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
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
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
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








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
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


















**TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GREEK**  
**OF SOME**  
**TREATISES OF PLOTINUS:**  
**ON SUICIDE, &c.**



TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GREEK  
OF THE FOLLOWING  
TREATISES OF PLOTINUS;

VIZ.

ON SUICIDE,

TO WHICH IS ADDED

AN EXTRACT FROM THE HARLEIAN MS. OF THE SCHOLIA OF OLYM-  
PIODORUS ON THE PHÆDO OF PLATO RESPECTING  
SUICIDE, ACCOMPANIED BY THE  
GREEK TEXT;

TWO BOOKS ON TRULY EXISTING BEING;  
AND EXTRACTS FROM HIS TREATISE ON THE MANNER IN WHICH  
THE MULTITUDE OF IDEAS SUBSISTS, AND CONCERNING  
*THE GOOD*;

WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES FROM  
PORPHYRY AND PROCLUS.

BY

THOMAS TAYLOR,

TRANSLATOR OF PLATO, ARISTOTLE, ETC. ETC.

---

Φευγωμεν συν νηυσι φιλην es πατριδα γαιαν.  
*Iliad*, ii. 140.

“Haste, let us fly, and all our sails expand,  
To gain our dear, our long-lost native land.”

Πατρις δε ημιν οθεν παρηλθομεν, και πατηρ εκει.  
PLOTIN. *de Pulchritud.*, p. 57.

“Our [true] country [*i.e.* truly existing being] is that from whence  
we came, and where our father lives.”

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## P R E F A C E.

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**O**F Plotinus, who for the sublimity of his genius and the profundity of his conceptions has been no less justly than unanimously dignified by his followers with the appellation of *the great*, I have elsewhere given the life from Porphyry<sup>a</sup>, who of all his disciples was the most learned and the best.

I rejoice, therefore, in the opportunity which is now afforded me of adding a translation of the following books to those which I have already published of this most extraordinary man<sup>b</sup>. For this

<sup>a</sup> In his *Life of Plotinus*, of which the reader will find the substance in the Introduction to my *Translation of Select Works of Plotinus*. 8vo. 1817.

<sup>b</sup> For the sake of those who have not, but may wish to have, all that I have translated of the works of Plotinus, prior to the present work, the following list is added of those translations :

On the Beautiful, a paraphrased translation. 12mo. 1787.

That Intelligibles are not external to Intellect, and concerning *the Good*.

On Intelligible Beauty. See my *History of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology* at the end of vol. ii. of my *Proclus on Euclid*. 4to. 1788.

Five Books, entitled : On Felicity ; On the Nature and Origin of Evil ; On Providence ; On Nature, Contemplation, and the One ; and On the Descent of the Soul. 8vo. 1794.

Select Works, viz. On the Virtues ; On Dialectic ; On Matter ;

opportunity I am indebted to the patronage of a gentleman (Charles Attwood, Esq.) who, through his great abilities and worth, and a sagacity which, in the present age, is rare in the extreme, has been led to admire and study the writings of Plato, “the mighty, magnificent, and immortal philosopher of Athens.” This gentleman did me also the honour to patronize my translation of a work of Proclus respecting Providence and the Subsistence of Evil; and of such a man, I may truly say with *Heraclitus*, that “*his praise is equivalent to that of a countless multitude.*”

Εἰς ἐμοὶ ἀνθρώπος τρισμύριοι.

Porphyry informs us, in the above-mentioned Life, that during the six years in which he was the companion as well as disciple of Plotinus, many questions of a very abstruse nature were discussed in their philosophical conversations, which, at the joint request of Porphyry and Amelius, Plotinus committed to writing, and produced from their in-

Against the Gnostics; On the Impassivity of Incorporeal Natures; On Eternity and Time; On the Immortality of the Soul; On the Three Hypostases that rank as the Principles of Things; On Intellect, Ideas, and Real Being; On the Essence of Soul; On the Generation and Order of Things after the First; On Gnostic Hypostases, and that which is beyond them; That the Nature which is beyond Being is not Intellective; and What that is which is Primarily, and also that which is Secondarily, Intellective; and On the Good, or the One. 8vo. 1817.

vestigation two elaborate and admirable books *On truly existing being, demonstrating that it is everywhere one and the same whole*. Though these books, from the brevity of the diction with which they are composed, and which, also, equally applies to all the writings of Plotinus, and from the very occult nature of their subject, are beyond the comprehension of the multitude, yet the man of intellect, who is only moderately skilled in the philosophy of Plato, will find many beautiful passages in them which he will immediately understand, and many sublime truths to which he will immediately assent. In short, what I have elsewhere said<sup>a</sup> of this most extraordinary man, who was the first that brought to light the divine wisdom of Plato, after it had been in oblivion for five hundred years, will be admitted by every one whose mental eye, in Homeric language, has been purged from mortal mists,

<sup>a</sup> *i. e.* In my panegyric on the most eminent intellectual philosophers of antiquity, in my Dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristotle, from which the following lines respecting Plotinus are extracted :

“ Genius sublime ! whilst bound in mortal ties,  
Thy soul had frequent commerce with the skies,  
And oft you loos’ned the lethargic folds  
By which th’ indignant mind dark matter holds.  
What depth of thought, what energy is thine !  
What rays of intellect in ev’ry line !  
The more we fathom thy exalted mind,  
A stronger light, a greater depth we find.”

and thus enabled to see the nature of God and man<sup>a</sup>.

That these very abstruse books may be more easily understood, I have added copious extracts from the admirable treatise of Porphyry, entitled, *Auxiliaries to the Perception of Intelligible Natures*<sup>b</sup>, and two Propositions from the Theological Elements of Proclus, for the accommodation of those who may not have in their possession my translation of these Elements and of Select Works

<sup>a</sup> I here allude to the following well-known lines in the Iliad of Homer, in which Minerva says to Diomed,

Αχλυν δ' αυ τοι απ' οφθαλμων ελον, η πριν εποιηεν,  
Οφε' ευ γινωσκης ημιν θεον, ηδε και ανδρα.

*Iliad*, v. 127, 128.

*i. e.*

“From mortal mists thine eyes are purg'd by me,  
And well enabled God and man to see.”

<sup>b</sup> *Αφορμαι προς τα νοητα*. Dr. Henry More, in his Platonic Song of the Soul, calls Plotinus “*more than man*.” And Ficinus, in his Exhortation to the readers of Plotinus (in the Preface to his edition of that philosopher's works), says,

“Principio vos omnes admoneo, qui divinum audituri Plotinum huc acceditis, ut Platonem ipsum sub Plotini persona loquentem, vos audituros existimetis. Sive enim Plato quondam in Plotino revixit (quod facile nobis Pythagorici dabunt), sive Dæmon idem Platonem quidem prius afflavit, deinde vero Plotinum, quod Platonici nulli negabunt; omnino aspirator idem os Platonicum afflat, et Plotinum.—Et vos Platonem ipsum exclamare sic erga Plotinum existimetis.”

Οἷος πεπνυται, τοι δ' ως σκιαι αἴσσοσι.

*i. e.* “In the first place, I admonish all you who approach hither

of Porphyry, that most celebrated disciple of Plotinus, who was considered by his contemporaries and successors to be the most learned of the philosophers, and who was no less remarkable for the sanctity of his conceptions than for the acuteness of his genius, and his power of developing the dogmas of the ancients relative to the most important physical and metaphysical truths. Hence, Eunapius elegantly says of him, "that like a Mercurial chain let down for the benefit of mortals, he un-

to hear the divine Plotinus, that you should think you will hear Plato himself speaking in the person of Plotinus. For whether Plato once lived again in Plotinus (which the Pythagoreans will readily grant us) [may have been the case], or whether the same Dæmon that first inspired Plato, afterwards inspired Plotinus, the possibility of which no Platonists will deny,—however this may be, [it must be admitted that] both were under the influence of the same inspiring power.—You should think, therefore, that you hear Plato himself thus exclaiming with respect to Plotinus :

"Wise is he only; but debarr'd from day,  
The rest like empty shadows glide away."

The line in the original, of which the above is a translation, is the second of the two following lines in the *Odyssey*, respecting the prophet Tiresias, with some alteration in it by Ficinus.

Τῷ καὶ τεθνεῶσι, νοῦν πορὲ Περσεφονίᾳ,  
Οἷω πεπνυσθαι· τοὶ δὲ σκίαι αἰσσοῦσιν.

*i. e.*

"Though dead, and in the realms beneath confin'd,  
To him Persephone imparted mind,  
And wisdom gave; the rest\*, debarr'd from day,  
Like empty shadows swiftly glide away."

---

\* *i. e.* *The multitude.*

folded everything with accuracy and clearness by the assistance of universal erudition.”

The philosophic reader will find in the Extract from Olympiodorus respecting Suicide, information no less novel than important, and the difficulty attending the question, whether suicide at any time, and under any circumstances, is lawful, unanswerably solved. For the sake of the learned and intelligent reader, therefore, the translation of this Extract is accompanied by the original Greek.

I shall conclude with observing, that the depth of the meaning contained in these books of Plotinus can only be fathomed by those who rank in that third class of men described by this mighty genius in the following beautiful passage from his treatise *on Intellect, Ideas, and [real] being*.


“ Since all men from their birth employ sense prior to intellect, and are necessarily first conversant with sensibles, some proceeding no further, pass through life, considering these as the first and last of things, and apprehending that whatever is painful among these is evil, and whatever is pleasant, is good; thus thinking it sufficient to pursue the one and avoid the other. Those, too, among them, who pretend to a greater share of reason than the rest, esteem this to be wisdom, being affected in a manner similar to more heavy

birds, which, collecting many things from the earth, and being oppressed by the weight, are unable to fly on high, though they have received wings for this purpose from nature. But others are in a small degree elevated from things subordinate, the more excellent part of the soul recalling them from pleasure to a more worthy pursuit. As they are, however, unable to look on high, and not possessing anything else in which they can find repose, they betake themselves, together with the name of virtue, to actions and the election of things of an inferior nature, from which they at first endeavoured to raise themselves, though in vain<sup>a</sup>. *In the third class is the race of divine men, who, through a more excellent power, and with piercing eyes, acutely perceive supernal light, to the vision of which they raise themselves above the clouds and darkness, as it were, of this lower world, and there abiding, despise everything in these regions of sense; being no otherwise delighted with the place which is truly and properly their own, than he who, after many wanderings, is at length restored to his lawful and native land<sup>b</sup>.*"

<sup>a</sup> These are men who engage in an active life, or, in other words, who energise according to the political virtues.

<sup>b</sup> Alluding to the wanderings of Ulysses, for an explanation of which, see the Appendix to my translation of Select Works of Porphyry.





# PLOTINUS ON SUICIDE:

BEING THE NINTH BOOK

OF HIS

FIRST ENNEAD.

AND

AN EXTRACT FROM THE HARLEIAN MS. OF THE SCHOLIA  
OF OLYMPIODORUS ON THE PHÆDO OF PLATO  
RESPECTING SUICIDE, ACCOMPANIED  
BY THE GREEK TEXT.

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**YOU** should not expel the soul from the body. For in departing, it will retain something [of the more passive life], which is necessary in this case to its departure<sup>a</sup>. Since to depart from the body is to pass from one place to another. But it is requisite to remain in life, until the whole body is

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *ουκ εξαξει, ινα μη εξιη. εξελιυσεται γαρ, εχουσα τι, ινα και εξελθη.* This is one of the Chaldæan Oracles, which in the Collection of them by Psellus is, *μη εξαξης, ινα μη εξιη εχουσα τι.* But in Stanley's Collection it is, *μη εξαξης, ινα μη εξιουσα εχη τι.* Ficinus, however, in his translation of this book, appears to have found in his MS. a more full, and a more perfect reading of this Oracle. For his version of it is as follows: "Nemo extrudat per vim è corpore animam; ne forte exeat in locum similem migratura: alioquin exhibit corporei nonnihil deferens, quo per similia emigrabit."

separated from the soul, and when it does not require migration, but is entirely external to the body. After what manner, therefore, is the body separated from the soul? When no longer anything pertaining to the soul is bound in the body<sup>a</sup>? For when this takes place, the body can no longer bind the soul, the harmony of it no longer existing, which the soul possessing, it also possessed. What, then, shall we say, if some one should endeavour to separate the body from the soul? May we not say, that in this case he must employ violence, and that *he* departs, but the *body* does not depart from him? To which may be added, that he who effects this separation, is not liberated from passion, but is under the influence of some molestation, or pain, or anger. It is requisite, however, that nothing of this kind should be accomplished. But what if some one should find himself beginning to be insane? Perhaps, indeed, this will

<sup>a</sup> This is well explained by Porphyry in his *Auxiliaries to the Perception of Intelligible Natures*, as follows :

“ The soul is bound to the body by a conversion to the corporeal passions ; and is again liberated by becoming impassive to the body.”

“ That which Nature binds, Nature also dissolves ; and that which the soul binds, the soul likewise dissolves. Nature, indeed, bound the body to the soul ; but the soul binds herself to the body. Nature, therefore, liberates the body from the soul ; but the soul liberates herself from the body.”

“ Hence there is a twofold death ; the one, indeed, universally known, in which the body is liberated from the soul ; but the other peculiar to philosophers, in which the soul is liberated from the body. Nor does the one entirely follow the other.”

not take place with a worthy man<sup>a</sup>; but if it should, this must be arranged among things that are necessary, and arising from things that are eligible from circumstance, and which are not simply eligible. For it is not, *perhaps*, expedient for the soul to take an envenomed potion in order to its expulsion from the body. If, also, a fated time is allotted to each individual of the human race, a separation of the body from the soul cannot be prosperous prior to this period, *unless, as we have said, this becomes necessary*. But if every one retains that order with respect to proficiency after, which he possessed prior to his departure from the present life, the soul is not to be separated from the body while a further proficiency is yet possible<sup>b</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> Plotinus says this conformably to what is asserted by Plato in the *Timæus*, viz. that "the disease of the soul is folly, which is of two kinds, madness and ignorance." νοσον μεν δη ψυχης ανοιαν συγχωρητηον. δυο δ' ανοιας γενη' το μεν μανιαν' το δ' αμαθιαν.

<sup>b</sup> Macrobius in his Annotations on this book of Plotinus, has the following remarkable passage: "In arcanis de animæ reditu disputationibus fertur, in hac vitâ delinquentes, similes esse super æquale solum cadentibus, quibus denuo sine difficultate præsto sit surgere: animas vero ex hac vitâ cum delictorum sordibus recedentes, æquandas his, qui in abruptum ex alto, præcipiteque delapsi sunt, unde facultas nunquam sit resurgendi." *i. e.* "In the arcane narrations concerning the re-ascent of the soul, it is said, that those who are delinquents in this life, resemble those that fall on level ground, from which they cannot again without difficulty rise; but that souls who depart from this life polluted with crimes, are similar to those who fall from a precipitous altitude into a great depth, from which they will never be able to rise again." This extract from arcane narrations is not, I believe, elsewhere to be found.

*The following is the Extract from the MS. Scholia of Olympiodorus on the Phædo of Plato<sup>a</sup>:*

Εν αὐτῇ τῇ νῦν προκειμένῃ λέξει ἐν ἡ κατασκευάζει ο Πλατων, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἐξαγεῖν εαυτοὺς, ἐμφασίν διδωσὶ καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου, πρῶτον μὲν λέγων, οὐ μὲντοι ἰσῶς βιάζεται εαυτὸν. τὸ γὰρ ἰσῶς ὑπονοῖαν διδῶσιν, ὅτι ποτε καὶ δεῖ ἐξαγεῖν εαυτοὺς, εἰ μὴ μεγάλην ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκὴν ἐπιπεμψῆ οἶαν τὴν νῦν παρουσαν<sup>b</sup>. δευτέρου ἐπιχειρήμα, εἰ αὐτὸς ὁ Πλατων φησὶν ὅτι ἐξαγεῖν εαυτὸν ἐπιτρέποι καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ, καὶ τῷ μεσῷ, καὶ τῷ πολλῷ καὶ φαυλῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· τῷ σπουδαίῳ ὡς ἐνταῦθα, τῷ μεσῷ, ὡς ἐν Πολιτείᾳ λέγων, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν νοσῶ ἀνιατῶ καὶ μακρὰ κατεχομένον ἐξαγεῖν εαυτὸν ὡς ἀχρηστον ὄντα τῇ πόλει, διότι βουλεταὶ ὁ Πλατων τοὺς

<sup>a</sup> Extracts from these Scholia, together with Selections from other MS. Greek Treatises, were published by those modern Greeks, Mustoxydes and Schinas. The Extracts contain twenty pages 8vo of Olympiodorus, among which is the passage that forms a part of this article. But the translation of it was made many years prior to the above-mentioned work of Mustoxydes and Schinas, the title of which is as follows: Συλλογὴ Ἑλληνικῶν Ἀνεκδοτῶν Παιητῶν καὶ Λογογραφῶν Διαφορῶν Ἐποχῶν Ἑλλοσ

Σπουδῆ

Ἀνδρίου Μουστοξυδοῦ καὶ Δημητρίου Σχίνα

Ἐν Βενετία. 1816.

The arrangement, also, of some of the sentences in the Harleian MS. is different from that of the Extracts of Mustoxydes and Schinas, as will be immediately evident on comparing the former with the latter, In the following translation, I have adopted that arrangement which appeared to me to be most natural, and therefore the best.

<sup>b</sup> The words of Plato in the Phædo, to which Olympiodorus in the above extract alludes, are in the original as follow: Ἐβελήσει τοῖνον καὶ Εὐνηὸς καὶ πᾶς ὅτῳ ἀξίως τοῦτου τοῦ πραγματος μιτίσσειν, οὐ μὲν ἰσῶς βιάσεται αὐτὸν, οὐ γὰρ φάσι θεμίτον εἶναι.—Ἰσῶς τοῖνον ταῦτην οὐκ ἀλογὸν μὴ προτιρον αὐτὸν ἀποκτινηται δύν, πρὶν ἀναγκὴν τίνα ὁ θεὸς ἐπιπεμψῆ, ὡσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παρουσαν.

εαυτου πολιτας τη πολει χρησιμους ειναι, και ουχ εαυτοις. εν δε τοις Νομοις τω πολλω ανθρωπω λεγων, οτι δει τον ανιατοις παθεσει κατεχομενον, οιον ερωτι μητρος, η ιεροσυλιας, η των τοιουτων τινι, και μη δυναμενον κρατειν εαυτον εξαγειν εαυτον. τριτον επιχειρημα, ει Πλωτινω γεγραπται περι αλογου (lege ευλογου<sup>a</sup>) εξαγωγης, δει αρα ποτε εξαγειν εαυτον. τεταρτον, ει οι Στωϊκοι πεντε τροπους ελεγον ευλογον εξαγωγης. απεικαζον γαρ τον βιον συμποσιω, και ελεγον οτι δι οσας αιτιας λυεται το συμποσιον, δια τας αυτας και τον βιον λυειν. λυεται το συμποσιον η δια χρειαν αφνω μεγαλην επιστασαν, οιον δια παρουσιαν φιλου αφνω ελθοντος· η δια καταλαμβουσαν μεθην λυεται το συμποσιον, και δια το παρατιθεμενα νοσερα οντα. ετι μην και δια ετερον τροπον δι ενδειαν των παρατιθεμενων. και τον βιον δε λυτεον δια πεντε τροπους· οιον δια χρεια λυεται το συμποσιον, δει λυειν τον βιον, και δια μεγαλην χρειαν, ως Μενοιχες αποσφαξας εαυτον δια της πατριδος, αλλα και δι αισχρορρημοσυνην, ουτω και διλυειν και τον βιον δια τυραννον αναγκαζοντα ειπειν τα απορρητα, ο και πυθαγορεια τις γυνη πεποιηκεν, αναγκαζομενη ειπειν, διατι ουκ εσθιει κυαμους. εφη γαρ φαγοιμι αν ει<sup>b</sup> ειποιμι αν· ειτα αναγκαζομενη φαγειν εφη, ειποιμι αν, ει<sup>b</sup> φαγοιμι αν, και τελος απετεμε την γλωτταν, ως και διαλεκτικον και γευστικον οργανον. αλλα και δια μεθην λυεται το συμποσιον, ουτω και τον βιον λυειν δει δια<sup>c</sup> τον παρεπομενον τω σωματι ληρον. φυσικη γαρ εστι μεθη ο ληρος. αλλα και δια τα παρατιθεμενα νοσερα οντα, και τον βιον λυτεον, δια το σωμα νοσοις ανιατοις κατεχο-

<sup>a</sup> Et sic recte Mustox. et Schin.

<sup>b</sup> Pro « Mustox. et Schin. habent η, sed male.

<sup>c</sup> δια deest in Mustox., sed male.

μενον, και ανεπιτηδειον προς το υπουργειν τη ψυχη. αλλα και δι ενδειαν των προσαγομενων λυεται το συμποσιον. ουτω και δια πενιαν δει εξαγειν εαυτους, εαν μη παρεστιν απο αγαθων λαμβανειν· ου γαρ ληπτεον απο φαυλων. μικρα γαρ απο μιρων δωρα, και ου δει ουδε τουτοις μολυνειν εαυτον. τι ουν ημεις φαμεν; εις αντιφασιν γαρ περιεστιν ο λογος. πως γαρ αθεμιτον το εξαγειν εαυτον και ευλογον; η ου δει εξαγειν εαυτον οσον επι τω σωματι· προς κακω γαρ εστι τουτο τω σωματι. αλλα ευλογον εξαγειν εαυτους δια μειζον αγαθον συντελουν τη ψυχη, οιον ως ηνικα βλαπτεται υπο του σωματος. ωσπερ γαρ ο βουλομενος (lege βουλευομενος) εκεινα αιρειται, οισ ελασσονα μεν κακα επεται, μειζονα δε αγαθα. και ωσπερ ανοσιον μεν φιλω τυπτομενω μη αμυνειν, ει δε τυπτοιτο υπο πατρος ουκ ευλογον αμυνειν, ουτω και ενταυθα και αθεμιτον εξαγειν εαυτον δια το σωμα, και ευλογον ποτε δια την ψυχην, λυσιτελουντος αυτη ποτε τουτου.

*i. e.* “Plato, when he here infers that suicide is not lawful, affords an occasion of supporting the opinion that it is lawful; in the first place, by saying, that he [who is worthy to partake of philosophy,] will not *perhaps* violently deprive himself of life. For the word *perhaps* affords a suspicion that suicide may sometimes be requisite, unless Divinity sends some great necessity, such as in the present instance [respecting Socrates]. In the second place, Plato admits that suicide may be proper to the worthy man, to him of a middle character, and to the multitude and depraved. To the worthy man, as in this Dialogue; to him of a middle character, as in the Republic, where he says,

that suicide is necessary to him who is afflicted with a long and incurable disease, as being useless to the city, because Plato's intention was that his citizens should be useful to the city, and not [merely] to themselves; and to the vulgar character, as in the Laws, when he says that suicide is necessary to him who is possessed with certain incurable passions, such as being enamoured of his mother, sacrilege, or anything else of this kind, and who is incapable of governing himself. In the third place, it may be said, if Plotinus has written concerning rational suicide<sup>a</sup>, it is sometimes necessary for a man to deprive himself of life. In the fourth place, this may be inferred from the authority of the Stoics, who said that there are five ways in which suicide may be reasonably admitted. For they assimilated life to a banquet, and asserted that it is necessary to dissolve life through such-like causes as occasion the dissolution of a banquet. A banquet, therefore, is dissolved either through a great necessity unexpectedly intervening, as through the presence of a

<sup>a</sup> It appears to me that Olympiodorus, in what he here says, does not allude to the preceding book of Plotinus on Suicide, but to the following passages in Ennead I. lib. iv. of his treatise on Felicity: *ει αιχμαλωτος αγοιτο, παντη εστιν οδος εξιεναι, ει μη ειη ευδαιμονειν. i. e.* "If [the wise man] should be led into captivity, there is entirely a way for him to depart from the present life, if he can be no longer happy in it." And shortly after he adds: *και πολλοι δη και αμεινον αιχμαλωτοι γινομενοι πραξουσι και επ' αυτοις δη βαρυνομενοις απελθειν. i. e.* "Besides, many, when they have become slaves, have acted better than they did before their captivity; and it is in the power of those who are bound, to depart from their bondage."



friend suddenly coming; or it is dissolved through intoxication taking place; and through what is placed on the table being morbid. Further still, it is dissolved after another manner, through a want of things necessary to the entertainment, and also through obscene and base language. In like manner life may be dissolved in five ways. And in the first place, as at a banquet, it may be dissolved through some great necessity, as when a man like Menœceus<sup>a</sup> sacrifices himself for the good of his country. In the second place, as a banquet is dissolved through intoxication, so likewise it is necessary to dissolve life through a delirium following the body: for a delirium is a physical intoxication. In the third place, as a banquet is dissolved through what is placed on the table being morbid, thus, too, it is necessary that life should be dissolved when the body labours under incurable diseases, and is no longer capable of being ministrant to the soul. In the fourth place, as a banquet is dissolved through a want of things necessary to the entertainment, so suicide is proper when the necessaries of life are wanting. For they are not to be received from depraved characters: since gifts from the defiled are small, and it is not proper for a man to pollute himself with these. And in the fifth place, as a banquet is dissolved through obscene language, so likewise it is necessary to dissolve life when compelled by a tyrant to speak

<sup>a</sup> Menœceus was a Theban, the last of the Cadmeian race, who voluntarily sacrificed himself for the safety of his country.

things arcane, or belonging to the mysteries, which a certain female Pythagorean is said to have done. For being compelled to tell why she did not eat beans, she said, I may eat them if I tell. And afterwards, being compelled to eat them, she said, I may tell if I eat them; and at length bit off her tongue as the organ of speech and taste.

“What, then, shall we say? for the discussion is brought to a contradiction. And how can it be admitted that suicide is unlawful, and yet reasonable? Or may we not say, that a liberation from life is not necessary so far as pertains to the body? for this is evil to the body. For as he who deliberates [about the election of some things rather than others], chooses those that are followed by a less evil, and accompanied by a greater good; and as it is unholy not to give assistance to a friend when he is scourged, but if he is scourged by his father, it is not becoming to assist him<sup>a</sup>; so here, suicide is *unlawful*, when committed for the sake of the body, but *rational*, when committed for the sake of the soul, since this is sometimes advantageous to it.”

<sup>a</sup> When the truly worthy man is placed in difficult circumstances, yet not of such a magnitude as to prevent him from energizing intellectually, in this case it is not lawful for him to commit suicide; for the affliction is from Divinity, and is analogous to the castigation of a son by his father. For, according to the Platonic philosophy, everything afflictive in life either exercises, or corrects, or punishes. And the most worthy men sometimes require for the health of their souls, severe endurance, in the same manner as the most athletic require great exercise for the health of their bodies.

THE FOURTH AND FIFTH BOOKS  
OF THE  
SIXTH ENNEAD OF PLOTINUS.

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BOOK IV.

That [truly existing] being which is one and the same, is everywhere wholly simultaneously present.

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1. Is soul everywhere present, on account of the magnitude of the body of the universe? For it has a nature adapted to be divided about bodies. Or is it everywhere present from itself? Not so far, indeed, as it is extended by body, but because body finds soul to be everywhere prior to it. So that wherever body is placed, there it finds soul existing, before it had itself an arrangement in a part of the universe; and the whole body of the universe is established in soul now existing. But if soul is thus largely extended, prior to the accession of so great a body, and fills all the interval of the universe, how is it possible that it should not have magnitude? Or what mode will there be of its existence in the universe before the universe was generated, the universe not yet having a being? But granting that soul is impartible and without

magnitude, and that hence it is everywhere, in consequence of not having magnitude, how can any one admit that it is everywhere, if it has no magnitude? And if it should be said that it is co-extended with body, though it is not body, neither will he who asserts this avoid the doubt, through ascribing to soul magnitude according to accident. For here in a similar manner some one may rationally inquire, how soul can be accidentally extended into magnitude. For soul is not extended through the whole body in the same manner as quality [such as<sup>a</sup>] sweetness or colour; since these are passions of bodies, so that the whole of that which is passive has a property of this kind, and being something belonging to body, possesses nothing from itself<sup>b</sup>, and is then known [when it is in body]. Hence it is necessarily extended into a magnitude equal to that of the body<sup>c</sup> [in which it is inherent]. Besides, though the whiteness of one

<sup>a</sup> The word *ουον* is omitted in the original; but the sense of the passage requires its insertion. The version of Ficinus has also *velut*.

<sup>b</sup> Quality is that which imparts what is apparent in matter, and what is the object of sense. Hence, as it is well observed by Damascius, *περι αρχων*, "That which is the object of sight is neither body nor colour; but coloured body, or colour corporalised, is that which is motive of the sight. And universally that which is sensible, which is body with a particular quality, is motive of sense."

<sup>c</sup> In the original there is nothing more than, *διο και εξ αναγκης τοσοουτον*. But from the version of Ficinus, it is requisite to add, *οσον εστι και το σωμα*. And indeed this addition is necessary. The version of Ficinus is, "Quapropter qualitas necessariò tanta est, quantum est et corpus."

part is specifically the same with that of another, yet it is not numerically the same. But with respect to soul, it is numerically the same in the foot and the hand, as is evident from sensible perceptions. At the same time, also, it must be observed, that the same thing may be surveyed subsisting partibly. In soul, however, there is the same thing, but it has not a partible subsistence. But it is said to be distributed into parts, because it exists everywhere. We shall therefore speak of these things from the beginning, investigating whether we may obtain any clear and credible information, how soul, being incorporeal and without magnitude, is able to proceed into a most abundant diffusion, whether this takes place prior to bodies, or in bodies. Perhaps, however, if it shall appear that it is able to do this prior to bodies, we may easily admit that a thing of this kind may take place in bodies.

2. There is, indeed, that which is a true all [or universe]; and of this all, the nature of that which is visible is an imitation. Hence that which is truly all, is not in any one thing; for there is nothing prior to it. But that which is posterior to this, if it is to be in future, must necessarily exist in *the all*; especially since it is suspended from it, and is not able without it, either to remain fixed, or to be moved. For if some one should establish in *this all*, that which is posterior to it, not conceiving that it subsists in it as in place, understanding by place, either the boundary of the containing

body, so far as it contains, or an interval prior to this, and which is of the nature of a vacuum, and which still exists, yet he must admit that the latter is, as it were, firmly fixed in the former, and is quiescent in it; the former being everywhere, and comprehending in itself the latter. If such a one, therefore, dismisses the appellation of place, he will apprehend by his reasoning power what is now said. This, however, is asserted, because *that all* which is the first and truly existing being, neither searches after place, nor, in short, subsists in a certain thing. But since the whole is all, it is not possible that it can by any means desert itself; for it fills itself and is equal to itself. Nor is that *all* an *all* pertaining to itself, [as if it were something different from itself]; for it is itself *the all*. In short, if anything is established in *the all*, being something different from, it participates of and conspires in union with it. It is also corroborated by it, not distributing it into parts; but finding it in itself, it accedes to it; that to which it accedes not becoming external to itself. For it is not possible that being should exist in that which is non-being: but if non-being should exist in being, it would meet with the whole of being; since it is impossible that being should be divulsed from itself. When, also, it is said that being is everywhere, this signifies that it exists in being, and therefore in itself. Nor is it wonderful if that which is everywhere in being should also be in itself: for now that which is everywhere is in one. But we, conceiving that

being subsists in that which is sensible, place also in sensibles that which is everywhere; and conceiving that which is sensible to possess great dimensions, we are dubious how that nature [*i. e.* true being] can be extended through such a vast bulk. This sensible bulk, however, which is said to be so great, is [in reality] small; but that which we conceive to be small, is [truly] great, if that which is [truly] a whole antecedently extends itself to every part. Or, rather, this every way extended sensible bulk, acceding by its parts to real being, finds it everywhere to be a universal whole, and greater than itself. Hence, it exists in such a way that it cannot receive anything more by the extension of itself, for if it could, it would become external to that which is [truly] all, and would wish to run round it. Not, however, being able to commit nor to insert itself within it, it is satisfied with the possession of place, and with an order in which its approximation to true being may be preserved; true being at the same time being present, and yet not present with it. For true being is in itself, though a certain thing should wish to be present with it. And here, indeed, the body of the universe recurring to it, finds that which is truly all, so that there is no necessity for it to proceed further, but to revolve in it, *that* being everything in which it revolves, and the whole of which it receives according to every part of itself. For if true being was in place, it would be requisite to proceed thither, and in a direct path, and [for the body of

the universe] in one part of itself to come into contact with another part of it; and to be [*necessarily*] more remote from, or nearer to it. [If, however, neither remoteness nor nearness can exist with respect to true being<sup>a</sup>], it is necessary that the whole of it should be present, if it is present. And, in short, it is wholly present with each of those things with respect to which it is neither remote nor near, but is received by whatever is able to receive it.

3. Shall we say, therefore, that true being is present [with that by which it is received]? Or that it indeed abides in itself, but that powers proceed from it to all things, and thus it may be said that it is everywhere? For some persons assert that souls are emissions [from truly existing being]; so that it indeed is established in itself, but souls which proceed from it become animals of different species. Or may it not be said, that in those natures in which one thing only pertaining to true being is received, because they cannot preserve the whole of its essence in themselves, in these a certain power of it is present with that with which it is present? Yet this does not take place, as if true being itself was not entirely present; since then also it is not separated from that power of itself

<sup>a</sup> It appears from the version of Ficinus, that the Greek of the words within the brackets is wanting in the original, and that also in what immediately precedes these words, it is requisite to supply the word *αναγκαιως*, *necessarily*. Hence, instead of *και ειναι το πορρω και εγγυθεν*, *αναγκη ολον παρειναι ειπερ παρεστι*, it is requisite to read, *και ειναι αναγκαιως το πορρω και εγγυθεν. ει δε μη δε το πορρω, μη δε το εγγυθεν εκει, κ.τ.λ.*



which it imparts to the recipient of it; but that which receives, derives the quantity of what it receives from the whole being present. Where, however, all the powers of true being are imparted, it is then clearly present, though at the same time having a separate subsistence. For if it should become the form of that which receives it, it would cease to be [truly] *all*, nor would it be everywhere in itself; but it would subsist from accident, and would pertain to another thing. As, however, it does not belong to anything which may wish to receive it, as far as it is able, it approximates to that which has this wish, not becoming anything belonging to it, or to any other thing, but it is present through the desire of that which wishes to receive it. It is not, therefore, by any means wonderful that it should thus be in all things, because, again, it is in no one of them in such a manner as to be something pertaining to them. On this account, also, perhaps it is not absurd to say that soul thus according to accident sympathizes with body, if it is to be also asserted of soul, that it is itself in itself, neither becoming anything belonging to matter nor to body; but every body, according to the whole of itself, is as it were illuminated [by soul]. But it ought not to seem wonderful if true being not existing in place, is present with everything which is in place. For, on the contrary, it would be wonderful, and besides being wonderful, it would be impossible, if it also having an appropriate place, should be present to another thing

which is in place, or should be at all present, and present in such a way as we have mentioned. Now, however, reason asserts that, since it is not allotted a place, it must necessarily be wholly present with whatever it is present. But being present with the universe, it is also present as a whole with everything which it contains. For if this is not admitted, one thing belonging to it must be here, and another there, so that it will be partible and a body. But how will you divide it? Will you distribute the life of it into parts? If, however, the whole is life [or life is the result of the whole], the part will not be life. But if you divide the intellect of it, so that this part of it may be in one thing, and that in another, in this case, in the same manner as with respect to the life of it, neither of the parts will be intellect. Will you, therefore, divide the being of it? But thus the part will be non-being, if the whole is being. What, therefore, if some one should say that body when divided has parts which are bodies? In answer to this we reply, that the division in this case is not that of body, but of a body of a certain magnitude. And every body is said to be what it is, so far as it is body, through form. But this has not a certain quantity, nor indeed any quantity at all.

4. How, therefore, [if this be the case,] can we speak of being and beings, and of many intellects and many souls, if [real] being is everywhere one, and this not as if it were of a similar species? And how can we say that there is one intellect and

one soul, though there is one soul of the universe, and others besides this? For these assertions appear to testify against what we have said, which, though they may possess a certain necessity, yet are not capable of producing persuasion, the soul conceiving it to be incredible that one thing should thus be everywhere the same. For perhaps it is better to divide the whole in such a way that there may be no diminution in that from which the distribution into parts is effected; or rather, that we may speak more accurately, something is emitted from it, while at the same time it abides in itself; but the parts which are, as it were, generated from it, are souls filling all things with themselves. If, however, it appears paradoxical that true being abiding in itself is everywhere at once wholly present, this will also be the case with respect to souls. For unless this is admitted, souls will not be totally present with the whole of bodies; but they will either be distributed into parts, or if they remain as wholes, they will impart a power of themselves to bodies. But with respect to the powers which they impart, the same doubt still remains, viz. whether the whole is everywhere present. And besides this, one part of the body will possess soul [totally], but another a power of it only. It is, however, requisite to investigate how there are many souls and many intellects, and how there is one being and there are also many beings. Things, also, which proceed from natures prior to themselves, being numbers and not magnitudes, in

a similar manner produce a doubt as to the manner in which they fill the universe. Nothing, therefore, thus proceeding from multitude, will be found by us sufficient to solve the doubt, since we also grant that being is multitudinous through difference, but not through place. For at one and the same time it is being, and is thus multitudinous; since [as Parmenides says<sup>a</sup>] being approximates to being. It is likewise all things at once. Intellect also is manifold through difference, but not through place; since every intellect has a simultaneous subsistence. Shall we say, therefore, that souls also thus subsist? Perhaps we must admit that this likewise must be the case with souls. For that which is said to be partible about bodies, is of an impartible nature; but bodies possessing magnitude have this nature of soul present with them. Or, rather, bodies being produced by soul, the nature of soul appears to be present with every part of them, so far as they are distributed into parts. And thus it causes us to think that soul itself is divisible about bodies. For it is not divided in conjunction with the parts of bodies; but being everywhere wholly present, the unity and true impartibility of its nature becomes manifest to us. That there is one soul, therefore, does not

<sup>a</sup> The words *ως ο Παρμενίδης φησι* are omitted in the original, but ought to be inserted, as is evident from the verses of Parmenides cited by Simplicius in his Commentary on the First Book of Aristotle's *Physics*. Ficinus also in his version has "*ut Parmenides ait.*"

subvert the subsistence of many souls; as neither does the existence of being subvert the existence of beings; nor is the multitude which is there hostile to unity; nor is it necessary that bodies should be filled with life through multitude. In like manner, neither<sup>a</sup> is it proper to think that the multitude of souls is produced on account of the magnitude of body; but it is necessary to believe that prior to bodies there are many souls, and one soul [from which the many proceed]. For in the soul which ranks as a whole the many now subsist, not in capacity, but in energy. For neither does the one total soul impede the subsistence of many souls in itself, nor<sup>b</sup> do many souls exclude the subsistence of one soul. For they are distinct from each other, but without interval; and they are present with each other without any vestige of alienation, since they are not separated from each other by boundaries<sup>c</sup>. But they subsist in the same manner as many sciences exist in one soul. And the nature of the one [total] soul is such, that it contains all souls in itself. So infinite is such a nature as this.

5. Hence the magnitude of it must be considered as not subsisting in bulk. For this is small, proceeding into nothing, if some one takes away anything from it. But there [*i. e.* in true being] it is not possible to take away anything, nor, if you

<sup>a</sup> For *οὐτω* here, it is necessary to read *οὐτι*.

<sup>b</sup> Here, likewise, for *οὐτω*, it is requisite to read *οὐτι*.

<sup>c</sup> For *παρῶσιν* in this place, it is necessary to read *περῶσιν*. Ficinus also has "*terminis*."

could abstract anything from it, would it be deficient. But if it cannot be deficient, there is no occasion to fear that it will ever be absent from anything. For how can it be absent, since it is never-failing, and is an eternal, unflowing nature? For if it had a flowing essence, it would proceed as far as it was able to flow. But it does not flow, since there is not any place to which it can flow. For it comprehends all things, or, rather, it is itself *the all*, and is something [far] greater than a corporeal nature. For it may reasonably be thought to be a small thing to impart to the universe only as much as it is able to receive. But it is necessary to assert that there is nothing diminutive in true being, nor must it be considered as less than another thing in bulk. For in this case we should be induced to believe that, being of a less magnitude, it would not be able to proceed through the whole of that by which it was surpassed in bulk. But, indeed, that which is less is not to be predicated of true being. Nor is bulk to be ascribed to it, as if it admitted of a measure which might be compared with another bulk. For this would be just the same as if some one should say that the medical art is less than the body of the physician. Nor, again, must it be thought that true being is greater according to the measure of quantity; since neither in soul does the great and the greater subsist according to the quantity of body. But the magnitude of soul is testified by this, that when the bulk becomes greater, the

same soul diffuses itself through the whole of it, which prior to this was in a less bulk. For it would be extremely ridiculous in any one who should ascribe bulk to soul.

6. What, then, does not body accede to something different from itself? May we not say, that it is necessary it should accede if it is able; but that acceding and receiving it possesses what it receives? What, then, has a different body the same [total] soul, at the same time possessing its own proper soul? For what difference will there be? May it not be said that they will differ by additions? In the next place, it may be asked, if we admit that there is the same soul in the foot and the hand, must we not also admit that the soul which is in one part of the universe, is the same with that which is in another part of it? But if the senses are different, the incidental passions also must be said to be different. The things, therefore, of which a judgement is formed are different, but that which judges is not different. But it is the same judge which forms a judgement in different passions, although that which suffers is not the judge. For the passion pertains to the nature of body possessing a certain quality. This, however, is just the same as if any one of us should form a judgement of the pleasure which is about the finger, and of the pain about the head. Why, therefore, does not the one soul perceive at the same time the judgement of the other? May it not be said, that it is because it is judgement, and

not passion? In the next place, neither does the power which judges say I have judged, but it judges only; since neither does our sight announce what it sees to the hearing, though both these senses have a judiciary power. But this is the province of ratiocination, which presides over both. Frequently, likewise, the reasoning power knows the judgement which is in another thing, and has a perception of the passion [or passive affection] which is in it. Of this, however, we have spoken elsewhere.

7. But again, we ask, how is the same thing in all things? This, however, is just the same as if we inquired, how each of the multitude of sensibles which are situated<sup>a</sup> in many places is not deprived of the nature of the same thing. For from what has been said, it would be erroneous to distribute true being into a multitude of particulars; but it is rather requisite to collect many divided particulars into one, and this a one which does not proceed into the many. These, however, because they have a dispersed subsistence, produce in us an opinion that true being also is distributed into parts; just as if some one should divide that which predominates over and contains another thing, into parts equal to those of the thing contained, though the hand can contain the whole of a body which is many cubits in length, and something else besides this. The power also of that which contains is in

<sup>a</sup> For *κείμενον* here, it is necessary to read *κείμενων*, conformably to the version of Ficinus.



every part of that which is contained, but it is not at the same time distributed into parts equal to those of the thing contained in the hand; though it appears, that so far as the hand comes into contact with that which it contains, so far the power of it is circumscribed. At the same time, however, the hand is bounded by its own quantity, and not by the quantity of the body which is suspended from and held by it. If, also, you add to the body contained by the hand a body of another length, the weight of which the hand is likewise able to bear, the power of the hand will predominate over this additional weight, without being divided into as many parts as those of the body of this weight. What then? If some one should suppose the corporeal bulk of the hand to be withdrawn, and that the sustaining power of it still remained the same, and which prior to the body which it held was in the hand, would not the same impartible power be similarly in the whole weight, and this according to every part of it? Besides, if you make a certain small luminous corpuscle to be, as it were, a centre, and place round it another greater spherical diaphanous body, so that the light of the internal corpuscle may transmit its splendour through the whole of the surrounding sphere, there being nothing of a luminous nature external to this sphere<sup>a</sup>; must we not say that in

<sup>a</sup> The original of the latter part of this sentence is, *ουκ ουσης αλλοθεν αυγης τω εξωθεν. ογκω αρ ου, κ.τ.λ.* But the period should obviously be at *ογκω*, and not at *εξωθεν*. It is singular that Ficinus

this case the internal light suffers nothing, but being itself fixed, proceeds through the whole of the external bulk, and that the light which is there seen in the corpuscle, comprehends that which is external to it? The light, however, was not derived from the corporeal bulk of that centre<sup>a</sup>. For it did not possess light so far as it was a body, but so far as it was a luminous body, and this through another power, which is incorporeal. If, therefore, some one should withdraw the bulk of the body, at the same time preserving the power of the light, would you any longer be able to say where the light is situated? Or would it not equally be both internal<sup>b</sup>, and diffused through the whole of the external sphere? Neither would you any longer be able to determine where prior to this it was situated; nor to say whence it was derived, or whither it is gone. But respecting this you would be dubious, and would consider it as a wonderful thing. At the same time, if you looked intently, you would perceive the light diffused through the different parts of the spherical body. Thus also with respect to the sun, you are able to say whence the light proceeds which illuminates the whole air when you look to the body of the sun; but at the same time you see the same light everywhere, undistributed should have translated *αυγης* in this passage as if it was *αυ γης*. For his version is, "ubi non sit aliunde terra externæ moli."

<sup>a</sup> For *μικρου* in this place, which is evidently erroneous, it is requisite to read, conformably to the version of Ficinus, *κεντρου*.

<sup>b</sup> Here, immediately after *ἡ εἰσις αὐτῆς* in the original, it is necessary to add, *εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ*. Ficinus also has "et intus."

into parts. This is evident from the diffusion of its rays, which illuminate from no other place than that from whence they flow, and this without any diminution or separation from their source. If, therefore, the sun was alone a power separated from body, and diffused its light, it would not proceed from this or that place, nor would you be able to say whence it was derived, but there would be everywhere one and the same light, neither rising into existence, nor having any principle whence it was derived.

8. Since light, however, is something corporeal, you can say whence it came, because you can also indicate the body from whence it proceeded. But if there is something which is immaterial, and which is wholly unindigent of body, being naturally prior to all body, and itself established in itself, or rather not being in want of an establishment of this kind, —such a nature as this, not having any beginning of its existence, nor proceeding from a certain place, nor pertaining to a certain body, how is it possible you can say that one thing belonging to it is here, and another there? For thus it would have that from whence it originated, and would pertain to something else. It remains<sup>a</sup>, therefore, to assert, that if anything participates of it, it entirely participates of it through the power of the whole, that which is participated neither becoming partible, or anything else. For to that which has a body,

<sup>a</sup> For *λεγειται* here, it is necessary to read *λειπεται*, and this emendation is confirmed by the version of Ficinus.

passivity, though it may be accidental, will pertain; and on this account it may be said to be passive and partible, since it is something belonging to body, such as passion or [corporeal] form. But with respect to that which does not at all pertain to body, but is such that body wishes to belong to it, it is necessary that it should in no respect suffer the other passions of body, and that it should not be possible for it to be distributed into parts. For this is a property, and primarily a passion of body, so far as it is body. If, therefore, so far as it is body, it is partible, it follows that so far as it is not body it is impartible. For how can you distribute into parts that which has no magnitude? Hence, if that which has magnitude participates in a certain respect of that which has not magnitude, that which it participates will be received by it indivisibly. Or, again, if it were not so, that which it participates would have magnitude. When, therefore, you say, that there is one thing in many, you do not also say that the one thing becomes many, but you adapt to that one the passion of the many, perceiving it to be in many things at one and the same time. The one, however, in the many is to be assumed in such a way, as that it neither becomes one nor all of the many, but it is what it is independently of its participants. But, subsisting from itself, it never deserts itself [or admits of any defect]. Nor, again, is it as great in quantity as the sensible universe, or as some part of it; for, in short, it is devoid of quantity. How, therefore, can

it be of a certain magnitude? for this is the property of body. But it is by no means proper to adapt quantity to that which is not body, but is [entirely] of a different nature. Nor is it endued with a certain quality. Hence neither does it subsist in place; nor can it be said that it is here and there. For thus it would be frequently somewhere. If, therefore, a distribution into parts pertains to places, when one thing belonging to it is here, but another there, how is it possible that partibility can belong to the nature which has not a subsistence somewhere? Hence it is necessary that such a nature as this should be impartible [abiding] with itself, though<sup>a</sup> many things aspiring after, partake of it. Hence, if many things aspire after it, it is evident that they desire to participate of the whole of it; so that if they are able to receive it, as far as they are able they receive the whole of it. It is necessary, therefore, that the natures which participate of it should possess it in such a way as if they did not partake of it, since the peculiarity of it does not become the peculiarity of any other thing than itself. For thus it will abide a whole in itself, and will be a whole in the things in which it is perceived to exist. For unless it was received as a whole, it would not be what it is, nor would things participate of that after which they aspire, but they would partake of something else, which was not the object of their desire.

<sup>a</sup> For *κατα* in this place, it is necessary to read *καιτοι*. The version of Ficinus also has rightly "*quamvis*."

9. Indeed if true being was received partibly, yet so as that every part of it should be, as it were, a whole, and each part by which it is received should be such as the whole from which it is separated, there would be many primary things, and each would be a first. And in the next place, with respect to these many first things, what will it be which separates them, so as that all of them should not be simultaneously one thing? For they are not separated by their bodies; since it is not possible that these first things should pertain to bodies, in consequence of their being similar to that first thing from which they were derived. But if the things which are said to be parts in the many are powers of true being, in the first place, each will not be a whole; and, in the next place, how will they proceed, divided from, and relinquishing their source? For if they leave it, it is evident that when they leave it they proceed elsewhere. Further still, are the powers which are produced here in a sensible nature, in true being or not? For it is absurd to admit that true being is diminished, and becomes powerless, in consequence of being deprived of the powers which it previously possessed. Again, how is it possible that powers can be separated from their essences? But if the powers are in true being, and also elsewhere, either the wholes or parts of them will be here. If, however, parts of them are here, what is left will be parts. But if the wholes, they will either be such as are there, and they will also sub-

sist here undistributed into parts; and, again, the same thing will be everywhere undivided. Or these powers severally form the whole, in consequence of becoming many, each of them being a whole, and similar to each other; so that together with each essence, there will alone be one power subsisting with that essence, but the rest will only be powers. It is, however, impossible that essence should be without power, or power without essence. For the power which is there is hypostasis and an essence which [in reality] is greater than essence. But if there are powers different from these, as being less and obscure, proceeding from thence like one light from another, an obscure splendour from one that is more luminous, in this case essences also will be conjoined with these powers, lest power should subsist without essence. And in the first place, indeed, in such-like powers, which are entirely of a similar form with each other, it is necessary to admit that there is the same essence everywhere, or if not everywhere, it must, however, be granted, that the same whole essence is everywhere without a distribution into parts, as if it were in one and the same body. But if this be the case, why may it not be admitted that the like takes place in the whole universe? If, however, each power may be infinitely divided, it will no longer be a whole, but will become powerless through partibility. In the next place, since there will be a different power in different parts, no cosensation will be left. To which may be

added, that if this is effected in the same manner as if the resemblance of a certain thing, such as a more imbecile light, should be segregated from that from which it originates, it will no longer have an existence. And, in short, everything which has its subsistence from another thing, so as to be the image of it, can no longer exist when separated from it. But this being admitted, neither can these powers, which proceed from true being, have any subsistence when cut off from it. Hence, wherever these powers are, there also will that at the same time be from which they were generated; so that again it will be simultaneously everywhere an undivided whole.

10. If, however, some one should say it is necessary that the image should be suspended from its archetype;—for it is possible for an image to exist when the archetype from which it was derived is absent; since when fire is absent, heat still exists in that which is heated;—in the first place, with respect to the archetype and the image, we reply, that if the image made by a painter is adduced, we say that it is not the archetype but the painter which makes the image, and this is not the image of the painter. For though some one should paint himself, that which paints is neither the body of the painter, nor the form which the picture imitates, nor [properly speaking] the painter himself; but it must be said, that a certain position of colours produces a certain image. Besides, in this instance, the production of an image and a resem-



blance is not properly introduced; for it ought rather to have been such as that of an image in water, in mirrors, or in shadows. For here a similitude to that which is prior to the image properly subsists, and is produced by it, nor can the image subsist when separated from its producing cause. But after this manner it is said that more imbecile powers are generated from powers which have a prior subsistence. With respect, however, to the objection concerning fire, we reply, that heat is not an image of fire, unless it should be said that fire also is in heat. For if this should be asserted, he who says this, will not thus separate heat from fire. And, in the next place, the heated body, though not immediately, yet shortly after becomes cold, in consequence of the fire departing from it. But if it should be said that these powers [which proceed into the sensible universe from true being,] are extinguished, in the first place, those who thus speak, assert, that there is only one thing incorruptible, but they make souls and intellect to be corruptible. And, in the next place, they assert that from an unflowing essence, flowing natures proceed, though if the sun were fixed, it would always impart the same light to the same places. If, however, some one should say that [accurately speaking] the same light is not imparted, he may be induced from this to believe that the body of the sun [continually] flows. But that the natures which proceed from true being are not corruptible, and that souls and every in-

tellect are immortal, has been elsewhere copiously demonstrated by us to be true<sup>a</sup>.

11. Why, however, if true being is everywhere totally present, do not all things receive the whole of the intelligible world? How, also, is one thing there first, but another second, and other things after this in a consequent order? May it not be said that true being is more present with that which is more adapted to receive it, and that the characteristic property of being is everywhere, never deserting itself; but that whatever is capable of being present with it, is present, [and participates of it,] and that it is more or less present with, in proportion to its ability of more or less receiving it. It is not, however, locally present, but in such a way as that which is diaphanous is present with light<sup>b</sup>; for light is participated in a different manner by a body whose parts are in a turbulent state. In true being also, things which have a first, second, and third rank, are distinguished from each other by order, power, and differences, but not by

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *αλλ' οτι μεν μη φθαρτα τα παρ' εκεινου, αθανατοι δε και αι ψυχαι και νους πας εν αλλοις δια πλειονων ειρηται*. But Ficinus's version of this passage is both erroneous and defective. For it is, "Quod autem quæ à mundo immortales, alibi quoque est ex pluribus confirmatum." Here that it is defective is obvious, as he has not translated the words *και αι ψυχαι και νους πας*. And that it is erroneous is also evident, by his translating *τα παρ' εκεινου*, "à mundo," unless we suppose that he originally wrote *à mundo intelligibili*. For *the intelligible world is true being*.

<sup>b</sup> In the original, *οιον τω φωτι το διαφανες*: but it is requisite to read *αλλ' οιον τω φωτι, κ.τ.λ.* The version of Ficinus also is, "*sed quemadmodum perspicuum corpus,*" &c.

places. For nothing prevents things which are different from having a simultaneous subsistence, such as soul, intellect, and all the sciences<sup>a</sup>, both those that are superior and those that are subordinate; since with respect to the same apple<sup>b</sup>, the sight, indeed, perceives the colour, but the smell the fragrance, and another sense perceives another property of it, though all these properties have a simultaneous subsistence, and are not separated from each other. Shall we say, therefore, that true being is various and manifold? Or must we not admit that it is various, but yet simple, and that the many which it contains are one? For it is one productive principle, and is at the same time multitudinous. Every true being likewise is one. For that which is different in it, and difference, are from itself; since its difference is not from non-being. Being, likewise, is not separated from *the one*, so that wherever being is, *the one* is present with it; and again, the one being abides in itself. For it is possible for one thing to be present with another, though it has a subsistence separate from it. Such sensible natures, however, as are present with intelligibles, are present with them after a different manner from that in which intelligibles are present with them; since also body is in one

<sup>a</sup> In the original in this place *επιστημας* is omitted; but both the sense and the version of Ficinus require its insertion.

<sup>b</sup> Here too, in the original, immediately after *και απο του αυτου*, it is necessary to add *μηλου*, from the version of Ficinus, which is, "quoniam et circa pomum idem," &c.

way present with soul, and science in another. One science, likewise, is present with another, each at the same time existing in the same thing. But one body is present with another in a way different from these.

12. Frequently a voice proceeds through the air, and words are uttered by the voice, which the ear being present receives, and also perceives; and if, when the air is tranquil, you conceive another ear to be placed in another part of the same region, the words and the voice will also accede to this other ear, or rather, the ear will accede to the words. Many eyes, also, look to the same thing, and all of them are filled with the vision of it, though the object to which their sight is directed subsists in a definite place. The perception, however, is different, because one thing is perceived by the eye, but another by the ear. Thus, also, that which is able to receive soul, receives it; and again, another and another thing receives it from the same source. But voice is everywhere diffused through the air, not being one voice distributed into parts, but one voice everywhere a whole. If the air, also, receives passively the object of sight, it receives the form of it in an undistributed manner. For wherever the sight extends itself, there it receives the form. Every opinion, however, does not admit this to be true. But it has been asserted by us in order to show that the participation is from one and the same thing. That which takes place, however, in voice, more manifestly confirms what

we assert, viz. that the whole form of what is said is in the whole air. For every one would not hear the same words, unless the whole of that which was enunciated by the voice was everywhere, and every auditory sense similarly received the whole of what was uttered. If, therefore, the whole voice is not so extended through the whole air as that different parts of it are conjoined with different parts of the air, and the parts of the one are not condistributed with the parts of the other, what occasion is there to disbelieve the assertion, that there is one soul which is extended through all things without being condistributed with them, and which is everywhere wholly present without any separation into parts? When, likewise, it is extended through bodies, it is analogous to the above-mentioned instance of voice diffused through the air. But when it subsists prior to bodies, it has a similitude to that which calls, and is about to call; though even when it is inherent in body, it does not cease to have a subsistence conformable to that which calls, and which has a voice and imparts it. The particulars, however, which pertain to voice, are not the same as those things with reference to which they were introduced, but they have a certain similitude to them. With respect to soul, however, as it has a different nature, it is necessary to assume that it is not partly in body and partly in itself, but that the whole of it is in itself, and is again apparent in many things. Something else also accedes to the reception of that which soul

occultly possesses, and which takes place in other recipients of it. For soul is not previously prepared<sup>a</sup> in such a way, that a part of it situated in a certain place accedes to a certain thing, but that which is said to accede was in everything, because it was in itself. And though it appears to accede to things in the sensible universe, it nevertheless is in itself. For how can it proceed to things which are here. If, therefore, soul does not accede, but appears to be now present, and is present in such a way that it does not wait for a participant, it is evident that, abiding in itself, it is present with its participant. But if this be the case, the participant accedes to it. Hence body being external to truly existing being, accedes to it, and thus becomes situated in the world of life. The world of life, however, subsists in itself. And the whole world of life is in itself, not being distributed into the bulk of the body of the universe which receives it. For it is not bulk. That also which accedes to it, does not accede to bulk. It participates, therefore, of it, yet not of a part but<sup>b</sup> of the whole. And

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *ουδε γαρ ουτω προητοιμαστο ωστε μερος αυτης ωδι κειμενον εις τουτο ελθειν, κ.τ.λ.* But Ficinus has in this passage evidently mistaken the meaning of Plotinus. For his version is, "Non enim sic præparata res est, ut pars animæ hic posita ad hoc accederet." For Plotinus is here speaking of soul, and not of the thing which is prepared to receive it.

<sup>b</sup> In the original, *μετελαβιν αρα αυτου, ου μερος ολου.* The sense, however, requires that for *ου μερος ολου*, we should read *ου μερος, αλλ' ολου.* Ficinus also has, conformably to this emendation, "Particeps igitur ipsius evasit, non partis quidem alicujus, sed totius."

though something else also should accede to a world of this kind, yet it becomes a participant of the whole of it. Hence it will be received as a whole by each of these; and therefore it will be everywhere one in number, not distributed into parts, but will be wholly [present with that which receives it].

13. Whence, therefore, is the extension derived which pervades all heaven and all animals? Or must it not be said, that the world of life is not extended? If we attend, indeed, to the information of the senses, we shall disbelieve in what has been said. For it will say that truly existing being is locally present. Reason, however, says, that though true being is present in different places, yet this is without extension. But everything which is extended participates of it, at the same time itself being without interval. If, therefore, anything participates of a certain thing, it is evident that it does not participate of itself; for otherwise, it would not be a participant, but would be that thing itself. Hence it is necessary that body should participate of a certain thing, but should not participate of body; for it already possesses it. Body, therefore, does not participate of body; and hence, neither will magnitude participate of magnitude; since it now possesses it. For neither if that which was previously magnitude should receive an addition, would it participate of magnitude. For two cubits do not become three cubits; but the subject possessing one quantity re-

ceives another; since if this were not admitted, two things would be three. If, therefore, that which is distributed into parts, and extended into a certain quantity, participates of another genus, or, in short, of another thing, it is necessary that the nature of which it participates should neither be distributed into parts, nor be extended, nor, in short, be a certain quantity. Hence, it is necessary that the nature which is everywhere totally present should be everywhere impartibly present. The impartibility, however, of it is not such as that of a thing which is small; for thus it would be nevertheless partible, and would not be adapted to the whole of its impartible self. Nor is it increased when present with that which is increased. Nor is the impartibility of it such as that of a point. For a corporeal mass is not one point, since it contains infinite points [in capacity]. Hence [if the impartibility of true being was like that of a point], that which is everywhere impartibly present, will be infinite points [in energy], and therefore will not be continuous<sup>a</sup>, and consequently will not be adapted to that which is a whole. If, therefore, the whole corporeal mass possesses true being, it will possess the whole of it according to all its parts.

14. But if the same soul is everywhere, how

<sup>a</sup> For infinite points in *energy* must exist separate from each other, and therefore will not be *continuous*. To which may be added, that infinite points can only have a subsistence in *capacity* (εν δυναμει), but not in *energy* (εν ενεργεια).



are there particular souls? And how is one soul good, but another evil? May we not say, that it is sufficient to each truly existing being that it possesses all souls, and all intellects? For it is one and infinite, and all things subsisting together at once. It likewise possesses each thing distinctly, yet not so as for one thing to be actually separated from another. For how in this case could it be infinite? Or may it not be said that it possesses all things simultaneously, every life, every soul, and every intellect, and that these are not separated from each other by boundaries; on which account also they are one? For it is not proper that truly existing being should possess one [definite] life only, but that it should possess a life which is infinite, and which, again, is one. The one life, likewise, is one in such a way, that it is at the same time all lives, not heaped up together into one, but beginning from one, and these abiding whence they began. Or we should rather say that they did not begin, but always subsisted after this manner. For nothing is there which is in generation, or becoming to be. Hence neither is anything there distributed into parts, but it appears to be divided by that which receives it. That, however, which exists there [*i. e.* in true being] is from an ancient subsistence and from the beginning. But that which is in generation approximates to, and appears to be conjoined with it. And it is also suspended from it. But with respect to us, what are we? Are we truly-existing being? Or are we that

which approximates to it, and generated in time? Or may we not say, that prior to this subsistence in becoming to be, we had a subsistence as men in true being, though different men from what we now are, *and possessing a deiform nature*<sup>a</sup>? We were likewise pure souls, and intellects conjoined with universal essence, being parts of the intelligible, not disjoined or separated from it, but pertaining to the whole of it. For neither are we now cut off from it. But even now, the man which is here wishing to be another [and better] man, accedes to the man which is there, and which finding us, (for we were not external to the universe,) surrounds us with himself, and conjoins himself to that man which each of us then was. Just as if one voice and one discourse existing, some one from a different place applying his ears, should hear and receive what was said, and should become in energy a certain hearing, in consequence of having that which energises present with itself. After the same manner we become both the man which is in the intelligible, and the man which is here. As long, also, as we continue to be what we were before, we are not different from man in the intelligible. But we then become different from it through that which

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *και τινες και θεοι*. But the version of Ficinus has erroneously nothing more than "alii quidam." For Plotinus is here speaking of human souls, when (according to Plato in the Phædrus,) they ascend in conjunction with the mundane Gods to the survey of the supercelestial place. For such souls, as ranking among the divine choir, are denominated by Plato in that Dialogue, Gods.

we afterwards add to it, the prior man [which we received from the intelligible world] being torpid, and being after another manner present with us.

15. But how did that accede which has acceded? May we not say, that aptitude being present with it, it possesses that which it was adapted to possess? It was, however, so disposed as to be capable of receiving soul. But this is effected in such a way that it does not receive the whole of the soul of the world, though the whole of it is present, yet not to the individual which participates of it. For thus, also, other animals and plants possess as much of soul as they are able to receive. Just as with respect to a voice signifying certain words, some things participate of the words as well as of the vocal sound, but others participate of the sound only, and the aërial percussio. Animal, however, is generated, which has indeed soul present with it from truly existing being, through which it is suspended from the whole of real being; body at the same time being present, not as a vacuum, nor as destitute of soul, but as that which prior to this was not situated in an inanimate nature, and which becomes, as it were, more proximate to soul, through its aptitude to receive it, and thus no longer becoming body only, but a living body, and through its vicinity, as it were, plucking as fruit a certain vestige of soul; not in so doing receiving a part of soul, but a certain heat, as it were, or illumination, proceeding into it, and which is the source of the generation of its desires, pleasures, and pains. But

the body of the animal now thus generated was not foreign [to the illuminations of soul]. The soul, indeed, derived from a divine nature, was quiet, being established in itself conformably to its own manner. Body, however, which is turbulent through its imbecility, and is continually flowing, and continually subject to the percussion of external blows, first uttered obstreperous sounds in the common nature of the animal, and imparted its own tumult to the whole [composite of soul and body]. Just as if when a senate sitting and consulting quietly [about public affairs], the disorderly multitude, asking for food and other things of which they are in want, should by their entrance throw the whole assembly into a disgraceful tumult. When, therefore, the uproar of the rabble ceasing, they listen to the arguments of some wise man in the senate, they become orderly, and the worst part of the community does not predominate; for if this were not the case, the rabble would have the supreme authority, that which is more excellent being quiescent, in consequence of the tumultuous vulgar not being able to receive the arguments of one wiser than themselves. And this is the evil of a city and a senate. This also is the depravity of man when he has predominating in himself the rabble of pleasures, desires, and fears; such a man as this giving himself up to such a rabble. A man, however, of another description reduces into slavery this tumultuous rabble, recurs to the man which he formerly was, lives conform-

ably to him, and is that same man, imparting to body such things as he can impart to that which is different from himself. There is also a man of another character, who at one time lives the life of the above-mentioned man, and at another time lives differently, being a certain mixture from his own good, and an evil foreign to his nature.

16. If, however, this nature cannot become evil, and this is the mode of the soul's proceeding into, and being present with body, what is the descent, and again the ascent of the soul in certain periods; and what, also, are its punishments, and its entrances into the bodies of other animals? For we have received these things from such of the ancients as philosophized in the best manner about the soul; and with these it is fit that we should either accord, or should demonstrate that the present discussion is not dissonant with their assertions. Since, therefore, soul in the participation of it by these sensible natures does not<sup>a</sup> descend into them, and thus depart from itself, but the accession of soul to them consists in its being present with them, and they, in consequence of this, participating of it, hence it must be said that the nature of body is generated by soul, and thence participates of life and soul. And, in short, the descent of soul is not to be considered as locally effected, but as subsisting in such a way as is

<sup>a</sup> In this place *ovx* is omitted in the original; but both the sense of the passage and the version of Ficinus require that it should be inserted.

adapted to a communion of this kind. So that the descent of soul into body consists in its being inherent in body so far as it imparts something of itself to a corporeal nature, without becoming a part of it. But for soul to depart from body, is for body to have no communication whatever with it; though at the same time an order of a communion of this kind exists in the parts of the universe. It must also be said, that soul subsisting in the last intelligible place, frequently imparts something of itself to body, as having a power proximate to it, and from a law pertaining to a nature of this kind, being less extended [than an essence solely intellectual]. A communion, however, of this kind, and a liberation from it is good. But why is this the case? Because, though soul does not partake of the nature of body, yet when it is said to be intimately connected with it, then instead of being universal it becomes partial. For its energy is no longer directed to the whole, though its energy is something belonging to the whole. Just as if he who possesses the whole of science should only energise according to some one of its theorems. The good, however, of one who is replete with scientific knowledge consists in energising, not according to a certain part of science, but according to the whole of it which he possesses. Soul, therefore, being something pertaining to the whole of the intelligible world, and having concealed the part in the whole, leaps from the whole into the part, in consequence of that into which it intro-

duces its energy being a part. Just as if fire, which is able to burn everything, should be compelled to burn a certain small material, though it possesses all possible caustic power. For each soul when entirely separated [from a corporeal nature] no longer ranks as an individual soul; but when it is separated from the intelligible world, not locally but in energy, and<sup>a</sup> becomes something particular, it is then a certain portion only of the universal, though at the same time after another manner it is universal. When, however, it does not preside over anything peculiarly, it is then entirely universal, as being then only in capacity a part. But with respect to the soul becoming situated in Hades, if this is for it to be in the invisible region, it signifies that it is separate from body; but if by Hades a certain inferior place is indicated, why is this wonderful? For now our soul is said to be in the place in which the body exists. May it not, therefore, be said, that the soul is in Hades, when it is not separated from its image? For how is it possible that it should not be there where its image is? If, however, philosophy perfectly liberates the soul, the image alone departs into the subordinate place, but the soul subsists purely in the intelligible world, without having anything suspended<sup>b</sup> from its essence. The image, therefore, is thus generated

<sup>a</sup> και is wanting in the original, but the insertion of it is obviously necessary.

<sup>b</sup> For εξηρημενου here, it is necessary to read, conformably to the above translation, εξηρητημενου.

from the soul, subsisting after the above-mentioned manner. But when the soul illuminates, as it were, the image<sup>a</sup>, by verging to that which is of a subordinate nature, it then becomes contracted to the whole of the image; nor does it then exist in energy, nor, again, does it perish. Thus much, however, may suffice respecting these things. Let us, therefore, again resume the discussion from the beginning.

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BOOK V.

1. Common [or self-evident] conception says, that one and the same thing in number is everywhere totally present, since all men assert, from the spontaneous motions of the soul, that in each of us Divinity is inherent as one and the same. And if some one should not inquire of them the mode in which Divinity is thus present with us, and should not wish to discuss their opinion by a reasoning process, they would also thus adopt the same opinion; and by the discursive energy of reason inferring that this is true, would thus cease from any further investigation; in a certain respect establishing their conceptions in one and the same thing,

<sup>a</sup> For *αυτην* in this place, it is requisite to read *αυτον*. For Plotinus is here speaking of the soul with reference to the *ιδωλον*, or image of it. Ficinus, therefore, was mistaken in translating this passage as if Plotinus was speaking of the soul illuminating *herself*, and not her *image*. For his version is, "Sed cum ipsa velut in se refulget."



and being unwilling to be divulsed from this oneness [and sameness]. This principle, also, is the most stable of all the enunciations of our soul, not<sup>a</sup> being a conclusion by an induction from particulars, but proceeding from the soul prior to all particulars, and being even prior to that principle which establishes and says that all things aspire after good. For thus, again, this principle will be true, if all things hasten to *the one*, and are one, and *the one* is the object of their appetite. For this one proceeding into another part, as far as it is possible for it to proceed, may appear to be multitudinous, and [at the same time] in a certain respect one<sup>b</sup>. But the ancient nature, and the appetite of good which is spontaneous, lead to that which is truly one, and on account of this every nature hastens to itself. For the good to this one nature consists in belonging wholly to itself, and in being itself; but this is to be one. Thus, therefore, good may be also said to be appropriate and allied; on which account, it is not requisite to seek for it externally. For where will it be, if it should fall external to being? Or how will any one be able to find it in non-entity? It is, however, evident, that it is to be searched for in being, at the same time not being itself non-entity.

<sup>a</sup> Both the sense and the version of Ficinus require that in this place, instead of ἡ, in *ἡ ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὰ, κ.τ.λ.*, we should read *μη*.

<sup>b</sup> Here, instead of *καὶ πῶς εἶη*, it is necessary to read *καὶ ἐν πῶς εἶη*. The version of Ficinus also has, "et quodammodo unum esse."

But if it is being<sup>a</sup>, and subsists in being, in each thing it will be in itself. Hence we are not distant from being, but exist in it. Nor, again, is being distant from us. All beings, therefore, are one.

2. Reason, however, endeavouring to investigate that of which we are speaking, does not in the inquiry assume something which is one, but a certain thing which is distributed into parts, viz. the nature of bodies. Hence, receiving its principles from corporeal natures, it distributes them into parts, conceiving that essence [or truly existing being] is a thing of this kind. Hence, too, it becomes dubious with respect to its unity, in consequence of not being impelled to make its investigation from appropriate principles. We, however, shall assume, in our discussion of that which is one and in every respect being, principles appropriate to a belief in its existence. But this is to assume intelligible principles of intelligibles, and such as adhere to truly existing essence. This sensible world, therefore, is in a continual flux, receives all-various mutations, and is distributed through all space. Hence it is proper to denominate it generation [or that which is becoming to be], and not essence [or truly existing being]. But true being is eternally without a distribution into parts<sup>b</sup>, always possess-

<sup>a</sup> Plotinus is here speaking of the *essential one*, which is being, and subsists in being, and not of the *superessential one*, or the ineffable principle of things.

<sup>b</sup> In the original, το δε εν ασι διελημμενον. But immediately after ασι, it is necessary to insert εν, conformably to the above version. Ficinus also has rightly "ipsum vero ens semper est indivisum."

ing an invariable sameness of subsistence, neither rising into existence, nor perishing, nor having any receptacle, or place, or seat; nor does it depart elsewhere, nor again enter into something else, but abides in itself. Hence, when any one speaks of corporeal natures, he very properly reasons from a nature of this kind, and from things pertaining to it, forming, also, from what is adapted to it, appropriate syllogisms. When, however, some one reasons about intelligibles, if he rightly assumes the nature of the essence which he discusses, he will then properly frame the principles of his reasoning, not latently deviating into another nature as if forgetful of the subject of his investigation, but from the nature itself of intelligibles surveying whatever pertains to it. For everywhere, that which a thing is, is said to be the principle of discussion to those who define in a proper manner. To these, also, the knowledge of many things which are accidental is requisite. But in those natures in which everywhere all things subsist in that which they are [and not in anything extraneous to their essence,]—in those it is much more necessary to adhere to this principle, and to refer all things to this.

3. If, therefore, this truly existing being possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, and does not itself depart from itself; and if, also, there is no generation whatever about it, and it cannot be said to be in place; it necessarily follows, since it thus subsists, that it must always dwell with, and

never be distant from, itself, nor have something belonging to it in this, but something else in another place. Nor is it possible that anything belonging to it can depart from it. For in this case it would now become situated in different things. And, in short, it would be in a certain thing, and not in itself, nor would it be impassive. For it would be passive if it subsisted in anything different from itself. If, therefore, it is not distant from itself, nor distributed into parts, nor suffers any mutation in being simultaneously present in many things, it will be itself at the same time one whole; and being everywhere the same with itself, it will have a subsistence in the many. This, however, is the same thing as to assert, that subsisting in itself, it is, again, not in itself. It remains, therefore, to say, that it is not itself in anything, but that such other things participate of it as are able to be present with it, and so far as they are able to accomplish this. Hence, it is necessary either to subvert these hypotheses and principles, and to assert that there is no such nature whatever as this; or if this is impossible, and there is necessarily such a nature and essence, then that which we asserted from the first must be admitted, viz. that true being existing one and the same in number, without any distribution into parts, but remaining as a whole, is not remote from any of the natures which are different from itself, not being in want of any local position, nor of certain parts proceeding from it [in order that it may be present with other things].

Nor, again, is it necessary to its abiding in itself as a whole, that another certain thing generated by it should desert it, and that thus it should everywhere proceed into other things; for thus it would be in one place, and that which proceeds from it in another. And being separated from the things produced by it, it would exist in a certain place. With respect to the natures, also, which proceed from it, it may be inquired, whether each is a whole or a part. And if, indeed, it is a part, it will not preserve the nature of the whole, which it is said to possess. But if each is a whole, either we must divide each into as many parts as are contained in that in which it subsists, [and thus it will be now divided,] or we must confess that the same thing is everywhere able to be present as a whole [*i. e.* totally and not partially present]. This assertion, therefore, has nothing foreign from the thing itself, and the essence of it, nor is it derived from a nature of a different kind.

4. Survey, therefore, if you are willing, this God, [*i. e.* truly existing being,] which we say does not so subsist as to be present in one place, and not present in another<sup>a</sup>, [but is everywhere equally present]. For it is acknowledged by all men who have a conception of the Gods, that not only this God, but likewise all the Gods, are everywhere

<sup>a</sup> In the original, ἰδε δε εἰ βουλει και τον δε τον θεον [Supple on] ου πη μιν ειναι, πη δε ουκ ειναι φαρμην: but both the sense and the version of Ficinus require that for πη in both places of this passage we should read που, conformably to the above translation.

present; and reason says it is necessary that this should be admitted. If, therefore, Divinity is everywhere, it is not possible that this could be the case if he were distributed into parts. For thus he would no longer be everywhere; but of his parts, one would be in this place, but another in *that*. Thus, however, he will no longer be one thing; but just as if a certain magnitude should be divided into many parts, it would be something which is dispersed, and all the parts would no longer be that whole<sup>a</sup>. Besides this, also, Divinity will be a body. If, however, these things are impossible, again, that which may appear to be incredible will be manifest, viz. that in all human nature it must be admitted that Divinity is simultaneously present, and that the same thing exists everywhere an undivided whole. Further still, if we say that this nature is infinite, since it cannot be finite, for what other reason will it be so than because it will never fail? And if it never fails, it will be present with everything. For if it were incapable of being present, it would fail, and there would be some place where it would not<sup>b</sup> be present. For if we should say that something else exists after *the one itself*, it is requisite that it should exist together with it, and subsist about, and tend to

<sup>a</sup> For when the parts are separated from each other, the continuity of it is dissolved, and thus it becomes a discrete instead of a continuous quantity.

<sup>b</sup> In the original, *και εσται σπου εν*: but for *σπου εν*, both the sense and the version of Ficinus require that we should read *σπου μη εν*.

it, and should be, as it were, its progeny united to it. Hence, whatever participates of that which is posterior to it, participates also of it. For since there are many natures in the intelligible world, some of which rank as first, others as second, and others as third in gradation, all of them are suspended, as it were, from the centre of one sphere, without any separation from each other through interval. For all of them have a simultaneous subsistence, so that wherever the natures are which rank as the third in order, there also those which are the second and those which are the first are present.

5. And frequently, indeed, for the sake of explanation, we assert, that in the same manner as many lines proceed from one centre, thus, also, intelligibles proceed from one fountain; and this similitude we adduce in order that we may obtain a conception of the multitude which is thence produced. It is requisite, however, that preserving this similitude, we should admit that all the multitude which is generated in the intelligible world has a simultaneous subsistence; just as in a circle it is necessary to assume the lines which are separated from each other as if they were not separated<sup>a</sup>: for all of them subsist in one superficies<sup>b</sup>. But where there is a subsistence not according to super-

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *λεγειν ως πακει επι του κυκλου ουκ ουσας γραμμας αφωρισμενας, εστι λαμβανειν*. But after *λαμβανειν* it is requisite to add *ως ουκ αφωρισμενας*, and in *ουκ ουσας γραμμας* to omit *ουκ*.

<sup>b</sup> And a superficies possesses interval.

ficies in interval, but the powers and the essence are without interval, there it may be properly asserted that all things subsist centrally, being at once united in one centre. And here the lines being, as it were, dismissed, the terminations of the lines in the centre are preserved, where, likewise, all of them are one. Again, however, if you add the lines to the points, they indeed will severally be suspended from the centres which they left, and yet nevertheless [the summit of] each of them will be a centre, not being separated from the first centre; but at the same time that they are absorbed in it, each has a distinct subsistence, and the points will be as many as the lines of which they are the terminations, so that there will be as many points as there are lines which touch the centre. All, however, will appear to be at the same time one. If, therefore, we assert that all intelligibles are similar to many centres, the centres being reduced and united to one centre, but appearing to be many on account of the lines, which do not generate the centres, but unfold them to the view,—if we assert this, the lines will be useful to us at present, for the purpose of showing, that as they are analogous to the things with which the intelligible nature comes into contact, they appear to be multitudinous and to be everywhere present.

6. For intelligibles being many, are at the same time one; and, being one, they are on account of their infinite nature many. Hence they are many in one, and one in the many. They are, likewise,



all things at once, and energise with reference to the whole, together with the whole. And, again, they likewise energise with reference to a part, together with the whole. But the part receives into itself the first effect of energy as the effect of a part; and the whole follows. Just as if a man, passing into some other man, should become a certain man, at the same time, again, being a man. The man, therefore, which subsists in matter, from one man posterior to the idea of man [in the intelligible world], produces many men of the same nature; and thus there is one and the same man in the many, because there is one and the same thing impressed, as it were, by a seal in the many. Man itself, however, and each thing itself, and the whole intelligible universe, do not thus subsist in the many, but the latter rather subsist about the former. For whiteness is everywhere after one manner, and the soul of each individual is the same in every part of the body [after another manner]. For thus, also, truly existing being is everywhere.

7. For that which pertains to us, and we ourselves, are referred to truly existing being as the ultimate end. We also ascend to it, and from the first were derived from it. Moreover, we intellectually perceive intelligibles, not from possessing either the images or impressions of them; and if this be the case, we perceive them, being ourselves intelligibles. If, therefore, we participate of true science, we are intelligibles, not receiving them

in ourselves, but existing in them. Since, however, not only we are them, but also other things are them, we are intelligibles in conjunction with other things. Hence we are one all. But when we look to externals, and not<sup>a</sup> to that nature from which we are suspended, we are ignorant that we are one. Just as if many faces, which are many externally, should be collected into one summit inwardly. If, however, some one should be able to convert himself [to an inward perception of himself], either from his own power, or through Minerva fortunately leading him to this conversion, he will then perceive himself to be a God, and to be everything. But at first he will not perceive himself as everything. Afterwards, however, not having where he can stop, so as to be able to give a boundary to himself, and define the extent of his nature, he will then dismiss the attempt to circumscribe himself, and to separate himself from the whole of real being. And in so doing he will arrive at that which is in every respect all, not in thus arriving at the all proceeding anywhere, but abiding there where the all is firmly established.

8. Indeed, I think, if any one directs his attention to the manner in which matter participates of forms, he will give greater credit to the truth of what has now been said, and will no longer disbelieve in it as an impossibility, or be dubious of its

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *εξω μὲν οὖν ὁρῶντες ἢ ὁθεν ἐξημμενα, κ.τ.λ.* But for *ἢ ὁθεν*, both the sense and the version of Ficinus require that we should read *καὶ μὴ ὁθεν*.

reality. For it appears to me to be both reasonable and necessary that forms should not be situated separately, and, again, that matter should not subsist remotely [with respect to forms], so as to receive supernally an illumination from forms. For to admit this would be absurd; since in these things, what will that be which is remote and separate? Will not, also, the mode of participation be almost inexplicable and most dubious? Such an assertion, however, as the above is easily made, in consequence of being known by examples. Nevertheless, though we sometimes speak of illumination, we do not speak of it in such a way as we do of the illuminations which proceed into a sensible nature. Since, however, the things which are seen in matter are images, but forms have the order of archetypes, the former appear to be illuminations from the latter. In an illumination of this kind we say that what is illuminated is separate from that which illuminates. But it is now necessary that, speaking more accurately, we should not admit that, form being locally separate, idea is afterwards beheld in matter as in water; but we should assert that matter everywhere comes into contact, as it were, with idea, and yet that it does not [accurately speaking] come into contact with it; since, according to the whole of itself, it receives through its proximity as much as it is able to receive of form, nothing at the same time intervening, nor form pervading through the whole of matter, and, as it were, running into it, but abiding in itself. If,

however, form is not in matter after the same manner as the idea of fire, matter being spread under the elements, in this case fire itself [or the form of fire] is not itself inherent in matter, but becomes visible through the whole of the ignited matter. But it may be supposed that the first material fire was, when generated, of a great bulk. And the same supposition will be adapted to all the other elements. If, therefore, the form of fire in matter is surveyed in all material substances in which it imparts an image of itself, and, though separated by place, does not impart this image as if it were a visible illumination;—for if this is not admitted, the whole of this fire would be sensible, if the whole of it consisted of many parts;—if this be the case, the idea of it does not subsist in place, but generates places from itself; or otherwise it would be requisite, if it became itself multitudinous, that it should fly from itself, in order that it may thus be multitudinous, and may frequently participate of the same thing. Nor does idea, in consequence of being without dispersion, impart anything of itself to matter. Nor, though it is [profoundly] one, is it incapable of giving form to that which does not subsist in its own unity. And, again, it is not so present with the universe as with one part of itself to give form to this, and with another to a different part of the universe; but it is everywhere totally present. For it would be ridiculous to introduce many ideas of fire, in order that each fire may be formed by its own idea, *this* idea producing

one, and *that* another fire; since, if this is admitted, there will be infinite ideas. In the next place, how also will you divide the things which are generated, since fire itself [or the idea of fire] is one continued [impartible] thing? And if to this matter you should add another fire, thus causing it to be greater, in this case it must be granted that, according to that portion of matter, the same idea, and not another, effects the same things.

9. If, therefore, some one should mentally collect together all the now generated elements into one spherical figure, it must not be said that there were many makers of the sphere, and that they were distributed into different places in order to produce the different parts; but it must be admitted that there is one cause of the production, which makes by the whole of itself, and does not effect different things by different parts of itself. For if this were admitted, there would, again, be many efficient causes, unless you refer the production to one impartible cause; or rather, unless it is granted that there is one impartible maker of the sphere, who is not himself diffused into the sphere, but the whole sphere is suspended from the maker of it. One and the same life, therefore, is possessed by the whole sphere, and the sphere itself is established in one life. Hence, too, everything which the sphere contains is referred to one life, and therefore all souls, likewise, are [in a certain respect] one. But, again, they are in such a way one as to be infinite [in power]. Hence, some

have said that soul is number; but others have asserted that number increases the nature of it, conceiving, perhaps, this to be the case, because soul is never-faillingly present with all things, at the same time remaining that which it is. And if the world were of a greater extent than it is, the power of soul would not be deficient, so as not to accede to everything which the world contains; or rather, this universe subsists in the whole of soul. It is here likewise requisite to assume increase, not as the word implies, but as signifying that soul being one, never ceases to be everywhere present. For the one of it is not of such a nature that it can be measured as if it were quantity; since this is the condition of another nature, which falsifies unity, and appears to be one through participation. But that which is one in reality, is such as not to be one thing composed of many, lest a certain thing being taken from it, the whole of that one should be destroyed. Nor is this truly one separated by boundaries, lest other things being adjoined to it, it should either be diminished, they being greater than it, or should be dissipated in consequence of wishing to proceed to all things, and thus should not be with all things wholly present, but by the parts of itself should be present with their parts. He, therefore, who asserts this, is, according to the proverb, one who does not know where he is, since he is incapable of passing into union with one thing, because he is divulsed from himself. If, therefore, he admits this one to be

true, of which it is predicated that it is the one of essence, it is requisite that it should appear after a certain manner to contain in its own power a nature contrary to itself, *i. e.* the nature of multitude; and that it should not possess this multitude so as to derive it from an external source, but should possess it in and from itself, *in consequence of being truly one*<sup>a</sup>, and in the one having an existence which is infinite and multitudinous. Being such, however, it everywhere appears to be a whole, possessing one form [or productive principle], so that it comprehends itself, and is also comprehended by itself, and yet is one and the same thing<sup>b</sup>. That, likewise, which comprehends, is in no respect distant from, but everywhere exists in, that which is comprehended, wherever it may be, and the one is not disjoined from the other by any local separation. For true being existed prior to everything which is in place, and is not itself in any want of these, but these are indigent of it in order to the firm establishment of their essence. They, however, being established, it does not depart from the collocation of itself in itself; since if it were moved, they would be destroyed, because that which is their basis and support would perish.

<sup>a</sup> For *τουτω εν οντως ειαι* in this place, it is requisite to read *τω εν, κ.τ.λ.*

<sup>b</sup> This sentence in the original is as follows: *τοιουτον δε ον, πανταχου ολον φαινησθαι ενα λογον εχοντα, εαυτον περιεχοντα, και τον περιεχοντα αυτον ειαι.* But for *και τον περιεχοντα αυτον ειαι*, the sense requires that we should read *και τον περιεχομενον, κ.τ.λ.* And this emendation is also supported by the version of Ficinus.

Nor, again, is it so devoid of intelligence as to become divulsed by a departure from itself, and though preserved by an establishment in itself, to commit itself to unfaithful place, which is indigent of true being to its preservation.

10. True being, therefore, abides in itself, flourishing in wisdom, and will never have a subsistence in anything different from itself; but those other things are suspended from it, discovering, as it were, from the desire of it where it is; and this is the vigilant love which continues all night at the door of the beloved object, being externally always present, *aspiring after the beautiful*<sup>a</sup>, and always being enamoured of it in such a way as it is able to become its participant. For here the lover participates of the beautiful by adhering to it. But the beautiful abides in itself. There are also many lovers of one thing,—and these love the whole of it,—possessing the whole when they obtain it. For the whole is the object of their love. How is it possible, therefore, that this whole should not be sufficient to all things while it abides in itself? It is likewise beautiful because it is present as a whole to all things; for intelligence [or wisdom], also, is with all things totally present. And hence intelligence is common; for one intelligence is not here, but another in some other place. For it would be ridiculous to suppose that it is in want of place. Nor does intelligence subsist in such a manner as

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *και εφιμενος του αθλου*. But for *αθλου*, it is requisite to read, conformably to the version of Ficinus, *καλου*.



whiteness, since intelligence does not pertain to body. But if we truly participate of intelligence, it is necessary that we should wholly conspire into one and the same thing with it. We likewise do not participate of it in such a way as if we received portions of it. Nor, again, as if I received a whole, and you also a whole, each being divulsed from the other. For this would be an imitation of what takes place in assemblies and in every synod in which there is a concurrence into one and the same intelligence; each member of the assembly being incapable of deciding wisely apart from the rest, but by contributing to one thing, and perceiving truly, wisdom is thus generated and discovered. For what should prevent intellect in this case from conspiring into one and the same thing? Indeed though in the above instance of an assembly there is a simultaneous concurrence with us of intelligence, yet this does not appear to us to be simultaneous. Just as if some one touching the same thing with many fingers, should think that he touched different things; or should strike the same<sup>a</sup> chord without perceiving that it was the same chord which he struck; though it is requisite that we should consider how by our souls we come into contact with *the good*. For I do not touch *this*, but you *another* good; but we both touch the same good. Nor, indeed, do we touch the same good

<sup>a</sup> In the original, ἢ τὴν αὐτοῦ χορδὴν. But for αὐτοῦ in this place, it is necessary to read αὐτὴν. Ficinus also has "*aut si eandem chordam,*" &c.

in such a way as that there is one effluxion of it to me, and another to you; so that it is situated somewhere on high, but the effluxions from it are received in the sensible region. It is also requisite that the giver should be present with its recipients, *in order that they may truly<sup>a</sup> receive* [that which it imparts], and that the giver may not impart from things which are foreign, but from such as pertain to himself. For the gift of intellect is not a transmission; since in bodies which are locally separated from each other, the gift which is imparted to one thing is allied to that which is imparted to another, and the gift and the effective energy tend to the same thing. The corporeal nature, also, of the universe acts and suffers in itself; nor does anything externally accede to it. If, therefore, in body nothing accedes externally<sup>b</sup>, though body naturally flies, as it were, from itself, how is it possible there can be anything external in that which is devoid of interval<sup>c</sup>? Hence, existing in the same thing, we both see the good, and come into

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *ινα ουτως λαμβανωσι, κ.τ.λ.* But the sense of the passage requires that for *ουτως*, we should read *οντως*, conformably to the above translation. And this is confirmed by the version of Ficinus, who has “*ut reuera illinc accipient.*”

<sup>b</sup> This is asserted by Plato, in the *Timæus*, of the body of the universe.

<sup>c</sup> The punctuation of this sentence after *του εκ φυσικως* is in the original erroneous. For it is *οιον φευγοντος εαυτο επι πραγματος αδιαστατου, πως το εξωθεν*. But it ought to be *οιον φευγοντος εαυτο, επι πραγματος αδιαστατου πως το εξωθεν*; conformably to the above translation.

contact with it, at the same time subsisting in conjunction with our intelligibles. And the world which is there is much more one than two sensible worlds will be, though similarly divided. And the sensible world would be an intelligible sphere, if the former were in the same manner one as the latter. Hence the latter transcends in union. Or it would be most ridiculous to admit that bulk necessarily pertains to the sensible world, but that the intelligible world, which is not in want of bulk, extends itself into it, and thus departs from itself. But what impediment can there be to the [profound] union of the latter? For there one thing does not repel another, as if not yielding to it the place which it occupies; as neither is there any locality in the perception of every discipline and theorem. And, in short, all the sciences subsist in the soul without any contraction of place. Some one, however, may say that this is not possible in essences; and, indeed, it would not be possible if true essences had an extension into bulk.

11. But how does that which is without interval extend to all body, though collectively it possesses such a great magnitude? And how,—which has been frequently the subject of doubt,—is it possible that [true] being, which is one and the same, should not in this extension be divulged? Since he who thus doubts, earnestly wishes to obtain a solution of the doubt. It has, therefore, been frequently demonstrated by us that true being is thus [imparti-

bly present with all things]. But it is nevertheless necessary that we should adduce certain persuasive arguments, though this very nature itself [of true being] contributes, not indeed in the smallest, but in the greatest degree to this persuasion, exhibiting itself to be such as it is. I mean, that it is not like a cubical stone of a great magnitude, situated in a certain place, occupying a space equal to its magnitude, and being incapable of passing beyond those limits. For this cubical stone possesses a certain measure of quantity, which is circumscribed by the bulk and the capacity of the stone [with respect to extension]. Since, however, true being is a primary nature, and is not measured, nor has a definite boundary of quantity,—for in this case it would be measured by something else,—hence it is universal power, entirely unconnected with quantity. On this account, also, it does not exist in time, but is beyond all time. For time is always dispersed through interval; but eternity abides in sameness and in itself, and possesses transcendency and amplitude by its never-failing power. But time appears to have a multitudinous progression; just as if a line suspended from a point should seem to proceed to infinity, and running round the point, should everywhere exhibit in itself that about which it circulates, the point during the circulation of the line remaining fixed. If, therefore, time has an essential analogy to that which abides in sameness, but the nature which thus abides is not only infinite through an eternal subsistence but is also

infinite in power, it is requisite to refer to the infinity of this power the nature which runs in a contrary direction to it, has a contrary elevation to, and is suspended from it; this nature<sup>a</sup> in a certain respect running equally with time towards a permanently abiding power<sup>b</sup>. And the amplitude of this power is evinced by the magnitude of the universe which receives it. What, therefore, is that which participates of this nature, so far as it is able to receive it? This nature, indeed, is wholly present, though it is not wholly seen in everything, in consequence of the imbecility of the subject by which it is received. It is, however, entirely present [with everything], not in the same manner as the material triangle is one and the same in many things; but it is present in the same way as the immaterial triangle, from which the triangle in matter derives its subsistence. Why, therefore, is not the material triangle everywhere, since the immaterial is everywhere? It is because all matter does not participate of it, but is the recipient of something else. All matter, likewise, is not adapted to everything, since neither is the whole of the first matter [immediately] adapted to everything; \*but it is first adapted to the first of genera, and afterwards, besides these, to other things. Neverthe-

<sup>a</sup> Plotinus is here speaking of a corporeal nature, which is suspended from eternity, and runs, together with time, to the permanently abiding power of true being.

<sup>b</sup> For *προσμενουσαν* here, it is necessary to read, conformably to the above version, *προς μενουσαν*.

less, the nature which is superior to this is at once present with everything\*<sup>a</sup>.

12. But how is this superior nature [*i. e.* the nature of truly existing being] present? It is present as one life. For the life in an animal does not proceed to a certain extent only, and afterwards is not able to extend itself to the whole animal, but is everywhere present in the animated body. If, however, some one should, again, inquire how this takes place, he ought to recollect that this power of life [*i. e.* of the life of true being] is not a certain quantity, but though it should be mentally divided *ad infinitum*, yet it will always be found to possess in unfathomable depths<sup>b</sup> the same infinite power. For matter is not in life, so as to cause it to fail together with the magnitude of bulk, and thus pass into something which is small. If, therefore, you apprehend in it a perennial infinity, an unwearied and untamed nature, and which has a never-failing subsistence in itself, being, as it were, a superfervid life;—if such are your conceptions of it, where can you accede, or to what can you direct your attention, without finding this infinite

<sup>a</sup> There is obviously in the original a defect in the latter part of the passage within the asterisks. For the original is, *αλλα προς τα πρωτα των γενων. ειτ' επι τουτοις αλλα. παρην μιν τι παντι.* But it appears to me to be necessary instead of this to read, *αλλα προς τα πρωτα των γενων' ειτ' επι τουτοις προς τ' αλλα. η δε υπερτερα φυσις παρην μιντοι παντι.* Ficinus also has “sed in primis ad genera prima, deinde per hæc ad reliqua : veruntamen natura superior æque aderat universo.”

<sup>b</sup> In this place, *βυασσοθεν* is erroneously printed for *βυσσοθεν.*

power to be there present? For if you think that you shall not meet with it everywhere, you will not in your progression pass beyond it; nor, again, will you stop at something which is small, as if this power could no longer impart anything further, in consequence of failing through its parvitude. If, however, you are able to concur with it, or rather to become situated in *the all*, you will not then investigate anything further. Or, failing in the ability to effect this, you will wander to something else, and will fall from it, not perceiving that which is present, in consequence of looking to a thing of a different nature. But if you investigate nothing further, how will you be thus affected? Is it not because you will then accede to *the all*, and will not abide in a part of it? Nor will you then say, Such is the extent of my magnitude. Omitting, however, the extension of quantity, you will become a whole, comprehending all things in itself, though prior to this you were a universal whole. Because, however, something else was present with you after *the all*, you became less by this addition: for the addition was not from *the all*, since you cannot add anything to it; but it was made from that which is not *the all*. But he who becomes a certain thing, and this from non-being, is by no means *all*. He is, however, then *all*, when he dismisses non-being. When, therefore, you dismiss other things, you will increase yourself. And by this dismissal, *the all* will be present with you; but while you are with other things it will not be unfolded to your

view. Nor will it accede, in order that it may be present; but you will depart from it when it is not [through your inaptitude to receive it] present with you. If, also, you depart, you will not depart from it; for it is [everywhere] present. *Nor will you then depart elsewhere<sup>a</sup>*; but being present with it, you will have converted yourself to things of a contrary nature. For thus, also, the other Gods [*i. e.* the mundane Gods], though many persons are present, frequently appear to one alone, because that one only is able to behold them. But these Gods, indeed, because they are all-various, convert cities to truly existing being<sup>b</sup>. Not only cities, however, but the whole earth and all heaven are converted to it. They also everywhere subsist together with, and abide in it; and possess from it being, and things which are truly beings, as far as to soul and the life which is suspended from it. They likewise tend to unity in conjunction with infinite magnitude<sup>c</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *ουδι ποτε απηλθεις*. But for this I read *ουδι αλλοθι ποτε απηλθεις*, conformably to the above translation. Ficinus also has “*sed neque etiam aliò quòquam abisti.*”

<sup>b</sup> This sentence in the original is *αλλ' ουτοι μιν οι θτοι οτι παντοιιοι τελιθοντες επιστρωφωσι τας πολεις*. But immediately after *τελιθοντες*, it appears to me necessary to add *εις το οντως ον*.

<sup>c</sup> Much of what is said by Plotinus in this paragraph is to be found in sect. iii. of Porphyry's *Αφορμαι προς τα νοητα*, or, *Auxiliaries to the Perception of intelligible Natures*. Many other parts also of this treatise of Porphyry are derived from the present two books of Plotinus, which Porphyry illustrates at the same time that he quotes, as will be evident from a perusal of the Additional Notes at the end of this work.




EXTRACTS  
FROM  
THE SEVENTH BOOK  
OF THE  
SIXTH ENNEAD OF PLOTINUS.

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On the manner in which the multitude of ideas subsists, and concerning *the good*.



SINCE we say that this universe was fashioned conformably to that paradigm of it [the intelligible world], it is necessary that every animal should by a much greater priority exist in that world. And if the being of that world is all-perfect, it is necessary that it should be all things; and that the heaven which is there should be an animal, and should not be destitute of the stars which exist in this sensible heaven. It is likewise requisite that the very subsistence of the intelligible heaven should consist in this. It is also manifest that the earth which is there will not be destitute of life, but will be much more vital [than this sensible earth], and will comprehend in itself all such pedestrian and terrestrial animals as the sensible earth is said to contain. Plants, likewise, established in life, will

evidently be there, and also the sea and all water in life, and an ever-abiding stream. All aquatic animals likewise are there. The nature of the air, too, is a portion of the intelligible universe; and the aërial animals which it contains are analogous to the intelligible air. For how is it possible that things which subsist in a vital nature should not be vital? Since we find this to be the case with terrestrial natures. Hence, how is it possible that every animal should not necessarily be there? For as each of the great parts [of the intelligible universe] is from necessity, such, also, is the nature of the animals in these parts, in whatever manner it may subsist. The heaven, also, which is there, subsists intelligibly. All the animals, likewise, which are in the sensible heaven are there. Nor is it possible they should not be there; for if it were possible, they would have no [sensible] subsistence. He, therefore, who inquires whence these animals derive their subsistence, inquires, also, whence the heaven which is there originates. But this is the same thing as to inquire whence animal is derived. And this, again, is to inquire whence all life and all intellect originate. For in the intelligible world there is not any indigence nor any defect; but all things possess a plenitude, and, as it were, an exuberance of life. There is also, as it were, an efflux of them from one fountain, not as if from one certain spirit or from one heat; but the efflux is just as if there was one quality, containing in itself all qualities, and likewise preserving them,

viz. sweetness, together with fragrance, the exhilarating property of wine, and the powers of all juices, the perceptions of colours, and whatever is known by the touch. There, also, everything which is audible will exist, and all melodies, and every rhythm.

For neither is intellect simple, nor soul, which is derived from it. But all such things as are simple [in the intelligible world] are various; yet this takes place, so far as they are not composites, and so far as they are principles, and so far as they exist in energy. For the energy of that which ranks as the last there, though it is a terminating energy, is simple. But the energy of that which is first consists of all energies. Intellect, also, in its motion is always moved with invariable sameness, and after a similar manner. Nevertheless, nothing is one and the same there, as if it had a subsistence in a part, but it exists as all things; since, again, that which exists in a part is not simply one thing, but it is this thing infinitely divided. We may also say, that the progression is from a certain thing, and entirely tends to a certain thing as to that which is last. (p. 705.)

But the wandering of intellect is in the *plain of Truth*<sup>a</sup>, from which it does not depart. It also occupies the whole of it, and makes, as it were, a

<sup>a</sup> See an admirable development of the *plain of Truth*, which is so magnificently celebrated by Plato in the *Phædrus*, in the 4th book of Proclus on the *Theology of Plato*, to my translation of which I refer the reader.

place for its own motion. The place, likewise, is the same with that of which it is the place. But this place is various, in order that it may be passed through. And unless the procession was through the whole of it, and was always various, so far as it was not various intellect would be quiescent. But if quiescent, it would not possess intellectual perception; and therefore would be no longer intellect. Hence it is intellectual perception. But the whole of its motion fills the whole of essence. And all essence being all intelligence, comprehends all life<sup>a</sup>, and after one thing, always another. This, however, takes place because that which is the same in intellect is always something else; so that to him who divides [its powers], another thing will always present itself to the view. But the whole of the progression [in the intelligible world] is through life and through animals; in the same manner as to him who travels through the earth, whatever he meets with is terrene, though the terrene natures differ from each other. There, however, the life through which the progression is made is the same; yet, because it always possesses an omniform variety, it is not the same. (p. 706.)

He, therefore, who beholds this abundant life, which comprehends in itself in one all, and the first life, will he not gladly embrace this, and despise every other life? For other inferior lives are dark-

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *και η παν ουσια, νοησις παν ζων περιλαβουσα πανσαν*. But immediately after *νοησις παν*, it appears to me necessary to add *ουσα*, and therefore to read *νοησις παν ουσα, ζων, κ.τ.λ.*

ness, small and obscure shadows, vile, impure, and defiling uncontaminated lives. Hence, if you look at them, you will no longer either perceive pure lives, or live simultaneously according to all those lives, in which there is nothing that is not vital, and nothing that does not live with purity, and without the possession of any evil. For evils exist in these terrene abodes, because they contain only a vestigie of life and a vestigie of intellect. But there the archetype subsists, which Plato denominates boniform, because it possesses goodness in forms. For one thing is good [itself], but another thing [*i. e.* intellect] is good in consequence of possessing an entirely contemplative life. But it contemplates, the objects of its contemplation being boniform, which it then obtains when it surveys the nature of *the good*. *The good*, however, accedes to intellect, not such as it is in itself, but such as intellect possesses. For that is the principle, and from this good accedes to intellect. And intellect, which is the fabricator of these things, [*i. e.* of whatever the universe contains,] possesses its power from *the good*. For it was not lawful that intellect, beholding it, should not have an intellectual perception of anything. Nor, again, is it possible that the objects of its perception should be in *the good*; since, if this were the case, it would not produce them. Hence, it receives from *the good* the power of generating, and through this is filled with the natures which it produces, *the good* imparting to it that which intellect does not itself possess. But

from *the good*, which is *the one*, multitude accedes to intellect. For intellect, since it was incapable of possessing the power which it derived from *the good* [separate from multitude], gave distribution to it, and caused one thing to become many, in order that it might thus be able to receive *the good* partially. Whatever, therefore, it generates was from the power of *the good*, and was boniform. Intellect, also, is good, being a various good, consisting of boniform natures. Hence, it may be assimilated to a various vital sphere, or to a thing of an omniform nature resplendent with vital faces. Or some one may conceive it to resemble all souls that are pure and unindigent, concurring in the same thing, and possessing whatever pertains to themselves. In addition to this, he may also conceive that the whole of an intellectual essence is established on the summits of these souls, so that the place everywhere glitters with intellectual light. He, however, who forms this conception of it, being in a certain respect external to it, will perceive it as something different from himself. But it is requisite that, becoming himself intellect, he should thus make himself to be the object of his contemplation. (p. 708.)

It is requisite, however, not always to remain in [the survey] of this exceedingly great beauty, but dismissing this, to pass rapidly to that which is superior to it; and not from this sensible heaven, but from the intelligible world, to investigate with admiration by whom the latter was produced, and

what the mode was of its production. Each of the natures, therefore, which exists in that world is a certain form, and, as it were, a peculiar paradigm. But being boniform, and inserting in all things that which is common, it possesses all things [according to a boniform nature]. Hence it has being in all things; it possesses likewise every animal, and a common life, which is inherent in all animals. Perhaps, likewise, it possesses other things. But what will that be on account of which all these are good, so far as they are good? In order, however, to the consideration of this, perhaps it will be proper, in the first place, to begin from hence. When intellect itself surveys *the good*, does it intellectually perceive that *one itself* as many; and since it is itself one being, does it in its perception of *the good* divide it into many parts, not being able to survey the whole of it at once? Was it, however, not yet intellect when it beheld *the good*, but surveyed it unintellectually? Or may we not say that it did not as yet perceive it, but lived adhering to, suspended from, and converted to it. This motion, therefore, from the plenitude which it derived by tending to, and revolving about *the good*, filled intellect, and was no longer motion alone, but motion abundant and full. Afterwards, however, *being itself* became all things, and knew this in the cosensation of itself, and was now intellect. For it was indeed filled, in order that it might possess that which it beheld. But it beheld all things, together with the light which

was imparted to it from *the good*. On which account *the good* is not only said to be the cause of essence, but likewise the cause through which essence is perceived. Just, however, as the sun is the cause of the visibility of sensible objects and of their existence, and of sight itself, though it is neither sight, nor the objects of sight<sup>a</sup>. Thus, also, the nature of *the good* is the cause of essence and of intellect, and is a light analogous to intelligibles, and to intellect, by which they are perceived, though it is neither beings nor intellect, but is the cause of these, imparting by its light perceptibility to beings and to intellect. Being itself, therefore, thus becomes filled, and through this is at the same time perfect, and possesses a visive power. The principle, however, of it is *the good*, which subsisted causally prior to it. (p. 709.)

But how are these things in intellect, and are intellect itself, since they do not exist in the replenishing cause, nor yet in that which is filled from it [prior to the plenitude which it thence derived]? For when it was not yet filled, these things were not yet possessed by it. Shall we say it is not necessary that a thing which is imparted should be in that which imparts it? But in things of this kind, it is necessary to think that the giver is greater, and that the thing given is less than the giver<sup>b</sup>. For

<sup>a</sup> See the 6th book of the Republic of Plato, where this is asserted.

<sup>b</sup> For every cause is that *primarily* which its effect is *secondarily*, as is demonstrated by Proclus in his Theological Elements.



such is generation in beings. For, in the first place, it is necessary there should be that which is in energy, and which has a primordial rank; and that things of a posterior nature should be in capacity the essences which are prior to them. It is also necessary that what has a priority of subsistence should be beyond things of a secondary nature, and that the bestower should be superior to that which is bestowed, since it is more excellent. Hence, if there is anything which is prior to energy, it is beyond energy, and, therefore, is also beyond life. Hence, too, if there is life in it [causally], it will indeed impart life, but will be itself more excellent and more honourable than life. It will, therefore, possess life [causally], and will not be in want of a various donor. The life, also, which it imparts will be a certain vestigie of itself, but will not be *its* life. This imparted life, however, when it first beheld its source, was indefinite, but after beholding it, then it became definite, though its source was without bound. For immediately on beholding a certain thing, it became bounded by that which it beheld, and contained in itself limitation and form. Form, likewise, was in the nature which was formed; but that by which it was imparted was without form. Bound, however, was not added externally, as if it was the limit of magnitude; but it was the boundary of the whole of that life, which is abundant and infinite, as being an illumination from a life of this kind.

Hence the life which is there is all power, and the

sight proceeding from thence is the power of all things. But the intellect which is produced by it appears to be itself all things.

And intellect is, indeed, with respect to soul, the light of it, in the same manner as *the good* is the light of intellect. When intellect, also, bounds the soul, it causes the soul to be rational, imparting to it a vestigie of the forms which it possesses. Hence, intellect is also a vestigie of *the good*. Since, however, intellect is form, and possesses difference and multitude, *the good* is simple and formless; for thus it gives form to intellect. But if *the good* were form, intellect would be reason. It is requisite, however, that the nature which is the first of all things should not be multitudinous; since if it were, the multitude of it would be referred to something beyond it. (p. 711.)

Some one, perhaps, will say, why may not our ascent terminate in intellect, and why may we not admit this to be *the good*? For soul and life are vestigies of intellect; and soul aspires after this. Hence it judges according to, and tends to, intellect. In consequence of this, deciding that justice is to be preferred to injustice, and that each form of virtue is better than each form of vice. Hence, too, soul considers that to be more honourable, which her choice prefers to other things. Whether, however, soul aspires after intellect alone [or after] something beyond intellect, will perhaps require a more abundant discussion, in which it will be shown that intellect is not the ultimate [object of

desire], and that all things do not aspire after it, but that all things aspire after *the good*. Of those things, likewise, which do not possess intellect, all do not seek to obtain it; but the natures which possess intellect do not stop at this, but, again, search for *the good*. For *the good* is prior to intellect. If, however, beings desire life, perpetual subsistence, and energy, they do not aspire after these things so far as intellect, but so far as *the good* is the [ultimate] object of desire, and so far as they proceed from and tend to *the good*. For life, also, subsists through aspiring after and tending to this.

What, therefore, is that one thing in all these which causes them to be good? Thus, then, we may dare to assert that it is intellect, and the life characterized by the form of *the good* which there subsists. But there is a desire of these things, so far as they are boniform. I call them, however, boniform, because the life of them is the energy of *the good*, or, rather, is an energy derived from *the good*. But this life is now a definite energy; and both it and intellect are full of splendour, and are pursued by soul because they proceed from *the good*; and soul, again, tends to them as things appropriate, yet not as if it tended to *the good*<sup>a</sup>. Being, however, boniform, they are in consequence

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *αλλ' ουχι αγαθα*. This Ficinus translates, "*non tamen tanquam per se bona*." This, however, is obviously erroneous; for life and intellect are both, according to Plato and Plotinus, essentially good. Hence, for *αλλ' ουχι αγαθα*, I read *αλλ' ουχ ως προς τ' αγαθον*, conformably to the above translation.

of this not to be despised. For that which is appropriate, unless it is good, is indeed familiar and allied, but may by some one be avoided. Since other things, also, which are remote, and of a subordinate nature, may indeed excite the soul; but a strenuous love of them is then only produced, not while they remain what they are, but when, in addition to what they are, they receive something else [from *the good*]. Just as in bodies, though light is mingled with them, another light is at the same time necessary, that *the colour*, viz. *the light which is in them*<sup>a</sup>, may become apparent. Thus, also, in supernal natures, though they possess an abundance of light, yet they are in want of a still more excellent light, in order that they may be visible to themselves and to some other thing. (p. 714.)

When, therefore, some one perceives this light, he is then excited to supernal natures, and aspiring after the splendour which surrounds them, he is excessively delighted. Just as he who loves these terrene bodies, is not a lover of the subjects of them, but of the beauty in them which presents itself to the view. For each thing is that which it is in itself; but it becomes desirable in consequence of being coloured over by *the good*, which imparts to it, as it were, an alluring gracefulness, and infuses love in the natures which aspire after good. Hence, soul receiving an influx from thence into

<sup>a</sup> Plato in the *Timæus* says, that *colour is a flame flowing from bodies*.

itself, is moved, is divinely inspired, is filled with vehement desire, and becomes inflamed with love. Prior to this, however, it was not excited to intellect, though intellect is beautiful. For the beauty of it is sluggish till it receives the light of *the good*; and the soul falls, as it were, from itself resupine, becomes torpid with respect to everything else, and appears to be dormant, though intellect is present. But when a heat, as it were, from *the good* proceeds into it, it is corroborated, roused, and becomes truly winged. In this state, also, though it is, as it were, seized with astonishment towards that which is adjacent and near to it, at the same time it is elevated in a still greater degree, as if by reminiscence, to another thing [*i. e.* to *the good*]. As long, too, as there is something superior to what is present, it is naturally elevated to it, being raised by that which imparts to it its [winged] love. And it transcends, indeed, intellect; but is not able to run beyond *the good*, because there is not anything beyond it. If, however, it abides in intellect, it surveys things beautiful and venerable, yet does not entirely possess the object of its search. For it approaches, as it were, to a face, beautiful, indeed, but which is not able to excite [vehemently] the sight, in consequence of not possessing the grace which supervenes *the good* and causes beauty to be alluring. Hence, also, it must be confessed, that here beauty is rather that which is resplendent in symmetry than symmetry itself, and that this is the object of love. For why in a living face is there

a greater light of beauty, but in the face of a dead body, though the flesh and the symmetry is not yet changed, there is no longer a vestigie of beauty<sup>a</sup>? Why, also, of statues, are those which exhibit more the appearance of life more beautiful than those which possess greater symmetry [without this appearance]? Why, likewise, is a living form, though it may be deficient in symmetry, more beautiful than the beauty in a statue? Is it not because it is more desirable? And this because it possesses soul. But this is because it is more boniform. And this, again, because it is after a certain manner coloured with the light of *the good*. Hence, being thus coloured, it is excited, and becoming lighter, is elevated, and elevates also that which it possesses, and causes it, as far as it is capable, to be good, and to be raised [to the good]. (p. 715.)

Plato, therefore, mingling pleasure with the end, and placing good, not according to a simple subsistence, nor as existing in intellect alone, as it is written in the *Philebus*<sup>b</sup>, perhaps perceiving the ambiguity of this doubt, neither entirely admitted,—and this rightly,—that good consisted in pleasure,

<sup>a</sup> The above sentence in the original is *δια τι γαρ επι μιν ζωντος προσωπου μαλλον το φειγγος του καλου, ιχνος δε επι τεθνηκοτος, και μηπω του προσωπου ταις σαρχι και ταις συμμετρηαις μεμερισμενου*. But immediately after *τεθνηκοτος*, it is obviously necessary to add, conformably to the above translation, *του καλου ουχ επι*. Ficinus, also, in his paraphrased version has “*vix pulchritudinis restat vestigium*.”

<sup>b</sup> The design of the *Philebus* is to discover what is the chief good of man. See my Introduction to, and Notes on, that Dialogue, in the 4th volume of my Plato.

nor that intellect, destitute of pleasure, is to be considered as good, because he did not see that in this case it could excite other natures to the desire of it. Perhaps, however, this was not the case; but because *the good* has a nature of this kind in itself, he thought that it was necessarily delectable to its possessor, and the object of desire to the being by whom it was not possessed; so that good is not present with him who is not in possession of joy. Hence if joy is not inherent in the first desiring nature [*i. e.* in intellect], neither is good present with it. Nor is this absurd. For in this Dialogue, Plato does not investigate the first good, but our good; and, in short, a good which belongs to another thing, and is itself different from that to which it belongs, being itself deficient, and perhaps of a composite nature. Hence, that which is solitary and alone is no participant of good, but possesses good after another, and a more excellent manner. It is necessary, therefore, that *the good* should be desirable, yet not from being desirable that it should be good, but that because it is good it should be desirable. Shall we say, therefore, that the nature which is prior to what is last among beings is good, and that the ascent is such, that what is superior always imparts good to that which is subordinate to it, if the ascent does not depart from the analogous, but always proceeds to something greater? At length, however, the ascent terminates in that which is supreme, beyond which nothing that is superior can be assumed. And this

is the first of things, and that which is truly the first, and is especially and peculiarly good, and is also to other things the cause of good. For to matter, indeed, form is good; since if matter could receive sensation, it would doubtless be delighted from the reception of it. But soul is the good of body; for without soul it would neither exist nor be preserved. Virtue, also, is the good of the soul, and, superior to this, the good of it is intellect. And above this is *the good*, which we denominate the first nature. Each of these, likewise, effects something in the natures by which it is received as good; to some imparting order and ornament, but to others life [alone], and to others wisdom, accompanied by an excellent condition of life. To intellect, however, it imparts good, which we say proceeds into this, and that it is an energy derived from *the good*. It likewise imparts to it that which is now said to be light. But what this light is we shall afterwards unfold. (p. 717.)

All things, therefore, are invested with beauty and possess light through that which is prior to all things. And intellect, indeed, derives from thence the splendour of intellectual energy, with which it illuminates nature. But soul receives from thence a vital power, and an abundance of life proceeding into it. Intellect, indeed, is elevated thither [*i. e.* to *the good*], and there abides, rejoicing in subsisting near it. But soul being converted to it as far as she is able, as soon as she knows and perceives it, is delighted with the spectacle, and from as much



of it as her power of vision permits her to see, she is astonished, feels as if she had been struck, and is conscious of containing in herself some portion [of the splendour] of *the good*. Being, also, thus disposed, she becomes desirous, like those who from the image of a beloved object, are excited to wish for a perception of the object of their love. But, as here, lovers fashion themselves to a similitude of the beloved object, and, in consequence of this, cause both their bodies and their souls to be more decorous and elegant, wishing as much as possible that they may not be deficient in the temperance and other virtues of the object of their love, lest they should be despised by this object; and these are able to become amatory associates;—after the same manner soul, also, loves *the good*, being excited by it to this love from the beginning, and the love which it promptly possesses does not wait, from the beauty in sensible objects, to be recalled to the recollection of *the good*. Possessing, however, love, yet being ignorant of what it possesses, it perpetually seeks for it. Soul, likewise, wishing to accede to it, despises the things which are here [*i. e.* sensible objects], and this in consequence of perceiving that whatever is beautiful in the visible world exists in flesh and in bodies, is defiled by that in which it resides, is dispersed by magnitude, and is not truly beautiful. For it is unlawful to suppose that the natures which possess true beauty would, remaining such as they are, merge themselves in the mire of bodies, and thus defile themselves and

become evanescent. But when, also, soul sees that whatever is beautiful in objects of sense is in a continual flux, it then perfectly knows that the beauty which supervenes them is adventitious. Afterwards soul vehemently extends itself to find the object of its love, nor desists till it obtains that which it pursues; nor ever will, unless some one could extirpate its love of *the good*. When, however, it obtains this object of its pursuit, it perceives whatever is beautiful and true. It also becomes in a greater degree corroborated, in consequence of being filled with the life of true being; is then itself truly existing being, dwells with it, and in consequence of proximity to it, clearly perceives that which had formerly been the object of its search. (p. 722.)

Where, therefore, is he to be seen who produced such great beauty, and such excellent and abundant life and essence? You may perceive beauty shining in all forms, and these all-various. And it is beautiful, indeed, to abide where you have this perception; but when situated in beauty, it is requisite to survey whence these forms, and likewise whence all beautiful objects originate. It is necessary, however, that the cause should be no one of these things<sup>a</sup>. For if it was any one of them, it would be a certain part. Hence, it is neither a certain form nor a certain power. Nor, again, is

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *δει δ' αυτον ειναι τουτων μηδε εν*. But for *αυτον* in this place, it is obviously necessary to read *αιτιον*. Ficinus also has "*autorem*."

it all the forms and powers which there<sup>a</sup> exist; but it is necessary that it should have a subsistence above all powers and all forms. For the principle is formless, since it is not indigent of form, but is that from which every intellectual form proceeds. For that which is generated, must necessarily be generated a certain thing, and possess a proper form. But how can that be made which does not originate from anything? This, therefore, is not one of the number of beings, and at the same time it is all things<sup>b</sup>. It is not, indeed, the former, because beings are posterior to it; but it is the latter, because all things proceed from it. Hence, since it is able to produce all things, what magnitude can it possess? Shall we say that it is infinite? But if infinite, it will not have any magnitude: for magnitude subsists in the last of things. It is likewise necessary, if it produced magnitude, that it should be itself without magnitude. Besides, the magnitude of essence does not consist in quantity. Something else, indeed, posterior to it may possess magnitude. But the magnitude of *the good* consists in this, that nothing is more powerful, and that nothing can be equalized with it. For how is it possible that any of its productions can be equal to it, since no one of them possesses the same nature? To which may be added, that the assertion

<sup>a</sup> *i. e.* In the intelligible world.

<sup>b</sup> *viz.* It is all things prior to all; or, in other words, it is that from which, as from an ineffable adytum, all things are ineffably unfolded into light.

that *the good* exists eternally, and is in all things, does not ascribe to him either measure<sup>a</sup> or unbounded extension. For how, if this were the case, could it measure [all] other things? Again, therefore, neither has it any figure. Hence, that object of desire which is wholly without figure and form will be the most desirable, and the most lovely of all things. The love of it, also, will be immeasurable: for here the love is not definite, because the object of love is infinite. On this account, likewise, the beauty of it subsists in a way different from that of other beautiful objects; for it is super-beautiful beauty<sup>b</sup>. For since it does not rank among beings, how can it be a certain beauty? Since, however, it is lovely, it will be the source of beauty. Hence it is the power of all beauty, and a flower beautifying beauty. For it generates beauty, and causes it to be more beautiful through its own exuberance of beauty; so that it is the principle and the end of beauty. But being the principle of beauty, it causes that to be beautiful of which it is the principle. It does not, however, make it to be beautiful in form, but that which is generated by it is without form, and after another manner subsists in form. For this very thing, which is said to be alone form, exists in another thing. But that which subsists in itself is without form. Hence

<sup>a</sup> For if *the good* possessed measure, it could not be the measure of all things, since it could not measure incommensurable natures.

<sup>b</sup> *i. e.* Causal beauty, or that which, being superior to essential beauty, is the cause of it. For every cause is that *primarily* which its effect is *secondarily*.

that which participates of beauty is invested with form; but this is not the case with beauty itself. (p. 724.)

Hence, when we speak of beauty itself, we must far remove from ourselves such a form as this; nor must we place it before our eyes, lest we should fall from the perception of the beautiful into an obscure participation of it, which is also said to be [though erroneously] beautiful. Form, however, which is without *morphe*, is beautiful<sup>a</sup>, if it is form of this kind.—But reason asserts, that whatever has *morphe*, and *morphe* itself, and everything that has form, is measured. This, however, is neither that which comprehends all things in itself, nor is sufficient to itself. Nor is it beautiful from itself, but is a thing of a mingled nature. It is necessary, therefore, that these things should be beautiful [yet measured], but that the nature which is truly beautiful, or rather, which is above beauty, should be without measure. But if this be the case, it is necessary that it should neither be formed, nor be form. Hence, that which is primarily lovely, and which is the first of things, and the beauty of the intelligible which is there, is the nature of *the good*. *This, also, is testified by the passion of lovers. For as long as some one is conversant with that figure only which is manifest to the eyes, he does not yet love the object which he sees; but when departing from it, he*

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *το δε αμορφον ειδος καλον*. But *μορφη*, as we learn from Simplicius, pertains to the figure, colour, and magnitude of superficies.

*generates in himself, in his impartible soul, a form which is not an object of sense, then love springs forth.* Nevertheless, he desires to see the beloved object, in order that he may irrigate his love, which from absence becomes marcid and dry<sup>a</sup>. If, however, he should conceive that it is necessary to pass beyond this to something more formless, after this superior nature, he will more vehemently aspire. *For the passion which he experienced from the beginning was the love of an immense light, excited by an obscure splendour.* For *morphe*<sup>b</sup> is the vestigie of that which is formless. This, therefore, generates *morphe*, but *morphe* does not generate the formless nature. But that which is without form, when it accedes to matter, generates *morphe*. Matter, however, is necessarily most remote from form, because it has not in itself even the last vestigie of form. If, therefore, a sensible object is lovely, it is not through matter, but through that which is invested with form. But the form which is in matter is derived from soul; and soul is in a much greater degree form, and is much more lovely. Intellect, also, is in a still greater degree form than soul, and is still more lovely. And this being the case, it is [obviously] necessary that the first nature [or primary source] of beauty should be formless<sup>c</sup>. (p. 725.)

<sup>a</sup> See the Phædrus of Plato, from which what Plotinus here says is derived.

<sup>b</sup> See the Note to p. 92.

<sup>c</sup> Because it is that from which form proceeds; and every cause is better than its effect.

We ought not, therefore, any longer to wonder that *the good* imparts vehement desires, if it is perfectly liberated from intelligible form. For soul, also, when she possesses a strenuous love of it, abandons every form which she contains, even though there should be in her a certain intelligible form. For it is not possible for him who possesses any other thing, and energises about it, either to see or be conjoined with *the good*; but it is necessary neither to have in readiness any other beauty or any other good<sup>a</sup>, in order that the soul, being herself alone, may receive *the alone*<sup>b</sup>. When, however, the soul fortunately obtains this, then *the good* accedes to her, or rather, being present, unfolds itself into light, when she withdraws herself from visible objects, and prepares herself, so that she may become eminently beautiful, and pass into a similitude with it. But the preparation and the adornment is manifest to those who are properly prepared [for the vision of *the good*]. The soul, therefore, becoming thus adapted, will perceive in

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *αλλα δει μητι κακον μητι αυ αγαθον ουδεν, αλλο προχειρον εχειν*. But for *κακον* here, it is obviously necessary to read *καλον*, though *κακον* is adopted by Ficinus in his version. It is likewise requisite, instead of placing a comma after *ουδεν*, to place it after *αλλο*, conformably to the above translation.

<sup>b</sup> Conformably to this, Plotinus at the conclusion of his last Ennead says, "that the life of the Gods and of felicitous men consists in *φυγη μονου προς μονον*, i. e. "in a flight of *the alone* to *the alone*." Thus, too, Hermes Trismegistus, in his Crater, or Monad, speaking of intellectual men, says, *καταφρονησαντες παντων των σωματικων και ασωματων επι το εν και μονον σπευδουσιν*. i. e. "Despising everything corporeal and incorporeal they hasten to *the one* and *the alone*."

herself *the good suddenly shining forth*<sup>a</sup>; for nothing then intervenes. Nor are there any longer two things, but both are one. For as long as *the good* is present, no separation or distinction can be made. But an imitation of this takes place between lovers that are here and the objects of their love, both of them wishing to be mingled together and to become one. The soul, however, during this union with *the good*, does not any longer perceive that she is in body, nor does she assert of herself any other thing<sup>b</sup>, neither man, nor animal, nor being, nor the universe. For in a certain respect the vision of these things is anomalous. Nor has the soul then leisure, nor is she willing to attend to these; but searching after *the good*, she meets with it, as being now present, and beholds it instead of herself. For she is too attentive to the vision to perceive anything else. While she is in this state, likewise, she would not exchange her condition for all other things; not even if some one should put her in possession of all heaven, because there is nothing else more excellent nor more replete with good. For neither can she ascend higher than this; and to behold anything else is to descend, though they should be supernal objects. Hence, then, the soul possesses the power of judging well, and knows that this is the object after which she

<sup>a</sup> See p. 452 of my translation of *Select Works of Plotinus*.

<sup>b</sup> In the original, *ουτι εαυτην αλλ' οτι λεγει*. But for *αλλ' οτι*, it is necessary to read *αλλο τι*, and this is also conformable to the version of Ficinus.



aspired, and admits that nothing is more excellent than this. For there is no fallacy there; since, otherwise, she would meet with that which is more true than truth. The soul, therefore, is herself what she then says, and says afterwards, and *silently says*<sup>a</sup>. Being, also, affected in a most delectable manner, she is not deceived in the delight which she experiences. For she does not say this as if she were influenced by corporeal pleasure, but in consequence of becoming that which she formerly was when she was in a felicitous condition of being. Everything else, likewise, with which she was once delighted, such as dominion, or power, or wealth, or beauty, or science,—all these, she now says, are to be despised; which would not be the case, unless she were in possession of things more excellent than these. Nor while thus united to *the good* is she afraid of anything of an adverse nature, nor does she at all perceive anything of this kind. If, also, other things pertaining to her should be destroyed, she would most willingly assent to this, in order that she might associate with *the good* alone, so delightfully is she then affected. (p. 726.)

Then, indeed, the soul is so disposed, that she despises intellectual energy, with which at another time she was delighted, because this energy is a

<sup>a</sup> See the Note to p. 453 of my translation of *Select Works of Plotinus*, in which it is shown from Homer, that to the reception of divine illumination, *silence*, and a cessation of all mental energy, are requisite, and this, too, is asserted by all the ancient intellectual philosophers.

certain motion, but she then does not wish to be moved. For neither does she say that the object of her vision is intellect<sup>a</sup>, though, becoming herself intellect, she surveys it, being, as it were, wholly absorbed in intellect, and situated in the intelligible place. But being thus situated and established about this place, she intellectually perceives the intelligible. When, however, she perceives that divinity [*the good*], she then dismisses everything else; *just as if some one entering a house variously and beautifully adorned, should attentively survey and admire everything which it contains, till he sees the master of the house; but on seeing, and being astonished at the view of him, as far transcending the statues which he beheld, and as a truly worthy object of vision, should dismiss these, and afterwards survey the master alone.* But beholding, and not withdrawing his eye from him, he should no longer by continuity of vision see the object of vision, but should mingle his sight with the spectacle itself, so that what was before visible now becomes sight. In this state, however, he will become oblivious of all other spectacles. And, perhaps, this image will preserve an appropriate analogy, if, instead of a man who is the master of this admirable house, we substitute a certain God, and he not visible to the sight, but wholly occupying the soul of the beholder,

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *και γαρ ου δ εκεινον φησιν ου ορα καιτοι νους γενομενος*. But the sense requires that between *φησιν* and *ου*, the word *νουν* should be inserted; and this is confirmed by the version of Ficinus.

Intellect, therefore, possesses a twofold power; one, by which it perceives intellectually, and beholds the forms which it contains; but the other, by which it sees things beyond itself by a certain intuition and reception [of the objects of its vision], according to which, prior to this, it was only visive, and in consequence of seeing, afterwards possessed intellect. And the former, indeed, is the vision of intellect replete with wisdom; but the latter of intellect inflamed with love. For when it becomes insane through being intoxicated with nectar, then it also becomes amatory, and is dilated from abundance into a felicitous condition of being<sup>a</sup>. And to be thus intoxicated is better to intellect than to be more temperately affected. Does intellect, however, at one time perceive certain things, and at another time others? By no means. But language, for the purpose of instructing others, represents it as energising differently at different times. It intellectually perceives, however, eternally. But it has a power beyond intellection, and through this it perceives *the good* in a way which transcends intellectual vision. For from perceiving *the good*, it produces in itself an offspring, and at the same time is conscious of containing this progeny in

<sup>a</sup> What Plotinus here says about intellect being intoxicated with nectar is derived from the Banquet of Plato. For there Diotima says, "that at the birth of Venus, Plenty, the son of Counsel, *being intoxicated with nectar*, had connexion with Poverty, and became pregnant with Love." See this explained in the Notes to my translation of this speech of Diotima, in vol. iii. p. 500. of my Plato.

itself. Perceiving this, also, it is said to have intellectual perception. It sees *the good*, however, by a power through which it afterwards possesses intellectual energy. But soul, confounding, as it were, the intellect which remains in her, and causing it to vanish, [sees the good]. Or rather, soul first sees the intellect which she contains, but the vision proceeds into her, and the two become one. *The good*, however, extending itself to these, and adapting itself to the condition of both, runs above them, and uniting the two, imparts to them a blessed sensation and vision. It also elevates them to such an exalted degree, that they are neither in place, nor in anything else in which one thing is naturally adapted to be in another. For neither has *the good* any subsistence in place; since the intelligible place is in him, but he is not in anything. Hence, neither is the soul then moved, because neither is *the good* moved. Nor is soul then [properly] soul, because she does not then [properly] live, but is above life. Nor is she intellect, because neither does she perceive intellectually; for if she did, an assimilation between the two would be necessary. But she does not intellectually perceive *the good*, because neither has she then intellectual perception. (p. 727.)

Other things, therefore, are evident. Something, also, has been said about this [*i. e.* about the union of the soul with *the good*]. At the same time, however, a little more must be added, beginning, indeed, from former assertions, but proceeding through other arguments. For with respect to *the*

*good*, either the knowledge of, or the contact with it, is the greatest of things. And Plato says, that this is the greatest discipline<sup>a</sup>, not calling the intuitive perception of it a discipline; but he thus denominates the learning something previously about it. Analogies, therefore, ablations, the knowledge derived from things produced by it, and certain gradual ascents, teach us something pertaining to it. We proceed, however, to it through purifications, prayer<sup>b</sup>, a soul adorned with every virtue, an ascent to the intelligible world, an establishment in it, and banqueting<sup>c</sup> on the divine food which is there. But whoever is a spectator of this [divine] world, becomes at one and the same time both the spectator and the spectacle. For he both surveys himself and other things; and becoming essence, intellect, and an all-perfect animal, he no longer beholds this intelligible world externally, but now being the same with it, he approaches to *the good*, which is proximate to this divine world, and illuminates the whole of it. Here, however, dismissing every discipline, and arriving at the utmost extent of erudition, he becomes established in beauty, as far as to which it is possible to energise intellectually. But being lifted from this, as

<sup>a</sup> Plato in the 6th book of his Republic says, "that the idea of *the good* is the greatest discipline." See vol. i. p. 341. of my Plato.

<sup>b</sup> In the original, *αρεται*, *virtues*; but from the version of Ficinus, it is requisite to read *ευχαι*.

<sup>c</sup> In the original, *επιαιους*, which is evidently erroneous. I read, therefore, conformably to the version of Ficinus, *επιαιουεις*.

from a wave of intellect<sup>a</sup>, and elevated, as it were, by its tumefaction, he will suddenly perceive [*the good*]. He will, however, be ignorant of the manner in which he sees it; but the vision filling the eyes with light, will prevent him from seeing anything else, since the light itself will be the object of his vision. For then one thing will not be in him that which is seen, and another the light of the visible object, nor will it be intellect, and that which intellect perceives; but it will be a splendour<sup>b</sup> generating these things afterwards and abiding in itself. This, however, will be light alone, generating intellect without being extinguished in

<sup>a</sup> Plotinus in what he here says, alludes to the following passage in the 5th book of Homer's *Odyssey*, where Ulysses is represented swimming in order to reach the Phæacian coast, after

“ The winds were hush'd, the billows scarcely curl'd,  
And a dead silence still'd the wat'ry world.”

..... ο δ' αρα σχεδον εισιδε γαιαν

Οξυ μαλα προιδων, μεγαλου υπο κυματος αρθεις.—v. 393, &c.

*i. e.*

“ When lifted on a ridgy wave he spies  
The land at distance, and with sharpen'd eyes.”—POPE.

But in this translation of Pope, for “*at distance*” in the second line, it will be more conformable to the original to substitute *not now remote*, omitting *and*. And for *ridgy* in the first line, to read *mighty*. With this alteration the lines will be,

“ When lifted on a mighty wave he spies  
The land, not now remote, with sharpen'd eyes.”

<sup>b</sup> In the original, *αλλ' αυτη γεννωσα ταυτα εις υστιρον*. But for *αυτη* it is necessary to read *αυγη*, conformably to the version of Ficinus, and to what immediately follows; though, from a typographical error, *lex* is in Ficinus printed for *lux*.

the production of it. But this light remains, and intellect is produced from the very existence of it. For if it was not a thing of this kind, intellect<sup>a</sup> would not have a subsistence. (p. 728.)

Hence, those who in their assertions about it ascribe intelligence to it, do not admit that it has a knowledge of things of an inferior nature, and which proceed from it; though to some this appears to be absurd, that *the good* should not know [all] other things. These, however, not finding anything more honourable, attribute to it an intellectual perception of itself; as if by this perception it will be more venerable, and as if intelligence was something more excellent than *the good*, considered as being nothing else than *the good*. Whether, therefore, will it possess that which is more honourable from intellection or from itself? For if from intellection, it is not venerable in itself, or at least, is less venerable than intelligence. But if from itself, it will be perfect prior to intellectual perception, and will not be perfected by intelligence. If, however, it should be said, that *the good* is energy and not power, it is necessary to know, that if it is an essence always intellectually energising, and through this is said to be energy, it will be two things, essence and intelligence. And thus it will not be perfectly simple; but those who make this assertion, add something else to *the good*,

<sup>a</sup> In the original, εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο τοιοῦτον ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ὑπέσθη ἐκεῖνο. For ἐκεῖνο, however, conformably to the above version, it is requisite to read ἐκείνος.

just as vision in energy would be ascribed to the eyes, though they should eternally perceive. But if it is said that *the good* is energy<sup>a</sup> because intelligence also is energy, in this case, being intelligence, it will not perceive intellectually, as neither will motion be that which is moved<sup>b</sup>. Here, however, it may be said, are not intelligibles essence and energy? To this we answer, that we acknowledge these to be multitudinous, and to possess a diversity of nature. But that which is the first of all things is simple; and we ascribe intellectual perception to that which proceeds from something superior to it. We also assert, that this perception investigates its own essence, and itself, and that which produced it. We likewise say, that this perception in the conversion to, and knowledge of, itself, may justly be called intellect<sup>c</sup>. But what want of intellectual perception can there be in that nature which was neither generated, nor has anything prior to itself<sup>d</sup>? Hence Plato rightly says, that

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *εἰ δὲ ἐνεργεῖα λεγούσιν, κ.τ.λ.* But the reading in the margin, in order that it may correspond with the version of Ficinus, is *εἰ δὲ ἐνεργεῖα, κ.τ.λ.* For the version of Ficinus is, "Sin autem in actu Deum esse dicant," &c. The true reading, however, is that of the printed text, as is evident from what immediately follows.

<sup>b</sup> For motion is a medium between that which is the cause of motion and the thing which is moved.

<sup>c</sup> For the very essence of intellect consists in a self-converting energy.

<sup>d</sup> *The good, or the one*, contains in itself all things, but in such a way as to be prior to all things. It is, therefore, prior to intelligence and intellectual perception.



*the good* is beyond intellect<sup>a</sup>. For intellect without intellectual perception will be devoid of intellect. And the being to which intellectual perception is natural, will be without intellect if it does not energise intellectually. But what work can be assigned to that nature to which no work belongs? At the same time, through a privation of this it may be said, as an accusation, that this nature does not act. This, however, is just the same as if some one should say, that *the good* does not practise the art of medicine. But no work pertains to him, because there is nothing which it is expedient for him to perform. For he is all-sufficient. Nor is there any occasion for him to search for anything, since he is above all things. For being that which he is, he is sufficient to himself and to everything else.

Neither can we assert of *the good* that he *is*; for neither is he in want of this, since it must not be said of him that he *is* good. But that of which *is* is predicated, *good* also is predicated, not as one thing of another, but merely as indicative of his nature. We denominate him, however, *the good*, asserting something *of* him, but not assigning anything *to* him; nor predicating this in such a way

<sup>a</sup> In the original, διοτιρ νουν φησιν ο πλατων ειναι ορθως. But the sense requires that for διοτιρ we should read, conformably to the above translation, διο υπερ. The version of Ficinus also accords with this emendation; for it is, "Quamobrem Plato summum Deum intellectui recte præfecit." The assertion of Plato, to which Plotinus here alludes, is to be found near the end of the 6th book of the Republic.

as if good was present with him, but as *good itself*. Again, neither do we think it fit [as we have said] to assert of him that he *is* good, nor is the article *the* to be applied to him.—But who can admit the existence of a nature which neither perceives nor has any knowledge of itself? (p. 729.)

It is necessary, therefore, to know that all intelligence is derived from a certain thing, and is of a certain thing. And the intelligence, indeed, which is coexistent with that from which it is derived has for its subject that of which it is the intelligence. It is also, as it were, something inherent, being the energy of its subject, and giving completion to the power of it<sup>a</sup>, but generating nothing itself. For it alone pertains to that to which it belongs, being, as it were, the perfection of it. But the intelligence which subsists together with essence, and which gives subsistence to essence, generates in itself, and the energy of it is essence. It also coexists in essence; nor is the intelligence different from this essence. This nature, likewise, intellectually perceives itself, not as something different, except so far as the object of intellection and intellection itself are distinguished from each other by definition; since this nature is a certain multitude, as we have frequently demonstrated. This, also, is

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *και πληρουσα, το δυναμι εκινου*. The sense, however, requires that we should read, conformably to the above translation, *και πληρουσα την δυναμιν εκινου*. And this emendation is confirmed by the version of Ficinus, which is, “*ejusdemque potentiam implens.*”

the first energy, generating an hypostasis in essence, and being the image of another thing, it is the image of something so great<sup>a</sup> that it becomes also essence. But if it was the image of this transcendent nature, yet was not derived from it, in this case it would be nothing else than an image of it, and would not be an hypostasis in itself. Being, however, itself the first energy and the first intelligence, it will not have prior to itself either energy or intellectual perception. He, therefore, who passes beyond this essence and intelligence will not arrive either at essence or intellectual perception, but will ascend to something beyond these, to a nature so admirable that it has neither essence nor intelligence in itself, but is itself alone with itself, not being in want of any of the things which proceed from it. For it did not, previously energising, produce energy; [since, in this case, it would energise prior to the generation of energy. Nor, perceiving intellectually, did it generate intelligence<sup>b</sup>;] for it would have had intellectual perception prior to the existence of intelligence. For, in short, intelligence, if it is an intellectual perception of *the good*, is inferior to it; so that it will not be intelligence possessed by *the good*. I say this,

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *ουτως εστι μεγαλον τινος*. But for *μεγαλον*, it is necessary to read, conformably to the version of Ficinus, *μεγαλου*.

<sup>b</sup> The Greek of the words within the brackets is wanting in the original. Hence, immediately after *ου γαρ ενεργησας προτιρον, εγεννησεν ενεργειαν*, it is requisite to add, *ηδη γαρ ενεργει πριν γενεσθαι ενεργειαν. ουδε νοησας εγεννησεν νοησιν*. The sense of the whole passage requires this addition, and is supported by the version of Ficinus.

not because *the good* has not a subsistence,—for this must be admitted,—but because there will not be in *the good itself* intelligence; since in this case *the good*, and that which is inferior to it, the intellectual perception of it, will be at the same time one thing. But if the intellectual perception of *the good* is inferior to it at one and the same time, it will be intelligence and essence. If, however, *the good* transcends intelligence, both intelligence and the intelligible will be inferior to it<sup>a</sup>; nor will there be intellectual perception in *the good*. But intelligence being inferior to, and on this account reverencing, *the good*, will have a situation different from it, and will leave it unmingled with itself, as also liberated from all other things. Since, however, it is unmingled with intelligence, it is genuinely that which it is, not being impeded by the presence of intellectual perception from purity of existence, and a subsistence as *the one*. But if some one should conceive that *the good* is at the same time both intelligent and the intelligible, and that it is essence, and an intelligence coexistent with essence, and should thus think fit to admit that *the good* is intellectual,—in this case, such a one will be in want of something else which is prior to *the good*; since energy and intelligence are either the perfection of another subject, or, being consubstantial, they will

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *εἰ δὲ κρείττον ἡ νοησις, τὸ νοητὸν χείρον ἔσται*. But it is necessary to read, conformably to the above translation, *εἰ δὲ κρείττον, ἡ νοησις καὶ τὸ νοητὸν χείρον ἔσται*. Agreeably to this, also, the version of Ficinus must be amended.

have another nature prior to them, through which intelligence derives an intellective power, as it is reasonable to admit it should. For it possesses that which it intellectually perceives, because there is another nature prior to it. When, also, intelligence perceives itself, it then recognises, as it were, what it derived into itself from the intuitive perception of another thing. But what can that nature intellectually perceive, or how can it even intellectually perceive itself, when there is nothing prior to it, and nothing derived from anything else subsists together with it? For what can it search for? Or what can it desire? Or can it be supposed that it investigates the magnitude of its own power, as if this power was external to it, so far as it is the object of its perception? I mean, as if there was one power through which it recognised what its nature is, and another which recognises this nature<sup>a</sup>. But if it is one thing only, what should it investigate? (p. 732.)

Intellectual perception, indeed, appears to have been imparted as an auxiliary to more divine natures, but yet which are less divine and less excellent [than the good]. This, also, is, as it were, an

<sup>a</sup> This sentence in the original is, *λεγω δε, ει αλλη μεν η δυναμις αυτου ην, εμαθανεν, αλλη δε η εμαθανεν*. But this is obviously defective, as is likewise the version of Ficinus, which is, "Dico autem, si quidem alia quidem sit ejus potentia quam perdiscit, alia verò quam discit." For in the original, instead of *η δυναμις αυτου ην, εμαθανεν*, it is necessary to read, *η δυναμις αυτου, δι ην εμαθανεν*. And it is requisite to correct the version of Ficinus conformably to this emendation.

eye to them being blind<sup>a</sup>. What, however, would the eye want in order to the perception of being, if it were itself light? But he who is in want of sight, possessing in himself darkness, seeks for light through the eye. If, therefore, intellectual perception searches for light<sup>b</sup>, but light does not search for light, that supreme nature *the good*, since it does not seek for light, will not endeavour to obtain intellectual perception. Nor does intelligence pertain to this nature; for the addition of it would not increase its excellence. Hence, it has not any sensation of itself, since it is not in want of it. Nor is it two things. Or, rather, it would be more than two things if it was intelligence. For if it were, it would be necessary to add a third thing, viz. the intelligible [or object of intellectual perception]. If, however, intellect, intelligence, and the intelligible are one and the same thing, in consequence of becoming one, they will be indistinctly mingled with each other. But if they are distinguished, so that one of them is separate from the other, again, they will not be that supreme nature, *the good*. Hence, it is requisite entirely to dismiss all other things in the contemplation of this most excellent

<sup>a</sup> *i. e.* Being intelligible; for this is beyond intellect. Hence, Orpheus says of Phanes, who subsists at the extremity of the *intelligible* triad, that "he feeds in his heart, *i. e.* his mind, swift *eyeless* Love," ἀνομματον ὠκυν Ἐρωτα.

<sup>b</sup> In the original, εἰ οὖν τὸ φῶς τὸ νοεῖν; but immediately after τὸ νοεῖν, it is necessary to add ζητεῖ, conformably to the above translation. And this is confirmed by the version of Ficinus, which is, "Si ergo intelligentiæ nixus quærit lumen."

nature, which is not in want of any aid. For you diminish that nature which is not in want of anything by any addition which you make to it. To us, indeed, intelligence is beautiful, because soul requires the possession of intellect. It is also beautiful to intellect, because intelligence is the same thing with its existence, and causes it to be what it is. It is necessary, indeed, that intellect should be conjoined with intelligence, and should always receive a conscious perception of itself, and that these two things in it should be one. If, however, it was one thing alone, it would be sufficient to itself, nor would it be in want of receiving anything else. For the mandate, "Know thyself," was delivered to those, *who, on account of the multitude which they possess*<sup>a</sup>, find it requisite to enumerate themselves, and in order that by knowing the number and quality of the things contained in their essence, they may perceive that they have not a knowledge of all things, or, indeed, of anything [which they ought to know], and who are ignorant over what they ought to rule, and what is the characteristic of their nature. If, however, anything is present with *the good*, it is present with it in a way transcending knowledge and intelligence, and a cosensation of itself, since it has not anything different from itself. For it introduces no-

<sup>a</sup> This passage in the original is, *οι δια το πληθος εαυτον*. But the sense requires that for *εαυτον* we should read *εαυτων*, conformably to the above translation. And this emendation is confirmed by the version of Ficinus.

thing into itself, but is sufficient to itself. Hence, neither is it *good* to itself, but to other things, For these are in want of it; but *the good* is not in want of itself, since this would be ridiculous. For thus it would be indigent of itself. Neither, therefore, does it behold itself: for if it did, it would be requisite that there should be a certain thing, and this produced in it from the survey of itself. For all these consequences must be conceded to the natures posterior to it. It appears, also, that nothing which is present with other things, is present with it, as neither is essence. Hence, neither is intellectual perception present with it, since with the existence of this there is essence, and at the same time both are the first intelligence, and this properly so denominated. On this account [Plato says in the Parmenides, speaking of *the one*,] that neither language can describe, nor sense, nor science apprehend it, because nothing can be predicated of it as present with it<sup>a</sup>. (p. 733.)

<sup>a</sup> See a most beautiful confirmation of what is said by Plotinus in these extracts respecting *the one* or *the good*, in the Additional Notes to the 3rd volume of my Plato, from Damascius *περι αρχων*.



## ADDITIONAL NOTES,

EXTRACTED FROM

### PORPHYRY'S AUXILIARIES TO THE PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES.

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EVERYTHING which is situated somewhere, is there situated according to its own nature, and not preternaturally. For body, therefore, which subsists in matter and bulk, to be somewhere, is to be in place. Hence, for the body of the world, which is material and has bulk, to be everywhere, is to be extended with interval, and to subsist in the place of interval. But a subsistence in place is not at all present with the intelligible world, nor, in short, with that which is immaterial, and essentially incorporeal, because it is without bulk, and without interval; so that the ubiquity of an incorporeal nature is not local. Hence, neither will one part of it be here, but another there; for if this were the case, it would not be out of place, nor without interval; but wherever it is, the whole of it is there. Nor is it indeed in this, but not in another place; for thus it would be comprehended by one place, but separated from another. Nor is it remote from this thing, but near to that; in the same manner as remoteness and nearness are asserted of things

which are adapted to be in place, according to the measures of intervals. Hence, the sensible is present, indeed, with the intelligible world, according to interval, but [a truly] incorporeal nature is present with the world impartibly, and unaccompanied by interval. The impartible, likewise, when it is in that which has interval, is wholly in every part of it, being one and the same in number [in every part of it]. That which is impartible, therefore, and without multitude, becomes extended into magnitude, and multiplied, when intimately connected with that which is naturally multitudinous, and endued with magnitude; and thus the latter receives the former in such a way as it is adapted to receive it, and not such as the former truly is. But that which is partible and multitudinous, is received by that which is naturally impartible and without multitude, impartibly and non-multitudinously, and after this manner is present with it; *i. e.* the impartible is present impartibly, without plurality, and without a subsistence in place, conformably to its own nature, with that which is partible, and which is naturally multitudinous, and exists in place. But that which is partible, multiplied, and in place, is present with the impartible essence, partibly, multitudinously, and locally. Hence, it is necessary, in the survey of these natures, to preserve and not confound the peculiarities of each; or rather, we should not imagine or opine of that which is incorporeal, such properties as pertain to bodies, or anything of the like kind.

For no one would ascribe to bodies the peculiarities of a genuinely incorporeal essence. For all of us are familiar with bodies; but the knowledge of incorporeal natures is attainable by us with great difficulty; because, through not being able to behold them intuitively, we are involved in doubt about their nature, and this takes place as long as we are under the dominion of imagination.

Thus, therefore, you should say, If that which is in place, is out of, or has departed from itself, through having proceeded into bulk, that which is intelligible is not in place, and is in itself, because it has not proceeded into corporeal extension. Hence, if the former is an image, the latter is an archetype. And the former, indeed, derives its being through the intelligible; but the latter subsists in [and through] itself. For every [physical] image is the image of intellect. It is also requisite that, calling to mind the peculiarities of both these, we should not wonder at the discrepance which takes place in their congress with each other; if, in short, it is proper on this occasion to use the word congress. For we are not now surveying the congress of bodies, but of things which are entirely distinct from each other, according to peculiarity of hypostasis. Hence, also, this congress is different from everything which is usually surveyed in things essentially the same. Neither, therefore, is it temperament, or mixture, or conjunction, or apposition, but subsists in a way different from all these; appearing, indeed, in all the mutual par-

participations of consubstantial natures, in whatever way this may be effected, but transcending everything that falls under the apprehension of sense. Hence, an intelligible essence is wholly present without interval, with all the parts of that which has interval, though they should happen to be infinite in number. - Nor is it present distributed into parts, giving a part to a part; nor, being multiplied, does it multitudinously impart itself to multitude; but it is wholly present with the parts of that which is extended into bulk, and with each individual of the multitude, and all the bulk impartibly, and without plurality, and as numerically one. But it pertains to those natures to enjoy it partibly, and in a distributed manner, whose power is dissipated into different parts. And to these it frequently happens, that through a defect of their own nature, they counterfeit an intelligible essence; so that doubts arise respecting that essence, which appears to have passed from its own nature into theirs.

Truly existing being is neither great nor small, for magnitude and parvitude are properly the peculiarities of bulk. But true being transcends both magnitude and parvitude; and is above the greatest, and above the least; and is numerically one and the same, though it is found to be simultaneously participated by everything that is greatest, and everything that is least. "You must not, therefore, conceive of it as something which is greatest; as you will then be dubious how, being that which is

greatest, it is present with the smallest masses, without being diminished or contracted. Nor must you conceive of it as something which is least; since you will thus again be dubious how, being that which is least, it is present with the greatest masses, without being multiplied or increased, or without receiving addition. But at one and the same time receiving into the greatest magnitude that which transcends the greatest bulk, and into the least magnitude that which transcends the least<sup>a</sup>, you will be able to conceive how the same thing, abiding in itself, may be simultaneously seen in any casual magnitude, and in infinite multitudes and corporeal masses. For according to its own peculiarity, it is present with the magnitude of the world impartibly and without magnitude. It also antecedes the bulk of the world, and comprehends every part of it, in its own impartibility; just as, *vice versá*, the world, by its multitude of parts, is multifariously present, as far as it is able with truly existing being, yet cannot comprehend it, neither with the whole of its bulk, nor the whole of its power; but meets with it in all its parts as that

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *αλλά το εκβιβηκος τον μεγιστον ογκον, εις το μεγιστον, και τον ελαχιστον εις το ελαχιστον, αμα λαβων, κ.τ.λ.* This Holstenius most erroneously translates, "Verum id quod maximam molem intervallo maximo, et minimam minimo excedit simul sumens, &c." For a truly incorporeal nature, such as that of which Porphyry is now speaking, has nothing to do with interval, and, therefore, does not by interval surpass either the greatest or the least corporeal mass; but is received transcendently by the greatest and the least magnitude.

which is infinite, and cannot be passed beyond; and this both in other respects, and because truly existing being is entirely free from all corporeal extension.

That which is greater in bulk, is less in power, when compared, not with things of a similar kind, but with those that are of a different species, or of a different essence. For bulk is, as it were, the departure of a thing from itself, and a division of power into the smallest parts. Hence, that which transcends in power, is foreign from all bulk. For power proceeding into itself, is filled with itself, and, by corroborating itself, obtains its proper strength; on which account, body proceeding into bulk through a diminution of power, is as much remote from truly incorporeal being, as that which truly exists is from being exhausted by bulk; for the latter abides in the magnitude of the same power through an exemption from bulk. As, therefore, truly existing being is, with reference to a corporeal mass, without magnitude and without bulk; thus, also, that which is corporeal is, with reference to truly existing being, imbecile and powerless. For that which is greatest by magnitude of power, is exempt from all bulk; so that the world existing everywhere, and, as it is said, meeting with real being which is truly everywhere, is not able to comprehend the magnitude of its power. It meets, however, with true being, which is not partibly present with it, but is present without magnitude, and without any definite limi-

tation. The presence, therefore, of truly existing being with the world, is not local but assimilative, so far as it is possible for body to be assimilated to that which is incorporeal, and for that which is incorporeal to be surveyed in a body assimilated to it. Hence, an incorporeal nature is not present with body, so far as it is not possible for that which is material to be assimilated to a perfectly immaterial nature; and it is present, so far as a corporeal can be assimilated to an incorporeal essence. Nevertheless, this is not effected through reception; since, if it were, each would be corrupted. For the material, indeed, in receiving the immaterial nature, would be corrupted through being changed into it; and the immaterial essence would become material. Assimilations, therefore, and participations of powers, and the deficiency of power, proceed into things which are thus different in essence, from each other, into each other. The world, therefore, is very far from possessing the power of real being; and real being is very remote from the imbecility of a material nature. But that which subsists between these, assimilating and being assimilated, and conjoining the extremes to each other, becomes the cause of deception about the extremes, in consequence of applying, through the assimilation, the one to the other.

Truly existing being is said to be many things, not by a subsistence in different places, nor in the measures of bulk, nor by coacervation, nor by the

circumscriptions or comprehensions<sup>a</sup> of divisible parts, but by a difference which is immaterial, without bulk, and without plurality, and which is divided according to multitude. Hence, also, it is one; not as one body, nor as in one place; nor as one bulk; nor as one which is many things; because it is different so far as it is one, and its difference is both divided and united. For its difference is not externally acquired, nor adscititious, nor obtained through the participation of something else, but it is many things from itself. For, remaining one, it energises with all energies, because, through sameness, it constitutes all difference; not being surveyed in the difference of one thing with respect to another, as is the case in bodies. For, on the contrary, in these unity subsists in difference; because diversity has in them a precedaneous existence; but the unity which they contain is externally and adscititiously derived. For in truly existing being, indeed, unity and sameness precede; but difference is generated from this unity being energetic. *Hence, true being is multiplied in impartibility; but body is united in multitude and bulk.* The former, also, is established in itself, subsisting in itself according to unity; but the latter is never in itself, because it receives its hypostasis in an extension of existence. The former, therefore, is an all-energetic one; but the latter is an united multitude. Hence, it is requisite to ex-

<sup>a</sup> For *διαληψισιν*, here, I read *καταληψισιν*, and Holstenius also has in this place *comprehensionibus*.



plore how the former is one and different; and, again, how the latter is multitude and one. Nor must we transfer the peculiarities of the one to those which pertain to the other.

The ancients, wishing to exhibit to us the peculiarity of incorporeal being, so far as this can be effected by words, when they assert that it is one, immediately add, that it is likewise all things; by which they signified that it is not some one<sup>a</sup> of the things which are known by the senses. Since, however, we suspect that this incorporeal one is different from sensibles, in consequence of not perceiving this total one, which is all things according to one, in a sensible nature, and which is so because this one is all things;—hence the ancients added, that *it is one so far as one*; in order that we might understand that what is all things in truly existing being, is something uncompounded, and that we might withdraw ourselves from the conception of a coacervation. When, likewise, they say that it is everywhere, they add, that it is nowhere. When, also, they assert that it is in all things, they add, that it is nowhere in everything. Thus, too, when they say, that it is in all things, and in every divisible nature which is adapted to receive it, they add, that it is a whole in a whole.

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *καθὸ ἐν τι τῶν κατ' αἰσθησιν συνεγνωσμένων*; but it appears to me to be necessary, after *καθὸ*, to insert the words *οὐκ ἔστιν*. For incorporeal being is not like some one of the things which are known by the senses, because no one of these is one, and, at the same time, all things. Holstenius did not perceive the necessity of this emendation, as is evident from his version of the passage.

And, in short, they render it manifest to us through contrary peculiarities; at one and the same time assuming these, in order that we may exterminate, from the apprehension of it, the fictitious conceptions which are derived from bodies, and which obscure the cognoscible peculiarities of real being.

When you have assumed an eternal essence, infinite in itself according to power, and begin to perceive intellectually an hypostasis unwearied, untamed, and never-failing, but transcending in the most pure and genuine life, and full from itself; and which is likewise established in itself, satisfied with, and seeking nothing but itself;—to this essence, if you add a subsistence in place, or a relation to a certain thing, at the same time that you [appear to] diminish it, by ascribing to it an indigence of place, or a relative condition of being, you do not [in reality] diminish this essence, but you separate yourself from the perception of it, by receiving as a veil the phantasy which runs under your conjectural apprehension of it. For you cannot pass beyond, or stop, or render more perfect, or effect the least change in a thing of this kind, because it is impossible for it to be in the smallest degree deficient. For it is much more never-failing than any perpetually flowing fountain can be conceived to be. If, however, you are unable to keep pace with it, and to become assimilated to the intelligible all, you should not investigate anything not pertaining to real being; or, if you do, you will deviate from the path that leads to it, and will

look to something else. But if you investigate nothing else, being established in yourself and your own essence, you will be assimilated to the intelligible universe, and will not adhere to anything posterior to it. Neither, therefore, should you say, I am of a great magnitude. For, omitting this greatness, you will become universal; though you were universal prior to this. But, together with the universal, something else was present with you, and you became less by the addition, because the addition was not from truly existing being. For to that you cannot add anything. When, therefore, anything is added from non-being, a place is afforded to Poverty as an associate, accompanied by an indigence of all things. Hence, dismissing non-being, you will then become sufficient to yourself<sup>a</sup>. For he will not return properly to himself who does not dismiss things of a more vile and abject nature, and who opines himself to be something naturally small, and not to be such as he truly is. For thus he, at one and the same time, departs both from himself and from truly existing being. When, also, any one is present with that which is present in himself, then he is present with true being, which is everywhere. But when you withdraw from yourself, then, likewise, you recede from real being;—of such great consequence is it for a man to be present with that which is present with

<sup>a</sup> Immediately after this something is wanting in the original, (as is evident from the asterisks,) which, as it appears to me, no conjecture can appropriately supply.

himself, [*i. e.* with his rational part,] and to be absent from that which is external to him.

If, however, true being is present with us, but non-being is absent, and real being is not present with us in conjunction with other things [of a nature foreign to it], it does not accede in order that it may be present, but we depart from it when it is not present [with things of a different nature]. And why should this be considered as wonderful? For you when present are not absent from yourself; and yet you are not [wholly] present with yourself, though present. And you are both present with and absent from yourself when you survey other things, and omit to behold yourself. If, therefore, you are thus present, and yet not [in reality] present with yourself, and on this account are ignorant of yourself, and in a greater degree discover all things, though remote from your essence, than yourself, with which you are naturally present, why should you wonder if that which is present is remote from you who are remote from it, because you have become remote from yourself? For, by how much the more you are [truly] present with yourself, though it is present, and inseparably conjoined with you, by so much the more will you be present with real being, which is so essentially united to you, that it is as impossible for it to be divulsed from you, as for you to be separated from yourself. So that it is universally possible to know what is present with real being, and what is absent from it, though it is everywhere present, and, again, is also nowhere.

For those who are able to proceed into their own essence intellectually, and to obtain a knowledge of it, will, in the knowledge itself, and the science accompanying this knowledge, be able to recover or regain themselves, through the union of that which knows with that which is known. And with those who are present with themselves, truly existing being will also be present. But from such as abandon the proper being of themselves to other things,—from these, as they are absent from themselves, true being will also be absent. If, however, we are naturally adapted to be established in the same essence, to be rich from ourselves, and not to descend to that which we are not; in so doing becoming in want of ourselves, and thus, again, associating with Poverty, though Porus<sup>a</sup> [or Plenty] is present;—and if we are cut off from real being, from which we are not separated either by place or essence, nor by anything else, through our conversion to non-being, we suffer as a just punishment of our abandonment of true being, a departure from, and ignorance of, ourselves. And, again, by a proper attention to, we recover ourselves, and become united to divinity. It is, therefore, rightly said, that the soul is confined in body as in a prison, and is there detained in chains like a fugitive

<sup>a</sup> In the original, *και δια τουτων παλιν τη πεινιη συνειναι, και περ παροντος αυτου*; but for *αυτου* I read *πορου*, as it appears to me that Porphyry is here alluding to what is said by Diotima, in the Banquet of Plato, concerning the parents of Love, viz. that they are *Poverly*, and *Porus*, or *Plenty*.

slave<sup>a</sup>. We should, however, [earnestly] endeavour to be liberated from our bonds. For, through being converted to these sensible objects, we desert ourselves, though we are of a divine origin, and are, as Empedocles says,

Heaven's exiles, straying from the orb of light.

So that every depraved life is full of servitude; and on this account is without God and unjust, the spirit in it being full of impiety, and consequently of injustice. And thus, again, it is rightly said, that justice is to be found in the performance of that which is the province of him who performs it. The image, also, of true justice consists in distributing to each of those with whom we live, that which is due to the desert of each.

That which possesses its existence in another [*i. e.* in something different from itself], and is not essentialised in itself, separably from another, if it should be converted to itself, in order to know itself, without that in which it is essentialised withdrawing itself from it, would be corrupted by this knowledge, in consequence of separating itself from its essence. But that which is able to know itself without the subject in which it exists, and is able to withdraw itself from this subject, without the destruction of itself, cannot be essentialised in that, from which it is capable of converting itself to

<sup>a</sup> See the Phædo of Plato. But something is here wanting in the original, as is evident not only from the asterisks, but from the want of connexion in the words themselves.

itself, without being corrupted, and of knowing itself by its own energies. Hence, if sight, and every sensitive power, neither perceives itself, nor apprehends or preserves itself by separating itself from body; but intellect, when it separates itself from body, then especially perceives intellectually, is converted to itself, and is not corrupted;—it is evident that the sensitive powers obtain the power [they possess by] energising through the body; but that intellect possesses its energies and its essence not in body, but in itself.

Incorporeal natures are properly denominated, and conceived to be what they are, according to a privation of body; just as, according to the ancients, matter, and the form which is in matter, and also natures and [physical] powers, are apprehended by an abstraction from matter. And after the same manner place, time, and the boundaries of things are apprehended. For all such things are denominated according to a privation of body. There are, likewise, other things which are said to be incorporeal improperly, not according to a privation of body, but, in short, because they are not naturally adapted to generate body<sup>a</sup>. Hence those of the former signification subsist in bodies; but those of the second are perfectly separated from bodies,

<sup>a</sup> *i. e.* They are not adapted to be the immediate causes of body, because they are perfectly separated from it. The original is, *ἤδη δὲ ἢ ἀλλὰ καταχρηστικῶς λεγόμενα ἀσώματα, οὐ κατὰ στέρησιν σώματος, κατὰ δὲ ὅλως μὴ πεφικέναι γεννᾶν σῶμα.* Holstenius, not understanding what is here said by Porphyry, translates the words *κατὰ*

and from those incorporeal natures which subsist about bodies. For bodies, indeed, are in place, and boundaries are in body. But intellect, and intellectual reason, neither subsist in place nor in body; nor proximately give existence to bodies, nor subsist together with bodies, or with those incorporeal natures which are denominated according to a privation of bodies. Neither, therefore, if a certain incorporeal vacuum should be conceived to exist, would it be possible for intellect to be in a vacuum. For a vacuum may be the recipient of body; but it is impossible that it should be the recipient of intellect, and afford a place for its energy. Since, however, the genus of an incorporeal nature appears to be twofold, one of these the followers of Zeno do not at all admit, but they adopt the other; and perceiving that the former is not such as the latter, they entirely subvert it, though they ought rather to conceive that it is of another genus, and not to fancy that, because it is not the latter, it has no existence.

*δι' ολως μη περιουκιναι γενναν σωμα, "sed quod nullum omnino corpus generare possunt."* For Porphyry, as is evident from what immediately follows, is here speaking of natures which are perfectly separated from bodies, and which are, therefore, not naturally adapted to be the immediate generators of them, not through any deficiency, but through transcendency of power.



The two following Propositions also are added from the Theological Elements of Proclus, as a further elucidation of what is said by Plotinus in the preceding books respecting *truly existing being*.

PROPOSITION 86.

Everything which is *truly being* (*ὄντως ὄν*) is infinite, neither according to multitude, nor according to magnitude, but according to power alone.

For every infinite, is either in discrete, or in continued quantity, or in power. *But that which always is, is infinite, as having an inextinguishable life, a never-failing essence, and an undiminished energy.* That which is eternally being, however, is neither infinite on account of magnitude,—for that which is truly being is without magnitude, *for it is self-subsistent*<sup>a</sup>; since everything self-subsistent is impartible and simple,—nor is it infinite on account of multitude; for it has in the most eminent degree the form of *the one*, as being ar-

<sup>a</sup> For everything which is truly existing being is of an intellectual nature, and is, therefore, converted to itself; and if this be the case, it is self-subsistent. For if it is converted to itself according to nature, it is perfect in the conversion to itself, and will possess essence from itself. *For to everything, essential progression is from that to which conversion according to nature is directed.* If, therefore, it imparts well-being to itself, it will likewise undoubtedly impart being to itself, and will be the lord of its own hypostasis. Hence, that which is able to revert to itself, is self-subsistent. See Proclus's Elements of Theology, Prop. 43. Hence, the rational soul is self-subsistent; for it is naturally converted to itself. Those who have not been disciplined in the philosophy of Plato, will not be willing to admit that anything, except the first cause, is self-sub-

ranged most near, and being most allied to it. But it is infinite according to power. Hence it is also impartible and infinite. And by how much the more it is one and impartible, by so much the more is it infinite. For the power which is divided becomes imbecile and finite, and powers which are entirely divided are in every respect finite. For ultimate powers, and which are most remote from *the one*, are in a certain respect finite on account of their distribution into parts. But first powers, on account of their impartibility, are infinite. For a separation into parts divulses and dissolves the power of everything. But impartibility, compressing and contracting that which it contains, renders it never-failing, and undiminished in itself.

Moreover, infinity according to magnitude, and also according to multitude, is entirely a privation and falling off from impartibility. For that which is finite is most near to the impartible; but the in-

sistent. To such as these, it will be sufficient to reply with Proclus, that "either there is nothing self-subsistent, or *the good* (which is the same as *the one*,) is a thing of this kind, or the first things that subsist from *the good*. But if there is nothing self-subsistent, there will not, in reality, be in anything self-sufficiency (or an essence sufficient to itself). Nor will it be in *the good*, since being *the one* it is better than self-sufficiency. It is also *the good itself*, and not that which possesses *the good*. But if *the good* was self-subsistent, in consequence of itself producing itself, it will not be *the one*. For that which proceeds from *the one*, is not *the one*. And it would proceed from itself, if it was self-subsistent; so that *the one* would at the same time be one and not one. See Prop. 40. of the Theological Elements of Proclus.

finite is most remote from it, entirely departing from *the one*. Hence that which is infinite according to power, is not infinite either according to multitude or magnitude, since infinite power subsists in conjunction with impartibility. But the infinite either in multitude or magnitude is most remote from the impartible. If, therefore, that which is truly being was infinite either in magnitude or multitude, it would not possess infinite power. It does, however, possess infinite power; and, therefore, is not infinite either according to multitude or according to magnitude.

PROPOSITION 98.

Every separate cause<sup>a</sup> is at one and the same time everywhere and nowhere.

For by the communication of its own power it is everywhere; since this is a cause which replenishes the natures that are naturally adapted to participate of it, rules over all secondary beings, and is present with all things by the prolific progressions of its illuminations. But by an essence unmingled with things in place, and by its exempt purity, it is nowhere. For if it is separate, it is established above all [subordinate] things. In a similar manner, also, it is in no one of the natures inferior to itself. For if it was alone everywhere, it would not, indeed, be prevented from being a cause, and from subsisting in all its participants. But it would not be prior to all of them in a separate manner.

<sup>a</sup> And such is *truly existing being*.

If, also, it was nowhere, without being everywhere, it would not, indeed, be prevented from being prior to all things, and from being nothing pertaining to subordinate natures; but it would not be in all things, as causes are naturally adapted to be in their effects by the abundant and unenvying communications of themselves. In order therefore that, existing as a cause, it may be in all things that are able to partake of it, and that, being separate in itself, it may be prior to all the natures that are filled by it, it is everywhere, and at the same time nowhere.

And it is not, indeed, partly everywhere and partly nowhere. For thus it would be divulged and separate from itself, if one part of it was everywhere in all things, but another was nowhere, and prior to all things. But the whole of it is everywhere, and in a similar manner nowhere. For the things which are able to participate of it meet with the whole of it, and find the whole present with themselves, though at the same time it is wholly exempt from them. For the participant does not place the separate cause in itself, but participates of it as much as it is capable of receiving. Nor in the communication of itself does it become contracted by the multitude of the participations of it; for it is separate. Nor do its participants participate of it defectively; for that which it imparts is everywhere.

THE END.

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