

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Thoughts in theology

John Sheppard

THOUGHTS IN THEOLOGY.

Thoughts in Theology.

I. CHRISTIAN THEISM ARGUED FROM ORGANIZED LIFE AND FOSSIL OSTEOLOGY.

II. ARGUMENT FROM THEISM FOR A FUTURE LIFE.

III. THE REUNION AND RECOGNITION OF CHRISTIANS IN THE LIFE TO COME.

IV. THE RIGHT LOVE OF CREATURES AND OF THE CREATOR.

V. THE EXCELLENCIES AND CONSOLATIONS OF DIVINE PHILOSOPHY.

BY

JOHN SHEPPARD,

AUTHOR OF "THOUGHTS ON PRIVATE DEVOTION," "AN AUTUMN DREAM," ETC.

"ταύτην μόνην εὕρισκον φιλοσοφίαν ἀσφαλῆ τε καὶ σύμφορον. βουλοίμην δ' ἂν καὶ πάντας, ἴσον ἐμοὶ θυμὸν ποιησαμένους, μὴ ἀφίστασθαι τῶν τοῦ σωτῆρος λόγων."—JUSTIN MARTYR, Dialog. p. 152.

"Si la miséricorde de Dieu est si grande qu'il nous instruit salutairement, même lorsqu'il se cache, quelle lumière n'en devons-nous pas attendre lorsqu'il se découvre?"—PASCAL.

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To

S. A. D. S.

Friend—through twelve fleeting years of life most dear,
And then united in that happier bond
Where tender friendship merg'd in tenderest love,—
Accept these pages.—'Tis my joy to tell
That of the thoughts which thus I preface, most
Have ow'd their rise to you: were first drawn forth
In our past converse, from the exhaustless mine
Of earnest, deep, reciprocal regard.

And so it well behoov'd; nay, must not such
Have needs been thence proceeding?—Faithful, pure
Affection,—strengthening as the years steal on,—
Must it not thus have urg'd my pensive soul
With strong presentient impulses, to muse
On the great parting?—silently to explore,
With love's own deepfelt warm solicitude,
Those touching questions,—Shall "Reunion" be,
Or "Recognition," for dissevered hearts?

And when this love, through many a change and pang,
In Christian bosoms glows, and grows,—despite
All chills and all preventions,—must it not
Wake the grave query—Can love thus subsist,
And still, midst varied obstacles, augment,—

Without "Idolatry"—rather, with more
Enhanc'd devoted faithfulness toward Him,
The Guardian-Guide, whose kind paternal arm
Hath led—then join'd us in these hallow'd bands
Now thrice six years unbroken?

Thus, belov'd,
Forget not that the happiest of these thoughts
Are in some sense your *own.*—If other minds
Glean thence aught good and welcome,—be it felt
They owe the gain to *you.*—And if "the world,"—
So prone to cursory judgments and severe—
Pronounce your generous love for my old age
A self-forgetful foible,—let them know
That, at the least, these words, which may refresh
And solace some, have been the fruits matur'd
By your unselfish kindness.

Tell them, dear one,
Now,—and again perchance when he you love
Is absent—through the lonely vale upheld,
Yet "not alone,"—to the mysterious gate
Of death—that lowly porch to light and joy,—
Tell them, those lines which love once dictated,
Shall then still solace *you;* shall bear you on
To meet new grief in calm well-doing; till
(When swift-wing'd noiseless time hath glided by,
In sadness, yet in patient hope serene,)
You wake—to meet your own departed one,
Where sudden wonder—for the instant, each
O'erwhelming,—half annihilates the joy.
If then a portion of these pages speak
Of love celestial, and of holy peace—
If they may soothe or calm some desolate heart,
Impel one loiterer toward exalted aims,—

Or guide one wanderer to a Saviour's rest,—
Remember, they are *yours*; 'twas your prolong'd
Affection which educ'd these late essàys.
Less animate indeed, less rife with thought
Diverse,—and less with figurative tints
Reliev'd, than those of life's more fervid prime.
But yet, belov'd one, in the fainter lines
Or unadorn'd, there breathes no less, I trust,
Of Heaven's own truth.—The later rill may flow
Less sparklingly,—yet from its stiller wave
With steadier light reflect the healing beam
Of that true Dayspring,—and in mirror calm
Give forth pale glimpses of the upper joys.

O dearest, when this pulse has ceas'd to beat,
This eye to gaze in gentleness, this hand
To trace a true love's symbols,—let the words
Which were first trac'd for *you*, be yet the pledge—
Surviving through your days, with import clear
In thought-embalming types—that your old friend
And fond associate liv'd, and wrote, and died,
Trusting in God: still grasping the "good hope
Through grace" to meet you near his Saviour's throne,
In deathless oneness with his Lord and yours,
And pure immortal oneness, love, with you!

PREFACE.

As we draw nearer to the mysterious close of this transient life, the great things of God, and of a world unseen, ought to interest us more and more profoundly; and, while added years convince us but the more fully of the exceeding narrowness of our knowledge concerning an infinite Creator, and an immense futurity, they show us, with a proportionate force, the value of such kinds and degrees of knowledge as He has *revealed* to us.

If, with our peculiar advantages, we still know but "in part," and are even yet constrained to say, "how little a portion,"—then how incomparably less, must we be conscious, would that portion have been, had we been left in the dim twilight of unassisted reason. But, in order to collect and exercise, if not increase, our measure of revealed knowledge, we must continue to search the Scriptures, and to meditate the truths

deducible from them, in connexion with the works of creation, and the constitution and history of man. Although this has been the study of far superior minds, it may, we trust, be still prosecuted by ourselves, if in a right spirit, with some hope of profit.

The writer is not entitled or inclined to say with Pascal, "qu'on ne dise pas que je n'ai rien dit de nouveau; la disposition des matières est nouvelle." He feels that nothing new, properly speaking, may be here elicited or adduced; and is only encouraged by the belief that, within a certain circle, old truths and hopes, discussed by one known and remembered, may have kinder welcome, and more indulgent acceptance, than as if treated of by a stranger's pen. Such is his excuse for re-publishing thoughts, to the defects of which he is unfeignedly sensible.

If they yield any consolation or beneficial suggestion to a single friend, especially when the writer shall have vanished from the scenes and interviews of time,—their inferiority to many productions of others ought not painfully to affect him.

There is more relation between the subjects

of these Essays, than may, at first view be observed.

The *first* is an argument *for* that greatest of all truths, which the universe so variously teaches, and which all written revelation pre-supposes or assumes,—the existence and attributes of God.

The *second* argues *from* that primal truth, the prospect of a future life.

The *third* proceeds to show that this future life will be social, and will involve reunion and recognition of the happy.

But if Christian love and friendship, in conjunction with supreme devotedness to God, are to be perpetuated hereafter, then it must be of great moment to learn what the *fourth* Essay attempts to show (as the proper consequents of those truths), namely, how the sentiments of love to God and love to man should be cherished and regulated. The last Essay inculcates the vast importance and value of this Divine philosophy.

Thus, although the subject and the style of these papers differ, such a connexion, it is hoped, will be found between them, as the intelligent reader would desire.

In re-publishing here the chief part of a volume

entitled, "Three Essays," now out of print,[1] that on "Christian Conversation" is omitted; and there is added, the substance of a lecture on "Christian Theism,"[2] now forming the first Essay; also a "Letter to Lord Brougham," published anonymously in 1840, now the fifth Essay. The answer from the late Lord Brougham, now appended to it, was till since his decease seen by no one; but both the "Letter" and the "Lecture" are so much akin to the "Essays" in subject and aim, as to be fitly joined with them. The manner and spirit in which Lord Brougham accepted both, will have more interest for thoughtful readers than any words of the present writer can have. His answers therefore are annexed, although it should seem egotism to introduce them. The writer is too near the close of a very long life, to be greatly moved by approval or

[1] They appeared as a second edition in 1853; but as the first and fifth of the present Essays have only been published once, the whole is named a second edition only. The new title is adopted as more descriptive of the scope and character of the volume.

[2] Addressed to the Frome Institution, and inscribed to the Rev. J. S. H. Horner, who had presented that Institution with a valuable museum.

disapproval, except to a deeper sense of manifold defects, and a more earnest prayer that these pages may, in their small measure, incline others to embrace, or to lay firmer hold on, revealed mercy and eternal life.

Perhaps the special and frequent references, in the first Essay, to the work entitled "Vestiges, etc.," may be deemed rather out of date, now that the treatises of Mr. Darwin and other men of science have more lately drawn attention and called forth discussion. But the theory of the "Vestiges" in its *fundamental* principles—the formation of all species by successive developments, and the unalterable constancy of general laws,—is substantially the same with those of the later writers, however else they may differ. The Essay investigates those main points only; and would have equally done so, if it had been attempted to criticise *subsequent* works of the kind.

Should any comment be made on the dialogue-form adopted in the fourth Essay, it may suffice as an apology with the studious reader to remind him of some of the chief treatises of Greek and Roman antiquity; and, among moderns, of

Bishop Berkeley's "Alciphron," or "Minute Philosopher." A more recent instance is that of Lord Brougham, who introduced "Dialogues on Instinct," among his valuable "Dissertations on Subjects of Science connected with Natural Theology."

It may appear to some very self-important, to prefix an abstract of contents, and subjoin an index, to so small a volume. But the writer considers it more requisite than ever, in days when most books will be rather consulted than read, to supply all facilities for reference. He even wishes that this practice could be secured by limiting the privileges of copyright to such works as shall have an alphabetical Index, and also an analytical table of Contents, noting against *each particular* clause of the latter the page to which that clause refers.

CONTENTS.

ESSAY I.

CHRISTIAN THEISM ARGUED FROM ORGANIZED LIFE AND FOSSIL OSTEOLOGY, pp. 3-62.

Tendencies to atheism, 3-7.—Argument for creative acts, 8.—Ancient theories of development, 9.—Revived in the "Vestiges," 10.—"Law" means Divine volition, 11, 12.—Atheistic view of law, 13.—Human mechanist, 15, 16.—First cause requisite, 17.—Creation of man later than of the early strata, 18, 19.—No proofs of transmutation, 19, 20.—Notion of man's rise from lower species, 20-22.—Anaximander, 24.—Man's lineage, 25, 26—Man's creation, a miracle, 27-29.—Reproduction a creation, 30, 31;—but production of new races a greater miracle, 32-35.—Diderot, 36.—Need of revelation, 37.—Miracles less improbable than some think, 38-41.—The Christian less so than those of creation, 42-44.—Higher motives for them, 44, 45.—Their lofty purposes, 46, 47.—Their object sublime, 48.—High probability warrants action, 50-52, and 54-55.—Combined improbabilities of religion being *not* true, 52, 53.—Probability sometimes cumulative, 57.—Value of Divine truth, 58.—Wretchedness of scepticism, 59.—Happiness of faith in God, 60-62.

ESSAY II.

ARGUMENT FROM THEISM FOR A FUTURE LIFE, pp. 65-79.

One argument only to be adduced here, 65.—Confirmative arguments have their value, 66.—Denial of future life involves atheism, 67.—Christian benevolence wills the endless good of others, 67.—If no future life, the Creator wills *not* this, 68, 69.—This would set the philanthropist above his Maker, 70, 71.—Objection to the argument, and answer, 71, 72.—The denial destroys all hope of moral per-

fection, 73, 74.—The will to do good the divinest of al qualities, 75.—Denial of it in God involves atheism, 76, 77. —Future life not necessarily happy, 78.—Importance of Christian hope, 79.

ESSAY III.

REUNION AND RECOGNITION OF CHRISTIANS IN THE LIFE TO COME, pp. 83–177.

SECTION I.

PRESUMPTIVE ARGUMENTS FOR IT, pp. 83–108.

Revelation assumes some prior knowledge of truth and duty, 83, 84.—Heathens had such, 84.—New Testament assumes more, and does not supply all we might expect, 85, 86.—Doubts of recognition and reunion not to be allowed, even were these prospects not disclosed, 87.—Scepticism of some heathen does not disprove general expectation, 88, 89, and 104.—Indications of this from ancient poets, 90–92.—Ancient philosophers, 93–99.—Modern heathen, 100–104.—Arguments from prevalent belief, 105.—Objections answered, 107, 108.

SECTION II.

SCRIPTURAL GROUNDS, pp. 109–136.

Revelation a uniting scheme, 109.—Purpose of Christ's mission, (1) To form a society, 110–112.—(2) A close spiritual relation, 113, 114.—(3) Expressed by strongest figures, 115–117. —(4) References to future *assembling*, 117–119.—(5) To future *abode* with Christ and each other, 120–122.—(6) Old Testament implies the same, 122–126.—(7) New Testament expresses warmest sympathy, and as extending to future life, 126–130.—(8) The Eucharist and its promised continuance, 130–133.—To deny future society impossible, to deny love absurd, 134–136.

SECTION III.

INFERENCES FROM SCRIPTURAL GROUNDS, pp. 137–147.

Objection that the above arguments do not strictly prove *recognition*, 137, 138.—But society and love being proved,

we have only to prove reminiscence, 138.—*Self*-reminiscence unquestionable, 139, 140.—Recognition a consequence of it, 140, 141.—Enlargement of knowledge, 141, 142.—Prohibition how improbable, 142.—Scripture at variance with non-recognition, 143-147.

SECTION IV.

OBJECTIONS, pp. 148-160.

(1) From supposed *equality* of regard in heaven: a mere hypothesis, 148, 149.—Exhortations to friendship, and examples, 150, 151.—Bonds of friendship often stricter than of kindred, 152.—(2) Supposed *want* of sympathy; but perfection excludes alienations, 153-155.—(3) Supposed fruitless search for friends who come short of heaven, 156;—but *non*-recognition would involve *universal* uncertainty, 156, 157.—Sense of brotherhood or attachment to the lost may be annulled, or oblivion of them take place, 157-159.—Archbishop Whately, 159, 160.

SECTION V.

PRACTICAL LESSONS, pp. 161-177.

(1) Necessity of renovation of heart, 161, 162.—(2) Importance of choosing Christian alliances and friendships, 162-165.—(3) Increased concern for spiritual welfare of others, 165-168.—(4) Duty of real Christian union, 168-170.—Prospect of future union should increase present regard and forbearance, 171-173.—Contemplation of that prospect, 173-177.

ESSAY IV.

THE RIGHT LOVE OF CREATURES AND OF THE CREATOR, pp. 181-269.

SECTION I.

PRISTINE HAPPINESS AND MAN'S FALL, pp. 181-193.

Introduction, 181-183.—The happiness of unfallen races, 183, 184;—and of man originally, 184, 185.—Song of praise and love in Eden, 186-190.—Liability of creatures to idolatry, 191.—Effect of man's fall the withdrawment of Divine communion and growth of idolatry, 192, 193.

SECTION II.

IDOLATRY AND IDOLATROUS, PASSIONS, pp. 194-201.

Idolatry has usually personified its objects; investing them with some excellencies, but rarely moral, 195, 196.—Study, by other races, of the history of evil, 196, 197.—Deification of separate qualities, 197.—Polydemonism and Atheism unite, 197, 198.—Idolatry has servile fear, 198.—Idolatrous passions, as to *things;* persons; self, 198-201.—True Theism subdues them, 199, 200.—Right affection not idolatrous, 200.—The true A Dieu, 201.

SECTION III.

MANIFESTATIONS OF DEITY, pp. 202-213.

Prevention or cure of idolatry the aim of revelation, 202, 203.—Manifestations of Deity had this object, 204.—Memory perfect in the unfallen, 205.—Objection as to limits of revelation, 205, 206.—Indifference towards it a mystery, 206.—Purpose of Divine judgments, 207.—Mercy to Israel, 208.—Enoch, Noah, 208.—Appearings to Abraham, 209.—Isaac, Jacob, 209, 210;—to Moses, the seventy elders, the whole people, 210-213.

SECTION IV.

DIVINE JUDGMENTS.—MOTIVES OF ANCIENT BELIEVERS TO LOVE GOD, pp. 214-233.

Objection concerning these, 214, 215.—Nothing could annul it but the exclusion of all evil, 215, 216.—Mercy amidst judgments, 216.—Supposed conduct of our sovereign, 217, 218.—Saving effects of Divine severities, 218.—Case of the Canaanites, 219, 220.—Beneficence may consist with rigour, 220, 221.—Motives of the ancient believer to love God, 221-229: viz., knowledge of the Divine perfections, 221-223;—obligations for existence and its blessings, 223-226;—acquaintance with God's mercies to His people, 226, 227;—hope in a future Redeemer, and a happy life to come, 227-231.—Superior strength of Christian motives, 232, 233.

SECTION V.

VIEW TAKEN BY OTHER BEINGS OF HUMAN REDEMPTION, pp. 234-245.

The theme should excite lofty praises, 234, 235.—Sentiments

of other beings, 236.—The Divine forethought, 236, 237.—Human rescue, 237.—Indifference of some who admire heroism, 238.—Unfitness of earthly pomp for "the Lord from heaven," 239.—Privileges of the redeemed, 239, 240.—Carelessness and sophistries of mankind, 241-244.—Expostulations, 244, 245.

SECTION VI.

CHECKS TO THE SENTIMENT OF LOVE TO GOD, pp. 246-269.

Discouragement: some of its causes, 246-248.—Supposed angelic visit, 248, 249.—Vast difference of this from the fact, 249, 250.—Habituation to it; and weak presentments of it, 250, 251.—The fact and its results unseen, 251, 252.—Alleged *uniqueness* of it discussed, 252-258.—Diversity of the kinds or modifications of love, 259-264.—Power of God to teach and prompt right love, 265.—Exhortation to it, 265-269.

ESSAY V.

EXCELLENCIES OF DIVINE PHILOSOPHY, pp. 273-298.

Interest felt in distinguished writers, 273, 274.—True sources of hope, 276, 277.—Value of Natural Theology, 277, 278.—Denial of future life involves atheism, 279, 280.—Wavering as to fundamental truths, 280, 281.—Need of revelation, 282.—The great discovery, 283.—Future life must be more happy or less, 284, 285.—Without revelation cannot be proved more so, 286, 287.—Pride towards God an infatuation, 288-290.—Rejection of revelation accounted for, 291, 292;—its influence vast, 293, 294;—its cordial reception gives happiness, 295.—The New Testament should be examined, 296, 297.—Power of true religion, 297, 298.

APPENDIX.

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE LATE LORD BROUGHAM, pp. 301-305.

NOTES 306-34

A. Sophisters and Jesuits 306-8

B. Divine omniscience 308-9

C. "Law" the Divine agency 310-11

D. Permanent volition 311-13

NOTES, *continued*,—

E. Strange theory of development . . pp. 313–15
F. Doctrines of the "Vestiges" 315–21
G. "Transmutation of species not to be proved" 322–3
H. Divine energy indispensable 323–5
I. Citations from Plato 325–7
K. Creations many and successive . . . 327–9
L. Bp. Butler, Drs. Price and Clarke on miracles 329–30
M. Bp. Warburton on mathematics . . . 331–2
N. Resurrection of Christ 332–3
O. Difficulties of Unbelief 333
* The Epinomis on a future life . . . 334

ESSAY I.

CHRISTIAN THEISM ARGUED FROM FOSSIL OSTEOLOGY AND ORGANIZED LIFE.

ESSAY I.

CHRISTIAN THEISM ARGUED FROM FOSSIL OSTEOLOGY AND ORGANIZED LIFE.

IT is the aim of this essay to show, that all around our globe's surface, and in its lower strata, God's hand and agency are clearly traceable,—except by those who choose to weave or borrow some veil of doubt or sophistry, lest they should see what they *would* not.

This is a question which interests all conscious and responsible minds on our own globe, and every mind in all the uncounted globes, susceptible of joy or pain. It surely therefore claims our earnest attention.

Some good men have affirmed their conviction that there can be no real or sincere atheist. If by this they only mean that the human mind cannot eradicate its own instinctive belief in a first cause of some sort, but, while considering itself and all other things as beings or substances, must needs consider them also as effects or consequents,—this may be true; true, at least, of minds which are sane enough to pursue natural processes of thought. But such an

amount of admission, so far from deserving the name of theism, may consist with a state of mind truly atheistical; and this in various degrees, from the merely implied disbelief of God's moral attributes or governing acts, down to the avowed disbelief of His personal being and creative acts.

The very learned Cudworth observes, that "atheists have commonly had their vizards; atheism, for the most part, prudently choosing to walk abroad in masquerade. And though some persons have been so far imposed on hereby, as to conclude that there was hardly an atheist in the world, yet they that are sagacious may easily look through these thin veils, and perceive such often insinuating their atheism,—even then when they most of all profess themselves theists,—as by affirming that we cannot have any idea or conception at all of God."[1]

Laying out of the case the practical atheism of which divines are used to speak, which consists in "*forgetting* God,"—in having, for the time, no realizing or vital belief of His presence and perfection, (and which, either as habitual or transient, so abounds in the actual state of man, since all acts against conscience appear to in-

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[1] Intell. Syst., vol. i. pp. 181, 182. Ed. Birch (abridged). See Note A, at the end.

volve it) there are other forms of atheism much more positive and active.

There is that which denies, or so far disputes as to nullify its impression, the moral character of God, His rectitude, holiness, and justice;—which says in the heart, "Jehovah will not do good, neither will He do evil."[1]

There is that which disbelieves, if not His physical attributes, at least the exertion of them. "Jehovah *seeth* us not. Jehovah hath *forsaken* the earth:"[2]—or which, at the very least, propounds the sceptical query, "*How* doth God know, and is there knowledge in the Most High?"—*Where* is thy God?"[3]

There is also that bolder atheism, which, either by perplexing sophistry, or by mere vague supposition, rejects and excludes the notion of a real Creator, or of a real *Sustainer;* a *personal* Deity. "The fool" (or wicked) "hath said in his heart, There is no God."[4]

Thus we see that some of the oldest writings extant (whether they be deemed sacred is not to our present purpose) describe, with no small accuracy, the several modifications or degrees of atheism then and now in the world. We

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[1] Zeph. i. 12; and see Ps. x. 13.
[2] Ezek. viii. 12; ix. 9. [3] Ps. lxxiii. 11; xlii. 10.
[4] Ps. xiv. 1; liii. 1.

may add, that all its kinds and degrees seem comprised in one short Scripture phrase: "God is not in all his thoughts."[1] *Thus* read, it states a total thoughtlessness or irreligious forgetfulness of God; though without the denial, or perhaps even doubt, that God exists. But the marginal version may equally state the creed of the *speculative* atheist, engrossed in his "system of nature;" in the earnest exclusion of a Creator and Ruler. "All his thoughts" (or devices) "are, There is no God:" no personal and moral Ruler supremely *Good*.[2]

These sayings are purposely taken from unphilosophical times and people, to show, what personal observation will confirm, that the clearer or finer speculations of the lettered unbeliever, and the coarsest or most confused of the unlettered, in their general issue, substantially agree.

Lucian may insinuate, with sarcastic raillery, from the unrebuked crimes and disorders of our world,[3] what Lucretius maintains with an array

---

[1] Ps. x. 4. In the second verse the same word is translated "devices."

[2] Which is what the very etymology of the word "God" happily imports; for—"it likewise signifies *good*—the same word passing in both senses, with only accidental variations, through all the Teutonic dialects."—*Johnson*.

[3] See his Timon.

of operose argument, that the gods have no governing concern in human affairs: but a Hebrew or Roman herdsman could, with equal ease, imagine that the Divinity was "altogether such a one as himself:" and that, because justice is "not executed speedily," therefore no such attribute exists.

A Hobbes or a Helvetius may argue abstrusely for the non-existence of spirit; but a self-conceited peasant or cotton-spinner may, with much less pains, persuade himself that nothing is sure or real but what is seen or felt by the senses.

A Spinoza may eruditely attempt to identify God with the world, and thus disprove any act of creation; but a common artisan is just as able to fancy, if he would *have* it so, that all may have come into being gradually by endless change; and the more crude or formless his imaginations of this, the better they may serve, perhaps, the purpose of self-delusion.[1]

If some modes or degrees of atheism be thus

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[1] Cudworth cites Plato as declaring, that "not merely by a grossly irregular life are men tempted to atheism, but also by an affectation of singularity and of seeming wiser than others; and that is a very grievous ignorance, which yet deems itself the greatest wisdom." (Intell. Syst., vol. i. pp. 379, 380, abridged; and see Platon. Opp., t. vi. p. 335, Ed. Stallb. The facts now

found in all periods and all ranks of society,—the question of true theism,—the proof of a real, personal, creating, sustaining, perfect Deity,—is of vast and wide importance: and if this proof can be so offered as to convince the more complete atheist, it would of course influence many whose unbelief is less settled and definite. Now the controversy with that sort of atheists is mainly this,—whether man, or any other organized body, with its living principle and powers, were in the *proper* sense *created*, and not creators of themselves or one another. Distinct belief that the first of any one kind of animal was, at a given time, passively formed and organized, would, I apprehend, compel the consequent belief that a Mind or Designer formed it. If any be such Pyrrhonists as to reject this consequence, *no* sort of reasoning or evidence at all, on *any* subject, ought to avail with them.

But with all for whom argument has force, it is conceived that the proof for original and successive acts of creation derivable from the phenomena and physiology of organized life in general, and from the modern researches of fossil osteology in particular, will appear conclusive.

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brought to mind might cure them,—if curable,—of that self-conceit.

It is proposed, first, to advert to certain views of a general kind, which may seem to enfeeble or preclude such reasoning; then to state briefly the argument itself; afterwards to deduce some inferences, and to offer a few concluding thoughts on the great general question of our noblest expectations.

There is—we must premise—a theory,—very ancient (since its principles appear in the Greek philosophy nearly twenty-four centuries ago), but often revived with different modifications,—concerning the formation of worlds, and evolutions or *developments* of living organisms, which, though it be not so designed by all its propounders,[1] would tend, if not shown to be fallacious, to weaken all proofs for true theism from the facts of creation,—*i.e.* all proofs of the initial and *continued* exercise of a real *personal* intellect and volition; and would thus affect, at once, the particular argument from osteology, and those derived from the general phenomena of life and organization; both which it will be here attempted,—however slightly,—to adduce. This theory therefore, in its *tendency* virtually atheistic,—though sometimes incautiously adopted by theists,—and in itself sophistical, though dressed

[1] Macculloch admits this. See his Proofs, etc. of the Attributes, vol. iii. p. 427.

in the eloquent guise of comprehensive research, —must be adverted to and examined.

It was, partly at least, adopted not many years since, in a work entitled, "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," the author of which professes to introduce "a somewhat different idea of the organic creation from what has hitherto been generally entertained;"[1] but has misconceived (for I will not suppose him knowingly to misstate) the views of those whom I believe best entitled to the character of real theists. He writes of their "notion" as being this, "that the Almighty produced the progenitors of all existing species by some sort of personal or immediate exertion."[2] Does he then imagine that Christians (or any other real theists, if there be such) believe the Supreme Being to have wrought *laboriously*, or in the manner of a *created artificer*, and to have performed creative acts in succession, on account of a limited prescience, skill, and power? He certainly seems to be under this great misconception of the opinion commonly held as to God's attributes and acts, inasmuch as he intimates that "it greatly detracts from His foresight."[3]

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[1] Vestiges, Ed. 2, p. 153. (3, p. 156.)
[2] Ibid. Ed. 2, p. 154. (3, p. 157.)
[3] Ibid. Ed. 2, p. 157. (3, p. 160.)

Yet who, I ask, have more fully affirmed and argued the Divine foresight or omniscience, and with it the immense plan and "counsel" of Diety, than the writers *of* Scripture, and the believers *in* it?[1]

This author ought to remember, that while Scripture (as he himself truly remarks) has represented creation as "flowing from commands and expressions of will,"[2] Christian philosophers (and "plain blunt men" besides), in full accordance with it, regard every creative act as a simple volition of the Almighty mind.

The writer insists much on "laws of matter,"[3] "creation by law," "creation by natural law;"[4] but I inquire, What *is* "law," a "law of matter," a "natural law," except a continued volition; in other words, a continued act, or energy, or "working," of the creative mind? The best writers, of different schools, agree in so defining. Paley does so; but I would rather cite laymen.[5] Judge Blackstone's annotator, Professor Christian, (in the chapter of Law in General),

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[1] A few instances of the "notions" of such believers (on these subjects) are offered in Note B.

[2] Vestiges, Ed. 2, p. 156. (3, p. 159.)

[3] Ibid. Ed. 2 and 3, p. 24.

[4] Ibid. Ed. 2, pp. 157–161. (3, pp. 160–164.)

[5] I add, however, a few words from Paley and others, in Note C.

remarks, that "the word law, where it is not applied to human conduct, may be considered as a metaphor. The volitions of the Almighty are His laws. When we apply the word "law" to motion, matter, or the works of nature or of art,—with equal, or greater propriety, we might have used the words quality, property, or peculiarity."[1]

Professor Brown, of Edinburgh, has stated, "the term *laws*, as employed in the physics whether of matter or of mind, is not used to denote anything different from the phenomena themselves."[2] Dugald Stewart writes, "the order we see, not only implies *intelligence* in its first conception, but *power* by its continued existence; or, in other words, it is the same Being who enacts and executes the law."[3]

Can it be meant by this author, who fully professes theism, that the Deity has erected "natural laws" into an *independency*, so that they go on of *themselves* to organize matter and mind, and this in the ascending series which is described, of organizations less and less imperfect; while He neither, on the other hand, continues *actually* to uphold, nor can, on the other, alter or rescind

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[1] Blackstone, edit. 1809. Vol. i. p. 39, note abridged.
[2] Dr. Brown on the Mind, p. 236.
[3] Act. and Mor. Powers, vol. i. p. 404.

them? This appears to be variously intimated.[1] But what, *then*, is virtually affirmed of the *power* of the First Cause? It has created an unalterable power, and so far independent of itself. "Law" (or fate) appears the true Deity in the scheme of such a theist. The "one God" has abdicated. Either *fate* is the power; or his "*laws*" are the "lords many;" yet surely, without his active energy, they are what Paul calls the idols—"nothing in the world." Indeed, in some places, the writer appears himself to admit the ceaseless ubiquitous presence and energy of the Deity; alleging that the "phenomena" are "carried on from first to last, here and elsewhere, under immediate favour of the creative will and energy;"[2] and again, that He is not "absent from a particle of the current of natural

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[1] Thus, "it is not in what we can conceive of the nature of things that there should be a special exemption from the ordinary laws of matter to save this virtuous man." "Laws for the operation of inanimate matter, which are quite *unswerving*."—Vestiges, Ed. 2, pp, 378, 379. (3, pp. 358, 359.) "No exceptions ever take place in that department."—Ed. 2, p. 365. (3, p. 345.) "Moral laws . . . are equally unswerving,—allowing for their wider range of action."—Ed. 2, p. 379. (3, p. 359.) "It is quite certain that in the next year about one in every six hundred and fifty of the French people will commit a crime;" etc. etc.—Ed. 2, p. 330. (3, p. 311.)

[2] Ibid. 204. (3, p. 209.)

affairs in one sense, seeing that the whole system is continually supported by His providence."[1] We ask then, is this a less *particular* acting, to be not "absent from a *particle*," but "continually" to "support" each one in the "whole system," upholding each "law" or volition which governs them; is this less an "acting constantly in *particular* ways for *particular* occasions,"[2] than it is "at one time to produce zoophytes," at "another time to bring in one or two crustacea; again to produce crustaceous fishes, again perfect fishes, and so on to the end?" The author gives these instances, and affirms, "this would be to take a very mean view of the Creative Power:"[3] and again, "that it is the narrowest of all views of the Deity, and characteristic of a humble class of intellects."[4]

I *accept* the learned author's classification in this case. It behoves us, both to be humble in spirit, and to *reckon* ourselves so in powers and attainments; especially if the author be right in

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[1] Vestiges, 158. (3, p. 160.)

[2] Ibid. 157. (3, p. 160.)

[3] Ibid. 154. (3, p. 157.)

[4] Ibid. Ed. 2, p. 157. (3, p. 160.) "The exercise of an immediately creative power" in "the more solitary commencements of species," it is affirmed, "would have been inconceivably paltry:" and, "this idea is too ridiculous." Ed. 2, pp. 161, 155. (3, pp. 164, 158.)

another of his classifications, when he avers that "the quadrumana (monkeys) and man, collectively form the first group in the" (animal) "scale."[1] But I again humbly ask, Is the "support" of "the whole system," and *each* "*particle* of the current of natural affairs," (I quote the author's words)—that is, of the whole and every part, a less particular acting than the creation of any part or particle at any one period?

The writer charges others with "anthropomorphizing the Creative Power, reducing it to some such character as that borne by the ordinary proceedings of mankind."[2] But I venture to think he has been *himself* misled by that *very* kind of analogies. When he speaks of "law-creation"[3] as alone worthy of the "august Being,"[4] meaning, if he intends anything *real* in the distinction, that the laws are left to go on and operate of themselves,—he appears to have in view the skill of a human mechanist, who should form a watch that might be left to itself, not needing to be wound up, and so framed, as itself to elaborate, and evolve, or turn out, other watches,—each in succession capable of evolving another and another

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[1] Vestiges, Ed. 2 and 3, p. 132.
[2] Ibid., Ed. 2, p. 154. (3, p. 157.)
[3] Ibid. 161. (3, p. 164.)
[4] Ibid. 155. (3, p. 158.)

still more complex and perfect. But he appears to forget that this wondrous mechanician would have the laws or properties of matter and motion made to his hand, and all the while upholden and kept going for his and his work's behoof; that he himself is only a deputy or instrument, to use and apply them; and may therefore go his way (if, by the way, his own interior automatic vital valves and strings—which he did *not* put together—be kept in order for him), and leave the ingenious machine which he has arranged, not to *itself*, but to the ever-present Law-*maker*, and Law-*upholder*, who surely "slumbereth not." Let the alone Sustainer of these "laws of matter" cease for an instant to sustain them, and where are the law-created, law-governed watches, and their movements *then*—Where the watch-*maker* and *his* movements?[1]

The author supposes "the various forms of

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[1] "Those mechanic theists" (Cudworth long since wrote) "who affect to concern the Deity as little as is possible in mundane affairs, either for fear of debasing Him, or else of subjecting Him to solicitous encumberment, and for that cause would have God to contribute nothing more than according to some general laws; these men, I say, seem not very well to understand themselves in this." (Intell. Syst. vol. i. p. 323, abridged.) One would like to know how the author of "Vestiges" understands and defines his own phrase, "*under immediate favour of*," etc.—cited above, p. 13.

plants as, immediately, the result of a law in electricity, variously affecting them." [1] Be it so: we are well content, (though prone to forget those familiar marvels,) provided the rose, and heliotrope, and bean-blossom, retain their peculiar tints and odours, unchanged, from summer to summer, and from age to age. But *grant* that electricity effects all this; fashioning and regulating these, and millions more;—who holds and manages the tool? Who guides that perilously subtle and quick instrument, the electric fluid, and keeps it keen and sparkling? Who causes this fluid at each instant to *be*, and to be *what* it is? Who sheathes or guides its edge, that it may not smite unseen, and directs it to accomplish with precision and constancy its vast and multiform work?

It is told (I think by the late excellent Bishop Corrie) of a Hindoo, that he learnedly accounted for earthquakes, as taking place when the elephant, who bears up our globe, occasionally changes his foot to rest himself;—but this deponent said not what would further happen if the tortoise, in winter, nodded, or stept awry, whose shell is the elephant's footing; nor, if the unknown power should repose or be inactive, who, it is presumed, holds up the tortoise.

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[1] Vestiges, Ed. 2. p. 168. (3, p. 171.)

In order to our sense of an instant's security, and not less in order to satisfy an intuitive demand of reason, it is indispensable to believe that a self-existent, unrelaxing Personal Energy upholds, and guides, and actuates the whole series of this world's affairs; the laws and the organizations, the means and instruments, and all. The production of organized life, therefore, even in its lower forms, and whether now extinct, or since arisen, or still subsisting, is an unanswerable argument for a Personal creative Mind, acting by volition in the past, and ever thus acting still.[1]

But I shall here *chiefly* rest this argument on the creation of *man;* a fact to be adduced without any need to investigate, on this occasion, the *date* which should be assigned to it. All geologists agree that man's first existence on the earth was at a period subsequent to the formation of those early strata in which no mammalia, or quadrumanous kinds of animals whatever, have been traced, or are expected. "The late discoveries," — observes Lord Brougham, (in his masterly "View of the researches of Cuvier and his Successors,")—"show, as plainly as the evi-

[1] On the continued volition of the Deity, as involved in the best conception we can form of the manner of Divine existence, see Note D.

dence of facts can show anything, that there was a time when this globe existed with animals to people it, but without any beings at all of the human kind."[1]

He adds: "If it should be supposed that human remains may hereafter be found in earlier formations, we may remark, that, even if they were, contrary to every probability, there found, no one pretends to expect such remains in those strata where no mammalia of any kind have been discovered."[2]

Indeed, the author of the "Vestiges" fully admits this: stating that "there is no authentic or satisfactory instance of human remains being found except in deposits obviously of very modern date; a tolerably strong proof that the creation of our own species is a comparatively recent event."[3]

Nor have we the smallest ground to believe in any transmutation, or transition, of one species of animals into another; least of all in that sort of transition which would consist in elevating an inferior kind of organization into the superior and most perfect. We see that, instead of this,

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[1] Analytical View of Researches on Fossil Osteology, in Dissertations on Natural Theology, vol. ii. p. 196.

[2] Ibid. p. 240.

[3] Vestiges, Ed. 2 and 3, pp. 145, 146.

the mixing of species occasions what may be most strictly termed degeneracy; and causes, likewise, incapacity of reproduction and continuance.

"The species," writes the learned Macculloch, "are determinate; notwithstanding those imagined transitions, which are themselves parts of a definite plan. No species passes into another, or has ever done so: the varieties which we occasionally see are variations of unimportant parts, and they return again to the original condition, or type, as it is termed; that type being a portion of the total plan of the Creator. The extinct creations present the same steadiness of forms."[1]

It is true, the inventive author of the "Vestiges," after giving instances of imperfect development, arising from what he terms "under-adequacy" in the parent animal, adds: "It is no great boldness to surmise, that a super-adequacy in the measure of this under-adequacy (and the one thing seems as natural an occurrence as the other) would suffice in a goose to give its progeny the body of a rat, and produce the ornithorhynchus, or might give the progeny of an ornithorhynchus the mouth and feet of a true rodent; and thus complete, at two stages, the passage from the aves

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[1] Macculloch: Proofs, etc. of the Attributes of God, vol. i. p. 85.

to the mammalia." [1] This notable "surmise" concerning "*super*-adequacy," that it is "as natural" (whether to a goose or to some nobler biped) as *under*-adequacy, appears to me,—whatever be thought of its "boldness,"—among all surmises, one of the least tenable.

Inadequacy (or "under-adequacy") of several kinds,—organic, intellectual, moral,—is a most usual and likely predicament of creatures, in any rank or position:—I experience it quite consciously at this hour:—while "super-adequacy" can never be predicated of a creature, except relatively to what is *below* the level or range of its ascertained and habitual powers. In its full and absolute sense, it is the attribute, not even of an archangel, but of Him whom St. Paul has described, with so much force, as able to do "exceeding abundantly above" all we think.

But it is the less to be wondered at, that visions of "super-adequacy" haunt this author's expansive imagination, seeing that he traces his own origin and ascent from the "Simiadæ," or "Cebidæ,"—"monkeys of the old," or "monkeys of the new world!" [2] putting man "into the typical place, as the genuine head, not only of this order, [which he has named "*Cheiro-*

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[1] Vestiges, Ed. 2, p. 220. (3, p. 224.)

[2] Ibid. p. 269. (In Ed. 3 these passages are omitted).

theria,"] but of the whole animal world. The double affinity which is requisite is obtained, for here he has the simiadæ on one hand, and the cebidæ on the other."[1]

Vast is the ascent (by descent) from the prehensile habits of his very remote progenitors,—the caudal grasp of branches, and manual projection of nuts and oranges,—to his own ideal comprehension and grasp of "astral systems," and even of "rudimental" stars.[2] What a descendant have they in *him*, (to what an ascendant has he sprung from *them !*) who discerns in our four smallest planets the "spherified fragments of a ring" once broken "between Jupiter and Mars !"[3] and is "all but certain" that "organic bodies" have the same constituents "in all the spheres which are yet seats of life"! "Such," he affirms, "must be the rule in Jupiter and in Sirius as it is here."[4]

Truly, though the "passage" from the simia to the seer may have taken many more stages than the two which he thinks might suffice from the aves to the mammalia, still must the "measure" of "super-adequacy," in some stage, or stages, of

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[1] Vestiges, Ed. 2, p. 269. (In Ed. 3 these passages are omitted.)

[2] Ibid. Ed. 2 and 3, p. 20.

[3] Ibid. p. 16. See Note E.

[4] Ibid. Ed. 2, p. 163. (3, p. 166.)

the "progress," have been no trifle. Why needs (in this view) the far-seeing author to instruct us, as he does, that "the gestation, so to speak, of a whole creation is a matter probably involving enormous spaces of time;" or that, "during the historical era, the limits of species have, to ordinary observation, been rigidly adhered to: but the historical era is, we know, only a small portion of the entire age of our globe"?[1]—If a "true rodent" (suppose a squirrel, or dormouse, or rabbit) could, in *any* era, be produced "at two stages" from a goose, I see not why a very "*talented*"[2] monkey "of the new world," and even of "the historical era," might not have eminent representatives in what Carlyle has named "the dandiacal body" of our own era.

The substance of this theory concerning "the progress of organic life,"[3] is twice presented in condensed forms.—"*The first step was an advance, under favour of peculiar conditions, from the simplest forms of being to the next more com-*

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[1] Vestiges, Ed. 2, p. 211. (3, pp. 215, 216.)

[2] As this modern adjective—so great a favourite with many—itself came, if I mistake not, from the "far west," it may well suit the "Cebidæ;" though, when conjoined with the modish but truly zoological substantive "female," —it seems more specially due to the wonder-working "geese."

[3] Vestiges, Ed. 2, p. 223. (3, p. 231.)

plicated."[1] And again,—(as "a hypothesis applicable to all similar theatres of vital being,") —"*the simplest and most primitive type, under a law to which that of like-production is subordinate, gave birth to the type next above it; that this again produced the next higher, and so on to the very highest.*"[2] The hypothesis (I have already intimated) is not quite *so* original as the ingenious producer of it would seem to imagine. It bears somewhat of the imitative—if we may not say the simial—type. Yet it may have arisen in the modern writer's mind quite independently, and is no doubt offered far more plausibly and scientifically than by ancient sages. But it seems not distantly related to the very old theory of "formative effort," [*nisus formativus*] propounded by Anaximander. We find in Cudworth's great work, that this Grecian philosopher held man to have proceeded first from a different kind of animals, [ἀλλοειδῶν ζώων ;[3]] and that, by Plutarch, he is recorded to have taught they were first produced from *fishes*."[4]

The author of "Vestiges" would say these were still earlier progenitors; "the stages of

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[1] Vestiges, Ed. 2, p. 206. (3, p. 210.)

[2] Ibid. p. 223. (3, p. 231.)

[3] As cited in Euseb. Præpar. Evang., lib. i. c. 8.

[4] Intell. Syst., vol. i. p. 280.

advance being in all cases very small—namely, from one species only to another, so that the phenomenon is always of a simple and modest character."[1] For my own part, and I think there is no want of modesty in the preference, I would gladly sink the later (or quadrumanal) line; and rather look back to those whose "caudal fin" steered them through the primitive ocean, than farther down in the genealogy, to ancestors whom Buffon describes as "hanging by each other from a tree, making a chain of their tails, and swinging like a pendulum till they lay hold of another tree."[2] I am not reconciled to *such* a lineage, even by the "talented" exercise of clannish and political habits so early developed. An Englishman may be allowed more of kindred feeling with the aboriginal possessors or rovers of the seas.

I should perhaps crave pardon for the strain of remark adopted on this very serious subject, and in reference to theories which I deem so gravely

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[1] Vestiges, Ed. 2, p. 223. (3, p. 231.) This, in the former edition, is termed being "translated forward:" and really the "translation,"—"from one species *only* to another,"—does not seem so "very small," or peculiarly "simple and modest."

[2] This is related of the Sapajou or Coaita monkeys (Cebidæ). See Barr's Buffon, vol. ix. p. 243.

opposed (not in these points alone)[1] to sound reason, as well as Divine revelation; were it not that, to my own mind, the ludicrous aspects which they present,—and the more amidst such wide scientific research and system-building skill,—fairly and effectively, though subordinately, concur, with their very conjectural character, towards discrediting them quite.

Had this newest shape of the older theories been quite original, I should have thought it less important to be treated of; but as it approaches (and revives with scientific variations) other schemes, both ancient and modern, for extenuating, to say the least, the miracle of creation, and the continued real agency of God, I adduce it as favourably "representative of the class;" or "the pre-eminent type" of the rest;[2] and think time more usefully employed in attempting the refutation of conjectures, which, if credited, would go to enervate our argument, than in dilating on that argument itself; which I hope can be urged conclusively without being much amplified.

The theories referred to are merely conjectural; though it is endeavoured to support them by ingenious analogies.

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[1] See Note F.

[2] Vestiges, Ed. 2, pp. 241, 272. (3, p. 246.)

It is admitted that "science has no such facts."[1] I repeat, also, the words of Dr. Macculloch: "the species are determinate."—"No species passes into another, or has ever done so."—"The extinct creations present the same steadiness of forms."[2]

We return, therefore, to the point proposed to be insisted on,—the creation of *man*.[3]

At some fixed period, long since the earth's first formation and chaotic state, *human* beings have arisen upon it; immensely superior to all organized beings that we know of, both in bodily conformation and in mental powers; essentially differing by that faculty of advance and cumulative improveableness, which, except within the very narrowest limits, is wanting to all others.

There was a period in the world's history, when this being — man — was *not:* a point of time when he began to be.

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[1] Vestiges, Ed. 2, p. 221. (3, p. 225.)

[2] Proofs, etc., vol. i. p. 85, (cited, p. 20 above); and see Note G.

[3] It will be well understood, that these reasonings must be taken as independent of, or antecedent to, the proofs of that revelation which we trust and prize, as our best, nay, only patrimony. But the great truths of Natural Theology are pre-supposed and assumed in the revealed record; and whatever deepens our conviction of the former, widens and makes more sure the foundations of the latter.

Is it necessary to prove to any sound mind that he did not create himself, or that beings far lower than himself did not conspire or contrive to create him? If not, then we prove irrefragably from the facts of nature what is affirmed on the page of Scripture, that "God created man." For the superior being who formed him, was either a creature or uncreated. If a creature, then, in forming man, this being was only the Creator's instrument: if uncreated, this being was God. The self-existent Mind, which we name God, framed a new creature more perfect than any of His known works on this our planet.

The Divine Sculptor (if I may so speak) having laid, in eras long past, the simple foundations of the earth, raises on them first a *pedestal* "curiously wrought," embossed with many organized forms; and at length He crowns these works with the principal figure, quite distinct from the subjacent groups.

In *each* addition we may trace a Divine hand, but most *clearly* of all in this latest and loftiest. We are sure that when the base of the pedestal was constructed, the human figure existed not. We see it now; and it is "fearfully and wonderfully made." Are we to deny the design and act of the sculptor? Are we to doubt whether a mind,—and a mind of immeasurable skill,—was requisite to constitute a creature capable of be-

coming an Aristotle or Laplace, and from which, instrumentally, creatures of similar capabilities might proceed, after a series, through many ages, of successive reproductions? And will not this amazing skill or wisdom appear still the more requisite, when we consider that even heathens and sceptics, besides admitting the moral corruption of our race,[1] held that its moral degeneracy had been and would be progressive,[2] and that from this a *derangement* or *decay* of intellectual powers would appear naturally to ensue?

It avails not to object (what indeed could not be proved) that man in his origin had nothing of this intellectual character, but was a grovelling savage.

If that were granted, it would be only the more wonderful, that in him, by a provision existing in no other earthly species, such capacities were treasured up and maintained, though latent.

This is as if the supposed statue of our illustration, which at first view appeared a statue merely, should in process of time develope secret powers, and become at length a calculating automaton.

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[1] "Nam vitiis nemo sine nascitur."—*Horat.*

"Unicuique dedit vitium natura creato."—*Propertius.*

[2] "Ætas parentum pejor avis tulit
Nos nequiores; mox daturos
Progeniem vitiosiorem."—*Horat.*

Would such a surprising development argue less skill in the artist?

If we do not call this creation of man a miracle, it must be only because the word miracle has been by custom otherwise appropriated; but certainly not to events more wonderful, more novel, more above the power of any creature. What can more emphatically deserve the name of miracle than this distinct innovation in the course of nature, the addition of a living intelligent being, of structure and faculties so superior to all other beings visible on this earth?

Some theists may say,—We fully admit the correctness of these reasonings. It is clear, on geological grounds, that there was an era when *no* animal did or could exist on our globe, and a subsequent era when there was still no *human* being. The successive origination of each one of these proves a distinct creative act; and every such act is virtually, however it may be designated nominally, one of the greatest of miracles, evincing more and more eminently, in proportion as the work is complex, the skill and power of the creative mind. This is evinced, therefore, with immensely cumulative force, both by *diverse* multitude, in the case of the numerous cotemporary species, and by *similar* multitude, in that of the vastly more numerous individuals of each species, both cotemporary and reproduced.

Hence we cannot admit, (it may be added,) that the creation of the first animal, or of the first human being, is *so* essential or important to be proved, inasmuch as every *re*-production of an organized living being is itself a creation. Creation, in both cases, as far at least as bodily structure is concerned, means collocation and arrangement; and, although reproduction proceeds by an appointed instrumentality, we know this not to be the efficient or designing cause. The argument from fossil osteology, it should therefore be understood, is only an addition of amount to those afforded by the phenomena before us of what we may venture to term *vital* osteology. As we know that the bones of the megatherium were not in the primary strata, and have been created since, so we know that "the bones" which "do grow"[1] in the yet unborn animal were lately (as such) not anywhere, and have been created now. This consideration seems to lessen the comparative value of the argument; because the successive creations of individuals so vastly exceed in number the first creations of species.—It should be remembered, however, that mere number is not here the right ground of comparison. Reproduction, though it be a creation, is not a creation of something different,—a strictly new kind of work

[1] Eccles. xi. 5.

or process, — but a repetition of the former; whereas, the creation of new races is a strongly varied beginning,—a change of former processes by a definitely new contrivance and collocation.

The former is, as if successive and similar watches were produced by a mechanism contained in the first watch, and repeated in each watch of the series; the supposition made by Dr. Paley to illustrate reproduction, which, for another use, I have already borrowed.

The latter is, as if the artist had constructed, first, hour-glasses; next, clepsydras, or water-clocks; then pendulum clocks; then watches, or time-pieces, with springs; and finally chronometers of more elaborate workmanship. If we could find watches produced in succession by the mechanism of prior watches, this might possibly suggest, in some minds, the doubt, however groundless and even *absurd*, whether the first watch was made, *or whether it made itself.* But, if we discovered, in the ruins of Pompeii, the Roman hour-glass and water-clock; next, in some ancient walled-up chamber at Naples, a pendulum-clock of the earliest and simplest fabric; afterwards, in an old German cabinet, a watch, different from those now in use, but set in motion, like them, by an elastic spring of steel; and, lastly, the recent chronometer, in which superior skill secures a still greater

precision,—these discoveries would surely induce no such doubt; but would more strongly lead to the contrary conclusion, that, at different periods, these several sorts of chronometers had been framed, and that a similar design had been acted on in each: so that, although not the same mind had contrived them, it was, in each later instance, a mind which derived its first knowledge from the former mind and age, and engrafted on that some new inventive means; which is much the same thing as if one mind (a Methuselah, or the pretended wandering Jew of later times) had been, at successive epochs, the maker of them all.

So far from at all depreciating the argument to be drawn from innumerable productions and reproductions (that is, distinct creations, both simultaneous and successive), I hold it, and adduce it here, as one of immense and ever accumulating strength; and, of course, much the more so on account of the unchanging quality of the reproductions. For, although repetition be not, in one aspect, so striking as origination, it becomes, in another aspect, in proportion as it is multiplied, a more forcible proof of design and superintendence. Take, for instance, a hive of bees, each one of which is a separate work of mind,—as exactly a bee, not only in structure, but in its botanising and mathematical instincts,

as those whose honey refreshed the fainting Hebrew prince and soldier.

This subject is fully and ably treated by Macculloch, who shows the incredibility of the doctrine of "involution of germs, and of life in germs;"[1] and the equal incredibility of life being a *result* of organization. He observes, that we have used ourselves to consider the original act as the only act of creation, and "to look on it as a miracle, when it is but one mode of the exertion of a power which is exerted every day, and every minute, and almost in the same manner. The daily production of a plant or an animal is the same thing, as far as it is an act of power; and it is an equal miracle. The process may be slower than it once was, but each is equally an act of creation."[2]

Nevertheless, the ascertained production, in the last year or century, of a *new* insect equal or superior to the bee, with other organization and other instincts than any which had till then existed, would afford a different *kind* of proof, parallel to that afforded by the production of the *first* bees; and, at least with some minds, more forcible. But if the production of the

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[1] Proofs, etc., of the Attributes, vol. iii. pp. 505–520. See Note H.

[2] Ibid., vol. iii. p. 520.

first *bees* had peculiar force as a proof of a creating mind, how much more that of the first human pair, with all their superiority of bodily organization and of intellectual endowment?

We thus return to our leading and peculiar argument. Geology and fossil osteology prove that *man* once was not. The fact that man is, and once was not, proves, unless he made *himself*, that he had a Creator. But a real Creator must be self-existent, uncreated, everywhere present, acting, ruling—that is, God.

The *constitution, powers, and capacities* of man, show, moreover, irresistibly, that he had a Creator of exalted power and wisdom.

The unceasing preservation, succession, and development of these faculties for many ages, show that the power and wisdom of his Creator have been still subsisting and acting. "He that planted the ear, shall He not hear? He that formed the eye, shall He not see? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not He know?"[1]

It is remarkable that Diderot, who afterwards professed atheism, thus amplified, in his better days, this argument against it. "If a butterfly's wing" (he asks) "offers me traces a thousand times more clear of a creative intellect,

[1] Ps. xciv. 9, 10.

than you have proofs that your fellow-man can think,—it is a thousand times more insane to deny that God exists, than that your fellow creature thinks. Is not the Divine mind as clearly indicated in the eye of an insect, as the faculty of thought in the writings of Newton? What?—does the world *formed* prove an Intelligence less than the world *explained?* What an assertion!—the intellect of the First Being not more evinced by His works, than the faculty of thinking in a philosopher by his writings! Reflect, that I only combat you with a butterfly's wing, when I might crush you with the weight of a universe!"[1]

Thus even *he,* "being dead, yet speaketh;" and as Volney has been made by Keith a witness for God's prescience, so Diderot, brought before us in the work of La Harpe, refutes his own subsequent aberrations from sound reason; and the words and intellect of the dead, more powerful than his later infatuation and enmity, still plead for God: so that he is yet forced to join in that one great silent creed, which the suffering poet (Smart) wrote so sublimely with a coal (methinks a "live coal from the

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[1] La Harpe (Cours, etc.), tom. xv. p. 26; and Dissert. I. prefixed to the seventh edition of Encyc. Brit., vol. i. p. 274.

altar"), in a lucid interval, on the wall of his asylum.

> "Tell them I AM—Jehovah said
> To Moses, while earth shook with dread;
> And, smitten to the heart,
> At once above, beneath, around,
> All nature, without voice or sound,
> Replied—O God, THOU ART!"

But if we have, at every moment in our own existence, this proof of a Creator, and of those attributes in Him which demand an awful veneration, how shall they be deemed wise who neglect God; who desire not the knowledge of His ways, nor any further revelation of His will and purpose to man; or who, having heard of such revelations, made in successive ages, are averse from a patient and candid examination of these; or who think humility towards God does not behove them, after once acknowledging that they are the mere creatures of His power?

Lord Bacon has most truly said,—"It is written, 'The heavens declare the glory of God,' but it is nowhere written, The heavens declare the *will* of God."[1]

We need, for our happiness, a disclosure of

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[1] De Augm. Scient., l. ix. c. l., quoted in the Latin by Dr. Buckland, Bridgw. Treat., vol. ii. p. 590.

this, and of His *gracious intentions* towards *us*. That is, we need a special and authenticated *revelation* of the Divine will and purpose. Plato and Socrates (in at least four or five passages) admitted and avowed this great *want* of human nature, — an instruction or revelation from God.[1]

Such a revelation we possess. Its grand external seals or attestations are, the *fulfilments of prophecy*, and specific *miracles*. With regard to these latter, doubts have been skilfully urged by unbelievers, grounded on the supposition of *extreme improbability*. If I can briefly further apply the arguments we have been now considering to the case of miracles properly so called, and thus nullify or weaken the presumption against them which unbelievers have raised, I may contribute a little to strengthen confidence in the great charter of our peace and hope.

Real theists,—believers in a personal Creator, a Being possessed of constant power and volition, whose "law" is "a mode of acting prescribed by *Himself*,"[2]—can never rationally doubt that miracles are *possible*. On the other hand, it will be as little doubted, that they need strong direct

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[1] See Note I.

[2] Stewart: Act. and Mor. Powers, vol. i. p. 404.

testimonies, and strong collateral probabilities, to establish their real occurrence; inasmuch as the very name of miracle implies an event highly wonderful, and, generally speaking, improbable. This may be admitted, without in the least conceding to Hume's assertion, that the improbability is such as no testimony can overcome.

In the best known answers to Hume,—with the exception of that by Dr. Price,—it is, I think, principally aimed to show, how great and overbalancing is the weight of a certain kind and amount of testimony; while the argument that alterations of the ordinary course of nature are in themselves *less* improbable than Hume affirmed, has been not so prominently dwelt upon. It has, indeed, been variously glanced at; chiefly, however, in the way of showing that the general improbability of miracles is, in particular cases, much abated by the importance of the ends for which they appear to have been wrought.[1]

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[1] The scope of the writers has not been to show that changes or suspensions of nature's ordinary laws have, absolutely, a less degree of unlikelihood than some suppose; but chiefly to contend that there is a *sort* and *combination* of testimony fully sufficing to outweigh it; and thence, that the improbability is far less than Hume states it, *relatively*; that is, as compared with the very high probability or moral certainty arising from such testimony.

It is conceived that the argument offered already for God's special providence, from the creation of living beings generally, and from the facts of fossil osteology in particular, may be rendered auxiliary to the object of these authors, although by a contrary process to that in which they have most laboured; namely, by subtracting from the improbability that the event was real, rather than adding to the improbability that the testimony could be false. The action of the mind, as to belief or disbelief of anything very unlikely, is a comparison of conflicting improbabilities. It may be judged very unlikely that a certain event or phenomenon should occur, and yet be accounted much more unlikely that *such* testimony as exists for it should be false or erroneous. In that case it will be credited; and with a strength of belief proportioned to the estimated excess of *un*-likelihood, that, being so attested, it did *not* occur.

But if it can be shown that the improbability of miracles (though great) is *less* than we have accounted it, the same thing is done as if the strength of the testimony for particular miracles, (that is, the improbability of its falsehood), were proportionally augmented. A subtraction from one scale may be as useful as an equivalent addition in the other. There will always remain a certain amount of improbability for the testi-

mony to overbalance; still it has been diminished; and we consequently need, in order to our conclusion, a less degree of improbability that the testimony should be delusive.[1]

Now the coming into existence of an entirely *new species* of organized living beings, in a world where everything appears to proceed by fixed laws and in unvarying order, would appear beforehand highly improbable. Till the discovery of organic remains attested the fact, few persons would have at all *believed* the conjecture (if any could have formed it) that there had been entirely different races of animals on this earth, which are now extinct, and that some of the races which now exist were not then in being.

Would not the rise of another new species in this world at present, differing from and

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[1] In other words, a deciding preponderance for the testimony may be obtained in either of two ways; either by proving its weight to be greater than was supposed, or by showing the weight of improbability (in the miracle) which it has to overcome, to be less.* This latter method, it is believed, may be used with some success, by adapting the argument already drawn from fossil osteology in support of real theism,—in the way of corollary or inference—to the Mosaic and Christian miracles.

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* See Dr. Price's Dissertations, Ed. 2, pp. 429–438.

superior to man, be deemed exceedingly improbable?

And yet this introduction of new living beings, first of more and more perfect animals, and lastly of man himself, we have seen, is precisely what has taken place, and that again and again, at different epochs, or points of time.

Here, then, have occurred, at several periods, partial changes in, or additions to, the ordinary course and laws of nature. For at the periods when such new races began to exist, the greater or wider laws,—as of gravitation, optics, aerostatics, vegetation, chemistry,—remained stable and unchanged. They were as adapted and as needful to the new organized beings as to those pre-existing.—But it having been ascertained, by the progress of science,—which in this corroborates the Mosaic record of creation,—that partial alterations and novelties have thus arisen, why may not others, still more partial, be regarded as, in certain great conjunctures, at least not more unlikely to have happened; and therefore, on good and strong testimony, be with the less difficulty believed?

We may suppose, on the one hand,—what would be very analogous to the prior successive creations which geology discovers,—the creation this day of an entirely new species of animal on a volcanic island, thrown up some years since from

the ocean, to the soil and climate of which this new production is peculiarly adapted.[1]

On the other hand, we may suppose the creation in Egypt of a single "serpent," or of "frogs abundantly," or of "swarms of flies;" or the restoration in Judæa of a palsied frame to strength, or of the dead to life; for some great ends to which those phenomena are specially adapted. What greater improbability can be alleged in *either* of these sorts of change or innovation, than in the more *extensive* changes or innovations which geology and osteology attest? what good reason why the narrower and more particular should not occur, as well as the wider and more general? It seems to have been quite as improbable beforehand, that light, with all its laws and properties, should have been created at all, or that fifty or five hundred new races of animals should have been created at certain epochs,—as that light falling on the sun-dial of Ahaz should have been there subjected to a local and temporary change in its reflection or refraction,[2] or that one or more new species of animals

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[1] Dr. Macculloch, whose respect for revelation and whose scientific attainments are alike indisputable, argues largely and ably for local creations. Some citations from his work and others, will be found in Note K.

[2] See Note L.

should have been created in a desert island, or that many individuals should have been healed of blindness and paralysis in a manner exceeding human power; provided always that in the latter cases, as the former, the ends be fully worthy of the means.

It is not more unlikely that the Russian Czar should cause a newly-invented steam-telegraph to be constructed for communication from the port of Cronstadt to the Admiralty at Petersburg, than that he should cause to be equipped, for the first time, a whole fleet of steam-ships, for purposes of defence or discovery.

The one is an *isolated* novelty, and on a small scale; the others are a *class* of novelties, and of much greater magnitude; but if the former accomplish important ends, which could not otherwise be answered as well, it cannot be thought more unlikely than the latter.

But, further, the improbability of such a partial deviation from the previous order of nature, as we call a miracle, will become *less* than that of such creative acts as are not usually so called, if, so far as we can judge, the motive for the narrower deviation be of a *higher* kind.

In comparing them with this view, the creation of *man* is *not* an appropriate instance; inasmuch as that act, in the Christian estimate of his prospects, involves the *very* highest motives.

Let us now instance, therefore, in those creative acts which produced at a certain epoch the most perfect kinds of the *lower* animals, "as a new thing in the earth." There the motive, as far as we discern it, was the formation of creatures fitted for action and enjoyment in a new state of the earth's surface. So, likewise, in the supposed case of a new and much more *partial* creation, of one or more animal races in particular desert or separated regions,—as in Australasia, or on an island newly emerging from the sea,—the motive would appear the same. But in the still more partial and temporary "new things" testified of as done in the earth,—such as the manna created in the wilderness of Arabia, or the bread in the wilderness of Judæa,—the motive was, in the first case, to certify to moral beings the unity, revealed attributes, and declared will of the Supreme; in the second case, to attest a great and more developed system of Divine interposition, a wonderful act of mediation, reconcilement, and endless benefits, as truly coming from God, to a race who (we apprehend it would be superfluous to argue) were in urgent need of it.[1] Between the importance of the

[1] Some testimonies to this *need* are, however, given in Note I. already referred to at p. 38, above. Perhaps it might be still better proved, as Nares and Maclaine

former and of these *last*-named ends, there is, on such estimates as we are capable of, no assignable proportion.

There may, indeed, have been further and greater ends proposed and fulfilled (wise and sufficient ones there doubtless were) by the creation of the mastodon, megatherium, etc., than we can at all perceive or search out. Still had there been *only* such creatures on the earth, *happiness* in the proper sense (not mere animal enjoyment, but the peace, welfare, and progress of a fully conscious being, capable of moral excellence, and love to its Creator), could not, as far as we know, have existed here at all.

Whereas the miracles of the Mosaic and Christian dispensations, if real, were seals of truths regarding God's perfections and man's hopes, which had a sublime adaptness to produce *happiness,* and in unnumbered instances have produced it: the improbability, therefore, of such miracles, under the rule of a wise and good Being, is, in our judgment, *much less* than that of the formation of new animal races, such as have been at successive epochs created.

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severally suggested, by Mr. Hume's "Natural History of Religion." See the Bampton Lecture, 1805, and "Letters to Soame Jenyns;" as cited in Magee's Discourses, vol. ii. p. 270, note.

For, if we may trust our moral reasonings and sentiments at all, it is manifestly much less unlikely that such a Being should vary the habitual state and sequence of His works, in order to results of moral progress and true *happiness*, than for any purpose of an inferior kind, which, though it *may subserve* the higher in some ways which we cannot discern, will hardly be supposed necessary to it.

Whatever antecedent improbability there might appear to have been in God's giving such revelations, or in the miracles which attested them,—it is greatly diminished by considering the vast importance of the objects proposed. If all nature evinces to us, by one vast induction, the power and skill and beneficence of God,—but mankind, prompted by their vain imaginations and corrupt passions, turned from adoration of Him to the worship of feigned, imperfect, base divinities, a worship conducing to all evil,—and in other cases totally discarded religious obligation,—surely interpositions to overthrow or check delusions so pernicious, were by their benevolence worthy of the true God.

If we inhabited a world which, under the rule of a perfect Being, evil had not invaded, the greatest of all improbabilities, in our view, would be the permission of its inroad.

But since that *has* here occurred, the greatest

thenceforth must be, that such a Being should wholly omit interposing for its counteraction; and for eventually eliciting superior good from all permitted evils and appointed penalties.

Dr. Campbell, of Aberdeen, well said, "Whatever regards the interest of the human species, is a grander concern than what regards either the inanimate or the brute creation. If man was made for an after-state of immortality, whatever relates to that immortal state, or may conduce to prepare him for the fruition of it, must be immensely superior to that which concerns merely the transient enjoyments of the present life. How sublime, then, is the object which religion, and religion only, exhibits as the *ground* of supernatural interpositions!—the interest of *man*, a reasonable and moral agent, the only being in this lower world who bears in his soul the image of his Maker; not the interest of an individual, but of the kind; not for a limited duration, but for eternity: an object, at least in one respect, adequate to the majesty of God."[1]

Any weighty improbability of miracles being wrought for such an object seems disproved, and in the briefest form, by the proposition of Paley: "In whatever degree it is probable, or not very improbable, that a revelation should be commu-

[1] Dissertation on Miracles, pp. 74, 75,

nicated to mankind at all, in the same it is probable, or not very improbable, that miracles should be wrought."

Our argument (it may be needless to repeat) has not been designed to show that miracles are not generally, and, apart from the character of their specific use and end, very improbable. If *this* could be shown, their definition or name would be improper, and their utility in attestation of truth would cease. Cautious scrutiny is requisite as to the character of the testimonies for them; since the occurrence of real miracles, in a world where both deceit and credulity abound, must itself have led to the invention, and sometimes to the imagination, of others not real.

It has, however, been attempted to show, that the general improbability is less than *some* have deemed it to be; and further, that while a *great general* improbability may remain, it may be exceedingly less in particular cases, where they are to answer great and adequate ends.

The argument, if valid, places us at a satisfactory distance from Hume's position, that the improbability of miracles is insurmountable by any kind or degree of testimony; and should dispose us to a full belief, where the value of these attestations is so great, and the proof of them so strong, as in the case of those which confirm the Mosaic and Christian revelations.

It may be further useful to observe, that our argument, as employed in support both of theism and Christianity, assumes, that in regard to religion, as in secular life and conduct, we must take a very high probability as the proper ground of moral belief and action. In religion we are very prone to demand or covet demonstration; while we must yet acknowledge, that in all other cases, moral certainty, which means the highest probability (not to say very often a probability much lower) decides our belief and conduct.

Mathematical demonstration cannot be applied to spirit or will, to right or wrong, to consciousness present or future, to historical events or past occurrences.

Our faith in revealed religion may, I think, derive some further support from attending to this *parallelism* in the proofs for *it* and those for simple *theism*. We can no more expect demonstration of the one than the other. In the argument from the successive creation of races, we have built on the very high and conclusive probability, that no such beings did or could exist in the primary strata. It may be added, that the whole argument from design in any work of nature rests on the extreme probability—the overwhelming improbability of the contrary—that it was not an effect of chance. So in the case of works of human art: who can mathemati-

cally *demonstrate* even that a cathedral or a telescope were such? or that the supposed Druidical temple of Stonehenge, with its great oval and huge mortised stones, was not, like the basaltic columns of Staffa, the natural effect of some primitive terraqueous catastrophe or change? Even if we were present when either of these objects was being constructed, and thus could have the evidence of sense, we still cannot impart *that* sort of proof to those who were absent. They must be content with the highest probability:—that is, the extreme improbability of the contrary.[1]

So the truth of the Mosaic miracles cannot be "demonstrated." But we can see it to be exceedingly improbable that a whole nation should have kept up burdensome rites and ceremonies for so many ages, in testimony and commemoration of miracles which never took place, feigned

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[1] These instances, especially the two former of them, may appear extravagant to those who do not sufficiently consider that I am aiming to point out the exclusion, in numberless cases where the highest certainty is possessed, of that mathematical demonstration which some men of science appear to be alone satisfied with for complete and cogent proof.

See (for a curious citation from Warburton on this subject, and for some further remarks on belief in intelligent design) Note M.

for the very purpose of *binding* them to that pure and strict *monotheism,* and self-denying morality, to which they were so strongly *averse.*

Nor can the *resurrection of Christ* be mathematically proved. But we perceive the extreme improbability that this fact should be unreal, and yet be so circumstantially attested by professed eye-witnesses, and so variously assumed and implied to be undeniable, both by them and by multitudes who received their oral testimony, and who, with them, hazarded the loss of all temporal good, and often actually forfeited life or liberty by maintaining it.[1]

We perceive, moreover, that with this great improbability several other independent improbabilities—on the supposition that Christianity was a human fiction—are conjoined. These, however, as not being immediately relevant to our chief subject, I will not here enumerate.[2]

Students of Scripture, and of Church-history, know that there are several, and each one of distinct importance. The whole complex unlikelihood that the revelation should be a deceit or illusion, must consist of the sum (at least) of these distinct improbabilities.

Just as, in like manner, if we examine the

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[1] See Note N.

[2] See, however, for some of them, Note O.

stupendous mechanism of the worlds,—or the structure of plants and animals (from mosses up to man), or the instincts of living creatures, or the constitution of our own minds and moral feelings, or the changes which geology and osteology unfold, we find, in each case, a vast improbability, independent of, and differing from, the others, that such a class of facts was not the work of a designing, and creating, and ever-ruling mind.

But it is the sum of these separate improbabilities,—and indeed of the numerous improbabilities that each class combines,—which forms the total *incredibility* of either natural or revealed religion being untrue.

Our primary purpose has been to show, that some subtraction may be justly made from the supposed improbability of miracles in general; and a much greater from that of particular miracles wrought for the highest ends.

A second object has been to point out the reasonableness of expecting no more than those high and determining probabilities,—which govern belief in secular life, and should do so in natural theology,—to be afforded us in proof of *revelation*. Illustrations of practical belief, grounded on probabilities much lower, abound on all sides in common life, and never so much, perhaps, as in the present age.

I enter the extensive "store" of a chemist, where prussic acid, arsenic, morphia, laudanum, cannabis sativa, and various other mortal poisons are at hand. I find the dispensers busy and hurried amidst these perilous yet medicinal substances. The prescription which I bring directs a small portion of one or other of them to be employed. Here I act in faith on man's trust-worthiness and circumspection, and on God's good providence; for if I use for myself or others the drops prepared, it must be without *any* "demonstration" either that care has been exercised, or that disease will be relieved.

I glide, by force of steam, over embankments and through tunnels, with a prevailing faith that I shall reach my destination. In this case, also, my trust is in the high probability of safety, under the same precautions of science and the same guardian Eye.

If I wait for the demonstrations either of my own eyes or of the mathematics, it will be long ere I take either the anodyne or the journey.

An emigrant sells his property and embarks for Australia. He justly reckons on the extreme improbability that the climate of those regions should have been falsely or incorrectly described, or should have since changed to a Siberian coldness; that an unprecedented deluge should have covered them; or that the concurring statements

which he has received from friends as to their own experience and the general prospect, should be forged or insincere; as well as the cheering though *less* improbability of his losing his life or possessions on the ocean.[1] Indeed, whether he pass to that hemisphere or remain in *this*, he *must*, to a great extent, "live by faith," and not "by sight," nor by demonstration. That the sun will rise to-morrow, or that his own powers and aims will be then what they are to-day, cannot be proved by either means. If, then, there can be no other means whatever of regulating belief and action in ordinary life, it is but congruous that, on like grounds, we should be taught to believe in what is the true basis of *any* probability,—a governing, sustaining Deity.

And if on such grounds we believe in a God, why should we not credit, on like grounds, the written records of His will and of His gracious acts and purposes? Were we to reject revelation on account of this character of its evidence, we should be but consistent in refusing the highest probability as a ground of belief and conduct in

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[1] Of course it is no way meant to intimate or admit that the evidences and issues in religion are no more certain than in some of the cases now referred to. On the contrary, our argument is from the "much *lower* probability," on which men daily trust and act in these cases.

all other cases: especially where the adoption of it would involve hardship or danger.

We may remark further, in the way of parallel, that this evidence of probability is in each case growing and cumulative, both by means of larger acquaintance with contemporaneous facts, and by new ones evolved with the progress of time.

Thus in the various affairs and enterprises of life, it augments by the continuation of the settled order of nature, as well as by enlarged experience and science,—whether as to the general principles and issues of human conduct, or the diversity of physical facts.

Thus, also, in regard to natural theology, it increases by the geological proofs accruing for a succession of creative acts; by the continually enlarging catalogue of newly-observed instances of design; and by that perennial order generally in the works and movements of creation, which ought daily to confirm our trust in its almighty and all-wise Ruler.

Lastly, in reference to Christianity, this evidence is progressively strengthened by the continued or the enlarging fulfilments of prophecies,—such as the separateness of the Jewish people, and the extending demolition of idolatry; by incidental discoveries of travellers or antiquarians, frequently hostile or indifferent to the cause (such as inscriptions, paintings, hieroglyphics, medals), which

corroborate former prophetic or historic proof; by collateral inferences from the discoveries of science, such as are now offered, which weaken previous sceptical objections; by those new instances (let me add) of the transforming power of Christian faith among all nations which, from age to age, our documents and observations supply; and if we have ourselves been taught cordially to receive it, then by that surest and happiest of confirmatory proofs, the personal sense of its renovating power—its sufficiency in the hand of God to console and tranquillize, to impel, and animate, and exalt us.

The phenomena of geology have been well designated as the "great stone book;"—a book that shows our wonderful poet who found "sermons in stones," to have been more of a prophet than he knew.

But this "stone book," however antique and vast,—and, like the heavens, "the work of God's fingers," recording His power and skill,—is yet, like the broken "tables of stone" at Sinai, or the brazen eagle in some cathedrals, a cold, lifeless, fruitless thing, *except* we use it as a "stand" and basis for the book of heavenly light, for that really "illuminated" missive of hope, which when Divine mercy sends it, and "opens the eyes" and "hearts" of those who read, "shines" into those hearts, imprints there, from

its colourless and simple pages, the costly crimson and the "much fine gold," and makes them "living epistles, known and read of all men."

When this heaven-descended and glowing light impresses and expands the spirit, it developes, or rather creates, human characters in whom are holier, lovelier, and more God-like qualities (though mixed with much evil and defect), than I can at all ascertain or trace in the "Great First Cause" of the mechanic theists; much more than, in those delegated divinities, the "general laws" which actuate and guide, in their system, His so-called creation.

The transcendent value of this truth and hope is best exhibited by contrast; by turning awhile from the Uncreated Light whose grandeur and sphere are boundless, whose rays can warm and quicken innumerable minds,—to the chill darkness and detritus of a storm-beat world, the wear and tear of matter and of human life, a universe borne on by some hypothesis of "unswerving" self-executing "laws," or rather by some stern unintelligible fate, without any watchful Providence, much more without a Parent. Even the author of the "Vestiges" confesses himself "apt to think" his own "a dreary view of the Divine economy,"[1] till he has reasoned himself into a

[1] Ed. 2, p. 387. (In Ed. 3, omitted.)

better view of it, with what success I leave for others to decide. To me the "dreariness" remains, even in his "law-creating" or "mechanic" theism.

What, then, must be the wilder and outer darkness of absolute scepticism or virtual atheism! —Let the finest genius of that wretched school, the lamented Shelley, tell us, like one chanting the dirge of humanity, as if from his own billowy grave! He mourns over the dream of *life*, and exclaims,—

"'Tis *we* who lost in stormy visions keep
With phantoms an unprofitable strife,
And in mad trance, strike with our spirit's knife
Invulnerable nothings. *We* decay
Like corpses in a charnel: fear and grief
Convulse us and consume us day by day,
And cold hopes swarm like worms within our living clay!"

Let the nobly energetic protest from a poet of a different spirit, rebuke that dark lament. Be it uttered in the name of our race, so long as "there is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding."

"For *this* hath science searched, on weary wing,
By shore and sea—each mute and living thing;
—Or round the cope her living chariot driven,
And wheel'd in triumph through the signs of heaven?
Oh, star-eyed science, hast thou wandered there,
To waft us home the message of despair?

—Ah, me! the laurelled wreath that murder rears,
Blood-nurs'd, and watered by the widow's tears,
Seems not so foul, so tainted, and so dread,
As waves the night-shade round the sceptic's head.
What is the bigot's torch, the tyrant's chain?
I smile on death if heaven-ward hope remain.
But if the warring winds of nature's strife
Be all the faithless charter of my life,
Doom'd o'er the world's precarious scene to sweep,
Swift as the tempest travels on the deep;
To know delight but by her parting smile,
And toil, and wish, and weep *a little while;*
Then melt, ye elements, that form'd in vain
This troubled pulse and visionary brain!
Fade, ye wild flowers, memorials of my doom;
And sink, ye stars, that light me to the tomb!"

This poet, as we all know, could fervently invoke and apostrophize *Hope*. Hear him for one moment, thus—

"Daughter of Faith, awake, arise, illume
The dread unknown, the chaos of the tomb;
Melt and dispel, ye spectre doubts, that roll
Cimmerian darkness on the parting soul;
Fly, like the moon-eyed herald of dismay,
Chased on his night-steed by the star of day!
—What though each spark of earth-born rapture fly
The quivering lip, pale cheek, and closing eye!
Bright to the soul, thy seraph hands convey
The morning dream of life's eternal day;—
Then, then, the triumph and the trance begin,
And all the phœnix spirit burns within!"

Not that we *need*, on this great theme of our

revealed and undying expectations, the aid of metre or of genius: it may breathe the spirit of exulting poetry into the soberness of prose. Dr. Paley with his emphasis of calmness, ever so impressive, writes,—"It is an immense conclusion that there is a God." And we may add in the same tone—It is an *inestimable* conclusion that there is a *paternal* God: and that if His diverse voices,—the harmony of the spheres, the chorus of the forests, the still whispers of conscience, the deeper monitions of His Spirit, above all the silent eloquence of that last Divine Manifestation, the one grand hieroglyphic of His love;—if these be humbly and devoutly listened to with what Augustin calls "the heart's interior ear,"—then does He become verily "*our* Father," and we are growing (though rank, or opinion, or locality, or death divide us) into oneness as His children, rescued and adopted by that Love.

Thenceforth we shall trace, in literature and science, in the wonders of matter and the mysteries of mind, the present footsteps of our Great Father's wisdom, the cheering "vestiges" of His unceasing guardianship: then we may look ever onward and upward, to that high abode, where all our feeble and dim research shall be superseded by a glorious intuition of His works and ways, and in some sort, of His own perfections; where the best associations of time shall

merge in the one sublime institute for "the nations of the saved," from "every kindred, and tongue, and people,"—where the "Father of lights" shall, in Him that is "the brightness of His glory," be visibly revealed; and all our attainments and affections shall conspire to attract and uplift us endlessly towards *Him.*

ESSAY II.

PRESUMPTIVE ARGUMENT FROM THEISM FOR A FUTURE LIFE.

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ARGUMENT FROM THEISM FOR A FUTURE LIFE.

IT would too much enlarge this essay, and would also be foreign to our ulterior object, to review those testimonies for a future life which are afforded by the resurrection of our Lord, and by numerous circumstances related to that event.

Nor is it intended to present the several presumptive arguments—moral and metaphysical—which have been adduced for a life to come, both by heathen and modern philosophers; but to offer *one* such, which although rarely adduced —and, so far as I know or remember, only in a slight and passing way—appears of great weight; evincing the belief of a future life to be involved inseparably in all real theism; showing that the denial of the former strikes fatally at the latter, and assails thus the foundation of all moral truth; or that he who discards a life to come is virtually an atheist. This argument, although quite preliminary, will not be irrelevant. It may seem, at first view, no part of our following structure, but it is a pillar, or prop, directly

beneath it; and I do not judge that even real Christians—for whom this essay is written—are all so unassailable in the present day, by fundamental doubts, that they should negelct or repudiate any confirmatory or fundamental arguments.

In so momentous a question it is well, likewise, sometimes to weigh the alternative; to see how, if we should yield to doubts of a future life, those doubts would logically issue; and how thankful we should accordingly be for the concurrent proofs, both natural and revealed, which support our highest hope, and prevent "the foundations" from being mined and "destroyed."

I proceed, therefore, to develop this argument, —that if there be persons who suppose themselves to believe in a God, while they disbelieve any future life of man,[1] their belief in a God is only imaginary and nominal; inasmuch as their *notion* is that of a most imperfect being,—since they

[1] Halyburton, a Scottish writer against Deism, speaks of such a class, whom he names "mortal deists;" and Dr. Samuel Clarke mentions a "sort of deists" who have right apprehensions concerning the "natural attributes of God," and "seem, also, to have some notion of His moral perfections;" "but, then, having a prejudice against the immortality of human souls, they believe that men perish entirely at their death." He justly remarks afterwards, that these, as well as two other classes professing deism, are not "true deists." Clarke on the Attributes, p. 167.

necessarily limit and degrade either His power, wisdom, or goodness.

Strictly speaking, it is a denial of Deity to deny the *infinitude* of either of these essential attributes. But as we are soon lost in the contemplation of the infinite, it may quite suffice for our purpose to affirm, that whatever implies either of these perfections in God to be less than we can easily, and even must necessarily, conceive it to be, is virtually a denial of God.

Every truly benevolent man would assuredly perfect and prolong, if he had power to do so, the moral excellence and happiness of his fellow-men. Every true Christian undoubtedly would do this, in the largest and most elevated sense. It is his unfeigned desire that men should become perfectly good, and be made for ever happy; and as far as his devout benevolence is active, it must be his endeavour, instrumentally, to promote these great objects. Nor can we imagine, next to the love of his Creator, any conception or desire, in a creature, so enlarged, exalted, and excellent as this. Indeed, a Christian cherishes this desire, and pursues those objects, as a chief expression of his love to God; as being in strict coincidence with the Divine will.

But the supposition which we propose to examine—that there were a Creator, yet no future life for man—involves one of the three following

conclusions: either that the highest and best conceptions which are in the human mind, are not in the mind of its Creator, who is thus supposed to have given that which He *had* not; to originate ideas which He does not possess: or, secondly, that the Divine mind, although necessarily possessing those conceptions of benevolence which, in human minds, become dispositions, desires, and aims, does not itself carry out these conceptions into purposes or volitions; and thus has formed beings, many of whom have become morally better and nobler than itself: or, lastly, that the power of the Creator—although creation, especially the creation of mind, and above all, the creation of moral excellency, be the highest act of power conceivable — is, notwithstanding this vastness, so inexplicably limited, that He is unable to perfect the character and protract the existence of the minds which He hath formed. Briefly, it must be supposed, either that God *conceives* not the thought of a permanent happiness for man; or that He *wills* not to impart it, or that He *cannot* effectuate it.

Now, the first and the last of these conclusions —namely, either that the author of human minds does not *possess* the conceptions or ideas of human rectitude, happiness, and immortality, which He has caused those minds to be themselves capable of,—or that He is not *able* to extend

beyond a brief limit the existence of those very minds which He has himself created,—appear alike too preposterous to be for a moment entertained.

There remains, therefore, no conclusion for the so-called deist who denies a future life, except the second which was offered; namely, that the Creator, while necessarily having the conception of an enduring goodness and felicity for man—(and if God be Himself "good" and "blessed," He must have this conception most intimately and transcendently)—while, moreover, endowing many human minds with an earnest benevolent desire that these benefits be realized by others as well as by themselves,—and having also power to cause them to be realized,—has yet no prevalent desire, or *will,* to cause this. In brief, the God of him who denies a life to come, must be conceived of as a Being who knows what moral perfectness and abiding happiness are—who has caused, or capacitated good men to cherish this glorious aim as their "hearts' desire and prayer" for human-kind—who is able to carry this idea into act and effect—but who *will* not.

If there were no other God but such a phantom divinity as is thus set up in imagination by the disbeliever of a life to come, it could be no more culpable to attribute defects or evil qualities to such a being than to a Mercury or a Vishnu.

It would then, also, be a palpable error to designate the most philanthropic of men or Christians, or his sentiments and efforts, as *godlike*. It is fully admitted that to do so now, except in the most qualified and guarded sense—as intending that all goodness is *derived* from the perfection and influence of the true God—would be an arrogant and presumptuous folly. But to do so *then*, would, on the contrary, be a heavy derogation and slander. The practical wishes and endeavours of the true philanthropist would be then far *above* those of his Creator; nay, would be morally *opposed* to them. For what are exalted *conceptions* of good, accompanied with the power to effect it, but with no *will* to do so? What would they be in man or angel, but an enhancement of moral pravity?

How many Christian mechanics and cottagers (to pass by those of higher station and office), who, as visitors of the poor, or teachers in Sunday schools, sincerely pray and sedulously labour for the spiritual perfection and endless happiness of others, would be incomparably more worthy of reverence and esteem than the supposed divinity? Might we not more justifiably "worship and serve" such "creatures" than *such* a "Creator!" Unquestionably they would be examples, to Him that made them, of a sublimity and largeness of benevolence which were not in Himself, and

must be conceived to teach their Creator moral excellence, and provoke Him to love and to good works. So far, also, from being justly exhorted to say—"What have we that we have not received?" the thing formed might say, concerning Him that formed it,—I have a will to do good —to perfect and perpetuate happiness—which (whether He gave it to me or no) my Creator *has not,* and it is the very quality in which moral superiority consists.

To all this it may be objected—the argument proves far too much: it is perilously akin to that of some daring atheists, who affirm the existence of evil to be a proof that God either cannot or will not destroy it.

For it is evident that your human philanthropists, if they could have their choice, would not permit evil at all. They would have had neither sin nor suffering in the universe. And now that evil is here, their benevolence desires and implores a far more rapid and universal extinction of it. So that, by parity of reason, we must infer, according to your argument, a defect of wisdom or power in the Creator, or else a want of that moral goodness which exists in many of His creatures, from the very existence, or—taking things as they are—from the duration and very slow diminution of evil, which good men would have had, at first, excluded, and are

now benevolently earnest to see at once abolished.

I answer, this no way and in no sense follows, except it were first clearly proved that the permission of moral evil, and infliction or ordination of pain, and the partial prolongation of these, will not be productive of more good and happiness ultimately, than *could* any way have existed without those events. Man's benevolence, in his present life, although it may act *for* immortality, has but, as it were, a day or "a moment" to act *in*; whereas, the goodness of God, except it could be circumscribed and made powerless by such a disbelief as we are combating, has all duration in which to operate and fulfil its glorious ends.

Infinite room is left, on the supposition of the future life of all conscious beings, for the rectification of all evil, or the production of an incomparable overplus—the greatest possible—of goodness and felicity.[1] But the disbelief of a

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[1] De Lamartine, in his poem entitled "Reponse de Dieu," has finely introduced the Creator thus addressing man:—

"Tu n'as qu'un jour pour être juste,
J'ai l'éternité devant moi."

We ought to add, the above objection wrongly assumes that Christian philanthropy wills anything but the will of God. No Christian can hold that it were, on the whole, better that evil had not been, or that it should cease earlier than God ordains.

future life *annihilates* all this. It puts a speedy term and cessation to all created good. For he who denies a future life of man can have no right or reason to assume the moral perfection or immortality of any other species in any part of the creation. If man, who strongly conceives and desires these attainments, with devout aspirations and efforts for himself and for others, and whose capacity for them cannot be rationally doubted, is altogether deceived, and has become the sport or victim of a sublime illusion, just in proportion to the firmness of his hope and largeness of his charity; then what ground is there to believe that other creatures will attain that which he so vainly anticipates? But, obviously, there is no possibility of moral perfection combined with permanent happiness, if there are to be no conscious beings who shall possess and enjoy this boon: if all are to be extinguished as a succession of ephemeral shadows. And the higher we suppose the approaches to moral perfection and happiness to be, during the fleeting existence of any creatures, the more violence is done to our best conceptions and sentiments by their extinction. It is far more strange and cruel than as if a Phidias or a Canova should have crushed his finest statue, before or after it had received the last touches of his chisel. It would be the wilful demolition of what, as far as we know, is "the

noblest work of God;" a sort of infanticide by the Parent of all goodness and all being.

We repeat, what has been said in other forms, that—on the supposition of no life to come—man, who, as exalted by Christian principle, practically desires and expects that life for himself and others, alone participates that enlarged goodness which would be the highest attribute of Divinity. Nay, even apart from that *benevolence* on which we have insisted, the very *expectation* of such a good is a higher conception than would exist in the supposed Creator. The philosopher Plotinus "is said, by his biographer Porphyry, to have been ashamed of his person; not that it was deformed or disagreeable, but because he considered his mind as debased by the companionship of the body. On this ground, he disdained the thought of leaving any vestige of his personal appearance to his admiring disciples, and steadily resisted the importunities of his friend Amelius, who entreated him to sit for his likeness; observing, as he refused, that it was quite humiliation enough for his soul to put up with so unworthy a tenement during the short space of human life, without perpetuating the remembrance of its disgrace by the aid of painting or sculpture." [1]

In these views, no doubt, there was an extrava-

[1] Joyce on the Love of God, pp. 337–8.

gance almost ludicrous. Yet this man, however proud or eccentric, had, on the hypothesis we have been refuting, a really higher conception than the Divinity possessed; for he viewed the future and perfect existence of his own mind as a lofty reality, whereas the Divinity only conceived of it as a mere idea, a delusive, empty fiction.

But St. Paul, and Brainerd, and Martyn, had not merely the believing conception. They had the benevolent, expansive, earnest will. They devoted themselves to the immortal good of others. What little power they had was zealously employed by them. The will and aim they possessed intensely and illimitably. But the volition of good is surely a far nobler and diviner thing than the mere dormant *power* of conferring it. The practical will to enlarge and perpetuate good, which was eminently in these men, and which exists, in various degrees, in unnumbered living minds, is, on this hypothesis, a quality of a more excellent kind than any conceivable quality of the Divine mind. Goodness (in its moral sense) is surely *better* than anything which is *not* goodness; or rather, goodness alone is essentially and necessarily good. Power and knowledge may be great in an evil man or evil demon.

But in showing that, on this supposition, good men would be really more divine than their

Creator, we certainly show the very idea of God to be so disturbed and subverted by the hypothesis, that it amounts in truth to the worst sort of atheism. The God of him who denies a future life is not worthy of veneration and trust, nor in reality, we may now add, can be recognised as Creator; for although it may seem in some respects more contrary to reason to deny what have been termed the Creator's natural attributes, —and therefore in this argument I have adopted, almost necessarily, that hypothesis which impugns the moral,—this supposition is really, in another aspect, still more incompatible with the idea of a Creator. If the practical *volition* of the largest possible good, that *best* of qualities, be in man only, and not in God, how absurd to suppose that God imparted this chief excellency, which he did not possess. And if a good man's chief excellency were thus underived, why not all the inferior attributes and accidents of his being? If his goodness were not of God, which sets him above the fiend and the brute, why should his intellect or his organization be of God, in which these, respectively, may perhaps equal or excel him? Thus one would be driven upon absolute atheism. But how monstrous, and gloomy, and untenable the resource; and in this peculiar view of it still more so, as we conceive, than in others. For if it be inconceivable, as has been often

shown, that the living organized structures of this world are without an author and contriver, how far more inconceivable that the minds which excogitate and contrive human sciences and inventions are themselves without an author; but then how much more incredible still that a sublime *moral* quality, that of a benevolence which has no limit,—which would be the noblest we could conceive of in a perfect Being,—should arise in a multitude of these minds without an author or an archetype, as a perfection springing from *im*perfection, a moral good originating from evil; since the want or defect of such goodness in the first powers and sources of conscious existence, whatever the atheist will have them to be, must be an irremediable evil, precluding all rational hope.

In proportion as Christianity has elicited and matured in human minds the principle of a lofty and boundless benevolence, it has strengthened all anterior proof that there is a real Deity, a perfect possessor and originator of this moral goodness: and that, therefore (even apart from its positive declarations), moral perfection and happiness will, by such a Being, be conferred.

But we see and feel, notwithstanding, that this supreme Ruler permits much evil and misery, and that ills both moral and penal extend and are protracted under His administration,—with

whom "a thousand years are as one day,"—far beyond human calculations and wishes. Nor can this at all disprove the *optimism* of His methods and purposes who has all futurity and all immensity in which to carry out and achieve them.

Therefore (without adverting to revealed truth) it is evidently no consequence from what has been advanced, that the next life of any will be morally perfect and happy, except those who are seeking this by the best lights and succours that are here attainable. A brief digression may be allowed from our direct subject, in order to remark that He who, for the production of greater good on the whole, has permitted moral evil, and caused it to incur and to generate penal evil in this life, cannot be thought unlikely to prolong that conjunction in the next. If it be here designed as corrective of the delinquent, it is quite as apparently meant and adapted as a warning, to reclaim or preserve others; and this latter end may be more eminently answered by fuller and darker manifestations of it in the life to come.[1]

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[1] The realizing belief of a life to come is often most strong and vivid as the present life is just closing. "Adam Ferguson, when he had reached the very limits of time, was strangely permitted to have a glimpse of eternity. His last words, as narrated to us by a friend

That life, whatever be its character, is very near at hand. It is the sole interest or prospect which in a few years or months will subsist for us.

Should not its approaches prompt us seriously to investigate a religion which has developed in unexampled measures the moral goodness adverted to; which affords to those who cordially embrace it the highest of pledges, in the intervention of a Divine Mediator, for the Divine placability; and equally assures them of omnipotent aid in their advances towards moral perfection as the only basis of unmixed felicity?

The argument which precedes this digression, if it corroborate in any measure those evidences for a life to come, which our whole plea for the reunion and recognition of Christians pre-supposes, cannot be wholly unserviceable; and as belonging to the class of presumptive arguments, it accords with those which are next to follow, although the scope and object of the next essay be not directly the same.

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who knew him well, are among the most remarkable on record. Turning to his daughters who surrounded his death-bed, he exclaimed,—'There is another world!'" —*Edin. Rev.*, Jan., 1867, No. 255, p. 85.

ESSAY III.

REUNION AND RECOGNITION.

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SECTION I.

PRESUMPTIVE ARGUMENTS FOR REUNION AND RECOGNITION.

OUR whole scriptural revelation from God assumes and appeals to some measure of prior unwritten revelation, both as to truth and duty. St. Paul declares, "the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen; being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead."[1] David had long before written, "the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth His handiwork;"[2] affirming also that it is "the fool" (the depraved or infatuated) who "hath said in his heart, there is no God;"[3] and appealing to the frame of man, in proof of the Creator's attributes, "Understand, ye brutish among the people; and ye fools, when will ye be wise?

[1] Rom. i. 20. [2] Ps. xix. 1.
[3] Ps. xiv. and liii.

He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? He that formed the eye, shall He not see," etc.[1]

So, on the subject of duty and accountableness, Paul speaks to the Gentiles, as "knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things" (the crimes he had before mentioned) "are worthy of death;"[2] and as showing "the work of the law written in their hearts; their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another."[3]

Accordingly, though much of heathen and even of philosophic morality was wrong and corrupt in theory, and yet more in practice, we still find several great primary principles—such as truth, fidelity to promises, justice, filial piety, friendship, gratitude — strongly recognised and enjoined, and the opposite vices as strongly denounced and branded.

If even the Old Testament does not profess to lay the whole primary foundations of theology and morals, still less is this the work of the New. It recognises former revelations, both written and unwritten, and proceeds on that basis. Neither does it profess to disclose all that we desire to know. It makes, no doubt, inestimable ad-

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[1] Ps. xciv. 8, 9. [2] Rom. i. ult.

[3] Rom. ii. 15.

ditions to revealed knowledge, but it is far from supplying all that we may sometimes wish, or even, in some cases, all that we might perhaps expect.

For example, it plainly and fully promises a future life; which reason, combined probably with tradition, had led the heathen to expect or to conjecture, and which the Hebrew Scriptures had, by slight intimations, partially revealed. But it discloses very little concerning the manner of that life, its locality, its employments.

Indeed, reserve and brevity are nowhere more apparent than in what relates to the details of that most important prospect.

And this has often been noticed as among the presumptive arguments of truth; inasmuch as *pretended* revelation has usually aimed at a minuteness of disclosure and description strongly indicating human artifice.

But further, we do not always find explicitness in the New Testament, in cases where it would appear more reasonable to look for it; namely, in regard to certain leading points of morals.

That suicide is a crime, cannot, I apprehend, be absolutely proved from Scripture, except inferentially or by implication;—though the proof, in that manner, is *abundantly* conclusive.

It will be difficult to produce, from the New Testament, any direct inculcation of gratitude,

or condemnation of its opposite. And this omission may partly supply an answer to those unbelievers who have alleged the non-inculcation of patriotism and friendship as defects in gospel morals; as well as to the paradoxes of one defender of revelation, who, arguing from the abuse of these, would have us regard them as dispositions essentially anti-christian.[1]

For no one, I imagine, will venture to assume, that because the inspired lawgiver, and the prophets, and the Divine Saviour, did not expressly enjoin gratitude or condemn the contrary, they did not estimate the one as a special duty, and the other as an odious offence. It may be admitted that the duty of gratitude and sin of ingratitude are *involved* in the command of "love to our neighbour;" but we should, I think, have expected, besides, a distinct injunction as to this most imperative occasion of evincing it; especially as there is some appearance of derogation from the duty or value of gratitude in Christ's sayings, "If ye love them [only] that love you, what reward have ye? Do not even the publicans so?"—"If ye love those only who love you, what thanks are ye entitled to; since even sinners love those who love them?"[2]

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[1] Soame Jenyns.

[2] Matt. v. 46; Luke vi. 32; Campbell's version.

These considerations, applicable by analogy to other subjects, should, I conceive, suffice to prevent our entertaining any presumptive doubt as to Christian reunion and recognition in the life to come, merely because the Scripture, and especially the New Testament, does not more explicitly promise them. Had the Gospel contained nothing from which recognition may be distinctly *inferred*, —had it not even declared that a future life will be *social*,—still, that future life being itself revealed, there would be the highest probability of both these things. Such has been, and is the habitual impression of the human mind, in connexion with natural or traditional expectations of a life to come. The references to a future state which we find in the works of heathen poets and philosophers, or which we gather from ancient and modern accounts of nations less civilised, are ever to a state of *society*, and, most commonly, to a state of *recognition*. Indeed, the former will be shown, in our future reasonings, forcibly to imply the latter, even were this latter nowhere expressly declared or anticipated.

Before adducing some passages illustrative of the opinion and expectation of heathens concerning a future life, I would premise that this is never regarded as a *firm, clear, and unvarying* belief, such as the corroborations and influences

of revelation alone can complete, but only as a somewhat vague and fluctuating prospect. On the other hand, I would also premise, that the amount of scepticism or unbelief which has existed, whether among the learned or the rude, no way subverts the general fact of such a prospect. It merely shows, that, in all ages and all ranks, from a proud, or sensual, or disputatious spirit, and from a dread of futurity, there has been a dogmatic resistance, or a subtle opposition to this opinion, in very many minds, both among Jews and Gentiles. But the notions invented and fortified by those Jews who "said in their hearts, there is no God," and by some sects of Gentile philosophy, can no more disprove that the general opinion—intuitive or traditional—was that of a Divine power and a life to come, than the existence of Spinoza, or Grimm, or Richard Carlisle, or their disciples, can do so in later times. When Cebes, in the Phædo, is represented as saying to Socrates—"Your doctrine concerning the souls meets with much distrust or disbelief among men, who imagine that it may perish and be lost in the day when man expires,"[1] —this describes the suspicion ever natural to the sensual or worldly, to minds averse from the prospect of futurity, and to those of an anxious

[1] Phædo, c. xiv.

questioning cast; but it does not, in my judgment, any way contravene the fact that there was, whether by nature or tradition, a prevalent, and all but universal forethought or presentiment of a future life as highly probable. To contend that ancient scepticism subverts this fact, seems to me a scarcely more tenable position than it would be to argue that the avowed or whispered unbelief of irreligious men in our own time and land disproves the widely diffused expectation of a future life among ourselves.

My direct object is to show that the heathen expected that life to be a state of *society* and *recognition;* but I have been induced to these previous remarks, as to their presentiment of a future life itself, by having examined an eminent modern writer's attempt to show that they had this only in degrees so slight as to be of no account.[1] The value of revelation may thus appear enhanced; but, in my humble opinion, the statements are not sustained on an impartial view of facts, while a kind of presumptive evidence is lost, which I cannot but think has *its* peculiar value as subsidiary to revelation.

In proceeding to adduce some passages from the ancient heathen as to the state of the departed,

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[1] Archbishop Whately's Essays on some Peculiarities of the Christian Religion, pp. 30–60, &c.

a portion may be fitly collected from their celebrated poets.

We find Achilles, after he has slain Hector, turning to lament Patroclus, and exclaiming, "Even if in Hades, others should forget the deceased, yet will I remember even there my beloved companion." [1]

When Ulysses is permitted to descend into that unseen region, he meets together the souls of Achilles and Patroclus, with those of Antilochus and Ajax, the former of whom (the son of Nestor), as we read in the Iliad, was chosen as a friend, when Patroclus fell, to announce his death to Achilles.[2] The soul of Achilles recognises Ulysses.[3] So had that of his own mother Anticleia,[4] who related many facts to him concerning the state of his family; and although her recognition of him did not take place till after partaking of the libation he had made to Pluto and Proserpine, the souls of Elpenor and Tiresias both knew him *before* that rite; nor is it mentioned to have preceeded the recognition by Achilles. Besides, in the twenty-fourth book we again read of Patroclus, Antilochus, and Ajax, as with Achilles in Hades, with the addition, "these conversed, or were associated around him;"[5] and on that occasion

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[1] Iliad, xxii. 1. 389. [2] Ibid. xviii. 1. 32.
[3] Odyssey, xi. 1. 471. [4] Ibid. xi. 1. 153. [5] Ibid. xxiv. 1. 19.

Achilles recognises and addresses Agamemnon (who joins them with his companions), and receives from him a long relation of events subsequent to his death. In the midst of this interview the souls of the suitors (slain by Ulysses) are conducted towards them, and Agamemnon recognises one of these, Amphimedon, as his former host, appealing to him whether he does not remember his coming to his house with Menelaus before the siege of Troy,[1] who tells him, in reply, that he "remembers all the facts to which he has referred," and relates others circumstantially in his turn. But for none of these occasions is any previous rite introduced or alluded to; whence it seems that the use of such was only supposed necessary to communication between a *living* visitant of Hades and the souls of the dead.

Anchises, in the Elysian abode, as described by Virgil,[2] recognises and greets his son with the warmest delight.[3]

These scenes indicate the prevailing opinion that there would be clear recognitions of each other by the departed, and distinct remembrance of what had happened in their preceding life.

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[1] Odyssey, xxiv. 1. 115. [2] Æneid, vi. 1. 684–695.
[3] Dryden's Virgil, vol. ii. p. 693.

Antigone (in the tragedy of Sophocles so named), when about to suffer a cruel death, exclaims—

"O tomb, O faithful couch, deep cavern'd house
Whence none escapes, and whither now I go
Unto mine own, of whom Proserpina
Hath ta'en the greatest number to the dead,
To whom I, last and wretchedest by far,
Descend, before my term of days expires;
But thither going, cherish most this hope,
To reach my father as his child belov'd,
Thee as thy dearest,—mother,—and thee too,
Departed brother, as thy sister dear."[1]

The shade of Darius, evoked in the Persæ of Æschylus, acts as one who has retained the habits of thought and feeling to which he was accustomed on earth.[2] The expressions of that supposed spectre will be cited in a subsequent page, to illustrate one particular opinion of the ancient Greeks respecting the dead; namely, that they were imagined to possess full and exact reminiscences of events which they had known in this life.

But we are led to similar conclusions by various passages in a very different class of ancient writers. Dr. Enfield, in his account of Pythagoras, and the very ancient sect which bore his name, states it as their doctrine, that "true friendship is a kind of union which is immortal."[3]

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[1] Antigone, 903–911. [2] Persæ, 656–840.

[3] Hist. of Philos. i. 392.

He refers, without citing them, to four passages in the life of this philosopher by Jamblichus. I cannot say that either in this or in the shorter biography by Porphyry, I have been able, on examination, to find *clear* statements of the kind. There is, however, a remarkable passage in the work of Jamblichus as follows:—"But much more wonderful were their aphorisms concerning the communion of divine good things, and concerning concord of mind, and concerning the Divine Spirit; for they constantly exhorted each other not to pluck asunder (or tear) the Divinity within them (*μὴ διασπᾶν τὸν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς θεόν*). Therefore their whole study in friendship, both in words and works, respected a certain mingling with the Divine (*θεοκρασία*),[1] and oneness with God, and fellowship of the mind with the Divine Spirit. But than this one can discover nothing better either proposed in discourse or practised in discipline. I think, indeed, that all the good things of friendship are comprised in it; and thus, including as in a compendium all the excellences which characterised Pythagorean friendship, I shall state no more concerning it."[2] Now, as this sect are fully declared to have held

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[1] Not in the Lexicons; but used by Jamblichus, whose book I cannot now re-examine.

[2] Jamb. de Vit. Pythag. c. 33. § 240.

the immortality of souls, the immortality of friendship seems in the foregoing passage most strongly implied.

The earnest expectation of human society and recognition hereafter, by those of the Greeks who believed in a future life, is most forcibly intimated by Socrates when he affirms—"Many, on losing by death the objects of their fond attachment, have willed by their own act to go into the world unseen, urged by the hope of there seeing and associating with those whom they desired."[1] And his own hope of this is variously stated in the same discourses; as where he says—"If I did not think that I should arrive first among other gods both wise and good, and then among deceased men better than those here, I should be wrong in not complaining of death; but now you well know that I hope to attain the society of good men; this, indeed, I may not be altogether positively sure of, but that I shall come to gods as rulers, who will be wholly good, you well know that I am as positively sure of, as any fact of the

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[1] Phædo, cap. xii. better translated (I think) by Cary, thus: "Have not many of their own accord wished to descend into Hades, on account of human objects of affection, their wives and sons, induced by this very hope of then seeing and being with those whom they have loved? and shall one who really loves wisdom not gladly go there?"

kind.[1] And, again, "I do not take it hard or repine to leave you and the rulers who are here, judging that I shall there meet with good rulers and companions no way inferior."[2] We find also the same hope clearly expressed in his Apology before the Judges, where he explicitly connects the prospect of society and recognition with that of a life to come.

"For," he says, "if one arriving in Hades, escaped from those who style themselves judges, shall find those truly judges who are said to judge there, Minos and Rhadamanthus, Æacus and Triptolemus, and whoever of the demigods were in this life righteous, then would that migration be an evil one? Or, again, to converse with Orpheus, and Musæus, and Hesiod, and Homer, at how much would any one of you prize this? For myself, I would choose even to die many times, if these things be true; for, to me, admirable would be the intercourse there, when I should meet Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and any other of the ancients who died through an unjust judgment. To compare my own sufferings with theirs would not I think be without delight, and above all to search and

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[1] Phædo, cap. viii., and Plato's works, vol. i. p. 66. Ed. Bohn. Ibid. p. 61.

[2] Phædo, cap. xiii. Ibid. vol. i. p. 68.

discover how they pass their life; which of them is wise and which only reputed so. What would one give, O judges, to converse with him who led the great armament to Troy, or with Ulysses, or thousands more whom one might name of men and women, with whom to discourse and associate would be a happiness wholly inconceivable."[1]

Towards the close of his dying discourses, he contrasts the desolate, unsocial condition of the wicked soul hereafter, with the *social* joy of the pure—"Such a spirit every one flies from and turns away, unwilling to be either a companion or a guide; but the soul which has passed through this life purely and fitly, obtaining gods as companions and leaders, dwells in the place appropriate for it."[2]

Cicero, in a well-known passage of his treatise

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[1] Apolog. Socrat. cap. xxxii. Plato's Works, vol i. p. 28, Ed. Bohn. A Latin version of this passage is in Cicero's Tusc. Quæst. l. i. § 41, and the Greek is quoted by Eusebius—Præpar. Evang. l. xiii. c. 10.

[2] Phædo, cap. lvii. Plato's works, vol. i. p. 117, Ed. Bohn. The sincerity of Socrates in these views has rarely, if ever, been impeached. A writer, who is quite disinclined in general to make such doctrines prominent, says of him, "No man ever faced death with greater calmness, for no man ever welcomed it as *a new birth to a higher state of being with greater faith.*" (Lewes's Biographical History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 207.) The passage is worthy of note, in both its positions.

on old age, thus speaks in the person of Cato the elder :—"I am impelled by the desire of seeing your fathers, whom I reverenced and loved; and yet not those only do I covet to meet whom I myself knew, but those also of whom I have heard and read, and myself have written—O illustrious day, when I shall go to that divine council and assembly of minds; when I shall depart from this throng and this impurity; for I shall go not to those only of whom I have before spoken, but also to my Cato, than whom no better man has lived, none more excellent in piety or kindness; whose corpse was by me committed to the funeral pile, which mine should have rather been by him; but his mind, not willingly quitting and often looking back towards me, departed to those regions whither he perceived that I myself should come; and this, my calamity, I seemed to bear with fortitude : not that I really had an equal mind; but he himself consoled me, judging that our distance and parting would not long continue."[1]

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[1] Ciceronis Cato Major, De Senectute, cap. xxiii.—It must here be observed, that I can no way acquiesce in the views of a distinguished prelate, respecting the "utter unbelief" of Cicero "in a future state."—(Whately's Essays, p. 127). The passages cited by him, do not, as it appears to me, establish that inference. It is readily admitted, as I have said elsewhere, that he and others

Cicero relates, in his treatise on divination, that Calanus, the Indian gymnosophist, who was very intimate with Alexander the Great, committed himself to the funeral pile in the presence of that monarch, and when Alexander asked if he had any wish to express, answered, "It is well; I shall shortly see thee;"[1] and Plutarch writes, "he said to the Macedonians, 'I shall see him in a little while at Babylon.'"[2] The conqueror died soon after in that city. This incident, which has been mentioned by Cicero as an

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had no "*fixed* belief or hope."—(Lecture on Missions, p. 8.) But it is only an *assertion* to say, that "the inconsistency in his writings did not arise from a corresponding hesitation and vacillation in his opinions."—(Whately's Essays, p. 54.) The view of his biographer, Dr. Middleton, appears much more just, that as "an Academic, though he believed in a future state, and was fond of the opinion, he believed it as probable only, not as certain; and probability admits variety in the stability of our persuasion." He adds—"Though we allow the passages in question to have all the force that they can possibly bear, and to express what Cicero really meant at that time, they prove nothing more, than that, agreeably to the principles of the Academy, he sometimes doubted what he generally believed. Whatever be the sense of them, it cannot be reasonable to oppose a few scattered hints, to what he had deliberately written on the other side of the question."- (Conyers Middleton's Life of Cicero, vol. ii. p. 514, abridged.)

[1] Cicero de Divinat. lib. i. c. 23, "propediem te videbo."

[2] Wrangham's Plutarch in Alex. vol. v.—280.

instance of the power of divination in the dying, is of course adduced here only as an example of the widely spread opinion of the recognition of the departed.

We may, further, collect this from Porphyry, who, in his account of the Indian philosophers, referring to their permitted suicides, remarks, "So stable and true do they, and also the multitude, believe the assertion to be, that souls, in another life, associate with each other."[1] All these instances (and those which will follow) imply reminiscence—self-reminiscence or consciousness of personal identity, and also remembrance of other persons and events. The popular belief of the ancients regarded those reminiscences (of the departed shades or manes) as very extensive and accurate. A special instance of this occurs in a historical narrative by the shade of Darius, when evoked on occasion of the defeats of his descendant Xerxes. The spectre says, ironically, in reference to the ill-fated expedition—

"And verily by that host a signal work was wrought,
Which ne'er can be forgotten; for it emptied out
The fallen stronghold Susa, as no war before,
E'er since imperial Jove conferr'd authority
On one man to control all Asia's fertile realms.

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[1] Porphyry on Abstinence from Animal Food. Taylor's translation, p. 160.

A Mede was first the leader of her mighty hosts,
And, after him, his son that dignity adorn'd;
For prudence steer'd the thoughts and passions of his soul.
The third was Cyrus, happy man, whose sway confirm'd
With all allies and friends the bands of amity,
But to his empire Lydia and the Phrygian tribes
Annex'd, and all Ionia by his forceful sword;
For Heaven resented not the deeds of that good prince.
The son of Cyrus was the fourth the host to rule;
And the fifth, Merdis, who disgrac'd his fatherland
And his ancestral throne; but him by secret stroke,
Artaphrenes the good within his palace slew,
Aided by friendly hands, and destin'd to the deed.
The sixth was Marafis, and Artaphrenes the seventh;
Then I next reach'd the imperial lot which I desir'd," etc.[1]

If, from these indications found in ancient authors, we turn to accounts of modern nations which remain heathen, whether the more civilised, or those in different stages of barbarism, we still find numerous traces of the same expectation.

"The word *death* never enters into the philosophy of Confucius: nor indeed, on common occasions, is it employed by the Chinese at the

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[1] Æschyl. Persæ, 758-781—translated almost lineally, and in the metre of the original, after the manner of the Germans.

present day. When a person departs this life, the common expression is, 'he has returned to his family.'[1] Confucius taught, that "the spirits of such as had performed their duty in life were permitted to visit their ancient habitations, or such places as might be appointed for receiving the homage of their descendants, on whom they had the power of conferring benefactions.'"[2]

The dreadful self-immolation of the Hindoo Suttees was founded on a belief of reunion and recognition. "The officiating Brahmin causes the widow to repeat the formulas, in which she prays that as long as fourteen Indrŭs reign, or as many years as there are hairs on her head, she may abide in heaven with her husband."

"The vedŭs and other shastrŭs recommend the deed, and promise the widow that she shall deliver her husband from hell, and enjoy a long happiness with him in heaven."[3]

"A man in the southern part of Kona" (a district in the island of Hawaii, or Owhyhee), "is said to have been conducted by a spirit to the lower regions, where he saw Tamehameha" (the

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[1] This expression singularly coincides with those phrases of the Old Testament which will be cited in the next section: he "was gathered unto his people."—"Thou shalt go to thy fathers."

[2] Barrow's China, pp. 45–67.

[3] Ward's View of the Hindoos, vol. ii. pp. 99 and 112.

former king), "who asked him by whom Hawaii was governed, and made several inquiries respecting his son Rihoriho, and his other children. Tamehameha then requested the man to return, and deliver a certain message to Kuakini, and also to Rihoriho the king." "The account given this evening of the Hawaiian *Hades* afforded another proof of the identity between the traditions of the Sandwich and Society islanders. Among the latter the spirits of the Areois, and priests of certain idols, went to Miru, where they lived much in the same way as the departed kings and heroes of Hawaii were supposed to do; or joining hands, they formed a circle with those that had gone before, and danced in one eternal round."[1]

"In some provinces" (of America), "upon the death of a cazique, or chief, a certain number of his wives, of his favourites, and of his slaves, were put to death, and interred together with him, that he might appear with the same dignity in his future station, and be waited upon by the same attendants. This persuasion is so deep-rooted that many of the deceased person's retainers offer themselves as voluntary victims, and court the privilege of accompanying their departed master, as a high distinction. It has been found

[1] Ellis's Tour through Hawaii, pp. 369–70.

difficult, on some occasions, to set bounds to this enthusiasm of affectionate duty, and to reduce the train of a favourite leader to such a number as the tribe could afford to spare."[1]

"Of the two great principles of natural religion,—the belief of a Deity, and of a future state,—it is remarkable, that the latter seems to be still more inseparable from our constitution than the former; a fact which coincides with a remark already made, that even absolute atheism does not exclude the possibility of our existing hereafter. Dr. Robertson, who admits that several tribes have been discovered, in America, which have no idea whatever of a Supreme Being, and no rites of religious worship, asserts, that the belief of a future existence may be traced from one extremity of America to the other; in some regions more faint and obscure, in others more perfectly developed, but nowhere unknown. The most uncivilised of its savage tribes do not apprehend death as the extinction of being."[2]

There are, indeed, exceptions to the almost universal expectation or presentiment of a life to come, occurring in a quite opposite class of persons to the savage tribes,—namely, the scientific materialists (and those who imbibe their doctrines),

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[1] Robertson's America, book iv. vol. ii. pp. 204–5.

[2] Stewart's Active and Moral Powers, vol. ii. pp. 242–3.

disclaiming all belief in, and sometimes, too, any wish for a future life. But these exceptions—of whichever class—do not disprove the almost universal expectation, any more than the professed atheism of a few men disproves the general belief in superhuman powers. An old writer fitly asks, "what if some men be blind, shall any conclude thence that sight is not natural to man?" We may add that some who have denied or strongly doubted of a future life, have yet at times expressed a hope of it. I have heard a foreign nobleman declare his utter scepticism and materialism; and yet state, "my father held precisely these opinions, but he died a Christian." A remarkable passage from the French encyclopedist D'Alembert, contained in his memoir of De Saci, is given by Professor Dugald Stewart as follows:—"Madame de Lambert, who for six years survived him, entertained and cherished the sentiment of friendship, so dear to her heart. With it she combined the more consolatory hope, which the beneficent Divinity gives to virtuous minds, the hope of being one day reunited, to weep no more at separation; that hope so adapted to soften the griefs of feeling hearts; the hope which suffering humanity so greatly needed, that it ran as it were to anticipate, before the supreme and Eternal Goodness Himself willed to present it.

"A profound sentiment, full of life,—deprived of

a cherished object which it could find no more, and unable to bear the gloomy thought of annihilation,—inspired and enlightened reason, so as to make it embrace with transport the precious prospect of immortal existence; the first desire of which must have had its birth, not in a cold philosophic head, but in a loving heart."

"Of the reality, therefore, and prevalence of this belief (however disfigured by superstition and ignorance), no one can doubt, who is either acquainted with the history of the ancient world, or with the voyages of our modern navigators; and the doctrine of a future state is in so far confirmed by the natural sentiments of mankind, without being at all affected by the accessory articles of belief, which vary in every different instance. 'That the souls of men survive the dissolution of the body,' says Cicero, 'we may consider as a truth, sanctioned by the universal belief of all nations.'"[1]

But this able author (Professor Dugald Stewart) had previously stated his own opinion, that belief in the existence of the Deity also, "derives support from the universal consent of all ages and nations. However contaminated with error, it will be found to be inseparable from the human

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[1] Stewart's Active and Moral Powers, vol. ii. p. 235, abridged.

mind. Now, unquestionably, the universal concurrence of mankind in the belief of any proposition, is a strong presumption, or rather a positive evidence, that this belief has a foundation in the principles of our nature." [1] He cites passages from Cicero, Lactantius, Seneca, Maximus Tyrius, Plutarch, all expressing the same idea—the presumption for the existence of the Deity arising from universal consent; and adds, "when, among an infinite variety of discordant systems, we find some opinions common to all, we are inevitably led to consider these opinions as possessing the highest evidence." [2]

Mr. Stewart, therefore, does not himself appear to allow the exceptions which Dr. Robertson has admitted. He elsewhere remarks, "if any tribe of men is to be found altogether destitute of religious impressions, it must be a tribe so sunk in the scale of civilisation as to have lost, at the same time, the other characteristical marks of a rational and moral nature." [3] Inasmuch, however, as the universality of popular consent in the belief of a future life is more generally allowed to be all but absolute, while that concerning a Deity is by some thought subject to more exceptions, it follows that the argument hence deducible

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[1] Active and Moral Powers, vol. ii. pp. 73, 74, abridged.
[2] Ibid. p. 77. [3] Ibid. p. 236.

for a future life is proportionately still more complete; and, I conceive, scarcely less so for a social life and a life of reunion and recognition; since these appear, from all the foregoing authorities, to have been, and still to be, through times and among races the most unlike and remote, involved in the creeds and expectations of mankind.

It is likely, however, that some Christians may be ready to reject this presumptive argument, grounded on universal consent, or even to view it as adverse to the doctrine we would support, because such flagrant errors, immoralities, and crimes have been connected with the opinion. But this objection either affects with equal force the similar argument for the being of God and for a future state, or else it does not invalidate that for future reunion and recognition. I think it invalidates neither. It shows, indeed, that all sentiments and creeds of fallen man have been corrupted, perverted, and abused by his depravity; but it cannot take off the force of arguments grounded on fundamental indelible persuasions of the human mind; arguments which it would be unwarrantable to set at nought.

Since the notions of a social condition, and of being connected with former associates of this life, are so bound up with the general belief of a life to come, even where that belief rests only on

the instinctive impressions of human nature, combined perhaps with some traditions of revealed truth, then how unquestionable, that a future existence being once revealed to man, the inference of a social state, and the further inference of reunion and recognition as highly probable, would irresistibly follow; and would not fail to be credible, even had there been not so much as any distinct implication of them.

It may be indeed (and I think has been) ingeniously objected, to arguments drawn from the universal belief of mankind, and especially of uncivilised nations,—that the belief in apparitions of the dead to the living was long universal, and yet is now held to have been groundless. Much real force, however, does not belong to this objection, although it has a plausible aspect. The anciently prevalent opinion of such apparitions strongly involves the belief of a separate being of the soul, or of another life; but the opinion or feeling itself—as to spectral appearances—is a sort of imaginative *supplement* or appendage to that prior belief, flowing from fear and other passions; and whether this appendage be groundless or not, (which cannot be certainly proved,) it leaves the general belief of the main facts—a future and a social life—wholly untouched.

SECTION II.

SCRIPTURAL GROUNDS FOR BELIEF IN REUNION AND RECOGNITION.

IT has been shown, in the former section, that the expectation of a social state, and of renewed intercourse with the companions of this life, is found strongly connected with the belief of a life to come, even where that belief rests only on instinctive impressions, combined, perhaps, with dim traditional light; and it is inferred that when a future existence was ascertained by revelation, those further expectations would irresistibly follow, and would be highly credible, even although there had been no clearly revealed intimation of them.

But the case is very different. We shall find that, both by the general spirit and particular statements of the New Testament, and by some intimations of the Old, such expectations are variously encouraged. Next to the beatific presence of God our Saviour—the essential and originating Good to which all must be subordinate,—there is no view which revelation gives of future happiness so prominent and constant as that of its being a *social* and *united* state.

In truth, it would else appear no way to accord with what is in so many forms announced concerning the Divine purpose and object in human salvation; that it is strictly and pre-eminently a *consociating uniting* scheme. This great and leading character of it we ought first attentively to investigate, in order to see how the descriptions of a future social and reunited state harmonise with, and are corroborated by it.

First, the New Testament abundantly declares, that it was the express purpose of Christ's mission to form a *society*; "to purify for Himself a peculiar (or treasured) people."[1] The office of His harbinger was "to make ready for the Lord a prepared people."[2] His own name was itself conferred because He should "save His *people* from their sins;"[3] which cannot be taken in a national sense, since vast numbers would reject him and perish amidst those crimes which their own historian records.

His followers are afterwards addressed as "a chosen race, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a *people* purchased or acquired,"—"who in time past were not a people, but are now the people

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[1] Λαὸν περιούσιον. Tit. ii. 14. Compare Septuag. Exod. xix. 5, and Deut. vii. 6.

[2] Luke i. 17.

[3] Matt. i. 21.

of God."[1] These phrases had been previously used of that Hebrew family who were a type of those that by "faith" are "the children of Abraham,"[2] "the father of all them that believe;"[3] for "the children of the promise are counted for the seed,"[4] and are the spiritual "people," or "Israel of God."[5]

The history of the former affords us emblems of that union which was designed to subsist in the latter. Israel, as a nation, had been "separated from among all the people of the earth to be Jehovah's inheritance."[6] And as that ancient people associated intimately with each other only, while they were also enjoined to "be circumspect and make no mention of the name of other gods, neither let it be heard out of their mouth,"[7] so Christ's people are "called unto the fellowship of our Lord;"[8] and while "their fellowship is with the Father and with His Son," they have also "fellowship one with another,"[9] and are described as not only "fellow-*citizens* with the

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[1] Λαὸς εἰς περιποίησιν. 1 Pet. ii. 9. Compare Septuag. Mal. iii. 7, and Isa. xliii. 20, 21.

[2] Gal. iii. 14, 17, 29. [3] Rom. iv. 11, 12; 16-18.

[4] Rom. ix. 8. [5] Gal. vi. 16. Compare Rom. ii. 28, 29.

[6] 1 Kings viii. 53. Compare Deut. xxxiii. 3. "He loved the peop'e. All his saints are in Thy hand."

[7] Ex. xxiii. 13. [8] 1 Cor. i. 9.

[9] 1 John i. 3 and 7.

saints, but of the household or family of God."[1]

Where a figure is used to describe them which does *not* express the most intimate union, it yet does strongly express a social state. "Fear not, little flock."[2] "There shall be one flock and one shepherd."[3]

But further, *secondly*, the New Testament declares not merely this social connexion between the followers of Christ, but also the closest spiritual relation or kindred. It proclaims, "As many as received Him, to them gave He power [or privilege] to become the children of God—being born not of the will of man, but of God."[4] "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the *sons* of God. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the *children* of God."[5] "Ye are all the sons of God by faith in Christ Jesus."[6]

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[1] Eph. ii. 19, οἰκεῖοι, inmates. [2] Luke xii. 32.

[3] John x. 16; μία ποίμνη. The word αὐλὴ in the preceding clause is "fold." The difference is not immaterial, for though the Gentiles would be one "flock," they cannot on earth be locally one "fold." Campbell and Luther thus render it.

[4] John i. 12. No reason appears why our version should here, and in Phil. ii. 15, and 1 John iii. 2, have, for τέκνα, the less comprehensive word "sons," as if the Almighty had not said, "I will be a Father unto you, and ye shall be my sons *and daughters*."—2 Cor. vi. 18.

[5] Rom. viii. 14 and 16. [6] Gal. iii. 26.

"Beloved, now are we the children of God."[1] "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God; and every one that loveth Him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of Him."[2] "Here mutual love is enjoined on this ground—that Christians are children of the same God. The sentiment has the air of an adage: *q. d.*—He who loves the parent will love the child."[3] And our Redeemer "bringing many sons unto glory," Himself owns them in this real and close relation; being "not ashamed to call them brethren; for both He that sanctifieth, and they who are sanctified are all of one [Father];"[4] and "forasmuch as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself, likewise, took part of the same."[5] Elsewhere they are described as pre-ordained "to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He should be the first-born [or chief] among many brethren."[6] Accordingly we read of "the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named."[7]

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[1] 1 John iii. 2.

[2] 1 John v. 1. Compare Jas. i. 18.

[3] Bloomfield in loc.

[4] Macknight in loc.

[5] Heb. ii. 10, 11, 14.

[6] Rom. viii. 29, and compare 1 Pet. i. 3 and 23, and 2 Pet. i. 4.

[7] Eph. iii. 15.

No one who at all believes the existence and nature of spirit, can account spiritual relations less real and vital than the corporeal. Mere consanguinity is a relation in that "flesh and blood," which "cannot inherit the kingdom of God." That the filial relation of Christians to God, and their fraternal relation to each other, were accounted by inspired men to be real and not metaphorical, is very manifest from the important *arguments* built upon them; as that of John for the duty of brotherly love,[1] and that of Paul for a consequent *heirship*; thus expressed, "if *children*, then *heirs;* heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ."[2] Further reference to this filial title and this heirship is found in Paul's address to the elders of Ephesus, "God is able to give you an *inheritance* among all them which are sanctified."[3]

But besides this, *thirdly*, as if in order to declare and illustrate a union between these "children," "brethren," and "joint-heirs," more vital

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[1] 1 John v. 1; compare iii. 14, 15, 16.

[2] Rom. viii. 17.

[3] Acts xx. 32. So Col. i. 12—"Hath made us meet for our portion of the lot (or inheritance) of the saints in light." See original, and compare that of Acts viii. 21, and xxvi. 18. It cannot be imagined that any territorial allotment is meant. But the contiguous lots of the kindred tribes in Canaan form an appropriate type of that social rest into which the sanctified shall enter.

and more strict than what subsists in natural relationship, figures are adopted, both from nature and art, to express this more strongly than any others we could devise. Thus our Saviour teaches, "I am the vine, ye the branches. He that abideth *in* me and I *in* him, the same bringeth forth much fruit."[1] The apostles compare the union of Christ and all believers to the closely cemented and attached connexion of materials in a building. St. Paul writes, "ye are built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being the chief corner stone; in whom all the building fitly framed together, groweth unto a holy temple in the Lord; in whom ye also are builded together, for a habitation of God through the Spirit."[2] And Peter, "To whom coming as unto a living stone—ye, also, as living stones, are built up together a spiritual house."[3] This image will appear forcibly expressive of close and durable union, when we consider that some edifices, made with hands before these texts were written, still remain.

But a yet more emphatic comparison is used. Our Lord is designated "Head over all to the church, which is His body;"[4] "Head of the church and Saviour of the body;"[5] that Head, from

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[1] John xv. 5. [2] Eph. ii. 20–22. [3] 1 Pet. ii. 4, 5.
[4] Eph. i. 22, 23. [5] Eph. v. 23, compare Col. i. 18.

whom the whole body, fitly joined together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth,"[1] "aided and knit together by joints and ligaments, increaseth with the increase of God."[2] So believers are elsewhere styled, "one body in Christ, and every one members one of another;"[3] "their bodies the members of Christ;"[4] "members of His body, and of His flesh, and of His bones."[5] They are described as "many," yet "one bread, one body;"[6] as "the body of Christ and members in particular:"[7] and the divine purpose in redemption is declared to be "to gather together in one (or unite under one head) all things in Christ:"[8] and, again, in reference to the two parts of the Church, the Jewish and Gentile, "to create the two in Himself into one new man, making peace;"[9] so "that the Gentiles should be co-heirs, and incorporate, and joint-partakers of His promise."[10] In conformity with which the same inspired writer says, "there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there

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[1] Eph. iv. 16.
[2] Col. ii. 19; and compare Eph. iv. 12.
[3] Rom. xii. 5, compare Eph. iv. 25.
[4] 1 Cor. vi. 15.
[5] Eph. v. 30.
[6] 1 Cor. x. 17.
[7] 1 Cor. xii. 27.
[8] Eph, i. 10, *ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι.*
[9] Eph. ii. 15, see original.
[10] Eph. iii. 6, *– συγκληρονόμα, καὶ σύσσωμα, καὶ συμμέτοχα.*

is neither male nor female, for ye are all one in Christ Jesus."[1] And to show how far the apostles were from going beyond our Lord in this, we may cite the still more singular and mysterious language of His prayer, "Holy Father, keep through Thine own name those whom Thou hast given me, that they may be one as we; . . . that they all may be one, as Thou, Father, in me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in us . . . that they may be one, even as we are one: I in them, and Thou in me, that they may be perfected into one."[2]

It will be found, *fourthly*, that the references of the New Testament to the future resurrection and assembling of Christians, fully correspond to this past and present uniting or incorporating design. Our Saviour appears to allude to the purposed oneness of His perfected followers, in the solemn declaration, "this is the Father's will—that of all *that* which (πᾶν ὃ) He hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise *it* up" (αὐτὸ) as one body, or intimately incorporated society, "at the last day."[3] And accordingly He declares, in the predictive promise of His second advent, that by "His angels" He will "gather

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[1] Gal. iii. 28. [2] John xvii. 11, 21, 22, 23.

[3] John vi. 39—The same allusion seems to be made to their present or earthly oneness in the preceding context, "all that which (πᾶν ὃ) the Father giveth me shall come to me."

together (ἐπισυνάξει) His elect from the four winds;"[1] as John the Baptist had previously foretold, "He will gather the wheat into His garner."[2] St. Paul has the same or cognate term in appealing to the same expected event, "we beseech you, by the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, and our gathering together unto Him."[3] So likewise he expresses to the Church at Corinth, the full assurance on the part of himself and his fellow-labourers of being presented unitedly with them to their adored Saviour. "We also believe and therefore speak, knowing that He which raised up the Lord Jesus, shall raise us up also by Jesus, and shall *present us with you.*"[4]

To the Colossians he writes—"You hath He reconciled, to present you holy and blameless and free from accusation in His sight;"—"when Christ is manifested, who is our life, then also *you with Him* shall be manifested in glory;"[5] and to the Ephesians, "Christ loved the church, and gave Himself for her, that he might present her (all her members conjointly) to Himself, a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing."[6] This quite accords with the

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[1] Mark xiii. 27. [2] Luke iii. 17.
[3] 2 Thess. ii. 1, ἐπισυναγωγῆς. [4] 2 Cor. iv, 13, 14.
[5] Col. i. 22 (Doddridge), and iii. 4.—See the original.
[6] Eph. v. 25–27 (Macknight). The Greek word ren-

predictive declarations, "Them which sleep in Jesus shall God bring *with Him.*" "The dead in Christ shall rise first." "Then we which are (whosoever may be) alive and remain, shall be caught up *together with them* in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air."[1]

So Jude ascribes praise "unto Him that is able to keep you from falling, and to present you faultless before the presence of His glory."[2]

Thus the New Testament fully shows, that while it was the great aim and labour of the apostles "to *present* every man perfect in Christ Jesus,"[3] it was also revealed to them, and expected by them, that there shall be a presentation of all the perfect to their Lord conjointly; as one redeemed, rejoicing brotherhood.

But we shall find, moreover, *fifthly*, that the revelation is not less clear, as to their continual *abode* with Him and with each other. Our Saviour's declaration to His followers on that subject is brief and simple, but distinct. "In

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dered "to present" in those passages, is used Matt. xxvi. 53—"Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father and He shall present to me (*παραστήσει μοι*) more than twelve legions of angels;" and Rom. xiv. 10—"We shall all be presented or placed before the judgment-seat of Christ." In each passage it conveys the idea of collective simultaneous presence.

[1] 1 Thess. iv. 14–17. [2] Jude, ver. 24. [3] Col. i. 28.

my Father's house are many mansions; I go to prepare a place for you"—not diverse mansions, but "a place for *you;*"—"and if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and receive you unto myself, that *where* I am there ye may also be."[1] How strictly with these words does Paul's simple statement accord, "and so ever with the Lord shall we be;"[2] and that of John, "we know that when He shall appear we shall be like Him, for *we shall see Him* as He is."[3] Nor can it be supposed that a promise already cited, "one flock, one shepherd," as referring to a more advanced and perfected state of the Church on earth, has no ulterior and happier reference to that above; a state to which our own version "one fold," would be yet more apposite. How well does it harmonize with that in the Apocalypse, which exclusively relates to the Church above; "the Lamb which is in the midst of the throne shall feed them, and shall lead them unto living fountains."[4] Nor can there well be words more descriptive of one society closely united, than those which immediately precede that text, "therefore are they before the throne of God, and serve Him day and night in His temple; and He that sitteth on the throne shall spread

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[1] John xiv. 2, 3. [2] 1 Thess. iv. 17.
[3] 1 John iii. 2. [4] Rev. vii. 17.

His tabernacle over them."[1] With these promises others in the same book, regarding individuals, are in full agreement; as "to Him that overcometh will I grant to sit with me in my throne," and "him will I make a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go no more out."[2] For thus to fix in His temple, and place even in the precinct of His throne, each one of those whom He makes "more than conquerors," is the very procedure needed to form one "holy" united "convocation." It will realize the exulting anticipative prospect of the apostle who had been caught up into paradise—"Ye are come unto the *city* of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem—unto the general assembly and church of the first born;"[3] and his similar language to the Ephesians—"God, who hath raised us up together, and made us *sit together* in heavenly places by Christ Jesus."[4] With this the phrase

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[1] Rev. vii. 15—*σκηνώσει ἐπ' αὐτούς*—obumbrabit (*i.e.* velut umbraculo proteget) eos. Erit ipsis *vice tabernaculi:* proteget eos contra æstum et injurias: (Pol. Synops. in loc.); that is, will shade them, will be to them in place of a tabernacle or covering, to protect from heat and harm. The image is that of an assembly under one overshadowing canopy; which our version, "shall dwell among them," does not convey.

[2] Rev. iii. 21 and 12.

[3] Heb. xii. 22, 23.

[4] Eph. ii. 6. Macknight—*συνεκάθισεν.*

of Peter is quite consonant, when he styles himself "a partaker (sharer in common, that is as to his title and expectation) of the glory that shall be revealed;"[1] and that of Paul, when viewing the Church collectively he writes—"there remaineth, therefore, a sabbatism (a continual social state of rest and devotion) to the people of God,"[2] as such.

We have the less reason to look for any material accession of evidence on these points from the scriptures of the Old Testament, because, in these, the intimations of a future life itself are confessedly less clear. But if it be found, on examination (*sixthly*), that as far as these slighter intimations are discoverable, the greater part of them do appear to imply, though it may be indistinctly, these same facts, the coincidence will be highly worthy of our notice.

We read of Abraham, "the father of all them that believe,"[3] that he "died in a good old age—

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[1] 1 Pet. v. 1, κοινωνός.—The use of this word is illustrated by Luke v. 10, "*Partners* with Simon;" by 1 Cor. x. 18, priests "that eat of the sacrifices, *partakers* of the altar;" 2 Cor. viii. 23, "Titus my *partner;*" Heb. x. 33, "Ye became *companions* of them that were so used." So the cognate word is used for the most intimately social act of Christians, "fellowship and breaking of bread."

[2] Heb. iv. 9.

[3] Rom. iv. 11, quoted above.

and *was gathered* to his people:"[1] according to the promise made him before the birth of Isaac—"thou shalt go to thy *fathers* in peace: thou shalt be buried in a good old age."[2] This patriarch was not *buried* with his "people," nor with his "fathers," but in the foreign land to which God called him. The same is recorded of Jacob, "he expired, and was *gathered unto his people*."[3] The phrase did not mean death; for the fact, he "expired" ("yielded up the ghost") *precedes*. It did not mean burial, for that *followed*, after an interval of very many days, in Canaan.[4]

The Lord promised Josiah, by the prophetess Huldah, "Because thy heart was tender, and thou hast humbled thyself, I will gather thee unto *thy fathers*, and thou shalt be gathered into thy grave in peace."[5] "When the days be expired," said Nathan to David, "that thou must go to be with thy fathers."[6]

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[1] Gen. xxv. 8. The same expression is used as to Isaac, chap. xxxv. 29. [2] Gen. xv. 15.

[3] Gen. xlix. ult. It is observable that the same word, "gather yourselves," is used at the beginning of the chapter, when Jacob calls his sons together to receive his blessing.

[4] See Gen. l. 3–5, &c.

[5] 2 Kings xxii. 20, and 2 Chron. xxxiv. 28.

[6] 1 Chron. xvii. 11.

If there had been no future life, these declarations and promises of being "gathered" to their "people," and to their "fathers," would have been but solemn mockeries; since there would have been in reality *no* "people," no "fathers," but only atoms dispersed through the elements. And if there *had* been a future life, but not social,—the state of spirits wandering in isolation, or promiscuous confusion,—even then the terms, "he was gathered to his people," "thou shalt go to thy fathers," "I will gather thee unto thy fathers," would appear devoid of all proper or distinct import.

The patriarch Jacob, when he believed his Joseph to have been *devoured*, said, "I will descend to my son in mourning to Sheol" (or Hades): not into *hell*, for he did not believe his son to be gone thither; nor into the *grave* properly so named, for he thought his son could have *no* burial; but into the region of the dead.[1]

David also said, on the death of his child, "I shall go to him, but he shall not return to me."[2]

When Abigail said to David, "the soul of my

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[1] See Leigh, quoted in Parkhurst's Lex. Heb. p. 709, on the word Sheol; and Gesenius on that word, and the word אסף gather.

[2] 2 Sam. xii. 23. The connective particle might as well be rendered "and," or "although."

Lord shall be bound in the bundle of life with the Lord thy God," she is interpreted by the Jews to have meant, not merely present safety, but union with God, and with the souls of His treasured people in the life to come.[1] Certainly the expression appears more appropriate to describe a closely united and abiding life in heaven, than any temporal preservation.

When Isaiah writes, "thy dead shall live, together with my dead body shall they arise,"[2] (or, even as Bishop Lowth renders it, "my deceased, they shall rise,") his language bears a similar character, suitable to future relation and union.

And when the expectation of the ancient saints is referred to by the apostle, it is as that of a social state, "a community never to be dissolved."[3] He declares that Abraham, "with Isaac and Jacob," joint-heirs of the same promise, "looked for" a much closer and more en-

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[1] See a Rabbinical comment on the words (1 Sam. xxv. 29), to that effect, in the Pugio Fidei of Martini, pars 3. dis. 2. c. 8. p. 487-8. The Jews inscribe this text on their tombs; (Pol. Synops. in loc.) a strong proof that this interpretation has been usual with them.

Abigail dixit—"Exit anima Domini mei ligata in ligatorio viventium:" id est, conservatorium ad modum gemmarum, &c.

[2] Isa. xxvi. 19.

[3] Bloomfield's note on Heb. xi. 9, 10.

during association than they had while "dwelling in tents;" even for the "*city*, having foundations, whose builder and maker is God,"[1] afterwards styled a "continuing city;"[2] adding, that God (who had said, "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob,"[3]) "is not ashamed to be called their God, inasmuch as He hath prepared for them a city," a "permanent abode;"[4] all which agrees with his language to the Philippians, "our community (or citizenship) is in the heavens."[5]

But it must further be remarked (*seventhly*), returning to the New Testament, how strongly and variously, in the writings of the apostles, is expressed on their part, the sympathy of joy and love towards their converts and brethren, and desire of presence with them; while a correspondent warmth of this sympathy from them is as clearly implied.

Thus, Paul to the Corinthians; "confiding in you all, that my joy is the joy of you all:"[6] to the Philippians; "I know that I shall abide, and continue with you all, for your furtherance and joy of faith, that your rejoicing in Christ Jesus

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[1] Heb. xi. 9, 10. [2] Heb. xiii. 14.
[3] Matt. xxii. 32; Mark xii. 26; and Luke xx. 37.
[4] Heb. xi. 16, Bloomfield's note.
[5] Phil. iii. 20, see original. [6] 2 Cor. ii. 3.

may abound through me by my coming to you again."[1]

He afterwards exhorts, "Fulfil ye my joy, that ye be like-minded, having the same love;"[2] and relates of a brother who had been sick, Epaphroditus, "he longed after you all;" adding, "I sent him, therefore, the more carefully, that when ye see him again, ye may rejoice, and that I may be the less sorrowful."[3]

To the Colossians he declares his sympathy with *all* Christians; "I would that ye knew what great conflict I have for you, and for them at Laodicea, and for as many as have *not* seen my face in the flesh, that their hearts might be comforted, being knit together in love."[4] To the Thessalonians he testifies like feelings in these fervent words, "Being affectionately desirous of you, we were willing to have imparted unto you not the gospel of God only, but also our own souls, because ye were dear to us;"[5] and again, "What thanks can we render to God for you, for all the joy wherewith we joy for your sakes before our God, night and day praying exceedingly, that we might see your face, and might perfect that which is lacking in your faith."[6]

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[1] Phil. i. 25, 26.
[2] Phil. ii. 2.
[3] Phil. ii. 26, 28.
[4] Col. ii. 1, 2.
[5] 1 Thess. ii. 8.
[6] 1 Thess. iii. 9, 10.

He had just mentioned the message brought by Timothy, "That ye have good remembrance of us always, desiring greatly to see us, as we also you."[1]

He assures that evangelist, "without ceasing I have remembrance of thee in my prayers, night and day, greatly desiring to see thee, being mindful of thy tears, that I may be filled with joy:"[2] and writes to Philemon, "We have great joy and consolation in thy love."[3] In the same spirit, the apostle John writes to the "elect lady and her children,"—"I trust to come unto you, and speak face to face, that our joy may be full."[4]

This feeling of intimately united enjoyment is expressed in these comprehensive terms by St. Paul, "If one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it."[5] And all this, it is important to consider, is but the carrying out of the second great commandment of the law, "thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," one of the two great bases of the revealed moral and social system. Our Lord's "new commandment" was but a modification, or special and more intimate application, of that great com-

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[1] 1 Thess. iii. 6.
[2] 2 Tim. i. 3, 4.
[3] Philem. ver. 7.
[4] 2 John v. 12.
[5] 1 Cor. xii. 26.

mand. "A new commandment give I unto you, that ye love one another, as I have loved you."[1] The apostle re-echoes it; "Beloved, let us love one another, for love is of God." "If we love one another, God dwelleth in us."[2] The sentiments, therefore, which were so strongly evinced in the apostolic age, were but the fulfilment and development of that simple and Divine injunction of the ancient law. That, and the "first great command" of "love to God," are the two grand pillars of human morality and happiness; and who can doubt that the top of them will reach to *heaven?* For it is equally apparent that the very same sentiment and prospect are extended to that social union of the saints hereafter, which we have already seen is largely promised. As the apostle names the Christians of Philippi at the time of writing, "My brethren, dearly beloved and longed for, my joy and crown,"[3] so he appeals to those of Thessalonica with respect to the future,—"What is our hope or joy, or crown of rejoicing? Are not even ye in the presence of our Lord Jesus Christ *at His coming?*"[4] And afterwards he prays, "the Lord make you to increase and abound in love, one toward another, and toward all, even as we toward you, to the

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[1] John xiii. 34. Compare xv. 12–17. [2] 1 John iv. 7–12.
[3] Phil. iv. 1. [4] 1 Thess. ii. 19.

end He may establish your hearts unblameable in holiness before God, even our Father, at *the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ* with *all His saints*."[1]

A main principle and quality, therefore, of that unblameable holiness which shall be exercised at the coming of the Lord, and in His presence, with all His saints, must be the grace of "love one toward another and toward all."

The same expectation is succinctly expressed to the Corinthians, "We are your rejoicing, even as ye also ours, *in the day* of the Lord Jesus."[2]

So our Lord Himself had said, "The reaper receiveth wages and gathereth fruit unto *life eternal*, that both the sower and the reaper may *together rejoice*."[3]

Everything here indicates a complete resemblance and harmony—nay, an unbroken continuity,—varying only by progressive exaltation and delight,—in the best sentiments of the renewed on earth and of the perfect in heaven.

Further, *eighthly*, the institution of that most affecting commemorative ordinance, "the Lord's supper," was immediately followed by our Saviour's emphatic words, "A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another;"

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[1] 1 Thess. iii. 12, 13. [2] 2 Cor. i. 14.
[3] John iv. 36.

which, in the sequel of the same discourse, are, with a slight variation, repeated.[1] His solemn prayer succeeding that discourse has the petitions already cited, "That they all may be one—one in us—perfected into one."[2] And the expression of St. Paul (also quoted in part already), "We, being many, are one bread, one body, for we all are partakers of that one bread,"[3] strongly intimates, that a collateral design of this ordinance was to impress, by a symbol, the importance of that affectionate oneness, which was, in connection with its appointment, so solemnly enjoined and invoked.

But then it appears also that this sacred festival will be virtually renewed or continued in the life to come. No other adequate meaning seems assignable to our Lord's declarations, "I grant unto you, as my Father hath granted me, a kingdom, to eat and to drink at my table in my kingdom;"[4] and at the close of the paschal supper, "I say unto you, I will not drink henceforth of the fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father's kingdom."[5] When He predicts to the Jews who rejected

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[1] John xiii. 34; xv. 12. [2] John xvii. 11, 21, 22.

[3] 1 Cor. x. 17.

[4] Luke xxii. 29, Dr. Campbell's version.

[5] Matt. xxvi. 29, compare Mark xiv. 25, and Luke xxii. 18.

Him, "They shall come from the east and west, and from the north and south, and shall *sit down* (*ἀνακλιθήσονται*) in the kingdom of God," the word is that often employed on occasion of a social repast or festivity, and might be well rendered "recline."[1] So the beloved disciple was commanded, "Write, blessed are they that are called to the marriage supper of the Lamb;" and reminded, "these are the true sayings of God."[2] It is true we cannot know or conceive what it will be to drink of the produce of the vine in the kingdom of God, and what the nature and manner of that festival, any more than what it is "to eat of the tree of life,"[3] or what the nature and aspect of the "spiritual body." Still we can discover no fitness or distinct import in these expressions, unless they signify the exalted enjoyments of a social assembly, at which the glorified Redeemer shall preside. And what *can* such a

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[1] Luke xiii. 29. The same word is used in the parallel passage, Matt. viii. 11. "Many. . . . shall *sit down* with Abraham," &c. So when Christ would feed the five thousand, "He commanded them (the disciples) to cause all to recline upon the green grass in companies." Mark vi. 39. He himself went into the Pharisee's house, and reclined at the table. Luke vii. 36. And his promise to the "watching servants" has the same term; "He shall make them to recline at the table, and will come forth and serve them." Luke xii. 37.

[2] Rev. xix. 9. [3] Rev. ii. 7.

festival be, where the rescued and beatified gaze on their infinite Benefactor,—what but a glowing social commemoration of His love,—what but a sublime exulting sacrament of endless gratitude together!

It has been thus, I think, amply evinced from the Christian Scriptures—first, that our Saviour's purpose was to form a *society;* secondly, that He originated with and between them the most real of *relations;* thirdly, that the *intimacy* of it is described by the very strongest comparisons we can imagine; fourthly, that the local *assembling* of this whole society, at His coming, is clearly promised; and, fifthly, not less so their everlasting *abode* with each other, and with Him.

We have seen, sixthly, that the references to these subjects in the Old Testament, however slight and brief, are yet in agreement with the prospects which a later revelation opens.

It has been shown, seventhly, that, not only is a reciprocal sympathy of love and joy between Christians in this life both recorded and strongly enjoined in the New Testament, but also the expectation of the same happy sympathy in the life to come; and, eighthly, that the renewal of especial "communion," by some joyful and exalted modification of that commemorative social rite which our Redeemer instituted, appears to be matter of promise.

To maintain, in the face of this collective evidence, that no near relation, and local assembling, and united abode, and festal convocation of glorified saints are revealed, would be to imitate those ancient neologians, who, with the Pentateuch in their hands, believed in "neither angel nor spirit;" and those others, who, with the Gospels before them, affirmed that there is "no resurrection," or that it is "past already."

But to admit that these things *are* revealed, to expect that the redeemed will arise together, will dwell together, will recline together at the same heavenly banquet, and yet that no mutual love and intimacy shall subsist, but every other sentiment be absorbed, or superseded, by the supreme love of God, if not as extensively contradictory to the letter of Scripture, would appear to me still more adverse to its spirit, and derogatory to the wisdom of its Author. It would be to suppose a perfect society, yet deny the noblest and happiest quality which can render it such; to exclude the very soul and essence of complacent association, and convert communion into a mere juxta-position. It would be to treat that "love" which St. Paul declares "is the bond of perfectness," and exhorts believers "above all things to put on,"[1] as only a transient bond of *imperfectness*, which the per-

[1] Col. iii. 14.

fect will put off. It would imply, that while the Redeemer asked for His disciples in glory a oneness, like that between His heavenly Father and Himself,[1]—the element of mutual love, which is repeatedly named in connection with that supreme oneness,[2] shall in their derived oneness have no place. It would suppose, that one of those two great commandments on which "hang all the law and the prophets"—that "love" which "is the fulfilling of the law,"[3]—and of which it is affirmed, that it "never faileth"—the grace, without which Paul declares himself and his gifts to be "nothing,"—will yet "vanish away;"[4] and the exercise of it "with a pure heart fervently," enjoined "above all things" here,[6] be found to have had no preparative intent towards its expansion and perpetuation, when this short life is exchanged for the exalted hereafter. The whole supposition would seem to rest on this strange assumption—that two modes of love will be incompatible in heaven, which are expressly inculcated as concurrent and connected, and even as indispensable to each other, on earth; for the apostle John writes, "He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God

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[1] John xvii. 22, 23.
[2] John xvii. 23, 24, 26.
[3] Rom. xiii. 10.
[4] 1 Cor. xiii. 2, 8.
[5] 1 Pet. i. 22, and iv. 8.

whom he hath not seen; and this commandment have we from Him; that he who loveth God love his brother also;[1] while on the other hand he declares, "by this we know that we love the children of God, when we love God and keep His commandments."[2] It would involve, also, a strange and vast exception to the conformity—which is ever spoken of as entire—between the glorified Head of the Church and the glorified members of it. Who has ever imagined, that the ineffable love of the Son of God to His eternal Father can any way interfere with His tender love to each of those whom He hath redeemed? And yet, in the case of those whose perfection consists in being like "Him," this supposition would appear to regard "fervent love" towards each other as hereafter inconsistent with supreme love towards the Author of salvation.

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[1] 1 John iv. 20, 21. [2] 1 John v. 2.

SECTION III.

INFERENCES FROM SCRIPTURAL GROUNDS.

BUT while the considerations which conclude the last section are, as I conceive, fairly and fitly urged against those (for such theologians there have been) who would have apparently banished from heaven all love except the love of God, I expect fully that most persons who doubt concerning future recognition will at once object, —those testimonies and arguments are for us quite superfluous, and appear not relevant to the question. We are so far from doubting the intimate oneness and fervent mutual love of the redeemed and glorified, that we hold them to be most distinctly revealed, and most important constituents of heavenly happiness. Our only doubt regards the personal recognition of those who knew each other on earth. This, if it be not the Divine will to grant it, cannot be necessary or important to the formation of the most intimate unions between saints above; and fellowship with perfected spirits must be perfectly happy, whether we knew and loved them in their state of imperfection or not; or, if we did, whether we become conscious of it or no. But this, which with us is

the only matter in question, you have thus far left untouched.

I answer, on the contrary, in what has been already advanced, and, as you admit, established, a secure and broad basis appears to me to be laid for that belief which you decline, or hesitate to adopt. If we have proved future society, intimacy, oneness, love, there remains nothing to prove but *knowledge;* nothing but that special kind of knowledge which consists in reminiscence and its results.

For the first question as to future recognition is,—Shall we know *ourselves* in the life to come? Shall we remember who and what we *ourselves* were on earth? A question which, it is presumed, no Christian will answer negatively.

Who will doubt that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in their heavenly state, are conscious of their own history; or imagine that Moses and Elias, when they spake with our Lord of His approaching "decease," were under an oblivion of their own past selves?

Christ manifestly implies the reminiscence of this life in a future state, when he represents Abraham as saying to the rich man, "Son, remember," and the rich man as distinctly calling to mind his "five brethren."[1]

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[1] Luke xvi. 28.

The language which our Saviour ascribes, after their resurrection and in the day of judgment, to those respectively whom he commends or condemns for their conduct towards His disciples,—"When saw we Thee," etc.; and the question of those who seek admission in that day,—"Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in Thy name," etc.[1] equally imply this. And the comment on those words anciently spoken to Moses, "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob: He is not the God of the dead, but of the living,"[2] declares in the departed saints a conscious identity or continuous being, to which reminiscence is essential.

For we have further to remark, that, even were no such intimations found in Scripture, this notion or fact of conscious identity, or reminiscence, is indispensable to that of a future life, properly so called. If that life succeeded to a life entirely forgotten, of which the mind was totally and for ever unconscious, the very notion of an *after*-life would be destroyed. Even supposing the first life to have somewhat modified or influenced the second, this would be no way a different thing to the being who was wholly *unconscious* of it, than as if his second state had been the first.

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[1] Matt. xxv. 37–44, and vii. 22. [2] Luke xx. 38.

Besides the Scripture proof, therefore, it is clear that if there be, properly speaking, a continuation or futurity of our present life at all, it must involve reminiscence, more or less perfect of the prior portion of it.[1]

But grant a self-reminiscence hereafter, even as imperfect as ours now is of past years,—grant the one local abode which Scripture assigns to the "just made perfect," grant, also, that communicative and sympathetic spirit which is inseparable from social amity: and then, how will it be conceivable that, in a state which is to continue always, recognition should *not* take place? Let two Christian friends or kinsmen be together in a city on earth, and it is very improbable that, by mutual research, and information of others, they should not, sooner or later discover each other; how much more so, in that heavenly city, where they will frequent one "general assembly" in their Lord's presence, and where their abode will never end.

This close and almost unavoidable consequence, of recognition from self-reminiscence, fully accounts for (while it is illustrated by) the views of the heathen detailed above. It is evident they

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[1] This the heathen, both civilized and savage, appear to have intuitively felt. We have found everywhere the belief of reminiscence and recognition connected with that of a life to come. See Section I. pp. 83-108, above.

could not conceive of a self-conscious and social state in which it would be otherwise.

But further, it is manifest from Scripture (as it is highly probable from reason), that a great *enlargement* of knowledge will in a future state take place. When Paul writes, "Whether there be tongues, they shall cease,—whether there be knowledge it shall vanish away," his obvious meaning is, that the *imperfections* of our present communication and acquirement of knowledge shall cease and vanish;—for he immediately adds, "We know in part:—but when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away;" our present imperfect amount and mode of knowledge shall by the "perfect" be superseded.

And then he subjoins, "Now we see in a mirror darkly, but then face to face; now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known."[1]

This last clause no doubt may have a special reference to the knowledge of God: but there is no reason why it should not refer also to the knowledge of His perfected creatures, and the whole passage include the expectation of a greatly augmented knowledge of His works and ways: which, indeed, appears necessarily involved

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[1] 1 Cor. xiii.

in the whole scriptural representation of future blessedness as a state of advancement and perfection.

Nothing, that I know of, can be conceived to exclude future recognition, except it were an express restriction and prevention of the Almighty.

But how altogether improbable this, that the very kind of knowledge should be forbidden, which love, the highest of graces, is most earnest to attain; that kind of knowledge also which, next to the knowledge of the Supreme, appears the highest and most interesting conceivable—the history and destiny of renewed, perfected, and immortal beings, whom we knew in their fallen state of danger and of sorrow.

How credible and likely, on the contrary, that there should be express and immediate provisions or facilities afforded by the Divine wisdom and benevolence for the recognition of the happy. Yet this supposition, though, as I think, exceedingly probable, is not requisite. A state of augmented knowledge and communication, which is to be gloriously permanent, will amply provide for the ultimate, if not immediate certainty of this. And if recognition—the assurance of its eventual certainty being given—were awhile delayed, that delay might in effect enhance the joy of its occurrence.

But, besides this general argument from the increase and perfection of knowledge in a future life, there are not wanting statements of Scripture with which the notion of non-recognition appears greatly at variance. We must look almost wholly to texts already mentioned; and I think it will be found, on the review of those numerous passages which have been cited under the eight heads foregoing, that with most of them this notion is in a greater or less degree discordant; while that of recognition agrees with all, and is by many of them suggested. Let the reader attentively review them, but especially examine those which affirm the joint presentation, and joint abode, and joyful sympathy of the risen saints;[1] reconsidering, particularly, Paul's language to the Churches, God "shall present *us with you.*"[2] "we shall be caught up *together with them,*" "and so shall we ever be with the Lord."[3] "What is our hope, or joy, or crown of rejoicing? Are not even ye in the presence of the Lord Jesus Christ at His coming?"[4] "We are your rejoicing, even as ye also ours, in the day of the Lord Jesus."[5]

Can these passages be fairly reconciled with

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[1] Section iii. pp. 44–53, and 60.
[2] 2 Cor. iv. 14.
[3] 1 Thess. iv. 17.
[4] 1 Thess. ii. 19.
[5] 2 Cor. i. 14.

the opinion that the apostle did not expect to recognise, in that blest assembly, "Clement and other his fellow-labourers, whose names are in the book of life,"[1] "Tryphena and Tryphosa—and the beloved Persis which laboured much in the Lord,"[2] or "Priscilla and Aquila his helpers in Christ Jesus,"[3] and "Timothy his own son in the faith;"[4] or that these persons, each knowing himself and herself, and remembering the past, would have no means of knowing Paul and each other? We need not say there can be no such thing as a *collective* personal recognition. If the apostle, therefore, will not recognise these individually and personally, it must only be by *faith* in their having attained to heaven that they could be then his "joy and crown of rejoicing." Unless we should imagine that it will be revealed to him—this group or assembly consists of the members of the Thessalonian Church, that of the Corinthian, etc., but, though they are all self-reminiscent, they are forbidden to communicate who each individually is. Nor would this forced device meet the difficulty of the words to the Corinthians, "we are your rejoicing." Paul, as an individual, could not be their rejoicing, if they recognised him not.

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[1] Phil. iv. 3.
[2] Rom. xvi. 12.
[3] Rom. xvi. 3.
[4] 1 Tim. i. 2.

When our Lord promises His apostles that they "shall eat and drink at His table, in His kingdom," is it credible that the friends and kinsmen, Peter, James, and John, each conscious of his own identity and history, each revolving the scenes of "the holy mount," and of the awful garden, which they beheld together, should be, there, mutually unknowing and unknown.

When Jesus said to the afflicted Martha, "Thy brother shall rise again," we cannot doubt that a reference was included to the final and immortal resurrection. His words would not only lose much of their consoling force if recognition were disbelieved, but there would seem a deviation from truth in exciting such a hope, if only the unknown Lazarus were to rise at last, with his consciousness of identity incommunicable. Lazarus was at once to rise, and to be joyfully recognised as her brother, yet with the painful forethought of a second parting. Is it to be conceived that he will rise at last, and *not* be so recognised, in a state which is to perfect and perpetuate love? So when our Saviour speaks of "Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, sitting down" (reclining as at a banquet) "in the kingdom of heaven," would it not be even absurd to suppose that the pious and perfected father, son, and grandson, while thus closely associated, and each conscious of his own character and history, continue strangers to each other?

Indeed, no one, I believe, can, with regard to those apostles or those patriarchs, really entertain the opinion.

But then, what shadow of reason is there, considering the whole spirit and genius of the Gospel, to doubt that the lowliest friends and kindred who have been associated as believers on earth shall recognise each other, as well as the most exalted? Who that has considered rightly the beatitudes and privileges announced in Scripture to the poor and lowly, can doubt that Christian kindred and friends in the rank of Bartimæus, or Eneas, or the lame man at the temple gate, or the widows clothed by Dorcas (whether they had been the subjects of miracles or not so), will be as much recognised in heaven by each other, and by their spiritual instructors, as if they had been apostles or patriarchs, kings or prophets?

The only passage, occurring to me, which it can be attempted to interpret as bearing the semblance of an intimation that attachments of Christian friendship and kindred shall not be in a future life renewed, is our Saviour's declaration to the Sadducees,—that the conjugal union shall not be formed or revived, in an earthly sense, hereafter. But no inference can be drawn from this, as to the ceasing of fraternal friendship and kindred between the "children of God," either in cases where that peculiar union preceded, or in

any other case. "They neither marry, nor are given in marriage," but they are "the children of God," arrived at the full dignity and blessedness of "heirs." The apostle declares of true Christians conjugally united, that they are "heirs together (joint-heirs)[1] of the grace of life," as Abraham and his immediate descendants were "joint-heirs of the same promise;" and the expression "joint-heirs," in the New Testament, appears to be applied exclusively to the inheritance above, which "life" also denotes.

It may be noticed, moreover, as to scriptural intimations of this prospect, that our Saviour seems to teach the mutual recognition of benefactors and beneficiaries in heaven, when he enjoins, "make yourselves friends by means of the mammon of unrighteousness, that when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting habitations;"[2] which I can only interpret and paraphrase thus; "procure to yourselves real friends by the beneficent use—especially in succours to the pious poor—of that wealth which is so often unrighteously acquired, retained, or expended; that, when ye go hence, those devout and grateful friends may recognise and receive and greet you in the everlasting habitations of the blest."

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[1] *συγκληρονόμοι.* 1 Pet. iii. 7.

[2] Luke xvi. 9.

SECTION IV.

OBJECTIONS.

TO this and to every doctrine, various objections may be doubtless offered; but if it possess so high a degree of probable evidence as to constitute sufficient proof, those must be very forcible and conclusive indeed, which would avail to set its truth aside.

A few shall be examined which I have observed to be most usual, or felt to be most considerable.

First, an objection may be raised, by previously inventing or adopting this opinion:—that mutual love or charity, though it will subsist and be a source of peace and of pleasure in heaven, will yet admit of no difference in degrees, no preferences for individuals; but will be equal or uniform to all the glorified, who, being all "blameless" and "perfect," will be all objects of the same regard in Christ:—that the value of recognition depends on our imagining the *reverse* of this; namely, that a different kind or degree of feeling is to be gratified towards and between some of those who are recognised:—that by these considerations the reason for desiring and for

granting recognition appears to be annulled:— and that, in the meantime, by excluding such an expectation, some pressing difficulties which would attend it are also excluded.

I answer, the reason for desiring it, which has now been mentioned, is by no means the only one for which recognition may be deemed important. If this reason did not exist, another great reason for desiring it would still remain, in those special motives of wondering adoration and glory to God our Saviour, which will arise from the history and experience of the saved; for these will surely be best appreciated and entered into by such as had been best acquainted with their state and course on earth.

But there is a prior answer: namely, that the opinion in question is a mere unsupported invention or hypothesis. Besides having (as far as I perceive) no particle of scriptural evidence, it is likewise quite contrary to the analogy of Scripture, and to those inferences which, except there were direct statements to preclude them, are fairly deducible from Scripture facts and precepts. We must ground such inferences on facts and precepts which relate to the present life.

Now, it is true, that exhortations to particular friendship are in the Scriptures not numerous; but neither are they wholly wanting. The sayings of Solomon are virtually preceptive; "A

friend loveth at all times, and a brother is born for adversity." "He that hath friends must show himself friendly, and there is a friend that sticketh closer than a brother."

His direct injunction also is forcible, "Thy own friend and thy father's friend forsake not." And Job has said, "Shame to the man who despiseth (or is wanting to) his friend."[1]

Further, if we consider some eminent scriptural examples, the conclusion as to friendship will likewise be, that it is not only allowable, but very commendable.

David, while yet a youth, "behaved himself wisely in all his ways, and the Lord was with him."[2] One of these ways was (as we read in the same chapter[3]) that "the soul of Jonathan was knit with the soul of David."

Afterwards, in circumstances of peril, it is recorded of these friends, "they kissed one another, and wept one with another, until David exceeded."[4] On his friend's death, David wrote "I am distressed for thee, my brother Jonathan;"[5] and he showed kindness for his sake to his son.[6]

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[1] Job vi. 14. Dr. Mason Good, I think, successfully vindicates this his rendering of the passage. See note in loc. at p. 75 of his work on Job.

[2] 1 Sam. xviii. 14.

[3] 1 Sam. xviii. 1.

[4] 1 Sam. xx. 41.

[5] 2 Sam. i. 26.

[6] 2 Sam. ix. 7.

Job's prayers for his friends procured for himself the "turning of his captivity," or reversal of his affliction.[1]

"Jesus loved Martha, and her sister, and Lazarus," evidently with a special and earnest regard. He so "groaned" and "wept" over the grave of the last, that the Jews exclaimed, "Behold how he loved him."[2]

There was "one of the twelve," whom our Lord honoured with peculiar love and preference.[3]

Paul was strongly attached to Timothy, whom he styled his "own son in the faith," his "dearly beloved son;" to Titus, whom he addressed in nearly the same terms; and (in different degrees, no doubt) to Philemon, Epaphroditus and others. And what ground have we to suppose that what was spiritually right and profitable on earth will not be so in heaven; that what was not any way obstructive to the love of God and of His universal Church, in this world, will become so when the love of God and of His Church shall be exceedingly heightened and perfected in another?

Inequality and variety in each rank of creatures, and in their several relations, are found

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[1] Job xlii. 10. [2] John xi. 5, 36.

[3] See on this the beautiful remarks of Robert Hall. Works, vol. i. p. 386. Funeral Sermon for Dr. Ryland.

prevailing on a vast scale throughout the known creation. "One star differeth from another:" so one human being differs widely from another, and so their respective and reciprocal sympathies.

Why, when they ascend, as we hope, amongst or above the "stars," should not the same analogies still subsist and reign?

I am far from supposing, that the feelings of the nearest *kindred* who are Christians are in every case to be more strongly drawn towards each other hereafter, than those of some who are not so related. It is not so here. "Better is a neighbour near, (near by affection or intimacy as well as place,[1]) than a brother afar off;" and "there is a friend that sticketh closer than a brother."

Sometimes, even between Christian kindred, though there be substantial affection, there is little special congeniality; and as we have no ground to suppose that minds hereafter—however intellectually exalted or developed, as well as spiritually perfected—will entirely lose their original stamp and temperament, so it is not to be doubted, that the same peculiar sympathies which have attracted and united Christian friends on earth, will continue to do so above.

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[1] Proverbs xxvii. 10. This seems to be Solomon's meaning. See Holden on Prov. Notes, p. 347. The Septuagint renders it "a friend near."

Again, while the fact that all the glorified are "perfected," no way implies equality of exaltation, neither does it at all imply that those who have equal spiritual exaltation, must, therefore, be always most closely associated or attached. It is not so, even here. Still less is it likely to be so in heaven, where moral perfection, of course, includes (and let the arrogant and vain revolve this) a perfect humility.

I return, however, to a former remark—namely, that to imagine a uniformity or equality, either of state or affection, in the "multitude" of the redeemed hereafter, is a baseless arbitrary supposition, without scriptural plea, and no way harmonising with the fitness and beauty of those diversities which we see pervading the arrangements of the all-wise Creator.

An objection can have for me no strength, which (so far as I discover) has no fact, no declaration, no fair inference, no analogy for its support.

There is a second, which I regard as not so artificial, or more likely to suggest itself spontaneously to the mind.

That which we have just examined seems framed on the opinion, that, if there were recognition hereafter, we might love some individuals too much. But it appears to me more naturally to occur (even to minds susceptible of great

general good-will, and of strong special affection), that if there be recognition, there may be some in heaven whom we shall love too little. There are those who have had to encounter unkindnesses or injuries (at least so deemed) from some, whom they are yet bound in charity to believe they shall meet in heaven. They have forgiven, but they are not able wholly to forget, or to feel a deeply cordial and entire esteem.

It must also frequently happen, even without such alienations as these, that persons have been brought into Christian connexion or intercourse with others of exceedingly different mental habits, and have found, as it respects some of these, difficulty in exercising as warm a regard as they would desire to cultivate. Even on that great uniting and sympathetic theme, "the Gospel," there may have been, from want of educational affinities, or from great dissimilitude of taste, a something like repulsion.

Now, if this difficulty prevail in any minds from the first-named aspect of the objection, namely, that there may be danger of some residue and tincture, in a future state of bliss, of former alienations, resentments, or disgusts,—they must strangely forget or misconceive the moral and spiritual perfection of that state.

They should consider, moreover, that our provocations of such feelings have been, more or less,

reciprocal; we all have something in us to be disliked and to be forgiven, as each finds in others something to dislike and to forgive; but we have read and believed that all are to be "presented faultless;" without which there could be no heaven. And, surely, the pattern of His love, whom His saints are to resemble, who declares concerning the rebels and transgressors that He has renewed, "their sins and their iniquities will I remember no more,"[1] must shame us out of any apprehension that the thought of past offences can mar the completeness of our love to joint-heirs of the same salvation and the same perfection.

If the difficulty, on the other hand, relate merely to the supposed want, or less degree, of mental affinity, it has been, in a great measure, already met, while answering the objection which preceded.

If it was then shown to be in full harmony with Scripture to believe that we shall love some hereafter with a more peculiar regard, this plainly involves our loving others less intimately.

No doubt all real defects will be removed in all the perfected, but it is presumable that there will remain nevertheless, some of those original diver-

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[1] Heb. viii. 12, and x. 17.

sities which we have observed to characterise all the works of God.

The thought of limiting the employments, or joys, or inclinations of heaven to sameness, has no sanction, either from Scripture or the analogy of nature; although doubtless, the one grand element and impulse, that of love to the Supreme, and devotedness to His will, must ever pervade and hallow and beatify whatever is subordinate.

A third objection remains, which certainly has far greater strength than those, and is, I believe, in many minds the very chief, if not the only real one.

It is, too obviously, this,—that the anxious and fruitless search for friends who have come short of heaven, or the dreadful information as to their absence which may preclude that search, could not but be a fearful subtraction from the happiness of loving and tender spirits.

It is an objection which, to parent or child, wife and husband, or any attached relative or friend, must have a most distressing force; nor may it be possible wholly to overcome or banish it.

This should, however, be remembered, which, I suspect, is very commonly overlooked,—that, in the *denial* or *disbelief* of future recognition, there is necessarily implied a prospect of *universal uncertainty* as to the issues of death with respect to

friends and kindred, which would *likewise* seem at variance with heavenly enjoyment; and if it were less poignant in character and degree, than an actual knowledge of the misery of some, would yet be at once more extensive, and more harassing, as including doubts (which might be groundless) on the state of others, for whom only a fearful and dubious hope had been cherished.

But, in truth, were the annihilation—by a complete oblivion—of these special remembrances and feelings ordained (which with regard to the recollection of the lost appears not improbable), still the ascertained misery of multitudes among our "brethren" of mankind, though personally unknown or unremembered, would seem, in a state of high sensibility and benevolence, enough to mar or embitter happiness.

The obvious reply will be, that whatever is quite compatible with the bliss of Him who is supremely benevolent, whose name is "Love," and "none is good save Him," cannot be proved or even believed to be not compatible with the bliss of creatures who shall be wholly like Him.

It may be added, that probably the sense of brotherhood in a common nature, and, also, the far deeper feeling of special kindred, or alliance, or attachment of any kind, may be all annulled by the distant perception that any who have been so linked with us (however closely) are wilfully

disconnected and severed from our Divine Head, and from the whole body that has real life through Him.

Such a feeling of entire alienation and disjunction, profoundly mournful as it is, would blunt the peculiar pain.

But the more conclusive answer to this objection (if we may again offer it to those affectionate minds for whom the difficulty must be more distressful) I conceive to be found in this fact, that non-recognition would involve an uncertainty in all cases as to the state of friends, even of the dearest,—the pain of which nothing, except a total oblivion brought upon the whole past, or a total abolition of our strongest natural sympathies, could preclude.

For those, however, who still feel, and undoubtedly they will be many, that nothing can be conceived to suffice for "perfect peace," without an absolute oblivion of any dear to us that may "come short" of heaven, I would add that this is a supposition to my own mind far more credible, than that which non-recognition or a denial of recognition involves,—namely, either uncertainty or total oblivion as to all that were known to us, whether saved or lost.

The objection, therefore, should, I think, be dismissed, as far as may be, from the mind, with other appalling and inscrutable aspects of the

great mystery of evil; and this the more decisively (by the aid of Him, without whom no painful feeling can be quelled), because at least it turns on a difficulty which its admission would not fully remove.

That measure of difficulty, which on any or every supposition remains, will be doubtless obviated hereafter, by His infinite wisdom and goodness who is Himself supremely benevolent and happy notwithstanding the evil that exists, and can make us perfectly benevolent and happy, notwithstanding the same.[1]

We cannot too deeply and gratefully meditate on the promised conformity and union of the

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[1] Archbishop Whately has written on this subject,—"As for the grief which a man may be supposed to feel for the loss—the total and final loss—of some who may have been dear to him on earth, as well as of vast multitudes, I fear, of his fellow-creatures, I have only this to remark: that a wise and good man in this life, though he never ceases to use his endeavours to reclaim the wicked, and to diminish every kind of evil and suffering, yet in cases where it is clear that no good can be done by him, strives as far as possible (though often without much success) to *withdraw* his thoughts from evil which he cannot lessen, but which still, in spite of his efforts, will often cloud his mind. We *cannot* at pleasure draw off our thoughts entirely from painful subjects which it is in *vain* to think of. The power to do this completely, when we will, would be a great increase of happiness; and this power, therefore, it is reasonable to suppose the blest will

renewed and glorified human nature with the divine, on its consequent incapacity for *painful* affections, and its necessarily complacent acquiescence in all the decisions of the One infinitely good and wise.

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possess in the world to come:—that they will occupy their minds entirely with the thought of things agreeable, and in which their exertions can be of service; and will be able, by an effort of the will, completely to banish and exclude every idea that might alloy their happiness."—Scripture Revelations of a Future State, pp. 281, 282: Fifth Edition.

SECTION V.

PRACTICAL LESSONS.

FROM this consolatory and animating prospect for real Christians—the reunion and recognition of the saints—and from the statements and arguments on which it has been grounded, we ought to deduce,—indeed, if we seriously believe in these things, we must be constrained to deduce,—several great moral and spiritual lessons, each of a practical character.

The first and most immediate will be, the unspeakable necessity to our happiness of such real personal renovation of heart as brings us into a true connexion with the Church of Christ, and alone prepares us to be for ever associated, in blessedness, with Him and His. Next to that most incalculable of calamities,—exclusion from vital and blissful union with God our Saviour, the sole fountain of life and peace,—must be the separation which unavoidably attends it, from the assembly of the perfect and glorified; and the dreadful alternative which this involves, of being connected, in doom, and character, and abode, with the unholy and condemned.

That prospect is so mournfully terrible, that I

shall not expatiate on it: perhaps my very inability or aversion may indicate its awfulness the more; and, assuredly, one effect of our whole subject should be to impress the *silent* consideration of *that* prospect on every mind; to awaken the deepest and most earnest gratitude, if we have good reason to hope that we are indeed "members of the body of Christ," and "heirs of the grace of life;" and if this be doubtful, then to excite intenser prayers and endeavours that we may more surely become such, and more entirely ascertain it.

Admit only, without aggravation or detail, the simple fact,—there are joys and woes beyond the grave, in the life when "time shall be no more,"—and what words can suffice to express the weight and urgency of this great question, Shall the joys, or the woes, be ours?

A second lesson, especially suggested likewise by the painful objection which was last discussed, will be, the vast importance of choosing really Christian alliances and connexions.

When the apostle wrote, "Become not discordantly yoked with unbelievers,"[1] and followed up his injunction with such pointed and cogent reasoning against that kind of connexions, he may have had in view primarily the bond of

[1] See Macknight's Version of 2 Cor. vi. 14.

marriage; but still must have meant to include all other intimate associations, co-operations, and friendships.

It has been well said, that "one must admire the rich variety of expression in the words which point the sense,"[1] when he asks, "what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? and what communion hath light with darkness? and what concord hath Christ with Belial? or what part hath he that believeth with an infidel? and what agreement hath the temple of God with idols?"

All this, so true, even as to the present life, must be yet more distinctly and fearfully true as it regards the life to come. Alas, what participation, what intercourse, what agreement, what portion, can the saved have with the lost?

According to the whole tenor of the New Testament, they who are united in blessedness hereafter and for ever, must be so by a joint-partaking in the moral image of God, by joint-heirship and incorporation as members of the mystical body of Christ.

Grace, with glory, which is but the plenitude and perfection of grace, must ultimately, nay, speedily, disjoin all ties which it does not consolidate and perpetuate. Or rather, its absence,

[1] Bloomfield's Greek Testament, vol. ii. p. 213.

even on the one side, must render those connexions transient, and melancholy in their termination, which else would be abidingly and indissolubly happy.

How essential, then, to union in blessedness hereafter, and to the firm and cheering hope of it here, that refinedly as the links of friendship may be molten and conjoined, this stamp of the indestructible and inseparable be set on them as from the mint of heaven—that, strong, yet tender as may be the "bands of love," this asbestos thread of immortality should run through them all.

Surely, on these grounds, the friendship of a lowly, simple Christian, whose tempers and conduct well attest the Divine influence on his heart, should be preferred, by a fellow-believer, to that of the most accomplished and elevated mind where the Christian life appears altogether wanting.

We are solemnly assured, that "without holiness none shall see the Lord," none be united or associated with Him and His:—but that, without present learning, or genius, or artificial refinement, the "meek," and the "pure in heart," will fail to enter that blessed company, not the most rationalistic or fastidious expositor would dare allege.

Nor will any doubt how quickly and "exceeding abundantly" the "only wise God" can

"supply all their need," in these respects; how soon, when "the tree is good and the fruit also good,"—though it be as yet lowly and diminutive—He that planted it here in a chilling soil and aspect, is able by transplanting it to a congenial clime, and grafting on it new kinds of wealth, to enrich the unnoticed shrub which the cedars and palm-trees overlooked, with all that is precious, luxuriant, and heavenly.

A third very obvious impulse and lesson involved in the belief of happy recognition hereafter, is that of an augmented concern for the spiritual and immortal welfare of others; and this in proportion as we are attached to them by bonds of kindred or friendship, by their dependence on us, or ours on them, and by the mutual regard which should result.

It has, indeed, been argued above, that the absence of some from heaven who were near or dear to us on earth, however deplorable an event in itself, cannot be permitted to affect future happiness;—but what is weak as an objection, may yet be very forcible as a motive.

If we attain, by God's great mercy, that state of bliss, it is certain that we could not be unhappy, even if some very dear to us might have come short of it: for we must not doubt the power and purpose of the Almighty to obviate such a consequence.

Not the less, however, if we are happily instrumental in bringing dear friends or near neighbours thither, will the delightful recognition of these be among the best ingredients by which joy can be enhanced or exalted.

For us to "receive" them, or they us, "into everlasting habitations," *must* be one of the purest and divinest springs of rejoicing; for it is eminently His joy who was to "see of the travail of His soul," and "be satisfied," and who for that "joy set before Him, endured the cross."

The sacred poet uses, I apprehend, no unwarranted phrase, when he describes it (excepting, of course, the bliss of the Son's infinite and peculiar love to the Eternal Father,) as

> "Still the chief of all His joys,
> That souls are sav'd from hell."

Meanwhile it is observable,—the more we are confirmed in the persuasion, that our bliss hereafter cannot be marred or impaired even by the absence of this or any other incidental joy,—the more purely *disinterested* (the more accordant, therefore, with the spirit of Christ) will be our desires and aims, that kindred, friends, and neighbours, should be saved.

Our Saviour's doings and sufferings were altogether so,—not accomplished or endured primarily "for the joy" to Himself, but for the

happiness of others; though this would doubtless yield to Him, also, unfailing fruits of personal delight.

As a subordinate consequence, that joy for Him is still great and excellent; and will be so for His followers.

Thus actuated, having the glory of God and the happiness of others as our chief aims,—with the latter desire strengthened by consanguinity, still more by mental affinity and attachment, in some degree by even local nearness,—and with the prospect of future recognition animating all these feelings,—our charity will, in the Christian sense, "begin at home."

Seeking, first, that pardoned and renewed state, without which we cannot hope to be spiritually happy ourselves, or spiritually to profit others,—we shall next turn affectionately to the nearest. The emotions of parental and filial, of fraternal and conjugal regard will be first and most strongly imbued with the Christian spirit. Friendships more tenderly intimate than some of these relationships may excite even a more profound solicitude. And after these, friendly acquaintance, domestic dependents, neighbours, and others with whom we have transactions or intercourse, will, when we feel rightly, in their due measure share it.

It is true, the not infrequent but unscriptural

notion,—that rites, whether initiatory or subsequent, or that a strict adhesion to some one community, can secure future blessedness,—may soothe and mislead those whose attachment to Christianity is nominal or professional only, and those who under their guidance can be content with the superficial "letter" and "form of godliness," instead of its spirit and substance.

But they who really seek and appreciate the sources of genuine tranquility and of a "good hope through grace," and who would have others partake of these, will look not to rites or names, but to the tempers of the heart and stamp of the character. And, surely, our spiritual sensibility —too often dormant—will be quickened (if any way) by the thought that our weak efforts and prayers for the endless well-being of some around us, may procure, besides a sentiment of gratitude here, an unending friendship above.

How should affection and charity yearn and aspire—if we believe that all have souls—to rescue some from the loss which impends, and bind them to us by a mutual recognition which shall mutually augment our joy?

Once more, a fourth great lesson to be deduced from these expectations, and from the scriptural statements by which they are mainly supported, is that of real Christian union, in its only practicable and vital sense; the spirit of harmony,

esteem, forbearance, affection, between all who belong to Christ.

They whose adherence to Christianity is merely geographical or political, or whose minds, first heated by passion, ruffled and agitated by prejudice or pride, have cooled into the mould of immovable partisanship,—will never, except by some new fusion and yielding of their whole nature and habits, understand or prize this sort of union; but will harden in exclusiveness, and cry out for uniformity:—*i.e.*, uniformity with themselves. The Gospel meanwhile breathes another spirit; and those who really believe and feel it will perceive, in spite of disputers, that liberty with charity, "unity of the spirit in the bond of peace," is the true oneness in Christ Jesus.

The attempt at a compilation and arrangement of texts, made in the foregoing pages, has, I hope, first answered its direct end, that of establishing truths, which firmly sustain the happy expectation that we have sought to justify and confirm.

Practically speaking, however, there is a higher ulterior use to be made of the supports thus adduced, and of the expectation itself which rests on them. It is that of inculcating, on these strongest grounds, the spirit of love and harmony, of reciprocal patience, of "thinking no

evil, believing, hoping, enduring all things," among all who are "holding the Head," and who are scripturally declared to be thus "joined" and "compacted," and "knit together."[1]

If it has been largely shown, according to the recapitulation offered,[2] that our Saviour's purpose was to form a society, the relation of whose members is most real and intimate to Him and to each other,—that this great society or body shall, at length, locally assemble, and permanently dwell with each other and with Him,—that sympathy of spiritual love and spiritual joy is the true bond of the institute in this world, and is predicted as more perfectly such in the life to come,—and that festal communion there between the Divine Head and the ransomed members is distinctly promised,—then has it been made clear, if anything can be so from Scripture, that all who honour and love the Saviour ought to honour and love one another. If we are to "honour all men," how much more all that truly "serve the Lord Christ," whatever be their particular way of serving Him!

No doubt this would be still true and evident from a large portion of the texts cited, and from others not adduced, even if the points relating to

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[1] See Col. ii. 19, and other texts at pp. 116, 117 above.

[2] At p. 133 above.

love and communion in a future life were not proved, and the belief of recognition—on account of some stronger objections than those I have examined—were foregone.

It would be so, because the plain command and purpose of our Lord, as to our relation and disposition towards our fellow-believers, in this life would still strongly bind us.

It is, however not a mere outward act, or a mere principle, which is enjoined—but an affection; and it cannot be thought that this affection would be in any case so deep, cordial, or intense, if we were to believe it transitory; ere long to be exercised and indulged no more for ever.

Whereas, when we can look onward to meeting the dearest Christian friends, where all faults and infirmities shall have been removed from us and them—and even those who, by us, were least esteemed in the Church, when what we account their greater defects and blemishes shall have disappeared, and their errors, with our own, be chased like mists by the full sunbeams of eternal and manifested truth—here is abundant motive for a far stronger prospective regard to each and all; a love to the faint or broken outlines of the image of Christ, which are upon them, chiefly as the earnest or rude type of that bright and lovely likeness to His perfection, which will be put on them, and (we trust) on us, ere long.

The schoolmen are satirised as having speculated concerning "possible angels;" but it is seriously a right and happy view to look on every human being in such an aspect; an aspect not more pleasing than just, since they must be *possible* angels whom the grace of God is able and ready to make really "equal" or "like to angels." But the prospect and obligation are more clear and happy. We are called to cherish love towards the whole Church of Christ, in all its forms or sections through the world, and towards every real though feeble or uncomely member or branch of it—not merely for its *possible* but for its *promised* perfection.

The great immutable "Head of the Church" and "Saviour of the body," has engaged to present the heirs of promise "faultless," and to render them "is-angelic," as "children of God," "children of the resurrection." [1]

If He can bear with their sins and failings now, through the successive years of time, in the prospect of that celestial change which He will work on them for eternity,—if we shall have to congratulate each other there on the perfect union which will be His glory and our joy, and

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[1] Luke xx. 36; where the expression rendered "equal to the angels" is but one word, which may be thus put literally in an English form.

if each one there will wonder most that his unworthy self has not been severed from the immortal Vine, then let it not seem too much to "bear one another's burdens" and be tolerant of each other's errors, faults, and infirmities, through the remaining transient season of our minority and imperfectness below. Meanwhile, how can we contemplate with enough of grateful earnestness the prospect of "our gathering together" unto Him that hath redeemed us, and to His ransomed Church!

What an assembly that which shall include the most ancient and venerated saints—the patriarch who "walked with God, and was not, for God took him"—the father of the faithful, who "saw Christ's day, and was glad"—the patient sufferer who "knew that his Redeemer lived;"—in which shall "shine forth" the glorified martyrs and confessors who "counted all things loss" for "the hope laid up in heaven:" where we shall meet our pious forefathers, who inhabited perhaps the same abodes on earth, who knelt where we kneel, and communed where we commune. And, with all these of former generations, how many Christians of our own land and our own vicinity will that great "gathering" introduce to us, cotemporary with and yet unknown to us here! There will it doubtless be discovered, that there were around us, and sometimes near at hand,

servants of God and heirs of the grace of life, of whom we knew nothing till the great revealing day. Nor can that day fail to bring both us and them into joyful intercourse with Christians of *other* lands; of "every kindred and nation and people and tongue." Although modern changes so wonderfully increase and facilitate communication in this world, still how inevitably narrow our acquaintance and intercourse with fellow-Christians here; limited by our busy fleeting hours, by the contracting hand-breadth of our life below. But there, not to speak of the removal of other impediments, the great boon of immortality will make the opportunities of social enjoyment boundless and inexhaustible.

A still more affecting subject, however, of meditation and delightful hope, is that of *re*union. We should muse on it as then happily occurring with those Christian brethren from whom we *differed* most, either in opinion or in feeling. All causes of alienation will be delightfully past and gone. Each will have to take the retrospect, doubtless, of various infirmities and errors, and many defective perceptions of truth. We shall meet, in that heavenly light, with all wrong estimates and sentiments corrected; and the glorious perfectness conferred on each, and mutually apparent in all, will become—perhaps in some proportion to former estrangement and distaste—a source of reciprocal joy.

More naturally, however, shall we anticipate reunion to those with whom we have most *agreed:* some—perhaps usually most—among them, of the same section of the Church on earth; but some, also, *not* of the same, and yet, as to far weightier matters than those by which its sections are divided, more intimately and peculiarly one.

How earnestly, too, are multitudes looking for reunion in that blissful society with the nearest kindred, with those from whom instrumentally they derived their being, or whose being was a part and derivation of themselves, and, above all, with those where deep attachment has been cemented by countless endearing obligations, who have suffered and enjoyed through many days together; who have imparted mutually the truest blessings; to whom each other's hearts have been opened and poured forth. What varied and complex emotions of wonder, veneration, and tenderness, must be enkindled by the multiform recognitions of that happy multitude, where the calm majesty of patriarchs, the radiant joy of martyrs, the incorruption and splendour of those whom we committed in sadness to the grave, the ecstatic greeting of the one that loved us best, will inundate the spirit with sentiments that might confuse and overwhelm it, except upholden by His gracious energy, to whom each owes that bliss; who will fix every emotion ultimately and

supremely, eliciting towards Himself an admiration and devotedness far more profound and intense than can subsist towards any one or all of His glorified creatures. How sublime and unparalleled an object of desire and effort is this great "gathering unto Him!"

The sight of *any* vast assembly, even where we have no peculiar sympathy with their character or position, often deeply moves the mind. A Xerxes could weep in gazing on his multitudinous host. Even the view of a mighty army of this world, marshalled by an illustrious leader, advancing to some arduous enterprise, or returning from it in triumph, must have in it a sort of mournful grandeur to stir every feeling of the soul. But what shall it be to look upon Him who is the King of kings, the "leader and commander of His people," yet the elder brother of the whole ransomed host,—and upon that innumerable company, through Him made more than conquerors, "the whole family in heaven;" comprising all that is good, and glorious, and venerable in itself, all that to ourselves is precious and endeared. Happy and exalted prospect, if we can but study and attain more devotion towards Him, more union of spirit with Him, who is the soul and centre of that blest assembly;—"looking for and hasting unto the coming of the day of God." If the philosophic Roman could so fer-

vently exclaim, "O præclarum diem!" hailing as a glorious prospect the immortal association of lofty and congenial minds, how much more intensely should the Christian believer haste and aspire, with a sort of exulting, trembling *agonism* (if I may use the earnest old word), towards that true and ecstatic oneness of the perfected, where their Divine redemption and rescue from all evil shall call forth one ceaseless flow of gratulation, alike from those whom he shall gaze on for the first time, reveringly, as the greatest and highest, and to those whom he shall recognise most tenderly and affectingly, as the dearest; and where every mutual effusion of gladness and gratitude shall spring up into adorations of the Giver of all their bliss; and all the ardours of that sublime devotion ever prompt anew the sympathy of joy, which, like a spiritual magnetism, will attract heart to heart! Who would not entreat the great Author of such felicities to

"———uphold and guide us home,
Home to the abode of waiting saints,
Where grief can never come.
Home—to the realm where saints embrace
In tenderness divine,—
And read in each enraptur'd face
The lineaments of thine."[1]

[1] Hymn by the writer, in "Christian Harp," p. 220.

ESSAY IV.

ON THE RIGHT LOVE OF CREATURES AND OF THE CREATOR.

(IN THE FORM OF DIALOGUE.)

SECTION I.

PRISTINE HAPPINESS AND MAN'S FALL.

THE summer evening was beautiful, but my heart was sad. I sat at the root of a spreading ash, picturesquely marked with mossy streaks and belts. My eyes wandered pensively over the watered valley, terminating in woodland hills, still bright with the declining sunbeams. But the thoughts which floated through my mind were dark and oppressive. The calm and sunshine around did not reach or gild the cloud of my silent reflections; which revolved the awful facts of moral evil and of penal suffering, the hardness and folly of many hearts, the mysteries of the Divine administration, and the great obstacles in the world to devotion, hope, and happiness. Then my mind turned to more near and personal griefs; to the loss of dear friends and kindred, some by early death, some by other distressing causes of separation; then to the sure though almost insensible approach of infirmity and death; thence to the painful assaults of unbelief and various temptation. Lastly, I mused on the great imperfection, and even seeming dubiousness, of my love to God; pondering, be-

sides, the question, how far my affection for the dearest of friends might tend to weaken or divert that sentiment of adoring devotedness which is due only to the Supreme and Perfect. Amidst these silent meditations, a sort of forgetfulness came over me, till I perceived, whether actually or in slumber, at the end of a green walk, which ran eastward from my rural seat, a figure beneath the group of trees in which that path ended; a spot whence I had often viewed the landscape with peculiar pleasure, and breathed many prayers of friendship. As this figure advanced, I observed that it wore a light blue robe, of somewhat oriental fashion. The expression of countenance was noble and animated, yet gentle.

I seemed in presence of a creature from some unknown region; yet a pleasing impression arose that this visitor of my solitude, whencesoever sent or journeying, was beneficent in character and purpose. I was therefore the less surprised when thus addressed, in tones of sympathy and kindness:—

Philalethes, you are not as happy as I—still less as your Saviour—would have you to be;—for I have understood much of your silent soliloquy. Yet our heavenly Father has taught you in His word *how* to be happy; and He has sent you afflictions, that you might feel profoundly your real need to be guided and blessed by Him, and

apply your distrustful, wounded heart, more earnestly, to the healing lessons of His truth. Perhaps, by His blessing, I may afford some aids to your weakness; and I am permitted to attempt the welcome office. I will speak to you of other created natures and of your own; desirous to confirm and enlarge your knowledge, as to the great means, for all, of preserving happiness or attaining it. I come from the small planet which your astronomers have named Ceres; one of those happy worlds into which evil has not entered. Among its joyful inhabitants the law of love is universally obeyed. No wants such as man experiences, no separate property, no rival interest, tempt to the violation of it. Nor do we wish our mansion more vast or conspicuous; though we would fain spread the same happiness through your broader sphere. The sources, indeed, and qualities of our mutual affection differ somewhat from those which frequently characterize yours; where all are created in maturity, no ties of peculiar kindred can exist. But we feel, not the less, as one family; children of the same creating and sustaining parent; and your nearest bonds on earth are not more strict than ours. We have also, by a pre-ordained affinity, our yet tenderer predilections, comprising more than all that is purely delightful in the warmest affections which subsist among your race.

Yet are we not on this account necessarily happy, although this be a precious and hallowed ingredient of our happiness.

We are happy, because we love our adorable and universal Father more than each other or ourselves. The Being who called us out of nothing, who alone every moment upholds us, from whom we exclusively derive whatever in each one is good and lovely,—must needs claim and deserve incomparably higher love than either self or any other creature. He who is infinite, in whom all excellencies originate and centre, must needs be worthy of infinitely more than all that adoring love which the finite can render. It is because we fully feel this claim, and devotedly respond to it, loving our Creator supremely, and then each other, as His, with a subordinate although most tender affection,—that we are perfectly happy; maintaining thus the essential order and peaceful rectitude of created natures.

Such too, was the condition of your first progenitors, in their paradise, while yet unfallen. All that was fervent, tender, constant, marked and cemented their mutual love; yet a far higher sort of love and homage was offered to that glorious Author of their being, who had given them to each other, who deigned to commune with both, in whom they beheld the source of all that was precious in each, who could alone per-

petuate existence, loveliness, and bliss in either. They rightly loved Him, by whom alone they had become and could continue what they were—more than what they were; Him in whom alone they possessed their own and each other's being, more than that being; the essential cause, more than the dependent effect: and while affection dwelt intensely on its created object, it glanced evermore upward, with a far loftier and an adoring attachment and gratitude to the Fountain of life. Thus they were, as we are, wholly and unchangingly happy; for there was no disproportion or disorder between the sentiments on which their happiness primarily depended, and those by which it was enhanced. Nothing was exorbitant, therefore all was peace; nothing inordinate, and all was joy.

Some inhabitants of our planet were permitted to visit the terrestrial Eden, and to witness that felicity which was afterwards marred by transgression. They heard the songs of praise in which your first parents celebrated their Maker's gifts, ascending from the lowest to the best and dearest, expressing love to all, as from Him, and in and through all, supremely to Him. Of one of these hymns of love, to the manifested Deity and to His creatures, certain portions have been preserved among us. It suffers from imperfect tradition, and still more from version into your

language; yet this disadvantage and my free irregular metre will not prevent your discerning somewhat of the spirit which pervaded it.

SUNSET HYMN OF LOVE TO JEHOVAH AND HIS GIFTS.

ADAM AND EVE.

Light of our loving soul,
Creator, Lord, and Friend,
Who, while the day-star, thy faint emblem, sinks,
Now in thy mildest majesty dost rise,
A gentle glory, midst the cooling shade,—
Our gladsome voice anew
Thine evening advent hails.

O Brightness of the Unseen,
Eternal Word, give ear
Propitious to our evening song of love;
Of love in all its joyous just ascent
Up through the diverse but harmonious scale
Of Thine own works, which lead
Through earth and heaven to Thee!

EVE.

I love yon fragrant rose
Which sheds Thine incense forth,
And meekly bends her dew-besprinkled head
As with glad tears and blushes to Thy praise!
How gratefully I love
Thy vermeil-tinctur'd rose!

ADAM.

I love the stately palm,
The broad banana's wealth,
Whose ample foliage waving to Thy breeze
Gives fruits and umbrage to these happy bowers;
I love each giant leaf
Thy bounteous hand unrolls.

EVE.

I love the glow-worm's lamp,
The fire-fly's quivering flame,
Illuming as with softest sparks minute
Of Thy own lustre, the now gathering dusk!
With fond delight I watch
Thy insects' vital fires!

ADAM.

I love Thy lucid star,
Clear harbinger of day,
Whose liquid gleamings pierce the odorous grove
Where our first symphonies invite the dawn.
Exultingly I love
Its brilliant stainless ray!

EVE.

I love the pliant moss,
Our couch in noontide's glow;
Its yielding leaflets rich with vivid green,
Fann'd by Thy zephyrs, freshen'd by Thy showers.
Admiringly I love
The lowliest life Thou breath'st!

ADAM.

I love the gnarlèd oak,
The smooth magnolia's shade,

Beneath whose mingled canopy we own
Thy hand which planted Eden in the wild.
That plastic hand I love,
In all their garniture
Tracing its touch divine!

EVE.

I love the playsome fawn,
Which in yon bubbling rill
Bathes her young lips, and to my side rebounds,
A trusting suppliant for the new pluck'd spray.
Her agile gentle step
Parentally I love

ADAM.

I love the tall giraffes,
Which from yon summit gaze
O'er the world's desert far,
With neck high arch'd, and meek dilated eye;
As if they knew and priz'd Thy sylvan gift,
Our paradise and theirs!
Half with a brother's heart
I love each life Thou giv'st!

EVE.

I love Thy cherub choir
Who float on purple wing,
And wake high music in our starlight glades,
Hymning Thy secret glories yet to come!
With almost fear I love
Those harpings to Thy name!

ADAM.

I love Thy seraphim,
Sons of the lightning flash,

Who dart like meteors through our twilight calm,
And pour the glowing torrent of Thy praise!
I emulously love
Their ardour in its might!

EVE.

I love his radiant eyes
For whom Thou bad'st me be!
Whence Thy blest spirit, Lord of glory, beams!
Soon as my own to conscious being woke
They met those mutual rays!
I love—O, fervently,
My bosom's lord and friend!

ADAM.

I love the tenderer light
Which pours its gentle streams
From the deep fountains of my Eva's brow,
Sweet effluence of Thy gentleness divine!
That better, dearer life,
How ardently I love!

BOTH.

True Life of all that lives,
Lord of our Eden's joys,
Thou gav'st her sweetness to the dewy rose,
Flame to the glow-worm's dust, the seraph's wing,
Speed to the tall giraffe,
Light to the morning star!
And all Thy dews and fires, and light and life,
From the great deep—Thy loving-kindness—flow.
Thee,—how supremely, Thee,—
How filially, we love!

EVE.

Lord of my bosom's lord,
Life of my bosom's friend,
Thou lend'st the radiance to his beaming eye,
Thou the bright smoothness to his lofty front,
The polish'd, arch'd expanse
That pictures thought sublime!
Thou, Thou, dost nerve the arm whose tenderness
Upholds this feebler step, and clasps this heart!

BOTH.

The image Thou hast wrought,
The spirit Thou hast breath'd,
'Tis thine, Immortal Word, to immortalize,
And guard for each thy best-lov'd boon for aye!
Thee, Lord, transcendently,
In that best boon we love!

ADAM.

Lord of my life's new life,
The self than self more dear,
Thou gav'st this priceless treasure to my soul;
Light'st the sweet dayspring in her waking eyes,
And mov'st each loving pulse
In her fond faithful breast!

BOTH.

None else, O Light of light,
Can shield, inspire, renew,
For evermore, with Thine infinitude,
The pure ethereal spark of life and love
Lit in that soul for me,
Yet first and last for Thee!
Whom each, eternally,
Adoringly, shall love!

The stranger now handed to me a scroll which contained those lines; and added,—This, as recorded among us, was the temper of your first parents in their devotions, and this the character of their happiness. But there is found, Philalethes, in all self-conscious creatures, who discern excellence in themselves and in each other, a liability to those propensions of mind which we must term self-idolatry and mutual idolatry; a tendency to become more attached to self and to fellow-creatures than to Him in whom and by whom all exist. This liability is not absent even in those to whom that most glorious Being intimately manifests Himself. For though self be not actually so near as the Essence and Cause of its being, and still less can a fellow-creature be so, yet is self always nearer, and a fellow-creature often, than the most intimate external *manifestations* of Deity. Personality, therefore, as felt—consciousness of self—and even that sort of reflected consciousness, that kindred personality, of a closely related fellow-being, tend to attach us more strongly to self and to that fellow-being, than we are attached to Him without whose Divine personality ours would sink into nothingness. Thus, when a superior spirit, who himself had fallen by self-idolatry, and who knew too well the vulnerable point, assured your first parents,—"Ye shall be as gods,"—the malignant

and insidious lure prevailed. That which promised to aggrandise and deify self, and to confer the same exaltation on a second self, met and stimulated the latent and hitherto undeveloped propension. It is impossible, as we conceive (although mystery involves the subject for all finite minds), that creatures endowed with liberty, with beauty, with goodness, and with capacities of progress, should not be in themselves liable to this. The power of God doubtless, His *internal* manifestations, the preventives which His Spirit may supply, can wholly preclude, as they have in my own happy world precluded, the development of that idolising tendency, and its result in disastrous fall.

But when your first ancestors *had* fallen,—and for the permission of that awful lapse there were high and gracious reasons,—then was the unreserved communion of their Divine Creator necessarily withdrawn. Their littleness and feebleness had been no obstacle to that high and delightful privilege. The sole and calamitous hindrance was their unhappy transgression.

It could not, after this, comport with the majesty and sanctity of the Divine Ruler, at once to commune, as before, with those who had disobeyed and were debased. Thus, the vivid assurance of God's supreme excellency, and the personal experience of His loving-kindness, being

lost, self-idolatry, and idolatry of other creatures, naturally grew and were fomented.

For love and admiration, those innate principles of your nature,—and originally of all conscious natures known to us,—when alienated from their rightfully supreme object, became more strongly fixed on others. All exorbitances of passion and appetite ensued, and the absorbing strength of these darkened still more the belief and apprehension of a perfect Deity, until men became atheists in the world, yet idolaters not the less.

But I now leave you, Philalethes. When you shall revisit to-morrow this pleasant solitude, endeared as I know by tender remembrances and sacred hopes, I will speak further of idolatry, in some of its chief characteristics and disguises, and afterwards, in succeeding interviews, of the means which heavenly mercy has provided for its extinction.—At these words my instructor retired, with friendly gestures of farewell, and I, still in reverie, returned slowly homeward.

SECTION II.

IDOLATRY AND IDOLATROUS PASSIONS.

ON the next evening I repaired to the grove, with solemn pleasure at the prospect of lessons from so dignified and kind a teacher; and had scarcely seated myself when the same oblivion of other objects stole upon me, and I was again greeted in my trance or slumber by the same friendly voice. Persuaded of my visitant's Divine permission and devout purpose, I became able to express my thoughts with composure; and said, —Good Theodosis,—for I was prompted to give the stranger a significant name, as one had been conferred upon myself,—it was your promise to speak more fully of idolatry; and then of the counteractions which it has received from the dispensations of Divine wisdom and grace.

My object (said Theodosis), is to remind rather than inform; much of what I shall say has been told you heretofore, and what I shall not say, could hardly be apprehended by you.

I spoke of the tendency to idolise self and fellow-beings, to which fallible creatures are liable, and which is lamentably aggravated in the fallen.

Let me now observe, that those modes of sub-

sequent idolatry, which seem most remote from this, have very often had that aspect induced; which has been the secret of their power and charm. When parts of creation, not generally conceived to be animate, became objects of worship, there was usually a personification of them in the form of quasi-human divinities. And this, because nothing but what is conceived to possess personality and intelligence can be rationally an object of homage, and because beings of our own kind, having most affinities with ourselves, are peculiarly objects of passion and affection. The inventors or adopters of such idols conceived, of course, some kind of excellency in them, and portrayed this according to their own bias of character and taste. It might be merely physical or intellectual, or might be, in some sort, moral; but the former kinds were likely to be preferred, because they could involve no moral rule, either of precept or of pattern, for the worshipper; and both with devisers of false religions and corrupters of the true, a favourite aim has been to divorce piety from morals; to make devotion practicable without pureness or righteousness of life. Such divinities, therefore, would have isolated qualities ascribed to them which are admirable in their kind,—mental power and genius, physical strength and agility, personal beauty, festivity or gracefulness—but such as had no

connexion with moral rectitude. Thus, in the Greek and Roman mythologies, those idols whose attributes were cruelty, deceit, or impurity, were made adorable to corrupt human nature, by surpassing elegance, or energy, or valour.

So is it in those idolatries of your Eastern world which still subsist, though doomed, we trust, rapidly to fall. Even the patroness of professional murderers, in whose service the most treacherous atrocities are religiously committed, is famed as an indomitable celestial heroine, who vanquished by her prowess the thousand-headed giant, and whose exulting dance after that triumph shook the earth to its centre.[1]

Here Theodosis pausing, I was compelled to say,—It astonishes me that you are so acquainted with the detail of human "inventions," follies, and crimes.

To this my teacher rejoined,—I have not only studied your Scriptures, but I know something of your literature generally, whether of the devout or speculative or satanic school. Some of us are directed specially to investigate the moral history

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[1] Ward on the Hindoos, vol. i. pp. 127–146.—In 1810, a Brahmin presented to Kalee, with other costly offerings, at her temple of Kaleeghathu, near Calcutta, a golden necklace, the beads of which were in the shape of giants' skulls.—*Ibid.* p. 161.

of your world. Indeed, this earth is appointed, more expressly than you may think or believe, to be a warning example to other worlds of "the mystery of iniquity." Admitting the fallibility of all self-conscious creatures, it will be evident that a knowledge of the manner in which evil has been caused and fostered, may be most profitable to guard and deter the unfallen. Obviously then, Philalethes, it is good that at least some of us make researches which may benefit all. They have been necessary, also, to a full appreciation of that "great mystery of godliness," into which your Scriptures apprise you that "angels desire to look."

Theodosis now resumed the topic, by adding,—This deification of separate qualities, even were they morally good, would still be essentially idolatry. Were the feigned idol a real personage, it would still be worshipping that which "by nature is no God," but a mere fraction of that integral and perfect goodness. But, in fact, the qualities adored, are made to stimulate and sanction the most flagrant evils. That, therefore, is a question of little meaning, which some of your sceptics have mooted,—whether atheism or idolatry be the worse,—inasmuch as they are not opposed or incompatible: but rather, identical. Fictions and nullities are imagined to rule the world; while its true and sole Ruler is excluded from

belief. Polytheism, so called, is in fact Polydemonism; faith in ghosts, but no faith in God. I speak of genuine or proper idolatry, which acknowledges no one supreme controlling Providence; but parcelling out certain excellencies in various conjunction, adores and imitates these creations of its fancy.

It should be observed, also, that while idolatry involves admiration, and often love of its objects, these are accompanied by servile fear and deprecative offerings. Such fear cannot but mingle in it; for divinities physically powerful, and morally imperfect, could never inspire a filial confidence, however they might excite a fanatical attachment.

But, even in your favoured land, whence, by the manifestation of the true God, Polytheism has long been banished, there still are found, as you know, actings and developments of the idolatrous passions, worship of the creature rather than the Creator, to which I shall now advert.

One of these is the idolatry of persons; of other human beings; by an imaginative or sensual love.

Another is the idolatry of things; of treasures coveted or possessed. This latter may be resolved clearly into an idolatry of self. He who idolises his estates or his mansion, regards these as the broad and costly pedestal of the one household

god, whom the mirrors of pride or vanity display as elevated and dignified, in proportion to the breadth and richness of that base. He who worships his rouleaux of gold does not pay homage to the sovereign's effigy there, but he moulds them ideally into a colossal statue of self, magically wielding the power that wealth confers.

On the other hand, the idolatry of persons has much in it of self-worship also. He who professes it, asks in effect, if not avowedly, to be, in return, himself the idol of its object. He would have his divinity a votary to her own adorer. Each of these kinds of idolatry is incompatible with that true theism which is vital and beneficial. Living and earnest faith in the God of infinite goodness, grace, and love, cannot subsist and act without subduing them.

To believe in the Holy One of Israel, your Saviour, to remember and realize His adorable perfections and His unspeakable acts of loving-kindness, must as truly preclude idolatry of self, or of any other created object, as the sight of the meridian sun excludes that of the stars.

Not that every *tendency* to this, from a pure and right but only too devoted attachment to fellow-beings—as to a wife or husband, a parent, child or friend—can be regarded as involving a wilful and irreligious forgetfulness of God. For the occasional strength of such emotions may be but

an intermission of direct acts of worship and love to the Supreme.

It is also not to be doubted that a fellow-being may be most tenderly and fondly loved on earth, and far more so in heaven, and yet this feeling concur with and terminate in a paramount and adoring love to Him who is infinitely excellent, who gave and preserves the being so endeared.

I have described such a sentiment as it animated and blessed your first parents, in their state of innocence. I have spoken of it as universal in the happy region whence I came. That cannot in itself be sinful, which has subsisted, and still subsists in the sinless.

Yet, as I admonished you in our first interview, there is a peril for all creatures, but a far greater for the fallen, who have lost the sensible communion of God, lest love to the Perfect be weakened and extinguished by the power of self-love and the attraction of fellow-beings. And, in speaking of self-love, let me remind you of a third kind of idolatry, more strictly and intimately self-worship than either of those already named: which may be, in a great measure, latent, and yet possess and govern the soul:—the inward complacent homage of a creature to its own intellectual faculties, attainments, and undertakings; or to its personal grace and beauty. It is obvious that this mode of idolatry equally implies forgetfulness,

or disbelief, of that Perfect Being from whom all created excellencies are derived, and without whom they must cease to exist. It were well for such self-worshippers to know—before that which is at once idolater and idol sinks into dissolution—that the highest of unfallen Intelligences ascribe all the glorious qualities, mental and personal, of which they are conscious, and in which they rejoice, with an entire humility, to the Author and Sustainer of all.

We have been examining, Philalethes, the aberrations of the human heart. When I next meet you, we shall contemplate the remedy which Divine mercy has provided.

For this time, adieu. I use that word in its devout sense: not merely in its friendly or sentimental import. It is curiously and sadly instructive, that from a nation too prone to forget God, you borrow a phrase of parting salutation which commends the hearer to *Him*. I say, sadly instructive, for by how many is the devout meaning unnoticed; while by some it would be wholly repudiated. May both the first owners, and the borrowers, learn to use it with the whole heart in its original sense! It then involves the sublimest, tenderest, happiest farewell; but otherwise, it is, like farewell, a fallacious and melancholy word.

Once more, then, for this day, Adieu!

SECTION III.

MANIFESTATIONS OF DEITY.

BEFORE my kind monitor again approached, I had grown anxious for the expected interview; since the shadows of our little grove had begun to lengthen in the evening sunshine. But I saw the countenance of Theodosis enlivened with a more than usual cheerfulness, as if in prospect of ascending from the mazes of idolatrous error into the bright atmosphere of remedial mercy.

The great proximate object, Philalethes (said my valued teacher), of all God's revelations to creatures, has been either to prevent or cure idolatry, in its diverse forms; which is nearly tantamount to saying that the object has been to prevent or cure sin; for all sin has in it the nature of idolatry, a preference of other objects to the adorable Creator. Idolatry is thus in some sense the root, as it is also the profuse and poisonous fruit, of transgression. The ulterior and loftier object is that of manifesting forth his glory; to which the prevention or cure of idolatry, and the confirmation or renovation of creatures in a true and cordial adherence to Himself, are directly instrumental. All indications of "the

great God and our Saviour," whether through His works natural or miraculous, or by personal or other symbolical Appearings, or by the record of these and of His purpose towards you,—have been designed to bring back the fallen to supreme love of Himself, and a rightly-ordered love for those who bear His image, whether undefaced, impaired, or restored; as well as to keep the unfallen in that happy pristine state, from which all, in themselves, are liable to deviate.

True, as you know and feel, that gracious revelation, that paternal communion vouchsafed to the occupants of Eden, failed—by the mysterious permission of the Most High, and in order to the evolution of sublimer blessings—failed to secure them from a criminal and hapless fall. Then, as I have already said, the unreserved approach of the Creator ceased. Doubtless, bright tokens of Jehovah yet remained. The stars which still rose and set on a now desolate world—the very eye and mind which gazed on these in sadness—continued to publish that indelible legend—

"The Hand that made us is Divine."

But man had fallen; and the gracious sensible influence was departed, by cherishing which, while unfallen, he might best have stood. To reclaim him from degraded proneness to the worship of self and creatures, more special revela-

tions were needful. The will, the purpose, the love of God towards the fallen, could not by His ordinary works of creation be certified or even announced; however forcibly these declared His wisdom or omnipotence.

View the Scriptures, Philalethes, in this aspect. Their great design is to bring God into a world whence sin excluded His habitual visible presence, by recording those manifestations of Himself which at sundry times He has deigned to make even to fallen humanity: thus recalling transgressors to a trustful love, by strong assurances of the Divine perfections; and, above all, of the Divine mercy. Holding this as the great clue, study the successive manifestations of Jehovah to man. Notice their diversity, their sequence, their progressive enlargement. Consider the messages of prophets, announcing from age to age His righteousness and loving-kindness, and setting a Divine seal on those announcements by embodying them in writings which bear the growing marks of His prescient inspiration. Examine the record of various personal appearings of Deity, first by visible symbols, and lastly by an actual assumption of human nature. I shall point out some of these to your notice; and you are not to wonder that I do so with promptness. Although my faculties are of the weakest in *our* little world, and very far inferior to those of many among

your race, there is one power in which we excel you—that of memory. The narrow capacity and unhappy fragility of human minds in this respect —especially as to the best and purest thoughts— are effects of its fall, and will be removed by that heavenly organization in which the renewed and glorified shall rise. Unfallen races like ours are not liable to such forgetfulness; and what I have read or heard of Holy writ has been imprinted, I trust indelibly, on my remembrance.

I know it is doubtingly asked, Why were not those revelations more extensive, or even universal?

For us, as for you, secret things belong unto God; yet some alleviating thoughts may be offered.

The revelations, as far as recorded, took place almost wholly in the line of one family, which became the Hebrew people; but it is observable that the central position of that people, and also their dispersions—themselves penalties of idolatry, and protests against it to the world—gave facilities for a wide diffusion of them. In the last and greatest instance, there was an express commission to those Hebrews who believed, that they should proclaim the glad tidings to all nations.

Their non-extension has not been mainly caused by want of opportunities, or even of

willingness, to convey them. The existence of proselytes in remote countries shows that revealed truth could early find its way, and we know that at length, in its most gracious development, it has been widely diffused. Its limited reception must be mainly ascribed to the strong pre-occupancy of the idolatrous and atheistic spirit. Had mankind possessed that longing for immortal hopes, which they have had for glittering ornaments and enticing stimulants, the truth of God would have been as diligently sought and as widely received, as gold and pearls, and alcohol and opium have been.

This permitted repulsion of the highest good, or deep indifference towards it, remains, with the permission of evil altogether, awful mysteries of the Divine government. But shall the genuineness and preciousness of a remedy be denied, which gives health wherever it is rightly received, because multitudes have repelled or trifled with it, or because to many it has been unknown ?

I am aware, also, that your faith is at times disturbed by the thought how fearfully those records exhibit the severity of God ; the exterminating justice exercised on the world of the ungodly, and on guilty individuals, cities, and nations.

Yet all those judgments were expressly designed to guard true worshippers from falling,

and to urge back transgressors, by terrific warnings as to the result of abandoning the supreme object of confidence and love, and idolising the abominations which he hates. His judicial denunciations and acts were accompanied by emphatic assurances of plenteous mercy and grace to the repentant. You know, also, how the early patriarchs, Enoch and Noah, walked with God, and found grace in the eyes of Jehovah: and when most of the descendants of those holy men had become idolaters and apostates, you remember how the Almighty called one of these descendants from those that served other gods, and addressed to him the signal promises—"I will bless thee and thou shalt be a blessing—I am thy shield and thy exceeding great reward—I am the Almighty God, walk thou before me and be thou perfect." "And in thee shall all families of the earth be blessed."[1]

When the offspring of this faithful worshipper had become a nation, Jehovah explicitly revealed to them those attributes which ought to win from fallen creatures the most devoted love. Descending in the cloud, to meet by a glorious symbol of His presence their appointed leader, the Lord stood with him there, and passed by before him, and proclaimed, "The Lord, the Lord God,

[1] Genesis xii. and xvii.

merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression and sin."[1]

Still, as was before intimated, it is not merely by verbally declaring the goodness and pardoning mercy of God, that your Scriptures combat idolatry, and incite man to the adoration and love of his Creator, but also by recording various personal manifestations of Him whose perfections are proclaimed. They should be viewed as a collection of writings which attest the personal interventions of Deity in your world; the sort of facts which atheism directly denies, and which idolatry virtually, though unintentionally, excludes; since it adduces mere fictions, of beings who, had they existed, would be no gods; and if it ever recognise the Self-existent, practically secludes Him from you.

How deeply does it concern a fallen race to know, that the gracious God has at times sensibly manifested Himself *since* their fall! And this is intimated in the earliest portion of the sacred record. When it is said of Enoch and of Noah that they "walked with God," the phrase, in connexion with the translation of the one, and signal preservation of the other, seems to indicate

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[1] Exod. xxxiv. 6.

some peculiar sensible communion. But to the son of Terah, when called from the land of idolaters, you are expressly told that "Jehovah appeared." And "he builded an altar to Jehovah who appeared unto him."[1] So, afterwards, when words were addressed to him which have been already cited, you read—"Jehovah appeared unto Abram,—and Abram fell on his face and God talked with him."[2] The name Abraham was then conferred, and after promises and ordinances uttered, you read, "He left off talking with Him, and God went up from Abraham."[3] Again, "Jehovah appeared unto him in the plains of Mamre;"[4] and when the attendant angels were gone thence, "Abraham stood yet before Jehovah."[5] "And Jehovah departed when he had ceased communing with Abraham."[6] Judge, Philalethes, from this patriarch's conduct in the extreme trial of faith which was afterwards assigned to him, how effective these gracious appearings of the Most High had been, to generate or confirm in his soul a loving and devout adherence.

And now, in pursuing the record of Divine manifestations, we might well expect that the rescued child of promise, for whom, when death impended from a father's hand, mercy had inter-

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[1] Gen. xii. 7.
[2] Gen. xvii. 1–3.
[3] Gen. xvii. 22.
[4] Gen. xviii. 1.
[5] Gen xviii. 22.
[6] Gen. xviii. 33.

posed, would not be without a similar privilege. Accordingly you find that Jehovah not only blessed Isaac,[1] but appeared to him in Gerar, and renewed the covenant of blessing made with his departed father;[2] and afterwards, in Beersheba, appeared unto him in the night, to ratify the covenant anew.[3] Again, to the favoured son of Isaac, the Lord first spoke in a dream, standing above the mystic ladder at the place thence named the House of God, and saying, "I am Jehovah, the God of Abraham thy father."[4] Later in his troubled life, when, as described by Hosea, "he had power with God, yea, had power over the angel, and prevailed,"[5] the suppliant called the name of the place Peniel—vision of God,—saying, "I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved."[6]

And once more "God appeared to Jacob when he came out of Padan-aram, and blessed him;" changed his name to Israel, and confirmed the former promises; "and God went up from him in the place where He talked with him."[7]

When, after the long bondage of Israel's descendants, Moses was to become their deliverer, you learn that to him "the angel of Jehovah ap-

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[1] Gen. xxv. 11. [3] Gen. xxvi. 24. [5] Hos. xii. 4.
[2] Gen. xxvi. 2–5. [4] Gen. xxviii. 12–16. [6] Gen. xxxii. 30.
[7] Gen. xxxv. 9–13.

peared in a flame of fire;—and God called to him from the midst of the bush—I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.—I am that I am."[1]

After the full induction of this chosen leader into his arduous office, "Jehovah descended on Mount Sinai, and called Moses to the top of the Mount, and Moses went up."[2] So, after the delivery of the law, he went up, "and the glory of Jehovah abode on Mount Sinai, and the cloud covered it six days, and on the seventh he called to Moses from the midst of the cloud.—And Moses went into the midst of the cloud."[3] It is recorded as the effect of his frequent sensible communion with God, that the splendour of his countenance awakened dread in the beholders.[4]

Those manifestations to the leader of Israel were accompanied by others of a more public kind. When he was introduced to that wonderful communion with Jehovah on Sinai, the privilege was shared in some degree by a body of chosen witnesses. — "Then went up Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel: and they saw the God of Israel; and under His feet as it were a paved work of a sapphire stone, and as it were the body (or fir-

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[1] Exod. iii. 2–14.
[2] Exod. xix. 20, 21.
[3] Exod. xxiv. 15, 18.
[4] Exod. xxxiv. 29, 35.

mament) of heaven in its clearness: and upon the nobles of the children of Israel he laid not His hand; also they saw God and did eat and drink."[1] The last expression appears designed to intimate, that the vision was of a more gracious and less overawing character than the attendant signs might betoken; not such as to disable them for partaking soon after of needful refreshment. The seventy elders were chosen, like the witnesses of your Divine Saviour's transfiguration, and the more numerous spectators of His ascension, to attest to the multitude of believers that visible glory which all are to behold hereafter.

There were, however, signal and long-continued displays of Jehovah's majesty, and miraculous tokens of His special mercy, granted to the whole multitude of Israel. The guiding pillar of cloud and fire;[2] the glory of Jehovah which filled the tabernacle;[3] which appeared to all the people and consumed the burnt offering; at which they shouted in gladness, then fell in prostrate worship;[4]—these, with the other wonders at the Red Sea, and in the wilderness, were striking signs of the Almighty's guardian presence.

Nor did the strong impressions of these manifestations cease, after the age of their frequent

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[1] Exod. xxiv. 9, 11.
[2] Exod. xiii. 21, 22.
[3] Exod. xl. 35.
[4] Lev. ix. 23, 24.

recurrence had passed away. Whatever unbelief and obduracy had been evinced by multitudes, still had the Divine interpositions, both those of the Mosaic and patriarchal ages, become engraven on the mind and heart of the nation; on the remembrance of all, on the grateful and confiding heart of the devout.

I trust, Philalethes, that you will perceive, even from this slight review, that the various assurances of the true and living God, and the diverse appearings by which these had been illustrated and attested, were adapted to counteract idolatries and idolatrous passions, by attracting reverential love from the sincere worshippers of Jehovah, even under that merely prelusive and imperfect economy. Meditate on these things; for the hour warns me to retire: and may the God of peace be with you till we meet again. If your thoughts of Him, who has been a Sun and Shield to generations past, and who is your and our eternal Refuge, shall be rightly fixed on His immutable holiness and mercy,—then, although the sun of this narrow horizon set in clouds or even tempest, your soul will yet anticipate the blissful and everlasting dawn.

SECTION IV.

DIVINE JUDGMENTS; AND THE MOTIVES OF ANCIENT BELIEVERS TO LOVE GOD.

WHEN Theodosis had left the grove, I endeavoured to recall and to amplify such thoughts of a cheering and sustaining cast, as I had been admonished or invited to pursue; and not without partial success. Yet difficulties, as has too often happened, arose in my mind against them, and some thoughtful uneasiness betrayed itself.

To this my returning visitor gently alluded, saying,—I divine your misgivings and solicitudes, and from your character of mind was prepared to expect that such would assail you.

Doubtless an objector, urging and enlarging on some aspects of sacred history, might make it seem hard to conceive how the Hebrews could *love* God, though strongly enjoined to do so. He might paint that unrelenting justice in which the Supreme Ruler was arrayed, when the fountains of the great deep overwhelmed the world's guilty population; and afterwards, when torrents of fire poured swift destruction on "the cities of the plain."

He might dwell on that strange and severe

appointment by which Jehovah permitted idolaters to make the lives of His own worshippers "bitter with hard bondage;" and, when rescued from those oppressors, led them to the burning Sinai with its blackness and tempests, at which even their leader trembled; on the stern penalties by fire and sword which were inflicted in the wilderness; and on that sanguinary, unsparing extirpation which Israel was no less sternly doomed to execute on the wretched race of Canaan. It would be tauntingly asked of you, and it may be distrustfully asked by yourself—how could a Judge so inflexible and rigorous be an object of love?

We cannot escape, nor do we desire to extenuate, the fact that those judgments awfully exhibit "the severity of God."

Consider, however, Philalethes, that the feelings and wishes which are shocked by such events could not be radically and altogether removed, except by an efficacious grace universally exercised; except the Sovereign Disposer had turned the hearts of all, and had mercy upon all. But this is palpably too much for our narrow reason to demand; that the perfect and omniscient Ruler of the universe should bend to all our emotions or our estimates. Who or what are we, the limited creatures of our planet or of yours, to solve so immense and profound a problem in

the government of the universe; to pronounce that it is not most fit and best, nor even on the whole most merciful and kind, that the adorable Father of our spirits should in some conspicuous instances display the rigours of condemning justice!

And if this be most fit and best, then the sudden total destruction of a flagitious community by deluge, or earthquake, or the sword, has had more of mercy in it than a reprieve or respite, which would have multiplied their numbers and their crimes.

It was better for the criminals of the old world and of Palestine, and for the apostate idolaters of the wilderness, to be exterminated as they were, than to add iniquity to iniquity till they had merited a more dreadful measure of subsequent retribution; and it was unspeakably better for the infants involved in some of those fearful judgments to die before they were capable of transgression, than to be trained and nurtured in crime by corrupt and guilty parents.

As my teacher here paused, I remarked—This, O Theodosis, as it regards the infants, should, at least in all consistency, have been the opinion of most heathens; since both the learned and the uncivilised among them agreed to lament over the newly-born, and to felicitate the dead.[1]

[1] See passages from Sophocles, Cicero, Theognis, He-

Suppose, resumed Theodosis, that you were estimating the character of your own sovereign, Victoria, and her titles to a nation's love: you would not, I think, take your impression of that character, primarily, from the fact that there were prisons and penal settlements and executions within her realm.

Not but that much might be learned on the subject in those very quarters, and this of a decisive value. For if it were found that perfect equity, and mercy too (so far as human government admits it), reign in her acts and system of punishment, this must itself create a claim to your esteem which could not exist if the culpable were always left to offend with impunity.

But were it found, moreover, that your sovereign signed the death-warrant, and ratified the sentence of imprisonment or exile, with a deep reluctant pity, yet did not allow this emotion to defeat the imperative claims of social order,—the knowledge of a tenderness thus controlled by duty ought to exalt abundantly your loyal affection and respectful regard. Still it would be natural to look more at the queen's kindness towards her faithful lieges, and her earnest desire to pardon the offender in every case where cle-

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rodotus, and Valerius Maximus, cited in my "Christian Encouragement."—Fourth Edit. Note A, pp. 343–5.

mency could be rightly exercised. If these dispositions always mark her sway (and you have good reason to believe it is so), ample proofs are thus afforded, that punishment is the strange unwelcome task, to which nothing but a full persuasion of greater resulting good could anywise constrain her.

You see, Philalethes, how this applies to the severities of the Divine government; only that the scale of its operation is so immense, so far from comprehensible, that your minds are overwhelmed by the extent and character of some of its penal acts. Had you seen, as we have, the vast regions and innumerable multitudes of happy beings, exempt from all such penalties, and yet, by a full knowledge of their terrible infliction and awful import, preserved from falling, and thus secured in blessedness,—you would be far less shaken and perturbed than you now sometimes are, by what we acknowledge to be mysteriously dreadful, but yet know to be in reality demonstrative of the infinite Ruler's perfection.

Here I interposed thus:—It is most consolatory to learn from you, what we have hoped for ourselves, that the comprehensive survey attained by the unfallen gives them exceedingly larger and brighter views of the benignity of Jehovah's acts and counsels. I have found in a foreign

writer these remarks:—"The Canaanites enter into the system of Divine government, as one of your limbs amputated, if that were needful, would enter into the plan of him who would save you by the amputation, or as the execution of a great criminal enters into your system of interior peace and leniency. The objector reasons as one who should designate our surgeons and judges tormentors and murderers. To leave the Canaanites in contact with the Hebrews, would have been to inoculate the latter with a cancer. Those tribes were infected with vices and crimes necessarily deadly for the religion and morals of God's people. As the positive part of the Mosaic system has, at least in the germ, the mildness of the Gospel, so even its negative part,—the severity employed to establish it,—does but equal the resistance which had to be overcome to make the establishment of that system possible." One of our own divines has observed,—"The Canaanites might have been swept off by pestilence, and the Hebrews thus acquired their territory; but would they have been thus equally guarded against the contagion of idolatry from every surrounding state? Would they have been filled with the same dread of impiety and crime, as when compelled to be executioners of Divine justice? It seems that nothing could have prevented their total apostasy, but miraculously rendering the

surrounding world a wilderness, or restraining them by a constant supernatural force from commerce with all other nations." [1]

These thoughts, said Theodosis, coincide with what I have suggested. They contribute to teach that, amidst great and appalling instances of rigour, there may be yet discovered the reign of supreme and illimitable Beneficence. But you may, perhaps, obtain some enlargement and corroboration of them, by attempting to realize our wider experience. Nothing, certainly, will so much conduce to reconcile with the Divine power and goodness the tremendous fact that angels and men have been permitted to lapse from innocence, and thus incur awful miseries, as the firm belief that their fall and ruin are a beacon, a warning to all fallible beings, so vast, so flaming, so terribly conspicuous, as to prevent, if I may so express it, the shipwreck of unnumbered worlds; keeping the free agents whom God has created, still and unendingly happy, in their first or renovated estate of purity and bliss. And if every exhibition of sin and misery be salutary for this end, that of idolatry, with the crimes which it involves, must be pre-eminently so. What spectacle can be so adapted to inspire amazement

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[1] Graves on the Pentateuch. Part iii., lect. i., sec. 1 and 2.

and aversion at the thought of sin, as this its prodigious effect?—as the contemplation, amidst ever augmenting love to our Creator, of creatures whom their transgression has debased to the blindness of forgetting Him, and adoring their own fictions, with sanguinary, licentious, and odious rites?

We that are afar off, on another islet, as it were, in the sea of creation, can discern and appreciate much better than yourselves the preventive influence of that great beacon of moral and penal evil.

Yet only He who surveys in one omniscient glance the whole ocean of existence, can know how vast and how intense such beacons must be, that their burning light may succour and guard the remotest voyagers on the waves of time and eternity.

But now, Philalethes, turn from those judicial and corrective appointments, to review the direct and evident motives of the believer, even under that preliminary dispensation, to love the Lord his God. First he reposed, as you have been reminded, on the true groundwork of all love and trust, the assurance of the moral perfection of Jehovah; and especially of those attributes of compassion and mercy, which are most attractive to the necessitous and sinful. After all the thunderings of Sinai, Jehovah still proclaimed Himself,

"merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth."[1] The Hebrew was earnestly enjoined to meditate on this, "When thou art in tribulation, if thou turn to the Lord thy God and shalt be obedient unto His voice (for the Lord thy God is a merciful God), He will not forsake thee, neither destroy thee."[2] And again, "Know therefore that the Lord thy God, he is God, the faithful God, which keepeth covenant and mercy with them that love Him and keep His commandments, to a thousand generations."[3] So, in that solemn ode which Moses uttered, at the close of his life, to the whole people, he said, "I will publish the name of Jehovah. . . . He is the Rock; His work is perfect, for all His ways are judgment: a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is He."[4]

Thus instructed in the Divine perfections, the pious Hebrew knew that the holiness, truth, faithfulness, grace, mercy, long-suffering, of Him who is Possessor of heaven and earth, must be attributes high as the heaven above his narrow thoughts. But goodness, in its largest sense, is the only and unchanging basis of esteem and veneration, confidence and love; and goodness, under the modification of grace and mercy, while

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[1] Exod. xxxiv. 6. [2] Deut. iv. 30, 31. [3] Deut. vii. 9.
[4] Deut. xxxii. 3, 4.

combined with all-sufficient power, is, for creatures that are fallen and indigent, the most invaluable aspect of the Divine character which they can themselves imagine. This knowledge, indeed, the word of Jehovah, by His prophet of a later age, justly declares to be the true subject of exultation. "Let him that glorieth glory [or exult] in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me, that I am Jehovah which exercise loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness, in the earth: for in these I delight, saith Jehovah."[1]

And now, with a real persuasion of these truths abiding in his heart, the worshipper of the true God could not but have strong motives to love Him from the personal obligations of gratitude. If existence and the preservation of it were benefits, he owed both these to that almighty Creator who was "his life and the length of his days," to whom all creatures are at each instant debtors for the continuance as well as origin of their derived being, and, consequently, for all the well-being they *can* enjoy.

I think your theologians, generally, do not dwell enough on the grand primal gift, the basis of all others,—the gift of conscious and rational *existence*,—the wondrous boon for which both men and angels are alike indebted, alike beholden

[1] Jer. ix. 24.

to the self-existent Creator. That great ancient, Augustine, recognised this first of obligations with profound thanksgivings when he wrote, "Whence this to me, most benignant Lord, almighty and all gracious? What are my merits, that it should please Thy glorious Majesty to give me being? I was *not*, and Thou didst create me. I was nothing, Thou hast caused me to *be*. And to be *what?* Not a stone or tree, not a bird or fish or serpent—but a little lower than the angels, for I have received, in common with them, the capacity of knowing and adoring Thee!"

In other places he recurs to this primary gift of creation:—"When in the beginning Thou didst form me out of nothing in Thine image, honouring and exalting me among the creatures which Thou hast made, and ennobling me with the light of Thy countenance, so that Thou hast distinguished me both from the inanimate and the merely sentient, and madest me a little lower than the angels."

And again, "I confess, O Lord, and I give thanks to Thee, who hast created in me this Thine image that I may remember Thee, contemplate Thee, and love Thee."[1]

It is true, under the pressure of extreme distress or peril, good men have been quite unable

[1] "Creasti in me hanc imaginem tuam."

to thank God for existence, and have been even tempted to execrate it as an evil. Thus Job said, "Perish the day in which I was born. That night, let extinction seize it. Why did I not expire from the womb?"[1] So Jeremiah, "Cursed be the day wherein I was born;"[2] and Jonah, "It is better for me to die than to live."[3] But these are quite exceptional and temporary states. It is not to be doubted, that Job and Elijah and Jeremiah had felt life habitually to be the first and prime gift of God, involving, as their prerequisite all the benefits which could ensue. That was a great general truth, although uttered by the father of lies, "Skin for skin, yea, all that a man hath, will he give for his life." If life is gone, all earthly is gone. If life had not been given, nothing could have been received. The first of motives, therefore, to love God is this, that by Him and in Him we live and move and *are*. One of your eloquent living writers has said, "Life appears to me so great a thing—it has in it, even with its struggle and battle and work, so much that makes it a glory and a joy

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[1] Chap. iii. Dr. Good's version.

[2] Jer. xx. 14, *et seq.*, and Jonah iv. 3.

[3] Thus a modern poet, (De Lamartine, "Medit. Poetiques," pp. 36–50) in the piece entitled "Le Desespoir," asks, "Quel crime avons nous fait pour meriter de naitre, etc.?" and nobly answers in the "Réponse de Dieu."

to have been born, that I do not see that we should cease to worship, to love, and to obey, even if God had *not* destined us to be immortal. To be *a man*,—simply a man and nothing more,—is so much, that I do not think we should abrogate our manhood and sink into brutes, because we were not to become angels." [1]

If, also, with this chief and marvellous benefaction — even of our conscious and rational existence—is combined the assurance (which the Hebrews had) that the glorious Being who bestowed it is "glorious in holiness," a God of "truth and without iniquity," "merciful and gracious," "long-suffering and of great mercy," then surely the obligation to love our supreme Benefactor who is also, in Himself, worthy of the highest and most reverential love,—then, I say, the obligation is undeniably cogent and complete.

Further: the pious Hebrew knew the reiterated promises of Jehovah to his pious fathers; and how signally these had been fulfilled, "when in all their affliction He was afflicted, and the Angel of His presence saved them; when in His love and in His pity He redeemed them, and bare them and carried them all the days of old." [2] He

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[1] Binney: "Weigh-house Sermons," p. 44.

[2] Isa. lxiii. 7–9.

had seen, or knew by public record and tradition, how Jehovah "led His Israel forth, instructed him, and kept him as the apple of His eye;"[1] how "He divided the sea and caused them to pass through; in the day-time led them with a cloud, and in the night with a light of fire; brought streams out of the rock, and gave them of the corn of heaven."[2] If he lived after the acquisition of the promised land, he had, personally, further proofs of the special protection of Jehovah, and the exuberant bounties of His providence.

Here the speaker looked at me, as expecting assent or comment; and I answered,—I perceive, Theodosis, those motives for grateful reverence; but, more than this, I have been ever taught, that the pious Hebrew, in some high and spiritual sense, trusted in Jehovah as his Redeemer. Although, as has been well observed, the way into the holiest of all was not made manifest,—the doctrine of Christ's vicarious sacrifice being reserved to be developed in a future day,—still there was an implicit confidence in mysterious mercy, while the offender, confessing his sins over the head of the victim, recognised his guilt, his just exposure to destruction, and his exclusive reliance on Divine forgiveness. Like the patriarchs, Abraham and Job, he saw by faith, though we

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[1] Deut. xxxii. 10.

[2] Ps. lxxviii., cv.

know not with what degree of clearness, the day of Christ, and was glad: expecting the advent of some glorious and Divine personage, who would bestow the highest spiritual and temporal felicity.[1]

Doubtless, rejoined Theodosis, these views of the hope of ancient believers are just; and I am glad that you could anticipate me by suggesting them. It should be remembered, moreover, in connexion with this hope, that the Divine Appearings which have been reviewed, whether personal to favoured individuals, or general to the chosen tribes, must have been regarded as preliminary to some more wondrous visitation of heavenly kindness. With the hope of an exalted Messiah, the Hebrew mind was deeply imbued; and all prior appearings of the "Word," or "Angel of Jehovah," were transient preludes to that more abiding advent, when the same Word should dwell on earth, and His followers behold His glory, full of grace and truth.

You thus confirm, I said, those expositions which regard all prior manifestations as made by Him who "was with God and was God;" and the phrase "Angel of Jehovah" as designating that Divine Person.

It is the only interpretation, replied Theodosis, which makes your Scripture consonant with itself.

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[1] See R. Hall's Works, vol. ii., pp. 208-212.

So, I rejoined, has it always appeared to me, from observing how the names Jehovah and Angel Jehovah,[1] Angel of God and God of Bethel,[2] are used interchangeably, alike denoting the manifestations by which God sometimes became visible to man; how "thus Moses himself, that most zealous opponent of all idolatry and polytheism, describes a Jehovah as sent by Jehovah;"[3] and how remarkable is the form of admonition to all Israel in the wilderness,—"Behold, I send an Angel before thee—revere His presence—provoke Him not; for He will not bear your rebellions, for MY NAME is within Him."[4] So the dying Jacob expresses himself—"The God before whom my fathers did walk—the God which fed me all my life—the Angel which redeemed me from all evil."[5] Who could this Angel be but the uncreated Word, variously manifested to believers of old; but dwelling among them at length as the incarnate Son of God?

Truly, said Theodosis, it would be unreasonable to suppose that Abraham, Jacob, Job, Daniel,

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[1] Exod. iii. 2, 6, 14.

[2] Gen. xvi. 7, 13; xxxi. 11, 13.

[3] Michaelis, quoted in Dr. Pye Smith's Scripture Testimony, vol. i., p. 485.

[4] Exod. xxiii. 20, 21.—Dr. Pye Smith's version.—Ibid. p. 486.

[5] Gen. xlviii. 15, 16.

Isaiah, and others, who fully believed, from experience or testimony, in past Divine manifestations, did not expect, in that Christ or Redeemer whom they foresaw, a superior revelation of the Deity. It is not credible, that patriarchs and prophets who had themselves witnessed, or devout men who had learned from their written testimony, the fact of Divine appearings, should not have expected—at the period and in the Personage marked out as the Desire of all nations—some yet more gracious and less transient "appearance of the likeness of the glory of Jehovah." But it is evident how this prospect must have heightened veneration and love to God, in all who waited for the consolation of Israel. Nor can the low and worldly views of others, and of the later Jews in general, affect the case of such as really "feared Jehovah and thought upon His name."

Further: Philalethes, in estimating the motives of the Hebrews to love God, we must include this fact, that together with those presentiments of a life to come, which were common to all nations, they had revealed grounds of hope in that future life as a state of happiness. Jehovah had said to the devout ancestor of their race, "I am thy exceeding great reward;" an expression utterly inappropriate, if the "few and evil" days of even patriarchal life on earth had been his narrow and precarious all. When, also, Jehovah

declared Himself to be still "the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob," after their bodies had been turned to dust, how fully did this imply—as you have been divinely taught—that the spirits of His ancient servants lived unto Him. So likewise, in the earliest times, the Hebrew knew of the "translation" of Enoch; and of the contrary lot of the pious and accepted Abel, which a perfect Being could not be conceived to permit, except there had remained for him a holy rest and recompence.

The book of Job very early recorded that cheering prediction—"I surely do know my Redeemer, the Living One, and He, the last, shall arise over the dust; and after the disease has cut down my skin, even from my flesh shall I see God."[1] You are well aware, also, that the language employed concerning the deaths of the patriarchs accords, to say the least, with such expectations.[2]

On the whole there is no room to doubt, that the ancient believers had this "*hope* toward God," that there should be "a resurrection of the dead;"[3] that they could adopt with large meaning the patriarch's departing words, "I have waited for Thy salvation, O Jehovah;" that confessing

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[1] Job xix. 25.—Dr. J. P. Smith's version.

[2] See Essay III. pp. 123–25.

[3] Acts xxiv. 15.

themselves strangers and pilgrims on the earth, they sought a heavenly fatherland and home.

Thus, whether the ancient believer contemplated the immutable goodness of Jehovah, or his own and his forefathers' peculiar experience of it, whether he looked to the mercy which had multiplied pardons, or to the hope of redemption and heavenly rest, motives to love the Lord his God were presented to his heart. Remember, also, by abandoning this faith, how entire a loss of spiritual comfort he would incur. Whither could he turn, but either to vain and corrupting idols, in which there could be not even a shadow of rational trust, or to the dreary hopeless void of atheism? And to what, indeed, would the thirsty feverish dreams of idolatry lead him, but to the desolateness and desperation of utter unbelief!

I have thus enlarged, Philalethes, on the motives of ancient believers to the love of God, in order the more forcibly to press the inference —how great is the superadded strength of your own motives for devoted love. If any event can effectually exhibit to the universe the loving-kindness and the righteousness, the holiness and compassion of the Most High, it must be the last and brightest manifestation of Himself in the person and character of the Saviour of the world. If any promise can be conceived capable of binding and quickening you into the most earnest

self-dedication to Him, it must be that of eternal life with Himself, the participation of His own felicity. But I leave these great things of God to your silent meditation. May His grace and peace be with you!

SECTION V.

THE VIEW TAKEN BY OTHER BEINGS OF HUMAN REDEMPTION.

AFTER some impediments, which our heavenly Father at length graciously removed, I again greeted my benevolent instructor, who met me with a complacent yet solemn manner, as if absorbed in contemplation of the love which passeth knowledge.

You cannot but feel, (said Theodosis,) as I intimated at our last adieu, that if any event be adapted to excite the profoundest wonder and awaken the most fervent thanksgiving, it must be the self-humiliation and triumph of eternal Love. If the Appearings of Jehovah in the wilderness, the ark, and the temple, called forth the lofty odes of Moses and David, of Isaiah and Habakkuk, how much more might the scenes of Bethlehem and Tabor, of Calvary and Olivet, impel both men and angels to the same kind of adoring celebration? The reason why you have nothing of this in the New Testament (except in a most condensed form), may be partly that *it* would have not accorded with fitting brevity; partly that no human language could adequately

unfold and celebrate those facts, which holy men were inspired so simply and succinctly to announce.

The majestic plainness of His statements who was "above all," the artless sublimity of him whom "Jesus loved," the parenthetic fire and energy of the great apostle to the Gentiles, are texts or germs of a celestial poesy which cannot through the weak medium of your verbal signs be uttered.

But although the Spirit of God—whose guidance of these writers may be observed in His restraints on them almost as much as in His suggestions—checked in the sacred volume such expansions of thought, they are, among us, who have other resources of expression, the habitual and natural utterances of admiration and praise.

When I was last about to quit our distant home, with several chosen associates, in order to revisit your world, one of our friends, who had heretofore been long a sojourner on earth, addressed us at our parting. Several others did the same: I select his thoughts and words, not for their superiority, but for a contrary reason: since loftier strains would include conceptions and images which your earthly language could not, even thus feebly and imperfectly, present. You may gain, perhaps, from a version necessarily most inadequate, some acquaintance with the

sentiments entertained by us as to the impression which human redemption ought to produce upon yourselves.

Go, messengers of kindness, speed your flight
To yonder sin-struck world: yet stay to raise
One strain of grateful harmony,—that we
Have "kept our first estate;"—by the' arm Divine
In our primeval innocence upholden,
Guileless and faithful: in one point alone
Less happy than the rescued who have fallen,
That we scarce reach their most surpassing heights
Of praise, nor wear the costliest bands of love
Which crown and guard the ransom'd.
Yet to us
Dear is their glorious theme, and dear our part,—
Howe'er by theirs transcended,—in the fruits
Imperishable of their Ransomer's grace.
List, then, with musing gladness, reverently,
While these weak harpstrings tremble at the emprise
Of love unsearchable; the mighty acts
Of heavenly fortitude; the gentle strength
Of godlike pity. Let this faltering voice,
Not with ambitious but adoring zeal,—
Invite you back through past immensity
Up to the holy unfathomable source
Of God's good pleasure; where the Eternal Word
In perfect interconsciousness of bliss
With the Paternal Godhead, and with Him
The emanating Spirit—thrice ador'd—
Revolv'd and purpos'd what created minds
Conceiv'd not; with omniscient mercy view'd
Amid the shadows of futurity,
A race unborn, immortals self-destroy'd;

Countless, capacious of unbounded joy,
Yet strengthless, hopeless, irrecoverable
By their own wisdom or creation's might
From sin's dire vortex.
See that heavenly glance
Of prescient kindness through the ideal world
Of man yet future, the divinest thought
That glows within the Fount and deep of love—
The ocean-bosom of the Infinite—
To save, make holy, shield, beatify
Millions that yet exist not, but shall be,
And from well-being by defect will fall:
But whom prevenient grace resolves to raise
And cluster as His jewels; nor the wreck
Of nature shall e'er pluck them from His hand.
But, O companions of our sinless home,
I droop in this ascent; too arduous far;
Too dark and awful for a seraph's wing.
Turn rather toward those denizens of earth
To whom ye gladly minister; far fallen,
Sever'd by guilt from our Eternal All,
Yet by the almightiness of grace restor'd,
And re-united with Him, gathering thus
A ceaseless impulse to ecstatic praise.
Debtors to Love, not solely for their being—
Educ'd from blank and void nonentity—
Nor for good shower'd profusely from on high,
But for strange rescue;—egress from the gulf
Of ruin, from the chaos of all ills,
Sin, death, remorse, insuperable woe!
Alas, that some high-ton'd and soaring minds
Amid those fallen immortals, minds intent
To span the starry orbs, and mete out heaven,
Or read the relics of the pristine earth,

Susceptive, too, of admiration's glow
At lofty self-devotement—patriot zeal,
Or friendship's fervour,—should yet coldly slight,
Or thrust aside with infidel disdain,
The records and the acts of godlike love.
We know their classic sympathy with names
Heroic or romantic, which the world
Has vaunted—a Leonidas in arms,
A Pythias, fearless for his friend to die,
Or the brave youth whose Roman virtue plung'd
In the riven Forum. Nor their genius less
Delights in poesy's ideal groups
And colourings, to trace or to portray
Self-sacrifice; the lofty nobleness
Or unbought constancy of generous hearts:
But yet, perversely credulous, they deem
These scatter'd rays, these sparks from heaven's full
These transient gleams of greatness, to be all: [orb.
Unmindful of that sovereign glory, whence
Man's little life and glow-worm lustre flow.
Heedless, that while exemplars found on earth,
And that ideal human which outvies them,
Can be so kingly, 'tis an atheist soul
Which will believe nought nobler, nought that was
Of these the Archetype; averse to own
That it behov'd the Inspirer and Prime Source
Of every lofty thought, in all to hold
Divine pre-eminence, and still surpass
Ineffably the shadows of Himself.
Ye envoys of His grace, who view the truth
In heaven's own daylight, unobscur'd, unstain'd,
(Not as man views it through the darkening fumes
Of sense and passion, earthliness and pride),
See with what beams of strong divinity

The condescension of our God shines forth
In self-abasing grandeur, as made one
With a weak nature, passible and frail,
And the deep sorrows which that nature bears.
  Would vain man deck it in his puerile plumes,
The wreath imperial or the Tyrian dye
And jewell'd sceptre, as if thus to gild
The heavenly?—If their Socrates had worn
A diadem, were his time-defying name
The more majestic?—
                When the Prince of Life
Stoop'd to their ruin'd world, and won release
For Satan's captives by the agony
Of His heroic love,—beseem'd it Him
To take the poor adornments which e'en man
Can scorn as trivial separable things?
—He stoop'd to save the lost; not to beguile
Forlorn humanity, but by the depth
Of love's humiliation, heal its woes,
Appease its terrors, quell the intensest need
Of the new waken'd heaven-illumin'd heart.
  O race Divinely honour'd—have they weigh'd
The task of that sublime Philanthropist
Who so lov'd, as Himself to disarray
Of the refulgence and the bliss supreme,
Welcoming toil and contumely and pain,
To snatch them from destruction, and to shield
His ransom'd trophies in the eternal rock
Cleft for their sakes, whence unexhausted flow
The streams that expiate, heal, and purify;
The prelibations of unending joy!
  O race Divinely favour'd, who shall join
For ever with their dearest—kindred—friends—
Belov'd ones—link'd in heavenly brotherhood

To their Deliverer's heart!
And what was man,
Infant of yesterday—frail child of dust—
That the Supreme is mindful of him so!
—Ye that revisit with benignant aim
The heirs of His salvation, can ye choose
But mourn and marvel, that their hope and love
Yet languish,—while the voiceless eloquence
Of the pale bleeding brow and closing lips
On which erewhile the stern centurion gaz'd
And own'd the Sufferer godlike—still appeals
In its pathetic silence to their souls—
What *could* have been done which Love *hath* not done
To wake the grateful ardour of the lost
And bind them to my throne!
Why slow of heart
To trust and prize eternal tenderness?
Why droops constraining gratitude towards Him
Whose love is changeless?
Still, those dark defaults
And deep infirmities of souls renew'd,
Own'd by themselves in contrite lowliness—
Can Mercy pardon, conquering grace dispel,
And heaven exclude!
What, meanwhile, can ye deem
Of all the illusions human hearts embrace?
Of busy triflers fluttering to the tomb
Amidst their visionary world of toys?
Of scorners, in their earthly dreams absorb'd,
Deaf to heaven's glorious tidings, sunk in sense,
Or deep entrench'd in arrogant conceits
Of science, wit, or shrewdness, which pretend
To wisdom, in contemning the remote
And spiritual;—as if the abyss of stars

Were nigh them, and their own mysterious life
And sceptic thought, by sight discernible!

True, not to such your chosen ministry,
But to those happier children of the light
Who welcome heaven's best gift; yet if perchance
In midnight watchings, or the lonesome hour
They fly from, ye could blend, as heaven may prompt,
Your warning whisper with the small still voice
That wakes within them—were it not your joy
To break that lethargy?
Repulse, we own,
Too oft awaits you. Proud and self-deceiv'd
Or sensual hearts, dark and impervious grown
Through levity or torpor, might elude
Persuasion, came it from seraphic tongues.
The world's pledg'd votary resists alike
His secret inward monitor, and all
Its heaven-sent echoes. Ere long ye shall hear
His cold soliloquy:—this love they boast,
And the great boon which claims it, what are these,
In reason's inquest, but the towering dreams
Of fond imagination, seen afar
Like forms colossal in the shifting clouds
On Alpine summits, brilliant and sublime,
But soon to vanish? Reason only loves
The plainly real; that which in itself
Or its sure adjuncts and undoubted signs
Is clear and tangible, not in the veil
Of mystery wrapt, eluding baffled thought.

Such may ye find the latent sophistries
Of earthly hearts, materialist and cold,
Incredulous of heavenly love: but truth

Their arguing thus reproves.
O child of earth,
Whose erring pride accounts thee wise, to escape
Delusion, and hold fast substantial good,
Owning no preciousness in things unseen,
No substance in the unbodied,—pause and weigh
The palpable and real which thou lov'st!
Is it thy bright new-minted gold, secure
Within its iron fastness from the hand
That would break through and steal?
Behold thy own
Which doth unlock it, and would still retouch
Thine idols—touch'd itself by stealthy time,
Powerless to count, or note, or lift thy store!
What then the shining hoards, inviolate,
But for thyself intangible! O what
But saddening phantoms of a wealth not thine!

Lov'st thou some goodly heritage; broad lands
Rich in green pasture; real, in the phrase
And law of earth?—Alas, thy failing foot,
As autumns wane, shall measure and survey
That heritage no more; grown far too wide
For thy small occupancy, who ere long
Need'st but a grave!
O self-deluded one,
Whom worldlings, by misnomer, help to cheat,
Titling thee—man of substance,—own'st thou not
One heavenward hope were more substantial soon,
Than the firm acres of that fair demesne
So near, so inaccessible for thee?
But these—perchance thou answerest—have not been
My sordid gods, or false realities.
I claim a heritage in nature's wealth,

In earth, sky, ocean: bright, unselfish, vast,
Broad as the sunbeams.
Good; we hail thy choice;
Art thou enamour'd of the seagirt cliff,
The multitudinous deep, the starry sphere?
'Tis well, 'tis noble; 'tis a princely love
Compar'd with dotage on those yellow heaps
Of tarnish'd gold: but yet, except thou rise
Through all that glorious scenery up to Him
Who stretch'd it forth, whose sovereign goodness fram'd
The mighty theatre of earth and heaven,—
Thou dost but look on splendid nothingness,
Admiring only what the tooth of time
Shall crumble, or a swifter ruin crush.
Nay, were that bright expanse, with all its forms
And magic circuits of perennial change,
Unperishing, how soon thy dying eye
Must cease to glance on it, while others take
Their fleeting turn, to gaze, a little while,
On earth's and ocean's wide magnificence,
And then, as first for thee, so next for them,
That visible sublime grows dark and void.

Or is it, peradventure, that thy soul,
Enchanted, dwells on the fair form and hues
Of virgin beauty, or the softer bloom
Of infant loveliness?—Ah, seest thou not
How the small, noiseless, ever hasting flow
Of moments from time's dusty horologe,
Thy breathing warm realities doth mar,
Bedim the smiling cheek of childish joy
And change the virgin charm to faded age,
Then to the pale, cold clay! except stern death
While these thy fancy captivate, arrest

The gazer, and abruptly call for thee!
O son of earth, too practical for faith,
Are these thy vaunted substances? Is this
The real, which doth warrant thee to scoff
At our delusions?
Strangely hast thou err'd.
If there be aught of real, surely not
The world of changeful sense, by sense perceiv'd:
But that of spirit, cognisable alone
By spirit, though frail sense the medium be.
And dream'st thou, servitor of sight and touch,
And imagery external, there is nought
Supremely real, permanent, Divine,
Firmer than adamant, more vital far
Than life's warm pulses, in that Spirit who fram'd
All tangible existence? Hast thou known
In human hearts the tender fervency
Of love unfeign'd? and wilt thou not ascribe
Its deeper energy, more vast, more true,
And more inscrutable, to the one Fount
Whence all must emanate?
Go, child of earth,
Discard thy vain repugnance. Bow thy heart,
In which the twilight of His love scarce dawns,
And plead for its full sunlight, till it rise
And shine, and cast its radiant warmth abroad
Through the dark region.
Kneel and meditate
What that love *must* be! Scan the depth and height
Of secret power which chains the rolling worlds
To their true centre, in free space upborne
By that immense attraction, whose one grasp
Circles the boundless! Wherefore shall His love
Be less omnipotent, less vast, less sure,

Or less unchanging, than His power or will
Which all those orbs sustains! His will is power,
His will is love. Doth sovereign power create
And marshal forth the many-peopled host
Of stars? Swift love those countless worlds shall bless:
Even as Power binds them, so shall Love pervade;
And while this guards each atom, guides each sphere,
That can each spirit win, attract, elate,
Ennoble with its joy! Oh, ask of Him
To melt thee with one soul-enkindling ray,
Till when the clay cell of mortality
Shall drop, that glorious unobstructed flood
Of love Divine, insphere thee in itself,
Amidst the bright realities of heaven,
The plenitude of uncreated bliss!

Theodosis paused; and then said—Consider those sentiments, my friend. If your memory can recall and note them, they may serve to evince to some around you, with what astonishment and sorrow we—who have clearer and more enlarged views of Divine interpositions—regard their insensibility; and may be salutary also to yourself, by reminding you how weak and defective are your own spiritual perceptions and emotions.

Farewell! When to-morrow's sun is declining to the west, we will resume our theme once more.

SECTION VI.

SOME CHECKS TO THE SENTIMENT OF LOVE TO GOD.

THE scenery of my dream or reverie again surrounded me, and I greeted cordially my returning visitor; but there was, methought, a shade on the brow of Theodosis, when advancing to me under the green arch of those trees which formed what I had named our little sanctuary of friendship. I remembered the last word of the last sunset, and my heart foreboded a parting.

Yield not to gloomy thoughts, said my instructor, in a tone of animated kindness. We must be severed awhile; but the scenes and the society of other regions await us. There the sun declines not, and the foliage of the tree of life, like those who meet beneath it, never falls or fades.

I know, Philalethes, that you sometimes appreciate, more than many, the grandeur and the tenderness which are divinely apparent, and more divinely latent, in the great mystery of human redemption: yet that you experience much discouragement in not being moved and enkindled by these deep things of God as you desire to be. I know that this continued failure

in spiritual attainments afflicts your spirit and darkens your best hopes.

It is not my purpose to advert to those culpable states of mind, and pernicious influences of the world, which unhappily militate against spiritual progress and enjoyment. To these your conscience distressingly bears witness. I shall not cease to pray that you may seek and obtain grace and strength against them.

But it may be useful to notice another class of causes which appear to contribute to the defects that you acknowledge and lament.

Those defects partly arise, as I conceive, from the immense and incomprehensible character of the facts and objects; from your long and gradual habituation to them; from trite, or feeble, or inflated presentations of them, which flatten or obscure their impressiveness; and from their being wholly unseen, both in respect of the agent, the achievement, and its highest results.

I judge also that there is an indirect weakening of faith—the basis of love—in some minds, by the imagined uniqueness of God's great work of grace: and a weakening, moreover, of love itself, by some misconception as to the character of those sentiments which ought to prevail in it.

I will explain these my views, and if they are confirmed by you, I shall hope, by thus unfolding

them, to obviate in some degree their ill influence on your spiritual growth and comfort.

Imagine some exalted dweller in a distant orb, the regent of Hesperus, or of the sun, voluntarily to quit his magnificent domain, and become, for a time, the visible guardian of your native Britain, this most favoured island of your world. Conceive of such a celestial Howard entering your fever or cholera hospitals, and by some unknown specific of heavenly science, restoring sudden health to the emaciated sufferers. Imagine him resorting to your most stormy coasts, and directing the construction of a life-boat so complete, as infallibly to rescue the tempest-beaten mariners. Suppose him teaching such a new and perfect culture to the tillers of your soil, as should make the peasant's garden suffice for every simple want. Let him exert such a winning and constraining persuasiveness as should move both young and old to diligence and happy self-control, and turn back, in many a locality, the wasting current of vices and their attendant miseries. Think of him, also, as maintaining the disguise of a human person and human infirmities, shrinking from no toil or hardship in his deeds of kindness, but with a charm of aspect and demeanour which betrayed his heavenly origin. Suppose him to unite a gentle sympathy, an unfailing patience, a capti-

vating affability and eloquence, with wisdom the most lofty and fortitude the most heroic. Let it be added, that, by his heavenly skill, this visitor had raised your dearest friend from the deepest mental gloom, and yourself from the most dangerous disease;—and tell me, Philalethes, would you not be one (not to say the foremost) among those earnest thousands who should crowd around his steps, extol him with affectionate veneration, be full of enthusiasm towards so great a benefactor, and be prompted, by their admiring fervour, to second and partake his efforts?

But now, my friend, dismiss that supposition, and turn to the fact. Your belief is, that the Uncreated Word, the Brightness of Jehovah's glory, the "Eternal Image," the "Angel Redeemer,"[1] stooped from an elevation—I will not say a million times greater than that of our supposed angelic philanthropist, but infinitely and unsearchably greater. You feel also that his mission, not only by his first miracles, but far more extensively since,—has bettered beyond all reckoning the temporal condition of mankind; yet that it had objects incomparably and infinitely higher, compassing the welfare of the spirit, reaching forth into immortality.

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[1] Titles given to the Word, or Messiah, in Philo Judæus, and in the Book Zohar. See Dr. Pye Smith, Scrip. Test. vol. i., pp. 594, 618.

All this you believe, or would shudder to dispute; but yet the very immensity of the act and its aims, while it moves a deep and obscure wonder—perhaps, also, some incredulity—perplexes your thoughts, and seems to paralyse your feelings, by confusing and overtasking them.

You cannot suspect me of meaning to insinuate that it were better the redemption and its objects had been finite, in order that you might better have conceived them, and perhaps have felt them more clearly. Far be from me and you such presumptuous error. That it should be all which it is, was indispensable for man's full salvation and beatitude; still this does not annul the incidental but inevitable disadvantage, which must be set to the account of man's littleness and weakness.

Truly, said I, you have expressed my experience in this matter, while you have analysed its cause with more exactness than I myself had explored it.

Let me then proceed, replied Theodosis, to indicate another cause, to which also, perhaps, your consciousness will respond; namely, the long-continued habit with which you both receive from others and frame for yourself, ideas or conceptions of the great fact of redemption.

The weak and perishable organization by which the human mind in this life acts, is always so affected by repetition, that the greatest and most

striking objects lose ever, gradually, somewhat of their force and impressiveness. Add to this, that not only can you barely, if ever, hear or speak or conceive of the events and results of Divine Redemption, except in forms of thought and expressions long customary, but that, besides this, they are very often presented in terms, and in a manner, which still farther lower and darken them. The ethereal flame of Divine love burns dimly through the stained or misty lamp of the mind which would display its brightness.

Alas! I said, Theodosis, you touch on points which have often grieved or disconcerted me.

I have been mortified in uttering or stating my own cold and meagre conceptions of this great subject; and yet I have felt still further distaste at the vapid, or low, or florid manner in which it has been sometimes presented by others.

The next point to which I advert, said my instructor, cannot have escaped your attention,—that both the supreme act or work of Divine love, and also its best and highest effects, are for you unseen and at present invisible. This continually weakens the realization—not to say belief—of those great facts.

The supposed visitor from Hesperus would have been *seen* by you: the nobleness and benignity of his air, the sweetness of his voice and smile, would have seconded all his claims on

grateful admiration; his works would have been sudden and visible wonders of kindness: life saved, health restored, comfort imparted;—just so, He that really came from heaven, was by His first followers seen; and His gracious deeds were evident and tangible. St. Peter, when he wrote, "whom having not seen ye love," had himself the advantage of his later converts, in that the risen Lord had visibly appeared to him, and thus fortified, permanently, both his faith and love. Although faith and love towards the *un*seen have reached very high and happy degrees, it does not thence follow that those graces would not be the greater and more fervent for seeing or having seen their adorable object. Indeed, unquestionably, they must be so.

I could only reply,—May God our Saviour grant, O Theodosis, that the love which I feel to be so faint and dubious, may receive a delightful accession from that glorious vision.

Trust, Philalethes, rejoined my comforter, that it shall be so,—and that reliance will itself enliven your weak beginnings of present love.

Let me mention to you, also, that there is in some minds a misconception on one or both of two points connected with this subject, detrimental, at least indirectly or by consequence, to those sentiments of devout love which redemption ought to awaken. One of these is, the

opinion implied by some of your theologians, and by some expressed and argued for, that the work of human salvation, as effected by Christ's humiliation and sacrifice, is an act of Divine benevolence never to be paralleled, wholly unmatched, and altogether unapproached in its grandeur, wonderfulness, and kindness, by any possible act of God, throughout His universe, and throughout eternity. It is intended, by insisting on this view of it, to extol and magnify the fact and doctrine, and thus to augment your love and adoration: but this aim has, I fear, been grievously defeated, in regard to some minds; inasmuch as there has been raised an occasion of doubt or incredulity.

Such affirmations and reasonings, I replied, remind me of Dr. Henry More's description of a theologist, by him named Psittaco, who,

> "——— with countenance sage
> Did speak, and did unfold God's secresie,
> And left untouch'd no hidden mystery;"

—to whom the poet replied:—

> "You are heaven's privie counsellor, I understand,
> Which I wist not before." [1]

The objection (I added) which has been raised against the fact of our Divine Redemption, from the immensity of God's works, I apprehend may

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[1] Psychozoia, book ii., stanz. 52, 53.

be thus presented:—Astronomical discoveries show us the high probability, that the number of inhabited worlds is vast beyond all calculation.[1] But when it is affirmed, by some theologians, that, together with the alleged Fall, the direct intervention of Deity by the assumption of a created nature, can never have occurred, and can never occur, except in this one world, we are met by the prior improbability that thus it should be: that there should be but one solitary world, and that only one our own, which, having undergone such a catastrophe, has been visited by so transcendent a deliverance. This antecedent unlikelihood, the testimony, or the allegation, has to outweigh.

Such is the objection; and, whatever be its real weight, there is no doubt that it has disturbed many.

But if, on the contrary, in the range of immensity and in the depths of a past and coming eternity, there have been numerous falls or imminent perils of falling, and many Divine salvations or conservations, then is the antecedent unlikelihood exceedingly lessened.

Allow me, Theodosis, to illustrate my own impression of this difference, by an imagined

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[1] "The number of the stars may be really infinite, in the only sense in which we can assign a meaning to the word."—Sir J. Herschell on Astronomy, c. xii., p. 373.

instance or two grounded on human affairs; which, alien as they are from our great theme, may at least serve to test my meaning.

Suppose it affirmed to me, that our sovereign had singled out myself *alone* from among the many millions of her British subjects, purposing, with a condescension truly royal, to confer with her own hand some mark of favour, as in the distribution of medals to the soldiers,—it would be exceedingly difficult for me really to believe and firmly to expect an occurrence so utterly improbable. But if I were taught, or even encouraged to conjecture, that I was one among five thousand of my countrymen, each of whom would be so honoured in the course of the next three years, my belief of the queen's intention thus to act towards myself would be many times the easier and more unwavering.

Or imagine me to have been a wounded soldier among the millions of the host of Xerxes, and to be assured that the lord of all those hosts had felt an unparalleled interest for me *alone*, and had come, incognito, to dress my wound and confer on me personally some honour, hidden from me as yet, but to be ere long made known, I should have found it immensely difficult to believe firmly the reality of such a visit.

But if I were told, or even indirectly led or permitted to infer, that the monarch had thus

visited and distinguished, severally, a great *number* of the wounded, assuredly would my faith in the reality of his disguised visit to myself be rendered many times more steadfast. I believe that the mental process, in minds of a certain character, when contemplating the recorded fact of redemption, is in this respect naturally and justly analogous to these: and that their faith in it must be, therefore, by the one view or the other, respectively in like manner shaken or strengthened. But faith is the *root* of love and veneration; and whatever tends to shake and unsettle the root, tends equally to wither the tree.

I am glad, therefore, that a late eloquent and devout advocate for the doctrine of human redemption,—when rebuking the assertion of the infidel,—maintains the incognoscible diversity and extent of such Divine acts, saying, "for anything he can tell, the redemption proclaimed to us is not one solitary instance, or not the whole of that redemption which is by the Son of God—but only one part in a plan of mercy, magnificent as all that astromony has discovered. For anything he can tell, the wonder-working God, who has strewed the fields of immensity with so many worlds, may have sent a message of love to each; and reassured the hearts of its despairing people by some overpowering mani-

festation of tenderness."[1] And elsewhere he asks—"Why have infidels missed the conception, that the time of those peculiar visitations which they look upon as so disproportionate to the earth's magnitude, is just as evanescent as the earth is insignificant?—that, after all, the redemption of our species is but an ephemeral doing in the history of intelligent nature?—that there remains to its Author time enough for carrying round the visitations of as peculiar a tenderness, over the whole extent of His universal monarchy?"[2] Now these rebukes—somewhat modified, and uttered in the tone of mild expostulation—are, I think, as suitable for some divines as they are for unbelievers. Might it not be fitly said to them,—You devoutly purpose to extol

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[1] Chalmers' Astron. Disc., pp. 80, 81, abridged.

[2] Ibid. p. 197, abridged. I may add the words of Dr. H. Bushnell. "Could we look into the history of the innumerable other worlds God has comprehended in His reign, what a lesson might we thence derive from events counterpart to this of the incarnation, varied only to meet the varied condition of their want, character, and destiny." Nature and the Supernatural, p. 269. Foster also, supposes "the Divine Nature performing infinite wonders of grace and power, altogether foreign, as the remote scenes of their display, from this world and the interposition for its redemption." Quoted in Dr. Smith's Scripture Testimony, vol. i., p. 186.

God's grace and glory in the act of man's redemption, by affirming it to be an exclusive work which never was or can be paralleled. But have you duly meditated His Eternal Being with whom all things are possible? Have you expatiated in the boundless conception of what the infinite past may register, or the unending future evolve, and what may be the annals of countless orbs and races, existing now, or to begin their existence unnumbered ages hence? "Hast thou walked in search of these depths? Declare if thou knowest them all;" and then tell us what He, who "made the stars" and "bringeth out their host," has or has not wrought, shall or shall not perform; and which of his actual or possible doings is the greatest or the least. Meanwhile forbear to perplex our faith by what may be termed the hyperboles of exclusiveness or limitation—restricting that Infinite Sovereignty which you design to exalt.[1]

I perceive (said Theodosis) that you are already quite awake to the error on which I might else have more copiously dwelt. I will only say, therefore, whatever defects I observe in your views or illustrations, the possession of our far

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[1] There are some remarks on this error, in Dick's Christian Philosopher, pp. 503, 532, to which I have referred in "Christian Encouragement," Note D.

more expanded knowledge would only lead you much farther in the same direction. The more elevated the standing-place, the more vast the horizon. But those wonders of God the Saviour's power and grace, those glorious "parts of His ways" which are well known to *us*, while wholly unknown to *you*, are of such kinds as I could no way in your present state make clear to your apprehension. I will only add, that in reference to the acts and ways of Jehovah, the words of your great apostle will be a fit aphorism and animating precept, as to all hallowed affections and all hallowed speculations, for all creatures and through all ages—"Be ye also enlarged!"

I will now notice a different misapprehension, which tends to discourage one class, and to beguile another. Shall I treat it as an instance of the want of copiousness in human language,—or rather of its versatility,—that one word may assume such various modifications of meaning? The very important word "love," has always in it one leading idea—the attachment or outgoing of the mind towards an object which in *some* way attracts it. But then the other constituent qualities of the sentiment are as various as its diverse objects. These may be even inanimate; or they may be creatures of low rank in the animate world; or those of your own species, feeble and dependent, but not closely related to

you; or these same when connected with you by the nearest bonds of consanguinity; or equals, as a chosen and intimate friend, or a partner of life joined in conjugal oneness; or the different classes of superiors,—parent, tutor, guardian, sovereign; and infinitely above all these, the supreme Benefactor, the perfect and adorable Creator.

You know how diversely the sentiment is modified through this gradation of instances, and how truly it may be styled in many respects another, though in one respect the same. If you love a flower, or tree, or fountain, the sentiment is only that of pleasure and admiration at beauty in this work of God, and, perhaps, some refreshment from it; if a fine statue or painting, there is mingled a gratification in witnessing the imitative skill conferred on man. In loving a gentle and docile bird, or a handsome and faithful dog, your sentiment involves fondness—care to protect—pity when it suffers. Love to the infants or children of others partakes the same qualities, but with a totally different and far higher feeling, of concern as to the capacities, perils, and hopes of their nature: while in love to your own child there is associated with all this the tender sense of a oneness wholly peculiar. Gratitude for kindnesses, or for reciprocal affection, often enters deeply, as years go on, into this parental love, and it is not excluded even from your love to

that sagacious animal who would do his master good offices if he could, and sometimes has done so. Whereas in love to a depraved and wretched outcast, gratitude, fondness, esteem, are alike impossible; and compassion for a being who casts away its own capability of happiness is the only emotion in which such love consists. But the grateful emotion becomes far stronger and more elevated between equals, friends, and partners. In filial love (when it is what it ought to be) respect and deference more largely mingle with grateful and confiding affection; and those qualities are yet more dominant, if not exclusively, in deferential esteem for a just and kind superior, or loyal attachment to a beneficent sovereign. Lastly, in love to the great Author of your being, the sentiments of pity and solicitude, as well as of fondness or familiarity, are totally excluded; while those of awe and veneration combine with profound gratitude for countless benefits, and admiring homage to unsearchable perfection.

It is somewhat remarkable, I here observed, that one of our chief English philologists defines love, in reference to this its supreme object, merely as "due reverence to God."[1]

That, replied Theodosis, is a frigid and scanty definition. It savours of the temperament and

[1] Samuel Johnson, in Dictionary.

religious views of its author; in whose mind awe prevailed, and who had attained very imperfectly, to say the most, a filial spirit. Doubtless, however, reverence should be a prominently characteristic feature of love to God. So far as any human analogy can approach it, love to God may be best imaged by conceiving the greatest and best of monarchs, adopting the feeble and destitute child of a rebel, which had itself shared the spirit of disaffection and revolt, but had been won by loving-kindness, and melted into penitence. Now, the attachment of such a child to that most exalted personage might, indeed, become filial—unmixed with disquietude and dread; yet it could never rightly become fond and familiar, but should always be marked by a self-controlled freedom, and an earnest reverential gratitude in which deference and veneration would regulate both sentiment and expression.

It is manifest that this applies with infinitely greater force to the love of God.

You should remember also that the expression of the most inferior and slightest kinds of love—as that to a favourite animal, or to an infant even not your own, is frequently more vivacious and profuse, superficially more fervid and tender, than of the love you bear to a very dear and highly-esteemed friend. The shallow rill has a bright and bubbling flow, while the deep broad river

glides in stillness. Consider, too, that the most intellectual persons are most likely to have profoundly solemn and repressive thoughts, from their larger conception and grasp of His unsearchable grandeur "who inhabiteth eternity." This shows the need, on their part, of a proportionally deeper and more steadfast contemplation of those paternal attributes, and of that fraternal love in the Divine yet human Redeemer, by whose sublimity and tenderness their grateful fervour and filial adoration may be so enhanced, as to dispel both sceptical coldness and oppressive awe. On the other hand, they in whom sanguine and imaginative emotions prevail, while their intellectual comprehension is less, should be self-observant, lest their love to God—especially as manifested in human nature—have in it some qualities inappropriate to the all-glorious object.

But for you and such as you, I would say,—be not discouraged if your love to God your Saviour have in it much less softness, warmth, and vivacity than you desire. The one thing needful is that it be a loyal, faithful love. Remember, that He who wept by the grave of Lazarus, and over the guilt of Jerusalem, has not proposed a melting or impassioned fervency, but a devoted allegiance, as the test of your love to Him.

Thus have I sought to develope to you some facts and circumstances, which, as I believe, tend

to repress the emotion and impede the exercise of your love to God; and my suggestions have found some response from your own experience.

I reminded you that the very immensity and unsearchableness of the Object of such love is itself an obstacle:—that your long habituation to superficial views of it has the same tendency;—that low or narrow or tawdry representations of it are suited to obstruct and mar its impression;—that the unseen character of the Object tends to enfeeble, though by no means to preclude love. I mentioned, also, as a needless difficulty for faith, and therefore as adverse to love, those limitations of the Divine beneficence which infidels urge, and which some theologians have also assumed. I have, lastly, referred to the unique character of love to God, as distinguished from every other kind of love; a difference which renders it more difficult both rightly to exercise and fully to ascertain.

But now, Philalethes, remember also, notwithstanding all these impediments, how easily and sovereignly the Father of lights can instruct and inspire you to love Him more, and to love Him more rightly. He that is as infinite in goodness as in power, can touch and move with Divine gentleness the spirit which His greatness has been wont to overwhelm. The hand that

upholds "the nebula of Orion,"[1] pours life through the frailest insect, and cherishes it there. He "who is invisible," can bid some hidden emanation from "the brightness of His glory" shine suddenly into the heart, scatter the dimness of habit, and the dust of trite and feeble words, assure you silently that He is Almighty Love, and vivify you into a conscious fulness of grateful and adoring love toward Him. Despond not of this, Philalethes. Be watchful, faithful, hopeful, then at evening time it shall be light.

But, in the meantime, do not neglect the methods and the endeavours which are adapted to cherish this heavenly affection. Seek to concentrate and elevate your mind into more fixed and cordial meditation on its sovereign uncreated Object.

Remember that although your evangelic records present a true portrait—sublime in its perfect simplicity, inimitable in its high originality—of Him who was the image and brightness of the Invisible, still they afford, at most, but a miniature outline of that Divine Person.

No doubt, the touches are exquisitely guided and governed by the Supreme and Master hand.

But still, ask of yourself,—what is a small

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[1] See Nichol's Syst. of the World (and Earl Rosse's Letter there quoted), pp. 55, 57.

outline sketch, even of a great painting wrought by human art—suppose of the Transfiguration by Raffaelle? Much more, what is a minute drawing or etching of Niagara, or of a scene in the Alps or Andes, to the vast magnificent reality?

Your Redeemer, as He put off, for your sakes, his primal and celestial glory, so did He, fitly and necessarily, adapt his thoughts and words to the conceptions and character of feeble and fallen mankind.

Herein, indeed, consists in great part the sublimity of His brief and simple language; that it condenses the greatest things into contracted outline, for your weak and limited mental vision.

The writers of your Gospels were restrained from attempting to paint, to expatiate, to admire; —were guided merely and succinctly to record.

But endeavour, my friend, by earnest and reverent meditation, somewhat to fill up and tint their outline. It will be, indeed, but an outline and a miniature still: yet it may have for yourself a greater warmth and freshness and strength.

Be sure, that whatever you have conceived of the tenderly heroic—firm in lofty endurance, gentle in benevolence and sympathy, delighting to rescue from misery and confer a perfect bliss, radiant with a mild majesty that shall charm every spirit,—all this, and unspeakably more,

must have met, and must endlessly meet, in Him, who, coming from heaven, was above all; who spake as never man spake, wrought as man never wrought, suffered as none else hath suffered.

Think of Him who is thus admirably and attractively perfect, as having given His whole self, His life, His death, for you; as still with deep attachment advocating your cause in heaven, and watching over your course on earth:—resplendent the while with all that spiritual and corporeal exaltation, which are the result and exhibition of His triumph.

Think of all the amplitude and grandeur of intellectual treasures, all the fervency of generous and melting affection, all the captivations of personal dignity and grace, as concentrated in the manhood of Him that is Divine;—and then of all those treasures as devoted and expended heretofore and still for you—for you the most unworthy—as earnestly, as efficiently, as if you were the exclusive object of celestial kindness!

Not to love so admirable and gracious a Deliverer,—is it not to be estranged, by a mental blindness or torpor, from all that is amiable and exalted, from perfect heroism and wisdom, combined with Divine generosity and gentleness?

To love Him, on the contrary, is it not to enter on a godlike alliance, union, participation, with the fulness of the Infinitely Good and Blessed?

Try, my Philalethes, to muse more intensely on this Supreme object of adoring love, till your heart glows with the deepening sentiment and expands to the glorious anticipation.

Try to realize what *we*, in some measure experience, who discern the presence and glory of God in modes and forms by you inconceivable. Think how you shall one day (and before many years elapse) be kneeling, hand in hand with the dearest to your heart, before your Creator, Ransomer, Restorer, Guide, Guardian, Welcomer to heaven,—seeing in His gracious eye the smile of a Divine complacence, the ineffable expression transcending all vocal language, which will say,—Ye that are one with me and with each other, be welcome to my beatific presence! Guilty ye have been; and ever since that guilt was cancelled by my grace, ye have been frail and faithless, relapsing and inconsistent still; but ye have been ever mine. Fear not, for I have redeemed you. I have blotted as a cloud your trespasses, and as a thick cloud your sins.

Think, Philalethes, with what emotion you and yours will meet that amazing welcome, that supreme loving-kindness; glancing back on all the multiplicity and aggravations of your offences, and then feeling yourselves encircled by the Infinite Compassion which overwhelms and obliterates all.

Realize, be it only in the thousandth part, the sentiments to be enkindled by that heavenly greeting, and then remember how much fainter in truth will be those expressions of love (however delightful), than the pathetic and agonizing expressions of it which are past,—past in their occurrence, indelible and ever-during in the eye of Him who seeth the end from the beginning. His smiles will enrapture you; yet the pangs of His agony prove and express far more than the enrapturing smiles. The welcome will awaken ecstasy; yet the ransom is incomparably more wondrous and Divine.

Pray that He who is Love would enliven and invigorate yours, by the fuller discovery of His own!

I am now called hence to minister to others. If we meet not again below, revolve often my friendly counsels!

Look beyond this brief evanescent scene, and anticipate that meeting, where every cloud of doubt and sadness shall be quite dispelled;—where love to the Author of all good, and to the whole perfected family in heaven, shall be quite unalloyed by error and infirmity, and yield, evermore, the unfading fruits of blessedness.

ESSAY V.

THE EXCELLENCIES OF DIVINE PHILOSOPHY

(IN A LETTER TO THE LATE LORD BROUGHAM).

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My Lord,—Whoever highly esteems intellectual powers and acquirements, as among God's noblest gifts—unless his own mind be possessed by envy and selfishness, or his temperament peculiarly cold and abstracted—must feel a deep interest in the character, career, and welfare of those whom the Giver of all good has most eminently thus endowed; even although not admitted to their intercourse, nor personally knowing them.

Such a feeling has been strongly awakened in myself, with respect to several distinguished writers and speakers now passed into another world; most of all, I think, in the instance of that eloquent De Stael, to whom your lordship has fitly assigned a place among the "statesmen" of our age. No doubt, in this case, the warmth and brilliancy of her imaginative powers, and the spell of her deep and pensive sentiment, much

augmented the impression. It exists, however, under a different modification, towards those great minds whose temperament and sphere and achievements are of a severer cast.

I am persuaded, my lord, that from this kind of feeling, as well as from simply considering the actual and important influence which you have exerted and might still exert, the announcement of your impaired health has affected not a few of your countrymen with genuine concern. It is said that you have suffered acutely from the loss of your nearest relatives; and that from these causes your indisposition has at least been aggravated, cannot but be deemed highly probable.

Minds of a lively and melting sensibility are, I believe, often less profoundly and lastingly wounded by great distresses, than they who endure with calmness and resist with active strength. The weeping willow droops, and the gnarled oak is riven. I have fallen unawares into metre; which, where figures are employed, is often near at hand. These facts, however, even if as true as I suppose them, will not go far towards vindicating from the charge of officious impertinence one who ventures, as a stranger, to urge topics of consolation and resources of happiness.

That charge may be perhaps somewhat extenuated, by mentioning, that he who addresses you,

however inferior both in social and mental rank, is one that has himself suffered; partly from great and repeated bereavements of the same and other kinds, partly from a mind so framed as to have often realized what Byron has expressed (though memory may not furnish his exact words):

> "This melancholy is a fearful gift,
> Holding up life in utter nakedness,
> Making the cold reality too real."

I address your lordship, however, not privately, but through the press—and thus not so much personally, as in the quality of one who may fitly represent, by eminence, the educated and intellectual classes generally;—I do so because this method obviates in part the imputation above referred to, of assuming to teach or to console *such* a reader.

I would fain hope and believe, my lord, that you have of late (if not earlier) yourself revolved and felt the truths which may here be suggested. If so,—or if you should decline, which perhaps is in your case almost unavoidable, to be led by another, and a stranger, towards them,—the suggestions here made will still be placed thus before other minds; some of whom may account them less unworthy of notice, just *because* the writer *has* presumed to address or

inscribe them to a censor so distinguished. Thus the charge of arrogance is in part averted, while the scope and sphere of whatever good may, by God's blessing, be hoped for, is indefinitely widened.

If, indeed, any near approach in point of intellectual grasp or furniture were requisite to justify and encourage such an attempt, your lordship would feel that few, if any, even of the great leaders with whom you have been in collision or co-operation through life, ought to venture on the task.

But few can know better than yourself how true and variously applicable is the maxim so tersely given by La Fontaine—

"On a souvent besoin d'un plus petit que soi;"

for the greater men are, the more occasions must they have to experience this; and, if not "often," it may at least be sometimes true as to the best and most availing presentment of those truths which most deeply concern our happiness.

The consolations, or sources of hope, which (as one who has in a *measure* proved them) I would now suggest, are, indeed, anything but new; on the contrary, their impression is likely to be abated by their being deemed so trite and common. For it is certain, that

they are sufficiently understood and appreciated to be effectually embraced by very many feeble and vulgar minds; often also presented *by* such, and sometimes, perhaps, purposely *for* such, in the garb of cant or technicality, and in connexion or mixture with extreme and untenable opinions, which render them repulsive to cultivated tastes and to comprehensive and powerful understandings; though such a dress, I believe, may most adapt them to the popular tone of thought and of susceptibility. But I conceive that, when divested of these adjuncts, which are, in great part, mere media of conveyance, the doctrines and discoveries *peculiar* to Christianity will be found, in spite of the strong aversion and contempt of many gifted persons, to contain in them the highest and best *philosophy*—that of true consolation, high moral advancement, and abiding satisfaction. You have yourself argued, my lord, with eminent success, and with a weight which the *future* influence of your name will, I am persuaded, continue to augment, the existence and attributes of Deity. A most important task; not merely on account of the dependence which you have shown of revelation on Natural Theology, but also as combating that actual or virtual atheism, whether of materialists like Broussais, or spirit-

nalists like Shelley, which I fear infects, in some vague form, multitudes in almost all countries, from Britain to Hindostan.

You have also, with much force (and in opposition to the theories of both those classes of speculatists) argued from that personal consciousness, which is the essential quality of the human mind—its oneness, spirituality, incapacity of division, or dissolution; that is, in other words, its natural immortality, or continuance of consciousness, *until* He who made it what it is shall, by ceasing to sustain its essence, will to *un*make it: the truth next in importance to the being of a God; nay, of co-ordinate importance, or rather involved with that truth, since, as you fully perceive and plainly declare, the disproof of the one would invalidate the proof and belief of the other.[1]

Permit me to add, that (even apart from the dogma of materialists) the denial of a future life for man must lead (as I conceive) to a virtual atheism. For if it could be supposed that a God really exists, and yet that the mind of man, *whatever* be its nature, is doomed to a destruction of consciousness at the death of the bodily frame, being designed for and made capable of no further happiness than our present life may

[1] Disc. of Nat. Theol., pp. 78, 79.

yield, then is this same perishing mind of man itself more sublime and benevolent than the mind of that supposed God, inasmuch as it conceives and hopes, and would, if it had power, assuredly procure for itself and others an existence far more perfect, happy, and durable than He wills or intends for it; or, if we should suppose a God who, having created and sustained the mind of man, *could not* sustain and prolong its conscious being beyond this short life, then must the power of that God be so limited as to preclude all belief in His spiritual perfection or greatness, and consequently in His real personal existence.

In giving, therefore, the suffrage and the reasonings of your powerful mind decidedly for these doctrines, a real Deity and a real soul, you would have performed (in my opinion) good service to the cause of revelation, even although it should be supposed (which I find no reason to conclude) that you had not directly aimed or sincerely wished to serve it.

Because, if I have observed human nature, or sounded my own heart aright, the mind of man is prone to doubt on these fundamental points, and it is this secret wavering which makes revelation always appear to those who reject or slight it, and sometimes even to those

who receive it, both the less *credible* and the less *needful*.

This *wavering*, as to the great "foundations" of all truth and hope, I conceive to be the habitual state of most who do not seriously accept revelation—a state varying with their temper, feelings, and circumstances, verging towards careless unbelief in seasons of comparative safety and enjoyment, and towards anxious views of the opposite kind in times of calamity and danger.

The sceptical prayer said to have been used by a soldier on the battle-field, "O God,—if there be a God,—save my soul, if I have a soul!" must have been offered in substance, though not in form, by thousands of doubting but alarmed minds, in the war-storm and the sea-storm, from the days of Jonah until now.

In urgent peril the belief or apprehension is usually awaked, which till then might be dormant or repressed, that there *is* both a God and a soul; and he who stirs it before that time (as I hope your lordship may have done in some minds), by showing strong *reasons* for both, proves, in so doing, the great need we have of *our* revelation,—a revelation of real grace,—in order to a life of real peace. It is too true the mind may be (or seem to be) convinced of a God and a soul, and yet *not* awakened

to that inference;—but, on the other hand, while it continues to deny or prevalently to doubt those primary and momentous facts, the inference *cannot* arise.

In this view I cannot but esteem your discourse of Natural Theology a most valuable and seasonable addition to our earlier treasures on that great subject. The deliberate and recorded suffrage of so powerful a mind, *for* those fundamental truths, must have weight both with some who hold and some who impugn them. It ought to have (let me add) much more weight than any argument or declaration of the same mind, or one equally powerful, *against* them; inasmuch as the love of ingenious paradox, and of proud independence, is well known to be most natural to such, and must ever incline them to dispute opinions on which the multitude of inferior minds are resting.

But there is a further question, the very next in importance to these fundamental truths of a God and a soul; namely, what are the attributes and intentions of the Deity towards *us?*

You have said, my lord, that the "peculiar attributes" of the "Ancient of Days," are "nearly the same in the volume of nature and in that of His revealed word."[1] This remark is, in a

[1] Disc., p. 213.

certain sense, true and valuable, but appears to need, what you will excuse me for suggesting, a qualification to which the term "nearly" is not adequate.

Your lordship, I presume, intended, that the wisdom and goodness, and to a certain extent the justice of the Supreme Being, are seen in the works of creation, and in the ways of providence; and that these also are the attributes declared by revelation. Fully acceding to both these propositions, I must, at the same time, hold that the moral attributes of goodness or clemency, and justice or equity, are exhibited by revelation, in a far more distinct and exceedingly enhanced manner; and above all, that modification of clemency and benevolence which consists in forgiveness, and in special help and favour to the forgiven. I would not at all contend that even *this* is in *no* degree indicated by the course of nature and providence. On the contrary, in whatever measure change of conduct induces the natural removal of the natural causes of suffering, an original Divine arrangement, partaking the character of forgiveness, seems involved. But that it is very partially and uncertainly so, and more of the nature of a respite than a reprieve, may be inferred from other and numerous cases in which no change of purpose or of life does or can remove the consequences of past folly and transgression.

Our revelation, however, is throughout (from beginning to end) essentially a revelation of sovereign and judicial pardon—a pardon much more than equivalent to even honourable acquittal by earthly judicatures, inasmuch as it includes the being instated in full favour of the Sovereign Judge whose law has been infringed. And this we regard as the cardinal and chief discovery of our book; that the Deity (at once our Sovereign, Judge, and Father) is *infinitely* forgiving towards all who really accept His great proclaimed amnesty in His own way and on His own prescribed terms.[1]

Here I believe to be the only, and (when cordially embraced) the plenary source of real comfort in the sorrows of declining life, in bereavements, in sinking health, and in the prospect of dissolution, as well as at other times, when conscience is susceptible, and, more or less, makes "cowards of us all," or ought to do so. This kind of consolation, my lord, you know that mere philosophy could not in old times and cannot now supply. For it—mere or unrevealed philosophy—either supposes the Deity indifferent alike to human agents and acts, or else generally

[1] On the case of those who have not heard of it, and those who cannot understand it, we have no occasion or title to pronounce.

good (meaning principally by that phrase, kind and lenient), and causing, either freely or by necessity, all things to be ruled by general laws tending to good, which they will and must follow. But not even this latter and better theory can at all assure us of our own or other men's complete and continued *happiness*. Those who believe in the oneness and indiscerptible character of spirit or consciousness—a doctrine so well defended and illustrated by yourself—and who therefore expect a future life of some sort (unless the Deity should resolve to *destroy*), must of course either expect that life to be precisely on a par with this, as to its sum of good or evil in a like duration, or else, that it will have more of good, *or* more of evil.

Now an exact parity it is *very* difficult to imagine, not only as a thing probably not occurring in all inanimate nature, nor in all the tribes of living beings (so far as we know them), but still more because, even if such parity were supposed, it is scarce possible that the reminiscences of this life, as having influenced the character of the next, should not cause a deep regret at its not being *better*, and being therefore less good than it might have been or *ought* to be; which very regret or self-reproach would subvert the parity supposed.

If so, it follows that the next life to this must

necessarily be either more or less happy. Suppose it happier—*wherefore* will it be so? From no other cause (every real theist must maintain) than *His will* who then, as now, can alone uphold our being and all its conditions or attributes. And why, or on what solid ground, shall we expect Him to *will* it to be happier?

Few real *thinkers,* after once admitting a distinction between right and wrong, can be at all confident that the Deity will make them happier on the score of their *deserts.*

Looking at the matter in some kind of forensic view, as either a sentence or award, which is the only conceivable way of viewing it, the Mahometan notion of a *balance* of merits (which, however, is vaguely held by very many called Christians) seems perfectly untenable.

The analogy of human law would be, that violations of it incur correspondent penalty, but fulfilments of it (even if perfect) claim no *reward,* except just the continuance of general protections and privileges already possessed.

I am aware that the understanding, even of a great thinker, may seem blinded to the fact of having deflected from right, and incurred ill desert. Yet when Cicero writes,

"Cum omni vacem culpâ"—
"Culpam et peccatum qua semper caruisti;"

and in other places to the same purport, he must, I apprehend, have only meant to state himself and Torquatus, etc., to be free from what human *law* and heathen society denounced as *infamous or criminal.* I have lately met a shrewd and vivacious person, who stoutly contended that his heart was *quite good and pure,* while stating, in the course of the same lengthened conversation, that he had been, till within a short period, intoxicated every night for seven years, besides gambling and other levities of which he had now seen the folly. Even men who think *deeply* and *comprehensively* on other points, I fear often view their personal character in this marvellously beautifying glass. But those who at once *think* deeply and *feel* deeply cannot. And they who have long *thought* deeply, on many subjects, without any *feeling* on these points, and who come at length, with Arthur Young, La Harpe, and many others, to feel and meditate profoundly concerning these, will have their views essentially altered, as to past culpability, as to the actual state of the heart, and as to the natural or rational prospect which may be formed concerning the quality of the life to come.

It is further obvious, that if the next life be in itself ever so *little* better than the present, it must be *much* better, supposing it a state not alterable or mutable, and sure to be of very long

continuance; and not merely much better as an aggregate, but in every section of it; inasmuch as, whatever be the amount of amelioration, it will be and appear of immense value *prospectively*. On the other hand, if it be but a little *worse*, the same attribute of foreseen duration must render that life a far more fearful burden than the present life is found by those most weary of it. Nay, suppose it *no* worse. You know how those who have drawn (as I think Gibbon somewhere observes was his own case) a prize in the lottery of life, may find it prove, at length, an insufferable blank.

You know, my lord, how some of your cotemporaries—the prosperous, the influential, and the honoured—have desperately cast it away. But what if they could not have done so? What if they had been destined to hold it without known limit, or even to the age of Methuselah; and this because they *must*, without the solace of bravely *choosing* and persevering to bear it?

Would such a reluctant protraction of the *same* life, even *without* the accession of great pains and infirmities, be less, in many cases, than a terrible, though it might be a simply natural, penalty?

The genuine hope of a *better* life, of a high, and pure, and lasting happiness (such a hope as shall not waver, or, at least, not be destroyed, n the greatest trials by which it can be tested,)

must arise from the assurance, that it is the will of the Deity first to *forgive*, and then to *perfect*, those who cordially accept the "free gift" revealed, of endless life through a Divine mediation—through His having provided against the claims of the supreme equity, and thus given scope for a safe and honourable extension of the supreme favour to all offenders who seek it. If pride object, as it often does, to this gratuitous *favour*, I should contend that pride, in a *creature* towards his Creator, is an enormous absurdity. It is the porcelain attempting to prescribe to the potter *how* and on what considerations he shall adorn or remodel that which he has formed.

And what matters it whether the porcelain be strong or weak, splendid or coarse, a peasant's cup or a Portland vase. Its highest qualities cannot prevent its being "broken to shivers" if the Former please. Let the created mind be ever so powerful and brilliant; let the stores of memory and the resources of reasoning be alike vast; let the masculine and versatile power of the pen be only surpassed by the more prompt and unfailing eloquence of the tongue; let the intellect be turned from high metaphysical distinctions, or severe analytical calculations, to the widest views in politics or the most intricate in law, and then revert from the pleadings of the senate to the hexagons of the bee, with equal facility and

energy—still is all this strength and adornment as quickly shaken and overthrown, as are the meanest faculties that can be pronounced mental. We might go farther, and say, that although not more dependent, it appears more fragile and insecure than those.

Pride towards the Maker from the made! It is this, I presume, which makes the denial of a *Creator* so favourite an object with that school, who have been at such pains to relieve and refresh themselves and us, by the theory of a mundane soul or spirit of nature, with which matter is coeternal. Towards an imagined personal divinity which once was *not*, such as the armed daughter of Jove,—or towards an *im*personal divinity, that soul of the world or spirit of nature,—there may be some ground for pride and independence; for refusing grace and favour and forgiveness from the one, and for denying, truly enough, the possibility of it from the other; but to stipulate for honourable conditions, or to stand on our merits, with that Being who "alone is able to make us stand" in the ranks of existence: "who holdeth our soul in life;" is a solecism into which, if it were well considered, none but the most limited minds could relapse.

If the pretender to a throne, or the insurgent against authority, has fully ascertained that his forces are, and must always be, hopelessly infe-

rior to those of the reigning and lawful monarch, will it not be rather *madness* than pride, if instead of "desiring conditions" of "peace," he affect to *dictate* terms? How much more when the disaffected is the creature, and the Sovereign is the Creator, who can not merely subdue him but "disband" him to nothing? Besides, let us suppose disloyal subjects in a remote province of the great Roman world, even under a Trajan or Antonine, having become so from misstatements of their emperor's character, imagining him to care nothing at all for *them*, or to be as unjust and relentless as most of his predecessors; if they became disabused of this, and learnt that his strict justice was only exceeded or equalled by his signal clemency, would it be unmanly or degrading on their part to accept from *him* an act of grace, especially if sent by the most intimate and dignified of his family as the envoy of kindness? Would it be justly thought, this is pusillanimity, to accept the pardon and favour of a generous prince who has right and power for summarily quelling disaffection, and thus to enter on that allegiance from which we swerved under a false and crude misbelief? If this act of submission be not (as it *is* not) parallel to that of those who welcome the *Divine* amnesty, it is not so, just because it falls immensely *short* of the case it is meant to illustrate.

Submission, with all the heart, to the rectitude and clemency of the universal Sovereign, as manifested and proposed in His own way and on His own terms in the message and acts of the Divine Saviour, is an act incomparably *less* open even to the plausible imputation of servility and cowardice than the supposed would be.

It is submitting to a Sovereign infinitely more just and good, whom (to say the least) we have entirely misconceived, and therefore wronged; who offers the most generous and perfect immunities by a Messenger infinitely greater and more benevolent. If refusal or neglect would in the first instance be insane pride or folly, what shall we say of neglect in the second? To trifle with the first would be to expose ourselves to danger or exile during a short reign; with the second, to "ills we know not of," through a reign which cannot terminate. To accept the former, would be to accept the favour of a mortal, himself dependent; to secure the latter, would be to procure His friendship in whom all wisdom, power, and faithfulness concentre.

It has indeed been objected, with much adroitness and force of sarcasm, that "the princes of this world," its leading and celebrated minds, as well as its chiefs in wealth and dignity, contemned and discredited the great embassy and act of heavenly grace at its introduction; and we

see many of them contemn it still; or if they notice it, do so (at least in their conclaves) merely to predict that it is doomed to sink into oblivion.

Our florid but insidious historian of the "Roman Empire" was careful to set up this stone of stumbling in one of its most imposing aspects; pointing out how the miracles which ushered in this embassy, were by the "wise" and "noble" strangely unrecognised and unobserved.

He might have added, that the import and value of the message appear to have been equally so. Indeed it is probable that the character of the message itself, if attended to, would have been always far more obnoxious than the pretension to miracles. But no one knows better than your lordship how pregnant with vast consequences certain occurrences have proved, to which "the princes of this world" paid but very small regard.

Of how much more lasting and extensive moment was the discovery of Guttenberg than the victories of Charles the Fifth; and the invention of Watt than the career of Napoleon. How justly also does Rousseau (in the person of his sceptical priest) exalt "the Son of Mary" immensely above the son of Sophroniscus.

Although "the house and lineage" of the former were ancient and royal,—His station, and His course, so far as *merely* human, were confess-

edly obscure;—yet what has been the real and enduring influence of any philosopher, ruler, or conqueror, on the mental and moral progress of mankind, compared with that of this lowly Galilean, whom no ancient persecutor or apostate could boast of vanquishing, and whom no modern conspiracy of bitter and idolized scoffers has prevailed to crush. True, the corrupting power of human nature, and of that deeply vitiated state of society into which His message and His system had to be *infused*, very soon adulterated both. The clear waters of life (as some one has forcibly expressed it) could not remain pure when they rolled over "this muddy bottom," in these polluting and darkening channels. But the low and ignoble Nazarene,—as the old antagonists of Christianity loved to style Him,—has still lived and still lives in the hearts, in the affectionate adoration and trust, of myriads both of "the wise and the unwise," and vindicates the Divine honours which He claimed, by His high moral influence, by the charm and power inherent in His "free gift" of grace, and His voluntary doom of love: not so much by the miracles which were but one kind of seals to it, as by the purport and effect of the charter itself; rendering all who sincerely and gratefully receive that amnesty and that true peace with God (as procured and ratified by His heroic sufferings), more pure, peaceful,

hopeful, happy—amidst all abatements for remaining evil and infirmity — than any class of mankind whom His enemies can confront with them, in this age, or from the ages past.

The cordial acceptance of this "grace," followed (as a *cordial* acceptance is) by the allegiance and attachment of admiration and gratitude, is the "Divine philosophy" which alone will make a *truly* happy man; and it will do so not the less, though most who embrace it should be as unlearned as Cowper's lace-maker, and as poor as Epictetus.

It was this which made that Wilberforce a happy man, to whose virtues and talents your lordship, notwithstanding wide differences of opinion and party, gives just honour, when you describe him as one whose "genius was elevated by his virtues and exalted by his piety."

You know, my lord, that the peculiar truths of Christianity were not embraced by him either from gloom, cowardice, or narrowness of mind; you know that they infused unceasing diligence and ardour into his philanthropy, and soothed him in life's decline. This peace with God, which men of the world think a weakness, was the added motive of his good-will towards men, and reinforced his patient courage in a course the most arduous, raising his eye really to heaven, and giving him boldness to meet the enmity of earth.

Thus we may affirm, that real faith, in a far loftier and happier as well as more spiritual sense, than the poet declares it of God or nature,—

> "Os homini sublime dedit, cœlumque tueri
> Jussit."

And this is true, more or less, of every one who truly receives the evangelic peace and consolation; from a Hale, a Boyle, or a Wilberforce, to an artisan; notwithstanding the weak, assailable, inconsistent, and even ludicrous points which may be found in the character of either. The flaws are not in the "Divine philosophy," but in its disciples.

It is a system of heavenly simplicity, divinely adapted to move, to soothe, to impel, to enlarge, both human and angelic minds; but as to the human,—the only sort of minds we *know*,—these are too weak, too unquiet, too indolent, too contractile by turns, for them to exhibit its efficacy without unnumbered failures and abatements.

My lord, the writer of these pages and many others wish you to possess fully this great specific in all its purity and strength; for all true Christians who know your position, your gifts, and your trials, must have this wish if their thoughts be at any time steadily directed towards you. I believe your mind to be too powerful and independent to be deterred from examining the

claims of this philosophy to destroy or exclude *real* misery, and to produce as much of happiness as earth admits,—merely because Epicureans or Stoics scorn it, or because many who are illiterate, enthusiastic, or superstitious prize it.

The New Testament, my lord, is but a small collection. Those important tracts, the Gospel of John, and the Epistle to the Romans, contain, I should suppose, fewer sentences than the celebrated speech of Demosthenes, which your lordship has so elaborately studied and so ably translated. It is probable that you, whose diligence has been so unremitting and whose research so various, have read these brief Greek writings of the apostles with attention and candour. If so, it has not been in expectation of the graces of style (which, if the tracts be genuine, you know was altogether unlikely to be pure), but for the important facts and doctrines they record, as well as the internal evidence of genuineness and veracity.

Not every one even of the lettered and studious has done this. The late Earl Dudley excused himself to Bishop Coplestone for not entering on the study of Paley's Horæ Paulinæ, on the ground that he had not as yet read the Epistles of Paul, being deterred by their obscurity.

But those facts and doctrines, I am persuaded

your lordship will agree, *deserve* to be examined and weighed. Nor ought it surely to be an appalling or repulsive toil for the scholar to investigate them as thoroughly as Wilberforce did, with serious prayer to the Father of lights for aid to discern their true import and feel their real worth.

In concluding this letter, I would again express a hope that the writer is not without some grounds of apology for the attempt on which he has ventured, at least in its general aim, if not as addressed to your lordship in particular. He is well aware that there are those approaching more nearly to your own rank, and sphere, and pursuits, able experimentally to recommend this "philosophy," who might do so in *those* respects with far greater advantage.

But he has at least *these* pleas for "intermeddling," which, if first credited and then considered, will appear not worthless. He gains by Christianity, either in office ecclesiastic or secular, or in pecuniary means and revenues,—nothing at all. He has encountered all the varieties of speculative doubt which could drive him to renounce it, or to rationalize and attenuate it almost to a nullity.

He has endured—as was hinted at the beginning, in divers forms much and deeply; he has been and is sometimes profoundly "cast down,"

yet, as these pages may testify, is not "destroyed;" and has often been restored to cheerfulness and energy, certainly, in great part, through the influence of spiritual supports and hopes, while the weight of outward trials has remained undiminished.

There are, however, far more striking attestations of this last kind to the effect and value of our "philosophy" than his. You may find them, my lord, in many cottages and in some noble mansions. I have space to adduce here only my own feeble and very imperfect instance, and I do so because a measure of such experience is evidently requisite for addressing you with honest earnestness, and desirable, to say the least, for accrediting the argument. The remedies which we ourselves have tried, and with good effect enough to make us invariably resort to them, are the only restoratives which we can feelingly urge, or can have much hope of successfully recommending.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

Answer from Lord Brougham to the foregoing published "Letter."

Nov. 12*th*, 1840.

"Lord Brougham desires to return his thanks to the author of the letter published by Nisbet & Co., and to assure him that he feels the kindness of it very much. He begs him to accept a copy of the two last volumes of Paley—which, it should seem, had not yet fallen in his way. Lord Brougham wishes to direct the author's attention to the argument derived from the Researches in Fossil Osteology; and which does not generally appear to have been sufficiently impressed upon readers of theological works. He knows from direct communication with many persons, that this argument has a very powerful effect in removing doubts, and he is only sorry that it is not urged in the work now sent, with the force which he believes abler hands might give it. With this view he recommends it to the able and zealous author of the letter; and also because he may have the means of inculcating that argument under a name not mixed up with political party controversy. When Ld. B.,* with Sir C. Bell, undertook the publication of the Paley, it was only after in vain endeavouring to prevail on the Society they were connected with to do so. This would have prevented the necessity of individual names appearing with the work. As the Society (from its constitution) could not undertake it, the names of authors became indispensable, but Ld. B. now feels convinced, that

* The abbreviations in the original are followed, to make the transcript quite exact.

although in one respect the circulation of such works may gain (indeed, if anonymous, they could hardly have been circulated at all,) yet their beneficial tendency in many quarters is obstructed by party and personal considerations.

The author of the letter, however, may very possibly be able to give circulation to the argument in some effectual way; of course, without any reference whatever, to Ld. B.'s treatise, to which he only refers because it contains a convenient summary of the facts, on the accuracy of which reliance may be placed, as it was carefully revised by scientific men of the greatest eminence. He is indeed far from regarding the argument as done justice to in that treatise. He thinks it may be shortly and strikingly put in a few words—as thus. Those researches (of Cuvier and his successors) prove incontestably by evidence before our eyes at this day, the fact of a miracle having been performed—that is, a suspension of the laws of nature as we now know them, and as they have in all historical times been known; and a suspension of those laws *at a period long subsequent to the first creation of the world.* The event, the miracle, referred to, is of course, the creation of races of animals previously not existing on the globe, and among others, of the human species.

This is a kind of evidence manifestly different from all the other evidences of Nat. Rel[n]

Ld. B. has further to thank the author for the suggestion of an argument respecting the immortality of the soul, which (to him at least) appears to be a new one.* This is the more valuable at a time when language

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* These remarks induced me to compose the first essay in the present volume, relating chiefly to "Fossil Osteology;" and also to develope in the second essay (p. 65), the argument which had been briefly stated in my letter (p. 278,) which Lord Brougham considered "valuable."

depreciating to Nat. Rel., has inconsiderately been employed in quarters where it could least have been looked for, but quarters entitled to great esteem and respect. Lord B. hopes that this letter will not be deemed an attempt to draw the author into any correspondence, in order to ascertain who he is. On the contrary, Ld. B. has no such desire at all. He is very sincerely anxious for the dissemination of what he regards as doctrines sound in themselves, and fitted most essentially to promote human happiness. The author may have it in his power to aid in this far more effectually than Ld. B., and he feels it a duty to make these suggestions to him with that view.

COLEHILL, CHARING, KENT,
12*th Nov.* 1840.

P.S. Ld. B. ought to have added, that when the necessity of names to the book was ascertained, some, indeed many, were of opinion that scientific men might be attracted to the subject by Sir C. Bell's name, and political men by Ld. B.'s. Of this (the latter especially) he always entertained great doubts; which have since been more than confirmed; and especially by the failure of M. Arago's name (to whom the French translation was dedicated) to draw the attention of any of the scientific and political men in France to the subject."

In a second letter, dated 4, Grafton Street, Dec. 28th, 1840, "Lord Brougham thanks the writer for his communication, which is extremely interesting from the suggestions it contains respecting one application of the argument.*

* This refers to my having observed in replying to Lord Brougham, that "the miracle of the creation of races of animals previously not existing on the globe, and among others of the human species," diminishes the antecedent improbability of the Christian miracles; inasmuch as it shows a suspension or alteration of the

Lord B. hopes the author may be enabled to complete the work which he mentions as having contemplated. When the author has made up his mind upon the course which he shall take, and resolves to publish with his name, if he has any desire of conferring with Ld. B., it will give him much satisfaction."

In March, 1842, I sent to Lord Brougham the manuscript of my intended essays, with a letter stating that "it has been attempted to improve his valued suggestions by the papers enclosed, one of which is on the argument from Osteology, and the other is an expansion of a different argument in the published letter to him, of which Lord Brougham kindly expressed his approval." See pp. 65, 278, 302.

It was thus answered. "Lord Brougham loses no time in thanking the author of the letter to him for his very interesting communication, which he will peruse without delay.

GRAFTON STREET,
Saturday Morning."

Three years after, in April 1845, I sent to Lord Brougham the lecture which now forms the first essay of this volume, and also the second essay, at the same time avowing the authorship of those pieces and of the published letter, now forming Essay V.

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laws of nature partially; the greater laws—as gravitation, etc., remaining the same: and if a large alteration be proved to have then taken place, a much narrower alteration must be viewed as the less improbable. Especially if in the latter case there can be shown stronger reason for it than in the former; though of a different kind. In the one, the reason or motive was the providing animals fitted for a new state of the earth's surface: in the other, the attesting to moral beings a system of mediation, reconcilement, and instruction, as verily from God.

Lord Brougham addressed to me the following reply.

"GRAFTON STREET,
Saturday, April 12th, 1845.

Dear Sir,—I am greatly obliged by your kind present which I am now reading with the greatest interest.—If any remarks occur to me, I will communicate them. The errors of the 'Vestiges' required to be exposed, for it has made some impression.[1]

Yours truly,
BROUGHAM."

No part of the foregoing correspondence was shown or even mentioned to *any one* during the lifetime of Lord Brougham; but since his decease, I have thought that words of so eminent a thinker, on so all-important a subject, ought not to remain unknown; and am well pleased to have it for the last employ of the kind, in all likelihood, of an old man's pen, thus to transcribe them.

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[1] This observation relates to the lecture now forming the first essay of this volume, which I had sent to Lord Brougham, and which contains strictures on the "Vestiges."

NOTES.

Note A.—Page 4.

"—Affirming that we cannot have any idea or conception at all of God."

One cannot but observe how "extremes meet." The serpent with tail in mouth was an ancient emblem of infinity; might it not be so likewise of a strange *af*finity between opposite subtleties, "pious" and impious?—Some take tenets in "a non-natural sense;" some "hold all Roman doctrine," "not teaching it:"—so are certain Socialists "Religionists," in a non-natural sense; or, indeed, they might shape a vizard more "cunningly devised:" as, that they hold "the *religion of nature*," since nature is their synonym for God; or that their sort of negative religion is both "natural" and "vital" in men whose liberalism discards the notion of a Supreme Ruler. And why not a negative religion,—in this age of science,—as well as a negative electricity? especially as "negative" and "positive" electricity are so nearly akin. Further, they might plausibly contend—that they hold *Roman* doctrine (though not without teaching it), namely, the *ancient* Roman. The atheist Lucretius was a Roman, and *his* doctrine current at Rome. Most "of the Roman nobility, and of Cicero's friends, were Epicureans;"[1] while "in the senate the ablest orators were not apprehensive of giving offence by exposing the doctrine of a future state as an idle and extravagant

[1] Middleton's Life of Cicero, vol. ii. p. 514, note.

opinion."[1] Nay, *modern* Roman doctrine also, they might in some sense claim to hold; for "infidels are numerous in Italy;"[2] and though unbelief was rare at Rome, "it has there made from year to year rapid advances."[3] Indeed, "Roman doctrine," in the dominant party of that Church which burnt Pascal's "Provinciales," must have been long since nearer than some think to that of new moral world "Religionists."[4]

But these, it may be said, would be equivocations too absurd and palpable, pretexts *too* false and ridiculous:

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[1] Gibbon's Decline and Fall, cap. xv.

[2] See La Mennais, Affaires de Rome, p. 94.

[3] Ibid. (Des Maux de l'Eglise), pp. 163, 172.

[4] I subjoin the "twenty-four" Jesuits' reasonings, to show that the habits of monks should be usually worn (as a cloak, or domino,) but, occasionally, were better put off:—"Les papes ont excommunié les religieux qui quittent leur habit, et nos vingt-quatre vieillards ne laissent pas de parler de cette sorte (tr. 6, ex. 7, n. 103). 'En quelles occasions un religieux peut-il quitter son habit sans encourir l'excommunication?' Il en rapporte plusieurs, et entre autres celle-ci:—'S'il le quitte pour une cause honteuse comme pour aller filouter, ou pour aller *incognito* en des lieux de débauche, le devant bientôt reprendre.' Aussi il est visible que les bulles ne parlent pas de ces cas-là. J'avois peine à croire cela, et je priai le père de me le montrer dans l'original; je vis que le chapitre où sont ces paroles est intitulé,—*Praxis ex Societatis Jesu scholâ*,—et j'y vis ces mots: *Si habitum dimittat ut furetur occultè, vel fornicetur.* Et il me montra la même chose dans Diana, en ces termes: *Ut eat incognitus ad lupanar.* Et d'où vient, mon père, qu'ils les ont déchargés de l'excommunication en cette rencontre? Ne le comprenez-vous pas? me dit-il. Ne voyez-vous pas quel scandale ce seroit de surprendre un religieux en cet état avec son habit de religion?"* I choose not to translate this: it shows that the vizard or domino has been sometimes put on, and sometimes put off, for the same ends. These "fathers" were practical atheists, yet "religious." Their casuistry may well help to produce and extenuate utter unbelief. But how far is it from the "school" and real "society" of "Jesus" and of His true followers—who "have renounced the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor handling the word of God deceitfully, but by manifestation of the truth commending themselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God!"

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* Les Provinciales de Pascal, tom. i., pp. 87, 88. Lettre 6me.

so, I think, are *all* masks; though some more thin and grotesque than others. It is curious and important, however, to observe, that a sort of *initiative* masking (at least) is common to extreme parties on all sides. Whether the coil be creeping towards Epicureanism or "Marianism,"[1] there is some lurking in the grass for a season, under flowers of rhetoric or fences of logic.

NOTE B.—Page 11.

"It greatly detracts from His foresight."—Who have more fully affirmed and argued the Divine foresight and omniscience than the believers in Scripture?

Let us instance, from the Puritan, Charnock:—"God is all eye, all understanding: as there is no succession in His essence, so there is none in His knowledge. He sees eternally and universally, all things by one act: not one after another, but all at once, and all together; the whole circle of His own counsels, and all the various lines drawn forth from the centre of His will, to the circumference of His creatures,—just as if a man were able in one moment to read a whole library. We could not know creatures unless they were; but creatures could not be unless God knew them."[2]

From the Episcopalian, Clarke:—"The Supreme Being, because He is infinite, must be everywhere present: and because He is an Infinite *Mind* or *Intelligence*, wherever He is His knowledge is, which is inseparable from His Being, and must therefore be infinite likewise:

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[1] A French Protestant pastor said to me in Paris, as to the religion prevailing there, "Ce n'est pas le *Christ*ianisme, c'est le *Maria*nisme."

[2] Charnock on the Attributes: Disc. on God's Knowledge, pp. 578-580.

and wherever His infinite knowledge is, it must necessarily have a *full and perfect* prospect of all things, and nothing can be concealed from its inspection. Further: all things having received their being itself, and all their powers from Him, as He knows all things that *are*, so He must likewise know all possibilities of things; that is, all effects that *can be*."[1]

From the French Presbyterian, Saurin:—"If it be allowable to advance anything on the most abstract of subjects, I would venture to affirm it highly probable that the same depth of Divine Intelligence, which conceived the ideas of body and spirit, conceiveth other ideas without end. What an unfathomable depth of meditation!"[2]

From the Baptist, Robert Hall:—"Conceive the Divine Being as a Spirit, having the same dominion over the universe as that which our minds possess over our bodies, and then you will perceive, faintly at least, the origin of that power, the indications of which are so visible. Being an infinite Spirit, and coming into immediate contact with all parts of the universe, He is capable, by a mere act of will, of effecting all possible changes, as we are capable by an act of will, of causing certain motions in the muscular parts of our body, and thus producing changes in the external objects around us."[3]

Such have been the "notions" *taught* to the "humble class of intellects;" if the author of "Vestiges" would except the teachers from that class.

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[1] Dr. S. Clarke (at Boyle's Lecture) on the Being of God, etc. abridged, pp. 109, 110.

[2] Abridged from Saurin: Sermon on the Greatness of God's Wisdom, etc., vol. i., serm. 5.

[3] Hall's Works, vol. vi., p. 6.

NOTE C.—Page 11.

What is "law," a "law of matter," etc., except a continued act, or energy, or "working," of the creative Mind?

Dr. Paley writes:—"It is a perversion of language to assign any law as the efficient operative cause of anything. A law presupposes an agent, for it is only the mode according to which an agent proceeds: it implies a power, for it is the order according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the *law* does nothing, is nothing."[1]

"There is a mistake concerning the idea which the term 'law' expresses in physics, wherever such idea is made to take the place of power, and still more of an intelligent power, and as such to be assigned for the cause of anything, or of any property of anything, that exists. This is what we are secretly apt to do, when we speak of organized bodies (plants or animals) owing their production, their form, their growth, their qualities, their beauty, their use, to any law or laws of nature. I say once more, that it is a perversion of language," etc. (as above.) "Mechanism is not itself power; mechanism, without power, can do nothing."[2]

Dugald Stewart remarks on the "inconsistency with which all those philosophers are justly chargeable, who imagine that, by likening the universe to a machine, they get rid of the necessity of admitting the constant agency of powers essentially different from the known qualities of matter. . . . Whether, with Malebranche, we resolve every effect into the immediate agency of God, or suppose that He employs the instru-

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[1] Paley's Nat. Theol., c. i. § 7, p. 7; Works, ed. 12, 1809 (abridged).
[2] Ibid. c. xxiii., pp. 415, 416.

mentality of second causes, we are equally forced to admit, with Bacon, the necessity not only of a first Contriver and Mover, but of His constant and efficient concurrence (either immediately or mediately) in carrying His design into execution. '*Opus*' (says Bacon) '*quod operatur Deus a primordio usque ad finem.*'"[1]

NOTE D.—Page 18.

A Personal creative Mind, acting by volition in the past, and ever thus acting still.

"It is only from the *variableness* and *contingency* of our own existence that all our successions spring." Existence (in itself) "cannot properly be denominated either finite or infinite, successive or instantaneous; for these are attributes which have a reference to *quantity*," etc.[2]

"There is a Being, senior to time, without time, whose duration is not successive and flowing, but *permanent*. The Atheists here can only show their little wit upon *nunc stans*, or a *standing now of eternity*; as if this were nothing but a pitiful small moment of time standing still: whereas the duration of everything must be agreeable to its nature; and therefore, as that, whose imperfect nature is ever flowing like a river, must needs have, accordingly, a successive and flowing duration, sliding perpetually from present into past, and on towards the future, so must that whose perfect nature is essentially immutable, have a *permanent* duration, never losing anything of itself, as sliding away from it, nor

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1 Dissert. i. prefixed to 7th ed. Encyc. Brit., p. 125 (abridged).

2 Law's Notes to Abp. King's Essay on Evil, vol. i., p. 69, Impart. Enq. there cited.

running forwards to meet something of itself which is not yet in being."[1]

"If we will attribute duration to God, it must be permanent unsuccessive duration (though we pretend not to determine the *manner* of such existence as excludes all succession); if, then, the Divine existence cannot include succession of parts, neither can His essential attributes. His knowledge can have no relation to times past or future, nor can any object be said to be at a distance from it. Hence then appears the impropriety (philosophically speaking) of the terms "prescience," etc.; and the only conclusion at last must be, that all things (called *past* or *future*) are equally and at once *present* to the view of God."[2]

"God sees all things past and to come; and they are no more distant from His knowledge, no farther removed from His sight, than the present. They all lie under the same view, and there is nothing which He cannot make exist each moment He pleases."[3]

"Time is the negation of a thing most real and supremely positive, which is *permanence of being*; that which has absolute permanence has in it neither before nor after. Infinite existence is always entire. That of creatures is never so; its parts exclude each other. One must end ere another begins. He who says *eternity*, if he understand what he speaks, says only '*that which is.*' To add *always*, or *for ever*, weakens the sense, for it marks continuity and not permanence."[4]

"The will of God is the same with His essence. As His understanding is nothing else but *Deus intelligens*, God understanding, so His will is nothing else but *Deus*

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[1] Cudworth's Intell. Syst., vol. iii., pp. 231, 232. Ed. Birch (abridged).
[2] Law's Notes to Abp. King's Essay, vol. i., p. 72.
[3] Locke's Essay, bk. ii., cap. xv., sec. 12.
[4] Fénélon de l'Existence de Dieu, pp. 320-340.

volens, God willing. As God knows all things by one simple vision of His understanding, so He wills all things by one (permanent) act of volition." "When God is the author of a new work, He is not changed, because He works it by an eternal will and an eternal power." [1]

Those who are inured to think on such high subjects will perceive the bearing of the above cited passages on the view taken by the author of "Vestiges," concerning God's primary volition and the subsequent progressive operation of natural laws, and will judge whether these Christian theists, or himself, have the more just and exalted notion of the Divine will and acts.

Let the impartial reader review this and the two preceding notes, and say if those teachers, or any rational learners from them, are likely to have had "the idea of a *separate exertion* for each" [2] creative act, in the sense which our author impugns; or to have conceived of "creative intelligence that it should be *constantly moving from one sphere to another*, to form and plant the various species which may be required in each situation at particular times." [3]

NOTE E.—Page 22.

"The double affinity which is requisite is obtained, for here he has the simiadæ on one hand, and the cebidæ on the other." . . . who discerns in our four smallest planets the "spherified fragments of a ring," once broken, "between Jupiter and Mars."

Having "obtained" such "double affinity," or, as

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[1] Charnock on the Attributes (abridged), vol. i., pp. 405-422.
[2] Vestiges, ed. 2, p. 198 (3, p. 201).
[3] Ibid., p. 162 (3, p. 165).

heraldry might phrase it, such "supporters," one would, at first, think man's "crest" should not be very lofty.

But how opposite our impression, when we find him exalted into a cosmogonist and diviner!

Who knows, but in a few more "stages" of "development,"—"bourgeoning into great variation,"[1] "not descending (as common genealogical language would have it), but *ascending*, from the now living mankind,"[2] he may communicate to beings less developed, in some other spheres, portions of "actual history" and scientific prophecy, for which their "knowledge is not yet ripe!"[3] Some rural Saturnians may be startled at what "seems to be the actual history of the ring between Jupiter and Mars." Misgivings may arise, in gazing on the stupendous rings around their own planet, whether "the matter" of these be "sufficiently equable to remain in the annular form," unless the seer can guarantee that there are at least as "many chances" *for* this, as there had been "against" it "till they were consolidated."[4]

In reference to the first passage above cited, I would remark, that as to the undeniable "affinity"—both bodily and in some degree mental—between the lower animals and man, no one can be less open than myself to the imputation of considering that affinity, as far as it extends, to be any way "degrading;" or of cherishing "unkindliness" or "contempt" towards those inferior creatures.

Proof enough appears, in a published work, of my very contrary sentiments and reasonings.[5]

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[1] Vestiges, ed. 3, p. 369. [2] Ibid., p. 370.
[3] Ibid., ed. 2, pp. 393 (3, 382).
[4] Ibid., eds. 2 & 3, p. 16.
[5] See "Collections respecting the Mind of the Lower Animals, and the Question of its Future Existence," being Appendix IV. (at p. 240) of "An Autumn Dream," etc. Ed. 3, 1869. Edwin Stock, London.

Doubtless, *if* it had "pleased Providence to arrange that one species should give birth to another, until the second highest gave birth to man, who is the very highest," it *would* be "our part to admire and to submit."

If this were revealed, or any way clearly proved, we ought to feel no "degradation in the idea of our race having been genealogically connected with them,"[1] or "of our *genetic* connexion with them."[2] But, while no such thing is in the least proved by science, and while the contrary is declared by revelation, I trust that "the very faintest notion," of there being something in this theory "ridiculous" and "degrading," is not to be extinguished by mere panic at the author's having denounced such a notion as "absurd."[3]

NOTE F.—Page 26.

—Theories which I deem so gravely opposed (not in these points alone) to sound reason, as well as Divine revelation.

It may be thought by some readers, that a disproportionate measure of attention has been given to those particular theories. But the motive for this, stated on the page where the above words are found, will, perhaps, to competent judges, appear sufficient.

I further think it right, in this place, to notice some other points in the work referred to. It has passages which I cannot otherwise interpret than as virtually teaching materialism and fatalism: doctrines most strictly allied.

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[1] Vestiges, ed. 2, pp. 236, 237.
[2] Ibid., ed. 3, pp. 241–243.
[3] Ibid., ed. 2, p. 236 (3, p. 242).

Thus: "Man is now seen to be an enigma only as an individual: in the mass he is a mathematical problem. It is hardly necessary to say, much less to argue, that mental action, being proved to be under law, passes at once into the category of natural things. Its old metaphysical character vanishes in a moment."[1] "Electricity is almost as metaphysical as ever mind was supposed to be. It is a thing perfectly intangible, weightless,—and yet electricity is a real thing, an actual existence in nature. So mental action may be imponderable, intangible, and yet a real existence, and ruled by the Eternal through His laws."[2]

"No individual being is integral or independent; he is only part of an extensive piece of social mechanism."[3] "Man is therefore a piece of mechanism, which never can act so as to satisfy his own ideas of what he might be."[4] (Why not rather *its* own ideas of what *it* might be?)[5]

"Free will in man" is "nothing more than a vicissitude in the supremacy of the faculties over each other."[6] "There are clever dogs and wicked horses, as well as clever men and wicked men."[7] "Does God, it may be asked, make criminals? He does not do so; and yet the criminal type of brain, as it is called, comes into existence in accordance with laws which the Deity has established."[8] "The criminal brain finds itself in a social scene where all is against it."[9]

But I ask, if the "brain" be all, or the "electricity"

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[1] Vestiges, ed. 2, 333–4 (3, p. 314). [2] Ibid., 336, 7 (3, 317, 318).
[3] Ibid., 353 (3, 335). [4] Ibid., 357 (3, 337).
[5] Mr. Owen describes man as "complex living mechanism," and advises "to treat *it* with kindness, that *its* mental movements might not experience too much irritating friction." (New View of Society, 1816, p. 75).
[6] Vestiges, ed. 2, 351 (3, 332). [7] Ibid., p. 353 (3, 334).
[8] Ibid., 358 (3, 338). [9] Ibid., 360 (3, 340).

within it,[1] how can this "real *thing*" be "criminal"? Where is the criminality of bodies (ponderable or imponderable), of atoms, of "corpuscular elements," or "physical points,"[2]—say of light, galvanic fluid, or ether? Is *their* kind of subtilty, *fraud*—or their kind of destructiveness, *cruelty?*

Gall's "system of mind" is extolled as "the only one founded upon nature, or which even pretends to, or admits of, that necessary basis;"[3] and we learn that "the storing of provision by the bees" (in Ed. 2, "ants") "is an exercise of acquisitiveness,—the faculty which with us makes rich men and misers."[4]

"It is clear, moreover, from the whole scope of the natural laws, that the individual, as far as the present sphere of being is concerned, is to the Author of nature a consideration of inferior moment—left, as it were, to take his chance amidst the *mêlée* of the various laws affecting him."—"The system has the fairness of a lottery, in which every one has the like chance of drawing the prize."[5] One is reminded here of Gibbon's reflection, "I must acknowledge that I have drawn a high prize in the lottery of life;—the lucky chance of a unit against millions."[6] On the "fairness" of the system, he says nothing.

The author of "Vestiges" has sufficiently indicated the kind and measure of respect which he is prepared to pay to revelation, when he affirms, that "the whole train

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[1] The author conjectures, in a note (Ed. 2, p. 337; 3, 318), that "mental action" may be "electric," and its rapidity or speed equal to that of light; as there is a "likelihood that one law rules the movements of all the imponderable bodies." The word "bodies" is observable, and perhaps used unawares, in application to *mental* action.

[2] See Leslie's Dissertation, prefixed to Ed. 7 of Encyc. Brit., pp. 605, 606.

[3] Vestiges, Ed. 2, p. 343 (3, 324).

[4] Ibid., p. 346 (3, 327).

[5] Ibid., p. 380 (3, 360).

[6] Autobiog., vol. i., p. 254.

of animated beings, up to the highest and most recent, are to be regarded as a series of advances of the principle of development;"[1] and that "the progress of organic creation seems but the minute hand of a watch, of which the hour hand is the transition from species to species:"[2] reminding us, accordingly, that man appears "to have originated where the highest species of the quadrumana are found—in the Indian Archipelago."[3] It is added in the third edition, "The development hypothesis would demand, of course, that the original seat of the human race should be in a region where the quadrumana are rife:" and further, "it now appears . . . that the chimpanzee of Western Africa approaches nearer to man than any known species of Indian simiæ."[4] In the meantime, what that record "would demand," which declares, "God created man in His own image," "The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life," is entirely laid out of the question: and on the "demand" of a "hypothesis," he is to seek his progenitors somewhere between Ceylon and Congo, where the simiæ are most developed. We cannot, then, wonder that it is "regarded as still an open question, whether mankind is of one or many origins."[5]

I do not overlook that, after all this, the writer fully presents, in language of great beauty, religious ideas and wants and hopes "as dictated by the universal feelings of man;"[6] and that he had previously said, "There is in reality nothing to prevent our regarding man as specially endowed with an immortal spirit, at the same time that his ordinary mental manifestations are looked

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[1] Vestiges, ed. 2, p. 203 (3, 208). [2] Ibid., 3, p. 368.
[3] Ibid. 2, p. 298. [4] Ibid., ed. 3, p. 281.
[5] Ibid. 2, 298 (3, 281.) In ed. 3, for "many," we read "more."
[6] Ibid. 3, 375-6

upon as simple phenomena resulting from organization."[1] But what real limitation is designed by the word "ordinary," when we read elsewhere that "a Cuvier and a Newton are but expansions of a clown"?[2] And how can we construe the phrase "nothing to prevent," except as a concession or tribute to the prepossessions of the unscientific, when we find it stated as an obvious truth, five pages after, "that mental action being proved to be under law, its old metaphysical character vanishes in a moment, and the distinction usually taken between physical and moral is annulled"?[3] Is then "an immortal spirit" *not* "under law"? Or does "its old metaphysical character" *refuse* to "vanish"? Indeed the passage itself in which "spirit" is mentioned, has an extract subjoined to it from Hope's "Origin and Prospects of Man," which argues for a future "mind *composed* of elements of *matter* more extended and more perfect; a mind formed of materials supplied by different globes," etc.[4] Our author also says, "there may then be occasion for a nobler type of humanity, which shall complete the Zoological circle;"[5] and this very phrase shows that *their* "mental action" is fully expected to be "in the category of natural things." It is suggested by him, whether "our race" be "but the initial of the grand crowning type."[6] Surely, then, the mind and mental action of that "nobler type" may be as great "expansions" of Newton, as was Newton of a clown. It is very desirable, in order better to understand the author's theism, that we should know whether there is meant to be implied a contrariety or entire unlikeness between the *essence* of mind in this "crowning type" of "developed" intelligence, and in that "Almighty Author," or "Divine

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[1] Vestiges, 2, 328 (3, 309.)
[2] Ibid., 353 (3, 334.)
[3] Ibid., 333—4 (3, 314).
[4] Ibid., 330 (3, 311.)
[5] Ibid. (2, 278.)
[6] Ibid., 2, 278.

Mind,"[1] on whose immense creative intelligence he justly expatiates. We are well aware that the *difference*, in degree, in power, wisdom, comprehensiveness, is *infinite:* but is there held to be an essential total dissimilitude? Are the essence and action of the highest possible finite minds to be only corpuscular, "composed of elements," "formed of materials," atomic, discerptible? It would seem *not*, from the author's speaking of "the origination of nature, in some Power, of which man's mind is a faint and humble representation;" and of nature, as "the production of a Being resembling, but infinitely greater, than ourselves."[2]

The author names the Deity, "the One eternal and unchangeable."[3] I conclude that he believes the "Divine Mind" to be an omnipresent immutable Reality; and assents to Newton's words, "Deus nihil patitur ex corporum motibus; illa nullam sentiunt resistentiam ex Omnipræsentia Dei." "God is no way affected by the motions of bodies; they experience no resistance from the omnipresence of God." Therefore the *supposed* exclusion of "the old metaphysical character of mind," would be, if real, but on a finite scale, though it should be "the rule in Jupiter," and even "in Sirius." The metaphysical character of that infinite all-pervading Mind *cannot* "vanish," "in whom" (the same philosopher writes) "all things are contained and moved, who must necessarily exist, and by the same necessity is always and everywhere." "In ipso continentur et moventur universa.—Deum summum necessario existere in confesso est; et eâdem necessitate semper et ubique."[4]

The terms, "an actual existence in nature," "a real

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[1] Vestiges, ed. 3, p. 377. [2] Ibid., 2, 252, 253.
[3] Ibid., 235 (3, 240.)
[4] Principia, lib. iii. Schol. Gen.; quoted by Lord Brougham in Dissertations appended to Paley, vol. ii., p. 95.

existence," (in whatever modified sense they may suit either "electricity" or "mental action,"[1]) must apply transcendently to Him who exists necessarily and immutably;—"the one eternal and unchangeable."

In the "Note conclusory," appended by the author to his book, he tells us, "It goes forth to take its chance of instant oblivion, or of a long and active course of usefulness in the world. Neither contingency" (he adds) "can be of any importance to me, beyond the regret or the satisfaction which may be imparted by my sense of a lost or realized benefit to my fellow-creatures."[2]

There is a third contingency (if contingencies can really have place in the system of "mechanism" laid down), which appears to have been overlooked. If his theory should shake the faith of some in the evidences and hopes of Revelation, in the guardian providence and renovating grace of the Most High, in the real responsibility of our nature, in the great fact that "there is a spirit in man" (if not in the higher and all-important truth, that "*God* is a *Spirit*")—then will the author have to "regret," not "instant oblivion," but "realized" *injury*, or at least *harm*, to some of his "fellow-creatures." To obviate this, in any humble degree, is my object in pointing out what (except I err) his theories involve, and to what they tend. If it can be *fairly* shown that such is not their character and tendency, I shall own my misconception of them. If not, I hope they will be refuted by others, more systematically and ably than this incidental notice, or my ability, permits.

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[1] See p. 316, above.
[2] Vestiges, Ed. 2, p. 391 (3, 380.)

NOTE G.—Page 27.

"No species passes into another, or has ever done so."

"If anywhere, we might look for the imagined changes in the lowest organizations: but the hydra, actinia, medusa, the fasciola, tænia, hydatis, ascaris, ligula; the still simpler, or at least more minute, volvox, vibrio, enchelis, trichoda, and even the monas itself, are now what they have been, from all our knowledge of them, and their successors are for ever the copies of themselves. But the prime foundation is false; it is but one of the numerous cases, so often noticed in this work, in which science mistakes its ignorance for knowledge, and then proceeds in the erection of its theories. The infusoria, which possess no external organs, are known to be of an intricate internal structure, equalling that of animals far higher up in the scale of magnitude, and exceeding in this respect many of considerable dimensions." [1]

The same uniform and regular propagation of species holds still throughout all nature, nor are the limits of each kind less definite than they are supposed to have been some thousand years ago." [2]

"It is evident that the *known invariability* of a large proportion of the species composing the animal kingdom, is a powerful objection to the hypothesis in question: it is for those who deny what all experience teaches, to adduce some proof of their position; and here we think that our author fails. The *known variability* of certain other species does not much help his doctrine; for, though there are many breeds of dogs and horses, sheep and oxen, they are *all* dogs and horses, sheep and oxen; differing in subordinate peculiarities, but in no instance

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[1] Macculloch's Proofs of the Attributes, etc. vol. i. pp. 85, 86.
[2] Dr. Prichard's Physical History of Man, Ed. 3, vol. i. p. 142.

becoming elevated towards any higher form, or acquiring any entirely new faculty. . . . We do not regard our author as at all more fortunate in the illustrations he has attempted to draw from the study of development. For neither in the case of the butterfly, which comes forth in the condition of a worm; the frog, which begins its *extra-oval* life in the condition of a fish; or the queen-bee, which is produced by the increased development of a neuter,—do we recognise any indication whatever of an advance upon the type of the species." [1]

NOTE H.—P. 34.

—The incredibility of the doctrine of "involution of germs, and of life in germs," etc.

"This system [of 'pre-existing laws,' and 'non-interference,'] is involved in far greater difficulties than one which supposes each new being to be as absolute an act of creation as the first, as far at least as concerns the attachment of life to an inchoated or barely commenced organization. Should the compared mass of difficulties on the opposed sides, render the latter view probable, it will then follow that there is a perpetually governing Providence, at least in this particular case: or, literally, that He who once created the living world is creating it daily by His will or word."

"We see and know no more of magnetism, as an entity or power, than we do of the Deity; but, from experience of its effects, we admit its existence and its action. The power which gives life may similarly be viewed as if it were some unknown thing. This power once gave the

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[1] British and Foreign Medical Review, of the "Vestiges," January, 1845. Pp. 177, 178.

principle of life to a large number of organized beings; we find it given again, in succession, to many more; we know of no other power which has done this, nor can we even conjecture one capable of doing it. If, therefore, I conclude that it is daily performed by this power, it is but one of the usual and admitted inferences of philosophy. In all other cases we are thankful for such solutions: in no other do we ever seek for an imperfect or improbable one, when we have a better. Yet we are to reject this solution, because the inferred power is that of the Deity—because it is God. Philosophy has even proved the fact in the first and the essential case, and yet denies it in the subsequent ones. And why? Because it chooses to think that He does not govern, or ought not to govern, what He has created: because He will not, or ought not, to create again. And why does it thus pronounce on His will, and thus will for Him? Is it that we are superior in judgment and intelligence? or is it that we wish to save Him trouble; since even that has philosophy thought unbecoming for His nature? or is it possible that we should desire that He were not the Governor, as He was the Creator?"[1]

"On the doctrine of the vital principle being a plastic or formative power, we have to remark, that it ascribes to a thing, which on the supposition is merely a species of matter highly attenuated, properties and agencies which belong to the highest power and the highest intelligence. We may, if we choose to do so, term the cause which governs organization and vital existence a plastic principle, but it is a principle endowed with intelligence and design; it is the *same principle*, and *one* and the *same agent* in all created bodies, since all are

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[1] Extracts (abridged) from Macculloch's Proofs of the Attributes, etc., vol. iii., pp. 504, 515-517.

formed on similar and harmonious laws; it is, in fact, nothing more or less than the energy of the Deity, operating continually through the universe, in preserving and renewing the various tribes of beings, in a manner scarcely less wonderful than at the period when they were first called into existence. To ascribe to a material principle such properties, is to invest it, not only with reason and intelligence, but with the wisdom and power of an omniscient Creator."[1]

NOTE I.—Page 38.

Plato and Socrates (in several passages) admitted and avowed this great *want* of human nature.

In the apology which Plato composed for Socrates, he says: "It seems to me that God has attached me [προστεθείκεναι] to your city as one who ceases not the whole day closely to applymyself in awakening, persuading, and reproving each of you. Such another will not easily arise for you, O Athenians! If you believe this, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, soon irritated, like slumberers wakened up, will strike (as Anytus bids) and easily destroy me, and then will sleep throughout your remaining life, except God, kindly caring for you, should send to you some other."[2]

In the second of the dialogues entitled "Alcibiades," we have this passage:—

"*Socrates.* It is necessary, therefore, to wait until some one teach how we ought to conduct ourselves towards the gods and towards men.

"*Alcib.* When will that time arrive, O Socrates, and

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[1] Dr. Prichard on the Vital Principle, pp. 122, 123.
[2] Apol. xviii. Bohn's Plato, vol. i., 18.

who will be the teacher? For I think it will be most pleasurable to me to see this man, and what he is.

"*Socrates.* It is he who is solicitous concerning thee. But methinks, as Homer says, that Minerva removed the mist from the eyes of Diomede, in order that he might well distinguish God from man[1],—so it is needful that he, first removing from thy soul the mist which is now present, should then impart means by which thou shalt know good and evil; for now thou dost not appear to me capable of this.

"*Alcib.* Let him take away, if he so will, the mist, or whatever else; since I am prepared not to shun any one of his injunctions, whoever the man may be, so that I may expect to be made the better.

"*Socrates.* But truly he also has a certain marvellous readiness of mind concerning thee.

"*Alcib.* It appears to me now, therefore, the most excellent way, to defer my sacrifice till then.

"*Socrates.* It appears to thee justly; for this is more safe than to run the hazard of such a peril.

"*Alcib.* Well, Socrates, since thou seemest to me to have given excellent counsel, I will deck thee with my garland. To the gods we will then give garlands, and all else that is deemed fit, when I see that day approaching. It will come not long hence, if such be their will."[2]

Simmias says, in the "Phædo:" "I agree with thee, O Socrates, that to attain, on such points, clear knowledge in the life that now is, must be either impossible, or exceedingly difficult. But yet again, not to try and prove, in every way, the things which are said on them, without desisting till after complete research, is the part of one entirely slothful; for it behoves us to accomplish one of these objects concerning them: either to learn or

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[1] Iliad. E. 127.

[2] Second Alcibiades, at the end. Bohn's Plato, iv. 397.

discover the truth; or, if this be impossible, then, taking the best and hardest to be disproved of *human* words, borne on this, as venturing on a raft,[1] to sail through life, except one could, more safely, and without peril, make the passage on a firmer vehicle of some *divine* word." [2]

NOTE K.—Page 43.

—The creation this day of an entirely new species of animal, etc.

"The Deity has created life on this very earth repeatedly. On what grounds, then, are we entitled to conclude that He is not doing the same thing, or rather that He cannot or ought not to create annually, or daily, if such a proceeding is not inconsistent with his plan; above all, if it is consistent with it, or necessary to it?

"Even they who argue from the record which they use to oppose this doctrine, are compelled to believe that the Almighty has actually proceeded in this very manner when there was occasion. We call the cases of Egypt miracles; and they were so; but they were still acts of subsequent creation for special ends;—and being acts for an end, under His plan, why may there not be similar acts for other ends belonging to the same plan? The coral islands are acts of creation: why must the Creator be deemed unwilling to produce a plant now, when He has wrought to produce an island.

"If all the plants of the earth could not have sprung

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[1] The allusion is probably to the *raft* [Σχεδία] of Ulysses, Odyss. E.

[2] Phædo, cap. xxxv. Opp. T. i. 118.

from original single individuals or pairs, this is not less true of the rooted and immovable animals, including even the shell-fishes, beyond enumeration. If it is true of them, it is true of the fresh-water fishes, since no communication through all the rivers of the world can be conceived, applicable to animals now so insulated, and not found in the sea. Thus, also, must it be true of insects and worms beyond numbering, when the same species, and in thousands, are insulated in a thousand places, and when that insulation is complete for each allotment, from the impossibility of sufficient locomotion.

"But, above all, this is true of the two great and distinct creations of America and New Holland, insulated by their very geography; and thus as much proving the necessity of their own peculiar creations, under the plan of the Deity, as the facts themselves are confirmatory of the anticipations."

"God created life when this was a far other earth than it is now, and He has created it again and again, to fill the successive earths which His wisdom thought fit to reproduce. He reproduced portions at later periods, and again He created life for those partial productions. He is now reproducing portions, if on a smaller scale; and I doubt not that He is now doing what He has thus done from the commencement, in consistency with the whole of His design. His creation never ceases for the habitation; and it ought not to cease as to the inhabitants, whenever that creation is expedient; since thus alone can He carry on His obvious design."[1]

"Is it to be presumed that the sacred Scriptures contain an account of all that it has pleased the Almighty to effect in His physical creation, or only of His dispensations to mankind, and of facts with which man is con-

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[1] Macculloch's Proofs, etc., vol. iii., pp. 525–527, 534, 535.

cerned? And of what importance could it be for men to be informed at what period New Holland began to contain kangaroos, and the woods of Paraguay ant-eaters and armadillos?" [1]

NOTE L.—Page 43.

—Light . . . subjected to a local and temporary change.

"Agreeably to Dr. Butler's observation, even the interposition of superior power implied in a miracle, however unusual or extraordinary, may be entirely natural: that is, the constitution of the world may be such as allows of it in certain cases.[2] . . . I know it is common to think that miracles imply a *suspension* or *violation* of the laws of nature. But no opinion can be more groundless. Were we to see the motion of water downwards cease at the word of a man, or a river parted in its course, as Jordan was, we should see a miracle. But we could not say that the law of gravitation was suspended; for the water might have gravitated as usual, and the true cause of the event be the exertion of an adequate superior power to control the effects of gravitation, in which its suspension is no more implied than by a man's preventing a heavy body from falling by applying his hand to it. Nor could we, in this instance, say that the event was not agreeable to the constitution of the universe; for, in order to this, we should be able to discover what the constitution of the universe is, taking in the visible and invisible world, and that it excludes *all* interpositions of *superior* power in human affairs." [3]

"The Course of Nature, truly and properly speaking,

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[1] Prichard's Physical History of Man, vol. i., p. 101.
[2] Analogy, pt. ii., cap. iv., pp. 223, 225.
[3] Price's Four Dissertations, Dissert. i., pp. 80, 81.

is nothing else but the *will of God* producing certain effects in a continued, regular, constant, and uniform manner: which course or manner of acting, being in every moment perfectly *arbitrary*, is as easy to be *altered*, at any time, as to be *preserved*. . . . Modern deists see that things generally go on in a constant and regular method; that certain causes produce certain effects, in a continued succession, according to certain fixed laws and rules; and hence they conclude, very weakly and unphilosophically, that there are in *matter* certain necessary *laws* or *powers*, the result of which is, that which they call the Course of Nature, which they think is impossible to be changed or altered, and, consequently, that there can be no such thing as *miracles*; whereas, if they would consider things duly, they could not but see, that the order and disposition of things which they vulgarly call the Course of Nature, cannot possibly be anything else but the *Will and Pleasure of God*, exerting itself and acting upon matter continually, either immediately by itself, or mediately by some subordinate intelligent agents, according to certain rules of uniformity and proportion, fixed indeed and constant, but which yet are made such merely by arbitrary constitution, not by any necessity in the things themselves;—and consequently it cannot be denied but that it is altogether as easy to alter the course of nature as to preserve it." [1]

It needs scarcely to be remarked, that wherever the popular terms, "laws of nature," "course of nature," etc., have been employed in this volume, they are used in the sense which these writers assign to them.

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[1] Clarke on the Attributes, pp. 377-379, abridged.

NOTE M.—Page 51.

They must be content with the highest probability:—
that is, the extreme improbability of the contrary.

Bishop Warburton writes thus of the mathematics: "It may seem, perhaps, too much a paradox to say, that long habit in this science incapacitates the mind for reasoning at large, and especially in the search of moral truth. And yet, I believe nothing is more certain. The object of geometry is demonstration, and its subject admits of it, and is almost the only one that doth. In this science, whatever is not demonstration is nothing; or, at least, below the professor's regard. *Probability*, through its almost infinite degrees, from simple ignorance up to absolute certainty, is the *terra incognita* of the geometrician. And yet, here it is that the great business of the human mind is carried on, the search and discovery of all the important truths which concern us as reasonable creatures. And here, too, it is that all its vigour is exerted; for to proportion the assent to the probability accompanying every varying degree of moral evidence, requires the most enlarged and sovereign exercise of reason. But the harder the use of anything, the more of habit is required to make us perfect in it. Is it, then, likely that the *geometer*, long confined to the routine of demonstration, the easiest exercise of reason, where much less of the *vigour* than of the *attention* of mind is required to excel, should form a right judgment on subjects, whose truth or falsehood is to be rated by the probabilities of moral evidence?[1]

"Had Dinocrates really carved Mount Athos into a statue of Alexander the Great," (which he proposed to do), "and had the memory of the fact been obliterated

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[1] Introduction to the "Julian," p. xix.

by some accident, who could afterwards have proved it impossible but that it might casually have been formed so? For every mountain must have some determinate figure, and why then not a human one, as possibly as another. And yet I suppose none could have believed so upon this bare account of possibility?"[1]

The stones at Stonehenge were anciently supposed by the vulgar to have been brought thither "by magic, by the help of demons, or by giants:"[2] and "a Celtic monument near Vitré, in Bretagne, bears the name of *La Roche aux Fées*, the Fairies' Rock."[3] But even these errors of ignorant ages serve to shew, that, however rude the character of those works, the marks of art and arrangement which they displayed, were unavoidably ascribed, by the common sense of mankind, on the ground of conclusive probability, to *some* intelligent contriver.

Note N.—Page 52.

Who—actually forfeited life or liberty by maintaining it.

On this subject (of Christ's resurrection) my learned friend, the late Dr. Francis Wayland, has quoted a striking passage from another American divine, Dr. Nott, as follows:—"Dr. N. was exhibiting the absurdity of the supposition that the apostles and early preachers testified falsely in bearing witness to the Lord's resurrection. He supposed them, after the death of Jesus, assembled to frame and carry out the deception. They consult, they send some of their number to invade the tomb, and to remove the body. Presently the deputed messengers

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[1] Bentley at Boyle's Lecture, Disc. 5, p. 27.
[2] Article Stonehenge, 2nd ed. Encyc. Brit.
[3] Reichard's France.

return; bringing with them the helpless corpse. They cast it down before the apostles, exclaiming—*there* is your Messiah. And *then*—the apostles go forth, bearing witness to His resurrection, proclaiming salvation only through His name; sealing their testimony with their blood; careless of reproach and peril, ignorant of fear, welcoming death!"[1]

NOTE O.—Page 52.

With this . . . several other independent improbabilities—on the supposition that Christianity was a human fiction—are conjoined.

As—that a large number of apparently clear and circumstantial predictions, published in different ages, should have been all fortuitous; that unlearned and unprincipled men should have propounded a wonderful system of morals; that these men should have all succeeded in portraying the sublime and original character of Christ; that their falsehood should have so mightily prevailed against Jewish and heathen and philosophic enmity; and that the alleged testimonies to the claims of Jesus, from the popular teacher who immediately preceded Him, from the apostate follower who betrayed Him,[2] and from the zealous missionary who had cruelly assailed His cause, should each have been alleged falsely; notwithstanding their being, in that case, signally adapted to brand as palpable impostures the very narratives which adduced them.

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[1] Life of Dr. Wayland, vol. i., p. 91.
[2] Matt. xxvii. 4.

NOTE *.—Page 89.

There was a prevalent forethought or presentiment of a future life as highly probable.

In the dialogue Epinomis, the Athenian guest says, "I do not affirm that it is possible for men, except a few, to be happy and blessed; I limit this to so long as we live. But there is good hope for him who has died, of obtaining all things, for the sake of which he would desire while living to live in the most beautiful manner (καλλιστ' ἄν) in his power, and at death to attain such an end."[1]

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[1] Platon. Opp. T. vi. 447.

INDEX.

Abraham, the manifestation of Jehovah to him, 208–9.
Achilles, a saying of his, 90; his associates in Hades, 91.
Adieu, comment on that word, 201.
Æschylus, his Persæ quoted, 99.
Affinities, peculiar, may be expected to subsist hereafter, 152-3.
Agamemnon, represented as recognising Amphimedon in Hades, 91–2.
Alliances and connexions, vast importance of their being Christian, 162–4.
Anchises, represented as recognising Æneas in Elysium, 91.
Angel of Jehovah, meaning of that phrase, 228–9.
Antigone, represented as expecting to meet her kindred in Hades, 92.
Atheism, involved in the denial of future life, 65–71;—in denial of the infinitude of God's perfections, 67;—in denying God's volition of the greatest good, 68–9;—in idolatry, 197–8.
——— tendencies to it, 3–8.
Attributes, moral, of God, early revelation of, 207–8.

Barrow's China, quoted, 101.
Brougham, Lord, letters from, 301–5.

Calanus, on the prospect of seeing the deceased Alexander, 98.
Campbell, quoted, 60.
Canaanites, their destruction considered, 216–20.
Cato the elder, his views of reunion, as stated by Cicero, 97.
Chalmers, Dr. Thomas, on Divine redemptions, quoted, 256–8.
Charity, Christian, its objects and degrees, 165–7;
——— duty of, 168–72.

Chinese, their views of the future life, 101.
Christian unity, in what it must consist, 168–72.
———— argument for, 172.
Christianity, great influence of, 293.
———— cordial reception of, gives happiness, 294–5, 61.
Christians desire the perfect and endless good of man, 67.
———— the most eminent have desired it intensely, 75.
Cicero, on divination, quoted, 298.
——— the right view of his opinions concerning a future life, 97–8.
Clarke, Dr. S., on deists, quoted, 66 ; on miracles, 329–30.
Communion, sensible and habitual, of man with Deity, lost at the fall, 192–3.
Concern for the immortal welfare of others, its importance, 165–6.
Confucius on the future life, 101.
Creation of man, 27–8.
Creations many and successive, 327–9.

D'Alembert on the death of De Saci, 101.
Darius, his ghost being evoked, remembers earthly events, 92.
——— his supposed speech, in the Persæ, 99.
Deists, so called, who deny a future life, not true deists, 66.
Deity, manifestations of, recorded in Scripture, 204, 208–13.
Denial of future life involves atheism, 278.
Development, theories of, 9, and 313–15.
Diderot, on atheism, 35–6.

Epinomis, quoted, 334.
Evil, its extinction desired, but with submission, in Christian minds, to God's will, 72 ; its history in this world a profitable study for other beings, 196–7 ; its prevalence and effects a beacon to all the fallible, 220–1.
Existence, the primal gift, 224.

Ferguson, Adam, 78.
Forbearance, Christian, duty of, 172–3.

Friendship, sanctioned by Scripture precepts and examples, 150–1.
Future life, the belief of, involved in all real theism, 65–6.
———— denial of, involves false and blasphemous thoughts of God, 68–70.
———— gloomy consequences of denying it, 73–4.
———— will not be happy, except Divine aid be sought, 78–9.
———— little said in Scripture respecting the manner of it, 85.
———— belief in it without revelation not firm and unvarying, 87.
———— must be more happy, or less, 284–5.
———— without revelation cannot be proved more so, 286–7.

Gratitude, taught in the New Testament but indirectly, 86.

Hades, meetings in, described by Homer, 90–1; by Virgil, 91; by Sophocles, 92.
Heathens, their moral accountableness affirmed and felt, 84.
Homer, on recognition in Hades, 91–2.
Hope, true sources of, 277.
Hymn of Love, supposed in Paradise, 186–190.

Idolatry, self-conscious creatures liable to it, 191–2.
———— is atheistic, 198–9; idolatrous passions, 198; idolatry of things, 198–9; of persons, 199.
———— cure of it the object of revelation, 202–3.
Idols, usually quasi-human, 195.
——— their qualities, mere fractions of goodness, 196.
Illustrations—of Divine judgments by penal acts of an earthly sovereign, 217–8; of redemption by supposed philanthropy of an angel, 248–9; by imagined acts of monarchs, 255–6.
Isaac, appearing of Jehovah to, 210.
Israel, the elders of, appearing of Jehovah to, 211.

Jacob, appearing of Jehovah to, 210.
Jamblichus, on Pythagorean friendship, 92–3.
Jesuits, doctrines of, 307.
Judgments, Divine, a trial of faith, 206.

Judgments, objection raised from them discussed, 215–6.

KALEE, her prowess, 196.
Knowledge, its enlargement in the future life, 141–2.

LAMARTINE, DE, on the providence of God, 72.
Law, natural, means Divine volition, 12, 310.
Letters from Lord Brougham, 301–5.
Liability of creatures to idolatry, 191–2.
Life sometimes a burden; but the chief boon, 225–6.
Love, varieties of the sentiment to which that word is applied, 259–64.
—— mutual, of Christians, strange consequences of limiting it to this life, 134–6.
—— to fellow-beings, its tenderness not blamable, 199–200.
Love to God, motives of ancient believers to, 221–9; viz., the Divine perfections, 221–2; personal obligations, 223; gift of existence, 223–6; promised redemption, 227–8; hope of future happiness, 230–1.
———— prompted supremely by His unspeakable gift, 232; some causes of its defectiveness suggested, 247–64; its distinctive qualities, 262–3; can be perfected by the Divine power, 265–9.

MANIFESTATIONS of Deity, a great topic of the Scriptures, 208; granted to Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, the seventy elders, all Israel, 208–12.
Man's creation, a miracle, 28–9.
Miracles, less improbable than some think, 40–1.
———— Christian, less so than that of creation, 42–3.
———— Bishop Butler, and Dr. Clarke on, 329–30.
Morals, some points of, not explicitly treated of in the New Testament, 85–6.
Moses, manifestations of Jehovah to, 211.

NEW TESTAMENT, its brevity, and absence of explicitness on some points, 84–5, 296.
———— deserves to be studied, 296–7.

OBJECTIONS to future recognition, discussed, (1.) from supposing that love will be in all cases equal, 148–9;—(2.) from supposing some instances of alienation or want of affinity, 154–5;—(3.) from the *absence* of some friends in heaven, 156–60.
Omniscience, Divine, 309.

PERFECTIONS, moral, of the Deity, a motive to love Him, 221–2.
Persæ of Æschylus, quoted, 99.
Plato, citations from, 325–7.
Plotinus, his disdain of the body, 74.
Polynesians, their view of a future life, 101–2.
Porphyry, on the ancient Indians, 99.
Power of God to perfect man's love to Him, 264–5.
——— of true religion, 298.
Price, Dr., on miracles, 329–30.
Pride, towards God, an infatuation, 288–90.
Probability, a just ground of belief, 50–1.
———— warrants action, 54–5.
———— sometimes cumulative, 56–7.
Pythagoreans, their views of friendship, 93–4.

REALITY, worldly mistakes concerning it, 241–4.
Recognition, questioned by some who admit the union of the glorified, 137.
———— easily provided for in the future life, 140–2.
———— proved from Scripture, 143–7.
———— objections to it discussed, 148–60.
Redemption, human, a subject of deep wonder and gratitude, 232–3.
———— view of it by other beings, 240–5.
———— its *immensity* perplexes the mind, 249–50.
———— effect of *habit* in detracting from its impression, 250–1;—and of its *unseen* character, 251–2;—and of its alleged *uniqueness*, 252–9.
Reflection, painful, sources of, 181–2.
Rejection of revelation, its causes, 290–1.
Religion, true, the power of, 297–8.

Reproduction, a creation, 30–1.
Resurrection of Christ, 332–3.
Reunion and recognition, would have been highly probable, though not *taught* in Scripture, 87.
———— were and are expected in a future life by heathens, 89–97.
———— described by the ancient poets, 89–91.
———— believed in by Socrates, 94–6.
———— belief in ascribed by Cicero to Cato the elder, 96–7; — by Porphyry to the Indian philosophers, 99.
———— expected by Hindoo widows, 101;—by the Polynesians, 102;—by the American Indians, 103.
———— argued for on scriptural grounds, 109–36 (see Scriptures).
———— lessons to be learned from this doctrine, 161–73.
———— a delightful prospect, 173–7.
Revelation, written, appeals to some prior knowledge of truth and duty, 83–4.
———— need and value of, 282–3, and 37–8.
———— question as to its limited extent, 205–6;—indifference or aversion the chief cause of this, 206.
———— causes of rejection, 292.
Robertson, Dr., on the American Indians, quoted, 102.

Sadducees, their cavil as to conjugal union hereafter, 146–7.
Scepticism, its existence does not disprove the prevalent expectation of a life to come, 87–8.
———— wretchedness of, 59–60.
Scriptures, arguments in them for reunion and recognition, (1.) Christ formed a society, 110–11;—(2.) a close spiritual relation, 112–14;—(3.) which is strongly insisted on, 114–17;—(4.) promised a future assembling, 117–19;—(5.) a united abode, 119–22;—(6.) the Old Testament intimates the same, 122–26;—(7.) the New Testament urges the sympathy of joy and love, here and hereafter, 126–30;—(8.) institutes a festival which is to be renewed above, 130–33.
———— their design, to record manifestations of Deity, 203–4.

Self-idolatry, involved in that of things and persons, 200–1.
Self-reminiscence, in a future life, unquestionable, 138–40.
Self-worship, the peril of, 200–1.
Shelley, quoted, 59.
Socrates, his views on reunion and recognition, 94–5.
Sophisters and Jesuits, 306–8.
Sophocles, his Antigone, quoted, 92.
Stewart, Dugald, on the universal expectations of a future life, and belief of a Deity, 103–6.

Theism, real, involves the belief of a life to come, 65.
Theodosis, an imagined visitant from the planet Ceres, 182–3;—describes the state of its unfallen inhabitants, 183–4;—of man in Paradise, 185.
Theology, natural, its importance, 277–8, 281.
Transmutation, no proof of, 19–20, 322–3.

Ulysses, represented as recognising Achilles and others in Hades, 90.
Unbelief (in Christ's resurrection), difficulties of, 333.
Union with Christ and His Church, vast importance of, 161–2.
Unity, Christian, in what it consists, 168–9.
——— duty of, enforced by expected recognition, 170–1.

"Vestiges," some doctrines of, 315–20.
Volition, Divine, 311–13.

Warburton, Bishop, on Mathematics, 331–2.
Wavering, as to greatest truths, 280–1.
Whately, Archbishop, on the unbelief of the heathen in a future life, 89 and 97;—on the power of *withdrawing* thought from painful objects hereafter, 159–60.
Wilberforce, a happy man, 294–5.
Writers, distinguished, interest in, 273–4.

Xerxes, his recorded weeping, 176.
——— supposition concerning him, 255.

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