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
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**ANSWER**

TO

**DR. GILLIES'S SUPPLEMENT,**

*&c. &c.*

2903 . e . 17.



ANSWER

DR. GILBERT'S SUPPLEMENT

AN  
ANSWER  
TO  
DR. GILLIES'S SUPPLEMENT

TO HIS  
NEW ANALYSIS  
OF  
ARISTOTLE'S WORKS;  
IN WHICH THE  
UNFAITHFULNESS OF HIS TRANSLATION OF ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS IS UNFOLDED.

BY  
THOMAS TAYLOR.

Ἡρακλείτης ἐγὼ τί με ὦ κείτῳ ἐλκετ' ἀμύσοι;  
Οὐχ' ὑμῖν ἐπονοῦν, τοῖς δὲ μ' ἐπισταμένοις  
Εἰς εἶμοι ἀνθρώπος τρισμυριοὶ οἱ δ' ἀναριθμοὶ  
Οὐδεὶς τούτ' αὐδῶ καὶ παρὰ Περσέφονη.

DIOG. LAERT.

Begone, ye *blockheads*! Heraclitus cries,  
And leave my labours to the *learn'd* and *wise*;  
By *wit*, by *knowledge*, studious to be read,  
I scorn the *multitude*, alive and dead.

JOHNSON.

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1804.



# ANSWER

## SUPPLEMENT OF DR. GILLIES, &c.

**D**R. GILLIES having thought proper to attempt a confutation of the proofs which I had brought forward to the public of his not having given either the *manner* or the *matter* of Aristotle in a work which he calls a translation of the Ethics and Politics of that philosopher; and as he has also presumed to ridicule the most sublime of Plato's doctrines, and to calumniate the best of his disciples, displaying in this attempt no less ignorance than illiberal invective, it now becomes necessary that I should fully unfold to the public the injustice which he has done to Aristotle in that work, and also to the best of the Platonists, in the Supplement to his Analysis of Aristotle's speculative works.

I shall begin with examining what he has advanced in his Supplement, as preparatory

to the specimens of ignorance and unfaithfulness which will be so copiously displayed in criticizing his translation of Aristotle's Ethics. In the first place, then, I think it may be fairly presumed, that the man who is so ignorant of the style of Aristotle in his acroamatic writings as not to know that it is remarkably obscure, cannot by any means have penetrated the depth which those writings contain. That he did not know this, is abundantly evident from the following passage, in which, also, from his inability to correct a very obvious error in the Greek text of a quotation from Simplicius, he has made that philosopher contradict himself. The passage I allude to is in a note to the Supplement of his Analysis, p. 215, octavo : " That he (Simplicius) gave into the mode of allegorical interpretation appears from the following short sentence, containing the just praise of Aristotle's perspicuity : Ουδε μυθοις ουδε συμβολικοις αινιγμασι ως των προ αυτου τινες εχρησαντο, αλλ' αντι παντος αλλου περιπέλασματος την σαφειαν προετιμησε. Simplic. in Proœm. Lib. των κατηγοριων. " He made not any use of fables, or dark symbols, like some

philosophers before him, but preferred perspicuity to every other ornament." Strange! that Simplicius should praise Aristotle for his perspicuity, when, in another place quoted by Dr. Gillies, he says, that Aristotle was purposely obscure in his acroamatic writings, "ut segniores ab eorum studio repellerit et dehortaretur." *Simplic. ad Auscult. Physic. fol. ii \**. See p. 23 of the Life of Aristotle, prefixed to the translation of his Ethics, by Dr. Gillies, octavo edition. It is evident, therefore, that in the above passage for *περιπετασμάτος* we should read *παραπετασμάτος*, and for *σαφειαν ασαφειαν*, and then Simplicius

\* For the sake of the learned reader, I will give the whole passage from which Dr. Gillies has made this extract. *Διχῆ δὲ διηρημένων αὐτοῦ τῶν συγγραμμάτων, εἰς τὰ ἐξωτερικά, οἷα τὰ ἱστορικά, καὶ τὰ διαλογικά, καὶ ὁλως τὰ μὴ ἀκρᾶς ἀκρίβειας φρονιζόντα, καὶ εἰς τὰ ἀκροαματικά, ὧν καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ πραγματεία, ἐν τοῖς ἀκροαματικοῖς ἀσαφείαν ἐπιτήδευσε, διὰ ταύτης τοὺς ραθυμότερους ἀποκρούομενος, ὡς παρ' ἐκείνης (lege ὡσπερ ἐκείνοις) μὴ δὲ γεγραφθῆναι δοκεῖν. Τοι γὰρ οὐν Ἀλεξάνδρου μετὰ τὴν Περσῶν καθαιρεσὶν ταδε πρὸς αὐτὸν γεγραφοτός. Ἀλεξάνδρος Ἀριστοτελεῖ εὐπράττειν. οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐποίησας ἐκδούς τοὺς ἀκροαματικούς τῶν λόγων. τίτι γὰρ ἐτι διοίσομεν ἡμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ καθ' οὓς ἐπαιδευθῆμεν λόγους, οὗτοι πάντων ἐσονται κοῖνοι; ἐγὼ δὲ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῖς περὶ τὰ ἀρίστα ἐμπειρίαις ἢ ταῖς δυνάμεσι διαφέρειν. αὐτὸς ταδε ἀντεγράψεν. Ἀριστοτελεὺς βασιλεῖ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ εὐπράττειν. ἐγράψας μοι περὶ τῶν ἀκροαματικῶν λόγων, οἰόμενος δεῖν αὐτοὺς φυλάττειν ἐν ἀπορρητοῖς. ἰσθι οὐν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐκδεδομένους καὶ μὴ ἐκδεδομένους. συνετοὶ γὰρ εἰσι μόνοις τοῖς ἡμῶν ἀκουσασιν. ἐρρωσθ. i. e. "The writings of Aristotle receiving a twofold division, into the exoteric,*

will speak accurately and consistently, and the translation of the whole passage will be as follows: "Aristotle neither employed fables nor symbolical enigmas, like some philosophers before him, but preferred obscurity to every other veil." That this is the true reading is likewise evident from an ancient Latin version of Simplicius on the Categories, printed at Venice, 1588, folio, in which the above passage is thus translated: "Verumtamen neque fabulis, neque ænigmatibus, conjecturis metaphoricisque implicitis, quemadmodum nonnulli ante ipsum

such as the historical, and those composed in the form of dialogue; and, in short, those which do not pay attention to extreme accuracy, and into the acroamatic, to which class the present treatise belongs—this being the case, in his acroamatic writings, he studies obscurity, through this deterring the more indolent, as if their very appearance evinced they were not written for them. Alexander, then, after the subversion of Persia, wrote to him as follows: Alexander wishing prosperity to Aristotle. You have not done right in publishing your acroamatic works: for in what shall we surpass others, if the doctrines in which we were instructed become common to all men? I indeed would rather excel others in the knowledge of the most excellent things than in power. To this Aristotle returned the following answer: Aristotle to king Alexander, wishing prosperity. You wrote to me concerning my acroamatic works, thinking that they ought not to have been divulged. Know, therefore, that they are published and not unpublished: for they can be understood by my auditors alone. Farewell." Simplicius adds, that, according to Plutarch, this letter of Alexander refers to the metaphysics of Aristotle.

usus est, sed pro omni alio velamine et involuto dicendi modo obscuritatem maxime laudavit et probavit." It is likewise indisputably manifest, from what immediately follows this passage, in which Simplicius investigates the reason why Aristotle adopted this mode of writing, as the learned reader who has the original in his possession will immediately perceive. It may be fairly concluded, therefore, that Dr. Gillies knew not that it was the general practice of the earliest writers of antiquity to employ different modes of concealing their wisdom from the vulgar, and that Aristotle adopted for this purpose obscurity of diction, though the former particular is well known to every tyro in the history of philosophy, and the latter is obvious to the meanest capacity.

Having premised thus much, I proceed, in the next place, to examine his Supplement. In p. 167, then, he endeavours to show "that those supposed entities, called by the Pythagoreans *numbers*, and by the Platonists *ideas*, and considered by them as eternal and immutable essences, the true causes of the universe, have not any real substantial existence in nature, but are merely



fictions of fancy, created from the fleeting action of human thought, expressed and embodied in language." This, he says, is evident from the doctrine of Aristotle, according to which, "definitions are the pure fountains of science only when they originate in an accurate examination and patient comparison of individual objects; so that individuals have a real existence in nature; but general names, expressing many individuals of the same kind, have not any correspondent archetypes." To this I answer, that I have already shown, in the Introduction to my translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, that Aristotle did not essentially differ from Plato in the doctrine of ideas; and I shall now farther observe, that the Stagirite would not be consistent with himself unless he admitted that those ideas which subsist in Deity with fabricative power and unerring knowledge, subsist also in the human soul in a manner accommodated to its nature; so as to possess partial instead of universal knowledge, to be deprived of productive power, and to be wakened from dormant capacity into energy by objects of sense. This is evident from the doctrine delivered by Aristotle in the first

book of his Posterior Analytics, that universals for the purpose of demonstration are superior to particulars; that demonstrations are conversant with things more universal; and that the principles from which demonstrations are composed have a *priority* of existence, and a *precedency*\* in nature to particu-

\* Aristotle, in the second chapter of the first book of his Posterior Analytics, having enumerated the three conditions of true science; viz: 1st, that the cause of the thing must be known, or, in other words, that the middle term of the demonstration must be the cause of the conclusion; 2d, that this cause must be compared with the effect, so that we may know it to be the cause of the conclusion; and 3d, that this conclusion must have a necessary subsistence, observes as follows: Εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστάσθαι, οἷον εἴθε μὲν ἀναγκὴ καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ' εἶναι, καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμεσῶν, καὶ γνωριμωτέρων, καὶ προτέρων, καὶ αἰτιῶν τοῦ συμπερασματος. οὕτως γὰρ εἰσὶν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ οἰκείαι τοῦ δεικνυμένου. συλλογισμὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνεῦ τούτων ἀποδείξεις δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ· οὐ γὰρ ποιήσει ἐπιστήμην. ἀληθῆ μὲν οὖν δεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐπιστάσθαι· οἷον ὅτι ἡ διάμετρος συμμετρος. ἐκ πρώτων δ' ἀναποδεικτῶν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιστησέηται μὴ ἔχων ἀποδείξιν αὐτῶν. τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστάσθαι ὧν ἀποδείξεις ἐστὶ, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὸ ἔχειν ἀποδείξιν ἐστίν. αἰτία τε, καὶ γνωριμωτέρα δεῖ εἶναι, καὶ πρότερα. αἰτία μὲν, ὅτι τότε ἐπισταμέθα, ὅταν τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδῶμεν. καὶ πρότερα, εἴπερ αἰτία. καὶ προγινωσκομένα οὐ μόνον τὸν ἕτερον τρόπον τῷ ξυνοῦναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἐστὶ. πρότερα δ' ἐστὶ καὶ γνωριμωτέρα διχῶς. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτον, πρότερον τῇ φύσει, καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον. οὐδὲ γνωριμωτέρον, καὶ ἡμῖν γνωριμωτέρον. λέγω δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν πρότερα καὶ γνωριμωτέρα τὰ ἐγγυτέρων τῆς αἰσθήσεως· ἀπλῶς δὲ πρότερα καὶ γνωριμωτέρα τὰ πορρωτέρων. ἐστὶ δὲ πορρωτάτω μὲν, τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα. ἐγγυτάτω δὲ, τὰ καθέκαστα. καὶ ἀντικεῖται ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοις. *i. e.* " If then science is such as we have established it to be, it is also ne-

lars, and are the causes of the propositions they prove. If, therefore, the causes of demonstrations are *universals*, and these universals have a *precedency in nature to particulars*, it is evident that individuals are not the only things which have a *real existence in*

cessary that demonstrative science should consist from things true, first, immediate, more known than, prior to, and the causes of the conclusion: for thus they will be the proper principles of that which is demonstrated. For there may be a syllogism indeed without these conditions; but there will not be demonstration, since such a syllogism will not produce science. It is necessary, therefore, that the things from which demonstrative science consists should be *true*, because that which is not cannot be *scientifically* known; as, for instance, that the diameter of a square is commensurable with its side. It is also necessary that they should be from things *first and indemonstrable*, because they will not be *scientifically* known without demonstration. For to know scientifically things of which there is demonstration, and this not from accident, is to possess demonstration. It is likewise necessary that they should be *the causes of, more known than, and prior* to the conclusion. *Causes*, indeed, because we then know scientifically, when we know the cause: and *prior* because they are the causes. They are also *previously known*, not only from our understanding what they signify, but from our knowing that they are true. But things prior and more known subsist in a twofold respect. For that which is prior to nature is not the same with that which is prior to us; nor is that which is more known to nature the same with that which is more known to us. By things prior and more known to us, I mean such as are nearer to sense; but *things simply prior and more known are such as are more remote from sense*. And *things more remote from sense are such as are especially universal*; but such as are most near to it are particulars, and these are opposed to each other."

*nature*, and that particulars are in the order of things subordinate to universals.

In the next place Dr. Gillies endeavours to illustrate his remarks by presenting the reader with what he calls a translation of the fourteenth chapter of the seventh book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, prudently omitting to give the original, at the same time that he vilifies my translation of the same chapter. That the learned reader, however, may see how he has deformed the text of Aristotle by a rambling paraphrase, which neither preserves the manner nor the matter of its author, I shall give both the original and the

Doctor's translation : Φανερον δε εξ αυτων τουτων το συμβαινον και τοις τας ιδεας λεγουσιν ουσιας τε και χωριστας ειναι αμα, και αμα το ειδος εκ του γενους ποιουσι, και των διαφορων. ει γαρ εσι τα ειδη και το ζων εν τω ανθρωπω και ιππω, ητοι εν και ταυτον τω αριθμω εσιν, η ετερον τω μεν γαρ λογω δηλον οτι εν. τον γαρ αυτον διεξεισι λογον ο λεγων εν εκατερω. ει ουν εσι τις ανθρωπος αυτο καθ'αυτο, τοδε τι και κεχωρισμενον, αναγκη και εξων, οιον το ζων, και το διπουν, τοδε τι σημαινειν, και ειναι χωριστα και ουσιας ωσε και το ζων. ει μεν ουν το αυτο και εν τω ιππω, ωσπερ συ σαυτω, πως εν χωρις ουσιν εν εσαι, και δια τι ου και χωρις

αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ ζῶν τούτο; ἐπειτα εἰ μὲν μεθεῖξαι τοῦ διποδοῦ καὶ τοῦ πολυποδοῦ ἀδύνατον τι συμβαίνει. ταναντία γὰρ ἀμὰ ὑπαρξῆαι αὐτῷ, ἐνὶ καὶ τῷδε οὐτι. εἰ δὲ μὴ, τίς ὁ τρόπος, ὅταν εἴπῃ τις τι ζῶν εἶναι διπουν ἢ πέζον; ἀλλ' ἴσως συγκοιταὶ καὶ ἀπ' ἑλῆαι, ἢ μεμικῆαι. ἀλλὰ πανῆα ἀτοπα. ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐν ἐκάσῳ. οὐκ οὐκ ἀπείρα ὡς ἐπος εἴπειν εἶναι, ὡν ἡ οὐσία ζῶν. οὐ γὰρ κάλα συμβεβηκός ἐκ ζῶου ὁ ἀνθρώπος. ἐτι πολλὰ εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶν. οὐσία τε γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἐκάσῳ ζῶν. οὐ γὰρ κατ' ἀλλοῦ λεγῆαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐξ ἐκείνου εἶναι ὁ ἀνθρώπος, καὶ γένος αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖνο. καὶ ἐτι ἰδέαι ἀπανῆα ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἀνθρώπος· οὐκ οὐκ ἀλλοῦ μὲν ἰδέαι εἶναι, ἀλλοῦ δ' οὐσία. ἀδύνατον γὰρ. αὐτὸ ἀρα ζῶν εἶναι ἐκάσον- τῶν ἐν τοῖς ζῶοις. ἐτι, ἐκ τίνος τούτου. καὶ πῶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ζῶου; καὶ πῶς οἷον τε εἶναι τὸ ζῶν ὁ οὐσία τούτου αὐτὸ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶν; ἐτι δ' ἐπι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτα τε συμβαίνει, καὶ τούτων ἀτοπωτέρα. εἰ δὴ ἀδύνατον οὕτως εἶναι, δηλὸν ὅτι οὐκ εἶναι ἰδέαι αὐτῶν οὕτως, ὡς τινες φασίν.

Dr. Gillies's translation of this chapter is as follows: "With the same absurdities are those chargeable who regard ideas as substances and separable substances; considering the more general ideas as constituting the less general included under the same common term: for example, the ideas *animal*, *biped*, *reason*, as constituting and com-

posing the *idea man*. Suppose *ideas* to be substances, and the *idea animal*, for instance, existing in *man* and *horse*; this idea in those two kinds must either be numerically one and the same thing, or two different things: in definition it is plainly one and the same, for we mean the same thing by the word *animal* when we say that men are animals, and that horses are animals. If the *idea man* existed as a separate being or entity, it would follow of course that the *ideas animal, biped, reason*, composing the *idea man*, should also exist as separate beings; so that the *idea animal*, if it were precisely one and the same thing in *man* and *horse* in the sense in which you are identically the same with yourself, would subsist the same individual entity in *man* and *horse*; and thus the same individual entity would subsist separately from itself! Farther; if one and the same *idea animal* subsists both in *man* and *horse*, in *man* a *biped*, and in *horse* a *quadruped*, must not the same individual be at once a biped and a quadruped, and thus the same subject be at once endowed with two mutually exclusive attributes? As this cannot happen by actual participation of those attributes, so neither

can it possibly be brought about by juxtaposition, mixture, or in any other way. The *idea animal* must therefore be numerically different in *man* and *horse*; and there must be many separate entities having the *idea animal* for their essential constituent, since this *idea* enters not adventitiously, but essentially, into their respective definitions. The *idea animal*, therefore, is many, constituting *man*, *horse*, and other species or tribes; whose different names cannot be reciprocally predicated of each other, because in that case all those different *ideas* would be one and the same *idea*, which is totally absurd. It is impossible, therefore, that the *idea animal* can have any substantial or separable existence, or be any thing beside what is found in all the different tribes of animals. The absurdity of realising general terms will appear still more monstrous if from species or tribes we descend to the individual objects of our senses, and say that this man or this horse is constituted and composed of *ideas*. There cannot, therefore, be any such *ideas* or *entities* as those spoken of by some philosophers."

Such is Dr. Gillies's translation of a most abstruse passage, from a book written by its

author, as is evident, from what has been above stated, with avowed obscurity of diction; a book written, as Plutarch well observes, not for the unlearned, but for men who have made a proficiency in philosophic attainments \*. Such a passage from such a book, when the extreme accuracy and unexampled brevity of diction adopted by its author are also taken into account, ought indisputably to be translated with the utmost faithfulness and the most literal exactness. A few instances will shew how little claim the translation of Dr. Gillies has to these requisites. In the first place, he has entirely perverted the meaning of the very first sentence; for this, literally translated, is as follows: "From these very things that which happens to those who assert that ideas are *separate* essences, and who at the same time make form to consist from *genus* and *differences*, is manifest." Compare this with the translation of Dr. Gillies: "With the same absurdities are those chargeable who regard ideas as substances, and *separable* substances;

\* Αληθως γαρ η μετα τα φυσικα πραγματια προς διδασκαλιαν και μαθησιν ουδεν εχουσα χρησιμον υποδειγμα τοις πεπαιδευμενοις απ' ερχης γεγραπται. Plutarch in *Alexan.* p. 668.



considering the more general ideas as constituting the less general included under the same common term." Here the reader will easily perceive that what Aristotle says is a deduction from prior reasoning ; but in the translation of Dr. Gillies something else is, as usual, substituted for the genuine meaning. In the next place, Aristotle is speaking of those who assert that ideas are *separate* essences, and accordingly he uses the words *ουσιας τε και χωριστας*, but, according to the translation of Dr. Gillies, he must be supposed to be speaking of those who regard ideas as *separable* substances. This, however, is very far from being the case, for the ideas of which Aristotle is here speaking are incorporeal natures resident in Deity, and perfectly *separated* from matter ; but *separable* ideas are the universals inherent in and predicated of the multitude of sensible particulars, which Aristotle everywhere admits, and which in modern language are no other than *abstract ideas*. Dr. Gillies's translation of the remaining part of the sentence is so very remote from the accurate meaning of Aristotle, that it may rather be called a conceit of the Doctor's than a translation ; and

any one who compares it with the original might fairly conclude that the Doctor knew not the distinction between genus and difference.

The next sentence, which, literally translated, is: "For if forms and animal are in man and horse, there is either one and the same, or a different animal in number,"—is entirely lost in the translation of Dr. Gillies. This also is the case with the next sentence: and in short, there is so little of the matter, (for of the manner there is none) of Aristotle in the whole of it, that it is in vain to compare it with the original, as must, I presume, be obvious to every Greek scholar, however moderate his skill may be in that language. Because my translation of this passage is faithful and literal I am accused by Dr. Gillies of having "travestied Aristotle into unintelligible gibberish;" and this merely because I have not made that by translation to be *obvious to every one which was never intended by its author to be so*, and because I have been more solicitous, by endeavouring to preserve the accurate meaning and manner of the original, to gain the approbation of the wise and worthy, than to do violence

to Aristotle in order to please the vulgar, and, in the language of trade, *manufacture a saleable book*.

After this Dr. Gillies endeavours to show that I have falsely charged him with ignorance, in the new arrangement which he has made of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. As a full answer to this, I deem it will be merely necessary to state to the reader, that in criticizing Dr. Gillies's arrangement of the *Metaphysics*, I regarded that order alone in which those books have been transmitted to us from the ancients; in which order they were first published by Aldus, and translated into Latin by Bessarion. This too is the order, which I presume every man of good sense would suppose Dr. Gillies objected to in his new arrangement. Far otherwise. Du Val, from not understanding the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, had, long before Dr. Gillies presumed to alter the arrangement of some of the books; and Dr. Gillies in making a new arrangement uniformly quotes Du Val's edition of Aristotle, and blames the order in which the *Metaphysics* are there published, as if it were the same with that adopted by the ancients; from which circumstance I

think it is most evident that he knew not at that time that Du Val's arrangement differs from that of the ancients. Afterwards, however, and most likely from my animadversions, he appears to have discovered his mistake, but with great subtlety endeavours to fix the charge of ignorance in this particular upon me. For in p. 173 of his Supplement he says: "I think it right to observe, that this deep student in Aristotle seems not aware that the book published as the twelfth by Aldus and Bessarion stands as the fourteenth in Du Val's noble edition." The liberal reader, however, will, I trust, readily admit that in criticizing Dr. Gillies's arrangement of the *Metaphysics*, I had no right to suppose that he referred to any other order than that in which these books were at first published from the most ancient manuscripts, especially as Dr. Gillies does not mention in any part of his *Analysis*, that he alone blames the arrangement of these books as published by Du Val.

Again, Dr. Gillies, in p. 99 of his *Analysis*, had asserted, "that the real subject of what is called Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is the

vindication of the existence and nature of truth against the cavils of sophists, and those now called metaphysicians; and this doctrine concerning truth illustrated in demonstrating the being of one god, in opposition to atheists on one hand and polytheists on the other." To this, in p. 48 of the introduction to my translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, I replied as follows: "That if by polytheists Dr. Gillies means men who believed in a multitude of self-existent beings independent of each other, and of one first cause, there were no such men among the Greeks and Romans, as must be obvious to every one who is conversant with the writings of the heathens, and as is fully evinced by Dr. Cudworth in his *Intellectual System*; nor am I acquainted with any nation who entertained an opinion so monstrous and dire. But if by polytheists he intends to signify men who believed in the existence of divine natures the immediate progeny of one first cause with which they are profoundly united, Aristotle is so far from opposing this doctrine in his *Metaphysics*, that in the eighth chapter of the twelfth book

(Aldus's edition) he demonstrates their existence. In this chapter he expressly says, "*It is necessary that each of the revolutions of the celestial orbs should be moved by an essentially immoveable and eternal essence; and that these essences should be as many in number as the revolving spheres* \*." And the conclusion of it is remarkably strong in support of this opinion: "OUR ANCESTORS," says he, AND MEN OF GREAT ANTIQUITY, HAVE LEFT US A TRADITION INVOLVED IN FABLE, THAT THESE FIRST ESSENCES ARE GODS, AND THAT THE DIVINITY COMPREHENDS THE WHOLE OF NATURE. *The rest, indeed, is fabulously introduced for the purpose of persuading the multitude, enforcing the laws, and benefiting human life. For they ascribe to THE FIRST ESSENCES a human form, and speak of them as resembling other animals, and assert other things consequent and similar to these.* BUT IF AMONG

\* Αναγκη και τουτων εκαστην των φορων υπ' ακινητου τε κινεισθαι καθ' αυτο, και αιδιου ουσιας. η τε γαρ των αστρων φυσις, αιδιος ουσια τις ουσια, και το κινουν, αιδιον, και προτερον του κινουμενου· και το προτερον ουσιας, ουσιαν αναγκαιον ειναι. φανερον τοιουν, οτι τωσαυτας ουσιας αναγκαιον ειναι, την τε φυσιν αιδιους και ακινητους καθ' αυται, και ανευ μεγεθους, δια την ειρημενην αιτιαν προτερον.

THESE ASSERTIONS ANY ONE, SEPARATING THE REST, RETAINS ONLY THE FIRST; VIZ. THAT THEY CONSIDERED THE FIRST ESSENCES TO BE GODS, HE WILL THINK IT TO BE DIVINELY SAID: AND IT MAY BE PROBABLY INFERRED; THAT AS EVERY ART AND PHILOSOPHY HAS BEEN INVENTED AS OFTEN AS POSSIBLE, AND HAS AGAIN PERISHED, THESE OPINIONS ALSO OF THE ANTIENTS HAVE BEEN PRESERVED AS RELICS TO THE PRESENT TIME. *Of the opinions of our fathers, therefore, and men of the highest antiquity, thus much only is manifest to us \*.*" To these first essences also he alludes in the following beautiful passage in the second book: "*As are the eyes of*

\* Παραδεδοται δε υπο των αρχαιων και παλαιων, εν μυθου σχηματι καταλειμμενα τοις υστερον, οτι θεοι τε εισιν ουτοι, και περιεχει το θειον την ολην φυσιν. τα δε λοιπα μυθικως ηδη προσηχθη προς την πειθω των πολλων, και προς την εις νομους και το συμφερον χρησην. ανθρωποειδεις τε γαρ τουτους, και των αλλων ζων ομοιους τισι λεγουσι, και τουτοις ετερα ακολουθα και παραπλησια τοις ειρημενοις ων ει τις χωρισας αυτο λαβοι μονον το πρωτον, οτι θεους ωντο τας πρωτας ουσιας εισαι, θειως αν ειρησθαι νομισειε, και καλα το εικος πολλακις ευρημενης εις το δυνατον εκαστης και τεχνης και φιλοσοφιας, και παλιν φθειραμενων, και ταυτας ται δοξας εκεινων, οιον λειψανα περισεσωσθαι μεχρι του νυν. η μεν ουν πατριος δοξα, και η παρα των πρωτων, επι τοσουτον ημιν φανερα μονον.

*bats to the light of day, so is the intellect of our soul to SUCH THINGS AS ARE NATURALLY THE MOST SPLENDID OF ALL \*.*" So prevalent, indeed, was this doctrine among the antients, that even so late as the time of the Emperor Commodus the elegant Maximus Tyrius observes, "That there is in all the earth one according law and opinion, that there is one god, the king and father of all things, and many gods, sons of God, ruling in conjunction with him. This is asserted by the Greek and the barbarian, by the inhabitant of the continent, and by him who dwells near the sea, by the wise and by the unwise. And if you proceed even as far as to the utmost shores of the ocean, there also there are gods, rising very near to some, and setting very near to others †."

\* Ωσπερ γαρ και τα των νυκτεριδων ομματα προς το φεγγος εχει το μεθ' ημεραν, ουτω και της ημετερας ψυχης ο νους προς τα τη φυσει φανερωτατα παντων.

† Ενα ιδοις αν εν παση γη ομοφωνον νομον και λογον, οτι θεος εις παντων βασιλευς και πατηρ, και θεοι πολλοι, θεοι παιδες, συναρχοντες θεω. ταυτα δε ο ελλην λεγει, και ο βαρβαρος λεγει, και ο ηπειρωτης και ο θαλαττιος, και ο σοφος και ο ασοφος· καν επι του ωκεανου ελθης τας ηιονας, κἀκει θεοι, τοις μεν ανισχοντες αγχου μαλα, τοις δε καταδυομενοι. Dissert. I.



The only reply which the Doctor makes to all this in his Supplement (p. 175) is the following: "In the chapter alluded to by Mr. Taylor, (which is the eighth of the fourteenth book in Du Val's edition) Aristotle, in deference to the opinion delivered down by the antients, and which prevailed in most ages of paganism, speaks of different gods presiding over the motions of the heavenly bodies. But the sentence immediately preceding this passage, and which Mr. Taylor entirely omits in his refutation of my opinion, maintains the unity of the first cause, the eternal spring of motion, himself immoveable. This principle, on which heaven and earth depend, is one in number as well as essence."

Is it possible that any reply can be more foreign from the purpose than this? Dr. Gillies had asserted that one design of Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* was to demonstrate the being of one god in opposition to polytheists. My answer to this most clearly proved that Aristotle could have no such design, according to the proper meaning of the word polytheist, or that meaning which was

adopted by antiquity ; but in order to evade this evidence, and, if possible, conceal his ignorance, Dr. Gillies tells his readers that I have omitted a sentence, in which Aristotle maintains the unity of the first cause. As if the existence of divine natures the progeny of one *first* cause invalidated the subsistence of that cause. Surely not more so than the existence of children subverts the prior existence of their father. But this affair will be more fully unfolded in the answer to the Doctor's next paragraph.

“ The existence (says he) of divine natures, the immediate progeny of one first cause, with which they are profoundly united, is not asserted by the Sagirite in the chapter alluded to by Mr. Taylor, or in any other part of his invaluable writings. Such mysterious language, indeed, occurs frequently in the works of Plotinus and other eclectics, or new Platonists, as they are called, the pretended reconcilers of Plato and Aristotle ; visionaries whose wild dreams seduced the old age and dotage of reason under the declining empire of Rome, and imposed on its childhood and imbecility at

the first revival of letters in modern Europe. Of such philosophers Mr. Taylor, as will presently appear, is not an unworthy pupil."

The man who, like Dr. Gillies, presumes to analyse and translate the acroamatic works of Aristotle without having even discovered that in these works he is designedly obscure, and that the profundity of his conceptions is no less extraordinary than the brevity of his diction, must also, like Dr. Gillies, perpetually err on subjects which are necessarily from their very nature most arduous and abstruse. The truth of this observation was never more fully displayed than in the above paragraph, as will be at once evident from the following observations: Aristotle having demonstrated, in the seventh chapter of the twelfth book of his *Metaphysics*, that there is a certain eternal and immoveable essence separated from sensibles, in the next chapter enquires whether only one essence of this kind\* is to be admitted or more than one; and in this chapter he proves that there

\* Πότερον δε μίαν δετέον την τοιαυτην ουσίαν, ἢ πλείους, και ποσας, δει μη λανθάνειν.

are many *such like* essences. Now if we attentively consider that Aristotle uses the word *τοιαυτη*, *such like*, on this occasion, and demonstrates that *such like* essences do exist, it will most evidently appear "that the Stagirate does admit the existence of divine natures, the immediate progeny of one first cause, with which they are profoundly united." For the term *such like* is equivalent to *similar to*; and *similitude* is defined by Aristotle to be a participation of *sameness*, and *sameness* to be a *union* of essence\*. Hence as Aristotle demonstrates the existence of one first cause, clearly asserting at the same time that there can be but one first; and as he also proves that there are many essences *similar* to this first cause, it necessarily follows, from his own definition of *similitude*, that these divine essences are *united* to their great producing cause. This single instance, as it shows the ignorance of Dr. Gillies in a strong point of view, shows also the necessity

\* Ομοια λεγεται τα τε ταυτο πεπονθота. i. e. " Things are said to be similar which are passive to (or participate) the same thing." And η ταυτοτης ενος τις εστιν του ειναι. i. e. " Sameness is a certain unity of essence." Metaphys. lib. v. cap. 9.

of adhering to the most rigid accuracy in translating the acroamatic writings of Aristotle.

In the remaining part of Dr. Gillies's Supplement there is but little deserving of notice, as it chiefly consists of misrepresentation and invective. I shall therefore only select two or three passages, as most incontestible proofs that he must necessarily advance absurdities and contradictions who writes on subjects which he does not understand, and who dares to calumniate where he cannot confute. Of the truth of this remark take the following specimen in p. 190 :  
“ The chimeras of those visionaries (Moderatus and Nicomachus) which would now entitle their professors to cells in a mad-house (so unaccountable to one age seem the follies of another !) were adopted by the whole tribe of later Platonists, and nearly a century before their times by the learned and sensible Plutarch, one of the finest painters of actions and manners in public and private life. But this excellent writer, an exuberant source of instruction and entertainment to all ages and nations, was both a Pla-

tonic philosopher and a priest of Apollo." Thus, according to Dr. Gillies, Plutarch, though a learned and sensible man, though an excellent writer, and an exuberant source of instruction and entertainment to *all* ages and nations; yet this same Plutarch, had he lived in these luminous days, would have been entitled to a cell in a madhouse!

No less absurd and *insane* is the following specimen: "The main end of their philosophy (that of the later Platonists) was to attain intellectual union with God, and thus to see all truths at one glance in the divine understanding. Deity they mysteriously describe as everywhere and nowhere; penetrating and sustaining all things, yet in nothing present, and ever totally unmixed: as the unity of unities, the root of being, the perennial fountain of spiritual existences; and the more irreverently they strove in this mystical language to exalt the Creator, the more material became their images, and the wilder the contradictions in which they were inextricably involved." (Supplement, p. 208.) According to the *sagacious* and *pious* Dr. Gillies, therefore, that philosophy is contemptible whose main end is to attain

intellectual union with deity, and *irreverent* are those conceptions of the Divinity which assert him to be everywhere and yet nowhere; *every where*, as illuminating all things with divine light, and *no where*, as being perfectly exempt from the nature of the things illuminated; penetrating and sustaining all things; and subsisting as the root of all being. The man, however, who presumes to call such conceptions as these *irreverent* is (to speak Platonically) unconscious that the greatest eye of his soul (το μεγαλειον της ψυχης ομμα) is blinded with ignorance and buried in error.

In the last place, Dr. Gillies, speaking of me, observes: "If that translator of the *Metaphysics* had been as skilful in Greek as he is profound in philosophy, he would not have recommended, as essential to the right understanding of Aristotle, the commentary of Alexander Aphrodisiensis. Alexander's commentary on the *Metaphysics* now exists only in a Latin version, and cannot, therefore, afford much assistance to a man capable of reading the Greek original, and who wishes to convey its sense clearly to his countrymen in their native tongue." I am

very much mistaken if there is not as much nonsense in this passage as malevolence. For can any thing be more absurd than to assert that the commentary of Alexander cannot afford much assistance to a man capable of reading the Greek original of Aristotle, because it now exists only in a Latin version? when at the same time Alexander was one of the most famous, and, except Simplicius, the best of all Aristotle's interpreters. And can any thing be more malevolent than the insinuation that I am not skilful in Greek because I availed myself of the assistance of this commentary in a Latin translation, not being able to consult the original because it is lost? Is it possible, likewise, that there can be a greater contradiction in terms than to suspect my knowledge of Greek, and yet confess that I am profound in philosophy? For if I am profound in philosophy it must be in that of Plato and Aristotle, since I have studied and profess no other. How then did I acquire my profundity? for, exclusive of my own translations, there is no English translation of any part of Aristotle's works, except his Poetics and his Politics, nor of the more abstruse of Plato's writings: and the



Doctor observes, in the paragraph above quoted, "That Latin translations from the Greek are seldom intelligible except where their assistance is superfluous to a Greek scholar." As I have therefore no knowledge whatever of any languages but English, Latin, and Greek, it is evident that this profundity must have been obtained from the Greek. And thus the malevolent insinuation of Dr. Gillies confutes itself, and is as imbecile as his answers to my strictures and his abuse of the Platonic philosophers.

Having therefore answered all those parts of Dr. Gillies's Supplement which appeared to me most deserving of notice, I shall, in the next place, present the reader with specimens of the manner in which he has translated, or rather mutilated and deformed, the Ethics of Aristotle. I shall begin, then, with the first chapter of the first book, and with the very first sentence of that chapter, as the extreme inaccuracy with which it is translated affords of itself a sufficient proof of the Doctor's total incapacity to translate a writer so uncommonly accurate and profound as Aristotle. The original is as follows: Πασα τεχνη και πασα μεθοδος, ομοιως δε

πραξις τε και προαιρεσις, αγαθου τινος εφισταται  
δοκει' διο καλωσ απεφηναντο ταγαθον, ου παντα  
εφιεσαι. i. e. "Every art and every method,  
and in like manner every action and delibe-  
rative tendency to that which is in our power  
(pre-election) appear to desire a certain  
good: hence they well assert *the good* to be  
that which all things desire." The transla-  
tion of Dr. Gillies: "Since every art and  
every kind of knowledge, as well as all the  
actions and deliberations of men, constantly  
aim at something which they call good;  
good in general may be justly defined, "that  
which all desire." Here, in the first place,  
the word *μεθοδος*, *method*, which properly sig-  
nifies a path to, or means of acquiring a cer-  
tain end, and in which sense it is here used  
by Aristotle, is translated by Dr. Gillies,  
"every kind of knowledge!" In the next  
place, the word *προαιρεσις*, *pre-election*, which  
Aristotle himself, in cap. iii. lib. 3, defines to  
be "a deliberative tendency to or desire of  
things in our power:" η προαιρεσις αν ειη  
βουλευτικη ορεξις των εφ' ημιν, is translated by  
Dr. Gillies merely "deliberation." And, in  
the third place, the words διο καλωσ απεφηναντο  
ταγαθον ου παντα εφιεσαι, "hence *they* well assert

*the good* to be that which all things desire," are miserably perverted by Dr. Gillies, who translates them, "good in general may be justly defined that which all desire." For Aristotle alludes here to Plato and the Pythagoreans, who called the supreme principle of the universe *ταγαθον*, *the good*, and said that it was the object of desire to all things, as must be obvious to every tyro in the doctrines of those philosophers.

Dr. Gillies, likewise, does not appear to have had the smallest conception that Aristotle in this sentence passes gradually from things more particular to things more universal. For *art* is less universal than *method*, because every art is a method, but not every method is an art, since many things are effected by inartificial methods. Again, *action* is more universal than *method*: for every method is a habit, but not every action is a method; since many things are done without method. And *pre-election* is more universal than *action*, because every true action proceeds from pre-election, but many things are the objects of this deliberative tendency which are not performed. The proposition, therefore, in this sentence, always proceeds to

things more universal, just as if, for instance, it should be said, every *man*, every *animal*, every *body*, participates of being.

Again, from the following specimen, the reader will see how little Dr. Gillies has preserved either the manner or the matter of Aristotle. It is the first part of the second chapter of the same book. Εἰ δὲ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτικῶν, ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλομεθα, τὰ ἄλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἰρουμεθα· (προεῖσι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἀπειρον, ὡς εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαιὰν τὴν ὀρεξίν·) δῆλον, ὡς τοῦτ' ἀνείη ταγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀρίστον. Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ροπὴν; καὶ καθάπερ τοξοῦται, σκοποῦν ἔχοντες, μᾶλλον ἢ τυγχάνομεν τοῦ δεσίου; εἰ δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον τυπῶ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ, τί ποτε ἐστὶ, καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπισημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων· δοξείε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης, καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. τοιαυτὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται. *i. e.* “ If there is a certain end of practical objects, which we wish for its own sake, but we choose other things on account of this, and not every thing for the sake of something else, (for thus there would be a progression to infinity, so that desire would be empty and vain,)—if this be admitted, it is evident that this end will be the good, and that which is most ex-

cellent. May we not, therefore, say that the knowledge of it is of great importance with respect to life ; and that, like archers, having this for a mark, we shall more readily obtain what we want ? If, then, this be the case, let us endeavour by a rude delineation to show what this end is, and to what science or faculty it belongs. It may indeed seem to belong to the most principal and master science, and such the political science appears to be." Dr. Gillies's translation of this passage is as follows : " But if there be an ultimate end of all *human pursuit*, an end desirable merely in itself, (and unless there be such an end, desire, proceeding to infinity, will terminate in a baseless vision,) this ultimate end must be what is called good, and of goods the best. The knowledge of it also must greatly contribute to the benefit of life ; serving as a butt to bowmen for *the direction of* our views and actions. Let us therefore endeavour *to delineate it carefully*, first premising that the investigation of it belongs to that master science called politics."

Again, in the beginning of the fourth chapter, the words *επειδη πασα γνωσις και προαιρεσις αγαθου τινος ορεγεται* ; *i. e.* " since all

knowledge and pre-election aspire after a certain good," are translated by Dr. Gillies, "since all our thoughts and desires aim at some kind of good;" and this, though the word *pre-election* is considered by Aristotle of such importance that he has devoted the whole of one chapter to the investigation of its nature. In the same chapter, too, the words, *εὐ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπορεῖ τοῦτο καὶ ἐζητεῖ*, *i. e.* "Plato well doubted and investigated," are rendered by Dr. Gillies, "Plato therefore doubted;" no notice whatever being taken of the compliment which Aristotle pays to his venerable master.

Again, in the beginning of the thirteenth chapter, Aristotle says, *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖα ἰς κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν*; *i. e.* "Since felicity is a certain energy of the soul according to perfect virtue;" but by Dr. Gillies he is made to say, "since happiness results from virtuous energies," which is very far from his real meaning. For Aristotle here repeats nearly the whole of that accurate and beautiful definition of felicity which he had before given; *viz.* "that it is the energy of the soul according to the most perfect virtue in a perfect life." So that fe-

licity, according to Aristotle, is not merely the result of virtuous energies, but of the energies of the most perfect virtue. Again, in the same chapter, Aristotle says, *ει δε ταυθ ουτως εχει, δηλον, οτι δει τον πολιτικον ειδεναι πως τα περι ψυχην· ωσπερ και τον οφθαλμους θεραπειουσα, και παν σωμα· και μαλλον οσω τιμιωτερα και βελτιων η πολιτικη της ιατρικης. i. e.* “ If this be the case, it is evident that the politician (the man who is capable of managing the reins of government) ought to know the manner in which things pertaining to the soul subsist, just as he who intends to administer remedies to the eyes ought to have a knowledge of the whole body; and this by how much the more honourable and excellent the political is than the medicinal science.” Compare this with the following translation of Dr. Gillies: “ The true statesman, therefore, ought to know the mind as much, or rather more, (because his pursuit is still more excellent) than the physician does the body.” Here the very beautiful and important dogma contained in the original, and which Aristotle derived from the Charmides of Plato, is entirely lost in the translation of Dr. Gillies. The dogma I al-

lude to is this: that he who intends to cure a part ought to have an accurate knowledge of the whole body, and that the former cannot be properly effected without the latter. Dr. Gillies too has destroyed by his translation the beautiful analogy implied by Aristotle in this sentence; I mean that the most exalted virtue, in which felicity consists, has the same relation to the whole soul that the eye has to the whole body. For the most exalted virtue, as Aristotle shows in the tenth book, is theoretic, which has evidently the relation of an eye.

Again, near the end of the first book, Aristotle says, "that of the virtues some are dianoetic and others moral," λεγομεν γαρ αυτων τας μεν διανοητικας, τας δε ηθικας; and this division he also repeats in the beginning of the second book. Dr. Gillies, however, not knowing the accurate meaning of the word *dianoetic*, translates *διανοητικας intellectual*, and thus destroys all the accuracy of Aristotle's meaning in this place, which is founded on that scientific division of the parts or powers of the soul made by him, particularly in his third book on the Soul, and alluded to in many of his other various works. For, ac-



According to Aristotle, in these writings *διανοία*, or the *dianoetic power*, is, in its most accurate signification, that faculty of the soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect; but *intellect* is that power which perceives truth without affirmation or negation, because it does not understand by composition or division, but simply, and with immediate vision sees the forms of things. See the sixth chapter of the sixth book of his Ethics, the tenth book of the same work, and the latter part of the third chapter of his third book on the Soul. There is an absolute necessity therefore of using the word *dianoetic* in translating the acroamatic works of Aristotle, because there is no word in the English language, nor perhaps in any other language, equivalent to its accurate meaning: for even in Latin the word *cogitatio*, which is the translation of it given by Cicero, conveys a very imperfect, or rather no idea whatever, of its primary philosophical signification.

Farther still, the beginning of the second chapter of the second book is as follows:

Ἐπει οὖν ἡ παρούσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἐνεκά  
 εἶναι, ὡσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι· οὐ γὰρ ἰν' εἰδῶμεν τι εἶναι ἢ

αρετη, σκεπτομεθα. αλλ' ιν' αγαθοι γενωμεθα, επει ουδεν αν ην οφελος αυτης. *i. e.* " Since then the present treatise is not for the sake of theory, like our other works : for we do not speculate that we may know what virtue is, but that we may become good, since otherwise it would be attended with no benefit, &c." Which is thus translated by Dr. Gillies : " Since the present treatise is not merely a theory, as other parts of our works (for the inquiry is not ' wherein virtue consists,' but ' how it may be best attained,' without which the speculative knowledge of it is not of the smallest value) &c." Here the reader will easily see, that Dr. Gillies, by his random translation perverts, as usual, the meaning of Aristotle. For the inquiry in Ethics is not " how virtue may be best attained," since a man may know this without being virtuous ; but we speculate on this subject, as Aristotle says, " that we may become good ;" the end of this inquiry, as he elsewhere observes, not being knowledge but action.

Again, near the end of the third chapter of this book, Aristotle says, *Περι δε το χαλεπωτερον αιει και τεχνη γινεται και αρετη και γαρ το ευ βελτιον εν τουτω. i. e.* " Both art and virtue are

always conversant with that which is more difficult, for in this there is a more excellent good." Compare this with the version of Dr. Gillies: "But the most difficult part is that best fitted for showing the excellence of the performer." In this translation, as the reader will easily perceive, neither the accurate meaning, nor any thing of the manner of Aristotle, are preserved.

Compare also the following passage, in the fourth chapter of this book, with the Doctor's version. It is the beginning of that chapter.

Απορησειε δ' αν τις, πως λεγομεν οτι δει τα μεν δικαγια πραττοντας δικαιους γινεσθαι, τα δε σωφρονα σωφρονας· ει γαρ πραττουσι τα δικαγια και τα σωφρονα, ηδη εισι δικαιοι και σωφρονες· ωσπερ ει τα γραμματικα και μουσικα, γραμματικοι και μουσικοι. η ουδε επι των τεχνων ουτως εχει; ενδεχεται γαρ γραμματικον τι ποιησαι και απο τυχης, και αλλου υποθεμενου· τοτε ουν εσαι γραμματικος, εαν και γραμματικον τι ποιηση και γραμματικως, τουτο δ' εστι το κατα την εν αυτω γραμματικην. *i. e.* "It may be doubted why we say that men from performing just things must necessarily become just, and from performing temperate things, temperate: for if they do such things as are just and temperate, they are already just and tem-

perate ; just as those who perform things grammatical and musical are grammarians and musicians. Or may we not say that neither is this the case with the arts ? For it is possible that a man may do something grammatical both casually and from the suggestion of another. Hence he will then be a grammarian, if he both does something grammatical and in a grammatical manner ; that is, if he does it according to the grammatical art which he contains in himself." The translation of Dr. Gillies is as follows : " A doubt arises, why we should say that men acquire justice by doing just actions, or become temperate by observing the rules of temperance ; since if they perform such actions and observe such rules, it should seem that they must be already endowed with those virtues ; in the same manner as a man who writes or who performs according to the rules of grammar and music is already a grammarian and a musician. *But this does not hold true even with respect to the arts ; for a man may write grammar merely by imitation, by chance, or by the direction of another ; but to be a grammarian he must himself understand the art.*" Here one part

of this passage, which is evidently a question in the original, is made an assertive sentence in the version of Dr. Gillies; and in the concluding part the meaning of Aristotle is entirely perverted. For Aristotle says that *a man is then a grammarian when he both does something grammatical and in a grammatical manner*; but he does not merely say that *to be a grammarian he must himself understand the art*. For simply to understand the art of grammar does not make a man a grammarian; but to be so he must *do something grammatical, grammatically*.

Again, in the second chapter of the third book, pre-election (*προαιρεσις*) is everywhere confounded in the translation of Dr. Gillies with *election* and *preference*, though, as we have before observed, it is defined by Aristotle himself to be *a deliberative tendency to, or desire of things in our power*. It is not therefore the same either with *election* or *preference*, since a man may *choose* or *prefer* one thing to another without *deliberation*, but in this case his energy is not pre-elective.

I shall pass on to the fifth book; for it would be an endless task to enumerate all the inaccuracies of Dr. Gillies's translation.

In the fourth chapter, therefore, of this book Aristotle treats of corrective justice and its analogy, and having shown that it holds the middle place between loss and gain, and that it is the business of a judge to find this middle term, which is an arithmetical mean between the greater and the lesser extreme, he illustrates his meaning as follows: *Ἰσαι αἰ ἐφ' ὧν, αα, ββ γγ, ἀλληλαῖς· ἀπο τῆς αα ἀφηρεσθῶ το αε, καὶ προσκείσθῶ τῆ γγ, το ἐφ ὧν γδ· ὡσεὶ ὅλη ἡ δγγ, τῆς αε ὑπερέχει τῷ γδ, καὶ τῷ γζ· τῆς ἀρα ββ τῷ γδ:*

α	ε	α	
β		β	
γ	ζ	γ	δ.

*i. e.* "Let there be three equal right lines, *aa, bb, cc*. From the line *aa* let there be taken a part *ae*, and let this part be added to the line *cc*. Let this part also be *cd*. This being done, the whole line *d c c* will surpass the line *ae* by the line *cd*, and the line *cf*. Hence it will surpass the line *bb* by the line *ed*.

<i>a</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>a</i>	
<i>b</i>		<i>b</i>	
<i>c</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d.</i> "

Dr. Gillies's translation of this passage is no-

thing more than “ This plainly appears in geometry by means of a diagram !”

Again; take the following specimen of the Doctor’s translation from the beginning of the eighth chapter of the same book :

Οντων δε των δικαιων και αδικων των ειρημενων, αδικει μεν και δικαιοπραγει, οταν εκων τις αυτα πρατῆη· οταν δε ακων, ουτ’ αδικει ουτε δικαιοπραγει, αλλ’ ἢ κατα συμβεβηκος· οἱς γαρ συμβεβηκε δικαιοις ειναι ἢ αδικοις, πρατῆουσιν. αδικημα δε και δικαιοπραγημα ωρισαι τῳ εκουσιῳ, και ακουσιῳ· οταν γαρ εκουσιον ἢ ψευγεται· αμα δε και αδικημα τοῖε εσιν. ωσε αδικον τι εσαι μεν, αδικημα δε ουδεπω, εαν μη το εκουσιον προση. λεγω δε εκουσιον μεν, ωσπερ και προτερον ειρηται, ο αν τις των εφ’ αυτῳ οντων ειδως και μη αγνοων πρατῆη, μητε ον, μητε ω, μητε ου ενεκα. οἱον τινα τυπῆι, και τινι, και τινος ενεκα, και εκεινων εκασον, μη κατὰ συμβεβηκος, μηδε βια· ωσπερ ει τις λαβων την χειρα αυτου, τυπῆι ετερον· ουχ εκων δε· ου γαρ επ’ αυτῳ. ενδεχῆται δε τον τυπῆομενον πάλῆρα ειναι, τον δ’ οτι μεν ανθρωπος ἢ των παροντων τις γινωσκειν, οτι δε πάλῆρ αγνοειν. ομοιως δε το τοιουτον διωρισθω και επι του ου ενεκα, και περι την πραξιν ολην. το δη αγνοομενον. ἢ μη αγνοομενον μεν, μη επ’ αυτῳ δε ον, ἢ βια ακουσιον· πολλα γαρ και Ἰων Φυσει υπαρχοντων ειδοτες και πρατῆομεν και παχομεν, ων ουθεν ουτε εκουσιον, ουτε

ἀκούσιον ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ γηραῖν, ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. ἰ. ε.,  
 “ Just and unjust actions then being those  
 which we have enumerated, a man acts  
 justly or unjustly when he does these things  
 voluntarily; but when he does them involun-  
 tarily he neither acts unjustly nor justly,  
 except from accident: for he does those  
 things which happen to be either just or un-  
 just. But an unjust and also a just deed are  
 defined by the voluntary and the involun-  
 tary: for when these deeds are voluntary  
 they are blamed; but at the same time an  
 unjust action is then performed. So that  
*something unjust* will indeed take place, but  
 will not yet be *an unjust deed* unless it is ac-  
 companied with the voluntary. But the vo-  
 luntary, as was before observed, takes place  
 when any one does that which is in his power  
 knowingly, and is neither ignorant of the  
 person to whom, nor with what, nor on what  
 account he does it; as, for instance, when he  
 is not ignorant whom he strikes, with what  
 instrument, and on what account, and when  
 he does each of these things, not from acci-  
 dent, nor by compulsion, as would be the  
 case, if some one, taking his hand, should  
 strike another person with it; since in this



instance he would not strike willingly, because it was not in his power to prevent it. It might also happen that he who was struck was the father of him by whom he was struck, and the son might know indeed that he was a man, or some one of the persons present, but might not know that he was his father. A similar distinction must likewise be made with respect to that for the sake of which a thing is done, and with respect to the whole action. Hence, that which is done ignorantly, or if not ignorantly, could not be prevented by him who did it, or was done by him through compulsion, is an involuntary deed. For we knowingly both do and are passive to many things, none of which is either voluntary or involuntary; such, for instance, as old age or death." In order to understand the meaning of Aristotle fully in this passage, it is necessary to observe, that, near the end of the seventh chapter, he makes a very accurate distinction between *the just* and *a just deed*, and also between *the unjust* and *an unjust deed*. "For," says he, "*the unjust* or *the just* derives its subsistence from nature or law; but the same thing when done is *a just* or *an*

*unjust deed*, and not before it is done. For prior to this it is *the just*, or *the unjust*."

Διαφέρει δε το αδικημα και το αδικον, και το δικαιωμα και το δικαιον· αδικον μεν γαρ εσι τη Φυσει, η ταξει. το αυτο δε τουτο, οταν πραχθη, αδικημα εσι· πριν δε πραχθηναι, επω, αλλ' αδικον· ομοιως δε και δικαιωμα.

Dr. Gillies's translation of this passage is as follows : " Injustice, as applicable to actions, consists in what we have now said, but it does not belong to persons unless it be committed voluntarily ; for when a man acts without intention the quality of his action, as good or bad, just or unjust, is, in reference to the agent, merely an accessory, not springing essentially from himself, and neither entitling him to praise nor subjecting him to blame. That therefore which is unjust is not injustice in the agent unless it be committed voluntarily ; that is, as formerly explained, unless the action, with all its circumstances, depend entirely on our own power, and be performed knowingly, with intention, and without constraint. Thus, to make the act of striking *parricide*, we must know the person whom we strike, the nature of the instrument with which the stroke is

inflicted; and the motive through which we are impelled to such a horrid crime. The action must also depend entirely on our own power; for in many natural events we are both agents and patients knowingly, though not voluntarily; witness old age and death." Here, in the first place, there is no vestige whatever in this translation of the distinction which Aristotle makes between *the unjust* το αδικον, and *an unjust deed*, το αδικημα. In the next place no notice is taken of the illustration adduced by Aristotle of one man taking the hand of another and striking a third person with it. And, in the third place, Aristotle says nothing about making "the act of striking parricide;" for this is an interpolation of the Doctor.

Entire chapters, likewise, are translated by Dr. Gillies with the same unskilfulness and inaccuracy; and in these the same unparadonable liberty is everywhere taken of arrogantly interpolating, and rashly omitting, as may best serve the purposes of random paraphrase. Of this the following chapters are instances. The first is the third chapter of the sixth book: Αρξάμενοι ουν ανωθεν, περι αυτων παλιν λεγωμεν. εσω δη οis αληθευει η ψυχη τω

καταφαναι ἢ αποφαναι, πεντε τον αριθμον· ταυτα δ' εσι, τεχνη, επισημη, φρονησις, σοφια, νους· υποληφει γαρ και δοξη ενδεχεται διαψευδεσθαι. επισημη μεν ουν τι εσιν, εντευθεν φανερον, ει δει ακριβολογεισθαι, και μη ακολουθειν ταις ομοιοτησι· παντες γαρ υπολαμβανομεν, ο επισαμεθα μη ενδεχασθαι αλλως εχειν. τα δε ενδεχομενα αλλως, οταν εξω του θεωρειν γενηται, λανθανει ει εσιν, ἢ μη. εξ αναγκης αρα εσι το επισητον· αιδιον αρα· τα γαρ εξ αναγκης οντα απλως, αιδια παντα· τα δ' αιδια, αγενητα και αφθαρτα. ετι διδακτη πασα επισημη δοκει ειναι, και το επισητον, μαθητον. εκ προγινωσκομενων δε πασα διδασκαλια. ωσπερ και εν τοις αναλυτικοις ελεγομεν. η μεν γαρ δι επαγωγης, η δε συλλογισμω. η μεν δη επαγωγή αρχη εσι και του καθολου· ο δε συλλογισμος εκ των καθολου. εισιν αρα αρχαι εξ ων ο συλλογισμος, ων ουκ εσι συλλογισμος· επαγωγή αρα. η μεν αρα επισημη εσιν εξις αποδεικτικη, και οσα αλλα προσδιοριζομεθα εν τοις αναλυτικοις· οταν γαρ πως πισευη, και γνωριμοι (lege γνωριμωτεροι\*) αυτω ωσιν αι αρχαι, επισαται· ει γαρ μη μαλλον του συμπερασματος, κατα συμβεβηκος εξει επισημην. περι μεν ουν επισημης διωρισθω τον τροπον τουτον. *τ. i. c.* “Assuming, therefore, a more elevated exor-

\* The necessity of this emendation will be at once evident to any one who reads the second chapter of the first book of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Indeed this is evident from the words that immediately follow.

dium, let us again speak concerning these. And let those things through which the soul asserts the truth, by affirming or denying, be five in number; viz. *art, science, prudence, wisdom, intellect*: for by *hypolepsis* and *opinion* it is possible to be deceived. What science therefore is, will be from hence evident, if it be necessary to employ accuracy on this occasion, and not to attend to similitudes. For we all are of opinion that what we know scientifically cannot admit of a various subsistence. But with respect to things which may subsist variously, when they are out of our view, we are ignorant whether or not they exist. The object of scientific knowledge, therefore, is from necessity. Hence it is eternal: for all such things as are simply from necessity are eternal: and things eternal are unbegotten and incorruptible. Farther still, all science appears to be capable of being taught, and the object of science is the object of discipline. But all learning is produced from things previously known, as we have said in our *Analytics*. For one kind of learning is acquired by induction, but another by syllogism. And induction indeed is a principle.

and is the principle of that which is universal \*, but syllogism is composed from universals. Hence the principles from which syllogism consists are not derived from syllogism. They are known therefore by induction. Hence, too, science is a demonstrative habit, and whatever else we have added to its definition in our analytics. For when a man believes in a certain way that a thing is, and the principles of that in which he believes are more known to him than the conclusion, he then possesses scientific knowledge. For if they are not more known to him than the conclusion, he will possess science accidentally. Let science therefore be thus defined."

Compare this with the following version of Dr. Gillies: "Let these habits be the five following; art, science, prudence, wisdom, intellect. In matters of opinion we are liable to be deceived, not so in matters of science. The former relates to things variable in their nature, of whose very existence we may doubt, unless when they are actually

\* By *that which is universal*, Aristotle means in this place every *indemonstrable principle*, or, in other words, every *axiom*, and definition.

perceived ; the latter is conversant about things unalterable, necessary, and eternal, incapable of being generated, exempt from corruption ; the knowledge of which admits not of degrees between total ignorance and absolute certainty. All science may be taught, and all teaching implies principles, namely, those truths which are previously known by experience or reason. The first principles are acquired by induction, that is by intellect operating on experience. Science then may be defined a demonstrative habit, distinguished by those properties which we have ascribed to it in our Analytics. The principles of science must be perceived with the clearest evidence ; for unless they be more evident than the conclusions drawn from them, those conclusions will not form science, strictly so called ; because their truth does not necessarily proceed from the truth of their premises, with which they are connected, not essentially, but only by way of accession or appendage."

In this translation of Dr. Gillies it is obvious that, in the first place, no notice whatever is taken of the word *υποληψις*, *hypolepsis*, though, considered as one of the powers of

the soul, it is a word of great importance in the philosophy of Aristotle; and though the Doctor himself admits (in the introduction to this book) that "the powers of intellection differ as widely from each other as those of sensation." This word, however, is used by Aristotle to signify *the definite assent of the soul to the discursive energies of the dianoetic power*. And, in the next place, by the rambling paraphrase of Dr. Gillies, the accuracy of Aristotle's reasoning is entirely destroyed, as must be obvious, by comparing it with the original, to any one in the smallest degree familiar with the very scientific mode of writing employed by that philosopher.

Again, the sixth chapter of the same book is as follows: *Ἐπει δ' ἡ ἐπισῆμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπολήψις, καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀναγκῆς ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπισῆμης· μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπισῆμη· τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπισῆτου, ὅτι ἂν ἐπισῆμη εἴη, ὅτε τέχνη, ὅτε φρονῆσις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπισῆτον, ἀποδεικτὸν· αἱ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν οὐσαὶ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχομένα ἄλλως εἶναι. οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἐστὶ· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων εἶναι ἀποδείξιν ἐστὶν. εἰ δὲ οἱς ἀληθεύομεν, καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδομεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχομένα, ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχομένα ἄλλως εἶναι, ἐπισῆμη, καὶ φρονῆσις ἐστὶ, καὶ σοφία, καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τριῶν μῆδεν*



εὐδεχεται εἶναι· λέγω δὲ τρία, φρονήσιν, σοφίαν,  
 ἐπιστήμην· λειπέσθαι γοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν. That  
 is, “ Since science is a definite assent to  
 universals, and things which have a neces-  
 sary subsistence; and since there are prin-  
 ciples of the objects of demonstration and of  
 all science (for science subsists in conjunction  
 with reason)—this being the case, of the  
 principles of the objects of science, there  
 will neither be science, nor art, nor pru-  
 dence. For the object of science is demon-  
 strable; but art and prudence are conversant  
 with things which have a various subsistence.  
 Neither can wisdom pertain to these things:  
 for it is the province of a wise man to possess  
 demonstration of certain things. If there-  
 fore the powers by which we assert the truth,  
 and are never at any time deceived either  
 about things which have not or which have  
 a various subsistence, are, science, prudence,  
 wisdom, and intellect; and if no one of  
 these three can have principles for its ob-  
 ject, (I mean by the three, prudence, wis-  
 dom, and science,) it remains that intellect is  
 conversant with principles, or is that power  
 by which we know the principles of sci-  
 ence.”

Compare this with the following translation of Dr. Gillies: "Since the object of science, as above observed, is universal and demonstrable truth, and whatever is demonstrable must be founded on principles, it is manifest that there must be primary principles, which are not science any more than they are art or prudence. They are not science, because *all science is demonstrable*; they are not art or prudence, because these have for their subjects things contingent and variable: neither are they wisdom, because, as we shall see hereafter, wisdom, and the highest wisdom, is conversant about truths susceptible of demonstration. Since then none of the four habits just mentioned; neither science, nor art, nor prudence, nor wisdom, can afford those primary principles; and since all the habits of the understanding are reducible to five, it follows that intellect, operating on experience, is the only source from which those great and primary truths can be supposed to flow."

Here, in the first place, no notice whatever is taken of the word *υποληψις*; and, in the next place, *science* is confounded with *the object of science*. For the words *το μεν γαρ*

επισητον, αποδεικτον; i. e. for the object of scientific knowledge is demonstrable, are rendered by Dr. Gillies, "because all science is demonstrable\*." In the last sentence, too, of Dr. Gillies's translation, Aristotle is made to assert that concerning intellect which neither the text authorizes, nor his own doctrine as delivered by him in the second chapter of his Posterior Analytics, which we have already noticed. For he there expressly says, "that the principles of demonstration (axioms and definitions) are *by nature* prior to the conclusions of which they are the source;" so far is he from asserting, "that intellect operating on experience is the fountain whence these principles flow.

Again: the latter part of the eighth chapter of the same book is as follows: Οτι δ' η Φρονησις ουκ επισημη φανερον του γαρ εσχατου εστιν, ωσπερ ειρηται το γαρ πρακτικον τοιουτον. αντικειται μεν δη τω νω ο μεν γαρ νους, των ορων, ων ουκ εστι λογος. η δε του εσχατου, ου ουκ εστιν επισημη, αλλ' αισθησις ουχ η των ιδιων, αλλ' οια αισθανομεθα οτι το εν τοις μαθηματικοις εσχατον,

\* This observation was made by me long since, in p. 44 of the introduction to my translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; but Dr. Gillies very prudently takes no notice of it in his Supplement.

τριγωνον· στησεται γαρ κακει· αλλ' αυτη μαλλον  
 αισθησις η φρονησις· εκεινης δε, αλλο ειδος. *i. e.*  
 That prudence is not science is evident:  
 for, as we have said, it is conversant with  
 that which subsists as an extreme: for that  
 which is practical is a thing of this kind.  
 But it is opposed to intellect: for intellect is  
 conversant with terms or limits, (*i. e.* axioms)  
 of which there is no definition; but prudence  
 is conversant with that extreme, the percep-  
 tion of which is not the province of science  
 but of sense. Not, indeed, that it is a sensi-  
 ble perception of things which are the pro-  
 per objects of sense, but it is of that kind, as  
 when we perceive that what is last in mathe-  
 matical figures is a triangle; for figures stop  
 there\*. This perception, however, rather  
 belongs to sense; but that which pertains to  
 prudence is specifically different."

Compare this with the following transla-  
 tion of Dr. Gillies: "Prudence is manifestly  
 different from science, being the perception  
 of those particular and practical truths which  
 admit not of demonstration; whereas intel-  
 lect is employed about those general and pri-  
 mary principles which require not any proof.  
 In the chain of mental faculties intellect and

\* *i. e.* All figures are ultimately resolved into triangles.

prudence then form the two extreme links; prudence holding the extreme of individuality, and intellect that of generalization. Prudence then may be called common sense, since it is conversant about objects of sense; but in a manner specifically different from that in which the other senses are respectively conversant about their particular objects."

Here, in the first place, what Aristotle says respecting a triangle is entirely omitted, as I have before observed in the introduction to my translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; and, in the next place, no part of this passage can with propriety be called a translation, as must be obvious even to the most careless reader.

Thus much for Dr. Gillies's translation of the sixth book. Without proceeding to notice similar inaccuracies and deformities in his translation of the seventh book, I shall only observe, that he has entirely omitted the four last chapters of this book, which treat of pleasure; because, says he, "they are mere transcripts from the sixth book of the *Ethics* to *Eudemus*; and the subject is more fully and more philosophically explained in the tenth book of the *Ethics* to *Nicomachus*." Can any thing be more ab-

surd than to omit translating these chapters because they are transcripts from another work of which he has given no translation? Besides, these chapters were evidently designed by Aristotle to form a part of this book, as appears from the concluding sentence, which is as follows: *Περι μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας, καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἰρηται, καὶ τί ἐκάστον, καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐσὶ, τὰ δὲ κακὰ· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐρούμεν.* *i. e.* “And thus we have spoken concerning continence and incontinence, *pleasure and pain*, what each of them is, and in what respect some of them are good and others bad. It now remains that we speak concerning friendship.” Are such omissions as these to be justified? And will any man presume to call him a translator who takes such liberties with his original?

Without proceeding to notice every thing worthy of reprehension in the remaining books, I shall finish this selection by presenting the reader with the original of the whole of the seventh chapter of the tenth book, as it is one of the most beautiful and important in the Ethics of Aristotle; and will show in a strong point of view how Dr. Gillies has deformed the manner, and destroyed the accu-

rate meaning of the Stagirite by his translation.

Εἰ δ' ἐσὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖα, εὐλογον  
κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὐτὴ δ' εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου εἴτε δὴ νοῦς  
τοῦτο, εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὁ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἀρχεῖν καὶ  
ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐννοίαν εἶχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων· εἴτε  
θεῖον οὐ καὶ αὐτοῦ, εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θεϊοτάτον· ἡ  
τοῦτου ἐνεργεῖα κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελειὰ  
εὐδαιμονία. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ εἰρηται. ὁμολογοῦμενον  
δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δοξείεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον, καὶ τῷ  
ἀληθεῖ· κρατίστη γὰρ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνεργεῖα· καὶ  
γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γινώσκων, περὶ ἁ ὁ  
νοῦς. ἐτι δὲ συνεχέστατη θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυναμέθα  
συνεχῶς μάλλον, ἢ πράττειν οἴουσι. οἴομεθα τε δεῖν  
ἡδονὴν παραμειχθῆαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ· ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ'  
ἀρετῶν ἐνεργειῶν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογοῦμενως ἐστὶ.  
δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ σοφία θαυμασῶς ἡδονᾶς εἶχειν καθ' ἀριστοτητι  
καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ. εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδοσι τῶν ζητούντων  
ἡδὴ τὴν ἀγωγὴν εἶναι. ἢτε λεγομένη αὐταρκεία, περὶ  
τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλισ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ  
ζῆν ἀναγκαιῶν, καὶ σοφός, καὶ δίκαιος, καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ  
δεόνται· τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἰκανῶς κεχρηγημένων, ὁ μὲν  
δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὐς δικαιοπραγήσει, καὶ μεθ' ὧν  
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σωφρων, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων  
ἐκαστος. ὁ δὲ σοφός, καὶ καθ' αὐτοῦ ὧν, δυνατὰ θεωρεῖν·  
καὶ ὁσῶν ἂν σοφός ἢ, μάλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἰσῶς συνεργούς  
εἶχων· ἀλλ' ὁμῶς αὐταρκεσῆτος. δοξείε δ' ἂν αὐτὴ  
μονῆ δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπασθῆαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γινέσθαι  
πᾶρα τὸ θεωρησῆαι. ἀπο δὲ τῶν πράξεων, ἢ πλείον ἢ

ελαττον περιποιουμεθα παρα την πραξιν. δοκει τε η ευδαιμονια εν τη σχολη ειναι· ασχολουμεθα γαρ ινα σχολαζωμεν, και πολεμουμεν, ινα ειρηνην αγωμεν. των μεν ουν πρακτικων αρετων, εν τοις πολιτικοις η τοις πολεμικοις αι ενεργειαι· αι δε περι ταυτα πραξεις, δοκουσιν ασχολοι ειναι. αι μεν ουν πολεμικαι, και παντελως· ουδεις γαρ αιρειται το πολεμειν, του πολεμειν ενεκα, ουδε παρασκευαζειν πολεμον· δοξαι γαρ αν παντελως μισθονος τις ειναι, ει τους φιλους πολεμιους ποιοιτο, ινα μαχαι και φονοι γιγνοιντο. εσι δε και η του πολιτικου ασχολος, και παρ' αυτο το πολιτευεσθαι, περιποιουμενη δυνασειας και τιμας, η την γε ευδαιμονιαν αυτω και τοις πολιταις, ετεραν ουσαν της πολιτικης, ην και ζητουμεν· δηλον ως ετεραν ουσαν. ει δη των μεν κατ' ας αρετας πραξεων αι πολιτικαι και πολεμικαι, καλλει και μεγαθει προεχουσιν· αυται δε ασχολοι και τελους τινος εφεινται, και ου δι' αυτας εισιν αιρεται· η δε του νοου ενεργεια σπουδη τε διαφερειν δοκει, θεωρητικη ουσα, και παρ' αυτην εδενος εφισθαι τελους, εχειν τε ηδονην οικειαν· αυτη δε συναυξει την ενεργειαν· και το αυταρκες δε και σχολασικον, και ακρυτον, ως ανθρωπιον, και οσα αλλα τω μακαριω απονεμειναι, κατ' αυτην ενεργειαν φαινεται οντα· η τελεια δη ευδαιμονια αυτη αν ειη ανθρωπου λαβουσα μηκος βιου τελειον· ουδεν γαρ ατελες εσι των της ευδαιμονιας. ο δε τοιουτος αν ειη κρειττων βιος, η κατ' ανθρωπον· ε γαρ η ανθρωπος εστιν, ετω βιωσεται,



ἀλλ' ἢ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπαρχει. ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει  
 τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνεργεῖα τῆς κατὰ  
 τὴν ἀλλήν ἀρετὴν. εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπῳ,  
 καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος, θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπῳ  
 βίον. χρῆ δὲ οὐ κατὰ τοὺς παραινούντας, ἀνθρώπινα  
 φρονεῖν, ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα, οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητῷ  
 ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδεχεται ἀπαθανατίζειν, καὶ ἀπαντὰ  
 ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κρατίστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ  
 εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ οὐκᾶ μικρὸν ἐστὶ, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι  
 πολὺ μάλλον ὑπερέχει πάντων. δοξείε δ' ἂν καὶ ἕκαστον  
 εἶναι τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κυρίον καὶ ἀμεινον. ἀτοπὸν οὖν  
 γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο, ἀλλὰ τινὸς  
 ἀλλοῦ. τὸ λεχθῆν τε πρότερον ἀρμοσεί καὶ νῦν· τὸ  
 γὰρ ὀκείον ἕκαστῷ τῇ φύσει, κρατίστον καὶ ἡδίστον ἐστ'  
 ἕκαστῷ καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ  
 μάλιστ' αὐτοῦ ἀνθρώπος. οὗτος ἀρα καὶ εὐδαιμονεστῆτος.

*i. e.* " But if felicity is an energy according  
 to virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it is  
 an energy according to the most excellent  
 virtue; and this will be the virtue of that  
 which is best. Whether, therefore, this be  
 intellect, or something else which appears to  
 rule and be the leader by nature, and to  
 have a conception of things beautiful and  
 divine; or whether it is itself divine, or the  
 most divine of all our parts, the energy of  
 this, according to its proper virtue, will be

perfect felicity. But we have said that this energy is contemplative. And this appears to accord with what we before asserted, and also with truth. For this energy is the most excellent; since intellect is the best of all our parts, and of objects of knowledge those are the most excellent about which intellect is conversant. This energy also is most continued: for we are able to contemplate more incessantly than to perform any action whatever. We likewise think that pleasure ought to be mingled with felicity; but the energy *according to wisdom* is acknowledged to be the most pleasant of all the energies according to virtue. Wisdom therefore appears to possess pleasures admirable both for their purity and stability. It is reasonable also to think that those who *possess* knowledge live more pleasantly than those who *investigate*. That too, which is called self-sufficiency, will especially subsist about the contemplative energy. For of the necessities of life, the wise and the just man, and the rest of those who possess the moral virtues, are in want; but even when they are sufficiently supplied with these, the just man is in want of those towards whom, and toge-

ther with whom, he may act justly ; and in like manner the temperate and the brave man, and each of the rest. But the wise man when alone is able to contemplate ; and by how much the wiser he is by so much the more does he possess this ability. Perhaps, indeed, he will contemplate better when he has others to co-operate with him ; but at the same time he is most sufficient to himself. This energy alone, likewise, will appear to be beloved for its own sake, for nothing else is produced from it besides contemplation. But from things of a practical nature we obtain something more or less besides the action itself. Felicity also appears to consist in leisure : for we engage in business that we may be at leisure, and we wage war that we may live in peace. The energies therefore of the political virtues consist either in political or in military transactions ; but the actions which are conversant with these appear to be full of employment. This indeed is perfectly the case with military transactions : for no one chooses to wage war, or prepare for it, for the sake of waging war ; since he would appear to be perfectly a homicide who should make enemies of his

friends for the sake of fighting and slaughter. The energy too of the politician is of a busy nature, and, besides the management of public affairs, is employed in procuring dominion and honour, or a felicity for himself and the citizens different from the political energy, which also, as something different, we evidently investigate. If, therefore, political and military actions surpass in beauty and magnitude all other virtuous actions, but these are of a busy nature, aspire after a certain end, and are not eligible for their own sakes; but the energy of intellect, which is contemplative, appears to excel other energies in ardor, and to desire no other end besides itself; if also it possesses a proper pleasure, which increases its energy, and has, in addition to this, self-sufficiency, leisure and unwearied power, so far as the condition of human nature will permit, with whatever else is attributed to the blessed, and appears to subsist according to this energy;—if such be the case this will be the perfect felicity of man when it receives a perfect length of life: for nothing belonging to felicity is imperfect. Such a life, however, will be more excellent than that which is merely human:

for man will not thus live so far as he is man but so far as he contains in himself something divine. And as much as this part excels the composite so much does its energy surpass the energy belonging to every other virtue. If, therefore, intellect is divine with respect to man, the life also according to intellect will be divine with respect to human life. Nor ought we, according to the exhortation of certain persons, to be wise in human affairs, since we are men, nor to regard mortal concerns, since we are mortal; but as much as possible we should immortalize ourselves, and do every thing in order to live according to our most excellent part. For this part, though it is small in bulk, far excels all things in power and dignity. It would seem also that each of us is this part \*, since that which obtains dominion is also more excellent. It would therefore be absurd for a man not to choose his own life but the life of something else. That too which was before asserted accords with what is now said: for that which is intimately allied to any na-

\* The *true man*, both according to Aristotle and Plato, is intellect: for the essence of every thing is the *summit* of its nature.

ture is most excellent and most pleasant to that nature; and hence a life according to intellect will be most excellent and pleasant to man, since this part is most eminently man. This life, therefore, is also most happy."

Dr. Gillies's translation of this chapter is as follows: "If happiness consists in virtuous energies the greatest human happiness must consist in the exercise of the greatest virtue in man, which must be the virtue or perfection of his best part, whether this be intellect, or whatever principle it be, that is destined to command and bear sway; having knowledge of things beautiful and divine, as being either divine itself, or at least that principle in us which most approximates to divinity. The greatest human happiness then is theoretic and intellectual, which well accords with the properties which we formerly found by investigation to be essentially inherent in that most coveted object. The intellect is the best principle in man; its energies are the strongest, and the objects about which it is conversant are far the most sublime. The energies of intellect are also the longest and most continuous, since we can persevere in theorizing and thinking much longer than in

performing any action whatever. Pleasure, it was observed, must be an ingredient in happiness; but contemplative wisdom offers pleasures the most admirable in purity and stability, and the pleasures of knowledge continually increase in proportion to our improvement in it: certainty concerning the sublimest truths affording still higher delight in proportion to the intense efforts of intellect by which they were discovered. That all-sufficiency, which we remarked as a property of happiness, belongs to intellectual energies more than to any other; for though the sage, as well as the moralist or the patriot, stands in need of bodily accommodations, yet in exerting his highest excellencies he is not, like them, dependent on fortune both for his objects and his instruments; for objects towards whom he may exercise his virtues, and instruments which may enable him to effectuate his ends. Even unassisted and alone, though perhaps better with assistants, he can still think and theorize; possessing in the energies of his own mind the purest and most independent enjoyments. These enjoyments are valuable peculiarly on their own account, since they

terminate completely in themselves; whereas all practical virtue has, beside the practice itself, some distinct and separate end in view. The tranquillity of leisure is naturally more agreeable than the bustle of business; we toil for the sake of quiet, and make war for the sake of peace. But the practical virtues are most conspicuously exercised in political and military functions, the latter of which none but the most savage and sanguinary minds would submit to from choice, converting friends into enemies for the mere pleasure of fighting with them. Politics, too, forms an operose and troublesome occupation, which would not be undertaken from the sole love of exercising political functions, independently of distinct and separate ends; power, wealth, and honour; in one word, prosperity to ourselves, friends, or fellow-citizens. But intellectual energies are complete and perfect in themselves, supplying an exhaustless stream of pure and perennial pleasure, which in its turn invigorates and enlivens the energies, and thus increases and refines the source from which it unceasingly springs; all-sufficient, peaceful, and permanent, as far as is compatible with the condi-



tion of humanity. Were unalterable permanency added to such a life, its happiness would be more than human; but even within a limited term, its inestimable delights may be enjoyed by those who attain the perfection of their ages and faculties; living not merely as partners with a frail and compound nature, but according to the simple and divine principle within them, whose energies and virtues as far transcend all others as the intellectual substance in which they reside excels all other substances of which our frame is composed. We ought not, therefore, according to the vulgar exhortation, though mortal, to regard only mortal things; but, as far as possible, to put on immortality, exerting ourselves to taste the joys of the intellectual life. This is living according to the best part of what we call ourselves, which, though seemingly small in bulk, is incomparably greater in power and in value than all things besides. The intellect indeed is the best and sovereign part of our constitution, and therefore strictly and properly ourselves. It is absurd therefore to prefer any other life to our own. What was above observed will apply here. The plea-

sure and good of each individual must consist in that which is most congenial to his nature. The intellectual life, therefore, must be the best and happiest for man, since the intellect is that which is peculiarly himself."

Such is the translation of Dr. Gillies, in which, besides continual inaccuracy and presumptuous interpolation, the manner of the original is entirely destroyed. For where in this translation is any vestige to be seen of that most accurate and syllogistic method which so eminently characterizes the writings of Aristotle? Where is that invincible force of reasoning to be discovered which in Platonic language everywhere presents itself bound with *geometrical necessities*? (*γεωμετρικαὶ ἀναγκαί.*) Where that modest caution with which the Stagirite in this chapter, in conformity to his general custom, introduces the dogmas of his philosophy? And, if we turn our attention to the matter, we shall find it no less unworthy the beauty and profundity of the original. For instance, in the very first sentence, Aristotle says, "If felicity is an energy according to virtue, *it is reasonable to suppose* that it is an energy according to the most excellent virtue; and

this will be the virtue of that which is best." Compare this with the version of Dr. Gillies: "If happiness consists in virtuous energies, the greatest human happiness *must* consist in the exercise of the greatest virtue in man, which *must* be the *virtue* or *perfection* of his best part." Here the word *ευλογον*, "*it is reasonable to suppose*," is translated by Dr. Gillies "*must*:" and thus the modesty of Aristotle in this sentence is entirely destroyed. That the reader too may see how Dr. Gillies has deformed the most scientific method of reasoning adopted by Aristotle, let him compare the whole of the first sentence of the Doctor's translation with the original. For Aristotle's reasoning is as follows: "If felicity is an energy according to virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it is an energy according to the most excellent virtue. The most excellent virtue is the virtue of the best part; the energy of this part, therefore, according to its proper virtue, will be perfect felicity." Where is this geometric reasoning to be found in the following rambling translation of Dr. Gillies: "If happiness consists in virtuous energies, the greatest human happiness must consist in the exercise of

the greatest virtue in man, which must be the virtue or perfection of his best part, whether this be intellect, or whatever principle it be, that is destined to command and bear sway ; having knowledge of things beautiful and divine, as being either divine itself, or at least that principle in us which most approximates to divinity."

Again, compare the following sentence with the version of Dr. Gillies: " This energy, also (says Aristotle, *i. e.* the energy of intellect) is most continued: for we are able to *contemplate* more incessantly than to perform any action whatever." But by Dr. Gillies he is made to say, " The energies of intellect are also the longest and most continuous, since we can persevere in *theorizing* and *thinking* much longer than in performing any action whatever." By this version it is evident that Dr. Gillies had not the smallest conception of what Aristotle means by *intellectual energy*; and that he is himself unfortunately deprived of its possession. For this employment, as Aristotle observes in this chapter, is *an energy according to wisdom*; and wisdom, as he defines it in the sixth book of these Ethics, is " the intellectual

perception of principles and things most honourable by nature," ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῆ φύσει, καὶ νοῦς τῶν ἀρχῶν. And these *principles* and *things most honourable by nature* are the first cause and his divine progeny, as is evident from what we have already observed. By no means, therefore, does this energy consist in merely *theorizing and thinking*; for this may be easily accomplished by any one, and the power of performing it is not attended with the possession of *intellectual virtue*.

Compare also the following with the translation of Dr. Gillies: "Wisdom, says Aristotle, appears to possess pleasures admirable both for their purity and stability. It is reasonable also to think that those who possess knowledge live more pleasantly than those who *investigate*." "Pleasure, it was observed (says Dr. Gillies) must be an ingredient in happiness; but contemplative wisdom offers pleasures the most admirable in purity and stability, and the pleasures of knowledge continually increase in proportion to our improvement in it; certainty concerning the sublimest truths affording still higher delight in proportion to the in-

tense efforts of intellect by which they were discovered." Here much is added by Dr. Gillies, which is not only unwarranted by the original, but evidently shows that the Doctor has entirely mistaken Aristotle's meaning. For though it is true "that the pleasures of knowledge continually increase in proportion to our improvement in it;" yet this is not what Aristotle says, nor does it contain the smallest vestige of his real meaning. For Aristotle says, "It is reasonable to think that those who *possess* knowledge live more pleasantly than those who *investigate*." In which sentence the nature of *intellectual energy* is indicated by the opposition of the *possession* of knowledge to the *investigation* of it. For as *intellectual energy* consists in *direct immediate* vision of the *intelligible*, or the proper object of intellect, the *full possession* of knowledge is previously necessary to the exercise of this energy. Hence Aristotle, in the twelfth book of his *Metaphysics*, speaking of intellect, expressly says "that it *energizes possessing*.\*" He, therefore, who is capable of this energy, lives more pleasantly than him who *investigates*; because

\* Ενεργεί δὲ ἔχων.

*investigation* is laborious, but *intellectual* energy, from being *immediate vision*, is unattended with labour, and is necessarily accompanied with delight. What Dr. Gillies therefore adds, "that **certainty** concerning the sublimest truths **affords** still higher delight in proportion to the intense efforts of intellect by which they were discovered," has nothing to do with the meaning of Aristotle in this place, but is, as usual, introduced by the Doctor to conceal his ignorance and please the vulgar. Not to mention that Aristotle's modest form of expression, "it is reasonable to suppose" (*ευλογον*) is entirely unnoticed by the Doctor. The reader who is disposed to compare the remaining part of Dr. Gillies's translation of this chapter with the original, even if he is but moderately skilled in the philosophy of Aristotle, will find that Dr. Gillies everywhere deforms the *matter* of the Stagirite by unskilful interpolations, and completely destroys the *manner*, by breaking his geometrical chain of reasoning, in order, through the medium of popular diction, to gratify the public ear.

Having presented the reader with so many

specimens of deformities and inaccuracies, of important omissions and rash interpolations, in the translation of Dr. Gillies, I shall leave him to judge what opinion ought to be formed of the following assertion in p. 236 of the Doctor's Introduction to the first book. "*My aim throughout,*" says he, "*is to adhere rigidly to the sense of Aristotle; to omit nothing which he says, to say nothing which he has omitted!*" From these specimens, too, I would hope it is nearly obvious to every one, that in translating the abstruse or acroamatic writings of Aristotle, it is necessary to observe the most rigid accuracy and the most literal exactness. For such is the pregnant brevity of diction, such the syllogistic method uniformly adopted by the Stagirite in these works, that in translating them it is no less necessary to copy his *manner* than faithfully preserve his *matter*; since, from the scientific nature of the composition, the union between the two is so great that the former cannot be neglected without essentially injuring the latter.

Similar deformities, and equally numerous, might be easily selected from Dr. Gillies's translation of Aristotle's Politics; but



the specimens which have been already adduced afford, I trust, a sufficient proof that the Doctor is very far from having fathomed the profundity of the Stagirite's mind, and is therefore unequal to the task of transfusing that profundity into English.

And now, I presume, Dr. Gillies is by this time furnished with a sufficient answer to the following observation in the conclusion of his reply to my Strictures. "The nature and scope," says he (p. 229 of his Supplement) "of my literary labours are so totally different from those of Mr. Taylor, that it is not easy to understand how our roads could cross, or why he should step forth as my determined antagonist. Utility, common and vulgar utility, above which that sublime author proudly soars, was my great or rather sole aim." Had Dr. Gillies in his translation faithfully given the *manner* and *matter* of Aristotle to the best of his ability, had he discovered by his translation that he was a *genuine* lover of truth, that he was a candidate for honest fame, and not for the applause of the vulgar, my road, so far from crossing, would have been perfectly parallel to his, and I should have rejoiced to find

him running with me the same race, a competitor for the same honours, and tending to the same goal. But perceiving that Dr. Gillies, so far from having been a legitimate student of Aristotle's more abstruse writings, had not even discovered that they were composed with studied obscurity of diction, and that, through a presumptuous confidence in his own abilities, he despised the best of Aristotle's Greek interpreters without being in the smallest degree familiar with their works, and in consequence of this had mutilated and deformed some of the noblest productions of the Stagirite, I did indeed step forth as his determined antagonist. Such, however, being the real state of the case, is it difficult to understand why I should do so? Is it possible I could act otherwise, professing, as I do, the sincerest regard for truth, and believing it to be, as Plato says, the source of every good both to God and man? Could I patiently submit to see a work presented to the English reader as a translation of the Ethics and Politics of Aristotle, in which the sense is injured, and the beauty of the original deformed, in every page? especially as I professed myself a student of Aristotle, and

one who had employed no common labour for a considerable number of years in the study of his philosophy; gladly availing myself, in order to penetrate its depth, of every assistance that could be obtained, and not scorning the labours of his best disciples, through an unlawful confidence in the strength of my own mind, or a desire to gain a noble end by ignoble means.

But, after wondering that I stepped forth as his antagonist, Dr. Gillies adds, "that utility, common and vulgar utility, above which Mr. Taylor proudly soars, was his great, or rather sole, aim." Dr. Gillies is ignorant, I am afraid, that in the human species, as well as in every order of beings in the universe, there is a first, a middle, and last, that the progression of things may form one unbroken chain, originating from deity, and terminating in matter. In consequence of this connexion, one part of the human species naturally coalesces through transcendency with beings of an order superior to man; another part through subjection unites with the brutal species; and a third part, which subsists as the connecting medium between the other two, possesses those properties which charac-

terize human nature in a manner not exceeding, but exactly commensurate to the condition of humanity. The first of these parts, from its surpassing excellence, consists of a small number of mankind. That which subsists as the middle is numerous. And that which ranks as the last in gradation is composed of a countless multitude,

“ Thick as autumnal leaves that strow the brooks  
In Vallambrosa.”

In consequence of this beautiful gradation the most subordinate part of mankind are only to be benefitted by good rulers, laws, or customs, through which they become peaceful members of the communities in which they live, and make a proficiency, as Maximus Tyrius \* well observes, not by the accession of good, but by the diminution of evil.

If Dr. Gillies, by professing to aim at common and vulgar utility, means an endeavour to benefit this lowest order of the human race by disseminating among them truths of a nature so arduous and sublime, that they can only be understood by the highest class of our species, I own, and I glory in the confession,

\* See p. 19 of my translation of his *Dissertations*.

that I do soar above such an endeavour, because it is not attended with any advantage, but is no less idle than profane. But if he means by this an attempt to be useful to the middle class of our species, (for such the Ethics and Politics of Aristotle are calculated to benefit) I am no less anxious than Dr. Gillies to do good to this part of mankind by the publication of such truths as they are capable of understanding. A very considerable part of the Dialogues of Plato are largely calculated to accomplish this end; but in translating these I have not violated the meaning of the original in order to gratify the most subordinate part of our species, and sacrificed truth to vulgar applause.

And this brings me, in the last place, to an apology for the manner in which I have published to the world the philosophy of Plato in an English garb. It is necessary then to observe, that Plato, in conformity with the earliest philosophers of antiquity, delivered the abstruse dogmas of his philosophy obscurely, in order to conceal from the profane and vulgar eye certain sublime truths, which that eye may fancy it sees, but which it can never perceive in reality. That he did so is abundantly evident from the fol-

lowing passages extracted from his Epistles. In his second epistle, then, which is to Dionysius, he says : “ According to the report of Archidemus, you say, that I have not sufficiently demonstrated to you the particulars respecting the nature of the first (god). *I must speak to you therefore in enigmas, that in case the letter should be intercepted either by land or sea, he who reads it may not understand this part of its contents\*.*” The passage which then immediately follows is one of the most deeply mystical in all the writings of Plato ; but he who has penetrated its depth will acknowledge that it is no less admirable than profound, no less sublime than obscure. Near the end of this epistle also he observes : “ *For as it appears to me there are scarcely any particulars which will be considered by the multitude more ridiculous than these ; nor again, any which will appear more wonderful and enthusiastic to those that are well born †.*”

\* Φησ γαρ δη κατα τον εκεινου λογον, ουχ ικανως αποδειχθαι σοι περι της του πρωτου φυσεως. φραστεον δη σοι δε' αιγιματων, εν' αυτη η δελτος η ποντου, η γης εν Ιουχαις παθη, ο αναγνους μη γκω.

† Σχεδον γαρ ως εμοι δοκει, ουκ εστι τουτων προς Ιους πολλους καταγελαστοτερα ακουσμαλα. ου δ' αυ προς τους ευφρεις θαυμαστοτερα τε και ενθουσιαστικωτερα.

In his seventh epistle also he observes as follows: "Thus much, however, I shall say respecting all those who either have written or shall write, affirming that they know those things which are the objects of my study (whether they have heard them from me or from others, or whether they have discovered them themselves) that they have not heard any thing about these things conformable to my opinion: for I never have written nor ever shall write about them \*. For a thing of this kind cannot be expressed by words like other disciplines, but by long familiarity, and living in conjunction with the thing itself, a light as it were leaping from a fire will on a sudden be enkindled in the soul, and there itself nourish itself." And shortly after he adds: "But if it appeared to me that the particulars of which I am speaking could be sufficiently communicated to the *multitude* by writing or speech, what could we accomplish more beautiful in life than to impart a mighty benefit to mankind, and lead an intelligible nature into light, so as to be obvious to all men? I

\* Plato means by this, that he has never written perspicuously about *intelligibles* or *true beings*, the proper objects of intellect.

think, however, that an attempt of this kind would only be beneficial to a few, who from some small vestiges previously demonstrated are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars. But with respect to the rest of mankind, some it will fill with a contempt by no means elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope that they shall now learn certain excellent things \*.”

As Plato therefore promulgated the most sublime of his doctrines obscurely, in order to conceal them from the vulgar, but at the same time delivered them scientifically, in translating the writings which contain those doctrines it is necessary to observe the most

\* Τοσονδε γε μην περι παντων εχω φραζειν των γεγραφοτων και γραψαντων, οσοι φασιν ειδεναι περι ων εγω σπουδαζω, ειτ' εμου ακηκοοτες, ειτ' αλλων, ειθ' ως ευροντες αυτοι, τουτους ουκ εστι κατα γε την εμην δοξαν περι του πραγματος επαίειν ουδεν. ουκ ουν εμον γε περι αυτων εστι συγγραμμα, ουδε μη ποτε γενηται. ρητον γαρ ουδαμως εστιν, ως αλλα μαθηματα, αλλ' εκ πολλης συνουσιας γιγνομενης περι το πραγμα αυτο, και του συζην, εξαιφνης οιον απο πυρος πηδησαντος εξαφθεν φως, εν τη ψυχη γενομενον αυτο εαυτο ηδη τρεφει. — ει δε μοι εφαινειο γραπτα θ' ικανως ειναι προς τους πολλους και ρητα, τι ταυτου καλλιον επεπρακτ' αν ημιν εν ζω βιω, η τοις τε ανθρωποισι μεγα οφελος γραψαι, και την φησιν εις φως τοις πασι προσαγαγειν; αλλ' ουτε ανθρωποις ηγουμαι την επιχειρησιν περι αυτων λεγομενην αγαθον, ει μη τισιν ολιγοις, οποσοι δυνατοι ανευρειν αυτοι δια μικρας ενδειξεως. των τε δη αλλων, τους μεν καλαφρονησεως ουκ ορθως εμπλησειεν αν ουδαμη εμμελους, τους δε υψηλης και χαυνης ελπιδος, ως σεμν' ατ'ια μεμαθηκοιας.



rigid accuracy and the most literal exactness, in the same manner as in translating the acroamatic works of Aristotle. As all his dialogues too are the progeny of consummate science, he who in translating them presumes to omit some words and interpolate others, or to give what he conceives to be the general meaning of the sentences; and, in short, alters the manner of Plato in order to accommodate his matter to the multitude,—he who does this will inevitably destroy the profound meaning of the original, and obtrude his own rambling ideas on the reader for the scientifically accurate conceptions of Plato. Let him who desires to be convinced of this read any of those dialogues in my translation of Plato's works, in which the substance of the Commentaries of Proclus, Hermias, and Olympiodorus are given in the notes.

And here I cannot help remarking concerning these most excellent interpreters, and the latter Platonists in general, as they are called, how fully the prophecy of their divine master has been verified in the fate of their works. The prophecy I allude to is contained in the latter part of the extract just

cited from his seventh epistle, in which he observes, that the man who writes perspicuously on the sublime dogmas of his philosophy will only benefit a few who are able to discover these abstruse particulars, but that in others he will produce either contempt or arrogant hope. For these admirable men, in order to preserve the recondite parts of their master's philosophy to posterity, unfolded all that is sublime and mystic in the doctrines of Plato into the most pleasing and admirable light. For more than a thousand years, however, very few indeed appear to have been in the smallest degree benefitted by their labours; and I know of none that for this extended period may be said to have studied them sufficiently to derive all that advantage which they are largely calculated to afford. Hence, as I have elsewhere observed \*, "the beautiful light which they benevolently disclosed may be said to have, hitherto unnoticed, illumined philosophy in her desolate retreats, like a lamp shining on some venerable statue amidst dark and solitary ruins." And yet though these philo-

\* See the General Introduction to my translation of Plato's works.

sophers have been treated with such undeserved contempt by a pigmy race of critics and sophists, will any man undertake to prove, that since the age of Plato there has lived a philosopher of so much profundity as Plotinus, so learned as Porphyry, so skilled in the deepest mysteries of theology as Jamblichus, so acute as Syrianus, or who has unfolded such treasures of wisdom as Proclus? Till this at least is attempted to be proved let critics be silent, and cease to defame writings which they have never studied, and doctrines which they do not understand.

But to return from this digression. Let this then be my apology for endeavouring to translate the works of Plato with such accuracy and literal exactness,—that it would not have been otherwise possible to have preserved either his manner or his matter; and that he who attempts to translate them without diligently attending to the accurate meaning of every word, may indeed compose a book more conformable to modern taste, and more captivating to the vulgar reader, but his work will cease to be a translation, and will lose in faithfulness what popularity can never compensate. Let the following

also be my apology for having introduced into my translation of Plato certain unusual words of Greek origin—that as the most abstruse doctrines of the Platonic philosophy had never before been promulgated in English, there were no words in our language equivalent to their accurate meaning, and that a paraphrase of them could not be adopted, because they very frequently occur; that to introduce Greek terms into any modern language is to enrich that language; that every art and science is full of words derived from the Greek; and that philosophy, as being the mistress of all arts and sciences, has a much prior and more legitimate claim to this privilege.

And now again declaring that I have no personal enmity whatever to Dr. Gillies, and that what I have said against him has been solely dictated by a love of truth, I shall, most probably, take my leave of him for ever. The accomplishment of a task, no less arduous than glorious, will for some years occupy all my leisure hours, and call forth my most strenuous exertions—that of translating into English the whole of Aristotle's works, with the substance of the commentaries of his best Greek interpre-

ters. The completion of this Herculean labour will so fully engage my attention, that I shall neither have time nor inclination to attend to the defamation of Dr. Gillies, or any other writer who is a candidate for the honours of the multitude, and whose eye is not *solely* fixed upon truth. As this work too, when completed, will be published in a manner so truly independent, as to be, perhaps, without a parallel in this respect since printing was invented, I shall have nothing to fear from illiberal criticism or malevolent invective\*. That in such an age as the present both these should unite in opposing the labours of a man who neither writes for *hire* nor with any view to sordid emolument, is so far from being wonderful, that it is the necessary consequence of extreme corruption of manners and depravity of taste †. Divi-

\* The reader, who is desirous of seeing perfect specimens of such criticism and such invective, is referred to an account of my translation of Plato's works, in two fungous productions, one of which is called *The Imperial Review* and the other *The Literary Journal*.

† The hand of barbaric despotism having destroyed the schools of the philosophers for more than twelve hundred years, knowledge has become venal, and book-making a trade. Science on moral and intellectual subjects has been in consequence of this entirely lost; and through the attempt to make *every man wise in every thing* all *real knowledge* on the sublimest subjects of speculation has been lost.

nity, however, has manifestly declared itself in favour of my undertakings; has obtained for them the most noble and the most liberal patronage; has enabled me, while engaged in them, to struggle successfully with adversity; and has made situations highly unfavourable to the cultivation of the Platonic philosophy the instruments of its promulgation in my native tongue. Relying, therefore, with firm confidence on the continuance of that support, compared with which the strongest human aid is perfect impotence, I shall devote the remainder, as I have done a considerable portion of the former part of my life, to preserve to posterity the elements of the virtues and the rules of truth, committing these to writing for common advantage, as a paternal and immortal inheritance.

FINIS.

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