To the Revd. Dr. Brown with the Author's Comp

DEFENCE

OF

ECCLESIASTICAL ESTABLISHMENTS;

IN

REPLY

TO THE

REV. ANDREW MARSHALL'S LETTER

TO THE

REV. ANDREW THOMSON, D.D.

MINISTER OF ST. GEORGE'S CHURCH, EDINBURGH.

BY THE REVIEWER.

"Such as openly reprove supposed disorders, are taken for men that carry singular freedom of mind. Under thi fair and plausible colour, whatsoever they utter passeth for good and current. That which wanteth in the weight of their speech, is supplied by the aptness of men's minds to accept and believe it. Whereas, on the other side, if w maintain things that are *established*, we have to strive with a number of heavy prejudices, deeply rooted in the hearts of men, who think that herein we serve the times." *Hooker.*

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DEFENCE

OF

ECCLESIASTICAL ESTABLISHMENTS, &c.

It has usually been esteemed the safest policy for the friends of existing establishments, to discountenance too narrow an inquiry into the grounds of their peculiar privileges. Their wisdom, it is conceived, lies rather in evading, than provoking discussion; in suffering the zeal of opposers to waste itself in silence, and to die out like a flame unfed. If this policy deserve the name of prudence, it is at best a suspicious prudence. It has its origin in fear, and seems to dread investigation from an apprehension of its results. We like not this creeping and pusillanimous wisdom. What we dare possess, we are ready to defend, and shew the title-deeds of our possession; persuaded that this is not an age of the world in which institutions which have lost their support in truth and reason, will long survive on the precarious footing of prescription and connivance.

Of this truth, Mr Marshall is well aware when he represents our establishment as "an abuse, sanctified by prejudice and time,"—as "a system of Antichristianism, that forges chains for the understandings and consciences of men." These indeed are weighty charges; and if the bill of enditement be made good, his end is gained. He is right in conceiving the world to be too old to sanction abuses on the plea of their antiquity; or that the spirit of popery can shew itself in this country without being instantly ejected. So far we commend the skill of Mr Marshall in the management of his argument. His zeal, however, has overshot itself. He ought to have reflected, that charges so extravagant are in danger of being altogether neglected, or of refuting themselves; and that it is the worst possible tactics in the management of a cause, to choose too high a position for its defence. A man who brings an action of damages against his neighbour for twenty thousand pounds, and by the verdict of an honest jury, is awarded one farthing, justly exposes himself by the loftiness of his pretensions, to the ridicule of the court. We are told by Miss Edgeworth, in her Essay on Irish Bulls, that it is not uncommon with her countrymen to appear before the sitting magistrate in the county town, and lay a complaint before his honour of having been quite *kilt* the last night in some quarrel with their companions, which *killing*, however, on examination, proves to have been only the infliction of a few blows, or a gentle castigation with a shillalo. Such hyperboles may be good strokes in Irish oratory, but they are bulls in argument.

But this is not the only blunder into which Mr

Marshall has fallen. After these exaggerated charges, he thinks it necessary to caution the friends of establishments, not to be irritated by his accusations, but to "hide and repress the fiercer and less honourable passions," and to abstain from "crying out," as he supposes we cannot fail to do, "against his attempt as a wicked one, dictated by envy, and savouring of impiety." Never was author more mistaken in his power of exciting passion, or more needlessly alarmed lest he should bring upon himself the honours of persecution. Truth, when unwelcome, may provoke opposition, for when it is against a man, a man is likely to be against it. But what offence can be taken at an author who tells us that our establishment is "a system of antichristianism," and that it "forges chains for the understandings and consciences of men." The man talks loose and fancifully, and entertains us by fictions so wide of the truth, that we only admire the aptness of his imagination which can trace, in the simple presbyterian establishment of Scotland, the pollutions of Antichrist, and the forged chains of the inquisition. We may be sickened by the nonsense of such representations, or pleased, if in the humour, by their oddity and extravagance; but assuredly, they have no power to stir the fiercer and less honourable passions. We might pity the man who had so strange a fancy, as to see a volcano in the curling smoke of every chimney, or a viper in every creeping insect that lay along his road, or who started at the sight of every quadruped, as if a lion and a tiger had passed before him, or who trembled to touch a ribbon in a lady's hand, lest it should prove a forged chain to bind him; we might pity such a man, or

even laugh at his whims, but it were a waste of good passion, or worse, it were inhumanity to be angry. So long as Mr Marshall shall indulge in this vein, he is guiltless of rousing the "fiercer passions," and safe from their effects. His representations can excite no other emotion than wonder, or force from us any other sentiment than the exclamation of Falstaff,—"Do you behold these meteors, my lord! do you behold these exhalations!"

If our establishment be in reality so rotten in its principle, as necessarily to involve the support of Antichrist, and the exercise of a tyrannous sway over the consciences of men, what reason has Mr Marshall to fear, that, by such an exposure, he will rouse the fiercer passions of its members? Is the "craft," as he expresses it, of our ministers dearer to them than their religion, or their "corporation," than the purity of their Christianity. This is the very essence of a narrow sectarianism, to claim all liberality for itself, and to make a monopoly in its own favour of Christian principle. Is there no virtue extant *within* the church? It is surely too much for Mr Marshall to arrogate to himself the sole possession of Christian principle, nay, to apprehend, that by the very exposure of the truth, he endangers his own peace. What is this but an avowal, that in his opinion, we are so wedded to our interest, that rather than forego the temporal advantages of our establishment, we will sacrifice the truth of God. A charge so serious, and which would unchristianize the better half of our nation, ought to have been maturely weighed before it was either indirectly or explicitly avowed. We would have Mr Marshall step beyond the pale of his own sect, and

look abroad upon the Christian world. By throwing open the windows of his apartment, his Christian charity, which seems well nigh expiring from the close thick air which it breathes, may yet revive when visited by the fresh gales and the warmth of heaven. The intercourse of the Chinese with foreigners, has done much to bring down, in their own estimation, the high pretensions of their Celestial Empire to exclusive learning and civilization, and taught them that the Europeans are not without arts and sciences, and that we Britains are not naked savages. A similar infusion of foreign light into the mind of Mr Marshall, would go far, we are persuaded, to reduce his exclusive assumption of Christian principle, and convince him that the friends of our establishment are not all inquisitors, and disposed to forge chains for the understandings and consciences of men.

So much for the temper and spirit in which this letter is written. We now proceed to the consideration of its arguments. Preparatory to this, it is necessary to clear away the prejudices which the writer has excited against the *principle* of establishments, by an artful presentation of their *abuses*. He indeed *professes* to deal solely with the principle, and takes offence at our animadversion upon the specialty and narrowness of his reasoning, assuring us, that "of the abuses of churches it never entered into his thoughts to write;" yet, notwithstanding this declaration, it is the abuses of establishments which give, to use a mechanical figure, both its purchase and momentum to his argument. He has loaded the principle with these non-essential abuses, and with abuses which, in reference to this country, have had no existence.

Following in his argument the steps of Conder, who pleads against the *English* establishment, and chiefly on the grounds of its intolerance, and its close alliance with the state, he turns the current of his reasoning against our *Scottish* establishment, without distinguishing between the different circumstances of these institutions, and reflecting, that whatever justice the arguments possessed as *originally* applied, they lose their force when transferred to another institution, which imposes no yoke upon the consciences of men, and rejects all civil interference in ecclesiastical doctrine and discipline. Though, in the opinion of Conder, (with which we by no means agree,) it be necessary, in order to get rid of these evils, to overthrow the English establishment, it cannot surely be necessary to subject *us* to the same treatment; since the diseases of which that writer complains have not appeared even in their first symptoms to the north of the Tweed. It were an odd kind of justice to enforce upon Scotland a regimen recommended as a cure for the distempered state of the English establishment, admitting even in the particular case the wisdom of the prescription. It were as if his Majesty's Ministers should insist upon the Provost of Edinburgh swallowing a dose of physic, because his worshipful brother the Mayor of London found it necessary to purge off his political humours, or his corporation dinners by a cathartic. His Lordship would be apt to move the previous question,—whether he were in need of the purgative? And if he found it unnecessary to his constitution, he would probably have no great relish in taking physic from courtesy. When told that to get rid of intolerance and

of Erastian supremacy in the church, we must get rid of our establishment, we are in like manner disposed to move the previous question,—do such intolerance and Erastian supremacy exist? And are they interwoven with the Scottish establishment? If they are not, why hold up these abuses to his readers as if they were essential parts of all establishments. To what purpose has he reiterated these, or equivalent phrases, "liberty of conscience, right of judgment, freedom of opinion;" and why tell us so frequently that the conscience is not under the care of the magistrate, and that when he "interferes with it, or with the free use of our understandings, he steps beyond his limits, and is guilty of a violent and tyrannical usurpation." Who questions these truths? Or, why are they adduced, if not to throw the odium of maintaining them upon the advocates of establishments, and to burden the principle with the abuses which, in some countries, have been accidentally linked with it. By a similar art have infidels fortified themselves in their infidelity, and struck at the roots of Christianity itself. They have liberally credited our faith with the vices of its followers, and, not unskilled in the tactics of argument, they have known how to turn these vices to an infidel account.

We are sorry Mr Marshall should have adopted a mode of reasoning against our establishment which he would instantly discard when applied to Christianity, or to any other institution. It is unfair in argument to throw on his opponents the odium of maintaining the dogmas of an obsolete and worn out tyranny; it is subversive of the end which he proposes to himself, of producing a rational conviction in the

mind of his readers, to call in passion as the judge. An example or two will show that we have not overcharged this statement. Let it be remembered that the simple questions involved in the principle of establishments are—whether governments ought to contribute to the spread and maintenance of religion, and whether the church can, consistently with the principles of Christianity, avail itself of such support? And with these in his view, let the reader judge how wide from the subject are such passages as the following:—"To the alliance of Christianity with the civil power," says he, adopting the language of Hall, "it is owing that ecclesiastical history presents a chaos of crimes, and that the progress of religious opinions, which, left to itself, had been calm and silent, may be traced in blood." And again, speaking in his own language, "what wars, what revolutions, what massacres, what scenes of open and indescribable outrage, not to speak of the commitments, the prosecutions, the dungeons, the chains, the scaffolds, the gibbets, which, but for the absurd connection of church and state, had never been heard of." And how still wider of the truth is the assertion, that though "it may be possible in idea to separate the assumption of religious power by the state from the exercise of violence, they never yet have been separated in fact." Is not this assertion refuted by the history of Scotland for the last century, and by the unmolested quiet, notwithstanding the existence of our establishment, which every man has enjoyed in the exercise of his religion? Our present object, however, is not to answer such statements, and to expose the fallacy on which they proceed, but to show

how they are employed as substitutes for argument, and tend to prejudice the mind against the truth, through the associations with which it is presented. Indeed, as it has been said of a certain poet, that his writings are so filled with the same images, that if you take from him his lilies and his roses, his satyrs and his dryads, he will have nothing left that can be called poetry; so of Mr Marshall's letter we would say, that if you take from it its "chains," "its trammels," its "freedom of thought," its "rights of conscience," &c. you leave little that can be called reasoning: for these expressions, if they do not always make up the body of the argument, at least, clothe it with the dress which sets it off.

Dismissing, then, the supernumerary embellishments of "wars, revolutions, massacres, commitments, prosecutions, dungeons, chains, scaffolds and gibbets," as so many of Mr Marshall's strokes of oratory and figures of speech, yet as great impediments to reasoning, we shall proceed to the twofold inquiry; *first*, does Scripture authorize governments to contribute to the support and spread of religion? and, *secondly*, are such contributions necessary for the maintenance of religion? The former of these inquiries necessarily takes the precedence of the latter; for if Scripture be against our establishment, however clear be the proofs of its utility, the argument is at an end. The fate of Uzzah, who died for putting forth his hand to the ark, even when in danger of being overturned, is sufficient to warn us against violating the commands of God, on the plea of doing service to his cause. If we must first profane, before we can minister at the altar, our ministry God will abhor.

To the Scriptures, therefore, is our first appeal. And here it might be sufficient to rest our argument upon the admission by all parties, that whatever collateral inferences may be drawn from Scripture, there are, at least, no specific commands *against* establishments; the only approximation to positive injunctions being contained in these words of our Lord, which have been so often quoted, and as often misapplied, "My kingdom is not of this world;" and in the exhortation of the Apostle, "Let him who is taught in the word, minister to him who teacheth in all good things." In reference to the words of our Lord, it is evident, that to apply them as an argument against the *principle* of an establishment is begging the question in dispute, since we deny that the simple reception on the part of the church of the liberality of the state converts the kingdom of Christ into a kingdom of this world. It is in condemnation of an establishment abused and corrupted by the secular ambition of ecclesiastics that the words of our Lord have their appropriate application. Originally uttered to defend himself against the imputation of seeking to usurp the throne of Cæsar, and to establish a temporal sovereignty, they apply with truth only to that church which brought under subjection the monarchies of Europe, and stretched its sceptre over the nations of Christendom. It was when the bishops of Rome exchanged the character of pastors for that of princes, the crook for the sceptre, and gave the law to the nations from the throne of the Cæsars, that they secularized the kingdom of Christ, and converted it into a kingdom of this world. To them in refutation of their claims to universal empire, and as a

test of their Antichristian ambition, was strictly applicable the saying of our Lord, "My kingdom is not of this world." But what resemblance is there in this hierarchy of thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers, to the simple Presbyterian establishment of Scotland, which, so far from usurping, renounces all pretensions to supremacy in the state, satisfied with maintaining its own ecclesiastical independence. Unless, however, our reader can detect an incipient Pope in the Moderator of our Assembly, and has the imagination to discover a conclave of Cardinals lurking under the disguise of Presbyterian ministers, it will be difficult for him to perceive the force of the application of the words of our Lord as a *positive* argument against an ecclesiastical establishment.

In reference to the injunction of the Apostle, it may be sufficient to observe, that before it can be converted into an argument against establishments, it must be shewn that the contribution raised by the state exhausts the means of Christian liberality, or forbids its exercise,—that it either dries up or seals the fountain. That it does the former, will not be easy to prove, in a country, the whole of whose ecclesiastical revenue is exceeded by the private annual income of some of its nobles, and which imposes a tax little exceeding, on the average, the sum of half-a-crown to each individual. That it does the latter, will be still more difficult of proof, so long as so many dissenting ministers are supported by the voluntary contributions of their hearers, and so many missionary societies, with their collectors, are daily soliciting and receiving our pecuniary aid. And besides, to what purpose is this injunction of the Apostle urged,

if the very people who contribute possess a voice in the legislature of their country, and have themselves consented to this contribution. That many of them give grudgingly is only what may and does frequently happen with the members of dissenting congregations, who become pledged for the stipend of their minister, yet who, after the first blush of his popularity has faded, and when their own zeal begins to wear out, feel their avarice too strong for their sense of duty, and would fain withdraw from the burden, did neither shame, nor the fear of prosecution, bind them to the fulfilment of their engagements. The Lord, indeed, loveth a cheerful giver, but though the established, like the dissenting clergyman, may have many in his flock who think that he sells his sacred wares, as Cowper expresses it, "plaguy dear," yet it is not the pastor in either case, but the people, who are to blame. *They* are the violators of the command of Scripture who give grudgingly, and not the recipients of their contributions, unless in so far as the latter provoke this illiberality by unfaithfulness or incapacity for the discharge of their duties.

Setting aside then these objections, as founded on a misapplication of Scripture, we might proceed immediately to the consideration of the necessity of establishments for the maintenance and spread of religion. Satisfied that they are not *anti*-scriptural, we are warranted, independent of any direct example or authority in their favour, to proceed immediately to the question of their necessity; *the silence of Scripture, leaving the question open to the determination of our reason, guided and enlightened in its decisions by the general principles of Scripture.* On this ground

alone has the question, as we are told by Mr Marshall, been argued by Warburton, Paley, Hill, and Chalmers. Assuming, from the acknowledgment of all parties, and from the silence of the sacred record, that an establishment is not *anti*-scriptural, they have proceeded to the proof of its utility as an instrument of Christianization. And, on the same ground, as Mr Marshall had chosen no other, *we* proceeded in our review of his discourse. But though we followed this line of argument, in answer to the leading objection of his discourse, and as sufficient in itself for the defence of establishments, we are far from admitting that there is no authority in Scripture for such institutions, and that all that can be said of them is, that they are not *anti*-scriptural. Mr Marshall has indeed broken out into a most intemperate triumph at our conceding, for the sake of argument, that no Scripture authority could be given in favour of establishments, and demanding whether it would follow, notwithstanding this admission, that they were unnecessary. "Follow what may," says he, and we shall favour our readers with the entire passage, "it is something to have this concession. Let the more religious portion of the people belonging to the national church take notice, that according to their champion, the Christian Instructor, in contending for an establishment, they contend for nothing Scriptural—nothing which the Bible enjoins—nothing for which the authority of any part of the Bible can be pled. They contend for a mere human invention of more than doubtful utility, an invention whose utility has been proved only to the satisfaction of an interested class—the class who have their living by it; at the best, a scheme for perfect-

ing what is confessedly the most perfect of all God's works; a method of extending the kingdom of Christ, which, it is acknowledged, neither Christ himself, nor any of his apostles, ever recommended. I say, let the more pious portion of the people in the national church give heed to this. Often have they been told that it is the true character of an establishment; some of them may have hesitated to credit the assertion, supposing it to come from an interested quarter; can they hesitate any longer, when it comes from the lips of their own chosen advocate? Good people of the establishment, this is one point gained. Whoever assails your strongholds assails nothing sacred. The whole structure, in so far as it is an establishment, consists only of the doctrines and commandments of men."—p. 36.

Joy, we are told by moralists, is naturally an extravagant passion, and diffuse in its expression; and this may account and apologize for the reiterations of this passage. Besides, as we read of armies in which the weaker side set up false lights, and make a great noise to draw their enemies from their advantageous position; so we look upon this passage as a false light set up to draw off the "good people of the establishment" from their "strongholds." Whatever may be the opinion of the Christian Instructor, it cannot be unknown to Mr Marshall, whose pages are so thickly studded with the authorship of the controversy, and who has collected from every forgotten corner the ashes of departed arguments, and out of the tombs in which for centuries they had lain quietly inurned, called them forth for a second life—it cannot, we say, be unknown to one so learned in the controversy,

that Bible authority has been pleaded and pleaded with effect for establishments, and that an argument has been drawn from this source, which ought to rebuke the presumption of our author, who, in the motto to his letter, has prostituted the words of our Lord, " every plant which my heavenly Father has not planted shall be rooted up ;"—thus profaning the solemn sayings of Scripture, and making God's own word the organ of conveying the poison of party vituperation. It is a false lure we repeat, which is thrown out in this passage, and it is not in ignorance Mr Marshall has raised the triumph, but with a perfect knowledge of the weight and force of the *Bible* arguments for establishments—arguments which, notwithstanding his preposterous triumph, he has failed to answer. To the proof then of the Scripture arguments we now proceed.

The *first* Scripture argument for establishments, is that which is drawn from the example of God himself, who, in the only nation for which he condescended to legislate, saw fit to bring in the aid of the civil power as an auxiliary to the church. This is what Mr Marshall has called a " flimsy" argument, and fitted only to impose on " half-informed persons. What! is the example of God not worthy the consideration of *our* reason, or can an argument drawn thence be dismissed without irreverence, on the imputation of being " flimsy" or superficial! Is there not a presumption, that following the example of God, we follow what is right; *His* actions being dictated by the highest wisdom, and therefore a rule for the direction of our derived and subordinate understandings. It is true, *all* the actions recorded

in Scripture as authorized by God, cannot be instituted as precedents for our conduct. But then in each particular case, we can shew a clear *moral* reason for our deviation from the example. It is thus in the particular instance adduced by Mr Marshall, of the licence given to the Jews to exterminate the Canaanites. No precedent, we admit, can be drawn from this example, authorizing any nation to invade the territories of another, or to make light of human life. To God alone belongs the disposal of life and property, and the dictates of that moral nature which he himself has given to us, forbid us to intermeddle with these prerogatives. It is only when he has put a death warrant into the hands of any nation, that it can lawfully exterminate the inhabitants of another. But does it follow, because all God's actions are not imitable by us, that none are imitable. This were a rash conclusion, and would go far to strip the Bible of its authority. On the contrary, it is our duty to discriminate; to separate those actions which are imitable from those which are not imitable, and thus obtain the benefit of God's example for the guide of our fallible reason. This, however, is too laborious a process for Mr Marshall, and would impose on him the necessity of reflection and discrimination. He therefore dismisses the whole series of the divine actions as incapable of furnishing an example for human conduct, and that he may preserve the appearance of reasoning, he presents us with a *particular* instance to support his *general* conclusion. This certainly is a summary mode, and supersedes the labour of thought, just as it is easier at once to dismiss or hang up all the criminals in a jail, than subject them individually to a

trial and sentence. The probability, however, is, that if all the criminals of a prison, because of the established guilt of one of their number, were ordered to execution, many of them would have reason to complain of this comprehensive and summary justice. Each one would demand a trial of his own, and since he could not be hanged by proxy, would justly refuse to suffer himself to be condemned by proxy. It is into this blunder of condemning by proxy that Mr Marshall has in the present instance fallen. To secure, however, the ends of justice, it is necessary that each individual stand or fall by the evidence of his own delinquencies. So in the case before us. Respecting the example of God, as one of infinite wisdom, we are bound, where we reject it, in *each particular case*, to examine the grounds of our rejection, and not from the occurrence of one or two extraordinary and inimitable actions, to reject his example as in all cases unsuitable. In the particular instance of the Canaanites referred to by Mr Marshall, that ground, as we have shewn, is clear and obvious; since to take away life without an immediate command from God himself, would be to violate the principles of that moral nature which he has implanted in our breasts, and of that moral law which he himself has given us. *This* is the test by which we are to judge whether in the particular instance the example of God be imitable or inimitable;—does it contradict the principles of our moral nature, or of his own moral law? To set aside, therefore, establishments which are sanctioned by the authority of God, without shewing that they contradict any clear moral principle, is again to assume the question in dispute. It

is worse. It is preferring our own plans for the advancement of religion, to the scheme drawn up by God for our imitation. Yet without attempting the proof of this position, has Mr Marshall, borrowing the solemn words of our Lord, pronounced of an institution of which God has thus set us an example, that it is " a plant which he hath not planted, and therefore shall be rooted up."

But though he has not attempted the proof of this position, he has other objections to the adoption of this example, as a pattern for the Christian church. If the Jewish establishment is to be taken as a pattern for the Christian church, he sees not how we can answer the infidel objections against the Mosaic institutions, and vindicate them from the charge of intolerance. " I defy them," viz. the advocates of establishments, says he modestly, " to give any other answer to these objections but that which is given by Locke and by Warburton, that the Jewish constitution was a theocracy; that the Most High bore a relation to that people which he never did, and never will bear to any other,—the relation of a King; and that their various laws were framed and executed immediately by him who is Lord of the conscience. Penal laws enforced by the magistrate in matters of opinion," says Warburton, " are manifestly unjust. Some way was to be contrived in the Jewish republic to render such laws equitable, but such laws are equitable only in a theocracy."—p. 12. We entirely agree with this solution, and are only surprised that Mr Marshall should conceive it to be inconsistent with our defence of establishments. Is our only alternative the entire rejection of the Jewish establishment,

or our acceptance of every part of it as a perfect and finished model? Our wisdom is to discriminate, and by applying the principle we have already laid down, to distinguish between what is imitable and what is inimitable. Their intolerance we discard, as justified only by the immediate command of God, and as inimitable by any other community, till they receive similar commands, or are placed under a new theocracy. *But we again demand, whether the establishment itself, apart from these accessories, and when stript of its peculiar Jewish drapery, be a thing fundamentally unlawful, forbid by our moral nature, or impracticable from the circumstances in which we are placed.*

It is hardly necessary to advert to the last objection of Mr Marshall against this argument, as it originates in the same confusion of ideas as the preceding. "Besides, if it was intended," says he, "that the Jewish commonwealth, with its incorporation of church and state, should be a model for Christian commonwealths, it must have been intended from the beginning; I mean, it must have been intended from the time Christianity commenced: and I beg you to conceive, in that case, what must have ensued, when the wall of partition was broken down, and the distinction between Jew and Gentile ceased to exist. I beg you to conceive what must have ensued, when, upon this supposition, the frame of government, civil and religious, that had so long been established in God's own land, became the only frame of government that could *legally* be established in any other land. *This*, it is manifest, on such a supposition, must have been the case, from the moment the gospel began to be published; from the moment it

was proclaimed, on the authority of God, that there was no longer either Jew or Greek, either circumcision or uncircumcision, either male or female, either bond or free, but that all were one in Christ Jesus. From that moment there could not be a lawful government any where on the face of the globe, because, on the face of the globe, there was not a government after the model which had existed in Israel. In other words, the gospel of Christ must have been the tocsin of sedition; wherever it came, it must have summoned the people to rise against their rulers—wherever it prevailed, its progress must have been marked by the downfal of existing governments."—p. 13.

If all that is meant in this passage be, that the entire Jewish commonwealth with its incorporation of church and state could not be a model for Christian commonwealths, no truth can be more obvious. Nor do we perceive the necessity of such a waste of words to describe the consequences of a self-created hypothesis; for who ever maintained that "the frame of government, civil and religious, that had been established in God's own land, was the only frame of government that could *legally* be established in another." The difficulty proposed by Mr Marshall is an invention of his own, and it is enough that we answer his arguments, without undertaking to contend against the creations of his fancy. Let the magician break his own spells. It will be time to refute the opinion by a view of its consequences, when once it shall be seriously maintained. Every man knows, however, who is not ignorant of Christianity, that many things in the civil and religious government of the Jews were *peculiar*, arising out of their circumstances as a nation,

and out of their government as a theocracy. The question, therefore, again recurs, was the establishment one of these peculiarities, or was it founded on permanent principles of utility, and, as opposed by no law of our moral nature, a warranted example for our imitation. That the apostles did not instantly avail themselves of this example, and demand from every nation which they visited the friendly contributions of the civil power, is no reason why *we*, in our altered circumstances, are to disregard its sanction. To have made such a demand in their condition, would only have exposed them to the ridicule of the heathen, and injured that cause which it was designed to serve. It would have been striving with impossibilities. I am not mad, most noble Festus, was the language of St Paul; and of all the apostles may it be said, as it was said prophetically of their Master, *I, wisdom, dwell with prudence.* Though, under the influence of one intense and exclusive passion, their conduct was yet governed by the most perfect reason. But because the apostles were neither enthusiasts nor madmen, and did not betray their cause by impossible demands, are we to conclude that they were hostile to establishments? Such, at least, is the conclusion of Mr Marshall. His design is to convince us that establishments are unscriptural, and he tells us—what? That the apostles pronounced them anti-christian? No. That they forbade their erection? No. What then? He informs us, as a wonderful discovery, that the apostles were not madmen and enthusiasts!! How it follows from this, that establishments are unscriptural, it will require the author's own ingenuity to apprehend.

But even if the entire burden of the Jewish civil and religious institutions had been transferred to the Christian church, the apostles would not have been under the necessity of acting otherwise than they did. So long as they were in the minority in any nation, they were under no command of duty to sound a tocsin of sedition, as Mr Marshall expresses it, or to summon the people to the destruction of existing governments. As Jewish proselytes were to be found in the palaces of Egypt, and the court of Rome, subject to the existing governments, and the servants of their princes; so Christians, even had they been bound in their *own* commonwealth to follow the exact pattern of the Jewish, might yet have lived without dereliction of duty under subjection to heathen governments; since it was impossible for them to new-model commonwealths which they did not yet possess. We can suppose it enjoined in scripture, that every man at a certain age should transcribe with his own hand one of the books of the New Testament, but that some individuals at the age specified were denied the use of the necessary instruments—pen, ink, and paper—for executing such a copy. Would it be right to conclude, that, because freed from the obligation to obey, from the circumstances in which they were placed, that they were freed in all future parts of their lives, and after they came into possession of the instruments of writing? Thus Mr Marshall has concluded; the Jewish incorporation of church and state, if it was intended to be a model to Christians, must have been intended from the beginning. But in the first ages of Christianity, its followers were few, too few to recast the constitution of a nation, and mould it after

their own ideas. The Jewish constitution was not, therefore, a model for the Christian in any age, even after Christians possessed the power to incorporate the church with the state. We do not indeed believe, that, in any circumstances, the entire civil and religious constitution of the Jews is a pattern to Christians; but it is upon other reasons than those advanced by Mr Marshall, whose arguments are altogether inconclusive, and which, if pursued to their consequences, would lead to the vindication of slavery, and sanction some of the worst evils which have prevailed in the world. If we are not to institute establishments when we have the power, because the apostles did not institute them, when, from their circumstances, they were denied the opportunity; we are not to abolish slavery when we *have* the power, because the apostles, when the attempt would have been madness, did not proclaim a universal crusade against this violation of human rights, and sound a tocsin, to use again the figure of our author, summoning the slaves to arms and rebellion.

This is a favourite argument with the advocates of slavery, whether domestic or political; and who, if Mr Marshall's reasoning be correct, shall deprive them of it? Did Christ or his apostles, it has been triumphantly demanded, preach against slavery? Did they declare it inconsistent with the gospel, or call the nations to emancipate their slaves, and governors to emancipate their subjects? To such reasoning we answer; the apostles were endowed with divine wisdom and prudence, which led them to act with a constant regard to the circumstances in which they were placed. All things are indeed possible to God, but it

is enough for us to know that God did not choose to put forth his almighty power to sustain them in such revolutions. He has chosen to leave many things to arise progressively out of the benignant and liberalizing spirit of the gospel, which he did not choose to enjoin as specific and absolute duties. He forbade, indeed, polygamy, which he had permitted under the Jewish dispensation; but he forbade not slavery. He left to the *spirit of Christianity* to work off this evil from the face of society. We witness in our day this spirit spreading over the world, and now that we have the power, it is our duty as a Christian nation, to vindicate the long abused liberties of mankind, and to act, if not according to the letter, yet according to the spirit of the religion of Jesus. But if Mr Marshall's reasoning be correct, though we possess the power to abolish slavery, we are not to exercise that power, because the apostles did not proclaim a universal emancipation of the bondsmen of the Roman empire. Such is the unfortunate argument upon which he has stumbled. In his zeal to pull down establishments, he joins the advocates of slavery; and notwithstanding all his high-blown panegyrics upon freedom, he falls into the flimsy sophistries of its greatest enemies.

Our *second* Scripture argument, which is but an extension of the former, is founded on the example of those Jewish kings and rulers, whose zeal for the advancement of their religion in their official capacity, is sanctioned by God's own approbation. Instances of this are innumerable, and run throughout the whole of the Old Testament. Every where those kings are commended, who provided for the purity and main-

tenance of the ordinances of religion; while those who neglected its interests, or permitted the establishment of idolatry, subjected themselves to the curse of Jeroboam, who made Israel to sin. "Where," it has been well asked, "do we read in all the book of God, of approved magistrates who confined themselves, in their official capacity, to civil matters, and the secular interests of mankind, and who did not employ their authority for the advancement of religion? We have a large account of Moses and Joshua, David and Solomon, Aza and Jehoshaphat, Hezekiah and Josiah; who will deny that their actions are recorded as an example to rulers? No magistrate who consults the Bible, will ever imagine that religious matters are excluded from his province. This notion must have been imbibed from some very different source."

To escape from this accumulated evidence, Mr Marshall conceives it sufficient to prove, that David, both in his prophetical and in his kingly character, was a type of Christ. And, as if this were not too obvious a truth to be mistaken by any reader of Scripture, he has thought it necessary to draw out the proof through ten pages of his Letter. That David, Solomon, and many of the kings of Judah, were types of Christ, and types in their official characters, is what every Christian admits, whatever be his sentiments respecting the duty of Christian kings about matters of religion. The question is not whether these kings of Judah were types of Christ, that being a question already settled; but whether, *notwithstanding* this typical character, their example be or be not in any part of it imitable by Christian rulers. How then has Mr Marshall settled this question? He has

asserted what should have been proved. While he is prodigal of argument in maintaining a self-evident truth, he flings from him the question at issue, by an assertion; and that he may give to his own dogma the air of an aphorism, he prints it in italics. "Away," says he, "with the argument for civil interference in matters of religion derived from the authority of the Old Testament. *If the throne of Christ be the throne of David, it is an argument good for nothing.*" A simple illustration will expose the fallacy of such reasoning, if reasoning it can be called. A minister, besides the character which belongs to him as a private Christian, is invested with a certain professional or official character. Let us suppose that he is a generous man, apt not only to teach, but ready to distribute, and given to hospitality. Struck by so good an example, a lay friend of Mr Marshall consults him whether it might not be right for him, although a private Christian, to imitate such an example, as fitted both to stimulate his charity, and direct him in the selection of its objects. No, says Mr Marshall, and that he may give a reason for his advice, he sets about the proof of what his friend never doubted, that Mr Such-a-one, whose example he would imitate, is a minister clothed with a peculiar and official character. Away then, he concludes, with the argument for Christian generosity derived from the authority of a minister. *If Mr Such-a-one be a minister, the argument is good for nothing.*

Our king, to take another illustration, is clothed with a peculiar character, different from that of any of his subjects. During the prevalence of a season of famine, his royal heart is affected by the sufferings of

his people, and he distributes £10,000, amongst the poorest for their relief. An example so munificent is eagerly caught by the friends of humanity, and urged upon the wealthier classes for their imitation. They plead the cause of the poor through the generosity of their sovereign. No, says Mr Marshall, the plea is wrong. The king is a king, and if he be a king, a proposition which he finds no great difficulty in establishing, away, he concludes, with a plea for liberality to the poor derived from the example of our sovereign. *If our king be a king, the argument is good for nothing.* Is it not obvious, that by such reasoning, Mr Marshall, in his haste to arrive at his conclusion, has again fallen into his usual blunder of assuming the question to be proved, and that he imposes upon his readers by an appearance of Scripture proof, while he has not looked the argument in the face. Who ever doubted that David in his kingly office was a type of Christ? And why a lengthened proof of so clear a truth, if it be not to draw off the attention of the reader to a convenient oversight of the only point in need of proof, which the author himself has also thought it convenient to omit. This mode of reasoning reminds us of a discussion once agitated before the Royal Society of London, about the cause of the wonderful fact, why a bason of water, though filled to the brim, would not overflow by a live fish being put into it. After various ingenious solutions had been proposed, some one had the good sense to suggest, that the fact itself should be first ascertained. An experiment soon satisfied them that they had set out with assuming as the foundation of their reasonings, what should first have been proved. In his rea-

soning against establishments, Mr Marshall has faithfully copied the blunder of this learned society. Is the example of Jewish kings a pattern to Christians? No, says Mr Marshall, king David is no pattern for king George. And why? Because a typical character cannot be an example to another. But where is the *proof* that a ruler who bears a typical character cannot be an example to other rulers? Upon the proof of this, which he *assumes*, the whole question turns. As we would have said to the philosophers of the Royal Society, be assured of your facts before you expose yourself to the ridicule of inquiring into their cause; so we say to Mr Marshall, be assured of the truth of the proposition upon which your whole reasoning is suspended, and mount not by a ladder, the first step of which is insecure, and which will give way beneath your foot. He will pardon, therefore, our unskilfulness in not apprehending the correctness of his reasoning on this subject; and, unless the confidence with which an opinion is pronounced be a criterion of its truth, he will also pardon us for thinking his a wrong one.

Admitting then the typical character of David, and of the other Jewish kings, the question we are now to consider is, whether, *notwithstanding* their investiture with this typical character, their example be not imitable by Christian kings. Our *first* remark is, that all the actions performed by David and the other kings of Judah in their kingly capacity, were not typical of Christ. Imperfections and errors, mingled with their administration as princes, as well as with their conduct as men. In their kingly office, they were guilty of acts of tyranny and revenge, of vanity,

ambition, and cowardice. These are recorded for the instruction of kings, as their more private actions are recorded for the instruction of individuals. Thus Moses, who, in his character of governor of Israel, was a type of Christ, twice incurred the displeasure of God for actions performed in his official capacity. "Ye trespassed against me," says God to the Jewish lawgiver, before he ascended the mountain where he was to die, "among the children of Israel, at the waters of Meribah-Kadesh, in the wilderness of Zin, because ye sanctified me not in the midst of the children of Israel." And again, when the people were subdued by fear at the tidings of the gigantic strength and size of their enemies, Moses yielded to the general panic. He fainted, though the standard-bearer of the nation, and "fell, with his brother Aaron, on his face, before all the assembly of the children of Israel." Will any one maintain that Moses, in *these* actions, was a type of Christ? Of him, with whom a voice from heaven declared that God was *well pleased?* Yet these were actions performed by Moses in his official character. Solomon, in like manner, was a type of Christ; yet Solomon, as a king, established and countenanced idolatry. Hezekiah was also a type of Christ; yet Hezekiah, as a king, vainly exhibited the riches and splendour of his court to the ambassadors of the king of Babylon. If in *these* actions, Moses, Solomon, and Hezekiah, were types, where was the antitype; if they were the shadow, where was the substance? Not in him who was holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners. The opposite supposition is too monstrous, unless for the abettors of the modern heresy of the sinfulness of the

human nature of Christ. How could that which is evil in itself be typical of that which is good?

All the official actions, therefore, of the Jewish kings were not typical; and, since all were not typical, we are entitled to demand of Mr Marshall the special proof that those actions performed by them in their official capacity, for the particular object of advancing religion, were typical. If *they* were not typical, then, according to his own reasoning, they are not done away in Christ; and even though many were typical, which may easily be proved, yet, if they were not all of this character, those which were not, remain as examples for our imitation.

Admitting, however, that all the actions for the advancement of religion performed by the kings of Judah were typical, our *second* remark is, that actions, though typical, may still be *moral*, and therefore binding in their example upon all generations of mankind. All Scripture, it is said, and said in reference to the Old Testament, is profitable, not for doctrine only, but for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be thoroughly furnished for every good work. This is the canon which Scripture lays down for its own interpretation. But all Scripture, according to Mr Marshall, is not given for correction, reproof, and instruction in righteousness. The greater part is given only for doctrine. Whatever action is recorded of a typical character, is now done away in Christ, and no longer fit to be imitated by Christians. Its end is gained in prefiguring the antitype, and "what need of the shadow when we have the substance?" True, one end of it is gained,—the prophetical or doctrinal end. Christ

has come, and by collecting upon his own person the thousand types and prophecies of Scripture, has shewn that his testimony is the spirit of prophecy, and that he is indeed the Messiah, the Saviour of the world. But there is another, though subordinate end, which survives the typical fulfilment,—the moral or exemplary end. Are the meekness of Moses, the piety of David, and the wisdom of Solomon, as exemplified both in their official and private actions, no longer to be imitated either by Christian princes in their public, or by Christian individuals in their private capacity? Are we to learn nothing from the noblest examples of human piety and wisdom which the world ever saw, and which God, as we are told, has recorded for our instruction in righteousness? Not so argued the apostles. Amidst their own labours and sufferings, they turned to the examples of patriarchs and prophets, collected new resolution from the contemplation of their zeal, and animated the converts of christianity to follow the steps of those of whom the world was not worthy. But if all typical actions or institutions are done away in the antitype, the apostles reasoned wrong, and we also are wrong in drawing examples from the same authority. Let no man henceforth be inconveniently reminded of duties which he is unwilling to perform, by the example of Jewish patriarchs and kings. It is wrong to restrain the folly or the tyranny of a prince, by reminding him of the wise and upright administration of Solomon. If the prince be skilled in the dialectics of Mr Marshall, he at once disposes of such an example, and refutes his counsellors by this ready-made dogma—if Solomon, in his character as a civil ruler, be a type of Christ, away with the ex-

ample as a restraint upon my princely authority; it is good for nothing. It is wrong in like manner to adduce the conduct of Joseph to his brethren as an example of generous forgiveness. We are not to appeal to this noblest instance of filial affection on the records of history, that we may repress the stirrings of revenge in the breast of some injured brother, or to insist that this action of Joseph is binding upon our imitation. He was a type of Christ, and a type in this very action, by an imitation of which, we would dissuade others from revenge. Away then with your argument for forgiveness, derived from the example of Joseph. *If Joseph be a type of Christ, it is an argument good for nothing.*

Lest, however, Mr Marshall should reject this reasoning on our own authority, we shall give him that of one whom he professes to revere, and who is no less eminent as a historian than as a Christian and a divine. "The power," says Dr M'Crie, "which was exercised by Jewish rulers, was warranted, in many cases, by judicial laws which were peculiar to the nation of Israel, founded upon that singular constitution given unto them by God, and bearing a necessary reference to the system of ceremonial and sacrificial worship which was erected among them, but now abolished. Presbyterians, who have defended the power of Christian magistrates from these examples, have not pleaded an absolute parity, and have made more accurate distinctions on this head, than are to be found in the writings of the advocates of the modern scheme, who usually confound the characters in which Jewish rulers acted, represent their power as wholly ecclesiastical, and extending to almost every

thing, with the view of making it appear totally inapplicable to the Christian dispensation. But it will not follow from this, that we can draw no argument from the conduct of Jewish rulers, to establish the warrantableness and duty of Christian magistrates employing their power in support of religion. Some are ready to conclude, that the argument is entirely set aside, when it is allowed there is not an absolute sameness between the two cases. Nothing can, however, be more unfounded than this conclusion. Such a mode of reasoning is of the most dangerous tendency, and if applied in all the extent to which it will lead, it would cut off the practical use of the greater part of the Old Testament."

To these very admirable remarks, we shall submit, for the benefit of Mr Marshall, the concurring sentiments of Dr Owen, as expressed in a sermon on Daniel vii. 15. "Although," says this celebrated theologian, "the institutions and examples of the Old Testament of the duty of magistrates, in the things, and about the worship of God, are not in their whole latitude and extent to be drawn into rules that should be obligatory on all magistrates, now under the administration of the gospel; and that because the magistrates were then *custos vindex et administrator legis Judicialis et politæ Mosaicæ*, from which, as most think, we are freed;—yet doubtless there is something in those instructions, which being *unclothed* of their judicial form, is still binding to all in the like kind, as to some analogy and proportion. Subtract from those administrations what was proper to and lies upon the account of the *nation and church of the Jews*; and what remains upon the general notion of a church and

nation, must be everlastingly binding; and this amounts thus far at *least*, that judges, rulers, and magistrates, which are promised under the New Testament to be given in mercy, and to be singular in usefulness, as the judges were under the Old, are to take care that the gospel church may in all its concernments as such, be *supported* and promoted, and the truth *propagated* wherewith they are entrusted."

To the observation of these eminent writers we would only add, that if it be adopted as a principle, that no example is to be taken from the conduct of those who were clothed with a *peculiar* character, we strip not the Old Testament only, but also the New, of its most impressive lessons,—those which are embodied in example. John the Baptist came in a *peculiar* character, as a forerunner of Christ. The apostles taught and acted in a *peculiar* character, as gifted with an extraordinary inspiration. And what more peculiar than the character of him who was *God manifest in the flesh*, and who died on the cross in a character so *peculiar*, as never can be imitated, or again exhibited on the theatre of the world? Yet, notwithstanding these peculiarities, we are to look to him who is the author and finisher of our faith, and, from his fortitude in suffering, to learn resignation in our own.

Our conclusion then is, that actions, though peculiar and typical, are not done away in the antitype, unless in so far as they are prophetical or doctrinal. In so far as they are moral, they survive, as examples, for the imitation of all generations of mankind. Till, therefore, Mr Marshall, prove that it is an immoral action for kings to support and propagate religion in

their official capacity, his dogma, to use his own language, is good for nothing. The example of the Jewish kings, when unclothed of what in it was peculiar to their constitution and government, is still an example imitable by Christian kings, because an example sanctioned by God's own approbation.

Our *third* scripture argument for Christian kings or magistrates, providing for the advancement of religion, is founded upon a New Testament principle. Apart from the authoritative examples of the Old, there are certain explicit commands in the New Testament, which, though addressed to Christians generally, are yet imperative upon kings and magistrates in their particular official capacities. The great New Testament principle to which we refer, is, *the obligation laid upon every Christian to propagate his religion according to his place in society, and to the power and influence with which he is entrusted.* Every-where this principle is recognized throughout the New Testament, and no language can be more decisive than that in which God demands an entire surrender and consecration of *every power* to his service. Is that power then, which is of all others the greatest, to enjoy a prescriptive right of irreligion? Or, in proportion to the greatness of the means of service, is there a relaxation of the duty to obey? It is to no purpose that we are told, that the office of the magistrate is erected, not for the advancement of religion, but for the preservation of the civil order of society. This we admit to be its distinctive and primary end. Our relation to the magistrate is a civil relation: he is the guardian of our person and property. But the question recurs, is he not bound, not-

withstanding the civil character of his office, to use his official influence for the propagation of Christianity; or, because of this primary destination of his office to a civil end, is he to alienate his power entirely from the service of God? Not so we reason respecting the duties of masters and teachers. Although the relation of master to servant be wholly a civil relation, founded upon mutual interest and convenience, yet every master is bound to use his influence for the Christianization of his servants. A teacher is in like manner invested with a certain authority for the communication of knowledge, altogether foreign, it may be, to the subject of religion. But what should we say of his Christian character, who, with the authority and influence of a teacher, should use no means to counteract the irreligion of his pupils. Though the power with which he is invested be for the communication of scientific or literary knowledge, still it is a power abused in the exercise, if not made subsidiary to religion; if, with the means of checking infidelity, he suffer it to grow rampant under his eye.

If such be the necessity laid upon the exercise of the power of the master and teacher,—a power altogether civil, and foreign in its primary end, to the advancement of religion,—is the magistrate alone to be freed from this universal law of Christianity? By whose authority shall the law be repealed, and a license put into his hand, to alienate his power from the service of God? Who will dare to prescribe to him as the rule of his conduct, quietly to survey the prevalence of infidelity and irreligion, and forbid the exercise of his power in diffusing amongst his people the blessings of Christian knowledge? The magis-

trate's own conscience, if enlightened with the principles of Christianity, would instantly reject this neutrality. He knows that he makes himself a partaker in the crime which he willingly permits, and that he is chargeable with the guilt of the religious ignorance which he possesses the means of enlightening. Unless, therefore, he would resign all pretensions to Christianity, he cannot remain an inactive spectator of irreligion.

It is to still less purpose, than in the former case, that we are told by Mr Marshall, to escape from this reasoning, that the power of the magistrate is ordained of men. Here, as in other instances, he encumbers his argument with superfluous proofs, and fails to discriminate the question in dispute. It is not the *origin*, but the *exercise* of the power which we have to determine. How a man came by a fortune of twenty thousand pounds, whether by marriage, merchandise, or bequest,—whether he found it as a treasure dropt from the skies, or dug it out of the bowels of the earth, are questions of little importance, compared with the inquiry, what *use* is he to make of it? Whether magistracy be an ordinance of God or of man, it is at least a power *possessed* by man, and if in the hands of a Christian, is claimed by God for the advancement of his cause. Whoever originates the power, this is the direction prescribed for its exercise; an exercise binding upon magistrates, unless we adopt the dangerous principle, that those powers only are to be devoted to the service of God, which are held by immediate commission from himself. Let Mr Marshall look to the consequences of this opinion. We have already shewn, how,

by the adoption of one of his favourite dogmas, Scripture would be stript of its most efficient practical lessons. But Mr Marshall is not to be appalled by the monstrous progeny of his opinions; he has others at hand, no less pregnant with dangerous consequences. "The power of the magistrate," says he, "is ordained of men," and therefore, exempt from the obligation of being employed in the service of God. Show me the immediate charter of office from God, and I am willing, is his reasoning, to admit the duty of a delegated power consecrating its service to its principal. But magistracy is an ordinance of man, appropriated exclusively to his civil advantage, and over the exercise of which, for the advancement of his own glory, God has no claim. He can only come in indirectly, and partake of the advantages of government at second hand; he is only to take what may fall to his share by accident, arising out of the quiet and subordination produced by just laws and a vigilant police.

Such is the scheme of Mr Marshall. God's interests are to be proscribed by all governments, because governments are an ordinance of man. Why not for the same reason proscribe God from all direct command over the disposal of our property? Is not property an institution of man, originating in human labour, and protected by human laws? Destroy the fabrics of government, and you pull down the fortunes which have been reared upon their foundation: you beggar society when you strip it of its laws. The power, therefore, which wealth confers, originating in an ordinance of man, can only be employed, if we follow the principle of Mr Marshall, in the service of

man, and exclusively for his temporal benefit. If God fall in for a share in the expenditure of our wealth, it is not by right but by favour. It is an alienation of that power from its original and legitimate end; for, since property is an ordinance of man, it is foreign to its primary purpose to be consecrated to the service of God.

That such an opinion should have been proposed and advocated by infidel politicians, would not have surprised us. It is inconsistent and unnatural in the mouth of a Christian minister, and is no less contrary to the spirit of our religion, than it is to the dictates of our heart. There is much wisdom to be learned by an observation of the general sentiments of mankind on any great question of human conduct, and if to this source Mr Marshall had appealed, instead of perplexing himself with abstract inquiries about the authority of the magistrate, he would have found that kings in all ages, had, on their conversion to Christianity, employed their wealth and influence for the propagation of their religion. Where is the example of a prince, who, on on his embracing Christianity, remained a quiet and satisfied spectator of the superstition of his countrymen, and who, though invested with influence, stood neutral, when the great contest was at issue between God and Satan—between the continuance of idolatry, and the establishment of Christianity? The thing is impossible. The magistrate's religion is either a fiction, or it has within it a vital and propagating principle commensurate with his means. If he give not more of his magisterial influence to that faith which he has adopted, than to the idolatry he has thrown off, he is a hypocrite in his

profession, or he is doing unnatural violence to his own feelings. It is not Christian principle alone that forbids this quiescence in the midst of evil which we have the power to reform; it is at variance with every feeling of our nature. The Prophet was mad for the sight of his eyes, when he beheld the idolatries of Israel; and with a kindred spirit did those princes, who, in the early ages of Christianity became converts to the faith, contemplate the iniquities of the idolatries they had renounced. And again, after Christianity had been well nigh extinguished under the cloud of Popish errors, did the princes of Europe, at the Reformation, "troop apace," as Milton has eloquently expressed it, "to the new erected banners of salvation," and with their subjects in their train, protest against the abominations of Antichrist. These examples are the best comment on the duty of Christian magistrates. Without awaiting the decision of the question,—whether the power with which they were invested was an ordinance of God or of man,—they felt themselves under the instant obligation to exercise it, in extending the religion they had embraced, and the heart of man is in such circumstances, we are persuaded, wiser than his understanding. That princes have often stretched their influence beyond its legitimate bounds, and exercised their power in persecution and intolerance, we do not deny. We only maintain the legitimacy of the power when legitimately exercised. Though it may be abused to countenance persecution, it has still its use commanded by Scripture, and approved by our natural conscience. We detest the moral casuistry, which, to vindicate the violation of one duty, pleads the per-

formance of another;—a plea which is the specious pretext of all intolerance and persecution. But we no less detest the principle which is at the foundation of Mr Marshall's reasoning,—that a duty may be given up which is hazardous in the performance, or apt to clash with other duties. That this principle is at the root of the objections against the exercise of the magistrate's influence, will be seen from the consideration of the arguments upon which we are now to enter. Indeed almost all of them take their rise from the fact, that the magistrate, in his attempt to give unto God the things which are God's, has not always given unto men the things which are men's; but in discharging his own conscience, has forgotten that other men also have theirs.

That the objections which we are now to consider, may lose nothing of their force, we shall present them in the language of Mr Conder. In the page of Mr Marshall, they have lost much of their point by their diffusion, and have been reiterated with a tedious multiplicity of words, more fitted to fatigue than to convince the understanding of his readers. Indeed, we have more than once had occasion to observe, that Mr Marshall seems to have formed his taste after the Chinese notions of elegance. We are told by travellers in that country, that corpulency is a great point of beauty amongst the inhabitants, and that the handsomeness of their ladies is estimated by their weight, —a gross computation, and worthy the stupidity of the nation. Mr Marshall has modelled himself after this fashion, and buried his thoughts under an impalpable body of words. But what care I, says our English dramatist, for the thews, the bulk, the dimen-

sions of a man; give me the *spirit.* It is the spirit of a writer, in like manner, that we want; and Mr Marshall, therefore, will pardon us for choosing a new guide, and for presenting him with his own favourite objections, increased in their weight, though somewhat diminished in bulk.

The *first* objection in point of importance urged by Mr Conder, and reiterated by Mr Marshall, is, that if it be the duty of Christian magistrates to exercise their influence for the propagation of Christianity, the same obligation is laid upon Mahommedan and Pagan princes to propagate their peculiar religions. "Is it," says Conder, "a general obligation, extending alike to all princes and governors, or one that is binding only upon Christian rulers, as the consequence of their having acquired more enlarged notions of religious duty? The latter branch of the alternative is seemingly maintained by those who lay the stress upon its being 'the true religion' which the supreme power has the right to establish by positive institutions. The esteemed ecclesiastical historian Milner in his chapter upon establishments, takes notice of an objection to his hypothesis, which he owns to be, on its first proposal, rather startling:—'Suppose the civil magistrate should happen to have formed an erroneous judgment concerning the true religion, will he not in that case be justified in establishing a false one? To this query the Dean scruples not to give a decisive negative. "Nothing can justify the magistrate in establishing a false religion." "How it can be right," says Conder again, page 506, "for the king of Spain to establish Popery, and for the king of England to establish Protestantism, it would be difficult satisfac-

torily to explain. If, however, the Roman Catholic religion is admitted to be a false religion, and its establishment is contemplated in its just light, as a portentous evil, we are then reduced to this most philosophical conclusion; that the Protestant religion being the only true one, Protestant rulers have the exclusive prerogative, and are exclusively under the obligation of establishing their own religion as the religion of the state." To support these opinions of his own, he appeals to the sentiments of Scott, the esteemed commentator, who, as our readers are aware, was a member of the English establishment. "If no way of defending our establishment," remarks this writer, "can be devised, which would not, if fairly applied, defend the establishment of Popery, of Mahommedanism, or Pagan idolatry, by the authority of kings and rulers, I must acknowledge the cause to be desperate. Again, if it be the duty of kings and rulers to prescribe these things to their subjects, it is equally the duty of all kings, and for the same reason. This is the *palladium* of those who oppose establishments, and how shall we deprive them of it?" "We do not ask," continues Mr Conder, "by what infallible guidance the rulers of a Protestant country have ascertained the fact, that their religion is the true one, because we are ready to concede that this is its real character; but still although Protestants, there is room for their happening not to form a right, that is to say a scriptural judgment, concerning the religion they profess. Can their duty be suspended on an antecedent condition of so doubtful a nature, as the rectitude of the human judgment?"

With all deference to the judgment of men so emi-

nent in the Christian world as Milner and Scott, we must confess we do not sympathize with their difficulty. If this be the strong-hold of dissent, it is a position easily won. The argument stands thus. It is the duty, we say, of the Christian magistrate to provide the inhabitants of a country with the means of religious education, because he believes his religion to be the true religion, and is therefore bound to use his influence for its propagation. But do not Mahommedan and Pagan magistrates, it is demanded, believe their religion also to be the true one? They are bound, therefore, to use their influence for the propagation of their respective faiths,—that is, they are right in propagating error and falsehood. Such is the dilemma in which the advocates of establishments are supposed to be placed. What although we could not solve the difficulty here proposed? Is it not a difficulty applicable to individuals, as well as to magistrates and nations, and which would strike at the root of private, as well as of public Christian liberality? Let us put this boasted and oft repeated argument to the test. It is the duty of every private Christian to provide the ignorant, according to his means, with religious education, because he believes his religion to be true. But does not the Mahommedan or the Pagan, it may be demanded, believe also his religion to be the true one? He is bound, therefore, to use his influence for its propagation—that is, a Mahommedan or a Pagan is right in propagating error and falsehood. Is it not obvious, that the engine here framed against establishments goes much too far for the purpose of its inventors, and if allowed free scope, would make fearful havoc, not of esta-

blishments only, which are but the outworks of Christianity, but of the interior furniture of the sanctuary? It would pluck from the hand of the Christian, one of the most essential badges, and the surest evidences of his own faith—his zeal in its propagation; and erase from the code of Scripture duties, that command which has hitherto won the triumphs of Christianity, and which is destined to complete the conquests of the faith in the Christianization of the world. However incapable, therefore, a plain Christian might be to resolve this difficulty, he would instantly brush it aside. Whether your objection be true or false, I know not, would be his language; but this I know, that I have a direct precept for *my* conduct; and as to Turks and Pagans, I am not much concerned how *they* reason. Of my own warrant for propagating my faith, I am certain; let Mahommedans and Pagans look to theirs.

But although we consider this a sufficient answer, we are not without hope of detecting the fallacy on which the objection rests. A simple illustration will make it obvious to our readers. Paul, when a Jew, was zealous in propagating Judaism, which he believed to be true. In following his conscience, it has never been maintained that he acted wrong. Paul the Jew, and Paul the Christian, were equally doing their duty in propagating what they believed to be true. Where then lay the guilt of the apostle? *Not in his actions*, we answer, *but in his belief.* His actions were right, unless in so far as he was a persecutor, and adopted unlawful means for the propagation of Judaism; it was his faith that was wrong; and for this he was guilty before God. The first principles of ethics might teach us, that to follow our conscience never

can be wrong; since Scripture itself must ultimately appeal to this tribunal, and be obeyed from our conviction of its truth. In all cases the guilt lies not in acting according to conscience, but in having a conscience ill informed or corrupted; not in endeavouring to propagate what we believe to be true, but in having the wrong belief. This is the true source of the guilt—a guilt aggravated in all cases by the opportunities which have been possessed of obtaining a correct knowledge of the truth. Let this distinction be observed, and the portentous objection of Mr Conder instantly disappears, and along with it the declamation which has been thrown around it by Mr Marshall. It no longer follows that the magistrate who establishes a false religion is guiltless. Like other men he is responsible for his belief. He stands, therefore, on a very different footing from the magistrate who propagates a true religion. In one respect both are alike; for all men are right in propagating the opinions they believe to be true; but then there is the *toto coelo* difference, that the one believes a lie, and the other that religion, which is the pillar and ground of the truth. The Christian magistrate, therefore, alone is right in propagating his religion. The Popish, the Pagan, the Mahommedan, is wrong.

"But can the duty, says Mr Conder, of the magistrate be suspended on an antecedent condition of so doubtful a nature as the rectitude of human judgment?" This is an extraordinary sentiment from the pen of a non-conformist. Thus the bishops of Rome argued, and on this foundation they reared their infallible church. Can the duty, they urged, of any one be suspended on antecedent conditions of so doubtful

a nature as the rectitude of human judgment? No. There must be an infallible church to decide for the erring judgments of men, and dictate the truth. We must release men from the necessity of thinking, and give them Popes, Cardinals, and Councils, to be their unerring interpreters of Scripture. Do not Messrs. Conder and Marshall perceive, that in their haste to overturn what the latter has falsely called Anti-christian establishments, they are laying anew the foundations of genuine Popery, and stripping Protestants of the first right which they won from that usurping hierarchy—the right of independent thought. Is Saul also among the prophets, exclaimed the wondering Jews! Are the abettors, may we exclaim with no less wonder, of the worst features of Popery lurking under the disguise of non-conformists and dissenters! Into such inconsistencies do men fall, whose passion for a favourite cause outrun their reason in defending it. Because men's judgments err, are all human duties to be annulled, or must we again fall back into the arms of an infallible church? The parent is not to instruct his child, because he may err in the instruction he communicates. Messrs. Conder and Marshall will prove to him that it is impossible a duty can be suspended on antecedent conditions of so doubtful a nature as the rectitude of human judgement: that as there are Arian, Socinian, and Deistical parents, no parent whatever ought to instruct his child; for, "by what infallible guidance has *he*" individually "ascertained the fact that *his* religion is the true one." To dwell longer upon such an argument were an indifferent compliment to the understandings of our readers. They will learn henceforth

to consider the air of defiance with which an argument is delivered as no infallible evidence of its truth, and that the coin, though it looks genuine, and is tendered with an unabashed and impudent countenance, yet, on being weighed and tested, may prove counterfeit.

The *second* objection of Mr Conder, and which is reiterated by Mr Marshall, is, that to admit the exercise of the magistrate's authority about matters of religion, is to constitute him the judge of what is the true or the false religion. Undoubtedly, we reply, that like every other man he is the judge for *himself* of what is true or false. But this does not constitute him a judge for others. If he attempts to impose his religion upon his subjects through other means than the agency of preachers and missionaries, he is a persecutor, and forgets, that while he would discharge a duty which he owes to God, he is violating a no less imperative duty which he owes to his fellow man. If, however, Messrs. Conder and Marshall would deny him the right of using these means, because he may judge wrong, we again revert to the previous argument, which, if it be just as applied to magistrates, would strike at the root of all Christian exertions, because all men are fallible and may err in their judgment of the truths of Scripture.

The *third* objection of Mr Conder, and which is but a new mode of presenting the former, is, that the exercise of the magisterial authority about matters of religion, implies "the selection and endowment of the teachers of a particular sect." This also is the central objection of Mr Marshall. It is in his eyes the monstrous and crowning iniquity of an establishment, that it is

the establishment of a particular sect. To this, as his favourite position, he returns, after many digressions, and by some stroke of his oratory, aims a new blow at these selected and endowed favourites, from whose sect he is excluded. His brethren, he conceives, have too quietly borne with the "monopoly" of the establishment: he would bestir them. His language is that of the mutinous soldiers in the comedy; "So please you, the very grievance of the matter is this, we are wronged; we should all speak together, each for himself, and all at once, that we may all be heard the better. We'll argue in platoons. Aye! let the *establishment* have our grievances in a volley, and if we be to have a spokesman, let *me* alone for that." It would, however, have been more prudent for a writer in the circumstances of Mr Marshall, to have left to another the discharge of these grievances, and not to have brought suspicion upon his cause, by betraying so much of the partizan in the advocate. The public are slow to believe the disinterested professions of a writer, whose every second thought is turned upon some private and peculiar wrong, and whose language seems to spring rather from the bitter root of sectarianism, than from an honest zeal for the truth. Men have distinguishing ears, and can discriminate between the voice of the Christian and the Sectary. They can understand that it is not an "interested class" only, as Mr Marshall has affirmed, who are engaged in the *support* of establishments, but that an "interested class" also may be engaged in their *destruction*. Indeed the sum of Mr Marshall's argument is, that as the principle of an establishment involves the selection and endowment of a particular

sect, it is a principle essentially unjust,—subversive of civil liberty, and the source of religious tyranny over the consciences of men.

As to the *first* point,—the selection and endowment of a sect; how, we would demand, can religious education be provided for a people, without propagating the opinions of a sect? If the magistrate distributes Bibles amongst his people, is he not disseminating the opinions of a sect? May not the Atheist, the Deist, the Jew, the Roman Catholic, who admits not the circulation of the Scriptures without the comment of the church, take offence, and clamour against his proceedings? If the judge, in passing sentence of death upon a criminal, exhorts him to make his peace with God, through the merits of his Saviour, and prepare for that higher tribunal before which he must appear, is he not propagating the opinions of a sect? There are who deny both an atonement and a resurrection. It is a violation, therefore, of the rights of men, to tell the wretched criminal, who has received the last award of human justice, that there may yet be mercy in heaven. The judge is guilty of religious tyranny, if he speaks of the hopes of the gospel, or the tribunal of the *future* judge. He must pass sentence as if he were a Sadducee and an Atheist. Such sentiments are repugnant to every feeling of nature and of Christianity, and though we are not ignorant of the influence of metaphysical dogmas in corrupting the heart, yet such, we are persuaded, is the strength of nature over artificial opinions, that the advocates of these sentiments, have only to witness the solemn scene of a human being adjudged to death, to refute their own speculations.*

* Note (A.)

We should like indeed to hear from Mr Conder or Marshall, a definition of religion stript of sectarianism. Take from religion the opinions of the Trinitarian sect, of the Arian, Unitarian, Baptist, Anabaptist, Deistical, &c. and what remains? "What is majesty," said an orator in the House of Commons, "stript of its externals?" "A jest," it was replied. The same we may say of religion stript of sectarianism. It is a jest, or it is nothing; for until the whole world acknowledge one faith, one Lord, one baptism, the propagation of religion will be the propagation of sectarianism. To admit it, therefore, to be the duty of magistrates, in any case, to propagate Christianity, and yet to object to their propagating the religion of a sect, is a contradiction in terms. You might as well impose upon a man the necessity of speaking, yet deny him the liberty of speaking in any known dialect. If then it be the duty of magistrates to provide religious education for their people, it can be no objection against doing so, that they propagate the opinions of a sect; for, to spread religion apart from sectarianism, is impossible. If Mr Marshall must have an objection against establishments, we would direct him to the right quarter. It must be against the primary duty of the magistrate, and not against the subsequent act of selecting and endowing a sect. This latter step is only a corollary from a preceding demonstration. But even should he succeed in disposing of the duty, he has not yet freed himself from the detested principle of selecting and favouring a particular sect. The moment government separates itself from the interests of religion, it goes over to the side of irreligion. When it ceases to lend its aid to Chris-

tianity, it becomes the abettor of Atheism and infidelity. There is no possibility of neutrality in religion. If the magistrate forbears to diffuse Christian knowledge, he gives his countenance to the propagation of infidelity. He may not endow sects to spread profanity and irreligion, that were a waste of zeal; it is enough to ensure the success of either, that they are let alone. This is the only favour they ask, and under such patronage their success is infallible.

The only question, therefore, which remains, is, whether the endowment of a particular sect out of the general treasury of the country be a measure of political injustice; for, if politically wrong, it cannot, we admit, be religiously right. To determine this question, it is evident, we must first consider what is the constitution of the government of the country, where the establishment exists. If the supreme power be vested in the hands of a sovereign magistrate, who possesses the uncontrouled management of the public resources, then, on Mr Conder's own admission, the magistrate's "will is the law of political right." Whatever he conceives to be his duty, or to be conducive to the good of society, he has the right to ordain. With this unlimited power, Constantine, on his conversion to Christianity, turned a part of the resources of the Roman Empire to the propagation of his newly acquired religion. His will was the law of political right. A happy circumstance, says Mr Conder, with a sneer, as if establishments were the legitimate offspring of despotism only, or as if their friends were necessarily the enemies of human freedom. So far are we from feeling ourselves implicated in such a charge, that with no part of Mr Con-

der's work, or of the letter of his disciple Mr Marshall, do we more sympathize, than with their commendations of the rights of men, and their invectives against tyranny and oppression. Our political creed is, that governments were made for the people, and not the people for governments; and that it is only where, according to the axiom of William Penn, "the laws rule, and the people are a party to those laws," that a government is free. Yet this freedom of legislating for itself, gives a Christian nation no license to exclude God from the province of its laws. If it be the duty of each individual to propagate his religion, it cannot be wrong in a nation collectively; unless we admit the monstrous doctrine, that there may be an individual Christianity, and a corporate Athiesm, and that in certain relations of life we may dispense with our Christian principles. To discharge this duty, there must therefore be the selection and endowment of a sect: and where, we ask, is the political wrong, in a nation ordaining by its own free voice the appropriation of a certain portion of its wealth to the service of religion, and endowing, out of the general treasury, the sect of the majority? Instead of being a political wrong, it is the law of all society, and the first principle of political right, that the minority yield to the majority. If we deny this principle, we overturn the basis of governments, and refuse subjection to all authority. How then can the dissenters, from an establishment in a free country, be politically wronged when taxed for the support of religion? Unless they be the majority of the nation, there is not a shadow of reason for complaint on the ground of political injustice. Yet dissenters, says Mr

Marshall, are " grievously wronged, though they have hitherto, from an amiable but perhaps ill judged forbearance, submitted quietly to take the wrong—and no one has deemed himself called to do for them, what it was obvious, if they chose, they might do for themselves. It is high time the case should be fully stated, that it should be exposed before an enlightened public—and particularly, that it should be told in the quarter where the telling of it is likely to be of some avail." " One would almost imagine," that Mr Marshall, to use his own words, " had never reflected on the subject, or that he were incapable of understanding what injustice means." He *talks*, indeed, familiarly of Locke, Warburton, Paley, and other eminent political writers; but he has yet to learn the elementary principles of political science. If his argument against establishments on this ground be just, and it is only against the principle of establishments, let it be observed, that he argues; then his reasoning goes to the subversion of *all government and taxation*, and to fix upon all, the charge of injustice and oppression. For, what governments can possibly be formed, or laws enacted, from which there will be no dissentients? It were as impracticable to bring all men to one opinion, as to reduce all trees to the same size; and if no act of government be politically right, but where there is the unexcepted acquiescence of every member of the community, then all laws are essentially unjust, and those who are in the minority are in all instances when taxed, grievously wronged; and if they submit, it is only from " an amiable and ill judged forbearance." In short, viewed as a *tax*, the justice or injustice of establish-

ments is to be judged by the same principle as all other taxes.

But it is not alone on the plea of an established religion being the religion of the *majority*, that it can be vindicated as Christian in its principle, and freed from the charge of political injustice. We can conceive a nation so situated, that the governors and the governed profess different religions—the one may be Christian and Protestant, the other Heathen or Roman Catholic. Such is the relation of the government of Great Britain to the people of Ireland and India; yet in both countries it is the duty of the British government to exercise its official influence for the diffusion of its own purer religion. We are not bound, as Mr Marshall and others falsely imagine, in order to be consistent with our own principles, to establish popery in Ireland or heathenism in India. We maintain no principles that lead to such monstrous conclusions. Our principle is, that it is the duty of a Christian government to provide for the propagation of that religion which it believes to be true, not for that which it knows to be false.

Wherever the government is not the mere organ of the people, but has an independent legislative authority, its duty may require it to oppose its own voice to the voice of the majority of the nation; and in doing so, it is not chargeable with political injustice, because its decisions constitute the law of political right. Thus the whole Jewish people cried out as with one voice for the crucifixion of our Saviour. Yet Pilate at first resisted, and would have displayed the highest moral principle, had he continued to resist, notwithstanding their reiterated demands. He

was not guilty of an act of political injustice in obeying the voice of his own conscience, though that single voice was opposed to the clamour of an assembled nation. His guilt lay not in his resistance, but in his compliance; in his temerity, which sacrificed his conscience to self-interest, his duty to his fears.* If in like manner, India demanded the establishment of the idolatrous and bloody superstitions of Juggernaut, our duty would be to resist. We ask not by what authority Great Britain holds possession of India. Her empire may be a usurpation, as the empire of the Romans over the Jews was a usurpation. It is enough that we are the *actual* governors of India; this lays upon us the obligation of exercising our authority agreeably to the spirit and commands of that religion which we profess. A slave may have come unjustly into our possession, but so long as he is resident under our roof, we owe to him the discharge of certain social and domestic duties—the providing for his physical wants, and the superintendence of his moral and religious education. If India, indeed, were left to itself, it might establish its own religion; but placed as it is, by the providence of God, under our administration, we cannot, and dare not establish what we know to be a lie. On the contrary, our duty is to disseminate amongst its inhabitants the principles of genuine Christianity. Hence our government has recently forbid the horrid practice of Sutteeship, and hence have the Christians of Great Britain called upon it to use still more of its *official* influence, to aid the exertions of the missionary in his work of Christianization. There may be difficulties to encounter in the dis-

* Note (B.)

charge of this duty, and great prudence requisite on the part of the governors to avoid irritating the prejudices of the governed, and trespassing unnecessarily upon their freedom, but till experience has proved that it is a duty impracticable, it is still imperious; not the less so because of the high, political, and Christian wisdom required for its exercise. Hitherto the government of Great Britain has been criminal, not in stretching its authority too far for the Christianization of India, but in its timidity and indifference to the great interests of religion. We would hail it as a redeeming act of Indian legislation, and worthy this Christian nation, should a systematic plan of religious instruction be organized, and missionaries diffused throughout every province of that vast continent, to instruct its ignorant inhabitants, and reclaim them from their inveterate superstitions. Even as a cheap instrument of government, the missionary would be preferable to the soldier,—the Bible to the bayonet.

It is true that this establishment of Christianity in India by the government, would not be the establishment of the religion of the majority. But we have shewn, that notwithstanding, it may still be our imperious duty to provide for the Christian education of India, and that in doing so we violate no principle of political justice; unless all the acts of our Indian legislation be chargeable with the same crime, and consequently all the laws of every government which is not framed on the principle of pure democracy. It is obvious, however, to the understanding of every man, that there are peculiar circumstances in which a government may be placed, where it would be a

violation not of duty merely, but of every maxim of common prudence, or of political wisdom, to yield itself in the enactment of its laws, to the voice of the majority of the people. In such peculiar circumstances is a civilized and Christian nation, when placed over a people sunk in ignorance, and the victims of a degrading superstition. It instantly assumes that superiority which is due to wisdom and truth, over ignorance and error. Instead of following the voice of the majority, it legislates for them, and regards them as pupils to be instructed, rather than as a community of men capable of sharing in the enactments of their own government. As in a period of popular commotion, a man of talent and sagacity assumes the station of leader, gives consistency to the councils of the multitude, and exercises an authority over them, which in times of quiet would be an infringement of their rights; so a civilized and Christian government, when placed, from whatever cause, over an ignorant and idolatrous nation, assumes the station of command which belongs to its wisdom and religion, and exercises an authority which in other circumstances would be an unjust violation of the natural freedom of mankind.

Much of the preceding reasoning applies to the duty of the government of Great Britain in reference to the religious instruction of Ireland; and upon the same principles is its Protestant establishment to be vindicated. *First*, Ireland is but a fractional part of a great kingdom, and cannot therefore charge any measure with *political* injustice, which has been ordained by the general legislature of the empire; and, *secondly*, Ireland, like India, is in peculiar circumstances, and

it were in violation, not of the duty of our government only, but of the clearest principles of political prudence to follow the will of the majority of that nation, and establish a religion which is not only false, but unfavourable to civil order, and to the temporal interests of society—a religion which holds the mind enthralled by the terrors of superstition, and lays its interdict upon the progress of knowledge. If Ireland indeed had a government of its own, and were entirely separated from the legislature of Great Britain, its established religion would be Popery. But Ireland is in an anomalous situation. It is a Roman Catholic country under a Protestant government, in the same manner as India is a heathen country under a Christian government. Great Britain, which is a Protestant and Christian nation, is invested with a certain authority over both these countries, and for the exercise of this authority it is responsible to God. To exercise it in establishing either Popery or heathenism, we dare not; for both of these religions we believe to be false. Left to themselves, each of these countries might establish its own religion, but so long as they are placed under our superintendence, our duty is to use our influence in diffusing that purer religion which we possess, and not to become a party to the dissemination of superstition and error. Instead of a political injustice, the diffusion of genuine Christianity in Ireland and India would confer upon both these countries a great political good. It would prepare them more fully for enjoying all the various blessings of social and civilized life.

Let it also be remembered, that the support of the Church of Ireland lays no tax upon the *present* inha-

bitants, and therefore cannot be opposed on the grounds of political injustice. It has an entailed inheritance of its own. Abolish the Irish establishment, and you remove not a single tax from the shoulders of the people—you only increase the revenues of the great proprietors of the land. You make a present to them of the tythes which never belonged to them, and swell out their lordly retinues at the expence of the religious instruction of the peasant and the artizan. The only hardship suffered by the poor from this tax, arises from the *mode* in which it is levied. Where the system of commutation has been introduced, and already it has been introduced extensively throughout Ireland, this grievance is removed. Detached from this evil, the levying of tythes is neither more nor less than a partitioning of the rent of the land between the great proprietors and the clergy. Abolish them, and you enrich not the poor, but add to the already overgrown fortunes of the nobles. Instead of a clergyman in each parish, you will find my Lord A. with an additional horse in his stud—with an additional groom in his stable—or with an additional pack of hounds in his kennel. Besides, to this addition to his fortune, let it be observed, that my Lord A. has no title whatever. For centuries the estates of Ireland have been bought and sold with the burden of the tythes. The church revenue is one of the estimated drawbacks on the rental of an estate; and on this condition landed property is bought and sold. To abolish tythes, therefore, would be to give the proprietors of the soil an increase of revenue to which they have no claim. Till once, then, it can be shewn that a clergyman is not as useful an appendage

to a parish, as a groom, a horse, or a pack of hounds, we know of no argument, on the mere ground of political justice, which can entitle us to violate the vested rights of the Irish church, and alienate her property from the maintenance of her clergy.

But there *is* a ground upon which the inheritance of that church might be justly alienated from its present possessors. If, after long trial it be found to be only a source of irritation and political strife; if its clergy be incurably tainted with a secular spirit, and the constitution of the church have no principle of renovation within itself to throw off these evils, and cleanse itself of its corruptions; let it be abolished, and Ireland freed from a nuisance which, under the form of a protestant establishment, is the abettor of sedition, and the disturber of the tranquillity of society. It is no longer the duty of our government to uphold an establishment which defeats its own end; and instead of co-operating with the government in diffusing civil order, is a bone of contention to the inhabitants. But if the Irish establishment have within itself a principle of renovation, if its clergymen, whatever be their characters, are only life-renters on the estate; and above all, if the peculiar circumstances of that establishment in the present day guarantee the redress of its abuses, and, from whatever motive, secure the activity of its members, it cannot fail to be productive of benefits to Ireland incalculably greater than what could be obtained by the exertions of private Christian benevolence. A great instrument, we have formerly said, for the future regeneration of Ireland, is at least prepared and ready for action. The Irish establishment may have been

long inactive, but it is yet susceptible of life; and when reanimated, will possess powers more ample than any other instrument for diffusing throughout that country the lights of knowledge, and of Christian instruction purified from the errors of superstition.

As a last resource, we are told by Messrs. Conder and Marshall, that there is something *peculiar* in a *religious tax*. Incapable of fixing a charge of injustice against establishments viewed as an ordinary tax, they next consider it as an extraordinary one. There is a peculiarity in the case which sets aside the general maxims of political reasoning. Religion is a matter of conscience, we are told. "What then," says Mr Marshall, "if we are taxed to uphold a religion from which we conscientiously dissent? What, if a large portion of our substance be annually taken from us for the support of a clergy, to whose ministrations we do not submit, and cannot submit, without violating what we conceive to be our duty to God? Do you call this justice? Do you call this no unwarrantable encroachment?" "How do you suppose the dissenters reconcile their consciences to the exaction I speak of? Does it never occur to you that it is a matter in which their consciences may be concerned, as well as their property?"—p. 53.

If Mr Marshall had suffered himself to pause and discriminate, he would have discovered that it is not peculiar to religion, to be a matter of conscience. Till once he has shewn that conscience is dissevered from all our other actions as citizens, and members of a community, the argument is good for nothing; since it proceeds upon the assumption of a peculiarity

which is not proved. Is religion, we ask, the only subject over which conscience holds empire? May we not plead conscience in refusing to pay a tax levied for the prosecution of a war which we conceive to be at once impolitic and unjust? We may be of opinion with those who believe the public money is used as an instrument of bribery and corruption. Can we submit to support a system which thus violates the laws of God? Is not our conscience here concerned, as well as our property? Quakers are on *religious* principles opposed to all wars, yet they have never pleaded exemption from those taxes which have been levied for the national defence. A class of the community, no less numerous than this sect, are opposed on Christian principles to the severe and sanguinary punishments of our criminal code; yet they pay for the execution of every criminal, and for the support of the judges by whom he is condemned. Admit the plea, that no tax can be rightfully imposed, against which individuals, or even classes of the community, may have conscientious scruples, and you at once sweep away the entire system of taxation. We doubt not but all men would become very *conscientious* if they were allowed to plead exemption from the payment of a tax, because of their scruples respecting the object to which it is to be applied. Scruples would multiply on all hands, till the tax-gatherer, instead of a levier of money, would become a *ductor dubitantium;* and our Chancellor of Exchequer, in place of a well filled treasury, would have the happiness of knowing, that he ruled over a most conscientious people, who, above all things, had a most conscientious abhorrence of taxation. It were im-

pertinent longer to trifle with the understandings of our readers in exposing such an argument. Every child can distinguish between what Mr Marshall has ignorantly confounded. Because we contribute to a tax imposed by government, do we therefore approve of the objects to which it is appropriated? We pay our money as the subjects of a state; we reserve our opinions and our consciences as the property of God. Thus Paul thought when he exhorted Christians to pay their taxes, and to give custom to whom custom is due. Yet Paul knew that no inconsiderable part of the revenue of every heathen country was appropriated to the support of idolatry; that the taxes which the Christians paid for upholding heathen governments, upheld also and perpetuated the mysteries of iniquity, and maintained those priests who ministered at the altars of false deities. He could distinguish between an exaction upon the *conscience*, and an exaction upon the *property* of Christians, and had no party end to gain in confounding these together. The use of conscience in our present argument is a mere pretext to cloak other motives of aversion to contribute to an establishment. But, as is quaintly observed by an old writer, "though the devil, when beat from other sanctuaries, sometimes gets into men's consciences for shelter, he must not be let alone because he has got thither."

It is the duty, then, we conclude, of the supreme power in Christian nations, whether vested in the hands of an individual, or in the representative assembly of the people, to provide when necessary for the religious education of the people. And in maintaining this doctrine, we speak not the sentiments of the

members of the establishment only, but of the church of the secession, as recorded in its own acts and testimonies, and with few exceptions of the Protestant church throughout Europe. It may excite some surprise in the minds of our seceding brethren to hear such a doctrine stigmatised by one of their own ministers, as "Anti-christian," and as "forging chains for the understandings of men." It would be well that they paused before passing sentence upon the assembled wisdom and piety of ages; and rather than doubt the sagacity of one individual, presumptuously condemn the recorded decisions of their own, and of every Protestant church in Europe. Mr Marshall is an alien from the principles of the secession; and, like other apostates, is over-hot and indiscreet in the defence of his newly acquired opinions. He has gone beyond the most extravagant of Independent controversialists, and caricatured the lesson which he has learned from his instructors. The Independents, Quakers, and Anabaptists, have not carried their principles so far as to pronounce our establishments *Anti-christian*, they only affirm that they find *no warrant* for them in Scripture. But, Mr Marshall, ambitious to out-do his masters, and to avoid the imputation of being a servile copyist, throws in a new stroke of his own, and bedaubs the picture that he may conceal the imitation. The doctrines of Mr Marshall, when stript of the peculiar extravagance with which he has invested them, are however no novelties. "Though they are sometimes," says Dr M'Crie, speaking of these very doctrines, "denominated a new scheme or new principles, and sometimes new light, because they are recommended, in

our times, as the effects of further light and improvement than our fathers were blessed with; yet it will be evident to any acquainted with church history and literature, that, from whatever source they may have been immediately drawn, whether from the religious sectaries, the sentiments of Latitudinarian and Socinianizing divines, or the schools of more modern philosophers, they are far from being new. Every proposition and favourite phrase, the very modes of expression used in argument, explication, or declamation, are but a repetition of what may be found almost *verbatim* in a variety of productions left by their worthy predecessors. They may indeed be allowed to be new in the mouths and creeds of Scots Presbyterians and Seceders, and to try to incorporate them with their former profession, and render them consistent with their former subscriptions, is certainly *a new and very barefaced attempt.*"

It may undeceive our seceding brethren to be thus told, by such an authority as Dr M'Crie, that they are not bound in consistency to maintain the opinions so confidently delivered by Mr Marshall; nay, that though he be a minister of their church, he is yet a dissentient from the principles of the Secession, and that their consistency is not to follow, but abandon his guidance. That we do not charge Mr Marshall falsely, will be obvious, by an appeal to the original deeds of the Secession church, as drawn up under the eye of the venerable Erskine, and to the sentiments expressed in the writings of subsequent Seceders. It will be seen by this review, that it "is certainly a new and a barefaced attempt" for a minister professing adherence to the principles of the Seces-

sion, to represent establishments as Anti-christian, or to speak of the defence of these institutions as confined to the advocacy of an "interested class." A writer who, by such epithets of abuse, outrages alike the sentiments of the living and of the dead, deserves to be treated with little ceremony, were it not that we should only dishonour ourselves by retorting upon their author his own aspersions. Besides, the universality of his accusation renders it harmless. A libel drawn up against the human race is not likely to find many who will prosecute for damages. If the libeller had an individual aim, he has blunted his own arrows, and shot so wide of the mark, as to hit no one. It is so with Mr Marshall. He designed only at first a stroke, it may be against his parish minister, or, at most, against the Church of Scotland; but so wide has his arm reached, and so gigantic has he unconsciously grown, that his own church, and the united Protestant churches of Europe, who, in their confessions, have universally vindicated establishments, have come in for their share of the castigation. The dispute now stands; Marshall, *versus* the Secession Church, and the Protestant churches of Europe! Who is this, we may exclaim, that defies the *armies* of Israel? Mr Marshall affects to scorn the Reviewer as being amongst the "lame" and the "blind," and, with his usual good taste, has made a holy text the bearer of his ill humour. To such invective our answer is short. Though this self-appointed champion had ten times the strength of Goliath, a shepherd boy, with a stone and a sling, when backed by the *hosts* of Israel, were sufficient to bring down the defier.

Our *first* appeal in proof of the wide departure of Mr Marshall from the principles of the Secession, is to the declaration of the original Seceders. The language of Mr Erskine and others who protested with him, is, " that they were laid under the disagreeable necessity of seceding, *not from the principles and constitution* of the Church of Scotland, to which they declared they steadfastly adhered, but from those ecclesiastical courts only which had ejected them from ministerial communion." " To rectify," says the eminent historian already quoted, " the abuses, and recover the original purity of the Church of Scotland, were the ends declared by the original Seceders, proposed by the association which they formed, and avowed in the testimony or declaration of their views and intentions, which they published to the world. Whatever others, as Christians, Protestants, or Presbyterians profess and glory in, they vindicate as theirs too, and have embodied in their testimony. They did not come forward in the suspicious character of *general* reformers, who would not avow what they intended to pull down, and did not know what they would build up in its room. They did not plan a reform according to a scheme of principles of their own, nor was it their object to overturn that church which had lately driven them from its communion. But they appeared as a *part* of the Church of Scotland adhering to her reformed constitution, testifying against the injuries it had received, seeking the redress of these, and pleading for the revival of a reformation, attained according to the word of God, in a former period, approved by every authority in the land, and ratified with solemn vows to the Most High." " The

truth is, that this doctrine (the doctrine which teaches that civil authority may be warrantably employed about matters of religion, and relating to the church) is not only necessarily implied in their religious professions, but it will be found running through the whole of it, so that it is impossible to separate the one from the other, without disordering and taking in pieces the entire system."

Again, in the re-publication of the Act and Testimony of the Burghers, they have declared, " that were the grounds of the Secession happily removed, they would account it one of the most singular felicities of their times, to return to the communion of the Established Church of Scotland." Yet this is a church which Mr Marshall now declares to be essentially Anti-christian in its principles—to be " a house of merchandise," and not " a house of prayer," occupied by " the buyers, the sellers, and the changers of money."

Our *second* appeal is to the writings of subsequent Seceders, who adhered to, and vindicated against Independents, the opinions embodied in their original testimonies. " Is there no difference," says Mr Adam Gib of Edinburgh, as quoted by Dr M'Crie, " betwixt these two; an establishing a national profession of religion, and a compelling all the subjects to embrace it by the terrors of civil penalties? The establishment now spoken of is to be considered as a bestowing of additional privileges upon some; not as detracting from the natural or common privileges of any,—and though the bestowing of temporal encouragements or advantages upon the church has been carried too far—unto a corrupting of her officers and

ordinances, yet this *says nothing* against such a measure thereof, as is truly serviceable to the interests of religion." "Whatever opportunity and power any Christian man has from his civil station, for favouring or promoting the interests of Christ in the gospel church, so as may be still agreeable to her nature, he should reckon it his *chief* business thus to improve the same in opposition to a *heathenish* way of managing the concerns of that station; and this must be principally incumbent on civil rulers, from the principal measure of their opportunity and power. To imagine that civil rulers, professing religion, should not use their power and influence in behalf of the religion which they profess,—or, that they can otherwise put a due value upon it, and be truly in earnest about it, this is a chimerical notion which never *can be*, nor *ought* to be exemplified in the world."

"Some people," says another seceding writer, quoted by Dr M'Crie, (Mr Morrison of Norham) "may perhaps be shocked at hearing of a *legal establishment* of religion, as if it were an *Anti-christian abomination.* But there is *no manner* of ground for the heinous charge, provided always the establishment be not formed on the Anti-christian plan. Nor are we to be presently alarmed, as if all that must needs be Anti-christian, which is *boldly* opposed under that odious character. It is no unusual thing for Satan to transform himself into an angel of light, and under the covert of appearing to condemn a thing, to seek to establish it in another light."

Lest, however, our Seceding brethren should reject these as antiquated authorities, we shall, as our *last* appeal, present them with the sentiments of one of

their present respected ministers, the Rev. Dr Peddie. The opinion expressed by this venerable minister of the Secession, in the passages we are about to quote, are the more decisive, as contained in a production written in answer to certain illiberal and unfounded aspersions thrown upon the Secession Church by a clergyman of the establishment.

" I always understood," says he in his reply to Dr Porteus, with a precision of language that correctly defines our own sentiments, " that the externals of religion were in some measure within the magistrate's province; and I have been the less disposed to allow him power in respect to any matter connected with religion, the more closely and intimately the matter is related to it. *In* religion I allow him no power; *in matters of* religion I allow him a little; and *circa sacra* or *about* the externals of religion, I give him a great deal of power. Such are my sentiments, and my distinctions on this celebrated question."—p. 70.

And again, in replying to Dr Porteus, who had unjustly accused the Seceders of passing an act, declaring establishments unlawful, he denies the fact, as a calumnious misrepresentation of their sentiments, and subjoins his own as a corroboration of his statement. " That the first Seceders," says he, " were friends to civil establishments of religion, is not a matter of doubt. They did not separate from the Church of Scotland because she was established by law, but because she took advantage of her alliance with the state, to oppress the heritage of God, and because, basking in the sunshine of temporal prosperity, she slumbered and slept. ' They gloried,' as you acknowledge, ' in being the descendants, and the

only true representatives of the national church;' 'yea,' as you add, 'ever since their secession, they have carefully preserved the memory of their descent, and held up the national church as the point to which they wished to return, whenever certain obstacles should be removed.' But now they have presumed to do what—to pass an act, declaring civil establishments of religion unlawful—asserting that to establish it by human law, is contrary to the nature of the New Testament church, and an attempt to turn the spiritual kingdom of Christ into a worldly kingdom? No: had they done this, your assertion that they have 'renounced all connection and alliance with the Church of Scotland,' would have been proved. But, Sir, whether establishments were lawful or unlawful, has *never* been a question among *Burgher* Seceders. *I know of none of them who have written against them; I know of some who have written in their defence.*"—page 20.

We doubt not but Mr Marshall has seen this publication of his reverend brother. It is spirited, repels with indignation the unsubstantiated charges of sedition advanced by Dr Porteus against the Secession Church, and retorts with a just severity, his unwarrantable contempt and abuse of her ministers. For our own part, we detest no less the high church arrogance of Porteus, than the narrow sectarianism of Marshall. Intolerance is the spirit of both, though presented in a different form; in the former, wearing the aspect of an aristocrat, in the other dressed in the garb of a republican, and using the language of liberalism. "People," says an English dissenter, (Robinson) "in the communion of the establishment

may think themselves religious, as the deformed think themselves handsome, or may be religious as trees may be accidentally fruitful in an unfriendly soil, but the constitution is not religion, nor calculated to promote it." Sentiments less pointedly expressed by Mr Marshall, but conveying the same meaning, run throughout his letter. Indeed, with the variation of a few phrases, Dr Peddie would do our office of administering rebuke to the intolerant dissenterism of his brother. Mr Marshall has changed parties with Dr Porteus, and drawn up a "railing accusation" not against the Secession but the establishment. Using a different language, he has copied the sentiments of that high church divine. We are wrong, however, in saying that his railing accusation is against the establishment only, for by his own declaration he speaks not against the abuses of establishments, but the principle—a principle recognized and vindicated as at once Scriptural and expedient by the writers of his own church. We are really at a loss to know to what particular sect he belongs. "Doubtless," to use the language of Dr Peddie, "he is a non-descript." "You have astonished me," says this venerable minister addressing Dr Porteus, "with the versatility of your talents; you can be churchman and dissenter by turns. Your parts equally fit you to defend or betray the church; to attack or vindicate the Secession. I have often been puzzled, but seldom more so than at present. In my attempts at a classification of character, I know not in what order to place yours. At once the defender of the opposite faiths of the church and of the Secession, the bulwark of the one, and the main pillar of the other! You are doubtless a non-

descript: or shall I place you among the amphibia, as capable of living alternately in two different elements."—p. 3.

Such a non-descript is Mr Marshall. He is a Presbyterian and an Independent,—a Seceder, yet an impugner of the doctrines of the Secession as Antichristian,—an ecclesiastical liberal, yet adopting the sentiments of a high church intolerance,—a professed friend of freedom of conscience, yet denying to the magistrate the exercise of his in the discharge of a duty which every Christian must feel obligatory, in proportion to the eminence of his rank and official situation.

To what causes this departure from the original grounds of the Secession is owing, it is not difficult to explain. The same fact is illustrated in the history of all Secession churches. By far the most numerous body of the English dissenters were originally friends of establishments, and wished to be comprehended in the national church, provided the terms of conformity had been such as they could have conscientiously subscribed. Excluded, however, from her communion, the breach gradually widened. That their people might not fall back into the church, their ministers invented new articles of separation, and while seemingly following the dictates of duty strengthened their own interest. Endangered by too close a vicinity to the establishment, they drew off to a safe distance, by multiplying the articles of disagreement. There is this peculiarity, however, in the circumstances of the Scottish Seceders, that at the very time when the church is purifying herself of those evils which were the cause of the original separation,

they are departing more widely from her principles and communion. Instead of hailing, as their predecessors would have done, the renovation of her Christian zeal, and preparing to join hands as the tide of corruption had retired, which had driven them from her fellowship, they have invented new articles of discord, and widened the breach to render all junction hopeless; afraid lest the growing effulgence of the church, as the cloud was lifted up from her countenance, would extinguish the taper they had lighted. Lest they might seem to be without reasons for their secession, when the old grounds were no longer tenable, they have taken up a new position. It is not from the *corruptions*, but from the *constitution* of the establishment, they now secede. We are not affected with a mere temporary ailment, which time and medicine may work off; our entire frame work must be taken down, and old Presbytery dressed in the new doctrines of Independency. The present ministers of the Secession, if Mr Marshall be taken as their representative, more profoundly skilled than their predecessors in the diognostics of ecclesiastical diseases, have discovered that our complaint is not relaxed discipline and corrupt judicatories, but that we are constitutionally distempered. They are more shrewd and penetrating, and happily freed from the unfortunate bias, which too ardent an affection for the mother church gave to the judgment of the original Seceders—an affection which concealed those defects that have been brought to light by the scrutiny of their unprejudiced descendants. We fondly hoped that the ministers of the Secession, whom we have hitherto regarded as important auxiliaries to the establishment,

and who have done much to restore its evangelical purity, would finally have merged themselves into that church from which they had reluctantly separated. But circumstances have changed. They have now grown too great to submit to the humiliation of losing their *individuality* in the general Church of Scotland, and as a pretext for their aversion, they push forward the new discoveries they have made of its Anti-christian constitution. Excellent disguise, to conceal party pride under the cloak of principle, and draw a credit of virtue out of their very inconsistencies!

But though such be the altered sentiments of a part of the ministers of the Secession their people are unchanged. *They* have not abandoned their old guides to follow the innovations of their modern leaders. Venerating the memory of Erskine, and of the other fathers of the Secession, they adhere to their principles. The people of Scotland love their national church, and were only forced to abandon it when it had receded from its own pure and Scriptural principles. But now that it has begun a new reckoning, they are prepared to return to its communion; unless where they have been taught to regard its constitution as Anti-christian, by the misrepresentations of an "interested class." Let our brethren of the Secession beware of such misrepresentations, and not suffer themselves to be misled into a renunciation of their own principles. Let them reconsider the arguments we have presented from Scripture, and they will discover the charge of Anti-christianism to be unfounded—to be the offspring of party zeal and of Sectarian intolerance.

These arguments, which we shall briefly recapitulate, are, *first*, the example of God himself, in the institution of the Jewish establishment—an establishment which, when stript of its Jewish drapery, affords an example for our imitation; and not till it be proved to be a thing fundamentally immoral for a government to use its influence in the propagation of religion, or impracticable from the circumstances in which it is placed, is it entitled to set aside this example, or in doing so, it virtually rejects the plan of infinite intelligence and wisdom. *Secondly*, We have shewn the Scripture authority for establishments, from the example of the Jewish kings, who officially contributed to the support and propagation of their religion, and whose conduct was approved and sanctioned by God. And here also, as in the former case, we have proved that their example, when stript of what in it was peculiar and Jewish, is binding upon Christian kings. We have exposed the gratuitous and unfounded dogma of Mr Marshall, who would dismiss these examples on the ground that Jewish rulers were clothed with a typical character, and therefore that whatever actions were performed by them, were done away in the antitype. The question in this dogma, we have seen is assumed, since, while we admit that the Jewish kings were clothed in many instances with a typical character, we yet deny that the actions of typical characters, if *moral*, are done away in the antitype. Was the design of David to build a temple for the worship of God an immoral design, and justified only from the peculiar and typical character which he bore? Was the action of Solomon an immoral action, when he erected the temple which

his father had designed? Or was the conduct of Jehoshaphat a violation of the principles of morality, when he sent Levites as missionaries throughout Judea, to revive the knowledge of true religion, by reading the books of the law? If these on the contrary were *moral* actions, and actions approved and sanctioned by God, they are, notwithstanding, the typical characters of the performers, binding upon the imitation of Christian rulers, and to deny this, were to set aside the greater part of the lessons of the Old Testament; for almost all its characters, illustrious for their piety and virtue, were types of Christ. *Thirdly*, We have adduced for the Scripture authority of establishments, the unreserved demand which the New Testament makes upon Christians, to use *every power* with which they are entrusted for the advancement of their religion. There is no exception made in favour of the powers possessed by magistrates and governors. Each Christian in his place, and with the powers with which he is entrusted, is called upon to advance the Christian cause. Nor is it of importance in determining the duty of the magistrate, whether his office originate in an ordinance of God or of man. If the objection be tenable, that would set aside the exercise of his power in favour of religion, because his office is an ordinance of man, the same objection, we shewed, would set aside the obligation of private Christians to use their wealth in the service of Christianity, because riches are the offspring of human labour, and of those laws, which, by securing property, encourage industry and accumulation. But though government be an ordinance of man, who is it, we ask, that gives understanding to our

counsellors, and teaches our senators wisdom? Who is it that raises up wise and virtuous princes as a blessing to a nation, and who is it that calms the tumult of the people? If God does not originate the power, upon him, at least depends its successful exercise for the tranquillity of society; Paul may plant, and Apollos water, but as in religion, so in government, it is God who giveth the increase. To exclude, therefore, the interests of his religion from the councils of a nation, or for a king to withhold the exercise of his official influence when it might be employed for the advancement of Christianity, were an ungrateful and Atheistic use of his authority. This, instead of laying the state as an oblation upon the altar, and consecrating the nation to him who is the author of our civil as well as of our domestic and private happiness, would be to erect the superstructure of governments on the basis of infidelity,—it would be to lay the foundation-stone of the social edifice, without invoking the presence of that Supreme Architect, without whose aid the builders of the house build in vain.*

To the *second* of the proposed points of discussion, we now proceed. Having shewn the Scripture sanction for establishments, it remains that we briefly consider their expediency. And here it is to be observed, there is a two-fold argument for establishments, arising out of the two-fold effects of Christianity. Apart altogether from the primary or religious advantages of an establishment, there is a subordinate and civil end gained by the diffusion of Christian knowledge. While Christianity has the high aim of promoting the eternal well-being of men, its influence is no less

* Note (C.)

paramount in advancing their temporal happiness. With its progress is associated the advancement of those virtues which bind men in society together, and secure obedience to human laws. It leads in its train social order, peace and humanity. "True religion," says the most eloquent of modern Dissenters, Robert Hall, "founded on the sacred oracles, is the pillar of society, the safe-guard of nations, the parent of social order—which alone has power to curb the fury of the passions, and secure to every one his rights; to the labourer the rewards of his industry; to the rich the enjoyment of their wealth; to nobles the preservation of their honours; and to princes the stability of their thrones."

If such be the effects of religion, can it be inexpedient in a state to contribute to its maintenance and diffusion; or can it, without forfeiting all pretensions to political wisdom, expend its resources upon inferior means, and exclude this great instrument of social order and civilization? While it erects prisons, appoints judges, organizes armies, and lavishes the public treasury in adopting these and other indirect and secondary means for the security of society, will it not dare without the imputation of injustice, at once to lay its hand upon the fountain of crime? Are the most efficient of all means to be rejected; and rather than expend a few thousands in the circulation of bibles, and the support of Missionaries, may it squander millions in the purchase of arms and the maintenance of soldiers? We appeal not to Heathen nations in proof of the importance of religion as an auxiliary to civil government; yet even they, corrupt as their religion was, found it necessary to the well-

being of society, and incorporated it with their political institutions. We speak of Christians who are blessed with a purer faith, a faith which is identified in its extension with the growth of every virtue that can exalt the character of a nation, and give integrity, consistency, and humanity to its councils. Heathen rulers may have erred in calling in religion as an auxiliary to civil government. It may be questioned whether their degrading superstitions improved the social character of mankind. But when the question respects Christianity, all doubt is at end. *It* is indeed the safeguard of nations, and the parent of social order, and that government which rejects its aid, is guilty of a political parricide. "The king," says Lord Bacon, "who holds not religion the best reason of state, is void of all piety and justice—the supporters of kings;" and we may add, he is no less void of all true political wisdom, if he holds not the advancement of religion, to be the shortest road to secure obedience to the laws. We speak not at present of any particular mode, which government ought to adopt for the religious education of the people; we maintain only the right it possesses of using the best means for the advancement of the great ends of civil society. Intrusted with power for the accomplishment of a particular object, it is unfaithful to its trust, if it employ not those means which are most condusive to the attainment of that object. And these means are the religious education of the people—means infinitely more effectual than the terrors of the police, or the bayonet of the soldier.

If against this use of religion, as an instrument of civil government, it be urged, that we degrade Chris-

tianity into a mere engine of state, or convert it into a political tool, we answer, by denying the charge. Our design is not to degrade Christianity, but to elevate the moral character of mankind; it is, to establish that peace on earth, and mutual good will, which Christianity is intended to promote. By the supreme wisdom of its author, our present and future happiness have been closely united together. The same principles which make a man a Christian, make him at the same time a good citizen, parent, and master. There is a domestic, as well as a political use of religion; and Christianity is not degraded, either when made instrumental in cherishing the virtues of the citizen, or of the parent, in securing the tranquillity of society, or the quiet and happiness of our homes. "A politic use of religion," says the venerable Hooker, Eccles. Pol. Book v. sect. 2, "there is. Men fearing God are thereby a great deal more effectually, than by positive laws, restrained from doing evil, inasmuch as those laws have no further power than over our outward actions only; whereas into men's inward cogitations, and into the prime intents and motions of their hearts religion serveth for a bridle. What more savage, wild, and cruel, than man, if he see himself able, either by fraud to overreach, or by power to overbear the laws whereunto he should be subject? Wherefore, in so great boldness to offend, it behoveth that the world should be held in awe, not by a vain surmise, but a true apprehension of somewhat which no man may think himself able to withstand. This is the *politic use of religion.*"

Apart, therefore, we say, from the religious advan-

tage of an establishment, there is a civil end gained by the diffusion of Christian knowledge; and unless it be the duty of governments to take the most laborious, indirect, and costly method, to secure the peace and order of the community, instead of the most direct and obvious, it cannot be unjust to use their official influence in promoting the religious education of the people; nay, it is in the highest degree expedient that their influence should be so exerted, and all classes instructed in the truths of that religion which is the pillar of society, and the safeguard of nations.

It is not, however, upon the grounds of their *political* expediency, that we would rest our defence of ecclesiastical establishments. This plea is sufficient to vindicate them from the charge of *political injustice*, and to point out to the statesman that the path of political wisdom lies in maintaining and cherishing the interests of religion, as inseparably linked with the true interest and glory of his country. But it is to Christians rather than to politicians, we at present address ourselves. However important be the consideration now adverted to, still it is upon the higher grounds of their *religious* expediency that we would rest our vindication of establishments. While Christianity scatters temporal blessings on our way, in its "march to immortality," these are as nothing in the estimation of the Christian, compared with the greater felicities to which it finally conducts its disciples. Its chief value lies not in its being our safeguard upon earth, but our guide to heaven. Are ecclesiastical establishments, then, necessary to the support and spread of religion? To answer this question, it is obvious, we have simply to inquire whether Christianity

be already so universally diffused as to render unnecessary the farther contributions of government; or whether, notwithstanding its partial diffusion, there be something in the very nature of a government contribution to defeat its own end. Are the channels of Christian benevolence so entirely filled, that nothing can flow out from the coffers of government that will be available for the more thorough Christianization of a country? Or, though these channels are miserably empty, can no aid from government replenish their well nigh exhausted currents? *These are the questions to be determined.* It must either, we repeat, be shewn that religion is universally diffused, and therefore in no need of the contributions of the state; or that, though ignorance and irreligion prevail, it is impossible for the liberality of government, however judiciously exercised, to lessen the evil. If a man reject the proffered advice of a physician, it must be for one of two reasons—either because he is whole, and needs not his prescriptions; or because he has no confidence in their virtue, and fears lest they should feed and aggravate his distemper.

That the assistance of the state is rejected on the former of these grounds, will not by the adversaries of establishments be generally maintained. There are indeed those who conceive, that we already have more than enough of religion; and such are for the most part vehement, and always, it must be confessed, consistent adversaries of establishments. Our argument, however, is not at present with infidels or irreligionists, but with Christians. *They* at least will not urge the inexpediency of establishments, because religion is already sufficiently diffused. The fact, they

know, is notoriously the reverse. We meet, therefore, in the common acknowledgement of the necessity of some means for supplying Christian instruction to the people; and the single question is, what means will be most effectual? And here we might at once determine the controversy in favour of an establishment in our own country, by an appeal to the fact, that notwithstanding the aid contributed by government, which on all hands is allowed to have done much, there is yet a deficiency of religious instruction provided for the community—a deficiency not unknown, and therefore unsupplied,—from the idea that the state had already made ample provision,—but proclaimed, and published, and even triumphed in, as if the fact of the deficiency of the aid proved that all aid was unnecessary, and that it were better there should be at once a total starvation than a partial and half-relieved famine. It is to this simple fact, that the *deficiency* of the establishment has not been supplied by the spontaneous benevolence of Christians, that we fearlessly appeal for the decision of the present question. If a poor man, who was dependent upon the gratuitous but scanty charity of a distant friend, should be urged by his neighbours to refuse this aid, and depend entirely upon their liberality; might he not reply with justice, your request is unreasonable—why, you have long known that the contribution I received was altogether inadequate to my subsistence, that it was meagre and scanty, and left many wants unrelieved; all this you have known, and heard often reiterated, yet you never generously came forward to suppliment what was *deficient* in the bounty of my distant friend, how much less, therefore,

can I rely upon your providing for my *entire* maintenance. This is plain experimental reasoning, and who could resist the justice of the poor man's reply? It were inhumanity to pull from under his hand the staff on which he leaned, when his past experience had proved to him that he had no other on which to rest.

Our reply, in like manner, to the adversaries of establishments, is that of the poor man to his neighbours. Let Christians shew their liberality in supplying the deficient bounty of the state, and then may we entrust them with the entire maintenance of religion. Till then our reverence for experience forbids us to confide in promises which have not been realized, in professions of liberality which would suffer the people to perish for lack of knowledge. This consideration is sufficient, we say, of itself, to determine the question in favour of establishments. We shall state, however, our reasons more at large. These are, *first*, The indifference of men to religion, and the consequent insufficiency of the demand to secure and uphold an adequate supply of Christian instruction; and, *secondly*, The narrow resources of private Christian liberality, compared with the vastness of the object to be accomplished.

The *first* of these is the reason urged by Dr Chalmers in his Civic Economy, and the same argument, we are told by Mr Marshall, is pursued by Mr Wilks in his Correlative Claims and Duties. To which of these authors we owe this argument, is of little importance in our estimate of its weight. We shall leave Mr Marshall to trace its pedigree, and to probe the question of its origin. It is sufficient that it approves itself to our

reason and experience. On this account we recommended the perusal of the Civic Economy to Mr Marshall, in our review of his discourse, as fitted by its comprehensive and luminous reasoning, to throw light upon his understanding of the present question. In this we have been mistaken. Mr Marshall has indeed read the Civic Economy, eulogized Dr Chalmers, but misapprehended his argument. This is the more surprising, as he has told us, that the whole of the reasoning of that work might be comprised in one or two pages. He cannot, therefore, have misapprehended it from want of frequency and distinctness of statement; for there is no figure of speech Dr Chalmers so dearly loves as reiteration, and none which appears so necessary to the instruction of Mr Marshall. But Mr Marshall has a theory—orators are bad reasoners, and Dr Chalmers has far too much imagination to be a wise man. Besides, he is a "benevolent enthusiast," and such splendour of imagination and goodness of heart, it were absurd to expect in union with sound wisdom and philosophy. We are sorry we cannot in our turn avail ourselves of this mode of reasoning, as it is not every writer's arguments that can be answered by a eulogy on his genius. To retort on Mr Marshall in this way, would be bad reasoning, and worse criticism. It would be dealing falsely with his arguments, and still more falsely with his abilities as a writer, did we abuse him with a panegyric.

But it is a vulgar error, that your men of cold, bare intellect are the only men of sagacity and wisdom, or that splendour and richness of imagination are incompatible with soundness of judgment, and reach of thought; as if an object could not at once be valuable

and splendid, like the sun which animates creation by its heat, while it adorns it by the glow and variety of its colours. Mr Marshall may take for granted, if he please, that it is too much for one man to be at once wise and eloquent. This may be agreeable to the vanity of those who have little imagination themselves, and who would fondly be supposed the only men in whose frigid intellects profound wisdom and sagacity dwell. But the writings of such men as Dr Thomas Brown, Hall, and Foster, and the author of that recent burst of genius and wisdom, the "Natural History of Enthusiasm," are a sufficient confutation of this vulgar error. In refutation of such a prejudice to the "Civic Economy" itself, we appeal. So far from being one of those works which lead us "splendidly astray," it is distinguished amidst all its eloquence, by a plain, practical, and even homely wisdom. It is the first application, of which we are aware, of the discoveries of political economy to the advancement of the Christian cause; and in no one part of that work has Dr Chalmers shewn more comprehensive wisdom, than in that very qualification of Smith's general principle of "demand and supply" which Mr Marshall has failed to apprehend.

This principle of Adam Smith, which has recently, as our readers are aware, been applied to reform the commercial policy of this country, strikes at the root of all monopolies and exclusive privileges; and on the broad maxim, that in proportion as a commodity is needed, will be the supply, leaves commerce to its own resources disincumbered from protecting laws, and the superfluous bounties of the state. As applied to articles of commerce, no principle can be more un-

exceptionable. It is a work of supererogation on the part of governments, to force by bounties the supply of articles, for which there is a natural and urgent demand. There is no need, for example, that the public money should be expended in erecting in every parish a stocking manufactory, or in endowing a corporation of millers or bakers. We have a spontaneous demand for food and clothing; and just in proportion as these articles are needed, will be the greatness of the demand. Withhold food from a man, and his appetite of hunger becomes more imperious. The longer continued the privation, the more acute and frequently reiterated is the cry of want. So it is with all our *physical* desires, and therefore the supply of their several objects may be safely left to the demand.

But it is not so with our *moral and spiritual* wants. They are not of that class of urgent and restless desires which push us forward in the pursuit of their objects, and which on that account supersede the necessity of gratuitous supply. The truth is too notorious to be denied, that men have no native and spontaneous demand for Christian instruction. What is this but a statement of the Scriptural doctrine of the depravity of our nature—a doctrine, which if we deny, we question the truth of God, and overthrow establishments, by trampling upon the authority of Scripture; nay, we reject the double and harmonizing lights of revelation and experience, for what is recorded in the pages of the one, is reflected back in the facts of the other. We ask not, then, where is the nation, but where is even the province of a country, that by its own voluntary demand has made

ample provision for its religious instruction? Take any district of Scotland, the most religious country on the face of the globe, and where the establishment has not already made the provision, how miserably deficient, compared with their wants, are the self-procured and self-paid instruction of the inhabitants. Besides, there is a re-action from the smallness of the supply, which constantly tends still further to limit the demand. The appetite for religious instruction, instead of increasing when scantily fed, or becoming more impatient from delay, grows altogether indifferent to its object. Its edge wears off as its appropriate subsistence is withheld, till it ceases to demand its necessary food, and dies through a long abstinence. The very desire for moral and religious education has in many cases to be created, and that there may be even the smallest demand, there must first be an unpaid and unsolicited supply, or, as Mr Marshall would prefer to express it, a "patron-chosen and pension-fed clergy."

It were in violation, therefore, of every maxim of philosophy and reason, to apply the same principle to facts so different. Our physical and our moral wants are not subject to the same law. Withhold the objects of the former, and you only increase the demand; withhold those of the latter, and you diminish it. In short, to use the language of the Civic Economy as quoted by Mr Marshall, "in proportion to our want of food, is our desire for food; but it is not so with our desire of knowledge, or virtue, or religion. The more destitute we are of these last, the more dead we are to any inclination for them." It is in overlooking the distinction between our physical and moral wants,

that the great error of Adam Smith lies; and from this cause he has brought upon literary, and above all, upon ecclesiastical endowments, the unjust imputation of monopolies, and identified them with the odium attached to commercial bounties and restrictions. The limitation to the universality of his principle is, however, so obvious when stated, that it seems hardly credible it should either have been misapprehended or controverted; yet, from whatever cause, Mr Marshall has entirely mistaken the argument in his attempt to answer it.

"I consider," says he, "the objection," (namely, the objection, that if the establishment were broken up, there would no longer be a sufficient supply of religious instruction,) "as altogether ludicrous, and scarcely deserving of a serious answer; but if it is to be answered at all, I would simply refer to the subject of *thirlage*, of which we have been speaking. What has been the consequence of abolishing thirlage, which, as has been said, is now happily abolished in most parts of the country? Have our farmers no longer ground their grain? have our markets no longer been supplied with meal? have the people reverted to the primitive diet of parched corn? or have they been obliged to whet their teeth, or to try them on the rude and raw material? On the contrary, has it not been found that millers, like other men, require only a fair field and no favour?—that their trade forms no exception to trades in general, and that left to a free competition, they can thrive like other manufacturers, by dint of superior diligence and superior skill? The same thing would infallibly happen with religion, and with the teachers of it, were

all civil restrictions and civil preferences done away, and every labourer in the vineyard of Christ left to recommend himself, as Paul did, "by pureness, by knowledge, by long-suffering, by love unfeigned."—page 126.

We commend this passage to the attention of Mr Marshall's brethren of the Secession, as a proof of the boasted qualifications of their champion; and to the friends of establishments, as an evidence of the character of this Goliath, who has come out to defy us to vindicate our privileges. Other controversialists first endeavour to understand an argument, and then to answer it; but Mr Marshall attempts to answer before he understands, and to laugh before he has earned the right to do so, by overthrowing his adversary.

Dr Chalmers's argument is founded upon the distinction between our physical and moral desires; the former being strong, urgent, and not to be bribed or appeased, but by their gratification; while the latter are feeble, irregular, and easily seduced from their objects. Oh, but, says Mr Marshall, misunderstanding the distinction, thirlage has been abolished, and the farmers get their grain ground as before, and the people get their meal as before. Is the desire, then, which the people have for meal, a *spiritual* desire? If it be, Mr Marshall's argument is pertinent and conclusive; otherwise it is utter nonsense.

Suppose the friends of a young man of fortune felt some anxiety regarding his literary and religious education; they come to Mr Marshall and ask his advice, when he very gravely inquires, what appetite the young man has for his food, how many glasses of

wine he drinks a day, and how many coats he wears during the year? His astonished visitors assure him that he has all these desires in the highest perfection; that "they grow with what they feed on;" nay, that there seems no limit to these desires, but the limit of his fortune. Oh, then, says Mr Marshall, your anxiety is altogether misplaced. If the youth has a natural desire for eating and drinking, for fine clothes, dogs and horses, all is well—leave to himself to seek the more precious food of the mind! If he has furnished his outside so elegantly, he will never leave out of his regard the nobler furniture of the mind! Holy man, would his visitors reply; to what monastery do you belong? What is the order of Monks to which you have devoted your life?

But the reply of Mr Marshall is still more absurd when applied to the great majority of the people, whose narrow circumstances, and whose severe struggle with poverty, leave them little leisure and few pressing inducements to look to their moral and literary education. But why tell us this, says Mr Marshall? Look to the farmer, he needs no bounty to grow his corn; the miller gets the grain to grind, though there be no thirlage; and the village shopkeeper gets customers for his wares, though he receive no encouragement from the state. What man that knows any thing of religion, or of his own heart, does not see that there is an essential difference between the desire which men have for that bread which cometh down from heaven, and that which sustains our mortal bodies? Upon this plain and palpable distinction, overlooked by Smith, and misunderstood by Mr Marshall, has Dr Chalmers raised an argument in behalf of literary

and ecclesiastical endowments, as impregnable as the authority of the gospel, and as certain as the depravity of man.

To what purpose, then, we repeat, does Mr Marshall *prove* that the trade of the miller can flourish independent of bounties, if he only *asserts* that "the same thing would happen with religion, and with the teachers of it?" His proof is superfluous as it is foreign to the subject; his assertion, unless it be, as he modestly terms it, an "infallible" one, is good for nothing, since we demand not his dicta but his reasons. His assertion, though "infallible," is contradicted by the universal experience of mankind; for, whatever may have been the different lines of policy pursued by states in their commercial regulations, one principle has uniformly guided their conduct with respect to literary and religious education. Wherever these have been valued by a government, they have been cherished and fostered by bounties and endowments; and out of the public funds, schools, and churches, have been erected, teachers and missionaries paid to instruct the ignorance of the people, and reclaim them from their irreligion. Thus Jehoshaphat, one of the pious kings of Judah, at a period when religion had declined among his countrymen, did not await the "infallible" operation of a spontaneous demand for religious instruction. "*He sent* Levites, and they taught in Judah, and had the book of the law of the Lord with them, and went about throughout all the cities of Judah, and taught the people;" (2d Chron. xvii. 8, 9,) and in consequence of this, the Lord established the kingdom of Jehoshaphat, and true religion prevailed over the corruptions of idolatry. Thus

also, guided by the same maxims of wisdom, and with a kindred zeal for the cause of God, did king Edward the Sixth, when the nations of Europe were emerging from the errors of Popery, send forth Knox —who was then an exile from his own country—and other apostles of the Reformation, to spread throughout England the new radiance of the gospel, and to arouse the people from that spiritual torpor into which for ages they had fallen. No government, in short, solicitous for the literary or Christian education of the people, ever adopted Mr Marshall's "infallible" maxim of a "fair field, and no favour." It is not a fair field, we maintain, to leave science and religion to contend *unassisted* with ignorance and irreligion. In the struggle of religious truth with error, the latter has always the advantage in the strong native corruption of the heart; and unless the former obtain some favour, it is not placed in a fair field for the combat. Oppose truth to falsehood on equal terms, and we can boldly warrant that the former will prevail; but if falsehood be armed with a thousand prejudices, if it have its strong-holds and defences, while truth comes naked into the field, who shall guarantee that it will not be foiled in the encounter, and though not vanquished, yet forced to retire?

Our *second* and *last* reason for the Christian necessity of an establishment, is the insufficiency of private Christian liberality compared with the magnitude of the object to be accomplished. Again, we call the friends of dissent to take notice of the dexterity of their chosen champion, whom "they are pleased to think," as he himself modestly tells us, the only man qualified to come with a "good grace" in-

to this field of controversy. Of Mr Marshall's qualifications for retiring at least with a good grace, when he discovers an adversary fully armed for his reception, our readers can have little doubt after our exposure of his evasion of the preceding argument. But Mr Marshall, though a "Hector," cannot always play the hero. It is not cowardice, but prudence, to flee when success is hopeless, and defeat inevitable. When Achilles enters the field, even Hector may quake; and it is thus Mr Marshall has done homage to the argument of Dr Chalmers, by sounding his retreat. In the management, however, of the present argument, he has not only declined the controversy, but sold himself to his enemies. While we maintain that private Christian liberality is too narrow in its resources to provide adequately for the religious instruction of the people, Mr Marshall, forgetting that he reasons *against* establishments, turns round and pleads *in their defence*. "We live," says he, "only in the *infancy* of liberal exertions. We see the hearts and the hands of men only *beginning* to open. The stream has just issued from its source at our feet, and is pursuing its way *gently*, and *hardly noticed*."—p. 114.

It requires no great art to answer a writer who has himself so amply provided the materials for his confutation; for, what other concessions are necessary to overwhelm the entire structure of dissent, which he has so laboriously reared? What! while his boasted principle of dissent is yet in its infancy, before it has acquired strength, or hardened into the bone of manhood, are we to lay upon its shoulders the entire burden of the maintenance of religion, and crush this

feeble infant, by the incumbent weight of a colossus? Are we to commit to the cold, stinted, and narrow liberality of men whose hearts and hands are only *beginning* to open, the generous and ample provision for the Christian wants of a whole nation? This were to lean Christianity, in so far as human means are concerned in its propagation, upon a bruised reed; it were presumptuously to tamper with providence, who has assigned for the spread of religion, as for the attainment of every other object, a system of means; and where are the means commensurate with the greatness of the end to be accomplished, if Christian liberality be still in the feebleness of infancy? Let us grant to Mr Marshall, that the stream of liberality of which he speaks, will, in the lapse of ages, become a mighty flood, and a river which no man can pass over; who would yet free us from the charge of madness, should we drain off the waters of our present reservoirs, and seal up our fountains, and spread inevitable drought and famine over the land? Our duty is with the present, and not with the future; it is to act according to our actual, and not by anticipation according to imaginary circumstances. Let us suppose a poor man applies to Mr Marshall for the relief of his poverty, but that Mr Marshall, gifted with a vision of prophecy, foresees, notwithstanding the present wretchedness of the applicant, that his descendants are afterwards to rise to an honourable rank in society, and to be loaded with wealth. He informs the poor man of the fortune of his descendants, and, instead of contributing to the supply of his wants, orders him to be gone from his door, for with such *future* prospects, what need has he of present relief. Alas! says the poor man, what

do these prospects avail me, I perish with hunger; give me but one morsel of bread. No, reiterates Mr Marshall, begone, I say; your sons, and your grandsons, and your great-grandsons will hereafter be among the noble and affluent of the land, trouble me not with your importunity. Alas!

> "Who can cloy the hungry edge of appetite
> By bare imagination of a feast?"

Could the poor man feed by anticipation on the plenty of his descendants, or prorogue his hunger till the abundance arrived, it were right to regale him with these future prospects; but if not, it were better in such circumstances that Mr Marshall should exercise his gifts of charity than of prophecy. Or, to bring our illustration still nearer to Mr Marshall's own feelings, let us suppose he is applying for an augmentation of stipend, not by an action before the Lords of Session, which he does not fail to inform us is the approved mode with the established clergy, but before the inferior lords of his own congregation. He pleads the smallness of his present living—represents to them the impossibility of his continuing to minister to them of his spiritual things, unless they minister to him more abundantly of their temporal, and remonstrates with them for their narrow and illiberal maxims. Very true, Sir, reply his auditors, your living is small, "liberal exertions" are only in their *infancy* amongst us, our "hearts and our hands are only beginning to open;" but then the stream which is just issuing from its source, will one day be a "mighty flood;" instead of sixty, eighty, or a hundred pounds, we shall give your *successor* five

hundred or a thousand; nay, so great will be our liberality, that it will much exceed his expenditure, it will be as "a river too great" for him to pass over. Away with your hypocrisy, would be the instant rejoinder of Mr Marshall. What have *I* to do with my successor; if I am to be suffered to drag out my life in penury, what will his riches avail me? It is with your present minister, I repeat it, it is with your present minister, and with him alone, you have to do. This for once is a plain, sensible, home-thrust speech of Mr Marshall, and though we have taken the liberty of putting it into his mouth, we doubt not but it would be the very language he would employ on such an occasion; for, nothing is more effectual in recalling a man's common sense, than his own interest. This at once causes a resurrection of whatever is plain and practical in his understanding, and puts to flight his speculative follies.

Thus we would argue in religion as in the affairs of life, and apply to both the same maxims of common prudence. If it be criminal to suffer a man to starve, because you foresee his children are to rise to affluence, it is still more criminal for a government to suffer one or two generations to die in ignorance, because a power is slowly maturing its strength, which may ultimately supersede its exertions, and free it from the necessity of providing for the Christian education of the people. Its duty is not with the future, but with the ignorant and perishing thousands of the present hour. We formerly admitted in our review of Mr Marshall's discourse, that the time may perhaps arrive, when the liberality of Christians shall supersede the provision of the state; when the avarice, sel-

fishness, or indifference of men shall no longer refuse to religion that portion of their substance which its necessities demand; when they shall give as freely as they now eagerly withhold, and shall be as prodigal of their wealth in the service of God, as they are now in squandering it in the gratification of their own passion, and in the indulgence of vanity and caprice; in a word, when God who bestowed it, is appointed the steward to distribute what he gave. When these become the prevailing dispositions of men, Christianity may be safely committed to their care, and the state be dismissed as an auxiliary no longer needed in the service. We anxiously wait for this period, and support our establishments, only that they may finally work their own overthrow; that like the labourer who has cultivated his field, and finished his task, they may be discharged from future employment. And what more than these concessions could Mr Marshall demand? But here lies his gross and monstrous inconsistency. While he surpasses us in his representations of the narrowness of Christian liberality, and exhausts his stock of imagery in its description, he would yet fearlessly hazard the experiment of committing to its resources the entire Christian instruction of the nation. He forgets that while he quietly awaits the result of his experiment, thousands are dying in ignorance; that while he is indulging himself in visions of future abundance, there is a famine in the land. There is a cry of present want which ought to be sufficient to break in upon his prophetical musings, and make him forego his theory in the contemplation of the dreadful reality. But no; Mr Marshall scorns all facts and reason, and can lis-

ten to no other voice than that of his own inspiration. "We can look down," says he from his prophetic eminence, "the vale of time, and behold the stream (of Christian liberality) advancing and gathering strength as Christianity advances. We can perceive a channel cut out for it, by that mighty power which prepares in the wilderness a high-way for our God—levelling the mountains and rending the rocks—and although its waters are as yet only to the ancles, we can foresee that ere long they shall rise above the loins, and can anticipate the time when they shall be found a mighty flood—waters to swim in—a great river not to be passed over."—page 114. Why, if this mighty flood of Christian liberality were in *existence*, we ask not, as we have already said, the superadded bounty of the state. But are we to be cheated by an imagination, and to have prophecies palmed upon us for facts and arguments? We are neither so "blind," we can assure Mr Marshall, as to be unable to see through such pitiable absurdity, nor so "lame," as to sink under the weight of such reasoning. How could Mr Marshall have deceived even himself by such a fiction, or have imagined that he assigned a sufficient reason for the overthrow of establishments in the *present* day, because he foresaw that at some future and distant period they would be unnecessary, from the profusion of Christian liberality? All Christian liberality, we know on the authority of inspiration, will one day be superseded, for the knowledge of the Lord is to cover the whole earth, as the waters cover the channel of the deep; but this assurance, instead of slackening our exertions, and putting the reins upon Christian enterprise, is the motive that ex-

cites it to greater zeal, and with the promise of a certain triumph, arms the Christian soldier with a tenfold resolution for the combat. What would we think of the humanity of a man who suffered a fellow-creature, who had fallen into a river, miserably to perish, and when asked the cause, should answer, that he knew there was a machine in the process of invention, which would henceforth instantly rescue all such unfortunate individuals from their perilous condition? Yet such is the answer given by Mr Marshall, while he contemplates the condition of his fellow-creatures in circumstances still more perilous. Let not the state interpose to rescue one man from ignorance; the Dissenters are preparing a safety engine, and what though a few thousand should perish in spiritual ignorance, before it is brought into operation? Let us await the experiment, and not supersede or spoil the invention, by prematurely instructing the people. This is language which we might expect to hear from the lips of infidel theorists, who are regardless of the souls of men; but it is dreadful when uttered, and uttered with the gravity of argument, by Christian divines. Yet what less than this is meant by Mr Marshall, when he tells us, that the Highlands of Scotland are still a moral wilderness, and for the irrigation of this wilderness, points to a stream so very gentle, as "hardly" to be perceptible; or when, stript of his figures, he speaks in plain and decisive language, of the wretched insufficiency of gratuitous aid for the Christianization of the people. "So little," says he, "have Scotch Dissenters, till of late, understood their own principles, so few have they been, and what is worst of all, so much have they

been divided, that their labours in extending the gospel, beyond their own immediate neighbourhood, have been but comparatively of slender amount."—p. 118.

Of no class of the Dissenters are these remarks more true than of the Secession, who have hitherto constituted the largest body of the Dissenters of this country. They have not occupied the wilderness, but the fertile plains; and whatever be "their own principles," they have followed a line of policy which is at least closely coincident with their own interest; or, as we should rather say, which has been the inevitable result of the very principles of dissent. They have trodden fast upon the heels of the church; and instead of braving the mountain blast, and the howling solitude of the wilderness, they have found, by the side of the establishment, a sunny and sheltered retreat. Unlike to that apostle, whose high Christian honour spurned the idea of entering into another man's labour, they have reaped where they sowed not, and gathered where they had not strawed; and without sharing in the dangers of the battle, they have come in for a division of the spoil.

We say not this to discourage the zeal and enterprise of Christian Seceders. So long as our establishment is insufficient for the Christianization of the entire community—until government increase the number of our churches and parishes, we hail every evangelical Dissenter, and welcome him as an auxiliary in the great cause of our common Christianity. We speak it only in our own defence, and to shew, that of all plans for the moral culture of our Highlands, that is the most desperate which proposes to pull down the establishment; and however inade-

quate it is to supply the entire wants of the people, still it is preferable to a system, which, on Mr Marshall's own admission, has as yet done nothing, and which has hitherto confined its operations to the more densely peopled parts of the country, where its ministers, notwithstanding their high and disinterested professions of Christian liberality, might find more luxurious pasturage than on the barren and heath-covered mountains of the Highlands.

"Why," we formerly asked, "if religion may be safely committed to the free-will offerings of Christians, has she been so stinted and starved in her provisions, and left well nigh to perish in the sequestered glens, and on the mountains of our native land? Let it be shewn that Christian liberality is sufficient to supply the defects of the establishment, before it proposes to overthrow the establishment itself. Let it not boast of its ability to distribute bread to an entire country, while it leaves the inhabitants of a single province in the jaws of famine. Our towns are crowded with the churches of Dissenters. Why are they so thinly scattered where they are most needed? It is because the system of dissent is fitted only for cherishing Christianity where it already exists. Where there is the antecedent demand, it provides a clergyman, but leaves religion to its own resources in those districts in which the inhabitants are unable to make the provision; or at best sends out a missionary, whose desultory labours may profit a few individuals, without touching the mass of the population. We rejoice in the co-operation of evangelical Dissenters, and welcome their contributions to the cause of our common religion; but we would remind them, that the little

which they have accomplished by their own efforts, should abate their hostility to an establishment, but for the existence of which, Christianity could scarcely have had even a name in the outskirts and remote boundaries of Scotland."

This Mr Marshall admits to be a strong objection; and could it "be made good," says he, "I acknowledge it would be a sweeping one—the cause of dissent would be materially affected by it, if not completely laid in the dust." We have therefore reiterated and enforced by new arguments what we formerly said upon this subject; and by the aid of Mr Marshall's own admissions and facts, demonstrated the insufficiency of the voluntary system for the Christianization of the remote districts of our country. As a specimen, however, of his confusion of argument, and of the subterfuges he has adopted for the defence of his cause, let us bring into one view the various answers he has proposed to this objection—an objection which, if made good, he allows to be decisive of the question. To its overthrow, therefore, we may expect he has summoned the full resources of his cause. His answers are *five* in number, and to these he especially "begs" the attention of the reader. "In the *first* place, the voluntary plan," says he, "as we have so often said, is unquestionably the plan which Christ himself appointed, and by which he proposed to evangelize the world. I must have evidence very different from any you have produced, or are likely to produce, before I can believe that the institution of the Saviour himself was not calculated to meet every exigency, to answer every possible case, and literally to convey the message of the gospel to all the world,

and to every creature." Here the whole question is *assumed*, and an air of piety thrown over the statement to conceal dogmatism of assertion and insufficiency of reasoning; nay, by his own former admission, the voluntary plan has actually been proved inadequate to meet the exigencies of our own country; "for any thing," says he, "that has been done in the Highlands by Dissenters, is scarcely worthy of being mentioned." *Secondly*, "An establishment is radically and essentially unjust. To say, therefore, that an establishment must be erected in order to reach the outskirts and remote boundaries, would be to say that evil must be done in order that good may come." Here again the question is *assumed*, and assertion substituted for argument; and, besides, the plea of injustice is in the present stage of the argument irrelevant, since our inquiry is into the expediency, and not into the abstract right or justice of establishments. *Thirdly*, The inefficiency of the voluntary system is owing, he urges, to the very existence of the establishment, which burdens the people with a tax that exhausts their liberality. We must suppose, therefore, establishments out of the way, that the voluntary system may have "a fair trial." Let the conditions, however, be observed, on which this "fair trial" is to be undertaken. No sooner does Mr Marshall rid the country of the old establishment, than he erects a new one, and then calls us to behold the *voluntary* system in the process of experiment! "Let £250 in each parish be set free, and annually applied to the purposes of religious instruction in the voluntary way, and I shall engage that with a little assistance from the people on the spot, who will not

be backward to give such assistance as they can, instead of one man, who at present receives the money whether he labour or not, and who very possibly does not labour, four or five shall be employed, each of them more active than he, and not worse qualified." Wonderful device to prove the sufficiency of the voluntary scheme! The £250 in each parish that are now appropriated to the support of the establishment, are to be set free, and yet they are to be *annually applied* to the purposes of religious instruction; that is, they are to be set free, and not set free; the establishment is to be abolished, yet all that constitutes it an establishment is to be retained. This looks like proposing to try the experiment how a man could live without food, under the condition that he should every day have his breakfast in the morning, his dinner in the afternoon, and his supper in the evening. Nay, besides the £250 annually applied in each parish to make the experiment on the *voluntary* plan, Mr Marshall is to have additional assistance from "the people on the spot," who, he assures us, "will not be backward to give such assistance as they can;" that is, those very people whose Christian stream of liberality he had spoken of as exhausted by the establishment, are, notwithstanding the re-erection of the establishment in the *voluntary* way, and the continued drain of £250 upon their pockets, to continue still to pour forth their contributions, to swell the general current of Christian liberality. With what amazing facility every thing bends before the sanguine imagination of this projector! His own facts and statements are no obstacles in his way. He can first abolish the establishment, yet secure the annual application of its revenue

to the services of religion; he can empty the pockets of the people by the continuance of this grievous voluntary tax, and still find a stream issuing from them, filling up the channels of Christian instruction! For every one clergyman with whom they are now burdened, Mr Marshall is to burden them with five. If the establishment chastises them with rods, the voluntary system is to chastise them with scorpions.

There is a trifling objection, however, to the success of this brilliant experiment to which Mr Marshall himself adverts, and by admitting it, again demolishes his own superstructure. "You may say, however, that allowing the present stipend in each parish to be disengaged, we should have no right to expect that it would become available for the purpose of voluntary instruction." The substance of this objection Mr Marshall is disposed to admit. "The greater part," continues he, "of what is now exacted in the shape of stipend, may very likely be absorbed in a quarter where it would be of little or no use to the cause of religion." This needs no comment; Mr Marshall is so accommodating as to refute himself, and put his own imagination to flight. With less shrewdness than those Tartars, of whom Hudibras speaks, who kill a man, that to his wit and talent they may fall heir, he proposes to overthrow the establishment, without even the prospect of being able to avail himself of the materials of its ruin, for the erection of a new instrument, on the voluntary plan, for the Christianization of the people. *Fourthly*, "The resources of the voluntary system," he tells us, "are not by any means to be considered as consisting solely, or even chiefly, of what may be drawn from the particu-

lar spot where its operations at the moment are going on. The poverty of the outskirts and remote boundaries may be assisted by the liberality of wealthier Christians, who are far removed from them in point of place." Here again, Mr Marshall's own facts confute his speculations. The simple question is not, *may* the wealthy Christians at a distance assist the poverty of the outskirts and remote boundaries, but *have* they assisted it? And this question Mr Marshall himself answers. "The labours of the Scotch Dissenters, in extending the gospel beyond their own immediate neighbourhood, have been but comparatively of *slender* amount." Is there one church, we ask, erected in the Highlands, and maintained by the wealthy Christian Seceders of Glasgow and Edinburgh; or is there one church in either of these cities, erected by the more wealthy class of Christian Dissenters, for the benefit of the ignorant thousands who inhabit our cities, and who are too poor to provide church accommodation for themselves? Let these questions be answered, and let facts and not conjectures be taken as the ground of our reasonings. It is truly edifying to hear how Mr Marshall preaches upon the liberality of the churches of Macedonia and Achaia, to the poorer churches in Judea. Would to God that that liberality were more imitated; but till then let us not mistake his "reasonable suppositions" of what may be, for what actually is, and in anticipation of the growth of Christian liberality, leave the outskirts and remote boundaries without the present means of Christian instruction. But, *fifthly*, Mr Marshall, unwilling to forego his former brilliant project of giving the voluntary plan "a fair trial," by annually applying the

£250, now absorbed by the establishment, again as the climax of his argument, proposes the same scheme, with the addition, that not satisfied with our money, he would appropriate also the Christian worth and talent of the establishment. Give us but your Chalmers's, your Thomson's, your Gordon's, and all your evangelical and active ministers, with "all their eminent talents, all the advantages they possess, from the reputation they have acquired, or from the places they occupy in society, or in the church;" that is, give us your establishment, with all its excellencies, and purged of all its abuses, and "through the blessing of our God, what object of Christian benevolence should we not be able to accomplish?" Such are the conditions on which Mr Marshall conceives the success of the voluntary scheme to depend. It must have all the resources, advantages, and talents of the establishment at its command. In other words, an establishment he acknowledges to be indispensable to the Christianization of our country.

On these *five* answers, then, to our objection against the voluntary scheme, Mr Marshall has staked the fortunes of his cause, and pledged himself, that if they be insufficient, he is "the last individual alive to stand up in its defence." The two first we have proved to be irrelevant, as the present argument respects not the Scriptural authority, or the political justice of establishments, both of these questions having been determined at a prior stage of the discussion, but their expediency or necessity as instruments of Christianization; and the three last we have proved to be gratuitous suppositions, contradicted by the author's own statement of facts, or which, even if

admitted, would resolve his voluntary system into an establishment, and equally strike at the foundation of the principles of dissent. The only one, indeed, of the five answers, which in reference to the present objection has even the merit of plausibility, or approaches to the truth, is the third in the order of arrangement. It is that by which he endeavours to account for the insufficiency of private liberality for the maintenance of religion. His theory is, that the existence of the establishment, absorbing by its prior demand the resources of Christian charity, disables the people from voluntarily contributing to the farther advancement of religion. It is necessary, therefore, that this answer be considered more at large. "If we be feeble, our feebleness is in a great measure owing to you." This is Mr Marshall's language, and contains the statement of his theory, and it is a favourite one both with himself and his dissenting brethren. Whatever inconveniences they experience from the poverty or illiberality of their people, is generously laid to the account of the establishment. *It* is the vortex that sucks up their maintenance, the huge feeder that consumes the national stores, and brings leanness to their table, and starvation to their families. Rid the country of this *horrendum monstrum cui lumen ademptum*, and they are confident, that like the withdrawment of a blight or a mildew, there will be plenty in the land. Our establishment is the *incubus* that presses upon the liberality of the nation, and stints its growth. Never were men more mistaken in assigning the cause of their poverty, or more deceived in the antidote they have provided for its cure.

It is not the establishment which is the cause of the poverty of dissenting ministers; on the contrary, it is the great means of augmenting the resources of the voluntary system. It has not created their poverty, but their wealth. Wherever the establishment flourishes, they flourish; they are grafted on its trunk, and grow luxuriant, or die, according as the root from which they draw their nourishment is vigorous or decayed. It is in those parts of the country dissent has made the most rapid progress, where the establishment has been active and vigilant. The appetite for spiritual food which has been created by the evangelical ministrations of her clergy, and which, from the increase of population, they have been unable to satisfy, from the limited church accommodation of their parishes, has sought for its aliment in the new channel of dissent. Where the ministers of the establishment, however, have been negligent in the performance of their duties, there also, though the harvest be plentiful, the dissenting labourers have been few. It is in the west of Scotland, a part of the country long distinguished for the evangelical zeal of its clergy, that dissent has taken its deepest root, and found its most congenial soil; while in the north, which has been the stronghold of moderation, and where the establishment most needed the stimulating industry of Dissenters —there they have hardly yet obtained a footing, and the various names of their sects are in many cases unknown. It is indeed too obvious to be denied, that not only do dissenting churches flourish on the root and stock of the establishment, but that from the ambition excited amongst their congregations to vie with the establishment, their generosity is

stimulated, and a more ample provision made for the support of their ministers. The establishment is the mark at which they aim, and being constantly in their eye provokes their liberality. Hence, notwithstanding the high pretensions of our Seceding brethren to Christian moderation, the magnificent buildings which they have reared in our large cities,—that the stately architecture of the church might not look down with scorn upon the humble fabric of the meeting-house; and hence also the ample remuneration which, in rivalry of the church, has been provided for their ministers, raising them to the rank of an aristocracy among their brethren. We say not this is wrong, for it is just what ought to be, and is the inevitable result of the operation of the ordinary principles of our nature; but it is the very certainty of the operation of these principles that ought to forewarn our dissenting brethren, that in fighting against the establishment, they fight against themselves, and lay the axe to the root of the tree from which they draw their chief nourishment and strength.

Lest, however, these answers should not be sufficient, Mr Marshall again supplies us with the materials for his own confutation. While he complains of the "cumbrous machines" of the establishment absorbing the voluntary liberality of Christians, he yet admits, that though these were taken down, we have no right to expect that the fund which formerly was set apart for their support, "would become available for the purposes of voluntary instruction. On the contrary," he continues, "it would go back into the pockets of those from whom it comes, the government of the country, or the landed proprietors, and

the poor inhabitants would be left to their own meagre resources, or would be compelled to look to the precarious liberality of Christians at a distance." The substance of this Mr Marshall is disposed to admit, yet in the face of this admission, he proposes to the Dissenters to pull down the establishment to increase their resources. While he assures them that another, and a stronger power is ready, when the work of destruction begins, to come in and appropriate the spoil, he can yet urge them to the enterprise, and, heedless of the consequences, push them forward, that they may bury themselves in the ruins.

With this single admission on the part of Mr Marshall, we not only obtain a satisfactory refutation of the theory by which he attempts to account for the insufficiency of the voluntary system, and to transfer the burden of the fact that incumbers his own cause, to the cause of the establishment, but we are furnished with an antidote to the loose though popular declamation that fills more than one half of the pages of his letter. If it be true, that with the exception of our city churches, the revenue of our establishment comes out of the pockets of the great landed proprietors, or to speak more correctly, if our establishment have an independent revenue of its own—a heritage in the land transmitted through a succession of generations, and holding its title-deeds of property by as ancient a tenure as the proudest of our nobles, the charge of oppressing the poor, or of drying up the current of Christian liberality, is unfounded; and can be designed only where arguments have failed to prop a tottering cause by misrepresentation, and where reason cannot be addressed, to rouse the passions of men

by loose and popular declamation. Since such is the *actual* source whence the revenue of our establishment is derived, it were as reasonable to attribute the poverty of Dissenters, or their illiberality in the support of their ministers, to the enormous revenue annually drawn from the land by the Duke of Hamilton or Buccleugh, and appropriated to their own use, as to attribute it to the revenue levied by the Church of Scotland, and appropriated to the support of her clergy. The latter like the former, draw the rental of their own estate—an estate transmitted through a series of ages into the hands of its present possessors, and which imposes no burden upon the inhabitants of the land.

Such being the acknowledged insufficiency of Christian liberality in our own country for supplying the religious wants of the people—an insufficiency demonstrating of itself the necessity of an establishment, it is in vain that Mr Marshall attempts to distract the attention of his readers, and to complicate the question by an appeal to America. He told us formerly of the revivals of religion in that country, and because in our review of his discourse we questioned the truth of the conclusions which he drew from them, he has thought himself warranted to charge us with the impiety of looking with jealousy upon the progress of religion in America, and of desiring that rather than that it "should prosper in a country where our favourite institution is awanting, it should not prosper at all." God forbid we should entertain such a sentiment, or regard with an evil eye the triumphs of the cross. By whatever means Christianity is propagated, we can say in the language of

the apostle, that we therein rejoice. It is an unchristian aspersion that we are suspicious of its progress, because not propagated by an establishment; the charge is unsupported by a single sentiment we have expressed, it is ungenerous and it is false.

But what though Mr Marshall, instead of a partial statement of facts, had presented us with the entire statistics of America? What though, by an accurate survey of all the provinces of that vast continent, he had proved that in each of them, the people, by their own voluntary contribution, had amply provided for their religious instruction,—would this gigantic growth of Christian liberality in America supersede the necessity of establishments in Great Britain, where the same principle is only in its "infancy;" or would it lay the cause of establishments in general, as he has vauntingly expressed it, "irrecoverably in the dust?" Such a fact, in reference to America, might prove indeed that in *that country* establishments were unnecessary, and would limit the universality of the principle that the demand for religious instruction is insufficient to uphold the requisite supply; but would leave the practical question of an establishment in every other country to be determined by its own particular circumstances. What is it to a man if his house be in darkness, that his neighbour's is splendidly illuminated, and pours from every window a profusion of light? Or, what avails to him the plenty of his neighbour's feast, if he is not suffered to partake even of the crumbs which fall from the table, and if he has no other means for relieving his necessities? We hear much of the facility with which artizans procure employment for their industry in America, of the happiness of its

labourers, and of the cheapness and plenty of its provisions. But if the artizans of our own country be set adrift from their occupations during a period of commercial distress, and the cry of want resound through the land, what relief will it bring to their sufferings to bid them look across the Atlantic and behold the flourishing trade of America, and the plenty of every article of subsistence? This might tantalize them, but it could not satisfy their necessities. If there be abundance in America, there is poverty in Britain, and it were to add insult to inhumanity if our Government, when assailed by the cry of national distress, should dismiss the complaint of the people, by telling them, that though they were perishing, yet the artizans of America had plenty of employment, and abundance of provisions, and why should they complain, since, if they only looked across the Atlantic, they might behold prosperous commerce and happy labourers. No Government dares thus outrage the feelings of its subjects. If it could not relieve, it could at least forbear to aggravate their sufferings by insult. But how reasons Mr Marshall? "Give me these facts," allow only that there is flourishing trade, ample employment, and plenty of provisions in America, and "I engage, feeble as I may be, with the help of these facts alone, to lay the cause of the suffering artizans irrecoverably in the dust. Independently of all other considerations, I will prove the inutility of contributing one farthing to the relief of their distress."

Every man can perceive the fallacy, or rather the inhumanity of such reasoning, when the question relates to the temporal privations and sufferings of the

people. And what is there when the question relates to their spiritual necessities to change its character; nay, is not the inhumanity aggravated in proportion to the magnitude of the interests involved in the decision? Yet thus Mr Marshall disposes of the spiritual wants of the people of this country. Acknowledging the religious destitution of many parts of the Highlands, because of the insufficiency of the establishment, he proposes to supply the defect by its entire abolition; and as a compensation to the people for the loss, and while they are perishing for lack of knowledge, he turns their eyes across the Atlantic to behold the unaided triumphs of religion in America. "The facts then," says he, "with regard to the American revivals, or what, in so far as regards my argument, amounts to the same thing—the flourishing state of religion in that country, are indisputable, and from these facts what is the conclusion? The conclusion, as has been said, is decisive of the question respecting establishments. Give me these facts, and, as Sheridan said of a free press, that he would engage with its single aid, to encounter and subvert whatever was hostile to political freedom, so will I engage, feeble as I may be, with the help of these facts alone, to lay the cause of establishments irrecoverably in the dust." —p. 154. Such are the magnificent words, by which Mr Marshall, confident in his assertions, in proportion to the weakness of his argument, endeavours to impose upon his readers; aware, that what is so *positively and triumphantly* affirmed, is apt, on the ground of the mere *vehemence* of the affirmation, to obtain credit for possessing some mixture of truth. But even though we "give" Mr Marshall the facts,

his conclusion is false. Each country is still left to determine, from its own particular circumstances, the necessity of an establishment; and if the spontaneous demand for religion be insufficient to uphold the requisite supply, it is the instant duty and wisdom of Government to make the provision, and not to await the slow result of an experiment, which, trusting to the gradual developement of the voluntary resources of the people, would inevitably consign thousands to die in ignorance.

So far, however, are the facts of America from justifying the rash conclusion of Mr Marshall, that to no country can the friends of establishments so confidently appeal for the melancholy experimental proof of the truth of their principles. It is not necessary as he conceives, that we should deny the reality of the religious revivals which have taken place in some of its provinces. Such revivals may occur, where there is a woeful deficiency of the means of religious instruction. By the blessing of God, the labours of a single missionary, or preacher, may awaken a religious earnestness throughout the inhabitants of a whole province or country. There may be, and there often has been, an extraordinary descent of heavenly manna in the very centre of a spiritual wilderness, but who, on this account, would dispense with the ordinary means for the spiritual nourishment of the people?

Besides, compared with the entire extent of the American continent, these religious revivals are but as an oasis in the desert, as a miraculous escape to life amidst unnumbered heaps of the infected and the dead. Professing to appeal to America as an experimental proof against the necessity of establish-

ments, instead of presenting the entire facts of the case, Mr Marshall selects and chooses such as are agreeable to his own hypothesis; while he rejects those opposite facts, which are greatly more numerous and overwhelming, and which would lay his conclusion "irrecoverably in the dust." As Lord Bacon says of certain theorizing philosophers, that they "draw only a bucket of water out of the well of nature for present use, and take only slips from off the root and stock of universal knowledge;" so Mr Marshall has drawn only a bucket of water out of the American well, and has taken only such slips from its root and stock of knowledge as are convenient for his present use. Why, if the appeal be to America, not take the whole facts of the case? Why draw a universal conclusion from a partial and limited induction, and maintain its universality in the face of opposite and contradictory facts? What should we think of the honesty of an agent, who, being commissioned to examine the springs of an estate for sale, should, after finding them of various qualities, some healthful and salubrious, others poisonous and noxious, draw only a bucket from the former, and bring it to his employer as a genuine sample of the waters? Yet such is the conduct of Mr Marshall respecting the facts of America. We say not that he has designedly imposed upon his readers; we only think he has imposed upon himself, and that, like other theorists, he is incapable of perceiving and weighing those facts which are opposed to his own preconceptions. Such facts, however, exist, and are so overwhelming in their numbers, and the certainty of their evidence, as not only to be sufficient for negativing his conclusion,

but for building up an affirmative and positive argument in favour of the necessity of establishments for the Christianization of a country.*

Such are the arguments for the expediency, or, as we should rather say, for the necessity of an ecclesiastical establishment. In the *first* place, there is a political, and, in the *second*, there is a religious expediency. The former arises, as we have shewn from the utility of religion, as an instrument of civil order, and this use, so far from derogating from the sacred character of Christianity, enhances only our admiration of the divine wisdom, who has united so closely our interest and our duty together, our spiritual and eternal, with our temporal and social happiness. "Whereas temporal laws," says Milton, "rather punish men when they have transgressed, than form them to be such as would transgress seldomest, we may conceive great hopes, through the showers of divine benediction, watering the unmolested and watchful pains of the ministry, that the whole inheritance of God will grow up so straight and blameless, that the civil magistrate may, with far less toil and difficulty, and far more ease and delight, steer the tall and goodly vessel of the commonwealth through all the gusts and tides of the world's mutability." It is upon the religious expediency, however, that we have rested our chief defence of establishments. This expediency, we have shewn, is founded, *first*, upon the undoubted fact corroborated both by experience and Scripture, that men have no such native and spontaneous demand for religious instruction as to make

* Note (D.)

an adequate provision for their own spiritual wants. The supply must therefore be obtruded upon them, and by its local presence so pressed upon their attention, that it will be impracticable entirely to resist its claims. *Secondly*, we have shewn the insufficiency of private Christian liberality for accomplishing this object, since even where it had only to *supplement* the defects of an establishment, its resources were inadequate to the attempt—resources which are yet only in their infancy, and therefore incapable of bearing the burden of the spiritual maintenance of the nation. We have disposed of the fallacy of Mr Marshall, who would substitute prophecies for facts, who, in anticipation of the *future* growth of Christian liberality, would overthrow our present establishment; and while thousands are perishing in ignorance, would forbid the interference of the state, lest it should mar the progress of an experiment, upon the success of which he has risked the truth of his cause. And, *lastly*, we have shewn that America is no exception to the general principle of the necessity of an establishment, that throughout the greater part of its provinces, it is still a moral wilderness; and that, even though it had made ample provision for its own religious instruction, it would still leave each country to determine the question for itself, by the consideration of its own particular circumstances, by the religious and moral character of its inhabitants, and by the extent or limitation of their Christian and philanthropic benevolence.

We have thus finished the course of inquiry we proposed to ourselves in the commencement of our reply. In so far, therefore as the general question is concern-

ed, our task is done. Before concluding, however, it is necessary we administer some reproof to the vanity of Mr Marshall, and advert to the unfair and disingenuous mode in which throughout he has conducted the argument. It may surprise our readers, after the exposure we have made of the flimsy sophistries to which he has had recourse in the defence of his cause, that he should yet modestly have conceived, that nothing less than the "very first talent the Church of Scotland can boast," can safely be intrusted with conducting the argument against him. He has compared himself to David approaching the city of the Jebusites to besiege it, and he is unable to conceal his chagrin that our "men of war" have not come forth in the defence of their strongholds. He has not been sufficiently honoured by the appearance of an adversary in the field corresponding to his own estimate of his strength. He is offended and mortified that the Church of Scotland did not instantly rise in arms at his challenge; and that he may heal his bruised dignity, he falls to praising himself by the indirect and second-hand method of railing at the Reviewer. It were indeed a high price paid by our men of might for their station of honour, were they compelled to appear upon every false alarm, and drive every vaunting combatant from the field. Let the thunder sleep in its cloud till there be an object worthy to call forth its irresistible power. It is not necessary that we should load a piece of artillery to destroy a little buzzing noisome fly, or that we should arm the whole fleet of Portsmouth, because a wretched half-rigged French frigate has appeared in the channel, and fired off a few guns to shew its bravery and magnanimous

defiance. It were unbecoming the dignity of the British nation to disturb the stately and anchored repose of her "men of war," to extinguish so harmless and innocent an enemy. It were enough, to use Mr Marshall's own language, that it "laughed to scorn" its magnificent pretensions, or punished its vanity by neglect. Our men of might are in like manner, we can inform Mr Marshall, reserved for perilous times; and, like the military stores, laid up in our arsenals, or the ships of the line in our harbours, are designed only for use when there is *actual* danger, and a formidable invasion. Great occasions demand indeed great actors, and desperate diseases desperate remedies; but it is an old advice of Horace to the poets, that they ought to be sparing in the introduction of a god, and not abuse their privilege by calling in Jupiter or Mars to perform every menial office to their heroes, or to deliver them from every trifling misfortune that may befal them. Since Mr Marshall, however, has been so displeased with the well-meant efforts of the Reviewer, we are not likely, we can assure him, should we fail in this second attempt to correct his errors and misconceptions, again to wound his dignity by presuming to "conduct the argument" against him. We shall no longer pre-occupy the field with the "lame and the blind," but shall allow Mr Marshall at least the chance of meeting an adversary more suitable to his own estimate of his strength, and who may flatter his vanity by the encounter.

There is a more serious charge, however, against Mr Marshall, than that of indulging in self-compliment. This were harmless in respect of our argument, and might be excused on the ground, that as

our author is most conscious of his own strength, so he is best qualified to become his own panegyrist. But Mr Marshall is not satisfied with praising himself, he has so managed his argument throughout, as to fasten upon his adversaries certain charges which involve in odium the cause which they advocate. He has liberally thrown upon the friends of establishments the imputation of impiety. By calling in the contributions of the state, we are accused of affecting to be "wiser than Christ," of seeking to "perfect his institutions;" we are charged with distrusting the providence of God, and with denying that his own power is sufficient for the propagation of his religion. These and similar accusations are reiterated under various forms, and that he may give point to his general charges, he selects a particular object, and pours his epithets of abuse on the reviewer. "He who wrote your review, whoever he be," says he, "is a base thing in a different sense from that of the apostle—the only grandeur he can comprehend is the earthly grandeur of rank and riches, and the wisdom of God is nothing in his eyes to the wisdom of Mr Burke." Yet after such epithets of abuse, Mr Marshall can assume the airs of the preacher, and counsel us that "if a discussion must ensue, let it not degenerate into a controversy—let it not be embittered by what is perhaps natural enough, but what is not the less sinful nor less discreditable, the sallies of bad temper. Why may it not be conducted with the *mildness of Christians*, or if that be difficult—why not at least with the *dignity of men!!*" The counsel of Mr Marshall is as superfluous as his abuse is harmless; for we have no design to degrade ourselves by imitating his ex-

ample. The writer who substitutes vulgar railing for reasoning, and abuse for argument, carries an antidote with his sting, and by lowering his own character in the estimation of his readers, disarms himself of the power to injure that of others.

It is of importance, however, to the truth of our argument, that such misrepresentations should not be passed over. The sentiments which called forth the abuse of Mr Marshall, the Reviewer sees no reason to retract, nor is he to be deterred from his adherence to the truth, by any fear of a repetition of the same illiberal invective. When Mr Marshall shall employ other instruments of conviction, and oppose argument to argument, we may then be compelled to yield to the weight of his reasons, and acknowledge that he has triumphed by the inherent merits of his cause. We repeat, then, as involving an important point in the argument for the expediency of an establishment, the remarks which have provoked this railing accusation from the pen of Mr Marshall, and we repeat them in the obnoxious language of Burke. "The teachers of religion," says that orator, "are likely to have little influence over the wealthy and powerful of long standing, and much less with the newly fortunate, if they appear in a manner no way assorted to those with whom they must associate, and over whom they must even exercise in some cases something like an authority. What must they think of that body of teachers, if they see it in no part above the establishment of their domestic servants? If the poverty were voluntary, there might be some difference. Strong instances of self-denial operate powerfully on our minds, and a man who has no wants, has obtained

great freedom and firmness, and even dignity. But as the mass of any description of men are but men, and their poverty cannot be voluntary, that disrespect which attends upon all lay poverty, will not depart from the ecclesiastical. Our provident constitution has therefore taken care that those who are to instruct presumptuous ignorance, those who are to be censors over insolent vice, should neither incur their contempt, nor live upon their alms; nor will it tempt the rich to a neglect of the true medicine of their minds."

There is a wisdom, we have said, in these remarks, which those will most readily appreciate who know human nature best; and let Mr Marshall disprove if he can their truth and justice. Let him prove in the face of all experience, that a clergy will be useful in proportion to their poverty, and that it is no part of the advantage of an establishment, that it upholds the respectability of the clerical character, and gives to the ministers of religion a command and authority in society, as the censors of vice, and the reprovers of public and private iniquity. Let him shew this by an appeal to experience, instead of perverting Scripture by a misapplication of its truths, and concealing the deficiency of his argument under a garb of pious sentiment. "I cannot help remarking," says he, "that if the doctrines of Mr Burke be true, the divine Founder of Christianity must have committed a mighty oversight, when he entrusted the conversion of the world to twelve poor fishermen." And again, "I have heard, Sir, of God choosing the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and the weak things of the world to confound the things that are mighty,

and the base things of the world, and the things that are despised, and the things which are not, to bring to nought the things that are, that no flesh should glory in his presence." Who does not perceive, that if there be truth in this application of Scripture, and that if the example of our Lord in the choice of his apostles be imperative upon us, the argument strikes not only against the liberal maintenance of the ministers of the gospel, but against all learning and education as auxiliaries in the cause of Christianity? The apostles were not only poor, but they were illiterate; chosen by God, that with the wisdom from above, they might confound the wisdom of this earth, and prove the more irresistibly from their very ignorance, that they were the mere organs and vehicles of a divine inspiration. We own we can never admire sufficiently the depth of that wisdom which laid the plan of the propagation of the gospel—which passing by the noble and the learned, called the fishermen of Galilee to be the apostles of its faith. Their character has throughout all ages been a standing argument to refute the infidel and the gainsayer, and has proved more convincingly than any other evidence, except its own inherent truth, that Christianity is no cunningly devised fable.

But is this plan applicable to *our* circumstances, now that God has withdrawn his extraordinary and miraculous agency? Because he "chose the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and the weak things of the world to confound the things that are mighty," are we in defiance of the lessons of experience, which in all other cases accord with the lessons of Scripture, to make fishermen our preachers,

and in proportion to the ignorance of any man, to estimate his qualifications for the office of a Christian minister? As in the natural world, though all things live and move in the Creator, there is yet a system of subordinate means necessary for the sustentation and growth of every organized and living being; so in the moral, though God alone creates the new principle of spiritual life, there is yet a series of means, which, according to the arrangements of providence, and the established laws of human nature, is fitted to arrest the attention of men to religion, and bring them into contact with its truths. With one class of men these means may be the eloquence of the preacher, with another his learning, and with a third class his station and respectability in society; and to reject the aid of any of these means of attraction and persuasion, were to violate the high Christian wisdom of that maxim of St Paul, by which we are commanded to be all things to all men, that we may gain some. It is this maxim which is embodied in the reflections of Burke, when he speaks of the necessity of assorting the rank of the preacher of the gospel to the average rank of those under his spiritual charge, that the rich may not be tempted to neglect the true medicine of their minds. It is the same maxim which is recognized in the churches of our large cities, both established and dissenting, where, from the greater wealth of the population, a more ample remuneration is provided for the ministers of religion, that by holding a rank which places them above the scorn or contempt of any class of the community, and by securing for them a more ready and conciliatory access to the attention and conviction of men, they may dis-

charge the duties of their office with greater independence and success. And, finally, it is the same maxim, obnoxious indeed in the language of Burke, and "base," when reiterated by the Reviewer, which Mr Marshall himself recognizes, when, for the success of his voluntary scheme, he proposes that the dissenters should have "all the vast influence of the *distinguished* men of the establishment, all their *eminent* talents, all the advantages they possess from the *reputation* they have acquired, or from the places they occupy in society, or in the church." Is this choosing the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, or the weak things to confound those that are mighty? Is the only grandeur which this writer can comprehend, the earthly grandeur of rank and riches—and is the wisdom of God nothing in his eyes to the "vast influence," the "eminent talents," and the "reputation" of men? Let Mr Marshall answer these questions, and in doing so, he will become the reprover of his own inconsistencies and illiberality.*

Besides those misrepresentations already adverted to, there are innumerable others in the pages of his Letter, which it were alike tedious and superfluous to examine and refute in detail. We can pass over, without prejudice to our cause, his general and indiscriminate censure of the churches of the establishment, and his high panegyrics upon the superior purity and efficiency of those of the dissenters. We have as little objection, in the present instance, to Mr Marshall indulging himself in the praises of his own church, as we had formerly to his passing encomiums upon his own merits. Few men or bodies of men, when they sit as judge and jury upon their own cause, are likely

* Note (E.)

to condemn themselves; and should they fall into the vice of self-flattery, we can excuse their predilection as natural, though it would say little for the discrimination of others should they be caught in the snare, and suffer themselves to be persuaded that these self-executed portraits are faithful likenesses. We can excuse, we say, this partiality on the part of Mr Marshall; besides, it is a stroke of policy to gain admission for his doctrines into the mind of his readers. Aware how powerful an instrument flattery is in gaining an entrance to the human heart, he has used this powerful lever, that he may overcome every obstacle to the reception of his principles in the minds of his seceding brethren. He has sweetened the potion, that it may be swallowed without reluctance.

When Mr Marshall, however, passes from encomiums on his own church to his censure of the churches of the establishment, when he descends to particulars in his accusations, and fortifies his general attack by specific examples, it is necessary that his errors and misrepresentations be refuted and exposed. They then wear the aspect of truth, and are presented in such a manner, as cannot fail to impose on the half-informed and the ignorant. It is in this manner Mr Marshall has brought forward the Bracadale case to the attention of his readers. A more egregious specimen of ignorance and misrepresentation than his comments upon it, we have seldom witnessed. Yet the whole is delivered with such an assured and confident air, as to be well fitted to impose upon those who have no other source of information.

Having stated that there is this difference between he corruptions of dissenting and of established churches,

that those of the one are accidental, while those of the other are essential and incurable—dissenting churches alone being voluntary societies, and having within themselves the power of expelling or admitting whom they please—he proceeds, in proof of these assertions, with the following queries, to each of which we give in succession our decided and unqualified negative. "Is it not a fact," says he, "that every person having a fixed residence in the parish, provided he be free from scandal, is, by virtue of his residence, a member of the parish church?" We answer by denying the fact. "Is it not a fact, that on this ground alone, he may claim the privileges of a Christian man?" We again answer, by denying the statement as false. "Is it not the fact, that he may require, for instance, that baptism may be administered to his children, or that the ordinance of the Supper be administered to himself? And is it not a fact, that were he doing so, neither ministers nor elders, whatever objections they might have to him otherwise, could venture to refuse his claim, unless they were prepared to prove him grossly ignorant, or grossly immoral?" To these queries we return the same answer as to the former, by denying again as false the facts which they allege. Nay, we assert as confidently of the churches of the establishment as Mr Marshall asserts of the churches of dissenters, "that whatever corruptions exist in them must be ascribed, not to their constitution, but to the mode in which they are managed. They are voluntary societies—they know no external control—they may admit whom they please, or expel whom they please—and if at any time they neglect, like the Corinthians, 'to put away from among them the wicked person,'

the fault is accidental, and must be imputed not to the principle of the association, but to the slackness of those who happen to bear rule." It is an unfounded charge of Mr Marshall, that the church of our establishment is an involuntary church. His assertion is refuted by the whole of its history. The resistance of our national church, we have formerly said, to the interference of Government in matters of doctrine and discipline, and the struggles which arose from her firmness in maintaining the integrity of her ecclesiastical polity, and the independent right of determining the articles of her creed, are events not slightly traced, but to be read in every page of her history. From her first establishment, she has betrayed a sensitive jealousy of the encroachment of the civil power, always suspicious lest the magistrate should carry his authority beyond his legitimate province, and usurp the place of *dictator*, instead of acting in his only proper, though inferior capacity, of *protector* to the church. During the protracted troubles of two centuries, and throughout the reign of four successive princes, though assailed alternately by the arts of policy, and the violence of persecution, she preserved her sanctuary unprofaned, and vindicated the authority of God above the commandments of men. That the struggle has now ceased, is not owing to her acquiescence in the domination of the State, but to the wisdom of the legislature, which has been taught its own province by experience, and which has learned after centuries of ineffectual hostility, that its true interest is to suffer the church to settle her own doctrines and discipline by the standard of inspiration. Yet, in the face of these facts

vindicating the independence of our church, are we charged with being subject to a foreign power, and with acting in our ecclesiastical discipline under the controul of a superior and external authority.

"If these questions (referring to those we have already quoted) are answered in the negative, I should like to know," says Mr Marshall, "what was the nature of the *Bracadale case*—the case which a few years ago engaged the attention of the country and of the General Assembly, and of which you wrote so largely in the Christian Instructor. Did not the minister of Bracadale, a pious man, refuse to administer the ordinances of religion to some of his parishioners, because in his conscience he believed them to be ungodly persons? Did not the parishioners, after carrying the cause through the inferior courts, bring it before the General Assembly? And did not the Assembly, having considered it maturely, find the minister in fault, and ordain him to do what the parishioners required?"

"At the time," continues Mr Marshall, "the Bracadale case was depending, I remember well of a serious young man a student of Theology in the establishment, opening his mind to me on the subject, and declaring his resolution, either to leave the establishment altogether, or at least to forbear entering into the ministry."

Such is the process of reasoning by which Mr Marshall undertakes to prove that our establishment is not a voluntary society, and, therefore, that whatever abuses may adhere to it are fundamental and incurable—incapable of being thrown off by its own healthful exertions. It consists of two steps—the statement of a decision of the General Assembly, and the

conviction which that decision produced upon the mind of an individual. It is with the former alone, it is evident, our argument has to do; for, however much we may respect the conscientious scruples of any man, we may still have reason to doubt the soundness of his judgment; and above all, we conceive that in laying open his heart to Mr Marshall, on a question connected with establishments, the young man referred to, was most unfortunate in his selection of an *unprejudiced* adviser. We may therefore set aside his evidence as incompetent, for it cannot be said of him according to the formulary of the law, that no one told him what to say—Mr Marshall having tampered with the witness. What then does the case itself prove? Let it be observed, that we defend not the measure as right, or deny that the actions of the ruling party of a church may be occasionally or even systematically wrong; we only deny what is affirmed by Mr Marshall, that the measure was *involuntary*. This is the single point to be determined, and unless it be supported on sufficient evidence, the charge is false and injurious. To the evidence then we appeal, and it is contained in this sentence, "Did not the Assembly, having considered it *maturely*, find the minister in fault, and ordain him to do what the parishioners required?" This is the sum of the evidence. Upon the *maturity and deliberation* of the decision, Mr Marshall rests his proof of its unvoluntariness! This certainly looks like a contradiction in terms; for what other evidence could we demand in confirmation of the unforced decisions of any supreme court, than that it decided with mature deliberation?*

* Note (F.)

A similar decision may be passed upon the conduct of any of their ministers, at the first meeting of the Synod of Associated Seceders, or of any other assembly or Synod of Presbyterian divines. It was not the act of the Church of Scotland, as an *established church*, that ordained the minister of Bracadale to administer the ordinances of religion to those parishioners, of whose Christian qualifications he himself had conscientious doubts; it was the act of the Church of Scotland as a *Presbyterian church*, exercising its discipline in hearing the appeals of the people, and taking cognizance of the conduct of its ministers. In this respect the church of the establishment, and the church of the secession are upon a footing of equality. The actions of the ministers of both are subject to the revision of the superior courts, and in both the people have the right of appeal, when they think themselves aggrieved by the conduct of their ministers. If Mr Marshall or any other seceding minister, upon his introduction into a new charge, refused church privileges to certain individuals of the congregation, of whose Christian qualifications he had conscientious doubts, might they not appeal to the Presbytery against his judgment, and from the Presbytery to the Synod; and if the Synod decided in their favour, what recourse would be left to Mr Marshall, but to submit to the decision of his brethren, unless he rejected all Presbyterian authority, and dissented into the principles of Independency?

Such is the only argument which can be adduced from the Bracadale case, so triumphantly appealed to by Mr Marshall. It is an argument that strikes against Presbyterian government, and might indeed

prove the superiority of independency, if the same objection might not be urged with still greater force against a system which leaves the minister without appeal, and wholly at the mercy of the congregation. But whatever the case proves, it is altogether foreign to the question of establishments. It is an illustration, not of the corruption of the constitution of the church, but of the mal-administration of Presbyterian authority, and when adduced in corroboration of other charges, proves only the ignorance or disingenuousness of their author.

It is true, as stated by Mr Marshall, that "the whole population, great and small, godly and profane, residing within certain territorial limits, are committed to some ecclesiastical functionary as his spiritual cure;" and this local distribution of clerical labour is one of the great benefits, we have said, of our establishment. "Do you imagine, however," replies Mr Marshall, "that the inclosing a people within a certain line called the boundary of a parish, and erecting a church, and ordaining a minister among them, constitutes them members of the body of Christ, or gives them a title to the privileges of his people?" Who ever maintained such a doctrine? And to what purpose is it asserted by Mr Marshall, unless to fortify his own cause by calumniating the principles of his adversaries? Cannot Mr Marshall distinguish between *providing* for the Christianization of a people and *acknowledging* them to be Christians? The schoolmaster in each parish has certain territorial limits assigned him, and the intellectual education of the people committed to his charge; but who ever conceived that, on this account, he was compelled by law to recognize

all residing within his bounds as great geniuses, or accomplished scholars. The duty of the schoolmaster is, to educate the people within his territorial limits, but not to recognize them as educated, or give them certificates of great scholarship, while they are yet ignorant of the elements of learning. In like manner, the duty of the clergyman is, to labour for the Christianization of the people within the limits of his parish, not to acknowledge them as Christians. It is to instruct the ignorant, and reclaim the irreligious; and not till he is satisfied with the Christian qualifications of his parishioners, is he under the obligation of administering to them the ordinances of religion. If at any time he is forced, contrary to his own conviction, to admit an individual to a participation of Christian privileges, the compulsion arises not from *without*, but from *within* the church; from the voluntary decision of those ecclesiastical courts of which he is himself a member; and is a compulsion to which all ministers are subject who recognize the principles of Presbyterian government.

We lament indeed that any decision should take place, either in the courts of our own, or of any other church, which may countenance the relaxation of Christian order and discipline, or tend to desecrate the purity of religious ordinances; but in our censure of such abuses, we can distinguish between the acts of the dominant party of a church, and its essential constitution. It is easy to confound these together, and to lay upon the constitution either of a church or state, the delinquences of its members; but men of judgment will, notwithstanding discriminate, and while they censure what is wrong in the conduct of

civil or ecclesiastical assemblies, they will yet distinguish between these accidental measures of individuals, and the general principles of the constitution under which they act. They will be at no loss to detect the artifice of those by whom they are confounded, and who would blind the judgment of men, that they may advance their own schemes for the overthrow of existing institutions. One lesson, however, we may learn from the injustice of our adversaries; we may be taught circumspection from their censoriousness, and if we cannot secure their co-operation, we may at least disarm their hostility. The time, we hope, is not far distant, when the specious pretext of the abuses of our establishment, will no longer be available as an argument against its constitution. There is a spirit of reformation abroad throughout our church which will purge off these abuses, and leave it free from every incumbrance to prosecute its great design of Christianizing the nation. "My object," said Mr Peel, in his speech on the law reform, and the sentiment was worthy the minister of this enlightened nation, and of the age in which we live, "is to abolish every technical form which is not absolutely necessary for the purposes of the impartial administration of justice." And the same object we would propose in reforming the abuses, whether of our own, or of the other established churches of the empire. Let every part of them be abolished which is not subservient to the great design of advancing the interests of Christianity, and which is only an impediment in the way of the truth. We are no advocates of abuses either in church or state; on the contrary, we esteem it as one of the most valuable

effects of the general diffusion of knowledge in our age, that the lamp of discovery is carried into every dark corner, and unclean and creeping things are exposed in their hiding place. Let the house of God, therefore, be purged, and its vessels made clean, and then shall our establishment, purified of its abuses, and devoted with singleness of aim to the moral and religious instruction of the people, find its defenders in the sentiments of every Christian heart, and constrain even its adversaries to join in the benediction, *Esto perpetua.*

A lucid & heartiful defense of National Establishments; but the criticism has commonly been severe —

29th Aug. 1/52.

NOTES.

Note (A.)—Page 52.

The case we have alluded to, of a judge passing sentence upon a criminal, is only one of many instances which might be employed, in illustration of the unnatural and mischievous consequences to which the principle of no establishments would lead, if followed out to its utmost extent. Such a principle goes to the subversion of all *national* religion, and especially of all recognition of whatever is peculiar to Christianity. The Christian governor, or legislator, must unchristianize himself in his official capacity, and become as a heathen man and a publican. If he admits into his plans of administration any light borrowed from Christianity, he propagates the opinions of a sect, and is guilty of political injustice. On this ground, all laws must be abolished which guard the sanctity of the Sabbath, and restrain profanity and blasphemy. "Those laws," says Dr M'Crie, "which were made for promoting the sanctification of the Sabbath, and for preventing the profanation of that holy day, cannot escape in the application of the extensive and sweeping principle, that 'the power competent to worldly kingdoms respects only the secular interests of society.' No other institution has contributed more to preserve religion in the world than the Sabbath; and its decent and religious observance among any people must greatly depend upon the enactment and due execution of salutary laws. But it cannot be pleaded for as contributing to promote the secular interests of society, except upon the principle, that the observation of religious ordinances does so; nor can the laws in its favour be successfully or consistently vindicated in any other way, than upon the principle, that magistrates in their official capacity, have a concern with religion, and that it is their duty externally to support its institutions.

But the admission of the last of these principles, and of the first as a ground for magisterial interference, is totally eversive of the new-light scheme. Neither is the Sabbath one of those things which are known by the light of nature, nor is it an ordinance merely moral, but as far as respects the definite and specified time is of positive institution. The observance of the *first* day of the week is an appointment of Jesus Christ, the King and Head of his church, and contained in the New Testament. According to the new principles, civil rulers can have no right to make laws respecting this ordinance, or add sanctions unto it; their conduct in this matter must be represented, according to the reasoning now current, as an invasion on the prerogative of Christ; as if the king of Spain or the emperor of France, should presume to ratify and add his sanctions to the laws made by the King and Parliament of Great Britain. Such laws must therefore be repealed, and every one left at liberty to pursue his secular interests or pleasure on that day, to walk or ride, to buy or sell, to plough, or sow, or reap, provided he does not disturb the peace of society."*

But farther, not only the laws for the sanctification of the Sabbath must be abrogated, but our parish schools must be abolished, or at least taken down, and erected on the new plan of excluding religion as a branch of education. It is not true, as stated by Mr Marshall, that while "the churches are exclusive, the schools are not exclusive; that while the churches are for a select portion, the schools are for all." On the contrary, they are but an appendage of our ecclesiastical establishment,—an initiatory step in the progress of that religious education which the church is designed to complete. Both are erected on the same basis—acknowledging the same Bible, and inculcating the same doctrines. Our schools are strictly sectarian, and neither Deists, nor Roman Catholics, nor Unitarians, can avail themselves of them for the education of their children, unless at the peril of their drinking in heresy with the elements of knowledge. They must therefore be purged of their political injustice, by the ex-

* Statement of the difference between the profession of the Reformed Church of Scotland, as adopted by Seceders, and the profession contained in the New Testimony and other acts, lately adopted by the General Associate Synod.—p. 27.

pulsion of religion, or Mr Marshall will brand them, like our establishment, as " relics of feudal oppression." There must be no Catechism taught, nor Bible read, nor prayers said, nor religious instruction, in short, of any kind communicated. If children have not the advantage of religious parents at home, they are to be suffered to grow up in utter ignorance of Christian truth, and to be denied even the chance of retrieving, by the instructions of the master, what they have lost by the negligence and irreligion of the parent.

It is not unworthy of observation, that while such principles are maintained in Great Britain, a document like the following should have issued from a *Negro* cabinet. The extract, as quoted by Mr Wilks, in his " Correlative Claims and Duties," is taken, he observes, from the preamble of the late King of Hayti's truly enlightened proclamation for the general establishment of schools throughout his part of the island of St Domingo :—" Persuaded that the greatest benefit we can procure for our subjects is an education suitable to their respective conditions ; that their education, when founded on the two real preserving principles of the liberty and independence of the Haytian people, *religion and morality*, is not only one of the most fruitful sources of public prosperity, but that it contributes to the good order of society, preserves obedience to the laws, and the accomplishment of all other duties ;—wishing, therefore, as much as is in our power to organize this important branch of the administration of the state, and by a suitable establishment, and adequate regulations, to direct our efforts to the attainment of that desirable object,—" We have constituted a Royal Chamber of Public Instruction, and placed at its head our minister of finance and interior, that schools may be established extensively, and academies and colleges wherever necessary."

Strange inversion, that the savages of Africa should become our instructors—that while our speculators in Great Britain would throw down the best defences of civil government—the *religious and moral* education of the people—their follies should be rebuked by the negroes of Hayti !

NOTE (B.)—Page 58.

Lest it be objected that the example of Pilate being drawn from a a despotic government, is inapplicable to the conduct of rulers in a

free state, we would subjoin another illustration. If, when the question of the abolition of the slave trade was agitated in this country, the inhabitants of Liverpool had been polled, to obtain their voice in the decision, there can be little doubt but that the majority would have been in favour of that inhuman traffic. Their city was the stronghold of the trade, and their interests were closely implicated in its support. But, notwithstanding the opposition of his constituents, what would have been the duty of the Member for Liverpool, when the question came before the legislative assembly of the nation, and when he was called to take his part in the decision? Would it not have been, fearlessly to have given his voice for its instant abolition? And who would have stigmatized this act of his legislative power as an act of political injustice? It ought indeed to be the general aim of a government to conform, if possible, its acts to the will of the majority, and always, at least, to respect their voice; but even the representatives of a free people are not bound, in the exercise of their legislative power, to follow the will of their constituents. Though a representative is only a servant of the people, and holds his authority in trust, he has still a conscience and a judgment of his own, and these, in his single mind, may be more enlightened than the conscience and the judgment of the thousands he represents. They may dismiss their representative for thwarting their will, but so long as he *retains* the power, he basely barters principle for popularity, if he recede one step from that line of conduct which his conscience dictates, and his judgment approves. "When I know," said one of our most virtuous and eloquent statesmen, "that the opinions of even the greatest multitudes are the standard of rectitude, I shall think myself obliged to make those opinions the masters of my conscience. But if it may be doubted whether Omnipotence is competent to alter the essential constitution of right and wrong, sure I am that such *things*, as they and I, are possessed of no such power. No man carries further than I do the policy of making Government pleasing to the people. But the widest range of this politic complaisance is confined within the limits of justice. I would not only consult the interest of the people, but I would cheerfully gratify their humours. We are all a sort of children that must be soothed and managed. I think I am not austere or formal in my nature. I would bear, I would even myself play my part in any innocent buffooneries to divert them. But I never

will act the tyrant for their amusement. If they will mix malice in their sports, I will never consent to throw them any living sentient creature whatsoever, no, not so much as a kitling to torment."

NOTE (C.)—Page 81.

To the three Scriptural arguments insisted upon in the text, we may add a fourth, which, independently of the others, would be decisive of the present question. Let the examples of the Old Testament, and the precepts of the New, be set aside by our adversaries, as inapplicable to Christian kings and rulers in their official capacities, still they have not overthrown the Scripture authority for establishments. How, we ask, according to their scheme, will they dispose of those promises and predictions, both in the Old and New Testament, which foretell the more rapid diffusion of the Christian religion, by the friendly co-operation of kings and nations in their kingly and national capacities? How will they reconcile with these promises and predictions, that indifference to religion on the part of kings, and that corporate neutrality or Atheism on the part of nations, which are the fundamental principles of their system? If it be unscriptural and Anti-christian for kings and nations to contribute to the advancement of religion, how is this very assistance promised as a blessing, and held out as an evidence of the prosperous state of the church? That such promises are contained in the Scriptures is not denied by Mr Marshall; but then, "it does not appear" to him how kings and nations, in their civil capacities, can provide for the diffusion of religion, "without encroaching far on the rights of private judgment, unless all the individuals composing a nation were of one mind and one profession, a state of things which never yet existed, and which, we may venture to say, never will exist." This, in other words, is asserting, that there are promises given in Scripture by God himself, which yet can never be fulfilled without injustice, and that it is a sufficient excuse for kings and nations neglecting an incumbent duty, because it does not appear how it may be easily performed?

To enumerate all the declarations and prophecies of Scripture connected with this subject, and to defend them from erroneous interpretations, were impracticable. The argument is an accumulative argument, depending not upon one or two isolated passages, but

is to be gathered from the general train of prophecy, and is illuminated by an assemblage of lights. Let the following passages, however, be taken as a specimen of the power of the argument, with the accompanying remarks and comments of Dr M'Crie.

"In Psalm ii. we have the Father's solemn introduction of Christ, as his King whom he had "set upon his holy hill of Zion," unto the kings and rulers of the earth, with injunctions to them to serve him in this character. "Be wise now, therefore, O ye kings; be instructed, ye judges of the earth. Serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and ye perish from the way." v. 10,—12. If the question be asked, In what *character* are they to serve Christ? It may be answered by proposing another, In what character did they *oppose* him? Was it not in their *public* character, as rulers? "The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord and against his Anointed, saying, Let us break their bands asunder, and cast away their cords from us, v. 2, 3. "Be wise now, therefore, O ye kings," &c. Shall we suppose, when they are reprehended in their public character for opposing Christ, that the exhortation to "serve" him respects merely their private character as individuals? Shall not the honour and homage to be paid to God's own King, be as conspicuous and decided as the ignominy which was poured upon him was? "Judges and rulers, *as such*, must 'Kiss the Son,' (says Dr Owen, in his sermon preached before the Parliament of England,) and own his sceptre, and advance his ways. Some think, if you were well settled, you ought not, *as rulers of the nation*, to put forth your power for the interest of Christ. *The good Lord keep your hearts from that apprehension!*" As this view of the words is agreeable to the concurrent judgment of the most judicious interpreters, so it is necessarily suggested by the scope of the whole Psalm, which relates to the public state of the kingdom of Christ; by the characters addressed, their being in the same station with those mentioned in the beginning; and by the judgments threatened for non-compliance with the injunction. Indeed, the exposition which confines this, and similar texts, to the private character and conduct of rulers, would not be borne with, if applied unto any other persons in authority, as ministers, parents, &c."

"What is enjoined upon rulers by divine precept, God promises they shall perform, in the way of homage to the Redeemer, and

service to his church, In Psalm lxxii. we have a remarkable prophecy relative to the extent and glory of the kingdom of Christ. Among other things, the subjection and service of the nations, and their rulers, are particularly mentioned, " The kings of Tarshish and of the isles, shall bring presents; the kings of Sheba and Seba shall offer gifts. Yea, all kings shall fall down before him, all nations shall serve him, v. 10, 11. The 'presents and gifts' here mentioned, refer to the custom of princes who paid tribute to those kings who had conquered them, or to whose authority they owned subjection, while they reigned as princes over their own subjects. Solomon had many kings and kingdoms who were tributary to him, and who sent presents, and performed services to him in this view. Read 1 Kings iv. 21. 2 Chron. ix. 26. These strikingly illustrate the promises here made to Christ. Whether, with some, we shall suppose that this Psalm refers in the *first* place to Solomon as the type, and ultimately to Christ as the antitype; or rather, with others, that it refers immediately to Christ, but describes the glory and extent of his kingdom in the way of continued allusion to that of Solomon; the illustration is in either view the same. It shows that kings, in their *kingly state*, should fall down before him, that nations, in their *national state*, should serve him; and exposes the foolish, not to say 'wicked import of the New-scheme', which would limit the whole meaning to individual conduct, and the character of church-members."

" We have an additional promise to this purpose, in Isaiah xlix. 23. " And kings shall be thy nursing-fathers, and their queens thy nursing-mothers; they shall bow down to thee with their face toward the earth, and lick up the dust of thy feet, and thou shalt know that I am the Lord; for they shall not be ashamed that wait for me." To which may be added, chap. lx. 10, 12, 16. " And the sons of strangers shall build up thy walls, and their kings shall minister unto thee; for in my wrath I smote thee, but in my favour have I had mercy on thee. For the nation and kingdom that will not serve thee, shall perish; yea, those nations shall be utterly wasted. Thou shalt also suck the milk of the Gentiles, and shalt suck the breast of kings, and thou shalt know that I the Lord am thy Saviour and thy Redeemer, the mighty One of Jacob." To limit the sense of these words to that *common protection* which is given to all subjects, and to any society, is to explain away the promises of God.

Kings shall act as *nursing fathers*, as *curators*, or *tutors* (as some render the words,) who exercise a special care and oversight over the orphans who are committed to them; or, as the metaphor is elsewhere illustrated, 'carrying them in their bosom, as a nursing father beareth the sucking child,' Numb. xi. 12. It is equally unreasonable to confine the meaning of the promise to the private or personal conduct of rulers, and of their subjects. This would never suggest itself to any who, in reading the passage, had not formed the notion that the church cannot be benefited by civil power. It offers violence to the plain meaning of the words. It does not accord with the context, which speaks of the public state of the church, and those means which tend to advance its interests in this view. It entirely sets aside the analogy between what is predicted and what had formerly taken place, which is suggested by the description. It does not correspond to what God actually did for the church at the period (that of Constantine and the Reformation) to which the promises refer. It gives an improper sense to the words, in opposition to what is intimated in the divine threatening against those who shall refuse service to his church: for 'the nation and kingdom,' (as such, and not merely individuals of them) 'that will not serve' her, 'shall perish,—shall be utterly wasted.'—chap. lx. 12. 'These promises (says Dr Owen) assert, that magistrates shall put forth their power for the welfare of the church. Kingdoms are said to serve the church: and how can a kingdom, *as* a kingdom, serve the church, but as putting forth *its power* and strength in *her* behalf? What God has promised, kings, magistrates, rulers, nations shall do, that is their duty to do.—Surely these promises will scarcely be accomplished in bringing commonwealths to be of Gallio's frame, to take care for none of these things."*

Without farther enumeration of particular passages, we may state in general in the language of Dr M'Crie, "that the whole tenor of the declarations, promises, and predictions of the Old Testament, lead to the conclusion that Christianity shall be owned, countenanced, and supported, in a *national* way." But not only the Old Testament contains such predictions and promises; the New Testament also furnishes corroborations to our argument. When the

* Statement of the difference between the Profession, &c.—p. 132, 133, 134.

seventh angel sounded, " there were great voices in heaven, saying, the kingdoms of this world are become *the kingdoms* of our Lord and of his Christ." Rev. xi. 15. " This refers," observes Dr M'Crie, " to the period of the Reformation from Popery, and includes, besides other things, the public state and actings of these kingdoms with reference to the religion of Jesus Christ. They had formerly been the kingdoms of Antichrist, not merely by having his ordinances set up in them, by the greater part of the people submitting to these, but by a public and national acknowledgement of his authority, and subjection to him. But they should now acknowledge, and submit to the Lord. Their kings had formerly given their power to the beast; but now they should withdraw it, and employ it on the side of the Lamb. See also Rev. xxi. 24, 26."* Whatever weight may be allowed to these passages separately, in favour of what we now plead for—a national profession of religion—there is an impression gathered from them in their combination, which it is impossible for those who reverence the authority of Scripture to resist. The false glosses, and loose, though ingenious modes of interpretation, necessary to get rid of their plain and obvious meaning, would assist us, in like manner, to get rid of all the most important doctrines of Christianity.

It may appear singular to our readers, that Mr Marshall, while he has eulogized the works of the eminent ecclesiastical historian from whom we have been quoting, should have profited so little by his wisdom. It is indeed hardly credible, that he should have come forward with the charge against establishments, that they are unscriptural and Antichristian, if he had read the forcible and luminous exposition of the Scripture authority for such institutions, contained in the appendix to Dr M'Crie's two discourses on the " Unity of the Church," and in the " Statement" from which the foregoing extracts have been taken. Let Mr Marshall re-peruse these productions, which are rich in the general principles of the Scripture argument; and if they do not convince him of the expediency of establishments, in existing circumstances, they will at least reprove the presumption with which he has affirmed such institutions to be fundamentally unlawful, unscriptural, and Antichristian.

* Statement of the difference, &c. page 140.

Note (D.)—Page 123.

To the travels of Dr Dwight we appeal, as our first authority, in corroboration of the statement we have made respecting the religious condition of America. For a very intelligent comment upon the facts of the following passage, we refer our readers to the November number of the Christian Instructor, where the extract is also given at length.

" If we look to facts," says Dr Dwight, " we shall find the same doctrine (the doctrine of the necessity of a legal provision for the Christian instruction of a nation) supported by illustrious evidence. In the year 1793 I was a member of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church. There were then, if I remember accurately, 412 congregations belonging to this church within the United States south of New England, and 209 congregations in Connecticut *alone*. To supply these Presbyterian congregations, there were 204 ministers. In Connecticut, there were in the year 1790 237,946 inhabitants, and in the States south of New England, 2,920,478. In the year 1798 there were belonging to the Presbyterian church 242 ministers, of whom 33 were without any charge, or in the language of New England, were not settled ministers. Two hundred and nine ministers, therefore, supplied, so far as they were supplied at all, the whole number of Presbyterian congregations south of New England. The number of congregations at that time cannot be ascertained, as the returns were in this respect imperfect. These ministers supported 290 congregations, 81 being what are called pluralities, and there were 142 vacancies returned. Five presbyteries made no return of the vacancies within their bounds. If we suppose the vacancies in these presbyteries to be 18, the number will be 160. This number will make the whole 430. With this monstrous train of vacancies there were 30 ministers still who were unsettled. It follows irresistibly, either that the congregations were so small as to be unable to support ministers, or so indifferent to religion as to be unwilling.

The number of vacancies in Connecticut, at that time, I am unable presently to ascertain. Twenty may perhaps be assumed as the probable number. There were then, at that time, within the State, 189 ministers.

In the year 1800, there were in Connecticut 251,002 inhabitants,

and in the States south of New England, 4,033,775. The whole amount, according to this estimate, will stand thus—

	Congregations.	Ministers.	Vacancies.	Pluralities.	Ministers not settled.	Inhabitants.
In Connecticut	209	189	20	0	5	251,002
In the States south of New England	430	242	160	81	33	4,033,775

In Connecticut then, a sixteenth of the number of inhabitants form 209 congregations, and support 189 ministers. Of these congregations 20 were vacant, and five of the ministers were unsettled. In the States south of New England, sixteen times the number of inhabitants formed 430 congregations, of which 81 were pluralities, and 160 were vacant. The ministers supported and settled were 209. If these States maintained congregations, and were supplied with ministers in the same proportion as Connecticut, the whole number of congregations would be 3344, and the whole number of ministers settled and supported would be 3024. In this estimate we have a fair specimen of the natural consequences of *establishing* or *neglecting to establish* the public worship of God by the law of the land. In Connecticut every inhabitant who is not precluded by disease or inclination may hear the gospel, and celebrate the public worship of God every Sabbath day. In the States specified, it is not improbable that a number of people, several times as great as the census of Connecticut, *have scarcely heard a sermon or a prayer in their lives.*"

Afterwards he says,

" To complete the picture, it is only necessary to add, the number of churches, in all places where there is an establishment, keeps full pace with the population. Every inhabitant, also, who enters a church finds a seat."

After stating that an examination of the religious state of Massachusetts would have given a result not essentially different, he concludes the letter with these important observations.

" In happy conformity to this estimate, and the scheme here supported, has been the prevalence of religion in these two states. It is doubted whether there is a collection of ministers in the world,

whose labours have been more prosperous, or under whose preaching a greater proportion of those who heard them have become the subjects of real piety. *I know of no country in which revivals of religion have been so frequent, or in proportion to the number of inhabitants so extensive as in these states. God, therefore, may be considered as having thus far manifested his own approbation of the system.* If at the same time we advert to the peace, the good order, the general distribution of justice, the universal existence of schools, the universal enjoyment of the education they communicate, and the extension of superior education, it will be difficult for a sober man not to perceive that *the smiles of Heaven have regularly accompanied this system from its commencement to the present time.* I need not, however, have gone any farther for the illustration of this subject, than to a comparison of the states of Rhode-Island and Connecticut. The former of these, independently of Providence, Newport, and two or three other small towns, is in all these important particulars, a mere contrast to the latter. Yet these states were planted by colonies from the same nation, lie in the same climate, and are separated merely by a meridianal line. A sober man who knows them both, can hardly hesitate, whatever may have been his original opinion concerning this subject, *to believe that a legislature is bound to establish the public worship of God.*"

The following passage from the British Review, shews still more distinctly the inadequacy of the means of religious instruction provided in the States of America, compared with the number of the population. Out of eight millions, the computed amount of the inhabitants of America, five millions, it is stated, on the authority of the calculations of the Rev. Mr Beecher, are destitute of competent religious instruction.

" All our readers are fully aware that in the United States of Ameica there is no established church: but we are perfectly convinced, that were they familiar with the real situation of that extensive country, in regard to the means of Christian knowledge, they would not approve of the experiment of which these federated Republics have set the first example, of leaving that important concern to the discretion or caprice of the multitude. In some of the States, it is left entirely to the option of the people whether they shall have clergymen and churches at all; or whether, with the name of Christians, they shall live like the rudest islander in the Pacific Ocean; and it gives us pain to remark, that in

the Southern parts of the Union, the Sabbath is never sanctified by a large majority of the inhabitants, and the rites of our most holy faith are scarcely ever practised. In the Northern States, indeed, there is more attention paid to the ordinances of religion than in the South. A tax for the support of a certain number of ministers and chapels, is levied in all the New-England States, the amount of which is divided among the several denominations of Christians, according to the number of churches which they keep open for public worship. It cannot fail to be observed that, in as much as this tax is compulsatory, it recognizes the principle upon which establishments are founded; namely, a power in the government to provide for religious instruction and public worship; and, which is completely at variance with the maxim maintained by Mr. Warden, [the writer whose work was under review] that 'religion is one of the natural wants of the human mind, and, in an enlightened age, requires no aid from the civil magistrate.' 'Laissez nous faire' is a good rule for practical men who preside over manufacturing and commercial industry; but, in reference to those grand institutions which are calculated to form the public mind, and to implant moral principles—to preserve the purity of our faith, and to keep the soul true to its great Author, we deem it somewhat more prudent to be guided by experience, than by any abstract theory of political economy. We are borne out in this opinion too by the real condition of the United States in the matter of religion, 'that natural want of the human mind,' which, agreeably to the received views of their political science, will be plentifully supplied according to the demand: for we find in Mr. Warden's own pages a statement, founded upon some investigations and calculations entered into by the Rev. Mr. Beecher, which affords the melancholy intelligence, that, out of eight millions, the computed amount of the American people, five millions of persons are destitute of competent religious instruction. Setting out upon the assumption that there ought to be a clergyman for every thousand souls, (the proportion in Great Britain and Ireland is one minister to eight or nine hundred souls,) Mr. Beecher assures us, that in Massachusetts there is a deficiency of one hundred and seventy-eight competent religious teachers. In Marne, not more than one half of the population is supplied with religious instructiou. In New Hampshire the deficiency is one third. Vermont is nearly in the same situation. In the western parts of Rhode Island, embracing a territory of fifty miles in length, and thirty in breadth, and including one half of the population, there is but *one* regularly educated minister, and but ten in the other parts. In

Connecticut, there are 218 Congregational Churches, of which thirty-six are vacant; of all other denominations, sixty-eight are vacant. In New York, the actual number of pastors is about 500; the population of a million would require double the number. In New Jersey, there is a deficiency of at least fifty pastors. In Pennsylvania and Delaware, the deficiency is very considerable. Virginia, with a population of 974,000, has but sixty regular ministers; consequently, 914,000 persons are without adequate religious instruction. The situation of Maryland is similar to that of Virginia. North Carolina, with a population of 555,500, which would require 550 clergymen, has but twenty. South Carolina, which with a population of upwards of 400,000, ought to have 400 pastors, has but thirty-six. The State of Georgia has but ten clergymen."

"So much in proof of the maxim, that religion, being one of the natural wants of the human mind, 'requires no aid from the magistrate in an enlightened age.'"

"As to practical morality, again, in those States of the Union where religion is viewed not as 'a want,' but as a superfluity, we are told by Bristed, that a bill was brought into the legislature of Louisiana, to enforce the better observation of the Sabbath, for punishing crimes which we cannot name, for preventing the defacing of church-yards, and shutting up the theatres and stores on Sunday; and that the said bill was rejected by a large majority, on the ground that though such *persecuting intolerance* might well enough suit the New-England Puritans, who were descended from the bigoted fanatics of Old England, who were great readers of the Bible, and consequently ignorant, prejudiced, cold-hearted, false, and cruel, it could never be fastened on the more enlightened, liberal, philosophical inhabitants of Louisiana, the descendants of Frenchmen!"

British Review, No. xxvi. pp. 513—515.

The last authority to which we appeal, is the Rev. Samuel J. Mills, from whose tour in America, Dr Chalmers has given the following extract, in his work "On the Use and Abuse of Literary and Ecclesiastical Endowments."

"Never will the impression be erased from our hearts, that has been made by beholding those scenes of wide spreading desolation. The whole country, from Lake Erie to the Gulf of Mexico, is as the valley of the shadow of death. Darkness rests upon it. Only here and there, a few rays of gospel light pierce through the awful

gloom. This vast country contains more than a million of inhabitants. Their number is every year increased, by a mighty flood of emigration. Soon they will be as the sands on the sea-shore for multitude. Yet there are at present only a little more than one hundred Presbyterian or Congregational ministers in it. Were these ministers equally distributed throughout the country, there would be only one to every ten thousand people. But now there are districts of country, containing from twenty to fifty thousand inhabitants, entirely destitute—'And how shall they hear without a preacher?'"

It ought to be observed, that though the general practice of the American government is to let religion alone, it has not always adhered to its own principles. We speak not at present of the provision which has been made in some of the States for the support of religious instructors, or of the creeds recognized by others; we refer to the practice of appointing chaplains, who are avowedly religious functionaries for the army and navy, and paying them out of the public treasury. This involves in it the very principle of an establishmen'. It is a government interference in favour of religion; nay, it is an illustration of the most odious form of that interference, for it involves the selection and endowment of the teachers of a sect. Amongst the crew of a ship, or the soldiers of an army, if all be not equally indifferent to religion, there must, as amongst the other classes of society, be various and discordant opinions entertained respecting the doctrines of religion. To accomodate each party with a teacher of its own, is impossible. The government, therefore, makes the selection, and in doing so, it necessarily propagates the opinions of a particular sect. Indeed, the consequences involved in the principle that proscribes all government interference about matters of religion, are such as frequently to appal its most zealous advocates, and to compel them to relax its sternness, in adaptation to the urgencies of particular circumstances. If the principle were followed out in the present instance, it would lead to the withdrawment of every means which government employs for the religious instruction of the sailors and soldiers of our nation. As a return for the services of these gallant defenders of their country, it would consign them to spiritual ignorance, or leave them to the chance instruction they may receive while lying in a harbour, or stationed in a barrack. It is the disgrace of our nation, that while it has been so prodigal of millions in the national defence, it should have been so parsimonious in providing for the spiritual in-

struction of the national defenders. If the doctrines of Mr Marshall, however, be true, our disgrace is our honour, and we are to glory in our shame. The little which government has done, it ought to undo; and if it dare make a more ample provision, by the distribution of Bibles, and the appointment of chaplains, for the religious instruction of our sailors and soldiers, it will be chargeable with unscriptural and "Antichristian" practices, and its actions will be stigmatized as "relics of feudal oppression."

But not only are chaplains appointed and paid by government in America; "strict orders are issued," says Mr Wilks, "under severe penalties, for the attendance and decent behaviour of the soldiers at divine worship. Profane cursing and swearing are also punishable. Thus it appears, that the United States of America, without *verbally* allowing of church establishments, and though thinking it unconstitutional, it is said, even to speak of the "Divine Providence" in their united capacity, as some of the States may not acknowledge such a doctrine, yet have felt *in practice*, the absolute necessity of acting upon some of the most contested principles upon which national church establishments are founded." In conclusion, we would say, in the words of the writer now quoted, that "America is but a new country; and some years must elapse before the general effects of its present system can be fully developed. It is devoutly to be hoped, that long before that period shall arrive, the necessity of a church establishment will be sufficiently felt among all classes, to induce the legislature to carry into effect some adequate provision for that purpose; if not on the higher ground of duty as Christians, and from an anxious concern for their own souls, and those of their countrymen, yet on the principles of political expediency, and civil decorum." *

Note (E.)—Page 132.

"It is an objection frequently urged," says Mr Wilks, "against national establishments, that the arguments employed to shew their necessity for the preservation of Christianity in a country, *interfere with the doctrine of God's superintending providence.* God, it is said, can extend and preserve his church without human auxiliaries."

* Correlative Claims and Duties, page 83.

To this objection Mr Wilks replies, " We *do* leave it to the providence of God, when humbly, and in exclusive dependence on his grace and blessing, we make use of the means and instruments which he has placed in our power; of which an established church, we conceive, is one. But while we employ the means, we do not put them in the place either of the agent or the end. It is quite unfair to suppose, that pious churchmen defend an ecclesiastical establishment, merely as an engine of civil utility; much less, because it may happen to be connected with secular wealth or splendour; but they defend it as a probable instrument of great utility in accomplishing the great ends of the divine dispensation, in the evangelization of the human race. *We believe as fully as the objector*, that God can and will preserve his church, even though all the temporal authorities of this world were colleagued with all the powers of darkness for its destruction. It was our Lord's own consolitary promise, that 'the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.' But we also believe, that the Almighty in his dealings with mankind, almost invariably operates by the use of means and second causes; not the least common of which, is disposing the hearts of civil rulers, and other persons of influence and authority, to devise or patronize measures which have a tendency to accomplish his all-wise designs, while perhaps they are only promoting their own. The Omnipotent Creator, it is true, *might* effect his plans without the use of these or any other instruments; but his power to do so, is no proof that such is the usual arrangement of his providence. It is quite inconclusive, therefore, to argue that the power and providence of God for the support of the church, render a national establishment unnecessary, unless it can also be satisfactorily proved, that such an institution, however pure, cannot in any case, probably or possibly further that important end; or in other words, that God will never permit his blessing to rest upon any plan founded on the basis of such an arrangement. Indeed most of the *a priori* arguments urged against national ecclesiastical establishments, followed out into all their bearings, would go far to banish *all human efforts whatever*, for extending and perpetuating the blessings of the gospel; while, on the other hand, all the arguments employed by our dissenting brethren themselves, to induce each minister or private individual to promote religion in his own sphere, might be applied on a larger scale, to prove it the duty of every Christian legislature, to institute a national esta-

blishment for the public instruction of the people in the doctrines and duties of the gospel. Pious Churchmen acknowledge as fully as any Dissenters, the peculiar and special providence of God in the protection of his church; and why should they be considered as virtually denying this great axiom in Christianity, merely because they speak of certain means or instruments, as ordinarily made use of by Him, for effecting his purposes?"*

We would go farther, however, than Mr Wilks, in this passage. Instead of acting as defenders, we would lay upon our adversaries the burden of the proof, that, in rejecting national church establishments, *they* are not setting aside the ordinances of God, and the instruments he has appointed for the dissemination of his religion. These institutions, we maintain, are scriptural in their principles, promised and predicted by God, as blessings to his church; and not without dereliction of duty, and a direct defiance of the examples of the Old, and the precepts of the New Testament, can a Christian government withhold from them its countenance and support. It is true, we have no explicit commands laid upon Christian magistrates in the New Testament, and no direct appointment of national churches; but the same rule holds in the exercise of the magisterial or the corporate power of a nation, as in the exercise of all other powers. Besides, is not the Old Testament, where its examples and precepts are founded, not on ceremonial, but on *moral* grounds, a rule of faith and practice to us? "It is commonly pleaded," says the eminent ecclesiastical historian already so often quoted, "that there is nothing in the New Testament which countenances a national religion, or proves that magistrates, as such, have any concern with the interests of religion and the church of Christ; and those who maintain this are often triumphantly asked to produce a proof of it from the New Testament. This plea is neither relevant nor well founded.—It is irrelevant. For if the Old Testament is a rule of faith and manners to us, as well as the New, it is sufficient that what we plead for is warranted by the former, although it should not be expressly mentioned in the latter. We have shewed that the power in question is warranted by the Old Testament, and that it records approved examples of its exercise which proceeded upon moral grounds. Those who affirm that it is abrogated, or has ceased, under the New Testament, must produce proof of this. 'We deny

* Correlative Claims and Duties, pp. 56—59.

that it is, our adversaries in this matter must affirm that it is; otherwise, they do not so much as enter into the question in controversy. And it is incumbent on those who take the affirmative side of a question to prove their assertion. It is contrary to the rules of just reasoning to tell us, that we cannot instruct the warrantableness of the magistrates power about religion, unless we produce a positive institution of it in the New Testament, if the whole word of God be the rule of our faith and practice.' "*

Without attempting to disprove what is here so forcibly urged, Mr Marshall entirely overlooks the unscriptural consequences which attach to his own opinions, and instead of undertaking the part of defender of himself, undertakes the more easy part of accusing his adversaries. The only two arguments by which he endeavours to justify the aspersions which he throws, with so much confidence, upon their principles, are founded—the one upon the exhortation of the apostle to voluntary liberality, and the other upon the fact that neither Christ nor his apostles made any attempt to propagate their religion by civil aid, or left any injunctions to their followers to institute national establishments. The first of these we have already answered, by shewing that a church establishment does not necessarily set aside the injunction of the apostle; for the establishment may have been erected by the voluntary decision of the nation. Besides, we have no objection, that where the Christian liberality of a parish is sufficient to make a competent provision for a religious instructor, that the compulsory provision be withdrawn. All that is necessary for the maintenance of our principle is, that that provision be supplemented where deficient, and that religion and its functionaries, be not left to starve upon gratuitous liberality. "Give thyself *wholly* to the ministry" is an apostolic injunction as decisive and unequivocal as the injunction, "Let him that is taught in the word administer to him that teacheth in all good things;" yet our dissenting brethren of England and Scotland scruple not to eke out a scanty stipend by a boarding or school establishment; nor do they conceive that in this alienation of their time and talents, to the instruction of youth in profane and secular learning, they are violating a Scripture command. The necessity of their circumstances they plead as an apology; and the plea, we admit, is good, and is sanctioned by

* Statement of the Differences, &c.—pp. 137, 138.

the example of an apostle. But notwithstanding this, it is our imperative duty to adopt such means as will prevent the violation of this, or any other precept of Scripture. Such means is an establishment; it secures, or ought to secure, such a competent remuneration to every minister, that he may be able to "give himself *wholly* to the ministry." This, in the system of dissenters, is, in many instances, impracticable. It is, or it ought always to be practicable, in the system of an establishment. We are aware that these remarks may be retorted upon ourselves, in reference to the pluralities which exist, both in our own and in the other established churches of the empire. If these pluralities be in any instance justifiable, it is upon the same principle as the boarding or school establishments of our dissenting brethren. We have no hesitation, however, in saying, that they are altogether incompatible with the right discharge of the duties of a Christian minister, and are a violation of the Scripture precept, "give thyself wholly to the ministry." The union of a pastoral charge with an academic office, of clergyman and professor in the same person, violates not only the Scripture precept, but the ordinary principle of the division of labour; and is no less incompatible with the successful discharge of the duties of a clergyman, than the union of wright and smith, in the same artizan, is, with excellent workmanship, from the smithery or wright-shop. We are told, in English history, that when King Richard, in fighting against Philip of France, had taken prisoner the Bishop of Beauvais, a martial prelate, he replied to the Pope, who demanded his liberation as an ecclesiastic, by sending his Holiness the coat of mail which the Bishop had worn in the battle, and which was besmeared with blood, employing these words of Jacob's son to the patriarch, "This we have found, know now whether it be thy son's coat or no." In like manner, of the gown of a professor on the shoulders of a clergyman, we would say, in the words of King Richard, "Know whether this be thy son's coat or no." The entire separation of one man to the pastoral office, by the destruction of all pluralities, would be of as much importance to the clerical, as subdivision of labour is to every other profession. If thirteen men, as Adam Smith informs us, are employed in making *one pin*, it is not too much to expect, that two men shall be employed in the very different occupations of lecturer on science, and preacher of the gospel.

The second of Mr Marshall's arguments, that neither Christ nor

his apostles made any attempt to propagate their religion by civil aid, or left any injunctions to their followers to institute national establishments, is sufficiently answered in the following passage of Mr Wilks. The argument is hardly, indeed, worthy of consideration, since it is wholly a negative argument, and therefore can prove nothing on either side.

"The Dissenter will, however, still demand, "Why is it, that, if a national church establishment was consistent with the intentions of our Saviour, he did not, either by himself or his Apostles, expressly clear up the point?" To this we reply, that we may conceive very sufficient reasons why much should not be said in the New Testament on the subject. For, in the first place, all the prejudices, habits, and persuasions of his disciples must have been in favour of a national church establishment: they had themselves been educated under one, and could never suspect, unless it were plainly declared, which it certainly is not, that under the new economy such an institution, which before was of Divine appointment, had become unlawful. Had one of the Apostles been the instrument of converting a heathen prince and the majority of his subjects to the Christian Faith, does it appear credible that he would have thought of cautioning the newly evangelized government carefully to avoid the example of the Jewish ecclesiastical polity?—to build no temples; to appoint no public instructors; and, in short, to steer as widely as possible of every thing resembling a national church establishment? On the contrary, would he not naturally and instinctively, unless specially instructed otherwise, have followed up, *mutatis mutandis*, the system in which he had been himself educated; and have earnestly exhorted his royal and senatorial converts to provide, as far as possible, for the extension and permanence of the Gospel among the body of the people, by founding a regular national church establishment? This appears at least a very probable presumption;—a presumption at all events sufficiently strong to shew, that for our Lord to have expressly enjoined his Apostles to do what would so naturally follow without such excitement, would, at best, have been superfluous, and might even have been injurious, by leading their minds too closely to the old system, and reviving the lingering prejudices of their education in favour of the abolished parts of Judaism. Indeed, considering the prepossessions of the first disciples, which must have been strongly on the side of an ecclesiastical polity connected with the state, it is more wonderful, perhaps, that there are *no cautions against pressing*

the subject too pertinaciously upon the Gentile nations, than that there are no specific injunctions to the practice."—pp. 31, 32.

NOTE (F.)—Page 137.

To have made out the charge, that the churches of our national establishment are involuntary churches, it would have been necessary for Mr Marshall to have shewn, that our General Assembly is not, in ecclesiastical matters, a *supreme* court, but that its decisions are subject to the revision of a higher tribunal. Without this proof, his argument from the Bracadale case is, as we have said, a contradiction in terms; for he at once affirms that the decision was involuntary, and that it was deliberately adopted. If the decisions of our Parliament were overawed by an army, or if they were subject to be revised and repealed by a superior court, it might then be said of it, that it was an involuntary Parliament, and had not the power of redressing national grievances, and altering and amending its own acts. But if it is a supreme court, from which there is no appeal, and if its deliberations are not overawed by some superior physical power, then the very fact that it deliberately decides upon any measure, is a proof that the measure is voluntarily chosen. In like manner with the General Assembly of our church, it is a *supreme* court, acknowledging no superior, and appealing to no higher tribunal. If its measures are wrong, it is not because it is an involuntary court; it is owing to the character and principles of its members. The acts passed by one Assembly may be repealed or modified by another, and the very next instance of a case similar to that of the minister of Bracadale, may be decided by a reversal of its former judgment. Agreeably to the principles of Presbyterians, our church recognizes the civil authority only *circa sacra*, (*about* sacred things,) not *in sacris*, (*in* sacred things.) In matters of doctrine or discipline, or in the adminstration of religious ordinances, it rejects all civil and external interference. If there are abuses, therefore, in the administration of these, they are subject to its own regulation. As they have originated within itself, so they may be remedied by the exercise of its own power. In short, like every other Presbyterian assembly of divines, its members may act properly or improperly, their legislation may injure or benefit the church; but whatever be the

character of its measures, these measures are at least its own deliberate choice.

With regard even to patronage, there is a power which lies *within* the church, sufficient to counteract any vicious exercise of the right on the part of the patron. The church is the sole judge of the qualifications of the presentee; and not only may it set aside his presentation on the general ground of his religious and literary disqualifications, but on the particular ground of his not being acceptable to the people. It is true, this power has long lain inactive; but the time, we hope, is not far distant, when it will again be exercised by the Assembly. Though out of use, it is not out of the constitution; and when revived, it will nobly vindicate the rights of the people, and protect them against any unprincipled exercise of patronage.

FINIS.

ERRATA.

Page 5, line 17, for "loose," *read* "loosely."
—— 5, line 30, for "and," *read* "or."
—— 6, line 6, for "or," *read* "nor."
—— 14, line 6 from the bottom, for "independent," *read* "independently."
—— 35, line 17, for "who is no less eminent as a historian than as a Christian and a divine," *read* "who is no less eminent as a Christian and a divine than as a historian."
——112, line 6, for "Chalmers's, Thomson's, Gordon's," *read* "Chalmerses, Thomsons, Gordons."