can believe Hirtius, the majority of votes, had it been a fair contest, was decidedly in his favour. Mark Antony was, however, elected a tribune of the people, and thus armed with an authority highly offensive to the ruling powers. His election, both to the augurship and tribuneship, proves that the popular votes, to a great degree, were still at the command of the Cæsareans.

Cæsar, before he left Gaul, formed two bodies, of four legions each, and stationed one in Belgium, under C. Trebonius, the other among the Ædui, under C. Fabius; for he thought that Gaul would be preserved in peace, if the two people whose influence was greatest were kept in check. He himself leaves for Cisalpine Gaul, and takes up his head quarters at Ravenna.

CHAPTER XVI.

PROCONSUL. B.C. 49.

AT Ravenna, Cæsar was visited by Curio, who explained all the transactions at Rome, and told him that there was no safety for him but in arms. Consequently he advised him, without loss of time, to summon his legions from Transalpine Gaul, and to advance at their head upon Rome. But Cæsar thought that one effort more was to be made, and commissioned Curio to bear an autograph letter from himself to the senate. In this document he inserted an elaborate defence of his past actions, and stated his willingness to dismiss his army, provided Pompey would do the same, and that other-

wise his life would not be safe. That, on hearing that Pompey's armed force was withdrawn from Rome, he was willing to dismiss his own troops, and to stand for the consulship in person. That, if these proposals were not accepted, he possessed both the means and the will to defend himself from the injuries of his enemies, and to maintain those rights and privileges which he enjoyed by the gift of the Roman people.

Curio arrived at Rome on the first of January, B.C. 49, and, with difficulty, by the intervention and active exertion of the tribunes, Mark Antony and Q. Cassius Longinus, obtained permission to read his despatches in the senate. But, after this ceremony had taken place, it was found impossible to take the senate's opinion respecting their contents, as the consuls resolutely refused to allow the senate to be consulted upon the occasion. The general question, respecting the state of the republic, was then put by the consul Lentulus. He said that he would not fail in his duty to the State, should the senators boldly and bravely express their sentiments, and not, as in former times, look to Cæsar, and court his favour. Should they, however, do so, he would take his own measures, and pay no attention to the decrees of the senate. Scipio, also, Pompey's father-in-law, spoke in the same tone, and as his son-in-law could not be present, because he had a military command, his words were regarded as Pompey's expressions. Even Marcus Marcellus, enemy as he was to Cæsar, wished the senate to pause before it committed itself, and to wait until troops were raised, and they were enabled to deliberate with more freedom; but both he and the gentle but persuasive orator, Marcus Calidius, who moved that Pompey should be sent to his own province, and thus all danger of collision be avoided, were overborne by the violence of Lentulus, whose invectives induced Marcellus to withdraw his motion, and who refused to refer that of Calidius to the consideration of the senate. Finally it was decreed, on the motion of Scipio, that Cæsar should dismiss his army before

a fixed day; should he refuse so to do, that he should be regarded as a public enemy. Mark Antony and Cassius, as tribunes of the people, put their veto upon this decree, but this was disregarded. Motions were made, declaring that they also, if they persisted in their intercession, should be declared public enemies. C. Curio called upon the ten tribunes in a body to defend the rights of the people, and not to allow the senate to annul the law by which Cæsar was permitted to become a candidate for the consulship, without attending in person. It was in vain that Lucius Piso, his father-in-law, and Lucius Roscius, his lieutenant, besought leave to wait in person upon Cæsar, and inform him of these proceedings, for which purpose they asked for only six days' absence. These and all other conciliatory propositions were refused, at the suggestion principally of Lentulus, Scipio, and Cato. As the tribunes, however, persisted in their intercession, the victorious majority went through the usual forms, changed their dress, assumed the appearance of profound grief, represented the State as reduced to the last extremity, and, finally, passed their ultimate decree, by which martial law was proclaimed, and all men in authority vested with unlimited power. Mark Antony and Cassius became thus liable to be instantly slain. Lentulus even advised them not to remain in the city until the decree was formally written out. They chose to take the alarm, disguised their persons, and stopped not in their flight until they had reached Cæsar's head-quarters at Ravenna.

Cæsar imputes this rash and imprudent conduct to Cato's hate, to the ambition of Lentulus, who expected to be the third Cornelius who was to rule Rome with kingly sway, to the pride of Scipio, and the envy and conscious guilt of broken faith on Pompey's part.

This ultimate decree was passed on the seventh of January; Cicero had reached Rome on the fourth, and might have been present at this important debate, but the miserable ambition of triumphing over some obscure tribes, whose robberies he

had suppressed, among the recesses of Mount Amanus, induced him to remain without the city, with his laurels and his lictors, until the consul Lentulus should be pleased to take his case into favourable consideration. We may safely infer from a letter to his favourite servant, the well-known Tiro, that he might have taken a more active part than he did in the senatorial deliberations, had he so chosen to act:—"I arrived near the city on the fourth of January. The procession which came forth to welcome me was magnificent. But I have fallen into the very fire of civil discord, if not of war, and, while I was eager to heal the wound and, as I thought, had the power, the evil desires of certain persons (for on both sides there are persons eager for a fight) completely thwarted me. Even Cæsar himself, my friend, had sent to the senate threatening and bitter letters, and was, moreover, impudent enough to say that he would retain his army and province against the senate's will; and my friend Curio incited him so to do. My friend Antony also, and Quintus Cassius, without having been driven out, had gone with Curio to Cæsar. After the senate had commissioned the consuls, the prætors, the tribunes of the people, and us, the pro-consuls, to take care that the republic should receive no damage, the State never was in greater danger; never had bad citizens a better prepared leader; nevertheless, on our side also, great preparations have been made. These are conducted by the authority and activity of my friend Pompey, who, though late, has begun to fear Cæsar. Nevertheless, amidst all these troubles, a crowded senate has loudly claimed a triumph for me. But the consul Lentulus, in order to make the favour more particularly his own, said that he would bring it forward, after settling the more important business of the State. I take no active part, consequently my authority is the greater. Italy has been divided into districts, to be managed by different individuals. I have chosen Capua."

During the ensuing days, the senate was convoked beyond

the city walls, that Pompey might attend it. There the whole business of the empire was arranged. Syria was decreed as a province to Scipio, and Cisalpine Gaul to Domitius. Every due step, for carrying the war on actively, was taken; and the different commanders, vested with military authority, left the city, without observing many of the ancient customs, which, with them at least, ought to have been held sacred.

When the account of these events arrived at Cæsar's headquarters, he lost no time in proclaiming them before the small force which he had with him, and calling upon the soldiers to defend the sanctity of the tribunician power and the dignity of their outraged general. They, of course, applauded his address, and promised to support him at the expense of their lives. He took his measures accordingly, and determined immediately to act upon the offensive, and to seek, rather than to await, his enemies. He therefore led the thirteenth legion across the border, and seized upon the city of Ariminum. There he was met by the expelled tribunes; invoked by whom, he prepared for war, and summoned others of his legions to follow his steps. He himself says not a word about the passage of the Rubicon; but it is not improbable that he could not have adopted that decisive step without sad and solemn thoughts. Plutarch says, when he arrived on the banks of the Rubicon, which divides Cisalpine Gaul from the rest of Italy, his reflections became more interesting as the danger grew nearer. Staggered by the greatness of the attempt, he stopped to weigh with himself its inconveniences; and as he stood, revolving in silence the arguments on both sides, he many times changed his opinion. After which, he deliberated with such of his friends as were by, among whom was Asinius Pollio, enumerating the calamities which the passage of that river would bring upon the world, and the reflections that might be made upon it by posterity. At last, upon some sudden impulse, bidding farewell to his reasonings, and plunging into the abyss of futurity, in the words of those

who embark in doubtful and arduous enterprises, he cried out, "The die is cast," and immediately passed the river. He travelled with so much speed, during the remainder of the day, that he took Ariminum before daylight.

When the news of this event reached Rome, Pompey induced the senate to decree that there was "a tumult," that is, a war in Italy, and that hostilities were immediately to be expected. He then left Rome, after ordering every Roman to follow who preferred liberty to despotism. The consuls, and all who were hostile to Cæsar, accompanied him in a departure which assumed all the appearance of flight, so that even the money in the treasury was abandoned to the invader.

While Cæsar was still at Ariminum, he was visited by his kinsman, young Lucius Cæsar, and by Lucius Roscius, now prætor, who stated that they were commissioned by Pompey to wait upon him privately, and make apologies for his apparent harshness; that he, however, had been guided in all the transaction by a sense of public duty, to which private considerations ought to give way; and that nothing had been done by him with an intention of hurting Cæsar's feelings.

Cæsar took advantage of this visit; and asked them, in return, to convey a message from him to Pompey, and to tell him, that with himself also, the honour and dignity of the commonwealth had been the first consideration, and a dearer object than his own life. That he had certainly been much pained that the privilege conferred upon him by the Roman people had been insolently wrested from him by his enemies; and because, while six months of his government were yet unexpired, he was to be dragged back to Rome. Although, by law, he had a right, in his absence, to stand for the consulship at the ensuing elections, he nevertheless had patiently submitted, for the public good, to wave this honourable privilege. However, when he had sent a letter to the senate, requiring that all the military commanders in Italy should withdraw from the armies, he had failed to

obtain even this concession; troops were being levied all over Italy; the two legions, which, under pretence of a Parthian war, had been abstracted from him, were detained in the country; and the whole State was in arms. What possible object could these measures have, except his destruction? Nevertheless, he was ready to have recourse to every means of pacification, and to suffer all indignities, for the public good. Let Pompey go to Spain. Let all in Italy give up their forces and military commands. Let the State cease to be overawed by arms. Let the comitial elections be free, and public affairs be submitted to the decision of the Roman senate and people. He added, that, in order matters might be the more easily arranged, and the terms of agreement be solemnly confirmed by oaths, either he would approach Pompey and his friends, or allow them to approach him.

Lucius Cæsar and Roscius found Pompey and the consuls at Capua, and explained the terms proposed by Cæsar, and carried back to him their written answer. They required that Cæsar should depart from Ariminum, return to Gaul, and dismiss his army. If he did so, that Pompey would withdraw into Spain. In the meantime, that Pompey and the consuls would not cease to raise troops, until Cæsar gave full security that he would fulfil his promises.

These conditions, and the refusal to grant a conference, were regarded by Cæsar as a determination, on the part of his enemies, to allow no reconciliation. So he prepared for action. We, who now know the comparative strength of both parties, can hardly account for the blindness, with which a great man, like Pompey, was thus visited. He, during his long predominance, had allowed himself to become the victim of self-delusion, and to regard his authority as firm and as well fixed as that of a hereditary monarch, whom no man but a rebel would dare to oppose. Even in the senate he had regarded any probable resistance, on Cæsar's part, as almost an impossible contingency. "What," said a senator, "if

Cæsar should wish both to be consul and to retain his army?" "What," answered Pompey, "if my son should wish to break my head with a cudgel?" But the following letter from Cicero, who had quitted the vicinity of Rome by night, that his laurelled lictors might not be laughed at, and was now in the neighbourhood of Formiæ, throws some light upon the subject. It was written to Tiro, and seems to contain a true description of his then feelings and opinions:—

"You can recognise the great danger in which I, all good men, and the whole commonwealth, are placed, from the fact that we have left our homes, and country itself, to be either plundered or burnt. Circumstances have come to that point, that, unless relieved by some deity or unlooked-for accident, we cannot be safe. I, for my part, ever since I came near the city, ceased not to feel, speak, and do everything that could tend to concord. But not only bad citizens, but also those who are accounted good, have been seized with an unaccountable desire of fighting; while I continue to exclaim, that nothing is more wretched than a civil war. Therefore, when Cæsar, seized with phrenzy, and forgetful of his name and high honours, had occupied Ariminum, Pisaurum, Ancona, Arretium, we left Rome; it boots not to say how wisely nor how bravely. You thus see our present plight. Conditions are proposed by him, and those final, that Pompey should go to Spain; that the new levies and our present forces should be dismissed; that he is ready to deliver Transalpine Gaul to Domitius, Cisalpine Gaul to Considius Nonianus, for they had fallen to their lot; that he would stand for the consulship in person, and that he dispensed with the privilege accorded to him by law; that he would personally attend during the thrice nine days required. We have accepted his terms, but on condition that he withdraws his troops from the places occupied by him, that the senate might deliberate freely at Rome, concerning these conditions. Should he do this, there is hope of peace, but not an honourable one; for laws are imposed upon us. But anything is better than our present

state. But should he refuse to stand by his own terms, we are ready to make war against him, and with a force which he will not be able to withstand, especially should he retract his own proposals. But we are anxious to prevent him from marching into Rome; and think we may succeed in so doing; for our levies are great, and we think that he fears to lose the Gauls, should he march upon Rome; and both these provinces, with the exception of the Transpadani, are bitterly hostile to him. In his rear he has six legions, and great bodies of auxiliaries advancing against him from Spain, under the leaders Afranius and Petreius. If he will play the madman, he will, in all appearance, be crushed, I hope, however, without endangering Rome. He has, moreover, received a heavy blow, as T. Labienus, the most influential man in his army, has refused to be an accomplice in his guilt. He has abandoned him, and is now with us; and many others of his officers are, it is said, ready to do the same."

So Cicero wrote, and so most likely he felt; but he does not seem to have bestowed one thought upon the fact, that Cæsar was the idol, not only of the Transpadani, but of all the ancient people of Italy; that he was their cherished champion, the open foe of their destroyer, Sylla, and his friends. None of the troops levied in the northern districts of Italy would serve against Cæsar. Minucius Thermus, the prætor, with five cohorts, occupied the Umbrian town, Iguvium, and was fortifying himself there. Curio, with three cohorts, was sent to attack him; he fled, his troops dispersed, and the Iguvians gave a hearty welcome to Curio. Cæsar himself, with a few cohorts of the thirteenth legion, marched upon Auximum, where Atius Varus was stationed, and levying troops in the whole of Picenum.

The magistrates waited upon Varus, and told him that neither they nor their townsmen could think of preventing Caius Cæsar, whose services to the State were so signal, from entering their city. They warned him, therefore, to provide for his own safety. Varus hurried forth, with the troops

which he had brought with him, but was overtaken by a few soldiers of Cæsar's vanguard, and when he attempted to give battle, abandoned by his men. Some went home; others seized their chief centurion, one of Pompey's veteran officers, and brought him to Cæsar. He praised the soldiers, but dismissed their prisoner. He then gave thanks to the Auximates, and promised to remember their good services.

Pompey, undoubtedly a great general, saw, from the first burst made by Cæsar, that war against him in Italy was impossible. His great object, therefore, was to gather as many troops as he could, and transport them into Greece, with all the senatorial party and nobility that would accompany him; to call his camp Rome, and his adherents the Roman senate and people. Thence he denounced all neutralists; and threatened every man who refused to abandon Italy with future condemnation. He was now at Luceria, at the head of the two Cæsarean legions, whom he dared not lead against their old general; and seeing that Rome would soon fall into the hands of Cæsar, he sent one of the tribunes of the people, with orders to the consuls, who were lingering at Capua, to return to Rome, to remove the money from the treasury, and to come to him as soon as possible. He had long before warned Domitius, who had marched to meet Cæsar with the troops which, during the preceding year, had acted as Pompey's prætorian guards at Rome, not to fight in his absence, but as soon as possible join him at Luceria, with all the troops which he could gather together. But Domitius was an ignorant, self-willed man, and refused to obey orders before their execution became impossible.

The two consuls went from Capua to Rome, and prepared to enter the treasury and carry off the money. But a false alarm was raised; a detachment of Cæsar's cavalry was said to be at the gates. Lentulus had already opened the chamber where the sacred treasure, reserved for the utmost need of the republic, was stored. But a panic suddenly seized him. He fled, without accomplishing his commission, and

was followed by Marcellus and the few magistrates who had hitherto remained in the city. The false alarm was, of course, raised by the Cæsareans in Rome; who, probably, also showed force enough to be able to drive the consul from the city, if he did not consent to be scared away. Cicero seems to have been aware that the service on which the consuls were sent was dangerous; for, after mentioning Pompey's orders, he added:—"Return to him? With what sufficient guard, then, are they to quit Rome? Who will permit them? The consuls wrote to Pompey, desiring him first to advance into Picenum. But Picenum was already lost. No one, however, knew it, except myself, to whom a letter from Dolabella had made it known. In my own opinion, it was a clear case that Cæsar would immediately be in Apulia, and our friend Pompey on board his fleet." Cicero, however, permitted the consuls to make the experiment; with what success we have already seen.

Cæsar, setting out from Auximum, traversed the whole Picenian territory, where he was welcomed and supplied with all necessaries. Even Cingulum, a town belonging to Labienus, and which he had almost entirely built, sent deputies, and promised to execute all his orders with the greatest zeal. He called for soldiers, and they were immediately raised. Here he was overtaken by the twelfth legion. With his forces, amounting now to two legions, he advanced to Asculum—occupied by Cicero's friend, Lentulus Spinther, with ten cohorts. Lentulus did not await his approach, and, in an attempt to lead away his troops, was abandoned by most of them. With the few that remained, he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, an old soldier, whom Pompey had detached into Picenum, to act according to circumstances. On learning the state of affairs in Picenum, Vibullius took the command of the troops of Lentulus, and soon after, from various sources, gathered thirteen cohorts. With these he joined Domitius, who was now at Corfinium, the ancient capital of the Italian allies during the social war, where about twenty more

cohorts, composed of Marsians, Pelignians, and the neighbouring tribes, had been collected by Domitius. Cæsar, with his two legions, soon appeared under the walls, and, without loss of time, began to blockade the town. The terrified Domitius, by holding out great rewards, persuaded some natives to convey a letter to Pompey, imploring immediate aid, and begging him not to abandon so great a body of the highest men in Rome to the mercy of their foe. Scarcely had Cæsar sat down before the town, when he received an intimation that the inhabitants of Sulmo, the capital of the Peligni, were willing to obey his orders, but were prevented by Lucretius, a Roman senator, and a countryman of their own, called Attius, who had seven cohorts with him. Mark Antony was sent to Sulmo with five cohorts, and, before night, brought back into Cæsar's camp both the hostile cohorts and their commanders. Attius was dismissed, the seven cohorts incorporated with Cæsar's army. When thus encamped he was joined by the eighth legion, twenty-two cohorts of recruits from Gaul, and three hundred horsemen, sent by the King of Noricum. These reinforcements enabled him to make the blockade of Corfinium complete. Before it was quite finished, Pompey's answer was received by Domitius, who was reminded that he had acted contrary to orders, and that it was impossible for him to march to his relief; that his only chance was to retreat, and join him in the south. That was now impossible. Pompey's answer was divulged. The troops would neither fight nor allow their leaders to escape. Their next step was to arrest them, and deliver them to Cæsar. We may form some idea of the wealth of some of these great oligarchs, when Domitius could promise to grant to every private soldier, should he serve him faithfully during the war, four acres of ground from his own estates, and announced grants, in proportion, to the old soldiers and officers. The private soldiers alone were in number more than twenty thousand.

Cæsar ordered all the men of distinction to be brought

into his presence. Among them were Lucius Domitius, Lentulus Spinther, Vibullius Rufus, Quintilius Varus, and Lucius Rubrius, all of senatorial rank. Besides these, there were the son of Domitius, a great number of young nobles, and an immense number of Roman knights and municipal magistrates, whom Domitius had gathered round him. The occasion was critical, for the whole character of the war was to take its hue from the treatment of these prisoners, some of whom were the bitter enemies and foul slanderers of Cæsar and all his acts. The whole Roman world expected the decision, according to which, in the words of Cicero, Cæsar was thenceforth to be classified either with the truculent Phalaris or the gentle Pisistratus—both tyrants, but of very opposite characters. The prisoners were all dismissed with great courtesy; not only was their private property spared, but even a heavy sum of gold, which Domitius had received from Pompey for the payment of his troops, was restored to him. His soldiers all took the military oath, and served willingly under Cæsar, for they were the sons and grandsons of the great champions of the social war. Cæsar lost only seven days before Corfinium, and reached Apulia, by traversing, without the slightest opposition, the territories of the Marrucini, Frentani, and Larinates.

The proceedings of the Pompeians at Capua and its neighbourhood were utterly unavailing. Indeed, the very expectation that the citizens of that now wealthy community would allow their children to enlist and serve against their benefactor, under the standards of the very men who had most obstinately resisted the Julian law, to which they owed their very existence, amounted to nothing short of insanity. The utmost which Cicero and the consuls could expect from such a community was that they should not, without waiting for Cæsar, take an active part against them. The actual result we learn from these passages in Cicero's letter to Atticus:—“On the fourth of February, a very rainy day, I went to Capua to meet the consuls, but they had not come, but were

soon to come, without means and without preparations." Again, "I went to Capua on the fifth of February, according to the consuls' orders. On that day Lentulus came late in the evening. The other consul had not arrived on the sixth, so I left Capua on that day, and came to Cales. . . . While I stayed at Capua I learned this, that there is nothing in the consuls, that there is no levy going on, for their recruiting officers dare not show their faces."

Etruria, the sole remaining province in Italy able to supply any respectable force, had driven out the Pompeian Libo, who had attempted to take possession of that district. The mere appearance of Mark Antony at Arretium was sufficient to induce all the Etrurian towns to send in their adherence to Cæsar, who does not appear elated by this wonderful success, but still anxious for an amicable settlement.

The following letter, sent by Cæsar to his two confidential friends, Balbus and Oppius, who were absent from Corfinium, seems to have been intended as a manifesto of his intentions:—"I am delighted to learn, from your letters, how much you approve of my conduct at Corfinium. I willingly follow your advice, and the more willingly because I had determined, in my own mind, both to behave as gently as possible and to spare no effort in attempting to conciliate Pompey. Let us, at least, endeavour, if possible, to recover the good will of all parties, and to ensure a lasting victory, because the other victors failed to escape the imputation of cruelty, and yet did not long enjoy their victory, except Sylla, whom I am not going to imitate. Let this be our novel means of vanquishing foes, to protect ourselves by mercy and liberality. Some parts of this plan have already occurred to me, and the whole may be made public. I beg you will both of you think of this. I captured Cn. Magius, Pompey's chief engineer; of course I acted according to my custom, and immediately dismissed him. Now two of his chief engineers have fallen into my hands, and have been dismissed by me. If they wish to

show their gratitude, they ought to advise Pompey to be rather a friend to me than to those men who have always been most hostile to both of us, and by whose intrigues the commonwealth has been reduced to its present state."

A copy of the above was sent by Balbus to Cicero, accompanied by a letter from himself, which the reader will be glad to see, as a specimen of the terms in which the barbarian of Gades could address the orator of Rome:—"From this letter you will clearly see how eager Cæsar is both for peace and Pompey's friendship, and how remote from all cruelty. I, of course, am delighted with his sentiments. I, my Cicero, agree with you, that it is not consistent with yourself, your good faith, and humanity, to bear arms against him, from whom, as you declare, you have received great benefits. I am certain that Cæsar, in accordance with his extraordinary courtesy, will approve of this, and will, I am sure, give you ample compensation, should you refuse to wage war against him and to aid his adversaries, and he will be content with this abstinence from actual war on your part, distinguished and illustrious as you are, as he has permitted even me to absent myself from those operations which are directed against Lentulus and Pompey, to both of whom I owe great obligations. Cæsar also told me it would satisfy him, should I, when asked, dispatch his business at Rome, and that, should they wish it, I might also do the same for them. Consequently, I at present manage all the business of Lentulus in the city, and thus discharge my duty and obligations. But I still think that all thoughts concerning a compromise of their disputes ought not to be viewed as desperate, because Cæsar is as well disposed as we could wish him. It would give me pleasure if you would write to him, and request a military guard from him, as you did, with my approbation, from Pompey, during the Milonian disturbances. I promise you Cæsar, if I know him well, will consult your honour rather than his own advantage. I do not know whether I am acting prudently in thus writing to you. But I am

certain of this, that I write what I do write from my great love and attachment to you. Because so, may I die before any misfortune overtakes Cæsar; there are very few whom I value so highly. Pray write to me when you shall have made up your mind on this point; for I am very anxious that you should be allowed, according to your wish, to show your goodwill to both parties, which I trust you will do. Farewell."

There are strong marks of internal evidence in these documents, that Cæsar was particularly anxious to come to a settlement, at least with Pompey; and he seems to have entertained a strong confidence, that if his former colleague would allow him a personal conference, all difficulties might be removed. Pompey, on the other hand, seems to have distrusted himself too much, to hazard an interview with a man, who was as much his superior in strength of character as he was in arms.

Cicero's old friend, Cælius, wrote to him a letter in a very different style. "What!" he began, "did you ever see a more silly fellow than your friend Pompey—a man who has excited such a commotion, and yet proved himself a mere trifler? On the other hand, did you ever know a more energetic man in action than my friend Cæsar; or read or hear of a person who made so temperate a use of his victory? What think you now of our soldiers, who, marching over barren and cold regions, during the worst of winters, yet appear 'with round, well-fed cheeks.' What now (you say), 'everything glorious?' If you knew how anxious I am, you would laugh at my boasting, for nothing of the glory really belongs to me. Yet, I cannot explain the thing to you, unless in person, and I hope soon to be able so to do. For Cæsar had arranged matters for calling me to Rome, as soon as he had driven Pompey from Italy, and that, I suppose, is already done, unless your friend has preferred being blockaded at Brundisium."

He, however, escaped that fate, but not without danger of

being prevented from following the consuls, and a portion of his army, to Dyrrachium. Cæsar was afraid that he might take up a position at Brundisium, which might seriously interfere with the quiet possession of the south of Italy. He, therefore, lost no time in pressing the siege and blockade of that city, with all possible vigour; and succeeded, at length, in compelling Pompey to leave Italy, with all his forces. He threatened to block up the entrance of the Brundusian harbour by huge embankments, such as were never conceived as works of an ordinary campaign, except by Alexander the Great and himself. Pompey escaped, and left the western world to Cæsar, who could not pursue him, because he had no fleet; and he remembered that Spain, from the Pyrenees to the ocean, was a Pompeian province, ready to act upon his rear, should he ever move eastward. He, therefore, determined to reduce Spain, before he engaged in a further pursuit of Pompey; or, according to the well-known saying, attributed to him, "to attack an army without a general, as he already had vanquished a general without an army."

From the camp before Brundisium he sent Curio, with three legions, into Sicily, there to oppose Cato, who had undertaken the care of that island, with the adjacent portion of the Italian peninsula. Cato, like the other Pompeians, found no favour, either with the Southern Italians or the Sicilians, and yielded the whole province without a struggle. Curio, in anticipation of this event, was ordered to pass over into Africa. Valerius Flaccus, with one legion, was dispatched into Sardinia; the inhabitants of which had already shown a strong wish to join the Cæsarean party.

Having taken these precautions, the conqueror prepared to visit Rome, for the first time, after so long an absence. As he was very anxious to be received favourably by all who were not declared adherents of the oligarchal party, he sent forth notices in all directions, that he should be present in the senate on the first of April, and there meet all the members who were willing to co-operate with him in arranging public affairs.

Two persons, his own friend, Matius (a third in his confidence with Balbus and Oppius), and Trebatius, the lawyer-friend of Cicero, were commissioned to write a letter to the great orator, asking him, among others, to countenance the Cæsareans with his presence, on the appointed day.

These were the terms of their letter:—

“After we had departed from Capua, we heard, on the road, that Pompey had sailed from Brundisium, with all his forces, on the fifteenth day of March; that next day Cæsar entered the city, and made a public speech; that immediately afterwards he set out for Rome; that he wished to be at Rome on the first, to stay there a few days, and then to set out for Spain. We thought it our duty, as we are certain of Cæsar’s movements, to send messengers to you, that you might get the earliest intelligence. We will take care of your commissions, and execute them at the proper season. After writing the above, we were informed, for certain, that Cæsar would lodge, on the twenty-third of March, at Beneventum; on the twenty-fourth, at Capua; and on the twenty-fifth, at Sinuessa.”

From Capua, Cæsar wrote himself to Cicero; the first letter since the orator had expressed his grateful thanks for the gentleness with which the prisoners at Corfinium had been treated. These are Cæsar’s words:—“You judge rightly of me, for I am well known to you, and detest nothing so much as cruelty; and I derive great pleasure from this your opinion, and am delighted with your approbation of my conduct. Nor am I annoyed because, as I am told, those who were dismissed have gone their several ways, to renew the war, for I like nothing better than that both I and they should preserve our distinct characters. I wish you would give me your personal support in the city; that, as usual, I may be benefited by your advice and influence. Be assured that I am delighted with your friend, Dolabella, more than I can express. he shows so much gentleness, good feeling, and attachment to me.” Cornelius Dolabella, a young noble-

man of high rank, had married Tullia, Cicero's daughter; yet, like most of Cicero's young friends and political pupils, had become, with other younger branches of many of the Syllan families, a devoted partizan of Cæsar.

Cicero could not avoid an interview with the conqueror of the Gauls and Germans, whom he had not seen since he had refused his proposal to become his lieutenant, and thus to escape the Clodian persecution. Since that time, he had accepted many favours from Cæsar; and, at that very time, owed him a heavy debt, which he could not discharge without sacrificing a portion of the money and materials which had been set aside for the celebration of his intended triumph. To Cicero the conversation must have been exceedingly painful. On the very morning, when the two best speakers of the age were to meet and confer on points affecting not only themselves, but Rome, and, with Rome, the whole civilized world, Cicero thus expresses himself:—"I am carefully meditating in what manner I am to speak to him. O wretched occasion! yet I doubt not he will press me to go to the city. For even at Formiæ there was public notice given, that he wished the senate to assemble in numbers on the first of April. Must I then refuse? But, why do I anticipate? I will instantly write to you a full account of our interview."

This was done in the following communication:—

"I acted according to your advice on both points. For my conversation tended rather to make him respect my motives, than to give me thanks for my conduct. And I persisted in refusing to go to Rome. We were both mistaken, in supposing that he would easily accept my excuses. So far from doing this, he complained that he was condemned by such a decision; that others would be more reluctant in their attendance, if I went not with him. I said that my case differed from theirs. . . . The end was, that Cæsar, apparently wishing to close the conversation, asked me to think again upon the subject. I could not refuse so to do, and thus we parted. I believe that he does not now love me; but I ever

since have loved myself, which has not been the case with me for some time past. For the rest, ye gods, what a retinue; what an 'infernal set,' as you call them; by what a crowd of reprobates was he surrounded. O utter ruin! O desperate bands! What do you think? The son of Servius was with them, and so also was the son of Titinius. How many men do you think he assembled in the camp, with which he beleaguered Pompey? Six legions! He is very vigilant, very daring; I see no end to the evil. . . . I almost forgot his most hateful conclusion, as he told me that, since he could not avail himself of my advice, he would avail himself of that which he could command, and would have recourse to all means for facilitating his purposes."

Cæsar met with no resistance in his entrance into Rome. Not only the lower orders, but also the great body of the middle ranks, were his adherents, and ready to give him a welcome reception. The tribunes of the people, Mark Antony and Quintus Cassius, assembled the senate in a temple outside the walls, where Cæsar addressed them in a long and apologetical speech, in which the conduct of his adversaries was not spared. He told them that he never had aimed at any extraordinary appointments, but had been content to wait until he could legally stand a second time for the consulship, a privilege open to every consular ten years after his first election; that a law, proposed by the ten tribunes of the people, was passed in the consulship of Pompey, by which he was allowed to stand for that office in his absence, although his enemies opposed it in vain, and Cato adopted every means of resistance, and, according to his practice, attempted to waste the day in an endless harangue. Now, if Pompey disapproved of this law, why did he permit it to pass? And, if he approved of it, why had he prevented him from availing himself of the people's favour? He then explained his own patient conduct—how he had proposed that all parties should dismiss their forces, and how he had been willing to forego his own dignity and honours. He dwelt

upon the harsh conduct of his adversaries, who refused to follow the course which they prescribed to another, and preferred a general confusion rather than they should part with their military authority and arms. He loudly complained that his legions had been wrongfully taken from him, and that the tribunes of the people had been cruelly and insolently deprived of their authority, and threatened with death. He recapitulated the terms proffered by him, and the conferences which he had sought, and the mode in which they had been refused.

He then called upon them, and besought them to take upon themselves the duties of government, and to assist him in discharging them. Should they, from fear, refuse to act, he would not trouble them, but would himself direct the commonwealth. It was proper that a deputation should be sent to Pompey, to treat concerning peace. Nor was he prevented from recommending this step by the scruples stated by Pompey himself in the senate not long before, when he said that an authority was ascribed to those to whom deputations were sent, from which the fear of the senders might be inferred; that these were, in his opinion, the sentiments of a little and feeble mind; that he, on the contrary, was as anxious to surpass his opponents in equity and justice as in the extent of his material power.

The senate, on the motion of the great lawyer, Servius Sulpicius, resolved to send a deputation, but found an insuperable difficulty when they came to nominate the members. For Pompey had announced that he would draw no line of difference between those who remained at Rome and the actual soldiers of Cæsar. Three days were thus wasted in vain discussion. We are told, by Dion, that an assembly of the people was also convoked, which decreed that Cæsar might take sums of money from the sacred treasury, and that this law was in vain vetoed by Metellus, the tribune. It is, however, certain that Cæsar forced open the doors of the treasury, of which the keys had been carried off by the consuls, and took possession of all the valuables.

Plutarch thus describes the transaction:—"As Metellus, the tribune, opposed his taking money out of the treasury, and alleged some laws against such an act, Cæsar said, 'Arms and laws do not flourish together; if you are not pleased at my acts, you may withdraw; indeed, war will not allow much liberty of speech. Even this warning, on my part, is a favour to you. For you and all your factious partizans are in my power.' Saying this, he approached the gates of the treasury, and, as the keys were not produced, he sent for workmen to break open the doors. Metellus still resisted, but Cæsar, raising his voice, threatened to put him to death if he gave any further trouble, and added, 'you know it would be easier for me to do than to say this.' " According to another tradition, he was warned that the reserved treasury was not to be used, except when a Gallic "tumult" was proclaimed, and that he immediately claimed it as his own, seeing he had prevented the possibility of any future aggression from the Gauls. According to his own account, he lost several days at Rome, owing to the interruption given to all proceedings by the tribune Metellus. Before setting out for Spain, he provided for the safety of Italy and its vicinity. He made his kinsman, Æmilius Lepidus, præfect of the city, Mark Antony, military governor of Italy and all its coasts, Licinius Crassus, the eldest son of the triumvir, governor of Cisalpine Gaul, Caius Antonius, the brother of Mark, governor of Illyricum. He gave orders for building two fleets—one on the lower sea, to be commanded by young Hortensius, the other, in the Adriatic, by Cornelius Dolabella. Valerius Flaccus had already been appointed to Sardinia, and Curio to Sicily. He also wrote a very kind letter to Cicero, and accepted his excuses for not attending in the senate. He added, that the two consulars, Volcatius Tullus and Servius Sulpicius, had bitterly complained that Cæsar had refused to grant them both the same indulgence; "ridiculous people," exclaims Cicero, "who, after sending their sons to aid in beleaguering Pompey, hesitated, forsooth, to attend in the senate!" But among other sons who differed from their

fathers was the son of Quintus Cicero, who, if personal favours were sufficient reasons for deciding between the opposing parties, would have been found in Cæsar's camp. But Quintus, like his brother, was still hovering between the two parties, although his indecision was more the result of the influence of his brother-in-law Atticus, and of his brother Marcus, than of steady principle. Whatever was the cause of the change in the great orator's feelings, the fact is evident that, in letters written after his return from Cilicia, he shows a spirit of hostility to Cæsar, which was not to be seen before. This he never concealed before the family circle. The son of Quintus had no portion of this spirit, but was a zealous partizan of Cæsar, to whom he was anxious to communicate the real estimation felt by the great orator for the great warrior, and to warn him against his uncle's duplicity. First, he wrote letters, which were intercepted by the father and uncle; lastly, he had absconded, gone to Rome, and entered into communications with the Cæsarean party. This is Cicero's account of the transaction, in a letter to Atticus:—
“The son of my brother Quintus (a wretched affair; no more bitter event ever happened in my life), corrupted by our indulgence, has proceeded to an extent which I dare not mention, and I am waiting for your letter; for you wrote that you would write more at large after seeing himself. All my indulgence to him was mingled with much severity, and I have checked in him not one trifling, but many heavy faults. He ought to have loved rather than have so cruelly abused his father's indulgence; for we were so heavily displeased with the letters sent by him to Cæsar, that we concealed the fact even from you, but seem thus to have rendered his life bitter.

“But I dare not tell you the object of his journey, nor with what pretence of filial duty he covered it. I only know that, after communicating with Hirtius, he, in a personal interview, described to Cæsar my feelings as most averse to his whole conduct, and my determination to leave Italy, and

even to do this furtively. But it is not our fault. *His* disposition is to be blamed. This, not the fault of their fathers, corrupted the sons of Hortensius and Curio; my brother is prostrated by grief, and fears not so much concerning his own as for my life."

Cæsar, however, took no notice of the communication, and a visit from Curio on his road to Sicily, and letters from Dolabella, relieved Cicero from his great alarm, and assured him that Cæsar entertained no hostile feelings towards him. Curio, like most of the young Cæsareans, seems to have been quite open in his communications, and to have revealed all that he knew respecting the present and future. "He staid with me," writes Cicero, "a long time. O, foul business!—you know the man. He concealed nothing. Above all, that nothing was surer than the restoration of all the exiles banished under the Pompeian laws, and that he would, therefore, employ them in Sicily: that the Spains would, undoubtedly, fall into Cæsar's hands: that from Spain he, with his army, would seek Pompey, wherever he was; that the war would end with Pompey's ruin. He told me, also, that Cæsar, excited by anger, wished to kill Metellus, the tribune, who was all but slain. Had this been done, it would have been the commencement of a great massacre; that many advised such a measure, that Cæsar's mildness was not his natural disposition, but assumed, because he thought clemency popular. But, if ever he lost the favour of the people, he would show himself cruel, and that he was disturbed in mind on understanding that the commonalty were offended by the treasury transaction; and so, although he had previously determined to harangue the assembly of the people, he durst not do so, and had set out from Rome with a *disturbed mind*."

But no symptoms of a disturbed mind were shown in the course of the ensuing campaign, which, in its issue, was decisive of the whole struggle. The first serious opposition which he received was from the Greek citizens of Massilia,

the wealthy and aristocratical descendants of the Phocæan colonists, who fled westward from the tyranny of the Persian Cyrus. The original expedition had been almost annihilated by the united fleets of Carthage and Etruria, who, some six hundred years before Christ, were the dominant naval power in the Mediterranean. We know not historically how the feeble remains of the Phocæan emigrants were enabled to settle on that seaboard, which had been occupied so long by the factories and posts, first of the Phœnicians, and afterwards of their colonists and successors, the Carthaginians. And it is still more puzzling to account for the complete check which the Phocæans themselves received, after not only gaining a settlement, but spreading their towns and cities along the whole coast, from Nice to the mouth of the Ebro. It has been conjectured, as we can infer from the traditions respecting Alesia, that the Gauls, who regarded that rock fortress as their metropolis, were a mixed race, who, although barbarized, might still be recognised as the joint descendants of the first inhabitants of the east of Gaul and of the followers of the Tyrian Hercules. The semi-civilization which would thus distinguish the inhabitants of southern, western, and midland Gaul, might thus account for the marked orientalism of the superstitious and religious rites of the Gauls, and partly account also for the success with which their comparative knowledge of arts and arms would enable them to resist the encroachments of the Greeks, and confine them within their narrow boundaries. If we suppose that a similar amalgamation took place in the southern and western coasts of Spain, and that the mixed race passed over from Galicia into Ireland, it may in part enable us to refer the ancient traditions which connected "the sacred island of the west" with Spain and its oriental colonists, to some such events.

But Cæsar cared not for such disquisitions. He demolished Alesia without bestowing a thought on its earlier renown, and was now preparing to take Massilia, were not its gates and harbours thrown open to his troops. On finding them

shut, he first tried, what persuasion and remonstrance would do. He summoned into his camp the fifteen magistrates, in whom the chief authority of the state was vested, and besought them to recognise in him the representative of all Italy, and not, from an attachment to a single person, to commence hostilities against him. When the fifteen had listened to these and other arguments tending to the same point, they asked leave to retire into the city, and there to deliberate. It is not reported whether they consulted the great senate of the state, composed of six hundred life members; probably not, as their answer was a refusal to admit Cæsar and his troops within the walls, but stating their intention to observe a strict neutrality between two parties whom they equally regarded as their friends and benefactors. But, according to Cæsar's account, while the negotiation was still going on, there arrived in the harbour Domitius, the fugitive from Corfinium, bringing with him seven ships, armed and equipped at his own expense, and conveying home a deputation of young Massilian noblemen, who, on quitting Pompey, were told to remind their countrymen of the great benefits which they had received at his hands. The arrival of this party spared further deliberation. Domitius was appointed commander-in-chief, and a fierce resistance immediately prepared. "Massilia," writes Paterculus, "thus retarded, for a considerable time, the march of the impetuous Cæsar. In taking this step, her faith was superior to her prudence, because she unseasonably wanted to act as umpire between two imperial powers, an interference which no party should assume, except it be able to coerce the party which might reject the arbitration."

But aristocracies have long memories, and the veteran politicians of Massilia would look back with painful recollections upon the long struggle between the democratic and aristocratic parties among their Roman allies.

Scarcely eighty years had passed, since they had heard of the violent death of Tiberius Gracchus, the gallant young

nobleman, who was the special favourite of the Spanish tribes. Ten years later, they would have heard how the aristocracy had crushed the younger Gracchus and his followers. Many still living among the Massilian leaders would remember the victories which had crowned the cautious skill and daring of Caius Marius in their own vicinity. And yet they had heard how he, the champion of the civilized world, the deliverer of Italy, had been sent forth to wander on the shores of that Africa which he had himself conquered. Even the short gleam of democratic success which followed his return was quickly overclouded by the darkening storm of Sylla's wrath and the ruin in which the whole party was involved. They had witnessed the long war of Sertorius, and his authority, once extending from the Lusitanian shore to their own city walls, when not only Spain, but Aquitania, was Roman in arms, ensigns, and military tactics. Yet all had been subdued, when apparently the empire had shrunk within the walls of Rome, and Spartacus was encamped in the fairest regions of Italy, and the Mediterranean was entirely swept by the pirates. Why should they then augur a different result to the present struggle? What was there in Cæsar which Marius had not? But, more than all, the Massilians could not forget that the Pompeian was the aristocratical party, that with them lay all the sympathies of the dominant citizens, and that, in all probability, the victory of the Roman democracy would soon be followed by the introduction of the same political system among themselves. Their means of defensive warfare were very complete—engines of every description, both fixed and moveable, an arsenal abounding with materials of every kind; lastly, the command of the sea, and a fixed confidence that Pompey's superior fleet would soon sail, and rescue them from all danger.

Cæsar, therefore, had no choice left. Twelve ships of war were built at Arelate, and D. Brutus was made naval commander. C. Trebonius, with three legions, was left to carry on the siege by land, while Cæsar hurried into Spain. Thither

he had long before ordered C. Fabius to proceed, with three legions, which had wintered in the vicinity of Narbo, and to force the passage of the Pyrenees; other legions were ordered to follow, with due intervals. Fabius had succeeded in crossing into Spain, without much difficulty; and, leaving the sea-coast, turned to the right, and entered the valley of the Sicoris, where the lieutenants of Pompey, Afranius and Petreius, had chosen Ilerda, the capital of the ancient Ilergetes, as a spot well chosen for defensive operations. As this is rather a life of Cæsar than a military memoir, it would fatigue the non-military reader to trace the various and shifting events of this short campaign, where we find the same tactics practised, the same energy developed against Afranius and his legions, which had proved successful against the less disciplined valour of the Gauls. Nor was it a mere contest between the Roman legions of Cæsar and Afranius. The lieutenants of Pompey had assembled not only five Roman legions, commanded by himself and Petreius, but no less than eighty cohorts of Lusitanians, Celtiberians, and Cantabrians, who furnished no small supply of heavy-armed, middle-armed, and light-armed troops. Cæsar, also, had reinforced the veteran legions and cavalry, whom he had chosen for this service, with an equal number of Gallic levies, selected with peculiar care, and of whom a great number had been personally invited by himself to join his standard. He had especially called out, and allured into his service, the mountaineers of Aquitania and the Cevennes, whose weapons and mode of warfare were most efficient against the Spanish auxiliaries of Afranius. The details of the campaign are of great interest, as a study, to the scientific soldier. Let it suffice to say, that the final success of Cæsar was apparently ascribable, not to superior knowledge of the art of war, but to a reliance on the sagacity of his own mind, and to the zeal and the single-mindedness with which his soldiers carried his plans into execution. For example, when a flood, sudden in its commencement and of long duration, had utterly ruined the

scientific plans adopted by Cæsar, and he was cut off from all communication with the only roads by which his continuous supplies from Gaul could reach him, he suddenly extricated himself from his dangerous position, and placed Afranius in the same difficulties which had so urgently pressed upon himself.

When in Britain, he had remarked British boats, not made altogether of solid timber, but of much slighter materials. The keels, the ribwork, and the upper edges were a wooden framework. The interstices were filled with wicker work, and the whole covered on the outside with hides, tarred and tallowed for the purpose. We must not suppose that these vessels, built by Cæsar, were to be compared to the modern coracle of the Welsh fishermen, capable of containing one, or, at most, two rowers. They might be constructed of great length and comparative breadth, and capable of receiving fifty or sixty passengers. In fact, the sea boats of the Saxon pirates, as late as the middle of the fifth century, were built upon this principle. These boats were built in the camp, and conveyed on wheels for two-and-twenty miles, to a place where the river was favourable for the operation; and they quickly carried across a body of troops, strong enough to make their position good for a time, and finally to enable him to recover his line of communication. The proceedings which succeeded this able manœuvre have little interest, for the contest was too unequal to excite any other than painful feelings. The Pompeian leaders, together with their troops, were paralyzed by the superior energy and fascinating influence of a more powerful mind; and, after an unavailing struggle, surrendered at discretion. Before he agreed to grant the final terms, Cæsar thought it advisable to address the lieutenants of Pompey, in the presence of their own troops. After severely blaming them for a semi-treacherous renewal of the war, when all asperities had apparently ceased, and the two armies were preparing to embrace each other as brothers, he declared that the Pompeian troops must be dismissed. That the only

object with which they had been maintained for so many years, was to act against him. That the six original legions had been sent thither for no other reason, increased in strength, as they afterwards were, by a newly-raised legion, and by large and well-equipped fleets, all placed under the command of experienced soldiers. That not one of those measures had any connexion with the pacification of Spain, nor with the benefit of the province; which, owing to its long continued tranquillity, needed not such an extraordinary force. He added, that all these measures were directed against him; that against him magistrates, with a power before unknown, were appointed; so that the same man encamped before the city gates, and, directing all public proceedings, nevertheless, kept actual possession, during so many years, of Africa and Spain—two of the most powerful provinces of the empire. That against him were changed the laws, according to which the consuls and prætors, at the termination of their offices, were to succeed to provinces; and new rules adopted, which enabled the few to send their own creatures, chosen by themselves, to govern the conquered nations. . . . That in his person had been overruled a permission, given to all successful commanders, to return home, if not with honour, at least without disgrace, and to dismiss their armies. Yet that he had patiently submitted to all these injuries; nor would he then take into his own service their troops, but only prevent the Pompeians from arming them against him. He therefore repeated, that they must dismiss their armies, and quit the province.

These are bitter words, and at once tear aside that veil of dissimulation, with which both parties had, for the preceding three years, cloaked their real intentions. Not that Cæsar was to be blamed, for he had not given to Pompey the slightest cause of offence; except his increasing power, renown, and influence be enumerated among offences.

Cæsar's terms were accepted; the Afranian legions were dismissed; two-thirds of the soldiers preferred to remain in

Spain, the remaining third was conducted into Italy, and discharged, on crossing the river Varus. The generals and high officers were allowed to go their own way, and within fifty days of the opening of the campaign, not a fragment of the great Pompeian army in Spain remained at their great general's disposal.

But rumour had been busy in the meantime; and, during that period of Cæsar's difficulties, when his communications with Gaul had been cut off, Afranius and Petreius had sent off highly-coloured descriptions of their temporary success, and hints were widely insinuated that the war was well-nigh finished. When these despatches and rumours reached Rome, the house of Afranius was crowded with visitants, who all congratulated his domestic circle upon the favourable intelligence; and many, who had hitherto remained in Italy, hastened to pass over to Pompey; some that they might be the first bearers of such joyful tidings, others that they might not be supposed to have waited for the event of the war to be the last laggards in such a cause. Among the latter class the great orator of Rome must, we fear, be placed.

Cæsar, when marching into Spain, had sent him a kind letter, dated in the middle of the month of April, of which the following is a copy:—"Although I am certain you will not do anything rashly or imprudently, nevertheless, alarmed by public report, I have thought it my duty to write to you, and to request you, in accordance with our good will, not to join that party, after the event has almost been decided, which you did not join, when it was yet undamaged. For, by such a proceeding, you will inflict a heavier blow on our friendship, and take a step by no means to your own advantage. For you will not seem to have been influenced by the success of either party, for things are much in our favour, and adverse to them; nor by the merits of the cause, for that was the same, when you refused to take a share in their councils, but by your disapprobation of something done by me; a heavier blow than this you cannot inflict upon me. I therefore be-

seech you, by our common friendship, not to do so. Finally, what is more suitable to a good and peaceable man, who is also a good citizen, than not to mingle in civil strife? Many men, from a sense of danger, although they approved of such conduct, have not been able to adopt it. You, as you have the evidence of my life before you, and my declaration of friendship, will find nothing safer, nothing more honourable, than not to meddle with this or any other struggle."

But, as first came the tidings of the resistance of the Massilians, and of the success of their defence; secondly, rumours that Pompey was to invade Italy through Illyricum and Cisalpine Gaul, or that he was to pass over to Africa with his forces, and thence join his victorious lieutenants in Spain, Cicero, like many others in the same position, became alarmed, lest, in case of Pompey's now probable success, they might be made examples of oligarchal vengeance. In his correspondence with Atticus, we see a continual struggle, painful in the extreme, and more vexatious, in most men's opinions, than even the worst decision.

Mark Antony also wrote to him in a similar strain:—"I cannot believe," he writes, "that you are going to cross the sea, seeing you value so highly Dolabella, and Tullia his accomplished lady, and are yourself valued so highly by all our party, many of whom regard your honour and dignity as almost more dear to them than their own." But his old friend Cælius wrote in a more offensive style, and appealed, without any delicacy, to his fears, as being the most impressible of all his feelings. "I was half killed," he writes, "by your letter, in which you show you entertain dismal intentions, although you have not explained what those are, but have only half revealed them. I therefore instantly dispatch this letter. I beseech and intreat you, Cicero, by your property, by your children, not to adopt any resolution fatal to your life and dignity. For I protest, in the name of men and gods, and of our common friendship, that I told you the truth, and gave you no groundless warning. For, as

soon as I had conversed with Cæsar, and discovered what his intentions were after gaining the victory, I made you acquainted with them. If you think he will then follow the same plan which he now does, by dismissing prisoners and offering terms of peace, you are mistaken. Both his thoughts and words indicate bloody and savage measures. If, on the one hand, you are alarmed by the threats of the optimates, or if, on the other, you are disgusted by the insolence and swagger of some of our party, my advice is, that you should choose some country town, free from the war, for your residence during the struggle; and, should you do this, I will say that you have acted wisely, and you will not offend Cæsar."

Cicero answered this letter at great length, and protested that he had never intended to act as Cælius supposed; that, so far from it, he was more than ever determined to abstain from civil war, and especially not to give any real cause of offence to Cæsar. Having thus expressed his sentiments to his false friends, he went on board a vessel, secretly prepared, with a few attendants and his laurelled lictors, and sailed in search of Pompey. This took place about the latter end of May.

The siege of Massilia had, in the meantime, been vigorously pressed by Trebonius on the land side, and Brutus with his naval force; nor had the defenders acted with less vigour. Brutus, with his hastily constructed fleet, had defeated, with great loss, the navy of the besieged, superior in every respect but in the strength and courage of the combating portion of their armaments. But that had not much facilitated the capture of the town. The old city was built on a projecting point, and was on three sides washed by the Mediterranean waves. The only approach by land was on the fourth side, against which, on either extreme, Trebonius determined to advance those huge mounds, of which we read so often in the histories of Alexander the Great and of Julius Cæsar. But the progress of these works was very slow, owing to the tremendous artillery with which the walls were

covered and defended. Missiles launched from these pierced the defences of the mound constructors with irresistible force, and inflicted great loss of lives. Pompey also did not entirely forget his Massilian friends, and sent sixteen ships of war, under Lucius Nasidius, to encourage and relieve the besieged. Supported by these reinforcements, the Massilians determined again to try their chance in a naval combat, and thus to open a way for a safe retreat at least, should the enemy prove victorious on the land side. But they were again defeated with a heavy loss, after having shown extraordinary skill and gallantry; but the Nasidian fleet did not display the same spirit, and, after losing one ship, sailed with the others to the mouth of the Ebro, possibly to carry certain orders to Afranius and Petreius, whom they never could have reached. The Massilians, nevertheless, although totally defeated and abandoned by their allies, still continued to resist with unabated resolution. But the mounds were approaching nearer, and a strong covered gallery, the pent roof of which could neither be crushed with weighty stones nor be destroyed by combustibles, was urged forward on wheels, until its head approached the walls, and enabled the mining party, which was protected by it on all sides, to undermine the stone foundation, and bring down a considerable part of the superincumbent structure. The Massilians, terrified by this breach, went forth in suppliant form, without arms, and wearing sacred fillets, and, with outstretched hands, besought the commanders and soldiers to spare them. The soldiers complied with their request, and conducted them to Trebonius, where they explained their great fears of an immediate assault, and merely requested him to reserve their fate for the consideration of Cæsar himself, and, in the meantime, to cease from hostilities.

Trebonius had been warned by Cæsar not to allow the soldiers to take the town by storm, as he knew that the men, in that event, had determined, in consequence of the obstinate resistance which they had encountered, to slaughter all the

grown up males, and commit other similar atrocities. He therefore complied with the petition of the Massilian deputation, who, like learned men, pleaded their case both elegantly and pathetically. But the soldiers were restrained with difficulty from breaking into the city, and loudly expressed their indignation against Trebonius, who, as they felt, had prevented them from capturing the town. But the truce did not last long. The Massilians, taking advantage of the carelessness of the Roman guards, who feared no treachery, sallied forth during the season of mid-day repose, and suddenly destroyed, with fire, the covered gallery and all the woodwork by which the larger mounds and towers were supported, and in a few hours, assisted by a strong wind, rendered the labour of months unavailing. The blow seemed a decisive one, for Trebonius had already exhausted all the timber within reach in constructing the former mounds. He did not, however, despair, but renewed the works with frameworks of brick instead of timber, and in a short time rendered his assailing lines as formidable as before.

Cæsar, during this period, was detained in Western Spain, where Varro, the lieutenant of Pompey, had gathered a formidable force, and intended to make Gades a stronghold for the Pompeians in that province. But the tidings of the complete defeat of Afranius and Petreius, and the popularity which his former government of that province had enabled Cæsar to acquire, baffled all Varro's efforts. His troops almost either universally passed over to Cæsar or dispersed themselves. Even Gades, his anticipated stronghold, ejected his governor, and called in Cæsar. Thither, after pacifying the rest of the province, and constituting Quintus Cassius its governor, he himself repaired. He found there a fleet built by the Gaditani by Varro's order, of which he took possession, and sailed with it to Tarraco, where the deputies from the eastern province met him, and were treated with all due honours. Thence he crossed the Pyrenees, and reached first Narbo, then Massilia. The townsmen, worn out with

defeat, famine, and disease, made an early submission, and were treated with great gentleness, more from a respect for their ancient character and renown, than from any kindness due to them from him. Before he left Massilia, messengers came to announce to him that he had been nominated dictator by Æmilius Lepidus, who was the chief magistrate left at Rome.

In his return to the city, he received the unpleasant news that the ninth legion, stationed at Placentia, had mutinied against its officers, and threatened to pillage the peaceable inhabitants. Some called for their discharge, alleging that their regular time of service had expired; others that a certain donative, which Cæsar had promised to distribute among them at the close of the Brundusian campaign, had not been received. Cæsar hastened to Placentia, and soon, by his personal influence, reduced the mutinous legionaries to order. He threatened to discharge them all; or, if they wished it, to allow them to join Pompey. Even their submission, and loudly-expressed repentance gained them but a reluctant pardon; and a hundred and twenty, who were reported to have been the ringleaders, were ordered to be decimated by lot, and to suffer the penalty due to disobedience. One of the twelve, thus drawn, was able to prove that he was not present during any part of the mutinous proceedings, and the centurion who had falsely denounced him took his place among the condemned.

At Rome, he assumed the dictatorship, which Lepidus, after submitting the question to the people, and receiving their assent, had conferred upon him. The object was to enable him to hold the consular comitia, which a prætor could not do. No more, perhaps, could he legally have nominated a dictator, but Fabius Maximus, after the battle of the Trasimene Lake, furnished a precedent for Cæsar's nomination, who would scarcely trouble himself with the question whether he was really a dictator, or, as Livy wishes to prove in the case of Fabius, only a pro-dictator. He might have allowed the

consular year to expire, when the comitia could have been regularly held by an interrex, and consuls be elected without any extraordinary stretch of power. But Cæsar could not wait, and therefore presided as dictator over comitia, by which he himself and his old commander, Servilius Isauricus, were elected consuls, *both* for the second time. The first law passed by him restored to their full rights, as Roman citizens, the children of the proscribed Marians, whom the Syllan laws had pronounced inadmissible to the honours of the State. Some fourteen years before, Cicero had persuaded this persecuted body, whom he describes as excellent and valuable citizens, not to press their just claims during the Catilinarian crisis. But when that danger ceased to threaten the State, neither Cicero, nor any other statesman, had interfered to perform an act of ordinary policy. Had Cæsar been, before this time, in a position to bring forward with success a measure of such vital importance to the party of which he had from early days been the leader, he would undoubtedly have done so. And this must have been one of the dangers which the oligarchs dreaded, as the necessary result of his second consulship. He next recalled from banishment the great body of exiles who had been condemned under the Pompeian laws, during what Cicero himself calls the severities of "*that judicial year,*" when so many young men were sacrificed, under the name of law, to the fears of their political enemies. Rome—far different from the same Rome in her better days—had, like the later free governments of Greece, become intolerant of a political minority, and sought party peace by either slaying or banishing leading opponents. Milo was not recalled, because he had been guilty of the very offence which Cæsar wished, by this act of grace, to stigmatize, and had cruelly murdered in cold blood a political adversary, whom his attendants had wounded in a street quarrel. This exception was the more remarkable, as Milo was generally supposed to have been condemned as a Cæsarean partizan, hostile and hateful to Pompey. "Milo," writes Velleius

Paterculus, "was condemned, as much because Pompey willed it, as because his deed was odious."

Cæsar's next measure demonstrates that his great object was to reform, not revolutionize the state; to secure the lives and properties of the citizens, not to allow them to be interfered with, either illegally, or under the forms of law. The civil war, the great dangers expected to accompany Cæsar's victory, the fears of renewed proscriptions and fresh confiscations had almost entirely destroyed credit in the city. The price of all articles had suddenly fallen ruinously low. Debtors could not pay their creditors, merchants could not meet their engagements, silver and gold had disappeared, and all were threatened with general bankruptcy. Then arose the loud cry, which had so often been used by the Roman demagogues, calling for "new accounts," and a general abolition of debts, to which the dictator would not listen for a moment. The only measures which he adopted were, first, the appointment of commissioners to adjust equitably between debtor and creditor, to settle the amount of their claims and obligations, and to diminish the debt in proportion to the diminished value of property in general. The second, a prohibition by law, according to which no private individual could legally keep in his possession more than a fixed weight of gold and silver, whether in a coined or uncoined state. As this was directed against the hoarders, the law was very popular; but the difficulty was, how to enforce it against refractory hidors of their precious stores. The people therefore petitioned for the addition of a clause, by which a reward should be held out to all slaves who should inform against masters guilty of this offence. But Cæsar firmly resisted such an inquisitorial proposition, and even imprecated a curse upon his own head, should he ever give credence to a slave, voluntarily informing against his master in any possible case of malefaction. After passing these laws, which were more immediately necessary, he provided for the regular supply of the city with corn and other stores, and re-arranged the government of some of the pro-

vinces. His kinsman, Decimus Brutus, was made governor of Transalpine Gaul; Æmilius Lepidus was sent to command and conciliate Eastern Spain, where Pompey's friends and retainers were still a powerful party. The consul Servilius, with his two new prætors, were left at Rome, to carry on the usual business of the state, and to distribute justice.

His lieutenants, in the various provinces, had not been equally successful in their military operations. C. Antonius, the brother of Mark, had been defeated in Illyricum by the Pompeians, Cn. Octavius and Scribonius Libo, who also had vanquished by sea Dolabella, who was in co-operation with C. Antonius. Curio, after chasing Cato from Syracuse, which he had made his head-quarters, had made himself master of all Sicily, without further opposition. Elated with this success, he had passed over to Africa with two legions, principally made up of the cohorts who had surrendered at Corfinium. Africa had been occupied by Atius Varus, their old leader, who had excluded Pompey's own governor, Tubero, and assumed the government of the province, and the management of the war, on his own authority. His influence was considerable among the Roman citizens in Africa, because he had been their governor before; and in Juba, the most powerful native sovereign which Africa had known since the days of Massinissa, he found a powerful ally, both because he was a friend and client of Pompey, and because Curio, during the preceding year, had, as tribune of the people, attempted to depose him. The head-quarters of Varus were under the walls of Utica, and Curio, that he might bring the war sooner to a conclusion, had taken possession of the strong position opposite Utica, and only one mile distant along the shore. The first Africanus selected this as a stronghold, and from him it had derived its name of the Cornelian camp. Curio was at first victorious, but success led to confidence. He advanced with his legions into the plain, where they were surrounded, overpowered, and put to flight by the numerous cavalry of Juba, who had hurried to the rescue of Varus.

Curio refused to outlive his disgrace, and perished sword in hand. The African prince abused his victory, by putting to death many of the Roman officers, who had surrendered, and whom Varus in vain tried to save. The death of Curio was the first great loss sustained by the commonwealth in this war. Had he lived, Mark Antony could never have occupied the position which, at a later period, made him so powerful for evil. The defeat, however, of Roman legions by a barbarian prince could not enhance the popularity of the Pompeian chiefs at Rome.

CHAPTER XVII.

DICTATOR. B.C. 48.

POMPEY had employed the year, during which he had been absent from Italy, in vigorously preparing for the final decision of the contest. He had gathered a large fleet from the western coast of Asia Minor, from the Cyclades, from Coreyra, Athens, the Pontus, from Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phœnicia, and Ægypt, and had caused other ships to be built in various harbours. He had collected large sums of money, being the contributions of the kings, dynasts, and tetrarchs of all Asia and Syria, and of the free cities of Achæa, and had drawn large sums from the equestrian societies, which farmed the revenues of the countries in his possession.

He had formed nine legions of Roman citizens, strengthened by numerous auxiliaries of all the eastern nations, three thousand archers and seven thousand horsemen, either led in person, or sent by various kings, such as Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia, Dejotarus, Saocondarius, and Dorilaus of Galatia, Cotus and his son Sadalis from Thrace, Rhascipolis from Macedonia, and Antiochus of Commagene.

He had collected immense quantities of provisions, of every

kind, from the fertile provinces under his command, and was preparing to occupy, during the ensuing winter, the whole eastern coast of the Adriatic with his land forces, while the fleets were to keep open the communications, and especially to prevent Cæsar from transporting his legions to Epirus.

Bibulus, Cæsar's bitter enemy, was made admiral, and under him Pompey, the son, commanded the Ægyptian fleet; D. Lælius and C. Triarius the ships of Asia; the Syrians were commanded by C. Cassius; the Rhodians by C. Marcellus; the fleet drawn from the Adriatic and the Achæan states by Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius.

Thessalonica had been selected for the head-quarters of Pompey and the consuls, where they were surrounded by more than two hundred senators. But as the year was drawing to a close, they had a long discussion whether they ought not to constitute themselves into a legitimate senate, and convoke an assembly of citizens, which might represent the regular comitia, and then proceed to elect their annual magistrates, according to the Roman constitution. But this they hesitated to do; probably from the impossibility of proceeding without acting in open violation of the augural laws, in support of which they were in arms, and which required a servile compliance with time and place, which could not possibly be observed in a foreign land. They therefore continued themselves in power, and merely changed their titles from consuls, prætors, and quæstors, to pro-consuls, pro-prætors, and pro-quæstors. This must have been the result of an unavoidable necessity, as the want of the consular name was a serious loss to them in dealing with reluctant allies, and Cæsar's "de facto" consulship was in a corresponding degree beneficial to his cause.

Cæsar left Rome about the middle of December, B.C. 49, and hurried to Brundisium, where he had ordered twelve legions to assemble. Seven of these he immediately embarked, without camp followers, without heavy baggage. But in the first convoy he could transport only twenty thousand legionaries

and six hundred cavalry. But these represented seven legions, so many of their number had perished in the Gallic wars, so many in the long march from the banks of the Ebro to Brundusium; and the change of climate from the healthy regions of Spain and Gaul to the Apulian and Calabrian coasts, infested by autumnal malaria, had rendered many unfit for service. He sailed from the harbour on the fourth of January, B.C. 48, and next day, without having suffered any loss, landed his whole force upon the open coast. The want of sufficient transports alone, says Cæsar, prolonged the war, and prevented him from bringing it to an immediate termination.

He sent back the transports under the command of Fufius Calenus, a trusty friend and lieutenant, with orders to convey the remaining legionaries and cavalry as soon as possible. But Bibulus, who was stationed with a fleet of a hundred and ten ships at Corcyra, hurried to the scene of action, and overtook thirty of the empty transports, which he burned in his wrath, and sought to expiate his own carelessness by burning the owners and their crews in the same fire. This he thought might deter others from a similar service. He then occupied, with detachments of his fleet, every landing-place between Salona and Oricum, and kept a vigilant watch, staying himself on board during the most inclement weather, and refusing to be relieved, lest Cæsar might be allowed to escape from his hands. Calenus had placed on board another division of his cavalry and infantry, and had reached the open sea, when he was met by a rowboat bringing a despatch from Cæsar, announcing the complete occupation of the shore by Bibulus, and the impossibility of landing. The seasonable receipt of this despatch was one of those fortunate chances of which many befell Cæsar during his perilous enterprizes. Calenus safely returned to Brundusium.

Cæsar, on landing his forces, had marched and occupied first Oricum and then Apollonia, which the inhabitants had willingly delivered into his hands, as they dared not, as they

represented to the Pompeian officers, oppose the Roman consul. Vibullius Rufus was in Cæsar's camp. He had taken him prisoner at Corfinium, and dismissed him. He had a second time fallen into his hands, when Afranius and Petreius, whom he had joined, had surrendered. He now commissioned him to carry a fresh proposal to Pompey, and to press upon him the necessity of a reconciliation; to tell him that both ought to recede from their pertinacity, and no further risk the chances of war; that heavy blows had been received by both parties, which ought to serve them as warnings not to expose themselves to further dangers; that Pompey had been expelled from Italy, had lost Sicilia, Sardinia, and Spain, and the armies there serving; that Cæsar, by the death of Curio and the loss of his African army, by the defeat of Dolabella, and the capture of C. Antonius and his force, had also experienced great reverses; that the moment was favourable, while the final event was still dubious; that a decisive advantage would make the victorious party unwilling to negotiate; that the only mode of terminating their differences was by a mutual agreement to dismiss their armies, and to bind themselves to submit to the judgment of the Roman people and senate. Vibullius, being dismissed with this message, hastened to inform Pompey of Cæsar's arrival in Epirus, and, as he said, with all his forces. He met Pompey in Candavia, through which he was conducting his troops, with the intention of making Dyrrachium and Apollonia his head-quarters for the remainder of the winter. Alarmed by the intelligence of Cæsar's presence, who, according to his opinion, could not commence active operations until the coming spring was well advanced, Pompey hastened to occupy those two important cities before Cæsar could seize them. He arrived in time to save Dyrrachium, where he at once began to form an intrenched camp. Cæsar, being thus anticipated, halted on the southern bank of the river Apsus, within the territory of Apollonia. There he ordered his hardy legions to pitch their tents and prepare to brave the

winter. Pompey did the same, and the river Apsus for a time was the only barrier between the two camps.

Cæsar had left at Oricum two of his lieutenants—one, Acilius, to command his few ships of war, the other, Staius Murcus, an excellent officer, to defend the town. Their duty was partly to prevent the Pompeian fleet from supplying themselves with water and fuel from the adjacent coasts, and thus had they succeeded in seriously annoying Bibulus and Libo by their vigilance and activity. Suddenly Libo opened a communication with them, in which it was stated that he and Bibulus were anxious for a personal interview with Cæsar, at which they hinted the means of reconciliation might be devised. Cæsar received intelligence of this proposition when in the vicinity of Buthrotum, whither he had gone from the camp with one legion, for the purpose of procuring corn. He thought it his duty to listen to a communication which the character of Bibulus seemed to stamp with importance; but on presenting himself at Oricum, Libo alone came to the conference, and Cæsar soon discovered that the only object was a temporary truce, during which they might be enabled to refurnish their ships with fuel and water.

The vicinity of the two camps had, in the meantime, enabled the soldiers and officers of the two contending armies to discuss the question of peace and war among themselves, in which the Cæsareans had the advantage, while protesting against the brutality of the Pompeian leaders, who refused to receive any deputy from Cæsar or to listen to his propositions; though Pompey himself had not disdained to treat, by accredited messengers, with the banditti of the Pyrenees and the pirates of Cilicia. The Pompeian soldiers consequently pressed their commanders to listen at least to what their adversaries had to say. Vatinius and Labienus undertook to represent their several parties, but the discussion was suddenly broken off by violence, and some of the centurions who accompanied Vatinius were seriously wounded. This violence

was succeeded by the following address by Labientis to the members of the Vatinian party:—"Cease henceforth to speak of peace, for with us there can be no peace except you bring to us the head of Cæsar."

Had any man but Julius Cæsar himself been placed in the very critical position which the opponent of Pompey had rashly occupied, his fate, according to all human calculations, was certain. With a force thrice outnumbered on the land, and exposed to an able, cautious, and experienced general; with communications with Italy cut off, and with the enemy's navy riding triumphant on each side of the Adriatic, what rational hope could be entertained of the final safety of men thus over-matched and isolated, without military engines, without magazines, and forced to live from hand to mouth on a barren coast, which could not in general feed its own population? Bibulus, with a desperate tenacity, although worn out with the severity of his duty, kept his position until relieved by death from the long struggle which he had carried on as ædile, prætor, and consul, as consular and proconsul against Cæsar and his principles. Libo succeeded him as admiral in those seas, and occupied with his fleet the island which partly formed the port of Brundisium, whence he commanded every movement made by Mark Antony, who for some time had been commander-in-chief of the Cæsarean troops at Brundisium, and had been waiting in vain to convey them into Epirus.

Many months had now elapsed, and the winter was drawing to a close, and yet Cæsar looked in vain for Antony and Calenus. He even thought that favourable opportunities had been lost, and that his own presence might effect what his lieutenants failed to perform. It is not, therefore, improbable that he attempted to cross into Italy in an open boat; nor that, when the boatmen, unable to make the passage good, were anxious to take refuge from the storm in a harbour occupied by the Pompeians, he roused the crew to fresh exertions by informing them "that they were conveying in that frail boat both Cæsar and his fortunes." The attempt,

if it was made, failed. The next order was to summon Antony across, and to land the soldiers somewhere near Apollonia, without being deterred by any scruples about the safety of the vessels when the shore was once gained.

Antony, by great activity, gathered a sufficient force of vessels of every kind to enable him to drive Libo from the Italian coast, and to sail with a fair south wind for the opposite shore. But the wind was too fair for the inexperienced sailors; the fleet of transports passed by Cæsar's camp and the Apollonian shore, passed by Dyrrachium, and finally entered a small harbour some three miles to the north of Lissus. The commander of the Rhodian fleet stationed at Dyrrachium sailed in pursuit, and would have overtaken the transports, had not certain shiftings of the wind, which enabled Antony to reach his harbour in safety, proved utterly destructive to the Pompeian fleet. Two of Antony's transports, being overtaken by night, and ignorant of the coast, had anchored off the harbour of Lissus. These being observed by the Pompeians, commanded by Otacilius Crassus, were soon surrounded by vessels of all descriptions, and were offered favourable terms of surrender. In one were two hundred and fifty young soldiers, who suffered themselves to be deceived, gave up their arms, were disembarked, and all murdered in cold blood. It is a painful duty which the historian has to perform in such cases, and to state that there can be no doubt that the Pompeians in this war murdered every soldier of Cæsar who fell into their hands. Even if we impute the contrary behaviour of Cæsar to policy, and not to generous feelings, yet the very fact that he invariably represents his own merciful treatment of prisoners as commendable, while he stigmatizes the opposite conduct of the Pompeians as deeds of cruelty, entitles him to the highest honour as a friend of suffering humanity. He seems to have been aware that one drop of blood wantonly shed and drawn from the veins of helpless victims, awakes the slumbering tiger within the human breast more than all

the streams which tinge with red the ground where victory is fairly lost or won.

The crew of the second transport, whose numbers did not much exceed two hundred, amused their assailants for the day, and at night ran their vessel aground, and fought their way amidst superior numbers to a place within Cæsar's lines.

In fact, Antony's fleet of transports had passed in sight of both camps, and both commanders had marched northward. Pompey to attack the enemy on their landing; Cæsar to prevent his soldiers, seasick and wearied, from being suddenly overpowered. But Antony was a wary general; he kept his troops within a fortified camp, until Cæsar, whose march was necessarily more circuitous than Pompey's, came to his rescue. Nothing can give us a more convincing proof of Pompey's distrust of the courage and discipline of his troops than the fact that he permitted Cæsar thus, as it were, to march round him, without even having attempted to annoy him in his course. As soon as Cæsar had joined Antony, Pompey marched southward, and encamped at Asparagium, a spot in the Dyrrachian territory, which topographers find it difficult to recognise.

Scipio, in the meantime, had assembled all the forces which Syria and the neighbouring provinces could raise, and exacted, with merciless severity, not only the public revenues, due or not due, but arbitrary contributions from cities, towns, villages, and private individuals. Cæsar describes the tyranny and insolence of the adherents of the senatorial party as intolerable, and as rendering the provincials eager to join his standard. The fact that this was the case makes it credible that the reasons stated by Cæsar as the probable, were also the real causes; but in the following graphic picture of the Pompeian camp by Cicero, a well-wisher, we have sufficient evidence that Cæsar's representations were not very exaggerated. The passage is to be found in a letter addressed by the orator to his kinsman, Marius:—"I was sorry that I had joined Pompey's camp; not on account of the danger which by doing so

I had to encounter, but on account of the vicious system which, on my arrival, was prevalent. First, the forces were not sufficiently large nor warlike; in the second place, with the exception of Pompey himself, and a few more chiefs, the rest were all rapacious in conducting the war, and also so cruel in their threats, that I shuddered at the very idea of victory itself. But what principally moved me was the enormous debts of the men of highest rank and station. What then, you ask? There was nothing good but the cause."

Cæsar's friends at Rome were, during this same period, employed in restoring credit to a sound basis. Trebonius, the city prætor, managed the question of equitable adjustment between debtor and creditor with so much justice and moderation, that no honest man could complain of his conduct. But there were spirits of a different character among the partisans of Cæsar, who had no inclination to compromise with their creditors, and whose only object was to cancel their debts and retain their property. These found a willing patron in Marcus Cælius, another prætor, Cicero's old friend, who, after in vain attempting to make himself, as it were, a court of appeal against the decisions of Trebonius, proposed a law which, if rightly interpreted by commentators, was to enable the debtor to subtract from the original sum borrowed all the interest which he had paid, and to make it incumbent upon the creditor to receive the remaining capital, made payable by six half-yearly instalments, in full discharge of all his claims. When he saw that, owing to the opposition of the consul Servilius, and of the other magistrates, he was not likely to succeed in carrying this law, he went further in bidding for popular support, and promulgated two new bills; one by which all tenants in the city were to be relieved from the payment of all rates and taxes, and another for "new accounts" and the annihilation of all existing debts. With such temptations held out, he roused the spirits of the commonalty, and headed them in an outrageous assault upon the

prætor, Trebonius, whom they actually thrust from his tribunal. Servilius appealed to the senate, and obtained a decree, by which Cælius was deposed from his office. He left the city, pretending that he was going to appeal to Cæsar, but really to organize an insurrection against the home authority. He summoned Milo from his banishment; and with his aid prepared to make Italy the seat of war. But their rebellion met with ill luck. Milo was slain at the head of his gladiators, in making an assault on Coda, and Cælius at Thurii, by some Gallic horsemen, whom he had attempted to seduce from their allegiance to Cæsar. Thus fell two of those characters whom Cicero delighted to honour, as the defenders of the party of the good. Cælius, before he quitted Rome, wrote the following letter to Cicero, then in Pompey's camp, which may describe, perhaps, the feelings of many who had joined Cæsar, in hopes of a general confusion. After complaining of his rashness in joining the Cæsarean party, and stating that he had done so more from his attachment to Curio than from love of the cause, he proceeds to say:—
“Nor do I thus speak, because I distrust the success of the cause. But, believe me, it is better to die than to see these Cæsareans. And were not men afraid of your cruelty, we should long ago have been driven from Rome. For here, with the exception of a few usurers, there is not a man of any rank who is not a Pompeian. I have already succeeded in gaining over, especially, the commonalty and the middle class, which heretofore were Cæsareans. For what purpose, you say? Wait a while: I will make you conquerors in spite of yourselves. I have roused in myself the very spirit of Cato. You are all asleep, and do not appear to know how open to attack, how very feeble we are. And I will do all this without hope of reward—stimulated, as usual, by a feeling of resentment and indignation. What in the world are you about? Do you expect, which is your best policy, a battle?”
As he had been present with Cæsar during the whole of the campaign against Afranius, he concludes with the following

remark :—" I do not know your forces, ours have been inured to desperate fighting, and can bear cold and hunger without repining."

When Cæsar had once more united all his forces in the same camp, and found that he could not compel Pompey to risk a general engagement, he sent forth detachments into the adjoining continent; and especially Cassius Longinus, with one legion and two hundred cavalry, into Thessaly; and Domitius Calvinus, a distinguished consular, into the southwestern provinces of ancient Macedonia, with three legions and five hundred horse. This movement was rendered necessary by the announcement of the arrival of Lucius Scipio, with a formidable army, in Eastern Macedonia. After a series of operations, in which no decisive success was obtained on either side, Scipio and Domitius contented themselves with keeping each other in check on the banks of the river Haliaemon. With his remaining legions, Cæsar conceived the extraordinary plan of throwing a line of forts and ramparts round the place on which Pompey had finally fixed for his head-quarters. This was a stronghold, called "Petra," not far from Dyrrachium, the foot of which was washed by the Adriatic, and commanded a small harbour. Never was there, apparently, a more hopeless project, than, with an inferior army, without magazines, and scantily supplied with provisions, to coop in a superior army, having the whole sea-board open, and the sea itself commanded by a large and powerful navy; while Cæsar could receive provisions only from the inland parts, and the superiority of the Pompeian cavalry enabled the enemies to intercept his communications. Hence the necessity of preventing their free egress and ingress; but, above all, he calculated upon the moral effect which the fact would produce among the oriental nations, when they heard that the great Pompey, the conqueror of the world from the Pillars of Hercules to the Caspian Sea, from the western Atlas to the eastern Caucasus, was confined and beleaguered in his own camp.

But to accomplish this was a difficult task. Cæsar's object was soon ascertained, and measures were skilfully chosen to counteract his plans—outposts were selected and fortified in such positions as made it necessary for Cæsar to throw back his lines and continually embrace a wider circuit. But he still continued his labours, and finally completed the outlines, as it were, of his works. As all the springs which fed the streams that irrigated the district occupied by Pompey were on the upper ground, Cæsar attempted to debar the blockaded troops from a free supply of water. Some streams he averted into other regions; others, which descended into the lower grounds through narrow gorges, he absolutely dammed, by throwing huge mounds across the valleys. He thus succeeded in seriously distressing the army of Pompey, especially the horses and other cattle, which soon consumed the fodder within the lines, and had to be supplied by the fleet. Even the men themselves were affected by the want of sufficient water and their long continuance in the same locality, and lost health and vigour. Cæsar's men, on the contrary, were in excellent health, nor did they regard the want of wheat as long as they were supplied with barley or peas and beans. They had abundance of beef and mutton, as flocks and herds from all parts of Epirus were driven into the camp. Finally, when their bread had entirely failed, they made coarse cakes from the roots of certain plants, which, when ground, they mixed with milk, and thus repelled the assaults of famine.

Original documents respecting the public feeling at this time are very scarce, but the following letter from Dolabella, to his father-in-law, Cicero, will throw some light upon the subject:—"You see that neither his own name, nor the glory of his exploits, nor his numerous client kings and nations, of which he was wont to make such a display, are a sufficient protection to Pompey; and that he cannot, even what is usually in the power of the meanest general, secure an honourable retreat. He has been beaten out of Italy, he has lost Spain, his veteran army has been captured, and, finally, he

himself is now confined within lines of circumvallation, a disgrace which, as I think, never before befell a Roman general. Therefore, think, according to your usual prudence, upon his own and your present hopes. Thus you will most easily adopt the most usual line of conduct. But I request of you, should he escape the present danger, and take refuge in his fleet, to provide for your own safety, and at last prove a friend to yourself rather than to others. You have already satisfied all the claims of duty and of friendship, and even of that political party which was your favourite. It now remains that we should belong to the present commonwealth rather than, while grasping at the ancient shadow, to be entirely without one. Therefore I wish, my dearest Cicero, should Pompey, driven from this place, also be compelled to repair to other regions, you will retire to Athens or some other quiet city. . . . It will be for your honour and humanity to take care that the bearer of this letter shall return safe to me, and bring your answer." This last paragraph proves that the war, on the part of the Pompeians, was internecine, and that no communication between the two parties was allowed.

But fortune had one bright day still in reserve for Pompey. Roscillus and Ægus, two Allobrogian chiefs who had long served Cæsar faithfully, and were in command of a body of Gallic cavalry, falsified their accounts, and defrauded their men both of their pay and fair share of captured booty. The men complained to Cæsar, who contented himself with a private reprimand and a warning respecting their future behaviour. But the promulgation of their disgraceful conduct made their further continuance among their comrades distasteful, and they deserted, with no small number of their clansmen, to Pompey. As the brothers were chiefs of well-known rank, and came over with a splendid retinue and no contemptible force, Pompey received them with peculiar honours, and conducted them in person through the different divisions of his camp. Their information was superior to the tales generally devised by

deserters, because they were thoroughly acquainted with the opinion of the best officers within Cæsar's lines respecting the strength and weakness of various parts of his works. Acting upon their information, Pompey made an attack, both by land and from the sea, on that portion of the lines which reached down to the shore. Two ramparts, with a sufficient interval between, had already been finished, but an intended ditch and rampart to protect the intervening ground from an attack by sea had not been commenced. Lentulus Marcellinus, with the ninth legion, had the command of these unfinished works. He was attacked in front and from the rear, and while the soldiers on either rampart were defending themselves with courage and vigour, a third body of Pompeians landed from their ships, and entered across the beach into the undefended interval. This body, immediately assailing the Cæsarean combatants from the rear, threw them into complete disorder. The retreat soon became a flight, and the eagle bearer, with dying hands, committed the eagle to some horsemen, who came in time to save the legion from the disgrace of losing its chief standard. First Antony came to the rescue, and finally Cæsar, but it was only to see that the enemy had broken through his lines, and was now encamping in the open country. Cæsar, evidently irritated, began to examine Pompey's position, with a wish to see some weak side where he might retaliate the blow which he had received. It appears that, in the previous course of the campaign, both Cæsar and Pompey had fortified and abandoned camps on that ground, without throwing down the fortifications. To one of these, situated at some distance from the main camp, Pompey had sent a legion with its usual auxiliaries. Cæsar, thinking that he could surprise this body, led by a long circuit thirty-three cohorts, with which he made an immediate attack upon the prætorian gate, which was forced open, and the outworks were won. But there was an inner camp, much smaller in size, and which served as a citadel to a larger and more exposed area. Here the Pompeian legion rallied, and offered

a stout resistance, while Cæsar's right wing, having mistaken a wall of communication between the camp and the river for the outside of the camp itself, wandered from the scene of contest, and occasioned a fatal loss of time. For Pompey, now warned of the danger, hastened with the cavalry and the fifth legion, and not only brought instant relief to his own men, but drove the Cæsareans out of the camp into the open ground, where the retreat became a flight. Cæsar in vain attempted to rally the fugitives. He seized the standards: they were either left in his hands or dashed to the ground; he laid hands on a standard bearer, and was nearly slain by him. Pompey's caution alone saved Cæsar's army from complete destruction, but content with a double victory on the same day, he restrained his men, and prevented them from pressing upon the retreating force. He allowed his soldiers to salute him as "Imperator," and issued letters in all directions, announcing a signal victory over his great antagonist, but he neither wreathed the dispatches nor the lictors' fasces with the customary laurel. He, however, incurred the guilt of a serious offence against the laws of humanity, for allowing Labienus to parade the captive prisoners among the victors, to insult them with contumelious language, and finally to murder them in the sight of the army.

This defeat called out all the energies of Cæsar. He instantly renounced his previous plans, drew in all his out-posts, and brought his whole army into one spot. He then assembled and addressed them in the manner best calculated to reassure their courage and make them forget their disasters. Several of the standard-bearers were punished, but the blame was principally imputed to himself, to the difficult ground, to fortune, and not to the soldiers.

He dared not, however, keep them within the reach of the victors, with their superior fleet and cavalry, and hurried them away that very night. He was pursued, but in vain. He conducted his retreat with consummate skill, and reached

Apollonia without suffering any serious loss. He was compelled to march to this city, where he had to leave his wounded, to pay the army, and protect his allies.

He saw that Pompey might take his choice of three different plans — first, pass over into Italy, which Cæsar could not prevent; second, remain on the coast, and capture the strong places held by the Cæsareans, such as Oricum and Apollonia; third, march into Macedonia, with the double purpose of joining Scipio and destroying Domitius Calvinus. To Cæsar himself only one line of proceeding was open—that was, to march into Macedonia; if victorious there, he could lead his troops through Illyricum, round the Adriatic, into his own Cisalpine Gaul. But Pompey had already taken the same resolution, and was marching along the main road leading from Dyrrachium eastward, and was thus likely to anticipate Cæsar, who was unable to communicate with Domitius, as the tidings of his utter defeat and flight with a miserable remnant of his forces had alienated from him the minds of all the inhabitants. But chance saved Domitius from being surprised, for some of the clansmen of Roscillus and Ægus, forming a portion of Pompey's van, met the advancing scouts of Domitius, and communicated to them, as being old comrades, all that had taken place in the vicinity of Dyrrachium. Domitius, thus warned, turned to the left, and joined Cæsar at Ægimium, a strong fortress placed on the ridge which separates the upper waters of Epirus from those of the Peneius.

The united armies then descended the Peneius, and arrived under the walls of Gomphi. This at the time was a wealthy and well-fortified city, and had previously sent deputies to Cæsar, calling upon him to issue orders which it was their duty to obey; but the rumour of his defeat had changed their inclinations, and induced them to reject all proffers of peaceable intercourse. Androstenes, the prætor of Thessaly, had occupied the town with a considerable force, and prepared a resistance which, according to his own calculations, would

enable Pompey and Scipio to come to his relief. Cæsar soon disabused him of these expectations, for he made a violent assault upon the walls at three o'clock in the evening, and carried the town by storm before sunset. Without waiting, he then pressed on with his vanguard to Metropolis, a city lower down the river, which, warned by the fate of Gomphi, left to the mercy of the soldiery, opened its gates, and was kindly treated. The contrast between the fate of the two cities made the other Thessalian states less eager to oppose Cæsar. He selected that portion of the great plain which promised, from an early harvest, to be best adapted for his head-quarters. Scipio had already descended from Macedonia into the vale of the Peneius, and occupied Larissa, a flourishing city on the upper gorge of the vale of Tempe, where he was soon after joined by Pompey.

Their late victories, and the addition of the oriental army under Scipio, inspired the Pompeians with so much confidence, that they thought nothing more was wanting to their final triumph but the day of battle; and if we could examine the grounds of the confidence, without recollecting the final issue, it would not appear unreasonable. In cavalry they had an immense superiority, for they could send forth seven thousand horsemen, full of spirit and vigour, and well armed and mounted, while Cæsar could with difficulty muster a thousand. To his two-and-twenty thousand veterans, they could oppose forty-five thousand foot soldiers, of whom twenty thousand at least were also veterans. Their officers, even if we except Pompey himself, were generals of great skill and experience; and Cæsar could not rank in his own lines either better or older soldiers than Labienus, Afranius, Petreius, Vibullus Rufus, and C. Triarius. These, whether we regard them as veteran officers of great experience, or as engineers and tacticians, were equal to any men which the Roman world could then produce; and as worthy instruments in their hands for directing and animating the newly-raised troops, they had at their disposal more than two thousand "evocati,"

old soldiers of Pompey, mostly centurions, who had been invited personally to volunteer their services under their old commander, by whom they had been so often led to victory. When, in addition to these great advantages, we take into consideration, that the battle was to be fought in plains which gave ample scope for the evolutions of their powerful cavalry, we ought not to wonder that their hopes were stronger than their fears, and that they allowed themselves to dwell more upon the fruits of victory than on the means by which it was to be won. They already anticipated a long sequence of consulships and prætorships, and contended fiercely for the precedence in the future fasti. Lentulus Spinther, Lucius Domitius, and Scipio, each urged his claim as the pontifex maximus, who was to succeed Cæsar, not without bitter altercations and re-criminatory charges. Domitius even proposed that, after the termination of the war, judges, of senatorian rank, who had served in Pompey's camp, should be appointed to try all such as had either remained in Italy, or, while living in regions occupied by Pompey's troops, had refused their military aid; that three billets should be given to these judges, one for acquittal, another for a pecuniary fine, and a third for capital punishment. It has been said that Pompey was himself unwilling to engage in battle, and that he was compelled by clamour to forego his better judgment, and risk the final issue. But the following passage from Cæsar's "Civil War" shows that the "Agamemnon" of the party, as they loved to call him, was as sanguine of success as any of his Achæan heroes: "Pompey, as it afterwards became known, had determined to give battle, in accordance with the general advice of his friends; he had, a few days before, even declared in the council that Cæsar's army would be defeated before the two lines met." When the majority had expressed their wonder at this, he said:—"I know I am promising an almost incredible result, but listen to the grounds of my belief, that you may go forth to battle with firmer confidence. I have persuaded our cavalry, and they have promised to adopt my suggestion—as soon as

the two armies approach, to attack the unshielded flank of Cæsar's right wing, and then to wheel round and assail the rear. Cæsar's troops will thus be thrown into disorder and defeated before they can cast a missile against our line. Thus we shall finish the war without endangering our legions, and almost without a wound. Nor will this be difficult, seeing that we are so superior to them in cavalry."

Cato was not in the camp; he had been left with the baggage at Dyrrachium, but his "other self," M. Favonius, was one of the loudest protesters against the dilatory conduct of "the king of men," who alone was to be blamed if they were not that autumn to enjoy the ripe figs at Tusculum." Lucan makes Cicero the mouth-piece of the impatient warriors, and commences the speech assigned to him with the following words:—"Fortune, O Pompey, in return for all her favours, prefers this one request, that you will make use of her; and we, the chiefs of your camp, and the kings your clients, together with the suppliant world pouring round you, beseech you to permit your father-in-law to be defeated." Cicero himself, in a letter before quoted to Marius, gives a far different account, but it must remain doubtful whether it is more trustworthy than the poet's figment:—"Despairing of victory (writes Cicero), I first began to advise peace, of which I had always been the supporter. In the second place, when I saw that Pompey was utterly averse to that measure, I attempted to persuade him to prolong the war. He approved of this, and might, perhaps, have persisted in the plan, had he not, in consequence of a successful battle, learned to put confidence in his soldiers. From that moment, that very great man was no longer a successful commander. He, with raw troops, collected from all quarters, fought a pitched battle against most hardy legions. He was conquered, even his camp was taken, and he fled alone." But this was written long after the result.

On the morning of the battle, Labienus gave a very different account of Cæsar's legions. These are the words imputed to

him by Cæsar, and which, probably, were spoken by him in the council of officers. After highly praising Pompey's plan of battle, he said:—"Do not imagine, O Pompey, that this is the army which conquered Gaul and Germany. I was present during all those campaigns, nor am I rashly giving my opinion on an unknown subject. But a very small portion of that army survives. The greater part has perished—the necessary result of so many battles. The pestilential autumn in Italy has swept away many, many have retired to their homes, many are left on the continent. . . . The forces which you see are recruits, levied within the last two or three years, in Cisalpine Gaul, most of them from the Transpadanian colonies; what strength there was among them was consumed by the two Dyrrachian battles." After saying these words, he solemnly swore that he would not return to the camp, unless he was victorious, and advised the rest to take a similar oath. Pompey approved of the suggestion, and took the oath; nor was there a man in the council who refused it. After these proceedings all dispersed to their several posts. And they now anticipated a certain victory; because it would have been unseemly to suppose that a commander so experienced and so successful as Labienus, could be guilty of any groundless assertion on so important a point.

Ever since his entrance into Thessaly, Cæsar, who was conscious of his weakness in cavalry, had, in imitation of the German tactics, taught active young soldiers, selected for their strength and speed, to act as footmen, in combination with horsemen, and had already succeeded in rendering them a very efficient force. He was, therefore, prepared to encounter his adversaries in the open field whenever a fair opportunity should present itself. This occurred on the ninth of August, B.C. 48, a day ever memorable in the history of mankind, as laying the foundation of that political system, under which so large a portion of the human race was trained to something like an unity of feelings, laws, and language.

Cæsar could not forget that he was on this day the cham-

pion of that party, which had so long struggled with unequal success against the undue encroachments of the oligarchs, and that not only his own fate, but the fate of his family, his friends, of the Roman commonalty, and of its provincial subjects, would be to a certain extent decided on that day. The ghost whom Lucan raises from the dead to explain future events, describes Sylla as grieving, and Marius sternly rejoicing at that day's event:—"I saw," said the man magically restored to life, "I saw that the Drusi and Gracchi, also popular names, extravagant in their legislation, and greatly daring, were rejoicing in anticipation."

The last signal for change of quarters had already sounded through Cæsar's camp, the tents had been struck, the baggage placed on the mules, and the vanguard of the marching column was already at the gates, when Cæsar looked up to the hills where Pompey had for several days posted himself, and perceived that the lines had advanced far beyond their usual distance, so as to present a fair field of battle. "We must postpone our march for the present," he cried; "and prepare for that contest which we have often demanded. Let us make ready for battle, we shall not hereafter easily find such an opportunity." The baggage was then left behind, with two cohorts to protect it, and the army led forth equipped for battle. He observed that Pompey in person commanded the left wing of his own army, which was formed of the two Cæsarean legions. Scipio, with the Syrian legions, formed the centre. The right was formed from the Cilician legions, and a body of the Spanish veterans, commanded probably by Afranius, who had brought them over. As the right was protected by a small stream, with broken banks, the whole of the cavalry, with the slingers and archers, were placed in the left wing, for the purpose of concentrating their efforts against Cæsar's exposed flank. The intervals between the centre and either wing were filled up with the rest of the infantry. Seven cohorts were left to defend the camp.

Cæsar, on observing Pompey's arrangement, gave Mark

Antony the command of his left wing, of the centre to Domitius Calvinus ; he himself, serving under P. Sylla, stationed himself on the extreme right, at the head of his favourite tenth legion. But to encounter Pompey's main attack, which his practised eye immediately detected, he drew forth from the third line six cohorts, which he so placed as not only to support the feeble cavalry on his right, but also to form a fourth line, ready to pass round the enemy's left, should their charge of cavalry and archers be repelled. These six cohorts were evidently a portion of the young foot soldiers, who had been trained to act in concert with his cavalry. Florus calls them Germans, evidently because they were taught to fight after the German fashion. They were to stand the shock of that cavalry, which, according to Lucan, was composed "of Tetrarchs, kings, and mighty monarchs, and of the patricians, clad in purple, who drew the Latian sword." It is said, although Cæsar himself does not mention it, that these chosen cohorts were ordered to aim at the face of their antagonists rather than at any other part of the body, and thus to threaten them with the loss of beauty, supposed to be more terrible to them than the loss of life. But this is probably a calumny. When the lines were drawn up in battle array, he first issued orders that not a man should stir from his place before he received the command to advance ; and that the Triarii especially should wait for his immediate order before they mingled in the combat.

He then summoned the officers into his presence, and explained to them how anxious he had been to avoid the impending contest. How he had endeavoured to open a communication with Pompey, through Vibullus, and again through Libo, and finally through Scipio, to whom, on his arrival in Thessaly, he had sent a common friend, and how all these attempts had failed, and all conferences had been sternly refused ; that it was not his fault if the blood of Roman soldiers was uselessly shed, and the commonwealth was to lose one of the two armies. When the officers had conveyed to

their soldiers these last communications from the general, they loudly called for the signal to charge, which immediately sounded. Nothing is more observable in the whole of Cæsar's military career than his extreme anxiety to secure the moral approbation of his followers.

The space between the two armies gave ample room for a mutual advance on equal ground. But Pompey, advised, as it was said, by Triarius, commanded his men to remain stationary, and await the shock. This, according to Cæsar, was a mistake, because nothing is more inspiriting to a soldier than the rapid charge, the sounding trumpets, and the accompanying cheers. Even the success which might have attended such a cautious measure, if directed against less disciplined troops, was prevented by the coolness of the Cæsarean veterans, who, after rapidly crossing their own share of the intermediate ground, halted of their own accord, dressed their ranks, took time to recover their breath, and then rushed forwards a second time. As soon as they had discharged their "pila," they drew their swords, and engaged in close combat. Nor did the Pompeians flinch from the collision; they also discharged their "pila," and encountered their enemies sword in hand.

During this time the Pompeian cavalry, in conjunction with clouds of archers and slingers, advanced against Cæsar's cavalry; which, unable to resist their superior numbers, gradually gave way, and enabled their opponents to ride round, and charge the right flank of the Cæsareans. At this critical moment the signal was given to the six cohorts, who, acting in concert with the unbroken horsemen, made a fierce onset on the Pompeian chivalry, who, unable to withstand it, gave way, fled, and dispersed. The archers and slingers, thus left to the mercy of the victorious horsemen and their supporters, were actually cut to pieces. Nor was this the end; for Pompey's left wing, while yet fighting gallantly, was assailed in flank and rear, and suffered that fate which Pompey had prepared for Cæsar's right wing.

Pompey, when he viewed the dastardly flight of his cavalry, despaired of victory, and retiring to his camp, gave orders to prepare for its defence, and then withdrew to his prætorium, distrusting of success, but still anxious for the result. But Cæsar, who had watched the same operation with equal vigilance, as soon as he perceived the enemy's defeat, ordered up the veteran *Triarii*, to crown by a fresh charge the business of the day. The whole Pompeian army then gave way, and sought refuge in their camp. But, although it was now mid-day, and the sun's heat was overpowering, Cæsar called upon the soldiers to make another effort, and to carry the enemy's camp by storm. They obeyed the call; and, after a desperate resistance, especially from some Thracian auxiliaries, the camp was won.

Pompey had not waited for this event; but, on hearing that the outworks were assailed, merely exclaimed, "What, my camp also!" changed his dress, mounted a horse, and fled to the seacoast.

A large body of his troops, under the command of their tribunes and centurions, made an orderly retreat to the neighbouring hills; but he, "who left nought undone where aught remained to do," persuaded his worn-out soldiers to forego the booty of the camp, and follow in the traces of the retreating body. He overtook them, cut them off from water, and compelled them to surrender at discretion. The result, according to Cæsar's own account of the great battle of Pharsalia (as it was afterwards called), was fifteen thousand of the Pompeians slain, twenty-four thousand taken prisoners. But what makes this battle especially disastrous to the defeated party was the fact that a hundred and eighty standards and nine eagles were brought by their captors to Cæsar. It was a practice among the Greeks, and often imitated by the Romans, to assign the chief merit of the victory to some individual. In Cæsar's judgment this was due to an old officer of the tenth legion, named Crastinus, who was then a volunteer in the camp. As soon as the signal of battle was given, he



Flight of Pompey after the Battle of Pharsalia.—p. 324.

addressed the company, of which he had been chief centurion, in these words:—"Follow me, you who were once my comrades, and perform your stipulated duty to your general. This one battle remains; and when this is won, both he will recover his proper place, and we our liberty." Then turning to Cæsar, he said:—"General, either dead or alive, I will this day win your thanks." It was he who commenced the charge at the head of a hundred and twenty veterans, and led the way to victory. He fell himself; but, as he predicted, was pronounced by his general the bravest and most meritorious warrior of the day.

The attendants of the Pompeian army were as confident of victory as their chiefs; consequently, when the Cæsareans became masters of their camp, they found all due preparations for a feast. The floors of the tents were covered with green turf, the dinner-tables laid, and adorned with no small display of silver plate; several of the tents, among others that of Lucius Lentulus, were wreathed with ivy, and gave other proofs of extravagant luxury and anticipated victory, "and yet these men," writes the victor, "ceased not to charge with luxurious habits the half-starved and long-enduring soldiers of Cæsar, who, for a long time, had been but very scantily supplied with the necessaries of life."

Of the Pompeian leaders Domitius alone was slain; he had succeeded in making his escape from Massilia before its final surrender. In him fell one of the most bitter of Cæsar's enemies, and also the wealthiest and least intellectual of the oligarchs. Brutus, according to Plutarch, escaped by hiding himself in a reedy marsh, whence he made his way to Larissa. When Cæsar arrived at that city Brutus wrote to him, and was immediately sent for, and treated with great respect. It was in consequence of opinions expressed by him that Cæsar inferred that Pompey's destination was Egypt. Asinius Pollio, who was present, and limits the number of the slain to six thousand, says that the conqueror, on seeing the slaughter and complete rout of the Pompeians, uttered these

memorable words:—"They would have it thus. I, Caius Cæsar, after the great deeds performed by me, would have been judicially condemned had I not appealed for protection to my army." Plutarch adds that he uttered the same sentiments in Greek, thus embodying his solemn protest in both languages. Dion Cassius, after a long account of this battle, thus concludes:—"He afterwards displayed the same humanity and goodness to all who had fought against him, especially when Pompey's secret cabinet, containing all his private correspondence, was brought to him; although he might have discovered, from its contents, who those were who were hostile to him and favourable to Pompey, yet he would neither read the letters nor have them copied, but burnt them all immediately, that he might not be compelled to punish any man in consequence of the information thus obtained. So that many admiring him for such conduct, have hated those who laid a plot against his life. I have said this not without reason, because Marcus Brutus Cæpio, who afterwards assassinated him, was both taken by him and dismissed in safety."

This is the language of sound moral feeling, recognised as such in every age and country where principles of right and wrong are believed to exist; nor can all the sophistry of the Ciceronian or Demosthenean schools ever justify the treacherous murder, either of a public enemy or a political offender, whether the one be a Philip or the other a Cæsar. Lucan, however, thought otherwise, when he thus describes Brutus at the battle of Pharsalia:—"There, O Brutus, you were, with your features concealed beneath a plebeian head-piece, and not known to the enemy as holding a weapon. O glory of the empire, O last hope of the senate! . . . Rush not too rashly through the midst of the enemies, nor prematurely bring upon yourself a fatal Philippi; destined to reign in a Thessaly of your own, you succeed not there, intent as you are on Cæsar's throat."

The victory of Pharsalia came in good season for the

Cæsarean party. Lælius, who had succeeded Libo, still blocked up Brundisium. The proceedings of Milo and Cælius had disturbed southern Italy. Marcus Octavius, with his victorious fleet, was complete master of the upper waters of the Adriatic; C. Cassius, with his Syrian, Phœnician, and Cilician ships, had made a successful attack on Sicily, burnt Cæsar's navy, and was on the point of recovering that great island, when the tidings came of the complete defeat of Pompey. The whole face of affairs was immediately changed, and Cassius sailed eastward with his fleet. Western Spain, owing to the malversation of Quintus Cassius, was rebelling.

During the continuance of the long struggle between the contending parties in Epirus and Thessaly, the minds of the residents at Rome had been variously affected by a succession of contradictory reports. For, in Dion's language, "they rejoiced and they grieved, they felt confidence and feared from the slightest causes. But when the battle of Pharsalia was announced, it was generally disbelieved; for Cæsar had sent no public dispatch on the occasion, as he scrupled to show any signs of joy after such a victory, and it seemed incredible, both on account of the relative strength of the two belligerents and the general expectation of a contrary result. But, when it was at last believed, they threw down the statues of Pompey and Sylla, which stood in front of the Rostra, but did nothing else. Many were even unwilling to do this, from a fear that Pompey might still continue the war, and while they thought the removal of the statues would satisfy Cæsar, they expected that Pompey would be inexorable. But when Pompey was slain, they were slow in believing the fact, nor did they do so before they saw his ring, which was sent to Rome. This was a copy of Sylla's ring, having three trophies engraved upon it. So, when he was thus proved to be dead, they openly eulogized Cæsar and reviled Pompey."

The Pompeian leaders fled from the battle to Dyrrachium, where were gathered together Cato, Cicero, Cn. Pompeius,

Labienus, and Afranius. The chief command was offered to Cicero, as the oldest consular, and when he declined it, he narrowly escaped being cut down by the irritated Cneius. Cato was then induced to assume the command, and conveyed the troops to Corcyra, whither soon after resorted M. Octavius and Cassius with their fleets. After an abortive attempt upon the Peloponnesus they sailed back to Corcyra, having taken on board Petreius and Faustus Sylla, the son of the dictator and son-in-law of Pompey. Thence they sailed eastward in search of Pompey and his pursuer. But touching at Cyrene, they received intelligence of Pompey's death and of Cæsar's residence at Alexandria. This news broke up the party; C. Cassius and Marcus Octavius retired from the cause, but Cato conducted all those who adhered to him across the desert to the Roman province in Africa. It is this march which Lucan has described in such hyperbolical terms.

Pompey, in his flight from Pharsalia, had first visited the Macedonian amphipolis, whence he sailed to Mitylene, a sad messenger to Cornelia of his own defeat and of their ruined fortunes. He took her on board as well as his son Sextus, and, after touching on the coast of Cicilia, reached Cyprus. Here he was informed that the leading Romans at Antioch had forbidden the entrance of any Pompeians into the Syrian province. Hence he was compelled to visit Ægypt. He took with him two thousand troops, and made for Pelusium. In the vicinity of that town the young king of Ægypt was encamped, warring against his sister Cleopatra, who claimed an equal share of the kingdom. Pompey's friends, who were sent ashore, gave the preference to the young king's claim, and announced to him and his friends the presence of Pompey. A civil answer was given, and a deputation sent to conduct the Roman from his ships. But the guardians of the king adopted the inhuman resolution of murdering their illustrious guest, as they afterwards alleged, in their own defence, because they feared him. They chose for their instruments

Achillas, a Macedonian by descent, as the termination of his name proves, who held a high military office under the king, and one Septimius, a tribune of the soldiers, one of the Gabinian expedition, whom, with a large body of other Romans, Ptolemy Auletes had retained in his service. As the sea on that coast is very shallow, the two assassins went with a long boat, ostensibly to bring their guest ashore. As they addressed him respectfully, and he personally knew Septimius, he agreed to accompany them. But when they had descended into the royal vessel, it was quickly rowed away, and, when not far from his fleet, they slew him in cold blood. No words seemed to have passed between the parties—they did their work in silence, nor did Pompey vouchsafe to complain. Lentulus, the consul of the preceding year, was spared for the moment, but afterwards put to death in prison. Vengeance was not slow in overtaking all the actors in this unprovoked murder. Cornelia and Sextus, after witnessing the bloody tragedy, sailed away in their fleet, and soon after fell in with some of Cato's ships.

When Cæsar, in his pursuit, reached Ephesus, he came in time to save the treasures of the Temple of Diana from being plundered legally by T. Ampius, a Pompeian. The news of his arrival in Epirus had before saved them from a similar act of the pro-consul Scipio. Cæsar boasts of having also saved the treasures of the Tyrian Hercules at Gades from sacrilege. He was, however, loudly accused of showing no scruples in plundering the sacred treasures of the Gallic groves and temples. But perhaps his reverence was reserved for the gods of temples of Hellenic name and sanctity, which could not be rifled without incurring popular indignation. On this very occasion he introduces a very remarkable proof that he was not indifferent to signs of divine interposition when indicated in his own favour, although he never allowed his own operations to be either hurried or retarded by any favourable or unfavourable appearance of the auspices. He has recorded that, on the day of Pharsalia, a statue of Victory.

which, in the Temple of Minerva at Elis, fronted the image of the goddess, had suddenly wheeled round and faced the entrance; that on the same day, at Antioch in Syria, the cheers of assailing armies and the signal blasts of their trumpets had been heard so distinctly, that the citizens in arms had twice manned their walls. The same thing occurred at Ptolemais. At Pergamus, from the very inmost sanctuary of the temple, loud sounds of kettle-drums were heard. At Tralles, also in the Temple of Victory, where Cæsar had a statue dedicated to him, a young palm tree was shown, which, at the same period, had shot up from the pavement between the interstices of the flag-stones. As Cæsar has inserted these interesting facts in his memoirs, a place is due to them in his life. Nor should the following anecdote, transcribed by Plutarch from Livy, who lived in the vicinity, be omitted:—At Patavium, Caius Cornelius, a friend and acquaintance of the historian, was observing the flight of birds on the very day when the battle of Pharsalia was fought; from this he first discerned the time of the action, and said to the bystanders, “The great affair is now drawing to a decision—the two generals are engaged.” Then he took another observation, and the signs appeared so clear to him, that he sprang up in the most enthusiastic manner, and cried out, “Cæsar, thou art the conqueror!” As the company stood in great astonishment, he removed the sacred fillet from his head, and swore that he would never put it on again until the event had put his art beyond question. Livy affirms this for a truth.

Plutarch writes that he remitted a full third of their taxes to the provinces in Asia. According to Diodorus, he did something far more beneficial, for he fixed the taxation in such a manner as to free the provinces from the tender mercies of the equestrian farmers of the revenue.

Cæsar entered the harbour of Alexandria with three thousand two hundred infantry (the miserable remains of two legions) and eight hundred cavalry. The inhabitants of

Alexandria were among the most turbulent in the world. Being made up of many nations, they were often torn by intestine strife, and various quarters of the great city waged fierce war on each other. Hence they were ready for civil broils and insurrection against their sovereigns. A standing army was therefore necessary to keep the peace and insure the safety of the crown. But in course of time this very remedy had become worse than the disease, and the commanders of these prætorian bands continued to make and unmake kings at their own discretion. It was into a city of this character that Cæsar entered with his small force. But according to his own confession, he "trusted that his renown would make every place a safe residence." It was here he received notice of Pompey's death. It is said that Pompey's head, together with his seal ring, was presented to him, and that he wept while recognising the well-known features, and ordered his remains to be decently buried. Immediately on landing he had a foretaste of the spirit with which the Alexandrians were prepared to welcome him; for his lictors were hooted and insulted for daring to bear their fasces in public. The multitude exclaimed that the display of these "insignia" was offensive to the royal character. Riots were consequently multiplied, and the Roman soldiers were daily massacred in various parts of the city. He therefore summoned other legions from Asia, especially those lately formed from the remains of Pompey's army. As to himself, he complains that it was impossible for him to sail away with his troops, as the Etesian winds would not permit him. And this is the only reason adduced by him for the loss of valuable time at so critical a period of the war. If we could for a moment suppose that Cæsar was a man who would sacrifice his policy to his passions, we might be induced to conclude with ancient writers, that he was attracted by the charms of Cleopatra, and, like another Hercules, forgot his arduous labours under the fascinating influence of his Ægyptian Omphale. But it should be remembered that the Etesian winds were a

real obstacle, and they might have confined him until his position became almost inextricable, and whence nothing but an increased force could rescue him. Besides, his residence at Alexandria, instead of being a season of enjoyment, was distinguished by extraordinary exertions and labour. The following account from Dion, apparently copied from the work of some Ægyptian writer of the day, presents us with the scandalous view of the transaction:—"The Alexandrians, fearing they would be delivered over to Cleopatra, who had great influence with Cæsar, excited an insurrection. For she had for a time pleaded before Cæsar the question litigated between her and her brother, through intermediate agents. But when she discovered his disposition, she sent to him and complained that her agents were betraying her, and asked leave to plead her cause in person. Now she was by far the most beautiful of women, and was then in the very bloom of her beauty. Her voice had the most brilliant tones, and she knew how to invest her conversation with all the charms of the graces, so that she was a bright vision to the eye, and a source of delight to the ear. . . . Having therefore received a promise of an audience, she dressed and adorned herself so as to appear both dignified and worthy of sympathy. And having thus prepared herself, she entered both the city (because she was in the country) and the palace, without the knowledge of Ptolemy. But Cæsar, when he saw her, and heard her uttering some words, became so instantaneously her slave, that with the morning's dawn he sent for Ptolemy and attempted to reconcile them, for instead of judge, he had now become Cleopatra's advocate. But the boy, both on this account and because he suddenly saw his sister in the palace, was filled with wrath, and having rushed into the streets, called out that the Romans were betraying him; and having torn his diadem from his brows, threw it away; and when a great tumult had arisen in consequence, the Roman soldiers carried him back to the palace; but the whole Ægyptian multitude was roused to action, and they would, at the first onset, have captured the

palace, by attacking it both from the land and seaside, as the Romans, who regarded them as friends, had not a sufficient force to encounter them, had not Cæsar, being alarmed, gone forth, and, addressing them from a safe position, promised to do all that they might desire. After this, having entered the assembly, he presented to them Ptolemy and Cleopatra, and read their father's will, in which there were written injunctions that his children should, after the customary laws of the Ægyptians, be consort sovereigns, and that the Roman people should be their guardians. He added, that it devolved on him, as the Roman dictator, to become the children's guardian and the executor of their father's will. He therefore pronounced Ptolemy and Cleopatra joint sovereigns of Egypt, and granted Cyprus as an appanage to the younger children, Arsinoe and another Ptolemy." "Thus," adds the Greek writer, "he was so terrified, that far from claiming any part of Ægypt, he freely gave her what was his own." There is nothing in this account which is not consistent with the most perfect good faith and disinterested conduct on the part of Cæsar, if we except the calumnious suggestions. But the army at Pelusium, which was under the command of Achilles, would listen to no terms of pacification, slew the Ægyptian deputies who were sent by Cæsar and his wards, and marched upon Alexandria. When Cæsar received an account of this movement, he seized upon the person of the young king, and detained him within the Roman lines.

The soldiers of Achilles were not to be despised, although an aggregate of the broken and desperate men of all nations, who found a certain refuge among the prætorian guards of the Ptolemies. Their number amounted to twenty thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry. These entered Alexandria without opposition, and made a simultaneous attack both upon Cæsar's quarters and upon the ships in the harbour. The result was, that Cæsar was compelled to burn his fleet, and to occupy the island Pharos with part of the crews. Amidst the confusion Arsinoe escaped, and gave the army a royal princess for a

nominal leader. It would be tedious, in a life of Cæsar like the present, to enter into the details of the Alexandrian war, which could not be understood by the general reader without a better picture of ancient Alexandria than has hitherto been produced. There were times when Cæsar's position and conduct present a striking likeness to the transactions of Cortes at Mexico, with this difference, that the assailants of the Romans were in every respect the equals in knowledge and civilization of Cæsar's soldiers, while the advantage was referable solely to the master-mind of the Roman. The Ægyptians introduced the sea into the reservoirs, formed by deep excavations under the city, and by which Cæsar's quarters had been supplied with fresh water; he sunk wells far below the ground foundations of the reservoirs, and procured ample supplies of this first necessary of life. Achilles had then recourse to fire; the docks, the arsenals, the magnificent library of the Ptolemies, were consumed in the flames, but Cæsar still escaped. In the meantime, Achilles and Arsinoe quarrelled, and the latter put the former to death by the hands of Ganymedes, a new favourite, who showed no less vigour in attacking the Romans. In a desperate contest which the Ægyptians had commenced, with the intention of mastering the Romans on the side of the harbour, Cæsar himself had a narrow escape. He had to throw himself from a sinking vessel into the water, and to escape by swimming. We read that, with a sword between his teeth, and with some valuable papers in his left, he made use of his right hand in propelling himself to a place of safety. It is probable that his purple cloak, worn always on the day of battle, was thrown away, and secured by the Alexandrians, who hung it up as a trophy in one of their temples. Cæsar could afford to allow his enemies to indulge in such harmless boasts. The Arvernians had, as they affirmed, acquired possession of his sword in some closely maintained conflict, and had suspended it, as a glorious trophy, in their principal temple. When the war was over, it was suggested by some friend that such a monument of his defeat ought to be-re-

moved, but he quietly observed that it would be wrong to deprive the Arvernians of such an innocent cause of delight. The cloak would therefore remain, to attest the prowess of the Alexandrians and the narrow escape of Cæsar.

Young Ptolemy, who is described as a first-rate hypocrite, was permitted to put himself at the head of his revolted subjects; who, according to their own account, needed only his presence to satisfy all their complaints, and reconcile themselves to Cæsar. But so far from performing their promises, the war was renewed with increased energy. But by this time a strong force, led by Alexander the Pergamenian, an able man and firm ally of Cæsar, had reached Pelusium. The king led forth his Ægyptians to prevent his entrance into Ægypt, but Cæsar also took the field, and by a series of able movements joined his reinforcements, and utterly defeated the enemy, whose king, in attempting to escape, was drowned in one of the branches of the Nile. Cæsar returned in triumph to Alexandria, where he was received as undisputed master. He left a sufficient force of Romans to protect the throne of Cleopatra and her younger brother, who, on the king's death, was made the royal consort, and set out, with one legion, to commence his Asiatic campaign against Pharnaces, the son of the great Mithridates.

This king, when Scipio had marched all the Roman forces from Asia, had made a sudden irruption into his hereditary kingdom, and overrun it without much opposition. Domitius Calvinus had been sent against him after the battle of Pharsalia, but, owing to the feebleness of his force, had suffered a partial defeat. Cæsar entered Syria without encountering any resistance; the Jews especially, who had been vanquished by Pompey, plundered and insulted by Crassus, and persecuted and oppressed by Scipio, had willingly sent a strong force, under Antipater the Idumean, to serve under the Pergamenian Mithridates during the Ægyptian campaign. If we can believe Josephus, the principal success of the invading troops was owing to the skill of Antipater, the father of Herod the

Great, and the founder of a new Judæan dynasty. In acknowledgment of these services, Hyrcanus, the high priest and nominal sovereign, was confirmed in his offices. Leave was given to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem, and the Jews were permitted to live according to their own laws. While employed in settling the affairs of Syria, and conciliating the goodwill of the neighbouring nations, Cæsar continued to receive despatches from Rome, which announced great disturbances in the city, and the necessity of his immediate presence. But he determined to pacify the eastern provinces before he left those regions.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Dictator. B.C. 47.

MARK ANTONY had been sent home from the field of Pharsalia with the main body of the legions, whom he was to conduct into Italy; and where, at the expiration of the consulship of Servilius, he was to exercise the supreme authority. there was no election of consuls, prætors, or curule ædiles, at the close of the year. Cæsar was nominated dictator for the next year; and when the tidings of his appointment reached him in Alexandria, he named Mark Antony as master of the horse. The only fasces, therefore, which were to be seen at Rome at the commencement of that year were those which were borne before Antony. But as tribunes of the people were elected as usual, and as Dolabella, having, according to the same authors, degraded himself from a patrician into a plebeian family, was elected one of their number, he adopted the measures which Cælius had failed to carry, and succeeded in exciting great disturbances by proposing laws for the abolition of debts, and the condonation of all rates, taxes, and

other burdens upon house-tenants. The shadow of a senatorian party which still remained in the city, and whom Cælius described as the usurers, being really the holders of property, raised up an opponent to Dolabella, in the person of his fellow-tribune, Trebellius. When the factions on both sides had repeatedly tried their strength, and the usual struggles for the possession of the rostra and commanding situations in the forum had taken place, and Dolabella, as leading the more numerous and popular party, had succeeded in fixing the copies of his intended laws in the places legally appointed for their promulgation, the senate interfered, and called upon Antony to secure the peace of the city, and take care that the commonwealth should receive no damage. He obeyed, introduced a strong body of troops into the city, and tore down and carried off Dolabella's incipient laws. But, although this was not done without resistance, nor yet without bloodshed, yet Antony seems to have behaved with great moderation, and to have continually pressed upon all parties the necessity of referring all disputable proceedings to the judgment of Cæsar.

These disputes among the Cæsareans, and the continued absence of their chief, inspired the Pompeians with new hopes, and numbers flocked into Africa to rally round those leaders who had not despaired of the cause, and had succeeded in gathering together a very imposing force. Nothing, however, can give a stronger proof either of their want of enterprise and courage, or of their great unpopularity at Rome and in Italy, than that they should not have made an attack upon the city during this long interregnum. Their fleets were masters of the intermediate seas, and a short voyage would have enabled them to land an expedition on any part of the opposite coast; but the truth is, that the Pompeians had no footing in Italy, nor dared they to trust themselves there.

It is painful to read the letters written by Cicero during this time of indecision and alarm. He had landed at Brundisium soon after the battle of Pharsalia, but found it almost

impossible to remove from that vicinity. His personal friends among the Cæsareans were very numerous; Balbus, Oppius, Matius, Hirtius, Pansa, Dolabella, Vatinius, Trebonius, were of this class, men who delighted in honouring the great orator, and even affectionate in their attentions to him. The following letter from him to Atticus, written late in December, B.C. 48, will give the best picture, now remaining to us, of the facts and opinions of the times. His laurelled lictors still accompanied him:—"It is agreed then, you write, that I should still keep my lictors—a liberty granted also to Sextius—although, as I think, Sextius has no legal right to his, for I hear that he does not allow the validity of those decrees of the senate which were passed after the flight of the (Cæsarean) tribunes. He may well therefore, if he wishes to be consistent, approve of my lictors. But why do I speak of lictors, seeing I am almost ordered out of Italy? For Antony has sent me a copy of a letter from Cæsar, in which he said that he had heard that Cato and Lucius Metellus had returned into Italy with so much boldness, that they made their public appearance at Rome. That he was not pleased with this, as he feared public disturbances might be the consequence. His orders therefore were, that all whose case he had not himself examined should be debarred from Italy; and his language on this point was very strong. Antony therefore, by letter, prayed that I would forgive him, but that he must obey his written orders. I then sent Q. Lamia to convince him that Cæsar had himself told Dolabella to write to me and to request me to return to Italy with the first opportunity, that I had come in consequence of Dolabella's letter. Then Antony issued a proclamation, according to Cæsar's orders; but especially named myself and Lælius as not compromised under its terms. This gave me great pain; for we might have been excepted without being named. O many and grievous blows! . . . But of all my offences against my own party, nothing is more blamed than my absence from Africa. But I came to a resolution, that we ought not to defend the

commonwealth with the barbarian auxiliaries of a most perfidious nation, especially against an army so often victorious. My friends, perhaps, do not approve of this determination, for I hear many good men have gone to Africa, and I know that many were there before. I feel great difficulty on this point. The event alone will show the better course. Some of our party, and possibly all, wish to secure their own eventual safety. Now, if they persevere and win, what will become of us? You will rejoin, what will become of them if they shall be conquered? The blow in their case will be more honourable. These thoughts torture me. . . . I wish to call your especial consideration to the following point. I believe that there are many who either have already given or are preparing to give information to Cæsar that I am sorry for the step which I have taken, or do not approve his present proceedings. Now, although both these statements are true, yet they are communicated to him not because they have discovered the truth, but because they hate me. But use all your influence to induce Balbus and Oppius, and the rest of the set, to write frequently to Cæsar, and thus to secure his goodwill to me." But his doubts were not half so strong three weeks before, when he thus states his feelings to the same correspondent:—"I have never once regretted my departure from the camp of the Pompeians. There was in them such a spirit of cruelty, so intimate an union with barbarous nations, that they had already proscribed not only individuals but whole races, they had all come to a fixed resolution that the property of you all should become the spoils of their victory. I say plainly of *you* all, for their intentions respecting you were always most cruel. I shall, therefore, never regret my departure. I am sorry that I came hither; I ought to have sat down in some country town until Cæsar should send for me. People would have talked less of me; I should have thus received the least pain. This would not trouble me; but it is most annoying thus to linger at Brundisium."

Towards the close of January, B.C. 47, the political aspect did not improve. Cæsar was still absent, and the African party was gaining strength. Cicero then thus writes:—“The news from Africa received by me is very different from the information given in your letter. For they say that nothing can be more vigorous and ready for action than the Pompeians. More than that, Spain and Italy are alienated from the Cæsareans; their legions have neither the same vigour nor the same strength. Affairs at Rome are in utter confusion.”

In the beginning of March the fate of the two parties appeared to the great orator completely changed. He then gives expression to his despair:—“I have nothing to write back to you; I see that all things have been changed by this long interval; that the Pompeian party is as it ought to be, quite strong; and that I have to pay the heaviest penalty for my folly. . . . You see the present state of all my affairs. There is no evil which I do not already bear, or in future expect, and my present grief is in proportion to my past faults.” May came, still no tidings from Cæsar, and the storm from Africa seemed ready to burst on Italy. These are his words on the fourth of May:—“As you allege sufficient reasons why I cannot see you at this time, pray tell me what I am to do; for Cæsar seems to retain so slight a hold on Alexandria, that he is ashamed to write concerning his affairs there. But the Pompeians from Africa are likely to be soon here. . . . No evil can be imagined which I do not suffer; all, however, are more tolerable than the pain of my offence, which is most bitter and everlasting; and were I to have as accomplices in my guilt those whom I expected, it would be a consolation, however trifling. But the case of everybody else is remediable, not so mine. Some, taken prisoners; others, intercepted in their communications, have not their will called in question, the less indeed when they extricated themselves, and began to act together. Even those who of their own accord submitted to Fufius Calenus, in

Achæa, can only be regarded as timid. But there are many, whatever be their character, who will be received, if they join the Pompeians. You ought, therefore, the less to wonder that I cannot resist such a load of grief; for my fault alone cannot be remedied, nor perhaps that of Lælius. But what relief can I derive from his participation? They say that C. Cassius has changed his intention of going to Alexandria."

But June came, and with it the tidings of the defeat of Domitius Calvinus in Asia, of the defeat of Gabinius in Illyricum, of the insurrection in Spain against Quintus Cassius, and of other severe blows to the Cæsarean party. No friendly advances were apparently made to the repentant Cicero by any of the Pompeian party, who regarded their triumph as certain. Cicero therefore, on the third of June, thus expresses his feelings to Atticus, who had sent him a copy of a favourable letter, purporting to be written by Cæsar, and which was evidently forged by the Cæsareans at Rome to console him in his solitary position:—"It is not my present fault (I once committed it) that the letter, to which you allude, gives me no consolation; for it is a scanty communication, and may justly be suspected of not having proceeded from him, and I see that this did not escape your observation. About going out to meet him, I will follow your advice, although his arrival is not much expected, and those who come from Asia do not say that they have heard any tidings of peace being re-established there. Nevertheless, it was the expectation of a peace that led me into this error. Now I see that there is no room for hope, especially since that defeat in Asia has been suffered, and disasters have occurred in Illyricum, and others, in consequence of the misconduct of Cassius in Spain, and of others even in Alexandria itself, at Rome, and in Italy. My own opinion is, that even if Cæsar, who is now carrying on the war, ever return, the whole business will be accomplished before that event can take place. In answer to your communication respecting the delight expressed by the good men on hearing of Cæsar's letter to me, I thank you

for not omitting to mention what, forsooth, you think will console me. But I cannot believe that any good man ever supposed that I ever valued my safety so highly as to petition Cæsar for it, and the less so, as I now have no companion in such an act. The Pompeians in Asia are waiting the result. Those in Achæa hold forth to Fufius Calenus the hope that they will intercede for his pardon from their leaders. The fears of these men were the same as my own, and so was their principle. But the Alexandrian delay has saved them and ruined me."

But Cæsar had defeated the Alexandrians and conquered Ægypt in the course of the very month when Cicero and all timid politicians looked upon his possible return as uncertain, or at least too late to succour his friends. The conquest, however, of a powerful kingdom could hardly have been achieved in a shorter period than the nine months which, according to Appian, was the time spent by Cæsar in Ægypt.

Leaving his relation, Lucius Sextus Cæsar, governor of Syria, he sailed from the coast of Syria into Cilicia, where, if we can believe Cicero, he had a narrow escape from being assassinated by Caius Cassius. We have already seen that, according to Cicero's own account, Cassius had changed his intention of going to Alexandria, probably because he learned that he would not be likely to find Cæsar there. But the same Cicero who gives us this information told the Roman senate, in his second Philippic of disastrous fame, the following particulars:—"Did Caius Cassius, born in that family which could not endure not only the despotism, but even the predominance of any individual, wait, forsooth, for me to advise him to put Cæsar to death; seeing he, without the aid of his illustrious coadjutors, would have done the same deed in Cilicia, at the mouth of the river Cydnus, had not Cæsar's ship been steered to that shore, which was not his original landing place." But concerning this point at a future period, although it may be here affirmed that to no other time of Cæsar's career, except his voyage from Syria to Tarsus, can

this boast of the intention of Caius Cassius be assigned. At Tarsus, Cæsar met the states of the province, and, after arranging all their affairs, hastened to cross into Cappadocia, through Mazaca, where he staid two days, to Comana, the seat of one of the great goddesses of the Syrian mythology. The high priest of this temple was inferior to the king alone, and his office was assigned by Cæsar to one who could claim a hereditary right, and would yet accept it as a benefice received from the representative of Rome. In his march thence to the confines of Galatia, he was met by King Dejotarus, who approached more like an offending supplicant than an independent sovereign; and after a gracious lecture, in which the Galatian was reminded that his military co-operation with Pompey was without an excuse, as he must have known that on the field of Pharsalia he had been combating against the Roman consul, he was received into favour, and allowed the privilege of aiding Cæsar in conquering Pharnaces. Cæsar's troops were indifferent, but he had the sixth legion with him, composed of seasoned veterans, but reduced by toil, disease, famine, and battles, to one thousand men.

Pharnaces negotiated and prepared for battle, Cæsar pressed on, but allowed his antagonist to avoid a collision, on condition of giving up all his conquests and contenting himself with the limits assigned by Pompey to his dominions. But the Asiatic knew how hard pressed for time Cæsar was, and temporized by sending embassy after embassy with fair promises, until at length the two armies met, and Pharnaces, tempted by false appearances, risked an attack upon Cæsar's position near the town of Ziela, which ended in the Asiatic's utter defeat, the capture of his camp, and the dispersion of his forces. The ease with which this victory was won tempted Cæsar to indulge in a very natural reflection upon the difference between the adversaries with whom he had contended in Gaul and Germany and those sons of the oriental world by whose conquest Pompey's reputation had been so greatly increased. Hence the laconic terms with

which he is said to have announced his victory to the senate, "Veni, vidi, vici." "I came, saw, conquered." The sixth legion, with whose steady attack the victory was begun, was sent to Italy by easy marches, there to receive the discharge and rewards due to its veteran members; Cæsar himself marched through Galatia and Bithynia into the Roman province of Asia. As he journeyed he settled many controversies, gave the law to tetrarchs, kings, and states, made his friend and ally Mithridates, the Pergamenian, king of the Bosphorus, and reached Italy sooner than was expected. On his arrival at Rome, which probably occurred about the end of September or the beginning of October, his first business was to allay the intestine disturbances, and to hold the comitial elections. His trusty adherents, Publius Vatinius and Fufius Calenus, were honoured with the consulship for the next three months, and not without having earned this distinction. For Vatinius, with very limited means, had carried an offensive war into Illyricum, driven out Marcus Octavius, and reduced the rebellious natives to submission; while Calenus, on whom the government of Achæa had devolved after Cæsar's eastern expedition, had managed affairs so quietly and judiciously, as to secure the peace of the province and the approbation of all parties. For the ensuing year Cæsar was himself appointed consul, together with Æmilius Lepidus, who was permitted also to triumph, because he had aided in quelling the disturbances in western Spain, and pacifying for a time that important province. He made Marcus Brutus governor of his favourite Cisalpine Gaul.

Cæsar took no notice of the serious disturbances by which the peace of the city had been more than threatened. Even Dolabella was not visited with his displeasure, so that Dion is induced to suppose that Cæsar had received some great services from Dolabella, which caused him to overlook his misconduct. Probably there might have been other reasons. We learn, from repeated notices in Cicero's letters, that Atticus had strong hopes that the Cæsareans at Rome and

the Pompeians in Africa might conclude a peace during Cæsar's absence. Perhaps it was owing to some unrecorded negotiations that the Africans did not pass over into Italy when policy apparently dictated such a movement. He made some new regulations respecting the payment of debts, which were supposed to have relieved the debtors from one fourth of their burden without detracting from the real interest of the creditor. He also granted that remission to house tenants which had been one of Dolabella's measures; he also increased the high offices, made ten prætors, added a member to each of the sacred colleges, enrolled many of the equestrian order and of his own military officers among the senators, and adopted several regulations for the better management of the finances. But the most serious duty he had to perform was to allay the spirit of mutiny and discontent which had broken out among the victorious legions which Mark Antony had brought into Italy from the plains of Thessaly. While Cæsar was still in the east we learn from Cicero, that this event had caused great alarm; that Publius Sylla, who commanded a division of the army at Pharsalia, had been pelted with stones by the soldiers of the twelfth legion, and compelled to fly, together with Valerius Messala, whose legions at Messana had openly rebelled, and seized upon the valuables which were reserved for Cæsar's triumph. But the most serious mischief took place in Campania, where, among other legions, the tenth was encamped. This body of mutineers slew two senators of prætorian rank, plundered several of the municipal towns, and marched upon Rome, whither the historian Sallust, their commander, who was then prætor, had with difficulty escaped. When they arrived in the suburbs, Cæsar sent a messenger to them, requesting to know their demands, and when, in their answer, they had claimed a sum of money as some compensation for their past services, he promised immediately to advance a portion of the sum claimed, and pay the remainder at the conclusion of the African war. Dissatisfied with this answer, they said the whole sum must be

immediately paid and they must have a personal audience from Cæsar. The troops which Antony commanded were then called out, and distributed in various parts for the protection of the city. The legionary mutineers were ordered to lay aside all their weapons but the sword, and assemble in the Campus Martius. Thither Cæsar also went, though vehemently dissuaded by his friends, and, having ascended the ordinary tribunal in that scene of military parade, called upon them to explain their desires. When their spokesman, after commemorating their toils and services, their right to their pay and promised rewards, also requested to be discharged from the service, Cæsar gently answered, "Your request is reasonable, for you are worn out with toils and wounds. I therefore discharge you all, O citizens, who have served your full time, and will, after my triumph, pay both you and those who shall then attend me all the rewards which I have promised. I will do more also—I will grant lands to all my old soldiers, not taken from others, but which belong to the state or to myself, and, if these will not suffice, other lands shall be bought for this purpose." This address changed all the feelings of the legionaries, and made the great body ashamed of their false pretences, for assuredly they had no wish to be discharged before the triumph was celebrated, when they would certainly receive splendid donatives. They therefore besought their general to forgive them and to allow them to continue their services under his standards and auspices, and when he persisted in his resolution and was preparing to withdraw, they begged him to punish them for their offence, and then to pardon them. But he answered that he would not punish any of them, that, nevertheless, he had not expected such conduct from the soldiers of the tenth legion, to whom, on account of their distinguished valour and faithful services, he had always shown especial favour. Upon this the tenth legion again solicited forgiveness, and wished him to decimate them for their unsoldierly conduct. This he refused to do, and observed that he would not compel a single

soldier to serve under him against his will, and, in proof of this, he required all who were willing to join in the African expedition, which had previously been announced to them, to volunteer their services on the occasion. This was done by the whole body unanimously. Many, however, were discharged as unfit for service, and ample provision was made for their future comfort. Their places were easily supplied by young recruits, better adapted for active duties.

This was a sad blow to the expectations of the Pompeians, who must have regarded this dangerous mutiny as the certain forerunner of their success, and which had undoubtedly been fomented by their agents. One fact silently proves that Cæsar did not ascribe the whole blame to his mutinous soldiers and intermeddling foes, but that he suspected that so dangerous a plot could not have been concocted and executed without great negligence, or perhaps connivance, on the part of his own great officers. The fact is, that none of them were selected to attend him in the ensuing campaign. All his lieutenants in the African war were either old soldiers whom he could trust, or not yet famous men. Of the latter class were Sallust, the historian, and Valerius Messala, who, though two of the ablest and most accomplished men of the day, had not hitherto found opportunities of distinguishing themselves. Of the former class were Caninius Rebilus, the old officer whom he had assigned as his military monitor to Curio, and who, had his suggestions been obeyed, would have saved at least the remnant of Curio's army; and Rabirius Postumus, a Roman knight, who, without any fault of his own, had been implicated in the prosecution of Gabinius, the restorer of Ptolemy Auletes, and who had been saved from ruin by the liberality of Cæsar. The terms in which Cicero describes, in his speech delivered in defence of Rabirius Postumus, this conduct on the part of Julius Cæsar are so glowing, so eloquent, and so true, that the whole passage demands insertion in a life of Cæsar. Julius was then warring in Gaul:—"I, for my part, am well acquainted with the numerous distinguished and

incredible qualities of Caius Cæsar; but the rest are exhibited, as it were, at the greater theatres, and almost in presence of the people. To choose the camping ground, to array an army, to storm cities, to defeat enemies on the battle-field, to endure the intense cold and the wintry blasts which we with difficulty repel within our houses here at Rome, in mid-winter to pursue the enemy, when even wild beasts retire into their dens, and wars, by the universal consent of nations, break not the general repose, these are arduous deeds—who can deny it; but men are roused to perform them by great rewards, by the desire of everlasting renown. We ought then the less to wonder that Cæsar, who aspires to immortality, should thus distinguish himself. But Cæsar's liberality to Rabirius deserves peculiar honour. Its praise is not proclaimed in the songs of bards nor the records of ages, but is awarded by the judgment of the wise—a Roman knight, his own old friend, a man who courted, loved, and looked up to him, and who was on the verge of ruin, not owing to his own indulgence or lavish expence in pursuit of pleasure, but owing to an honest attempt to improve his patrimony, was rescued from danger. Cæsar did not allow him to fall—he propped and supported him, and to this day supports him by his wealth, his high position, and his credit. Nor will he allow his tottering friend to fall. His keen view is not dazzled by the splendour of his own renown, nor are, as it were, the eyes of his mind be-dimmed by the height of his glorious position. Let his warlike renown be great—great, indeed, it is. Let every man judge according to his own sentiments. I, however, when I take into consideration his great power and high rank, prefer this liberality to his friends, this remembrance of old attachments to all his other great qualities.”

With Caninius and Rabirius may be classed Allienus, whom he had appointed pro-consul of Sicily. The rest of his lieutenants were men but little known.

CHAPTER XIX.

CONSUL B.C. 46.

THE preparations made by the Pompeians in Africa for the impending campaign were on the largest scale. The tillers of the soil were swept from the open country and compelled to serve as soldiers. The fields of the African province were left absolutely untilled, open towns were destroyed, and large magazines, both of provisions and of all the materials of war, were formed in towns strongly fortified; horsemen, regular and irregular, Numidians, Gauls, and Germans, were raised, armed, and exercised, with care and diligence; elephants were trained to war, and in unusual numbers, were reported as the most formidable portion of their force. Their fleets were numerous, well equipped and manned, and able, with due diligence, to prevent the transit of the Cæsarean troops. By sea the chief commanders were Attius Varus and Marcus Octavius; by land, Scipio, Juba, Labienus, Afranius, and Petreius. Cato, seating himself at Utica, acted as an able financier and a capital war minister. Service in the field had no charms for him, probably because he had never acted in a high military capacity.

Cæsar, acting on his usual principle, resolved to surprise them by his unexpected presence. Leaving Rome about the middle of December, B.C. 47, he came to Lilybæum, where he encamped on the sea-shore, and soon assembled there six legions and two thousand cavalry. He then received information that Juba had four and Scipio ten legions, that their cavalry and light troops were innumerable, that they had a hundred and twenty elephants, and powerful fleets, with which the whole coast was guarded. He nevertheless sailed with a few transports, conveying only three thousand infantry and a hundred and fifty cavalry, leaving orders for Allienus

to forward the remaining force with the first opportunity. He soon came in sight of Africa, and sailing along the projecting coast, past first Clupea, then Neapolis, and finally cast anchor in the vicinity of Adrumetum. On the first of January he landed his troops and commenced his winter campaign. The cities of this coast were wealthy and populous, and many of them independent of the Roman governor. They seem to have inherited the spirit of their old masters, the Carthaginians, and of the numerous Greek colonies on the same shore. Adrumetum, one of the principal of these cities, was occupied with two legions by Publius Considius, most probably a son of that Caius Considius, who, being an old Syllan officer, had served under Cæsar in the Helvetian campaign, and whom Cæsar, a rare exception with him, had charged with incapacity. This Considius, whoever he was, refused to hold intercourse with Cæsar, slew a letter bearer, and sent the dispatch unopened to Scipio. This augured worse for success than the fall which befell him on landing, and of which he averted the omen by saying, "Thus, then, I grasp thee, O Africa!" His small force, principally young soldiers, were repulsed in an attack, and pursued in their retreat to Ruspina, of which he fortunately became master, as well as of the adjacent Leptis. He was here joined by more of his troops, who, after wandering along various parts of the coast, discovered at last his position, for he had left Sicily without giving orders as to where the transports were to land his soldiers, seeing he was not himself aware where he might fix his head-quarters.

Labienus and Petreius, more vigilant than their fellow commanders by sea, soon arrived with a large force of horsemen and infantry, and gave battle to the foraging troops of Cæsar. A sharp contest took place, in which the Pompeians were finally defeated. Cæsar then lost no time in fortifying his position at Ruspina, and sending orders in every direction for the conveyance of provisions and all the materials of active and defensive warfare into his intrenched camp.

Afranius and Petreius, who had not decamped from the vicinity, were soon joined by Scipio, at the head of eight legions, and the camp of Cæsar was beleaguered on all sides, and his men were prevented from supplying themselves with either forage or water. Tidings also arrived that Juba was soon to join. It was at this time, probably, when the army was in great distress and the young soldiers were especially alarmed at the dangers of their position, the superiority of the enemy, and the reported arrival of King Juba, who was to inflict upon them the fate of Curio's army, and to trample them in the dust under the feet of his horses and elephants, that Cæsar issued the following notification to his affrighted recruits:—"Know," said he, "that the king will be here in a very few days with ten legions, with thirty thousand horsemen, with one hundred thousand light armed troops, and with three hundred elephants. Therefore let all busybodies cease to ask any further questions or to express their own opinions, and let them believe me who have a certain knowledge of the fact. If they refuse to do this, I will put them on board the oldest ship I can find, and send them forth to sea to be carried away at the pleasure of the winds to whatsoever coast it may blow them." But the sudden appearance of an unexpectedly prevented Juba from arriving with all his army. Publius Silius, a Samnite of Nuceria, had probably, at the conclusion of the civil war in Sylla's days, entered the service of Bocchus, king of Mauritania, and eventually rose to the command of his army. Silius and the troops commanded by him were one of the supports to his cause, whom Catiline had indicated to his fellow conspirators as certain and trusty auxiliaries. He knew nothing personally of Cæsar, but he would know that he was the champion of the popular party, and consequently the great opponent of the Syllans, his enemies. As soon, therefore, as he heard that King Juba was moving eastward into the Roman province, he entered his dominions from the west, and threatened to besiege Cirta, the first and wealthiest city of the king's dominions. Juba

was, therefore, obliged to return to his own country, and content himself with detaching thirty elephants to join Scipio. This respite was highly useful to Cæsar; for troops were continually joining him from Sicily, and Sallust captured the island of Circinna, with large magazines of provisions. Moreover, when the inhabitants were fully convinced that Cæsar had come over in person (for they were long incredulous upon this point), they flocked to his camp and offered their services. Many of the leading natives, who had served under Marius and been rewarded by him, transferred their allegiance from the Syllan king, Juba, to the nephew of their old commander, Marius. This feeling became almost universal. Acilla, Tisdrus, and other rich cities on the coast, opened their gates to Cæsar, and supplied him with all necessaries. Soon after, not only the veteran legions arrived from Sicily, but old soldiers from all parts, on receiving notice that their services were required, crowded into Africa. He was strong enough to take the field and offer battle to his adversaries, but Labienus and Scipio, becoming wary in their turn, avoided a general battle with great skill. City after city, however, fell into Cæsar's hands, of which the names alone survive, so much has that coast suffered from its barbarous lords. At last Cæsar determined to sit down before Thapsus, a strong city, garrisoned by Virgilius Petreius and an adequate force. As Thapsus was protected on one side by a lagoon, on the other by the sea, and could be approached on one side only by a belt of sand about a mile and a half broad, which intervened between the sea and the lagoon, Cæsar threw a rampart across its entrance, and strongly fortified it. Scipio seeing that, if he did not interfere at an early period, Thapsus and its garrison would soon be taken, descended early in the morning into the plain, and commenced intrenching himself within a mile of Cæsar's lines. He protected his workers by a body of sixty elephants. But this was not a safe measure in presence of Cæsar. He led out his legions in battle array to assail the Pompeians, who

were busily employed in throwing up their ramparts. The elephants, so far from protecting, rushed back upon their own party. The half-finished works were soon carried, and when the defeated troops sought refuge in the camp on the heights from which they had descended in the morning, they were pursued by a detached portion of the victors, who soon carried this second camp also. The baffled Pompeians then made for Juba's camp, which was always separate from that of Scipio, but found that this also had been carried by another detachment of the Cæsareans. The miserable men would have then surrendered, but the remembrance that numbers of their comrades had been slaughtered in cold blood by Scipio and his fellow commanders made the Cæsarean veterans deaf to the voice of mercy, and they there slaughtered them where they stood; they then turned their bloody swords against some of their own officers, and slew many of them before they could be rescued from their wrath. As the historian of this war calls the obnoxious officers "auctores," it has been conjectured that these were the ringleaders in the late mutinies. Many of them had already been weeded from the legions by Cæsar himself, who, for slight offences, had discharged and transported them out of Africa. The sentence which he pronounced on some of these culprits is worthy of being recorded. He had before him Avienus and Fonteius, tribunes of the tenth legion, and four centurions. "I wish," said he, "some soldiers had ceased from their petulant and licentious proceedings, and had taken into consideration my gentleness, moderation, and patience. But since they will not themselves place the proper bounds upon their conduct, I will, according to military practice, make them a solemn example, that the rest may conduct themselves in a different manner. Caius Avienus, because you, when in Italy, instigated the soldiers of the Roman people against the State, and were guilty of plundering the municipal towns, and because you have been useless to me and to the State, and instead of soldiers, burdened the transports with your own attendants, and horses, and mules, and

owing to this your misconduct, the commonwealth has been at a critical period deprived of the services of her soldiers; for these reasons I ignominiously dismiss you from my army, and order you to leave Africa this very day, and as soon as possible. I likewise dismiss you, Aulus Fonteius, because, as tribune of the soldiers, you have been mutinous, and have also been a bad citizen. You, Titus Salienus, Marcus Tiro, Caius Clusinus, after procuring your commissions by patronage, not merit, have so conducted yourselves as to be neither brave in war nor useful in peace, and have been more eager to excite a spirit of mutiny against your general than to be reverential and obedient, are pronounced unworthy of holding commissions in my army. Therefore I dismiss you, and order you to quit Africa without loss of time."

The defeat was complete, and before the summer was well commenced all real resistance ceased in all parts of Africa. Fifteen hundred cavalry, under Afranius, hurried from the field of battle in the direction of Utica, committed great outrages on the way, and would have carried by assault and plundered Utica itself, had not Cato interfered, and induced them, by a liberal advance in money, to march westward for Spain, after he had in vain besought them to aid him in defending the town.

Soon after Scipio and other fugitives arrived, who, with all who preferred flight to submission to the victor, were furnished with transports and travelling expenses, and escorted to the sea-shore by Cato himself.

The Uticans, who had always favoured the Cæsarean party, principally owing to the protection which, as a free city, they had derived from the salutary operation of the Julian laws, were anxious to secure the safety of their upright governor. But he refused, with a proud smile, all intervention in his behalf, and said that he needed not the patronage of any man. He then sent for Lucius Sextus Cæsar, his pro-quæstor, a near relative but a troublesome foe to Julius, and recommended his children to his protection. He advised his son to submit to Cæsar, and

to live peaceably under the new order of government, to which he, from old principles and associations, could not submit. In the course of the night he committed suicide; first with a feeble hand, eventually with a desperate resolution. Thus perished by his own hand the most determined, the most bitter, and the most renowned of Cæsar's opponents. It is difficult for a modern to understand the principles on which he acted, or to account for the greatness of his reputation. It is sufficient for his fame and the integrity of his character, that the historian, Sallust, who well knew both the men, has thus described, and also contrasted their two characters:—

“Within my own knowledge there were two men of great talent and different character. By birth, in age and eloquence they were nearly equal. They were also equal in greatness of soul and in renown, but their paths to glory were very different. Cæsar's great name was derived from his acts of kindness and munificence; Cato's from the integrity of his life. Cæsar was renowned for his mildness and clemency; severity had conferred dignity upon Cato. Cæsar was distinguished by giving, relieving, and forgiving all; Cato by bestowing on no man more than what was due to him. One was the refuge of the wretched; the other the scourge of the wicked. The facility of Cæsar and the consistency of Cato were equally praised. Finally, Cæsar, at an early age, had determined to spare neither toil nor watchfulness in securing the interests of his friends, to neglect his own, and never to refuse a friend what was worthy his acceptance. He coveted the possession of power, armies, and military command, where his great qualities might be brilliantly displayed. But Cato's principal desire was to be characterized by the moderation, decorum, and even strictness of his life. He did not vie with the rich in their riches, nor with party-men in their party-influence, but strove to surpass the strenuous man in the performance of his active duties, the peaceable man in moderation, and the honest man in integrity. He preferred to be, rather than to be esteemed, a good man. Therefore the less he

desired, the more effectually he secured, renown." It would be idle to criticize this famous passage; but if the rest be as equally unfounded as the very first passage, that they were equal in birth and eloquence, much allowance must be made for rhetorical exaggeration. It is very unfortunate that we have very few documents for enabling us to form an opinion respecting Cato's character, otherwise than are to be found in the eulogies of his friends. The following letter, addressed by him to Cicero, respecting his wish to triumph over the unfortunate Pindinessians, is the only specimen handed down to us as immediately proceeding from his own pen. It is not well written, and demands a very free translation:—"According to what is due both to the State and our friendship, I am most willing to express my joy that your virtue, integrity, diligence, well known in most important affairs, at home in civil life, abroad in arms, are still exemplified by equal industry. Therefore, what I could do, in accordance with my own judgment, I *did*, and praised you both in my speech and motion, because the province was preserved by your integrity and wisdom; because the kingdom of Ariobarzanes, along with the king himself, was preserved, and the attachment of the provincials to our empire was again secured. I am pleased that the supplication was decreed, since you prefer that, in a case where the safety of the State was secured by no blind chance, but by your own excellent measures and self-command, we should rather thank the gods for the result than ascribe it to your account. But you are mistaken if you suppose that a triumph necessarily follows a supplication, and therefore prefer that chance rather than yourself should be praised; and it is an honour much more illustrious than a triumph for the senate to pronounce that the province was retained and preserved more by the mildness and integrity of the military commander, than by either the power of his soldiers, or the kind patronage of the gods; and this principle I expressed in my speech. I have consequently, contrary to my custom, written a long letter to you, in order that you may

think, which I am very anxious you should, that I exerted myself to persuade you I both wished to add to your dignity, in the manner which I thought most honourable, and that, nevertheless, the course most pleasing to yourself has been adopted. Farewell, love me, and persist in your present career, and perform your duty both to the allies and to the State with strictness and diligence."

According to most authorities, Cato was a member of the Stoic school of philosophy, but the doctrines contained in this letter savour more of the garden of Epicurus than of the porch of Zeno.

Cæsar hastened to Utica, and on his road was met by a deputation of the citizens, accompanied by Sextus Cæsar, Cato's son, and other Romans. All were allowed to depart their own ways, but a heavy fine was inflicted on Cato's mock Senate—the three hundred capitalists who had served as instruments in Cato's hand for raising money. Here he received a deputation from Zama, Juba's royal residence, imploring Cæsar's assistance against their monarch. It seems that he, having imbibed the Roman spirit, or rather wishing to imitate the oriental Sardanapalus, had before his last departure from the army, constructed a huge funeral pile, on which, should not his arms be crowned with success, he intended to burn himself, wives, friends, and all his valuables. But some of his friends were not willing parties to this fearful holocaust. They appealed to the citizens to protect them from the insane despair of their king. They succeeded in their efforts; and when Juba, accompanied by Petreius and a few horsemen, in their flight from Thapsus, demanded admittance, they were refused entrance. Thus excluded, they retired to one of the royal court-residences, where they agreed to fall by each other's sword. Petreius was easily slain by the more vigorous Juba; who, having in vain inflicted a wound upon himself, persuaded an attendant to give him the finishing stroke. Silius had in the meantime not only defeated Sabara, Juba's lieutenant, but also intercepted Afranius and his

cavalry. He first led them into an ambuscade, slew the greatest number of their men, and captured their leaders, Afranius and Faustus Sylla, together with his wife, Pompeia, and her children. Silius was anxious to send the prisoners to Cæsar, but both Afranius and Sylla were slain by his troops, who quarrelled about their possession. The lady and her children were delivered to Cæsar, who treated them with all kindness. Scipio, with Torquatus and others, after sailing from Utica, had been compelled by stress of weather to touch at Hippo, then occupied by the fleet of Silius. Their ships were surrounded by superior numbers, attacked, and sunk, and with them perished Scipio and his party. Pompey's elder son, together with Labienus and Varus, who, of the commanders by sea, had alone distinguished himself, escaped into Spain, where they were welcomed by the discontented legions and people of Eastern Spain. The chiefs of Juba's kingdom hastened to offer their homage to Cæsar, who treated them with kindness, remitted all the taxes due to the king, and reduced the kingdom to a Roman province, of which the historian, Sallust, was appointed the first governor.

Having thus finished all his military and civil duties, Cæsar returned to Utica, and on the fifth of June sailed to Sardinia, as, in Cicero's words, "he had not yet seen that farm of his." He spent some time in arranging the affairs of that island, and did not reach the vicinity of Rome until the month of August was drawing to a close.

The historian of the African war mentions anecdotically several particulars, which throw some light on the character of the contest, and of the contrary views with which Cæsar himself was regarded by his adherents and partizans. Thus Labienus, addressing a soldier of the tenth legion, who had accompanied the first detachment of the young soldiers into Africa, says:—"What makes you so bold, my young soldier? Has the fellow infatuated you also with his words? By Jove, he has brought you into great danger! I pity your condition." The soldier who recognised Labienus, who rode with his head

bare, answered, "I am not a recruit, Labienus, but a veteran of the tenth legion." "I cannot see," replied Labienus, "the standards of that legion." "You shall, however, know who I am," retorted the soldier, and throwing aside his head-piece, that he might be recognised, hurled his missile with such force, that it deeply pierced the breast of the charger of Labienus.

In fact, it was very necessary to have some old soldiers, such as the one thus described, among that "forlorn hope" which first landed in Africa. Once they missed the presence of their general, who had embarked himself in search of the various transports, wandering along the coast, "and were disturbed by great terror and sorrow; for they saw that in small numbers, consisting chiefly of recruits, they were exposed in Africa to the great forces and innumerable cavalry of a most insidious nation; and they had no consolation within themselves, and were aware that little aid was to be derived from the wisdom of their officers, were they to miss the look of their general, his vigour, and admirable cheerfulness; for he always displayed a lofty and undaunted spirit. The men, therefore, rested upon him; and all continued to hope that all difficulties would yield to his skill and wisdom."

On another occasion, Varus had captured with his fleet a transport conveying some of Cæsar's veterans, with their centurions, and sent them uninjured to Scipio. This general thus addressed them, when placed before his tribunal:—"I am certain that you are not acting of your own accord, but are compelled by the violence and tyranny of that great criminal, your general, wickedly to make war upon your fellow-countrymen, and the better class of citizens. Since, therefore, fortune has placed you in my power, if you will do your duty, and, in common with every good man, defend the commonwealth, I have determined to spare your lives, and give you money. Therefore speak out as you feel." But a centurion of the fourteenth legion gave him a different answer from what he expected:—"In return for your great kindness, I thank you, O Scipio, for I do not acknowledge you as 'Imperator,' because

you promise life and my full rights to me—a prisoner by the laws of war—and perhaps I would avail myself of your offer, were it not conjoined to the greatest crime. Can I fight against my general, Cæsar, whose commission I have borne, and stand against his army, for whose honour and victory I have fought for sixteen years? So far from doing this I earnestly exhort you to relinquish your attempt. For even if you have not yet learned against whose troops you are contending, you may now know from experience. Choose out of your own troops that which you regard as your bravest cohort, and place it in battle-array before me; I, on the contrary, will select from my comrades, your prisoners, only ten men. You will then understand from our valour what you have to expect from your own troops.”

The bold centurion was cut down on the spot, and his comrades were also massacred; but their spirit survived, while one defeat scattered abroad all the elements of resistance which Scipio, his friends, and allies had been so long preparing. Cæsar, after dismissing some of his veteran soldiers in Sardinia, and sending a strong force under Marcus Didius into Spain, reached Rome in safety.

The state of public opinion at Rome, during his absence, was comparatively calm. Lepidus, the consul, seems to have managed to direct the government with more success than Mark Antony. Cicero's correspondence shows that his fears were not so great, nor his doubts so painful, as they had been during the preceding year. He writes as if he was better satisfied with the line of conduct which, during the difficulties, he had adopted. These are his expressions, taken from a letter partially quoted before, and addressed to his kinsman, Marius: “I quitted that war in which I must have either fallen in the field, or in some ambuscade, or become a prisoner, or taken refuge with Juba, or chosen a place of exile, or have committed suicide. There was certainly no other course if you were either unwilling or afraid to surrender to the conqueror. But of all the alternatives mentioned

by me, the most endurable was exile, especially to an innocent man, and when no disgrace accompanied it. I also add, you would, in such a case, be absent from that city in which there is nothing which you can see without pain. I, however, preferred to live with my own family (if anything is now a man's own), and on my own estates. I foretold all that has happened. I returned home, not with the hope of the happiest state of things, but that if the form of a commonwealth should remain, I might live in it as a citizen, if not as an exile. I saw no reason why I should kill myself, many why I should wish to die; for it is an old proverb, 'There is no reason why you should wish not to live because you are not the great man you may once have been.' My whole conduct is thus explained to you, that you might know that, in the first place, I was always unwilling for one individual to have more power than all the commonwealth; that, in the second place, when, by Pompey's fault, Cæsar had become too powerful to be resisted, I wished for peace. After the loss of that army and general which were our sole hope, I wished all others would abandon the contest. When I could not persuade them to do this, I abstained myself from war. So that now, if this is a commonwealth, I am a citizen; if not, an exile, not in a more inconvenient place than if I had gone to Rhodes or Mitylene." In another letter, written about the same time, and directed to Messinius Rufus, he adopts the same line of argument: "I am, as you may well judge, a man of that character, that I never acted for my own advantage so much as for the good of my countrymen, and had not that man (Pompey) envied me,—I mean him whom you never loved, for you loved me,—both he himself and all good men would now be happy. I always wished that an honourable peace should be stronger than the violence of any one individual. Thus, also, when I discovered that those very arms which I had always feared were more powerful than the combination of all the good men formed by myself, I preferred to accept terms of peace, provided they were safe, rather than

resist with arms our more powerful opponent. But I shall soon have an opportunity of discussing this and other questions with you personally. Nothing detains me at present at Rome, except the expected tidings from Africa. For affairs there seem to me to be drawing near to a crisis. I think I have some interest (though I do not clearly see what that interest is) at all events, whatever intelligence may be brought from that quarter, in not being far from the councils of my friends. For affairs have come to this point, that although there is much difference between the cause of the belligerents, I do not think there will be much difference between their victory. But in truth, my spirit, which perhaps was feeble when affairs were doubtful, is now, when the cause is desperate, much strengthened." In fact, no man was more afraid of the victory of the Pompeians than Cicero was, but still it was necessary for him, to save appearances, when he was writing upon the subject to any of that party. Thus, when the account of Cæsar's victory at Thapsus was brought to Rome, Cicero, who was there at the time, wrote thus to his friend Varro, the antiquarian, who, like himself, had retired from the war. After announcing the receipt of the important tidings, he adds, "I give you the same advice which I myself adopt—to avoid the eyes of men should we not be able to escape their tongues; for the Cæsareans, who exult in their victory, gaze upon us as part of the vanquished party, while the Pompeians, who mourn the defeat of our friends, are grieved that we are living. You will ask, perhaps, why, when such is the state of things in the city, I do not leave it as you did, for you, who surpass both me and others in prudence, saw everything, as I believe, and nothing escaped your notice. For who is so keen-sighted, in this dense darkness, as not to stumble or run foul of some obstacle? Even I had long ago decided that it would be proper for me to withdraw into some quarter that I might neither hear nor see their sayings and doings. But I was wont to raise false charges against myself. I thought that if, when leaving, I

should meet any man in the ordinary course of things, he would suspect, or even if he did not suspect, would say, 'Cicero is either afraid, and consequently flies, or he is plotting, and has a ship ready for him.' Finally, men, the least suspicious, and who knew me best, would suppose that I withdrew because my eyes could not endure to look upon certain characters here. I, entertaining these fears, still continue at Rome, yet daily habits have gradually rendered my feelings callous. You now understand my plan; my advice to you is, to live in obscurity, where you are, for some time longer, until this congratulation evaporates, and, at the same time, until we hear how affairs there have been settled, for settled they are, in my opinion. It will be of great consequence to know what the spirit of the victor may be, what will be the end of things. For although I draw my own inferences, I nevertheless wait for further intelligence. I am therefore unwilling you should go to Baiæ until rumour has grown hoarse with crying the late news. For it will be more honourable, even when we leave Rome, to seem to have retired to Baiæ rather to mourn than to bathe. But you know all this better than any one; only let us persist in our devotion to studious pursuits, from which we formerly derived amusement, but now safety, and not to refuse, should Cæsar wish to employ us, our aid as architects, and even as workmen, in rebuilding the commonwealth, but rather willingly proffer our service. Should no one employ us, we can still write and study political constitutions! and if not in the senate-house and in the forum, but in our published works, as the most learned of the ancients did, do good service to the commonwealth."

In fact, he had been all the time feasted and flattered by Cæsar's friends, with whom he was a great favourite, and from whom he procured immense favours for his old comrades. The senate, on receiving Cæsar's final dispatches, voted a supplication for forty days, and many personal honours. The most important were a decennial dictatorship

and a triennial censorship. This last office was honoured with a new name and enlarged powers, and when united to the dictatorship, enabled him to reform the whole constitution, and regulate the whole social fabric according to his own will and pleasure. Other distinctions, more personal, and perhaps more invidious, were decreed and accepted. A curule chair, next to the consul's, was to be placed for him in the senate; his opinion was to be first asked; and in the games of the circus he was to distribute the rewards. The chariot in which he should triumph was to be dedicated to the Capitoline Jove, and placed in his temple. There, also, his statue, with one foot placed upon a globe, and bearing the inscription of a demigod, was to be erected. These decrees were drawn out and forwarded to him, with many others which he rejected. He immediately entered upon the dictatorship, and appointed his colleague, Lepidus, master of the horse. His arrival at Rome was anxiously expected, as we learn from Cicero's letter to Varro. "Cæsar's arrival is daily expected, as you know; although he himself wrote, as I think, he would land at Alsium; his friends wrote to him not to do so, saying that both the multitudes would prove annoying to him, and he to the multitudes, and that he could more conveniently land at Ostia. I could not understand what difference it made. Hirtius, however, said that he himself, as well as Oppius and Balbus, all good friends of yours, as I know, had advised him by letter so to do. I wish you, therefore, to learn this—that you might procure lodgings for yourself, or rather for both of us. For it is uncertain what he will do, and I have already told you that I am intimate with his friends, and am present at their councils. Nor do I see any reason why I should not. For it is not the same thing to endure, if anything is to be endured, and to approve of what should not be approved. But of what should I disapprove? or what do I know but the commencement of things? Things were once in our own power; for I saw (you were absent) that our friends were eager for war, that

Cæsar was not so eager, but feared it not. Then was the time for deliberating. Other events were necessary consequences: one of the two parties must have conquered. I know that you always joined with me in lamentations, as we saw the great evil that would arise from the destruction of either army and general, and that the greatest of all the evils of civil war is a complete victory; and I dreaded the victory even of that party which we had joined; for they used cruelly to threaten all neutrals, and your thoughts were as hateful to them as my words. Now, had our friends won the victory, they would have been very intemperate, for they were very angry with us, as if we had taken any steps for our own safety which we would not have recommended to them, or as if it was more advantageous for the commonwealth for them to take refuge with (Juba's) elephants than either to die at once or to live, if not with the best, at least with some hope."

When Cæsar arrived near Rome he convoked the senate, and addressed them in a speech of which Dion Cassius has preserved a portion, which appears to be an accurate version of Cæsar's words:—"Let no one, conscript fathers," said he, "suspect that I will either speak or act with severity because I am victorious, and can fearlessly express my sentiments, and can with authority carry into execution my expressed will; and let no one, because Marius, Cinna, and Sylla, and almost all others who, like them, vanquished in war their political antagonists, were gentle and kind in word and deed while conducting their operations, and thus induced many to become their partizans, or at least to remain neutral, became, nevertheless, when they gained their objects, and were victorious, guilty of many actions contrary to their former promises and practice,—let no one, I say, suppose that I will act in the same manner. For being in reality of a contrary disposition, I have not hitherto acted the hypocrite in my transactions with you, nor, when I may do so safely, am I now going to act with harshness. Again, I have been

neither seduced nor inflated by great success, so as to wish to tyrannize over you. The men before mentioned seemed to have erred either in both these points or at least in one. I am the same in disposition as you have always found me; for why should I, by recapitulating particulars, seem offensively to become my own eulogist, nor would I willingly disparage fortune, but in proportion as I have experienced her favours, I will, on all occasions, try to make the best use of them. For my object in wishing to attain my present strength and power was not so much that I might chastise those who opposed me in war, and correct my political antagonists, as that I might safely exercise my prowess and honourably enjoy my success. For it would not be just for a man to become guilty of those very deeds with which he has charged his opponents; nor would I even condescend, by imitating their faults, merely to be different from them by my eventual victory. For who ought to confer greater or more numerous favours than he who has the greatest power? Who ought least to offend but the same man? Who ought more prudently to use the gifts of the gods than the man upon whom they have conferred the greatest favours? Who can more judiciously manage his prosperous affairs than he whose wealth is the greatest and fears least that he may lose it? For prosperity, guided by moderation, will continue, and authority, temperately exercised, preserves all that has been acquired, and, moreover, is attended with this greatest advantage, to which no man, without conducting himself on virtuous principles, can ever attain, inasmuch as it secures to the living friends without guile, to the dead eulogies without falsehood. On the contrary, the man who shamelessly abuses his power acquires neither real good nor certain security, but is openly, although hypocritically, flattered. For the man who exercises despotic authority is both suspected and hated by all, especially by those who are his favourite instruments. This is no idle theory on my part, but I have thus expressed myself that you may know that it is no vain display nor

extemporaneous effusion, but that, having judged from the very beginning of my career that these principles would be more honourable and advantageous to me, I have given expression to the feelings of my heart; so that you may be confident not only for the present, but also full of hopes respecting the future. If you consider that if I were up to this day a hypocrite, I would not be still wearing the mask, but would have thrown it aside on this very day; nor was I even otherwise minded (as my previous actions convincingly prove), and now I will be still more eager not to be your tyrant; no, by Jove! but to rule you with all equity—not to be your despot, but your leader; to be in all public transactions your agent for your benefit, to be both dictator and consul, but, in vindicating my own wrongs, to be merely a private individual, and this I think I ought particularly to state. For why should you suspect me of wishing to kill any of you who have done me no wrong, seeing I have destroyed none of those who opposed me in the field, even although they had by every means aided and abetted my enemies, but showed mercy to the bitterest of my opponents, and spared the lives of many who, having been once dismissed, took arms a second time against me. And why should I be suspected of entertaining secret but vindictive feelings against any man, seeing, without having either read or allowing them to be copied, I immediately committed to the fire the secret correspondence both of Pompey and Scipio. So that, O conscript fathers, we may become firm allies, forget the past as the result of some over-ruling necessity, and learn to love each other as citizens placed together in a new colony, without any mutual hatred; so that ye, enjoying the fruits of my foresight and guardianship, and dreading no future hardships, may regard me as a father, and that I should take care of you as if you were my children, praying that prosperity may always be your lot, and that you should patiently submit to the evils necessarily attached to human affairs, while honouring the good with the rewards due to them, and attempting, as far as

possible, the correction of the bad. Nor should you fear my soldiers, but regard them as the protectors of my authority and your empire; for they must be maintained, for many reasons, and they shall be maintained, not against you, but for your protection, and be taught to be content with their pay and respect their paymasters. It is on this account principally that more than ordinary contributions have been raised—that both all insurrections might be suppressed, and the restraining soldiers, being sufficiently paid, might not cause new insurrections. I never have appropriated any such money to my own use; on the contrary, I have spent my whole property and contracted a heavy debt in your service. You are yourselves aware that much of the money raised has been spent in the public service, and that the remainder is reserved for you. I have, therefore, personally borne the whole odium of the exacted contributions, while the advantage derived from them is peculiarly your own; for you must always have an armed force, without which, with your great city and empire, you cannot live in safety—a large revenue is therefore absolutely necessary. However, let no one suspect that I am going to persecute the richer citizens or to establish any new taxes—I shall content myself with the present revenue, and hope rather to make you all more wealthy than unjustly to deprive any one of you of his property.” Cæsar, says Dion, delivered this speech first in the senate, afterwards in the assembly of the people, which most probably he did, as Dion himself was totally incapable of inventing a speech so full of great truths, enunciated with so much simplicity, and so admirably consistent with Cæsar’s whole life and character.

Then followed the long-delayed triumphs—the first over the Gauls and Germans. The Britons were modestly omitted. The framework of the vehicles was of citron wood—mahogany most probably. In procession were borne statues of the Rhine, the Rhone, and of old Ocean himself, wrought out of solid gold. The triumphal chariot broke down as Cæsar was

passing a temple of fortune in the Velabrum, which was regarded as a fatal omen. It was evening when he reached the foot of the stairs leading up to the Capitol, which he reached by passing between two lines of elephants, all bearing on their backs magnificent candelabra.

The second was over Ægypt and King Ptolemy. The framework of the vehicles in this triumph was covered with tortoiseshell. The third was over the kingdom of Pontus and King Pharnaces, who was carried in effigy, with a label displaying Cæsar's famous dispatch of "Veni, vidi, vici," which hinted, in no ambiguous terms, to the Roman factions what they themselves had to expect from his personal appearance.

The fourth triumph was over Africa and King Juba, whose son, afterwards a Roman writer, of no small fame, was one of the pageantry. The framework of this triumph was covered with ivory.

The sums of money carried up to the Capitol were immense; but some idea may be formed, when we read, that among the valuables thus presented to the God were two thousand eight hundred crowns of gold which Cæsar had received from different individuals and communities as honorary distinctions. The veterans were then paid off, and received all the donations which Cæsar had promised them, and something considerably more; and the whole transaction was concluded with a public banquet, where all the citizens were magnificently entertained. They also received a handsome present of corn and oil and ready money. Nor did he confine his munificence to his soldiers and fellow-citizens; strangers of all nations were treated with a representation of their favourite spectacles, and when these were dramatic, in their different languages. The exhibition of the gladiators, which was dedicated to the memory of his daughter, Julia, was on a very large scale, and it is recorded among his faults by Suetonius that he repeatedly rescued, by the interference of his soldiers, those unfortunate combatants, whom the popular voice had ordered to be

sacrificed. The hunting expeditions, and the contests between men and wild beasts, were on the same scale; and it was then that the cameleopard was first exhibited to European eyes. Natural history in later times denied the fact, and proved to its own satisfaction that an animal, answering to the ancient description, could never have existed, or if monstrously produced, have been able to feed itself: so very often truth has been proved to be stranger than fiction. Two sets, one of grown-up young men, another of youths, exhibited the graceful evolutions of the Trojan equestrian dance, and the Pyrrhic sword-ballet was represented by the youthful nobles of Asia and Bithynia. Sham fights, both by sea and land, were also exhibited, and horses and elephants, and camels were trained to perform their part in these exhibitions. Were it possible to reproduce all that then was displayed to the Roman people and strangers, it would form a series of pictures which the world would not easily forget; nor ought we to forget that such exhibitions, enjoyed by all alike, would be a powerful means of calming down political animosities, and make the majority, at least, better satisfied with these shadowy representations, than with the stern realities of war. Caius Cassius may have scorned these theatrical displays, but Caius Cæsar was a far wiser and a better man. The senate, recruited, undoubtedly, by many of his best officers, whether military or civil, assumed a more dignified position, and was allowed to deliberate and decide on all questions which the dictator thought might be safely submitted to their consideration: nay, they even dared to take upon themselves the initiation of certain measures, as in the case of Marcus Marcellus, who, after the battle of Pharsalia, had retired from the war, and lived a splendid exile at Mitylene. There can be no doubt that he was one of the ablest men of the day, one whom few could equal in birth, wealth, ability, and eloquence. The enmity between him and Cæsar was bitter, the more bitter, perhaps, because he had married Cæsar's favourite grand-niece, and, nevertheless, had most vehemently opposed both him and his

measures. By Octavia he was the father of that young Marcellus, who, prematurely dying, has been embalmed in the well known and most pathetic verses of Virgil. His friends had made great efforts, although he himself appears to have been indifferent, to procure his recal; and Cæsar, at the request of the united senate, had consented to permit him to return. On that occasion Cicero, who had taken great interest in the case, returned thanks in a well-known speech, which we dare not to tax with insincerity; although his after-conduct casts a most unfavourable light on the whole transaction. Cæsar had expressed a suspicion that certain parties were plotting his death; that he cared not for their machinations, because he had lived long enough both for nature and for glory. Cicero thus enlarges upon that topic:—"And now I approach your weighty complaint and most deplorable suspicion, against the realization of which you yourself ought not to guard with greater caution than all your fellow-citizens, especially we who have been preserved by you. And, although I hope that your suspicion is groundless, I will never speak lightly upon the subject. For your precautions are also ours, and should we err on either side, I would prefer being too fearful than not sufficiently cautious. But who is that mad man? Is he one of your own friends? Yet, who are more your friends than those to whom you so unexpectedly restored everything. Is he one of those who followed your standard. We must not believe that any man can be so insane as not to prefer before his own life the safety of that leader to whom he owes his high promotion. But should your own followers meditate no such crime, ought we to fear that your opponents may do so? Who among them? For all your opponents have either lost their lives by their obstinacy, or have retained them by your clemency. So that, either none of your opponents survive, or the survivors have become most friendly. Nevertheless, as in men's minds there are dark and secret chambers, let us rather increase your suspicion; for thus we shall also increase our own diligence. For what man among us is so ignorant of the state

of things, so blundering a politician, so regardless of both his own and of our common safety, as not to understand that his own security is bound up with yours ; that on your single life depend the lives of all. I, for my part, while thinking of you by night and by day, as I ought to do, am accustomed to dread only the chances common to us all, the uncertainty of our health and our frail constitution ; and to grieve, that when the commonwealth ought to be immortal, its existence depends upon the life of a single mortal. But if, in addition to common chances, and the uncertainty of life, we have to fear crime and treacherous conspiracies, can we believe that any God, even should he desire it, could save the commonwealth ?” The orator then eloquently depicts the duties which Cæsar had to perform, and which he alone could adequately fulfil ; and concludes with this powerful argument :—“ The commonwealth has seen the end of this wretched and fatal war. He has conquered whose animosity was not inflamed by success, but softened by his goodness, and who did not think that all the objects of his anger were also fit objects of banishment or death. Some laid down their arms, from the hands of others they were torn. Ungrateful, therefore, and unjust, is that citizen, who, when liberated himself from the danger of arms, still retains an armed spirit. How much better was not he who fell in battle, and spent his life in the service of his cause. But all our quarrels have now been decided by arms and extinguished by the equity of the victor. It remains that all who have one spark of prudence, wisdom, or even sanity, should wish one thing—unless you, O Caius Cæsar, continue to live and to act upon the same principles on which especially this very day you have previously acted, we cannot be saved. Therefore we all, who wish the safety of the community, both exhort and beseech you to provide for your life and safety ; and we all,—that I may speak for others also what I feel to be my own sentiments,—since you think that there is some danger against which you ought to guard, promise to protect you not only by watching and guarding, but by the interposition of our own bodies.”

The ides of March supply but a sorry commentary upon this able and well-argued passage. But the letters of Cicero seem to prove that at the time he was sincere, more, perhaps, from the feeling of the moment than from principle. In a letter to Aulus Cæcina, a nobleman of great influence and some ability, who had libelled Cæsar, and was not on that account permitted to return immediately into Italy, he thus expresses himself:—"No one is so hostile to that cause which Pompey undertook with better spirit than preparation, as to dare to call us bad citizens, or wicked men. On this point I am wont to admire the dignity, the justice, and the wisdom of Cæsar, who never mentions Pompey but in the most honourable terms. But he was guilty of many harsh deeds against him personally. These were the deeds of the war and victory, not of Cæsar. But he has behaved to our party with the greatest kindness. He has made Cassius his lieutenant, Brutus governor of Gaul, Sulpicius of Greece. Even Marcellus, with whom he was especially angry, has been restored in the most honourable manner."

Also in a letter addressed to Quintus Ligarius, one of the African resisters, he thus expresses his opinion:—"I will first write to you what I know and clearly see, that Cæsar will not be very harsh to you; for the course of things, the lapse of time, the public sentiment, and even his own disposition, as it appears to me, daily make him more content."

But Cæsar, while thus gently dealing with his old opponents, did not neglect his political duties. One of the reforms most required was the emendation of the calendar, and the adjustment of the year to the apparent revolution of the sun. It is said that when in Ægypt he had frequent consultations with the learned men of Alexandria upon astronomical and other subjects, and that we owe to their suggestions the Julian reformation of the calendar. But the knowledge, which as Pontifex Maximus, he must have derived from the pontifical annals, respecting the abuses arising from the uncertain length of the year, and the shameful jobbing, by which a consulship

might be either shortened or lengthened, to punish a foe or reward a friend, must have long before called his attention to this matter. Nor did he copy the Ægyptian year, which was composed of twelve months, of thirty days each, and five days superadded at the close of each year. He divided the months, as we now have them; and thought that by adding a day every fourth year to the month of February, a perfect cycle might be established; not that he was not aware of the existence of a fraction which was not taken into account by this system, but regarded it as more trifling than the lapse of centuries proved it to be. According to Dion Cassius, perhaps the best authority, the seasons were restored to their proper place, by inserting sixty-seven days between the last day of November and the first day of December of this year, which was, consequently, of unexampled duration. He next reformed the judicial bench, and restored the judicial power to the senators and knights, of whom a selected number were to form what we would call the jury list. He assumed the nomination of one half of the annual magistrates, and allowed the people to elect the other half. He limited the provincial government of a prætor to one year, of a consul to two years. As social reformer, he passed several sumptuary laws; by which many luxuries were absolutely forbidden, and gold ornaments, jewels, pearls, and robes of certain materials, were restricted to people of fixed rank and station. He increased the custom duties on all articles of foreign luxury; and passed most salutary laws for checking the facility of divorce, and rendering the marriage tie more binding. He then approached the monster nuisance, the pauper citizens of Rome; and reduced the number of those who received their provisions at the public expense from three hundred and twenty to one hundred and fifty thousand, and decreed by law that this number should never be exceeded, and that no person should in future have his name placed on the list, except to supply a vacancy. He made it compulsory upon the great landholders, who had covered large portions of Italy with pastoral dis-

tricts, to employ, as their shepherds and herdsmen, free people, in the proportion of one freeman to every two slaves. These were great and salutary reforms, which prove that he was in reality far more anxious to suppress abuses, to revive the drooping vigour of the constitution, and to reconstruct its decaying framework, than to establish a despotism. He carefully observed the laws which he himself established, and was as frugal in his table, and as temperate in his habits, as when partaking, with his soldiers, the simple fare and diet of the camp. While thus employed, he was suddenly called away, to conduct the last of his campaigns against Labienus and the sons of Pompey in Spain.

CHAPTER XX.

Dictator. B.C. 45.

THE legions in South-Eastern Spain, consisting principally of natives of that province, had, after frequent mutinies, finally expelled Trebonius, and, under the command of two obscure men, called Aponus and Scapula, had proclaimed themselves the supporters of the Pompeian cause. They were soon joined by Cneius and Sextus Pompey, of whom the first brought with him one of the legions which Afranius had formed in Africa. These were followed by Labienus and Atius Varus, who conveyed in the fleet, to which little damage had been done, all the wreck and remnant of the African host. They had even persuaded King Bocchus to join them, with a considerable force of Numidians and Mauritanians. With these forces, and levies raised in the provinces, they had formed a large army, to which Caius Fabius and Quintus Pedius, Cæsar's lieutenants in Eastern Spain, were unequal in the field. Consequently, the greater part of Spain had

declared itself Pompeian. Cæsar left Rome late in the year, B.C. 46, and in seventeen days reached Saguntum, and in seven more was in presence of the enemy. Cneius, on hearing of his approach, had concentrated all his forces in the vale of the river Bætis, where Corduba was occupied by his brother Sextus, with a strong garrison. Ulla, alone, a mountain fortress on the northern side of the ridge which separates the river Bætis from the Mediterranean, had in that province proved faithful to Cæsar, and was then besieged by Cneius in person.

The rough soldier, who has left on record his remembrances of this Spanish campaign, is not a writer whom we can easily follow in his descriptions of Cæsar's operations. The first movement was to throw a strong force into Ulla, which was successfully done under the guidance of Patiecus, a native of that province. The second was to besiege Corduba, but the want of provisions, the severity of the winter, and the arrival of Cneius compelled Cæsar to desist from his enterprise, and change the scene of his operations. The whole of the province is described as most fertile, abounding in corn, wine, and oil, and feeding immense numbers of flocks and herds; but all had been either driven off, or stored in the numerous mountain fortresses, with which both the ridges, on either side of the Bætis, absolutely bristled. Among these, and not far from Ulla, Ucubis and Attegua, two fenced cities, had been selected by Cneius, as well adapted to secure the immense magazines which he had accumulated. He himself formed an intrenched camp on a mountain situated between the two rock fortresses, nearer, however, to Attegua. Cæsar was induced to direct all his efforts against this latter city, which, if captured, would relieve him from his principal difficulties. The Pompeians in the town made a desperate defence, and even massacred the inhabitants who wished to surrender before the place was reduced to extremities. They were, however, overpowered, and gave up the city on the twentieth of February. Pompey fell back upon Ucubis, where his

position was so strong, that Cæsar did not venture to attack him. In the meantime, the different cities began to pass over to Cæsar; and Pompey and his officers discovered that if they refused to meet their enemies in the field, they would lose the support of the whole province. He, therefore, collected his forces, and took up a strong position in the vicinity of Munda, a city in a small plain between the Sierra Nevada and the Mediterranean, and not far from the modern Malaga. Cæsar, having reduced Ucubis to ashes, followed the Pompeians across the mountains into the plains of Munda. In one of his marches he intercepted a messenger with the following letter, addressed by Cneius to the inhabitants of Ursaon:—"Although, with our usual good fortune, we have hitherto repelled our enemies, nevertheless, if they allowed me an opportunity to fight on equal ground, I would finish the war sooner than you could possibly expect. But they do not dare to bring down into the plains their newly-raised troops; and, maintaining themselves on the provisions captured in our strongholds, prolong the war; for they besiege our cities one by one; hence they procure provisions. I promise, however, both to preserve the cities attached to our party, and to finish the war the first opportunity. I intend to send you a few cohorts. As soon as they shall cease to live upon our provisions, they must have recourse to a pitched battle."

The only authentic account of the battle which soon followed, is to be found in the memoir before mentioned, and which was attributed to some "rough soldier" who was an eye-witness. It is very difficult to guess at the meaning of his barbarous Latin, but the following attempt will probably convey his idea as nearly as can be done in our day: "Next morning, when Cæsar was preparing to march out his forces, he was informed by his scouts that Pompey, at an early hour, had drawn up his troops in battle array. When this report was announced, he immediately raised the signal for battle. Pompey led forth his troops because he had previously told

the Ursaonenses that Cæsar would not descend into the lower ground. This letter greatly encouraged the townsmen. Pompey, trusting to this opinion, thought he could finish the whole business; for he was defended by the nature of the ground, and by the fortifications of the town itself, close to which he had pitched his camp. For, as I have shown above, their strongholds are constructed on hills, and sometimes no plain intervenes between them. But we must, by all means, explain what then took place. Between the two camps there intervened a plain about five miles broad, and Pompey's troops were defended at the two extremities by a lofty fortress and the ruggedness of the ground. The part of the plain next to Cæsar was level, but it subsided, at a certain place, where it was divided by a brook, which rendered the approach to the enemy especially difficult and dangerous, as it flowed to the right through a soft, marshy bottom. Now Cæsar, when he saw their line drawn up, had no doubt that our opponents would advance into the middle of the plain, in order that the battle might be fought on equal ground. The whole space was in the view of both armies. Moreover, the cavalry made a gallant show upon that plain, and in the pure sunshine, for the immortal Gods had granted a beautiful and lovely day as a favour to the combatants. Our men were most of them in high spirits; some, however, were afraid, because their lives and fortune would be endangered by the result of the impending combat. Our men advanced to the combat, expecting their adversaries to do the same. They, however, did not move more than a mile from the fortifications of the town, and were, in fact, stationed at no great distance from the wall. Our men continued to move forwards. When our men, at a slow pace, approached the brook, our opponents still ceased not to maintain their advantageous position. Their line was formed of thirteen legions and their flanks were covered by their cavalry and six thousand light troops. Their auxiliaries equalled the legionaries in number. We had eighty cohorts and eight

thousand horsemen. So when our men, having crossed the plain, had approached the disadvantageous ground, the enemy's preparations seemed to be superior, and the advance up the ascent particularly dangerous. When Cæsar saw this, he ordered the men not to advance beyond a certain line. This order both annoyed and grieved our men, as they were thus prevented from commencing the battle. This halt emboldened our opponents, as they thought fear prevented the Cæsareans from attacking. Exulting, therefore, in their superior position, they pretended to give us a fair opportunity of measuring our strength against theirs, although we could not approach them without imminent risk. The soldiers of the tenth legion were in their place on the right, on the left were the third and fifth legions, and beyond them the cavalry and the auxiliaries. At last the battle began with the war-shout. Here, although our men were stronger, their opponents derived great advantages from their superior position. Hence the cheering from both parties, and the discharge of missiles, and the very shock itself, were so equal, that for a moment our men mistrusted their victory; for the charge and the cheers by which conflicting armies are mostly terrified, were very equally matched. But when on both these points the courage of both armies had been equally displayed, the mass of our opponents were pierced in heaps, and fell under the stout javelins of our legionaries. The tenth legion, as before mentioned, was on our extreme right. The men, few in number, by their valour struck great terror into the enemy's ranks, while they were then forcing the enemy's left wing to give way. The Pompeian leaders, fearing our victorious troops might assail their left flank, attempted to transfer a legion from their own to our right wing. But as soon as it began to move, Cæsar ordered our cavalry on the left to press upon the enemy's right wing; and they charged with so much spirit that their adversaries were prevented from sending any succour to their distressed friends. So when groans were mingled with the war-shouts and the din

of battle rung in their ears, the young soldiers were paralyzed with terror. Here was what Ennius describes 'foot matched to foot, shield pressed on shield;' and our men, vigorously fighting, gradually drove back our opponents, who took refuge in the town. The enemy, thus routed and put to flight on the feast of the 'Liberalia' (17th March), would have all been destroyed, had they not retreated into the same town from which they had marched in the morning. In the battle there fell of the enemy thirty thousand men, and perhaps more; among them Labienus and Attius Varus, who were both honourably buried; there also fell three thousand knights on the same side, partly from the city, partly from the province. Of our own men one thousand were slain, five hundred wounded. Thirteen of the enemy's eagles, together with innumerable standards and fasces, were captured, and seventeen of the chief instigators of the war."

It is almost impossible to reconcile this simple statement with the exaggerations of later writers, probably of the Pompeians, who afterwards became distinguished leaders under their chief's second son, Sextus. According to them, all was lost except for Cæsar's own interference and pathetic remonstrances against the shame which would attach to the memory of his veterans were they to abandon their hoary captain to the mercy of beardless boys. Nay, he is said even to have thought of killing himself in the extremity of his despair, and thus destroying, by his own hand, the great edifice which he had been so laboriously constructing for the whole of his life. And he who had fought against the Nervii with the desperation of a common soldier; he who at Alesia was engaged in a contest from which he could not escape with life except victorious; he who at Dyrrachium had narrowly escaped being cut down by one of his own standard-bearers; he who at Alexandria had saved himself owing to the simple fact that he was a good swimmer; is said to have told his friends that on other occasions he had fought for glory, but at Munda for his life.

The truth is, that this last is one of his most extraordinary campaigns. His opponents were bold and desperate. Their real leaders fought without hope of pardon. Among their troops were to be found the broken men of the whole Roman and barbarian world, and they had not scrupled to proclaim liberty to all the slaves who would take service under their banners. But all this did not prevent Cæsar from defeating their united forces in a campaign which was commenced at midwinter and virtually finished on the 17th of March. Nor is it presumptuous in us to hint that military men have never condescended to inform us why one of the greatest captains of the world should have so repeatedly chosen the worst months of winter as the favourite time for active operations, nor why success should have invariably attended these mid-winter campaigns. On the present occasion the victory was one of the most complete won even by Cæsar. But the inhabitants of the country called Turdetani, whom Strabo describes as almost pure Phœnicians, did not willingly surrender their mountain holds. Both Munda and Ursaon required long sieges, and Corduba was not recovered without a desperate struggle between the Cæsarian and Pompeian parties. Scapula, the chief cause of the war, literally imitated the oriental Sardanapalus, indulged himself with a last banquet, satisfied himself with the pleasures of the table, anointed himself with precious perfumes, and induced his favourite slaves first to slay him and then to place him upon his funeral pile.

It is a question well worth asking, whether the Arabs of the Mohammedan conquest did not find, in the ancient Turdetania, men of a cognate race, who easily coalesced with the Moorish invaders. At least we know that here alone the Arabs found and made a home, and without the facility afforded by a unity of race it is difficult to account for the fact that the Moorish conquerors should have so completely identified themselves with the original inhabitants as to make their kindoms of Jaen, Seville, Cordova, and Granada com-

plete types of the oriental civilization. It would be a vain imagination to suppose that the comparatively few emigrants who passed from Africa into Spain could have dislodged from their mountain fortresses the first occupants of the upper valleys of either the Sierra Morena, or of the Sierra Nevada.

Strabo describes this country and its inhabitants as the richest in the world, with numerous cities, flourishing agriculture, inexhaustible mines, well protected harbours, extensive fisheries, purple dyes, numerous ships, and as rich in the fine linen of their looms and the matchless fleeces of their flocks.

The following passage is more fanciful, but still worth transcribing: "Homer, a man of many languages, and patient in his investigations, gives us occasion to know that he had heard of this country, should any one rightly infer what may be gathered from his statements whether in its praise or dispraise. In dispraise, because he had heard that it was the westernmost land, where, as he says,

' Into the ocean—sinks the bright light of the sun,
Drawing the dark veil of night over the life-bestowing earth !'

But it is clear that night is an ill-boding name, and closely connected with Hades, and Hades with Tartarus. One may conjecture that he, on hearing of Tartessus, hence named the lowest subterraneous region Tartarus, and affixed a myth to it thus to preserve the poetry of the fact. But what he had heard in praise of the same countries may be inferred from the following particulars: the very fact that the expeditions of Hercules and of the Phœnicians reached into these regions, suggested to him both the wealth and indolence of the inhabitants; for the latter were so subjugated by the Phœnicians, that the majority of the cities in Turdetania and of the neighbouring countries are to this day inhabited by Phœnicians; and the expedition of Ulysses appears to me to have reached this country and to have been investigated by Homer. From this event he borrowed many suggestions, so that in the 'Odyssey,' as well as in the 'Iliad,' he introduced real

events into the poem, together with the mythology usual with poets. For not only many places in Italy and Sicily, and other circumstances, show signs of this, but even in Iberia, a city called Odyssea is still shown, and a temple of Athena, and other innumerable vestiges of his wanderings, and of the wanderings of others, which took place after the Trojan War, for both parties, the victors and the vanquished, were equal sufferers, since the Achæans won only a Cadmean victory. For as their home affairs were ruined, and as each one's share of the spoils was but small, it came to pass that the Trojan survivors who escaped with their lives, as well as the Hellenes, had recourse to piracy. The former because their country was destroyed, the latter because each warrior was ashamed to have remained so long from his family, and to return to them empty-handed. Hence we have the tradition of the wanderings of Æneas, of Antenor and the Eneti, as well as of Diomed, of Menelaus, and of others. The poet, therefore, having heard that these expeditions to the uttermost parts of Iberia had taken place, and also of the wealth and other excellences of these regions, placed there the seats of the blessed souls, and the Elysian plain where Proteus tells Menelaus that the Gods would settle him.

‘ But thee to the Elysian plain and the extremities of the earth
The immortals will convey, where dwells the bright-haired Rhadamanthus,
Where the means of life are easiest procured by mankind.
No snow, no storms in excess, nor rains are there,
But ocean always sends forth for man's refreshment
The zephyr's breezes, tuneful as they blow.’

For the healthy tone of the west wind is peculiar to this region, as it sends forth its soft evening breeze. It is also at the extremity of the earth, where fables, as we said before, place Hades. And Rhadamanthus being placed there, suggests that the place was near to Minos, of whom he says,

‘ There truly I saw Minos, Jove's illustrious son,
With golden sceptre, legislating for the dead.’

And the succeeding poets talk in a similar strain ; hence the expedition against the herds of Geryon and for the golden apples of the Hesperides, and certain spots denominated ‘ the islands of the blest,’ which we know to be still visible not far from the Mauritanian promontory, over against Gadeira.

“ And I say that Homer’s informers were the Phœnicians, for they had occupied the west part both of Iberia and of Lybia *before the age of Homer*, and continued to be masters of the country until the Romans destroyed their empire. The following are proofs of Iberian wealth : the Carthaginians, who passed over with Hamilcar Barca, found that the mangers and the casks in common use were made of solid silver. One might suspect also that the inhabitants, especially their rulers, were called long-lived, from their wealth and happiness, and that Anacreon, on that account, wrote thus :—

‘ I would not prefer the horn of Amalthea,
Nor to reign for a hundred and fifty years over Tartessus.’

..... Some say that the present Carteia is Tartessus. The civilization and the political institutions of the Turdetani corresponded with the fertility of their country, in which the Celtici participated, on account of their vicinity ; according to Polybius, on account of their consanguinity. But they were not equally civilized, for the majority of this tribe live in villages.”

In another passage Strabo thus writes of the same country : “ It is called, from the river, Bætica, but from the inhabitants Turdetania. They are called both Turdetani and Turduli ; some think them the same people, others that they are different. Among the others is Polybius, who says the Turdetani dwell more to the north. Now there appears to be no difference among them. They are accounted the wisest of the Iberians, and cultivate letters, and have books of ancient history, and poems, and metrical laws, amounting to six thousand verses, as they say. And the rest of the Iberians also cultivate letters, but not with the same form.”

This was the race which, under the surviving Pompeians, waged this desperate war against the Romans. Even the battle of Munda did not terminate it. The cities perched on high hills, and fortified by art, required all the science and perseverance of Cæsar's soldiers, before they could be captured. Such were Munda itself and Ursaon, with many others.

Cn. Pompey fled from the battle to Carteia, one of the greatest of the Phœnician cities, and whose extensive ruins may still be traced on the sea-shore to the east of Gibraltar. The Carteians were divided into two parties; some were for delivering the fugitive to Cæsar, others against such treachery. In the strife that ensued, Pompey was severely wounded, but, having escaped with thirty ships, was driven by Didius, Cæsar's admiral, to the shore, whence, guarded by some faithful Lusitanians, he reached the hilly country, where he was overtaken and slain. The man who slew him cut off his head and sent it to Cæsar, who ordered it to be honourably interred. Sextus Pompey, on hearing of the result of the battle of Munda, quitted Corduba with a strong detachment of cavalry, and took refuge among the Celtiberians, where his father's clients concealed and protected him until fortune once more enabled him to appear before the world. Both Corduba and Hispalis (Seville) became the scenes of internal contest, before they finally fell into the conqueror's hands. Cæsar had visited Carteia, which, owing to its position close to the rock, is called even by a third name, Calpe, and had passed thence to Gades. Thence he returned to Hispalis, where he convoked an assembly of the chiefs of the province, and told them "That in his Quæstorship he had chosen Bætica for his peculiar province, and had at that time freely bestowed upon it many benefits. That in his Prætorship, when his office was more influential, he had petitioned the senate, and freed the province from the pecuniary contributions which Metellus had imposed upon them. He had also become its patron, and passed many laws in the senate for its benefit. He had, moreover, defended the province, both publicly and privately,

in many causes, which had brought many enmities upon himself. Lastly, during his own consulship he had, although absent, conferred what favours he could upon the inhabitants. That, nevertheless, forgetful of these benefits, they had proved ungrateful to him and to the Roman people, both in the present war and in past times. "You," said he, "although well acquainted with the law of nations and with the institutions of the Roman people, have, like barbarians, repeatedly laid violent hands on the sacro-sanct magistrates of the Romans. In open day-light, and in the middle of the forum, you attempted wickedly to slay Cassius. You have always so utterly hated peace, that the Roman people have never ceased to keep legions in this province. Benefits are regarded by you as injuries; injuries as benefits. Consequently you have never been able either to be harmonious in peace, or valiant in war. Cneius Pompey, a young man without any commission, who was a mere fugitive, was welcomed by you, and seized upon the fasces and military power. After slaying many citizens, he raised an army against the Roman people. By your own instigation, he ravaged your territories and the whole province. Did you think you would ultimately be the victors?" The rest of the speech is unfortunately lost, otherwise we might have known by what process he intended to remedy this inveterate evil, and change this turbulent and peace-hating people into orderly and well-behaved allies. He undoubtedly possessed that valuable secret, and it was communicated by him to his successors, under whom the different races, who had always warred upon their republican masters, became peaceful subjects of the empire. This is the picture presented by Strabo of the same people described by Cæsar in the above-quoted terms: "Now all the Turdetani, and especially those on the banks of the Bætis, have completely adopted the Roman habits, and have even forgotten their own language. Most of them are Latins in privilege, and have admitted Roman settlers. So that they are now nearly altogether Romans. And the cities which have

been settled among them, Paxaugusta (Badajos) among the Celtici, and among the Turduli, Augusta-Emerita (Merida), and Cæsar Augusta (Saragosa), near the Celtiberians, and some other settlements, clearly show this change of institutions, and all the Iberians who have adopted this habit are called 'togati.' Among these are even the Celtiberi, who were once regarded as the most brutalized of all the tribes." Cæsar seems to have bestowed much time and care upon the proper settlement of this most interesting province, as he did not return to Rome until the month of October. It may be remarked, in conclusion, that Ireland was undoubtedly both colonized and inhabited by men from this quarter; nor did they entirely lose their racy qualities by change of soil. English literature is deplorably blind upon this subject, and refuses to acknowledge that the modern Briton owes more of his blood and spirit to the Celtic stock, than to all other races put together.

At Rome Lepidus had maintained peace and order without any interruption. Cicero was the leading man in the senate, and was allowed to exert great influence. So that even Vatinius, Cæsar's friend and supporter, who was proconsul of Illyricum, beseeches him to procure a vote for a supplication from the senate, which, according to his own confession, Cæsar was unwilling to grant, before he had conquered the whole of Dalmatia. The supplication was voted. But the death of Tullia quite paralyzed Cicero for a time, and left him almost helpless. Even before that event, he does not seem to have taken a great interest in the Spanish war. In a letter to Cassius, written at an early period of the year, he says— "Nothing new from Spain, but very great expectation: there are bad reports, but anonymous." Cicero sent many persons with letters of recommendation; among others, a Greek of some literary reputation, who was anxious to describe Cæsar's actions in Greek prose. We hear no more of him. In return, he received a letter of consolation concerning Tullia's death, written by Cæsar from Hispalis, and dated the thirty-first of

March. Cicero had heard from Hirtius, in a letter dated fourteen days before, that Sextus Pompeius had departed from Corduba, and that Cneius had fled, "I know not whither," says this staunch Pompeian, "nor in truth do I care: no other news." At a later period, he says that he had heard that "Cneius was not detained at Carteia, and that the remains of the war were still considerable." Had Cæsar run any considerable risk at Munda, we should have seen some allusions to it in these and similar letters. C. Cassius, in a letter to Cicero, gives a very fair description of the general feelings of the old Pompeians upon the question of the Spanish war. "Now to return to politics, write back to me an account of what is going on in Spain. May I die if I am not anxious about it; and I prefer to have our old and clement master, rather than a new and cruel despot. You know what a fool Cneius is. You know how he regards cruelty as a virtue. You know how he thinks that we were always making a fool of him. I am afraid he will rudely retaliate upon us with a stroke of his sword. Let me know by the bearer what is going on. Well! now I wish to know whether you are reading this letter with an anxious or careless spirit. For then I should know at the same time what I myself ought to do. Not to be tedious, farewell, and love me as you do. If Cæsar is victorious, expect instantly to see me,"—most probably, to form the conspiracy against his old and clement master, and to execute that murder which he had failed to commit upon the banks of the Cydnus. We have already seen that Cicero, in his second Philippic, declared this intention to the senate, and recorded it as a great merit in Cassius. Of course he could have learned this secret intention only from Cassius himself; nor would Cassius have confessed it, except he was sure of Cicero's sympathy in such a cause; and to this act of confidence Cassius seems to have alluded in the following passage:—"Now then we shall live free. Now I shall have you the greatest of all citizens, and dearest to me (which you discovered in the greatest darkness of the commonwealth).

I again say it, I shall have you as a witness of my attachment to you and to the commonwealth. Now as you often promised to be silent as long as we were slaves, and then to speak out when the declaration would be useful to me, still I am not so anxious to have those things spoken out as to be felt by you. For I am not more anxious to be recommended to the good opinion of the world, than to be worthily recommended to your own judgment, that you may feel that these our last actions were not sudden impulses, nor inconsistent, but similar to those intentions of which you are a witness, and that you can yourself hold me out as not in a slight degree worthy of the best hopes of my country."

There is a curious letter written in the course of this year by Cicero to Atticus, from which it might be inferred that Cæsar's conduct was, in spite of continual suggestions to the contrary, producing a kindly feeling in Brutus, which would make him an unwilling conspirator when the day of action came. "What," writes Cicero, "does Brutus say so? That Cæsar will return to the good men? Excellent news! but where will he find them? unless, peradventure, he hangs himself; for how foolish is it to look for them here. Where, then, will be that artistical work of yours, which I saw in the Parthenon, Ahala, and Brutus? But what will he do? The following passage in your letter is excellent:—'But even he who is the author of all our disgrace does not think favourably of our friend; I, on the contrary, was afraid that Brutus would love him.' For he had mentioned this in letters which he wrote to my female friends." (Probably Servilia and her daughters.)

The death of Cato had given occasion to many of the Pompeians to write elaborate eulogies on his character. Cicero took the lead; and, in his "Cato," used all his efforts to deify a man, for whom, while living, he entertained a strong dislike. Brutus had followed in the same track; and, not content with this step, divorced his own wife, that he might make room for Cato's daughter, the famous Porcia.

Cicero's "Cato" seems to have been an eloquent production; for Cæsar, after reading it, is reported to have said that he had derived many useful lessons, with respect to copiousness of style, from its perusal. According to the same authority, which is only Cicero himself, he is said, after reading the "Cato" of Brutus, to have expressed a very different opinion, and to have insinuated that he himself was the better writer. One of the great subjects of the eulogists was Cato's conduct during the crisis of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and the stern determination with which he had insisted upon the necessity of acting with a vigour beyond the law, and of instantly putting the detected conspirators to death.

We know not how Cicero had enlarged upon this topic, but the following passage from a letter to Atticus proves that he was by no means satisfied with the part which Brutus had assigned to him in that memorable tragedy. These are his words:—"I have read the letter of Brutus, and have sent it back to you. Certainly not judiciously written, in return to the questions which you had put to him. But that is his business, although he makes a disgraceful mistake upon the following point; he thinks Cato was the first who proposed the immediate death of the conspirators, although all the preceding speakers, with the exception of Cæsar, had proposed the same. He spoke but from the prætorian bench. Brutus supposes the judgment of the consulars to have been more gentle. These were Catulus, Servilius, the two Luculli, Curio, Torquatus, Lepidus, Gellius, Volcatius, Figulus, Cotta, Lucius Cæsar, Caius Piso, also Marius Glabrio, and the two consuls elect, Silanus and Muræna. Why, then, was Cato's motion carried? Because it had embodied the whole case more clearly and copiously. Again, Brutus thinks that he pays me a high compliment, by calling me 'the best of consuls;' now, what unfriendly writer could have been more meagre in his praise? But see how carelessly he has written to you, in answer to my other objections. He merely asks you to correct his mistake about the form of the decree of the

senate. You would have done this, if any croaking frog had reminded you of the mistake. But again I say, *that* is his business."

The meaning of all this remonstrance is, that Cicero would not agree in conceding even to Cato the merit of having been the first proposer of the instant execution of the conspirators. It is a curious fact, that in Sallust's history of the same proceedings, the odious phrase of Brutus by which Cicero is called "optimus consul," is the greatest eulogy of Cicero still extant.

A third bitter opponent of Cæsar, called Fabius Gallus, who can scarcely be the same person who, in the Catilinarian times, was one of Cicero's best informers, wrote an eulogy on Cato, which was sent to Cicero. The letter which accompanied it seems to have been exceedingly audacious and libellous against Cæsar; for in his answer, written immediately before Cæsar's return from Spain, Cicero says:—"I am very thankful for your admonition, and beg of you always to do the same. You seem to me to fear that if we are to have Cæsar for our critic, we may have to laugh with a sardonic grin; but, hark you! take your hand off the writing-board, the master is upon us sooner than we had expected. I am afraid he will thrust all the Catonians into the Catonian Hades. My Gallus, trust me, nothing is better than that portion of your letter, from the place beginning 'times are passing away.' Listen to this as a secret; keep it all to yourself; tell it not even to your freedman Apelles; except us both, not a man speaks in this manner; whether it be well or ill spoken, will be my business; but whatever it is, it is our own."

Cæsar's only answer to these occult libels was a small book, which he called "Anticato." It is a real loss to those who wish to know both sides of the question respecting Cato's character, that neither the Ciceronian "Cato," nor the Cæsarean "Anticato," have come down to our times. Plutarch, who quotes a few expressions from both works, says:—"At present either work has its own admirers," which

probably would be the case, had *we* also, in modern times, an opportunity of criticising them.

But the professing admirers and secret foes of Cæsar were startled by the murder of Marcus Marcellus; who, instead of hurrying home after the senate had extorted his pardon from Cæsar, still lingered in the East. Cicero was very anxious for his return, and succeeded at length in inducing him to direct his course homewards. There can be no doubt that had he returned, and resumed his place in the State, he would have easily occupied the first place among the independent senators, whom Cæsar delighted to honour. Cicero says to him:—
 “I wish you could persuade yourself to do what I am doing. If there is to be any commonwealth you ought to take your share in it as one of our leaders, both in fact and in public estimation, and to yield to the exigencies of the times. But if there is to be no commonwealth, yet Rome is the best place for one exiled from its privileges. If our object be independence, pray what place is not within reach of our present despot? but if it be only a choice of place, what spot ought to be more agreeable than our own home? But, believe me, even he who rules all is favourable to men of talent, and as far as circumstances and his own interests permit him, patronizes all of noble birth and high character.” Unfortunately, however, Marcellus was murdered by one of his own followers, while preparing to cross from Attica into Italy.

The narrative of this sad event is so graphically given by the great lawyer, Sulpicius, the governor of Achæa, that for this and other reasons it is inserted. It is addressed to Cicero:—

“Although I am aware that I am not going to communicate the most agreeable tidings, nevertheless, as chance and nature rule over us, I must do my duty, and acquaint you with the fact, however sad it may be. When, on the twentieth of May, I had crossed over from Epidaurus to the Piræus, I there found our colleague, Marcellus, and there spent the day, for the sake of his society. Next morning, when I had parted

from him, with the intention of visiting Bœotia, and finishing my circuit, he, as he told me, was going to sail round the Peloponnesus into Italy. The day after that, when I was intending to set out from Athens, Publius Postumius, one of the friends of Marcellus, came to me at ten o'clock at night, and told me that our colleague had been after dinner stabbed with a dagger by one of his followers, P. Magius Cilo, and had received two wounds, one in the throat, the other in the head, close to the ear; that my informer hoped, however, that his life might be saved; that Magius had slain himself; that afterwards Marcellus had sent to me, to communicate the fact, and request me to gather medical men. I collected them, and without loss of time set out with the dawn of day. When I was not far from the Piræus, a servant of Acidinius met me with a note, in which intimation was given that Marcellus had expired a short time before the day dawned. Thus a most illustrious man has been cruelly murdered by a worthless creature; and a friend was found who was base enough to kill him, whom even his enemies had spared, on account of his high character. I, however, proceeded to his tent: I found there two freedmen, and a very few slaves; they told me the rest had fled alarmed, because they had allowed their master to be murdered in front of his tent. I was compelled to carry the body back into the city in the same litter in which I had been conveyed, and by my own bearers. There I took care that he should be buried with all the due honours which I could command at Athens. I could not obtain leave from the Athenians to bury him within the walls, which they said could not be done without a violation of their religious feelings; indeed, it was a favour which they never had granted to any one. They allowed us, which was the next favour, to bury him in whichever of their gymnasia I might choose. I, therefore, chose a spot in the grounds of the Academia, the noblest gymnasium in the whole world, and burnt him there. Afterwards I bargained with the Athenians that they should procure a marble monument, to be erected

to him on the same ground. I have, therefore, discharged all the duties which I owed to him, both as a colleague and a near friend, both when he was alive and after his death."

Critics have remarked that this letter is a perfect specimen of what a narration of an event, as known to a man from his own experience, ought to be. It is, however, still more valuable as a proof of the gentle treatment of the Roman provincials under the Julian laws. It is difficult to suppose that this letter was addressed to that Cicero, who, in his persecution of Verres, had proved that under the older system there was no protection either for life or property, even for the much favoured Greeks, against the oppression and injury of a Roman proconsul. We have heard from an old officer, in the East India Company's service, that he was strongly reminded, while perusing this letter, of the manner in which Englishmen deal with their Oriental subjects. Marcellus and his suite, encamping at the Piræus; the Roman proconsul's unwillingness to force any obnoxious duties upon the inhabitants of the city, and his generous sympathy with the religious scruples of the Athenians;—are all, according to him, daily practised in the British dominions in India.

It is painful to add, that the Athenians showed no gratitude to their benefactor; on the contrary, they hailed his murderers with all the honours which they could bestow, and placed their statues in the most sacred of their temples, close to those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton—the Athenian Tyrannicides. They could not have behaved more disgracefully had Demosthenes been alive. When the senate received information of Cæsar's final success, they voted a supplication of fifty days, with the attendant triumph, and perpetual dictatorship, with a decennial consulship. These honours were accompanied by others, which seem to have been intended rather to excite public indignation than to gratify their object. Regarding the Spanish war, as waged, in reality, against the Turdetani and Lusitanians, he scrupled not to triumph over them, and allowed his two lieutenants

also, Fabius Maximus and L. Pedius, to enjoy the same honour. His next care was to provide for the needy citizens, of all classes, with which Rome was still infested: and the extent of the public lands enabled him to do this with facility. Sallust, in the letter which has been already quoted, had principally insisted upon this point: That a great number of new citizens should be admitted, and embodied with the city multitude, and then sent forth to occupy the waste lands in common, and thus to become flourishing colonies. His words are as follows:—"When the new citizens are added, I have strong hopes that all may be roused to a spirit of independence, as one party will be eager to retain their liberty, the other to part with their servitude. I am of opinion that you should head our colonies of citizens thus amalgamated; so we shall have a more efficient military force, and the commonalty, occupied with honest exertions, will cease to be the public evil. I am, however, fully aware, when such a plan shall be proposed, what the rage, what the stormy fury, of the nobility, will be, when, expressing their indignation that all things are thrown into utter confusion; that the sole object of such a measure is to impose the yoke of slavery on the ancient citizens; that, finally, our free state will be changed into a monarchy, should a boundless multitude acquire the franchise by one man's gift. I, for my part, am of opinion, that the man who secures his own interest at the expense of the State is guilty of a great crime. On the other side, if the public advantage should coincide with your own interest, I regard all hesitation in securing it as the result of cowardice and sloth. It was the intention of Marcus Livius Drusus always to act during his tribuneship for the interest of the nobility; nor, at the commencement of his career, did he intend to propose any measure except in concert with them. But the factious nobles, who prided themselves more upon their tricks and cunning wickedness than upon their honour, as soon as they saw that one man was going to bestow a mighty gift upon the multitude, in truth, because, individually, they were conscious of

their bad and treacherous spirit, began to regard Drusus as animated by similar motives. Fearing, therefore, lest, by his great popularity, he might become master of all things, they combined their efforts for his overthrow, and frustrated their own measures. You, therefore, general, must, with the greater care and caution, procure friends and strong supports. It is not difficult for an active man to crush an open enemy. Good men do not love secrecy; they are, for that reason, not sufficiently on their guard against concealed dangers."

This advice was now adopted on a large scale; crowds of citizens, formed of freedmen, old soldiers, and other poverty-stricken members of the community, were bound together by municipal institutions, and sent forth to those parts of Campania which were still undistributed, and colonies were planted at Calatium and Casilinum; at Veii and Volaterra, in Etruria; at Pola, in Istria; at Forum Julii, in Gaul; at Berytus, in Syria. But the two most celebrated were sent to Carthage, in Africa; and Corinth, in Achæa. We know what splendid cities these suddenly became; and we may be certain that the public revenues were ten times improved, and rendered more profitable, than when the sites of these ancient cities were, with their adjacent lands, held as a waste by the tax-farming societies. It is profitable to compare the reality of subsequent facts with the idle dreams of Capuan power, with which Cicero attempted in vain to terrify the imagination of the supporters of the Agrarian law of Rullus. Rome derived nothing but wealth and power from the resuscitated capitals of even the Carthaginian and Achæan empires.

While Cæsar was absent in Spain, his master of the horse, Lepidus, had convoked the Comitia, and created him sole consul. This was his fourth consulship. He resigned it after holding it for a short time, and procured the election of his two lieutenants, Fabius Maximus and Caius Trebonius, for the remainder of the year. He was now perpetual dictator, and still retained Lepidus as master of the horse. For the ensuing year Mark Antony and himself were appointed consuls.

After his return to Rome, Cæsar went to Baïæ to visit

Philippus, who had married Atia, the mother of C. Octavius, his intended heir, and whom he was educating in a manner which was to make him capable of filling his place. He had been his companion during the whole Spanish campaign, and had been sent at its close to Apollonia, which, at the period, could boast of an university of some name. Cicero, who was a near neighbour to Philippus, was compelled to ask the perpetual dictator to dine with him. At the time they were apparently very good friends, for a short time before Cicero had written a letter to him, complimenting him upon the publication of his "Anticato," in answer to his book on the same subject. He thus describes to Atticus his letter on the occasion:—"I forgot to send you at the time a copy of my letter to Cæsar; not, as you may suspect, because I was ashamed to send it to you. Nor, by Jove! did I write otherwise than if I were writing to my own equal in rank. For I think highly of his book, as I told you in person; therefore, I both wrote without flattery, and yet in such a manner that I am sure he will read it with the greatest pleasure."

The following description of the dinner party is worth insertion:—"I expected much annoyance from my guest's visit, but now I am not sorry for it; for things passed away very pleasantly. When, on the second day of the saturnalia, he had reached the house of Philippus, late in the evening, my villa was so filled with soldiers that the dining-room in which Cæsar was to dine next day was with difficulty kept disengaged. For he had with him two thousand men. I was much alarmed as to what was to be done next day, when Barba Cassius came to my aid. He gave me a guard which encamped in the grounds. So my villa became a forbidden spot. On the third day of the saturnalia he staid in the house of Philippus until one o'clock, nor did he admit any visitor. He was, as I guess, dispatching business with Balbus. After that he walked on the sea-shore; at two he bathed; then he heard about Mamurra. His look was unmoved. He anointed himself, and took his place on the dinner-couch. And

so he both ate and drank fearlessly and pleasantly. The banquet was rich, and everything was well served. Nor was that the only thing—the conversation was also well cooked and seasoned; and, if you wish to know, ‘all was good and pleasant.’ Besides that, his high officers were very plentifully feasted in three several rooms, and his less honoured freedmen and slaves had everything they wanted, for the superior attendants were elegantly entertained. Why say more? We made a capital appearance. However, he is not a guest to whom you would say, pray visit me in the same manner on your return; once is quite enough. Our conversation did not take a serious turn. We had plenty of philology. Why ask more? He was delighted, and spent the time pleasantly. He told me he would spend one day at Puteoli and another at Baiæ. I stay a little longer here, and then go to my Tusculan villa. When he was passing Dolabella’s villa the troops drew up on the left and right of his horse. This was not done anywhere else. Nicias told me this.”

But Cicero, and with Cicero the whole party, seemed to have been more disturbed by trifles than by real grievances. The perpetual dictatorship seems to have irritated them less than the fact described in the following letter to Curius in Achæa:—“I now neither encourage nor ask you to return home. I rather am anxious to fly hence, where I shall not hear of the name nor of the deeds of the Pelopidæ. It is incredible how disgraceful I regard my own conduct for being present in such transactions. You seem to have better foreseen what was impending when you fled from Rome. For although the report of such deeds is painful, yet the sight of them is far less endurable. You certainly were not in the Campus Martius when the curule chair of Quintus Maximus, who was called consul by these people, was placed there at eight, after the quæstorian election had commenced, but was removed when his death was announced. The magistrate, however, who had taken the omens for the Comitia Tributa, held them as if they were the Comitia Centuriata, and announced at one o’clock the return of a consul,

who was to last until the first of January, that is, until the next morning. So know this, that in the consulship of Caninius, no one took his morning meal, no crime was committed in the consulship, for he was so wonderfully vigilant that he slept not a wink during the whole time. These things appear to you to be ridiculous, for you were not present. But if you saw them you would weep."

This is all false feeling—straining at gnats, and swallowing camels; nor is it certain that Cicero was himself annoyed by such trifles. At least, the event gave occasion for one of his best jokes. He describes Caninius as complaining to him that he had not called and congratulated him on his new honours, and himself as replying, "I was hurrying so to do, but was overtaken by the night."

The senate did not cease to prescribe new enterprizes to Cæsar, which probably was done at his own suggestion. Temples and theatres, on a gigantic scale, were to be erected. The Pomœrium was to be extended. The Tiber and the Anio, whose united streams often proved destructive to the lower parts of the city, were to be conducted by a new channel into the Mediterranean, a little to the west of Terracina, where a magnificent harbour was to be excavated. As it was a hopeless task to drain the Pontine marshes, it was proposed they should be raised above their natural level by accumulated layers of earthy materials; better roads were to be formed across the Apennines; the superfluous waters of the Fucine Lake were to be drained by a deep tunnel; a canal was to be dug across the Isthmus of Corinth; and other works of great practical value were to be executed. Above all, public libraries were to be built, and books of all kinds were to be collected under the superintendence of the learned Varro, who was to spare no expense, either in the construction of the building, or the collection of the books and manuscripts. A new code of laws was also to be formed.

Cæsar himself, after giving orders for the execution of these works, many of which were afterwards completed by Augustus, and many also remain desirable objects at this

very day, had planned an oriental expedition against the Parthian empire, in which he proposed both to vindicate the honour of the Roman arms, tarnished by the defeat of Crassus, and by acts of repeated aggression of Parthian invaders on the Syrian provinces. He contemplated a partial imitation of Alexander's eastern achievements, and then to march through the Caucasian mountains round the Euxine, and assail his old enemies, the Germans, in their native forests.

His noble friend, Mithridates, now King of the Cimmerian Peninsula, would prove an useful guide and ally in such an expedition. As he anticipated a three years' absence on this extraordinary expedition, he arranged the various magistrates for that period, and seems anxious to see how the newly-constructed machine of government would act during the absence of his own superintending mind. As Antony was now consul, he made young Octavius his master of the horse, and intended to have taken him with him in his oriental campaign. Sixteen legions, with all their attendant equipments, had already crossed from Italy into Greece, when all was interrupted by the foulest crime which ever stained the annals of ancient Rome. "Cæsar (writes Dion Cassius) was thus making due preparations for his expedition against the Parthians, when an inexpiable fury seized upon certain parties, who envied his superiority, and hated him because he was honoured more than they were. They therefore suddenly overthrew all that was established, while yet they claimed for the deed a new name of impious renown. Thus they introduced strife instead of concord, and new civil wars into the Roman world. They boasted, indeed, that they were the destroyers of Cæsar, and the liberators of the community; but the truth is, they plotted against him impiously, and threw the State, which was then well established, into utter confusion. It was impossible for the Roman State, so old as it then was, and which ruled over the best and largest portion of the known world, and which contained so many people of different habits, such great and

various sources of wealth, and so liable, both publicly and privately, to various accidents and changes, to remain peaceable and quiet under a democracy, while, without this spirit of peace and moderation, constant discord must be the inevitable result. So that, if Marcus Brutus and Caius Cassius had reasoned rightly on this point, they would not have slain the president and guardian of the State, nor have inflicted numberless evils, both upon themselves and upon all the human beings of that day. But this was the case, and his death was ascribed to this cause. For the envy with which he was regarded had some cause given by himself. It was not his fault, however, that the senators, after extolling and inflating him with novel and excessive honours, afterwards blamed and calumniated him on this very point, as too readily accepting them, and conducting himself with greater haughtiness on that account. Perhaps Cæsar also erred in accepting some of the honours decreed to him, as if he believed that they were really his due. But their fault was greater, since they, having commenced to honour him as really worthy, imputed to him as a fault the very decrees passed by themselves. For he could not refuse all that was offered, for fear that he might be supposed to despise them, while, on the contrary, by accepting them, he rendered his position more dangerous. For excessive honours and eulogies naturally render even moderate men more arrogant, as they are led to believe that they are really such as their eulogists describe them.

“Now, in addition to the honours before-mentioned, I will enumerate all that were decreed to him, although they were not all passed at the same time. In the first place, it was decreed that he should always wear, even in the city, his triumphal robe; secondly, that he should always sit in a curule chair, except at the public games, for on such occasions he was to view them from the tribunician bench, while sitting along with the tribunes of the people; that he should dedicate in the Temple of Feretrian Jove the “*spolia opima*,” as if he had slain with his own hand a commander-in-chief of the enemies;

that he should be always accompanied by laurelled lictors; that on his return from the Mons Albanus, after celebrating the Latin holidays, he should enter the city with all the honours of an ovation. In addition to these honours, they called him "father of his country," and engraved his face upon the current coins, and decreed that a public sacrifice should be offered on his birth-day, and that a statue should be erected to him in all the temples of the empire; and that, in front of the Rostra, two statues, one crowned with a civic, as if he had saved all the Romans, the other with an obsidional crown, as if he had saved Rome from a state of siege, should be erected in his honour. They also voted that a new temple of Concord, in commemoration of the peace established by him, should be built, and a yearly festival be held in it in his honour. And when he had accepted all these distinctions, they commissioned him to fill up the Pomptine marshes, and to dig a canal through the Corinthian Isthmus, and to build a new senate-house to be called "the Julian." Thus, also, the month in which he was born was also called "the Julian;" and one of the tribes selected by himself was to bear the same epithet. They also made him sole censor for life, and that he should partake in all the privileges attached to the Tribunician office; so that every man who insulted him, either in word or deed, should be declared guilty of sacrilege. They also decreed that his son, whether the legitimate offspring of his own body, or merely adopted by him, should be declared "Pontifex Maximus." And when he seemed pleased with these honours, a golden chariot, and a statue like that of the Roman kings, were decreed to him, and a guard, formed partly of the senatorian, and partly of the equestrian, order. Moreover, that every individual should annually offer up prayers for his safety. They also decreed that an oath, taken in the name of his "Fortune," should be binding on the taker, and that all public acts, authorised by him, should immediately have the force of law; that a quinquennial festival should be celebrated in his honour, as being a demigod; and that a third college, called "the Julian,"

should be added to the ancient fraternity of the Priests of the Lupercalia; and that one of the days set apart for gladiatorial exhibitions should be dedicated to him. And when he was contented to accept those distinctions also, they decreed that his statue, in the golden chariot, crowned with a golden and a jewelled diadem, should be introduced among the images of the gods, which were carried in sacred procession at the Circensian games. Finally, they openly called him the Julian Jove, and voted a temple, dedicated to his equity, to be set apart and consecrated, and that Mark Antony should be, as it were, the Flamen Dialis of the new worship."

This long quotation from Dion is introduced not as being correct in all its assertions, but as giving a fair representation of what he found on either side among the Cæsarian and Pompeian writers of the day. Nothing can be more certain than that a conspiracy had been long before formed, and that most of the offences with which Cæsar was charged after his assassination, originated in circumstances which are all capable of a double interpretation. When in his ovational entrance into Rome, after performing the due sacrifices on the Alban mount, he was saluted as king by a minority, with which the majority did not seem to sympathize, the cry might have been raised by his enemies, and not by his friends. When, on the Lupercal Feast, he thrice refused the diadem proffered to him by Antony, it appears clear to a man who has studied his character, to have been a prepared scene, in which he resolutely disclaimed the obnoxious name of king.

When, finally, he gave, as it is generally supposed, *the* great offence, by refusing to rise from his seat when a deputation from the senate waited on him with a new list of extraordinary honours recently voted to him, and by perhaps ungraciously saying that these same honours ought rather to be retrenched than increased, the motives upon which they were acting were perfectly known to him.

We read that on this memorable occasion his friend the lawyer, Trebatius, reminded him of the presence of the Sena-

torial deputation ; that Balbus, with his oriental predilections, checked the intention to rise, and called upon him to remember that he was Cæsar ; that Balbus was obeyed, and Trebatius repaid with a frown ; and that subsequently some weak friends attempted to account for the supposed insult by hinting at a bodily infirmity from which Cæsar was at the time suffering. But these are idle tales. The conspirators were not moved nor excited by any such trifles. Their "king," with all his odious distinctions, was going to give them a long holiday. A distant and a dangerous campaign against a fierce enemy and a pestilential climate was immediately to be encountered by him. *Three days only* were to elapse, and they were to be delivered from his hateful presence. In all probability he never would have returned to interfere with their own measures, for the very men who murdered him would have had a principal share in the administration of the government for the ensuing three years. According to them, his health was broken, and he was the victim of epilepsy, which seldom spares men until they attain his age. Surely they might have waited for the dart of the Parthian warrior, for the more deadly assaults of an eastern climate, and the numerous chances to which the invader would be exposed during such an enterprise. But they would not wait—they slew him, slew him vindictively to their own destruction, and when the world grows wiser, to their own everlasting infamy.

We have no trustworthy information respecting the principles upon which the conspirators against Cæsar's life acted. It is a mistake to suppose that it originated with the Roman aristocracy. Not a single member of any patrician family is to be found among the list of assassins. Marcus Brutus was a plebeian, so also was the epicurean Caius Cassius, and the young Domitius, a Pompeian, spared and promoted by Cæsar. So were Cæsar's own lieutenants, Decimus Brutus and Caius Trebonius. These are the chiefs, and among them, if we except Brutus, there was not a single man of high mark. Yet these were the men who protested most strongly against

those laws and regulations of Cæsar by which he endeavoured to mould the various parts of the empire into one entire body. He had dared even to make some of the noblest of his Gallic followers members of the Roman senate, and this was the proceeding which, if improved rightly, the conspirators thought might be represented in a light well calculated to make the object of their enmity unpopular. Hence notices were put up at the corners of the streets, warning all persons not to show to the new senators the way to the senate house, and hence the wide-spread witticism that Cæsar, after leading the Gauls in triumph, had ordered them to throw aside their "Braccæ," and assume the senatorial robes.

It is credible that Marcus Brutus, whose legal name was still Quintus Servilius Cæpio Brutus, was the last man who joined the conspiracy planned by Cassius, and patronized without immediate participation by Cicero and his cautious friend Atticus. Hence we are told of inscriptions, probably merely written in chalk upon the prætorian seat of Brutus, of the following kind:—"O Brutus, you are asleep." Again, "You are not a Brutus." At the same time similar pasquinades were inscribed upon the statue of the first Brutus. For example, "Would that you were alive!" Again, "Your descendants are degenerate;" and upon the statue of Cæsar, which was placed in the capitol among the seven kings and their expeller, Brutus, "Brutus, because he expelled the kings, was made the first consul. This man, because he expelled the consuls, was at the end of all made king." These were sorry incitements, but they seem to have prevailed, and Brutus became a leading conspirator.

It would be useless to copy the various and conflicting accounts of the events immediately preceding and attendant upon the actual scene of butchery. It is recorded that Cæsar had many warnings of the intended treason, but that he refused to listen to any pretended discoveries. He was a man of strong mind and clear intellect, and well knew that his life was the only link which bound the discordant members

of the commonwealth in social union; that his death would snap that link asunder, and bring all parties into violent collision. He therefore does not seem to have anticipated an act which would necessarily bring destruction upon its perpetrators. Like many able men, who knew beforehand what the interest of their opponents really is, he thought *they*, possessing the same knowledge, would avoid acting in direct opposition to it,—a very common political mistake.

The senate, on the Ides of March, was to be held in the Pompeian Curia. Cæsar had not only pardoned all opponents, but had passed an act of real amnesty, by which all political offences were remitted, and all the clients and children of his enemies were, upon their submission, welcomed home to their privileges and properties. In proof of this, the statues of Sylla and Pompey were replaced in front of the rostra, and this senate house was adorned with a magnificent statue of its founder.

We must believe that some events had occurred to make Cæsar unwilling to attend the senate on that day—perhaps Calpurnia's dreams, perhaps some undefined anticipation of impending evil, or even a remembrance that he had been warned to beware of the Ides of March. It is said that Decimus Brutus overpowered these scruples, and led his friend and patron like an ox to the slaughter-house.

But we look in vain for any confirmation of such circumstances in the correspondence of the immediate actors in the tragedy of the day.

We know that Trebonius prevented Mark Antony from immediately accompanying his colleague into the house; that Cæsar entered, took his seat, and was immediately surrounded by the conspirators, sixty in number, pressed upon, and stabbed to death. He received three and twenty wounds, of which one alone was fatal. There can be no doubt, for all present must have seen the act, that as soon as he discovered the intentions of his numerous assassins, he drew his robe around his head, and permitted them to exercise their ven-

geance without resistance. From a phrase used by Cicero in one of his letters, it has been supposed, and not without good reason, that Brutus was the first that wounded Cæsar. If that is the truth, we can hardly accept as trustworthy the tradition that his attack was late, and that it extorted from Cæsar the pathetic exclamation of "Thou also, my child!" In fact, as Cæsar, as first consul, had taken the seat of honour, Brutus, as first prætor, would necessarily be sitting immediately on his right, when the more ignoble conspirators, the two Cascæ and Tillius Cimber, were pressing upon their victim from the front. When the foremost man in all the world was thus struck down by ignoble hands, when the greatest and loftiest spirit which the heathen world ever produced was suddenly severed from its mortal abode, when a light was extinguished than which a more salutary beacon had never shone upon the nations of the Roman world, what was the conduct of the senators, of whom some five or six hundred at least were assembled? They were stunned by the suddenness of the blow, and were paralyzed. Mark Antony, the other consul, was not present, and the magistrate next in rank, Marcus Brutus, the first prætor, was seen with a reeking dagger, calling upon the first consular, Marcus Cicero, to laud that bloody deed, to the perpetration of which he had often encouraged his younger disciples, although they had not on the present occasion admitted him into their secret councils. They knew that he would be more valuable as an accessory after the act than as an actual participator in the murder. Perhaps the best and most accurate description of the brutal transaction is to be found in Cicero's book, "De Divinatione," where he thus writes:—"What do we think of Cæsar, had he foreseen that, among those very senators who had been principally chosen by himself, in the very Pompeian curia, before the statue of Pompey himself, while such a number of his own centurions were looking on, he should have been slain without mercy by the noblest of his fellow-citizens, who had many of them been honoured by himself

with the highest offices, and should lie so neglected, that no one, not only of his friends, but not even of his slaves, dared to approach his dead body!"

Later in the day some were found bold enough to raise the body, place it in a litter, and convey it, with one arm dangling over its side, to his own home and to his widowed Calpurnia.

In the meantime the conspirators had rushed forth into the public streets, with their bloody daggers in their right, and their gown wrapped round their left hands, proclaiming their act, and announcing it as the commencement of Roman liberty. But their call found no response in the hearts of the citizens. The general cry was "Fly! fly! shut up your houses!" and the self-styled liberators were glad, before nightfall, to take refuge in the Capitol, into which the city prætor could easily obtain admittance.

But although Cæsar had dismissed his guards, in spite of the protestations of his trusty friends, Hirtius and Pansa, and had remained in the city without a single military attendant, yet there was a force at the gate; for his friend, Æmilius Lepidus, who, with a strong army, was to occupy Eastern Spain during Cæsar's absence, had not yet set out for his province.

He, therefore, when informed of the murder and subsequent proceedings, scrupled not to enter the city at the head of his troops, and took military possession of the Forum and adjacent buildings. There he was soon joined by Mark Antony and others. The two parties then communicated with each other through mutual friends, which was not difficult, as they were closely connected, seeing Lepidus had married one, and Cassius another, sister of Marcus Brutus, while their mother, Servilia, had great influence with the Cæsarean party, both before and after their great leader's death.

An agreement was concluded, that the senate should be convoked by Mark Antony, and called upon to mediate between the two parties. Next day, accordingly, the senate was convoked in the Temple of Tellus, and Cicero proposed

that an act of indemnity should be passed, absolving from legal guilt all who, during Cæsar's supremacy, had gone beyond the verge of the law, and that all honorary offices and free gifts conferred by him should be secured to the present possessors.

The senators, of whom the great majority were Cæsareans, allowed themselves to be persuaded, and voted the amnesty. The conspirators, in the meantime, who dreaded the vengeance of the soldiers, took active measures to secure their good will. They summoned some of their leaders, as well as a body of citizens, to the foot of the stairs leading to the capitol, whence Brutus addressed them in a popular strain, and especially promised that no gift or privilege bestowed by Cæsar on the soldiers should be taken from them. Letters were also sent down to the leading officers in the Forum, in which the conspirators bound themselves by similar promises, and expressed their willingness to take a solemn oath not to interfere with the laws and acts of Cæsar.

The next question was, what was to be done with Cæsar's body; as a traitor to his country, and justly slain, he ought to have been dragged through the streets, and cast into the Tiber; as a great legislator, whose laws were to be binding on all the citizens, no honours could be too great for him. We know that the case was warmly discussed, and that even Titus Pomponius Atticus warned his friends, the conspirators, that it would be a fatal step to allow him to be buried with the usual honours. But they could not prevent it. The whole power was vested in Antony and Lepidus, who, therefore, prepared to bury him magnificently. A funeral pile was constructed in the Campus Martius; and the body was conveyed on a superb bier, and deposited before the rostra, whence Mark Antony delivered his funeral oration, of which Dion Cassius has invented the following peroration, which might have been truly spoken:—

“To serve the gods, he was appointed chief priest; to serve you, consul; to lead the soldiers, imperator; to wage war

against your enemies, dictator. But why should I enumerate his titles? to pass over all others, you not long ago saluted him as the father of his country.

“But this father, this chief priest, this sacro-sanct magistrate, this hero, this demigod, is dead. Alas! he is dead! Not by the violence of disease; not by the wasting effects of old age; not by wounds on the battle-field, nor by any sudden intervention; but *here*, by treason, within the walls of Rome. He who had sailed in safety to Britain against open enemies; he, who had enlarged its boundaries, was treacherously way-laid in this very city. He was assassinated in the senate-house, although he had himself built another. Skilful warrior as he was, he fell unarmed and unprotected; peace-maker, judge, as he was, they slew him at his own tribunal;—the chief magistrate, while exercising his official duties. He, whom no enemy could slay, even when he had plunged beneath their darts into the sea, was slain by his own fellow-citizens; by the very companions to whom he had repeatedly shown mercy. What availed thee, O Cæsar! thy love to mankind? What availed the sacredness of thy person? What availed the sacredness of the laws? You, indeed, passed many laws to prevent any man from slaying his enemy; yet *you* have been mercilessly slain by your friends, and lie a slaughtered corpse in that forum, through which you, crowned with laurel, have so often advanced in triumph. Pierced with wounds, you lie stretched before those rostra from which you have so often addressed the people. Alas! for your blood-stained hoary hair. Alas, for your triumphal robe, thus rent and torn, which, as it seems, was decreed to you for this sole purpose, that in it you might be stabbed!”

The best and most accurate description of what was transacted during the days immediately following Cæsar's death, seems embodied in the following quotation from Suetonius:—

“There were some among the conspirators who intended to cast his body into the Tiber, to confiscate his property, and rescind all his acts, but they ceased from their attempts,

because they were afraid of the consul Antonius, and Lepidus, the master of the horse. Therefore, at the desire of Lucius Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law, his will was opened, and read in Mark Antony's house. He had made it in his own Lavican villa, on the fifth of the preceding September, and had deposited it with the eldest of the vestal virgins. Q. Tubero writes, that from the time of the first consulship to the commencement of the civil war, he had always introduced Pompey's name, and mentioned this publicly to his soldiers. But in this, his last will, he had made the grandchildren of his sisters his heirs, three-fourths of the whole inheritance to C. Octavius, and one-fourth between Lucius Pinarius and Q. Pedius; all others named had only legacies left to them. C. Octavius was also adopted as his son, and desired to take the family name. Many of his assassins were named among the guardians of his sons, should any be born to him. D. Brutus was even pronounced his heir, should the first-named not survive him. He left to the people his gardens on the banks of the Tiber, and a specific sum (perhaps seventy-five denarii) to each citizen. When the day of his funeral had been publicly announced, a pile was raised to him near his daughter Julia's tomb and in front of the rostra; and on it a shrine, gold-gilt, being a model of the Temple of Venus Genetrix, was placed, and within it an ivory couch, dressed up with gold and purple coverlets. At his head was a trophy, with the robe in which he had been slain. Those who were hurrying with their funeral offerings, as the day did not seem long enough for their orderly reception, were told to carry them to the Campus Martius along the streets which suited them best. At the theatrical representations, by which the funeral obsequies were celebrated, several passages from the tragedy of 'Pacuvius,' called the 'disputed arms' (of Achilles) were loudly repeated, both to excite public sympathy and detestation of the murder. For example, the following line:—

' That I should have saved men to become my destroyer.'

And other passages having the same tendency, from the

'Electra,' of Accius. Instead of a funeral oration, Antony ordered a herald to recite, with a loud voice, the decrees by which the Senate had loaded him with all honours, human and divine; also the oath by which all had bound themselves to defend his life and safety. To these proclamations he added but a few words of his own. His bier was carried into the forum, and placed before the rostra, by the actual magistrates and those who had borne high offices; and when some were proposing to burn his body in the shrine of Jupiter, in the capitol, others, in the Pompeian senate-house, suddenly two men, with swords by their sides, and each bearing two javelins, set fire to the bier with blazing wax torches. Immediately the crowd of bystanders threw into the flame dry faggots, the benches of the judges, together with the seats of the jurymen and pleaders, and whatever people had brought as funeral gifts; then the musicians and other actors tore off and threw in their theatrical robes and ornaments with which they were dressed for the occasion; thus, also, the veteran legionaries sacrificed the arms, adorned with which they had attended the funeral; the great majority of the matrons, also, parted in the same cause with their own ornaments, and heaped upon the pile the purple-fringed dress and decorations of their young sons. While the whole state was thus expressing its extreme sorrow, foreign nations also formed themselves into circles of their own, and mourned, according to the fashion of their people, especially the Jews, who kept up a continuous succession of mourners, both by day and night, round the spot, on which he was burned. The populace rushed immediately from the funeral, torch in hand, to the houses of Brutus and Cassius, and having been repulsed with difficulty, met in their return Helvius Cinna, and, having mistaken him for Cornelius Cinna, who the day before had delivered a bitter speech against Cæsar, slew him on the spot, and, placing his head on the point of a spear, carried it round the city. Afterwards the same people raised in the forum a solid pillar of Numidian marble, full twenty feet high, and inscribed it to

the father of his country, and for a long time persisted in sacrificing before it, and binding themselves by vows, and deciding litigated questions by allowing the whole case in dispute to be settled by an oath taken in Cæsar's name."

The history of the Roman empire, between the murder of Cæsar and the battle of Actium, furnishes the best illustration of the wisdom and sagacity, of the merciful and catholic policy of the great Julius, and of the folly, incapacity, and vindictive cruelty, both of his assassins and their immediate opponents, who were alike destroyed by their own infatuation, amidst the overwhelming ruins of the ancient republic.

No attempt will be made to draw an elaborate character of Julius Cæsar. The facts of his life have been carefully placed before the reader, and as full an account as could be extracted from ancient writers of the various lights in which these facts were viewed by his own contemporaries. It is by studying these in close connexion, and contrasting them with the actions and maxims of modern politicians, that the readers of history can derive the most instructive lessons.

Cæsar's life, actions, and principles, seem full both of suggestive guidance and serious warnings to all the nations of the civilized world; but the lessons, both positive and negative, should be gradually derived from the furnished materials, not dogmatically prescribed by him who has accumulated them.

A Life of Antony, written on the same principles as this biography of Cæsar, will serve to complete the picture, and display a strong contrast between a rash innovator in power, and a cautious reformer, who never despairs and thinks a crisis can never arise in the history of a nation in which men

"Can neither bear the evils, nor yet their remedies."

It is impossible, within the limits prescribed to this slight work, to enter into the details of that elaborate system of intrigue by which the Cæsareans were brought into fierce collision with each other. That will demand another volume, which may be properly inscribed the Life of C. Cæsar Octavius

Augustus, whose history has never been hitherto adequately attempted.

In the meantime it will be useful to show, from cotemporary evidence, the false position, and the inextricable difficulties in which the great crime had involved the conspirators and their admirers.

The friends of the house of Cæsar, when their chief was slain, and who stood by the name and cause when deserted not only by men like Decimus Brutus, C. Trebonius, and Sergius Galba, who, from friends and partizans, had become deadly enemies, but by Mark Antony and his two brothers, Caius and Lucius; by Lepidus and Dolabella; by Asinius Pollio and Munatius Plancus;—were all, with the exception of Hirtius and Pansa, neither of them high men, persons not city Romans, but faithful to Cæsar's cause and Cæsar's name. These were Balbus, Matius, Oppius, and Mæcenas, a son of the secretary of Sertorius, all civilians; and Salvidienus, Egnatuleius, Ventidius, all military men of the social states, of whom Ventidius had even been led in triumph by the father of Pompey the Great, and who lived to be honoured himself with a triumph. To this list may be added Vipsanius Agrippa, whose appearance on the stage is, however, of a later date.

One of the first intimations of the feeling of this band of trusty adherents, is in a letter addressed by Cicero to Atticus, written not long after the Ides of March: "I called upon him (Matius) whom I this morning mentioned; nothing can be more desperate. He says that our difficulties never can be surmounted. For if Cæsar, with his splendid genius, failed to settle matters, who will now settle them? Why do you ask? He repeatedly said that all was ruined, and I do not know but that he is right. I say it with sorrow, but he with joy, and said that in less than twenty days there would be a Gallic insurrection. He said that he had not conversed seriously with any one since the Ides of March, except with Lepidus. On the whole, he said that things cannot end as they are. O cautious Oppius, who, although he equally regrets Cæsar's

death, gives no offence to any man." Again, speaking of Balbus, he writes—"O ye good gods, how easily you can see that he is afraid of peace; and you know the man, how close he is; nevertheless, he told me Antony's plans, that he went round to visit the veterans, asking them to confirm the acts of Cæsar, and to induce them to swear that they would do so, so as to ratify them all, and that they should appoint two commissioners monthly to look after them. Balbus complained also of his own unpopularity with us, but still his whole discourse seemed to show a predilection for Antony. Why do you ask? There is nothing sincere about him. I am certain the business will end in war. Cæsar's death was a manly act, but all the subsequent measures childish. For who did not see that an heir* to the sovereignty was left, and what was more absurd, than to dread the one, and not to fear the other. Nay, more, there are plenty of gross inconsistencies in the present time. What, for example, can be more so than that the Tyrannicide's mother (Servilia) holds the Neapolitan estate of Pontius?" (Aquila, one of the conspirators.) Again, writing concerning Hirtius, he says—"I am very anxious, before I visit Rome, to discover carefully what the result is likely to be, although I fear my conjectures are likely to be too true. For their intended measures are not obscurely foreshown. Now my disciple (Hirtius), who dines with me to-day, loves affectionately him whom Brutus wounded, and, if you ask, I clearly see it they are afraid of peace. For they have laid down this as a principle, and declare it, that by the death of the most illustrious of men, the whole commonwealth has been thrown into utter confusion; that all his measures will be annulled as soon as our party shall cease to be afraid; that his clemency proved his bane, which, if he had not practised, no misfortune could have happened to him.

Not long after, Cicero, merely from selfish reasons, for he had before expressed his feelings of joy, in witnessing the murder of Cæsar, seems rather inclined to regret the event. For

* Cicero indicates by the word "heir," Antony. At this time he utterly overlooked the young Octavius.

writing to Atticus, he thus expresses himself: "You may judge of me as you like—as I hope, most favourably,—but if things remain as they are, which to all appearances they will, I am not pleased with the Ides of March. For Cæsar would never have returned. Fear could not have compelled us to confirm all his acts, even otherwise. . . . I was so influential with him (yet may the gods destroy him, dead as he is), that at my age, if I am not to live without a master after his death, he was not the master from whom I ought to have run away. Trust me, I blush at the words, but as they are written, I will not blot them out."

The state to which the conspirators were reduced is thus graphically depicted in another letter to Atticus: "The two Prætors were bound by their duties to be present in the city, but their lives were not safe. They had therefore requested Antony to give them leave of absence. This he finally consented to do, by appointing them the commissioners for supplying Rome with provisions. Brutus was delighted at my arrival. He then, in the presence of Servilia, Tertulla (the wife of Cassius), Porcia, and Favonius, asked what was to be done. I was persuading him, as I had made up my mind on the road, to accept the Asiatic superintendence of the corn supplies, stating that the only object at which we could now aim was the preservation of their lives,—that the safety of the commonwealth depended upon that. But before I finished, in came Cassius. I repeated all that I had said. Upon this, Cassius, with a resolute look,—you would say that he breathed the spirit of Mars,—said that he would not go to Sicily. 'Shall I,' said he, 'accept as a favour what is intended as an insult?' 'What will you do, then?' said I. He answered he would go into Achæa. 'And you, Brutus?' said I, again. 'I will go to Rome, if you think it advisable.' 'Not at all,' I replied, 'for you will not be safe there.' 'Would you approve of such a step,' added he, "if it were feasible?" 'Undoubtedly,' said I; 'nay, more, I would not have you in such a case go

into any province, either now or at the close of your Prætorship. But I cannot advise you to trust yourself to the city.' I then mentioned all the reasons which had occurred to you why such a step would not be safe. They then began to complain in many words, especially Cassius, that opportunities had been lost. He then uttered heavy complaints against Decimus. I, while reminding him that it was useless to complain of the past, nevertheless agreed with him. And when I began to explain what ought to have been done, there was nothing new in my words but what all men daily say, and was not yet touching upon this point; that any body else ought to have suffered; but was undertaking to prove that the senate ought to have been convoked, the people, burning with zeal, to have been violently roused; nay, the whole community. Your fair friend (Servilia) suddenly exclaimed, 'I never heard any one recommending any such proceedings.' So I restrained myself. Cassius appeared to me to wish to go. For Servilia promised that she would take care to have the commission for managing the supply of corn struck out of the decree of the senate. And our friend Brutus soon gave up his idle talk. For he said he was willing to go. He therefore agreed that the games should be celebrated in his name, although absent. He seemed to me to wish to set out from Antium for Asia. Why say more; nothing during the whole visit gave me any pleasure except my own conscience. For it was not to be allowed that he should leave Italy without our meeting with the exception of this proof of my love and duty; it followed that I said to myself—

"Well, soothsayer, what now avails my journey hither? I found the vessel with all her timbers loose, or rather scattered. Nothing has been wisely, nothing rationally, nothing orderly done."

But the shipwreck was not yet complete: better hopes dawned upon the desponding conspirators and their friend. Sextus Pompeius reappeared in Spain, gathered together a

considerable force, became master of Carthagera, and assumed a formidable appearance.

In Syria, one Cæcilius Bassus slew the governor, Sextus Cæsar, at Apamea, and became the actual leader of the legions of the province. The mass of the soldiers was formed from the Pompeians of Pharsalia, and consequently favourable to the cause.

Above all, Antony's unjust treatment of young Octavius produced a schism among the Cæsareans themselves, which was attended with most disastrous consequences. On hearing of his great relative's death, Octavius quitted Apollonia, and refusing the proffered services of some of the finest legions of the veteran Cæsareans, crossed into Italy, and boldly, in spite of all remonstrances, claimed the inheritance and name of Cæsar. When he had in vain, by conciliatory means, attempted to induce Mark Antony to deal justly with him, he appealed, and not in vain, to the veterans of Campania, who willingly rallied around his name and standard, and promised him their aid.

Circumstances favoured his boldness. Antony, who knew that the armed Governor of Cisalpine Gaul was the real master of southern Italy, had become dissatisfied with the province of Macedonia, and induced the people to pass a law allowing him to exchange the latter for the former province. But as Decimus Brutus was the actual possessor of Cisalpine Gaul, he required a strong force to enable him to gain possession. Hence he ordered four of the veteran legions to cross over from Dyrrachium to Brundisium; there he met them. But disputes arose; the cause is not stated: it ended in his putting to death many of their leading centurions. Young Cæsar found access to them, and two of the legions abandoned the consul, and ranged themselves with his opponents. These had soon the advantage of being the more legitimate party, for Hirtius and Pansa, the ensuing consuls, made common cause with young Cæsar. Antony marched with his detachment of veterans into Cisalpine Gaul, and there laid siege to

Mutina, into which Decimus Brutus had thrown himself with a strong detachment of troops. Cicero, with an activity inspired by hatred of Antony, whom he regarded as a disease, not as a symptom, urged the senate to vote Antony an enemy, and to commission the two consuls and Cæsar to exterminate him and his adherents. But blood had been already shed. Dolabella had set out to take possession of his province, Syria; but touching at Ephesus, he found there Caius Trebonius, whom he treacherously seized and put to an ignominious and painful death. There can be no doubt that there was a secret paction between the leading officers of both the separated legionary parties, that Cæsar's death was to be avenged, and that none of his murderers were to be spared. There are almost proofs that Antony at first did not contemplate such a necessity; but Cæsar's name and Cæsar's blood were elements which, when invoked, could not be controlled by him, or all the other lieutenants of their great chief, if united in one camp.

The following letters will give the modern reader a very adequate idea of the actions and motives of the leading parties in the closing struggle. The first is from Matius to Cicero, written when Cicero's star was in the ascendant and that of Antony on the wane. After the introductory sentences, the excellent Matius thus proceeds:—"I will answer the charges against which you have so often pleaded in my defence, as was in consistence with your singular goodness and regard for me. I am myself well acquainted with all the accusations brought against me since Cæsar's death. I am blamed because I bitterly lament the death of one so closely connected with me, and feel indignant that he has perished; for they tell me that country is to be preferred to friendship; just as if they had already proved that his death was useful to the commonwealth. But I am not going to argue the question. I confess I have not yet arrived at that pitch of wisdom. It was not Cæsar, whom I followed in the civil war, but, although troubled by the event, I did not abandon

my friend. I was far from approving of the civil war or of the origin of the dissension. On the contrary, I earnestly attempted to smother it at the commencement, and so, when my intimate friend was victorious, neither high office nor riches had any charms for me. Others, however, who had far less influence with him than I had, shamefully abused his generosity. Besides that, my own property was seriously diminished by Cæsar's law for settling the disputes between debtors and creditors, while most of those who are rejoicing in Cæsar's death owe to that alone their present status as Roman citizens. I laboured as hard to secure pardon for the conquered as I would have done for my own preservation. How, therefore, am I not to feel indignant that he has perished, who, at my intercession, showed favour to so many? Especially when the very same men who, by abusing his confidence, rendered him unpopular, were also his slayers. You shall, then, be punished, they say, if you dare to blame our deed—an unprecedented insolence. Some, then, are allowed to glory in that same deed, others not even to grieve with impunity. But surely even slaves have always been freely allowed to fear, rejoice, and grieve, according to their own feelings, without requesting the permission of others, and yet these would-be assertors of liberty attempt to extort from us by terror this our common right. But they will not succeed. I will never swerve from the path prescribed to me both by duty and the natural feelings of a man, on account of any terrors with which they can threaten me. My own belief is that we never ought to shrink from, that sometimes we ought to court, an honourable death. But why are they angry with me, seeing I only wish that they should be sorry for their deed; for I am anxious that Cæsar's death should be bitterly regretted by all. But you will say that, as a good citizen, I ought to wish the salvation of the commonwealth. Unless my past life and future hopes, even without any words on my part, prove this, I am not anxious to demonstrate it by arguments. I therefore especially beseech you to

take this for a real truth, and to believe that, as you must feel that it is my interest that all should be well, I can have no communion with bad citizens. . . . But I must meet another objection. I was the superintendent of the games which young Cæsar celebrated in honour of the elder Cæsar's victory; but that was a private act, and had no connexion with the state. Yet, were that not the case, it was my duty to have shown this respect to the memory of my greatest friend, although he was dead. Indeed, when requested so to do by my young friend, from whom we hope great things, and who is so worthy of Cæsar, I could not refuse. Another charge is, that I often visited Antony, and paid my respects to him. But, on inquiry, you will find that the very men who accuse me for lack of patriotism, used to crowd his house for the sake of gaining favours by humble petition or threatening demand. But what means this arrogance? Cæsar himself never interfered to prevent me from keeping up my intercourse with all whom I might choose, and even with those whom he did not love. Are the very men who deprived me of my friend to attempt by slanders to prevent me from selecting my own acquaintance? But I have no fears that the moderation of my whole life will not prove a sufficient answer against all calumnies, nor that those who love me not on account of my steady attachment to Cæsar, would not prefer me as a friend to persons like themselves."

The next letter is from Cicero to C. Cassius, written at a time when Mark Antony had despaired of making common cause, with safety to himself, with any of the conspirators, and determined upon ceasing from all friendly communications with them.

"Your friend," writes Cicero, "becomes daily more mad. First of all, he has inscribed upon Cæsar's statue, which he had placed before the rostra, the following words: 'to our most deserving father;' so that *you* are pronounced to be not only murderers, but parricides. But why do I say *you*? It is rather we that are so proclaimed; for he, in his ph

that I was the leader in your most glorious act. I wish I had been. Antony would not then be troublesome to us. But that is your consideration. But as that opportunity was lost, I wish I knew what advice to give you. I do not know what I am to do, even in my own case. For what can be done against violence without a counterbalancing force? They have evidently adopted the resolution to avenge Cæsar's death. Therefore, on the seventh of October, when the tribune Canutius had introduced him to the assembly, Antony indeed made a wretched appearance; yet he applied terms to the saviours of their country which could be properly applied only to traitors. With respect to myself, he said, without hesitation, that all which you had done and Canutius was doing, was at my instigation."

But, in spite of his conviction that the Cæsareans had already determined upon avenging Cæsar's death, Cicero ceased not to hope that young Cæsar, who had no place or status except as his adopted father's representative and consequent avenger, might be so managed as to become a tool in his hand for crushing Antony and giving time to Brutus and Cassius to return to Italy with a force strong enough to overpower the Cæsareans, weakened by their own dissensions. In one of the last letters addressed to that most cautious and covetous of men, he thus writes to Atticus:—

"I return to politics. I have often, by Jove! been pleased with your judicious speculations in that department. But nothing can be better than your last letter, especially the passage, 'For although we may fear for the consequences, yet, for the present, that young boy beautifully baffles Antony; nevertheless, we ought to look out for the result.' It is quite true. For what a speech to the people he made. It was sent to me. He thus solemnly prays: 'So may I be allowed to attain to the same honours as my father,' and then he pointed with his hand to Cæsar's statue. May I not even be saved, at least by such a character. But as you write, I see that the tribuneship of my friend Casca will decide all my difficulty.

On this point I told Oppius himself, when he was exhorting me to undertake the whole cause of the young man, and patronize the veterans, that I could by no means do so, unless it was made manifest to me that Cæsar will prove to be not only not an enemy, but even a friend to the tyrannicides; when he said that he would be so. Why hurry, then? said I; for Cæsar has no need of my assistance until the first of January. But I shall test his intentions in the case of Casca before the fifth of December."

Casca, one of the conspirators, would, if permitted, have entered on the office of tribune of the people on the fifth of December. But he did not, nor was it safe for him. Octavius, most likely, if an appeal was made to him, would say that he had not the power to protect him. Casca seems to have remonstrated with Cicero, and to have irritated him, as we learn from a letter of Brutus, that the slayer of Lentulus and his fellow sufferers had called the slayer of Cæsar a murderer. The test was therefore disregarded, and their common enmity to Antony was looked upon as a tie sufficiently binding for the time upon Cicero and young Cæsar. It was, however, only a hollow truce, as is well proved by Antony in the following letter to Hirtius and Cæsar, who were proceeding to wage war against him. Hirtius sent a copy of it to Cicero, who read it in the senate, with a running commentary of his own at the end of every sentence. This commentary is omitted.

"Antony to Hirtius and Cæsar." "When I heard of the death of Trebonius, I did not rejoice more than I was pained. I had occasion to rejoice that the guilty wretch had paid the proper penalty to the manes and ashes of the most illustrious of men, and that the providence of the gods had been manifested before the year had rolled round, by the signal punishment of the parricide. I deeply lamented, on the other hand, that Dolabella has, at this critical time, been declared a public enemy because he slew a murderer, and that the son of a buffoon seems more dear to the Roman people than Caius

Cæsar, the father of his country. But most bitter of all is it, Aulus Hirtius, that you, loaded with Cæsar's favours, and left by him in such a state, that you wonder at your own elevation, and you, young boy, who owe everything to his name, should join in procuring the legal condemnation of Dolabella, and in delivering this poisoning hag from a state of siege; and is not this all done that Brutus and Cassius may be as powerful as possible? Surely you regard present affairs in the same spirit, with which you call Pompey's former camp the senate. You have chosen the vanquished Cicero for your leader; you supply Macedonia with strong armies; you have entrusted Africa to the twice-captured Varus; you have sent Cassius into Syria; you have permitted Casca to act as tribune; you have taken from the Luperci the Julian revenues; you have abolished colonies of veterans, already sent forth according to law and the acts of the senate; you promise to restore to the Massilians what was taken from them by the law of war. Are you not aware that, by the Hirtian law, no Pompeian can hold any office? You supplied Brutus with the money collected by Apuleius; you approved of the decapitation of Pætus and Menedemus, foreign friends of Cæsar, and presented by him with the franchise; you compelled Theopompus, stripped of his property and expelled by Trebonius, to fly for refuge to Alexandria; you see in your camp Sergius Galba, armed with the same dagger with which he slew Cæsar; you gathered together soldiers, either mine or discharged veterans, as if for the destruction of those who slew Cæsar, and have excited the same, scarcely conscious of the act, to endanger the lives of their quæstor, general, and comrades. Finally, what have you not either approved of or done? What more would Pompey himself do, were he once more living? or his son, if permitted to live at Rome? Finally, you tell me there shall be no peace, unless I either allow Brutus to escape or supply him with provisions. What! is this agreeable to those veterans, whose privileges are as yet untouched, since you visited them with

your flatteries and poisoned gifts? But you say your object is to relieve the soldiers besieged by me. I am willing to spare them and permit them to withdraw whither you may please to send them, that is, if they permit him who deserves it to suffer death. You write that peace was proposed in the senate, and that five consulars were to come as delegates to me. It is difficult to imagine that the men who drove me to extremities, while offering the fairest conditions and still intending to remit some of my demands, will act with either moderation or humanity. Indeed, it is scarcely probable that the same persons who have decreed Dolabella a public enemy for his most righteous act, should spare me while entertaining similar sentiments. Consider well, therefore, whether it is the more eligible course and the most advantageous to the party, to avenge the death of Trebonius rather than of Cæsar, and whether it is more expedient that we should engage in battle, that the Pompeian cause, so often put down with the sword, may the more easily revive, or that we should come to a common understanding in order that we may not become the laughing-stock of our enemies. Who will be the gainers, whichever of us may be defeated? Hitherto Fortune herself has avoided the sad sight of two armies belonging to the same body, yet combating like gladiators at the command of Cicero, their trainer, who is still so fortunate in deceiving you with the same honours by which he boasts Cæsar himself was deceived. I have determined not to submit to any injurious treatment offered to myself, and to protect my friends from the same, and never will abandon that party which Pompey hated, nor will I permit the veterans to be dislodged from their lands, nor to be dragged singly to punishment, nor to violate the pledge which I gave to Dolabella, nor break my faith with Lepidus, who is moved by the strongest sense of duty not to betray Plancus, who participates in all our plans. Should the immortal gods (as I hope they will) aid me, advancing on my path with right feeling, I shall be most happy to live; but if another fate

awaits me, I enjoy beforehand your certain punishment; for if the Pompeians, when vanquished, are so insolent, you, rather than I, will have to know by experience what kind of conquerors they are likely to prove. Finally, I have come to this conclusion that I might endure the injuries inflicted on myself and friends, should the authors of them be either willing to forget that they had inflicted them, or be ready to avenge along with us the death of Cæsar. I do not believe that the ambassadors are coming whither the war is now going. When they come I will consider their demands."

In spite of the bitter truths contained in this powerful and ably drawn up remonstrance, Cæsar and the two consuls persisted in waging war against Antony, and a desperate war it was—fought between the choice veterans of Cæsar's army, men inured to war, conscious of their skill and valour, while each legion, jealous of its hard won honours, fought as fiercely against the soldiers of another number as if they were Cimbrians or Parthians. Three bloody battles were fought, one in which Pansa was defeated by Antony, and mortally wounded; a second, in which Hirtius, with a great loss on his own part, inflicted a still greater upon Antony, whom he drove into his camp; a third, in which Antony's camp was simultaneously attacked by Hirtius from without and by Decimus Brutus from within the besieged town. Hirtius was successful, but fell in the very act of forcing his way within the hostile ramparts. Antony fled, but his veterans did not disperse: they still crowded around him, and when they reached the fords of the Po, at a place called Vada Sabbata, not far from the modern Alexandria, they were joined by the prætor Ventidius, who brought from Etruria the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions to his aid.

He was not pursued. Brutus, with whom Cæsar refused to communicate, could not; Cæsar, probably, would not; perhaps, he also could not: for the veterans, after the excitement of the conflict was over, and they had to examine their fallen opponents, and to converse with the captured and the

wounded, must have discovered the nature of the suicidal struggle in which they had been engaged.

In the following letter, written by Asinius Pollio, governor of Western Spain, and addressed to Cicero, we have the real truth respecting this sanguinary contest, of which the particulars seem, after the reconciliation of the Cæsarean leaders, to have been studiously buried in silence. Pollio writes thus:—"I did not receive at an earlier period an account of the battles fought at Mutina, because Lepidus detained my messengers for nine days. But it was desirable, especially for those who can neither prevent nor remedy the evil, to be as long as possible ignorant of this terrible calamity of the commonwealth. I wish you had ordered me also to come into Italy by the same decree of the Senate by which you summoned Plancus and Lepidus. Had this been the case, the state would not have suffered this severe blow; and if, for the moment, any persons are pleased with the result, because both the leaders and the veterans of the Cæsarean party appear to have utterly perished, yet even such people must necessarily grieve when they look upon the desolation of Italy; for both the strength and promise of the soldiers have perished, if what is reported is only partially true..... So both parties hastened to engage, as if they feared nothing more than lest peace should be made without the most serious loss to the commonwealth. But if it was his duty to hurry, I see that Hirtius acted like a consummate general; for I receive written communications from that part of Gaul occupied by Lepidus, and many things are also orally communicated to me. I hear that Pansa's army has been cut to pieces; that Pansa has died of his wounds; that the legion Martia perished in the same place; and Q. Fabatus, C. Peducæus, and D. Carfulenus; that in the battle gained by Hirtius, both the fourth legion, as well as all the legions of both Antonius and Hirtius, suffered very severely; moreover, that the fourth, after capturing the camp of Antony, was cut to pieces by the fifth legion; that in that attack Hirtius also, and Pontius Aquila, fell; I was also told that there was a

report that Octavianus also had fallen : and if this, which may the Gods forbid, be true, I am not moderately grieved ; that Antony disgracefully raised the siege of Mutina, but had with him of cavalry, and three legions, with their arms and standards, one commanded by L. Bagienus, and of unarmed soldiers a large crowd ; moreover, that Ventidius had joined him with the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions. Antony is stated to have said, that should there be no hope in Lepidus, he would have recourse to extreme measures ; that he would rouse to arms, not only the adjacent nations, but also the slaves ; that Parma was plundered ; that Lucius Antonius had occupied the passes of the Alps."

The feelings with which Cicero received the account of the two first battles were very different. The battle of Pharsalia had been passed over in silence by Cæsar ; no laurelled lictors sent to the camp ; no dispatches to the Senate ; no supplications decreed ; no triumph claimed. But here the case was sadly changed, as we may learn from the following motion, made by Cicero in the Senate, and also carried. It is to be found at the end of his fourteenth and last Philippic. His notorious postponement of the expression of the truth is only in perfect consistence with his other public declarations whenever there was a purpose to be gained by the suppression of a fact, or the suggestion of a non-fact. He had carried his forensic conscience into the Senate and the rostra, and could neither see nor describe anything inconsistent with the cause which he had to maintain. These are the words of the decree :—" Since Caius Pansa, consul general, commenced the engagement with the enemy, and in the ensuing battle, the Legio Martia defended with such admirable and incredible valour the liberty of the Roman people, which was also done by the newly-raised legions ; and since Caius Pansa, consul general, while moving amidst the enemy's missiles, was wounded ; and since Aulus Hirtius, consul general, on hearing of the battle, and understanding the state of affairs, led forth from his camp, with a most gallant and distinguished spirit,

his whole army, and made so successful an assault upon Mark Antony and the enemy's forces, that he utterly destroyed them, without losing even a single man of his own troops; and since Caius Cæsar, general, by his own careful conduct, luckily defended his own camp, and routed and slew those forces of the enemy which had approached it; I move that, on account of these events, the Senate acknowledges and declares that, by the valour of these three generals, by their military power, by their wisdom, by their steadiness, consistency, greatness of mind, and by favouring fortune, the Roman people has been delivered from a foul and most cruel slavery; and since, by fighting and risking their own lives, they have preserved the commonwealth, the city, the temples of the immortal gods, the privileges and property of all the citizens, I also move that on account of these results, secured by their wise, gallant, and fortunate conduct, Caius Pansa and Aulus Hirtius, consuls and generals, either conjointly or separately, or, in their absence, C. Cornutus, the prætor, should appoint a supplication of fifty days at all the shrines of the gods."

The arrival of the dispatches, announcing the result of the third battle, and the retreat of Antony, crowned the joy of Cicero and the Pompeians. The great orator immediately wrote to Brutus, who was at Dyrrachium with five legions, which he had received from Vatinius, and wrested from Caius Antonius, proposing to make his own son a Pontifex instead of Hirtius; and Brutus wrote back, recommending young Bibulus as the fittest man to be elected consul. Brutus, however, recommended clemency to the conquered, advice to which Cicero would not listen for one moment. He tells him—"In no degree do I approve of that distinction drawn by you; for you write, that we ought to be more careful in guarding against civil wars, than in wreaking our wrath upon the vanquished. I altogether dissent from you, O, Brutus! nor do I make any concession to your clemency. For salutary severity surpasses the vain show of clemency.

But if we wish to be merciful, there never will be an end to civil wars." In the next letter he writes still more savagely—"Consider whether your liberality is not too lax. The Senate is of this opinion, and so is the Roman people, that no public enemies were ever more worthy of extreme punishment than are those citizens who in this war have taken arms against their country. And I take vengeance on them, and persecute them in all my speeches, while all good men approve my conduct. It is for you to determine what your own feelings are on this subject. I am of this opinion—that the cause of the three Antonii is one and the same. We have lost the two consuls, good men, indeed, but only good. Hirtius fell in the moment of victory, after conquering the enemy in a great battle a few days before; for Pansa had fled, having received wounds which proved fatal. Brutus is pursuing the remains of the enemy, and so is Cæsar. But all who followed the party of Mark Antony have been declared public enemies. And so most men say that the same act of the Senate extends to those in your power, whether they were captured or surrendered themselves."

But severity was the order of the day at Rome; and Ventidius was, on the motion of Servilius Casca, declared a public enemy, because he had joined Mark Antony with his three legions.

Mark Antony had now passed the Alps, and drew near to the camp of Lepidus. He had with him an invincible band against any troops not led by Cæsar. He had under his standards not only the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions, but also the fifth, which rivalled in fame and discipline the tenth, and the legionaries, which, from one of their ensigns, a lark, were called *Alaudæ*, and these soon persuaded the soldiers of Lepidus to join their common cause. The result is given in the following letter, sent by Lepidus to the Senate:—

"Conscript fathers, I call God and men to witness, that I have the same mind and spirit respecting the commonwealth which I have always entertained, and that nothing has been dearer to me than our common safety and liberty; and this I

would have soon proved to you, had not fortune deprived me of my free will ; for my whole army, having proved mutinous, retained its ancient custom of preserving our fellow citizens and the common peace ; and, that I may speak truly, compelled me to attempt to secure the lives and properties of such a multitude of citizens. And on this point I beseech you to forget all private animosities, and to provide for the public safety ; and do not regard as a crime the pity shown by me and my army in these our civil dissensions. If you pay due regard to the safety and dignity of all parties, you will consult best both for yourselves and the Republic.”

When this secession was announced at Rome, new decrees were passed on Cicero’s authority, declaring Lepidus and all his adherents public enemies, in addition to those already proscribed. Even the odious Syllan practice, of involving the children in the guilt of their parents, was renewed with all its atrocities, and the nephews of Brutus and Cassius were embraced in the sentence of condemnation.

Brutus was shocked by these proceedings, for he saw clearly that to carry into execution such extreme proceedings against whole armies, was as impossible as it would have been impolitic. He therefore remonstrated, but in vain. Cicero thus defends himself: “ I have often discovered, from your letters, that you wish to be praised for your clemency to those whom you have conquered in war. Of course I believe that you never act but wisely. But to overlook the punishment of crime, for that is the real meaning of the word forgiveness, even if it might be tolerated in other cases, I regard as destructive in this war ; for of all the civil wars which have occurred in our state within my memory, there was not one which would not, whichever party conquered, have left us some form of a commonwealth. I cannot easily say what kind of state we should have, if we were to prove conquerors. There will, however, be none at all, if we are conquered. Consequently I pronounced heavy sentences against Antony and against Lepidus, not so much from a wish of taking vengeance

on them, as of deterring for the present wicked citizens from assailing their country, and of leaving a warning for the future, that no man hereafter might wish to imitate such madness; although this was not more my own opinion than that of all the senate. Yet it appears cruel, that the punishment extends to the children who are free from guilt. But this was an ancient practice common to all states, since the children even of Themistocles were left in poverty; and if this punishment overtakes citizens judicially condemned, how can we be more gentle to public enemies? But what right has any man to complain of me, who, if he had conquered, must confess that he would have been most bitter against me."

In the meantime Cicero and his party seemed to have forgotten that their only chance of success in the desperate cause which they had prescribed to themselves was in Cæsar and his troops. Him, however, they studiously neglected, and even degraded; for they voted the chief command of all the troops in the vicinity of Mutina to D. Brutus, who could not even approach in safety the veterans of Cæsar's army. As Cicero tells him in a letter: "But to return to the point, those who know the fourth and Martian legions, say it is not possible to induce them to join you on any conditions." Hence these took the matter into their own hands, and first bound themselves with mutual oaths never again to fight against any Cæsarean army, and took steps to make their resolution known to their comrades in various quarters. They seem also, at the same time, to have discovered the nature of Cicero's policy, or at least to have been persuaded that his intentions were to destroy the Cæsareans by their own swords, and hand over the whole power to the Pompeians, Brutus, Cassius, and Sextus Pompey; and such were undoubtedly his intentions, and it was not his fault that another Pharsalia was not fought under the very walls of Rome.

The following letter from D. Brutus to Cicero will show the spirit of the veterans serving under Cæsar: "Both my regard for you and your kindness to me, compel me to feel that fear

for your safety which I do not feel for myself. A report has repeatedly reached my ears, nor was it despised by me. Last of all, Labeo Segulius, a man like to nothing but himself, has just mentioned to me that he has been visiting Cæsar, and that the company talked much concerning you; that Cæsar himself had not complained of your conduct, except that he mentioned that you had said that the young man was to be eulogized, honoured, raised aloft (or taken off); that he would not so expose himself as to make it possible for any one to take him off. My own belief is, that Labeo reported these words to Cæsar, or even invented them, and that the young man uttered no such expression. Labeo also wished me to believe that the veterans spoke most bitterly respecting you, and that they were likely to prove dangerous to you. He said that they were highly indignant, because neither Cæsar nor I was among the ten commissioners for assigning lands to them, and because everything was conferred at your discretion. When I heard this, and was already upon the road, I determined not to cross the Alps before I distinctly knew what was going on in that quarter. For with respect to your own danger, believe me that their hope is by alarming you with swaggering words and threats of danger, and by inciting the young man to action, to procure great rewards. The sole object of their whole song is merely to gain as much as possible. I wish you, however, to be cautious, and avoid treachery. For nothing can be more dear and more valued by me than your life. Only beware, lest, by showing fear, you may be forced to fear still more, and meet, by whatever means you can, the demands of the veterans."

But it was too late. It was now well known that Brutus and Cassius were constantly expected with their armies; that Sextus Pompey had also been summoned; that the veteran legions from Africa were already in the Tiber. Cæsar's army, therefore, sent a deputation from their own body, who claimed the vacant consulship for their young leader. The senate, after in vain attempting an opposition, and practising divers evasions,

was forced to yield. The people were eager to elect, and at a Comitia held by two officers appointed for the occasion, Octavius and Quintus Pedius, the two nearest kinsmen of Cæsar, were elected joint consuls, and entered upon their office B.C. 43. Quintus Pedius soon introduced and carried though a law by which the slayers of Julius Cæsar were condemned to death. Cæsar himself marched into Etruria with his army, ostensibly to carry on the war against Antony and Lepidus, really to re-unite the Cæsarean party under one head. This soon was effected, and the self-styled defenders of Roman liberty had a second time to seek supporters among oriental despots and barbarian allies, and a second time to be vanquished by Cæsar's army and auxiliaries. The name of the murdered chief proved no less fatal to their cause than the living warrior had proved to their predecessors in the disastrous contest.

INDEX.

	PAGE
ADRIATIC SEA	327
Adrumetum, c. (<i>Mahometta</i>)	350
Ædileship of Cæsar	61
Agenticum, capital of the Senones (<i>Sens</i>)	214
Alesia, city of the Mandubii	235
—, besieged	236, 239
Alexandria, c. of Egypt	320, 328
Allobroges, people of Gallia Transalpina (<i>Savoy and Piedmont</i>)	127
Alps, crossed by Cæsar	129
Ancona, Cinna slain at	18
Anio, r. (<i>Teverone</i>)	399
Antioch, c.	528
Antony joins Cæsar	307
Antony besieges Mutina	419
Antony's Manifesto	423
Apamea, c., Sextus Cæsar slain at	418
Apollonia, c. (<i>Piergo</i>)	303
Appollonia, Octavius Cæsar leaves	418
Apsus, r. (<i>Crevasa</i>)	304
Aquileia to <i>Ocelum</i>	129
Arar, r. (<i>Saone</i>)	130
Aquitania visited by Cæsar	252
Arelate, t. (<i>Arles</i>)	288
Ariminum, c., captured by Cæsar, (<i>Rimini</i>)	266
Ariovistus defeated	143
Arretium, Mark Antony at (<i>Arezo</i>)	275
Asculum, c. (<i>Ascoli</i>)	272
Asiatic government of Pompey	104
Asparagium, t.	308
Attegua, c. (<i>Tebula Veja</i>)	376
Auximum, t. of Picenum (<i>Osino</i>)	270
Avaricum, c. (<i>Bourges</i>), taken by siege	223
BAIÆ, c.	398
Bætis, r. (<i>Guadalquivir</i>)	376
Belgian War	150
Belgians subdued	159
Belgian preparations for war	249
Beneventum, c. (<i>Benevento</i>)	279
Berytus, t. (<i>Beirout</i>)	396
Bibracte, capital of the Ædui (<i>Autun</i>)	132, 234
Bibulus, admiral of the fleet	302
Bithynia, Cæsar in	30

	PAGE
Britain invaded	190
Britannia Romana of Horsley	187
Brundisium, c. of Apulia (<i>Brindisi</i>)	278, 327, 302
Brutus at Pharsalia	326
Buthrotum, t. (<i>Butrinto</i>)	305
CÆSAR born	11
Cæsar's father dies at Pisa	25
Cæsar made a priest of Jupiter	26
Cæsar in the Sabine Mountains	28
Cæsar in Bythia	30
Cæsar at the University of Rhodes	39
Cæsar seized by pirates at Rhodes	39
Cæsar in Asia Minor	41
Cæsar returns to Rome, and is elected military tribune	43
Cæsar quæstor in Spain	53
Cæsar returns to Italy	55
Cæsar marries Pompeia	59
Cæsar departs for Spain	91
Cæsar proconsul of Gaul	116
Cæsar leaves Labienus governor of Cisalpine Gaul	146
Cæsar's distribution of his army after the campaign in Gaul	248
Cæsar visits Aquitana	252
Cæsar crosses the Rubicon	267
Cæsar's correspondence with Cicero	279
Cæsar arrives in Epirus	304
Cæsar defeated by Pompey	315
Cæsar defeats Pompey at Pharsalia.	325
Cæsar saves Ephesus from plunder	329
Cæsar visits Egypt	331
Cæsar enters Syria	335
Cæsar dictator	336
Cæsar defeats Pharnaces	343
Cæsar's progress through Galatia and Bithynia	344
Cæsar's army encamped at Lilybæum	349
Cæsar defeats Scipio and Juba at Thapsus	353
Cæsar at Utica	357
Cæsar's return to Rome from Africa	365
Cæsar's triumphal processions	369
Cæsar defeats the Pompeians at Munda	377
Cæsar visits Cicero	397
Cæsar's plans for the future	399
Cæsar's honours	401
Cæsar warned of danger	405
Cæsar slain	406
Cæsar Octavius and Quintus Pedius consuls	434
Calatium and Casilium	396
Campania, colonization of	100
Capua, c.	279
Capua, Pompey, and consuls at	268

INDEX.

437

	PAGE
Carnutes, a Gaulish people	218
Carteia, c. (<i>Tariffa</i>)	385
Carthage, c.	396
Caspian Sea	311
Catiline's conspiracy	12
Catulus defeats Lepidus	37
Cato's death	389
Celtic people	182
Cicero leaves Rome for Formiæ	269
Cicero at Capua	275
Cicero's clemency	429
Cilicia, defeat of pirates in	57
Cingulum, t. (<i>Cingoli</i>)	272
Cinna slain at Ancona	18
Cisalpine Gaul, L. Crassus gov. of	283
Civil wars	426
Clupea, t. (<i>Aklibia</i>)	350
Comum a Roman colony (<i>Como</i>)	148
Consulship	96
Corcyra (<i>Corfu</i>)	303, 328
Corfinium, c. of the Peligni besieged	272
Corfinium, c. (<i>St. Pelino</i>)	300, 309
Corinth, c.	396
Corduba, c. (<i>Cordova</i>)	376, 385
Cretans vanquished by Metellus	58
Curio's death	301
Cydnus, r.	342
Cyprus, isle	328
Death of Cornelia	52
Dover, Cæsar's arrival at	196
Druids, their power	217
Dubis, r. (<i>Le Doux</i>)	138
Durocortorum, council at (<i>Rheims</i>)	214
Durovernum, c. (<i>Canterbury</i>)	193
Dyrrachium, c. (<i>Durazzo</i>)	304, 327
EBRO, r.	286, 295
Egypt, Cæsar conquers	335
Ephesus, c.	329
Ephesus, c., Dolabella kills C. Trebonius at	419
Epirus	329
Epirus and Thessaly, contention in	327
Etruria, Octavius Cæsar in	434
FORUM JULII (<i>Frejus</i>)	396
Fucine, Lake	399
Funeral of Cæsar	411
Gadeira, c. (<i>Cadiz</i>)	203
Gades	296
Galatic nations	181

	PAGE
Games, magnificence of the shows and	63
Gaul governed by Cæsar	109
Gaul divided by the Ædui and the Arverni	135
Gaul, winter war in	210
Gaulish insurrection	217
Gaul's decay	123
Gauls defeated	235
Geneva, an Allobrogian town, occupied by Cæsar	127
Gergovia, capital of the Arverni	225
Germans expelled	159
Gibraltar	385
Gomphi, c. (<i>Gonfi</i>)	316
H	
HALIAEMON, r. (<i>Jenicora</i>)	311
Helvetic and Germanic wars	125
Hippo, c. (<i>Bona</i>)	358
Hispalis, c. (<i>Seville</i>)	385
I	
IGUVIUM, t. of Umbria (<i>Gubeo</i>)	270
Ilerda, c. (<i>Lerida</i>)	289
Illyricum, c. Antonius governor of	283
Incursions of the northern tribes	183
Insubrians (<i>Milan, Mantua, &c.</i>)	147
Italy, Mark Antony governor of	383
Ireland colonized	387
J	
JOSEPHUS on the Roman army	152
Juba and Scipio defeated	353
Jura, Mount, western boundary of the Helvetii	125
Jura, Mount, passed by the Helvetii	129
L	
LABIENUS's operations	233
Larissa, c. (<i>Genisahar</i>)	317
Lentulus dies in prison	329
Lepidus and his army proscribed	431
Liger, r. (<i>Loire</i>)	221
Ligurians (<i>Ferrara and Genoa</i>)	147
Lilybæum, t. (<i>Capo Boco</i>)	349
Lingones, a people of Gallia Belgica	134
Lissus, harb. (<i>Alessio</i>)	307
Lucca, conference at	166
M	
MACEDONIAN government of Antonius	113
Magetobria, battle of	136
Marcellus's death	393
Massilia, c. (<i>Marseilles</i>)	283, 295
Menapian territory (<i>borders of the Rhine</i>)	167
Metellus vanquishes the Cretans	58
Mitylene stormed	31
Mitylene, c.	328
Morini and Mænapii, Cymric races, subjection of	173
Mosa, r. (<i>Meuse</i>)	169

	PAGE
Mosa and Rhine, confluence	171
Munda, battle of	377
Mutina, c. (<i>Modena</i>) besieged by M. Antony	419
NARBO, c. (<i>Narbonne</i>)	252, 298
Neapolis, c. (<i>Naples</i>)	350
Nemetocenna, t. (<i>Arras</i>)	253
Nervian attack	156
Nice, c.	286
Noricum (<i>Austria and Bavaria</i>)	127
Noviodunum, c. (<i>Nevers</i>)	221
ORICUM, t. (<i>Orco</i>)	303
PELUSIUM, t. (<i>Tineh</i>)	328
Peneus, r. (<i>Salampria</i>)	316
Pergamus, t. (<i>Bergamo</i>)	330
Pharnaces defeated	343
Pharsalia, battle of	321
Pisæ, C. J. Cæsar dies at	25
Placentia, t. (<i>Piacenza</i>)	297
Pompeia divorced	90
Pompey visits Africa	163
Pompey's public games	177
Pompey sole consul	241
Pompey leaves Rome	267
Pompey at Luceria	271
Pompey's plans	271
Pompey's camp at Asparagium	309
Pompey assassinated	329
Pontine marshes	399
Pola, c.	396
Portius Ictius, (<i>Calais</i>)	196
Prætorship of Cæsar	82
Puteoli, t. (<i>Puzzoli</i>)	398
RAVENNA, c.	262
Results of Cæsar's death	413
Rhine crossed by the northern tribes	121
Rhine, the northern boundary of the Helvetii	125
Rhone and Lemman Lake, boundary of the Helvetii	125
Rhone, r., wall formed in front by Cæsar	128
Rome, Syllan massacre in	16
Rome, Æmilius præfect of	283
Rubicon passed by Cæsar	267
SAGUNTUM, c. (<i>Murviedro</i>)	376
Samnites' entire defeat	19
Samorobrivæ, c. (<i>Amiens</i>)	-253
Sardinia, Lepidus dies in	37
Sardinia, Valerius Flaccus governor of	283
Salona, t. (<i>Spalatro</i>)	303
Senones, a Celtic people of Gallia Transalpina	147

	PAGE
Sequani, people of Gallia Belgica (<i>Burgundy</i>)	127
Sextus Pompeius in Spain	417
Sicambri, a Rhenish tribe	172
Sicily, Curio governor of	283
Sicoris, r. (<i>Segre</i>)	289
Sinuessa, c. (<i>Rocca di Mondragone</i>)	279
Soldiers' confidence in Cæsar	359
Spanish campaign	375
Stour, r.	197
Suevi, country, the modern Switzerland	135
Suevi, a people of Germany	169
Sulmo (<i>Sulmona</i>), capital of the Peligni	273
Sylla's death	21
Syria	342
TARSUS, c.	342
Tempe, Vale of	317
Thapsus, t. (<i>Demsus</i>)	352
Thames, r.	193, 197
Tiber, r.	399
Tralles, t. (<i>Sultanissar</i>)	330
Trasimene, Lake	297
Trinobantes, a British people (<i>Middlesex and Herts</i>)	193
Trebonius killed by Dolabella	419
Tuscans	147
VARUS, r. (<i>Var.</i>)	292
Veii and Valaterra	396
Vellaunodunum, t. (<i>Beaune</i>)	221
Venetia	147
Veneti and other maritime states revolt	160
Venetian fleet destroyed	162
Ventidius declared a public enemy	430
Vercingetorix, chief of the Arvernians	218
Verulamium stormed by Cæsar	197
Vesentio, capital of the Sequani (<i>Besançon</i>)	138
UBII, a people of Germany	169
Ucubis, c. (<i>Lucubi</i>)	376
Ulla, mountain fortress	376
Umbrians (<i>Apennines</i>)	147
Utica, c. (<i>Satcor</i>)	300
Uxellodunum fortress surrenders	251
ZIELA, t. (<i>Arzila</i>)	343

15

[The page contains extremely faint and illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the document. No specific content can be transcribed.]

