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
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





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THE  
WAR IN SYRIA.

BY  
COMMODORE SIR CHARLES NAPIER, K.C.B.,  
*&c., &c., &c.*

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*IN TWO VOLUMES.*

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## ADVERTISEMENT.

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IN giving an account of the War in Syria, I have endeavoured to state the facts as they occurred, of most of which I was an eye-witness. The *Levant Papers* have furnished me with much useful information, and I have endeavoured to make no statements that cannot be borne out either by them or by documents in my own possession.

In writing a work of this kind I have been obliged to publish letters and extracts of letters from these Papers, in order to save the reader the trouble of examining them, and, indeed, it is not in the power of the public to get hold of Parliamentary Papers without a serious expense; this I trust will be a sufficient excuse for the numerous documents that I have thought it necessary to give.

*May, 1842.*



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## INTRODUCTION.

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IN writing the history of the War in Syria, I began after the battle of Nizib, and the defection of the Turkish fleet, which had well nigh laid Turkey prostrate at the feet of her powerful vassal; but it is necessary that the uninformed reader should be acquainted how Mehemet Ali, who began a simple soldier, should have risen to such a height of power as to attract the attention of the nations of Europe, and cause them to come forward, at the imminent risk of a European war, to interfere between the vassal and the master.

Mehemet Ali is of low origin, and was born at Cavallo, in Roumelia, in 1769. He left his parents when young, and began his career as a tobacco-merchant, but soon tired of trade, became a soldier, and was sent to Egypt, at the time of the French invasion, at the head of a body of Arnauts (Albanians.) After the evacuation of Egypt by the French, he made himself extremely useful to Kourschid Pacha, the

governor of Egypt, who was unpopular with the Mamelukes, and disliked by his own soldiers. Mehemet was too clever for the Governor, and soon began to see an opening for himself. Kourschid became jealous, and endeavoured to get rid of him; but the future Pacha of Egypt had gained over his countrymen to his interest, and, with the assistance of the Mamelukes, deposed the Pacha, and stepped into his shoes. His own talent, and the weakness of the Porte, kept him in place; though many attempts were made to remove him.

Mehemet Ali never openly opposed the Porte; he was the most submissive of Pachas, and always managed to gain his point, and each unsuccessful attempt of the Porte to displace him left him more powerful than ever. When the British landed at Damietta, in 1807, Mehemet Ali ruled in Egypt, and it was principally owing to his energetic conduct that the expedition failed.

The massacre of the Mamelukes, which took place in 1811, cannot be justified, even according to Eastern ideas. That they were extremely troublesome and dangerous there cannot be a doubt; they would have had no hesitation whatever in overthrowing Mehemet

Ali's government, and putting him to death; and had he openly attacked them, he would have been justified; but a breach of hospitality is a greater crime in the East than in the West. He had invited the Mamelukes to eat salt with him, and he treacherously attacked and butchered them in the citadel of Cairo in cold blood. One alone escaped; he took a desperate leap over the battlements, his horse was killed on the spot, and he alone, of between 400 and 500, survived to tell the story of the massacre of his fellows.

About this time the Pacha began to extend his views beyond Egypt, and his first step was to take advantage of the opening afforded by the depredations of the Wahabees, a reforming military sect of Arabs, who had captured Mecca and Medina, plundered the caravans, and put a stop to the pilgrimages of the Faithful. Less actuated, it may be fairly supposed, by religious zeal than by political wisdom, he procured orders from the Porte, by virtue of which he attacked, and at length, after several campaigns, succeeded in subduing them; his two sons Toussoon and Ibrahim greatly exerting themselves in the war. The pachalic of the Holy Cities was in consequence granted by the Sultan

to Ibrahim, but Mehemet Ali pushed his arms still further, and did not desist till he had got into his possession the most valuable parts of the coast of Arabia.

Shortly after the massacre of the Mamelukes, Mehemet, with the assistance of Colonel Seve (now Souliman Pacha), an officer of merit in the French service, set to work to raise an army and to discipline it on the European model. The latter was no easy task; he had to contend against the habits and prejudices of the Arabs, but nevertheless, he succeeded in this, as he has done in most of his undertakings. In 1824 he was enabled to send a powerful army and fleet to Greece to assist in putting down the insurrection; here the Allies interfered; the "untoward" battle of Navarino destroyed his fleet, and not more than half his army returned to the land of their birth. As a reward for his services, however, the government of Candia was conferred on him by the Porte.

From this time to 1831 Mehemet Ali employed himself in improving his country, and perfecting his establishments; and though according to our notions, the means he employed were not very mild or humane, the public works

he executed in a short time were almost as wonderful as those of Peter the Great.

His military and naval conscriptions, and other acts of tyranny, induced many of the inhabitants of Egypt to abandon their country and take refuge in Syria, and they were protected by Abdallah Pacha, the Governor of the province in which stands the celebrated fortress of St. Jean d'Acre. This Pacha was under considerable obligation to Mehemet Ali; but, nevertheless, disregarded all his remonstrances. Mehemet Ali was not a man to be trifled with; and, under the pretence of recovering his Fellahs and punishing Abdallah Pacha, he took steps from which the far-famed Eastern Question at length arose.

He assembled an army of 40,000 men, including eight regiments of cavalry, and several thousand Bedouins, a large park of artillery, and a battering train. At the head of this army he placed his son Ibrahim Pacha. A squadron of five sail-of-the-line and several frigates were despatched to Acre in the month of November, 1831, a season of the year rather too late to commence a campaign. Nevertheless, Ibrahim having crossed the Desert, set himself down before Acre in December.



The Grand Prince of Lebanon, the Emir Bechir, after much hesitation, paid him a visit in his camp before Acre, and brought presents of horses for Ibrahim and Abbas Pachas, and endeavoured to make his visit one of compliment only. Ibrahim, seeing the immense advantage of gaining him over to his interest, either by force or persuasion, detained him in his camp for several months, and at last obtained a promise of his co-operation; he was then permitted to return to Ibteddin, leaving, however, his grandson, the Emir Mahmoud, as a hostage for his fidelity.

The siege was conducted with so little skill both by land and sea, that six months elapsed before the fortress fell into the possession of Ibrahim Pacha, and then it was taken by storm. The following, extracted from the work of Mr. St. John, is the best account I have been able to procure\*.

“Ibrahim on the 26th of May, ordering the generals, colonels, and chiefs of battalions into his tent, made the following arrangements for carrying the place by storm. Ahmed Bey, General of Brigade, with the first battalion of the second regiment of infantry, was directed to mount the breach near

\* *Egypt under Mohammed Ali*, vol. ii., pp. 493—496.

the tower of Kapoo-Boorjou; to the second battalion, the breach opposite Nebi-Saleh was assigned, and to the third, that of Zavié; each assaulting party to be supported by a party in reserve. About an hour after midnight, scaling ladders were commanded to be brought to the trench near the tower of Kerim Boorjou. Each officer, moreover, received particular instructions. During the night the batteries kept up a continual fire upon the city, and immediately after sunrise the order for the assault was given. The breaches of Zavié and Nebi-Saleh were at once carried; but the detachment which had been directed against the tower of Kapoo-Boorjou, meeting with some resistance, exhibited signs of trepidation, and was about to give ground. Observing this, Ibrahim, sabre in hand, advanced towards them, and succeeded, by vehement menaces, in arresting their retrograde movement. At the same time the reserve advanced to their support, and while a part of the men kept the enemy in check by a well-directed fire, the others threw up an intrenchment.

“In the city, the Turkish soldiers, whose numbers had been reduced to about 2000, with the chivalrous Abdallah Pacha at their head, exhibited eminent proofs of bravery. In one hour and a half they made three different sallies, and though constantly repulsed, left upon the minds of the besiegers a high idea of their indomptable intrepidity. The cannonading continued all day on both sides. At the breach of Zavié, the Arabs having penetrated

to the gate near the tower of the Khazné, Abdallah Pacha, followed by his staff, attacked them in person, and driving them beyond the ditch where they were exposed to the fire of the besieged, they retired under the cover of their own battery. Ibrahim, supported by a great number of inferior officers, endeavoured to bring them once more to the charge; but they again gave way, and retired before the Turks. He now ordered one of his chaooshes to snatch the colours from the standard-bearer, and advance towards the enemy. The soldier refused to deliver them. A second was sent, and met with the same refusal; but the standard-bearer himself now marching forward to the breach, was followed by the Arabs, who returned to the charge with so much fury, that they succeeded in reaching the parapet, from behind which they dislodged the enemy with stones. Such was the nature of the contest for hours, a series of successes and disasters, more fatal, however, to the Turks than to the Arabs, since, their numbers being small, every man was missed. At length the firing ceased on both sides; and this suspension of slaughter continued until half past five in the afternoon.

“In this interval, the principal engineer was directed to reconnoitre a part of the wall, where Ibrahim supposed the scaling ladders might be successfully applied; and his report confirming the suspicion of the General, orders were issued to commence the escalade. As the operation was conducted

in the teeth of the enemy, who maintained a constant and murderous fire, the number of men who fell in effecting it was considerable ; but their efforts were at length crowned with success, and a party of horse also throwing themselves into the town, the besieged perceived that all further defence was impracticable, and demanded quarter. Immediately afterwards, a deputation consisting of certain officers of artillery, with the mufti and imam of Abdallah Pacha, arrived, imploring the clemency of the victor. They were graciously received by Ibrahim, who promised them his protection, and even allowed the officers to retain their arms. To Abdallah Pacha, life only was guaranteed. By this time the city was filled with soldiers, and those excesses and atrocities, too common on the storming of towns, took place ; but such property as could be discovered was next day restored to the owners. It has been asserted, upon the authority of an European consul, then in the city, that the soldiers of Ibrahim were allowed seven days' sack of the town ; but the author of this report is an ardent partisan of Abdallah Pacha ; and it may be further remarked that, since Mohammed Ali aimed at gaining a permanent footing in Syria, the thing itself is improbable.

“ Abdallah Pacha, two days after the taking of Acre, was sent prisoner into Egypt, where he was received with the honours due to a brave man, and had a palace, situated on the island of Rhouda, assigned him for his residence.”

The Turkish Government were not unwilling to see Abdallah Pacha deprived of Acre, as they thought he had assumed an air of too much independence, and they also hoped that Mehemet Ali, who they saw with a jealous eye was becoming too powerful, would exhaust his resources by undertaking a campaign in Syria. After the capture of Acre the Porte soon began to perceive that Abdallah Pacha's position was taken possession of by a more powerful, a more ambitious, and a more dangerous vassal; they therefore ordered him immediately to withdraw from Syria, and not expecting compliance, collected an army of 20,000 men on the banks of the Orontes, and advanced another from Anatolia, to oppose him.

Mehemet Ali, however, had no idea of satisfying himself with the capture of Acre. He had now passed the Rubicon, and he directed Ibrahim to advance a part of his army on Balbeck to watch the operations of Hussein Pacha, who commanded the Ottoman army, and to occupy Damascus with the remainder. Ali Pacha, who commanded the Turkish troops in that city, evacuated it without firing a shot, and retired on Homs, by the old road of Palmyra, and joined the Turkish army.

Ibrahim Pacha, having now possession of Damascus, advanced on Khan Kousseir, where he arrived on the 6th of July. The next morning he attacked and defeated a part of the Turkish army, and took 3000 prisoners and 13 field pieces. On the 8th the Egyptian army entered Homs, and took 1500 prisoners and 14 guns. The remains of the Ottoman army retired on Aleppo, and formed a junction with the force under Hussein Pacha; from thence they continued their retreat, in two columns, on Beylan, and soon after Ibrahim took possession of Aleppo, where he halted a short time to reorganize his army. On the 29th he again came in sight of the Ottoman army, again attacked, and again defeated them, taking 25 guns and 2000 prisoners. On the following day the Egyptians entered Alexandretta, where they found 14 guns and abundance of stores and provisions; and the Turks now retired on Mount Taurus.

The Sultan becoming alarmed for the stability of his throne, made great exertions, and speedily collected an army of 50,000 men, and a good train of artillery, and placed them under the command of Rechid Pacha, the Grand Vizier. The Egyptian army had now

assembled at Adana, and on the 14th of October they drove the Turks from the defiles of Mount Taurus, and on the 20th the Egyptian advanced guard occupied Erekli, where they remained till the 27th of November.

On the 13th of December, the whole army was put in motion, and arrived at Koniye on the 17th, the day after the Turks had evacuated it. From that time to the 20th of December, various movements took place on both sides, and on the 21st the battle of Koniye was fought, when the Ottoman army was totally defeated and dispersed by Ibrahim Pacha, and the Grand Vizier taken prisoner.

Nothing now hindered the conqueror from marching on Scutari, where he might have arrived early in January, and before the Russians had reached the Bosphorus. Had he followed this course, Constantinople would have been revolutionized, and the power of the Sultan overturned, and most probably Mehemet Ali would have been placed on the throne of Osman.

The Egyptian army did not leave Koniye till the 20th of January, 1833, and reached Kutayah on the 1st of February. The Russians had by that time arrived in the Bos-

phorus, called in by the Sultan, who, being neglected by his natural friends, was obliged to apply to his natural enemy to protect him from the rebellion of one of his own subjects.

The arrival of the Russian squadron and army in the Bosphorus decided Ibrahim to enter into negotiations, and the Treaty of Kutayah, by which the Ottoman empire was saved from immediate destruction, was signed, the Pachalic of Adana and the whole of Syria (by far the most valuable part of their conquests,) being entrusted to Mehemet Ali and his son.

This Treaty, so mortifying to the Sultan's pride, was followed by that of Unkiar Skelessi, and the consequent departure of the Russian squadron from the Bosphorus; they had, however, learnt the road to Constantinople, which neither the British nor French Governments ought to have permitted, and the time is not far distant when they will profit by their experience.

Shortly after the Treaty of Kutayah, Ibrahim retired within the defiles of the Taurus, and the whole province was formally put under the government of Mehemet Ali.

Had the Pacha of Egypt been a wise man, and ameliorated, in the slightest degree, the



condition of the people he had released from the barbarous rule of the Turks, so as to have made them feel the difference, he might have consolidated his power both in Syria and Egypt, and restored these two fine countries to prosperity. His tribute to the Porte was small, and he possessed the power to render the people both prosperous and happy. The conduct of his army, too, when passing through Syria had been most exemplary, and the inhabitants had to their astonishment observed the wonderful difference between an irregular and undisciplined Turkish force and the order and regularity of the Egyptian troops, and, generally speaking, were most favourable to the change of masters. But Mehemet Ali, though possessing ten times the intelligence and energy of a Turk, was still an Oriental, and only knew how to govern the people entrusted to his charge with Eastern despotism.

The powers of Europe now turned their attention to Egypt with increased interest, and England was the first to establish a permanent agent and Consul at the Court of Alexandria; her example was followed, shortly after, by the other great powers of Europe. Mehemet Ali had been permitted to send his officers to

England, and they were instructed in our dock-yards in the art of ship-building, and were even received on board our ships to be instructed in seamanship and discipline. What greater proof could we have given of the interest we took in Mehemet Ali, than such a distinguished mark of favour? and what other conclusion could he have drawn, than that we were favourable to his government? The French were not behind us; they even went farther. A French officer of distinction had disciplined the Pacha's army; he had now also a French Admiral at the head of the navy; and great credit is due to both for the state of order and discipline into which they have brought both arms of the service.

Had Mehemet Ali been now satisfied, he might have lived to see the inhabitants of the countries he ruled rich and prosperous, and invoking blessings on his head for having given them happiness, tranquillity, and security of property; but the old man, either mistrusting Turkey, or having a lurking ambition to be seated on the throne of Osman, instead of reducing his armies, and remitting part of the imposts on the people, began his government in Syria by increasing the taxation, and afterwards

introduced the conscription, of all measures the most unpopular in Eastern countries.

Ibrahim was not insensible to the imprudence of those measures, and remonstrated with his father, and shortly after entirely withdrew from the management of the civil affairs of the country; when Scheriff Pacha was appointed civil governor of Syria, and established the seat of government at Damascus.

Mehemet Ali's first new financial measure was the ferdeh, a tax on all males from twelve years upwards, varying from fifteen to five hundred piastres, according to their means. This was paid by all classes and religions, and the Christians, who before paid a poll-tax, were also obliged to pay the ferdeh, in addition to the regular taxes. Forced contributions were also occasionally raised to supply the exigencies of the government. According to Mr. Farren, the Syrian contributions was raised from 20,000 to 32,000 purses.

The Governor and local officers, it is true, were not allowed to receive bribes; but the people gained little by this. Besides the regular taxes, and the occasional forced contributions, the government was in the habit of purchasing what was required for the mainte

nance of the army at their own price, the inhabitants being obliged to deliver it into the government stores at their own risk and cost. They were also liable to be pressed to work at the public establishments, and even transported to distant parts of the country, receiving pay hardly sufficient to keep body and soul together.

In addition to these oppressions, whenever the army was put in motion the inhabitants were obliged to furnish animals to transport baggage and provisions, and were paid two-thirds less than the common wages of the country. If horses or mules were wanted for the government, they were seized without any respect to persons, and paid for at whatever price the authorities thought proper to give. Vessels for the transport of provisions and government stores were seized in like manner, and the owners paid about a third of the freight they could have gained in trade.

Tampering with the currency was a source of dishonest gain to the Pacha: taxes were ordered to be paid in certain coins, Mehemet Ali fixing the value always below its standard; in short, there was a system of legal pillage established from one end of the country to the other.

These oppressions were nevertheless borne with, for they are common in Eastern governments; and, had not their new ruler commenced the disarmament of the people, and the forced levies, they probably would never have endeavoured to shake off his yoke. But his measures, odious in themselves, were rendered quite intolerable by the mode in which they were executed. According to Mr. Farren, the conscription in Syria amounted to 11 per cent. on the male population; the classes who were exempt from the conscription were obliged to find substitutes either by fine or purchase, and many who had been seized and drafted into regiments more than once, and obtained their discharge by purchase, were again seized, and their remonstrances wholly disregarded.

“The periods,” says Mr. Farren, in his excellent letter to Lord Lindsay\*, “of the forced levies are kept secret, and generally commence on a Friday, when the mosques are resorted to. At the hour of prayer numerous parties of soldiers are distributed through the quarters of the cities, and intelligence is conveyed to them by the firing of a gun of the moment to commence. They then rush

\* *Letters from the Holy Land*, vol. ii.

on all the citizens who may be in the streets, and drive or drag them struggling along to the great square of the Serai, when, having left them in its inclosure, they return to make fresh captives of all upon their routes. A short time suffices to spread a thrill of fear and despair throughout the city. Women may be seen rushing wildly through the streets, followed by their children, to seek the husband, son, or father, who but a few hours before had left them to provide for their daily wants, and now are separated, perhaps for ever, from their families without a parting benediction.

“Within the inclosure, which files of armed troops surround, the wretched victims are crowded together, bowed down with despair, while, pressing upon every avenue, their wives and daughters and aged mothers may be seen, wildly darting their frenzied glances through the captives in search of a missing relative, or bursting into paroxysms of despair on beholding the lost objects of their fears; and, all around, the air is rent by the cries of these unfortunates, cursing, as I have heard them, the very name of their prophet, and invoking the Deity himself to avenge the cause of the poor and the oppressed. The wretched conscripts are taken immediately before the medical men of the army, and, unless physically disqualified, are sent off to the Castle, confined there, dressed as soldiers, and in a week or fortnight, marched out of the place and drafted into the regiments. This is no exaggerated picture, and many travellers in

England—and one especially, Sir Edwin Pearson, who was lately with me at Damascus during one of these scenes,—can verify this statement, and attest the general wretchedness of the people. In the dead of the night the quarters of the city have been entered by armed soldiers, the houses forcibly opened, and their male inmates dragged from them. At these times the shops are closed for days, and all business is suspended. Considerable loss is consequently sustained by all classes, and as the debts that may be due by those who are seized are seldom or never recovered, large sums are lost in that manner to the citizens.

“The soldiers avail themselves of the general panic to get money from the aged or maimed,—and even by entering houses and seizing children in them, who are liberated by their frightened mothers at any immediate sacrifice.”

It is not surprising that people, thus driven to despair, should revolt. In the year 1834 the insurrections began in the Haouran, and spread afterwards to the country of the Druses and Naplousians. These insurrections, however, Mehemet Ali managed with his usual energy to put down, and established more security to the people from being plundered by anybody but himself; that, and a greater facility and safety in travelling through the country,

appear to have been the only merits of Mehemet Ali's government in Syria. Thus things proceeded for a while, the Pacha exerting himself to fortify the passes of Taurus, and building barracks at Antioch and other places, particularly at St. Jean d'Acre, while Ibrahim and his officers laboured to introduce new cultures, as of the sugar-cane, the indigo plant, &c., and with some success; but this could not reconcile the Syrians to the grinding monopolies and vexatious burdens of their ruler, and very strong measures were required to keep up the Egyptian authority.

In the year 1838 Mehemet Ali first began to talk of independence, and announced to the Consuls his intention, at no distant period, of declaring himself. Shortly after this he set out on an expedition to the mines of Sennaar, and was absent some considerable time.

The Sultan, as might have been expected, had never ceased to form plans for the recovery of Syria to his rule, and as early as the year 1834 he had committed the charge of several of the pachalics of the eastern part of Asia Minor to a Circassian soldier, named Hafiz Pacha, in order that he might there raise an army for that purpose. Hafiz laboured with



great zeal in the cause, and from the remoteness of the districts, his progress was unnoticed by the European Powers. At length, in the beginning of 1839 the Porte more openly made preparations for war; and on the 12th of February of that year, Count Molé for the first time brought the affairs of the East under the consideration of Lord Granville, the British Ambassador\*; and Lord Palmerston repeatedly wrote to Lord Ponsonby to discourage, by every possible means, the Porte from again embroiling themselves in war with Mehemet Ali; declaring, at the same time, that if the Porte was attacked, assistance would be given; but, if on the other hand they became the aggressors, it might change the whole face of affairs.

Notwithstanding the advice given to the Porte by the Allied Ministers at Constantinople, the Sultan, relying on the reports of the efficiency of his army in Asia Minor, communicated to him by his General, gave directions for the advance of the Turkish army, and they actually marched beyond Bir, which is only sixty miles distant from Aleppo. Mehemet Ali determined, however, not to be the

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part I., p. 1.

aggressor, and directed Ibrahim to refrain from making any movement in advance.

Russia and Austria becoming alarmed lest the peace of Europe should be disturbed, instructed their Consuls at Alexandria to request that Mehemet Ali would desire Ibrahim to withdraw his troops towards Damascus, assuming that Ibrahim was the first to put his army in motion, which certainly was not the case. France seeing the possibility also of a rupture between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, expressed a strong desire that Great Britain would act in concert with her, and proposed to send a fleet of eight or nine sail of the line to the Levant, to co-operate with the British fleet, which she supposed would consist of ten sail of the line.

Whether Mehemet Ali was sincere in his desire to avoid hostilities with the Porte or not, is not very easy to divine; but his actions certainly seem in his favour. He not only remitted the tribute to the Porte, but he declared to M. Cochelet, the Consul-General of France, that if the troops of the Sultan were withdrawn on the other side of the Euphrates, he would order his army to retrograde, and direct Ibrahim to return to Damascus; nay

more, if the Turks would retire still further, he would recal Ibrahim into Egypt; and if the Four Powers would guarantee peace, and procure him the hereditary succession, he would withdraw a great part of his army from Syria\*.

Notwithstanding all this, Lord Ponsonby, so early as the 20th of May, 1839, declared the Pacha the aggressor, and sided with Russia. He finishes a long despatch to Lord Palmerston with these remarkable words, "Russia has declared a truth—a limited truth—the Great Powers cannot deny it; their repeated declarations engage them to oppose the aggressor†."

In the beginning of May, Ibrahim seeing all prospect of peace at an end, left his agricultural pursuits at Khan Jouman, distant five hours from Aleppo, and immediately gave orders for the assembling of his army at the latter place. The army of Ibrahim was said to consist of 55,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 196 guns, besides 6000 irregular cavalry. That of the Sultan was supposed to amount to 80,000 men of all arms, and 170 guns.

On the 7th of June Mehemet Ali received intelligence from Ibrahim that the Turks had

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part I., p. 54.

† *Ibid.*, p. 29.

driven back a detachment of Egyptian cavalry. He immediately invited the Consuls to a conference, and asked their advice as to his future conduct. They unanimously advised him to act on the defensive; and above all, not to send his fleet to sea, which he had determined on doing. This advice he decided for the present to follow, but a circumstance soon occurred to alter his determination.

On the 9th of June the Turkish fleet sailed for the Dardanelles, under the command of the Capudan Pacha; Captain Walker of the British Navy embarked with him as his adviser; and the Capudan Pacha intended to remain six or eight days in the Dardanelles. On the same day, Mehemet Ali, having received letters from Ibrahim, giving an account that the advanced guard of the Turkish army had attacked some of his troops on the territory under his government, lost all patience, and, in spite of the remonstrance of the Consuls at Alexandria, sent orders to Ibrahim to drive the Turks out of his territory, and then march on the main body; and, if victorious, occupy Malatiyeh, Kharput, Urfah, and Diyarbekr.

On the 16th of June Captain Caillier, an aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult's, arrived at

Alexandria, with orders to call upon Mehemet Ali to suspend hostilities, whereupon the Pacha gave him a letter to Ibrahim, desiring him not to pass the frontier; and, if in the Turkish territory, to halt, unless Hafiz Pacha continued to advance; he was then to engage him. On the 16th of June the first division of the Egyptian squadron sailed, and the remainder on the following day. Captain Caillier left Alexandria on the 19th for Alexandretta.

On the 25th and 26th of June, orders were sent by the English and French Governments to their naval Commanders-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, to proceed to the coast of Syria, and prevent a collision between the Turkish and Egyptian fleets, and urge them to return to their respective ports, in the event of their having sailed. They were also directed to open a communication with the Turkish and Egyptian Generals, and exert their influence to bring about a suspension of arms, and a wider separation between the hostile armies. Should the Turkish General refuse to agree to these propositions, it was to be pointed out to him that all communication by sea would be closed, and his supplies cut off. If the refusal, on the other hand, should proceed from

Ibrahim Pacha, similar representations were to be made to him, and communication cut off between Alexandria and Syria. In some respects the English instructions differed from the French. The English Admiral had no orders to cut off the Turkish supplies by sea, in the event of their refusing the armistice; nor had he any orders to receive a Russian squadron should they tender their services; but the English Admiral was at liberty to force the Dardanelles should a Russian fleet arrive at Constantinople, which the French Admiral was not authorized to do without fresh instructions.

On the 2nd of July a further instruction was sent to Sir Robert Stopford in accordance with the instructions of the French Admiral, to receive a Russian force should it offer its co-operation\*.

Lord Ponsonby having written to Sir Robert Stopford, that war was inevitable between the Turks and Egyptians, the Admiral, on the 7th of June, being then in Palermo Bay, despatched Sir Thomas Fellowes in the Vanguard, together with a brig, to the Levant, to watch the Turkish squadron, but with positive orders to observe the strictest

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part I., pp. 90, 93, 101, 122.

neutrality. At this time the Commander-in-Chief had received no instructions how to act.

Sir Thomas Fellowes arrived in Besika Bay on the 29th of June, and the following day received a visit from Captain Walker, accompanied by M. Etienne Pisani, and Mr. Lander, the British Consul at the Dardanelles, with an offer, on the part of the Capudan Pacha, of provision, and also to ascertain whether Sir Robert Stopford was expected, and whether he would interfere with the Turkish fleet. This, of course, Sir Thomas Fellowes declined answering. M. Pisani then went on board the ship of the Capudan Pacha, who distinctly informed him that he had orders to attack the Egyptian fleet, and should sail in a few days. He was under some apprehensions that the French would interrupt him, but he assured M. Pisani, that, unless the English interfered also, he should proceed in the execution of the Sultan's orders.

On the 30th of June Sultan Mahmoud, who had been in bad health for some time, died, and his son, Abdul Medjid, a youth of sixteen, was declared of age by the Divan, and proclaimed Emperor. Orders were imme-

diately forwarded to Hafiz Pacha to suspend hostilities, and the Capudan Pacha was directed not to quit the Dardanelles.

A few days after the Sultan's death, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs communicated to the Ambassadors that the young Sultan was disposed to confer the hereditary Government of Egypt on Mehemet Ali, on condition that he would restore Syria, Candia, and the Holy Cities, to the Porte\*. These pacific intentions, however, were too late, for on the 24th of June Ibrahim Pacha had attacked and totally defeated the Turkish army at Nezib, who lost all their guns, ammunition, and baggage, and the remainder repassed the frontier in complete disorder. In addition to this misfortune, the Capudan Pacha had sailed from the Dardanelles, and on falling in with Admiral Lalande, sent his second in command on board to say, that when he heard of the Sultan's death he was of opinion that he had been poisoned by Hosrew and Halil Pacha, who were devoted to Russia; and under this impression he had written to Hafiz Pacha to march on Constantinople; that he should apply to Mehemet Ali for assistance, and in

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part I., p. 183.



the mean while take the Turkish fleet to Candia. This M. Lalande advised him not to do, and he then intimated his intention of going to Rhodes.

The French and English Ambassadors, in consequence of these untoward and unexpected events, wrote to the Grand Vizier to assure him of their support, and Lord Ponsonby also wrote to Sir Robert Stopford to recommend him not to be at any distance from the centre of affairs.

The Admiral left Malta on the 2nd of July, in consequence of a private letter from Lord Minto, desiring him to proceed off the south end of Cyprus, and there wait for orders. His arrival there he communicated to Lord Ponsonby under date of the 11th of July. It does not appear that at this time Sir Robert Stopford had received Lord Palmerston's instructions of the 25th of June, which pointed out to him the course he ought to follow in the event of the defeat of the Turkish army, and on the Egyptian and Turkish squadron meeting each other at sea. Had these instructions arrived, the Admiral, no doubt, would have conceived it his duty to have taken still stronger steps to have prevented the defection

of the Turkish fleet; and it is to be regretted that in the absence of instructions he had not taken upon himself to have immediately proceeded off Alexandria, and forced the Capudan Pacha to return to his duty, particularly if he had received in time Lord Ponsonby's reply (dated July 19,) to his letter announcing his arrival off Cyprus, in which his Lordship states,

“I think the spirit and the end of your instructions indicate that it would be proper to consider the Ottoman fleet, thus removed from the authority of its legitimate Sovereign by the rebellious act of the Capudan Pacha, as being thereby subjected to the vigorous exertion of your power; and I think it would be right to take all safe and proper means to prevent that fleet being delivered up to the Pacha of Egypt, if there should be fortunately still time left for so doing; and I am of opinion it will be equally advantageous and just to restore it to the Sultan.

“I have stated my opinion in consequence of your desire, and I have only to add that there is perfect tranquillity here.”

Sir Thomas Fellowes's orders were so strict, that though he kept company with the Ottoman fleet for several days, he had no communication with the Capudan Pacha; but even if he

had, he could not have discovered his intentions, because Captain Walker himself, who was on board, had no notion that they were going off Alexandria for any other purpose than attacking the Egyptian squadron. This, however, was very far from the Turkish Admiral's intention.

On the 9th of July an Ottoman corvette arrived at Alexandria, having on board Sheriff Aga, the kiaya of the Capudan Pacha, who was the bearer of a letter to Mehemet Ali; Mehemet did not conceal its contents, which were to ask permission to bring the fleet to Alexandria as a friend, stating that the Capudan Pacha disapproved of the election of Hosrew to the post of Grand Vizier, and that he would co-operate with Mehemet Ali in placing him as vakeel to the young Sultan, as the only person fit to rule the empire. On the same evening Mehemet Ali sent the Nile steamer with his reply to the Capudan Pacha, and on the 10th the Rhadamanthus left Alexandria to communicate this intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief, as appears by Colonel Campbell's despatch to Lord Palmerston of the 11th of July\*.

On the same day that the Rhadamanthus

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part I., p. 219.

left, a Turkish steamer arrived with despatches from Hosrew Pacha to Mehemet Ali, who was very communicative to Colonel Campbell. The purport of this despatch was, to announce the accession of Abdul Medjid, and his pardon of Mehemet Ali: that it was his intention to send him the nichan iftikhar, a decoration indicative of high favour, and grant him the hereditary succession of Egypt and its dependencies; and that he had ordered the Turkish troops to retire from the frontiers of Syria.

On the reception of this, Mehemet Ali said he should consider the war at an end, and should order Ibrahim to retire on Marash. That he hoped the Allies would be satisfied; and as soon as everything was settled, he would proceed to Constantinople to do homage to his sovereign. That should Achmet Pacha wish to deliver up the fleet, he would not accept it, but send it back to Constantinople; and that as for the post of vakeel, he would rather remain in his present position. All this seemed very well; but we shall shortly see how he acted.

On the 14th of July the Turkish fleet arrived off Alexandria, and, as no doubt had been previously arranged, formed a junction

with the Egyptian fleet. The following morning, the Nile steamer, bearing the flag of the Capudan Pacha, arrived in the harbour, and the traitor was well received by Mehemet Ali\*.

\* The following is a portion of the account of the reception of the Turkish Admiral by the Pacha, furnished by the dragoman of the British Consul-General, and published at length in the *Levant Papers* :

“When the Nile steamer anchored, Mushir Achmet went into the boat, and immediately a salute of nineteen guns was fired by the Nile, which salute was repeated by the forts the moment he landed, when he was received by the Pacha’s civil officers of rank, and he rode upon the Pacha’s own horse; and thus preceded by the said officers, cawasses, and chiaushes, went to the Pacha’s palace between two files of the troops that were placed all the way. As soon as he entered the palace gate, Mehemet Ali walked out of his room to meet him, when the Admiral seeing him, unbuckled his sword, gave it to one of the officers behind him, and walked respectfully towards the Viceroy, and bowed to the ground as if meaning to kiss his dress, while the Viceroy embraced and kissed him, saying, ‘Welcome, brother.’ After this, they walked arm in arm into the Viceroy’s room, all the officers following them. They sat near each other on the middle of the sofa. The Capudan Pacha then told his Highness that, for a long time past, it was his wish to have the honour of seeing him. After coffee and pipes, the Viceroy dismissed all the bystanders, and this was at half-past nine o’clock; when Sheriff Aga, the Capudan Pacha’s Kiaya, who was still within, walked up to the Viceroy, and kissing his feet, told him, ‘Now you are both together, with your leave I retire,’ meaning that he had accomplished his object, and fulfilled his duty so far. His Highness and the

So secret was all this kept on board the Capudan Pacha's ship, that Captain Walker, who was with him, had no notion of what the Turkish Admiral was about, until he sent a steamer to direct two ships, who, being bad sailers, were left astern, to rendezvous off Alexandria. On speaking to the Capudan Pacha, he was assured that Mehemet Ali had put the Egyptian fleet under his orders, and that he was proceeding to Egypt to confer with Mehemet Ali on what were the best steps to be taken for the good of the Turkish empire. When the Turkish fleet anchored,

Capudan Pacha remained by themselves in the room till half-past ten o'clock, after which the Capudan Pacha walked out of the room bare-footed, his own servant not being there to give him his shoes, and was obliged to walk about twenty paces without shoes, until his servant brought them, as well as his sword, upon which he went to the Musappi Serai (the palace for guests), accompanied in the same way as he had arrived. When he entered the palace assigned to him, all the civil officers, as well as Houssein Pacha, kissed his foot, and he asked them to take seats, and gave them coffee, telling them, 'Thank God, my wishes to meet the Viceroy are accomplished, and you may know that I have obtained his Highness's permission for the landing of the Vice and the Rear Admirals.'

"With the Capudan Pacha ten officers landed, two of whom are Beys (Colonels), and one is the brother of Osman Pacha, the ex-Egyptian Admiral, who deserted to Constantinople more than five years ago."

Captain Walker landed, and left Alexandria for Constantinople on the 20th, much to the annoyance of the Capudan Pacha, who wished him to remain.

The Allied Consuls used all their endeavours in vain to advise Mehemet Ali to send back the fleet. He said he would have nothing to do with Hosrew, who was his bitter foe; and that he had written to him to send in his resignation; and should Hosrew do so, all would be right.

Mehemet Ali's enmity to Hosrew was much strengthened by the latter having sent, through the hands of the French Consul, letters to the General and inferior Admirals of the Turkish fleet, calling upon them to return to their allegiance. These letters M. Cochelet gave to Mehemet Ali, who delivered them to the Admirals, when, as might have been expected from the position they were in, they tore them up with indignation.

On the 16th about sixty of the principal officers of the Turkish fleet came on shore, and were presented to the Pacha, who received them in a gracious manner. By the 28th the whole of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets had entered the port of Alexandria, so that had

the Commander-in-Chief proceeded off there immediately after the *Rhadamanthus* had joined him, or even had he proceeded after his receipt of the despatch of the 25th of June which I believe arrived by the *Hydra*, there would have been ample time to have secured them. This would have completely anticipated Lord Palmerston's instructions of the 7th of August\*, which directed the Admiral to use his utmost efforts to prevent the Turkish fleet going into Alexandria, and to endeavour to oblige them to return under the authority of the Sultan.

The Commander-in-Chief, however, may have had other instructions, which do not appear in the *Levant Papers*, for the guidance of his conduct, or he might have thought that the force under his orders, without the co-operation of the French squadron, was not sufficient to have enforced his demand on the Capudan Pacha to return to his allegiance if supported in his treason by the Egyptian fleet. But, nevertheless, I think the experiment might have been tried, and probably would have succeeded to a certain extent, because the entrance into the harbour of

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part I., p. 255.



Alexandria is so difficult and so shallow that large ships must be considerably lightened before they can enter, and neither the Egyptian nor Turkish Admiral would have ventured to weaken their squadron by either entering in detail or lightening the ships in the presence of a British squadron hostile to their measures. The Commander-in-Chief, however, as I have before said, may have had other instructions, or he took a different view of the case, for instead of going off Alexandria he repaired to Besika Bay, where he was joined the same evening by the Powerful, Ganges, and Implacable. At this point, then, my history of the War in Syria commences.

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# THE WAR IN SYRIA.

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## CHAPTER I.

*State of Affairs in the Levant in August, 1839—The Author's Interview with Hosrew Pacha—Sir Robert Stopford at Constantinople; his Interview with the Sultan—Impolitic Junction of the English and French Fleets—Sir John Louis takes the command of the English Squadron—The Author tenders his Resignation.*

THE loss of the battle of Nizib, the death of the Sultan Mahmoud, and the defection of the Turkish fleet, threatened to place Turkey at the mercy of Mehemet Ali, or under the protection of Russia. At the earnest desire of France Ibrahim Pacha halted, and in the beginning of August, 1839, the combined squadrons of England and France assembled in Besika Bay, ready to proceed to Constantinople, should Ibrahim march, or should the Russians leave Sebastapol.

The allied ministers, however, do not appear to have considered how the squadrons were to pass the Dardanelles; the current runs constantly to the southward, and the prevailing winds are generally

from the opposite direction. It rarely happens that a favourable breeze sufficiently strong springs up to enable ships to pass the Hellespont; and we had not an adequate number of steam vessels to take the ships in tow. Russia had a strong fleet and army at Sebastapol, and could approach the Sultan's capital at pleasure, whereas we were powerless, and as for being able to protect the Porte from a sudden attack, either from Russia or Ibrahim Pacha, we might just as well have been in Malta Harbour.

As forty-eight hours would have been sufficient for a Russian fleet and army to arrive at Constantinople, it always appeared to me, after the unforeseen misfortunes which had befallen the Porte, the ambassadors and admirals ought to have taken the responsibility on themselves, and anchored the squadrons in the Golden Horn the first favourable opportunity; the ministers of the different Powers could then have treated the Eastern Question on an equal footing. Russia would, no doubt, have stormed, threatened, and, perhaps, withdrawn her ambassador, but she would not have gone to war, and, after a time, would have sent her squadron to Constantinople to join that of England and France; strong detachments should then have appeared off Alexandria,

and, most probably, Mehemet Ali, seeing a close union between the great Powers of Europe, would have given up the Turkish fleet, and restored Syria to the Porte.

This was not done, and France soon began to take a new view of the Eastern Question, and shortly after refused to send the combined fleets to Alexandria to demand the Turkish squadron, and, under all circumstances, I think she was right; a hostile fleet could not enter the harbour easily, or indeed at all, if proper precautions were taken. We had no troops to land, and the absence of the Russian squadron would have given Mehemet Ali reason to believe the four Powers were not united. Alexandria might have been bombarded, it is true, and the fleet burnt, but that would have been almost as untoward an event as the battle of Navarino, and certainly would not have tended to strengthen the Turkish empire; it might have provoked Mehemet Ali to order Ibrahim to advance, which would have brought the Russians to Constantinople, and once there, they most assuredly would not have permitted us to pass the Dardanelles.

About this time the Admiral and many of the officers were at Constantinople, when it was intimated

to him that he might shortly expect decided instructions; leave was immediately stopped, and the officers were ordered to rejoin their ships forthwith. These instructions were supposed to be, to proceed to Alexandria, but they never arrived, as France objected to the measure. Admiral Roussin was recalled, we became cool with France, and began to draw near to Russia. During my sojourn at Constantinople, I had an opportunity of examining the sea defences, the capital, and the Bosphorus, and I sent Colonel Napier, who was with me, to examine the land fortifications. The batteries were numerous, well placed, and mounted many heavy guns; but with a strong wind and current a fleet might pass down without much damage, and if that fleet was accompanied by an army the fortifications could be taken in reverse; the defences of the Dardanelles are strong to the sea, but weak to the land; a fleet might descend with the stream, but it would be no easy matter to go against it.

When at Constantinople I had an interview with the Grand Vizier, Hosrew Pacha. The old man appeared nearly eighty; he is of low stature, and a good deal deformed; his countenance fresh, with a most intelligent and penetrating eye, his dress

simple. On entering his apartment he immediately rose, kissed my cheek, complimented Colonel Napier on his soldier-like appearance, and begged us to be seated; seeing us in boots, he called for his, which he drew on in great haste, apparently to be on a footing with us. Pipes and coffee were produced, and, after a few puffs, he began the conversation through Mr. Redhouse, the interpreter, by expressing his satisfaction at seeing me in the Sultan's capital. I replied that I hoped to have an opportunity of performing some services for His Imperial Majesty, and that I thought the first step he ought to take, should be, inviting the combined fleets to Constantinople. The old man appeared to apprehend more danger from Mehemet Ali than from Russia, and did not relish this proposal; he roundly asserted that it would cause an insurrection, and the Christians would be massacred; that he was not afraid of Russia, and although the empire had been brought to a very low ebb by the incapacity of the men the late Sultan had placed at the head of the army, followed by the defection of the Turkish fleet, she was still strong; that he had no fears of Russia, and should her troops advance on Constantinople he would put himself at the head of the Ottoman army and defeat

them. I asked him where his army was, as it had been destroyed at Nizib and replaced by boys; remarking that Russia would never think of marching, but would come by sea, pass the Bosphorus in spite of all the batteries, and take possession of Constantinople with the greatest ease.

To this he replied that, in the neighbourhood of the capital there was an army of 30,000 men, which was quite sufficient for its defence, and it would be much better if one half of the fleet was to remain at the mouth of the Dardanelles and the other half proceed to Alexandria. To this I answered, that nothing could be done at Alexandria without troops, that the entrance of the harbour was too shallow for ships to enter with their guns, and that Mehemet Ali had declared that if the fleet appeared there, he should instantly direct Ibrahim to march on Scutari; this would inevitably bring down the Russians, who would object to the French and English approaching Constantinople, even if they could get a fair wind, and the probability would be that it would embroil Europe in war, and Turkey would be sacrificed.

The Vizier inquired why an English army could not be spared to attack Alexandria. To this I replied, we had already too much on our hands;

what with the troubles in Canada, the war in India, the prospect of an outbreak in China, and the Chartists at home, it was impossible to spare troops, and that I was sure Parliament would not grant supplies for such an expedition. This ended our conversation. Hosrew was strongly suspected of being in the interest, if not the pay of Russia; how far that is true, is hard to say.

The Admiral obtained firmans to see the mosques and other curiosities at Constantinople, which have been so often described that I shall not torment the reader with a repetition of an often told tale.

After passing ten days pleasantly enough between Constantinople and Therapia, and being entertained by the ambassadors, we embarked on board the Carysfort, which bore the Admiral's flag, and, in tow of a steamer, left Therapia, and shortly after anchored abreast of the Sultan's Asiatic palace. A royal salute was then fired, and returned by the batteries in the vicinity of the Imperial residence. Nothing can be more beautiful than the passage down the Bosphorus, and nothing more magnificent than the Sultan's palaces and the country-houses situated on its banks.

Mahmoud was fond of building, and just before



his death had finished a new palace on the European shore. With Colonel Napier's permission, I give the account of an interview with the Sultan in nearly his own words.

“The household troops, such as they were, received the Admiral and his suite on landing, and we proceeded into a handsome apartment on the ground floor, where we were received by the Sultan's brother-in-law, the Seraskier, Halil Pacha. Pipes were in this instance dispensed with, and after partaking of coffee and sweetmeats, handed round in gold filagree cups and saucers, richly studded with diamonds, a very common-place conversation took place, through the medium of the interpreter, between Sir Robert and the commander-in-chief of the Turkish forces.

“In about a quarter of an hour his ‘Highness’ sent word that he was ready to receive us, whereupon the whole suite, consisting of about a dozen British officers, proceeded, ‘booted’ as we were, up a magnificent staircase, and through numerous apartments, the floors of which shone forth in all the splendour of the rarest and most highly-polished woods; and whilst the Turkish courtiers glided noiselessly along, in their purple slippers of thin

morocco leather, a most martial tramp proclaimed our entrance into the presence chamber, where, on a sofa, sat the effeminate-looking Sultan, girded with the Sword of Osman.

“ Abdul Medjid, the youthful Sultan, far from being

A man of solemn port,  
Shawled to the nose and bearded to the eyes,

was a pale and sickly-looking youth, of apparently three or four and twenty, though in reality his age exceeded not seventeen; but it is said that his frequent visits to the harem had given him this appearance of premature age.

“ He was plainly dressed, not in the Oriental style, but in a plain cloth military surtout and pantaloons, a short blue cloak, gracefully placed on his left shoulder, and a fez on his head. The only sign of regal magnificence displayed by him was a few brilliants on the clasp of his belt, with which the hilt of the sabre was likewise thickly studded.

“ We formed half a circle round his Imperial Majesty, who did not deign to rise, and were presented by the Seraskier. Sir Robert Stopford then said, that the gratification he had received at seeing Constantinople, together with the attention he had met with, was very great. The Sultan, through

Halil Pacha, who seemed to prompt him in all he uttered, replied, he was very glad his Excellency had felt so gratified.

“The Admiral then said, that he had been entrusted by Her Britannic Majesty with the command of a fleet, to render any service which might be required by the Sublime Porte. To this the Sultan bowed. Here ended the conference; we retired with the Seraskier, partook of the parting bowl of sherbet, and in four-and-twenty hours were once more in the midst of the fleet in Besika Bay.”

The fleets remained there till the end of October; the English then proceeded to Vourla for the winter, and were shortly followed by the French squadron, part of which went to Smyrna. The English now consisted of twelve sail of the line; the French of nine. The French ships were much larger and better manned than ours, and Admiral Lalande was indefatigable in exercising them, and I must admit that in harbour manœuvres they were equally as expert as ourselves, and in some respects superior; and I cannot refrain from observing that keeping the two fleets so much together was a most impolitic measure. When the French squadron first joined Sir Pulteney Malcolm in the Downs they

were all abroad; the five or six years they had been almost constantly in company with the British had brought about a most astonishing change for the better, and although it may be very advantageous to have an alliance with France, there ought to be no acting together with fleets if it can possibly be avoided.

On the 22nd of January, 1840, Commodore Hyde Parker sailed for England, (his broad blue pennant had been up a few months,) and the Commander-in-chief shortly after obtained leave to proceed to Malta, with six sail of the line, and Sir John Louis, the Superintendent of Malta Dockyard, was ordered to Vourla, to take command of the remainder of the squadron; this was an unusual measure, and by no means complimentary to myself, who was the next senior officer. I in consequence proffered my resignation to the Admiral, which he declined to accept, and after some explanation with him my letter was withdrawn, and I pocketed the affront.

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## CHAPTER II.

The English Fleet winters at Smyrna—Summer Cruise—Insurrection in Lebanon—Opinion on the proper course of the English Fleet—The Powerful and Edinburgh sent to Beyrout—Murder of a Frank; conduct of the French Consul—Insignificance of the Insurrection—Mission of Mr. Wood—Grievances of the Mountaineers—Author's Letter to the Egyptian Admiral—Letter from Souliman Pacha—Suppression of the Insurrection—Ignorance of the Allied Consuls—Visit to Tripoli—Excursion into the Mountains—Appearance of the Country—Ships ordered to Vourla Bay—Author's Report to the Admiral.

THE squadron now consisted of six sail of the line\*, which, by degrees, were moved up to Smyrna, a much more agreeable anchorage than Vourla.

I had been confined to my cabin for six weeks with a severe cough, and I took up my quarters at Boujar, a small village a few miles from Smyrna, which very soon re-established my health; there was very good English society at both places, and the time passed agreeably enough.

While the squadron lay at Vourla the sulphur dispute with Naples commenced; their ports were

\* Benbow, Powerful, Edinburgh, Implacable, Hastings, Belleisle, and Castor.

blockaded, and the Admiral proceeded to the Bay with three or four sail of the line; this decided measure brought the King to his senses, and the question was settled through the mediation of France. On the 4th of June the squadron left Smyrna for a summer cruise; the French preceded us by a few days. We visited the beautiful island of Mitylene, which possesses one of the finest harbours in the world, completely land-locked, and capable of containing any number of ships; from thence we proceeded to Scio, which had not recovered from the ravages of the Turks during the Greek insurrection. The town was still in ruins, and there appeared little probability of it ever recovering its former splendour. From Scio we returned to Mitylene, from thence to Mosconisi, and, after visiting the ruins of Assos, passed between Mitylene and the Main, and anchored in Besika Bay on the 24th. Here the Gorgon joined, with the intelligence of an insurrection having broke out in Lebanon; of Mehemet Ali having offered to give up the Turkish fleet, and of his preparing an expedition to put the insurrection down. This expedition was chiefly composed of Turkish frigates, manned with mixed crews, and carrying an army of

from 12,000 to 15,000 men, of which 4000 were Turks; thus employing the Sultan's ships and troops to put down the Sultan's subjects, who were anxious to shake off the yoke of Mehemet Ali. Hosrew Pacha was disgraced about this time, and a daughter was born to the Sultan; like an expert politician, Mehemet Ali sent Sami Bey to Constantinople, to compliment his master on the birth of a daughter, and to express his readiness, now the Grand Vizier was disgraced, to enter into negotiations, and give up the fleet. This was evidently a blind; and it so far succeeded that a part of the squadron had actually sailed before his intentions were known; so secretly and so actively had he carried on the embarkation of the troops at the arsenal.

Colonel Hodges, the British Consul-General at Alexandria, had given every facility to the Turkish soldiers and sailors to desert, and when his conduct was brought before Parliament, Lord Palmerston declared that though he had no instructions to that effect, he perfectly approved of his assisting, by every means in his power, the Sultan's subjects to return to their allegiance. On that declaration of Lord Palmerston I founded my opinion that

the squadron ought immediately to proceed to the coast of Syria, seize the Sultan's ships and troops, and carry them to Rhodes, till further orders, or allow them to act on the coast of Syria in assisting the insurrection, as circumstances might point out. Sir John Louis had no orders on the subject, and did not think proper to take the responsibility on himself. He, however, sent the *Castor* and *Cyclops* to Beyrout, for the protection of British subjects and property, and the *Gorgon* to Malta for instructions; the squadron returned next day to Vourla, and the *Powerful* to Smyrna.

In a few days orders arrived from Sir Robert Stopford for the *Powerful* and *Edinburgh* to proceed to Beyrout, but on no account to interfere in any way with the Egyptian squadron; the Commander-in-chief having taken the same view of the question as Sir John Louis. The French admiral was, however, not so certain of our intentions, and he despatched a steamer, with directions, it is generally supposed, to advise the immediate return of the Turkish ships to Alexandria. On the 1st of July we sailed from Vourla, and arrived at Beyrout on the 7th. The Turco-Egyptian squadron, with the exception of two frigates and several corvettes, had sailed two days before, on their return to Alexan-



dria, after landing their troops. The *Castor*, which was cruising off the port, had seen them the day before my arrival.

It would have been easy to have come up with this fleet before they reached their destination, but as my orders were positive not to interfere, I anchored at Beyrout. Had we sailed from Besika Bay the day the *Castor* did, we should have found them at anchor, and it would not have been difficult to have caused a movement amongst the Turks, which would have furnished me with an excuse for carrying out my own views, and I may add, the policy of the Government; but at sea it could not have been done without a direct interference, from which I was interdicted; and here I may remark, an officer's taking responsibility on himself, and acting without orders, is very different to acting in direct disobedience of orders, even when satisfied they are erroneous, and it must be a strong case to justify such a breach of discipline.

On my arrival at Beyrout, I was visited by Mr. Moore, the British Consul, who gave a most alarming account of the state of the country, and of the want of discipline and insubordination of the Albanian troops, who formed part of the Egyptian army under the immediate command of Souliman Pacha.

The servant of a French nobleman had been murdered, and the Consul of that nation had rather hastily struck his flag because the murderer was not immediately executed. He had been tried and condemned, but nothing would satisfy the Consuls short of his immediate execution, however contrary to the military law of Egypt, which required the sanction of the Viceroy. A deputation was sent to Alexandria to demand his execution, which took place on board the flag-ship there; and on the return of the deputation the French Consul rehoisted his flag, under a salute. The French Government disapproved of his conduct, and he was recalled.

On making inquiry, I found there had been one or two persons murdered by the Albanian troops, an occurrence not very extraordinary in Eastern countries, and not to be wondered at when we consider an army of nearly 15,000 men was collected in the neighbourhood of the town. I ascertained that the French Consul on striking his flag had put his countrymen under the protection of the Sardinian Consul, except this nobleman, whom Mr. Moore took charge of, and as it did not appear to me the British Consul had any authority to make a selection and give protection to this gentleman, I declined interfering; and a little more experience showed me that

the outrages of the Albanians were as much exaggerated as the strength and respectability of the insurrection undoubtedly was. Mr. Wood, one of Lord Ponsonby's dragomen, had been sent by the ambassador into the mountains of Lebanon, to ascertain the real strength of the mountaineers, and at his instigation a petition was signed and sent to the British Ambassador by five chiefs, one of whom, a sheik of inferior note, was styled the Seraskier\*. In fact the insurrection was never of any consequence. The mountaineers were justly dissatisfied at being obliged to work in the coal mine of Corneille, and on being required to deliver up the arms which had been supplied them to assist in putting down another sect. An attempt was also made to introduce the conscription, which is quite at variance with their ideas, and is viewed throughout the whole district of Lebanon with horror and detestation; moreover, they were oppressed with heavy taxes, the greater part of which went into the coffers of their own prince, the Emir Bechir; the odium, however, was thrown on Mehemet Ali, who only received 30,000 dollars annually from the mountains. They were unprovided with either arms or ammunition, were headed by no chief of note, and never could

\* See their Petition, in Appendix.

assemble, even for a few days, a force of a thousand men; nevertheless with that number they showed a considerable degree of boldness, and occasionally advanced to the walls of Beyrout, and fired a few shot into the town. Mehemet Ali, seeing the danger of a rising in Syria, should the mountaineers succeed, with his usual promptitude and decision, at once sent a powerful army to Beyrout; on their arrival, pacific proposals were sent to the mountaineers, who submitted. The following morning the greater part of the Egyptian camp was struck, and they marched to the neighbourhood of Deir el Kammar, the capital of the mountains; a little resistance was shown by small parties on the first advance, and the Albanians were sent to disperse them; in accomplishing this, several villages were destroyed, and they penetrated to the heights of Brumanah, and burnt the village and convent of Betmarie. Observing this from the Powerful, I sent the following letter to the Egyptian Admiral, to which Souliman Pacha replied.

“ H. M. S. Powerful, Beyrout,  
July 14, 1840.

“ Sir,

“ I observe with pain and regret that a general conflagration began in the mountains a few hours

after the march of the troops from this place. Without at all entering into the question of whether the inhabitants of Lebanon are right or wrong in rising in favour of the Sultan, I do not conceive that the generals of the Pacha of Egypt can be justified in carrying on the war against them in the barbarous manner I now see in operation.

“ I write to you, Sir, as an Egyptian admiral, and the officer holding the highest office now in Beyrout, to request you will immediately communicate to his Highness Abbas Pacha the horror I feel at witnessing such acts of useless barbarity, which must lead to the destruction of thousands of women and children, who can take no part in the insurrection.

“ His Highness Abbas Pacha may rest assured that the five great Powers of Europe, who are now treating the Eastern question, will not view with satisfaction the manner he has adopted of putting down the insurrection.

“ I have the honour to remain,

“ Your obedient servant,

“ CHARLES NAPIER.”

“ To the Rear-Admiral  
Commanding the Egyptian squadron at Beyrout.”

*Souliman's Reply, translated from the Arabic.*

“THE letter which has been sent to us in English, with its Arabic translation, from the senior officer, Captain Napier, commanding the English vessels in the port of Beyrout, has reached us, and from its Arabic translation we have understood its meaning.

“On our arrival at the place called Ain-el-Hajmige, we there found one or two hundred insurgents, not originally from this place, but from Balbeck, and from the parts inhabited by mountaineers, who had come since the insurrection of this mountain, which has since submitted; they, therefore, knowing themselves guilty, and feeling the hand of punishment, in order to stir up the inhabitants, set fire to the different villages, saying, ‘Why have you submitted, and have given up your arms? we therefore choose to serve you in this manner,’ and to which the Christians of the mountains can attest and affirm. The above-mentioned insurgents, being at a place called Mulay, opposite the camp, some Albanians were sent against them, and drove them away after a fight; when pursuing them, the aforesaid insurgents, according to their promise, burnt the

villages which they passed through in their flight and so gained the heights of the mountains; two of these individuals were caught, and brought in armed, but no injury was done them, and they were allowed to go after being furnished with a pass. The villages of Haded, Babda, Soafet, and other large villages like them, besides others near them, which are under us, have asked for security, which has been granted, and they have submitted peaceably and given up their arms; nothing has been done to them, only at the expulsion of the above-mentioned insurgents, they took from them their animals, arms, &c. The cavalry of Kabal, being like us troops, know very well the laws of war, and therefore those who are led astray, must expect to be killed, destroyed, &c., which they deserve, as they are not children. Still quarter is given them, as they may have been misled by the insurgents, and those who are found wounded after a battle are not destroyed.

“But if his Excellency the above-mentioned senior officer intends making any observations with regard to the movements or actions of the camp, then it does not appertain to us to answer; we cannot naturally but follow the instructions of his Highness our Master, the Vicercy. In consequence, all such

answers can be given only by our Master the Viceroy to the Consuls-General at Alexandria; they alone are competent to do it, and which we beg to notify to your Excellency.

“(Signed) SOULIMAN PASHA.”

Whether this was well translated or not, and whether what is stated here is correct, I am not able to say, but I must do them the justice of observing, that after that remonstrance I had nothing to complain of. The Egyptian troops marched to the neighbourhood of the Emir Bechir's palace, Osman Pacha advanced from Balbeck, and the Emir sent his own troops to disarm the mountaineers. There were no executions, and only seven Emirs, at the instigation of the Grand Prince, were sent into Egypt, and from there were banished to Sennaar.

So badly informed were the allied Consuls, who felt a great interest in the mountaineers, and believed everything they wished, that for upwards of a week after the insurrection was put down, they fancied it in full force, and it was from a French merchant, who showed me a letter from Souliman Pacha's secretary, I first learnt the actual state of the Mountain in the neighbourhood of Beyrout.



I sent the *Edinburgh* to Tripoli to learn what was passing there, and I followed on the 18th. On my arrival I found the mountaineers in that district, with few exceptions, had laid down their arms, and all was quiet; both ships watered, and returned to Beyrout. The exaggerated statements of Mr. Wood and Mr. Moore to the ambassador at Constantinople, who was ready to believe anything to the disadvantage of Mehemet Ali, had, however, their effect, and no doubt very much accelerated the signing the Treaty of the 15th of July.

At the very time I was writing to the Admiral that the insurrection was at an end, he was receiving letters from Constantinople, that it was in full force. On our return from Tripoli, we made an excursion into the mountains, on the road to Deir el Kammar, and there we saw nothing like the ravages of war; the country was beautifully cultivated to the tops of the highest mountains, and had we not known to contrary, we should have supposed from the appearance, that it was well governed. Nothing can be more beautiful than the mountains and villages of Lebanon, inhabited by a hardy and honest race of beings, and not a spot capable of cultivation is allowed to lie fallow. Terraces to support the soil

are built up at great expense, and water conducted for irrigation throughout the mountain. The mulberry-tree is cultivated with great care, and produces two crops of leaves; the first goes to feed the silkworms, and the second the cattle in autumn. All kinds of fruit and vegetables are also produced, and the vine flourishes in great luxuriance nearly up to the summit of the mountain. As we were winding along the difficult passes we observed a steam-ship at sea, several thousand feet below us, making the best of her way to Beyrout, and before we had finished our repast, which the kindness of Mr. Moore had provided, we were agreeably surprised by the appearance of Captain Henderson, of the *Gorgon*, who had arrived from Alexandria, with orders to join the Commander-in-chief in Vourla Bay; this was a great disappointment, as we had projected excursions to Damascus and Balbeck, and also to the most interesting parts of these beautiful mountains. The subjoined is my report to the Admiral.

“ H. M. S. *Powerful*, Beyrout,

“ Sir,

July 20, 1840.

“ A column of the Egyptian army marched to Sidon on the 8th, and returned on the 12th with a

couple of squadrons of cavalry, whom they escorted to this place. On their march there and back the Albanians committed all sorts of disorders, burnt three or four villages and two convents, and even shot the muleteers who carried their baggage, in order to possess themselves of their animals.

“ On the evening of the 13th, the Emir Hallid, second son of the Emir Bechir, ruling prince of the Mountain, came into Beyrout with 30 horse, leaving, it is said, 800 men in the neighbourhood, and next day the Egyptian army was put in motion and marched to the mountains; scarce two hours had elapsed ere the country was in a blaze, up to the tops of the highest hills; even the convents did not escape the fury of the Albanians. I thought it my duty to write on the subject to the Egyptian admiral, a copy of which letter I have the honour to inclose, together with Souliman Pacha's reply. I only received positive information last night, that the insurrection was nearly put down; in fact, the chiefs, on seeing the imposing force Mehemet Ali sent against them, gave up the contest without a struggle. There are still men in arms in the mountains near Tripoli, but I fear all hope of Syria being relieved from the oppressive rule of Mehemet Ali by their

own exertions is at an end. The Egyptian admiral sailed from here on the 15th, and was joined off Sidon by another frigate. There are lying here two Egyptian corvettes and three brigs; the town and neighbourhood is as quiet as can be expected, though attempts have been made to excite the Arabs against the Christians.

“ Rejoicings are going on, and are to continue for seven days, in consequence of the birth of a Sultana, and I hope they will pass off quietly. However, at any moment, a feeling may be stirred up against the Franks and Christians, and no one can tell what would be the consequence; and as they are intermixed in the town there would be no means of protecting them, or of intimidating the Arabs. Should anything unpleasant occur I shall do all I can to preserve order.

“The Cyclops joined me on the 14th, and the Alecto on the 20th, to wait for the India Mail. The Turco-Egyptian squadron arrived at Alexandria on the 16th, to the great joy of Mehemet Ali. I have every reason to believe that the French steamer which arrived here the day after the Cyclops, brought the intelligence of our coming down, which hurried off the fleet. The French appear to be in favour of Mehemet

Ali, and in that follow the views of the Government. The convents are under French protection, and their flag is flying in a dozen different places in the mountains; this gives them great influence. The greater part of the army is expected back daily, and I presume a part will be sent to Tripoli, should the insurgents be there in any force; they will also be pressed by Osman Pacha, who is at Merge.

“There are two French corvettes and a brig here; they appear very busy in their communication with the convents in Lebanon.

“I have the honour to remain, &c.,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

“Rear-Admiral Sir John Louis, Bart.”

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## CHAPTER III.

The English ships withdrawn from the coast of Syria—The Author appointed to the command of a Squadron—Return to Beyrout—Instructions to the Squadron—Letters to the Egyptian Authorities, the British Consul, the Emir Bechir, and others—Proclamation to the Syrians—Letters from the Emir Bechir and Souliman Pacha.

ON the 3rd of August we took leave of Beyrout, and sailed in company with the Edinburgh, to join the Commander-in-chief's flag, leaving the Castor and Gorgon on the coast. Thinking it probable that counter orders might be sent to Rhodes, we made the best of our way thither. On the 10th we made Castel Rosso, on the coast of Caramania, and there fell in with the Ganges, commanded by my old friend Captain Reynolds, who brought me direction to hoist a broad blue pennant, and take under my command the Ganges, Thunderer, Edinburgh, Castor, and Gorgon, and return to Beyrout. He was the bearer of the Treaty of the 15th of July, and of orders to assist the mountaineers, supposing the insurrection to be in full force; the Ganges was directed to pass to the east of Cyprus, and the

Thunderer to the west, in order to pick me up. All sail was made, and by noon next day we were fortunate in joining the latter ship, and then made the best of our way to Beyrout.

The service was rather of a delicate nature; the insurrection was over, and twenty days were allowed Mehemet Ali to reject or accept the Treaty of July. In the quarantine ground, two miles from Beyrout, were encamped 4000 Turks; it was known they were dissatisfied, and wished to return to Constantinople, but how to assist them, and how far to go under the existing treaty, was not very easy to decide; it was, however, important some effort should be made before they were moved out of our reach. It was also desirable to prevent, if possible, that enterprising officer Souliman Pacha (who had organized the Egyptian army) from removing the stores from the magazine, and from strengthening the town.

My position was not agreeable. If I commenced hostilities before the expiration of the twenty days and Mehemet Ali accepted the terms, I should be accused of precipitation, and of causing an unnecessary sacrifice of life; on the other hand, should Mehemet Ali hold out, I might be accused of su-

pineness. Under this embarrassment we anchored at Beyrout on the 12th of August.

After perusing my orders, Lord Palmerston's instructions, and the third article of the Convention, and giving them my best consideration, it appeared to me evident that, under all circumstances, nothing but a very decided demonstration could be undertaken, following that demonstration up by hostilities, should opportunity offer.

Beyrout is a small town surrounded by a wall, with a few weak turrets mouldering to ruins, and mounting very few guns. The arms, provisions, and ammunition were stored in two weak castles. About a mile and a half from the town, on a point of land, stands the quarantine establishment, surrounded by a high wall; on this establishment the Turkish troops were encamped, a second camp was a little removed, and a third a still greater distance in the country, where were quartered the Egyptian and Albanian troops.

My first object was to rise and protect the Turks, the second to recover the arms of the mountaineers.

The 13th was employed in preparing the following proclamation, and the letters necessary to



carry this into execution ; and at eleven o'clock of the 14th the squadron weighed. The Powerful was placed within three hundred yards of one castle, the Edinburgh about the same distance from another, the Ganges close into the bay, with her broadside bearing between the two camps I have described ; the Thunderer off the point, and the Castor in the bay round it. The orders were as follows :—

“ H. M. S. Powerful, Beyrout,  
“ 12th of August, 1840.

“ MEMORANDUM.—The Powerful and Edinburgh will take up a position abreast of the town ; the object of so doing is to induce the Governor to deliver the arms that have been taken from the inhabitants of Lebanon, and to assist the Turkish troops to return to their allegiance. I shall avoid hostilities, if possible, therefore great caution is to be used, and the Edinburgh will not fire without signal, even if the Powerful should open, and then the guns will be carefully directed at the batteries.

“ The Ganges will take up a position to command the Turkish camp to the south, the Thunderer abreast of the island, and the Castor in the bay. Captain Reynolds will endeavour to send the ac-

companying letter on shore, and should any attempt be made to withdraw the Turkish troops he will enfilade the road, and endeavour to prevent their retiring, and he will do this with great caution, and spill as little blood as possible. It has been intimated to the Governor that any movement amongst the Turkish troops will be the signal for hostilities.

“ CHARLES NAPIER, *Commodore.*”

“ To the Captains of H. M. S. Ganges,  
Thunderer, Castor, and Edinburgh.”

An officer was then sent to the Governor and the Consul with the papers marked 1 and 2. Lieutenant Fitzjames landed in the Turkish camp, a service of some danger, with No. 3, and the Proclamation. No. 4 was sent to the Grand Prince, and No. 5 to his Nephew. The Governor declined giving any answer, and the commander of the Turkish forces said he could not act without orders.

An attack on the town depended entirely on a movement in the Turkish camp, but they either had not spirit or inclination to throw up their caps and declare for the Sultan; or it is possible the soldiers were kept in ignorance of the proclamation, for though we remained three days in our position

no movement took place. I threatened to commence hostilities should the Turkish troops be moved, but in the night they were gradually withdrawn by a gate we could not see, and mingled with the Egyptians.

Towards dark, as I suspected, the removal of the stores from the castles and water side began, and I sent an officer to remonstrate and threaten, and it was with much difficulty I refrained from putting my veto on the proceedings, through the medium of a few 32lb. shot; this could easily have been done; but was it justifiable? I thought not—and most unwillingly made up my mind, unless a fair opportunity offered, to allow the twenty days to expire.

No. 1.

“ Sir,

“ Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia, have decided that Syria is to be restored to the Sultan. I notify this to you for your guidance. I demand that the Turkish troops be put under my protection, and that the arms be restored to the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon. I am unwilling to shed blood, or destroy the property of the inhabit-

ants of Beyrout, therefore I caution you not to provoke hostilities; you must see, by the position I have taken up, that the town is at my mercy, therefore if you are the cause of uselessly shedding blood the responsibility must rest on your head. Any attempt to move the Turkish troops from their present position will be the signal for hostilities.

“ I am, Sir, &c.,

“ CHAS. NAPIER.”

“ His Excellency Mahmoud Bey, Governor of Beyrout.”

No. 2.

“ Sir,

“ I beg you will communicate to the Consuls of the different Powers, and the British merchants at Beyrout, that Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, have decided that Syria is to be restored to the Sultan. I have demanded that the Turkish troops be put under my protection, and that the arms be restored to the inhabitants of Lebanon. I trust the Governor will not provoke hostilities; if he does, the responsibility of shedding blood must be on his own head.

“ I am, Sir, &c.,

“ CHAS. NAPIER, *Commodore.*”

“ N. Moore, Esq., British Consul, Beyrout.”

No. 3.

“ Sir,

“ I inclose you a proclamation I have thought proper to issue ; if you attempt to move out of the camp, hostilities will commence immediately.

“ I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

“ CHAS. NAPIER, *Commodore.*”

“ To the Commanding Officer of the Turkish Troops.”

“ *Proclamation.*

“ Syrians,

“ Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, &c., in conjunction with the Sultan, have decided that the rule of Mehemet Ali shall cease in Syria ; and I have been sent here with an advanced squadron to assist in throwing off the yoke of the Pacha of Egypt.

“ You know that a hatt-i-scheriff has been issued by the Sultan, securing the life and property of his subjects, and which is in full operation throughout the Turkish territories ; in addition to this the allied Powers have engaged to recommend to the Sultan an arrangement which will render your condition happy and comfortable.

“Inhabitants of Lebanon, who are more particularly under my eyes, I call upon you to rise and throw off the yoke under which you are groaning; troops, arms, and ammunition, are daily expected from Constantinople, and, in the mean time, the Egyptians shall no longer molest your coast.

“Soldiers of the Sultan, who were treacherously led from your homes to the burning sands of Egypt, and have since been transported to Syria, I call upon you, in the name of the great Powers, to return to your allegiance. All past events will be forgotten, and your arrears of pay discharged by the Sultan.

“ (Signed) CHARLES NAPIER.”

No. 4.

“Prince,

“I send you a Proclamation I have thought proper to issue. I call upon your Highness to return to your allegiance to the Sultan, or take the consequence.

“I have the honour to remain,

“Your Highness’s obedient servant,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

“His Highness the Emir Bechir,  
Grand Prince of Lebanon.”

No. 5.

“ Prince,

“ My Proclamation will be delivered to you by Mr. Wood, or forwarded. I call upon you to stand forth in favour of your Sovereign; you may rely upon all the support I can give, and of reinforcements from the Porte.

“ I have the honour to remain,

“ Your obedient servant,

“ CHARLES NAPIER.”

“ To the Emir Bechir Cassim.”

The Grand Prince sent no answer, but a few days after, his surgeon came on board, and gave me to understand that as soon as the Turkish troops landed the Emir would declare for the Sultan; the Emir Bechir Cassim sent a favourable reply, but wavered till he could see what turn affairs were likely to take.

*Copy of a letter received from the Emir*

*Bechir Cassim.*

“ August 14, 1840.

“ After the customary compliments to his Excellency Commodore Napier.

“I have had the honour to receive your commands, and I have to pray to the Almighty to preserve to eternity your Government and your Excellency.

“I have had the honour to receive the Proclamation you were pleased to send me, containing the decision of the four great Powers, to which I readily submit. I am prepared to render instantly all the services that may be required of me, while I consider the opportunity afforded me as a peculiar favour from God. I am waiting only for supreme orders to commence immediately acting accordingly with diligence, when I will also follow all your commands. I hope to be able to prove to you the sincerity of my declarations. You have forwarded to us your Proclamation through Mr. Wood; we will follow your instructions thereon.

“I have requested the bearer of the present to express to you my sentiments verbally, and I hope that, with your assistance, we shall obtain peace, tranquillity, and liberty.’

“ (Signed)      EMIR BECHIR CASSIM.”

Vessels were constantly arriving with provisions and warlike stores, which were detained, much to the



annoyance of the unfortunate crews and passengers, and, I may add, to our own. Many of the vessels were loaded to the water's edge, quite unseaworthy should it blow, and badly found in water and provisions; this induced me to write to Souliman Pacha as follows :

“ Sir,

“ Powerful, Beyrout, August 18, 1840.

“ I am instructed to detain all ships of war and vessels having troops, military stores, or provisions on board, going from one part of Egypt or Syria to another. As it is a very vexatious duty for me to perform, I submit to your Excellency whether it would not be better to give orders to all the ports under your jurisdiction, not to permit any vessels to sail loaded with the description of articles I have pointed out. I have detained eleven officers and eighty-seven privates on board different vessels; they have no provisions, and are totally unaccustomed to our mode of living. I therefore submit to your Excellency's consideration whether it would not be desirable to send them off provisions.

“ I am, &c.,

“ (Signed) CHARLES NAPIER, *Commodore.*”

“ His Excellency Souliman Pacha, &c.”

“ Commodore,

“ Beyrout, August 18, 1840.

“ I am very grateful for the advice which your Excellency gives me. I did not expect less from the noble character of so loyal and valiant a soldier as fame has long reported you to be. But it is impossible for me to profit by it, not having received any instructions from my Government that war exists between England and Egypt. I cannot, therefore, take upon myself to interrupt the communications between Egypt and Syria, or between the ports of the latter country. If, according to your instructions, you have taken from the vessels any passengers, provisions, or stores, belonging to the army or to the country, I can no longer consider them as our subjects or our property. I can only refer the matter to my Government, regretting that I am without the power to provide further.

“ Receive, I beg you, Commodore, the assurance of the highest consideration of

“ Your very humble servant,

“ SOULIMAN PACHA.”

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## CHAPTER IV.

Generous behaviour of Souliman Pacha; Intercepted Letter from Boghos Bey to that Officer—Interview of the Consuls with Mehemet Ali—A Turkish Squadron equipped—Arrival of the Turkish Troops—Force of the Egyptian Army—Its proper line of Action.

SOULIMAN behaved with great generosity, though enraged at the detention of vessels, which appeared to him contrary to the usages of war; he received the sick into the hospitals, with a promise to deliver them up when demanded, and allowed not only the vessels detained, but the squadron, to be supplied with fresh provisions and vegetables, and, I may add, did everything to prevent a collision taking place.

On the 19th an Egyptian cutter arrived with despatches from Boghos Bey to the Grand Prince, to Souliman, and to the Governor of Beyrout; they were all to the same purpose, tending to show that France was determined to take an active part in favour of Mehemet Ali; the French merchants and priests were not idle in circulating reports to the same effect, and they were generally credited in the mountains. I subjoin Boghos Bey's letter.

*Copy of Intercepted Instructions sent to Souliman Pacha.*

“TO HIS EXCELLENCY SOULIMAN PACHA.

“After the usual compliments, &c.

“Notwithstanding that the conditions of the Convention signed in London have not yet transpired, nevertheless, the Russian, English, and Austrian Consuls, in their vain attempts to intrigue, have been employing their clerks day and night to make drafts of the aforesaid Convention, with the intention of distributing the same in Syria, to bring about an insurrection there if necessary. By way of aid, 6000 troops will be conveyed from Constantinople to Cyprus, and arms and ammunition will be sent to Syria. We have also learned that a firman has been sent to the Emir Bechir, notifying to him, that as by the Convention of London he is to be freed from the government of Mehemet Ali, he had better be aware of it in time, and not be found in allegiance with him. In the hope of creating an insurrection and disturbances in Syria, the aforesaid Consuls have made drafts of a Convention as above described, and have transmitted them to Syria in the English steamer. The French

Consul at Beyrout will be deposed, and sent to Paris, for having acted contrary to the policy of his Government, and will be replaced by Monsieur Delvasy, who is now at Damascus for the affair of the Jews. On the other hand, the French Consul-General at Alexandria has been graciously decorated by his Government for having followed its views. The French are with us, and have agreed, out of friendship, to furnish us with 100,000 troops, 600,000 purses, and 24 ships of the line, with 80 steamers. That such is the resolution taken in France, we have it from the proper quarter.

“By the grace of God, after the above becomes known to you, let the quarantine be strictly enforced in the principal sea-port towns in Syria as before, by which you will ascertain the destination of all letters brought by vessels. Vessels must not be allowed to go to places where there are no sanatory establishments, it being irregular; and should any vessels go to such places, and desire to land any passengers, let them be slightly opposed; but should any one resist the quarantine, let him be informed that the sanatory regulations are the same for all. Our Master, the Viceroy, is in Upper Egypt; but on his return to-day or to-morrow, he will necessarily

write to you in detail on the conduct you are to pursue, and until you receive his instructions, the present notification will serve you as a guide, &c.

“A copy of the same instructions has been addressed to the Governors and Kakya of Beyrout, and to the Governor-General of Damascus.

“(Signed) BOGHOS BEY.”

On the 20th, an Egyptian frigate, armed *en flûte*, bound to Scanderoon with stores, was detained by the *Castor*, stationed off the Point, to give notice should the Egyptian fleet appear off, to raise the blockade.

On the 27th I heard from the Admiral, announcing his arrival off Alexandria, and was shortly after reinforced by the *Revenge*, *Benbow*, and *Magicienne*. The Consuls, on their first audience, had laid before the Pacha the Treaty of the 15th of July, which he rejected at once; and he gave them to understand it was useless coming to him at the expiration of either the ten days or the twenty, for they should have the same answer; and that what he had won with the sword, he should defend with it; and he added, that after the expiration of the twenty days, the sooner they took themselves off the better, as

their longer stay would neither be for their honour or his interest. The old man kept his word ; on the 5th of September Raifat Pasha and the Consuls again presented themselves, and they were dismissed with the same answer.

The Admiral, in his last dispatch, gave me to understand I might shortly expect a small Turkish force would arrive at Cyprus, under the orders of Captain Walker, who had been promoted to the rank of Rear-Admiral in the Turkish service. This appeared business-like, and we anxiously looked forward to some active service during the remaining two months of summer.

Shortly after this, I received a dispatch from Lord Ponsonby, announcing that a war with France might be expected at any moment, and recommending the ships to be on their guard, and that the Turkish Government had recalled the expedition. Some of the Turkish vessels had already sailed, and Admiral Walker, with great judgment and decision, pushed on, and sent me word of his approach. Not a moment was lost ; the *Hastings*, which had joined, was sent to Cyprus to reinforce him, and supply his ships with provisions, and I removed my pennant to the *Gorgon* steamer, and ran down

the coast as far as D'Jebail, to ascertain the best landing place ; from there I crossed over to Cyprus, where I arrived next afternoon. Admiral Walker had anchored the day before.

The Turkish troops, to the amount of 5300 men, had been landed. The Government, with their accustomed want of foresight, had started them with only a fortnight's provisions, of which only three days remained. With all my desire to commence active operations, it would have been madness to have brought this force to the coast of Syria, where nothing could be procured in the event of a reverse. The troops had really a very respectable appearance, and were much better than I expected. After a conference with the Admiral and General, it was decided to leave it to Admiral Walker's discretion to start the moment he could procure a moderate supply, and we agreed to meet off Sidon, as by that time I should have determined on what part of the coast we should strike the first blow, on the success of which all our hopes depended.

From Cyprus we ran over and reconnoitred St. Jean d'Acre, which I was glad to see did not present any great obstacle to an attack from sea. Many men were employed completing the works on the



land side; but the sea front, I suppose, was considered sufficiently strong.

From Acre we went off Tyre, which was occupied by Albanian troops, and in the evening anchored at Beyrout, having run over all this ground in little more than forty-eight hours. The following day the Carysfort was despatched to Cyprus with more provisions. On the 9th of September, the ships in the offing, who had directions to bring Admiral Walker to Beyrout, made the signal for a convoy. Sir Robert Stopford, in the Princess Charlotte, also hove in sight, and before sunset the whole were at anchor off the town. Sir Charles Smith, who had arrived in the Pique a few days before in bad health, was still too unwell to take the direction of the military affairs, and Sir Robert Stopford did me the honour of placing the troops under my command.

Souliman Pacha at this time was at the head of the army at Beyrout, and was supposed to have 15,000 men under his orders. Ibrahim and Osman were at Balbeck with 10,000 more; the garrison of Sidon consisted of 3000; that of Tripoli, and in the neighbourhood, 5000; the rest of the Egyptian army, consisting of from 40,000 to 50,000 men, were stationed in various parts of Syria.

Had the Egyptian troops at Beyrout, with the exception of the garrison, marched to the heights of Ornagacuan and the high land over Nahr-el-Kelb, those at Balbeck on Gazir, Harissa and Antoura, and those at Tripoli pushed along shore by D'Jebail the moment we landed, there is little doubt but we should have been withdrawn, and the troops sent to Cyprus, and Mehemet Ali would now have been in possession of Syria, and England, in all probability, involved in war with France; or even had we remained inactive, and contented ourselves with occupying a strong hold only, we should have incurred the same risk.

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## CHAPTER V.

The Allied Troops landed in D'Jounie Bay—Encampment—  
Reconnoissances—Submission of the Emir Abdallah—Bey-  
rout summoned to Surrender—Reply of Souliman Pacha—  
Impolicy of the Attack on Beyrout—Forbearance of Souli-  
man Pacha—Capture of D'Jebail—Captain Martin's Report  
—Reconnaissance to Merouba—Report to the Admiral.

As Beyrout was surrounded by a slight wall without a ditch, it did not appear to me advisable to make our first impression there, because had we succeeded in obtaining possession of the town, we should have been penned in by a very superior force, and had no opportunity of communicating with and arming the mountaineers, without whose assistance it would have been quite impossible to have made any impression on Souliman Pacha's army. Under these circumstances, I suggested to the Admiral, who was commander-in-chief of the allied forces by sea and land, that we should put the troops ashore in D'Jounie Bay, in the province of Kesrouan, there intrench ourselves, and arm the mountaineers, who, we had reason to suppose, would flock down and join the Sultan's standard. This province is separated from El-Kata by a deep gorge, through which

runs the Nahr-el-Kelb ; a stream only passable at its mouth, a few miles higher up at Argentoun, four or five leagues from the sea, and at Basquinta, where it rises. A road leads from Beyrout along the sea-shore to its mouth, passing round a precipitous promontory jutting into the sea ; on this promontory stands a convent of monks. Another road leads further inland to a village, and from that village you may descend by a very rugged path across Nahr-el-Kelb (or Dog River), and ascend to another convent, on the top of the hills which look down on D'Jounie Bay. To the northward a road leads from Tripoli along shore, and crosses a bridge over another gorge ; besides which, there are several roads which can be traversed by troops from Balbeck, leading to Antoura and Gazir, the capital of the province.

After dark on the 9th of September, the Turkish troops and marines were moved into the steamboats, which was accomplished by two in the morning ; soon after eight they weighed, and proceeded off Beyrout Point to draw the enemy's troops in that direction, and there wait till the sea breeze set in. This had the desired effect, and a few shot and shell were pitched into their columns to keep them in play. At ten the

Powerful weighed, accompanied by Admiral Walker, in the Turkish line-of-battle-ship, a frigate, and corvette, the Pique, Castor, Carysfort, Daphne, and Wasp, and stood towards D'Jounie. The Castor and one steamer were directed to anchor off Nahr-el-Kelb, enfilade the pass, and land a Turkish battalion to the north of the river, and occupy the high ground over it, to prevent the advance of the Egyptians when they discovered our real attack. The rest of the squadron proceeded towards D'Jounie, where they anchored at two in the afternoon, and the whole of the troops, under the judicious direction of Admiral Walker and Captain Reynolds, were landed by four o'clock. The heights were immediately occupied, a couple of companies of marines, commanded by Captain Childs, were detached to reinforce the Turks at Nahr-el-Kelb, and a battalion was posted in the village of Zug, about a league distant from the camp; beyond them, a couple of battalions of Turks occupied a strong position, having their left flank protected by an impassable gorge\*. I took up my quarters in a Maronite chapel, in which we placed a gun; this chapel served for dining-room, bed-room, and powder

\* See Letter to the Admiral, in the Appendix.

magazine. My establishment was landed from the *Powerful*, and I look back to the month I passed there as one of the happiest of my life. Provisions were abundant, wine not bad, and Archdukes, Princes, Pachas, and Emirs were entertained; and I fear the laws of the prophet were frequently infringed by our Turkish allies.

The *Carysfort* and *Daphne* were despatched to *D'Jebail* to drive the Albanians out of a strong château, and impede the sudden advance of troops from Tripoli. The *Wasp* flanked the bridge I have before pointed out. After the troops were landed, the ships and steamers took up positions to protect the flanks of the camp in the event of an attack, and those in advance, if hard pressed, were ordered to retire, disputing the ground, but not to risk a severe loss. The Admiral, with the *Princess Charlotte*, *Bellerophon*, *Ganges*, *Thunderer*, *Edinburgh*, *Hastings*, *Benbow*, and the Austrian squadron, remained at *Beyrout*; the *Zebra*, and the Austrian frigate *Guerriera*, commanded by the Archduke, covered the bridge near the quarantine ground, and the *Revenge* was stationed in the bay between it and *Dog River*, to harass the enemy (should they advance,) and give us timely notice of their approach.

At midnight the *Revenge* made the signal the enemy were advancing; I immediately landed and turned out the troops, and the *Powerful* was warped closer in; but it proved a false alarm. The following morning we began throwing up intrenchments, which were finished on the fourth day; and much praise is due to the exertions of both officers and men; Captain Reynolds, Berkeley, and indeed all the Captains and Commanders, were indefatigable. The defences were much too confined to secure our whole force; and I wished them enlarged, but the Engineer officer differed with me, and the Admiral ordered them not to be changed. During the time they were in progress, I occupied myself in gaining a knowledge of the country, and of the roads leading to our position, and I soon ascertained that there was little danger of being disturbed, even had we to contend with a more powerful army.

At first the mountaineers came in slowly, and the Admiral gave directions to re-embark the troops in a few days, but I succeeded in persuading him to allow them to remain. Our stay gave confidence to the inhabitants, who in two or three days began to flock in in great numbers, and the Emir Abdallah,

nephew of the Grand Prince, and governor of the province, who had retired before a Turkish battalion, sent to his capital the day after we landed, came over in good style, bringing with him a considerable number of followers tolerably well mounted and armed. I now ordered Gazir, the capital of the province, to be occupied, and the road reconnoitred leading to Merouba, where Ibrahim and Osman Pacha had collected a considerable force; another detachment was sent to the neighbourhood of the convent of Harissa, on the right of Gazir, under Captain Loué, a Prussian officer attached to the Turkish army, both detachments having orders to retire to the camp should the enemy advance on their line. On the 15th of September the enemy pushed a reconnoitring party as far as Ackshout, on the road to Harissa, where they remained an hour, and then returned to Merouba; they seemed undecided, whether to advance on Gazir, Harissa, or Argentoun; their position gave them the choice of the three roads.

On the 11th a flag of truce was sent into Beyrout by Sir Robert Stopford and Admiral Bandeira, with a summons to Souliman Pacha to withdraw his troops: subjoined are the summons and reply.



“WE, the Admirals of the British and Austrian squadrons, acting in obedience to the instructions of our respective Governments, and in the interests of his Highness the Sultan, consider our duty to represent to your Excellency our earnest desire to stop the effusion of blood, and to call upon your Excellency to withdraw your troops from Beyrout, and to deliver the town to our united forces, to be retained in the name of the Sultan.

“Your Excellency will have observed, from the fire of the ships yesterday, a small specimen only of the course we shall be compelled to pursue. The fire has not been pressed this morning, that your Excellency may benefit by the pause, and upon reflection come to the decision in consonance with our benevolent views, to spare the innocent inhabitants from the inevitable horrors which a few hours would inflict upon them.

“We request your Excellency will send an answer as soon as you can, or at the latest by half-past one.

“(Signed)      ROBERT STOPFORD, *Admiral.*  
                         BANDEIRA, *Admiral.*

“His Excellency Souliman Pacha,  
Major-General of the Egyptian army at Beyrout.”

In answer to the above the following was, after some time, forwarded :

“Beyrout, September 11, 1840.

“General Souliman Pacha has the honour to present his compliments to the Admirals of the English and Austrian squadrons, and to inform them, that not being acquainted with the language, it is impossible for him to return an answer unless the Admirals will be good enough to translate their communication into French, Turkish, or Arabic.

“(Signed) SOULIMAN.”

“To the Admirals commanding the English and Austrian squadrons before Beyrout.”

I should have thought that the Egyptian general could have found some one in Beyrout to have translated the summons, and it did appear that he treated the admirals rather cavalierly; nevertheless, the summons was sent in French, to which he replied that, he was engaged in a council of war, and that the reply would be ready in the morning. A heavy fire was immediately opened on the two forts, but the town was spared as much as possible, and the following morning a letter was brought off from Souliman, as follows:—

“Admirals,—You are acquainted with my orders, and after the refusal which, as was my duty, I returned to the proposals made me in the name of your Governments to betray my master and benefactor, it was impossible that I should act in opposition to his wishes.

“As you observe, I was enabled yesterday fully to appreciate all the extent of evil it was in your power to bring down on innocent families, strangers to the present misunderstanding.

“For the sake of killing five of my soldiers, you have ruined and brought families into desolation, you have killed women, a tender infant and its mother, an old man, two unfortunate peasants, and doubtless, many others whose names have not yet reached me; and, far from slackening the fire of your ships, when my soldiers (who during that deplorable day did not once fire) fell back on the town across the inhabited country of Beyrout, your fire, I say, became more vigorous and destructive for the unfortunate peasants rather than for my soldiers. You appear decided to make yourselves masters of the town, notwithstanding that, in any event, the question will remain as before. If the fortune of war prove adverse to me, Beyrout shall only fall into your power when

reduced to cinders. This town has not ceased being inhabited, and moreover, it contains merchandise imported from Europe, the value of which is considerable. Under these circumstances I have constantly endeavoured to justify throughout, the grateful thanks which I have received from Europeans. Guards have been posted to secure respect to their habitations and their magazines. They will find them untouched on their return. It lies not in my power to deliver the town; my orders are for its defence, and I shall defend it come what may. I, therefore, am not the person to address if you are really desirous of sparing innocent persons from the inevitable horrors of warfare, which in a few hours you have power to bring down on them.

“Mehemet Ali alone can give you an answer on this question. If, then, you attack Beyrout, and if its inhabitants are buried in the ruins, let me not be responsible for the blood that is shed.

“I have the honour to remain,

“Your humble and obedient servant,

“SOULIMAN.”

“Beyrout, Saturday, two hours after sunrise.”

I thought at the time it was impolitic opening

a fire on Beyrout unless it was determined to follow it up by an attack. The mountaineers had before witnessed the little damage done at D'Jounie and along the coast by the Egyptian squadron, when they fired on the armed mountaineers, in various parts along shore; and when they saw that a powerful British squadron could not drive the Egyptian troops out of a defenceless town, it did not give them a very high opinion of our power. Souliman well knew the moral effect keeping possession of Beyrout would have on the mountaineers, and determined not to abandon it till forced; we ought to have taken the same view, and either not have opened a fire at all, or persevered until they were driven out, whatever mischief was done to the town. Had the same measures been taken at Beyrout that were taken at Sidon, there is no doubt but we should have got possession of it. We should have lost men, it is true, but in war that must be expected, when a great point is to be gained; and gaining the principal sea port on the coast of Syria, in view of the mountains, was a great point, and would have had an immense moral effect. Withdrawing the squadron, which we did on the 16th, with the exception of the Edinburgh and

Hastings, which ships occasionally kept up a fire on the town, gave Souliman the opportunity of telling the mountaineers that he had beaten off the British squadron.

The Pacha, though much annoyed, no doubt, at our proceedings, yet showed himself a man of great forbearance. During the time the cannonading was going on, the Indian mail arrived; our intercepting despatches from Alexandria furnished him with a fair excuse for stopping this mail, but as its detention had nothing to do with hostilities then going on, he hoisted a flag of truce, and delivered the mail, with a very civil message that all letters to and from India should be religiously forwarded. The Admiral, not to be outdone in civility, wrote a letter of thanks, and sent Souliman, who I have since learnt was a jolly and hospitable old soldier, a package of wine, that had been detained in an Egyptian vessel.

At this time the Admiral arrived at D'Jounie Bay, and the *Castor* and *Pique* having embarked their marines, went off Acre, Caiffa, and Tyre; and the *Bellerophon* took her station, with the *Revenge*, off the *Nahr-el-Kelb*, and covered that most important pass; the road was broken up, and at night an

officer was stationed on shore with blue lights to burn, should the enemy attempt to advance in that direction.

The Albanians at D'Jebail did not seem disposed to give up their castle. On the 12th I sent 220 marines and 150 armed mountaineers, with orders to Captain Martin to turn them out: his report will show that it was not easily done; the officer in command rather incautiously advanced to the castle, and met with a severe loss. The mountaineers in this district came in also for arms in great numbers. Captain Martin, with great zeal, pushed on to Batroun, a little to the northward of D'Jebail, and drove the Albanians from that neighbourhood, which gave him an opportunity of distributing more arms to the warlike inhabitants.

“H.M.S. Carysfort, D'Jebail,  
September 13, 1840.

“ Sir,

“ I have the honour to inform you that, pursuant to your directions, I anchored yesterday off D'Jebail. The enemy have evacuated the town; the mountaineers are coming in fast for arms, and, as far as I can judge from their words and professions, the most enthusiastic feeling prevails among them. I

trust that the results will, in some degree, excuse the loss we have sustained. I shall now proceed to detail the circumstances of the attack.

“At noon I anchored, with springs, within musket-shot of D’Jebail. The Dido took a good position ahead of the Carysfort, and the Cyclops astern; groups of mountaineers immediately came down to the beach, and many were brought off by the boats. Having given a sufficient time for the marines to prepare for landing, and for their commanding officer to reconnoitre the place of disembarkation, at 1 P.M. the ships opened their fire upon the castle and upon the points which the mountaineers designated to us as occupied by the Albanians. This was returned by occasional musket shots.

“When the fire had been continued with great precision, and apparently some effect, for about an hour, the marines, accompanied by a large party of armed mountaineers, pushed off from the Cyclops, and to cover their landing the ships re-opened upon the castle. About half-past 3, P.M., observing the detachment formed upon the beach to the south of the town, and believing all the effect likely to be produced by our shot was already done, and that the



gardens had been swept by the launch's caronnades, I made the signal to push on. The marines advanced briskly to the assault, but the cliff soon obstructed my view of their progress through the gardens in front of the castle. They reached within thirty yards of the tower, when a destructive fire was opened upon them from a crenelled outwork, having a deep ditch in front, which was completely masked from the fire of the ships. Finding his men were falling fast, that the wall of the castle was impracticable, that there was no gate accessible, and nothing but the muzzles of the enemy's muskets visible through the loopholes, Captain Robinson very judiciously drew his men off. The marines retired to the beach steadily and in good order. Captain Austin, who superintended the landing, and accompanied the marines, having sent to me to say that nothing could be done unless the tower was levelled, the ships again commenced firing upon it. Finding, however, that the immense solidity of the building prevented our making a sufficient impression upon it, at half-past 5 I ordered the marines to be re-embarked and the firing to cease.

“An English flag, which had been planted on the garden wall as a signal to the ships, was acci-

dentally left there by the pilot of the Cyclops after the marines had retired; Lieutenant Grenfell and — Macdonald, a seaman of the Cyclops, volunteered to recover it, and brought it off most gallantly amidst the cheers of the ships.

“At night a party of the mountaineers, whom we had armed, were established in the town; and at daylight this morning I found that the Albanians had evacuated the castle during the night, leaving three behind, one of them badly wounded, and since dead. The conduct of a Turkish soldier, who was sent up in the Cyclops, has been admirable in organizing and keeping together parties of the mountaineers.

“Having distributed all the arms, I now send the Cyclops for a fresh supply. I think we may dispose of more; and I take the liberty of suggesting that they should be sent immediately, before the present enthusiasm has time to subside.

“The painful part of my duty is, to inclose the list of killed and wounded in the attack on D’Jebail; I deeply lament that it has been so severe.

*Benbow.*—2 marines killed, 4 wounded severely.

*Hastings.*—2 marines killed, Lieut. C. W. Adair slightly, 7 marines severely, 3 slightly, wounded.

*Castor.*—1 marine wounded severely.

*Zebra*.—1 marine killed.

*Cyclops*.—Lieut. George Gifford wounded severely, 1 seaman severely.

Total killed, 5. Total wounded, 18.

“(Signed) HENRY MARTIN.”

“To Commodore Napier.”

On the 22nd I marched, with a Turkish battalion and a battalion of marines, by the road of Antoura and Argentoun toward Merouba, through the strongest and most difficult country I ever beheld, over roads hardly passable, and under a fiery sun; the marine battalion, unaccustomed to marching, were sorely pressed, and arrived with difficulty at Argentoun; there they halted, and I went on with a couple of companies of Turks, who were good marchers, holding a party of marines, the least fatigued, ready to advance should we be pressed. About two hours before sunset we came in sight of Osman Pacha's camp and the Albanian standards; they appeared intrenched in a very strong position. The marines were now ordered to move on and show themselves, and we continued to advance through a most difficult but beautifully romantic country. In an hour we joined the mountaineers, under the Scheik Francis (the person who had been designated the Seraskier by Mr. Wood), in position in a small

village, a little distance from very precipitous rocks, through which an execrable road led to Merouba, where Osman was intrenched. I desired the mountaineers to throw themselves amongst the rocks, to see whether they were occupied or not, which they did with considerable reluctance, till assured all was safe; they then went on with great alacrity: this enabled me to reconnoitre Osman's position; he appeared well fortified, and from that I augured he was as much afraid of being attacked by us as we were of being attacked by him. In the evening we returned to Argentoun, where we attempted to get some rest, but from the numerous bedfellows in the shape of monstrous fleas, our slumbers were anything but sound. At dawn of day we were again on the move, and returned to the camp, after a very hot and fatiguing march. The following is my report of this reconnoissance to the Admiral:—

“ Sir,

“ I last night reconnoitred the enemy's position at Merouba, a long march from here; they seemed more afraid of us than we were of them, as they had fortified their position. Very few men showed

themselves, which inclines me to believe that a great part have retired; it is certain the Druses are gone to their homes. This morning I reconnoitred the enemy's position on our right; we have had a communication with their chief, who promises to come over: if he does not I shall beat up his quarters to-morrow, open the province between the Nahr-el-Kelb (Dog River) and Beyrout, and arm it; that done, we ought to make a reconnoissance on Beyrout, our left covered by the mountaineers, and our right by the steamers, gun-boats, and small craft. The proposal of Selim Pacha to advance on Ibrahim is out of the question; we have no means of transport, nor have the troops shoes. I am satisfied, were the Turks left to themselves, in one week they would be prisoners. I am glad the Emir Hanjar is come; he is a host in himself. I should have come off to you this afternoon, but I was on horseback yesterday from day-light till half-past six, and again to-day from day-light till sunset, with the exception of an hour and a half, added to which I have a devil of a ———, which requires a few hours to put to rights.

“ Believe me yours very truly,

“ CHAS. NAPIER.”

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CHAPTER VI.

Proposed attack upon Sidon—Correspondence between Sir Robert Stopford and the Author respecting the command—Attack on the Heights of Ornagacuan—Report to the Admiral—Return to D'Jounie.

HAVING ascertained that Ibrahim had no immediate intention of attacking our position, it became necessary to undertake something bold immediately after the rally I intended to give the troops in our immediate front, should they not come over. I therefore proposed to the Admiral to make an attack upon Sidon, to which, with some reluctance he consented, and, in the afternoon, I was rather surprised at receiving the following letter:

“ My dear Commodore, “ September 23d.

“ After having employed Captain Stewart, a junior officer, upon an expedition to Tripoli, I cannot, and ought not to cast such a stigma upon Captain Berkeley, as to consider him unworthy, or incapable of a similar employment at Sidon.

“ He must therefore go there, and he will be most happy to attend to all your suggestions, if I

may venture, under such circumstances, to hope that you will go with the expedition.

“Your fame, my dear Commodore, is too well established, and your liberality of thinking too well known upon points of service, to allow me to suspect for a moment that you would wish to deprive a brother officer of a few sprigs of laurel with which you are so well covered. The good of the service upon which we are employed, is your first wish, and to you our unexpected success is owing, aided as you have been by the zeal of the officers under your command.

“I am aware that Captain Reynolds is the senior officer, but I hear that he has expressed a wish to remain here, and therefore there can be no jealousy against Berkeley.

“Believe me your’s, &c.,

“ROBERT STOPFORD.”

“P. S. I shall be obliged to you to organize the force intended for Sidon, so as to have them off Damour early on the 25th.”

This appeared to be making me so complete a cipher, that I replied as follows:

“My dear Admiral,

“There is nothing in the whole world that I would not do to please you, or forward the service, but I do not see how I can, with any propriety, put myself under a junior officer, where we shall have 500 English marines and 500 Turks. You must know that as yet I have had all the fag, and surely I ought to reap the advantage of it. Captain Stewart went away without any force, therefore Captain Berkeley cannot complain of me, his senior officer, with a broad pennant flying, commanding an important expedition. God knows I should be sorry to rob any man of his share of service; but as you was good enough to allow me to plan all things, I do think it hard I am not allowed to execute them; as yet I have had nothing but fag, and it is natural that I should wish to reap the fruits I have been fagging for; I trust, therefore, you will allow it to go on as you agreed this morning.

“Believe me, &c.

“CHAS. NAPIER.”

The Admiral saw the reasonableness of my request, and replied as follows:—



“ My dear Commodore,

“ September 23rd.

“ I cannot resist the formal application made by an officer of your standing to command an expedition in preference to a junior officer.

“ I have, therefore, directed Captain Berkeley to proceed towards Sidon, looking out for you on the morning of the 25th off Damour, and to place himself under your orders.

“ I will give to any steamer you like an order to hoist your blue pennant, and to Commander Liardet to carry on the discipline of the Powerful during your temporary absence.

“ But as I do not see any probability of a further expedition, it is not worth while to change the Admiralty order for this once.

“ This is a final arrangement, upon which I request no further controversy.

“ I have heard from Captains Collier and Stewart, who have succeeded in doing all they could towards giving arms to the Syrians. Commander Robinson gave many to a parcel of men, who began robbing the moment they got them, though delivered under the authority of a Scheik. You will see, by the orders which I have given to Captain Berkeley, the

nature and object of this expedition, on which success is certain under your management.

“I wish you, however, to observe some attention to the family of Souliman Pacha, and if you can get communication with them, to offer protection on board our ships, to be conveyed subsequently to where they wish to go.

“Yours, &c.,

“ROBERT STOPFORD.”

I now thought everything finally settled, and I requested the Wasp might be sent off Sidon. The Admiral, however, fearing a heavy loss, was unwilling the town should be attacked, and he again wrote to me on the subject.

“My dear Commodore,

“September 23, 1840.

“I am at a loss to know the advantage of making a regular attack by troops on Sidon.

“Our only object is to land arms for the mountaineers, and if this cannot be accomplished without considerable loss, it is not worth the expense, and does not come within the scope of my instructions.

“Sidon, I am told, is a very solidly built town, as are the works about it.

“If there are any troops in the town determined to defend it, you will not easily take possession, unless by its destruction, a measure not justifiable for the object in view.

“The steamer will clear the environs of the Egyptians, and the troops may be landed to cover your proceedings in the distribution of arms.

“The country is open for the use of the enemy’s cavalry.

“I plainly foresee that in all operations on shore, wherever there is any fighting, the brunt of the whole will fall on the marines, as you will see tomorrow.

“Your’s, &c.,

“ROBERT STOPFORD.”

“P.S. I will direct Wasp to go with Thunderer.”

I left things in this state on the evening of the 23rd, and finding that no further communication had been made by the Albanian chief on our front, I directed General Jochmus to descend into the valley of the Dog River with three Turkish battalions, move up the valley, and take the road leading

to the heights of Ornagacuan on the enemy's left. Another battalion crossed the bridge near the mouth of the river, and occupied the heights on the opposite side, to watch the Beyrout road, and cover a battalion of marines and the Austrian rocketeers who crossed higher up, and advanced on the enemy's front. The Albanians, afraid of being cut off from the road leading to Boharsof, and not liking the appearance of the marines in their front, moved to their right, and gained the heights of Ornagacuan, occupying a strong position above the road by which General Jochmus was advancing. The Turks moved with great rapidity and gallantry.

General Jochmus, the chief of the staff, accompanied by my aide-de-camp, Lieut. Bradley, put himself at the head of the skirmishers, and was followed by Selim Pacha, leading a Turkish battalion. The mountaineers also joined, and were not the last in advancing. The enemy's skirmishers were driven in, and the main body, consisting of about seven hundred men, after firing two volleys, retired by the road of Boharsof; the Turks followed them up with great vigour, made three or four hundred prisoners, and dispersed the rest. This first success gave confidence to the Sultan's troops,

and opened the whole district of the Kata, and enabled us to arm many of the mountaineers of that province. Our loss was only an officer wounded, and two men killed.

“ D’Jounie, head-quarters of the Army  
of Lebanon, Sept. 25, 1840.

“ Sir,

“ In obedience to your directions to drive the enemy from the position they had been fortifying for some days, on the left of Dog River, I marched out of our cantonments at daylight of the 24th, with four Turkish battalions, under his Excellency Selim Pacha; the second battalion of Royal Marines, under Capt. Fegan; and an Austrian rocket detachment, under Alfred de Vasilli Baldissiritto.

“ The ground on either side of the river is very high and precipitous, and offers great advantages to the defending, and very considerable danger to the attacking party; to secure against this, a Turkish battalion descended unseen near the entrance of the gorge through which Dog River runs, and gained the heights on the other side. The marines and Austrian rocket detachment, covered by this battalion, crossed higher up, crowned the heights, and

advanced on the enemy's position, about two leagues off; the Turkish battalion remained in position to cover our right, in the event of Souliman Pacha advancing from Beyrout to disturb our operations.

“ Three Turkish battalions descended into the gorge before the marines pushed their way up the river, and advanced by a mountain path to turn the enemy's left; this being perceived they abandoned their intrenchments, and occupied a new position on the heights of Ornagacuan, about a league to the right of their intrenchments.

“ The Turks advanced with great rapidity and gallantry.

“ General Jochmus, the chief of the staff, accompanied by my aide-de-camp, Lieut. Bradley, of the Powerful, put himself at the head of the skirmishers, and showed a noble example, which was as nobly followed by his Excellency Selim Pacha, at the head of a battalion. The country people also joined, and were not the last in advancing. The enemy's skirmishers were speedily driven in, and their main body, consisting of about 700 men, fired two volleys, and retired in great confusion; the Turks following them up with so much vigour

that between 300 and 400 prisoners were made, and the rest dispersed. The enemy's moving from their first position, on which the marines advanced, threw them out, and the work was done entirely by the Turks; they are, however, most anxious to try their strength, and I hope an opportunity will soon offer.

“ This operation opened the whole district of Kata, and the mountaineers, who had been driven from their homes, flocked down in great numbers, and were immediately armed.

“ I have great reason to be satisfied with the conduct of his Excellency Selim Pacha, and with General Jochmus, who fearlessly exposed himself in front, accompanied by my young friend, Lieut. Bradley, who for the first time smelt powder.

“ We have had a Turkish officer wounded and two men killed. Inclosed is a list of Turkish officers who particularly distinguished themselves, and whom I trust will meet with some mark of favour from the Sultan.

“ I have the honour, &c.

“ C. NAPIER, *Commodore.*”

“ Admiral the Hon. Sir Robt. Stopford,  
&c., &c., &c.”

It would have been desirable to have continued on these heights, but the advance from Beyrout, where Souliman Pacha was encamped, with from 10,000 to 12,000 men, was so easy, and our retreat across the Nahr-el-Kelb so difficult, that I thought it prudent next day to recross the river, and occupy our former position, and prepare for a blow on Sidon, where it was least expected.

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## CHAPTER VII.

Proposed Attack on Sidon abandoned; resumed—Instructions—Correspondence between the Author and Sir R. Stopford—Arrival at Sidon—Letter of Sir R. Stopford to the Admiralty—Summons to the Governor—Report to the Admiral of the Capture of the Town—Excellent behaviour of the Allied Troops—Fortitude of a Negro Soldier—Return to the Camp at D’Jounie.

SOME new idea had, however, been started in my absence; every body had his plan, and I am sure the Admiral must have been worried to death with the projects of the different people who had access to him; and on the morning of the 24th he informed me by letter that the attack on Sidon was given up for another.

“ Princess Charlotte, D’Jounie Bay,  
September 24, 1840.

“ Sir,

“ I have to acquaint you that the plan on Sidon is to be abandoned for another which I consider of far more importance, selecting a proper situation for the Turkish troops to remain in during the winter, as their remaining where they are is quite impossible.

“ Izzet Pacha will accompany the troops going to

Tyre, the place which appears best calculated for a winter settlement, and will, upon examination, take and keep possession of it if found favourable.

“ I am, Sir,

“ Your obedient servant,

“ ROBERT STOPFORD.”

This new project was happily set aside; and, after dining with the Admiral, on the 25th, I took my leave, promising to be back in forty-eight hours with the garrison of Sidon, and received orders to the following effect:

“ YOU will proceed with the steamer named in the margin\* with the troops put on board towards Sidon, where you will fall in with the Thunderer and Wasp, and take them under your orders.

“ The object is to arm the inhabitants in that quarter, and, if necessary, to land troops to allow of their approach towards Damour, which having done to the best of your power, the troops are to re-embark and go to Sidon, where you will summon the governor to give up the place, and on his refusal bring all the fire you can upon the forts and

\* Gorgon.

fortifications, avoiding as much as possible the destruction of private houses; should you, after due precaution, find the town to be evacuated, you will land the troops, under protection of the ships and take possession of it, retaining it long enough to distribute arms to the Syrians, which is the principal object of the expedition, after which you will return to this anchorage; but should the Egyptians not leave the town, you will seize every opportunity of supplying the Syrians with arms, by landing the troops, if necessary.

“Given under my hand, on board the Princess  
Charlotte, off D’Jounie, September 25, 1840.

“ROBERT STOPFORD.”

“Commodore Napier, H.M.S. Powerful.

“By command of the Commander-in-Chief,

“JOSEPH LOUDEN, *Sec.*”

This was followed up by a precautionary letter:

“My dear Commodore,

“September 25, 1840.

“You may naturally suppose that Ibrahim Pacha is not blind to our proceedings, and that he will know the weakening of our camp by the absence of our forces going with you. I therefore recommend

your return as speedily as possible after arming the people about Sidon. My letters from Alexandretta are so anxious for a ship that I shall send the *Magicienne* to Captain Stewart to order him there. Mr. Werry, our Consul, has been directed to quit, or remain prisoner in his house; he has chosen the latter. Much more efficient measures are taken there to oppose our proceedings than we find here. Tongues are cut out if persons are found to congregate contrary to the orders of Ibrahim.

“Yours, &c.,

“ROBERT STOPFORD.”

“My dear Admiral,

“September 25, 11 o'clock.

“I shall be back as quick as possible. Depend upon it Ibrahim Pacha will not touch our camp; the worst thing he could do would be to come in contact with us; he will not know of my absence before I return. Steam gives us a great superiority, and we shall keep them moving. I have pointed out to Jochmus what he must do under any circumstances.

“Believe me,

“Yours, &c.,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

At midnight we left Beyrout with the Gorgon and Cyclops, having a battalion of marines, 500 strong, under Captain Morrison, and a Turkish battalion of like force, commanded by Kourschid Aga. My broad pennant was on board the Gorgon, which, by the bye, was quite irregular, as a blue pennant cannot be moved, and any Captain might have objected serving under it, unless appointed to the ship where it was flying. The general printed instructions provided a remedy, by authorizing the Commander-in-Chief to substitute a red pennant, which, however, the Admiral, for reasons of which I am not aware, did not think proper to do.

At daylight next morning, the castles of Sidon, the twin sister of Tyre, the emporium of commerce in days gone by, appeared above the horizon, and the squadron under Captain Berkeley close at hand, anxiously expecting our arrival. Seeing no mountaineers at Damour, we pushed on at once to Sidon, which was summoned, and, on receiving no answer by eleven o'clock, the attack began, the description of which I give in my letter to the Admiral, together with his to the Admiralty :

“ Princess Charlotte, D’Jounie Bay,  
October 4, 1840.

“ Sir,

“ Considering the possession of Sidon as of great importance to the success of the Sultan’s cause, by giving confidence to his faithful subjects, and very much embarrassing the measures of Ibrahim Pacha, I directed Commodore Napier to proceed thither, and, after summoning the place, to make the attack. I have great satisfaction in communicating, for their Lordships’ information, the most complete success of this enterprise, as detailed in the Commodore’s letter herewith sent.

“ Our loss, as their Lordships will perceive by the return herewith transmitted, has been comparatively small, but still much to be regretted: the only officer killed was Lieutenant Hockin, of the Royal Marines, a young man of great promise, who had only arrived in the Stromboli, with a detachment of Royal Marines, in time to take part in the enterprise.

“ The place is still in our possession, and its capture seems to have been an unexpected blow to Ibrahim Pacha, and has much paralyzed his measures.

“ It is a very pleasing duty to me to call their

Lordships' attention to the excellent and judicious manner in which the plan of attack upon Sidon was laid by Commodore Napier, and the spirit and gallantry with which it was accomplished.

“ The ships employed upon this expedition were as follow:—Thunderer, Captain M. F. F. Berkeley; Guerriera, Austrian frigate, his Royal Highness Prince Frederick of Austria; Gorgon, Captain Henderson; Cyclops, Captain Austin; Wasp, Commander Mansel; Hydra, Commander Robinson; Stromboli, Commander Williams; Gul Sefide, Turkish corvette.

“ The Commodore expresses himself much obliged to Commander Mansel for his intelligent and active services. Amongst several individual acts of bravery, it appears from every account that the most prominent one belongs to Mr. Cummings, mate of the Cyclops.

“ After the Commodore left Sidon (Captain Berkeley has been left for its protection, with as many other vessels as can be spared, including the Guerriera, Austrian frigate), much skill and judgment have been displayed in putting the place into a good state of defence against an attack by Ibrahim Pacha, who is in that neighbourhood; and Captain

Berkeley mentions the ready assistance he at all times receives from his Royal Highness Prince Charles Frederick of Austria.

“ I have, &c.,

(Signed) “ ROBERT STOPFORD, *Admiral.*”

“ .M. O’Ferrall, Esq., &c., Admiralty.”

## SUMMONS.

“H. B. M. Steam Ship Gorgon,  
Sept. 26.

“ Sir,

“ In the name of the five united Powers, Turkey, England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, I demand that you immediately declare for the Sultan, your Master. Pardon for past offences will be granted; and the arrears to the troops will be paid by the Sultan.

“ CHARLES NAPIER, *Commodore.*”

“ To the Governor of Sidon.”

“ D’Jounie, Head-Quarters, Army of Lebanon,

“ Sir,

Sept. 29, 1840.

“ I embarked at sunset of the 25th instant, in obedience to your directions, with a Turkish battalion, under Chef de battailon Kourschid Aga, and the first battalion of Royal Marines, under Captain Mor-



risson, of the Princess Charlotte, in the two steam ships Gorgon and Cyclops, and proceeded off Sidon. At daylight the Thunderer, and the Austrian frigate Guerriera, commanded by the Archduke Frederick, a Turkish corvette, and Wasp, joined; as also Stromboli from England, with 284 marines, under Captain Wylock.

“The wind being light, the Cyclops towed the Thunderer to her position, previously fixed by Captain Berkeley. The Stromboli towed the Austrian frigate Guerriera, and the Turkish corvette, who were placed by Captain Berkeley abreast of the town. The Wasp and Stromboli anchored more to the southward, to flank it. The Gorgon, Cyclops, and Hydra, who joined from Tyre with Walker Bey, took up their positions to the southward, close to the castle. The inclosed summons was sent to the Governor, with which he refused to comply. The Turkish battalion was now put into the boats, and rendezvoused round the Cyclops; a few shot and shell were fired from the Gorgon at the castle and barracks, and shortly after, the whole of the squadron opened their broadsides to drive the troops from the houses and the intrenchments they had thrown up to prevent a landing. In half an hour

the firing ceased, and Captain Austin landed the Turkish battalion in the castle, which is joined to the town by a narrow causeway; this was effected with some loss. As the enemy still stuck to their intrenchments, the fire of the ships was again opened, and the houses in front battered down.

“Commander Mansel, of the *Wasp*, was directed to seize the first favourable moment of throwing the detachment of marines, brought out by Stromboli, and the Austrian marines, into the castle abreast of him, which he did with great gallantry and judgment.

“Lieutenant Hockin, of the Marines, and several men were killed and wounded. They were directed to work their way to the upper castle, which commanded the town.

“The first battalion of marines were now landed by Captain Henderson, of the *Gorgon*, on the beach to the northward of the town, where they formed, and advanced to the walls. All being now ready, the Turkish battalion, headed by Walker Bey and Captain Austin, pushed along the causeway, and entered the town. I put myself at the head of the British marines, and broke into the barracks. Captain Henderson, and another party, lodged them-

selves in a house above the barracks; this done, I marched the battalion along the line wall to the upper gate, broke it open, and seized the castle. All seemed now quiet below; and leaving a guard in the castle, we descended through several streets arched over, where occasional skirmishing took place, with detached parties of Egyptian troops, who were easily driven, and finally took refuge in a vaulted barrack, where we found upwards of a thousand men lying ready for a sortie, should occasion offer, or to lay down their arms. should they be discovered; the latter was their fate! I congratulate you, Sir, on the success of this enterprise. The garrison consisted of nearly 3000 men, and not one escaped; our force was under 1000. Our loss, which I inclose, has been trifling; one marine officer and three seamen, killed; two mates, a boatswain, and thirty men wounded.

“I have much reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the captains, officers, and men under my orders; all showed the greatest zeal, English, Austrian, and Turks vied with each other. Commander Mansel is an old officer well deserving of promotion. Messrs. McGuire and Price, old mates, are both severely wounded, and behaved most gallantly, as

did Mr. Cummings, mate of the Cyclops, whose conduct was seen by the Hon. Captain Berkeley, who wrote him a strong letter on the occasion, and I trust their Lordships will promote them. My aide-de-camp, Lieut. Bradley, was also forward on all occasions. The Archduke Frederick placed his ship well, and kept up an excellent fire; he landed with his men. Walker Bey, who was there by accident, was the first who advanced along the causeway.

“ My thanks are due to the Hon. Captain Berkeley, who assisted me on all occasions, as well as to Captains Henderson and Austin, Commanders Robinson and Williams, and the Captain of the Turkish corvette; to Captain Morrison, who commanded the Marine Battalion, and to Captain Wylock, who commanded the Marine Detachment.

“ I am also much indebted to Captain Loué, of the Prussian service, who is attached to my staff.

“ I have the honour be, &c.,

“ C. NAPIER, *Commodore.*

“ P.S.—Since writing my public letter on the capture of Sidon it has come to my knowledge that there was a complete race between Mr. James Hunt, midshipman of the Stromboli, and Signor Dominico

Chinca, midshipman of the Austrian frigate *Guerriera*, who should first place the colours in the part of the town they landed at.”

“To Admiral the Honourable  
Sir Robert Stopford, G.C.B.”

Half the garrison were immediately embarked, and arrived at Beyrout the same evening, thus keeping our word to the Admiral twenty-four hours sooner than we had promised.

In taking a town by storm, much confusion necessarily arises, accompanied by plunder and other barbarities, but to the honour of the Marines, the Austrians, and the Turks, I believe there never was an occasion where less blood was spilt, or disorder easier put an end to, which was to be attributed in a great degree to the exertions and excellent arrangements of Captain Berkeley (to whom I gave command of the town,) assisted by the Archduke and the Captains of the squadron.

Souliman Pacha's family embarked in a French steamer before the attack began; his house, situated in one of the positions first assailed, I regret suffered much, in spite of all the efforts of the officer to save it.

Next morning many wounded Egyptians were found in various parts of the town, and it was extraordinary to see the patience with which they endured their sufferings; a black man I particularly observed, with his leg broken, lying in a corner without uttering a murmur, though he appeared in much pain: a shutter was procured, on which he managed to place himself, holding the wounded leg with both hands, (for he would not accept assistance,) and in this manner he was safely carried to the hospital. In the afternoon I embarked the remainder of the garrison, and returned to D'Jounie Bay, after an absence of forty-eight hours, leaving a battalion of Turks in the town, and the squadron under Captain Berkeley.

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## CHAPTER VIII.

State of Affairs at D'Jounie—Effect of the Capture of Sidon—  
 The Emir Bechir Cassim joins the Allies—Overtures from  
 the Emir Bechir—Movements of Ibrahim Pacha—Capture  
 of Caiffa, and of Tyre; Captain Collier's Report—Con-  
 flicting opinions as to future Operations—Letter from Sir  
 R. Stopford—Insufficient boating of War Steamers.

ON the following morning I examined our positions, and found the enemy had again established themselves on the heights of Boharsof, and set fire to the habitations of the mountaineers of that district, (who had assisted in the first attack,) and driven their wives and families across the Nahr-el-Kelb, to Antoura, Argentoun, and the adjacent villages. War at all times is the parent of misery and destitution, and in this instance I found none of its horrors alleviated; it was heart-rending to see the unfortunate women and children encamped under trees in the mountains, without the means of subsistence, and on our part, without being able to offer them much relief.

The effect of taking Sidon soon began to show itself. Hitherto the Chiefs on the Mountain had not much confidence in our operations. Beyrout was still in the possession of the enemy, and they

could not understand how a defenceless town could hold out against a powerful squadron, but when they heard of the capture of Sidon, their eyes began to open.

The Emir Bechir Cassim, the next in succession to the old Emir Bechir, found means to escape with a few horse from the neighbourhood of Beyrout, and joined our camp, and the old Emir sent me a message by a priest, with a request to meet one of his emissaries at our advanced posts after dark, and he proposed the following terms:

1. Secresy: granted.

2. That he should retain his government, and be guaranteed by the Four Powers.

This, I said, was inadmissible, that his Firman was here confirming him in his government, and it depended on himself.

3. That he should be allowed time to withdraw his sons and grandsons from Ibrahim Pacha before he declared himself. This I thought reasonable, and acceded to it, with the understanding that I was to see a beginning as soon as possible.

I had no great confidence in this prince, as he had deceived me before; and it was arranged that the Firman of the Porte should be given to the Emir



Bechir Cassim, in the event of his not presenting himself at the appointed time. This prince, after staying a few days at D'Jounie, where he was well entertained, proceeded to take the command of the mountaineers who were watching the movements of Ibrahim and Osman Pacha at Merouba. When the former heard of the loss of Sidon, he was confounded, and immediately marched a part of his forces on Ibteddeen, the residence of the prince, for the double purpose of securing his fidelity, and endeavouring to recapture Sidon. On hearing of Ibrahim's departure, I reinforced Captain Berkeley, who commanded at Sidon, with a battalion of Turks, and shortly after with one of marines; this cooled Ibrahim's courage, and after staying a few days with the Emir, he set out for Beyrout, to concert measures with Souliman.

On the 29th of September, the Pique arrived with the accounts of the capture of Caiffa and Tyre, by that active officer, Captain Collier, who wrote as follows:

“ H.M.S. Castor, off Acre,  
Sept. 20, 1840.

“ Sir,

“ In compliance with your orders of the 14th instant, I have the honour to acquaint you that the

Castor, with the Pique and Ottoman frigate Dewan, appeared off Caiffa, in the evening of the 16th, and the following morning about six o'clock, a boat was dispatched with an officer of the Turkish frigate, accompanied by Lieutenant Shadwell, in one from this ship, both bearing flags of truce, to demand the surrender of the place to the Sublime Porte; the flag was refused, and peremptorily warned off; the ships took up their berths, Lieutenant Wellesley, of this ship, ably assisting in placing the Ottoman frigate, and a fire was opened on the batteries, the Castor commencing, which were manned and ready to receive us, with 500 men in the town; but such was the effect of the first few broadsides, that the troops abandoned their posts, deserted the town, leaving their arms, knapsacks, &c., in all directions. The Ottoman flag was soon planted on the ramparts by Lieutenant Patey, accompanied by Lieutenant Winthrop, Messrs. Connelly and Boyd, mates; Mr. Hare, midshipman; and Mr. Cole, second master; who were immediately joined by Lieutenants Carey and Macdougall, and a party of seamen and marines from the Pique; and the whole party proceeded to spike and destroy, by knocking off the trunnions and burning the carriages of the eight guns on the

ramparts. A quantity of arms, stores, and munitions of war were found in the magazines, all of which were either brought off or destroyed, amongst which were two 13-inch mortars, which were put on board the Ottoman frigate.

“The following morning, the 18th, the *Castor* shifted her berth to cover the entrance to the Acre gate, at the distance of one mile from which 500 troops were distinctly seen drawn up. Towards the middle of the day, an officer and a few men had planted themselves in a castle, mounting five guns, in the rear of, and commanding the town, but the well directed fire of the *Pique* and *Castor* soon wounded the officer and dislodged the men, some of the latter seeking safety on board this ship. Considering the destruction of this castle and its guns most desirable, I ordered the marines of the two frigates, with their respective officers, Lieutenants Varlo, Moubray, and Hamley, Lieutenant Wellesley; Messrs. Cockburn and Gibbard, mates; Mr. Foley, midshipman; and Mr. Ramage, clerk; with a few seamen, all under command of Lieutenant Patey, senior Lieutenant of this ship, on that service, which was gallantly and completely executed, by the guns being thrown out and the walls shook to their

foundations, and this in full view of 500 of the Egyptian army.

“ I am pleased to observe, that all this service has been performed without the loss of a man, although I am grieved to say that Lieutenant Macdougall, of the Pique, has been severely wounded, by the discharge of one of the enemy's guns, whilst in the act of spiking it; and also Mr. Gill, carpenter of that ship, by the same explosion.

“ To my much valued friend, Captain Boxer, who has been unceasing in his exertions, both on shore and on board, in the execution of this service, I am much indebted for the success of the enterprise. The destruction of the defences of the town has been most complete; some prisoners have been taken, and many deserters have come over to us. I have great pleasure in apprising you, that the zealous co-operation of the Ottoman frigate Dewan, in the service, has been highly meritorious to all on board, and calls for my warmest approbation.

“ To Mr. Young, the Consul of Palestine, I am much indebted for the service he has rendered me, by his knowledge of the people and localities of country.

“ Captain Boxer speaks in high terms of the

conduct of Lieutenant Galway, who accompanied the boats of the Pique both days; Messrs. Morris and Heath, mates; Messrs. Hawkins, Kenly, and Bridge, midshipmen; and Mr. Partridge, volunteer of the first class.

“ I consider it my duty to recommend to your notice, Lieutenant Patey, senior Lieutenant of this ship, as well as Mr. Cockburn, the senior mate, employed on shore, for their officer-like, cool, and steady conduct; indeed, too much praise cannot be given to every officer and man employed on this service, for the manner in which they conducted themselves through three days of arduous and fatiguing duty.

“ I am, &c.,

“ EDWARD COLLIER, *Captain.*”

“ Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, G.C.B.,  
Commander-in-Chief.”

“ H.M.S. Castor,  
Tsour, September 26.

“ Sir,

“ I have the honour to acquaint you, that agreeably with the arrangements I had made, the Castor appeared off Jaffa on the 22nd, the following day calling again off Caiffa, whence, proceeding in the further execution of your orders of the 14th instant,

the Pique, and Ottoman frigate Dewan, in company, I beg to acquaint you that Her Majesty's two frigates took up their positions off this town about noon on the 24th instant, (having ordered the Ottoman frigate to take a position in the South Bay, which the badness of the anchorage prevented her doing, and from the calms and light winds she did not rejoin until yesterday): the town was summoned by an officer bearing a flag of truce, to surrender to the Sultan, to which the civil authorities readily consented; but as 500 Egyptian troops still kept possession, I directed the inhabitants to be warned to quit the town immediately, as it was my intention to dislodge the soldiers, and having given them sufficient time to do so, a fire was opened by both ships at the distance of about 500 yards, which soon accomplished the object. At day-light the following morning, Captain Boxer having gallantly landed and reconnoitred to prevent surprise, the marines of the two frigates, with a few small-arm-men, under the command of Lieutenant Patey, senior Lieutenant of this ship, landed and took possession of the town, which we still hold. Two guns were found mounted on the works, the trunnions of which were knocked off; also, a vast

quantity of grain in the public stores, and some munitions of war; a brig has been loaded with part of the former, and the latter brought off.

“The arduous duty of levelling great sandbanks ten feet high, thrown up by the enemy to cover the approach to the town from the fire of the ships, loading grain, and in gun-boats by day and night, all in full view of 1500 of the enemy’s troops, who are two miles off, will, I hope, sanction my recommending to your notice every individual officer and man of the two ships, for each man has nobly performed his part in like manner as at Caiffa.

“To my gallant friend, Captain Boxer, I am deeply indebted for the assistance he has afforded me on every occasion in the execution of this service, but particularly for his vigilance each day in preventing surprise on the troops landing. He speaks in the highest terms of Lieut. Curry, senior Lieutenant of the Pique, who had charge of the party employed levelling the approach to the town.

“It affords me much pleasure to say we have not lost a man on this service, and I am much gratified in being able to state that none of the inhabitants have been hurt.

“I feel myself called upon to recommend espe-

cially to your notice Lieutenant Patey of this ship, as an officer of great merit, who has highly distinguished himself on this service as well as at Caiffa.

“I have, &c.,

“EDWARD COLLIER, *Captain.*”

“Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, G.C.B.,  
Commander-in-Chief.”

The most difficult part of my task was to contend against the conflicting opinions of officers, both English and Turks; every man had his notions; one wanted one plan of operations, another a different one, each person very naturally thinking the part of the coast he had been employed upon the best to occupy, without having the smallest knowledge of what was going on in the mountains. No sooner was the Pique arrived than the Admiral wrote to me :

“My dear Commodore,

“Pique arrived, and brought the letters I send you. I fear we have too many irons in the fire, we must begin to concentrate. Captain Boxer thinks that Tyre is very preferable to Sidon for permanent holding for winter; I send him to you that you may



compare your opinions and decide which is best, and by degrees the stores from hence may be removed. I must soon embark the marines to have the ships efficient.

“Revenge must go off to Acre with the Pique to cut off communications. If the Turks cannot defend themselves they must also embark. I will not agree to any further operations.

“Yours, &c.,

“ROBERT STOPFORD.”

“To Commodore Napier.”

I plainly saw that the Admiral was tormented with the conflicting opinions of those who had access to him, and who gave him the most absurd reports. At one moment the enemy were said to be advancing upon us with 20,000 men, though there was a deep ravine between us which could only be crossed at one or two places, and those places watched; at another moment it was said I was preparing to march the troops into the interior of the country without even consulting the Commander-in-Chief; this was deliberately communicated to him by an officer, without having the smallest foundation, and a strong letter was actually written to me on the

subject, and which letter would have been sent had not Captain Berkeley, who happened to be on board the flag ship at the time, assured the Admiral that there was not one word of truth in it.

It was necessary to be patient and persevering, and I wrote to the Admiral that I was sorry to find that he had decided not to undertake any further operations, because, in that case, I feared that all we had already done would be lost, and I felt quite satisfied, were we to go away without taking Beyrout, which would free the country from Souliman and Ibrahim Pacha, all the arms we had issued would fall into their hands; that the family of Emir Haider, who was a prisoner in Egypt, had decided to declare for the Sultan, the moment they could get rid of Ibrahim and procure arms, and that I saw no means of doing this but by taking Beyrout; that it was impossible to cross Dog River and attack Ibrahim with Souliman on my right and Osman Bey in front. The latter might be surprised, but it must be done by troops who could march well, because it would not do to be long absent from our camp. To which the Admiral replied in the following terms:

“My dear Commodore,

“September 30, 1840.

“By what process of reasoning you have brought your mind to hazard so unwarrantable an assertion, that unless we take Beyrout all the arms we have issued will fall into the hands of Mehemet Ali’s generals, is to me quite incomprehensible. I assert directly the contrary, and say the attack of a place like Beyrout, having had ample time to prepare for its defence, conducted by a skilful general, would mar all that we have hitherto so successfully done ; no place, so circumstanced, ought to be attacked upon rumours, upon surmises, and expectations.

“We are certain of sustaining a great loss of men, equally certain are we that, with our present force, and we cannot hold it after getting possession ; any number of troops can approach on the front of the town without being annoyed, as we can only command the two flanks. Could we depend on the co-operation of 3000 or 4000 mountaineers at the least, knock down every house in Beyrout, the enemy’s troops would still remain in it, and we shall have to force our way through barricaded streets, placed so low that our shot cannot destroy them.

“Under all these circumstances I shall not take

upon myself to order an attack on Beyrout of such very doubtful issue.

“With respect to what I said to you yesterday, about not entering, at present, into any new enterprise, I did not by any means wish to restrain the operations of our troops against the enemy near our positions, or at any reasonable distance from it. All that has been hitherto performed with so much spirit and ability, as to give me full confidence in the success of similar skirmishes.

“Your’s, &c.

“ROBERT STOPFORD.”

“To Commodore Napier.”

In all our expeditions with steam-vessels we found great difficulty in landing troops, from the insufficient manner in which the steamers are boated, and we were obliged to take the line-of-battle ships’ boats to enable us to land a sufficient number of men; and I take this opportunity of strongly recommending the paddle boats invented by Capt. G. Smith, particularly for steam vessels on military excursions.

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## CHAPTER IX.

Destruction of Stores at Beyrout—Intermeddling of Izzet Pacha—Correspondence between the Author and Sir R. Stopford—Visit to Tyre and Sidon, and Reconnoissance of Acre.

ON the 2nd of October an Egyptian gunner deserted to the Hastings, at Beyrout, and gave information that a train was laid along the bridge to the eastern castle, in which there was a considerable quantity of powder, and he offered to accompany a party to cut the train and seize the powder. Commander Worth, in one of the Hastings' boats, volunteered this dangerous service, and, protected by the launch and pinnace of the Edinburgh, and covered by the fire of the ships, landed on the bridge, under a heavy fire of musketry, cut off the train, then got into the castle, brought off 31 barrels of powder, and threw over the walls about 60 or 70 more. This service was not performed without loss: Mr. Luscomb, a midshipman of the Hastings, was killed, the Egyptian, and two seamen of the Hastings, and one of the Edinburgh, wounded. In the afternoon another landing took place, under Commander

Hastings, of the Edinburgh, and they brought off six cases and one barrel, and threw a great number over the walls. On this occasion there was only one man wounded. Though these expeditions were successful, it showed the enemy were alive, and the loss met with put another damper on the attack of Beyrout.

Izzet Pacha, a meddling and savage old Turk, without capacity, had been appointed Governor of Syria; hitherto he had been quiet, but as things began to brighten he began to meddle, and urged me to march on Merouba and attack Osman Pacha, not considering that by so doing we exposed ourselves to be attacked by Souliman, who was within four hours' march of our position; he also proposed to abandon Sidon, which had been captured only a few days before; in this he was supported by many who ought to have known better, and I was urged to undertake this Quixotic expedition merely to please the old Pacha. This I peremptorily refused; he then sent Admiral Walker to Sir Robert Stopford to urge him to attempt it, and he wrote to me on the subject:—

“ My dear Commodore,

“ October 1, 1840.

“ The Pacha has sent Admiral Walker to me to say that he is very desirous of going this evening to a post four hours' distant to attack a party of troops belonging to Osman Pacha, and that he wishes to have a battalion of marines with him, and some rockets, asking if I had any objection to this plan. In the first place, I am very unwilling to place marines under Turkish officers; and secondly, I have no confidence in them.

“ I do not hear of General Jochmus going out with the Pacha, or having been consulted.

“ I shall, therefore, express to the Pacha my wish that this expedition should be delayed until the return of some troops from Sidon, by which time you may perhaps discover the object of this plan, with the probability of its success.

“ The Pacha also signified his wish that Sidon should be abandoned, and an attack made on Tripoli.

Beyrout appears to have revived again; the Pacha says there are 4500 men in its immediate neighbourhood. It is of no use getting more men from the mountains till we have arms to give them.

“ If Sir Charles Smith is well enough on his arrival I shall request him to look at Sidon, to ascertain the nature of its defences.

“ I wish Berkeley would send a steamer here.

“ Your's truly,

“ ROBERT STOPFORD.”

“ To Commodore Napier.”

To this I made answer as follows :

“ My dear Admiral,

“ October 1, 1840.

“ I would certainly not allow our marines to go out with Turks ; when they go, I go ; and I quite agree with you we ought to pause a day or two. I am turning over things in my mind, and I shall shortly prepare you a coup ; to cross Dog River cannot be done with safety ; I have been all over the ground to-day. I send you a letter to Souliman Pacha ; if you approve of it you can send it, and if not you had better keep it. I have not had time to see you to-day, but will to-morrow, in the course of the day.

“ Believe me your's, &c.

“ CHAS. NAPIER.”

“ Admiral Sir R. Stopford, G.C.B.”



This affair was in consequence given up, and I proceeded in the Hydra to Sidon, which I found Captain Berkeley had put in a good posture of defence; he accompanied me to Tyre, which was under the protection of Captain Collier; and I found it a very unfit place to put a force on shore for the winter, being only fifteen miles from Acre, where there was a strong garrison, possessing every material requisite to drive us out, should the squadron be obliged to quit the coast. From Tyre we went on to Acre, which was closely reconnoitred, but not without receiving a salutation from the batteries; only one shot took effect, but did no damage.

In the evening I returned to D'Jounie, bringing back the marine battalion, perfectly satisfied, as were all who accompanied me, that Acre presented no difficulties that could not be overcome, when the proper time arrived for attacking it.

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## CHAPTER X.

Osman Pacha defeated by the Emir Bechir Cassim at Merouba  
 —Proposed Attack on Beyrout—Correspondence with Sir  
 Robert Stopford—Letter from the Emir Bechir Cassim—  
 Letters to Lords Minto and Palmerston—Visit to the  
 Encampment of the Emir Bechir Cassim—Comfortless  
 quarters at Argentoun—Return—Preparations for the  
 Attack of Beyrout.

I WAS much pleased, on my return, to find the Emir Bechir Cassim, taking advantage of Ibrahim having weakened his forces before Merouba, had attacked Osman Pacha, defeated him, taken between 400 and 500 prisoners, and obliged him to retire on Basquinta, at the head of the Nahr-el-Kelb. It now became absolutely necessary to act with vigour, and I again brought Beyrout under the Admiral's consideration, and was glad to find he approved of it, and he wrote to me as follows:—

“ My dear Commodore,

“ October 5, 1840.

“ This Emir is a capital fellow, and has done good service. In a conversation I had with the Pacha yesterday he thought it would much facilitate the fall of Beyrout if the passes in the adjoining

hills could be cleared, to allow the mountaineers to come down, who he says are all armed.

“ In furtherance of the object of attacking Beyrout I shall go there in the afternoon, after embarking our marines, and those of the Edinburgh and Hastings, in a steamer; these men will have to embark all their various concerns, as it will be unnecessary to land them here again.

“ I am sorry to say we have now 100 sick on board, mostly our own men.

“ The Pacha wishes to come to Beyrout; he had better embark with Walker Bey, and be towed up, and the Turkish flag ought to be displayed.

“ I may, perhaps, pound Beyrout to-morrow, but the attack on shore will wait your arrival. There are fully 3000 men outside the town, with 20 field pieces.

“ Your’s very truly,

“ ROBERT STOPFORD.”

“ To Commodore Napier.”

This looked like business, and I lost no time in replying as follows; an opportunity offering, I also wrote to Lords Minto and Palmerston:—

“ My dear Admiral,                      “ Powerful, October 5, 1840.

“ I inclose you a letter\* I wrote last night to the prince, and his answer. I am now going off to concert measures with him. If he is prepared to come down the left bank of Dog River we shall then cross over, but were we to do it without him to clear the mountains, we should expose our right to be turned by Souliman Pacha. All this our good Pacha on shore does not think of. I am glad he is going with Walker Bey; the fact is, he is afraid to stay here when we attack Beyrout, for fear the enemy should come in upon our camp, which I shall take care they do not do.

“ I send off the Princess Charlotte’s marines, and am glad you are going; the effect will be good. The marines of the other two ships shall be kept in readiness to go in Stromboli, but with your permission I will not embark them till after my interview with the prince, who is a trump. Permit me, my dear Admiral, to congratulate you on our unexampled success; all we have now to do is to act with great judgment, accompanied by dash when a favourable opportunity offers.

“ I find last night, notwithstanding all that has

\* This letter is lost.

been said to the Pacha, he sent one battalion to the mountains, where they were useless, and withdrew another from a very important pass, without either myself or Jochmus knowing one word about it; so much for Turkish tactics.

“ With your permission I will keep the Austrian rockets also till after I have seen the prince. I shall have a long ride, but I find personal interviews and examining the country one’s-self, preferable to correspondence, which is always uncertain here.

“ Believe me your’s, &c.,

“ CHARLES NAPIER.”

“ Admiral Sir R. Stopford, G.C.B.”

*Emir Bechir Cassim’s Letter.*

“ October 4, 1840.

“ I HAVE received your kind letter, and find you are sorry that I took the Turkish troops with me; they came of their own accord, not to fight, only for amusement, and they have returned quite safe. The troops of the mountains, after one day’s fighting, drove back Osman Pacha, took more than 300 prisoners and more than 60 killed, still my troops are following him to Natasanine. What you say about coming by the province of Kátá, when we meet, we will talk about it; I will do everything I

can; but now what is necessary is for one scheik and 500 men to remain in Tegretil Bunduk (near Masra), to prevent the enemy from entering Kesrouan, and we have written about it, and expect to put this place in order before we return. I have the ague and fever; it is very bad for us. The provisions have not been sent. There is no excuse for the muleteers, as they can hear our firing. Mr. Wood promised to come to me; he has not; if the fever returns to me, and I cannot come to you, let him come to me, and we will talk together about this business."

The following are my letters to the Earl of Minto and Viscount Palmerston.

" Head-quarters, Army of Lebanon,  
D'Jounie, October 7, 1840.

" My Lord,

" The Admiral's dispatch will inform your Lordship what is passing here. The Little Prince, Emir Bechir, destroyed Osman Pacha's army on the 4th, with his mountaineers, and crossed over Dog River this morning. I have moved forward the Turkish troops, and am preparing to advance the whole army by land and by water, preparatory to attacking Souliman Pacha, who is still at Beyrout, and in the

neighbourhood; the town is strongly barricaded, and as yet we have not attempted it. If we succeed in moving him we have little more to do in Lebanon; and I do not think the enemy will enter these provinces again. We expect every day 4000 more Turks; and I hear that Sir Charles Smith is better; if he is able to work, my functions cease, which I regret; however, I have had a glorious time of it, and all my plans have completely succeeded.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.,

“ CHARLES NAPIER.”

“ To the Right Hon. Earl Minto.”

“ Head-Quarters, Army of Lebanon,

“ My Lord,

D’Jounie, October 7, 1840.

“ Success attends our operations; we attacked on the 24th the enemy’s advanced posts on the left bank of the Dog River, and made between 400 and 500 prisoners. On the 26th I attacked and took Sidon, and made nearly 3000 prisoners. On the 4th of October the little Emir Bechir attacked and destroyed Osman Bey’s army, who have retired on Balbec, and this morning he has entered the province of Kata, and I have moved forward the Turkish troops. We are now preparing to attack

Souliman Pacha, and if we succeed, the whole of the country, with the exception of the position of the Grand Prince, will be cleared and armed. We have then Tripoli to turn our attention to, which I think will be an easier conquest. Acre will be a tougher job, but I believe within our power to accomplish, unless more forces are brought against us; we expect 4000 more Turkish troops every day, which will be a great assistance. Sir Charles Smith, I hear, is better; if he is able to take the command, my functions cease, which I am sorry for. I hope, in the final settlement of this question, some attention will be paid to the mountaineers of Lebanon; they ought to have added to their territory the seaports of Sidon, Beyrout, and Tripoli; this would be most advantageous to them, and most beneficial to the interests of England. They would pay a tribute to the Porte, and have the sea open to the export of their produce without the vexatious exaction of the Turks.

“Your Lordship will excuse this letter, I have hardly a moment to myself.

“I have the honour to be, &c.,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

“To the Right Hon. Lord Palmerston.”



After a very fatiguing journey of eight hours, I found the Prince encamped in a glen surrounded by the most rugged and savage rocks, perched on the top of which were many mountaineers to prevent surprise. From 1500 to 2000 men were in the camp, dressed in the gay costume of the Mountain. The Prince himself was in a small tent, surrounded by his Emirs and Scheiks, and received me with the greatest kindness. After complimenting him on his victory, through the medium of my interpreter, the tent was cleared, and I pointed out to him the plan of operations I meant to pursue to gain possession of Beyrout, which he quite approved of, and promised his cordial cooperation the moment he was supplied with ammunition and provisions, which the Turkish Commissary was most negligent in doing; they were almost in a starving state, a few goats being all they could procure in the mountains, and the horses were entirely without barley. After staying an hour, we returned to Argentoun; the road was strewed with dead and dying Egyptians, some of them stark naked, and it was with the utmost difficulty I could persuade the mountaineers to assist in getting the poor wretches crammed into a small cottage on the

road-side; they did not put the prisoners to death, but they stripped them, and left these poor creatures to die of cold and want.

At Argentoun we did not find our quarters at all improved since our last visit; in addition to the bed-fellows we had to encounter, we were obliged to turn in supperless; having calculated on getting back to the camp the same night, we brought no provisions with us, and not even an egg was to be had for love or money. Next morning, at daylight, we were on horse, and by noon arrived at D'Jounie.

On the morning of the 7th I sent a battalion across the Nahr-el-Kelb to support some of the mountaineers who had collected there, and other preparations were made to move on Beyrout by sea and land. The Grand Prince was also directed to cross higher up, and to keep me regularly informed of all his movements.

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## CHAPTER XI.

March towards Beyrout—Apprehensions of the Admiral—Arrangements in case of Disaster—Letters to and from the Emir Bechir Cassim—Skirmish—Position at Boharsof—Omar Bey dispatched to join the Emir—Letter to the Admiral—Arrival of Sir Charles Smith—The Author ordered to return to the Camp.

ON the 8th (October) General Jochmus marched out of his position with four Turkish battalions, and occupied Ornagacuan, pushing his advanced posts as far as Boharsof, opposite to which, on the hills above, commanding a winding road, were observed a few of the enemy's light troops. In the evening the Admiral became alarmed at our intended movement, and wrote as follows:—

“ My dear Commodore,

“ October 8.

“ I cannot but feel most sensibly alive to the imminent risk in which we have placed ourselves and our former successes, by the very precarious result of our projected expedition.

“ If we draw the mountaineers from their fastnesses on the hills, and are obliged to embark in consequence of an attack from Ibrahim, we expose

those men to certain destruction. Let the young Emir depend upon his information for coming down the mountains or not, but do not persuade him to rely too much on a Turkish force.

“We must leave a sufficient number of troops in our position here and the outposts to render it secure from a sudden attack.

“Should the Emir object to join you, you must fall back. Nothing but the advanced state of the season induces me to assent to this plan, which I consider pregnant with risk and uncertainty, and not waiting for the reinforcements.

“Yours, &c.,

“ROBERT STOPFORD.”

“To Commodore Napier.”

I felt so confident that the arrangements I had made must succeed, and had received from Souliman Pacha's aide-de-camp, who came over to us, such information about the position of the enemy's army, who were much disheartened, that I did not at all enter into the Admiral's apprehensions, and wrote to him that I had received most satisfactory information from the aide-de-camp, and that he might rely upon it I should do nothing rash, or move till

assured all was right; that two hours would bring us all back, and Ibrahim must march very quick if he could beat steam.

At daylight on the 9th, I sent an Arab battalion, composed of Egyptian deserters, to join General Jochmus, and shortly after I left my head-quarters at D'Jounie, and arrived on the heights of Orna-gacuan at nine. The Princess Charlotte proceeded in tow of a steamer to Beyrout, and two others with a marine and Turkish battalion to St. George's Bay, to keep Souliman in check; in our lines were left four battalions, and the sick and convalescents took charge of the camp at D'Jounie. In the event of disaster, or meeting a very superior force in front, it would have been impossible to have repassed Dog River, I therefore sent directions to Captain Austin, of the *Bellerophon*, who flanked its mouth, to fill up the road that had been broke up leading from Beyrout; and I made my arrangements to retire to the convent and heights above the river, gain the road, and cross at its mouth, under cover of the *Bellerophon*. This could have been effected with little loss.

Before leaving D'Jounie, I wrote to the Prince Cassim as follows:—

“ Prince,

“ October 9.

“ The Emir Bechir is not come; if at twelve o'clock to-day he is not here, you are Grand Prince. I cross over Dog River this morning, and will occupy Ornagacuan. I wish you to cross over immediately, and join me on the heights of Boharsof to-morrow morning; we shall then march on Beyrout.

“ I have the honour to remain,

“ Your's, &c.,

“ CHAS. NAPIER.

Soon after this was dispatched, came a letter from the Emir :—

“ 9th October.

“ THIS morning I have sent all the troops to Basquinta, with the Princes, and I am going to Ma-sàrà because I am ill. I hope the troops will drive the enemy away. I have received the firman which you sent me. I have read it before all my people, and I have thanked you for this honour. I have sent one of the Emirs to Blazebel to put those troops in good order, and drive the enemy away, because, though there were a good many chiefs there before,

they were of no use. I beg you always to send the provisions and ammunition; and now send more, because I am going to El-Metten, and every day I shall have more people; and I have named Scheik Uden, Scheik Sarley, and Scheik Sal-Ufine to take the provisions, and send them to me. Mr. Wood will tell you everything."

So far all appeared right; there had been a little skirmishing with the mountaineers, but we had no idea that an enemy of any force was at hand, and were very comfortably seated in the convent at Ornagacuan, enjoying a tolerable breakfast after our long ride. During our repast, the firing became brisker and nearer, and before we were quite finished, a priest came in with the intelligence that the enemy were in our position. General Jochmus, who had been out in the morning, was incredulous; but I thought it high time to beat to arms, get on horse, and see what was going forward. By this time the fire was very sharp; and when I got near the advanced posts, I found sure enough they had been driven in, and the enemy's skirmishers were actually in our position. No time was to be lost; two Turkish battalions advanced en tirailleur,

and another in column, supported by two others and the Egyptian battalion, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance, we succeeded in driving them back. Our position was along a high mountain, with a deep ravine on each side. Towards the end of the position there was a considerable descent; another mountain rose at nearly right angles, the ravine to the left went round it, but to the right it finished, and a circuitous road led from the foot of the mountain, and conducted to its summit, where we discovered a strong body of Egyptians covering another column, who were retiring along the road I have mentioned. This first position was commanded by another, and it again by a third, the approach to them nearly perpendicular; another road led from the first position to Bechfaya. The appearance of this unexpected force, and the strength of the ground, rather staggered me, and after examining it with great attention, and consulting Colonel Hodges, an old Peninsular warrior, and the other officers under my command, I decided that nothing could be done by an attack in front, unless assisted by the Emir Bechir, who had not yet made his appearance; and I felt satisfied, that as the enemy had not pushed



forward when they had actually got into our position, I had nothing to fear now we were aware of their force, and prepared to meet them.

In the evening the Emir wrote as follows to General Jochmus:—

“October 9.

“I have received your letter, and our troops to-day at ten o'clock left Merouba for Basquinta; perhaps they will get there before sunset; that place is seven hours from you. I had the fever, and could not move with the troops; but I hope to-morrow to join them. I hear Osman Pacha arrived yesterday at Suwacka-Suswat, distant from Basquinta two hours and a half; if we meet him there, we will drive him away; it will not do to leave him a march behind us. We want men on horseback to be in your service. We send the bearer Mansur.”

This intelligence was not very pleasing; it would be impossible for them to arrive in the rear of the Egyptians before the afternoon of the 10th, even if they met with no opposition and used their best exertions, and this would have given another day for Ibrahim and Souliman to concert a movement. I

was, however, determined to keep my ground, and I desired Jochmus to order Omar Bey, who had been left in our position, to march on Argentoun, cross over Dog River, and endeavour to form a junction with Emir Bechir. This was a very dangerous movement, the pass was difficult, and if discovered in the act of crossing, the consequences would have been serious. Omar Bey was, however, a good soldier; I placed full confidence in him, and I wrote to the Emir Bechir as follows:—

“ Prince,

“ Convent, October 9, 1840.

“ We are here at the convent of Ornagacuan with five battalions; the enemy is in front of us under Osman Bey, and the Emir Mourat at Caillet Medun. I have ordered two battalions to march on Argentoun, cross Dog River in the night, and get in the enemy's rear. Leave Osman Pacha to himself, march rapidly on Bechfaya, and join Omar Bey. When I hear your firing, I shall attack.

“ CHAS. NAPIER.”

At day-light on the morning of the 10th, I observed the English Consul's flag flying in Beyrout, and a brisk communication going on between the

ships and the town; that, and the steam-boats moving from St. George's Bay, led me to believe, that Beyrout was evacuated, and that Souliman Pacha was concentrating his troops to attack my right, while Ibrahim, who we ascertained was our opponent, attacked my front; under these circumstances it was not a pleasing sight to see the Turks and marines, who were stationed in St. George's Bay for the express purpose of watching Souliman, removed to take possession of an abandoned town, thus leaving my right quite exposed, and I wrote to the Admiral, giving him an account of my position as follows:

“ My dear Admiral,

“ October 10.

“ I am on the heights of Ornagacuan, in a very strong position: the enemy are in front, close to me, also in an unassailable position: we drove in the out-posts yesterday. I last night received a letter from the Prince, who is not well, but his troops were at Basquinta, about five hours march from the enemy. I have desired him to advance on their rear, and I have directed two battalions to march on Argentoun, ready to cross Dog River at the first favourable moment.

“I see you have sent men to Beyrout, so I presume it has capitulated; this may change our operations. If Souliman reinforces Ibrahim, who is here, it might be proper to withdraw in the night, embark every soul in the steam-boats, go round to West Bay, land our troops there before day-light, and precipitate ourselves on Souliman’s camp; this can only be done when we hear what the Prince may do. But if you do not want the steam-boats at Beyrout they ought all to be in the Bay, in order that I might embark without a human being knowing it but yourself. Hodges, who is in my confidence, and who will stay till you send the steam-boat to Constantinople, will be able to answer any question you may please about us. I hope to hear from you the news about Beyrout. Be quite easy, my dear Admiral, about us, and believe me to remain,

“ Yours, &c.,

“ (Signed) CHARLES NAPIER.”

I had heard a report of Sir Charles Smith’s arrival, but I did not apprehend he would assume the command till after the performance of the service now in progress. Shortly after dispatching

this letter, however, I received two from the Admiral, dated the day before, which prepared me to expect an order to retreat; they were as follows:—

“ Princess Charlotte, D’Jounie Bay,  
“ Sir, October 9th, 1840.

“ Colonel Sir Charles Smith having arrived with a Firman from the Sultan, constituting him General in command of all his forces in Syria, nothing is in future to be undertook without his order, and you will abstain from any further operations until further orders.

“ I send the steamer as before ordered, to protect your right, if necessary, but not to land their troops.

“ I am, Sir,

“ Your most obedient humble Servant,

“ ROBERT STOPFORD.”

“ Commodore Sir Charles Napier,  
H.M.S. Powerful.”

“ My dear Commodore, “ October 9th, 1840.

“ Colonel Sir Charles Smith will listen to all your plans, and readily adopt them if he thinks them feasible, but his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Turks, and senior officer of the Europeans, gives him the sole military authority.

“I hope you will listen to, and receive him with kindness, not bordering on any feeling of disappointment.

“It will be no discredit to our arms to make a military reconnoissance, and to retire if necessary.

“Yours truly,

“ROBERT STOPFORD.”

This was followed up as I expected, by another from the Admiral.

“My dear Commodore,

“October 10th.

“The nature of our operations being completely changed by our possession of Beyrout, from which place the enemy’s troops were withdrawn last night, that I have sent you an order with the advice and opinion of Sir Charles Smith, appointed by Firman to command the Turkish forces, to return without a moment’s loss of time, and with due security to your troops, which appear in some degree of insecurity.

“Yours truly,

“ROBERT STOPFORD.”

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## CHAPTER XII.

Impossibility of immediately retiring—Letter to the Admiral—His Answer—Arrival of the Emir—Advance upon the Enemy—Doubtful character of the Forces on both sides—Novelty of the Author's situation—Battle of Boharsof—Defeat and Flight of Ibrahim—An awkward Mistake—A Green Egyptian Flag taken, and said to be lost again—Promptitude of Omar Bey—Turkish mode of Rejoicing—Second Letter of Recall—Note to the Admiral—Letter respecting the Author's return to D'Jounie—Official Report of the Battle of Boharsof.

OUR movements were however begun, and a retreat impossible, without compromising both the Prince and Omar Bey; I therefore decided on going on, and sent orders to our camp to hurry up the two remaining battalions to occupy Ornagacuan, and secure our right when we began the attack: and I ordered a battalion to cross over a deep ravine, ready to turn the enemy's left when we attacked in front. This latter movement, from the procrastination natural to Turks, was not executed till several hours after the order was given.

As we every moment expected to hear of an attack on the enemy's rear, the answer to the Admiral's last letter was simple enough. I subjoin it, and the reply which he made.

“ My dear Admiral,

“ October 10, 1840, 2 P.M.

“ Since you have given the command to Sir Charles Smith, of course I shall return to my ship. I have been too much annoyed with other people’s plans since I have had the command, to offer mine to my successor. It is no part of my character to receive him with either pique or unkindness.

“ You do not seem to be at all aware of my present position. I am strongly posted. The enemy is within musket shot of me, strongly posted also. The Emir Bechir is marching in his rear, and I have two battalions ready to cross Dog River higher up to support him, so that if he advances as he writes me he is doing, we shall probably destroy Ibrahim. But I wish you to understand, that it is likely that Souliman Pacha will send more troops up here, and you have taken away from my right the marines and a Turkish battalion; they ought to be sent back, and the steam-boats, if you can spare them, should be kept in the bay, for if we defeat this army, we ought to fall instantly on Souliman; and even if we retire from here, this ought to be done. Admiral



Bandeira informs me that 400 men have already been moved up to join the enemy.

“ Believe me, &c.,

“ (Signed) CHARLES NAPIER.

“ P.S. I have just received a note from Sir Charles Smith, who, I hear, is gone to Tyre. Were I to retreat, as he says you wish me to do, the Emir Bechir and all his men would be cut to pieces.

“ I hope you will send me all the marines immediately, which will render my victory certain when the Emir arrives.”

This was the Admiral's reply:—

“ My dear Commodore,

“ October 10, 1840.

“ The Sultan's firman, and not I, has given the command of the Turkish troops to Sir Charles Smith.

“ I have not taken away the marines from your right. It is contrary to my instructions to send them far up the country, and they have been kept in the steam boats according to the intended plan until they were wanted to secure Beyrout. I cannot, therefore, send you any marines; and as Sir Charles Smith is now commanding the troops, I have only

to repeat his orders that you will fall back on D'Jounie, or come down to where the steamers are, and where they were always intended to be, for embarkation.

“ You will of course apprise the Emir of your intended retreat from your present position, and not expose him to risk of being singly attacked.

“ I think the Cambridge is in sight.

“ Yours, &c.

(Signed) “ ROBERT STOPFORD.”

“ To Commodore Napier.”

I had sent to Admiral Bandeira to request he would send up his rocketeers; but this the Commander-in-Chief would not permit.

I had no idea the Emir could possibly be up, or Omar Bey be able to form a junction with him, before sunset, and I calculated to attack at dawn of day on the 11th; but we had hardly finished a scanty repast, which the kindness of Captain Henderson, of the Gorgon, furnished us with, when a firing was heard in the direction we expected the Emir to advance; and shortly after, my trusty interpreter Misk rushed into the room with the welcome news that the Emir had arrived. This

intelligence set all orders that had arrived, or that might arrive, at nought. The drums beat merrily to arms, the troops were put in motion, we mounted our steeds, and in a few minutes were at the advanced posts. The battalion that had been sent across the ravine to turn the enemy's left, notwithstanding the delay, had made considerable progress as yet unopposed; and the two battalions that were ordered up from the lines, much against the wish of Izzet Pacha, were advancing rapidly on Ornagacuan.

The enemy's position was very strong, and perhaps might have been considered unassailable. I knew little of the troops I commanded; many of them were Albanians; and both parties had been endeavouring to persuade each other to come over. Our friends advised them to bring over Ibrahim, (who the day before I had seen sitting under a green flag in the second position, and saluted him); and the enemy, on the other hand, recommended that the old Commodore should be brought over to them. All this was distinctly heard at the out-posts.

I was strongly posted on a narrow range of hills, both flanks well protected; in front of my position there was a considerable descent, at the bottom of which a narrow road led round the foot of another

hill to the summit, which the enemy occupied in force; their first position was commanded by a second, still higher, and that again by a third.

It was rather a new occurrence for a British Commodore to be on the top of Mount Lebanon commanding a Turkish army, and preparing to fight a battle that would decide the fate of Syria; but the very novelty was exciting to a degree. I was in my glory; standing on an eminence, surrounded by the general officers and my own staff, I fancied myself a great "Commander," and surveying the enemy, who had not quite so brilliant an appearance as the Scottish host, although I could not exclaim with *Marmion*,

Oh, well, Lord Lyon, hast thou said,  
Thy King from warfare to dissuade  
Were but a vain essay.  
For, by St. George, were that host mine,  
No power, infernal or divine,  
Should once my soul to rest incline,  
Until I had dimmed their armour shine  
In glorious battle fray!

yet I said to my friend Hodges:—"If we can get the Turks and mountaineers to mount that rugged hill, and Omar Bey attacks at the same time their rear, Ibrahim will get such a dressing as he never had before."

The troops being now assembled just out of musket-shot, two small field-pieces opened their fire, and pitched their shot into the position where the Albanians were posted; the armed peasantry were directed to throw themselves among the rocks and work their way to the heights, and two Turkish battalions and the Arab battalion were in readiness, under cover of their fire, to advance along the winding road. The peasantry were rather shy, and required a good deal of coaxing, and occasionally a little manual persuasion, to get them forward, but, knowing the country, they took a long circuit on the enemy's left, and advanced unseen to the heights without firing a shot; a Turkish battalion was now sent forward *en tirailleur*, and advanced with caution, but great gallantry, under a heavy fire, and they unexpectedly found much good cover under the rocks; a second battalion, headed by General Jochmus, was directed to advance along the road in column, but they broke into skirmishing parties; the Arab battalion was then brought up, but there was no keeping them together; they also broke into skirmishers, and the whole advanced with so much rapidity, (with the exception of some few, who I was obliged to stir up with my stick,)

that I thought it best to keep my last battalion in reserve to cover their retreat in the event of disaster.

This was an anxious moment, for our success depended on the steadiness of the Turks when they came in contact with the enemy on the top of the hill, but it was soon over; the moment the hill was crowned the Turks ran in upon the Egyptians, the firing ceased, and the latter laid down their arms.

The reserve was now brought up, and the battalion which had crossed the gorge was making great progress on the enemy's left.

The Egyptians kept up a heavy fire from their second position, and it was with some difficulty I succeeded in persuading the troops to renew the attack; but the example of Selim Pacha, General Joehmus, Lieutenants Bradley and Duncan, Mr. Pearn, Captain Loué, and the other Turkish officers, who all behaved well, encouraged them to storm the second position, which was carried in less than half an hour. It now became a complete rout, the enemy dispersed in all directions, leaving their baggage, ammunition, and provisions behind. Night put an end to the pursuit. Ibrahim, who commanded, escaped with a few men, leaving between 600 and 700 prisoners behind.

Our Arab battalion, seeing a Turkish force advancing, took them for the enemy, and lined a wall that had been thrown up to resist Omar Bey; he on the other hand, took them for Ibrahim's troops, and seeing myself and several officers with them, thought we were prisoners. A sharp fire was now opened on both sides, and it was with some difficulty I put an end to the conflict, which might have been attended with serious consequences.

A green flag was taken, which General Jochmus informed me afterwards was lost, but I am disposed to think it had been improperly concealed by some one instead of being brought to headquarters. Our loss was not more than 50 killed and wounded, that of the enemy was never ascertained; their force was from 3000 to 4000 men. The greatest praise is due to Omar Bey, who marched the moment he got his orders on Argentoun, descended unseen into the gorge of Dog River by a narrow and rugged path, where he would have been annihilated had he been discovered, and although he got no intelligence of the Prince, pushed on and commenced his attack.

We now re-assembled the troops, which was no easy matter, and returned to Ornagacuan ready to face Souliman in the morning, leaving Omar Bey

with his two battalions in possession of the field of battle.

The Turks after any success are fond of discharging their arms, caring very little whether they load with ball or blank, and I verily believe I run more risk of being shot as I returned to my quarters by the Turks than I did in the attack on Ibrahim's position.

On my arrival on the coast I found the following orders from the Admiral :

"Princess Charlotte, off Beyrout,  
October 10, 1840.

"Sir,

"It is my positive directions, in conjunction with the opinion of Colonel Sir Charles Smith, Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish forces, by the appointment of the Sultan, and whose directions, with regard to every military movement, I am instructed to follow, that you return forthwith to the position of D'Jounie with the troops now under your command, with all due caution and circumspection.

"I have the honour to be, Sir,

"Your obedient servant,

"ROBERT STOPFORD, *Admiral*,

"*Commander-in-Chief.*"

"To Commodore Napier."



I was happy to be able to send the following short letter in reply:—

“ My dear Admiral,

“ October 10th.

“ I this afternoon attacked Ibrahim Pacha, and totally defeated him. He was driven from position to position, and Selim Pacha is still after him. I do not know how many prisoners we have made. The Turks behaved nobly.

“ In haste, yours very truly,

“ CHAS. NAPIER.”

“ The Hon. Sir R. Stopford, G.C.B.”

Next morning I addressed the Admiral again respecting my return to D’Jounie.

“ Sir,

“ Head-quarters, October 11, 1840.

“ I received your letter last night, written before the battle, desiring me to return to D’Jounie forthwith; I do not know whether that is now to be put into execution. I expect the Emir Bechir every moment; he ought to march by the mountains, and come down on Souliman; the marines ought to be landed, and we ought to collect our troops and attack Souliman instantly, and thus finish the campaign; if we do not, he will withdraw. I merely

suggest this for your consideration; if I am to return to D'Jounie, if you will hoist the *affirmative* with guns, I shall answer with a white flag, and march forthwith, leaving the Emir on the hills to do what he thinks best.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ CHAS. NAPIER, *Commodore.*

“ P.S. I sent you a few lines last night by Lieut. Duncan, who is not yet returned. We have 500 prisoners, but they still keep coming in; the enemy's troops are dispersed in all directions. Ibrahim took himself off in double quick, and I suppose is now with Souliman.”

“ The Hon. Sir Robert Stopford, G.C.B.”

The following is my official report to the Admiral of the action of the 10th of October, penned, as will be seen, after my return to my ship:—

“ Powerful, D'Jounie Bay,  
October 13, 1840.

“ Sir,

“ After the great advantages gained by the Emir Bechir over Osman Pacha, at Merouba, it became necessary to move on Souliman Pacha, defeat him, and obtain possession of Beyrout; I in consequence directed the Emir Bechir to join me on the heights

of Ornagacuan on the 9th inst., and on the 8th General Jochmus marched with four battalions, and was followed the day after by the Arab battalion, composed of Turkish and Egyptian deserters; on the 9th two steam-boats anchored in St. George's Bay, with a Turkish and marine battalion, ready to disembark when necessary. At nine in the morning I arrived on the heights, and found that our picquets had been driven in by an enemy we did not expect in that quarter; a Turkish battalion and the mountaineers sent them back; and on reconnoitring I found to my surprise between 2000 and 3000 men in a position that appeared unassailable. No time was to be lost, as the deserters assured me they expected a reinforcement of 2000 men the next morning.

“ My own position was strong, being in a long narrow range of hills; my left almost inaccessible, and my right protected by a deep gorge, at the head of which the hills on which I was posted, after a considerable descent, turned off to the right; this part of the hill the enemy occupied in force, amongst rugged, and apparently inaccessible rocks; a road considerably below the top of the mountain wound round it; above the first position there was a second, still stronger, and above that again a third.

In the course of the day, I learned that the Emir Beshir had crossed Dog River, and arrived at Basquinta, in the enemy's rear; I desired him to continue his march, and I directed Omar Bey, who had been left with four battalions in our lines, to march at night with two on Argentoun, descend into the deep gorge of the Dog River with great caution and secrecy, and cross over to Bechfeya, in the rear of the enemy, and effect a junction with the Emir Beshir; this very dangerous movement (for had he been discovered in the bottom of the gorge he would have been destroyed) was executed with great skill by Omar Bey, and about two o'clock we were delighted to hear a firing in the enemy's rear. By this time the other two Turkish battalions who were ordered from our lines were in sight, and another that I had passed over the gorge in our right was rapidly advancing on the enemy's left.

“All being prepared to the best of my ability, I directed the armed peasantry to throw themselves among the rocks, and advance on the enemy, and two Turkish battalions and the Arab were held in readiness to march along the winding road; the peasantry were very shy, and required a great deal of coaxing to get them forward, but knowing the

country they took a long circuit on the enemy's left, and advanced unseen to the heights without firing a shot. A Turkish battalion now advanced 'en tirailleur' in front, which they did with caution, but great gallantry, under a very heavy fire; and as they advanced they unexpectedly found much good cover under the rocks.

“ A second battalion, led by General Jochmus, was directed to advance along the road in column, but they broke into skirmishing parties; the Arab battalion was then advanced up in column, but there was no keeping them together, they also broke into skirmishers, and the whole advanced with so much rapidity that I thought it best to keep my last battalion in reserve, to cover their retreat in the event of disaster. This was an anxious time, for our success depended on the steadiness of the Turks when they came in contact with the enemy on the top of the hill; but it was soon over; the moment the hill was crowned the firing ceased, and the Egyptians laid down their arms. The reserve was now brought up, and the battalion which had crossed the gorge was making great progress on the enemy's left; a heavy fire was kept up from the second position, and it was with some difficulty I

succeeded in getting the troops to make a second attack, but the example of Selim Pacha, General Jochmus, and the Turkish officers, who all behaved well, succeeded in bringing them again to the scratch, and in less than half an hour it became a complete rout, leaving all their baggage, ammunition, and provisions in the second position. Night put an end to the pursuit. Ibrahim, who commanded, escaped with a few men, and the rest dispersed, leaving between 600 and 700 prisoners.

“ A rather ludicrous scene took place on the heights, at the end of the battle: our own Arab battalion, seeing a force coming forward, took them for the enemy, and placed themselves in position under a wall (that had been thrown up to resist Omar Bey), he, on the other hand, took them for the enemy, and a sharp fire was opened on both sides; I, however, arrived in time to prevent mischief, which might have been serious.

“ A green Turkish standard was taken, but General Jochmus informs me it was lost, but I am disposed to think it has been improperly concealed by some one instead of being brought to headquarters. I have not been able to get the returns of the killed and wounded, but I believe it to be

under fifty; that of the enemy, from their position, must have been less. The first effect of our forward movement, as you already know, has been the evacuation of Beyrout; the effect of our victory over Ibrahim, the entire disorganization and submission of the army of Souliman Pacha to the amount of nearly 3000 men, and the whole of the artillery and stores.

“ I landed at D’Jounie on the 10th of September, with the army you did me the honour of putting under my command, consisting of 5300 Turkish troops and 1500 marines, which has from time to time been reduced to half that number; and by the 10th of October we have made about 5000 prisoners, and nearly 5000 deserters have come over; the whole of Lebanon is nearly free, Tripoli alone remains to be taken, which I am of opinion will be an easy conquest, if attacked immediately.

“ It is now my pleasing duty to express to you, Sir, how much I have been satisfied with the conduct of Selim Pacha, General Joehmus, Omar Bey, and indeed all the Turkish officers. Lieut. Bradley has accompanied me on all occasions, and has been everywhere most forward, and I beg strongly to recommend him for promotion; Mr. Pearn, the

master of the Powerful, and my old companion in arms in Portugal, joined me as a volunteer, as did also Lieut. Duncan, who I sent to lead the mountaineers. I am also much indebted to her Majesty's Consul General, Lieut.-Colonel Hodges, who did me the honour of serving with me in the action. I have requested Selim Pacha to furnish me with the names of the Turkish officers who particularly distinguished themselves, and which shall be forwarded as soon as possible. In giving up the command of the army to Sir Charles Smith, I beg to return my thanks to you for the confidence you have placed in me, and to assure you that I have spared no pains to render all the service in my power to the cause of the Sultan.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) “ CHAS. NAPIER, *Commodore*.

“ P.S.—I forgot to mention that the Emir Bechir did not come up in time, but did good service in checking the reinforcement of 2000 men that was intended to join Ibrahim.

“ C. N.”

“ To Admiral the Hon. Sir Robert Stopford.”



## CHAPTER XIII.

Necessity for disobeying the Orders to return to D'Jounie—  
Advantageous results—Difference with Izzet Pacha—his  
Character—Unmolested retreat of Souliman Pacha—he  
should have been closely followed up—Letter from the  
Admiral—The Author resigns the Command—Letter to  
Lord Ponsonby—Unsuccessful attack on Tortosa.

It is necessary in war, and I think quite justifiable, to take responsibility on oneself in unforeseen cases, running of course the risk of answering for the consequences; it is more dangerous, however, to disobey orders; but there are instances in which events may justify such disobedience; the reader will judge whether what I have related may be considered one of them.

I saw clearly that the Admiral was not at all aware of the critical position in which I was placed. When I left D'Jounie it was with the intention of joining the Grand Prince, and attacking Souliman Pacha, who was encamped before Beyrout, leaving four battalions in our position, to secure it against an unforeseen attack. On my arrival on the heights of Ormagacuan, I was as much surprised to find

myself in front of Ibrahim, as I suppose he was to find himself opposed to me; he was evidently collecting troops to attack D'Jounie, which he ought to have done long before, and we were collecting ours to attack Souliman. Finding ourselves unexpectedly opposed to each other, it was distinctly my game to attack him before his force was assembled. Had I obeyed the orders that were sent me to return to D'Jounie I should have had a most difficult and dangerous retreat, and been harassed by an enemy to whom we should have restored confidence. It would have been impossible to have sent timely notice to Omar Bey or the Prince, both of whom would have been sacrificed, the Turks would have lost confidence, and as the season was fast advancing I have no doubt the whole would have been re-embarked, and the expedition entirely failed. What, on the contrary, happened? the ships going to Beyrout, and my advance, caused the abandonment of the town; the victory, the dispersion of Ibrahim Pacha's army, and, as will be shortly seen, the disorganization of the Egyptian troops, and the retreat of Souliman.

On the morning of the 11th Izzet Pacha joined me, and shortly after I received information that

2000 of Souliman's soldiers had deserted; I immediately put the troops in motion, intending to march on him, having had no information that he had decamped; to this Izzet objected; the old man was afraid of being left at D'Jounie, and insisted on two battalions being sent there. I offered him one for his protection; this did not satisfy him; he invented all sorts of stories,—first, that Ibrahim was again collecting his forces, and was advancing,—and many others of the same nature; and when he found I was inexorable, he said the weather was changing and the troops would all get wet. This was quite true; we had not seen a cloud the whole summer, but now the sky became overcast, and there was every appearance of a storm; I, however, observed to old Izzet that I never understood that a shower of rain was a sufficient reason to prevent an attack upon an enemy's camp. The troops were ordered to march, and Izzet returned to D'Jounie, and on announcing his approach by firing his pistols in the usual way, one went off by accident and wounded him in the leg; it is a pity it had not gone through his head, for never was there a more unfit man to govern a country than the man in question: he had once

before lost a Turkish army by starvation, had cut off his own wife's head, and was a notorious tyrant and savage; and this was the man chosen to govern the Syrians. Representations were made to the Porte, and they very wisely recalled him.

On my arrival at the beach I found Souliman had decamped during the night, leaving his artillery behind, removing, however, the day before, all his tent equipage near the town, without being at all molested.

Had intelligence been sent to me early on the 11th I should have had no difficulty in advancing on Souliman, and probably cutting off the greater part of his division, as well as preventing Ibrahim from retiring on Corneille and collecting his forces there; such a movement would have encouraged the advance of the mountaineers, instead of remaining in the neighbourhood of Basquinta and allowing Ibrahim and Souliman to retire quietly with a defeated army, and assemble at Zachle, a little above the plain of the Bekaa.

Before I went off to the flag-ship I received the following letter from the Admiral:—

“ My dear Commodore,                      “ Beyrout, Oct. 11, 1840.

“ Colonel Hodges is on board, and has described your splendid operations of yesterday, to the merits of which no words of mine can do justice. You have nothing to fear from Souliman Pasha; 2000 of his men came into Beyrout to-day and delivered themselves up, with their arms; more are expected. His field pieces, nearly 30, remain about four miles off, and we are going to get them in. Sir Charles Smith wants as many of your troops as you can spare, consistently with guarding your prisoners, and your security in reaching the camp. The men had better go on board the Gorgon and Hydra to be conveyed here.

“ I do most heartily assure you of being fully sensible of the benefit which I and the whole expedition have received from your indefatigable services, and on your rejoining the Powerful, your conscience may be perfectly satisfied on your having accomplished all that could be done.

“ According to the plans from Constantinople, Sidon and Tyre are to be put into a good state of security for the troops, to which Beyrout will now be added.

“ There is no news from England; but Lord

Palmerston's letters are not to risk the Turks beyond the means of retreat to the shipping; also the marines; and saying, that Acre is not to be attacked at present.

“From all this I apprehend some negotiation is going on, which will be much assisted by our successes here.

“As the capture of Beyrout was the principal object of our expedition from D'Jounie, I had no conception of your having another enterprise in hand; and therefore, after the possession of Beyrout, imagined that you had better fall back upon the camp, which has been left in a very defenceless state.

“I wish you to remain at D'Jounie for the present, and am most anxious to hear from Alexandria, where it is certain some large ships will come out if possible.

“No Cambridge; she left Malta on the 26th, ten days before the Confiance.

“Very truly yours,

“ROBERT STOPFORD.”

Two battalions were sent back to the camp at D'Jounie, and the rest marched to Beyrout; and I

went on board the flag-ship and of course resigned my command, after having held it one month. I then addressed the following letter to the Ambassador:—

“My Lord,

“Powerful, D’Jounie,  
Oct. 11, 1840.

“Hodges will tell your Lordship all that has passed here. We want arms very bad; Cambridge has brought none. Selim Pacha is a very good man, and a brave one. Izzet Pacha would be much better at Constantinople than here; I have no opinion of him in any one way whatever. I do hope when Lebanon is settled, something will be done for the mountaineers; Sidon, Beyrout, and Tripoli ought to be added to their territory; they ought to be free, paying a fixed tribute to the Porte. This country would then flourish, and British interests and commerce would be greatly benefited by such an arrangement. I hope your Lordship has received the various letters I have written to your Lordship, though I have no replies.

“I have the honour to be,

“Your Lordship’s obedient servant,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

“To the Right Hon. Lord Ponsonby.”

The day before I took Sidon, Captain Houston Stewart, with the Benbow, Carysfort, and Zebra, attacked Tortosa, but failed in consequence of the boats grounding on an unknown reef. Both officers and men displayed great gallantry, but his loss was severe. Subjoined is Captain Stewart's letter to the Admiral on the subject:—

“H.M.S. Benbow, off Ruad,  
September 26, 1840.

“Sir,

“I have the honour to acquaint you that the Benbow, Carysfort, and Zebra, anchored here on Sunday last, the 20th instant.

“We found the island without troops or arms of any kind, but an immense population just arrived from Tripoli, Tortosa, and other parts of the coast, at present menaced with military operations.

“About 200 cavalry and two field-pieces were encamped at the watering-place on the main land, immediately opposite to the island, and I was informed that two squadrons (each of 200 men, with two field-pieces) were stationed about nine miles distant to the north and south, with orders to prevent any persons taking water, and to obstruct all communication between the inhabitants of the



country and the ships. We also learned that the whole of these troops depended upon the stores in Tortosa for subsistence, and that these stores were very considerable, consisting of grain, rice, &c. The island of Ruad is very small, and dependent on tanks and cisterns for water, which are generally quite sufficient for its ordinary population, said to amount to 1500; but, in consequence of the influx of refugees, there cannot be less than 5000 souls upon it just now, and therefore an extra supply of water became necessary; but the cavalry prevented any boats from the island approaching the watering-place. We therefore, at daylight next morning, dislodged them by throwing a few shot and shells, and the ships were moved nearer the watering-place, and, every precaution being taken, all Her Majesty's ships were completed with water; and ever since the place (being under our guns) has been quite free to the people of Ruad to water.

“My attention was now anxiously turned towards Tortosa; all information concurred in representing its great importance to the enemy's troops, and all agreed in declaring that, could we destroy the provisions, the troops must shift their quarters, and thus leave the communication with the moun-

tains (whose inhabitants were most anxious for arms) comparatively open. We were also informed that the chief storehouses were situated close to the sea, that a breach might be made in the outer wall, and immediate access obtained to them.

“ I therefore directed some large bags of powder, with bores and fuzees, to be prepared, and ordered the Carysfort and Zebra to anchor close off it, which they did within 500 yards. Four successive deserters from the enemy's cavalry (each arriving on different days) stated that there were no soldiers quartered in Tortosa, but a party was regularly sent down every night to bring away sufficient provisions for their different detachments, and the last deserter, who left Tortosa so late as the night of the 24th, stated confidently that there was not then a soldier in it—that even had any come in after his departure, they could only be dismounted cavalry, with short carbines—that a sort of council of war had been held two days before, when it was resolved, that, as they had no infantry, cavalry alone could not protect it, and that they must get camels, &c., to remove the stores from it as speedily as possible: and he offered, if we could give him an axe, to land with a single boat's crew, and break the corn store

door open; and the three other deserters likewise offered to go.

“This determined me to make an attempt either to take the town, or at least to destroy the stores, and the following plan of operations was decided upon:—The boats to rendezvous on board the Carysfort, and she and the Zebra to cannonade the walls, and especially a large built-up archway in the centre, until sufficiently opened for entrance. Lieutenant Charlewood being prepared with the necessary means for blowing up stores, buildings, &c., and accompanied by Mr. Turner, gunner of this ship, with eight steady men as pioneers, to land in the cutter, and be immediately followed by the portion of marines at present on board the Benbow, together with those of the Zebra; and 20 seamen of the Benbow, under Lieutenants Maitland, R.N., and Harrison, R.M.; and that all the boats (after the disembarkation) under the command of Lieutenant Stevens, of the Carysfort, should lie off, prepared to cover the landing party with their guns and small arms, and to re-embark them.

“The space from the margin of the sea to the breach does not exceed sixteen yards. We could perceive only a few loopholes commanding that

spot, and I concluded, that even should a fire be opened from them, the advance from the boats would be too rapid to admit of its being effective, and that, being once within the breach, our men would easily make good their way.

“Accordingly, yesterday, at 15 minutes past 1, P.M., the Carysfort and Zebra commenced an admirably well-directed fire, and very soon opened the archway, and showed us a large clear space within, and the boats shoved off. The beach under the town appeared so smooth and deep, and so similar to all the other parts where we had landed; that a doubt of the heavy boats being able to reach it never presented itself until they went in, when a ledge of rocks or ancient building was found to extend itself across at some distance from the shore, with such deep water inside that no man could land and keep his ammunition dry; only the light boats, of which there were but two, could pass over it. Thus the marines (in the launch, barge, and two pinnaces) were unable to land; had they done so, I feel confident that we should have completely succeeded in destroying the magazines of provisions, and have driven the enemy out of the vaults, and even from the town, although not

without loss, as subsequent intelligence has reached me that 200 infantry (from the northward), and 100 dismounted cavalry, had entered the town the same morning, three hours before daylight. Lieutenant Charlewood being in the cutter with the pioneers' powder, and the three deserters as guides, landed at once, and proceeded towards the breach, and had nearly reached it before a shot was fired; but the moment the large boats touched the rocks, they became exposed to a destructive fire from every minute loop and crevice, and even from the holes which our cannon-shot had just made. Lieutenant Maitland had succeeded in getting about 14 of his men, with himself, landed by another turn of the same cutter, and my only reason for not instantly recalling the boats when the fire opened was, that I could not know what these officers were doing inside, and I entertained great hopes that they might be able to find out and blow up the provision stores, and thus effect our principal object. The guides who had landed fled back to the boats at the commencement of the firing, but they are now all on board, and free from any suspicion of treachery. Lieutenant Charlewood, proceeding with his pioneers, broke open several stores, and at length reached

one filled with rice, and another with corn, when he immediately ran back to inform Lieutenant Maitland, and get more hands forward. Unfortunately, during his momentary absence, his men had hewn open another door, when, to their surprise, they found it entered upon a place filled with infantry soldiers, and a struggle ensued. Two soldiers were killed by the three pioneers, but having nothing but axes, they were obliged to give way, but Mr. Charlewood's return checked the enemy's advance, and they never followed him.

“Becoming anxious at the delay, and seeing Lieutenant Maitland still in the breach, I hastened in my gig, and, hailing that officer, I learned from him that there was no longer any prospect of success, his ammunition being expended, and much of that of the marines wet (from the attempt to get out), and I immediately ordered all to retire, and succeeded in getting every man off, Lieutenant Charlewood even bringing his exploding apparatus away.

“It is now my duty to allude to a more grateful theme—the merits of the officers and men employed. Where all did their duty, it is a difficult and somewhat delicate task to particularize; but I should

be very unjust did I not bear my cordial testimony to the very gallant conduct of Lieutenants Maitland and Charlewood: the latter officer was the first man on shore, and the very last off, and his quiet, determined resolution, was the theme of praise with every person.

“I annex a list of the boats employed, with the names of the officers commanding them, together with a return of casualties in each boat. The first cutter, being a light boat, was extremely serviceable, and much and constantly exposed. Mr. J. C. Dalrymple Hay, midshipman, and his crew, deserve every credit for their very spirited conduct.

“The jolly-boat of the Carysfort (the only other light boat), commanded by Mr. W. H. Stewart, midshipman, was also very useful, and Lieutenant Maitland speaks in favourable terms of that young officer's proceedings.

“To Captain Martin and Commander James Stopford my grateful thanks are justly due; all that was done was in perfect concord with them, and from both these officers I derived the most cordial support and assistance. The precision of the fire from their ships over the boats and men during the

whole of the attack was quite astonishing, and by rendering the aim of the enemy unsteady, must have saved many lives.

“ I have, &c.,

“ HOUSTON STEWART, *Captain.*”

“ To Admiral

“ The Hon. Sir R. Stopford, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,

“ Commander-in-Chief.”

*Benbow's*.—Launch, Mr. William King Hall, mate ; Lieut. Harrison, R.M.—Killed, 3 marines, 1 seaman.—Wounded, 1 marine, (since dead).—Wounded, 4 marines, 2 seamen.—Barge,—Mr. G. F. Day, mate.—Wounded, 4 seamen.—1st Gig,—Hon. A. Cochrane, volunteer, 1st Class.—Pinnance,—Mr. A. G. West, midshipman.—Wounded, 1 seaman.—1st Cutter,—Mr. J. C. D. Hay, midshipman.—Killed, 1 seaman.—Wounded, 2 seamen.—Landing Party,—Mr. F. H. Stanfell, mate ; Mr. J. F. Ross, midshipman.—Wounded, 1 seaman.

*Carysfort's*—Pinnance, Lieut. Stephens ; Hon. — Douglas, midshipman ; none killed or wounded.—Barge,—Mr. Genneys mate ; Mr. Loney, second master.—Jolly-boat,—Mr. W. Houston Stewart, midshipman.

*Zebra's*—Pinnance, Mr. J. Simpson, mate.—Wounded, 3 marines.

Return of officers and men killed and wounded, belonging to Her Majesty's ships and vessels, in an attack by the boats of



those ships on the town of Tortosa, the 25th of September, 1840.

*Benbow*—Killed, 2 seamen; 3 royal marines.—Wounded, 9 seamen; 3 royal marines severely.—Wounded, 1 seaman; 1 royal marine, slightly.

*Zebra*—Wounded, 2 seamen; 1 royal marine, slightly.

Total killed—5.—Total wounded—17.

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CHAPTER XIV.

Interview of the Author with the Admiral and Sir Charles Smith—Returns to Beyrout—Urges various enterprises upon the Admiral, which are disapproved of—Correspondence with the Emir Bechir Cassim—Surrender of the old Emir Bechir—Retrospect of the Successes of the Expedition—Speculations as to the Attack upon Acre—Visit to the Emir at Ammanah—Scenery of Lebanon—Reconnoissance of Ibrahim's Position—Letter to the Admiral—Conduct of the Turkish Authorities—Visit to the Emir's Palace at Ibteddin—Accident to the Young Prince—Departure of the Squadron for Acre.

THE day after the action of Boharsof I had an interview with the Admiral and Sir Charles Smith on board the Princess Charlotte. I then stated my opinion, that Ibrahim should be followed up to Zachle, but this opinion was ill received, and I retired with the determination of mixing no further with the military affairs.

After being confined for two days on board the flag-ship with a slight illness, the natural consequence of the excitement I had been in for a month too rapidly subsiding, I proceeded to D'Jounie Bay, where the Powerful and Admiral Walker were still at anchor, and after embarking all the troops

and stores, returned to Beyrout. The weather had been threatening for some days, and after a few heavy squalls and a slight gale, which proved to us the insecurity of the anchorage, it again became fine. The troops were now stationed at Beyrout, Sidon, and Tyre, and everything indicated a cessation of active measures for the present; but Acre was still within the reach of the British fleet, and every officer looked forward with great anxiety for an attack on that celebrated fortress.

Tripoli was also in the hands of the Egyptians, as was Latakia, and I repeatedly urged the Admiral to allow me to proceed there, which was declined; he seemed to have resigned the military authority entirely, though I never understood that the firman given by the Porte to Sir Charles Smith, which was merely an authority over the Turkish officers, in any way superseded the power of the Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces by sea and land, as he styled himself.

On the 13th October, the Grand Prince arrived at Ammanah with the mountaineers, to watch Ibrahim and Souliman Pachas, who had intrenched themselves at Zachle and El Malaka, with upwards of 6000 men and seven field pieces; they had sent

the sick, amounting to 1000, to Damascus. The advanced posts of the Grand Prince had fallen in with, and made prisoners, the Emir Meshud and two of his horsemen.

On the 16th the Emir wrote to me as follows:—

“MANY of the mountaineers come in for arms. I gave the chiefs of the village letters to you, and I beg you will give arms to all the people who have notes sealed by me, and I will drive them from the country. Please to send me provisions.

“Scheik Dahir Dalhook, with a few men, was coming over, but lost the road, and Ibrahim Pacha took them and put them to death.”

To this I replied:

“Prince, “Princess Charlotte, Beyrout,  
October 25, 1840, at 5, P.M.

“I no longer command, therefore your communications must be addressed to Sir Charles Smith, who brought a firman from Constantinople to command the troops. I long to see you, to congratulate you on all your successes. I shall be happy to hear from you, and assist you in all your demands. I am pressing the Admiral

to send me to take Tripoli; this will finish all Lebanon.

“Yours truly,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

The old Emir Bechir now considering the game up, quitted his palace at Ibteddin, and came into Sidon with a good escort. Captain Berkeley sent him to the Admiral at Beyrout. His property was guaranteed to him; and he was conducted, at his own request, to Malta, with his family. This Prince was very rich; and had managed to keep his place through all revolutions for many years; and if he lives, I have no doubt will succeed in regaining his authority.

A few days after this we received information that the Egyptian force at Tripoli, consisting of 4000 men, had evacuated the town and blown up the magazine in the castle, without, however, damaging the city. It was soon after taken possession of by the mountaineers, and the Egyptians retired by the road of Balbeck, destroying the villages in their retreat. About the same time, Latakia and the passes of Adana were abandoned, the garrisons retiring on Aleppo. Had a little more

energy been used by us, the greater part of these troops must have fallen into our hands.

I believe history does not record such unexampled successes gained in so short a time by so small a force. We landed on the 10th of September, at D'Jounie, with 5300 Turks, 1500 marines, and about 100 Austrians; by the 10th of October we had managed to storm and take Sidon, defeat the Egyptians at Ornagacuan, Ibrahim Pacha at Boharsof, and what between prisoners and deserters, get possession of 10,000 men, had freed all Lebanon, and forced Ibrahim to withdraw his troops from Tripoli and Latakia, abandon the passes of the Taurus, and concentrate the whole of his army at Zachle and Damascus.

Seeing no further prospect of active operations, I turned my attention, in common with my brother officers, to the propriety of an immediate attack on Acre, which I had thoroughly reconnoitred, and felt satisfied that the ships, in a very short time, would drive the Egyptians from the guns, if there was a possibility of approaching within a moderate distance of the walls. The subject was frequently raised on board the Princess Charlotte and discussed; but whether the Commander-in-Chief was

restricted by orders from home, or was afraid of the lateness of the season, I am not aware, but certainly much valuable time was lost. The weather is generally, throughout the Mediterranean, good during the month of October; and after the little breeze we had, there is what is called on the coast of Syria, an autumnal summer for six weeks. On the 24th, Admiral Walker was despatched off Acre with several Turkish ships-of-war to make a demonstration, and I believe to summon the place; he was there joined by the *Revenge*, *Thunderer*, and *Pique*; they refused to receive the flag of truce, and Admiral Walker stood in and fired a few broadsides; but whether the Egyptians either did not think it worthwhile to return the fire, or had still some respect for the Sultan's flag, they took no hostile notice whatever of this movement. Admiral *Bandeira*, who commanded the Austrian squadron, I believe was also anxious to attack Acre, and thinking it possible that the Egyptians might surrender to Admiral Walker, very wisely followed him with his small squadron. I had obtained leave to pay a visit to the Emir *Bechir* at *Ammanah*, and set out at daylight of the 25th, quite convinced that all hope of attacking Acre was at an end; but when

I got half way up the mountain, to my utter astonishment I observed the Princess Charlotte, and all the squadron under weigh, with the exception of the Powerful. This sudden movement, I presume, was occasioned by the Austrian Admiral starting without orders; and, I suppose, the same reasons that induced Bandeira to follow Admiral Walker, induced the Commander-in-Chief to follow Bandeira; but feeling convinced that nothing serious was intended, I pursued my ride through the beautiful mountains of Lebanon to the Grand Prince's headquarters.

I have travelled in Switzerland and in the Tyrol, and admired the romantic scenery that you meet with in these fine countries; but still I give the preference to Mount Lebanon. The whole country is one mass of rocks heaped one on the other; and every spot of land, capable of cultivation, is supported by terraces, and irrigated by streams of water from springs, which are abundant in the mountain. On these terraces the mulberry-tree is cultivated with great care, and grows with much luxuriance. Fruit and vegetables of every description are grown in great abundance. The mountains produce only a sufficient quantity of grain for



three months' consumption; the other nine months are supplied either from the plains of the Bekaa, or by importation. The roads throughout the mountain are purposely bad, to render the passage of artillery impracticable. This assists the mountaineers in the defence of their country. The mountain passes are strong, and if bravely defended by peasants alone, no army, ever so well-disciplined, could obtain possession of them without immense loss. On approaching Ammanah, we descried armed peasantry stationed on the various heights to prevent surprise; and on our arrival at the court-yard of the chateau in which the Grand Prince was lodged, some hundreds of men were lounging about in the gay attire of the mountains, armed at all points. Many horsemen were also in the court-yard, ready to be despatched to any point whence an attack might be apprehended.

On entering the *château*, which certainly had not much the appearance of the residence of a Prince, I was immediately ushered into his presence. The old man was sitting cross-legged smoking his pipe, but immediately rose and embraced me with much warmth, calling me his friend, his protector and master; praising, with much apparent warmth,

the English, who had come to release the mountaineers from the oppression of Mehemet Ali. Pipes and coffee were then produced, and after puffing away for a few minutes, the room was cleared, and an interpreter sent for. The Prince informed me that he had with him 3500 men; that he was ill-supplied with provisions and ammunition; that he had constantly written to the Pacha, but received neither answer or supplies; that the mountains were too poor to victual his men; and that they would shortly be obliged to go to their homes, and leave the country exposed. Ibrahim Pacha had collected 15,000 men, including 3000 cavalry, at Zachle and Malaka, the former above the plain, the latter in it, and he could again enter the mountains when he pleased. He wished to be reinforced by three Turkish battalions, and he would then answer for preventing Ibrahim coming again into Lebanon; or if he were supplied with 5000 stand of arms, he could arm the Druses, and would require no more troops.

As I was anxious to see Ibrahim's position, the Prince supplied me with fresh horses and an escort, some of whom had just come over from the enemy; and we proceeded over the mountain, which was

well guarded by men, both on horseback and foot, perched in different positions, to give notice of Ibrahim's movements. An hour brought us in sight of Zachle, which is on the edge of the hill. There appeared a few intrenchments thrown up, but I did not think it prudent to descend, not being provided with the best horses, and having reason to believe that Ibrahim's cavalry would have no difficulty in cutting us off, should we approach too near his den; besides, I was not sure of my escort, who could very easily have delivered me up to Ibrahim, and as many of them had only been a few days in the service of the Prince, I did not feel myself particularly comfortable. After a pleasant ride of a couple of hours we returned to the Emir's quarters, where there was a very tolerable repast prepared for us; we found a good appetite, far preferable to the best sauces supplied by Gunter in London, or the gourmand at Paris. We retired at an early hour, but neither to sleep nor rest; our bed-fellows were troublesome, and seemed to think they had a good right to a share of the dinner furnished us by the Prince.

At daylight we started on our return, and taking the road of Corneille, passed the coal-mines at which

Mehemet Ali obliged the poor Syrians to work, almost without pay, and proceeded to Salima, a town situated in a rich valley, the capital of the province of Mitten ; we then ascended the mountain to Brumanah, and got back to Beyrout before sunset.

I was still anxious about the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, and I desired the *Medea* to get her steam up, and wrote to him the following letter :—

“ My dear Admiral,

“ Powerful, Beyrout,  
October 26, 1840.

“ As I was going over the hill yesterday morning, to my great surprise, I saw you and the *Edinburgh* under weigh ; I, however, continued my route to the Prince, at whose quarters I arrived at two o'clock, at Ammanah, a small town on this side of the highest mountain of Lebanon. He has with him 3500 mountaineers, who guard all the passes. He says Ibrahim Pacha has collected 15,000 men, including 3000 cavalry, at Zachle and Malaka, the one a little above the plain of the Bekaa, the other in it.

“ I got fresh horses, crossed the mountain pass, from whence I saw Malaka, Zachle, and Balbeck. The Bekaa is a plain separating Lebanon from Anti-Lebanon ; it could not be entered without

cavalry, unless our force was far superior to the enemy. Ibrahim's intention is evidently to cover Damascus, but if it is true what a chief has written to the Prince, who had reconnoitred from the Haouran to the gates of Damascus, Ibrahim cannot stay where he is, and we ought to be ready to harass his retreat; if this is not true, the Prince has not a sufficient force to prevent his penetrating into the mountains, and doing much mischief. If the Prince had 5000 muskets to arm the Druses, who are all with him, he would not require troops, but it is absolutely necessary, till arms arrive, that he should be reinforced by three battalions and four guns. He is about a day's march from Beyrout, and it could be done with great ease in a day and a half. There are many other things which he has spoken to me about, which I will not trouble you with now, but I have taken notes, and shall try to get all he wants done either with the Pacha, or Sir Charles Smith. On my return I found the Benbow, Carysfort, and Zebra; they have filled up their provisions, and I have desired them to water. Stewart has sent by this conveyance an account of the stores on various parts of the coast; it seems important to place them in a state of security. I feel very uncomfortable at being left behind without

a line from you; my inclinations lead me to follow you this moment, as I hope you will find Powerful in her place at Acre, but as I see you are not far off, I send the Medea with letters that have arrived, and to acquaint you with the arrival of Benbow, Carysfort, and Zebra, and of my anxious desire to be with you if anything is to be done at Acre. If I stay here it will absolutely appear as if you were displeased with my proceedings, taking every ship with you but Powerful.

“ I shall anxiously look out for the return of Medea, and probably shall be under weigh, ready to join you.

“ The Austrian steamer Marianne found 265 Turks at Rhodes, landed from a vessel making water, and very properly embarked them; he has provisions on board for the Admiral, and wishes to know whether he is to stay here or go to him.

“ Believe me, &c.,

“ CHAS. NAPIER.

“ P.S.—Two hundred and fifty irregular cavalry have come to-day from the Haouran; active measures would finish everything in one month.

“ C. N.”

“ Admiral Sir Robert Stopford,  
&c., &c., &c.”

The Admiral only proceeded as far as Sidon, where he fell in with Admiral Walker and the Austrian squadron. The former went back to Acre for a day or two, and the two admirals returned to Beyrout.

The Turks had already begun their old practices, of treating the mountaineers with the most perfect contempt; and they were beginning to doubt very much whether their condition would be changed for the better. Old Izzet Pacha did not conceal his desire to get rid of the Grand Prince, and place himself in his palace at Ibteddeen.

As active operations seemed now entirely at an end, notwithstanding the reinforcements which were constantly arriving, some of whom were sent to Sidon and Tyre, but none to the mountains, I obtained leave from the Admiral to pay a visit to the Grand Prince's palace, and was accompanied by his nephew, a fine young man of about twenty-two, and next heir to the government of Lebanon. After a long ride of eight hours, through a most beautiful mountainous country, we arrived at Deir el Kammar, the capital of Lebanon, a tolerably well-built small town; as the plague was said to exist there, we passed on without entering it, and on rounding a

projecting cliff the palace of the Prince opened to our view ; it is situated half-way up the mountain, and has a very grand appearance ; above it stands another palace, smaller than the first, and the houses of two of the Emir's sons,—they were all in an unfinished state ; the large palace had been originally constructed in wood, but the late Emir had been many years employed in converting it into a more solid shape. The entrance into the court-yard is very strong, and capable of resisting anything but artillery, which could not easily be brought against it ; the court-yard is large, and surrounded by a high wall, and in the time of the late prince several hundred armed men were constantly kept in the barracks adjoining, and a body of horse, richly caparisoned in the Eastern style, were always ready in the yard. Some of the rooms are handsome, particularly those of the harem, but mostly unfurnished, the Emir having removed everything he could to Sidon, and from thence to Malta. The stables were large and capable of containing five hundred horses, the greater part of which were gone ; the Emir's stud had been magnificent, and although the whole of his property was guaranteed to him, many of the best horses fell into the hands of the



Turks. We were well received by some of the family who remained, and tolerably well entertained, but even in the palace of the Grand Prince of Lebanon our slumbers were much disturbed by the occupants he had left behind. After dinner we visited the small palaces, which were also in an unfinished state, though built in a tasteful style. On looking at these palaces it was easy to account for the fidelity of the Emir Bechir to Mehemet Ali; the fact is, the old man plundered the inhabitants in the most atrocious manner, confiscated the estates, and put out the eyes of the Emirs he did not like; Mehemet Ali knew well the importance of keeping him faithful, and allowed him to do as he pleased in the mountain, and was content with a very small tribute, not exceeding 30,000 dollars a year.

After breakfast we took leave of our friends and proceeded to Beyrout, but a sad accident clouded our otherwise pleasant journey. The mountaineers are good horsemen, and fond of showing off whenever a little flat ground allows them to exhibit their dexterity in firing off their muskets and pistols and throwing the d'jerré at full gallop, reloading in an incredible short time. The young Prince and several of his attendants, seeing an

opportunity for a display, set off at full gallop; one of his men, close behind him, amused himself by throwing his musket in the air, to show his dexterity in catching it; it unexpectedly went off, and shot out both the Prince's eyes. The poor lad fell instantly from his horse, and when we came up he was, indeed, in a most pitiable condition: his eyes hanging out of their sockets, and streaming with blood; he himself, unconscious of what had happened, was pulling them out with his fingers, and it was with the greatest difficulty I could persuade him to desist, and allow them to be bandaged. What an awful visitation was this! a few minutes before, this youth was full of life and spirits, the heir to the ruling Prince, in one moment plunged into eternal darkness; it was a cruel sight. His poor attendant, who had accidentally done the deed, hung over him more dead than alive; the poor fellow seemed to suffer more than the Prince himself, who was nearly unconscious. We were three leagues from the first village, and with great difficulty succeeded in getting him there, carried in one of our cloaks. I rode on to Beyrout, and despatched an English surgeon to his assistance. His sight, as I expected, proved to be gone for ever; but youth, and the strength of his

constitution, in a few months healed his wounds, and otherwise restored him to perfect health.

On my arrival at Beyrout, to my great astonishment, I found a steamer had arrived from England with orders to attack Acre. This was, indeed, a change for the better; there was now no further room for indecision. Orders were sent to Sidon to march 2000 Turks to the pass of the White Mountain, about eleven miles from Acre. Want of cavalry limited the operation of the land force to that movement, as it would not have been prudent to have exposed the Turkish troops to the Egyptian cavalry in a country where they could act. 3000 Turks, under Selim Pacha, small detachments of artillery, of sappers and miners, under Major Higgins and Lieutenant Aldrich, were embarked in the squadron. On the 30th the steamer started, and in the night, a breeze springing up, the squadron followed.

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## CHAPTER XV.

Letter of Congratulation from Lord Ponsonby to the Author—  
Ibrahim Pacha's Standard, missing from the Field of Boharsof—Letters to Lord Ponsonby, Colonel Hodges, and the Admiral respecting it—Lord Ponsonby's Speech to the Sultan, and Letter to the Author—Colonel Hodges' Explanation—The Affair never satisfactorily cleared up.

BEFORE leaving Beyrout, I received a letter from the Ambassador, dated October 22, congratulating me on the affair of Boharsof, and expressing a hope that we should follow up our successes. His Lordship was also very active in urging the Porte to send more arms and troops, and also to secure to the mountaineers all their rights and privileges, and remove that wicked and unprincipled old Turk, Izzet Pacha, which I had requested him to do.

By the same conveyance I received the *Oriental Observer*, in which paper it was stated that Colonel Hodges had arrived at Smyrna, with the green flag, under which I had seen Ibrahim Pacha reconnoitring our position, and which we took at Boharsof, and afterwards lost, as I was informed by General

Jochmus; this rather puzzled me. I always thought there was a mystery about this flag, which never was in my possession, and which I never sent to Constantinople. How it got there demanded an explanation, and I accordingly wrote to Lord Ponsonby as follows :

“ My Lord,

“ Powerful, Beyrout,  
November 1, 1840.

“ I received your Lordship's letter, and I am happy to find that our operations have given so much satisfaction at Constantinople, as also to yourself. I do hope you will be able to do something for the mountaineers ; nothing would increase our influence so much as giving them the sea ports, because the Turks do not treat them well ; and they would be quite willing to pay a tribute. I was yesterday at the residence of the Grand Prince, and I am no longer surprised that he should have stuck to Mehemet Ali ; he had three palaces building at the same time, which shows that he had his full sway in the mountains, and it is to be hoped his successor will be kept in check.

“ We are at last going to Acre with 3500 men ; should the weather remain fine I think we shall

succeed, but it does not follow that it will be easy; all depends on the disposition of the garrison.

“Ibrahim Pacha’s standard was taken, which I should have sent to the Sultan, with the Admiral’s permission, but General Jochmus told me it had been lost, which very much surprised me. It appears, by the Smyrna paper, that Colonel Hodges was in possession of it, and that he was to present it to the Sultan. I can hardly believe he would have done this unless under some mistake. I have written to him about it; and your Lordship will oblige me by inquiring if Ibrahim’s standard has found its way to Constantinople, and who sent it.

“I have two flags taken at Sidon, one by Corporal James Symons; some mark of favour to him would do good. I hope, in the course of the winter, to be at Constantinople if operations cease here, which I hope will not be the case till the coast becomes dangerous.

“I have the honour to remain,

“Your Lordship’s obedient servant,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

“To the Right Hon. Lord Ponsonby.”

I also very naturally applied to Colonel Hodges :

“ My dear Hodges,

\* \* \* \* \*

“ In the Oriental Observer the following paragraph appears :

“ ‘ Colonel Hodges, Her Britannic Majesty’s Consul General at Alexandria, is on board, and has the flag of Ibrahim Pacha, taken in the last engagement, which, on his arrival at Constantinople, he will present to the Sultan.’

“ If this is true, this flag must have been sent to you in a surreptitious manner, for I feel assured you never would have lent yourself to such a transaction.”

A few days after this I received another letter from the Ambassador, acquainting me that he had presented the standard in question to the Sultan, in form, and made the following speech :

“ Sire, I solicited the honour of an audience of your Imperial Majesty, that I might lay at the foot of your Majesty’s throne the standard taken in battle by your Majesty’s valiant troops, and sent to me from the officer who had the happiness to direct the

action of those brave men in the glorious combat of the 10th of October.

“A few weeks since, some rebellious subjects of your Majesty boasted that the standard should be displayed before the capital of your empire. The standard is now here, a monument of the triumph of your Majesty’s arms, and an evidence of the error of those who proclaimed the weakness of the Sublime Porte, and the power of the Pacha of Egypt.”

His Lordship’s letter and his Lordship’s speech puzzled me more than the *Oriental Observer*. I began to doubt whether I had commanded the Turkish army, or had ever been on the heights of Boharsof at all, as I most certainly never sent this flag to Lord Ponsonby, and I again wrote to his Lordship for an explanation.

“My Lord,

“I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, the 25th of September, inclosing the copy of a speech your Lordship made to the Sultan on presenting the standard of Ibrahim Pacha to His Majesty, taken by the Sultan’s troops under my command, at the battle of Boharsof.



“ Your Lordship says it was sent to you by the officer who had the happiness to direct the action of those brave men in the glorious contest of the 10th of October. I fear some deception has been practised on your Lordship. I never sent the standard, nor did I ever see it. General Jochmus reported to me it was taken, and when I desired it might be produced, he made inquiry, and found it had been lost.

“ The standard ought to have been brought to me, and by me delivered to Sir Robert Stopford, and I have considered it necessary to write officially to him to request that he will order an inquiry into this mysterious affair.

“ Your Lordship must not be satisfied with the capture of Acre; the next attempt should be made on Damascus. I am ordered to Alexandria, and I shall see what can be done there.

“ The Sultan had better form the whole of the Egyptian troops who have been captured or deserted, give them their arrears of pay, promote the officers, and land them in Egypt, promising that when Mehemet Ali is put down they should go to their homes, and that the rest of his army shall have their arrears, and go home also, if they come over ;

let him do that, and he will get Egypt as easily as he has got Syria.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ CHAS. NAPIER.”

“ Right Hon. Lord Ponsonby.”

I also sent to the Admiral the following letter :

“ Powerful, off Acre,  
Nov. 7, 1840.

“ Sir,

“ Lord Ponsonby has inclosed me a speech made by his Lordship to the Sultan on delivering to his Majesty Ibrahim Pacha’s standard, taken by the troops under my command at the battle of Boharsof; it is a mystery to me how that standard fell into Lord Ponsonby’s hands. It was not sent to his Lordship by me who commanded the troops, and General Jochmus, the chief of the staff, declared that the standard had been lost. I have not now the power to officially inquire how this lost standard found its way to Constantinople, but I have to request you will take such steps as you see fit to clear up this mysterious affair. Had an inferior officer in the Duke of Wellington’s army sent a captured standard to the King of Portugal, unknown

to the Commander-in-Chief, it may be easily answered what would have been his fate; and I do trust a severe example will be made of the person who committed this extraordinary breach of discipline and decorum, to give it the softest name.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ CHAS. NAPIER.”

“ Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.”

The Ambassador never thought proper to reply to either of my letters, and the only explanation I ever got was from Colonel Hodges, which I subjoin:

“ As to the flag, I was the bearer of it to this place. I left Beyrout on Sunday evening. I called on Sir Charles Smith on the afternoon of that day, at his quarters on shore, when he asked me to take charge of despatches, and a flag, that I understood from him had been taken from the 2000 Egyptian troops that had surrendered the day before at Beyrout. This flag, with a parcel of red buntin flags, were sent by a sergeant of artillery to my boat, that was waiting to carry me to the Princess Charlotte. When I reached the ship the Admiral was on the quarter-deck; he asked me ‘ What that flag was.’ I told him it was one that Sir Charles

Smith had requested me to take to Lord Ponsonby. The Admiral replied, 'It is I who ought to send that flag to Lord Ponsonby to present to the Sultan, and I shall write a despatch with it.' This is all I know of the transaction."

This did not explain Lord Ponsonby's speech, and to this day it is a mystery. Now the flag was either sent or not; if sent, the person has managed to conceal it, and if it was not sent, then some one has bamboozled the Ambassador or the Ambassador bamboozled the Sultan. Here I shall let it rest, and carry the reader at once to St. Jean D'Acree, a place well known in ancient and modern history.

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## CHAPTER XVI.

Former Sieges of Acre—Arrival of the Allied Squadron—Proposed mode of Attack—Objections—Survey of the North Channel—The Squadron under weigh—The Author attacks from the North—Conduct of the different Divisions—Explosion of the Grand Magazine—Close of the Action—Evacuation of the Town—Fate of the Sick and Wounded.

WHEN Bonaparte sat himself down before Acre, in 1799, the fortress was not strong enough to resist a regular siege; his heavy guns had been captured by Sir Sydney Smith's cruisers, and field artillery was not sufficient to open a practicable breach in the walls; there is, however, no doubt but it must have fallen had it not been for the bravery and exertions of Sir Sydney Smith, and the gallant officers and crews of the *Tigre* and *Theseus*, who obliged Bonaparte to raise the siege after having been before it two months. Had Bonaparte succeeded in capturing Acre the Grand Prince of Lebanon would have immediately declared for him, and it is difficult to say what then would have stopped his enterprising career.

In November, 1831, Ibrahim Pacha anchored off Jaffa with an Egyptian squadron, and invested Acre in December ; he must have been much favoured by the weather to have ventured on such a dangerous coast at that season of the year. Had a gale of wind set in, not a ship would have escaped ; but fortune seems to have favoured all his undertakings up to the time the Allies landed in D'Jounie Bay. The Egyptian squadron attacked the south face of the works, and left their mark behind, which was still visible when the British squadron anchored ; but little real damage was done to the fortress by their fire. The siege lasted six months ; in that time 20,000 shells and 200,000 shots are said to have been thrown into the town, which ultimately surrendered for want of water.

After Acre fell into the possession of Mehemet Ali, he considered it of so much importance that vast numbers of labourers were employed to make it a fortress of the first order towards the land side, but when the squadron arrived before it, there still remained much to be done. It has two fronts to the sea, one to the westward, the other to the south.

The allied squadron anchored, on the afternoon of the 2nd of November, at some distance from

the fortress towards Mount Carmel. The *Revenge*, *Pique*, and *Talbot*, had been off the port some time, and had made a tolerable accurate survey of the coast, and buoyed some shoals which were not known: and here I may remark that, though a British squadron had been there in 1799, the Admiralty had not been able to furnish us with anything like a correct plan of the fortifications and the soundings. The Consuls in the different parts of the world ought to be instructed to procure information, and if a little more attention were paid by the Foreign Office to these appointments no place where the British Consular flag waves would be unknown to the Government; these situations are generally filled up without the smallest regard to the capacity or fitness of the gentlemen who hold them, to which may be traced many of the disasters that have frequently befallen our expeditions, and more particularly our last to Egypt, from whence we were driven with great loss by Mehemet Ali.

After dinner I went on board the *Princess Charlotte*, where I met several officers of the squadron. I found the following plan of attack had been settled by Captain Boxer, of the *Pique*, to which the

Admiral had acceded. We had before Acre four steamers, the Gorgon, Stromboli, Phoenix, and Vesuvius; they had been throwing shells into the town the day before. There were also seven line-of-battle ships, the Princess Charlotte, bearing the Admiral's flag; the Powerful, bearing my broad blue pennant; the Bellerophon, Captain Austin; the Revenge, Captain Waldegrave; Thunderer, Captain Berkeley; Edinburgh, Captain Henderson; Benbow, Captain Stewart; and the Castor, Captain Collier; Pique, Captain Boxer; Carysfort, Captain Martin; Talbot, Captain Codrington; Wasp, Captain Maunsell; and Hazard, Captain Elliot.

Captain Boxer had observed that at daylight it was generally calm, the sea breeze not setting in till twelve o'clock, or thereabouts; he therefore proposed that three steamers should take the Princess Charlotte, Powerful, and Bellerophon in tow; the fourth the Admiral reserved for himself. These three ships were to anchor on the west face of the fortress of Acre; the steamers were then to return for the other line-of-battle ships, the smallest of which, the Benbow and Edinburgh, were to be placed on the south. This novel mode of attack certainly did not appear to me good, as I felt confi-



dent that it would require at least two hours after the three first ships were placed before the other three could be brought into action, and about as much more before the fourth, the Turkish line-of-battle ship, and the frigates and small craft could be in their stations, and that probably we should be beaten in detail. I ventured to express my doubts on the subject, but Captain Boxer assured me that he knew the place perfectly well, and as everything was settled with the Admiral, there was no necessity for my attempting to change anything, as he knew as much about battery work as I did. After making some further observations, in disapproval of the plan, I pointed out the propriety of the smaller ships leading, to enable the line-of-battle ships to place themselves sufficiently close without the danger of grounding, which is the common mode of attack, and more particularly necessary in a place very imperfectly known, and at that advanced season of the year. My opinion was, however, overruled, and I took my leave. Preparations were made during the night to anchor the ships by the stern, some with bowers, others with the sheet, or stream, according to the judgment of the several captains. I preferred the sheet anchor, and gave directions

accordingly. At daylight next morning the steamers proceeded to their different ships to be lashed alongside; and after the most mature reflection, which in no way changed my opinion, I went on board the *Princess Charlotte*, I think with Captain Henderson, of the *Vesuvius*; there I also found Captain Henderson, of the *Gorgon*. I told the Admiral that I thought it my duty to say that I felt satisfied, if the present plan was persevered in, we should be defeated. I appealed to Captain Henderson, of the *Gorgon*, an experienced steam officer, to know whether, even allowing everything to go right, (which could not be expected,) he would be able, after having placed one ship, to return and place another in less than two hours, to which he replied, "he could not." I also pointed out to the Admiral that, as the sea-breeze generally set in from the northward, we ought to wait till it was steady; and the ships destined to attack the west face should come in from the northward, where fewer guns would bear upon them, and where there was no spit running out to interrupt their progress as there was on the south point. The Admiral, I was glad to find, came into my views, and the steam-boat plan was abandoned.

The only objection that could be started was the lateness of the hour before the sea-breeze set in, and in a conversation with Captain Fanshawe, that was the difficulty he raised, to which I observed, that it was a very reasonable objection, but still I was of opinion that a place like Acre should either be attacked *properly, or not at all*; and the masters of the Princess Charlotte and Powerful agreed with me, that it was much preferable sailing the ships in to towing them; and both these officers went on board the Vesuvius and reconnoitred the north channel, passing inside the shoal, which lay about three or four miles from the west face of the fortification. This passage they found perfectly safe, and few guns defending the approach from the northward. Our sheet cable had been improperly bent, being unshackled inside, and passed out of the stern port, round the bows, into the hawse hole, and reshackled, leaving the bight on board. I gave orders for remedying this inconvenience immediately and went on board the flag ship by signal. The breeze had sprung up from the southward, and it was then determined to attack from that quarter. The Powerful was to place herself on the S. W. angle, and the Princess Charlotte to pass

ahead of her and anchor; the other Captains were not on board, but I concluded they had their instructions.

The general signal was now made to weigh, and on coming alongside the *Powerful*, to my dismay, in remedying the mistake that had been made in bending the sheet cable, they let the bight, which was through the hawse hole, go by the run, and the weight of the cable almost tore the anchor from the bows. All hands were sent on the lower deck to rouse in the slack of the cable, but the chock in the stern port had not been shipped, and all attempts to get a fathom of it were unavailing. By this time the squadron were under weigh, and we were obliged to leave the cable to its fate and weigh also, which was hardly done when the lashing of the anchor gave way, and the ship was brought up by the stern; there was nothing left but to cut away the cable and substitute the stream, which is by no means a safe way of bringing up a ship alongside of a battery.

I do not know that in the whole course of a long service I ever was before so annoyed; the whole squadron were under weigh, and the *Powerful* at anchor, without any person but ourselves being

aware of the cause, and at a time when there was not a moment to be lost. The wind, however, died away, which gave time to get our stream anchor ready; and about one o'clock the proper sea breeze set in, and the Phoenix, on board of which were embarked Sir Robert Stopford and Sir Charles Smith, (though the flag was flying in the Princess Charlotte,) made the signal for the squadron to close round the Powerful. Captain Stewart, of the Benbow, who was to attack from the south, under the orders of Captain Collier, together with Castor, Edinburgh, Carysfort, Talbot, Wasp, and Hazard, thinking there was some mistake, very properly asked permission to attack from the south, which was granted. Shortly after, as we were standing to the northward to round the shoal, and give room for the squadron to follow, the signal was made to bear up, to which I replied, "Intend attacking from the north." I believe the answer was not understood, and the Flag Lieutenant came on board to know what we were waiting for. I desired him to explain to the Admiral my intention. A few minutes after, the signal was made to the Revenge to keep under weigh as a reserve, much to the annoyance of my friend Captain Waldegrave.

The Powerful, followed by the Princess Charlotte, Thunderer, Bellerophon, and Pique, having got well round the shoal, now bore up, and ran along shore towards the north angle. As we drew near the fortress, the colours were hoisted from two flag-staffs, one on the citadel, the other lower down. I desired the bow guns of the Powerful to be fired to prevent the Egyptians pointing with correctness. At this time the southern division, led in with great judgment and gallantry by Captain Collier, of the Castor, were fast approaching their position, and when well within range, the Egyptians opened their fire, the shot passing very considerably over. In a few minutes we passed the circular redoubt, where only three or four guns were mounted, and then anchored abreast of the sea wall, defended by forty guns, in six and a half fathom water, and about seven hundred yards distance. The wind was on the land, and we were not sure of our soundings further in; and had we been obliged to swing and veer, we might have tailed on shore; besides, it was the month of November, and fine weather was not to be expected to continue.

Captain Fanshawe, of the Princess Charlotte,

supposing he was, under any circumstances, to take her station to the northward of the Powerful, which ship he thought would anchor on the S. W. angle, (as if she had come in from the south,) and believing we had brought up in consequence of shoal water, anchored astern of us, as did the Bellerophon. Captain Berkeley, seeing a sufficient opening, (and being under the same impression, and having the same orders as Captain Austin, to anchor in succession,) pushed in between the Princess Charlotte and Bellerophon. I was not aware of these orders, and I sent a boat, which arrived too late, to desire them to pass ahead of me. Perhaps I was wrong in not making a signal, but as the Commander-in-Chief was in the Phœnix, to direct the movements of the squadron, I did not think it proper.

As each ship anchored, a tremendous fire was opened, and the shot were so well directed, that the bravest men of the bravest nation in the world could not have resisted; no wonder, then, that the Egyptians were soon thrown into confusion. Five of their guns only, placed in a flanking battery, were well served, and never missed; but they were pointed too high, and damaged our spars and rigging only. The main-top-mast and mizen-top-sail yard were

shot through on board the Powerful, and the rigging much cut; two shots only struck our hull, but did little or no damage. The ships astern suffered also in their rigging. One man was killed on board the Princess Charlotte, and the Thunderer had her quarter-gallery shot away.

The Admiral, seeing room ahead of the Powerful, made the signal for the Thunderer to weigh; but she was so jammed between the Princess Charlotte and Bellerophon, though she tried, it was impossible to move without fouling either one or other. Seeing this, and being apprehensive that the five guns which kept playing upon us would at last find their proper elevation, I first sent a boat, but before she reached, took upon myself to order the Revenge, who was in reserve, to anchor ahead of me, which Captain Waldegrave did in gallant style.

While this was going on on the west face, Captain Collier's squadron, (the Castor anchoring first, and the others passing ahead of her,) were doing their work to admiration on the south, supported by the Austrians, under Admiral Bandeira. Nor was the fire of the Turkish Admiral to be slighted; he ran inside of all the squadron, and took up a warm



berth abreast a new, and very strong work. Nothing could resist the fire of our ships; many of the shot from our side passed over the town, and might have much injured the ships to the south, unknown to us; and I fancy a few of their's flew occasionally over us. The steamers outside were not idle; most of their fusees, however, were bad, and some fired shot instead; but still a few shells must have done execution. Ours in the Powerful, fitted agreeable to a plan of Mr. Jenner, gunner's-mate of the Edinburgh, rarely failed; and I believe all those on his system did much good service.

After a most severe firing of upwards of two hours, the grand magazine blew up with a tremendous explosion; whether caused by accident, or by our shells, will never be known. Many ships, as in similar cases, claimed the credit of it. The Admiral gave it to the Gorgon; one of the captains of our shell-guns claimed it also; and I dare say there was not a captain of a shell-gun in the squadron who did not think that he had done the deed. But there let it rest; it was an awful visitation on the enemy. Many an unfortunate being finished his existence in the air; and

many still more unfortunate were buried in the ruins or in the casemates, and probably lived for days, and perished from starvation or gradual suffocation, of all deaths the worse to die. The five guns I have mentioned, notwithstanding the explosion, kept up their fire with great spirit to the last.

About sunset the signal was made to discontinue the engagement ; but as that might have encouraged the enemy to re-man their guns, we kept on till a considerable time after dark, when the Flag Lieutenant brought us orders to withdraw. The *Revenge* slipped her stern anchor, and made sail with great facility. The *Princess Charlotte*, I believe, picked up both her anchors, and also made sail, but casting the wrong way, nearly got on shore ; she was conducted in a most seamanlike manner, and not a word was to be heard on board of her. The *Powerful*, having her main-top mast badly wounded, and the main-top-gallant mast down, was towed out by the *Gorgon*. The *Thunderer* and *Bellerophon* remained in their position.

The southern squadron being anchored in the bay, with their stern to the beach, and their broadsides bearing on the Mole, remained at anchor also ; and fortunately they did, for their position certainly

contributed to decide the Governor to abandon the town, which he did after midnight, taking the greatest part of the garrison with him.

Towards the west side there was no breach, and the walls were much too high to surmount without scaling-ladders, which were left behind, with the exception of a few in the Princess Charlotte. Towards the south the walls were lower, but still they were not breached; and a determined enemy might have remained secure under the breastworks, or in the numerous casemates, without suffering much loss, and, considering the season of the year, it would have been worth their while to have made the experiment. Be that as it may, it was decided to evacuate the town. What number was withdrawn, and finally escaped, is difficult to say, as many deserted on the march and came over in the morning, and others were picked up by the irregular cavalry who had joined from the country. Before the attack on the fortress, a regiment of Egyptian cavalry, with their flying artillery, encamped outside, charged the mountaineers who had collected in some force; these, although they behaved with great gallantry, were quite unequal to resist the disciplined Egyptians, and suffered severely. The loss of

the enemy's force during the battle, by the explosion, must have been very great; an entire battalion, who were formed near the magazine ready to resist any attempt to storm, were entirely destroyed; and nothing could be more shocking than to see the miserable wretches, sick and wounded, in all parts of this devoted town, which was almost entirely pulverized. The Turks paid little attention to the poor creatures, and many were seen lying in all directions dying for want of seasonable relief.

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## CHAPTER XVII.

Difference between the Admiral and the Author—The Author's Orders—Captain Berkeley's Orders—The Author applies for a Court Martial, but is refused—Correspondence with the Admiral—The Admiral's Dispatches.

AT daylight in the morning I went on board the Phoenix steamer, where the Admiral still was; he received me on the quarter-deck, and, after congratulating him on the capture of Acre, I said, I hoped he was satisfied with the position I had taken up. To which, to my great surprise, he replied, in a most abrupt manner, "Not at all! you ought to have gone on to the south-west angle." Such a reproof on the quarter-deck of a man-of-war, and on such an occasion, given by the Commander-in-Chief to his second in command, even had he committed an error of judgment, cannot be justified, particularly after the services I had brought to so happy a termination on shore, and which had been frequently acknowledged by him.

That the squadron were not anchored so well as they might have been, is quite true, but no blame

could be attributed to me, nor did I attribute any to others. When I attacked from the north I never doubted but the ships astern would pass on in the same manner as if I had attacked from the south, and anchor in a line ahead. But Captain Fanshawe, in the *Princess Charlotte*, as I have before stated, being impressed with the idea that, under any circumstances, he was to take his station astern of the *Powerful*, and believing we were in shoal water, anchored astern, as did the other ships who were under the same impression, and who had orders to anchor in succession, of which I was not aware. The *Revenge*, however, being in reserve, corrected the mistake.

I had frequently been engaged with batteries last war, and I believe was the only officer in the squadron who had ever commanded a ship in action against stone walls, and the system I followed was the one I had always been accustomed to; it was the plan followed by the leading ship at the battle of the Nile, and I am not aware that Lord Nelson found fault with Sir Samuel Hood for anchoring abreast of the leading ship; and if that is the tactics to be followed in attacking a line of ships, it is certainly the same that ought to be followed in attacking

a line of stone walls. I never saw, in the whole course of my service, the leading ship run along a whole line of either ships or batteries; neither did I ever hear of such a thing. There are two palpable inconveniences attending such an attack; the first is, the leading ship would be disabled before she got to her station; the second, if the ships were in close order of battle, it would be *perfectly impossible*, in the smoke, for the next ship astern to know the exact moment her leader anchored, and she most probably would run aboard of her, and those astern would fall into the same difficulty. The fact is, the officers were not called on board of the flag-ship, and the plan of the place, and the plan of attack, under all circumstances, was never pointed out to them; each captain had separate instructions, and one did not know the orders of the other. I have before stated, that the first evening the attack was arranged between Captain Boxer and the Admiral, which I fortunately succeeded in changing. The officers were not sent for afterwards, for I went immediately on board my own ship, where I remained till my signal was made to go to the Admiral, (the breeze having sprung up,) who wished to ask my opinion,

if we should attack, which was agreed upon; and I think Captain Fanshawe was the only captain there; I certainly never saw either Captain Austin or Captain Berkeley, nor did I know they were ordered to anchor in succession. The orders I received were as follows:

“ Princess Charlotte, off Acre,  
Nov. 2, 1840.

“ MEMORANDUM.—The Princess Charlotte and Powerful are to be ready at daylight to-morrow morning to take their stations along the west front of the battery at Acre, at a distance of about 500 yards, and to commence firing upon the batteries on shore, which is to be continued until the whole seawall is destroyed.

“ Should the wind be favourable, and the water sufficiently smooth, the ships may go in under sail; but if the wind is off the land and moderate, steam-vessels will be ordered to tow them.

“ Signals made from the Phœnix are to be attended to in the same manner as if made from the Princess Charlotte.

“ ROBERT STOPFORD, *Admiral.*”

“ To Commodore Napier.”



What were the orders to the other Captains I did not know at the time. Captain Berkeley has since shown me a short note which he received the morning of the action :—

“ Dear Berkeley,

“ November 3, 1840.

“ If the wind comes from the south-west, I mean to sail in from the south.

“ Powerful, Princess Charlotte, Bellerophon, Thunderer. Ships to anchor as named in succession. You had better be prepared to bring up by the stern.

“ Your’s truly,

“ ROBERT STOPFORD.”

“ To Captain Berkeley.”

It is much to be regretted, after an attack, which succeeded beyond our expectations, that such an observation should have been made to me by the Commander-in-Chief; and I feel quite satisfied that some mischievous person had told the Admiral that the berth I took up had thrown out the rest of the squadron, or words to that effect.

That I was hurt, beyond measure, can be easily conceived. An admiral passing a censure after an

action on his second in command was not to be borne with temper; some few words passed on both sides, which I do not recollect, and the conversation finished by my asking, in an abrupt manner, if he had any further commands for me, which was answered in the negative in the same style. I am not at all aware that I had ever given the least cause for this break-out. I certainly had frequently pressed the Admiral to carry on active measures, and perhaps in too urgent a manner, but I had no reason to expect that I should ever have been so treated.

On quitting the Phoenix I went on board the Gorgon, and took the only step open to me, namely, to ask for a court-martial. This was refused, and I had just finished a letter, requesting that the correspondence might be sent to the Admiralty if he persisted in denying me a court-martial, when I was beset by my brother officers, earnestly requesting that I would be pacified, very naturally concluding that a difference of so serious a nature between the Commander-in-Chief and his second, would put a stop to the promotion and rewards that it was expected would be liberally bestowed on the whole squadron. Of this I felt quite aware, but I considered myself

so unjustly and so indecorously treated, and that my character as an officer would suffer, unless an investigation took place, as there are always people in the world ready to breathe upon one's reputation.

This feeling for several days induced me to resist all their endeavours to make matters up, but I at last consented, much against my own inclination, (and I believe, even now, that I was wrong in doing so,) on condition the Admiral would write me a proper letter on the subject. He did write me a letter, which I subjoin :

“ My dear Sir,

“ November 6.

“ I do not apprehend that a difference of opinion implies a censure upon either party, as I cannot allow infallibility to any body.

“ That I differed in opinion with you is true, but that therefore censure was intended is without foundation.

“ Believe me, my dear Sir,

“ Yours truly,

“ ROBERT STOPFORD.”

“ Commodore Napier.”



upon any one; and the reader must judge whether I was right or wrong.

I close this Chapter with Sir Charles Smith's report to Lord Palmerston, and the Admiral's letter to the Admiralty, in which he followed the example of Sir John Jervis, on the 14th of February, 1797, and made no mention of either the second in command, who led in one division, or of Captain Collier, who led in another, or any of the other officers engaged. Captains Boxer and Codrington were thanked for their exertions in sounding. In a second letter which he wrote, and where he had an opportunity of correcting this omission, he makes mention only of his own captain and flag-lieutenant.

“ Princess Charlotte, off St. Jean D’Acre,  
November 4, 1840.

“ Sir,

“ You will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the town and fortress of Acre were taken possession of by the allied forces under my command this morning in the name of the Sultan.

“ The circumstances which led to this result occurred on the 3rd, when a heavy cannonade from the ships and vessels, beginning at 2 P.M. and ending

at 5, completely demolished the town, and materially damaged the fortifications, inducing the Egyptians to evacuate the place in the night. A tremendous explosion of a large magazine of powder took place about 4 P.M. on the 3rd.

“The attacks were made upon the west lines and south face of the works, the former composed of the following ships:—viz., Princess Charlotte, Powerful, Bellerophon, Revenge, Thunderer, and Pique, under the immediate command of Commodore Napier (as I thought it advisable to accompany Colonel Sir Charles F. Smith in the Phoenix steamer, to be ready to take advantage of any breach that might be made in either of the two sea faces of the walls of the place for an immediate assault). The south face, being a more contracted anchorage, was occupied by the Edinburgh, Benbow, Castor, Carysfort, Talbot, Wasp, and Hazard: the destruction caused by the fire of the ships on both sides sufficiently proves its rapidity and precision.

“Rear-Admiral Baron de Bandeira, in the Austrian frigate Medea, and the Guerriera, under the command of His Imperial Highness the Archduke Frederick, with the Austrian corvette Lipsia, rendered much assistance. Rear-Admiral Walker Bey,

in the Sultan's ship Mookuddimay-i-hive of 74 guns, took up a most favourable position opposed to the south face, and did good service.

“ The steamers Gorgon, Vesuvius, Phœnix, and Stromboli, fired shot and shells into the town with much precision, and it is generally supposed that shells from the Gorgon occasioned the destruction of the powder magazine.

“ A flag of truce having been offered by the Turkish Admiral and rejected a short time before, I did not think it necessary or becoming that the summons should be repeated, particularly as hostilities had already commenced, and the ships and steamers had been fired upon as they approached the walls.

“ I have not been able to ascertain the number of troops in the town of Acre at the commencement of our fire: they have been estimated at 4500, besides a body of cavalry outside the town of 800. Many lives were lost by the explosion of the magazine. 700 Egyptians and two officers of rank came in this morning with their arms, and surrendered themselves as prisoners.

“ To Colonel Sir Charles Smith devolves the task of putting the town and fortifications into a

posture of defence, and I am happy to find that his health enables him to perform his duty with his usual intelligence.

“ A great quantity of arms and ammunition was found at Acre, and the fortifications were fast getting into a state of preparation against attack.

“ I am much indebted to Captain Edward Boxer, of the *Pique*, and to Captain Codrington, of the *Talbot*, for the excellent surveys which they made of the shoals round Acre, which enabled the ships to go in without risk of getting ashore.

“ I return a list of the killed and wounded in the allied squadrons, but the damage to the masts and rigging can be made good without the ships being sent off the station.

“ The success of this enterprise, so important in its results, has called for my acknowledgements in general orders to the officers and men of the combined squadrons, whose united exertions had so much contributed to its attainment.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.,

“ ROBERT STOPFORD, *Admiral.*”

“ R. More O’Ferrall, Esq., &c.”

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“ My Lord,

“ St. Jean d’Acre, Nov. 5, 1840.

“ On the 29th ultimo it was finally determined between Sir Robert Stopford and myself that the siege of Acre should be undertaken. I accordingly detached Omar Bey for the purpose of advancing from Sidon with 2000 Turks upon Tyre, and thence to occupy the Pass of the White Mountain, to the northward of this place; and on the 31st, the Admiral made sail from Beyrout roads, having previously embarked in the squadron 3000 men, under the immediate command of the Pacha Selim, and small detachments of Royal Artillery and Sappers under Major Higgins, of the former corps, and Lieutenant Aldrich, Royal Engineers.

“ Omar Bey reached the position assigned to him at the same hour on the 2nd inst. that the fleet appeared off Acre.

“ Owing to the light winds the ships did not get into action till 2 P.M. on the 3rd, when an animated fire commenced, and was maintained without intermission until darkness closed the operations of the day. About three hours later, the Governor, with a portion of the garrison, quitted the town, which was taken possession of by the allied troops at daylight the following morning. The moral influence

on the cause in which we are engaged that will result from its surrender is incalculable.

“During the bombardment the principal magazine and the whole arsenal blew up. By the explosion, two entire regiments, formed in position on the ramparts, were annihilated, and every living creature, within the area of 60,000 square yards, ceased to exist; the loss of life being variously computed at from 1200 to 2000 persons. Those who may have been inclined to doubt the fighting qualities of the Egyptian troops might acquire a lesson from the example of their endurance, if they could but contemplate the devastation and scene of horror by which this once formidable fortress is enshrouded.

“To the Royal Navy I should be guilty of great injustice were I to attempt to record services that will be so much more ably detailed by their gallant and respected Commander-in-Chief; whilst the early departure of the despatch vessel for Malta, and the labour that has devolved on me within the walls, alike deprive me of the means of transmitting returns of ordnance, ammunition, treasure, &c., that have fallen into the hands of the captors, and of giving your Lordship an approximation even to the amount of prisoners, (over 3000,) as many are still

coming in, and others are dragged in numbers from their places of refuge and concealment.

“To Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Constantinople I have reported the measures I have adopted for the temporary administration of the Pachalic of Acre, pending the pleasure of the Sultan.

“I have, &c.,

“C. F. SMITH, *Colonel,*

“*Commanding the Forces in Syria.*

“Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B. &c.”

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“Princess Charlotte, off St. Jean d’Acre,  
“November 8, 1840.

“SINCE my letter of the 4th another explosion has taken place of a magazine of live shells, from a smouldering fire under the rubbish of the former, which it had been found almost impossible entirely to subdue; one marine of the Benbow was killed, and several others slightly hurt; but I regret to say that gallant officer, Captain Collier, of the Castor, who had so distinguished himself in the attack, was severely wounded, having his leg fractured, and several other hurts of a slighter description, which require his removal to Malta; and the Castor, having her bowsprit badly wounded, and other masts and spars

shot away, I have ordered her and the *Wasp*, having her fore-mast disabled, into Malta to refit, and rejoin me with all dispatch.

“One thousand prisoners have been sent away in the Turkish flag-ship, eighteen officers, and a party of soldiers, by the *Talbot*, to Constantinople, and 2000 to Beyrout, by the *Bellerophon*, *Thunderer*, *Revenge*, and *Edinburgh*; and the garrison being placed in a state of order and tolerable security, under Sir Charles Smith, is to be left with 3000 Turkish troops, under Selim Pacha, and about 250 marines, under Lieut.-Colonel Walker, with the protection of the *Pique* and *Stromboli*, and occasional visits of other ships, as circumstances require.

“The *Hazard* resumes her station at Tyre, and Commodore Napier proceeds from Beyrout to take charge of the squadron off Alexandria—*Benbow*, *Magicienne*, and *Daphne*, at Scanderoon and the neighbourhood.

“The people of the country seem very firm in the cause, and keep the neighbourhood clear of Mehemet Ali's troops. Abundance of ammunition and stores have been found in the place, and arms have been sent in the *Benbow* and *Powerful*, for

distribution to the inhabitants to the northward. Among those who surrendered themselves was the Polish Colonel Schultz, the chief engineer, who has been sent as a prisoner to Constantinople; he was wounded, and says it was quite impossible to withstand such an incessant stream of fire as was poured from our guns, which I found, on going round the ramparts with Sir Charles Smith, had torn and almost demolished many of the embrasures, and disabled the guns in such a manner, that it did appear extraordinary that the garrison should have made so good a defence; for the state of devastation was beyond description.

“When I see the effects of our fire upon so formidable a fortress, I cannot help feeling the greatest obligation to every officer and man engaged in this enterprise. The cool, steady, and beautiful style in which the ships and vessels, through shoals and banks, came into their positions, and the noble spirit that animated the whole, in the destructive fire opened and maintained against a very smart return from the forts and batteries, were most gratifying, and drew forth my admiration, being enabled in the steamer to observe the simultaneous attacks on both faces; but where all were animated

with the same spirit, and each did his duty to my heart's content, it cannot be possible for me to single out cases of individual merit. I may be allowed to observe, however, that in confiding to Captain Fanshawe, my flag-captain, (who had been of great service to me in the previous details and arrangements on this and former occasions during the expedition,) the charge of conducting my flagship, while it behoved me to survey and direct the whole, he most ably fulfilled his trust.

“Lieutenant Granville, my flag-lieutenant, besides the duties he had to perform in the signals, was actively employed in the boats communicating with the different ships along the line of the two divisions, as necessity required; I would, therefore, beg to recommend him to their Lordships' notice, and I should feel gratified by any mark of approbation their Lordships may be pleased to bestow on the senior officers of each class for their gallant conduct, in common with all, on this important occasion.

“I am, &c.,

“ROBERT STOPFORD, *Admiral.*”

“R. More O'Ferrall, Esq., &c.”

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Return of killed and wounded in the squadron under the orders of Admiral the Hon. Sir Robert Stopford, Commander-in-Chief, in the attack of the fortifications of St. Jean d'Acre, on the 3rd of November, 1840:—

*Princess Charlotte*—Killed, 1 seaman.

*Powerful*—Wounded, 1 seaman severely, 2 seamen and 1 royal marine slightly.

*Bellcrophon*—None killed or wounded.

*Revenge*—Killed, 1 seaman, 1 drummer, royal marines; wounded, 3 seamen severely, 1 royal marine slightly.

*Thunderer*—None killed or wounded.

*Castor*—Killed, 4 seamen; wounded, 1 seaman severely, 3 seamen slightly, 2 privates royal marines severely, 1 private royal marine slightly.

*Edinburgh*—Killed, 2 seamen, 1 drummer royal marine, 1 private royal marine; wounded, Commander F. D. Hastings, slightly; Mr. John Davies, master, slightly; Mr. Joseph Plimsoll, assistant-surgeon, slightly; Mr. Henry Boys, midshipman, slightly; 1 seaman, 1 boy slightly, 1 serjeant royal marines slightly.

*Benbow*—None killed or wounded.

*Pique*—None killed or wounded.

*Carysfort*—None killed or wounded.

*Talbot*—Wounded, Lieutenant G. B. Le Mesurier, since dead; Mr. Henry Haswell, mate, slightly; 1 seaman severely.

*Gorgon*—None killed or wounded.

*Wasp*—Wounded, 5 seamen severely, 1 private royal marine.

*Stromboli*—None killed or wounded.

*Phoenix*—None killed or wounded.

*Vesuvius*—None killed or wounded.

*Hazard*—Wounded, 1 private royal marine, 1 boy slightly.

Turkish flag-ship, Rear-Admiral Walker—4 killed, 3 wounded.

*Medea*, Austrian flag-ship, Rear-Admiral Bandeira—1 killed, 4 wounded.

*Guerriera*, Austrian frigate—1 killed, 2 wounded.

Total killed, 18—Total wounded, 41.

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## CHAPTER XVIII.

Second Explosion at Acre—Prisoners sent to Beyrout—The Author ordered to Alexandria with a Squadron—Letter from the Emir—Neglected State of his Troops—English Commissary-General appointed—Excursion to the Mountains—Padre Ryllo—French Priests in Lebanon—Visit to the Wife of an Emir—Bad conduct of the Turks—Letters to Lord Ponsonby, Palmerston, and Minto on the subject.

A DAY or two after the surrender of the ill-fated town of Acre, another severe explosion took place, but fortunately few suffered. Captain Collier had his leg broke, and Sir Charles Smith received a contusion on the foot.

The prisoners were sent in the ships-of-war to Beyrout; and I was directed to proceed there also, complete my water, and then take the command of the squadron off Alexandria, which was to be increased to six sail of the line. I had gained so much influence over the mountaineers that I did not think this a wise measure; and the Admiralty seemed to have been of the same opinion, for orders were afterwards sent for the Powerful to return.

The Admiral had decided to winter in Marmorice

Bay, and leave the Benbow at Beyrout, Pique and Zebra at Acre, and the other small vessels and steamers on various parts of the coast. We arrived at Beyrout on the 9th of November, and a few days after were followed by the Admiral who, with the rest of the squadron, anchored in St. George's Bay, with the exception of the Bellerophon, which remained off the town. The anchorage at the latter place in winter is far from safe; the former is quite open, but the holding-ground good. We found things in the same state; Ibrahim was concentrated at Zachle and Malaka, and the Turkish troops divided between Tripoli, Beyrout, Sidon, Acre, and Tyre. About this time they must have amounted to 12,000. The Emir Bechir had been left to himself to watch the mountains the best way he could, without either forces or provisions, and why Ibrahim did not attack him, and march upon Beyrout, is to me inexplicable. The Emir shall tell his own story.

“ Sir,

“ Ammanah, Nov. 11, 1840.

“ We have received your favoured letter, and I thank you very much for telling me so soon about Acre. The 3000 muskets which you sent me the

order for, I am sending for to-day, and I thank you for it. I also inform you that the troops under my command have had no provisions for three days, nor the horses any barley, and in fact nothing at all to eat. I have written to the Pacha several times, and he has done nothing. You know very well the troops cannot keep together without pay and provisions, nor the horses without barley. In consequence of this, the troops have returned to their homes; and if they remain, the enemy will come into the mountains. Perhaps this may happen, and I write this to you that you shall not blame me if it does.

“The bearer (Scheik Osman) will inform you plainly about all this, and I leave every thing to you.”

I communicated this to Sir Charles Smith, who immediately gave orders to the Turkish authorities to send the supplies that were wanted; they, however, knew very little of the movements of a Commissariat, and the probability is the orders were badly executed. Shortly after, a Commissary General arrived from England to take charge of this department.

Three days after my arrival at Beyrout, I made an excursion to the mountains, and went over the ground whence we had so recently driven Ibrahim Pacha. It was indeed a fine position; and how so renowned a warrior as Ibrahim Pacha could have allowed himself to be driven from such a post, is not easily to be accounted for. After getting possession of the third position, there is a cavalry country; and had he taken the precaution of ordering up a couple of squadrons of Souliman Pacha's horse, and attacked us unexpectedly, we should have lost many men before we could have recovered from the disorder unavoidably caused by the difficulty of the ascent. After going over the ground, we partook of the hospitality of Padre Ryllo, at Bechfaya. He had been an officer in the Polish army; and, after witnessing the destruction of his country, became a priest, and took refuge in the mountains of Lebanon. He was a most useful and intelligent man; had a large correspondence through the country, and was most serviceable in procuring information. Besides the Padre, there were half a dozen more priests in the convent, French and Italians, who possessed great influence in the mountains, and turned their attention to the

education of the people. The French priests were, generally speaking, in the interest of Mehemet Ali; and all his correspondence with the mountains was carried on through them, and by means of French vessels of war stationed on various parts of the coast. We were well aware of this inconvenience; but it was very difficult, if not impossible, to remedy it, without running the risk of collision with France, which the Government was anxious to avoid.

After enjoying a good dinner, we mounted our horses, and proceeded along the summit of the mountains leading to Brumanah. The greater part of the villages in this district had been burnt by order of Ibrahim, after the first affair of Ornagacuan, and it was out of my power to prevent it. Brumanah was in ruins also; it had been destroyed by a party of Albanians during the insurrection. We were well received by the wife of the Emir of the place, whose name I do not recollect; she was mother to the wife of the Emir Bechir Cassim. We had a tolerable dinner served on a low table; and were afterwards invited into the ladies' apartment, where were seated the Princess and her two daughters, smoking their pipes, dressed out in all their finery. The three

ladies wore horns on their heads, studded with jewels, about two feet and a half long, over which were hung veils, the horn richly ornamented. The old lady had lost her beauty, but not her dignity. The husband of the eldest daughter was a prisoner in Nubia; and when she heard I was going off Alexandria, she implored me to obtain his release; she was a determined smoker, and frequently handed me her pipe. The second daughter was unmarried and handsome, and also treated me occasionally with a whiff, which is considered a high compliment on the mountains. After a good deal of conversation, through the medium of an interpreter, we were served with coffee; the ladies then retired, and we followed their example; but as usual, were kept awake the greater part of the night by our numerous bed-fellows, who appeared more inveterate in this chateau than we had ever found them before. After breakfast we mounted our horses, and made the best of our way to Beyrout.

The Turks now considering themselves pretty secure in Lebanon, took no pains to gain the good will of the inhabitants; on the contrary, they soon made them feel that they had gained nothing by the change of masters. Before leaving Beyrout for

Alexandria, I wrote to Lord Ponsonby the following letter on the subject:—

“ H.M.S. Powerful, Beyrout,  
Nov. 14, 1840.

“ My Lord,

“ Things are going on here just as bad as possible. I do not mean as to military affairs, for I know nothing about them, except that the troops are divided between Beyrout, Sidon, Tyre, and Acre; but the Pacha is disgusting everybody. The troops of the Grand Prince are left sometimes without provisions, or any thing else, for days. I send you the last letter I had from him. The appointments to the different places are made without judgment; and I verily believe, if the war lasts, Ibrahim Pacha will get a party in his favour. I understand Izzet openly says when Ibrahim is put down, the next thing to do is to disarm the mountaineers. This, I suspect, will be no easy matter; and I see no prospect of any good coming out of all this to the Sultan; he ought at once to give them the same government they have at Samos.

“ I before mentioned to your Lordship that Sidon, Beyrout, and Tripoli should be added to the government of the Grand Prince; and as the

mountaineers have land in the Bekaa, if that and Anti-Lebanon could be also added to their government, they would be quite content, and be the best supporters the Sultan could have. If Mehemet Ali was to offer it, even now, and they could depend upon him, I verily believe he would be supported.

“The Turks in Beyrout treat the mountaineers very ill, and they are beginning to find they will not be a bit better off than they were. At present I have great influence over them, and can make them do just what I like, but I am unfortunately going to Alexandria, where I do not believe anything can be done without troops, and there will be no one here to look after their interests. My son is come out to join me; he is Major in the 46th. I have some idea of sending him to the Emir, but he ought to have Turkish rank; he has great talent, great application, and knows a little Arabic, and will soon know more. If you could get him Turkish rank, as Major-General, he would be most useful. There is another thing that ought to be done immediately, viz., to send one who could be *trusted*, with a sum of money, say 5000*l.*, to distribute amongst the mountaineers whose houses have been burnt. I was yesterday at Bechfaya; there is a town near it entirely destroyed,



and the inhabitants without shelter or provisions, and the winter coming on ; they cannot go into the plain to cultivate their lands, and there will certainly be a famine if magazines are not formed to provide against it.

“The garrison of Jaffa marched into Acre the other day, and 500 irregular horse are come in from Marash ; I believe if Ibrahim was attacked with vigour, we should get all the Egyptian army ; after another fortnight nothing more can be done, because the rains will set in. Should anything turn up at Alexandria I shall not fail to keep your Lordship informed. It is generally believed here that the French squadron are gone to Toulon, in that case we shall probably go to Malta ; they are, I dare say, about something,—at least it looks like it,—or they may have determined on war, and are concentrating their squadron, which will be stronger than ours, till the arrival of the *Britannia* and *Howe*. The Admiral, for the present, talks of going to Marmorice Bay, and the ships from home are ordered to rendezvous there.

“Believe me, &c.,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

“To the Right Hon. Lord Ponsonby.”

This letter I followed up by one to Lord Palmerston :—

“ Powerful, Beyrout,  
Nov. 14, 1840.

“ My Lord,

“ By this time your Lordship will have known of the defeat of Ibrahim Pacha, and the total evacuation of Lebanon. Since then, Acre has fallen ; but no military operations have taken place. Troops are arriving every day from Constantinople, and we cannot now have less than 12,000 men. Ibrahim Pacha is two days' march from here, and is watched by the mountaineers only ; and they are so neglected by the Pacha, that sometimes they are without provisions for three days. I send you the translation of the last letter I received from the Grand Prince ; this is not the first, second, or third time. The Pacha here is the worst person that can be ; and unless he is removed, there will be mischief. I have written fully to Lord Ponsonby on the subject. Nothing would give England so much influence here as giving Lebanon the same government as Samos. The Grand Prince ought to be a Pacha ; Sidon, Tripoli, and Beyrout ought to be added to his government ; and, if possible,

the Bekaa and Anti-Lebanon. This would be a prosperous country; but agreeable to the present system, they are almost shut out from the sea. God knows how the Sultan is to govern the other provinces; but if his Pachas are all like the man here, they will be worse off than they were under Mehemet Ali; and I verily believe, should the war last, he will have a party in his favour, the Turks treat them so ill. If Mehemet Ali was a wise man, he would do with the mountains what I have stated, and he would get a strong party in his favour.

“I am going to Alexandria, which I am sorry for. I have great influence here at present, and can make them do what I like; and would have been of much more service here than off Alexandria, where nothing can be done at this season.

“My son joined me the other day, which I believe you know; I should have put him on my staff had I remained in command of the army. I have some idea of sending him to the Grand Prince, where he would be of use; but I fear it might create jealousies. I hope your Lordship will order him the same fit-out and allowances with the other officers. I wrote to Sir John Macdonald; at my

request he sent him to me, and it would be hard if he was put to personal expenses.

“The weather is still fine; but if a movement does not take place at once, it will be too late, and the troops must remain in garrison all the winter. Ibrahim will probably establish his head-quarters at Balbeck, if he intends remaining in Syria; but as he has given up the north, and lost Acre, I do not see what he is to gain by remaining in this country.

“We hear the French fleet are gone to Toulon; I fear they are up to some mischief. If this is true, we ought to be at Malta; but we never can, with our present force, watch both the French and Egyptians. I do not, however, apprehend the latter will proceed to sea; if they do, I shall see what I can make of them. I believe the best thing to settle this affair would be at once to say to Mehemet Ali, ‘Withdraw from Syria, and give up the Turkish fleet, and you shall keep Egypt.’ If your Lordship and the allies have any notion of that, try me as a negotiator with six sail of the line, which I am to have, and I dare say I should succeed. I believe Egypt would be just as well governed by him, as it would be by one of the Turkish Pachas; he is an

old man, and it is hardly worth while risking a European war to turn him out.

“ I have the honour to remain, &c.,

“ CHARLES NAPIER.”

“ To the Right Hon. Lord Palmerston.”

“ P. S. If your Lordship expects a French war, for God’s sake full man the ships, or we shall meet with disasters. I have frequently written on this subject, both to Parker and Lord Minto.”

I next wrote as follows to Lord Minto:—

“ H.M.S. Powerful, Beyrout,  
November 14, 1840.

“ My Lord,

“ I learn, with great pleasure, from Sir William Parker, that my son is to be employed, for which I beg to thank your Lordship. The defeat of Ibrahim Pacha has led to greater events than I was aware of when I last wrote to your Lordship. It appears that he immediately sent orders to evacuate all the north, and blow up the batteries in the passes; at the same time he evacuated Tripoli.

\*      \*      \*      \*      \*

“ Ibrahim is now at Zachle with about 12,000 men, including 3000 cavalry. I believe there is

some intention of moving, but I fear it will be too late, as the rains are expected every day. We have had a very fine week, but I do not think a forward movement will take place till the officers arrive from England; it will be then too late.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The Pacha they have sent here is the greatest — on earth; the appointments to the different posts are given without judgment, and I believe, are bought right and left. The inhabitants are ill-treated by the Turks, and begin to ask what they are to gain by the change. The Pacha countenances all sorts of intrigues against the new Grand Prince, who is left for days without provisions, and his men are forced to go to their houses; and I verily believe he is in the pay of the old Prince and his family, who are very rich, and are trying to regain their places. I go into the mountains occasionally, where I have great influence, and they all tell me this. Had I been Commander-in-Chief, at my own risk and my own responsibility, I would have shipped old Izzet Pacha off to Constantinople, which would at once have shown a determination that oppression should not go on. I have written to Lord Ponsonby, who has

promised to have him removed, but if it is not done speedily, it will be too late.

“The taking of Acre has had the same effect in the south. The garrison of Jaffa has marched to Acre, and a body of Naplouses have come in from the mountains. Five hundred irregular cavalry have marched in from Marash. A vigorous attack on Zachle would finish the war which was so happily begun. I hope the Admiral will not leave the coast: the anchorage in St. George’s Bay is quite open, but the holding-ground is good, and country vessels lay there all winter, therefore there can be no reason why a fleet should not lay there. It never blows home.

“The Austrian squadron is to remain, and I hope ours will remain too. I am to have six sail of the line off Alexandria. If I get them out, I hope to give a good account of them. Blockading is of no use, particularly when you have not the power to stop neutrals. One or two ships there, to give notice if they come out, would be quite sufficient, and the fleet, if they did come out, never would get back again. I most sincerely think the best thing to do would be to leave Mehemet Ali in Egypt; he will govern it better

than a Turkish Pacha. Let him withdraw from Syria, give up the whole of the fleet as a counter-balance for the expense of the war, and pay the Syrians for the damage he has done them; this would be clipping his wings, and punishing him with sufficient severity. He is an old man, and it is hardly worth while to risk a European war to turn him out. I wish Lord Palmerston would make me a negotiator with six sail of the line under my orders; I think it is most likely this affair of the East would be soon finished.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.,

“ CHARLES NAPIER.”

“ To the Right Hon. Lord Minto.”

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## CHAPTER XIX.

The Author sent to Alexandria—Defences of the Town—Lord Palmerston's Instructions to Lord Ponsonby—Lord Ponsonby's dislike to Mehemet Ali—The Author's Correspondence with Boghos Bey—Interview with the Pacha—His Arsenal—Further Correspondence—Signature of the Convention.

THE Admiral having thought it necessary to increase the squadron off Alexandria to six sail of the line, I sailed on the 15th November to take the command; the object was to make a powerful demonstration before Alexandria under my pennant, as the Admiral wrote to me. The rest of the squadron, as I have before stated, were to be withdrawn, with the exception of the Benbow. Ibrahim at this time had collected a very strong force at Zachle and Malaka, and I thought it very probable, unless he had decided to abandon Syria altogether, that he would take advantage of the absence of the squadron, and march a strong force on Beyrout. Had he attempted such an enterprise he must have succeeded; Sidon would then have fallen, and probably Acre, for the explosion had blown a great part of the

land-face down, and the temporary reparations could not have resisted a powerful force.

On the 21st of November I arrived off Alexandria, where I found the Rodney, Revenge, Ganges, Vanguard, and Cambridge, of the line; Carysfort, and Medea, steamer. The latter a few days before had been nearly blown up by the bursting of a shell. Before communicating with the squadron, I ran in and reconnoitred the defences: the sea-face appeared covered with guns, but, with the exception of the Pharo Castle, I saw nothing that could resist a strong naval force; but still any attack without troops would lead to no result, and at this season of the year, even if a force could have been spared, it would not have been prudent to have attempted it.

When I joined the squadron I was put in possession of a copy of the following letter from Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby:

“ My Lord,

“ London, Oct. 15, 1840.

“ Her Majesty’s Government having taken into consideration the act by which the Sultan deprived Mehemet Ali of the pachalic of Egypt, the bearings of that act upon the present state of pending ques-

tions, and the course which it may be expedient to take thereupon, have invited the Representatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia at their court, to submit to their respective Governments, that undoubtedly there is much force in the reasons which, according to your Excellency's reports, induced the Sultan to take this step; and, that while on the one hand, this measure in no degree prevents the Sultan from reinstating Mehemet Ali, if he should speedily make his submission to his Sovereign, on the other hand, it may operate as a powerful instrument of moral coercion upon Mehemet Ali, by making him aware, that if the contest between him and his Sovereign should be prolonged, and if the issue of that contest should be unfavourable to him, he might lose everything by his too obstinate resistance.

“That in this view, and in order to make the recent exercise of the sovereign authority of the Sultan useful towards effecting an early and satisfactory settlement of pending questions, it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that it would be expedient that the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, should be instructed to proceed to the Turkish Minister, and state to him

that their respective Governments, in pursuance of the stipulations of the Seventh Article of the Separate Act annexed to the Treaty of the 15th July, beg strongly to recommend to the Sultan, that if Mehemet Ali should at an early period make his submission to the Sultan, and should agree to restore the Turkish fleet, and to withdraw his troops from Syria, from Adana, Candia, and the Holy Cities, the Sultan should not only reinstate Mehemet Ali as Pacha of Egypt, but should also give him an hereditary tenure to that pachalic, according to the conditions specified in the Treaty of July, and liable, of course, to the forfeiture by any infraction of those conditions on the part of Mehemet Ali, or his successors.

“ Her Majesty’s Government have reason to hope that this suggestion will meet the concurrence of the Governments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia ; and your Excellency will accordingly take the steps pointed out in this despatch, as soon as your colleagues shall have received corresponding instructions.

“ If the Sultan should consent to act upon this advice, tendered to him by his four Allies, it would be expedient that he should take immediate steps

for making his gracious intentions in this respect known to Mehemet Ali; and your Excellency and Sir Robert Stopford should afford every facility which they may require for this purpose.

“ I have, &c.,

(Signed) “ PALMERSTON.”

“ To his Excellency Lord Ponsonby.”

This letter shows that the British Government was not quite satisfied with the deposition of Mehemet Ali. The British Ambassador at Constantinople merely announced it in a short despatch; but his dislike of Mehemet Ali was so little concealed, that it was generally supposed he used all his influence with the Porte to induce the Sultan to depose him. Great praise is, however, due to his Excellency, for the vigour with which he had pushed the armaments at Constantinople, and I believe, had it not been for his exertions, neither a Turkish army or fleet would ever have appeared on the coast of Syria. Had the Ambassador stopped here, and recommended the Porte to be satisfied with the possession of that country, he would have shown himself a great statesman, and a wise man; but it will shortly be seen that he was so exasperated

against Mehemet Ali, that he endeavoured to hurry the Porte into measures, that they had not the power of carrying into execution, against the wish of the Ambassadors of the other Powers, and at the imminent risk of a war with France.

I saw things through a very different telescope. We had met with great success, more than we had the least right to expect, and notwithstanding the menaces of France, a European war had as yet been avoided. I knew it was the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to leave the coast, and also shortly to recall the squadron from Alexandria. Ibrahim had collected his troops at Damascus, Zachle, and Malaka, and they could not have consisted of less than 60,000 men. He had the reputation of being a great General, and the talents of Souliman were undoubted; he had met with uninterrupted success in all his campaigns, with the exception of the last; and it was natural to expect he would seize the first opportunity of wiping off the stain on his military reputation. He must have known that the mountaineers were badly provisioned and unsupported by a regular force, and that the Turkish troops were scattered in various garrisons, and as the season advanced would be unsupported by a British fleet.

I gave Ibrahim credit for attempting to do the same thing I should have done in similar circumstances, and I determined to take the responsibility on myself, and at once open a communication with Mehemet Ali. Captain Maunsell, of the *Rodney*, was an old friend of the Pacha's, and I decided on making him my negotiator, and next morning he proceeded with a flag of truce to Alexandria with the subjoined letter to Boghos Bey:—

H.B.M. Ship *Powerful*, off Alexandria,

“ Sir,

November 22, 1840.

“ This will be delivered to your Excellency by Captain Maunsell, an old acquaintance of his Highness Mehemet Ali. I send him to request his Highness will consent to release or exchange, the Emirs and Scheiks of Lebanon, who were sent to Alexandria last July by the authorities of Syria. The greater part of those unfortunate individuals were arrested only on suspicion of disaffection, at the instigation of the late Grand Prince, whose government of Lebanon was anything but just, or moderate, and who at last deserted Mehemet Ali.

“ The retaining those unhappy individuals in captivity can answer no good purpose at present :

Lebanon is entirely free and armed ; and come what may in other parts of Syria, the mountains never can again fall under the rule of Mehemet Ali.

“His Highness is, no doubt, aware of the willingness of the Allies to secure to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt.

“Will his Highness permit an old sailor to suggest to him an easy means of reconciliation to the Sultan and the other Great Powers of Europe ?

“Let his Highness frankly, freely, and unconditionally deliver up the Ottoman fleet and withdraw his troops from Syria ; the miseries of war would then cease, and his Highness, in his latter years, would have ample and satisfactory occupation in cultivating the arts of peace, and probably laying a foundation for the restoration of the throne of the Ptolemies.

“By what has taken place in Syria, his Highness must be aware what can be accomplished in a country where the inhabitants are disaffected to the Government. In one month 6000 Turks and a handful of marines took Sidon, Beyrout ; defeated the Egyptian troops in three actions ; possessed themselves of 10,000 prisoners and deserters ; and caused the evacuation of all the seaports, the passes



of the Taurus and Mount Lebanon ; and this in the face of an army of more than 30,000 men ; and in three weeks more, Acre, the key of Syria, fell to the combined fleets, after a bombardment of three hours. Should his Highness persist in hostilities, will he permit me to ask if he is safe in Egypt ? I am a great admirer of his Highness, and would much rather be his friend than enemy.

“In the capacity of the former, I take the liberty of pointing out to his Highness, the little hope he can have of ever preserving Egypt, should he refuse to be reconciled to the Sultan.

“Experience has shown that the Egyptian army in Syria are disaffected, and the whole of the country are in arms against them ; and if Ibrahim Pacha is attacked by a larger and increasing Turkish force, he will probably be forced to lay down his arms. Let his Highness look to Egypt : the Turkish seamen are all disaffected ; the Vice-Admiral and several of his officers abandoned him a few days ago, and are now in the squadron ; the Syrian troops in Egypt wish to return to their country ; the Egyptians are in arrears of pay, and are sighing for their homes. From 12,000 to 15,000 Egyptian soldiers, now at Constantinople, are being

clothed, paid, and organized, under the eyes of the Sultan; let his Highness reflect on his danger, should they be thrown into Egypt, with a promise of being disbanded, together with the rest of the army, on the overthrow of his Highness.

“He may rely upon it, Egypt is not invulnerable; he may rely upon it, Alexandria itself may be made to share the fate of Acre; and his Highness, who has now an opportunity of founding a dynasty, may sink into a simple Pacha.

“I am, &c.,

(Signed) “CHARLES NAPIER, *Commodore.*”

“His Excellency Boghos Bey.”

Captain Maunsell returned next evening with the answer, accompanied by the English Consul, Mr. Larking.

“Commodore,                      “Alexandria, November 23, 1840.

“I have received, with much pleasure, the letter which you have done me the honour to address to me, through my old friend Captain Maunsell, and I have lost no time in laying a translation of it before the Viceroy, my master.

“His Highness commands me to acquaint you,

that he is particularly sensible of the good feelings which are expressed in your above-mentioned letter of the 22nd instant.

“It seems to me impossible, Commodore, that you should give credit to the malevolent reports of the Rear-Admiral: and your honourable character is a certain guarantee of the little credit which you will give to the words of a man, who, when he deserted from Constantinople, did not hesitate to shower upon the Sublime Porte the calumnies of which Egypt is now the object on his part. At the time when the officers of the Ottoman fleet got leave to quit Alexandria, this same Rear-Admiral solicited the Viceroy's permission to remain in Egypt.

“Again, lately, he might without difficulty have received from his Highness permission to retire, but he preferred desertion to a frank and honourable proceeding, because he thought that he saw in desertion a means of re-establishing himself. It is enough to be aware of the conduct of this officer, to appreciate at their true value assertions which I do not even think I need refute.

“His Highness's orders have already anticipated your intentions, with regard to setting the Druse

chieftains at liberty. Some time ago several of these chieftains had quitted Syria and had fixed themselves at Cairo; at the news of the late events they came, of their own accord, to demand his Highness's permission to return among their countrymen, there to act in the interest of the Egyptian cause, and ten days ago they took the road for Syria. It is at their request that the Druse chieftains, who had formerly been banished to Nubia, have been authorized to return to their homes, and that the order for their return has already been sent. The restoration of these different personages to their country being thus, as it may be said, a thing already done, your good intentions with regard to them are carried into effect, without its being necessary to have recourse to an exchange.

“It had already come to our knowledge that the intention of the Great Powers was to leave the hereditary government of Egypt to his Highness, and the Viceroy awaits an official communication upon this point. His Highness is not the less grateful for the proposal contained in your letter, for he sees therein a personal manifestation of your friendly and conciliatory sentiments. In no case has his

Highness intended to place himself in opposition to the will of the Great Powers of Europe. You are not ignorant, Commodore, that he had already submitted to the stipulations of the Treaty which grants to him the hereditary administration of Egypt. His Highness had only reserved to himself the power of soliciting from the Sublime Porte the favour of joining the government of Syria for life to this first concession; and this because the Viceroy was convinced that Syria in his hands might still furnish great resources to the Ottoman empire. Instead of making any answer to this request, hostilities have been had recourse to. You will judge impartially, Commodore, whether the faults have been on the side of the Viceroy. His Highness is persuaded of the contrary, and remains convinced that the Great Powers will do him justice.

“With regard to the restoration of the Ottoman fleet, and the evacuation of Syria, I hasten to reply on these two points. It has never entered into his Highness's intentions to keep the fleet of his Sovereign, and he has not ceased to express himself in this sense from the very day that circumstances brought the fleet of the Grand Signor to Alexandria.

“Moreover, when Sami Bey was sent on a mission to the Sublime Porte, he offered, in the name of his Highness, the restitution of the fleet, which was on the point of putting to sea to return to Constantinople when the hostilities begun in Syria postponed the execution of the orders of the Viceroy. With regard to the evacuation of Syria, his Highness thought himself justified in waiting for fresh orders from the Sublime Porte. You are aware, Commodore, of the manner in which the request of the Viceroy was replied to, who thereupon thought it necessary to have recourse to the unofficial mediation of France, manifesting thereby his intention of entering upon the path of conciliation, and his desire to see an end put to a state of things, which his Highness is conscious he did not give occasion for.

“The direct communications between the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army in Syria are for the moment suspended, in consequence of the agitation which exists in that country. It is with the sole object of putting a stop to the disorders, and of ensuring the means of correspondence between the army and Egypt, that the Viceroy has directed a body of troops to march upon

the frontier, the object of whose mission is to re-establish the communications.

“I hope, Commodore, that you will be satisfied with the explanations which the Viceroy has ordered me to transmit to you, and that you will perceive, in the eagerness which I have shown to reply with frankness to your friendly communication, a fresh proof of the pacific and conciliatory feelings which have never ceased to animate the Viceroy, my master.

“I avail myself, &c.,

(Signed) “BOGHOS JOUSSOUR.”

“To Commodore Napier.”

The weather had been fine, but still we could not expect a long continuance of it. Mehemet Ali I knew was in some fears that Alexandria might share the fate of Acre; a gale of wind driving us off the coast would relieve him from those fears, and restore his confidence, powerfully supported as he would have been by France. I was so satisfied with Boghos Bey's answer, that, to save time, I resolved to accompany Captain Maunsell, who returned with the following letter, and offer an interview, which was accepted.

“H.M.S. Powerful,  
Off Alexandria, November 24, 1840.

“Sir,

“I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency’s letter, and am happy to find that the Emirs and Scheiks of Lebanon have been released and if they are not all gone, I shall be glad to send them to Beyrout by sea.

“I have the honour of inclosing a copy of Lord Palmerston’s letter\* to Lord Ponsonby, by which your Excellency will observe, that the desire of the Allied Powers is to reinstate his Highness in the hereditary government of Egypt, provided he at once evacuates Syria, and gives up the Ottoman fleet.

“It is of the utmost importance that my Government should be informed, by the packet about to leave Alexandria, of the intention of his Highness, in a clear and distinct manner. I have therefore to request your Excellency will at once inform me whether or not it is his Highness’s intention to give immediate orders for the surrendering the

\* This letter, dated October 15, 1840, was by mistake, not sent to the Minister. The error was soon discovered and rectified. A copy of the letter will be found at p. 249 of this volume.



Ottoman fleet, and the evacuation of Syria? If his Highness consults his own interests he will not hesitate a moment.

“ I shall give every assistance with the squadron, to prepare the Turkish fleet, and will permit any number of transports to proceed to Beyrout or Acre, to embark the army, who have now retired on Damascus, the intelligence of which I have this moment received from the Commander-in-Chief.

“ I beg you will inform his Highness that if he does not at once decide, should any expedition be sent from Constantinople, I have no discretionary power, and must act against him according to the best of my abilities.

“ I observe with regret, by your letter, that more troops have already been sent into Syria, which I fear will be interpreted at Constantinople, into a determination of persisting in hostilities.

“ To avoid all unnecessary delay, I am now on board the steam-boat, and shall be most happy to pay my respects to his Highness, should he wish to see me, and offer him any guarantee in my power.

“ I beg, &c.,

(Signed) “ C. NAPIER.”

“ His Excellency Boghos Bey.”



official and positive guarantee of the advantages which are promised him in return for these concessions.

“ On another hand, you are not ignorant, Commodore, that the despatches received from France by the last steam-boat have apprised us that the French Government, having entered into negotiation with the Four Powers at the request of the Viceroy, a definitive arrangement was expected to take place in a few days. In this posture of affairs do not you think, Commodore, that it would be fitting not to anticipate the decision which the Great Powers, acting in concert with the Sublime Porte, are about to take? a decision which the Viceroy engages in the most formal manner to submit to without delay.

“ You seem to fear that the sending of a body of troops upon the frontiers of Syria might be considered at Constantinople as a proof of the intention of his Highness to prolong hostilities in that country; it is in order to put you completely at ease upon this point that I repeat to you the positive assurance, that the column which has recently been sent towards El-Arish has no other

object, no other destination, than to secure the means of communication.

“ I repeat, &c.,

(Signed) “ BOGHOS JOUSSOUF.”

“ To Commodore Napier.”

The Turco-Egyptian squadron, consisting of twenty-one sail of the line, and numerous frigates and corvettes were, when I arrived, lying in the harbour, with the yards and topmasts struck; but at noon on the 24th of November, being the first day of the Bairam, an unusual movement was observed on board the ships, and they began to sway their masts up, and before sun-set, their royal yards were across, and after dusk they were brilliantly illuminated.

On the morning of the 25th, I entered the harbour of Alexandria in the Medea steamer, passed through the Turco-Egyptian fleet, and anchored off the Palace. I then landed and proceeded to the house of the British Consul, Mr. Larking. As the Pacha was receiving visits from his officers and the principal inhabitants of Alexandria, he appointed the following day at noon to receive me. In the afternoon we walked about the town, and there

appeared much satisfaction in the countenances of the inhabitants of all nations and all religions at being released from the apprehension they entertained of having their town knocked about their ears.

Alexandria is a tolerably good town, and is fast improving. The naval establishments of the Pacha are wonderful, and whatever may be said against Mehemet Ali, it must be admitted, that no man of ordinary abilities could have in so short a time accomplished what he has done. I am not sure that the means employed were justifiable, but judging him by an Oriental standard, which is the only fair way of judging him, he must be considered an astonishing man. In less than twenty years he has created an army and a navy, and a dockyard that would do credit to any nation; he has constructed nine or ten sail of the line, and some of them very fine ships; he has made officers and sailors of his Arabs, and has instilled some of his own activity into the minds of the indolent Turks in his service.

His dockyard is very complete; there is a large basin capable of holding all his squadron; his storehouses are well built, and full of stores, and the

whole establishment is well arranged. Everything is done in the arsenal. He builds his ships, makes his masts, yards, sails, rope, cabin furniture, compasses, quadrants, clothing for the crews, (out of his own manufactures,) shoes, &c.; he paints oil-cloths for the cabins of his officers, and even the sealing-wax and wafers they are supplied with are made in the arsenal. He is now constructing a dry-dock, which is, however, getting on very slow, and I do not think they are going the right way about it. His principal officers, and, indeed, many of the inferior ones, have been brought up in our arsenals, and appear perfectly to understand their business. Outside of the dockyard is a tolerably well built village for the wives and families of the crews, half of which are allowed to be on shore every night.

Previously to my interview with the Pacha, the following letters passed between the Minister and myself:

“ H.M. Steam-ship Medea, Alexandria,  
Nov. 25, 1840.

“ Sir,

“ I wish your Excellency to acquaint me whether in informing me that the Druse chiefs had

been sent back to Lebanon, your Excellency means that all the chiefs that were removed from Syria last July have returned to their homes.

“ I observed to your Excellency in my letter of yesterday, that I had no direction to suspend hostilities by sea, unless his Highness would surrender the fleet, and give immediate orders for the evacuation of Syria, much less can I insure the discontinuance of military operations ; on the contrary, I feel perfectly satisfied that operations will be carried on, until orders are given for its complete evacuation.

“ I am perfectly ignorant of the despatches brought by the last French steamer, nor have I any knowledge that the French Government has entered into negotiation with the Allied Powers.

“ I only know that the Allied Powers have recommended to the Porte to reinstate Mehemet Ali in the government of Egypt, and render it hereditary in his family ; and I know that nothing could afford so much pleasure to the British Government, as my writing by this packet to say that orders have been given for the evacuation of Syria, and the surrender of the fleet. I can enter into his Highness's feelings in hesitating to do this

until he officially receives the guarantee of the Allied Powers; but at the same time I must do my duty.

“I am most anxious to avoid any further effusion of blood; war and sickness have already done enough.

“Therefore, if his Highness will give immediate orders for the evacuation of Syria, and send transports to receive the troops, and get the fleet ready for sea, I will not insist on their departure for Constantinople, until the Pacha is guaranteed in the hereditary government of Egypt, and on those conditions I will suspend hostilities.

“I have, &c.

(Signed) “CHARLES NAPIER, *Commodore.*”

“His Excellency Boghos Bey.”

“Commodore,

“Alexandria, Nov. 25, 1840.

“I have just received the letter which you have this day done me the honour to address to me, and I have hastened to lay it before the Viceroy, my master. Agreeably to his orders, I reply to the different paragraphs contained in it.

“In the first place, with regard to the Druse chieftains, I repeat to you, Commodore, that



those among them who live at Cairo, have set out for Syria by land; with regard to those who are still in Nubia, the order to secure their return has already been forwarded, as I had the honour to write to you, and I repeat to you the assurance that the moment they arrive in Egypt, they will be perfectly free to proceed to their own country.

“ With regard to the Ottoman fleet, which is to be put into a fit condition for sailing, as soon as the decision of the Powers shall have been officially notified to the Viceroy, his Highness sees with pleasure that you concur in his sentiments.

“ His Highness, sincerely participating in the wish which you express to put a stop to the shedding of blood, has decided to put an end to hostilities; but as you are not ignorant that the transport by sea of an army which has a large quantity of stores, horses, and camp equipage, presents great difficulties, and that it is above all important to put an end to the calamities of war, the Viceroy is ready to order his son Ibrahim Pacha to concentrate his troops in order to fall back with them upon Egypt, an order which shall be transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief by an Egyptian

officer, accompanied, if you think fit, by an English officer accredited by you.

“ By this means, Ibrahim Pacha will be enabled completely to evacuate Syria the moment the decision of the Powers shall be officially known.

“ I have, &c.

(Signed) “ BOGHOS JOUSSOUR.”

“ To Commodore Napier.”

At noon on the 26th I proceeded to the Palace, accompanied by Captains Maunsell, Martin, and Warden. Sir William Eden, who was on board the Carysfort, did me also the honour of accompanying me, and Mr. Larking, the British Consul; and I must take this opportunity of stating how much I am indebted to Sir William Eden for some valuable suggestions; as also to Captains Maunsell and Martin. A battalion of Egyptian troops was drawn up in the court-yard of the Palace, and presented arms, the band playing martial airs.

On entering the reception-room of Mehemet Ali, which is in the old palace, we were most graciously received. The Pacha, in a short dress, was standing surrounded by his officers, and free admission seemed to have been given to Franks of all

description. After a few compliments on both sides, the Pacha walked to a corner of the room, and seated himself on his Divan. Pipes and coffee were called for, and we smoked away for a considerable time, as if we had been the best friends in the world. The palace was too crowded to enter into business; and it was arranged I should again see the Pacha in the evening, after communicating with Boghos Bey, and give him in writing the terms I wished him to comply with.

The Pacha is a man of low stature, is a good deal marked with the small-pox, his complexion sallow, his eyes quick and penetrating. He wears a fine white beard; and when in good humour, has a most fascinating manner; but when out of temper, his eyes sparkle, he raises himself up in his corner, and soon convinces you he is much easier led than driven. He is easy of access, and indeed fond of gossipping; and seems to be informed of every thing that is either said or done in Alexandria. He has many friends amongst the Franks; and when he takes a liking, the man's fortune is made. He has built a very handsome palace, and furnished it with taste. Opposite the palace is the harem, where his wife resides; but

the old gentleman has given up his visits to that establishment.

After leaving the Pacha I had an interview with the Bey, and settled with him the terms of the Convention, which was submitted to the Pacha in the evening, and after some discussion was agreed upon. I was anxious that the Egyptian troops should be embarked and return by sea, because I foresaw their retiring by land would disorganize the whole of Syria, and stir up the evil passions of the inhabitants, which would not easily subside. Besides I was afraid some untoward event might bring the Turks and Egyptians into contact, and upset all I had been doing. Mehemet Ali, on the other hand, afraid of foul play, (and the sequel has proved he had reason,) was anxious they should retire by land; and it is singular enough that there was a greater outcry against that Article which he did not like, than against all the other Articles of the Convention; and I feel quite satisfied that the hold of Turkey on Syria has been more weakened by that retreat than by any other follies they have since committed; the different sects know their strength, and the day is not far distant when the Turks will be driven out of the country, with a severer loss than Ibrahim Pacha met with.

The subjoined correspondence, together with the Convention, is the best account I can give of the progress of the transaction:—

“ H.M. Steam-ship Medea, Alexandria,  
“ Sir, Nov. 26, 1840.

“ In the last paragraph of your letter of yesterday’s date, you say that the Pacha will give orders to concentrate the Egyptian army in Syria, in order that they may evacuate the country, when the decision of the Powers is officially known.

“ I beg to observe to your Excellency that the Egyptian troops are already concentrated, and my demand is, that the order should be given for the *immediate* evacuation; and I shall place a steamer at your Excellency’s disposal to convey the officer whom the Pacha sends, together with one I shall appoint, to Beyrout, with the Pacha’s despatches to his son Ibrahim Pacha.

“ Nothing short of this will either meet the Commander-in-Chief’s approbation, or put an end to hostilities.

“ I have, &c.,

(Signed) “ CHAS. NAPIER, *Commodore.*”

“ His Excellency Boghos Bey.”

I received no answer to this letter, but the following was published in the *Journal des Debats* :—

“ Commodore,

“ Alexandria, Nov. 26, 1840.

“ I reply to the last letter which you have done me the honour to address to me, and which I have laid before the Viceroy, my master.

“ His Highness consents to re-equip the fleet of the Sublime Porte, to victual it, in a word to put it in a state to sail at a moment’s notice for Constantinople, on the express condition,—a condition which you yourself have laid down,—that the said fleet shall remain in our port until the official notification of the Powers which shall guarantee the hereditary government of Egypt to his Highness.

“ Besides this, on the formal demand which you have made to the Viceroy thereupon, his Highness will send to Beyrout, and that forthwith, an officer of his household, (already appointed,) who will be the bearer of the necessary orders for the evacuation of Syria by his son Ibrahim Pacha and his whole army.

“ This envoy will embark on board the steamer which you have placed at his Highness’s disposal,

and will be accompanied by an English officer, on his way there and back again.

“ This is written with lively gratitude for the care and the delicacy you have shown in the solution of this difficult question. And in the name of his Highness,

“ I am, &c.,

(Signed) “ BOGHOS JOUSSOUR.”

I had already detained the Oriental with the India mail three days, and not thinking it proper to keep her longer, I decided on sending the correspondence by her, and the Convention, when signed, by the Medea. I wrote at the same time to Lord Palmerston.

“ Medea, Alexandria,

“ My Lord,

“ Nov. 26, 1840.

“ I have sent to the Admiralty copies of my correspondence with the Egyptian Government. I am not able to send the reply to my last letter, because it will not be ready till to-night, when everything will be signed. But I am just come from the Pacha and Boghos Bey, who have consented to the immediate evacuation of Syria. But

as I have already kept the *Oriental* three days, I did not think it right to detain her longer. I hope I am right, and that I have done what I think you wish; and as I feel certain the Turkish army, as it is, could not have followed up Ibrahim without cavalry, artillery, or commissariat, I thought it better to get them out of Syria by treaty. Had we attacked them at Zachle, it would have been different; but they are retired on Damascus. A French steamer arrived here three days ago with a negotiator, besides the one they had here; and they did all they could to prevent this. But six eighty-gun ships negotiate better than a steamer. I should have sent your Lordship copy of the papers, but I could not any longer detain the Indian mail. I shall, probably, send a steamer home with the Convention.

“I have done what I think will meet the views of the Government. I know the responsibility I incur. But an officer ought not to be afraid of acting without instructions, when it is for the advantage of his country.

“I have, &c.,

(Signed) “CHARLES NAPIER.”

“The Right Hon. Lord Palmerston.”



“ Medea Steamer, Alexandria,

Nov. 26, 1840.

“ Sir,

“ I have the honour of inclosing copies of a correspondence that has taken place between the Egyptian Government and myself. I have not been able to send the reply to my last letter, as I could not get it till late this evening; but I am this moment returned from the Pacha and Boghos Bey, who have consented to the immediate evacuation of Syria; and as the India mail has been already detained three days, I do not like to detain her another.

“ I hope their Lordships will approve of the steps I have taken to at once settle the Eastern Question.

“ I have, &c.,

(Signed) “ CHARLES NAPIER.

“ R. More O’Ferrall, Esq.”

On the morning of the 28th, the Treaty being signed, I left Alexandria, and returned to the Powerful. The Prometheus steamer had joined the day before, and I now dispatched her to Beyrout to the Commander-in-Chief; and the Medea, with the Treaty and the rest of the correspondence, to the Admiralty.

“ H.M. Steam-vessel Medea, Alexandria,  
“ Sir, Nov. 28, 1840.

“ In my letter by the Oriental, I sent the copies of the correspondence that has taken place between the Egyptian Government and myself. I also acquainted you that the terms had been agreed to.

“ I have now the honour of inclosing a copy of the Convention I have signed, which I trust will meet their Lordships' approbation. The whole of the correspondence has been sent to the Commander-in-Chief; and the Egyptian officer, with the order to Ibrahim Pacha, has also proceeded to join him.

“ I have, &c.,  
(Signed) “ CHAS. NAPIER, *Commodore.*

“ P.S. I beg to observe that I am much indebted to the decision of Captain Maunsell, of the Rodney, in opening a direct communication with the Pacha. It had been usual to send in letters by the French boat, but Captain Maunsell very properly landed at the Palace, and sent right up to the Pacha at once.”

“ R. More O'Ferrall, Esq.”

“CONVENTION between COMMODORE NAPIER, commanding Her Britannic Majesty's Naval Forces before Alexandria, on the one part, and his Excellency BOGHOS JOUSSOUF BEY, specially authorized by his Highness the VICE-ROY of EGYPT, on the other part; signed at Alexandria, the 27th November, 1840.

“ART. I.—Commodore Napier, in his above-mentioned capacity, having brought to the knowledge of his Highness Mehemet Ali, that the Allied Powers had recommended the Sublime Porte to reinstate him in the hereditary government of Egypt, and his Highness seeing in this communication a favourable occasion for putting an end to the calamities of war, he engages to order his son Ibrahim Pacha to proceed immediately to the evacuation of Syria. His Highness engages, moreover, to restore the Ottoman fleet, as soon as he shall have received the official notification that the Sublime Porte grants to him the hereditary government of Egypt, which concession is, and remains, guaranteed by the Powers.

“ART. II.—Commodore Napier will place a steamer at the disposal of the Egyptian Government, which will convey to Syria the officer charged

by his Highness to carry to the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army the order to evacuate Syria. The Commander-in-Chief of the British forces, Sir Robert Stopford, will on his side appoint an officer to watch over the execution of this measure.

“ART. III.—In consideration of what precedes, Commodore Napier engages to suspend hostilities on the part of the British forces against Alexandria, or any other portion of the Egyptian territory. He will, at the same time, authorize the free passage of the vessels appointed for the transport of the wounded, the invalids, or of any other portion of the Egyptian army, which the Government of Egypt might wish to return to that country by sea.

“ART. IV.—It is well understood that the Egyptian army shall have the liberty of retiring from Syria with its artillery, arms, horses, ammunition, baggage, and in general everything that constitutes the stores of an army.

“Done in duplicate, each Contracting Party to have an original.

(Signed) “CH. NAPIER, *Commodore.*

“BOGHOS JOUSSOUF.”

In order, if possible, to avoid giving rise to any cavil, I thought it necessary, at the time of signing the Convention, to address the following explanatory note to the Minister of Mehemet Ali :

“ Her Majesty’s Ship Medea,  
Nov. 27, 1840.

“ Sir,

“ In the Convention entered into by your Excellency and myself, Mehemet Ali is styled his Highness the Viceroy of Egypt. As this does not alter the spirit of the Convention, I did not hesitate to sign it, but you must clearly understand that I cannot acknowledge that title until Mehemet Ali is restored by the Porte.

“ I have, &c.,

“ CHARLES NAPIER, *Commodore.*”

“ His Excellency Boghos Bey.”

Venturing on so important a measure as this Convention without authority, would only be justified by the result; but it was not without precedent. Sir Sydney Smith had entered into a Convention with the French for the evacuation of Egypt, and Captain Foote had also, when serving under Lord Nelson, entered into one for the evacua-

tion of Naples. Both were rejected by their superior officers. The rejection of the first led to the expedition to Egypt, which cost some millions, and the loss of much life; the rejection of the last, to scenes that are better buried in oblivion.

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## APPENDIX.

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CONVENTION concluded between the Courts of GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA, and RUSSIA on the one part, and the SUBLIME OTTOMAN PORTE on the other, for the pacification of the Levant, signed at London, July 15, 1840.

In the Name of the Most Merciful God.

His Highness the Sultan having addressed himself to their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, to ask their support and assistance in the difficulties in which he finds himself placed by reason of the hostile proceedings of Mehemet Ali, Pacha of Egypt,—difficulties which threaten with danger the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the independence of the Sultan's throne,—Their said Majesties, moved by the sincere friendship which subsists between them and the Sultan; animated by the desire of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire as a security for the peace of Europe; faithful to the engagement which they



contracted by the Collective Note presented to the Porte by their Representatives at Constantinople, on the 27th of July, 1839; and desirous, moreover, to prevent the effusion of blood which would be occasioned by a continuance of the hostilities which have recently broken out in Syria between the authorities of the Pacha of Egypt and the subjects of the Sultan; their said Majesties and His Highness the Sultan have resolved, for the aforesaid purposes, to conclude together a Convention, and they have therefore named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say :

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable Henry John Viscount Palmerston, Baron Temple, a Peer of Ireland, a Member of Her Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, a Member of Parliament, and her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the Sieur Philip, Baron de Neumann, Commander of the Order of Leopold of Austria, decorated with the Cross for Civil Merit, Commander of the Orders of the Tower and Sword of Portugal, of the Southern Cross of Brazil, Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stanislaus of the Second Class of Russia, his Aulick Councillor, and his Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty;

His Majesty the King of Prussia, the Sieur

Henry William, Baron de Bulow, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle of the First Class of Prussia, Grand Cross of the Orders of Leopold of Austria, and of the Guelphs of Hanover, Knight Grand Cross of the Orders of St. Stanislaus of the Second Class, and of St. Wladimir of the Fourth Class of Russia, Commander of the Order of the Falcon of Saxe-Weimar, his Chamberlain, actual Privy Councillor, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Sieur Philip, Baron de Brunnow, Knight of the Order of St. Anne of the First Class, of St. Stanislaus of the First Class, of St. Wladimir of the Third, Commander of the Order of St. Stephen of Hungary, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle, and of St. John of Jerusalem, his Privy Councillor, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty;

And His Majesty the Most Noble, Most Powerful, and Most Magnificent Sultan Abdul Medjid, Emperor of the Ottomans, Chekib Effendi, decorated with the Nichan Iftihar of the First Class, Beylikdgi of the Imperial Divan, Honorary Councillor of the Department for Foreign Affairs, his Ambassador Extraordinary to Her Britannic Majesty;

Who, having reciprocally communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following Articles:—

ART. I.—His Highness the Sultan having come to an agreement with their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, as to the conditions of the arrangement which it is the intention of His Highness to grant to Mehemet Ali, conditions which are specified in the Separate Act hereunto annexed; Their Majesties engage to act in perfect accord, and to unite their efforts in order to determine Mehemet Ali to conform to that arrangement; each of the High Contracting Parties reserving to itself to co-operate for that purpose, according to the means of action which each may have at its disposal.

ART. II.—If the Pacha of Egypt should refuse to accept the above-mentioned arrangement, which will be communicated to him by the Sultan, with the concurrence of their aforesaid Majesties; Their Majesties engage to take, at the request of the Sultan, measures concerted and settled between them, in order to carry that arrangement into effect. In the meanwhile, the Sultan having requested his said Allies to unite with him in order to assist him to cut off the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria, and to prevent the transport of troops, horses, arms, and warlike stores of all kinds, from the one province to the other; Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of Austria, King of

Hungary and Bohemia, engage to give immediately to that effect, the necessary orders to their naval Commanders in the Mediterranean. Their said Majesties further engage, that the naval Commanders of their squadrons shall, according to the means at their command, afford, in the name of the Alliance, all the support and assistance in their power to those subjects of the Sultan who may manifest their fidelity and allegiance to their Sovereign.

ART. III.—If Mehemet Ali, after having refused to submit to the conditions of the arrangement above-mentioned, should direct his land or sea forces against Constantinople, the High Contracting Parties, upon the express demand of the Sultan, addressed to their Representatives at Constantinople, agree, in such case, to comply with the request of that Sovereign, and to provide for the defence of his throne by means of a co-operation agreed upon by mutual consent, for the purpose of placing the two Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, as well as the Capital of the Ottoman Empire, in security against all aggression.

It is further agreed, that the forces which, in virtue of such concert, may be sent as aforesaid, shall there remain so employed as long as their presence shall be required by the Sultan; and when His Highness shall deem their presence no longer necessary, the said forces shall simultaneously withdraw, and shall return to the Black Sea and to the Mediterranean, respectively.

ART. IV.—It is, however, expressly understood, that the co-operation mentioned in the preceding Article, and destined to place the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, and the Ottoman Capital, under the temporary safeguard of the High Contracting Parties against all aggression of Mehemet Ali, shall be considered only as a measure of exception adopted at the express demand of the Sultan, and solely for his defence in the single case above-mentioned; but it is agreed, that such measure shall not derogate in any degree from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for ships of war of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus. And the Sultan, on the one hand, hereby declares that, excepting the contingency above-mentioned, it is his firm resolution to maintain in future this principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his empire; and as long as the Porte is at peace, to admit no foreign ship of war into the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles; on the other hand, their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform to the above-mentioned principle.

ART. V.—The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged

at London at the expiration of two months, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, the fifteenth day of July, in the year of Lord One thousand Eight hundred and forty.

(L.S.) PALMERSTON.	(L.S.) CHEKIB.
(L.S.) NEUMANN.	
(L.S.) BULOW.	
(L.S.) BRUNNOW.	

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SEPARATE ACT annexed to the CONVENTION concluded at London on the 15th of July, 1840.

His Highness the Sultan intends to grant, and to cause to be notified to Mehemet Ali, the conditions of the arrangement hereinafter detailed:—

§ 1. His Highness promises to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pachalic of Egypt; and his Highness promises, moreover, to grant to Mehemet Ali, for his life, with the title of Pacha of Acre, and with the command of the fortress of St. John of Acre, the administration of the southern part of Syria, the limits of which shall be determined by the following line of demarkation:

This line, beginning at Cape Ras-el-Nakhora, on the coast of the Mediterranean, shall extend direct

from thence as far as the mouth of the river Seisaban, at the northern extremity of the Lake of Tiberias; it shall pass along the western shore of that lake, it shall follow the right bank of the river Jordan, and the western shore of the Dead Sea; from thence it shall extend straight to the Red Sea, which it shall strike at the northern point of the Gulf of Akaba, and from thence it shall follow the western shore of the Gulf of Akaba, and the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez, as far as Suez.

The Sultan, however, in making these offers, attaches thereto the condition, that Mehemet Ali shall accept them within the space of ten days after communication thereof shall have been made to him at Alexandria, by an Agent of his Highness; and that Mehemet Ali shall, at the same time, place in the hands of that Agent the necessary instructions to the Commanders of his sea and land forces, to withdraw immediately from Arabia, and from all the Holy Cities which are therein situated; from the Island of Candia; from the district of Adana; and from all other parts of the Ottoman Empire which are not comprised within the limits of Egypt, and within those of the Pachalic of Acre, as above defined.

§ 2. If within the space of ten days, fixed as above, Mehemet Ali should not accept the above-mentioned arrangement, the Sultan will then withdraw the offer of the life administration of the Pachalic of Acre; but His Highness will still con-

sent to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pachalic of Egypt, provided such offer be accepted within the space of ten days next following; that is to say, within a period of twenty days, to be reckoned from the day on which the communication shall have been made to him; and provided that in this case also, he places in the hands of the Agent of the Sultan the necessary instructions to his military and naval commanders, to withdraw immediately within the limits, and into the ports of the Pachalic of Egypt.

§ 3. The annual tribute to be paid to the Sultan by Mehemet Ali, shall be proportioned to the greater or less amount of territory of which the latter may obtain the administration, according as he accepts the first or the second alternative.

§ 4. It is, moreover, expressly understood, that, in the first as in the second alternative, Mehemet Ali (before the expiration of the specified period of ten or of twenty days), shall be bound to deliver up the Turkish fleet, with the whole of its crews and equipments, into the hands of the Turkish Agent who shall be charged to receive the same. The Commanders of the Allied Squadrons shall be present at such delivery.

It is understood, that in no case can Mehemet Ali carry to account, or deduct from the tribute to be paid to the Sultan, the expenses which he has incurred in the maintenance of the Ottoman fleet



during any part of the time it shall have remained in the ports of Egypt.

§ 5. All the Treaties, and all the laws of the Ottoman Empire, shall be applicable to Egypt, and to the Pachalic of Acre, such as it has been above defined, in the same manner as to every other part of the Ottoman Empire. But the Sultan consents, that on condition of the regular payment of the tribute above-mentioned, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall collect, in the name of the Sultan, and as the delegate of His Highness, within the provinces the administration of which shall be confided to them, the taxes and imposts legally established. It is moreover understood, that in consideration of the receipt of the aforesaid taxes and imposts, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall defray all the expenses of the civil and military administration of the said provinces.

§ 6. The military and naval forces which may be maintained by the Pacha of Egypt and Acre, forming part of the forces of the Ottoman Empire, shall always be considered as maintained for the service of the State.

§ 7. If, at the expiration of the period of twenty days after the communication shall have been made to him (according to the stipulation of § 2), Mehemet Ali shall not accede to the proposed arrangement, and shall not accept the hereditary Pachalic of Egypt, the Sultan will consider himself at liberty to withdraw that offer, and to follow, in consequence,

such ulterior course, as his own interests and the counsels of his Allies may suggest to him.

§ 8. The present Separate Act shall have the same force and validity as if it were inserted, word for word, in the Convention of this date. It shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at London, at the same time as those of the said Convention.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, the fifteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord One thousand Eight hundred and forty.

(L.S.) NEUMANN.

(L.S.) CHEKIB.

(L.S.) BULOW.

(L.S.) BRUNNOW.

(L.S.) PALMERSTON.

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PROTOCOL signed at London, on the 15th of July, 1840, by the Plenipotentiaries of GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA, RUSSIA, and TURKEY.

IN affixing his signature to the Convention of this date, the Plenipotentiary of the Sublime Ottoman Porte declared:

That in recording by Article IV. of the said Convention the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, by virtue of which it has been at all times forbidden to foreign vessels of war to enter within the Straits

of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, the Sublime Porte reserves to itself, as heretofore, to deliver passes to light vessels under flag of war, which may be employed according to custom, for the service of the correspondence of the Legations of Friendly Powers.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, took note of the above Declaration, for the purpose of communicating it to their respective Courts.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.  
 NEUMANN.  
 BULOW.  
 BRUNNOW.  
 CHEKIB.

---

RESERVED PROTOCOL signed at London on the 15th of July, 1840, by the Plenipotentiaries of GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA, RUSSIA, and TURKEY.

THE Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, having, in virtue, of their full powers, concluded and signed this day a Convention between their respective Sovereigns, for the pacification of the Levant;

Considering that, in consequence of the distances which separate the Capitals of their respective Courts, a certain space of time must necessarily elapse before the ratifications of the said Convention can

be exchanged, and before orders founded thereupon can be carried into execution;

And the said Plenipotentiaries being deeply impressed with the conviction, that by reason of the present state of things in Syria, the interests of humanity, as well as the grave considerations of European policy which constitute the object of the common solicitude of the Contracting Parties to the Convention of this day, imperiously require that, as far as possible, all delay should be avoided in the accomplishment of the pacification which the said Convention is intended to effect;

The said Plenipotentiaries, in virtue of their full powers, have agreed, that the preliminary measures mentioned in Article II. of the said Convention, shall be carried into execution at once, without waiting for the exchange of the ratifications; the respective Plenipotentiaries recording formally, by the present Instrument, the consent of their Courts to the immediate execution of these measures.

It is moreover agreed between the said Plenipotentiaries, that His Highness the Sultan will proceed immediately to address to Mehemet Ali, the communication and offers specified in the Separate Act annexed to the Convention of this day.

It is further agreed, that the Consular Agents of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, at Alexandria, shall place themselves in communication with the Agent whom His Highness may send thither to communicate to Mehemet Ali the above-

mentioned offers; that the said Consuls shall afford to that Agent all the assistance and support in their power; and shall use all their means of influence with Mehemet Ali, in order to persuade him to accept the arrangement which will be proposed to him by order of His Highness the Sultan.

The Admirals of the respective squadrons in the Mediterranean shall be instructed to place themselves in communication with the said Consuls on this subject.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.  
NEUMANN.  
BULOW.  
BRUNNOW.  
CHEKIB.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

THE  
WAR IN SYRIA.

BY  
COMMODORE SIR CHARLES NAPIER, K.C.B.,  
*&c., &c., &c.*

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*IN TWO VOLUMES.*

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VOL. II.

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#### ERRATA.

Vol. I., p. 88, line 16, *for* southward, close to the castle, *read* northward, close to the castle.

Vol. II., p. 41, line 3, *for* 22nd November, *read* 11th December.

„ p. 199, line 4, *for* Opposed, *read* Approved.





# THE WAR IN SYRIA.

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## CHAPTER I.

Gale on the Egyptian and Syrian Coasts—The Author's return to Marmorice Bay—Letters from the Admiral, the General and the Ambassador regarding the Convention—The Author's Replies—Letter of the Admiral to Mehemet Ali—Commotion occasioned by the Convention—Admiral's Letter to the Admiralty—Instruction of the 14th November—Captain Fanshawe dispatched to Alexandria—Instruction to the Admiral.

AMONG the reasons that induced me to enter into negotiation with the Pacha of Egypt, it will be recollected that I have mentioned the uncertain state of the weather, which rendered it possible that the British squadron might at any minute be blown off the coast; and I found that I had concluded my arrangements only just in time. For I had hardly got the *Prometheus* away, on the 28th of November, 1840, when it began to blow, which freshened to a gale in the night; the morning brought more moderate weather, but towards dusk it came on with great violence, and lasted thirty-six hours. The *Powerful*

was struck by a heavy sea, which started her fore-channels and endangered the fore-mast; the new rigging of the Rodney and Cambridge had given out so much, that their masts became insecure, and seeing no further necessity for keeping the squadron at sea, I proceeded to Marmorice Bay, where I anchored on the 8th of December, and was much gratified to be received by the squadron with three cheers, and the rigging manned, with the same enthusiasm I had before experienced on joining the squadron off Alexandria.

Captain Henderson, of the Gorgon, first communicated to me that my Convention had been rejected by the Admiral, which I have reason to believe he approved of in the first instance, but was overruled by the authorities in Syria. Next morning the Princess Charlotte and Bellerophon arrived from Beyrout. They had experienced the same gale we did off Alexandria, and rode it out in St. George's Bay; the Bellerophon, driven from the anchorage at Beyrout, was obliged to cut her cable and make sail, and after scraping the land as far down the coast as Latakia, was saved by a miraculous shift of wind; great credit is due to Captain Austin, and the officers and crew of the

Bellerophon, for saving the ship. The Pique was obliged to cut away her masts to prevent her going on shore at Caiffa; and the Zebra parted and was thrown on the beach, with the loss of two men only. The Austrian squadron quitted the coast of Syria with the English, and the French vessels of war remained.

On the Admiral's arrival at Marmorice, letters from himself, Sir Charles Smith, and Lord Ponsonby, were put into my hand. I insert them here, together with the replies.

“Princess Charlotte, St. George's Bay,  
Beyrout, December 2, 1840.

“Sir,

“I have received, by the Prometheus, your letter and the Convention which you have entered into with Boghos Bey, for the evacuation of Syria.

“I am sorry to say that I cannot ratify, or approve of this measure: setting aside the unauthorized manner and the unnecessary haste with which so important a document was executed, with the Commander-in-Chief within two days' sail of you, the articles of that Convention, if carried into execution, in the present state of affairs in Syria, would be productive of much more evil than good, and occasion much embarrassment. You

will immediately stop the Egyptian transports from coming to this coast; and should any arrive, I have given orders that they should return to Alexandria.

“I am, &c.,

(Signed) “ROBERT STOPFORD, *Admiral*.

“Commodore Napier, C. B., H.M.S. Powerful,  
Senior Officer off Alexandria.”

“H.M.S. Powerful, Marmorice Bay,

December 14, 1840.

“Sir,

“I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd of December, disapproving of the Convention I had entered into with the Egyptian Government for the evacuation of Syria and the surrender of the fleet. I have only to regret, that what I did with the best intentions, and believed to be in accordance with the views of the Allies, should not have met your approbation.

“I beg to assure you that, it was not from any want of respect to you that I did not communicate with you before signing it, but it was under the impression that it was of the utmost importance to seize the opportunity, when the Pacha was highly incensed against France, to bring him, without loss of time, to terms without the mediation of that power.

“I have also to acknowledge the receipt of the copy of a letter you have sent me from Lord Ponsonby, the original of which, I presume, is gone to

Alexandria, and I beg to inclose you a copy of my reply.

“ I have &c.,  
 (Signed) “ C. NAPIER, *Commodore.*”

“ The Hon. Sir R. Stopford,  
 Commander-in-Chief, &c., &c., &c.”

---

“ Head Quarters, Beyrout,  
 30th November, 1840.

“ Sir,

“ Had you fortunately abstained from honouring me with your letter of the 27th instant, I should have been spared the pain of replying to it. I am not aware that you have been invested with special powers or authority to treat with Mehemet Ali as to the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptian troops; and if you have such special powers and authority, you have not taken the trouble of acquainting me therewith.

“ The Convention into which you have entered has been, as relates to the advanced stage of military events in Syria, more than attained by the retreat of Ibrahim Pacha. If therefore, you have unknown to me, had authority to treat, I must decline to be a party to recommending the ratification of the said Convention; and if unauthorised to treat, such Convention is invalid, and is, by me, protested against as being highly prejudicial to the Sultan's cause, in as far as it has, or may have, relation to the operations of the army under my command. It is needless for me to add that a copy of this protest shall be forwarded

to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

“ I have, &c.,  
 “ C. F. SMITH, *Major-General*,  
 “ *Commanding the Forces in Syria.*”

“ Commodore Napier, C.B.,  
 H. M.S. Powerful.”

“ H.M.S. Powerful, Marmorice,  
 January 6, 1841.

“ Sir,

“ Had I unfortunately abstained from writing to you, and the Admiral had quited the coast, you would have had just cause to have complained of my want of courtesy.

“ When I left Beyrout, Sir Robert Stopford was Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces by sea and land, it was therefore unnecessary for me to communicate to you what my powers were, as on him alone devolved the duty of approving or disapproving of my Convention. He disapproved of it, and Ibrahim Pacha returned to Damascus. I quite disagree with you that the Convention was prejudicial to the interests of the Porte, and I am happy to say it has been approved of (with the exception of the guarantee) by Her Majesty's Government, and I am now going to Alexandria to see it carried into execution.

“ I have, &c.,  
 “ CHARLES NAPIER, *Commodore.*”

“ To Sir Charles Smith, &c., &c.,  
 Gibraltar.”

“ Sir,

“ Therapia, December 7, 1840.

“ I had the honour last night to receive your communication of a Convention, dated Medea steamer, Alexandria, 27th November, 1840, signed Charles Napier, Commodore, and Boghos Bey.

“ I immediately laid that Convention before the Sublime Porte, and acquainted my colleagues, the Austrian Internuncio, the Prussian Envoy, and the Russian Chargé d’Affaires, with it. It is my duty to acquaint you that the Sublime Porte has made a formal protest against your acts, declaring you have no power or authority whatever to justify what you have done, and that the Convention is null and void.

“ My colleagues above-mentioned, and myself, entirely concur with the Sublime Porte, and declare that we are ignorant of your having the least right to assume the powers you have exercised; and that we consider the Convention null and void, *ab initio*.

“ It is my duty to call upon you to abstain from every attempt to carry your Convention into execution, in any degree whatever, and to state that you are bound by your duty to Her Majesty, to continue to act with the ships under your command, as you did act before you assumed the right to make the aforesaid Convention, and as you would have acted in conformity with your orders, if that Convention had never been made by you.

“ I have sent a copy of this dispatch to Admiral



the Hon. Sir Robert Stopford, and also to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

“ I have, &c.,  
(Signed)      “ P O N S O N B Y . ”

“ To Commodore Napier.”

“ H.M.S. Powerful, Marmorice Bay,  
Dec. 14, 1840.

“ My Lord,

“ The Commander-in-Chief has sent me a copy of a letter addressed to me by your Lordship, the original of which I presume has been sent to Alexandria; this letter states that the Porte has made a formal protest against my acts, and that the Convention is null and void, in which your Lordship and your colleagues entirely concur, and you call upon me to abstain from carrying it into execution.

“ In reply to which I beg leave to acquaint your Lordship that I never had the least idea that the Convention could be carried into execution without the authority of the Porte and the Commander-in-Chief, to whom the whole correspondence was addressed; therefore I cannot see the necessity of the formal protest of the Porte against my acts. The Convention simply tied down Mehemet Ali to abandon Syria immediately, and give up the Turkish fleet when the Porte acknowledged his hereditary title to govern Egypt; and on these conditions I agreed to suspend hostilities.

“ I was led to believe from Lord Palmerston's

letter to your Lordship that I had followed up the views of the Allied Powers; I was led to believe, from letters I have received from different members of the Government, that they were most anxious to settle the Eastern Question speedily; I was led to believe, from your Lordship's correspondence, \* \* \* \* \* that Lord Palmerston was anxious to finish everything; that he had not good information about Egypt; but that your Lordship thought if I was at liberty to act, Alexandria would not long be in the possession of Mehemet Ali; and this opinion your Lordship risked, though you had never seen the place, and confessed yourself entirely ignorant of the art of war. I saw clearly that your Lordship had an erroneous impression about Alexandria, and I was convinced that nothing could be done against it without a military force, and at a proper season, and my being driven off the coast has confirmed that opinion.

“I further knew that the French Consul-General, and other French agents at Alexandria, were doing all they could to prevent Mehemet Ali from submitting, still holding out hopes of assistance from France.

“Under all these circumstances I thought I was serving my country, and the cause of the Sultan, in tying down Mehemet Ali to immediately evacuate Syria, and give up the Turkish fleet when acknowledged, and I knew perfectly well that the Convention did not tie down the Sultan; and I firmly believe that if Thiers' ministry had not fallen, all

I have done would have been approved, and I think it still will be approved. I have thought it necessary to make these explanations to your Lordship, and I beg at the same time to observe, that it appears to me that your Lordship has assumed a tone, in the latter part of your letter, that you are by no means authorized to do. I know my duty to Her Majesty full as well as your Lordship, and I have always done it, and it is the Commander-in-Chief alone who has the right to point out to me how I am to act, and I trust, should your Lordship have any further occasion to address me, it will be done in a different style.

“ I have sent a copy of this to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, and I trust your Lordship will send a copy to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

“ I have, &c.

(Signed) “ CHAS. NAPIER, *Commodore.*”

“ The Right Hon. Lord Ponsonby.”

I also insert the Admiral’s letter to Mehemet Ali, acquainting him that he had disapproved the Convention, couched in no very measured terms. An admiral may disapprove of the acts of a junior officer, even with severity if he pleases, but I believe it is not usual in addressing a foreign prince, to convey to him the opinion he has formed of his second in command.

“ Princess Charlotte, St. George’s Bay, Beyrout,  
“ Highness, December 2, 1840.

“ I am sorry to find that Commodore Napier should have entered into a Convention with your Highness for the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptian troops, which he had no authority to do, and which I cannot approve of, or ratify.

“ Your Highness’s Envoy, Abdel Amen Bey, has consulted with the General, commanding the troops, as to his best manner of proceeding to Ibrahim Pacha. The General having good reason to suppose that Ibrahim Pacha had left Damascus, (a great part of his army having left it a few days since going to the southward, upon the Mecca road,) could not guarantee a safe conduct for your Highness’s Envoy further than Damascus. He therefore returns to Alexandria, having done all in his power to execute your Highness’s instructions.

“ I hope this letter will reach your Highness in time to stop the transports which Commodore Napier writes me are coming to the coast of Syria for the purpose of embarking part of the Egyptian army. Should any of them arrive here, they will be ordered to return to Alexandria.

“ I hope this hasty and unauthorized Convention will not occasion any embarrassment to your Highness. It was no doubt done from an amicable motive, though under a limited view of the state of affairs in Syria; but it will not lessen my earnest desire most readily to adopt any measure which may

tend to a renewal of that amity and good feeling which I trust hereafter may subsist between England and your Highness, the terms of which I am happy to hear are now in a state of progress with the Allied Powers.

“ROBERT STOPFORD, *Admiral.*”

“To his Highness Mehemet Ali Pacha.”

The Ambassador wrote also to the Admiral and to the different authorities in Syria and Egypt, calling upon them to repudiate my Convention, and in fact no means were neglected by him to prevent the settlement of the Eastern Question, and do as much mischief to Mehemet Ali as possible.

The reader will allow this was tremendous odds against me: the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, the General commanding in Syria, Lord Ponsonby, and the four Ambassadors, the Sultan and all the Divan, against an Old Commodore. The whole corps diplomatique, (for on this point even the French minister agreed,) were up in arms—they thought their trade was gone—nevertheless I was not dismayed. I felt satisfied at Alexandria I was right, and I felt still more satisfied at Marmorice, when I found our squadron, with the exception of the steamers, had abandoned the coast, and left Ibrahim

to himself. Why he did not take advantage of it is not my affair—he ought to have done it. In the fleet we had conventionalists and non-conventionalists: the Captains who were off Alexandria were satisfied I was right; those who were not, with few exceptions, were satisfied I was wrong. For my part I had only to wait patiently the first arrival from England, to announce either that I was a blockhead, or that I had taken a more correct view of the affairs of the East, than either Admirals, Generals, Ambassadors, Sultans, or Divans.

The letter of Sir Robert Stopford to the Admiralty, acquainting their Lordships that he had rejected my Convention, clearly shows that he was not aware of Ibrahim's movements. The Admiral writes under date of the 1st of December, from Beyrout.

“ Sir,

“ I beg to transmit for their Lordships' information the copy of a Convention which Commodore Napier has entered into with Mehemet Ali, the correspondence leading thereto having been transmitted by him from Alexandria.

I beg you will further acquaint their Lordships that I do not feel myself authorized to enter into

this Convention; and the Egyptian troops being already on their retreat by the Mecca road to Egypt, I cannot consider this as a concession from Mehemet, but the consequence of their late discomfitures, and the inimical state of the country towards them.

“ I have, &c.,

“ ROBERT STOPFORD.”

“ R. More O’Ferrall, Esq.”

Now, it is well known that Ibrahim did not finally leave Damascus till the 29th of December; so that it appears by the Admiral’s letter, that nothing was known at Beyrout of Ibrahim’s movements; and, after the squadron left the coast, there was nothing to hinder him falling upon Beyrout; I know that there were strong fears there that he would do so, and General Michell, as will hereafter appear, requested the Admiral would send some ships of war back.

Before the Admiral arrived at Marmorice, he fell in with the *Megæra*, bringing the Instruction of the 14th of November, which was given to satisfy Austrian etiquette, Prince Metternich not entirely approving of the instruction of the 15th of October, his reasons for which he afterwards explained.

“Foreign Office, Nov. 14, 1840.

“The instruction addressed to Lord Ponsonby on the 15th of October last, in consequence of a deliberation which had taken place between the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, recorded the propriety of the Representatives of the Four Courts at Constantinople being authorized to announce to the Sublime Porte, ‘that their respective Governments, in conformity with the stipulations of the seventh paragraph of the Separate Act annexed to the Convention of July 15, deem it their duty strongly to recommend to the Government of his Highness, that, in case Mehemet Ali should submit without delay, and should consent to restore the Ottoman fleet, to withdraw his troops from the whole of Syria, from Adana, Candia, Arabia, and the Holy Cities, his Highness should be pleased not only to reinstate Mehemet Ali in his functions as Pacha of Egypt, but at the same time to grant him the hereditary investiture of the said pachalic, according to the conditions laid down in the Convention of July 15, it being well understood that this hereditary title should be liable to revocation, if Mehemet Ali, or one of his successors, should infringe the aforesaid conditions.’

“The advantage of addressing the Sublime Porte a communication couched in the sense above-mentioned, was unanimously admitted by the Four Courts.

“Nevertheless, in order to make still more



apparent the just respect which is due to the rights of his Highness, the Cabinet of Vienna was of opinion that the advice which the Representatives of the Four Powers should be called upon to address to the Divan, relative to the reinstatement of Mehemet Ali in the pachalic of Egypt, ought not to be put forth at Constantinople, until after Mehemet Ali should have taken the preliminary step of applying to his Sovereign for pardon, submitting himself to the determination of his Highness.

“Taking into consideration that this opinion of the Cabinet of Vienna serves as a fresh proof of the respect which the Courts, parties to the Convention of July 15, entertain for the inviolability of the Sultan’s rights of sovereignty and independence; considering, moreover, the necessity of speedily bringing the existing crisis in the Levant to a pacific solution, in conformity with the true interests, as likewise with the dignity of the Porte; the Plenipotentiaries of the said Courts have unanimously resolved to adopt the course above pointed out, in order that Mehemet Ali’s application for pardon and his submission should precede the friendly measures which the Allied Representatives will be instructed to adopt, in order to incline the Porte to grant its pardon to Mehemet Ali.

“With this view, the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers being desirous of hastening as much as possible the moment when it will be possible

for those measures to take place at Constantinople, have judged it fitting to cause to be pointed out without the least delay to Mehemet Ali, the way which is still open to him to regain the pardon of his Sovereign, and to obtain his reinstatement in the pachalic of Egypt, notwithstanding the decisive events which have declared themselves against him.

“In consequence it was further agreed to communicate to the Ambassador of the Sublime Porte, Chekib Effendi, the present Memorandum, as likewise the instruction thereunto annexed.

(Initialed)            N.  
                                   P.  
                                   B.  
                                   B.

Upon the receipt of this document, and a special instruction of the same date, the Admiral immediately dispatched Captain Fanshawe, with the following letter, to communicate with the Pacha. His orders were, to proceed to Alexandria and demand an interview with Mehemet Ali, in the presence of Boghos Bey, and communicate the instructions of Her Majesty's Government. He was not to refuse Mehemet Ali's answer even if he expressed a desire to obtain the hereditary government of Egypt.

“ Princess Charlotte, at Sea, off Cyprus,  
December 6, 1840.

“ Highness,

“ I have now the honour to transmit to your Highness, by Captain Fanshawe, the Captain of my flag-ship, the official authority from the British Government, in the name of the four Allied Powers, to maintain your Highness in the pachalic of Egypt, upon condition, that within three days after the communication made to you by Captain Fanshawe, you agree to restore the Turkish fleet to the Sultan, and finally evacuate Syria.

“ Let me beseech your Highness to take these terms into your serious consideration; and I implore the Almighty God to impress upon your mind the benefit you will bestow on a distracted country by an early compliance with the decision of the four Allied Powers.

“ Captain Fanshawe is fully authorized to receive your Highness’s final decision.

“ I have, &c.,

(Signed) “ ROBERT STOPFORD, *Admiral.*”

“ To his Highness Mehemet Ali Pacha.”

The further conduct of the Admiral was to be guided by the following instruction, of November 14, from Lord Palmerston to the Admiralty.

“ With further reference to my letters of this day, I am to signify to your Lordships the Queen’s

commands that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be informed that he is not in any degree to suspend his operations, or to relax his efforts, on account of the communication which he is instructed to make to Mehemet Ali; but, on the contrary, he should continue to push on with vigour his operations for the purpose of expelling the Egyptians from the whole of Syria, and he should not slacken in his exertions, till he learns from Constantinople that an arrangement has been made with Mehemet Ali.”

The reader must bear in mind that, at the date of these instructions, the capture of Acre was not known at the Foreign Office, nor was my Convention signed.

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## CHAPTER II.

Captain Fanshawe's proceedings at Alexandria—Letter from Mehemet Ali to the Admiral—Official Report of Captain Fanshawe—Letter of Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier—English Ships again ordered to the Coast of Syria—Part of the Convention carried into effect by the Admiral.

THE mode in which this new negotiation of points which he naturally considered as already settled, was received by the Pacha, will best appear from his own letter, and Captain Fanshawe's report.

“ Most Honourable Admiral Sir Robert Stopford,

“ I have received the two letters which you addressed to me, the first by the channel of Hamid Bey, who had been entrusted with a despatch for my son Ibrahim Pacha, and the second by Captain Fanshawe, of your flag-ship. I am delighted with the friendship which you evince towards me, and I hasten to act in the sense which you point out in your official dispatch. I consequently address a petition to the Sublime Porte under flying seal, and in order that the contents thereof may be known to you, I add a French translation to it. I hope that my compliance will be appreciated by the Allied

Powers, and in asking a continuance of your friendship, I flatter myself that your good offices will ensure me their good will.

(Signed) "MEHEMET ALI."

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"H.M. Steam-vessel *Megæra*, at Sea,  
December 12, 1840.

"Sir,

"I have the honour to report to you my proceedings in the service on which you ordered me.

"I arrived off Alexandria in this vessel early on the morning of the 8th, and finding no English man-of-war off the place, proceeded into the port, and sent for Mr. Larking, Her Majesty's Consul, whom I requested to inform Mehemet Ali that I was charged by you to make a communication to him from Her Majesty's Government, and for which purpose I demanded an interview with him in the presence of Boghos Bey.

"At noon I went to the palace with Mr. Larking, and had an audience with Mehemet Ali: after delivering your letter to him and passing a few compliments, I read to him my extract from Lord Palmerston's instructions, which was interpreted to him by his Dragoman, and then presented to him, expressing my hope that his compliance with what it required, would restore a good understanding between the Sultan and himself. He alluded to the recent Convention, and said he had promised all this before to Commodore Napier, if Egypt was

guaranteed to him, and that he never departed from his word.

“I replied, I had no guarantee to offer; but he would perceive that, though you had not been able to ratify that Convention, you had lost no time in communicating the instructions received from your Government, and in expressing your own disposition to conciliate; and that I hoped he would merit the wish which I knew you had expressed, and take some immediate steps for the restitution of the Turkish fleet, which I regretted to observe was making no preparation for sea; that the words in my note with reference to the fleet were ‘immediate,’ and ‘without delay;’ and I was sure his giving directions for that part of it which could be most expeditiously equipped proceeding to you at Marmorice, would be regarded in a favourable light, both at London and at Constantinople.

“Mehemet Ali said earnestly, he had always wished to give the fleet up to his master; that I might pledge myself that it should be ready to deliver to me, or to any officer that might be sent by the Porte to take charge of it, and that he would send his own officers and men to assist in navigating it, if he was reinstated in Egypt; adding, ‘If I give up the fleet, what security have I, having already given orders for the evacuation of all the places referred to?’

“I told him he must look for his security in the good faith and friendly disposition of the English

Government, and in the influence it might have with the Sultan and the Allied Powers. He seemed rather disposed to yield on this point, but gave no positive answer. I then stated that my time was limited; he said he had no wish for delay; the documents which I had given him should be forthwith translated, and brought again under his consideration, and that I should have his answer in French to take to you as soon as possible. I replied, I was authorized to take his final answer to Constantinople, and that I must be furnished with his written engagement to convey thither; and as I concluded it would be written in Turkish, I must have a translation of it also, that I might be satisfied it contained all that was required. This was immediately assented to, Mehemet Ali saying, he was always ready to make his submission to the Sultan, and that he would promise all that was asked, if he was allowed to remain quiet in Egypt. This ended the conference.

“In the evening, Mr. Larking and myself had an interview by appointment with Boghos Bey, who said it was Mehemet Ali's desire to meet the views of the Allied Powers, and that he was pleased with the English mediation, but that he considered that he had already the promise of the hereditary government of Egypt, and he was afraid there would be difficulties raised at Constantinople, and that there was one Power (Russia) not so well disposed to see such a termination to the question. I told



Boghos Bey, that he must be aware the Allied Powers could not regard Mehemet Ali since his deposition by the Sultan in the same light as before, and that he must make his submission ; and that I was sure, if he would without delay send such part of the Turkish fleet as could be got ready to Marmorice, it must tend to conciliate all parties, and be a proof of the entire sincerity of his intentions.

“I then called his attention to the limit of my stay at Alexandria, and to the necessity that the written engagement I was to receive should be so worded that I could not hesitate to convey it. Boghos assured me he would use his influence to prevent any obstacle ; that he was to attend a Council with Mehemet Ali directly, at which the translated copies would be discussed and the answer decided upon, which he thought would be quite satisfactory. This Council, however, I learnt was not so harmonious as Boghos Bey expected, and nothing was then decided. On the following morning (Wednesday) Mr. Larking received a summons, and had an interview with Mehemet Ali and Boghos Bey, which was more favourable ; and I was informed I might expect a translation of the engagement early on the following day, and that it would contain all that was asked ; but Mr. Larking did not find Mehemet Ali disposed to let any part of the fleet go first,—a point which I had requested him to urge again,—saying, they all came, and should all go together. I did not, however, receive the translations of the

letters to the Vizier and yourself, which I now inclose, until ten o'clock yesterday morning, but then accompanied by a notice that Mehemet Ali was ready to receive me. On perusing the letter to the Vizier, it appeared to me to be so complete an engagement, in all points required, without any especial stipulation about Egypt, and that though the terms of submission might be somewhat equivocal, it came within the view of Lord Palmerston's instructions, and that I could not hesitate to be the bearer of it. I therefore repaired to the palace with Mr. Larking, and had, I consider, a satisfactory interview with Mehemet Ali. I pointed out to him that I did not feel that the expressions in his letter to the Vizier, relating to the fleet, came up to the promise which he had made me the other day, and that I saw no appearance yet of preparation, and that I or some one else might return very soon to claim the fulfilment of that pledge. Mehemet Ali said he had given orders already on the subject, and repeated earnestly that the fleet should be ready to quit the port, as far as he was concerned, five days after the arrival of the officer to whom the Sultan wished it to be delivered.

"I then remarked that on the subject of Candia there might be some delay, as I understood the Pacha there had not submitted to the Sultan; and as I thought it probable the Porte might be prepared to send troops immediately to take possession of that island, I proposed that I should be the bearer

of a letter to the Pacha of Candia, directing him to yield it to the Turkish authorities; to which Mehemet Ali immediately assented, and ordered one to be written. I hope these points, therefore, may be taken as an earnest of his sincerity, though I am quite of opinion, that unless the Sultan gives him the hereditary pashalic of Egypt, he will be very much disposed to fight for it—or, at any rate, to give further trouble. This letter to the Pacha of Candia being ready, I received it with those to the Vizier and yourself (all which I herewith transmit), all under flying seals, from Mehemet Ali's hands, and took my leave of him. Boghos Bey then requested to speak with me on one or two subjects, by Mehemet Ali's desire, which were—1st. His wish to be allowed to send some of his steam-vessels to Gaza or El-Arish to receive the sick, wounded, women and children, of Ibrahim Pacha's army who might be entering Egypt by that route, and who would be thus spared a painful and tedious march, saying that Commodore Napier's Treaty embraced that subject. I replied, that though you had not been able to confirm the Commodore's Convention, you would, I was sure, for the cause of humanity, be now ready to meet Mehemet Ali's wish, and that I would communicate with the senior officer of our ships off the port on the subject, who would allow vessels, going strictly for that purpose, to pass freely. 2ndly. That in case of any of our ships of war coming to the port, the

commanders should be desired to conform rigidly to the quarantine regulations. I told him they always had, and always would do so, and reminded him of the quarantine you had passed yourself in August, and said that whatever our Consul told the captains was required by the regulations of the port would be abided by; for Mr. Larking had an idea that they might contemplate some new regulations which might affect the ships or officers to be sent down for the Turkish fleet.

“At 1 P.M. yesterday we sailed from Alexandria, and off the port communicated with Her Majesty’s ship Carysfort, and I delivered to Captain Martin two letters (copies of which I inclose) which I had thought it right to address to the senior officer of Her Majesty’s ships off Alexandria, and of which I hope you will approve; we are now proceeding to join your flag at Marmorice.

“I cannot close this report, without expressing how much I benefited by Mr. Larking’s ready and cordial assistance, and by the information I was able to obtain from him, and also from the zeal and attention of Mr. John Chumarian, the Dragoman.

“I have, &c.,

(Signed) “ARTHUR FANSHAWE, *Captain.*

“P.S.—We left the Ambuscade, small French frigate, a corvette, and steam-vessel at Alexandria; the latter, I understand, was to start for France

to-day; the Bourgainville, brig, sailed for Beyrout, the day of our arrival."

"The Hon. Sir R. Stopford, G.C.B."

On the 13th of December Captain Fanshawe returned from Alexandria, and after delivering the Pacha's reply to the Admiral, proceeded to Constantinople with his answer to the Vizier, which, like a clever diplomatist, he had taken care to base on the Convention, and it does appear to me quite astonishing that so determined a man as the Pacha certainly is, and as he had shown himself, should have listened at all to the Instruction of the 14th of November, which had the material difference from that of the 15th of October, of not containing the hereditary title; the very fact of our appearing to have changed our mind in so short a period, ought to have awakened his suspicion, because he could not know that that change originated with Austria, who however, as will presently be seen, got alarmed at the rejection of the Convention, and distinctly stated that Mehemet Ali should be confirmed, and that she would have nothing to do with any attack that might be meditated on Alexandria.

“ 17 Chewal, 1256.

“ After the usual Titles.

(Dec. 11, 1840.)

“ Commodore Napier, of the British fleet, informed me by a despatch dated from before Alexandria, the 22nd of November, N.S., that the Great Allied Powers have requested the Sublime Porte to grant me the hereditary Government of Egypt, on the conditions laid down by them; that is, that I shall give up the Imperial fleet which is in the Port of Alexandria, and that the Egyptian troops shall retire from Syria, and re-enter Egypt.

“ The Commodore required that diligence should be used in preparing the fleet, in order to its being delivered up, and in withdrawing the troops from Syria.

“ After some correspondence and some discussions with the Commodore on this matter, these conditions were accepted, and an authentic Act, manifesting that it is expected that the favour of him who is the shadow of God should be granted, and serving as a document to both parties, was concluded and signed.

“ In consequence, I wrote to my son, Ibrahim Pacha, your servant, to come immediately to Egypt with the Egyptian troops concentrated at Damascus, and with the persons in his employment, and others, and I even sent to him a person expressly for this purpose, whom I despatched in a steam-vessel procured by the Commodore.

“ I have just received from Ibrahim Pacha,

overland, a despatch dated the 1st of Ramazan, (October 27,) according to which, he was to set out, with all his people, from Damascus, the 3rd or 4th of Chewal (the 28th or 29th of November). Thus, it may be looked upon as certain that he commenced his march at the specified time.

“ And now, in the meanwhile, I receive from the Admiral of the British fleet, his Excellency Sir Robert Stopford, an official despatch written off Cyprus, on the 6th of December, and couched in the sense mentioned below. The Admiral sent to me, at the same time, a copy of the instructions which he had received from his Excellency Lord Palmerston. I see by this communication, that it has been stipulated that I must renew my submission to the Sublime Porte, restoring the Imperial fleet, and causing Syria, Adana, Candia, the Hedjaz, and the two Holy Cities, to be evacuated by the Egyptian troops.

“ I perceive that the obtaining my pardon, that my re-admission into the good graces of my Sovereign and master, to whose service I take this opportunity of dedicating my fortune and my life, and the gracious acceptance by His Imperial Majesty of my most humble submission, are the effects of the noble efforts of the high Allied Powers; and thoroughly grateful for all this, I have taken measures for restoring the Imperial fleet. People are actively employed in putting the vessels into a good state; and on the receipt of a firman, making known in what

manner it shall have pleased His Imperial Majesty that the fleet shall be delivered up and despatched, I will hasten to conform myself to the sovereign will by carrying the said firman into execution.

“ In like manner, as I am ready to withdraw all the Egyptian authorities who are in the Island of Candia, in the Hedjaz, and in the two Holy Cities, on the arrival of His Imperial Majesty’s firman in that respect, the above-mentioned places shall be evacuated without delay by the Egyptian authorities.

“ Thus, then, when your Excellency shall, if it please God, have taken cognizance of my prompt submission, carried into effect as above, you will be pleased to lay it at the feet of the clemency of my most august and most powerful Sovereign and Master, of whom I am so proud to be the faithful and submissive servant, and to employ your good offices, in order to cause a man advanced in age, and faithful, who has grown old in his service, to experience without ceasing the effects of his sovereign clemency.

“ He who can ordain, will ordain.

(L.S.) “ MEHEMET ALI.”

The Admiral in the mean time, in consequence of an application from General Michell, who now commanded the English force in Syria, (Sir Charles Smith having returned to England,) sent Captain



Stewart, in the Benbow, and several small ships, to Beyrout, with instructions to suspend hostilities until the result of Mehemet Ali's submission was known; and also authorized the Pacha to send steamers to Caiffa to bring away the sick and wounded; thus putting into execution a part of the rejected Convention.

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## CHAPTER III.

Captain Fanshawe's Arrival at Constantinople—Interview with the Grand Vizier—Conference of Ambassadors and Rechid Pacha—Conduct of Lord Ponsonby ; his Letter to Lord Palmerston—The Porte accepts the submission of Mehemet Ali—Letter of Rechid Pacha to the Ambassador and of the Vizier to Mehemet Ali—Captain Fanshawe returns to Marmorice.

It has already been shown, that notwithstanding the rejection of the Convention communicated to Mehemet Ali by Captain Fanshawe, he, on the 11th of December, in a letter to the Grand Vizier, sent his unconditional submission ; that letter reached Constantinople on the 16th of the same month. Captain Fanshawe, on his arrival, gave in a report of his proceedings to the Ambassador, couched in much the same terms as that to the Admiral already given, and on the 18th he had an audience of the Grand Vizier. The Captain was accompanied by Mr. Pisani, and by Captain Codrington and Captain Williams, and he informed the Vizier that he had been ordered by the Admiral to convey to Alexandria a summons to Mehemet Ali to make

\* See p. 22. The report is given in the *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 133.

his submission; this submission he now conveyed to him in an open letter, which he begged to deliver. The Grand Vizier, after having read Mehemet Ali's letter, said, "The Porte is already aware of these conditions, as is known; but I can tell you nothing upon this great question which the Sublime Porte is treating with the Allied Courts, and which consequently has become a question of foreign policy, belonging entirely to the department of Foreign Affairs, which is acquainted with all the circumstances relating to it better than I am. The Porte will take this question into consideration with the representatives of the Allied Courts, and his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs will make known the intentions of the Porte to the Allies; I beg you, M. le Capitaine, in the mean time, not to consider my acceptance of this letter from you as an acceptance of its contents." Captain Fanshawe replied that he also was in nowise authorized to enter into the details of this affair, and that he would learn the result from Lord Ponsonby. The Captain said that Mehemet Ali had given him his word that he would deliver over the Turkish fleet to whatever officer the Porte shall direct to conduct it hither. The Vizier replied, "The fleet is ours; Alexandria is

our country ; we are perfectly sure of having the fleet sooner or later." The Captain took the opportunity of speaking of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. The Grand Vizier replied, "Peace is made between two governments, and not between a sovereign and one of his rebel subjects."

The letters given clearly show that Mehemet Ali could do no more. He promised to deliver up the fleet, Candia, Syria, and the Holy Cities. The Grand Vizier replied, as has been shown: "The fleet is ours; Alexandria is ours;" and when Captain Fanshawe talks to him about peace, he said, "Peace is made between two Governments; and not between a sovereign and one of his rebel subjects." This indeed was talking big; the Grand Vizier forgot that Mehemet Ali had twice nearly knocked at the gates of Constantinople, and had he not been interfered with, would have dethroned his Master.

What does the Ambassador do? Though he was quite aware that every hour the Eastern Question remained unsettled, a European war was imminent—though he knew that France had intimated that we were not to touch Egypt—though he knew the British fleet had left the coast of Syria

and Egypt in consequence of bad weather—yet the Ambassador, acting on his own responsibility, to gratify his dislike of Mehemet Ali, did all he could to keep the question open, though he must have known the Allies were anxious to bring it to a close; and if he had had the power, I know, would have risked the whole British fleet to ensure the Pacha's destruction. Annexed is his letter to Lord Palmerston, furnishing an account of the Conference which the arrival of Mehemet Ali's letter gave rise to.

“ My Lord,

“ Therapia, December 23, 1840.

“ I received this afternoon the Protocol of the conference held at the house of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 20th instant, at which were present Rechid Pacha, and the Representatives of the Four Allies, and the dragomans of Austria and England, and M. Francheschi, who made the Protocol which I have now the honour to inclose\*.

“ I have little need to explain to your Lordship the grounds upon which I acted; submission is the first mentioned of the conditions, upon which I am ordered to give advice to the Sublime Porte, and it is also the most important, the others being insignificant, as things have turned out. My duty is to

\* See Protocol in the Appendix.

see that submission has been made by Mehemet Ali—real submission, and there are many things to make it very doubtful if Mehemet Ali has submitted, and has not taken this matter as concessions forced upon the Sultan by the Allies for the purpose of establishing him in Egypt with indefinite power. Your Lordship's instructions would not authorize me to say that such a submission is the submission contemplated by Her Majesty's Government, and as I do not think it proper for me, under the circumstances in which I am placed, to declare that it is not a submission, I have declined giving any opinion at all on the point, and said I would await the decision of it by the Sublime Porte, having stated what counsel I shall have to offer in the name of my Government, if the Sublime Porte accept the submission.

“Your Lordship has always declared that the Sultan is the sole judge and arbiter of his own interests; and you will see, in the Protocol, that the Representatives united cordially in disavowing intentions to act upon the Sultan except by counsel alone. I saw this with satisfaction, because endeavours have not been wanting to inspire the Ottoman Ministers with some jealousy of the prepotency of the Four Powers.

“It will appear, I think, in the Protocol, that I am not alone in thinking the submission may be subject to doubt, for the Internuncio says that Mehemet Ali has made a commencement of sub-

mission. This may be so, for the interest of Mehemet Ali is to accept the boon offered him, as he gives nothing for it in return; but my orders from my Government are not subject to be modified by me, and I cannot take upon myself the responsibility of acting without the most positive authority in a question like the present.

“ I will send a messenger to acquaint your Lordship with the determination of the Sublime Porte whenever I am informed of it.

“ I send the copy of the Protocol which was sent to me by his Excellency the Internuncio.

“ The Protocol is substantially correct in statement of what passed, but there are errors in its report of expressions.

“ I have, &c.,  
(Signed) “ PONSONBY.”

The reader will observe, without my pointing it out, from his own letter, and still more from the Protocol, with what diplomatic art the British Ambassador, in opposition to the opinion of the other Ministers, endeavours to gain time. Had he been instructed so to do, he would have shown himself a good diplomatist; but the contrary was the case. Rechid Pacha writes from Constantinople, under date of the 26th of November, to Chekib Effendi at Paris, “ That Lord Palmerston was favourable

to the reinstatement of Mehemet Ali, and that instructions had been sent to the Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject." Besides that, he knew of the instructions that Captain Fanshawe had communicated to Mehemet Ali, and which he accepted.

And no Minister of Foreign Affairs could have shown his want of confidence in his Ambassador more distinctly than Lord Palmerston did, by sending his instruction of the 14th of November direct to Sir Robert Stopford, thus completely throwing the Ambassador overboard. And well he did; for he decidedly would have found some means of putting it aside, as he did my Convention. In fact, his Lordship was the cleverest of Ambassadors for evading orders, and, indeed, managed to transfer Downing-street to Constantinople.

The Sultan, however, appeared to be satisfied with Mehemet Ali's submission; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to Lord Ponsonby, thus:

" The Sublime Porte,  
December 27, 1840.

" Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

" I have lost no time in laying before the Sultan the Protocol of the Conference of the 20th of this



month; and I am commanded to acquaint your Excellency, that His Imperial Majesty, wishing to prove by a fresh act the moderation of his sentiments, is disposed to accept the submission of Mehemet Ali, and only awaits the fulfilment of the conditions imposed upon him by the Memorandum of the 14th of November, to consider that submission as complete, and to confirm Mehemet Ali in the Pachalic of Egypt.

“ With the view of hastening that fulfilment, and of thus proving more clearly his desire to lend himself, as far as is in his power, to the views of his august Allies, the Sultan has decided that Yaver Pacha (Admiral Walker) and Mazloun Bey shall proceed immediately to Egypt as his Commissioners to receive the Ottoman fleet, and to ascertain that the places described in the Memorandum of the 14th of November are evacuated by the troops of Mehemet Ali.

“ I am commanded at the same time to request your Excellency will have the goodness to instruct Her Britannic Majesty's Admiral to assist according to the 4th paragraph of the Separate Act of the Convention of the 15th of July, at the restoration of the fleet to the said Commissioners.

“ Receive, &c.,  
 (Signed) “ RECHID,  
 “ *Minister for Foreign Affairs.*”

The Vizier, too, at the same time, wrote as follows to Mehemet Ali:

“ I have taken cognizance of the contents of the good despatch which you addressed to me dated the 17th Chewal, (the 22nd of November,) and which has also been laid before His Imperial Majesty.

“ It appears, from your Highness’s communication, that you intend really to make your submission to his Highness, and that in proof of this you have decided immediately to restore the Imperial fleet, and to surrender, without delay, certain places situated out of Egypt.

“ The intentions and good disposition which you have thus evinced, being a happy omen that the good system and the good proceedings which are desired, will be adopted and carried into execution, his Highness has duly appreciated them.

“ In all its affairs, in all its proceedings, the Sublime Porte, guided by feelings of justice, makes it a rule never to exceed the bounds of moderation.

“ On this account his Highness is disposed to accept your submission with favour, and to grant your Highness his full pardon.

“ As soon then as, in conformity with your engagements, the Imperial fleet shall have left the harbour of Alexandria, and shall be despatched with all its officers and crews, some well-known persons excepted, and with all its equipments and stores, and the places already known shall have been made over without delay to the Commissioners of the Sublime Porte, and when these acts shall be accom-

plished, that is to say, when positive intelligence of this shall have arrived here, it is decidedly resolved that then his Imperial Majesty will deign to reinstate your Highness in the Government of Egypt. These views of his Highness, and the pacific and benevolent opinions of the Great Powers, being quite in accordance upon this point, this resolution has been officially made known to the representatives of the Allied Courts.

“ His Excellency Mazloun Bey, one of the principal servants of the Sublime Porte, Member of the Council of Justice, and formerly Mousteshar of the Admiralty, is charged with the execution of the necessary instructions; and the Ferik of the Imperial navy, the most distinguished Yaver Pacha, is charged to receive the Imperial fleet and bring it here.

“ We leave to your wisdom to do what is necessary.”

On the 30th of December Captain Fanshawe wrote as follows to the Admiral from on board the Stromboli, off Tenedos, and soon after joined him at Marmorice.

“ Sir,

“ With reference to your orders to me to proceed to Constantinople, and to my letter to you of the 18th instant, I have now the honour to acquaint you

that I had no communication from his Excellency Lord Ponsonby from that date until the 27th, when I received a letter from him, relative to the conveyance of Turkish Commissioners in this vessel to Alexandria; and I beg to inclose you copies of the correspondence that in consequence passed between his Lordship and myself, through Mr. Doyle, on the subject; and also to state, that, in pursuance of the intimation from his Lordship, that he was 'not aware of anything within his competency' which could be the cause of my detention at Constantinople, and having yesterday afternoon received the accompanying despatch from him for you, I quitted the Golden Horn in the Stromboli, at 9 P.M. yesterday, and am proceeding in her to rejoin you at Marmorice.

" I have, &c.,

(Signed) " ARTHUR FANSHAWE, *Captain.*"

The despatch referred to inclosed a copy of the official note from the Porte\*, announcing the appointment of the Commissioners, and requesting the assistance of the British ships to bring home the Ottoman fleet from Alexandria.

\* See page 30.

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## CHAPTER IV.

Disinclination of the Porte to confer the Hereditary Pachalic on Mehemet Ali—Departure of the Turkish Commissioners—Their orders—Opposition of the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian Ministers to the views of Lord Ponsonby—Lord Palmerston's opinion of his conduct—Rewards conferred on the Officers of the Squadron at Acre—News from England—Approval of the Convention—Instruction of the 15th of December—Lord Palmerston's Letter to Lord Ponsonby—Prince Metternich and Count Nesselrode, in approval of the Convention.

THOUGH the Porte accepted the submission of Mehemet Ali, it was in no hurry to act, and when it did get in motion, it was far from doing what, I presume, three out of the four Representatives wished and expected.

The Commissioners did not leave Constantinople till the 6th of January, and they had no power to confer the hereditary pachalic on Mehemet Ali; and instead of carrying orders to General Jochmus to suspend hostilities, they brought orders to demand the arms and guns of Ibrahim's army; which demand was supported by Mr. Wood, the emissary of the Ambassador, and also by General Jochmus\*.

The Austrian Internuncio saw through this

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., pp. 274, 276.

intrigue; and on the 7th of January, in an interview with Rechid Pacha, announced to him that the four Powers had decided on applying for the hereditary succession for Mehemet Ali. This produced a correspondence—far too long for me to give here, but which may be seen in the Government volume of *Levant Papers*.

From this correspondence it appears that the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Ministers decided to act without Lord Ponsonby, in consequence of directions from the Ministers in London, based upon the Convention they had previously rejected. The English Ambassador does not appear to have received his instructions till the 10th of January, though they were dated the 17th of December. I should like to see the reply Lord Palmerston made to the Ambassador on learning that he had rejected the Convention; why it is suppressed, is easily accounted for. It ought to be explained how, on the 7th of January, the Internuncio received his dispatches which must have passed through the hands of Prince Metternich at Vienna, whilst the English Ambassador only received his on the 10th. The delay might have caused great embarrassment, and indeed at such a critical moment it was not desirable that a

disagreement even for three days should have existed between Lord Ponsonby and the other Ministers.

The Governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, as well as their Ambassadors at Constantinople, saw how things were going on in the East. They wrote peremptorily to those personages to settle the question; and Prince Metternich requested Lord Beauvale to state to Lord Palmerston that, in case the Porte should hesitate to accede to the recommendation of the Allied Powers to confer the hereditary government on Mehemet Ali, his court could not be compromised by such hesitation\*.

Lord Beauvale also wrote to Lord Palmerston on the 17th of January †, that the Turkish Commissioners going to Alexandria were not empowered to grant the hereditary pachalic, and in consequence, Austria would withdraw her support from the Sultan, and would disavow any attack on Ibrahim Pacha.

Lord Palmerston, in a letter to the Ambassador, of the 26th of January ‡, does not exactly find

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 151.

† *Ibid.*, p. 159.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

fault with his Excellency for not taking Mehemet Ali's offer as a complete submission, but he tells him the advice in his Lordship's instructions of the 15th of October\* might have been given. This appears a pretty broad hint, and I suppose diplomatic etiquette did not admit of any thing stronger.

On the 17th of December despatches were received in Marmorice Bay from England. The Commander-in-Chief was appointed Governor of Greenwich Hospital; I was directed to hoist a red broad pennant, and was made a Commander of the Bath; the Captains commanding ships at Acre were made Companions; and a large promotion went through all classes of officers who were fortunately present at the bombardment. On the 27th a new Pacha arrived from Constantinople on his way to Syria, with orders to send to Adrianople Izzet Pacha, who had created so much discontent throughout the country, and to report on the state and condition of Ibrahim's army. This Pacha was the bearer of letters of thanks to the Admiral and others employed in Syria, with the exception of myself, who have never received any

\* See Vol. I., p. 249.



acknowledgment from the Turkish Government up to the present day. The Admiral strongly recommended this new Pacha to suspend hostilities, and I also advised him to control General Jochmus, who was a young man ambitious of military glory, and more likely to make war than peace.

On the 5th of January, 1841, the *Megæra* arrived from England. I was aware she must either bring my sentence of acquittal or condemnation, and having been already denounced by the wise men of the East, I felt it was not impossible that their opinion might have influenced the judgment of the Ministers of the West, if unfortunately their protests had arrived in London before my despatches from Alexandria. I had, however, taken precautions to prevent this, which fortunately succeeded, and they were left to their own calm judgment, which decided in my favour.

I had a party dining with me that day, when numerous letters, public and private, were put into my hand by the officer of the watch. I laid them on the table, determined not to run the risk of spoiling my dinner by bad news, and not requiring good to give me an appetite. After the inward man had been well fortified, I ventured to open a letter

from Lord Minto, which, to my great satisfaction, announced to me that the Government were satisfied with what I had done, with the exception of the Guarantee. I received also letters from various members of the Government, and an official one from the Admiral, inclosing an instruction from Lord Palmerston to the Admiralty, bearing date Dec. 15, 1840, some extracts from which I subjoin\* :

“ I have to request your Lordships to convey to Commodore Napier the approval of Her Majesty’s Government of the steps taken by him on this occasion, though without any instructions to that effect, and upon his own responsibility, to carry into execution the arrangements contemplated by the Treaty of the 15th of July, and to put an end to the contest in the Levant.

“ But the instruction given by your Lordships to Sir Robert Stopford in pursuance of my letter of the 14th of November†, will have reached Sir Robert Stopford a few days after he received from Commodore Napier a report of the result of his negotiation at Alexandria; and it is uncertain whether Sir Robert Stopford will have considered the in-

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 87.

† See page 15.

struction of the 14th of November as superseding Commodore Napier's arrangement, or whether he will have looked upon Commodore Napier's arrangement as superseding that instruction.

“ In this state of things, Her Majesty's Government must postpone a final communication with respect to the arrangement made by Commodore Napier, till they learn, as they probably will in a few days' time, what course Sir Robert Stopford took upon the receipt of the instruction of the 14th of November. But there is one part of the Articles signed by Commodore Napier and Boghos Bey, upon which it is necessary that an instruction should immediately be sent to Sir Robert Stopford.

“ In the first Article, Boghos Bey, on the part of Mehemet Ali, takes two engagements: the one is to order the Egyptian troops to evacuate Syria; the other is to restore the Turkish fleet. The first engagement was to be fulfilled immediately, and was to be conditional only upon the promise of Commodore Napier that he would, in his capacity of commander of the British fleet before Alexandria, suspend hostilities against Alexandria, and every other part of the Egyptian territory. The other engagement was eventual, and was to be fulfilled as

soon as Mehemet Ali should have received an official notification that the Porte grants him the hereditary government of Egypt, and that this concession is, and shall continue to be, under the guarantee of the Four Powers. Now it is necessary that Sir Robert Stopford should lose no time in making known to Mehemet Ali that this last demand of his, that the Four Powers should guarantee to him the grant of the hereditary government of Egypt, if that grant should be made to him by the Sultan, cannot be complied with.

“That which the Four Powers will do, is to recommend to the Porte to make the concessions specified in the communication which Sir Robert Stopford has been instructed to convey to Mehemet Ali.”

A despatch of the same tendency was addressed (Dec. 17) by Viscount Palmerston to the Ambassador\*, in which he remarks,—

“A doubt may have been felt by your Excellency and your colleagues what steps you should take in pursuance of the instructions contained in my despatch of the 15th of October, and in the corresponding instructions sent from Vienna, Peters-

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 88.

burgh, and Berlin; because those instructions, modified by the subsequent letter to the Admiralty of November 14, contemplated the unconditional submission of Mehemet Ali to the Sultan, as a preliminary to the advice to be given to the Porte to reinstate Mehemet Ali in the Government of Egypt; and, on the contrary, Mehemet Ali, in the demands which he sets forth in the first Article of the Agreement, signed on the 27th of November, engages to restore the fleet only on two conditions,—the one being, that the Sultan should grant him hereditary tenure in the Government of Egypt,—and the other being, that such grant on the part of the Sultan should be placed under the guarantee of the Four Powers.

“ It appears to Her Majesty’s Government that the fact that Mehemet Ali attached the first of these conditions to his restoration of the fleet, need not prevent the Porte from making to him that concession. For, in fact, those Articles of Agreement were substantially a complete surrender on the part of Mehemet Ali; and he was led to suppose, that in asking for hereditary tenure, he was only asking that which the Porte was willing to give. But the second condition, namely, the guarantee of the Four

Powers, is one which cannot be complied with; and your Excellency should, on this point, give to the Porte the same explanations which Sir Robert Stopford has been instructed, in pursuance of my letter to the Admiralty of the 15th instant, to give to Mehemet Ali.

“ It has been reported, but upon what authority is not known, that the Porte was, towards the end of November, but before it had heard of the submission of Mehemet Ali, disinclined to revoke the decree which had deprived him of the Government of Egypt. It is not unnatural that such a feeling should have existed at that time in the mind of the Turkish Government, but Her Majesty’s Government hope that subsequent events, and the unanimous advice of the Four Powers, will have removed these objections on the part of the Porte, and will have led the Porte to accept the settlement effected by Commodore Napier’s arrangement, or by the subsequent more ample submission of Mehemet Ali.”

Lord Palmerston’s letter to Lord Ponsonby, acknowledging the receipt of the Ambassador’s letter announcing the rejection of the Convention, as I have before said, has never been published; it would be a curious document, and I dare say

will come to light some day or other; but Lord Palmerston's despatch to Lord Ponsonby after receiving my despatches, is clear enough; he tells the Ambassador plainly, that it does not signify whether Sir Robert Stopford adopted my Convention or his subsequent instruction of the 14th of November; that the articles of agreement were substantially a complete surrender on the part of Mehemet Ali; and he was led to suppose, on asking for the hereditary tenure, he was only asking that which the Porte was willing to give; but that the guarantee could not be complied with.

Prince Metternich also agreed with Lord Palmerston, and directed the Internuncio to co-operate with Lord Ponsonby in carrying out the instructions of the 17th; and moreover tells Lord Beauvale very plainly that in case the Porte hesitates to confer the hereditary Pachalic on Mehemet Ali, his Court will not admit that the Allies could be compromised by such hesitation. Count Nesselrode also states to Lord Clanricarde, that it is unfortunate that the Sultan had not been disposed, or advised, to concede the hereditary government to Mehemet Ali.

Shortly before this (December 22,) Count Nesselrode wrote to Baron Brunnow at London, in

terms that show his full approval of the Convention, except the guarantee\*.

“ I hasten to reply to the despatch which your Excellency has done me the honour to address to me under date of the 27th November (9th Dec.), and the arrival of which was almost immediately preceded by that of the reports which you entrusted to the Marquis of Clanricarde. Before entering further into detail upon the principal subject of that despatch, my first desire, M. le Baron, is to communicate to you the lively satisfaction with which the Emperor received the happy intelligence of the submission of Mehémet Ali. The Treaty of London has at last been executed in spite of all opposition. It has been so to its fullest extent, and that without having cost the Powers who were parties to it any compromise, or any concession to be regretted. There is nothing, even including the armed demonstration with which the British squadron accompanied its summons at Alexandria, which has not stamped its result with a character still more favourable to the consideration of the alliance. Have the goodness, M. le Baron, to offer our sincere congratu-

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 121.



tulations to Lord Palmerston upon this result, which we consider as a common triumph of his and of our policy.

“The Eastern Question thus settled, it now remains to record and confirm the solution thereof by a final transaction in which France should concur. You have already, in anticipation of this event, been put in possession of the views and intentions which our august Master entertains upon this subject. Much more will the Emperor be disposed to accede to the plan which Lord Palmerston has proposed to you, because it simplifies still further the transaction which is to be concluded. His Majesty, then, could not but approve the motive which leads Lord Palmerston to desire that the details of the special arrangement, by virtue of which the Sultan shall grant to Mehemet Ali the investiture of Egypt, should not be embodied in the text of the agreement. Accordingly, M. le Baron, if the bases of the proposed agreement should be such as have been stated to you by the Principal Secretary of State, and if the French Government should decide upon accepting it, the Emperor would authorize you to concur in it.”

The Count also wrote as follows, under date of 4th January, 1841, to M. Titow, at Constantinople\* :—

“I lost no time in laying before the Emperor your despatch of the 28th of November, in which you reported to us the late events which have taken place at Alexandria, as well as the determination of the Porte to refuse its sanction to the arrangement concluded by Commodore Napier.

“It certainly belongs to his Highness alone to determine finally the extent of the sacrifices which it is expedient for him to make, in order to secure the pacification of his empire, and that Sovereign ought not to doubt that the Emperor desires sincerely that that pacification may be effected upon conditions as little unfavourable as possible to the Porte.

“But, the more our august Master has at heart the defence of the interests of the Sultan, the more would His Imperial Majesty consider himself as failing in the friendship which he bears to his Highness, if he did not seriously recommend him, at this decisive moment, to consider with calmness and moderation the present posture of affairs, and to be

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 152.

on his guard against illusions and hopes which in the end may never be realized.

“ But a few months since, even at the period of the signature of the Convention of July 15, the Porte could not have hoped in so short a time to have reduced Mehemet Ali to the powerless state to which he is now reduced; and it is hardly to be doubted, that it would a little while ago have granted to him the hereditary succession, if it had been possible for it by that means to hasten a definitive arrangement, in the interests of general peace.

“ The military operations of the Allies in Syria have, since, been crowned with the most decided success. Nevertheless, when the Porte in a moment of irritation, determined to pronounce the deprivation of Mehemet Ali, the Powers did not hesitate to declare their opinion upon the subject, and to make known the conditions upon which it appeared to them that the Sultan should not hesitate to reinstate the Pacha in the hereditary administration of Egypt.

“ It is certainly true that the Porte has never hitherto received an official communication of the advice which the Allied Powers thought it their duty to tender to it, but the Porte is perfectly aware

of the nature and tendency of the instructions of the 15th of October, which have acquired European publicity ; it is equally acquainted with the measures determined upon on the 14th of November in London, and with the step which Sir Robert Stopford was instructed to take, and the only object of which was to secure the execution of the preceding instructions.

“ It would now be impossible for the Four Allied Powers to retract their former declarations. Already the British Cabinet has not hesitated an instant to declare itself in favour of the advantages which result from the cessation of hostilities between the Porte and Mehemet Ali ; but while it fully appreciates the object which Commodore Napier had in view, in undertaking upon his own responsibility to hasten the submission of the Pacha ; while it fully approves of all the conditions which that officer has imposed upon him ; the Cabinet of London has not thought fit to take upon itself a formal guarantee with respect to the right of hereditary succession which the Sultan might confer upon Mehemet Ali.

“ We are firmly convinced that the other Powers will readily adhere to this opinion of England ; not one of them will, in fact, take upon itself a gua-

rantee, which would become as burdensome for those Powers, as it would be incompatible with His Highness's rights of Sovereignty.

\*       \*       \*       \*       \*

“The Cabinet of London appears to be more than ever impressed with the necessity of furthering, by all possible means, the pacification of the East, and of putting an end to the doubts which the Divan appears to entertain with respect to the real intentions of the Allies. Have the goodness then, Sir, to unite with Lord Ponsonby, in holding to the Ministers of the Porte the language which Lord Palmerston has lately prescribed to the English Ambassador, and which, we have no doubt, will be equally supported by the Representatives of Austria and Prussia.”

Nothing could be more gratifying to me than that my first essay at diplomacy should have received the sanction of the great powers of Europe, and I presume such a sanction was not very palatable to the gentlemen who took a different view of Eastern affairs.

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CHAPTER V.

The Author ordered to Alexandria to carry the Convention into effect—Interviews with the Pacha and Boghos Bey—Letter from Boghos Bey explaining the Pacha's Intentions—Lieut. Loring dispatched to see the Evacuation of Syria carried into effect; his Instructions—Letters to the Chief Officers in Syria—Arrival of the Turkish Commissioners at Alexandria—Surrender of the Turkish Fleet—Bad Faith of the Turks—Correspondence between the Author and Boghos Bey respecting the Cotton Crop—The Commercial Treaty.

THE day after the arrival of the *Megæra*, I waited on the Commander-in-Chief, who directed me to proceed to Alexandria, and see the Convention carried out. I arrived there in the *Stromboli* on the 8th January, when the Pacha sent one of his officers to compliment me, and invite me to the Palace.

Between seven and eight in the evening I waited on Boghos Bey, and delivered the Admiral's and Rechid Pacha's letters\*, and an extract of Lord Palmerston's instruction, dated the 15th of December, beginning with the words, "Now it is necessary that Sir Robert Stopford †." Boghos Bey did not seem much disappointed at the refusal of the Allies

\* See page 39.

† See page 51.

to give a guarantee, but expressed his dissatisfaction at the word "hereditary" not appearing in the letter of Rechid Pacha to the British Ambassador, and expressed his fears that there would be some difficulty with the Pacha, who fully expected on his submission, the hereditary Pachalic of Egypt would be conferred on him.

I was now introduced to the Pacha, who was far from being in good humour, and evidently disappointed at the communication Boghos Bey had previously made to him; he nevertheless invited me to sit on the divan beside him, and gave me a pipe.

I acquainted his Highness that I was authorized to allow vessels to proceed to Caiffa, to embark the sick, wounded, women, children, and any part of the Egyptian army, and that I should send a British officer with the person to whom he entrusted his instructions to Ibrahim to evacuate Syria. I also told him that I should give every assistance to fit out the Turkish fleet, which I was sorry to observe was in the same state I had left them.

He replied it was not his fault; that after the agreement I had made with him the officer had been sent back from Syria, and the agreement disallowed.

I remarked that that difficulty was now obviated,

that the Convention had been approved of in London, with the exception of the guarantee.

To this he observed that he did not care so much about the guarantee, but that the word "hereditary" had been left out, whereas in Lord Palmerston's dispatch to Lord Ponsonby, dated the 15th of October, and which had been made public, it was distinctly stated that the Porte would be strongly recommended to confer on him the hereditary Pachalic, and that in M. Guizot's speech to the French Chambers he had declared that the Allies would recommend it; and finally, that the agreement signed by Boghos Bey and myself stipulated that the fleet should be delivered up on receiving the official account that the Sublime Porte would confer on him the hereditary government of Egypt; that notwithstanding this, in Lord Palmerston's instructions of the 14th of November, communicated to him by Captain Fanshawe, the word "hereditary" had been left out; but nevertheless he had entirely submitted himself to the will of the Sultan, and asked for no terms, being convinced he would be confirmed in the fullest sense.

There was so much truth in these observations that I did not endeavour to controvert them, and



soon after took my leave, promising to call on Boghos Bey next morning, when the papers were translated.

In my next interview with Boghos Bey he again spoke of the disappointment and dissatisfaction of the Pacha. He said he had done everything to gain the good will of England; that the interests of Great Britain and Egypt were identified; that at one time England had encouraged him, and even permitted Egyptians to enter her dockyards and ships to gain instruction, and that now she wanted to put him down altogether. All this he very naturally attributed to Lord Ponsonby, and Mehemet Ali often said, he was not at war with either Turkey or England, but with the English Ambassador.

I told him I was not without hopes that the British Government would still use their influence with the Porte to obtain that point, and that I should do everything in my power to forward the Pacha's wishes, and I had reason to believe they would be complied with.

He requested me to read the part of Lord Palmerston's letter, approving of the Convention\*, which I consented to do, but he must consider it a

\* See page 49.

private communication; he listened to this with much satisfaction, and said, if I would communicate it to the Pacha, it would go a great way to tranquillize his mind.

In the morning I waited on the old man, and read to him the other part of Lord Palmerston's instructions, which had some effect in putting him in good humour; he talked a good deal about the difficulty of quitting Syria till the spring without a great loss of life and stores, and was anxious that the women, children, and sick should be allowed to embark at Beyrout, Sidon, or the most convenient place, should the army be still at Damascus.

There is no doubt whatever that he had sent orders to Ibrahim to withdraw, but was probably afraid that he would not obey them when he heard of his father's submission without being certain of the hereditary pachalic being conferred, and he was anxious, in the event of his staying at Damascus, to free him of his incumbrances.

I observed that the weather was now better than when the Convention was signed, and was improving every day; that I had no authority to allow any embarkation either at Beyrout or Sidon, but that I should write to the officer in command to give every

facility in his power, and that I felt satisfied the best way to insure the British Government pressing the point of the hereditary pachalic was, by throwing no difficulties in the way; that, whether or no, his son must succeed him, and as to a guarantee, he had shown it was more necessary to guarantee the Porte against him, than him against the Porte. The old man was tickled at this observation, and consented to all I asked, and next morning Boghos gave it me in writing, as follows :

“ Commodore,

“ Alexandria, Jan. 10, 1841.

“ The object of the letter which I have the honour to address to you, is to recapitulate, according to the desire which you have expressed to me, the words which you heard from the mouth of the Viceroy, my master, himself, in your conversation yesterday evening.

“ The delay which has occurred in the evacuation of Syria is not dependent on the will of his Highness. In consequence of the Convention concluded with you on the 27th of November last, Hamid Bey was sent to Syria, to carry the Viceroy's orders to Ibrahim Pacha. You know, Commodore, the reasons which hindered that superior officer from fulfilling his mission, and you are acquainted with the nature of the obstacles which prevented the despatches of his Highness from reaching their destination.

“The Viceroy, always desirous to give you a fresh proof of his readiness to fulfil his engagements, proposes to dispatch a steam-vessel this very day to take back to Syria Hamid Bey, who will be charged, in conjunction with the English officer appointed by you, to deliver the orders to the General-in-Chief of Egyptian army. As soon as Ibrahim Pacha shall be made acquainted with them, he will immediately effect the evacuation of Syria, despatching, if it is in his power to do so, the women, children, and sick, towards Caiffa, and marching himself towards Egypt, should he not be already in motion with his army to effect his retreat in that direction. Immediately on our being made acquainted, by the return of Hamid Bey, with the measures taken by Ibrahim Pacha in execution of the orders of his Highness, and as soon as we shall have acquired the certainty that the sick, women, and children, belonging to the Egyptian army have been able to proceed to Caiffa, his Highness will send transports to that port to secure their return to Egypt.

“With respect to the Ottoman fleet, I can only confirm what I had formerly the honour of writing to you, Commodore; it is ready to put to sea.

“Such is the substance of the terms in which the Viceroy expressed himself to you, Commodore. His Highness, in thus giving you a fresh proof of his deference to the decisions of the Allied Powers, is convinced that they will hasten the execution of the Treaty of the 15th of July, by obtaining in his

favour the hereditary government of Egypt; and that they will show their intention of securing the pacification of the East, by placing it on an imperishable foundation."

The Egyptian steamer *Generoso* started on the second day after my arrival, with one of the Pacha's officers and Lieutenant Loring, to whom I gave the following instructions:—

" H.M.S. Carysfort,  
January 10, 1841.

" Sir,

" Pursuant to directions from the Commander-in-Chief, you will accompany Hamid Bey in the Egyptian steam-boat *Generoso*, to the coast of Syria.

" You will recommend him first to proceed to Acre, and you will deliver the accompanying letter to the officer commanding the Allied troops.

" You will consult with him on the best way of proceeding to Ibrahim Pacha's head-quarters, and you will demand a proper escort (if necessary) for your own protection and that of the Egyptian officer who accompanies you. The object of your mission is to see the evacuation of Syria carried into effect, and you will remain with Ibrahim Pacha as long as you think it necessary, and then return to Alexandria.

" I have, &c.,

" CHAS. NAPIER."

" Lieutenant Loring, H.M.S. Carysfort."

I wrote also to the senior Naval and Military officers in Syria.

“H.M.S. Carysfort,  
January 10, 1841.

“ Sir,

“The bearer of this letter is charged by me, (agreeably to the orders of Sir Robert Stopford, in consequence of directions of Lord Palmerston, to carry my Convention into effect,) to proceed with Hamid Bey to Ibrahim Pacha’s head-quarters, and deliver to him the order of Mehemet Ali, for the immediate evacuation of Syria.

“It is Sir Robert Stopford’s directions that every facility is given for the embarkation of the sick, the wounded, the women and children, and others of the Egyptian army, at Caiffa.

“But it appears to me, (if there be no objection, of which I cannot be a judge,) they may be permitted to embark at any other place if more convenient.

“The officer charged with the despatches to Ibrahim Pacha, will necessarily concert with him and with you on this point, as will also do the officer charged to see the evacuation carried into effect.

“It is needless to observe, that as Mehemet Ali has made his submission to the Porte, and is reinstated in the Pachalic of Egypt, it is of the utmost importance that Ibrahim should not be disturbed in his evacuation, but should be protected

and assisted in every manner, so as to cause as little loss of life as possible.

“ I have, &c.,

“ CHAS. NAPIER.”

“ To the Officer commanding the  
Allied Forces in Syria.”

“ Sir,

“ I have the honour to inform you that I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to permit the women, children, sick, wounded, and others of the Egyptian army, to embark at Caiffa, and that Lieut. Loring is charged to see the evacuation of Syria carried into effect, and is accompanied by Hamid Bey, who is the bearer of orders to Ibrahim Pacha to evacuate Syria forthwith.

“ It is possible there may be other places on the coast of Syria more convenient for the embarkation than Caiffa, (of which I cannot be a judge, not knowing the position of Ibrahim’s army;) in that case you will concert with the officer commanding the Allied army, and act accordingly.

“ As soon as it is ascertained where the embarkation will take place, the steamer will return here, and transports will be sent to receive them.

“ I need not observe, that as Mehemet Ali has sent his submission to the Porte, which has been accepted, and is now reinstated in the Pachalic of Egypt, every facility should be given to Ibrahim Pacha to evacuate Syria, in order

that it may be done with as little loss of life as possible.

“ I have, &c.,

“ CHAS. NAPIER.”

“ To the Senior Naval Officer  
at Acre or Ascalon.”

The Turkish Commissioners, Yaver Pacha (Admiral Walker,) and Mazloun Bey, arrived at Alexandria on the 10th January, and were graciously received by Mehemet Ali, who gave directions that the fleet should be immediately given up, and Admiral Walker hoisted his flag on the 11th at noon, under a salute from the batteries at Alexandria, and the Egyptian men-of-war and steamers were put at their disposal, and they were ordered to be entertained at the Pacha's expense. My friend, Admiral Walker, took up his residence with me, and in the morning of the 13th I visited him on board the Mahomedie, and afterwards waited on all the Turkish and Egyptian Admirals, when as much powder was burnt as would have fought a good action.

I dispatched the Stromboli with the important intelligence of the delivery of the Turkish fleet, to Sir Robert Stopford, at Marmorice Bay, on the 11th of January, supposing that the Eastern Question



was brought to a close, but the sequel will show that it was not yet over.

I shall here make a comparison between the conduct of Sir Robert Stopford and Lord Ponsonby. Both rejected my Convention, and I believe it was the first time they ever agreed. When Captain Fanshawe returned from Alexandria, the Admiral, I think, saw his error, because he wrote to Syria to order a suspension of hostilities, and permitted the embarkation of the sick and wounded. Lord Ponsonby, on the other hand, did every thing he possibly could to gain time, and more than that, the British Ambassador wrote to General Jochmus, a Turkish officer, and desired him not to suspend hostilities, as is positively stated in General Michell's letter to Lord Palmerston, dated December 31, 1840, and as we shall shortly see, he gave the same directions to his emissary, Mr. Wood; and the very steamer that brought the Commissioners to Alexandria, as I shall show hereafter, was the bearer of orders to, if possible, destroy Ibrahim's army: so much for the good faith of the Turks\*. Admiral Walker was quite ignorant of this as well as myself, and thinking

\* See Chapters XI. and XII.; and also *Levant Papers*, Part III., pp. 203, 268, 275.

every thing was settled with Turkey, I very naturally turned my attention to English interests at Alexandria.

Boghos Bey had announced his intention of selling the crop of cotton on the 20th of February, and continuing the sale the first of every succeeding month. The British merchants complained of the difficulty they had in becoming purchasers under this arrangement; they alleged that if they imported cash to purchase the cotton, it might be put up at such a price that they would either be obliged to take it at a loss, or re-export their specie, and they requested I would use my influence with Boghos Bey to get him to put it up at public sale. I thought their request so reasonable, that I immediately went to Boghos Bey, and suggested to him, that the cotton in question should be put up at public sale, when it is sure to fetch its real value, and the merchants would then have a fair chance of becoming purchasers; that this system was invariably followed by the East India Company, and they found it to answer their purpose and satisfy the public.

I also took the opportunity of asking Boghos Bey whether the Pacha intended to execute the Commercial Treaty of the 16th of August, 1839,

which, I assured him, the British Government would insist upon; and that I felt certain, if the Pacha would allow it to take its course, he would not only gain many friends in England, but it would engage Lord Palmerston more strongly to push the point of the hereditary government. I told him that as I had signed the Convention of the 27th of November, which had been approved of, I felt bound in honour to do all in my power to carry it out, and that no argument I could make use of would weigh more than being able to write to Lord Palmerston that the Commercial Convention was in full operation.

I also expressed to his Excellency my satisfaction at the loyal manner in which His Highness had acted throughout the whole affair of the evacuation of Syria, and the delivery of the fleet, and I trusted it would have its due weight at Constantinople. The substance of this I put in writing, and requested Boghos Bey to give me a reply, which he did next morning.

“ Commodore,

“ Alexandria, Jan. 15, 1841.

“ After having informed you, Commodore, that I had made known to the Viceroy, my master, the friendly letter which you wrote to me on the 14th

of this month, I had the honour to accompany you this morning to his Highness, and in the conversation which ensued, you have been enabled to convince yourself, Commodore, of the sincerity of his sentiments and conduct. All the means which we possess have been placed at the disposal of the Admiral Yaver Pacha to facilitate the departure of the Ottoman fleet, which is ready to put to sea; the retreat of the Egyptian troops is being carried into effect in Syria; the garrisons in Candia, Arabia, and the Holy Cities, only wait the arrival of the forces to replace them, in order to maintain the tranquillity of those countries.

“With regard to commerce, his Highness, who is desirous to dedicate to it all his care, in conformity with the desire which has been expressed, has been hitherto prevented from doing so by the occupation of the war. In a few days he will proceed to the provinces to complete such arrangements as may, without a violent shock to the administration of the country, put him in a position to fulfil the conditions of the Treaty to which he has given his acquiescence. The Viceroy trusts that the time will be granted him, which is indispensable to work this change, to be effected to the satisfaction of all.

“I have, &c.,

“BOGHOS JOUSSOUR.”

## CHAPTER VI.

The Author visits Cairo—The Mahmoudieh Canal—Fire on board the Steamer—Voyage up the Nile—Appearance of the Country—Condition of the People—Arrival at Cairo—Visit to Abbas Pacha—Palace of Schoubrah—Establishments of the Pacha—Industry of the Arabs—Visit to the Pyramids—Quit Cairo.

THINGS appeared to go on so smoothly at Alexandria, and anticipating no further difficulty in Syria, I took this opportunity of proceeding to Cairo, to gain as much information as I could relative to the interior of the country. The Pacha put his own steam-boat at my disposal, and sent one of his officers as interpreter; and who, I afterwards found, was likewise charged with paying the expenses of my journey. A palace in the neighbourhood of Cairo was also put at my disposition, both of which civilities I declined.

We embarked in a very tolerable boat on the 24th of January, and proceeded by the Mahmoudieh Canal to Atfeh, where it joins the Nile. The boat was dragged by horses at a good pace, and the distance, forty-eight miles, was accomplished in about

seven hours. At Atfeh there is a tolerable inn, where we stopped.

According to a statement in Russell's *Egypt*, this canal was begun by Mehemet Ali in October, 1819, and finished early in December of the same year. It is forty-eight miles long, eighteen feet deep, and ninety feet broad. It is said that 250,000 persons were employed in cutting it, and that 30,000 men, women, and children perished in the undertaking; but I believe this number to be much exaggerated. Before the construction of this canal, the produce of Upper Egypt was brought down the Nile in boats to Damietta, and there transhipped into sailing vessels; and, in fine weather, even open boats frequently undertook the voyage to Alexandria. This occasioned much loss of time; and as they were frequently wrecked, much destruction of life and property; for which reasons Mehemet Ali decided on undertaking the construction of this Grand Canal. Unfortunately for the inhabitants, the Pacha was anxious to see his work completed in a short space of time, and the poor Fellahs were driven in from the country like a flock of sheep, and set to work,—the greater part unprovided with tools, and all ill-fed, and unpaid; exposed on a scanty allowance

of water to the heat of a broiling sun by day, and with little or no shelter from the noxious dews at night.

Under these circumstances, it cannot be wondered that the destruction of human life was immense; but the Pacha troubled himself little about their sufferings. He saw his work rapidly progressing; and the first boat started just two months after its commencement. The Mahmoudieh Canal, though certainly a grand undertaking, is, nevertheless, incomplete; there are no locks at either end to communicate with the Nile and the harbour of Alexandria; the goods are landed at the latter place, and carried by railroad to the canal close by; and when they arrive at Atfeh, are again disembarked, and transported to the Nile, which is shut out by a badly constructed barage. The Nile, in the lowest season, is below the canal; and the canal is several feet above the sea in the harbour of Alexandria. It makes a considerable circuit round the eastern end of the lake Mareotis; and, I believe, had a skilful engineer been employed, it might have been greatly shortened.

At daylight on the morning of the 25th we embarked in one of the Pacha's steamers. I was accompanied by Mr. Larking, the English

Consul, and his lady,—the former in very bad health,—by Captain Martin, Mr. Waghorn,—the active agent for the transport of goods and passengers (and indeed the first projector of the enterprise) up the Nile and across the Isthmus,—and several officers of the Carysfort. Mr. Larking has the management of a farm belonging to a relation of his, on the banks of the canal, which he conducts as nearly after the English method as the difference of the country will allow. There was a very good house on the estate, besides other extensive buildings.

Mrs. Larking was a capital caterer; and we owe to that amiable lady the good cheer we met with in our passage up the Nile. The steamer was none of the best as to speed; but her accommodations were good.

We had not proceeded many miles when she was discovered to be on fire in the coal-bunkers. We ran her alongside the bank; and Mr. Larking, who was ill, and could hardly walk, was with difficulty got on shore, together with Mrs. Larking and his child. The decks were ript up; and, notwithstanding the noise and confusion amongst the Arab crew, with the assistance of the officers, we managed to get the fire under, without materially injuring the boat.



On examination, we found the beams of the vessel were too close to the chimney; and after being completely charred, they took fire, and ignited the coals. This was not a good beginning; but was attended with no other consequence than the delay of a few hours. The current was running down between two and three miles an hour; and, although the wind was generally in our favour, we made little progress, and were easily passed by the light country boats, notwithstanding their miserable equipments. The Nile in most parts is about a quarter of a mile wide; and the water not being low, was easily navigated. Boats of all sizes crowd the river, conveying to Alexandria, corn, chopped straw, cotton, and various other products of the upper country. Most of these boats were the property of the Pacha, for he monopolized the greater part of the trade, as well as most of the produce of the country; and if I may judge by their appearance, Mehemet Ali was as bad a ship's husband, as he was an agriculturist; but he has a mania of doing every thing himself. He was rapidly making himself owner of all the land in Egypt, as well as of all the trade. It is a common custom with him, when

his crops are ready, to force the Fellahs to leave their own villages to work on his property. At the same time, he seizes all the boats on the river to bring down his produce, caring very little what becomes of the property of others. This becomes peculiarly oppressive when the Nile is rapidly rising, as it often happens that the whole of their produce is swept away during the time they are employed to save the Pacha's.

When the wind blows down the river, the passage of the boats is very slow. There is no towing path; no horses or mules; the crew land, and they manage to tug their boats along from ten to twenty miles a day, varying according to the size of the boat. The descent down, owing to the current, unless the wind is very strong, may be about fifty or sixty miles in the twenty-four hours; and considerably more when the wind is fair.

Egypt in the Delta is about 160 miles wide; but when you ascend the river, and are clear of the Delta, it narrows to from 11 to 20 miles, and is shut in by sand-hills and mountains on each side. The country is richly cultivated, and well irrigated, but in a very primitive manner. The villages are raised considerably above the plain; but, nevertheless, are

sometimes much inconvenienced by a high Nile, and are of the most miserable description. The people are poorly dressed in coarse blue cotton shirts and petticoats; but their wants seemed few; and I saw no appearance of discontent or unhappiness amongst them.

At sunset on the second day, in passing round a point where there was a considerable bend in the river, the Pyramids opened to our view, apparently only a few miles off; their gigantic size gave them this appearance, though their distance could not have been less than thirty miles. We continued our route during the night, and at daylight we stopped considerably below Boulac, the Wapping, it may be called, of Cairo. From thence we decided to prosecute our journey on foot. As the vapour that hung over the river became dissipated by a brilliant sun rising over the Mokhattan hills, on one hand appeared the spires, mosques, and minarets of the City of Victory, whilst on the other its beams gilded that part of the seven wonders of the world, the gigantic relics of antiquity, the Pyramids. About an hour's pleasant walk, under the shade of a fine avenue of sycamore trees, brought us to the comfortable hotel of Mr. Wag-

horn, to whose perseverance and activity we owe the comparatively easy trajet across the isthmus to Suez. By the time we had dressed and breakfasted, our guide returned from the Citadel, where I had sent him to announce our arrival to Abbas Pacha, the grandson of Mehemet Ali, and the Governor of Cairo. Eleven was the hour appointed to wait upon his Excellency, who sent a brilliant cavalcade to conduct us to his palace, consisting of splendid Arab horses, proudly champing their golden bits, under a profusion of crimson velvet trappings, each led by a sais, or groom, and a tolerable coach dragged by four cream-coloured horses; the coach we consigned to the junior of the party, Captain Martin; Captain Williams and myself preferred the horses. In this manner we entered the Citadel, the scene of so many brilliant achievements, and of so many bloody deeds. Memory failed not to recall one of the most appalling of the latter that tyranny ever planned or perfidy carried into effect. The foul murder of the Mamelukes will for ever be a deep stain on the character of Mehemet Ali. It is true they were troublesome gentlemen, and had they lived would, in all probability, have destroyed the Pacha; but nothing can excuse the treacherous manner in which he accomplished his object.

Such were our feelings as we passed the gates so securely closed on that fearful occasion, and as we cast a glance on these, on the appalling height of these once blood-stained battlements, we could not help admiring the bold spirit which ventured on such a leap, and wondering how he survived to tell the tale. The place known as the Mameluke's Leap is near the gateway, the fall between thirty and forty feet. The horse was crushed on the spot, but, strange to say, the bold rider escaped unhurt, and lived for many years afterwards at Constantinople.

Abbas Pacha, the grandson of Mehemet Ali, has long been known for his hatred to anything having the resemblance of a Frank, and this is little to be wondered at, considering the education he has received. His character is none of the best; he is devoid of talent, and much more feared than either loved or respected. However, all things considered, he received us with tolerable politeness. Pipes and coffee were produced, and we were invited to take seats on the Divan. His appearance is not much in his favour, being a dull heavy man, much more resembling a butcher than a Pacha. After a short conversation on indifferent subjects we took our leave, and were conducted through the different apart-

ments of the Palace, which were both elegant and comfortable. From the Citadel we proceeded to the country palace and gardens of Schoubrah, which we approached under the shadow of a noble avenue of Egyptian sycamore, whose thick foliage rendered it quite impervious to the rays of the sun. The palace of Schoubrah, built a few years back by the Pacha, cost an immense sum of money, and as we strolled through the delightful gardens, and inspected the fountains and kiosks, constructed at immense expense, we could not repress a feeling of sorrow that the ruler who had raised such a structure for his own ease and convenience, had not turned more of his attention to the comforts of the poor Arabs, who are lodged in the most miserable mud huts at the very gates of the palace.

During the short period of our stay at Cairo, time did not hang heavily on our hands. The crowded and covered bazaars, the mosques, the tombs of the Caliphs and Mamelukes, together with the numerous manufactories and institutions established by the Pacha, successively occupied much of our time, and fully engaged our attention.

Had the Pacha shown a little more judgment and a little more nature in the establishment of

these institutions he would have deserved more credit, but he has a mania of going ahead, and thinks that Egypt should have manufactories of her own of all sorts, and be independent of other nations; and really when we look at his founderies for cannon, his manufactory for arms, and the industry with which the Arabs work, it is quite surprising. Most of his establishments are directed by English or French men; in the musket manufactory there is an Englishman, and he assured me that the industrious manner in which the Arabs were working on the day we inspected the establishment was their usual habit; if so, I certainly never saw so much activity in any manufactory in my life. The Pacha has begun to find out that the cotton and cloth manufactories, &c., are far from profitable, and many of these establishments were shut up, and the workmen discharged.

Amongst the scientific institutions, which are nearly all under the management of Frenchmen, may be reckoned the hospital, with the schools of surgery and medicine attached to them, under the superintendence of Clot Bey; the academy of drawing, and that of mathematics; the students being all taken from the class of common Fellahs, and, like

the rest of the Pacha's subjects, compelled to work at whatever he thought fit, and toil they do from morning to night, in hopes of being one day employed as civil engineers, or draughtsmen.

The second day following our arrival we devoted to a pilgrimage, which we could not but fulfil: a visit to the Pyramids.

After traversing the fine olive grounds and gardens planted by Ibrahim, on what were formerly unsightly and huge heaps of rubbish, we crossed the Nile at the Island of Rhoda, where he has likewise carried cultivation to great perfection, and landed on the western bank, at Gezeh, famed for the action that took place between the French and the Mamelukes; the conquerors thought perhaps it would be more grand if dignified as *La Bataille des Pyramids*, of which it is certainly in view. Each of our party being duly accommodated with that most useful of all animals in Egypt, a little jackass, after traversing fields waving with the richest luxuriance of cultivation, we in due time reached the foot of the first of those stupendous monuments the "Pyramids," that of Cheops; then, and not till then, were we aware of the huge mass at the foot of which we stood. But descriptions without end have been written of these



stupendous works, and they rise as a memento of the folly of those who consumed so much labour and time in raising such useless fabrics. As numberless conjectures as to their purposes have been ventured by various writers, I shall not increase the list, but refer the reader to Belzoni, Wilkinson, Vyse, or fifty others.

On my return to Cairo I learned by telegraph that intelligence of importance had arrived at Alexandria, which required my immediate presence; this put an end to all the projects we had formed of further exploring this interesting country, and next morning we bad adieu to Cairo and its wonders, and soon found ourselves steaming down the broad Nile, with the current in our favour, but a strong northerly wind right in our teeth.

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## CHAPTER VII.

Letter from Captain Stewart—Apprehended Treachery of the Turkish Authorities—Question of the Syrian Troops—Double dealing of Mehemet Ali—The Author's Letters to the chief British and Turkish Officers—Letter to the Admiral.

HALFWAY down the river I met Colonel Napier, with the following letter from Captain Stewart, who had come to Gaza to prevent, if possible, a collision between the Turks and the Egyptians.

“Gaza, January 25, 1841,  
Monday, 1½h., P.M.

“My dear Commodore,

“I arrived here with Colonel Rose and Rechid Pacha about an hour ago, in the *Hecate*.

“We have been induced to come, from the suspicions and jealousies entertained by the Turks,  
\* \* \* of the intentions of Ibrahim Pacha, in concentrating such a formidable force in this place.

“The Turks have advanced all their forces on Jerusalem, Hebron, and Medjdel, and we become somewhat anxious that \* \* \* would bring on a collision.

“They assure us here, that the retirement shall be commenced to-morrow morning, by two regi-

ments of cavalry and two more in the afternoon; and we send this news back to Jaffa, which will keep all right and safe.

“But the point of the Syrian conscripts being allowed to remain in their own country, is one of great difficulty and great importance, inasmuch as the Turks have received positive and late instructions to insist upon it. Achmet Pacha, (who commands here,) says, he will restore them the moment he receives the order. Meantime a list of those who may be in the first retiring regiments is to be given to me, and so soon as leave for the Syrians to remain arrives, every one of them shall be returned.

“Rechid Pacha assures us that Mehemet Ali gave his word of honour to the Turkish Commissioners at Alexandria, that they should all be permitted to leave the Egyptian ranks previous to passing the frontiers; and it is to obtain this order, without a moment’s loss of time, that I send off the steamers. I beg of you to return the authority by the quickest *possible conveyance*, be it Hecate or any other already coaled. The Turks attach great importance to this article. They are now in force as well of cavalry as of infantry, all the cavalry from the north having joined,

\* \* \*

“I have now no fears but all will go well. Ibrahim Pacha is expected here to-morrow, and I shall wait here to see him, and, indeed, until I hear from Alexandria.

“ Poor gallant, excellent, General Michell died at Jaffa yesterday of fever and ague, caught by exposure and fatigue. Colonel Bridgeman now commands, and will do everything well. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

“ In haste,

“ Yours very faithfully,

(Signed) “ HOUSTON STEWART.”

“ To Commodore  
Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.”

The Turks, not aware of the strength of the Egyptians, seemed to await a good excuse to attack them, and this I feared would be afforded them, by the fact that many of the Syrians had accompanied the Egyptian army; the Turks had orders to demand them, and it was stoutly refused by the Egyptians, who had no orders on the subject.

I had before spoken to Mehemet Ali about these people, and he objected, under the plea that it would disorganize Ibrahim's army even more than the retreat, and if they were allowed to join the Turks they might be turned against him. This was much more than probable, and I in consequence consented that they should be delivered up at Gaza. Mehemet Ali in this case did not keep his word.

Colonel Napier, accompanied by Capt. Ward, had seen Boghos Bey and also the Pacha, on the subject of these despatches. Mehemet Ali declared to them that he had settled with Masloun Bey that they were to come into Egypt, and be sent back from thence. This was not true. I do not believe any such arrangement was entered into with Masloun: on the contrary, he demanded them, and on the Pacha appealing to me I consented to their coming as far as Gaza. The Turks had shown so little good faith since the commencement of the retreat that I am not at all surprised that Ibrahim should put no confidence in them.

On my return to Alexandria I brought the subject of the Syrian troops before the Pacha, who expressed a great unwillingness to leave them behind; and as there was no way of obliging Ibrahim to do this but by violence, and as it is more than probable the Turks would have had the worst of it, I thought it much better, under all circumstances, not to proceed to this extremity, and I wrote as follows to Captain Stewart, and General Jochmus, inclosing a copy of the Convention, in order that the Turks might have no pretext whatever to use force; which I have

no doubt they would have done when Ibrahim's army was weakened by the detachments that were embarked, and sent across the Desert, had it not been for the presence of the British officers, who, however, though with difficulty enough, managed to keep them quiet till the evacuation was completed.

“ H.M.S. Carysfort, Alexandria,  
Feb. 2, 1841.

“ Sir,

“ I beg to inclose you the copy of a Convention entered into by myself and the Egyptian Government, which Convention has been approved of by the British Government and the Allies, and I have been sent by Sir Robert Stopford to carry it into execution.

“ I have authorized his Highness the Pacha to send frigates and transports to Gaza, to embark any part of the Egyptian army he thinks fit, and it is my direction that you afford them every facility in your power to accomplish this, as well as to facilitate their retreat by land.

“ You will call upon the Turkish authorities to support you in this, and should you find any impediment thrown in the way, you will, in the name of the Allied Powers, protest against it in the most solemn manner, as contrary to the existing treaties, as contrary to the custom of civilized nations, as

contrary to the laws of humanity, and contrary even to the interests of the Porte.

“ The Syrian troops are not to be embarked against their own free will, but if you have any suspicion that General Jochmus will use them against the Egyptians they had better be disarmed, or even be allowed to go into Egypt; in fact, do any thing to avoid a collision.

“ I have, &c.,

“ CHAS. NAPIER, *Commodore.*

“ P.S. I have written this to avoid any misunderstanding, though my letter of the 11th, delivered to you by Lieut. Loring, appears sufficiently explicit. The Stromboli is to be sent back immediately.”

“ Captain Houston Stewart, C.B.,  
H.M.S. Benbow,  
Or, the Senior Naval Officer, Gaza.”

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“ H.M.S. Carysfort, Alexandria,  
Feb. 2, 1841.

“ Sir,

“ I have the honour of inclosing you the copy of a Convention entered into by myself and the Egyptian Government, which has been approved of by the Allies, and I have been directed to see it carried into execution.

“ I send you this Convention, because I understand the Turkish authorities, (notwithstanding my letter to you on the 11th of January, sent by Lieut. Loring,) have put difficulties in the way of carrying

it into execution, and have even meditated an attack on the Egyptian army.

“I have authorized Mehemet Ali to send frigates or transports to Gaza to embark any portion of the Egyptian army he sees fit, and I have directed Captain Stewart to give them every facility; and I call upon your Excellency, in the name of the Allied Powers, to desist from any hostile measure.

“Relative to the question of the Syrians, I have directed Captain Stewart not to embark them against their will.

“Should the Turkish authorities, (at the head of which I believe you are,) impede in any way the retreat of the Egyptian army, I have directed Captain Stewart to protest against it in the most solemn manner, in the name of the Allies, as contrary to the existing treaties, as contrary to the custom of civilized nations, as contrary to the laws of humanity, and contrary even to the interests of the Porte.

“I have, &c.,

“CHARLES NAPIER, *Commodore.*”

“His Excellency Jochmus Pacha,  
Commander-in-Chief, Forces, Syria.”

I wrote a short letter to the same purport to Colonel Bridgeman, and also communicated the state of affairs to the Admiral, then at Malta:—



“ H.M.S. Carysfort, Alexandria,

Feb. 4, 1841.

Sir,

“ In my letter to you of the 23rd of January I informed you of the arrival of Ibrahim Pacha at Gaza, which I find was a mistake; he marched with the rear-guard, and arrived at Gaza on the 31st.

“ I received a private letter from Captain Stewart, dated the 23rd January, informing me he was very apprehensive that the Turkish authorities would seize any opportunity to bring on a collision between the Turks and Egyptians, and in fact the former had advanced, and skirmished with the outposts, and then made rather a precipitate retreat.

“ I inclose copies of letters I wrote to Captain Stewart, General Jochmus, and Colonel Bridgeman.

“ Yesterday I again heard from Captain Stewart, announcing the arrival of Ibrahim Pacha at Gaza, and his intention of immediately retiring again into Egypt; he had collected at Gaza 25,000 men, including about 6000 cavalry, in good order; this formidable force will, I have no doubt, keep the Turks quiet.

“ I have, &c.,

(Signed) “ CHAS. NAPIER, *Commodore.*”

“ The Hon. Sir Robert Stopford, &c.,  
Malta.”

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Ibrahim retired from Zachle and Malaka on the 21st of that month.

Without at all putting my experience in comparison with Sir Charles Smith's, I must differ in opinion from him about the propriety of attacking Ibrahim Pacha. When Sir Charles Smith took command of the troops, Ibrahim had lost Sidon, been beat on the heights of Ornagacuan and Boharsof, and been forced to evacuate Beyrout, Tripoli, and the passes of the Taurus, and retire on Zachle. My opinion at the time was for a

Wearied in waiting for an opportunity of practising his well-disciplined cavalry and artillery upon a detachment of Turkish infantry, Ibrahim, on the 21st instant, broke up from Zachle and Malaka in full retreat on Damascus, where he now is with 30,000 men, including 7000 cavalry and artillery. He has pushed a corps of 3000 irregular cavalry to El Mezereib, on the road towards Mecca,—the only route now open to him for a final retreat into Egypt,—whither I calculate on his going the moment he receives from Alexandria the political news brought by the Oriental.

In as far as regards the sway of Mehemet Ali in Syria, I look upon the military part of the question as determined.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) C. F. SMITH, *Major-Gen. Commanding.*

P.S. The Emir Effendi and other chiefs who left Ibrahim near Damascus, report his force to exceed 50,000, of whom 40,000 are said to be effective.

C. F. S.

forward movement. Ibrahim ought not to have been allowed to concentrate at Zachle and Malaka. He ought not to have been allowed breathing-time, and most probably the greater part of his army would have deserted or been captured. I cannot say the Turkish troops were well organized, but, nevertheless, they had done very well; their wants were few, and after getting possession of Beyrout, the means of transport was not wanting, and they were capital marchers. I do not say that we ought to have followed them across the plain of the Bekaa without cavalry, but we ought to have followed him up to Zachle and Malaka, and afterwards been guided by circumstances. It appears that he was enabled to collect 50,000 men at Damascus, of which 30,000 were effective. Such a force being collected, there was a very good reason for accepting a Convention, but a very bad one for rejecting it.

Sir Charles Smith further writes, under date of the 29th of November\*, that the troops from Aleppo had commenced their retreat from Damascus on El Mezereib on the 26th instant, and that Ibrahim Pacha had ordered his secretaries to be ready to

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 119.

depart with him by the same route, and the whole of the force under his command had moved, or was in order of march. On comparing dates, it is impossible that Ibrahim's army could have moved from Damascus on the 26th, as he only left Zachle on the 21st, the distance from thence to Damascus being three days' march, and it surely would have required more than two days to put in motion an army of 50,000. I am disposed to think the intelligence was incorrect. It is not impossible that a division might have gone to El Mezereib, but I do not believe that Ibrahim began his final retreat till the 29th of December.

Sir Charles further writes from Beyrout, under date of the 6th of December\*, that a courier from Alexandria had stopped the progress of the Egyptian army in retreat, and that Ibrahim Pacha, by intelligence of the 2nd from Damascus, "had returned to the city, with the intention of quartering his whole force within the walls, wisely preferring, to the hazard of a retreat through the Desert, the guarantee of the Convention for embarking all he possesses, (plunder as well as military stores,) at the points we hold on the coast; such stipulation having been

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 119.

made clear to his understanding, as being binding on the Allies. The contrary, however, being the fact, he will now find himself, (accidentally as it were,) master of a stronghold in the heart of Syria, of which he had been virtually, if not totally, bereaved."

How a courier could stop the progress of the Egyptian army I cannot comprehend. The Convention was signed on the 27th of November; on the 28th Mehemet Ali sent an officer to Beyrout by a British steamer, with orders to Ibrahim to commence his retreat; the Egyptian was to be accompanied by a British officer to see it carried into execution. What object, then, could Mehemet Ali have in sending a courier, even if it was possible, which he declared it was not, in consequence of the distracted state of the country, to order them to return? It will be seen, by my correspondence with Boghos Bey, that Mehemet Ali always objected to embarking his troops. I proposed that he should do so, thinking it much better for the peace and happiness of the country, that they should proceed by sea to Alexandria in preference to marching through a country where the inhabitants would be exposed to all the devastations of a retiring army. I never

contemplated that his army should be destroyed after signing a Convention; quite the contrary. The moment the Convention was signed, Mehemet Ali could only be considered the Sultan's servant, and the Egyptian troops the Sultan's army, and not a hair of their heads ought to have been touched; and as to embarking plunder, no part of the Convention sanctioned that, and if it had been permitted, the blame would have rested with our own officers.

I cannot either understand how Ibrahim Pacha could have known of the Convention which only left Alexandria on the 28th in the afternoon, so as to have allowed him time, had he quitted Damascus on the 27th, to return on the 2nd of December; nor can I understand how he could suppose the Convention should be binding on the Allies, when it was immediately rejected by the authorities in Syria, and his officer sent back without, I believe, landing at Beyrout; nor do I see how he had either been virtually or totally bereaved of his stronghold in Syria, seeing that if he had ever quitted Damascus and returned, it was his own act and deed.

Sir Robert Stopford received the intelligence of Ibrahim's retreat at Marmorice Bay on the 13th of January, which he communicated to the

Admiralty, adding, "my orders to Commodore Sir Charles Napier may by this time have been the means of facilitating his retreat\*."

Captain Stewart writes to the Admiral from Jaffa, January the 10th †: "General Jochmus reached this from Jerusalem yesterday morning early; and we find that he has given such orders as will complete a line of twenty-eight battalions betwixt this place and Jerusalem, and that all will be in position by sunset this evening. The chief object of this advance seems to be to induce Ibrahim Pacha to retire by the Desert, and not by the coast. We have been somewhat in doubt and suspense as to which road he would retire by; but news reached the Seraskier last night, which is believed to be authentic, stating, that Ibrahim's vanguard was already thirteen hours' march to the south-east of El-Mezereib, and that, consequently, there was no longer any doubt of his taking the Desert route. It is very difficult to get information, and still more so to know how much to believe; but my own opinion, and (what is of much more importance,) General Michell's opinion is, that Ibrahim is positively evacuating Syria. General Michell and I are both

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 163.

Ibid., p. 164.



determined to confine ourselves strictly to precautionary and defensive measures; and we shall use every endeavour to prevail on our allies to do the same, and not to obstruct, but rather to facilitate, Ibrahim's retreat." By this it appears that Captain Stewart and General Michell had also orders to facilitate Ibrahim's retreat; and with the exception of the irregulars and mountaineers harassing, and occasioning some losses, unavoidable in a retreating army, but very much exaggerated by the officers sent by General Jochmus, who reports them to have lost 10,000 or 15,000 men, on the 5th of January nothing had been done by the Turkish army who occupied Acre, Jerusalem, defiles of D'Jenin, Jaffa, and Ramla.

General Michell writes to Lord Palmerston, dated Acre, December 31, 1840\*:

"On the departure of Sir Charles Smith, the Sultan's commission was delivered to General Jochmus, and a few days afterwards he left Beyrout for Sidon, and proceeded thence with some light cavalry to Hasbeyah in the hill country on the Upper Jordan, for the purpose of giving encouragement and direction to the mountaineers, and of

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 202.

obtaining accurate intelligence concerning the Egyptian army.

“The most vague and conflicting accounts were arriving daily as to the intentions of Ibrahim Pacha. He had concentrated his forces about Damascus, and the general belief was that he would immediately commence his retreat to Egypt.

“General Jochmus, notwithstanding his nearer approach to Damascus, has been still kept in doubt as to what is going on there; but he seems to be fully of opinion that Ibrahim Pacha is about to move, and that he will, if possible, retreat on Gaza. His proposal, therefore, is to cause the Egyptian Army to be harassed on its flanks and rear by the mountain levies, and having assembled the regular Turkish troops at points along the coast, to operate with them as occasions may offer, in the defiles between the Jordan and the coast. In the mean time General Jochmus has been very desirous of attacking Gaza, and of capturing or destroying the provisions which are said to be in store there for the Egyptian army, and he has repeatedly urged my co-operation for this purpose with men-of-war or steamers on the coast. There have been, however, and are still, many difficulties opposed to such

an undertaking. The whole of the fleet had taken shelter at Marmorice, leaving only one steamer to watch the wreck of the Zebra in the Bay of Acre, besides the Hecate, which brought me to Beyrout; yet three French vessels, a corvette, and two brigs of war, remained upon the coast and were generally at anchor near Beyrout. I took the earliest opportunity of making this known to the Admiral, Sir Robert Stopford, and he most kindly and promptly sent Captain Houston Stewart with the Benbow, seventy-two, and the Hazard sloop. They arrived on the 24th of December, but the heavy surf prevented their communication with the shore, and it was not until the 27th that I could get the detachments of artillery and sappers, which came from England in the Hecate, disembarked at Acre. In the mean time, however, Lieutenant-Colonel Colquhoun of the Artillery, and Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson of the Engineers, had made a visit to that fortress, and likewise to Tyre and Sidon.

“The Admiral, while he sent me this naval aid, expressed a great unwillingness to have it employed against Gaza or in any offensive operations; first, on account of the storms prevailing at this season; secondly, because the negotiations opened by Cap-

tain Fanshawe were still pending, and he had consented to a request, made by the Pacha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, that Egyptian steamers might go off Gaza to embark the sick, the women, and the children, of Ibrahim Pacha's army, for Alexandria.

“ Captain Houston Stewart had instructions from the Admiral based upon these reasons; and they of course weighed also with me as to any operations against Gaza; besides I had received information of the Egyptian force there, and at El-Arish, having been largely reinforced.

“ Nothing has been seen of the Egyptian steamers from Alexandria, to receive the sick of Ibrahim Pacha's army. When that permission was given by Captain Fanshawe, it was supposed the army was already on its march to Gaza, and not likely to linger at Damascus. Probably Ibrahim Pacha delays his movement from that city, now, in consequence of the Convention commenced with his father by Captain Fanshawe. Our situation will be very embarrassing until the negotiations are terminated, since any act of hostility on our part may be construed into a breach of faith, and may disturb arrangements half concluded. I am, there-

fore, anxiously expecting orders from Lord Ponsonby upon the subject. In the meantime his Excellency's latest instructions to General Jochmus, and upon which he is prepared and resolved to act with energy, dictate a continuance of offensive operations."

As I have before stated, we now see the Commander-in-Chief of the allied force by sea and land giving directions to his officers to facilitate the retreat of Ibrahim Pacha, and the Austrian Ambassador declaring he would disavow any attack upon him, thereby maintaining good faith with Mehemet Ali; and the Ambassador at Constantinople giving orders to his general to continue offensive operations, thereby compromising not only the honour of England but of the Allied Powers.

M. Steindl, in a letter to Baron Stürmer, dated the 10th of January, writes from Jaffa\*,—

"General Jochmus, escorted by 100 Turkish cavalry, continued in the mean time to traverse the mountains of the Naplouse and the districts situated between the Jordan and the Haouran, in order to assemble as many mountaineers as possible. He formed several corps of them, the command of

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 204.

which he entrusted to M. Dumont and Count Szechenyi, his aides-de-camp, for the purpose of harassing Ibrahim Pacha during his retreat, whilst he ordered Omar Pacha, who was stationed at Ramla, with 2500 men, to form a junction with a portion of the garrisons of Jaffa and of Jerusalem, and to attempt a sudden attack upon Gaza, in order there to burn the considerable magazines of provisions which Mehemet Ali had caused to be transported thither to facilitate the retreat of his son's army by that road.

“ The English loudly disavowed this attack, less, as it appears, because they despaired of success, than because Admiral Stopford had indicated to Mehemet Ali that town as the place where the Egyptians should concentrate themselves to be embarked for Alexandria, in case an arrangement could be brought about between the Sultan and his vassal. For this purpose, Rechid Mehemed Pacha, appointed Chief of the Staff at head-quarters, was sent on the 5th instant from St. Jean d'Acre to Tiberias to General Jochmus, with orders to invite him to proceed to Jaffa to be present at a great council of war, whilst the same order was sent by Tatar to Omar Pacha, with a prohibition against attacking

Gaza. General Jochmus arrived here in the course of yesterday, still leaving his aides-de-camp at the head of the armed peasantry.”

On the 17th of January Captain Stewart again writes to the Commander-in-Chief from Jaffa\* :—

“ My letter of the 10th instant †, forwarded by Gorgon, would inform you of General Michell's and my own determination to confine ourselves strictly to precautionary and defensive measures. It will be therefore necessary to explain the circumstances attending a late advance of the Turkish troops upon Gaza, and for this purpose I transmit herewith copies of a letter I addressed to General Jochmus, immediately after our last conference on the 12th instant, also of a note which I received from General Michell, after he had reached Ramla, and my reply to that note, sent by a staff officer to General Michell, at Ashdod.

“ General Michell expressed, in the most decided and unequivocal terms, his disapprobation of the expedition. We both appealed to the Seraskier, who refused to put his written veto on the advance, without which General Jochmus declared he would persevere, and accordingly he left Jaffa for Ramla

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 265.

† See p. 103.

within an hour. General Michell then felt that he was in a peculiarly awkward position, but with the true spirit of an English soldier determined to accompany and render every assistance to the Turkish generals.

“ I also felt myself bound, notwithstanding my protest, to go down with the *Vesuvius* and *Hecate*, and make a demonstration on the coast, especially as I thought I might render material assistance, by either threatening a descent on the Egyptians' rear to the southward of Gaza, by which their retreat on El-Arish would be endangered, or in case of the Turks retreating, protecting with the great guns that hazardous operation.

“ At 4 A.M. of Friday the 15th, we weighed in the *Vesuvius* and *Hecate*, and proceeded as far as Ascalon, when the weather became so thick, and blew so hard, with a heavy increasing sea, that after showing ourselves again off Jaffa, I requested Captain Henderson to run out fifteen or twenty miles for an offing, bank up the fires, and put the vessels under canvass. At 2 A.M. on the 16th, it being then more moderate, we bore up, and at daylight we put the steam on and steered towards Ascalon, but on getting sight of the beach, the surf was so exces-



sive as to preclude all hope of being able to communicate with the shore for many hours to come. We therefore unwillingly returned off Jaffa, where we were not able to effect a landing until sunset, when I found General Michell just returned, having preceded the returning Turkish troops. The Seraskier had reached Jaffa about two hours previous to General Michell.

“I ought to have stated, that by General Michell’s desire, twenty-five marines were embarked on board the *Vesuvius* under command of Lieutenant Anderson, and a like number on board the *Hecate*; these have all since been disembarked here.”

General Michell writes to Capt. Stewart\*, “Mr. Wood is prepared to give us in writing very powerful arguments in favour of a continuation of active offensive operations; his letter from Lord Ponsonby, after Captain Fanshawe’s arrival at Constantinople, is strong upon the subject.” To which Stewart replies †, “We know Lord Palmerston’s and the British Government’s wishes and orders. Lord Ponsonby’s orders must with us be subordinate to

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 268.

† *Ibid.*, p. 268.

Lord Palmerston's; we have promised the Admiral that we will act strictly on precautionary and defensive principles."

Captain Stewart's letter to General Jochmus, above referred to, and the reply, were as follow :

" British Head-quarters, Jaffa,  
January 12, 1841, 3 P.M.

" Sir,

" In order that there may be no misapprehension on the subject of our conferences yesterday and to-day, I think it right to put the particulars into writing.

" When Rechid Pacha came to General Michell and myself yesterday morning, he stated that Ibrahim Pacha's army being now fairly entered on the Desert, there could be no reason for the 3000 Egyptian men quartered at Gaza being permitted to remain there, and asked us if we would concur in an advance which should have the effect of ridding the Syrian country of the plunderers. General Michell and I both said that our instructions being to facilitate the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians, there could be no political reason to prevent our co-operation, and that, provided the forces advanced were so great as to make resistance hopeless, and certain information received of Ibrahim Pacha having advanced south of any road by which he could march upon Gaza, there appeared to be none of a military nature.

" Very shortly after this, Rechid Pacha returned

with your Excellency, when the same points were distinctly stated, and you expressed your conviction of the impossibility of Ibrahim's coming upon Gaza; that we should advance close to it, and you would send notice to the Egyptian troops, that they might have twenty-four hours to retreat, after which you would attack and occupy Gaza. Rechid Pacha said he would go immediately to Jerusalem, from whence he would write positive information, upon which we might safely rely; that we should not move from this place until we received his communications. After his departure, General Michell and I paid your Excellency two visits, in which we found out, on examination of maps and Egyptian officers who had deserted from Gaza, that it was not only possible but very probable that Ibrahim might come on Gaza by the end of the Dead Sea, and that he might reach it within two days of the time in which your troops could. You then avowed that your aim was not to facilitate his retreat, but to annihilate his army, and prevent a single Egyptian getting back to his own country.

“The Seraskier Zacharias Pacha, your Excellency, General Michell, and myself had a meeting this forenoon, at which you stated it to be your determination to advance; that you had ordered the troops at Jerusalem to make a combined movement on Gaza with those from Ramla; and that 6000 men and 1400 cavalry (900 of them being irregular), with twenty-four guns, would attack Gaza, destroy

the provisions, and immediately retire, leaving two battalions in the place; that if Ibrahim Pacha appeared you would retire, and that, if he pressed you, you could retreat on the mountains near Jerusalem. There appeared to General Michell and to me such an evident and imminent hazard in this operation, and so inadequate an object to be gained, so much evil would result from a retrograde movement, such disaster from defeat, that I declared I could be no party to it, and that so long as it was not ascertained beyond doubt that Ibrahim Pacha was not coming on Gaza, I could not afford any naval co-operation.

“It is with sincere pain that I have come to this resolution; your Excellency has had no reason to doubt the hearty co-operation hitherto of Her Britannic Majesty’s naval forces in promoting the Sultan’s cause; but I should be betraying my trust, and acting in direct opposition to my orders, if I concurred in any operations which had for their object the prevention or suspension of Ibrahim Pacha’s evacuation of Syria.

“I have, &c.,

(Signed) “HOUSTON STEWART,

“*Captain and Senior Officer commanding  
H.B.M. ships and vessels on the Coast of Syria.*”

“Head-quarters, Jerusalem,

January 25, 1841.

“Sir,

“I had the honour to receive your letter of the 12th of January only on the 17th, and ac-

tive operations have prevented my answering this before.

“It would be superfluous to enter now into any details on its varied contents, since fortune and victory have declared on all sides for me by the total rout of the Egyptians, thus consoling me, in a certain degree, for that want of confidence in my judgment which it is evident you entertain, with respect to my operations in the field. Unskilful as I may be deemed as a military commander, it must at least be confessed, from the recent march of events, that I am certainly a very fortunate one. I must, however, most distinctly advert to, and refute two points upon which a great part of the critical acumen, contained in the letter in question, appears to be erroneously based; stating first, that I am not aware of any person in Syria being in the secret of my operations, and cognizant of all my plans, until after their execution, since I consider secrecy the mainspring of success; and secondly, that I do not admit the right of any naval officer, on a special station, to attempt to control those operations, in the way you have thought proper to assume, upon the same principle, as I suppose would guide you, were I to presume to give you a lesson on the best mode of managing your ship. At the same time I am, and have always been, most happy to receive any opinion or explanation, provided they be given with the courtesy and respect due to the General intrusted with the operations of the army.

“It is to me a matter of regret, that after the transcendant services rendered by the British fleet in the very last operation, you should have thought proper to decline any naval co-operation in the projected movements on Gaza, but it certainly is to me much more a cause of surprise, that you should have thought proper to write an official letter, on an occasion where naval co-operation could not even make any serious impression on the inland position of the enemy, and where the sole column of Ramleh was more than doubly sufficient to attain my object. It is well known, that after the defeat of part of the Egyptian cavalry at El-Maishdell on the 15th instant, the enemy never ventured again to meet our troops beyond the river Ascalon, although I advanced our cavalry, which was not half his in number, on the following day, and left it encamped within an hour and a half’s march of Gaza, whilst, at the same time, I sent the infantry and artillery into Jaffa, on account of the inclement weather and impracticable state of the roads. Under these circumstances, it would, in my opinion, have been perfectly consistent with your responsibility, not to have given any naval assistance in this operation, but without officially declining it after my return to Jaffa, the more so, as I fully agreed with you on the impossibility of the steamers being of any immediate use; but it seems to have been your particular desire to have made the whole transaction a matter of official correspondence, which, although

118      GEN. JOCHMUS TO CAPT. STEWART.

I do not decline, I would fain hope is now brought  
to a close.

“I have, &c.,  
(Signed)      “A. JOCHMUS, *Lieut.-General,*  
                  “*Commanding the Army of Operation.*”

“To Capt. Houston Stewart, R.N.,  
Commanding the Naval Forces off Jaffa.”

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## CHAPTER IX.

Examination of the Conduct of General Jochmus regarding Ibrahim Pacha's Retreat—Sir Robert Stopford styled by him Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces—The General's Reports to Sir Robert Stopford—Unwillingness of the Admiral to prolong the War—Reported Destruction of the Egyptian Army—Advance upon Gaza—Colonel Alderson's Narrative of the Skirmish of Medjdel.

WHETHER Sir Robert Stopford, as commanding the allies by sea and land, wrote also to General Jochmus, as well as to General Michell and Captain Stewart, I am not aware. In the official correspondence laid before Parliament Sir Robert Stopford's orders to these officers do not appear, and we only learn the fact from General Michell and Captain Stewart's letters, but it is evident though General Jochmus commanded the army of operation he still considered himself under Sir Robert Stopford's orders, for he writes to him officially from Jaffa, on the 13th of January, 1841\*, sending him the details of his operations, in which he styles him Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces. It appears by his letter that he took charge of the army of operation

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 288.



on the 16th of December, 1840; at that period he could not have known of the submission of Mehemet Ali, and therefore he was quite right to make his arrangements for driving Ibrahim from Damascus, particularly after the rejection of the Convention, but he must have been quite aware of his submission by the 22nd, the day he shifted his head-quarters to Hasbeya. In one paragraph of the General's letter he says Ibrahim had resolved to maintain himself as long as he could in Damascus; in another he states, that should circumstances force him to retire he had determined to march by El Mezereib, the bridge of Moïadjumah on the Jordan, D'Jenin, Ramla, and Gaza, to El-Arish, and this was corroborated by the Admiral having authorized the embarkation of the sick, wounded, and women at Gaza, and the Carysfort frigate being then in the harbour of Alexandria. What does this prove? Why that General Jochmus must have known of the Pacha's submission, and of the unwillingness of the Admiral to prolong the war.

In the next paragraph he writes (remember this is to his Commander-in-Chief, who disapproved of carrying on hostilities), "Under such circumstances I considered it a most positive duty on my

part to defeat the intention of the Egyptian commander, and oblige him to quit Damascus, and follow the route of the Desert; for if a Convention had actually been signed while Ibrahim Pacha remained at Damascus, the military question remained undecided, and the complete conquest of Syria by the allied arms could be denied on the ground of our inability of driving a much superior force from its capital; while, if the Egyptian army made forcibly its way through Palestine to El Arish, its losses and sufferings would be small, the country being rich in every resource, and large government stores existing still at Safed, Tiberias, Ramla, and Gaza." Now what does this mean? that neither General Jochmus nor Lord Ponsonby, under whose orders it appears, by General Michell's letter, he was acting\*, cared one straw about conventions or submission, but were

\* *General Michell to Viscount Palmerston.*

December 31, 1840.

Our situation will be very embarrassing until the negotiations are terminated, since any act of hostility on our part may be construed into a breach of faith, and may disturb arrangements half concluded. I am, therefore, anxiously expecting orders from Lord Ponsonby upon the subject. In the meantime his Excellency's latest instructions to General Jochmus, and upon which he is prepared and resolved to act with energy, dictate a continuance of offensive operations.

determined, if they could, to destroy as many human beings as possible to give *éclat* to themselves, and please the Sultan or his ministers. After describing what his plans were, the General writes, "It was at this time, and it remains still, my firm conviction\*, that victory would have crowned the Sultan's arms in a few hours, and that the whole of Ibrahim's army would have been annihilated, or obliged to surrender; the only force of his still in some state of organization being his cavalry, and they would have been of no use in the rocky grounds of D'Jenin."

Here the General reckoned without his host, for there was no necessity for Ibrahim passing by D'Jenin at all. He might have kept through the extensive plains of Esdraelon, until he arrived at the defiles of Kakoun between Mount Carmel and the Naplouse range, which he must have traversed to gain the sea shore; at this point he might have been attacked advantageously. But it appears that Ibrahim had no intention of taking that route; his apparent hesitation at El Mezereib for three days was probably, as General Jochmus says, to reconnoitre the Jordan, but he had another object in view, and

\* Alluding to the probability of his retiring by D'Jenin.

which it will be seen he executed with great skill. By General Jochmus's account he appears to have arrived at Remtha on the 7th or 8th of January, 1841; and on the 9th a foraging party was repulsed near Es-Salt.

“The Egyptian army,” says the General, “fairly launched into the Desert\*, has not since been authentically heard of. When last seen, between El Mezereib and Kalat Mefrek, its infantry was reduced to 15,000 disorderly men; its artillery, though still numerous, was utterly disorganized, principally by desertion.” . . . We shall shortly see where this wandering, disorganized army next makes its appearance.

Ibrahim, the reader already knows, quitted Damascus on the 29th of December, 1840; General Jochmus says he left in consequence of his military dispositions, and being blocked up within the walls of Damascus; but surely irregular troops only, without either pay or commissariat, were not capable of blocking up an army of upwards of 50,000 men, including about 8000 cavalry, known to be in splendid order, 150 pieces of artillery, together with 4000 or 5000 irregulars, for he does

\* He does not give the date.

not acquaint the Commander-in-Chief that there were any regular Turkish troops near Damascus. The fact is, Ibrahim had received orders from Mehemet Ali to return to Egypt, he knew of the enemy's army advancing by land, and it would have been imprudent, even if he had not received orders, any longer to have delayed his retreat. Captain De l'Or reports that in three days he lost 10,000 men and 20 guns. "The hail and intense cold," writes the General, "caused numerous deaths amongst the nearly naked soldiery, in summer clothing, and the sword of the fierce and revengeful Haouranees, the victims of Ibrahim's abominable oppression, was unmerciful to small detachments of straggling deserters." All this reputed loss of life took place after Mehemet Ali's submission, and after that submission was known, and the unfortunate wretches destroyed, *if they were destroyed*, were the Sultan's own subjects.

General Jochmus also tells the Commander-in-Chief the valour of the Imperial and Allied troops had done much in the conquest of a vast country like Syria, in a short period of glory and success. How he makes this out I am at a loss to know, for up to this time the Allied and Imperial troops had

not fired a shot since the capture of Acre, so if the reports sent to General Jochmus were correct the whole mischief was done by the mountaineers and irregular cavalry.

“The God of battle,” says the General, “may lead Ibrahim and his shattered forces through the desert, and bring some troops back to the banks of the Nile.” (We shall shortly see how many he brought to the banks of the Nile.) “I have taken, as in duty bound, such means as may as much as possible delay his march or diminish his chance of escape.” And again, “It is to me an agreeable duty to state to your Excellency the perfect unanimity which has actuated all the men of the Turkish and allied forces during these late and extensive operations\*, which by mere strategic combinations and movements, and with very little loss of life, have produced great and important results; the clear proof of Ibrahim’s having lost Syria by force of arms, and without negotiations, the salvation of Palestine from pillage and destruction, and finally, the enormous loss of the Egyptian General, only as far as El-Meze-

\* Captain Stewart and General Michell do not confirm this.

reib, since he left Damascus, without calculating those reserved for him by the sufferings of the Desert.”

By this dispatch one would suppose that the gallant General had been destroying the Russians, the natural foes of the Porte, and not the Egyptians, who had submitted to Turkish sway, and who ought to have been preserved instead of destroyed. What could have been the use of all this boasted destruction of human life? Syria would have been evacuated, the country would have suffered less, and humanity would not have been outraged, had not a single Turkish soldier quitted his cantonments, or at least, had they confined themselves to precautionary and defensive measures, so strongly recommended by General Michell and Captain Stewart.

We now come to General Jochmus' report of the affair of Gaza\*, against which it has already been

\* *General Jochmus to Admiral Stopford.*

Head-quarters, Jaffa,

Jan. 17, 1841.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that on the 14th instant I directed a division of ten battalions of infantry, 1800 irregular and Tatar horse, 150 regular cavalry, and 14 pieces of artillery, to march from Ramla towards Gaza.

This latter village is abandoned by the enemy, who has a flying camp of 1200 regular and 1800 irregular horse, with

shown that both General Michell and Captain Stewart protested so strongly. It appears the division intended for the attack arrived at El-Medjdel on the 15th of January, where it halted. Here the General changed his mind, and decided on returning to Jaffa, and against this movement General Michell protested as strongly as he had before done against the advance: the first he thought quite unnecessary, and the last he thought quite improper.

Before the General retired, a party of the enemy's irregular horse reconnoitred his position, and were fired upon by several field-pieces planted in an open

eight pieces of horse artillery, at three-quarters of an hour's march south of Gaza, whence he draws his forage and provisions: but ravages, at the same time, the country, carrying off cattle and mules to a great extent from most of the villages south of Ramla.

The object of my movement was the protection of these villages, but principally the destruction of the enemy's provisions at Gaza, in case Ibrahim Pacha, distressed in the Desert, should have struck off south of the Dead Sea towards Gaza.

On the 14th of January the division encamped at Ashdod; on the 15th it could only make a march of three hours to El-Meshdel on account of the incessant heavy rain, which poured down ever since it left Ramla.

Towards the afternoon, a reconnoitring party of the enemy of 500 horse approached the camp; but the commanding officer making a very silly manœuvre was taken in flank and rear by about 400 or 500 of our cavalry, who pursued him for two hours, taking between forty and fifty prisoners, and killing



grove, in advance of Medjdel. At this moment Colonel Rose, who had been in search of some stray baggage with a small party of irregular horse, accidentally coming up, charged them in the most gallant style, and beat them; this being observed by Captains Harvey and Wilbraham from the Turkish camp, they sallied out with a few horse, joined Rose, and pursued the enemy for a considerable time, until the Colonel was severely wounded, when the pursuit ended. Whether it is to this that the General alludes I do not know, but it

and wounding as many. Our loss was about four killed and twelve wounded.

Hearing nothing positive about Ibrahim's immediate approach, and the low country towards Gaza having become a complete marsh by the continued floods of rain up to the 16th in the evening, and the troops having been completely drenched day and night in the bivouacs, I suspended the movement, and sent the infantry and guns to Jaffa, advancing, at the same time, the cavalry detachments to the neighbourhood of Ascalon and some villages towards the river of that name, with their head-quarters at El-Mesde, intending to resume the operations the moment the ground had become practicable; but on my arrival here, informed officially of the complete submission of Mehemet Ali Pacha, and the consequent cessation of the state of rebellion of his army, our troops have been ordered to cease offensive hostilities. His Excellency the Seraskier Ahmed Zacharias Pacha commanded in person since we left Ramla.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) A. JOCHMUS, *Lieut.-Gen.*

appears strange that no mention is made of the British officers in the dispatch to Sir Robert Stopford.

The account of this affair, by Colonel Alderson, of the Royal Engineers, one of the British officers engaged, is so graphic that it cannot fail to be highly interesting to the reader. I give it at length :

“ We selected an encampment at the outskirts of the village of Medjdel, but whilst the tents were being pitched, the assembly sounded, and it was understood the enemy were advancing to attack our position.

“ It appeared that Colonel Rose, not being able to find his servant and baggage mule, had taken the Gaza road, to ascertain if they were in advance, and in doing this fell in with one of our picquets patrolling the outskirts of the village ; and, whilst in their company, perceived some cavalry advancing, the main body of which appeared to consist of several hundred men, with a picquet like our own in front. Having therefore sent to inform the Commander-in-Chief of the advance of the enemy, and finding that our troops were forming, he induced the Turkish picquet to charge that of the enemy. Whilst Colonel Rose, who was gallantly leading them on, was in the act of cutting down one of the enemy, he received two slight wounds,—one in the breast and the other in the back.

“ By this time the whole of the Turkish force

had got under arms, and the light artillery were placed in position, and opened fire on the main body of cavalry, now within cannon-shot. The fire of the artillery took effect, and, as we afterwards learned, killed their colonel. They retired immediately, and our irregular cavalry commenced the pursuit.

“ I had, with two other officers, gone to Ascalon to ascertain if it were possible to communicate with the steamers, and finding it not so, owing to the heavy sea and thick state of the weather, was returning with them, when we heard the report of the artillery, and putting spurs to our horses, and gaining the summit of the high sandy ridge separating the sea shore from the plain of Medjdel, (or possibly those of Ascalon, the scene of the encounter of Richard Cœur-de-Leon and Saladin, at the end of the twelfth century,) perceived our regular cavalry at the caravanserai forming, and several other horsemen, apparently flying or pursuing.

“ We were not long in coming up with them, and found Colonel Bridgeman and Major Wilbraham encouraging the irregular cavalry to pursue and attack the flying foe. We joined them, and for upwards of an hour continued the pursuit, the regular cavalry bringing up the rear, though at a slower pace.

“ As it may never be my lot to witness so extraordinary a sight again, as the one which now took place, I will endeavour in a few words to explain the affair of Medjdel. The irregular cavalry, on both

sides, appeared to consist of several tribes; each tribe had its standard bearer, and little drums or tom-toms\*. The standard-bearer is, I suppose, selected for his bravery; as he gallops in advance, shouting with all his might, when his followers rush up to defend the standard. If the enemy is too strong, and he has to retire, they cover his retreat; the object appearing, in each case, to out-manceuvre each other, principally by feats of horsemanship. If the retiring party are under-horsed, their pursuers seldom fail to do execution. If, on the other hand, they have a superiority, the retreat is a feint only to separate a portion from the main body, when they suddenly wheel round and become in turn the assailants, cutting down those in advance before they can rejoin their companions.

“There did not appear, as far as I could see, any desire to cross spears or weapons. Their dress was of the most picturesque description, from the embroidered mushalla to the simple sheepskin; nor were their arms less various,—the musket with the bayonet fixed, the lance, blunderbuss, pistol, sabre, dagger, and crease; and I confess the danger appeared to me greater from our own troops in our rear, who were firing over our heads, than from the

\* “Very small kettle-drums, or basins, about six inches in diameter, covered with a parchment, and fixed on each side of the pommel of the saddle as holster-pieces are, and beat with pieces of leather straps. They make a monotonous noise, and always accompany Arab cavalry.”

retiring foe, who had to turn half-round to discharge his piece, whilst his horse was at speed. Our pursuit lasted for upwards of an hour, during which time about twenty-five of the enemy were killed, and twenty-seven taken prisoners; when, finding General Jochmus did not advance from his position, and the regular cavalry had halted on a high sand-hill, some distance in the rear, we counselled our motley brothers in arms, with whom we were enabled to communicate through Major Wilbraham, to call together their separate tribes, and return to the camp, as the enemy had now joined their main body, and we were no match for them.

“We returned by the Gaza road, our pursuit having been on the sandy hills, partially covered with grass, between it and the sea.

“The rain fell in torrents, and we returned to as wretched an encampment as I ever remember to have witnessed. Late that night General Michell, having received no communication from General Jochmus, sent a staff officer to ask for the orders. They were, to march at daylight,—not, however, to our surprise, on the road to Gaza, but back to Jaffa, General Jochmus assigning as a reason, that the heavy rains had rendered the roads impassable for artillery.

“General Michell had not been consulted, nor had any questions been asked of Colonel Bridgeman, Majors Robe and Wilbraham, or myself, as to the state of the Gaza road, although we had been nearly

halfway to that place. I will merely add, (having, since that period, twice travelled the road by daylight,) that nearly the whole of it is a sandy soil, and I should say the rain which had fallen had rather been beneficial than otherwise.

“If we had disapproved of the expedition in the first instance, how much greater was our mortification at having to abandon it after having come in contact with the enemy.

“We learned afterwards that the Egyptian cavalry, with whom we had been engaged at Medjdel, was making its customary reconnoissance to ascertain if any movement had been made on the part of the Turks, as well as to forage: and that, in all probability, the action had been brought on by the dashing conduct of Colonel Rose in charging their advanced picquet.”

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## CHAPTER X.

General Jochmus's further Reports to Sir Robert Stopford—  
 Destruction of the Magazines at Maan—Ignorance as to  
 Ibrahim's movements—Ibrahim crosses the Jordan to  
 Jericho, and menaces Jerusalem, while supposed to be  
 wandering in the Desert—General Jochmus's Account of  
 the Movements of Ibrahim—Reported Destruction of his  
 Infantry—Ibrahim did not intend to enter Palestine—his  
 Statement to Colonel Napier.

To proceed with General Jochmus, I may remark that a letter of his to the Admiral, of the 20th of January\*, clearly shows what little reliance could be placed in the reports that were made to him, of the state of Ibrahim's army from all quarters. After giving an account of the destruction of 230 camel-loads of grain by the Baron Dumont, at Maan, after Souliman Pacha had provisioned himself, and marched on Suez, with the greatest part of the artillery, women, and children, he states, "The army itself, of which the second column was to sleep at Maan on the 11th, seeing its provisions burnt, had been obliged to countermarch, and is now wandering in the Desert harassed on all

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 294.

sides by Bedouin tribes. Its state seems to be dreadful, and all over the country through which the Baron Dumont came back to Kerek, he saw the bodies of small detachments which had been cut off by the Bedouins.”

We look in vain for a confirmation of this in Baron Dumont's report\*. The Baron talks of the quantity of grain he destroyed, of the forty-four camels he captured, and forty he found dead, which are included in the eighty-four taken in one night, but not one word of dead bodies destroyed by the Bedouins, or of Ibrahim's army wandering in the Desert; and so far were they from wandering in the Desert pursued by the Arabs, that on the very day that the magazines at Maan were said to be destroyed, Ibrahim, hearing of the movement on Gaza, crossed the Jordan at Jericho, menaced Jerusalem, and forced Hussein Pacha to return to Abugosh. Having succeeded in this point, he recrossed the Jordan, passed to the south of the Dead Sea, and arrived at Gaza without any person knowing what had in the meantime become of him, as will shortly be seen by Lieut. Loring's report.

In another report to the Admiral, dated from

\* See *Levant Papers.*, Part III., p. 295.



Jerusalem, January 28\*, the General, in giving an account of the passage of the Jordan by the Egyptians, says: "On the 14th a corps was reported to have crossed the Jordan, and bivouacked (near Jericho) at Reyha. Hassan Pacha, encamped at Abugosh, three hours south-west of Jerusalem, marched, towards the evening, on the 15th instant; but the Egyptian division, hearing of his approach, immediately recrossed the Jordan, with a heavy loss in drowned and killed, the waters of that river having risen more than a foot during the incessant rains of the 14th and 15th of January; and the Arabs falling upon the troops during the passage, and in the nearly impracticable passes of the Dead Sea.

"The enemy's column above-mentioned proved to be the shattered remains of the corps, called by Mehemet Ali 'The Guards,' amounting to from 4000 to 5000 men, and two cavalry regiments, with a battery of artillery, forming the rear-guard of the army, under the personal command of Ibrahim Pacha. The artillery, and one of the regiments, had remained at some distance on the left bank of the river, and the movement was evidently a

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 295.

desperate attempt to march by any way on Gaza or El Arish.

“The forlorn situation of this corps,” adds the General, “will be seen from the two inclosed reports of Mehemed Rechid Pacha, Chief of the Staff, and of Riza Pacha, commanding the cavalry\*. I do not estimate the loss of this army so great as the latter; but certainly, after comparing all the reports, it amounts to 1,000 or more men, and eight pieces of artillery, which latter, although with the column at Es-Salt, were unquestionably not at Kerek on the 19th instant, whither Ibrahim had retired after continual skirmishes with the Arabs. The Governor of Jerusalem had sent his son, Hadgi Hafiz, to ascertain whether the artillery had been buried in the desert mountain or not.

“Such was the isolated position of this last corps of the Egyptian army, that its Commander-in-Chief had lost all means of communication with his remaining forces, and that, although Hamid Bey and the Commissioners from Egypt were from the 19th to the 23rd at El-Chalil, trying by all means to

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 295. Tahir Bey reports that after Ibrahim re-crossed the Jordan, he lost all his infantry, and arrived at Kerek with his cavalry only.

establish a communication with Ibrahim either by the north or south of the Dead Sea, it proved a vain attempt, notwithstanding that, during the same days, the above column under the Pacha was at Kerek, surrounded by the Arabs of the country, who had been reinforced by the tribes of Beni Sackr and Beni Hennedy, arrived from the depths of the Desert in consequence of the orders sent them from Jerusalem on the 8th of January, through Baron Dumont.

“The distance from El-Mezereib to Kerek is, at the utmost, five days' march. Ibrahim Pasha left the former place on the 6th or 7th of January, and after fifteen days was still at Kerek, having continually marched and counter-marched in the desert mountains in search of food, or from having been stopped in the mountain defiles. According to the statement of the son of the Chieftain of Abugosh, a Captain in the Guards, who deserted on the 21st instant from Kerek, and had been with the column ever since it quitted Damascus and El-Mezerib, Ibrahim marched from the latter place to Bilka, thence back north to Es-Salt, again south to Kerek and back to Jericho; obliged to recross the Jordan, he for a second time returned to Kerek, having lost

his guns, ammunition, and stores, during the continued and very harassing attacks, day and night, of the Arab bands intent on plunder.

“ My last reports from El-Chalil of the 28th of January (twenty-two days after Ibrahim's leaving El-Mezereib, and thirty-one after his retreat from Damascus) state that Hamid Bey, despairing of communicating with Ibrahim Pacha, had resolved to return to Gaza, and thence to Egypt.”

Here it appears that General Jochmus himself began to doubt the reports that were made him. We have before seen\* that Captain De l'Or reported Ibrahim to have lost 10,000 men on his march to El-Mezereib, though he had 10,000 cavalry to cover his retreat, and was only followed by 3000 or 4000 irregulars, who must have been ill provisioned.

It never could have been Ibrahim's intention to have taken the Jaffa road to Gaza, unless he intended to fight a battle, which he hardly would have risked, with his rear guard only, and after having detached Souliman to Suez; moreover he must have known of the submission of Mehemet Ali, and would certainly not have provoked the hostility of the European Powers by a breach of faith, and it is

\* See page 124.

well for the Turks he did not, for by all accounts his army was not in the state they supposed it was, and his cavalry was in excellent order.

Colonel Napier was with the corps of Hassan Pacha, who, although he had an opportunity of attacking Ibrahim, was too wise to attempt it. The Colonel saw Ibrahim Pacha afterwards at Alexandria, and he declared to him that the passage of the Jordan was a mere feint, which completely succeeded; and, moreover, that had he been attacked by the Turkish army, they would have been cut to pieces by his cavalry.

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## CHAPTER XI.

Fruitless Journey of the Envoys sent in quest of Ibrahim Pacha—Arrival of part of the Egyptian Army at Gaza—Promised Neutrality of the Turks—The Egyptians informed of the Cessation of Hostilities by the English Officers—Terms recommended by Mr. Wood to be imposed upon Ibrahim Pacha—Colonel Napier's Narrative of the Retreat of Ibrahim Pacha.

ON the 30th January, General Jochmus writes from Jaffa to the Admiral: "Hamid Bey, Major Wilbraham, and Selim Bey (the Turkish Commissioner,) after fruitless attempts to communicate with the Pacha (Ibrahim), have returned to Gaza\*."

This is not to be wondered at: no assistance was given them, as will be seen hereafter by Lieutenant Loring's report, and they were reluctantly obliged to return to Gaza on the 22nd of January. Ahmed Menikli Pacha had arrived there the day before with the main body of the cavalry, and Ibrahim himself came in on the 31st, with the rest of the army, the greater part of whom must have been resurrection men, as we have seen they had been destroyed in the retreat.

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 298.

It has been seen that General Jochmus's report of the 17th of January, to the Admiral, of the affair of Gaza\*, affirms that he intended to resume his operations when the ground became practicable, but on his arrival at Jaffa he was officially informed of the complete submission of Mehemet Ali, and the consequent cessation of the state of rebellion of his army; "our troops," he adds, "have been ordered to cease offensive hostilities. His Excellency, the Seraskier Ahmed Zacharias Pacha, commanded in person since we left Ramla." I presume General Jochmus means that Lieutenant Loring arrived with my despatches to the authorities in Syria.

These despatches were certainly sufficient authority for the Allies to suspend all hostilities against Ibrahim Pacha, but we shall see that notwithstanding the opinion of the British officers, difficulties were endeavoured to be thrown in the way, both by General Jochmus and Mr. Wood. It has before been shown that both General Michell and Captain Stewart, in consequence of the submission of Mehemet Ali, and the instructions from Sir Robert Stopford, had decided on taking only precautionary measures, and the Turkish authorities,

\* See page 128.

acting under the Admiral's orders, were bound to follow the same course, notwithstanding any directions to the contrary they might have received from the Ambassador at Constantinople, whose orders, Captain Stewart justly remarks, must be subordinate to those of Lord Palmerston.

Two days after my despatches arrived at Jaffa the Seraskier received his instructions from Constantinople; the nature of them will appear in Mr. Wood's Protest, at which I shall presently arrive: nevertheless the Seraskier, after holding a council, gave General Michell and Captain Stewart a positive assurance that no further act of hostility should take place, and that he had no wish to deprive Ibrahim Pacha of either his arms, baggage, or guns\*. The Seraskier was a wise man, he knew very well he had not the power to deprive him of either the one or the other. Captain Stewart and General Michell most properly wrote to Ibrahim Pacha and the Egyptian officer in command at Gaza, to inform them of the cessation of hostilities†, and of their intention to give every possible facility for the evacuation of Syria, and the

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 270.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 271, 272.



embarkation of the women, children, and sick at Caiffa, or any other more convenient port; and Captain Arbuthnot and Colonel Colquhoun were despatched with the letters to Ibrahim Pacha and the Egyptian officer commanding at Gaza, and they were instructed to protest against any act of hostility the Turks might commit\*.

So ignorant were the Turkish authorities of the movements of Ibrahim, who they fancied was wandering in the Desert, without an army, that on the very day on which Captain Stewart signed the instructions to Captain Arbuthnot and Colonel Colquhoun, to insist on Ibrahim retiring by Gaza in successive columns of 3000 men each, Ahmed Menikli Pacha arrived at Gaza with the main body of Ibrahim's cavalry in excellent order, and the infantry in three columns. Ibrahim himself bringing up the rear was shortly expected: and on that day also General Jochmus and Mr. Wood, the emissary of Lord Ponsonby, wrote to the Seraskier† to inform him that the Baron Dumont having destroyed the magazine at Maan, Ibrahim's army being cut in two, and gone back in thorough disorder, and his 150

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 272.

† *Ibid.*, p. 276.

guns being already in their power, according to the official orders read at the council of the preceding day Ibrahim would only be allowed the choice of two conditions,—viz.

“1. To march upon El-Arish by the south of the Dead Sea, also upon Suez, with the men, arms, and conveyance which he now possesses.

“2. To come in detachments of 3000 men by Gaza upon El-Arish, leaving his cannon in our hands, in consideration of the power which is granted to him of being permitted to follow this road, provided that he leaves all the Syrians in their country.”

The march of Ibrahim on Gaza, by the south of the Dead Sea, shows very clearly that he never had the intention of entering Palestine, and that his crossing the Jordan was a manœuvre to mislead the Turks, in which he completely succeeded, and arrived safe at Gaza, without having encountered a single outpost of the Turkish army.

Colonel Napier was attached to the Turkish division that Ibrahim forced to return to Jerusalem: the following is the Colonel's account of their movements, as well as of what he knew of Ibrahim's retreat.

“Junior United Service Club,  
December, 1841.

“You wish me to give you some information as to the retreat of Ibrahim Pacha from Damascus. All the notes I took at the time being with my baggage at Gibraltar, I cannot be very accurate in dates; but will furnish whatever I remember on the subject from the time you left me at Beyrout in November 1840, until my embarkation at Gaza for Egypt, in January 1841.

“When the Powerful left St. George's Bay, I think the Princess Charlotte, the Benbow, and Bellerophon remained off Beyrout, with a steamer and a couple of Austrian vessels.

“From the time of your driving back Ibrahim,—in the action of the 10th of October,—from the heights of Boharsof, nothing certain had been known at Beyrout relative to his movements, and we,—to all *appearance*,—remained in a state of complete inactivity.

“We continued quietly in our quarters all November, which leisure I employed in learning Arabic, in visiting the neighbouring parts of Lebanon, and keeping up the acquaintance I had been enabled to form,—through your introductions,—with the principal Emirs and Sheikhs of the mountain, with several of whom I became very intimate.

“About the latter end of November, I was sent with Colonel Bridgeman to make a reconnoissance on the enemy, who was supposed to be still at Zachle.

On arriving there we found he had retired across the Boccah two days before. Next morning, Colonel Bridgeman and myself, each accompanied by some fifty or sixty irregular horse, pushed on in different directions towards them. The Colonel fell in with a body of 300 or 400 cavalry deserters from the Egyptian army, whom he brought back to Zachle;—whilst I traversed the range of the Anti-Lebanon, and descending into the plain of Damascus reached the village of Zebdeni,—a few hours' distant from that city,—on which the Egyptians had fallen back; the last of their rear-guard having left that place on the previous day.

“It was now certain that Ibrahim occupied Damascus, but whether or not he intended to make it his winter quarters was still unknown. However, the good people of Beyrout considered his presence even at the holy city of ‘El Sham,’ as much too near to be pleasant; and when the gale of wind of the 2nd of December drove all our vessels from the coast, serious apprehensions were entertained, that some fine morning he would walk quietly into the town;—which undertaking he might have accomplished with little or no opposition.

“Things continued in this state at Beyrout, till the beginning of December, at which period I received written instructions to the following effect from Sir Charles Smith: ‘That I was in the first instance to proceed to the head-quarters of the Emir Bechir with certain communications, and then to go, without loss

of time, to Naplouse; that Selim Pacha would have orders notifying my official employment within his pachalic, and requiring him to attend to any requisition I might make (with the exception of troops,) on the garrison of Acre.

““ Having arrived at Naplouse, I was to order Soulyman Abdul Hadi, the Governor of that place, to levy 1500 men within his district, and with these I was to do my best to guard the passes of Agiloun, Djebail Khalil (Hebron), or Khan Younus\*; directing my movements according to the intelligence I should receive of the enemy.

“I was further instructed to ‘investigate and inquire into the conduct of the said Governor of Naplouse;—he being suspected of adhering to the Egyptian interests,—and to ascertain whether there was any foundation for the numerous complaints preferred against him from different quarters.’

“In the execution of this ‘important trust†,’ I was left to the guidance of my own military judgment. In fact, I had a sort of independent roving commission, which pleased me much, and I lost no time in proceeding to take up my command.

\* “The latter,—by the bye,—being no pass at all, but an open place in the plains to the eastward of Gaza.”

† Although these instructions from Sir Charles Smith were so termed,—and Colonel Napier has documents from his successor, General Michell, to prove that they were satisfactorily executed,—it appears strange that this mission of the Colonel's should never have been publicly made known.

“It was evident, from the nature of these instructions, that we were still completely in the dark as to the line of retreat which Ibrahim Pacha might eventually fix on.

“I was surprised to find, on arriving at my destination, that,—contrary to the tenor of my instructions,—no notification had been received by the authorities, as to the nature of the mission on which I was about to be employed; and had it not been for the kindness of Selim Pacha, I should have found myself placed in an extremely awkward predicament.

“Not to lose time, whilst my ‘forces’ were being assembled, I went to Jerusalem, to ascertain the state of the Turkish garrison there,—and had an interview with Sheikh Abderrahman, the chief of the Bedouin tribes about Hebron, who was said to be able to bring into the field 10,000 men. After strongly urging on him the necessity of assembling his people to be ready to strike a blow,—as I had still some days to spare,—I determined, with 100 horsemen, to push across the river Jordan and the Agiloun hills, in order to gain some positive intelligence of the enemy, about whom the most contradictory reports were now afloat.

“Amongst other things, it was however positively said that he was making El Mezerib his headquarters, preparatory to passing the Jordan at the bridge of Moïadjumah\*, a few miles south of Lake

\* “Moïadjumah, literally meaning the ‘meeting of the waters.’”

Tiberias; for this point, I therefore, in the first instance proceeded, and having carefully reconnoitred the neighbouring ground, I sent from thence a report to General Michell\*, and also to Selim Pacha, requesting that some barrels of gunpowder might be immediately forwarded from Acre for the destruction of the old Roman arch, which here singly spanned the river.

“ Crossing the Jordan on the 31st December,—accompanied by Captain Laué, Count Tchezeni, and Mr. Hunter,—the following day we pushed on to Hareemi, a small village on the elevated plateau overlooking the fortress of El Mezerib. The greatest consternation prevailed here amongst the inhabitants, who were flying in every direction, as it was reported the Egyptian advanced guard was already at Mezerib, and would push on the next day to Hareemi, which was only a few miles distant.

“ Having come thus far, I was determined to obtain all the information in my power,—and accordingly, at daylight on the morning of the 2nd January 1841, I got my troop in their saddles, with the design of making a forward movement,—but, as soon as I had expressed my intention of proceeding direct to El Mezerib, the greater part positively refused to advance, and the remainder only followed with the utmost reluctance. After proceeding thus for two or three miles, we observed, on the opposite

\* “He had lately succeeded Sir Charles Smith.”

side of a ravine, a number of horsemen,—probably a vidette of the enemy, whom we could easily have driven in;—but this sight was quite enough for my brave troops; with the exception of the European party and my dragoman, one and all took to their heels; I returned alone to Naplouse; nor did I ever again behold my valiant cavalry\*!

“However, appearances strongly leading to the supposition that the Moïadjumah bridge was the point on which Ibrahim was directing his army, I lost no time in hurrying thither the mountaineers who had been already assembled at Naplouse; and, on the 5th of January, I marched off my first detachment of a few hundreds,—certainly not the most soldierlike-looking fellows in the world,—to Jennin, which I had fixed on as the point of assembly.

“After despatching as many of these ragamuffins as could be gathered together, I myself proceeded to Jennin, and arriving there late at night, found General Jochmus and his aide-de-camp, Captain De l’Or; the latter very much elated at the wonderful exploits he said he had recently been performing on the rear of the Egyptian army.

“To my surprise, however, I learnt that the General had given orders for my Naplousians to

\* “Mr. Wood, in one of his official reports, gives General Jochmus the credit of this reconnoissance, whereas I am not aware that the latter was, at this period, ever across the Jordan.”



return, in consequence, as he said, of the positive intelligence received, that Ibrahim no longer intended taking the route of Jennin. This was all very well; but having been placed in command by the British General, I did not at all consider myself under the orders of Jochmus Pasha; and accordingly told him, that since he had divested me of my command, he might do what he pleased with the mountaineers, of whom I washed my hands; and immediately mounting my horse, I made the best of my way to Jaffa, not sorry at having an opportunity of going to what was now likely to become the scene of active operations before Gaza.

“Shortly after reaching Jaffa, I was sent by General Michell, along with Reschid Pacha, to accompany and advise the movements of the left column of the Turkish army, consisting of twelve battalions, and a dozen field-pieces. This body was then concentrated at Jerusalem, and instructed to join the main force in a contemplated advance on Gaza. The whole Turkish army, including 3000 of the Emir Beschir's cavalry, might have amounted to between 22,000 and 25,000 men, distributed as follows:

“At Jerusalem, near Jaffa and Ramlah, 21 battalions of regular infantry,—each battalion consisting of about 500 men,—with 18 field pieces.—At Medjdel (to the south of Jaffa) 3500 regular cavalry.—At Hebron 3000 irregular cavalry, composed of the Desert tribes. These, together with

the Emir Beschir's people, were now to the number of 20,000 men concentrated on the southern frontier of Syria. The garrisons of Beyrout and Acre being added, will make up the Turkish force to the above amount.

“On the 13th of January, the column moved from Jerusalem, but had scarcely proceeded half a dozen miles when intelligence arrived that Ibrahim had crossed the Jordan at Jericho, and was advancing in our rear on Jerusalem.

“It was resolved to halt for the night at Abou Hosh, and should this intelligence be confirmed, to return at daybreak to Jerusalem. The news proved correct; and we accordingly fell back on the Holy City, which we re-occupied on the following day.

“Ibrahim Pacha had positively crossed the river; but from the incessant rain, which for the last three days had fallen,—as I concluded he could not possibly have got over a larger number than our own force,—as his men were, moreover, wearied and starved, whilst our's were fresh,—I proposed, that after giving our people a few hours' rest, we should immediately advance and strike a blow, whilst his army was yet separated by a deep and rapid torrent; and I wrote as follows to Reschid Pacha, who, from having been educated in France, spoke and wrote the French language with the greatest fluency:

" Jérusalem, ce 15 Janvier,  
à 7 heures du soir.

" Mon Général,

" Cette pluie continue aura tellement grossi le Jourdan, qu'il sera maintenant impossible d'y faire passer des troupes. Il n'est pas probable que le nombre de l'ennemi qui si trouve maintenant sur la rive droite, excède de beaucoup nos propres forces.

" Marchons demain matin une heure avant le jour, avec dix bataillons, et fions nous à la fortune de la guerre et de nos bonnes épées. Il me sera superflu d'observer que nous ne pouvons pas espérer que cette pluie dure beaucoup plus long temps.

" " Tout à vous.

" " E. E. NAPIER,

" " *Asst. Adjt.-Gén.*"

" " A Son Excellence Reschid Pasha,  
Chef de l'Etat-Major de l'Armée Ottomane, &c.'

" Reschid Pasha's reply was :

" " Mon cher Napier,

" " Après que vous m'avez quitté j'ai vu un Arabe qui a été à Reyha (Jericho) qui a causé avec Ibrahim, cet Arabe m'a dit qu'il pouvait avoir à peu près trois mille hommes d'infanterie ; et qu'il n'avoit point de canons ; cet homme pretend qu' Ibrahim est parti de Reyha ce matin de bonne heure en prenant le chemin de Chalil, ce qui indiquerait de la part de l'ennemi l'intention de se rendu à Gaza ; si cette

nouvelle est réelle, il ne faudrait pas hésiter un instant d'attaquer l'ennemi ; puisque nous avons plus d'infanterie que lui, nous avons des canons, et si cette coquette qu'on appelle la ' Fortune ' n'est pas avec nous : c'est le Diable.

“ ‘ Tout à vous,

“ ‘ MEHMED RESCHID PASHA. ”

“ ‘ Au Major-Général\* Napier,  
&c. &c. &c.’

“ Now, although the feasibility of an attack on the Egyptians was hereby fully allowed ;—although Reschid Pasha at the time imagined that Ibrahim was exposing his right flank in this rumoured advance on Hebron (Chalil) ;—and although I not only urged, but entreated them to make the attempt, the Turks were afraid to try the experiment ; and it was decided that the following day we should make a reconnoissance, which accordingly took place, when we found Jericho in flames, and that Ibrahim, after its destruction, had just recrossed the Jordan, and thus slipped through our fingers !

“ His object had evidently been to delay our junction with head-quarters, and having effected this purpose, he was at present retiring unmolested by the south of the Dead Sea.

\* This title was conferred in consequence of a promise made by the Sultan, through Lord Ponsonby, that Colonel Napier should receive the nishan or order of that rank—which promise has as yet been kept with true “ Turkish faith.”

“I now proposed to make a diagonal movement by Mount Hebron to try and cut him off in that direction, as we heard that General Jochmus had already advanced on Gaza, which, ere this, we concluded must have been captured.

“Notwithstanding my urgent entreaties for expedition, *two* days elapsed ere we reached Hebron, a distance of about twenty-two miles!

“The Osmanlis, I plainly saw, still feared their old conqueror; and, on our arrival at Hebron,—meeting there Major Wilbraham and Lieutenant Loring, R.N., the bearers of your Convention to Ibrahim Pacha,—the exuberant joy of the Turkish Chiefs, at the termination of hostilities, led them, in some slight degree, to infringe the injunction of the Prophet.

“E. NAPIER.”

“To Commodore Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.”

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## CHAPTER XII.

Conduct of Mr. Wood—His Letter to the Seraskier examined—His Advice disregarded by the British Officers—Mission of Colonel Alderson to Gaza—Colonel Rose's Account of the State of Ibrahim's Army—Colonel Alderson's Character of Ibrahim Pacha—Death of General Michell.

I DO not think blame can be attached to General Jochmus for having done all he could to cripple Ibrahim, if he was acting under proper authority; but whether his orders were from the English Ambassador or the Sultan is not clear: both General<sup>l</sup> Michell and Captain Stewart speak of the Ambassador's orders\*. If so, I do not think he was justified in obeying them; on the other hand, if his orders were from the Sultan's minister, or from the the Seraskier, he was quite right. I think, however, he put too much reliance in the reports that were made to him of numerous loss inflicted on the Egyptian army, which he speaks of with much complacency, and which I hope and believe was very much exaggerated.

As to Mr. Wood, he was quite in a different capacity, and what right he had, as a British sub-

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., pp. 203, 268.

ject, to put the interpretation he did on Sir Robert Stopford's orders, I do not know.

In the first paragraph of his letter\*, he says the women and sick were to be embarked, and that Ibrahim Pacha must provide other means of withdrawing his army; now the despatches say, women, sick, and others of the Egyptian army, which meant any portion that Ibrahim thought proper; but even if the term was not clear, as Syria was to be evacuated without delay, why was Mr. Wood to take upon himself to point out the way in which it ought to be done?

In the second paragraph he says that it is "understood that Ibrahim must re-enter Egypt by the Desert, or by El Arish, which is the direct road, and the easiest; and by leaving the road free, we act in conformity with the desire of Mazloun Bey and of the Commodore, to offer every facility for his retreat without compromising our military position."

Mazloun Bey, in his letter to the Seraskier, read before the council, according to Mr. Wood, says the impression at Constantinople was that the Egyptian army was disorganized; but that Com-

\* Letter to the Seraskier and Hussein Pacha, dated January 21, 1841. *Levant Papers*, Part III., pp. 275, 276.

modore Napier undeceived him, and pretended that it was in a situation to resist the Imperial army, and that he did not venture to insist on Mehemet Ali giving up the Syrian conscripts, and his arms, guns, and military stores, agreeably to the orders of the Porte; but as they were on the spot, they must be the best judges whether or no they ought to insist on these two conditions. I do Mazloun Bey the justice of saying that he was much wiser than the Divan, for had he proposed those terms, Mehemet Ali would not have given up one ship.

Mr. Wood then goes on to advise, that in consequence of the complete disorganization of the Egyptian army, the want of provisions, and the small number of men capable of resistance, the destruction of Maan, the passage over the Desert of Souliman, and the retrograde movement of Ibrahim Pacha with a handful of men without artillery, and as there was now nothing to fear from their antagonist, he should be obliged to ask permission to come to Gaza, which should only be granted on condition of giving up the Syrian troops, his guns, stores, and arms.

According to Mr. Wood's reasoning, this would be, affording him "the facilities required by Mazloun



Bey and Commodore Napier ;” and “if he persisted in coming to Gaza without those conditions, he would be the aggressor, and must trust to the consequences.”

He finishes by saying, this is his humble opinion, founded on mature reflection ; and he cannot conceal from himself the danger of Ibrahim coming to Gaza, where he might recruit his army, and allow his father to negotiate more advantageously. “Even now,” he adds, “his General at Gaza has instructions not to attack us, but to deliver up Gaza only with his life. From such facts, your Excellency may judge of the bad faith of the vassal who refuses to surrender his arms on the demand of his Sovereign, which renders his submission incomplete, and even doubtful.” Really, Mr. Wood is a true disciple of the Ambassador's school ; he does not perceive that not the Egyptians, but the Turks, were guilty of bad faith from beginning to end ; and that, if the officer at Gaza had delivered it up, Ibrahim's army would have been compromised.

Fortunately for the honour of the Porte there were wiser men on the spot who decided to follow neither the advice of the General nor that of the Diplomatist, and I should like to have seen the

faces of these latter when they heard of the arrival of Ibrahim's cavalry, and the near approach of the infantry.

Next day the accounts came in of the arrival of the Egyptians, and Captain Stewart most wisely sent Colonel Alderson, at the desire of General Michell, with instructions\*, very properly saying nothing

\* *Memorandum for Colonel Alderson's guidance.*

Jaffa, January 22, 1841.

Accounts having been received by the Seraskier that a considerable number of Egyptian troops have advanced towards Gaza, his Excellency has requested that an English officer of rank and discretion should proceed to the quarters of the Egyptian officer commanding the troops in that neighbourhood, to act as Conservator of the Peace. In all probability the Egyptian Commandant will not feel himself authorized to order any of these troops to retire until he shall receive directions from Ibrahim Pacha; but you will point out to him the evident necessity that exists for the avoidance of any the smallest act of hostility or plunder, if he would not break the Convention and renew the war. So long as you are satisfied that he is acting in good faith, and doing everything possible to maintain order and peace towards the Turkish troops and inhabitants of the neighbourhood, you will remain with him, taking occasion at all times to point out and to urge upon him the propriety of hastening, by any means in his power, the evacuation of Syria, in the terms of Mehemet Ali Pacha's order to his son Ibrahim Pacha. Should you have reason to object to any of his proceedings, you will at once remonstrate and protest: should he persist, you will formally take your leave, and immediately return to the British head-quarters,

about the advance by columns of 3000 men. The mode in which Colonel Alderson acquitted himself of his delicate mission may be best told in his own words\* :—

“ Being selected for this duty, I left Jaffa on the afternoon of the 22nd, with my instructions, and arrived the following day at Gaza. I immediately waited on the commanding officer, Achmet Menekli Pacha, the General of Cavalry, who had arrived two days previous, with eight regiments of

giving notice that you have done so to the officer commanding the nearest post of the Ottoman troops, and putting him on his guard. You will communicate with head-quarters as frequently as possible, and notify as exactly as you can the number and state of the Egyptian troops in that district.

You will have with you copies of the letters which have been forwarded to Ibrahim Pacha, and of Commodore Sir Charles Napier's letters from Alexandria to General Michell and to Captain Stewart. The Seraskier Pacha has declared that he has no design to deprive the Egyptians of their arms, baggage, or guns ; and that he wishes, by every fair and safe means, to facilitate the retirement from Syria of the Egyptian forces. Copies of the instructions given to the officers sent to Ibrahim Pacha, and to accompany General Jochmus, will also be furnished to you : and you will observe that the immediate evacuation of Syria is the principal object to which all others are to be considered as secondary.

By desire of GENERAL MICHELL,

(Signed) HOUSTON STEWART.

\* See *Lerant Papers*, Part III., p. 307.

cavalry, after much fatigue and suffering, and annoyance also from the attacks of the Arabs in the interest of the Turkish authorities.

“On my first interview with the Egyptian General, I urged the necessity of their immediately commencing their retreat, so as not to assemble a large force in Gaza. At first this was stated to be impossible till the arrival of Ibrahim, or orders from him to that effect, but the following morning, on going to see the General at the camp, he agreed to commence the retreat on the 26th, if Ibrahim did not in the mean time arrive, and that a brigade of cavalry, (two regiments) should march daily.

“On the 25th, five regiments of infantry arrived, and on the day following, five more, each consisting of four battalions; they were evidently much fatigued and reduced in numbers, and stated that they had not had rations for the last seven, nor water for the last three days.

“This day Captain Houston Stewart arrived in the *Hecate*, with Colonel Rose, who came to go in search of Ibrahim, Rechid Pacha, and Lieutenant-Colonel Napier. We all went to the General Achmet Menekli Pacha's quarters, to urge the propriety of not obliging the Syrians to return to Egypt, but, as he said he had no powers to interfere, it was determined on sending off a letter to Commodore Napier\*, for an order from Mehemet Ali to this effect, as well as to order Ibrahim to

\* See page 89.

retire in columns of 3000 men, and not assemble a large force at Gaza.

“ On the 28th a council was held, at which Captain Stewart and myself attended.

“ We requested that a pledge should be given that Ibrahim would, on his arrival, carry into execution the orders of his father, Mehemet Ali, for the evacuation of Syria. This was at once done without the slightest hesitation. Indeed Hourschid Pacha, a fine old man, with a magnificent white beard, who commanded the irregular force, stated he had been forty years in Mehemet Ali's service, and during the whole of that period had never once known Ibrahim to refuse to obey his father's orders.

“ On receiving this guarantee we, in the name of the united forces of Great Britain, pledged ourselves that no molestation or obstacle should be put in the way of such evacuation, nor any advance of the Turkish troops at Medjdel take place, until I had reported the evacuation complete.

“ This pledge was approved and confirmed by the Seraskier at Jaffa\*, and the evacuation went on afterwards with confidence.

“ This measure had become absolutely necessary from the Egyptians' evident want of confidence in the Turks; they feared that as soon as they had so far weakened their force at Gaza as to be incapable of resistance, the Turks might attack them.

“ Colonel Rose having been also sent in search

\* See these documents in pages 176—178.

of Ibrahim, with a copy of the Convention, and a letter from General Michell and Captain Stewart, after much disappointment, arising from the determination on the part of the Arabs not to conduct any one to Ibrahim, if indeed they knew where to find him, fell in with him on the 31st (January), in the Desert, about four hours from Gaza, which town he entered with him between 4 and 5 P.M. the same afternoon.

“The General-in-Chief appeared much fatigued, and very unwell, and had no doubt suffered much on the journey round the east and south sides of the Dead Sea. He brought with him about 5000 troops.”

Colonel Rose, soon after this, went to Constantinople, and upon his arrival at Therapia, made a report to Lord Ponsonby on the state of Ibrahim's army, which differs a good deal from that of the other officers. I give a short extract from the document\*.

“When I came up with Ibrahim Pacha's column, there were two lines of videttes flanking it towards the Syrian side,—mounted and dismounted cavalry—to prevent desertion. I rode for several miles along the column, which was in great disorder—in fact it was quite broken up; groups of men in twos and

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 329.

threes, some armed, some not, others hardly able to walk. I saw two standards, one without any escort, the other with a guard of two men: they must have belonged to battalions which had been broken up on account of their casualties. Ibrahim Pacha's own horses had had no barley that day; the troops had been three days without water, and had subsisted chiefly on mule and donkey flesh, which sold at a high price: 200 determined cavalry might have swept away all that part of the column which I saw (I entered it at about two-thirds of its length,) with great ease.

“Ibrahim Pacha did not appear pleased when I gave him Mehemet Ali's letter. He was agitated, and it took him five minutes to read it, although it only consisted of four lines. Whilst he was thus employed, his camel-rider and chief groom were also endeavouring to read it over his shoulder. I rode with him for about four hours, and accompanied him to Gaza; he spoke with considerable bitterness of the Turks. He said, ‘Why have you turned out the Seraskier\*?’ I said that the Turkish Government had, I believed, recalled him, because they were not satisfied with his conduct. He answered, ‘Oh! they are all alike; they smoke all day, and have people to wash their hands.’ I said, ‘The present Seraskier is a very good man and soldier.’ ‘Oh yes,’ he replied, ‘as long as he is in the saddle; as soon as he sits down he will rob like

\* “Izzet Pacha.”

the rest'—on which he laughed very much. 'I am the only man,' he said, 'to manage the Arabs and Bedouins, who never had any master before me. I could and did cut off their heads, which the Turks never will do. Lord Palmerston from London, and Lord Ponsonby from Constantinople, will have to come here to manage Syria.' I said, that certainly they had done so much without coming to the country, that there was no knowing what they might effect, were they actually to do so. He did not look pleased. It appeared to me that he was either affecting high spirits, or that he had been drinking too much. He drank frequently from a bottle which hung in front of his saddle, and I was informed by an Egyptian Colonel of Artillery that it was filled with claret. He talked and laughed constantly with his servants. He is now suffering under a very bad attack of the jaundice, his eyes and head being quite yellow.

“His reception at Gaza was remarkable: the people flocked from curiosity to see him, but his entry formed a singular contrast to that of the Turkish troops into the different towns and villages which they had occupied for the first time. In the latter case, the reception was enthusiastic, the men lining the roads and saluting us with all the varieties of an Eastern welcome, and the women crowding the house-tops and making with their tongues that extraordinary noise which is meant to denote extreme pleasure; but with Ibrahim Pacha there was



look of deep-rooted dislike on the faces of the people, which even their dread of him could not conceal. He, contrary to the Eastern fashion, saluted no one,—not one saluted him; certainly, as an inhabitant afterwards said to me, ‘Not a tongue nor a heart blessed him.’”

Colonel Alderson had necessarily some intercourse with Ibrahim Pacha, and his character of that renowned personage is well worth quoting.

“From the frequent opportunities I had of seeing and conversing with Ibrahim Pacha, (if asking questions through an interpreter deserve that name,) it may be expected of me to give some description of this extraordinary man. His appearance fully corresponds with his known character, a voluptuous despot; one who, to all the vices of the East, adds that of great indulgence in the table.

“He is considerably past his prime, being I believe fifty-six or fifty-seven years old, and very fat, with a large full projecting eye, a handsome nose, (like all natives of the East,) a broad forehead projecting over the eyes, then suddenly retiring very much, strongly-marked eyebrows, and a thin gray moustache.

“He is evidently a man of considerable talent, and when called for, of great energy, and appeared to have the most unbounded control over those by whom he was surrounded, partly from fear, partly

from the known energy and cruelty of his character, and the confidence they had in his succeeding in what he undertakes.

“His smile was anything but agreeable, and would, I think, have sat on his features, whether ordering an execution or welcoming a guest.

“When amongst his generals, if in a good humour, he showed it by practical jokes, pulling the beard of one, hitting another with his fist, or pushing them about; they seemed to bear it as you would the fondling of a tamed lion or tiger whelp which his master assured you was quite safe, but which you felt might end in something less agreeable if you resented any of his rough jokes.

“He has, however, the character of possessing considerable personal courage, and is counted a good soldier, though many think he owes much of his success to the talents of Souliman Pacha.

“I did not pay him many gossiping visits, because he was deficient in the usual forms of Eastern courtesy, seldom offering coffee, never pipes; besides, having been so lately in arms against him, I felt I had no right to intrude myself excepting when required to do so in the execution of my duty. This he remarked, and sent his German physician to me to complain of my avoiding him, with some flattering compliments about me as a soldier, and the regard he had for the profession.

“I consequently waited on him next day with Lieutenant Loring, R.N.; he received us with loud

expressions of joy, made us sit down, ordered coffee, and, asking if we liked music, sent for an Arab band, consisting of a violin, like a tenor, but with five strings, a dulcimer, and guitar, with two men who sang; the music itself was bearable, but when the men commenced singing at the top of their voices it was anything but harmonious. His Highness certainly has no very refined taste in music.

“He was, when we entered, surrounded by his generals playing *vingt-un* for handfuls of gazees (dollars); he showed his character here too, always ready to back his own play, and was loud in his expressions of delight when successful. He apologized for being found so employed, but said, they had nothing else to do there, but that when at Cairo they had their farms to attend to and plenty of business to occupy their time.”

The second day after the departure of Colonel Alderson, that good and gallant officer General Michell fell a sacrifice to the climate and the fatigue he suffered on the Gaza expedition, and Colonel Bridgeman succeeded to the command.

Colonel Alderson remarks, “The cold caught by General Michell, that wretched night of incessant rain, that followed the affair of Medjdel, under single canvass, acting on a delicate frame, arising from repeated wounds received in an hundred fights,

together with, I firmly believe, the mortification he felt at the result of the movement on Gaza, brought on a fever, under which poor Michell sank in a few days. He died at Jaffa on the 24th of January, at noon.

“It falls to the lot of few soldiers to earn so high a reputation in the profession as Brigadier-General Michell had done; fewer still, who to these high military acquirements have united a mind so highly cultivated. He was too well known in the military world to enable me to add anything to his well-earned reputation. I may, however, be permitted, as a friend, to say that, having been his constant companion since we left Spain together, I deeply felt and deplored his loss; and that a life so valuable to his country should have been *thus* so prematurely cut off.

“His remains were deposited in a vault hastily constructed by the British sappers, in what is called the English, or South-Eastern Bastion, at Jaffa, for which a marble slab is now preparing at Malta, as a slight memorial of the great respect and esteem in which he was held by his brother officers.”

## CHAPTER XIII.

Detail of the Retreat of the Egyptians—Treacherous Intentions of the Turkish Authorities—Decided Conduct of the British Officers—Guarantees exchanged—Fright of Rechid Pacha—Letter from Ibrahim to the Seraskier—The Author's Letters to Lords Minto and Palmerston.

ON the 22nd of January General Jochmus wrote to the Seraskier from Jerusalem\* that as Ibrahim had passed to the south of the Dead Sea, with his disorganized army, there was no necessity for nego-

\* *General Jochmus to the Seraskier.*

Head-quarters, Jerusalem,  
27 Zilkadé, 1257, (Jan. 22, 1841,) 11 A.M.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I arrived here yesterday evening. Lieutenant-General Hassan Pacha also returned here yesterday from Chalil-Rachman ; and Selim Pacha, with the brigade of Chalid Pacha, will be here to-day, so that this evening a force of twenty-one battalions, and eighteen guns will be assembled at Jerusalem. The cavalry of Riza Pacha will this evening or to-morrow morning join that of the Murchardsou, who must have arrived yesterday evening at El-Chalil. The forces, in the central positions in which they are, ought to be more than sufficient to support our negotiations with Ibrahim, if they should have taken place ; but as the latter must be, according to the statements of all the deserters, to the south of the Dead Sea, there is no longer any

ciation, and that Baron Dumont corroborated the complete defeat of the Egyptians. (I suppose he means the taking of Maan, defended by twenty men, for we have had no account of any action, therefore there could not be a defeat.) The Baron appears to have been within gun-shot of Ibrahim's columns and did not see the artillery; it was therefore concluded that the guns were buried in the Desert, but I believe it will be found that they all arrived safe at Cairo; at all events we have not heard of their having been dug up.

occasion for negotiation. His army is in complete disorder, for want of provisions, owing to the capture of Maan: and all the deserters state, that even before reaching the magazines (now burnt), the whole infantry subsisted for four or six days upon camel's flesh. I found Baron Dumont here, who corroborates the complete defeat of the Egyptians. As he saw the three first columns pass within gun-shot, and as in the second where, according to all accounts, the artillery ought to have been, he only saw a great number of camels and mules, it is generally believed here that Ibrahim has buried his cannons in the Desert.

The third column only of his infantry was seen, reduced to 5000 men; a separate body at Jufila of 2000 men, who were some days since with Ibrahim Pacha near to Kerek: all these people were half dead with hunger. The losses of Ibrahim in men, in horses, and in beasts of burden, in passing the Jordan, were very great. Finally, his Excellency Hassan Pacha upon the news of peace, sent a safe conduct to Ahmed Menikli Pacha, commander of the Egyptian cavalry, and gave him to under-

“The cavalry,” observes the General, “are reduced to 2500 horses and 700 dismounted horsemen, in a miserable condition, and if it had not been for the Convention”—(oh! that Convention!)—“two battalions, in the almost impracticable passes of Wadi-el-Ghor, would have been sufficient to stop the columns.” To catch a bird you must put salt on his tail,—to stop the columns they must have come *through* the Ghor, which, according to Col. Napier, they never did, having only *crossed* it to the south of the Dead Sea, on their way to Gaza.

stand that he would not attack him in his retreat, provided that he did not come to plunder the villages near to Chalil. Ahmed Menikli Pacha, conducted by an officer of Hassan Pacha, then chose the road towards Gaza in his retreat upon Egypt. The cavalry, reduced to 2500 horses and 700 dismounted horsemen, was in the most miserable condition: and had it not been for the Convention, two battalions in the almost impracticable passes of the Wadi-el-Ghor, one day south of Chalil, would have been sufficient to stop that column. It appears to be very necessary for the troops coming towards Gaza to withdraw, in order that there may never be more than 3000 men at a time in this place. I request your Excellency to communicate this letter to General Michell.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) A. JOCHMUS, *Lieut.-General.*

P.S. There is plenty of barley at El-Chalil, and there are other provisions there, but rice and butter must be sent there.

Hassan Pacha, who commanded the division to which Colonel Napier was attached, reported that he had sent a safe conduct to Achmet Menikli Pacha, commander of the Egyptian cavalry, and that his officer conducted him to Gaza. Colonel Napier knows nothing of this, nor does Lieutenant Loring, who, after communicating with this division, set out in search of Ibrahim, of whom he could get no tidings, and returned to Gaza; therefore the safe conduct must have existed only in Hassan Pacha's imagination, or if he did send it, it certainly never arrived; but if it was sent, more shame to the Turkish authorities, who not only meditated attacking Ibrahim, fancying his army was destroyed, but had actually given orders to that effect. This Captain Stewart ascertained from Rechid Pacha, who admitted that orders had been sent to General Jochmus to act upon Ibrahim's line of march, and impede it as much as possible, abstaining at the same time from any direct attack. But as Ibrahim's troops began to arrive in a very different state from that which this gentleman expected, he changed his mind and set out for Jaffa, post haste, overtook the courier with the letter, and put it into Colonel Bridgeman's hands, who immediately protested in the council



against such proceedings\*, which would compromise the honour both of Great Britain and Turkey, after the guarantees that had been exchanged between Captain Stewart, Colonels Rose and Alderson, and the Egyptian Generals†. This decided conduct of Colo-

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 315.

† *Guarantee by Menikli Pacha, and the other Chief Officers of the Egyptian Army, at present encamped near Gaza.*

Gaza, January 28, 1841.

We, the Undersigned, being assembled in council with Commodore Houston Stewart, Royal British Navy, and Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson, Royal Engineers, after the discussion which has taken place, have pledged ourselves, that his Highness Ibrahim Pacha will, on his arrival at Gaza, execute the orders of his Highness Mehemet Ali, the Viceroy of Egypt, for the evacuation of Syria, and that he will not make any movement whatever against those orders; for all of which we give our signatures and affix our seals.

(Signed) AHMED MENIKLI, *Gen. of Division*;  
KOURCHID, *Gen. of Division*; SELIM, *Gen. of Division*;  
AHMED DRAMALY, *Gen. of Division*; ISHMAEL,  
*Gen. of Brigade*; IBRAHIM, *Gen. of Brigade*; MAH-  
MOUD BEY, *Capt. Navy*.

*Captain Houston Stewart and Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson to Menikli Ahmed Pacha and the other Chief Officers of the Egyptian Army at present encamped near Gaza.*

Gaza, January 28, 1841.

In consequence of the written guarantee which you have now given us, making yourself responsible that his Excellency Ibrahim Pacha, as well as yourselves, will implicitly obey, and forthwith carry into effect with perfect good faith, the orders of his Excellency Mehemet Ali Pacha for the evacuation of

nel Bridgeman had the desired effect; promises were given that no hostile movement should be made, but every possible assistance should be afforded. These assurances were kept, but more owing to the strength of Ibrahim than to the good faith of the Turkish

Syria by the whole of the Egyptian army: We, Houston Stewart, Captain of Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Benbow*, and Senior Naval Officer on the coast of Syria, and Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Carr Alderson, Royal Engineers, representing here the united forces of Great Britain, do pledge ourselves that no molestation nor any obstacle be put in the way of such evacuation, and that you are perfectly safe in diminishing your forces here as fast as possible; and, further, that provided you continue to make that diminution to the satisfaction of the said Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson, we promise to insist with his Excellency the Seraskier, Zacharias Pacha, Commanding-in-Chief the Ottoman forces, that no advance shall be made by the Turkish troops now at Megdill, nor Governor be sent to Gaza, until Colonel Alderson shall have reported the evacuation complete; and we promise, that if the Turkish authorities refuse to ratify and accept any one of these conditions, we will immediately, and in perfect honourable faith, give you notice thereof.

(Signed)      HOUSTON STEWART.  
R. C. ALDERSON.

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*Guarantee by the Seraskier, the Moustechar Effendi, and  
Lieutenant-General Jochmus.*

We, the Undersigned, upon the received declaration of his Excellency Menikli Ahmed Pacha and the other Egyptian Generals and Officers, to carry forthwith into execution the entire evacuation of Syria and the Desert, consent and promise faithfully to abstain from any hostile movement, according to

authorities; and as for Rechid, the officer who recommended the movement against Ibrahim, I am informed by an eye-witness, that he went into Ibrahim's presence with fear and trembling, using the words, "*Il m'assassinera,*" and absolutely stooped down and kissed the hem of his garment.

On the arrival of Ibrahim Pacha he approved of the conduct of his Generals, and made the following reply to the Seraskier:—

"Your Highness,

"I am going from Syria for Egypt. Your letter has reached me; the Egyptian troops are concentrating in Gaza, and when they have their necessary supplies, they will go immediately according to your wishes.

"I have written this to you in a friendly manner and have sent it to your Highness.

(Signed) "IBRAHIM."

the promise given by Commodore Stewart and Colonel Alderson, with the proviso that the forces at present near and at Gaza, march on El-Arish within seven days from this, embarking such men in transports as are sick, unfit for campaign, and unable to march according to Colonel Alderson's judgment, and provided no movement is made by any Egyptian force at Gaza, east or northward.

Given under our hand and seal at the Imperial head-quarters of Jaffa, January 30, 1841.

(L.S.) MOUSTECHAR EFFENDI, *Seraskier,*  
JOCHMUS, *Lieutenant-General.*

Being duly informed of the arrival of Ibrahim, and how affairs were going on in Syria, I wrote as follows to Lord Minto and Viscount Palmerston :—

“ Carysfort, Alexandria,

February 5, 1841.

“ My Lord,

“ Ibrahim Pacha arrived at Gaza on the 31st, with the rear-guard of the Syrian army; he has brought from Syria between 20,000 and 30,000 men, including 6000 cavalry in good order.

“ The Turkish authorities at Jaffa were very much disposed to find a pretence to attack him, and I believe nothing but his strong force prevented it. He has already commenced his march across the Desert, and in a week hence there will not be an Egyptian soldier in Syria.

“ It was arranged that the Syrians, if any were with the army, were to return from Gaza, but I suspect Ibrahim was afraid to disorganize his army by letting them go. Captain Stewart was there, and I wrote to him to say they were not to be embarked, unless he had a suspicion that the Turks intended using them against Ibrahim; in that case, I recommended them to be disarmed, or even allowed to retire into Egypt; in fact, he was to do anything to avoid a collision, and as there are an abundance of Egyptians in Turkey, it will be an easy matter to exchange them.

“ I dined with the Pacha yesterday; he is quite satisfied now his army is safe, and I am sure if the

Porte will now let him alone he will improve this country much; but he is apprehensive they will demand some part of his fleet, and otherwise vex him. He looks to England to protect him, and if we do, he will become our vassal if we wish it; in fact, there is nothing we can ask in reason that he will not do. Next to Egypt being a colony of England, it is best that it should be an independent power, paying tribute to the Porte. Our commerce to India will become very extensive; and the facility of travelling become easier every day. He intends putting a lock from the canal into the Nile, to enable passengers to go from hence to Cairo without moving from the steam-boats that are to be established, and I have no doubt ere long a railroad will be made from Cairo to Suez; the distance is eighty-four miles. Four in hand may be driven across the desert at present.

“I shall remain here, (unless ordered to the contrary,) till I hear the last man is out of Syria. I think the sooner the Consuls return the better. I have not heard a word about them.

“I have, &c.,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

“To the Right Hon. Earl Minto.”

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“H.M. Steam-vessel Stromboli, Alexandria,

“My Lord,

February 6, 1841.

“In my last communication to your Lordship, I mentioned that Ibrahim Pacha had arrived at Gaza.

I was mistaken; he arrived on the 31st of January, with the rear-guard of his army, the whole consisting of between 30,000 and 40,000 men in good order. The Turkish authorities were very much disposed to interrupt them; and indeed, General Jochmus did advance on Gaza, (contrary to the opinion of General Michell,) with the intention of attacking him, but retreated rather precipitately. I have written in very strong terms to him, and have instructed Captain Stewart to protest against any attempt he may make; and by the last accounts I had from him, all is quiet. Ibrahim began to retire across the Desert on the 1st, and I apprehend by the 15th there will not be an Egyptian soldier in Syria. The Pacha has not yet received the hereditary title from the Porte, but I trust your Lordship will push the point; he has all the desire to throw himself into the arms of England.

“I dined with him a few days ago. I have had a good deal of conversation with him and Boghos Bey about abolishing the Slave Trade, and I have some hopes of carrying that point before I leave this, which will not be till after the arrival of the Liverpool on the 16th. I have made him quite understand that nothing will gain him so many friends as such a measure.

“I have, &c.,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

“To Lord Viscount Palmerston.”

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## CHAPTER XIV.

Contradictory Statements as to the Numbers of the Egyptian Army—Reason for abiding by the Reports of the British Officers—Colonel Alderson's Detail of the Retreat—General Jochmus's Statement—Lieutenant Loring's Mission.

It appears rather difficult to get at the exact amount of Ibrahim's army, either when it left Damascus, or when its two divisions arrived at Gaza and Akaba. In the *Levant Papers* are several statements upon the subject; but they are rather contradictory\*. This is not to be wondered at, as the framers of some of them must have been sorely puzzled to account for the numbers, who, in spite of famine, cold, and "the sword of the fierce and revengeful Haouranees †," unquestionably made their appearance ‡ at the places I have named. I shall, therefore, prefer to abide by the statements of the British officers at Gaza, who had no former

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., pp. 292, 301, 307, 366, 367.

† See page 124.

‡ See General Jochmus's letter and accompanying statement, in *Levant Papers*, Part III., pp. 305—307.

reports to bolster up, and who undoubtedly have described things precisely as they fell under their observation.

By Colonel Bridgeman's report\*, Ibrahim brought to Gaza 15,000 infantry and 6000 or 7000 cavalry. Lieutenant Loring, who was charged by me with superintending the evacuation, gave the infantry at 23,550 men, and the cavalry 6440, independent of Souliman's division of 5000 men, and 175 pieces of artillery†, who marched from El-Mezereib to Akaba and Suez, by the way of Maan, at which latter place he provisioned himself for his march, arrived safely at Cairo, and by all the information I received at Alexandria, and what Souliman Pacha communicated to Colonel Napier at the former place, he did not lose a gun, and the Colonel was himself an eye-witness to the excellent state of his cavalry. This enumeration of Lieutenant Loring's does not include the non-combatants.

Colonel Alderson, who was with the naval officer, carried up the amount of Ibrahim's army to 33,000 men‡, besides Souliman's force. He re-

\* See *Levant Papers.*, Part III., pp. 282, 332.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 309, 310.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 307.



marks, in a private document with which I have been favoured :

“ It appears Ibrahim commenced his retreat from Damascus on the 29th of December to El-Mezereib: at the latter place he divided his forces into five columns\*: 1st, the artillery and guns †, women, &c., *via* the Desert and Suez, under Souliman Pacha; 2nd, the cavalry, consisting of ten regiments, under Achmet Menekli Pacha; two of them (the cavalry of the Guards) were recalled to join Ibrahim, after he recrossed the Jordan, near Jericho; the 3rd and 4th, each consisting of five regiments of infantry;

\* “ Does not this division of Ibrahim's army at El-Mezereib at once convince any military man that he considered peace as concluded; and that a want of provisions was the only enemy he had to fear? he therefore divided his troops, so that one arm should not retard the other.

“ Cavalry, by forced marches, were enabled to get on faster than the infantry, encumbered as they were by women, &c., and barley was no doubt very scarce.

“ In a military point of view, either in advancing or retreating in an enemy's country, it would be considered very injudicious to have infantry without cavalry on the route; that Ibrahim knew this well, his sending for the two regiments of cavalry of the guard, on finding at Rieha (Jericho) that the Turkish troops were in position to resist his march *via* Hebron, fully shows.”

† “ The number of the guns has been variously stated, but I believe they were between 150 and 200.”

and lastly Ibrahim himself, with three regiments of foot guards, the two cavalry regiments of the guard as before stated, and from 300 to 400 Arnauts, Henadi, and 300 rifles. Each of these last four divisions had orders to make the best of their way to Gaza.

“When they left Damascus they had only sixteen days’ provisions, in addition to which they obtained a small supply of flour at El-Mezereib. The cavalry were sixteen days on the march, the infantry twenty-seven and twenty-eight, and Ibrahim’s corps thirty-four. Small supplies were occasionally received from the villages, but they avoided the great towns, and made for the Dead Sea, which they kept sight of, and approached as near as the nature of the country would allow.”

Colonel Alderson, who was an-eye witness of their arrival at Gaza, and collected all the information he could, states that Ibrahim left Damascus with 62,499 souls, including women and children; there arrived at Gaza, independent of women and children, 27,000 regular troops, of which 4250 were cavalry, and 3200 irregulars; the garrison of Gaza consisted of 2800 men. Thus, then, 33,000 men either embarked from Gaza or marched from thence

between the 23rd of January and the 19th of February, besides 9215 under Souliman Pacha, who marched to Suez.

Colonel Alderson's account stands thus :

Arrived at Gaza	-	-	-	-	30,200
Marched with Souliman	-	-	-	-	9,215
Regular troops missing	-	-	-	-	8,859
Irregular troops supposed to have gone to their homes	-	-	-	-	8,440
Women and children supposed to have arrived at Gaza	-	-	-	-	2,000
Perished	-	-	-	-	3,786
					<hr/>
					62,500

Be it remembered this loss of human life took place after the submission of Mehemet Ali on the 11th of December, and the greater part after his submission had been accepted by the Porte. The poor sufferers had taken no interest in the contest, but had been dragged from their homes to gratify the ambition of Mehemet Ali; why, then, after his submission were they not allowed to retire in safety? Where was the merit of forcing Ibrahim through the Desert, when he might have taken the shortest road to Gaza, where he had depôts of provisions? These men lost their lives, not in open war with the

Turkish army, which they never saw, but were plundered and butchered by the Arabs; therefore there was no great credit due to those who were the authors of such measures, barbarous in themselves, and, as I have already shown, contrary to the opinion of Austria, (who would most probably be supported by the Allied Powers,) who had declared they would disavow any attack on Ibrahim Pacha\*.

General Jochmus, in his letter to Sir Robert Stopford, dated the 15th of February†, states the remains of Ibrahim's army to be 19,000 men; and from the reports of the Turkish and European staff-officers sent to ascertain the numbers, the estimate, he says, is quite correct. General Jochmus makes his calculation from the reports of his officers, which must be received with caution. Captain de L'Or gave Ibrahim's losses in five days at 10,000 men; this was considered by the English officers very much exaggerated, nor do I see how Ibrahim and Souliman, who were both good generals, could have met with such a loss, unpursued as they were by a regular army, and having nearly 10,000 cavalry to

\* See pp. 46, 54.

† See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 305.

cover their retreat and protect them from the few irregulars that followed them, and who, if they did not behave better than those Colonel Napier had under his command\*, would never have come within sight of them, and it is more than probable, picked up the stragglers only.

Lieutenant Loring, in his report †, states that he did not reach Caiffa till the 15th of January; the weather had been very boisterous and the steamers were hardly seaworthy. Having procured horses at Acre, he proceeded along the coast, through Tortura and Cesarea, and arrived on the 17th at Jaffa, where were stationed the greater part of the Turkish forces, having returned from their demonstration on Gaza the day before.

On the same evening, by the advice of General Michell, he proceeded to Jerusalem in company with Major Wilbraham and Selim Bey, who was the bearer of a letter from the Seraskier to Ibrahim; he was also provided with a firman to the Governor and Scheiks to assist them on the road. On arriving at Jerusalem they found Hassan Pacha had marched

\* See page 151.

† A private document furnished by him to me. His public report appears in the *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 309.

on Halil (Hebron) with 8000 men and six pieces of artillery.

Thither they proceeded and arrived the same evening. On acquainting Hassan Pacha with their mission, he was easily persuaded to return to Jerusalem; they then pushed forward, but instead of getting information from the authorities, Abder Rahman, the scheik of the El-Halil district, plainly told them that he would neither give them information nor assistance, and there is no doubt whatever he was acting under orders from the Turkish authorities. Abder Rahman must have known where Ibrahim's army was, because he had just returned from Maan, to which place he had accompanied the Baron Dumont on his excursion to destroy the magazines; in which, however, the Baron failed, as Souliman's division had passed through the day before and pretty nearly cleared the stores. Finding it impossible to advance with any prospect of meeting Ibrahim, they returned to Gaza, where they found Achmet Menekli Pacha had arrived with the greater part of the cavalry. He made bitter complaints of the conduct of the Arabs, and Lieutenant Loring immediately proceeded to Jaffa to remonstrate with the Turkish authorities on the

conduct of their officers. From Jaffa he returned to Gaza with Captain Stewart and Colonel Rose, accompanied by Rechid Pacha, and everything appeared settled in an amicable manner with Achmet Pacha to facilitate as much as possible the evacuation of Syria.

Mr. Loring was present some hours after, when Rechid Pacha, to the utter astonishment of the British officers, declared his intention of immediately returning to Jaffa, confessing at the same time that he had sent orders for the advance of the Turkish troops to endeavour to cut off the communication between the division at Gaza and those hourly expected from the Desert. As has been already shown\*, the spirited remonstrance of Captain Stewart and Colonel Bridgeman put a stop to this infamous proceeding.

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\* See pages 175, 176.

## CHAPTER XV.

Embarkation of the Egyptians—Mode in which it was conducted—Departure of Ibrahim Pacha—Retreat of Souliman's Division—Complete Evacuation of Syria—Letter of Lord Ponsonby—Delivery of the Turkish Fleet—Anxiety of Mehemet Ali for the safety of his Army—Letter from Boghos Bey to the Author on the subject.

THE season of the year was very unpropitious for embarking troops on the coast of Syria, nevertheless Mehemet Ali, who had no idea of difficulties or the risk he ran of losing his ships at Gaza, which is at the very bottom of the Mediterranean, and from whence there is no escape should the wind blow on the land, sent three transports, two steamers, two corvettes, and a brig of war, from Alexandria, with directions to carry the troops to Damietta. The surf is generally so high on the coast that six days out of seven embarking troops is attended with great danger. The Egyptian admiral and generals were indefatigable in their exertions; they seldom left the beach night or day, and Ibrahim himself, when he recovered, was frequent in his attendance. The poor Arabs, whether sick or well, were obliged to strip, take their clothes on their heads, and wade up



to their armpits, and were then bundled into the boats like so much lumber; the women and children were treated in the same manner. Human life is little thought of amongst either Turks or Egyptians.

Ibrahim Pacha remained to the last, and embarked on the 18th of February on board the Hadji Baba, and landed at Damietta; the same day a regiment of cavalry or of cuirassiers, and two corps of irregular horse, marched for El-Arish, and the town was shortly after taken possession of by a Turkish regiment of cavalry.

As to the retreat of Souliman Pacha's column I am not able to speak very particularly. Some documents that would have given the whole detail, had they arrived, have not reached me. I believe, however, that after parting from the main body at El-Mezercib on the 4th of January, the column reached Maan on the 13th, supplied themselves with provisions, and then pursued their route to Akaba, where the guns and stores were embarked and carried to Suez, to which port the troops repaired overland, and arrived there in tolerable condition and with very little loss, reaching Cairo about the middle of February.

Thus terminated the evacuation of Syria, and after comparing the different reports, the loss of the Egyptians could not have been less than 10,000 men, (besides women and children,) the greater part of whom most probably deserted, and were destroyed by the Arabs. The Turkish army never came in contact with them, except in the affair at Medjdel; they were, however, followed and harassed by irregulars, and also suffered from want of provisions; but under all circumstances the retreat seems to have been well conducted. Ibrahim's crossing the Jordan was a masterly manœuvre; it alarmed the Turks, saved Gaza, and greatly facilitated his arrival there. The Turkish army appear to have followed a very prudent course by taking up a position to cover Jerusalem, Acre, and Jaffa, thereby securing those places against a breach of faith on the part of Ibrahim, had he entertained any notion of the sort; and it is just as well they never came in contact: Ibrahim was well provided with cavalry, and that is an arm of which the Turkish soldiers are very apprehensive, and I have no idea they could have maintained themselves steady enough in square to resist an attack of cavalry.

Had the Convention been adopted by Sir Robert

Stopford in the first instance the loss of life incurred in this retreat might have been saved, and the country would have suffered much less than it did. Nothing has been gained by its rejection; it stipulated for the delivery of the Turkish fleet, the evacuation of Syria, and the confirmation of Mehemet Ali in the hereditary government of Egypt, all of which have now been obtained, with the loss, it is true, of some thousands of human beings, who were not at all interested in the war. General Jochmus thinks that the military question has been decided, and that the Turks drove Ibrahim out of Syria; it is very certain that Ibrahim marched out of Syria, harassed by the different tribes, but the Turkish army might just as well have been at Constantinople; in fact, they were just where they ought to have been, and the only fault committed by the Turkish authorities was giving directions to the different tribes to harass Ibrahim's retreat, which was quite improper after the unconditional submission Mehemet Ali sent to the Porte by Captain Fanshawe. This submission, too, was well known in Syria at the time they were thus acting, for we learn from Captain Stewart that on the 9th of January the Gorgon arrived at Jaffa, bringing the



would have been easy to assert that victory might still have been on the side of the Pasha, had Mehemet Ali thought it politic to continue the war.

“If Ibrahim had taken back to Egypt his large army unharmed, Mehemet Ali would possess a force that might encourage him to resist, and might possibly make him stronger than ever. The energy of General Jochmus has rendered all doubt and delusion on the subject of the military question impossible, and has shown, that under able command the Turkish troops are more than a match for the Egyptian army and General; his energy has also taken from Mehemet Ali the best means he could have to support resistance, and therefore has afforded the best ground for hoping he will submit.

“All this good is due to the energy of General Jochmus. The praises General Jochmus gives to those who have done good service, are proofs of his honourable and just feelings.

“I have, &c.,

(Signed) “PONSONBY.”

“Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston.”

I have already mentioned the arrival of the Turkish Commissioners at Alexandria, and the formal delivery of the fleet\* on the 11th of January, which sailed on the 20th of that month from Alexandria; and the greatest credit is due to

\* See page 71.

Admiral Walker for his exertions in fitting out that fleet, many of which were obliged to be lightened even to their ballast, and take in their guns and stores outside; this they did without anchoring, and got clear of the land before sunset. Mehemet Ali having parted in good faith with this valuable deposit, became alarmed about the fate of his son and his army, and though he complained little to me in person, desired Boghos Bey to write to me on the subject.

“Commodore,

“Alexandria, Jan. 30, 1841.

“I have the honour of informing you that, according to the last despatches received from Gaza, almost all the Egyptian army is already assembled in that town; that it is believed there that Ibrahim Pacha will arrive to-day or to-morrow; that although the cavalry regiments are already on their way towards Egypt, the infantry being too much fatigued, it will be desirable on every account to transport it to Egypt by sea, and thus, according to the desire of both parties, to spare the loss of men; but that the English officers who are in authority at Gaza object to the Egyptian troops embarking with their arms, a circumstance which appears inexplicable, it being mentioned in the Convention concluded between you and the Egyptian Government, that the Egyptian troops should be transported to Egypt by sea with

their arms and baggage. Seeing, then, this opposition on the part of the English officers, it appears probable that they are not acquainted with the contents of the Convention above-mentioned. You are therefore requested, Commodore, to write to the authorities at Gaza, in order that they may no longer oppose the Egyptian troops embarking with their arms and baggage for Alexandria; to send your letter to His Excellency Abbas Pacha, so that it may reach his address in time; and to have the goodness also to inform me of it, in order that a sufficient number of vessels may be sent to Gaza.

“Receive, Commodore, &c.,

“BOGHOS JOUSSOUF.”

“To Commodore Napier,  
&c., &c., &c.”

In consequence of this application, I wrote the letters to the British and Turkish authorities in Syria already given\*, and did everything I could to tranquillize the Pacha's mind, and assured him that I felt perfectly satisfied Captain Stewart would do all in his power to oblige the Turks to keep faith.

\* See pp. 92, 95

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CHAPTER XVI.

Examination of the Conduct of the Allied Ministers at Constantinople—Lord Ponsonby's Propositions regarding the Hereditary Government of Egypt—Opposed by the other Allied Ministers, but on consideration rejected by them—Lord Palmerston's Conversation with the Turkish Minister—Note of the Four Powers in favour of the Hereditary Tenure.

It is now proper to examine a little into the conduct of the Allied Ministers at Constantinople, who, of course, had some influence over the Porte, and exercised it, in framing the Hatti Sheriff reinstating Mehemet Ali in the government of Egypt; and I shall take the *Levant Correspondence* to guide me in my criticism; for although a great deal of that is no doubt suppressed, there still remains enough to form an opinion on the wisdom of the Allied Ministers.

I shall take the British Ambassador in hand first, as he had more influence, and took a more prominent part than the Ambassadors and Ministers of the other powers.

After the news of the surrender of the Turkish fleet arrived at Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby



wrote to the Internuncio and to M. Titow\*, recommending conditions which should be attached to the grant of the hereditary pachalic of Egypt to Mehemet Ali, which they approved of in the first instance, but on reconsideration, they, like wise men, rejected.

Lord Ponsonby, in his letter to Lord Palmerston†, states, that he will follow his Lordship's instructions of the 17th of December, and do all he can to secure the Sultan against the evil designs of Mehemet Ali, and preserve the people of Egypt in future from the oppression which they have hitherto endured. "I am convinced there is no way of doing both, so certain, as that which your Lordship says you wish would be taken, viz.: taking the collection of the revenue out of the hands of the Pacha." I see nothing of the sort in Lord Palmerston's letter; he gives an opinion that the Porte will be able to make certain regulations for the government of Egypt, but not one word is said about the collection of the revenue; and surely it was not statesmanlike of Lord Ponsonby advising the Porte to impose conditions on

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 221.

† *Ibid.*, p. 207.

Mehemet Ali which they had no power of enforcing, for Lord Ponsonby knew full well that neither England, or the other Powers, could touch Egypt, without provoking a war with France. He says, "The Austrians desire to put a sudden end (as they suppose they can do) to the question here, by yielding every thing to the Pacha. Your Lordship desires to establish future security both for the Sultan and his Egyptian subjects. My duty is to follow your orders; but could I be shaken in that duty by the exertions of the Austrians, I should be still deterred from acting with them for such a purpose, by my own knowledge that all this question is to be most rigidly scrutinized in Parliament, and that severe censure would fall upon me if I deviated from your instructions\*."

I do indeed hope that Parliament will scrutinize his conduct, and ascertain whether or not it is true that the Ambassador instructed General Jochmus to follow up hostilities after the submission of Mehemet Ali†, and thereby cause the death of some

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 208.

† I think there could not be much difficulty in proving that he did give such orders, when we consider the terms in which his Lordship speaks of General Jochmus's conduct, in his letter to Viscount Palmerston, already given. See p. 195.

thousands of human beings, which was just as bad, if not worse than the chase of the negroes in Nubia, of which Lord Ponsonby speaks with such horror\*. The only difference between the two is, that the chase of the negroes was the custom of the country, whereas the chase of the Egyptians from Syria was not according to the custom of civilized nations, as it was carried on after the submission of Mehemet Ali, and when there was not the least necessity for it.

The British Ambassador, in writing to Baron Stürmer and M. Titow, quotes the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Articles of the Treaty of the 15th of July†, and makes a budget for the Pacha, showing the resources of Egypt in the year 1833‡ to be 62,778,750 piastres, while the expenditure was only 49,951,500, which may have been correct or not; but it appears to me that the tribute Mehemet was to pay to the Porte on his being reinstated in the government of Egypt, ought to have been fixed by the state of the revenue and expenditure in 1841, when the war ceased.

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 226.

† See Appendix, Vol. I.

‡ See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 219.

The proposition his Excellency makes is, that the Sultan should issue a firman, giving the hereditary government of Egypt to Mehemet Ali; but he is to bear in mind that Egypt was just to be considered like any other pachalic of the Turkish empire, and at a future time he should be made acquainted with the nature and extent of his administrative powers\*.

All this would have been very well had the power of the Porte alone put down Mehemet Ali, and then had the means of enforcing the firman; but the Ambassador must have known full well, that had Mehemet Ali been left to himself, he could have dictated terms to the Sultan, and that, even after all the losses he met with in Syria, occasioned by the Allied Powers, and the losses he met with in his retreat by the bad faith of the Turks, he was still in a position to resist the whole power of the Turkish empire.

M. Titow, as well as Baron Stürmer and Count Königsmark, as I have before stated, at first agreed with Lord Ponsonby †, but asked his opinion about the restrictive clause relating to the nomination of

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 221.

† *Ibid.*, p. 222.

the successor of Mehemet Ali. Their approval of the British Ambassador's proposal seems to have thrown his Excellency off his guard, and he wrote to M. Titow :

“I reply at once to your question, and I say that I think it will be more prudent to keep everything like specific arrangement for the settlement that will flow from the assertion and establishment of the Sultan's sovereign authority and right. You will observe that I used the expression, ‘hereditary in the family of Mehemet Ali,’ which cannot tie up the Sultan's right to specify the mode in which the succession shall take place; and if it should be argued hereafter that the succession should be in the direct line, (and, as it is called, by representation,) the answer would be easy, that nothing of the sort is known to Turkish law, nor is usual in the East, succession being commonly regulated by very different principles.

“I do not see any inconvenience in leaving this matter untouched, but I do fear that any thing that might give Mehemet Ali ground for discussion and dispute at this moment might be inconvenient, and would be seized upon by him. He cannot deny the Sultan's sovereignty, which he has already admitted;

it will be impossible for him to refuse the hereditary right, as it is expressed, without denying, at the same time, the sovereignty of the Sultan already acknowledged.”

The alteration of the opinion of the Allied Ministers only appears in Lord Ponsonby's letter to Baron Stürmer two days after, in which he withdraws his proposal\*. He, however, alludes to a letter from Baron Stürmer, communicating this change of opinion, in which the Baron asks, “Have we any right to act according to our fancies, when the route we have to pursue is clearly traced to us?”

To which Lord Ponsonby replies, “Certainly not; and in conformity with your just notions, I will continue to act, without the smallest deviation, upon the instructions of December 17, which have already been made known to you, but which, to avoid error, I transcribe *literatim* from the document.

“It will indeed be necessary, that in reinstating Mehemet Ali in the Pachalic of Egypt, care should be taken to make such arrangements as would protect the people of Egypt from a continuance of

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 224.

the tyrannical oppression by which they have of late years been crushed, and should secure the Sultan against a renewal of those hostilities which have compelled him to have recourse to the aid of his Allies. But the means of effecting all these purposes may be found in the stipulations of the Treaty of the 15th of July, without removing Mehemet Ali from his Pachalic. The Treaty says, that all the laws of the Turkish Empire, and all the Treaties of the Porte, shall apply to Egypt, just as much as to any other province of the Sultan's dominions; and the land and sea forces which may be maintained by the Pacha of Egypt, shall be part of the forces of the empire, and be kept up for the service of the State.

“Under these stipulations, the Sultan will of course be able, by an exercise of his legislative authority, to establish unity of flag, and of military and naval uniform, throughout all his provinces; to limit the number of troops which each province shall, according to its population, maintain; to regulate the mode of enforcing the conscription, so as to protect the people from undue burthens and oppressive levies; to fix the number and class of ships of war which shall belong to the several naval ports of his dominions; to fix the manner in which

commissions in the army and navy shall be granted in his name, and by his authority; to determine that a single monetary system shall prevail throughout all his dominions, and that there shall be but one Mint. The Treaty specifies, that none but the legal imposts should be levied in Egypt, which will secure the people from undue exactions; and the execution of the Convention of 1838, by which all monopolies are to be abolished, will at once free the industry of the people of Egypt from those oppressive restrictions which have hitherto kept the great mass of the population in the most abject poverty, and which have gradually thrown out of cultivation extensive tracts of land that were formerly tilled and productive.

“‘By such means it seems to Her Majesty’s Government, that future security might be afforded, both to the Sultan and to his Egyptian subjects, against the disposition of Mehemet Ali to rebel against his Sovereign, and to oppress the people of the province he would have to govern.’

“The above constitute the sole rule I can follow, and they are the only words I am at liberty to use in the counsel I shall consent to give to the Sublime Porte.”



The reader will observe these instructions were merely general, and ought to have been followed only so far as the Porte had the power of enforcing them; besides, at the time they were given, Lord Palmerston was not aware what force Mehemet Ali had in Egypt; and there is not a word in these instructions to lead Lord Ponsonby to suppose that Lord Palmerston would have recommended the Porte to set aside Ibrahim Pacha, which was evidently Lord Ponsonby's aim.

His Lordship finishes his letter to the Baron by observing, that as Mehemet Ali had rejected the Treaty of the 15th of July, the Allies are free to act as they think proper. However free they might have been, they always declared they should abide by the basis of the Treaty of the 15th of July, which was acknowledged by my Convention, and also by the instructions of the 15th of October, which Lord Palmerston quotes in his despatch of the 17th of December,—that despatch which the British Ambassador takes for the guide of conduct, viz.: “Your Excellency and your colleagues will, of course, have given to the Porte the advice specified in my despatch of the 15th of October to your Excellency:” and again, “In fact these articles of

agreement were substantially a complete surrender on the part of Mehemet Ali, and he was led to suppose, that in asking for hereditary tenure, he was only asking that which the Porte was willing to give\*.”

Lord Palmerston writes still more strongly to the Ambassador, under date of the 29th January†, in which, relating a conversation he had had with the Turkish Minister in London, he says, in reply to the unwillingness of the Porte to grant the hereditary pachalic communicated to him by Chekib Effendi, “I said, that in all affairs, one must be content with what is practicable, and not endanger what has been obtained by striving after that which is unattainable. I said, that it is clear that Mehemet Ali has made his submission in the expectation that he should obtain hereditary tenure in Egypt: now if, after all, this tenure were to be refused to him, what would probably be the consequence?—renewed revolt, or an attitude, at least, of passive resistance. What would then be the remedy? Such a state of things could not be allowed to continue, because if it lasted, it would

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., pp. 88, 89.

† *Ibid.*, p. 169.

amount to the separation of Egypt from the Turkish Empire. But the Sultan, has not, at present, naval or military means sufficient to enforce his authority, in such a case, over Mehemet Ali in Egypt. The Sultan, would, therefore, be obliged to have recourse for aid to his Allies. But the measures hitherto agreed upon by the Four Powers in virtue of the Treaty of July, are confined to the expulsion of the Egyptians from Syria, Arabia, and Candia, and to the driving of Mehemet Ali's forces and authorities back within the limits of Egypt. If, then, the Sultan were to apply to the Four Powers for assistance to attack Mehemet Ali in Egypt itself, a new deliberation of the Conference would become necessary.

“ Now, I said to Chekib, I could tell him beforehand what would be the result of that deliberation, if the assistance asked for by the Sultan were required in consequence of the Sultan's refusal to comply with the advice given him by the Four Powers, to confer upon Mehemet Ali hereditary tenure of his Egyptian pachalic. I said I knew perfectly well that the Four Powers would decline giving the Sultan such assistance; and what then would happen? Why, the Sultan would, in conse-

quence, find himself, for want of sufficient means of his own, obliged to grant to Mehemet Ali, with a bad grace, and after an ineffectual attempt to avoid doing so, that which he might now make a merit of conferring willingly; and thus, instead of performing, as he now may do, an act of sovereign power, at the suggestion of his Allies, he would appear to all the world as making an extorted concession to a subject.

“I said that I would not attempt to represent as being of no value or importance a sacrifice which is unquestionably a great one, because such a representation could not convince the Sultan. But I begged Chekib Effendi to request his Government to consider the immense importance of the moral and physical strength which the Sultan has gained by the events of the few last months, and to remember that all which the Sultan has gained, Mehemet Ali has lost. That thus their relative positions have been so entirely changed, that the Pacha can never again become really dangerous or seriously troublesome to the Sultan, if the Sultan avails himself properly of the stipulations of the Treaty of July; and if he shall well organize his army, navy, and finances, and shall place those

branches of his public service upon an efficient footing. I desired Chekib Effendi to bear in mind that the Sultan has recovered, for his direct authority, the whole of Syria, Arabia, and Candia ; points which, with reference to military, naval, financial, and religious considerations, are of the utmost importance, and for the recovery of which the Sultan would, at this time last year, have gladly made very considerable sacrifices. I further reminded him, that a faithful execution of that stipulation of the Treaty of July, which says, that all the laws and treaties of the empire are to apply to Egypt as to any other province, will afford a most essential security for the sovereign authority of the Sultan. I therefore requested Chekib Effendi to urge his Government to conclude this matter without further delay, because it is of great importance for all parties concerned, that it should be brought to a final settlement as soon as possible.

“Chekib Effendi promised me to write to Rechid Pacha to this effect, and he said that he had no doubt that the Sultan will comply with the advice of his Allies.”

The day after this conversation, and in conformity with Lord Palmerston's views, the Allied

Ministers sent a note to Chekib Effendi, expressing their opinion that the Sultan should confer on the descendants of Mehemet Ali in the direct line, the Pachalic of Egypt\*.

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 171.

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## CHAPTER XVII.

Determination of the Allied Courts to secure the Hereditary Pachalic for Mehemet Ali—Correspondence between Baron Stürmer and Lord Ponsonby—Decisive Instructions from Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby—Conference of the Allied Ministers with Rechid Pacha—Project for settling the Egyptian Question—Lord Ponsonby's Observations at the Conference—The Firmans decided on—Refusal of Lord Ponsonby to allow the English Consul-General to return to Egypt—Lord Ponsonby's Letter to Rechid Pacha.

BEFORE the last communication could reach the British Ambassador, indeed before it was written, Baron Stürmer in a letter of the 7th of January\*, had told him that Prince Metternich had written in the most peremptory terms, that the Four Courts had pronounced *that the hereditary succession in the functions of the Government of Egypt should be granted to the family of Mehemet Ali*, and he finishes by condoling with Lord Ponsonby, that the Allies have destroyed the hope they both had of seeing the power of Mehemet Ali crumble to pieces. He adds, "My part is played, and it only remains for me to await in silence the orders which

\* See *Lerant Papers*, Part III., p. 183.

my Government may be pleased to transmit to me, and execute them scrupulously.”

The English Ambassador, in no way daunted, replies\*, “It is wholly indifferent what may be the private opinion of any of us as to this question, which is the affair of our Governments, and for which none of us are responsible; but it is another thing to act ‘without orders,’ and I will not incur ‘that’ responsibility, and therefore I must decline acting in concert with you until I am authorized to take the steps you propose, by instructions to that effect. It is necessary I should acquaint our colleagues and the Ottoman Ministers with my position, and I shall do so without loss of time. I have been told by the best authority, including yourself, if I mistake not, that your Government had not decided to grant the hereditary right to Mehemet Ali; and at the Conference it did appear that you had no authority to mention that point. This matter, however, is not of a very recent date, and it is not at all impossible that more than one alteration may have taken place in the language or opinion of that Government, and that which is erroneous now, may have been right before, or possibly may be so

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 185.



again, for in this affair there has been a perpetual fluctuation of circumstances. If my Government has not sent me orders, it cannot be for want of time, as they would have reached me through Vienna as soon as the instruction you have received."

The Ambassador wrote in the same sense to M. Titow and Count Königsmark\*, complaining of the breathless haste they were proceeding in, in recommending the hereditary succession, and urging every argument to prevent it in the first instance; all of which happily failed, and at last he got decided instructions from home, which produced a couple of short notes to the other Ministers and M. Pisani.

"My dear Sir,

"Therapia, Jan. 10, 1841.

"I hasten to acquaint you, that in consequence of what I have received from my Government by the messenger who has just arrived here, I have instructed my Dragoman to inform his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the British Government advises the Sublime Porte to grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt.

"I have, &c.,

(Signed) "PONSONBY."

"To M. Titow."

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 185, 192.

“ Sir,

“ Therapia, Jan. 10, 1841.

“ You will acquaint his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that I am ordered to counsel the Sublime Porte, in the name of the British Government, to grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt.

“ I have, &c.,

(Signed) “ PONSONBY.”

“ To M. Frederick Pisani.”

Lord Palmerston, in a short letter of February 10\*, approves of the Ambassador's conduct, without stating whether it was the long correspondence to endeavour to induce the Allied Ministers not to recommend the grant of the hereditary tenure, or the short correspondence recommending the grant to be confirmed.

Notwithstanding that Lord Ponsonby had been foiled in his first attempt to prevent the Porte from conferring the hereditary pachalic on Mehemet Ali, he was not discouraged, and returned to the charge with fresh vigour, on the question of attaching such conditions to the hereditary title, as would render it worse than useless; and I have shown that on reflection, the Allied Ministers altered their

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 197.

opinion, and Lord Ponsonby in consequence withdrew his proposal.

On the 4th of February the Allied Ministers were invited to a conference with Rechid Pacha, who laid before them his project of definitively settling the Egyptian question, which was as follows:—

“Hereditary succession of Egypt granted on condition that all the Treaties and all the laws of the empire shall be applied to Egypt as to every other part of the Ottoman empire.

“The Sultan reserves to himself to choose among the male descendants of Mehemet Ali whom he shall please. The heir chosen for the Government of Egypt shall not have the title of Vizier until he shall have received the investiture of the Sultan, and after such investiture he shall be styled Vizier, and treated like the other Viziers of the empire. Considering the advanced age of Mehemet Ali, he is exempted from proceeding to the capital; his successors are under an obligation to do so.

“As the Porte contemplates an improvement in its coinage, the money which Mehemet Ali may coin in Egypt should have the same alloy and value as that of the Sultan.

“All appointments to civil and military employments must proceed from the Sultan, and all promotions emanate from His Highness; wherefore Mehemet Ali is prohibited from appointing to any

employment, and making provision for any office without the authorisation and consent of His Highness; in order, however, to leave him means of military organisation, he is permitted to appoint up to the rank of captain inclusive.

“The tribute to be paid yearly shall be fixed separately.

“The distinctive marks (nischan) of every rank, as well civil as military, are to be ordained by His Highness.

“The uniforms, as well civil as military, must resemble those worn by the civil and military officers of the Sultan, the whole adapted to the climate; it being well understood that the cut and shape must be absolutely the same.

“With respect to the garrison for the maintenance of good order in Egypt, the Porte proposes from 20,000 to 25,000 troops.

“The conscription which in the other provinces furnishes one man in a hundred, shall not in Egypt furnish more than one in two hundred.

“The Government of Egypt has always been bound to provide for the wants of the Holy Cities; Mehemet Ali must therefore, as a faithful subject, act in conformity with what is imposed on him by the situation of Governor of Egypt\*.”

Lord Ponsonby, being first called upon for his opinion, stated, he had no objection to offer, but

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 229.

after his colleagues had spoken he should make some observations on the Tribute. The other Ministers gave their assent to the propositions of Rechid Pacha; the arguments they used Lord Ponsonby does not report to Lord Palmerston, as they would appear in the Protocol, but which Protocol is not, I suppose for some wise purpose, inserted in the *Levant Papers*. We must, then, content ourselves with the British Ambassador's own observations. He begins by stating, that Mehemet Ali having been deposed, and the Porte appealed to, to reinstate him, sufficiently proves that the Treaty of the 15th of July does not bind the Allies. His Lordship, I believe, was singular in this opinion, for it has been distinctly and repeatedly stated by the Allied Ministers both in London, Vienna, and Constantinople, that the Treaty of the 15th of July should be the basis of the settlement of the Egyptian question; and in no part of the correspondence does it appear that the Allies approved of the deposition of Mehemet Ali, and it may therefore be fairly inferred that they entirely disapproved of it.

His Lordship takes for granted the Treaty is not an absolute rule, and thus observes:

“ If the Treaty be not the absolute rule, why are we to counsel the Sublime Porte to take a measure that was adopted in that Treaty, at a time when affairs were in a state totally different from their actual state? The Treaty was a compromise with Mehemet Ali, and all its stipulations were conditional, and with a view to engage him to accept it. Mehemet Ali decided to refuse the Treaty, and to try the chance of arms. He has been vanquished, and he has made unconditional submission to his Sovereign. How then can the Treaty be obligatory upon the Allies, (of whom the Sultan is one,) to take the measures framed for another position of affairs which has ceased to exist?

“ If then the Treaty be not obligatory upon the Allies, the counsel to be given by us to the Ottoman Porte is to be based upon the instructions we have received from our Courts; and we are not to advise the Porte to adopt measures that are impossible to be reconciled one with another, and contradictory, so as that one measure, if adopted, shall defeat almost every other measure which we are ordered to recommend.”

The document is much too long, but may be seen in the *Levant Papers*. The burden of it is, that

Mehemet Ali should be crippled in his finances to prevent him doing further mischief; and the Ambassador finishes by saying, "I have reason to believe my colleagues entertain an opinion different from mine. They have had before them for their consideration the instructions from Lord Palmerston so often referred to. They are possibly better able to interpret them than I may be, but I understand them in the sense I have described; and it is for others, not for me, to decide, and to take such part as they may esteem the best. Those whom I have now addressed can judge, as well as I can do, what is the opinion of the British Government. My opinion is of little importance, excepting to myself, but I must stand before my country and justify my acts\*."

All this would have been right enough if the Porte had the power to enforce it, but not having the power, they only exposed their own weakness to Mehemet Ali, and gave him an opportunity of treating their overtures with the contempt they deserved.

On the 15th of February Rechid Pacha officially delivered to M. Pisani, Lord Ponsonby's dragoman,

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 229.

copies of the firman granting the hereditary succession, the firman for governing the provinces bordering on Egypt, as likewise an official note to the four Ministers, and a letter from the Vizier to Mehemet Ali\*, communicating to them at the same time, that the Consuls might proceed to Alexandria in the steam-boat, which would leave in the afternoon without fail. This information had been privately communicated by the dragoman to Lord Ponsonby on the 13th.

Nothing was, however, further from his Lordship's intention than allowing the British Consul-General to return. He appears to have been dissatisfied because he was not consulted before the measure was decided on, and he informed the Turkish Minister that he should not require the Consul-General to return, because it might not suit the British Government to establish the Consul-General on the same footing as before; that Mehemet Ali might refuse; and lastly, that Colonel Hodges could not leave Constantinople so suddenly†. Of these three arguments the only valid

\* See these documents in the *Levant Papers*, Part III., pp. 247—252.

† See *Levant Papers*, Part III., pp. 239, 240.



one seems to be, the probability of Mehemet Ali's refusing the conditions; but even granting that, it would have been more politic to have sent the Consuls with the Turkish Commissioner who bore the firmans, with orders to persuade Mehemet Ali, if possible, to accept them, and to signify to him at the same time that the flags would not be hoisted till that point was arranged. They being on the spot, and in an official capacity, furnished with instructions from the Ambassador at Constantinople, would have seen how far it was possible for Mehemet Ali to accept the firman without risking the tranquillity of Egypt, and would necessarily have more influence on the Pacha than I could have, being totally unprovided with instructions, and not having received a single line from the Ambassador to guide my conduct.

On the 15th of February Lord Ponsonby wrote officially to Rechid Pacha\*, disowning having had any thing to do with the firman, and stating that he never had been consulted at all, or knew any thing about it, till every thing was decided, and ordered to be sent to Alexandria. The fact is, the Porte saw that Lord Ponsonby was determined to keep the question open, and therefore arranged the firman

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 325.

without asking his advice. What that advice might have been is hard to say; but we must infer that had he been consulted, the firman would have been much more stringent than it was, and which, as it turned out, was not palatable to the Pacha, who absolutely constrained the Porte to alter it, and give him more favourable terms; in this, as we shall see, he was supported by the majority of the Ambassadors.

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## CHAPTER XVIII.

Delay in forwarding the Firmans to Mehemet Ali—Instructions to the Commissioner—The Author's Visit to the Egyptian Flag-ship—Substance of the Firmans—Objections of the Pacha—The Author's Advice—Letter to Lord Palmerston—The Author's last Interview with Mehemet Ali—Return to Malta—Correspondence with Sir Robert Stopford—Return to England.

ALTHOUGH it had been distinctly stated to Mehemet Ali in the Vizier's letter of the 12th of January, (in consequence of the remonstrance of the Allies)\*,

\* *The Grand Vizier to Mazloum Bey.*

19 Zilkadé, 1256. (12 January, 1841.)

In the letter which I wrote and sent by your Excellency to his Highness Mehemet Ali Pacha, there is nothing clear or precise relative to the hereditary succession to the Government of Egypt. It is said, in general terms, that he shall be reinstated in the Government of Egypt. It is then probable, it is to be presumed, that his Highness will conceive suspicions in this respect; and it is for this reason that it has been judged necessary to give the following explanations upon this point.

As the letter which Mehemet Ali Pacha sent to me, and by which he offered his submission to His Imperial Majesty, commenced by making mention of the Convention which had been concluded between him and Commodore Napier, and as the Sublime Porte had not accepted that Convention, which it regarded as null and of no effect, it was thought that if I had spoken in my letter of the hereditary succession, it would have been, in substance, to recognise the Convention, and that is the reason why it was omitted to speak of it.

that he should be confirmed in the hereditary government of Egypt after the delivery of the fleet and his complete submission, still the confirmation was delayed for a considerable time, and the firman did not arrive at Alexandria until the 20th of February, and was brought by Said Muhib Effendi, who was instructed to read the firman\* in full divan, and if rejected by the Pacha, he was to exhort him to receive it. He was also the bearer of the fez and the nisham of the Vizier, which Mehemet Ali was to wear on the day the firman was

Nevertheless, His Imperial Majesty, whose goodness and favours are shed over his servants truly submissive, entertaining with regard to Mehemet Ali Pacha the benevolent intentions which are in unison with the sentiments of moderation by which the High Allied Powers are animated, it is certain that as soon as he shall have proved by facts, as has been declared in my letter, the submission which he has offered, by immediately restoring the Ottoman fleet, and by making over, without delay, to the Commissioners of the Sublime Porte, the countries which are known to be in question, and which are situated out of Egypt, His Highness will be pleased to reinstate him in the government of Egypt, with right of hereditary succession.

The requisite conditions laid down by the Treaty of Alliance, and other points connected with those conditions, are about to be settled; and as all this will be arranged at the same time that the investiture of the hereditary succession

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\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 242.

read. He was to inform him, that in consequence of his advanced age, the Sultan did not require him to go to Constantinople to receive his investiture, but that one of his sons was expected to thank the Sultan in person for the signal favour conferred on his father. He was further instructed, in the event of Mehemet Ali's remonstrating against any part of the firman, to send back the steamboat for further orders; but in the event of the Pacha's rejecting the firman, he was to demand that the rejection should be in writing.

The day after the arrival of the firman, Mehemet

shall take place, I abstain for the moment from entering into details upon this subject.

However, it is important that His Highness should know in a few words what is doing, and that he should be apprized beforehand, that if a single one of the conditions which shall have been laid down, is not observed, the hereditary succession will be abolished.

You will therefore formally ratify to Mehemet Ali, on the part of His Imperial Majesty, in case that, in conformity with what has been said above, his submission shall be a fact, the conditional hereditary succession aforesaid. And in order altogether to dispel the doubts which he might have in this respect, and to inspire him with entire confidence, you will even allow him, if necessary, to see my present official despatch.

Such are the orders of the Sultan, in conformity with which you will be careful to act, and it is for this purpose that I write to you the present despatch.

Ali visited the Liverpool steamer, and from thence invited me on board the Egyptian Admiral's ship. The old man appeared in low spirits, but nevertheless, he seemed proud of pointing out the cleanliness and order that reigned in every part of his ship. On entering the cabin, the whole of the guns were fired at once, and the rest of the squadron followed the example of the flag-ship. He conducted me through every part of this magnificent vessel, and it was quite impossible to conceive any ship better fitted in every respect. After the inspection the drums beat to quarters, and in less than three minutes she was ready for action. The men were well trained, and the guns exercised with great alacrity, though not quite in the style of the Excellent. The magazine was opened, the powder-boxes handed up, the rigging stoppered, fire-engines and buckets at hand, and large tubs full of water were placed along both the lower and main deck in great abundance. After the gun exercise, a party were paraded with their cutlasses and muskets, and it was altogether surprising to see how well the poor Arabs went through their exercises. The yards were then manned; but in this part of their manœuvres they were not quite so expert.

After the exercises were over, we retired into the cabin, and I ventured to ask if he was satisfied with the news from Constantinople, at which he shook his head, and expressed a desire to see me in his palace. On arriving there he begged me to sit beside him on the divan, pipes and coffee were called for as usual, and through the medium of his interpreter, he communicated the substance of the firman\*, which he also gave me in writing; it is as follows:—

“Egypt within its ancient limits is granted to you and to your male descendants on the following conditions:

“1st. When there shall be a decease of the incumbent, the Porte shall select among his heirs the person who shall best suit it, who will be summoned to Constantinople to receive the investiture. The present concession does not involve any precedence over the other Viziers, and the Governor in whose favour it is made shall, as regards the title and the other prerogatives, only enjoy the advantages which are assigned to him.

“2nd. The Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané, and the

\* The firmans are given at length, as are also the instructions of the Turkish Envoy, and the official notifications connected with the affair, in the *Levant Papers*, Part III., pp. 241—254.

other fundamental laws of the empire, as likewise the treaties present or future with foreign Powers, shall be executed in Egypt.

“3rd. All the duties and all the revenues of Egypt shall be collected in the name of the Sultan; and as the Egyptians form a portion of the subjects of the Grand Signior, the rules adopted in the rest of the empire for the collection of the taxes shall be observed in Egypt. In order that the Sultan may be well assured that the people are not over-taxed, a fourth part of the gross revenue arising either from customs-duties, tenths, or all other duties, shall appertain to the Sultan, and be in the place of tribute; the other three-fourths shall be applied to the liquidation of the charges of collection and of the expenses concerning the internal administration, the maintenance of the troops, the household of the Viceroy, and the contributions in kind allotted every year to the Holy Cities. The preceding arrangements shall take effect from the first day of the year 1257 (the present time), and be carried into execution for five years, at the expiration of which term, provision will be made according to the circumstances and condition of Egypt. In order that the duties may not be levied arbitrarily, and in a manner prejudicial to the people, the Sultan, having undertaken to watch over the interests of his subjects, considers that the presence of a comptroller of finance is necessary in Egypt: you will conform yourself to the order



which shall hereafter be sent to you on this subject.

“4th. Measures are about to be taken at Constantinople in order that the money may be coined of the same die, as likewise of the denomination and weight corresponding with its value; the money coined in Egypt in the name of the Sultan must be so at the rate adopted.

“5th. During peace, Egypt can be protected by 18,000 soldiers; this number shall not be exceeded; and as the land and sea forces of Egypt are at the disposal of the empire, the Porte, in case of war, will fix the augmentation which it is requisite to give to them. In the other parts of the empire, the soldier, after a service of five years, is free; this rule shall be enforced in Egypt. Consequently, there shall be chosen from the existing army, and according to the periods of service, 20,000 men, of whom 18,000 shall serve in Egypt, and 2000 shall be sent to Constantinople. Every year a ballot shall be had, in conformity with the rules of equity, and in proportion to the population of each district, for the levy of 4000 men, of whom 3600 shall be incorporated into the troops of Egypt, and 400 shall be sent to Constantinople, the whole to replace those who are discharged. The soldiers liberated from service shall not be re-enlisted. It is possible that as regards the material, the troops cannot be clad in Egypt as they are at Constantinople, but as regards the shape of the clothing, the badges, and the

standards, they shall be wholly alike. The same is the case with regard to the naval forces.

“6th. The Viceroy of Egypt cannot confer ranks except up to that of Solkal-Aghassi (adjutant-major); as regards the superior ranks, they must be applied for to the Sublime Porte.

“New ships of war shall not be built without the permission of the Porte.

“The continuance of the hereditary succession being subject to the execution of each of these fundamental dispositions, in case of non-execution, the concession of hereditary succession will be revoked.”

Another firman conferred upon the Pacha the government (not hereditary) of the provinces of Nubia, Darfour, Kordofan, and Sennaar. This firman forbids the incursion of the troops into these provinces, who had been permitted to seize the inhabitants, male and female, and retain them as slaves in lieu of pay. He was also prohibited from reducing the slaves to the state of eunuchs, a common practice in Egypt.

The Pacha pointed out to me how impossible it was to comply with the firman relative to the hereditary title. That in the first place, with respect to the Porte choosing his successor from

any of his family, that it was a blow directed against Ibrahim Pacha, which was both unjust and impolitic. That he was his eldest son, and well worthy of succeeding him; besides which, even if he consented to such a condition, it was by no means clear that Ibrahim would, and even if he did, it would sow the seeds of dissension in his family. That as to the appointment of his officers, it had always been the practice to allow the Pacha of Egypt to appoint them up to the rank of General, and that the proposed restrictions would dissatisfy the army, and probably cause a mutiny. The 3rd Article, stipulating that he was to pay a fourth of the revenue of Egypt to the Porte, appeared to him oppressive to Egypt. He asked my advice how to act in his present position. This was a delicate question; I had no instructions from home, nor from the Admiral, who was at Malta, and no communication of any description from Lord Ponsonby, and simply a letter from Colonel Hodges, stating the fact of the firmans having been sent, and his opinion that the conditions would not be accepted by the Pacha.

The reasons the Pacha gave for rejecting parts of the firman were so just and so strong, that I did not

hesitate to express my opinion that they ought not to be accepted, and I advised him to write to the Porte, and respectfully point out the impossibility of his accepting such terms.

I knew in doing this I was taking a good deal of responsibility on myself, as it was probable these terms had been suggested to the Porte by some of the Ambassadors, if not by all; but, being on the spot, and seeing that should Ibrahim, who was at the head of a large army, resist, and be supported in his resistance by the officers of the army, which was pretty certain, the whole country would be thrown into confusion, I knew I should incur censure for not taking upon myself the responsibility of advising the Pacha to adopt what I thought was the safest course. Had the British and the other Consuls been at Alexandria, I should have left it entirely to them.

The following is my letter to Lord Palmerston, relating the whole occurrence:—

“ Stromboli, Alexandria,

“ My Lord,

Feb. 23, 1841.

“ I have the honour of inclosing the translation of the Hatti Scherif, which was brought here by the Turkish Commissioner on the 21st.

“The Pacha has accepted the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Articles, and the part of the 6th which regards the construction of men of war; he begs the Sublime Porte to modify Article 3 as being oppressive to Egypt.

“The first article he considers quite inadmissible, as it would not be acceded to by Ibrahim Pacha, would cause discord in his family, and a civil war at his death. He also objects to the part of Article 6 which relates to the appointment of officers; hitherto they have all been appointed by him, with the exception of General of Division, and a sudden deviation from that system would disorganize the army, and bring his authority into contempt.

“The Pacha has repeatedly consulted me on this subject; and it is a most delicate situation to be placed in, as I cannot know what instructions your Lordship may have given to Lord Ponsonby; but judging of the intentions of the Allies from the Treaty of the 15th July, I cannot think it was contemplated by the Allies to attach such a condition to the hereditary title, and I did not hesitate to tell His Highness as much. It is true I might have preserved silence; but placed as the Pacha at present is, he is sure of turning to some one for advice, and that person would have been the French Consul-General, out of whose hands I have kept him since my arrival here; in fact, he looks up to England for protection and advice, and I believe I am the only person he consults.

“There is a separate firman giving him the pachalic of Nubia for life, with the condition that the chase should be suppressed, and no more eunuchs made. This he has no objection to; and he regrets the Sublime Porte has not taken the initiative and abolished slavery. I have urged him strongly to do this at once; but he says it is surrounded with so many difficulties, that the people’s minds must be prepared before he can venture on such a measure.

“Mr. Larking goes home in the Liverpool in bad health; and he will explain to your Lordship the position of this country, and the anxiety of the Pacha for the friendship of England. The Consuls are not yet arrived from Constantinople, which is to be regretted. I don’t know that I have any right to stay now my mission is finished. Syria is entirely evacuated, and many lives have been lost in consequence of the rejection of the Convention, and the menacing attitude of the Turks, which obliged Ibrahim Pacha to go round the Dead Sea, instead of marching straight on Gaza.

“After the honourable manner the Pacha has behaved about the fleet, it is to be regretted the Porte should have pressed him so hard, particularly as I do not see how they can enforce their demands, and I do not apprehend the Allies will risk another armament to enforce them.

“The Scheiks and Emirs are arrived at Cairo;

and they will be sent to Syria immediately on their arrival here.

“*February 24.* I saw the Pacha last night; he had a very long conversation with the Turkish Minister, who seems to be aware of the impossibility of imposing such terms on the Pacha, and he has sent his steamer to Constantinople for fresh instructions. I do hope they will be more reasonable at Constantinople. I do not think it would have been possible to have concocted a better plan to throw discord and confusion into a country, than the terms they have proposed to him. Egypt is making rapid strides to improvement, and is now beginning to feel the advantages of Mehemet Ali's system. He is, it is true, an Oriental, and has many mistaken notions; but he must be treated with kindness and consideration.

“A good many Syrians have come into Egypt with the Egyptian army. I have demanded their immediate release; and for the first time, had rather a warm discussion with him on the subject. He promises to send them to their homes; but not till he hears from Constantinople. I regret this, because it will furnish his enemies with weapons against him; but I cannot wonder at his being irritated, because he has not been treated well. He behaved so honourably about the fleet, that he deserved some consideration. Imposing such a heavy tribute on him, will have either the effect of stopping improvement in Egypt, or if he goes on with his public

works, he will have to oppress the people, and he was on the point of reducing the poll-tax, when the Hatti Scherif arrived.

“ I have, &c.,

(Signed) “ CHARLES NAPIER.

“ To Viscount Palmerston.

“ P.S. I have this moment received a letter from Boghos Bey, promising the release of the Syrian troops.”

My last interview with the Pacha was not of a very pleasant nature; for the first time, he neither offered me a pipe, nor took one himself, and was in very ill humour. I pressed him hard about the Syrians, which he evaded; and I told him I should speak to him no more on the subject, but should address an official letter to Boghos Bey; this I did, and he answered, promising their immediate release.

Next morning the Pacha set out for Cairo to see Ibrahim, who, for some reason or other, had declined coming to Alexandria. Seeing that I could be of no further use here, I made up my mind to proceed to join the Powerful in Marmorice Bay, and accordingly paid a parting visit to Boghos Bey. The old man was very civil, and informed me he had orders to present me with a snuff-box set in bril-



liants. Boghos Bey had before pressed me to receive a large present as a *souvenir* from the Pacha, which I declined, as being contrary to our rules and regulations; but in this instance he pressed the box, saying it was an Eastern custom, and the grand *souvenir* should be given at a later period. I replied that I should have had no objection to have taken a small keepsake of little value from the Pacha; but that in my last interview, I did not think he had behaved well, and evaded giving me any answer about the Syrian troops, in which I thought he had not kept his word. I added that he might rely upon it the British Government would insist on the performance of his promise.

I then took leave of Boghos Bey, left Alexandria on the 1st of March, and arrived at Marmorice Bay on the 3rd. I there found orders to proceed to Malta, where I arrived on the 22nd, and was placed in quarantine. The day after my arrival I received a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, which left me in doubt whether the Government had repented their approval of my Convention or not. The letter and answer I insert, together with the Admiral's further reply:—

“ Princess Charlotte, Malta,  
March 15, 1841.

“ Sir,

“ I am desired by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, that whatever may have been the political considerations which induced Her Majesty’s Government to sanction a Convention entered into under the circumstances in which you felt yourself placed, their Lordships fully concur in my opinion of the injury and inconvenience to which Her Majesty’s service may be exposed by a junior officer taking upon himself such a responsibility, which can only be justified by the event as in the present instance.

“ I am, &c.,

“ ROBERT STOPFORD, *Admiral.*

“ Commodore Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.,  
H.M.S. Powerful.”

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“ H.M.S. Powerful,  
Malta, March 23, 1841.

“ Sir,

“ Had I not received a letter from the Admiralty direct, together with private ones from Lords Minto and Palmerston, approving of the Convention I entered into with Mehemet Ali, which Convention was based on the Treaty of the 15th of July, and approved of by the great Powers of Europe, who are now carrying it out, I should have considered your letter of the 15th of March, communicating their Lordships’ opinion, as intended to convey a sort of censure.

“I am quite aware, when an officer takes upon himself the responsibility I did, there must be strong reasons to justify him; I took the same responsibility at Sidon and Boharsof, and had I been defeated I incurred the same risk of censure, and I trust, as long as I can benefit my country by incurring responsibility, I shall always possess strength of mind to do it.

“I take this opportunity of observing how much I regret that you should have found it necessary, in disapproving of my Convention, to have expressed yourself in such harsh terms of me to Mehemet Ali, which placed me in a most unpleasant situation at Alexandria.

“I have, &c.,

“CHAS. NAPIER, *Commodore.*

“To Admiral the Hon. Sir Robert Stopford,  
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Malta.”

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“Princess Charlotte, at Malta,

March 23, 1841.

“Sir,

“I do not intend to enter into the political merits of your Convention with Mehemet Ali, which has been subsequently sanctioned by Her Majesty’s Government, but as Commander-in-Chief upon this station I think I should have signally failed in my duty if I had not represented to the Admiralty any act of an officer under my command which I considered to be contrary to the rules and customs of the naval service.

“I am not aware of any harsh expression towards your proceedings, in my letter to Mehemet Ali, as I consider the words ‘hasty and unauthorized’ perfectly justifiable under the circumstances of the case, and which accounted for my refusing to ratify the Convention.

“I am, &c.,

“ROBERT STOPFORD, *Admiral.*

“Commodore Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.,  
H.M.S. Powerful.”

On the 31st of the same month, having obtained a month's leave of absence, I hauled down my broad pennant, and proceeded to England in the Oriental steamer, and arrived at Liverpool in the middle of April.

## CHAPTER XIX.

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London—Protocol of the 5th March—Note of Chekib Effendi—Note of the 13th of March—Lord Palmerston's explanation of the Views of the Allies regarding the Hereditary Tenure—Conference of the 16th March—Protocol—Endeavour to include France in a Convention for closing the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus—False Position of the Porte—Views of Lord Ponsonby and of the other Ambassadors—Instructions of the Austrian and British Governments—Opinions of M. Guizot—Turkish Plan of Settlement—Note of the 10th May.

WHEN Lord Palmerston heard from Sir Robert Stopford that the Turkish fleet had arrived at Marmorice Bay, and that Ibrahim Pacha had reached Gaza, he immediately assembled the Foreign Ministers, and, on the 5th of March, they agreed to a Protocol to the following effect\* :—

1. That Mehemet Ali had submitted, and asked for pardon.
2. That he had delivered the Ottoman fleet to the Commissioners.
- 3, 4. That he had evacuated Syria; and that the Turkish authority was established there and in Candia.

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 235.

5. That the Sultan had accepted the submission, and pardoned Mehemet Ali, his children, and adherents.

6. That the Sultan had announced his intention of reinstating Mehemet Ali with hereditary succession.

The conditions settled on the 15th of October and 14th November\*, being thus fulfilled, the assembled Ministers determined that the Consuls of the Four Powers should now return to Alexandria.

On the 11th of March, Chekib Effendi, the Ottoman Minister, communicated to Lord Palmerston† that the Porte had restored Mehemet Ali, and forwarded him the firmans I have already mentioned, and requested his Lordship to communicate them to the other Ambassadors in London, and he desired an answer to the official communication; whereupon Lord Palmerston again assembled the Foreign Ministers on the 13th of March‡, and they drew up a Collective Note, expressing their lively satisfaction at the event, and communicating to the Ottoman Minister that they had heard from Alexandria, under date of the 24th of February, that Mehemet Ali had admitted, without reserve, that the treaties and

\* See Vol. I., p. 249; Vol. II., p. 15.

† See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 241.      ‡ Ibid., p. 263.

laws of the empire should apply to Egypt in the same way as to the other provinces of the empire. That he had acceded to the regulation of the monetary system, the service and uniform of the troops, and the building of the ships. That he had replaced under the orders of the Sultan, the land and sea forces, and, in fact, that at the present moment he had put himself in the situation of a subject, and that it appertains to the Sultan alone to settle the internal administration, and take into consideration the wishes which Mehemet Ali has submitted to the Sultan. The Ministers finish the Note by stating, "The Undersigned are fully assured that these explanations, conceived in a sincere spirit of conciliation, would be received by the Sultan in the same manner in which he has constantly received the advice already given by his Allies,—advice disinterested and sincere, which His Highness has justly appreciated, when he accomplished, by an act of clemency, a work of pacification which his Allies had frankly aided him in effecting."

Lord Palmerston wrote at the same time to Lord Ponsonby\*, transmitting the Note of the Plenipotentiaries, and remarking that doubts might

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 326.

arise out of the wording of the first Article of the Hatti-Sheriff, which specifies the conditions to be imposed upon Mehemet Ali. "The wording of that Article might lead to the supposition, that the Sultan intended to reserve to himself to choose upon each vacancy in the pachalic of Egypt, any one of the descendants of Mehemet Ali, without regard to any fixed rule whatever; and that thus the principle of hereditary tenure would be rendered illusory.

"Her Majesty's Government conceive, that this was by no means the intention of the Porte, and that what was meant to be established by the condition above-mentioned is, that while, on the one hand, the Sultan grants to the descendants of Mehemet Ali in the direct male line hereditary succession in the pachalic of Egypt, the Sultan reserves his own sovereign rights intact, by declaring, that those descendants shall not succeed as a matter of course and of inherent right, as would be the case with the rulers of an independent state, but shall each in turn receive his appointment from the Sultan, and by a separate act of the Sultan's sovereign power.

"If this is a correct view of the meaning of the



Article in question, there can be no difficulty on the part of the Porte in giving such an explanation thereof as will remove all misunderstandings; and the Porte might say, that is the intention of the Sultan that this right of selection shall in all cases be exercised in favour of the next male heir to the deceased Pacha, unless, by infancy or by physical incapacity, such male heir should be incapable of taking charge of the administration of the province, in which case the person next in relationship to the deceased Pacha would be appointed in his stead. The Sultan might, at the same time, make it to be clearly understood, that it is his intention that Ibrahim shall succeed to Mehemet."

Lord Palmerston was also of opinion that it would not be difficult to settle the affair of the tribute, and that the Allies had purposely abstained from entering into the question; and that relative to the appointment of the officers, could be easily arranged.

On the 16th of March the Allied Ministers in another conference\* conceiving the Eastern Question settled, engaged the French Government to rejoin the European family, and they initialed a

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 321.

Convention recognising the right of the Porte to shut the passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus against ships of war of all nations. The Protocol was as follows :—

“The difficulties in which His Highness the Sultan was placed, and which decided him to apply for the support and the assistance of the Courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, being now removed, and Mehemet Ali having made towards His Highness the Sultan the act of submission which the Convention of the 15th of July was designed to bring about, the Representatives of the Courts, parties to the said Convention, have considered that, independently of the execution of the temporary measures resulting from that Convention, it is of essential importance to record in the most formal manner, the respect which is due to the ancient rule of the Ottoman empire, in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for ships of war of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus.

“This principle being from its nature one of general and permanent application, the respective Plenipotentiaries, provided with the orders of their Courts to this effect, have been of opinion that, in order to manifest the agreement and union which regulate the intentions of all the Courts in what concerns the maintenance of the peace of Europe, it would be proper to record the respect which is

due to the above-mentioned principle, by means of an arrangement in which France should be invited to concur, at the invitation, and agreeably to the wish, of the Sultan.

“ This arrangement being calculated to afford to Europe a pledge of the union of the Five Powers, Her Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, agreeably to an understanding with the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers, undertook to bring this matter to the knowledge of the French Government, requesting it to take part in an arrangement by which, on the one hand, the Sultan should declare his firm resolution to maintain for the future the above-mentioned principle; the Five Powers, on the other hand, should announce their unanimous determination to respect that principle and to conform themselves thereto.

“ (Initialed)      E. N.  
    P.  
    B.  
    B.  
    C.

On the 6th of March Mehemet Ali’s and Said Muhib Effendi’s letters to the Vizier arrived at Constantinople\*. Mehemet Ali’s, in respectful terms, and with great clearness, pointed out the

\* See these documents in the *Levant Papers*, Part III, pp. 341, 353.

impossibility of his consenting to the first, third, and part of the sixth articles of the Firman; the other articles he cheerfully acceded to. The Commissioner makes a long report of the arguments he used to induce Mehemet Ali to consent, and the very clever way he evaded them; and it must be admitted the old Pacha had the best of the argument.

The Porte, as might have been expected, was now in a false position; France had so far joined the Allies as to initial the Treaty for shutting the Dardanelles, but it was not likely she would now attempt to coerce Mehemet Ali or even advise him to yield; and under this embarrassment Rechid Pacha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote to the Ministers for advice. Lord Ponsonby did not hesitate to entirely agree with Rechid Pacha that the application of Mehemet Ali to change some of the articles of the Firman was no proof of submission\*. The Firman, says the Ambassador, is an order, and no subject can refuse to obey an order and be considered submissive; he does not admit that he petitioned for a change, but he asserts that he disobeys. I cannot read Mehemet Ali's letter in that sense. After giving his reasons

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 371.

why the hereditary succession should go by right of primogeniture, which appear to me convincing, he states, "It is evident, moreover, that his Highness, moved by sentiments of clemency, desires the maintenance of repose and tranquillity, and it is for that reason that I request that the question of the hereditary succession may be settled as has been stated above." Surely this may be considered petitioning, and in a moderate way too, when we recollect that Mehemet Ali knew full well that the Porte had no means of enforcing these orders.

What the Ambassador says of the preparations Mehemet Ali was making for resistance is incorrect. I was at Alexandria at the time, and I saw no new preparations; there were a few men completing his unfinished works, which were so ill constructed that if not attended to they would have crumbled to pieces. He was certainly reorganizing his army, after the retreat, which was absolutely necessary; but even had he been preparing for resistance could he be blamed? The Firman that was sent to him was so perfectly absurd that no man in his senses, with an army of 50,000 or 60,000 man, and upwards of 10,000 cavalry, would have accepted such terms from a weak master; and no

set of men, possessed of common understanding, and knowing the relative position of the Porte and Mehemet Ali, would have counselled such a Firman. The Ambassador finishes by recommending the Porte to do nothing till they have heard from Great Britain.

Baron Stürmer was a wiser man, and he recommended the Porte to seek some means of acceding to the entreaties of Mehemet Ali without compromising the dignity of the Sultan\*. Baron Königs-mark and M. Titow declined giving an opinion till they received further instructions †.

On the 29th of March Rechid Pacha and Ahmed Fethi Pachi were displaced, and succeeded by Rifat Bey, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Tahir Pacha, as Capudan Pacha.

On the 31st March Prince Metternich, seeing no end to this question, instructed Baron Stürmer to inform the Divan, that if they did not adopt the modifications to the Firman recommended by the Conference of London, the Emperor of Austria would withdraw altogether from the alliance. Prince Metternich writes most strongly; he observes, "The contents

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 372.

† *Ibid.*, p. 374.

of your despatch of the 17th of March attract our most serious attention, because they prove the existence of a position without precedent in the annals of diplomacy. What, for example, has been the result of the very precise instructions of the 30th of January? What attention have the Divan, and the agents of the Four Courts, paid to the opinion expressed in that document? On the one hand we see the Porte undecided as to the course which it will have to take on the subject of the representations of Mehemet Ali against certain articles of the Firman; and on the other, the Representatives of the Four Powers ignorant how to counsel from the very clear words of the Collective Note above mentioned; in truth, M. le Baron, it is impossible to make it out." This is pretty strong language, which he follows up by saying, "The instructions I sent you on the 26th of March have replied, by anticipation, to your scruples, and I flatter myself you will have considered those instructions as anticipating the orders which each of you have applied for, and not have hesitated to offer the advice they contain.

"Nevertheless, as in the course of this affair we have already been exposed to see ourselves deceived

in our expectations, I now direct you to invite your colleagues to a conference, and acquaint them that the Emperor enjoins you to insist on the Divan admitting the modifications which the other Courts desire, for the interest even of the Porte, to see introduced into certain articles of the Firman. And should your colleagues decline doing so, you are to take the step prescribed, either alone or with those who will join you; and should the Porte refuse to listen, the Emperor will consider himself as restored to entire liberty of position and action\*.”

Lord Palmerston writes under date of the 10th of April†, that he conceives his former despatches and the Collective Notes are sufficient to guide Lord Ponsonby in the advice he shall give, and that it is important the dispute between the Porte and Mehemet Ali should be settled as soon as possible, and that the Government do not think the objection stated by the Ambassador, “that it would not be proper for the Sultan to negotiate with Mehemet Ali,” ought to weigh against the extreme urgency of coming to a final settlement, and that no settlement can be made without a direct communica-

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 378.

† *Ibid.*, p. 364.



tion. "On some points," his Lordship adds, "Mehemet Ali has reason on his side, in others he is clearly and decidedly wrong." The Sultan ought, therefore, without delay, to modify the Firman in the objectionable parts, and explain that other parts cannot be altered without a departure from the terms of the Treaty of the 15th of July.

Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord Ponsonby more peremptorily on the 21st of April, inclosing a copy of Prince Metternich's letter to Baron Stürmer, and acquainting his Lordship that Her Majesty's Government concur in the view taken of the matter by the Austrian Government, and are prepared to take the same course\*.

M. Guizot in a conversation with Mr. Bulwer at Paris, took the same view of the 1st, 3rd, and 6th articles of the Firman I had done, and admitted he disapproved of some of Mehemet Ali's pretensions, and had taken care to tell him so; and that the only way to settle the dispute was by the Allies pressing the Porte on one side, and France pressing Mehemet Ali on the other†.

On the 27th of April, Chekib Effendi, the

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 335.

† *Ibid.*, p. 332.

Ottoman Minister in London, submitted to Lord Palmerston a new plan\*, which was little better than the first: the Porte offered to confer the Government of Egypt, after the death of Mehemet Ali, either on Ibrahim Pacha or any other son that Mehemet Ali might select, on condition that afterwards, the right of selection should devolve on the Porte; if that was not approved of, it was proposed that one of his descendants should be chosen by the members of his family and by the chief people of the country, and proposed to the Sublime Porte, which choice should be confirmed, and the person nominated by the Sultan; the other articles remained the same. Who could have put this wild scheme into the heads of the Divan, it is not easy to conceive; this plan would certainly have settled the succession on Ibrahim Pacha, but on failure it would have given rise to intrigues without measure, and also have put the dignity of the Porte in a worse position than at once fixing the hereditary succession in the family of Mehemet Ali as he wished. The Plenipotentiaries met in London on the 10th of May, and very adroitly passed over the new proposition of Chekib, and repeated their opinion that the

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 389.

succession should go in the right line, from father to son. As to the tribute, they recommended that it should be fixed at a stated sum, subject to revision at certain periods, and they conceived that the difficulty which had arisen relative to promotion, could only be considered as of secondary importance. They finish by saying that they persist in their views communicated to the Porte in the Collective Notes of the 30th of January, 13th of March, and by the Protocol of the 5th of March\*, and that they look upon the submission formally made by Mehemet Ali as absolute, and in consequence the Turco-Egyptian question terminated †.

\* See pages 171, 244, 245.

† See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 404.

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## CHAPTER XX.

Colonel Napier's Account of his Missions to Egypt—Seizure of the Maronite and Druse Emirs and Sheikhs—Their Condition in Egypt—Their Return to Syria—False Assertions of the French—Mission for the Liberation of the Syrian Soldiers—Difficulty of ascertaining their Number—Bad Faith of the Pacha—Infamous Proposal of a Turkish Officer—Sudden termination of the Negotiation—Suspicious conduct of the Egyptians—Liberation of the Syrians.

I HAVE already mentioned that on my way down the river from Cairo, in February, 1841, I met Colonel Napier. He had been dispatched from Syria by Colonel Bridgeman, with orders to bring back the Scheiks and Emirs for whose restoration to liberty I had stipulated in my correspondence with Boghos Bey\*. The Colonel's own account of this mission, and of a subsequent one in which he was employed by the Foreign Office to procure the release of the Syrian troops carried into Egypt, is as follows:—

“Shortly before the allied forces landed in Syria, several of the most influential Maronite and Druse chieftains† of Mount Lebanon being seized by

\* See Vol. I., pp. 254—278.

† “*Maronite Emirs or Princes.*—1. Emir Hyder of Solymah. 2. Emir Faoul Shehab. 3. Emir Faris Shehab. 4. Emir

Ibrahim Pacha, were, together with a great number of their servants and dependants, embarked on board an Egyptian vessel at Acre. On arriving at Alexandria, these unfortunate people, after being loaded with chains, and subjected to every species of indignity, were sent up the Nile to the remote regions of Sennaar, there to work at the Pacha's recently discovered gold mines.

“One of Commodore Napier's stipulations with Boghos Bey being the emancipation of these mountain chiefs\*, after the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians I was sent by Colonel Bridgeman, then in command of the British troops, to accompany these Emirs and Scheiks back to their own country.

“On my arrival in Egypt, in February, 1841, I immediately proceeded on the purport of my mission, and ascended the Nile in quest of my charge. Mehemet Ali, I learnt, had already sent orders for their liberation, and I met them all at Cairo on their way to Alexandria. Finding them here in the most complete state of destitution, clothed in rags, without money, and in want of the common necessaries of life, I made several representations on the subject

Youssouf Shehab. 5. Emir Mahmoud Shehab. 6. Emir Abdallah Umrud. 7. Emir Ali Kaid Bey. 8. Emir Ali Faris.

“*Druse Scheiks or Chieftains.*—9. Scheik Hamoud Naked. 10. Scheik Kassim. 11. Scheik Abbas. 12. Scheik Nickul el Cassim (a Christian).

“And about sixty followers.”

\* See the correspondence on this subject in Vol. I., pp. 254, 258, *et seq.*

to the authorities, which were, however, disregarded ; and it was only through the active mediation of that gallant old soldier Souliman Pacha (who had just returned across the Desert) and on his and my repeated applications, that daily rations were at last served out to these unfortunate people.

“ After numerous vexatious delays, the order for them to proceed to Alexandria at length arrived ; a fine Egyptian corvette was placed at my disposal for their conveyance, and about the middle of March, 1841, I had the satisfaction of landing them, (with one exception\*,) in safety at Beyrout, where they were received with the greatest enthusiasm.

“ Although the return of these Emirs and Scheiks may entirely be attributed to Commodore Napier, the French merchants and priests in Beyrout and Lebanon had the assurance to arrogate to themselves the merit of the act, and widely spread this report in the mountains, which assertion, however, I as flatly contradicted, and completely succeeded in disproving this false and barefaced assertion. Shortly after this I rejoined my regiment at Gibraltar.

“ The Commodore, in thinking of his mountain friends, had not neglected the interests of the unfortunate Syrian soldiers, who, having been pressed into the Egyptian service, were, on the evacuation of Syria, unwillingly dragged after Ibrahim Pacha to

\* “ The Emir Youssouf, the son of the Emir Solyman Shehab, of El Haded, who died of fever in Upper Egypt.”

the 'Land of Bondage.' The Commodore's stipulation with Boghos Bey on the subject was, 'that as soon as the evacuation of Syria should be effected, the whole of these men should be immediately sent back to their country.' However, time wore on, and as Mehemet Ali showed no symptoms of fulfilling his promise, the writer was again sent to Egypt by the Foreign Office, with directions to exact from the Pacha the accomplishment of his engagement to Sir Charles Napier as to the Syrian soldiers, and to accompany those soldiers back to their country, Armed with 'full powers\*,' I left the Rock on the

\* *Viscount Palmerston to Lieutenant-Colonel Napier.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, May 14, 1841.

I have to instruct you, immediately on the receipt of this despatch, to proceed to Alexandria to demand from Mehemet Ali the release of the Syrian soldiers, whom he promised Sir Charles Napier to dismiss; and you will accompany those soldiers back to Syria.

I have applied to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to provide you with a passage on board the steam-vessel which conveys the mail from Gibraltar to Malta; and the Admiral at Malta will be instructed to send you on to Alexandria, and also to make arrangements for conveying the Syrian soldiers, when released by Mehemet Ali, from Egypt to the coast of Syria.

You will report your proceedings in execution of this instruction directly to me, and also to Colonel Bridgeman, or the officer commanding the British detachments on shore in Syria, to whose orders you will be subject while employed on this service; and who will be instructed to direct you to return to your regiment when the service is completed.

I inclose a despatch to Colonel Hodges, directing him to join

26th of May, and arriving at Alexandria about a month later, at once set about the performance of my task, and this I very soon discovered would be no easy one.

“In the first place, it was difficult to ascertain the exact number of surviving Syrians of Ibrahim’s army who had arrived in Egypt, particularly as every obstacle was industriously thrown in the way of obtaining such information. The Egyptian authorities estimated the number of survivors at so low a figure as 3000; however, from all the information I was able to collect, I concluded the sum total to amount to about 10,000 or 12,000; nor was I much out in this calculation, though the extremes of heat and cold, the griping hand of hunger and thirst during the winter retreat over the plains of the Haouran, and across the sands of the Desert, to say nothing of the plague which had been raging in Egypt since their return to the latter country;—all these circumstances combined,—had made sad havoc amongst their devoted bands.

“The Pacha at first sheltered himself under the plea of not being able to take any steps in the matter until he had received the sanction of the Sultan, and thus gained a month or six weeks, until a com-

you in demanding from Mehemet Ali the release of these Syrians; and you will deliver the same to Colonel Hodges, if he should be at Alexandria, when you arrive there. But you will not delay making the demand, if Colonel Hodges should not have arrived.



munication was sent and answer returned from Constantinople. The reply of the Porte arrived in the shape of a Turkish officer of the rank of 'Meeralai,' (Colonel), who, whatever might be his secret instructions, came with professed orders for the immediate liberation of the Syrians. Still no great alacrity was manifested to comply with these injunctions. Time passed away; the month of August arrived, and with it Colonel Barnett, the British Consul-General, who joined me in urging the fulfilment of an engagement which the Pacha continued as perseveringly, to evade. Mustapha Bey, the Turkish Commissioner, *apparently* united with us in our request; but it may not be here irrelevant to remark, as an instance of what reliance may be placed on Turkish faith and honour, that this person had the audacity to propose to me the *enlèvement* of Mehemet Ali on the occasion of a proposed visit of the latter to Her Majesty's steamer *Medea*; adding, that taking the old gentleman captive to Stamboul, would ensure the fortune of us both! I was strongly inclined to turn the tables on the fellow, by letting the Pacha into the secret; but the consequence would probably have been fatal to the offender, who, after all, was perhaps no worse than the majority of Oriental diplomatists.

“How long the negotiation might otherwise have been protracted is hard to say; but, luckily about this time, my representations received great additional weight from the unexpected appearance of a

couple of British line-of-battle ships at Alexandria, the Rodney and Calcutta having received orders to station themselves off that port. Accordingly, on the 7th of September, I received a communication from Boghos Bey, stating that the first detachment of Syrian soldiers, to the amount of 1100, would embark in two of the Pacha's vessels on the following, and sail the succeeding day, offering me, at the same time, accommodation on board; which offer, however, was politely declined.

“Fully relying on the accuracy of this statement, I was, on the following day (the 8th), not a little surprised to find that the vessels, with these troops on board, had gone out of port early on *that* morning. I immediately communicated the circumstance to the Consul-General, and as suspicions were entertained at the time that the Pacha had,—with the concurrence of the Porte,—some design of sending troops to Candia, we concluded that the destination of the people, who were thus clandestinely smuggled off, might not be for Syria. Under this impression, Captain Maunsell, of the Rodney, was immediately communicated with, and he ordered the Egyptian vessels to be watched by the Calcutta and Medea, in which latter vessel I embarked.

“But whatever their originally proposed destination might have been, under this goodly escort, the first batch of Syrians arrived in safety at Beyrout on the 14th of September, and being duly handed over by me to the British and Turkish authorities,—Col.

Rose and Selim Pasha,—were shortly afterwards followed by the remainder of their unfortunate fellow exiles, to the amount of 10,000, who returned to their native shores in the most miserable plight, without pay, many in rags, and the greater part with several months' arrears due to them, some even to the extent of from twenty to twenty-four months!

“So much for the faith, justice, and honour of His Highness Mehemet Ali Pacha!”

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CHAPTER XXI.

Prince Metternich's Orders to the Internuncio—Lord Ponsonby's Correspondence with Baron Stürmer—Hesitation of the Porte—Message from Lord Ponsonby to Rifat Pacha—The new Firman granted—Accepted by Mehemet Ali—Termination of the Eastern Question.

THE peremptory orders of Prince Metternich to Baron Stürmer, to settle the Egyptian question, arrived on the 12th of April at Constantinople, whereupon the Baron wrote to Lord Ponsonby to inform him that his colleagues of Russia and Prussia had agreed to hold to the Porte an uniform language, and requesting to know if he could count on his Lordship's concurrence in this instance\*.

I give his Lordship's answer in full, that the reader may judge for himself: it is an exquisite piece of diplomacy, and judging from it, it would be extremely difficult to decide whether the Ambassador had followed his instructions or not.

“Monsieur l'Internonce,                      “Therapia, April 14, 1841.

“I had the honour to receive this day at a few minutes before 4 o'clock your Excellency's official

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 417.

Note dated the 13th instant, and I reply to it without a moment's delay. Your Excellency has communicated to me a despatch you have received from Vienna, containing directions for the conduct your Excellency is to pursue, and your Excellency expresses your desire that I should act in co-operation with your Excellency and both our colleagues of Russia and Prussia, in furtherance of the measure you are directed to adopt. If I am not in error, the measure you are to take, is to make known to the Sublime Porte the opinions and views of the Conference at London, as that opinion, or those views, are stated and exposed in the Collective Note of the Representatives of the Four Powers addressed to Chekib Effendi, and dated 13th of March, 1841, and in Lord Palmerston's instructions, dated 16th of March, 1841, and addressed to me.

“I have already had the honour to acquaint you, that I had not only made known to the Ottoman Minister the contents of those documents, stating at the same time the opinion I entertained of the anxiety of the Allies to bring the Egyptian Question to a termination at any rate; but I also communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the Collective Note and Lord Palmerston's instructions in original. Your Excellency will therefore be satisfied that I have already done in my individual capacity that which is so fervently urged in the despatch your Excellency has received.

“Your Excellency will, I am sure, have the

goodness to acquaint me what you and our colleagues may desire to have done further for making known the opinion and views of the Conference to the Sublime Porte; I mean the mode of acting. Your Excellency is, no doubt, fully informed of the fact that the Ottoman Ministers have come to a decision to modify the Article of succession to the government of Egypt, with the view of rendering it agreeable to the wishes of the Conference; that the Ottoman Ministers have also modified, with a similar intention, the Article of the military rank to be conferred by the Pacha of Egypt; and that they are engaged in considering in what manner the Article of tribute may be modified so as to meet the views of the Conference.

“Your Excellency is also acquainted with the disposition manifested in the instructions sent by Rechid Pacha to Chekib Effendi, to arrange this last-mentioned point; and no doubt your Excellency will esteem that to be an evidence from which we may draw the conclusion, that the Sublime Porte is desirous to gratify the wishes of the High Allies of the Sultan, and may be supposed likely to act in the spirit of concession whenever the wishes of those Powers shall have been made known to the Sublime Porte.

“I have, &c.,  
(Signed) “PONSONBY.”

“The Baron de Stürmer.”

His Lordship, under the same date, writes to Lord Palmerston that the Porte had given way to the wish of the Allies, and come to the resolution that the government of Egypt should be inherited by the eldest son; that Mehemet Ali should have the right to appoint officers to the army below the rank of General of Brigade, and that the tribute should be fixed at a stated sum.

The Porte, still in doubt, or wishing for delay, asked Lord Ponsonby what were his precise notions relative to the execution in Egypt of the laws of the Sublime Porte as laid down in the Separate Act of the Treaty of Alliance, as it could not know what the Allied Powers would say should Mehemet Ali not fulfil that part of the Treaty. To which Lord Ponsonby replies, that he is quite ignorant what will be the opinion of the Allies on this point, and he therefore cannot give advice.

Baron Stürmer, though an old diplomatist, seems to have been puzzled with Lord Ponsonby's letter to him, and did not reply. This called forth another letter, which with the reply I give.

“Monsieur l'Internonce,      “Therapia, April 19, 1841.

“On the 14th instant I had the honour to receive an official Note from your Excellency desir-

ing me to inform you if I was disposed to co-operate with your Excellency and our colleagues in carrying into effect the instructions received from our Courts, &c., &c.

“ I had the honour to reply to your Excellency’s note the same day, and after having, at some length, explained what my conduct had been, (being desirous to concur with my colleagues,) I requested your Excellency to have the goodness to inform me in what way your Excellency and our colleagues desired that I should act, in furtherance of the instructions of our Governments.

“ This is the fifth day since I sent my note, and not having had the honour to hear from you, I take the liberty to express my hope, that your Excellency will favour me with a reply, as it is necessary for me to state to my Government everything connected with this affair.

“ I have, &c.,

(Signed) “ PONSONBY.”

“ The Baron de Stürmer.”

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“ M. l’Ambassadeur, “ Constantinople, April 21, 1841.

“ I received yesterday morning the letter which your Excellency did me the honour to address to me the day before yesterday.

“ The Sultan having at length adopted with regard to the Pacha of Egypt resolutions in conformity with the advice and wishes of his august Allies, and those resolutions having yesterday been



announced to us officially, our task, it appears to me, is accomplished. The question which you have the goodness to ask me, M. l'Ambassadeur, as to the kind of co-operation which my colleagues of Russia and Prussia and myself expected from you, becomes therefore unnecessary.

“If I have not replied to that same question which was already contained in your letter of the 13th of this month, it is because you had assured me therein that you had done everything which had depended upon you, by communicating to the Porte the acts of the Conference of London and Lord Palmerston's instructions of the 16th of March, and in acquainting it at the same time with the strong desire of the Allied Powers to see the Egyptian affair terminated ‘at any rate.’ Now, that was precisely what we wished to propose to your Excellency to do, and there remained nothing more for us to ask you.

“Be pleased, &c.,  
(Signed) “STURMER.”

“Viscount Ponsonby.”

The Porte, though they expressed their satisfaction with the plan proposed by the Representatives of the Four Powers, were extremely slow in following it out, and the British Ambassador, who seemed now to be disciplined into obedience by Prince Metternich and Lord Palmerston's peremp-

tory instructions, on the 12th of May directed his dragoman to tell Rifat Pacha that if any further delay took place, he should feel it necessary to call upon his colleagues to support him in inquiring of the Sublime Porte the cause of the delay\*. This letter quickened the motions of the Divan; and on the 22nd of May the new Firman was laid before the Allied Ministers, and approved of by them†. This Firman complied with Mehemet Ali's demands; it left Constantinople on the 2nd of June, arrived at Alexandria on the 7th, was accepted by Mehemet Ali, and was publicly read on the 10th‡.

Thus terminated this long protracted question, which might have been as easily settled after the signing of my Convention on the 28th November, 1840, as it was on the 10th June, 1841, and without at all compromising the honour or dignity of the Porte, who the reader has seen was, through the rejection of my arrangement, obliged to make concession to a conquered vassal. Who was the principal adviser of the Sultan the reader will be able to judge by what I have stated; and if that is not sufficiently satisfactory, he may turn over the

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part III., p. 433.

† *Ibid.*, p. 435.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 472.

*Levant Correspondence*, where he will find that the British Ambassador, even at the eleventh hour, lent a willing ear to every report which designing people were too happy to make to him, prejudicial to Mehemet Ali.

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## CHAPTER XXII.

Review of the Turco-Egyptian Question—Mehemet Ali not the Aggressor—Hostile Preparations of the Porte—Representations of the Allied Powers—What Interests affected by the Independence of Mehemet Ali—Views of France—Designs of Russia.

THE Syrian and Egyptian question being now brought to a close, by the total evacuation of the former country, and Mehemet Ali's establishment in the hereditary pachalic of Egypt almost on his own terms, it is time to inquire what has been gained by measures that had well nigh plunged Europe into a war, the end of which no man could have foreseen.

I think every impartial man who has read the correspondence must allow that Mehemet Ali was not the aggressor. It is quite true he was anxious to be independent, and no wonder that a man who had acquired such extensive possessions by the sword should be desirous of emancipating himself from a weak master. I am not going to justify Mehemet Ali's first invasion of Syria: that would have been the time for the Allies to have discouraged him, and a naval force sent off Acre would have been quite

sufficient to have put an end to his ambitious designs; but nothing of the sort was done. Mehemet Ali was allowed to follow up one victory after another, till his road to Constantinople was open, and the Turks, having been refused assistance by their friends, called in the Russians to protect them; and the Treaty of Kutayah settled for that time the Eastern question.

The Allied Powers, on learning that preparations were making for war at Constantinople, instructed their Ambassadors to urge the Porte to preserve peace. At the same time Russia took the initiative, and instructed her Consul to desire Mehemet Ali to recall Ibrahim, and to withdraw the Egyptian army to Damascus. What right had Russia, after consenting to the Treaty of Kutayah, to make such a proposal? Would it not have been safer and wiser, had the Allied Powers preserved the *status quo*, or even persuaded the Porte to acknowledge Mehemet Ali at once, and confer on him the government of the countries he had conquered, stipulating at the same time that he should establish a milder government in his extensive possessions? It had been proved that Turkey, weak as she was, was entirely incapable of governing her distant provinces; and would it not

have been better to have given her a powerful ally who would have been interested in protecting her against her natural enemy, Russia, than curtailing his power, by restoring provinces which she had not been able to govern, and at best giving her a discontented vassal? It may be argued that such a proceeding would have been dismembering the Turkish empire: I answer, that was already done by the Treaty of Kutayah, and it would have been much safer to have let things alone.

Candia, which was entirely separate both from Egypt and Syria, might have been restored to the Porte; this would have given her more real strength than she is ever likely to receive from her very imperfect possession of Syria.

Let us now examine whose interests would have been affected by giving Mehemet Ali independence. No power in Europe is so much interested in keeping well with Mehemet Ali as Great Britain, and no power is more aware of that than France; for in the very first conversation Count Molé had with Lord Granville\* he alluded to the subject, and the French Government have never let slip an opportunity of doing acts of kindness to Mehemet Ali,

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part I., p. 1.

so as to keep him as much out of our hands as possible, and I fear they have too well succeeded. France had opened a considerable trade with Egypt, and she entertained great fears that English enterprise would supplant her; no wonder, then, that she should have befriended the Pacha in every possible way. France is as well aware as we are, that steam navigation having got to such perfection, Egypt has become almost necessary to England as the half-way house to India, and indeed ought to be an English colony. Now if we wished to weaken Mehemet Ali, with a view, in the event of the break-up of the Turkish empire, which is not far distant, to have seized Egypt as our share of the spoil, we were perfectly right in our policy; or even, had we not looked so far ahead, it might, perhaps, have been politic to have confined Mehemet Ali to Egypt, so that in the event of his stopping the road to India by Suez, we might have the road of the Euphrates open, one remaining in the possession of the Ottoman empire, and the other in that of the Pacha of Egypt. It is not, however, usual for a Government to quarrel with their own interests, and it is so decidedly the advantage of the Pacha of Egypt to facilitate, by every possible means, the passage across the

Isthmus of Suez, that on the whole I believe the soundest policy of Great Britain would have been to have supported Mehemet Ali, and I have not the smallest doubt that when France saw we were committed against him, she seized that opportunity of quitting the alliance in order to make the Pacha her firm friend.

France, however, though she had all the desire to protect the Pacha, even at the risk of war, with match lighted ready to put to the gun, hesitated, and, fortunately for Europe at large, Louis Philippe had either not nerve to begin the strife, or being desirous of preserving peace, refused to adopt M. Thiers' plan of sending the French fleet to Alexandria. The Ministers resigned, and Europe was saved from a general conflagration.

What aid France actually promised to the Pacha, or whether she ever decidedly promised him any, we do not know, but it is not to be supposed he would have resisted the wishes of the Allied Powers without some hope of assistance at the last moment. The fall of Acre opened the Pacha's eyes; he turned his back on France, and listened to English counsels, which guided him for a while. But the hostile conduct of our Ambassador



at Constantinople so disgusted him, that he again turned to France, who received him with open arms, and thus completely destroyed the English influence in Egypt.

I think I have shown that England had no immediate reason to clip the Pacha's wings, and that France supported him because England was against him. To Prussia it must have been quite indifferent whether Mehemet Ali kept possession of Syria or not; nor do I see what interest Austria could possibly have in displacing him—quite the contrary. Russia cannot be a pleasant neighbour to Austria; and the Porte is a feeble ally. By raising Mehemet Ali the Porte would have been strengthened; and indeed, the Pacha, in possession of Syria and Egypt, would have been as much interested in controlling the power of Russia as the Sultan himself. Who then was to gain by reducing the power of Mehemet Ali? Russia! and Russia alone.

The Emperor of that great and powerful state saw clearly that the duration of the Ottoman empire was drawing to a close; and that, sooner or later, Russia would be the greatest gainer by its dissolution. It is not then to be wondered at that she should be content to wait her time, and accept the

legacy that would fall in to her at its demise ; and all she had to do was to prevent a skilful practitioner coming to her assistance. That practitioner was Mehemet Ali ; and had he been supported by France, England, Austria, and Prussia, his independence, granted by the Porte and guaranteed by those Powers, would have been a far greater blow on Russia than she has received for many years ; and which blow, I have no doubt, she would have used every effort to avert. We, however, fell into her views ; the Treaty of the 15th of July was signed ; Mehemet Ali has been sent back to Egypt ; the Syrian provinces restored to the Porte, and she has become weaker than ever.

Various reasons have been given for Mehemet Ali's obstinate refusal to listen to the advice of the Allies. At one time it was supposed he was backed by Russia, who wished for an excuse to come to Constantinople for the second time ; and, indeed, after the battle of Nizib, and the defection of the Turkish fleet, that was my opinion. To check Russia, I always thought that the combined fleets should have proceeded at once to Constantinople, which was the thing, of all others, the Emperor wished to avoid ; and Count Nesselrode distinctly stated to

Count Medem, that if a French fleet appeared in the sea of Marmora, he would withdraw the Ambassador, and then take such measures as he saw necessary to re-establish the independence of the Porte\*.

When France began to take a different view of the question from the other Powers, and support Mehemet Ali, Russia at once came forward, and despatched Baron Brunnow to England with a letter from the Emperor to the Queen. Part of the proposal of Russia was that the French and English should appear off Alexandria, while the Russian fleet should anchor in the Bosphorus. This France most properly and most decidedly objected to. Lord Palmerston took the same view; and though he expressed himself perfectly satisfied with the good intentions of Russia, he was of opinion that if it was necessary for a Russian force to appear in the Bosphorus, a British force should be there also. To this, as might be expected, Baron Brunnow objected, and lamented that the British Government had not more reliance on the good faith of Russia. After various discussions, unnecessary to enter upon here, Russia gave up the point of being the sole protector of Constantinople, and consented to a small English

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part I., p. 307.

force being sent there in the event of the Russian fleet appearing in the Bosphorus\*. France in consequence withdrew from the alliance, and the Four Powers decided so far to fall into the views of Russia as to put down Mehemet Ali, who was the best supporter the Ottoman empire could have had, and give back Syria to the Porte, and thereby accelerate her fall.

The defection of France brought the other Powers closer together; and the insurrection breaking out in Lebanon hastened the signing of the Treaty of the 15th of July. We have seen that the movement was put down by the energy of the Pacha; and that he refused the conditions that were offered to him, and determined to defend himself; and, under all circumstances, I think he was right. He had good intelligence from Constantinople; he knew the Turkish Government could only spare a very small force; he knew we had only 1500 marines in the fleet; he was quite certain that Prussia would send no troops to Syria; and he did not think that Austria would; and he was sensible that Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia, would be very unwilling to call in the military assistance of Russia, which would

\* See *Levant Papers*, Part I., p. 553.

also be disagreeable to the Porte. Besides this, he had a very large army in Syria, which had always been victorious, and was well commanded, and the season of the year was far advanced, and not a safe harbour or anchorage (with the exception of Scanderoun, which was too far distant) on the coast where our ships could take shelter in the winter. In addition to all this, he was backed by France, and was determined to put every thing to the hazard of a die; and had his views been properly followed up, he must have succeeded.

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## CHAPTER XXIII.

Errors of the Pacha—His proper course of Action—Mismanagement of Ibrahim Pacha in Syria—Gain or Loss of Turkey by the Acquisition of Syria—Conduct of the Turks in Lebanon—Quarrels of the Mountaineers—Ill treatment of the Prince—Consequent hatred of Turkish rule—Conclusion.

THE first error Mehemet Ali committed was not immediately ordering Ibrahim to march on Scutari after the battle of Nizib. At that time the Allies had not come to a final arrangement, and the British and French fleets were not collected in Besika Bay. Had he done that at once, Russia would certainly have come down to Constantinople with a fleet and army; France would have got alarmed, and probably ordered her fleet up the Dardanelles; Great Britain would have done the same. Russia would have urged the Porte to prevent it, which she would have been obliged to have complied with, and the probability is that Europe would have been set by the ears, and in the struggle Mehemet Ali would most likely have retained the government of Syria; indeed, both France and England would have been obliged to have made use of Mehemet Ali against

Russia, and the Porte, who must have joined with Russia in preventing the fleets from forcing the Dardanelles. His second error was, in not concentrating his army the moment he resolved on resisting the decision of the Allies.

At the time we landed in D'Jounie Bay, the Egyptian army in Syria could not have consisted of less than 80,000 men of all arms. They were distributed, it is true, in various parts of the country. Ibrahim Pacha ought to have divined our plan of operations the moment we landed; he ought also to have ascertained from his spies, (which we could not prevent,) the number of our troops, and the works we were throwing up, which of themselves showed our weakness. He must have also known how slow the mountaineers were in coming in in the first instance for arms. Seeing all this, had he acted with vigour, and set his troops in motion from Tripoli, he would first have saved D'Jebail, then occupied Gazir, and prevented the Emir Abdallah from joining our standard. Had Osman Pacha advanced at the same time from Balbeck, and occupied Antura and the strong ground in front of our advanced posts, while Souliman Pacha, strengthening himself at Beyrout with a couple of thousand men

from Sidon, might have marched with his army from Beyrout, and occupied the convents and high grounds above the Nahr-el-Kelb, and threatened an advance at the same time at the mouth of the river, he would, in the first place, have prevented a single mountaineer from joining our standard, and the overwhelming force which he would have mustered almost within shot of us, would have been quite sufficient, without firing a gun, to have made us pack up our traps and carry the Turkish troops to Cyprus. By some strange fatality he remained inactive; we gained confidence; were successful in all our enterprises; desertion began in Ibrahim's army, which was just as likely to have begun in our's; and when at last Ibrahim made an effort, and advanced to Beckfaya and Boharsof, instead of collecting the whole of his forces, and driving us from Ornagacuan, he did not bring half his troops, and allowed himself to be attacked on both flanks, front and rear, and was defeated. Still the game was not up with him; withdrawing his troops from Tripoli, Aleppo, Adana, and concentrating the whole at Zachle, Malaka, and Damascus, and seeing we hesitated in following up our successes, he ought to have taken advantage of the absence of the squadron



at Acre, and the weakening of the garrison at Beyrout, and pushed on the latter place, which he would have taken with ease, and found abundance of provisions. He should then have marched on Sidon, which probably would have shared the same fate.

These movements being communicated to the Governor of Acre, would have encouraged him to hold out; and if he was forced to withdraw, he could have joined Ibrahim, and again marched on Acre, where they would have found a practicable breach; and most certainly, at that season of the year, the British squadron would not have remained in so open an anchorage.

Such vigorous measures would have had a great effect on France, and there is no knowing what might have happened. This was not done; and Ibrahim, without making one effort to draw our attention from Acre, or to profit by our absence, remained inactive, and to his astonishment, heard of the surrender of that renowned fortress, which he had not in the least calculated upon. Still his cause was not lost; our troops were divided in Beyrout, Sidon, Tyre, and Acre, and, I believe, we had also some at Tripoli.

The gale of the 29th of November alarmed the Admiral for the safety of the squadron. The coast was abandoned, except by a steamer or two, and there was nothing whatever to have prevented Ibrahim from again advancing, and recovering all his losses, and which he would have been perfectly justified in doing when the Convention was rejected. Why he did not, to every military man acquainted with the country, and with our weakness, must be a matter of surprise.

Had any of these operations I have described been put in force, Mehemet Ali would have been now in Syria, and a war among the European Powers in all probability would have been raging.

We will now examine what Turkey has gained by the recovery of the Syrian provinces. She has got back her fleet, which will never be of the least use to her, and is an expensive floating ornament to the Seraglio. Situated as the Turkish empire is, with a rapid stream cutting her in two, it is evident her only proper defence is a fleet of steamboats; with these, and the Bosphorus and Hellespont properly fortified, she may defy attacks either from the north or the south, and have a rapid means of communicating with her islands and possessions

on the Syrian coast, and of suddenly transporting troops to any part of her extensive empire. The Turks are not sailors, and never will be, and are therefore much better adapted to serve in vessels moved by steam than in line-of-battle ships, where seamanship cannot be dispensed with.

The Porte has regained Syria, and with it a most extensive kingdom and discontented population, and instead of keeping her army at home to defend her against Russia, her natural enemy, she is obliged to maintain a large force in Syria to keep down her justly irritated subjects, whom she has neither the talent nor inclination to govern either with prudence or decency. Syria is divided, as before, into pachalics, and influential Turks are appointed, as usual, to govern them. There is neither law nor justice. The Turk sits all day smoking his pipe, and the people are plundered by their underlings as usual; and they now feel they were better off under the government of Mehemet Ali than they are now under their former masters. They pay the taxes they formerly did under the Porte; they pay Mehemet Ali's taxes in addition, and are plundered into the bargain by their old rulers. Property of every description is less protected than it was,

trade destroyed, and the roads insecure throughout the country. As for Mount Lebanon, whose population was the first to come forward and join our bands, and whose position the Allies and the Turks themselves promised to alleviate—how have they been treated? As yet they have received little or no remuneration for the burning of their villages and destruction of their property by Ibrahim Pacha, in revenge for their having joined the standard of the Sultan. They have been badly paid for the losses we ourselves caused them at D'Jounie, at Beyrout, Acre, and Sidon. The old feuds between the Maronites and Druses, which had nearly subsided, have been fomented by their rulers, and I fear Mehemet Ali himself, as might have been foreseen, has not been altogether blameless in assisting to set them by the ears.

In the course of my work it has been shown that the Maronites were the first to take up arms in the cause of the Sultan. The Druses being more under the influence of the old Emir Bechir, came forward at a later period, and when the war was nearly finished, they became jealous of the Maronites; and the Turks, instead of by prudent management discouraging these feelings, rather

fomented them, with the view of weakening both. The mountaineers had been armed during the insurrection, and they are looked upon more as enemies, than friends who had assisted in bringing them back to power.

In the beginning of November, 1841, about the period when the taxes for the support of the local government were to be raised, the chiefs of the Druses requested the Grand Prince to attend at Deir-el-Kamar, the seat of government, to consider how the taxes were to be distributed; this being acceded to, they sent orders to the different tribes to come armed to the meeting, which was certainly not a very peaceable way of settling who was to bear the burden of taxation. These tribes concealed themselves in the houses of the Scheiks of the family of Abu Bekr, in Deir-el-Kamar, and, without provocation, sallied out of their houses, set fire to the town in several places, and plundered and murdered several of the peaceable inhabitants. The Maronites, taken entirely by surprise, suffered very considerably at first, but being rallied by their leaders took up arms, and a regular battle ensued, which lasted with occasional intermission for several days. The Prince defended himself in his palace,

but seeing the Druses were the strongest, repeatedly sent to Selim Pacha, who commanded the Ottoman troops at Beyrout, for assistance; none, however, arrived. This was exactly what the Turks wanted—the more men killed on each side, and the more exasperated they became against each other, the better they were satisfied. “Divide and Govern,” was their motto.

When the news of this unfortunate rencontre came to the knowledge of our gallant Consul-General, Colonel Rose, he immediately set out for the mountains, and at imminent hazard to himself, succeeded in putting an end, for a time, to the broil. Unfortunately, however, the Maronite Christians hearing of the danger of their countrymen at Deir-el-Kamar, sent a strong force to relieve them; this, as might be expected, again brought the Druses into the field, and again the Grand Prince sent to Selim Pacha, but his appeal to him was in vain, and the Druses being the strongest, he was besieged in his palace for twenty-four days.

Instead of Turkish troops being sent to put down the insurrection and relieve the Prince, he received orders to repair to Beyrout; and his provision and ammunition being expended, he was

obliged to capitulate with the Druse Scheiks, who guaranteed his safety and that of his retinue and their property; and though the negotiations were carried on through the medium of the messenger sent by Selim Pacha, no sooner had the Prince quitted his residence, than the Druses rushed upon them, seized their arms, horses, and clothes, and even stripped them to their shirts. The Prince himself did not escape this indignity. On his arrival at Beyrout he made strong and repeated representations to Selim Pacha, and entreated him to assist in putting down the civil war, but in vain. The fact is, Selim Pacha was acting under the orders of the Porte, who only wanted a good excuse to put an end to the government of the ruling Prince.

Shortly after this the Porte threw off the mask; the Grand Prince was arrested and sent to Constantinople, and Omar Pacha, a German who had entered into the Turkish service, and served under my orders in Syria, was appointed by the Porte Governor of Lebanon. He may be a good man enough; but certainly, a Christian having changed his religion was not a fit man to govern the Christians of Lebanon. The poor Prince has lost the whole of his

property, and his family is brought to ruin. This is the gratitude of the Porte ; this is the reward he has obtained for his eminent services ; and this is the way the Ottoman Government have treated their allies.

We are informed by Sir Robert Peel that our Ambassador at Constantinople has protested against these acts, and also against the Porte sending Albanian troops (who are little better than barbarians) into Syria, and that they have promised to remove Omar Pacha, and restrict the services of the Albanians to garrison duty only. How far the Porte will keep their promise we shall see ; but, I confess, with such a man as Izzet Pacha at the head of the Turkish Government, and who is only putting into execution what he planned when in Syria, and for which he was recalled, I confess I have no reliance upon him, or indeed upon any Turkish Pacha. They are all alike, and quite incapable of preventing the fate of the Ottoman empire, which is tottering to its base, and the sooner it goes the better ; it is unworthy of preserving.

Had my advice been followed, and the seaports of Lebanon, the Bekaa, and Anti-Lebanon, been put under the jurisdiction of the Grand Prince, assisted



by a council of the powerful Emirs, and the Turkish troops removed entirely from his territory, causing him to pay a reasonable tribute to the Porte, the whole Mountain would have been bound by gratitude to the Sultan, and would have assisted him to keep the rest of Syria in order. As it is now, there is nothing but the most inveterate hatred existing against the Turkish Government; and I most sincerely hope the different sects will unite, and make a noble effort to drive their miserable and tyrannical rulers out of their fine country. Cultivation and commerce would then revive; a field would be opened to British enterprise, and we might recover the influence we had in the mountains, and which has been lost, in consequence of the inhabitants believing that we have not made use of our power to obtain from the Porte all that was so liberally promised them when we were in want of their assistance.

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I CANNOT close this work without returning my best thanks to all the officers and men who served in the squadron that Sir Robert Stopford did me the honour of putting under my command. The very laborious services they performed in D'Jounie Bay is above all praise ; this was no question of sending a Lieutenant and a working party on shore ; the whole of the ships' companies were constantly employed, headed by their Captains. Captain Reynolds was my second in the landing at D'Jounie, and continued his unremitted exertions till he was sent off Alexandria. Captain Berkeley was my second on the attack at Sidon, and both of us regretted that I could not employ him in the assault on shore ; but it was absolutely necessary that he should remain on board the Thunderer to regulate the firing as we advanced, and to cover our retreat if necessary. Nor am I less obliged to Captain Maunsell, of the Rodney, who was my ambassador to Mehemet Ali, and who with great decision landed at once at the Palace and opened the negotiations. Indeed, all the officers, both of the Navy and Marines, as well as Selim

Pacha, General Jochmus, Omar Bey, and the whole of the Turkish officers, did their duty to my entire satisfaction, and I should be but too proud to command such a force on another occasion. The merits of Admiral Walker are too well known to make it necessary for me to say one word in his praise.

I must also take this opportunity of thanking the Commander-in-Chief for having placed the Allied force under my direction when the ill health of Sir Charles Smith obliged him to proceed to Constantinople.

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## APPENDIX.

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### No. I.

INSTRUCTIONS given by the SULTAN to HAFIZ PACHA, found at the Turkish Head-Quarters after the battle of Nizib\*.

*Plan of march of the Army of the Sultan against Egypt, in nine Articles.*

SEEING that the Egyptian Government will never submit to its Sovereign, it is very probable that in the approaching summer it may declare and obtain its independence. As all my efforts and all my calculations have been useless, there is nothing but war which will render me master of that province, and which will unite it to the empire of the Osmanlis, and for its execution and success good dispositions must be taken.

ART. I.—For the success of this enterprise, rigorous laws must be established; in the public orders the grade of Seraskier shall be promised to all the Ferik Pachas, if they do not betray their trust or intrigue; but if they fail in their duties,

\* Forwarded by Colonel Campbell to Lord Ponsonby, and published in the *Levant Papers*, Part I., pp. 362—365.

they shall be immediately turned out of the service.

ART. II.—According to this plan, the army ought to consist of from 60,000 to 70,000 men, with 120 pieces of cannon, as follows: 40,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry, 5,000 artillery and engineers, and the remaining 10,000 irregular troops.

ART. III.—Wherever the enemy shall be met, he should be attacked by the artillery; it is necessary that the Commander-in-Chief should exercise the artillery daily in line of battle.

ART. IV.—To prevent the Egyptians from making a sudden attack upon Marash, it is necessary that this town be fortified and guarded by a strong body of troops. After having taken these measures, the Commander-in-Chief will march upon Aleppo, and from thence to Damascus, and then to Acre, to take possession of that fortress, and not to lose time in obtaining possession of all the said towns. After the capture of Acre, he must leave a strong body of troops in that place, and march direct upon Egypt. The taking of Acre shall be considered the first conquest of this war; this enterprise may, perhaps, be accomplished within four or five months; and if the Egyptian Government does not return under the dominion of the empire, let the Commander-in-Chief know that the war will be indefinite, and he must take measures in consequence; for the conquest of Egypt being the second achievement, four or five months will be necessary

for the success of this second enterprise. According to this calculation, the important possession of Syria and Egypt will require eleven months or a year to accomplish.

ART. V.—According to the information we have, Solyman Pacha is not content with his position. A man of so much importance should be got rid of. An officer should be sent to him to endeavour by all means to gain him over to our side. Solyman Pacha being a European, one of our French officers must be sent to him to endeavour to gain him over to us.

ART. VI.—Mehemet Ali, up to the present time, has given no higher grade to Arabs than that of Captain, whilst to Christians he gives the rank of Colonel, General, and Pacha; in our camp, there are Arabs who have the rank of Pacha. Such being the case, he who deserts to us with thirty soldiers, shall receive the rank of Lieutenant; and he who deserts with from thirty to one hundred soldiers, the rank of Captain; and if a Commandant deserts with his battalion, the rank of Colonel; and those who intrigue in the Egyptian army to make the soldiers revolt, whether he be an officer or Colonel, shall obtain high grades with us. In order to put this project into execution, it is necessary to write proclamations and to scatter them in the Egyptian camp by means of spies.

ART. VII.—The Druses, the Mutualis, who are in the Egyptian army, the chiefs of tribes, and the people who are under the dominion of Mehemet Ali,

should be encouraged by promises to embrace our party. Accordingly their intentions should be seconded, and they should be granted all they desire; and the better to succeed in this enterprise, it is necessary that Hafiz Pacha should have with him 7000 or 8000 purses, to distribute money where he judges it convenient and useful.

ART. VIII.—In the army of Mehemet Ali Pacha, there are a great many European *employés*, by means of whom all his plans and projects may be known. It is necessary, in order to be well informed, to send spies among them, in order that the success of the war, which is about to open in the approaching summer, may be ensured.

ART. IX.—In order to disembark 10,000 or 12,000 men at Tripoli, the squadron must be put in movement, and as soon as the *corps d'armée* shall march from Marash, it is necessary to enter into communication with the Druses, the Mutualis, and other Cabaïles. For the success of this enterprise, thirty or forty pieces of field artillery, from 10,000 to 15,000 muskets, with ammunition and *materiel*, must be prepared to be sent by sea on the first demand. The persons charged with this enterprise should employ all their diligence in order that these affairs may terminate as soon as possible.

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No. II. See Vol. I., page 18.

TRANSLATION of a PETITION (in Copy) from the NATIONS and INHABITANTS of MOUNT LEBANON and SYRIA, to Sultan ABDUL MEDJID of Constantinople.

A PETITION.

WE humbly supplicate, at the threshold of the Divan of the Mighty Sovereign, the Benevolent and Just, the Venerated Authority and Daring Lion, the Lord of the Sword and of the Pen—(viz. of Death and Mercy)—the Shadow of God over the Earth, our Honoured Sultan, Abdul Medjid Khan, may God perpetuate the days of his flourishing reign for ever and ever, Amen.

That the frightful tyranny and the horrible oppression and cruelty under which Mehemet Ali Pacha has belaboured us—(he who pretends to be as one of your Majesty's slaves, but who, in fact, has dared to be treacherous to your most illustrious and venerated defunct Father, of blessed memory, and whose abode now may be Paradise)—have compelled us to throw ourselves at the feet of your Imperial Throne, which is adorned with the rays of justice and mercy,—spreading our supplicating arms towards your Majesty's paternal and sublime clemency, that you may pleased to turn your eye towards our protection and safety,—knowing as we do how vast and extensive the equity of your Majesty's Government, which is so renowned throughout the world.—and how immense and unlimited your Majesty's



mercy and clemency; wherefore our hearts burn with the fire of the desire of attaining that happiness also, which is enjoyed by all those fortunate beings who are your subjects. What crime have we committed to cause your Majesty's resplendent face to be turned away from us, and thereby we should be left to be thrashed under the edges of an unbearable tyranny and of an insupportable iniquity and oppression, while our fathers and forefathers, ever since a period of four hundred years, have continually enjoyed the happiness and comfort of the protection of your Majesty's Imperial Standard? We are their sons, and prepared to follow their steps, that we may inherit the same happiness which they enjoyed for so many centuries, to the great glory of your Majesty's Imperial Dynasty.

We therefore pray and supplicate your paternal benignity and clemency not to abandon us, and to let it be said that a vast and numerous population has been left to be immolated as a sacrifice to the selfish ambition and sordid avarice of a single man, a tyrant, totally void of feeling and humanity, who not only proved himself ungrateful to, and forgetful of, your Majesty's great bounty to him, but dared, most perfidiously, to turn his sword towards your sacred person. Seeing ourselves thus placed in this most wretched and miserable condition, bordering on the last degree of our total ruin and annihilation, we have got up and raised your Majesty's mighty Standard in defence of the legitimate and lawful

rights of your Imperial Sovereignty over us, for which we shall continue to fight to the last breath of our existence; and therefore we trust to the Divine aid of the Almighty, and in your Majesty's assistance, to overpower that common enemy of yours and ours, and to drive him away from your dominions.

Hence, we again supplicate and implore the Throne of your Majesty's universal mercy and clemency, to turn your royal face towards us with your mighty aid and assistance,—especially, our said enemy having stopped all the roads against us by land and also by sea, and thereby prevents us receiving any supply of the necessary warlike stores we are in need of; and as we have no fleet to oppose his, we most earnestly entreat your Majesty to afford us the needful recourse for the opening of the roads, &c.; otherwise, we shall be, God forbid, unavoidably placed in a most distressing state, and in imminent ruin. But no, never will your Majesty's imperial and paternal mercy and benevolence allow such a disastrous calamity to befall us! And we pray the Almighty God to preserve your sacred person, and to perpetuate the days of your glorious reign with happiness and victory.

Signed and Sealed by your Majesty's Slaves.

(No Date)

THE NATION OF MUTUALI.

THE NATION OF DRUSE.

THE CHRISTIAN NATION.

FARIS HONEISH, &c., &c.

**LETTER** addressed by the **INHABITANTS** of **MOUNT LEBANON** to his Excellency the **BRITISH AMBASSADOR**.

After the usual Compliments, (Translation.)

The humanity which so eminently distinguishes all the acts of the British Government,—the readiness with which it steps forward to the assistance of the oppressed,—the anxiety that it displays to make the people of the East share in the benefits enjoyed by that portion of their fellow-creatures that are blessed with happier Governments,—embolden the Syrians to appeal to England for her mediation to rescue them from the destruction with which Mehemet Ali threatens them now.

Since the invasion of Syria by Mehemet Ali, he has trampled us under foot by an oppression which knows no bounds, and by a tyranny the most atrocious and cruel.

For the last eight years, we have acceded to all his demands, and because he has left us nothing more to give him, he menaces us with extermination; nor will his unbounded rapacity be satisfied until he drinks the very blood of our children, and satiates the licentiousness of his soldiers with the honour of our families. Driven to despair, we have taken up arms for the defence of our lives, and to guard our dwellings from fire and ourselves from the sword with which he threatens to erase us from among nations.

Abandoned by the world, we implore the protection of Great Britain. In the humanity of her

Government, and in the generosity of one of the greatest and most powerful nations, rest all our hopes in this cruel crisis. All that we demand is, to be allowed to return to our legitimate Sovereign Abdul Medjid,—a natural desire coming from loyal subjects. Why should two millions and a-half of His Highness' subjects be sacrificed to the personal ambition of one man, who himself, forgetful of the benefits conferred upon him, has turned his sword against the bosom of his own Sovereign?

We have but one prayer,—we seek but to be allowed to enjoy, in common with the rest of His Highness' subjects, the rights and privileges secured to them by the Hatti-Sheriff; and it is in this hope that we submit our petition to your Excellency, praying that you will be pleased to lay it before the "Divan" of Great Britain, the Ally of our august Master Abdul Medjid, with a request that we may be honoured with a speedy glad tidings, before we are utterly destroyed by the Governor of Egypt.

May the Almighty prolong the days of your Excellency with happiness to the end of time.

(Signed) (L.S.) PRINCE FARIS SHEHAB.  
 (L.S.) EMIR HAIDAR.  
 (L.S.) SHEIK FARIS HABEISH, &c.  
 THE MARONITE NATION.  
 THE DRUSE NATION.  
 THE MUTUALIS.

LETTER addressed by the INHABITANTS of MOUNT  
LEBANON to his Excellency the FRENCH AM-  
BASSADOR.

(Literal Translation from the Arabic.)

After the usual Compliments,

The painful news that have reached us by the newspapers, have struck a terrible blow to Syria,—they have torn the hearts of men, women, and children, now menaced to be exterminated by Mehemet Ali, to whom France has deigned to grant her powerful protection. Can she be possibly ignorant of the evils this man has made us suffer since fortune has made him master of Syria? They are innumerable. Suffice it to say, that the most distressing vexations, and the most cruel oppression, have driven us to despair, and have renewed in us the ardent desire of returning to the paternal government of our august Sovereign, Abdul Medjid. Is not this a legitimate desire from a loyal people? France, a nation so great, so magnanimous, that has extended liberty everywhere, that has for ages spilt so much blood to establish it in her own Government, refuses us to-day her powerful influence to obtain the enjoyment of the same good!

The French press says, “that France will not admit of any arrangement that has for basis the restitution of Syria to its legitimate Sovereign.” Can it be so? the Syrians cannot believe it! The French nation, so generous, so civilized, cannot desire to see us crushed by a systematic oppression which

alone distinguishes the Egyptian Government from others.

We wish but to be allowed to return to the protection of our legitimate Sovereign, whom we have not ceased to obey for the last four hundred years. We demand but to participate in the privileges and rights of the Hatti-Sheriff which our gracious Sovereign has granted to all his faithful subjects, without exception, without distinction. We appeal to the French Government—we supplicate the French nation at large, to assist us to obtain our demand. The most atrocious tyranny has compelled us to take up arms for the defence of our lives and the honour of our families, from the brutality of the Egyptian soldiery, or to bury ourselves in the ruins of our country. Our cause is a just one; and as such, we sincerely trust that the French Government will not abandon us in a moment so dangerous.

It is with this hope we submit to your Excellency this, our prayer, begging that you will be pleased to lay it at the feet of the throne of your august Master, the Ally of our gracious Sovereign, Abdul Medjid.

(Signed) (L.S.) PRINCE FARIS SHEHAB.  
 (L.S.) PRINCE YOUSUF SHEHAB.  
 (L.S.) EMIR HAIDAR, &c., &c.  
 THE MARONITE }  
 THE DRUSE } NATIONS.  
 THE MUTUALI }

## No. III.

LETTER from Commodore NAPIER to Lieut.-Col.  
HODGES.

H.M.S. Powerful, Beyrout,

July 15, 1840.

My dear Hodges,

I received your letter and postscript of the 10th and 13th of July, and I think you are as cautious a diplomatist as if you had been at it for the last twenty years; you do not make a single remark upon what my opinions were relative to this expedition of Mehemet Ali. I do not feel that there is any responsibility on me whatever; I am positively forbid to meddle with anything that Mehemet Ali may do, as long as he lets alone British persons and property; and however I disapprove of this, I can only obey.

The Pacha's troops marched out yesterday morning, and although they met with no resistance, they set the whole country in a blaze, convents and all. I wrote a very strong letter to the Egyptian Admiral, which I begged him to communicate to Abbas Pacha, a copy of which accompanies this. Mr. Wood was sent here by Lord Ponsonby, and he came off a few days ago, bringing petitions from the poor Mountaineers to the Sultan and the French and English Ambassadors; he landed again early this morning, and brings off news that the insurgents are divided amongst themselves, have been abandoned by many of their chiefs, are badly armed, and, by all I can collect, unless they are succoured with

arms and ammunition, the insurrection will be put down very shortly, and thus will finish all hope of Syria being released from the power of Mehemet Ali, by the efforts of the inhabitants themselves, and the question will become more complicated than ever; all of which might have been avoided, had the Admiral had instructions how to act, or had he taken upon himself, which I feel assured would have been approved of by our Government at home. I am surprised the mission of Mr. Wood has not been notified to you, as he certainly was sent here by Lord Ponsonby, and I have the Admiral's order to facilitate him, and even to send the Cyclops back when he has any particular communication to make.

Should Mehemet Ali come this way, the shortest way of putting an end to all doubts would be to seize him. I do not say I am prepared for so bold a step, but if I see much cruelty and devastation going on, I don't know whether I should not be very much disposed to do it, unless he came accompanied by such a force as would render the success doubtful; but I have no idea that he will come, because I believe all will be settled without him, and you will find that the strength of the insurgents has been very much magnified. You seem to think that Mehemet Ali is on his last legs, but I think this will strengthen him very much; he is evidently backed up by the French, that is clear by the language held by all the French officers, and



we have Thiers' speech, which is plain enough. You say, if we act with vigour and determination, we shall carry through Lord Palmerston's policy without the aid of any foreign power; but, my good friend, the opportunity is lost, his troops are landed and his squadron by this time is in Alexandria, and I do not see now where our vigour and determination can be applied.

*July 20.*—It was only yesterday I could get anything positive about the Egyptians. Our Consul knows nothing, and he will believe nothing against the Syrians, but a Frenchman has read me a letter from Souliman Pacha, saying the insurrection was put down; and another from his secretary, detailing the whole of their operations. It appears they marched as far as Hammana, about eight hours from here, and met less than a couple of hundred of the insurgents, whom the Albanians disposed of, and the Emir Bechir sent to desire them to submit, and give up their arms, which many of them have done. I was not satisfied with this, and last night I went down in the Cyclops, and sent on shore at Zouk and Jebel, when they informed me that the son of Emir Bechir had been there and told them. It is a pity you had not a vessel to have sent earlier information, but even that would have made no difference, as nothing would have been done; it serves them right for their behaviour to me, and I hope you will tell Lord Palmerston so. I shall keep this open till the last moment.

*July 21.*—The Indian mail is just arrived; I have no more news. I wish you could come this way, for I fear there is no chance of my going to Alexandria; I shall, however write to the Admiral by the Austrian steamer, which I expect hourly.

Believe me, &c.,

CHARLES NAPIER.

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No. IV. See Vol. I., page 52.

EXTRACT of LETTER from COMMODORE NAPIER  
to ADMIRAL the Honourable Sir ROBERT  
STOPFORD, G.C.B.

D'Journie, Head-Quarters of the Army  
of Lebanon, September 16, 1840.

IN execution of your order of the 9th instant, I removed the whole of the Turkish troops from the transports and the marines of the squadron into the steamers. The *Dido* and *Wasp* took up an anchorage well up to Beyrout Point, in order to draw Souliman Pacha's attention from the position I intended to disembark at. Soon after daylight, the squadron and steamers you had put under my orders weighed; the Turkish squadron, under Admiral Walker, weighed also; and the whole, with the exception of *Zebra*, who flanked the Egyptian camp, worked up to Beyrout Point, where a considerable force of the enemy was in position.

When the breeze freshened, the whole bore up for D'Journie. Castor and Hydra anchored close to Dog River, landed the Turkish troops, and completely blocked up the pass leading to D'Journie.

The Powerful and Pique, Gorgon, Cyclops and Phœnix, followed by the Turkish squadron, ran into the bay of D'Journie, and landed the troops in an incredibly short time, owing to the excellent arrangement of Captain Reynolds, who took charge of the landing. Admiral Walker put his troops on shore at the same moment with great celerity and order; a position was then taken up, and the artillery landed, the few Albanians stationed here retiring without firing a shot. The Carysfort and Dido went off D'Jebel, about three leagues to the northward, to act against a strong tower, garrisoned by Albanian troops.

D'Journie is a good-sized bay, with a promontory projecting considerably into the sea. A road from Beyrout lies along the shore, and is practicable for infantry, artillery, and cavalry: this road the Revenge covered. The road from Tripoli leads also along shore, and the Wasp and Phœnix covered a gorge, over which it would be necessary to pass. Two roads lead from Baalbec by Antura, where an excellent position was taken up by two battalions of Turks, supported by five companies of marines. The left of this is protected by an impassable gorge, the right rests on the sea, Dog River separating it from high ground in front.

The first day the inhabitants who had been driven into the mountains, came in slowly for arms, but these few took them with great avidity, and hastened to the mountains to drive away the Emir Bechir's troops, and open the mountain passes,—this done, the mountaineers have flocked in in great numbers, with the Sheiks, who have crowded to the standard of the Sultan.

I beg to inclose Captain Martin's reports of the occupation of D'Jebel and Batroun, in which he speaks highly of Captain Austen, of the Cyclops, and of the officers employed\*.

I regret the loss he met with; it was not to be avoided. The inhabitants of this city are most warlike and determined, and many Albanians have suffered by their severity.

Ibrahim Pacha reconnoitred our positions the day before yesterday.

I have sent a battalion of Turks in advance of Gazir to open the country, and give due notice, should he endeavour to turn our left by that road, which he will have some difficulty in doing, as the country is covered by the broadsides of the ships.

I have much reason to be satisfied with the zeal of the whole of the officers and seamen employed: their exertions in completing our lines, under Mr. Aldrich, of the Engineers, is beyond all praise.

Permit me, sir, to congratulate you on the first success of the army of Lebanon. You, yesterday,

\* See Vol. I., pp. 62—66.

were witness of the arrival of his Highness the Emir Abdallah, the Governor of the district of Kesrouan, and of the enthusiasm of the mountaineers; and if this continues, I have every reason to think that the Egyptian army will be obliged to retire from the sea-coast, and the mountains of Lebanon.

I have, &c.

CHARLES NAPIER, *Commodore.*

No. V. See Vol. II., page 17.

INSTRUCTIONS for CAPTAIN FANSHAWE, on his  
MISSION to ALEXANDRIA.

By the Honourable Sir ROBERT STOPFORD, &c.

HAVING received instructions from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send a competent officer to Alexandria, in order to make a communication to Mehemet Ali, the substance of which is stated in a letter from Viscount Palmerston to their Lordships of the 14th of November, of which you will receive a copy,—it is my direction you proceed forthwith in H.M. steam vessel *Megæra* to Alexandria, taking with you the Dragoman named in the margin\*, and on your arrival, after communicating with the senior officer, who will give you every support, you will demand to have an interview

\* John Chumarian.

with Mehemet Ali, in the presence of Boghos Bey, in order to make to Mehemet Ali a communication from Her Majesty's Government. When admitted you will be guided in all respects by the directions contained in the said letter; and further, should the written document which Mehemet Ali may deliver to you, for the purpose of being transmitted to Constantinople, contain an expression of a desire, on the part of Mehemet Ali, to obtain hereditary tenure of the Pachalic of Egypt, you will not decline to receive and convey the document on that account, provided it shall also contain the engagements mentioned in the aforesaid letter. You will also state that if Mehemet Ali, as a proof of his desire for conciliation, expresses his readiness to restore the fleet immediately, you will offer in my name every assistance in conducting it to Marmorice, where it will be placed at the Sultan's disposal; and making the senior officer acquainted with the result, you will return in the Megæra, and join me at Marmorice.

Should the senior officer be at any distance from the port, you will not go out of your way, but communicate with him on your return from Alexandria.

Given on board the Princess Charlotte, off Cyprus, 6th Dec. 1840.

(Signed) ROBERT STOPFORD, *Admiral*.

By command of the Commander-in-Chief,

(Signed) JOHN LOUDON, *Secretary*.

Captain Fanshawe, H.M.S. Princess Charlotte.

No. V. See Vol. II., page 36.

PROTOCOL of the Conference held at the house of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte, the 20th of December, 1840, between the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on one part, and the Representatives of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, on the other.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.* You are aware, gentlemen, that a letter was addressed by Mehemet Ali to the Sublime Porte, and you are acquainted with its contents. The Sublime Porte yesterday received likewise the Memorandum of the Conference of London of the 14th of November. The Sublime Porte directs me to ask you, gentlemen, if Mehemet Ali by this letter has complied with the spirit of the Memorandum, and if his submission ought to be considered as real?

*Ambassador of England.* I think that it belongs to the Sultan alone to decide this point.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.* Up to this time there have only been words on the part of Mehemet Ali; if he executes the promises made in the letter, then his submission may be considered as real.

*Ambassador of England.* I leave to my Colleagues to decide upon that point. As for me, I see nothing before me at present which can authorize me in explaining myself, or in giving an opinion.

*Internuncio of Austria.* With the view of relieving myself from all responsibility, and of making

the views of my Government in so important a matter clearly manifest, I have deemed it fitting to give my vote in writing. I will now read it to the Conference:—

“ I have read over and over again with the most scrupulous attention the letter which Mehemet Ali has just addressed to the Grand Vizier, and on which I am called upon to pronounce my opinion. I have found nothing in it which is not correct. The tone which pervades it has appeared to me to be altogether proper. It might have been desirable that no allusion had been made to the Convention of Commodore Napier; but we are all agreed that it would have been much more so that the Convention in question had never been concluded; and Mehemet Ali, by referring to it, has only made use of an advantage which has been gratuitously offered to him. Besides, it was Captain Fanshawe alone who should have represented to him that an act which the Allied commanders had declared null and of no effect, ought not to be mentioned in the letter to the Grand Vizier. But I will not dwell on this point, which, after all, is now only of secondary interest. I return to Mehemet Ali's letter. In this letter the Pacha declares himself ready to do all that is required of him, and in this respect his submission appears to me entire.

“ I should then be of opinion that this submission should be accepted; that an officer of his Highness should be sent to Alexandria; that Mehe-



met Ali should be enjoined to deliver up to him the Ottoman fleet; that, according to the terms of the Separate Act of the Convention of the 15th of July, the Allied commanders should be invited to assist at such delivery; that the Pacha should be summoned to evacuate the provinces or cities of the Ottoman empire still occupied by the Egyptian troops, and situated beyond the limits of Egypt; finally, that the Grand Vizier, in replying to his letter, should announce to him that when once these conditions should be entirely fulfilled, his Highness, from deference to his Allies, would be pleased to reinstate him in his functions as Pacha of Egypt. This advice is what the Conference of London wished that we should give to the Sublime Porte, in case Mehemet Ali should yield to the summons about to be made to him. As for the tribute, the land and sea forces, and the laws which must govern Egypt, those points have been settled beforehand by the Convention of the 15th of July, and it will be sufficient to execute in this respect the stipulations contained in the IIIrd, Vth, and VIth Articles of the Separate Act annexed to the Convention.

“ I should consider as in every respect to be regretted any hesitation on the part of the Porte to comply with the advice of its Allies. The most brilliant successes have crowned their efforts in Syria; those successes have surpassed our calculations, our anticipations, our expectations. Syria has returned to the rule of his Highness, and thus

the principal object of the alliance is accomplished. To proceed further does not enter into the views of the Allied Powers; the Conference of London has pronounced with sufficient distinctness in this respect. The Sublime Porte may doubtless have good reasons to desire the destruction of Mehemet Ali; but as it has not the means of effecting it itself, the task of doing so would devolve upon its Allies. Now would it desire, in return for the services which they have rendered to it, to involve them in an undertaking which would endanger the general peace, so ardently desired by all people, and so happily maintained up to the present time?

“ It is especially towards France that the attention of our Governments is at present directed; that Power is entitled to their respect and their consideration; and if the menacing and warlike attitude of the Thiers Ministry could not stay them in their course towards the end which they proposed to themselves, and which they have attained, they appear henceforth to be desirous to dedicate all their care to keep well with the Ministry which succeeds it, and whose language announces a prudent, moderate, and conciliatory policy. They must consequently enter into its position, make allowances for the difficulties by which it is surrounded, and not expose it to be hurried along against its will in a false course. In the present state of sentiments in France an unlooked-for event might subvert everything; and is it not for the interest of all and for

that of justice, that they should frankly unite themselves with those who govern France, to prevent a like calamity?"

The Internuncio thereupon reads the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs of the Separate Act of the 15th of July.

*Envoy of Prussia.* I partake of the opinion of the Internuncio. Mehemet Ali's proceeding appears to me in fact to be in conformity with the spirit of the Memorandum. I think besides, that Mehemet Ali having solicited his pardon of the Sultan, the Sublime Porte ought not to act with too great severity against him; that, on the contrary, it ought to lend itself to explanations, and to evince consideration and moderation, not only for the interest of the Porte itself, but also for the general interest of Europe.

*Chargé d'Affaires of Russia.* In all that relates to the general question the views of my Government cannot differ from those of the three other Courts, its Allies; my instructions are founded on that principle. In the special question which forms the object of this Conference, the existing documents ought to point out to us the course and the rules to be observed; now this course and these rules appear to me to be already laid down by the Memorandum of the Conference of London on the 14th of November, and by Lord Palmerston's despatch of the 15th of October. The Memorandum had not yet reached me from my Government; it is the

Internuncio who has had the goodness to communicate it to me; I have only received Lord Palmerston's despatch, which is mentioned, and I conceive that I shall conform to the meaning of these documents, by joining, under existing circumstances, in the vote pronounced by the Internuncio.

*Ambassador of England.* The question, I repeat, appears to me to depend upon the fact of the submission of Mehemet Ali, and the Sultan appears to me to be the sole judge in such a question: he alone has the right to decide. If the Sublime Porte informs us that the Sultan has accepted Mehemet Ali's submission, that he is satisfied with it, the orders of my Government enjoin me, in such a case, to advise the Porte to grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt. Until that time, until the Porte communicates to us the decision of the Sultan, I must abstain from giving any advice, any opinion.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.* There are different kinds of submission. Mehemet Ali might, for example, have come himself, according to our usages, or have sent some one to implore his pardon; but that is not what we mean. The Memorandum requires that Mehemet Ali should restore the fleet, that he should evacuate certain countries. He writes that he will do all this; if he accomplishes these promises, the Sublime Porte will be able to credit his submission, but the letter cannot of itself alone be considered as a real submission.

*Internuncio of Austria.* The letter is a commencement of submission. If the Sublime Porte demands the delivery of the fleet, if Mehemet Ali restores it, and if he evacuates the countries specified in the Memorandum, his submission will certainly be then complete.

*Chargé d'Affaires of Russia.* It is certain that we shall not be able to consider the submission of Mehemet Ali as completed until he shall have restored the fleet, and evacuated the Holy Cities, as well as the other places specified in the Memorandum; but for the present we should abide by the text of the Memorandum and of the instruction addressed by the Admiralty to Admiral Stopford, wherein mention is made of a letter to be delivered by Mehemet Ali to the officer commissioned to notify to him the decision of the Conference of London.

*Internuncio.* What more could Mehemet Ali do? He must begin by saying that he submitted, and he could not, at the same instant, carry into effect all the conditions of his submission.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs,* alluding to what the Ambassador for England had said, observes, that up to the present time there had been no question of hereditary succession.

*Internuncio.* I am not at this moment called upon to discuss that point, on which I have no precise instruction; but, the case occurring, I shall conform myself altogether on that matter to what the Ambassador of England shall do.

*Ambassador of England.* For my part, I have precise orders to advise the Porte to grant hereditary succession to Mehemet Ali, so soon as it shall apprise us that the Sultan is satisfied with the submission of Mehemet Ali; but such advice can only be conditional; I have not the right to judge of the reality of the submission, and I must wait, before giving it, for the Sultan to pronounce himself on the fact of the submission.

*Internuncio.* As for me, I must repeat it, I look upon the letter of Mehemet Ali, as a first step towards his submission.

*Ambassador of England.* It will not be in my power to act in the sense of the instructions of my Government, until the Sublime Porte shall have declared that it considers the submission of Mehemet Ali as complete. But I cannot demand of the Sultan any declaration whatever on that matter, for I should think that I trenched upon his rights. It is for his Majesty to decide.

*Envoy of Prussia.* I think, as I have already said, that the Sublime Porte ought not, in the present case, to act with too great severity, and I must always exhort it to act with moderation.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.* The Porte has never wished to act with severity; facts have already proved it. It does not wish to do so even now. It wishes, on the contrary, to act in concert with its Allies; and although it is doubtless for the Sultan to decide on the submission of Mehemet Ali, never-

theless, as his Allies have declared their intentions in the Memorandum, I have thought it right to consult their Representatives to know whether Mehemet Ali's proceeding is in conformity with the spirit of the Memorandum: but, since their opinions are at variance, they might refer to the decision of the Conference of London.

*Internuncio.* But there is no variance between us; we all think that Mehemet Ali's submission, in order that it should be complete, must be followed by the execution of the conditions which are imposed upon him. I think, moreover, that to refer the question to the decision of the Conference of London would be to appeal from the Conference to the Conference, and lose time in useless adjournments.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.* I think that Mehemet Ali must first execute the conditions imposed upon him; as for the hereditary succession, that is another question upon which I am not prepared to explain myself.

*Internuncio* once more declares, that when the time arrives, he will concur in the steps of the Ambassador of England on that point, and the *Envoy of Prussia* makes the same declaration.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.* You are aware, gentlemen, that on his accession to the throne the Sultan had granted to Mehemet Ali the hereditary administration of Egypt; he rejected that favour. Still later, with the view of sparing the shedding of blood, the Treaty of July 15 granted it to him;

Mehemet Ali equally rejected it. It was necessary to have recourse to measures of coercion, and the Sultan withdrew this favour from him. At present it appears to me that there can no longer be a question of a right in favour of Mehemet Ali, and the Sultan is free to take his decision on this point.

*Representatives* unanimously admitted that the Sultan possesses his entire freedom of action in this respect, and that Mehemet Ali could not appeal to any right.

*Envoy of Prussia* added, that any concession in favour of Mehemet Ali could only be considered as an effect of the Sultan's generosity; for the independence of his Highness is the object of the Convention of July 15; but the more advantageous the Sultan's position is at the present time, the more will it perhaps allow him to be generous.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.* Since Mehemet Ali has rejected the Treaty of July 15, that Treaty no longer exists for him, and other conditions might be imposed on Mehemet Ali.

*Internuncio.* But the Treaty continues to exist for us.

*Ambassador of England.* I declare that, in my opinion, Mehemet Ali has now no right; that the Sultan is master to take the course which he shall consider fitting, and that we can only afford him our advice.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs,* addressing himself to the Internuncio, says to him: Your Excellency



began by saying, that if the Sultan is satisfied with the letter of Mehemet Ali, his submission ought to be accepted. But Mehemet Ali has already written a thousand letters of the same kind. Can any faith be placed in his letters? It is evident besides that there is some trick even in this last letter. For example, he speaks of Commodore Napier's Convention, which is a void act, in order to come to the subject of hereditary succession.

*Internuncio.* That is true; but this letter, given in consequence of a summons made to him by the English Admiral in the name of the Four Powers, cannot be compared to all those which he has addressed of his own accord to the Sublime Porte, and specifically to Hosrew Pacha.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.* You understand, gentlemen, that in any case it is necessary that the Porte should have time to reflect upon this matter.

*Internuncio.* Assuredly, an affair of this kind cannot be concluded in a day; it is, doubtless, necessary that your Excellency should be able to concert with your colleagues, and take the orders of the Sultan.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs* observes, that having to submit to the Council and to the Sultan his report on the Conference of this day, he is desirous of knowing, definitely, what is the conclusion which he should communicate to them.

*Representatives* reply that their opinion being recorded in the present Protocol, they refer themselves to it.

*Ambassador of England.* I repeat that I must wait for the decision of the Sultan to give the advice which is enjoined to me by the orders of my Government.

*Internuncio* observes once again how much it would be to be regretted if the Porte should not conform with promptitude to the wish expressed by the Allied Courts in the Memorandum of the 14th of November.

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No. VII.

LETTER from Lieutenant-Colonel NAPIER to Sir CHARLES NAPIER.

My dear Father, Cairo, February 16, 1841.

I have just returned from a visit to Souliman Pacha, who is a fine hearty old soldier, and begs to be remembered to you, saying it will be some time ere he forgets the *cannonnade* you gave him. I told him how much you were annoyed at his house having been plundered at Beyrout, assuring him that the English had nothing to do with it; to which he replied that he was aware that he was under an obligation on that account to the Austrians; but he said that some things of his which you had ordered to be sent to him, had been seized by the *douane* at Beyrout, and amongst others some arms from Persia, which he valued much as curiosi-

ties. When his house was plundered all his papers was destroyed; amongst others some military works of his in manuscript, which had cost him the labour of years.

Ibrahim Pacha was present at Beckfaya, and mentioned your having taken off your hat. He was also in person at the crossing of the Jordan, when we returned in such a hurry to Jerusalem. He says it was merely a demonstration, which answered the purpose for which it was intended, and which caused him to gain three marches on us. We had altogether a most interesting conversation, which lasted upwards of an hour, and during which he was civil in the extreme, shaking me repeatedly by the hand, and ended by desiring to be most particularly remembered to you.

*Feb. 17.*—Souliman Pacha has just called on me; he is a fine old fellow. I gave him a bottle of porter; he drank your health, and told me to let you know he had done so heartily.

He brought back with him 8000 troops of artillery, who were much harassed by the Arabs from Akaba. He says he put to death every one of them whom he caught. I did not like to ask him if he had many Syrians amongst his troops; but I am sorry to inform you that there are a great many here, who have arrived with the troops from Gaza.

About eight regiments of infantry are now encamped near this, the last of which arrived yesterday

from Gaza, which they left on the 4th instant; and from what I can learn from the men, they were forced to accompany the Egyptians. Besides the infantry, a couple of regiments of lancers have come, some irregular Mogrebins (from the Deserts of Libya), and some irregular *Turkish* cavalry from *Anatolia*; I believe about 200. The horses, particularly those of the lancers, are in good condition, and it is lucky for me that I could not get my mountain horsemen to approach them\*, as they would have eaten us without salt. I dine with Souliman the day after to-morrow, and manage to spend my time pleasantly enough; but I am anxious to hear from our head-quarters, and have as yet been able to learn nothing positive about the Emirs, but have sent to Thebes to obtain information.

\* \* \* \* \*

The disturbances have already begun in the Hedjaz since the Egyptian troops have been withdrawn; and a Prophet, calling himself King of the Land and Sea, has already set up the standard of a religious warfare. \* \* \* \*

Your affectionate son,

E. NAPIER.

\* See page 151.

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## No. VIII.

LETTER from BOGHOS BEY to Sir CHARLES  
NAPIER.

Commodore,

Alexandria, June 19, 1841.

I hasten to acknowledge the receipt of the letter, dated May 27, with which you have honoured me. Having placed it before His Highness the Viceroy, I am desired to express his grateful acknowledgements for the friendly expressions it contains.

On the two points, "of the return of some Syrian soldiers who are still here, and of the regulation of the monopoly," which form the principal object of your letter, I believe that I cannot do better than transcribe, Commodore, the words which His Highness proffered in reply, as I have obtained authority to transmit them to you.

"I cannot see the motive why my friend Napier should be in any difficulty; he who has talked with me, who has seen all, and doubtless, with his penetration, understood all. No one is ignorant that since the signing of the Convention with him the difficulty of the question could not have been made smoother; the affair having been submitted to different conditions, has been prolonged by negotiations with the Envoy of the Sublime Porte; and whilst the conditions were under consideration, they could not be executed, neither could they consider my conduct strange, still less suppose that I was thereby breaking my word. Thank God, it is now

arranged to the satisfaction of the parties; the Firman has arrived, and has been solemnly read in public with the usual ceremonies. I am now only under the necessity of submitting to the clemency of my Sovereign as to the quota of the tribute. I have already conferred on this subject with his Envoy here, who is on the point of setting out, and the matter is almost arranged. Now that the moment has arrived to put successively into execution the conditions contained in the above-mentioned Firman, my friend Napier will very soon learn that what I talked to him about, that what I said to him concerning the monopoly, will be effected in a manner to promote the interests of the country; and I hope that his friendship for me will be more than ever strengthened."

In sending you, Commodore, on the part of His Highness, the preceding communication, I am desired also to present his friendly salutations, and I avail myself of this opportunity in my own person to reiterate the assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honour to be,

Commodore,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

BOGHOS JOUSSOUFF.

THE END.

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“In speaking of himself and his deeds, he has hit the just and difficult medium—showing his real feelings, yet steering clear of affected modesty on the one hand, and over-weening egotism on the other hand.”—*Tait's Magazine*.

“This is a very graphic account of the affairs in which the gallant author figured so nobly, and added fresh lustre to the name of Napier.”—*News*.















