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
ARE BRUTES IMMORTAL?

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# ARE BRUTES IMMORTAL?

AN ENQUIRY,

Conducted mainly by the Light of Nature

INTO

BISHOP BUTLER'S HYPOTHESES

And concessions on the subject, as given in Part I.

Chap. I. of his "Analogy of Religion."

BY

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## PREFACE.

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The statements advanced, and the explanations given in the accompanying essay, render all remarks by way of preface, almost, if not altogether unnecessary. Bishop Butler's great work, to which exceptions have been taken in these pages, has long been deservedly held to be a rocky fortress of strength, built around the truth. I am not alone in the feeling, that, in some places, it has rather the appearance than the solid reality of strength:—and in the infidel, we have a subtle enemy to deal with, who is not slow to perceive all advantageous points of attack upon our holy religion, and all weakness on the part of its defenders. These pages however have been penned, less with the view of offering battle to the professed sceptic, than with that of aiding the Christian to “give a reason for the hope that is in him.” Those minds are happiest that feel no yearnings after evidences, and yet it cannot be doubted that many, who are most earnest seekers after God, and who will be Divinely kept “faithful unto death,” lean not a little, in many a weak hour, upon such confirmation of revealed truth. To be brief:—unable myself to accept certain reasonings



IV.

in the "Analogy" as possessed of any solid value,—and convinced, at the same time, that Revelation and Nature go hand in hand in proclaiming the infinite perfection of God, and the eternal happiness of all who put their trust in Him, I have striven to reach the great doctrine of the exclusive immortality of man by paths through nature diverse from those trodden by bishop Butler. Reserving for the last pages of my essay the consideration of those passages of Holy Scripture which I conceive to be, directly or indirectly, subversive of the idea that brutes will live again after death,—it seemed to me, meanwhile, that the best way to exhibit nature's testimony against the possibility of a future life for the brute, would be to commence with the attempt to show her testimony as to the perfect reasonableness of *human* expectation of immortality:—such as she does not furnish in the other case. I have avoided, as much as possible, in seeking to establish my assertions, all that breathes of the dissecting-room, and have sought to claim their proper emphasis and weight for those living and eloquent voices within us, which, according to the light of nature, contain a significance not to be overlooked, and one too that is harmonious with the inspired teachings of Holy Writ.

*Dishforth, May 13th, 1861.*

## EPITOME.

Fallacies allowed for generations to take the place of Truth in matters relating to the destinies of man. Lack of moral courage in faith. A fallacious theory disfigures the imperishable work of Bishop Butler, in that he would teach us that the light of Nature, in adding confirmation to the truth that we are immortal creatures, argues also in favour of the immortality of brutes. Should not the arguments involving these views be well sifted? Our notions as to immortality. Butler's ideas on the subject seem rather accommodated to the inevitable deductions of mere logic, than to be the convictions of the judgement. Brute instinct, though wonderful, does not approach near in dignity to human reason. Bacon's definition of brute instinct confines their mission to this state of being. Evidences in man of an immortal nature. The hypothesis that brutes are immortal is an insult to human dignity, and inharmonious with the rest of the manifest System pervading God's creations. Further evils, springing from the admission that brutes may be immortal, given. The bearings of faith in man. Reason, and Faith contrasted. The mission of Faith obvious from the consideration of her tendencies. No traces of Faith in the brute creation—of the higher kind. There are some circumstances in our life-history whence man's exclusive immortality has been too carelessly and inconsiderately argued. In what respect dreams fail to establish the exclusive immortality of man. Butler's remarks as to "an à priori probability that our present powers of thought and action will be continued to us after death," examined. How can we expect to obtain *any* positive reason as a clue to the settlement of the question either way, from the uncertain light of Nature? Of what import is the evidence of any signs or indications that may be noticed in connexion with our living powers? The preponderance of probability, as furnished by such signs and indications, to be studied when positive reasons cannot be obtained.

Death's nature the first secret made known to immortal minds emancipated from the flesh. The unfairness of expecting us to reach the transcendental, in a material chariot. The study of sensational life keeps down our thoughts to mere natural cause and effect. Butler and Bacon's views as to the nature of the soul or "living being" contrasted. Can the same fact be established from too opposite theories, or certain conclusions be deduced from uncertain premisses.

Objection taken to Butler's arguments that a future life is probable from the fact that "while it is known that our bodies continue in a perpetual state of flux, the living powers yet remain the same." Materialism enters into his argument. The study of material life insufficient to show us that consciousness exists independently of our bodies as material organs, for though affirmative arguments may be undoubtedly drawn from the fact that we live after *some* portions of the body have been severed from us, yet negative arguments of equal weight may be drawn from the fact, that we have never been conscious of life surviving the separation from us of the brain or the heart. The presumptions on both sides evenly balanced. Higher ground to be sought for the basis of the argument by the light of nature than that now occupied.

Objection taken to Butler's argument that "the changes which confessedly we have undergone in our birth, and in our growth from infancy, are as great as any which death can bring upon us." One change may be as great as another, and yet produce an opposite result.

Insufficiency to convince the sceptic of recovery from a swoon as an argument in favour of the continuance of the living powers. The heart not pulseless in a swoon. Can it be proved from materialism that although the living powers *seem* to depend on the heart, and the powers of reflection on the brain, they are yet separable, and capable of active exercise without the aid of these organs?

Arguments drawn from sensational evidence shown to be unsatisfactory as confirmative of immortality either in man or in the brute. Extrication for man, from the dilemmas they involve,

effected by the light of nature such as cannot serve in the case of the "brutes that perish." Vindication of the foregoing views. Infidel views characterized mainly by short-sightedness and improper bias.

The infidel has data before him apart from those furnished by materialism, whence he cannot determine that the brute is on a level with man as to immortality. Are reason, reflectiveness, imagination, fancies or truths—that the infidel should reject their bearings as testimony against his views? If they are *fancies* then is sensation a fancy too. The follies and fallacies of sceptical arguments demonstrated. What is the sceptic's idea about the nature of a fact? His views refuted.

Mysterious instincts in our rational immortal part, pointing to immortality—of whose existence there is no evidence in the case of the brute. Are faith, fancy, &c. mere mists floating around the sensational life, having their origin in the dust, and intended only to delude and to mock? As material comforts serve a good end, so do the higher faculties too, and their tendencies to immortality are not to shadows and theory, but to substance and fact.

Usefulness of the former arguments shown in their bearings on the subject of the enquiry. Butler's notions as to the state brutes may be placed in after death not worth examination, as being hypothetical and based on the study of the sensational life, which—it has been urged—does *not* give any attestation in favour of even human immortality. Fair to enquire, how far our observation of their life in the present state, is suggestive of its prolongation after death.

Butler's arguments in favour of the immortality of the brutes drawn from our "ignorance as to what latent powers and capacities they may be endowed with," examined. Vagueness and indistinctness in the argument that "there was, prior to experience, as great presumption against human creatures as there is against brute creatures, arriving at that degree of understanding which we have in mature age"?

Arguments drawn from the apparent contentment of brutes with this life, refutative of the fancy, that they may have "latent capacities" for a higher. Characteristics of brutes considered with reference to their effect on the moral perceptions of mankind. Further objections raised against the hypothesis that they are immortal. Dreams *illustrate* the doctrine of man's immortality.

Difficulty of conducting this enquiry by the simple light of nature. The Bible God's key to unlock the natural world. Any apparent discrepancy between nature and Revelation, justifies farther search :—since it really cannot exist. What is the testimony of Divine Revelation as to the future life of brutes? Bacon on Genesis I. Agreement in their philosophical teachings of ancient authors with those of Holy Writ, as to the relative dignity of man and the brute.

Enquiry instituted as to whether Holy Scripture furnishes us with any means of arriving at a solution of this question one way or the other. Passages from Isaiah quoted. Teaching of Revelation xx. 8. 9. with reference to the Millennium. Other passages of Holy Writ examined. St. Paul on "celestial bodies and bodies terrestrial." We cannot without manifest irreverence, say that the Resurrection of The Redeemer Implied and Foreshadowed that of brutes. The testimony of the word "perish", as used with reference to brutes, not to be relied upon either one way or the other. A positive testimony against the future life of brutes given in the Book of Ecclesiastes. Farther proofs of an indirect nature quoted. Are any signs given us, either in nature, or in Revelation, as to the bearings of the Divine Will upon the Divine Potentiality in this matter? The argument "God is Powerful to do so and so" loses much weight apart from its legitimate connexion with any expression or intimation we may find of His Will in the matter.—Conclusion.

## ARE BRUTES IMMORTAL?

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THERE are some subjects hushed up by common consent, as it were, among men, from the very mysteriousness pervading them. And yet it is not alone the mere mystery that seems to repel the mental powers from their investigation, for the wise in every age have devoted the whole course of their lives, with all their best energies and zeal, to the exploration of the natural sciences,—though to them more or less occult,—and there is every prospect that the search will be continued as ardently by successive generations to the end of time. Patient research has been permitted to solve in the phænomena connected with the motions of the heavenly bodies, many problems to which once the mind of man seemed to possess no key. Comets and eclipses arouse superstitious dread no longer. Many a noble and enduring monument of the human mind's achievements, bearing witness to its high origin, its gradual development, its altitude above the clay, its breadth of comprehension, giving promise of yet more wonderful discoveries, and implying its deathless nature, throngs the past and present ages.

But it may be noted that the results of these investigations have frequently borne less of the stamp of truth upon them as their subjects have been erroneously thought to bear upon the secrets of human destiny. Where piety and trust have raised their immortal tribute with a single eye to the praise and the glory of God, and have been permitted to lay open to mankind some of His mightiest truths more or less clear from the shadows that had rested on them previously, the result has been the awakening of a salutary and reverential awe in the breasts of mankind. But genius straining with a lawless ambition, to lay bare in its own strength such truths as the Divine Purpose seems to have veiled from intrusive investigation in the present state of being has not always been contented to put up with the abortion of its schemes. It has clothed its defeat in the semblance of victory, and though its charlatanism has been suspected during the whole course of its existence, it has been suffered to live because it has appealed to those ever active feelings in mankind which would pry into subjects beyond the ken of human knowledge. So have the giant impostures of astrology, witchcraft, and necromancy triumphantly defied the march of enlightenment—facing the light, standing side by side the counterfeit with the real—and men have not looked closely into the delusion. They have given nutriment to an unhallowed curiosity which Truth has ever refused to gratify, and men have been contented to dream on of their genuineness, and to accept them as oracles, much in the same way perhaps as the

ancients cherished their mythological creed,—suspecting its lack of foundation, but having no heart to put themselves to discomfort by such a discovery. Faith, caring rather to adore than to question, has borne immortal fruits of truth, while lurking distrust, openly defying the Omnipotent, and the Omniscient One, as did the fallen angels in past ages, has vauntingly claimed for its rank growth of weeds an origin, no less heavenly, in foolish and unsanctified human wisdom.

But Faith has often exhibited a weakness too, in giving a blind acquiescence to human theories or to her own conclusions, drawn from exceptional premisses whose fallacy she has found it no easy matter to lay bare. Where she should have been deterred, by the evident contrariety to God's revealed purpose they exhibit on their very surface, from suffering them to endure unopposed, and unsifted, she has turned away her face and her tests from them. And so have they lived on to deface and to mar many of her noblest creations, and to check by their gross weight of earthly and discomfort-breathing associations her flights heavenward.

We may well ask why the master-mind of Butler should have patiently endured to send down to posterity a work that shall be consulted till time shall be no more, disfigured by one of these fallacious theories? Have not multitudes who think affectionately of his memory, and who cannot but sit meekly at his feet as their teacher, felt chilled by his allowance and even defence of the conclusion to which the line of reasoning



he had adopted led him,—that brutes are immortal? However convincing might be the testimony to our own high origin and destiny, as drawn from the silent eloquence of Nature, must we not receive it with abated thankfulness, when told that if we accept it as an evidence of our own immortality, we must take it as blended with the inseparable consequence that brutes are immortal too? Have we not sufficient plea for enquiry as to the convincing nature of such arguments as furnish us with the truth we seek, but in a state soiled and loathsome to us from so unseemly an excrescence? If we cannot detach this, shall we not reject the arguments whence it springs, and seek others that shall give us the truth most dear to us in a detached and purified form? How many readers of the ‘Analogy’ have perused the obnoxious paragraphs without shuddering aversion? Is it possible there was not a secret feeling of discomfort in the mind of the great prelate himself when he sent them forth? Would he not feel as he neared his conclusions, and saw what they involved, much as one feels who has snared a fine fish, but has brought up with it from the same element an unsightly reptile, clasping it round as its prey, with which it shudders to have contact? There is such a kinmanship among men as to the aspirations of their souls, that the very fact of the distastefulness of such utterances to learned and unlearned, virtuous and vicious alike, leads us to suspect that when Bishop Butler pronounced the denial as to the immortality of brutes to be “invidious and weak,” he himself had yet

some sympathy with those who have continued to question such an assertion. We feel, and as I believe rightly feel, that immortality is a garland made for the brows of the human being alone, of all the living creatures that throng the busy scenes of life. By the aid of the light of nature no less than by that of Revelation, we have looked into the subject of immortality fondly and earnestly as befits our yearnings. But it has been that of God, of the angels, of the redeemed; it has been an immortality not pale and attenuated such as Butler allows to the brutes, but one radiant with a happiness dependent on and kept alive by moral and spiritual and intellectual perfection. It is plain that Butler's theories on the subject owe their birth to the train of his logical process; they would appear to be the inevitable deductions of mere logic rather than the convictions of the judgement, untrammelled by the laws of reasoning. Something we know of the dignity of human nature, though it rests much under clouds in this present state. Its unbounded superiority to the brute it is plain to see. Judging from the endowments of the brute-creation, we can discern no reason why its whole mission needs a wider sphere than earth for its accomplishment. Much indeed do we marvel over the wonders effected by brute-instinct, but so may we do more and more, and yet have no misgivings as to its approaching at all near to the dignity of reason, to which on earth we may rest assured the words of the poet may be truthfully applied—at least in contrast with this instinct—

“Nec viget quicquam simile aut secundum,”

for Bacon\* appears to speak truthfully and convincingly enough of this endowment of the brutes, when he describes it as “an intent solicitude about some one thing, and a perpetual exercise thereof, *which the necessity of their preservation imposes upon them.*” To this feeling he then goes on to refer the raven’s habit in time of drought, of dropping pebbles into a hollow tree, where she chanced to spy water, that the water might rise for her to drink; the bee’s voyage “through the vast ocean of air, to distant fields,” and the accomplishment of her way back to her hive; the ant’s practice of gnawing every grain of corn that she hoards, to prevent it sprouting. On the other hand there is that in man, evidenced by his very face and deportment, no less than by his noble endowments, which convinces us of his destination for a higher sphere of being. So have the very heathen taught us, who had no light of Revelation vouchsafed to them, that might break in, as it were unconsciously upon their enquiries after truth by the light of nature, and interfere with the singleness and simplicity of their conclusions. We look upon the theory that would have the brute’s life “clothed upon” with immortality, however inferior a grade fancy might assign to it, as not merely an insult to the dignity wherewith God has gifted us, in our relations with regard to the brute, but as directly inharmonious with the rest of the manifest system pervading His

\* Bacon’s *Novum Organum*, Book v. chap. II. p. 185. Bohn’s Ed.

creations—creations whose mutual harmony and adaptation to each other, it were wilful blindness not to perceive:—which indeed our high faculties seem to have been assigned us for the very purpose of discovering to His Glory,—and to our own edification, comfort, and rest in Him.

Prior to our entrance upon the discussion of Butler's arguments—the portion of them at least that involves the noxious conclusion we now seek to disprove in his own way,—it may be remarked that the very notion of immortality being the common climax of man and brute is not offensive merely, and opposed to the convictions of even the most savage and untutored intellects, but that its tendencies are in the highest sense injurious. In a state of probation, wherein human faith is allowed on all hands to be weak at best, and wherein it is matter of experience that The Creator has surrounded us on all sides with evidences of His Love, as though with the intention that we should use them as props to our falling faith, the consequences of admitting such a doctrine would necessarily be most pernicious. The light of divine intellect, that speaks for the opposite view within us, would become filmy and obscure from its very neighbourhood to such an idea. If faith be weak now, she would then become more sceptical still. We may not be able to feel our way as to whether we can hold Bacon's theories as to the living powers of the man and the brute or not, but we trace their formation in his mind to the divinely inseated principle of intel-

ligent trust which is common to him with the heathen who knows not God. This trust or persuasion will be found to be a common residuum in most schemes of religion that embrace immortality, however fantastic. We allow the cases of the ancient Egyptians and others to be exceptional. But in the majority of instances man is chilled and repelled where he cannot trace a broad line of distinction between himself and the brute. In proportion to his conviction that as the dust is the common origin of the two as to their bodies, so there is no more honor present or ultimate for the one than for the other, will he "give himself up to work all uncleanness with greediness." Then will he soil his nobler endowments by copying swine in their gluttony, or "wallowings in the mire." And the same temptations to all unclean living, did he once feel the brute to be immortal, would drown the expostulating voice of his higher in-born dignity, and faith, and draw him aside from pure paths of virtue. Then would he, in proportion to his mental enlightenment, see contradictions in nature where now he discerns harmony. His own yearnings, he would feel, uttered no certain significancy. His views perhaps as to the moral dignity of the Creator might not suffer, but the out-pouring of his reverential love would be chilled. Not without a sadness, at present more or less unknown, would he soar to the intelligence of some of the great mysteries of the universe. However much he might refine his notions as to any imagined difference between his own immortality and that of the brute, it

would not prevent the cramping effects upon his virtue of a certain sense of distant alliance and association with creatures of low, grovelling, earthly tendencies. As soon in his system of divinity would he accept the notion of purgatory, as that of a mean state of immortality, between eternal life and eternal death, or punishment. Immortality suffers we know not how much, as we entertain such thoughts. If it retains for us its reality, our views respecting it become painfully qualified. We instinctively hide our heads, and survey the ground, when God has made us to look upward and heavenward. No:—when brutes have any capacities for God's active praise, when they can scale the heights and dive into the depths that have known the soarings and the profoundness of man, when they can hold converse of their Maker, and can pour forth floods of melodious music to His Holy Name, *then* let man divide with them the priesthood he holds in the mighty cathedral of nature. Let him know nothing of a shared or a stinted immortality: let him place nothing on a level with God's revealed will; or with those of God's purposes which we are allowed to reach through the mazes of nature; let him not cherish a creation of his own breath and fancy rather than break up the foundations to which they cling altogether. Let him look at the brute as his minister, his subject on earth, not as one of some unknown but distant relationship to him in the eternal world. Let him not deify materialism in any form, though it were with a crown of parsley, instead of one of immortal light.

And now it may be allowed me to gain a little courage, for the task of tracking Bishop Butler's footsteps, by a few thoughts more, suggested as well by nature's light as by the 'fuller and stronger of Revelation. A task it must inevitably be of no mean kind, to put into any useful form one's questions as to the validity of conclusions arrived at by so much learning. I enter upon it humbly but earnestly, in all deep admiration of my author, in all self-distrust and submission to the weight of his episcopal office, and to the lustre of the solid qualities that adorned it,—seeking as far as may be, that my enquiry may seem less that of the disputant, than of a disciple convinced by a revered instructor in all points but one.

Faith is the root, the beginning of all spiritual life in the soul:—second only to the grace that draws it to God. Through unnumbered ages it has been the recipient and the weaver into form and consistence as systems, of those communications of The Infinite with man, conveyed by subtle impressions upon his soul, which have ever given, more or less, their testimony to the nobility of his nature. The gift of God, and no indigenuous tenant of the human soul, yet, once left in possession, it has roused it from languor, disturbed it in dreams of earthliness, thrown down for it the wall between the seen and the unseen, showed it of how much more infinite moment it is, for its true happiness, to share the realities of eternity than those of time. It combats at once the too common feeling that there *are* no realities beyond those submitted to bodily sight,

or detected by mental reasoning. Man's eyes are opened by it to discern a fact of much force and beauty as he gazes at the ascending scale of God's creations in this world. While he is led to observe how wonderfully the lower creation is made to depend upon the upper,—while, looking down upon all orders of the lower animals, he traces in their habits, the law that actuates them,—that is implanted in their instincts, of subservience to, and dependence upon himself, a superior and more perfectly developed creature, he learns to see that his own life frets and chafes against the boundaries of time,—that it has countless cravings for whose satisfaction he looks in vain on earth. He detects himself for ever reaching away from things seen and palpable. He is restless on earth, as one in a prison-house, seeking freer air, less confinement, fresh scenes. He feels his dependence on some one whom on earth, the dwellers whereon, reason leads him to feel, all are his inferiors,—he cannot find. And as he cannot find his superior in this world while his needs and longings burden him yet more and more, a feeling somewhat akin to, though loftier than that, which guides to him the brute, leads him in his turn to the Creator. His vision of that Creator is more dim than are the perceptions the lower animals may have of his own capacities and endowments. But reason teaches him to lean upon that unseen, unknown Power, seeing that of himself he cannot stand. Reason shows him that if the brute is contented with its present scope of action, and of vision, and he is not, the feeling of contented-



ness within him is intended to remain imperfectly satisfied here, but that it must nevertheless *somewhere*, at some time or other, and from some source or other, receive its fill. For should the rest of the creations have such a completeness in themselves, and he be the solitary instance of incomplete development? And so naturally step by step his lips are opened to pray, and his imagination to depict a future state.

Now it is faith's province, not to supersede reason, so much as to show wherein she is weak, and to lead man by her own hand through the dark when reason can no longer follow. Reason and faith part company at the grave. As one loth to turn back from the sight of a receding companion, Reason stands on the very verge of the finite, and would fain follow her bright-eyed æthereal sister up the steeps of the infinite. But faith herself ascends those steeps with eyes fast-closed. A veil as it were of the dimmest, the mistiest twilight rests upon all by which she passes. She moves on as if drawn upward by a mighty magnet, silent, absorbed, but unknown. Faith's vision indeed, though she cannot see the roadside scenery, yet discerns indistinct images of the destined home that awaits her on the termination of her travels: but reason is purblind, and narrow-sighted. And yet even to faith there are limits beyond which she cannot pierce by reason of the blinding light streaming down upon her from those distant regions. She has the telescopic power of regarding as near that which lies far away in immensity of time, or space,—yet as she can only

advance to a certain stage where she will be required to transfer her pilgrims to the charge of perfect sight, so is she with all her nobility, necessarily imperfect.

What were man without faith,—his trustworthy guide whom he loves, and to whom he clings, and who bears him upward on her wing, and carries him over places he fears to traverse? She is clearly necessary to his happiness, and indispensable to his contentment. Every dark heathen keeps closely by her side. And if he be an unconscious, an unwilling heathen, a Socrates for instance, she makes his old traditions as to direct Divine interference in human affairs, mixed up as they undoubtedly are with very much fable, to possess wonderful powers of alleviation and encouragement for him. It matters not that his views as to the deluge, and the confusion of tongues, or the yet more distant war of the angels, are of the wildest and most visionary kind. Faith so blends her instruction with their garbled histories that he is cheered, encourages high hopes, forms high aims, and so sinks into that sleep which is death. The vague and fantastic notions as to a state of existence in other worlds after death, which have possessed the fancies and regulated the conduct of their savage entertainers, can only be supposed to have had this effect through the medium of faith.

It might then justly be maintained that there is something manifestly inconsistent with the universal harmony pervading creation in the idea that there is such a faculty in our nature, as that which leads us to

believe in the existence of things we see not, and vehemently to long for them, if yet that which is believed in and desired is shadow and phantasy instead of substance. Are we to look upon the exercise of faith as if it were like that false light that plays over marshy places, luring the benighted traveller to his doom, instead of to some friendly fireside-glow, or shall we rather look at it as a guide, an instruction, a consolation to us?

In the case of man only is this faith to be found. There is not a trace of it in brute instincts, except it be instanced in a far minor, weaker way, in the faithful trust some of them repose in man. No traces are there in brute instincts of the hopes or fears, exultation or dejection that spring from faith. There is indeed evidence enough in the case of the lower animals that they are of two-fold conformation. The loftiest forest quadruped, and the tiniest insect, the eagle and the humming bird, the whale and the minnow cannot be spoken of as mere machines of motion. There are secret and marvellous powers within the external framework of each—volition, rage, courage, fear, hope, memory, grief. Perhaps we may even trace in some—as in the case of the dog—a feeling of fear akin to that produced by conscience in man. We cannot fail to discern that the lower animals possess a considerable measure of the passions and capacities met with in the human being.

It has perhaps been often urged that there are some circumstances in our own life-history whence man's

exclusive nobility has been too carelessly and inconsiderately argued, but which appear to lead to similar conclusions in favor of the brute creation. Take the case of dreams. There is a noble passage in Young's "Night Thoughts" inculcating the doctrine that the soul's immortality peeps through dreams. Their phænomena very clearly point out to us the subordination of our organs of sense. They show us that the subtle part within us which is invisible, the mind, the immortal soul, can see when the bodily eyes are closed in sleep, and can hear voices loud or low, the din of the tempest, or whispers as of rustling leaves, when in the bed-chamber all around is as still as the grave. Dreaming, we climb over rocks, ford rivers, soar in the air, descend into deep places, explore alone vast old buildings forsaken and dreary, find our way up and down mazy flights of stairs, and through impossible apertures, feel our persons washed by the tossing waves of ocean, or range through scenery lovelier than we have ever in waking hours beheld,—while in reality our bodies are almost or completely at rest. The objects we discern through the agency of the senses in active play, impress themselves with no more force upon them than do those presented to our wandering fancies in sleep. The only difference is that the sights and sounds we are aware of when awake have a greater uniformity and fixedness. Real landscapes and haunts retain a stereotyped aspect, while very frequently those of dream-land change as quickly as dissolving views, or deceive our impressions of them. And then again

these phantoms do not merely look like the realities of actual life: they have *apparently* the material weight and consistence, of those realities. If we dream that the hands or arms are occupied with some burden, the burden often causes them to sink down in weariness by a weight it seems to possess that is the very reverse of the shadowy, the intangible, the imponderable.

Now as to man, dreams may or may not prove the great doctrine, and the true doctrine of the soul's immortality. Revelation indeed has settled the point satisfactorily, and to our great comfort. But the value of dreams as an evidence of it—though we may by and by prove it to be sufficient,—should not have attached to it a too unqualified importance. Not that we are to deny any final testimony they may have. But we remember Scott's "staghound dreaming of the chase": we have seen our own dogs tremble, and start or show signs of pleasure, and have heard them growl and bark in their sleep, while yet their eyes were closed, and they lay quietly enough in front of the fire. Now if we hastily accept dreams as a proof of immortality in man, why not listen to the same testimony as it may be urged in favor of that of the brute? It is plain there must be a distinction, a reservation somewhere. If dreams *do* prove immortality, it must be when they possess characteristics never to be met with, never existing in those of the lower animals. In allowing that they prove our own immortality we must somehow hedge about our words, lest we be forced into the awkward concession that brutes are immortal also, and that

“the poor Indian” was not so far wrong after all, when he held that “his faithful dog should bear him company” in the spirit-world of his imagination.

It is very natural that we should like to see the supposed testimony of dreams in favor of the soul’s immortality, given without flaw or drawback of any kind. Strip it of all that involves a paradox contrary to revealed truth, or that leads us to make an admission from which we recoil, and gladly will we open a way for it into our corps of arguments,—wherein indeed we should rejoice to see it occupy a high and prominent rank.

But if we recoil from the prospect of making the admission referred to, bishop Butler finds fault with us for so doing. He expresses no sympathy with us in our aversion. He says—“*It is thought* an insuperable difficulty that they (brutes) should be immortal, and, by consequence, capable of everlasting happiness. Now this manner of expression is both invidious and weak, but the thing intended by it is really no difficulty at all, either in the way of natural or moral consideration.” He then proceeds to quarrel with the notion, that their immortality necessarily involves their subsequent arrival at great attainments, their eventual translation to the dignity of rational and moral agents: and argues in favor of his views from our ignorance as to the latent powers and capacities wherewith they may be endowed. To this he adds a second argument,—“that the natural immortality of brutes does not in the least imply that they are

endued with any latent capacities of a rational or moral nature; and that the economy of the universe might require that there should be living creatures of this kind."

It is to be feared that by far the greater portion of christian, and even of civilized humanity, would be found to hold these "invidious and weak" views rather than exhibit the strength of mind evidenced in the prelate's reproof. We have to grapple with a judgement of superior order, with reasoning powers weighty, close, and logical, and to adopt common ground with our author if we would hope to set forth the reasonableness of our scruples.

Now has Butler brought away the right testimony from Nature or has he mistaken her utterances? A concern for truth requires that we should add our feeble powers of search to his keener vision as a discoverer.

"There is" argues Butler—for brevity's sake we put his views analytically—"an *â priori* probability that our present powers of thought and action will be continued to us after death, unless we have some positive reason given us for thinking that death will be the destruction of these living powers. But so far from this being the case, our present possession of them is the very strongest reason for believing that we shall possess them hereafter."

Now we may readily allow the existence of this "*â priori* probability", in the case both of the man and of the brute, but we maintain that any reason which may

be given us for thinking that death will be their destruction needs not to be of the "positive" nature referred to. In what sense would Butler here use the term "positive reason?" Our search shuts us out for the present from consulting Revelation, and it is a matter of great question whether Nature can be said to furnish us with directly positive proof on either side of the matter. So then for positive reason we shall be obliged to substitute reason drawn from considerations that furnish us with the highest degree of moral probability, as to the subject one way or the other. Why does Bishop Butler saddle this especial part of his argument with such a requisition, when as to other parts he is content to be guided by preponderance of probability? If nature has no *positive* utterances for us in this case at all, does she furnish us with any clues to *assist* us in our search, whose guidance we may follow without suspicion that it may be deceptive? Throughout his argument Butler trusts much to these real or imagined clues, and we must do the same, setting aside the hope of obtaining a voice from heaven or from nature to bring us to a perfect adjustment of the contested point at once. And besides this, we may perhaps question the trust-worthiness of the implication, that present powers are necessarily obliged to be continued to us even any length of time,—unless the giver of them inform us positively to the contrary. Did we know nothing of the Supreme Being, we could not safely argue as to any fixed and unalterable purpose of His will respect-



ing the continuance or alienation of these powers. But the imperfect knowledge we have of Him, and of His creations, leads us to feel, that, in the present constitution of things, there *are* certain signs or indications given as to their stay or removal. Of what import then are the signs that may be noticed in connexion with our living powers?—or are these living powers so different from the rest of created things that no such signs exist with respect to them? If such signs do exist, and we interpret their language aright, they must be allowed some weight in the balance of the argument. If they do not, we must either seek signs from analogy in other creations, or be left in darkness.

Truly it is argued that we know not what death is. The revelation of this secret is perhaps the first step towards perfect knowledge in immortal minds emancipated from the flesh. We only know some of its phænomena and effects, and all these—argues Butler—“in no wise imply the destruction of any living powers. Again, we do not *know* on what the existence of our living powers depends; for we see them suspended—in sleep for example, or in a swoon,—and still not extinguished.”

Now we are confining ourselves to the mysteries of sensational life. We are treading on ground where we may be allowed to guide ourselves by observations of cause and effect. Let our arguments deal awhile with them. It seems rather unfair to put us into a material chariot, and expect us all at once to reach the

transcendental: to bid us learn what the senses do teach us, and thence to infer what they do not. It is undeniable that "as we are greatly in the dark, upon what the exercise of our living powers depends, so we are wholly ignorant what the powers themselves depend upon." As to the bodily organs such as are those of sight, hearing, or motion, the links in the chain of connexion between the exercise of any faculty, and the organ itself, on which, considered from a mere mechanical stand-point, that exercise depends, are far more readily seen; and we may even go further still into the laws of causation in this instance, and trace the connexion between the impression produced on the organ, and the impressing faculty of volition. But here we draw near to the shadows of the unknown, the incomprehensible. Butler however brings us back again to the region of sensation by the nature of his illustrations, and, as I think step by step demonstrates unconsciously the unsatisfactory nature of the evidences furnished by mere sensational life to immortality, either in man or brute. The knowledge we gain by experience as to suspension of the living powers, deals only with the phænomena and the subordinate causes of such suspension. Both in the case of sleep and of a swoon we find it difficult to lose sight of their mysterious connexion with the body. But there will be occasion to say more on this head presently, when we come to Butler's remarks on consciousness, and its existence independently of material organs.

"All presumption of death being the destruction of

living powers, must go on the idea of their discerptibility" further reasons the bishop,—and with this we naturally connect his subsequent remarks as to the singleness and indivisibility of consciousness, and the following on another kindred subject—"We have no way of determining by experience, what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls himself; and yet, till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary particles of matter, which there is no ground to think any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason to think death to be the dissolution of it, of the living being, even though it should not be absolutely indiscerptible." That consciousness is indivisible, few if any would be prepared to deny, for as there is an oneness in personal identity, to predicate number of which would manifestly involve absurdity and confusion, so must consciousness be one. The same person can no more possess many consciousnesses than many personal identities. Nor is consciousness apparently discerptible in the sense in which we speak of a limb as being so. Supposing we adopted a theory of the soul different to that of Butler, —such as will presently be given,—our notions would I think naturally favor the supposition, that if, this consciousness should become alienated from one portion of a supposed functional soul, it would centre without abatement or loss in others.

At this stage however we may begin seriously to question whether conclusions either affirmative or negative, are trustworthy, as drawn from sensational

life in man and in the brute. We seek to establish a truth. But can two philosophers satisfactorily or even with any major degree of moral probability, establish the same fact as a deduction from two opposite theories? If the premisses be opposite, the very fact of their being so at once demonstrates the ground to be one unfit to raise a building of any solidity upon. Fact may be built on fact, and theory on theory, but surely not fact on theory. We have seen Butler's notions as to consciousness and his *idea* as to the nature of the soul. But the view taken by Bacon as to the soul, we shall recollect, is, that so far from being less than the smallest particles or atoms of matter it (i. e. the sensitive or produced soul—differing from and subservient to the rational soul of his system) “must be allowed a corporeal substance, attenuated by heat, and rendered invisible as a subtile breath or aura, of a flamy and airy nature, having the softness of air in receiving impressions, and the activity of fire in exerting its action, nourished partly by an oily, and partly by a watery substance, *and diffused through the whole body*; but in perfect creatures residing chiefly in the head and thence running through the nerves, being fed and recruited by the spirituous blood of the arteries as Telesius and his follower Donius in some measure have usefully shown.”—And again, a little lower, this great philosopher adds—“This *soul* in brutes is a principal soul, whereof their body is the organ; but in man it is itself an organ of the rational (or higher) soul, and may be rather called by the name

spirit than soul."\* Now even though we took up neither of these theories as to the express nature of the soul, but adapted another, such as we might conceive to be more akin to truth, would it be right to rest the main weight of the argument,—or any considerable portion of it—for the great fact for which we are contending, upon so purely human a basis? Butler believes in discerptibility, as consisting only with his idea that probably the living principle is less than one of the elementary particles of matter. If it should be larger, then Butler's argument manifestly suffers deterioration, inasmuch as he no longer seems disposed to predicate that indiscerptibility of it, on which he rests his reasoning. Butler and Bacon cannot both be right: they may both be wrong:—but at all events from uncertain premisses we cannot deduce a certain conclusion—or one at all approaching the nature of certainty.

But our neighbourhood with materialism lays us open to its mists and darkness as to what follows. Death is allowed by bishop Butler to be the destruction of the bodily organs of sensation, though not of the powers of reflection. He advocates the probability of our future life from the fact that "while it is known that our bodies continue in a perpetual state of flux, the living powers yet remain the same." But may not this suggest the question whether such is the case simply because the decaying parts, subject to and re-

\* Bacon's *Novum Organon*, Book iv. Chap. III. p. 173. Bohn's Ed.

moved by the said flux, are supplanted, as they are in process of decay, by fresh material,—those links being transferred to the new particles which had formerly existed between the old, and the powers of life? If there be decay in the said flux there is a manifest renewal too. And from such a process in our frame, and from the known and experienced connexion between mind and matter, it seems as legitimate to argue that the powers of life continue, simply because they have new bodily particles, in place of the old, to supply the lost links of connexion, as that they are indestructible because they remain unharmed by the decay implied in such flux. Materialism gives us little help here. When that event happens, which, it is manifest, puts an end to this flux, because the body then decays altogether, and is turned completely into its native dust, it is surely impossible to follow up further the ultimate history of the living powers.

Then again: we know that our bodies are but material organs, and our faith teaches us that consciousness exists quite independently of them. And we may learn this latter fact, as I believe, from nature—though not from the study of material life. Does the separation from the body of those parts or organs in which the powers of life are known more especially to reside, affect our consciousness no more than does the loss of various limbs? Materialism shows us that consciousness exists without the eye, or the arm, or the leg, and thus far the argument we may deduce from such an illustration, favours the idea of our im-

mortality. But it is open to us to take other illustrations from the same source. We were never yet able to think without the agency of the brain, or to breathe without that of the heart. Surely this is no more of the nature of a truism than it is to illustrate the subject by the aid of any other bodily organs. And both heart and brain are component organs of that body in which the living powers reside for the present, and of which assertion has been made to the effect that they are unnecessary to the activity or the continuance of the living powers. If the brain and the heart, when made the subjects of a surgical operation, left these powers apparently intact, (as it is not denied they undoubtedly do, though not so far as our perceptions influenced by materialistic studies can determine,) the case would then be proved to demonstration that consciousness can exist without the whole of the body. But Butler proves only that it (consciousness) exists without a *part* of the body,—and while he omits altogether to notice this opposite illustration, which would have been as fatal to the establishment of his proof from these sources as the illustration he does use is favourable to it, it cannot surely be wondered at if we stagger in our convictions. The presumptions on both sides appear to be about evenly balanced.

We shall see as I hope presently what *does* seem to prove that our bodies “are accidental adjuncts” of the living powers—not only those limbs of them whose separability has been proved to be in no way injurious

to the living powers, but also those which to our limited sight, as far as the study of the sensational life goes, appear to be inseparably blended with their activity and even existence. We may dive into the depths of the subject, and faithfully set down our own convictions, while yet we shall be mercifully upheld by other considerations drawn from nature, such as will be suggested in due course, from embracing the cold creed of the infidel or the sceptic. It must be recollected that in guiding our researches by the study of the human frame, we have chosen common ground with the infidel investigator, and it would surely be better to vacate the ground in his favor altogether and go elsewhere whither he would not so willingly follow us, than to have our affirmative proofs met half-way by his negative ones, and so incur the danger of provoking his ridicule.

An apparent indistinctness—at first sight at least—pervades the ideas that “the changes which confessedly we have undergone in our birth, and in our growth from infancy, are as great as any which death can bring upon us.” For not only would this seem to involve the notion of our pre-existent consciousness which is foreign to the teachings to be gleaned from material illustrations, but it is an idea which affects to soar away from, while yet it is closely chained down to material and sensational laws. For these teach us that “the living being each man calls himself,” could not have entered at all upon this earthly existence previous to the formation of those organs at least with



which the powers of life seem so intimately—not to say (to the infidel) *inseparably* connected. Unless we hold Plato's notions in the Phædo as to our capability of retaining in the earthly,—as though in an ulterior sphere of being,—impressions derived from antecedent residence elsewhere, there seems nothing to prevent our arriving at the conclusion,—as far as we have gone at present,—that as we have entered into this existence, and at such time were closely united with certain vital but material organs, so when these organs are dissolved, a separation takes place between them and ourselves, which we must hold to be transcendental in nature, and *so*, belonging as a consequence of this, to another class of reasonings.

It is not sought to be denied that “the changes death will bring upon us will be no greater than those we have already experienced” in our birth and in our growth from infancy. They may not be so great for that matter, and yet be of an opposite nature to the other changes (and so cause for all we may glean from the study of sensational life to the contrary) dissolution and discontinuance instead of further life.

Among the illustrations drawn from the sensational life of man from the first moment of his being a living embryo to the last of his earthly existence, we have omitted to refer to the case of a swoon, as indicative of the separate existence of the living powers. But again this illustration appears to be of little assistance, for the sceptic would be ready with his reply that we regain consciousness on recovery from a swoon, simply

because, however severe the swoon might have been, a continuous, though feeble pulsation of the heart was maintained throughout; and that even though the rest of the body were collapsed and rigid, as has been known to be the case, yet consciousness would return provided the heart preserved its powers.

From what phænomena then connected with the sensational or material life can we gather any satisfactory evidence as to the existence of the soul apart from the ministering organs of the body?—such as are the heart and the brain? Can it be proved that although the living powers seem to depend on the heart, and the powers of reflection upon the brain, they are yet separable and capable of active exercise without the aid of these organs? Till we have shown that there is no such connection, we can scarcely argue for the real existence of such a notion as that there are independent processes of thought, or that the mind, when it has once received impressions through the senses, can dwell and, as it were, feed upon these impressions in a way with which the vital organs of sensation cannot interfere.

At the present stage of our considerations the boundary of life as gazed at by the light of nature may to some of us seem to be gloomy enough. There seems nothing to prevent our speaking of its joys, and sorrows, as “rounded by” a long eternal “sleep.” We see nothing beyond the chilling damps of the sepulchre, and the sad and revolting scenes of the charnel house. There appears at present to be little reason why we

should not exclaim "let us eat and drink for to-morrow we die." By the light of nature as far as it has been evolved, if at least success has been attained in showing the futility of employing sensational illustrations as arguments for immortality, we may wonder there should have been such power of support in the words of St. Paul—"If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable." For clearly, the apostles "endured" voluntarily "a great fight of afflictions" because of that "hope in Christ" pointing out to them happiness in a future state, of whose expectation as yet we have not been able fully to discern the reasonableness. We have treated only the subjects of consciousness and of *sensational* existence;—and they breathe to us of the dust:—they have an odour "of the earth earthy" that offends us. We have indeed rid ourselves of the obnoxious notion that brutes are immortal, but still we have degraded ourselves to their level in place of raising them to ours. It were time to be sad now,—if we could proceed no further—as well as "invidious and weak." But it will be permitted us, as I hope, to part company altogether with the brutes now. The argument, as far as it goes, suits their case well. There is more to be said respecting them presently, but of a nature as little favorable to their immortality as the reasons, such as they are, which have been already given. But is there a way, pointed out by the light of nature, of extrication for ourselves from this dilemma? We have seen that the living powers may be dissolved when the

heart and the brain cease to act, and we know not when, if ever, we may recover their possession. Where is an outlet for us from this degrading companionship with the "beasts that perish?"

It may seem to some that we have thus far to a great extent been treading on dangerous and unjustifiable if not untenable ground—that perhaps we have helped to strengthen the infidel in his blind unbelief. But surely such an opinion would be scarcely just. Is Christianity capable of receiving confirmation as to its truth, from evidences, which, with almost if not absolutely equal force, may be urged to its disparagement? We have an intellectual scepticism to grapple with in the present day, whose insight into the arguments opposed to it is sufficiently keen to detect a fallacy, however well it may be hidden. Its champion is an adversary eager in his attack upon all theories raised by mere speculative fancy more or less, as will be seen from the objections that have been taken to a certain indistinctness manifest in Bacon's \* doctrine of the rational and produced souls. It is then our interest to meet the infidel as little as possible with other weapons than those that have the sharpened edge of truth—a truth not hastily arrived at by the way of conjecture, but deducible from certain known and recognized powers and laws in human nature. But we should remember at the same time the peculiarity of our foe in this,—that he will accept

\* Book IV. chap. iii. p. 174, Bohn's Ed.

only evidences drawn from his favorite ground of *materialism*, and that on this ground he is prone to find a level for even the highest endowments of human nature. There is an apparently incurable blindness of vision as to his perception of anything higher than materialism which gives to all he urges an appearance of perversity, and leads one to feel convinced that he argues from the will rather than from the judgement, or that at least his judgement is warped and weak, as though in punishment of his sin.

Hitherto we have confined ourselves rather in appearance than in reality to the sensational life. We have taken with us a few of the darker considerations suggested to the intellectual and reflective faculties by materialism as it is severed from all connexion with themselves. We have in short—as Bacon would say—used the rational or higher soul as our guide, into the produced:—or, in other words, in the whole course of our examination, we have stood upon uniformly higher ground than that occupied by the brute. Brute instincts cannot discern even the dark bearings and ultimate tendency of the sensational nature as we have seen them. All appearances are manifestly against the supposition that they can exercise such foresight. The infidel may find ground to stand upon in materialism whence to attack us, but here his footing is insecure, and only his own inventive sophistry can give him a show of power. To be honest he must reason from data, not from imagination, and if he take these data for a foundation, he cannot determine that

the brute is on a level with man. We must be contented to gain our victory over him by degrees. Where in the case of the brutes, we ask, is the progress from dark to light in the case of the reasoning and reflective faculties as is shown during the course of developement of the embryo into the man? Where in the case of the brutes are the land-marks that point the way to immortal life, or that even guide them to the end of this life?

Separate the intellectual, the reflective, the inspirational from the sensational in man, and our hopes and expectation of immortal life are not. How are we then able to make such use of our memory and experience? In our past research we have not used that lower memory which belongs to the sensational life unaided and alone. It has served us in such good stead because reason has taken it by one hand, reflection by the other, and imagination, kept in check by her two other companions, has led the way before us. Separate reason, reflection, imagination from man's sensational nature, and we will then consent to his being placed on a level with the brutes. We will allow that no breath from the better land can be felt on the frame of either the one or the other. But why does the infidel adopt natural data in the one case, and not in the other? Are reason, reflectiveness, imagination fancies or truths? If they are fancies, the stubborn fact of the sensational life is a fancy too. Or rather put it thus—if the material frame be a truth then are sensation, motion, reason, reflectiveness, imagination

truths too. Shall we accept the infidel's inference that that alone is true, is a fact, which is made up of, or traceable to gross matter liable to change and decay, and that because we cannot *see* to the contrary,—because we cannot *lay our hands* on faculties high or low, as we can on matter, *therefore* the one is fit as a ground for argument, while the others, if not actual fancies, are not separate creations, but all one with and soiled by that which has its foundation in the dust? Even if we grant that these several faculties appear to be indissolubly united with the material frame, and that they are accidents of it, why should we allow that confidence to the one which we do not allow to the other? We trust to the eye as capable of enabling us to see, to the ear as capable of enabling us to hear, to the feet as capable of enabling us to walk: we further still allow that they have severally strength to bring before us certain sights, to cause us to hear certain sounds, and to walk to certain places within the limited sphere assigned them for exercise. And why then, when our reason, faith, and imagination would teach us they have a mission too, should we spurn them because the Creator has not gifted them with bodies or audible voices?—or because they would lead us from too close an alliance with and love for the mere sensational life? We might as well say that all beyond simple motion is a fancy—that volition and desire are fancies. For has desire no power to range without the boundary of the material frame? Is it made for the frame, or is an imperfect frame, such as will serve

it a little while, made for *it*? And what does nature really teach us—us who have the least element of faith and upward yearning—as to this said faculty of desire? She teaches us that in brutes it *is* gifted with a mere kingship over the material organs: that it has no reach, and consequently no inclination to range beyond the boundaries of its material kingdom. But what does she teach us respecting it in the case of man? That it has other relationship than as the motive power of the will in this decaying body: that its range is infinitely beyond it: that there is a certain mysterious directing power over it which shows what it is, and what it is not, capable of. Has human desire a habit of ranging beyond the boundaries that are laid down by a mysterious power within us between the possible and the impossible? Is it prone to indulge in wild, insane flights? The sceptic would reply: “Yes when strains after immortality.” But why then shall it not be said with equal truth that it has no power through the will to stir the organs of sensation? The will too instinctively shrinks from the absurd. I say *instinctively* advisedly;—believing that there are mysterious instincts in our rational, immortal part distinguishable from those of the brute in this—that they have no relation confined to the requirements of our present bodies, that they have, so to speak higher or sublimer appetites, that they have relation to another life beyond this which is not therefore unattainable because as yet it is beyond our ken. The very infidel in setting these aside as fancies betrays



ignorance, blind and wilful, of the bearings of his nature. There is really no reason why he should not as soon trust the guidance of one faculty as that of another. He acts in an autocratic way when he will listen to his judgement and shut his ears to imagination. Fancy has an existence as well as judgement. Was the one only created to be useful as a guide?

It may be objected to this, that a man cannot follow the guidance of his fancy which might lead him into the wildest and most extravagant vagaries. But is not one faculty made to be guided and controlled by another? Faith has a gravity, a discretion, so to speak, connected with it to which fancy is a stranger. May not the one then be intended as the natural guide of the other, first guided itself by contemplation or revelation? Or are faith and fancy mere mists floating around the sensational life, having their origin in the dust, made to delude and to mock? Will the sceptic allow to the Creator a purpose in the provision for his rational creature of the countless comforts of life around him, and deny its existence in the provision for him of the higher faculties? Does he tell us that the material comforts furnish clues to God's good purposes as to our temporary happiness, but that the higher faculties, because for countless ages they have led man to look for a future life, are therefore not trustworthy bear no stamp upon them of the Creator's purposes, such as all other things bear? Can he be so unreasonable as to wish to teach us that the Creator has placed sources of content on the one side and of discontent on

the other? He allows by compulsion the wonderful skill evidenced in the formation of and in the laws regulating the human frame. What can be said for his clear-sightedness, when he reasons as though the human frame were the climax of the Creator's skill, or its material adjuncts the climax of the Creator's love? What can be said for his reasonableness as a finite being *allowing* the Infinite, but refusing to believe that anything infinite is blended with his own nature, because the Infinite has not brought down His purposes to the level of his comprehension? Is not, in this instance, profession of wisdom, plain and senseless folly? Material comforts serve a good end, and the higher faculties would never have been implanted within us but for a good end too. We cannot grasp as yet the truths to which they point—as far at least as nature is concerned—but where the leanings and the tendencies are, their perfect satisfaction will in time follow.

These considerations as to the proofs of the immortality of the human soul have been somewhat prolonged in order that a broader front might be presented against the notion that brutes are immortal too. It is contended that as in the case of man appearances are *for*, so in that of the lower animals they are *against* a future life. The slightest consideration would suggest that there is antagonism between the two cases that could not lightly be passed over.

If the evidences, on the strength of which the asserted future life of brutes recommends itself to our notice, be those furnished by the study of the sensational life,

and if these have been satisfactorily proved to be insufficient to establish even man's immortality, it must follow either that the case can be affirmatively determined by another or other classes of arguments, or that it must be considered untenable. It will moreover at once be conceded that inferences deduced from the exercise of those higher faculties in man which are called the inspirational, the rational, the reflective, the imaginative,—all of which indubitably point us onward to that future life whither, together with the powers of consciousness, they clearly depart when the material organism has ceased from its action,—have within them the very element which is least of all applicable to Butler's notions as to the kind or grade of immortality of which he asserts brutes may be capable. It were perhaps then scarcely necessary to consider—at any length at least—Butler's notions as to the state brutes might be placed in after death: since it is plain that they can but be hypothetical, and that they lose very much of their weight of conviction as severed from the peculiar arguments by which they were upheld. But it will be only proper to ascertain, as far as may be, how far our observation of their life in the present state is suggestive of its prolongation after death.

It is contended that these creatures may become immortal, and exist in a state of happiness quite independent of their arrival at great attainments or conversion into rational and moral agents: and the argument receives a negative support, in the eyes of bishop Butler, from our ignorance as to what "latent

powers and capacities they may be endowed with." It is then argued that our own existence and theirs have the same original: that "we find it to be a general law of nature, that creatures endued with capacities of virtue and religion, should be placed in a condition of being, in which they are altogether without the use of them, for a considerable length of their duration, as in infancy and childhood: and that a great part of the human species go out of the present world before they come to the exercise of these capacities in any degree at all."

We may be allowed to pass by the subject of a *possible* immortality differing from that to which man's powers, capacities, and desires lead him to look forward. We cannot know any—even the smallest portion of the hidden purposes of God, to which He has given us no clue in the way either of nature or revealed religion. But it is natural we should apply similar tests in the case of the asserted immortality of brutes to those already applied in the case of man:—tests bearing upon their present gifts and endowments. The immortality of brutes, as it is conceived by Butler, has a colourless, a meagre, an unnatural aspect which one is hardly able to look at long. We cannot so readily separate the idea of existence in a future state from certain observed tendencies towards it which have been the subjects of remark already.

Truly we do not know what "latent powers or capacities brutes may be endowed with," but judging by all possible evidences, it must, one would think, be

conceded that such powers, of whatever kind they may be, cannot be measured for magnitude with those of man, which guide us so well as to his immortality. They must also be connected with instinct which manifestly seems to have no bearings upon a future life, and which arguments drawn from material sources lead us to feel is mortal.

It may be noticed that a certain vagueness and indistinctness seems to pervade the argument that "there was, *prior to experience*, as great presumption against human creatures as there is against the brute creatures arriving at that degree of understanding which we have in mature age." It is an argument whose basis is dim, insubstantial, shadowy, and altogether unserviceable. For it may be asked in whom such presumption could be said to exist, or whether any minds, prior to their being even capable of and passive to experience, could be said to be capable of the exercise of presumption at all. The reasoner who makes such an argument shifts his ground for an impossible position. He uses a term implying the exercise of active judgement to supply the place of mere vacancy, and we are at a loss to know to whom he refers as the holder of the presumption. For he clearly cannot mean that it was a presumption actively felt. He speaks as though he were instancing the case of a person arrived at a certain degree of understanding contemplating an infant whose faculties of course are as yet undeveloped. He seems to make the one say—"prior to my present experience, and while yet I was

as this infant, there was a presumption against my arriving at the degree of understanding possessed by me now." But where is the ground for a parallel between the two cases of the man and the brute? An infant cannot surely be said correctly to form a presumption before the dawn of his experience, or the development of his faculties, but still *the power to presume* lies passive and dormant within him. Where are the proofs of such exercise of understanding in the brute? And clearly when a man of mature faculties is gazing at a brute, and remarks the stationary nature of that brute's endowments, he *may* fairly be allowed the exercise of presumption one way or the other. And again: take the case of the two farther advanced in growth. By and by we will suppose that the infant become a child or a youth, *does* feel a fancied incapacity for arriving at the possession of those mental powers which nevertheless are his eventually. But in the brute no trace whatever of the latent power of presumption betrays itself from first to last. As to what evidences there are furnished by the brute's material life for the truth of the idea that there may be latent faculties within him which will only develop themselves after death, it has been already suggested that the study of material life alone furnishes no proof of any value, as to there being any future life. And if no trace whatever of a latent power exist, is it not mere fancy to argue that it *may* exist—a fancy encouraged both against observation and judgement; and the data given for guides to a conclusion? The

argument is one springing altogether from the reflective faculty in man. But we cannot transfer ourselves suddenly from manhood's attainments to infancy,—and urge, “such and such were then my presumptions before experience came.” Butler could not have referred to any presumption formed in such case by other than man: nor could he have referred to any presumption in the abstract, which must involve a presumer. The opening out of this argument leads us to observe an obvious disparity, a great distinctiveness between the man and the brute, which is far more suggestive of their having been respectively created after entirely different types in the Divine mind, than of there being any ground for the establishment of a fair similarity between them.

There are no evidences that the present life to the brutes is the troubled scene it so constantly is to us. On the contrary, all the evidence we *can* collect points to their perfect contentedness with such a state. They seek nothing apparently beyond the satisfaction of low earthly appetite. They cannot be said to be proper creatures, as to their present propensities, for existence anywhere in a regenerate “œconomy of the universe,” and there are no evidences of an approaching change in this respect for the better. When we perceive their apparent lack of desire for an ulterior sphere of being, as it is evidenced by their contentment with this life, we may surely be allowed to consider as fanciful, the imputation to them of “latent capacities” for a higher state of happiness—which seems to involve the notion

that they have faculties of whose existence, in their case, not a trace has ever been discovered. And it may be asked whether man, in his relation to them as a superior being, would not have been gifted with some means of discerning such supposed faculties, if it were only that he might record them to the praise and the glory of the Infinite mind?

But if it is hard—if it contradicts our common-sense apprehensions of things to suppose a place for evil or imperfect habits in a regenerate economy, it seems to be by no means so difficult to account for the diversity of these habits in the present economy of the universe, and to allow them a place in it that may seem to be more conformable to the observed harmony pervading the Divine system of creation.

It will be acknowledged that good and evil examples possess alike the power of exercising a salutary influence over our conduct in this life:—that good qualities invite, just as evil qualities repel imitation of them. Example too has in every way at least as powerful an influence in moulding our characters as precept. It is not dissonant with the moral government and the benevolence of the Supreme Being, as they are proved by the hopes and fears relative to an expected future life, and by pleasure and pain being the natural accompaniments of the practice of virtue and vice respectively, that creatures of a lower grade should have been placed among the human race having each characteristic peculiarities assigned them, not less for the guidance of their own instincts, than for en-



abling us to observe the beauty of good, and the ugliness of evil. Nor is it requisite to such recognition on our part—that the brutes should be rational or moral agents. We are disgusted none the less with the gluttony and indolence of swine, because we cannot perceive their instincts soar so high as to show them the moral ugliness of these propensities. We admire and love the faithful attachment of the dog, even though we may feel that it is in no way concerned with any apprehension of moral right or wrong he may possess, but that it proceeds from, or is blended with, his instinct alone. It may be noticed that each one of the lower animals has one or more good or evil characteristics especially prominent in its habits, not admitting of increase or decay, nor alienable, as in the case of man's nature, but fixed, stationary, inseated in their species. The ant is frugal, the bee industrious, the drone idle, from no moral preponderance in the instincts of either of them, but simply from the fixed and ordered bent of their instincts. Man however is gifted with reasoning powers, and with tendencies towards a higher state of moral perfection that lead him to attach a moral colouring and significance to these different qualities in the brutes: to love the one and hate the other, to be guided by the one, and to beware of the other. A moral agent himself, possessed of a faculty of imitation, he has the range of the lower animal creation before him, by the contemplation of whose uniformly even, and as it were, stereotyped excellencies and defects he is incited to seek the growth

of such similar excellencies in himself as are at too low a standard, to cultivate such as he finds to be wanting, to eradicate or weaken his evil propensities, and to continue in abstinence from them when as yet they have not infected his nature.

To sum up:—the very facts that the brute is contented with this life, wherewith man is not contented, and that the brute is never more or less good or evil as to its peculiar characteristics or propensities at any one time than at any other, while, on the other hand, man is conscious of moral growth or decay, give at least such presumptive evidence as bishop Butler seems alone careful to establish, that a life after death, and one too of perfect moral excellency or moral baseness is reserved for the latter, but not for the former. And, from what has been already said, it will have been inferred that if brutes are to live again with all their instincts and propensities unchanged, and are to occupy any part of God's new creation, then such foreshadowings of the perfect happiness of that future state as natural religion imparts to christians and heathens in common, are deceptive. It is as contrary to one's anticipations as to one's yearnings respecting a regenerate state of existence, that a place should be found in any—even the smallest portion of it—for creatures whose instincts once made them the terror or the aversion of mankind.

A word more may be said before we proceed to consider the testimony of Divine Revelation on the subject of immortality of brutes, as to what limits

should be placed to our trust in the phenomena of dreams considered as evidence for a future life. It is taken for granted from what has gone before, that we cannot allow their testimony in the affirmative to the future life of the brute. But are we compelled to follow a like course in the case of man? Certainly not. Keeping out of sight altogether the testimony of Revelation as to dreams having been very frequently made the medium of the Almighty's communion with the soul, very remarkable authentic records—matters of history—have from time to time taken up attention as to future events in the career of individuals having been foreshadowed to them in dreams and visions of the night. While we carefully avoid the advances of superstition as our teacher on this point, we cannot assert that that is no way of communication between God and man, of which open proofs abound to the contrary. Dreams then imply the soul's immortality in man, inasmuch as in the ordinary way they *illustrate* the soul's ethereal nature, the ability of consciousness to act without the material organs, and the power of the principles of life and thought to dispense with these organs. This they do *not* imply in the case of the brute. For immortality must first be proved before light can be thrown upon it as a fact. As far as man's nature is concerned, this is done. Dreams occupy no first rank, as though sufficient of themselves alone to prove our immortality. The evidence they do furnish is valuable,—but it is an evidence that comes solely through the faculties of reflection. Primarily

or mainly we trace them to some disturbing causes proceeding from the influence of the body over the mind. When those cases occur to which we may rightly apply the epithet *extraordinary*, in which they are made to have so direct and pointed a reference to something future as that we could not reasonably call it accidental, we see by them man's capability of receiving inspiration from his Creator. And so does inter-communication between heaven and earth assume a more marked form. So is the bent of our higher faculties towards a future state confirmed, and so is the trust we put in our own yearnings as indicative of a state of existence after death, shown to be reasonable and just.

It is not easy to conduct such an enquiry as this by the simple light of nature. That light is so wan and uncertain—so like fitful flashes of radiance streaking a dark atmosphere, that we feel instinctively its insufficiency to serve our purpose. We discern all things by it only very dimly. And in our case too there is this additional obstacle. Hedged about by the difficulties we experience in consequence of the weak light we have taken for our guide, our spirits, rather than be overborne or weighed down by the gloom surrounding us, and by our own consequently imperfect success, turn naturally for relief to the remembrance that we have in our possession that which, as to natural religion, is at least as the day far advanced to the star-lit night. If we were able to lose sight of this altogether, we should become more diligent ex-

plorers in the light such as it is—that nature gives us. But we know a fuller light exists: and its radiance beams across our path, more or less, while we prosecute our search, as if to infuse a little of its better light and heat that we may not be chilled by the cold light of nature. It is truly said by a trans-atlantic divine, the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher—“Nature means what it seems to mean—material cause and effect; but this is not all. There is a more subtle meaning. Nature is organized to teach spiritual things. Human experience developed under natural influences teaches some things as much as God’s Revelation, although it is not so easy to be understood till after we have been put into possession of the key by the Bible; *for the Bible is God’s key for unlocking the natural world.*”

The infidel perhaps may taunt us as prejudiced investigators: he may assert that we set out with the intention of making our search to answer the end we wish it to do, and none other. And is not he then prejudiced to his own hurt in a far darker way? That it is scarcely possible the investigation should be carried on by perfectly unbiassed minds, all should readily allow. But not to the extent of involving their conscientiousness in blame. Through God’s great goodness we have been led to accept His Word for truth. And when revealed religion places a fact before us, strong in our conviction of its truth, in a different and contradictory point of view from that in which we look at it with the aid of nature, we unhesitatingly accept the testimony afforded us by the greater

light, and we cannot but feel that our misapprehension of such fact, is the fault, not of nature, but of the inability of our finite faculties to make nature's light in the measure we have it, serviceable to us. And we reasonably feel that the real testimony of nature must confirm, in all points, that of Divine Revelation, for they are two great volumes written by the same unchangeable Mind, and on that account are not likely to contain any real contrariety of views, however it may appear to be so on the surface of our search. We are concerned then to disprove the immortality of brutes by the light of nature for the simple reason that that of Revelation is opposed to it. Any apparent discrepancy in the witness of the two is of itself sufficient to justify further search, while, at the same time, as finite creatures, we are not to fall into scepticism, however great may be the contradictions over which we may stumble. Our growing faith—itsself from God,—should lead us to feel that such contradictions are *apparent—not real*, and that their reconciliation lies beyond the boundary allowed for the march of human knowledge and discovery.

Can it be reasonably doubted that the testimony of Divine Revelation is against the alleged future life after death of the brute? If we can prove it so to be, then may it well be thought “an insuperable difficulty that they should be immortal, and by consequence capable of everlasting happiness.” And if such proof amount not to actual demonstration, but be simply such as will furnish the highest degree of probability,

then we may surely use these against that in the case of brutes, which support it in that of man. For it will be recollected that the evidences for man's immortality, as drawn from nature, do not amount to actual demonstration, though they touch so closely on the verge of it. Let us at least have accorded to us the same area for argument in the case of the Holy Scriptures as in that of nature.

First as to the very earliest stage of life in men and brutes respectively, there is very much wisdom and truth in the words of Bacon\* commenting upon the records of creation as given in Genesis I. † “Two different emanations of souls”—he says—“are manifest in the first creation, the one proceeding from the breath of God, the other from the elements. As to the primitive emanation of the rational soul, the scripture says God formed man of the dust of the earth, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; but the generation of the irrational and brutal soul was in these words,—“let the water bring forth; let the earth bring forth.” And this irrational soul in man is only an instrument to the rational one, and has the same origin in us as in brutes, viz., the dust of the earth; for it is not said God formed *the body of man* out of the dust of the earth, but God formed man, that is, the whole man, the breath of life excepted, of the dust of the earth”—and then he proceeds to the peculiar division with regard to souls, or souls and

\* Novum Organon, Book iv. chap. III. p. 172, Bohn's Ed.

† Genesis I., &c.

spirits, associated with his philosophy. It should not however be forgotten that these remarks are open to objection, from the fact that an apparent contradiction marks this portion of the inspired account of the creation, which is calculated to weaken its force of conviction with some minds. For though in the one verse † the details are given as though the creation of certain animals were left to the earth as a subordinate agent, yet the language of the following verse is “*God made the beast of the earth after his kind, and cattle after their kind, and everything that creepeth upon the earth after his kind.*” It would seem as though the sacred historian contemplated little if at all the arguments that would be likely to be raised, as to the difference in dignity between the various species of the animal world, arising from their creation by God Himself, or by His subordinate ministers and agents the elements. Sufficient breadth of distinction is made in subsequent verses, for *only* man is recorded to have been made after the image and the likeness of God. We may be left in doubt and difficulty as to whether the material frames of any animals were made out of a less perishable substance than those of any others. But if we cannot draw inferences hence as to their respective mortality or immortality, the seal of transcendent value set upon man at once implies his immeasurable superiority to the brute. And an argument drawn hence as to participation in a future state being reserved for *man only*, receives great con-

† Gen. I. 24.



firmation from the generally unanimous opinions of mankind upon the point in all ages. It is truly wonderful to observe the similarity of conception as to these primal creations that exists between the inspired account of Moses, and the doctrines of different heathen philosophers. Plato thought or believed that man was not only made by God, but that he was made after the image of God, and had a spirit akin and like to his Maker. His silence as to the spirit of the brutes possessing a like dignity is of itself impressive. Ovid claims the same high distinction for man, and Hesiod in his *Theogony* has celebrated in most melodious lines the formation of all things quite according to the doctrine of Moses.\* And an eloquent father of the Church†, in a work on man's formation, specifies immortality as one of the consequences of man's having been formed after the image of God.

Our limited space forbids that we should linger long upon the manifold inferences to the widely inferior nature of the brute to be gleaned from the first chapters of the inspired records. As even long subsequent to the fall, we read of the Divine invitation given to Moses to ascend the mount for the purpose of a conference with his Maker, while if a beast only touched the mountain, it was to die, so in the days of our first parents' innocence, the fact that they were able to sustain the approaches of the Divine Presence, and to

\* Huetius' *Inquiries*.

† St. Gregory Nyssen.

converse with their Maker in the same language, proves their divine illumination, and that they were fortified and prepared to endure the presence of God by a Divine power not given to the brutes. Hence we gather, without straining the point at all, that the nearer approach of these latter creatures to their Maker must have been followed by their complete annihilation.

But setting aside these implications by comparison that the present state alone is reserved for the brutes, it may be well to confine our enquiries only to themselves, and to learn whether Holy Scripture furnishes us with any direct means of arriving at a solution one way or the other.

There certainly are not wanting passages in the word of God whence some might be disposed to argue in favour of a future life for the brute. Take for instance certain declarations in the Book of the prophet Isaiah—"the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; *and a little child shall lead them?*" But it should be recollected that these and similar verses have distinct reference to the Millennial reign of Christ upon earth whose commencement, it is generally thought will precede the day of judgement. And there is nothing apparently inharmonious either with our own ideas of this particular era in the world's history, or with revealed truth in even the literal acceptation of their details, while at the same time there is no presumption in them in

favour of a future state after death for the brute creation. For first, the Millennium, of whatever nature it may be, will precede that constitution of things as to whose perfection it is prophesied *inter alia* "there shall be no more death." Events are foreshadowed as being destined to take place at some ulterior period in this thousand years that involve angry passions, battle, and destruction by fire.\* There is nothing favourable to Butler's hypotheses in the idea of this removal of all hurtful, baneful instinct from the brutes. It may be, that during the reign of Christ upon earth, their lives should even be greatly prolonged, and yet death await them at last. For there is nothing to show that even in the course of the last hour before the coming of Christ, many, both human beings and brutes, will not die. It is simply to be inferred from Revelation that the natures of the brutes who may happen to survive, at this time, will be changed, and made to harmonize with and to contribute to the general happiness and tranquillity of the Church. But perhaps it is still more probable that such passages, and very many others like them, bear only their part in the symbolism peculiar to the Bible, and were never intended to admit of a closely literal interpretation. The very conception that in a spiritual or allegorical sense "the Æthiopian can so completely change his skin and the leopard his spots" deepens by its power of illustration our notions of Millennial

\* Revelation **xx.** 8, 9.

peace, while yet the particulars of real life on which the illustration is based need form no actual part or constituent of it.

There are however other passages that do speak—whether literally or symbolically remains to be seen—of the brute creation in connection with even heaven. Such is the one recording the translation of Elijah by means of “horses and chariots of fire.” That this however is merely figurative language, expressive only of an appearance or resemblance, is evident on the very surface of it. For even if we allowed that the luminous spirits of horses formed a part of this recorded vision, we should halt long before allowing that use may be found in heaven for material chariots. It is true we read “the chariots of God are twenty thousand”—but the literal, material aspect of this is removed at once by the context—“even thousands of angels.” Then again those passages in the Psalms suggest themselves to our notice—“He maketh the clouds His chariot and His ministers a flame of fire: He rideth upon the cherubims and doth fly: He walketh upon the wings of the wind.” So that although St. John beheld, among other visions during his exile at Patmos, horses pale, and fiery, and white, we find no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that they were not spiritual realities, but only ideas divinely created and impressed upon his mind. To some symbols of the Apocalypse the keys are at once given as in a case just noticed. Thus the heavenly hosts, as the apostle beheld them by vision, are “arrayed in fine linen clean

and white, *which*”—it is added—“is the righteousness of saints.” Of precisely the same character appear to have been the visions of the mountain full of horses and chariots of fire round about Elisha, “and the visions of a flaming sword, and horses and chariots of fire,” that are recorded by Josephus to have overhung the doomed city of Jerusalem. We think of them as ideal images intended for the prognostication of future events, but as having the semblance, and not the substance of reality.

One or two of St. Paul’s arguments in the sublime chapter wherein he treats of the resurrection of the body, convey either an affirmative or negative refutation of the supposition that brutes are immortal. To the affirmative class belong those drawn from considerations as to the different “kinds of flesh” and the difference in honour between “celestial bodies and bodies terrestrial.” It will be recollected that this passage has been variously interpreted, but I may be permitted to express my full and entire belief in the views of the Principal of Magdalene Hall upon it.\* St. Paul “notices”—he remarks—“the difference between the flesh of different races of animals, as beasts, and birds, and of degrees of brightness of sun, moon, and stars, and of the latter among themselves, not I apprehend as indicating in the future life degrees of glory, but to convince the sceptic that God, who has created such a variety of bodies in earth and heaven,

\* Lectures on The Acts of the Apostles, and Epistles.—Oxford, 1855, p. 222.

can restore human bodies to life, and invest them with greater beauty; *and that there may be incorruptible as well as corruptible bodies.*" And in the same chapter where St. Paul so strongly insists upon the resurrection of Christ, as a proof and a pledge of our own, and avers that had not this event taken place, the hopes of christians as to a future life would have been unfounded, their faith vain, and their self-denying and painful lives an uncalled for self-torture, we cannot, without manifest irreverence, include the brute creation among ourselves, and say that the Resurrection of the Redeemer implied and foreshadowed theirs also. At the Crucifixion we read that "many bodies of the saints which slept arose, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many," but not a single intimation is given of such an event having happened to any individuals of the brute creation.

There are several passages scattered throughout the Old and New Testaments, in which we find the verb "perish" used as applied to the dissolution of brutes, but we cannot safely rely on such, from the fact that the term seems to be as often used to express the death of man, the death of his thoughts &c., which we know, is not final, as to put before us the final end of the brute. And as sceptics, so disposed, might make much of an asserted discrepancy and contradiction in such cases, it is best to show them how little necessary it is, that we should cling to them as indispensable proofs of immortality. Not that there are wanting, by any means, passages in Holy Writ, which, while speak-

ing of the bodies of men as perishing, contradict by their affirmative testimony to their resurrection, and by their impressive silence on the subject of that of other bodies, any dark construction that might be made in such cases. We may remember one by way of example in the Book of Job\*—"If He set His heart upon man, if He gather unto Himself his spirit and his breath; all flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn again unto dust." There is however one testimony given us in the Book of Ecclesiastes† which, none could reasonably doubt, does give a positive voice in this matter—"I said in mine heart concerning the estate of the sons of men, that God might manifest them, and that they might see that they themselves are beasts. For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so doth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no pre-eminence over a beast: for all is vanity. All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again." So far all is dark and gloomy enough, but the royal preacher is careful to draw the grand line of distinction between God's creatures as to their deaths, in the appended verse "*Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?*" And as a proof of his holding the doctrine of the resurrection of the body in the

\* Job xxxiv. 14, 15.

† Eccl. iii. 18, 21.

case of man—a proof that not only does away with impressions that may be drawn from any alleged ambiguity in the verse just quoted, but that serves to mark in it the expression of two decided and directly opposite opinions, we have in the next chapter the words—“then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it.”

In addition to such direct testimony as this may be fairly presumed to be, strong proof of an indirect nature may be gathered from detached questions, propositions, or groupings of words, which serve to enable us to read the Mind of God as it is expressed in Holy Scripture. Such are, “Doth God take care for oxen?” “As natural brute beasts.” “Give not that which is holy unto dogs.” “Cast not your pearls before swine.” “Without are *dogs*, and sorcerers, and whoremongers, and murderers, and idolators, and whosoever loveth and maketh a lie.” The fact as shown by this last passage, that unbelievers should be compared to dogs, and as such, should be shut out of eternal life, has some weight in balancing our present question. But it seems scarcely necessary to multiply such instances as these here. Let only the following passages and extracts of passages be quoted for the sake of their significance, and because they so evidently bear out much that has been said. They are to be met with in the institution of the Noachic covenant—\*“The fear

\* Genesis ix. 16.



of you, and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; *unto your hand are they delivered. Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green herb have I given you all things. And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand of man.*"

It has been urged with much force that bishop Butler does not *advocate* the existence of brutes after death, but that he simply leaves it as a case of supposition, and argues in favor of the Almighty Creator's power to revive them, even as He at first called them into being, *if such should be His Will*. This Potentiality cannot of course be denied, but the question is whether any signs are given to us either by nature or by Revelation as to the bearing of the Divine Will upon it. And in proportion as such signs, if discovered,—*though* they may be at best uncertain,—yet sway the judgement towards the affirmative or the negative side of the question, we must allow that the argument "God is powerful to do such and such a thing" loses much weight apart from its legitimate connexion with such expression or intimation of His Will. Had no such signs been vouchsafed, bishop Butler's arguments and hypotheses on this point would have been justifiable and right. But, since we have their guidance both in Nature and in Revelation, and since that guidance is such as to lead us to feel more convinced that God will

*not* raise the bodies of the brute creation from the dust, than that He will raise them, so it would appear as though we considered God's light upon the point only darkness, even in the measure in which we have it, or as though we refused to be guided by it at all, if we were to attach much weight to arguments drawn from the Divine Power as separate from its manifest connexion with the Divine Will. It is clearly with Divine Willingness or Unwillingness that we are most concerned in the present enquiry. And when it is remembered that the Will of God is fixed and unalterable, "for God is not a man that he should lie, or the son of man that he should repent," it must of necessity be admitted, that, as He has enabled us to discern more or less clearly the bearings of that Will, so He will verify its purport. The question then to be determined is whether in the foregoing considerations anything has appeared calculated to inspire our minds with any degree of moral certainty on the point. Have we discovered—if not in the teachings of nature, yet in those of Revelation, any intimation that it is God's will *not* to reserve for the brutes a future life? If this discovery has *not* been made, we may still encourage the hypotheses of bishop Butler on the point, if we will:—but if it *has* been made, our belief in the need of their formation *at all*, becomes proportionably weakened, when it is thus evidenced they were formed in the face of adverse testimony. And it has already been argued from the fact that Nature and Revelation are the design and the work of the same unchangeable

Being, that there is, in consequence of this, a strong probability that an agreement, more or less discernible, will be found to exist between them. And if then the pursuit of certain paths of reasoning, as pointed out by the light of nature, leads us to results different from those furnished by Revelation, it surely seems better to abandon those paths altogether, and to seek others, which it is to be fairly presumed may exist, and which may lead us right, than to insist on those that appear to have brought us into a dilemma, and to weave theories and conjectures, in the very face of a greater or less degree of moral certainty, in justification of our holding an onward course, instead of retracing our steps.

THE END.





