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


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ADDITIONAL
OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
DISCOURSE
OF
NATURAL THEOLOGY,
BY
HENRY LORD BROUGHAM,

INTENDED
TO DISPROVE THE DOCTRINE THAT THE IMMORTALITY OF THE
SOUL DEPENDS ON ITS BEING IMMATERIAL, AND ALSO
TO TRACE THE ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF
THE SOUL'S IMMATERIALITY.

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ADVERTISEMENT TO READER.

It is obvious that these Additional Observations relate to the same general subject, as those which the reader has had before him. It may naturally be asked why, therefore, the whole were not published together? The reason is, (and the reader is entitled to know it,) that it was after I had by the former Observations endeavoured to shew that his Lordship's *general reasoning* was fallacious—and after I had sent the sheets to press—that it occurred to me it would be useful to inquire more particularly how far authorities, and of what weight and character, could be found in support of his Lordship's *peremptory* and *positive* assertion, that the *immortality* of the soul depends on its essence being *immaterial*. I found that instead of being ALL *with* him, in that absolute and unqualified doctrine, they were *against* him, and that therefore his Lordship had failed not only in proving his main proposition, but in the *fact* as it related to the authorities. The search after authorities in support of the doctrine of *immateriality*, naturally disclosed much of the

history of it—*that*, too, appeared so little favourable to its general character, that in the whole of the subject I could not help thinking it would add greatly to the weight of argument on the main question, if *those facts* also were submitted to the reader. Hence these Additional Observations. The reader will judge of their value.

ERRATA.

PAGE.	LINE.	
1	.. 10	For <i>in</i> read <i>by</i> .
6	.. 12	After <i>be</i> dele <i>not</i> .
9	..	Dele asterisk in line 18, and place it in line 4, after, "notes."
17	..	In first note, for <i>appendix</i> read <i>supplement</i> .
..	..	Last line but one, dele "moral."
18	.. 9	For <i>more</i> read <i>mere</i> .
33	.. 11	For <i>præ-existence of mind</i> read <i>præ-existing harmony</i> .
51		In 6th line from the bottom, for $\mu\omicron\nu\omicron\mu$ read $\mu\omicron\nu\omicron$; and in 7th line read $\iota\pi'$ for $\alpha\pi'$.
51	.. 6	For 266 read 267.
55		In penult line read <i>strongest</i> for <i>stronger</i> .
80	.. 17	After "such" insert "as."
95	.. 1	For "corp" read "corps."
..	.. 2	For "meme" read "mesmes."
108		Last line, For "an immaterial" read "a material."
117		Last line, For "extended" read "extend."

OBSERVATIONS, &c.

SECOND PART.

IN the former part of the observations on Lord Brougham's discourse, I have endeavoured to shew that his *reasoning* fails in proving his main proposition—that the Immateriality of the human soul is *essential* to its future immortality. But he couples with this another proposition, highly important to his argument, and which he takes for granted, namely—that all the “doctrines,” in which, I presume, he means all the “authorities” that relate to its future state, make that immateriality the foundation

of its future immortal existence. His Lordship must have had in his mind, at the time of pronouncing this fearful denunciation, some qualification of it, which I am quite at a loss to comprehend—for, in my view (of course a summary one) of those authorities, or of the “doctrines” to which he refers, they appear not only not to be unanimous, or even, in the general, with him; but, on the contrary, whether we look to the opinions of the ancient Philosophers of the Grecian schools, or to the Latin Philosophers, Orators or Poets—or to the Christian controversialists—or to the Metaphysicians of the last or present century, those authorities appear to be—often conflicting—sometimes unintelligible from their obscurity,—and very generally expressive of the highest degree of doubt upon the doctrine; and that, finally in the silence of revelation on the subject, the mind of any unprejudiced enquirer must rest in the conclusion—that it is not within the power of the human mind, in its present condition, to arrive at truth. On a view of what I have already

offered on this important and somewhat novel doctrine of his Lordship, I incline to think that the error into which I believe he has fallen may be somewhat more clearly shewn by some further observations, which I therefore venture to submit.

No man who is a friend to his species can doubt that he who assists in placing the belief of a future state on a rational and firm base, renders a most important service to society. Natural theology may give an independent, and when judiciously cultivated, does afford, a most powerful aid to revealed religion in this great work ; it widens, while it strengthens the foundations of individual human hope, and protects, by additional safeguards, the peace and security of human society. But if Natural Theology is to render to mankind all the valuable benefit which she is capable of doing, she must act as the handmaid, not the rival or competitor of Revealed Religion. If Revelation be a cheat, and the doctrine of a future life, which it teaches, a fable or a phantom, let the philosophers of mind apply themselves

with honest and direct aim to expose the one, and undeceive us as to the other. In the present advanced state of knowledge, and with the aids which that advanced knowledge affords to the human mind to prosecute further the search for truth in every region into which the human understanding can penetrate, Natural Theology, as an independent science, may, possibly, teach a creed at once perfectly true, and, to a large extent, promotive of individual and social good. But if, as a false ally, she becomes a concealed competitor—if, while she professes to assist, she subverts, or weakens, or brings into doubt, the doctrines of Revelation, or any of them—if, instead of confirming and extending the hope of a futurity which religion promises, she weakens, embarrasses, trifles with, or narrows that hope, and by vain pretensions to superior evidence, diverts the belief of the great mass of mankind from simple and intelligible doctrines, in which they have placed their faith, to the unintelligible subtleties and sophistry of dark and mystic learning—she becomes a most dangerous, by

being the insidious, enemy of the peace, faith, and hope of society, so far as that society is Christian.

Do I attribute to Lord Brougham, in his theological work, such a motive or such a wish? Most undoubtedly not. I am fully persuaded he had none such. But I cannot but acknowledge that to a certain degree I do fear that his work is likely, from the high character of the writer, and the seductive eloquence with which it is written, to produce some such effect. It tends to do so, by leading every reader who may have leisure or taste for metaphysical inquiries—or may feel an interest in corroborating his religious opinions by the concurrent doctrines of Natural Theology, or, above all, that unhappy class “who,” to use Goldsmith’s definition of the *very* miserable, “by suicide, shew us that they have nothing left to hope” ; it tends, I say, to lead every such reader of this extraordinary disquisition, to deliberate, and without reference to Revelation, on this abstract and abstruse inquiry—“is my mind—is the human soul—*immaterial*?—is it

quite a distinct, separate, independent entity or essence, from the body—from matter, from all and every modification of matter—from every combination with material elements?” He who enters on this inquiry may, I think, most naturally reason thus—“This is to me a momentous question, for I am now told, by the very high authority of Lord Brougham, that if my mind be such distinct, separate, immaterial, independent essence, then *I shall live for ever*—but if *not*—if my mind be *not* indissolubly connected with my body—if that mind be not a *thing* separate from and independent of my body and bodily organs—from the brain which now throbs with the doubt—from the nerves, or other organ, which conveys to that brain the written words which I am now contemplating—then my *whole rational, mental being is annihilated on the dissolution of my physical frame!*—On this awful question, then, depends, *as to me*, whether there be any life after the present—the present! which may this hour end!—whether I shall continue to bear the

heavy load of accumulated ills, which urge me to despair, or instantly terminate those ills by the bullet or the knife! or, shall I rather, fearless of future responsibility, and certain of present power, seize on wealth and pleasure, which nothing but the cobweb of a human law now withholds from me?—shall I thus snatch at happiness, which tempts me, and laugh at despair, and justice, and humanity! Let me, however, yet pause—*is my mind immaterial?*—is it, indeed, clear and free from every possible modification of matter? If it be, then, indeed, I must *beware* of death, and of a judgment to come! But how am I to decide this vital question?—If I look to one class of philosophers, among whom are reckoned names eminent for extensive learning, great talents, and comprising some who were zealous professors of the Christian faith; and others who attained the highest reputation in a profession to which physiological learning and practical knowledge of the human frame are essential—I am told by *them* that the Immateriality of the Human Mind

is a senseless dream! and that mental power, the Mind itself—is material organization *only*. If I turn to another class of teachers, with no less an authority than Lord Brougham at their head, I am informed, without hesitation or doubt, that the human soul *is immaterial*; and that though they cannot account for the many apparently inexplicable phenomena which result from the supposed connection of the immaterial soul with a material body, yet one thing they announce as positively certain, that if the soul be *not* immaterial, it *necessarily* perishes on the dissolution of the material organs.”

“ In this discussion revelation gives me no aid; for it is silent on the point; and I am, therefore, now to decide upon arguments furnished by the natural light of human reason and science—by this Natural Theology, to which I am directed to resort whenever revelation is obscure or doubtful. The case, then, (the inquirer will say,) resolves itself into this—on what authority does Lord Brougham and his followers rest this doctrine of *immateriality*? I find the reason-

ing of his opponents simple, consistent, and uniform. I look into the authorities to which his Lordship refers me in his notes—I find them, so far as the ancient heathen philosophers are concerned, founded upon reasonings, partly unintelligible, partly incredible, and inconsistent with all the notions of deity—of the nature and origin of the human soul—which I have been taught to believe and rely on from my earliest youth—I find this doctrine derives no support from any portion of that great accession which has been made to actual knowledge within the two last centuries; and I further find the partizans of this doctrine differing from each other on almost every point. I find his Lordship, almost admitting in terms,* that Paley, whose character stands so high, and whose principal work his Lordship is about in this very volume, to illustrate, thought differently from him on the precise point in question. I find, too, that so far as inference may be made

* See 6th, 7th, and 8th Notes, annexed to the Discourse.

from revelation in the case, *that* revelation substantially contradicts him, inasmuch as it is silent on the limitation by which he confines future existence to the immateriality of the soul. Under such circumstances, (the inquirer may ask,) what shall I resolve? I lean to the materiality of the soul, for *I* do not feel that *wish*, that *hope* for immortal being,* of which I have heard so much; my misery makes present life a load—my vices would make future life, if there be one, an object of dread, not hope! In this doubt, then, on this momentous question, I shall take Paley for my guide as to the *fact* that soul is material; and adopt Lord Brougham as to the *philosophy* of the

* Is it not possible that we may state too strongly this longing after immortality, which we seem to consider as innate in man? May there not be multitudes who would gladly exchange the hope of future existence for deliverance from present ills, “hopeless want and incurable disease?” are there not many who willingly prefer the certainty of a continuation of present enjoyments here, to the chances of superior happiness in a future world? and are there not, also, *not a few*, who desire to prolong life here from a fear of what may ‘come hereafter?’

case, that being material, there is no future state!"

It was from a conviction that Lord Brougham's discourse had such tendencies as these, and was calculated also to perpetuate a fruitless controversy, that I was originally induced to devote some time and trouble in offering to the reader the observations which I have laid before him. In reviewing those observations, I feel that in addition, perhaps, to many other defects, they are deficient in having been calculated, merely to shew, that his Lordship had failed in some of the main arguments on which his most interesting positions rested; and also, in omitting to refer to any particular authorities on those subjects. I was, perhaps, misled into this by Lord Brougham's example, who had rested on his own allegation, that "all the doctrines" were with him. I have, however, since, looked a little more particularly, not so much into the question of the mind's *immateriality*, to which his Lordship particularly applied himself, as into that which I had chiefly pressed, and

would still wish to urge upon the reader's attention, namely, that whatever may be the *philosophic truth*, with respect to the essence of the mind, *it is a question not yet settled, and most probably, never can be.*

It is upon this latter head that I feel myself strongly impelled to lay before those who shall have read the former observations, a short detail of the opinions which have been avowed by, or are fairly extracted from writers of the highest reputation, who, within the last century and an half, have treated on the philosophy of mind. From those, and, indeed, from all that has been written on the subject of the *essence* of the human soul, I think two inferences clearly result: first, that the question is one which still remains undecided, and next, that though it yet stands free and unfettered by any formula of religious creed of any acknowledged sect of Christians, and so far may be a fit subject of metaphysical, physiological, or psychological inquiry, yet, there can be but little hope of a beneficial result from such discussion. Undoubtedly it has entered

largely into theological disputes, as if it properly belonged to that department of human science ; heated minds have frequently resorted to it as a topic of debate—have made it a stumbling-block—a supernumerary subject of controversy and discord, and added it to the already numerous points of difference among the more or less mystic professors of particular creeds: when theological hatred has happened to have a cool fit, it is always ready for immediate use, as a test of doubtful orthodoxy ; and there are always to be found some charitable advocates for unity of faith, who gladly use it to prevent controversial zeal from subsiding into peace !

Beyond opinion, however, it has never acquired any legitimate authority. Even when religious belief has been made the test of fitness for secular power or trust, the opinion of the soul's essence being material or immaterial has been suffered to remain debateable ground. No English University has yet refused the benefit of its degrees to non-believers, or non-subscribers to belief in this

dogma—nay, even in those recent and unedifying reciprocations of personal invective, which our legislative assemblies have lately indulged or tolerated, I have not yet heard that disbelief in the immateriality of the soul, has been used as a topic of personal reproach.

One very peculiar circumstance is connected with this controversy—generally one cites an authority to prove the affirmative or the negative of some particular proposition or doctrine. In the present case the purpose is not to establish or disprove, but to show the question incapable of proof on either side, and that therefore controversy should cease. But I do not on this account feel much apprehension. The names to which I refer are among those which even Lord B. will acknowledge entitled to high respect.—Locke, the founder of the British School of logics and metaphysics—Reid, Steward, Playfair, and some others to whose opinions they have referred with respect; their opinions shall be given in their own words; they will be found to concur, on the whole, in declaring the solution of this question

hopeless in our present state of being. I am quite willing, however, to admit that in discussing this and similar questions connected with the powers, faculties, and essence of the human mind, many a loose expression, and many an illogical and hasty inference may be found in those writers, indicating guess, conjecture, perhaps something like a *desire* that the mind of man might prove made of better stuff, if better could be found, than *mere matter* ! sometimes, too, not un-mixed with doubt whether the existence of mere matter itself, may not be quite as questionable as that the mind is immaterial. Whatever other impression those quotations may make on the mind of the reader, they will, I am persuaded, produce a conviction, that the opinion of Lord Brougham which I have presumed to doubt, namely—"that the immateriality of the soul is the foundation of all the doctrines relative to its future state, and that if it consists of any modification of matter, we have no reason for believing that it can survive the dissolution of the body," is an erroneous opinion ; and

that, on the contrary, Natural Theology itself, supported as that science has been, by the reasoning of those who have raised the physical and abstract sciences to their present eminence, and availed themselves of the moral evidence which they furnish—is now enabled to afford abundant hope of an existence hereafter, *though the mind may not be immaterial* ; an hope and belief which is, at once, the best possession of individual man, and his best support and protection in civil society.

Those authorities shall be followed by some remarks on the manner in which the doctrine of the immateriality of the mind has found its way into the Christian world, and a very summary view given of the extremely unsatisfactory ground on which it stands with respect to the ancient as well as modern authorities. Summary, indeed, and most imperfect, must a view of such a subject be, when given in such a sketch as this, and by one so little qualified for the task as I am ; but with all its imperfections, it may tend to elicit a more efficient

work, and by an abler hand, to prevent a useless waste of mental power and valuable time on an endless and fruitless labour.

In referring to *Locke* I might have contented myself with the acknowledgment made by Mr. Steward,* that 'he appears to have been far less decided than *Des Cartes* with respect to an essential difference between *mind* and *matter*, and has even gone so far as to hazard the *unguarded*† proposition, that there is *no absurdity* in supposing the Deity to have superadded to the other qualities of matter the power of thinking.' But I cannot be satisfied with this admission; the answer of Locke to the malignant and silly criticism of the Bishop of Worcester, given in the note, page 80 of the 2d vol. of the *Essays on the Understanding*, contains so much good sense and sound philosophy

* Page 87 of 1st Dissertation prefixed to Appendix of *British Encyclopedia*.

† 'Unguarded!' as if it were such delicate and dangerous ground even to suggest the *possibility* that OMNIPOTENCE could enable *matter* to *think*! or, as if it endangered the moral character of Locke even to impute it.

on this subject, and vindicates so fully the moderation and justness of his opinion on the reasonableness of believing that *matter* may be invested with thought, that I must give a few extracts from that incomparable argument. Locke in the text says—"We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any more material being thinks or no." To this is annexed the note to which I have alluded, and from which the following passages, bearing on the point, are selected.

"To what I have said in my book, to show that all the great ends of religion and morality are secured barely by the immortality of the soul, without a necessary supposition that the soul is immaterial, I crave leave to add, that immortality may and shall be annexed to that, which in its own nature is neither immaterial nor immortal, as the apostle expressly declares in these words,* For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality." * *

"Your lordship proceeds, It is said indeed elsewhere,† that it is repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge. But this doth not reach the present case; which is not what matter can do of itself, but what matter prepared by an omnipotent hand can do. And what

* 1 Cor. xv. 53.

† B. 4. C. 10. § 5.

certainty can we have that he hath not done it? We can have none from the ideas, for those are given up in this case, and consequently we can have no certainty, upon these principles, whether we have any spiritual substance within us or not." * * *

"Again, the bishop of Worcester undertakes to prove from Mr. Locke's principles, that we may be certain, 'That the first eternal thinking Being, or omnipotent Spirit cannot, if he would, give to certain systems of created sensible matter, put together as he sees fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought.'

To which Mr. Locke has made the following answer in his third letter :

"Your first argument I take to be this; that according to me, the knowledge we have being by our ideas, and our idea of matter in general being a solid substance, and our idea of body a solid extended figured substance; if I admit matter to be capable of thinking, I confound the idea of matter with the idea of a spirit; to which I answer, No; no more than I confound the idea of matter with the idea of a horse, when I say that matter in general is a solid extended substance; and that a horse is a material animal, or an extended solid substance with sense and spontaneous motion." * *

"But it is further urged, that we cannot conceive how matter can think. I grant it; but to argue from thence, that God therefore cannot give to matter a faculty of thinking, is to say God's omnipotency is limited to a narrow compass, because man's understanding is so; and brings down God's infinite power to the size of our capacities. If God can give no power to any parts of matter, but what men can account for

from the essence of matter in general ; if all such qualities and properties must destroy the essence, or change the essential properties of matter, which are to our conceptions above it, and we cannot conceive to be the natural consequence of that essence ; it is plain, that the essence of matter is destroyed, and its essential properties changed, in most of the sensible parts of this our system." * * * *

“ Let us apply this rule one degree farther. You cannot conceive how an extended solid substance should think, therefore God cannot make it think ; can you conceive how your own soul, or any substance, thinks ? You find indeed that you do think, and so do I ; but I want to be told how the action of thinking is performed ; this, I confess, is beyond my conception ; and I would be glad any one, who conceives it, would explain it to me. God, I find, has given me this faculty ; and since I cannot but be convinced of his power in this instance, which though I every moment experiment in myself. yet I cannot conceive the manner of ; what would it be less than an *insolent absurdity*, to deny his power in other like cases, only for this reason, because I cannot conceive the manner how ?” * * *

“ That Omnipotency cannot make a substance to be solid and not solid at the same time, I think with due reverence we may say ; but that a solid substance may not have qualities, perfections, and powers, which have no natural or visibly necessary connexion with solidity and extension, is too much for us (who are but of yesterday, and know nothing) to be positive in. If God cannot join things together by connexions inconceivable to us, we must deny even the consistency and being of matter itself ; since every particle of it having some

bulk, has its parts connected by ways inconceivable to us. So that all the difficulties that are raised against the thinking of matter, from our ignorance, or narrow conceptions, stand not at all in the way of the power of God, if he pleases to ordain it so ; nor prove anything against his having actually endued some parcels of matter, so disposed as he thinks fit, with a faculty of thinking, till it can be shown, that it contains a contradiction to suppose it." * * *

" I have been pretty large in making this matter plain, that they who are so forward to bestow hard censures or names on the opinions of those who differ from them, may consider whether sometimes they are not more due to their own ; and that they may be persuaded a little to temper that heat, which, supposing the truth in their current opinions, gives them (as they think) a right lay what imputations they please on those who would fairly examine the grounds they stand upon. For *talking with a supposition and insinuations, that truth and knowledge, nay, and religion too, stand and fall with their systems, is at best but an imperious way of begging the question*, and assuming to themselves, under the pretence of zeal for the cause of God, *a title to infallibility*. It is very becoming that men's zeal for truth should go *as far as their proofs*, but not go for proofs themselves. He that attacks received opinions with any thing but fair arguments, may, I own, be justly suspected not to mean well, nor to be led by the love of truth ; but the same may be said of him too, who so defends them. An error is not the better for being common, nor truth the worse for having lain neglected ; and if it were put to the vote any where in the world, I doubt, as things are managed, whether truth

would have the majority, at least, whilst the authority of men, and not the examination of things, must be its measure." * * * *

"As to self-consciousness, your lordship asks,* what is there like *self-consciousness* in matter? *Nothing at all in matter as matter.* But that God cannot bestow on some parcels of matter a power of thinking, and with it *self-consciousness, will never be proved by asking,† How is it possible to apprehend that mere body should perceive that it doth perceive?* The weakness of our apprehension I grant in the case; I confess as much as you please, that we cannot conceive how a solid, no, nor how an unsolid created substance thinks; but this weakness of our apprehensions reaches not the power of God, whose weakness is stronger than anything in men."

After these numerous quotations from Mr. Locke's answer to Stillingfleet, and for which I make no apology, considering the manner in which the doctrine of the soul's immateriality is forced upon us by the pressure of Lord Brougham's eloquence, I still would earnestly request the reader to peruse the whole of Mr. Locke's admirable vindication.

Next in order comes Reid—his character as a metaphysician and philosopher of mind appears to have been respectable, though not

* 1st. Ans.

† Ibid.

of the very highest order ; he was not made, nor indeed any of his successors, of such sterling stuff as Locke ; he had neither his sagacity, his boldness and strength of mind, nor his fearless love of truth.

Reid was in many points opposed to the doctrine of *Locke* ; he is not, therefore, a disciple implicitly adopting the opinion of a master, when he either concurs with *Locke*, or expresses doubt whether the immateriality of the mind can ever be definitely settled by the human understanding.

“By the *mind* of a man we understand *that* in him which thinks, remembers, reasons, wills ; the *essence both of body and of mind is unknown to us.*”—Vol. 1, a 5.

“We do not give the name of *mind* to thought, *reason*, or desire, but to that which thinks,” &c.

The *essence* of this mind, the reader will find by the import of the passages which then follow, “*is unknown to us.*”—p. 38.

Speaking of the hypotheses respecting the nature of the mind, he says—

“Now, though we may in many cases, form very probable *conjectures* concerning the works of man, every

conjecture we can form, with regard to the works of God, (the *mind* one,) has *as little* probability as the *conjecture of a child* with regard to the man.”—p. 43.

“The world has been so long fooled by hypotheses in all parts of philosophy, that it is of the utmost consequence to every man who would make any progress in real knowledge to treat them with just contempt, as the reveries of vain and fanciful men, whose pride makes them conceive themselves able to unfold the *mysteries of nature*, by the *force of their genius*.”—p. 47.

Speaking of the operations of the mind in perception, he says—

“We shall find many things in this operation *unaccountable*, sufficient to convince us that we know but *little of our own frame*, and that a perfect comprehension of our *mental* powers, and of the manner of their operation is *beyond the reach of our understanding*.”—page 75.

“The Supreme Being has seen fit to limit our power of perception, so that we perceive not without such impressions, and *this is all that we know of the matter!*” page 82.

Treating of the opinion respecting the seat of the soul in the brain, and of the *place* of spirits, and whether they have existence *in loco*, &c.—he says :

“After men had *fought in the dark* about these points

for ages, the wise part seem to have left off * disputing about them *as matters beyond the reach of the human faculties.*"—p. 105.

Speaking of *perception* from *external* objects—

" *Of the nature of those impressions we are perfectly ignorant, and they are conjoined with perception by the will of our maker.*"

" We perceive, because *God has given us the power of perceiving, and not because we have impressions from objects.* He has limited and circumscribed our power of perception, by such laws as to his wisdom seemed meet."—p. 108.

" *No other account can be given of the constitution of things, but the will of him that made them.*"—p. 115.

Comparing Des Cartes with Locke—he says :

" *They differed with regard to the essence both of matter and mind ; the British philosopher holding that ' the real essence of both is beyond human knowledge.'*"—p. 154.†

* Lord Brougham seems likely to convict Reid of an egregious mistake here, in point of *fact*. He is again gallantly leading us back to the *battle* !

† The following is an extraordinary specimen of the extravagance to which hypothesis and conjecture on this subject of the mental essence and powers has been carried :

" Of the authors I have met with," (says Dr. Reid,)

“ *Memory is an original faculty given us by the Author of our being, of which we can give no account but that we are so made! It is the inspiration of the Almighty that gave us this understanding.*”—p. 329.

“ *Our original faculties are all unaccountable; he only who made them comprehends fully how they were made, and how they produce in us not only a conception, but a firm belief and assurance of things which it concerns us to know.*”—p. 334.

“ *The body and mind operate on each other according to fixed laws of nature; it is the business of a philosopher to discover those laws by observation and experience, but when he has discovered them, he must rest on them as facts whose cause is inscrutable to the human understanding.*”—p. 368.

The following passages bear but indirectly on the point for which these extracts are given; but they are curious, and not unimportant, in showing the *uncertainty* of

“ *Dr. Robert Hook is the most explicit; he was one of the most ingenious and active members of the Royal Society of London at its first institution, and read lectures to the Society; in his lectures upon light, he makes ideas to be material substances! and thinks that the brain is furnished with a proper kind of matter for fabricating the ideas of each sense. The ideas of light he thinks are formed of a kind of matter resembling the BONONIAN stone, &c.*”—p. 155. (See other ridiculous notions of his.)

our knowledge and of its source, when the subject is the *nature* of the human mind. Speaking of a wild man, brought up without the society of any of his species, he says :

“ But all I have heard of agreed in this, that the wild man gave but very slender indications of the rational faculties, and with regard to his mind, was *hardly distinguishable* from the more sagacious of the *brutes*.”— Vol. 3, p. 112, 113.

Reid in the same passage, observing on the want of education in the lower orders, and that yet they are much superior in intellect to the wild man, says :

“ This difference is *wholly* the effect of *society*, and I think in a great measure, though not wholly, the effect of undesigned and *instinctive* imitation.”

“ Perhaps not only our actions, but even our *judgment* and *belief*, are in some cases guided by *instinct*—that is, by a natural and blind impulse.”

“ Some operations of brute animals look so like reason, that they are not easily distinguished from it; whether brutes have anything that can properly be called *belief*, I cannot say, but their actions shew something very like it; *if there* be any *instinctive belief* in man, it is probably of the same kind with that which we ascribe to brutes, and specifically different from that rational belief which is grounded on evidence; but that

there is *something* in man which we call *belief*, which is *not grounded on evidence*, I think *must be granted*."—p. 113.

"Man would never acquire the use of reason if he were not brought up in the society of reasonable creatures."—p. 113.

Reid, like Lord Brougham and others, gives *habit* as one of the instances of mental power ; he exemplifies as Lord Brougham does, by the extempore speaker, p. 119—he adds :

"I see no reason to think *that we shall ever be able to assign the physical cause either of instinct or of the power of habit* ; both seem to be parts of our *original constitution*—their end and use is evident—but *we can assign no cause of them, but the will of him who made us*."

Let the opinion of *Mr. Stewart* be now consulted on this question of psychology. He is *more than a single witness* ; he is *quasi judicial*, and above exception as a judge on such a subject, selected as he has been, by those competent persons who appointed him to transmit to posterity a representation

of the state of physiological and mental science at a period when a permanent addition to the learning of the last century was to constitute a Supplement to the British Encyclopædia.

His *first* dissertation, (first part, page 17,) furnishes a distinct denial of Lord Brougham's cardinal proposition, so often before cited—'that the future existence of the human mind depends on its being perfectly immaterial.' And not only does he give this distinct denial as his own opinion—he records it as the *universal opinion* of the metaphysicians of the period at which he was pronouncing his own judgment.

After having, in a preceding paragraph (in page 87) stated the opinion of Locke, as mentioned above, 'that there is no absurdity in supposing the Deity to have superadded to the other qualities of matter the power of *thinking*'—and observed, that the doubt had arisen from the supposed connexion of the *immateriality* of the soul with its *immortality*—he asks, in the next page, after some remarks on Dr.

Priestly's peculiar notions, (irrelevant to our present object)—

“ Where is the sober metaphysician to be found, who now speaks of the *immortality* of the soul as a logical consequence of its *immateriality*, instead of considering it as depending on the will of that Being by whom it was called into existence ?”

So far Mr. Stewart saves the immortality of the soul, *material though it were*, against the sentence of annihilation, pronounced by Lord Brougham's Discourse. But the future existence of it appears still more fully proved by the arguments which Natural Theology appropriately suggests, and which are clearly and impressively put by Mr. Stewart ; for, in adverting to what he (erroneously, I believe) conceived to be Dr. Priestly's notion, namely, that if the soul were *material*, the whole man must perish at death, he urges, that in arguing thus, he Dr. Priestly, “ neglected all the presumptions for a future state, afforded by a comparison of the course of human affairs with the moral judgments and moral feelings of the human heart ; and over-looking, with the

same disdain, the presumptions arising from the narrow sphere of human knowledge when compared with the indefinite improvement of which our intellectual powers seem to be susceptible, he tacitly assumed as a principle, that the future prospects of man depend entirely on the determination of a physical problem." And Mr. Stewart concludes his admirable statement of the argument by truly stating, that "the proper use of argument concerning the *immateriality* of mind is, *not to establish any positive conclusion as to its destiny hereafter*, but to repel the reasoning alleged by those who urge that its annihilation must be the obvious and necessary effect of the dissolution of the body."

I cannot help stating here a note for which we are indebted to the industry of Mr. Stewart, and which places in a very strong and clear light that which I conceive to be the meaning of those who hope for the immortality of the soul, whether it be *material* or *immaterial* in its nature or essence from the Deity. It is

a passage from the Select Discourses of John Smith of Cambridge, 1660, one of the oldest partisans of Des Cartes among the English philosophers, "We shall be content," he says, "with that sober thesis of Plato in his *Timæus*, who attributes the *perpetuation of all substances* to the benignity and liberality of the Creator, whom he, therefore, brings in thus speaking, you are not of yourselves *immortal*, nor *indissoluble*, [*αθανατοι ουδε αλυτοι*, &c.] but would relapse and slide back from that being *which I have given you*, should I withdraw the influence of my own power from you, *but yet you shall hold your immortality by a patent from myself*."

Mr. Stewart again in this page says :

"The hypothetical language afterwards introduced by Leibnitz concerning the human soul (calling it a living mirror of the universe, and supposing it to contain in itself the seeds of that knowledge which the progressive exercise of its faculties implied) is another impotent attempt to *explain a mystery unfathomable by human reason*."

Again,

"It is very justly observed by Mr. Hume with respect to Newton, that while he seemed to draw off the

veil from some of the mysteries of nature, he shewed the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy, and thereby *restored her ultimate secrets* to that obscurity *in which they ever did and ever will remain.*—“When the justness of this remark shall be as universally acknowledged in the *science of mind* as it now is in natural philosophy, we may reasonably expect that an end will be put to those *idle controversies which have so long diverted the attention of metaphysicians* from the *proper* object of their study.”

Speaking of the doctrine of the “pre-existence of the mind* and the *occasional causes*” of Malbranche and Leibnitz, Stewart says :

“The chief objection to the doctrine of occasional causes is, that it presumes to decide upon a question of which human reason is altogether incompetent to judge—*our ignorance of the mode in which matter acts upon mind, or mind upon matter*, furnishing not the shadow of a proof that the one may not act directly and immediately on the other, in some way *incomprehensible* by our faculties.”—1st Dissertation, 2d part, p. 41.

Here is an admission of a degree of ignorance much beyond that of the *essence of mind*, and extending even to the mode of its action on matter, or matter on mind,

* See Note I. at the end.

whatever may be the essence of either. To support this position of his, as to the extent of our ignorance of the nature of mind, he quotes with approbation a sentence from Gravesende :

“ Substantiæ incognitæ sunt. Jam vidimus naturam mentis nos latere : scimus hanc esse *aliquid* quod ideas habet, has confert, &c. sed *ignoramus quid sit subjectum cui hæ proprietates conveniunt*. Hoc idem de corpore dicimus ; est extensum, impenetrabile, &c. sed quid est quod habet hasce proprietates ? Nulla nobis via aperta est quâ ad hanc cognitionem pervenire possimus.”

When adverting to the discoveries of Newton, Mr. Stewart says :

“ In this way his discoveries have cooperated powerfully with the reasonings of Locke, in producing a *general conviction of the inadequacy of our faculties to unriddle those sublime enigmas on which Descartes, Malbranche, and Leibnitz, had so recently wasted their strength, and which in the ancient world were regarded as only fit subjects of philosophical curiosity.*”—p. 65.

Now among those sublime enigmas a chief one was the nature, essence, and origin of the human mind.*

* Though the following extract from Stewart does not go directly to the point which the former have been given

I cannot trespass farther on the reader by quotations of Stewart's opinion; what I have cited most abundantly answers the end for which they were intended.

There is, I acknowledge, another writer, who as public lecturer has professed to treat

to establish, yet its general bearing on the subject is important to show, that all the phenomena of mind are of *material origin*, though they who entertained this opinion firmly believed in the soul's immortality.

D. Stewart, first Dissertation, part 2, 5 vol. of Supplement to Encyclopædia, p. 18—

“The external senses furnish not only the *occasions* by which our intellectual powers are excited and developed, but all the materials about which our thoughts are conversant; or in other words, that it is impossible for us to think of anything which is not either a sensible image, or the result of sensible images combined together and transmuted into new forms by a sort of logical chemistry. That the *powers of the understanding would for ever continue dormant were it not for the action of beings external on the bodily frame, is a proposition now universally admitted* by philosophers.” And he cites also Mr. Harris and Lord Monboddo, the two most zealous and learned of Mr. Locke's admirers in England, as expressing their assent to the common doctrine—“that *all our ideas and knowledge are ultimately to be derived from sense and matter.*”

on the physiology of the mind—the late very popular professor of moral philosophy in Edinburgh, Dr. Thomas Browne. He does not appear so modestly to recede from the question touching the soul's essence, as Dr. Stewart had done. He certainly does profess to have settled it in favour of its *immateriality*. As my own mind is perfectly open to proof on that subject, and would most willingly receive and acknowledge it, if proof there were, I can only say, that in the abundance of Dr. Browne's eloquence, (and most fluent, popular, and eloquent he is,) I cannot find a shred of what may properly be called argument on this subject, which has not been successfully answered, over and over again; I am not, however, for this reason an opponent—on the contrary, if by the beauty of his composition, and the felicity of his amplification, he shall succeed with some, or many, in convincing them that the soul must be immaterial, even though he errs in this opinion, he errs at the safe side according to Lord Brougham's doctrine, both for his converts and society.

Another and a living writer has recently written, and written well, on this metaphysical question, Dr. Abercromie of Edinburgh, who has treated of the "Intellectual Powers." This gentleman considers the human mind in its essence *immaterial*, but with a modesty which generally is found to accompany talents and knowledge, does not treat as light the difficulty which such philosophers as Stewart and his predecessors have admitted to be incapable of solution, by the present limited capacity of the human intellect. He says in the very outset :

"The mind we know nothing of except from its functions—By means of the corporeal senses it holds intercourse with the things of the external world ; but of this connexion we know nothing but the facts : when we attempt to speculate upon its nature and cause, we wander at once from the path of philosophical inquiry into conjectures which are far beyond the proper sphere as they are *beyond the reach of the human faculties.*"

From Professor Playfair I shall give but one short extract, taken from his Dissertation in the second volume of the Supplement of the British Encyclopædia ; and shall then leave

the question on Lord Brougham's doctrine, to the reader's judgment.

Metaphysics, or metaphysical theology, were not the subjects on which it was Professor Playfair's province peculiarly to treat in this disquisition. His task was to give an historical sketch of the discoveries which had been made in natural philosophy, since the revival of letters. He details those discoveries; and what falls within the scope of his inquiry in that way, deserves, from his high character, the utmost attention.

The reader will also recollect that we are not now considering whether the human mind be material or immaterial, but *whether that question be one on which it is rational to hope that, in the present state of our faculties, we shall ever be capable of ascertaining the truth?* In other words, whether the human mind be capable of discovering, with certainty and truth, *its own essence.* The following extract, I apprehend, will afford valuable aid to the inquiry.

In p. 62 of Mr. Playfair's Dissertation, after stating and commenting on Bacon's rules for the advancement of scientific discovery, he observes that,

“Bacon placed the ultimate object of philosophy too high, and too much out of the reach of man, even when his exertions are most skilfully conducted. He seems to have thought that, by giving a proper direction to our researches, and carrying them on according to the inductive method, we should, for instance, become acquainted with the *essence* of *heat*, of *cold*, of *colour*, of *transparency*. The **FACT**, however, is that, in as far as science has yet advanced, *no one essence has been discovered*, either as to *matter* in general, or as to *any* of its more extensive *modifications*. We are yet in doubt whether heat is a peculiar *motion* of the *minute* parts of bodies, as Bacon himself conceived it to be, or *something emitted or radiated from their surfaces*, or, lastly, the *vibrations* of an elastic medium by which they are penetrated and surrounded.”—“An *equal degree of mystery hangs over the other properties and modifications of body—light, electricity, magnetism, elasticity, gravity*, are *all* in the same circumstances; and the only advance that philosophy has made toward the discovery of the *essences* of these *qualities* or *substances*, is, by exploding some theories, rather than by establishing any!”

Such is the *extent* of our knowledge as to the essences! Can it then be true, that visible tangible *matter*, and all its *qualities*—which

we touch, handle, taste, see, feel, and are affected by every moment of our lives—from which we cannot escape, for a single second, from the instant of our birth, till that of our dissolution—is it true that this matter, and its qualities, in which we have lived, moved, and had our being;—this matter, which constitutes the palpable and visible portion *even of our very selves*, and to the use and management of which the greater portion of the lives of the greatest portion of human beings that have lived, or now live, on the face of this globe, has been devoted; that *this matter*, and all its qualities, are, as to their *nature* and *essence*, perfectly *unknown to us*?—that with all the aids which the experience of revolving ages, and the accumulated knowledge that science assiduously, and in other respects successfully, cultivated, has given to our inquiries, we have not yet ever, as to this *brute matter* and its qualities, been able to make any advance towards *knowledge* of their nature and essence: and yet that, as to MIND—mind, invisible, intangible, accessible by no sense

but for its own purposes, residing where, if at all in space, it eludes alike the grasp of fancy and the penetrating sagacity of science—mind, omnipresent, ever, pervading, ruling, through man's little microcosm, yet never found to answer the appeal of religion or of philosophy as to the *nature* of its origin, or the *duration* of its existence—disclosing itself only by its acts of rule and will over the material world, but rendering no account to human authority—hourly extending its discoveries and its power through the whole visible universe, itself remaining *even to itself hitherto* an inscrutable secret! Can it be that of *this* Being we are called on to pronounce dictatorially, and with the confidence of actual knowledge, on its nature and its essence!

After reading these extracts it is scarcely possible to feel less than astonishment, that Lord Brougham should have taken up as a clear, ascertained, absolute, and unqualified truth, that the human soul is in its essence purely immaterial; and that, *if* material, there is no possibility of a future state:

That he should not only have formed such opinion as his philosophical one, but published it with the sanction of his high name, as one warranted and supported by “all the doctrines :”

That he should, not only have thus published it, but given it to the world as an indispensable and necessary article in the orthodox creed of Natural Theology :

And finally, that he should have chosen to do this in a work professing to explain and illustrate the system of Natural Theology of a philosopher and divine, whose opinion he, almost in terms, declares to have been directly on this point contrary to his own !

If surprise, amounting almost to astonishment, be raised by his lordship’s publishing this doctrine in such a way, and under such circumstances, our *curiosity* is excited in nearly an equal degree, when we inquire on what authority, or by what train of reasoning, Lord Brougham could have arrived at this absolute and unqualified certainty, on a question on which the learned world, ancient and modern, were thought to be nearly una-

nimous in declaring that *absolute scientific truth* was not within the reach of the human mind, and on which revelation was silent!

Could such a mind as Lord Brougham's, acute, searching, and, as a scientific man, cautious, and even fastidious it might be thought, in giving assent to any opinion, not coming with demonstrative proof; could *he* have taken up this often debated and never decided article of belief, from the loose, uncertain, vague, popular, and ill-understood opinion of the multitude,* or of the almost insane crowd of enthusiasts and heresiarchs, who swarmed respectively in the early heathen world, and in the first and dark ages of Chris-

* The 'multitude' have, it is admitted, always had, and most probably ever will have, some indefinite, but necessarily gross and inaccurate notions of the mind's nature and essence, as different from that of the body—those notions are almost the inevitable consequence of the universal belief of a future state of existence—but I apprehend it will appear, when the question comes to be fully and impartially examined, that the popular belief of the soul's immateriality, a belief, like many others, rather *professed* than *understood*, had its origin in the wild

tianity ? yet whence, but from these sources, or one of them, we may well inquire, can he have taken it ?

This pure immateriality of the human mind, as taught by Lord Brougham, is not to be found in the schools of the Greek philosophy.

It is not to be found in the doctrines of the synagogue.

It is not mentioned in the gospel, which so far from waging interminable war against material substance either in body or mind, declares it capable of, and raises it to a glorious immortality in the future state of existence which it holds out to the hope of man.

Neither is it to be found, as we have just seen, in the works of those philosophers of modern times, who, whatever their hopes, their wishes, or their doubts on this subject

doctrines of an heathen sect, earlier than the age of Socrates and Plato ; and which, with many modifications, became afterwards incorporated with Greek philosophy.

may be, have all declared that philosophic *certainty* on it is by us, at present, unattainable.

On a subject at once so curiously circumstanced, and in its own nature, so deeply interesting, may I not hope that even the indolent reader will accompany me for a very short time, while I offer a few arguments to shew that the observations I have just made are not unwarranted, and also perhaps point to a source from which his lordship's doctrine of immateriality may have arisen.

That his lordship did not take his Natural Theology in this instance from the Grecian school, is manifest from his declared opinion of the doctrine of those ancient sages on the point in question, as well as from the plain and obvious difference between their doctrine and his.

In page 263, in his note "*On the ancient doctrine of the mind,*" we find his lordship speaking thus :

"The opinions of the ancient philosophers upon the nature of the soul were not very consistent with them-

selves, and in some respects were difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of the *immateriality*, which most of them entertained."

And then he gives instances from Plato and Aristotle, which I shall advert to hereafter.

His lordship's observation is perfectly just ; but he might have added, in addition to the inconsistency of their opinion, that taking their doctrine as to the immateriality of the soul in connexion with their general opinions, they are found to be all combined with some atheistical principle ; or to be the result of their ignorance in physical science, for which their age, compared with the present, was remarkable ; or to arise from some ambiguity of language, resulting from want of precision in thought, on those subjects to which the language referred. Thus, it is acknowledged that the notion taken up by the Greek philosophers on the immateriality of mind, is traceable to the parent atheistical doctrine—viz. that matter was eternal, and co-eternal with the being which they *called* deity, though they

divested him of the peculiar and characteristic attribute of deity—omnipotence—and made him but the artificer in, not the creator* of the co-existing, co-eternal matter, and believed him as powerless to annihilate, as he was of creating, material substance, even in its grossest form.

It was consistent with these opinions, and indeed a necessary consequence of them, and of some other items, of a similar complexion, in their creed, that, as they conceived the thinking substance in man to be somewhat of a different nature from that of the body of the individual, and designated it by a distinct epithet,† *incorporeal*, there should follow, as there actually did, a belief that it was immortal a *parte post*, because it could not be annihilated, and also eternal a *parte ante*, because it could not have been created. It did not, however, follow that this thinking substance, though admitted to be different from *that* of body, was, therefore, an immaterial

* See quotation, p. 269—“Matter was not created but always lay ready for the artificer.”

† *ασωματος*.

entity in the sense in which the term is properly used; for, as to the *nature* of this immortal soul, it distinctly appears in numberless instances, that what they called *spirit*, (*πνευμα*) and which the modern reader is led to think was intended to designate an *immaterial* being, did really mean nothing more than some very attenuated species of matter—breath, air, &c. and which eluded sight, and touch. Indeed in the general view they seem to have of the soul's nature, it was *not* at all *necessary* to its immortality that it should be *immaterial*—for (as will appear below) they believed both mind and matter to be eternal, and, therefore, both incapable of perishing and of annihilation. This is expressly stated by Lord Brougham himself, 270, where he says—“upon the uncreated nature of things, (the doctrine extended to mind as well as matter) the ancient philosophers founded another tenet of great importance: Matter and Soul were reckoned not only uncreated but indestructible—their existence eternal, without end and without beginning.”

But his lordship has given us in his 6th note two passages—the one from the treatise *De Anima*, ii. 2, and the other from Plutarch, which show in a most remarkable way what very indistinct and confused notions were entertained of the nature of the soul. The first from Plato's *De Anima*.

“Those, therefore, rightly hold who think that the soul *cannot exist* without the body—and yet that it is *not* body; it is not the body but *somewhat* of the body.”*

The other quotation given from Plutarch, is—

“The soul is older than the body, and the cause and origin of its existence; not that the soul exists without the body, or the understanding without the soul, but that the soul is in the body, and the understanding in the soul.”†

Considering the point which his lordship was endeavouring to establish, it is not very

* και δια τουτο καλως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οἷς δοκεῖ μητε ἀνευ σώματος εἶναι μητε σωματί ψυχῆ· σωμα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶ, σωμαπος δὲ τι. p. 264.

† ψυχὴν αἰεὶ πρεσβυτεραν τοῦ σώματος, αἰτιαν τε τῆς ἐκείνου γενεσεως και ἀρχην.—οὐκ ἀν γενεσθαι ψυχὴν ἀνευ σώματος, οὐδε νοῦν ἀνευ ψυχῆς· ἀλλὰ ψυχὴν μὲν ἐν σωματι, νοῦν δὲ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. p. 265.

easy to see how these passages bear upon his subject, or are indeed at all intelligible—they prove, however, decidedly that whatever metaphysical learning they contain is not very valuable. Two other extracts, however, he gives in that note, which show the kind of notion those philosophers had of the *origin* of this *immaterial* being—one from Epictetus, which shows they considered souls as *portions* respectively of the divine essence, or *fragments of the divinity torn off from the divine mind!**

Another is given from Plutarch :

“ *The soul is not only his work, but part of himself ; it was not created by him, but from him, and out of him.*”

The Greek learning apart, I do not believe the friends to immaterialism can be either much gratified or informed by the citation of these passages to *explain* or to *reconcile* to modern understandings this

* συναφεις τῷ θεῷ ἅτε αὐτον μορια οὐσια και αποσπασματα. p. 266.

ancient doctrine! How very little instructive must it be to read, even in beautiful Greek—"that the soul *is* HIS WORK—but that it was NOT CREATED by HIM, but is *from* him, and *out* of him!"*

Lord Brougham, in his 7th note, 266, applies himself directly to give an account of the ancient doctrine respecting deity and matter, and states, what I have above mentioned, that those same metaphysicians who entertained such lucid notions as above described, touching the nature and essence of the soul,

"Clung to the notion of *matter* being *eternal as the deity*, and *co-existent* with the supreme power—that by *creator* and *artificer* they rather seem to have meant the *arranger of atoms*—the *power, giving form to chaotic matter*, than the power of calling things into existence—that they appear to have been all pressed by the difficulty (and who, he asks, can deny it†) of conceiving

* ἡ δὲ ψυχή οὐκ ἐργὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μονομῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος· οὐδ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀλλ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν.

† It would seem from this expression as if Lord Brougham were inclined to consider the act of creation as a fit subject for inquiry—for human comprehension

the *act* of creation—the act of calling existence out of nothing—that accordingly the maxim prevailed generally, that *nothing is made of nothing*, and that some of the older philosophers abolished all generation and destruction—for they held that none of the things which exist are either created or destroyed.”

He states that the doctrine of matter being uncreated, extended to MIND as well as matter, and that, therefore, *minds* were *eternal*, and that they were also indestructible; and from this doctrine Lord Brougham candidly admits the Greek philosophers derive the immortality of the soul, and also that this was the doctrine of Plato. “This,” his Lordship says, (and no doubt all his readers agree with him,) it must

as to the *modus operandi* of the Almighty power; surely no sane mind ever for an instant contemplated *that* idea without abandoning it. He who has not implicit faith in *that* without the aid of reason, must for ever remain in hopeless infidelity. Lord Brougham, in p. 95, has another expression which seems to confirm the above remark; he says—“How the Supreme Being made matter out of the void, is not *easily comprehended*.” To be sure it is not! Did any human mind ever entertain the presumptuous idea that it is possible to approach a comprehension of it?

be admitted is a most unsatisfactory way of deriving a future existence, and constitutes a very bad psychological argument!" His lordship *reasons to show* it bad, but I need not, I believe, detail the argument. Can it be possible that, when his lordship laid down his main proposition, that "by ALL THE DOCTRINES" the future existence of the soul depended on its *immateriality*," he could have had *these* most rational doctrines in his view, and reckoned them among his authorities!

In commenting on one of the extracts cited by his Lordship from Plutarch, he states, and truly, as the sum of Plato's doctrine, that he held the soul to be what he called an immaterial substance, "separable from any given body, and incapable of existing without some body or other—and the mind or understanding to be a *part* of the soul—the *residue* of the soul was its sensitive or mortal portion."

But this passage demonstrates that really and truly the soul of the Greek Platonic school as there described, must have been

material—for, as the soul was incapable of existing without *some* body, there could not be imagined a possibility of its existence in an immaterial state ; the inseparable union of it with body must amount to an identification with it—an inseparable co-existing sameness : there could not have been even a *moment* of transition* from one body to another in which it was *immaterial* ; for, in such a moment it would be *ex hypothesi* incapable of existing. On the whole, therefore, Lord Brougham's doctrine of an *immaterial* mind, subsisting quite *separate* from and *independent* of matter, must be admitted to be quite irreconcilable with this account of the soul of the Greek school, and can derive no aid or illustration from any of its tenets.

This passage indeed furnishes the best possible opportunity of showing how wide is the difference between what is really understood in the Discourse of Lord Brougham

* The Greek philosophers admitted the *transmigration* of souls.

and in Plato, by the *immaterial* soul ; and how little dependence is to be placed in opinions announced in such loose language.

For, first ; is this *immaterial substance* of Plato, the same with that which Lord Brougham assumes (p. 111) to be independent of matter," and to have "a *capacity of existence* without it?" Plato says *no*—for he alleges his immaterial mind to be "*incapable of existing without some body or other !*" Again :

Is *this* the immaterial soul of which Lord Brougham (p. 122) says—"the existence of the mind is entirely independent of the existence of body, and it depends not in the *least degree* upon the existence of the body?"

Is this mind of Plato the mind of Lord Brougham, which, because it is *immaterial*, is to survive the body and exist for ever, independent of it?

Is this the mind which Lord Brougham alleges he proves by his "stronger argument," page 123, to "exist *apart* from the body?"

Is it the mind which, page 124, “continues to exist, as before, after the body’s death”—after “the dissolution of the bodily frame, with which it was connected?”

Or are we to understand that Plato’s “Immaterial Soul” is one of a totally different kind from his Lordship’s, and that Plato’s soul *cannot possibly exist without some body or other, i. e. that the connexion of body with the soul of Plato is necessary and everlasting*—but that the immaterial soul of Lord Brougham can live everlastingly, separate and apart from the deceased body, and independent of it, in a state of happy widowhood?

If so—if they are different, why those learned quotations?—

“Quorsum hæc—tendant?”

It seems, therefore, indisputable on the authorities which Lord Brougham himself has referred to, (for I have only followed him) that his doctrine of pure immateriality derives no support from the Greek philosophy—whatever may be the value of its

opinion.* It is equally destitute, I think, of

* Lord Brougham himself admits, p. 94, that the Grecian Theists, as well as the Atheistical, were "pressed by the difficulty of conceiving the possibility of creation, whether of matter or spirit;" and that their inaccurate views of physical science, made them consider the difficulty as peculiar to the creative act, and that they were thus driven to the hypothesis, that "matter and mind are eternal, and the power of the Deity only plastic." Ought not this admission put an end to all reference to their opinions or doctrines, either as authority or illustration to any extent upon this question of the mind's essence, and, therefore, rid us at once of all the Grecian lumber, with which the subject is so often encumbered? Lord Brougham also admits, p. 95, speaking of the actual difficulties that not only embarrassed the Grecian philosophers in considering the essence and powers of the Deity, of the mind, and of creation—but that must at all times connect themselves with questions of this nature—"that in truth these difficulties meet us at every step of the argument of Natural Theology, when we would penetrate beyond those things (those facts) which our faculties can easily comprehend." Might we not, therefore, fairly expect from his Lordship, less dogmatism in asserting absolutely the immateriality of the soul? and still less as to its being "necessary to its future existence?" or, if not, a direct avowal on his part that, contrary to the declared sentiment of the whole philosophic world, this question to him is one of most *easy* and *certain solution*, is "one among those facts which our faculties can *easily comprehend!*"

aid from the *derived* philosophy of the Roman school.

Neither the physics nor the metaphysics of the Roman sages, philosophic and inquiring as they undoubtedly were, are sufficiently enlightened to serve, even as guides, in any one of the numerous difficulties which lie in the way of his doctrine. We collect from Cicero, in his Tusculan questions, in which is to be found a short but interesting view of the history and state of the original Latin Philosophy, that they had made some progress in eloquence, though it was but then lately that even their orators had any claim to learning : philosophy had fallen to decay and had produced no celebrated name; their writings and their writers had been rash and unlearned—“ *Philosophia jacuit usque ad hanc ætatem, nec ullum habuit lumen litterarum Latinarum—in quo magis nobis est elaborandum, quod multi jam esse libri dicuntur scripti inconsiderate et ab optimis illis quidem in viris non satis eruditis;*” insomuch that the writers themselves and their friends were generally their only

readers, &c. In that tract also, Cicero gives a summary view of the state of philosophic opinion as adopted among his countrymen, from their teachers, the Greeks. The reader will there find that by some, death was thought to be the departure of the soul from the body ; by others, that no soul was separated by death, but that soul and body perished together. Of those who believed “ that the soul was separated by death from the body, some thought, that it was immediately dissipated in air, and thus ceased to exist—others that the soul continued to subsist for a long time—others, for ever.” As to the nature of the soul, he states, there was a great diversity of opinion—some conceived it to be the heart, others the blood or life-blood of the heart—others, that a part of the brain was its seat. Zeno the Stoic thought the essence of the soul was fire. These opinions had, however, it seems, become somewhat vulgar, and Aristoxenes, who had been a musician and a philosopher, placed the essence of the soul in a certain *harmony* between the parts of the body, its feelings, properties, mind, &c.

a doctrine which, he says, singular as it was, had been taken into Plato's consideration, and explained by him. Xenocrates afterwards made the soul consist in *number*, the virtue and force of which had been taught by Pythagoras to be most powerful. Plato was stated to have believed in a *threefold* soul—the chief, Reason, he placed in the head as its citadel; to the two other parts, Anger and Desire or Cupidity, he gave separate quarters—anger, in the breast—cupidity, in a lower station, *subter præcordia*. Other philosophers, he said, denied that man had any soul, and that all the force or power (*vis*) by which man is enabled to act or feel, was equally diffused, and existing in every part of the body—inseparable from the body, because in fact it was not a separate entity, &c. &c. Aristotle, he described as having believed in four distinct principles or elements, of, or from which, all things consisted or were produced—and that there was a fifth to which he gave no name, and of which the mind consisted, invested with all those powers which we call mental

or intellectual. These, Cicero says, are all the opinions touching the soul which he could recollect ; for as to Democritus, who made the soul consist of *light and round particles, tossed together in a fortuitous chance way*, though he calls him, ‘ a great man !’ he would not let his doctrine enter into his enumeration.* He concludes it by

* This exposé by Cicero of the philosophy of his age, so important in several respects, I give in the original.

“Sunt enim, qui discessum animi a corpore putent esse mortem. sunt, qui nullum censeant fieri discessum, sed una animum et corpus occidere, animumque cum corpore exstingui. qui discedere animum censent, alii statim dissipari, alii diu permanere, alii semper. Quid sit porro ipse animus, aut ubi, aut unde, magna dissensio est. aliis cor ipsum, animus videtur : ex quo excordes, vecordes, concordesque dicuntur : et Nasica ille prudens, bis consul, Corculum, et

Egregie cordatus homo catus Æliu' Sextus.

Empedocles animum esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem. aliis pars quædam cerebri visa est animi principatum tenere. aliis nec cor ipsum placet, nec cerebri quandam partem, esse animum : sed alii in corde, alii in cerebro dixerunt animi esse sedem, et locum. animum autem alii animam, ut fere nostri declarant nomen. nam et agere animam et efflare dicimus, et animosos, et bene animatos, et ex animi sententia : ipse autem

saying—"Which of these opinions is *true*, some god only can tell us."

animus ab anima dictus est. Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur. Sed hæc quidem, quæ dixi, cor, cerebrum, animam, ignem, vulgo: reliqua fere singuli, ut multi ante veteres. Proxime autem Aristoxenus, musicus, idemque philosophus, ipsius corporis intentionem quandam, velut in cantu, et fidibus, quæ harmonia dicitur, sic ex corporis totius natura, et figura, varios motus cieri, tamquam in cantu sonos. Hic ab artificio suo non recessit, et tamen dixit aliquid, quod ipsum quale asset, erat multo ante et dictum, et explanatum a Platone. Xenocrates animi figuram, et quasi corpus, negavit esse, verum numerum dixit esse, cujus vis, ut jam antea Pythagoræ visum erat, in natura maxima esset. ejus doctor Plato triplicem finxit animam: cujus principatum, id est rationem, in capite, sicut in arce, posuit: et duas partes parere voluit, iram et cupiditatem: quas locis disclusit; iram in pectore, cupiditatem subter præcordiâ locavit. Dicæarchus autem in eo sermone, quem Corinthi habitum tribus libris expouit, doctorum hominum disputantium, primo libro multos loquentes facit: duobus Pherecratem quendam Phthiotam senem, quem ait a Deucalione ortum, disserentem inducit, nihil esse omnino animum, et hoc esse nomen totum inane, frustra que animalia, et animantes appellari; neque in homine inesse animum, vel animam, nec in bestia: vinque omnem eam, qua vel agamus quid, vel sentiamus, in omnibus corporibus vivis æquabiliter esse fusam, nec separabilem a corpore esse, quippe quæ

In the same tract, ch. 17, 1st Tus. Quest. we have a further sample of the physical and metaphysical learning of the Roman sages.

“Eam porro naturam esse quatuor omnia gignentium corporum, ut quasi partita habeant inter se, et divisa momenta: terrena et humida suo pte nutu, et suo pondere ad pares angulos in terram, et in mare ferantur; reliquæ duæ partes, una ignea, altera animalis, ut illæ

nulla sit, nec sit quidquam, nisi corpus unum, et simplex, ita figuratum, ut temperatione naturæ vigeat, et sentiat. Aristoteles longe omnibus (Platonem semper excipio) præstans et ingenio, et diligentia, cum quattuor illa genera principiorum esset complexus, e quibus omnia orirentur, quintam quandam naturam censet esse, e qua sit mens. cogitare enim, et providere, et discere, et docere, et invenire aliquid, et tam multa alia meminisse, amare, odire, cupere, timere, angere, lætari: hæc, et similia eorum, in horum quattuor generum nullo inesse putat. quintum genus adhibet, vacans nomine: et sic ipsum animum, ἐντελεχίαν appellat novo nomine, quasi quandam continuatam motionem, et perennem. Nisi quæ me forte fugiunt, hæc sunt fere omnium de animo sententiæ. Democritum enim magnum quidem illum virum, sed lævibus et rotundis corpusculis efficientem animum concursu quodam fortuito, omittamus. nihil est enim apud istos, quod non atomorum turba conficiat. Harum sententiarum quæ vera sit, deus aliquis viderit: quæ verisimillima, magna quæstio est.”—1st Tus. Ques. ch. 9.

superiores in medium locum mundi gravitate ferantur et pondere, sic hæc rursum rectis lineis in cælestem locum subvolent, sive ipsa natura superiora appetente, sive quod a gravioribus leviora natura repellantur. quæ cum constant, *perspicuum debet esse, animos, cum e corpore excesserint, sive illi sint animales, id est spirabiles sive ignei, in sublime ferri.* Si vere aut *numerus quidam sit animus* quod subtiliter magis, quam dilucide dicitur, aut *quinta illa non nominata magis, quam non intellecta natura;* multo etiam integriora, ac puriora sunt, ut a terra longissime se efferant. horum igitur aliquid animus est, nec tam vegeta mens aut in corde, cerebrove, aut in Empedocleo sanguine demersa jaceat.”

It would be perfectly idle to give any further instances of the state of philosophical opinion upon this head, from any other of the Roman writers or orators; and as to the Roman poets, the doctrine of Lucretius is too well known to make any reference to it necessary or desirable.

When we consider the character and tenets of the Greek philosophy as to mind, even as they are given by Lord Brougham in corroboration or explanation of his theory, one is almost necessarily led to ask, why it is that the metaphysicians of the Greek schools should be ever referred to, as autho-

rity, by a metaphysician, or natural theologian of the present day? The differences are so broad, so prominent, so irreconcilable, between the Grecian opinions on those subjects, and ours, that it is scarcely possible they can materially illustrate or assist each other. Of those differences we, at least, have reason to be proud, for whether it be a blessing which we derive from revelation, or the natural progress of reason operating on, or improved by the experience of so many centuries, it cannot be doubted, at least by *us*, that our system of Natural Theology, teaching as it does, the unity, the power, and the attributes of the Deity, and his moral government of the world, are beyond measure, more consonant to truth and reason than were those of Greece, upwards of two thousand years since. Even if the light of revelation had not shone upon us, it is most probable we should in this respect be much, indeed, in advance of the Grecian sages of Plato's age; for in every science and art, in every pursuit in which the mind of man can engage, so far as science can promote

individual or social happiness, none can be so ignorant or so sceptical as to deny that we stand infinitely beyond the point at which Greece stood in the time of Plato and Aristotle. As to metaphysical science—the knowledge of mind, its origin, nature, powers, and future destiny, &c.—it cannot be doubted by any who are competent to form a right judgment, that just in proportion as we possess more sound, true, and extensive physical science, in the same proportion are we likely to advance in metaphysical researches: must not the present age, therefore, be more likely to expose the errors, or correct the metaphysics of ancient Greece, or of any other ancient school referred to for our improvement, than *they* are to instruct us? Useful scientific learning of all kinds, (and I include Natural Theology) was with them in its infancy—with us it has grown into full and ripe manhood; why should we be driven back to the ignorance or the follies of childhood? why should we—rejoicing in the confidence of consistent truth, while we worship one God, “the creator and preserver

of all men," and of the universe of which they form a part, recur for fact or for science to the monstrous and palpable falsehoods of Polytheism, because they are recorded in the beauties of classical Greek? why with Natural Theology in the state in which we possess it, (even with the alleged disparagement which Lord Brougham adverts to,) founded on the ascertained truths of physical science accumulated during three and twenty centuries, giving us incomparably juster and wider views of the designs of the Deity, and the duties and destinies of man; why should we resort for aid in religion or metaphysics to the darkness, and doubts, and ignorance of a remote age, of which every extant record is but a monument of its errors on those subjects! To Greece indeed we may, and must at all times recur with advantage, for the unexampled accuracy and refinement of language—for exquisite simplicity, taste and beauty in composition—for the incomparable efforts and models of eloquence which they furnish—and for examples of public virtue, patriotism

and valour ! In most, if not all of these, they were our masters—from them we have derived all that we possess in those arts, if not in those virtues, and to them we may always successfully resort to add to our acquisitions ; but for religious, scientific, or metaphysical knowledge, we have outstripped them, even beyond the proportion which our age bears to theirs. If it be said, that the references to Greek philosophy in Lord Brougham's Discourse, were not made with a view either to authority or illustration, but to gratify or satisfy critical taste or curiosity, (and it is probable they were so,) the motive, then, is, no doubt, *blameless* ; but it would have been *laudable*, had it been to expose or ridicule the folly of recurring to remote antiquity, to investigate or to illustrate the essence of the human soul.*

* If I am asked, do I then think lightly of the immense accumulation of learning—of the incredible industry—unparalleled acuteness, and almost miraculous power of comprehension of *Aristotle*, in whom, it is said, is to be found all the learning of all the ages which had gone before him : I would venture to answer—

But it appears to me, that those references by Lord Brougham to the Grecian doctrine calls for yet another observation—they are in fact authorities substantially against the propositions he seeks to support. There can be no doubt, I think, that those opinions of Plato and Aristotle were referred to for the purpose of at least giving some strength to his argument, that the soul is *immaterial*, and that *because* of its *immateriality* it is immortal ;—for *that* is his Lordship's main doctrine. I come to this conclusion because, in his 6th note, he states in the outset, that “Plato and his pupil, Aristotle, may cer-

that I consider him a fine, perhaps the finest, monument of mental power in all antiquity ; for admiration, however, rather than practical use, to a people removed from him, as we are, by four and twenty centuries ; and I would adopt for the rest of my answer what is said of him by one of his late editors—“Non ego is sum cui Aristotelem in pristinum regnum reducere animus sit—*maneant ille in loco suo, nec in rempublicam philosophorum imperium exercent, insunt in ejus scriptis quæ legentis animum etsi ab ejus philosophandi ratione alienissimum, alligant tamen, teneant et enutrient.*”—In Preface to Buhle's Edition, Biponti, 1791.

tainly be said to have *held the soul's immateriality*, at least that it was of a nature *wholly different from the body*," and to shew this, he refers to the Greek passages bearing on that point. And in his 7th and 8th notes, he introduces passages from their writings, to show that they believed *mind* as well as *matter* were not *created* but *eternal a parte ante*, and that the soul was *immortal* because indestructible, not having been created. In short, the three notes, and these Greek quotations, in my view of them were thus introduced for the purpose of proving, as I have mentioned—first, that the soul is immaterial, and secondly, that being immaterial, and also indestructible, it is therefore, immortal. Now in both these respects, they egregiously fail him, if such were his object; for the quotations in the 6th note, which have the appearance of showing *immateriality*, may possibly only indicate that loose and popular notion of it, which relates to things, *not palpable to sense*, &c. but most clearly shew the *materiality* of the soul, or its *necessary* connexion with matter—and the

quotations in the 7th and 8th notes only show the *immortality* of it, by showing, what I presume he will not admit, that it is *not created*, but co-eternal with *matter* and the Deity. It follows, that if Lord Brougham does not admit the ground of those arguments which he produces from the Greeks, namely, the pre-existence of the soul with its *immateriality*, and connect its *immortality* with its being co-eternal with matter and the Deity, he must give up the doctrine derived from his notes, as authorities against him.*

* Would it not seem more useful if the advocates for the immateriality of the mind, with reference to its immortality, should apply themselves to an inquiry after the *origin* of the soul, rather than after its immateriality: for if it were once made apparent that the mind pre-existed, or was eternal, the question as to its *immateriality* would then become comparatively less important, for, if its *pre-existence* independent of the body was established, whether by earlier creation, or by being of itself eternal, no argument could arise against its *immortality* on the principle of Lord Brougham, for it would then be plain that its *duration* would not necessarily cease with the organization of the body, as it had derived its origin independent of it.

It is very truly said by Gibbon, that—"Four differ-

If then it be not from the Grecian or Roman philosophy, or from any indisputable or admitted principle warranting the doctrine for which Lord Brougham contends, (none such appears in the Discourse,) from whence is it that this doctrine has arisen, and how is it that he thinks himself warranted in saying, “that all the doctrines establish his proposition.”

ent opinions have been entertained concerning the origin of human souls. First—That they are eternal and divine. Second—That they were created in a separate state of existence, before their union with the body. Third—That they have been propagated from the original stock of Adam, who contained in himself the mental as well as the corporeal seed of his posterity. Fourth—That each soul is occasionally created and embodied in the moment of conception.”

It is a question worthy of consideration for the *curious* or the *incredulous* in this matter, whether the chance of finding *certainty*, in such a search be more likely than in that in which Lord Brougham is at present engaged—I only venture humbly to suggest the consideration of it. Gibbon in his usual style, slyly says—“The last of those sentiments appears to have prevailed among the moderns, and that our spiritual history is grown less sublime, without becoming more intelligible.”

I am willing to admit that what has been called immateriality, has been attributed to the soul by many ancient, and some of the most respected names in the philosophic world ; but we have already seen from the passages cited by Lord Brougham himself, and indeed he admits, that the immateriality of the ancients was not that which is now properly so called, but a loose, popular, ill-defined, and unphilosophical immateriality, and which, he now also admits, would not support or correspond with that quality which he attributes to the mind in his treatise, or to which his argument refers.* Much of the difficulty of the inquiry arises from this ambiguity ; and had not his Lordship

* Besides the many instances which occur in the Discourse, and elsewhere, of this popular immateriality, being that which was understood and spoken of by philosophers and Christian writers, take the following—Herodotus defines even the Deity as a *subtile* and *swift substance*, Cudworth, 505. Democritus states it to be of the form of *fire*, *εμπυροειδη*—Plutarch de placitis Philos. lib. 1. Origen in his Prin. speaking of *ασωματος*, describes *incorporeal* to mean subtile bodies, Plut. *ibid*. Austin believed that there was a *spiritual matter*, out

alleged a necessary connexion between *proper* immateriality and the future immortal existence of the soul, neither this difficulty, nor indeed any thing connected with that question, would have made any very elaborate investigation necessary. If the question as to the nature of the mind were proposed, merely as one of metaphysics or psychology, it might be discussed in the same tone and spirit as other philosophical questions are, and probably men would soon become pretty generally agreed, (as all the modern authorities, except his Lordship, seem to be,) that the inquiry must be fruitless. But when it is sought in a theological work, and by high authority, to persuade mankind, that if they cannot be

of which God made souls, *ibid.* Porphyry and Iamblicus say—*angels* and *dæmons* are made of matter—Encyclopædia, head, “Immateriality.”

The Stoics (according to Mrs. Carter’s Translation of Epictetus) define *all essences* to be *body*, and held the eternity of *matter*, but that it was plastic and passive. Indeed the instances in which the word is so used are numberless.

assured that the soul is immaterial in its essence, neither can they have any hope of a future life, then indeed, it behoves us to inquire with an anxiety proportioned to the value of immortality itself, *what is the soul's essence, and what is the foundation of this most alarming doctrine?* perhaps one might more properly say, the inquiry should be, in the first instance at least, on the latter point only—for if it shall be found, that there is no necessary connexion between the two things, the question as to the immateriality of the soul's essence, would still be one rather of metaphysical curiosity, than of deep interest. It may not, however, be found easy, practically, to separate the questions; for philosophy and religion, from the earliest records which we have of either, have been constant and anxious in inquiry into the *origin* as well as the *future* fate of the intellectual part of our nature; though I am induced to think that a fair inquirer who should be appealed to at the present day on the subject, would truly say, that independent of the aid of revelation, the researches

of philosophy have produced no result. The most powerful minds which have ever appeared among mankind, applying themselves to those inquiries, without aid extrinsic to their natural faculties, or information from higher sources, than those naturally within their reach, have produced theories, and fancies, and systems, incongruous, inconsistent, absurd, and incredible by sober reason. Lord Brougham has himself brought within our view, from the philosophy of Greece, specimens of the result of their labours, elaborated by the sagacity, the acuteness, the learning, and all that have been called the divine powers of Plato and Aristotle, and that too after coming fresh from the lectures and wisdom of Socrates and his dæmon, in the same field of knowledge ; we have seen in these opinions, and systems, what miserable morsels of intelligence philosophy was enabled to afford us on the origin and future fate of the soul of man !

.. One might have thought that this would teach the natural theologian—the

priest of the religion of nature! at least this useful lesson; that confining himself, as behoves him, to sources of knowledge which nature and human science alone afford him—he should feel and admit, that the origin, essence, and future fate of the soul is far beyond his power to teach; that *he* has not been admitted to the counsels of the Deity; and that *these* are among the “secret things belonging to HIM,”—that upon these, what he has thought fit to reveal, and *that only* can man know.

The doctrine of Lord Brougham, obviously comprising as it does, the two propositions of which we have been speaking—that of the immaterial essence of the mind, and its necessary connexion with immortality—to trace these doctrines from their origin, and through their progress till now, would be a work of no little labour, and requiring talents and learning, which do not belong to me—nor could such an inquiry be comprised in a sketch like this; there may, however, be some obvious remarks suggested even here, with some probability perhaps,

of throwing light upon a subject which his lordship has made so interesting.

With respect to the question on the soul's essence, without reference to its future existence—it appears tolerably clear, I conceive, that when the question between the ancients and the philosophers of the present day, is confined to the immateriality of the soul, they very seldom do really discuss the same question ; for, in fact, the ancient and the modern philosophers, when treating of this essence of the mind, most generally speak of two essentially different things—they use indeed the same expression, but they do not annex to it the same idea, when they profess to assert or deny the soul's *immateriality*. This has already, to a certain degree, appeared, nor is it necessary further to dwell on it.

Now it follows from this, that when we are inquiring into the origin of the present doctrine (Lord Brougham's) of the immateriality of the soul, it is by no means necessary for us to examine when *immateriality*, in the former loose, inaccurate

and unphilosophical sense of the word, was considered as an essential attribute of the human mind : but the question is, when did it become a received doctrine, that the essence of the soul was a *strict and philosophical immateriality* ? having, to use his lordship's emphatic language—“no material part, not consisting of any modification of matter, and disconnected from any combination of material elements.” On this subject it is most remarkable that Lord Brougham has not shown by any reference, nor indeed by any argument, that the *immateriality* of the soul, in *this* sense of the word, was at any particular time, or among any particular people, an admitted doctrine ; those who so believed on the supposed authority of revelation, would necessarily be excluded on a discussion of the question as a principle of Natural Theology ; but it certainly is singular that he does not actually (I do not mean to say that he could not) produce any other instances than those ambiguous Greek passages which he has given in his notes. I particularly mention

this to show, that from the nature of such an inquiry, and from his silence on it, it becomes evident, that to trace such a belief to its origin is a matter of difficulty; indeed this is so, whether the attribute of immateriality be taken in its strict, or even in its popular sense; if the doctrine were considered without reference to its new adjunct, the *immortality* of the soul, it was one well calculated to grow gradually and silently into a distinct article of popular belief, even if those causes to which I shall advert, had not existed; it might have been the offspring of that innate pride of our nature, which delights in glorifying itself by claiming high descent, and close relation, to the Deity; such being, as the Platonic doctrine taught, a fragment of the Deity himself. Perhaps it might have been suggested, and cherished, by the wish so natural to the priesthood, (of which every age has had abundant supply,) to amplify their own importance, by enhancing the value of that part of our compound substance over which they claim a deputed jurisdiction—

besides, it is unquestionable, that indefinite and loose notions, tending to connect the origin and nature of the soul with mystery, have always prevailed among the people of every country, whether barbarous or civilized. Doctrines too, tending to bend the belief of the great mass of mankind in that direction, have been taught by the leaders and founders of the most ancient sects of the heathen world—and their doctrines have reached to, and misled, not the populace only, but their philosophers and priests. The Christian world, also, has had its belief and its errors on this subject.*

* The belief indeed that some difference in essence, existed between the soul and body, may be said to have been general, if not universal; undoubtedly nothing follows from thence, that can tend to support either branch of Lord Brougham's doctrine; for, in tracing downwards from the Grecian and Roman schools (which, we have seen, do not support him) through the long period since the commencement of the Christian æra, though, as I have said, there appears to have been some indications of assent to the nature of the soul being, *quodammodo*, superior to, and different from body, yet not only has this belief been indefinite, inconstant, ill-defined, but the doctrine particularly connected with

Every one knows how extravagant and erroneous were the early heathen systems of belief in relation to the Deity, and the soul—it would be idle pedantry to enumerate them—it is sufficient here to observe, that the earliest of those systems known to us, exclusive of the Scripture records, was that which was attributed to the Persian Zoroaster. There is a general concurrence of authority to prove, that those doctrines of Zoroaster, after having spread through Asia, became known to Pythagoras—that most of them were adopted from him by the early philoso-

this subject, entered the early church under circumstances, and in a connexion, so revolting to the rational Christian of this day, that it loses all authority.

That the philosophers of Greece and Rome contemplated no such immateriality, as Lord Brougham's doctrine refers to, is certain—and it is equally so, that as to immateriality in the popular sense of the word, the mass of mankind have had a tendency to acquiesce in the belief of it, but without deliberation or evidence, and that, therefore, there is nothing like proof, that the *immateriality* of which we must now be understood to speak—proper and strict immateriality—has had the sanction, either of philosophy, or of universal popular belief.

phers of Greece, and, after having undergone various successive modifications from successive Greek teachers, became at last an essential part of what were afterwards known as the Platonic doctrines. Of what those were Lord Brougham's notes give us a sufficient sample—that they were wild, atheistical, incongruous, and in a great degree incredible, when intelligible at all, is incontrovertible. The reader will find, in looking at any of the ecclesiastical histories of the early ages of Christianity, that those doctrines, extraordinary as they were, and inconsistent, one would say, as they must have appeared to the professors of the gospel doctrine, they nevertheless attracted multitudes of the Christian converts.

The simplicity of the gospel, its absolute silence on all questions connected with the metaphysical essence or nature of the human mind, might reasonably have been expected to have preserved its doctrine, and its professors, free from controversy on all questions of that kind. The fact, however, is otherwise. Not fewer than thirty different

sects professing opinions on the origin of man, on the nature of Deity,* and of the human soul, on matter, spirit, &c. distracted the church during the two first centuries. “Thick coming fancies” on the nature of the Deity, and of those beings, with which the philosophic Christians seem to have been delighted to people space previous to the creation of the existing world, began to operate at a very early period indeed of Christianity. They mixed up the simple and almost abstract doctrine of the future existence pronounced by the gospel to man

* “In general (says Beausobre, 1 vol. 474) the idea of a substance absolutely incorporeal, was not a common idea with Christians at the beginning. When I consider with what confidence Tertullian, who thought that God was corporeal and figured, speaks of his opinion, it makes me suspect that it must have been the general opinion of the Latin Church. Who can deny, says he, that God is a *body* though he is a *spirit*? Every *spirit is a body*, and has a form proper to it. Melito, so much boasted of for his knowledge and his virtues, composed a treatise to prove that God is corporeal.”

The same author speaking of Tertullian, says—“He believed God to be a body, because he thought that what was not a *body* was *nothing*.”—p. 474.

after this probationary life, with ideal and imaginary beings of the most whimsical, extraordinary, and incredible nature—they were not, however, more extraordinary than those with which the ancient philosophy and mythology had peopled the heathen heaven, and appear to have had a close analogy to some of them, particularly those of eastern origin. The state of a persecuted and despised church, was calculated certainly to create an aptitude for corruptions of such a nature—particularly those which came, as those heresies generally did, in the garb of philosophic truths: as such they were, not unnaturally, considered as tending at once to strengthen and dignify a creed which was still “accounted foolishness” to the Greek and Roman philosopher. Many of those imaginary beings were supposed, like those of the Platonic philosophy, to have had a co-eternal existence with the Deity himself—to have been generated by an eternal generation, not created; and, in some instances, were supposed to have been co-operators with the Deity in the creation of the

existing world—in other instances, to have been exerting adverse power over the world created—Light and darkness, good and evil, were personified deities, considered as, and exercising perpetually, opposing forces.

These creatures of the imagination, to whom was given a nature participating, at least, if not identified with, and forming part of the nature of the Deity itself, it may be easily conceived, must have been regarded as approaching as nearly to *immateriality*, as did the idea of the Deity. The human soul, though inferior in rank and power, was by many of those sects, counted among the entities which derived an eternal being from the Deity, and, subject to the disposal of his power, became united with matter in a corporeal form, and was destined also to a future existence. Generally speaking, those heretical Christian sects conceived of the Deity, as did the church itself, that his essence was incomprehensible, but not material. On a view, therefore, of the whole of those deplorable aberrations from rational religion and faith exhibited by the Christian

world in the three or four first centuries, it seems scarcely possible not to believe that among very many, if not all of those heretical wanderers, the idea of the immateriality of the soul, most probably in its strict signification, must have arisen and been adopted, so far as such an idea as that of an *immaterial substance* is at all comprehensible by the human mind :—that it is not so comprehensible, is perhaps among the strongest arguments that are urged against that opinion.*

A full and satisfactory account of these extraordinary doctrines of the early heresies on this subject may be had on reference to very obvious sources of information ; Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History will give the general reader a very sufficient view of them. It may not, however, be a trespass on the reader's patience to give a short abstract of a few of them here, to show how congenial the idea of the soul's immateriality seems to have been with doctrines from which the rational and pious mind now recoils.

* See Note II.

It appears, that so early as the end of Adrian's reign, the oriental teachers came from the retreat, in which they had concealed themselves during his life: one branch of them, which had arisen in Asia, preserved the oriental doctrine concerning the origin of the world; while the others, formed in Egypt, made a medley mixture of this philosophy with the tenets of that superstitious country—one of the leaders was himself Egyptian, Saturnius—and the first of the Gnostic Christians. He held the existence of two principles—one, a wise and benevolent Deity—the other, a principle essentially evil. According to him, the world and its first inhabitants, were created by 'seven angels who presided over the seven planets. This work was carried on without the knowledge of the benevolent Deity; but when the creation became known to him, *he* endowed the inhabitants with *rational* souls, their creators had given them only *animal life*; the evil being, to maintain his empire, added another kind of soul, formed of a malignant character, and hence the

difference between men. The seven creators fell from their allegiance to the supreme Deity, and Christ was sent into the world—clothed with a corporeal *appearance*, but not a *real body*. After the dissolution of the body, the soul which, during life had abstained from sensual gratification, returned to the Supreme Being. Here is a distinct assertion of the existence of two principles on the scheme of Zoroaster,—the creation of a rational soul subsequent to the creation of the animal life of the body—and a return of the rational soul after death to the Deity.

Cerdo, also a Gnostic Platonist, taught the existence of *two* principles, one good, one evil, and also a third, neither good nor evil—that the origin of the soul was divine, and that it ascended after death to mansions of felicity, if abstinent from sensual gratification. Christ too, according to him, had not a real, but the *semblance of a body*.

Bardesanes had also his two great conflicting powers. The original inhabitants of the world had *subtile* ethereal bodies, and spirits of a *celestial nature*. But where

men were enticed to sin, they were handed over (the souls) to fall into sluggish and gross bodies, formed of *corrupt matter*, by the evil principle.

The Egyptian branch of the Gnostics blended in one mass the oriental philosophy and the Egyptian theology. They differed from the Asiatic branch, by maintaining the *eternity of a matter* endued with life and motion, but did not admit the existence of an evil principle.

Basilides acknowledged one supreme God, who had produced from his own substance *seven* beings, or *Eones*, (*Aiwes*) of 'a most excellent nature.' *Two* of them, Dynamis and Sophia, (power and wisdom,) engendered the angels of the highest order, who also brought forth in *their* heaven other angelic beings, but of a nature inferior to their own, until they made 365 distinct orders of angels, &c. A new world was made, and the Supreme Being *gave* to its inhabitants a *reasonable* soul, they *having*, *at first*, only *animal life*, and gave the empire of the world to the angels; these, however, became

depraved, and then Christ was sent for their recovery, he being chief of the *Eons*—the souls who obeyed him were to ascend after death to the Father—disobedient spirits, to *pass into other bodies*.

Carpocrates, of Alexandria, surpassed all his predecessors in impiety and blasphemy ; he, like the Egyptian Gnostics, acknowledged a Supreme God, and Eons from him—he also maintained the eternity of a corrupt matter, and the creation of the world by angels, and the *divine origin* of souls, imprisoned in mortal bodies.

Valentine, also an Egyptian, founded a sect which spread extensively and rapidly through Asia, Africa, and Europe. He placed in the habitation of the Deity thirty Eons, one half females, the other males, and four others who were of neither sex ; the sum of his execrable doctrine it is not necessary to state more at large, than to say, that man was, according to him, made of the subtile, and also of the grosser matter, and also of a *spiritual* and *celestial* substance—that the rational soul of Christ ascended on high,

and that only the *animal* soul, and the *ethereal* body of Christ suffered crucifixion.

‘Such,’ says Mosheim, ‘is the doctrine of Valentine, and the Gnostics,’ and such, also, are the tenets of the oriental philosophy. These were heresies of the first century; the second was still more fertile, and in all the Platonic philosophy seems to have been the corrupting power. ‘While the emperors and pro-consuls employed edicts and the edge of the sword against the church, the Platonic philosophers exhausted against Christianity all the force of their learning and eloquence in rhetorical declamation, subtile writings, and ingenious stratagems, the more dangerous because they had adopted several of the doctrines and institutions of the gospel, and were attempting to reconcile paganism with Christianity, and form a sort of coalition between the ancient and the new religion.’ The existence of the two principles, the good and the evil, the divine origin or essence of the soul distinct from body, and its transmigrating power

which entered into all the systems of the Platonic Christian heretics, are all from the doctrines of *Zoroaster*, and are said to have “ensnared many.”

It appears by the immense spread of the Manichæan heresy which arose about a century and a half after, that these tenets affected a *very great proportion of the whole Christian world*, and apparently must have introduced, where adopted, a notion of the essence of the soul very consonant to that immateriality which has since been contended for as its true essence, but which appears as held by the Gnostics and Manichæan heresiarchs to be as inconsistent with the doctrines of Christianity as with any principle of sound and rational philosophy.

The following century was as prolific as its predecessor of those monstrous productions generated by Platonism; I shall content myself with giving a short view of the Manichæan system, taken from Beausobre, the celebrated French writer, by whom a full history of the sect was written.

“ Dans un coin de l'espace immense residoit de toute eternité une puissance maligne que Manéé appeloit La Matiere en stile Philosophique, en stile vulgaire le Demon, et les Tenebres en stile Mystique.”

He then states a contest to have arisen between light and darkness;* and the darkness made an irruption into the territory of light,— he then proceeds,

“ Alors Dieu leur opposa une puissance qui est appelée le Premier Homme lequel étoit armé des cinq elemens de la SUBSTANCE CÆLESTE. Entre ces elemens étoit celui de la Lumiere, qui, si je ne me trompe, n'est autre chose que l'*Ame Humaine*.”

“ Les Ames Humaines étant ce qu'il y avoit de plus excellent dans la Substance cæleste, dont les Princes des Tenebres s'étoient emparés ils penserent à les garder. Pour cet effet le grand Prince s'avisait d'un artifice qui lui réussit. Il forma donc leur corps organisés, sur le Modele du Premier Homme, qu'il avoit vu. Il leur donna des sexes differens, et y renferma les premières ames qu'il avoit prises. Il voulut les charmer par les douces impressions des sens leur faire aimer leur prisons et les porter, d'une maniere comme invincible à perpétuer leur captivité par les attraites de la concupiscence.

* Zoroaster held darkness to be a real substantive being.

Et comme la generation continue de produire des corp de la meme figure et avec les meme ames que les deux premiers, les pauvres ames, *qui voltigent dans les airs* ou qui sont *repandus dans la nature* viennent imprudemment habiter les prisons que la concupiscence ne cesse point de leur preparer. Elles s'y lient ensuite et s'y attachent par les attraits qu'elles y trouvent.

“*Les Ames qui sont d'une origine celeste* ont naturellement la connoissance de la verite et de leur devoirs; mais, lorsqu'elles sont unies a des corps, *elles beuvent dans la coupe d'oubli*, qui leur en fait perdre la memoire: cela etoit *Platonicien*. Pour remedier a cet inconvenient la divine providence se servit d'abord du ministere des bons anges, qui enseignerent aux premiers Patriarchs les Verites salutaires. Et pour empecher que cette lumiere ne s'etiegnit entierement, Dieu n'a point cesse de susciter, dans tous les temps et toutes les nations des Sages et des Prophets jusqu' a ce qu'il lui plut enfin d'envoyer au monde son Fils. Apres avoir opere une infinite des miracles pour confirmer sa doctrine, il leur monstra dans sa *crucifixion mystique*, comment elles doivent mortifie sans cesse la chair et ses passions. Il leur fit voir encore par sa *resurrection mystique* et par son ascension dans le air, que la mort ne detruit point l'Homme; qu'elle ne detruit que sa *prison* et qu'elle *rend aux ames purifiees liberte de retourner dans leur celeste patrie*. La chaire etant composee de matiere, et meme de ce qu'il y a de plus vicieux dans la matiere, il ensuivoit de la, que le fils de dieu n'en a pu prendre que la Figure et non la Realite. Comm' il n'est pas possible que toutes les ames acquierent une parfaite purete, pendant le cours d'un vie mortelle, Manichee admet *transmigration des ames*, &c. &c.

Lorsque toutes les ames et toutes les parties de la substance celeste auront ete separeés de la matiere alors arrivera la consommation du siecle," &c.

All the main ingredients of the doctrine of Zoroaster, and of the Platonic school, are to be found in this absurd creed mixed up with the abused and corrupted doctrines of Christianity and Manes—the conflict of light and darkness—the eternity of matter and mind—the good and the evil principle—the transmigration of souls—the final termination of the world, &c. The doctrine of Zoroaster has had a most extensive spread, and in one shape or other, has had a longer duration than that of any other of the heathen systems which have prevailed among men. If the reader shall ever think fit to look into the tenets of the early heresies, he will be surprised to find how largely some of his doctrines entered into the composition of those systems.

The *Eons* of Manichæus, his spiritual and eternal beings, give, perhaps, the most striking specimens of his *immaterial* entities.

According to Beausobre, Manes calls them the first born of the Divinity—the highest order of Spiritual powers—who dwelt with the Deity before the creation of the material world—countless in number, and of incalculable duration. Lib. 3, ch. 9,—569, &c.

He derives the *Eones* from Pythagoras, whose philosophy in general was that of his successor Plato, and he cites Eusebius for the doctrine of this latter, and that these Eones were identical also with the *Dii intelligibles*, or intellectuals, of Aristotle, and the *Ideæ* of Plato. He cites, too, Tertullian as an authority that all this *pneumatic* philosophy was of Chaldæan origin, from whom it passed to the Greek. The Eones were held to be in their essence perfectly simple, indivisible and incapable of change or corruption.

On the whole, there appears almost an insuperable difficulty in the way of the inquirer as to *when* and *where* the pure immateriality of soul became first definitely acknowledged in Greco-Christian philosophy. Who can draw a line that distinguishes one

set of those imaginary entities as purely immaterial from others that mix up matter in the compound? The question must always be decided by the most probable guess. This much, however, appears to approach very nearly to certainty, namely—that among the fanciful creations of the early fanatical heresies many of them must have been considered as strictly and properly immaterial, and that therefore, most probably, it is here first, that we find the notion of *pure immateriality* attributed and believed to belong to spiritual Being.

There is also another proposition which may, I think, be taken as deducible with certainty from the early opinions on the *immortality* and *immateriality* of beings distinct from the substance of the body—namely—that wherever immortality was attributed, it was also believed that such entities had pre-existed from eternity. The reader will find this expressly and fully stated upon authority in Cudworth's *Intellectual System*; and he accounts for the origin of that belief from the attachment which all the ancient philo-

sophers had to the maxim—*ex nihilo nil fit*. He says in one passage particularly, “ Indeed it is a thing very well known, that according to the sense of the philosophers, these two things were always concluded together in that one opinion of the soul’s immortality, namely—its *præ*-existence and its *post* existence.” Page 38.

The Manichæan heresy, from the extent to which it spread, and its adopting the Greek or eastern notion of the eternity of the soul *a parte ante*, with its supposed relation to the Deity, may, and doubtless did, introduce very extensively, not a new doctrine or article of faith, but ideas of the nature and essence of spiritual entities, variant from those originally entertained by the church: and I incline to think we have no reputable evidence of the *pure* spirituality or *immateriality* of the human soul having been generally received, or adopted as an opinion, previous to that period. We have seen that even the acuteness of the Greek school did not inculcate any thing beyond the ambiguous immateriality which was satisfied with

attenuated matter ; and, therefore, the most probable opinion, it would seem, is, that at this period commenced the prevalence of this notion. One may judge of the degree of prevalence of Manichæism from the fact, that St. Augustine himself became to a certain extent seduced by it, though in his latter years, he is said to have been cured by the *more deliberate study* of the Platonic writings ;* this I cannot well conceive ; however, the tone of his writings, on the whole, affords an instructive instance of the extremely degraded state in which the philosophy, if not the religion of the time then stood, and how susceptible the public mind of the Christian world must then have been, of the most gross errors. The saint, in no very philosophic spirit, is said to have considered matter as *divisible into two kinds, the one corporeal, of which all visible objects are composed, and which are "below the firmament ;" and the other, an "incorporeal matter," of which the*

* Beusobre, 478, and in almost all the accounts of Manichæism, in which St. Augustine is mentioned.

“*heavenly and invisible beings are composed.*” That he entertained also, the loose notion of immaterial or spiritual substance, which we have already seen so prevalent, is proved by his having defined it—“*Corpus quod est naturaliter subtile ac velut aura.*”*

This father of the early church appears, too, when pressed with objections which were urged against his doctrine as connected with the origin of the soul, to have adopted and avowed a certain idea rather of an extraordinary kind—of a distinction between two kinds of matter, of which he considered *invisible* bodies are made—and of which the Almighty formed the human mind, namely—

“*Credo sub firmamento cæli materiam corporalium invisibilium, ab illa incorporeali invisibilium fuisse discream.*”—De Gen. Contra. Manich. Lib. i. II.

* Horace, when speaking of *mind*, or of a *quality* of mind, talks of the ‘*divinæ particula auræ* ;’ and Cicero himself speaks of the immaterial substance of which ‘*astra* and *mentes*’ are made ;—strong instances how *material* the *immaterial* mind was then considered.

Of the strong hold which those early absurdities had on the mind of the Christians of that day, another remarkable instance is on record of a Christian, named Synesius, who refused a bishoprick, rather than give up the idea of the eternity of mind and matter, or admit that *his soul was not as ancient as his body!*

I have been the more anxious to give this short view of the state of opinions respecting the Deity and the soul during the early times of the Christian church, in order to show how little authority the belief of the soul's immateriality derives from its being entertained by those numerous bodies of the church at that remarkable period. I do it certainly, not with a hope, or a wish, that the reader should from *them* decide against that opinion, as one untenable by a rational mind which may be able to separate it from the mass of impious and absurd notions with which it was associated in those ages. The opinion *may be* one which corresponds with the real nature or essence of the soul; though it so manifestly appears, that at

present, we have not means or faculties to satisfy the judgment upon it ; and the only object which we can hope to attain by exhibiting it in the very bad company in which we have just found it, is, to moderate the confidence of those, who having adopted it as an article of their own belief, when cleared of its former atheistical and untenable accompaniments, are dogmatic in enforcing it—not by arguments, but authority—on the minds of others. Undoubtedly the opinion has antiquity to recommend it ; and equally certain is it, that the doctrines of the Platonic heretics were, if true, demonstrative that the essence of the human soul is immaterial. I presume not overweeningly to assert—but I certainly think it highly probable—from the close analogy between the opinions then, and in our own times, promulgated and urged on this subject, that it was among those sects the immateriality of the soul had its rise in the Christian world, and from them has in various channels been derived to us. Certainly, if “the mind be a *fragment* of the Deity,” it must doubtless

be like him, *purely immaterial*, if *he* be so. If "the soul *existed before the creation of the body*," no doubt it must be a *separate, independent existence*. If "one God made the *body*, and another gave the rational *mind*," assuredly they are *separate* entities; so, if the transmigration of souls be possible: and, therefore, it is much more than a mere probability, that when the Platonic creed became incorporated with the Christian, the philosophy of Plato would instil new notions of the essence and nature of the soul, all tending to establish such *separability*—such *independence* and *superiority* of its nature and essence over mere matter, as Plato taught; and so far as these arguments prevailed, the *immateriality* of the Platonizing Christians would be, of course, prevalent; but it surely would not be that pure and simple immateriality which is now contended for, and asserted by, Lord Brougham. Such as it was, however, the belief when once established among the Christian sects who were spread, as we know the Gnostic and Manichæan Christians were, over Asia, Africa,

and Europe, must have taken deep root, and become almost impossible to be eradicated. The mental darkness which soon afterwards began to cover the mental world would leave little hope, even if ecclesiastical authority did not intervene, that the mind would right itself, and acquire juster or more rational opinions on a subject so difficult, that we *now* feel ourselves incapable of grappling with it. It is, however, remarkable that even in those early dark ages, and among the many successful attempts which were made to shackle the human understanding, it was not attempted to make the immateriality of the soul an article of orthodox faith. An opinion and a popular one it did, no doubt, continue, and however the scholastic theology of the ages which followed may have profited in other respects by the Aristotelian philosophy and logic, which in the eleventh and twelfth centuries found their way, at first by Arabic translations, into Europe—yet *that* philosophy, and *that* logic, were not those which in the hands of the schoolmen would be employed to give sounder and more rational

ideas of the nature of the human soul, or of the Deity or his attributes. The scholastic and subtile conflicts between the Augustine and Aristotelian opinions—with the occasional intervention of Thomas Aquinas, and other disputants of that temper afforded more appropriate occupation for the men and the times. The correction of an inveterate error on such a subject, would, under such circumstances, naturally be slow; though even in those times, superior minds would occasionally emerge, as *Anselm*, for instance, whose philosophic attainments had been such, that it is admitted* he had used and urged the very argument to prove the existence of the Deity, for which Des Cartes afterwards became celebrated as having discovered. Indeed it is asserted by Buhle, a critic and literary historian, within our own times, that some of the scholars of Anselm's day are entitled to the praise of having, from time to time, used every theoretical argument which are to be found in support of, or to repel objections on that topic.

* Hallam's Middle Ages, 2d volume.

Even after those darker ages had nearly passed away, and the light of letters and philosophy had again begun to appear, this notion of the immateriality of the soul, still held its ground, and accompanied by the same Platonic spirit, though in a state purified from many of the follies and pollutions which had disgraced it in its earlier age; and even so late as when Des Cartes in the 17th century, broached his ingenious but unfounded system, the Platonic doctrine, including the immaterial theory of the essence of mind, not only continued to subsist to a considerable extent, but may be said truly to have influenced the philosopher and his system. His Meditations were obviously the source of the greater number of the metaphysical controversies between him and his antagonists Gassendi and Hobbes. Even Spinoza's system has been thought to have originated from him. Malebranch, clearly in many respects a Platonic Christian, was his disciple, and it may be not unreasonable to believe, it produced Berkley also. An improved and rationally metaphysical *immate-*

rialism and one not opposed to the leading doctrines of the church, became the prevailing and fashionable opinion of the day ; but it was still immaterialism, sprung from the same Platonic source which had poured forth all the follies and heresies of the earlier ages of Christianity, and remained still associated with the now almost forgotten and exploded systems of the Vortices—the *Præ-established Harmony*—and the numerous incredible tenets which now *amuse* us, nearly as much as their predecessors, from the same school, *shocked*, the reasoning part of mankind in the preceding centuries. What is peculiarly remarkable in the immaterialism of Malebranch is, that his mind had so far emancipated itself from prejudice and false reasoning on the subject of the immaterial soul's connexion with a material body, and though he admitted the fact of the immateriality of the one, and of some mystical union of it with the other, yet he could not bring himself to believe, because he said he could not understand, the possibility of mind acting at all on an immaterial

body; and, therefore, resorted in every instance of action in the body, to the immediate operation of the Deity. He avowed his opinion—“*qu'il n'est pas concevable que l'esprit recoive quelque chose du corps—* (even though his master Plato taught the contrary) *et pretendoit que ce soit par conversion aux Fantomes, ou aux traces du cerveau per conversionem ad phantasmata, que l'esprit appercoive toutes choses.*”

After him came Leibnitz, also adopting the improved idea of immateriality, but retaining still the Manichæan tenet of the soul's separate existence or nature; and finding it impossible to reconcile that doctrine with the difficulty of *immaterial entity* operating upon *matter* without the intervention of a Deity, he assumes the fanciful theory of the *pre-existing* harmony between the soul and body, by which, by a special order of nature for that purpose, the will and the motions of both soul and body are made to *harmonise* throughout their union in life! From his time, the pure immateriality of the soul has been maintained against the materialists, as they have been called, with whom

we have seen Locke acting as a powerful auxiliary, though not openly enrolled in their number.*

* Lord Brougham, we see, with more courage than Locke seems to have possessed, takes a *decided* part with the pure Immaterialists. Whether he will devote *all* his energies to their cause, or engage also with the German Mystics—or become a partizan or ally of the Kantian school, the transcendentials—la raison suffisante, &c. &c.—cannot yet be known, nor perhaps shall we ever know, until he shall have finished his labours in *illustrating* Dr. Paley. If his Lordship shall devote the whole force of his undivided, powerful mind, to the Doctor, I shall entertain great fears for his safety—for his Lordship seems to be illustrating him in the *focus of his burning glass, where, as he illustrates, he consumes him!* I anxiously hope, however, that before he shall be quite reduced to ashes, some friendly succours will arrive to his rescue. For myself, I feel I have been more daring than prudent in coming forward even as a vidette, and shall therefore now fall to the rere in my proper rank as private.

While these sheets have been at press I have seen with pleasure that a gentleman, the well known elegance of whose characteristic style leaves no doubt that he fills a high judicial station in Ireland, has been attracted like myself, in his *Metaphysic Rambles*,† to the subject of Lord Brougham's Discourse. I am happy to perceive, that in some instances at least, I am supported by his concurrence of opinion. He does not profess to enter

† *Metaphysic Rambles*, by Warner Christian Search, LL.D. F.R.S. and M.R.I.A. Milliken, Dublin.

I have now done what I proposed to do in these further observations.—I have shewn that “all the doctrines,” or authorities, do not support Lord Brougham’s tenet—“that on the IMMATERIALITY of the soul depends its future existence and IMMORTALITY.” I have shewn further, that his tenet derives no additional sanction or credibility from any ancient or modern philosophic authority—that, on the contrary, it appears to have arisen from a philosophy which, with respect to the Deity, and the soul of man, taught doctrines utterly inconsistent with the sound principles of Natural Theology, or revealed religion : that it is traceable to our times, from the earliest of the heathen systems : that in its course through the Grecian schools—and the

profoundly into the, always fruitless, discussion of the nature of the soul, and the alleged connexion of its immateriality with immortality—he does what is much more attractive ; he touches with a light and elegant finger, and in a playful way, almost every point which the topic suggests to fancy and taste ; and certainly, whenever the subject relates to philosophy, literature, or the arts, it may truly be said of him, that—“*nihil unquam tetigit quod non ornavit.*”

Christian heresies of the first ages which adopted it—and through the dark and barbarous ages which followed, it never failed to combine itself, throughout its long descent, with principles at once atheistic, incongruous, incredible, and absurd : that in every modern system which sprung up since the dawn of light and learning in modern times, it has more or less tainted each of these systems with its inherent vice, mystifying, and darkening, and degrading, each in its turn, until the sound, rational, and truly religious tone of Locke's system, produced a salutary check, which Lord Brougham's doctrine, in my humble opinion, is calculated mischievously to counteract.

What effect the discussion he has introduced may have on the minds of others I know not. To my understanding it appears that it cannot be doubtful : the result of the argument may be summed up in a very few sentences. See what it is :—

The proposition to be proved is—That the *immortality* of the soul *depends upon* its *immateriality* ; in other words—that if

the soul be not immaterial, it *cannot* be immortal.

It is agreed—that what is called *soul* is that *thinking thing* in which the power of thought, reason, &c. &c. subsist. But in order to discuss this question, some further data must be given ;—those who dispute his Lordship's proposition, require only that he shall admit, what it is conceived, as a Natural Theologist, he must concede, namely, that *man*—the *human* mind—is the work of an intelligent and *omnipotent* being ; and that as the work was *his*, he might, if he so willed, being omnipotent, have made that which thinks and is called soul, whether it be material or immaterial, either to endure for ever, or for a time only.

If his Lordship denies this power to the deity, the argument must stop—for men will not at this time of day, discuss it on the atheistical principle, which limits the qualities of being, not by the power of the Creator—but by the *very little* which we know of the Nature which he has created. If he concedes it, the concession concludes

the argument ; for on that concession it follows, that *if the Deity willed the soul to be material and immortal, it is untrue that the immortality of the soul depends or depended on the immateriality of it.*

The only objection to this conclusion must amount to a denial of the Deity's *power*, to create an *immortal* mind of organised matter, because, as it may be said, it involves a contradiction. I believe his Lordship will not go that length ; but if he does, the world will then expect from him, not the peremptory re-assertion of the proposition on which he now rests, but some proof, by conclusive *argument*, or at least, *acknowledged authority*, that the Almighty could not vest with immortality, a soul or thinking substance, inseparably connected during man's life with his organised matter.

Though I have already occasionally ventured to advert to the mischief which appears to connect themselves with this doctrine of Lord Brougham's, so peremptorily inculcated by the Discourse, I cannot

abstain, before concluding, once a gain to call attention, to the injurious results which may, perhaps *must*, follow from inculcating the doctrine which his lordship puts forward. I do this, not as a partisan, for though I feel convinced that his Lordship has failed to establish the immateriality of the human mind, I certainly do not presume to say, it must be false; I content myself with thinking, in concurrence with the numerous authorities which I have cited, that we are incapable of attaining a knowledge of the truth on this question, covered, as it is, by impenetrable darkness! If we cannot—how many inconveniences must follow from persevering to discuss, to agitate it!

If you teach men that all the indications which natural religion suggests of a future state, are vain if the soul of man be material, what is the solid difference, in effect, between *that* doctrine, and teaching *absolutely* that there is no future life! There can surely be none but with respect to the few, the *very* few who are capable, and are led to

examine and decide that difficult problem in favour of the soul's immateriality.

In order to show this doctrine mischievous, it is not necessary to prove it *false*. If there be a *possibility*, much more a *probability*, that it is so, does the philosopher who teaches it as true, and as a doctrine of Natural Theology, raise or lower, dignify or degrade that science? If it should be erroneous, must not the consequence be, that Natural Theology, instead of being raised to the dignity of a science, would sink to the condition of being a disreputable instrument whereby loose, incongruous, and silly sophisms, in the guise of scientific certainty, are imposed upon mankind?

If the doctrine we have been considering be really that which the illustrator of Paley's Theology means to urge as illustrative of Dr. Paley's work, will not the illustration amount to this, so far as relates to his evidences of a future state—"What Dr. Paley has urged is true and valid as to a life hereafter *if* the soul of man be *immaterial*, but

if it be *material*, all he has urged on that head is false or groundless, FOR in that case, there neither is, nor can be a life hereafter !

Had this doctrine arisen out of a mere metaphysical discussion, and were it before the public nakedly as a question of psychological science, and been neutral with respect to theology, it might have been safely left to the care of those who, from curiosity or a love of science, might have become interested in its fate. It would have left opinion free—left every man harmless, and undisparaged whatever opinion he might form and avow upon it. But it is now brought before the Christian public of the empire under far different circumstances ; it is introduced by a man of great influence of character for intellectual acquirements, and abilities of very various kinds. It is formally announced as one of the most important doctrines of Natural Religion—*that* religion whose base is wider still than that of Christianity itself, inasmuch as its doctrines extended to, and

are recognized by all who acknowledge the existence of a Deity with attributes of omniscience, omnipresence, benevolence, and wisdom : and it is promulged in due form in a theological tract professedly teaching its essential doctrines, and as one of them, and a principal one, that the soul of man is immaterial and, *therefore, only* immortal ; *therefore, only* liable to account and retribution hereafter. Does not this doctrine, therefore, among its other mischiefs, most injuriously divide society into two classes—one of which must infallibly look upon the other with abated confidence in every social relation—because—from their disparaged creed they must be reckoned free from the *fear*, the *restraint*, and the *moral checks* of a *judgment to come* !

It is worthy, too, of special observation that as to this doctrine of the *materiality* or *immateriality* of the soul, whatever injurious consequences might flow from adopting the opinion of its materiality, could not necessarily be derived from that belief, *simply*—for, as we have seen, the materiality of the soul *may be* if

such were the Divine Will, also immortal. It is Lord Brougham's doctrine that pours poison into the cup! *He* teaches that if material it cannot be immortal. *He* leaves no escape from annihilation to him who adopts his opinion of the consequence of the soul's materiality, if he also believes it to be material; he takes fear from the sinner, and hope from the saint! He makes all—ALL to depend on *his* being right in teaching as a certain and peremptory *truth*, that which in the opinion of the ablest and wisest men, if not *absolutely*, at least possibly MAY BE, an error.

I have carefully abstained throughout both these and the former observations from any attempt to deduce either argument or illustration, from anything which either the Scriptures of the Old, or New Testament might afford; though much indeed of both, corroborating the view which I have taken of the subject, might be deduced. But it would have been to deal unfairly with a question properly and professedly be-

longing to Natural Theology—and so treated by Lord Brougham—had I thus, resorted to those sacred sources, *sacros ausus recludere fontes*, in order to patch or piece clandestine reasoning that in justice and good faith, should have been carried on exclusively by materials furnished by the science to which the question belonged. Besides, it would approach very nearly to *circular* reasoning were we to support the Theology of nature by argument or aid taken from Revelation, when one of the first objects of the Natural Theologist, amongst us, is, to strengthen the cause of revealed religion against those who deny its truth, and dispute its doctrines.

NOTES.

NOTE I.—PAGE 33.

THE doctrine of a *præ-established harmony* which owes its origin to Leibnitz, about the middle of the 17th century, is an extremely interesting monument of the state of mental science at that recent period, and also an extraordinary proof how extravagant may be the notions of the ablest men on those abstruse subjects. The following sketch of the system is from Professor Stewart.—Dissert. 1st. Part 2d.

“According to the system of *præ-established harmony*, the human mind and human body are two independent but constantly correspondent machines, adjusted to each other like two unconnected clocks, so constructed that at the same instant, the one should *point* to the hour, and the other *strike* it. Of this system the following summary and illustration are given by Leibnitz himself:

“I cannot help coming into this notion that God created the *soul* in such a manner at first, that it should represent within itself all the simultaneous changes of the *body* also, in such a manner, as that it must *of itself*, do what the *soul wills* : so that the thoughts of the

soul follow each other in regular succession, and must produce *images* which shall be coincident with the impressions made by external objects upon our organs of sense ; and that the motions of the body follow each other, and become coincident with the thoughts of the soul, so as to give to our volitions and actions the very same appearance, as if the latter were really the necessary consequences of the former. Every thing goes on in the body as if it had no soul.' ”

This extraordinary and irrational doctrine originated in the wish to account for—what is unaccountable on any *physical* reasoning—how an *immaterial* soul can operate upon *body*. It pre-supposes that the connection between them is not real, but apparent only ; and that, in fact, it is by a præ-established act or volition of creative power by the Deity that the mind and body are made so to correspond, as we perceive volition here does with the action of body. This difficulty produced a similar theory in the system of *Malebranche*, who conceived that the ‘communication’ between the mind and the body was managed, not by any permanent law of nature, but by the *occasional*, or rather the immediate, permanent, and incessant agency of the Deity. Leibnitz’s theory differed from that of *Malbranche*, in this correspondence being the effect of a *præ-established* original adjustment of the two machines by the Creator. This subject, the mode of operation by which mind affects body, is one quite as incomprehensible by the human faculties, as is the immaterial essence of the mind itself. Stewart admits that these doctrines of Leibnitz and *Malbranche* endeavouring to account it, “are quite beyond the competency of human reason to judge of.”

NOTE II.—PAGE 71.

We are apt to give to the phrase, *immaterial substance*, an *intelligibility*, if I may so speak, to which it is not entitled. In its primary signification I believe *substance* must have been intended to express, not only something material, but something *palpably* or emphatically so; when we prefix the epithet *immaterial* to it, we create a difficulty in the mind to comprehend it, unless by a paraphrase. It has sometimes struck me, that by reducing important but ambiguous expressions, by a kind of previous compact, to a precise signification, the way to distinct knowledge would be greatly shortened; or, we should soon come to learn, that knowledge was not attainable in that direction. Now I would be much pleased if my reader would condescend to suppose himself, for a few minutes, at the opposite side of my library table, and assist me in a short conference for this purpose. If he will favour me, I should propose to him that we should examine what we really mean by the phrase, *immaterial soul*. I would say to him—“Let us now talk over this matter in a spirit of perfect sincerity, and come, if possible, to an explicit understanding of our meaning—let us have no reserve—no figures of speech—no rhetorical flourishes—no system or theory to support—let us have a true view of each other’s minds on this difficult subject.” If he agreed, I would begin by asking—

QUESTION—What do you mean by the words *immaterial soul*?

ANSWER—I mean the *immaterial substance* which I feel thinks within me.

Q. I understand what you mean by *immaterial*—it is that which is not matter, either in the whole or in part—but I do not so clearly understand what you mean by *substance*. I presume I am right in supposing you cannot mean by it any thing solid, visible, tangible, extended, or, in short, any one of the qualities which we attribute to matter—any thing of which any of our senses can by possibility take cognizance—for you have already called it *immaterial*?

A. You are quite right—you have so far my meaning exactly.

Q. Then let me know, what you actually mean by *substance*, in your present use of the word?

A. I mean by it, *something* which according to the strict etymology of the word, “stands under,” or “supports something else,” and by this last *something*, i. e. the *thing supported*, I mean the *qualities* or *powers* of the *mind*, or *soul*, for I use these two latter words as synonymous.

Q. You answer with perfect clearness and candour as I expected from you; and I infer from your answer, that I may now express your sense of *immaterial soul*, by these other words, and that they mean neither more nor less than, that “the *immaterial soul* is a *something* that is not *material*, and that supports, (or if you please, possesses, but as something distinct from itself,) those qualities which we call *mental perception*, *thought*, *reason*, *will*, &c.

A. I perfectly assent—your adopted expression exactly expresses my meaning.

Q. Well, you permit me now to ask, do you so understand this *substance* that you speak of, and the *qualities*

which you say it supports, as *thought*, &c. &c. as different and distinct ideas ?

A. Undoubtedly I do—I must distinguish the qualities of a thing, from the thing itself—else the *substance* supporting could not support, but would be *itself* the thing supporting and supported—which would be *nonsense*.

Q. You are most satisfactory as a reasoner, exact, and logical ; but you will excuse me for the question I last put to you, for the *nonsense* you speak of is found so very often in argument, even among fair people, that I thought it was necessary to make quite sure of your meaning. And now let me further ask ; as you do not by *substance* mean to identify it with its *qualities*, or the things which it *supports*, can you give me *any* information as to what this *substance* consists of? or what is its *essence* or *nature* ?

A. I candidly admit I am unable to do so ; I know not, nor can conceive any thing of it but its *negative* quality, (perhaps you will call *that* nonsense,) its *immateriality*, that it is *not matter*.

Q. It certainly is not a very satisfactory mode of answering one, who asks what a thing *is*, to tell him what it is *not* ; but I am far from charging the imperfection of the answer on *you*, for I know that the ablest and the best men have been obliged to resort to such a manner of answering, from the nature of the subject. Lord Brougham himself admits, that ‘no scientific language we possess, can help breaking down with us in an attempt to maintain logical precision, on such subjects.’ I, however, am warranted, I hope, to infer from your answer, that you are perfectly ignorant of

what this *substance* is, its *nature, essence, origin, or duration*, and only understand that it is not in any degree material.

A. Certainly you are, and even as to its being *immaterial*, I only say, that when I use the word *soul*, or *substance*, &c. I mean, that in my *belief* as to it, it is immaterial, and I may add, that so far as belief goes, I conceive it to be also immortal, and will survive the body.

Q. Yes, you *believe* so and so, but I am now inquiring, not as to belief, but how far you have actual knowledge, or conceive you have, from any scientific inquiry of your own, or of other persons, that you think you can fairly call knowledge?

A. Certainly, I pretend to none such; of the *immaterial substance* which I call soul, I am totally ignorant, as to knowledge, and even as to any belief, that only extends to its being *immaterial* and *immortal*.

Q. You have no idea, therefore, I presume, of the mode or manner in which this substance of which you know nothing has been made *capable* of thought, reason, &c.

A. Most certainly I have not; the Almighty Creator has thought proper, I believe, to *give* that quality or power to, or perhaps rather connect it with, the substance we call the mind; but the "*how*" he has done so, or the "*manner*" in which this substance supports, produces, or exerts, the power which has been given to it, I know not, nor shall ever pretend to know; I am taught that it *is*, and I *feel* it to *be*, beyond my power.

Q. Let us now then talk of this same *matter*, a little while; what do *you* mean by the word?

A. I understand by *matter* that substance (I use the

word *substance* as before) which supports, or in which inhere the qualities of *extension, solidity, impenetrability*, and the other qualities or attributes which belong, or are commonly supposed to belong to it.

Q. Then as to *substance*, if I understand you, you use it in precisely the same way you did when speaking of it in respect to the soul—that is, by the *substance* of the soul, you mean what *supports* the *mental* qualities, by the *substance* as to *matter*, that which supports the *qualities of matter*.

A. Exactly so.

Q. Do you know anything of the nature or essence of the *substance* which supports the *material* qualities ; or are you ignorant of *its* essence and nature, as you are of that which supports the *mental* qualities'?

A. I must confess my ignorance, both of the substance of the *soul*, distinct from its qualities, and of the substance of *matter* with respect to its qualities—I am equally and profoundly ignorant of both.

Q. Then, for aught you know, the *substance* which supports the *mental* qualities, and the *substance* which supports the qualities of body, may be the *self same* substance?

A. Undoubtedly, for aught I know to the contrary, they may ; I being quite ignorant of both.

Q. Have you the same *belief* as to the immortality of the substance of *matter*, as you told me you had of the immortality of the substance of the *soul*?

A. I certainly have not been in the habit of applying the word *immortality* to that substance, but to that of the soul—but if you suffer me to apply the phrase “ everlasting duration,” instead of “ *immortality*,” to the substance of matter, I am willing to admit, that I believe

the substance of matter to be indestructible, and, therefore, to be in one sense of the word, immortal.

Q. Then the *substance* of the *soul*, and the *substance* of *matter* are both, in your belief and opinion, *equally everlasting* ?

A. Most certainly that is my belief, and as far as my information in the matter goes, no modern or ancient philosopher has disputed the *indestructibility* of matter, whatever may have been their opinion or their doubts as to the substance of the soul being *immortal*.

Q. But I suppose you do not deny that the Almighty who created matter, as we both believe, can also by his almighty power *annihilate* it ?

A. I certainly never meant to deny that. But unless annihilated, the substance of matter would in my opinion, remain in one varying form or another, everlastingly.

Q. Do you doubt whether the almighty power may not also annihilate the substance of the mind ?

A. As I admit his power to be almighty, I cannot hesitate to admit that the Deity may, if he shall so please, annihilate the substance of the mind—*ALL substances*—I beg pardon for that word—I mean all imaginable *things*—which he has created. Observe, however, that I do not say he *will* annihilate either ; it is a very general belief that, according to the Scripture, he will not annihilate the soul, i. e. according to our precise mode of speaking, the “substance” of the souls ; but that *that* shall live for ever. I do not find, however, that there is any belief that he will, or will not annihilate the substance of *matter*.

Q. We are not now talking of religious belief, we are discussing these subjects, *en philosophe*, as Lord B. has

proposed to do. I have no doubt sound religion, and sound philosophy will go hand in hand, but we must not mix them in this conversation.

But to go on; I think we have now acquired such knowledge of *our own meaning* touching *matter* and soul, that I may ask whether we do not fully agree in this—that *matter*, a substance supporting one set of qualities—and *mind* supporting another set of qualities—both having been created, must both be equally in the power of the Creator, to preserve and to annihilate according to his pleasure, whatever *that* may be.

A. I fully agree that, as we have been reasoning the thing, it is so. In other words, I infer that under all circumstances, having created matter and mind—(they having no *necessary self-existence*)—he *can*, when it shall seem good to him, annihilate either or both.

Q. Now, does it not seem to you that we have both clearer notions of the soul and of matter, than we had before our discussion began? We now thoroughly agree on these points, which I believe we did not before; and yet I cannot perceive that we have made any new discovery.

A. We certainly have made no addition to our actual knowledge. We have only been wise enough, in this instance, to agree about the meaning of our own words. This, however, has produced one of the best *effects* of increased knowledge—it has prevented useless argument.

Q. Pardon me, I think it has done something more; it has given, in my opinion, a full answer, and perhaps refutation to the doctrine of Lord Brougham, for if we are right that the Creator, *qua* Creator, has *power* when

he shall think proper to will it, he may either annihilate or prolong, *ad infinitum*, the existence of any being, whatever may be the qualities or the nature he has given to that being. He cannot, indeed, will or do what involves a contradiction ; but this can never be an objection in the way of his perpetuating or shortening being.

A. Undoubtedly it is so ; and, therefore, even if there were no other answer to Lord Brougham, this alone proves that on the *mere immateriality of the soul*, its *immortality cannot* depend—it must depend on the original will—or (if the Deity can change) or any variation of that will which may be dictated by or suggested by his justice or his wisdom.

THE END.





