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THE
WORKS
OF
ST. AUGUSTINE

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
II. ANTI-PELAGIAN WORKS, VOL. II.

The issues of fourth year will comprise CONFESSIONS ; ANTI-PELAGIAN WRITINGS, Vol. 3 ; LETTERS, Vol. 2 ; and LIFE, by Principal RAINY ; so that the series (as originally proposed) will, so far as can be at present calculated, be completed in sixteen volumes.

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38 GEORGE STREET,
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THE WORKS

OF

AURELIUS AUGUSTINE,

BISHOP OF HIPPO.

A NEW TRANSLATION.

Edited by the

REV. MARCUS DODS, D.D.



VOL. XII.

THE ANTI-PELAGIAN WORKS OF ST. AUGUSTINE.

VOLUME II.

EDINBURGH:

T. & T. CLARK, 38, GEORGE STREET.

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THE
ANTI-PELAGIAN WORKS
OF
SAINT AUGUSTINE,
BISHOP OF HIPPO.

Translated by

PETER HOLMES, D.D., F.R.A.S.,

DOMESTIC CHAPLAIN TO THE RIGHT HON. THE COUNTESS OF ROTHES;
AND CURATE OF PENNYCROSS, PLYMOUTH.

VOLUME II.

EDINBURGH:
T. & T. CLARK, GEORGE STREET.
MDCCCLXXIV.

DEDICATION.

TO THE REV. C. T. WILKINSON, M.A.,
VICAR OF ST. ANDREWS WITH PENNYCROSS, PLYMOUTH.

MY DEAR VICAR,

I have great pleasure in associating your name with my own in this volume. We are officially connected in the sacred ministry of the Church, and I think I may, not unsuitably, extend our relations in this little effort to strengthen the defences of the great doctrine of GRACE committed to our care and advocacy. Never was this portion of revealed truth more formidably assailed than at the present day. Rationalism, as its primary dogma, asserts the perfectibility of our nature, out of its own resources; and with a versatility and power of argument and illustration, which gathers help from every quarter in literature and philosophy, it opposes "the truth as it is in 'Jesus.'" This truth, which implies, as its cardinal points, the ruin of man's nature in the sin of the first Adam, and its recovery in the obedience of the second Adam, is vindicated with admirable method and convincing force in the Anti-Pelagian treatises of the great Doctor of the Western Church. Some of these treatises appear for the first time in our language in this volume; and you will, I am sure, admire the acuteness with which Saint Augustine

tracks out and refutes the sophistries of the rationalists of his own day, as well as the profound knowledge and earnest charity with which he enforces and recommends the Catholic verity.

In identifying you thus far with myself in this undertaking, I not only gratify my own feelings of sincere friendship, but with a confidence which I believe I do not over-estimate, I assume, what I highly prize, your agreement with me in accepting and furthering the principles set forth in this volume.

With sincere sympathy for you in your important work at Plymouth, and best wishes for the divine blessing upon it,—
Believe me, yours very faithfully,

PETER HOLMES.

MANNAMEAD, PLYMOUTH,
June 24, 1874.

PREFACE.

THIS volume contains a translation of the three following treatises by St. Augustine on the Pelagian controversy :—

De Gratia Christi, et De Peccato originali contra Pelagium et Cælestium, ad Albinam, Pinianum, et Melaniam; libri duo, scripti anno Christi 418.

De Nuptiis et Concupiscentiâ ad Valerium Comitem; libri duo, scriptus alter circiter initium anni 419; alter anno Christi 420.

De Animâ et ejus origine, contra Vincentium Victorem; libri quatuor, scriptus sub finem anni Christi 419.

These, with the contents of our former volume, comprise eight of the fifteen works contributed by the great author to the defence of the Catholic faith against Pelagius and his most conspicuous followers. The prefaces and chapter headings, which have been, as heretofore, transferred to their proper places in this volume from the Benedictine edition of the original, will afford the reader preliminary help enough, and thus render more than a few general prefatory remarks unnecessary here.

The second book in the first of these treatises adds some facts to the historical information contained in our preceding volume; Pelagius is shown to be at one, in the main, with Cælestius, the bolder but less specious heretic. They were condemned everywhere—even at Rome by Pope Zosimus, who had at first shown some favour to them. These authoritative proceedings against them gave a sensible check to their

progress in public ; there is, however, reason to believe that the opinions, which the Pelagian teachers had with great industry, and with their varied ability, propounded, had created much interest and even anxiety in private society. The early part of the first of the following treatises throws some light on this point, and on the artful methods by which the heretics sought to maintain and extend their opinions ; it affords some evidence also of the widespread influence of St. Augustine. The controversy had engaged the attention of a pious family in Palestine ; Pelagius was in the neighbourhood ; and when frankly questioned by the friends, he strongly protested his adherence to the doctrine of GRACE. " I anathematize," he exclaimed with suspicious promptitude, " the man who holds that the grace of God is not necessary for us at every moment and in every act of our lives ; and all who endeavour to disannul it, deserve everlasting punishment." It was an act of astonishing duplicity, which Augustine, to whom the case was referred, soon detected and exposed. It is satisfactory to find that the worthy Christians to whom the Saint addressed his loving labour were confirmed in their simple faith ; and in one of the last of his extant letters, towards the close of his days on earth, the venerable St. Jerome, in the course of the following year, united the gratitude of Albina, Pinianus, and Melania, with his own to his renowned brother in the west, whom he saluted as " the restorer of the ancient faith." "*Macte virtute,*" said the venerable man, "*in orbe celebraris ; et, quod signum majoris est gloriæ, omnes heretici detestantur.*" [Go on and prosper ; the whole world endows thee with its praise, and all heretics with their hatred.]

In the latter part of the first treatise in this volume, one of the most formidable of the Pelagian objections to the Catholic doctrine of original sin is thrown out against marriage : " Surely that could not be a holy state, instituted of God, which produced human beings in sin !" Augustine in a few weighty chapters removes the doubts of his perplexed

correspondents, and reserves his strength for the full treatment of the subject in the second treatise, here translated, *On Marriage and Concupiscence*. It is a noble monument of his firm grasp of Scripture truth, his loyal adherence to its plain meaning, and his delicate and, at the same time, intrepid handling of a subject, which could only be touched by a man whose mind possessed a deep knowledge of human nature—both in its moral and its physiological aspects, and in its relations to God as affected by its creation, its fall, and its redemption.

This treatise introduces us to a change of circumstances. The preceding one was, as we have seen, addressed to a small group of simple believers in sacred truth, who were not personally known to the author, and, though zealous in the maintenance of the faith, occupied only a private place in society; but the present work was written at the urgent request of a nobleman in high office as a minister of state, and well known to the writer. It is pleasant to trace a similar earnestness, in such dissimilar ranks, in the defence of the assailed faith; and it illustrates the wide stretch of mind and comprehensive love of Augustine, that he could so promptly sympathize with the anxieties of all classes and conditions in the Christian life; and, what is more, so administer comfort and conviction out of the treasures of his wisdom, as to settle their doubts and reassure them in faith. Nor does the change end here. Instead of Pelagius and Cœlestius, Augustine has in this work to confute the powerful argument of Julianus, bishop of Celanum, the ablest of his Pelagian opponents. This man was really the mainstay of the heresy; he had greater resources of mind and a firmer character than either of his associates;—more candid and sincere than Pelagius, and less ambitious and impatient than Cœlestius, he seemed to contend for truth for its own sake, and this disposition found a complete response in the Church's earnest and accomplished champion. Notwithstanding the difficulty

and delicacy of the subject, which removes, no doubt, the treatise *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentiâ* out of the category of what is called "general reading," the great author never did a higher service to the faith than when he provided for it this defence of a fundamental point. The venerable Jerome rejoiced at the good service, and longed to embrace his brother Saint from his distant retreat of Bethlehem. "*Testem invoco Deum,*" he wrote to Augustine, and his dear friend and helper Alypius, "*quod si posset fieri, assumptis alis columbæ, vestris amplexibus implicarer.*"

In the last and longest work, translated for this volume, we come upon a change, both of subject and circumstances, as complete as that we have just noticed. Vincentius Victor, whose unsafe opinions are reviewed, was a young African of great ability and rhetorical accomplishment. His fluent tongue had fairly bewitched not only crowds of thoughtless hearers, but staid persons, whose faith should have been proof against a seductive influence which was soon shown to be transient and flimsy. The young disputant seems to have been more of a schismatic in the Donatist party, than a heretic with Pelagius; showy, however, and unstable, and hardly weighing the consequence of his own opinions, he began to air his metaphysics, and soon fell into strange errors about the nature and origin of the human soul. In his youthful arrogance he happened to censure Augustine for his cautious teaching on so profound a subject; kindly does the aged bishop receive the criticism, show its unreasonableness, and point out to his rash assailant some serious errors which he was propounding at random. He also reproves one of Victor's friends, who happened to be a presbyter, for allowing himself to be misled by the young man's eloquent sophistry; and in the latter half of his treatise, with fatherly love and earnestness, he advises Victor to renounce his dangerous errors, some of which were rankly Pelagian, and something worse. The result of Augustine's admonitions—adorned as

they were with great depth and width of reflection and knowledge (extending this time even to physical science, on some facts of which he playfully comments with the ease of a modern experimenter), with loving consideration for his opponent's inexperience, kindly deference to his undoubted abilities, and a pious desire to win him over to the cause of truth and godliness—was entirely satisfactory. We find from the *Retractations* (ii. 56), that Victor in time abjured all his errors, and doubtless, like another Apollos, ably employed his best powers in the service of true religion. This was a real trophy, great among the greatest of Augustine's achievements for faith and charity. For so great a soul to stoop to the level of so captious a spirit, and with industrious love and patience to trace out and refute all its ambitious error, was "a labour of love" indeed. He remembered the wise counsel of the apostle: "Count him not as an enemy, but admonish him as a brother;" and he reaped the victory the Saviour promised: "Thou hast gained thy brother."

The translation, as in the former volume of the Anti-Pelagian writings of our author, has been made from the tenth volume of the Antwerp reprint of the Benedictine edition of St. Augustine's works.

PETER HOLMES.

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
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EXTRACT FROM "THE RETRACTATIONS,"
Book II. Chap. 50.

"AFTER the conviction and condemnation¹ of the Pelagian heresy and its authors by the bishops of the Church of Rome,—first Innocent, and then Zosimus,—aided by letters from councils in Africa, I wrote two books in opposition to the heretics: one of these was *On the Grace of Christ*, and the other *On Original Sin*. The work began with the following words: 'How greatly we rejoice on account of your bodily health, and, above all, because of your spiritual welfare'" [Quantum de vestrâ corporali, et maxime spiritali salute gaudeamus].

¹ From this it follows that we must refer his works *On the Grace of Christ* and *On Original Sin* to the year 418; for it was in this year that the Pelagian heresy was condemned even by the pope Zosimus, [who had at first acquitted Pelagius]. And about the same time also was held a general council of the bishops of Africa at Carthage, to take measures against the heresy,—the precise date of which council is May 1st of this year 418. Augustine, by reason of this council, was detained at Carthage, and his stay in that city was longer than usual, as one may learn from the 94th canon of the council, or from the *Codex Canonum* of the Church of Africa, canon 127, as well as from his epistle (93) to Mercator. Now it was in this interval of time, before he started for Mauritania Cæsariensis, that he wrote these two books for Albina, Pinianus, and Melania; accordingly, in his *Retractations*, he places them just previous to the time of his proceedings with Emeritus, which were concluded at Cæsarea on the 20th of September in this very year 418. Julianus, in his work addressed to Turbantius, calumniously attacked a passage in this book *On the Grace of Christ*; the passage is defended by Augustine in his work against Julianus, iv. 8. 47, where he mentions this first book, addressed to *the holy Pinianus*, as he calls him, and gives its title as *De Gratid contra Pelagium* ["Concerning Grace, in opposition to Pelagius"].—ED. BENEDICT.

ON THE GRACE OF CHRIST,
AND
ON ORIGINAL SIN;
WRITTEN AGAINST PELAGIUS AND CŒLESTIUS,
IN THE YEAR A. D. 413.

BOOK FIRST.

ON THE GRACE OF CHRIST.

WHEREIN HE SHOWS THAT PELAGIUS WAS SIMPLY DISINGENUOUS IN HIS CONFESSION OF GRACE, INASMUCH AS HE PLACED GRACE EITHER IN MAN'S NATURE AND FREE WILL, OR IN THE LAW AND DOCTRINE [OF SCRIPTURE ;] AND, MOREOVER, ASSERTED THAT IT WAS MERELY THE "POSSIBILITY" (AS HE CALLS IT) OF A MAN'S EXERCISING WILL AND ACTION, AND NOT THE WILL AND ACTION ITSELF, WHICH IS ASSISTED BY DIVINE GRACE ; AND THAT THIS ASSISTING GRACE, TOO, IS GIVEN BY GOD ACCORDING TO MEN'S MERITS ; WHILST HE FURTHER THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE SO ASSISTED FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF BEING THE MORE EASILY ENABLED TO FULFIL THE COMMANDMENTS. AUGUSTINE EXAMINES THOSE PASSAGES OF HIS WRITINGS IN WHICH HE BOASTED THAT HE HAD BESTOWED EXPRESS COMMENDATION ON THE GRACE OF GOD, AND POINTS OUT HOW THEY CAN BE INTERPRETED AS REFERRING TO THE LAW AND THE DOCTRINE,—IN OTHER WORDS, TO THE DIVINE REVELATION AND THE EXAMPLE OF CHRIST, WHICH ARE ALIKE INCLUDED IN "THE DOCTRINE,"—OR ELSE TO THE REMISSION OF SINS ; NOR DO THEY AFFORD ANY EVIDENCE WHATEVER THAT PELAGIUS REALLY ACKNOWLEDGED CHRISTIAN GRACE, IN THE SENSE OF HELP RENDERED FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF RIGHT ACTION TO NATURAL FACULTY AND [SCRIPTURAL] INSTRUCTION, BY THE INSPIRATION OF A MOST GLOWING AND LUMINOUS CHARITY ; AND HE CONCLUDES WITH A REQUEST THAT PELAGIUS WOULD SERIOUSLY LISTEN TO AMBROSE, WHOM HE IS SO VERY FOND OF QUOTING, IN HIS EXCELLENT EULOGY IN COMMENDATION OF THE GRACE OF GOD.

CHAP. 1. [I.]

HOW greatly we rejoice on account of your bodily health, and, above all, because of your spiritual welfare, my most sincerely attached brethren and beloved of God, Albina, Pinianus, and Melania, we cannot express in words ; we therefore leave all this to your own thoughts and belief, in

order that we may now rather speak of the matters on which you consulted us. We have, indeed, had to compose these words to the best of the ability which God has vouchsafed to us, while our messenger was in a hurry to be gone, and amidst many occupations, which are much more absorbing to me at Carthage than in any other place whatever.

CHAP. 2. [II.]—*Suspicious character of Pelagius' confession as to the necessity of grace for every single act of ours.*

You informed me in your letter, that you had entreated Pelagius to express in writing his condemnation of all that had been alleged against him; and that he had deliberately said, in the audience of you all: "I anathematize the man who thinks or says that the grace of God, whereby 'Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners,'¹ is not necessary for us every hour and every moment, and also for every act of our lives; while they who endeavour to disannul it deserve everlasting punishment." Now, whoever hears these words, but is ignorant of the opinion which he has clearly enough expressed in his books,—not those, indeed, which he declares to have been surreptitiously foisted on him without any correction of his own, nor those which he already repudiates, but those even which he mentions in his own letter which he forwarded to Rome,—would certainly suppose that the views he holds are in strict accordance with the truth. And yet, if any one notices carefully what he openly declares in them, he cannot fail to regard even these statements with suspicion. Because, although he makes that grace of God which sent Christ into the world to save sinners to consist simply in the remission of sins, he can still accommodate his words to this meaning, by alleging that the necessity of such grace every hour and moment, and for every action of our life, comes to this, that while we recollect and keep in mind the forgiveness of our past sins, we sin no more, aided not by any supply of virtue from without, but by the resources of our own will, as it recalls to our mind, in every action we do, what advantage has been conferred upon us by this remission of sins. Then, again, whereas they are accustomed to say that Christ has given us assistance for avoiding sin, in that He has left us an example

¹ 1 Tim. i. 15.

by living righteously and teaching what is right Himself, they have it in their power here also of accommodating their words, by affirming such to be the necessity of grace to us every moment and for every action, that we should in all our conduct regard the example of the Lord's conversation. Your own fidelity to the truth, however, enables you clearly to perceive how such a profession of opinion as this differs from that true confession of grace which is now the question before us. And yet how easily can it be obscured and disguised by their ambiguous statements!

CHAP. 3. [III.]—*Grace according to the Pelagians.*

But why should we wonder at this? For the same Pelagius, who in the Acts of the episcopal synod unhesitatingly condemned those who say that God's grace and assistance are not given for single acts, but consist in [the general gift of] free will, or in the law and the doctrine [of Scripture,]¹ upon which points we were apt to think that he had been expending all his subterfuges; and who also condemned such as affirm that the grace of God is bestowed in proportion to our merits,—the Pelagius, I say, who has pronounced these anathemas, is, notwithstanding, proved to hold, in the books which he has published on the freedom of the will (and which he mentions in the letter he sent to Rome), no other sentiments than those which he seemingly condemned. For that grace and help of God, by which we are assisted in avoiding sin, he makes to consist either in nature and free will, or else in the gift of the law and [Scripture] doctrine; the result of which of course is this, that whenever God helps a man, He must be supposed to help him to turn away from evil and do good, by giving him the revelation [of His will] and teaching him what he ought to do,² but not with the additional assistance of His co-operation and inspiration of love, that he may accomplish that which he had discovered it to be his duty to do.

CHAP. 4.

In his system, he places, with distinct functions, three

¹ See *De gestis Pelagii*, c. 30.

² [We have in these two clauses an explanation of the terms "law and doctrine," which Pelagius uses almost technically.]

faculties, with which he says God's commandments are fulfilled,—possibility, volition, and action: meaning by "possibility," that with which a man is enabled to be just and righteous; by "volition," that he wills to be just; by "action," that he actually is just. The first of these, the possibility, he allows to have been bestowed on us by the Creator of our nature; it is not in our power, and we possess it even against our will. The other two, however, the volition and the action, he asserts to be our own; and he assigns them to us so strictly as to contend that they proceed simply from ourselves. In short, according to his view, God's grace has nothing to do with assisting those two faculties which he will have to be altogether our own, the volition and the action, but that only which is not in our own power and comes to us from God, namely the possibility; as if the faculties which are our own, that is, the volition and the action, have such avail for declining evil and doing good, that they require not any divine help, whereas that faculty which we have of God, that is to say, the possibility, is so weak, that it is always assisted by the aid of grace.

CHAP. 5. [IV.]

Lest, however, it should chance be said that we either do not correctly understand what he advances, or malevolently pervert to another meaning what he never meant to bear such a sense, I beg of you to consider his own actual words: "We classify," says he, "these faculties thus, arranging them into a certain graduated order. We put in the first place *posse*, 'possibility;' in the second *velle*, 'volition;' and in the third *esse*, or 'being.' The possibility we place in our nature, the volition in our will, and the being in the realization by act. The first of these faculties expressed in the term *posse* is especially assigned to God, who has bestowed it on His creature; the other two, indicated in the terms *velle* and *esse*, must be referred to the human agent, because they flow forth from the fountain of his will. In his willing, therefore, and doing a good work consists man's praise; or rather this praise belongs both to the human being and to God, who has bestowed on him the 'possibility' of exercising his actual will and

work, and who evermore by the help of His grace assists this very possibility. That a man possesses this possibility of willing and effecting any good work, comes from God alone. So that this one faculty may exist, even when the other two have no being ; but the converse is not true,—that these latter can exist without that former one. It is therefore at my own option not to have a good inclination and not to do a good action ; but it is by no means within my own power not to have the possibility of good. This possibility is inherent in me, whether I will or no ; nor does nature at any time receive in this point an option for itself. Now the meaning of all this will be rendered clearer by an example or two. That we have the possibility of seeing with our eyes is no power of ours ; but it is in our own power that we make a good or a bad use of our eyes. So again, that I may, by applying a general case in illustration, embrace all, the fact that we have the possibility of accomplishing every good thing by action, speech, and thought, comes from Him who has endowed us with this possibility, and also assists it ; but that we really do a good thing, or speak a good word, or think a good thought, proceeds from our own selves, because we are also able to turn all these actions into evil. Accordingly,—and this is a point which needs frequent repetition, because of your calumination of us, —whenever we say that a man can live without sin, we also give praise to God by our acknowledgment of the possibility which we have received from Him, who has bestowed such power upon us ; and there is here no occasion for praising the human agent, since it is God's matter alone that is for the moment treated of ; for the question is not about willing, or effecting, but simply and solely about that which may possibly be."

CHAP. 6. [v.]

The whole of this dogma of Pelagius, observe, is carefully expressed in these words, and none other, in the third book of his treatise in defence of the liberty of the will, in which he has managed in respect of these three faculties,—the possibility, the volition, and the action, indicated in the first by *posse*, the second by *velle*, and the third by *esse*,—to distinguish them with so much subtle skill, that, whenever we read or hear of his

acknowledging the assistance of divine grace in order to our avoidance of evil and accomplishment of good,—whatever he may mean by the said assistance of grace, whether the law or the doctrine [of Scripture,] or any other thing,—we are sure of what he says; nor can we run into any mistake by understanding his meaning to be different from his expression of it. For we cannot help knowing that, according to his belief, it is not our volition nor our action which is assisted by the divine help, but solely the “possibility” of our will and action, which alone of the three, as he affirms, we have of God. As if that faculty were infirm which God Himself placed in our nature; while the other two, which, as he would have it, are our own property, are so strong and firm and self-sufficient as to require none of His help! so that He does not help us to will, nor help us to act, but simply helps us to the possibility of willing and acting. The apostle, however, holds the contrary, when he says, “Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling.”¹ And that [the Philippians] might be sure that it was not simply in the possibility of their working (for this they had already received in nature and in [Scripture] doctrine), but in their actual working that they were divinely assisted, the apostle does not go on to say to them, “For it is God that worketh in you to be able,” as if they already possessed volition and operation among their own resources, without requiring His assistance in respect of these two; but he says, “For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of His own good pleasure;”² or, as the reading runs in other copies, especially the Greek, “both to will and to energize” [*καὶ τὸ θέλει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν*]. Consider, now, whether the apostle did not thus long before foresee by the Holy Ghost that there would arise adversaries of the grace of God; and did not therefore declare that God works within us those two very operations, even of “willing” and “acting” [or “doing,”] which this man so determined to be our own, as if they were in no wise assisted by the help of divine grace.

CHAP. 7. [VI.]

Let not Pelagius, however, in this way deceive incautious and simple persons, or even himself; for after saying, “Man’s

¹ Phil. ii. 12.

² Phil. ii. 13.

praise consists in his willing and doing a good work," he added, as if by way of correcting himself, these words: "Or rather, this praise belongs to the human being *and to God.*" It was not, however, that he wished to be understood as showing any deference to the sound doctrine, that it is "God which worketh in us both to will and to do," that he thus expressed himself; but it is clear enough, on his own showing, why he added the latter clause, for he immediately subjoins: "Who has bestowed on him the 'possibility' of exercising this very will and work." From his preceding words it is manifest that he places this possibility in our nature. Lest he should seem, however, to have said nothing about grace, he added these words: "And who evermore, by the help of His grace, assists this very possibility,"—"this very possibility," observe; not [man's] *very will*, or *very action*; for if he had said so much as this, he would clearly not be at variance with the doctrine of the apostle. But there are his words: "this very possibility;" meaning that very one of the three faculties which he had placed in our nature. This God "evermore assists by the help of His grace." The result, indeed, is, that God does not share with the human agent the praise which comes in the processes of will and action, in such wise that man either so wills as to have God also inspiring his volition with the ardour of love, or so works as to have God also co-operating with him. And without such help, what is man after all? But he has associated God [with man] in this praise of which he treats, in this wise, that were it not for the nature which God gave us in our creation wherewith it might be *possible* to exercise volition and action, we should neither will nor act.

CHAP. 8.—*Grace, according to the Pelagians, consists in the internal and manifold illumination of the mind.*

As to his allowing that this possibility of our nature is assisted by the grace of God, it is by no means clear from the passage either what grace he means, or to what extent he supposes our nature to be assisted by it. But, as is the case in other passages in which he expresses himself with more clearness and decision, [so, deriving information from them,] we may here also perceive that no other grace is intended by him as

helping the possibility of our nature than the law and the doctrine [of revelation.] [VII.] For in one passage he says: "We are supposed by very ignorant persons to do wrong in this matter to the divine grace, because we say that it is by no means able to effect sanctification in us without our own will,—as if God could have imposed any command on His grace, without also supplying the help of His grace to those on whom he imposed His commands, so that men might more easily accomplish through grace what they are required to do by their free will." Then, as if he meant to explain what grace he meant, he immediately went on to add these words: "And this grace we for our part do not, as you suppose, allow to consist merely in the law, but also in the help of God." Now who can help wishing that he would show us what grace it is that he would have us understand? Indeed we have the strongest reason for expecting him to tell us what he means by saying that he does not allow grace merely to consist in the law. Whilst, however, we are in the suspense of our expectation, observe, I pray you, what he has further to tell us: "God helps us," says he, "by His doctrine and revelation, whilst He opens the eyes of our heart; whilst He points out to us the future, that we may not be absorbed in the present; whilst He discovers to us the snares of the devil; whilst He enlightens us with the manifold and ineffable gift of heavenly grace." He then concludes his statement with a kind of clinching appeal: "Does the man," he asks, "who says all this appear to you to be a denier of grace? Does he not acknowledge both man's free will, and God's grace?" But, after all, he has not got beyond his commendation of the law and of the doctrine [of revelation;] assiduously inculcating this as the grace that helps us, and so following up the idea with which he had started, when he said, "We, however, allow it to consist in the help of God." God's help, indeed, he supposed must be recommended to us by manifold lures; by setting forth doctrine and revelation, the opening of the eyes of the heart, the demonstration of the future, the discovery of the devil's wiles, and the illumination of our minds by the varied and indescribable gift of heavenly grace,—all this, of course, with a view to our learning the commandments and

promises of God. And what else is this than placing God's grace in [his original formula of] "the law and the doctrine [of Scripture?"]

CHAP. 9. [VIII.]—*The law one thing, grace another. What the law can do without grace. The utility of the law.*

Hence, then, it is clear that he acknowledges such a grace as that whereby God points out and reveals to us what we are bound to do, but not such as endows us with gifts and assists us to action and conduct; since the knowledge of the law, unless it be accompanied by the assistance of grace, rather produces the effect of developing the transgression of the commandment. "Where there is no law," says the apostle, "there is no transgression;"¹ and again: "I had not known lust [or concupiscence], except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet."² Therefore so far are the law and grace from being identical, that the law is not only unprofitable, but it is absolutely prejudicial, unless grace assists it; and the utility of the law may be shown by this, that it obliges all whom it proves guilty of transgression to betake themselves to grace for deliverance and help to overcome their evil lusts. It rather commands than assists; it discovers disease, but does not heal it; nay, the malady that is not healed is rather aggravated by it, so that the cure of grace is more earnestly and anxiously sought for. "The letter indeed killeth, but the spirit giveth life."³ "For if there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law."⁴ To what extent, however, the law gives assistance, the apostle informs us when he says immediately afterwards: "The Scripture hath concluded all under sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe."⁵ Wherefore, says the apostle, "the law was our schoolmaster in Christ Jesus."⁶ Now this very thing is serviceable to proud men, to be more firmly and manifestly "concluded" [or shut up] "under sin," so that none may presumptuously endeavour to accomplish their justification by means of the resources as it were of their own free will; but rather "that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become

¹ Rom. iv. 15.

² Rom. vii. 7.

³ 2 Cor. iii. 6.

⁴ Gal. iii. 21.

⁵ Gal. iii. 22.

⁶ Gal. iii. 24.

guilty before God. Because by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in His sight: for by the law is the knowledge of sin. But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets."¹ But how so? How manifested without the law, if witnessed by the law? This, however, is not the meaning. The phrase is not, "manifested without the law," but "the righteousness without the law," because it is "the righteousness of God;" that is to say, the righteousness which we have not from the law, but from God,—not the righteousness, indeed, which by reason of His commanding it causes us fear through our knowledge of it; but rather the righteousness which by reason of His bestowing it is held fast and maintained by us through our loving it,—“so that [according as it is written], He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord.”²

CHAP. 10. [IX.]—*What purpose the law subserves.*

What object, then, can he gain by accounting the law and the doctrine of Scripture to be the grace which helps us to work righteousness? For, in order that it may effect its great help, it must assist us to the extent of our feeling the need of grace and seeking it. No man, indeed, is able to fulfil the law through the law. "Love is the fulfilling of the law."³ And the love of God is not shed abroad in our hearts by the law, but by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us.⁴ Grace, therefore, is pointed at by the law, in order that the law may be fulfilled by grace. Now what does it avail for Pelagius, that he declares the self-same thing under different phrases, that he may not be understood to place in law and doctrine that grace which, as he avers, assists the "possibility" of our nature? So far, indeed, as I can conjecture, the reason why he fears being so understood is, because he condemned all those who maintain that God's grace and help are not given for a man's single actions, but exist rather in [the general endowment of] his freedom, or in the law and Scripture doctrine. And yet he supposes that he escapes detection by the shifts he so constantly employs for disguising what he means by his formula of "law and doctrine" under so many various phrases.

¹ Rom. iii. 19-21.

² 1 Cor. i. 31.

³ Rom. xiii. 10.

⁴ Rom. v. 5.

CHAP. 11. [x.]—*Pelagius resolves grace into "law and doctrine." The grace which one ought to own, to be a Christian; namely, that which not only advises, but actually prevails on us, to do good.*

For in another passage, after asserting at length that it is not by the help of God but out of our own selves that a good will is formed within us, he confronted himself with a question out of the apostle's epistle; and he asked this question: "How will this stand consistently with the apostle's words,¹ 'It is God that worketh in you both to will and to effect'?" Then, in order to obviate this opposing authority, which he plainly saw to be most thoroughly contrasted with his own dogma, he went on at once to add: "He works in us to will what is good, to will what is holy, when He rouses us from our devotion to earthly desires, and from that mere love of the present, which affects us after the manner of brute animals, by the magnitude of the future glory and the promise of its rewards, when by revealing wisdom to us He stirs up our sluggish will to a longing after God, and (what you are not afraid to deny in another passage) when he advises us to follow everything which is good." Now what can be plainer, than that by the grace whereby God works within us to will what is good, he means nothing else than the law and the doctrine? For in the law and the doctrine of the holy Scriptures are promised future glory and its great rewards. To the doctrine also appertains the revelation of wisdom, whilst it is its further function to direct our thoughts to everything that is good. And if between teaching and advising (or rather exhorting) there seems to be a difference, yet even this is provided for in the general term "doctrine," which is included in the several discourses or letters; for the holy Scriptures both teach and exhort, and in the processes of teaching and exhorting there is room likewise for man's operation. We, however, on our side would fain have him after all confess that grace, which not only holds out the promise of future glory in all its magnitude, but also believes in it and hopes for it. By this same grace, too, wisdom is not only revealed, but also loved; while everything that is good is not only recommended to us, but pressed upon us until we accept it. For all men do not

¹ Phil. ii. 13.

possess faith,¹ who hear the Lord in the Scriptures promising the kingdom of heaven ; nor are all men persuaded, who are counselled to come to Him, who says, " Come unto me, all ye that labour." ² They, however, who have faith are the same who are also persuaded to come to Him. This He Himself set forth most plainly, when He said, " No man can come to me, except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him." ³ And some verses afterwards, when speaking of such as believe not, He says, " Therefore said I unto you, that no man can come unto me except it were given unto him of my Father." ⁴ This is the grace which Pelagius ought to acknowledge, if he wishes not only to be called a Christian, but to be one.

CHAP. 12. [XI.]

But what shall I say about the revelation of wisdom ? For there is no man who can in the present life very well hope to attain to the great revelations which were given to the Apostle Paul ; and of course it is impossible to suppose that anything used in these revelations to be made known to him but what appertained to wisdom. Yet for all this he says : " Lest I should be exalted above measure through the abundance of the revelations, there was given to me a thorn in the flesh, the messenger of Satan to buffet me. For this thing I besought the Lord thrice, that He would take it away from me. And He said unto me, My grace is sufficient for thee ; for my strength is made perfect in weakness." ⁵ Now, undoubtedly, if there were already in the apostle that perfection of love which admitted of no further addition, and which could be puffed up no more, there could have been no further need of the messenger of Satan to buffet him, and thereby to repress the excessive elation which might arise from abundance of revelations. What means this elation, however, but a being puffed up ? And of charity it has been indeed most truly said, " Charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up." ⁶ This charity, therefore, was still in process of constant increase in the great apostle, day by day, as long as his " inward man was renewed day by day," ⁷ and would then be perfected, no doubt,

¹ 2 Thess. iii. 2.² Matt. xi. 28.³ John vi. 44.⁴ John vi. 65.⁵ 2 Cor. xii. 7-9.⁶ 1 Cor. xiii. 4.⁷ 2 Cor. iv. 16.

when he was got beyond the reach of all further vaunting and elation. But at that moment his mind was still in a condition to be inflated by an abundance of revelations, [and would so remain] until it should be perfected in the solid edifice of charity; for he had not arrived at the end and apprehended the prize, to which he was reaching forward in his constant course.

CHAP. 13. [XII.]—*Grace causes us to do.*

To him, therefore, who is reluctant to endure the troublesome process, whereby this vaunting disposition is restrained, before he attains to the ultimate and highest perfection of charity, it is most properly said, "My grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength is made perfect in weakness,"¹—in weakness, that is, not of the flesh only, as he² supposes, but both of the flesh and of the mind; because the mind, too, was, in comparison of that last stage of complete perfection, weak; and to it also was assigned, in order to check its elation, that messenger of Satan, the thorn in the flesh. Notwithstanding, it was very strong, in contrast with the lower faculties of the flesh and our "natural man," which as yet "receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God."³ Inasmuch, then, as strength is made perfect in weakness, whoever does not own himself to be weak, is not in the way to be perfected. This grace, however, by which strength is perfected in weakness, conducts all who are predestinated and called according to the divine purpose⁴ to the state of the highest perfection and glory. By such grace it is effected, not only that we discover what ought to be done, but also that we do what we have discovered,—not only that we believe, too, what ought to be loved, but also that we love what we have believed.

CHAP. 14. [XIII.]—*How grace can be called "doctrine." He who learns by grace does only that which he has learned ought to be done. The righteousness which is of God. The righteousness which is of the law. The fear of punishment.*

If this grace is to be called "doctrine," let it at any rate be so called in such wise that God may be believed to infuse it, along with an ineffable sweetness, more deeply and more internally, not only by *their* agency who plant and water from

¹ 2 Cor. xii. 9. ² [Pelagius.] ³ 1 Cor. ii. 14. ⁴ Rom. viii. 28, 30.

without, but likewise by Himself too who ministers in secret His own increase,—in such a way, that He not only exhibits truth, but likewise imparts charity. For it is thus that God teaches those who have been called according to His purpose, giving them simultaneously both to know what they ought to do, and to do what they actually know. Accordingly, the apostle thus speaks to the Thessalonians: “As touching brotherly love, ye need not that I write unto you; for ye yourselves are taught of God to love one another.”¹ And then, by way of proving that they had been taught of God, he subjoined: “And indeed ye do it towards all the brethren which are in all Macedonia.”² As if the surest sign that you have been taught of God, is that you put into practice what you have been taught. Of that character are all who are called according to God’s purpose, as it is written in the prophets: “They shall be all taught of God.”³ The man, however, who has learned what ought to be done, but does it not, has not as yet been “taught of God” according to grace, but only according to the law,—not after the spirit, but only in the letter. Although there are many who apparently do what the law commands, acting through fear of punishment, not through love of righteousness; and such righteousness as this the apostle calls “his own which is after the law,”—a thing as it were commanded, not given. When, indeed, it has been given, it is not called our own righteousness, but God’s. It becomes our own only so that we have it from God. These are the apostle’s words: “That I may be found in Him, not having mine own righteousness which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith.”⁴ So great, then, is the difference between the law and grace, that although the law is undoubtedly of God, yet the righteousness which is of the law is not of God, but the righteousness which has its consummation from grace is of God. The one is designated the righteousness of the law, because it is done through fear of the curse of the law; while the other is called the righteousness of God, because it is bestowed through the beneficence of His grace, so that it

¹ 1 Thess. iv. 9.

² Isa. liv. 13; Jer. xxxi. 34; John vi. 45.

³ 1 Thess. iv. 10.

⁴ Phil. iii. 9.

is not a terrible but a pleasant commandment; according to the prayer in the Psalm: "Good art Thou, O Lord, therefore in Thy goodness teach me Thy righteousness;"¹ that is, [teach me in Thy sweet graciousness,] that I may not be compelled like a slave to live under the law with fear of punishment; but rather in the freedom of love may be delighted to live with law as my companion. When the freeman keeps a commandment, he does it with good will and cheerfulness. And whosoever learns his duty in this spirit, does only that which he has learned ought to be done.

CHAP. 15. [XIV.]—*He who has been taught by grace comes to Christ; he who does not come has not been so taught. In what way God teaches by grace. Assistance is given both for willing and for working.*

Now as touching this mode of [divine] instruction, the Lord also says: "Every man that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me."² Of the man, therefore, who has not approached the Lord, it cannot be correctly said: He has heard and has learned that it is his duty to come, but he is not willing to do what he has been taught. It is indeed absolutely improper to apply such a statement to that method of instruction, whereby God teaches by grace. For if, as the [incarnate] Truth says, "Every man that hath learned cometh," it follows, of course, that whoever does not come hath not learned. But who can fail to see that a man's coming or not coming is decided by his will? This decision, however, may stand alone, as when the man does not come; but if he does come, it can only be by having received assistance in his will,—and such assistance, that he not only knows what it is he ought to do, but also actually does what he thus knows. And thus, when God teaches, it is not by the letter of the law, but by the grace of the Spirit. Moreover, He so teaches, that whatever a man learns under such tuition, he not only perceives by the process of discovery, but also desires by the exercise of will, and accomplishes in continuous action. By this mode, therefore, of [divine] instruction, man's very volition even, and his very action too, are assisted, and not merely the natural "possibility" of using the will and employing action. For if nothing but this "possibility" of ours

¹ Ps. cxix. 68.

² John vi. 45.

were assisted by this grace, the Lord would rather have said, "Every man that hath heard and hath learned of the Father *may possibly* come to me." This, however, is not what He said; but His words are these: "Every man that hath heard and hath learned of the Father *cometh* unto me." Now *the possibility of coming* Pelagius places in man's nature, or even—as we found him attempting to say some time ago¹—in grace (whatever that may mean according to his apprehension), when he says of it, "whereby this very possibility is assisted;" whereas *the actual coming* lies in the will and act. It does not, however, follow that he who *may* come actually comes, unless he has also willed and acted for the coming. But every one who has learned of the Father not only has the possibility of coming, but comes; and in this result are already included the *motion* of the possibility, the *affection* of the will, and the *effect* of the action.²

CHAP. 16. [XV.]

Now what is the use of his examples, if they do not really accomplish his own promise of making his meaning clearer to us;³ not, indeed, that we are bound to admit their sense, but that we may discover more plainly and openly what is his drift and purpose in using them? "That we have," says he, "the possibility of seeing with our eyes is no power of ours; but it is in our power that we make a good or a bad use of our eyes." Well, there is a good answer for him in the Psalm, in which the psalmist says to God, "Turn Thou away mine eyes, that they behold not iniquity."⁴ Now although this was said of the eyes of the mind, it still follows from it, that in respect of our bodily eyes there is either a good use or a bad use that may be made of them: not in the literal sense merely of a good sight when the eyes are sound, and a bad sight when they are bleared; but in the moral sense of a right sight when it is directed towards succouring the helpless, or a bad sight when its object is the in-

¹ See above, ch. 7 [vi.].² [The technical gradation is here neatly expressed by *profectus*, *affectus*, and *effectus*.]³ See above, ch. 5 [iv.].⁴ Ps. cxix. 37.

dulgence of lust. For although the poor man who needs the succour, and the woman who excites the lust, are severally objects which employ the organs of external sight, it is after all from the inner eye [of the mind] that the sentiment either of compassion in the one case or of lust in the other proceeds. How then is it that the prayer is offered to God, "Turn Thou away mine eyes, that they behold not iniquity"? Or why is that asked for which lies within our own competency, if it be true that God does not assist the will of man?

CHAP. 17. [XVI.]

"That we are able to speak," says he, "is a gift of God to us; but that we make a good or a bad use of speech is our own matter." He, however, who has made the most excellent use of speech does not teach us so. "For," says He, "it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you."¹ "So, again," adds [Pelagius], "that I may, by applying a general case in illustration, embrace all, the fact that we have the possibility of accomplishing every good thing by action, speech, and thought, comes from Him who has endowed us with this possibility, and who also assists it." Observe how even here he repeats his former meaning—that of the three faculties of possibility, volition, and action, it is only the possibility which receives any help. Then, by way of completely stating what he intends to say, he adds: "But that we really do a good thing, or speak a good word, or think a good thought, proceeds from our own selves." He forgot what he had said by way of correcting, as it were, his own words; for after saying, "Man's praise therefore consists in his willing and doing a good work," he at once goes on to modify his statement thus: "Or rather, this praise belongs both to the human being and to God, who has bestowed on him the possibility of exercising his very will and work." Now what is the reason why he did not remember this admission when giving his examples, so as to say this much at least after quoting them? The fact that we have the power of accomplishing every good thing by action, speech, and thought, comes from Him who has endowed us with this

¹ Matt. x. 20.

power, and who also assists it. The fact, however, that we really do a good thing, or speak a good word, or think a good thought, proceeds *both from ourselves and from Him!* This much, however, he has not said. But if I am not mistaken, I think I see why he was afraid [to make such an admission].

CHAP. 18. [XVII.]—*He discovers the reason of Pelagius' fear.*

For, when wishing to point out what lies within our own competency, he says: "Because we are also able to turn all these actions into evil." This, then, was the reason why he was afraid to admit that such an action proceeds "*both from ourselves and from God,*" lest it should be objected to him in reply: If the fact of our doing anything good by action, speech, or thought is owing both to ourselves and to God, on the ground that He has endowed us with such a power, then it follows that our doing an evil thing in act, word, or thought is therefore due to ourselves and to God, because He has here also endowed us with such a power; the conclusion from this being—and God forbid that we should admit any such—that just as God is associated with ourselves in the praise of good actions, so must He share with us the blame of evil actions. For that "possibility" with which He has endowed us makes us capable both of good actions and of evil ones.

CHAP. 19. [XVIII.]—*The two roots of action, charity and cupidity; who is the good man, and who the bad.*

Concerning this "possibility," Pelagius thus writes in the first book of his *Defence of the Freedom of the Will*: "Now," says he, "we have implanted in us by God a possibility for acting in both directions. It resembles, as I may say, a root which is most abundant in its produce of fruit. It yields and produces diversely according to man's will; and is capable, at the planter's own choice, of either shedding a beautiful bloom of virtues, or of bristling with the thorny thickets of vices." Scarcely heeding what he says, he here makes one and the same root productive both of good and evil fruits, in opposition to gospel truth and apostolic teaching. For the Lord declares that "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit;"¹ and when the

¹ Matt. vii. 18.

Apostle Paul says that [covetousness or] “the love of money is the root of all evil,”¹ he intimates to us, of course, that charity may be regarded as the root of all good things. On the supposition, therefore, that two trees, one good and the other corrupt, represent two human beings, a good one and a bad, what else is the good man with his good will, than a tree with a good root? And what the bad man with his bad will, but a tree with a bad root? The fruits which spring from such roots and trees are deeds, and words, and thoughts, which proceed, when good, from a good will, and when evil, from an evil one.

CHAP. 20. [XIX.]—*In what sense a man makes a good or a bad tree ; whence the evil will originates.*

Now a man makes the tree good when he receives the grace of God. For it is not by himself that he does good instead of evil ; but it is of Him, and through Him, and in Him who is always good. And in order that he may not only be a good tree, but also bear good fruit, it is necessary for him to be assisted by the self-same grace, without which he can do nothing good. For God does Himself contribute to the production of fruit in good trees, when He both externally waters and tends them by the agency of His servants, and internally by Himself also gives the increase.² A man, however, makes the tree corrupt when he corrupts his own self, when he falls away from Him who is the unchanging good ; for such a declension from Him is the origin of an evil will. Now this decline does not initiate some other nature in a corrupt state, but it vitiates that which has been already created good. When this vitiation, however, has been healed, no evil remains ; for although there was no doubt a *vitium naturæ*, [since nature had received an injury], yet it was not *vitium natura*, [for nature was not itself essentially wrong].

CHAP. 21. [XX.]—*Charity the root of all good things ; cupidity, of all evil ones. The inhabitants of the world are in Scripture called “the world.”*

The “possibility,” then, of which we speak is not (as he supposes) the one identical root both of good things and evil. For the charity which is the root of good things is quite different from the cupidity which is the root of evil things—as different,

¹ 1 Tim. vi. 10.

² 1 Cor. iii. 7.

indeed, as virtue is from vice. But no doubt this possibility is capable of contributing both roots: because a man may not only possess charity, whereby the tree becomes a good one; but he may likewise have cupidity, which makes the tree evil. This cupidity, however, which is the fault of man, has for its author man, or man's deceiver, but not man's Creator. It is indeed that "lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, which is not of the Father, but is of the world."¹ And who can be ignorant of the usage of the Scripture, which under the designation of "*the world*" is accustomed to describe those who inhabit the world?

CHAP. 22. [XXI.]—*Charity is a good will.*

That charity, however, which is [so great] a virtue, comes to us from God, not from ourselves, according to the testimony of Scripture, which says: "Love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God: for God is love."² It is on the principle of this love or charity that one can best understand the passage, "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin;"³ as well as the sentence, "And he cannot sin."⁴ Because the charity after which we are born of God "doth not behave itself unseemly," and "thinketh no evil."⁵ Therefore, whenever a man sins, he is not in accord with charity: it is after the promptings of cupidity or covetousness that he commits sin; and following such a disposition, he is not born of God. Because, as it has been already stated, "the possibility" [or faculty of which a man is possessed] may have both roots [productive of good and of evil]. When, therefore, the Scripture says, "Love is of God," or still more pointedly, "God is love;" when the Apostle John so very emphatically exclaims, "Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and be, the sons of God!"⁶ with what face can this writer, on hearing [such words, and especially] that "God is love," persist in maintaining his opinion, that we have of God one only of the three faculties of our nature, namely, "the possibility" [of which he speaks so much]; whereas it is

¹ 1 John ii. 16.

² 1 John iv. 7, 8.

³ 1 John iii. 9.

⁴ Same verse.

⁵ 1 Cor. xiii. 5.

⁶ 1 John iii. 1.

of ourselves that we have the good will and the good action? As if, indeed, this goodness of will were a different thing from that charity which the Scripture so loudly proclaims to have come to us from God, and to have been given to us by the Father, that we might become His children.

CHAP. 23. [XXII.]

Perhaps, however, it is our own antecedent merits which caused this gift to be bestowed upon us; as this writer has already suggested in reference to God's grace, in a work which he addressed to a holy virgin,¹ whom he mentions in a letter sent by him to Rome. For, after adducing the testimony of the Apostle James, in which he says, "Submit yourselves unto God; resist the devil, and he will flee from you,"² he goes on to say: "He shows us how we ought to resist the devil, if we submit ourselves indeed to God, and by doing His will merit His divine grace, and by the help of the Holy Ghost more easily withstand the evil spirit." Judge, then, how sincere was his condemnation in the Palestine Synod of those persons who say that God's grace is conferred on us according to our merits! Have we any doubt as to his still holding this opinion, and most openly proclaiming it? Well, how could that confession of his before the bishops have been true and real? Is it true that he had at that time written the book in which he most explicitly alleges that grace is bestowed on us according to our deserts—the very position which he without any reservation condemned at that Synod in the East? Let him frankly acknowledge that he once held the opinion, but that he holds it no longer; so should we most frankly rejoice in his improvement. As it is, however, when, besides other objections, this one was laid to his charge which we are now discussing, he said in reply: "Whether these are the opinions of Cœlestius or not, is the concern of those who affirm that they are. For my own part, indeed, I never entertained such views; on the contrary, I anathematize every one who does entertain them."³ But how could he "never have entertained such views," when he

¹ [*Epistola ad Demetriadem.*]

² Jas. iv. 7.

³ See the *De Gestis Pelagii*, ch. 30 [xiv.].

had already composed a work advocating them?¹ Or else with what face does he still "anathematize everybody who entertains these views," if he afterwards composed this work?

CHAP. 24.

But perhaps he may meet us with this rejoinder, that in the sentence before us he spoke of our "meriting the divine grace by doing the will of God," in the sense that grace is added to those who believe and lead godly lives, whereby they may boldly withstand the tempter; whereas their very first reception of grace was, that they might do the will of God. That such a rejoinder, however, is quite untenable [you may judge for yourselves, if] you consider some other words of his on this subject: "The man," says he, "who hastens to the Lord, and desires to be directed by Him, that is, who makes his own will depend upon God's, who moreover cleaves so closely to the Lord as to become (as the apostle says) 'one spirit' with Him,² does all this by nothing else than by his own liberty of will." Observe how great a result he has here stated to be accomplished by one's own free will; and how, in fact, he supposes us to cleave to God without the help of God: for such is the force of his words, "by nothing else than by his own liberty of will." So that, after we have cleaved to the Lord without His help, we even then, because of such adhesion of our own, deserve to be assisted. [XXIII.] For he goes on to say: "Whosoever makes a right use of this" (that is, rightly uses his liberty of will), "does so entirely surrender himself to God, and does so completely mortify his own will, that he is able to say with the apostle, '[Nevertheless I live]; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me;'³ and [in the words of Solomon], 'He placeth his heart in the hand of God, so that He turneth it whithersoever He willeth.'"⁴ Great indeed is the help of the grace of God, when He turns our heart in whatever direction He pleases. But according to this writer's foolish opinion, however great the help may be, we deserve it all at the moment when, without any assistance beyond the liberty of our own will, we hasten to the Lord, desire His

¹ [The "*hunc librum*" of the text being the *Epistola ad Demetriadem*.]

² 1 Cor. vi. 17.

³ Gal. ii. 20.

⁴ Prov. xxi. 1 (Septuagint).

guidance and direction, suspend our own will entirely on His, and by close adherence to Him become one spirit with Him. Now all these vast courses of goodness we (according to him) accomplish, forsooth, simply by the choice of our own free will; and by reason of such antecedent merits we so secure His grace, that He turns our heart which way soever He pleases. Well, now, how is *that* grace which is not gratuitously conferred? How can it be grace, if it is given in payment of a debt? How can that be true which the apostle says, "It is not of yourselves, but it is the gift of God; not of works, lest any man should boast;"¹ and again, "If it is of grace, then is it no more of works, otherwise grace is no more grace:"² how, I repeat, can this be true, if such meritorious works precede as to procure for us the bestowal of grace? Surely, under the circumstances, there can be no gratuitous gift, but only the recompense of a due reward. Is it the case, then, that in order to find their way to the help of God, men run to God without God's help? And in order that we may receive God's help while cleaving to Him, do we without His help cleave to God? What greater gift, or even what similar gift, could grace itself bestow upon any man, if he has already without grace been able to make himself one spirit with the Lord by no other power than that of his own free will?

CHAP. 25. [XXIV.]—*God by His wonderful power works in our hearts good dispositions of our will.*

Now I want him to tell us whether that king of Assyria,³ whose holy wife Esther "abhorred his bed,"⁴ whilst sitting upon the throne of his kingdom, and clothed in all his glorious apparel, adorned all over with gold and precious stones, and dreadful in his majesty, when he raised his face, which was inflamed with anger, in the midst of his splendour, and beheld her, with the glare of a wild bull in the fierceness of his indignation; and the queen was afraid, and her colour changed as

¹ Eph. ii. 8, 9.

² Rom. xi. 6.

³ [The reading "*Assyrius*" is replaced in some editions by the more suitable word "*Assuerus*."]]

⁴ [This "*exsecratur cubile*" seems to refer to Esther's words in her prayer, βδελύσσομαι κούβητὴν ἀπεριτομήτων, "I abhor the couch of the uncircumcised" (Esth. iv., Septuagint).]]

she fainted, and she bowed herself upon the head of the maid that went before her;¹—I want him, [I say], to tell us whether this king had yet “hastened to the Lord, and had desired to be directed by Him, and had subordinated his own will to His, and had, by cleaving fast to God, become one spirit with Him, [and had then done all this] simply by the force of his own free will.” Had he surrendered himself wholly to God, and entirely mortified his own will, and placed his heart in the hand of God? I suppose that anybody who should think this of the king, in the state he was then in, would be not foolish only, but even mad. And yet God converted him, and turned his indignation into gentleness. Who, however, can fail to see how much greater a task it is to change and turn wrath completely into gentleness, than to bend the heart, when it is not preoccupied with either affection, but is indifferently poised between the two, in any direction at all? Let them therefore read and understand, observe and acknowledge, that it is not by law and doctrine uttering their lessons from without, but by a secret, wonderful, and ineffable power operating within, that God works in men's hearts not only revelations of the truth, but also good dispositions of the will.

CHAP. 26. [XXV.]—*The Pelagian grace of “possibility” exploded. Pelagius a proud assertor of the liberty of the will.*

Let Pelagius, therefore, cease at last to deceive both himself and others by his disputations against the grace of God. It is not in the interest of only one of the three faculties—that is to say, of the “possibility” of effecting a good will and work—that the grace of God towards us ought to be proclaimed and held; but it must also include in its operation the good “will” and “work” themselves. This “possibility,” indeed, according to his definition, avails for both directions [of good and evil]; and yet our sins must not also be attributed to God in consequence, as our good actions, according to his view, are owing to the same possibility attributed to Him. It is not simply, therefore, on this account that the help of God's grace is held and maintained, because it assists our natural capacity or possibility. He must give up saying, “The fact that we have the possibility of accomplishing every

¹ Esth. v. 1 (Septuagint).

good thing by action, speech, and thought, comes from Him who has endowed us with this possibility, and who also assists it; whereas the fact that we really do a good thing, or speak a good word, or think a good thought, proceeds from our own selves." He must, I repeat, cease to say this. For God has not only conferred on us the capacity [or "possibility"], but He further works in us "to will and to do."¹ It is not because of our own not willing, or our own not doing, that we will and do nothing good, but because we are unhelped by Him. How can he say, "That we have the possibility of doing good is of God, but that we actually do good is of ourselves," when the apostle tells us that he "prays to God" in behalf of those to whom he was writing, "that they should do no evil, but that they should do that which is good and honest" ?² His words are not, We pray that ye *be not able* to do anything evil; but, "that ye do no evil." Neither does he say, That ye *be able* to do that which is honest and good; but, "that ye should do that which is good." Forasmuch as it is written, "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God,"³ it follows that, in order that they may do that which is good, they must be led by Him who is good. How can Pelagius say, "That we have the power of making a good use of speech comes from God; but that we do actually make this good use of speech proceeds from ourselves," when the Lord declares, "It is the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you" ?⁴ He does not say, It is not in your own competency to bestow on yourselves the power of speaking rightly and well; but His words are, "It is not ye that speak."⁵ Nor does He say, It is the Spirit of your Father which *giveth*, or *hath given*, you the power to speak; but He says, "[It is the Spirit of your Father] which speaketh in you." He does not allude to the motion or assistance of "the possibility," but He plainly asserts the effect of actual co-operation. How can this arrogant asserter of free will say, "That we have the ['possibility' or] power to think a good thought comes from God, but that we actually think a good thought proceeds from ourselves" ? He has his answer to all

¹ Phil. ii. 13.² See 2 Cor. xiii. 7.³ Rom. viii. 14.⁴ Matt. x. 20.⁵ Matt. x. 20.

this from the humble preacher of grace, who says, "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God."¹ Observe he does not say, *to be able* to think anything; but, "to think anything."

CHAP. 27. [XXVI.]—*What the true grace is, as opposed to Pelagius' grace. Grace, properly so called, is a gift of charity. Merits do not precede grace.*

Now even Pelagius should frankly confess that such grace as that is plainly set forth in the inspired Scriptures; nor should he hide from himself the fact that he has too long opposed it with shameless effrontery. Let him, however, admit the discovery with salutary regret; so that the Church may cease to be harassed by his stubborn persistence, but rather rejoice in his sincere conversion. Let him discern between knowledge and charity, as they ought to be distinguished; because "knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth."² Knowledge, however, no longer inflates a man when charity moulds his character. And inasmuch as both are gifts of God (although one is less, and the other greater), he must not extol our righteousness above the praise which is due to Him who justifies us, in such a way as to assign to the lesser of these two gifts the help of divine grace, and to claim the greater one for the control of the human will. And should he consent that we receive charity from the grace of God, he must not suppose that any merits of our own preceded our reception of the gift. For what merits could we possibly have had at the time when we loved not God? In order, indeed, that we might receive that charity whereby we might love [Him], we were loved while as yet we felt no love ourselves. This the Apostle John most expressly declares: "Not that we loved God," says he, "but that He loved us;"³ and again, "We love Him, because He first loved us."⁴ Most excellently and truly spoken! For we could not have wherewithal to love Him, unless we received it from Him in His first loving us. And what good could we possibly do if we possessed no love? Or how could we help doing good if we have love? For although God's commandment appears sometimes to be kept by those who do not love Him, but only fear Him; yet where there is no love, no good work is reckoned as done, nor is

¹ 2 Cor. iii. 5. ² 1 Cor. viii. 1. ³ 1 John iv. 10. ⁴ 1 John iv. 19.

there in fact any good work, rightly so called ; because " whatsoever is not of faith is sin,"¹ and " faith worketh by love."² Hence also that grace of God, whereby " His love is shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us,"³ must be so confessed by the man who would make a true confession, as to show his undoubting belief that nothing whatever in the way of goodness pertaining to godliness and real holiness can be accomplished without it. Not after the fashion of him who clearly enough shows us what he thinks of it when he says, " That grace is bestowed in order that what God commands may be the more easily fulfilled ;" which of course means, that even without grace God's commandments may, although less easily, yet actually, be accomplished.

CHAP. 28. [XXVII.]

In the book which he addressed to a certain holy virgin, there is a passage which I have already mentioned,⁴ wherein he plainly indicates what he holds on this subject ; for he speaks of our " deserving the grace of God, and by the help of the Holy Ghost *more easily* resisting the evil spirit." Now why did he insert the phrase " more easily " ? Was not the sense already complete : " By the help of the Holy Ghost resisting the evil spirit " ? But who can fail to perceive what an injury he has caused [to truth] by the insertion in question ? He wants it indeed to be supposed, that so great are the powers of our nature, which he is in such a hurry to exalt, that even without the assistance of the Holy Ghost the evil spirit can be resisted—less easily it may be, but still in a certain measure.

CHAP. 29. [XXVIII.]

Again, in the first book of his *Defence of the Liberty of the Will*, he says : " Now, inasmuch as we have in our free will so strong and sure a protection against sinning, which our Maker has implanted in human nature generally, such is His unspeakable goodness, that we are further defended by His own daily help." Well, but what need is there of such help, if we have in our free will so strong and sure a protection against

¹ Rom. xiv. 23.² Gal. v. 6.³ Rom. v. 5.⁴ [Quoted above, ch. 23 [xxii.], from the *Epistola ad Demetriadem*.]

sinning? But here, as before, he would have it understood that the purpose of the alleged assistance is, that that may be more easily accomplished by grace which he supposes may be effected, less easily, no doubt, but yet actually, without grace.

CHAP. 30. [XXIX.]

In like manner, in another passage of the same book, he says: "In order that men may more easily accomplish by grace that which they are commanded to do by their free will." Now, expunge the phrase "*more easily*," and you leave not only a full, but also a sound sense, if it be regarded as meaning simply this: "That men may accomplish through grace what they are commanded to do by their free will." The addition of the words "more easily," however, tacitly suggests the possibility of accomplishing good works even without the grace of God. But such a meaning is disallowed by Him who says, "Without me ye can do nothing."¹

CHAP. 31. [XXX.]

Let him amend all this, that whereinsoever through human infirmity he has erred in treating of subjects which are so profound, he may not add to the error, the deception and wilfulness which are inspired by the devil, either by denying what he has really believed, or obstinately maintaining what he has rashly adopted, after he has once discovered, on recollecting the light of truth, that he ought never to have entertained such opinions. As for that grace, indeed, by which we are justified,—in other words, whereby "the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us,"²—I have nowhere, in those writings of Pelagius and Cœlestius which I have had the opportunity of reading, found them acknowledging it in the way in which it ought to be acknowledged. In no passage at all have I observed them recognising "the children of the promise," concerning whom the apostle thus speaks: "They which are children of the flesh, these are not the children of God; but the children of the promise are counted for the seed."³ For that which God promises we do not ourselves bring about by our own choice or natural power, but He Himself effects it by His grace.

¹ John xv. 5.² Rom. v. 5.³ Rom. ix. 8.

CHAP. 32.—*Why the Pelagians deemed prayers to be necessary. The letter which Pelagius despatched to Pope Innocent with an exposition of his belief.*

Now I will say nothing at present about the works of Cœlestius, or those tracts of his which he produced in those ecclesiastical proceedings,¹ copies of the whole of which we have taken care to send to you, along with another letter which we deemed it necessary to add. If you carefully examine all these documents, you will observe that he does not place the grace of God, which helps us either to avoid evil or to do good, beyond the natural choice of the will, but only in the law and doctrine [of Scripture]. This he does in such a way as to assert that even their prayers are necessary for the purpose of showing men what to desire and love. All these documents, however, I shall omit further notice of at present. [There are other things to occupy my attention]; for Pelagius too has lately forwarded to Rome both a letter and an exposition of his belief, addressing it to Pope Innocent, of blessed memory, of whose death he was ignorant. Now in this letter he says: "There are certain subjects about which some men are trying to vilify him. One of these is, that he refuses to infants the sacrament of baptism, and promises the kingdom of heaven to some, independently of Christ's redemption. Another of these calumnies is, that he represents man's ability to avoid sin in such terms as to exclude God's assistance, and so strongly confides in the freedom of the human will, that he repudiates the help of divine grace." Now, as touching the perverted opinion he holds about the baptism of infants (although he allows that it ought to be administered to them), in opposition to the Christian faith and catholic truth, this is not the place for us to enter on an accurate discussion. We must now, indeed, complete our treatise on the assistance of grace, which is the subject we undertook. Let us see what answer he makes out of this very letter to the objection which he has proposed concerning this matter. Omitting his invi-

¹ [Augustine again mentions a short treatise by Cœlestius produced by him at Rome in some proceedings of the church there, below, in ch. 36 (xxxiii.), and also in his work *De Peccato Originali*, ch. 2 and 5 (ii., v.), etc. Those acts of the Roman church were drawn up (as Augustine testifies in his *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, ii. 3, "when Cœlestius was present to answer charges laid against him") in the time of Pope Zosimus, A.D. 417.]

dious complaints about his opponents, we approach the subject before us; and when we come to it, [we find that] he has expressed himself as follows.

CHAP. 33. [XXXI.]—*Pelagius professes nothing on the subject of grace, which may not be understood of the law and doctrine.*

“See,” he says, “how this epistle will clear me of these charges before your Blessedness; for in it we clearly and simply declare, that we possess a will which is entirely free in its choice for the commission of sin or the avoiding thereof; and this will is in all good works *always* assisted by divine help.” Now you perceive (such is the understanding which the Lord has given you) that these words of his are inadequate to solve the question. For it is still open to us to inquire what the help is by which he would say that the free will is assisted; lest perchance he should, as is usual with him, maintain that the law and the doctrine are meant. If, indeed, you were to ask him why he used the word “*always*,” he might answer: Because it is written, “And in His law will he meditate day and night.”¹ Then, after interposing a statement about the condition of man, and the possibility with which nature has endowed him for committing and for avoiding sin, he added the following words: “Now this power of our free will we declare to reside generally in all alike—in Christians, in Jews, and in Gentiles. In all men free will is equally inherent by nature, but in Christians alone is it assisted by grace.” We again ask: By what grace? And again he might answer: By the law and the doctrine of Christ.

CHAP. 34.—*Pelagius says that grace is given according to men's merits. The beginning, however, of merit is faith; and this is not a recompense for our merits.*

Then, again, whatever it is which he means by “grace,” he says that it is given even to Christians according to their merits, although he condemned (as I have already mentioned above²), when he was in Palestine, in that remarkable vindication of himself, the persons who hold this opinion. Now these are his words: “In them,” says he, “the good of their created³ condition is naked and defenceless;” meaning in those who are not Christians. Then he composes that other conceit

¹ Ps. i. 2.

² In ch. 23 [xxii.].

³ Conditionis bonum.

of his, and says: "Whereas in those who belong to Christ, there is defence afforded them by Christ's help." You see it is still uncertain what the help is, according to the remark we have already made on the same subject. He goes on, however, to say of those who are not Christians: "They deserve judgment and condemnation, because, although they possess freedom of choice whereby they could come to have faith and deserve God's grace, they make a bad use of the liberty which has been granted to them. But those persons deserve to be rewarded, who by the right use of their free will merit the Lord's grace, and keep His commandments." Now it is clear that he says grace is bestowed according to merit, whatever and of what kind soever the grace is which he means, but which he does not plainly declare. For when he speaks of those persons as deserving reward who make a good use of their free will, and as therefore meriting the Lord's grace, he asserts in fact that a debt is paid to them. What, then, becomes of the apostle's saying, "Being justified freely by His grace"?¹ And what of his other statement too, "By grace are ye saved"?²—where, that he might prevent men's supposing that it is by works, he expressly added, "*by faith.*"³ And yet further, lest it should be imagined that this very faith must be attributed to men independently of the grace of God, the apostle says: "And that not of yourselves; for it is the gift of God."⁴ It follows, therefore, that we receive without any merit of our own that from which everything has its beginning, which, according to them, we obtain because of our merit—that is to say, faith itself. If, however, they insist on denying that this is freely given to us, what is the meaning of the apostle's words: "According as God hath dealt to every man the measure of faith"?⁵ But if it is contended that faith is so bestowed as to be a recompense for merit, not a free gift, what then becomes of another saying of the apostle: "Unto you it is given in the behalf of Christ, not only to believe in Him, but also to suffer for His sake"?⁶ The two facts are by the apostle's testimony both made the effect of a free bestowal—the fact of a man's believing in

¹ Rom. iii. 24.² Eph. i. 8.³ Eph. i. 8.⁴ Eph. i. 8.⁵ Rom. xii. 3.⁶ Phil. i. 29.

Christ, and the fact of one's suffering for His sake. They, however, attribute faith to free will in such a way as to make it appear that grace is rendered as a debt due to faith, and not as a gratuitous gift,—thus ceasing to be grace any longer ; because that is not grace which is not gratuitously bestowed.

CHAP. 35. [XXXII.]

But Pelagius would have the reader pass from this letter to the book which states his belief. This he has made mention of to yourselves, and in it he has discoursed a good deal on points about which no question was raised as to his views. Let us, however, look simply at the subjects about which our own controversy with them is concerned. Having, then, terminated a discussion which he had conducted to his heart's content [on articles of the creed], on which nobody inquired his opinion,—from the Unity of the Trinity to the resurrection of the flesh,—he goes on to say : “ We hold likewise one baptism, which we aver ought to be administered to infants in the same sacramental formula as it is to adults.” Well, now, you have yourselves affirmed that you heard him admit at least as much as this in your presence. What, however, is the use of his saying that the sacrament of baptism is administered to children in the same words as it is to adults, when our point of inquiry is the substantial verity, and not merely the form of words ? It is a more important matter, that (as you write) with his own mouth he replied to your own question, that “ infants receive baptism for the remission of sins.” For he did not say in respect of this point, that [their baptism was administered] in words which mentioned remission of sins, but he acknowledged that they were actually baptized for the remission itself ; and yet for all this, if you were to ask him what the sin is which he supposes to be remitted to them, he would contend that they had none whatever.

CHAP. 36. [XXXIII.]

For who would imagine that, under so clear a confession of the faith, there is concealed a contrary meaning ? No one would have suspected it, if Coelestius had not plainly discovered to us [such a collusion]. He who in that book of

his, which he quoted at Rome in the ecclesiastical proceedings there,¹ so distinctly acknowledged that "infants too are baptized for the remission of sins," also denied that they had any original sin. But let us now observe what Pelagius thought, not about the baptism of infants, but rather about the assistance of divine grace, in this exposition of his belief which he forwarded to Rome. "We allow," says he, "the freedom of the will in such a sense that we declare ourselves to be always in need of the help of God." Well, now, we ask again, what the help is which he says we require; and again we find the case a doubtful one, since he may possibly answer that he meant the law and the doctrine of Christ, whereby that natural "possibility" [of which he speaks] is assisted. We, however, on our side require them to acknowledge a grace like that which the apostle describes, when he says: "For God hath not given us the spirit of fear; but of power, and of love, and of a sound mind;"² although it does not follow by any means that the man who has the gift of knowledge, whereby he has discovered what he ought to do, has also the grace of charity by which to do it.

CHAP. 37. [XXXIV.]

I also have read those books or writings of his which he mentions in the letter which he sent to Pope Innocent, of blessed memory, with the exception of a brief epistle which he says he sent to the holy Bishop Constantius; but I have nowhere been able to find in them that he acknowledges such a grace as helps not only that natural "possibility" [or capacity] of willing and acting (which according to him we possess, even when we neither will a good thing nor do it), but also the will and the action itself, by the ministration of the Holy Ghost.

CHAP. 38. [XXXV.]—*A definition of the grace of Christ.*

"Let them peruse," says he, "the epistle which we wrote about twelve years ago to that holy man Bishop Paulinus: its subject throughout in some three hundred verses is concerning God's grace and assistance, and our own inability to

¹ See above, ch. 32 [xxx.].

² 2 Tim. i. 7.

do any good thing at all without God." Well, I have read this epistle also, and found him dwelling throughout it on scarcely any other topic than the faculty and possibility of man's nature, whilst he makes God's grace consist almost entirely in this possibility. Christ's grace, indeed, he teaches with such brevity, simply mentioning its name, that his only aim seems to have been to avoid the scandal of ignoring it altogether. It is, however, absolutely uncertain whether he means Christ's grace to consist in the remission of sins, or even in the doctrine of Christ, including also the example of His life (a meaning which he asserts in several passages of his treatises); or whether he believes it to be a help towards good living, in addition to nature and doctrine, through the inspiring influence of a burning and shining charity.

CHAP. 39. [XXXVI.]

"Let them also read," says he, "my epistle to the holy Bishop Constantius, wherein I have—briefly no doubt, but yet plainly—combined the grace and help of God with man's free will." This epistle, as I have already stated,¹ I have not read; but if it is not unlike the other writings which he mentions, and with which I am acquainted, even this work does nothing for the subject of our present inquiry.

CHAP. 40. [XXXVII.]—*The help of grace placed by Pelagius in the mere revelation of doctrine.*

"Let them read, moreover," says he, "what I wrote, when I was in the East, to Christ's holy virgin Demetrias, and they will find our commendation of nature to be always so expressed as to admit the addition to it of the help of God's grace." Well, I read this letter too; and I had almost persuaded myself that he did acknowledge therein the grace about which our discussion is concerned, although he did certainly seem in several passages of this work to contradict himself. When, however, there also came to my hands those other treatises which he afterwards wrote for more extensive circulation, I discovered in what sense he must [even in his epistle to Demetrias] have intended to speak of grace,—concealing, indeed, his real opinion in a vague generality, but employing

¹ See above, ch. 37 [xxxiv.].

the term "grace" in order to break the force of obloquy, and to avoid giving offence. For at the very commencement of this work (where he says: "Let us apply ourselves with all earnestness to the task which we have set before us, nor let us have any misgiving because of our own humble ability; for we believe that we are assisted by the mother's faith and her daughter's merit") he appeared to me at first to acknowledge the grace which helps us to individual action; nor did I at once notice the fact that he might possibly have made this grace consist simply in the revelation of doctrine.

СНАР. 41.

In this same work he says in another passage: "Now, if even men without God show of what character they have been made by God, see what Christians have it in their power to do, whose nature has been through Christ restored to a better condition, and who are, moreover, assisted by the help of divine grace." By this restoration of nature to a better state he would have us understand the remission of sins. This he has shown with tolerable clearness in another passage of this epistle, where he says: "Even those who have become in a certain sense obdurate through their constant practice of sinning, can be restored through repentance." But he may even here too make the assistance of divine grace consist in the revelation of doctrine.

СНАР. 42. [XXXVIII.]—*Grace placed by Pelagius in the remission of sins and the example of Christ.*

Likewise in another place in this epistle of his he says: "Now, if even before the law, as we have already remarked, and long previous to the coming of our Lord and Saviour, some men are related to have lived righteous and holy lives; how much more worthy of belief is it that we are capable of doing this since the illumination of His coming? How much better than they, who lived before the law, ought we to be, who have been renewed by the grace of Christ, and born again to a better manhood, who have been reconciled and cleansed by His blood, and by His example encouraged to the pursuit of a perfect righteousness!" Observe how even here, although in different language, he has made the assistance of grace to

consist in the remission of sins and the example of Christ. He then completes the passage by adding these words: "Better than they were even who lived under the law; according to the apostle, who says, 'Sin shall not have dominion over you: for ye are not under the law, but under grace.'¹ Now, inasmuch as we have," says he, "said enough, as I suppose, on this point, let us describe a perfect virgin, who shall testify the good both of nature and of grace by the holiness of her conduct, evermore warmed with the virtues of both." Now it is your duty to notice that in these words also he wished to conclude what he was saying in such a way that we might understand the good of nature to be that which we received when we were created; whereas the good of grace is that which we receive when we regard and follow the example of Christ,—as if sin were not forgiven in the case of those who were or are under the law, on this account, because they either had not Christ's example, or else do not believe in Him.

CHAP. 43. [XXXIX.]

That this, indeed, is his meaning, other words also of his show us,—not contained in this work, but in the third book of his *Defence of Free Will*, wherein he holds a discussion with an opponent, who had insisted on the apostle's words when he says, "For what I would, that do I not;"² and again, "I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind."³ To this he replied in these words: "Now that which you wish us to understand of the apostle himself, all churchmen⁴ assert that he spoke in the person of the sinner, and of one who was still under the law,—such a man as was, by reason of a long course of vice, held bound, as it were, by a certain necessity of sinning, and who, however strongly he desired good in his will, in practice indeed was hurried headlong into evil. In the person, too, of an individual," he continues, "the apostle designates the people who still sinned

¹ Rom. vi. 14.

² Rom. vii. 15.

³ Rom. vii. 23.

⁴ [By his *ecclesiastici viri* he refers, of course, to ecclesiastical writers who had commented on St. Paul's doctrine. See also Augustine's *Contra duas Epist. Pelag.* i. 14 [viii.]; *Contra Julianum*, ii. 5 [iii.], 8 [iv.], 13 [v.], 30 [viii.]; and *De Predestinatione Sanctorum*, 4 [iv.].]

under the ancient law [of Moses]. This nation he declares was to be delivered from this evil of their inveteracy of custom through Christ, who first of all remits all sins in baptism to those who believe in Him, and then urges them by an imitation of Himself to perfect holiness, and by the example of His own virtues overcomes the evil habit of their sins." Observe in what way he supposes them to be assisted who sin under the law: they are to be delivered by being justified through Christ's grace, as if the law alone were insufficient for them, owing to their long habit of sinning, without some reinforcement from Christ; not the inspiration of charity by His Holy Spirit, but the contemplation and copy of His example in the inculcation of virtue by the gospel. Now here, at any rate, there was the very greatest call on him to say plainly what grace he meant, seeing that the apostle closed the very passage which formed the ground of discussion with these telling words: "O wretched man that I am, who [or what] shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord."¹ Now, when he places this grace, not in the help of His power and virtue, but in the imitation of His example, what further hope must we entertain of him, since everywhere the word "grace" is mentioned by him under the disguise of a vague generality?

CHAP. 44. [XL.]

Then, again, in the work addressed to the holy virgin,² of which we have spoken already, there is this passage: "Let us submit ourselves to God, and by accomplishing His will let us merit the divine grace; and let us more easily, by the help of the Holy Ghost, resist the evil spirit." Now, in these words of his, it is plain enough that he regards us as assisted by the grace of the Holy Ghost, not because we are unable to resist the tempter without Him by the sheer capacity of our nature, but in order that we may resist *more easily*. With respect, however, to the quantity and quality, whatever these might be, of this assistance of grace, we may well believe that he made them consist of the additional knowledge which the Spirit reveals to us through the doctrine [of Christ], and which

¹ Rom. vii. 25.

² The nun Demetrias.

we either cannot, or scarcely can, possess through our natural resources. Such are the particulars which I have been able to discover in the book which he addressed to the virgin [disciple] of Christ, and wherein he evidently confesses [a doctrine of] grace. Of what purport and kind these details really are, you of course perceive.

CHAP. 45. [XLI.]—*To what purpose Pelagius thought prayers ought to be directed; the revelation of "Doctrine" by the Holy Ghost is acknowledged by Pelagius; what grace, properly so called, is according to the view of Pelagius.*

"Let them also read," says he, "my recent little treatise which we were obliged to publish a short while ago in defence of the freedom of the will, and then they will discover how unfair is their determination to disparage us for a denial of grace, when we throughout almost the whole work acknowledge fully and sincerely both free will and grace." There are four books in this treatise, all of which I read, marking such passages as required consideration, and which I proposed to discuss: these I examined as well as I was able, before we came to that epistle of his which was sent to Rome. But even in these four books, that which he seems to regard as the grace which helps us to turn aside from evil and to do good, he describes in such a manner as to keep to his old ambiguity of language, and thus have it in his power so to explain it to his followers, that they may suppose the assistance which is rendered by grace, for the purpose of helping our natural capacity [or "possibility"], consists of nothing else than the Law and the Doctrine. Thus our very prayers (as, indeed, he most plainly affirms in his writings) are of no other use, in his opinion, than to procure for us the explanation of the doctrine by a divine instruction, not to procure help for the mind of man to bring to effect by action and love the lessons of duty which it has learned. The fact is, he does not in the least relinquish that very clear ground of his system in which he sets forth our three faculties of possibility, volition, and action; maintaining that only the first of these, the possibility, is favoured with the constant assistance of divine help, but supposing that the will and the practical act stand in no need of God's assistance. Moreover, the very help which he says assists our natural capacity [or so-called "possibility"], he places in the law and

the doctrine. This doctrine, he allows, is revealed or explained to us by the Holy Ghost, on which account it is that he concedes the necessity of prayer. But still this assistance of law and doctrine he supposes to have existed even in the days of the prophets; whereas the help of grace, which is properly so called, he will have to lie simply in the example of Christ. But this example, you can plainly see, pertains after all to "doctrine,"—even that which is preached to us as the doctrine of the gospel. The general result, then, is the pointing out, as it were, of a road to us by which we are bound to walk, now that we are endued with the resources of our free will, and in want of no assistance from any one else, so that we have in ourselves sufficient power not to faint or fail on our journey. And even as to the discovery of the road itself, he contends that nature alone is competent for it; only the discovery will be *more* easily effected if grace renders assistance.

CHAP. 46. [XLII.]

Such are the particulars which, to the best of my ability, I have succeeded in obtaining from the writings of Pelagius, whenever he makes mention of grace. You perceive, however, that men who entertain such opinions as we have reviewed are "ignorant of God's righteousness, and desire to establish their own [righteousness],"¹ and are far off from "the righteousness which we have of God,"² and not of ourselves; [although] they ought to have discovered and recognised it, especially in the Holy Scriptures of the Canon. Forasmuch, however, as they read these Scriptures in a sense of their own, they of course fail to observe even the most obvious truths therein. Would to God, indeed, that they would but turn their attention in no careless mood to what might be learned concerning the help of God's grace in the writings, at all events, of catholic worthies; for they freely allow that the Scriptures were correctly understood by these, and that they would not pass them by in neglect, out of an overweening fondness for their own opinions. For how this very man Pelagius, in that very treatise of his so recently put forth, and which he formally mentions in his self-defence (that is to say,

¹ Rom. x. 3.² Phil. iii. 9.

in the third book of his *Defence of Free Will*), praises Saint Ambrose, you may understand [from the following extract].

CHAP. 47. [XLIII.]—*Ambrose most highly praised by Pelagius.*

“The blessed Bishop Ambrose,” says he, “in whose writings the faith of Rome shines forth with especial brightness, and whom the Latins have always regarded as the very flower and glory of their authors, has never found a foe bold enough to censure his faith and purest interpretation of the Scriptures.” Now observe the sort as well as the amount of the praises which he bestows [upon his favourite]: however holy and learned he be, he is incomparable as an authority on the canonical Scripture. The reason of this high commendation of Ambrose lies in the circumstance, that Pelagius sees proper to quote a certain passage from his writings to prove that man is able to live without sin. This, however, is not the question before us. We are at present discussing that assistance of grace which helps us towards avoiding sin, and leading holy lives.

CHAP. 48. [XLIV.]—*Ambrose is not in agreement with Pelagius.*

I wish, indeed, that he would listen to the venerable bishop [whom he admires], when, in the second book of his *Exposition of the Gospel according to Luke*,¹ he expressly teaches us that the Lord co-operates also with our wills. “You see, therefore,” says he, “that no man is able to build without the Lord, no man is able to watch without the Lord, no man is able to undertake anything without the Lord. Whence the apostle thus enjoins: ‘Whether ye eat, or whether ye drink, do all to the glory of God.’”² You observe how the holy Ambrose deprives men of even their familiar expressions,—such as, “We undertake, but God accomplishes,”—when he says here that no man is able to take anything in hand without the Lord. To the same effect he says, in the sixth book of the same work,³ treating of the two debtors of a certain creditor: “According to men’s opinions, he perhaps is the greater offender⁴ who has contracted the larger debt. The case, however, is altered when the Lord’s mercy is concerned. Here it happens

¹ [Book ii. c. 84, on Luke iii. 22.] ² 1 Cor. x. 31.

³ [Book vi. c. 25, on Luke vii. 41.] ⁴ [Or perhaps, “feels the greater offence.”]

that he who owes the most loves the most, when indeed he obtains grace." See how the catholic doctor most plainly declares, that the very love which prompts every [Christian] man to an ampler love appertains to the kindly gift of grace.

CHAP. 49. [XLV.]—*With what eye Christ turned and looked upon Peter.*

That repentance, indeed, itself, which beyond all doubt is an affair of the will, is wrought into action by the mercy and help of the Lord, is asserted by the blessed Ambrose in the following passage:¹ "Good," says he, "are the tears which wash away sin. They upon whom the Lord at last turns and looks bewail. Peter, when at first he denied Him, did not weep, because the Lord had not turned and looked upon him. He denied Him a second time, and still wept not, because the Lord had not even yet turned and looked upon him. The third time also he denied Him, Jesus turned and looked; then he wept most bitterly." Let these persons only read the Gospel; let them consider how that the Lord Jesus was at that moment within, having a hearing before the chief of the priests; whilst the Apostle Peter was outside,² and down in the hall,³ sitting at one time with the servants at the fire,⁴ at another time standing,⁵ as the most accurate and consistent narrative of the several evangelists shows. It cannot therefore be said that it was with His bodily eyes that the Lord turned and looked upon him by a visible and apparent admonition. That operation, then, which is described in the words, "The Lord turned and looked upon Peter,"⁶ was effected internally; it was wrought upon the mind, wrought upon the will. In mercy the Lord silently and secretly approached, touched the heart, recalled the memory of the past, with His own internal grace visited—gazed upon Peter, stirred and brought out into external tears the feelings of his inner man. Behold in what manner God comes home with His help to our wills and our actions; see how "He worketh in us both to will and to do."

¹ ["In the *ninth* book of the same work," says St. Augustine. The true reference, however, is to book x. c. 89, on Luke xxii. 61.]

² Matt. xxvi. 69, 71.

³ Mark xiv. 66.

⁴ Luke xxii. 55.

⁵ John xviii. 16.

⁶ Luke xxii. 61.

CHAP. 50.

In the same book the same St. Ambrose says again: "Now if Peter fell, who said, 'Though all men shall be offended, yet will I never be offended,' who else shall have any right to presume so far for himself? David, indeed, because he had boasted, 'In my prosperity I said, I shall never be moved,' confesses how injurious his confidence had proved to himself. 'Thou didst turn away Thy face,' he says, 'and I was troubled.'"¹ Pelagius ought to listen to the teaching of so eminent a man, and should follow his faith, since he has commended both it and his doctrine. Let him listen humbly; let him follow with fidelity; let him indulge no longer in obstinate presumption, lest he perish therein. Why does Pelagius choose to be drowned in that sea whence Peter was rescued by the Rock?²

CHAP. 51. [XLVI.]

Let him lend an ear also to the same godly bishop, who says, in the sixth book of the before quoted Exposition:³ "The reason why they would not receive Him is mentioned by the evangelist himself in these words, 'Because His face was as though He would go to Jerusalem;'⁴ but His disciples had a strong wish that He should be received into the Samaritan town. God, however, calls whomsoever He deigns, and whom He wills He affects with religion." What wise insight of the man of God, drawn from the very fountain of God's grace! "God," says he, "calls whomsoever He deigns, and whom He wills He makes religious." See whether this is not the prophet's own declaration: "I will be gracious" [saith the Lord to Moses] "to whom I will be gracious, and will show mercy on whom I will show mercy;"⁵ and the apostle's deduction therefrom: "So then," says he, "it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy."⁶ Now, when even his model man of our own times says, that "whomsoever God vouchsafes to call He calls, and

¹ Ps. xxx. 7.

² [It is impossible to keep the playful jingle of the original, which has the words *Pelago, Pelagius*; and *Petram, Petrus*.]

³ [It is the *seventh* book in reality, c. 27, on Luke ix. 53.]

⁴ Luke ix. 53.

⁵ Ex. xxxiii. 19.

⁶ Rom. ix. 16.

whom He wills He inspires with religion," will any one be bold enough to contend that that man is not as yet influenced by religious emotion "who hastens to the Lord, and desires to be directed by Him, and makes his own will depend upon God's; who, moreover, cleaves so closely to the Lord, that he becomes (as the apostle says) 'one spirit' with Him?"¹ Great, however, as is this entire work of a "religious man," Pelagius maintains that it is effected only by the free energy of the human will. But his own blessed Ambrose, whom he so highly commends in word, is against him when he says: "The Lord God calls whomsoever He deigns, and whom He wills He affects with religion." It is God, then, who endues with religious principle whomsoever He pleases, in order that he who is so endued may "hasten to the Lord, and desire to be directed by Him, and make his own will depend upon God's, and cleave so closely to the Lord as to become (to use the apostle's phrase) 'one spirit' with Him." All this none but a man religiously affected does. Who, then, ever does so much, unless he be made by God to do it?

CHAP. 52. [XLVII.]—*The difficulty of reconciling man's free will and God's grace. What is required of Pelagius on this question of grace.*

Inasmuch, however, as the discussion about free will and God's grace has this difficulty in arriving at a decision, that if the freedom of the will be maintained, God's grace is apparently denied; whilst if God's grace be asserted, free will is supposed to be done away with,—Pelagius has this advantage, that he can so involve himself in the meshes of this obscure subject as to profess agreement with all that we have quoted from Saint Ambrose, and declare, moreover, that such is, and always has been, his opinion; and yet at the same time so explain each of his sentiments, that men may suppose them to be in fair accord with Ambrose's doctrine. So far, therefore, as concerns the question of God's help and grace, you are requested to observe the three principles which he has distinguished so very plainly, under the terms *posse, velle, and esse*, that is to say, possibility, volition, and action. If, then, he has come round to an agreement with us, [he will believe]

¹ 1 Cor. vi. 17. These are the words of Pelagius, which have been already quoted above, in ch. 24.

that not the "possibility" alone, unaccompanied by the good will and the virtuous action, but the will and the action also—in other words, our exercising a virtuous will, and making it yield the fruit of good conduct—are faculties which have not a barren existence in man, but exist in him only when he has a good will and acts rightly. If, I repeat, he thus consents to hold with us, that even the will and the action are assisted by God, and so assisted that we can neither will nor do any good thing without such help; if, too, he believes that this is that very grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ which makes us righteous through His righteousness, and not our own, so that our true righteousness is that which we have of Him,—then, so far as I can judge, there will remain no further controversy between us concerning the assistance we have from the grace of God.

CHAP. 53. [XLVIII.]—*In what sense some men may be said to live without sin in the present life.*

But in reference to the particular point in which he quoted the holy Ambrose with so much approbation, even because he found in that author's writings, from the praises he accorded to Zacharias and Elisabeth, the opinion that a man might in this life be without sin; although this cannot be denied on the supposition that God wills it, with whom all things are possible, yet he ought to consider more carefully *in what sense* this position is laid down. Now, so far as I can see, this statement was made in accordance with a certain standard of conduct, which is among men held to be worthy of approval and praise, and which no human being could justly call in question for the purpose of laying accusation or censure. Such a standard Zacharias and his wife Elisabeth are said to have maintained in the sight of God, for no other reason than that they, by walking therein, never deceived people by any dissimulation; but as they in their sincerity appeared to men, so were they known in the sight of God.¹ The statement, however, was not made with any reference to that perfect state of righteousness in which we shall one day live truly and absolutely in a condition of spotless purity. The Apostle Paul, indeed, has told us that he was "blameless, as touching the righteousness which

¹ Luke i. 6.

is of the law ;"¹ and it was in respect of the same law that Zacharias also lived a blameless life. This righteousness, however, the apostle counted as "dung" and as "loss," in comparison with the righteousness which is the object of our hope,² and which we ought to "hunger and thirst after,"³ in order that by and by we may be satisfied with the vision thereof, enjoying it now by faith, so long as "the just do live by faith."⁴

CHAP. 54. [XLIX.]

Lastly, let him give good heed to his venerable bishop, in his *Exposition of the Prophet Isaiah*,⁵ when he says that "no man in this world can be without sin." Now nobody can pretend to say that by the phrase "*in this world*" he simply meant, in the love of this world. For he was speaking of the apostle, who said, "Our conversation is in heaven ;"⁶ and while unfolding the sense of these words, the eminent bishop expressed himself thus: "Now the apostle says that many men, even while living in the present world, are perfect and consistent with themselves, who could not possibly be deemed perfect, if one looks at absolute and true perfection. For he says himself: 'We now see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know, even as also I am known.'⁷ In a sense, they who are spotless in this world will also be spotless in the kingdom of God; although, of course, if you sift the thing minutely, no one could be spotless, because no one is without sin." This passage, then, of the holy Ambrose, which Pelagius applies in support of his own opinion, was either written in a qualified sense, probable indeed, but not expressed with minute accuracy; or if the holy and lowly-minded author did think that Zacharias and Elisabeth lived according to the highest and absolutely perfect righteousness, which was incapable of in-

¹ Phil. iii. 6.

² Phil. iii. 8.

³ Matt. v. 6.

⁴ Rom. i. 17.

⁵ This work of Ambrose is no longer extant. It is again quoted by Augustine in his work *De Peccato Originali*, c. 47 [xli.]; in his *De Nuptiis et Concupisc.* i. 40 [xxxv.]; in his *Contra Julianum*, i. 11 [iv.], ii. 24 [viii.]; and his *Contra duas Epist. Pelagianorum*, c. 30 [xi.]. Ambrose himself mentions this work of his in his *Exposition of Luke*, book ii. c. 56, on Luke ii. 19.

⁶ Phil. iii. 20.

⁷ 1 Cor. xiii. 13.

crease or addition, he certainly corrected his opinion on a minuter examination of it.

CHAP. 55. [L.]

He ought, moreover, carefully to note the fact that, in the very same context from which he quoted this passage of Ambrose's, which seemed so satisfactory for his purpose, [the venerable author] also said this: "To be spotless and pure from the beginning [of one's life] is an impossibility to human nature."¹ In this sentence the venerable Ambrose does undoubtedly predicate feebleness and infirmity of that natural gift of "possibility," which Pelagius faithfully refuses to regard as vitiated by sin, and therefore boastfully extols. [In this, Ambrose], beyond question, runs counter to this man's will and inclination, although he does not contravene the truthful confession of the apostle, wherein he says: "We too were once by nature the children of wrath, even as others."² For through the sin of the first man, which issued from his free will, our nature became vitiated and ruined; and nothing ever came to its succour but God's grace alone, through Him who is the Mediator between God and men, and our Almighty Physician. Now, since we have already prolonged this work too far in treating of the assistance of the *divine grace* towards our justification, by which assistance God co-operates in all things with those who love Him for their good,³ and with whom He was beforehand in loving⁴—giving to them [His love], that He might receive theirs in return—we must commence another treatise, as the Lord shall enable us, on the subject of *sin* also, which by one man has entered into the world, along with death, and so has passed upon all men;⁵ setting forth as much as shall seem needful and sufficient, in opposition to those persons who have broken out into violent and open error, contrary to the truth here stated [by the apostle].

¹ See Augustine, above, *De Naturâ et Gratiâ*, c. 75 [lxiii.].

² Eph. ii. 3.

1 John iv. 19.

³ Rom. viii. 28.

⁵ Rom. v. 12.

BOOK SECOND.

ON ORIGINAL SIN.

WHEREIN AUGUSTINE SHOWS THAT PELAGIUS REALLY DIFFERS IN NO RESPECT, ON THE QUESTIONS OF ORIGINAL SIN AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS, FROM HIS FOLLOWER CÆLESTIUS, WHO, REFUSING TO ACKNOWLEDGE ORIGINAL SIN, AND EVEN DARING TO DENY THE DOCTRINE IN PUBLIC, WAS CONDEMNED IN TRIALS BEFORE THE BISHOPS—FIRST AT CARTHAGE, AND AFTERWARDS AT ROME; FOR THIS QUESTION WAS NOT, AS THESE HERETICS WOULD HAVE IT, ONE WHEREIN PERSONS MIGHT ERR WITHOUT DANGER TO THE FAITH. THEIR HERESY, INDEED, AIMED AT NOTHING ELSE THAN THE VERY FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN BELIEF. HE AFTERWARDS REFUTES ALL SUCH AS MAINTAINED THAT THE BLESSING OF MATRIMONY IS DISPARAGED BY THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL DEPRAVITY, AND AN INJURY DONE TO GOD HIMSELF, THE CREATOR OF MAN, WHO IS BORN BY MEANS OF MATRIMONY.

CHAP. I. [I.]

NEXT I beg of you, [Albina, Pinianus, and Melania],¹ carefully to observe with what caution you ought, on the question of the baptism of infants, to lend an ear to men of this character, who have not the courage openly to refuse the laver of regeneration and the forgiveness of sins to this early age, for fear that Christians would not bear to listen to them; and who yet persist in holding and urging their opinion, that the children of our first parent were not born in sin, although they apparently allow infants to be baptized for the remission of sins. You have, indeed, yourselves informed me in your letter, that you heard Pelagius say in your presence, reading out of that book of his which he declared that he had actually sent to Rome, that [his party] maintain that “infants ought to be baptized with the same formula of sacramental words as adults.” Who, after that statement, would suppose that they ought to raise any question at all on this subject? Or if he did [suppose so], to whom would he not seem to indulge a very calumnious disposition—previous, [at all events], to the perusal of their plain assertions, in which they deny

¹ [See above, in book i. c. 1, *De Gratia Christi.*]

that infants inherit original sin, and contend that all persons are by birth free from all sinful taint ?

CHAP. 2. [II.]—*Cœlestius, on his trial at Carthage, refuses to condemn this error ; the written statement which he gave to Zosimus [Bp. of Rome].*

Cœlestius, indeed, maintained this erroneous doctrine with less restraint. To such an extent did he push his freedom as actually to refuse, when on trial before the bishops at Carthage, to condemn those who say, "That Adam's sin injured only Adam himself, and not the human race, and that infants at their birth are in the same state that Adam was in before his transgression and fall."¹ In the written statement, too, which he presented to the most blessed Pope Zosimus at Rome, he declared with especial plainness, "that original sin binds not a single infant." Concerning the proceedings at Carthage we copy the following account from his words.

CHAP. 3. [III.]—*Part of the acts of the Council of Carthage against Cœlestius.*

"The bishop Aurelius said: Let what follows be recited. It was accordingly recited, that the sin of Adam injured only himself, and not the human race. Then, after the recital, Cœlestius said: I said that I was in doubt about the transmission of sin,² but so as to yield assent to any man whom God has gifted with the grace of knowledge; for the fact is, that I have heard different opinions from men who have been even appointed presbyters in the Catholic Church. The deacon Paulinus³ said: Tell us their names. Cœlestius answered: The holy presbyter Rufinus,⁴ who lived at Rome

¹ Pelagius, at Diospolis, condemned this position of Cœlestius. Hence the comparative restraint on Pelagius, and the greater freedom in holding the error which is here attributed to Cœlestius.

² *De traduce peccati*, the technical phrase to express the conveyance by birth of original sin.

³ This Paulinus, according to Mercator (*Commonit. super nomine Cœlestii*), was the deacon of Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, and the author of his biography, which he wrote at the instance of Augustine. He, according to his own showing, lived in Africa, and wrote the *Life of Ambrose* when John was pretorian prefect, *i.e.* either in the year 412, or 413, or 422. The trial mentioned in the text took place about the commencement of the year 413, according to Augustine's letter to Pope Innocent (*Inter Augustinianas*, 175, 1. 6). See above, in the treatise *De Gestis Pelagii*, 23.—[ED. BENED.]

⁴ Mercator (*Commonit. adv. Hæres. Pelagii*) informs us that a certain Syrian

with the holy Pammachius. I heard him declare that there is no transmitted sin. The deacon Paulinus then asked: Is there any one else? Cœlestius replied: I heard others say the same. The deacon Paulinus rejoined: Tell us their names. Cœlestius said: Is not one priest enough for you?" Then afterwards in another passage we read: "The bishop Aurelius said: Let the rest of the book be read." It then went on to recite how that infants at their birth are in the same state as Adam was before his transgression; and they read to the very end of the little book which had been previously put in. [IV.] "The bishop Aurelius inquired: Have you, Cœlestius, taught at any time, as the deacon Paulinus has stated, that infants are at their birth in the same state as Adam was previous to his transgression? Cœlestius answered: Let him explain what he meant when he said, '*previous to his transgression.*' The deacon Paulinus then said: Do you on your side deny that you ever taught this doctrine? It must be one of two things: he must either say that he never so taught, or else he must now condemn the opinion. Cœlestius rejoined: I have already said, Let him explain the words he mentioned, '*previous to the transgression.*' The deacon Paulinus then said: You must deny ever having taught this. The bishop Aurelius said: I ask, What conclusion I have on my part to draw from this man's obstinacy; my affirmation is, that although Adam, as created in Paradise, is said to have been made incapable of dissolution at first, he afterwards became corruptible through transgressing the commandment. Do you say so, brother Paulinus? I do, my lord, answered the deacon Paulinus. Then the bishop Aurelius said: As regards the condition of infants before baptism at the present day, the deacon Paulinus wishes to be informed whether it is such as Adam's called Rufinus introduced the discussion against original sin and its transmission into Rome in the pontificate of Anastasius. According to some, this was the Rufinus of Aquileia, whom Jerome (*in Epist. ad Ctesiphont.*) notices as the precursor of Pelagius in his error about the sinless nature of man; according, however, to others, it is the other Rufinus, mentioned by Jerome in his 66th Epistle, who is possibly the same as he who rejects the transmission of original sin in a treatise *On Faith*, which J. Sismondi published as the work of Rufinus, a presbyter of the province of Palestine. It is, at any rate, hardly possible to suppose that the Aquileian Rufinus either went to Rome, or lodged there with Pammachius, in the time of Pope Anastasius.—[ED. BENED.]

was before his transgression ; and whether at least it derives the guilt of transgression from the original sin wherein it is born ? The deacon Paulinus asked : Whether he actually taught this, or could not deny the allegation ? Cœlestius answered : As touching the transmission of original sin, I have already asserted, that I have heard many persons of acknowledged position in the Catholic Church deny it altogether ; and on the other hand, many affirm it : it may be fairly deemed a matter for inquiry, but not a heresy. I have always maintained that infants require baptism, and ought to be baptized. What else does he want ?”

CHAP. 4.

You, of course, see that Cœlestius here conceded baptism for infants only in such a manner as to be unwilling to confess that the sin of the first man, which is washed away in the laver of regeneration, is transferred to them, although at the same time he did not venture to deny [the transmission] ; but by reason of his uncertainty and doubt he refused to condemn those who maintain “ that Adam’s sin injured only himself, and not the human race ; and that infants at their birth are in the self-same condition wherein Adam was before he fell.”

CHAP. 5. [v.]—*Cœlestius’ book which was produced in the proceedings at Rome.*

But in the book which he published at Rome, and produced in the proceedings before the church there, he so speaks on this question as to show that he really believed that about which he had professed to be in doubt. For these are his words : “ That infants, however, ought to be baptized for the remission of sins, according to the rule of the Church universal, and according to the meaning of the Gospel, we readily admit. For the Lord has determined that the kingdom of heaven should only be conferred on baptized persons ;¹ and since the resources of nature do not possess it, it must necessarily be conferred by [God’s] free grace.” Now if he had not said anything elsewhere on this subject, who would not have supposed that he acknowledged the remission of original sin in infants at their baptism, by saying that they ought to be baptized for

¹ John iii. 5.

the remission of sins? Hence the point of what you have stated in your letter, that Pelagius' answer to you was on this wise, "That infants are baptized with the same words of sacramental formula as adults," and that you were rejoiced to hear the very thing which you were desirous of hearing, and yet that we preferred holding a consultation concerning his words.

CHAP. 6. [VI.]—*Cœlestius the disciple is in this work bolder than his master.*

Carefully observe, then, what Cœlestius has advanced so very openly, and you will discover what amount of concealment Pelagius has practised upon you. Cœlestius goes on to say as follows: "That infants, however, must be baptized for the remission of sins, was not admitted by us with the view of our seeming to affirm [the doctrine of] original sin, which is very alien from the sentiment of Catholics. Because sin is not born with a man; it is subsequently committed by the man: for it is shown to be a fault, not of nature, but of the human will. It is fitting, indeed, to confess this, lest we should seem to make different kinds of baptism; it is, moreover, necessary to lay down this preliminary safeguard, lest by the occasion of this mystery evil should, to the disparagement of the Creator, be said to be conveyed to man by nature, previous to man's having committed it at all." Now Pelagius was either afraid or ashamed to avow this to be his own opinion before you; although his disciple experienced neither a qualm nor a blush in openly professing it to be his, without any obscure subterfuges, in presence of the Apostolic See.

CHAP. 7.—*Pope Zosimus kindly excuses him.*

The bishop, however, who presides over this See, upon seeing him hurrying headlong in so great presumption, like a madman, chose in his great compassion, with a view to the man's repentance, if it might be, rather to bind him tightly by eliciting from him answers to questions proposed by himself, than by the stroke of a severe condemnation to drive him over the precipice, down which he seemed to be even now ready to fall. I say advisedly, "down which he seemed to be ready to fall," rather than "over which he had actually fallen," because he had already in this same book of his forecast the

subject with an intended reference to questions of this sort in the following words: "If it should so happen that any error of ignorance has stolen over [us, who are but] human beings, let it be corrected by your decisive sentence."

CHAP. 8. [VII.]—*Cælestius condemned by Zosimus.*

The venerable Pope Zosimus, keeping in view this deprecatory preamble, dealt with the man, puffed up as he was with the blasts of false doctrine, in such a way as to condemn all the objectionable points which had been alleged against him by the deacon Paulinus, whilst yielding his assent to the rescript of the Apostolic See which had been issued by his predecessor of sacred memory. The accused man, however, refused to condemn the objections raised by the deacon, yet he did not venture to hold out against the letter of the blessed Pope Innocent; indeed, he went so far as to promise "that he would condemn all the points which the Apostolic See condemned." Thus the man was treated with gentle remedies, as a delirious patient who required rest; but, at the same time, he was not regarded as being yet ready to be released from the restraints of excommunication. The interval of two months was granted him, until communications could be received from Africa, with the further concession of a *locus penitentiæ*, under the mild restorative of the sentence which had been pronounced. For the truth is, if he would have laid aside his vain obstinacy, and be now willing to carry out what he had undertaken, and would carefully read the very letter to which he had replied by promising submission, he would yet come to a better mind. But after the rescripts were duly issued from the council of the African bishops, there were very good reasons why the sentence should be carried out against him, in strictest accordance with equity. What these reasons were you may read for yourselves, for we have sent you all the particulars.

CHAP. 9. [VIII.]—*Pelagius deceived the council in Palestine, but was unable to deceive the church at Rome. The faith of the Romans deserved to be spoken of. Pelagius lived at Rome for some time.*

From these [you will find that] even Pelagius, if he will only reflect candidly on his own position and writings, has no

reason for saying that he ought not to have been banned with such a sentence. For although he deceived the council in Palestine, seemingly clearing himself before it, he entirely failed in imposing on the church at Rome (where, as you well know, he is by no means a stranger), although he went so far as to make the attempt, if he might anyhow succeed. But, as I have just said, he entirely failed. For the most blessed Pope Zosimus recollected what his predecessor, who had set him so worthy an example, had thought of these very proceedings. Nor did he omit to observe what opinion was entertained about this man by the trusty Romans, whose faith deserved to be spoken of in the Lord,¹ and whose consistent zeal in defence of catholic truth against this heresy he saw prevailing amongst them with warmth, and at the same time most perfect harmony. The man had lived among them for a long while, and his opinions could not escape their notice; moreover, they had so completely found out his disciple Cœlestius, as to be able at once to adduce the most trustworthy and irrefragable evidence on this subject. Now what was the solemn judgment which the holy Pope Innocent formed respecting the proceedings in the Synod of Palestine, by which Pelagius boasts of having been acquitted, you may indeed read in the letter which he addressed to me. It is duly mentioned also in the answer which was forwarded by the African Synod to the venerable Pope Zosimus, and which, along with the other instructions, we have despatched to your loving selves.² But it seems to me, at the same time, that I ought not to omit producing the particulars in the present work.

CHAP. 10. [IX.]—*The judgment of Innocent respecting the proceedings in Palestine.*

Five bishops, then, of whom I was one, wrote him a letter,³ wherein we mentioned the proceedings in Palestine, of which the report had already reached us. We informed him that in the East, where [this man] lived, there had taken place certain

¹ Rom. i. 8.

² Albina, Pinianus, and Melania. Literally, they are here addressed as "your Charity."

³ *Epistola 177, inter Augustinianas.*

ecclesiastical proceedings, in which he is thought to have been acquitted on all the charges. To this communication from us [Innocent] replied in a letter which contains the following among other words: "There are," says he, "sundry positions, as stated in these very acts, which, when they were objected against him, he partly suppressed by avoiding them altogether, and partly confused in absolute obscurity, by wresting many words from their relative meaning; whilst there are other allegations which he cleared off,—not, indeed, in the honest way which he seemed at the time to resort to, but rather by methods of sophistry, meeting some of the objections with a flat denial, and tampering with others by a fallacious interpretation. Would to God, however, that he would even now adopt what is the far more desirable course of turning from his own error back to the true ways of catholic faith; that he would also, duly considering God's daily grace, and acknowledging the help thereof, be willing and desirous to appear, amidst the approbation of all men, to be truly corrected by the method of open conviction,—not, indeed, by judicial process, but by a hearty conversion to the catholic faith. We are therefore unable either to approve of or to blame their proceedings at that trial; for we cannot tell whether the proceedings were true, or even, if true, whether they do not really show that the man escaped by subterfuge, rather than that he cleared himself by entire truth."¹ You see clearly from these words, how that the most blessed Pope Innocent without doubt speaks of this man as of one who was by no means unknown to him. You see what opinion he entertained about his acquittal. You see, moreover, what his successor the holy Pope Zosimus was bound to recollect,—as in truth he did,—even to confirm without doubt or wavering the judgment in this case of his predecessor.

CHAP. 11. [x.]—*How that Pelagius deceived the Synod of Palestine.*

Now I pray you carefully to observe by what evidence Pelagius is shown to have deceived his judges in Palestine on this very question of the baptism of infants, not to mention other points; [and I make this request of you], lest we should

¹ Innocent's letter occurs amongst *The Epistles of Augustine* (183. 3, 4).

seem to any one to have used calumny and suspicion, rather than to have ascertained the certain fact, when we alleged that Pelagius concealed the opinion which Cœlestius expressed with greater frankness, while at the same time he actually entertained the same views. Now, from what has been stated above, it has been clearly seen that, when Cœlestius refused to condemn the assertion that "Adam's sin injured only himself, and not the human race, and that infants at their birth are in the same state that Adam was before his transgression," he did so because he saw that, by condemning these propositions, he would in fact affirm that there was in infants a transmission to them of Adam's sin. When, however, it was objected to Pelagius that he was of one mind with Cœlestius on this point, he condemned the words without hesitation or recall. I am quite aware that you have read all this before. Since, however, we are not writing this account simply for yourselves, we proceed to transcribe the very words of the synodal acts, lest the reader should be unwilling either to turn to the record for himself, or if he does not possess it, take any trouble to procure a copy. Here, then, are the words:—

CHAP. 12. [XI.]—*A portion of the acts of the Synod of Palestine in the cause of Pelagius.*

"The Synod said: Now, forasmuch as Pelagius has pronounced his anathema on this shifting utterance of folly, rightly replying that a man can with God's help and grace live *ἀναμάρτητος*, that is to say, without sin, let him give us his answer on some other articles also. Another particular in the teaching of Cœlestius, disciple of Pelagius, selected from the heads which were mentioned and heard before the holy Aurelius bishop of Carthage, and other bishops, was to this effect: 'That Adam was made mortal, and that he must have died, whether he sinned or not; that Adam's sin injured himself alone, and not the human race; that the law no less than the gospel leads us to the kingdom [of heaven]; that before the coming of Christ there were persons who lived without sin; that new-born infants are in the same condition as Adam was before his transgression; that, on the one hand, the entire human race does not die owing to Adam's death

and transgression, nor, on the other hand, does the whole human race rise again through the resurrection of Christ; that the holy bishop Augustine wrote a book in answer to his followers in Sicily, on articles which were subjoined; and in this book, which was addressed to Hilary, are contained the following statements: That a man can be without sin if he wishes; that infants, even if they die unbaptized, have eternal life; that rich men, even if they are baptized, unless they renounce and give up all, have, whatever good they may seem to have done, nothing of it reckoned unto them, neither can they possess the kingdom of heaven.' Pelagius then said: As regards man's power to live without sin, my opinion has been already spoken. With respect, however, to the allegation that there were even before the Lord's coming persons who lived without sin, we also on our part say, that before the coming of Christ there certainly were persons who passed their lives in holiness and righteousness, according to the accounts which have been handed down to us in the Holy Scriptures. As for the other points, indeed, even on their own showing, they are not of a character which obliges me to be answerable for them; but yet, for the satisfaction of the sacred Synod, I anathematize those who either now hold or have ever held these opinions."

CHAP. 13. [XII.]—*Cœlestius the bolder heretic; Pelagius the more subtle.*

You see, indeed, not to mention other points, how that Pelagius pronounced his anathema against those who hold that "Adam's sin injured only himself, and not the human race; and that infants are at their birth in the same condition in which Adam was before he transgressed." Now what else could the bishops who sat in judgment on him have possibly understood him to mean by this, but that the sin of Adam is transmitted to infants? It was to avoid making such an admission that Cœlestius refused to condemn this statement, which *he* on the contrary anathematized. If, therefore, I shall show that he did not really entertain any other opinion concerning infants than that they are born without any contagion of a single sin, what difference will there remain on this question between him and Cœlestius, except this, that the one is more open, the other more reserved; the one more pertina-

cious, the other more mendacious ; or, at any rate, that the one is more candid, the other more astute ? The one even before the church of Carthage refused to condemn what he afterwards in the church at Rome publicly confessed to be a tenet of his own ; at the same time professing himself “ ready to submit to correction if an error had stolen over him, considering that he was but human ; ” whereas the other both condemned this dogma likewise as being contrary to the truth (lest he should himself be condemned by his Catholic judges), and yet kept it in reserve for subsequent defence, so that either his condemnation was a lie, or his interpretation a trick.

CHAP. 14. [XIII.]—*He shows that, even after the Synod of Palestine, Pelagius held the same opinions as Cœlestius on the subject of original sin.*

I see, however, the very great justice of the demand made of me, that I would not defer my promised demonstration, that he actually entertains the same views as Cœlestius. In the first book of his more recent work, written in defence of the freedom of the will (which work he mentions in the letter he despatched to Rome), he says : “ Nothing good, and nothing evil, on account of which we are deemed either laudable or blameworthy, is born with us, but is done by us : for we are born not fully developed, but with a capacity for either conduct ; we are formed naturally without either virtue or vice ; and previous to the action of our own proper will, the only thing in man is what God has formed in him.” Now you perceive in these words of Pelagius, that therein is contained the dogma of both these men, that infants are born without the contagion of any sin from Adam. It is therefore not astonishing that Cœlestius refused to condemn such as say that Adam’s sin injured only himself, and not the human race ; and that infants are at their birth in the same state in which Adam was before he fell. But it is very much to be wondered at, that Pelagius had the effrontery to anathematize these opinions. For if, as he alleges, “ evil is not born with us, and we are begotten without fault or sin, and the only thing in man previous to the action of his own will is that which God created in him,” then of course the sin of Adam did only injure himself, inasmuch as it did not pass on to his offspring. For there is not any sin which is not an evil ; otherwise sin is not a flaw or fault ; or else

sin was created by God. But *he* says: "Nothing evil is born with us, and we are procreated without vice; and the only thing in men at their birth is what God created in them." Now, since by this language he supposes it to be most true, that, according to the well-known sentence of his: "Adam's sin was injurious to himself alone, and not to the human race," why did Pelagius condemn this, if it were not for the purpose of deceiving his Catholic judges? By parity of reasoning, it may also be argued: "If evil is not born with us, and if we are procreated without vice, and if the only thing found in man at the time of his birth is what God created in him," it follows beyond a doubt that "infants at their birth are in the same condition that Adam was before he fell," to whom no evil or vice was incidental, and in whom no quality existed which was not the creature of God. And yet Pelagius pronounced anathema on all those persons "who hold now, or have at any time held, that new-born babes are placed by their birth in the same state that Adam was in previous to his fall,"—in other words, are without any sin or any vice, simply possessing whatever quality God had created in them. Now, why again did Pelagius condemn this tenet also, if it were not for the purpose of deceiving the Catholic Synod, and saving himself from the condemnation of an heretical innovator?

CHAP. 15. [XIV.]—*Pelagius by his mendacity and deception stole his acquittal from the Synod in Palestine.*

For my own part, however, I, as you are quite aware, and as I also stated in the book which I addressed to our venerable old [bishop] Aurelius on the proceedings in Palestine, really felt glad that Pelagius in that answer of his had exhausted the whole of this question. To me, indeed, he seemed most plainly to have acknowledged that there is original sin in infants, by the anathema which he pronounced against those persons who supposed that by the sin of Adam only himself, and not the human race, was injured, and who entertained the opinion that infants are in the same state in which the first man was before his transgression. When, however, I had read his four books (from the first of which I copied the words which I have just now quoted), and discovered that he was

still cherishing thoughts which were opposed to the Catholic faith touching infants, I felt all the greater surprise at a mendacity which he so unblushingly maintained in a synod of the church, and on so great a question. For if he had already written these books, how did he profess to anathematize those who ever entertained the opinions alluded to? If he purposed, however, afterwards to publish such a work, how could he anathematize those who at the same time were holding the opinions? Unless, to be sure, by some ridiculous subterfuge he meant to say that the objects of his anathema were such persons as had in some previous time held, or were then holding, these opinions; but that in respect of the future—that is, as regarded those persons who were about to take up with such views—he felt that it would be impossible for him to prejudge either himself or other people, and that therefore he was guilty of no lie or deception when he was afterwards detected in the maintenance of similar errors. This plea, however, he does not advance, not only because it is a ridiculous one, but because it cannot possibly be true; because in these very books of his he both argues against the transmission of sin from Adam to infants, and glories in the proceedings of the Synod in Palestine, where he was supposed to have sincerely anathematized such as hold the opinions in dispute, and where he, in fact, pilfered his acquittal by practising deceit.

CHAP. 16. [xv.]—*Pelagius' fraudulent and crafty excuses.*

For what have his answers to his followers to do with the matter on which we are at present treating, when he tells them that “the reason why he condemned the points which were objected against him, was because he himself maintains that the primal sin was injurious not only to the first man, but to the whole human race; not because it was transmitted by birth, but because it was an example;” in other words, not on the ground of his offspring having derived any fault from him, but because all who afterwards sinned imitated him who committed the first sin? Or when he says that “the reason why infants are not in the same state in which Adam was before his transgression, is because they are not yet able to understand the commandment, whereas he was

able; and because they do not yet possess that choice of a rational will which he indeed possessed, for otherwise no commandment would have been given to him"? How does such an exposition as this of the points alleged against him justify him in thinking that he rightly condemned the propositions, "Adam's sin injured only himself, and not the whole race of man;" and "infants at their birth are in the self-same state as Adam was before he sinned;" and that by the said condemnation he is not guilty of deceit in holding such opinions as are found in his subsequent writings, how that "infants are born without any fault or sin, and that there is nothing in them but what God created,"—no wound, in short, inflicted by an enemy?

CHAP. 17. [XVI.]

Now, by making such statements as these, meeting objections which are urged in one sense with explanations which are meant in another, is it his aim to prove to us that he did not deceive those who sat in judgment on him? Then he utterly fails in his purpose. In proportion to the craftiness of his explanations, was the stealthiness with which he deceived them. For, Catholic bishops as they were, when they heard the man pouring out anathemas upon those who maintained that "Adam's sin was injurious to none but himself, and not to the human race," they understood him to assert nothing but what the Catholic Church has been accustomed to declare, on the strength of which it truly baptizes infants for the remission of sins—not, indeed, sins which they have committed by imitation of the example of the first sinner, but sins which they have contracted by their very birth, owing to the taint and flaw of their nature. When, again, they heard him anathematizing those who assert that "infants at their birth are in the same state as Adam previous to his fall," they supposed him simply to refer to those persons who think that infants have derived no sin from Adam, and that they are accordingly in the same state that *he* was in previous to his sin. For, of course, no other objection would be brought against him than that on which the question turned. When, therefore, he so explains the objection as to say that infants are not in the same state that Adam was before he sinned, simply

because they have not yet arrived at the same firmness of mind or body, not because sin has passed on to them by birth, he must be answered thus: When the objections were laid against you for condemnation, the Catholic bishops did not understand them in this sense; therefore, when you condemned them, they believed that you were a Catholic. That, accordingly, which they supposed you to maintain, deserved to be released from censure; but that which you really maintained was worthy of condemnation. It was not you, then, that were acquitted, who held tenets which ought to be condemned; but that opinion was freed from censure which you ought to have held and maintained. You could only be supposed to be acquitted by having been believed to entertain opinions worthy to be praised; for your judges could not suppose that you were concealing opinions which merited condemnation. Rightly have you been adjudged an accomplice of Coelestius, in whose opinions you prove yourself to be a sharer. Though you kept your books shut during your trial, you published them to the world after it was over.

CHAP. 18. [XVII.]—*The condemnation of Pelagius; after Pelagius and Coelestius were excommunicated, many of their followers were converted.*

This being the case, you of course feel that episcopal councils, and the Apostolic See, and the whole Church of Rome, and the Roman Empire itself,¹ which by God's gracious favour has become Christian, has been most righteously moved against the authors of this wicked error, until they repent and escape from the snares of the devil. For who can tell whether God may not give them repentance to discover, and acknowledge, and even declare His truth, and to condemn their own truly damnable error? But whatever may be the bent of their own will, we cannot doubt that the merciful kindness of the Lord has sought the good of many persons who followed them, for no other reason than because they saw them joining in communion with the Catholic Church.

¹ Possidius, in his *Life of Augustine*, chapter 18, says: "Even the most pious Emperor Honorius, upon hearing that the weighty sentence of the Catholic Church of God had been pronounced against them, in pursuance of the same, determined that they should be regarded as heretics, under condemnation by his own [imperial] laws." These enactments are placed by the Benedictine editors in the second part of their Appendix.

CHAP. 19.—*Pelagius' attempt to deceive the Apostolic See ; he inverts the bearings of the controversy.*

But I would have you carefully observe the way in which Pelagius endeavoured by stealth to overreach even the judgment of the bishop of the Apostolic See on this very question of the baptism of infants. He sent a letter to Rome to Pope Innocent of blessed memory ; and when it found him not in the flesh, it was handed to the holy Pope Zosimus, and by him directed to us. In this letter he complains of being “ defamed by certain persons for refusing the sacrament of baptism to infants, and promising the kingdom of heaven irrespective of Christ’s redemption.” The objections, however, are not urged against them in the manner he has stated. For they neither deny the sacrament of baptism to infants, nor do they promise the kingdom of heaven to any irrespective of the redemption of Christ. As regards, therefore, his complaint of being defamed by sundry persons, he has set it forth in such terms as to be able to give a ready answer to the alleged charge against him, without injury to his own dogma. [XVIII.] The real objection against them is, that they refuse to confess that unbaptized infants are liable to damnation because of the first Adam, and that original sin has been transmitted to them, and requires to be purged by regeneration ; their contention being that infants must be baptized solely for the purpose of being admitted to the kingdom of heaven, as if they could only have eternal death without the kingdom of heaven, who cannot have eternal life without partaking of the Lord’s body and blood. This, I would have you know, is the real objection to them respecting the baptism of infants ; and not as he has represented it, for the purpose of enabling himself to save his own dogmas while answering what is actually a proposition of his own, under colour of meeting the objection [of his accusers].

CHAP. 20.—*Pelagius provides a refuge for his falsehood in ambiguous subterfuges.*

And then observe the mode in which he makes his answer, how he provides in the obscure mazes of his double sense retreats for his false doctrine, quenching the truth in his dark mist of error ; [and he succeeded so well], that even we, on our first

perusal of his words, rejoiced almost at their propriety and correctness. But the fuller discussions in his books, in which he is generally forced, in spite of all his efforts at concealment, to explain his meaning, have made even his better statements suspicious to us, lest on a closer inspection of them we should detect them to be ambiguous. For, after saying that "he had never heard even an impious heretic say this" (namely, what he set forth as the objection) "about infants," he goes on to ask: "Who indeed is so unacquainted with Gospel lessons, as not only to attempt to make such a statement, but even be able to slightly sketch it, or only let it enter his thought? And then who is so impious as to wish to exclude infants from the kingdom of heaven, by forbidding them to be baptized and to be born again in Christ?"

CHAP. 21. [XIX.]

Now it is to no purpose that he says all this. He does not clear himself thereby; for even they have never denied the impossibility of infants entering the kingdom of heaven without baptism. But this is not the question; what we are now discussing concerns the obliteration¹ of original sin in infants. Let him clear himself on this point, since he refuses to acknowledge that there is anything in infants which the laver of regeneration has to cleanse. On this account we ought carefully to consider what he has afterwards to say. After adducing, then, the passage of the Gospel which declares that "whoever is not born again of water and the Spirit cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven"² (on which matter, as we have said, they raise no question), he goes on at once to ask: "Who indeed is so impious as to have the heart to refuse the common redemption of the human race to an infant of any age whatever?" But this is ambiguous language; for what *redemption* does he mean? Is it from evil to good? or from good to better? Now even Cœlestius, in his book at Carthage,³ allowed a redemption for infants; although, at the same time, he would not admit the transmission of sin to them from Adam.

¹ Purgatione.

² John iii. 5.

³ [See, above, the *Admonitio* (or advertisement) to the treatise, *De Perfectione Justitiæ Hominis*, towards the end.]

CHAP. 22. [xx.]

Then, again, observe what he subjoins to the last remark: "Can any one," says he, "deny his second birth to an eternal and certain life, who has been born to this present uncertain life?" In other words: Who is so impious as to forbid his being born again to the life which is sure and eternal, who has been born to this life of uncertainty? When we first read these words, we supposed that by the phrase "uncertain life" he meant to designate this present temporal life; although it appeared to us that he ought rather to have called it "mortal" than "uncertain," on the ground that it is brought to a close by certain death. But for all this, we thought that he had only shown a preference for calling this mortal life an *uncertain* one, because of the general view which men take that there is undoubtedly not a moment in our lives when we are free from this uncertainty. And so it happened that our anxiety about him was allayed to some extent by the following consideration, which rose almost to a proof, notwithstanding the fact of his unwillingness openly to confess that infants incur eternal death who depart this life without the sacrament of baptism. We argued: If, as he seems to admit, eternal life can only accrue to them who have been baptized, it follows of course that they who die unbaptized incur everlasting death. This destiny, however, cannot by any means justly befall those who never in this life committed any sins of their own, who therefore only possessed original sin.

CHAP. 23. [xxi.]—*The opinion of Pelagius concerning infants who die unbaptized; how he shelters himself under his ambiguous phrases.*

Certain brethren, however, afterwards failed not to remind us that Pelagius possibly expressed himself in this way, because on this question he is represented as having his answer ready for all inquirers, to this effect: "As for infants who die unbaptized, I know indeed whither they go not; yet whither they go, I know not;" as much as to say, I know they do not go into the kingdom of heaven. But as to whither they actually go, he was (and for the matter of that, *still is*¹) in the habit of saying that he knew not, for no other

¹ *Dicebat, aut dicit.* These two latter words are not superfluous, as some have thought; they intimate that Pelagius still clave to his error.

reason than because he had not the courage to say that those persons went to eternal death, who he was persuaded had never committed sin in this life, and whom he would not admit to have contracted original sin. Consequently those very words of his which were forwarded to Rome to secure his absolute acquittal, are so steeped in ambiguity that they afford a shelter for their doctrine, out of which may sally forth an heretical sense to entrap the unwary straggler; for when no one is at hand who can give the answer, any man may find himself weak in his solitary condition.

CHAP. 24.—*Pelagius' long residence at Rome.*

The truth indeed is, that in the document of his faith which he sent to Rome with this very letter [which we have been discussing],¹ to the before-mentioned Pope Innocent, to whom he had also written the letter, he only set himself in a clearer light by his efforts at concealment. He says: "We hold one baptism, which we insist ought to be administered in the same formula of sacramental words in the case of infants as in the case of adults." He did not, however, say, "in the same sacrament" (although if he had so said, there would still have been ambiguity), but "in the same formula of sacramental words,"—as if remission of sins in infants were only a matter of verbal sound, instead of a fact effectually wrought. For the time, indeed, he seemed to say what was agreeable with the catholic faith; but he had it not in his power permanently to deceive the [Holy] See. Subsequent to the rescript of the Council of Carthage, into which province this pestilent doctrine had stealthily made its way—without, however, spreading widely or sinking deeply—other opinions also of this man were by the industry of some faithful brethren discovered and brought to light at Rome, where he had dwelt for a very long while, and had already engaged in sundry discourses and controversies. In order to procure the condemnation of these opinions, Pope Zosimus, as you may read, annexed them to his letter, which he wrote for publication throughout the Catholic world. Among these statements, Pelagius, pretending to expound the Apostle Paul's Epistle

¹ See above, ch. 19.

to the Romans, argues in these words: "As even Adam's sin did not injure sinners, so Christ's righteousness also profits not those who believe." He says other things, too, of the same purport; but they have all been refuted and answered by me with the Lord's help in the books which I wrote, *On the Baptism of Infants*.¹ But he had not the courage to make those objectionable statements in his own person in the fore-mentioned so-called exposition. This particular one, however, having been enunciated in a place where he was so well known, his words and their meaning could not be disguised. In those books, from the first of which I have already quoted above,² he treats this point without any suppression of his views. With all the energy of which he is capable, he most plainly asserts that human nature in infants cannot in any wise be supposed to be tainted by birth; and by claiming salvation for them as their due, he does despite to the Saviour.

CHAP. 25. [XXII.]—*The condemnation of Pelagius and Cœlestius.*

These things, then, being as I have stated them, it is now evident that there has arisen a deadly heresy which, with the Lord's help, the Church by this time guards against more directly—now that those two men, Pelagius and Cœlestius, have been either offered repentance, or on their refusal been wholly condemned. They are reported, or perhaps are actually proved, to be the authors of this perversion; at all events, if not the authors (as having learnt it from others), they are yet boastfully set forth as its abettors and teachers, through whose agency the heresy has advanced and grown to a wider extent. This boast, too, is made even in their own statements and writings, and in unmistakable signs of reality, as well as in the fame which arises and grows out of all these circumstances. What, therefore, remains to be done? Must not every Catholic, with all the energies wherewith the Lord endows him, confute this pestilential doctrine, and oppose it with all vigilance; so that whenever we contend for the truth, compelled to answer, but not fond of the contest, the untaught may be instructed, and that thus the Church may be benefited

¹ See especially book iii. ch. 5, 6 [iii.].

² In ch. 14 [xiii.].

by that which the enemy devised for her destruction ; in accordance with that word of the apostle's, " There must be heresies, that they which are approved may be made manifest among you " ?¹

CHAP. 26. [XXIII.]—*The Pelagians maintain that raising questions about original sin does not endanger the faith.*

Therefore, after the full discussion with which we have been able to rebut in writing this error of theirs, which is so inimical to the grace of God bestowed on small and great through our Lord Jesus Christ, it is now our duty to examine and explode that assertion of theirs, which in their desire to avoid the odious imputation of heresy they astutely advance, to the effect that " calling this subject into question produces no danger to the faith,"—in order that they may appear, forsooth, while under the conviction of having quitted the usual track, to have erred only by a sort of offence against courtesy, and not to have incurred any charge of hostility to the faith.² This, accordingly, is the language which Cœlestius used in the ecclesiastical process at Carthage:³ " As touching the transmission of original sin," he said, " I have already asserted that I have heard many persons of acknowledged position in the Catholic Church deny it altogether, and on the other hand many affirm it ; it may fairly, indeed, be deemed a matter for inquiry, but not a heresy. I have always maintained that infants require baptism, and ought to be baptized. What else does he want ?" He said this, as if he wanted to intimate that only then could he be deemed chargeable with heresy, if he were to assert that they ought not to be baptized. As the case stood, however, inasmuch as he acknowledged that they ought to be baptized, he thought that he was not in error, and therefore ought not to be adjudged a heretic, even though he maintained the reason of their baptism to be other than the truth holds, or the faith claims as its own. On the same principle, in the book which he sent to Rome, he first explained his belief, so far as it suited his pleasure, [on all the

¹ 1 Cor. xi. 19.

² [This is a paraphrase rather than a translation of the terse original : *Non criminaliter, sed quasi civiliter errasse videantur.*]

³ See above, ch. 3 [iv.].

articles of the creed], from the Trinity of the One Godhead down to the Resurrection of the Dead, as it is to be ; on all which points, however, no one had ever questioned him, or been questioned by him. And when his discourse reached the question which was under consideration, he said : " If, indeed, any questions have arisen beyond the compass of the creed, on which there might be perhaps dissension on the part of a great many persons, in no case have I pretended to pronounce a decision on any dogma, as if I possessed a definitive authority in the matter myself ; but whatever I have derived from the fountain of the prophets and the apostles, I have presented for determination to the sentence of your apostolic office ; so that if any error has crept in among us, human as we are, through our ignorance, it may be corrected by your decision and sentence." You of course clearly see that in this action of his he used all this deprecatory preamble in order that, if he had been discovered to have erred at all, he might seem to have erred not on a matter of faith, but on questionable points outside the creed ; wherein, however necessary it may be to correct the error, it is not corrected as a heresy ; wherein also the person who undergoes the correction is declared indeed to be in error, but for all that is not adjudged a heretic.

CHAP. 27. [XXIII.]—*On questions outside the creed—what they are, and instances of the same.*

But he is greatly mistaken in this opinion. The questions which he supposes to be outside the creed are of a very different character from those in which, without any detriment to the faith whereby we are Christians, there exists either an ignorance of the real fact, and a consequent suspension of any fixed opinion, or else a conjectural view of the case, which, owing to the infirmity of human thought, issues in conceptions at variance with truth : as when a question arises about the description and locality of that Paradise where God placed man whom He formed out of the ground, without any disturbance, however, of the Christian belief that there undoubtedly is such a Paradise ; or as when it is asked where Elijah is at the present moment, and where Enoch—whether in this Paradise or in some other place, although we doubt not of their existing still in the same bodies in which they were born ; or as when

one inquires whether it was in the body or out of the body that the apostle was caught up to the third heaven,—an inquiry, however, which betokens great immodesty on the part of those who would fain know what he who is the subject of the mystery itself expressly declares his ignorance of,¹ without impairing his own belief of the fact; or as when the question is started, how many are those heavens, to the “third” of which he tells us that he was caught up; or whether the elements of this visible world are four or more; what it is which causes those eclipses of the sun or the moon which astronomers are in the habit of foretelling for certain appointed seasons; why, again, men of ancient times lived to the age which Holy Scripture assigns to them; and whether the period of their puberty, when they begat their first son, was postponed to an older age, proportioned to their longer life; or where Methuselah could possibly have lived, since he was not in the Ark, inasmuch as (according to the chronological notes of most copies of the Scripture, both Greek and Latin) he is found to have survived the deluge; or whether we must rather follow the order of the fewer copies—and they happen to be extremely few—which so arrange the years as to show that he died before the deluge. Now who does not feel, amidst the various and innumerable questions of this sort, which relate either to God’s most hidden operations or to most obscure passages of the Scriptures, and which it is difficult to embrace and define in any certain way, that ignorance may on many points be compatible with sound Christian faith, and that occasionally erroneous opinion may be entertained without any room for the imputation of heretical doctrine?

CHAP. 28. [XXIV.]—*The heresy of Pelagius and Cœlestius aims at the very foundations of our faith. The Christian belief is principally concerned about the Two Men [who are at the head of the old and the new creation]. Without faith in Christ, no man could possibly be either justified or saved. Faith in Christ an entirely gratuitous gift.*

There is, however, [subject-matter of quite a different kind] in the case of the Two [representative] Men, [who have affected our race so diversely, that] by one of them we are sold under sin, by the Other redeemed from our sins—by the one have

¹ 2 Cor. xii. 2.

been precipitated into death, by the Other are liberated unto life: the former of whom has ruined us in himself, by doing his own will instead of His who created him; whereas the Other has saved us in Himself, by not doing His own will, but the will of Him who sent Him.¹ Now it is in what concerns these Two Men that the Christian faith properly consists. For “there is one God, and one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus;”² since “there is none other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved;”³ and “in Him hath God defined unto all men their faith, in that He hath raised Him from the dead.”⁴ Now without this faith, that is to say, without a belief in the one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus; without faith, I say, in His resurrection, whereby God has given assurance to all men, and which no man could of course truly believe, were it not for His incarnation and death; without faith, therefore, in the incarnation and death and resurrection of Christ, the Christian verity unhesitatingly declares that the ancient saints could not possibly have been cleansed from sin, so as to have become holy, and justified by the grace of God. And this is true both of the saints who are mentioned in Holy Scripture, and of those also who are not indeed commemorated therein, but must yet be supposed to have existed,—either before the deluge, or in the interval between that event and the giving of the law, or in the period of the law itself,—not merely among the children of Israel, as the prophets, but even outside that nation, as for instance Job. It was no doubt by the self-same faith in the one Mediator that the hearts of even these were cleansed, in which also was “shed abroad the love of God by the Holy Ghost,”⁵ “who bloweth where He listeth,”⁶ never following men’s merits, but ever producing them Himself; since the grace of God will in no wise exist unless it be wholly free.

¹ John iv. 34, v. 30.⁴ Acts xvii. 31.² 1 Tim. ii. 5.⁵ Rom. v. 5.³ Acts iv. 12.⁶ John iii. 8.

CHAP. 29.—*The righteous men who lived in the time of the law were for all that not under the law, but under grace. The grace of the New Testament hidden under the Old. The veil of the temple. Gideon's fleece.*

Death indeed reigned from Adam until Moses,¹ because it was not possible even for the law given through Moses to overcome death: it was not given, in fact, with a view to its being able to give life;² but its proper function was to show that all were dead,—not only as being prostrated under the dominion of original sin, but as being also convicted of the additional guilt of breaking the law itself,—and that grace was needed to give them life: so that no man might perish who in the mercy of God understood this even in that early age; but that, destined though he were to punishment, owing to the dominion of sin, and conscious, too, of guilt through his own violation of the law, he might seek God's help; so that where sin abounded, grace might much more abound,³ even the grace which alone delivers from the body of this death.⁴ [XXV.] Yet, notwithstanding this, although the very law which Moses gave was unable to liberate any man from the dominion of death, there were even then, at the time of the law, men of God who were not living under the terrors and conviction and punishment of the law, but under the delights and healing and liberating influence of grace. Some there were who said, "I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me;"⁵ and, "There is no rest in my bones, by reason of my sins;"⁶ and, "Create in me a clean heart, O God; and renew a right spirit in my inward parts;"⁷ and, "Stablish me with Thy directing Spirit;"⁸ and, "Take not Thy Holy Spirit from me."⁹ There were some, again, who said: "I believed, therefore have I spoken."¹⁰ For they too were cleansed with the self-same faith with which we ourselves are. Whence the apostle also says: "We having the same spirit of faith, according as it is written, I believe, and therefore have I spoken; we also believe, and therefore speak."¹¹ Of very faith was it said, "Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and they shall call His name Emmanuel,"¹²

¹ Rom. v. 14.² Gal. iii. 21.³ Rom. v. 20.⁴ Rom. vii. 24, 25.⁵ Ps. li. 5.⁶ Ps. xxxviii. 3.⁷ Ps. li. 10.⁸ Ps. li. 12.⁹ Ps. li. 11.¹⁰ Ps. cxvi. 10.¹¹ 2 Cor. iv. 13.¹² Isa. vii. 14.

“ which is, being interpreted, God with us.”¹ Of very faith too was it said concerning Him: “ As a bridegroom He cometh out of His chamber ; as a giant did He exult to run His course. His going forth is from the extremity of heaven, and His circuit runs to the other end of heaven ; and no one is hidden from His heat.”² Of very faith, again, was it said to Him : “ Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever ; a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of Thy kingdom. Thou hast loved righteousness, and hated iniquity ; therefore God, Thy God, hath anointed Thee with the oil of gladness above Thy fellows.”³ By the self-same Spirit of faith were all these things foreseen by them as about to happen, whereby they are believed by us as having happened. They, indeed, who were able in faithful love to foretell these things to us were not themselves partakers of them. The Apostle Peter says, “ Why tempt ye God to put a yoke upon the neck of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we were able to bear ? But we believe that through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ we shall be saved, even as they.”⁴ Now on what principle does he make this statement, if it be not because even those [ancient saints] were saved through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and not the law of Moses, from which comes not the cure, but only the knowledge of sin ?⁵ “ Now, however, the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets.”⁶ If, therefore, it is now manifested, it even then existed, but it was hidden. This concealment was symbolized by the veil of the temple. When Christ was dying, this veil was rent asunder,⁷ to signify the full revelation of Him. Even of old, therefore, there existed amongst the people of God this grace of the one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus. As, however, in the fleece the rain which God sets apart for His inheritance,⁸ not of debt, but of His own will, was but latently inherent, it is now patently visible amongst all nations as its “ floor,” the fleece being dry ; in other words, the Jewish people having become reprobate.⁹

¹ Matt. i. 23.⁴ Acts xv. 10, 11.⁷ Matt. xxvii. 51.² Ps. xix. 5, 6.⁵ Rom. iii. 20.⁸ Ps. lxxviii. 9.³ Ps. xlv. 6, 7.⁶ Rom. iii. 21.⁹ Judg. vi. 36-40.

CHAP. 30. [XXVI.]—*Pelagius and Cœlestius deny that the ancient saints were saved by Christ.*

We must not therefore divide the periods, as Pelagius and his disciples do, who say: "Men first lived righteously by nature, then under the law, thirdly under grace." By their period "*ex natura*," they mean all the long time before the giving of the law. "For then," say they, "the Creator was known by the guidance of nature; and the rule of living rightly was carried in the hearts of men, written not in the law of the letter, but of nature. But men's manners became corrupt; and then," they say, "when nature now tarnished began to be insufficient, the law was added to it, whereby as by a moon the original lustre was restored to nature after its blush was impaired. But after the habit of sin had become excessive by over-indulgence among men, and the law was unequal to the task of curing it, Christ came; and the Physician Himself, through His own self, and not through His disciples, brought relief to the malady at its most desperate development."

CHAP. 31.—*Christ's incarnation was of avail to the fathers, even though it had not yet happened.*

By disputation of this sort, they attempt to shut off the ancient saints from the grace of the Mediator, as if the man Christ Jesus were not the Mediator between God and *them*; on the ground that, not having yet taken flesh of the Virgin's womb, He was not man yet at the time when those righteous men lived. If this, however, were true, in vain would the apostle say: "By man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead; for as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."¹ For inasmuch as those ancient saints, according to the vain conceits of these men, found their nature self-sufficient, and required not the man Christ to be their Mediator to reconcile them to God, so neither shall they be made alive in Him, to whose body they are shown not to belong as members, according to the statement that it was on man's account that He became man. Since, however, as the Truth says through His apostles, all shall be made alive in Christ, even as all die in Adam, foras-

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22.

much as resurrection from death comes through the One, even as death comes through the other, what Christian man can be bold enough to doubt, that even those righteous men who pleased God in the fresher periods of the human race are destined to attain to the resurrection of eternal life, and not eternal death, because they shall be made alive in Christ; that they are made alive in Christ, because they belong to the body of Christ; that they belong to the body of Christ, because Christ is the head even to them;¹ and that Christ is the head even to them, because there is but one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus? But this He could not have been to them, unless through His grace they had believed in His resurrection. And how could they have done this, if they had not known that He was to come in the flesh, and if they had not turned this faith to good and pious account in their lives? Now, if the incarnation of Christ could be of no concern to them, on the ground that it had not yet come about, it must follow that Christ's judgment can be of no concern to us, because it has not yet taken place. But if we shall stand at the right hand of Christ through our faith in His judgment, which has not yet transpired, but is to come to pass, it follows that those ancient saints are members of Christ through their faith in His resurrection, which had not in their day happened, but which was one day to come to pass.

CHAP. 32. [XXVII.]—*He shows by the example of Abraham that the ancient saints believed in the incarnation of Christ; why Abraham wished his servant to swear with his hand under his thigh.*

For it must not be supposed that those saints of old only profited by Christ's divinity, which was ever existent, and not also by the revelation of His humanity, which had not yet come to pass. What the Lord Jesus says, "Abraham desired to see my day, and he saw it, and was glad,"² meaning by the phrase *his day* to understand *his time* [or dispensation], affords of course a clear testimony that Abraham was fully impressed with the belief of His incarnation; for it is only in respect of *this* that He possesses any temporal attribute at all. His divinity, indeed, transcends all time, for it was by It that time and all its dispensations were created. If, however, any

¹ 1 Cor. xi. 3.

² John viii. 56.

one supposes that the phrase in question must be understood of that eternal "day" which is limited by no morrow, and preceded by no yesterday,—in a word, of the very eternity in which He is co-eternal with the Father,—how would Abraham really desire this, without being aware that there was to be a mortality belonging to Him whose eternity he wished for? Or, perhaps, some one would confine the meaning of the phrase so far as to say, that nothing else is meant in the Lord's saying, "He desired to see my day," than "He desired to see me," who am the never-ending Day, or the unfailing Light, as when we mention the life of the Son, concerning which it is said in the Gospel: "So hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself."¹ Here the life is nothing less than Himself. So we understand the Son Himself to be the life, when He said, "I am the way, the truth, and the life;"² of whom also it was said, "He is the true God, and eternal life."³ Supposing, then, that Abraham desired to see this equal divinity of the Son's with the Father, without any precognition of His coming in the flesh—as certain philosophers sought Him, who knew nothing of His flesh—can that other act of Abraham, when he orders his servant to place his hand under his thigh, and to swear by the God of heaven,⁴ be rightly understood by any one otherwise than as showing that Abraham well knew that the flesh in which the God of heaven was to come was the offspring of that very thigh?⁵

CHAP. 33. [XXVIII.]—*How Christ is our Mediator.*

Of this flesh and blood Melchizedek also, when he blessed

¹ John v. 26. ² John xiv. 6. ³ 1 John v. 20. ⁴ Gen. xxiv. 2, 3.

⁵ [The word "thigh," ירך, occurs in the phrase, "to come out from the thigh of any one," in the sense of *being begotten by any one*, or *descended from him*, in several passages: see Gen. xlvi. 26; Ex. i. 5; Judg. viii. 30. In the last of these passages, the A. V. phrase, "of his body begotten," is יצא ירכו, *the offspring of his thigh*. Abraham was the first to use this form of adjuration; after him his grandson Jacob, Gen. xlvii. 29. The comment of Augustine in the text, which he repeats elsewhere (see his *Sermon 75*), occurs also in other Fathers, e.g. Jerome, Theodoret, Ambrose (*De Abrahamo*, i. cap. ult.), Prosper (*Prædicat.* i. 7), and Gregory the Great, who says: "He orders him to put his hand under his thigh, since through that member would descend the flesh of Him who was Abraham's son according to the flesh, and his Lord owing to His divinity."]

Abram himself,¹ gave the testimony which is very well known to Christian believers, so that long afterwards it was said to Christ in the Psalms: "Thou art a Priest for ever, after the order of Melchizedek."² This was not then an accomplished fact, but was still future; yet that faith of the fathers, which is the self-same faith as our own, used to chant [the prophecy as a certain truth]. Now, to all who meet with death in Adam, Christ is of this avail, that He is the Mediator for [obtaining] life. He is, however, not a Mediator, as being equal with the Father; for in this respect He is Himself as far distant from us as the Father; and how can there be any mediatorial function in a case where there is an absolute identity of distance [in the parties]? Therefore the apostle does not say, "There is one Mediator between God and men, even Jesus Christ;" but his words are, "The MAN Christ Jesus."³ He is the Mediator, then, in that He is man. He is inferior to the Father, in being nearer to ourselves; and superior to us, in being nearer to the Father. A doctrine which is more openly expressed thus: "He is inferior to the Father, because in the form of a servant;"⁴ superior to us, because without spot of sin.

CHAP. 34. [XXIX.]

Now, whoever maintains that human nature at any period required not the second Adam for its physician, as not having been diseased in the first Adam, is convicted as an enemy to the grace of God; not in a question where doubt or error might be compatible with soundness of belief, but in that very rule of faith which makes us Christians. How happens it, then, that the human nature, which first existed, is praised by these men as being so far less tainted with evil manners? How is it that they overlook the fact that men were even then sunk in so many intolerable sins, that, with the exception of one man of God and his wife, and three sons and their wives, the whole world was in God's just judgment destroyed by the flood, even as the little land of Sodom was afterwards with fire?⁵ From the moment, then, when "by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed

¹ Gen. xiv. 18-20.² Ps. cx. 4.³ 1 Tim. ii. 5.⁴ Phil. ii. 7.⁵ See Gen. vii. and xix.

upon all men, for that all¹ sinned,"² the entire mass of our nature was ruined beyond doubt, and fell into the possession of its destroyer. And from him no one—no, not one—has been delivered, or is being delivered, or ever will be delivered, except by the grace of the Redeemer.

CHAP. 35. [XXX.]—*Why the circumcision of infants was enjoined under pain of so great a punishment; what is meant in the Scriptures by "being cut off from one's people."*

The Scripture does not inform us whether before Abraham's time righteous men and their children were marked by any bodily or visible sign.³ Abraham himself, indeed, received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the righteousness of faith.⁴ And he received it with this accompanying injunction: All the male infants of his household were from that very time to be circumcised, while fresh from their mother's womb, on the eighth day from their birth;⁵ so that even they who were not yet able with the heart to believe unto righteousness, should nevertheless receive the seal of the righteousness of faith. And this command was imposed with so fearful a sanction, that God said: "That soul shall be cut off from his people, whose flesh of his foreskin is not circumcised on the eighth day."⁶ If inquiry be made into the justice of so terrible a penalty, will not the entire argument of these men about the free will, and laudable soundness and purity of our nature, however cleverly maintained, fall to pieces, struck down and fractured to atoms? For, pray tell me, what evil has an infant committed of his own will, that, for the negligence of another in not circumcising him, he must be actually condemned, and with so severe a condemnation, that that soul must be cut off from his people? It was not of any temporal death that this fear was injected, since of righteous persons, when they died, it used rather to be said, "And he was gathered unto his people;"⁷ or, "He was gathered to his fathers:"⁸ for no attempt to separate a man from his people is long formidable to him, when his own people is itself the people of God.

¹ [Or, "*in whom* all sinned"—*in quo.*]

³ Sacramento.

⁶ Gen. xvii. 14.

⁴ Rom. iv. 11.

⁷ Gen. xxv. 17.

² Rom. v. 12.

⁵ Gen. xvii. 10.

⁸ 1 Macc. ii. 69.

CHAP. 36. [XXXI.]—*The Platonists' opinion about the existence of the soul previous to the body rejected ; circumcision ; prophecy of Christ's grace.*

What, then, is the purport of so severe a condemnation, when no wilful sin has been committed? For the opinion of certain Platonists has no existence here, that every such infant is thus requited in his soul for what it did of its own wilfulness previous to the present life, as having possessed previous to its present bodily state a free choice to live either well or ill; since the Apostle Paul says most plainly, that before they were born they did neither good nor evil.¹ On what account, therefore, is an infant rightly punished with such ruin, if it be not because he belongs to the ruined mass, and is properly regarded as born of Adam, condemned under the bond of the ancient debt [of original sin], unless he has been released from the bond—not indeed by any merit of his own, but by grace? And what grace but God's, through our Lord Jesus Christ? Now there was a forecast of His coming undoubtedly contained not only in other sacred institutions² of the ancient Jews, but also in their circumcision of the foreskin. For the eighth day, [whereon it was administered], in the recurrence of weeks, became the Lord's day, on which the Lord arose from the dead; and Christ was the rock³ [whence was formed] the stony blade for the circumcision;⁴ and the flesh of the foreskin was the body of sin.

CHAP. 37. [XXXII.]—*In what sense Christ is called "Sin."*

There was a change of the sacramental ordinances made after the coming of Him whose advent they prefigured; but there was no change in the Mediator's help, who, even previous to His coming in the flesh, all along delivered the ancient members of His body by their faith in His incarnation; and in respect of ourselves too, though we were dead in sins and in the uncircumcision of our flesh, we are quickened together in Christ, in whom we are circumcised with the circumcision not made with the hand,⁵ such as was prefigured by the old manual circumcision, that the body of sin might be done away⁶ which was born with us from Adam. The propagation

¹ Rom. ix. 11.

² Sacramenta.

³ 1 Cor. x. 4.

⁴ Ex. iv. 25.

⁵ Col. ii. 11, 13.

⁶ Rom. vi. 6.

of a condemned original nature condemns ourselves, if we are not cleansed in the likeness of sinful flesh, in which He was sent without sin, who nevertheless concerning sin condemned sin, having been made sin for us.¹ Accordingly the apostle says: "We beseech you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled unto God. For He hath made Him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him."² God, therefore, to whom we are reconciled, has made Him to be sin for us,—that is to say, a sacrifice by which our sins may be remitted; for sins are designated as the sacrifices for sins. And indeed He was sacrificed for our sins, the only one among men who had no sins, even as in those early times [a faultless animal] was sought for among the flocks, to prefigure the Faultless One who was to come to heal our offences. On whatever day, therefore, an infant may be baptized after his birth, he is as if circumcised on the eighth day; inasmuch as he is circumcised in Him who rose again the third day indeed after He was crucified, but the eighth according to the weeks. He is circumcised for the putting off of the body of sin; in other words, that the grace of spiritual regeneration may do away with the debt which the contagion of carnal generation contracted. "For no one is pure from uncleanness" (what uncleanness, pray, but that of sin?), "not even the infant, whose life is but that of a single day upon the earth."³

CHAP. 38. [XXXIII.]—*Original sin does not render marriage evil. Conjugal chastity the blessing of the nuptial state.*

But they captiously argue, saying: "Is not, then, marriage an evil, and surely the human being which is produced by marriage is not God's work?" As if the good of the married life were that morbid concupiscence with which they who know not God love their wives—a course which the apostle forbids;⁴ and not rather that conjugal chastity, by which carnal lust is reduced to the good purposes of the moderate procreation of children. Or as if, forsooth, a man could possibly be anything but God's work, not only when born in wedlock, but even if he be produced in fornication or adultery. In the present

¹ Rom. viii. 3 and Gal. iii. 13.

² 2 Cor. v. 20, 21.

³ Job. xiv. 4, 5 (Septuagint).

⁴ 1 Thess. iv. 5.

inquiry, however, when the question is not for what purpose the Creator is wanted, but the Saviour, we have not to consider what good there is in natural procreation, but what evil there is in sin, whereby our nature has been certainly vitiated. No doubt the two are generated simultaneously—both nature and nature's flaw; one, however, of these is good, the other evil. The one comes to us from the bounty of the Creator, the other is contracted from the original condemnation; the one has its cause in the goodwill of the Supreme, the other in the depraved will of the first man; the one exhibits God as the maker of the creature, the other as the punisher of disobedience. In short, the very same Christ was *man's maker* for the creation of the one, and *man-made*¹ for the healing of the other.

CHAP. 39. [XXXIV.]—*Three things good and laudable in matrimony. Lust.*

Good out of evil. Whence arises modesty in the members of our body.

Marriage, therefore, is a good in all the things which are the properties of the nuptial state. And these are three: it is the ordained means of procreation, it is the guarantee² of chastity, it is the pledge and security of sexual union.³ In respect of its ordinance for generation the Scripture says, "I will therefore that the younger women marry, bear children, guide the house;"⁴ as regards its guaranteeing chastity, it is said of it, "The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband; and likewise also the husband hath not power of his own body, but the wife;"⁵ and considered as the sacramental pledge and security of sexual union, the Scripture [gives it this sanction], "What God hath joined together, let not man put asunder."⁶ Touching these points, we do not forget that we have treated at sufficient length, with whatever ability the Lord has given us, in other works of ours, which are not unknown to you.⁷ In relation to all these properties the Scripture has this general praise: "Marriage is honourable in all, and the bed undefiled."⁸ For, inasmuch as the wedded state is good, insomuch does it produce a very large amount of good in respect of the evil of

¹ This harsh and otherwise inexcusable English may be forgiven the translator, from his desire to preserve, however faintly, Augustine's antithesis, *factor est hominis* and *factus est homo*.

² Fides.

³ Connubii sacramentum.

⁴ 1 Tim. v. 14.

⁵ 1 Cor. vii. 4.

⁶ Matt. xix. 6.

⁷ *De Bono Conjugali*, 3 sqq.

⁸ Heb. xiii. 4.

concupiscence ; for it is not lust, but reason, which makes a good use of concupiscence. Now lust lies in that law of the "disobedient" members which the apostle notes as "warring against the law of the mind ;"¹ whereas reason lies in that law of the wedded state which makes good use of concupiscence. If, however, it were not possible for any good to arise out of evil, not even could God create man out of the embraces of adultery. As, therefore, the damnable evil of adultery, whenever man is born in it, is not chargeable on God, who certainly amidst man's evil work actually produces a good work ; so, likewise, all which causes shame in that rebellion of the members which brought the accusing blush on those who after their sin covered the said members with the fig-tree leaves,² is not laid to the charge of marriage, by virtue of which the conjugal embrace is not only allowable, but is even useful and honourable ; but it is imputable to the sin of that disobedience which was followed by the penalty of man's finding his own members emulating against himself that very disobedience which he had practised against God. Then, abashed at their action, since they moved no more at the bidding of his rational will, but at their own arbitrary choice as it were, instigated by lust, he devised the covering which should conceal such of them as he judged to be worthy of shame. For man, as the handiwork of God, deserved not confusion of face ; nor were the members which it seemed fit to the Creator to form and appoint by any means designed to bring the blush to the creature. Accordingly, that naked simplicity [of Eden] was displeasing neither to God nor to man : there was nothing to be ashamed of, because nothing at first accrued which deserved punishment.

CHAP. 40. [XXXV.]—*Marriage existed before sin was committed. How God's blessing operated in our first parents.*

There must, however, undoubtedly have been marriage, even when sin had no prior existence ; and for no other reason was it that woman, and not a second man, was created as a help meet for the man. Moreover, those grand words of God, "Be fruitful and multiply,"³ are not prophetic of sins to be condemned, but a benediction upon the fertility of marriage. For by these ineffable words of His, I mean by the divine methods

¹ Rom. vii. 23.

² Gen. iii. 7.

³ Gen. i. 28.

which are inherent in the verity of, that wisdom by which all things were made, God endowed the primeval pair with their seminal power. Suppose, however, that nature had not been tarnished by sin, God forbid that we should think that marriages in Paradise must have been such, that in them the procreative members would be excited by the mere ardour of lust, and not at the beck of the will,—as the foot is for walking, the hand for labour, and the tongue for speech. Nor, as now happens, would the purity of the virgin state be excited to the conception of the womb by the force of a turbid heat, but it would rather be submissive to the power of the gentlest love; and thus there would be no pain, no blood-effusion of the concumbent virgin, as there would also be no groan of the parturient mother. This, however, men refuse to believe, because it has not been verified in the actual condition of our mortal state. Nature, having been vitiated by sin, has never experienced an instance of that primeval purity. But we address ourselves to faithful men, who have learnt to believe the inspired Scriptures, even though no examples are adduced of actual reality. For how could I now possibly *prove* that a man was made of the dust, without any parents, and a wife formed for him out of his own side?¹ And yet faith takes on trust what the eye no longer discovers.

CHAP. 41. [XXXVI.]—*Lust and travail come from sin. Whence our members became a cause of shame.*

Granted, therefore, that we have no means of showing that the nuptial acts of even that primeval marriage were quietly discharged, undisturbed by lustful passion, and that the motion of the organs of generation, like that of any other members of the body, was not instigated by the ardour of lust, but directed by the deliberate choice of the will (in which tranquillity marriage would have continued, had not the disgrace of sin intervened); still, from all that is stated in the sacred Scriptures on divine authority, we have reasonable grounds for believing that such was the original condition of wedded life. Although, it is true, I am not told that the nuptial embrace was unattended with prurient desire; as also I do not find it on record that parturition was unaccompanied with groans and pain, or that

¹ Gen. ii. 7, 22.

actual birth led not to future death; yet, at the same time, if I follow the verity of the Holy Scriptures, [I must conclude that] the travail of the mother and the death of the human offspring would never have supervened if sin had not preceded. Nor would that have happened which abashed the man and woman when they covered their loins; because in the same sacred records it is expressly written that the sin was first committed, and then immediately followed this hiding of their shame.¹ For unless some indelicacy of motion had shown to their eyes—which were of course not closed, though not open to this point in the sense of earnest perception—that those particular members required chastisement, they would not have perceived anything on their own persons, which God had entirely made worthy of all praise, that called for either shame or concealment. If, indeed, the sin had not first occurred which they had dared to commit in their disobedience, there would not have followed the disgrace which their shame would fain conceal.

CHAP. 42. [XXXVII.]—*The evil of lust ought not to be ascribed to marriage. The three good results of the nuptial ordinance: offspring, chastity, and the sacramental union. Original sin the result of carnal concupiscence.*

It is then manifest that that must not be laid to the account of marriage, in spite of which, even if it had not come into being, marriage would have existed. The good of marriage is not taken away by the evil, although the evil is by marriage turned to a good use. Such, however, is the present condition of mortal men, that the connubial intercourse and lust are simultaneous in action; and on this account it happens, that as the lust is blamed, so also the nuptial commerce, however lawful and honourable, is thought to be reprehensible by those persons who either are unwilling or unable to draw the distinction between them. They are, moreover, inattentive to that good of the nuptial state which is the glory of matrimony; I mean offspring, chastity, and the sacramental union.² The evil, however, at which even marriage blushes for shame is not the fault of marriage, but of the lust of the flesh. Yet because without this evil it is impossible to effect the good purpose of marriage, even the procreation

¹ Gen. iii. 7.

² Sacramentum.

of children, whenever this process is approached, secrecy is sought, witnesses are removed, and even the presence of the very children which happen to be born of the process is avoided as soon as they reach the age of observation. Thus it comes to pass that marriage is permitted to effect all that is lawful in its state, only it must not forget to conceal all that is improper. Hence it follows that infants, although incapable of sinning, are yet not born without the contagion of sin,—not, indeed, because of what is lawful in matrimony, but of its improper element: for from the lawful a natural creature is born; from the improper, sin. Of the natural creature so born, God is the Maker, who created man, and who united male and female under the law of the nuptial union; but of the sin the origin lies in the subtlety of the devil who deceives, and in the will of the man who yields to the deception.

CHAP. 43. [XXXVIII.]—*Human offspring, even previous to birth, under condemnation at the very root. Uses of matrimony undertaken for mere pleasure not without venial fault.*

Where God has done nothing else than by a just sentence to condemn the man who wilfully sins, root and all; there also, and as a matter of course, everything pertaining to human offspring is in its sinful root under condemnation. In this radical ruin carnal generation involves every man; and from it nothing but spiritual regeneration liberates him. In the case, therefore, of regenerate parents, if they continue in the same state of grace, there will undoubtedly ensue no injurious consequence [of their radical ruin], by reason of the remission of sins which has been bestowed upon them. It is only when they make a perverse use of this grace that the ruin operates, not only in improper and corrupt practices of all kinds, but also in the marriage state itself, whenever husband and wife toil at procreation, not from the desire of natural propagation of their species, but are mere slaves to the gratification of their lust out of very wantonness. As for the permission which the apostle gives to husbands and wives, “not to defraud one another, except with consent for a time, that they may have leisure for prayer,”¹ he concedes it by way of indulgent allowance, and not as a command; but this very form of

¹ 1 Cor. vii. 5.

the concession evidently implies some degree of fault. The connubial embrace, however, which marriage-contracts point to as intended for the procreation of children, considered in itself simply, and without any reference to fornication, is good and right; because, although it is by reason of this body of death (which is unrenewed as yet by the resurrection) impracticable without a certain amount of bestial motion, which puts human nature to the blush, yet the embrace is not after all a sin in itself, when reason applies the concupiscence to a good end, and is not overmastered to evil.

CHAP. 44. [XXXIX.]—*A full renewal through the resurrection, the effect of baptism.*

This concupiscence of the flesh would be prejudicial* [to good], even so far only as it is inherent in us,* did not the remission of sins prove so beneficial,* that while it is inherent in men, both in the natural and the regenerate, it may in the former be prejudicial as well as inherent, but in the latter inherent simply, but never prejudicial. In the unregenerate it is prejudicial to such an extent indeed, that, unless they are born again, it can contribute no advantage to them, even if they are born of regenerate parents. The fault of our nature remains in our offspring so deeply impressed as to make it guilty, even when the guilt of the self-same fault has been washed away in the parent by the remission of sins—until every defect which ends in sin by the consent of the human will is consumed and done away in the last regeneration. This will be identical with that renovation of the very flesh itself which is promised in its future resurrection, when we shall not only commit no sins, but be even free from those vitiated desires which lead us to sin by yielding consent to them. To this blessed consummation advances are even now made by us, through the grace of that holy laver which we have put within our reach. The same regeneration which now renews our spirit, so that all our past sins are remitted, will by and by also operate, as might be expected, to the renewal to eternal life of that very flesh, by the resurrection of which to an incorruptible state the incentives of all sins will be purged out

* The three phrases here marked with asterisks have a more clearly expressed relation in the original: *obesset, inesset, prodesset.*

of our nature. But this salvation is as yet only accomplished in hope: it is not absolutely realized in fact; it is not in present possession, but it is looked forward to with patience. [XL.] And thus there is a whole and perfect cleansing, in the self-same baptismal laver, not only of all the sins remitted now in our baptism, which make us guilty owing to the consent we yield to wrong desires, and to the sinful acts in which they issue; but of these said wrong desires also, which, if not consented to by us, would contract no guilt of sin, and which, though not in this present life removed, will yet have no existence in the life beyond.

CHAP. 45.—*Man's deliverance suited to the character of his very captivity. Exorcism, exsufflation, and renunciation of Satan, among the ceremonies of baptism.*

The guilt, therefore, of that fault of our nature of which we are speaking will remain in the carnal offspring of the regenerate, until in them also it be washed in the laver of regeneration. A regenerate man does not regenerate, but generates, sons according to the flesh; and thus he hands on to his posterity, not the condition of the regenerate, but only of natural birth. Therefore, be a man guilty of unbelief, or a perfect believer, he does not in either case beget faithful children, but sinners; in the same way that the seeds, not only of a wild olive, but also of a cultivated one, produce not cultivated olives, but wild ones. So, likewise, his first birth holds a man in that bondage from which only his second birth delivers him. The devil holds him, Christ liberates him; Eve's deceiver holds him, Mary's Son frees him: he holds him, who approached the man through the woman; He frees him, who was born of a woman that never approached a man: he holds him, who injected into the woman the cause of lust; He liberates him, who without any lust was conceived in the woman. The former was wholly able to hold all men in his grasp through one; nor does any deliver them out of his power but One, whom he was unable to grasp. The very sacraments indeed of the Church, which she¹ administers with due cere-

¹ That is, *the Church*, according to one reading—*concelebrat*; but another reading, *concelebrant*, understands "the Pelagians" to be the subject of the proposition.

mony, according to the authority of very ancient tradition (and these [opponents of the truth], notwithstanding their opinion that the sacraments are only feignedly and not really used in the case of infants, still do not venture to reject them with open disapproval),—the very sacraments, I say, of the holy Church show plainly enough that infants, even when fresh from the womb, are delivered from the bondage of the devil through the grace of Christ. For, to say nothing of the fact that they are baptized for the remission of sins by no fallacious pretence, but in a true and faithful mystery, there is previously effected in them the exorcism and the exsufflation of the hostile power, which they profess to renounce by the mouth of those who bring them to baptism. Now, by all these consecrated and evident signs of hidden realities, they are shown to pass from their worst oppressor to their most excellent Redeemer, who, by taking on Himself our infirmity in our behalf, has bound the strong man, that He may spoil his goods;¹ seeing that the weakness of God is stronger, not only than men, but also than angels. While, therefore, God delivers small as well as great, He shows in both instances that the apostle spoke under the direction of [Him who is] the Truth. For it is not merely adults, but little babes too, whom He rescues from the power of darkness, in order to transfer them to the kingdom of God's dear Son.²

CHAP. 46.—*Difficulty of believing original sin. Man's vice is a beast's nature.*

No one should feel surprise, and ask: "Why does God's goodness create anything for the devil's malignity to take possession of?" The truth is, God's gift [of creation] is bestowed on the seminal elements of His creature with the same bounty wherewith "He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust."³ It is with so large a bounty that God has blessed the very seeds, as it were, of our nature, and by blessing has constituted and built it up. Nor has this blessing been eliminated out of our excellent nature by a fault which puts us under condemnation. Owing, indeed, to God's justice, who punishes, this fatal flaw has so far prevailed, that men

¹ Matt. xii. 29.

² Col. i. 13.

³ Matt. v. 45.

are born with the fault of original sin; but yet its influence has not extended so far as to stop the birth of men. Just so does it happen in persons of adult age: whatever sins they commit, these defects of character do not eliminate his manhood from man; nay, God's good workmanship continues still, however evil be the deeds of the impious. For although "man being in honour abideth not; and being without understanding, is compared with the beasts, and is like them,"¹ yet the resemblance is not so absolute that he becomes a beast. There is a comparison, no doubt, between the two; but it is not by reason of nature, but through vice—not vice in the beast, but fault in nature. For so excellent is a man in comparison with a beast, that man's vice is a beast's nature; still man's nature is never on this account changed into the nature of a beast. God, therefore, condemns man because of the fault wherewithal his nature is disgraced, and not because of his nature, which is not removed out of existence in consequence of its fault. Heaven forbid that we should think beasts are obnoxious to the sentence of condemnation [which lies on ourselves]! It is only proper that they should be free from our misery, inasmuch as they cannot partake of our blessedness. What, then, is there surprising or unjust in man's being subjected to an impure spirit—not owing to his nature, but on account of that impurity of his which he has contracted in the stain of his birth, and which proceeds from the will of man,—the impure spirit itself being a good thing considered as spirit, but an evil in that it is impure? For the substance is of God, and is His work, while the bad quality emanates from man's own will. The stronger nature, therefore, that is, the angelic one, keeps the lower, or human, nature in subjection, by reason of the association of vice with the latter. Accordingly the Mediator, who was stronger than the angels, became weak for man's sake.² So that the pride of the Destroyer is destroyed by the humility of the Redeemer; and he who makes his boast over the sons of men of his angelic strength, is vanquished by the Son of God in the human weakness which He assumed.

¹ Ps. xlix. 12.

² 2 Cor. viii. 9.

CHAP. 47. [XLI.]—*Sentences from Ambrose in favour of original sin. Every male which opens the womb.*

And now that we are about to bring this book to a conclusion, we think it proper to do on this subject of *Original Sin* what we did before in our treatise *On Grace*,¹—adduce in evidence against the injurious talk of these persons that servant of God, the Archbishop Ambrose, whose orthodoxy is claimed by Pelagius as being the most perfect among the writers of the Latin Church; [and there is a consistency in this testimony, for] *grace* is more especially honoured in doing away with *original sin*. In the work which the saintly Ambrose wrote, *Concerning the Resurrection*, he says: “I fell in Adam, in Adam was I expelled from Paradise, in Adam I died; and He only recalls me [to a state of salvation] because He has found me in Adam—obnoxious, indeed, to the guilt of sin in him, and subject to death, but also justified in Christ.” Then, again, writing against the Novatians, he says: “We men are all of us born in sin; our very origin is wrapped in sin; as you may read when David says, ‘Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me.’² Hence it is that Paul’s flesh is ‘a body of death;’³ even as he says himself, ‘Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?’ Christ’s flesh, however, has condemned sin, which He experienced not by being born, and which by dying He crucified, that in our flesh there might be justification through grace, where previously there was impurity through sin.”⁴ The same holy man also, in his *Exposition of Isaiah*, speaking of Christ, says: “Therefore as man He was tried in all things, and in the likeness of men He endured all things; but as born of the Spirit [or Divine Nature] of God, He was free from sin. For every man is a liar, and no one but God alone is without sin. It is therefore an observed and settled fact, that no man born of a man and a woman, that is, by means of their bodily commerce, is clearly free from sin. Whosoever, indeed, is free from sin, is free also from a conception and birth of this kind.”⁵ Moreover, when expounding the

¹ [See above, *De Gratia Christi*, 49–51 (xlv., xlvi.).] ² Ps. li. 5.

³ Rom. vii. 24.

⁴ [*De Pœnitentia*, i. 2, 3.]

⁵ [Quoted from a work by St. Ambrose, *On Isaiah*, not now extant.]

Gospel according to Luke, he says: "It was no cohabitation with a husband which opened the secret energies of the Virgin's womb; rather was it the Holy Ghost which infused immaculate seed into her unviolated womb. For the Lord Jesus alone of those who are born of woman is holy, inasmuch as He experienced not the contact of earthly corruption, by reason of the novelty of His immaculate birth; nay, He repelled it by His heavenly majesty."¹

CHAP. 48.

These words, however, of the man of God are contradicted by Pelagius, notwithstanding all his commendation of his author, when he himself declares that "we are born, as without virtue, so without vice."² What remains, then, but that Pelagius should condemn and renounce this error of his; or else be sorry that he has quoted Ambrose in the way he has? Inasmuch, however, as the blessed Ambrose, Catholic bishop as he is, has expressed himself in the above-quoted passages in accordance with the Catholic faith, it follows that Pelagius, along with his disciple Cœlestius, was justly condemned by the authority of the Catholic Church for having turned aside from the true way of faith, since he repented not for having bestowed commendation on Ambrose, and for having at the same time entertained opinions in opposition to him. I know full well with what insatiable avidity you³ read whatever is written for edification and in confirmation of the faith; but yet, notwithstanding its utility as contributing to such an end, I must at last bring this treatise to a conclusion.

¹ [See book ii. 56 of this *Commentary on St. Luke*, ch. ii.]

² [See above, ch. 14 (xiii).]

³ [The three friends to whom these two books are addressed were pious members of the same family; Pinianus was the husband, Melania his wife, and Albina her mother.]

ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE:

IN TWO BOOKS

ADDRESSED TO THE COUNT VALERIUS,

BY AURELIUS AUGUSTINE, BISHOP OF HIPPO.



ADVERTISEMENT TO THE READER ON THE FOLLOWING TREATISE.

ON revising these two Books, which he addressed to the Count Valerius, Augustine placed them immediately after his reply to the discourse of the Arians, which was affixed to the *Proceedings against Emeritus* [the Donatist bishop]. Now these proceedings are stated to have taken place on the 20th of September, in the year of our Lord 418. There can be no doubt, then, that these subjoined books—or, at any rate, the former of them—were written either at the close of the year 418, or in the beginning of the year 419. For, concerning this first book, Augustine says himself: “This book of mine, however, which he [Julianus] says he answered in four books, I wrote after the condemnation of Pelagius and Cœlestius. This,” he adds, “I have deemed it right to mention, because he declares that my words had been used by the enemies of the truth to bring it into odium. Let no one, therefore, suppose that it was owing to this book of mine that condemnation had been passed on the new heretics who are enemies of the grace of Christ.” From these words one may see at once that this first book was published about the same time as the condemnation of the Pelagian [leaders] in the year 418. Soon after its publication it began to be assailed by the Pelagians, who observed that its perusal was producing in the minds of the Catholics much odium against their heresy. One of them, Julianus [Bishop of Eclanum, in Italy], influenced

with a warm desire of furthering the heretical movement, attacked the first book of Augustine's treatise in four books of his own. Out of these, sundry extracts were culled by some interested person, and forwarded to Count Valerius. Valerius despatched them from Ravenna to Rome, to Alypius [the great friend of Augustine], in order that he, on returning to Africa, might hand them to Augustine for the purpose of an early refutation, together with a letter in which Valerius thanked Augustine for the previous work which he also mentioned. Augustine saw at once that these extracts had been taken out of the work of Julianus; and, although he preferred reserving his answer to the selections till he had received the entire work from which they were culled, he still thought that he was bound to avoid all delay in satisfying the Count Valerius. Without loss of time, therefore, he drew up in answer his second book, with the same title as before, *On Marriage and Concupiscence*, which, as we think, must be assigned to the year 420, since the holy doctor wrote it immediately after the expression of [Valerius'] thanks for the first book; for it is clearly improbable that Valerius should have waited two years or more to make the acknowledgment of his gratitude.

Moreover, the Valerius whom Augustine dignifies with the title of *Illustrious* as well as *Count*, was much employed in public life—not, to be sure, in the forum, but in the field; and from this circumstance we find it difficult to accede to the opinion that supposes him to have been the same person with the Valerius who was Count of the Private Estate in the year 425, Consul in 432, and lastly Master of the Offices under Theodosius the younger in the year 434. These appointments, indeed, had no connection with military service, nor had the prefects of Theodosius anything in common with those of Honorius.

FROM "THE RETRACTATIONS," *Book II. chap. 53.*

"I addressed two books to the Illustrious Count Valerius, upon hearing that the Pelagians had brought sundry vague

charges against us,—how, for instance, we condemned marriage by maintaining Original Sin. These books are entitled, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*. We maintain, in fact, that marriage is good; and that it must not be supposed that the concupiscence of the flesh, or “the law in our members which wars against the law of our mind,”¹ is a fault of marriage. Conjugal chastity makes a good use of the evil of concupiscence in the procreation of children. My treatise contained two books. The first of them found its way into the hands of Julianus the Pelagian, who wrote four books in opposition to it. Out of these, somebody extracted sundry passages, and sent them to Count Valerius; he handed them to us, and after I had received them I wrote a second book in answer to these very extracts. The first book of this work of mine opens with these words: “Our new heretics, most beloved son Valerius” [*Hæretici novi, dilectissime fili Valeri*]. While the second begins thus: “Amid the cares of your duty as a soldier” [*Inter militiæ tuæ curas*].

A LETTER² ADDRESSED TO THE COUNT VALERIUS,

ON AUGUSTINE'S FORWARDING TO HIM WHAT HE CALLS HIS
FIRST BOOK “ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE.”

TO THE ILLUSTRIOUS AND DESERVEDLY EMINENT LORD VALERIUS, HIS MOST
DEARLY BELOVED SON IN THE LOVE OF CHRIST, AUGUSTINE, SENDS GREETING
IN THE LORD.

1. While I was chafing at the long disappointment of receiving no acknowledgments from your Highness of the letters which I had on different occasions written to you, I all at once received three letters full of your usual kindness,—one by the hand of my fellow bishop Vindemialis, which was not meant for me only, and two, soon afterwards, through my brother presbyter Firmus. This holy man, who is bound to me, as you may have ascertained from his own lips, by the ties of a most intimate love, had much conversation with me

¹ Rom. vii. 23.

² This is the 200th in the collection of Augustine's *Letters*.

about your excellence, and gave me undoubted proofs of his complete knowledge of your character "in the bowels of Christ;"¹ by these means he had sight, not only of the letters of which the fore-mentioned bishop and he himself had been the bearers, but also of those which we expressed our disappointment at not having received. Now his information respecting you was all the more pleasant to us, inasmuch as he gave me to understand, what it was out of your power to do, that you would not, even at my earnest request for an answer, become the extoller of your own praises, contrary to the permission of Holy Scripture.² But I ought myself to hesitate to write to you in this strain, lest I should incur the suspicion of flattering you, my illustrious and deservedly eminent lord and dearly beloved son in the love of Christ.

2. Now, as to your praises in Christ, or rather Christ's praises in you, see what delight and joy it was to me to hear of them from him, who could neither deceive me because of his fidelity to me, nor be ignorant of them by reason of his friendship with you. But other testimony, which though inferior in amount and certainty has still reached my ear from divers quarters, assures me how sound and catholic is your faith; how devout your hope of the future; how great your love to God and the brethren; how humble your mind amid the highest honours, not trusting in uncertain riches, but in the living God, and rich in good works;³ how your house is a rest and comfort of the saints, and a terror to evil-doers; how great is your care that no man lay snares for Christ's members (either among His old enemies or those of more recent days), although he use Christ's name as a cloak for his wiles; and at the same time, though you give no quarter to the error of these enemies, how provident you are to secure their salvation. This and the like, we frequently hear, as I have already said, even from others; but at the present moment we have, by means of the above-mentioned brother, received a fuller and more trustworthy knowledge.

Touching, however, the subject of conjugal purity, that we might be able to bestow our commendation and love upon you for it, could we possibly listen to the information of any one

¹ Phil. i. 8.

² Prov. xxvii. 2.

³ 1 Tim. vi. 17.

but some bosom friend of your own, who had no mere superficial acquaintance with you, but knew your innermost life? Concerning, therefore, this excellent gift of God to you, I am delighted to converse with you with more frankness and at greater length. I am quite sure that I shall not prove burdensome to you, even if I send you a prolix treatise, the perusal of which will only ensure a longer converse between us. For this have I discovered, that amidst your manifold and weighty cares you pursue your reading with ease and pleasure; and that you take great delight in any little performances of ours, even if they are addressed to other persons, whenever they have chanced to fall into your hands. Whatever, therefore, is addressed to *yourself*, in which I can speak to you as it were personally, you will deign both to notice with greater attention, and to receive with a higher pleasure. From the perusal, then, of this letter, turn to the book which I send with it. It will in its very commencement, in a more convenient manner, intimate to your venerable self the reason, both why it has been written, and why it has been submitted specially to your consideration.

FIRST BOOK.¹

WHEREIN HE EXPOUNDS THE PECULIAR AND NATURAL BLESSINGS OF MARRIAGE.

HE SHOWS THAT AMONG THESE BLESSINGS MUST NOT BE RECKONED FLESHLY CONCUPISCENCE; INSOMUCH AS THIS IS WHOLLY EVIL, SUCH AS DOES NOT PROCEED FROM THE VERY NATURE OF MARRIAGE, BUT IS AN ACCIDENT THEREOF ARISING FROM ORIGINAL SIN. THIS EVIL, NOTWITHSTANDING, IS RIGHTLY EMPLOYED BY MARRIAGE FOR THE PROCREATION OF CHILDREN. BUT, AS THE RESULT OF THIS CONCUPISCENCE, IT COMES TO PASS THAT, EVEN FROM THE LAWFUL MARRIAGE OF THE CHILDREN OF GOD, MEN ARE NOT BORN CHILDREN OF GOD, BUT OF THE WORLD, WHO ARE TIED AND BOUND WITH THE CHAIN OF SIN, ALTHOUGH THEIR PARENTS HAVE BEEN LIBERATED THEREFROM BY GRACE; AND ARE LED CAPTIVE BY THE DEVIL, IF THEY BE NOT IN LIKE MANNER RESCUED BY THE SELF-SAME GRACE OF CHRIST. HE EXPLAINS HOW IT IS THAT CONCUPISCENCE REMAINS IN THE BAPTIZED IN ACT THOUGH NOT IN GUILT. HE SHOWS, THAT BY THE SANCTITY OF BAPTISM, NOT MERELY THIS ORIGINAL GUILT, BUT ALL OTHER SINS OF MEN WHATEVER ARE TAKEN AWAY. HE LASTLY QUOTES THE AUTHORITY OF AMBROSE TO SHOW THAT THE EVIL OF CONCUPISCENCE MUST BE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE GOOD OF MARRIAGE.

CHAP. 1.—*Concerning the argument of this treatise.*

OUR modern heretics, my dearest son Valerius, who maintain that infants born in the flesh have no need of that medicine of Christ whereby sins are healed, are constantly affirming, in their excessive hatred of us, that we condemn marriage and that divine procedure by which God creates human beings by means of men and women. This they allege of us, because we maintain that they who are born of such a union contract that original sin of which the apostle says, "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for in him all men sinned;"² and because we do not deny, that of whatever parents they are born, they are still under the devil's dominion, unless they be born again in Christ, and by His grace be removed from the power of darkness and translated into His

¹ [Written about the beginning of the year A.D. 419.]

² In quo omnes peccaverunt, Rom. v. 5.

kingdom, who willed not to be born from the same union of the two sexes. Because, then, we affirm this doctrine, which is contained in the oldest and unvarying rule of the Catholic faith, these propounders of the novel and perverse dogma, who deny that there is in infants any sin to be washed away in the laver of regeneration, in their unbelief or ignorance calumniate us, as if we condemned marriage, and as if we asserted to be the devil's work what is God's own work—even the human being which is born of marriage. Nor do they reflect that, as the good of marriage is not impeachable on account of the original sin which is derived therefrom, so the evil of adultery and fornication cannot be excused for the natural good which is born of them. For as sin is the work of the devil, whether derived to infants from this source or from that; so man is the work of God, whether born of parents in wedlock or out of it. Our purpose, therefore, in this book, so far as the Lord vouchsafes us His help, is to show the difference between the evil of that carnal concupiscence which involves man who is born therefrom in original sin, and the good of the nuptial institution itself. For there would have been none of this shame-producing concupiscence, which is favourably spoken of by shameless men in a shameless tone and manner, if man had not previously sinned; while as to marriage, it would still have existed, even if no man had sinned. For the procreation of children in the body of that chaste life could have been effected without the moral malady, which in "the body of this death"¹ cannot be separated from the process of procreation.

CHAP. 2. [II.]—*Why this treatise was addressed to Valerius.*

Now there are three reasons, which I will briefly indicate, why I wished to write to you especially on this subject. The first reason is, because by the endowment of Christ you are a strict observer of conjugal chastity. The second is, because by your powerful influence you have effectually withstood those profane novelties which we are resisting in our present discussion. The third arises from the circumstance of my discovering that something which they had committed to writing

¹ Rom. vii. 24.

had found its way into your hands; and although in the exceeding strength of your faith you could despise such an attempt, it is still a good thing for us even to know how to help on our common faith by a defence of it. For the Apostle Peter instructs us to be "ready always to give an answer to every one that asketh us a reason of the hope that is in us;"¹ and the Apostle Paul says, "Let your speech be always with grace, seasoned with salt, that ye may know how ye ought to answer every man."² These are the motives which chiefly impel me to hold such converse with you in this volume, as the Lord shall enable me. I have never liked, indeed, to intrude the perusal of any of my humble labours on any eminent person, who is like yourself conspicuous to all from the elevation of his office, without his own request,—especially when he is not blessed with the enjoyment of a dignified retirement, but is still occupied in the public duties of a soldier's profession; this has always seemed to me to savour more of impertinence than of respectful esteem. If, then, I have incurred censure of this kind, while acting on the reasons which I have now mentioned, I crave the favour of your forgiveness, and a kindly regard to the following arguments.

CHAP. 3. [III.]—*Conjugal chastity, the gift of God.*

That the purity of the marriage state is God's gift, is shown by the most blessed Paul, when, speaking on this very subject, he says: "I would that all men were even as I myself: but every man hath his proper gift of God, one after this manner, and another after that."³ Observe, he tells us that this gift is from God; and although he classes it below that continence in which he would have all men to be like himself, he still describes it as a gift of God. Whence we understand that, when these precepts are given to us in order to be carried out into action, nothing else is stated than that there ought to be within us our own will also for the purpose of receiving and retaining them. When, therefore, these are shown to be gifts of God, it is meant that they must be sought from Him if they are not yet obtained; and if they are possessed, thanks must be given to Him for the possession; moreover, that our

¹ 1 Pet. iii. 15.

² Col. iv. 6.

³ 1 Cor. vii. 7.

own wills and affections have but small avail for seeking, obtaining, and holding fast these gifts, unless they be assisted by God's grace.

CHAP. 4.—*A difficulty as regards the chastity of unbelievers. None but a believer is truly a chaste man.* [See Augustine's work *Against Julianus*, iv. 3.]

What, then, have we to say when conjugal chastity is discovered even in some unbelievers? Must it be said that they sin, in that they make a bad use of a gift of God, in not referring it to the worship of Him from whom they received it? Or must these endowments, perchance, be not regarded as gifts of God at all, inasmuch as they are not believers who exercise them; according to the apostle's sentiment, when he says, "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin"?¹ But who would dare to say that a gift of God is sin? For the soul and the body, and all the natural endowments which are implanted in the soul and the body, even in the persons of sinful men, are still gifts of God; for it is God who made them, and not they themselves. When it is said, "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin," only those things are meant which men themselves do. When men, therefore, do without faith those things which seem to appertain to conjugal chastity, they do them either to please men, that is to say, themselves or other people, or to avoid incurring such troubles as are incidental to human nature in those matters which kindle faulty desires, or to pay service to devils. In such cases sins are not really restrained, but some sins are overpowered by other sins. God forbid, then, that a man be truly called chaste and pure who observes connubial fidelity to his wife from any other motive than devotion to the true God.

CHAP. 5. [IV.]—*The natural good of marriage. All society naturally repudiates a fraudulent companion. What is true conjugal purity? No true virginity and chastity, except in devotion to true faith.*

The united effort, then, of a man and a woman for the purpose of procreation is the natural good of marriage. But the man makes a bad use of this good who uses it like a beast, intent merely on the gratification of his lust, instead of the simple desire to propagate his species. Now, although in

¹ Rom. xiv. 23.

sundry animals unendowed with reason, as, for instance, in most of the winged tribe, there is strongly maintained a certain kind of marriage union, and a social combination of skill in nest-building, yet their mutual division of the periods for cherishing their eggs, and their taking it in turns to foster their young, give them the appearance of so acting, whenever they mate, as to be intent rather on securing the continuance of their kind than on gratifying any lustful instinct. And of these two desires, the one betokens a man's likeness in a brute; the other, a brute's likeness in a man. With respect, however, to that property which I ascribed to the nature of marriage, that the male and the female are united together as associates in the act of procreation, and consequently do not behave fraudulently towards each other (forasmuch as every associated state has a natural abhorrence of a fraudulent companion), although even men without faith possess this palpable blessing of nature, yet, since they use it not in faith, they only turn it to sin and evil. In like degree, however, believers in Christ, by their marriage, convert to the purpose of righteousness that carnal concupiscence by which "the flesh lusteth against the Spirit."¹ For they entertain the firm purpose of generating an offspring to be regenerated—that the children who are born of them as "children of the world" may be born again and become "sons of God." Wherefore all parents who have children with no intention, will, or purpose of transferring them from their conjunction with the first man to membership with Christ, but simply boast as unbelieving parents over unbelieving children,—however fastidious they be in their cohabitation, studiously limiting it according to the rules of wedlock to the end of begetting children,—they really have no conjugal chastity in themselves. For inasmuch as chastity is a virtue, having impurity as its contrary vice, and as all the virtues (even those whose operation is by means of the body) have their seat in the soul, how can the body be in any true sense said to be chaste, when the soul itself is by fornication severed from the true God? Now such fornication the holy psalmist censures when he says: "For, lo, they that are far from Thee shall perish: Thou hast destroyed all them that go

¹ Gal. v. 17.

a whoring from Thee.”¹ Only that, then, can be called true chastity, whether of the married state, or of widowhood, or of virginity, which devotes itself to true faith. The estate of virginity when consecrated to religion is no doubt preferable to wedded life; yet what sober-minded Christian would not prefer Christian women who have been even once married, to not only vestal virgins, but also to heretical ones? So great is the influence of faith, of which the apostle says, “Whatsoever is not of faith is sin;”² and of which it is written in the Epistle to the Hebrews, “Without faith it is impossible to please God.”³

CHAP. 6. [v.]—*The censuring of lust is not a condemnation of marriage; whence comes shame in the human body. Adam and Eve were not created blind; meaning of their “eyes being opened” in the case of our first parents.*

Now, this being the real state of the question, they undoubtedly err who suppose that, when the lust of the flesh is censured, the nuptial institution is condemned; as if the malady of concupiscence was the outcome of marriage and not of sin. Were not the first man and wife, whose nuptials God blessed with the words, “Be fruitful and multiply,”⁴ naked, and yet not ashamed? Why, then, did shame arise out of their members after they had sinned, were it not for an indelicacy of motion, which, if man had never sinned, would certainly never have existed in married life? Or was it, forsooth, as some hold (who give little heed to what they read), that human beings were, like dogs, at first born blind; and—absurder still—obtained sight, not as dogs do, by growing, but by sinning? Far be it from us to entertain such an opinion. But they gather that opinion of theirs from reading: “She took of the fruit thereof, and did eat; and gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat: and the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked.”⁵ This accounts for the opinion of unintelligent persons, that the eyes of the first man and woman were previously closed, because Holy Scripture testifies that they were then opened. Well, then, were Hagar’s eyes, the handmaid of Sarah, previously shut, when, with her thirsty and sobbing

¹ Ps. lxxiii. 27.

² Rom. xiv. 23.

³ Heb. xi. 6.

⁴ Gen. i. 28.

⁵ Gen. iii. 6, 7.

child, she opened her eyes¹ and saw the well? Was this also the case with the two disciples, who, after the Lord's resurrection, walked in the way with Him; were they blindfold, since the evangelist says of them that "their eyes were opened, and they knew Him"?² When, therefore, it is written concerning the first man and woman, that "the eyes of them both were opened,"³ we ought to understand that they became intent on beholding and recognising the new state which had befallen them in their body. Now that their eyes were opened, their body appeared to them naked, and they knew it. If this were not the meaning, how, when the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air were brought unto him,⁴ could Adam have given them names if his eyes were shut? He could not have done this without discernment of the objects; and without eyesight he could have had no discernment. How, too, could the woman herself have been beheld so clearly by him when he said, "This is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh"?⁵ If, indeed, any one shall be so determined on cavilling as to insist that Adam might have acquired a discernment of these objects, not by sight but by touch, what explanation will he have to give of the passage wherein we are told how the woman "saw that the tree," from which she was about to pluck the forbidden fruit, "was pleasant for the eyes to behold"?⁶ No; "they were both naked, and were not ashamed,"⁷ not because they had no eyesight, but because they had not discovered any reason to be ashamed in their bodily limbs, which had all along been seen by them. For it is not said: They were both naked, *and knew it not*; but, "they were not ashamed." Because, indeed, nothing had previously happened which was not lawful and right, so nothing had ensued which could cause them shame.

CHAP. 7. [VI.]—*Man's disobedience justly requited in the rebellion of his own flesh; the blush of shame for the disobedient members of the body.*

When the first man transgressed the law of God, he began to have another law in his members which was repugnant to his mind; then he felt the evil of his own disobedience when

¹ Gen. xxi. 17-19.

² Luke xxiv. 31.

³ Gen. iii. 7.

⁴ Gen. ii. 19.

⁵ Gen. ii. 23.

⁶ Gen. iii. 6.

⁷ Gen. ii. 25.

he experienced in the rebellion of his flesh a most righteous retribution recoiling on himself. Now it was such "an opening of his eyes" which the serpent had promised him in his temptation¹—the discovery, in fact, of a something which he had better never known. Then, indeed, did man perceive within himself what he had done; then did he discern between good and evil,—not by the absence of evil, but by his endurance of it. For it certainly was not just or right that obedience should be rendered by his servant, that is, his body, to him, who had not obeyed his own Lord and Master. Well, then, how significant is the fact that the eyes, and lips, and tongue, and hands, and feet, and the bending of back, and neck, and sides, are all placed within our power—to be applied to such operations as are suitable to them, when we have our body free from impediments and in a sound state of health; but when it must come to man's great function of the procreation of children, the members which were expressly created for this purpose will not obey the direction of the will, but lust has to be waited for to set these members in motion, as if they were under its dominion, while it sometimes refuses to act when the mind wills, although it as often acts against the will! Must not this bring the blush of shame over the liberty of the human will, that by its contempt of God, its own Commander, it has lost all proper command for itself over its own members? Now, wherein could be found a more fitting demonstration of the just depravation of human nature by reason of its disobedience, than in the disobedience of those parts whence nature herself derives subsistence by perpetual renewal? For it is by an especial propriety that those parts of the body are designated as *natural*. This, then, was the reason why the first human pair, on experiencing in the flesh that motion which would not have been indecent had it not have been disobedient, and on feeling the shame of their nakedness, covered these offending members with fig-leaves;² in order that, at the very least, a veil might, by the deliberate choice of the ashamed offenders, be thrown over that part which was not put into motion by any express will of their own: and since shame arose from that which produced in-

¹ Gen. iii. 5.

² Gen. iii. 7.

decent pleasure, so by throwing a covering over it there might arise that which was decent.

CHAP. 8. [VII.]—*The evil of lust does not take away the good of marriage.*

Forasmuch, then, as the good of marriage could not be lost by the addition of this evil, some imprudent persons suppose that this is not an added evil, but something which appertains to the original good. A distinction, however, occurs not only to the subtle reasoning faculty, but even to the most ordinary natural apprehension, which was both apparent in the case of the first man and woman, and also holds good still in the case of married persons. What they effected in the propagation of the human race,—that is the good of the marriage state; but what they first veiled through shame,—that is the evil of concupiscence, which everywhere shuns sight, and in its shame seeks privacy. Since, therefore, marriage effects some good even out of that evil, it has whereof to glory; but since the good cannot be effected without the evil, it has reason for feeling shame. The case may be illustrated by the example of a lame man. Suppose him to attain to some good object by limping after it, then, on the one hand, the attainment itself is not evil because of the evil of the man's lameness; nor, on the other hand, is the lameness good because of the goodness of the attainment. So, on the same principle, we ought not to condemn marriage because of the evil of lust; nor must we praise lust because of the good of marriage.

CHAP. 9. [VIII.]—*This disease of concupiscence in marriage should not be a matter of will, but of necessity; what ought to be the wish of believers in the use of matrimony; who is to be regarded as using, and not succumbing to, the evil of concupiscence; how the holy fathers of the Old Testament formerly used wives.*

This disease of concupiscence is what the apostle refers to, when, speaking to married believers, he says: "This is the will of God, even your sanctification, that ye should abstain from fornication: that every one of you should know how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honour; not in the lust of concupiscence, even as the Gentiles which know not God."¹ The married believer, therefore, must not only not

¹ 1 Thess. iv. 3-5.

use another man's vessel, but he must know that even his own vessel is not to be possessed in the lust of a carnal concupiscence. And this counsel is not to be understood as if the apostle prohibited conjugal—that is to say, lawful and honourable—cohabitation; but that the sexual intercourse (which would have no adjunct of morbid lust, were it not that man's perfect freedom of choice had become by preceding sin so disabled that it has this fatal adjunct) should not be a matter of mere desire, but of necessary duty, without which, indeed, it would be impossible to attain to the fruition of the desire itself in the procreation of children. And this desire is not in the marriages of believers determined by the purpose of having children born, who shall pass through life in this present world, but that their children may be born again in Christ, and remain in Him for evermore. Now if this result should come about, the reward of a full felicity will spring from marriage; but if such result be not realized, there will yet ensue to the married pair the peace of their good intention and desire. Whosoever possesses his vessel (that is, his wife) with such a firm purpose of heart as this, certainly does not possess her in the lust of concupiscence, as the Gentiles which know not God, but in sanctification and honour, as believers who place their hope in God. A man turns to good use the evil of concupiscence, and is not overcome by it, when he bridles and restrains its rage, as it works in inordinate and indecorous gestures; and never relaxes his hold upon it except when intent on offspring, and then controls and applies it to the carnal generation of children to be spiritually regenerated, not to the subjection of the spirit to the flesh in a sordid servitude. That the holy fathers of olden times after Abraham, and before him (to whom God gave His testimony that "they pleased Him"),¹ thus used their wives, no one who is a Christian ought to doubt,—even when it was permitted to certain individuals amongst them to have a plurality of wives, where there was a good reason for the multiplication of their offspring, not the desire of merely varying their gratification.

¹ See Heb. xi. 4-6.

CHAP. 10. [IX.]—*Although it was sometimes permitted that a man should have several wives, yet no woman was ever allowed to have more than one husband at once. Nature prefers singleness in her first principles.*

Suppose, now, that to the God of our fathers, who is likewise our God, such a plurality of wives had not, therefore, been displeasing, in order that lust might have a fuller range of indulgence; then, on such a supposition, the holy women also ought each to have rendered service to several husbands. But if any woman had so acted, what feeling but that of a disgraceful concupiscence could impel her to submit herself to more than one husband, seeing that by such licentiousness she could not have more children? That the good purpose of the nuptial institution, however, is better promoted by one husband with one wife, than by a husband with several wives, is shown plainly enough by the very first union of a married pair, which was made by the Divine Being Himself, with the intention of marriages taking their beginning therefrom, and of its affording to them a more honourable precedent. In the progress, however, of the human race, it came to pass that to certain husbands, and of good reputation too, were united a plurality of wives, also of virtuous character; and from this it would seem that moderation aimed at rather securing dignity on one side of the arrangement, while nature permitted the other side to promote fecundity. For on natural principles it is more feasible for one to have dominion over many, than for many to lord it over one. Nor can it be doubted, that it is more consonant with the order of nature that men should bear rule over women, than women over men. It is with this principle in view that the apostle says, "The head of the woman is the man;"¹ and, "Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands."² So also the Apostle Peter writes: "Even as Sara obeyed Abraham, calling him lord."³ Now, although the fact of the matter is, that while nature loves singleness in her first principles, we still see plurality existing more readily in the subordinate portion of our race; yet for all that, it was at no time lawful for one man to have a plurality of wives, except for the purpose of a greater number of children springing from him. But whenever one woman becomes

¹ 1 Cor. xi. 3.

² Col. iii. 18.

³ 1 Pet. iii. 6.

concubine to several men, inasmuch as no increase of offspring accrues to her therefrom, but only a more frequent gratification of lust, she cannot possibly be a wife, but only a harlot.

CHAP. 11. [x.]—*The sacrament of marriage; marriage indissoluble; the world's law about divorce different from the Gospel's.*

It is certainly not fecundity only, the fruit of which consists of offspring, nor chastity only, whose bond is fidelity, but also a certain sacramental character¹ in marriage which is recommended to believers in wedlock. Accordingly it is enjoined by the apostle: "Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the Church."² Of this sacrament the substance³ undoubtedly is this, that the man and the woman who are joined together in matrimony should remain inseparable as long as they live; and that it should be unlawful for one consort to be parted from the other, except for the cause of fornication.⁴ For this principle is guardedly observed in the case of Christ and the Church; that living as they do together for evermore, there is no divorce, no separation ever possible for them. And so complete is the observance of this sacrament in the city of our God, in His holy mountain⁵—that is to say, in the Church of Christ—by all married believers, who are undoubtedly members of Christ, that, although women marry, and men take wives, for the purpose of procreating children, it is never permitted one to put away even an unfruitful wife for the sake of having another to bear children. And whosoever does this is held to be guilty of adultery by the law of the gospel; though not by this world's rule, which allows a divorce between the parties, without even the allegation of guilt, and the contraction of other nuptial engagements,—a concession which, the Lord tells us, even the holy Moses extended to the people of Israel, because of the hardness of their hearts.⁶ The same condemnation applies to the woman, if she is married to another man. So enduring, indeed, are the rights of marriage between those who have contracted them, as long as they both live, that even they are looked on as man and wife still, who have separated from one another, rather than they between whom a new connection has been

¹ Quoddam sacramentum.

² Eph. v. 25.

³ Res sacramenti.

⁴ Matt. v. 32.

⁵ Ps. xlvi. 2.

⁶ Matt. xix. 8.

formed. For by this new connection they would not be guilty of adultery, if the previous matrimonial relation did not still continue. If the husband die, with whom a true marriage was made, a true marriage is now possible by a connection which would before have been adultery. Thus between the conjugal pair, as long as they live, the nuptial bond has a permanent obligation, which can be cancelled neither by separation nor by union with another. But this permanence tends only to injury from the sin, not to a bond of the covenant. In like manner the soul of an apostate, which renounces as it were its marriage union with Christ, does not, even though it has cast its faith away, lose the sacrament of its faith, which it received in the laver of regeneration. It would undoubtedly be given back to him if he were to return, although he lost it on his departure from Christ. He retains, however, the sacrament after his apostasy, to the aggravation of his punishment, not as a merited reward.

CHAP. 12. [XI.]—*Marriage does not cancel a mutual vow of continence; there was true wedlock between Mary and Joseph; in what way Joseph was the father of Christ.*

But God forbid that the nuptial bond should be regarded as broken between those who have by mutual consent agreed to observe a perpetual abstinence from the use of carnal concupiscence. Nay, the engagement will be only a firmer one, whereby they have exchanged pledges together, which will have to be kept by an especial endearment and concord,—not by the voluptuous links of the body, but by the voluntary affections of the soul. For there was no mistake in what the angel said to Joseph: “Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife.”¹ He is regarded as her husband because of their plighted troth, although he had had no carnal knowledge of her, nor was destined to have. The designation of a married spouse had become neither obsolete nor untrue in a case where there never had been, nor was meant to be, any carnal connection. The virgin wife was a joy to her husband in a more sacred and wonderful manner from her very pregnancy without his marital aid, with disparity as to the child that was born, without disparity in the faith they cherished. And

¹ Matt. i. 20.

because of this conjugal fidelity they are both deservedly called "parents"¹ of Christ (not only she as His mother, but he as His father, as being her husband), both having been such in mind and purpose, though not in the flesh. But while the one was His father in purpose only, and the other His mother in the flesh also, they were both of them, for all that, only the parents of His low estate, not of His majesty; of His weaker nature, not of His divinity. For the Gospel does not lie, in which one reads, "Both His father and His mother marvelled at those things which were spoken about Him;"² and in another passage, "Now His parents went to Jerusalem every year;"³ and again a little afterwards "His mother said unto Him, Son, why hast Thou thus dealt with us? Behold, Thy father and I have sought Thee sorrowing."⁴ In order, however, that He might show them that He had a Father besides them, who begat Him without a mother, He said to them in answer: "How is it that ye sought me? Wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?"⁵ Furthermore, lest He should be thought to have repudiated them as His parents by what He had just said, the evangelist at once added: "And they understood not the saying which He spake unto them; and He went down with them, and came to Nazareth, and was subject unto them."⁶ Subject to whom but His parents? And who was the subject but Jesus Christ, "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God"?⁷ And wherefore subject to them, who were far beneath the form of God, except that "He made Himself of no reputation [emptying Himself of His glory], and took upon Him the form of a servant,"⁸—the form in which His parents lived? Now, since the woman bore Him without the seed of the man, they could not surely have both been His parents, of the actual form of a servant, if they had not been conjugally united, though without carnal connection. Accordingly the genealogical series (although both parents of

¹ Luke ii. 41.

² [Luke ii. 33. "Et erat *pater* ejus et *mater*," etc. So the Vulgate and the best Greek texts, instead of the *Ἰωσήφ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ* of the *textus receptus*.]

³ Luke ii. 41.

⁴ Luke ii. 48.

⁵ Luke ii. 49.

⁶ Luke ii. 50, 51.

⁷ Phil. ii. 6.

⁸ Phil. ii. 7.

Christ are mentioned together in the succession)¹ had to be extended, as it is in fact,² down rather to Joseph's name, that no wrong might be done, in the case of this marriage, to the male, and indeed the stronger sex, while at the same time there was nothing detrimental to truth, since Joseph, no less than Mary, was of the seed of David,³ of whom it was foretold that Christ should come.

CHAP. 13.—*In the marriage of Mary and Joseph there were all the blessings of the wedded state ; all that is born of concubinage is sinful flesh ; lust.*

The entire good, therefore, of the nuptial institution was effected in the case of these parents of Christ : there was offspring, there was faithfulness, there was a sacrament. In the Lord Jesus Himself we recognise the offspring ; in the fact that there was no adultery we find the fidelity ; and there was the sacrament, because there was no divorce. [XII.] Only there was no nuptial cohabitation in the case ; because He who was to be without sin, and was sent not in sinful flesh, but in *the likeness of sinful flesh*,⁴ could not possibly have been made in sinful flesh itself without that shameful lust of the flesh which comes from sin, and without any taint of which He willed to be born, in order that He might teach us, that every one who is born of sexual intercourse is in fact sinful flesh, since that alone was not sinful flesh which was not born of such concubinage. Nevertheless the union of the marriage bed is not in itself sin, when it is contracted with the intention of producing children ; because the mind's good-will and purpose leads the ensuing bodily pleasure, instead of following its lead ; and the human choice is not distracted by the yoke of sin pressing upon it, inasmuch as the homethrust⁵ of the sin is reduced within control when directed to the purposes of procreation. This thrust has a certain prurient activity which plays the king in the foul indulgences of adultery, and fornication, and lasciviousness, and uncleanness ; whilst in the indispensable duties of the marriage state, it exhibits the docility of the slave. In the one case it is condemned as the shameless effrontery of so violent a master ; in the other, it gets modest praise as the honest service of so submissive an attendant. This concupiscence, then,

¹ Matt. i. 16.

³ Luke i. 27.

² Compare Luke iii. 23 with Matt. i. 16.

⁴ Rom. viii. 3.

⁵ Plaga.

is not in itself the good of the nuptial institution; but it becomes obscenity in sinful men, a necessity in procreant parents, the fire of lascivious indulgences, the shame of nuptial pleasures. Wherefore, then, may not persons remain man and wife when they cease by mutual consent to lie together; seeing that Joseph and Mary continued such, though they never even began to cohabit?

CHAP. 14. [XIII.]—*Before Christ it was a time for marrying; since Christ it has been a time for continence.*

Now this propagation of children was among the ancient saints a most bounden duty for the purpose of begetting and preserving a people for God, amongst whom the prophecy of Christ's coming must needs have had precedence over everything. But now that duty has ceased to be indispensable. For from among all nations the way is open for an abundant offspring to receive spiritual regeneration, from whatever quarter they derive their natural birth. So that the scripture which says there is "a time to embrace, and a time to refrain from embracing,"¹ we may acknowledge to be capable of a separate application in its clauses to the periods before Christ and since. The former was the time to embrace, the latter to refrain from embracing.

CHAP. 15.

Accordingly the apostle also, speaking apparently with this passage in view, declares: "But this I say, brethren, the time is short: it remaineth, that both they that have wives be as though they had none; and they that weep, as though they wept not; and they that rejoice, as though they rejoiced not; and they that buy, as though they possessed not; and they that use this world, as though they used it not:² for the fashion of this world passeth away. But I would have you without carefulness."³ This entire passage (that I may express my view on this subject in the shape of a brief exposition of the apostle's words) I think must be understood as follows:

¹ Eccles. iii. 5.

² [Tamquam non utantur. The original is ὡς μὴ καταχρῶμενοι. A.V. : "As not abusing (or misusing) it."]

³ 1 Cor. vii. 29-31.

“This I say, brethren, the time is short.” No longer is God’s people to be propagated by carnal generation [as in the Jewish nation of the olden time]; but, henceforth, it is to be gathered out by spiritual regeneration. “It remaineth, therefore, that they that have wives” do not submit themselves to carnal concupiscence; “and they that weep,” under the sadness of present evil, should rejoice in the hope of future blessing; “and they that rejoice,” over any temporary advantage, should fear the eternal judgment; “and they that buy,” should so hold their possessions as not to cleave to them by overmuch love; “and they that use this world” should reflect that it is passing away, and does not remain. “For the fashion of this world passeth away: but,” he says, “I would have you to be without carefulness,”—in other words: I would have you lift up your heart, that it may dwell among those things which do not pass away. He then goes on to say: “He that is unmarried careth for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please the Lord: but he that is married careth for the things that are of the world, how he may please his wife.”¹ And thus to some extent he explains what he had already said: “Let them that have wives be as though they had none.” For they who have wives in such a way as to care for the things of the Lord, how they may please the Lord, without having any care for the things of the world in order to please their wives, are, in fact, just as if they had no wives. And this is effected with greater ease when the wives, too, are of such a disposition, because they please their husbands not merely because they are rich, because they are high in rank, noble in race, and amiable in natural temper, but because they are believers in the Lord, men of religion, chastity, and goodness.

CHAP. 16. [XIV.]—*A certain degree of incontinence is to be tolerated in the case of married persons; the use of matrimony for the mere pleasure of lust is not without sin, but because of the nuptial relation the sin is venial.*

These points, indeed, are desirable and praiseworthy in the intercourse of married life; but there are others which are simply to be tolerated, with a view to the avoidance of damnable sin in the cases of fornication and adultery. To escape this evil, even such embraces of husband and wife as have

¹ 1 Cor. iii. 32, 33.

not procreation for their object, but are nothing more than concessions to an overbearing concupiscence, are permitted, so far as to be within range of forgiveness, though not prescribed by way of commandment:¹ the married pair are enjoined not to defraud one the other in these indulgences, lest Satan should tempt them by reason of their incontinence.² For thus says the Scripture: "Let the husband render unto the wife her due:³ and likewise also the wife unto the husband. The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband: and likewise also the husband hath not power of his own body, but the wife. Defraud ye not one the other; except it be with consent for a time, that ye may have leisure for prayer;⁴ and then come together again, that Satan tempt you not for your incontinency. But I speak this by permission, and not of commandment."⁵ Now in a case where forgiveness must be awarded, it cannot by any means be contended that there is not some amount of sin. Since, however, the cohabitation for the purpose of procreating children, which must be admitted to be the proper end of marriage, is not sinful, what is it which the apostle allows to be venial, but that permission to married persons, when they have not the gift of continence, to require and receive one from the other the remedy of the flesh which is their due—and that not from a wish for procreation, but for the pleasure of concupiscence? This gratification incurs not the imputation of sin, but receives forgiveness owing to the married state in which it is indulged. This, therefore, must be reckoned among the praises of matrimony; that, on its own account, it makes pardonable that which does not essentially appertain to itself. The truth is, that the nuptial embrace, which subserves the demands of concupiscence, is so effected as not to impede the child-bearing, which is the end and aim of marriage.

CHAP. 17. [XV.]—*What is sinless in the use of matrimony? what is attended with venial sin, and what with mortal?*

It is, however, one thing for married persons only to come

¹ 1 Cor. vii. 6.

² 1 Cor. vii. 5.

³ [*Debitum*, after the best mss. of the original τὴν ὀφειλὴν, instead of the text, receipt. τὴν ὀφειλομένην εὐνοίαν.]

⁴ [So again, after the best authorities.]

⁵ 1 Cor. 3-6.

together for the sole wish to beget children; this is not sinful: it is another thing for them to aim at carnal pleasure by cohabitation; this, as being attempted only in the marriage state, involves only venial sin. For although propagation of offspring is not the motive of the concumbency, there is still no attempt to prevent such propagation, either by wrong desire or evil appliance. They who resort to these, although called by the name of man and wife, are really not such; they retain no vestige of true matrimony, but pretend the honourable designation as a cloak for their criminal conduct. Having also proceeded so far, they are betrayed into exposing their children, which are born against their will. They have an abhorrence of nourishing and retaining those whom they beget with dislike. This infliction of cruelty on their offspring so reluctantly begotten, unmasks the sin which they had practised in darkness, and drags it clearly into the light of day. The open cruelty reproves the concealed sin. Sometimes, indeed, this lustful cruelty, or, if you please, cruel lust, resorts to such extravagant methods as to use poisonous drugs to secure barrenness; or else, if unsuccessful in this, to destroy the conceived seed by some means previous to birth, preferring that its offspring should rather perish than receive vitality; or if it was advancing to life within the womb, should be even deprived of it before it was born. Well, if both parties alike are so flagitious, they are not husband and wife; and if such were their character from the beginning, they have not come together so much by holy wedlock as by abominable debauchery. But if the two are not identical in such sin, I boldly declare either that the woman is, so to say, the husband's harlot; or the man, the wife's adulterer.

CHAP. 18. [XVI.]

Forasmuch, then, as marriage cannot partake of the spotless purity which might have characterized primitive marriage, if sin had not preceded; it may yet be like that of the holy fathers of the olden time, in such wise that the carnal concupiscence which causes shame (which did not exist in paradise previous to the fall, and after that event was not allowed to remain there), although necessarily forming a part of the

body of this death, is not subservient to it, but only submits its function, when forced thereto, for the sole purpose of assisting in the procreation of children; otherwise, since the present time (as we have already¹ said) is the period for abstaining from the nuptial embrace, and therefore makes no necessary demand on the exercise of the said function, seeing that all nations now contribute so abundantly to the production of an offspring which shall receive spiritual birth, there is the greater room for the blessing of an excellent continence. "He that is able to receive it, let him receive it."² He, however, who cannot receive it, "even if he marry, sinneth not;"³ and if a woman have not the gift of continence, let her also marry.⁴ "It is good, indeed, for a man not to touch a woman."⁵ But since "all men cannot receive this saying, save they to whom it is given,"⁶ it remains that "to avoid fornication, every man ought to have his own wife, and every woman her own husband."⁷ And thus the weakness of incontinence is hindered from falling into the ruin of profligacy by the honourable estate of matrimony. Now that which the apostle says of women, "I will therefore that the younger women marry,"⁸ is also applicable to males: I will that the younger men take wives; that so it may appertain to both sexes alike "to bear children, to be [fathers and] mothers of families, to give none occasion to the adversary to speak reproachfully."⁹

CHAP. 19. [XVII.]—*Blessings of matrimony.*

In matrimony, however, let these blessings be the objects of our choice and love—offspring, fidelity, the sacrament. Offspring, not that it be born only, but born again; for it is born to punishment unless it be born again to life. Fidelity, not such as even unbelievers observe one towards the other, in their ardent love of the flesh. For what husband, however impious himself, likes his wife to be an adulteress? Or what wife, however impious she be, likes her husband to be an adulterer? This good in marriage, though a carnal one, is yet

¹ [See above, chap. 14. [XIII.]

² Matt. xix. 12.

³ 1 Cor. vii. 28.

⁴ 1 Cor. vii. 9.

⁵ 1 Cor. vii. 1.

⁶ Matt. xix. 9.

⁷ 1 Cor. vii. 2.

⁸ 1 Tim. v. 14.

⁹ 1 Tim. v. 14.

perfectly natural. But a member of Christ ought to be afraid of a partner's adultery, not on account of self, but of the said partner, hoping to receive from Christ the reward of that fidelity which is shown to the partner. The sacrament, which is lost neither by divorce nor by adultery, should be guarded by husband and wife with concord and chastity. For it alone is that which even an unfruitful marriage retains by the law of piety, now that all that hope of fruitfulness is lost for the purpose of which the couple married. Let these nuptial blessings be praised in marriage by him who wishes to extol the nuptial institution. Carnal concupiscence, however, must not be ascribed to marriage: it is only to be tolerated in marriage. It is not a good which comes out of the essence of marriage, but an evil which is the accident of original sin.

CHAP. 20. [XVIII.]—*Why of holy matrimony are born children of wrath.*

This is the reason, indeed, why of even the just and lawful marriages of the children of God are born, not children of God, but children of the world; because their parents, although regenerated, beget not children as being born of God, but from the fact of their being still children of the world. "The children of this world," says our Lord, ["marry and are given in marriage,¹ and] are begotten and beget."² From the fact, therefore, that we are still children of this world, our outer man is in a state of corruption and decay; and from the same circumstance our offspring are born as children of the present world; nor do they become sons of God, except they be regenerate.³ Yet inasmuch as we are children of God, our inner man is renewed from day to day.⁴ But even our outer man has been sanctified through the laver of regeneration, and has received the hope of future incorruption, on which account it is justly designated as "the temple of God." "Your bodies," says the apostle, "are the temples of the Holy Ghost, which is in you, and which ye have of God; and ye are not your own, for ye are bought with a great price: therefore glorify

¹ Luke xx. 34.

² [St. Augustine's reading, "*generant et generantur*," occurs in one of the uncial MSS. (D), and in some of the Fathers: Origen has *γίνωσι καὶ γίνονται*.]

³ See *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, ii. 11. [ix.] ⁴ 2 Cor. iv. 16.

and carry God in your body.”¹ The whole of this statement is made in reference to our present sanctification, but especially in consequence of that hope of which he says in another passage, “We ourselves also, which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body.”² If, then, the redemption of our body is expected, as the apostle declares, it follows, that being an expectation, it is as yet a matter of hope, and not of actual possession. Accordingly the apostle adds: “For we are saved by hope: but hope that is seen is not hope: for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for? But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it.”³ Not, therefore, by that which we are waiting for, but by that which we are now enduring, are the children of our flesh born. God forbid that a man who possesses faith should, when he hears the apostle bid men “love their wives,”⁴ love that carnal concupiscence in his wife which he ought not to love even in himself; as he may know, if he listens to the words of another apostle: “Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world. And the world passeth away, and the lust thereof: but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever, [even as God abideth for ever].”⁵

CHAP. 21. [XIX.]—*Thus sinners are born of righteous parents, even as wild olives spring from the olive.*

That, therefore, which is born of the lust of the flesh is really born of the world, and not of God; although it is born of God, when it is born again of water and of the Spirit. The guilt of this concupiscence, regeneration alone remits, even as natural generation contracts it. What, then, is generated must be regenerated, in order that what has been contracted in the way of sin may be remitted. This analogous process must

¹ [So the Vulgate of 1 Cor. vi. 20.]

² Rom. viii. 23.

³ Rom. viii. 24, 25.

⁴ Col. iii. 19.

⁵ 1 John ii. 15-17. [The last clause in brackets, though not in Jerome's Vulgate, was yet read by some of the Latin Fathers—by Cyprian, for instance.]

take place—no other is possible. It is very wonderful that what has been remitted in the parent should still be contracted in the offspring; but such is the case. That this mysterious verity, which unbelievers neither see nor believe, might get some palpable evidence in its support, God in His providence has secured in the example of sundry objects in the botanical world. For why should we not suppose, that for this very purpose the wild olive springs from the olive? Is it not indeed credible that, in a thing which has been created for the use of mankind, the Creator provided and appointed what should afford an instructive example, applicable to the human race? It is a wonderful thing, then, how those who have been themselves delivered by grace from the bondage of sin, should still beget those who are tied and bound by the self-same chain, and who require the same process of loosening? Yes; and we admit the wonderful fact. But that the embryo of wild olive trees should latently exist in the germs of true olives, who would deem credible, if it were not proved true by experiment and observation? In the same manner, therefore, as a wild olive grows out of the seed of the wild olive, and from the seed of the true olive springs also nothing but a wild olive, notwithstanding the very great difference there is between the wild olive and the olive; so what is born in the flesh, either of a sinner or of a just man, is in both instances a sinner, notwithstanding the vast distinction which exists between the sinner and the righteous man. He is a sinner that is begotten, though not practised in a single act as yet, and still fresh from his birth; but the guilt of an ancient sin is upon him. Human from the Creator, he is a captive of the destroyer, and needs a redeemer. The difficulty, however, is how a state of captivity can possibly befall the offspring, when the parents have been themselves previously redeemed from it. Now it is no easy matter to unravel this intricate point, or to explain it in a set discourse; therefore unbelievers refuse to accept it as true; just as if in that other point about the wild olive and the olive, which we gave in illustration, any reason could be easily found, or explanation clearly given, why the self-same shoot should sprout out of so dissimilar a stock. The truth, however, of this can be discovered by any one who is

willing to make the experiment. Let it then serve for a good example for suggesting belief of what admits not of ocular demonstration.

CHAP. 22. [XX.]—*Even infants, when unbaptized, are in the power of the devil; exorcism in the case of infants, and renunciation of the devil.*

Now the Christian faith unfalteringly declares, what our new heretics have begun to deny, both that they who are cleansed in the laver of regeneration are redeemed from the power of the devil, and that those who have not yet been redeemed by such regeneration are still captive in the power of the devil, even if they be infant children of the redeemed, unless they be themselves redeemed by the self-same grace of Christ. For we cannot doubt that the mercy of God applies to every stage of human life, which the apostle describes when he says concerning Him: "Who hath delivered us from the power of darkness, and hath translated us into the kingdom of His dear Son."¹ From this power of darkness, therefore, of which the devil is the prince,—in other words, from the power of the devil and his angels,—infants are delivered when they are baptized; and whosoever denies this, is convicted by the truth of the Church's very sacraments, which no heretical novelty in the Church of Christ is permitted to destroy or change, so long as the Divine Head rules and helps the entire body which He owns—small as well as great. It is true, then, and in no way false, that the devil's power is exorcised in infants, and that they renounce him by the hearts and mouths of those who bring them to baptism, being unable to do so by their own; in order that they may be delivered from the power of darkness, and be translated into the kingdom of their Lord. What is that, therefore, within them which keeps them in the power of the devil? What is it, I ask, but sin? Nothing else, indeed, has the devil found which enables him to put under his own control that nature of man which the good Creator made good. But infants have committed no sin of their own since they have been alive. Only original sin, therefore, remains, whereby they are made captive under the devil's power, until they are redeemed therefrom by the laver of regeneration and the blood of Christ, and pass into their

¹ Col. i. 13.

Redeemer's kingdom,—the power of their enthraler being frustrated, and ability being given them to become "sons of God" instead of children of this world.¹

CHAP. 23. [XXI.]—*Sin has not arisen out of the goodness of marriage; the sacrament of matrimony a very great one in the case of Christ and the Church—a very small one in the case of a man and his wife.*

Suppose now we interrogate, so to speak, those good qualities of the nuptial institution to which we have often referred, and inquire how it is that sin could possibly have been derived from them to infants, we shall get this answer from the first of them—the operation itself of procreation: My happiness would in paradise have been greater if sin had not been committed. For to me belongs that blessing of almighty God: "Be fruitful, and multiply."² For accomplishing this good work, divers members were created suited to each sex; these members were, of course, in existence before sin, but they were no objects of shame. This will be the answer of the second good—the faith of chastity: If sin had not been committed, what in paradise could have been more free from perturbation than myself, when there was no concupiscence of my own to spur me, no lust of another to tempt me? And then this will be the answer of the connubial sacrament—the third good of holy matrimony: Of me was that word spoken in paradise before the entrance of sin: "A man shall leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife; and they two shall become one flesh."³ This the apostle applies to the case of Christ and the Church, and calls it then a *magnam sacramentum* [*Τὸ μυστήριον τοῦτο μέγα*], "a great mystery."⁴ In the instances of each married pair it is but very small, but even then it is the sacrament of an inseparable union. What now is there in these three blessings of the nuptial institute, out of which could be forged the chain of sin to bind posterity? Absolutely nothing. And in these blessings it is certain that the goodness of matrimony is entirely comprised; and even now good wedlock consists of these same blessings.

CHAP. 24.—*Lust and shame come from sin; the law of sin; the shamelessness of the Cynics.*

But if, in like manner, the question be asked of the lust of

¹ John i. 12.

² Gen. i. 29.

³ Gen. ii. 24.

⁴ Eph. v. 32.

the flesh, how it is that acts now bring shame in their operation, which once were free from shame, will not her answer be, that she only began to have existence in men's members after sin? [XXII.] That the apostle designated her influence as "the law of sin,"¹ inasmuch as she subjugated man to herself when he was unwilling to remain subject to his God; and that it was she who made the first married pair ashamed at that moment when they covered their loins; even as all are still ashamed, and seek out secret retreats for cohabitation, and dare not have even the children, whom they have themselves and thus begotten, to be witnesses of what they do. It was against this modesty of natural shame that the Cynic philosophers, in the error of their astonishing shamelessness, struggled so hard: they thought that the intercourse indeed of husband and wife was lawful and honourable, and that therefore it should be done in public. Such barefaced obscenity deserved to receive a *doggish* name; and so they went by the title of "*Cynics*."²

CHAP. 25. [XXIII.]—*Concupiscence in the regenerate without consent is not sin; in what sense concupiscence is called sin.*

Now this concupiscence, this law of sin which dwells in our members, is that to which the law of righteousness and holiness forbids any allegiance; in the words of the apostle, "Let not sin, therefore, reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof; neither yield ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin."³ This concupiscence, then, which is only cleansed by the sacrament of the new birth, does undoubtedly, by means of natural birth, pass on the chain of sin to a man's posterity, unless they are themselves loosed from it by regeneration. In the case, however, of the regenerate, concupiscence is not itself sin any longer, whenever they do not consent to it for illicit works, and when the members are not applied by the presiding mind to perpetrate such deeds. So that, if what is enjoined in one passage, "Thou shalt not covet [or have concupiscence],"⁴ is not kept, that at any rate is observed which is commanded in another place, "Thou shalt not go after thy

¹ Rom. vii. 23.

³ Rom. vi. 12, 13.

² Cynici, *i. e.* Κυνικοί, "dog-like."

⁴ Ex. xx. 17.

lusts.”¹ Inasmuch, however, as by a certain mode of speech it is called sin, since it arose from sin, and, when it has the upper hand, produces sin, the guilt of it prevails in the natural man; but this guilt is not suffered to prevail in the regenerate man, who does not yield obedience to it whenever it urges him to the commission of evil,—a hindrance which is due to the grace of Christ through the remission of all sins in the gift of regeneration. As arising from sin, it is, I say, called sin, although in the regenerate it is not actually sin; and it has this designation applied to it, just as speech which the tongue produces is itself called “*tongue* ;” and just as the word “*hand*” is used in the sense of writing, which the hand produces. In the same way concupiscence is called sin, as producing sin when it conquers the will: so to cold and frost the epithet “*sluggish*” is given; not as arising from, but as productive of, sluggishness; benumbing us, in fact.

CHAP. 26.—*Whatever is born through concupiscence is not undeservedly in subjection to the devil by reason of sin; the devil deserves heavier punishment than men.*

The wound which the devil has inflicted on the human race compels everything which has its birth in consequence of it to be under the devil’s power, as if he were exercising a right, and plucking fruit off his own tree. Not as if man’s nature, which is only of God, came from him, but sin alone, which is not of God. For it is not on its own account that man’s nature is under condemnation, because it is the work of God, and therefore laudable; but on account of that damnable corruption by which it has been vitiated. Now it is by reason of this condemnation that it is in subjection to the devil, who is also in the same damnable state. The devil is himself an unclean spirit: good, indeed, so far as he is a spirit, but evil as being unclean; for by nature he is a spirit, by the vitiation thereof an unclean one. Of these two qualities, the one is of God, the other of himself. His hold over men, therefore, whether of an advanced age or in infancy, is not because they are human, but because they are depraved and polluted. He, then, who feels surprise that God’s creature is a subject of the devil, should cease from such feeling. For one creature of

¹ Ecclus. xviii. 30.

God is in subjection to another creature of God, the less to the greater, a human being to an angelic one; and this is not owing to nature, but to a corruption of nature: polluted is the sovereign, polluted also the subject. All this is the fruit of that ancient stock of pollution which he has planted in man; himself being destined to suffer a heavier punishment at the last judgment, as being the more polluted, and the author of pollution; but at the same time even they who will have to bear a less heavy burden in that condemnation are subjects of him as the prince and author of sin, for there will be no other cause of condemnation than sin.

CHAP. 27. [XXIV.]—*Through lust original sin is transmitted; venial sins in married persons; concupiscence of the flesh, the daughter and mother of sin.*

Wherefore the devil holds as guilty even infants, who are born, not of what is good from the goodness of marriage, but of what is evil in concupiscence, which is used aright, indeed, in marriage, but at which even marriage has occasion to feel shame. Marriage is itself "honourable in all"¹ the good aspects which properly appertain to it; but even when it has its "bed undefiled" (not only by the damnable sins of fornication and adultery, but also by any of those nuptial excesses, which do not arise from any prevailing desire of children, but from an overbearing lust of pleasure, venial, as we have seen, in man and wife), yet, whenever it comes to the actual process of generation, the very embrace which is honourable and permitted cannot be effected without the ardour of concupiscence, in order that that may be accomplished which appertains to the use of reason and not of lust. Now, this ardour, whether following or preceding the action of the will, does somehow, by a power of its own, move the members which cannot be moved simply by the will, and in this manner it shows itself not to be the servant of a will which commands it, but rather to be the punishment of a will which disobeys it. It shows, moreover, that it must be excited, not by a natural and willing choice, but by a certain seductive stimulus, and that on this very account it produces shame. This is the carnal concupiscence, which, while it is no longer accounted sin in the regenerate, yet in no case happens to nature except

¹ Heb. xiii. 4.

from sin. It is the daughter of sin as it were; and whenever it yields assent to the commission of shameful deeds, it becomes also the mother of many sins. Now from this concupiscence whatever comes into being by natural birth is tied and bound by original sin, unless, indeed, it be born again in Him whom the Virgin conceived without this concupiscence. When He vouchsafed to become incarnate, He, and He alone, was born without sin.

CHAP. 28. [XXV.]—*Concupiscence remains after baptism, just as languor does after recovery from disease; concupiscence is diminished in persons of advancing years, and increased in the incontinent.*

If the question arises, how this concupiscence of the flesh remains in the regenerate, in whose case has been effected a remission of all sins whatever, seeing that human semination takes place by its means, even when the carnal offspring of even a baptized parent is born; or, at all events, if in the case of a baptized parent concupiscence may be, or may not be, sin, why should this same concupiscence be sin in the offspring?—the answer to be given is this: Carnal concupiscence is remitted, indeed, in baptism; not that it may be put out of existence, but that it may not be imputed for sin. Still it remains, although its guilt is now taken away; and remain it will, until our entire infirmity be healed by the renewal of our inner man advancing day by day, when at last our outward man shall be clothed with incorruption.¹ It remains, however, not substantially as a body, or a spirit. It is nothing more than a certain affection of an evil quality, such as languor, for instance. There is not, to be sure, anything remaining which may be remitted whenever, as the Scripture says, “the Lord forgiveth all our iniquities.”² But until that happens which immediately follows in the same passage, “Who healeth all thine infirmities [*languores*], who redeemeth thy life from corruption,”³ there remains this concupiscence of the flesh in the body of this death. Now we are admonished not to obey its sinful desires to do evil: “Let not sin reign in your mortal body.”⁴ Still this concupiscence is daily lessened in persons of continence and increasing years, and most of all when old age makes a near approach. The man, however, who yields

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 53.

² Ps. ciii. 3.

³ Ps. ciii. 4.

⁴ Rom. vi. 12.

to it a wicked service, receives so vast an energy that, even when all his members are now failing through age, and those especial parts of his body are unable to be applied to their proper function, he does not ever cease to revel in a still increasing rage of disgraceful and shameless desire.

CHAP. 29. [XXVI.]—*How concupiscence remains in the baptized actually, when it is passed away as to its guilt ; what not having sin means ; sins remain and pass away in two senses—in act and in guilt.*

In the case, then, of those persons who are born again in Christ, when they receive an entire remission of all their sins, it is of course necessary that the guilt also of the still indwelling concupiscence should be remitted, in order that (as I said) it should not be imputed to them for sin. For even as in the case of those sins which cannot be themselves permanent, since they pass away as soon as they are committed, the guilt yet is permanent, and (if not remitted) will remain for evermore ; so, when the concupiscence is remitted, the guilt of it also is taken away. For not to have sin means this, not to be deemed guilty of sin. If a man have (for example) committed adultery, though he do not repeat the sin, he is held to be guilty of adultery until the indulgence in guilt be itself remitted. He has the sin, therefore, remaining, although the particular act of his sin no longer exists, since it has passed away along with the time when it was committed. For if to desist from sinning were the same thing as not to have sins, it would be sufficient if Scripture were content to give us the simple warning, " My son, hast thou sinned ? Do so no more." ¹ This, however, does not suffice, for it goes on to say, " Ask forgiveness for thy former sins." ² Sins remain, therefore, if they are not forgiven. But how do they remain if they are passed away ? Only thus, they have passed away in their *act*, but they are permanent in their *guilt*. Contrariwise, then, may it happen that a thing may remain in act, but pass away in guilt.

CHAP. 30. [XXVII.]—*The evil desires of concupiscence ; we ought to wish that they may not be.*

For there is some action in the concupiscence of the flesh, even when it does not exhibit either an assent of the heart,

¹ Ecclus. xxi. 1.

² Ecclus. xxi. 1.

where its seat of empire is, or those members whereby, as its weapons, it fulfils what it is bent on. But what in this action does it effect, unless it be its evil and shameful desires? For if these were good and lawful, the apostle would not forbid obedience to them, saying, "Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof."¹ He does not say, that ye should have the lusts thereof, but "that ye should obey the lusts thereof;" in order that (as these desires are greater or less in different individuals, according as each shall have progressed in the renewal of the inner man) we may maintain the fight of holiness and chastity, for the purpose of withholding obedience to these lusts. Nevertheless, our wish ought to be nothing less than the non-existence of these very desires, even if the accomplishment of such a wish be not possible in the body of this death. This is the reason why the same apostle, in another passage, addressing us as if in his own person, gives us this instruction: "For what I would," says he, "that do I not; but what I hate, that do I."² In a word, "*concupisco*," my concupiscence besets me. He was unwilling to do so and so, that he might be perfect on every side. "If, then, I do that which I would not," he goes on to say, "I consent unto the law that it is good."³ Because the law, too, wills not that which I also would not. For it wills not that I should have concupiscence, for it says, "*Non concupisces*," thou shalt not covet; and I am no less unwilling to cherish so evil a desire. In this, therefore, there is complete accord between the will of the law and my own will. But because he was unwilling to covet, and yet did covet, and for all that did not by any means obey this concupiscence so as to yield assent to it, he immediately adds these words: "Now, then, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me."⁴

CHAP. 31. [XXVIII.]—*Who is the man that can say, "It is no more I that do it"?*

A man, however, is much mistaken if, while consenting to the lust of his flesh, and then both resolving in his mind to do its desires and setting about it, he supposes that he has still a right to say [with the apostle], "It is not I that do

¹ Rom. vi. 12.

² Rom. vii. 15.

³ Rom. vii. 16.

⁴ Rom. vii. 17.

it," even if he hates and loathes himself for assenting to evil desires. The two things are simultaneous in his case : he hates the thing himself because he knows that it is evil ; and yet he does it, because he is bent on doing it. Now if, in addition to all this, he proceeds to do what the Scripture forbids him, when it says, "Neither yield ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin,"¹ and completes with a bodily act what he was bent on doing in his mind ; and says, "It is not I that do the thing, but sin that dwelleth in me." because he feels displeased with himself for resolving on and accomplishing the deed,—he makes a great mistake ; so great indeed, as not to know his own self. For, whereas he is himself *ex toto*, his mind determining and his body executing his own purpose, he yet supposes that he is himself no longer ! [XXIX.] That man, therefore, alone speaks the truth (when he says, "It is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me") who, upon simply experiencing the concupiscence, neither resolves on doing it with the consent of his heart, nor accomplishes the deed with the ministry of his body.

CHAP. 32.—*When good will be perfectly done ; what is the drift of the commandment against concupiscence [“Thou shalt not covet”],³ since it is not fulfilled here ?*

The apostle then adds these words : "For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing : for to will is present with me ; but how to perform that which is good I find not."⁴ Now this is said, because a good thing is not then performed, or perfected, when there is an absence of evil desires, in the way that evil is consummated whenever evil desires are obeyed. But when, being present, they are not also obeyed, neither evil is performed, since obedience is not yielded to them ; nor good, because of their inoperative presence. There is rather an intermediate condition of things : good is effected in some degree, because the evil concupiscence has gained no assent to itself ; and in some degree there is a remnant of evil, because the concupiscence is present. This accounts for the apostle's precise words. He does not say, To *do* good is not present to him, but "how to *perform*" (*i.e.* perfect) it. For the truth is, one *does* a good deal of good

¹ Rom. vi. 13.² Rom. vii. 17.³ Ex. xx. 17.⁴ Rom. vii. 18.

when he does what the Scripture enjoins, "Go not after thy lusts;"¹ yet he falls short of *performance*, or perfection, in that he fails to keep the great commandment, "Thou shalt not covet."² The law said, "Thou shalt not covet (or have concupiscence)," in order that, when we find ourselves lying in this diseased state, we might seek the medicine of Grace, and by that commandment know both in what direction our endeavours should aim as we advance in our present mortal condition, and to what a height it is possible to reach in the future immortality. For unless perfection could somewhere be attained, this commandment would never have been given to us.

CHAP. 33. [XXX.]

The apostle then repeats his former statement, the more fully to recommend its purport: "For the good," says he, "that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do. Now, if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." Then follows this: "I find then a law, that, when I would do good, evil is present with me."³ In other words, I find that the law is a good to me, when I wish to do what the law would have me do; inasmuch as it is not with the law itself (which says, "Thou shalt not covet") that evil is present; no, it is with myself that the evil is present, which I would not do, because I have the concupiscence even in my willingness. "For," he adds, "I delight in the law of God after the inward man; but I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members."⁴ This delight in the law of God⁵ after the inward man, comes to us from the mighty grace of God; for thereby is our inward man renewed day by day,⁶ because it is thereby that progress is made by us with perseverance.

¹ Eccles. xviii. 30.

² Ex. xx. 17.

³ Rom. vii. 19-21. [The punctuation of the passage in Latin fits the argument, thus: "Invenio ergo legem mihi, volenti facere, bonum; quoniam malum mihi adjacet;" *i.e.* "I find then the law is a good to me, when I wish to act; for evil is present with me."]

⁴ Rom. vii. 22, 23.

⁵ [This sharing of joy with the law of God: "*Ista condelectatio legi Dei.*"]

⁶ 2 Cor. iv. 16.

In it there is not the fear that has torment, but the love that cheers and gratifies. We have true liberty in that wherein we have no unwilling joy.

CHAP. 34.—*How concupiscence made a captive of the apostle ; what the law of sin was to the apostle.*

Then, indeed, his statement, "I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind," refers to that very concupiscence which we are now speaking of—the law of sin in our sinful flesh. But when he said, "And bringing me into captivity to the law of sin" [that is, its own self] "which is in my members," he either meant "*captivating*," in the sense of endeavouring to make captive, that is, urging me to approve and accomplish evil desire ; or rather (and this is an incontrovertible sense), leading me captive after the flesh, which, if possessed not by the carnal concupiscence which he calls the law of sin, no unlawful desire—such as our mind ought not to obey—would, of course, be there to excite and disturb it. The fact, however, that the apostle does not say, Bringing my flesh into captivity, but "Bringing *me* into captivity," obliges us to look out for some other meaning for the phrase, and to understand the term "*captivating*" as if he had said, endeavouring to captivate. But why, after all, might he not say "Bringing me into captivity," and at the same time mean us to understand his flesh ? Was it not spoken by one concerning Jesus, when His flesh was not found in the sepulchre : "They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid Him" ?¹ Was Mary's then an improper question, when she said, "My Lord," and not my Lord's body or flesh ?

CHAP. 35. [XXXI.]—*The flesh, carnal affection.*

But we have in the apostle's own language, a little before, a sufficiently clear proof that he might have meant his flesh when he said, "Bringing *me* into captivity." For after declaring, "I know that *in me* dwelleth no good thing," he at once added an explanatory sentence to this effect, "That is, *in my flesh*."² It is then the flesh, in which there dwells nothing good, that is brought into captivity to the law of sin. Now he designates that as the flesh wherein lies a certain

¹ John xx. 2.

² Rom. vii. 18.

morbid carnal affection, not that actual conformation of our bodily fabric whose members are not to be used as weapons for sin—for that very concupiscence, in fact, which possesses this fleshy substance of ours as its captive. So far, indeed, as concerns this actual bodily substance and nature of ours, it is already God's temple in all faithful men, whether living in marriage or in continence. If, however, absolutely nothing of our flesh were in captivity, not even to the devil, because there has accrued to it the remission of sin, that sin be not imputed to it (and this is properly designated the law of sin); yet if under this law of sin, that is, under its own concupiscence, our flesh were not to some degree held captive, how could that be true which the apostle states, when he speaks of our "waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body" ?¹ In so far, then, as there is now this waiting for the redemption of our body, there is also in some degree still existing something in us which is a captive to the law of sin. Accordingly he exclaims, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God, through Jesus Christ our Lord."² What are we to understand by such language, but that our body, which is undergoing corruption, weighs heavily on our soul? When, therefore, this very body of ours shall be restored to us in an incorrupt state, there shall be a plenary riddance of the present death from the body; but there will be no such deliverance for them who shall rise again to condemnation. To the body of this death then is understood to be owing the circumstance that there is in our members another law which wars against the law of the mind, so long as the flesh lusts against the spirit—without, however, subjugating the mind, inasmuch as on its side, too, the spirit has a concupiscence contrary to the flesh.³ Thus, although the actual law of sin partly holds the flesh in captivity (whence comes its resistance to the law of the mind), still it has not an absolute empire in our body, notwithstanding its mortal state, since it refuses obedience to its desires.⁴ For in the case of hostile armies between whom there is an earnest conflict, even the side which is inferior in the fight usually holds a something which it has captured;

¹ Rom. viii. 23.² Rom. vii. 24.³ Gal. v. 17.⁴ Rom. vi. 12.

and although in some such way there is somewhat in our flesh which is kept under the law of sin, yet it has before it the hope of redemption: and then there will remain not a particle of this vitiated concupiscence; but our flesh, healed of that diseased plague, and wholly clad in immortality, shall live for evermore in eternal blessedness.

CHAP. 36.

But the apostle pursues the subject, and says, "So then with the mind I myself serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin;"¹ which must be thus understood: "With my mind I serve the law of God," by refusing my consent to the law of sin; "with my flesh, however," I serve "the law of sin," by having the desires of sin, from which I am not yet entirely freed, although I yield them no assent. Then let us observe carefully what he has said after all the above: "There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus."² Even *now*, says he, when the law in my members keeps up its warfare against the law of my mind, and retains in captivity somewhat in the body of this death, there is no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus. And listen why: "For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus," says he, "hath made me free from the law of sin and death."³ How made me free, except by abolishing its sentence of guilt by the remission of all my sins; so that, though it still remains, only daily lessening more and more, it is nevertheless not imputed to me as sin?

CHAP. 37. [XXXII.]—*The law of sin with its guilt in unbaptized infants. By Adam's sin the human race has become a "wild olive tree."*

Until, then, this remission of sins takes place in children, they have within them the law of sin in such manner, that it is really imputed to them as sin; in other words, with that law there is attaching to them its sentence of guilt, to keep them debtors to eternal condemnation. For what a parent transmits to his children in the flesh is the condition of his own carnal birth, not that of his spiritual new birth. The very fact that he was born in the flesh, although no hindrance after the remission of his guilt to the fruit thereof, still retains its

¹ Rom. vii. 25.² Rom. viii. 1.³ Rom. viii. 2.

latent poisonous influence as it were in the seed of the olive. Because of the remission of his sins, indeed, all injury is removed from the olive oil—that is, in plain language, from his holy life which he lives (“the just by faith”¹) after Christ, whose very name is *Unction* [Christus a Chrismate]. That, however, which in the case of a regenerate parent, like the seed of the pure olive, is covered, without any remainder of guilt, which has been remitted, is still no doubt retained in the case of his offspring, which are yet unregenerate, like the wild olive, with all its guilt, until here also it be remitted by the self-same grace. When Adam sinned, he was changed from that pure olive, which had no such corrupt seed whence should spring the bitter issue of the wild olive, into a wild olive tree; and, inasmuch as his sin was so vast, that by it his nature became commensurately changed for the worse, he converted the entire race of man into a wild olive stock. The effect of this change we see illustrated, as has been said above, in the instance of these very trees. Whenever God’s grace converts a sapling into a good olive, so that the fault of the first birth (that original sin which had been derived and contracted from the concupiscence of the flesh) is remitted, covered, and not imputed, there is still inherent in it that nature from which is born a wild olive, unless it, too, by the same grace, is by the second birth changed into a good olive.

CHAP. 38. [XXXIII.]—*To baptism must be referred all remission of sins, and the plenary healing of the resurrection. Daily cleansing.*

Blessed, therefore, is the olive tree “whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered;” blessed is it “to which the Lord hath not imputed sin.”² But this, which has received the remission, the covering, and the acquittal, even up to the plenary change of an eternal immortality, still retains a secret force which furnishes seed for a wild and bitter olive tree, unless the same tillage of God prunes it also, by remission, covering, and acquittal. There will, however, be left no corruption at all in even carnal seed, when the same regeneration, which is now effected through the sacred laver, purges and heals all man’s evil to the very end. By its means the very same flesh, through which the carnal mind was formed, shall

¹ Rom. i. 17.

² Ps. xxxiii. 1, 2.

become spiritual,—no longer having that carnal lust which resists the law of the mind, no longer emitting carnal seed. For in this sense must be understood that which the apostle, we have so often quoted, says elsewhere: “Christ loved the Church, and gave Himself for it; that He might sanctify and cleanse it by the washing of water by the word; that He might present it to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing.”¹ It must, I say, be understood as implying, that by this laver of regeneration and word of sanctification all the evils of regenerate men of whatever kind are cleansed and healed,—not the sins only which are all now remitted in baptism, but those also which after baptism are committed by human ignorance and frailty; not, indeed, that baptism is to be repeated as often as sin is repeated, but that by its one only ministration it comes to pass that pardon is secured to the faithful of all their sins both before and after their regeneration. For of what use would repentance, even before baptism, be, if baptism did not follow; or after, if it did not precede? Nay, in the Lord’s Prayer itself, which is our daily cleansing, of what avail or advantage would it be for that petition to be uttered, “Forgive us our debts,”² unless it be by such as have been baptized? And in like manner, how great soever be the liberality and kindness of a man’s alms, what, I ask, would they profit him towards the remission of his sins if he had not been baptized? In short, on whom but on the baptized shall be bestowed the very felicities of the kingdom of heaven; where the Church shall have no spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing; where there shall be nothing blameworthy, nothing unreal; where there shall be not only no condemnation for sin, but no concupiscence to excite it?

CHAP. 39. [XXXIV.]—*By the sanctification of baptism, not sins only, but all evils whatsoever have to be removed. The Church is not yet free from all stain.*

And thus not only all the sins, but all the ills of men of what kind soever, are in course of removal by the sanctification of that Christian laver whereby Christ cleanses His Church, that He may present it to Himself, not in this world, but in that which is to come, as not having spot, or wrinkle, or

¹ Eph. v. 25.

² Matt. vi. 12.

any such thing. Now there are some who maintain that such is the Church even now, and yet they are in it. Well then, since they confess that they have some sins themselves, if they say the truth in this (and, of course, they do, as they are not free from sins), then the Church has "a spot" in them; whilst if they tell an untruth in their confession (as speaking from a double heart), then the Church has in them "a wrinkle." If, however, they assert that it is themselves, and not the Church, which has all this, they then as good as acknowledge that they are not its members, nor belong to its body, so that they are even condemned by their own confession.

CHAP. 40. [XXXV.]—*Refutation of the Pelagians by the authority of St. Ambrose, whom they quote to show that the desire of the flesh is a natural good. Ambrose mentioned by Pelagius with approbation. Valerius devoted to reading.*

In respect, however, to this concupiscence of the flesh, we have striven in this lengthy discussion to distinguish it accurately from every good in the nuptial institution. This we have done on account of our modern heretics, who cavil whenever concupiscence is censured, as if it involved a censure of marriage. Their object is to praise concupiscence as a natural good, that so they may defend their own baneful dogma, which asserts that none who are born by its means contract original sin. Now the blessed Ambrose, bishop of Milan, by whose priestly office I received the washing of regeneration, briefly spoke on this matter, when expounding the prophet Isaiah he gathered from him the nativity of Christ in the flesh: "Thus," says the bishop, "He was both tempted in all points as man,¹ and in the likeness of man He bare all things; but inasmuch as He was born of the Spirit, He kept Himself from sin. For every man is deceitful; and there is none good but God alone. It has, therefore, been ever firmly maintained, that from husband and wife, that is to say, by means of that conjunction of their persons [which occurs in marriage], it is clear that no man is free from sin. He who is free from sin is also free from human conception of this kind." Well now, what is it which St. Ambrose has here condemned in the true doctrine of this sentence? is it the goodness of marriage, or not rather [by anticipation] the

¹ Heb. iv. 15.

worthless opinion of these heretics, although they had not then come upon the stage? I have thought it worth while to adduce this testimony, because Pelagius mentions Ambrose with such commendation as to say: "The blessed Bishop Ambrose, in whose writings more than anywhere else the faith of Rome is clearly stated, has flourished like a beautiful flower among the Latin writers. His fidelity and extremely pure perception of the sense of Scripture no opponent even has ever ventured to impugn."¹ I hope he may regret having entertained opinions opposed to Ambrose, but not because he has bestowed this praise on that holy man.

Here, then, [dearest Valerius,] you have my book, which, owing to its tedious length and difficult subject, it has been as troublesome for me to compose as for you to read, in those little snatches of time in which you have been able (or at least, as I suppose, have been able) to find yourself at leisure. Although it has been indeed drawn up with considerable labour amidst my ecclesiastical duties, as God has vouchsafed to give me His help, I should hardly have intruded it on your notice, with all your public cares, if I had not been informed by a godly man, who has an intimate knowledge of you, that you take such pleasure in reading as to lie awake by the hour, night after night, spending the precious time in your favourite pursuit.

¹ *Pro libero arbitrio*, lib. 3.

ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE :

IN TWO BOOKS

ADDRESSED TO THE COUNT VALERIUS,

BY AURELIUS AUGUSTINE, BISHOP OF HIPPO.



SECOND BOOK.

PRELIMINARY NOTES ON THIS SECOND BOOK.

(1.) *From the Preface of Augustine's Unfinished Work against Julianus.*

I WROTE a treatise, under the title *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* [On Marriage and Concupiscence], and addressed it to the Count VALERIUS, on learning that he had been informed of the Pelagians that they charge us with condemning marriage. Now in that treatise I showed the distinction, as critically and accurately as I was able, between the good of matrimony and the evil of carnal concupiscence,—an evil which is purely and properly used by conjugal chastity. On receiving my treatise, the illustrious man whom I have named sent me in a short paper¹ a few sentences culled from a work of Julianus, a Pelagian heretic. In this work he has thought fit to extend to four books his answer to the before-mentioned treatise of mine, which is limited to one book only, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*. I do not know to whom we were indebted for the said extracts: he confined his selection, evidently on purpose, to the first book of Julianus' work. At the request of Valerius, I lost no time in drawing up my answer to the extracts. It has, moreover, happened that I have written a

¹ In chartula.

second book also under the same title; and in reply to this, Julianus has drawn up eight books, in the excess of his loquacious powers.

(2.) *From Augustine's Epistle to Claudius.* [CCVII.]

“Whoever has perused this second book of mine, addressed (as the first was) to the Count Valerius, and drawn up (as, indeed, both were) for his use, will have discovered that there are some points in which I have not answered Julianus, but that I meant my work rather for him who made the extracts from that writer's books, and who did not arrange them in the order in which he found them. He deemed some considerable alteration necessary in his arrangement, very probably with the view of appropriating by this method as his own the thoughts which evidently were another person's.”

SECOND BOOK.¹

AUGUSTINE, IN THIS LATTER BOOK, REFUTES SUNDRY SENTENCES WHICH HAD BEEN CULLED BY SOME UNKNOWN AUTHOR FROM THE FIRST OF FOUR BOOKS THAT JULIANUS HAD PUBLISHED IN OPPOSITION TO THE FORMER BOOK OF HIS TREATISE "ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE;" WHICH SENTENCES HAD BEEN FORWARDED TO HIM AT THE INSTANCE OF THE COUNT VALERIUS. HE VINDICATES THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN FROM HIS OPONENT'S CAVILS AND SUBTLETIES, AND PARTICULARLY SHOWS HOW DIVERSE IT IS FROM THE INFAMOUS HERESY OF THE MANICHEANS.

CHAP. I. [I.]—*Introductory statement.*

I CANNOT tell you, dearly loved and honoured son Valerius, how great is the pleasure which my heart receives when I hear of your warm and earnest interest in the testimony of the word of God against the heretics; and this, too, amidst your military duties and the cares which devolve on you in the eminent position you so justly occupy, and the pressing functions, moreover, of your political life. After reading the letter of your Eminence, in which you acknowledge the book which I dedicated to you, I was roused to write this also; for you request me to attend to the statement, which my brother and fellow-bishop Alypius is commissioned to make to me, about the discussion which is being raised by the heretics over sundry passages of my book. Not only have I received this information from the narrative of my said brother, but I have also read the extracts which he produced, and which you had yourself forwarded to Rome, after his departure from Ravenna. On discovering the boastful language of our adversaries, as I could easily do in these extracts, I determined, with the help of the Lord, to reply to their taunts with all the truthfulness and scriptural authority that I could command.

CHAP. 2. [II.]—*In this and the four next chapters he adduces the garbled extracts he has to consider.*

The paper which I now answer starts with this title:

¹ [Written A. D. 420.]

“ *Headings out of a book written by Augustine, in reply to which I have culled a few passages out of books.*” I perceive from this that the person who forwarded these written papers to your Excellency wanted to make his extracts out of the books he does not name, with a view, so far as I can judge, to getting a quicker answer, in order that he might not interrupt your earnest interest in the discussion. Now, after considering what books they were which he meant, I suppose that it must have been those which Julianus mentioned in the Epistle he sent to Rome,¹ a copy of which found its way to me at the same time. For he there says: “ They go so far as to allege that the nuptial institution, now in dispute, was not founded by God,—a declaration which may be read in a work of Augustine’s, to which I have lately replied in a treatise of four books.” These are the books, as I believe, from which the extracts were taken. It would, then, have been perhaps the better course if I had set myself deliberately to disprove and refute that entire work of his,² which he spread out into four volumes. But I was most unwilling to delay my answer, even as you yourself lost no time in forwarding to me the written statements which I was requested to reply to.

CHAP. 3.

The words which he has quoted and endeavoured to refute out of my book, which I sent to you, and with which you are very well acquainted, are the following: “ They are constantly affirming, in their excessive hatred of us, that we condemn marriage and that divine procedure by which God creates human beings by means of men and women. This they allege of us, because we maintain that they who are born of such a union contract original sin; and because we do not deny that, of whatever parents they are born, they are still under the devil’s dominion unless they be born again in Christ.”³ Now, in

¹ See Augustine’s *Imperfectum Opus contra Julianum*, i. 18.

² This Augustine afterwards did by the publication of six books against Julianus, on receiving his entire work. Augustine tells us (*Opus Imperfect.* i. 19), that he had long endeavoured to procure a copy of Julianus’ books for the purpose of refuting them, and only succeeded in getting them after some difficulty and delay.

³ See above, Book i. chap. 1 of this treatise.

quoting these words of mine, he took care to omit the testimony of the apostle, which I adduced. He felt himself too hard pressed by its weighty significance. For my own part, after saying that men at their birth contract original sin, I at once introduced the apostle's words: "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for in him all men sinned."¹ Well, as I have already mentioned, he omitted this passage of the apostle, and then closed up the other remarks of mine which have been now quoted. For he knew too well how acceptable to the hearts and consciences of all faithful Catholics are these words of the apostle, which I had adopted, but which he omitted,—words which are so direct and so clear, that these new-fangled heretics use every effort in their dark and tortuous glosses to obscure and deprave their force.

CHAP. 4.

But there are other words of mine which he has sought to obscure by his subtle treatment. Here they are, as he has quoted them: "Nor do they reflect that, as the good of marriage is not impeachable by reason of the original sin which is derived therefrom, so the evil of adultery and fornication cannot be excused for the natural good which is born of them. For as sin is the work of the devil, whether derived from this source or from that; so is man the work of God, whether born of parents in wedlock or out of it." Even here he has left out some words, in which he was afraid of Catholic ears. But to come to the words here quoted, it had previously been said by us: "Because, then, we affirm this doctrine, which is contained in the oldest and unvarying rule of the Catholic faith, these propounders of the novel and perverse dogma, who deny that there is in infants any sin to be washed away in the laver of regeneration, in their unbelief or ignorance calumniate us as if we condemned marriage, and as if we asserted to be the devil's work what is God's own work, even the human being which is born of marriage."² All this passage he has passed over, and merely quoted the words which follow it, as given above. Now, in the omitted words he was afraid of the clause

¹ Rom. v. 12.² Book i. of this treatise, chap. 1.

which suits all hearts in the Catholic Church, and appeals to the very faith which has been firmly established and transmitted from ancient times with unfaltering voice, and excites their hostility most strongly against us. The clause is this: "They deny that there is in infants any sin to be washed away in the laver of regeneration." For all persons run to church with their infants for no other reason in the world than that the original sin which is contracted in them by their first and natural birth may be cleansed by the regeneration of their second birth.

CHAP. 5.

He then returns¹ to our words, which were quoted before: "We maintain that they who are born of such a union contract original sin; and we do not deny that, of whatever parents they are born, they are still under the devil's dominion unless they be born again in Christ." Why he should again refer to these words of ours I cannot tell; he had already cited them a little before. He then proceeds to quote what we said of Christ: "Who willed not to be born from the same union of the two sexes." But here again he quietly ignored the words which I placed just previous to these words; my entire sentence being this: "That by His grace they may be removed from the power of darkness, and translated into His kingdom: who willed not to be born from the same union of the two sexes." Observe, I pray you, what my words were which he shunned, in the temper of one who is thoroughly opposed to that grace of God which comes through our "Lord Jesus Christ." He knows well enough that it is the height of improbity and impiety to exclude infants from their interest in the apostle's words, where he said of God the Father: "Who hath delivered us from the power of darkness, and hath translated us into the kingdom of His dear Son."² This, no doubt, is the reason why he preferred to omit rather than quote these words.

CHAP. 6.

He has next adduced that passage of ours, wherein we said: "For there would have been none of this shame-producing concupiscence, which is favourably spoken of by shameless men

¹ [See *Opus Imperfectum*, i. 64.]

² Col. i. 13.

in a shameless tone and manner, if man had not previously sinned; while as to marriage, it would still have existed, even if no man had sinned: for the procreation of children would have been effected without the moral malady." Up to this point he cited my words; but he shrank from adding what comes next—"In the body of that chaste life," and "which [*i.e.* the moral malady] in 'the body of this death' cannot be separated from the process of procreation." He would not complete my sentence, but mutilated it somewhat, because he dreaded the apostle's exclamation, of which my words gave him a reminder: "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God, through Jesus Christ our Lord."¹ For the body of this death existed not in paradise before sin; therefore did we say, "In the body of that chaste life," which was the life of paradise, "the procreation of children could have been effected without the moral malady, which in the body of this death cannot be separated from the process of procreation." The apostle, however, before arriving at that mention of man's misery and God's grace which we have just quoted, had first said: "I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." Then it is that he exclaimed, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God, through Jesus Christ our Lord." In the body of this death therefore, such as it was in paradise before sin, there certainly was not "another law in our members warring against the law of our mind"—which now, even when we are unwilling, and withhold consent, and use not our members to fulfil that which it desires, still dwells in these members and harasses our resisting and repugnant mind. And this conflict in itself, although not involving condemnation, because it does not consummate sin, is nevertheless "wretched," inasmuch as it has no peace. I think, then, that I have shown you clearly enough that this man had a special object as well as method in quoting my words: he adduced them for refutation in such manner as in some instances to interrupt the context of my sentences by removing what stood between them,

¹ Rom. vii. 24.

and in other instances to curtail them by withdrawing their concluding words ; and his reason for doing all this I think I have sufficiently explained.

CHAP. 7. [III.] *Augustine answers a passage selected from the preface of Julianus.* [See his *Opus Imperfectum*, i. 73.]

Let us now look at those words of ours which he adduced just as it suited him, and which he would present as his own. For they are followed by his words ; moreover, as the person insinuated who sent you the paper of extracts, he copied something out of a preface, which was no doubt the preface of the books from which he selected a few passages. The paragraph thus copied stands as follows : “ The teachers of our day, holy brother,¹ who are the instigators of the disgraceful faction which is now overheated with its zeal, are determined on compassing the injury and discredit of the men, with whose sacred fervour they are set on fire, by nothing less than the ruin of the whole Church, little thinking how much honour they have conferred on those whose renown they have shown to be only capable of being destroyed along with the Catholic religion. Now if one should say, either that there is freewill in man, or that God is the Creator of infants,² he is at once set down as a Celestian and a Pelagian. To avoid being called heretics, they turn Manicheans ; and so, whilst shirking a pretended infamy, they incur a real reproach : just like the animals, which in hunting they flank with dyed feathers, in order to scare and drive them into their nets ;³ the poor brutes are not gifted with reason, and so they are thrust all together by a vain panic into a real destruction.”

CHAP. 8.

Well now, whoever you are that have said all this, what you say is by no means true ; by no means, I repeat ; you are much deceived, or you aim at deceiving others. We do not deny freewill ; but, even as the Truth declares, “ if the Son

¹ [Beatissime frater. He calls Florus *beatissimus pater* elsewhere (see *Opus Imperfectum*, iv. 5). This man, to whom Julianus dedicated his work, is called a *colleague* or fellow-bishop of Julianus by Augustine (*Op. Imp.* iii. 187).]

² [*Conditor nascentium*, i.e. the Maker of all men's births.]

³ [For a description of this curious mode of capture, see Dr. Smith's *Greek and Roman Antiquities*, s. v. RETE.]

shall make you free, then shall ye be free indeed.”¹ It is yourselves who invidiously deny this true Liberator, for you ascribe a vain liberty to yourselves in your captivity. Captives you are; for “of whom a man is overcome,” as the Scripture says, “of the same is he brought in bondage;”² and no one except by the grace of the great Liberator is loosed from the chain of this bondage, from which no man living is free. For “by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned in him.”³ God, then, is no doubt the Creator of all that are born, but yet in such wise that all pass from the one [first parent] into condemnation, who have not the One Liberator by regeneration. For He is described as “the Potter, forming out of the same lump one vessel unto honour in His mercy, and another unto dishonour⁴ in judgment.” And so runs the Church’s canticle “of mercy and judgment.”⁵ You are therefore only misleading yourself and others when you say, “If one should affirm, either that there is freewill in man, or that God is the Creator of infants, he is at once set down as a Celestian and a Pelagian;”⁶ for the Catholic faith says these things. If, however, any one says that there is a freewill in man for worshipping God aright, without His assistance; and whosoever says that God is the Creator of all that are born, in such wise as to deny that infants have any need of one to redeem them from the power of the devil, that is the man who is set down as a disciple of Celestius and Pelagius. Therefore that men have within them a freewill, and that God is the Creator of infants, are propositions which we both allow. You are not Celestians and Pelagians for merely saying this. But what you do really say is this, that any man whatever has freedom enough of will for doing good without God’s help, and that infants undergo no such change as being “delivered from the power of darkness and translated into the kingdom of God;”⁷ and because you say so, you are Celestians and Pelagians. Why, then, do you deceive us with the covering of a common dogma, concealing

¹ John viii. 36.

² 2 Pet. ii. 19.

³ Rom. v. 12. [With Augustine’s reading, *in quo omnes peccaverunt.*]

⁴ Rom. ix. 21.

⁵ Ps. ci. 1.

⁶ [See *Opus Imperfectum*, iii. 101.]

⁷ Col. i. 13.

your own especial delinquency which has gained for you a party-name ; and why, to terrify the ignorant with a shocking term, do you say of us, "To avoid being called heretics, they turn Manicheans" ?

CHAP. 9.—*The Catholics maintain the doctrine of original sin, and thus are far from being Manicheans.*

Listen, then, for a little while, and observe what is involved in this question. Catholics say that human nature was created good by the good Divine Creator ; but that, since it has been diseased by sin, it needs the physician Christ. The Manicheans affirm, that human nature was not created good by God, and then vitiated by sin ; but that man was formed by the prince of eternal darkness of a mixture of the two natures which had ever existed—one good and the other evil. The disciples of Pelagius and Cœlestius agree that human nature was created good by the good God ; but that it is still so sound and healthy in infants at their birth, that they do not require at that time of life Christ's needful medicine. Recognise, then, the fitness of your name in this dogma of yours ; and cease from intruding upon the Catholics, who refute you, a name and a dogma which belong to others. For truth rejects both parties—the Manicheans and yourselves. To the Manicheans it says : "Have ye not read that He which made man at the beginning, made them male and female ; and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife ; and they twain shall be one flesh ? Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What, therefore, God hath joined together, let not man put asunder."¹ Now Christ shows, in this passage, that God is both the Creator of man, and the uniter in marriage of husband and wife ; whereas the Manicheans deny both these propositions. He says again to you : "The Son of man is come to seek and to save that which is lost."² But you, admirable Christians as you are, reprove Christ with your answer : If you came to seek and to save that which was lost, then you did not come for infants ; for they were not lost, but are born in a state of salvation : go to older men, we give you a rule from your own words : "They that be whole need not a physician, but they

¹ Matt. xix. 4-6.

² Luke xix. 10.

that are sick.”¹ Now, as it happens, the Manichean, who says that man has evil mixed in his nature, must wish his good soul at any rate to be saved by Christ; whereas you contend that there is in infants nothing to be saved by Christ, since they are already safe [in body].² And thus it fares ill with human nature: the Manichean besets it with his detestable censure, and you with your cruel praise. For whosoever shall believe your laudation, will never bring their babes to Christ for His salvation. Entertaining such impious views as these, of what use is it that you fearlessly face that, which is enacted for you,³ in order to induce salutary fear, and which treats you as a human being, and not as that poor animal of yours which was flanked with the coloured feathers to be driven into the hunting toils? It was indispensable that you should hold the truth, and by an affection for it escape fear; but, as things are, you evade fear in such wise that, if you were of a timid turn, you would prefer running away from the net of the malignant hunter to running into it. The reason why your Catholic mother alarms you is, because she fears for you in the interest both of yourself and of others; and if by the help of her sons who possess any authority in the State she acts with a view to make you afraid, she does so, not from cruelty, but from love. You, however, are a very brave man; and you deem it the coward’s part to be afraid of men. Well then, fear God; and do not try with such obstinacy to subvert the ancient foundations of the Catholic faith. Although I could even wish that that spirited temper of yours would entertain some little fear of human authority at least in the present case. I could wish, I say, that it would rather show cowardice by dread than audacity by ruin.

CHAP. 10. [IV.]—*In what manner the adversary’s cavils must be refuted.*

Let us now look at all the rest of what he has joined together in his selections. But what should be my course of

¹ Matt. ix. 12.

² *Corpore* is here placed in the text in the *Edit. Bened.*, though in none of the mss. It is found in the passage as quoted in the *Opus Imp.* iii. 138.

³ [This clause, *quoad tibi fit ut*, etc., alludes to the Imperial edicts which Honorius issued, enacting penalties against the Pelagian heretics.]

proceeding? Ought I to set forth every passage of his for the purpose of answering it, or, omitting everything which the Catholic faith contains, as not in dispute between us, only handle and confute those statements in which he strays away from the beaten path of truth, and endeavours to graft on Catholic stems the poisonous shoots of his Pelagian heresy? This is, no doubt, the easier course. But I suppose I must not lose sight of a possible contingency, that any one, after reading my book, without perusing all that has been alleged by him, may think that I was unwilling to bring forward the passages on which his allegations depend, and by which are shown to be truly deduced the statements which I am controverting as false. I should be glad, therefore, if the reader will without exception kindly observe and consider the two classes of contributions which occur in this little work of ours—that is to say, all that he has alleged, and the answers which on my side I give him.

CHAP. 11.

Now, the man who forwarded to your love the paper in question has introduced the contents thereof with this preliminary note: "In opposition to those persons who condemn matrimony, and ascribe its fruits to the devil." This, then, has nothing to do with us, who neither condemn matrimony, which we even commend in its order with a just commendation, nor ascribe its fruits to the devil. For the fruits of matrimony are the human beings which are ordinarily engendered from it, and not the sins which accompany their birth. Human beings are not under the devil's dominion as human beings, in which respect they are the fruits of matrimony, but as sinful beings, in which results the transmission of their sins. For the devil is the author of sin, not of nature.

CHAP. 12.—*Eve's name means life, and is a great sacrament of the Church.*

Now, observe the rest of the passage in which he thinks he finds, to our prejudice, what chimes in with the above-quoted title. "God," says he, "who had formed Adam out of the dust of the ground, constructed¹ Eve out of his rib,² and said,

¹ [*Construxit*; so the Hebrew בָּנָה, "*built*."]]

² Gen. ii. 22, 23.

She shall be called Life, because she is the mother of all who live." Well now, this is not what Scripture says. But what matters that to us? For it constantly happens that our memory fails in verbal accuracy, while the sense is still maintained. Nor was it God, but her husband, who gave Eve her name, which should signify *Life*; for thus it is written: "And Adam called his wife's name Life" [חַוָּה, Eva, ζῶη (Sept.)], "because she is the mother of all living."¹ But very likely he might have understood the Scripture as testifying that God gave Eve this name through Adam, as His prophet. For in that she was called Life, and the mother of all living, there lies a great sacrament of the Church, of which it would detain us long to speak, and which is unnecessary to our present undertaking. The very same thing which the apostle says, "This is a great mystery [or sacrament]: but I speak concerning Christ and the Church," was also spoken by Adam when he said, "For this cause shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh."² The Lord Jesus, however, in the Gospel mentions God as having said this of Eve; and the reason, no doubt, is, that God declared through the man what the man, in fact, uttered as a prophecy. Now, observe what follows in the paper of extracts: "By that primitive name," says he, "He showed for what labour the woman had been provided; and He said accordingly, 'Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth.'"³ Now, who amongst ourselves denies that the woman was provided for the work of child-bearing by the Lord God, the beneficent Creator of all good? See further what he goes on to say: "God, therefore, who created them male and female,⁴ furnished them with members suitable for procreation, and ordained that bodies should be produced from bodies; in the formation of these, however, by the divine operation, there is present everything which is acting in subservience under that Power by which the creature is formed."⁵ Well, even this we acknowledge to be catholic

¹ Gen. iii. 20.

² Compare Eph. v. 32 with Gen. ii. 24.

³ Gen. i. 28.

⁴ Gen. i. 27.

⁵ For once a difficulty occurs (for which, however, St. Augustine is not responsible) in the construction of the original. The obscure passage is here tran-

doctrine, as we also do with regard to the passage which he immediately subjoins: "If, then, offspring comes only through sex, and sex only through the body, and the body through God, who can hesitate to allow that human fecundity is rightly attributed to God?"

CHAP. 13.—*The heretical tenet of the Pelagians, that there is nothing in the natural stages of procreation which can give the devil a rightful possession of the human being who is born.*

After these true and catholic statements, which are, moreover, really contained in the Holy Scriptures, although they are not adduced by him in a catholic spirit, with the earnestness of a catholic mind, he loses no time in introducing to us the heresy of Pelagius and Cœlestius, for which purpose he wrote, indeed, his previous remarks. Mark carefully the following words: "You now who say, 'We do not deny that they are still, of whatever parents born, under the devil's power, unless they be born again in Christ,' show us what the devil can find to call his own in the sexes, by reason of which he can (to use your phrase) rightly claim as his property the fruit which they produce. Is it the *difference* of the sexes? But this is inherent in the bodies which God made. Is it their *union*? But this union is justified in the privilege of the primeval blessing no less than institution. For it is the voice of God that says, 'A man shall leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they two shall be one flesh.'¹ It is again the voice of God which says, 'Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth.'² Or is it, perchance, their *fertility*? But this is the very reason why matrimony was instituted."

CHAP. 14. [v.]

You see the terms of his question to us, what can the devil find in the sexes to call his own, by reason of which they should be in his power, who are born of parents of every kind

scribed for the reader's information: "Quorum tamen efficientiæ potentiâ operationes intervenit omne quod est eâ administrans virtute quâ condidit." The editors suggest *potentia* (nominative) *Dei operationis intervenit*; but there is no MS. authority for the *Dei*.

¹ Gen. ii. 24.

² Gen. i. 28.

whatever, unless they be born again in Christ ; he asks us, moreover, whether it is the difference in the sexes which we ascribe to the devil, or their union, or their very fruitfulness. We answer, then, nothing of these qualities, inasmuch as the difference of sex belongs to "the vessels" of the parents ; while the union of the two pertains to the procreation of children, and their fruitfulness to the blessing pronounced on the marriage institution. But all these things are of God ; yet amongst them he was unwilling to name that "lust of the flesh, which is not of the Father, but is of the world ;"¹ and "of this world" the devil is said to be "the prince."² Now, the devil found no carnal concupiscence in the Lord, because the Lord did not come amongst men as incarnate by its means. Accordingly, He says Himself : "The prince of this world cometh, and findeth nothing in me"³—nothing, that is, of sin ; neither that which is derived from birth, nor that which is added during life. Among all the natural goods of procreation which he mentioned, he was, I repeat, unwilling to name this particular fact of concupiscence, which throws a blush of shame even upon the nuptial institute, which glories in all these before-mentioned goods. For why is the especial work of parents withdrawn and hidden even from the eyes of their children, except that it is impossible for them to be occupied in laudable procreation without the incident of shameful lust ? Because of this it was that even they were ashamed who first covered their nakedness.⁴ These portions of their person were not suggestive of shame before, but deserved to be commended and praised as the work of God. They put on their covering when they felt their shame, and they felt their shame when, after their own disobedience to their Maker, they felt their members disobedient to themselves. Our quoter of extracts likewise felt ashamed of this concupiscence. For he mentioned the difference of the sexes ; he mentioned also their union, and he mentioned their fertility ; but this last concomitant of lust he blushed to mention. And no wonder if mere talkers are ashamed of that which we see parents themselves, so interested in their function, blush to think of.

¹ 1 John ii. 16.² John xiv. 30.³ John xiv. 30.⁴ Gen. iii. 7.

CHAP. 15.—*Man, by birth, is placed under the dominion of the devil through sin; we were all one in Adam when he sinned; Jovinian was bold enough to call Ambrose a Manichean.*

He then proceeds to ask: "Why, then, are they in the devil's power whom God created?" And he finds an answer to his own question apparently from a phrase of mine. "Because of sin," says he, "not by reason of nature." Then framing his answer in reference to mine, he says: "But as there cannot be offspring without the sexes, so there cannot be sin without the will." Yes, indeed, such is the truth. For even as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; so also has death passed through to all men from him in whom all men sinned.¹ By the depraved will of that one man all sinned in him, since all were [in] that one man, from whom, therefore, they individually derived original sin. "For you allege," says he, "that the reason why they are in the devil's power is because they are born of the union of the two sexes." I plainly aver that it is by reason of transgression that they are in the devil's power, and that their participation, moreover, of this transgression is due to the circumstance that they are born of the said union of the sexes, which cannot even accomplish its own honourable function without the incident of shameful lust. This has also, in fact, been said by Ambrose, of most blessed memory, bishop of the church in Milan, when he gives as the reason why Christ's birth in the flesh was free from all sinful fault, that His conception was not the result of a union of the two sexes; whereas there is not one among human beings conceived in such union who is without sin. These are his precise words: "On that account, and being man, He was tried by every sort of temptation, and in the likeness of man He bore them all; inasmuch, however, as He was born of the Spirit, He abstained from all sin. For every man is deceitful, and none is without sin, but God only. It has accordingly," adds he, "been constantly observed, that clearly no one who is born of a man and a woman, that is to say, through the union of their bodies, is free from sin; for whoever is free from sin has had no relation whatever to conception of this

¹ Rom. v. 12.

kind.”¹ Well now, will you dare, ye disciples of Pelagius and Cœlestius, to call this man a Manichean? as Jovinian did, when the holy bishop maintained the permanence of the blessed Mary’s virginity even after child-bearing, in opposition to this man’s impiety. If, however, you do not dare to call him a Manichean, why do you call us Manicheans when we defend the Catholic faith in the self-same cause and with the self-same opinions? But if you will taunt that most faithful man with having entertained Manichean error in this matter, there is no help for it, you must enjoy your taunts as best you may, and so fill up Jovinian’s measure more fully; as for ourselves, we can patiently endure along with such a man of God your taunts and jibes. And yet your heresiarch Pelagius commends Ambrose’s faith and extreme purity in the knowledge of the Scriptures so greatly, as to declare that not even an enemy could venture to find fault with him. Observe, then, to what lengths you have gone, and refrain from following any further in the audacious steps of Jovinian. And yet this man, although by his excessive commendation of marriage he put it on a par with holy virginity, never denied the necessity of Christ to save those who are born of matrimony even fresh from their mother’s womb, and to redeem them from the power of the devil. This, however, you deny; and because we oppose you in defence of those who cannot yet speak for themselves, and in defence of the very foundations of the Catholic faith, you taunt us with being Manicheans. But let us now see what comes next.

CHAP. 16. [VI.]

He puts to us, then, another question, saying, “Whom, then, do you confess to be the author of infants? The true God?” I answer:² “Yes; the true God.” He then remarks, “But He did not make evil;” and again asks, “Whether we confess the devil to be the creator of infants?” Then again he answers, “But *he* did not create human nature.” He then shuts up the subject, as it were, with this inference: “Since [sexual]

¹ [Ambrose *On Isaiah*; see also his *Epistle* (81) *to Siricius*.]

² [*Respondeo* is the Bened. reading; but another reading has *respondet*, which seems to suit the context: *Rursusque respondet*.]

union is evil, and the condition of our bodies is degraded, therefore you ascribe our bodies to an evil creator." My answer to this is, I do not ascribe to an evil creator our bodies, but our sins; by reason of which it came to pass that, whereas in our bodies, that is to say, in things which God has made, all was honourable and well-pleasing, there yet accrued in the intercourse of male and female what caused shame, so that their union was not such as might have been in the body of that unimpaired life, but such as we see with a blush in the body of this death. "But God," says he, "has divided in sex what He would unite in operation. So that from Him comes the union of bodies, from whom first came the creation of bodies." We have already furnished an answer to this statement, when we said that these bodies are of God. But as regards the disobedience of the members of these bodies, this comes through the lust of the flesh, which "is not of the Father."¹ He goes on to say, that "it is impossible for so many evil fruits to spring from things which are good, such as human bodies, sexes, and their unions; or that human beings should be made by God for the purpose of their being, by lawful right, as you maintain, held in possession by the devil." Now it has been already affirmed, that they are not thus held, as being men, which designation belongs to their natural state, of which the devil is not the author; but inasmuch as they are sinners, which designation is the result of that fault of nature of which the devil is the author.

CHAP. 17. [VII.]—*The Pelagians are not ashamed to eulogize concupiscence, although they are ashamed to mention its name. Natural appetite not altogether evil nor dishonourable.*

But among so many names of good things, such as bodies, sexes, unions, he never once mentions the lust or concupiscence of the flesh. He is silent, because he is ashamed; and yet with a strange shamelessness of shame (if the expression may be used), he is not ashamed to praise what he is ashamed to mention. Now just observe how he prefers to point to his object by circumlocution rather than by direct mention of it. "After that the man," says he, "by natural appetite knew his wife." See again, he refused to say, He knew his wife by

¹ 1 John ii. 16.

carnal concupiscence; but he used the phrase, "by natural appetite," by which it is open to us to understand that holy and honourable desire which wills the procreation of children, and not that lustful pruriency, of which even he is so much ashamed, forsooth, that he prefers to use ambiguous language to us, to expressing his mind in unmistakeable words. Now what is the meaning of his phrase—"by natural appetite"? Is not the very wish on the part of parents to beget, nourish, and educate children a characteristic of natural appetite? And is not this appetite the property of reason and not of lust? Since, however, we can ascertain the purport of his phrase plainly enough, we are pretty sure that he meant by these words to indicate the prurient use of the organs of generation. Do not the words in question appear to you to be the fig-leaves, under cover of which is hidden nothing else but that which he feels ashamed of? For just as they of old sewed the leaves together¹ as a girdle of concealment, so has this man woven a web of circumlocution to hide his meaning. Let him weave out his statement: "But when the man knew his wife by natural appetite, the divine Scripture says, Eve conceived, and bare a son, and called his name Cain. But what," he adds, "does Adam say? Let us hear: I have gotten a man from God. So that it is evident that he was God's work, whom the divine Scripture testifies to his having received from God."² Well, who can entertain a doubt on this point? Who can deny this statement, especially if he be a Catholic Christian? A human being is God's work; and, if sin had not preceded, the seed from which he springs would have been sown by means of the organs of generation, which in that case would have been not less obedient than the other members to a quiet and normal will; nor would there have been that lust of the flesh which is not of the Father, but is of the world.³

CHAP. 18.

But now, I pray you, look a little more attentively, and observe how he contrives to find language wherewith to cover what he blushes to unfold. "For," says he, "Adam begets him by the natural power of his members, not by any diversity

¹ Gen. iii. 7.² Gen. iv. 1.³ 1 John ii. 16.

in their merits (*non diversitate meritorum*)." Now I confess I do not understand what he meant by the latter clause, *non diversitate meritorum*; but when he said, "by the natural power or efficiency of his members," I believe he wished to express what he is ashamed to say openly and clearly. He preferred to use the phrase, "by the natural power of his members," rather than say, "by the lust of the flesh." Plainly—even if the thought did not occur to him—he intimated a something which has an evident application to the subject. For what is more powerful than a man's members, when they are not in due submission to a man's will? Even if they be restrained by temperance or continence, their use and control are not in any man's power. Adam, then, begat his sons by what our author calls "the natural power of his members," which after his sin must have raised a blush upon his cheek, before he begat his children. If, however, he had never sinned, he would not have begotten them by the power, but in the obedience, of his members. For he would himself have possessed the ability to rule them as his subjects according to his own will, if he, too, by the same will had only submitted himself as a subject to his own more powerful Lord.

CHAP. 19. [VIII.]

He goes on to say: "After a while the divine Scripture says again, 'Adam knew Eve his wife; and she bare a son, and he called his name Seth: saying, The Lord hath raised me up another seed instead of Abel, whom Cain slew.'" He then adds: "The Divinity is said to have raised up another seed, as a proof that the sexual union was His appointment." This person did not understand what the Scripture records; for he supposed that the reason why it is said, The Lord hath raised me up another seed instead of Abel, was none other than that God might be supposed to have excited in him a desire for sexual intercourse, by means whereof seed might be raised for being poured into the woman's womb. He was perfectly unaware that what the Scripture has said is not "Has raised me up seed" in the sense he uses, but only as meaning "Has given me a son." Indeed, Adam did not use the words in question after his sexual intercourse, when he emitted his

seed, but after his wife's confinement, in which he received his son by the gift of God. For what gratification is there (except perhaps for lascivious persons, and those who, as the apostle says with prohibition, "possess their vessel in the lust of concupiscence" ¹) in the mere shedding of seed as the ultimate pleasure of sexual union, unless it is followed by the true and proper fruit of marriage—conception and birth?

CHAP. 20.—*Original sin is derived from the faulty condition of human seed.*

This, however, I would not say, as implying at all that we must look for some other creator than the Supreme and true God, of either human seed or of man himself who comes from the seed; but as meaning, that the seed would have issued from the human being by the quiet and normal obedience of his members simply yielding to his will and pleasure, if sin had not preceded the operation. The question now before us does not concern the nature of human seed, but the faulty condition of it. Now the *nature* has God for its author; it is from its vitiated state that original sin is derived. If, indeed, the seed had itself no fault, what means that passage in the Book of Wisdom, "Not being ignorant that they were a naughty generation, and that their malice was inbred, and that their cogitation would never be changed; for their seed was accursed from the beginning"? ² Now whatever may be the particular application of these words, they are spoken of mankind. How, then, is the malice of every man inbred, and his seed cursed from the beginning, unless it be in respect of the fact, that "by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, in that all have sinned"? ³ But where is the man whose "evil cogitation can never be changed,"—only the change cannot be effected by any inherent power,—by nothing else, indeed, than by divine grace; without the assistance of which, what are human beings, but that which the Apostle Peter says of them, when he describes them as "natural brute beasts made to be taken and destroyed"? ⁴ Accordingly, the Apostle Paul, in a certain passage, having both conditions in view,—even the wrath of God with which we are born, and the grace whereby we are

¹ 1 Thess. iv. 5. ² Wisd. xii. 10, 11. ³ Rom. v. 12. ⁴ 2 Pet. ii. 12.

delivered,—says: “Among whom also we all had our conversation in times past in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind; and were by nature the children of wrath, even as others. But God, who is rich in mercy, for His great love wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ; by whose grace we are saved.”¹ What, then, is man’s “inbred malice,” and “the seed cursed from the beginning;” and what are “the natural brute beasts made to be taken and destroyed,” and what the “by nature children of wrath”? Was this the condition of the nature which was formed in Adam? God forbid! Inasmuch as his pure nature, however, was vitiated in him, it has run on in this condition by natural descent through all, and still is running; so that there is no deliverance for it from this ruin, except by the grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ.

CHAP. 21. [IX.]

What, therefore, is this man’s meaning, in the next passage, wherein he says concerning Noah and his sons, that “they were blessed, even as Adam and Eve were; for God said unto them, ‘Be fruitful, and multiply, and have dominion over the earth’”?² To these words of the Almighty he added some of his own, saying: “Now that pleasure, which you would have to wear the appearance of diabolical, was resorted to in the case of the above-mentioned married pairs; and it continued to exist, both in the goodness of its institution and in the blessing attached to it. For there can be no doubt that the following words were addressed to Noah and his sons in reference to their bodily connection with their wives, which had become by this time unalterably fixed by use: ‘Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth.’” It is, indeed, unnecessary for us to employ many words in repeating our former argument. The point here in question is the flaw in our nature, whereby its goodness has been depraved, of which depravity the devil is the author. That goodness of nature, as it is in itself, the author of which is God, is not the question we have to consider. Now God has never withdrawn from vitiated and depraved nature His own mercy and goodness, so

¹ Eph. ii. 3-5.

² Gen. ix. 1.

as to deprive man of fruitfulness, vivacity, and health, as well as the very substance of his mind and body, his senses also and reason, as well as food, and nourishment, and growth. He, moreover, "maketh His sun to arise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust;"¹ and all that is good in human nature is from the good God, even in the case of those men who will not be delivered from evil.

CHAP. 22.

It is, however, of *pleasure* that this man spoke in this passage, because pleasure may be even honourable: of the concupiscence, or lust of the flesh, which produces shame, he made no mention. In some subsequent words, however, he discovered his susceptibility of shame; and he was unable to dissemble what nature herself has prescribed so forcibly. "There is also," says he, "that statement: 'Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh.'" Then after these words of God, he goes on to offer some of his own, saying: "That he might express faith in works, the prophet approached very near to a perilling of modesty." What a confession! How clear and extorted from him by the force of truth! The prophet, it would seem, to express faith in works, almost imperilled modesty, when he said, They twain shall become one flesh; wishing it to be understood of the sexual union of the male and the female. Let the cause be alleged, why the prophet, in expressing the works of God, should approach so near an imperilling of modesty? Is it then the case that the works of man ought not to produce shame, but must be gloried in at all events, and that the works of God must produce shame? Is it, that in setting forth and expressing the works of God the prophet's love or labour receives no honour, but his modesty is imperilled? What, then, was it possible for God to do, which it would be a shame for His prophet to describe? And, which is a weightier question still, could a man be ashamed of any work which not man but God has made in man? Whereas workmen in all cases strive, with all the labour and diligence in their power, to avoid shame in the

¹ Matt. v. 45.

works of their own hands. The truth, however, is, that we are ashamed of that very thing which made those primitive human beings ashamed, when they covered their loins. That is the penalty of sin; that is the plague and mark of sin; that is the temptation and very fuel of sin; that is the law in our members warring against the law of our mind; that is the rebellion against our own selves, proceeding from our very selves, which by a most righteous retribution is rendered us by our disobedient members. It is this which makes us ashamed, and justly ashamed. If it were not so, what could be more ungrateful, more irreligious in us, if in our members we were to suffer confusion of face, not for our own fault or penalty, but because of the works of God?

CHAP. 23. [x.]

He has much also to say, though to no purpose, concerning Abraham and Sarah, how they received a son according to the promise; and at last he mentions the word *concupiscence*. But he does not add the usual phrase, "of the flesh," because this is the very thing which causes the shame. Whereas, on account of concupiscence there is sometimes a call for boasting, inasmuch as there is a concupiscence of the spirit against the flesh,¹ and a lusting for wisdom.² Accordingly, he says: "Now you have certainly defined as naturally evil this concupiscence which is indispensable for fecundity; whence comes it, therefore, that it is aroused in aged men by the gift of Heaven? Make it clear then, if you can, that that belongs to the devil's work, which you see is conferred by God as a gift." He says this, just as if the lust of the flesh had been previously wanting in them, and as if God had bestowed it upon them. No doubt it was inherent in this body of death; that fecundity, however, was wanting of which God is the author; and this was actually given whensoever God willed to confer the gift. Be it, indeed, far from us to affirm, what he thought we meant to say, that Isaac was begotten without the heat of sexual union.

¹ Gal. v. 17.

² Wisd. vi. 21. [The expression is the same in the epistle (*ἐπιθυμία σοφίας*), and in Wisdom, *ἐπιθυμία σοφίας*.]

CHAP. 24. [XI.]—*What covenant of God the new-born babe breaks. What was the value of circumcision. The old fathers were justified by the same faith as we.*

Now let him inform us how it was that his soul would be cut off from his people if he had not been circumcised on the eighth day. How could he have so sinned, how so offended God, as to be punished for the neglect of others towards him with so severe a sentence, had there been no original sin in the case? For thus ran the commandment of God concerning the circumcision of infants: "The uncircumcised man-child, whose flesh of his foreskin is not circumcised on the eighth day, his soul shall be cut off from his people; because he hath broken my covenant."¹ Let him tell us, if he can, how that child broke God's covenant,—an innocent babe, so far as he was personally concerned, of eight days' age; and yet there is by no means any falsehood uttered here by God or Holy Scripture. The fact is, the covenant of God which he then broke was not this which commanded circumcision, but that which forbade [the fruit of] the tree; when "by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned."² And in his case the expiation of this was signified by the circumcision of the eighth day, that is, by the sacrament of the Mediator who was to be incarnate. For it was through this same faith in Christ, who was to come in the flesh, and was to die for us, and on the third day (which coming after the seventh or Sabbath day, was by appointment to be the eighth) to rise again, that even holy men were saved of old. For "He was delivered for our offences, and raised again for our justification."³ Ever since circumcision was instituted amongst the people of God, which was at that time the sign of the righteousness of faith, it availed also to signify the cleansing even in infants of the original and primitive sin, just as baptism in like manner from the time of its institution began to be of avail for the renewal of man. Not that there was no justification by faith before circumcision; for even when he was still in uncircumcision, Abraham was himself justified by faith, being the father of those nations which should also imitate the faith.⁴ In former times, however, the sacramental mystery of justifi-

¹ Gen. xvii. 14.

² Rom. v. 12.

³ Rom. iv. 25.

⁴ Rom. iv. 10, 11

cation by faith lay concealed in every mode. Still it was the self-same faith in the Mediator which saved the saints of old, both small and great—not the old covenant, “which gendereth to bondage;”¹ not the law, which was not so given as to be able to give life;² but the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord.³ For as we believe that Christ has come in the flesh, so they believed that He was to come; as, again, we believe that He has died, so they believed that He would die; and as we believe that He has risen from the dead, so they believed that He would rise again; whilst both we and they believe alike, that He will hereafter come to judge the quick and the dead. Let not this man, then, throw any hindrance in the way of its salvation upon human nature, by setting up a bad defence of its merits; because we are all born under sin, and are delivered therefrom by One alone who was born without sin.

CHAP. 25. [XII.]

“That sexual connection of bodies of which you speak, with heat, with pleasure, with emission of seed, deserves approval, ordained as it is of God, and praiseworthy on its own account; it, moreover, becomes sometimes even a great gift to pious men.” He distinctly and severally repeated the phrases, “with heat,” “with pleasure,” “with emission of seed.” He did not, however, venture to say, “with lust.” Why is this, if it be not that he is ashamed to name what he does not blush to praise? A gift, indeed, for pious men is the prosperous propagation of children; but not that shame-producing excitement of the members, which our nature would not feel were it in a sound state: nature now experiences it, however, because it is vitiated. On this account, indeed, it is that he who is born of it requires to be born again, in order that he may be a member of Christ; and that he of whom he is born, even though he be already born again, wants to be freed from that which exists in this body of death by reason of the law of sin. Now since this is the case, how is it he goes on to say, “You must, therefore, of necessity confess that the original sin which you had devised is done away with”? It was not I who devised the original sin, which the Catholic faith holds

¹ Gal. iv. 24.

² Gal. iii. 21.

³ Rom. vii. 25.

from ancient times ; but you, who deny it, are undoubtedly an innovating heretic. In the judgment of God, however, all are in the devil's power, born in sin, unless they are regenerated in Christ.

CHAP. 26. [XIII.]

But as he was speaking of Abraham and Sarah, he goes on to say : " If, indeed, he were to affirm that the natural use was strong in them, and there was no offspring, my answer will be : Whom the Creator promised, the Creator also gave ; the child which is born is not the work of concubinage, but of God. He, indeed, who made the first man of the dust, fashions all men out of seed. As, therefore, the dust of the earth, which was taken as the material, was not the author of man ; so likewise that power of sexual pleasure which forms and commingles the seminal elements does not complete the entire process of man's making, but rather presents to God, out of the treasures of nature, material with which He vouchsafes to make the human being." Now the whole of this statement of his, except where he says, that the seminal elements are formed and commingled by sexual pleasure, would be correctly expressed by him were he only earnest in making it to defend the Catholic sense. To us, however, who are fully aware what he strives to make out of it, he speaks indeed correctly in a perverse manner. The exceptional statement to the general truth, which I do not deny belongs to this passage, is untrue for this reason, because the pleasure in question of carnal concupiscence does not form the seminal elements. These are already in the body, and are formed by the same true God who created the body itself. They do not receive their existence from the libidinous pleasure, but are excited and emitted in company with it. Whether, indeed, such pleasure accompanies the commingling of the seminal elements of the two sexes in the womb, is a question which perhaps women may be able to determine from their inmost feelings ; but it is improper for us to push an idle curiosity so far. That concupiscence, however, which we have to be ashamed of, and the shame of which has given to our secret members their shameful designation, *pudenda*, had no existence in the body during its life in paradise before the entrance

of sin ; but it began to exist "in the body of this death" after sin, the rebellion of the members retaliating man's own disobedience. Without this concupiscence it was quite possible to effect the function of the wedded pair in the procreation of children : just as many a laborious work is accomplished by the compliant operation of our other limbs, without any lascivious heat ; for they are simply moved by the direction of the will, not excited by the ardour of concupiscence.

CHAP. 27.

Carefully consider the rest of his remarks : "This likewise," says he, "is confirmed by the apostle's authority. For when the blessed Paul spoke of the resurrection of the dead, he said, 'Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened.'¹ And afterwards, 'But God giveth it a body as it pleaseth Him, and to every seed its own body.' If, therefore, God," says he, "has assigned to human seed, as to everything else, its own proper body, which no wise or pious man will deny, how are you going to prove that any person is guilty by birth ? Do, I beg of you, reflect with what snares this assertion of natural sinfulness is entrapped.² But come," he says, "deal more gently with yourself, I pray you. Believe me, God made even you : it must, however, be confessed, that a serious error has infected you. For what profaner opinion can be broached than that either God did not make man, or else that He made him for the devil ; or, at any rate, that the devil moulded God's image, that is, man,—which clearly is a statement not more absurd than impious ? Is then," says he, "God so poor in resources, so lacking in all sense of propriety, as not to have had aught which He could confer on holy men as their reward, except what the devil, after making them his dupes, might infuse into them for their vitiation ?³ Would you like to know, however, that even in the case of those who are no saints, God can be proved to have bestowed this power of procreation of children ? When Abraham, struck with fear among a foreign nation, said that Sarah, his wife,

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 36.

² [The idea in the original is that of *strangulation*, "quibus laqueis suffocetur."]

³ [In vitio, forte pro *in vitium* ; quia præcessit *in præmium*.]—*Ed. Ben.*

was his sister, it is said that Abimelech, the king of the country, took her home for a night's enjoyment of her. But God, who had the holy woman's honour in His keeping, appeared in a dream to the king, and restrained his daring purpose; threatening him with death if he went to the length of violating the wife's chastity. Then Abimelech said: 'Wilt thou, O Lord, slay an innocent and righteous nation? Did they not tell me that they were brother and sister? Therefore Abimelech arose early in the morning, and took a thousand pieces of silver, and sheep, and oxen, and men-servants, and women-servants, and gave them to Abraham, and sent away his wife untouched. But Abraham prayed unto God for Abimelech; and God healed Abimelech, and his wife, and his maid-servants.'¹ Now why did he narrate all this at so great a length? You may find the sense of it all in these few words which he added: 'God, at the prayer of Abraham, restored their potency of generation, which had been taken away from the wombs of even the meanest servants; because God had closed up every womb in the house of Abimelech.'² Consider now," says he, "whether that ought to be called a natural evil which sometimes God when angry takes away, and when appeased restores. He," says he, "makes the children both of the pious and of the ungodly, inasmuch as the circumstance of their being parents appertains to that nature which rejoices in God as its Author, whilst the fact of their impiety belongs to the depravity of their desires; and this in every person, whatever happens as the consequence of his freedom of will."

CHAP. 28. [XIV.]

Now to this lengthy statement of his we have to say in answer, that, in the passages which he has quoted from the sacred writings, there is nothing said about that shameful lust, which we say did not exist in the body of our first parents in their blessedness, when they were naked and were not ashamed.³ The first passage from the apostle was spoken of the seeds of corn, which first die in order to be quickened. For some reason or other, he was unwilling to complete the verse for his quotation. All he adduces from it is: "Thou

¹ See Gen. xx. 2, 4, 5, 8, 14, 17.² Gen. xx. 18.³ Gen. ii. 25.

fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened;" but the apostle adds, "except it die."¹ This writer, however, so far as I can judge, wished this passage, which treats only of corn seeds, to be understood of human seed, by such as read it, without either understanding the Holy Scriptures or recollecting them. Indeed, he not merely curtailed this particular sentence, by omitting the clause, "except it die," but he omitted the following words, in which the apostle explained of what seeds he was speaking; for the apostle adds: "And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body which shall be, but the bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain."² This he omitted, and closed up his context with what the apostle then writes: "But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased Him, and to every seed its own body;" just as if the apostle spoke of man in concubinage when he said, "Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened," with a view to our understanding of human seed, that it is quickened by God, not by man in concubinage conceiving children. For he had previously said: "Sexual pleasure does not complete the entire process of man's making, but rather presents to God, out of the treasures of nature, material with which He vouchsafes to make the human being."³ He then added the quotation, as if the apostle affirmed as follows: Thou fool, that which thou sowest *is* not quickened,—quickened, that is, by thyself; but God forms the human being out of thy seed. As if the apostle had omitted to mention the *media*, which this writer chose to pass over; and as if the apostle's aim was to speak of human seed thus: "Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened; but God giveth to the seed a body such as pleaseth Him, and to every seed its own body." Indeed, after the apostle's words, he introduces remarks of his own to this effect: "If, therefore, God has assigned to human seed, as to everything else, its own proper body, which no wise or pious man will deny;" quite as if the apostle in the passage in question spoke of human seed.

CHAP. 29.

Though I have given special attention to the point, I have

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 36.

² 1 Cor. xv. 37.

³ Above, chap. 26. [xiii.]

failed to discover what assistance he could obtain from this fraudulent use of Scripture, except that he wanted to produce the apostle as a witness, and by him to prove, what we ourselves admit, that God forms man of human seed. And inasmuch as no passage directly occurred to him, he deceitfully manipulated this particular one; fearing no doubt that, if the apostle should chance to seem to have spoken of corn seeds, and not of human, in this passage, we should have suggested to us at once by such procedure of his, how to refute him: not indeed as the pure-minded advocate of a chastened will, but as the impudent proclaimer of a profligate voluptuousness. But from the very seeds, forsooth, which the farmers sow in their fields he can be refuted. For why can we not suppose that God could have granted to man in his happy state in paradise, the same course with regard to his own seed which we see granted to the seeds of corn, in such wise that the former might be sown without any shameful concupiscence, the members of generation simply obeying the inclination of the will; just as the latter is sown without any lustful emotion, the hands of the husbandman merely moving in obedience to his will? There being, indeed, this difference, that the desire of begetting children in the parent is a nobler one than that which characterizes the farmer, of filling his barns. Then, again, why might not the almighty Creator, with His unsullied universal presence, and power of creating from human seed just what it pleased Him, have operated in women—as He still does—in the self-same manner as He operates in the ground with corn seeds according to His will; when mothers in their innocence conceived without any libidinous gratification, and brought forth children without any parturient pains, inasmuch as there was not (in that state of happiness, and while the body had not as yet declined to the body of this death, but was still fraught with that primeval life) in woman when receiving seed anything to produce shame, as there was nothing when giving birth to offspring to cause pain? Whoever refuses to believe this, or is unwilling to have it supposed that, while men previous to any sin lived in that happy state of paradise, such a condition as that which we have sketched could not have been permitted

in God's will and kindness, must be regarded as the lover of voluptuous shame, rather than the encomiast of so great fecundity.

CHAP. 30. [XV.]

Then, again, as to the passage which he has adduced from the inspired history concerning Abimelech, and God's choosing to close up every womb in his household that the women should not bear children, and afterwards opening them that they might become fruitful, what is all this to the point? What has it to do with that shameful concupiscence which is now the question in dispute? Did God, then, deprive those women of this feeling, and give it to them again just when He liked? But it was a punishment to them to be unable to bear children, and a benefit to be able to bear them after the manner of this corruptible flesh. For God would not confer such a benefit upon this body of death, as only that body of life in paradise could have had before sin entered; that is, the process of conceiving without the prurience of lust, and of bearing children without excruciating pain. But why should we not suppose, since, indeed, Scripture says so, that the closing up of these wombs took place with a considerable amount of pain, so that the women were unable to bear any concubinage—a pain which God inflicted in His wrath, and removed in His mercy? For if concupiscence was to be taken away as an impediment to begetting offspring, it ought to have been taken away from the men, not from the women. For a woman might perform her share in concubinage with perfect willingness, even if concupiscence ceased a while for stimulating her, provided it were not absent from the man for exciting him, unless, perhaps (as Scripture informs us that even Abimelech himself was healed), he would tell us that virile concupiscence was restored to him. If, however, it were true that he had lost this, what necessity was there that he should be warned by God to hold no connection with Abraham's wife? The truth is, Abimelech is said to have been healed, because his household was cured of the affliction which smote it.

CHAP. 31. [XVI.]—*Why God proceeds to create human beings, who He knows will be born in sin.*

Let us now look at those three clauses of his, any one of

which equals, as he says, any amount of profanity that could possibly be uttered: "Either God did not make man, or else He made him for the devil; or at any rate the devil moulded God's image, even man." Now, the first and the last of these sentences, even he himself must allow, if he be not reckless and perverse, were never uttered by us. The dispute is confined to that which he puts second between the other two. In respect of this, he is so far mistaken as to suppose that we had said that God had man for the devil; as if, in the case of human beings whom God creates of human parents, His care and purpose and provision were, that by means of His workmanship the devil should have as slaves those whom he is unable to make for himself. God forbid that any sort of pious belief, however childish, should ever entertain such a sentiment as this! Of His own goodness God makes man—the first without sin, all others under sin—for the purposes of His own profound thoughts. For just as He knew full well what to do to counteract the malice of the devil himself (and what He does is just and good, however unjust and evil he is, about whom He takes His measures); and just as He was not unwilling to create any man by reason of His foreknowledge that he would turn evil; so in regard to the entire human race, though not a man of it is born without the taint of sin, He who is supremely good Himself is always working out good, making some men, as it were, "vessels of mercy," whom grace distinguishes from those who are "vessels of wrath;" whilst He makes others, as it were, "vessels of wrath," that He may make known the riches of His glory towards the vessels of mercy.¹ Let, then, this objector go and contest the point against the apostle, whose words I use; nay, against the very Potter, whom the apostle forbids us from answering again, in the well-known words: "Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God! Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?"² Well now, will this man contend that the vessels of wrath are not under the dominion of the devil? or else, because they are under this

¹ Rom. ix. 23.

² Rom. ix. 20, 21.

dominion, are they made by another Creator than He who makes the vessels of mercy? Or does He make them of other material, and not out of the self-same lump? Here, then, He may object, and say: "Therefore God makes these vessels for the devil." As if God knew not how to make such a use of even these for the furtherance of His own good and righteous works, as He uses the very devil Himself.

CHAP. 32. [XVII.]

Then, does God feed the children of perdition, the goats on His left hand,¹ for the devil, nourish and clothe them for the devil, "because He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain upon the just and the unjust"?² He creates, then, the evil, just in the same way as He feeds and nourishes the evil; because what He bestows on them by creating them appertains to the goodness of nature; and the growth which He gives them by food and nourishment, He bestows on them, of course, as a kindly help, not to their evil character, but to that same good nature which He in His goodness created. For the fact that they are human beings is a good of that nature whose author and maker is God; but the circumstance of their being born with sin, and so destined to perdition unless they are born again, makes them the property of the seed which was cursed from the beginning,³ by fault of the primitive disobedience. This fault, however, is turned to good account by the Maker of even the vessels of wrath, that He may make known the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy;⁴ and that no one may attribute to any merits of his own, pertaining as he does to the self-same mass, his deliverance through grace; but "he that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord."⁵

CHAP. 33. [XVIII.]

From this most true and firmly-established principle of the apostolic and Catholic faith the writer before us departs in company with the Pelagians. He will not have it that by birth men are under the dominion of the devil, so that infants are not carried to Christ to be delivered from the power of

¹ Matt. xxv. 33.² Matt. v. 45.³ Wisd. xii. 11.⁴ Rom. ix. 33.⁵ 2 Cor. x. 17.

darkness, and to be translated into His kingdom.¹ Thus he becomes the accuser of the Church which is spread over the world; into this Church everywhere infants, when to be baptized, are first exorcised, for no other reason than that the prince of this world may be cast out² of them. For by him must they be necessarily possessed, as vessels of wrath, since they are born of Adam, unless they be born again in Christ, and transferred through grace as vessels of mercy into His kingdom. In his raid, however, upon this most firmly-established truth, he would avoid the appearance of an assault upon the entire Church of Christ. Accordingly, he limits his appeal to me alone, and in the tone of reproof and admonition he says: "But God made even you, though it must be confessed that a serious error has infected you." Well now, I thankfully acknowledge that God did make even me. Still the fact indeed remains, that I must have perished with the vessels of wrath, if He had only made me of Adam, and had not regenerated me in Christ. Possessed, however, as this man is with the heresy of Pelagius, he does not believe this: if, indeed, he persists in so great an error to the very end, then not he, but Catholics, will be able to see the character and extent of the error which has not simply infected, but absolutely ruined³ him.

CHAP. 34. [XIX.]

I request your attention now to the following words. He says, "That children, however, who are conceived and born in wedlock are by nature good, we may learn from the apostle's words, when he speaks of men who, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another, men with men working that which is unseemly.⁴ Here," says he, "the apostle shows the use of the woman to be both natural, and, in its way, laudable; the abuse consisting in the exercise of one's own will in opposition to the chaste and proper employment of the institution. Deservedly then," says he, "in those who make a right use thereof, concupiscence is commended in its kind and mode; whilst the excess of it, in which abandoned

¹ Col. i. 13.² John xii. 31.³ [There is a playful climax in *infecerit* and *interfecerit*.]⁴ Rom. i. 27.

persons indulge, is punished. Indeed, at the very time when God punished the abuse in Sodom with His judgment of fire, He invigorated the generative powers of Abraham and Sarah, which had become impotent through old age.¹ If, therefore," he goes on to say, "you think that fault must be found with the strength of the generative organs, because the Sodomites were steeped in sin thereby, you will have also to censure the creatures of bread and wine, since Holy Scripture informs us that they, moreover, sinned in the abuse of these gifts. For the Lord, by the mouth of His prophet Ezekiel, says: 'These, moreover, were the sins of thy sister Sodom; in their pride, she and her children overflowed in fulness of bread and abundance of wine; and they helped not the hand of the poor and needy.'² Choose, therefore," says he, "which alternative you would rather have: either impute to the operation of God the sexual connection of human bodies, or account the creatures of bread and wine to be equally evil. But if you should prefer this latter conclusion, you prove yourself to be a Manichean. The truth, however, is this: he who observes moderation in natural concupiscence uses it well; but he who does not observe moderation, abuses a good thing. What means your statement, then,"³ he asks, "when you say that, 'as the good of marriage is not impeachable on account of the original sin which is derived herefrom, so the evil of adultery and fornication cannot be excused because of the natural good which is born of them'? In these words," says he, "you conceded what you had denied, and what you had conceded you nullified; and you aim at nothing so much as to be unintelligible. Show me any marriage of the body without sexual connection. Else impose some one name on this operation, and designate the conjugal union as either a good or an evil. You answer, no doubt, that you have already defined marriages to be good. Well then, if marriage is good,—if the human being is the good fruit of marriage; if this fruit, being God's work, cannot be evil, born as it is by good agency out of good,—where is the original sin, which has been set aside by so many prior admissions?

¹ Gen. xxi. 1, 2, and xix. 24.

² Ezek. xvi. 49.

³ See first chapter of the first book of this treatise.

CHAP. 35. [XX.]—*He answers the arguments of Julianus. What the natural use of the woman; what is the unnatural use.*

My answer to this challenge is, that not only the children of wedlock, but all who are the offspring of adultery also, are so far a good work as they are made by God the Creator of all alike: I add, however, that as concerns original sin, they are all born under condemnation of the first Adam; not only those who are born in adultery, but likewise such as are born in wedlock, unless they be regenerated in the second Adam, which is Christ. As to what the apostle says of the wicked, that “leaving the natural use of the woman, the men burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly;”¹ he did not speak of the use of marriage, but the use of *nature*, wishing us to understand how it comes to pass that by means of the members created for the purpose the two sexes can combine to accomplish generation. Thus it follows, that even when a man unites with a harlot to use these members, the use is a natural one. It is not, however, commendable, but rather blameworthy. But as regards any part of the body which is not meant for generative purposes, should a man use even his own wife in it, the deed is against nature and flagitious. Indeed, the same apostle had previously² said concerning women: “Even their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature;” and then concerning men he added, that they worked that which is unseemly by leaving the natural use of the woman. Therefore, by the phrase in question, “the natural use,” it is not meant to praise the connection of marriage; but thereby are denoted those flagitious deeds which are more unclean and criminal than even men’s use of women, which, however unlawful, is not against nature.

CHAP. 36. [XXI.]

Now we do not find fault with bread and wine because some men are luxurious and drunkards, any more than we disapprove of gold because of the greedy and avaricious. Wherefore on the same principle we do not censure the honourable connection between husband and wife, because there is a lustful union of bodies which causes shame. For

¹ Rom. i. 27.

² Rom. ix. 26.

the former would be quite possible before any commission of sin, without raising a blush in the united pair; whereas the latter arose after the perpetration of sin, and they were obliged to hide it from very shame.¹ Accordingly, in all united pairs ever since, however well and lawfully they have used this evil, there has been a permanent necessity of avoiding the sight of man in any work of this kind, and thus acknowledging what caused inevitable shame, though a good thing would certainly cause no man to be ashamed. In this way we have two distinct facts insensibly introduced to our notice: the good of that laudable union of the sexes for the purpose of generating children, and the evil of that shameful lust, in consequence of which the offspring must be regenerated in order to escape condemnation. The man, therefore, who, though with the concupiscence which causes shame, joins in lawful concubinage, turns an evil to good account; whereas he who joins in an unlawful concubinage, uses an evil badly; for that is more correctly called evil than good, at which both bad and good are alike confounded. We do better to believe him who has said, "I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing,"² rather than him who calls that good, out of which the shame that arises in him is an admission of its evil; but if he feels no shame, he adds the worse evil of impudence. Rightly then did we declare that, "as the good of marriage is not impeachable because of the original sin which is derived therefrom, so the evil of adultery and fornication cannot be excused, because of the natural good which is born of them:" since the human nature which is born, whether of wedlock or of adultery, is the work of God. Now if this nature were an evil, it ought not to have been born; if it had not evil, it would not have to be regenerated; and (that I may combine the two cases in one and the same predicate) if human nature were an evil thing, it would not have to be saved; if it had not in it any evil, it would not have to be saved. He, therefore, who contends that nature is not a good thing, says in fact that the Maker of the creature is not good; whilst he who will have it, that nature has no evil in it, deprives it in its faulty condition of a merciful Saviour.

¹ Gen. iii. 7.

² Rom. vii. 18.

From this then it follows, that in the birth of human beings neither fornication is to be excused on account of the good which is formed out of it by the good Creator, nor is marriage to be impeached by reason of the evil which has to be healed in it by the merciful Saviour.

CHAP. 37. [XXII.]

Then comes his challenge. "Show me," he says, "any marriage of the body without sexual connection." For my own part I do not show him any corporal marriage without sexual connection; but then neither does he show me any case of sexual connection which is without shame. In paradise, no doubt, if sin had not preceded, there would have been, I will not say, generation without commingling of the sexes, but this commingling would certainly have been without shame; for in the sexual union there would be a quiet acquiescence of the members, not a lust of the flesh productive of shame. Matrimony, therefore, is a good, in which the human being is born after orderly conception; the fruit, too, of matrimony is good, as being the very human being which is thus born; sin, however, is an evil with which every man is born. Now it was God who made and still makes man; but "by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men from him in whom all sinned."¹

CHAP. 38. [XXIII.]—*Jovinian used formerly to call Catholics Manicheans; the Arians also used to call Catholics Sabellians.*

"By your new mode of controversy," says he, "you both profess yourself a Catholic and support Manichæus, inasmuch as you designate matrimony both as a great good and a great evil." Now he is utterly ignorant of what he says, or pretends to be ignorant. Or else he does not understand what we say, or does not wish it to be understood. If, however, he does understand, why then, he has the impediment of predisposing error; or if he does not wish our meaning to be understood, then obstinacy is the fault with which he defends his error. Jovinian too, who endeavoured a few years ago to found a new heresy, used to declare that the Catholics patronized the Manicheans, because in opposition to him they pre-

¹ Rom. v. 12.

ferred holy virginity to marriage. But this man is sure to reply, that he does not agree with Jovinian in his indifference about marriage and virginity. I do not myself say that this is their opinion; still these new heretics must allow, by the fact of Jovinian's playing off the Manicheans upon the Catholics, that the expedient is not a novel one. We then declare that marriage is a good, not an evil. But just as the Arians charge us with being Sabellians, although we do not say that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are one and the same [Person], as the Sabellians hold; but affirm that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost have one and the same nature, as the Catholics believe: so do the Pelagians cast the Manicheans in our teeth, although we do not declare marriage to be an evil, as the Manicheans pretend; but affirm that evil accrued to the first man and woman, that is to say, to the first married pair, and from them passed on to all men, a doctrine which the Catholics hold. As, however, the Arians, while avoiding the Sabellians, fall into worse company, because they have had the audacity to divide not the Persons but the natures; so the Pelagians, in their efforts to escape from the pestilent error of the Manicheans, by taking the opposite extreme, are convicted of entertaining worse sentiments than the Manicheans themselves touching the fruit of matrimony, inasmuch as they believe that infants stand in no need of Christ as their Physician.

CHAP. 39. [XXIV.]

He then says: "You conclude that a human being, if born of fornication, is not guilty; and if born in wedlock, is not innocent. Your assertion, therefore, amounts to this, that natural good may possibly subsist from adulterous connections, while original sin is actually derived from marriage." Well now, he here attempts, but in vain before an intelligent reader, to give a wrong turn to words which are correct enough. Far be it from us to say, that a human being, if born in fornication, is not guilty. But we do affirm, that a human being, whether he be born in wedlock or in fornication, is in a sense a good, for God's sake, the Author of nature; we add, however, that he derives some evil by reason of original sin. Our

statement, therefore, "that natural good may possibly get existence even from adulterous parentage, but that original sin is derived even from marriage," does not amount to what he endeavours to make of it, that one born in adultery is not guilty, nor innocent when born in wedlock; but the truth is, that one who is generated in either condition is guilty, because of original sin; and that the offspring of either state is to be freed by regeneration, owing to the good of nature.

CHAP. 40. [XXV.]

"One of these propositions," says he, "is true, the other false." My reply is as brief as the allegation: Both are really true, neither is false. "It is true," he goes on to say, "that the sin of adultery cannot be exculpated by the man who is born of it; inasmuch as the sin which adulterers commit pertains to a fault of the will; but the offspring which they produce tends to the praise of fecundity. If one were to sow wheat which had been stolen, the crop which springs up is none the worse. Of course," says he, "I blame the thief, but I praise the corn. So I pronounce him innocent who is born of the generous fruitfulness of the seed; even as the apostle puts it: 'God giveth it a body, as it pleases Him; and to every seed its own body;'¹ but, at the same time, I condemn the flagitious man who has committed his adulterous sin in his perverse application of the divine appointment."

CHAP. 41. [XXVI.]

After this he proceeds with the following words: "Certainly if evil arises from marriage, it may be blamed, nay, cannot be excused; and you place under the devil's power its operation and fruit, because everything which is the cause of evil is itself without good. The human being, however, who is born of wedlock owes his origin not to the faulty accidents of wedlock, but to its seminal elements: the cause of these, however, lies in the condition of wedded bodies; and whosoever makes a bad use of these bodies, deals a blow at the good desert thereof, not at their nature. It is therefore clear," argues he, "that the good is not the cause of the evil.

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 38.

If, however," he continues, "original sin is derived even from marriage, the cause of the evil is the coming together in the matrimonial functions; and that must needs be evil by which and from which the evil fruit has made its appearance; even as the Lord says in the Gospel: 'A tree is known by its fruits.'¹ How then," he asks, "do you think yourself worthy of attention, when you say that marriage is good, and yet declare that nothing but evil proceeds from it? It is evident, then, that marriages are sinful, since original sin is deduced from them; and they are indefensible, too, unless their fruit be proved innocent. But they are defended, and pronounced good; therefore their fruit is proved to be innocent."

CHAP. 42.—*The Pelagians try to get rid of original sin by their praise of God's works; marriage, in its nature and by its institution, is not the cause of sin.*

I have an answer ready for all this; but before I give it, I wish the reader carefully to notice, that the result of the opinions of these persons is, that no Saviour is necessary for infants, whom they deem to be entirely without any sins to be saved from. This vast perversion of the truth is hostile to God's great grace, which is given through our Lord Jesus Christ, who "came to seek and to save what was lost;"² it tries to worm its way into the hearts of the unintelligent by eulogizing the works of God; that is, by its commendation of human nature, human seed, marriage, sexual intercourse, fruits of matrimony—which are all of them good things. I will not say that he adds the praise of lustful desire; because this occasions a feeling of shame even to him, so that it is something else and not *it* which he seems to commend. By this method of his, not distinguishing between the evils which have accrued to nature and the goodness of nature's very self, he does not, indeed, show it to be sound (because that is untrue), but he does not permit its diseased condition to be healed. And, therefore, that first proposition of ours, to the effect that the good thing, even the human being, which is born of adultery, does not exculpate the sin of adulterous connection, he allows to be true; and this point, which occasions no question to arise between us, he even defends and strengthens (as he well may) by his similitude of the thief

¹ Matt. vii. 16.

² Luke xix. 10.

who sows the seed which he stole, and out of which there arises a really good harvest. Our other proposition, however, that "the good of marriage cannot be blamed for the original sin which is derived from it," he will not admit to be true; if, indeed, he assented to it, he would not be a Pelagian heretic, but a Catholic Christian. "Certainly," says he, "if evil arises from marriage, it may be blamed, nay, cannot be excused; and you place its operation and fruit under the devil's power, because everything which is the cause of evil is itself without good." And in addition to this, he contrived other arguments to show that good could not possibly be the cause of evil; and from this he drew the inference, that marriage, which is a good, is not the cause of evil; and that consequently no man could be born of it at all in a sinful state, without having need of a Saviour: just as if we said that marriage is the cause of sin; though it is true that the human being which is born in wedlock is not born without sin. Marriage was instituted not for the purpose of sinning, but of producing children. Accordingly the Lord's blessing on the married state ran thus: "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth."¹ The sin, however, which is derived to children from marriage does not belong to marriage, but to the evil which accrues to the human agents, from whose union marriage arises. The truth is, the evil of shameful concupiscence can exist without marriage, just as marriage might have been without it. It appertains, however, to the condition of the body—not, indeed, of that life, but of this death—that marriage cannot exist without it, though it may exist without marriage. Of course, that lust of the flesh which causes shame has existence out of the married state, whenever it urges men to the commission of adultery, chambering and uncleanness, so utterly hostile to the purity of marriage; or again, when it does not commit any of these things, because the human agent gives no permission or assent to their commission, but still rises and is set in motion and creates disturbance, and (especially in dreams) it effects the likeness of its own veritable work, and reaches the end of its own emotion. Well, now, this is an evil which is not even in the married

¹ Gen. i. 28.

state actually an evil of marriage; but it has this apparatus all ready in the body of this death, even against its own will, which is indispensable no doubt for the accomplishment of that which it does will. The evil in question, therefore, does not accrue to marriage from its own institution, which was blessed; but entirely from the circumstance that sin entered into the world by one man, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men through him in whom all sinned.¹

CHAP. 43.—*The good tree and the corrupt tree in the Gospel; the first man's voluntary sin the cause of original sin.*

What, then, does he mean by saying, "A tree is known by its fruits," on the ground of our reading that the Lord spake thus in the Gospel? Then was the Lord speaking of this question in these words, and not rather of men's two wills, the good and the evil, calling one of these the good tree, and the other the corrupt tree, inasmuch as good works spring out of a good will, and evil ones out of an evil will—the converse being impossible, good works out of an evil will, and evil ones out of a good will? If, however, we were to suppose marriage to be the good tree, according to the Gospel simile which he has mentioned, then, of course, we must on the other hand assume fornication to be the corrupt tree. Wherefore, if a human being is said to be the fruit of marriage, in the sense of the good fruit of a good tree, then undoubtedly a human being could never have been born in fornication. "For a corrupt tree bringeth not forth good fruit."² Once more, if he were to say that not adultery must be supposed to occupy the place of the tree, but rather human nature, of which man is born, then in this way not even marriage can stand for the tree, but only the human nature of which man is born. His simile, therefore, taken from the Gospel avails him nothing in elucidating this question, because marriage is not the cause of the sin which is transmitted in the natural birth, and atoned for in the new birth; but the voluntary transgression of the first man is the cause of original sin. "You repeat," says he, "your allegation, 'Just as sin, from whatever source it is derived to infants, is the work of the devil, so man, howsoever he be born, is the work of

¹ Rom. v. 12.

² Matt. vii. 18.

God.'” Yes, I said this, and most truly too; and if this man were not a Pelagian, but a Catholic, he too would have nothing else to avow in the Catholic faith.

CHAP. 44. [XXVII.]

What, then, is his object when he inquires of us, “By what means sin may be discovered in an infant, through the will, or through marriage, or through its parents”? He speaks, indeed, in such a way as if he had an answer to all these questions, and as if by clearing all of sin together he would have nothing remain in the infant whence sin could be discovered. I beg your attention to his very words: “Through what,” says he, “is sin found in an infant? Through the will? But there has never been one in him? Through marriage? But this appertains to the parents’ work, of whom you had previously declared that in this action they had not sinned. It appears, however, from your subsequent words that you did not truly make this concession. Marriage, however,” he then says, “must be condemned, since it furnished the cause of the evil. Yet marriage only indicates the work of personal agents. The parents, therefore, who by their coming together afforded occasion for the sin, are properly deserving of the condemnation. It does not then admit of doubt,” says he, “any longer, if we are to follow your opinion, that married persons are handed over to eternal punishment, it being by their means brought about that the devil has come to exercise dominion over men. And what becomes of what you just before had said, that man was the work of God? Because if through their birth it happens that evil is in men, it is through the evil that the devil has power over men, so in fact you declare the devil to be the author of men, from whom comes their origin at birth. If, however, you believe that man is made by God, and that husband and wife are innocent, see how impossible is your standpoint, that original sin is derived from them.”

CHAP. 45.

Now, there is an answer for him to all these questions given by the apostle, who censures neither the infant’s will,

which is not yet matured in him for sinning, nor marriage, which, as such, has not only its institution, but its blessing also from God; nor parents, so far as they are parents, who are united together properly and lawfully for the procreation of children; but he says, "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for in him all have sinned."¹ Now, if these persons would only receive this statement with Catholic hearts and ears, they would not have rebellious feelings against the grace and faith of Christ, nor would they vainly endeavour to convert to their own particular and heretical sense these very clear and manifest words of the apostle, when they assert that the purport of the passage is to this effect: that Adam was the first to sin, and that any one who wished afterwards to commit sin found an example for sinning in him; so that sin, you must know, did not pass from him alone upon all men by birth, but by the simple imitation of his example. Whereas it is certain that if the apostle meant this imitation to be here understood, he would have said that sin had entered into the world and passed upon all men, not by one man, but rather by the devil. For of the devil it is written: "They that are on his side do imitate him."² He used the phrase "by one man," from whom the generation of men, of course, had its beginning, in order to show us that original sin had passed upon all men by generation.

CHAP. 46.—*The reign of death, what it is; the figure of the future Adam; how all men are justified through Christ.*

But what else is meant even by the apostle's subsequent words? For after he had said the above, he added, "For until the law sin was in the world,"³ as much as to say that not even the law was able to take away sin. "But sin," adds he, "was not imputed when there was no law."⁴ It existed then, but was not imputed, for it was not set forth so that it might be imputed. It is on the same principle, indeed, that he says in another passage: "By the law is the knowledge of sin."⁵ "Nevertheless," says he, "death reigned from Adam to Moses;"⁶ that is, as he had already expressed it, "until

¹ Rom. v. 12.

² Wisd. ii. 24.

³ Rom. v. 13.

⁴ Rom. v. 13.

⁵ Rom. iii. 20.

⁶ Rom. v. 14.

the law." Not that there was no sin after Moses, but because even the law, which was given by Moses, was unable to deprive death of its power, which, of course, reigns only by sin. Its kingdom, too, is such as to plunge mortal man even into that second death which is to endure for evermore. "Death reigned," but over whom? "Even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, who is the figure of Him that was to come."¹ Of whom that was to come, if not of Christ? And in what sort a figure, except in the way of contrariety? which he elsewhere briefly expresses: "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."² The one condition was in one, even as the other condition was in the other. It is figure itself. But this figure is not conformable in every respect; accordingly the apostle, following up the same idea, added, "But not as the offence, so also is the free gift. For if through the offence of one many be dead; much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many."³ But why "hath it much more abounded," except it be that all who are delivered through Christ suffer temporal death on Adam's account, but have everlasting life in store for the sake of Christ Himself? "And not as it was by one that sinned," says he, "so is the gift: for the judgment was by one to condemnation, but the free gift is of many offences unto justification."⁴ "By one" what, but offence? since it is added, "the free gift of many offences." Let these objectors tell us how it can be "by one offence unto condemnation," unless it be that even the one original sin which has passed over unto all men is sufficient for condemnation? Whereas the free gift delivers from many offences to justification, because it not only cancels the one offence, which is derived from the primal sin, but all others also which are added in every individual man by the motion of his own will. "For if by one man's offence death reigned by one, much more they which receive abundance of grace and righteousness shall reign in life by One, Jesus Christ. Therefore, [as it results] by the offence of one upon all men to condemnation; so by the righteousness of one upon all men [does

¹ Rom. v. 14.² 1 Cor. xv. 22.³ Rom. v. 15.⁴ Rom. v. 15.

it lead] unto justification of life.”¹ Let them after this persist in their vain imaginations, and maintain that one man did not hand on sin by propagation, but only set the example of committing it. Now, how is it that by one’s offence judgment comes on all men to condemnation, and not rather by each man’s own numerous sins? How is this, unless it be that although there is but that one sin, it is sufficient, without the addition of any more, to lead to condemnation, as it leads all who die in infancy who are born of Adam, without being born again in Christ? Why, then, does he, when he refuses to hear the apostle, ask us for an answer to his question, “By what means may sin be discovered in an infant,—through the will, or through marriage, or through its parents?” Let him listen in silence, and hear by what means sin may be discovered in an infant. The offence of one, says the apostle, has passed upon all men to condemnation. He mentioned, moreover, all for condemnation through Adam, and all for justification through Christ; not, of course, that Christ removes to life all those who die in Adam. Still, he said “all men:” well, it is *all*, because as without Adam no one [is doomed] to death; so without Christ no man [is admitted] to life. Pretty much as we are apt to say of a learned teacher, when he is alone in a town: This man teaches all their learning; not that all the inhabitants take lessons, but that no man who learns at all is taught by any but him. Indeed, the apostle afterwards designates as *many* those whom he had previously described as *all*, meaning the self-same persons by the two different terms. “For,” says he, “as by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners; so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.”²

CHAP. 47.

Still let him ply his question: “By what means may sin be discovered in an infant?” He may find an answer in the inspired pages: “By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men through him in whom all sinned.” “Through the offence of one many are dead.” “The judgment was by one to condemnation.” “By

¹ Rom. v. 17, 18.² Rom. v. 19.

one man's offence death reigned by one." "By the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation." "By one man's disobedience many were made sinners."¹ Behold, then, "by what means sin may be discovered in an infant." Let him now believe in original sin; let him permit infants to come to Christ, that they may be saved. [XXVIII.] What means this passage of his: "He sins not who is born; he sins not who begat him; He sins not who created him. Amidst these guarantees of innocence, therefore, what are the chinks through which you pretend that sin entered?" Why does he search for a hidden chink when he has an open door? "By one man," says the apostle; "through the offence of one," says the apostle; "by one man's disobedience," says the apostle. What does he want more? What does he require plainer? What does he expect to be more impressively repeated?

CHAP. 48.—*Original sin arose from Adam's depraved will. Evil arose only out of Nature's good. Whence the corrupt will sprang.*

"If," says he, "sin comes from the will, the will is an evil one which causes sin; if it comes from nature, then nature is evil." I at once answer, Sin does come from the will. Perhaps he wants to know, whether original sin does? I answer, most certainly original sin does proceed from the will. Because it, too, germinated from the will of the first man; so that it both existed in him, and passed on to all. As for the dilemma which he next proposes, "If it comes from nature, then nature is evil," I request him to answer, if he can, to this effect: As it is manifest that all evil works spring from a corrupt will, like the fruits of a corrupt tree; so let him say whence arose the corrupt will itself—the corrupt tree which yields the corrupt fruits. If from an angel, what was the angel, but the good work of God? If from man, what was even he, but the good work of God? Nay, inasmuch as the corrupt will arose in the angel from an angel, and in man from man, what were both these, previous to the evil arising within them, but the good work of God, with a good and laudable nature? Behold, then, evil arises out of good; nor was there any other source, indeed, whence it could arise, but out

¹ Rom. v. 12-19.

of good. I call the will itself bad, when no evil has preceded it; no evil works, since they only proceed from an evil will, as from a corrupt tree. Nevertheless the evil will could not arise out of good, in the sense that good was made by the good God, but because it was created out of nothing—not out of God. What, therefore, becomes of his argument, “Since nature is the work of God, it will never do for the work of the devil to permeate the work of God”? Did not the work of the devil, I ask, arise in a work of God, when it first arose in that angel who became the devil? Well, then, if evil, which was absolutely nowhere previously, could arise in a work of God, why could not evil, which had by this time found an existence everywhere, pervade the work of God; especially when the apostle uses the very expression in the passage, “And so death passed upon all men”?¹ Can it be that men are not the work of God? Sin, therefore, has pervaded or passed upon all men—in other words, the devil’s work has penetrated the work of God; or putting the same meaning in another shape, The work done by a work of God has pervaded God’s work. And this is the reason why God alone has an unchangeable and almighty goodness: even before any evil came into existence He made all things good; and out of all the evils which have arisen in the good things which He has made, He works through all for good.

CHAP. 49. [XXIX.]

“Only in a man is the intention [of will] blamable, and his origin [or nature] praiseworthy; because there must be two things to admit of contraries: in an infant, however, there is but one thing, nature only; because will has no existence in his case. Now this one thing,” says he, “is ascribable either to God or to the devil. If nature,” he goes on to observe, “is of God, there cannot be original sin in it. If of the devil, there will be no means of claiming man for the workmanship of God. So that he is completely a Manichean who maintains original sin.” Let him prefer listening to what is true in opposition to all this. In an adult only is the will to be blamed, and his nature to be praised; because there should

¹ Rom. v. 12.

be two things for the application of contraries. Still, even in an infant, it is not the case that there is but one thing only, that is, the nature in which man was created by the good God; for he has also that flaw of sin, which has passed upon all men by one, as the apostle wisely says, and not as the folly of Pelagius, or Cœlestius, or any of their disciples would represent the matter. Of these two things, then, which we have said exist in an infant, one is ascribed to God, the other to the devil. From the fact, however, that (owing to one of the two, even the sinful flaw) both are subjected to the power of the devil, there really ensues no incongruity; because this happens not from the power of the devil himself, but of God. In fact, flaw is subjected to flaw, nature to nature, because even the two are in the devil; so that whenever those who are beloved and elect are "delivered from the power of darkness"¹ to which they are justly exposed, it is clear enough how great a gift is bestowed on the justified and good by the good God, who brings good even out of evil.

CHAP. 50.—*The rise and origin of evil. The exorcism and exsufflation of infants, a very ancient rite.*

As to the passage, which he seemed to himself to indite in a pious vein, as it were, "If nature is of God, there cannot be original sin in it," would not another person seem even to him to give a still more pious turn to it, thus: If nature is of God, there cannot arise *any* sin in it? And yet this is not true. The Manicheans, indeed, meant to assert this, and they endeavoured to steep in all sorts of evil the very nature of God itself, and not His creature, which He had made out of nothing. For evil arose in nothing else than what was good—not, however, the supreme and unchangeable good which is God's nature, but that which was made out of nothing by the wisdom of God. This, then, is the reason why man is claimed for a divine work; for he would not be human unless he were made by the operation of God. Evil, again, would not exist in infants, if evil had not been committed by the wilfulness of the first man, and original sin were derived from a nature thus vitiated. It is not true, then, as he puts it, "He is completely a Manichean who maintains original sin;" but

¹ Col. i. 13.

rather, he is a thorough Pelagian who does not believe in original sin. For it is not simply from the time when the pestilent opinions of Manichæus began to grow that in the Church of God infants about to be baptized were for the first time exorcised with exsufflation,—which ceremonial was intended to show that they were not removed into the kingdom of Christ without first being delivered from the power of darkness;¹ nor is it in the books of Manichæus that we read how “the Son of man come to seek and to save that which was lost,”² or how “by one man sin entered into the world,”³ with those other similar passages which we have quoted above; or how God “visits the sins of the fathers upon the children;”⁴ or how it is written in the Psalm, “I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me;”⁵ or again, how “Man was made like unto vanity: his days pass away like a shadow;”⁶ again, “Behold, Thou hast made my days old, and my existence as nothing before Thee; nay, every man living is altogether vanity;”⁷ or how the apostle says, “Every creature was made subject to vanity;”⁸ or how it is written in the book of Ecclesiastes, “Vanity of vanities; all is vanity: what profit hath a man of all his labour which he taketh under the sun?”⁹ and in the book of Ecclesiasticus, “A heavy yoke is upon the sons of Adam from the day that they go out of their mother’s womb to the day that they return to the mother of all things;”¹⁰ or how again the apostle writes, “In Adam all die;”¹¹ or how holy Job says, when speaking about his own sins, “For man that is born of a woman is short-lived and full of wrath: as the flower of grass, so does he fall; and he departs like a shadow, nor shall he stay. Hast Thou not taken account even of him, and caused him to enter into judgment in Thy sight? For who shall be pure from uncleanness? Not even one, even if his life should be but of one day upon the earth.”¹² Now when he speaks of *uncleanness* here, the mere perusal of the passage is enough to show that he meant *sin* to be understood. It is plain from

¹ Col. i. 13.² Luke xix. 10.³ Rom. v. 12.⁴ Ex. xx. 5.⁵ Ps. li. 5.⁶ Ps. cxliv. 4.⁷ Ps. xxxix. 5 [Septuagint].⁸ Rom. viii. 20.⁹ Eccles. i. 2, 3.¹⁰ Ecclus. xl. 1.¹¹ 1 Cor. xv. 22.¹² Job xiv. 1-5.

the words, of what he is speaking. The same phrase and sense occur in the prophet Zechariah, in the place where "the filthy garments" are removed from off the high priest, and it is said to him, "I have taken away thy sins."¹ Well now, I rather think that all these passages, and others of like import, which point to the fact that man is born in sin and under the curse, are not to be read among the dark recesses of the Manicheans, but in the sunshine of Catholic truth.

CHAP. 51.—*The great antiquity of exorcism and exsufflation as practised in the Church.*

What, moreover, shall I say of those commentators on the divine Scriptures who have flourished in the Catholic Church? They have never tried to pervert these testimonies to an alien sense, because they were firmly established in our most ancient and solid faith, and were never moved aside by the novelty of error. Were I to wish to collect these together, and to make use of their testimony, the task would both be too long, and I should probably seem to have bestowed less preference than I ought on canonical authorities, from which one must never deviate. I will merely mention the most blessed Ambrose, to whom (as I have already observed²) Pelagius accorded so signal a testimony of his integrity in the faith. This Ambrose, however, maintained that there was nothing else in infants, which required the healing grace of Christ, than original sin. But in respect of Cyprian, with his all-glorious crown [of martyrdom], will any one say of him, that he either was, or ever could by any possibility have been, a Manichean, when he suffered before the pestilent heresy had made its appearance in the Roman world? And yet, in his book on the baptism of infants, he so vigorously maintains original sin as to declare, that even before the eighth day, if necessary, the infant ought to be baptized, lest his soul should be lost; and he wished it to be understood, that the infant could the more readily be presented for baptism, inasmuch as it is not so much his own sin, but the sin of another, which is remitted to him. Well, then, let this writer dare to call

¹ Zech. iii. 4.

² See Book i. of this treatise, last chapter. Ambrose *On Isaiah* was cited in the same Book i. chap. 35.

these worthies Manicheans; let him, moreover, under this scandalous imputation asperse that most ancient tradition of the Church, whereby infants are, as I have said, exorcised with exsufflation, for the purpose of being translated into the kingdom of Christ, after they are delivered from the power of darkness—that is to say, of the devil and his angels. As for ourselves, indeed, we are more ready to be associated with these men, and with the Church of Christ, so firmly rooted in this ancient faith, in suffering any amount of curse and contumely, than with the Pelagians, to be bespattered with the flattery of public praise.

CHAP. 52. [XXX.]—*Respecting the CAMPESTRIA or SUCCINCTORIA, or περιζώματα, [aprons, girdles, or kilts] of the ancients.*

“Do you,” he asks, “repeat your affirmation, ‘There would be no concupiscence if man had not first sinned; marriage, however, would have existed, even if no body had sinned?’” I never said, “There would be no concupiscence,” because there is a concupiscence of the spirit, which craves wisdom. My words were, “There would be no *shameful* concupiscence.” Let my words be reperused, even those which he has cited, that it may be clearly seen how dishonestly they are handled by him. However, let him call it by any name he likes. That was what I said would not have existed unless man had previously sinned, which made them ashamed in paradise when they covered their loins, and which every one will allow would not have been felt, had not the sin of disobedience first occurred. Now he who wishes to understand what they felt ought to consider what it was they covered. For of the fig-leaves they made themselves “aprons,” not clothes; and these aprons or kilts are called *περιζώματα* in Greek. Now all know well enough what it is which these *peri-zomata* cover, which some Latin writers explain by the word *campes- tria*. Who is ignorant of what persons wore this kilt, and what parts of the body such a dress concealed; even the same which the Roman youths used to cover when they practised naked in the *campus*, from which circumstance the name *campes- tre* was given to the girdle.

CHAP. 53.

He then says to me: "Therefore the marriages which might have been without lust, without bodily motion, without necessity for sexual intercourse—to use your own statement—are pronounced by you to be laudable; whereas such marriages as are now enacted are, according to your decision, the invention of the devil. Those, therefore, whose institution was possible in your dreamy view, you deliberately assert to be good, while those which Holy Scripture intends, when it says, 'Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife, and they shall be one flesh,'¹ you pronounce to be evils of the devil; worthy, in short, to be called a pest, not matrimony." It is not to be wondered at, that these Pelagian opponents of mine try to twist my words to any meaning they wish them to bear, when it has been their custom to do the same thing with the Holy Scriptures, and not simply in obscure passages, but where their testimony is clear and plain: a custom, indeed, which is followed by all other heretics. Now who could make such an assertion, as that it was possible for marriages to be "without bodily motion, without necessity for sexual intercourse"? For God made the sexes; because, as it is written, "He created them male and female."² But how could it possibly happen, that they who were to be united together, and by the very union were to beget children, were not to move their bodies, when, of course, there can be no bodily contact of one person with another if bodily motion be not resorted to? The question before us, then, is not about the motion of bodies, without which there could not be sexual intercourse; but about the libidinous motion of the organs of generation. This, indeed, could not be, and the fructifying connection be still not wanting, if the organs of generation were not obedient to lust, but simply to the will, like the other members of the body. Is it not even now the case, in "the body of this death," that a command is given to the foot, the arm, the finger, the lip, or the tongue, and they are instantly set in motion at this intimation of our will? And (to take a still more wonderful case) even the liquid contained in the urinary

¹ Gen. ii. 24.² Gen. i. 27.

vessels obeys the command to flow from us, at our pleasure, and when we are not pressed with its overflow; while the vessels, also, which contain the liquid, discharge without difficulty, if they are in a healthy state, the office assigned them by our will of propelling, pressing out, and ejecting their contents. With how much greater ease and quietness, then, when the generative organs of our body are compliant, does natural motion ensue, and human conception is effected; except in the instance of those persons who violate natural order, and by a righteous retribution are punished with the intractability of these members and organs! This punishment is felt by the chaste and pure, who, without doubt, would rather beget children by mere natural desire than by voluptuous pruriency; while unchaste persons, who are impelled by this diseased passion, and bestow their love upon harlots as well as wives, are excited by a still heavier mental remorse in consequence of this carnal chastisement.

CHAP. 54. [XXXII.]—*How marriage is now different since the existence of sin.*

God forbid that we should say, what this man pretends we say, "Such marriages as are now enacted are the invention of the devil." Why, they are absolutely the same marriages as God made at the very first. For this blessing of His, which He appointed for the procreation of mankind, He has not taken away even from men under condemnation, whom also He has not deprived of their senses and bodily limbs, which are no doubt His gifts, although they are condemned to die by an already incurred retribution. This, I say, is the marriage whereof it was said (only excepting the great sacrament of Christ and the Church, which the institution prefigured): "For this cause shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh."¹ When, therefore, it is alleged that marriage is now of such a character, but might have been different had no body sinned, this is not predicated of its nature, but of a certain quality which has undergone a change for the worse. Just as a man is said to be different, though he is actually the same individual, when he has changed his manner of life

¹ Gen. ii. 24.

either for the better or the worse; for as a righteous man he is one thing, and as a sinful man another, though the man himself be really the same individual. In like manner, marriage without shameful lust is of one character, and marriage with shameful lust is of another. When, however, a woman is lawfully united to her husband in accordance with the true constitution of wedlock, whereby fidelity to what is due to the flesh is kept free from the sin of adultery, and so children are lawfully begotten, it is actually the very marriage which God instituted at first, although by his primeval inducement to sin, the devil inflicted a heavy wound, not, indeed, on marriage itself, but on the man and the woman who effected the matrimonial state, by his prevailing on them to disobey God,—a sin which is requited in the course of the divine judgment by the reciprocal disobedience of man's own members. United in this matrimonial state, although they were ashamed of their nakedness, still they were not by any means able altogether to lose the blessedness of marriage which God appointed.

CHAP. 55. [XXXIII.]—*Lust is a disease; the word passion in the ecclesiastical sense.*

He then passes on from those who are united in marriage to those who are born of it. It is in relation to these that we have to encounter the heaviest discussions with the new heretics in connection with our subject. Impelled by some secret instinct from God, he makes avowals which go far to untie the whole knot. For in his desire to raise greater odium against us, because we had said that infants are born in sin even of lawful wedlock, he makes the following observation: "You assert that they, indeed, who have not been ever born might possibly have been good; them, however, who have peopled the world, and for whom Christ died, you decide to be the work of the devil, born in a disordered state, and guilty from the beginning. Therefore," he continues, "I have shown that you are doing nothing else than denying that God is the Creator of living men." I beg to say, that I declare none but God to be the Creator of all men, however true it be that all are born in sin, and must perish unless born again. It was, indeed, the sinful flaw which had been impregnated

in them by the devil's persuasion that became the means of their being born in sin; not the created nature of which men are composed. Lust, however, could not excite our members to shame, except at our own will, and if it were not a disease. Nor would even the lawful and honourable cohabiting of husband and wife raise a blush, with avoidance of any eye and desire of secrecy, if there were not a diseased condition about it. Moreover, the apostle would not prohibit the possession of wives in this condition, did not disease exist in it. The phrase in the Greek text, *ἐν πάθει ἐπιθυμίας*, is by some rendered in Latin, *in morbo desiderii vel concupiscentiæ*, in a diseased desire or concupiscence; or it is found with various readings in different copies: at any rate, the Latin equivalent *passio*, especially in the ecclesiastical use, is usually understood as a term of censure.

CHAP. 56.—*My opponent allows that Christ died even for infants; Julianus slays himself with his own sword.*

But whatever opinion he may entertain about the shame-causing lust of the flesh, I must request your attention to what he has said respecting infants (and about *them* is my chief care in this controversy), as to their being supposed to need a Saviour, if they are not to die losing salvation. I repeat his words once more: "You assert," says he to me, "that they, indeed, who have not been ever born might possibly have been good; them, however, who have peopled the world, *and for whom Christ died*, you decide to be the work of the devil, born in a disordered state, and guilty from the very beginning." Would that he only solved the entire controversy as he unties the knot of this question! For will he pretend to say that he merely spoke of adults in this passage? Why, the subject in hand is about infants, about human beings at their birth; and it is about these that he raises odium against us, because they are defined by us as guilty from the very first, because we declare them to be guilty, since Christ died for them. And why did Christ die for them if they are not guilty? It is entirely from them, yes, from them, we shall find the reason, wherefore he thought odium should be raised against me. He asks: "How are infants guilty, for whom Christ died?" We answer: Nay,

how are infants not guilty, since Christ died for them? This dispute wants a judge to determine it. Let Christ be the Judge, and let Him tell us what is the object which has profited by His death? "This is my blood," He says, "which shall be shed¹ for many for the remission of sins."² Let the apostle, too, be His assessor in the judgment; since even in the apostle it is Christ Himself that speaks. Speaking of God the Father, he exclaims: "He who spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all!"³ I suppose that he describes Christ as so delivered up for us all, that infants in this very matter are not separated from ourselves. But what need is there to dwell on this point, out of which even he no longer raises a contest? For the truth is, he not only confesses that Christ died even for infants, but he also reproves us out of this admission, because we say that these same infants are guilty for whom Christ died. Now, then, let the apostle, who says that Christ was delivered up for us all, also tell us why Christ was delivered up for us. "He was delivered," says he, "for our offences, and rose again for our justification."⁴ If, therefore, as even this man both confesses and professes, but admits and objects, that infants too are included amongst those for whom Christ was delivered up; and if it was for our sins that Christ was delivered up, even infants, of course, must have original sins, for whom Christ was delivered up; He must have something in them to heal, who (as Himself affirms) is not wanted as a Physician by the whole, but by the sick;⁵ He must have a reason for saving them, seeing that He came into the world, as the Apostle Paul says, "to save sinners;"⁶ He must have something in them to remit, who testifies that He shed His blood "for the remission of sins;"⁷ He must have good reason for seeking them out, who "came (as He says) to seek and to save that which was lost;"⁸ the Son of man must find in them something to destroy, who came for the express purpose, as the Apostle John says, "that He might destroy the works of the devil."⁹ Now to this salvation of infants He must be

¹ Effundetur.

⁴ Rom. iv. 25.

⁷ Matt. xxvi. 28.

² Matt. xxvi. 28.

⁵ Matt. ix. 12.

⁸ Luke xix. 10.

³ Rom. viii. 32.

⁶ 1 Tim. i. 15.

⁹ 1 John iii. 8.

an enemy, who asserts their innocence, in such a way as to deny them the medicine which is required by the hurt and wounded.

CHAP. 57. [XXXIV.]—*The great sin of the first man.*

Now observe what follows, as he goes on to say: "If, before sin entered, God provided in creation a source from which men should be born, while from the same source their parents were moved and excited by the devil, then beyond a doubt holiness must be ascribed to the offspring, and sin to the parents. Since, however, this would be a most manifest condemnation of marriage; remove, I pray you, this view from the midst of the churches, and really believe that all things were made by Jesus Christ, and that without Him nothing was made."¹ There is a censorious tone in this passage, as if he would make us say, that there is a something in man's substance which was created by the devil. The devil persuaded [the commission of] evil as a sin; he did not create it as a nature. No doubt he worked by persuasion on nature, for [he persuaded man, and] man is nature; and therefore by his persuasion he vitiated it. He who wounds a limb does not, of course, create it, but he harasses it.² Those wounds, indeed, which are inflicted on the body produce lameness in a limb, or difficulty of motion; but they do not affect the virtue whereby a man becomes righteous: that wound, however, which has the name of sin, maims the very life, which was being righteously lived. This sinful wound was at that fatal moment of the fall inflicted by the devil [on his victims] to a vastly wider and deeper extent than are the ordinary sins which are known amongst men. Whence it came to pass, that our nature having then and there been deteriorated by that vast sin of the first man, not only became actively sinful, but also generates sinners; and yet the very weakness, under which the virtue of a holy life has drooped and died, is not really nature, but a vitiated state thereof; precisely as a bad state of health is not a bodily substance or nature, but a disordered condition of it; very often, indeed, if not always,

¹ John i. 3.

² [Vexat. Another apparently better reading has *vitiat*, "vitiates."]

the ailing character of parents is in a certain way implanted, and reappears in the bodies of their children.

CHAP. 58.—*Adam's sin is derived from him to every one who is born even of regenerate parents ; the example of the olive tree and the wild olive.*

But this sin, which changed man for the worse even in paradise, because it is far vaster than we can form any judgment of, is contracted by every one at his birth, and is remitted only in the regenerate ; and this derangement is such as to be derived from parents who have been even regenerated, and in whom the sin is remitted and covered, to the condemnation of the children born of them, unless these, who were bound by their first and carnal birth, are absolved by their second and spiritual birth. Of this wonderful fact the Creator has produced a wonderful example in the cases of the olive and the wild olive trees, in which, from the seed not only of the wild olive, but even of the good olive, nothing but a wild olive springs. Wherefore, although even in persons whose natural birth is followed by regeneration through grace, there exists this carnal concupiscence which contends against the law of the mind, yet, seeing that it is remitted in the remission of sins, it is no longer accounted to them as sin, nor is it in any degree hurtful, unless consent is yielded to its motions for unlawful deeds. Their offspring, however, being begotten not of spiritual concupiscence, but of carnal, like a wild olive of our race from the good olive, derives guilt from them by natural birth to such a degree that it cannot be liberated from that pest except by being born again. How is it, then, that this man affirms that we ascribe holiness to those who are born, and guilt to their parents ? when the truth rather shows that even if there has been holiness in the parents, original sin is inherent in their children, which is abolished in them only if they are born again.

CHAP. 59. [XXXV.]—*The Pelagians can hardly venture to place concupiscence in paradise before the commission of sin.*

This being the case, let him think what he pleases about this carnal lust and concupiscence which lords it over the unchaste, has to be mastered by the chaste, and yet is to be blushed at both by the chaste and the unchaste ; for I see plainly it is very pleasant to him. Let him not hesitate to

praise what he is ashamed to name; let him call it (as he has in fact called it) the vigour of the members, and let him not be afraid of the horror of chaste ears; let him designate it the power of the members, and let him not care about the impudence. Let him say, if his blushes permit him, that if no one had sinned, this vigour must have flourished like a flower in paradise; nor would there have been any need to cover that which would have been so moved that no one should have felt ashamed; rather, with a wife provided, it would have been ever exercised and never repressed, lest so great a pleasure should ever be denied to so vast a happiness. Far be it from being thought that such blessedness could in such a spot fail to have what it wished, or ever experience in mind or body what it disliked. And so, should the motion of lust ever precede men's will, then the will would immediately follow it up. The wife, who ought certainly never to be absent in this happy state of things, would be impelled to it, whether before conception or during pregnancy; and, at any rate, either a child would be begotten, or a natural and laudable pleasure forsooth would be gratified,—for perish all seed rather than disappoint the appetite of so fine a concupiscence! Only be sure that the united pair do not apply themselves to that use of each other which is contrary to nature, then (with so modest a reservation) let them use, as often as they would have delight, their organs of generation, created ready to hand. But what if this very use, which is contrary to nature, should peradventure give them delight; what if the aforesaid laudable concupiscence should hanker even after such delight; I wonder whether they would pursue it because it was so sweet, or loathe it for its disgrace? If they should pursue it to gratification, what becomes of all thought about virtue and honour? If they should loathe it, where is the peaceful composure of so vast a happiness? But at this point perchance his blushes will awake, and he will say that so great is the tranquillity of this happy state, and so entire the orderliness which may have existed in this state of things, that carnal concupiscence never preceded these persons' will: only whenever they themselves wished, would it then arise; and only then would they entertain the wish, when there was need for begetting children;

and the result would be, that no seed would ever be emitted to no purpose, nor would any embrace ever ensue which would not be followed by conception and birth; the flesh would obey the will, and concupiscence would vie with it in subserviency. Well, if he says all this of the imagined happy state, he must at least be pretty sure that what he describes does not now exist among men. And even if he will not concede that lust is a vitiated condition, let him at least allow that through the disobedience of the man and woman in the happy state the very concupiscence of their flesh was vitiated, so that what would once be excited obediently and orderly is now moved disobediently and inordinately, and that to such a degree that it is not obedient to the will of even chaste-minded husbands and wives, so that it is excited when it is not wanted; and whenever it is necessary, it never, indeed, follows their will, but sometimes too hurriedly, at other times too tardily, it exerts its own movements. Such, then, is the rebellion of this concupiscence which the primitive pair received for their own disobedience, and transfused by natural descent to us. It certainly was not at their bidding, but in utter disorder, that it was excited, when they covered their members, which at first were worthy to be gloried in, but had then become a ground of shame and confusion.

CHAP. 60.—*Let not the Pelagians indulge themselves in a cruel defence of infants.*

As I said, however, let him entertain what views he likes of this lust; let him preach it up as he pleases, praise it as much as he chooses (and *much* it is, as several of his extracts show), that the Pelagians may gratify themselves, if not with its uses, at all events with its praises, as many of them as fail to enjoy the limitation of continence enjoined in wedlock. Only let him spare the infants, so as not to praise their condition uselessly, and defend them cruelly. Let him not declare them to be safe; let him suffer them to come, not, indeed, to Pelagius for eulogy, but to Christ for salvation. For, that this book may be now brought to a termination, since the dissertation of this man is ended, which was written on the short paper you sent me, I will close with his last words: "Really believe that all things were made by Jesus

Christ, and that without Him nothing was made.”¹ Let him grant that Jesus is Jesus even to infants; and as he confesses that all things were made by Him, in that He is God the Word, so let him acknowledge that infants, too, are saved by Him in that He is Jesus; let him, I say, do this if he would be a Catholic Christian. For thus is it written in the Gospel: “And they shall call His name Jesus; for He shall save His people from their sins”²—Jesus, because Jesus is the Latin *Salvator*, “Saviour.” He shall, indeed, save His people; and amongst His people surely there are infants. “From their sins” shall He save them; in infants, therefore, are there sins, original sins, on account of which He can be Jesus, that is, a Saviour even unto them.

¹ John i. 3.

² Matt. i. 21.

ON THE SOUL AND ITS ORIGIN:

IN FOUR BOOKS,¹

BY AURELIUS AUGUSTINE, BISHOP OF HIPPO.

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ADVERTISEMENT TO THE READER ON THIS TREATISE.

THE subject-matter of these four books was supplied by a young man named Vincentius Victor, a native of Mauritania Cæsariensis, a convert to the Catholic Church from the Rogatian faction (which split off from the Donatist schism, and inhabited that part of Mauritania which lay around Carthenna). This Victor, they say, had previously so high an opinion of the Vincentius who succeeded Rogatus as the head of the before-mentioned faction, that he adopted his name as his own.² Happening to meet with a certain work of Augustine's, in which the writer acknowledged himself to be incapable of saying whether all souls were propagated from Adam's soul simply, or whether every man severally had his soul given to him by God, even as Adam himself had, without propagation, although he declared, for all that, his conviction that the soul was in its nature spirit, not body, Victor was equally offended with both statements: he wondered that so great a man as Augustine did not unhesitatingly teach what tenets one ought to have concerning the origin of the soul, especially as he thought its propagation probable; and also that he did state with so great assurance the nature of the soul to be incorporeal. He accordingly mentioned two books

¹ [These books were written towards the close of A. D. 419.]

² See below, Book iii. c. 2.

as having been written for one Peter, a presbyter of Spain, against Augustine on this subject, containing some conceits of the Pelagian heretics, and other things even worse than these.¹

A monk called Renatus happened then to be at [the Mauritanian] Cæsarea. It appears that this man had shown to Augustine, who was staying at the same place in the autumn of the year 418, a letter of the Bishop Optatus consulting him about the origin of the soul. This monk, though of the order of laymen, was notwithstanding perfectly orthodox in the faith, and, induced by the circumstance, carefully copied the books of Victor, and forwarded them from Cæsarea to Hippo the next summer; Augustine, however, only received them at the end of autumn of the year 419, as is supposed. As soon as the holy doctor read them, he without delay wrote the first of the four following books to the good monk, and then the second, in the shape of a letter, to the presbyter Peter, and the two last books to Victor himself, but after a considerable interval, as it appears from the following words of the fourth chapter of the second book: "If, indeed, the Lord will that I should write to the young man, as I desire to do." In the *Retractions* this little work of Augustine is placed immediately after the treatises of the year 419, *i.e.* in the fifth place, next to *the Proceedings with Emeritus*, which were completed in the month of September in the year 418. It belongs, therefore, to the termination of the year 419 or to the commencement of the year 420, having been written after "the condemnation of the Pelagians by the authority of Catholic Councils and of the Apostolic See,"² but "very soon after,"³ as that happy event had happened in the year of Christ 418.

In BOOK I. he points out his own opinion about the nature of the soul, and how he had been wrongly charged by Victor with hesitation on the subject. He reproves the man's juvenile forwardness, shows him he had fallen into grave and unheard-of errors while venturing to take upon himself the solution of a question which exceeded his abilities, and points out that he adduced only doubtful passages of Scripture, and such as were not applicable to the subject, in his endeavour to prove

¹ See below, ii. 13, 15.

² See Book ii. 17.

³ See Book i. 34.

that souls are not propagated, but that entirely new ones are breathed by God into every man at his separate birth.

In BOOK II. he advises Peter not to incur the imputation of having approved of the books which had been addressed to him by Victor *On the Origin of the Soul* by any use he might make of them, nor to take as Catholic doctrines that person's rash utterances contrary to the Christian faith. Victor's various errors, and those, too, of a very serious character, he points out and briefly confutes; and he concludes with advising Peter himself to try and persuade Victor to amend his errors.

In BOOK III., which was written to Victor in person, he points out the corrections which Victor ought to make in his books if he wished to be deemed a Catholic; those opinions also and paradoxes of his, which had been already refuted in the preceding books to Renatus and Peter, the author briefly censures in this third book, and classifies under eleven heads of error.

In BOOK IV., addressed to the same Victor, he first shows that his hesitation on the subject of the origin of souls was undeservedly blamed, and that he was wrongly compared with cattle, because he had refrained from any bold conclusions on the subject. Then again, with regard to his own unhesitating statement, that the soul was spirit, not body, he points out how rashly Victor disapproved of this assertion, especially when he was vainly expending his efforts to prove that the soul was corporeal in its own nature, and that the spirit in man was distinct from the soul itself.

FROM "THE RETRACTATIONS," Book II. chap. 56.

"At that time one Vincentius discovered in the possession of a certain presbyter called Peter, in Mauritania Cæsariensis, a little work of mine, in a particular passage of which, touching the origin of souls in individual men, I had confessed that I knew not whether they are propagated from the primal soul of the first man, and from that by parental descent,

or whether they are severally assigned to each person without propagation, as the first was to Adam ; but that I was, at the same time, quite sure that the soul was not body, but spirit. In opposition to these opinions of mine, he addressed to this Peter two books, which were sent to me from Cæsarea by the monk Renatus. Having read these books, I replied in four others,—one addressed to the monk Renatus, another to the presbyter Peter, and two more to Victor himself. That to Peter, however, though it has all the lengthiness of a book, is yet only a letter, which I did not like to be kept separate from the other three works. In all of them, while discussing many points which were unavoidable, I defended my hesitancy on the point of the origin of the souls which are given to individual men ; and I pointed out this man's many errors and presumptuous pravity. At the same time, I treated the young man as gently as I could,—not as one who ought to be denounced all out of hand, but as one who ought to be still instructed ; and I accepted the account of his conduct which he wrote back to me. In this work of mine, the book addressed to Renatus begins with these words : “Your sincerity towards us” [*Sinceritatem tuam erga nos*]; while that which was written to Peter begins thus : “To his Lordship, my dearly beloved brother and fellow-presbyter Peter” [*Domino dilectissimo fratri et compresbytero Petro*]. Of the last two books, which are addressed to Vincentius Victor, the former one thus opens : “As to that which I have thought it my duty to write to you” [*Quod mihi ad te scribendum putavi*].

FIRST BOOK.

ADDRESSED TO RENATUS, THE MONK.

ON RECEIVING FROM RENATUS THE TWO BOOKS OF VINCENTIUS VICTOR, WHO DISAPPROVED OF AUGUSTINE'S OPINION TOUCHING THE NATURE OF THE SOUL, AND OF HIS HESITATION IN RESPECT OF ITS ORIGIN, AUGUSTINE POINTS OUT HOW THE YOUNG OBJECTOR, IN HIS SELF-CONCEIT IN AIMING TO DECIDE ON SO ABSTRUSE A SUBJECT, HAD FALLEN INTO INSUFFERABLE MISTAKES. HE THEN PROCEEDS TO SHOW THAT THOSE PASSAGES OF SCRIPTURE BY WHICH VICTOR THOUGHT HE COULD PROVE THAT HUMAN SOULS ARE NOT DERIVED BY PROPAGATION, BUT ARE BREATHED BY GOD AFRESH INTO EACH MAN AT BIRTH, ARE AMBIGUOUS, AND INADEQUATE FOR THE CONFIRMATION OF THIS OPINION OF HIS.

CHAP. I. [I.]—*Renatus had done him a kindness by sending him the books which had been addressed to him.*

YOUR sincerity towards us, dearest brother Renatus, and your brotherly kindness, and the feeling that such love was mutual between us, we already had clear proof of; but now you have afforded us a still clearer proof, by sending me two books, written by a person whom I knew, indeed, nothing of,—though he was not on that account to be despised,—called Vincentius Victor (for in such form did I find his name placed at the head of his work): this you did in the summer of last year; but owing to my absence from home, it was the end of autumn before they found their way to me. How, indeed, would you be likely with your very great affection for me to fail either in means or inclination to bring under my notice any writings of the kind, by whomsoever composed, if they fell into your hands, even if they were addressed to any one else? How much less likely, when my own name was mentioned and read—and that in a context of gainsaying some words of mine, which I had published in certain little treatises? Now you have done all this in the way you were sure to act as my very sincere and beloved friend.

CHAP. 2. [II.]—*He receives with a kindly and patient feeling the books of a young and inexperienced man who wrote against him in a tone of arrogance. Vincentius Victor converted from the sect of the Rogatians.*

I am somewhat pained, however, at being thus far less understood by your Holiness than I should like to be; forasmuch as you supposed that I should receive so your communication, as if you did me an injury, by making known to me what another had done. You may see, indeed, how far this feeling is from my mind, in that I have no complaint to make of having suffered any wrong even from him. When he entertained views different from my own, pray, was he bound to hold his tongue? It ought, no doubt, to be even pleasant to me, that he broke silence in such a way as to put it in our power to read what he had to say. He ought, I certainly think, to have written simply to me, rather than to another concerning me; but as he was unknown to me, he did not venture to intrude personally on me in refuting my words. He thought there was no necessity for applying to me in a matter on which he seemed to himself to be holding no doubtful,¹ but a perfectly well-known and certain opinion. He, moreover, acted in obedience to a friend of his, by whom he tells us he was compelled to write. And if he expressed any sentiment during the controversy which was contumelious to me, I would prefer supposing that he did this, not with any wish to treat me with incivility, but from the necessity of thinking differently from me. For in all cases where a person's *animus* towards one is indeterminate and unknown, I think it better to suppose the existence of the kindlier motive, than to find fault with an undiscovered one. Perhaps, too, he acted from love to me, as knowing that what he had written might possibly reach me; being at the same time unwilling that I should be in error on such points as he especially thinks himself to be free from error regarding. I ought, therefore, to be grateful for his kindness, although I feel obliged to disapprove of his opinion. Accordingly, as regards the points on which he does not entertain right views, he appears to me to deserve gentle correction rather than severe disapproval; more especially because, if I am rightly informed,

¹ [The reading here is surely *minime dubitandam*.]

he has lately become a Catholic—a matter in which he is to be congratulated. For he has freed himself from the schism and errors of the Donatists (or rather the Rogatists) in which he was previously implicated; and if he understands the Catholic verity as he ought, we may really rejoice at his conversion.

CHAP. 3. [III.]

For he has an outspoken clearness, which enables him to explain what he thinks. He must, therefore, be dealt with accordingly; and we must hope that he may entertain right sentiments, and that he may not turn useless things into objects of desire; that he may not seem to have propounded as true whatever opinions he may have expressed with eloquence. But in his very outspokenness he may have much to correct, and to prune of redundant verbiage. And this characteristic of his has actually given offence to you, who are a person of gravity, as your own writings indicate. This fault, however, is either easily corrected, or, if it be resorted to with fondness by light minds, and borne with by serious ones, it is not attended with any injury to their faith. For we have already amongst us men who are frothy in speech, but sound in the faith. We need not then despair that this quality even in him (it might be endurable, however, even if it proved permanent) may be tempered and cleansed—in fact, may be either extended or recalled to an entire and solid criterion; especially as he is said to be young, so that diligence may supply to him whatever defect his inexperience may possess, and ripeness of age may digest what crude loquacity finds indigestible. The troublesome, dangerous, and pernicious thing is, when folly is set off by the commendation which is accorded to eloquence, and when a poisonous draught is drunk out of a precious goblet.

CHAP. 4. [IV.]—*The errors contained in the books of Vincentius Victor. He says that the soul comes from God, but was not made either out of nothing or out of any created thing. As the soul is a mutable thing, it could not possibly have been formed out of God, who is immutable.*

I will now proceed to point out what things are chiefly to be avoided in his contentious statement. He says that the soul was made, indeed, by God, but that it is not a portion of

God or His nature—which is an entirely true statement. When, however, he refuses to allow that it is made out of nothing, and mentions no other creature out of which it was made; and makes God its author, in such a sense that He must be supposed to have made it, not out of any non-existing things — in a word, out of nothing; nor out of anything which exists other than God, but out of His very self: he is little aware that in the revolution of his thoughts he has come back to the position which he thinks he has avoided, even that the soul is nothing else than the nature of God; and consequently that there is an actual something made out of the nature of God by the self-same God, for the making of which the material, of which He makes it, is His own very self, who makes it; and that thus God's nature is changeable, and by being changed for the worse the very nature of God Himself incurs condemnation at the hands of the self-same God! How far all this is from being fit for your intelligent faith to suppose, how alien it is from the heart of a Catholic, and how much to be avoided, you can readily see. For the soul is either made out of the breathing of the Almighty, or is itself His breath in action, in such a way that it was not created out of Himself, but by Himself out of nothing. It is not, indeed, like the case of a human being, when he breathes: he cannot form a breath out of nothing, but he restores to the air the breath which he inhaled out of it. We may in some such manner suppose that certain air surrounded the Divine Being, and that He inhaled a particle of it by breathing, and exhaled it again by respiration, when He breathed into man's face, and so formed for him a soul. If this were the process, it could not have been out of His very self, but out of the circumambient airy matter, that what He breathed forth must have arisen. Far be it, however, from us to say, that the Almighty could not have made the breath of life out of nothing, by which man might become a living soul; and to thrust ourselves into such straits, as that we must either think that something already existed other than Himself, out of which He formed breath, or else suppose that He formed out of Himself that which we see was made subject to change. Now, whatever is out of Himself, must necessarily be of the

self-same nature as Himself, and therefore immutable: but the soul (as all allow) is mutable; therefore it is not of Him, because it is not immutable as He is. If, however, it was not made of anything else, it was undoubtedly made out of nothing—but by Himself.

CHAP. 5. [V.]—*Another of Victor's errors, that the soul is corporeal.*

But as regards his contention, "that the soul is not spirit, but body," what else can he mean to make out, than that we are composed, not of soul and body, but of two or even three bodies? For inasmuch as he says that we consist of spirit, soul, and body, and asserts that all the three are corporeal; it follows, that he supposes us to be made up of three bodies. How absurd this conclusion is, I think ought rather to be demonstrated to him than to you. But this is not an intolerable error on the part of a person who has not yet discovered that there is in existence a something, which, though it be not corporeal, yet may wear somewhat of the appearance of a body.

CHAP. 6. [VI.]—*Another error out of his second book, to the effect, that the soul deserved to be polluted by the body.*

But he is plainly past endurance in what he says in his second book, when he endeavours to solve a very difficult question on original sin, how far it affects body and soul, if the soul is not derived by parental descent, but is breathed afresh by God into a man. Striving to explain this troublesome and profound point, he thus expresses his view: "Through the flesh the soul fitly recovers its primitive condition, which it seemed to have gradually lost through the flesh, in order that it may begin to be regenerated by the very flesh by which it had deserved to be polluted." You observe how this person, having been so bold as to undertake what exceeds his powers, has fallen down such a precipice as to say, that the soul deserved to be defiled by the body; although he could in no wise declare whence it drew on itself this desert, before it put on flesh. For if it first had from the flesh its desert of sin, let him tell us (if he can) whence (previous to sin) it derived its desert to be contaminated by the flesh. For this desert, which projected it into sinful flesh to be polluted by

it, it of course had either from itself, or, which is much more offensive to our mind, from God. It certainly could not, previous to its being invested with the flesh, have received from that flesh that ill desert, by reason of which it was projected into the flesh, in order to be defiled by it. Now, if it had the ill desert from its own self, how did it get it, seeing that it did no sin previous to its assumption of flesh; but if it be alleged that it had the ill desert from God, then, I ask, who could listen to such blasphemy? Who could endure it? Who could permit it to be alleged with impunity? For the question which arises here, remember, is not, what was the ill desert which adjudged the soul to be condemned after it became incarnate? but what was its ill desert prior to the flesh, which condemned it to the investiture of the flesh, that it might be thereby polluted? Let him explain this to us, if he can, seeing that he has dared to say that the soul deserved to be defiled by the flesh.

CHAP. 7. [VII.]—*Victor entangles himself in an exceedingly difficult question. God's foreknowledge is no cause of sin.*

In another passage, also, on proposing for explanation the very same question in which he had entangled himself, he says, speaking in the person of certain objectors: "Why, they ask, did God inflict upon the soul so unjust a punishment as to be willing to relegate it into a body, when by reason of its association with the flesh that begins to be sinful which could not have been [otherwise] sinful?" Now, amidst the reefy sea of such a question, it was surely his duty to beware of shipwreck; nor to commit himself to dangers which he could not hope to escape by passing over them, and where his only chance of safety lay in putting back again—in a word, by repentance. He tries to free himself behind the foreknowledge of God, but to no purpose. For God's foreknowledge only marks beforehand, [but does not make] those sinners, whom He purposes to heal. For if He liberates from sin those souls which, [when whole and innocent,] He Himself involved in sin, He then heals a wound which Himself inflicted on us, not what He found in us. May God, however, forbid it, and may it be altogether far from us to say, that when God cleanses the souls of infants by the laver of

regeneration, He then corrects evils which He Himself made for them, when He commingled them [which had no sin before] with sinful flesh, that they might be contaminated by its original sin. As regards, however, the souls which this calumniator alleges to have deserved pollution by the flesh, he is quite unable to tell us how it is they deserved so vast an evil, previous to their connection with the flesh.

CHAP. 8. [VIII.]—*Victor's erroneous opinion, that the soul deserved to become sinful.*

Vainly supposing, then, that he was able to solve this question from the foreknowledge of God, he keeps floundering on, and says: "Although the soul deserved to be sinful, which could not else have been sinful, yet it did not remain in sin, because, as it was prefigured in Christ, it was bound not to be in a sinful state, even as it was unable to be." Now what can he mean when he says, "which could not else have been sinful," or "was unable to be in a sinful state," except, as I suppose, this, If it did not come into the flesh? For, of course, it could not have been sinful through original sin, or have been at all involved in original sin, except through the flesh, if it is not derived by parental descent. We see it, indeed, liberated from sin through grace, but we do not see how it deserved to be involved in sin. What, then, is the meaning of these words of his, "Although the soul deserved to be sinful, yet it did not remain in sin"? For if I were to ask him, why it did not remain in sin, he would very properly answer, Because the grace of Christ delivered it therefrom. Since, then, he tells us how it came to pass that an infant's soul was liberated from its sinfulness, let him further tell us how it happened that it deserved to be sinful.

CHAP. 9.

But what does he mean by that, which in his introduction he says has befallen him? For previous to proposing that question of his, and as introducing it, he affirms: "There are other opprobrious expressions underlying the querulous murmurings of those who rail at us; and, shaken about as in a hurricane, we are again and again dashed amongst enormous rocks." Now, if I were to express myself about him in this

style, he would probably be angry. The words are his; and after premising them, he propounded his question, by way of showing us the very rocks against which he struck and was wrecked. For to such lengths was he carried, and against such frightful reefs was he borne, drifted, and struck, that his escape was a perfect impossibility without a retreat—an amendment, in short, of what he had said; since he was unable to show by what desert the soul became sinful; though he was not afraid to say, that previous to any sin of its own it had deserved to become sinful. Now, who deserves, without committing any sin, so immense a punishment as to be conceived in the sin of another, before leaving his mother's womb, and then to be no longer free from sin? However, from this punishment the souls of such infants as are regenerated in Christ, the free grace of God delivers them, with no previous merits of their own—"otherwise grace is no grace."¹ With regard, then, to this person, who is so vastly intelligent, and who in the great depth of his wisdom is displeased at our hesitation, which, if not well informed, is at all events circumspect, let him tell us, if he can, what the merit was which brought the soul into such a punishment, from which grace delivers it without any merit. Let him speak, and, if he can, defend his assertion with some show of reason. I would not, indeed, require so much of him, if he had not himself declared that the soul deserved to become sinful. *Deserved!* Let him tell us what the desert was—whether good desert or evil? If good, how could well-deserving lead to evil? If evil, whence could arise any ill desert previous to the commission of any sin? I have also to remark, that if there be a good desert, then the liberation of the soul would not be of free grace, but it would be due to the previous merit, and thus "grace would be no more grace." If there be, however, an evil desert, then I ask what it is. Is it true that the soul has come into the flesh; and that it would not have so come unless He in whom there is no sin had Himself sent it? Never, therefore, except by floundering worse and worse, will he contrive to set up this view of his, in which he predicates of the soul, that it deserved to be sinful. In

¹ Rom. xi. 6.

the case of those infants, too, in whose baptism original sin is washed away, he found something to say after a fashion,—to the effect, that being involved in the sin of another could not possibly have been detrimental to them, predestinated as they were to eternal life in the foreknowledge of God. This might admit of a tolerably good sense, if he had not entangled himself in that formula of his, in which he asserts that the soul deserved to be sinful: from this difficulty he can only extricate himself by revoking his words, with regret at having expressed them.

CHAP. 10. [IX.]—*Another error of Victor's, that infants dying unbaptized may attain to the kingdom of heaven. Another, that the sacrifice of the body of Christ must be offered for infants who die before they are baptized.*

With respect, however, to those infants who are prevented by death from being first baptized in Christ, wishing to find some answer, he was so bold as to promise them not only paradise, but also the kingdom of heaven. He found no way of avoiding the necessity of saying that God condemns to death eternal their innocent souls, which, without any previous desert of sin, He introduces into sinful flesh. He saw, however, to some extent what evil he was giving utterance to, implying that without any grace of Christ the souls of infants are redeemed to everlasting life and the kingdom of heaven, and that in their case original sin may be cancelled without Christ's baptism, in which is effected the forgiveness of sins: observing all this, and into what a depth he had plunged in his sea of shipwreck, he says, "I am of opinion that for them, indeed, constant oblations and sacrifices must be continually offered up by holy priests." You may here behold another danger, out of which he will never escape except by regret and a recall of his words. For who can offer up the body of Christ, for any except those who are members of Christ? Moreover, from the time when He said, "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven;"¹ and again, "He that loseth his life for my sake shall find it;"² no one becomes a member of Christ except it be either by baptism in Christ, or dying for Christ.

¹ John iii. 5.

² Matt. x. 39.

CHAP. 11.—*Martyrdom for Christ supplies the place of baptism. The faith of the thief who was crucified along with Christ contrasted with the defection of His disciples.*

Accordingly, the [dying] thief, who was no follower of the Lord previous to the cross, but His confessor upon the cross, from whose case a presumption is sometimes taken, or attempted, against the sacrament of baptism, is reckoned by St. Cyprian¹ among the martyrs who are baptized in their own blood, as happens to many unbaptized persons in times of hot persecution. For to the fact that he confessed the crucified Lord so much weight is attributed and so much availing value assigned by Him who knows how to weigh and value such evidence, as if he had been actually crucified for the Lord. Then, indeed, his faith on the cross flourished when that of the disciples failed, and that without recovery, if it had not bloomed again by the resurrection of Him before the terror of whose death it had drooped. They despaired of Him when dying, he hoped when joined with Him in dying; they fled from the author of life, he prayed to his partner in punishment; they grieved as for the death of a man, he believed that after death He was to be a king; they forsook the sponsor of their salvation, he honoured the companion of His cross. There was discovered in him the full measure of a martyr, who then believed in Christ when they fell away who were destined to be martyrs. All this, indeed, was manifest to the eyes of the Lord, who at once bestowed so great felicity on one who, though not baptized, was yet washed clean in the blood, as it were, of martyrdom. But even of ourselves, who cannot reflect with how much faith, how much hope, how much charity he might have undergone death for Christ when living, who begged life of Him when dying? Besides all this, there is the circumstance, which is mentioned with some amount of credibility, that the thief who believed as he hung by the side of the crucified Lord was sprinkled, as in a most sacred baptism, with the blood which issued from the wound of the Saviour's side. I say nothing of the fact that nobody

¹ [Cyprianus, *Epist. ad Jubaianum*. See likewise Augustine's work *Against the Donatists*, iv. 22; also *On Leviticus*, question 84; also his *Retractations*, ii. 18, 55.]

can prove, since none of us knows that he had not been baptized previous to his condemnation. However, let every man take this in the sense he may prefer; only let no prescriptive rule about baptism affecting the Saviour's own precept be taken from this example of the [dying] thief; and let no one promise for the case of unbaptized infants some middle place, as it were, between damnation and the kingdom of heaven, of rest and happiness, such as he pleases and where he pleases. For this is what the heresy of Pelagius promised them: he neither fears damnation for infants, whom he does not regard as having any original sin, nor does he give them the hope of the kingdom of heaven, since they do not approach to the sacrament of baptism. As for this man, however, although he acknowledges that infants are involved in original sin, he yet boldly promises them, even without baptism, the kingdom of heaven. This even the Pelagians had not the boldness to do, though asserting infants to be absolutely without sin. See, then, in what a network of presumptuous opinion he entangles, without regret for having committed such views to writing.

CHAP. 12. [x.]—*Dinocrates, brother of the martyr St. Perpetua, is said to have been delivered from the state of condemnation after having been dead seven years.*

Concerning the case of Dinocrates, however, the brother of St. Perpetua, there is no canonical record; nor does the saint herself, or whoever it was that wrote the account, say that the boy, who had been dead seven years, died without baptism; in his behalf she is believed to have had, when her martyrdom was imminent, her prayers effectually heard that he should be removed from the penalties of the lost to rest. Now, boys at that time of life are capable both of lying and saying the truth, both of confessing and denying. Therefore, when they are baptized they say the Creed, and answer in their behalf to such questions as are proposed to them in examination. Who can tell, then, whether that boy, after baptism, in a time of persecution was estranged from Christ to idolatry by an impious father, and on that account incurred mortal condemnation, from which he was only delivered for Christ's sake, given to the prayers of his sister when she was at the point of [a martyr's] death?

CHAP. 13. [XI.]—*The sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ cannot be offered for unbaptized persons ; he presses Victor with arguments.*

But even if it be conceded to this man (what cannot by any means be allowed with safety to the Catholic faith and the rule of the Church), that the sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ may be offered for unbaptized persons of every age, as if they were to be helped by this kind of piety on the part of their friends to reaching the kingdom of heaven, what will he have to say to our objections respecting the thousands of infants who are born of impious parents, and never fall, by any mercy of God or man, into the hands of pious friends, and who depart from that wretched life of theirs at their most tender age without the washing of regeneration? Let him tell us, if he only can, how it is that those souls deserved to be made sinful to such a degree as never afterwards (to say the least) to be delivered from sin. For if I ask him why they deserve to be condemned if they are not baptized, he will rightly answer me: On account of original sin. If I then inquire whence they derived original sin, he will answer, From sinful flesh, of course. If I go on to ask why they deserved to be condemned to a sinful flesh, seeing they had done no evil before they came in the flesh, he will here, too, find something to say in answer—that they are to such a degree condemned to undergo the contagion of the sin of another, that neither baptism shall regenerate them, born as they are in sin, nor sacrifices expiate them in their pollution. For in such circumstances and of such parents have these infants been born, or are still being born, that it is not possible for them to be reached with such help. Here, at any rate, all argument fails. Our question is not, why souls have deserved to be condemned subsequently to their consorting with sinful flesh? But we ask, how it is that souls have deserved to be condemned to undergo at all this association with sinful flesh, seeing that they have no sin previous to this association? There is no room for him to say: “It was no detriment to them that they shared for a season the contagion of another’s sin, since in the prescience of God redemption had been provided for them.” For we are now speaking of those to whom no redemption brings help, since they depart

from the body before they are baptized. Nor is there any propriety in his saying: "The souls which baptism does not cleanse, the many sacrifices which are offered up for them will cleanse. God foreknew this, and willed that they should for a little while be implicated in the sins of another without incurring eternal damnation, and with the hope of eternal happiness." For we are now speaking of those whose birth among impious persons and of impious parents could by no possibility find such defences and helps. And even if these could be applied, they would, it is certain, be unable to benefit any who are unbaptized; just as the sacrifices which he has mentioned out of the book of the Maccabees could be of no use for the sinful dead for whom they were offered, inasmuch as they had not been circumcised.¹

CHAP. 14.

Let him, then, find an answer, if he can, when the question is asked of him, why it was that the soul, without any sin whatever, either original or personal, was condemned to undergo the original sin of another so irrevocably as to be unable to be delivered from it; let him also see to it, and choose one of two alternatives—either to say that even the souls of dying infants who depart hence without the washing of regeneration, and for whom no sacrifice of the Lord's body is offered, are absolved from the bond of original sin—although the apostle teaches that "the judgment was upon all by one to condemnation"² (to whom, of course, grace does not find its way to help), in order that by One all might escape with redemption;—or else to say that souls which have no sin, either their own or original, and are in every respect innocent, simple, and pure, are punished with eternal damnation by the righteous God when He inserts them Himself into sinful flesh without any means of deliverance therefrom.

CHAP. 15. [XII.]—*God does not judge any one for what he might have done if his life had been prolonged, but simply for the deeds he actually commits.*

For my own part, indeed, I affirm that neither of the alternative cases ought to be admitted, nor that third opinion which would have it that souls sinned in some other state

¹ 2 Macc. xii. 43.² Rom. v. 16.

previous to the flesh, and so deserved to be condemned to the flesh ; for the apostle has most distinctly stated that " children being not yet born, had done neither good nor evil."¹ So it is evident that infants can have contracted none but original sin to require remission of sins. Nor, again, that fourth position, that the souls of infants who will die without baptism are by the righteous God banished and condemned to sinful flesh, since He foreknew that they would lead evil lives if they grew old enough for the use of freewill. But this not even he has been daring enough to affirm, though embarrassed in such perplexities. On the contrary, he has declared, briefly indeed, yet manifestly, against this vain opinion in these words : " God would have been unrighteous if He had willed to judge any man yet unborn, who had done nothing whatever of his own freewill." This was his answer when treating a question in opposition to those persons who ask why God made man, when in His foreknowledge He knew that he would not be good ? He would be judging a man before he was born if He had been unwilling to create him because He knew beforehand that he would not turn out good. And there can be no doubt about it, even as this person himself thought, that the proper course would be for the Almighty to judge a man for his works when accomplished, not for such as might be foreseen, nor such as might be permitted to be done some time or other. For if the sins which a man would have committed if he were alive are condemned in him when dead, even when they have not been committed, no benefit is conferred on him when he is taken away that no wickedness might change his mind, inasmuch as judgment will be given upon him according to the wickedness which might have developed in him, not according to the uprightness which was actually found in him. Nor will any man be possibly safe who dies after baptism, because even after baptism men may (I will not say sin in any ordinary way, but actually go so far as to) commit apostasy. What then ? Suppose a man who has been taken away after baptism should, if he had lived, have become an apostate, are we to think that no benefit was conferred even upon him in that he was removed and was

¹ Rom. ix. 11.

saved from the misery of his mind being changed by wickedness? And are we to imagine that he will have to be judged, by reason of God's foreknowledge, as an apostate, and not as a faithful member of Christ? How much better, to be sure, would it have been—if sins are punished not as they have been committed or contemplated by the human agent, but foreknown and about to happen in the cognizance of the Almighty—if the first pair had been cast forth from paradise previous to their fall, and so sin have been prevented in so holy and blessed a place! What, too, is to be said about the entire nullification of foreknowledge itself, when what is foreknown is not to happen? How, indeed, can that be rightly called the prescience of something to be, which in fact will not come to pass? And how are sins punished which amount to none at all, that is to say, which are not committed before the assumption of flesh by life not yet commencing, not after the assumption by death already preventing?

CHAP. 16. [XIII.]—*Difficulty in the opinion which maintains that souls are not by propagation.*

This means, then, of settling the point whereby the soul was sent into its incarnate state until it should be delivered from the flesh,—seeing that the soul of an infant, which has not grown old enough for the will to become free, is the case supposed,—makes no discovery of the reason why condemnation should overtake it without the reception of baptism, except the reason of original sin. Owing to this sin, we do not deny that the soul is righteously condemned, because for sin God's righteous law has appointed punishment. But then we ask, why the soul has been made to undergo this sinful state, if it is not derived from that one primeval soul which sinned in the first father of the human race. Wherefore, if God does not condemn the innocent,—if He does not make guilty those whom He sees to be innocent,—and if nothing liberates souls from either original sins or personal ones but Christ's baptism in Christ's Church; and if sins, before they are committed, and much more when they have never been committed, cannot be condemned by any righteous law, then this writer cannot adduce any of these four cases; he must, if he can, explain, in respect to the souls of infants, which, as they quit life with-

out baptism, are sent into condemnation, by what desert of theirs it is that they, without having ever sinned, are consigned to a sinful flesh, there to find the sin which is to secure their just condemnation. Moreover, if he shrinks from these four cases which sound doctrine condemns,—that is to say, if he has not the courage to maintain that souls, when they are even without sin, are made sinful by God, or that they are freed from the original sin that is in them without Christ's sacrament, or that they committed sin in some other state before they were sent into the flesh, or that sins which they never committed are condemned in them,—if, I say, he has not the courage to tell us these things because they really do not deserve to be mentioned, but should affirm that infants do not inherit original sin, have no reason why they should be condemned should they even depart hence without receiving the sacrament of regeneration, he will without doubt, to his own condemnation, run into the damnable heresy of Pelagius. To avoid this, how much better is it for him to share my hesitation about the soul's origin, without daring to affirm that which he cannot comprehend by human reason nor defend by divine authority! So shall he not be obliged to utter foolishness, whilst he is afraid to confess his ignorance.

CHAP. 17. [XIV.]—*He shows that the passages of Scripture adduced by Victor do not prove that souls are made by God in such a way as not to be derived by propagation : first passage.*

Here, perhaps, he may say that his opinion is backed by divine authority, since he supposes that it is by passages of the Holy Scriptures that he proves that souls are not made by God by way of propagation, but that they are by distinct acts of creation breathed afresh into each individual. Let him prove this if he can, and I will allow that I have learnt from him what I was trying to find out with great earnestness. But he must go in quest of other defences, which, perhaps, he will not find, for he has not proved his point by the passages which he has thus far advanced. For all he has applied to the subject are to some extent undoubtedly suitable, but they afford only doubtful demonstration to the point which he raises respecting the soul's origin. For it is certain that God gave to man breath and spirit, as the prophet testifies : “ Thus saith

the Lord, who made the heaven, and founded the earth, and all that is therein; who giveth breath to the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk over it."¹ This passage he wishes to be taken in his own sense, which he is defending; so that the words, "who giveth breath to the people," may be understood as implying that He creates souls for people not by propagation, but by insufflation of new souls in every case. Let him, then, boldly maintain at this rate that He does not give us flesh, on the ground that our flesh derives its original from our parents. In the instance, too, which the apostle adduces, "God giveth it a body as it hath pleased Him,"² let him deny, if he dares, that corn springs from corn, and grass from grass, by seminal process, each after its kind. And if he dares not deny this, how does he know in what sense it is said, "He giveth breath to the people"?—whether by derivation from parents, or by fresh breathing into each individual?

CHAP. 18.—*By breath is signified sometimes the Holy Spirit.*

How, again, does he know whether the repetition of the idea in the sentence, "who giveth breath to the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk over it," may not be understood of only one thing under two expressions, meaning, in short, not the life or spirit whereby human nature lives, but the Holy Spirit? For if by the *flatus* or breath the Holy Ghost may not be signified, the Lord would not, when He breathed upon His disciples after His resurrection, have said, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost."³ Nor would it have been thus written in the Acts of the Apostles, "Suddenly there came a sound from heaven, as if a rushing mighty wind were borne in upon them; and there appeared unto them cloven tongues, like as of fire, and it sat upon each of them, and they were all filled with the Holy Ghost."⁴ Suppose, now, that it was this which the prophet foretold in the words, "who giveth breath unto the people upon it;" and then, as an exposition of what he had designated "*breath*," went on to say, "and spirit to them that walk over it." Surely this prediction was most manifestly fulfilled when they were all filled with the Holy Ghost. If, however, the term "*people*" is not yet applicable to the one hundred and

¹ Isa. xlii. 5.

² 1 Cor. xv. 38.

³ John xx. 22.

⁴ Acts ii. 2.

twenty persons who were then assembled together in one place, at all events, when the number of believers amounted to four or five thousand, who when they were baptized received the Holy Ghost,¹ can any doubt that the recipients of the Holy Ghost were *then* "the people," even a multitude walking in the earth? For that breath or spirit which is given to man as appertaining to his nature, whether it be given by propagation or be renewed by insufflation to individuals (and I do not determine which of these two modes ought to be affirmed, at least until one of the two can be clearly ascertained beyond a doubt), is not given to men when they "walk over the earth," but whilst they are still shut up in their mother's womb. "He gave breath, therefore, to the people upon the earth, and spirit to them that walk over it," when many became believers together, and were together filled with the Holy Ghost. And He gives Him, Himself, to His people, although not to all at the same time, but to every one in His own time, until, by departing from this life, and by coming into it, the entire number of His people be fulfilled. In this passage of Holy Scripture, therefore, *breath* is not one thing, and *spirit* another thing; but there is a repetition of one and the same idea. Just as [in that passage in the psalms], "He that sitteth in the heavens" is not one, and "the Lord" is not another; nor, again, is it one thing "to laugh," and another thing "to hold in derision;" but there is only a repetition of the same meaning in the passage where we read, "He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh: the Lord shall have them in derision."² So, in precisely the same manner, in the passage, "I will give Thee the heathen for Thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for Thy possession,"³ it is certainly not meant that "inheritance" is one thing, and "possession" another thing; nor that "the heathen" means one thing, and "the uttermost parts of the earth" another; there is only a repetition of the self-same thing. He will, indeed, discover innumerable expressions of this sort in the sacred writings, if he will only attentively consider what he reads.

CHAP. 19.

The term used in the Greek version, *πνοή*, is variously ren-

¹ Acts iv. 31.² Ps. ii. 4.³ Ps. ii. 8.

dered in Latin: sometimes by *flatus*, breath; sometimes by *spiritus*, spirit; sometimes by *inspiratio*, inspiration. This term occurs in the Greek editions of the passage which we are now reviewing, "Who giveth breath to the people upon it," the word for *breath* being *πνοή*.¹ The same word is used in the narrative where man was endued with life: "And God breathed upon his face the breath of life."² Again, in the psalm the same term occurs: "Let everything that hath breath praise the Lord;"³ but it is rendered by the Latin *spiritus* here. In the Book of Job it is translated *adspiratio* (inspiration): "The inspiration of the Almighty is that which teaches."⁴ The translator refused the word *flatus* for *adspiratio*, although he had before him the very term *πνοή*, which occurs in the text of the prophet which we are considering. We can hardly doubt, I think, that in this passage of Job the Holy Ghost is signified. The question discussed was concerning wisdom, whence it comes to men: "It cometh not from number of years; but there is a spirit in mortals, and the inspiration of the Almighty is that which teaches."⁵ By this repetition of terms it may be quite understood that he did not speak of man's own spirit in the clause, "There is a spirit [or, the spirit] in mortals." He wanted to show whence men have wisdom,—that it is not from their own selves; so by using a duplicate expression he explains his idea: "The inspiration of the Almighty is that which teaches." Similarly, in another passage of the same book, he says: "The understanding of my lips shall meditate purity. The divine Spirit is that which formed me, and the breath of the Almighty is that which teacheth me."⁶ Here, likewise, what he calls *adspiratio*, or "inspiration," is in Greek *πνοή*, the same word which is translated *flatus*, "breath," in the passage quoted from the prophet. Therefore, although one ventures to question

¹ [The passage is (in the LXX.), *Καὶ διδοὺς πνοὴν τῷ λαῷ τῷ ἐπ' αὐτῆς.*]

² [The LXX. text of Gen. ii. 7 is, *Καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς.*]

³ [Ps. cl. 6: *Πᾶσα πνοὴ αἰνεῖσάτω τὸν Κύριον.*]

⁴ [According to the LXX., *Πνοὴ δὲ παντοκράτορος ἐστὶν ἡ διδάσκουσα.*]

⁵ Job. xxxii. 7, 8.

⁶ [Job xxx. 3, 4, according to the LXX., of which the text is, *Σύνεσις δὲ χειλῶν μου καθαρὰ νοήσει. Πνεῦμα θεῖον τὸ ποιῆσάν με, πνοὴ δὲ παντοκράτορος ἐστὶν ἡ διδάσκουσα.*]

whether the passage, "Who giveth breath to the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk over it," has reference to the life or spirit of man; and although the Holy Ghost may with greater credibility be understood as referred to in the passage, yet I ask on what ground anybody can boldly determine that the prophet meant in these words to intimate that the life or spirit whereby our nature possesses vitality [is not given to us by God through the process of propagation?]¹ Of course if the prophet very plainly said, "Who giveth breath [or soul] to the people upon earth," it still remains to be asked whether God Himself gives it from the original matter of which the preceding generation is composed, just as He gives the body out of such prior material, and that not only to men or cattle, but also to the seed of corn, or to any other body whatever, just as it pleases Him; or whether He bestows it by in-breathing as a new gift to each individual, as the first man received it from Him?

CHAP. 20.

There are also some persons who understand the prophet's words, "He gave breath to the people upon it," that is to say, upon the earth, as if the word "breath," *flatus*, were simply equivalent to natural life, or *anima*; while they construe the next clause, "And spirit to them that walk over it," as referring to the Holy Ghost; and they suppose that the same order is described by the prophet as is mentioned by the apostle: "That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterward that which is spiritual."² Now from this view of the prophet's words a neat interpretation may, no doubt, be formed consistent with the apostle's sense. The phrase, "to them that walk over it," is in the Latin, "*calcantibus eam*;" and as the literal meaning of these words is "treading upon it," we may understand the idea of contempt of it (*contemnentibus eam*) to be implied. For they who receive the Holy Ghost despise earthly things in their love of heavenly things. All these opinions, however, are *contra fidem*, whether one regards the two terms, *breath* and *spirit*, to pertain to human nature, or both of them to the

¹ [The words here given in brackets are suggested by the Benedictine editor.]

² 1 Cor. xv. 46.

Holy Ghost; or one of them, *breath*, to the natural life, and the other, *spirit*, to the Holy Ghost. If, however, the breath and spirit of the human being, as the gift of God to him, be the meaning here, as undoubtedly it ought to be, then we must further inquire, by what way does God bestow this gift? Is it by propagation, as He gives us our bodily limbs by this process? Or is it bestowed on each person severally by God's inbreathing, not by propagation, but as always a fresh creation? These questions are not ambiguous, as this man would make them; but (according to our own desire) they are capable of being defended by the most certain warrant of the divine Scriptures.

CHAP. 21.—*The second passage quoted by Victor.*

On the same principle we treat the passage in which God says: "For my Spirit shall go forth from me; and I have created all breath."¹ Here the former clause, "My Spirit shall go forth from me," must be taken as referring to the Holy Ghost, of whom the Saviour similarly says, "He proceedeth from the Father."² But the other clause, "I have created all [or every] breath," is undeniably spoken of each individual soul. Well; but God also creates the entire body of man; and, as nobody doubts, He makes the human body by the process of propagation: it is therefore, of course, still open to inquiry concerning the soul (since it is evidently God's work), whether He creates it, as He does the body, by propagation, or by inbreathing, as He made the first soul.

CHAP. 22.—*Victor's third quotation.*

He proceeds to favour us with a third passage, in which it is written: "[The Lord] that forms the spirit of man within him."³ As if any one denied this! No; all our question is as to the *mode* of the formation. Now let us take the eye of the body, and ask, who but God forms it? I suppose that

¹ [Isa. lvii. 16. In the Septuagint it is, Πνεῦμα γὰρ παρ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεύσεται, καὶ πνοὴν πᾶσαν ἐγὼ ἐποίησα.]

² John xv. 26.

³ [Zech. xii. 1, which in the Septuagint is, Κύριος . . . πλάσσει πνεῦμα ἀνθρώπου ἐν αὐτῷ.]

He forms it not externally, but in itself, and yet, most certainly, by propagation. Since, then, He also forms the human spirit, or soul, in itself, the question still remains, whether it be derived by a fresh insufflation in every instance, or by propagation.

CHAP. 23.—*His fourth quotation.*

We have read all about the mother of the Maccabean youths, who was really more fruitful in virtues when her children suffered than prolific when they were born; how she exhorted them to constancy, speaking in this wise: "I cannot tell, my sons, how ye came into my womb. For it was not I who gave you either breath or life; nor was it I that formed the members of every one of you, but it was God, who also made the world, and all things that are therein; who, moreover, formed the generation of men; and searches the action¹ of all; and who will Himself of His great mercy restore to you your breath and life." All this we know; but how it supports this man's assertion we do not see. For what Christian would deny that God gives to men life and breath? But similarly, I suppose that he cannot deny that God gives to men their tongue, and ear, and hand, and foot, and all their bodily sensations, and the form and nature of all their limbs. For how is he going to deny all these to be the gifts of God, unless he forgets that he is a Christian? As, however, it is evident that these were made by Him, and bestowed on man by propagation; so also the question must arise, by what means man's life and spirit are formed by Him; by what efficiency given to man—by the parents, or of nothing, or (as this man asserts, in a sense which we must by all means guard against) out of some existing condition of the divine breath, not created out of nothing, but of His own self?

CHAP. 24. [XV.]—*Whether the soul is derived by natural descent (EX TRADUCE), his cited passages fail to demonstrate.*

Forasmuch, then, as the passages of Scripture which he mentions by no means show what he endeavours to enforce out of them (indeed, they express nothing at all on the immediate question before us), what can be the meaning of these

¹ [Actum; another reading is *ortum*, more in accordance with the Greek *γένεσιν*.]

words of his: "We firmly maintain that the soul comes from the breath of God, not from natural generation, because it is given to man of God"? As if, forsooth, the human body could be given of any another than Him by whom it is created, "Of whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things;"¹ not that they are of His nature, but of His workmanship. "Nor is it from nothing," says he, "because it comes forth from God." Whether this be so, is (we must say) not the question to be here entertained. At the same time, we do not hesitate to affirm, that the proposition which he advances, that the soul comes not to man by natural generation, is not at all true. For it is one of two things: if the soul is not derived by natural descent from the parent, it comes out of nothing. To pretend that it is derived from God in such wise as to be a portion of His nature, is simply sacrilegious blasphemy. Still we strongly desiderate, and look out for some plain passages of Scripture bearing on the point, whether the soul comes by parental descent; but we do not want such passages as he has adduced, which yield no illustration of the question now before us.

CHAP. 25.

How I wish that, on so profound a question, so long as he is ignorant what he should say, he would imitate the mother of the Maccabean youths! Although she knew very well that she had borne children of her husband, and that they had been created for her by the Creator of all, both in body and in life and soul, yet she says, "I cannot tell, my sons, how ye came into my womb." Well now, I only wish this man would tell us that which she was ignorant of! She, of course, knew (on the points I have mentioned) how they came into her womb as to their bodily substance, because she could not possibly doubt that she had conceived them by her husband. She furthermore confessed—because this, too, she was, of course, well aware of—that it was God who gave them their life and soul, and that it was He also who formed for them their features and their limbs. What was it, then, that she was so ignorant of? Was it not probably (what we likewise are equally unable to

¹ Rom. xi. 36.

determine) whether the life and soul, which God no doubt bestowed upon them, was derived to them from their parents, or breathed into them separately, as it had been into the first man? But whether it was this, or some other particular respecting the constitution of human nature, of which she was ignorant, she frankly confessed her ignorance; and did not venture to defend at random what she knew nothing about. Nor would this man say to her, what he has not been ashamed to say to us: "Man being in honour doth not understand; he is compared to the senseless cattle, and is like unto them."¹ Behold how that woman said of her sons, "I cannot tell how ye came into my womb," and yet she is not compared to the senseless brutes. "I cannot tell," she said; then, as if they would inquire of her why she was ignorant, she went on to say, "For it was not I who gave you either breath or life." He, therefore, who gave them that gift, knows whence He made what He bestowed upon them, whether He communicated it by parental propagation, or breathed it as a fresh creation into each,—a point which, this man says, I for my part know nothing of. "Nor was it I that formed the members of every one of you." He, however, who formed them, knows whether He formed them with the soul, or gave the soul to them after they had been formed. She had no idea of the manner, this or that, in which her sons came into her womb; only one thing was she sure of, that He who gave her all she had would restore it to her again. But this man would choose out what should be the precise ignorance, on so profound and abstruse a fact of our nature, of the Maccabean woman; only he would not judge her, if in error; nor compare her, if ignorant, to the senseless cattle. Whatever the point was about which she was ignorant, it certainly pertained to man's nature; and yet anybody would be blameless for such ignorance. Wherefore, I too, on my side, say concerning my soul, I have no certain knowledge how it came into my body; for it was not I who gave it to myself. He who gave it to me knows whether He imparted it to me from my father, or created it afresh for me, as He did for the first man. But even I shall know, when He Himself shall teach me, in His

¹ Ps. xlviii. 12 (Septuagint).

own good time. Now, however, I do not know; nor am I ashamed, like him, to confess my ignorance of what I know not.

CHAP. 26. [XVI.]—*The fifth passage of Scripture quoted by Victor.*

“Learn,” says he, “for, behold the apostle teaches you.” Yes, indeed, I will learn, if I have the apostle for my instructor; since it is God alone who teaches by the apostle. But, pray, what is it which the apostle teaches? “Observe,” he adds, “how, when speaking to the men of Athens, he strongly set forth this truth, saying: ‘Seeing He giveth to all life and breath.’” Well, who thinks of denying this? “But understand what it is the apostle states: *He giveth*; not, *He hath given*. He refers us to continuous and indefinite time, and does not speak peremptorily of past and completed time. Now that which he gives without cessation, He is always giving; just as He who gives is Himself ever existent.” I have quoted his words precisely as I found them in the second of the books which you sent me. First, I beg you to notice to what lengths he has gone, while endeavouring to affirm what he knows nothing about. For he has dared to say, that God, without any cessation, and not merely in the present time, but for ever and ever, gives souls to persons when they are born. “He is always giving,” says he, “just as He who gives is Himself ever existent.” Far be it from me to say that I do not understand what the apostle said, for it is plain enough. But what this man says, he even ought himself to know, is contrary to the Christian faith; and he should be on his guard against going any further in such assertions. For, of course, when the dead shall rise again, there will be no more persons to be born; therefore God will bestow no longer any souls at any birth; but those which He is now giving to men along with their bodies He will judge. So that He is not always giving, although He is ever existent, who at present is giving. Nor, indeed, is that at all derivable from the apostle’s expression, *who giveth* (not *hath given*), which this writer wishes to deduce, namely, that God does not give men souls by propagation. For souls are still given by Him, even if it be by propagation; even as bodily endowments, such as limbs, and sensations, and shape, and, in fact, the whole sub-

stance, are given by God Himself to human beings, although it be by propagation that He gives them. Nor again, because the Lord says,¹ "If God so clothes the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven" (not using the preterite time, *hath clothed*, as when He first formed the material; but employing the present form, *clothes*, which, indeed, He still is doing), shall we on that account say, that the lilies are not produced according to the birth of their own kind. What, therefore, if the life and soul of a human being in like manner is bestowed by God Himself, whenever it is bestowed; and bestowed, too, by propagation from its own kind? Now this is a position which I neither maintain nor refute. Nevertheless, if it must be defended, or confuted, I certainly recommend its being done by clear, and not doubtful proofs. Nor do I deserve to be compared with senseless cattle because I avow myself to be as yet incapable of determining the question, but rather with cautious persons, because I do not recklessly teach what I know nothing about. But I am not disposed on my own part to return railing for railing, and compare this man with brutes; but I warn him as a son, to acknowledge that he is really ignorant of that which he knows nothing about; nor to attempt to teach that which he has not yet learnt, lest he should deserve to be compared [not, indeed, with brute beasts, but] with those persons whom the apostle mentions as "desiring to be teachers of the law, understanding neither what they say, nor whereof they affirm."²

CHAP. 27. [XVII.]—*Augustine did not venture to define anything about the propagation of the soul.*

For whence comes it that he is so careless about the Scriptures, which he talks of, as not to notice that when he reads of human beings being from God, it is not merely, as he contends, in respect of their life and soul, but also as regards their body? For the apostle's statement, "We are His offspring,"³ this man supposes must not be referred to the body, but only to the life and soul. If, indeed, our human bodies are not of God, then that is false which the Scripture says: "For of Him are all things, through Him are all things, and in Him are all things."⁴ Again, with reference to the same apostle's state-

¹ Matt. vi. 30. ² 2 Tim. i. 7. ³ Acts xvii. 28. ⁴ Rom. xi. 36.

ment, "For as the woman is of the man, so also is the man by the woman,"¹ let him explain to us what propagation he would choose to be meant in the process,—that of the soul, or of the body, or both? But he will not allow that souls come by propagation: it remains, therefore, that, according to him and all who deny the propagation of souls, the apostle predicated gender, masculine and feminine, of the body only, when he said, "As the woman is of the man, so also is the man by the woman;" the woman having been made out of the man, in order that the man might afterwards, by the process of birth, come out of the woman. If, therefore, the apostle, when he said this, did not intend the immaterial parts of life and soul to be understood, but only the bodily components of the two sexes, why does he immediately add, "But all things are of God,"² unless it be that bodies also are of God? For so runs his entire statement: "As the woman is of the man, so also is the man by the woman; but all things are of God." Let, then, our disputant determine of what this is said. If of men's bodies, then, of course, even bodies are of God. How comes it to pass, therefore, that whenever this person reads in Scripture the phrase, "*of God*," when man is in question, he will have the words understood, not in reference to men's bodies, but only as concerning their souls and spirits? But if the expression, "All things are of God," was spoken of the body of the two sexes, as well as of their soul and spirit, it follows that in all things the woman is of the man; for the woman comes from the man, and the man is by the woman: but all things of God. What "all things" are meant, except those he was speaking of, namely, the man of whom came the woman, and the woman who was of the man, and also the man who came by the woman? For that man came not by woman, out of whom came the woman; but only he who afterwards was born of man by woman, just as men are now born. Hence it follows that if the apostle, when he said the words we have quoted from him, spoke of men's bodies, undoubtedly the bodies of persons of both sexes are of God. Furthermore, if he insists that nothing in man comes from God except their souls and spirits, then, of course, the woman is of the man even as regards

¹ 1 Cor. xi. 12.

² 1 Cor. xi. 12.

her soul and spirit; so that not a leg is left to stand upon to those who dispute against the propagation of souls. But if he is for dividing the subject in such a manner as to say that the woman is of the man as regards her body, but is of God in respect of her soul and spirit, how, then, will that be true which the apostle says, "All things of God," if the woman's body is of the man in such a sense that it is not of God? Wherefore, allowing that the apostle is more likely to speak the truth than that this person must be preferred as an authority to the apostle, the woman is of the man, whether in regard to her body only, or in reference to the entire whole of which human nature consists (but we assert nothing on these points as an absolute certainty, but are still inquiring after their truth); and the man is through the woman, whether it be that his whole nature as man is derived to him from his father, and is born in him through the woman, or the flesh alone; about which points the question is still undecided. "All things, however, are of God," and about this there is no question; and in this phrase are included the body, soul, and spirit, both of the man and the woman. For even if they were not born or derived from God, or emanated from Him, as portions of His nature, yet they are of God, inasmuch as whatever is created, formed, and made by Him, has from Him the reality of its existence.

CHAP. 28.

He goes on to remark: "But the apostle, by saying, 'Seeing that He giveth life and breath to all,' and then by adding the words, 'And hath made the whole race of men of one blood,'¹ has referred life and breath to the Creator in respect of their origin, and the body to parental propagation." Now it is true that any one who does not wish to deny at random the propagation of souls, before ascertaining clearly whether the opinion is correct or not, has good ground for understanding, from the apostle's words, that he meant the expression, *of one blood*, to be equivalent to *of one man*, by the figure of speech which understands the whole from its part. Well, then, if it be allowable for this man to take the whole from a part in the passage, "And man became a living soul,"² as if the spirit also

¹ Acts xvii. 25.² Gen. ii. 7.

was understood to be implied, about which the Scripture there said nothing, why is it not allowable to others to attribute an equally comprehensive sense to the expression, *of one blood*, so that the soul and spirit¹ may be considered as included in it, on the ground that the human being who is signified by the term "*blood*" consists not of body alone, but also of soul and spirit [or "life and breath"]? For just as the controversialist, who maintains the propagation of souls, ought not, on the one hand, to press this man too hard, because the Scripture says concerning the first man, "In him all have sinned"² (for the expression is not, In him the flesh of all has sinned, but "all," that is, "all men," seeing that man is not flesh only);—as, I repeat, he ought not to be too hard pressed himself, because it happens to be written "all men," in such a way that they might be understood simply in respect of the flesh; so, on the other hand, he ought not to bear too hard on those who hold the propagation of souls, on the ground of the phrase, "The whole race of men of one blood," as if this passage proved that flesh alone was transmitted by propagation. For if it is true, as they³ assert, that soul does not descend from soul, but flesh only from flesh, then the expression, "*of one blood*," does not signify the entire human being, on the principle of a part for the whole, but merely the flesh of one person alone; while that other expression, "In whom all have sinned," must be so understood as to indicate merely the flesh of all men, which has been handed on from the first man, the Scripture signifying a part by the whole. If, on the other hand, it is true that the entire human being is propagated of each man, himself also entire, consisting of body, soul, and spirit, then the passage, "In whom all have sinned," must be taken in its proper literal sense; and the other phrase, "*of one blood*," is used metaphorically, the whole being signified by a part, that is to say, the whole man who consists of soul and flesh; or rather (as this person is fond of putting it) of soul, and spirit, and flesh. For both modes of expression the Holy Scriptures are in the habit of employing, putting both a part for the

¹ [Or "the life and breath"—*anima et spiritus*—of the A. V. of Acts xvii. 25.]

² Rom. v. 12.

³ [Isti = that party; another reading has *iste*, Augustine's opponent, Victor.]

whole and the whole for a part. A part, for instance, implies the whole, in the place where it is said, "Unto Thee shall all flesh come;"¹ the whole man being understood by the term *flesh*. And the whole sometimes implies a part, as when it is said that Christ was buried, whereas it was only His flesh that was buried. Now as regards the statement which is made in the apostle's testimony, to the effect that "He giveth life and breath to all," I suppose that nobody, after the foregoing discussion, will be moved by it. No doubt "He giveth;" the fact is not in dispute; our question is, How does He give it? By fresh inbreathing in every instance, or by propagation? For with perfect propriety is He said to give the substance of the flesh to the human being, though at the same time it is not denied that He gives it by means of propagation.

CHAP. 29. [XVIII.]—*The sixth passage of Scripture [quoted by Victor].*

Let us now look at the quotation from Genesis, where the woman is created out of the side of the man, and is brought to him, and he says: "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh." Our opponent thinks that "Adam ought to have said, 'Soul of my soul, or spirit of my spirit,' if this, too, had been derived from him." But, in fact, they who maintain the opinion of the propagation of souls feel that they possess a more impregnable defence of their position in the fact that in the Scripture narrative which informs us that God took a rib out of the man's side and formed it into a woman, it is not added that He breathed into her face the breath of life; because, as they hold, she had already received animation from the man. If, indeed, she had not, the sacred Scripture would certainly not have kept us in ignorance of the circumstance. With regard to the fact that Adam says, "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh,"² without adding, Breath of my breath, soul of my soul, they may answer, just as it has been already shown, that the expression, "my flesh and bone," may be understood as indicating the whole by a part, only that the portion that was taken out of man was not dead, but instinct with life;³ for no good ground for denying that the Almighty was able to do all this is furnished by the circum-

¹ Ps. lxxv. 2. ² Gen. ii. 23. ³ Animata, possessing the *anima* or soul.

stance that not a human being could be found capable of cutting off a part of a man's flesh which should retain its animation. Adam went on, however, to say, "She shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man."¹ Now, why does he not express himself in such a way as should confirm the opinion of our opponents, to the effect that her flesh was taken out of her husband's side? As the case stands, indeed, they who hold the opposite view may well contend, from the fact that it is written, not woman's flesh, but the woman herself was taken out of man, that she must be considered in her entire nature endued with soul and spirit. For although the soul is undistinguished by sex, yet when women are mentioned it is impossible to regard them without relation to the soul. On no other principle would they be thus admonished with respect to self-adornment. "Not with braided hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly array; but which (says the apostle) becometh women professing godliness with a good conversation."² Now, "godliness," of course, is an inner principle in the soul or spirit; and yet they are called women, although the ornamentation concerns that internal portion of their nature which has no sex.

CHAP. 30.

Now, while the disputants are thus contending with one another in alternate argument, I offer them on both sides this judicial determination, that they must not rely on uncertain evidence; and I would strongly advise each party to make no bold assertions on points of which they are ignorant. For if the Scripture had said, "God breathed into the woman's face the breath of life, and she became a living soul," it would not have followed even then that the human soul is not derived by propagation from parents, except the same statement were likewise made concerning the parents' son. For it might have been that whilst a member taken from the body without animation might require to be animated,³ yet that the soul of the son might be derived from the father, transfused by propagation through the mother. There is, however, an absolute silence on the point; it is entirely concealed from our view.

¹ Gen. ii. 23.² 1 Tim. ii. 9, 10.³ Animari, or endued with the *anima* or soul.

Nothing is denied, but at the same time nothing is affirmed. And thus, wherever the Scripture does not happen to be quite silent, the point requires to be supported by clearer proofs. Whence it follows, that neither they who maintain the propagation of souls receive any assistance from the circumstance that God did not breathe into the woman's face; nor ought they, who deny this doctrine on the ground that Adam did not say, "This is soul of my soul," to persuade themselves to believe what they know nothing of. For just as it has been possible for the Scripture to be silent on the point of the woman's having received her soul, like the man, by the inbreathing of God, without the question before us being solved, but, on the contrary, remaining open; so has it been possible for the same question to remain open and unsolved, notwithstanding the silence of Scripture, as to whether or not Adam said, This is soul of my soul. And hence, if the soul of the first woman comes from the man, a part signifies the whole in his exclamation, "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh;" inasmuch as not her flesh alone, but the entire woman, was taken out of man. If, however, it is not from the man, but came by God's inbreathing it into her, as at first into the man, then the whole signifies a part in the passage, "She was taken out of the man;" since on the supposition it was not her whole self, but her flesh that was taken.

CHAP. 31.—*The argument of the Apollinarians to prove that Christ was without the human soul.*

Although, then, this question remains unsolved by these passages of Scripture, which are certainly indecisive so far as pertains to the point before us, yet I am quite sure of this, that those persons who think that the soul of the first woman did not come from her husband's soul, on the ground of its being only said, "Flesh of my flesh," and not, Soul of my soul, do, in fact, argue in precisely the same manner as the Apollinarians argue, and all such gainsayers, in opposition to the Lord's human soul, which they deny for no other reason than because they read in the Scripture, "The Word was made flesh."¹ For if, say they, there was a human soul in Him also, it ought to have been said, The Word was made man. But the reason

¹ John i. 14.

why the great truth is stated in the terms in question really is, that under the designation *flesh*, Holy Scripture is accustomed to describe the entire human being, as in the passage, "And all flesh shall see the salvation of God."¹ For flesh alone without the soul cannot see anything. Besides, many other passages of the Holy Scriptures go to make it manifest, without any ambiguity, that in the man Christ there is not only human flesh, but a human soul also, that is the reasonable one. Whence they, who maintain the propagation of souls, might also admit that a part is put for the whole in the passage, "Bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh," in such wise that the soul, too, be understood as implied in the words, in the same manner as we believe that the Word was flesh, not without the accompaniment of the soul. All that is wanted is, that they should support their opinion of the propagation of souls on passages which are unambiguous; just as other passages of Scripture [correct the misapprehension of the Apollinarians, and] show us that Christ possesses a human soul. On precisely the same principle we advise the other side also, who do away with the opinion of the propagation of souls, that they should produce certain proofs for their assertion that souls are created by God in every fresh case by insufflation, and that they should then maintain the position that the saying, "This is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh," was not spoken figuratively as a part for the whole, including the soul in its signification, but in a bare literal sense of the flesh alone.

CHAP. 32. [XIX.]

Under these circumstances, I find that this treatise of mine must now be closed. It contains, in fact, all that seemed to me chiefly necessary to the subject under discussion. They who peruse its contents will know how to be on their guard against agreeing with the person whose two books you sent me, so as not to believe with him, that souls are produced by the breath of God in such wise as not to be made out of nothing. The man, indeed, who supposes this, however much he may in words deny the conclusion, does in reality affirm that souls have the substance of God, and are His offspring, not by His creative

¹ Luke iii. 6, and Isa. xl. 5 (Sept.).

gift, but by nature. For from whomsoever a man derives the original of his nature, from him, in all sober earnestness, it must needs be admitted, that he also derives the sort or kind of his nature. But this author is, after all, self-contradictory : at one time he says that "souls are the offspring of God,—not, indeed, by nature, but by endowment;" and at another time he says, that "they are not made out of nothing, but derive their origin from God." Thus he does not hesitate to recall them to the nature of God, a position which he had previously denied.

CHAP. 33.—*Augustine has no objection to the opinion about the propagation of souls being refuted, and that about their insufflation being maintained.*

As for the opinion, that souls are created by fresh acts of inbreathing without being propagated, we certainly do not in the least object to its maintenance,—only let it be by persons who have succeeded in discovering some new evidence, either in the canonical Scriptures, in the shape of unambiguous testimony towards the solution of a most knotty question, or else in their own reasonings, such as shall not be opposed to Catholic truth, but not by such persons as this man has shown himself to be. Unable to find anything worth saying, and at the same time unwilling to suspend his disputatious propensity, without measuring his strength at all, in order to avoid saying nothing, he boldly affirmed that "the soul deserved to be polluted by the flesh," and that "the soul deserved to become sinful;" though previous to its incarnation he was unable to discover any merit in it, whether good or evil. Moreover, that "in infants departing from the body without baptism original sin may be remitted, and that the sacrifice of Christ's body must be offered for them," who have not been incorporated into Christ through His sacraments in His Church, and that "they, quitting this present life without the laver of regeneration, not only can go to rest, but can even attain to the kingdom of heaven." He has propounded a good many other absurdities, which it would be evidently tedious to collect together, and to consider in this treatise. If the doctrine of the propagation of souls is false, may its refutation not be the work of such disputants; and may the defence of the rival principle of the insufflation of new souls in every creative act, proceed from better hands.

CHAP. 34.—*The mistakes which must be avoided by those who say that men's souls are not derived from their parents, but are afresh inbreathed by God in every instance.*

All, therefore, who wish to maintain that souls are rightly said to be breathed afresh into persons at their birth, and not derived from their parents, must by all means be cautious on each of the four points which I have already mentioned. That is to say, do not let them affirm that souls become sinful by the original sin of some one else; do not let them affirm that infants who died unbaptized can possibly reach eternal life and the kingdom of heaven by the remission of original sin in any other way whatever; do not let them affirm that souls had sinned in some other place previous to their incarnation, and that on this account they were forcibly introduced into sinful flesh; nor let them affirm that the sins which were not actually found in them were, because they were foreknown, deservedly punished, although they were never permitted to reach that life where they could be committed. Provided that they affirm none of these points, because each of them is simply false and impious, they may, if they can, produce any conclusive testimonies of Holy Scriptures on this question; and they may maintain their own opinion, not only without any prohibition from me, but even with my approbation and best thanks. If, however, they fail to discover any very decided authority on the point in the divine oracles, and are obliged to propound any one of the four opinions by reason of their failure, let them restrain their imagination, lest they should be driven in their difficulty to enunciate the now damnable and very recently condemned heresy of Pelagius, to the effect that even the souls of infants have not original sin. It is, indeed, better for a man to confess his ignorance of what he knows nothing about, than either to run into heresy which has been already condemned, or to found some new heresy, while recklessly daring to defend over and over again opinions which only display his ignorance. This man has made some other absurd mistakes, indeed many, in which he has wandered out of the beaten track of truth, without going, however, to dangerous lengths; and I would like, if the Lord be willing, to write even to himself something on the subject of his books; and probably I shall point them all

out to him, or a good many of them, if I should be unable to notice all.

CHAP. 35. [xx.]

As for this present treatise, which I have thought it proper to address to no other person in preference to yourself, who have taken a kindly and true interest both in our common faith and my character, as a true Catholic and a good friend, you will give it to be read or copied by any persons you may be able to find interested in the subject, or may deem worthy to be trusted. In it I have thought proper to repress and confute the presumption of this young man, in such a way, however, as to show that I love him, wishing him to be amended rather than condemned, and to make such progress in the great house of the Catholic Church, whither the divine compassion has conducted him, that he might be therein "a vessel unto honour, sanctified, and meet for the Master's use, and prepared unto every good work,"¹ both by holy living and sound teaching. But I have this further to say: if it behoves me to bestow my love upon him, as I sincerely do, how much more ought I to love you, my brother, whose affection towards me, and whose Catholic faith I have found by the best of proofs to be cautious and sober! The result of your loyalty has been, that you have, with a brother's real love and duty, taken care to have the books, which displeased you, and wherein you found my name treated in a way which ran counter to your liking, copied out and forwarded to me. Now, I am so far from feeling offended at this charitable act of yours, as you did it, that I think I should have had a right, on the true claims of friendship, to have been angry with you if you had not done it. I therefore give you my most earnest thanks. Moreover, I have afforded a still plainer indication of the spirit in which I have accepted your service, by instantly composing this treatise for your consideration, as soon as I had read those books of his.

¹ 2 Tim. ii. 21.

SECOND BOOK,

IN THE SHAPE OF A LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE
PRESBYTER PETER.

HE ADVISES PETER NOT TO INCUR THE IMPUTATION OF HAVING APPROVED OF THE BOOKS WHICH HAD BEEN ADDRESSED TO HIM BY VICTOR ON THE ORIGIN OF THE SOUL, BY ANY USE HE MIGHT MAKE OF THEM, NOR TO TAKE AS CATHOLIC DOCTRINES THAT PERSON'S RASH UTTERANCES CONTRARY TO THE CHRISTIAN FAITH. VICTOR'S VARIOUS ERRORS, AND THOSE, TOO, OF A VERY SERIOUS CHARACTER, HE POINTS OUT AND BRIEFLY CONFUTES ; AND HE CONCLUDES WITH ADVISING PETER HIMSELF TO TRY AND PERSUADE VICTOR TO AMEND HIS ERRORS.

TO his Lordship, my dearly beloved brother and fellow-presbyter Peter, Augustine, bishop, sendeth greeting in the Lord.

CHAP. I. [I.]—*Depraved eloquence an injurious accomplishment.*

There have reached me the two books of Vincentius Victor, which he addressed in writing to your Holiness ; they have been forwarded to me by our brother Renatus, a layman indeed, but a person who has a prudent and religious care about the faith both of himself and of all he loves. On reading these books, I saw that their author was a man of great resources in words, of which he had enough, and more than enough ; but that on the subjects of which he wished to treat, he was as yet insufficiently instructed. If, however, by the gracious gift of the Lord this qualification were also conferred upon him, he would be serviceable to many. For he possesses in no slight degree the faculty of being able to expound in choicest language whatever his opinions may be ; all that is wanted is, that he should first take care to acquire correct opinions. Depraved eloquence is a hurtful accomplishment ; for to persons of inadequate information it always carries the appearance of truth in its readiness of speech. I know

not, indeed, how you received his books ; but if I am correctly informed, you are said, after reading them, to have been so greatly overjoyed, that you (though an elderly man and a presbyter) kissed the face of this youthful layman, and thanked him for having been taught what you had been previously ignorant of. Now, in this conduct of yours I do not disapprove of your humility ; indeed, I rather commend it ; for it was not the man whom you praised, but the truth itself which deigned to speak to you through him : only I wish you were able to point out to me what was the truth which you received through him. I should, therefore, be glad if you would show me, in your answer to this letter, what it was he taught you. Be it far from me to be ashamed to learn from a presbyter, since you did not blush to be instructed by a layman, in proclaiming and imitating your humble conduct, if the lessons were only true in which you received instruction.

CHAP. 2. [II.]

Therefore, brother greatly beloved, I desire to know what you learned of him, in order that, if I already possessed the knowledge, I might participate in your joy ; but if I happened to be ignorant, I might be instructed by you. Did you not then understand that there were two certain principles, soul and spirit, according as it is said in Scripture, “Thou wilt separate my life [soul, *animam*] from my spirit” ?¹ And that both of them pertain to man’s nature, so that the entire human being consists of spirit, and soul, and body ? Sometimes, however, the two are combined together under the designation of *soul* ; for instance, in the passage, “And man became a living soul.”² Now, in this place the *spirit* is implied. Similarly in sundry passages the two are described under the name of spirit, as when it is written, “And He bowed His head and gave up the ghost [or spirit];”³ in which passage the soul or vital principle must also be understood. And the two are of one and the same substance. I suppose that you already knew all this. But if you did not, then you may as well know that you have not acquired any great knowledge,

¹ Job vii. 14. [Ἀπαλλάξεις ἀπὸ πνεύματός μου τὴν ψυχὴν μου, Sept.]

² Gen. ii. 7.

³ John xix. 30.

the ignorance of which would be attended with much danger. If there must be any keener or more subtle discussion on such points, it would be better to carry on the controversy with himself, whose wordy qualities we have already discovered. The questions we might consider are: whether, when mention is made of the soul, the spirit is also implied in the term in such a way that the two comprise the soul, the spirit being, as it were, some part of it,—whether, in fact (as this person seemed to think), under the designation *soul*, the whole is so designated from only a part; or else, whether the two together make up the spirit, that which is properly called soul being a part thereof; whether again, in fact, the whole is not called from only a part, when the term *spirit* is used in such a wide sense as to comprehend the soul also, as this man supposes. These, however, are but subtle distinctions, and ignorance about them certainly is not attended with any great danger.

CHAP. 3.

Again, I wonder whether this man taught you the difference between the bodily senses and the sensibilities of the soul; and whether you, who were a person of considerable age and position before you took lessons of this man, used to consider that faculty to be one and the same by which white and black are distinguished, which sparrows even see as well as ourselves, and that by which justice and injustice are discriminated, which Tobias also perceived even after he lost the sight of his eyes.¹ If you held the identity, then, of course, when you heard or read the words, “Lighten my eyes, that I sleep not in death,”² you merely thought of the eyes of the body. Or if this were an obscure point, at all events when you recalled the words of the apostle, “The eyes of your understanding being enlightened,”³ you must have supposed that we possessed an understanding somewhere between our forehead and cheeks. Well, I am very far from thinking this of you, so that this instructor of yours could not have given you such a lesson.

[¹ Properly it is Tobias' father *Tobit* who is here meant. See Tobit iv. 5, 6; compare ii. 10.]

² Ps. xiii. 3.

³ Eph. i. 18.

CHAP. 4.

And if you happened to suppose, before receiving the instruction from this teacher, which you are rejoicing to have received, that the human soul is a portion of God's nature, then you were ignorant how false and terribly dangerous this opinion was. And if you only were taught by this person that the soul is not a portion of God, then I bid you thank God as earnestly as you can that you were not taken away out of the body before learning so important a lesson. For you would have quitted life a great heretic and a terrible blasphemer. However, I never could have believed this of you, that a man who is both a Catholic and a presbyter of no contemptible position like yourself, could by any means have thought that the soul's nature is a portion of God. I therefore cannot help expressing to your beloved self my fears that this man has by some means or other taught you that which is decidedly opposed to the faith which you were holding.

CHAP. 5. [III.]—*Created beings, in what sense they are of God (ex Deo).*

Now, though I do not suppose that you, a member of the Catholic Church, ever believed the human soul to be a portion of God, or that the soul's nature is in any degree identical with God's, I still have some apprehension that you may be induced to fall in with this man's opinion, that "God did not make the soul out of nothing, but that the soul is so far of Him as to have emanated forth from Himself." For he has put out such a statement as this, with his other opinions, which have led him out of the usual track on this subject to a huge precipice. Now, if he has taught you this, I do not want you to teach it to me; nay, I should wish you to unlearn what you have been taught. It is, indeed, of only small moment to avoid believing and saying that the soul is a part of God. We do not even say that the Son or the Holy Ghost is a part of God, although we affirm that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are all of one and the same nature. It is, then, a small matter for us not to say that the soul is a part of God, but it is of indispensable importance that we should not affirm that the soul and God are of one and the self-same nature. This person is therefore right in declaring that

“souls are God’s offspring, not by nature, but by gift ;” and then, of course, not the souls of all men, but of the faithful. But afterwards he returned to the statement from which he had shrunk, and affirmed that God and the soul are of one and the same nature—not, indeed, in so many words, but plainly and manifestly to such a purport. For when he says that the soul is of God, in such a manner that God created it not of any other nature, nor out of nothing, but out of His own self, what would he have us believe but the very thing which he denies, in other words, even that the soul is of the self-same nature as God Himself is ? For every nature is either God, who has no author ; or of God, as having Him for its Author. But the nature which has for its author God, of whom it exists, is in one sense not made, in another sense created. Now, that nature which is not made and yet is of Him, is either begotten by Him or proceeds from Him. That which is begotten is His only Son, that which proceedeth is the Holy Ghost, and this Trinity is of one and the self-same nature. For these three are one, and each one is God, and all three together are one God, unchangeable, eternal, without any beginning or ending of time. That nature, on the other hand, which is created is called creature ; God is its Creator, even the blessed Trinity. The creature, therefore, is said to be *of God* in such wise as not to be made out of His nature. It is predicated as *of Him*, inasmuch as it has in Him the author of its being, not so as to have been born of Him, or to have proceeded from Him, but as having been created, moulded, and formed by Him, in some constituents of it, out of no other substance,—that is, absolutely out of nothing, as, for instance, the heaven and the earth, or rather the whole material of the universe coeval in its creation with the world—but, in some particulars, out of a nature already created and in existence, as, for instance, man out of the dust, woman out of the man, and man out of his parents ; still every creature is of God,—but God creating it either out of nothing, or out of something previously existing, not, however, begetting it or producing it out of His own very self.

CHAP. 6.

All this, however, I am saying to a Catholic: advising with him rather than teaching him. For I do not suppose that these things are new to you; or that they have been long heard of by you, but not believed. This epistle of mine, you will, I am sure, so read as to recognise in its statement your own faith also, which is by the gracious gift of the Lord the common property of us all in the Catholic Church. Since, then (as I was saying), I am now speaking to a Catholic, from what original, I pray you tell me, do you suppose that the soul, I will not say your soul or my own soul, but the soul of the first man, was given to him? If you admit that it came from nothing, made, however, and inbreathed into him by God, then your belief tallies with my own. If, on the contrary, you suppose that it came out of some other created thing, which served as a substratum, as it were, for the divine Artificer to make the soul out of, just as the dust was the material of which Adam was formed, or the rib whence Eve was made, or the waters whence the fishes and the fowls were created, or the ground out of which the terrestrial animals were formed: then this opinion is not Catholic, nor is it true. But further, if you think, which may God forbid, that the divine Creator made, or is still making, human souls out of nothing, out of no other created material, but out of His own self, that is, out of His own natural substance, then you have learnt this of your new instructor; but I cannot congratulate you, or flatter you, on the discovery. You have wandered along with him very far from the Catholic faith. Better would it be, though it would be untrue, yet it would be better, I say, and more tolerable, that you should believe the soul to have been made out of some other created substance, which God had already formed, than out of God's own uncreated substance; so that what is mutable, and sinful, and impious, and if persistent to the end in the impiety would have to suffer eternal damnation, should not with horrible blasphemy be referrible for its origin to the pure nature of God! Away, brother, I beseech you, away with this (I will not call it) faith, but execrably impious error. May God avert from you, a man of gravity and a presbyter, the misery of being seduced

by a youthful layman ; and, while supposing that your opinion is the Catholic faith, of being lost from the number of the faithful. For I must not deal with you as I might with him ; nor does this tremendous error, when yours, deserve the same indulgence as being that of this young man, although you may have derived it from him. *He* has but just now found his way to the Catholic fold to get healing and safety ;¹ *you* have a rank among the very shepherds of that fold. But we would not that a sheep which comes to the Lord's flock for shelter from error, should be healed of his sores in such a way, as first to infect and destroy the shepherd by his contagious presence.

CHAP. 7.

But if you say to me, He has not taught me this ; nor have I by any means given my assent to this erroneous opinion of his, however much I was enchanted by the sweetness of his eloquent and elegant discourse ; then I earnestly thank God. Still I cannot help asking, why, even with kisses, as the report goes, you expressed your gratitude to him for having learned what you were ignorant of, previous to hearing his discussion. Now if it be a false report which makes you to have done and said so much, then I beg you to be kind enough to give me this assurance, that the idle rumour may be stopt by your own written authority. If, however, it is true that you bestowed your thanks with such humility upon this man, I should rejoice, indeed, if he has not taught you to believe the opinion which I have already pointed out as a detestable one, and to be carefully avoided as such. Nor shall I find fault [iv.] if your humble thanks to your instructor were further earned by your having acquired from discussions with him some other true and useful knowledge. But may I ask you what it is ? Is it that the soul is not a spiritual but a bodily substance ? Well, I really do not think ignorance on such a point is any great injury to Christian learning. And even you indulge in subtle disputes about the different kinds of bodily substance : I think the information you obtain is more difficult than serviceable. If,

¹ See below in chap. 14. [x.]

however, the Lord will that I should write to this young man himself, as I desire to do, then perhaps your loving self¹ will know to what extent you are not indebted to him for your instruction; although you rejoice in what you have learnt from him. And now I request you not to feel annoyance in writing me an answer; so that what is clearly useful and pertinent to our indispensable faith may not by any chance turn out to be something different.

CHAP. 8.

Now with regard to the point, which with perfect propriety and great soundness of view he believes, that souls after quitting the body are judged, before they encounter that final judgment to which they must submit when their bodies are restored to them, and be either tormented or glorified in the very same flesh wherein they once lived here on earth; is it, let me ask you, the case that you were really ignorant of all this? Who ever had his mind so obstinately set against the gospel as not to hear these truths, and after hearing to believe them, in the parable of the poor man who was carried away after death to Abraham's bosom, and of the rich man who is set forth as suffering torment in hell?² But has this man taught you how it was that the soul when disembodied could crave from the beggar's finger a drop of water;³ when he himself confessed, that the soul only required bodily aliment for the purpose of protecting the perishing body which encloses it from dissolution? These are his words: "Is it," asks he, "because the soul craves meat and drink, that we suppose material food passes into it?" Then shortly afterwards he says: "From this circumstance it is understood and proved, that the sustenance of meat and drink is not wanted for the soul, but for the body: for which clothing also, in addition to food, is provided in like manner; so that the supplying of food seems to be necessary to that nature, which is also fitted for wearing clothes." This opinion of his he expounds clearly enough; but he adds some illustrative similes, and says: "Now what do we suppose the occupier of a house does on an inspection of his dwelling? If he observe the tenement

¹ *Dilectio tua.*² See Luke xvi. 22, 23.³ Luke xvi. 24.

has a shaky roof, or a nodding wall, or a weak foundation, does he not fetch girders and build up buttresses, in order that he may succeed in propping up by his care and diligence the fabric which threatened to fall, so that in the dangerous plight of the residence the peril which evidently overhung the occupier might be warded off? From this simile," says he, "see how the soul craves for good for its fleshly tenement, from which it undoubtedly conceives the appetite itself." Such are the very lucid and adequate words in which this young person has explained his ideas: he asserts that it is not the soul, but the body, which requires food; out of a careful regard, no doubt, of the former for the latter, as one that occupies a dwelling-house, and by a prudent repair prevents the downfall with which the fleshly tenement was threatened. Well, now, let him go on to explain to you what probable ruin this particular soul of the rich man was so eager to prevent by propping up, seeing that it no longer possessed a mortal body, and yet suffered thirst, and begged for the drop of water from the poor man's finger. Here is a good knotty question for this astute instructor of elderly men to exercise himself on; let him inquire, and find a solution if he can: for what purpose did that soul in hell beg the aliment of ever so small a drop of water, when it had no ruinous tenement to support?

CHAP. 9. [v.]—*The Son of God is a different person from the Father, but not a different substance.*

In that he believes God to be truly incorporeal, I congratulate him that herein, at all events, he has kept himself uninfluenced by the ravings of Tertullian. For *he* insisted, that as the soul is corporeal, so likewise is God.¹ It is therefore specially surprising that our author, who differs from Tertullian in this point, yet labours to persuade us that God, who is incorporeal, does not make the soul out of nothing, but exhales it as a sort of corporeal breath out of His own substance. What a wonderful learning that must be to which every age erects its attentive ears, and which contrives to gain for its disciples men of advanced years, and even presbyters!

¹ See Tertullian's Treatise *De Anima* [in Clark's Ante-Nicene Christian Library]. See also our Augustine, *Hæres.* 86, and *Epist.* 190.

Let this eminent man read what he has written, read it in public; let him invite to hear the reading well known persons and unknown ones, learned and unlearned. Old men, assemble with your younger instructors; learn what you used to know nothing about; hear now what you had never heard before. Behold, according to the teaching of this scribe, God creates a breath, not out of any material creature which exists in some way or other, not out of that which absolutely has no existence; but out of that nature which He is Himself, perfectly incorporeal, He breathes a creature into corporeal being: so that He actually changes His own incorporeal nature into corporeity, before it undergoes the change into the body of sin. Does he mean to say, that He does not change something out of His own nature, when He creates breath? Then, of course, He does not make that breath out of His own substance. For He is not Himself one thing, and His nature another thing. What is this insane man thinking of? But if he means to say, that God creates breath out of His own natural substance, in such a way as to remain absolutely entire Himself, this is not the question. The real question is, whether that which comes not of some previously created substance, nor from nothing, but from Him, is not identical with Him, that is, is of the self-same nature and essence? Now He remains absolutely entire after the birth of His Son; but this is because He begat Him of His own nature: He did not beget a something which was different from that which He is Himself. For, excepting the circumstance that the Word took on Himself human nature and became flesh, the Word who is the Son of God is not a different nature or essence, though He is, indeed, a different person. And whence does this come to pass, except from the fact that He is not created out of something else, or out of nothing, but is begotten of Himself; not that He might better His condition by His birth, but that He might be altogether even what *He* is, of whom He is begotten; that is, of one and the same nature, equal, co-eternal, in every way like, equally unchangeable, equally invisible, equally incorporeal, equally God; in a word, that He might be altogether what the Father is, except that He actually is Himself the Son, and not the

Father? But if He remains Himself the same God entire and unimpaired, but yet creates something different from Himself, and worse than Himself, not, to be sure, out of nothing, nor out of some other creature, but out of His very self; and that something emanates as a corporeal creature out of the incorporeal God; then God forbid that a Catholic should imbibe such an opinion, for it does not flow from the divine fountain, but it is a mere fiction of the human mind.

CHAP. 10. [VI.]

Then, again, how inaptly he labours to free the soul, which he supposes to be corporeal, from the passions of the body, raising questions about the soul's infancy; about the soul's emotions, when paralysed and oppressed; about the amputation of bodily limbs, without cutting or dividing the soul. But in dealing with such points as these, my duty is to treat rather with him than with you; it is for him to labour hard to assign a reason for all he says. In this way we shall not seem to wish to be too importunate with an elderly man's gravity on the subject of a young man's work. As to the topic of the similarity of disposition to the parents which is discovered in their children, he does not dispute its coming from the soul's germ or seed. Accordingly, this is the opinion of those persons who do away with the soul's propagation, although not even the opposite party who entertain this theory place in the fact in question the weight of their assertion. Naturally enough, for they observe also that children are unlike their parents in disposition; and the reason of this, as they suppose, is, that one and the same person very often has various dispositions himself, unlike each other,—not, of course, that he has received another soul, but that his life has undergone a change for the better or for the worse. So they say that there is no impossibility in a soul's not possessing the same disposition which *he* had by whom it was propagated, seeing that the self-same soul may have different dispositions at different times. If, therefore, you think that you have learnt this of him, that the soul does not come to us by natural transmission at birth, I only wish that you had discovered from him the truth of the case,—I would with the greatest pleasure resign

myself to your hands to learn the whole truth. But really to learn is one thing, and to seem to yourself to have learned is another thing. If, then, you suppose that you have learned what you still are ignorant of, you have evidently not learnt, but given a random credence to a pleasant hearsay. Falsity has stolen over you in the suavity.¹ Now I do not say this from feeling as yet any certainty as to the proposition being false, which asserts that souls are created afresh by God's inbreathing rather than derived from the parents at birth; for I think that this is a point which still requires proof from those who find themselves able to teach it. No; my reason for saying it is, that this person has discussed the whole subject in such a way as not only not to solve the point still in dispute, but even to indulge in statements which leave no doubt as to their falsity. In his desire to prove things of doubtful import, he has boldly stated things which undoubtedly merit reprobation.

CHAP. 11. [VII.]

Would you hesitate yourself to reprobate what he has said concerning the soul? "You will not have it," he says, "that the soul contracts health and strength from the sinful flesh; to what holy state can you see it in due course pass, with a view to the amendment of its state, through that very flesh by which it had lost its worthiness? Is it because baptism washes the body that the supposed benefit of baptism does not pass on to the soul or spirit? It is only right, therefore, that the soul should, by means of the flesh, repair that old condition which it had seemed to have gradually lost through the flesh, in order that it may begin a regenerate state by means of that whereby it had deserved to be polluted." Now, do observe how grave an error this teacher has fallen into! He says that "the soul repairs its condition by means of the flesh through which it had lost its virtue." The soul, then, must have possessed some meritorious state and condition previous to its incarnation, which he would have that it recovers through the flesh when the flesh is cleansed in the laver of regeneration. Therefore, previous to its connection

¹ [This play of words too inadequately represents Augustine's *Subrepsit tibi falsiloquium per suaviloquium.*]

with the flesh, the soul had lived somewhere in a state of worthiness and good, which condition and meritoriousness it lost when it came into the flesh. His words are, "that the soul justly repairs by means of the flesh that primitive condition which it had seemed to have gradually lost through the flesh." The soul, then, possessed before its incarnation an ancient condition (for his term *priscam* describes the antiquity of the state); and what could that ancient condition have possibly been, but a blessed and laudable state? Now, he avers that this happiness is recovered through the sacrament of baptism, although he will not admit that the soul derives its origin through propagation from that soul which was once manifestly happy in paradise. How is it, then, that in another passage he says that "he constantly affirms of the soul that it exists not by propagation, nor comes out of nothing, nor exists by its own self, nor previous to its junction with the body"? You see how in this place he insists that souls do exist prior to their junction with the body somewhere or other, and that in so happy a state that the same happiness is restored to them by means of baptism. But, as if forgetful of his own views, he goes on to speak of its "beginning a regenerate state by means of that," meaning the flesh, "whereby it had deserved to be polluted." In a previous statement he had indicated some good desert which had been lost by the flesh; now, however, he speaks of some evil desert, by means of which it had happened that the soul had to come, or be sent, into an incarnate state; for his words are, "By which it had deserved to be polluted;" and if it deserved to be polluted, its merits could not, of course, have been of a worthy kind. Pray let him tell us what sin it had committed previous to its pollution by the flesh, in consequence of which it merited such pollution by the flesh. Let him, if he can, explain to us a matter which is utterly beyond his power, because it is certainly far above his reach to discover what to tell us on this subject which shall be true.

CHAP. 12. [VIII.]

He also says some time afterwards: "Although the soul deserved to be sinful, which could not else have been sinful, yet it did not remain in sin; because, as it was prefigured in

Christ, it was bound not to be in a sinful state, even as it was unable to be." Now, my brother, do you, I ask, really think thus? At any rate, have you formed such an opinion, after having read and duly considered his words, and after having reflected upon what extorted from you praise during his reading, and the expression of your gratitude after he had ended? I pray you, tell me what this means: "Although the soul deserved to be sinful, which could not else have been sinful." What mean his phrases, *deserved* and *could not*? For it could not possibly have deserved its alleged fate, unless it had been sinful; nor would it have been, unless it could have been, sinful,—so as, by committing sin previous to any evil desert, it might make for itself a position whence it might, under God's desertion, advance to the commission of other sins. When he said, "which could not have been sinful," did he mean, which would not have been able to be sinful, unless it came in the flesh? But how did it deserve a mission at all into a state where it could be sinful, when it could not possibly have become capable of sinning anywhere else, unless it entered that particular state? Let him, then, tell us how it so deserved. For if it deserved to become capable of sinning, it must certainly have already committed some sin, in consequence of which it deserved to be sinful again. These points, however, may perhaps appear to be obscure, or may be tauntingly said to be of such a character, but they are really most plain and clear. The truth is, he ought not to have said that "the soul deserved to become sinful through the flesh," when he will never be able to discover any desert of the soul, either good or bad, previous to its being in the flesh.

CHAP. 13. [IX.]

Let us now go on to still plainer matters. For while he was confined within these great straits, as to how souls can be held bound by the chain of original sin, when they derive not their origin from the soul which first sinned, but the Creator breathes them afresh at every birth into sinful flesh,—pure from all contagion and propagation,—in order that he might avoid the objection being brought against his argument, that at this rate God makes these souls guilty by such insufflation, he first of all had recourse to the theory drawn from God's

prescience, that "He had provided redemption for them." Infants are by the sacrament of this redemption baptized, so that the original sin which they contracted from the flesh is washed away, as if God were remedying His own acts for having made these souls polluted. But afterwards, when he comes to speak of those who receive no such assistance, but expire before they are baptized, he says: "In this place I do not offer myself as an authority, but I present you with an example by way of conjecture. We say, then, that some such method as this must be had recourse to in the case of infants, who, being predestinated for baptism, are yet, by their frail condition in this life, hurried away before they are born again in Christ. Of such," adds he, "we read it is written, Speedily was he taken away, lest that wickedness should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul. Therefore [God] hastened to take him away from among the wicked, for his soul pleased the Lord; and, being made perfect in a short time, he fulfilled a long time."¹ Now who would disdain having such a teacher as this? Is it the case, then, with infants, whom people usually wish to have baptized, even hurriedly, before they die, that, if they should be detained ever so short a time in this life, that they might be baptized, and then at once die, wickedness would alter their understanding, and deceit beguile their soul; and to prevent this happening to them, a hasty death came to their rescue, so that they were suddenly taken away before they were baptized? By their very baptism, then, they were changed for the worse, and beguiled by deceit, if it was after baptism that they were snatched away. O excellent teaching, worthy to be admired and closely followed!² But he took a great liberty with the prudence of all you who were present at his reading, and especially with yours, [my brother,] to whom he addressed this treatise, and handed it after the reading, in supposing that you would believe that the scripture he quoted was intended for the case of unbaptized infants, written, as it was, of the ages of all saints who died early in life, whom foolish men deem to be hardly dealt with, whenever

¹ Wisd. iv. 11, 14, 13.

² Sectanda. [Another reading for *admiranda atque sectanda* has *detestanda et execranda* (worthy of abhorrence and execration).

they are suddenly removed from the present life, and are not permitted to attain to the years which people covet for themselves as a great god-send. What, however, is the meaning of these words of his: "Infants predestinated for baptism, who are yet, by their frail condition in this life, hurried away before they are born again in Christ," as if some power of fortune, or fate, or anything else you please, did not permit God to fulfil what He had fore-ordained? And how is it that He hurries them Himself away, when they have pleased Him? Then, does He really predestinate them to be baptized, and then Himself hinder the accomplishment of the very thing which He has predestinated?

CHAP. 14. [X.]

But I beg you mark his boldness still, who takes a dislike to our hesitancy, which prefers to be cautious rather than over-knowing in a question so profound as this: "I would be bold to say"—such are his words—"that they can attain to the forgiveness of their original sins, yet not so as to be admitted into the kingdom of heaven. Just as in the case of the thief on the cross, who confessed but was not baptized, the Lord did not give him the kingdom of heaven, but paradise;¹ the words remaining accordingly in full force, 'Except a man be born again of water and of the Holy Ghost, he shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.'² This is especially true, inasmuch as the Lord acknowledges that in His Father's house are many mansions,³ by which are indicated the many different merits of those who dwell in them; so that in these abodes the unbaptized is brought to forgiveness, and the baptized to the reward which by grace has been prepared for him." You observe how the man keeps paradise and the mansions of the Father's house distinct from the kingdom of heaven, so that even unbaptized persons may have an abundant provision in places of eternal happiness. Nor does he see, when he says all this, that he is so unwilling to distinguish the future abode of a baptized infant from the kingdom of heaven as to have no fear in keeping distinct therefrom the very house of God the Father, or the several parts thereof. For the Lord Jesus did not say: In all the created universe, or in any portion of that universe,

¹ Luke xxiii. 43.

² John iii. 5.

³ John xiv. 2.

but, "In my Father's house, are many mansions." But in what way shall an unbaptized person live in the house of God the Father, when he cannot possibly have God for his Father, except he be born again? He should not be so ungrateful to God, who has vouchsafed to deliver him from the sect of the Donatists or Rogatists, as to aim at dividing the house of God the Father, and to put one portion of it outside the kingdom of heaven, where the unbaptized may be able to dwell. And on what terms does he himself presume that he is to enter into the kingdom of heaven, when from that kingdom he excludes the house of the King Himself, in what part soever He pleases? From the case, however, of the thief who, when crucified at the Lord's side, put his hope in the Lord, who was crucified with him, and from the case of Dinocrates, the brother of St. Perpetua, he argues that even to the unbaptized may be given the remission of sins, and an abode with the blessed; as if any one, to whom unbelief would be a sin, had shown him that the thief and Dinocrates had not been baptized. Concerning these cases, however, I have more fully explained my views in the book which I wrote to our brother Renuus.¹ This your loving self will be able to ascertain if you will condescend to read the book; for I am sure our brother will not find it in his heart to refuse you, if you ask him the loan of it.

CHAP. 15. [XI.]

Still he chafes with indecision, and is well-nigh suffocated in the terrible straits of his theory; for very likely he descries with a more sensitive eye than you, the amount of evil which he enunciates, to the effect that original sin in infants is effaced without Christ's sacrament of baptism. It is, indeed, for the purpose of finding an escape to some extent, and tardily, in the Church's sacraments that he says: "In their behalf I most certainly judge,² that constant oblations and incessant sacrifices must be offered up on the part of the holy priests." Well, then, you may take him if you like for your arbiter, if it were not enough to have him as your instructor. Let him decide that you must offer up the sacrifice of Christ's body even for those who have not been admitted into Christ's

¹ See Book i. of the present treatise, chaps. 11 [ix.] and 12 [x.] ² Censeo.

mystical body. Now this is quite a novel idea, and foreign to the Church's discipline and the rule of truth: and yet, when daring to propound it in his books, he does not modestly say, I rather think; he does not say, I suppose; he does not say, I am of opinion; nor does he say, I at least would suggest, or mention;—but he uses the authoritative term *censeo*, I give it as my decision; so that, should we be (as might be likely) offended by the novelty or the perverseness of his opinion, we might be overawed by the authority of his judicial determination. It is your own concern, my brother, how to be able to bear him as your instructor in these views. Catholic priests, however, of right feeling (and among *them* you ought to take your place) could never keep quiet—God forbid it—and hear this man pronounce his decisions, when they would wish him rather to recover his senses, and be sorry both for having entertained such opinions, and for having gone so far as to commit them to writing, and chastise himself with the most wholesome discipline of repentance. “Now it is,” says he, “on this example of the Maccabees who fell in battle that I ground the necessity of doing this. When they offered stealthily some interdicted sacrifices, and after they had fallen in the battle, we find,” says he, “that this remedial measure was at once resorted to by the priests,—sacrifices were offered up to liberate their souls, which had been bound by the guilt of their forbidden conduct.”¹ But he says all this, as if (according to his reading of the story) those atoning sacrifices were offered up for uncircumcised persons, as he has decided that these sacrifices of ours must be offered up for unbaptized persons. For circumcision was the sacrament of that period, which prefigured the baptism of our day.

CHAP. 16. [XII.]—*Vincentius Victor promises to the unbaptized paradise after their death, and the kingdom of heaven after their resurrection.*

But your friend, in comparison with what he has shown himself to be further on, thus far makes mistakes which one may somewhat tolerate. He apparently felt some disposition to relent; not, to be sure, at what he ought to have misgivings about, even for having ventured to assert that original sin is relaxed even in the case of the unbaptized, and that remission

¹ [This is a loose reference to the narrative in 2 Macc. xii. 39-45.]

is given to them of all their sins, so that they are admitted into paradise, that is, to a place of great happiness, and possess a claim to the happy mansions in our Father's house; but he seems to have entertained some regret at having conceded to them abodes of lesser blessedness outside the kingdom of heaven. Accordingly he goes on to say, "If any one happen to dislike the opinion, that paradise is bestowed as a temporary and provisional gift on the soul of the thief or of Dinocrates, and that there remains for them still, in the resurrection, the reward of the kingdom of heaven—although the opinion is opposed to the sentence of the Prince,¹ 'Except a man be born again of water and of the Spirit, he shall not enter into the kingdom of God,'²—he may yet hold my assent as ungrudgingly given to this point; only let him magnify³ both the aim and the effect of the divine compassion and foreknowledge." These words have I copied, as I read them in his second book. Well, now, could any one have shown on this erroneous point greater boldness, recklessness, or presumption? He actually quotes and calls attention to the Lord's weighty sentence, encloses it in a statement of his own, and then says, "Although the opinion is opposed to the sentence of the Prince, 'Except a man be born again of water and of the Spirit, he shall not enter into the kingdom of God;'" he dares then to lift his haughty head in censure against the Prince's judgment: "He may yet hold my assent as ungrudgingly given to this point;" and he explains his point to be, that the souls of unbaptized persons have a claim to paradise as a temporary gift; and in this class he mentions the dying thief and Dinocrates, as if he were prescribing, or rather prejudging, their destination; moreover, in the resurrection, he will have them transferred to a better provision, even making them receive the reward of the kingdom of heaven. "Although," says he, "this is opposed to the sentence of the Prince." Now, do you, my brother, I pray you, seriously consider this question: What sentence of the Prince shall that man deserve to have passed upon him, who imposes on any person an assent

¹ Acts v. 31.

² John iii. 5.

³ [Or perhaps, "as simply amplifying both the effect and the purpose of," etc. etc.]

of his own which runs counter to the authority of the Prince Himself ?

CHAP. 17.—*Disobedient compassion and compassionate disobedience reprobated. Martyrdom in lieu of baptism.*

The new-fangled Pelagian heretics have been most justly condemned by the authority of Catholic councils and of the Apostolic see, on the ground of their having dared to give to unbaptized infants a place of rest and salvation, even besides the kingdom of heaven. This they would not have dared to do, if they did not deny their having original sin, and the need of its remission by the sacrament of baptism. This man, however, professes the Catholic belief on this point, admitting that infants are tied in the bonds of original sin, and yet he releases them from these bonds without the laver of regeneration, and after death, in his compassion, he admits them into paradise ; while, with a still ampler compassion, he introduces them after the resurrection even to the kingdom of heaven. Such compassion did Saul see fit to assume when he spared the king [Agag] whom God commanded to be slain ;¹ deservedly, however, was his disobedient compassion, or (if you prefer it) his compassionate disobedience, reprobated and condemned, that man may be on his guard against extending mercy to his fellow-man, in opposition to the sentence of Him by whom man was made. Truth, by the mouth of Itself incarnate, proclaims as if in a voice of thunder : “ Except a man be born again of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.”² And in order to except martyrs from this sentence, to whose lot it has fallen to be slain for the name of Christ before being washed in the baptism of Christ, He says in another passage, “ He that loseth His life for my sake shall find it.”³ And so far from promising the abolition of original sin to any one who has not been regenerated in the laver of Christian faith, the apostle exclaims, “ By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation.”⁴ And as a counterbalance against this condemnation, the Lord exhibits the help of His salvation alone, saying, “ He that believeth, and is baptized, shall be saved ;

¹ 1 Sam. xv. 9.

³ Matt. x. 39.

² John iii. 5.

⁴ Rom. v. 18.

but he that believeth not shall be damned.”¹ Now the mystery of this believing in the case of infants is completely effected by the response of the sureties by whom they are taken to baptism; and unless this be effected, they all pass by the offence of one to condemnation. And yet, in opposition to such clear declarations uttered by Truth Himself, forth marches before all men a vanity which is more piteous than pitiful, and says: Not only do infants not pass into condemnation, though no laver of Christian faith absolves them from the chain of original sin, but they even after death have an intermediate enjoyment of the felicities of paradise, and after the resurrection they shall possess even the happiness of the kingdom of heaven. Now, would this man dare to say all this in opposition to the firmly-established Catholic faith, if he had not presumptuously undertaken to solve a question which transcends his powers touching the origin of the soul?

CHAP. 18. [XIII.]

For he is hemmed in within terrible straits by those who make the natural inquiry: “Why has God visited on the soul so unjust a punishment as to have willed to exile it in a body of sin, when by its consorting with the flesh it began to be sinful, which else could not have been sinful?” For, of course, they say: “The soul could not have been sinful, if God had not commingled it in the participation of sinful flesh.” Well, this opponent of mine was unable to discover the justice of God’s doing this, especially in consequence of the eternal damnation of infants who die without the remission of original sin by baptism; and, as a matter of course, his inability was equally great in finding out why the good and righteous God both bound the souls of infants, who He saw would derive no advantage from the sacrament of Christian grace, with the chain of original sin, by sending them into the body which they derive from Adam,—the souls themselves being [by the hypothesis] free from all taint of propagation,—and by this means also made them amenable to eternal damnation. [Equal to his inability to make these discoveries, when challenged,] was his unwillingness to admit that these very

¹ Mark xvi. 16.

souls likewise derived their sinful origin from that one primeval soul. [In face of this inability and unwillingness,] he preferred escaping by a miserable shipwreck of faith, rather than furl his sails and steady his oars, in the voyage of his controversy, and by such prudent counsel check the fatal rashness of his course. Worthless in his youthful eye was our aged cautiousness; just as if this most troublesome and perilous question of his was more in need of a torrent of eloquence than the counsel of prudence. And this was foreseen even by himself, but to no purpose; for, as if to set forth the points which were objected to him by his opponents, he says: "After them other reproachful censures are added to the querulous murmurings of those who rail against us; and, as if tossed about in a whirlwind, we dash repeatedly among huge rocks." After saying this, he propounded for himself the very dangerous question, which we have already treated, wherein he wrecked the Catholic faith; [and must have been lost] unless by a real repentance he repaired the faith which he had shattered. That whirlwind and those rocks I have myself avoided, unwilling to entrust my frail barque to their dangers; and when writing on this subject I have expressed myself in such a way as rather to explain the grounds of my hesitancy, than to exhibit the rashness of presumption.¹ This little work of mine excited his derision, when he met with it at your house, and in utter recklessness he flung himself upon the reef: he showed more spirit than wisdom in his conduct. To what lengths, however, that over-confidence of his led him, I suppose that you can now yourself perceive. But I give heartier thanks to God, since you even before this descried it. For all the while he was refusing to check his headlong career, when the issue of his course was still in doubt, he alighted on his miserable enterprise, and maintained that God, in the case of infants who died without Christian regeneration, conferred upon them paradise at once, and ultimately the kingdom of heaven.

CHAP. 19. [XIV.]

The passages of Scripture, indeed, which he has adduced in

¹ [See Augustine's treatises, *De Libero Arbitrio*, iii. 21; *De Peccatorum Meritis*, ii. (last chapter); *Epist.* (166) *ad Hieronymum*, and (190) *ad Optatum*.]

the attempt to prove from them that God did not derive human souls by propagation from the primitive soul, but that He formed them by breathing them into each individual, as He did in the very first instance, are so uncertain and ambiguous, that they can with the utmost facility be taken in a different sense from that which he would assign to them. This point I have already demonstrated¹ with sufficient clearness, I think, in the book which I addressed to that friend of ours, of whom I have made mention above. The very passages which he has used for his proofs, inform us that God gives, or makes, or fashions men's souls; but whence He gives them, or of what He makes or fashions them, they tell us nothing: they leave untouched the question, whether it be by propagation from the first soul, or by insufflation, as He created the first soul. This writer, however, simply because he reads that God "giveth" souls² [to the people upon earth], "hath made" souls, "formeth" souls, supposes that these phrases amount to a denial of the propagation of souls; whereas, by the testimony of the same scripture, God *gives* men their bodies, or *makes* them, or *fashions* and *forms* them; although no one doubts that the said bodies are given, made, and formed by Him by seminal propagation.

CHAP. 20.

As for the passage which affirms that "God hath made of one blood all nations of men,"³ and that in which Adam says, "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh,"⁴ inasmuch as it is not asserted in the one, *of one soul*, and in the other, *soul of my soul*, he supposes that a denial is implied of children's souls coming to them from their parents, or the first woman's from her husband; just as if, forsooth, had the sentence run in the way suggested, *of one soul*, instead of "of one blood," anything else than the whole human being could be understood, without any denial of the propagation of the body. So likewise, if it had been said, *soul of my soul*, the flesh would not be denied, of course, which evidently had been taken out of the man. Constantly does Holy Scripture indicate the whole by a part, and a part by the whole. For certainly, if

¹ [See above in Book i. 17 [xiv.] and following chap.]

² Isa. xlii. 5.

³ Acts xvii. 26.

⁴ Gen. ii. 23.

in the passage which this man has quoted as his proof it had been said that the human race had been made, not of one blood, but of one man, it could not have prejudiced the opinion of those who deny the propagation of souls, although man is not soul alone, nor only flesh, but both. For they would have their answer ready to this effect, that the Scripture here might have meant to indicate the whole by a part, that is to say, the entire human being by his flesh only. In like manner, they who maintain the propagation of souls contend that in the passage where it is said, "of one blood," the human being is implied by the term "blood," on the principle of the whole being expressed by a part. For just as the one party seems to be assisted by the expression, "of one blood," instead of the phrase, "of one man," so the other side evidently gets countenance from the statement being so plainly written, "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, [from him] in whom all sinned,"¹ instead of its being said, "in whom the flesh of all sinned." Similarly, as one party seems to receive assistance from the fact that Scripture says, "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh," on the ground that a part covers the whole; so, again, the other side derives some advantage from what is written in the immediate sequel of the passage, "She shall be called woman, because she was taken out of her husband." For, according to their contention, the latter clause should have run, "Because her flesh was taken out of her husband," if it was not true that the entire woman, soul and all, but only her flesh, was taken out of man. The fact, however, of the whole matter is simply this, that after hearing both sides, anybody whose judgment is free from party prejudice sees at once that loose quotation is unavailing in this controversy; for against one party, which maintains the opinion of the propagation of souls, those passages must not be adduced which mention only a part, inasmuch as the Scripture might mean by the part to imply the whole in all such passages; as, for instance, when we read, "The Word was made flesh,"² we of course understand not the flesh only, but the entire human being; nor against the other party, who deny this doctrine of the soul's propagation,

¹ Rom. v. 12.

² John i. 14.

is it of any avail to quote those passages which do not mention a part of the human being, but the whole ; because in these the Scripture might possibly mean to imply a part by the whole ; as we say in our confession of the faith that Christ was buried, whereas it was only His flesh that was laid in the sepulchre. We therefore say, that on such grounds there is no ground on the one hand for rashly constructing, nor on the other hand for, with equal rashness, demolishing the theory of the propagation ; but we add this caution, that other passages must be duly looked out, such as admit of no ambiguity.

CHAP. 21. [XV.]

For these reasons I fail thus far to discover what this instructor has taught you, and what grounds you have for the gratitude you have lavished upon him. For the question remains just as it was, which inquires about the origin of souls, whether God forms, and makes, and bestows them on men by propagating them from that one soul which He breathed into the first man, or whether it is by His own inbreathing that He does this in every case, as He did for the first man. The fact that God *does* form, and make, and bestow souls on men, the Christian faith does not hesitate to aver. Now, when this person endeavoured to solve the question without gauging his own resources, by denying the propagation of souls, and asserting that the Creator inbreathed them into men pure from all contagion of sin,—not out of nothing, but out of Himself,—He dishonoured the very nature of God by opprobriously attributing mutability to it, an imputation which was necessarily untenable. Then, desirous of avoiding all implication which might lead to God's being deemed unrighteous, if He ties with the bond of original sin souls which are pure of all actual sin, although not redeemed by Christian regeneration, he has given utterance to words and sentiments which I only wish he had not taught you. For he has accorded to unbaptized infants such happiness and salvation as even the Pelagian heresy could not have ventured on doing. And yet for all this, when the question touches the many thousands of infants who are born of ungodly parents, and die among them,—I do not mean those whom charitable persons are unable to assist by baptism, how-

ever desirous of doing so, but those of whose baptism nobody either has been able or shall be able to think, and for whom no one has offered or is likely to offer the sacrifice which, as this instructor of yours thought, ought to be offered even for ourselves who have been baptized,—he has discovered no means of solving it. If he were questioned concerning them, what their souls deserved that God should involve them in sinful flesh to incur eternal damnation, never to be washed in the laver of baptism, nor atoned for by the sacrifice of Christ's body and blood, he will then either feel himself at an utter loss, and so will regard our hesitation with a real, though tardy favour; or else will determine that Christ's body must be offered for all those infants which all the world over die without Christian baptism (their names having been never heard of, since they are unknown in the Church of Christ), although not incorporated into the body of Christ.

CHAP. 22. [XVI.]

Far be it from you, my brother, that such views should be pleasant to you, or that you should either feel pleasure in having acquired them, or presume ever to teach them. Otherwise, even he would be a far better man than yourself. Because at the commencement of his first book he has prefixed the following modest and humble preface: "Though I desire to comply with your request, I am only affording a clear proof of my presumption." And a little further on he says,¹ "Inasmuch as I am, indeed, by no means confident of being able to prove all that I may have advanced, moreover I should always be anxious not to insist on any opinion of my own, even if it is found to be an improbable one; and it would be my hearty desire to pass sentence upon any judgment of my own, and earnestly follow better and truer views. For while it shows evidence of the best intention, and a laudable purpose, to permit yourself to be easily led to truer views of a subject; so it betokens an obstinate and depraved mind to refuse to turn quickly aside into the pathway of reason." Now, as he said all this sincerely, and still feels as he spoke, he no doubt entertains a very hopeful feeling about a right

¹ [See below in Book iii. 20. (xiv.)]

issue. In similar strain he concludes his second book: "You must not think," says he, "that there is any chance of its ever recoiling invidiously against you, that I constitute you the critic of my words. Besides, that the sharp eye of some inquisitive reader may have no opportunity of turning up and encountering any possible footprints of elemental error which may be left behind on my [so far] blemished sheets,¹ I beg you to tear up page after page with unsparing hand, if need be; and after expending on me your critical censure, punish me further, by smearing out the very ink which has given form to my worthless words; so that, having your full opportunity, you may prevent all ridicule, on the score either of the favourable opinion you so strongly entertain of me, or of the inaccuracies which lurk in my writings."

CHAP. 23. [XVII.]—*Who they are that are not injured by reading injurious books.*

Forasmuch, then, as he has both commenced and terminated his books with such safeguards, and has placed on your shoulders with such scrupulosity the burden of their correction and emendation, I only trust that he may find in you all that he has asked you for, that you may "correct him righteously in mercy, and reprove him; whilst the oil of the sinner which anoints his head"² is absent from your hands and eyes,—even the indecent compliance of the flatterer, and the deceitful leniency of the sycophant. If, however, you decline to apply correction when you see anything to amend, you offend against charity; but if he does not appear to you to require correction, because you think him to be right in his opinions, then you are wise at the expense of truth. He, therefore, is [as I said] a better man, since he is only too ready to be corrected, if a true censurer be at hand, than yourself, if either knowing him to be in error you despise him with derision, or ignorant of his wandering course you at the same time closely follow his error. Everything, therefore, which you find in the books that he has addressed and forwarded to you, I beg you to consider with sobriety and vigilance; and you will perhaps make fuller discoveries than I have myself of statements which deserve to be censured. And as for such of their

¹ *Illitas fibras.*

² *Ps. cxli. 5.*

contents as are worthy of praise and approbation,—whatever good you have learnt therein, and by his instruction, which perhaps you were really ignorant of before, tell us plainly what it is, that all may know that it was for this particular benefit that you expressed your obligations to him, and not for the manifold statements in his books which call for their disapproval,—*all*, I mean, who, like yourself, heard him read his writings, or who afterwards read the same for themselves. [And this I desire to be cleared up,] that in his ornate style they may not drink poison, as out of a choice goblet, at your instance, though not after your own example, since they know not precisely what it is you have drunk yourself, and what you have left untasted ; and because, from your high character, they suppose that whatever is drunk out of this fountain would be for their health. For what else are hearing, and reading, and copiously depositing things in the memory, than several processes of drinking ? The Lord, however, foretold concerning His faithful followers, that even “ if they should drink any deadly thing, it should not hurt them.”¹ And thus it happens that they who read with judgment, and bestow their approbation on whatever is commendable according to the rule of faith, and disapprove of things which ought to be reprobated, even if they commit to their memory statements which are declared to be worthy of disapproval, they receive no harm from the poisonous and depraved nature of the sentences. To myself, through the Lord’s mercy, it can never become a matter of the least regret, that, actuated by our previous love, I have given your reverend and religious self advice and warning on these points, in whatever way you may receive the admonition for which I have regarded you as possessing the first claim upon me. Abundant thanks, indeed, shall I give unto Him in whose mercy it is most salutary to put one’s trust, if this letter of mine shall either find or else make your faith both free from the depraved and erroneous opinions which I have been able herein to point out from this man’s books, and sound in Catholic integrity.

¹ Mark xvi. 18.

THIRD BOOK.

ADDRESSED TO VINCENTIUS VICTOR.

AUGUSTINE POINTS OUT TO VINCENTIUS VICTOR THE CORRECTIONS WHICH HE OUGHT TO MAKE IN HIS BOOKS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF THE SOUL, IF HE WISHES TO BE DEEMED A CATHOLIC. THOSE OPINIONS ALSO WHICH HAD BEEN ALREADY REFUTED IN THE PRECEDING BOOKS ADDRESSED TO RENATUS AND PETER, AUGUSTINE BRIEFLY CENSURES IN THIS THIRD BOOK, WHICH IS WRITTEN TO VICTOR HIMSELF ; MOREOVER, HE CLASSIFIES THEM UNDER ELEVEN HEADS OF ERROR.

CHAP. I. [I.]

AS to that which I have thought it my duty to write to you, my much-loved son Victor, I would have you to entertain this above all other thoughts in your mind, if I seemed to despise you, that it was certainly not my intention to do so. At the same time I must beg of you not to abuse our condescension in such a way as to suppose that you possess my approval merely because you have not my contempt. For it is not to follow, but to correct you, that I give you my love ; and since I by no means despair of the possibility of your amendment, I do not want you to be surprised at my inability to despise the man who has my love. Now, since it was my bounden duty to love you before you had any communication with us, in order that you might become a Catholic ; how much more ought I now to love you since your intercourse with us, to prevent your becoming a new heretic, and that you may become so firm a Catholic that no heretic may be able to withstand you ! So far as appears from the mental endowments which God has largely bestowed upon you, you would be undoubtedly a wise man if you only believed that you were not one already, and begged of Him who maketh men wise, with a pious, humble, and earnest prayer, that you might become one, and preferred not to be

led astray with error rather than to be honoured with the flattery of those who go astray.

CHAP. 2. [II.]—*Why Victor assumed the name of Vincentius. The names of evil men ought never to be assumed by other persons.*

The first thing which caused me some anxiety about you was the title which appeared in your books with your name ; for on inquiring of those who knew you, and were probably your associates in opinion, I found that you had been a Donatist, or rather a Rogatist, but had lately come into communion with the Catholic Church. Now, while I was rejoicing, as one naturally does at the recovery of those whom he sees rescued from that system of error,—and in your case my joy was all the greater because I saw that your ability, which so much delighted me in your writings, had not remained behind at the disposal of the enemies of truth,—additional information was given me by your friends which caused me sorrow amid my joy, to the effect that you wished to have the name Vincentius prefixed to your own name, inasmuch as you still held in affectionate regard the successor of Rogatus, who bore this name, as a great and holy man, and that for this reason you wished to become his namesake. Some persons also told me that you had, moreover, boasted about his having appeared in a certain vision to you, and assisted you in composing those books the subject of which I discussed with you in that small work of mine, and to such an extent as to dictate to you himself the precise topics and arguments which you were to write about. Now, if all this be true, I no longer wonder at your having been able to make those statements which, if you will only lend a patient ear to my admonition, and with the attention of a Catholic duly consider and weigh those books, you will undoubtedly come to regret having ever advanced the statements they contain. For he who, according to the apostle's portrait, "transforms himself into an angel of light,"¹ has transfigured himself before you into a shape which you believe to have been, or (for the matter of that) still to be, an angel of light. In this way, indeed, he is less able to deceive Catholics when his transformations are not into angels of light, but into heretics ;

¹ 2 Cor. xi. 14.

now, however, that you are a Catholic, I should be sorry for you to be beguiled by him. He will certainly feel torture at your having learnt the truth, and so much the more in proportion to the pleasure he formerly experienced in having persuaded you to believe error. With a view, however, to your refraining from loving a dead person, when the love can neither be serviceable to yourself nor profitable to him, I advise you to consider for a moment this one point—that he is not, of course, a just and holy man, since you withdrew yourself from the snares of the Donatists or Rogatists on the score of their heresy ; but if you do think him to be just and holy, you ruin yourself by holding communion with Catholics. You are, indeed, only feigning yourself a Catholic if you are in mind the same as he was on whom you bestow your love ; and you are aware how terribly the Scripture has spoken on this subject : “ The Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the man who feigns.”¹ If, however, you are sincere in communicating with us, and do not merely pretend to be a Catholic, how is it that you still love a dead man to such a degree as to be willing even now to boast of the name of one in whose errors you no longer permit yourself to be held ? We really do not like your having such a designation, as if you were the monument of a dead heretic. Nor do we like your book to have such a title as we should say was a false one if we read it on his tomb. For we are sure Vincentius is not *Victor*, the conqueror, but *Victus*, the vanquished ;—may it be, however, with fruitful effect, even as we wish you to be vanquished, indeed, but by the truth. And yet your thought was an astute and skilful one, when you designated the books, which you wish us to suppose were dictated to you by his inspiration, by the name of Vincentius Victor ; as much as to intimate that it was rather he than you who wished to be designated by the victorious appellation, as having been himself the vanquisher of error, by revealing to you what were to be the contents of your written treatise. But of what avail is all this to you, my son ? Be, I pray you, a true Catholic, not a feigned one, lest the Holy Spirit should flee from you, and that Vincentius be unable to profit you at all, into whom

¹ Wisd. i. 5.

the most malignant spirit of error has transformed himself for the purpose of deceiving you ; for it is from *him* that all these evil opinions have proceeded, notwithstanding the artful fraud which has persuaded you to the contrary. If this admonition shall only induce you to correct these errors with the humility of a God-fearing man and the peaceful submission of a Catholic, they will be regarded as the mistakes of an over-zealous young man, who is eager rather to amend them than to persevere in them. But if he shall have by his influence prevailed on you to contend for these opinions with obstinate perseverance, which God forbid, it will in such a case be necessary to condemn them and their author as heretical ; this is required by the pastoral and remedial nature of the Church's charge, to check the dire contagion before it quietly spreads through the heedless masses, [as indeed it will surely do] if wholesome correction is neglected, under the name but without the reality of love.

CHAP. 3. [III.]—*He enumerates the errors which he desires to have amended in the books of Vincentius Victor. The first error.*

If you ask me what the particular errors are, you may read what I have written to our brethren, that servant of God Rhenatus, and the presbyter Peter, to the latter of whom you yourself thought it necessary to write the very works of which we are now treating, "in obedience," as you allege, "to his own wish and request." Now, they will, I doubt not, lend you my treatises for your perusal if you should like it, and even press them upon your attention without being asked. But be that as it may, I will not miss this present opportunity of informing you what amendments I desire to have made in these writings of yours, as well as in your belief. The first mistake is, that, as you will have it, the soul was not made by God in the sense that He made it out of nothing, but out of His own very self. Here you do not reflect what the necessary conclusion is, that the soul must partake of the nature of God ; and you know very well, of course, how impious such an opinion is. Now, to avoid such impiety as this, you ought to say that God is the Author of the soul in the sense that it was made by Him, but not of Him. For whatever is *of* Him (as, for instance, His only-begotten Son)

is of the self-same nature as Himself. Now, that the human soul might not be of the same nature as its Creator, it was made by Him, but not of Him. Well, I must challenge you to tell me what is its origin, or else confess that it is of nothing. What do you mean by that expression of yours, "That it is a certain particle exhaled from the nature of God"? Do you mean to say, then, that the exhalation¹ itself from the nature of God, to which the particle in question belongs, is not of the same nature as God is Himself? If this be your meaning, then God made out of nothing that exhalation of which you will have the soul to be a particle. Or, if not out of nothing, pray tell me of what God made it? If He made it out of Himself, it follows that He is actually (what should never be affirmed) Himself the material of which His own work is formed. But you go on to say: "When, however, He made the exhalation or breath out of Himself, He remained at the same time whole and entire;" just as if it were conceivable that the light of a candle should not remain entire when another candle is lighted from it, and be of the same nature, and not another.

CHAP. 4. [IV.]—*The lungs are like a pair of bellows. Besides meat and drink, there is a third aliment in the air.*

"But," you say, "when we inflate a bladder, no portion of our nature or quality is poured into the bag, while the very breath, by the infusion of which the bladder is extended to its full size, is emitted from us without the least diminution of ourselves." Now, you enlarge and dwell upon these words of yours, and inculcate the simile as an indispensable one for our understanding how it is that God, without any injury to His own nature, makes the soul out of His own self, and how, when it is thus made out of Himself, it is not what Himself is. For you ask: "Is this inflation of the bladder a portion of our own nature? Or do we create human beings when we inflate bladders? Or do we suffer any loss of our substance at all when we impart our breath by inflation on diverse things? The fact is, we suffer no loss whenever we transfer breath from ourselves to any object, nor do we ever remember experiencing any loss to ourselves from inflating a bladder,

¹ Halitus (breath).

the full quality and entire quantity of our own breath remaining in us notwithstanding the process." Now, however neat and applicable this simile seems to you, I beg you to consider how greatly it misleads you ; for you affirm that God, who is incorporeal, breathes out the soul in a corporeal condition,—not making it out of nothing, but out of Himself,—whereas the breath which we ourselves emit is corporeal, although of a more subtle nature than our bodies ; nor do we exhale it out of our soul, but out of the air through internal functions in our bodily structure. Our lungs, like a pair of bellows, are moved by the breath (which by its action excites also to motion the other members of the body), for the purpose of inhaling and exhaling the atmospheric air. For, besides the substances of nutrition, whether solid or fluid, which constitute our meat and drink, God has surrounded us with aliment in the atmosphere which we breathe ; and that with so good effect, that we can live for some time without meat and drink ; but not for a moment without this third nourishment, which the air, surrounding us on all sides, supplies us with as we breathe and respire, could we possibly exist. And as our meat and drink have to be not only introduced into the body, but also to be expelled by passages adapted to the purpose, to prevent injury accruing either way (from either not entering or not quitting the body), so this third aliment of aerial matter (not being permitted to remain within us, and thus not becoming corrupt by delay, but being expelled as soon as it is introduced) has been furnished, not with different, but with the self-same channels both for its entrance and for its exit, even the mouth, or the nostrils, or both together.

CHAP. 5.

Prove now, what I say for your own satisfaction in your own case ; emit some breath by exhalation, and see whether you can continue long without catching back your breath ; then again catch it back by inhalation, and see what discomfort you experience unless you again emit it. Now, when we inflate the bladder, as you prescribe, we do, in fact, the same thing which we do to maintain life, except that in the case of the artificial experiment our inhalation is somewhat

stronger, in order that we may emit a stronger breath, so as to fill and distend the bladder by compressing the air we blow into it, rather in the manner of a hard puff than of the gentle process of ordinary breathing and respiration. On what ground, then, do you say, "We suffer no loss whenever we transfer breath from ourselves to any object, nor do we ever remember experiencing any loss to ourselves from inflating a bladder, the full quality and entire quantity of our own breath remaining in us notwithstanding the process"? It is very plain, my son, if ever you have inflated a bladder, that you did not carefully observe your own performance. For you do not perceive what you lose by the act of inflation by reason of the immediate recovery of your breath. But you may learn all this with the greatest ease if you would simply prefer doing so to stiffly maintaining your own statements for no other reason than because you have made them—not inflating your experimental bladder, but puffed up yourself to the full, and inflating your hearers (whom you should rather edify and instruct by veritable facts) with the empty prattle of your turgid discourse. In the present case I do not send you to any other teacher than your own self. Breathe, then, a good breath into the bladder; shut your mouth instantly, hold tight your nostrils, and in this way discover the truth of what I say to you. For when you begin to suffer the intolerable inconvenience which accompanies the experiment, what is it you wish to recover by opening your mouth and releasing your nostrils? Surely there would be nothing to recover if your supposition be a correct one, that you have lost nothing whenever you breathe. Observe what a plight you would be in, if by inhalation you did not regain what you had parted with by your breathing outwards. See, too, what loss and injury the insufflation would produce, were it not for the repair and reaction caused by respiration. For unless the breath which you expend in filling the bladder should all return by the re-opened channel to discharge its function of nourishing yourself, what, I wonder, would be left remaining to you,—I will not say to inflate another bladder, but to supply your very means of living?

CHAP. 6.

Well, now, you ought to have thought of all this when you were writing, and not to have brought God before our eyes in that favourite simile of yours, of inflated and inflatable bladders, breathing forth souls as of some other nature which was then beginning to exist, just as we ourselves draw our breath from the air which surrounds us. At all events you should not, in a manner which is really as diverse from your similitude as it is abundant in impiety, have represented God as either producing some changeable thing without injury, indeed, to Himself, but yet out of His own substance; or what is worse, creating it in such wise as to be Himself the material of His own work. If, however, we are to employ a similitude drawn from our breathing which shall suitably illustrate this subject, the following one is more credible: Just as we, whenever we breathe, make a breath which is not of our own nature, but (because we are not omnipotent) is composed of the very air around us, which we inhale and discharge whenever we breathe and respire; and the said breath is neither living nor sentient, although we are ourselves living and sentient; so [we must believe] that God cannot, indeed, out of His own nature but (as being so omnipotent as to be able to create whatever He wills) make a breath even out of that which has no existence at all, that is to say, out of nothing, and the said breath be living and sentient, but evidently mutable, though He be Himself immutable.

CHAP. 7. [v.]

But what is the meaning of that, which you have thought proper to add to this simile, with regard to the example of the blessed Elisha because he raised the dead [child] by breathing into his face?¹ Now, do you really suppose that the prophet's breath became the soul of the child? I could not believe that even you could stray so far away from the truth. If, now, the soul in that particular case, which was taken from the living child so as to cause his death, was itself afterwards restored to him so as to cause his restoration to life, where, I ask, is the pertinence of your remark when you say "that

¹ 2 Kings ii. 34.

no injury or diminution accrued to Elisha" ? as if it could be imagined that anything had been transferred from the prophet to the child to cause his revival. If it were necessary simply to remark that the prophet breathed and remained entire, without any diminution by the effort, where was the necessity for your saying that of the prophet, when raising the dead child, which you might with no less propriety say of any one whatever when emitting a breath, but not reviving a corpse ? Then, again, you spoke unadvisedly (though God forbid that you should believe the breath of Elisha to have become the soul of the resuscitated child !) when you intimated your meaning to be a desire to keep at a distance the primeval breathing of God and this of the prophet, in that the One breathed but once, and the other thrice. These are your words : " Elisha breathed into the face of the deceased child of the Shunammite, after the manner of the original creation. And when by the prophet's breathing a divine force inspired the dead limbs, and they were reanimated to their original vigour, no diminution or injury accrued to Elisha, through whose breathing the dead body recovered its revived soul and breath. Only there is this difference, the Lord breathed but once into man's face and he lived, while Elisha breathed three times into the face of the dead [child] and he lived again." Now, your words seem to intimate that the number of the breathings alone made all the difference, and forbade our believing that the prophet actually did what God had done. This statement, then, requires to be entirely revised. There was so complete a difference between that work of God and this of Elisha, that the former breathed the breath of life whereby man became a living soul, and the latter breathed a breath which was not itself sentient nor endued with life, but was figurative and significant [of another's power]. The prophet did not really cause the child to live again by *animating* him, but he procured God's doing that by *loving* him.¹ As to what you allege, that he breathed three times, either your memory, as often happens, or a faulty reading of the text, must have misled you. Why need I enlarge ? You

¹ [In the original of the italicised words we have an instance of Augustine's happy play on words—Non *animando*, sed *amando*.]

ought not to be seeking for examples and arguments to establish your point, but rather to amend and change your opinion. I beg of you neither to believe, nor to say, nor to teach "that God made the human soul out of nothing, but out of His own substance," if you wish to be a Catholic.

CHAP. 8. [VI.]—*Victor's second error.* (See above in Book i. 26. [XVI.])

Do not, I pray you, believe, say, or teach that "just as God who gives is Himself ever existent, so is He ever giving souls through infinite time," if you wish to be a Catholic. For a time will come when God will not give souls, although He will not therefore Himself cease to exist. Your phrase, "is ever giving," might be understood "to give without cessation," so long as men are born and get offspring, even as it is said of certain men that they are "ever learning, and never coming to the knowledge of the truth."¹ For this term "ever" is not in this passage taken to mean "never ceasing to learn," inasmuch as they do cease to learn when they have ceased to exist in this body, or have begun to suffer the fiery pains of hell. You, however, did not allow your word to be understood in this sense when you said "is ever giving," since you thought that it must be applied to infinite time. And even this was a small matter; for, as if you had been asked to explain your phrase, "ever giving," more explicitly, you went on to say, "just as He is Himself ever existent who gives." This assertion the sound and Catholic faith utterly condemns. For be it far from us to believe that God is ever giving souls, just as He is Himself, who gives them, ever existent. He is Himself ever existent in such a sense as never to cease to exist; souls, however, He will not be ever giving; but He will beyond doubt cease to give them when the age of generation ceases, and children are no longer born to whom they are to be given.

CHAP. 9. [VII.]—*His third error.* (See above in Book ii. 9. [VII.])

Again, do not, I pray you, believe, say, or teach that "the soul deservedly lost something by the flesh, although it was entirely meritorious previous to its incarnate state," if you

¹ 2 Tim. iii. 7.

wish to be a Catholic. For the apostle declares that "children being not yet born, had done neither good nor evil."¹ How, therefore, could their soul, previous to its participation of flesh, have had anything like good desert, if it had not done any good thing? Will you by any chance venture to assert that it had, previous to the flesh, lived a good life, when you cannot actually prove to us that it even existed at all? How, then, can you say: "You will not allow that the soul contracts health and strength from the sinful flesh; to what holy state, then, can you see it in due course pass, with the view of amending its condition, through that very flesh by which it had lost its worthiness"? Perhaps you are not aware that these opinions, which attribute to the human soul a meritorious life and condition previous to its junction with the flesh, have been already condemned by the Catholic Church, not only in the case of some ancient heretics, whom I do not here mention, but also more recently in the instance of the Priscillianists.

CHAP. 10.—*His fourth error.* (See above in Book i. 6 [VI.] and Book ii. 11. [VII.])

Neither believe, nor say, nor teach that "the soul, by means of the flesh, repairs its ancient condition, and is born again by the very means through which it had deserved to be polluted," if you wish to be a Catholic. I might, indeed, dwell upon the strange discrepancy with your own self which you have exhibited in the next sentence, wherein you said that "the soul through the flesh deservedly recovers its primitive condition, which it seemed to have gradually lost through the flesh, in order that it may begin to be regenerated by the very flesh through which it had deserved to be polluted." Here you—the very man who had just before said that the soul repairs its condition through the flesh, by reason of which it had lost its desert (where nothing but *good desert* can be meant, which [as you will have it] is recovered in the flesh, by baptism, of course)—said in another turn of your thought, that through the flesh the soul had deserved to be polluted (in which statement it is no longer the good desert, but *an evil one*, which must be meant). What flagrant incon-

Rom. ix. 11.

sistency! but I will pass it over, and content myself with observing, that it is absolutely uncatholic to believe that the soul, previous to its incarnate state, deserved either good or evil.

CHAP. 11. [VIII.]—*His fifth error.* (See above in Book i. 8 [VIII.] and Book ii. 12. [VIII.]

Neither believe, nor say, nor teach, if you wish to be a Catholic, that “the soul deserved to be sinful, even prior to sin.” It is, to be sure, an extremely bad desert to have deserved to be sinful. And, of course, it could not possibly have incurred so bad a desert previous to sin of any kind, especially prior to its coming into the flesh, when it could have possessed no merit either way, either evil or good. How, then, can you say: “If, therefore, the soul, which could not be sinful, deserved to be sinful, it yet did not remain in a sinful state, because as it was prefigured in Christ it was bound not to be in a sinful state, even as it was unable to be”? Now, just for a little consider what it is you say, and desist from repeating such a statement. How did the soul deserve, and how was it unable, to be sinful? How, I pray you tell me, did it deserve to be sinful when it never led a sinful life? How, I ask again, did that become sinful which had not the capacity to be sinful? Or else, if you mean your phrase, “*was unable*,” to imply inability irrespective of the flesh, how in that case did the soul deserve to be sinful, and by reason of such desert to be injected into the flesh, when previous to its union with the flesh it could not have been sinful, so as to deserve any evil at all?

CHAP. 12. [IX.]—*His sixth error. The apostles baptized. Dinocrates, brother of St. Perpetua.* (See above in Book i. 10–12 [IX., X.], and in Book ii. 13, 14. [IX., X.]

If you wish to be a Catholic, refrain from believing, or saying, or teaching that “infants which are prevented by death from being baptized may yet attain to forgiveness of their original sins.” For the examples by which you are misled—that of the thief who confessed the Lord upon the cross, or that of Dinocrates the brother of St. Perpetua—contribute no help to you in defence of this erroneous opinion. As for the thief, although in God’s judgment he might be reckoned among

those who are purified by the confession of martyrdom, yet you cannot tell whether he was not actually baptized. For, to say nothing of the opinion that he might have been sprinkled with the water as well as the blood which gushed out of the Lord's side,¹ as he hung on the cross at His side, and thus have been washed with a baptism of the most sacred kind, what if he had been baptized in prison, as in after times some under persecution were enabled privately to obtain? or what if he had been baptized previous to his imprisonment? If, indeed, he had been, the remission of his sins which he would have received in that case from God would not have protected him from the sentence of public law, so far as appertained to the death of the body. What if, being already baptized, he had committed the crime and incurred the punishment of robbery and lawlessness, but yet received, by virtue of repentance added to his baptism, forgiveness of the sins which, though baptized, he had committed? For beyond doubt his faith and piety appeared to the Lord clearly in his heart, as they do to us in his words. If, indeed, we were to conclude that all those who have quitted life without a record of their baptism died unbaptized, we should calumniate the very apostles themselves; for we are ignorant when they were any of them baptized, except the Apostle Paul.² If, however, we could regard as an evidence that they were really baptized the circumstance of the Lord's saying to St. Peter, "He that is washed needeth not save to wash his feet,"³ what are we to think of the others, of whom we do not read even so much as this,—Barnabas, Timothy, Titus, Silas, Philemon, the very evangelists Mark and Luke, and innumerable others, about whose baptism God forbid that we should entertain any doubt, although we read no record of it? As for Dinocrates, he was a child of seven years of age; and as children who are baptized so old as that can now recite the creed and answer for themselves in the usual examination, I know not why he may not be supposed after his baptism to have been recalled by his unbelieving father to the sacrilege and profanity of heathen worship, and for this reason to have been condemned to the pains from which he was liberated at his sister's intercession. For in the

¹ John xix. 34.² Acts ix. 18.³ John xiii. 10.

account of him you have never read, either that he was never a Christian, or died a catechumen. But for the matter of that, the very account we have of him does not occur in that canon of Holy Scripture whence in all questions of this kind our proofs ought always to be drawn.

CHAP. 13. [x.]—*His seventh error.* (See above in Book ii. 13. [ix.])

If you wish to be a Catholic, do not venture to believe, to say, or to teach that “they whom the Lord has predestinated for baptism can be taken away from their allotted destiny, or die before that has been accomplished in them which the Almighty has predetermined.” There is in such a dogma more power than I can tell assigned to chances in opposition to the power of God, by the occurrence of which casualties that which He has predestinated is not permitted to come to pass. It is hardly necessary to spend time or earnest words in cautioning the man who takes up with this error against the absolute vortex of confusion into which it will absorb him, when I shall sufficiently meet the case if I briefly warn the prudent man who is ready to receive correction against the threatening mischief. Now these are your words: “We say that some such method as this must be had recourse to in the case of infants who, being predestinated for baptism, are yet, by their frail condition in this life, hurried away before they are born again in Christ.” Is it then really true that any who have been predestinated to baptism are prevented from obtaining the intended blessing by any chance or frailty of this life? And could God predestinate anything which He either in His foreknowledge saw would not come to pass, or in ignorance knew not that it could not come to pass, either to the frustration of His purpose or the discredit of His foreknowledge? You see how many weighty remarks might be made on this subject; but I am restrained by the fact of having treated on it a little while ago, so that I content myself with this brief and passing admonition.

CHAP. 14.—*His eighth error.* (See above in Book ii. 13. [ix.])

Refuse, if you wish to be a Catholic, to believe, or to say, or to teach that “it is of infants, who are hurried prematurely

away by their frail condition before they are born again in Christ, that the Scripture says, 'Speedily was he taken away, lest that wickedness should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul. Therefore God hastened to take him away from among the wicked; for his soul pleased the Lord; and being made perfect in a short time, he fulfilled long seasons.'"¹ Well, now, this passage has nothing to do with those to whom you apply it, but rather belongs to those who, after they have been baptized and have progressed in pious living, are not permitted to tarry long on earth,—having been made perfect, not with years, but with the grace of heavenly wisdom. This error, however, of yours, which suggests the idea of this scripture being applicable to infants who die unbaptized, does an intolerable wrong to the holy laver itself. If we suppose that an infant, when baptized, may possibly be "hurried away," the reason of his premature taking off is [stated here to be], "lest wickedness should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul." [What absurdities does not this conceit of yours engender!] as if in this self-same baptism this must be supposed to be the "wickedness," and this the "deceit which beguiles the soul," and changes it for the worse, that [the baptized] was not prematurely taken away without it! Then, again, since his soul had pleased God, He hastened to remove him out of the midst of iniquity; and he tarried not for ever so little while, to fulfil in him His preordained purpose; and yet somehow he preferred to act in opposition to His predestined purpose, and actually hastened to prevent what had pleased Him so well in the unbaptized child becoming exterminated by his baptism! As if the dying infant would perish in that [sacrament], whither we ought to run with him in our arms in order to save him from perdition. Who, therefore, in respect of these words of the Book of Wisdom, could believe, or say, or write, or quote them as having been written concerning infants who die without baptism, if he only reflected upon them with proper consideration?

CHAP. 15. [XI.]—*His ninth error.* (See above in Book ii. 14. [x.])

If you wish to be a Catholic, I pray you, neither believe,

¹ Wisd. iv. 11.

nor say, nor teach that "there are some mansions outside the kingdom of God which the Lord said were in His Father's house." Now He does not affirm, as you have laid down, His testimony to be, "There are with my Father (*apud Patrem meum*) many mansions;" although, if He had even expressed Himself so, the mansions could hardly be supposed to have any other situation than *in the house* of His Father; but [He does not leave it to be thus conjectured, for] He plainly says, "In my Father's house are many mansions."¹ Now, who would be so reckless as to separate the sundry portions of God's house from the kingdom of God; so that, whilst the kings of the earth are found reigning, not in their house only, not only in their own country, but far and wide, even in regions across the sea, the King who made the heaven and the earth is not described as reigning even over all His own house?

CHAP. 16.

You may, however, not improbably contend that all things, it is true, belong to the kingdom of God, because He reigns in heaven, reigns on earth, in the depths beneath, in paradise, in hell (for where does He not reign, since His power is everywhere supreme?); but that the kingdom of heaven is one thing, into which none are permitted to enter, according to the Lord's own true and settled sentence, unless they are washed in the laver of regeneration, while quite another thing is the kingdom over the earth, or over any other parts of creation, in which there may be some mansions of God's house; but these, although appertaining to the kingdom of God, belong not to that kingdom of heaven where God's kingdom exists with an especial excellence and blessedness; and that it hence happens that, while no parts and mansions of God's house can be rudely separated from the kingdom of God, yet not all the mansions in the kingdom of heaven are prepared [for all indiscriminately]; still, even in the abodes which are not situated in the kingdom of heaven, those may live happily, to whom, if they are even unbaptized, God has willed to assign such habitations. They are no doubt in the kingdom of God, although (as not having been baptized) they cannot possibly be in the kingdom of heaven.

¹ John xiv. 2.

CHAP. 17.—*Where the kingdom of God may be understood to be.*

Now, they who say all this, do no doubt seem to themselves to say a good deal, because theirs is only a slight and careless view of Scripture ; nor do they understand in what sense we use the phrase, "kingdom of God," when we say of it in our prayers, "Thy kingdom come ;"¹ for that is called the kingdom of God, in which His whole family shall reign with Him in happiness and for ever. Now, in respect of the power which He possesses over all things, He is of course even now reigning. What, therefore, do we intend by the *future* sense when we pray that His kingdom may come ? What else than that we may deserve to reign with Him ? But even they will be under His power who shall have to suffer the pains of eternal fire. Well, then, do we mean to predicate of these unhappy beings that they too will be in the kingdom of God ? Surely it is one thing to be honoured with the gifts and privileges of the kingdom of God, and another thing to be restrained and punished by the laws of the same. However, that you may have a very manifest proof that on the one hand the kingdom of heaven must not be parcelled out to the baptized, and other portions of the kingdom of God be given to the unbaptized, as you seem to have determined, I beg of you to hear the Lord's own words ; He does not say, "Except a man be born again of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven ;" but His words are, "he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." His discourse with Nicodemus on the subject before us runs thus : "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Observe, He does not here say, *the kingdom of heaven*, but *the kingdom of God*. And then, on Nicodemus asking Him in reply, "How can a man be born when he is old ? can he enter the second time into his mother's womb and be born ?" the Lord, in explanation, repeats His former statement more plainly and openly : "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a man be born again of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." Observe again, He uses the same phrase, *the kingdom of God*, not *the kingdom of heaven*.² It is worthy of remark, that while He varies two

¹ Matt. vi. 10.

² John iii. 3-6.

expressions in explaining them the second time (for after saying, "Except a man be born *again*," He interprets that by the fuller expression, "Except a man be born *of water and the Spirit*;" and in like manner He explains, "he cannot *see*," by the completer phrase, "he cannot *enter into*"), He yet makes no variation here; He said "the kingdom of God" the first time, and He afterwards repeated the same phrase exactly. It is not now necessary to raise and discuss the question, whether the kingdom of God and the kingdom of heaven must be understood as involving different senses, or whether only one thing is described under two designations. It is enough to find that no one can enter into the kingdom of God, except he be washed in the laver of regeneration. I suppose you perceive by this time how wide of the truth it is to separate from the kingdom of God any mansions that are placed in the house of God. And as to the idea which you have entertained that there will be found dwelling among the various mansions, which the Lord has told us abound in His Father's house, some who have not been born again of water and the Spirit, I advise you, if you will permit me, not to defer amending it, in order that you may hold the Catholic faith.

CHAP. 18. [XII.]—*His tenth error.* (See above in Book i. 13 [XI.] and Book ii. 15. [XI.]

Again, if you wish to be a Catholic, I pray you, neither believe, nor say, nor teach that "the sacrifice of Christians ought to be offered in behalf of those who have departed out of the body without having been baptized." Because you fail to show that the sacrifice of the Jews, which you have quoted out of the books of the Maccabees,¹ was offered in behalf of any who had departed this life without circumcision. In this novel opinion of yours, which you have advanced against the authority and teaching of the whole Church, you have used a very arrogant mode of expression. You say, "In behalf of these, I most certainly judge that constant oblations and incessant sacrifices must be offered up on the part of the holy priests." Here you show, as a layman, no submission to God's priests for instruction; nor do you associate yourself with them (the least you could do) for inquiry; but you put your-

¹ 2 Macc. xii. 43.

self before them by your proud assumption of judgment. Away, my son, with all this pretension; men walk not so arrogantly in that way, which Christ in His humility taught His very self to have been.¹ No man enters through His narrow gate with so proud a disposition as this.

CHAP. 19. [XIII.]—*His eleventh error.* (See above in Book i. 15. [XII.])

Once more, if you desire to be a Catholic, do not believe, or say, or teach that “any of those persons who have departed this life without Christ’s baptism, do not for a time go into the kingdom of heaven, but into paradise; yet afterwards in the resurrection of the dead they attain also to the blessedness of the kingdom of heaven.” Even the Pelagian heresy was not daring enough to grant them this, although it holds that infants do not contract original sin. You, however, as a Catholic, confess that they are born in sin; and yet by some unaccountable perverseness in the novel opinion you put forth, you assert that they are absolved from their birth-sin, and admitted into the kingdom of heaven without the baptism which saves. Nor do you seem to be aware how much below Pelagius himself you are in your views on this point. For he, being alarmed by that sentence of the Lord which does not permit unbaptized persons to enter into the kingdom of heaven, does not venture to send infants thither, although he believes them to be free from all sin; whereas you have so little regard for what is written, “Except a man be born again of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God,”² that (to say nothing of the error which induces you recklessly to sever paradise from the kingdom of God) you do not hesitate after all to promise to certain persons, whom you, as a Catholic, believe to be born in sin, both absolution from this birth-sin, and the kingdom of heaven, even when they die without baptism. As if you could possibly be a true Catholic in constructing a doctrine of original sin against Pelagius, if you show yourself a new-fangled heretic against the Lord, by pulling down His statement respecting baptism. For our own part, beloved brother, we do not desire thus to gain victories over heretics:

¹ John xiv. 6.

² John iii. 5.

vanquishing one error by another, and, what is still worse, a less one by a greater. You say, "Should any one (as may happen) be reluctant to allow that paradise was temporarily bestowed on the soul of the dying thief and of Dinocrates, there still remaining to them the reversion of the kingdom of heaven at the resurrection, seeing that the primary passage stands in the way of the opinion, 'Except a man be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven,' he may still hold even all that I have unhesitatingly shown him on this part of the subject; only let him do full honour to both the effect and the aim¹ of the divine mercy and foreknowledge." These are your own words, and in them you express your agreement with the man who says that paradise is conferred on certain unbaptized for a time, in such a sense that at the resurrection there is in store for them the reward of the kingdom of heaven, in opposition with that leading declaration [of the Lord], which has determined that none shall enter into that kingdom who has not been born again of water and the Holy Ghost. Pelagius was afraid to oppose himself to this great primary statement of the Gospel, and he did not believe that any (whom he still did not suppose to be sinners) would enter into the kingdom of heaven unbaptized. You, on the contrary, acknowledge that infants have original sin, and yet you absolve them from it without the laver of regeneration, and send them for a temporary residence in paradise, and subsequently permit them to enter even into the kingdom of heaven.

CHAP. 20. [XIV.] (See above in Book ii. 22. [XVI.])

Now these errors, and such as these, with whatever others you may perhaps be able to discover in your books on a more attentive and leisurely perusal, I beg of you to correct, if you possess the Catholic temper; in other words, if you spoke in perfect sincerity when you said, that you were not overconfident in yourself that what statements you had made were all capable of proof; and that your constant aim was not to maintain even your own opinion, if it were shown to be improbable; and that it gave you much pleasure, if your

¹ Et effectum et affectum.

own judgment were condemned, to adopt and pursue better and truer sentiments. Well now, my dear brother, show that you said this in no fallacious sense; so that the Catholic Church may rejoice in your capacity and character, as possessing not only genius, but prudence withal, and piety, and moderation, rather than that the madness of heresy should be kindled by your contentious persistence in these errors. Now you have an opportunity of showing also how sincerely you expressed your feelings in the passage which immediately follows the satisfactory statement which I have just now mentioned of yours. "For," you say, "as it is the mark of every highest aim and laudable purpose to transfer one's self readily to truer views; so it shows a depraved and obstinate judgment to refuse to return promptly to the pathway of reason." Well, then, show yourself to be influenced by this high aim and laudable purpose, and transfer your mind readily to truer views; and do not display a depraved and obstinate judgment by refusing to return promptly to the pathway of reason. For if your words were uttered in frank sincerity, if they were not mere sound of the lips, if you really felt them in your heart, then you cannot but abhor all delay in accomplishing the great good of correcting yourself. It was not, indeed, much for you to allow, that it showed a depraved and obstinate judgment to refuse to return to the pathway of reason, unless you inserted the idea of *promptitude*. By adding this, you showed us how execrable is his conduct who never accomplishes the reform; inasmuch as even he who effects it but tardily appears to you to deserve so severe a censure, as to be fairly described as displaying a depraved and obstinate mind. Listen, therefore, to your own admonition, and turn to good account mainly and largely the fruitful resources of your eloquence; that so you may promptly return to the pathway of reason, more promptly, indeed, than when you declined therefrom, at an unstable period of your age, when you were fortified with too little prudence and less learning.

CHAP. 21.

It would take me too long a time to handle and discuss fully all the points which I wish to be amended in your

books, or rather in your own self, and to give you even a brief reason for the correction of each particular. And yet you must not because of them despise yourself, so as to suppose that your ability and powers of speech are to be thought lightly of. I have discovered in you no small recollection of the sacred Scriptures; but your accuracy of knowledge is less than was proportioned to your character, and the labour you bestowed on them. My desire, therefore, is that you should not, on the one hand, grow vain by attributing too much to yourself; nor, on the other hand, become cold and indifferent by prostration or despair. I only wish that I could read your writings in company with yourself, and point out the necessary emendations in conversation rather than by writing. This is a matter which could be more easily accomplished by oral communication between ourselves than in letters. If the entire subject were to be treated in writing, it would require many volumes. Those chief errors, however, which I have wished to sum up comprehensively in a definite number, I at once call your attention to, in order that you may not postpone the correction of them, but banish them entirely from your preaching and belief; so that the great faculty which you possess of disputation, may, by God's grace, be employed by you usefully for edification, not for injuring and destroying sound and wholesome doctrine.

CHAP. 22. [XV.]—*A summary recapitulation of the errors of Victor, which Augustine had detected in his writings.*

What the particular errors are, I have, to the best of my ability, already explained. But I will run over them again with a brief recapitulation. The *first* is your assertion, that "God did not make the world out of nothing, but out of His own self." The *second* is, that "just as God who gives is Himself ever-existent, so is He ever giving souls through infinite time." The *third* is, that "the soul deservedly lost something by the flesh, although it was entirely meritorious previous to its incarnate state." The *fourth* is, that "the soul by means of the flesh repairs its ancient condition, and is born again through the very same flesh by which it had deserved to be polluted." The *fifth* is, that "the soul deserved to be sinful, even prior to sin." The *sixth* is, that

“infants which are prevented by death from being baptized, may yet attain to forgiveness of their original sins.” The *seventh* is, that “they whom the Lord has predestinated to be baptized may be taken away from this allotted destiny, or die before that has been accomplished in them which the Almighty has predetermined.” The *eighth* is, that “it is of infants who are hurried prematurely away by their frail condition, before they are born again in Christ, that the Scripture says, ‘Speedily was he taken away, lest wickedness should alter his understanding,’” with the remainder of the passage to the same effect in the Book of Wisdom. The *ninth* is, that “there are some mansions outside the kingdom of God, belonging to those which the Lord said were in His Father’s house.” The *tenth* is, that “the sacrifice of Christians ought to be offered in behalf of those who have departed out of the body without being baptized.” The *eleventh* is, that “any of those persons who have departed this life without the baptism of Christ do not for a time go into the kingdom [of heaven], but into paradise; afterwards, however, in the resurrection of the dead, they attain even to the blessedness of the kingdom of heaven.”

CHAP. 23. — *Obstinacy makes the heretic.*

Well, now, as for these eleven propositions, they are extremely and manifestly perverse and opposed to the Catholic faith; so that you should no longer hesitate to root them out and cast them away from your mind, from your words, and from your style, if you are desirous that we should rejoice, not only at your having come over to our Catholic altars, but at your being really and truly a Catholic. For if these dogmas of yours are severally maintained with pertinacity, they may possibly engender as many heresies as they number opinions. Wherefore consider, I pray you, how dreadful it is that they should be all concentrated in one person, when they would, if held severally by various persons, be every one of them damnable in each holder. If, however, you would in your own person cease to fight contentiously in their defence, nay, would turn your arms against them by faithful words and writings, you would acquire more praise as the censurer of

your own self than if you directed any amount of criticism, and rightly deserved, against any other person; and your amendment of your own errors would bring you more admiration than if you had never entertained them. May the Lord be present to your heart and mind, and by His Spirit pour into your soul such readiness in humility, such light of truth, such sweetness of charity, and such peaceful piety, that you may prefer being a conqueror of your own spirit in the truth, than of any one else who gainsays it with his errors. But I do not by any means wish you to think, that by holding these opinions you have departed from the Catholic faith, although they are unquestionably opposed to the Catholic faith; if so be you are able, in the presence of that God, whose eye infallibly searches every man's heart, to look back on your own words as being truly and sincerely expressed, when you said, that you were not over-confident in yourself as to the opinions you had broached, that they were all capable of proof; and that your constant aim was not to persist in your own sentiments, if they were shown to be improbable; inasmuch as it was a real pleasure to you, when any judgment of yours was condemned, to adopt and pursue better and truer thoughts. Now such a temper as this, even in relation to what may have been said in an uncatholic form through ignorance, is itself catholic by the very purpose and readiness of amendment which it premeditates. With this remark, however, I must now end this volume, where the reader may rest a while, ready to renew his attention to what is to follow, when I begin my next book.

FOURTH BOOK.

ADDRESSED TO VINCENTIUS VICTOR.

HE FIRST SHOWS, THAT HIS HESITATION ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ORIGIN OF SOULS WAS UNDESERVEDLY BLAMED, AND THAT HE WAS WRONGLY COMPARED WITH CATTLE, BECAUSE HE HAD REFRAINED FROM ANY BOLD CONCLUSIONS ON THE SUBJECT. THEN, AGAIN, WITH REGARD TO HIS OWN UNHESITATING STATEMENT, THAT THE SOUL WAS SPIRIT, NOT BODY, HE POINTS OUT HOW RASHLY VICTOR DISAPPROVED OF THIS ASSERTION, ESPECIALLY WHEN HE WAS VAINLY EXPENDING HIS EFFORTS TO PROVE THAT THE SOUL WAS CORPOREAL IN ITS OWN NATURE, AND THAT THE SPIRIT IN MAN WAS DISTINCT FROM THE SOUL ITSELF.

CHAP. I. [I.]

I must now, in the sequel of my treatise, request you to hear what I desire to say to you concerning myself—as I best can; or rather as He shall enable me in whose hand are both ourselves and our words. For you blamed me on two several occasions, and went so far as to mention my name in your censure; and [this you did in a somewhat disingenuous way]: in the beginning of your book you spoke of yourself as being perfectly conscious of your own want of skill, and as being destitute of the support of learning; and, when you mentioned me, you bestowed on me the complimentary phrases of “most learned” and “most skilful.” But yet, all the while, on those subjects in which you seemed to yourself to be perfectly acquainted with what I either confess my ignorance of, or presume with no unbecoming liberty to have some knowledge of, you—young as you are, and a layman too—did not hesitate to censure me, an old man and a bishop, and a person withal whom in your own judgment you had pronounced most learned and most skilful. Well, for my own part, I know nothing about my great learning and skill; nay, I am very certain that I possess no such eminent qualities; moreover, I have no doubt that it is quite within the scope of

possibility, that it may fall to the lot of even an unskilful and unlearned man occasionally to know what a learned and skilful person is ignorant of; and in this I plainly commend you, that you have preferred to merely personal regard a love of truth,—if not truth which you have apprehended, yet at any rate such as you have deemed truth. This you have done no doubt with temerity, because you thought you knew what you were really ignorant of; and without restraint, because, having no respect of persons, you chose to publish abroad whatever was in your mind. You ought therefore to understand how much greater our care should be to recall the Lord's sheep from their errors; since it is evidently wrong for even the sheep to conceal from the shepherds whatever faults they have discovered in them. O that you censured in me such things as are indeed worthy of just blame! For I must not deny that both in my conduct and in my writings there are many points which may be censured by a sound judge without temerity. Now, if you would select any of these for your censure, I might be able by them to show you how I should like you to behave in those particulars which you judiciously and fairly condemned; moreover, I should have (as an elder to a younger, and as one in authority to him who has to obey) an opportunity of setting you an example under correction which should not be more humble on my part than wholesome to both of us. With respect, however, to the points on which you have actually censured me, they are not such as humility obliges me to correct, but such as truth compels me partly to acknowledge and partly to defend.

CHAP. 2. [II.]—*The points which Victor thought blameworthy in Augustine.*

And they are these: The first, that I did not venture to make a definite statement touching the origin of those souls which have been given, or are being given, to human beings, since the first man—because I confess my ignorance of the subject; the second, because I said I was sure the soul was a spiritual, not a corporeal essence. Under this second point, however, you have included two grounds of censure: one, because I refused to believe the soul to be corporeal; the other, because I affirmed it to be spirit. To yourself, indeed,

the soul appears both to be body and not to be spirit. I must therefore request your attention to my own defence against your censure, and ask you to embrace the opportunity which my self-defence affords you of learning what points there are in yourself also which require your amendment. Recall, then, the words of your book in which you first mentioned my name. "I know," you say, "several men of very great reputation who when consulted have kept silence, or admitted nothing clearly, but have withdrawn from their discussions everything definite when they commence their exposition. Of such character are the contents of sundry writings which I have read at your house by a very learned man and renowned bishop, called Augustine. The truth is, I suppose, they have with an overweening modesty and diffidence investigated the mysteries of this subject, and have consumed within themselves the judgment of their own treatises, and have professed themselves incapable of determining anything on this point. But, I assure you, it appears to me excessively absurd and unreasonable that a man should be a stranger to his own being; or that a person who is supposed to have acquired the knowledge of all things, should regard himself as unknown to his very self. For what difference is there between a man and a brute beast, if he knows not how to discuss and determine his own nature and quality? so that there may justly be applied to him the statement of Scripture: 'Man, although he was in honour, understood not; he is like the cattle, and is compared with them.'¹ For when the good and gracious God created everything with reason and wisdom, and produced man as a rational animal, capable of understanding, endowed with reason, and lively with sensation,—because by His prudent arrangement He assigns their place to all creatures which do not participate in the faculty of reason,—what more incongruous idea could be suggested, than that God had withheld from him the simple knowledge of himself? The wisdom of this world, indeed, is ever aiming with much effort to attain to the knowledge of truth; its researches, no doubt, fall short of the aim, from its inability to know through what agency it is permitted that truth should be ascertained; but yet there are some things on

¹ Ps. xlix. 12.

the nature of the soul, near (I might even say, akin) to the truth which it has attempted to discern. Under these circumstances, how unbecoming and even shameful a thing it is, that any man of religious principle should either have no intelligent views on this very subject, or actually prohibit himself from acquiring any whatever !”

CHAP. 3.—*On researches of anatomists, as they are called.*

Well, now, this extremely lucid and eloquent castigation which you have inflicted on our ignorance lays you so strictly under the necessity of knowing every possible thing which appertains to the nature of man, that, should you unhappily be ignorant of any particular, you must (and remember it is not I, but you, that have made the necessity) be compared with “the cattle.” For although you appear to aim your censure at us more especially, when you quote the passage, “Man, although he was in honour, understood not,” inasmuch as we (unlike yourself) hold an honourable place in the Church; yet even you occupy too honourable a rank in nature, not to be preferred above the cattle, with which according to your own judgment you will have to be compared, if you should happen to be ignorant on any of the points which manifestly appertain to your nature. For you have not merely sprinkled your censure over those who are affected with the same ignorance as I am myself labouring under, that is to say, concerning the origin of the human soul (although I am not indeed absolutely ignorant even on this point, for I know that God breathed into the face of the first man, and that “man then became a living soul,”¹—a truth, however, which I could never have known by myself, unless I had read of it in the Scripture); but you asked in so many words, “What difference is there between a man and a brute beast; if he knows not how to discuss and determine his own nature and quality?” And you seem to have entertained your opinion so distinctly, as to have thought that a man ought to be able to discuss and determine the facts of his own entire quality and nature so clearly, that nothing concerning himself should escape his observation. Now, if this is really the truth of the matter,

¹ Gen. ii. 7.

I must now compare you to "the cattle," if you cannot tell me the precise number of the hairs of your head. If, however, as we advance in life, you allow us to be ignorant of sundry facts appertaining to our nature, I then want to know how far your concession extends,—so as to be sure that it does not include the very point we are now raising, that we do not by any means know the origin of our soul,—subject, however, to an admission, which concerns the safety of our faith, that we do indeed know beyond all doubt that the soul is a gift to man from God, and that it still is not of the same nature as God Himself. Do you, moreover, think that each person's ignorance of his own nature must be exactly on the same level as your ignorance of it? Must everybody's knowledge, too, of the subject be equal to what you have been able to attain to? So that if he is so unfortunate as to possess a slightly larger amount of ignorance than yourself, you must compare him with cattle; and on the same principle, if any one shall be ever so little wiser than yourself on this subject, he will have the pleasure of comparing you with equal justice to the aforesaid cattle. I must therefore request you to tell me, to what extent you permit us to be ignorant of our nature so as to save our distance from the formidable cattle; and I beg you besides duly to reflect, whether he is not further removed from cattle who knows his ignorance of any part of the subject, than he is who thinks he knows what in fact he knows not. Man's entire nature is certainly composed of spirit, soul, and body; therefore, whoever will have it, that the body is alien from man's nature, is unwise. Those medical men, however, who are called anatomists have investigated with careful scrutiny, by dissecting processes, even living men, so far as men have been able to retain any life in the hands of the examiners; their researches have penetrated limbs, veins, nerves, bones, marrow, the internal seats of vitality, and all to discover the natural condition of the body; but none of these men have ever thought of comparing us with the cattle, because of our ignorance of their subject. But perhaps you will say that it is those who are ignorant of the nature of the soul, not of the body, who are to be compared with the brute beasts. Then you ought not to have expressed yourself

at starting in the way you have done. Your words are not, "For what difference is here between a man and cattle, if he is ignorant of the nature and quality of the soul ;" but you say, "if he knows not how to discuss and determine his own nature and quality." Of course our quality and our nature must be taken account of together with the body, but at the same time the investigation of the several elements of which we are composed is conducted in each case separately. For my own part, indeed, if I wished to display how far it was in my power to treat scientifically and intelligently the entire field of man's nature, I should have to fill many volumes; not to mention how many topics there are which I must confess my ignorance of.

CHAP. 4. [III.]

But as for yourself, how far do you mean that the matter which we discussed in our former book concerning the breath of the human being should reach?—Shall it include the nature of the soul, seeing that it is the soul which effects it; or that of the body, since the body is moved by the soul to effect it; or that of the atmospheric air, by whose reciprocity of action it is discovered to effect it; or shall it include all three, that is to say, the soul which moves the body, and the body which by its motion receives and emits the breath, and also the circumambient air which feeds and raises [the lung part of the body] by its entrance into it, and then, by its alternate departure, relieves and depresses it? And yet you were evidently ignorant of all this, learned and eloquent though you are, when you supposed, and said, and wrote, and read in the presence of the crowd assembled to hear your opinion, that it was out of our own nature that we inflated a bag, and yet had no diminution of our nature at all by the operation; [and this unskilful guess you hazarded to your own discredit], although you might most easily ascertain how we accomplish the process, not by any tedious examination of the pages either of human or of inspired writings, but by a simple investigation of your own physical action, whenever you liked. This, then, being the case, how can I trust you to teach me concerning the origin of human souls,—a subject which I confess myself to be ignorant of? What if you are actually doing every

moment, with your nose and mouth, that which you know not the very process of? May the Lord bring it to pass that you may be advised by me, and accept rather than resist so manifest a truth, and one so ready to your hand. May you also not interrogate your lungs about the bag inflation in such a temper as to prefer inflating them in opposition to me, rather than acquiesce in their tuition, when they answer your inquiry with entire truth,—not by speech and altercation, but by breath and respiration. Then I could bear with you patiently while you correct and reproach me for my ignorance of the origin of souls; nay, I could even warmly thank you, if, besides inflicting on me rebuke, you would convince me with truth. For if you could teach me the truth I am ignorant of, it would be my duty to bear with all patience any blows you might deal against me, not in word only, but even with hand.

CHAP. 5. [IV.]

For with respect to the question between us, I confess to your loving self¹ I greatly desire to know one of two things if I can,—either to discover what I am ignorant of touching the origin of souls, or to determine whether the discovery is within our reach at all, so long as we are in the present life. For what if our controversy touches the very points of which it is enjoined to us, “Seek not out the things that are too high for thee, neither search the things that are above thy strength; but whatever things the Lord hath commanded and taught thee, think thereupon for evermore.”² This, then, is what I desire to know, either from God Himself, who knows what He creates, or even from some competently learned man who knows what he is saying, not from a person who is ignorant of the breath he heaves. It is not everybody who recollects his own infancy; and do you suppose that a man is able, without divine instruction, to know how and whence he began to exist in his mother’s womb,—especially if the knowledge of human nature has so completely eluded his observation as to leave him ignorant, not only of what is within him, but of that also which infringes on his nature from without? Will you, my dearest brother, be able to teach me, or any one else,

¹ Dilectioni tuæ.

² Ecclus. iii. 21, 22.

whence human beings at their birth get their souls,¹ when you know not even now how it is that their life is so sustained by food, that they are certain to die if the aliment is withdrawn for a while? Or [if I may vary the question] will you be able to teach me, or any one else, whence men obtain their souls, when you are actually ignorant even now whence bags, when inflated, get the repletion? My only wish, as you are ignorant whence souls have their origin, is, that I may on my side know whether such knowledge is attainable by me in this present life. If this be one of the things which are too high for us, and which we are forbidden to seek out or search into, then we have good grounds for fearing lest we should sin, not by our ignorance of it, but our quest after it. For we ought not to suppose that a subject, to fall under the category of the things which are too high for us, must appertain to the nature of God, and not to our own.

CHAP. 6. [V.]—*Questions about the nature of the body. Arteries, air-veins.*

What do you say to the fact, that amongst the works of God there are some which it is more difficult to take cognizance of than even God Himself,—so far, indeed, as He can be an object of recognition to us at all? For we have learnt the lesson that God is a Trinity; but to this very day we do not know how many kinds of animals (at least of land animals) He created which were able to enter Noah's ark,² unless by some happy chance you have ascertained this fact. Again, in the Book of Wisdom it is written, "For if they were able to prevail so much, that they could know and estimate the world, how is it that they did not more easily find out the Lord thereof?"³ Is it because the subject before us is *within* us that it is therefore not too high for us? For it must be granted that the nature of our soul is a more internal thing than our bodily substance. The fact, however, is, that the soul has been better able to explore the body itself externally by the bodily eye than internally by its own means. For what is there in the inward parts of the body where the soul does not exist? But yet, even with regard to these several inner and

¹ [Animentur = "are furnished with their *anima*."]

² Gen. vii. 8, 9.

³ Wisd. xiii. 9.

vital portions of our frame, the soul has examined and searched them out by the bodily eyes ; and all that it has succeeded in learning of them it has acquired by means of these visual organs ; and, without doubt, all the material substance was there, even when the soul knew not of it. Since also our inward parts are incapable of living without the soul, it follows that the soul has been more able to give them life than to ascertain their nature. Well, then, does it happen that the soul's subordinate, the body, is a higher object to attain the knowledge of than the soul's own self ? Suppose now it wished to inquire and consider when human seed is converted into blood, and when into solid flesh ; when the bones begin to harden, and when to fill with marrow ; how many kinds of veins and nerves there are ; by what channels and circuits the former serve for irrigation and the latter for ligature to the entire body ; whether the skin is to be reckoned among the nerves, and the teeth among the bones,—for they show some difference, inasmuch as they have no marrow ; and in what respect the nails differ from both [bones and teeth], being similar to them in hardness, while they possess a quality in common with the hair, in being capable of growing and being cut ; what, again, is the use of those veins wherein air, instead of blood, circulates, which they call *the arteries*,¹—suppose, I repeat, that the soul desired to ascertain these and similar points respecting the nature of its [servant] the body, ought it then to be said to a man, “ Seek not out the things that are too high for thee, neither search the things that are above thy strength ; ” whereas, if the inquiry be made into the soul's own origin, of which subject it knows nothing, the matter then, forsooth, is not too high or beyond one's strength to be capable of apprehension ? And you deem it an absurd thing, and incompatible with reason, for the soul not to know whether it is inbreathed into the human being by God, or whether it is derived from the parents, although it does not remember this event as soon as it is past, and reckons it among the things which it has forgotten beyond

¹ [These vessels which carry the blood from the heart were formerly supposed, from being found empty after death, to contain only air. Comp. Cicero (*De Nat. Deor.* ii. 55, 138), “ Sanguis per *venas* in omne corpus diffunditur, et spiritus per *arterias*.”]

recall,—like infancy, and all other stages of life which followed close upon birth, though doubtless, when they happened, they were not unaccompanied with sensation; but yet you do not deem it absurd or unreasonable that it should be ignorant of the body which is subject to itself, and know nothing whatever about incidents pertaining to it which are not in the category of things that are past, but of present facts,—as to whether it sets the veins in motion in order to produce life in the body, but the nerves, in order to operate by the limbs of the body; and if so, why it does not move the nerves except at its especial will, whereas it affects the pulsations of the veins, and that without intermission, even without willing; and in respect of this part of the bodily structure, whether that which they call the *ἡγεμονικόν* (the authoritative part of the soul, even the reason) exercises its universal rule from the heart, or from the brain, or by a distribution of motions from the heart and sensations from the brain; or if from the brain, both by its sensations and voluntary motions; but if from the heart, by the involuntary pulsations of the veins; and once more, if it applies to the two methods of the brain, how is it that it has the sensations, even without willing, while it does not move the limbs except it wills? Inasmuch, then, as only the soul itself does all this, how is it that it knows not what it does? or whence its power to do it? And it is no disgrace to it to be so ignorant. Then do you suppose it to be a discredit if it knows not whence or how it was itself made, since it certainly did not make itself? Well, then, none know how or whence the soul effects all its action in the body; do you not therefore think that it, too, appertains to those things which are said to be “too high for us, and above our strength”?

CHAP. 7. [VI.]

But I have for myself to put to you a far wider question arising out of our subject. Why should a few know how all men do what they actually do? Perhaps you will tell me, Because they have learnt the art of anatomy or experiment, which are both comprised in the physician's education, which is obtained by a few, while others have refused to acquire the information, although they might, of course, if they had liked.

Here, then, I say nothing of the point why many try to acquire this information, but fail, because they are hindered by a tardy intellect (which, however, is a very strange fact) from learning of others what is done both by their own selves and in their own selves. But this is a very important question which I now ask, Why I have no need of science to know that there is a sun in the heavens, and a moon, and all the other stars; but must have the aid of science in order to know, on moving my finger, whence the act begins,—with my heart, or my brain, or with both, or with neither: why I do not require a teacher to know what is so far above me; but must yet wait for some one else to learn whence that is done by me which is done within me? For although we are said to think in our heart, and although we know what our thoughts are, without the knowledge of any other person, yet we know not in what part of the body we have the heart itself, which is the region of our thinking, unless we are taught it by some other person, who yet is ignorant of what passes in our thoughts. I am not unaware that when we hear how we should love God with our whole heart, this is not said of that portion of our fleshly structure which lies under our ribs, but of that power which originates our thoughts. And this is properly designed by the name [“heart”]; because, as motion does not rest in the heart, whence the pulsation of the veins radiates in every direction, so in the process of thought we do not rest in the act itself, and abstain from further pondering. But although every sensation is imparted even to the body by the soul, how is it that, while we can count our limbs externally, even in the dark and with closed eyes, by the bodily sense which is called “the touch,” we know nothing of our internal functions in the very central region of the soul itself, where that power is present which imparts life and animation to all else,—a mystery this which, I apprehend, no medical men of any kind, whether empirics, or anatomists, or dogmatists, or quacks,¹ or any man living, have any knowledge of?

CHAP. 8.

And whoever shall have attempted to fathom such know-

¹ Methodicos [or, perhaps, “of independent views,” as opposed to the *dogmatici*, who followed the rules of general practice].

ledge may not improperly have addressed to him the words we have before quoted, "Seek not out the things that are too high for thee, neither search the things that are above thy strength." Now it is not a question of mere altitude, such as is beyond our stature, but it is an elevation which our intelligence cannot reach, and a strength which our mental power cannot cope with. Neither the heaven of heavens, nor the measure of the stars, nor the scope of sea and land, nor the nethermost hell [are the tests of our incapacity]; it is our own selves whom ourselves are incapable of comprehending; it is our own selves, who, in our too great height and strength, transcend the humble limits of our own knowledge; it is our own selves, whom we are incapable of embracing, although we are certainly not beside ourselves. But we are not to be compared with cattle simply because we do not perfectly discover what we ourselves are: and yet you think that we deserve the humiliating comparison, if we have forgotten what we were, even though we knew it once. My soul is not now being derived from my parents, is not now receiving insufflation from God. Whichever of these two processes He used, He used when He created me; He is not at this moment using it of me, or within me. It is past and gone,—not a present thing, nor a recent one to me. I do not even know whether I was aware of it and then forgot it; or whether I was unable, even at the time when it was done, to feel and to know it.

CHAP. 9. [VII.]—*The remarkable memory of one Simplicius.*

Observe now, even now while we live, while we know that we live, while we are absolutely certain that we possess memory, understanding, and will; who boast of ourselves as having a mighty knowledge of our own nature;—observe, I say, how entirely ignorant we are of what avail to us is our memory, or our understanding, or our will. A certain man who from his youth has been a friend of mine, named Simplicius, is a person of accurate and astonishing memory. I once asked him to tell me, what were the last lines but one of all the books of Virgil; he immediately answered my question without the least hesitation, and with perfect accuracy. I then asked him to mention the preceding lines; he did so.

And I really believe that he could have repeated Virgil line after line backward. For wherever I put him on by way of trial, he was never at fault. Similarly in prose, from any of Cicero's orations, which he had learnt by heart, he would perform a similar feat at our request, by reciting backwards as far as we wished. Upon our expressing astonishment, he called God to witness, that he had no idea of his ability this way previous to the trial we made of him. So far, therefore, as memory is concerned, his mind only then learnt its own power; and such discovery would at no time be possible except by trial and experiment. Moreover, he was of course the very same man before he tried his powers; how was it, then, that he was ignorant of himself?

CHAP. 10.—*The fidelity of memory; the unsearchable treasure of memory; the powers of a man's understanding sufficiently understood by none.*

We often assume that we shall retain a thing in our memory; and so thinking, we do not write it down. But afterwards, when we wish to recall it, it refuses to come to mind; and we are then sorry that we thought it would return to memory, or that we did not secure it in writing so as to prevent its escape; when lo, on a sudden, without our seeking it, it occurs to us. Then does it follow that we were not ourselves when we thought so? And that we cease in fact to be the same thing that we were, when we are no longer able to think so? Now how does it happen that I know not how we are abstracted from, and denied to, ourselves; and similarly am ignorant how we are restored and reproduced to ourselves? As if we are other persons, and elsewhere, when we seek, but fail to find, what we deposited in our memory; and are ourselves incapable of returning to ourselves, as if we were situated somewhere else; but afterwards return again, on finding ourselves out. For where do we make our quest, except in our own selves? And what is it we search for, except our own selves? As if we were not actually at home in our persons, but had gone away somewhither. Do you not observe, even with alarm, so deep a mystery? And what is all this but our own nature—not what it has been, but such as it now is? And observe how much wider the question is than the comprehension thereof. I have often thought that I could

understand a question which had been submitted to me, if I were to bestow thought upon it. Well, I have bestowed the thought, but have not solved the question; and many a time I have refrained from the thinking, and yet have determined the point. The powers, then, of my own understanding have not been really known to me; nor, I apprehend, have they been to you either.

CHAP. 11.—*The Apostle Peter told no lie, when he said he was ready to lay down his life for the Lord.*

But perhaps you despise me for confessing all this, and will in consequence compare me with "cattle." For myself, however, I will not cease to advise you, or (if you refuse to listen to me) at all events to warn you, to acknowledge the infirmity to be rather common to us all, in which virtue has its probation; lest by assuming unknown things to be known you fail to attain to the truth. For I suppose that there is something, which even you wish to understand, but are unable; which you would never seek to understand, unless you hoped some day to succeed in your research. Thus you also are ignorant of the powers of your own understanding, who profess to know all about your own nature, and decline to follow me in my confession of ignorance. Well, there is also the will; what am I to say about that, where at all events a free choice is ostentatiously claimed by us? The blessed Apostle Peter, indeed, was ready to lay down his life for the Lord. He was no doubt sincere in his readiness; nor was he treacherous to the Lord when he made the promise. But his will was entirely ignorant of its own powers and resources. Therefore the great apostle, who had discovered his Master to be the Son of God, was unknown to himself. Thus we are quite aware respecting ourselves that we will a thing, or rather "nill" it; but although our will is a good honest one, we know neither its strength nor its resources, unless we deceive ourselves, my dear son; nor what temptations it may yield to, nor what it may resist.

CHAP. 12. [VIII.]

See therefore how many facts of our nature, not of the past but of the present time, and not pertaining to the body only but also to our inner man, we know nothing about, without

deserving to be compared with the brute beasts. And yet this is the opprobrious comparison which you have thought me worthy of, because I have not complete knowledge of the past origin of my soul—although I am not wholly ignorant of it, inasmuch as I am sure that it was given me by God, and yet not of God's nature. But when can I enumerate all the particulars relating to the nature of our spirit and our soul of which we are ignorant? Whereas we ought rather to utter that exclamation before God, which the Psalmist uttered: "The knowledge of Thee is too wonderful for me; it is very difficult, I cannot attain to it."¹ Now why did he add the words *for me*, except because he conjectured how incomprehensible was the knowledge of God for himself, inasmuch as he was unable to comprehend even his own self? The apostle was caught up into the third heaven, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter; and whether this had happened to him in the body or out of the body, he declares himself unable to say;² but yet he has no fear of encountering from you comparison with the cattle. His spirit knew that it was in the third heaven, in paradise; but knew not whether it was in the body. The third heaven, of course, and paradise were not the Apostle Paul himself; but his body and soul and spirit were himself. Behold, then, the curious fact: he knew the great things—lofty and divine—which were not himself; but that which appertained to his own nature he was ignorant of. Who in the vast knowledge of such occult things can help being astonished at his great ignorance of his own existence? Who, in short, would believe it possible, if one who errs not had not told us, that "we know not what we should pray for as we ought"?³ Where, then, ought our bent and purpose mainly to be—to "reach forth to those things which are before"? And yet you compare me to cattle, if among the things which are behind I have forgotten anything concerning my own origin—although you hear the same apostle say: "Forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press toward the mark, for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus."⁴

¹ Ps. cxxxix. 6.² 2 Cor. xii. 4.³ Rom. viii. 26.⁴ Phil. iii. 13, 14.

CHAP. 13. [IX.]—*In what sense the Holy Ghost is said to make intercession for us.*

Do you happen also to think me ridiculous and like the irrational beasts, because I said, "We know not what we should pray for as we ought"? Perhaps this is not quite so intolerable. For since, in the dictates of a sound and righteous judgment, we prefer our future to our past; and since our prayer must have reference not to what we have been, but what we shall be, it is of course much more injurious not to know what we should pray for, than to be ignorant of the manner of our origin. But recollect whose words I repeated, or read them again for yourself, and reflect whence they come; and do not pelt me with your reproaches, lest the stone you throw should alight on a head you would not wish. For it is the great teacher of the Gentiles, the Apostle Paul, himself, who said, "For we know not what we should pray for as we ought."¹ And he not only taught this lesson by word, but also illustrated it by his example. For, contrary to his own advantage and the promotion of his own salvation, he once in his ignorance prayed that "the thorn in the flesh might depart from him," which he said had been given to him "lest he should be exalted above measure by the abundance of the revelations which were given him."² But the Lord loved him, and so did not do what he had requested Him to do. Nevertheless, when the apostle said, "We know not what we should pray for as we ought," he immediately added, "But the Spirit Himself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered. And He that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit, because He maketh intercession for the saints according to the will of God"³—that is to say, He makes the saints offer intercessions. He, of course, is that Spirit "whom God hath sent into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father;"⁴ and "by whom we cry, Abba, Father;"⁵ for both expressions are used by the apostle—both that we have received *the Spirit who cries, Abba, Father*; and also that it is through Him that *we cry, Abba, Father*. His object is to explain by these varied statements in what sense he used the

¹ Rom. viii. 26.

² 2 Cor. xii. 7, 8.

³ Rom. viii. 26, 27.

⁴ Gal. iv. 6.

⁵ Rom. viii. 15.

word "*crying*:" he meant *causing to cry*; so that it is we who cry at His instance and impulse. Let Him therefore teach me this too, whenever He pleases, if He knows it to be expedient for me, that I should know whence I derive my origin as regards my soul. But let me be taught by that Spirit who searches the deep things of God; not by a man who knows nothing of the breath which inflates a bag. However, be it far from me to compare you with brutes because of this piece of ignorance; because it arose not from incurable inability, but from sheer inadvertence.

CHAP. 14. [X.]—*It is more excellent to know that the flesh will rise again and live for evermore, than to learn whatever scientific men have been able to teach us concerning its nature.*

But although the questions which arise touching the origin of souls are of a higher character, no doubt, than that which treats of the source whence the breath comes which we inhale and exhale, you perhaps deem them to be especially high from the strong belief you entertain of having learnt them out of the Holy Scriptures, from which we derive what we learn by faith; and such subjects are not traceable by any human minds. Of course it is far more excellent to know that the flesh will rise again and will live for evermore, than to learn whatever facts scientific men have been able to discover in it by careful examination, which the soul perceives by no outward sense, although it really quickens with its presence all the things of which it is ignorant. It is also far better to know that the soul, which has been born again and renewed in Christ, will be blessed for ever, than to discover all that we are ignorant of touching its memory, understanding, and will. Now these subjects, which I have designated as more excellent and as better, we could by no means find out, unless we believed them on the testimony of the inspired Scriptures. These Scriptures you perhaps think you so thoroughly believe, that you do not hesitate to draw out of them a definite theory about the origin of souls. Well, then, first of all, if it be as you suppose, you ought never to have attributed to human nature itself what man knows in discussion and inquiry about his own nature and quality, but to God's gift. Now you asked: "Wherein does a man differ from the cattle, if he is ignorant

of this?" But why need we read anything at all, in order to know this, if we ought already to know it by the very fact that we are different from cattle? For just as you do not read anything to me for the purpose of teaching me that I am alive (my own nature making it impossible that I should be ignorant of this fact), so if it is an attribute of nature to know its own quality, why do you produce passages of Scripture for me to believe concerning this subject? Is it then only those persons who read them that differ from the cattle? Are we not so created as to be different from brute animals, even before we can acquire the art of reading? Pray, tell me how it is that you put in so high a claim for our nature, that by the very circumstance of its differing from cattle it already knows how to discuss and inquire into the origin of souls; while at the same time you make it so inexpert in this knowledge, as to be unable by human endowment to know this without faith to believe the witness of Scripture.

CHAP. 15. [XI.]

But then, secondly, you are mistaken in this matter; for the passages of Scripture which you chose to produce for the solution of this question of yours, do not illustrate the point. For it is another thing which they prove, without which we cannot really lead a pious life, namely, that we have in God the giver, creator, and fashioner of our souls. But how He does this for them, whether by inbreathing them in each several person, or by deriving them from the parents, they do not tell us—except in the instance of that one soul which He gave to the first man. Read attentively what I have written to that servant of God, our brother Renatus;¹ for inasmuch as I have pointed it all out to him there, it is not necessary for me to repeat my proofs here. But you would like me to follow your example in definiteness of theory, and so thrust myself into such difficulties as you have surrounded yourself with. Involved in these, you have spoken many stout words against the Catholic faith; if, however, you would faithfully and humbly bethink yourself and consider, you would assuredly see how greatly it would have profited you, if you had only

¹ See above, Book i. 17. [xiv., and following.]

known how to be natural and consistent in your ignorance; and how this advantage is still open to you, if you were even now able to maintain such propriety. Now, since intelligence is so pleasant a function to you in man's nature (for, truly enough, if our nature were without it, we should not be different from brute beasts, so far as our souls are concerned), understand, I beg of you, what it is that you do not understand, that so you may not utterly fail in intelligence; and do not despise any man who, with the view to a right and true understanding, is quite aware that he does not understand that which is beyond his intelligence.¹ With regard, however, to the passage in the inspired psalm, "Man, being in honour, understandeth not; he is compared to the senseless cattle, and is like unto them;"² I beg of you to read and understand these words, that you may rather with a humble spirit guard against the opprobrious estimate, yourself, than arrogantly throw it out against another person. The passage applies to those who regard only that as a life worth living which they live in the flesh—having no hope after death—just like "cattle;" it has no reference to those who [on the one hand] never deny their knowledge of what they actually know, and [on the other hand] always acknowledge their ignorance of what they really do not know; who, in point of fact, are aware of their weakness, rather than confident of their strength.

CHAP. 16.—*Predestination to eternal life, and predestination to eternal death.*

Do not, my son, let my apprehension and fear, as an old man's, offend the forwardness and confidence which you feel as a young man. For my own part, indeed, if I proved unequal, either under the teaching of God or of some spiritual instructor, to the task of understanding the subject of our present inquiry on the origin of souls, I am more prepared to vindicate God's righteous will, that we should even remain in ignorance on this point, as on many other topics, than to

¹ [The original of this involved paragraph is characteristic of our author: "Intellige quid non intelligas, ne totum non intelligas . . . qui ut veraciter intelligat, quod non intelligit hoc se non intelligere intelligit."]

² Ps. xlix. 12, 13.

indulge in any random allegation, that this is a question of such obscurity that I can neither bring it home to the intelligence of other people, or understand it myself. This would only be to help the cause of the heretics who endeavour to persuade us that the souls of infants are entirely free from guilt; on the ground, forsooth, that such guilt would only recoil on God as its Author, for having compelled innocent souls (for which He knew beforehand that no laver of regeneration was appointed to help them) to become sinful, by assigning them to sinful flesh, without any provision for that grace of baptism which should prevent their incurring eternal damnation. For the fact undoubtedly is, that numberless souls of infants pass out of the body before they are baptized. God forbid that I should cast about for any futile effort to dilute this stern fact, and say what you have yourself said: "That the soul deserved to be polluted by the flesh, and to become sinful, though it previously had no sin, by reason of which it could be rightly said to have incurred this desert." And again: "That even without baptism original sins may be remitted." And once more: "That even the kingdom of heaven is at last bestowed on those who have not been baptized." Now, if I were not afraid to utter these and similar poisonous allegations against the faith, I should probably not be afraid to propound some definite theory on this subject of yours. How much better, then, is it, that I should avoid any separate discussion about the soul, and acknowledge my ignorance at once! I simply hold, indeed, what I see the apostle has most plainly taught us, that owing to one man all pass into condemnation who are born of Adam,¹ unless they are born again in Christ, even as He has appointed them to be regenerated, before they die in the body; having predestinated them to everlasting life, as the most merciful bestower of grace; whilst to those whom He has predestinated to eternal death, He is also the most righteous awarder of punishment, not only on account of the sins which they add in the indulgence of their own will, but also because of their original sin, even if, as in the case of infants, they add nothing thereto. Now this is my definite view on that

¹ See Rom. v. 18.

question, [held by me in such a way] that the hidden things of God may keep their secret, without impairing my own faith.

CHAP. 17. [XII.]—*A twofold question to be treated concerning the soul ;
what "body" is.*

And now, as far as the Lord vouchsafes to enable me, I must reply also to that allegation of yours, in which, speaking of the soul, you again mention my name, and say, "We do not, as the very able and learned bishop Augustine professes, allow it to be incorporeal and also a spirit." We have therefore, first, to discuss the question, whether the soul is to be deemed incorporeal, as I have said ; or corporeal, as you hold. Then, secondly, whether in our Scriptures it is called a spirit—though there is propriety in designating it "spirit," not, indeed, the whole, but a part of it. Well, I should, to begin with, like to know how you define *spirit*. For if that is not "body" which does not consist of limbs of flesh, then the earth cannot be a body, nor the sky, nor a stone, nor water, nor the stars, nor anything of the kind. If, however, a "body" is whatever consists of parts, whether greater or less, which occupy greater or smaller local spaces, then all the things which I have just mentioned are bodies ; the air is a body ; the visible light is a body ; and so are all the things which the apostle has in view, when he says, "There are celestial bodies, and bodies terrestrial."¹

CHAP. 18.—*The first question, whether the soul is corporeal ; breath and wind,
nothing else than air in motion.*

Now whether the soul is such a substance, is an extremely nice and subtle question. You, indeed, with a promptitude for which I very greatly congratulate you, affirm that God is not a body. But then, again, you give me some anxiety when you say, "The soul so lacks corporeity, as to consist (as some persons are pleased to suppose) of hollow emptiness, of airy and futile substance." Now, from these words you seem to believe, that everything which lacks body is of an empty substance. Well, if this is the case, how do you dare to say that God is without a body, without fearing the consequence that He is of an empty substance? If, however, God has not a body, as you have just allowed ; and if (as God forbid

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 40.

you should for a moment suppose) He is yet of an empty substance; it follows, that not everything which lacks body is of an empty substance. And therefore a person who contends that the soul is incorporeal does not necessarily mean, that it is of an empty and futile substance; for he allows that God, who is not an empty being, is at the same time incorporeal. But observe what great difference there is between my actual assertion, and what you suppose me to say. I do not say that the soul is an airy substance; if I did, I should admit that it is a body. For air is a body; as all who understand what they say declare, whenever they speak concerning bodily substances. But you, because I called the soul incorporeal, supposed me not only to predicate mere emptiness of it, but, as the result of such predication, to say that it is "an airy substance." I could not, however, have implied that it has not corporeity, which air has; nor could it be empty, if a body full of air. And your own bag similes failed to remind you of this. For when the bags are inflated, what is it but air that is pressed into them? And they are so far from being empty, that by reason of their distension they become even ponderous. But perhaps the breath [which has distended them] seems to you to be a different thing from air; [wrongly, however,] since your very breath is nothing else than air in motion; and what this is, can be seen from the shaking of a fan. With respect to any hollow vessels, which you may suppose to be empty, you may ascertain with certainty that they are really full, by lowering them straight into the water, at the mouth where they are filled. You see no water can get in, by reason of the air with which they are filled. If, however, they are lowered either in the opposite way, with mouth upward, or aslant, they then fill, as the water enters at the same opening where the air passes out and escapes. This could be, of course, more easily proved by performing the experiment, than by a description in writing. This, however, is not the time or place for longer delay on the subject; for whatever may be your perception of the nature of the air, as to whether it has corporeity or not, you certainly ought not to suppose me to have said that the soul is an aerial thing, but absolutely incorporeal. And this even

you acknowledge God to be, whom you do not dare to describe as an empty substance, while you cannot but admit that He has an essence which is unchangeable and almighty. Now, why should we fear that the soul is an empty void, if it be incorporeal; when we confess that God is incorporeal, and at the same time deny Him to be an empty void? Thus it was within the competency of an Incorporeal Being to create an incorporeal soul, even as the living God made living man; although, as the unchangeable and the almighty, He communicated not these attributes to the changeable and far inferior creature.

CHAP. 19. [XIII.]—*Whether the soul is a spirit.*

But again, why you would have the soul to be a body, and refuse to deem it a spirit, I cannot see. For if it is not a spirit, on the ground that the apostle named it apart from the spirit, when he said, "I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body be preserved,"¹ the same is a good reason why it is not a body, inasmuch as he mentioned the body, too, as distinct from it. If you affirm that the soul is a body, although they are both distinctly named; you should allow it to be a spirit, although these are also enumerated apart. Indeed, the soul has a much greater claim to be regarded by you as a spirit than a body; because you acknowledge the spirit and the soul to be of one substance, but deny the soul and the body to be of one substance. On what principle, then, is the soul a body, when its nature is different from that of a body; and not a spirit, although its nature and a spirit's is one and the same? Besides, according to your argument, you must needs confess that even the spirit is a body; for otherwise, if the spirit is not a body, and the soul is a body, the soul and the spirit are not of one and the same substance. You, however, allow them both (although believing them to be two separate things) to have one substance. Therefore, if the soul is a body, the spirit is a body also; for under no other condition can they be regarded as being of one and the same nature. On your own principles, therefore, the statement of the apostle, who mentions, "Your spirit, and soul, and body," must imply

¹ 1 Thess. v. 23.

three bodies; yet the body, which has likewise the name of flesh, is of a different nature. And of these three bodies, as you would call them, of which one is of a different, and the other two of one and the same substance, the entire human being is composed—one thing and one existence. Now, although you assert this, yet you will not allow that the two which are of one and the same substance, that is, the soul and the spirit, should have the one designation of spirit; whilst the two things which are not of one and the same substance ought, as you suppose, to have the one name of body.

CHAP. 20. [XIV.]—*The body does not receive God's image.*

But I pass by all this, lest the discussion between us should degenerate into one of names rather than things. Let us, then, see whether the inner man be the soul, or the spirit, or both. I observe, however, that you have expressed your opinion on the point in writing, calling the inner man the soul; for of this you spoke when you said: "And as the substance congealed, which was incapable of comprehension, it would produce another body within itself rounded and amassed by the force and twirl of its own nature, and thus an inner man would begin to appear, who, being moulded in a corporeal sheath, would in its lineaments be shaped after the likeness of its outer man." And from this you draw the following inference: "God's breath, therefore, made the soul; yea, that breath from God became the soul, stamped into a substantial image—being corporeal in its nature, like its own body, and conformed to it in shape." After this you proceed to speak of the spirit, and say: "This soul which had its origin from the breath of God could not have existed without an innermost sense and intellect of its own; and such is the spirit." As I, then, understand your statement, you mean the inner man to be the soul, and the inmost one to be the spirit; as if the latter were enclosed within the former, as this is interior to the body. Whence it comes to pass, that just as the body receives another body pervading its own inner cavity, which (as you suppose) is the soul; so in its turn must the soul be regarded as having its interior hollows also, where

it could receive the third body, even the spirit; and thus the whole man consists of three constituents, the outer, the inner, and the inmost. Now, do you not perceive by this what great absurdities follow in your wake, when you attempt the asseveration that the soul is corporeal? Tell me, I pray you, which of the two is it that is to be renewed in the knowledge of God, after the image of Him that created him?¹ The inner, or the inmost? For my own part, indeed, I do not see that the apostle, besides the inner and the outer man, knows anything of another man inside the inner one, that is, of an inmost man. But you must decide which it is you would have to be renewed after the image of God. How is he to receive this, who has already got the image of the outer man? For if the inner man has run [as in a mould] through the limbs of the outward one, and been condensed, or *congealed* (for this is the term you have used; as if a molten shape were formed out of soft clay, which was thickened out of the dust), how, if this same figure which has been impressed upon it, or rather *expressed* out of a body, is to retain its place, could it be refashioned after the image of God? Is it to have two images—God's from above, that of the body from below—as is said in the case of money, "Heads and Tails"?² Will you pretend to say, that the soul received the bodily image, and that the spirit takes God's image, as if the former were contiguous to the body, and the latter to God; and that, therefore, it is really the inmost man which is refashioned after the image of God, and not the inner man? Well, but this pretence is useless. For if the inmost man is so entirely diffused through all the members of the soul, as the inner man of the soul is through the limbs of the body; even it has now, through the soul, received the image of the body, as the soul moulded the same [inmost man]; and thus it results that it has no means whereby to receive God's image, while the afore-mentioned image of the body remains impressed upon it; except as in the case of the money which I have just quoted, where there is one form on the upper

¹ Col. iii. 10.

² Caput et Navia. [This phrase the Benedictine editor illustrates by the French game-challenge, *Croix ou [or et] pile.*]

surface, and another on the lower one. These are the absurd lengths to which you are driven, whether you will or no, when you apply to the consideration of the soul the material ideas of bodily substances. But, as even you yourself with perfect propriety confess, God is not a body. How, then, could a body receive His image? "I beseech you, brother, that you be not conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind;"¹ and cherish not "the carnal mind, which is death."²

CHAP. 21. [XV.]

But you say: "If the soul is incorporeal, what was it that the rich man saw in hell? He certainly recognised Lazarus; if he did not³ know Abraham. Whence arose to him the knowledge of Abraham, who had died so long before?" By using these words, I suppose that you do not think a man can be recognised and known without his bodily form. To know yourself, therefore, I imagine that you often stand before your looking-glass, lest by forgetting your features you should be unable to recognise yourself. But let me ask you, what man does anybody know more than himself; and whose face can he see less than his own? But who could possibly know God, whom even you do not doubt to be incorporeal, if knowledge could not (as you suppose) accrue without bodily shape; that is, if bodies alone can be recognised? What Christian, however, when discussing subjects of such magnitude and difficulty, can give such little heed to the inspired word, as to say, "If the soul be incorporeal, it must of necessity lack form"? Have you forgotten that in that word you have read of "a form of doctrine"?⁴ Have you forgotten, too, that it is written concerning Christ Jesus, previous to His clothing Himself with humanity, that He was "in the form of God"?⁵ How, then, can you say, "If the soul is incorporeal, it must of necessity lack form;" when you hear of "the form of God," whom you acknowledge to be incorporeal; and so ex-

¹ Rom. xii. 1, 2.

² Rom. viii. 6.

³ Non noverat Abraham. [But some mss. omit *non*; rightly, one would think. The meaning then is: "He knew Abraham."]

⁴ Rom. vi. 17.

⁵ Phil. ii. 6.

press yourself, as if form could not possibly exist except in bodily shape ?

CHAP. 22.

You also say, that "names cease to be given, when form is not distinguished; and that, where there is no designation of persons, there is no giving of names." Your aim is to prove that Abraham's soul was corporeal, inasmuch as he could be addressed in Hades as "Father Abraham." Now, we have already said, that there is form even where there is no body. If, however, you think that where there are not bodies there is no assigning of names, I must beg of you to count the names which occur in this passage of Scripture, "But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance,"¹ and tell me whether you do not recognise the very things of which these are the names; and recognise them so as to descry some outlines of bodies. Come, tell me, to mention only *charity*, for instance, what are its members, its figure, its colour? For if you are not yourself empty-headed, these appurtenances cannot possibly be regarded by you as an empty thing. Then you go on to say: "The look and form must, of course, be corporeal of him whose help is implored." Well, let men hear what you say; and let no one implore God's help, because no one can possibly see anything corporeal in Him.

CHAP. 23. [XVI.]

"In short," you say, "members are in this parable ascribed to the soul, as if it were really a body." You will have it, that "by the eye the whole head is understood," because it is said, that "he lifted up his eyes." Again you say, that "by tongues are meant jaws, and by finger the hand," because it is said, "Send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water, and cool my tongue."² And yet to save yourself from the inconsistency of ascribing corporeal qualities to God, you add that "by these terms must be understood incorporeal functions and powers;" because with the greatest propriety you insist on it, that God is not corporeal. What is the reason, therefore, that the names of these limbs do not

¹ Gal. v. 22, 23.² Luke xvi. 24.

argue corporeity in God, although they do in the case of the soul? Is it that these terms must be understood literally when spoken of the creature, and only metaphorically and figuratively when predicated of the Creator? Then you will have to give us wings of literal bodily substance, since it is not the Creator, but only a human creature, who said, "If I should take my wings like a dove."¹ Moreover, if the rich man of the parable had a bodily tongue, on the ground of his exclaiming, "Let him cool my tongue," it would look very much as if our tongue, even while we are in the flesh, itself possessed material hands, because it is written, "Death and life are in the *hands* of the tongue."² I suppose it is even to yourself self-evident, that sin is neither a creature nor a bodily substance; why, then, has it a face? For do you not hear the psalmist say, "There is no peace in my bones, in the *face* of my sins"?³

CHAP. 24.—*Abraham's bosom—what it means.*

As to your supposing that "the Abraham's bosom referred to is corporeal," and your further assertion, that "by it is meant his whole body," I fear that you must be regarded (even in such a subject) as trying to crack a joke and raise a laugh, instead of acting gravely and seriously. For you could not else be so foolish as to think that the material bosom of one person could receive so many souls; nay, to use your own words, "contain the bodies of as many meritorious men as the angels carry thither, as they did Lazarus." Unless it happen to be your opinion, that his soul alone deserved to find its way to the said bosom. If you are not, then, in fun, and do not wish to make childish mistakes, you must understand by "Abraham's bosom" that remote and separate abode of rest and peace in which Abraham now is; and that what was said to Abraham⁴ did not merely refer to him personally, but had reference to his appointment as the father of many nations,⁵ to whom he was presented for imitation as the first

¹ Augustine's reading of Ps. cxxxix. 9.

² [In *manibus* linguæ = the Hebrew phrase בְּיָדֵי-לָשׁוֹן, Prov. xviii. 21.]

³ Ps. xxxviii. 3, מִפְּנֵי הַטָּאֲרֵי.

⁴ In Luke xvi. 24.

⁵ Gen. xvii. 5.

and principal example of faith ; even as God willed Himself to be called "the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob," although He is the God of an innumerable company.

CHAP. 25. [XVII.]

You must not, however, suppose that I say all this as if denying it to be possible that the soul of a dead man, like a person asleep, thinks either good or evil thoughts in the likeness of his own body. Now, in dreams, when we suffer anything harsh and troublesome, we are, of course, still ourselves ; and if the distress do not pass away when we awake, we experience very great suffering. But to suppose that they are veritable bodies in which we are hurried, or flit, about hither and thither in dreams, is the idea of a person who has thought only carelessly on such subjects ; for it is in fact mainly by these imaginary sights that the soul is proved to be non-corporeal ; unless you choose to call even the objects which we see so often in our dreams, besides ourselves, bodies, such as the sky, the earth, the sea, the sun, the moon, the stars, and rivers, mountains, trees, or animals. Whoever takes these phantoms to be bodies, is incredibly foolish ; [they are not bodies], although they are certainly very like bodies. Of this character also are those phenomena which are demonstrably of divine significance, whether seen in dreams or in a trance. Who can possibly trace out or describe their origin, or the material of which they consist ? It is, beyond question, spiritual, not corporeal. Now things of this kind, which look like bodies, but are not really corporeal, are formed in the thoughts of persons when they are awake, and sink deep in their minds and memories, and then out of these secret recesses, by some wonderful and ineffable process, they come out to view in the operation of our memory, and present themselves as if palpably before our eyes. If, therefore, the soul were a material body, it could not possibly contain so many things and such large forms of bodily substances in its scope of thought, and in the spaces of its memory ; for, according to your own definition, "it does not exceed this external body in its own corporeal substance." Possessing, therefore, no magnitude of its own, what capacity has it to hold the

images of vast bodies, spaces, and regions? What wonder is it, then, if it actually itself appears to itself in the likeness of its own body, even when it appears without a body? For it never appears to itself in dreams with its own body; and yet in the very similitude of its own body it runs hither and thither through known and unknown places, and beholds many sad and joyous sights. I suppose, however, that you really would not, yourself, be so bold as to maintain that there is true corporeity in that form of limb and body which the soul seems to itself to possess in dreams. For at that rate that will be a real mountain which it appears to ascend; and that a material house which it seems to enter; and that a veritable tree, with real wood and bulk, beneath which it apparently reclines; and that actual water which it imagines itself to drink. All the things with which it is conversant, as if they were corporeal, would be undoubted bodies, if the soul were itself corporeal, as it ranges about amongst them all in the likeness of a body

CHAP. 26. [XVIII.]—*St. Perpetua seemed to herself, in some dreams, to have been turned into a man, and then have wrestled with a certain Egyptian.*

Some notice must be taken of sundry accounts of martyrs' visions, because you have thought proper to derive some of your evidence therefrom. St. Perpetua, for instance, seemed to herself to be wrestling with an Egyptian, after being changed into a man. Now, who can doubt that it was her soul in that apparent bodily form, not her body, which, of course, remained in her own sex as a woman, and lay on the bed with her senses steeped in sleep, whilst her soul was struggling in the similitude of a man's body? What have you to say to this? Was that male likeness a veritable body, or was it no body at all, although possessing the appearance of a body? Choose your alternative. If it was a body, why did it not maintain its sexual integrity? For in that woman's flesh were found no virile functions of generation, whence by any such process as that which you call *congelation* could be moulded this similitude of a man's body. We will conclude then, if you please, that, as her body was still alive while she slept, notwithstanding the wrestling of her soul, she remained in her own natural sex, enclosed, of course, in all

her proper limbs which belong to her in her living state, and was still in possession of that bodily shape and lineaments of which she had been originally formed. She had not resigned, as she would by death, her joints and limbs; nor had she withdrawn from the transposing power, which arises from the operation of the power of death, any of her members which had already received their fixed form. Whence, then, did her soul get that virile body in which she seemed to wrestle with her adversary? If, however, this [male likeness] was not a body, although such a semblance of one as admitted the sensation in it of a real struggle or a real joy, do you not by this time see, as far as may be, that there can be in the soul a certain resemblance of a bodily substance, while the soul is not itself a body?

CHAP. 27.

What, then, if some such thing is actually realized among the departed; and souls recognise each other among them, not, indeed, in bodies, but in the semblances of bodies? Now, when we suffer pain, if only in our dreams, although it is only the similitude of bodily limbs which is in action, and not the bodily limbs themselves, still the pain is not merely in semblance, but in reality; as is also the case in the instance of joyous sensations. Inasmuch, however, as St. Perpetua was not yet dead, you probably are unwilling to lay down a precise rule for yourself from that circumstance (although it bears strongly on the question), as to what nature you will suppose those semblances of bodies to partake of, which we have in our dreams. If you allow them to be like bodies, but not bodies actually, then the entire question would be settled. But her brother Dinocrates was dead; she saw him with the wound which he received while alive, and which caused his death. Where is the ground for the earnest contention to which you devoted your efforts, when you laboured to show, that when a limb is cut off, the soul must not be supposed as suffering a like amount of loss by amputation? Observe, the wound was inflicted on the soul of Dinocrates, expelling it by its force from his body, when it was inhabiting that body. How, then, can your opinion be correct, that "when the limbs of the body are cut off, the soul

withdraws itself from the stroke, and after condensation retires to other parts, so that no portion of it is amputated with the wound inflicted on the body," even if the person be asleep and unconscious, when the loss of limb is suffered? So great is the vigilance which you have ascribed to the soul, that even should the stroke fall on any part of the flesh without its knowledge, when it is absorbed in the visions of dreams, it would instantly, and by a providential instinct, withdraw itself, and so render it impossible for any blow, or injury, or mutilation to be inflicted upon it. However, you may, as much as you will, ransack your ingenuity for an answer to the natural question, how the soul withdraws the portions of its own existence, and retreats within itself, so that, whenever a limb of the body is cut off or broken, it does not suffer any amputation or fracture in itself; but I cannot help asking you to look at the case of Dinocrates, and to explain to me why his soul did not withdraw from that part of his body which received the mortal wound, and so escape from suffering in itself what was plainly enough seen in his face, even after his body was dead? Is it, perchance, your good pleasure that we should suppose the phenomena in question to be rather the semblances of bodies than the reality; so that as that which is really no wound seems to be a wound, so that which is no body at all wears the appearance of corporeity? If, indeed, the soul can be wounded by those who wound the body, should we not have good reason to fear that it can be killed also by those who kill the body? This, however, is a fate which the Lord Himself most plainly declares it to be impossible to happen.¹ And the soul of Dinocrates could not at any rate have died of the blow which killed his body: its wound, too, was only an apparent one; for not being corporeal, it was not really wounded, as the body had been; possessing the likeness of the body, it shared also the resemblance of its wound. Still it may be further said, that in its unreal body the soul felt a real misery, which was signified by the shadow of the body's wound. It was from this real misery that he earned deliverance by the prayers of his holy sister.

¹ Matt. x. 28.

CHAP. 28.

Now, again, what means it that you say, "The soul acquires shape from the body, and grows and extends with the increase of the body," without keeping in view what a monstrosity the soul of either a young man or an old man would become if his arm had been amputated when he was an infant? "The hand of the soul," you say, "contracts itself, so that it is not amputated with the hand of the body, and by condensation it shrinks into other parts of the body." At this rate the aforesaid arm of the soul will be kept, wherever it holds its ground, as short as it was at first when it received the form of the body, because it has lost the form by the growth of which it might itself have increased at an equal degree of expansion. Thus the soul of the young man or the old man who lost his hand in his infancy advances with two hands, indeed (because the one which shrank back escaped the amputation of the bodily limb), but one of these was the hand of an adult, young or old, according to the hypothesis, while the other was only an infant's hand, just as it was when the amputation happened. Such souls, believe me, are not made in the mould and form of the body, but they are fictitiously framed under the deformed stamp of error. It seems to me impossible for you to be rescued from this error, unless with God's help you fully and calmly examine the visions of those who dream, and from these convince yourself that some forms are not real bodies, but only the semblances of bodies. Now, although even those objects which we suppose to be like bodies are of the same class,¹ yet so far as the dead are concerned, we can form an after guess about them from persons who are asleep. For it is not in vain that Holy Scripture describes as "asleep" those who are dead,² were it only because in a certain sense "sleep is akin to death."

CHAP. 29. [XIX.]

If, indeed, the soul were a bodily substance, and the form

¹ [That is (in opposition to the really "dead," afterwards mentioned), such as are seen by living persons in visions.]

² 1 Thess. iv. 13. [Augustine uses Virgil's phrase (*Aeneid*. vi. 278), "Consanguineus Lethi sopor" (Death's own brother, Sleep); so Homer, "ἄπνοος, κασίγνητος θανάτῳ, *Il.* xiv. 231.]

were also a corporeal figure in which it sees itself in dreams, on the ground that it received its expression from the body in which it is enclosed, not a human being, if he lost a limb, would in dreams see himself bereft of the amputated member, although actually deprived of it. On the contrary, he would always appear to himself entire and unmutated, from the circumstance that no part has been cut away from the soul itself. But since [in these visions] persons sometimes see themselves whole and sometimes mutilated in limb, when this happens to be their actual plight, what else does this fact show than that the soul, both in respect of other things seen by it in dreams and in reference to the body, bears about, hither and thither, not their reality, but only their resemblance? The soul's joy, however, or sadness, its pleasure or pain, are severally real emotions, whether experienced in actual or in apparent bodies. Have you not yourself said (and with perfect truth): "Aliments and vestments are not wanted by the soul, but only by the body"? Why, then, did the rich man in hell crave for the drop of water?¹ Why did holy Samuel appear after his death (as you have yourself noticed) clothed in his usual garments?² Did the one wish to repair the ruins of the soul, as of the flesh, by the aliment of water? Did the other quit life with his clothes on him? Now in the former case there was a real suffering, which tormented the soul; but not a real body, such as required food. While the latter might have seemed to be clothed, not as being a veritable body, but a soul only, having the semblance of a body with a dress. For although the soul extends and contracts itself to suit the members of the body, it does not similarly adapt itself to the clothes, so as to fit its form to them.

CHAP. 30.

But who is able to trace out what capacity of recognition even souls which are not good possess after death when divested of "the luggage of carnality," so as to be able by an inner sense to observe and recognise either souls that are evil like themselves, or even good ones, either in states which are actually not corporeal, but the semblances of bodies; or else

¹ Luke xvi. 24.

² 1 Sam. xxviii. 14.

in good or evil affections of the mind, in which there occur no lineaments whatever of bodily members? Whence arises the fact that the rich man in the parable, though in torments, recognised "Father Abraham," whose face and figure he had never seen, but the semblance of whose body his soul, though incorporeal, was able to comprehend?¹ But who could rightly say that he had known any man, except in so far as he has had means of knowing his life and disposition, which have, of course, neither material substance nor colours? It is in this way that we know ourselves more certainly than any others, because our own consciousness and disposition are all before us. This we plainly perceive, and yet we see therein no similitude of a bodily substance. But we do not perceive this inner quality of our nature in another man, even if he be present before our eyes; though in his absence we recollect his features, and recognise them, and think of them. Our own features, however, we cannot in the same manner recollect, and recognise, and think of; and yet with most perfect truth we say that we are ourselves better known to ourselves than he is, so manifest is it where lies the stronger and truer knowledge of man.

CHAP. 31. [XX.]

Forasmuch, then, as there is one function in the soul, which we execute by the five bodily senses, even the perception of true corporeal substances; another, which enables us to discern, besides our own selves, things which though resembling bodies are not corporeal (and by this faculty we can have a view of ourselves also, in a state not at all differing from the mere semblance of corporeity); and a third, by which we gain a still surer and stronger insight into objects fitted for its faculty, which are neither corporeal nor are like bodily substances,—such as faith, hope, charity,—things which have neither complexion, nor passion, nor any such thing: on which of these functions ought we to dwell more intently, and to some degree more familiarly, and where be renewed in the knowledge of God after the image of Him who created us? Is it not on and in that which I have now put in the third place? And

¹ Luke xvi. 23.

here we shall certainly experience neither sexual difference nor the semblance thereof.

CHAP. 32.

For that form of the soul, whether masculine or feminine, which has the distinction of limb characteristic of man and woman, being no semblance merely of body, but actual body, is either a male or a female, whether you will or no, precisely as it appears to be a man or a woman. But if your opinion be correct, and the soul is a body, even a living body, then it both possesses swelling and pendent breasts, and yet lacks a beard; it has a womb, and all the generative organs of a woman, yet is not a woman after all. Will not mine, then, be a statement more consistent with truth: the soul, indeed, has an eye and has a tongue, has a finger, and all other members which resemble those of the body, and yet the whole is the semblance of a body, not a body really? My statement is open to a general test; everybody can prove it in himself, when he brings home to his mind the image of absent friends; he can prove it with certainty when he recalls the figures both of himself and other persons, which have occurred to him in his dreams. On your part, however, no example can throughout nature be produced of such a monstrosity as you have imagined, where there is a woman's real and living body, but not a woman's sex.

CHAP. 33.—*The Phenix after death coming to life again.*

Now, what you say about the phenix has nothing whatever to do with the subject before us. For the phenix symbolizes the resurrection of the body; it does not do away with the sex of souls; if indeed, as is thought, he is born afresh after his death. I suppose, however, that you hardly thought your discourse would gain any favour unless you prattled a good deal about the phenix, after the fashion of young pedants. [But to take the example you adduce,] do you find in the body of your bird male organs of generation and not a male bird; or female ones, and not a female? Now I beg of you reflect on what it is you say,—what theory you are trying to construct, and to recommend for our acceptance. You say

that the soul, spread through all the limbs of the body, grew stiff by congelation, and received the entire shape of the whole body from the crown of the head to the soles of the feet, and from the inmost marrow to the skin's outward surface. At this rate it must have received, in the case of a female body, all the inner appurtenances of a woman's body, and yet not be a woman! Why, pray, are all the members feminine in a true living body, and yet the whole be no woman? And why all be male, and the result be not a man? Who can be so presumptuous as to believe, and profess, and teach all this? Is it that souls never generate? Then, of course, mules and she-mules are not male and female? Is it that souls without bodies of flesh would be unable to cohabit? Well, but this deprivation is shared by castrated men; and yet, although both the process and the motion be taken from them, their sex is not removed—some slender remnant of their male members being still left to them. Nobody ever said that a eunuch is not a male. What now becomes of your opinion, that the souls even of eunuchs have the generative organs unimpaired, and that these organs will remain entire, on your principle, in their souls, even when they are clean removed from their bodily structure? For you say, the soul knows how to withdraw itself when that part of the flesh begins to be cut off, so that the form which has been removed when amputated is not lost; but although spread over it by condensation, it retires by an extremely rapid movement, and so buries itself within, as to be kept quite safe; yet that cannot, forsooth, be a male in the other world which carries with it thither the whole appendage of male organs of generation, and which, if it had not even other signs in the body, was a male by reason of those organs alone. These opinions, my son, have no truth in them; if you will not allow that there is sex in the soul, there cannot be a body either.

CHAP. 34. [XXI.]—*Prophetic visions.*

Not every semblance of a body is itself a body. Fall asleep and you will see this; but when you awake again, carefully discern what it is you have seen. For in your dreams you will appear to yourself as if endued with a body; but it really

is not your body, but your soul; nor is it a real body, but the semblance of a body. Your body will be lying on the bed, but the soul walking; the tongue of your body will be silent, but that of your soul in the dream will talk; your eyes will be shut, but your soul will be awake; and, of course, the limbs of your body stretched out in your bed will be alive, not dead. Consequently that congealed form, as you regard it, of your soul is not yet extracted, as it were, out of its sheath; and yet in it is seen the whole and perfect semblance of your fleshly frame. Belonging to this class of similitudes of corporeity, which are not real bodies, though they seem to be such, are all those appearances which you read of in the Holy Scriptures in the visions even of the prophets, without, however, understanding them; by which are also signified the things which come to pass in all time—present, past, and future. You make mistakes about these, not because they are in themselves deceptive, but because you do not accept them as they ought to be taken. For in the same apocalyptic vision where “the souls of the martyrs” are seen,¹ there is also beheld “a lamb as it were slain, having seven horns;”² there are also horses and other animals figuratively described with all consistency;³ and lastly, there were the stars falling, and the earth rolled up like a book;⁴ nor does the world, in spite of all, then actually collapse. If therefore we understand all these things wisely, although we say they are true apparitions, yet we do not call them real bodies.

CHAP. 35.

It would, however, require too lengthy a discourse to enter very carefully on a discussion concerning this kind of corporeal semblances; whether angels even, either good ones or evil ones, appear in this manner,⁵ whenever they appear in the likeness of human beings or of any bodies whatever; or whether they possess any real bodies, and show themselves in this veritable state of corporeity; or, again, whether by persons when dreaming, indeed, or in a trance they are perceived in these forms—not in bodies, but in the likeness of bodies; while to persons

¹ Rev. vi. 9.² Rev. v. 6.³ Rev. vi. and ix.⁴ Rev. vi. 13, 14.⁵ [That is, as true apparitions indeed, but *not* as real bodies.]

when awake they present real bodies which can be seen, and, if necessary, actually touched. Such questions as these, however, I do not deem it at all requisite to investigate and fully treat in this book. By this time enough has been advanced respecting the soul's incorporeity. If you would rather persist in your opinion that it is corporeal, you must first of all define what "*body*" means; lest, peradventure, it may turn out that we are agreed about the thing itself, but labouring to no purpose about its name. The absurd conclusions, however, to which you would be reduced if you thought of a body being inherent in the soul, such as are those substances which are called "*bodies*" by all learned men,—I mean such as occupy portions of space, smaller ones for their smaller parts, and larger ones for their larger,—by means of the different relations of length and breadth and thickness, I venture to think you are by this time able intelligently to observe.

CHAP. 36. [XXII.]—*He passes on to the second question about the soul, whether it is called spirit. The proper meaning of "spirit" in man. What the mind is. What is "the spirit of the mind" (Eph. iv. 23), and "the body of the flesh" (Col. ii. 11).*

It now remains for me to show how it is that while the designation *spirit* is rightly predicated of a part of the soul, not the whole of it,—even as the apostle says, "Your whole spirit, and soul, and body;"¹ or, according to the much more expressive statement in the Book of Job, "Thou wilt separate my soul from my spirit,"²—yet the whole soul is also called by this name. This, indeed, may appear to be much more of a question of names than of things; for although it is certainly a fact that there is a something in the soul which is properly called "*spirit*," while (with the exception of this) it is also designated with equal propriety "*soul*," still our present contention is not about the things themselves, mainly because I on my side certainly admit, and you on your part say the same, that the faculty is properly called *spirit* by which we reason and understand; and yet that these portions of our nature are so distinctly designated, that the apostle mentions "*your whole spirit, and soul, and body.*" This *spirit*, however, the same apostle appears to also describe as *mind*; as when

¹ 1 Thess. v. 23.

² Job vii. 15 [Sept.].

he says, "So then with the mind I serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin."¹ Now the meaning of this is precisely what he expresses in another passage thus: "For the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh."² What he designates *mind* in the former place, he must be understood to call *spirit* in the latter passage. Not as you interpret the statement, "The universal mind is meant, which consists of soul and spirit,"—a view which I know not where you obtained it. By our "mind," indeed, we usually understand nothing but our rational and intellectual faculty; and thus, when the apostle says, "Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind,"³ what else does he mean than, Be ye renewed in your mind? "The spirit of the mind" is, accordingly, nothing else than the mind, just as "the body of the flesh" is nothing but the flesh; thus it is written, "In putting off the body of the flesh,"⁴ where the apostle calls the flesh "the body of the flesh." He designates it, indeed, in another point of view as the spirit of a man, which he quite distinguishes from the mind: "If," says he, "I pray with the tongue, my spirit prayeth, but my mind is unfruitful."⁵ We are not now, however, speaking of that spirit which is distinct and separate from the mind; and this involves a question relating to itself which is really a difficult one. For in many ways and in divers senses the Holy Scriptures make mention of the *spirit*; but with respect to that we are now speaking of, by which we exercise reason, intelligence, and wisdom, we are both agreed that it is called (and indeed rightly called) "spirit," in such a sense as not to include the entire soul, but a part of it. If, however, you contend that the soul is not the spirit, on the ground that the understanding [a part of the soul] is distinctly called "spirit," you may as well deny that the whole seed of Jacob is called Israel, since (apart from Judah) the same appellation was distinctly and separately borne by the ten tribes which were then organized in Samaria. But why need we linger any longer here on this subject?

CHAP. 37. [XXIII.]

At this point of our inquiry, with a view to our easier

¹ Rom. vii. 25.² Gal. v. 17.³ Eph. iv. 23.⁴ Col. ii. 11.⁵ 1 Cor. xiv. 14.

elucidation of it, I beg you to observe that what is the soul is also designated spirit [or ghost] in the scripture which narrates an incident in our Lord's death, thus, "He bowed His head and gave up the ghost [spirit];"¹ and when you hear or read these words, you should understand them as if the whole were signified by a part, and not because that which is the soul may also be called spirit. I shall, for the purpose of being able the more readily to prove what I say, actually summon yourself with all promptitude and convenience as my witness. For you have defined spirit in such terms that cattle appear not to have a spirit, but a soul. Irrational animals are so called, because they have not the power of intelligence and reason. Accordingly, when you admonished man himself to know his own nature, you spoke as follows: "Now, inasmuch as the good God has made nothing without a purpose, He has produced man himself as a rational animal, capable of intelligence, endowed with reason, and enlivened by sensibility, so as to be able to distribute in a wise arrangement all things that are void of reason." In these words of yours you have plainly asserted what is certainly most true, that man is endowed with reason and capable of intelligence, which, of course, animals void of reason are not. And you have, in accordance with this view, quoted a passage of Scripture, and, adopting its language, have compared men of no understanding to the cattle, which, of course, have not intellect.² A statement the like to which occurs in another passage of Scripture: "Be ye not as the horse or as the mule, which have no understanding."³ This being the case, I want you also to observe in what terms you have defined and described the spirit when trying to distinguish it from the soul: "This soul," you say, "which has its origin from the breath of God, could not have possibly been without an inner sense and intellect of its own; and this is the spirit." A little afterwards you add: "And although the soul animates the body, yet inasmuch as it possesses sense, and wisdom, and vigour, it must needs be spirit." And then somewhat further on you say: "The soul is one thing, and the spirit—which is the soul's wisdom and sense—is another." In these words you plainly enough indicate what

¹ John xix. 30.

² Ps. xlix. 12.

³ Ps. xxxii. 9.

you take the spirit of man to mean ; that it is even our rational faculty, whereby the soul exercises sense and intelligence,—not, indeed, the sensation which is felt by the bodily senses, but the operation of that innermost sense from which arises the term “*sententia*” [sentiment, or opinion]. Owing to this it is, no doubt, that we are placed above brute animals, since these are unendowed with reason. These animals therefore have not *spirit*,—that is to say, intellect and a sense of reason and wisdom,—but only *soul*. For it is of these that it was spoken, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures that have a living soul;”¹ and again, “Let the earth bring forth the living soul.”² In order, indeed, that you may have the fullest and clearest assurance that what is the *soul* is in the usage of the Holy Scriptures also called *spirit*, the soul of a brute animal has the same designation. To be sure, cattle have not that spirit which you, my beloved brother, have defined as being distinct from the soul. It is therefore quite evident that the soul of a brute animal could be rightly called “spirit” in a general sense of the term ; as we read in the Book of Ecclesiastes, “Who knoweth the spirit of the sons of men, whether it goeth upward ; and the *spirit of the beast*, whether it goeth downward into the earth ?”³ In like manner, touching the devastation of the deluge, the Scripture testifies, “All flesh died that moved upon the earth, both of fowl, and of cattle, and of beast, and of every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth, and every man : and all things which have the spirit of life.”⁴ Here, if we remove all the windings of doubtful disputation, we understand the term *spirit* to be synonymous with *soul* in its general sense. Of so wide a signification is this term, that even God is called “a spirit;”⁵ and a stormy blast of the air, although it has material substance, is called by the psalmist the spirit of a tempest.⁶ For all these reasons, therefore, you will no longer deny that what is the soul is called also spirit ; I have, I think, adduced enough from the pages of Holy Scripture to secure your assent in passages where the soul of the very brute beast, which has no understanding, is designated spirit. If, then, you take and wisely

¹ Gen. i. 20.² Gen. i. 24.³ Eccles. iii. 21.⁴ Gen. vii. 21, 22.⁵ John iv. 24.⁶ [He seems to refer to Ps. lv. 8.]

consider what has been advanced in our discussion about the incorporeity of the soul, there is no further reason why you should take offence at my having said that I was sure the soul was not body, but spirit,—both because it is proved to be not corporeal, and because in its general sense it is denominated spirit.

CHAP. 38. [XXIV.]

Wherefore if you take these books, which I have with a sincere and affectionate interest written in answer to your opinions, and read them with a mutual love for me; if you attend to what you have yourself declared in the beginning of your first book, and “are anxious not to insist on any opinion of your own, if it be found an improbable one,”¹ then I beseech you to beware especially of those eleven errors which I warned you of in the preceding book of this treatise.² Do not say, that “the soul is of God in such a sense that He created it not out of nothing, nor out of another nature, but out of His own;” or that, “as God who gives is Himself ever existent, so is He ever giving souls through infinite time;” or that “the soul lost some merit through the flesh, which it was credited with previous to its incarnate state;” or that “the soul by means of the flesh repairs its ancient condition, and is born again through the very same flesh, by which it had deserved to be polluted;” or that “the soul deserved to be sinful even prior to sin;” or that “infants who die without the regeneration of baptism, may yet attain to forgiveness of their original sins;” or that “they whom the Lord has predestinated to be baptized may be taken away from this destined gift; or die before that has been accomplished in them which the Almighty had predetermined;” or that “it is of those who expire before they are baptized that the Scripture says, ‘Speedily was he taken away, lest wickedness should alter his understanding,’”—with the remainder of the passage to the same effect; or that “there are some mansions outside the kingdom of God, belonging to the ‘many,’ which the Lord said were in His Father’s house;” or that “the sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ ought to be offered in behalf of those who have departed out of the

¹ See above in Book ii. 22. [xvi.]² See Book iii., last chapter.

body without being baptized;" or that "any of those persons who die without Christ's baptism, are received for a while into paradise, and afterwards attain even to the blessedness of the kingdom of heaven." Above all things, [I say again] beware of these opinions, my son, and, as you wish to be the vanquisher of error, do not rejoice in the surname of "Vincentius." And when you are ignorant on any subject, do not think that you know it; but in order to get real knowledge, learn how to be ignorant. For we commit a sin by affecting to be ignorant of nothing among "the secret things of God;" by constructing random theories about unknown things, and taking them for known; and by producing and defending errors as if they were truth. As for my own ignorance on the question whether the souls of men are created afresh at every birth, or are transmitted by the parents (an ignorance which is, however, modified by my belief, which it would be impious to falter in, that they are certainly made by the Divine Creator, though not of His own substance), I think that your loving self will by this time be persuaded that it either ought not to be censured at all, or, if it ought, that it should be done by a man who is capable by his learning to remove it altogether; and so also with respect to my other opinions, that while souls have in them the incorporeal semblances of bodies, they are not themselves bodies; and that, without impairing the natural distinction between soul and spirit, the soul is in a general sense actually designated spirit. If, indeed, I have unfortunately failed to persuade you, I must leave it rather to my readers to determine whether what I have advanced ought not to have convinced you.

CHAP. 39.

If, as may possibly be the case, you desire to know whether there are really other points besides the many which appear to me to require emendation in your books, it cannot be troublesome for you to come to me,—not, indeed, as a scholar to his master, but as a person in his prime to one full of years, and as a strong man to a weak one. And although you ought not to have published your books, still there is a greater and a truer glory in a man's being censured, when he confesses with his own lips the justice of his correction, than in being

lauded out of the mouth of any defender of error. Now, while I should be unwilling to believe that all those who listened to your reading of the afore-mentioned books, and lavished their praises on you, had either previously held for themselves the opinions which sound doctrine disapproves of, or were induced by you to entertain them, I still cannot help thinking that they had the keenness of their mind blunted by the impetuous and constant flow of your elocution, and so were unable to bestow adequate attention on the contents of your discourse; or else, that when they were in any case capable of understanding what you said, it was less for any very clear statement of the truth that they praised you than for the affluence of your language, and the facility and resources of your mental powers. For praise, and fame, and kindly regard are very commonly bestowed on a young man's eloquence in anticipation of the future, though as yet it lacks the mellowed perfection and fidelity of a fully-informed instructor. In order, then, that you may attain to true wisdom yourself, and that what you say may be able not only to delight, but even edify other people, it behoves you, after removing from your mind the dangerous applause of others, to keep conscientious watch over your own words.

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