

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



THE

WORKS

OF

THE REV. DANIEL WATERLAND, D. D.

FORMERLY

MASTER OF MAGDALENE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,

CANON OF WINDSOR,

AND

ARCHDEACON OF MIDDLESEX;

NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND ARRANGED.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,

A REVIEW

OF THE

AUTHOR'S LIFE AND WRITINGS,

BY

WILLIAM VAN MILDERT, D. D.

LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF.

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A FARTHER

VINDICATION

OF

CHRIST'S DIVINITY:

IN ANSWER TO A PAMPHLET,

ENTITLED,

OBSERVATIONS ON DR. WATERLAND'S SECOND DEFENCE.

MAGNA EST VERITAS ET PRÆVALEBIT.

THE

INTRODUCTION.

SINCE the publication of my Second Defence in the cause of our blessed Lord's *Divinity*, I have been waiting to see what further attempts we were to have from the Arians. I perceive they are still resolute in their opposition to the faith of Christ, blaspheming his *Godhead*, impugning his *worship*, and despising every kind offer of instruction, or exhortation, to convince or reclaim them. I have the satisfaction however to observe, that they daily give ground more and more; that the *defensive* part, which they begun with, is, in a manner, yielded up; their main *scheme* appearing so *gross*, and so untenable, that they themselves are afraid or ashamed to *own* it. As to the *offensive*, which is now all that they are willing to abide by, they hold it on still as far as they are able: and yet even here one may observe, that, as to matter of *argument*, their attacks are as *harmless* as a man might wish; only there is a certain *fierceness* or *bitterness of spirit* still remaining, and which seems to increase, as their strength decreases; and which perhaps may grow upon them more and more to the last, as is natural and common in such cases. But to come to the point.

Their first effort to renew the contest appeared under the title of Remarks, &c. by one Philalethes Cantabrigiensis, printed for J. Noon. Having no manner of acquaintance, that I know of, with the man under that conceited name; and finding little in the piece more than tedious *repetition*, and studied *confusion*, I slighted it, as

apprehending myself not at all obliged to take notice of it.

Waiting a while longer, there comes out another pamphlet, entitled, Observations, &c. and *by the Author of the Reply to my First Defence*, printed for James Knapton, &c. which when I saw, I immediately concluded, as I had some leisure upon my hands, that here was a call to me to set pen to paper once more. For however low an opinion I might have of the performance, after reading it, yet *the Author of the Reply*, when he has any thing to say, and while our readers are not quite weary, may always command my more especial notice. Whether it be Dr. Clarke, or whether it be Mr. Jackson, (for though it be doubted which, all agree that it lies between them,) they are both men whom I must attend to: one, as he is the *principal* in the cause; the other, as he is *second*, and had the first hand in committing my Queries to the press, engaging me ever after in the *public service*. Let but *either* of those *two* gentlemen stand accountable in the *opinion* of the *world*, (I mean no more,) for any *foul play* on *their* side, as I by setting my *name* am answerable for any on *mine*, and then I shall think myself upon even terms with them in that respect: and as to any other, I humbly conceive, I have no reason to fear their gaining any advantage.

The *author* of the Observations begins with giving us *his* judgment of his *own* performance; assuring his reader, in the most *solemn manner*, that the Observations contain in them *no argument*, nor *branch of any argument*, but what, upon the most serious consideration and careful review, appears to *him* strictly and perfectly *conclusive*. Thus far perhaps may be true: for I know not how things may *appear* to *him*, nor how defective he may be in *judgment*. But I wish he could have added, *no representations* but what, upon calm examination, he had found to be *strictly just*; no *reports*, but what he *knew* to be *true*; no *charges* upon his adversary, but what he believed to be *honest* and *upright*; no *personal reflections* be-

yond what he had *clear* and *sufficient* grounds for. But I pass on to his book.

He has cast his work into fourteen *observations;* the weightiest, no doubt, that the whole compass of the controversy could afford. I shall consider what to say to them, after I have given the reader some brief hints of the past and present state of the *dispute* between us. It should be remembered, that this gentleman at his first setting out, and all along till now, undertook to answer *queries*, to satisfy *objections*, to assoil *difficulties*, to reconcile the *new* scheme to *itself*, to *Scripture*, to *antiquity*, and to *reason;* that so having first cleared his *own* doctrine in every part, beyond any thing that could be done for the *faith received*, he might then with a better face disturb the *peace* of the *Church*, and plead the more earnestly (but modestly withal) for a thorough change. This was what he undertook: and had he been as able to *execute*, as he was forward to *project*, I profess sincerely, he should not have wanted any encouragement, or even *thanks* of mine; so far should I have been from giving him further molestation. But it hath happened to him, (as it ordinarily must to every man, who undertakes a business before he has seen into it,) that he has met with many *difficulties*, more than he at first apprehended, and is by no means able to surmount them.

To mention a few particulars, out of a great number.

1. He has not been able to clear his scheme of the unsupportable charge of making *two Gods*, one *supreme*, and another *inferior* [a].

2. He has not been able to get over the difficulty of supposing God the Son and God the Holy Ghost *two creatures* [b], in direct opposition to *Scripture* and *antiquity*. He has indeed avoided giving them the name of *creature*, which yet can contribute but little satisfaction to as many

[a] See my First and Second Defence, Query v. vol. i. and iii.

[b] See my First and Second Defence, Query xi. xii. vol. i. and iii.

as plainly see how the *thing* is otherwise fully and repeatedly owned under other names [c].

3. He has not been able to defend or excuse *creature-worship*, so fully condemned by *Scripture*, and by the ancient Jews and Christians, with one voice [d].

4. Nor hath he been able to disprove or elude the proofs brought from *Scripture* and *antiquity*, of the *divine* worship due to Christ [e].

5. He hath not been able to salve, or so much as to colour over a notorious flaw in his scheme, relating to the *foundation* of the *worship* of Christ; taking up principles there which can suit only with the Socinian scheme, at other times espousing the Arian, though it be impossible for *both* to stand together [f].

6. He has not been able to give any tolerable account of the divine *titles*, *attributes*, and *honours* being ascribed to a *creature* [g].

7. He gas given no satisfaction at all about Christ being *Creator* and *creature* too; not being able to elude the proofs of the former, nor to reconcile both parts together [h].

8. Though he set out with pompous pretences to *antiquity*, he cannot make them good: but it is proved upon him, nor can he elude the proof, that in *thirteen* instances of doctrine, containing the main branches of his scheme, he runs directly counter to all Catholic antiquity [i].

9. He has not been able to vindicate Dr. Clarke's quotations from the *ancients*: which have been proved, all of

[c] See my Supplement to the Case, &c. vol. ii. p. 354. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 328, &c.

[d] First and Second Defence, Query xvi. xvii. vol. i. and iii.

[e] See my First and Second Defence, Query xvi. xviii. vol. i. and iii.

[f] First Defence, vol. i. p. 195, &c. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 370, &c.

[g] First and Second Defence, Query x. xi. vol. i. and iii. Sermons vii. viii. vol. ii.

[h] First and Second Defence, Query xii. vol. i. and iii.

[i] First Defence, vol. i. p. 271. Second, vol. iii. p. 437, &c.

them, to be either *not pertinent*, or *not justly quoted*, or *not fairly translated*, or *not rightly understood* [k].

The author of the Reply having thus failed in the main business, I might reasonably decline any further dispute with him. He is so sensible of the lameness of his former performances in the *defensive*, that he is now pleased to quit that part entirely, and to *attempt* it no longer. My Queries remain queries still; and the *oracle* shuts up in sullen silence. All that I contended for seems to be *tacitly* yielded up to me; and I stand in quiet and peaceable possession of it. What room then is there for any further dispute? Yes, there is room still, this *gentleman* thinks, to act upon the *offensive:* and since he has been so unhappy as to give no satisfaction in respect of his *own* scheme, he hopes however to be even with us in some measure, by declaring himself still dissatisfied with *ours*. He had many objections formerly, which he has been pleased to drop one after another in the course of the debate: and he has some left still, which he resolves to abide by; though the force even of these few remaining have been already so broken and blunted, that were it not for the *ignorance* of some readers, and the convenient use of *misrepresentations*, *misreports*, *flouts*, and *scoffs*, and an assuming *positiveness*, in lieu of a just reply, he could do nothing with them.

For the benefit therefore of *weak* readers, who may be moved by *weak* things, and for the sake of *truth* and *godliness*, and in regard to the *character* of the men I am engaged with, I proceed to examine the Observations. The author has taken his own method; and so will I mine, as to me seems most proper, and most convenient for the reader. As his work is a rhapsody of independent thoughts, thrown under heads, at discretion: and as the author in the composition observes very little coherence, but jumps from thing to thing, blending matters together as it happened, or as came into his head, I shall not

[k] First and Second Defence, Query xxvii. vol. i. and iii.

think it necessary to follow him all the way in his rambling chase. But some *method* I must have too; and it shall be this, to rank his most material observations under several heads, *viz. False Charges, Misrepresentations, Flouts* and *Scoffs*, &c. And these heads shall make so many chapters.

A FARTHER

VINDICATION

OF

CHRIST'S DIVINITY.

CHAP. I.

False and injurious Charges *contained in the Observations.*

1. IN the list of *false charges,* I shall first place one that stands in page 118th, as being a very remarkable one, and proper to be first spoken to, by way of introduction to what shall come after. The words of the Observator are,

" Not so much as one single writer in the three first " centuries——has presumed to teach, but, on the con- " trary, they would all have judged it the *highest blas-* " *phemy* either to say or think, (which is the very point " in which Dr. Waterland's whole doctrine centers,) that " God the Father Almighty, even the one God and Fa- " ther of all, who is above all, has no natural and neces- " sary supremacy of authority and dominion *at all;* has " no other supremacy of authority and dominion, than " what is founded merely in mutual agreement and vo- " luntary concert; but has, naturally and necessarily, a " priority of order only."

Here is a high charge, a charge of *blasphemy* laid to me, and in the name too of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, whose memory will be ever precious, and whose judg-

ment I respect and reverence. Now, that the reader may the better judge of this extraordinary paragraph of the Observator, I must take care to inform him how the case stands between him and me in regard to the *supremacy*. In the preface to my Second Defence, and again in the book, I intimated over and over, in as plain words as I could speak, that provided the Son's *necessary existence* be secured, that he be acknowledged not to exist *precariously*, or *contingently*, but *necessarily*, that his *coeternity* and *consubstantiality* be maintained, his *creative* powers, his *infinite* perfections, his being *no creature*, but *one God* with the Father, and the like; that then the *supremacy* shall be no matter of dispute with me. Any *supremacy* of the Father that is *consistent* with these *certain, plain, Catholic* tenets, always and universally believed by the churches of Christ; I say, any *supremacy* consistent herewith, I hold, assert, and maintain: any that is *not consistent*, I reject, remove, and detest, with all the Christian churches early and late.

The case then, betwixt this *gentleman* and me, lies thus:

It is agreed, I presume, on both sides, that God the Son is either strictly *equal* with God the Father, as to all *essential* perfections, or that he is *infinitely* inferior to him, as one that does not exist *necessarily*, must of course be *infinitely* inferior to another that does.

The *equality* of nature, it seems, is not consistent with this writer's *supremacy;* and he readily acknowledges that it is not: but he will maintain however the *supremacy* at all adventures; which is directly making God the Son *naturally* subject to the *Father*, who is therefore his sovereign Lord and Ruler, to *reward* him if he does well, to *punish* him if he does amiss, to do with him according to his will and pleasure, as with any other *creature*. The consequence is, making God the Son a *creature;* the *Jehovah*, the *true God*, and *God blessed for ever*, &c. a *creature*, a being that might never have existed, and might cease to exist, if God so pleased. These are the

plain certain consequences of this *gentleman's* scheme, and such the tendency of his doctrine about the *supremacy*. He urges the *supremacy* to destroy the *equality*: I stand by the *equality*, and insist upon it, that it is consistent with all the *supremacy* that either *Scripture* or Catholic Fathers taught. And I have this plain reason to offer, with respect to the *Fathers*, that while they maintained the *supremacy*, they maintained also the *necessary existence*, the *coeternity*, the *consubstantiality* of God the Son, and his *unity* of *Godhead* with the Father; which points once secured, I am very ready to admit any consistent *supremacy*. The consequences which Dr. Clarke and his adherents draw from the *supremacy*, I answer, as the Church of Christ has always done from the time such consequences were pleaded, by admitting a *supremacy* of *order*, which is *natural*, and a *supremacy* of *office*, which is *economical*. The consequences, on the other hand, which we draw against them, as destroying the *equality*, (so manifestly taught through the whole *Scripture* and by the *primitive* churches,) they have never answered, nor can they answer them: which they are so sensible of, that they do not care to have them *mentioned*, but perpetually disguise, conceal, dissemble them, and keep them out of sight.

I must therefore, in my turn, now tell the objector, that he is the blasphemer, upon the avowed principles of the Ante-Nicene churches; in making God the Father *naturally* sovereign Lord and Ruler over *God* the *Son* and *God* the *Holy Ghost*; in reducing both the *divine* Persons to the condition of *creatures*, or precarious beings; brought into existence at *pleasure*, and reducible to *non-existence* again at pleasure. This is not the doctrine of *Scripture* or *Fathers*, but diametrically repugnant to both; is derived from ancient *heresies*, and is false, wicked, and detestable.

There may be some difficulties objected to the Church's way of reconciling (the *Church's* way I call it, for such it is, not *mine*) the *equality* and *supremacy* together: but

no greater difficulties than what occur in almost every other controversy. They that have seen into the heart of the controversy between Jews and Christians, or between Atheists and Theists, or between Papists and Protestants in some points, or between Calvinists and Arminians, must acknowledge the same thing in every one of them: which is owing to this, that human capacity is *finite*, and our *ignorance* of wider compass than our *knowledge;* and that therefore it is much easier to raise doubts and difficulties, than it is to solve them. But *difficulties* are one thing, and *demonstrations* another: and it very ill becomes this gentleman, when he has such large *scores* of his own, and while he bends under the weight of many *insuperable* objections, to grow so exceeding flippant, and above measure assuming, upon the strength only of two or three stale cavils, borrowed from ancient *heresies*.

I should take notice of his wording the charge, about *the natural and necessary supremacy of dominion*. He gives it out that I have totally disowned and denied that the Father has any, asserting that he *has none at all*. I think there is a great deal of difference between saying, that the *Father* has a natural and necessary dominion over the creatures in *common* with the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, and saying, that he has no natural supremacy of dominion *at all*. And this *writer* could not be ignorant with what iniquity he thus worded the thing, to leave room for a false construction, and to shock and astonish every careless and ignorant reader. However, thus much may be said, that, in strictness, no supremacy of dominion can be *natural* and *necessary*, in such a full sense as God's attributes are natural and necessary, eternally and constantly residing in him. All *supremacy* of *dominion* supposes an *inferior*, and commences with the *existence* of that inferior; and is therefore so far, and so much *voluntary*, as the *creating* of an inferior is. But upon the *inferior's* coming into being, then indeed commences the *supremacy;* which is an extrinsic *relation*, no essential *attribute:* only, thus far it may be called *natural* and *ne-*

cessary, as being necessary *ex hypothesi*, or, *upon that supposition*, as being a relation founded upon the *natural* and *necessary* perfections of the Godhead, which set it above the *creatures*, and make an *infinite* disparity of *nature* between that and them. So that, after all, this superabundant eagerness and vehemence for a *natural* supremacy over *God* the *Son*, and *God* the *Holy Ghost*, is only contending, in other words, for a *disparity* or *inferiority* of *nature* in those two Persons: and this is the sole meaning of appointing them a *governor*. The *blasphemy* I am charged with, is only the denying that they have *naturally* any *ruler* and *governor*. I venture once and again to repeat, that they have not, nor ever could have: and this I maintain upon the clear and undoubted principles of all the *ancient* and *modern* churches.

This gentleman may call it, if he pleases, (words are free,) my *wonderful fiction*, p. 7. my *new* and *unheard of fiction*, p. 23. *entirely of* my *inventing*, p. 28. my *own invention*, p. 46, 52, 100. If he really thinks so, I should advise him to read the *ancients*; or if that be too much, to read only Bishop Pearson, or Bishop Bull, to inform himself better: or if he does not believe it, and yet says it, I should entreat him to correct that evil habit of *romancing*, that outrageous method of *reviling*, and to learn the due government of his *mind*. I have *invented* nothing, have coined no new notion, but have plainly and sincerely followed what the *ancients*, with one voice, have led me into, and the two excellent *moderns*, just mentioned, have taught and maintained upon the same bottom. Bishop Bull may be consulted at large: I shall quote one passage of Bishop Pearson, because short: "The Word, that is, Christ as God, hath the supreme "and universal dominion of the world[a]." Which is to all intents and purposes *denying* the *Father's supremacy* as much as I have ever done. But what a pass are things come to, that the *known* standing doctrine of all Christian

[a] Pearson on the Creed, p. 151.

churches, ancient and modern, must be treated as a *novelty*, as a *fiction* or *invention* of mine! If the reader desires a *specimen* of the *ancient* doctrine in this point, he may turn to the quotations in my First Defence, (vol. i. p. 205, 206.) which express the Catholic doctrine, and to which all the Fathers are conformable. So much in answer to the charge of *blasphemy*.

Whether this gentleman can ward off that very charge, or prevent its returning on his own head, may deserve his consideration. The good *Christians* of old would have stopped their ears against such *blasphemy* as his tenets amount to. All reclaim against it: some *directly* and *expressly*, as often as they pronounce any *two*, or the whole *three*, to be *one God*, or *one substance*, of *one dominion*, of *one power* or *glory*: and the rest *consequentially*, by maintaining the *necessary existence*, *consubstantiality*, *coeternity*, or other *divine* attributes of the *Son* or *Spirit*.

I have now done with the first *charge*; which I have dwelt the longer upon, because it runs in a manner through the book; and the answering it here in the entrance will give light to what follows.

II. A second *false charge* upon me is in these words: "Neglecting therefore the reason upon which the Scrip-"ture expressly founds the honour we are to pay to "Christ, the Doctor builds it entirely upon another foun-"dation, on which the Scripture never builds it, *viz.* on "this, that by him God created all things," p. 7.

I shall say nothing here of the absurdity of *founding* the *worship* of Christ in the manner this author does, by tacking *Socinianism* and *Arianism* together, though entirely repugnant to each other, as I have observed elsewhere[b]: but as to the *charge* brought against me, of founding Christ's worship as is here said; I must beg leave to confute it by producing my own words. "I "found the Son's title to worship upon the *dignity* of his "*Person*; his *creative* powers declared in John i. and else-

[b] Defence, vol. i. p. 195. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 370.

"where; his being Θεὸς from the beginning; and his "*preserving* and *upholding* all things, (according to Coloss. "i. 16, 17. and Heb. i.[e])"

"I say, his honour is founded on the *intrinsic* excel- "lency and *antecedent* dignity of his Person; whereof the "power of *judgment* committed is only a farther attesta- "tion, and a provisional security for the payment of his "due honour. It did not *make* him *worthy*, but *found* "him so: and it was added, that such his high worth and "dignity might appear, &c[d]."

Is this founding it *entirely* upon what the author here pretends? As to his pleading, that his way of founding it is *scriptural*, and mine *not scriptural*: both the parts of his pretext are abundantly confuted in my First and Second Defence[e], and in a preface to my Sermons[f].

III. Another *false charge* is in these words, p. 11. "Here the Doctor directly *corrupts* the Apostle's asser- "tion; not allowing him to say (what he expressly does "say) that to *us there is one God, the Father*, but only on "the reverse, to give the Father the style or title of the "one God." He grounds the charge upon what he finds in my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 183, 393. In the first I have these words: "Yes, he (the Apostle) tells us, "that the *Father, of whom are all things, is the one* "*God*, (N. B.) in opposition to *false* ones, to *nominal* "gods and lords: and it is plain, that he meant it not in "opposition to God the Son, because he reckons him "*God to us*." Rom. ix. 5.

Now where, I pray, is the *corruption* of what the Apostle *asserts*? Or how do I refuse to *allow him to say* what he does say? This gentleman, it seems, will show it by this wise remark; "It is one thing to say, that the one "God is the Father, of whom are all things; and another "thing to say, that the Father (though not the Father

[e] Defence, vol. i. p. 195.
[d] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 381, 382.
[e] First and Second Defence, vol. i. and iii. Query xvi. xvii. xviii. xix.
[f] Preface to Eight Sermons, vol. ii.

" only) is the one God. Now it is evident the Apostle " in this text is not reciting the characters of the Father, " and telling us that he may be styled the one God; " but—he is declaring to us who the one God is, *viz.* the " Father." The difference then between us is only this; that I suppose the Apostle to tell us *who is the one God,* he supposes him to tell us *who the one God is.* A notable *criticism,* to found such a charge, of *directly corrupting* and *disallowing* Scripture, upon! Especially considering that the Greek words (εἷς Θεὸς ὁ Πατὴρ) may bear either construction, (if they be really two constructions,) and either may equally suit with the context. For though the text is not reciting the Father's characters, not all his characters, yet the design was to point out *who is the one God;* and he fixes that character upon the Person of the *Father,* as being *primarily* and *eminently,* though not *exclusively,* the one God.

I have been considering (longer perhaps than it deserves) where the difference lies between asking *who is the one God,* and asking, *who the one God is:* and to me it appears so very small and imperceptible, that I can lay no hold of it. I have tried what I could do in another instance: let it be inquired, *Who is the apostle of the Gentiles?* The answer is, *Paul of Tarsus,* &c. Well, but inquire, *Who the apostle of the Gentiles is?* The answer is still the same, *Paul of Tarsus,* &c. Put the *questions* into Latin, we are still never the nearer, they are plainly tantamount: at least the difference to me is undiscernible; unless by *who,* in the latter case, be meant *what:* upon which supposition, the text we are concerned with should not be translated, *To us there is but one God, the Father;* but thus; *To us the one God is a Father,* &c. Perhaps this ingenious gentleman may be able to clear up the matter to satisfaction: but since he has not yet done it, it is plain he was too *hasty* in charging me *at all,* but very *injurious* in running it up to such an extravagant height.

IV. " The doctrine of the Trinity delivered in these

" words (Eph. iv. 3, 5, 6.) by the Apostle, is so expressly " contradictory to Dr. Waterland's scheme, and so im- " possible to be perverted even into any appearance of " consistency with it, that the Doctor finds himself here " obliged even fairly to tell us, that St. Paul *ought not* to " have writ thus as he did, &c." p. 17.

This is a charge so malicious and petulant, and withal so groundless, that I cannot well imagine what could transport the man into such excesses. For supposing I had misinterpreted St. Paul, and very widely too, would it amount to a declaration that the Apostle *ought not to have writ* what he did write? How hard would it be with *commentators*, if upon every *misconstruction* of a text, *really* such, they were to be thus charged with taking upon them to be *wiser* than the *sacred* penmen, and to *correct* the *Spirit* of God!

After all, if the reader pleases to look into my Defence[g], he will be surprised to find how *innocent* the words are, which have been wrought up into this *high charge*. In my Defence, I say, " Ephes. iv. 6. has been generally " understood by the *ancients* of the *whole* Trinity: *above* " *all*, as Father; *through all*, by the *Word*, and *in all*, " by the Holy Ghost." I refer to Irenæus, Hippolytus, Marius Victorinus, Athanasius, and Jerome, for that construction: I conclude, " However that be," (that is, whatever becomes of that interpretation, be it just or otherwise,) yet " the Father may be reasonably called the *one*, " or *only* God, without the least diminution of the Son's " real divinity[g]."

In my Second Defence, all I pretend is, that " I see no " absurdity[h]" in the interpretation now mentioned: and I observe, that " we are not *there* inquiring into the sense " of the *text*, but into the sentiments of the *ancients upon* " *it*;" and I exhibit their testimonies at large. And to take off the pretended *absurdity* of that ancient interpreta-

[g] Defence, vol. i. p. 7.

[h] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 60, &c.

tion, in making the *one God and Father of all* include all the three Persons, I observe how Irenæus (one of the Fathers quoted) reckons the Son and Holy Ghost to the *Father*, as being his very *self* in a qualified sense. And I farther add, that "nothing is more common than for a "*head* of a family, suppose Abraham, to be understood "in a stricter or larger sense, either as denoting his own "proper person, or as denoting him and all his descend-"ants considered as contained in him, and reckoned to "him." I show farther from the plain and express testimonies of Hippolytus and Tertullian, that they also, as well as Irenæus, sometimes considered the *Father* in that *large* sense before mentioned[i].

These are the *facts;* which this gentleman should have confuted, instead of bringing against me railing accusations. If there be any force (as there is none) in the *charge*, it falls upon the *Fathers;* whose interpretation I defended no farther than by showing it not to be *absurd*, nor unsuitable to the language of the early times. As to myself, I did not so much as condemn the *common* interpretation, but was content to admit of it: and yet if I had *condemned* it, I should not, I conceive, have been therefore chargeable with *condemning* St. Paul.

This writer has a farther complaint, it seems, in relation to the present text. He is positive that the title of *Father of all* is *very disagreeable*[k] to me: and he insinuates, that pure *decency* here restrained me from *finding fault with St. Paul, for choosing such a* Pagan *expression*. A *mean* suggestion, and entirely *groundless*. For neither did I give any the least hint of dislike to St. Paul's expression, nor did I *find fault with* the Fathers for adapting sometimes their style to *Pagans*, but commended them rather for doing it, in the cases by me mentioned[l], as doing what was *proper*. And certainly it was *commend-*

[i] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 62, 96.
[k] Observations, p. 18.
[l] See Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 131.

able in St. Paul, and I acknowledged it to be so[m], to adopt the *Pagan* phrase of *unknown God*, and to apply it in a Christian sense, to lead the *Pagans* into a belief of the *true* God.

Before I leave this article, I would take notice of this gentleman's *affectation*, (to call it no worse,) of *loading* every thing beyond measure, in a way *uncommon;* and *pointing* and *edging* his expressions to such a degree as to make them *ridiculous*. It is not enough, with him, to say, as another man would in such a case, that a *text* has been *misconstrued*, and its sense *perverted*, or *misapplied;* no, that would sound flat and *vulgar:* but it is to be called *corrupting* the Apostle's assertion, *not allowing him to write* what he did write; or, it is *finding fault with* him, or fairly telling us that *he ought not* to have writ thus as he did; or, it is an attempt to *expose and render ridiculous* the Apostle's doctrine, and arguing, not against Dr. Clarke, but against *plain Scripture*, and against the *Evangelists* and *Apostles* themselves[n]. This it is to be *elegant* and *quaint*, and to push the *satire* home. I can pardon the *pedantry*, and the *false sublime*, in a man of such a taste: but I desire he may use it somewhere else; and not where he is laying an *indictment*, or making a *report*, which requires *truth* and *strictness*.

V. "The supreme authority and original independent "absolute dominion of the God and Father of all, *who is* "*above all;* that authority which is the foundation of the "*whole law of nature*, which is taught and confirmed in "every page of the New Testament; which is professed "and declared in the first article of every *ancient creed*, "in every Christian church of the world, and which is "maintained as the *first principle* of religion by *every* "*Christian writer*, not only in the three first centuries, "but even in the following ages of contention and ambition: this supreme authority, &c. Dr. Waterland in

[m] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 186.

[n] See Reply, p. 195, 197.

" his last book (merely for the more consistent salving of " a metaphysical hypothesis) has, by a new and unheard " of fiction, without any shadow of evidence from any " one text of Scripture, in direct contradiction to the first " article of all the ancient *creeds*, without the testimony " of *any one ancient* (I had almost said, *or modern*) writer, " very presumptuously (and had he himself been an op- " poser of the hypothesis he defends, he would have said, " *blasphemously*)—reduced entirely to nothing," p. 23.

Here seems to be something of sounding *rhetoric* in this paragraph; which had it been intended only for an *exercise*, or by way of *specimen*, might have been tolerable: but it was wrong to bring it in here, in a grave debate, because there is not a word of *truth* in it.

To speak to the matter, all this hideous outcry against an innocent man means only this, as hath been above hinted; that I have been willing to think, and as willing to say, that God the Son and God the Holy Ghost have *naturally no Governor*, are not *naturally* subject to any *Ruler* whatever. This gentleman is here pleased to intimate that they are, and is very confident of it. Let me number up the many palpable *untruths* he has crowded into half a page. *One* about *the foundation of the law of nature:* a *second*, about the *New Testament:* a *third*, about *every ancient creed:* a *fourth*, about the *first principle of religion*, and *every Christian writer: four* or *five* more, about Dr. Waterland. There is not a syllable of *truth* in any of the particulars of which he is so positive. For neither does any *law of nature*, nor any *text* of the New Testament, nor any *ancient creed*, nor any Christian and Catholic *writer*, early or late, ever assert, or intimate, that God the Father is *naturally* supreme *Governor* over his *own Son* and *Spirit;* or that they are *naturally* under his *rule* or *government*. And as to Dr. Waterland, it is no *new or unheard of fiction* in him, to assert *one common dominion* to all the three Persons, and to deny that either the Son or Holy Ghost is *naturally* subject to (that is, a *creature of*) the Father. He has full *evidence* for his per-

suasion, from innumerable *texts* of *Scripture*, from all the *ancient creeds*, as understood by the Christian churches from the beginning to this day: and he has neither *blasphemously* nor *presumptuously*, but soberly, righteously, and in the fear of God, stood up in defence of the injured honour of the ever *blessed Trinity*, grievously insulted and outraged by the Arians of these times; who when they have carried on their resolute opposition as far as argument and calm reasoning can go, and are defeated in it, rather than yield to conviction, come at length to such a degree of *meanness*, as to attempt the support of a baffled cause by the low methods of *declaiming* and *railing*.

VI. "When Dr. Waterland says, that *many supreme* "*Gods in one undivided substance* are not *many Gods*, *for* "*that very reason, because their substance is undivided*, he "might exactly with the same *sense* and *truth* have af- "firmed, that many supreme persons in one undivided "substance are not many persons; for that very reason, "because their substance is undivided." p. 51.

Here I am charged with saying, that "many supreme "Gods are not many Gods." Let my own words appear as they stand. *Second Defence*, vol. iii. p. 331.

"I assert, you say, *many supreme Gods in one undi-* "*vided substance.* Ridiculous: they are not many Gods, "for that very reason, because their substance is undi- "vided." Is this saying, that *many Gods are not many Gods?* No; but *they*, that is, the three Persons, supposed by the objector to be *three Gods* upon our scheme, are not three Gods, not *many*, but *one* God only. This *gentleman* appears to be in some distress; that, in order to form his objection, he is forced to invent words for me, and to lay them before the reader instead of mine. He seems however, in the same paragraph, to aim obscurely at an *argument* which the Author of the Remarks has expressed plainly, and urged handsomely enough[o], though with too much *boasting*.

[o] Remarks, p. 36.

The answer, in short, is this: though the union of the three Persons (each Person being *substance*) makes them *one substance*, yet the same union does not make them *one Person;* because *union* of *substance* is one thing, and *unity* of *Person* is another: and there is no necessity that the same kind of union which is sufficient for one, must be sufficient for the other also. There is no consequence from one to the other, but upon this *supposition*, that *person* and *acting substance* are *equivalent* and *reciprocal:* which the Author of the Remarks had acuteness enough to see, and therefore fixes upon me, unfairly, that very *supposition*. If he pleases to turn to my *definition* of *person*, he will find, that though I suppose *Person* to be *intelligent acting substance*, yet that is not the *whole* of the definition, nor do I ever suppose the *terms* or phrases *reciprocal;* any more than the asserting *man* to be an *animal*, is supposing *man* and *animal* to be tantamount, or to be *reciprocal* terms. I have taken this occasion of replying to the Remarks upon this head, to let the author see that I do not neglect his performance for any *strength* it bears in it. That which I have now answered is, in my judgment, the *best* and *strongest* argument in the whole piece: and I believe he thinks so too.

VII. "When the Doctor affirms that the one supreme "God is not one *supreme God* in Person, but in substance: "what is this but affirming, that the one supreme God is "two *supreme Gods* in Person, though but one *supreme* "*God* in substance?" p. 51.

Let the reader see my words upon which this weak charge is grounded: they are in my First Defence, vol. i. p. 24.

"Father and Son both are the one supreme God: not "one in Person, as you frequently and groundlessly in- "sinuate, but in substance, power, and perfection." I neither said, nor meant to say, *not one* supreme God *in Person;* but, *not one in Person:* the rest is of this writer's foisting in by way of blunder, first to make *nonsense*, and then to comment upon it, and add more to it. In the

mean while, it is some satisfaction to me to observe, that in a controversy where it is not very easy to express every thing with due *accuracy*, the keenest adversaries have not yet found any *offensive* or *unjustifiable* expression to lay hold on, till they have first made it so, by artifice and management.

VIII. "Another method whereby Dr. Waterland at-
"tempts to destroy the supremacy of the one God, &c.—
"is by denying any real generation of the Son, either
"temporal or eternal." *Obser.* p. 56.

Here are two *false* and *injurious* charges: one of my denying any *temporal generation* of the Son; the other of my denying any *eternal* generation. Every body that has seen my books knows that I assert, maintain, and inculcate *three generations;* the first *eternal*, the other two *temporal:* so that this charge of the Observator must be made out, if at all, by inference, or consequence only, and not directly: and therefore he ought not to have expressed this article in such general terms as he has, but should have said, *consequentially*, *implicitly*, or the like, if he had not been exceeding prone to set every thing forth in the *falsest* and *blackest* colours.

What he advances in support of these two charges betrays such *confusion* of thought, and such surprising *forgetfulness* of ancient learning, (for I am unwilling to impute it *all* to formed, premeditated *malice*,) that I stand amazed at it.

1. One of his first blunders is, his attributing the words *before all ages* (πρὸ πάντων αἰώνων) to the Council of Nice: this he repeats, p. 67, 70. though every body knows that those words were not inserted by the Nicene Council, but the Constantinopolitan, above fifty years after. It is necessary to remark this, because part of the argument depends upon it. There can be no doubt but that the Constantinopolitan Council intended *eternal* generation: but as to the Nicene Council, it may be questioned whether they did or no. These two our writer, as his way is to

confound every thing, has blended together, and, I suppose, very *ignorantly*.

The use he makes of it is, bringing me in as his voucher (p. 67.) for the Nicene Fathers professing no more than a *temporal* generation, *though they expressly say, it was* πρὸ πάντων αἰώνων, *before all ages.* I do indeed offer such a conjecture about the Nicene Fathers[p]; but then I know nothing of the πάντων αἰώνων which this gentleman puts upon them; nor do I allow that either the Nicene or Ante-Nicene Catholics understood that phrase in the limited sense[q].

2. Another mistake, or rather gross misreport, is what he says of the *writers* before and at the time of the Nicene Council, that using the similitude of *light* from *light*, or fire from fire, they "always take care to *express* this "one difference in the similitude, that whereas light "shineth forth, and is communicated not by the *will* of "the luminous body, but by a necessary property of its "nature, the Son of God is, by the power, and *will*, and "*design* of the Father, his *substantial* image."

I do not know that any *single* writer ever *expressed* this, before Eusebius; if it may be said of him. If it be pretended, that they *meant* it at least; yet neither can that be proved, in the *full extent* of what is here asserted, of any one of them. All that is true is, that as many Ante-Nicene Fathers as went upon the *hypothesis* of the *temporal* ante-mundane generation, so many acknowledged such generation to be by *will* and *counsel:* but none of those writers ever used that *similitude* upon which Eusebius made the remark now mentioned; *viz.* that of *light* and *splendor;* but that of one *light*, or one *fire* of *another*, which has a very different meaning[r] and applica-

[p] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 268. Compare Bull. D. F. sect. iii. cap. 9. But see also Lowth's note upon Socrat. Eccl. Hist. p. 24. ed. Cant.

[q] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 99, &c.

[r] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 292.

tion. But it is not the Observator's talent to think or write accurately.

I must farther add, that Origen, Theognostus, Dionysius of Alexandria, and Alexander, making use of the same *similitude* that Eusebius does, give no such account of it[s]. And none that intended to illustrate *eternal generation* thereby ever intimated that it was by *will, design,* or *counsel,* in opposition to what is *natural* or *necessary,* in our sense of *necessary.*

3. A third instance of this writer's great *confusion,* upon the present head, is his blending and confounding together what I had laid down distinctly upon different subjects. What I say of Post-Nicenes only, he understands of Ante-Nicenes too: and what I say of one Ante-Nicene writer, he understands of another; and thus, by the *confusion* of his own intellect, I am made to be perpetually *inconsistent.* It would be too tedious to repeat. All may be seen very *distinctly,* and with great *consistency,* set forth in my Second Defence; whither I refer the reader that desires to see the sentiments of every particular *writer* fairly considered[t].

4. A fourth instance of this author's *confusion,* is his pretending that none of the Ante-Nicene writers *ever mention any prior generation, any other ante-mundane generation, beside* that *temporal* one before spoken of. It is *true* that many, or most of the Ante-Nicene writers were in the hypothesis of the *temporal* generation, mentioning no other: but it is very *false* to say, that none of them speak of any higher. Origen, and Dionysius of Alexandria, and Methodius, and Pamphilus, and Alexander, are express for the *eternal* generation, or filiation[u]: and Irenæus, and Novatian, and Dionysius of Rome may, very probably, be added to them. These together make eight, and may be set against Ignatius, Justin, Athena-

[s] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 293.

[t] Ibid. from p. 262 to p. 286.

[u] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 97, &c. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 273, &c.

goras, Tatian, Theophilus, Clemens of Alexandria, Tertullian, Hippolytus, who make an equal number for the other *hypothesis*. And I have often observed, and proved, that the difference between these writers was *verbal* only, all agreeing in the main doctrines, and differing only about *terms*, whether this or that should be *called* generation[x].

5. Another instance of his great *confusion* under this head, is his objecting to me again, as before in the Reply, my appealing to the *ancients* for the understanding of *will* in the sense of *acquiescence* and *approbation*, meaning by *ancients*, Post-Nicene writers. This I did to obviate Dr. Clarke's pretences from some Post-Nicene writers, such as Hilary, Basil, Marius Victorinus, and Gregory Nyssen. And, certainly, in expounding these writers, heed must be given to their way and manner of using their phrases. And as to calling them *ancients*, the Author of the Reply had done the same twice together[y].

6. This writer discovers his *ignorance*, or *infirmity* rather, in calling my interpretation of ἀνάγκη φυσικὴ *ridiculous*, as *taken only from* some *later Christian* writers. I proved my interpretation from Athanasius, Epiphanius, Hilary, and the history of the times in which the Sirmian Council was held, in order to fix the meaning of the phrase about that time, which is the first time we find it applied in this subject[z]. And I fully answered all this *gentleman's* cavils, which he now repeats.

7. Another instance of his *confusion*, is his saying of the *procession*, or temporal generation, that it is *no generation at all;* and that "not one Ante-Nicene writer ever "was so absurd, as to call that a *generation* by which "the generated person was no more *generated* than he "was before." As to the fact, that the Ante-Nicene writers, in great numbers, called this procession *genera-*

[x] First Defence, vol. i. p. 113, &c. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 76, 296.

[y] See Reply, p. 256, 257. and my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 286.

[z] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 276, 284.

tion, I proved it at large; nor can any *scholar* make doubt of it. And as to the poor pretence, which he here repeats, I answered it before in these words, (Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 273.) "Though the *Logos* was the same "*essentially* before and after the generation, he was not "the same in respect of *operation*, or *manifestation*, and "outward *economy*; which is what those Fathers meant." And I particularly proved this to be their meaning, from the express testimonies of Justin, Methodius, and Hippolytus[a]; and confirmed it by quotations from Zeno Veronensis, Hilary, Phœbadius, and others. And what does it signify for the Observator to set his raw conceptions and fond reasonings about the meaning of a word, against such valuable *authorities*? Can any thing be more ridiculous, than to sit down and argue about what an ancient writer must or must not have said, from pretended reasons *ex absurdo*? I assert it to be *fact*, that they *said* and *meant* what I report of them; and I have produced their *testimonies*: the author may, if he pleases, go on with his *dreams*.

This writer having performed so indifferently upon one part of the *charge*, will not be found less defective in regard to the other; wherein he charges me with denying *eternal* generation, or reducing it to *nothing*. He will not, I presume, pretend that I either *deny* it or *destroy* it, as he does, by pronouncing all *eternal* generation *absurd* and *contradictory*. If I *deny* it or *destroy* it, it is in *asserting* it however at the same time: and it must be by *explaining* it, if any way, that I reduce it to *nothing*. If it happens not to be so explained as to fall under this gentleman's *imagination*, it is, according to him, reduced to *nothing*. But before he comes to his *metaphysical* speculations on this head, he gives us a taste of his *learning*, in respect of the *ancients*; boldly asserting, that they never express the *first* (or eternal) generation of the Son, by *filiation*, or *generation*, or *begetting*, *or by any other*

[a] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 265, 295.

equivalent term. This is a notorious untruth. For when Irenæus reproves some persons as attributing any *beginning* to the *prolation* of the *Son*, (*prolationis initium donantes*,) he uses a term equivalent to *filiation*, or *generation*[b]. When Origen declares there was *no beginning of the* Son's *generation*, he uses the very word[c], as also when he speaks of the *only begotten*, as being *always* with the Father. Dionysius of Alexandria expresses it by the word ἀειγενὴς, *eternally generated*[d]; which surely is very express. When Methodius asserts, that he never became a Son, but always was so[e], what is this, but saying the same thing? And when other writers assert, that the *Father was always a Father*, this is at least asserting an eternal generation in *equivalent* terms. But this writer's knowledge of *antiquity* has been sufficiently shown. Let us see whether he can perform any thing better in *metaphysics*. He forms his attack thus: "Dr. Waterland— "desires, you would by no means understand him to in- "tend eternal generation indeed, but a mere *coexistence* "with, and not at all any *derivation* from the Father," p. 72.

And certainly Dr. Waterland is very right in making *eternal* generation to be *eternal*, amounting to a *coexistence* with the Father, without which it could not be *eternal*. It is observable however, that this gentleman opposes *derivation* to *coexistence;* which shows what kind of *derivation* he intends; a derivation from a state of *non-existence*, a derivation commencing *after* the existence of the Father, and because *later* than the Father's existence, *infinitely* later, as it must be if *at all* later. In short then, it is a derivation of a *creature* from his *Creator:* this is the *eternal* generation he is contending for, in opposition to *mine;* while he is endeavouring to show that mine is not *generation;* as his, most certainly, is not *eternal*, nor *generation*, but *creation*. The sum of what he

[b] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 96.
[c] Ibid. p. 97. [d] Ibid. p. 101. [e] Ibid. p. 102.

has to advance is, that *coexistence* is incompatible with *generation;* that an *eternal derivation* is absurd, and contradictory. No doubt but such a *derivation* as he is *imagining* (which he explains by a *real* motion *of emission,* and *growth of one out of the other*) is incompatible with *coexistence.* But what the primitive Fathers intended, and what the Scripture intended by *eternal generation,* implies no such *motion of emission,* no such *growth* of one out of the other, but an *eternal relation* or reference of one to the other as his *Head.* An *eternal relation* has no difficulty at all in the conception of it. All the difficulty lies in the supposition of its not being *coordinate,* though the Persons be *coexistent.* And when it can be shown that all *priority* of *order* must of course imply a *priority* of *duration* too, then the objection may have some weight in it. Till that be done, the notion of *eternal generation* will stand: an *eternal Logos* of the *eternal Mind,* which is the aptest *similitude* to express the *coeternity* and *headship* too; and is the representation given of it both by *Scripture* and *antiquity.* I proceed to a new charge.

IX. "Another method by which Dr. Waterland endeavours to destroy the *supreme dominion,* &c.—is his "labouring, by a dust of learned jargon, to persuade men "that the very terms *one God* mean nobody knows "what," p. 85. To this I answer, that *one God* means *one necessarily existing, all-perfect, all-sufficient substance,* or *Being:* which *substance,* &c. consists (according to Scripture account) of three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, one *Jehovah.* This is *one God.* Let this gentleman disprove it, when he is able.

I had said, [f] "If Scripture makes the three Persons *one* "*God,* either *expressly* or by necessary *consequence,* I "know not what men have to do to dispute about *intelli*-"*gent agents* and *identical lives,* &c. as if they under-"stood *better* than God himself does, what *one God* is, or "as if *philosophy* were to direct what shall or shall not

[f] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 66.

" be *Tritheism.*" Upon this our Observator remarks; " Better than Dr. Waterland himself does, is all that he " means." I would allow the justice of his reflection, were we disputing what *one God* is, upon the foot of *Scripture:* for then it would amount only to this difference, that *his* interpretation leads one way, and *mine* another. But as the competition is made between *Scripture* and *philosophy,* he may easily perceive both the *impertinence* and *iniquity* of his reflection. While the point is removed from *Scripture* to *philosophy* for a decision of it, I insist upon it, that this is *interpretatively,* and in *effect,* though not in *design,* pretending to understand the thing *better* than *God* himself does. But to proceed with our writer's pretences against the account I had before given from the *ancients.*

He objects, (p. 86.) that " one substance is not the " same as one God; because two equally supreme, two " unoriginate divine Persons would be two Gods," by my own confession: for I say (vol. iii. p. 195.) that " two un- " originate divine Persons, however otherwise inseparable, " would be two Gods according to the ancients." I knew very well what I said, though I perceive this gentleman does not apprehend it. The *ancients* thought this reference of one Person to the other, as *Head,* was one requisite among others, to make the *substance one,* being thus more closely allied, and, as it were, of *one stock.* This made me say, *however otherwise inseparable:* that is, whatever *other* union may be supposed, the Persons would not be perfectly *inseparable,* not perfectly *one substance,* (according to the *ancients,*) and so not *one God,* but upon the present supposition. And now how does this show that *one substance* and *one God* are not, in this case, tantamount? To me it seems, that it both *confirms* and *explains* it.

X. The Observator charges me (p. 94.) with making one *compound* person of *many* distinct persons. His words are: " He thinks a person may be compounded of " many distinct persons." He refers to page the 340th of my Second Defence. If the reader can find any such

thing there, or any where else in my books, let the charge of *false doctrine* lie upon me: if not, let the charge of *slander* and *calumny* lie upon the accuser.

XI. He charges me, p. 62. with referring to a passage in Modest Plea, without "pretending to make any the "least answer to it." This is like his other *misreports:* I abundantly answer it, (vol. iii. p. 205.) by allowing *necessary existence* to be *positive*, but denying it of *self-existence.*

From the instances here given, (to which more will be added under the next chapter,) the reader may perceive, that speaking of the *truth*, in simplicity and singleness of heart, is none of this gentleman's talent. If he hits upon any thing really true, and which he might perhaps make some little advantage of, he has such a faculty of *inventing* and *straining*, that he quite spoils it in the telling, and turns it into *romance.* One would not expect such exorbitances as these are from men of their profession and character: but it now brings to my mind the Postscript to the Reply[g]: and I shall wonder at nothing of this kind hereafter.

CHAP. II.

Misreports *and* Misrepresentations *contained in the Observations.*

EVERY page of the pamphlet is concerned in this charge: the whole is, in a manner, one continued *misrepresentation* from beginning to end. But some of the *misrepresentations* have been already shown in the first chapter, among *false charges;* and others will fall under a subsequent chapter. I shall select a convenient number to fill up this.

I. Page 11. the author writes thus: "The Doctor is "forced farther to affirm, that the Son is *tacitly* included, "though the Father be eminently styled the *one God:*

[g] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 483.

" nay, (which is very hard indeed,) *tacitly included*, though " by name expressly *excluded*, and *contradistinguished* by " a peculiar character of his own, in the very words of " the text itself." Thus he leaves the remark, without informing the reader in what sense I suppose the Son *tacitly* included. I explain it in my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 425.

" I have before shown what we mean by saying that " the Son is *tacitly included*, though the Father be emi- " nently styled the *one God:* not that the word *God*, or " the word *Father*, in such cases, includes Father and " Son; but the word *God* is predicated of one only, at " the same time that it is tacitly understood that it may " be predicated of either, or both; since no *opposition* is " intended against either, but against *creatures* and *false* " *gods*."

This gentleman pretends indeed that the *one God* is *opposed* to the one *true Lord*, (in 1 Cor. viii. 6.) as well as to *false* gods. But this is *gratis dictum;* and he does not consider that then the Son can be no *God* at all *to us*, contrary to Rom. ix. 5. besides many other places of Scripture. I say therefore that the *exclusive* term, in this case, is not to be understood with utmost rigour, but with such qualifying considerations, as other Scriptures manifestly require to be consistent with this. I gave instances, in good number, of *exclusive* terms so used, [h] which this laconic gentleman *confutes*, first, by calling them *ridiculous;* and next, by *positively affirming*, that " wherever any particular thing or person is by any par- " ticular title or character contradistinguished from any " other thing or person mentioned at the same time under " another particular title or character, it is infinitely *ab-* " *surd* to suppose the latter *tacitly included* in the former, " from which it is expressly excluded." Now allowing him the whole of what he here asserts, all that follows is, that in 1 Cor. viii. 6. the Son is *excluded* from being God

[h] Vol. ii. Sermon iv. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 30, 53. 78.

in that *eminent* manner, that *unoriginate* manner as the Father is; not from being *God* in the *same sense* of the word, [i] nor from being *one God* with him. But it will be difficult for him to prove any thing more, than that the Father is there described under the character of the *one God*, of whom are all things, and the Son under the character of the *one Lord*, by whom are all things, in opposition only to *nominal* gods and lords, and not to each other. For since all things are *of one*, and by the *other*, they together are *one Fountain* of all things, one God and Lord: and thus may this text stand with verse the 4th of the same chapter, which declares that there is but *one God;* and with Rom. ix. and 5. which declares the Son to be "over all, God blessed for ever."

II. Page the 18th of the Observations, I am found fault with for misunderstanding a passage of Athanasius, in his Epistle to Serapion [k]. I had said, that the one God is his *subject* in that passage; as is manifest to every one that can read and construe.

My smart corrector here says, "And yet not only the "necessary construction of this very passage, but more-"over Athanasius himself declares, on the contrary, in "the fullest and most express words, that he is speaking "of the Father all the way." And to prove this, he refers me to Athanasius's third Oration against the Arians; a *prior* work, and which therefore could declare nothing about his meaning in the place I had to deal with: so far

[i] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 55.

[k] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 62.

Ἐν γὰρ εἶδος θεότητος, ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ, καὶ εἷς Θεός. ὁ πατὴρ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὢν κατὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πάντων εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ δὲ φαινόμενος κατὰ τὸ διὰ πάντων διήκειν, καὶ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐν ἅπασι διὰ τοῦ Λόγου ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνεργεῖν, οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἕνα διὰ τῆς τριάδος ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν——ὅτι τὴν μίαν ἐν τριάδι θεότητα φρονοῦμεν. *Athan. Orat.* iii. p. 565.

Εἷς Θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ κηρύττεται, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν· ἐπὶ πάντων μὲν, ὡς πατὴρ, ὡς ἀρχὴ, καὶ πηγή· διὰ πάντων δὲ διὰ τοῦ Λόγου· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ—οὐκ ἔστι μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑμῶν φρόνημα εἰς ἕνα Θεὸν, τὸν ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι. Τὸ γὰρ, ἐν πᾶσιν οὐκ ἔχετε, διαιρῶντες καὶ ἀποξενοῦντες ἀπὸ τῆς θεότητος τὸ πνεῦμα. *Athanas. ad Serap.* i. p. 677.

from declaring in the *fullest* and *most express* words. It would have been sufficient for a *cooler* writer to have said, that Athanasius had explained his meaning in *one* place by what he had said in *another:* and to have offered it as a *probable* argument to determine a *doubtful* construction.

Certain it is, that Athanasius did not, *could not* in *full* and *express* words, declare beforehand in his third Oration against the Arians, that he should be "speaking of the "Father all the way," several months or years after, in an epistle not yet written, nor perhaps thought of. I can with better reason plead, that since the Epistle to Serapion was written *after* the other, and contained his *later* thoughts, that either the *former* treatise should be interpreted by the *latter*, or at least that his *second thoughts* upon the text should be preferred. However, upon a careful review of both the places, and upon considering the context, and the argument Athanasius is upon in both, (namely, to prove *one Godhead* in all the *three* Persons, *one God* in, or by, *a Trinity*, his express words,) I am so far from thinking that the passage in his Oration is at all against me, that it rather confirms my construction of the other; allowing only a different *pointing* from what appears in the prints, such as I have here given. And I desire the words, ἕνα Θεὸν διὰ τῆς τριάδος, may be attended to, *one God in Trinity*. If ἕνα Θεὸν means the Father only, then the sense is, *one God the Father, in* (or *by*) *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost;* which is a sense that this writer will call perfectly absurd. I submit this whole matter to the judgment of the *learned*. In the meanwhile it is evident, that our Observator has let his pen run too fast; has been exceeding *positive* in a thing which he cannot make *clear*, or so much as *probable;* and that he has expressed his *positiveness* in such a manner, and in such words, as cannot be justified by common rules.

I may just note, before I leave this article, that this gentleman has not shown his skill in Greek, by rendering ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὢν, (as if it had been ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, or ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ,) *ex-*

isting of himself: nor does he apprehend the force of ἐπὶ πάντων, or what Athanasius is talking of in that place. When he understands the maxim of Irenæus, (*invisibile Filii Pater*, p. 234.) and considers how God the Son was supposed to be let down, as it were, to the *creatures*, while the Father remained *in excelsis*, and, as it were, within himself; he will then know how to construe that passage.

III. Page 19th of the Observations, we meet with another *misrepresentation*, a very great one.

"It was further alleged, that Dr. Waterland most ab-
"surdly so interprets this phrase, (ἐχαρίσατο,) *given him*
"*a name*; as if it could signify extolling and magnifying
"in such a sense as men extol and magnify God; as if
"men could (χαρίσασθαι) *graciously grant* any thing to
"God." I had interpreted *exalting* to signify *praising*, (in such a sense as men *exalt* God,) in opposition to the other sense of *exalting*, which is *raising* up to a *higher place* or dignity. This is all the objector has to ground his weak suggestion upon. As to χαρίσασθαι, *giving, gratifying* with, or the like, as it may be done by *equals* to *equals*, or even by *inferiors* to *superiors*, as well as by *superiors* to *inferiors;* where is the inference that the Father must be *superior* to the Son, because of his *giving him a name?* My answer therefore was in these words: "I see no *absurdity* in interpreting *giving a name* to be
"*giving a name.* But it is *absurd* to imagine that God
"may not glorify his Son, as well as his Son may glorify
"him; by spreading and extolling his name over the
"whole creation[1]:" which this writer transcribes, and leaves as he found; not being able to answer it. Nor indeed is there any just objection against an *equal* doing thus to an *equal*: nor does χαρίσασθαι intimate any thing more than its being a *free* and *voluntary* act. But it is trifling in this case to strain the words (used in the other case) *in such a sense as men exalt God;* which were in-

[1] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 211.

tended only in opposition to another quite *different* sense of *exaltation:* and are still to be understood with allowance for the *different* circumstances.

IV. Page 34th, this writer cites some words of my Second Defence, (vol. iii. p. 169.) which are these: "If you "ask why that Person called the Son might not have "been Father, I have nothing to say, but that in fact he "is not. So it is written, and so we believe: the Father "is Father, and the Son is Son." Upon which he is pleased to remark as follows: "By the Doctor's hypo- "thesis therefore, there was no impossibility in the na- "ture of things, but unoriginate might have been origi- "nate, and originate unoriginate; underived might have "been derived, and derived underived; the Father might "have been begotten, and the Son unbegotten." Such is his *malicious* or thoughtless misconstruction of very plain and very innocent words. In the same paragraph, from which he cited my words, I assert the *priority of order* (that is, the originateness of one, and unoriginateness of the other) to be *natural*, that is, *necessary* or *unalterable*, and eternally so: so that one could never have been the other; which is my constant doctrine. But if you ask *why* they *could not*, which is asking a *reason a priori* in a case which admits of none, I pretend not to it; being content to prove the fact *a posteriori*, which is all that can be done. Will any man give me a reason *a priori*, why there *must* have been a God, or *why* it *could not* have been otherwise? It is impossible. It is sufficient to prove *a posteriori*, that in fact there is a God, and that he *could not but be*, because we find that he exists *necessarily*, and without a cause. But we shall have more of this in the sequel.

V. Page 35. Observat. "Instead of *eternal generation*, "the Doctor, if he was at liberty, had much rather say "*eternal existence* of a real and living Word, &c.—And "for this reason, I suppose, it is, that instead of the Ni- "cene words, *begotten of the Father*, and *from the sub- "stance of the Father*, the Doctor, by a new and unheard

" of expression, affirms the Son to be *the substance of the* " *Father.*" *First Defence*, vol. i. p. 269.

Answ. As to what he is here *imagining* of what the Doctor had *rather say*, and *if he was at liberty*, it deserves no answer: my sentiments in that article are sufficiently known, and fully laid down in my writings. His other remark about a *new and unheard of expression*, betrays his *ignorance* in antiquity, or something worse. Ever since the terms *substance* and *person* came into this controversy, Father and Son have been always believed and professed to be *one substance:* as high as Tertullian, all the three have been called *one substance. Una substantia in tribus cohærentibus.* What is this but saying, that both the Son and Holy Ghost are the Father's substance, since all are *one substance*, which one substance is the *Father's*, as well as theirs? This is all that I say in the place referred to, " that the Son might be justly called the Father's sub- " stance, both being one."

VI. " Tertullian presumes to add, speaking of one of " Dr. Waterland's principal assertions, if the Scripture " itself had taught it, it could not have been true." Observ. p. 52. comp. p. 47. This is *misrepresentation* both of Tertullian and *me*. The assertion of which Tertullian speaks is, that " the Father was actually incarnate, suf- " fered," &c. the tenet of the Praxeans. And he does not say, it could not have been *true*, but could not have been *believed*, and that with a *perhaps* (*fortasse non credenda de Patre licet scripta*) to show that it was rather a rhetorical figure of speech, than to be taken strictly, and with utmost rigour: and his chief reason why he said so much, was because such a tenet could hardly, if at all, be reconciled with other *Scriptures* and their description of the *Father*, and the standing *economy* of the three Persons therein *revealed*. How does this at all affect my assertion that, antecedent to the economy, " there was no " impossibility in the nature of the thing itself, but the " Father himself might have done the same that the Son " did?" This is not the assertion which Tertullian strikes

at: nor did he say of the other, that *it could not be true*, nor *positively*, that it *could not be believed*. Three *false* reports this gentleman has here crowded into one short sentence. And I must remind him of what I before told him[m], (though he is pleased to forget it,) that the same Tertullian, in the same treatise, when, in the course of the dispute, he was brought closer up to the pinch of the question; had nothing to say about the *natural impossibility* of the supposition: but he resolves the case entirely into this, that *Scripture* had warranted the assertion in regard to God the *Son*, and had not done so, but the contrary, in regard to God the *Father*. So little reason had this writer to appeal, *twice*, to Tertullian upon this article.

VII. "The three Persons in the Trinity are (with Dr. "Waterland) real Persons, each of them an individual "intelligent agent, undivided in substance, but still dis-"tinct Persons: so distinct, that were they all unori-"ginated, he himself allows they would be three Gods." [Good reason *why*, when upon that supposition they would be more *distinct* than they now are: but this is one of our author's *shrewd* remarks.] "Yet at the same time, "in a most unintelligible manner, and with the utmost "inconsistency, he professes them to be all but one living "Person." Where do I profess any such thing? This hasty *gentleman* might better have stayed a while to prove what he pretends, instead of fixing upon me a *consequence* of his *own*, and in such a manner as must make an ignorant reader think he had *quoted my own words*. He brings some passages of mine to prove his charge, which yet prove nothing like it. If the reader pleases to turn to my definition of *person*[n], he will easily perceive that the *same life* may be common to three Persons, and that *identical* life no more infers *singularity* of Person, than identity of *essence*[o]. When this writer pleases to give us another

[m] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 124.
[n] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 338.
[o] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 92.

definition of person, or to confute *mine*, we may give him a farther hearing.

VIII. In the next page, (p. 90.) I meet with a *misrepresentation* of so odd a kind, that I could never have suspected it, and can scarce think he was well awake when he made it. He pitches upon a passage of my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 188. which runs thus.

"You have taken a great deal of fruitless pains to show, "that the particular glories belonging to the Son, on ac- "count of his *offices*, are distinct from the glories belong- "ing to the Father. You might in the same way have "shown that the particular glories due to the Father "under this or that consideration, are distinct from the "glories of the Father considered under another capa- "city." Now let us come to the remark of this acute gentleman upon it. It is thus: "What is this, but saying, "that the Persons of the Father and Son differ no other- "wise than as *capacities* of the same Person?" I am content to put it off, and to refer the reader to my book, which fully explains the whole thing; hinting only, that the writer might as well have said *offices*, (as capacities,) when his hand was in; and that nothing is more evident than that, if distinct offices in *different* persons are a foundation for *distinct* worships, then distinct offices in the *same* person will make as many *distinct worships* as there are *offices*.

IX. One noted *misrepresentation* must not be neglected: the author insults mightily upon it. I shall cite part of what he says.

"A coordination or subordination of mere order, with- "out relation to *time, place, power, dominion, authority*, "or the like, is exactly the same manner of speaking and "thinking, as if a man should say, a coequality or in- "equality of *equality*. Dr. Waterland therefore was really "much *weaker* than he imagines, when he *wantonly* de- "clared, *he was so weak as to think, that the words* coordi- "nation *and* subordination *strictly and properly respected*

" order, *and expressed an equality or inequality of* order[p]. " Are not things come to a fine pass, if the prime foun- " dation of religion, the first and great commandment, is " to be ludicrously placed on such a *quicksand as this?*" p. 33.

The reader, I suppose, is pretty well acquainted with this gentleman's manner, before this time, that I have the less need to take notice of his affecting big swelling words, and his running out into extravagant exclamations on very slight occasions. It is his unhappiness, that he never knows where to stop, nor how to be *moderate* in any thing. It is *ludicrous* indeed for him to pretend a zeal for the *first and great commandment*, while he is preaching up *two Gods*, and is a friend to *creature-worship:* but that I mention by the way only. As to the point in hand; had I made any mistake in a very nice part of the controversy, he might have borne it with *temper*, as I have many and great ones of his, where there was less excuse for them. To come to the business: he will not find it easy to confute a very plain thing, that *coordination* and *subordination* strictly and properly respect *order*, (to say nothing here what the *order* respects,) as much as *contemporary* or *coeval* respects *time* or *age*, *collateral* place, *concomitant* company; or as any other word of like nature bears a signification suitable to its *etymology*, and to the *analogy* of speech.

Against this he objects, that a " coordination or subor- " dination of mere order is exactly the same manner of " speaking, as a coequality or inequality of equality:" which happens to be a blunder. For as *coequality* and *equality* are the same, in this case, the expression to answer *a coequality or inequality of equality* would be this; *a coordination or subordination of coordination;* which is not my *expression*, nor any thing like my *sense*. What *order*, abstractedly considered, may signify, or what in this

[p] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 94.

particular case, are questions which may come in presently. But in the mean while it is evident, that there is no solecism nor impropriety, but *truth* and *accuracy* too, in saying that *coordination* and *subordination* respect *order*; not *dominion*, not *dignity*, &c. as this author pretends; unless all *order* implies *dominion*, as it certainly does not. *Order* is a general word, and is sometimes determined to a particular meaning by what it is joined with: as order of *time*, order of *situation*, order of *dignity*, order of *nature*, order of *conception*, order of *existence*, order of *causality*, order of *dominion*, and the like. But then *order* is also frequently used *simply* and *absolutely*, without any thing farther to determine or specify its signification: and thus it hath been *anciently* [q], as well as in later times, made use of in our present subject. Thus far then, I hope, it may be very excusable to use the word *order* in this subject *simply* and *absolutely*. If any word is to be put to it, to make the sense more *special*, I admit order of *conception*, with Tertullian [r]; or order of *existence*, as the Son exists *of* and *from* the Father: which may be likewise called order of *causality* [s], in the old sense of *causality* respecting emanative *necessary* causes. That I did not use the word

[q] Λέγοντας Θεὸν πατέρα, καὶ υἱὸν Θεὸν, καὶ πνεῦμα ἅγιον, δεικνύντας αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ἑνώσει δύναμιν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τάξει διαίρεσιν. *Athenag. Legat.* cap. 10.

Ὁ υἱὸς τάξει μὲν δεύτερος τοῦ πατρὸς, ὅτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου· καὶ ἀξιώματι ὅτι ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία, τῷ, εἶναι αὐτοῦ πατέρα, καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτοῦ ἡ πρόοδος καὶ προσαγωγὴ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν καὶ πατέρα· φύσει δὲ οὐκέτι δεύτερος, διότι ἡ θεότης ἐν ἑκατέρῳ μία. *Basil. contr. Eunom.* lib. iii. p. 272. ed. Bened. See my Second Defence, in relation to this passage, vol. iii. p. 332, 454, 464, 465.

Ἔστι τι τάξεως εἶδος, οὐκ ἐκ παρ' ἡμῶν θέσεως συνιστάμενον, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθίᾳ συμβαῖνον, ὡς τῷ πυρὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἐστι τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ——τίνος οὖν ἕνεκεν ἀθετεῖ τὴν τάξιν ἐπὶ θεοῦ λαμβάνεσθαι;——ἡμεῖς δὲ, κατὰ μὲν τὴν τῶν αἰτίων πρὸς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν σχέσιν, προτετάχθαι τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸν πατέρα φαμέν· &c. *Basil.* l. i. p. 232.

[r] Principaliter determinatur ut *prima Persona*, quæ ante Filii nomen erat proponenda, quia *Pater* ante cognoscitur, et post Patrem Filius nominatur. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* cap. 18.

[s] Nihil plane differt in substantia, quia verus Filius est: differt tamen *causalitatis* gradu; quia omnis potentia a Patre in Filio est: et in substantia minor non est Filius; *auctoritate* tamen major est Pater. *Auct. Quæst. utr. Testam. apud August. Quæst.* 122.

order without a *meaning*, may appear from the very passages which this writer quotes from me, p. 34. though he is pleased to call them *empty words*; as every thing here is *empty* with him that carries not in it his crude conceptions about *natural dominion*. His argument to prove them *empty*, being founded on nothing but his own shufflings and mistakes, is answered above, p. 36.

The meaning however of *order*, in this case, may be thus intelligibly set forth to the meanest capacity.

While we consider the *scale* of persons from God the *Father* down to *man*, or ascending from *man* up to God the Father, he is the *first* in the scale from whom all things *descend*; and he is the *last*, in the way of *ascent*, in whom all things *terminate*. The Father by the *Son* and *Holy Ghost* conveys all his blessings to his *creatures*; and his creatures in the *Holy Ghost* and by the *Son* ascend up to the *Father*. Such is the *scale* of existences, such the *order* of things: and this, I hope, is intelligible enough.

If it be next inquired what the *foundation* of this *order* is, and why the *Father*, if but *equal* in nature to the *Son* or *Holy Ghost*, shall yet be at the top of all, and stand *first*; we have this to say, that both the parts are *true* and *certain*; and that the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, though in nature *equal*, are yet *referred up* to the Father as their *head* and *source*, because *of him* and *from him*, in a mysterious and inscrutable manner, they both are. The Father is *from none*; they *from the Father*. This is the Catholic doctrine[t], and as old as Christianity itself, so far as we can

[t] Πᾶσα δὲ τοῦ κυρίου ἐνέργεια ἐπὶ τὸν παντοκράτορα τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει, καὶ ἔστιν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, πατρική τις ἐνέργεια ὁ υἱός. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* 7.

Ἡνῶσθαι γὰρ ἀνάγκη τῷ Θεῷ τῶν ὅλων τὸν θεῖον Λόγον· ἐμφιλοχωρεῖν δὲ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαι δεῖ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα. ἤδη καὶ τὴν θείαν τριάδα εἰς ἕνα, ὥσπερ εἰς κορυφήν τινα, τὸν Θεὸν τῶν ὅλων τὸν παντοκράτορα λέγω, συγκεφαλαιοῦσθαί τι καὶ συνάγεσθαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. *Dionys. Roman. ap. Athan.* vol. i. p. 231.

Φύσις δὲ τοῖς τρισὶ μία Θεός. ἕνωσις δὲ ὁ πατὴρ, ἐξ οὗ, καὶ πρὸς ὃν ἀνάγεται τὰ ἐξῆς. *Gregor. Nazianz. Orat.* xxxii. p. 520.

Θεὸς δὲ ἐξαιρέτως λέγεται, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἕνωσις, ἤτοι ἀνάπτυξις, καὶ ἀνακεφαλαίωσις τῆς τριάδος ὁ πατήρ ἐστι ὡς εἶπεν ὁ Θεολόγος. *Theod. Abucar. ap. Petavium. Trin.* lib. iv. cap. 15. p. 262.

" This

find in the primitive records: all acknowledging (conformable to Scripture) this *order*, and reference of the *Son* and *Holy Ghost up* to the *Father*, and at the same time asserting their *consubstantiality*, *coeternity*, *necessary existence*, *equality* of *nature*, and *unity* of *Godhead*.

If our *ideas* of this eternal reference of one Person up to another be no more than *general* and *confuse*, not full and adequate; what wonder is it, that we should find it so in a subject so sublime? Is it not the tremendous *substance* or *essence* of the *divine* Being that we are here considering? And who is sufficient for these things? Let any man try the utmost stretch of his capacity, in any thing else immediately pertaining to the *divine substance;* and he will soon perceive how short and defective all his *ideas* are. He cannot tell us *what* it is, nor whereunto we may *liken* or *compare* it: cannot say *how* it is *present* every where, or *how* it *acts* any where. Every thing belonging thereto, as *simplicity*, *infinity*, *eternity*, *necessary existence*[u], is all dark and mysterious: we see but "through a "glass darkly," and cannot "see God as he is." It may therefore become these gentlemen to be a little more *modest*, and less *positive* in these *high* matters; and not to insult us, in their manner, as teaching a *collocation of words*, or an *order* of *empty* words; only because we cannot give them, what we cannot have, full and adequate *ideas* of the *mysterious* order and relation of the *blessed Three*, one among another. We might as reasonably object to them an *eternity* of *words*, or an *omnipresence* of *words*, a *verbal ubiquity*, *simplicity*, *infinity*, and the like, as often as we perceive that they are not able to give us more than *general*, *confuse*, and *inadequate* conceptions of those things.

"This origination in the divine Paternity hath anciently been looked upon "as the assertion of the unity: and therefore the Son and Holy Ghost have "been believed to be but *one God with the Father*, because both *from* the "Father, who is *one*, and so the *union* of them." *Pearson on the Creed*, p. 40. See also my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 45, 169, 486.

[u] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 222, &c.

Such is our answer, such our just defence, after attending to every *consequence* the adversary can object, and after suffering it, in the way of fair debate, to be run up to the utmost height. We acknowledge God's *essence* to be *inscrutable*, as did the ancient Catholics in the same cause, against the Eunomians; who finding themselves thereby pinched, had no way left but to put on a bold face, and flatly to deny the *incomprehensibility* of God's *essence*[x]. If their successors at this day are of the same mind, let them speak out. It should be observed how differently our adversaries here behave, from what we do when pursued with *consequences*. They deny the *necessary existence* of God the Son. Run them down but to the next *immediate* consequence, *precarious* existence, and they are amazed and confounded: and instead of frankly admitting the *consequence*, they fall to doubling, shifting, equivocating, in a most childish manner, to *disguise* a difficulty which they cannot *answer*[y]. Push them a little farther, as making a *creature* of God the Son; and they fall to blessing themselves upon it. They make the Son a *creature*? No, not they; God forbid. And they will run you on whole pages, to show how many *quirks* they can invent to avoid giving him the *name* of *creature*, and at the same time to assert the *thing*. Carry the *consequence* a little lower, till their whole scheme begins to show itself more and more repugnant to the *tenor* of *Scripture* and all Catholic antiquity; and then what do these gentlemen do, but shut their eyes and stop their ears: they do not understand a word you say; they will not be answerable for *consequences*; they never taught such things, nor think them fit to be *mentioned*. This is their way of management, as often as we go about to pursue the *consequences* of their scheme down as far as they can go; at the same time that we suffer them to exhaust all their *metaphysics*, in drawing any imaginable consequences against the Ca-

[x] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 217.
[y] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 206.

tholic doctrine, and both attend to them, and answer them, with all Christian fairness, openness, and sincerity[z]. The meanest reader may here see, by this different conduct, where *truth*, where *integrity*, where *reason* is, and where it is not: *truth* does not use to shun the *light;* nor is it any sign of a *good cause* to want so much *art* and *colouring*. And let it not be pretended, that all this shuffling and disguise is only to screen their sentiments from the *popular odium*, and themselves from public *censure:* there may be something in that; and so far perhaps their conduct may appear the more excusable. But there is certainly more in it than that comes to; because the same men can, upon occasion, discover their *low* sentiments of *God* the *Son* very freely[a]; and it is chiefly when they are pressed in dispute, and when they see plainly how hard an argument bears upon them, from *Scripture* and *antiquity*, that they have recourse to *evasion* and *disguise*, and refuse to speak out[b]. But to proceed.

X. "The Doctor frequently appeals from reason and "Scripture to *authority*. When his argument is reduced "to an express contradiction, a contradiction in itself, as "well as to Scripture, then he alleges that the thing he "contends for must be so *upon the principles of the primitive churches*, (Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 122.) "meaning, that it must be so upon his own *hypothesis*." *Observations*, p. 115.

Let the reader see my words, upon which this gentleman makes his tragical exclamation.

"One substance with one Head, cannot make two Gods "upon the principles of the primitive churches: nor are "your *metaphysics* strong enough to bear up against their "united testimonies, with *Scripture* at the head of them." How is this appealing from *Scripture* to *authority?* So far

[z] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 329.

[a] See a collection of passages in my Supplement to the Case, &c. vol. ii. p. 347, &c.

[b] See instances in the Reply, p. 45, 175, 223, 224, 237, 319, 323, 339, 343, 347, 402.

am I from it, that in another place[c], while I commend the *ancients* for their way of solving the *unity*, as taking the best that human wit could invent or rest upon, yet I declare at the same time, that there is no necessity at all for showing *how* the three are one: it is sufficient that *Scripture* bears testimony to the *fact*, that so it is; we are not obliged to say *how*. And there also I obviate what this writer here pretends, in his vain confidence of *boasting*, as if he was able to do great things in the way of *natural* reason; by observing that the *adversary* can do nothing in this case, unless he be able to show (which is impossible) that "no unity whatever can be sufficient to make "more Persons than one, *one Being*, *one Substance*, *one* "*God*."

XI. "When an argument is worked up to the evidence "even of an *identical* proposition, (which is the essence of "demonstration,) then, *it is contrary* (he says) *to the sen-* "*timents of* wiser *men*, *who have argued the other way*." *Observations*, p. 87, 115.

It is very true that I preface my answer to some big pretences of theirs with the words here recited[d]. I suppose, the great offence is in reminding them that there have been men *wiser* than they are. As to the *identical* proposition, the *demonstration* here talked of, I show in the same place[e], that it is built upon nothing but the *equivocal* meaning of *sameness*. Reduce it to *syllogism*, and it will be found a *sophism* with *four terms* in it.

In page the 87th, arguing against the supposition of powers derived and underived being the *same;* he says, "If it were possible, it would follow, that the supreme "power of all, the power of begetting, or deriving being "and powers down to another, would be no power at all." That is to say, if the *essential* powers of the Godhead be the *same*, then the *personal properties* are lost. But I

[c] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 65, 66. Compare First Defence, vol. i. p. 232, 233.

[d] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 203. Compare p. 219, 220.

[e] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 203, 204.

humbly conceive, that as *union* of substance accounts for the one, the *distinction* of *persons* may account for the other: and this *supreme power* of deriving, &c. amounts to nothing more than a *mode* of existing, or a *relation* of order[f].

N. B. The supreme power of *begetting*, which the author here speaks of, means with him nothing more nor less than the supreme power of *creating;* which is plainly his sense of *begetting*, as may appear from what hath been observed above, p. 28.

XII. "Again, when two very different assertions are "affirmed not to be the same assertion, then he asks, *how* "*do you know?* Or, *how came you to be wiser in this par-* "*ticular than all the Christian churches early or late?* "Who yet never affirmed two such different assertions to "be the same assertion; and if they had affirmed it, still "the assertions would not have been the same." *Observations*, p. 119.

Let my words appear; [g] "You add, that making *one* "*substance* is not making *one God:* to which it is sufficient "to say, how do you know? &c." The thing here maintained is, that upon the principles of the *primitive* and *modern* churches, if the three Persons be *one substance*, they are of consequence *one God*. The assertions in this case are equivalent, and tantamount. This is the plain avowed doctrine of the Church ever since the term *substance* came in. They that impugn this doctrine ought first to confute it, if they can. Sometimes indeed I express this primitive doctrine by *one substance* with *one head*, for greater distinction: but *one substance* implies *both*, because the notion of *headship* is taken in with the *union* of substance, as rendering the union *closer*, and making the substance more perfectly *one*[h].

XIII. "When he is told, that it is great presump-

[f] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 205.

[g] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 307.

[h] See above, p. 30.

" tuousness to call the particularities of his own explica-
" tion, *the doctrine of the blessed Trinity; then he cries out,*
" *Great presumption indeed! to believe that the Catholic*
" *Church has kept the true faith;* which are the very
" words, and the very argument wherewith the writers of
" the Church of Rome perpetually insult, and will for ever
" *with justice* insult over all such Protestants, as endea-
" vour to discourage all serious inquiry," &c.

This writer, to introduce his weak reflection, is forced to cut off part of my sentence, which runs thus:—— " kept the true faith, while Eunomians and Arians made " shipwreck of it." This shows that I was speaking of the Catholic Church justly so called, of the *primitive* times, and before Popery was in being; which observation would have entirely prevented his *sarcasm*, or have discovered the impertinence of it. As to the Church of Rome, I desire no *better*, no *other* argument against her, than the *same* I make use of against the Arians, *viz. Scripture* interpreted by *primitive* and *Catholic* tradition. Down falls *Popery* and *Arianism* too, as soon as ever this principle is admitted. But this author, I conceive, was a little too liberal to Popery, or did not know what he was talking of, when he presumed to intimate, that the *writers of the Church of Rome* can, *with justice*, insult us on that head. I hope it was a slip, and he will retract it when he comes to consider. But here again his *eagerness* overcame him, and carried him too far.

XIV. " It had been alleged, that he who never acts in " subjection, &c.——and every other person *always* acts " in subjection to his will, is *alone* the supreme Gover- " nor. In reciting this argument twice, Dr. Waterland " does twice omit the word *always*, in which the stress of " the argument lies." *Observations*, p. 24.

In *abridging*, not *reciting*, the argument, I omitted the word *always;* having indeed no suspicion that any *stress* at all could be laid upon it, but thinking rather that it had been carelessly or thoughtlessly put in by the author. If the *stress* of the argument lies there, the argument is a

very poor one, being grounded only upon a *presumption* of a *fact* that can never be proved. I allow indeed, if God the Son antecedently to the *economy*, and *before the world was*, acted in *subjection* to the Father, that then the argument will have some force in it: but as I very well knew that the author never had, never could prove any such thing; so I could not suspect him to be so weak a man, as to lay the *stress* of the argument there. I insist upon it, that millions and millions of ages, an eternity, *a parte ante*, had preceded, before ever the Son or Holy Ghost are introduced as acting in *subjection*. Let the author disprove this, and he will do something. I have read of the *glory* which our Lord had with the Father *before the world was:* but never heard any thing of his *then* acting in *subjection* to him: wherefore it does not appear that he *always* did it.

XV. "There is no argument in which Dr. Waterland "is more *insolent*, or with *less reason*, than in this which "follows. There are, he thinks, as great *difficulties* in "his adversary's notion of the *divine omnipresence*, as "there are in his notion of many equally supreme (*in na-*"*ture*) independent Persons, constituting one supreme "Governor or Monarch of the universe.——Upon this "*weak* comparison he seems to build all his *hopes*—— "and yet the whole of the comparison is as entirely "*impertinent*, as if a man should pretend that to him "there are as great difficulties in conceiving *immensity* "*or eternity*, as in conceiving *transubstantiation*," &c. *Observations*, p. 95.

How *just*, how *civil*, how *pertinent* this representation is, will appear, when I shall have given the reader a true and faithful account of this whole matter, from the beginning, which is as follows.

In the year 1704, Dr. Clarke, then but a young man, published his Demonstration (as he is pleased to call it) of the Being and Attributes of God: in which work, not content with the common arguments for the existence, *a posteriori*, he strikes a note higher, and aims at a proof *a*

priori; which every man of sense besides knows to be *contradictious* and *impossible*, though he was not aware of it. However, to countenance his pretended Demonstration, he laid hold of the ideas of *immensity* and *eternity*, as *antecedently* forcing themselves upon the minds of all men: and his notion of the divine *immensity* is, that it is infinite *expansion*, or infinite *space*, requiring an infinitely expanded *substratum*, or *subject;* which subject is the very *substance* of God, so expanded. Upon this *hypothesis*, there will be substance and substance, *this* substance and *that* substance, and yet but one *numerical*, *individual*, *identical* substance in the whole. *This* part will be one individual identical substance with *that* part: and a thousand several parts will not be so many *substances*, (though every one be *substance*,) but all will be *one substance*. This is Dr. Clarke's avowed doctrine: he sees the consequence, he owns it; as may appear from his own words[i], in answer to the objection. And he must of course admit, that the one individual substance is both one in *kind*, in regard to the distinct parts, and one in *number* also, in regard to the *union* of these parts in the whole. Upon these principles does the Doctor's famed Demonstration of the *existence* proceed; and upon these does it now stand.

I must next observe, that the same Dr. Clarke, in the year 1712, was disposed to publish, and did publish a very ill book against the received faith of the Church; which he entitled, The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity. He made a pompous show of *texts*, and pretended much to *antiquity* also: but as many as could look through the surface, and penetrate into the work, easily saw that the main strength of his performance rested upon two or three *philosophical* principles, by virtue whereof he was to turn

[i] "No matter is *one substance*, but a heap of substances. And that I take "to be the reason why matter is a subject incapable of thought, not because "it is *extended*, but its parts are distinct *substances*, ununited, and inde- "pendent on each other: which (I suppose) is not the case of *other* sub- "stances." *Clarke's Answer to the Sixth Letter*, p. 40.

and wrest *Scripture*, and *Fathers* too, to such a sense as he wished for; that is, to the Arian hypothesis. Among his *philosophical* principles, the most considerable of all, and which he oftenest retreated to in distress[k], was this; that the defenders of the *received* doctrine, whenever they should come to explain, must inevitably split either upon *Sabellianism* or *Tritheism:* which presumption he grounded upon this reasoning; that the three Persons must be either *specifically* one, (one substance in *kind* only, while three substances in *number*,) which is *Tritheism;* or else they must be *individually* one substance, one in *number* in the strictest sense, which is plain *Sabellianism*. Which reasoning at length resolves into this principle; that *substance* and *substance*, however united, must always, and inevitably make *substances;* and that there cannot possibly be such a thing as *one substance* in *number* and in *kind* too at the same time.

And now it could not but be pleasant enough to observe the Doctor and his friends confuting the Atheists upon this principle, that substance and substance *united* does not make *substances*, and at the same time confuting the Trinitarians upon the contrary supposition. Against Atheists, there might be substance one in *kind* and *number* too: but against the Trinitarians it is downright nonsense and contradiction. Against Atheists, union shall be sufficient to make *sameness*, and *numerical* substance shall be understood with due latitude: but against Trinitarians, the tables shall be turned; *union* shall not make *sameness*, and no sense of *numerical* substance shall serve here but what shall be the very reverse of the other. In a word, the *affirmative* shall serve the Doctor in one cause, and the *negative* in the other: and the self-same principle shall be evidently *true* there, and demonstrably *false* here, to support two several *hypotheses*.

I had observed the thing long ago, before I published a syllable in the controversy: and that I might be the

[k] See my First and Second Defence, Query xxii. vol. i. and iii.

better satisfied, discoursed it sometimes over with friends; which still confirmed me the more in it. Having tried the thing every way, and being secure of that point, a point upon which the main cause, as I easily foresaw, would at length turn, I then proceeded to engage those gentlemen: and as often as they have been retreating to their dilemma about *Sabellianism* and *Tritheism*, (their impregnable fortress as they esteemed it,) I have objected to them their *self-contradiction* and *inconsistency*[l]; have retorted upon them their *own* avowed doctrine in another cause; have reminded them of their *former* (their *present*) sentiments in that article, and have sometimes pretty smartly taxed their notorious *prevarication* and *partiality* in the cause of the Trinity; while they insist upon principles here as of undoubted certainty, though they *believe not* a word of them, though they really *disbelieve* them in any cause else. For this I am called *insolent* by the meek and modest Observator: and by the judicious Author of the Remarks my conduct herein has been censured as *ridiculous* and *monstrous*[m]: by which I perceive, that the men are stung somewhere or other, and have sense enough to know when they are *hurt;* but have not learned how to *bear* it. One tells me, that I build *almost all my hopes* upon this discovery: another intimates, how *happily* for me my adversaries had *advanced* their *notion*, because otherwise I should *have had nothing at all to say*[n]. It is a great favour in them to allow that I have *something* at last: let us now examine what *they* have to say: I will reduce it to heads, for distinction sake.

1. They are sometimes inclinable to *disown* any such notion as I have charged upon them. The Author of the Remarks, being a *nameless* man, thinks he may safely say, that he "has nothing to do with that notion, one "way or other[o]." And even the *writer* whom I am now

[l] See First Defence, vol. i. p. 119, 120, 122, 211, 212, 250. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 52, 65, 198, 306, 302, 333, 387, 397, 410, 411, 417.

[m] Remarks on Dr. Waterland's Second Defence, p. 38.

[n] Remarks, p. 36. [o] Ibid. p. 14.

concerned with says, that "it is by mere conjecture "only, that Dr. Waterland has taken it to be his opinion "at all[p]." If it be Dr. Clarke that says this, his *own books* confute him: if Mr. Jackson, he *knows* that I am perfectly well acquainted with his real and full sentiments in that question. However, if Dr. Clarke's friends *meanly* desert him here, and in a point too on which his famed Demonstration very much depends; I will endeavour to do the Doctor justice *so far*, and shall not suffer him to be run down in a *right* thing, however I may blame him when I find him *wrong*.

2. Sometimes they complain of me as very unfair to take an advantage of an opinion of *theirs*, and to plead it as *true*, at the same time that I myself judge it to be *erroneous* and *false*[q]. But this is gross misrepresentation. I plead nothing but what I take to be very *true*; namely, that substance and substance in *union* does not always make *substances*; which is Dr. Clarke's doctrine as well as mine; and, if true against Atheists, cannot be *false* against the Trinitarians. Indeed, I do not admit (at least, I *doubt of*) their *hypothesis* about God's *expanded* substance: but their general principle of *union* being sufficient to make *sameness*, and of *united* substance, in things immaterial, being *one substance*, this I heartily close in with, and make no question of its *truth* and *certainty*.

3. They sometimes plead that, at best, this is only *argumentum ad hominem*[r], and that it is therefore mean to insist upon it. Let them then first condemn Dr. Clarke for leading me into it: and when they have done, I will defend the Doctor, *so far*, by the concurring verdict of the whole *Christian world*, by the maxims of *common sense*, and by the prevailing *custom* of speech, which never gives the name of *substances* to any thing, but where the substance is *separate*, or *separable*. And I will farther plead, that upon the hypothesis of *extension* this principle

[p] Observations, p. 100.
[q] See the Remarks, p. 37, &c.
[r] See the Remarks, p. 13.

must be true; or else there is no such thing as *one substance*, or *one being*, in the world[s]. Farther, if I had not such plain and cogent reasons for the truth of this principle; yet since I am here upon the *defensive* only, and am warding off an *objection*, I have a right to *suppose* it *true*, till my adversaries can prove the *contrary*. All these considerations put together are more than enough to answer the pretence of my arguing *ad hominem*.

4. They add farther, that their explication of the *omnipresence* is not exactly *parallel* to my notion of the Trinity[t]. Nor did I ever pretend that it was *exactly parallel:* I have myself particularly shown[u] wherein and how far the two cases differ. But, forasmuch as *both* agree in one *general* principle, (which was all that I wanted, and all that I insisted upon,) that substance in *union* with substance does not necessarily make *substances*, they are *so far* parallel: and so long as this principle stands its ground, (which will be as long as *common* sense shall stand,) so long will the *received* doctrine of the *Trinity* stand clear of the most important and most prevailing objection that *metaphysics* could furnish: and the boasted pretence of *no medium* between *Sabellianism* and *Tritheism*, which has been in a manner the *sole* support, the *last* refuge both of Socinians and Arians, is entirely routed and baffled by it. *Hinc illæ lacrymæ*, &c. that I may use now and then a scrap of Latin, as well as our Observator. I pass over several remarks of his, relating to this article, because now the reader will perceive how wide they are of the point in hand; and that they are only the uneasy struggles of a man fast bound and fettered; bearing it with great regret, and very desirous, if possible, to *conceal* it; though he *shows* it so much the more, by the laborious pains he spends upon it.

XVI. "What I suppose the Doctor more strictly "means—is this; that if, from the highest titles given

[s] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 302, 411.

[t] Remarks, p. 38.

[u] First Defence, vol. i. p. 120.

" to Christ in Scripture, he cannot prove the Son to be " naturally and necessarily the God supreme over all; " then neither can we, from the highest titles given to " the Father in Scripture, prove him to be naturally and " necessarily the God supreme over all, so as to have no " one above or superior to him in dominion." *Observat.* p. 110.

This *representation* of the case is pretty fair in the main, had but the author in his farther process kept close to it, and made no change in it. My argument was this[x]; that Dr. Clarke and his friends, by their artificial elusions of every text brought for the *divinity* of God the Son, had marked out a way for eluding any text that could be brought for the *divinity* of God the Father. To make this plain, let it be premised, (as granted on both sides,) that there is discoverable, by the light of reason, the existence of some eternal, immutable, necessarily existing God: and now the question will be, how we prove from *Scripture* that any particular Person there mentioned is the *eternal God*, whose existence is proved by *reason*. We urge in favour of God the Son, that he is *God*, according to Scripture, in the true and full meaning of the word; therefore he is the *eternal God*, and has no God above him. We urge that he is *Jehovah*, which implies *necessary existence;* therefore, again, he is the *eternal God*, who has no God above him. We plead farther, that he is properly *Creator*, since the " heavens are the works of " his hands, &c." therefore again he is the *eternal God*, who has no God above him. We farther urge, that he is " over all, God blessed for ever," Rom. ix. 5. And παντοκράτωρ, *Almighty*, or *God over all*, who " is, and " was, and is to come," Rev. i. 8.[y] which expressing *necessary existence*, and supreme dominion too, proves farther that he is the *eternal* God, &c. The same thing

[x] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 82. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 230, &c.

[y] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 319, 320. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 136, &c. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 227, &c.

we prove from several *titles*, and *attributes*, and *honours*, being all so many marks and characters of the one true and eternal God. These proofs of the Son's divinity are at the same time applicable to the Father, and so are proofs of the *eternal* divinity both of Father and Son. Now to come to our *Arianizing* gentlemen: they have found out ways and means, artifices, colours, quibbles, distinctions, to elude and frustrate them all. *God* is a word of *office* only[z], not *substance: Jehovah* means only one *faithful to his promises*[a]: παντοκράτωρ, *God over all*, and the like, may bear a *subordinate* sense[b]. Every *title* or *attribute* assigned may admit of a *limited* construction. Well then: what remains to prove the *eternal Godhead* of the Person of the *Father*, against any Marcionite, or other heretics that should assert another God *superior* to him? Here is the pinch of the present argument. This gentleman in answer asks, "Does he by whom God "created all things claim as much to be the first cause "of all things, as he that created all things by him? "Does he who came not to do his own will, but the will "of him that sent him, claim as much to have no su-"perior, as he whose will he was sent to fulfil?" And he has more to the same purpose. To which I answer, that when all the proofs before mentioned of the Son's having no God above him are set aside, I allow that there would remain but very weak and slender presumptions of the Son's being *equal* to the Father, or of his having no God *above* him. But suppose (for argument sake) the Son thus proved to be *inferior* to the *Father*, when the texts before mentioned are all set aside; next show, that the *eternal God*, known by the light of reason, is not, or may not be another God *above* them *both*. What I assert is, that the same *elusions*, at least the *same kind* of elusions, will serve to frustrate every argument that has been or can be brought. Let us try the experiment upon those

[z] Clarke's Reply, p. 110, 200, 301. Scripture Doctrine, p. 296. ed. 1st.
[a] Collection of Queries, p. 19.
[b] Reply, p. 159.

which this gentleman (after the last straining and racking of invention) has been able to produce. He builds his main hopes and confidence upon 1 Cor. viii. 6. "To us "there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things." To which a Marcionite may make answer, that *to us* may not signify to the *whole compass of beings;* neither is there any necessity of interpreting *all things* in an *unlimited* sense, when it may very well bear a *limited* one. And supposing *of whom are all things* (that is, *some* things) to be meant of *creating;* yet since the work of *creating* is allowed not to prove the *essential* divinity of the *Creator*, here is nothing done still. The words *one God* prove nothing: for *God* being a word of *office*, it means little more than *one King*, or *one Ruler*. And so the whole amounts to this only, that to *us* of *this earth, this system*, there is *one Ruler*, who made all things in it. How does this prove that our *Ruler* is the *eternal* and *necessarily existing* God? The like may be said of Eph. iv. 6. *One Ruler* over this system, supreme King over *all the earth*, above all, and through all, and in all *that belong to it*. The last thing the gentleman has to offer is, that this *Ruler* claims to have no other *God above him*. This is not without its weight and force, though it has not a tenth part of the force of those arguments I have above mentioned, and which this gentleman knows how to *elude*. By a *little straining*, (as this writer knows how to *strain much* upon occasion,) this may be interpreted in a *subordinate* and *limited* sense, to signify *supreme* in these *his* dominions, having no rulers *here* to control or command him, or, no God of *this kind*, (that is, God by *office* only,) which does not exclude any God of *another* kind, the supreme God of the universe: for it would be *improper to say, that the supreme God has an office*[c]. It is not therefore proved, that there may not be, above him, another God; who is really and truly, and in the *metaphysical* sense, the *eternal* and *necessarily existing* God. This gen-

[c] See Reply, p. 220.

tleman adds, speaking still of the *Father*, that he is *sent by none*, receives power and authority *from none*, acts by *no one's commission*, fulfils *no one's will*. It is true, it is not said that he is sent by *any*, or receives power from *any* one: and this may afford a probable presumption in favour of his being absolutely without any *superior*, and be as good a proof of it, as a mere *negative* proof can be. But as this is not said, so neither is the *contrary*; or if it were, it might bear a *limited* construction, so that the demonstration at length appears lame and defective.

I should have been very sorry to engage in an argument of this kind, but to convince some persons of the great imprudence, as well as impiety, of throwing aside so many clear, solid, and substantial proofs, which the holy Scripture affords, of the *eternal* divinity of God the *Father*, and resting it at last upon so weak and so precarious a bottom; at the same time introducing such a *wanton* way of eluding and frustrating the plainest texts, that it looks more like burlesquing Scripture, than commenting upon it. I heartily beseech all well-disposed persons to beware of that *pride* of pretended *reason*, and that *levity* of *spirit*, which daily paves the way for *infidelity*, and a contempt of all *religion*; which has spread visibly, and been productive of very ill effects, ever since this new sect has risen up amongst us.

XVII. "The Doctor cannot possibly express *his* (*notion*) "in any words of Scripture: and, when called upon to "do it, he has only this *jesting* answer to make, *Do you* "*imagine that I cannot as easily, or more easily, find Scrip-* "*ture words for mine? But this is trifling*[d]. And again: "*You blame me for not expressing my faith in any* Scripture "position: *as if every thing I assert as matter of faith were* "*not as much* Scripture position, *according to my way of* "*understanding Scripture, as yours is to you*, &c.——Un- "doubtedly it is just as much so; that is, not at all. For

[d] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 408. where I add, "Why have you not laid "down your doctrine in *Scripture words*, that I might compare it with the "Doctor's *propositions*, to see how far they exceed, or come short?"

" neither one man's nor another man's interpretation, or " way of understanding Scripture, is at all a Scripture " position: but the *texts themselves only are* Scripture " positions, with which no man's interpretation can with- " out the greatest presumptuousness be equalled." *Observations*, p. 113.

The *civility* and the *sense* of this worthy passage are both of a piece. Why is my answer called a *jesting* answer? I never was more *serious*, nor ever said a thing with better *reason*, than when I called that pretence *trifling*. If nothing will satisfy but *exposing* his weak reasoning at full length, it must be done.

1. In the first place, what has he gained by giving us the *whole of his notion* (as he calls it) in the *very words* of Scripture? The words are, " one Spirit; one Lord; one " God and Father of all, who is above all." Had Dr. Clarke done no more than cited these words, could any man have ever known the *whole of his notion*, or ever suspected him to be an Arian? His *propositions* and *replies* are the things that contain the *whole* of his notion, and not these words, which do not contain it.

2. Again, let but a Socinian understand these words as *he* pleases, and they may as well contain the *whole* of his *notion*. A Sabellian will tell you the same. I shall not despair, *reserving* to myself my own construction, of maintaining my claim also, and making the same words contain the *whole* of my notion. Well then, here will be four *different*, or *contrary* positions, and all of them *Scripture positions*, to their respective patrons and abettors. What must we do now? Oh, says the Arian, but *mine* is the *Scripture position*, (for it is in the *very words* of *Scripture*,) yours is *interpretation*. Ridiculous, says the Socinian; are not my words the very *same* with yours, and as good Scripture as yours? I tell you, yours is *interpretation*, and mine only is the *Scripture position*. Hold, I beseech you, gentlemen, says a Sabellian, or any Athana-

• Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 394.

sian, why do you exclude me? I tell you, the words contain *my notion* to a tittle, and they are *Scripture words;* mine therefore is the *Scripture position.*

Now if this writer can end the dispute any other way than by showing whose is the *best interpretation* of the four, and by admitting that *best interpretation* for the only *Scripture position;* he shall have the reputation of a shrewd man, and the honour of being the author of that sage maxim, that *texts themselves only are Scripture positions.*

3. I cannot help observing farther, what a fine handle he has here given for such as adhere to the *letter,* in any instance, against the *sense* of Scripture. For the *letter,* in such a case, upon this gentleman's principles, must pass for the *Scripture position:* and the other being *interpretation* only, or drawn out by *reason* and argument, must not be *equalled* with it, under pain and peril of *presumptuousness.* The Quakers must thank him highly. "Swear not at all," say they: Can there be ever a plainer *Scripture position?* Can the opposite party bring any text like it? Can they express their *notion* in *Scripture words* like these? No: their notion can be reckoned only as *interpretation,* and must never be set against a plain *Scripture position.*

An Anthropomorphite will insult over his adversary on the same foot. He will produce many and plain texts, where God is represented with *eyes, ears, face, heart, hands,* or *feet.* There are no texts so plain on the other side. The plainest is where it is said, *God is* πνεῦμα, which yet is capable of divers constructions, and every one is only *interpretation,* never to be *equalled* with *Scripture position.*

The Apollinarians, or other heretics, will insult. "The "Word was made flesh:" was *made,* not *took upon him;* and *flesh,* not *man.* They will challenge their adversaries to produce any text so plain on their side, and will value themselves, no doubt, upon the *Scripture position;* to which the *interpretation,* however just or necessary, must not be equalled.

To mention one more, the very Papists will assume upon it, and even in favour of *transubstantiation*. "This "is my body," is a Scripture position: and, "Except ye "eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, "you have no life in you." Let any Protestant produce a *text*, if possible, as full and expressive of his *notion*, as these are of the other; or else let him confess that his is *interpretation* only, which is by no means to be *equalled* with *Scripture position*.

This gentleman is pleased to say, that *transubstantiation* has some colour in the "bare words of Scripture, though," as he adds, "none in the sense." But what is the *sense* till it be drawn out by *interpretation?* The *words*, according to him, are the *Scripture position;* to which no *interpretation* must be *equalled*.

To conclude this head; if this writer will understand by *Scripture position*, the *sense* and *meaning* of Scripture rightly *interpreted*, I shall readily prove to him that my main positions, in regard to the *ever blessed Trinity*, are all *Scripture positions*. But if he means any thing else, let him first answer the Quakers, the Anthropomorphites, the Apollinarians, and Papists, as to the texts alleged; and then we shall take care to answer him about Ephes. iv. 6. or any other *text* he shall please to produce.

He talks much of my putting my "own explications "of a doctrine, in the place of the doctrine to be ex- "plained;" and spends a whole *observation* upon it. He certainly aims at something in it; though I profess I cannot well understand what: nor do I think that he himself *distinctly* knows what it is that he means. If he means, that I have put what I have collected from many *texts*, or from the *whole* tenor of *Scripture*, into a narrow compass, or into a *few words*, as *our Church*, as all Christian churches have done; I see no harm in it. If he means, that I substitute my *own doctrine* in the room of the *Church's* doctrine, or of the *Scripture doctrine*, I deny the *charge*, and leave him to prove it at leisure. If he

means that I take upon me to call the *received doctrine* the *doctrine of the Trinity*, in opposition to his doctrine, which is not properly the doctrine of a *Trinity*[f], nor *true* doctrine, but *heresy*; I own the fact, and have said enough to justify it. And this gentleman will be hard put to it, to make good his pretended *parallel* between teaching this doctrine, and asserting *transubstantiation*; which is a calumny that he has twice repeated, p. 95, 112. and which he has borrowed from the Papists, though abundantly confuted long ago by learned and judicious hands[g].

XIX. This gentleman represents me (p. 63, 64, and 120.) as changing the word ἀγέννητος into ἀγένητος, in innumerable passages of ancient authors, without any pretence of *manuscripts*; nay, without *any pretence of authority* for so doing. This is great *misrepresentation*: and he is herein guilty at least of *fraudulently* concealing what I do pretend, and what *authority* I had for it. Let but my Second Defence be consulted[h], and it will there be seen, that I had *good reason*, and sufficient *authority*, even for correcting the manuscripts in relation to that *word*; showing by an *historical deduction*, and *critical* reasons, what the reading ought to be, and what it *anciently* was: which is of much greater weight than the readings of manuscripts (supposing them to agree, which yet is doubtful) in an instance of this kind, where the copyists might so easily mistake, the difference being no more than that of a single or double *letter*. I laid down rules whereby to judge of the *readings* in this case. If this gentleman can either *confute* them, or give *better*, I shall stand corrected. In the mean while, he has been acting an *ungenerous* and *unrighteous* part, in the *representation* here given, and ought to make satisfaction to his readers for it.

[f] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 386.

[g] See the Collection of Pamphlets relating to the Popish Controversy.

[h] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 240, &c.

CHAP. III.

Concerning the Author's Flouts, Abuses, declamatory Exclamations, Repartees, &c. in lieu of Answers.

WE shall meet with many instances of this kind in the course of his work: I shall point out some of them in order as they occur.

I. Page 9th and 10th, to the solutions I had given of his great *objection*, wherein he pleads for a *natural* superiority of dominion over God the Son, and to what I had urged about the Father and Son mutually *glorifying* each other[i]; he is pleased only to say: "If any man who, to "say no more, reads seriously this chapter, (John xvii.) "can believe this to be the doctrine of Christ, I think it "can be to no purpose to endeavour to convince him of "any thing."

He introduces these words, indeed, with some pretence to *reasoning;* though it is really made up of nothing else but his own shufflings and mistakes. I have never said that the Father *might not have disdained* to have been *incarnate.* He might, he could not but *disdain* to be so; because it was not *proper* nor *congruous* for the *Father,* or *first* Person, to condescend to it. And admitting that it was *possible* for him to have been *incarnate;* it does not follow that the Father could become a *Son,* or the Son *Father;* their relation to each other being *natural,* and *unalterable.*

II. Page the 13th, he is pleased to cite, imperfectly, my words wherein I answer and obviate[k] his pretences from 1 Cor. viii. 6. by reasons drawn from the context, and very plain ones. He tells us, instead of replying,

[i] Expostulatio *clarificationis* dandæ, vicissimque reddendæ, nec Patri quidquam adimit, nec infirmat Filium; sed *eandem divinitatis* ostendit in utroque *virtutem;* cum et clarificari se Filius a Patre oret, et clarificationem Pater non dedignetur a Filio. *Hilar.* p. 814.

[k] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 401, 402.

that " the Doctor endeavours to cover *the reader* with a " thick dust of words, that have no signification;" and that it could scarce " have been believed, that such a " twist of unintelligible words should have dropped from " the pen of a serious writer." I am sorry for his slowness of apprehension: but I am persuaded rather, that he *understood* the *twist* of words too well to attempt any *answer*.

III. To the objection about the Son's *receiving* dominion, I had shown[l], how both Father and Son may *receive* dominion, and *increase* of dominion; intimating that *dominion* is an *external relation* which may accrue to any of the *divine* Persons, and is no argument against their *equal* perfection. This gentleman turns it off by *misrepresentation*, (p. 16.) to this purpose; " As if the Father's " receiving the kingdom, &c. was as much an argument " of the Son's supremacy over the Father, as the Son's " receiving," &c. and concludes; " Was ever any thing " so ludicrous upon so important a subject?" Which is first making a ridiculous blunder of his *own*, and then, to show still greater indecency and levity, beginning the *laugh* himself. I did not plead for any supremacy of the Son *over the Father;* but was showing, that *economical* conveyance of dominion on one hand, or *economical* reception of dominion on the other, is no bar to *equality* of nature.

IV. To a reply made by me[m], about the sense of *exalting*, (Phil. ii. 9.) which sense I vindicated at large, and then asked, where now is there any appearance of absurdity? to this the author here returns me a *flout*, though in the words of an Apostle: " If any man be ignorant, " let him be ignorant." This, he thinks, is the *only proper answer*, p. 19. The next time he is disposed to *jest*, or show his *wit*, he should be advised to choose some other than *Scripture words* to do it in. I shall endeavour however, that he may not be *ignorant* hereafter, by tak-

[l] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 80, 81. [m] Ibid. p. 210.

ing care to inform him, that when I interpret *exalting* in such a sense as men *exalt* God, in opposition to another sense of *exalting* to an *higher* place or dignity, I could not be supposed to mean, that the Father is *inferior* to Christ, as men are *inferior* to God: it must be great *maliciousness* to insinuate that I had any such meaning. But as *inferiors* may exalt *superiors* in the sense of *extolling*, or *praising*; so undoubtedly may *equals* exalt *equals* in the same sense of *extolling* or *praising*; and thus God the Father *exalted* his *coequal* Son.

V. Upon a remark of mine[n], or rather not *mine*, in relation to the construction of two Greek words, (εἰς δόξαν[o],) this gentleman, full of himself, breaks out into "wonder, that some men of great abilities and great "learning can never be made to understand grammar[p]." These men that our *writer* so insults over, as not understanding *grammar*, are, we should know, such men as Beza, Grotius, Schmidius, and the top critics; who unanimously assert that εἰς is often put for ἐν, and some admit it even in this very text. This gentleman is pleased to deny that *one* is ever put for the *other*. I might very justly decline entering into that dispute, because, as it happens, our learned *grammarian* confirms the construction he finds fault with in this text, by the very instance brought to *confute* it; which, if it does not show want of *grammar*, shows want of *thought*.

His words are: "If I mean to affirm that a man is in "the field, I can with equal propriety of speech say ei-"ther that he is ἐν ἀγρῷ, or εἰς ἀγρὸν, because the sense, "in *this* case, happens to be the same whether I say that "he is *in* the field, or that he is *gone*, or *carried*, *into* the "field." Admitting this to be so, then I hope εἰς δόξαν may as well signify *in the glory*, because the sense, in *this* case, is the same, whether Christ be said to be *in* the glory, or *gone into* the glory; that glory which he had

[n] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 361.
[o] Phil. ii. 11.
[p] Observations, p. 20.

" before the world was," and into which he *reentered* after his passion and ascension, which is called " entering into " his glory," Luke xxiv. 26. This is sufficient for me, in regard to the *text* I am concerned with.

As to this *author's new* rule of *grammar*, (which happens to do him no service,) I may leave it to the mercy of the *critics*; who perhaps may take it for a vain conceit in matter of *criticism*, as he has discovered *many*, both in *divinity* and *philosophy*: the same turn of mind will be apt to show itself in like instances in all. I know not whether this gentleman will be able, upon the foot of his *new rule*, to give a tolerable account of the use of the preposition εἰς in such examples as here follow: εἰς τὸν κόλπον, John i. 18. εἰς ὃν εὐδόκησεν, Matt. xii. 18. εἰς ᾅδου, (Suppl. οἶκον,) Acts ii. 31. εἰς διαταγὰς ἀγγέλων, Acts vii. 53. εἰς τὸ γῆρας, Gen. xxi. 2. He must suppose, at least, something understood (as in his other instance, *gone into*, or *carried into*) beyond what is expressed, to make the *preposition* εἰς stand with *equal propriety*: and so he must solve by an *ellipsis* what others solve by a *change* of *prepositions*. Which at last is changing *one phrase* for *another* phrase, or using one *form* of *speech* instead of another which would be clearer and more expressive. To me it seems, that the easier and better account is that which our ablest *critics* hitherto have given; that one *preposition* or *particle* may be, and often is, *put for another*: which may be owing to several accidental causes among the different *idioms* of various languages borrowing one from another. To instance in *quia*, or *quoniam*, for *quod*, by a Grecism: for since it happens that ὅτι may sometimes signify this and sometimes that, these two renderings by degrees come to be used one for the other. The like might be observed in many other cases of the same kind: but I am not willing to weary the reader with *grammatical* niceties, of small importance to the point in hand.

VI. To an assertion of mine, namely, that there was no *impossibility*, in the nature of the thing itself, that the

Father should be *incarnate*, (an assertion which all that have professed a *coequal* Trinity have ever held, and still hold,) only it is not so suitable or congruous to the *first* Person to have been so: to this the gentleman replies, "Do not the reader's ears tingle?" And he goes on *declaiming* for a whole page of *repetition*. This is the gentleman, who in his preface enters a *caveat* against making "applications to the passions of the ignorant;" as if he meant to engross the privilege entirely to *himself*.

VII. In the next page, (p. 29.) he seemed disposed to give some answer to an observation of mine, that by voluntary *economy* the exercise of powers *common* to *many* may devolve upon *one* chiefly, and run in his name[q]. After some fruitless labouring, as we may imagine, to make some *reply*, out comes a scrap of Latin, from an old comedy, *Quid est, si hæc contumelia non est?* which, if the reader pleases, he is to take for an *answer*.

VIII. From page 39th to 47th, this writer goes on declaiming about the supposed *absurdity* of the *Father's* appearing according to the *ancients*.

Bishop Bull[r], and after him, I have particularly, fully, and distinctly considered that whole matter, and have answered every thing that has been or can be brought in the way of *reason* or *argument*, against the *divinity* of God the Son from that topic[s]. Yet this writer, applying only to the *passions of the ignorant*, and roving in generals, displays his talent for eight or nine pages together. And among other Fathers, he is weak enough to bring St. Austin in, as voucher for the *absurdity* of the Father's being *sent*, *appearing*, &c. For verily, if St. Austin, who undoubtedly believed there was no *natural impossibility*[t],

[q] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 383.

[r] Bull. D. F. sect. iv. c. 3. Breves Animadv. in Gilb. Cler. p. 1044, &c.

[s] Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 270. Second Def. vol. iii. p. 123 to 130.

[t] Solus Pater non legitur missus, quoniam solus non habet *auctorem* a quo genitus sit, vel a quo procedat. Et ideo non propter *naturæ diversitatem*, quæ in Trinitate nulla est, sed propter ipsam *auctoritatem*, solus Pater non dicitur *missus*. Non enim splendor, aut fervor ignem, sed ignis mittit sive splendorem, sive fervorem. *August. contr. Serm. Arian.* c. 4.

but only great *incongruity* in the thing, could yet use such a strong expression of it as *absurdissime*[u], what consequence can be drawn from the expressions of other *Fathers*, which scarce any of them come up to this? But St. Austin was professedly for the Father's *appearing*, and objects only against his being *sent;* which this writer seems not to know. I have remarked upon him before in relation to Tertullian in this very matter, nor need I add more[x].

IX. There is a sentence in my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 158. (repeated, in sense, p. 164, 165.) which has happened to fall under the displeasure of this gentleman. My words are:

"What has supremacy of office to do with the notion "of supreme God? *God* is a word expressing *nature* and "*substance:* he is supreme God, or God supreme, that "has no God of a superior nature above him. Such is "*Christ*, even while he submits and condescends to act "ministerially." To the former part of this passage we have the following smart repartee: "What has supre-"macy of office, or authority and dominion to do with "the notion of supreme man.—Is not *man* (in the same "way of reasoning) a word expressing nature and sub-"stance? *Quam ridicule!*" p. 50. Now, for my part, I never heard of *supreme man*. *Man* is the word upon which the argument turns; for which reason I have thrown out *supreme King*, or *Governor*, as not pertinent. And as no supremacy of *office* can make one *man* more truly or more properly *man*, or man in a *higher* sense of the word *man;* so it seemeth to me that no supremacy of *office* can make God the Father more truly *God*, or God in a *higher sense* than is God the Son. There was no

[u] Pater non dicitur missus; non enim habet de quo sit, aut ex quo procedat——si voluisset Deus Pater per subjectam creaturam visibiliter apparere, *absurdissime* tamen aut a Filio quem genuit, aut a Spiritu Sancto qui de illo procedit, *missus* diceretur. *August. de Trin.* lib. iv. c. 28, 32.

[x] See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 270. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 124, &c.

great reason for the gentleman's bursting out into merriment upon it, with his *quam ridicule:* but perhaps his infirmity, as usual, overcame him.

X. To a well known plea on our side, that God could not be God merely in the sense of *dominion*, having been God from everlasting, and before dominion commenced, the Observator thus speaks: "But is it in reality no cha- "racter of dominion, no *relative* character, to have in "himself an essential power from eternity to eternity, of "producing what subjects he thinks fit, and of destroy- "ing what subjects he thinks fit, and of producing new "subjects of his government at pleasure? Was ever such "trifling in serious matters?" Truly, I think not, if the last part be intended for an answer to the first; as any stranger might judge, who knows not that both come from the same hand. This gentleman is so taken up with *grammar*, it seems, that he has forgotten the first elements of *logic;* which will teach him that *relate* and *correlate* always rise and fall together. Where can the *relative* character be, while as yet there is supposed to exist but one *term* of *relation?* It is true, God can make to himself new *relations* by making new *creatures* when he pleases: but when he had as yet, for an *eternity* backwards, no relation to any *creature* at all, none being created, I humbly conceive he was under no such *relative* character, nor had any *dominion;* consequently could not be *God* in the sense of *dominion*[y]. This writer therefore might have spared his *ridicule* for a more proper occasion, had the gaiety of his heart permitted him to think *seriously* of the matter. As to what he has farther upon the same question, it is no more than repetition of what I fully answered long ago[z]. And the main of the question was before given up in the Reply[a]: as I observed also in my Second Defence[b].

[y] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 171.
[z] First Defence, vol. i. p. 34, &c. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 171.
[a] Reply, p. 119.
[b] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 162, 198, 232.

XI. When this writer comes to the head of worship, (Observat. viii.) he repeats some stale pleas used by the party, and which have all been particularly considered and confuted in my Defences, vol. i. and iii. As to reinforcing the pleas with any new matter, or taking off the force of the answers given, he is not solicitous about it. But here a *scoff* and there a *flout* he flings at his adversary. P. 78. he cites a sentence of mine[c] in a *scoffing* manner, calling it an excellent commentary upon two texts, (1 John ii. 1. Hebr. vii. 25.) which texts, he conceives, teach us to "pray to Christ, to pray in heaven "for us:" in the mean while taking no notice of what I had said to obviate so low and mean a notion of God the Son, and to cut off the pretence of *creature-worship*. Having gone on with *repetition* as far as he thought proper, he next vouchsafes to take notice that I had made some *replies:* and one of them he *confutes*, by saying, that there will be found in it a *singular dexterity*, p. 81. Another, by saying, "If any serious reader finds any in-"struction or improvement in it, it is well," p. 84. A third, by a scrap of Latin, from the Comedian, *Quid cum isto homine facias?* The English of which seems to be, that he has thought every way to come at some solution, is disappointed in all, and *knows not what to do* more; except it be to *flout* and *scoff*, that whatever reputation he and his friends had once gained, by beginning like *serious men*, (in which way I was ready to go on with them,) they may at length throw up, by ending like——

XII. Page the 86th, this *writer* comes to speak of *individuality* and *sameness;* in which I had been beforehand with him, answering all his pretences on that head[d]. Instead of *replying*, he goes on in his way. "*Indivi-*"*duality* and *sameness*," says he, "are words, it seems, "which signify nobody knows what:" because, forsooth, I had exposed his weak pretences to show what *makes* it,

[c] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 344.
[d] Ibid. p. 298, &c. 219, 410, 411.

or what its *principle* is. He refers me to his Reply[e], to convince me of the *absurdity* of my *way of talking*. I had seen, I had considered his Reply long ago, and exposed the weakness of it[f]: what pity is it that he is forced to leave it at last helpless, and entirely destitute of any reinforcement.

XIII. He is farther angry with me for calling upon him to *explain* his terms[g], particularly *supreme* and *independent*. As to the first of them, he says, (p. 87.) it is "a term which no man, *he* believes, before Dr. Water-"land, misunderstood." Whether I misunderstood it or no, may be a question. I think the English of it is *highest:* and as *high* or *low* may have respect to variety of things, to *place*, to *dignity*, to *dominion*, to *office*, to *order*, to *nature*, &c. it was but just in Dr. Waterland to call for an explanation, that so the word *supreme* might be admitted or rejected under proper *distinctions*.

Independent is likewise a word variously understood according to variety of *respects*. God the Son, for instance, is *dependent* on the Father, as being *of him*, and *from him*, and referred up to him: but he is not *dependent* on the Father's *will*, or *pleasure*, being *necessarily existing* as well as the Father. Every Person of the Trinity is *independent* of any thing *ad extra;* but none of them are entirely *independent* of each other, having a *necessary* relation to one another, that they must and cannot but exist *together*, never were, never could be *separate*, or asunder. This is sufficient to justify my calling for an explanation of *independent*. Which this gentleman would not have been offended at, but that it touches him in a tender part: it is breaking through his *coverts*, letting the *world* in upon him, when he has a mind to be *retired*, and to lie concealed under *equivocal* and *ambiguous* terms.

The term *authority* was another *equivocal* word, which I was willing to *distinguish* upon[h]. This writer being

[e] Reply, p. 307, 308.
[f] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 298.
[g] Ibid. p. 386. [h] Ibid. p. 45, 170.

extremely desirous of finding a *governor* for God the Son and God the Holy Ghost, says; "As if any man, since "the world began, ever did or ever could mean, by those "terms, not power and dominion." It were easy to quote a multitude of writers, ancient and modern, that use the word *authority*, without reference to *dominion;* and who when they ascribe it to the *Father*, as his peculiar, never mean to express any the least *dominion* over the other *two Persons* by it. I content myself here with two only, both quoted in my Second Defence[i], namely, St. Austin and Bishop Pearson. It would be endless to instruct this gentleman in all the *useful* things which he wants to *know*. He does not know, that as early as the days of St. Austin, the very *distinction* which I insist upon, as to the *equivocal* sense of *authority* in this case, was taken notice of, and pleaded against one of his Arian predecessors, Maximin[k]: so little is he acquainted with what men of *letters* have been doing *since the world began*.

Upon this occasion he drops a *maxim*, as he takes it to be, that "nothing can be the same in kind and in number "too." The Author of the Remarks is full of the same thing[l]. I have already hinted, how contradictory this pretended *maxim* is to Dr. Clarke's known and avowed principles in another cause. To answer now more directly, and to cut off their main argument at once; I observe, that though in *finite* things, especially things *corporeal*, those that are one substance in *kind* are more than one substance in *number;* yet the reason is not, because they are *one in kind*, but because they are really *separate*, or *separable* from each other: and so it happens, that while they are one substance *in kind*, they are not one in *number*. But where the substance is neither *sepa-*

[i] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 169, 312. See other testimonies in Petavius, de Trin. lib. v. c. 5. sect. 11, 12, 13. lib. ii. c. 2. sect. 9. and in Bull. D. F. sect. iv. c. 1. p. 254.

[k] Augustin. cont. Maxim. lib. iii. c. 5, 14.

[l] Remarks, p. 25.

rate nor *separable*, (as in the *divine* Persons,) there unity of *kind* and *number* are consistent, and meet in one: and thus the unity is both *specific* and *individual*, without any the least repugnancy, or appearance of it [m].

XIV. Page the 93d, we meet with several little efforts to say something, but with a very *ill spirit*, and showing more of the author's *spleen* than his abilities. He *scoffs* at the advice given him, not to pretend to be *wise* in the deep things of God. He is positive that an *infinitely active* Being can, if he pleases, entirely *cease to act*; that God's *loving* himself, however it may be the prime *mover* in all the divine acts, is *no act at all*; and that God never *naturally* or *necessarily* exerts any *power*; for this wise reason, because in such a case he *can have no power to exert*: that is, because the *will* is the *original* (with this writer) of all *exerting of power*, which was the point in *question*. He has left several very material things I urged upon this head, perfectly untouched [n]: but seems to be affronted that any man should *question* whatever he has been pleased to affirm, or should not take his *dictates* for *demonstrations*.

XV. There is a place which I have passed over in p. 62. but deserves to be mentioned under this chapter. I happened to find fault with Dr. Clarke, for pretending to prove the existence of a first Cause, *a priori* [o]: which has no sense without supposing a cause *prior* to the *first*, which is flat *contradiction*. This plain reasoning is called turning the pretended *proof into ridicule*; though, in my notion, *reasoning* is one thing, and *ridiculing* another. However, the gentleman being grievously offended, resolves to revenge himself in a note. Repeating some words of mine, out of the place I have referred to in my Second Defence, vol. iii. he enters a remark: "These "words show that Dr. Waterland does not understand "what the meaning of a proof *a priori* is." I should be glad to receive information on this head from our great

[m] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 300, 364.
[n] Ibid. p. 303, 304. [o] Ibid. p. 395.

dictator in science: and if he *understands* the thing so well, the reader might have expected some explication of it at his hands, that it might be seen where Dr. Waterland's mistake lay. Till this be done, I will presume to think, that what I said was perfectly right; and that neither Dr. Clarke nor his friends can return any *reply*, more than *abuses* to it. Dr. Cudworth was one that had travelled in the argument as far as any man, and had as good an inclination to prove the *existence a priori*, as Dr. Clarke could have. But he was a wise man, and saw clearly how that matter stood. Let us hear what he says, after many years' thought and meditation. Speaking of what he had done in his last chapter, he has these words: "We therein also demonstrate the absolute im-"possibility of all atheism, and the actual existence of a "God: we say *demonstrate;* not *a priori*, which is *impos-"sible*, and *contradictious*, but by necessary inference "from principles altogether undeniable[p]." I do not want Dr. Cudworth's, or any man's *authority* for a maxim of common sense, and as plain as that *two and two are four:* but the plainer it is, so much the greater wonder that men of parts and abilities could not see it, or are yet *ignorant* of it.

The most knowing men hitherto have been contented with the proofs *a posteriori*, as being sufficient, and the *only* ones that are so. And they have rightly judged, that to pretend more is betraying great ignorance of things, and is exposing the clearest and best cause in the world to the insults of *atheism* and *infidelity*. These gentlemen endeavour to blind this matter by substituting *ground* and *reason* in the room of *cause*. Let them say plainly what they mean by this *cause*, *ground*, or *reason*, or whatever else they please to call it. They will at length find the words either to have *no sense*, or to contain that *absurd sense* of a cause *prior* to the *first*. Is this *ground*, *reason*, &c. the substance itself? The conse-

[p] Cudworth's Intellect. Syst. Preface.

quence then is, that the substance is the *cause* or ground of *itself*. Is it any *attribute* or *attributes* of that substance? The consequence then is, that *attributes* are the *cause*, or *ground* of the *subject*, or *substance*. Let them turn it which way they will, the *absurdity* still recurs, till they please to allow, (what is both *sense* and *truth*,) that the *first Cause* is absolutely *uncaused*; and that it is nonsense to talk of any *ground* or *cause* of that substance which is itself the *ground* and *cause* of all things. But it is pleaded (p. 63.) that if God may "exist absolutely "without any ground or reason" (that is, cause) "of existence, it would follow that he might likewise as well "without any cause or reason cease to exist." Which is as much as to say, that unless there be a cause *prior* to the *first*, which exists *necessarily*, it will follow that the *first Cause* does not exist *necessarily*, but may *cease to be*. What is this, but making the notion of a *first Cause* repugnant, and contradictory to itself; or in short, denying any such thing as a *first Cause*? I think it sufficient to say, that it is the property of the *first Cause* to exist *necessarily:* he must, and cannot but exist from eternity to eternity. If *existence* be considered as an *attribute* of that first Cause, the sole *ground*, *reason*, or *subject* of it is the *substance* itself so existing; which is therefore the support of *that* and of every other *attribute*. All pretended *grounds*, *reasons*, *causes*, &c. in this case, can resolve into nothing but the actual existence of *such* a Being. Prove first *a posteriori*, that it is fact that he does exist; and the *necessary* manner of his existing is proved at the same time. It is nonsense to run up higher for an *antecedent* ground, reason, or cause, after we are come to the top, and can go no higher; unless this writer is disposed to go on *ad infinitum*, and never to come at a *first Cause* at all. But he has been so used, it seems, to talk in this way upon other subjects, that he thinks it *strange* he may not do it here too; and that he may not talk of an *antecedent* reason for what has not any thing *antece-*

dent, as well as for what has. Such is his great proficiency in *metaphysics*.

I should have been willing to have passed over the Doctor's misconduct in this argument, had it not accidentally fallen in with our present subject. The cause of *Theism*, and his *good intentions*, and, I believe, *very honest* endeavours in it, might have been his *protection*. But since this matter has at length been brought in, and admits of no just *defence;* it is good to acquaint this gentleman, that it will not be carried through, either by confident *dictating*, or by throwing out *abuses*. But I proceed.

XVI. Page the 91st, this gentleman, speaking of me, says as follows: "Having been told, that whenever the "Deity, or divine nature, [τὸ Θεῖον,] is spoken of as an ob-"ject of adoration, it is not by way of accuracy, (as the "Doctor had absurdly pretended,) but on the contrary by "a mere figurative way of speaking, put for God himself, "just as we frequently say the *king's majesty*, not mean-"ing the majesty of the king, but the king himself; his "answer is, that *his affirming the contrary is sufficient* "*against our bare affirmation*. If the reader thinks it so, "I am willing to leave it to him."

That this writer is offended, one may perceive. I shall endeavour to set the matter however in a clear light. In my Defence[q] I have these words:

"God alone is to be worshipped, the Creator in opposi-"tion to all creatures whatever, the τὸ Θεῖον, as Clemens of "Alexandria[r] and Origen[s] sometimes *accurately* express "it: which also Tertullian[t] seems to intimate in the words, "*quod colimus*, above cited."

[q] First Defence, vol. i. p. 178.

[r] Θρησκεύειν τὸ Θεῖον. *Clem. Alex.* p. 778. Ox. ed.

[s] Σέβει τὸ Θεῖον, &c. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 367.
Ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγένητον τοῦ Θεοῦ φύσιν, κἀκείνῳ μόνῳ λατρεύειν. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 189.

[t] Quod colimus Deus unus est, &c. *Tertull. Apol.* cap. xvii.

The Author of the Reply having a fancy, that worship cannot be properly said to be paid to the divine, or any *nature*, but to *Person* only, was pleased to put in his answer[u] to what I had said, in the words he has since repeated. To a bare *affirmation* of his, and positively laid down, only to serve an *hypothesis*, I first returned a *counter-affirmation*, (disputants, as I thought, being always upon a level in such cases, and never obliged to take each other's *word* for *proof*,) but presently subjoined[x] some remarks and references, about the sense of τὸ Θεῖον in Greek writers, and particularly in Clemens and Origen: from which I had reason to conclude, that τὸ Θεῖον properly signifies the *divine nature*, or *substance*, or God considered substantially as *res divina*, and not according to *personal* characters, acts, or offices. That this was the sense of Clemens, when he speaks of the τὸ Θεῖον, as the object of *worship*, might appear plainly from the places I referred to; particularly from those I have again noted[y] in my margin. And the reason why both Clemens and Origen chose that expression rather than Θεὸς, was to be more emphatical and expressive against Pagan worship offered to things of a frail and corruptible *nature*, to *created* beings. I think, it was paying great respect to this gentleman's *bare affirmation*, to trace the sense of τὸ Θεῖον so far as I did in opposition to it; as may appear by my *references*. And though I threw in a parenthesis, *saving to myself* the just claims of every disputant, he need not have been offended at it, as if it were intended as an *affront* to his *superior* learning or judgment, to set *mine* against it: I had no such thought in it. But however raised and extraordinary his abilities may be, and however *high* an *opinion* he conceives his readers should have of them, he ought nevertheless to have taken some *notice* of what I had pleaded; if not as a *critic*, yet as an *honest man*: and I cannot but think it too

[u] Reply, p. 356.
[x] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 359, 360.
[y] Clem. Alex. p. 50, 836.

assuming still, to expect that his bare *dictates* shall have more weight than another's *reasons*.

XVII. To an observation of mine out of Tertullian, that God the Son is an *Angel* and *Messenger*, not by nature but by office[z], he returns me this answer: "Can "any man tell what the being a messenger by nature "means[a]?" No: but he may know what an *angel* by *nature* means, which was the word I designed the distinction for, and to which alone it referred; as my argument, and the *quotation* at the bottom, sufficiently showed: and all the fault was in not throwing the word *Messenger* into brackets. The reason of bringing it in appears from what went before. This is low carping: but no doubt the author intended a smart *repartee*. He has such another piece of smartness in the same page, relating to the word *servility*; which he charges me with adding *deceitfully*, as synonymous to *subjection*[b], because of the *quite different* sense of that word in the *English language*. Whatever sense it be that he speaks of, as to the English, I am sure nobody but himself can mistake *my sense* of it, in the place where I used it, nor think the word *improper*. But this gentleman seems to be so elated upon his skill in *language*, that he can scarce allow others to understand their *mother tongue*.

XVIII. He has some *ingenious* thoughts and *smart* sayings, p. 40. which must not be omitted. They are bestowed upon a passage of mine[c], where I say, that the Father was not to be visible, so much as *per assumptas species*, by *visible symbols*, because he was not to *minister*, or be *incarnate*. The remark hereupon is: "It seems from these "words, that Dr. Waterland does not suppose the incar- "nation of Christ to be at all *real*, but merely a *phantasm*, "*per assumptas species*: this being confessedly the only

[z] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 123.
[a] Observations, p. 26.
[b] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 104.
[c] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 136.

" way in which there was any *natural possibility* for the " Father to be *incarnate.* And accordingly in his expli- " cation of that text, (Phil. ii. 7.) he tells us that Christ " emptied himself in appearance."

I passed over this uncommon turn of his, when I met with it in the Reply[d]. I saw he was strangely lost and bewildered; and I was willing to give him time to recover and recollect. But by his repeating it here, he appears to be very fond of it: and this, no doubt, is one of the arguments which, (as he tells us in his preface,) upon the *most careful review*, he believes to be *strictly and perfectly conclusive.* I am ashamed to answer such impertinencies: but sometimes it must be done. His *first* mistake is, understanding *per assumptas species* of a *phantasm:* but this was to make way for what was to come after, and to answer to *appearance.* His *second* is, in pretending that this was the *only way* that it was *naturally* possible for the Father to be *incarnate.* For neither would this way have amounted to any *incarnation* at all, being only *præludium incarnationis*, as it was anciently called: nor is a *real* incarnation *naturally* less possible than that was. His *third* is, in not distinguishing between the taking up *visible symbols* for a while to *appear* by, and being *personally* united to the *human nature*, which is *incarnation.* His *fourth* is so *gross*, (not to perceive the difference between *veiling the glories of the Godhead*, and *having no real manhood*,) that I can hardly suppose his thoughts were at home when he wrote it. But the word *appearance* seems to have struck his *imagination* at once, and to have made him jump immediately, without any premises, into a marvellous *conclusion.*

XIX. Page the 74th, &c. he undertakes to show, that, upon his hypothesis, the existence of God the Son is not *precarious.* I could scarce have believed, till I saw the Reply, that any man of tolerable parts or discretion would have engaged in so silly an argument. But there is a ne-

[d] Reply, p. 59, 181.

cessity for it, it seems: and this is the *second* time that he has resolved to shut his eyes against *common sense*[c] in this very article.

We are to observe, that he denies the *necessary existence* of God the Son; which is directly making his existence *contingent*, which is another word for *precarious*, and is proper to a *creature*.

This gentleman endeavours, p. 75. with a dust of words, to obscure this plain state of the question. At last, he comes a little closer to the point, and begins the debate. "God, says the Apostle, cannot lie: the only reason why "he cannot, is because he will not." [Note then, that the only reason why God does not, or cannot reduce God the Son to *nothing*, is because *he will not*.] "Is therefore the "veracity of God a thing as mutable and *precarious*, be- "cause it entirely depends upon his will, as is the exist- "ence of any creature whatever?" But this gentleman should have shown that God was as much bound up by his own *attributes* to give the Son *existence*, and to *continue* him in it, as he is bound *never to lie*, to make the case parallel: and upon this supposition, God could no more want his Son one moment from all eternity, than he could be ever one moment capable of *lying:* which is making the Son as *necessarily existing*, by *necessary* will, (which this gentleman would call *no will*,) as God's attribute of *veracity* is necessary and immutable. God's *moral* attributes are founded in the *natural* perfections, and are indeed no other than *natural* and *necessary* perfections of the Deity, which he can no more cease to have, than he can cease to be. And even the *rectitude* of his *will* is *natural, necessary*, and *unalterable:* and the reason why he never *wills* amiss is because he *cannot*. But not to run farther into this point, which is perfectly *remote* and *foreign*, and brought in only for a *blind;* what becomes of the distinction between the *necessary* existence proper to the *divine* Being, and the *precarious* existence proper to

[c] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 206.

creatures? If God may be obliged by any of his *moral* attributes of *wisdom, goodness, veracity,* &c. to preserve the Son in his being; so may he likewise to preserve *angels,* or *men,* or any other *creature:* and is this a reason against calling their existence *precarious?* If it be, then there may be *creatures,* many besides God the Son, whose existence is not *precarious:* and thus the distinction between *necessary* and *precarious* existence is lost. The meaning of *precarious* existence is, *not necessary,* of what might either *never have been,* or may *cease to be,* if God *pleases.* Let this gentleman either *affirm* this of God the Son, or deny it of any *creature* whatever.

This writer, who is used to *wise* questions, asks me, whether the *supreme dominion* of God the Father (that which I found in *voluntary* economy) be *precarious?* Undoubtedly every *voluntary* office may cease to be, is not *necessary,* but depending on *pleasure,* and is therefore so far *precarious.* And even as to *natural* dominion, God might *choose* whether he would make any *creatures;* he may choose whether he will *continue* any: that is, he may choose whether he will exercise any such *dominion* at all; for all such *dominion* supposes the existence of *creatures,* over which only such *dominion* is. Supremacy therefore of dominion is as *precarious* as the existence of the *creature:* and if that be not *precarious,* I know not what is so. But, I think, I am over-abundantly civil to this writer to debate a maxim of *common sense* with him. The sum is, that that existence which is *not necessary* is *contingent;* and *contingent* is *precarious,* or depending on *pleasure,* in opposition to what is *naturally* immutable, and *cannot but be:* such is the existence of *God* the *Son* with this writer: therefore his existence is *precarious* in the *same sense,* though perhaps not in the *same degree,* that the existence of any *creature* whatever is called *precarious.* *Q. E. D.*

XX. Page 92d, this gentleman tells me of "affecting to "express a ridiculous seeming repugnancy in maintaining, "that the same act is certain as being foreknown, uncer-

" tain, as depending on the will of a free agent[f]." I should be glad to see the difficulty dexterously hit off by this *acute* writer, to make us some amends for his failures in other things. He does it, he thinks, in two words; that what depends on the will of a *free agent* may be *certain*, though not *necessary*. But to me it seems that the difficulty stands just where it did: for how is that *certain* which is *not necessary*, which *may* or *may not be*; which is all the meaning of *not necessary*, and which seems to amount to the same with *not certain*, in the present case. And how is that *fixed*, or *certain*, which is yet *floating* and hanging in *suspense*, either *may* or *may not be*? Possibly, some solution may be found for these and the like difficulties: but I am afraid, not by this gentleman, who does not appear hitherto to have gone to the bottom of the subject, or to have *patience* or *coolness* of temper requisite to go through with it.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning Quotations *from the Ancients.*

THE 14th *observation* is spent upon this subject: and I shall think it worth the while to bestow a *chapter* upon the same; that as we have seen this gentleman's penetration in matters of *argument*, we may now also see his diligence and accuracy in matters of *learning*. I have had frequent occasion, in both my Defences, to take notice of his superficial acquaintance with the *ancient* Fathers.

1. Sometimes he has endeavoured to put *spurious* or worthless pieces upon us, as being of considerable value and authority. The Apostolical Constitutions[g], Ignatius's larger epistles[h], the Arian Councils of Sirmium[i], Philippopolis[k], and Antioch[l], (instead of the Catholic and ap-

[f] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 391, 392.
[g] Ibid. p. 262, 263, 297. [h] Ibid. p. 262, 263. [i] Ibid. p. 277, 297.
[k] Ibid. p. 280, 297. [l] Id. ibid.

proved synods,) and the tenets of Semi-Arians for those of Epiphanius[m]. See the instances of this kind up and down in the Reply[n]. The doing this, unless it be done *ignorantly*, is much the same honesty in the way of *writing*, as the putting off bad wares or damaged goods at the price of good ones in the way of *trading*.

2. Sometimes he has expressed wonder and amazement at me, as if I had been teaching some *new* and *strange* thing, or something merely *scholastic*, when I have been only following the concurring judgment of the ancient Fathers[o].

3. Sometimes you will find him representing a doctrine as unanimously taught by *all the ancients*, when they were *all* directly against it, or *none* clearly for it[p].

4. *False* history and *misreports* of the Fathers have been very ordinary and common with him[q].

5. *Misrepresentations* of the Fathers, as to their real sense and meaning, have been numberless: the greatest part of my labour has been all the way to lay them open and confute them.

6. *Misquotations*, or *deceitful* translations, I have often had occasion to observe and correct[r].

Now this gentleman being very desirous, as it seems, to make reprisals upon me, undertakes to furnish out a whole section of *gross misrepresentations* made by me in my *quotations*. He gives them for a *specimen* only, as he says, and calls them *some few*; being willing the reader

[m] See Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 385.

[n] Reply to Dr. Waterland, &c. p. 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 29, 58, 61, 258, 260, 274, 275, 276, 299, 404, 410.

[o] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 15, 61, 269, 333, 340. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 51, 200.

[p] See these fallacies noted: First Defence, vol. i. p. 25, 71, 239, 255, 256, 278, 318. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 275, 276, 321, 401, 441, 443.

[q] See the same detected: First Defence, vol. i. p. 65, 132, 141, 187, 271, 282, 318, 320, 329, 331. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 10, 13, 59, 73, 97, 125, 135, 137, 143, 146, 196, 201, 228, 229, 297, 311, 418, 422, 435, 436.

[r] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 92, 94, 130, 141, 302, &c. 347. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 79, 115, 130, 268, 271, 297, 326, 368, 446, &c. 469.

should think he had been very *tender* and *compassionate*. The reader perhaps may really think so, when he finds what the sum total of this worthy charge of *gross misrepresentations* amounts to: nothing but an account of some very *fair* and *just* representations set in a bad light, misreported under *false* colours, and called by a wrong *name*. I hope every intelligent reader will apprehend the difference between *making* a charge and *proving* one; between a *false* report and a *true* one; between an unrighteous *calumny* and a *just censure*. I am willing to put the issue entirely upon the justice and merits of the case, upon the *evidence* produced here or there, to justify the charges respectively. Let but the reader compare my remarks on Dr. Clarke's quotations[s] with what this writer would lay to me; and then the difference betwixt the one and the other will be throughly understood. Now to come to particulars: they are twelve in number; which were they all *faults*, it were easy to select hundreds greater out of their pieces. But I confined myself, in my collection, to such only as betrayed manifest *partiality* and *deceit*, or great want of care and exactness.

I. In the first place, he finds fault with my way of *understanding* a passage of Philo, and gives me his own *judgment* against it: which I have as much regard for, as he has for *mine*. The very passage which he cites from Philo, to *confute* my construction, *confirms* it: as it shows that the *Logos* was betwixt the τὸ γενόμενον and ὁ πατὴρ, and was therefore *neither*. And if he is not reckoned with the τὰ γενόμενα, he is of course ἀγένητος.

II. The *second*, is my reading ἀγένητος in two places of Justin, where he chooses to read ἀγέννητος. His reasons, it seems, are good to *him*, and mine to *me*, which is the whole matter. I vindicated my *reading* against his exceptions in my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 157, 248: and he has nothing to add by way of reinforcement. A mighty business to found a charge of *gross misrepresentation* upon:

[s] First Defence, vol. i. p. 302, &c. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 446, &c.

he must have been hard put to it, to strain so much for one.

III. A *third* article of my *gross misrepresentations* begins with a *new* invention of his *own*; a very forced interpretation of a passage in Irenæus[t]; which interpretation was never, I believe, thought on by any man before himself, and rests only in strength of imagination. For what if the Father be called Λόγος in that chapter as well as the Son, could Irenæus be there talking of the *emission* or *generation* of the *Father?* If this gentleman will but please to look forwards, as far as page 157. and 158. and view the whole process of the argument, he will see what Irenæus meant by the *Logos*, namely, the *only begotten* of the Father, the same that Isaiah speaks of chap. liii. 8.

This writer also tells me of citing two passages of Irenæus, as containing the Church's notion, when he is ridiculing the notions of the Valentinians: as if a man might not be ridiculing the notion of the Valentinians, and at the same time discover his *own*. Had the author undertaken to vindicate this his *new* and *extraordinary* construction, I should have taken care to consider it at large: but as he has only given a few dark and obscure hints of what he would have, I think it sufficient to refer the reader to my Second Defence[u], and to Irenæus himself[x], and to his learned editor, who has particularly considered his author's meaning[y].

A farther complaint against me, is for falsely interpreting *non alius et alius*, in Irenæus[z], of *Father* and *Son*;

[t] Qui generationem prolativi hominum *Verbi* transferunt in Dei æternum *Verbum*, et prolationis initium donantes et genesim, quemadmodum et suo Verbo. Et in quo distabit *Dei Verbum*, imo magis *ipse Deus*, cum sit *Verbum*, a Verbo hominum, si eandem habuerit ordinationem et emissionem generationis? *Iren.* p. 132. ed. Mass.

[u] Vol. iii. p. 67, 253.

[x] Iren. p. 132, 139. ed. Mass.

[y] Massuet. Dissert. Præv. p. 128.

[z] Non ergo alius erat qui cognoscebatur, et alius qui dicebat; *nemo cognoscit Patrem*, sed unus et idem, omnia subjiciente ei Patre, &c. *Iren.* p. 234. *Mass. Præv. Diss.* p. 131.

which is so trifling and groundless, that nothing can be more so. He has invented another imaginary construction, peculiar to himself, which he endeavours to help out, by supplying something in Irenæus's text, which the good Father never thought on, and which the whole context strongly reclaims against. See my Second Defence[a], where I cite the passage, with another parallel place of Tertullian. In this way of charging me with *gross misrepresentations*, the author may be copious enough; for *invention* is fruitful.

As to the *fourth* place, all the fault is, that I follow the *common* reading, (*cum Verbo suo*, Iren. p. 183.) though there is *one* manuscript which leaves out *cum:* a manuscript scarce above 400 years old, and of no great authority[b]. The manuscript is the Arundel, in the library of the Royal Society: I have seen it, and find the *reading* to be as Dr. Grabe represented. But that the reading is "without doubt the truer reading," as the Reply pretends[c], against the faith of all the other manuscripts, about ten in number, several of them much *older*, and most of them more *faithful* in the whole, will not be taken for granted upon a bare *affirmation*.

A *fifth* place of Irenæus by me cited[d], I am willing to leave with the reader: who may please to consider, whether what this writer objects be of any force against what I said; since I did not pretend that the Son did any thing *contrary to*, or *without* the Father's *good pleasure*.

IV. This gentleman proceeds to Clemens Alexandrinus, and charges me with *misrepresenting* him. I vindicated my sense of that passage at large before[e], and obviated every pretence to the contrary: nor has this writer so much as attempted to *reply* to what I there urged; except calling a thing *monstrous* be the same with *confuting* it.

[a] Vol. iii. p. 69.
[b] See Massuet. præf. p. 8.
[c] Reply, p. 103.
[d] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 82.
[e] Ibid. p. 134.

His repeating here his former opinion about Christ being *representative only*, (which has been so abundantly answered and baffled in both my Defences[f], beyond any just reply,) only shows to what a degree of hardiness a man may arrive to by long opposing the *truth*.

There is another place of Clemens[g], as to which he *insists* upon his construction, and I also upon mine[h]; though it is sufficient for me, if mine *may* be true; he should prove, on the other hand, that his *must*. He appeals to all that understand Greek. So do I, and to the *context* likewise. Bishop Bull, Le Nourry, and the learned editor of Clemens, (who, I believe, understood Greek,) had declared beforehand for my construction. Let this gentleman produce his better *vouchers*, if he has any, to support his pretences about *the nature of the Greek tongue*: which he may sometimes happen to mistake, and pretty widely too, as appears by his *versions*. His *translation*, as he calls it, of this very place of Clemens, is no *translation*, but a loose *paraphrase*[i]; and such a one, that no man could ever imagine from it what the Greek words are. Whether I am *right* or no, he is most certainly *wrong* in taking the liberty he has, of *foisting* in words, and altering the *turn* of the expression, to help out his construction. But besides that, the construction itself appears to me somewhat *forced* and *unnatural*, as referring ᾧ μάλιστα to the *negative* going before, and to the *first* member of the sentence, rather than the *second*; when in the preceding sentence, of like kind, the *third* part hangs upon the *second*. The most natural construction therefore seems to be this; *Who is Lord of all, etiam maxime ser-*

[f] First Defence, vol. i. p. 24, &c. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 155, &c.

[g] Οὔτ' οὖν φθονοίη ποτ' ἄν τισιν, ὁ πάντας μὲν ἐπ' ἴσης κεκληκὼς, ἐξαιρέτους δὲ τοῖς ἐξαιρέτως πεπιστευκόσιν ἀπονέμας τιμάς. οὔθ' ὑφ' ἑτέρου κωλυθείη ποτ' ἄν, ὁ πάντων κύριος, καὶ μάλιστα ἐξυπηρετῶν τῷ τῦ ἀγαθῦ καὶ παντοκράτορος θελήματι πατρός. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* vii. cap. 2. p. 832.

[h] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 469.

[i] Reply, p. 511. Compare my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 469.

viens[k], &c. *even when most subservient*, &c. that is, even in his lowest condescension, becoming *incarnate*, which Clemens had been speaking of. In the very next page, resuming the assertion of the Son's being *Lord of all*, he again qualifies it, in like manner, by referring all up to the supreme Father.

V. We now come to Tertullian: where he taxes me with a *misconstruction;* owning however that he had gone before me in the *same*. I must acknowledge I looked upon the construction of that place as *doubtful*, at least; for which reason I had never cited it in my First Defence, or elsewhere, to prove Father and Son *one God*. But finding at length that some learned men so understood the place, and observing that the Reply also came into it, I thought I might then *safely* use it. If it be a mistake, (as probably it may,) it should not however have come under the head of *gross misrepresentations*.

He next charges me with a great neglect, as omitting to take notice of what the Reply had objected to my construction of a place in Tertullian, though I again quote the place. It is unreasonable in the man to expect particular notice of every thing that he has any where occasionally dropped, when he has slipped over many and more material things of mine: but I have accustomed him so much to it, that now he insists upon it. After all, his construction of *suo jure*[l], in Tertullian[m], which he makes to be the same with *sensu sibi proprio*, is so extravagant, that it might be safely left with any man that knows Tertullian, or knows Latin. What could Tertullian say less, than that God the Son was God Omnipotent in

[k] As to the like construction of μάλιστα in Clemens, see p. 138, 250, 436, 443, 620, 759, 821.

[l] Reply, p. 509.

[m] Omnia, inquit, Patris mea sint, cur non et nomina? Cum ergo legis *Deum omnipotentem*, et *altissimum*, et *Deum virtutum*, et *Regem Israelis*, et *qui est;* vide ne per hæc Filius etiam demonstretur; *suo jure* Deus omnipotens, qua Sermo Dei omnipotentis, &c. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* cap. 17.

his *own right*, when he so often proclaims him to be of the *same substance* with the Father? It is not said merely *suo jure* omnipotens, but *suo jure* Deus *omnipotens:* and as the meaning of *suo jure* is well known to all that know Latin; so are Tertullian's principles well known to as many as know him; and that he makes the Son *God* in the *same sense* as the Father is, as partaking of the *same divine substance*. Tertullian therefore could not mean, as this gentleman says, that the Son is God Almighty, *in a sense proper to him*, or *upon a ground peculiar to himself;* since Tertullian's principles plainly make Father and Son God in the *same sense*, and upon the *same ground*, as being of the same *divine substance*. But this he might mean, and this he did mean, that the Son is Almighty God *distinctly*, and in his own *proper Person* and *right;* and not considered as the *Person* of the *Father*, which Praxeas pretended. This gentleman however, by endeavouring to find out some *misinterpretations* of *mine*, does nothing else but discover more and more of his *own*.

He is in the same page (p. 125.) cavilling at a very innocent translation of an Arian passage in my book[n]; where I render *sua virtute, by his own power*. He will have it, that it does not mean the Son's *own power*, but his *Father's*, because supposed to be *given* him: which is nothing but *equivocating* upon the word *own*. The meaning undoubtedly is, that the Son created all things by his own *natural, inherent* power; though supposed to be given him, with his nature, by the Father. And this is all I meant in my *version* of the words: it is observable however, that this gentleman never yet came up so high in his doctrine as the ancient Arians did. They supposed Christ invested with *creative powers* by the Father; which is a great deal more than making him merely an *instrument* in the work of creation.

As to Tertullian's meaning in some passages which this

[n] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 380.

author produced to prove that souls were *consubstantial* with God[o], (according to that writer,) as much as the Son was supposed to be by the Nicene Council; it was so mean, and so unworthy a suggestion, that I thought it proper to vindicate [p] Tertullian, as falsely charged in that matter. It was of some moment that Tertullian had utterly denied it of *angels;* or even *archangels,* and of the highest order. This the objector takes no notice of. Tertullian denies that the *soul* comes up *usque ad vim divinitatis,* and explains himself inoffensively on that head; as I observed. Nay, he argues through the whole chapter against Marcion's tenet, of the *soul* being *substantia Creatoris,* the substance of (or *consubstantial* with) its *Creator.* Yet this writer here goes on with the same ridiculous charge, founding it upon words that express nothing of it. What the words mean, I intimated at large in the place referred to[q]: and this gentleman makes no reply to it. Why he did not, is best known to himself.

VI. We come next to Origen, whom, it seems, I have greatly injured in rendering, μετέδωκε γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ ϗ τῆς μεγαλειότητος, *hath imparted even his greatness*[r], instead of *has imparted even* of *his greatness*[s]. But I am sure he has injured Origen a great deal more by suppressing the remaining part of the sentence, which shows what Origen meant, *viz.* that the Son is *commensurate* with the Father in *greatness.* This was not imparting some small pittance of his greatness, but *equal greatness,* or his *whole* greatness: and this gentleman might have considered that μεταδίδωμι commonly governs a *genitive* case; which is sufficient to take off the force of his *criticism:* though I must own I see but little difference in the two ways of

[o] See Reply, p. 55, 225, 328. Preface, p. 6.

[p] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 97. Compare Pamelii Paradox. Tertullian. n. 3.

[q] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 115. Vid. Tertull. contr. Marc. lib. ii. c. 9.

[r] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 47.

[s] Observations, p. 25, 126.

speaking, nor that either of them may not be admitted; provided only that the *whole* sense of Origen in that passage be taken along with it.

As to another place of Origen, this writer desires that my Defence[t] and his Reply[u] may be compared; which I desire also.

The same I say as to a *third* place[x] of Origen.

As to a *fourth* place in Origen, this writer is pleased to stand corrected in respect of his *translation* of it, which I found fault with[y]. As to his further endeavours to defeat the meaning of that place, I am willing to trust them with the reader, after he has seen the passage itself, and what I have said upon it.

Another passage of Origen I shall likewise trust with the reader, if he pleases but to look into my Second Defence[z]. This writer here (p. 127.) talks of my construction being "contrary to the nature of all language;" as if the nature of language never admitted any *adjective* to stand alone, the *substantive* being sufficiently intimated from the context. But this is his forward way of talking: and he seems to think he has a right to be believed upon his *word*.

VII. This article concerns Novatian. I have fully expressed myself, as to this author, in many places of my Defences, which the reader that thinks it of importance may please to consult. I forbear any farther dispute about the *reading* of a certain passage, till the learned Mr. Welchman's new edition of that author appears, which may probably give us some farther light into it.

VIII. The eighth article, instead of proving any *misrepresentation* upon me, only revives the memory of a great one of his *own*[a]; which discovered his small ac-

[t] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 69, 106. Reply to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 227.

[u] Reply, p. 83, 84, 85.

[x] Compare Reply, p. 295. and Observations, p. 63. with my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 258, 371.

[y] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 367, 368. [z] Ibid. p. 69.

[a] Ibid. p. 200.

quaintance with the ancients. As to this writer's exceptions to Hippolytus, I have sufficiently obviated them elsewhere[b]: and one would think that Tertullian's use of the word *Persona*, in the same sense with Hippolytus's πρόσωπον, might have screened the latter from this author's censure in that particular. But supposing I had less to plead for my saying that the Sabellian singularity consisted in making the Godhead μονοπρόσωπος, and that I had expressed it in a phrase that came not into use till the fourth century; can there be a greater mark of *pedantry*, than for a man to take me up, and cavil at the bare *expression*, and to charge me with an *untruth* upon it? How would it look to charge Basil, and Chrysostom, and Theodoret, as reporting a thing *notoriously untrue*, when they represent Sabellius as making the Godhead ἓν πρόσωπον, just as I do? Would not the man be taken for a *jester*, or a very ignorant man, in doing it, as cavilling only at a mode of *expression?* But I proceed.

IX. The author here censures me for rendering μοναρχίας by *unity*, rather than *monarchy*, in a passage of Pope Dionysius[c]. My reasons for so doing, I conceive, were such as these: 1. That the same Dionysius had expressed the same thing a little higher by the word μονάδα, which signifies *unity:* and he seems to have chosen μοναρχίας after, only to vary the phrase. 2. Because in the words immediately preceding, he is speaking of the *union* of Father and Son; by which he solves the difficulty objected, and not by throwing the *oneness* of Godhead upon the *Father* alone, exclusive of the other Persons. 3. Because τριὰς, *Trinity*, is the word opposed to μοναρχίας in the same sentence; Dionysius showing that there must be a *Trinity*, and withal an *Unity* (say I) preserved. These reasons made me prefer the word *unity*. When this author has better for the word *monarchy*, and in his sense[d], I shall be ready to accept it, instead of the other.

[b] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 102, 228. [c] Ibid. p. 110.

[d] It is to be noted, that μοναρχία, in this subject, sometimes signifies, not

X. Here I am charged with mistranslating a word in Eusebius, ἠρτημένη, which I render *compacted*[e], that is, *constituted;* which, it seems, is *wonderfully* done. But the *wonder* may cease, if it be considered, 1. That in the same place the *equality* is mentioned as belonging to the *ternary* number, here considered as a figure of the *Trinity*. 2. That the τριὰς is there also made the one ἀρχὴ, *Source* of all things. 3. That the whole τριὰς is said to be ἠρτημένη, *compacted*, as I render it. For had the meaning been that two Persons were dependent on *one*, the epithet would not have been applied to the *whole Trinity*. 4. There is a plain opposition between the τριὰς and the τῶν γενητῶν. Whether these reasons may convince our *writer* or no, I know not: if he pleases, he may go on *wondering* at very *plain* things, to show his want of *reflection*. He will have it that ἠρτημένη there signifies a *connection* of things, one *depending on* or *derived from* another. He has not thought fit to give us any *translation* of the place, according to his *own sense* of it: but all he says in favour of it is only *misreport* of the use of the word ἄναρχος, as I shall show hereafter.

The second passage [f] of Eusebius I leave to the reader; this gentleman having no way of eluding my sense of it, but by misrepresenting it, after his manner.

XI. The next relates to Gregory Nyssen[g], where this writer has nothing to show but chicane. I translate some words that may be seen in the place referred to, thus: "Neither let us dissolve the immediate connection, by "considering the will in the generation." Upon which my acute censor thus remarks: as if the author meant to say, that "considering the *will* of the Father in the ge- "neration of the Son, would be a dissolving of the im-

monarchy, but unity of *headship*, or *principle, source*, or *fountain*, as in Athanasius.

Ἀιχθείη δὲ ἂν καὶ οὕτως μία ἀρχὴ θεότητος, καὶ ὐ δύο ἀρχαί· ὅθεν κυρίως καὶ μοναρχία ἐστίν. *Athan. Orat.* 4. init.

[e] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 118. [f] Ibid. p. 146.

[g] Ibid. p. 283, 284.

" mediate connection." No, neither the author nor I meant to say it: the words immediately foregoing show that we did not; nor does my *translation* imply any such thing. But the meaning is, that the notion of *will* was not to be carried so far, as to destroy that necessary *connection*.

XII. As to the passage of Cyril, and my *inference*, as he calls it, from it, (which is not my *inference*, but an inference which is mentioned as having some colour, and at the same time *confuted* by the late learned Benedictine editor, as I observed[h],) this writer might as well have let it alone, unless he had known more of it. Had not that learned editor given us much better arguments against that *inference* than the Observator has, it would be more considerable than he imagines. The reader that desires to know more of this matter may consult the learned Toutée's Dissertation[i], before referred to; and which this writer has fraudulently concealed from the reader, in order to make way for his charge upon me.

My words are these: " If there is any thing to be " suspected of Cyril, it is rather his excluding the Father " from being *Creator*, than the Son from being *efficient*: " but the late learned Benedictine editor has sufficiently " cleared up Cyril's orthodoxy on that head." Now after I had so plainly declared against the *inference*, is it not very unaccountable in this gentleman to *charge* me with it, and in the *manner* he does? " The Doctor's inference," says he, " from the words of Cyril, is as remarkable an " instance of the strength of prejudice, as (I think) I ever " met with," p. 131. I may much more reasonably say, that this representation is as remarkable an instance of the strength of *malice*, as I ever met with. See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 311, 313, 385. where I take notice of the Father being represented as issuing out *orders* for creating, and the Son as *creating*: which is

[h] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 312.

[i] Dissert. iii. de Doctrin. Cyrilli, p. 139, &c.

Cyril's notion also, and which affords some *colour* for the *inference* before mentioned; but *colour* only, and not ground sufficient for it, as I before intimated, acquitting Cyril of it.

I have now run through the whole charge of "very "gross misrepresentations," of which the foregoing instances are the *specimen*, all that this gentleman could find. Nobody doubts of his inclination to have picked out the very *worst* that my books could any where afford; and these are they. I thank him for them. I could not, I think, have desired a fuller testimony from an *adversary* than this is, of my *fidelity* in the matter of *quotations;* I might almost say, *care* and *exactness* beyond what I had expected. For though I had taken the best care I could, in revising every thing of that kind, and again comparing it with the books themselves, as my papers went through the press, and was certain not to be *wilfully* guilty of any mistake; yet I knew not what an *able critic* might possibly discover after me, in a work that had not long time to lie by, nor had passed through the hands of my judicious and learned friends. But perhaps our Observator has been *negligent* in examining, or is not very *acute:* and so I shall not *assume* upon it.

One thing, I hope, will be observed, that though this writer has *found* no *gross misrepresentations* of mine, he has *made* several of his *own;* which may now be added to the rest above mentioned, under my *second* chapter. And to his former *misreports* of the ancients may be added another great one which he has in p. 130. "It is "notorious," says he, "that the word ἄναρχος was always "appropriated to the Father." The contrary is *notorious* to all that know antiquity. Ἄναρχος is very often applied to God the Son, by the Post-Nicene Fathers[k], of the same century with Eusebius, though some years later;

[k] Epiphanius passim. Gregor. Nazianz. Orat. p. 421, 563, 630. Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. lib. i. p. 118.

and more than once *directly* by the Ante-Nicenes also[l]: as to *indirect* application of it to him, in respect of his *generation* or *existence*, as being ἄναρχος or ἀνάρχως, nothing more common[m]: Eusebius himself is an evidence for it[n]. But why will this positive gentleman make *reports* of antiquity, till he knows more of it?

CHAP. V.

A summary View of the Judgment of the Ancients upon the question, Whether God the Father be *naturally* Ruler and Governor over God the Son.

SINCE the Author of the Observations has been pleased to reduce the controversy to this single *question*[o], and to boast highly of the *ancients* as holding the *affirmative*, charging the *negative* as being an unheard of *fiction* and *invention* of mine, with repeated *insults*, and such a degree of groundless *assurance*, as is scarce to be paralleled: I say, since he has indulged himself in these peculiar strains, it may not be improper to lay before the reader a summary view of the *ancient* doctrine upon that head. I shall content myself with *references*, for the most part, to my own books; pointing out to the reader such material *quotations*, relating to this question, as lie scattered in several parts, under several heads, in the course of our debate. I shall follow the chronological order of the Fathers, showing all the way for what reasons I judge that every one respectively was in the same persuasion that I defend, and not in the contrary *hypothesis*.

[l] Τὸ περισσεύτερον ἐν γενέσει, τὴν ἄχρονον καὶ ἄναρχον ἀρχήν τι καὶ ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ὄντων, τὸν υἱόν. *Clem. Alex.* p. 829.

Σύνεστιν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα ἄναρχον, καὶ ἀιγενὲς, προφαινόμενον αὐτῷ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ λέγουσα σοφία, ἐγὼ ἤμην ἡ προσέχαιρε. *Dionys. Alex. apud Athanas.* vol. i. p. 254.

[m] Clem. Alex. p. 832. Alexand. Alex. apud Theod. lib. i. cap. 4. p. 19. Cyrill. Hieros. Catech. xi. cap. 13. p. 155. Athanas. vol. i. p. 99, 526.

[n] Euseb. in Psalm. p. 15.

[o] The main thing he lays to my charge, is the denying the alone *natural* dominion, p. 8, 9, 15, 24, 27, 32, 40, 44, 46, 89, 118, 119.

A. D. 116. IGNATIUS.

Ignatius did not believe that the *Father* is *naturally* Governor over the Son, but the contrary: because he acknowledged the *consubstantiality*[p], and *coeternity*[q], and *necessary existence*[r] of God the Son. Any *supremacy* of the Father, *consistent* with these doctrines of the *Son*, may be readily admitted. But the adversary has not been able to produce any testimony from him to prove the *natural* dominion of the Father over the Son. What he has pleaded may be seen in the Reply[s], and a confutation of it in my Second Defence[t].

I may just take notice of an incidental remark which this writer drops (p. 63.) to invalidate some of my testimonies for the Son's *necessary existence*. He says that φύσει, or κατὰ φύσιν, does not express *necessary existence;* for man is φύσει, or κατὰ φύσιν ἄνθρωπος. Admitting this, yet φύσει ὢν can never be applied to any thing but what exists *necessarily:* and it may always be *certainly* determined from the *context*, or circumstances, or from the author's usual *phraseology*, what φύσει, or κατὰ φύσιν, signifies in any ancient writer: and this gentleman will not be able to show that I have misconstrued the phrase so much as in a *single* testimony. Suppose, for instance, *natura bonus* may be sometimes applicable to a *man* or an *angel;* yet it may at other times signify *necessary existence* so plainly, that no one can doubt of it: particularly in Tertullian, in this sentence: *Bonus natura Deus solus: qui enim quod est sine initio habet, non institutione habet illud, sed natura*, &c. *Tertull. adv. Marc.* lib. ii. cap. 6.

146. JUSTIN MARTYR.

Justin Martyr did not believe that the Father is *naturally* Ruler or Governor over the Son.

[p] See Bull. Def. F. N. p. 40.
[q] Ibid. p. 174, &c.
[r] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 238.
[s] Reply, p. 261, 294.
[t] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 238, &c. 263, 265.

1. Because he declares that God the Son is not *another God* [u] besides the Father; at the same time acknowledging the Son to be *God.*

2. Because he asserts the Son's *consubstantiality* [x].

3. Because he gives to God the Son such high and great titles as Scripture appropriates to the *one true* God of Israel [y].

4. Because he teaches the *necessary existence* of God the Son [z].

5. Because he declares for the *worship* of God the Son, yet admitting no worship as due to any but to *God alone* [a].

Any *supremacy* of the *Father*, *consistent* with these doctrines of the *Son*, may be admitted. But the adversary has not produced any testimony that may not be fairly accounted for upon the foot of *voluntary* economy, or *natural* priority of *order.* The principal pretences from this Father's writings may be seen in the Reply [b], and the *answers* in my Second Defence [c]. Let this gentleman *disprove* the particulars here asserted; or if not, let him *admit* them, and then we need not dispute farther.

170. Lucian.

Lucian, or some other contemporary Pagan writer, bears testimony to the faith of the Christians in his time, in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: which means there *one God supreme* [d] in the whole three. This doctrine is not consistent with any *natural* dominion of God the

[u] See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 250, &c. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 72.

[x] See Bull. D. F. p. 65, &c.

[y] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 125.

[z] Ibid. p. 246.

[a] My Sermons, vol. ii. p. 180. Defence, vol. i. p. 175, 182. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 71, 357.

[b] Reply, p. 129, &c. 263, &c. 293, 375.

[c] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 125, &c. 156, 247, 266, &c. 357, 364, &c. Compare Nourrii Apparat. ad Bibl. Max. p. 405, &c. vol. i.

[d] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 182. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 72.

Father over God the *Son:* but is rather a full and clear testimony for one *common dominion* of all the three Persons.

177. Athenagoras.

Athenagoras could not believe any *natural* rule over God the Son.

1. Because he asserts his *consubstantiality*[e].
2. Because he asserts his *coeternity*[f].
3. Because he makes Father and Son *one God*[g].
4. Because he maintains the Son's *necessary existence*[h].
5. Because he is express for the *common dominion* of both[i].

Nothing can be pleaded on the contrary, but what is easily reconciled by admitting a *temporal* procession, generation, or manifestation of the Son, and a priority of *order* in the Father. The pretences of the Reply[k] are all answered in my Second Defence[l].

181. Theophilus.

For the *consubstantiality* and *coeternity* maintained by this writer, Bishop Bull may be consulted. Besides which, he gives Christ the title of Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς, *God* absolutely so called[m]: and he drops some intimations, by a *similitude* which he makes use of, that Father and Son are *one God*, and have *one dominion*[n]. Objections of the Reply[o] have been considered and answered[p].

[e] See Bull. D. F. p. 71. Nourrii Appar. vol. i. p. 487.
[f] See Bull. D. F. p. 203. Nourrii Appar. vol. i. p. 489.
[g] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 181. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 72.
[h] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 250. [i] Ibid. p. 76.
[k] Reply, p. 57, 105, &c. 299.
[l] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 72, &c. 250, &c. 271, 358.
[m] Ibid. p. 131. [n] Ibid. p. 132.
[o] Reply, p. 114, 142, 270.
[p] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 131, 271, &c.

187. Irenæus.

Irenæus could never believe that the *Father* is *naturally* Governor over the Son.

1. Because he ascribes to God the Son *titles* and *attributes* peculiar to the God of Israel [q], God supreme.

2. Because he asserts his *consubstantiality*, *coeternity*, and *necessary existence* [r].

3. Because he makes Father and Son *one God* [s].

4. Because he expressly excludes any *inferior* God, and clearly intimates that God the Son has no God *above* him [t].

There is nothing on the contrary to be pleaded from this author, but what may be fairly and easily reconciled upon the foot of the *economy*, and the natural *order* of the Persons; as hath been particularly shown [u] in answer to the Reply [x].

192. Clemens of Alexandria.

This ancient writer could never have a thought of *subjecting* God the Son to the natural *rule* and governance of God the Father. For,

1. He asserts the *necessary existence* [y] of the Son, which is an insuperable bar and obstacle to any such *subjection*.

2. He makes him to be the *Jehovah*, the *Almighty God* [z] of the Jews, who had no God above him.

3. He even *equalizes* [a] the Son, that is, *proclaims him equal* to the Father.

4. He gives him the titles ὁ Θεὸς [b], and παντοκράτωρ [c], titles expressive of dominion *supreme*, and such as the

[q] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 133. [r] Ibid. p. 251, &c.

[s] Sermons, vol. ii. p. 182. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 67, 78, &c.

[t] See First Defence, vol. i. p. 39. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 85.

[u] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 61, 66, 77, &c. 133, 221, &c. 251, 254, 273, 359.

[x] Reply, p. 10, 17, 19, 23, 41, 60, 61, 62, 93, &c. 140, 239, 283, 295, 379, 393, 417, 484, 496, 507.

[y] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 254. [z] Ibid. p. 134.

[a] Ibid. p. 88. [b] Ibid. p. 175. [c] Ibid. p. 176, 470.

Observator would translate *supreme God*, and *supreme Ruler*, whenever spoken of the Father.

5. He makes Father and Son *one God of the whole universe*[d]: which certainly expresses *equality* and union of *dominion*.

6. Lastly, he addresses to both together as *one Lord*[e]; which does not look like addressing to a *Sovereign* and his natural *subject*, but to one God and Lord *supreme*. The Author of the Reply showed his good wishes and endeavours[f] to *elude* the testimonies: but failed in the performance[g].

200. TERTULLIAN.

Tertullian could never think that the Father is *naturally* the Son's Ruler, or Governor.

1. He admits the *necessary existence* of the *Son*[h].

2. He makes both to be *one substance*, and *one God*[i].

3. He rejects with indignation the notion of an *inferior God*[k].

4. He directly and *expressly* asserts the one *power* and dignity of both[l]. The objections made by the Reply[m] are answered at large[n].

225. HIPPOLYTUS.

This ancient writer could not suppose God the Son to be *naturally* under the rule of God the Father.

[d] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 67, 87. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 183.

[e] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 87.

[f] Reply, p. 80, &c. 140, 190, 227, 377.

[g] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 88 to 95, 134, 273.

[h] Ibid. vol. iii. p. 257.

[i] Sermons, vol. ii. p. 184. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 95, 68. Compare p. 135.

[k] First Defence, vol. i. p. 39. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 192.

[l] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 97, 192. Bull. D. F. p. 261. *Statu* ab altero diversum non esse, idem valet atque illud ipsi non esse subditum, sed par et æquale. *Bull.* ibid.

[m] Reply, p. 55, 111, 76.

[n] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 95 to 102, 135.

1. Because he makes them both *one God* [o], and consequently one God *supreme*.

2. He asserts the *consubstantiality* [p] and *necessary existence* [q] of God the Son.

3. He joins all the three Persons equally in his *doxology* [r], which can by no means be suitable to a *Sovereign* and his *subjects*.

The objections made by the Reply [s] have been easily solved [t] upon the foot of the *economy*, and distinction of *order*.

249. Origen.

Origen, in his certainly genuine works, no way favours the notion of the *Son's* being *naturally* subject to the Father.

1. He asserts Father and Son to be *one God* [u].

2. He makes but one object of worship [x] of both.

3. He maintains the Son's *necessary existence* [y].

4. He is very express for the *coexistence*, *coeternity*, and *consubstantiality* of God the Son [z].

5. He asserts, that the Son is *commensurate* to the Father, equal in *greatness* [a].

Any possible *supremacy* of the Father, *consistent* with these plain and avowed doctrines, will not be scrupled.

[o] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 185. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 104, 136. First Defence, vol. i. p. 16.

[p] First Defence, vol. i. p. 259.

[q] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 42.

[r] See Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 257. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 146. and Hippolytus, vol. ii. p. 18. Fabric.

[s] Reply, p. 13, 16, 20, 39, 61, 65, 91, 117, &c. 509.

[t] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 39, &c. 61, 102, &c. 273, &c.

[u] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 186. Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 227. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 69, 106.

[x] First Defence vol. i. p. 183. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 366.

[y] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 257.

[z] First Defence, vol. i. p. 14. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 145, 146. See also Bishop Bull.

[a] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 47.

The Reply[b] has boasted much of Origen the other way, and produced counter-evidences; but such as are either not to be compared with ours for *genuineness* and *certainty*, or such as may be reconciled[c] with the doctrine here mentioned, by allowing a superiority of *office* and *order*. Let him either *disprove* these particulars, or *reconcile* them with his notion of the *alone supremacy*.

250. CYPRIAN.

Cyprian has nothing in favour of the pretended *natural* dominion over God the Son; but the contrary.

1. As including all the three Persons in the *one God*[d].

2. As applying to God the Son the *appropriate* titles of the one true God[e].

The few things which the author of the Reply[f] had to offer, are answered in my Second Defence[g].

257. NOVATIAN.

Novatian looks more favourably to the notion of a *natural* superiority of dominion, than any writer before him. But as he has several tenets *inconsistent* with such a notion, so what he has that seems most to favour it, does not necessarily require any such sense, but may very well bear a candid construction.

1. He maintains *equality*, and *unity* of *substance*[h].

2. He asserts the *eternity*[i] of God the Son; and, as it seems, *eternal* generation[k].

[b] Reply, p. 4, 5, 10, 18, 20, 23, 28, 31, 42, 49, 56, 69, 70, 84, 85, 187, 219, 242, 272, 295, 319, 327, 375, 380, &c. 442, 446, &c.

[c] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 47, 107, 258, &c. 274, 322, &c. 359, 367, &c.

[d] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 187.

[e] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 137. Bull. D. F. p. 131.

[f] Reply, p. 10, 24, 28, 146.

[g] Vol. iii. 137, 373.

[h] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 9, 26, 258, 307. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 120, 140, 457.

[i] First Defence, vol. i. p. 97, &c.

[k] Ibid. p. 101.

3. He applies such texts to Christ as are intended of the *Jehovah*, and one true God of Israel[l].

These tenets are by no means consistent with a *natural* superiority of *dominion* over God the Son: neither does Novatian assert any *subjection* but what may reasonably be understood of the *economy*, as I have observed[m]. The pretences of the Reply are all distinctly considered in my Second Defence, vol. iii. And though the Observator[n] has since charged me as being *too hasty*, in saying, that the ancients never speak of Christ as a *constituted* God, because of a passage of Novatian, where the phrase is *Deus constitutus;* yet he thought proper to *conceal* from the reader what I had said[o] to obviate his construction of that very place.

259. Dionysius of Alexandria.

Dionysius of Alexandria could not be in the *hypothesis* of *natural* rule over God the Son.

1. Because he asserted the *coeternity* of God the Son, in very full and express words[p], and his *eternal*, *beginningless*[q] generation.

2. Because he was as *express* for the *consubstantiality*, name, and thing[r].

3. Because he taught the *necessary existence* of the Son, representing it as *necessary* for the Son to *coexist*, as for the Father to *exist;* as may be seen at large in Athanasius. Besides that in *other* words[s] he has also expressed the same thing.

[l] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 139, 58.

[m] Ibid. p. 58, 140.

[n] Observations, p. 54.

[o] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 218.

[p] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 147.

[q] Ὁ δέ γε Θεὸς αἰώνιόν ἐστι φῶς, οὔτε ἀρξάμενον, οὔτε λῆξόν ποτε. οὐκοῦν αἰώνιον πρόκειται, καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, ἄναρχον καὶ ἀϊδιγενὲς προφαινόμενον αὐτοῦ. *Dionys. ap. Athan.* vol. i. p. 254, 258.

[r] Vid. ap. Athanas. vol. i. p. 255, 230.

[s] Μόνος δὲ ὁ υἱὸς ἀεὶ συνὼν τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ τοῦ ὄντος πληρούμενος, καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν ὢν ἐκ τοῦ πατρός. *Apud Athan.* p. 254.

4. He included all the three Persons in the *Monad*, or the *one God*, as I have shown elsewhere[t]: which is making all together one God *supreme*, directly contrary to the notion of a *natural* superiority of *dominion*. The Reply[u] has some few things to say of this author; which had been long ago obviated by Bishop Bull, and are since answered in my Second Defence[x]. I might observe too, how Dionysius particularly guards[y] against the notion of the Son's being *created* by the Father, which is the only thing that could be a foundation of *natural* dominion.

259. Dionysius of Rome.

This excellent writer is no less full and plain against the hypothesis of *natural* superiority of dominion.

1. By declaring it *blasphemy* to suppose the Son a *creature*[z], understanding *creature* in the common sense of *precarious*, or *temporal* existence.

2. By teaching the *necessary existence* of God the Son, inasmuch as the Father never was, never *could be* without him[a].

3. By including all the three Persons in the *one true Godhead*[b]. Some little objections of the Reply to the *genuineness* of the piece are abundantly answered in my Second Defence[c].

260. Gregory of Neocæsarea.

This celebrated Father is full and express, in his fa-

[t] Sermons, vol. ii. p. 189. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 48.

[u] Reply, p. 71, 331.

[x] Vol. iii. p. 48, 321.

[y] Ἐὰν δέ τις τῶν συκοφαντῶν ἐπιδὴ τῶν ἁπάντων ποιητὴν τὸν Θεὸν καὶ δημιουργὸν εἶπον, οἴηταί με καὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ λέγειν, ἀκουσάτω μου πρότερον πατέρα φήσαντος αὐτὸν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς προσγέγραπται. *Apud Athan.* p. 257.

[z] First Defence, vol. i. p. 101, 259. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 109, 317.

[a] See Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 257. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 146.

[b] Sermons, vol. ii. p. 187. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 110.

[c] Vol. iii. p. 48, 317.

mous *creed*, against any thing *created*, or *servient*, in the *Trinity*[d]; asserting one undivided *glory* and *dominion* of all the three Persons. There have been *suspicions* raised against the genuineness of this creed; but such as have not been thought of sufficient weight by any of the best *critics*, against the express testimonies of Ruffinus and Gregory Nyssen, confirmed, in some measure, by Nazianzen[e].

Besides what Gregory has in his *creed*, he has some considerable things to the same purpose in another work, written about the year 239, and which is of *unquestioned* authority. The titles and epithets he therein gives to the Son are, *Creator and Governor of all things*[f], *really*, or naturally, *united to* the Father[g], the most *perfect living* Word[h]; the last expressions very like to some in his creed, and a *probable* argument of their having the same author.

270. Antiochian Fathers.

The synodical epistle of these Fathers gives to God the Son such *titles* as belong to the *one true God*. But as they have nothing *express* upon our present question on either side, it may be sufficient to have mentioned them, and to refer[i] to what has been said of them.

290. Methodius is express against the Son's being a *creature*, and for *eternal* generation and *immutable* existence[k]: tenets utterly repugnant to such a *natural* infe-

[d] Οὔτε οὖν κτιστὸν, ἢ δοῦλον ἐν τῇ τριάδι, &c. Τριὰς τελεία, δόξῃ, καὶ ἀϊδιότητι, καὶ βασιλείᾳ μὴ μεριζομένη, μηδὲ ἀπαλλοτριουμένη. Fabric. ed. p. 224.

[e] Nazianz. Orat. xxxvii. p. 609. Orat. xl. p. 668.

[f] Πάντων δημιουργῷ καὶ κυβιερνήτῃ.

[g] Πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀτιχνῶς ἡνωμένος.

[h] Τελειότατον καὶ ζῶντα, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρώτου νοῦ Λόγον ἔμψυχον. *Bull. D. F.* p. 154.

[i] Reply, p. 18, 20, 64, 148, 445. Bull. D. F. p. 158, 199, 263. My Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 138.

[k] First Defence, vol. i. p. 102, 287, 288. Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 234. Bull. D. F. p. 164, 200.

riority as is pretended. What the Reply [l] had to object is answered in another place [m].

300. Theognostus is also *express* against the Son's being a *creature*, and for his *consubstantiality* [n]. What the Reply [o] has to object had been abundantly before answered by Bishop Bull.

303. As to Arnobius, little has been pleaded on either side from him. He has some strong expressions that seem to carry the *supremacy* very high: and he has other expressions very full for the *true* and essential divinity of God the Son. Bishop Bull [p], and Le Nourry [q], may be consulted in respect of both the parts, and how to make them *consistent*.

318. Lactantius has been largely considered both in the Reply [r] and in my Second Defence. He makes Father and Son *one God* [s]. He makes both *one substance* [t]. He describes him under the characters of the one true God [u]. He supposes both to be *one object* of worship [x]. He joins the Son with the Father in the same *dominion*, and exempts the Son from the *necessity* of obeying [y]. These tenets are perfectly repugnant to *natural* superiority of *dominion* in the Father only. Nevertheless, he has some *crude* expressions, scarce excusable in a catechumen of his abilities.

322. Alexander of Alexandria.

This venerable Patriarch, defender of the Catholic faith against his Presbyter Arius, shows in his two letters the Church's doctrine in his time. He could not be a friend to any *natural* subjection of God the Son. For,

[l] Reply, p. 290, 334.
[m] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 275. Bull. D. F. p. 166.
[n] See Bull. D. F. p. 135.
[o] Reply, p. 333.
[p] Bull. D. F. p. 169.
[q] Nourrii Apparat. vol. ii. p. 350.
[r] Reply, p. 49, 55, 63, 86, &c. 119, 388.
[s] Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 111, &c. [t] Ibid. p. 112, 113.
[u] Ibid. p. 140. [x] Ibid. p. 373. [y] Ibid. p. 117.

1. He asserts his *coeternity*, and *inseparability* with the Father.

2. He maintains his *necessary existence*.

3. His *natural* divinity, or *Godhead*, of and from the Father.

4. His *high* or supreme Godhead. Proofs of these particulars may be seen in my Second Defence [z]; where also objections are answered, such as had been offered in the Reply [a]. Hitherto we have not found one man full and express for the *natural* government, or *natural* subjection among the Persons of the sacred Trinity. Several have been here cited, who were *expressly* against it: and the rest *implicitly* condemn it; while none, either *directly* or so much as *consequentially*, maintain it. But now I take leave to name a man who did maintain it, and in pretty plain and broad terms.

323. Arius.

Arius, with his confederates, in a letter to Alexander, delivers it for doctrine [b], that God the Father *rules over* God the Son, as being *his God*, and having existed *before* him. Here may Dr. Clarke and his followers see the first lines of their doctrine; which was afterwards filled up and completed by Ætius and Eunomius.

These were the authors and founders of that *natural* supremacy of *dominion* over God the Son, that *natural subjection* and *servitude* of two of the *divine* Persons, which these gentlemen are so eagerly contending for; and which, with as *groundless* and *shameless* a confidence as I ever knew, they presume to father upon the sacred

[z] Vol. iii. p. 50. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 146. First Defence, vol. i. p. 103.

[a] Reply, p. 57, 73, 291, 355, 451, 498.

[b] Ἄρχει γὰρ αὐτοῦ, ὡς Θεὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὤν. *Ap. Athan. de Synod.* vol. ii. p. 730.

Phœbadius well expresses the Arian doctrine of *natural* subjection, at the same time distinguishing it from the Catholic doctrine of *filial* ministration.

Subjectum Patri Filium, non Patris et Filii nomine, ut Sancta et Catholica dicit Ecclesia, sed creaturæ conditione, profitemini. *Phœbad. B. P. P.* tom. v. p. 303.

Scriptures, upon the ancient *creeds*, and upon the venerable *Doctors* of the Church; against plain *fact*, against the fullest and clearest evidence to the contrary. I shall proceed a little lower, to show what reception this Arian conceit met with.

I shall say nothing of Eusebius of Cæsarea, of this time, a *doubtful* man, and of whom it is difficult to determine in the whole [c].

340. Athanasius.

Athanasius, about this time, began to write in the cause against Arius. His Exposition of Faith is of uncertain date: and so I may place it any where from the time he entered the list against the Arians. His doctrine is well known from his many works. I shall cite but one short sentence of his, speaking of God the Son. He is "Ruler supreme, of Ruler supreme: for whatsoever "things the Father bears rule and dominion over, over "the same does the Son also rule and govern [d]."

348. Cyril of Jerusalem.

The elder Cyril was always looked upon as a very *moderate* man, and not so vehement against the Arians as many others. Yet let us hear how expressly and fully he condemns the doctrine of *natural* subjection in the *Trinity*, [e] owning none other but *voluntary* and *chosen*.

"[f] All things," says he, "are servants of his," (of the Father); "but his only Son and his own holy Spirit are "exempt from the all things: and all these servants do, "by the one Son, in the Holy Ghost, serve the Master."

[c] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 142 to 155.

[d] Παντοκράτορα ἐκ παντοκράτορος· πάντων γὰρ ὧν ἄρχει ὁ πατὴρ καὶ κρατεῖ, ἄρχει καὶ κρατεῖ καὶ ὁ υἱός. *Athan. Expos. Fid.* vol. i. p. 99.

[e] Οὐκ ἀναγκαστὴν ὑπακοὴν ἔχων, ἀλλ' αὐτοπροαίρετον ὑπεύθυναν· οὐ γὰρ δοῦλός ἐστι, ἵνα ἀνάγκῃ ὑποταγῇ· ἀλλὰ υἱός ἐστιν, ἵνα προαιρέσει καὶ φιλοστοργίᾳ πεισθῇ. *Cyrill. Cat.* xv. n. 30. p. 240.

[f] Τὰ σύμπαντα μὲν δοῦλα αὐτοῦ· εἷς δὲ αὐτοῦ μόνος υἱὸς, καὶ ἓν τὸ ἅγιον αὐτοῦ πνεῦμα ἐκτὸς τούτων πάντων, καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα δοῦλα, διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς υἱοῦ ἐν ἁγίῳ πνεύματι δουλεύει τῷ δεσπότῃ. *Ibid. Cat.* viii. p. 123.

[g] In another place, the same Cyril says, "The Father "has not one glory, and the Son another, but one and "the same." So little countenance had the *alone* supremacy of dominion, or *natural subjection* of two *divine* Persons at that time.

358. HILARY.

Hilary's doctrine on this head is, that the *subjection* of the Son is *voluntary*, and not by *constraint* [h]; that is to say, it is *economical*, not *natural*. [i] In another place he directly denies that either the Son is *servant* to the Father, or the Father *Lord* over him, save only in respect of the *incarnation* of God the Son: where he expressly again denies any *natural* subjection of God the Son as such.

360. Zeno Veronensis's doctrine, to the same purpose, may be seen in my First Defence [k].

370. Basil's also, no less full and express against the pretended *natural* dominion on one hand, and *subjection* on the other, is shown in my Second Defence [l].

375. Gregory Nazianzen's testimony I shall throw into the margin [m]: the same will be a confirmation of the creed of Thaumaturgus.

[g] Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλην δόξαν πατὴρ, καὶ ἄλλην υἱὸς ἴσχει, ἀλλὰ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτήν. *Catech.* vi. p. 87.

[h] Subjectio Filii naturæ pietas, subjectio autem cæterorum creationis infirmitas. *Hilar. de Synod.* p. 1195.

[i] *Servus* enim non erat, cum esset secundum Spiritum Deus Dei Filius. Et secundum commune judicium, ubi non est *servus*, neque *Dominus* est. Deus quidem et Pater nativitatis est unigeniti Dei: sed ad id, quod *servus* est, non possumus non nisi tunc ei *Dominum* deputare cum *servus* est: quia si cum ante per *naturam* non erat *servus*, et postea secundum naturam esse quod non erat cœpit; non alia *dominatus* causa intelligenda est, quam quæ exstitit *servitutis;* tunc habens ex naturæ dispensatione *Dominum*, cum præbuit ex hominis assumptione se *servum*. *Hilar. de Trin.* lib. xi. p. 1090.

[k] Vol. i. p. 206. Bull. D. F. p. 266.

[l] Vol. iii. p. 24, 332, 465.

[m] Θεὸν τὸν πατέρα, Θεὸν τὸν υἱὸν, Θεὸν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, τρεῖς ἰδιότητας θεότητα μίαν, δόξῃ καὶ τιμῇ καὶ οὐσίᾳ καὶ βασιλείᾳ μὴ μεριζομένην, ὥς τις τῶν μικρῷ πρόσθεν θεοφόρων ἐφιλοσόφησεν. *Orat.* xxxvii. p. 609.

Οὐδὲν τῆς τριάδος δοῦλον, οὐδὲ κτιστὸν, οὐδὲ ἐπείσακτον, ἧκουσα τῶν σοφῶν τινος λέγοντος. *Orat.* xl. p. 666.

380. Gregory Nyssen's doctrine may be seen in my Defences [n], very full to the purpose.

382. I conclude with Ambrose [o], having thus brought the doctrine low enough down. No doubt can be made of the Catholics all the way following to this very time.

These, after *Scripture*, are my authors for that very doctrine which the Observator every where, without the least scruple, charges upon me as my *fiction* and *invention*. Such is his great regard to *truth*, to *decency*, and to common *justice:* such his respect to the English readers, in imposing upon them any the grossest and most palpable *abuses*. Let him, when he is disposed, or when he is able, produce his vouchers from Catholic antiquity, for the *natural* subjection of God the Son, or the *natural* superiority of the Father's *dominion* over him. He may give proof of a superiority of *order* (which I dispute not) or of *office*, which I readily admit: but as to there being any *natural* rule, or *natural* subjection among the *divine* Persons, or within the *Trinity* itself, none of the ancients affirm it; all, either directly or indirectly, *reclaim* against it. He may run up his doctrine to Eunomius, and so on to Arius, where it began. He, I believe, is the first man upon record, that ever allowed the *preexistence* and *personality* of the *Logos*, and yet made God the Son, as such, *naturally* subject to the *dominion* of the Father; appointing him a *Governor*, another God *above* him: which was really Arius's sense, and is the plain sense likewise of his *successors* at this day.

[n] Vol. i. p. 206. Vol. iii. p. 25.

[o] Non sunt enim duo Domini, ubi *Dominatus unus est;* quia Pater in Filio, et Filius in Patre, et ideo *Dominus unus*. *Ambros. de Sp. S.* l. iii. c. 15. p. 686.

THE CONCLUSION.

I HAVE nothing now to do, but to take my leave of these gentlemen for this time. If they are disposed to proceed in the way they have now taken, it will be no great trouble to me (while God grants me life and health) to do myself *justice*, as often as I see *needful*; and to support, with God's assistance, the *cause* I have undertaken, as well against *calumnies* now, as against *arguments* before. But I think, since the *argument* is in a manner brought to an end, it is time for these gentlemen to put an end to the *debate* too; lest, after exposing the *weakness* of their *cause*, they may meet with a more *sensible* mortification, by going on to the utmost to expose their *own*.

They have done enough for *Arianism*; and more a great deal than the best cause in the world (though theirs is a very bad one) could ever require. They have omitted nothing likely to *convince*, nothing that could be any way serviceable to *deceive* their readers. They have ransacked the Socinian stores for the eluding and frustrating the Catholic interpretation of *Scripture texts*. They have gone on to *Fathers*: and whatever they could do there, by *wresting* and *straining*, by *mangling*, by *misinterpreting*, by false *rendering*, and the like, they have done their utmost to make them all Arians. And, lest that should not be sufficient, they have attempted the same thing upon the ancient creeds, and even upon *modern* confessions; upon the very Articles and Liturgy of the Church of England. To complete all, having once found out the secret of fetching in what and whom they pleased, they have proceeded farther to drag me in with the rest [a], into the very doctrine that I had been largely *confuting*.

[a] See Reply, p. 116. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 195.

They have spared no pains, or art, to *disguise* and colour over their wretched tenets, and to give them the best face and gloss that they could possibly bear. They will not call the Son a *creature;* nay, it was some time before they would say plainly, that he is not *necessarily existing*, till the course of the debate, and some pressing straits almost forced it from them; and that not till after some of the plainer and simpler men of the party had first blabbed it out. At last, they would seem not so much to be writing *against* the divinity of God the Son, as *for* the honour of God the *Father*. They do not care to say, they are pleading for the *natural* subjection and servitude of the Son, but it is for the *natural* dominion of the *Father* over him: and they do not commonly choose so much as to say that in plain and broad terms; but they hint it, and mince it, under the words "alone supremacy of "the Father's dominion." And for fear that that should be taken hold on, and wrested from them, in due course of argument, they clap in *authority* with *dominion;* that they may have something at least that looks *orthodox*, something that may bear a *colour* upon the foot of *antiquity*, as admitting of a *double* meaning. And they have this farther view in *confounding* distinct things together, to make a show as if we admitted no kind of *authority* as *peculiar* to the Father when we deny his *alone* dominion; or that if we *assert* one, we must of course, and at the same time, assert *both*. To carry on the *disguise* still farther, they represent their adversaries as teaching that the Father has *no natural supremacy* of authority and dominion *at all;* without taking care to add, (what they ought to add,) *over the Son and Holy Ghost*, to undeceive the reader; who is not perhaps aware what *subjection* they are contriving for *two* of the *divine* Persons, while they put on a *face* of commendable zeal for the *honour* of the *first*. Such is their excessive care not to *shock* their young, timorous disciples; not to make them *wise* at once, but by degrees, after leading them about in their *simplicity* for a time, with their eyes half open.

Besides giving a *fair* gloss and outside to their *own* scheme, they have next studiously endeavoured to *expose* and blacken the *faith received.* It is *Sabellianism*, it is *Tritheism*, it is *scholastic* jargon, it is *metaphysical* revery, *nonsense*, *absurdity*, *contradiction*, and what not: contrary to *Scripture*, contrary to all the *ancients*, nay, contrary even to *moderns* also: and, to make it look as little and *contemptible* as possible in the eyes of all men, it is at length nothing more than Dr. Waterland's own novel *fiction* and *invention.*

Now I appeal to all serious and thinking men, whether any thing can be done, that these men have not done, in favour of their beloved *Arianism;* and whether they may not now fairly be *excused*, if they should desist, and proceed no farther. A great deal less than this, though in ever so *good* a *cause*, might have been sufficient: and had they sung their *liberavi animam* some twelve months backwards, I know not whether any truly *good* and *conscientious* Arian could have thought them *deserters*, or have condemned them for it. Let the *cause* be ever so *right*, or just, yet who hath *required it at their hands* that they should pursue it to such hideous lengths? Their design, suppose, is to promote *truth* and *godliness:* let it then be in *God's* own way, and by *truth*, and truth *only*. There can be no necessity of *deceiving*, of *betraying*, of *beguiling* any man even into *truth*, (though this is not *truth*,) by *disguises*, by *misreports*, by making things *appear* what they *are not*, or not suffering them to *appear* what they really *are*. This is going out of the way, wide and far, and defending *truth*, (were it *really* truth,) by making fearful inroads upon *simplicity* and godly *sincerity*, upon moral *honesty* and *probity*.

In conclusion, I must be so just to myself as to say, that considering how I was at first *forced*, in a manner, into *public* controversy, and what kind of a controversy this is, and how *often*, and how *anciently* before *decided* by the churches of Christ; I was civil enough in engaging the men so *equally* as I did, and upon so *fair terms*.

I expected, I desired nothing, but that they would make the best use they could of their *own understandings*, from which we were promised great things. I invited them to the utmost *freedom*, in discussing every point within the compass of the question; only not to exceed the rules of just and regular debate[b]: that every branch of the cause might have a *new hearing*, and be *reexamined* with all possible strictness and severity. In a word, all I required was, to *dispute fair*, to *drop ambiguous terms*, or *define them*, to contemn every thing but *truth* in the search after *truth*, and to *keep close to the question;* at the same time binding myself up to a careful and constant observance of the same rules.

When their Reply appeared, I presently saw how far those gentlemen were gone off from *just* debate; and how little inclination they had to dispute *fairly*, or *regularly*. To prejudice the readers, they began with *charges* and *complaints*; all *trifling*, most *false;* and some such as they themselves could scarce be weak enough to *believe*[c]. I need not say what followed. When I found how the case stood, I reminded them of their misconduct, sometimes raised my style, and treated them with some sharpness, (though with less than they had me, with much less reason,) to let them know that I *understood* what they were doing, and that if I could not be *confuted*, I would not be *contemned*. As *they* had taken the liberty of *charging* me very often, and very *unfairly*, with things that they *could not* prove; I made the less scruple of charging *them* with what I *could prove*. And this, I hope, the impartial reader will upon examination find, that all the *severity* on my side lies in the *truth* of the things *proved* upon them; while *theirs*, on the other, lies mostly in *invention*, and *abusive* words, which, for want of evidence to support them, must of course return upon their own heads. They appear, in their last pieces especially,

[b] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 343, &c.
[c] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 19.

to be no great friends to *ceremony:* so that I have reason to believe they will expect the less in return. I had hitherto been so tender of Mr. Jackson, as never to *name* him; though his own friends had done it at full length: particularly the Author of the Catalogue, &c. and Dr. Whitby twice[d], promising the world something very considerable from "the accurate pen of Mr. Jackson." *Accuracy* is a thing which I shall not complain of, but shall ever receive, even from an adversary, with the utmost reverence and respect. I wish this gentleman had shown something of it; if not in his account of *Scripture* or *Fathers*, (which his *hypothesis* perhaps would not permit,) yet in his *reports* and *representations*, at least, of *my words*, and *my sense;* which might have been expected from a man of *probity*. Whether his writing without a *name* has been his principal encouragement to take the *liberties* he has, I will not be positive: but it is highly probable; because *common prudence*, generally, is a sufficient bar against it, in men that have any *character* to *lose*, any *reputation* to be responsible for it. The just and proper views, or reasons, for a writer's concealing his *name* are, to relieve his *modesty*, or to screen himself from public *censure;* to be *frank* and *open* in debate, and to discuss every point of importance (though against the *received* opinions) with all due *freedom* and *strictness*, like a lover of *truth*. Had the gentlemen I am concerned with gone upon these *views*, or made use of their concealment for these or the like laudable purposes, I should have been perfectly well satisfied. But while they continue their *disguises* as before, and regard nothing less than *frank*, *fair*, and *open* debate; while the main use they make of their concealment is only to be less solicitous about what they think or write; pelting us from their *coverts* with *misreports*, and slandering in *masquerade:* when this is the case, it concerns a man in his own *defence* to intimate to these gentlemen, that they are not

[d] Whitby's Second Part of his Reply, p. 74, 122.

so entirely under *cover* as they may imagine; but that it is their *prudence* still to be a little more upon their *guard*, and to write with more *decency* hereafter, at least, for their own *credit* and *reputation*.

After all, if any reasonable man is disposed to examine this question, or any part of it, with *freedom* and *plainness*, with sincerity and strictness, attending to the *argument*, and representing every thing in a *fair* and *true* light, without *misreport* or *insult*; such a person, though *nameless*, would have a just title to all *tender*, and *candid*, and even *respectful* treatment, from an adversary; and, I am very sure, would never find any other than such from me. I shall ever think it a much greater disgrace to be outdone in *civility*, than in matter of *argument*. The first cannot happen but through a man's own *fault*: the other may; and when it does, there is no real discredit in yielding to the *truth* once made clear. Both sides, if they are good men, are *victorious* in such a case; because both attain the *only* thing that they aimed at, and both share the prize.

A

CRITICAL HISTORY

OF THE

ATHANASIAN CREED:

REPRESENTING

THE OPINIONS

OF

ANCIENTS AND MODERNS CONCERNING IT:

WITH

An Account of the Manuscripts, Versions, *and* Comments, *and such other particulars as are of moment for the determining the* Age, *and* Author, *and* Value *of it, and the Time of its* Reception *in the Christian Churches.*

TO HIS GRACE

WILLIAM

LORD ARCHBISHOP OF YORK,

PRIMATE OF ENGLAND AND METROPOLITAN.

My Lord,

I AM desirous of sending these papers abroad under your Grace's name, in confidence you will be a Patron to them, as you have been to the Author. I would make their way short and easy to the *public* esteem, by introducing them first into your Grace's acquaintance and good opinion: which if they have once the honour to obtain, I may then be assured that they will be both *useful* to the *world*, and acceptable with all *good men*; the height of my ambition.

The *subject*, my Lord, is the Athanasian Creed, the most accurate system of the Athanasian, that is, the Christian faith: of which your Grace is, by your station and character, by duty and office, and, what is more, by inclination and principle,

and real services, the watchful Guardian and Preserver.

The happy fruits of it are visible in the slow and inconsiderable progress that the *new heresy* has been able to make within your *province*; where it died, in a manner, as it first arose, and no sooner began to lift up its head, but sunk down again in shame and confusion: as if the plenty of *good seed* sown had left no room for *tares*, or they could take no root in a *soil* so well *cultivated*.

While your Grace is promoting the honour and interests of our holy faith, in the *eminent* way, by the wisdom of your *counsels*, the authority of your *precepts*, and the brightness of your *high example*; I am endeavouring, in such a way as I can, to contribute something to the same *common cause*, though it be but slight and small, though it be only reviewing the *fences* and surveying the *outworks*; which is the most I pretend to in the *history* here presented.

What advantage *others* may reap from the *publication* will remain in suspense: but I am sure of one to *myself*, (and I lay hold of it with a great deal of pleasure,) the *opportunity* I thereby have of returning my *public* thanks to your Grace for your *public* favours. Though this, my Lord, is but a scanty expression for them, and far short, where

the engaging *manner* and *circumstances*, known but to *few*, and not to be understood by *many*, make so considerable an addition in the whole, and almost double the obligation upon,

My Lord,

Your Grace's most obliged,

Most dutiful, and most obedient

Humble Servant,

DANIEL WATERLAND.

Cambridge, Magd. Coll.
Oct. 25, 1723.

THE

PREFACE

TO

THE SECOND EDITION.

WHAT I here present the Reader with, will not require much Preface. The Introduction intimates the *design*, and *use*, and *partition* of the Work. The Appendix, which is an additional enlargement beyond my first design, gives account of itself. I subjoin two Indexes, for the ease and convenience of such persons as may be disposed, not only to read these sheets, but to study the subject. I should scarce have thought of making Indexes to so small a treatise, had I not found the like in Tentzelius, upon the same subject, and to a smaller Tract than this is. His were of considerable use to me, as often as I wanted to review any particular *author* or *passage*, or to compare distant parts, relating to the same things, one with another: the benefit therefore which I reaped from his labours, I am willing to pay back to the *public* by mine.

As to the *subject* of the following sheets, I make no question of its well deserving the thoughts and consideration of every studious reader; having before passed through the hands of many the most learned and most judicious men, and such as would not misemploy their time and pains upon a trifle. As to the present *management* of it, it must be left to the Reader to judge of, as he sees cause.

For the *chronology* of the several parts, I have consulted the best authors; endeavouring to fix it with as much accuracy as I could. Wherever I could certainly determine the age of any Tract, *printed* or *manuscript*, to a *year*, I set down that year: where I could not do it, (as in manuscripts one seldom can,) I take any probable year within the compass of time when an Author is known to have *flourished*; or for a manuscript, any probable year

within such a *century*, or such a *king's reign* wherein the manuscript is reasonably judged to have been written: and I generally choose a *round* number, rather than otherwise, in such indefinite cases and instances.

Thus for example, first in respect of Authors: there is a comment of Venantius Fortunatus, upon the Athanasian Creed, which I reprint in my Appendix. I cannot fix the age of it to a year, no, nor to twenty years. All that is *certain* is, that it was made between 556, when Fortunatus first went into the Gallican parts, and 599, when he was advanced to the Bishopric of Poictiers. Within this wide compass, I choose the year 570. If any one shall rather choose 580, or 590, I shall not dispute it with him, nor doth any thing very material depend upon it: but if any good reason can be given for taking some other year rather than 570, I shall immediately acquiesce in it.

As to *manuscripts*, it is well known there is no fixing them precisely to a year, merely from the *hand* or *character*: and there are but few, in comparison, that carry their own certain dates with them. The best judges therefore in these matters will think it sufficient to point out the *king's reign*, or sometimes the *century*, wherein a manuscript was written: and in the very ancient ones, above 1000 years old, they will hardly be positive so much as to the *century*, for want of certain discriminating marks between manuscripts of the 5th, 6th, and 7th centuries.

It may be asked then, why I pretend to fix the several *manuscripts*, hereafter to be mentioned, to certain years in the margin; those that carry no certain dates, as well as the other that do? I do it for *order* and *regularity*, and for the more *distinct* perception of things; which is much promoted and assisted by this orderly ranging them according to *years*. At the same time the intelligent reader will easily understand where to take a thing as certain, and where to make allowances. It is something like the placing of cities, towns, rivers, &c. in a *map* or a *globe*: they have all their *certain* places there, in such or such precise degrees of *longitude* and *latitude*; which perhaps seldom answer to the strict truth of things, or to a mathematical exactness. But still it serves the purpose very near as well as if every thing had been adjusted with the utmost nicety: and the imagination and memory are mightily relieved by it. Thus much I thought proper to hint in vindication of my *method*, and to prevent any de-

ception on one hand, or misconstruction on the other. I have, I think, upon the whole, generally gone upon the fairest and most probable presumption, and according to the most correct accounts of knowing and accurate men: but if I have any where through inadvertency, or for want of better information, happened to mistake in any material part, the best way of apologizing for it will be to correct it the first opportunity, after notice of it.

As to mere *omissions*, they will appear more or fewer, according to men's different judgments or opinions what to call an *omission*. I might have enlarged, considerably, the first chapter, which treats of the *learned moderns:* though some perhaps will think it too large already, and that it might better have been contracted. I have omitted several *moderns* mentioned by Tentzelius, whose professed design was to take in all: mine is only to take the *principal*, or as many as may suffice to give the Reader a full and distinct *idea* how this matter has stood, with the learned *moderns*, for eighty-five years last past.

In this second edition I have considerably shortened my Appendix, by throwing the several parts of it into the book itself, referring them to their proper places. Some few additional observations will be found, here and there interspersed, and some *corrections*, of slight moment as to the main thing, (in which I make no alteration,) but contributing in some measure to the perfection and accuracy of the Work.

I conclude with professing, as before, that I shall be very glad if what hath been here done may but prove an useful introduction to more and larger discoveries. If any thing considerable still remains, either in private hands or public repositories; any thing that may be serviceable to clear up some *dark part*, or to correct any *mistake*, or to confirm and illustrate any important *truth* relating to the subject; I shall be very thankful to the person that shall oblige either *me* with private notice, or the *public* with new improvements.

Cambridge, Magd. Coll.
Nov. 1, 1727.

A

CRITICAL HISTORY

OF THE

ATHANASIAN CREED.

THE INTRODUCTION,

SHEWING

The Design and Use of this Treatise: with the Method and Partition of it.

MY design is, to inquire into the *age*, *author*, and *value* of that celebrated Confession, which goes under the name of the Athanasian Creed. The *general* approbation it hath long met with in the Christian churches, and the *particular* regard which hath been, early and late, paid to it in our *own*, (while it makes a part of our Liturgy, and stands recommended to us in our Articles,) will, I doubt not, be considerations sufficient to justify an undertaking of this kind: provided only, that the performance be answerable, and that it fall not short of its principal aim, or of the just expectations of the ingenuous and candid readers. No one will expect more of me than my *present* materials, such as I could procure, will furnish me with; nor any greater *certainty* in an essay of this nature, than things of this kind will admit of. If a reasonable diligence has been used in *collecting*, and due pains in *digesting*, and a religious care in *building* thereupon, (more

than which I pretend not to,) it may, I hope, be sufficient with all equitable judges.

Many learned and valuable men have been before employed in the same design: but their treatises are mostly in Latin, and some of them very scarce, and hard to come at. I know not that any one hitherto has attempted a just treatise upon the subject in our own language, however useful it might be to the English readers; and the more so at this time, when the controversy about the *Trinity* is now spread abroad among all ranks and degrees of men with us, and the Athanasian Creed become the subject of common and ordinary conversation. For these reasons, I presumed, an English treatise might be most proper and seasonable: though otherwise, to avoid the unseemly mixture of English and Latin, (which will here be necessary,) and because of some parts which none but the *learned* can tolerably judge of; it might be thought more proper rather to have written a Latin treatise, and for the use only of scholars. However, there will be nothing very material but what an English reader may competently understand: and I shall endeavour to lay before him all that has been hitherto usefully observed upon the subject, that he may want nothing which may be conceived of any moment for the enabling him to form a true judgment. What I borrow from others shall be fairly acknowledged as I go along, and referred to its proper author or authors; it being as much my design to give an *historical* account of what others have done, as it is to supply what they have left undone, so far as my present materials, leisure, and opportunities may enable me to do it. Now to present the reader with a sketch of my design, and to show him how one part is to hang upon another, my method will be as follows.

I. First, in order to give the clearer *idea* of what hath been already done, and of what may be still wanting, I begin with recounting the several conjectures or discoveries of the *learned moderns*.

II. Next, to enter upon the matter itself, and the evi-

dence proper to it, I proceed to lay down the direct *testimonies* of the *ancients* concerning the *age*, *author*, and *value* of this Creed.

III. To these I subjoin an account of the ancient *comments* upon the same Creed, being but another kind of *ancient testimonies*.

IV. After these follows a brief recital of the most ancient, or otherwise most considerable, *manuscripts* of this Creed, which I have either seen myself or have had notice of from others.

V. After the *manuscripts* of the Creed itself, I inquire also into the ancient *versions* of it, printed or manuscript; which will be also very serviceable to our main design.

VI. I come in the next place to treat of the ancient *reception* of this Creed in the Christian churches; as being a point of great moment, and which may be more *certainly* determined than the time of its *composition*, and may give great light into it.

VII. These preliminaries settled, to introduce to what follows, I then fall directly to the darkest part of all; namely, to the inquiry after the *age* and *author* of the Creed: which I dispatch in two distinct chapters.

VIII. Next, I lay before the *learned* reader the Creed itself in its *original* language, with the most considerable various lections; together with *select* passages from ancient writers, either parallel to those of the Creed, or explanatory of it. And, lest the English reader should appear to be neglected, I subjoin the Creed in English with a running English commentary, serving much the same purpose with what is intended by the Latin quotations going before.

IX. I conclude all with a brief vindication of our own Church in receiving, and still retaining this excellent formulary of the Christian faith; answering the most *material* objections which have been made against us, on that account; and showing the expediency, and even necessity of retaining this form, or something equivalent, for the preservation of the Christian faith against heresies. The

Reader, I hope, will excuse it, if in compliance with custom, and to save myself the trouble of circumlocution, I commonly speak of it under the name of the Athanasian Creed; not designing thereby to intimate, either that it is a *Creed* strictly and properly so called, or that it is of Athanasius's composing: both which points will be discussed in the sequel.

CHAP. I.

The Opinions of the learned Moderns concerning the Athanasian Creed.

IN reciting the opinions of the learned *moderns*, I need go no higher than Gerard Vossius: who in his treatise De Tribus Symbolis, published in the year 1642, led the way to a more strict and critical inquiry concerning this Creed than had been before attempted. The writers before him, most of them, took it for granted that the Creed was Athanasius's, without troubling themselves with any very particular inquiry into it: and those few who doubted of it, or ascribed it to another, yet entered not closely into the merits of the cause, but went upon loose conjectures rather than upon any just rules of true and solid criticism. It will be sufficient therefore to begin our accounts from Vossius, who, since the time of his writing, has been ever principally mentioned by writers upon the subject, as being the first and most considerable man that has entered deep into it, and treated of it like a critic. He endeavoured to sift the matter thoroughly, as far as he was well able to do from *printed* books: as to *manuscripts*, he either wanted leisure or opportunity to search for them. The result of his inquiries concluded in the following particulars, some of them dubiously, all of them modestly proposed by him. 1. That the Athanasian Creed is not Athanasius's. 2. That it was originally a Latin composure, and of a Latin author or authors. 3. That it was made in the eighth or ninth century, in the time of Pepin, or of Charles the Great; and probably by some French divine. 4. That the first time it was produced, under the name of Athanasius, at least, with any assurance and confidence of it being his, was in the year 1233, when Pope Gregory the IXth's legates pleaded it at Constantinople in favour of the *procession* against the

A. D. 1642.

Greeks. 5. That it scarce ever obtained in any of the Christian churches before the year 1000. These were his sentiments when he wrote his treatise De Tribus Symbolis. But in a posthumous piece of his, having then seen what some other learned men had written upon the subject, he was content to say that the Creed could not be set higher than the year 600[a]. How far Vossius was mistaken in his accounts will appear in the sequel. Thus far must be allowed him, that he managed the argument with great learning and judgment, made a good use of such materials as he was possessed of; and though he was not very happy in determining the *age* of the Creed, or the time of its *reception*, yet he produced so many and such cogent arguments against the Creed's being originally Greek, or being made by Athanasius, that they could never be answered.

1644. The learned Petavius, who in the year 1622 (when he published Epiphanius) had fallen in with the common opinion of this Creed's being Athanasius's, did yet afterward in his treatise of the *Trinity*, published in the year 1644, speak more doubtfully of it; in the mean while positive that it was written in Latin[b].

1647. The next considerable man, and who may be justly called a *first writer* in this argument, as well as Vossius, was our learned Usher. He had a good acquaintance with libraries and manuscripts; and was able from those stores to produce new evidences which Vossius knew not of. In the year 1647, he printed his Latin tract De Symbolis, with a prefatory epistle to Vossius. He there appeals to the testimonies of Ratram of Corbey, and Æneas Bishop of Paris, neither of them at that time made public, as also to Hincmar's of Rheims, (which had been published, but had escaped Vossius's observation,) to prove that this Creed had been confidently cited under the name of Athanasius almost 400 years before the

[a] Neque ante annum fuisse sexcentesimum, fuse ostendimus in libro De Symbolis. *Voss. Harm. Evang.* lib. ii. c. 13. p. 215.

[b] Petavius de Trin. lib. vii. c. 8. p. 392.

time of Pope Gregory's legates, the time set by Vossius. And further, by two manuscripts found in the Cotton Library, he thought he might carry up the antiquity of the Creed to the year 703, or even to 600. In short, he scrupled not to set the date of it above the year 447: for he supposes a council of Spain, held in that year, to have been acquainted with it, and to have borrowed the *Filioque* from it[c]. Thus far he, without any more particular determination about either the *age* or the *author*.

About the same time Dr. Jeremy Taylor (afterwards Bishop of Down and Connor) published his Liberty of Prophesying, wherein he expresses his doubts whether the Creed be justly ascribed to Athanasius. But as he had never seen Usher's treatise, nor indeed Vossius's, nor was at that time furnished with any proper assistances to enable him to make any accurate inquiries into this matter, it may suffice just to have mentioned him, in regard to the deserved name he has since borne in the learned world. 1647.

George Ashwell, B. D. published an English treatise, which was printed at Oxford, entitled, Fides Apostolica, asserting the *received authors and authority of the Apostles' Creed*. At the end of which treatise, he has a pretty long Appendix concerning the Athanasian Creed; which is well written, and contains a good summary of what learned men, before him, had advanced upon the subject. His judgment of it is, that it was written in Latin, and by Athanasius himself, about the year 340. 1653.

Hamon L'Estrange[d], in his Alliance of Divine Offices, gives his judgment of the Athanasian Creed, that it is not rightly ascribed to Athanasius, but yet ancient, and extant ann. 600 after Christ. 1659.

Leo Allatius, about this year, printed his Syntagma de 1659.

[c] Usser. de Symbolis, p. 24. N. B. Usher went upon the supposition that the words, *a Patre, Filioque procedens*, were genuine; and not foisted into the Confession of that Council; as they now appear to have been, after a more careful view of the MSS. of best note, and greatest antiquity.

[d] Hamon L'Estrange, Annot. in chap. iv. p. 99.

Symbolo S. Athanasii; which no doubt must be a very useful piece, especially in relation to the sentiments of the Greek churches, and the reception of this Creed amongst them: but I have never seen it; only I learn from Tentzelius (who yet could never get a sight of it) and Fabricius, that such a piece was written by Allatius in *modern* Greek, in 12mo. published at Rome 1658 or 1659. It appears to be very scarce, since none of the learned who have since written upon this Creed, have either referred to it, or given extracts out of it, so far as I have observed: excepting only something of that kind at Rome, A. D. 1667, by the College de propaganda Fide[e].

1663. Cardinal Bona, some years after, in his book De Divina Psalmodia, makes frequent mention of this Creed, touches slightly upon the question about its *age* and *author*, takes some cursory notice of what Vossius had said, but nevertheless ascribes it to Athanasius, as being composed by him while in the western parts, *teste Baronio;* resting his faith upon Baronius, as his voucher[f].

1669. Our very learned Bishop Pearson, in his Exposition of the Creed, occasionally delivers his opinion, that the Athanasian Creed was written in Latin, and by some member of the Latin Church[g]; and extant about the year 600. Though the last particular he builds only upon an epistle attributed to Isidore of Seville, and since judged to be spurious.

1675. Joh. Lud. Ruelius, in his second volume, or tome, Conciliorum Illustratorum, has a particular dissertation, about thirty pages in quarto, upon this Creed. He follows Vossius's opinion for the most part, repeating the same arguments[h].

1675. Our next man of eminent character is Paschasius Quesnel, a celebrated French divine. In the year 1675, he

[e] Vid. Tentzel. Judic. &c. p. 147.

[f] Bona de Divina Psalmod. cap. xvi. sect. 18. p. 864.

[g] Pearson on the Creed, Art. viii. p. 324. ed. 3. Art. v. p. 226.

[h] Ruelii Concil. Illustrat. tom. ii. p. 639 to 670.

published his famous edition of Pope Leo's works, with several very valuable dissertations of his own. His fourteenth contains, among other matters, a particular inquiry about the author of this Creed. He ascribes it to Vigilius Tapsensis, the African[i]; and so well defends his position, that he has almost drawn the learned world after him. He is looked upon as the father of that opinion, because he has so learnedly and handsomely supported it: but he is not the first that espoused it. For Labbe, about fifteen years before, had taken notice of some that had ascribed this Creed to Vigilius, at the same time signifying his dissent from them[k].

The year after Quesnel, Sandius, the famous Arian, printed a second edition of his Nucleus, &c. with an Appendix: wherein he corrects his former judgment[l] of this Creed, taken implicitly from Vossius; and allows, nay, contends and insists upon it, that this Creed was not only known, but known under the name of Athanasius, as high at least as the year 770[m]. He ascribes it, upon conjecture, to one Athanasius, Bishop of Spire in Germany, who died in the year 642. 1676.

I ought not to pass over our very learned Cudworth, though he has entered very little into the point before us. He gives his judgment, in passing, of the Creed commonly called Athanasian; that it "was written a long "time after Athanasius by some other hand[n]." 1678.

Henricus Heideggerus, in his second volume of Select Dissertations, (published at Zurich,) has one whole dissertation, which is the eighteenth, containing near forty pages in quarto. This author takes his account of the Creed mostly from Vossius, does not allow it to be Athanasius's, only called by his name as containing the *Athanasian faith:* and he defends the doctrine of the Creed at 1680.

[i] Quesnel, Dissert. xiv. p. 729, &c.
[k] Labbæi Dissert. de Script. Eccles. tom. ii. p. 477.
[l] Vid. Sandii Nucl. Histor. Eccles. p. 256.
[m] Sandii Append. p. 35.
[n] Cudworth, Intellect. Syst. p. 620.

large against the objections of Dudithius and other Antitrinitarians; and concludes with a running comment upon the whole.

1681. Wolfgang Gundling, a German writer, the year after, published a small Tract, containing notes upon a little piece relating to the religion of the Greek churches, written by Eustratius Johannides Zialowski. What is chiefly valuable in Gundling is his account of the Greek copies of this Creed, (printed ones I mean,) giving us six of them together. He occasionally expresses his doubts whether the Creed be Athanasius's, or of some later writer[o].

1683. I may next mention our celebrated ecclesiastical historian, Dr. Cave; who about this time published his Lives of the Fathers, and particularly of Athanasius. His account of this Creed is, that it "was never heard of in the "world till above 600 years after Athanasius was dead; "but barely mentioned then, and not urged with any con-"fidence till above 200 years after, when the legates of "Pope Gregory the Ninth produced and pleaded it at "Constantinople[p]." The learned Doctor, it is plain, took this account from Vossius, and had never seen Usher's Treatise; which one may justly wonder at. Five years after, in his Historia Literaria, he allows that this Creed had been spoken of by Theodulphus, which was within 436 years of Athanasius: but not a word yet of any elder testimony, or manuscript, though both had been discovered, and publicly taken notice of, before this time. He still contends that the Creed obtained not in the Christian churches before 1000, nor became famous every where before 1233; but inclines nevertheless to ascribe it to Vigilius Tapsensis, who flourished about the year 484[q].

1684. Doctor Comber, in his book entitled, A Companion to the Temple, closes in with the old tradition of the

[o] Gundlingii notæ in Eustratii Johannidis Zialowski Delineationem Ecclesiæ Græcæ, p. 68, &c.

[p] Cave, Life of Athanasius, sect. vi. art. 10.

[q] Cave, Histor. Literar. vol. i. p. 146, 371.

Creed being Athanasius's; repeating the most considerable arguments usually pleaded for that persuasion[r].

To him I may subjoin Bishop Beveridge, who perhaps about this time might write his thoughts on the Creed, in his Exposition of our Articles, published after his death. He was so diligent and knowing a man, that had he been to consider this matter in his *later* years, he would certainly have given a more particular and accurate account than that which now appears. He ascribes the Creed to Athanasius, but with some diffidence; and thinks it might have been originally a Greek composition, but that the old Greek copies have been lost, and that the only remaining ones are *versions* from the Latin[s]. 1684.

Cabassutius, in his Notitia Ecclesiastica, hath a short dissertation about the author of this Creed[t]. He contents himself with repeating Quesnel's arguments, to prove that Athanasius was not the author of it, determining nothing farther; save only that it was originally a Latin composure, known and cited by the Council of Autun about the year 670. 1685.

The celebrated Dupin, in his Ecclesiastical History, sums up the reasons usually urged to prove the Creed is none of Athanasius's, and assents to them. He determines with confidence that it was originally a Latin composition, and not known till the fifth century; repeats Father Quesnel's reasons for ascribing it to Vigilius Tapsensis, and acquiesces in them, as having nothing more certain in this matter[u]. 1687.

About the same time Tentzelius, a learned Lutheran, published a little treatise upon the subject[x]; setting forth the several opinions of learned men concerning this Creed. He is very full and accurate in his collection, omitting nothing of moment that had been said before him by any 1687.

[r] Comber, Companion to the Temple, p. 144.

[s] Beveridge on the eighth Article, p. 162.

[t] Cabassutii Notit. Eccles. Dissert. xix. p. 54.

[u] Dupin, Eccles. Histor. vol. ii. p. 35.

[x] Ernesti Tentzelii Judicia Eruditorum de Symb. Athanas. studiose collecta. *Gothæ*, A. D. 1687.

of the learned *moderns*, but bringing in some farther materials, from his own searches, to add new light to the subject. He determines nothing; but leaves it to the reader to make a judgment as he sees cause from a full view of the pleadings.

1688. I may place here the learned Pagi, who in his Critick upon Baronius passes his judgment of this Creed[y]: which being the same with Quesnel's, and little more than repetition from him, I need not be more particular about him.

1693. Joseph Antelmi, a learned Paris divine, first began directly to attack Quesnel's opinion; and to sap the reasons on which it was founded. He published a particular Dissertation to that purpose[z], consisting of eighty-five pages in octavo. He ascribes the Creed to Vincentius Lirinensis, who flourished in the year 434.

1695. The famous Tillemont wrote after Antelmius; for he makes mention of his Treatise, and examines his hypothesis: and yet it could not be long after; for he died in the year 1697. He commends Mr. Antelmi's performance as a considerable work; but inclines still rather to Quesnel's opinion. All that he pronounces *certain* is, that the Creed is none of Athanasius's, but yet as old as the *sixth* century, or older[a].

1698. In the year 1698, Montfaucon published his new and accurate edition of Athanasius's works. In the second tome he has an excellent dissertation upon this Creed; the best that is extant, either for *order* and *method*, or for plenty of useful matter. The sum of his judgment is, that the Creed is certainly none of Athanasius's, nor yet Vigilius Tapsensis's, nor sufficiently proved to belong to Vincentius Lirinensis; but probably enough composed about the time of Vincentius, and by a Gallican writer or writers[b].

[y] Pagi, Critic. in Baron. an. 340. n. 6. p. 440.

[z] Josephi Antelmii Disquisitio de Symbolo Athanasiano. Paris, 1693. 8vo.

[a] Tillemont, Mémoires, tom. viii. p. 667.

[b] Symbolum *Quicunque* Athanasio incunctanter abjudicandum arbitramur

In the same year, Ludovicus Antonius Muratorius, an Italian writer, published a second tome of Anecdota out of the Ambrosian Library at Milan. Among other manuscripts there, he had met with an ancient Comment upon this Creed, ascribed to Venantius Fortunatus, who was Bishop of Poictiers in France in the sixth century. He publishes the Comment, together with a Dissertation of his own, concerning the author of the Creed: concluding, at length, that Venantius Fortunatus, the *certain* author of the Comment, might possibly be the author of the Creed too. He entirely rejects the opinion of those that would ascribe it to Athanasius, and disapproves of Quesnel's persuasion about Vigilius Tapsensis; but speaks favourably of Antelmi's, as coming nearest to the truth[c]. 1698.

Fabricius, in his Bibliotheca Græca[d], (highly valued by all men of *letters*,) gives a summary account of the sentiments of the learned relating to this Creed. His conclusion from all is, that thus far may be depended on as *certain;* that the Creed was not composed by Athanasius, but long after, in the fifth century, written originally in Latin, and afterwards translated into Greek. 1712.

In the same year, the learned Le Quien published a new edition of Damascen, with Previous Dissertations to it. In the first of these, he has several very considerable remarks, concerning the *age* and *author* of the Athanasian Creed. He appears inclinable to ascribe it to Pope Anastasius I. (who entered upon the Pontificate in the year 398,) because of some ancient testimonies, as well as manuscripts, carrying the name of Anastasius in the title of the Creed: but he is positive that the Creed must 1712.

——Afro itaque Vigilio nihil est quod symbolum *Quicunque* tribuatur.—— Non ægre quidem concesserim *Vincentii ætate* editam fuisse illam fidei professionem.——Haud abs re conjectant viri eruditi in Galliis illud (*symbolum*) fuisse elucubratum. *Montf. Diatrib.* p. 723.

[c] Hæc et similia pluribus pertractavit eruditissimus Anthelmius, cujus opinioni, quorumnam eruditorum suffragia accesserint, me penitus fugit: fateor tamen ad veritatem omnium maxime illam accedere. *Murator.* tom. ii. p. 222.

[d] Fabricii Biblioth. Græca, vol. v. p. 315.

be set as high as the age of St. Austin, Vincentius, and Vigilius[e]. And, as Antelmius before had made light of the supposition that the *internal characters* of the Creed show it to be later than Eutyches; he makes as light of the other supposition of the *internal characters* setting it later than Nestorius.

1714. Natalis Alexander's new edition of his Ecclesiastical History bears date A. D. 1714. He had examined into our present question some years before, (about 1676, when his first edition came abroad,) subscribing to the opinion of Quesnel: and he does not appear to have altered his mind since. He takes notice of Antelmi's opinion, and speaks respectfully of it, as also of the author; but prefers the other hypothesis[f].

1715. I ought not here to omit the late learned Mr. Bingham, to whom the public has been highly indebted for his Origines Ecclesiasticæ, collected with great judgment, and digested into a clear method. He had a proper occasion to say something of the Athanasian Creed, in passing, and very briefly. He observes, that it was not composed by Athanasius, but by a later, and a Latin writer; and particularly Vigilius Tapsensis; referring to such learned moderns as I have above mentioned, for the proof of it; and giving no more than short hints of their reasons[g].

1719. Dr. Clarke of St. James's, in his second edition of his Scripture Doctrine[h], gives us his last thoughts in relation to this Creed. Referring to Dr. Cave, he informs us, that "this Creed was never seen till about the year 800, near "400 years after the death of Athanasius," (they are his own words,) "nor was received in the Church till so very "late as about the year 1000." Yet Cave does not say, *was never seen*, (for he himself ascribes it to Vigilius Tap-

[e] Omnino fateri cogor Augustini, Vincentii, et Vigilii ætate extitisse expositionem Latinam fidei, quæ postmodum Athanasio Magno attribui meruerit. *Le Quien, Dissert.* i. p. 9.

[f] Natal. Alexand. Eccl. Hist. tom. iv. p. 111.

[g] Bingham's Antiq. of the Christian Church, vol. iv. p. 118, &c.

[h] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 379. 2d edit.

sensis, of the fifth century,) but only that it was not *quoted* before the year 800, or nearly; which yet is a very great mistake. What the learned Doctor intended by saying "about the year 800," and yet only "near 400 years "after the death of Athanasius," or, as he elsewhere [i] expresses it, "above 300 years after the death of Athana- "sius," I do not understand; but must leave to those that can compute the distance between 373 (the latest year that Athanasius is ever supposed to have lived) and the year 800. I am persuaded, the Doctor was thinking, that if Athanasius had lived to the year 400, then the distance had been just 400 years; but as he died 27 years before, the distance must be so much the *less*, when it is quite the *contrary*.

The last man that has given his sentiments in relation to this Creed, is Casimirus Oudinus, in his new edition of his Supplement (now called a Commentary) to the Ecclesiastical Writers. I need say no more than that he does not seem to have spent much pains in reexamining this subject, but rests content with his first thoughts; ascribing the Creed, with Quesnel, to Vigilius Tapsensis [k]. 1722.

These are the principal *moderns* that have fallen within my notice: and of these, the most considerable are Vossius, Usher, Quesnel, Tentzelius, Antelmius, Tillemont, Montfaucon, Muratorius, and Le Quien; as having particularly studied the subject, and struck new light into it, either furnishing fresh *materials*, or improving the old by *new* observations. Some perhaps may wish to have the several opinions of the moderns thrown into a narrower compass: for which reason I have thought it not improper to subjoin the following table, which will represent all in one view, for the ease and conveniency of every common reader.

[i] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 447. 1st edit.

[k] Vid. Oudin. Commentar. de Scriptor. Eccl. vol. i. p. 345, 1248, 1322.

A.D.	*Writers.*	*Author of the Creed.*	*What Century composed in.*	*What Year composed.*	*When received.*
1642.	Vossius.	A Latin Author.		Not bef. 600.	A. D. 1000.
1644.	Petavius.	Doubtful.			
1647.	Bishop Usher.		Vth.	Before 447.	Bef. 852.
1647.	Bishop Taylor.	Not Athanasius.			
1653.	G. Ashwell.	Athanasius.	IVth.	340.	
1659.	L'Estrange.	Not Athanasius.		Before 600.	
1659.	Leo Allatius.	Athanasius	IVth.	340.	
1663.	Card. Bona.	Athanasius Alex.	IVth.	340.	
1669.	Bishop Pearson.	A Latin Author.		About 600.	
1675.	Ruelius.	Not Athanasius.			
1675.	Paschas. Quesnel.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.	484.	Bef. 670.
1676.	Sandius.	Athanasius of Spire.	VIIth.	Before 642.	Bef. 770.
1678.	Dr. Cudworth.	Not Athanasius.	After the IVth.		
1680.	Heideggerus.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.	484.	
1681.	Wolf. Gundling.	Doubtful.			
1683.	Dr. Cave.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.	484.	1000.
1684.	Dr. Comber.	Athanasius Alex.	IVth.	336.	
1684.	Bishop Beveridge.	Athanasius Alex.	IVth.		Bef. 850.
1685.	Cabassutius.	A Latin Author.			Bef. 670.
1687.	Dupin.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.	484.	
1687.	Tentzelius.	Doubtful.			
1688.	Pagi.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.	484.	570.
1693.	Antelmius.	Vincentius Lirinens.	Vth.	Before 450.	
1695.	Tillemont.	Not Athanasius.	VIth or sooner.		
1698.	Montfaucon.	A Gallican Writer.	Vth.		Bef. 670.
1698.	Ant. Muratorius.	Venant. Fortunatus.	VIth.	570.	800.
1712.	Fabricius.	A Latin Author.	Vth.		663.
1712.	Le Quien.	Anastasius I.	IVth or Vth.	Before 401.	500.
1714.	Natal. Alexander.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.	484.	
1715.	Mr. Bingham.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.		670.
1719.	Dr. Clarke.	Doubtful.	VIIth or VIIIth.		1000.
1722.	Oudin.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.	484.	

CHAP. II.

Ancient Testimonies.

HAVING taken a view of the *moderns*, in relation to the Creed, we may now enter upon a detail of the *ancients*, and their *testimonies*; by which the *moderns* must be tried. My design is to lay before the reader all the *original* evidence I can meet with, to give any light either into the *age* or *author* of the Creed, or its *reception* in the Christian churches; that so the reader may be able to judge for himself concerning the *three* particulars now mentioned, which are what I constantly bear in my eye, producing nothing but with a view to one or more of them.

Ancient testimonies have been pretended from Gregory Nazianzen, Gaudentius Brixiensis, St. Austin, and Isidorus Hispalensis, of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries. But they have been since generally and justly exploded by the *learned*, as being either *spurious* or *foreign* to the point; and therefore I conceive it very needless to take any further notice of them. As to *quotations* from our Creed, or *comments* upon it, falling within the compass of the centuries now mentioned; if there be any such, they shall be considered under other heads, distinct from that of *ancient testimonies*, properly so called, to be treated of in this chapter.

The oldest of this kind, hitherto discovered, or ob- 670.
served, is that of the Council of Autun in France, under Leodegarius, or St. Leger, the Bishop of the place in the seventh century. There is some dispute about the year when the Council was held, whether in 663, or 666, or 670. The last is most probable, and most generally embraced by learned men. The words of this Council in English run thus: "If any Presbyter, Deacon, Subdea-
"con, or Clerk, doth not unreprovably recite the Creed
"which the Apostles delivered by inspiration of the Holy
"Ghost, and also *the Faith of the holy Prelate Athanasius*,

" let him be censured by the Bishop[l]." By *the Faith of Athanasius* is here meant what we now call the Athanasian Creed; as may be reasonably pleaded from the *titles* which this Creed bore in the earlier times, before it came to have the name of a Creed: which *titles* shall be exhibited both from manuscripts and written evidences in the sequel. Yet it must not be dissembled that Papebrochius, a learned man, and whom I find cited with approbation by Muratorius[m], is of opinion, that the *Faith of Athanasius*, here mentioned, means the Nicene Creed, which Athanasius had some hand in, and whereof he was the great defender. I can by no means come into his opinion, or allow any force to his reasonings. He asks, why should the Nicene Creed be omitted, and not mentioned with the Apostles'? And why should the Athanasian, not then used in the Sacred Offices, be recommended so carefully, without a word of the Nicene? I answer, because it does not appear that the Nicene Creed was so much taken notice of at that time in the Gallican churches, while the Apostolical, or Roman Creed, made use of in baptism, in the western churches, instead of the Nicene, (which prevailed in the east,) in a manner superseded it: which no one can wonder at who considers how prevailing and universal the tradition had been in the Latin Church, down from the fifth century at least, that the Apostolical Creed was composed by the twelve Apostles, and therefore as *sacred*, and of as great authority as the inspired writings themselves. Besides that it appears from Hinc-

[l] Si quis Presbyter, Diaconus, Subdiaconus, vel Clericus Symbolum quod Sancto inspirante Spiritu Apostoli tradiderunt, et Fidem Sancti Athanasii Præsulis irreprehensibiliter non recensuerit; ab Episcopo condemnetur. *Augustodun. Synod. Harduin.* tom. iii. p. 1016.

[m] Atqui, ut eruditissime adnotavit Cl. P. Papebrochius, in Respons. ad Exhibitionem Error. par. 2. art. xiii. n. 3. verbis illis Fidem S. Athanasii, minime Symbolum Athanasium designatur, sed quidem Nicænum, in quo elaborando plurimum insudasse Athanasium verisimile est. Etenim cur Apostolico Symbolo commendato Nicænum prætermisissent Augustodunenses Patres? Cur Athanasiani Symboli cujus tunc nullus erat usus in sacris, cognitionem exegissent, Nicænumque ne uno quidem verbo commemorassent? *Murator. Anecdot.* tom. ii. p. 223.

mar, who will be cited in his place, that it was no strange thing, even so low as his time, about 850, to recommend the Athanasian Creed along with the Apostles', without a word of the Nicene. And why should it be thought any objection against the Athanasian Creed, that it was not at that time received into the Sacred Offices, (supposing it really was not, which may be questioned,) when it is certain that the Nicene was not yet received into the Sacred Offices in France, nor till many years after, about the time of Pepin, or of Charles the Great? There is therefore no force at all in the argument of Papebrochius: but there is this strong prejudice against it, that the *title* there given is a very common title for the Athanasian Creed, and not for the Nicene. Nor would the Fathers of that Council have been so extravagantly fond of the name of Athanasius, as to think it a greater commendation of the Creed of Nice to call it after him, than to call it the Nicene. There is then no reasonable doubt to be made, but that the Council of Autun, in the Canon, intended the Athanasian Creed; as the best criticks and the generality of the learned have hitherto believed.

But there are other objections of real weight against the evidence built upon this Canon. 1. Oudin makes it a question whether there was ever any council held under Leodegarius, a suffragan Bishop under the Archbishop of Lyons, having no *metropolitical* authority[n]. But it may suffice, if the Council was held at Autun, while he was Bishop of the place, a good reason why he should be particularly mentioned; especially considering the worth and fame of the man: to say nothing of the dignity of his see, which from the time of Gregory the Great had been the *second*, or next in dignity to the metropolitical see of Lyons. Nor do I perceive any force in Oudin's objection against St. Leger's holding a *diocesan* synod, (for a *provincial* synod is not pretended,) though he was

[n] Oudin. Comment. de Script. Eccles. tom. i. p. 348.

no *metropolitan*. 2. A stronger objection is, that the Canon we are concerned with cannot be proved to belong to the Council held under Leodegarius. It is not found among the Canons of that Council published by Sirmondus from the manuscripts of the library of the Church of Angers, but it is from another collection, out of the library of the monastery of St. Benignus of Dijon, with this title only; Canones Augustodunenses: so that one cannot be certain whether it belongs to the Synod under St. Leger, or to some other Synod of Autun much later. It must be owned that the evidence can amount to no more than probable presumption, or conjecture. Wherefore Dupin[o], Tentzelius[p], Muratorius[q], and Oudin[r], do not scruple to throw it aside as of too suspected credit to build any thing certain upon: and even Quesnel[s] expresses some dissatisfaction about it; only in respect to some great names, such as Sirmondus, Peter le Lande, Godfr. Hermantius, &c. he is willing to acquiesce in it. To whom we may add, Labbe[t], Le Cointu, Cabassutius[x], Pagi[y], Tillemont[z], Montfaucon[a], Fabricius[b], Harduin[c], and our learned antiquary Mr. Bingham[d]: who all accept it as genuine, but upon *probable* persuasion, rather than *certain* conviction. Neither do I pretend to propose it as clear and undoubted evidence, but probable only, and such as will be much confirmed by other evidences to be mentioned hereafter.

[o] Dupin, Eccl. Hist. vol. ii. p. 35.
[p] Tentzel. Judic. Erud. p. 61, &c.
[q] Murator. Anecdot. Ambros. tom. ii. p. 223.
[r] Casim. Oudin. vol. i. p. 348.
[s] Quesnel, Dissert. xiv. p. 731.
[t] Labb. Dissert. de Script. Eccles. tom. ii. p. 478.
[u] Le Coint, Annal. Franc. ad ann. 663. n. 22.
[x] Cabassut. Notit. Eccl. Dissert. xix. p. 54.
[y] Pagi Crit. in Baron. ann. 340. n. 6.
[z] Tillemont, Mémoires, vol. viii. p. 668.
[a] Montfauc. Diatrib. p. 720.
[b] Fabric. Bibl. Græc. vol. v. p. 316.
[c] Harduin. Concil. tom. iii. p. 1016.
[d] Bingham, Origin. Eccl. vol. iv. p. 120.

Regino, abbot of Prom in Germany, an author of the ninth and tenth century, has, among other collections, some Articles of Inquiry, supposed by Baluzius the editor to be as old, or very nearly, as the age of Boniface, Bishop of Mentz, who died in the year 754. In those Articles, there is one to this purpose: "Whether the clergy "have by heart Athanasius's Tract upon the Faith of the "Trinity, beginning with *Whosoever will be saved*[e], &c." This testimony I may venture to place about 760, a little after the death of Boniface. 760.

The Council of Frankfort, in Germany, in their thirty-third Canon give orders, that "the Catholic Faith of "the holy Trinity, and Lord's Prayer, and Creed, be set "forth and delivered to all[f]." 794.

Vossius[g] understands the Canon of the two Creeds, Nicene and Apostolical. But I know not why the Apostolical, or Roman Creed, should be emphatically called *Symbolum Fidei, The Creed*, in opposition to the Nicene; nor why the Nicene should not be called *a Creed*, as well as the other, after the usual way. Besides, that Fides Catholica, &c. has been more peculiarly the *title* of the Athanasian Creed: and it was no uncommon thing, either before or after this time, to recommend it in this manner together with the Lord's Prayer and Apostles' Creed, just as we find here. And nothing could be at that time of greater service against the heresy of Felix and Elipandus, (which occasioned the calling of the Council,) than the Athanasian Creed. For which reasons, till I see better reasons to the contrary, I must be of opinion that the Council of Frankfort in their thirty-third Canon intended the Athanasian Creed, which Charles the Great had a particular respect for, and had presented in form

[e] Si Sermonem Athanasii Episcopi de Fide Sanctæ Trinitatis, cujus initium est, *Quicunque vult salvus esse*, memoriter teneat. *Regin. de Discipl. Eccles.* l. 1.

[f] Ut Fides Catholica Sanctæ Trinitatis, et Oratio Dominica, atque Symbolum Fidei omnibus prædicetur, et tradatur. *Concil. Francf.* Can. 33.

[g] Vossius de tribus Symb. Dissert. iii. c. 52. p. 528.

to Pope Adrian I. above twenty years before; as we shall see in another chapter.

809. Theodulphus, Bishop of Orleans in France, has a Treatise of the Holy Ghost, with a preface to Charles the Great, written at a time when the dispute about the *procession* began to make disturbance. He brings several testimonies in favour of the procession *from the Son*, out of Athanasius; and, among others, a pretty large part of the Athanasian Creed, from the words, "'The Father is "made of none, &c." to "He therefore that will be "saved must thus think of the Trinity[h]," inclusive.

809. An anonymous writer of the same time, and in the same cause, and directing himself to the same Prince, makes the like use of the Athanasian Creed, in the following words; "St. Athanasius, in the Exposition of the "Catholic Faith, which that great master wrote himself, "and which the universal Church professes, declares the "procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and Son, "thus saying; *The Father is made of none*[i], &c." This I cite upon the credit of Sirmondus in his notes to Theodulphus.

809. It was in the same year that the Latin monks of Mount Olivet wrote their Apologetical Letter to Pope Leo III. justifying their doctrine of the procession *from the Son*, against one John of Jerusalem, a monk too, of another monastery, and of an opposite persuasion. Among other authorities, they appeal to the Faith of Athanasius, that is, to the Creed, as we now call it. This I have from Le Quien, the learned editor of Damascen, who had the copy of that letter from Baluzius, as he there signifies[k].

[h] Item idem——*Pater a nullo est factus*, &c. usque ad *Qui vult ergo salvus esse*, &c. *Theodulph. apud Sirmondum Oper.* tom. ii. p. 978.

[i] Incertus autor quem diximus, hoc ipso utens testimonio, Beatus, inquit, Athanasius, in Expositione Catholicæ Fidei, quam ipse egregius Doctor conscripsit, et quam universalis confitetur Ecclesia, processionem Spiritus Sancti *a Patre et Filio* declarat, ita dicens: *Pater a nullo est factus*, &c. *Sirmond. Op.* tom. ii. p. 978. Conf. p. 967.

[k] In Regula Sancti Benedicti quam nobis dedit Filius vester Dominus Karolus, quæ habet fidem scriptam de sancta et inseparabili Trinitate; *Credo*

Not long after, Hatto, otherwise called Hetto and Ahyto, Bishop of Basil in France, composed his Capitular, or Book of Constitutions, for the regulation of the clergy of his diocese. Amongst other good rules, this makes the fourth; "That they should have the Faith of "Athanasius by heart, and recite it at the *prime* (that is, "at *seven o'clock in the morning*) every Lord's Day[l]." 820.

Agobardus of the same time, Archbishop of Lyons, wrote against Felix Orgelitanus; where he occasionally cites part of the Athanasian Creed. His words are: "St. "Athanasius says, that except a man *doth keep* the Ca- "tholic faith *whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall* "*perish everlastingly*[m]." 820.

In the same age flourished the famous Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims; who so often cites or refers to the Creed we are speaking of, as a standing rule of faith, that it may be needless to produce the particular passages. I shall content myself with one only, more considerable than the rest for the use that is to be made of it hereafter. He directs his Presbyters "to learn Athanasius's Treatise "of Faith, (beginning with *Whosoever will be saved,*) to "commit it to memory, to understand its meaning, and "to be able to give it in *common* words[n];" that is, I sup- 852.

Spiritum Sanctum Deum verum ex Patre procedentem et Filio: et in Dialogo quem nobis vestra sanctitas dare dignata est similiter dicit. Et in Fide S. Athanasii eodem modo dicit. *Monachi de Monte Oliv. apud Le Quien, Dissert. Damasc.* p. 7.

[l] IVto. Ut Fides Sancti Athanasii a sacerdotibus discatur, et ex corde, die Dominico ad *primam* recitetur. *Basil. Capitul. apud Harduin.* tom. iv. p. 1241.

[m] Beatus Athanasius ait; Fidem Catholicam nisi quis integram, inviolatamque servaverit, absque dubio in æternum peribit. *Agobard. adv. Felic.* cap. 3. ed. Baluz.

[n] Unusquisque presbyterorum Expositionem Symboli atque Orationis Dominicæ, juxta traditionem orthodoxorum patrum plenius discat——Psalmorum etiam verba, et distinctiones regulariter, et ex corde, cum canticis consuetudinariis pronuntiare sciat. Necnon et Sermonem Athanasii de Fide, cujus initium est, *Quicunque vult salvus esse*, memoriæ quisque commendet, sensum illius intelligat, et verbis communibus enuntiare queat. *Hincm. Capit.* i. tom. i. p. 710. ed. Sirmond.

pose, in the *vulgar tongue*. He at the same time recommends the Lord's Prayer and (Apostles') Creed[o], as I take it, without mentioning the Nicene: which I particularly remark, for a reason to be seen above. It is farther observable, that though Hincmar here gives the Athanasian formulary the name of a Treatise of Faith; yet he elsewhere [p] scruples not to call it (Symbolum) a Creed: and he is, probably, as Sirmondus observes[q], the first writer who gave it the name it bears at this day. Which, I suppose, may have led Oudin into his mistake, that *no writer before Hincmar ever made mention of this Creed*[r]; a mistake, which, though taken notice of by Tentzelius[s] in the year 1687, he has nevertheless again and again repeated in his last edition.

865. In the same age lived Anscharius, monk also of Corbey, and afterwards Archbishop of Hamburgh and Bremen in Germany. Among his dying instructions to his clergy, he left this for one; that they should be careful to recite the Catholic Faith composed by Athanasius[t]. This is reported by Rembertus, the writer of his Life, and successor to him in the same see; who had been likewise monk of Corbey: so that we have here two considerable testimonies in one.

868. Contemporary with these was Æneas Bishop of Paris, who, in his treatise against the Greeks, quotes the Athanasian Creed under the name of Fides Catholica[u], Catholic Faith, producing the same paragraph of it which Theodulphus had done sixty years before.

[o] Vid. Hincm. Opusc. ad Hincmar. Laudunensem, tom. ii. p. 473.

[p] Athanasius in Symbolo dicens &c. de Prædestin. tom. i. p. 309.

[q] Sirmond. Not. in Theodulph. p. 978.

[r] Oudin, Commentar. vol. i. p. 345, 1322.

[s] Tentzel. Judic. Eruditor. p. 144.

[t] Cum instaret obitus, præcepit ut fratres canerent Fidem Catholicam a beato Athanasio compositam. *Anschar. Vit. apud Petr. Lambec. in Append.* lib. i. *Rerum Hamburg.* p. 237.

[u] Sanctus Athanasius, sedis Alexandrinæ Episcopus, &c.——Item, idem in Fide Catholica, quod Spiritus Sanctus a Patre procedat et Filio, *Pater a nullo est factus*, &c. *Æneas Paris. adv. Græc.* cap. 19.

About the same time, and in the same cause, Ratram, or Bertram, monk of Corbey in France, made the like use of this Creed, calling it, a Treatise of the Faith[x]. 868.

Adalbertus of this time, upon his nomination to a bishopric in the province of Rheims, was obliged to give in a profession of his faith to Archbishop Hincmar. Among other things, he professes his great regard to the Athanasian Creed, (Sermo Athanasii,) as a Creed *received with great veneration by the Catholic Church*, or being of *customary and venerable use* in it[y]. This testimony is considerable in regard to the *reception* of this Creed; and not before taken notice of, so far as I know, by those that have treated of this argument. 871.

This Creed is again mentioned in the same age by Riculphus Bishop of Soissons in France, in his pastoral charge to the clergy of his diocese. He calls it a Treatise (or Discourse) of Catholic Faith[z]. This I take from Father Harduin's Councils, as also the former, with the dates of both. 889.

Ratherius, Bishop of Verona in Italy in the year 928, and afterwards of Liege in Germany in the year 953, and restored to his see of Verona in the year 955, did after this time write instructions to his clergy of Verona; in which he makes mention of all the three Creeds, Apostolical, Nicene, and Athanasian; obliging his clergy to have them all by heart: which shows that they were all of standing use in his time, in his diocese at least[a]. 960.

[x] Beatus Athanasius, Alexandrinus Episcopus, in libello de Fide quem edidit, et omnibus Catholicis proposuit tenendum, inter cætera sic ait; *Pater a nullo est factus, nec creatus, nec genitus*, &c. *Ratr. contra Græcor. oppos.* lib. ii. cap. 3.

[y] In Sermone beati Athanasii, quem Ecclesia Catholica venerando usu frequentare consuevit, qui ita incipit; *Quicunque vult salvus esse, ante omnia opus est ut teneat Catholicam fidem.* Professio Adalberti Episcopi Morinensis futuri. *Harduin. Concil.* tom. v. p. 1445.

[z] Item monemus, ut unusquisque vestrum Psalmos, et Sermonem Fidei Catholicæ, cujus initium, *Quicunque vult salvus esse*, et Canonem Missæ, et cantum, vel compotum, memoriter, et veraciter et correcte tenere studeat. *Riculf. Const.* 5. *Harduin. Concil.* tom. vi. p. 415.

[a] Ipsam Fidem, id est Credulitatem, Dei, trifarie parare memoriter festi-

997. Near the close of this century lived Abbo, or Albo, Abbot of Fleury, or St. Benedict upon the Loire in France. Upon some difference he had with Arnulphus Bishop of Orleans, he wrote an Apology, which he addressed to the two kings of France, Hugh and Robert. In that Apology he has a passage relating to our purpose, running thus. "I thought proper, in the first place, to speak concerning "the Faith: which I have heard variously sung in alter- "nate choirs, both in France and in the Church of "England. For some, I think, say, in the Athanasian "form, *the Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son,* "*neither made, nor created, but proceeding:* who while "they leave out, *nor begotten,* are persuaded that they are "the more conformable to Gregory's Synodical Epistle, "wherein it is written, that the *Holy Ghost is neither un-* "*begotten, nor begotten, but proceeding*[b]." I have taken the liberty of throwing in a word or two to make the sentence run the clearer. What the author intends is, that some scrupulous persons, both in France and England, recited the Athanasian Creed with some alteration, leaving out two words, to make it agree the better, as they imagined, with Gregory's Synodical Instructions. As to their *scruple* herein, and the ground of it, I shall say more of it in a proper place. All I am to observe at present is, that this testimony is full for the custom of alternate singing the Athanasian Creed, at this time, in the French and English Churches. And indeed we shall meet with other

netis: hoc est, secundum Symbolum id est Collationem Apostolorum, sicut in Psalteriis correctis invenitur; et illam quæ *ad Missam* canitur; et illam Sancti Athanasii quæ ita incipit; *Quicunque vult salvus esse——Sermonem,* ut superius dixi, Athanasii Episcopi de Fide Trinitatis, cujus initium est, *Quicunque vult,* memoriter teneat. *Ratherii Synod. Epist. Harduin. Con.* tom. vi. p. 787.

[b] Primitus de Fide dicendum credidi; quam alternantibus choris et in Francia, et apud Anglorum Ecclesiam variari audivi. Alii enim dicunt, ut arbitror, secundum Athanasium, *Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio non factus, non creatus, sed procedens:* qui dum id quod est *non genitus* subtrahunt, Synodicum Domini Gregorii se sequi credunt, ubi ita est scriptum; *Spiritus Sanctus nec ingenitus est, nec genitus, sed procedens. Abbo Floriacens. Apol. ad Francor. Reges.*

as full, and withal earlier evidence of the same custom, when we come to treat of *manuscripts* in the following chapters. To proceed with our ancient testimonies.

In the next century, we meet with Gualdo, a monk of Corbey; who likewise wrote the life of Anscharius, but in *verse*, as Rembertus had before done in *prose*. He also takes some notice of our Creed, ascribing it to Athanasius[c]. 1047.

In the century following, Honorius, a scholastic divine of the Church of Autun, in his book entitled The Pearl of the Soul, (which treats of the Sacred or Liturgic Offices,) reckons up the several Creeds of the Church, making in all *four:* namely, the Apostolical, the Nicene, the Constantinopolitan, and the Athanasian. Of the last, he observes, that *it was daily* repeated at the *prime*[d]. He ascribes it to Athanasius of Alexandria in the time of Theodosius: where he is undoubtedly mistaken in his chronology. For, if he means the first Athanasius of Alexandria, he is too early for either of the Theodosius's; and if he means it of the second, he is as much too late. But a slip in chronology might be pardonable in that age: nor does it at all affect the truth of what he attests of his own times. 1130.

Otho, Bishop of Frisinghen in Bavaria, may here be taken notice of, as being the first we have met with who pretends to name the *place* where Athanasius is supposed to have made this Creed; Triers, or Treves, in Germany[e]. It is no improbable conjecture of M. Antelmi, that the copy of the Creed found at Treves, being very ancient, or the most ancient of any, and from which many others 1146.

[c] Catholicamque Fidem quam composuisse beatus
Fertur Athanasius—— *Gualdon. Vit. Ansch. apud Lambec.* p. 322.

[d] Quarto, Fidem *Quicunque vult*, quotidie ad *primam* iterat, quam Athanasius Alexandrinus Episcopus, rogatu Theodosii Imperatoris, edidit. *Honor. Augustod. Gemm. Animæ*, lib. ii. cap. 5. Bibl. PP. tom. xx. p. 1086.

[e] Ibidem manens in Ecclesia Trevirorum sub Maximino ejusdem Ecclesiæ Episcopo, *Quicunque vult*, &c. a quibusdam dicitur edidisse. *Oth. Frising. Chronic.* lib. iv. cap. 7. p. 44. al. p. 75.

were taken, might first occasion the story of the Creed's being made at Treves, and by Athanasius himself, who by his exile thither might render that place famous for his name to all after ages.

1171. Arnoldus, in his Chronicle, informs us of an abbot of Brunswick, who attending the Duke of Brunswick, at this time, in his journey into the east, had some disputes with the Greeks at Constantinople, upon the article of *procession*, and pleaded the usual passage out of this Creed; whose words are to be seen in the margin[f]. What is most to be noted is the title of Symbolum Fidei, which now began to be common to this form, as to the other Creeds.

1178. Robertus Paululus, Presbyter of Amiens, in the diocese of Rheims, speaking of the Offices recited at the *prime*, observes that the piety of good Christians had thereunto added the "*Quicunque vult*, that the articles neces- "sary to salvation might never be forgotten any hour of "the day[g]."

1190. Beleth, a celebrated Paris divine, is the oldest writer that takes notice of this Creed's being commonly ascribed to Anastasius; though he himself ascribes it to Athanasius[h]. Tentzelius[i] marks some differences between the *prints* and the *manuscripts* of this author, and betwixt one manuscript and another. But as the difference, though in *words* considerable, is yet very little in the *sense*, it is

[f] Unde Athanasius in Symbolo Fidei: Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio non factus, nec creatus, nec genitus, sed procedens. Ecce Spiritum Sanctum a Patre dicit procedere et a Filio. *Henric. Abb. apud Arnold. Chron. Slavor.* lib. iii. cap. 5. p. 248.

[g] His addidit fidelium devotio, *Quicunque vult salvus esse*, ut Articulorum Fidei qui sunt necessarii ad salutem, nulla diei hora obliviscamur. *Rob. Paulul. inter Oper. Hugon. de S. Victor. de Offic. Eccl.* lib. ii. cap. 1. p. 265.

[h] Notandum est quatuor esse Symbola; *minimum* quod a cunctis communiter in quotidiana oratione dicitur, quod Apostoli simul composuerunt. Secundum est quod in *prima* recitatur, *Quicunque vult salvus esse:* quod ab Athanasio Patriarcha Alexandrino contra Arrianos hæreticos compositum est, licet plerique eum Anastasium fuisse falso arbitrentur. *Beleth. de Divin. Offic.* cap. xl. p. 334. ed. Venet.

[i] Tentzel. Judicia Erudit. p. 91.

not material to our present purpose to be more particular about it.

I must not omit Nicolaus Hydruntinus, a native of Otranto in Italy, who sided with the Greeks, and wrote in Greek against the Latins. He understood both languages, and was often interpreter between the Greeks and Latins, in their disputes at Constantinople, Athens, and Thessalonica[k]. He wrote several tracts, out of which Leo Allatius has published some fragments. There is one relating to the Athanasian Creed, which must here be taken notice of; being of use for the certifying us that this Creed was extant in Greek at and before his time. It is this: "They (the Greeks) do not know who made the "addition to the Faith of Athanasius, styled Catholic; since "the words, *and of the Son*, are not in the Greek (*form*,) "nor in the Creed" (of Constantinople[l]). 1200.

From this passage we may learn, that there was a Greek copy of the Athanasian Creed at this time; that it wanted the words, *of the Son;* that it was looked upon as Athanasius's; and that the title was, The Catholic Faith of St. Athanasius; which is its most usual title in the Latin copies. I may just hint to the reader, that though both πίστις in the Greek, and *fides* in the Latin, might justly be rendered *creed* in English, rather than *faith*, whenever it stands for a *formulary* or *confession* of faith, as it does here; yet because I should otherwise want another English word for σύμβολον in the Greek, and *symbolum* in the Latin, I therefore reserve the word *creed*, in this case, for distinction sake, to be the rendering of *symbolum*, or σύμβολον, and nothing else. But to proceed.

Alexander of Hales, in Gloucestershire, may here deserve to be mentioned, as showing what Creeds were then received in England. He reckons up *three* only, not *four*, 1230.

[k] Vid. Fabric. Bibl. Græc. vol. x. p. 393.

[l] "Οτι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀγνοοῦσι, τὶς ὁ προσθήσας ἐν τῇ πίστει τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀθανασίου, τῇ καθολικῇ λεγομένῃ, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἑλληνικῷ οὐχὶ τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ, περιέχεται, οὔτε ἐν τῷ συμβόλῳ. *Leo Allat. de Consens. Eccl. Occident.* &c. lib. iii. cap. 1. n. 5. p. 887.

(as those that make the Nicene and Constantinopolitan to be two;) namely, the Apostles', the Nicene or Constantinopolitan, and the Athanasian[m]: where we may observe, that the Athanasian has the name of a Creed, which yet was not its most usual or common title in those times: only the Schoolmen, for order and method sake, chose to throw it under the head of Creeds.

1233. I am next to take notice of the famed legates of Pope Gregory the IXth, (Haymo, Radolphus, Petrus, and Hugo,) who produced this Creed in their conferences with the Greeks at Constantinople. They asserted it to be Athanasius's, and made by him while an exile in the western parts, and penned in the Latin tongue[n]. They had not assurance enough to pretend that it was a Greek composition: there were too many and too plain reasons to the contrary.

1240. In this age, Walter de Cantilupe, Bishop of Worcester, in his Synodical Constitutions, exhorts his clergy to make themselves competent masters of the Psalm called *Quicunque vult*, and of the greater and smaller Creed, (that is, Nicene and Apostolical,) that they might be able to instruct their people[o]. From whence we may observe, that at this time the Athanasian formulary was distinguished, here amongst us, from the Creeds properly so called; being named a Psalm, and sometimes a Hymn, (as we shall see from other evidences to be produced hereafter,) suitably to the place it held in the Psalters among the other Hymns, Psalms, and Canticles of the Church, being also sung *alternately* in churches, like the other.

[m] Tria sunt Symbola: primum Apostolorum, secundum patrum Nicænorum, quod canitur in Missa, tertium Athanasii. *Alexand. Alens.* par. iii. q. 69. membr. 5.

[n] Ὁ ἅγιος Ἀθανάσιος ὅταν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῖς δυτικοῖς ἐξόριστος ἦν, ἐν τῇ ἐκθέσει τῆς πίστεως, ἣν τοῖς λατινικοῖς ῥήμασι διεσάφησεν, οὕτως ἔφη· Ὁ πατὴρ ἀπ' οὐδενός ἐστι, &c. *Definit. Apocris. Greg. IX. Harduin.* tom. vii. p. 157.

[o] Habeat etiam saltem quilibet eorum simplicem intellectum, secundum quod continetur in Psalmo qui dicitur, *Quicunque vult*, et tam in *majori* quam in *minori Symbolo*, ut in his plebem sibi commissam noverint informare. *Walter Wigorn. Const. apud Spelm. Concil.* vol. ii. p. 246.

We may here also take notice of a just remark made by Thomas Aquinas of this century; that Athanasius, whom he supposes the author of this formulary, did not draw it up in the way of a Creed, but in a *doctrinal form*; which however was admitted by the authority of the Roman see, as containing a complete system of Christian faith[p]. 1250.

Walter de Kirkham, Bishop of Durham, in his Constitutions, about this time, makes much the same order that Walter Cantelupe had before done, styling the Creed a Psalm also as usual[q]. 1255.

Johannes Januensis, sometimes styled Johannes Balbus, makes mention of this Creed in his Dictionary, or Catholicon, under the word *symbolum*. He reckons up three Creeds, and in this order, Apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian. The name he gives to the last is Symbolum Athanasii, thrice repeated[r]. 1286.

In a Synod of Exeter, in this century also, we have mention again made of the Athanasian Creed, under the name of a Psalm, and as such distinguished from the two Creeds[s] properly so called: though the name of Psalm was also sometimes given to the Creeds and to the Lord's 1287.

[p] Athanasius non composuit *manifestationem fidei* per modum Symboli, sed magis per modum cujusdam doctrinæ: sed quia integram fidei veritatem ejus doctrina breviter continebat, auctoritate summi Pontificis est recepta, ut quasi *fidei regula* habeatur. *Thom. Aqu. Secund. Secundæ* qu. i. art. 10. n. 3.

[q] Habeat quoque unusquisque eorum simplicem intellectum fidei, sicut in Symbolo tam majori quam minori; quod est in Psalmo, *Quicunque vult*, et etiam *Credo in Deum*, expressius continentur. *Spelm. Conc.* vol. ii. p. 294.

[r] Tria sunt Symbola; scilicet Apostolorum, quod dicitur in matutinis, in prima, et in completorio: item Nicænum, quod dicitur in diebus Dominicis post Evangelium: item Athanasii, quod dicitur in prima in Dominicis diebus alta voce.——Symbolum autem Athanasii quod contra hæreticos editum est, in *prima* dicitur, quasi jam pulsis hæreticorum tenebris.——Ad id editum est Symbolum Athanasii quod specialiter contra hæreticos se opposuit. *Johan. Januens. in voce* symbolum.

[s] Articulorum Fidei Christianorum saltem simplicem habeant intellectum, prout in Psalmo, *Quicunque vult*, et in *utroque Symbolo* continentur. *Synod. Exon. Spelm. Conc.* vol. ii. p. 370.

Prayer[t] likewise, since those also were sung in the church.

1286. William Durants, or Durandus, the elder, Bishop of Menda in France, recounting the Creeds, makes their number *three;* mentioning the Athanasian in the second place, between the Apostles' and Nicene. He follows the same tradition which Otho Frisingensis did before, that this Creed was made at Triers, or Treves[u]. It is scarce worth noting that some copies here read Anastasius, since the circumstances plainly show that Athanasius is the man intended, and that Anastasius can be nothing else but a corrupt reading.

1330. Ludolphus Saxo, the Carthusian, numbers three Creeds, with very brief, but good hints of their uses respectively: the Apostles', useful for a short compendious *instruction* in the faith; the Nicene, for fuller *explication;* and the Athanasian, for *guard* or *defence*[x] against heresies.

1337. William of Baldensal, or Boldesale, a German knight, ought here to be mentioned; as being the first writer extant that ascribes the Creed to Eusebius (of Verceil in Piedmont) along with Athanasius. The reason, I presume, was, the better to account for the Creed's being originally Latin. Baldensal's treatise, being the History of Piedmont, wherein he makes the remark, is not yet published, I suppose: but Cardinal Bona informs us that

[t] In a MS. of Trinity College, (called *Rythmus Anglicus,*) written about 1180, is a copy of the Apostles' Creed, and another of the Lord's Prayer, with these titles: *The Salm the Me Clepeth Crede: The Salm that is cleped pr̄ nr̄.* This manner of speaking seems to have been borrowed from the Germans: for Otfridus, as is observed by Lambecius, gives the name of *a Psalm* to the Apostles' Creed. *Lambec. Catal.* vol. ii. p. 760.

[u] Nota, quod triplex est Symbolum. Primum est Symbolum Apostolorum, quod vocatur *Symbolum minus*——Secundum Symbolum est, *Quicunque vult salvus esse,* &c. ab Athanasio, Patriarcha Alexandrino, in civitate Treviri compositum——Tertium est Nicænum quod——vocatur *Symbolum majus. Gul. Durant. Rational. Divin. Offic.* lib. iv. cap. 25.

[x] Tria sunt Symbola: primum Apostolorum; secundum, Nicæni Concilii; tertium, Athanasii. Primum, factum est ad fidei *instructionem.* Secundum, ad fidei *explanationem.* Tertium, ad fidei *defensionem. Ludolph. Sax. de Vit. Christi,* cap. lxxxiii. p. 732.

the manuscript was, in his time, in the library of the Duke of Savoy at Turin[y].

Manuel Caleca, a Latinizing Greek, wrote a treatise upon the Principles of the Catholic Faith, published by Combefis, in his new Auctarium to the Bibliotheca Patrum, tome the second, where we find some passages to our present purpose; particularly this, that Caleca ascribes the Creed to Athanasius, and supposes it to have been presented by him to Pope Julius[z]. I know not whether he be not the first writer that mentions that circumstance, nor whether he reports it from others, or from his own invention. 1360.

About the same time Johannes Cyparissiota, surnamed *the Wise*, wrote his Decads, which are published in Latin, in the Bibliotheques, of Turrianus's version. What we are to observe from him is, that he cites this Creed in the name of Athanasius, and as if it were made at the Council of Nice[a]. It seems, after it once passed current that Athanasius was the author, there was great variety of conjectures about the place where, and the time when, he composed or presented this Creed. 1360.

I shall mention but one more, as late as the Council of Florence, or a little later; and that is Johannes (afterwards Josephus) Plusiadenus, a Latinizing Greek, who wrote a Dialogue in defence of the Latins. What is observable in him is, that he makes the Creed to have been presented by Athanasius to Pope Liberius, instead of Julius[b]. 1439.

[y] In hoc autem Symbolo, sive componendo, sive e Græco in Latinum traducendo, adjutorem fuisse Athanasio Eusebium, Vercellensem Episcopum, refert Gulielmus Baldesanus in historia Pedemontana, quæ manuscripta Taurini asservatur in bibliotheca Ducis Sabaudiæ, ex tabulario Vercellensis Ecclesiæ. *Bona de Divin. Psalm.* cap. xvi. sect. 18. p. 864.

[z] Ταύτην γὰρ ἰὰν μή τις πιστῶς πιστεύσῃ, σωθῆναι οὐ δύναται, ὡς ὁ μέγας Ἀθανάσιος ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἰούλιον πάπαν Ῥώμης τῆς πίστεως ὁμολογίᾳ προσέθηκεν. *Manuel Calec. de Fid.* c. 10. Confer eund. contr. Græc. lib. ii. c. 20.

[a] Magnus Athanasius in Expositione Fidei, in *prima synodo*, ait, &c. *Joan. Cypariss. Decad.* ix. c. 3. Bibl. PP. tom. xxi.

[b] Ὁ θεῖος τῷ ὄντι καὶ ἱερὸς Ἀθανάσιος, ἐν τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πίστιως, ἣν

I have now come low enough with the *ancient* testimonies, if I may be allowed so to call those of the later times. A few of the first and earliest might have sufficed, had I no other point in view but the mere *antiquity* of the Creed: but, as my design is to treat of its *reception* also, in various places, and at various times, and to lay together several kind of evidences which will require others, both early and late, to clear up and explain them; it was, in a manner, necessary for me to bring my accounts as low as I have here done. Besides that several inferior, incidental questions will fall in our way, for the resolving of which, most of the testimonies I have here cited will be serviceable in their turn; as will appear more fully in the sequel. I have omitted several testimonies of the later centuries, such as I thought might conveniently be spared, either as containing nothing but what we had before from others more ancient, or as being of no use for the clearing up any that we have, or for the settling any point which will come to be discussed in the following sheets. The rule I have set myself in making the collection, and which I have been most careful to observe, was to take in all those, and none but those, which are either valuable for their *antiquity*, or have something *new* and *particular* upon the subject, or may strike some light into any *doubtful question* thereunto relating.

I shall shut up this chapter, as I did the former, with a table, representing in one view the sum and substance of what has been done in it. The several columns will contain the *year* of our Lord, the *authors* here recited, the *country* where they lived, and the *title* or *titles* by them given to the Creed. The *titles* ought to appear in their *original* language wherein they were written; which my English reader may the more easily excuse, since they have most of them been given in English above, where it was more proper to do it. The use of such a table will

ἐξέθετο πρὸς Λιβέριον Πάπαν, ἧς ἡ ἀρχὴ, ὅστις ἂν βούληται σωθῆναι, τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον φησὶν, ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, &c. *Joan. Plusiad. apud Combefis. not. in Calec.* p. 297.

be seen as often as a reader has a mind to look back to this chapter, or to compare several evidences of different kinds, proving the same thing, one with another.

A.D.	*Authors*	*Country*	*Title of the Creed.*
670	Council of Autun	France	Fides Sancti Athanasii Præsulis.
760	Articles Inqu. Regino	Germany	Sermo Athanasii Episcopi de Fide.
794	Counc. Frankfort	Germany	Fides Catholica Sanctæ Trinitatis.
809	Theodulphus	France	
809	Anonymous	France	Expositio Catholicæ Fidei Athanasii.
809	Monks of M. Olivet	Judea	Fides Sancti Athanasii.
820	Hatto, or Hetto	France	Fides Sancti Athanasii.
820	Agobardus	France	
852	Hincmar	France	Sermo Athanasii de Fide.
			Athanasii Symbolum.
865	Anscharius	Germany	Athanasii Fides Catholica.
868	Bertram	France	Libellus Athanasii de Fide.
868	Æneas Paris.	France	Athanasii Fides Catholica.
871	Adalbertus	France	Sermo Beati Athanasii.
889	Riculphus	France	Sermo Fidei Catholicæ.
960	Ratherius	Italy	Sermo Athanasii Ep. de Fide Trinitatis.
997	Abbo, or Albo	France	Fides secundum Athanasium.
1047	Gualdo	France	Fides Catholica Athanasio adscripta.
1130	Honorius	France	Fides *Quicunque vult.*
1146	Otho	Bavaria	Quicunque vult &c.
1171	Duke of Brunswick	Germany	Athanasii Symbolum Fidei.
1178	Robertus Paululus	France	Quicunque vult &c.
1190	Beleth	France	Athanasii Symbolum.
1200	Nic. Hydruntinus	Italy	Τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀθανασίου πίστις ἡ Καθολική.
1230	Alexander Alens.	England	Athanasii Symbolum.
1233	P. Gregory's Legates		Ἔκθεσις τῆς πίστεως.
1240	Walter Cantelupe	England	Psalmus *Quicunque* &c.
1250	Thom. Aquinas	Italy	Athanasii Manifestatio Fidei.
1255	Walter Kirkham	England	Psalmus *Quicunque* &c.
1286	John Januensis	Italy	Symbolum Athanasii.
1286	Durandus	France	Athanasii Symbolum.
1287	Exon. Synod.	England	Psalmus *Quicunque.*
1330	Ludolphus	Saxony	Athanasii Symbolum.
1337	Baldensal	Germany	Athanasii Symbolum.
1360	Man. Caleca	Greece	Ἡ τῆς πίστεως ὁμολογία τοῦ Ἀθανασίου.
1360	Joan. Cyparissiota	Greece	Athanasii Expositio Fidei.
1439	Joan. Plusiadenus	Greece	Ἡ τῆς πίστεως ὁμολογία τοῦ Ἀθανασίου.

CHAP. III.

Ancient Commentators and Paraphrasts upon the Athanasian Creed.

ANCIENT *comments*, or *paraphrases*, may be properly mentioned after ancient *testimonies*, being near akin to them, and almost the same thing with them. I call none *ancient* but such as were made before the year 1500; and therefore shall carry my accounts no lower, nor quite so low as that time.

A. D. 570. The first *comment* to be met with on this Creed is one of the *sixth* century, composed by Venantius Fortunatus, an Italian by birth, but one that travelled into France and Germany, became acquainted with the most eminent scholars and prelates all over the west, and was at length made Bishop of Poictiers in France. His comment on this Creed has been published from a manuscript about 600 years old[x], out of the Ambrosian library at Milan, by Muratorius, in his second tome of Anecdota, in the year 1698. There can be no reasonable doubt but that the comment really belongs to the man whose name it bears. 1. Because in the same book there is also a comment upon the Apostles' Creed[y] ascribed to Fortu-

[x] Est porro nobis in Ambrosiana bibliotheca membranaceus codex annos abhinc ferme sexcentos manu descriptus; ut ex characterum forma, aliisque conjecturis affirmari posse mihi videtur. Heic, præter alia opuscula multa, tres Symboli expositiones habentur, quarum *unam* tantum nunc publici juris facio.

Prima ita inscribitur, Expositio Fidei Catholicæ. Alteri nullus titulus præfixus est. *Postrema* vero hunc præ se fert; *Expositio Fidei Catholicæ Fortunati.*——Fortunatus autem, heic memoratus, alius a Venantio Fortunato non est, quem Insulæ Pictaviensis Ecclesiæ, quem Christianæ poetices ornamenta æternitate donarunt. *Murator. Anecdot.* tom. ii. p. 228.

[y] Expositionem quoque continet (cod. Ambrosianus) Apostolici Symboli, cum hac inscriptione: *Incipit expositio a Fortunato Presbytero conscripta.* Eadem vero est ac edita inter Fortunati opera. Tum sequuntur geminæ ejusdem Symboli explicationes. Tres Orationis Dominicæ, et duæ Athanasiani Symboli expositiones incertis auctoribus scriptæ. Tandem, uti dixi-

natus, and which is known to belong to Venantius Fortunatus, and has been before printed among his other works. 2. Because it appears highly probable from what Venantius Fortunatus has occasionally dropped in his other undoubted works [z], that he was really acquainted with the Athanasian Creed, and borrowed expressions from it. 3. Because in the expositions of the Apostles' and Athanasian Creeds, there is great similitude of style, thoughts, and expressions; which shows that both are of the same hand, and indeed, the other circumstances considered, abundantly proves it. It would burden my margin too much, otherwise it were easy to give at least half a dozen plain specimens, where either the expressions or turn of thought, or both, are exactly parallel. Such as think it of moment to examine, may easily be satisfied by comparing the comment on the Apostles' Creed, in the tenth tome of the last Bibliotheque, with the comment on the Athanasian, in Muratorius. 4. I may add, that the tenor of the whole comment, and the simplicity of the style and thoughts, are very suitable to that age, and more so than to the centuries following. These reasons convince me that this comment belongs to Venantius Fortunatus, composed by him after his going into France, and before he was Bishop of Poictiers: and so we may probably fix the date of it about the year 570, or

mus, Expositio Fidei Catholicæ Fortunati legitur. Quocirco quin ad Venantium quoque Fortunatum opusculum hoc sit referendum, nullus dubito. *Murator.* ibid. p. 331.

[z] Præclarum in primordio ponitur cælestis testimonii fundamentum, quia *salvus esse non poterit*, qui recte de salute non crediderit. *Fortunat. Expos. Symb. Apost.* Bibl. PP. tom. x.

Non Deus in carnem versus, Deus accipit artus:
Non se permutans, sed sibi membra levans.
Unus in ambabus naturis, verus in ipsis
Æqualis matri hinc, *par Deitate Patri.*
Non sua *confundens*, sibi nostra sed omnia nectens.
. . . . . .
De *Patre* natus habens *divina*, *humanaque matris*,
De Patre sublimis, de genetrice humilis.
Venant. Fortun. lib. viii. carm. 5. Bibl. P. tom. x.

perhaps higher. There is an older manuscript copy of this comment (as I find by comparing) in the Museum at Oxford, among Junius's manuscripts, number 25[a]. I am obliged to the very worthy and learned Dr. Haywood, for sending me a transcript of it, with a specimen of the *character*. It is reasonably judged to be about 800 years old. It wants, in the beginning, about ten or a dozen lines: in the other parts it agrees with Muratorius's copy, saving only some slight insertions, and such *various lections* as are to be expected in different manuscripts not copied one from the other. From the *two copies* compared may be drawn out a much more correct *comment* than that which Muratorius has given us from *one*; as will be shown at the end of this work.

I intimated above, that Muratorius supposes this Venantius Fortunatus to be the author, not of the *comment* only, but Creed also. But his reasons, which plead strongly for the former, are of no force at all in respect of the latter: which he is so sensible of himself, that while he speaks with great assurance of the one, he is very diffident of the other[b]. And indeed, not to mention several other considerations standing in the way of his conjecture, who can imagine Venantius Fortunatus to have been so *vain*, as, after commenting on the Lord's Prayer and Apostles' Creed, to fall to commenting upon a composition of his *own*?

This comment of Fortunatus is a great confirmation of what hath been above cited from the Council of Autun: for if the Creed was noted enough to deserve a *comment* upon it so early as the year 570, no wonder if we find it strongly recommended by that Council in the year 670, a hundred years after. And it is observable that, as that Council recommends the Apostolical and Athanasian

[a] The title, Expositio in Fide Catholica.

[b] Hujus *Symboli* auctor esse potuit Venantius Fortunatus: saltem fuit hujus *Expositionis* auctor. *Murator.* p. 217.

Non ita meis conjecturis plaudo, ut facilius non arbitrer *Expositionem* potius quam *Symbolum* huic auctori tribuendum. *Murator.* p. 231.

Creeds, without saying a word of the Nicene; so Fortunatus, before them, comments upon those two only, taking no notice of the third.

I cannot take leave of this comment, without observing to the reader, that in Pareus's notes on this Creed, I have met with a passage which I am not well able to account for. He cites a *comment* upon this Creed, under the name of Euphronius Presbyter[c], does not say whether from a *print* or a *manuscript:* but the words he produces are in this very comment of Fortunatus. Who this Euphronius is, I can no where find; nor whether an *ancient* or *modern* writer. There was an Euphronius Presbyter, (mentioned by Gregory of Tours,) who lived in the fifth century, and was at length Bishop of Autun: but I never heard of any writings of his, more than an epistle ascribed to him and Lupus of Troyes. There was another Euphronius, who was Bishop of Tours, with whom Fortunatus had some intimacy. Whether his name, appearing in any manuscript copy of Fortunatus's tracts, might occasion the mistake, I know not. Bruno's comment has the very same passage which Pareus cites, only in a different order of the words: but neither will this help us to account for its being quoted under the name of Euphronius Presbyter, which has no similitude with the name of Bruno, Bishop of Wurtzburgh. I would not however omit the mentioning this note of Pareus, because a hint may sometimes lead to useful discoveries; and others may be able to resolve the doubt, though I am not.

Our next *Commentator*, or rather *Paraphrast*, is Hinc- 852.
mar of Rheims: not upon the whole Creed, but upon such parts only as he had occasion to cite. For his way is to throw in several words of his own, as explanatory

[c] Euphronius Presbyter in expositione hujus Symboli Athanasii, Fides, inquit, Catholica, seu universalis, dicitur: Hoc est, recta, quam Ecclesia universa tenere debet. *David. Parei not. ad Symb. Athan.* p. 118. edit. an. 1635. The words are not in the edition of 1627.

notes, so far as he quotes the Creed[d]: and he sometimes does it more than he ought to have done, to serve a cause against Gothescalcus: which I may hint, in passing; to say more of it would be foreign to our present purpose.

1033. S. Bruno, Bishop of Wurtzburgh in Germany, has a formal comment, and much larger than Fortunatus's, upon the Athanasian Creed. It is at the end of his Psalter, and has been several times printed with it. Father Le Long reckons up six editions[e], in this order: 1. At Nuremberg, in folio, A. D. 1494. 2. By Antonius Koburger, in quarto, A. D. 1497. 3. By Cochleus, at Wurtzburgh, in quarto, A. D. 1531. 4. At Leipsic, in quarto, 1533. 5. In the Cologne Bibliotheque, A. D. 1618. tom. xi. 6. In the Lyons Bibl. PP. A. D. 1677. tom. xviii. The *old* editions are scarce, and not easy to be met with. I have seen two of them in our public library at Cambridge, those of 1494 and 1533. There is an elegant one of the former (as I conceive by the description sent me by a learned gentleman) in the Bodleian at Oxford: it is in vellum, in a black and red letter, reserved among the manuscripts, and marked Laud. E. 81. The title, at the beginning, Fides Anastasii; at the end, Fides Athanasii. The two editions of 1497 and 1531 I never saw. I have seen one by Antonius Koberger, in quarto, bearing date A. D. 1494[f], in the Bodleian, marked F. 40. Bishop Usher makes mention of an edition in 1531[g], and seems to have known of none older. I should have suspected 1531 to be a false print for 1533, had not Le Long confirmed it, that there is such an edition as 1531, and named the

[d] Vid. Hincmari Oper. tom. i. p. 452, 464, 469, 552, 553.

[e] Commentarii in totum Psalterium et in Cantica Vet. et Nov. Testamenti, in fol. Norembergæ, 1494. In 4to. per Antonium Koburger 1497. Idem a Joan. Cochleo restitutum in 4to. Herbipoli 1531. Lipsiæ 1533. Bibl. PP. Coloniensis et Lugdunensis. *Le Long*, *Bibl. Bibl.* tom. ii. p. 654.

[f] Per Antonium Koberger impressum anno incarnationis Deitatis millesimo quadringentesimo, nonagesimo quarto, finit feliciter.

[g] Psalterii editio vulgata Latina, obelis et asteriscis distincta, cum Brunonis Herbipolensis Episcopi commentariis, anno 1531. a Johanne Cochlæo in lucem est emissa. *Usser. de editione LXX Interpr.* p. 104.

place where it was printed: though I cannot but observe that he makes a *folio* of it in his first tome[h], and a *quarto* in the second; which is to me an argument that he had never seen it, but perhaps took the hint from Usher. But leaving the *printed* editions of this *comment* of Bruno's, let us next say something of the *manuscripts* of it, and their differences from the *prints*, or from each other. There are many manuscript copies, which I shall mention in order.

1. The first and most valuable manuscript is in the library of Wurtzburgh, as old as the author, left by him as a legacy to that church. The first printed edition (if I mistake not) was taken from that very *original* manuscript[i]; which at the lowest computation must be 680 years old. The title of the Creed, Fides Catholica S. Athanasii Episcopi.

2. There is a *second*, which I have seen in Trinity College in Cambridge, annexed to a Psalter described at large by the learned Mr. Wanley, in his Catalogue[k], and judged by him to have been written about the time of King Stephen. So that this is about a hundred years later than the former, or about 580 years old; no *title* to the Creed.

3. There is a *third*, of much the same age with the former, or some years older, in the Bodleian at Oxford, marked Laud. H. 61. the title of the Creed, Fides Catholica Sancti Athanasii Episcopi.

[h] Psalterium vetus obelis et asteriscis distinctum, cum commentariis S. Brunonis, studio Joannis Cochlæi editum, in fol. Herbipoli, 1531. in 4to. Lipsiæ 1533. *Le Long*, tom. i. p. 274.

[i] Posteris filiis suis (S. Bruno) memorabilem et sanctum Psalmorum librum, *ex quo ille impressus est*, sumptuose scriptum, quasi hæreditatis spiritualis non minimam portionem reliquit. Prolog. ad editionem anni 1494.

Preciosum istum thesaurum posteritati post se reliquit, et quidem insigni scriptura sumptuose descriptum——extat donum illud memorabile et conspicuum in locuplete antiquorum voluminum bibliotheca Herbipolensis Ecclesiæ: quod sane religiosa pietate, velut hæreditas quædam hujus Sancti Patris custoditur. *Joan. Coch.* prolog. ad edit. an. 1533.

[k] Wanleii Catalog. MSS. Septentr. p. 168.

4. In the Bodleian also is another, (Laud. E. 71. Catal. N. 994.) Athanasii Symbolum cum Glossa. This, as I am certified by a learned gentleman, is Bruno's comment. The title of the Creed, Fides Sancti Athanasii Episcopi.

5. In Merton College is another, an ancient copy of Bruno's comment. Catal. N. 675—208.

6. In St. John Baptist's College, Oxon. (Catal. N. 1874. G. 42.) Commentarius in Symbolum Athanasii. By the beginning and concluding words, (a transcript of which has been sent me by a worthy member of that society,) I am well assured that it is Bruno's comment.

7. There is another in Balliol College, (Catal. N. 210. marked B. I.) Athanasii Symbolum cum Commentario.

8. Another I have seen in the Cathedral library at York, which may be 500 years old. No title.

9. There is another, in the library of St. German de Prez, about 500 years old. Montfaucon, having met with it, published it[1] as an *anecdoton;* not knowing that it was Bruno's comment. It is not indeed quite so *full*, nor any thing near so *correct* as the printed copies: but still it is plainly Bruno's comment. The title, Tractatus de Fide Catholica.

10. There is also, in my Lord Oxford's library, a modern manuscript of this comment, written at Augsburg, in the year 1547, copied from Bruno's original manuscript, (by order of Charles Peutenger, son to the famous Conrad,) where the title is, Fides Catholica Sancti Anastasii Episcopi. The mistake of Anastasii for Athanasii, we find, had crept into the German copies some centuries before: wherefore this is not to be wondered at. All the older copies, as well as the *original* manuscript, have Athanasii in the *title*, where there is a *title*, and Athanasius in the beginning of the comment.

The manuscripts which I have here recited, all but the first, seem now to be of no great use; if it be true, as I suppose, that the first prints were taken from the very

[1] Montfaucon, Athanas. Oper. tom. ii. p. 735.

original at Wurtzburgh. It is certain that they are very imperfect and incorrect, (I have collated three of them,) in comparison of the *printed* copies: I could not observe above two or three places, and those not very material, where the printed copies seem to have followed a false reading, or may be corrected by those manuscripts. One thing I a little wondered at, that the three manuscripts of St. Germans, Trinity College, and York, should all leave out some paragraphs, which appear in the *printed* copies, and the same paragraphs: but I have since found, that those very paragraphs were taken out of Fortunatus's comment, and belong not properly to Bruno's. This, I presume, the first copiers understood, and therefore omitted them. Probably Bruno's own copy might at first want them, (though they must have been added soon after,) or if Bruno himself inserted them, yet he had left some mark of distinction, which was understood at that time; though not by the editors of this comment so many years after. But to proceed.

In the next age, the famous Peter Abelard wrote com- 1120.
ments upon this Creed: which are printed amongst his other works. The title in the prints is, Petri Abaëlardi Expositio Fidei, in Symbolum Athanasii. I suspect that the editor has added the latter part, in Symbolum Athanasii, as a hint to the reader. The *comment* is a very short one, scarce three pages in quarto, and, for the age it was wrote in, a pretty good one; though, as I conceive from some flaws in it, printed from a copy not very *correct*.

Of the same century is Hildegarde, the celebrated Ab- 1170.
bess of St. Rupert's Mount, near Binghen on the Rhine. She wrote explications of St. Benedict's Rule, and of the Athanasian Creed: which may be seen, Bibl. PP. tom. xxiii. p. 596.

Simon Tornacensis, Priest of Tournay, in the begin- 1210.
ning of the thirteenth century, taught divinity at Paris, with great reputation. His manuscript works are in many libraries: and, among his other writings, there is an

Exposition of the Athanasian Creed[m]. Oudin reckons up four manuscript copies of it, in as many distinct libraries, and acquaints us where they are to be found, and of what age they probably are.

1215. Contemporary with the former is Alexander Neckham, an Englishman, Abbot of Cirencester, or Circeter, in Gloucestershire. He wrote a comment on the Athanasian Creed, which is extant in manuscript, in the Bodleian at Oxford, (marked E. 7. 8. Catal. N. 2339.) coeval probably with the author.

There is another copy of the same comment, in the Bodleian also. E. 6. 11. n. 2330. The title, Expositio Fidei Catholicæ a Magistro Alexandro edicta. This copy is about fifty years later than the former. It may be of use to note down the first words of the comment[n]. It is drawn up in the scholastic way, and is pretty large, making ten folio leaves with double columns, in E. 7, 8. and four folio leaves with three columns, and a very small hand, in E. 6. 11.

1230. Not long after, Alexander Hales, before mentioned, wrote comments upon the same Creed, which are published in his Summa, part the third, under Quæst. 69. His method of commenting is, to raise doubts and scruples all the way he goes, and to answer them in the scholastic form: referring sometimes to the Fathers of the Church, and particularly to St. Austin: to whom he ascribes Gennadius's treatise De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, according to the common error of that time. But I proceed.

1340. There is another commentary upon this Creed, written, as is said, by Richardus Hampolus, Richard Rolle of Hampole, a native of Yorkshire, and a monk of the order

[m] Expositio Symboli, per Simonem Tornacensis Ecclesiæ Canonicum, et Parisiensem Doctorem, quæ sic incipit: Apud Aristotelem argumentum est ratio faciens fidem, sed apud Christum argumentum est fides faciens rationem. *Oudin.* tom. iii. p. 30.

[n] Hæc est enim victoria quæ vincit mundum, fides nostra. Signanter dicit *vult*, et non dicit, *Quicunque salvus erit.*

of St. Austin. It contains, in a manner, Bruno's comment entire, with several additions and insertions either of the author's own, or such as he had borrowed elsewhere. It has been twice printed, first at Cologne in the year 1536, and afterwards in the Bibliotheca Patrum, Lugdun. tom. xxvi. p. 624.

I am in doubt concerning the author of that comment, having reason to believe that the three copies mentioned by Tentzelius [o], preserved in the Gotha, Basil, and Leipsic libraries, are so many copies of this very comment which passes under the name of Hampole: and yet one of them is judged to be above 500 years older [p] than 1686, which is 150 years before Hampole's days. It is possible that Joachim Fellerus, the compiler of the catalogue of the Leipsic library, might mistake in judging of the age of the manuscript: but it appears much more probable that the editors of that comment were mistaken in ascribing it to Hampole. However that be, I would here observe, that there is in Magdalen College, in Oxford, a comment entitled, Expositio in Symbolum Athanasianum per Januensem, (N. Catal. 2256—115.) which is no other than this very comment that passes in the prints under the name of Richard Hampole. The Catalogue's ascribing it to Januensis was owing, I suppose, to an occasional passage in that manuscript, relating to the Athanasian Creed, cited from Johannes Januensis's Catholicon, or Dictionary, under the word *symbolum*. The

[o] Tentzel. Jud. Eruditor. Præfat. et p. 224.

[p] Tentzelius writes thus:

Opportune ad manus meas pervenit Responsio Ampl. Felleri, qua rationem codicis Latini Lipsiensis in præfatione a me citati prolixius exposuit. Ait enim, membranaceum istum codicem ante CCCCC annos et ultra, eleganter scriptum videri; additas etiam esse non interlineares tantum notas, sed et marginales utrinque; in *dextro* videlicet et *sinistro* paginarum latere: *Rubricam* autem *Symboli* nostri ita se habere; *Fides Anastasii Papæ*. In *dextro* primæ paginæ hæc legi verba: *Hæc ratio Fidei Catholicæ traditur in veteribus codicibus*, et reliqua, quæ antea ex MS. bibliothecæ ducalis attuli. Unde patet, easdem plane glossas in utroque codice reperiri; præsertim quum in *sinistro* alterius margine, hæc etiam verba legi referat Fellerus: *Hic beatus Anastasius liberum arbitrium posuit*, &c. *Tentzel.* p. 225.

comment however, I say, is the same with that which passes for Hampole's, as may plainly appear from the beginning of it, which I have transcribed into the margin[q]; only filling up an *omission* in it, occasioned, as is very common, by the repetition of the same word. There may be a good use made of that manuscript in Magdalen College, for correcting the printed copy, which is very faulty, both in *words* and *order*. The comment ought to begin as it begins in that manuscript; and not with the words, *Hic beatus Athanasius*, as in the prints. The editors did not understand, or did not consider, the nature and composition of that comment. The author, whoever he was, had made two columns, one on each hand, with the Athanasian Creed in the middle. On the *left hand*, which is the first place, he set Bruno's comment, and on the *right hand*, in the other column, he carried down another comment, either of his own, or borrowed. The first note on the *right hand* was plainly designed for an introduction to the rest, and therefore ought to be set first; though the editor's considering only the position of the notes, began from the *left hand*, with the first words of Bruno's comment. The Oxford copy observes the true natural order, and may very probably be of good use all the way through, for the better digesting and methodizing that comment, or comments, being in reality two comments mixed and blended together.

I should observe of the Oxford copy, that after the comment there is, in the same hand, this note: *Hæc conscripta sunt a quodam antiquo libro*. Possibly this may be of some use for the determining whether that comment be really Hampole's or no. For if the manuscript

[q] Hæc ratio Fidei Catholicæ traditur etiam in veteribus codicibus a beato Athanasio Alexandrino conscripta. Et puto, quod idcirco tam plano et brevi sermone tradita sit, ut omnibus Catholicis, et minus eruditis, tutamen defensionis præstaret adversus illam tempestatem [quam contrarius ventus, hoc est, Diabolus, excitavit per Arrium; quam tempestatem] qui fugere desiderat, hanc fidei unitatem (al. *veritatem*) integram et inviolabilem teneat. Ita enim incipit ipsum opusculum, dicens, *Quicunque vult salvus*, &c. Hic beatus Athanasius liberum arbitrium posuit, &c.

be not much later than 1415, (it must be so late, since it fixes that very date to Dr. Ullerston's Exposition of the Six Psalms,) it may be probably argued that any thing of Hampole's, who flourished but about eighty years before, would not have been called *antiquus liber*, an ancient book. But this I leave to farther inquiries, not insisting upon it, since the argument is but probable at the best; and I do not know but the manuscript may be several years later than 1415, though hardly later than the middle of that century. Ullerston is undoubtedly the latest author in that collection. Petrus Florissiensis, or Floreffiensis, (otherwise called Petrus de Harentals,) wrote in 1374[r]: Januensis, Gorrham, Lyra, and Hampole are all older than he: the last therefore is Ullerston, who was probably still living when that manuscript was written. But enough of this.

To the Latin comments here mentioned I may add an 1380.
English one, which I may suppose to be Wickliff's. If it be not his, yet certainly it is of his time, and not far from the middle of the fourteenth century. I will first give some account of this English comment, and then show both why I ascribe it to Wickliff, and why I do it not with full assurance, but with some degree of diffidence. I first met with it in a munuscript volume (in 12mo.) belonging to the library of St. John's College in Cambridge. The volume contains an English version of the Psalms and Hymns of the Church, with the Athanasian Creed produced paragraph by paragraph in Latin, interspersed with an English version of each paragraph, and commented upon quite through, part by part. After the comment, follow Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus, all in old English, without gloss or comment. Now the reasons why I incline to ascribe the comment to Wickliff are these.

1. Dr. Langbaine, of Queen's College in Oxford, in a letter to Bishop Usher, bearing date A. D. 1647, testifies

[r] See Oudin, tom. iii. p. 1218.

that he had seen such a comment, and that he found it to be Wickliff's, by comparing the beginning of it with Bale[s]. This, very probably, is the same comment; though there is no such manuscript now in Magdalen College, Oxon, as was in Dr. Langbaine's time.

2. All those parts of Scripture which go before and after this comment, in the same volume, are of the *same version* with that of Wickliff's Bible in the library of Emanuel College, without any difference, (except that St. John's copy, being older, retains the more ancient spelling,) as I am well assured by comparing them together: so that if those parts be Wickliff's, it may appear very probable that the *comment* is his too. Indeed, our very learned Wharton was of opinion, that the version commonly ascribed to Wickliff[t] was really John Trevisa's; who flourished in the time of Richard the Second, was a Cornish man by birth, and Vicar of Berkely in Gloucestershire, about the year 1387[u]: in which year he finished his translation of the Polychronicon. But Mr. Wharton's reasonings in this matter have appeared to others not satisfactory[x], and have in part been confuted[y]. I shall not enter far into that dispute, being almost foreign to my purpose: and it is not very material whether Wickliff or Trevisa (if either) be judged the author of the comment. This only I may observe, by the way, that Mr. Wharton's argument drawn from the Norfolk manuscript of the Gospels, (Cod. 254.) which he is posi-

[s] While I was there, (in Magdalen College Library,) tumbling amongst their books, I light upon an old English comment upon the Psalms, the Hymns of the Church, and Athanasius's Creed; which I presently conjectured (though there be no name to it) to be Wickliff's. And comparing the beginning with Bale, found that I had not erred in the conjecture. *Langbaine, among Usher's Letters*, p. 513.

[t] Wharton Auctarium Histor. Dogmat. p. 425, 426.

[u] In that year he finished his version of Higden's Polychronicon, as the manuscripts testify; and as is plain from its being finished in the thirty-fifth year of Thomas Lord Berkley, the fourth of that name, which agrees exactly with that year, and with no other.

[x] Oudin. Comment. de Scriptor. Eccles. vol. iii. p. 1044.

[y] Vid. Le Long, Bibl. Bibl. vol. i. p. 426.

tive belongs to Wickliff, appears to be of some weight, so far as concerns the New Testament; and the inference may reach to several parts of the Old Testament also. Either Mr. Wharton must have been mistaken in ascribing the Norfolk copy to Wickliff, or else, for any thing I see, his argument will stand good. The *characteristic* which he lays down whereby to distinguish Wickliff's version (namely, the frequent insertion of *synonymous* words) will by no means agree with the common version: and then the *specimen* he gives of the two different renderings of Luke ii. 7. is directly contrary [z]. But a fuller discussion of that point may be left with those who have more leisure, and have more particularly studied it. I am content to suppose that the common version ascribed to Wickliff is really his: perhaps he might give two editions of it [a]; or else Trevisa's may be little more than Wickliff's version, corrected and polished with great liberty, both as to sense and expression, where it appeared needful. That Trevisa really did translate the whole Bible into English is positively asserted by Caxton, in his preface to Trevisa's translation of Higden's Polychronicon [b]; and by Bale [c], who gives us the first words of the preface to it. To proceed.

[z] Wicklefus sic reddit: "And puttide him in a cratche; for place was "not to him in the comyn stable."

Alter interpres sic: "And leide him in a cratche; for there was no place "to him in no chaumbre." *Wharton*, p. 426.

I have a manuscript of the New Testament, belonging to our college library, which reads Luke ii. 7. according to the first reading, and which has many instances of *synonymous* insertions every where: it is a different version from that which is commonly ascribed to Wickliff.

[a] Patet, aut antiquiorem fuisse quandam S. Scripturæ translationem Anglicam, aut duplicem fuisse translationis Wiclevianæ editionem. *Wharton. Auctor. Hist. Dogm.* p. 436.

[b] Ranulph monke of Chestre first auctour of this book, and afterward Englished by one Trevisa Vicarye of Barkley; which atte request of one Sr. Thomas Lord Barkley translated this sayd book, the Byble, and Bartylmew de Proprietatibus Rerum out of Latyn into Englysh. *Caxton. Prohemye to his edit.* 1482.

[c] In Anglicum idioma, ad petitionem prædicti sui Domini de Barkeley, transtulit totum bibliorum opus: utrumque Dei Testamentum lib. ii. (His

3. A third reason I have for the ascribing the comment to Wickliff is, that some parts of it seem to suit exactly with his humour, and manner, and way of thinking; particularly the gird upon popes and cardinals in the close [d].

Nevertheless, I am far from being positive in this matter: much may be offered to take off the force of these reasons, or to counterbalance them. 1. This very comment is annexed to a manuscript *commentary* upon the Psalms and Hymns of the Church, now in Trinity College library in Cambridge: which commentary appears not to be Wickliff's, though supposed to be his by Mr. Wharton [e]. The English version of the Psalms going along with that commentary is not the same with that of Wickliff's Bible: I have compared them. The *commentary*, and *version* too, are reasonably judged to be Hampole's. I find by a note left in a blank page at the beginning, (signed J. Russel,) that there is a copy of this *commentary* in the Royal library, (B. 15. 12.) but imperfect; the *prologue* the very same, and expressly ascribed to Richard of Hampole: from whence it may be justly suspected, that the comment upon the Athanasian Creed at the end, appearing in part, (for two leaves are cut out,) is Hampole's, as well as the rest. There is in Bennet li-

preface beginning) "Ego Johannes Trevisa Sacerdos." *Bal.* cent. vii. c. 18. p. 518.

N. B. Bale seems to be mistaken in saying that Trevisa continued the Polychr. to 1397. For Trevisa ended with 1357. And Caxton declares that himself continued the history for 103 years farther, to 1460.

[d] And algif this Crede accorde unto Prestis, netheles the higher Prelatis, as Popis and Cardynals, and Bisshops shulden more specially kunne this Crede, and teche it to men undir hem. *Comm. on the Athan. Creed.*

Compare some words of Wickliff's Bileve.

I suppose, over this, that the Pope be most oblishid to the keping of the Gospel among all men that liven here; for the Pope is highest Vicar that Christ has here in erth. *Collier, Eccl. Hist.* vol. i. p. 728.

[e] Commentarius in Psalmos, aliosque Sacræ Scripturæ ac Liturgiæ Ecclesiasticæ Hymnos. MS. in Collegio S. Trinitatis Cantab. F. Commentarius in priores 89 Psalmos habetur MS. in Bibliotheca Lambethana. *Wharton. sub Wicklef. Append. ad Cav. H. L.* p. 54.

brary, in Cambridge, another manuscript copy of the same commentary, (marked 1—1. Catal. p. 69.) with the *comment* upon the Creed entire. The *prologue* I found to be the same as in the other, as also the comment on the *first* Psalm; by which I judge of the rest[f]. The comment on the Canticles at the end is likewise the same; only the Canticles are not all placed in the same *order*. At the bottom of the second leaf of the commentary, there is left this note, by an unknown hand: *Author hujus libri, Richardus, Heremita de Hampole.* Now, if this commentary really be Hampole's, of which I can scarce make any question, it will appear highly probable that the *comment* on the Creed is his too. 2. What favours the suspicion is, that here the *comment* is annexed to other *comments* in like form with itself, and not to mere *versions*, as in the manuscript of St. John's library. Nay, further, this comment on the Creed, as it appears in St. John's copy, has the several parts of the Creed in Latin, and in *red* letter, prefixed to the respective version and comment; just as we find, in Hampole, the several parts of each Psalm exhibited first in Latin, and in *red* letter: which circumstance is of some weight. 3. Add to this, that there are some expressions in the comment on the Creed very like to those which are familiar with the author of that *commentary* on the Psalms: such as these; "It is seid comunly, that ther ben &c. clerkis sein" thus and thus; so that from similitude of style an argument may be drawn in favour of Hampole, as well as for Wickliff. These considerations suffer me not to be positive on the other side. The comment may be Hampole's; or it may be Wickliff's; which latter opinion I the rather incline to for the reasons before given, appearing to me something more forcible than the other. And I may farther observe, that there is in Sidney College in Cambridge, a very old copy of Hampole's commentary,

[f] Q. Whether there be not one or two more copies of the same in the Bodleian. See the Bodleian Manuscripts, in the General Catalogue, N. 2438. 3085.

which runs through the Psalms, and all the ordinary Hymns and Canticles, but has no comment upon the Athanasian Creed annexed, though the manuscript appears very whole and entire. This makes me less inclinable to suspect the comment upon the Creed being Hampole's; it is more probably Wickliff's, as I before said. However it be, the comment may be useful: and if it should prove Hampole's, it must be set forty years higher than I have here placed it. The distance of thirty or forty years makes no great alteration in any language: so that merely from the *language*, especially in so small a tract, we can draw no consequence to the *author*; excepting such peculiarities as may have been rather proper to this or that *man*, than to this or that *time*.

1478. To the comments before mentioned I may add one more, a Latin one, printed, as I suppose, about the year 1478, though it carries not its date with it. The author is Peter d'Osma, called in Latin Petrus de Osomaꝫ, or Petrus Oxomensis, or Uxomensis. The comment makes about seventy pages in quarto, and is drawn up in the scholastic way, with good judgment and accuracy, considering the age it was written in. The book was lent me by Mr. Pownall of Lincoln, a gentleman of known abilities, and particularly curious in searching out and preserving any rare and uncommon pieces, printed or manuscript. I do not find that this *comment* has been at all taken notice of in any of our Bibliotheques, or in any of the catalogues of the books printed before 1500. Even those that give account of the author, yet seem to have known nothing of the printing of this piece. Probably there were but very few copies, and most of them soon destroyed upon the author's falling under censure in the year 1479. The author, if I judge right, was the same Peter Osma who was Professor of Divinity in Salamanca, and adorned the chair with great reputation for many

[t] Commentaria Magistri Petri de Osoma in Symbolum *Quicunque vult*, &c. finiunt feliciter. Impressaque Parisiis per Magistrum Udulricum, cognomento Gering.

years. He began to be famous about the year 1444, and at length fell under the censure of a provincial synod, held under Alphonsus Carrillus, Archbishop of Toledo, in the year 1479 [h]. He was condemned for some positions advanced in a book which he had written upon the subject of *Confession*. The positions, nine in number, are such as every Protestant professes at this day [i], being levelled only at the corruptions of Popery in doctrine and discipline: but the good man was forced to submit and abjure, and to profess an implicit belief in whatsoever was held for faith by the then Pope Sixtus IV. Such, in short, is the account of our author, one of the most learned and valuable men of his time, by confession even of his enemies. At what particular time he composed his comment on the Athanasian Creed, I cannot say; only that it was between 1444 and 1479. I have placed it according to the time it was printed, as nearly as I am able to judge of it.

These are all the *ancient* comments upon the Athanasian Creed that I have hitherto met with or heard of; excepting only such as have no certain *author*, or none mentioned.

Muratorius informs us of two comments without names, which are in manuscript, in the Ambrosian library, near six hundred years old. One of them bears for its title, Expositio Fidei Catholicæ; the other has no title. By the age of the manuscripts (if Muratorius judges rightly thereof) one may be assured that they are distinct and different from any of the *comments* below Abelard: and that they are neither of them the same with Bruno's or Fortunatus's may reasonably be concluded, because Muratorius was well acquainted with both, and would easily have discovered it. Whether either of them may prove to be Abelard's, which has for its title Expositio Fidei, and may suit well with the age of the manuscripts, I

[h] Nicol. Antonii Bibliotheca Hispana Vetus, tom. ii. p. 203.

[i] See the positions and censure in Carranza. *Summ. Concil.* p. 880, &c.

know not. Muratorius, while he makes mention of Bruno and Hildegardis, whose comments he had seen, says nothing of Abelard's: so that possibly one of his manuscript comments may prove the same with that. But if neither of them be the same with Abelard's, nor with each other, they must be allowed to pass for two distinct comments, whose *authors* are not yet known.

Nothing now remains, but to close this chapter with a table, as I have the former, representing in one view a summary of what is contained in it.

A.D.	*Commentators*	*Country*	*Title of the Creed*
570	Venant. Fortunatus	Poictiers	Fides Catholica.
852	Hincmar	Rheims	Symbolum Athanasii.
1033	Bruno	Wurtzburgh	Fides Catholica S. Athan. Episc.
1110	MS. Ambrosian.	Italy	Fides Catholica.
1110	MS. alter Ambros.	Italy	
1120	Pet. Abaelardus	France	Symbolum Athanasii.
1170	S. Hildegardis	France	
1210	Simon Tornacensis	France	Symbolum Athanasii.
1215	Alex. Neckham.	England	Fides Catholica.
1230	Alexander Hales	England	Athanasii Symbolum.
1340	Rich. Hampolus	England	Athanasii Symbolum.
1380	John Wickliff	England	Crede, or Salm, of Attanasie.
1478	Petr. de Osoma	Spain	Athanasii Symbolum.

CHAP. IV.

Latin Manuscripts of the Athanasian Creed.

I CONFINE myself in this chapter to the Latin manuscripts, since the Creed was undoubtedly written originally in Latin; and therefore the manuscripts in any other languages will be more properly treated of in another chapter, among the *versions*. None of the *learned* at this day make any question but that the Creed was originally a Latin composure. This they pretend to be *certain* of, and unanimously agree in; however doubtfully they may speak of other things, or however they may differ in their opinions about the *age* or *author*. Even those, many of them, who have ascribed the Creed to Athanasius, have yet been obliged by plain and irresistible evidence to acknowledge, with the legates of Pope Gregory IXth, that it was originally Latin. The *style* and *phraseology* of the Creed; its early reception among the Latins, while unknown to the Greeks; the *antiquity* and *number* of the Latin manuscripts, and their *agreement* (for the most part) with each other, compared with the *lateness*, *scarceness*, and *disagreement* of the Greek copies, all concur to demonstrate that this Creed was originally a Latin composure, rather than a Greek one: and as to any other language besides these two, none is pretended.

I proceed then to recount the Latin manuscripts as high as we can find any extant, or as have been known to have been extant; and as low as may be necessary or useful to our main design.

The oldest we have heard of is one mentioned by Bishop Usher, which he had seen in the Cotton library, and which he judged to come up to the *age* of Gregory the Great[i]. This manuscript has often been appealed to A. D. 600.

[i] Latino-Gallicum illud Psalterium in Bibliotheca Cottoniana vidimus: sicut et alia Latina *duo*, longe majoris antiquitatis; in quibus, præter Hym-

since Usher's time, and upon the credit of Usher, by the learned on this subject: as particularly by Comber, L'Estrange, Tentzelius, Tillemont, Le Quien, Muratorius, Natalis Alexander, and perhaps several more. Montfaucon takes notice of Usher's manuscript; but observes that Usher himself allowed the *character to be much later* than the time of Gregory [k]. Which would have been a strange inconsistency in Usher, who forms his argument for the antiquity of the manuscript from the *character* itself, and from the *ancient* kind of *picture*. But Montfaucon is plainly mistaken, confounding what Usher had said of another manuscript, in Bennet library at Cambridge [l], with what he had said of the Cotton manuscript at Westminster. The two manuscripts are very distinct, and different as possible; nor has the Bennet manuscript any Athanasian Creed in it: only its being called Gregory's Psalter occasioned, I suppose, the mistake of making it the same with the other. Tentzelius [m] seems first to have confounded them together: and probably Montfaucon followed him implicitly, not having Usher at hand to consult; which would immediately have discovered the fallacy. Were there no other objection against Usher's manuscript beside what hath been mentioned, all would

num hunc (sc. *Te Deum*) sine ullo autoris nomine, Hymni ad Matutinas, titulo inscriptum, et Athanasianum habebatur Symbolum, et Apostolicum totidem omnino quot hodiernum nostrum continens Capitula. In priore, quod Gregorii I. tempore non fuisse recentius, tum ex antiquo picturæ genere colligitur, tum ex literarum forma grandiuscula, Athanasianum quidem, Fidei Catholicæ,——alterum vero Symboli Apostolorum præfert titulum. In posteriore, quod Regis Æthelstani aliquando fuit, Apostolicum, vice versa, Symbolum simpliciter, alterum autem Fides Sancti Athanasii Alexandrini nuncupatur. *Usser. de Symb.* præf. p. 2, 3.

[k] Codicum omnium qui hactenus visi memoratique sunt, antiquissimus ille est qui ab Usserio laudatur, ævo Gregorii Magni conscriptus; si tamen ea vere sit ejus MS. ætas: nam addit Usserius, scripturam *ævo Gregorii longe esse posteriorem*. *Montf. Diatr.* p. 721.

[l] In Psalterio Græco Papæ Gregorii, ut præfert titulus (scriptura enim ævo Gregorii longe est posterior) Psalterio videlicet Græco et Romano, Latinis utroque literis descripto, quod in Benedictini, apud Cantabrigienses, collegii bibliotheca est reconditum. *Usser. de Symb.* p. 9.

[m] Tentzelii Judic. Eruditor. p. 49. Et Exercit. Select. p. 29.

be well. But it is of greater weight to observe, that there is not, at this day, in the Cotton library any such manuscript copy of the Athanasian Creed; nor indeed any Latin Psalter that can come up to the age of Gregory, or near it. There is an *ancient Psalter* (marked Vespasian A) written in *capitals*, and *illuminated;* and which might perhaps by the *character* be as old as the time of Gregory the Great; were it not reasonable to think, from a charter of King Ethelbald, written in the same hand, and at the same time, and formerly belonging to it[n], that it cannot be set higher than the date of that charter, A. D. 736. But I should here observe, that that *charter* is not in the *larger* capitals, as the Psalter itself is, but in the *smaller* capitals, the same hand that the several pieces in that manuscript, previous to the Psalter, are written in: and how far this may affect our present argument, I cannot say. Possibly the Psalter itself being in a different hand may be older than those previous pieces; as it is certainly much older than the additional pieces at the end, which are not in *capitals* great or small.

This Psalter has the *Te Deum* annexed to it, with the title of Hymnus ad Matutinum, as Usher's had; and also the Athanasian Creed, with the title of Fides Catholica; but both in a very different and much later hand than that of the Psalter itself; later by several centuries, as the very learned Mr. Wanley[o] judges, who sets the age of the Psalter about 1000 years, but of the Athanasian Creed, &c. at the time of the Norman Conquest. A sus-

[n] Constat vero ex Historia et Synopsi Biblioth. Cottonianæ, quam in ingens reipublicæ literariæ beneficium edidit, amplificandis bonis literis natus, doctissimus Thomas Smithus noster, et indiculo Psalterii Latini in majusculis scripti cum versione Saxonica interlineari, quod notatur Vespasian. A. I. Chartam hanc (Æthelbaldi R. Australium Saxonum) ex isto MS. exscissam esse. Quod etiam illius quum mensura quæ cum foliis illius MS. quadrat, tum etiam *manus* in utroque prorsus *eadem*, tum denique *locus* MSS. unde scissa est, inter folia x et xi. codicem vertentibus ostendit. *Hickes, Dissert. Epist. in Lingu. Septentr. Thesaur.* p. 67.

[o] Vid. Wanleii Catal. MSS. Septentrion. p. 222.

picion, however, may from hence arise, that this very Psalter, with what belongs to it, might be the Psalter, &c. which Usher spake of; especially since there is none other in the Cotton library at all like it. But, on the contrary, it is to be considered, that this manuscript has no Apostolical Creed at all in it, which Usher affirms his to have had: nor has it the Hymnus Matutinus, beginning with *Gloria in excelsis Deo*, which Usher's also had [p]: nor is the Creed in *capitals*, as one would imagine Usher's to have been by what he says of it. Neither is it at all probable, that, if Usher had intended the Psalter now extant in the Cotton, he should give no hint of the Saxon version going along with it; especially considering that it might be made an objection to its antiquity. Nor do I think that so inquisitive a man as Usher could either have been ignorant of the age of Ethelbald, or of his *charter* having been once a part of that manuscript. In his Historia Dogmatica [q], he takes notice of this very Psalter, (now marked Vespasian A,) and of the Saxon *version* in it, and likewise of its being in the *same hand* with Ethelbald's charter: and there he sets the age of it no higher than the year 736, (that is, above 130 years later than Gregory I.) without the least hint that he had ever mistaken the age of it before, or had thought otherwise of it than he did at the time of his writing this later treatise. These considerations persuade me that Bishop Usher had seen some other manuscript, which has since that time, like many more [r], been lost, or stolen from the Cotton library. He that was so accurate in every tittle of what he says of King Athelstan's Psalter,

[p] Ad finem veterum Psalteriorum Latinorum, cum Apostolico et Athanasiano Symbolo, etiam Hymnus iste (sc. *Gloria* &c.) habetur adjectus. In antiquissimo Cottoniano ἀνεπίγραφος est; in Æthelstaniano proximo, Hymnus in die Dominico ad Matutinas, inscribitur. *Usser. de Symbol.* p. 33.

[q] In Bibliotheca D. Roberti Cotton extat Psalterium Romanum vetustissimum, cum versione interlineari Saxonica: character idem cum charta Æthilbaldi Anglorum Regis, anno 736 data. *Usser. Histo. Dogmat.* p. 104.

[r] Vid. Tho. Smithi Præfationem ad Catalog. MSS. Bibl. Cotton.

(mentioned at the same time,) could never have been so negligent, or rather plainly careless, in respect of the other. I conclude therefore, that there really was such a Psalter as Usher describes, with the Athanasian Creed in it; such as he judged to be of the *age* of Gregory I. from more marks than one: and how good a judge he was in those matters is well known to as many as know any thing of that great man. But how far his judgment ought to sway, now the manuscript itself is lost, I must leave with the reader.

Next to this of Bishop Usher we may place the famous manuscript of Treves, from which the Colbert manuscript (to be mentioned hereafter in its place) was copied. Mr. Antelmi sets it as high as the year 450, upon a presumption that the Colbert manuscript is as old as the year 600, and that 150 years may reasonably be allowed between the Colbertine copy and that from which it was copied. Tillemont, supposing, or admitting the Colbertine to be near the age that Antelmi mentions, yet thinks fifty years' difference might be sufficient; and that therefore the age of the Treves manuscript might be fixed at 550, or thereabout[s]. But since the Colbert manuscript cannot reasonably be set much higher than 760, as we shall see in its proper place; I shall not pretend to set the Treves manuscript above 660; and that only under the favourable allowance of a probable conjecture. The authority of this manuscript of Treves stands upon the credit of a passage prefixed to the Colbertine copy[t], which declares that the latter was copied from a manuscript found at Treves. It was not a copy of the *entire* Creed, but began at the second part which relates to the *incarnation*. For after the words, "believe rightly the incarnation of our Lord "Jesus Christ," (being only part of the foregoing sentence,) follows; "For, the right faith is, that we believe," 660.

[s] Tillemont, Mémoires, tom. viii. p. 670.

[t] Hæc inveni Treviris in uno libro scriptum, sic incipiente, "Domini no-"stri Jesu Christi et reliqua. Domini nostri Jesu Christi fideliter credat." *Apud Montf. Diatrib.* p. 728.

and so on to the end of the Creed. This remaining part of the Creed is very different from the common copies, and seems to have been so contrived with design, as I shall have occasion to observe more at large in the sequel. And it is to me an argument that the manuscript was written while the Eutychian controversy was at the height, about the end of the fifth century, or beginning of the sixth; though I here set it a great deal lower, because this is not the place to explain that matter fully, nor would I too far indulge a bare *conjecture*. It is sufficient to suppose it written in the seventh century, as it was undoubtedly copied from, as early, if not earlier, than the eighth.

700. After the manuscript of Treves, may justly follow the Ambrosian manuscript, which is in the Ambrosian library at Milan; a copy of which has been published by Muratorius, in his second tome of Anecdota. It was brought thither from the famous monastery of Bobbio, (of High Lombardy, in the Milanese,) founded by Columbanus, A. D. 613. The *character* of the manuscript is Langobardick; and it is judged by Muratorius (who has more particularly examined it) to be above 1000 years old[u]. By his account then, who wrote in the year 1698, we ought to set the age of this manuscript higher than 698. Yet, because Montfaucon, who in his travels through Italy had also seen it, puts it no higher than the eighth century[x], we shall be content to place it between the seventh and eighth, or in the year 700, to make it a round number. There are in this manuscript some *readings* different

[u] In alio etiam vetustissimo Ambrosianæ bibliothecæ codice *ante mille et plures annos* scripto, Symbolum idem sum nactus. *Murator.* tom. i. p. 16.

Cæterum opusculum hoc (Bachiarii Fides) mihi depromptum est ex antiquissimo Ambrosianæ bibliothecæ codice, quem *ante annos minimum mille* conscriptum, characterum forma non dubitanter testatur. Fuit autem olim celebris monasterii Bobiensis, et ex illo in Ambrosianam translatus a magno Card. Frederico Borromæo, &c. *Murator.* tom. ii. p. 8. item p. 224.

[x] Codex VIII. Sæculi, charactere Langobardico, in quo Gennadii liber de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, Bachiarii Fides, Symbolum Athanasii, omnia eadem manu. *Montfauc. Diatr. Ital.* p. 18.

from the common copies; which shall be carefully noted hereafter. It is without any *title*.

We may next set down K. Athelstan's Psalter, of which Bishop Usher had taken notice, making it next in age to the other most ancient one of the age of Gregory I. He and Dr. Grabe both fix the date of it to the year 703, from the *rule* of the *calendar* found in it[y]. Dr. Smith, in his Catalogue of the Cotton manuscripts, inclines to think that the manuscript is later than that time, but taken from one that was really as early as the year 703; the later copyist transcribing (as sometimes has been) the book and the rule word for word, as he found them[z]. Allowing this to have been the case here, (though it be only conjecture,) it may still be true that there was a manuscript of the age of 703, with this Creed in it; from whence the later one, now extant, was copied: which serves our purpose as well, and the rest is not material. But it should not be concealed, that the Psalter (in this manuscript) is in small Italian, and the above mentioned *rule* in a small Saxon hand; which may in some measure weaken the argument drawn from the age of one to the age of the other: so that at length our evidence from this manuscript will be short of *certainty*, and will rise no higher than a fair, probable presumption. I have nothing farther to observe, but that the Psalter, wherein this Creed is, is the Gallican Psalter, not the Roman; and the title

703.

[y] Psalterium illud anno æræ nostræ Christianæ 703, longe ante Æthelstani regnantis tempora, ex Regulis Kalendario in libri initio subjunctis scriptum fuisse deprehendi. *Usser. de Symb.* p. 6.

Quod regis Æthelstani fuisse dicitur, atque anno 703 scriptum est. *Grabii Prolegom. in Psalt. Alexandr.* cap. 3.

[z] Hic vero venerandæ antiquitatis liber fere ante mille annos descriptus; ut quibusdam ex Calendario, quod annum Christi 703, certo designat, illic præfixo videtur. Sed cum librarios eandem temporis adnotationem, quæ ad vetustissimos codices proprie et peculiariter spectat, suis exemplaribus apposuisse sæpissime observaverim——an sit ille ipse codex autographus qui tantam præ se ferat ætatem, vel annon potius sæculo, aut circiter, ante tempora Æthelstani descriptus, vix pro certo præstarem; ad posteriorem sententiam faventiori animo inclinaturus. *Smith. Bibl. Cotton. Histor.* p. 44.

is, Fides Sancti Athanasii Alexandrini, The Faith of St. Athanasius of Alexandria.

760. We may now take in the Colbertine copy, of which I have before spoken, referring the date of it to the year 760, or thereabout. Montfaucon sets it above the age of Charles the Great[a], allowing it to have been written about the time of Pepin, who began to reign in the year 752. So that I cannot be much out of time in placing it as I have done. It is written in Saxon character, and is imperfect; wanting the first part, above one half of the Creed, just as the manuscript of Treves from which it was copied.

760. The manuscript of St. Germans, at Paris, is entire, and of the same age with the former[b]. It is marked num. 257, and written in a Saxon *letter*, as well as the other. A specimen of the *hand*, with the three first paragraphs of the Creed, may be seen in Mabillon[c]. The title, Fides Sancti Athanasii Episcopi Alexandriæ. It differs in some places from the common copies, (as shall be noted hereafter,) though not near so much as the Colbert manuscript before mentioned.

772. Next to these is the famous manuscript of Charles the Great, at the end of a Gallican Psalter, written in letters of gold, and presented by Charlemagne, while only King of France, to Pope Adrian I. at his first entrance upon the pontificate, in the year 772. Lambecius in his Cata-

[a] Nongentos superat annos Colbertinus codex 784. Saxonicis descriptus literis, et, mea quidem sententia, ante ætatem Caroli Magni editus——Sunt qui codicem illum 1100 annorum esse adfirmarunt: verum periti quique ævo circiter Pipini exaratum arbitrantur. *Montf. Diatr.* p. 721.

Nec tamen codicis Colbertini auctoritate nititur hæc opinio, quem arbitratur Antelmius 1100 annorum. Etenim (quod pace iri eruditissimi, mihique amicissimi dicatur) multo minoris ætatis codex esse comprobatur; nemo enim peritus cui librum exhibuerim, octavo eum sæculo antiquiorem æstimavit. *Montf. ib.* p. 724.

[b] Paris saltem antiquitatis est Sangermanensis noster, num. 257. Saxonicis pariter literis exaratus, qui titulum habet, Fides Sancti Athanasii Episcopi Alexandriæ. *Montf.* p. 721.

[c] Mabill. de Re Diplom. p. 351.

logue of the Emperor's library at Vienna, where this manuscript is, gives a large account of it[d]. The title is, Fides Sancti Athanasii Episcopi Alexandrini.

There is another manuscript in the Royal library at 800.
Paris, marked 4908, which Montfaucon judges to be near 900 years old[e]. He wrote in the year 1698. So if we place it in the year 800, we shall want a little of 900 years from that time. He supposes it of very near the same age with the Vienna manuscript. It bears no *title*, nor any name or note of the *author*. It contains no more than the first part of the Creed, as far as the words, *et tamen non tres æterni; sed unus*— the rest is torn off and lost.

I may here place a manuscript of Bennet College li- 850.
brary in Cambridge, whose age I cannot certainly fix to a year; but by all circumstances it cannot well be supposed later than this time. It is at the end of a Psalter, which by comparing I find to be a Gallican Psalter. Bishop Parker left a remark in it about its being in the possession first of one of the Archbishops of Canterbury, and at length conveyed down to the hands of Becket[f], who was Archbishop of Canterbury in the year 1162. The great antiquity of the manuscript appears from the *martyrs*, *confessors*, and *virgins* addressed to in it; all of the early times[g]. There are some few variations in this

[d] Lambecii Catal. Biblioth. Vindobonens. lib. ii. cap. 5. p. 261, 296, &c. Carolus Magnus proprio carmine suo testatur se illum codicem summo Pontifici Hadriano I. dono misisse; et quidem, ut ego arbitror, illo ipso anno 772. cujus die decimo Februarii jam memoratus Hadrianus in summum Pontificem electus est. *Lambec. ibid.*

[e] Regius Codex, num. 4908. annorum pene nongentorum, nullum habet *titulum*, nullumque *auctoris* nomen. Æqualis ipsi est, qui memoratur a Lambecio &c. *Montf. ibid.* p. 721.

[f] Hoc Psalterium [N. X.] laminis argenteis deauratum, et gemmis ornatum, quondam fuit N. Cantuar. Archiep. tandem venit in manus Thomæ Becket quondam Cant. Archiep. quod testatum est in veteri scripto. *Matth. Cant.* Vid. Catal. MSS. C. C. C. C. p. 43.

[g] In Litaniis, Orate pro nobis, Sancte Contestor, Sancte Herasme, Sancte Oswolde, &c. martyres. Sancte Cuthberte, Sancte Germane, Sancte Placide,

copy, such as are also found in the most ancient manuscripts of this Creed; particularly the word *et*, frequently inserted before *Spiritus Sanctus*, which has been since erased by some officious hand. The title is observable; Fides Sancti Anasthasii Episcopi: Anasthasii for Athanasii, by a transposition of syllables.

860. Montfaucon informs us of a manuscript in the Colbert library, num. 1339, which once belonged to Charles the Bald[h], who died in the year 877; began to reign 840. It cannot therefore be much amiss to fix upon 860 for the date of it. The title it bears is, Fides Athanasii.

883. There is a *second* manuscript copy of the Athanasian Creed, in the library of Bennet (or Corpus Christi) College, marked N. O. V. It is at the end of a Gallican Psalter, in the same hand, and carrying its certain date with it. It was written in France, by order of Count Amadeus, or Achadeus[i]; and in the year 883, as appears from the Litany[k]. The title is, Fides Catholica.

930. Mr. Wanley gives us an account of a Roman Psalter in the Royal library, (formerly of St. James's,) with an interlinear Saxon version to it, written about the time of King Athelstan[l]. Among the Canticles at the end, there is also this Creed, under the title of Hymnus Athanasii de Fide Trinitatis, *quem tu concelebrans discutienter intellige:* this is in red ink. The title seems to have been then customary in England, as may be probably argued

Sancte Columbane, Sancte Caurentine, &c. confessores. Sancta Brigida, Sancta Eugenia, Sancta Eulalia, Sancta Petronella, &c. virgines. Et non sunt hisce recentiores. *Catal. MSS. Bibl. C. C. C. C.* p. 43.

[h] Colbertinus N. 1339. Qui fuit Karoli Calvi imperatoris, inscribitur; Fides Athanasii. *Montfauc. Diatrib.* p. 721.

[i] Ad finem Psalterii, "Achadeus, misericordia Dei comes hunc Psalterium "scribere jussit." *Vid. Catal. MSS.* p. 46.

[k] Oratur, "ut marinum apostolicum in sancta religione conservare dig- "neris, ut Karlomannum Regem perpetua prosperitate conservare digneris: "ut reginam conservare digneris: ut fulconem episcopum cum omni grege "sibi commisso in tuo apto servitio conservare digneris." *Vid. Catalog. MSS. C. C. C. C.* p. 47.

[l] Wanleii Catal. MS. Septentr. p. 182.

from a Saxon version (to be hereafter mentioned) of the same age, or very near, and bearing the same title[m].

In the Archbishop's library, at Lambeth, there is a Gallican Psalter, written, according to Mr. Wanley[n], in the time of King Edgar, or a little before. At the end, there is the Athanasian Creed in the same ancient hand, with an interlinear Saxon version. The title, Fides Catholica Sancti Athanasii Episcopi. 957.

There is another manuscript copy of this Creed, much of the same age with the former, in my Lord Oxford's elegant library, richly furnished with all kinds of curious and valuable manuscripts. This Creed is at the end of a Gallican Psalter, and has an interlinear Saxon version to it. Mr. Wanley, who was so kind as to acquaint me with it, and to favour me with a sight of it, refers it to the time of King Edgar; who began his reign in 959, and died in 975. The title is, Fides Catholica Athanasii Alexandrini Episcopi. 970.

In the Cotton library there is a Gallican Psalter, with Saxon interlined, (marked Vitellius. E. 18.) which Mr. Wanley refers to the year 1031[o]. The Athanasian Creed at the end, as usual, among the other Canticles, bears the title of Fides Catholica Athanasii Episcopi Alexandrini. 1031.

In the Norfolk library, now belonging to the Royal Society at London, there is also a Gallican Psalter, whose age is fixed by Mr. Wanley[p] to the time of Edward the Confessor. The Creed is in it, and has an interlinear Saxon version running along with it. The title, Fides Catholica Athanasii Alex. 1050.

In Bennet College library is a manuscript copy of this Creed without any title. The Psalter wherein it is, is 1064.

[m] Hymnus Athanasii de Fide Trinitatis. *Vid. Wottoni Conspectum Brevem Operis Hickesiani*, p. 77.

[n] Wanleii Catal. p. 269. Eadgari regis Anglosaxonum temporibus, aut paulo ante, ut videtur, exaratus.

Wharton. Auctarium Historiæ Dogmaticæ, p. 374. Alfredo parum recentior videtur.

[o] Wanleii Catal. p. 222, 224. Smith. Catal. Cotton. p. 101.

[p] Wanleii Catal. MSS. Septentr. p. 291.

called Portiforium Oswaldi, and is marked K. 10. An account of the book may be seen in Mr. Wanley, and in the Catalogue.

1066. I may here place the Cotton manuscript before mentioned, bound up with the ancient Roman Psalter, marked Vespasian A; though of a very different and much later hand. The Creed has an interlinear Saxon version, as usual; and its title is, Fides Catholica. Mr. Wanley judges it to be as old as the coming in of the Normans[q].

1066. Of the same age is the Roman Psalter in our public library[r] at Cambridge, with the Latin text in *black* letter, a Saxon version in *red*, and the titles in *green*. The Creed is interlined with Saxon, as well as the Psalter, but has no *title:* for, from this time, I conceive, the *title* began to be left out in some copies, for brevity sake, or because it was thought superfluous.

It will be needless to take notice of any manuscripts below this time, excepting only such as contain something *particular*.

1087. Quesnel[s], and after him Pagi[t], speaks of a manuscript copy of this Creed in a Breviary and Psalter for the use of the monks of mount Cassin, judged to be about 600 years old. This is the same Breviary that Quesnel has made observations upon in another work[u]. And there he fixes the age a little below 1086; *paulo post annum* 1086. The title of the Creed is, Fides Catholica edita ab Athanasio Alexandrinæ sedis Episcopo. There is the like title to the Creed in the Triple Psalter of St. John's College Cambridge, about the same age, or older, (marked B. 18.) Incipit Fides Catholica edita ab Athanasio Archiepiscopo Alexandrinæ civitatis. And there is such another title in a Psalter of the Norfolk library, (N. 155.) Fides Catholica edita a Sancto Athanasio Episcopo. But the hand is modern.

[q] Wanleii Catal. p. 222. Smith. Bibl. Cotton. Histor. p. 35.
[r] Wanleii Catal. p. 152.
[s] Quesnel, Dissert. xiv. ad Leon. Oper. p. 732.
[t] Pagi, Critic. in Baron. vol. i. p. 441.
[u] Quesnel, Observat. ad Breviarium &c. in Theodor. Pœnitentiale, p. 327.

In my Lord Oxford's library I had a sight of a manu- 1120.
script written in Germany about 600 years ago, for the use of the Church of Augsburg; which bears for its title, Fides Anastasii Episcopi.

In the Norfolk library is a Psalter (marked N. 230.) 1150.
with an interlinear version Normanno-Gallican: the Psalter is Gallican, and the title of the Creed at the end, Fides Catholica.

Usher takes notice of a copy of this Creed then in the 1240.
Royal library at St. James's, (formerly belonging to Lewis the Ninth,) the title, Fides Catholica.

Montfaucon informs us of a Latin and a French copy 1300.
of this Creed found in a manuscript about 400 years old; placed in opposite columns. What is remarkable is, that the Latin has for its title Canticum Bonifacii, and the French over against the other, Ce chant St. Anaistaise qui Apostoilles de Rome[x].

In the Bodleian at Oxford there is a manuscript copy 1400.
of this Creed, (Num. 1204.) which has for its title, Anastasii Expositio Symboli Apostolorum. It is about 300 years old, and belonged once to the Carthusian monks at Mentz. The Carthusians are particularly noted for their more than common veneration for this Creed, reciting it every day at the *prime*, as Cardinal Bona testifies both of them and the Ambrosians[y]; which I remark by the way. I observe that the German copies of this Creed, for five or six hundred years upwards, have most commonly Anastasius instead of Athanasius. I make no question but that this first arose from a mistake of the copyists, and not out of any design. One may perceive that Anastasius is sometimes written where Athanasius of Alexandria must have been intended. I suppose, at first, some copies had accidentally Anasthasius for Athanasius, (as one in Bennet College library mentioned above,) by a transposition of letters or syllables;

[x] Montfaucon, Diatrib. p. 722, 727.

[y] Bona de Divin. Psalmod. cap. xviii. p. 897, 900.

as easily happens in writing or speaking: thus Phrunutus for Phurnutus, Marivadus for Varimadus, and the like. Now when the copyists had thus introduced Anasthasius, (*Anas-tha* for *Atha-nas*) those that came after left out the *h*, to make it Anastasius, that being a common name, which the other was not. This I thought proper to hint, that it may appear how little reason there is for ascribing this Creed to Anastasius, whether of Rome, or of Antioch, or any other.

I have now run through the manuscripts of greatest note, or use, either for *antiquity*, or for any thing *particular*, to give light to our further inquiries. Two only I have omitted, which have been thought considerable; not so much in themselves, as upon account of the other tracts they were found to be joined with. The one is the manuscript found in the library of Thuanus (Codex Thuaneus) annexed to some tracts which were once supposed to belong to Vigilius Tapsensis, though now certainly known to be none of his. Quesnel was much pleased with the discovery of this manuscript, as favouring his hypothesis about Vigilius Tapsensis[z]. And Antelmius has taken some pains in confuting him; showing that the supposed works of Vigilius are none of his[a], and that if they were, yet no certain argument could be drawn from thence to make Vigilius author of the Creed; since it is a common thing for tracts of several authors, especially if they relate to the same subject, to be tacked to each other.

[z] Absoluta dissertationum nostrarum editione, inveni Codicem Thuaneum, in quo Dialogus Vigilii Tapsensis adversus Arianos, Sabellianos, et Photinianos legitur, sub hoc titulo: *Incipit Altercatio Athanasii cum Hæresibus.* Post hunc tractatum habetur Symbolum Nicænum, et formula fidei Ariminensis Concilii, quam proxime sequitur Symbolum Athanasianum cum hac epigraphe: *Fides dicta a Sancto Athanasio Episcopo.* Porro, conjecturæ nostræ de *auctore* hujus *symboli* non parum suffragatur, quod in *antiquissimo* codice illigatum reperiatur opusculo cui nomen Athanasii pariter præfixum legitur, sed quod Vigilii Tapsensis esse indubitatum habetur &c. *Quesnel in Addend.* p. 913.

[a] Vid. Montfauc. Athan. Op. tom. ii. p. 603, 724.

The *second* manuscript is one that was found annexed to the Fragments of Hilary of Poictiers[b]; which circumstance was thought a reason for ascribing this Creed to Hilary. Vossius first, and after him many others throw it off as a very slight argument, since the manuscript pretended is very *modern*, nor is the Creed ascribed to Hilary in that manuscript, but only bound up with his Fragments, as any other work might be, however little akin to them. Montfaucon takes notice of this matter in few words[c], Tentzelius more at large[d]. It is sufficient for me just to have hinted it.

Having now given as particular account as was needful of the more ancient Latin manuscripts of this Creed, I may just observe that as to *modern* ones, they are innumerable, there being scarce any manuscript Latin Psalter of modern date but what has the Creed in it, and generally without a *title*. I may next subjoin a table of the manuscripts here recited, representing in one view the *age*, the *title*, the *country* where written, and the kind of *Psalter* wherein found: all which circumstances will be of use to us in our following inquiries. Particularly, as to the Psalters, it will be of moment to observe whether they be Roman or Gallican; because from thence we may be able to discover in what places or countries this Creed was first *received*, according to their use of this or that Psalter. But because, perhaps, some readers may be at a loss to know what we mean by those different names of Roman and Gallican Psalters; it may not be improper here to throw in a few previous instructions

[b] Invenitur id similiter in Fragmentis Hilarii historicis in cod. veteri part. 2. sub finem. *Felckman. Var. Lect. Oper. Athan.* p. 83.

[c] Hilario nonnulli adscriptum voluerunt, quia nimirum in codice quodam exstat post Hilarii Fragmenta. Quasi vero id non vulgo et in plerisque codicibus observetur, ut multa diversorum opera consequenter in manuscriptis describentur. Cum autem in ejusmodi codice post Hilariana opera, nullo præmisso auctoris nomine compareat; hinc, uti jam supra diximus, inferendum, tum exaratum fuisse cum pro Athanasiano nondum vulgo haberetur. *Montf. Diatrib.* p. 723.

[d] Tentzel. Judic. Erud. p. 2, 3, &c.

relating to the different kinds of Latin Psalters, and the *names* they have gone under.

There are four kinds, or sorts, of Latin Psalters; which have passed under the names of Italic, Roman, Gallican, and Hebraic. One of them was before Jerome's time: the three last are all Jerome's; as he had a hand, more or less, in every one of them. I shall treat of them distinctly, in their order, as follows.

I. The Italic Latin Psalter is of the old translation, or version, such as it was before Jerome's time. I shall not enter into the dispute whether it were *one* version or *many*. The common opinion is, that there were several Latin versions before Jerome[e], but one more eminent than the rest called Italic[f], as being received into common use in Italy[g]. However that be, it is become customary, with such as treat of this subject, to speak of all that was extant before Jerome, as of *one version*, under the name of Vetus Vulgata, or Versio Italica. There are *entire* Psalters of this old version, *printed* and *manuscript*[h]; though now no where in use in divine Offices, except such parcels of it as, having been anciently taken into the Roman Missals, or other old Liturgies, remain there still, the people being accustomed to them, and there being no great necessity for changing them: but all the *entire* Psalters in use are of another kind. Martianay, in his edition of Jerome's works, once intended to give us an entire and correct Psalter (with some other of the sacred

[e] Qui enim scripturas ex Hebræa lingua in linguam Græcam verterunt numerari possunt, Latini autem interpretes nullo modo: ut enim cuique primis fidei temporibus in manus venit codex, et aliquantulum facultatis sibi utriusque linguæ habere videbatur, ausus est interpretari. *August. de Doctr. Christian.* lib. ii. cap. 11. p. 25. tom. iii.

[f] In ipsis autem interpretationibus Itala cæteris præferatur: nam est verborum tenacior cum perspicuitate sententiæ. *August. ibid.* p. 27.

[g] Ecclesia Latina a principio, vel ferme a principio, usa est versione Latina Testamenti Vet. ex Græca τῶν ὁ translatione facta, quæ Itala vulgo dicebatur, quoniam in Italia prius usitata in alias inde Latinorum Ecclesias recipiebatur. *Humphr. Hodius, De Biblior. Text. Origin.* p. 342.

[h] Le Long, Biblioth. Bibl. vol. i. p. 243.

books) of the old Italic version. But the *various lections* were so many, and so different, that the work appeared too laborious and difficult, for which reason he then laid it aside[i]. This version, or versions, is what all the Latins used before Jerome; and many also after him, the Africans especially, down to the sixth century at least, or beginning of the seventh.

2. The Roman Psalter is not very different from the old Italic. It is nothing else but that old version cursorily, and in part, corrected by Jerome, in the time of Pope Damasus, A. D. 383. It has had the name of Roman, because the use of it began the soonest, and continued the longest in the Roman Offices. It obtained in Gaul near as soon as at Rome, but was laid aside in the sixth century, when Gregory of Tours[k] introduced the other Psalter, since called Gallican. The Roman Psalter however still obtained at Rome till the time of Pope Pius[l] the Fifth: and it is still used in the Vatican church, and some few churches besides.

3. The Gallican Psalter is Jerome's more correct Latin translation made from Origen's Hexaplar[m], or most correct edition of the Greek Septuagint, filled up, where the Greek was supposed faulty, from the Hebrew; distinguished with *obelisks* and *asterisks*, denoting the common Greek

[i] Appendicem sacrorum aliquot voluminum, juxta Veterem Vulgatam usu receptam ante Hieronymum, hoc loco edendam statueramus: sed quum operi manus jamjam accederet, tantam inter MSS. Codices *hujus versionis Latinæ* deprehendimus dissonantiam, ut impossibile esset vel solas variantes horum codicum lectiones adnotasse nisi maximo temporis intervallo. Quare ne in sequentem annum differretur editio hujus Divinæ Bibliothecæ, appendicem prædictam latiori operi, ac majori otio reservavimus. *Martian. Not. ad Hieronym.* vol. i. p. 1419.

[k] Psalmos autem cum secundum LXX Interpretes Romani adhuc habeant; Galli et Germanorum aliqui secundum *emendationem* quam Hieronymus Pater de LXX. editione composuit, Psalterium cantant: quam Gregorius, Turonensis episcopus, a partibus Romanis mutuatam, in Galliarum dicitur Ecclesias transtulisse. *Walafrid. Strab. de Reb. Eccles.* cap. xxv. p. 690.

[l] Vid. Card. Bona Rerum Liturgic. lib. ii. cap. 3. Humphr. Hod. p. 383. Mabillon. de Curs. Gallican. p. 398.

[m] Vid. Hieron. Epist. ad Sunn. et Fretel. p. 627. ed. Bened. tom. 2.

version in those places to be either redundant or deficient. Many of the old manuscripts[n] still retain those marks: but more have left them out, I suppose, to save trouble. This more correct Psalter was drawn up by Jerome in the year 389, and obtained first in Gaul about the year 580; or however not later than 595: from which circumstance it came to have the name of Gallican, in contradistinction to the Roman. From Gaul, or France, it passed over into England before the year 597, and into Germany, and Spain, and other countries. The popes of Rome, though they themselves used the other Psalter, yet patiently connived at the use of this in the western churches, and even in Italy; and sometimes privately authorized the use of it in churches and monasteries[o]; till at length it was publicly authorized in the Council of Trent, and introduced a while after into Rome itself by Pius the Fifth. It was admitted in Britain and Ireland before the coming of Augustine the monk, and prevailed after, except in the church of Canterbury[p], which was more immediately under the Archbishop's eye, and more conformable to the Roman Offices, than other parts of the kingdom. It has been said, [q] that this very Gallican Psalter

[n] The Cotton manuscript of 703, and the Bennet of 883, Lambeth of 957, Lord Oxford's of 970, and Bruno's own manuscript of 1033: besides many more in France, England, and other countries. Quanta porro fuerit diligentia nostratium in describendo hocce Psalterio, cum asteriscis et obelis, non aliunde testatum volumus quam ex infinita copia Codicum MSS. qui cum talibus distinctionibus supersunt in Gallicanis Bibliothecis. *Martin. Hieronym. Op.* vol. i. Prolegom. ii. c. 5.

[o] Anno 1369. Urbani V. autoritate sancitum, ut Cassinenses Psalterio Gallicano uterentur. *Montfauc. Diatr. Ital.* p. 331. P. Adrian, long before, had recommended the Gallican Psalter to the Church of Bremen. See below in ch. vi. and C. Bona, p. 506.

[p] Ante adventum Augustini monachi, primi Archiepiscopi Cantuariensis, in Angliam, i. e. ante annum 597, Ecclesiæ Britannicæ et Hibernicæ Psalterium Gallicanum receperant. Augustinus huc a Gregorio M. missus Romanum secum advexit, et Ecclesiæ suæ Cantuariensi tradidit. Sed loco illius invaluit tandem, per omnes ecclesias Anglicas, usus Gallicani. *Hodius, de Text. Bibl. Origin.* p. 384.

[q] Hodiernum in Liturgia Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ retinetur editio Gallicana: at versio illa quæ habetur in Bibliorum voluminibus, quæque pro authentica agnoscitur, ex Hebræo est. *Hod. ibid.* p. 384.

is what we still retain in our Liturgy; called the *reading Psalms*, in contradistinction to the other Psalms in our Bibles, of the new translation. But this is not strictly true: for the old translation, though it be taken in a great measure from the Gallican, has yet many corrections from the Hebrew, (where they were thought wanting,) first, by Coverdale in 1535, and by Coverdale again, 1539, and last of all by Tonstall and Heath, in 1541: according to which edition is the Psalter now used in our Liturgy, as I have learned by comparing: and it had been before taken notice of by Durell[r]. But this in passing.

4. The Hebraic Latin Psalter means Jerome's own translation, immediately from the Hebrew, made in the year 391. This, though otherwise of great esteem, was never used in the public Church Offices[s]. There are but few copies of it, in comparison, because this Psalter, as before hinted, having never been in common use, like the Roman and Gallican, has been confined to a few hands. We are not to expect an Athanasian Creed in this Psalter, as not being intended for the use of the *choir:* neither are we to expect to meet with it in the Italic Psalters, which are few, and which were grown, or growing, out of use before the Athanasian Creed was brought into the public Offices. But in the Roman and Gallican Psalters we may find it: and it will be of moment to observe in which of them it is found. Indeed, some manuscript Psalters there are, which have the Roman and Gallican together in opposite columns, the Gallican always set first[t]. Others have the

[r] Durell. Eccles. Anglican. Vindic. p. 306.

[s] Tertium est de Hebræo in Latinum quod Ieronymus transtulit de Hebræo in Latinum. Sed non est in usu Ecclesiæ, sed viri studii literati et sapientes eo utuntur. *Roger. Bacon. apud Hodium de Text. Original.* p. 384.

Hæc autem (versio ex Hebræo) ideo recepta non fuit, quia duæ priores, quotidiano usu in ecclesiis frequentatæ, sine magna divini officii perturbatione non poterant abrogari. *Bona, Rerum Liturg.* lib. ii. cap. 3. p. 506. Vid. etiam Hodium, p. 385.

[t] Hody de Text. Bibl. Original. p. 385.

Hebraic and Gallican set column-wise as the former: and some have all the *three* versions of Jerome placed in the like order. Dr. Hody informs us of two such manuscripts, to which may be added a *third* now in Trinity College in Cambridge, which has the Athanasian Creed with Bruno's comment in it; as intimated above. Another such *triple* Psalter there is in St. John's College of the same University, as before hinted; and in my Lord Oxford's library is a fine old Latin Bible, where the Psalms appear under all the three versions. Nay, some manuscripts have the Greek also with the other, making a *fourth* column: an account of this last sort may be seen both in Dr. Hody and Le Long[u]. These double, triple, or quadruple Psalters came not in, I presume, before the end of the *tenth* century, or beginning of the *eleventh*. For Berno Augiensis of that time acquaints us with the occasion and use of them, and how they came to be so contrived[x]. When the Roman way of *singing*, first adapted to the Roman Psalter, had been introduced into France and Germany, (which was first done in the eighth century,) in process of time it bred some confusion in the two Psalters, mixing and blending them one with the other; that it was difficult to distinguish which words belonged to this, and which to that. To remedy this inconvenience, a way was found out to have both the Psalters distinctly represented to the eye together, in two

[u] Le Long, Biblioth. Bibl. vol. i. p. 244.

[x] Inter cætera, ex emendata LXX Interpretum translatione Psal. ex Græco in Latinum vertit (Hieronymus) illudque cantandum omnibus Galliæ, ac quibusdam Germaniæ ecclesiis tradidit. Et ob hoc Gallicanum Psalterium appellavit, Romanis adhuc ex corrupta vulgata editione Psalterium canentibus; ex qua Romani cantum composuerunt, nobisque usum cantandi contradiderunt. Unde accidit quod verba, quæ in diurnis vel nocturnis officiis canendi more modulantur, intermisceantur, et confuse nostris Psalmis inserantur; ut a minus peritis haud facile possit discerni quid *nostræ*, vel *Romanæ* conveniat editioni. Quod pius pater ac peritus magister intuens, *tres editiones* in uno volumine composuit: et Gallicanum Psalterium, quod nos canimus, ordinavit in una columna; in altera Romanum, in tertia Hebræum. *Berno Augiens. Epist. inedit. apud Mabill. de cursu Gallicano*, p. 396. Hodium de Text. Original. p. 382.

several columns: and thus came in the kind of Psalters before mentioned. We easily see why the Gallican used to be set in the *first* column; namely, because those Psalters were contrived by the French and Germans, who made use of the Gallican, and so gave the preference to their own. If I have detained my reader a little too long in this digression about the Psalters; I hope the usefulness of the subject may make him some amends, and be a just apology for it. I now return to our Creed, and what more immediately belongs to it; closing this chapter, as I promised, with a table representing a summary, or short sketch of what hath been done in it.

A.D.	*MSS.*	*Psalters*	*Titles of the Creed*
600	Bp. Usher's		Fides Catholica.
660	Treves		
700	Ambrosian		
703	Cotton 1	Gallican	Fides Saneti Athanasii Alexandrini.
760	Colbert 1		
760	St. Germans		Fides Sancti Athanasii Episcopi.
772	Vienna	Gallican	Fides Sancti Athanasii Episc. Alexandr.
800	Regius, Paris		
850	Benet Coll. Cant. 1	Gallican	Fides Sancti Anasthasii Episcopi.
860	Colbert 2		Fides Athanasii.
883	Benet C. 2	Gallican	Fides Catholica.
930	St. James's 1	Roman	Hymnus Athanasii.
957	Lambeth	Gallican	Fides Catholica S. Athanasii Episcopi.
970	Harleian 1	Gallican	Fides Catholica Athanasii Alexand. Episc.
1031	Cotton 2	Gallican	Fides Catholica Athanasii Alexand. Episc.
1050	Norfolk 1	Gallican	Fides Catholica Athanasii Alexandrini.
1064	Benet C. 3		
1066	Cotton 3		Fides Catholica.
1066	Cambridge	Roman	
1087	Cassinensis		Fides Catholica edita ab Athanasio &c.
1120	Harleian 2		Fides Anastasii Episcopi.
1150	Norfolk 2	Gallican	Fides Catholica.
1240	St. James's 2		Fides Catholica.
1300	Friars Minors	Gallican	Canticum Bonefacii.
			Ce Chant fust St. Anaistaise qui Apostoilles de Rome.
1400	Bodleian		Anastasii Expositio Symboli Apostolorum.

CHAP. V.

Ancient Versions, printed or manuscript.

SOME account of the ancient versions of the Athanasian Creed may be of use to show *when* and *where* it has been *received*, and what *value* hath been set upon it, at several times, and in several countries. I shall note the time in the margin, when the *first* version into any language appears to have been made: and I shall rank the versions of the several countries according to the chronological order of those *first* versions respectively.

FRENCH VERSIONS.

850. Under the name of *French versions*, I comprehend all versions made at any time into the *vulgar* language then current in France, whatever other name some may please to give them. I beg leave also to comprehend under the same name all *oral* versions delivered by word of mouth, as well as *written* ones: otherwise I am sensible that I ought not to have begun with *French versions*. I do not know that the Gauls or French had any written standing version of this Creed so early as 850, or for several centuries after. Their oldest versions of the Psalter are scarce earlier than the eleventh century[y], and of the *entire* Scripture scarce so early as the twelfth[y]: and we are not to expect a *written* version of the Athanasian Creed more ancient than of their Psalter. But what I mean by setting the *French versions* so high as I here do, is that the Athanasian Creed was, as early as is here said, interpreted out of Latin into the *vulgar* tongue for the use of the people, by the clergy of France, in their *verbal* instructions. This is the same thing, in effect, with a *written* standing version, as supplying the place of it;

[y] See Le Long, Biblioth. Bibl. vol. i. p. 313, &c.

and is as full a proof of the general *reception* of the Creed, at that time, as the other would be. Now, that the Athanasian Creed was thus interpreted into the *vulgar* tongue in France, as early as the year 850, or earlier, I prove from the words of Hincmar, above cited[z], giving orders to the clergy of his province to be able to express this Creed *communibus verbis*, that is, in their *vulgar*, or mother tongue. What that mixed kind of language which they then used should be called, is of no great moment to our present purpose to inquire. Some perhaps, with Vitus Amerbachius, and Bishop Usher[a], will call it Teutonic, or German, because Franks and Germans being originally the same, spake the same language. But I see no consequence that because Franks and Germans used the same language, therefore Franks and Gauls mixed together must still keep the same; any more than that a mixed nation of Normans and Saxons must all agree either in Norman or Saxon. One would rather expect in such a mixed people, a mixed language too, as usually happens in such cases. As to France in particular, at that time, Mr. Wharton has plainly shown that the language there spoken was very widely different from the Teutonic, or German.

The Concordate between the two brothers Lewis and Charles, at Strasburgh, puts the matter out of dispute: where one expressed himself in the Teutonic, the other in the language then current in France, called Romanensis, or Rustica Romana, corrupt Roman, or Latin[b]; nearer to the Latin than to the German, but a confused mixture of both. Such was the language then vulgarly spoken in France, as appears from the specimen of it given by Wharton from Nithardus. And this I presume is the language into which our Creed was interpreted in Hincmar's time; for which reason I have set the French versions first. If any one shall contend that the Teutonic

[z] See above, p. 151.

[a] Usser. Histor. Dogmat. p. 111.

[b] Vid. Wharton. Auctar. Histor. Dogmat. p. 344.

prevailed then in the *diocese* of Rheims, though not in the other parts of Gaul more remote from Germany, I shall not think it of moment to dispute the point, since it is not material to our present purpose.

As to the French versions, properly so called, *written* standing versions, I have said that none of them reach higher than the eleventh century. Montfaucon gives us one, though imperfect, 600 years old[c]; that is, of the eleventh century, and very near the end of it, about 1098, six hundred years before the time of his writing: and this is the oldest that I have any where found mentioned. Next to which, perhaps we may reckon that in Trinity College in Cambridge; I mean the interlinear version which Mr. Wanley[d] calls Normanno-Gallican, about 580 years old. And next to that, the Norfolk manuscript (N. 230.) before mentioned, about the same age with the other: and Mr. Wanley informed me of two more in my Lord Oxford's library. There is one in the Cotton library (Nero, C. 4.) above 500 years old, according to Mr. Wharton[e]. Montfaucon gives us another above 400 years old[f]. But it is needless, and foreign to my purpose to number up all the versions: the *first* in its kind is what will be chiefly serviceable to our following inquiries.

German Versions.

870. As to *written* and standing versions, the German, so far as we find any records, ought to have the first place. There is in the Emperor's library at Vienna[g], a German, or Teutonic version of this Creed made by Otfridus, monk of Weissenberg in the ninth century: the manuscript, as Lambecius assures us, is coeval with the author. There have been several later German versions, a brief account

[c] Montfaucon, Diatrib. p. 721, 727, 733.
[d] Wanleii Catal. MSS. Septentr. p. 168.
[e] Wharton. Auctar. Histor. Dogmat. p. 390.
[f] Montf. Diatr. p. 722.
[g] Lambec. Catal. Biblioth. Vindobon. lib. ii. p. 460, 760.

of which may be seen in Lambecius[h], Tentzelius[i], and Le Long[k]; but more particularly in Tentzelius. It is sufficient to my purpose to have taken notice of the *first*, and most considerable in its kind.

Anglo-Saxon Versions.

There have been Anglo-Saxon versions of this Creed 930.
as early as the time of K. Athelstan; as appears from the manuscript of the Royal library with an *interlinear* version, noted above; and which I place in 930. The Lambeth manuscript of 957 has also an *interlinear* Saxon version: both which manuscripts confirm the account given of an Anglo-Saxon copy of this Creed printed from a Latin manuscript, interlined with Saxon, out of the church of Salisbury. The *version* itself seems to have been made about the middle of the tenth century, or about 950; which suits very well with the age of the manuscripts before mentioned. Only, this we may expect, that the Saxon copies of those manuscripts will be found much more *correct* than the Sarum copy, (and so I find that of Lambeth is, having a copy of it by me, which I owe to the civility of the very learned Dr. Wilkins,) being written at a time when the Saxon language was less corrupted, and retained more of its primitive purity; whereas the Sarum copy was written[l], as is conjectured, after both Danes and Normans had much altered the language. I before observed, that the title in Dr. Wotton's copy is Hymnus Athanasii, as in St. James's copy: and there is something farther worth the noting, which is the rubrick following the title, directing the Creed to be sung *alter-*

[h] Lambec. Catal. lib. ii. p. 763.

[i] Tentzel. Judic. Erudit. Præf. et p. 226.

[k] Le Long, Biblioth. Biblic. vol. i. p. 376.

[l] Versionem istam circiter medium *decimi sæculi* esse factam ipsius sermonis cum puritate (ubi non hallucinatur interpres) conjuncta proprietas ostendit. *Recentius* vero descriptam fuisse, sub Nortmannorum in Angliam adventum, non tantum librarii linguæ Saxonicæ haud gnari recentior manus in qua exaratur, sed pravum illud Anglo Danicum, vel forsan Anglo Nortmannicum, scribendi genus demonstrat. *Wotton. Not. ad Brevem Conspect. Operis Hickesiani*, p. 75.

nately[m]; which confirms the account given by Abbo Floriacensis of the custom of the Gallican and English churches in that age. But to proceed; from the time we have had any version of this Creed into our country language, we may reasonably conclude that such versions have varied, by little and little, in every age, in proportion to the gradual alteration in our language; till at length the version became such as it stands at this day. Such as are desirous of having a specimen of the Creed in very old English *verse*, may find one in Dr. Hickes's Thesaurus[n]. And they may see a good part of a *prose version* in old English, (though considerably later than the other,) in Wickliff's comment, before mentioned: or an entire version into the English of that time in a manuscript of Pepys's library now belonging to our College, N. 2498. p. 368. I may here note, that all our Saxon and English versions down to the time of the Reformation, or to the year 1548, were from the Latin only, and not from any Greek copy: and after that time, upon the return of Popery, the old version from the Latin came again into use for a while, as appears by the Primmer set forth by Cardinal Pole in Queen Mary's days, A. D. 1555. But these and the like observations are out of the compass of my design, and so I pass on.

Greek Versions.

I have before intimated that this Creed was originally Latin, and therefore the Greek copies can be no more than *versions:* and they appear to be very *late* also, in comparison to the former. However, since the Greek is one of the *learned* languages, since the Creed has been ascribed to a Greek author, and has been also supposed by many to have been written in Greek; it will therefore be proper to give as particular and as distinct account as

[m] Hymnus Athanasii, de Fide Trinitatis.

* Quem tu *concelebrans*, discutienter intellege. Incipit de Fide.

On which Dr. Wotton makes this note.

* Ita MS. hoc est, quem tu *antiphonatim*, vel *alternatim* psallens, animo percipe, p. 77.

[n] Hickes. Thesaur. Linguar. Septentr. p. 332.

is possible of the Greek version, or versions. Our inquiries here will lie within a little compass: for the Greek copies are neither *many* nor *ancient*. Montfaucon, a very diligent searcher into these matters, frankly professes that he had never seen any Greek copy of this Creed so old as 300 years; nor ever heard of any that was *ancient*[o]. He scruples not to say farther, that there had not been yet seen any Greek record, of *certain* and *undoubted* credit, whereby to prove that this Creed had been known to the Greek Church for more than 500 years upwards[p]. He speaks only of Greek records: as to Latin ones, they afford sufficient proof that this Creed was pleaded against the Greeks in the dispute about the *procession*, in the eighth or ninth century at latest, and therefore must have been in some measure known to them. The Greeks and Latins had some dispute on that head in the Synod of Gentilly, not far from Paris, in the year 767, under King Pepin. But perhaps this Creed was not pleaded at that time: at least it does not appear that it was.

It cannot be doubted but that the Greeks had heard something of this Creed from the Latins, as early as the days of Ratram and Æneas Parisiensis; that is, above 850 years ago, when the dispute about the *procession* between the Greeks and Latins was on foot: this the testimonies above cited plainly show. But this is not enough to prove that the Greek Church had yet any value for this Creed, or that there was then extant any Greek copy of it.

[o] Sane nullum vidimus Græcum hujus Symboli codicem qui *trecentorum* sit annorum; nec *antiquum* alium a quopiam visum fuisse novimus. *Montfaucon, Diatrib.* p. 727.

[p] Adjicere non pigeat non visum hactenus fuisse Græcorum quodpiam monumentum (certum scilicet ac indubitatum) quo ab annis plus quingentis notum Ecclesiæ Græcæ fuisse Symbolum, *Quicunque*, possit comprobari. *Montf. ibid.* p. 721.

To the same purpose speaks Combefis of this Creed.

Vix enim extat præterquam in recentiorum collectaneis, librisque eorum polemicis, quibus ipsum vel impugnant, vel etiam defendunt; idque volunt illi qui aiunt *non haberi in Græcorum libris*; non enim sic stupidi videntur ut negent Græce haberi. *Combef. Not. ad Man. Calec.* p. 297.

1200. Nicolaus Hydruntinus, cited above, who flourished under Alexius IV. emperor of the east, and Pope Innocent the Third, that is, in round numbers about 1200, he gives us the first notice of this Creed being extant in Greek in his time. He observes, that the article of the *procession from the Son* was not in the Greek copy of this Creed, as neither in the Nicene, blaming the Latins, as I apprehend, for *interpolating* both. The censure was just with respect to the Nicene Creed, but not with respect to the Athanasian, which certainly never wanted that article; as is plain from the agreement of the Latin copies, and the earliest of them, those of a thousand years date: which I remark by the way. As to our present purpose, this is certain, that some time before Nicolaus of Otranto wrote, the Creed had been translated into Greek, by a Greek, or at least by one that took part with the Greeks in the question about the procession. It can hardly be imagined that Nicolaus had translated it himself, and that he appealed to his *own* version. There must have been a version before undoubtedly: and one can scarce suppose less than 50 or 100 years before, since both the *time* and *author* of it were forgotten, and this Greek version passed with Nicolaus for Athanasius's original. Manuel Caleca [q], who wrote about the year 1360, intimates that there had been Greek copies long before his time, and that the most ancient of all had the article of the procession from *the Son;* and that the older Greeks who wrote against the Latins did not pretend to strike out that article, as those did that came after. Could we depend upon this report, we might then be certain that the Greek copies of the time of Nicolaus Hydruntinus were late in comparison, and

[q] Testantur autem hanc ipsam Fidei Confessionem sancti viri (Athanasii) esse, atque id dictum ita se habere, qui contra Latinos multo ante scripserunt; quam sibi ut adversam frustra labefactare nituntur. Atque, ut intelligi datur, tunc quidem adhuc servabatur; *postmodum* vero pertinaciores ad contradicendum facti, *omnino auferre* voluerunt: etsi modo nihilominus curiose inquirentibus raro, licet in vetustissimis codicibus, ita habere invenitur. *Man. Calec. contr. Græc.* lib. ii. B. PP.[e] tom. xxvi. p. 414.

that there had been other Greek copies much more ancient. But this I leave to the consideration of the learned. However this fact be, one thing is certain, that the oldest Greek copy could be only a *version*, whether sooner or later.

As to Greek copies now extant in *manuscript*, they are but *few*, and *modern*: I may here give a short account of them, of as many as I have hitherto found mentioned in books, or catalogues of manuscripts.

1. There is one in the Emperor's library at Vienna, said to be in *paper*, *ancient*, and of *good value*[r]. These words are too general to fix any certain date upon: one may guess from the *paper*, that the manuscript is not very ancient; since *paper* came not into frequent or common use before the thirteenth century. But not to insist upon a disputable argument, (since *cotton* paper, though not common, was however sometimes used as early as the tenth century,) one may judge more certainly from what is written in the same volume, and, I suppose, in the same hand, (for Nesselius makes no distinction,) that the copy of the Creed is not earlier than the middle of the fourteenth century. Maximus Planudes makes a part of the manuscript: he flourished about the year 1340.

2. There is another Greek manuscript of this Creed in the same library, a *paper* one too, and said to be *pretty ancient*, by Nesselius, who gives account of it[s]. From the

[r] CCXIV. codex MS. theologicus Græcus est *chartaceus*, *antiquus*, et *bonæ notæ*, in 4to. constatque foliis 341.

Continentur eo hæc.

Imo, &c.

2do et quidem a fol. 77. ad fol. 79. S. Athanasii Archiepiscopi Alexandrini Symbolum Fidei, cujus titulus et principium, Τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀθανασίου τοῦ μεγάλου. Ὅστις δ' ἂν βούληται σωθῆναι, πρὸ πάντων χρὴ κρατεῖν πίστιν, &c. *Nessel. Catal.* vol. i. p. 344.

[s] CXCmus codex MS.——est *chartaceus*, *mediocriter antiquus*, et *bonæ notæ*, in 4to. constatque nunc foliis 332, et ad Johannem Sambucum olim pertinuit. Continentur eo hæc. I. primo, &c.

18° Et quidem a fol. 303. ad fol. 304. S. Athanasii magni, Archiepiscopi Alexandrini, Confessio Catholica Fidei, ad S. Julium Pontificem Romanum; cujus et titulus et principium, Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἀθανασίου τοῦ μεγά-

mention therein made of the Creed's being presented to Pope Julius, I should be apt to conclude that the manuscript is not earlier, nor copied from any earlier than Manuel Caleca's time, or the fourteenth century: but there are other marks, particularly some pieces of Julianus Cardinalis, which demonstrate that the manuscript cannot be much older than the middle of the fifteenth century.

3. Felckman had a manuscript copy of this Creed in Greek, without any *title* to it, or any *author* named[t]. I can say nothing to the age of it, for want of further particulars.

4. Felckman had another manuscript out of the Palatine library, (which library is since transferred partly to the Vatican, the rest to Munich, &c.) with a *title* to it, *σύμβολον τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀθανασίου*, St. Athanasius's Creed[u]. The *title* alone is a sufficient argument of its being *modern*, to any that consider what were the more usual and ancient titles, represented above. It is to be noted that those two manuscript copies are so nearly the same, that they make but *one* copy in print, which has been inserted in all the editions of Athanasius's works after Felckman's, as well as in his, and makes the fifth in Gundlingius[x], who gives us six Greek copies of this Creed. It is observable, that this copy owns not the procession *from the Son:* from whence we may infer that it was not made by the Latins,

λου Ὁμολογία τῆς καθολικῆς πίστιως ἣν ἔδωκε πρὸς Ἰούλιον Πάπαν Ῥώμης. Τῷ θέλοντι σωθῆναι &c. *Nessel. Catal.* vol. i. p. 281.

[t] Extat hoc Symbolum in nostro codice 2 anonymo, sed absque titulo et nomine autoris; unde et sic editum. *Felckman. ed. Athanas. Commelin.* p. 83.

Incipit; Εἴ τις θέλει σωθῆναι, πρὸ πάντων χρὴ αὐτῷ τὴν καθολικὴν κρατῆσαι πίστιν, &c.

[u] Invenimus id ipsum etiam post in codice quodam Palatinæ bibliothecæ, expresse Athanasio inscriptum (licet id recentiores Græci nolint, ut videre est ex epistola Meletii Constantinopolitani Patriarchæ ad Douzam) ex quo etiam discrepantias quasdam notabimus.

Incipit; Εἴ τις θέλει σωθῆναι, πρὸ πάντων χρεία ἐστὶν ἵνα τὴν καθολικὴν κρατήσῃ πίστιν, &c. *Felckman. ibid.*

[x] Gundlingii not. ad Eustrat. et p. 76.

or however not by any who were not friends to the Greeks.

5. Lazarus Baifius's copy[y], which he had from Venice, in the time of Francis I. in the year 1533, was published by Genebrard, anno 1569. This copy probably was contrived by a Latin, (having the procession *from the Son* in it,) or at least by some *honest* Greek, who would not vary from the *original*. I conclude this Greek copy to be *modern*, from the *title;* for a reason before hinted.

6. There was another manuscript copy[z] of this Creed, which Nicolaus Bryling first printed at Basil, and afterwards H. Stephens in France, in the year 1565. This also must, in all probability, be very *modern*, because of σύμβολον in the title. It acknowledges the procession *from the Son*, conformable to the *original*.

7. In the Royal library at Paris, (Numb. 2502,) there is another manuscript Greek copy of this Creed[a], written in the year 1562, published by Genebrard 1569, and said by him to belong to the Church of Constantinople. This was taken from an older manuscript, but how much older cannot certainly be known[b]. One may imagine from the

[y] Titulus; Ἔκθεσις ὁμολογίας τῆς καθολικῆς πίστεως τοῦ μεγάλου Ἀθανασίου πατριάρχου Ἀλεξανδρείας πρὸς Ἰούλιον Πάπαν.

Incipit; Ὅστις ἂν βούληται σωθῆναι, πρὸ πάντων χρὴ κρατεῖν τὴν καθολικὴν πίστιν.

[z] Titulus; Σύμβολον τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀθανασίου.

Incipit; Ὅστις βούλεται σωθῆναι, &c.

[a] De Græcis autem codicibus panca suppetunt dicenda, cum unum tantum nobis inspicere licuerit, scil. Reg. 2502. In quo extat Symbolum superiore sæculo exaratum. *Montf. Diatrib.* p. 722.

Secunda, quam edimus formula, jam olim publici juris facta per Genebrardum anno 1569, quam ait ille esse Ecclesiæ Constantinopolitanæ, extat in regio codice num. 2502. olim ex bibliotheca Johannis Huralti Boistallerii a Carolo IX. Venetias legati, in quo codice hæc leguntur, ante Dialogum S. Athanasii cum Ario—— " transcriptus et recognitus liber hic est, ex vetus- " tissimo exemplari cretico; Venetiis anno 1562, impensa facta aureorum " X. Zacharias Sacerdos transcripsit et habuit." *Montf. Diatrib.* p. 727.

[b] Incertum autem utrum ex illo quod memorat *vetustissimo exemplari*, Symbolum etiam sit mutuatus; codex quippe amplæ molis multa et varia complectitur, quæ dubitare licet ex unone codice exscripta fuerint, an ex compluribus. *Montf. ibid.*

title[c] and *beginning* of it, that the form is the same with one of those in the Emperor's library, and that they were copied one from the other, or both from a third copy. This manuscript acknowledges the procession *from the Son*. I had understood, from Montfaucon's general way of expression, that Genebrard had published his copy from this very manuscript of the Royal library, Num. 2502. But observing that Genebrard's wants some words (ἀΐδιος ὁ πατὴρ, ἀΐδιος ὁ υἱὸς, ἀΐδιον τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον) which Montfaucon's copy has, I conclude that he meant only the *same form*, as to matter and words, for the most part, not the same manuscript.

8. There is another manuscript Greek version, or rather paraphrase of this Creed, having several interpolations, published by Bishop Usher anno 1647, from a copy sent him by Patrick Young. It has been often since printed: in the Councils, in Gundling, and in Montfaucon.

It leaves out the article of procession *from the Son;* from whence we may judge that it was composed by a Greek, or Grecizing Latin. The title insinuates that the Creed was drawn up in the Nicene Council[d]: an opinion entertained by Johan. Cyparissiota, about the year 1360, as observed above. When this story or fiction first came in, I cannot pretend to determine. Bishop Usher speaks of a *very ancient* manuscript, partly in Irish and partly in Latin, which hints at the same thing: but he fixes no date to the manuscript; the words, *very ancient*, are too general to give satisfaction in it. The Creed is there said to have been composed in the Nicene Council, by Eusebius and Dionysius, and a *third* left *nameless*[e], as not

[c] Titulus; Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις Πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἀθανασίου τοῦ μεγάλου ὁμολογία τῆς καθολικῆς πίστεως ἣν ἔδωκε πρὸς Ἰούλιον Πάπαν Ῥώμης.

Incipit; Τῷ θέλοντι σωθῆναι, &c.

[d] Ἐκ τῆς ἁγίας καὶ οἰκουμενικῆς τῆς ἐν Νικαίᾳ, περὶ πίστεως κατὰ συντομίαν, ᾗ πῶς δεῖ πιστεύειν τὸν ἀληθῆ χριστιανόν. *Usser. de Symb.* p. 26.

[e] In hymnorum, partim Latino partim Hibernico sermone scriptorum, codice vetustissimo——notatum reperi, trium Episcoporum opera, in eadem Nicæna Synodo illud fuisse compositum, Eusebii, et Dionysii, *et nomen tertii* (sic enim ibi legitur) *nescimus. Usser. de Symb. præf.*

being known. The author of that book of Hymns must have been very ignorant, not to know Athanasius, who was undoubtedly the *third* man, and for whose sake (to account for the Creed's being written in Latin) the whole story seems to have been contrived. By Eusebius must have been intended Eusebius of Verceil in Piedmont, a Latin, and a great friend and intimate of Athanasius: by Dionysius undoubtedly is meant Dionysius Bishop of Milan, of the same time and of the same principles, and well acquainted with Eusebius[f]. Had the contrivers of the fable laid their scene at Alexandria, where Athanasius and this Eusebius, with several other Latins, met together in the year 362, they had made it the more plausible. But let us return to our Greek copies, from which we have a little digressed.

This is observable of the Greek copies in general, that they differ very widely from each other, and therefore cannot be copies of one and the same version. Possibly, three or four of them may be thrown into one, admitting however many *various lections:* but still there will be as many remaining, which cannot be so dealt with, but must be looked upon as distinct and different versions. Such as desire to see all the copies together, may find them in Gundling and Montfaucon; four at large, the rest exhibited only by *various lections.* I do not know whether the manuscripts of the Vienna library have been *collated* for any of the *printed* editions: perhaps not; I do not remember that I have met with any mention of them, in any of the editors of the printed copies.

It may be of use to set the *printed* editions, after our account of the manuscripts, in chronological order, as dis-

[f] It seems highly probable, that the whole fable about Eusebius and Dionysius was first raised out of a passage of St. Ambrose, which might be thought to hint some such thing. The words are:

"Itaque ut Eusebius Sanctus prior levavit vexillum confessionis, ita beatus "Dionysius in exilii locis, priori martyribus titulo vitam exhalavit." *Ambros. ad Vercellens.* Ep. lxiii. p. 1039.

tinctly as may be, since we cannot fix the dates of the manuscript copies.

1540. 1. The first printed edition was by Nicolaus Bryling[g], a printer of Basil. My authors have been deficient in not setting down the date of it. I have endeavoured to fix the year, but have not yet been so happy as to come to a certainty in it. Wherefore, I hope, my reader will excuse it, if, rather than set no year at all, I choose one which I know cannot be very much over or under, because of other pieces printed by the same Bryling about that time. Fabricius mentions Michael Neander as editor of the same copy after Bryling, and before Stephens: but what year is not said. Sebastian Lepusculus's[h] edition of the same was in 1559[i]; and Stephens's in 1565.

1569. 2. The second *printed* copy was taken from the manuscript of Lazarus Baiffius, which he received from Dionysius[k], a Greek, in the year 1533, as before hinted. This was first printed by Genebrard in the year 1569, again in 1585, and oftentimes since. This copy is sometimes called the Dionysian copy; and it is observed by Gundling to differ from the first copy but in *seven* places; and there-

[g] Quod olim evulgavit Basileæ Nicolaus Bryling; deinde in Gallia anno 1565, Henricus Stephanus. *Genebrard. in Symb. Athanas.* p. 8.

Quam post Nic. Brylingium, et Mich. Neandrum, H. Stephanus in lucem edidit. *Fabric. Bibl. Græc.* vol. v. p. 315.

[h] Sebastian. Lepusculi compendium Josephi Gorionidis, cum Collectaneis quibusdam, p. 49. *Basil.* 1559.

[i] Nic. Serarius, who wrote in the year 1590, speaking of that first copy printed by Bryling and Stephens, says as follows:

"Quarum prima *vulgata* dici potest, eo quod hactenus ea sola hic apud "nos, Germania et Gallia, typis evulgata fuerit." *Nicol. Serar. de Symbol. Athanas. Opusc. Theolog.* tom. ii. p. 9.

[k] Hoc Symbolum reperi in libro Græco MS. de processione Spiritus Sancti, quem Lazaro Baiffio oratori regis Francisci I. apud Venetos, obtulit Dionysius Græcus, Episcopus Zicnensis et Firmiensis anno 1533. *Genebr. Comm. in Symb. Athanas.* p. 8.

In manus meas pervenit liber quidam Græcus, de processione Spiritus Sancti, oblatus Lazaro Baiffio claro regis nostri Francisci I. apud Venetos oratori, anno Christi 1533. Quem manu sua elegantissime pinxerat Nicolaus Sophianus Patrum nostrorum ævo vir valde doctus. *Genebr. ibid.* p. 2.

fore these two have been commonly thrown into one, by the editors of both.

3. The *third* copy was also first printed by Genebrard, at the same time with the other. It has gone under the name of the Constantinopolitan copy, because Genebrard supposed it to have been in use at Constantinople[1]. It differs considerably from both the other, and is never thrown into one with them, but kept distinct by itself. 1569.

4. The *fourth* is the Commeline, or Felckman's copy, from the Palatine manuscripts, often reprinted with Athanasius's works. This also stands by itself as a distinct version. 1600.

5. The *fifth* was first published by Usher, in the year 1647. This differs extremely from all the rest, having, besides many *variations* and slight insertions, one very large *interpolation*. It hath been often reprinted since Usher's time. 1647.

6. The *sixth* and last was first published by Labbe and Cossart in the second tome of Councils. This copy comes the nearest to the two first, and therefore is sometimes thrown into one with them: but it differs from both in about *forty* places, according to Gundling's computation. 1671.

These are all the *printed* copies; which are sometimes called *four*, and sometimes *six*: *four*, because the *first*, *second*, and *sixth* may be tolerably thrown into one; *six*, because they may also be kept distinct, and may be reckoned as so many *copies* at least, if not so many several *versions*. So much for the Greek versions of our Creed.

To the versions already mentioned may be added the Sclavonian, of several *dialects*, and, as I conceive, pretty *ancient*: but we have little or no account of them; only, as I shall show in the sequel, we may be certain that there have been such. There are Italian, Spanish, Irish, and Welsh versions; but whether any that can justly be

[1] Superius Symbolum, Athanasii verbis aliquantulum immutatis, Constantinopolitani sic Græce legunt, et recitant. *Genebr. ibid.* p. 14.

called *ancient*, I know not. Future searches into libraries may perhaps produce farther discoveries. Fabricius makes mention of an Hebrew version of late date, and of an Arabic one still later[m]: but these or the like *modern* versions will be of no use to us in our present inquiries.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Reception of the Athanasian Creed *in the Christian Churches.*

FROM the materials here laid down, we may now be able to determine something about the *reception* of the Creed, especially in the western Churches; among which the Churches of France, or Gaul, ought undoubtedly to be named first.

France, or Gaul.

A. D. 550. This Creed obtained in France in the time of Hincmar, or about 850, without all dispute. We may advance higher up to 772: for it was then in Charles the Great's Psalter, among the Hymns of the Church. The Cotton manuscript Psalter, with this Creed in it, will carry us up to 703: and the Canon of the Council of Autun to 670; at which time the Gallican clergy, at least of the *diocese* of Autun, in the province of Lyons, were obliged to recite this Creed together with the Apostles', under pain of episcopal *censure*. Which shows of how great value and esteem the Creed was at that time, and affords a strong presumption (as Quesnel and Pagi[n] well argue in the

[m] Hebraice versum a Julio Marcello Romano MS. in bibliotheca Vaticana memorat Imbonatus in bibl. Latino Hebraica, p. 149. Sed omitto recentiores versiones, ut Arabicam a Nisselio editam Lugd. Bat. 1656. 4to, una cum Cantico Canticor. *Fabric. Bibl. Græc.* v. 5. p. 315.

Georgius Nisselius Symbolum Athanasii Arabico idiomate cum Cantico Canticorum Æthiopice et Arabice edito Lugd. Bat. anno 1656, conjunxit—— id tamen non hausit ex codice MS. sed ipse in Arabicum sermonem transtulit. *Tentzel.* p. 125.

[n] Dubium non est quin multis ante Synodum illam Augustodunensem annis compositum esset, et jam olim per totam Ecclesiam celebre evasisset:

case) that it had been in use there long before. There will be some doubt, as I intimated above, about the supposed Canon of the Council of Autun; which will in some measure abate the force of our evidence, and of the argument built upon it. But as it is certain from other evidence, that this Creed was received in the Gallican churches as high as 772 or 703; so it must be owned that this very much confirms the supposition of the Council of Autun: and the concurring circumstances give very great light and strength to each other. But what most of all confirms the foregoing evidence, and the reasoning upon it, is, that Venantius Fortunatus, a full hundred years before the Council of Autun, had met with this Creed in the Gallican parts, and found it then to be in such esteem as to deserve to be *commented* upon, like the Lord's Prayer, and Apostles' Creed: accordingly he wrote comments upon it, as well as upon the other. This wonderfully confirms the reasoning of Quesnel and Pagi, that this Creed must have been in use there near a hundred years before the Council of Autun, that is, as high as 570, about which time Fortunatus flourished and wrote. And considering that this Creed must have been for some time growing into repute, before it could be thought worthy to have such honour paid it, along with the Lord's Prayer and Apostles' Creed; I may perhaps be allowed to set the time of its *reception*, in the Gallican churches, some years higher: reception of it, I mean, as an excellent formulary, or an acknowledged *rule* of *faith*, though not perhaps admitted into their *sacred* Offices. Upon the whole, and upon the strength of the foregoing evidences, we may

nunquam enim sapientissimi præsules id commisissent, ut istam fidei formulam omnium ordinum clericis amplectendam, et *irreprehensibiliter*, ut aiunt, recensendam, Synodali edicto sub *condemnationis pœna* præciperent; imo et illam e regione cum Symbolo Apostolico ponerent, nisi jam *longo usu recepta*, approbata, et inter germanas Magni Athanasii lucubrationes numerata fuisset; quod nisi post plurium annorum seriem fieri vix potuit. *Quesnel, Dis.* xiv. p. 731.

Quare jam ante *centum* fere annis opus illud Athanasio attributum fuerat. *Pagi, Critic. in Baron.* vol. i. p. 441.

reasonably conclude, that the reception of this Creed, in the Gallican churches, was at least as early as 670; understanding it of its reception into the public Offices: but understanding it of its reception as a *rule* of *faith*, or an orthodox and excellent formulary and system of *belief*, it may be justly set as high as 550, which is but twenty years, or thereabout, before Fortunatus commented upon it. Le Quien scruples not to set it as high as 500[o].

Spain.

630. Next to France, we may mention her near neighbour Spain, which seems to have received this Creed very early, and within less than a hundred years after the time before fixed for its reception in France. As to the truth of the fact, it may be argued two several ways. 1. From the near affinity and relation between the Spanish and Gallican Offices, before either France or Spain had received the Roman. 2. From the fourth Council of Toledo, their quoting passages from this very Creed.

1. As to the first argument, though a *general* one, it must appear of great weight. If the sacred Offices in France and Spain were in those times the same, or very nearly so; then the reception of this Creed in France will afford a very considerable argument of its reception in Spain also.

Cardinal Bona is very large and diffuse in setting forth the agreement and harmony of the old Gallican Offices with the Spanish, in sundry particulars[p]. And he supposes this uniformity of the two Churches to have been as early, at least, as the days of Gregory Bishop of Tours, who died in the year 595. Mabillon, after him, frequently asserts the same thing[q], and with greater assurance than Bona had done; having met with new and fuller evidences to prove it: only, he dates the agreement of the Spanish Mosarabick Offices with the Gallican, from the third and

[o] Non nisi ex eodem Symbolo, quod jam ante *receptum* esset, Avitus Viennensis——alicubi scribebat &c. *Le Quien, Dissert. Damascen.* p. 98.

[p] Bona, Rerum Liturg. lib. i. cap. 12. p. 372.

[q] Mabillon, de Liturg. Gallican. præf. et lib. i. cap. 3. p. 20, 23.

fourth Councils of Toledo[r], the latter of which was in the year 633. Mr. Dodwell, speaking of the same matter, says, "Nor does Mabillon himself judge it probable that "the innovations attempted by Pope Vigilius in Spain "held long, of what kind soever they were. All Spain "was soon after united in *one form*, and that different "from the Romans, and agreeing with the Gallican[s]." It is therefore a plain case, that the Gallican and Spanish Offices were very much the same in the beginning of the seventh century, and so continued for some time. If therefore the Gallican churches received the Athanasian Creed into their public Offices before the year 670, it will appear extremely probable that the Spanish received it also, and about the same time. I here make a distinction, as I did before, between receiving the Creed as a *rule* of *faith*, and receiving it into the solemn Offices, to be recited or sung in churches. The *reception* of it, in the first sense, I conceive to have been somewhat earlier in Spain, as well as in France, than its reception in the latter sense. But as different churches in France had anciently different customs, so also was it in Spain: and therefore it is probable that the reception of this Creed into the public Offices was in some churches sooner, and in others later, according to the various rites, customs, and circumstances of the several churches.

But I proceed to the second article, whereby we are to prove the reception of this Creed in Spain.

2. The fourth Council of Toledo cites a considerable part of this Creed, adopting it into their own *Confession*[t].

[r] Mabillon, lib. i. c. 4. p. 32.

[s] Dodwell of Incense, p. 190.

[t] Nec personas confundimus, nec substantiam separamus. Patrem a nullo factum, vel genitum dicimus: Filium a Patre non factum, sed genitum, asserimus: Spiritum vero Sanctum nec creatum, nec genitum, sed procedentem a Patre et Filio profitemur, ipsum autem Dominum Jesum Christum——ex substantia Patris ante sæcula genitum——æqualis Patri secundum divinitatem, minor Patre secundum humanitatem.——Hæc est Ecclesiæ Catholicæ Fides: hanc confessionem conservamus, atque tenemus. Quam quisquis firmissime custodierit, perpetuam salutem habebit. *Concil. Tolet. IV.* Capitul. 1.

We may be confident that the Creed did not borrow the expressions from them, but they from the Creed; since we are certain that this Creed was made long before the year 633. The reference to this very Creed appears so plain in the words of that Council, that most of the learned have concluded from thence, that the Spanish Fathers had both seen and approved this Creed. Baronius is positive that the Council took their expressions from it[u]. Calvisius dates the *publication* of the Creed from that Council[x]: so also Alstedius[y]. Gavantus, in his comments upon the Roman Breviary, concludes from thence that this Creed had been *read in the Church*, as high as that time[z]. Helvicus[a] falls in with the opinion of Calvisius and Alstedius, grounded upon the expressions of this Council being parallel to those of the Creed. These authors have perhaps carried the point too far, in supposing this a sufficient proof of any *public* reception of the Creed in Spain, at that time, or of its being *read* in their *churches:* but it is clear enough, that the Spanish Fathers had both seen and approved it; otherwise they could not, or would not, have borrowed so plainly from it. Thus much is allowed by most of the learned moderns, as Quesnel[b], Natalis Alex-

[u] Ex eodem Athanasii Symbolo ea verba primi Capituli Toletani quarti Concilii deducta noscuntur, quibus dicitur, *Patrem a nullo factum*, &c. *Baron. Annal.* tom. iii. p. 436.

[x] Repositum fuit in archivis, nec *publicatum*, nisi, quantum ex historiis conjicere licet, post trecentos fere annos, ubi in Concilio Toletano quarto quædam ex eo translata verba recensentur. *Seth. Calvis. Op. Chronolog.* p. 396.

[y] Symbolum Athanasii ab illo scriptum est Romæ itidem contra Arium. Publicatum est post 300 fere annos in Concilio Toletano, et inde usque ad nostra tempora in Ecclesia usurpatum. *Alsted. Thesaur.* p. 178.

[z] Athanasius dum esset Romæ, scripsit Latine Symbolum——et recitavit coram Pontifice et ei assidentibus, anno 340, ut scribit Baronius; et est illud idem, non mutatum, *legique solitum in Ecclesia*, ante annos nongentos sexaginta. *Vide Annales ad Annum prædictum. Barthol. Gavant. Commentar. in Rubric. Breviarii Romani*, p. 106.

[a] Athanasius Symbolum scribit Romæ, et Concilio offert; non tamen publicatur, nisi post 300 ferme annos in Concilio Toletano. *Helvic. Theatr. Histor. ad an.* 339.

[b] Imo et jam ab anno 633 aliqua ex isto Symbolo descripta mihi videntur

ander[c], Montfaucon[d], Tillemont[e], Muratorius, Oudin[f], and others, that the expressions of that Council and this Creed are parallel, and one borrowed from the other, and the words of the Council from the words of the Creed: only, Muratorius hints as if a doubt might be made whether the Council took from the Creed, or the Creed from the Council[g]; which may seem strange in him, who supposes the Creed to have been made by Fortunatus, many years before that Council was held. But, I suppose, he is there speaking of the argument drawn from the words of that Council alone, abstracting from the other circumstance, and previous to the consideration of Fortunatus's comment: otherwise he is guilty of a very great oversight. It appears then, that this Creed was known and approved in Spain as early as 633: and it is observable how exactly this falls in with the time, when the Spanish churches are supposed to have received the Gallican Offices, according to Mabillon's account. Wherefore it is extremely probable, that about this time they received this Creed from the Gallican churches; received it as an orthodox formulary, and an approved *rule* of *faith*. As to their taking it into their *public* Service and Psalmody, I pretend not to set it so high, having no proof that they did *receive* it, in that sense, so early: but as soon as the Gallican churches made it a part of their Psalmody, we may reasonably think that the Spanish did so too; or within a very short time after.

in ea Confessione Fidei, quæ edita est a Concilio Toletano 4. habeturque Capit. 1. ejusdem. *Quesnel, Dissert.* xiv. p. 731.

[c] Natal. Alexand. tom. iv. p. 109.

[d] Montfauc. Diatrib. p. 720.

[e] Tillemont, Mémoires, tom. viii. p. 670.

[f] Oudin. Comment. de Script. Eccl. p. 348.

[g] Verum ne majoris quidem momenti sunt verba illa, quæ in Concilii Toletani quarti professione leguntur: quamvis enim phrases nonnullæ ibidem inveniantur Symboli phrasibus oppido similes, attamen ejusmodi non sunt ut iis patribus Symbolum jam innotuisse demonstrent. Quin ex eodem Concilio has formulas quis delibasse videri potest, ut inde Symbolum istud conflaret. *Muratorii Anecdot. Ambros.* tom. ii. p. 223.

GERMANY.

787. Next to France and Spain, we may mention Germany; not only because of their nearness of situation to France, but also because of their mutual intercourse and affinity with each other. This Creed, very probably, was received in some parts of Germany, soon after it obtained in the Gallican Church. The mutual intercourse of the German and Gallican Churches makes it probable: and the ancient manuscript of the Creed found at Treves, or Triers, in Germany, may persuade the same thing. Our positive evidence is however clear and certain for the reception of the Creed, as early as 870, being then translated by Otfridus into the German or Teutonic language. Anscharius's Instructions to his Clergy (above mentioned) will afford an argument for the reception of this Creed in Germany, from the time of his holding the see of Hamburg, or from 830: and it was received at Basil, as we learn from Hatto, Bishop of the place, before 820. Indeed, I have above referred Basil to France, considering how it stood in Hatto's time, and that it was part of ancient Gaul: but then it was upon the confines of Germany, and has in later times been reckoned to it; and we have good reason to think that the customs of the German churches in the ninth century were nearly the same with those of the Church of Basil in 820. What passed in the Council of Frankfort (if I mistake not in my construction of it) may warrant the carrying it up as high as 794. And it was seven years before that, namely in the year 787[h], that Pope Adrian sent to St. Willehad, Bishop of Breme, the famous Psalter of Charles the Great[i], with this Creed

[h] Mabill. Act. Sanct. sæc. iii. part. 2. p. 409.

[i] Codex iste——in bibliotheca cubiculari summi pontificis Hadriani I. permansit usque ad annum DCCLXXXVIII. quo S. Willehadus ab eodem, cum consensu Caroli M. primus Episcopus Bremensis declaratus est. Tunc videlicet P. P. Hadrianus eundem illum codicem Psalterii, quem ipse in principio pontificatus sui tanquam munus gratulatorium a Carolo Magno acceperat, eadem ratione donavit S. Willehado, ut ille, in novo Episcopatu

in it, the same that I have spoken of above. No wonder therefore that Anscharius and Rembertus, afterwards Archbishops of Hamburg and Breme, so very highly valued this Creed. The particular regard paid to this Creed by Charles the Great, in the year 772, may plead perhaps in favour of a more early date: at least, no doubt can be made but as soon as he came to be emperor, if not a great deal sooner, the German churches (as well as the Gallican before) admitted this Creed, even into their *public* Offices. It is of this time that an *anonymous* author cited above, in a tract directed to Charlemagne, then Emperor, says, that this Creed was "professed by the uni-"versal Church." We cannot however be mistaken in setting the *reception* of it in Germany, as high as the year 787. So high may pass for *certain* fact: and there is great probability for the running it up many years higher.

England.

AS to our own country, we have clear and positive proof of the Creed's being sung alternately in our churches in the *tenth* century, when Abbo of Fleury, an ear-witness of it, was here; and when the Saxon versions, still extant, were of standing use for the instruction and benefit both of clergy and people. These evidences alone will prove the *reception* of this Creed in England to have been as early as 950 or 930, or the time of Athelstan, whose Latin Psalter, with the Creed in it, remains to this day. The age of the manuscript *versions* will warrant us thus far: but, possibly, if those *versions* were thoroughly examined by a critic in the Saxon, it might appear that the version or versions were some years older than the manuscripts. But it may be worth the observing farther, that among several other ancient professions of faith drawn up by our bishops of the Saxon times there is one of 800.

suo, frueretur usu sacri istius muneris. *Lambec. Catal. Bibl. Vindob.* lib. ii. cap. 5. p. 297.

Denebert Bishop of Worcester, presented to Archbishop Athelard in the year 799, which contains in it a considerable part of the Athanasian Creed[k]. From whence may be concluded, that this formulary was well known here and well approved, among the learned at least, in those times. Wherefore, upon the whole, and all circumstances considered, I may presume to name the year 800, or thereabout, for the reception of this Creed in England. Further inquiries may perhaps carry it up higher: but it cannot reasonably be brought lower, and so there I leave it.

ITALY.

880. WE learn from Ratherius, above cited, that this Creed was in common use in some parts of Italy, particularly in the diocese of Verona in Low Lombardy, in his time; that is, about 960. He then speaks of it as a man would do of a formulary that had been customary amongst them, and of long standing. He exhorts his clergy to make themselves masters of the three Creeds, Apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian; without the least intimation of the last of them being newly introduced. I incline to think that from the time that Lombardy became a province of the French under Charles the Great, (about the year 774,) this Creed obtained there by means of that *prince*, who had so great a value for it, and whose custom it was to disperse it abroad wherever he had any power or influence. He presented it to the Pope himself in 772: he delivered it, about the same time, or before, to the monks of Mount Olivet in Jerusalem, of his foundation. And it appears to have been with his consent, or perhaps at his request, that Pope Adrian conveyed it to Willehad, the first Bishop of Breme, in 787. These circumstances make it highly probable, that the same Charles the Great introduced this Creed into Lombardy soon after his con-

[k] Orthodoxam, Catholicam Apostolicam Fidem, sicut didici, paucis exponam verbis, quia scriptum est, *Quicunque vult salvus esse*—&c. *Profess. Deneberti Ep. Wigorn. apud Text. Roff.* p. 252.

quest of it. And indeed nothing could be more serviceable at that time, in a country which had so long before been corrupted with *Arianism*. Add to this, that it appears highly probable that the Gallican Psalter was introduced into the churches of Italy soon after Lombardy became a province under the kings of France: and if their Psalter came in, no doubt but their Creed, then a part of their Psalter, came in with it. Cardinal Bona observes, and seems to wonder at it, that the Gallican Psalter obtained in most parts of Italy in the eleventh century[1]. He might very probably have set the date higher, as high perhaps, or very near, as the conquest of Lombardy by Charlemagne. Thus far at least we may reasonably judge, that those parts which were more immediately subject to the kings of France, Verona especially, one of the first cities taken, received the Gallican Psalter sooner than the rest. However, since I here go only upon probabilities, and have no positive proof of the precise time when either the Creed or the Psalter came in, and it might take up some years to introduce them, and settle them there, (new customs generally meeting with difficulties and opposition at the first,) these things considered, I am content to suppose the year 880 for the reception of this Creed in Italy; which is but eighty years higher than Ratherius, and is above one hundred years from the entire conquest of Lombardy by Charles the Great. There may be some reason to suspect that this Creed had been known in Italy, and *received*, at least in some of the monasteries there, near two hundred years before. The manuscript of Bobio, in Langobardick character, and written about the year 700, or sooner, will afford a very strong presumption of it. And if we consider how from the year 637, in the time of Rotharis, one of the Lombard kings of Italy, there had been a constant struggle between the Catholics and Arians, and a succession of *bishops* on both sides kept up, in almost every

[1] Bona, Rerum Liturg. lib. ii. c. 3. p. 506.

city of his dominions, for many years together; I say, from these considerations, one might reasonably presume that the Catholics had about that time procured this Creed, together with Bachiarii Fides, and Gennadius's tract, out of the Gallican parts, to arm themselves the better against the spreading heresy. But as this does not amount to a *public reception* of it, nor is the fact so clear as not to be liable to dispute, I pretend not to insist upon it.

Rome.

930. Rome is of distinct consideration from the other parts of Italy, and was always more desirous of imposing her own Offices upon other churches, than of receiving any from them. The *Filioque*, in the Constantinopolitan Creed, had been long admitted into all the other western churches before Rome would accept it; which was not (at least it does not appear that it was) till the middle of the eleventh century, or about 1050. The custom of reciting the Nicene, or Constantinopolitan Creed, in the Communion Service, had prevailed in Spain, France, and Germany, for several centuries; and was at length but hardly admitted at Rome in the year 1014. It was thought civil enough of the Popes of Rome to allow the other western churches to vary from the Roman customs in any thing: and those other churches could not enjoy that liberty and privilege in quiet, without complying with the Roman Offices in most things besides. The use of the Athanasian Creed was one of those things wherein they were beforehand with the Church of Rome, and in which they were indulged; as was also the use of the Gallican Psalter, which the western churches in general were allowed [m] to have,

[m] Alexander IV. in sua Constitutione quæ est sexta in Bullario ordinis Eremitarum Sancti Augustini, mandat Priori Generali et reliquis fratribus in Tuscia, ut recitent Officium juxta morem Romanæ Ecclesiæ, excepto Psalterio. *Bona, Rer. Liturg.* lib. ii. c. 3. p. 506.

Sic quoque S. Franciscus, ut testatur Frassenius (Disqu. Bib. c. vi. s. 1.) illius ordinis frater, in regula suorum præcipit: *Clerici faciant divinum*

while the Romans were tenacious of their *own*. But though the Romans retained their own Psalter all the way down to the middle of the sixteenth century; yet they had long before borrowed this Creed from the Gallican, and received it into their Offices. This is certain fact; but as to the precise time when it was first done, it may not be easy to determine. It was, without all question, before Thomas Aquinas's days; who tells us, (as above cited,) that this Creed was "received by the au-"thority of the Pope:" I wish he had told us *what* Pope. That it was not received into the Roman Offices so soon as the year 809 may be probably argued from a case that then happened, which has been hinted above. The Latin monks of Mount Olivet, (founded by Charles the Great,) in their Apologetical Letter to Pope Leo III. made the best defence they were able of their own practice in their public professing that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the *Son*. They pleaded the open acknowledgment of the same doctrine in Charles the Great's own chapel; and that the same doctrine had been taught them, in St. Gregory's Homilies, and in the Rule of St. Benedict, and in the Athanasian Creed, and in a Dialogue given them by Pope Leo himself[n]. Now, had the Athanasian Creed been at that time recited in the public Offices at Rome, those monks who were so particular in every little circumstance pleadable in their favour, could not have failed (especially upon their mentioning the Athanasian Creed)

Officium secundum ordinem sanctæ Romanæ Ecclesiæ, excepto Psalterio. Hod. de Text. Bibl. p. 383. Vid. etiam supra p. 164.

[n] Benignissime pater, dum essem ego Leo, servus vester, ad sancta vestigia vestra, et ad pia vestigia Domni Karoli, piissimi Imperatoris, filiique vestri, audivimus in capella ejus dici in Symbolo Fidei, *qui ex Patre Filioque procedit*. Et in Homilia S. Gregorii, quam nobis filius vester Domnus Karolus Imperator dedit, in parabola Octavarum Paschæ, ubi dixit: *Sed ejus missio ipsa processio est, qui de Patre procedit et Filio*. Et in Regula S. Benedicti, quam nobis dedit filius vester Domnus Karolus,——et in Dialogo quem nobis *vestra sanctitas* dare dignata est, similiter dicit. Et in Fide S. Athanasii eodem modo dicit. *Epist. Monach. Montis Olivet. apud Le Quien, Damasc. Dissert. Præv.* p. 7.

to have pleaded a thing so notorious, and which would have given the greatest countenance and authority possible to them and their doctrine; and must have been of the greatest weight and force with Pope Leo, to whom they were writing, and whose protection they were then seeking, and humbly imploring. From hence then one may reasonably infer, that this Creed was not received into the Roman Offices so early as the year 809. Let us now inquire whether we can fix upon any later time for its coming in.

Genebrard testifies, that in the oldest Roman Breviaries he could meet with or hear of, this Creed always made a part of the Service [o]. But this is too general, nor can we be certain how ancient those oldest Breviaries were, nor whether they belonged to the Roman Church, strictly so called, or to other western churches. And indeed I know not how we can come to any certainty in this matter, unless it be by examining into the Roman Psalters which have this Creed in them. Whenever the Creed came into the Roman Psalters, we may justly conclude, that at the same time it came into the Roman Offices. We have in our public library at Cambridge a Roman Psalter, written for the use of the church of Canterbury, (as our judicious Mr. Wanley reasonably conjectures [p],) and about the time of the Conquest, or a little before, suppose 1060. The church of Canterbury more especially used the Roman Psalter, as hath been observed above, and was in all things conformable, of old time, to the Roman Offices. Now if this Creed, which had long before been introduced into the Gallican Psalters, did at this time obtain in the Roman also; it is obvious to con-

[o] In vetustissimis Romanæ Ecclesiæ ὡρολογίοις (hæc nunc vocamus Breviaria) sub Athanasii nomine ejus ad *primam* recitatio usu recepta est. *Genebr. in Symb. Athanas.* p. 3.

[p] Notandum vero in Litania extare hæc verba: *Ut archiepiscopum nostrum, et omnem congregationem illi commissam, in sancta religione conservare digneris, te rogamus:* quibus pene inducor ut credam hunc cod. olim pertinuisse ad ecclesiam Christi Salvatoris Cantuariæ. *Wanleii Catal.* p. 152.

clude, that it at the same time made a part of the Roman Offices, even at Rome itself, as well as Canterbury, since one was conformable to the other. This argument may carry us up some years higher: for there is another, an older Roman Psalter, taken notice of above, which has this Creed in it; written about the year 930, in the time of King Athelstan. It is said to have belonged formerly to Archbishop Cranmer. Perhaps this also might have been written for the use of the church of Canterbury: I know of no church, amongst us, which at that time used the Roman Psalter, but the church of Canterbury. However, it is highly improbable that any church which complied so far with Rome, as to use the Roman Psalter, should take this Creed into that Psalter before such time as Rome itself had done the same thing. Upon the strength of this argument, though it be not demonstrative, but probable only, (such as the case will admit of, and such as may very well pass till we can fix upon something more certain,) I say upon the strength of this, I incline to date the *reception* of this Creed at Rome from the *tenth* century, and the beginning of it, about the year 930. From this time forwards, I presume, the Athanasian Creed has been honoured with a *public* recital, among the other sacred Hymns and Church Offices, all over the west. The way has been to recite it at the *prime*, or first hour, (*one o'clock* in the Latin account, with us *seven* in the morning,) every Lord's Day[q]; and in some places *every* day[r]. But as the custom of making it only a part of the Sunday Service is the most *ancient*, so has it likewise been the most *general* and *prevailing*; and is at this

[q] Die Dominico ad *primam* recitetur. *Hatt. Basil.* A. D. 820.

Per omnes occidentis ecclesias Dominicis semper diebus psallitur——in cunctis ecclesiis publice cani præcepta. *Manuel. Calec. Bibl. PP.* tom xxvi. p. 414.

[r] Fidem, *Quicunque vult*, quotidie ad primam iterat. *Honor. August.* Ad primam dicunt *quotidie* Symbolum Athanasii. *Bona de Carthusianis*, p. 897. *Psalmod.*

Ad primam——quotidie subditur Symbolum Athanasii. *Bona de Ambrosianis*, p. 900. *Divin. Psalmod.*

day the common and constant usage of the churches within the Roman communion. And let this suffice so far as concerns the western churches.

Of the GREEK *and* ORIENTAL CHURCHES.

AS to the Greek, or Oriental churches, I reserved this place for them, that I might not entirely omit them. It has been questioned, whether any of them ever received this Creed at all. Vossius[s] seems to have thought that they never have: and so also Combefisius[t]. And Dr. Smith, in his Account of the Greek Church, is positive that "as to the Creed of Athanasius, the Greeks are "*wholly strangers to it*[u]."

Nevertheless, I find some very considerable men of a contrary persuasion, and not Romanists only, as Baronius, Spondanus[x], Muratorius[y], Renaudot[z], and others, but Protestants also; as particularly Gundling, whose words I have put into the margin[a]. We may observe however,

[s] Nec qui nostra ætate Patriarcha Alexandrinus, et Præses Constantinopoleos fuit, pro germano illud Symbolum habuit. Sic enim Meletius litteris suis Constantinopoli, anno 1597, ad Johannem Douzam, Nordovicem datis, et a filio Georgio Douza editis. "Athanasio falso adscriptum Symbolum, "cum appendice illa Romanorum Pontificum adulteratum, luce lucidius "contestamur." *Voss. de Trib. Symb. Dissert.* ii. c. 20. p. 521.

[t] Combef. not. ad Calec. p. 297. et notatione 48 in vitam Basilii Pseudo-Amphiloch.——*Symbolum Athanasii Græci ut ejus non recipiunt.*

[u] Smith, Account &c. p. 196.

[x] Spondanus epitomizing the words of Baronius, as I find quoted by Tentzelius, p. 152.

Cum autem e Romanæ Ecclesiæ antiquis monumentis, veluti eruderatum emersit in lucem, tum a Latinis omnibus, tum a Græcis æque susceptum est: non ab Ecclesia Constantinopolitana tantum, sed Serviana, Bulgarica, Russica, Moscovitica, et aliis; licet ab eis dempta inde pars illa fuerit, qua Spiritum Sanctum a Patre *Filioque* procedere expressum habetur.

[y] Re vera, non Ecclesia tantum Constantinopolitana, sed Serviana, Bulgarica, Russica, Moscovitica, aliæque ritui Græco addictæ, etsi Athanasiano Symbolo in sacris Liturgiis *utantur*, hanc tamen particulam, *et Filio*, inde exclusere. *Murator.* tom. ii. p. 227.

[z] Quod dicitur Domini Filius assumpsisse hominem &c. rectum est, Symbolo quod Athanasii dicitur, et *a Græcis Latinisque recipitur*, conforme. *Renaud. Orient. Liturg.* vol. ii. p. 643.

[a] Mirari quis possit cur Græci processionem Spiritus Sancti a Filio ne-

that thus far is agreed on all hands, that this Creed is not received in *all* the Greek churches; and if it is in *any*, yet it is there differently read in the article of *procession*. It is not pretended that any of the African churches, Alexandrian, Nubian, or Ethiopian, (which are, most of them, of the Jacobite or Eutychian sect,) have received it. So far from it, that they have not (at least the Ethiopian or Abassine churches have not) so much as the Apostles' Creed amongst them, if we may believe Ludolphus[b]: so little are they acquainted with the Latin forms or confessions. Nor is it pretended that the more eastern Christians, belonging to the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem, have any acquaintance with the Athanasian Creed: no not the Maronites, though they formerly submitted to the see of Rome, and are still supposed to hold communion therewith, and to acknowledge the Pope for their head. All that is pretended, with respect to this Creed, is, that the churches of Constantinople, Servia, Bulgaria, Russia, and Muscovy, acknowledge it as Athanasius's, or make use of it in their common and sacred Offices. And for proof of this, it has been usual to appeal to a passage of Cazanovius, a Polish knight, in a letter of his to Calvin: which letter I have not seen, but find quoted both by Genebrard[c] and Vossius[d], men of opposite principles, and therefore the more safely to be relied on where they agree. But what does Cazanovius confess? That the Greek, Servian, Russian, and Muscovite

gent, additionem ad Symbolum Nicænum tam ægre ferant, cum tamen *Symbolum Athanasii recipiant. Gundling. Not. ad Eustrat.* &c. p. 68.

[b] Ludolph. Histor. Æthiop. lib. iii. c. 5. Symbolo Fidei Catholicæ Nicæno communiter utuntur——illo quo nos utimur, uti cæteri orientales, carent: haud levi indicio Apostolos illius autores non esse.

[c] Si Athanasii est, cujusnam illud erit quod nunc Græcorum, Serviorum, Russorum, et Moscorum ecclesiæ sub ejusdem Athanasii titulo retinent, ac pro genuino agnoscunt? *Cazanov. ad Calvin. Epist. apud Genebr. de Symbol. Athanas.* p. 7.

[d] Cazanovius sarmata——etsi multum ei hoc Symbolum displiceat, agnoscit tamen Athanasianum vocari, non in Latina solum Ecclesia, sed etiam in Constantinopolitana, Serviana, Bulgarica, Moscovitica. *Voss. de Symb. Diss.* ii. c. 1. p. 516.

churches acknowledge the Athanasian Creed as Athanasius's; only *curtailed* (or, as they would say, *corrected*) as to the point of the *procession*. A confession from a Socinian adversary, in this case, is of some weight; and especially if it can be enforced by any corroborating evidence. Let us see then what may be further learned concerning the several churches here named, and the *reception* of this Creed in them. I may take them one by one.

1. To begin with Muscovy, where the matter of fact seems to be most fully attested of any. In the account given of the Lord Carlisle's embassy from King Charles II. to the Great Duke of Muscovy, in the year 1663 [c], I meet with this passage, relating to the Muscovites, and their *divine Service:* "The whole Service is performed by "reading of certain Psalms, or chapters in the Bible: "sometimes the priest adds Athanasius's Creed, or sings "certain hymns, and St. Chrysostom's Homily." In another treatise entitled, Of the Ancient and Modern Religion of the Muscovites, written in French, and printed at Cologne 1698, and since translated into English, there is this account of the Muscovites; that "they receive the "Creed of the Apostles, and that of Nice and Athana-"sius [f]." These two testimonies are undoubtedly sufficient, so far as concerns Muscovy. Now the Muscovites received their religion and their *orders* from the Patriarch of Constantinople, about the tenth century, or beginning of the eleventh: and their receiving of this Creed will be a presumptive argument in favour of its *reception* at Constantinople also, if there be no evident reason against it. That the Muscovites did not receive the Creed from the Latins, but from the Greeks, is very plain, because their copies of the Creed are without the article of the procession *from the Son* [g]. For they pretend that the Latins

[c] Harris's Complete Collection, &c. vol. ii. p. 181. See also the Duke of Holstein's Travels, ibid. p. 36.

[f] Harris's Collect. of Travels, vol. ii. p. 238. See also p. 240, 241.

[g] Vid. Tentzel. Judic. Erudit. p. 151.

have *interpolated* the Creed, appealing to their own uncorrupted copies; and they blame the Latins, farther, for inserting the *Filioque* into the Nicene [h]. From what hath been said, it appears to be certain fact, that the Muscovites receive the Athanasian Creed: how long they have had it, or how far short of seven hundred years, (reckoning from the time that Christianity was received, or restored amongst them,) I cannot say. I should observe, that the Muscovites always perform their Service in their own *vulgar* tongue, as is allowed on all hands [i]: since then the Athanasian Creed is a part of their Service, they must have had a *version* of it in the Muscovite language, which is a dialect of the Sclavonian. Wherefore this also, after our proof of the thing, may now be added to the other *versions* above mentioned.

2. Russia, as distinguished from Muscovy, must mean Russia Minor, or the Black Russia, a province of Poland. As many as there follow the Greek rites are of the same account with the Muscovites before spoken of: and therefore what has been said of the former, with respect to the use of the Athanasian Creed, will be applicable to these also; and so I need not be more particular about them. The Patriarch of Muscovy ordains their Archbishop, who is therefore subject to him, and follows the same rites and customs: and their language is also a dialect of the Sclavonian, like the other.

3. Servia, now a large province of the Turkish empire,

[h] See Harris, ibid. p. 240.

[i] In cæteris autem regionibus, videlicet in Servia, Mysia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Russia Minori regi Poloniæ subdita, in Volhinia, Podolia, et parte quadam Lituaniæ, aliisque finitimis provinciis, ritu Græco divinum peragitur officium, translatis Græcorum typicis in Sclavonicam linguam. Eosdem Græcos ritus, eadem lingua, servant Moscovitæ, quorum regio Russia Major, seu Roxolania nuncupatur &c. *Bona de Divin. Psalmod.* cap. xviii. sect. 17. p. 911. Vid. etiam Usser. Histor. Dogmat. p. 246.

Armeni suo quoque nativo sermone dudum sacra celebrant, tum qui *orthodoxam* fidem retinuerunt, tum Jacobitæ, ut Moscovitæ seu Rutheni, Constantinopolitanæ sedi subjecti, Russico; et alii quidam de quibus pauca scimus. *Renaudot. Liturg. Orient.* vol. i. Dissertat. 6. p. 43.

part of Northern Turkey in Europe, first received Christianity about the year 860, by the means of Cyrill and Methodius, who are said to have invented the Sclavonian letters, and to have translated the Scriptures into the Sclavonian tongue. Cyrill was a Greek, and came from Constantinople: and Methodius was a Greek too, both sent by the Greek emperor to convert the country; which therefore became instructed in the Greek rites and religion. It is not improbable that they should have the Athanasian Creed, as well as the Muscovites and Russians; or perhaps before them, being converted sooner: and they also must have received it from the Greeks, and not from the Latins, because of their varying, in the article of the *procession*, from the western churches.

4. Bulgaria is likewise part of Turkey in Europe, and has been so from the year 1396. Christianity was planted there in the year 845. There were of old great disputes between the two Bishops of Rome and Constantinople, upon the question to whose Patriarchate the Bulgarians did of right belong. In conclusion, about the year 870, the Greek Patriarch prevailed over the Roman, by the interest of the then Emperor of Constantinople. The Bulgarians of consequence fell to the share of the Greek Church, and so have been educated in their rites and customs. Their language is a dialect of the Sclavonian, in which they perform their *sacred* Offices: and therefore, if they make use of the Athanasian Creed, they must be supposed to have it in their own *vulgar* tongue. I have no particular evidence of their using it, beyond what has been mentioned from Cazanovius, and the Romish writers; which yet seems to be sufficient, since it has been fully proved that it is used in Muscovy, and in Russia, to whom the Bulgarians are neighbours, and with whom they conform in their other religious rites derived from the same fountain, namely, the Constantinopolitan Greeks.

5. It remains then, that we consider the fact in respect of Constantinople itself, and the Greek church there: for

this also, as we have seen, has been named with others, as receiving the Athanasian Creed. Genebrard is positive in it, and gives us the very Creed itself, which the Constantinopolitans, as he says, use and recite[k]. He wrote in the year 1569. The truth of his report is very much doubted, because the *form*, which he exhibits, acknowledges the procession from *the Son*, which the Constantinopolitans admit not: and even those who, as before seen, assert or allow that they receive this Creed, yet at the same time intimate that it is not the *entire* Creed, but *curtailed* in that article. However, Genebrard might be in the right, as to the main thing, that the Constantinopolitans do receive the Creed, though mistaken in the particular *form:* or possibly some Latinizing Greeks at Constantinople might have one form, and the rest another, and thus all will be well. But let us inquire what further evidence there is of this Creed's having been ever received at Constantinople, and by the Greeks properly so called. An argument thereof may be drawn from the Greek copies that vary from the Latin, in the article of procession. For who should draw up and curtail the Greek copies but the Greeks? And why should they be at the trouble of *correcting* (as they will call it) the Creed, if they did not *receive* it? A second argument may be drawn from the Creed's being found in the Horologia belonging to the Greeks; that is, in their Breviaries, (as we should call them,) their books of Service for the *canonical* hours. How should the Creed come in there; unless the Greeks received it into their sacred Offices? As to the fact, Bishop Usher's copy found in such a Breviary is a sufficient evidence: and it is plain from the copy itself, that it was no Latinizing Greek that made it, or used it; since the procession from the *Son* is struck out. Further, this Horologion belonged to a monk of Constantinople[l];

[k] Superius Symbolum, Athanasii verbis aliquantulum immutatis, Constantinopolitani sic Græce legunt, et recitant. *Genebrard. in Symb. Athan.* p. 14.

[l] In Thecaræ, Constantinopolitani monachi, Græcorum Hymnorum Horo-

which argues the reception of the Creed in that very *city:* and as a token of their esteem of it, and value for it, it is ascribed to the Nicene Council itself; which all the Greeks receive and respect with the greatest veneration. From hence then it is plain, that the Constantinopolitan Greeks (some of them at least) receive, or have received this Creed, but with some alterations proper to their peculiar tenets in opposition to the Latins. This fact of the Constantinopolitans their receiving this Creed, might be farther proved from the Confession of Metrophanes Critopulus, (in the year 1620, published in 1667[m],) who admits the Creed, and looks upon it as owing to a very particular providence, that the Greek copies (as he supposes) have been preserved pure and entire, while the Latin ones have been corrupted or interpolated. We find by Nicolaus Hydruntinus, above cited, that such had been the general persuasion of the Greeks, five hundred years upwards, in relation to this Creed; not rejecting the Creed, but the Latin *interpolation* only, as they take it to be.

Which when I consider, reflecting withal how the Muscovites, Russians, &c. (who derived their religion from the Greeks since the ninth century,) have all come into this Creed, and that no good account has been given of such agreement, except it be that they all received the same form when they first received their religion; I say, when I consider and compare these things together, it cannot but give me a suspicion, that this Creed had been received by the Greeks soon after their first disputes with the Latins about the *procession;* only they took care to strike out a part of it, hoping to solve all by charging the Latins with *interpolation.* Or possibly, the Latin Pa-

logio (a Ravio nostro ex oriente huc advecto) Symbolum hoc, eo quo post finem hujus diatribæ cernitur interpolatum modo, Nicænæ Synodo adscriptum ——reperi &c. *Usser. de Symb.* p. 1.

m Metrophanis Critopuli, Protosyngeli Constantinopolitani ὁμολογία τῆς ἀνατολικῆς ἐκκλησίας edit. Helmstad. in 4to. a Joann. Horneio: vid. cap. i. p. 18. apud Tentzel. p. 150.

triarchs of Constantinople, between the years 1205 and 1260, might first introduce the Creed there. They made use of it, as it seems, then and there in their Offices for the instruction of catechumens; as I learn from a Pontifical of the church of Constantinople, about five hundred years old, published in part by Martene, who gives an account of it [n], and also an extract of the Office relating to catechumens, which I have transcribed [o] into the bottom of the page. It is not improbable that the use of the Creed at Constantinople might first come in such a way: and when it had prevailed there for forty or fifty years, the returning Greeks might think it not improper to continue its use, only taking out the article which concerns the *procession*.

However this be, one thing is certain, and, I think, hath been proved abundantly, that the professed Greeks, even under the Patriarch of Constantinople, have in former times received, and still do receive this Creed, with such alterations or corrections as are proper to their principles: and so I understand Dr. Covel [p], where he says, speaking of what is done amongst the Greeks, that "Athanasius's "Creed is owned as corrupted;" that is, with such corruptions as the Greeks have made to it. Upon the whole, therefore, I cannot but close in with those many learned Romanists who have affirmed, and still do affirm, that

[n] Constantinopolitanæ Ecclesiæ Pontificale vetus, ad Latinos ritus accommodatum, cujus caracter ad annos 500 accedit; scriptum proinde eo tempore quo urbe a Gallis occupata, Latinis ritibus serviebat. Ex bibliotheca R. R. P. P. prædicatorum majoris conventus Parisiensis. *Martene. Syllab. Ritual.*

[o] Interrogatio. Fides quid tibi præstat? R. Vitam æternam. Ait ei sacerdos——Fides autem est, ut unum Deum in Trinitate, et Trinitatem in Unitate venereris, neque confundendo Personas, neque substantiam separando. Alia est enim Persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti: sed horum trium una est, et non nisi una Divinitas. *Exeat ergo de te spiritus malignus* &c. *Martene de Antiq. Eccl. Ritibus*, p. 44, 45.

[p] Covel, Account of the Greek Church, præf. p. 9. to which I may add a remark of the learned Dr. Hickes, that "this Creed, though of an uncertain "author, was, for its excellent composure, received into the Greek and La"tin Churches." *Hickes's Serm.* vol. ii. p. 235.

this Creed is *received* both by Greeks and Latins. If the expression be thought too *general*, since it is certain that the Creed is rejected by innumerable Greeks, or more properly Orientalists, in Asia and Africa; as the Cophtes, and Nubians, and Abassines, and Maronites, Armenians, Nestorians, &c. I say, if this be objected; it is to be considered, that the Romanists, under the name of Greeks, mean generally the *orthodox* Greeks only, the Melchite Greeks, or as many as hold communion with the Patriarch of Constantinople; making no account of the rest, as being by their heresies cut off from the Church, and therefore of little or no consideration[q]. Now, in this sense, it is excusable enough to say, that the Creed is received both by Greeks and Latins.

To sum up what hath been said of the *reception* of this Creed: from the foregoing account it appears that its reception has been both *general* and *ancient*. It hath been received by Greeks and Latins all over Europe: and if it hath been little known among the African and Asian churches, the like may be said of the Apostles' Creed, which hath not been admitted, scarce known, in Africa, and but little in Asia[r], except among the Armenians, who are said to receive it[s]. So that, for *generality* of reception, the Athanasian Creed may vie with any, except

[q] Attamen hoc ævi sub Orientalis Ecclesiæ nomine diversarum nationum orientalium ecclesiæ veniunt; quæ licet a Græca suam cognoscant originem, propter tamen variarum hæresium colluviem et alia præter mores Christianos pessima introducta a Græca longissime absunt. Græci enim illius religionis homines, tanquam a se disjunctos, atque improbissimos, arcent, et detestantur. *Leo Allat. de perpet. Consens. Eccl. Occid. et Orient.* p. 9.

[r] Illo quo nos utimur, uti cæteri orientales, carent (Habessini) haud levi indicio, Apostolos illius autores non esse, quamvis doctrinæ ratione *Apostolicum* recte vocetur. *Ludolph. Hist. Æthiop.* lib. iii. c. 5. n. 19. Ἡμεῖς οὔτε ἴχομεν οὔτε εἴδομεν σύμβολον τῶν Ἀποστόλων. *Marc. Ephesius in Concil. Florent. ann.* 1439. *Sylv. Syurop. Hist.* sect. vi. c. 6. p. 150.

Symbolum nec ab Apostolis, nec a Synodo ulla generali factum est: adhæc, nec in Græc. nec in Orient. ullis Ecclesiis obtinuit, sed in Ecclesia Romana. *Suicer. Thesaur.* p. 1093.

[s] Sir Paul Ricaut, Present State of the Greek Church, p. 409.

the Nicene, or Constantinopolitan, the only *general* Creed common to all the churches. As to the *antiquity* of its reception into the *sacred* Offices, this Creed has been received in several countries, France, Germany, England, Italy, and Rome itself, as soon, or sooner than the Nicene; which is a high commendation of it, as gaining ground by its own intrinsic worth, and without the authority of any *general council* to enforce it. And there is this thing further to be said for it, that while the Nicene and Apostles' Creeds have been growing up to their present perfection in a course of years, or centuries of years, and not completed till about the year 600, this Creed was made and perfected at once, and is more ancient, if considered as an *entire form*, than either of the other; having received its full perfection, while the others wanted theirs. No considerable additions or defalcations have been made to it (it has needed none) since its first compiling, till of late years, and in the Greek Church only; which yet are so far from correcting or amending the form, that they have rendered it so much the less perfect: and the only way of restoring it to its perfection is to restore it to what it was at the first. But I pass on.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Time when, and Place where the Creed was composed.

HAVING observed *when* and *where* this Creed hath been *received*, we may now ascend higher, and consider *when* and *where* it was *made*. Our inquiries here will be in some measure dark and conjectural; strong probabilities will perhaps be as much as we can reach to: which made it the more necessary for me to begin, as I have, at the lower end, where things are more plain and clear, in hopes to borrow some light to conduct our searches into what remains still dark and obscure. Whatever we have to advance in this chapter must rest upon two things. 1. Upon *external testimony* from ancient citations, manu-

scripts, comments, versions, and the like, such as have been previously laid down. 2. Upon the *internal characters* of the Creed.

1. To begin with the *external* evidence; our *ancient testimonies*, above recited, carry up the antiquity of the Creed as high as the year 670, if the first of them be admitted for genuine; as it reasonably may, notwithstanding some objections. Our *manuscripts*, now extant, will bring us no higher than 700; but such as have been known to be extant may reach up to 660, or even 600. This must be thought very considerable to as many as know how great a *rarity* a manuscript of eleven hundred, or of a thousand years date is; and how few books or tracts there are that can boast of manuscripts of such antiquity. The injuries of time, of dust, and of moths, and above all, the ravages of *war* and destructions of *fire*, have robbed us of the ancient monuments, and left us but very thin remains; that a manuscript of the fourth century is a very great rarity, of the fifth there are very few, and even of the sixth not many. So that our want of manuscripts beyond the sixth or seventh century is no argument against the *antiquity* of the Creed, however certain an argument may be drawn from those we have, so far as they reach. But, beyond all this, we have a comment of the sixth century, of the year 570, or thereabout; and this certain, and unquestionable: which may supersede all our disputes about the *ancient testimonies* or *manuscripts* of more doubtful authority. Here then we stand upon the foot of *external evidence:* the Creed was, about the year 570, considerable enough to be commented upon, like the Lord's Prayer and Apostles' Creed, and together with them. Here is *certain* evidence for the time specified; and *presumptive* for much greater antiquity. For who can imagine that this Creed, or indeed any Creed, should grow into such repute of a sudden, and not rather in a course of years, and a long tract of time? Should we allow one hundred or one hundred and fifty years for it, though it would be *conjecture* only, yet it would not be

unreasonable or improbable conjecture. But we will let this matter rest here, and proceed to our other marks of direction:

2. The *internal characters* of the Creed. The Creed contains two principal doctrines; one of the *Trinity*, and the other of the *incarnation*. Possibly from the *manner* wherein these doctrines are there laid down, or from the *words* whereby they are expressed, we may be able to fix the true date of the Creed, or very nearly at least; certain however thus far, that it must be somewhere above 570.

From the doctrine of the *incarnation*, as expressed in this Creed, we may be confident that it is not earlier than the rise of the Apollinarian heresy, which appeared first about the year 360, and grew to a head about 370, or a little later. This Creed is so minute and particular against those heretics, (without naming them, as it is not the way of the Creed to name any,) obviating every cavil, and precluding every evasion or subterfuge, that one cannot suppose it to have been written before the depths of that heresy were perfectly seen into, and the whole secrets of the party disclosed: which we have no reason to think could be before the year 370, if so soon. This consideration alone is to me a sufficient confutation of those who pretend, that Athanasius made this Creed either during his banishment at Treves, which ended in the year 338, or during his stay at Rome in the year 343; or that he presented it to Pope Julius, or Pope Liberius, who were both dead before the year 367.

I must add, that Epiphanius[a] marks the very time when the Creeds first began to be enlarged in opposition to the Apollinarian heresy; namely, the tenth year of Valentinian and Valens, and the sixth of Gratian, (it should be seventh,) which falls in with A. D. 373, the very last year of Athanasius's life, according to those that place his death the latest; some say he died a year or two

[a] Epiphan. Ancorat. c. 121. p. 123.

sooner. If therefore he made this Creed at all, it must be about that time. And, indeed, were there no stronger objections against the *antiquity* of the Creed, or against its being made by Athanasius, than the common objection about the supposed condemnation of the Nestorian and Eutychian heresies; I should scarce think it at all improbable that Athanasius should be the author, admitting that he lived to the year 373. For Epiphanius's larger Creed, made about that time, appears to me as full and express against both those heresies, as the Athanasian can be supposed to be, and in some respects more so: and yet neither of those *heresies* were then in being, nor for many years after. But there are many other reasons which convince me that the Athanasian Creed must be placed lower than this time. I take Epiphanius's larger Creed to have been the first that enlarged the article of the *incarnation*, in opposition chiefly to the Apollinarians: and that Creed being drawn up, as Epiphanius expressly testifies, by the joint advice of *all the orthodox bishops*, and the *whole Catholic Church*, became a kind of *rule*, or *model*, for most of the Creeds that came after; among which I reckon the Athanasian.

For, from the doctrine of the *Trinity*, as particularly and minutely drawn out in that Creed, it is to me very plain, that it must be some years later than the Creed of Epiphanius: which will evidently appear to any man who will but be at the pains to compare the two Creeds together.

One very observable particular is the manner of expressing the *Unity* by a singular adjective; *unus æternus*, *unus immensus*, &c. *one eternal*, *one incomprehensible*, &c. and the condemning the expression of *tres æterni*, *tres immensi*, &c. The Greeks never laid down any such rule of expression, never observed or followed it, but have sometimes run counter to it[u]; meaning indeed the very same thing, but not so *expressing* it. As to the Latins,

[u] Τριῶν ἀπείρων ἄπειρον συμφυΐαν. *Nazianz. in Bapt. Orat.* xl. p. 668.

we shall find none of them (at least I have not observed any) coming into that way of expression before Ambrose[x] and Faustinus[c], (in the years 381 and 384,) who are the first that use it, and that but once, or very sparingly; not repeating and inculcating it, like the Athanasian Creed, nor leaving it destitute of explication. But St. Austin, afterwards, in his books of the *Trinity*, in the fifth especially, enlarges in justification of this rule of expression, and is full and copious upon it. His proofs, illustrations, example, and authority gave new strength and credit to this *rule*, which might then pass current, and become fit to appear, without farther explication, in a Creed. For this reason, principally, I incline to think that this Creed was not made before St. Austin's books of the Trinity were *public*, (which was not till 416,) or not before 420, or thereabout, to allow some time for his works to be read, considered, approved, and to gain a general esteem. If it be said, that St. Austin might as well copy from this Creed, as the Creed from him; I say, no: for the reason is different. Creeds and other the like formularies, which are to be put into every one's hands, and spread round about, ought not to contain any thing till it has been maturely weighed, long considered, and fully explained, as well as proved, and *generally* acknowledged by the churches of Christ. It is therefore much more reasonable to believe that St. Austin's writings should go first, and a *general* approbation of them in that particular; and then the Creed might conveniently follow, the way being now opened for it[z].

[x] Ergo sanctus Pater, sanctus Filius, sanctus et Spiritus Sanctus: sed *non tres Sancti*, quia unus est Deus sanctus, unus est Dominus. Una est etenim vera sanctitas, sicut una est vera divinitas, una illa vera sanctitas naturalis. *Ambros. de Sp. S.* lib. iii. c. 16. p. 688.

[y] Sed *ne duos omnipotentes* intelligas, præcavendum est: licet enim et Pater sit omnipotens, et Filius, tamen *unus est omnipotens*, sicut et unus est Deus: quia Patris et Filii eadem omnipotentia est, sicut et eadem deitas &c.——Ostenditur Unitas divinitatis in Patre et Filio, sicut et *omnipotentiæ*, et quicquid omnino *divinæ substantiæ* est; hoc solo differens a Patre Filius, quod ille Pater est, et hic Filius. *Faustin. de Trinit.* c. 3. p. 123, 124.

[z] Combefis, speaking to this point, seemed inclinable to suppose that St.

I may observe the like of another article of the Athanasian Creed; namely, the *procession from the Son:* a doctrine entertained indeed both by Greeks and Latins, (as may appear by the testimonies commonly cited for that purpose,) and expressed frequently *in sense*, though rarely *in terms;* but such as came not to be much inculcated or insisted upon, till St. Austin undertook to assert and clear it, and to render it less liable to any dispute hereafter. For which reason the modern Greeks have looked upon him, in a manner, as the *Father* of that doctrine, being at least the principal man that brought it into vogue; however weakly they may pretend that he *invented* it. Thus far is certain, that his elaborate arguments, and solid proofs from *Scripture*, of the truth, and of the importance of the doctrine, made it pass the more readily; and gave it credit and authority enough to have a place in a standing Creed or Confession: which is to me another argument of the Creed's being made after St. Austin's writings were well known in the world; in that place, at least, where the Creed was made. From the premises then I presume to infer, that the Athanasian Creed is not earlier than the year 420.

I will next endeavour to show, that it cannot reasonably be set lower than the Eutychian times, nor later than the Council of Chalcedon, or than the year 451: and this also I shall attempt from the *internal characters* of the Creed, in like manner as above.

1. There is not a word in the Creed directly and plainly expressing *two natures* in Christ, or excluding *one nature:* which *critical* terms, against the error of Eutyches, are very rarely or never omitted in the Creeds drawn up in the Eutychian times, or the times immediately following.

Austin had borrowed from the Creed; but correcting himself afterwards, he supposes rather that the Creed borrowed from him. His words are these:

"Ejus Symboli, seu Formulæ Fidei, antiquitatem produnt illi ejus versiculi "quos totidem verbis habet August. in libris de Trinitate et alibi, quos non "aliunde desumpsisse videatur quam ex eo Symbolo——Quanquam nihil "vetat dicere ipsum potius Symboli auctorem ex Augustino, aliisque P. P. "sua consarcinasse." *Combefis. not. in Man. Calec. Auctar.* tom. ii. p. 296.

It is true, there is, in the Athanasian Creed, what may be sufficient to obviate or preclude the Eutychian heresy; as there is also in the *larger* Creed of Epiphanius, A. D. 373, and in the works of Nazianzen and Ambrose, about the year 380; and in Pelagius's Creed, A. D. 417; and in the writings of Austin, and Vincentius of Lerins, both before the year 435, many years before Eutyches. The strongest expression of the Creed against the Eutychians, and which has been most frequently urged in this case, is, *Unus omnino, non confusione substantiæ, sed unitate Personæ: One altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of Person:* which yet is used by Vincentius[a], and by Austin[b] too almost in *terms*. And if this be no reason for making either of those authors, or the tracts ascribed to them, later than Eutyches; why shall the like expression be of any force in respect to the Athanasian Creed? There is nothing in the Creed but what was common and ordinary in Catholic writers before the Eutychian times: but there are wanting those *critical*, distinguishing terms of *two natures*, or *one nature*, necessary to be inserted in the Creeds after these times, and never, or very rarely, omitted; which is one reason, and a very considerable one, for setting the date of the Creed higher than 451.

2. Another argument of the same thing, near akin to the former, is, that this Creed makes no mention of Christ being *consubstantial with us*, in one nature, as he is *consubstantial* with the *Father* in another: a tenet expressly held by some of the ecclesiastical writers before Eutyches's time; but seldom or never omitted in the Creeds or Confessions about that time, or after. To be convinced of the truth both of this and of the preceding article, one need but look into the Creeds and Formularies of those times: namely, into that of Turribius of Spain in 447, of

[a] Unus autem, non——divinitatis et humanitatis confusione, sed——unitate Personæ. *Vincent. Lerin.* c. 19. p. 58.

[b] Idem Deus qui homo; *non confusione* naturæ, *sed unitate Personæ. August.* tom. v. p. 885.

Flavian of Constantinople, as also of Pope Leo in 449, of the Chalcedon Council in 451, of Pope Felix III. in 485, and Anastasius II. in 496, and of the Church of Alexandria in the same year: as also into those of Pope Hormisdas, and the churches of Syria, and Fulgentius, and the Emperor Justinian, and Pope John II. and Pope Pelagius I. within the sixth century. In all which we shall find either *express* denial of *one nature*, or express affirming of *two natures*, or the doctrine of Christ's *consubstantiality* with us, or all three together, though they are all omitted in the Athanasian Creed. This is to me a second reason for setting our Creed higher than the Eutychian times.

3. I may argue this point farther from a passage of the Athanasian Creed, running thus: "One, not by conver-"sion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the "manhood into God." This would not, I conceive, have run in these words, or in this manner, in the Eutychian times. For though the Eutychians were sometimes (as well as the Apollinarians often) charged with the doctrine of a *conversion of the Godhead into flesh*; yet nothing more certain than that the generality of them absolutely disowned and detested any such tenet, teaching rather *a conversion of the manhood into God*, just the reverse. And, by the way, I would here offer it to the learned reader to consider, whether we may not from hence give a probable account of a very noted *variation* observable in many of the most ancient copies of this Creed, which run thus; *Unus autem, non conversione divinitatis in carne, sed assumptione humanitatis in Deo:* where there is *carne* for *carnem*, and *Deo* for *Deum*. A slight alteration in the words, but a very great one in the sense. A change of the Godhead *in the flesh* the Eutychians admitted, by making the *two natures* become *one*; though they allowed not a change *into flesh:* so that by this little alteration of *carne* for *carnem*, the Creed would strike more directly at the Eutychian principles. Then again as to *Deum*, if that reading was to stand, the Creed, instead of confuting

the Eutychians, would seem rather to favour them; for they taught that the *manhood* was *assumed into God*, and that in so literal and strict a sense as really to become *God*, or to be absorbed and lost in the divine nature, both natures becoming one *divine* nature. Such a construction might the words of the Creed be liable to. But put *Deo* for *Deum*, and it is entirely defeated: for then the sense is not that the manhood is assumed *into God*, but that God assumed the human nature; which is true, and not liable to any such misconstruction as the other. However this be, as to the variation of the copies, and the reason here assigned for it, (which I offer only as a probable conjecture to be further inquired into,) yet this is certain, that these words of the Creed, according to the common copies, are not so cautiously or accurately chosen as they might or would have been, had the Creed been drawn up after the Eutychian times.

4. A fourth argument may be drawn from the *similitude* in the Creed, running thus: "As the reasonable soul "and flesh is one man; so God and man is one Christ." This familiar and easy comparison was much made use of by the Catholics, down from the Apollinarian times to the time of Eutyches: by Nazianzen, Austin, Vincentius, Claudianus Mamertus, and others. But no sooner did the Eutychians wrest the comparison to their own sense, pleading for *one nature* in Christ, like as soul and body make *one nature* in man, but the Catholics grew strangely averse to the *similitude*, and rarely made use of it: or when they did, it was either to dispute against it, and condemn it, or else to guard and qualify it with proper cautions and restrictions. Wherefore it is by no means probable that this *similitude* would have been inserted, at such a time, in a Catholic Creed, and there left without guard or caution, for the Eutychians to make an ill use of. This fourth argument I take from the learned and acute Le Quien, whose words may be seen in the margin[c].

[c] Quod quidem *simile*, quo *theologus* etiam, aliique patres Apollinaristas confutarunt, tanti posthac non fecerunt insequentis seu quinti sæculi desi-

And may we not from hence give a probable guess at the reason why the ancient manuscript of Treves, and the Colbertine copied from it, have entirely omitted this *similitude*, throwing in a few words, both before and after, to salve the breach, in some measure, and to preserve a connection: which shows that it was no casual omission, but made with design. But I pass on.

These reasons convince me that the Creed was not made so late as the Council of Chalcedon, but before the year 451. It cannot therefore be ascribed to Vigilius Tapsensis in the year 484: not to mention that the *phraseology* of it agrees not with that writer's usual manner of expression, as Le Quien hath observed[d]. Besides that the principal reasons, on which Quesnel rested his opinion in regard to that author, are now found to have been grounded on a false presumption of certain works being Vigilius's which are none of his[e]. And I may add, that to me there does not appear in Vigilius's pieces any thing of that strength, closeness, and acuteness, which we find in the Athanasian Creed.

But I proceed to show that this Creed is earlier than even the times of Nestorius, or the Ephesine Council of the year 431. It is certain that this Creed does not condemn the Nestorian heresy in such full, direct, critical

nentis Doctores, ut illud in Expositione Fidei insererent; cum Monophysitæ, Severo præsertim duce, eo vehementius contra Catholicos *pugnarent*, ut *unam* in Christo *naturam* esse ex Deitate et humanitate compositam evincerent. Quinimo omnes ingenii vires explicare coacti sunt, ut varias discrepantias reperirent inter unionem Deitatis cum humanitate in Christo, et unionem animæ cum corpore in homine. *Le Quien, Dissert. Damasc.* p. 10. Confer. Petav. Dogm. Theol. tom. v. lib. iii. cap. 9, 10, &c.

[d] Sunt qui suspicentur expositionem istam fidei fuisse concinnatam a Vigilio Tapsensi, qui scripsisse existimatur libros tres contra Varimadum Arianum: sed ab illorum opinione me deterruit versus iste, *Unus omnino, non confusione substantiæ, sed unitate Personæ*. Nam Vigilius in libris quinque contra Eutychem nusquam *unitatem Personæ* dicit, sed passim, et frequentissime *unionem Personæ*——Cumque variæ supersint hodie Vigilii Tapsensis Confessiones Fidei de Trinitate et incarnatione, nulla earum similitudo et convenientia cum Symbolo Athanasiano, quoad stylum animadvertitur. *Le Quien, Dissert. Damasc.* p. 9.

[e] Vid. Montf. Diatrib. p. 724. Anthelm. Disquis. p. 33, 34.

terms, as the Catholics found to be necessary against the wiles and subtilties of those men. There is not a word of *the mother of God*, or of *one Son* only, in opposition to *two sons*, or of *God's* being *born, suffering, dying:* which kind of expressions the Creeds are full of after Nestorius's times, and after the Council of Ephesus, to guard the more certainly against *equivocations*, and to express the Catholic doctrine in strong terms, such as could not be eluded. As to what the Athanasian Creed really does express, and is conceived to strike directly at the Nestorian heresy; it is demonstration that the words are not more full, or expressive, than may be found in elder Creeds, and in the Fathers that wrote against the Apollinarians and others, before ever Nestorius was heard of[f]. I know not how to give my reader a clear and just idea of this whole matter, but by setting down in chronological order the doctrine of the *Incarnation*, as expressed in Catholic writings from the Apollinarian times down to the Nestorian, from the year 373 to the year 431. One thing only I would remark beforehand, to make the following account the clearer, that the Apollinarians really held a doctrine very near akin to that which afterwards was called Eutychian; and they maliciously charged the Catholics with that very doctrine which was afterwards called Nestorian: so that the Catholics, in their charge upon the Apollinarians, condemned the Eutychian doctrine long before Eutyches; and, in their defence of themselves, they also condemned the Nestorian tenets before Nestorius. I shall first justify the truth of this remark in both its parts, and then shall proceed farther to what I intend.

As to the first part, that the Apollinarians held a doc-

[f] Le Quien is beforehand with me in the observation, whose words I may here cite.

"Nec cuiquam negotium facessat, quod Nestorii et Eutychis hæreses ea "(*Formula*) prius pessundatæ essent, quam ipsarum autores emergerent: "alibi siquidem ostensum fuit SS. Patres, qui contra Apollinarium calamum "strinxerant, disertissimis etiam verbis amborum impietates proscripsisse." *Le Quien, Dissert. Damasc.* p. 9.

trine very near akin to that which was afterwards called Eutychian, it is a thing so well known, that I need not cite many testimonies for it. It was one of the commonest charges against the Eutychians, that they had revived the heresy of the Apollinarians[g] in some considerable branches of it: Petavius briefly shows what those branches were[h].

As to the other part of my remark, that the Apollinarians charged the Catholics with the opposite extreme, afterward called Nestorian, that has not been so much observed, but is no less true than the other; as may abundantly appear from the testimonies in the margin[i]; besides others that will occur as we pass along. This also is observed by Le Quien in his Notes to Damascen[k], whereupon he rightly infers, that it will be a false conclusion to argue that such or such writings must belong to the Nestorian times, only because of their treating of an *unity* of *Person* in Christ.

[g] Eutyches——per impios veterum hæreticorum volutatus errores, tertium Apollinaris dogma delegit; ut negata humanæ carnis atque animæ veritate, totum Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum *unius* asserat esse *naturæ*, tanquam *verbi* Deitas ipsa se in carnem animamque converterit. *Leon. Epist.* xcvii. p. 633. Quesnel. ed. confer Ep. 134. p. 699.

[h] Sane cum et multiplex, et ab autore suo interpolata sæpius Apollinaris hæresis fuerit, ut capite sexto docuimus; ea parte cum isto consensit Eutyches, qua carnem Christi non ex utero sumptam B. Virginis sed e cælo delapsam Apollinaris credidit: tum quatenus uterque *unicam naturam* asseveravit, et utriusque permistam ac confusam substantiam. *Petav. Dogmat. Theol.* tom. v. lib. i. c. 16. p. 37.

[i] Neque vero *alium* Jesum Christum, *alium* Verbum dicimus, ut *nova hæresis calumniatur*, sed eundem, et ante sæcula, et post sæcula, et ante mundum et post Mariam; imo, ex Maria magnum Deum appellamus. *Hieronym. in Tit.* cap. 3. p. 431.

Qui Apollinarii dogmata defendunt, per querimoniam quam adversus nos faciunt sua confirmare conantur, carnale Verbum et Dominum sæculorum, hominis Filium immortalem Filii Deitatem construentes. Proferunt enim quod aliqui quasi Ecclesiæ Catholicæ existentes, *duos* colunt *Filios* in dogmate; unum quidem secundum naturam, alterum autem secundum adoptionem postea acquisitam; nescio a quo talia audientes——nondum enim novi cum qui hæc subloquitur. *Gregor. Nyssen. cit. Concil. V. Collat.* vi. p. 106. Harduin. Vid. etiam Ambros. de Incarn. c. 7. p. 721. Athanas. Epist. ad Epictet. p. 907.

[k] Le Quien, Not. in Damascen. vol. i. p. 95.

These things premised, I now proceed to lay down the doctrine of the *incarnation*, as expressed in Catholic writers from the year 373 down to the year 431, inclusive.

I begin with the larger Creed of Epiphanius, which sets forth the *incarnation* in the following terms.

" The Word was made flesh, not by undergoing any 373.
" change, nor by converting his Godhead into manhood,
" but by co-uniting it into his one holy perfection and
" Godhead. For there is *one Lord Jesus Christ*, and not
" *two;* the same he is God, the same he Lord, the same
" he King[l]."

Here we may observe that the Creed guards, just as the Athanasian does, against the two extremes; against the Apollinarian notion of the Godhead being converted into flesh, and against the Apollinarian calumny that the Catholics made *two Christs* instead of one.

Gregory Nazianzen, not long after, expresses himself 380.
in terms to the like effect. " We divide not the man
" from the Godhead, but we make them one and the
" same (*Person*)——If any one imagines Mary not to be
" the *mother of God*, he has no part with God.——If any
" man introduces *two Sons*, one of God and the Father,
" and a *second* of the Virgin-mother, and not one and the
" same him, let him forfeit the adoption of sons promised
" to true believers. For God and man are indeed *two*
" *natures*, like as *soul* and *body:* but they are not *two*
" *Sons*, nor (two) Gods[m]."

Here, again, we find the Nestorian tenets very fully obviated, while Nazianzen is answering the Apollinarian

[l] Ὁ γὰρ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, ὐ τροπὴν ὑποσὰς, ὐδὲ μεταβαλὼν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ θεότητα εἰς ἀνθρωπότητα· εἰς μίαν συνενώσαντα ἑαυτοῦ ἁγίαν τελειότητά τε καὶ θεότητα· εἷς γάρ ἐστιν Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς καὶ ὁ δύο, ὁ αὐτὸς Θεὸς, ὁ αὐτὸς Κύριος, ὁ αὐτὸς Βασιλεύς. *Epiph. Ancor.* p. 124. *Petav.*

[m] Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον χωρίζομεν τῆς θεότητος, ἀλλ' ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δογματίζομεν.——εἴ τις ὁ θεοτόκον τὴν Μαρίαν ὑπολαμβάνει, χωρὶς ἐστὶ τῆς θεότητος.—— εἴ τις εἰσάγει δύο υἱὸς ἕνα μὲν τὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς, δεύτερον δὲ τὸν ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς, ἀλλ' ὐχὶ ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν, καὶ τῆς υἱοθεσίας ἐκπέσοι τῆς ἐπηγγελμένης τοῖς ὀρθῶς πιστεύουσι. Φύσεις μὲν γὰρ δύο Θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος, ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, υἱοὶ δὲ ὁ δύο, ὐδὲ θεοί. *Gregor. Nazianz. ad Cledon. Ep.* i. p. 738, 739.

calumny against the Catholics: and at the same time, the Eutychian heresy (afterwards so called) is as plainly precluded, while Nazianzen is laying down the Church's faith in *two natures* against the Apollinarians, who made but one.

382. Ambrose, in like manner, confutes the Apollinarians, without naming them. "We ought also to condemn "those who, in another extreme, teach not one and the "same Son of God, but that he who is begotten of God "the Father is *one*, and he that is generated of the Virgin "*another:* when the Evangelist saith, that *the Word was* "*made flesh*, to instruct us that there is but *one Lord* "*Jesus*, not *two*.—There are others risen up who pretend "that our Lord's flesh and Godhead are both of *one* "*nature*.——And when they say that THE WORD was "converted into flesh, hairs, blood, and bones, and changed "from its own nature; after such a pretended change of "the divine nature, they may take the handle to wrest "any thing to the weakness of the Godhead, which be-"longs to the infirmity of the flesh[n]."

Ambrose seems here to intimate as if there were really some at that time, who had run into that very error which the Apollinarians charged upon the Catholics, and which was afterwards called Nestorian. However that be, he condemns it in the name of the Catholics; as he condemns also the Apollinarian extreme, which afterwards became Eutychian. There is another passage of Ambrose cited by Theodoret, seemingly so full and express against the Nestorian and Eutychian heresies, that one can hardly be persuaded to think it really Ambrose's. But, on the

[n] Et illos condemnare debemus qui adversa erroris linea, non unum eundemque Filium Dei dicunt, sed *alium* esse qui ex Deo Patre natus sit, *alium* qui sit generatus ex virgine; cum Evangelista dicat quia *Verbum caro factum est*, ut *unum* Dominum Jesum *non duos* crederes——emergunt alii qui carnem Domini dicant et divinitatem *unius* esse *naturæ*——Deinde, cum isti dicant quia *Verbum* in *carnem*, capillos, sanguinem, et ossa *conversum* est, et a natura propria mutatum est, datur illis locus ut infirmitatem carnis ad infirmitatem Divinitatis, quadam facta divinæ naturæ mutatione, detorqueant. *Ambros. de Incarn.* c. 6.

other hand, it appears to be so well attested, that the late learned editor of Ambrose could not but yield to place it among his genuine works. Tom. ii. p. 729.

There is a Creed of Pelagius (as learned men now agree) inserted among the works both of Jerome[o] and Austin[p]. It was made several years before the Nestorian controversy. Our learned Dr. Wall has translated it into English[q], subjoining some excellent notes of his own to it: I shall transcribe as much as is to our purpose. "We "do in such manner hold that there is in Christ one "Person of the Son, as that we say there are in him two "perfect and entire substances, [*or natures,*] *viz.* of the "Godhead and of the manhood, which consists of body "and soul.——We do abhor——the blasphemy of those "who go about by a new interpretation to maintain that "since the time of his taking flesh, all things pertaining "to the divine nature did pass into the man, [*or manhood,*] "and so also that all things belonging to the human na-"ture were transferred into God, [*or the divine nature.*] "From whence would follow, (a thing no heresy ever "offered to affirm,) that both substances, [*or natures,*] "*viz.* of the divinity and humanity, would by this con-"fusion seem to be extinguished, and to lose their proper "state, and be changed into another thing: so that they "who own in the Son an imperfect God and imperfect "man, are to be accounted not to hold truly either God "or man." 417.

Dr. Wall hereupon judiciously remarks, that "there "wanted only the accuracy of speaking, which Pelagius "had here used, to clear and settle the dispute between "the Nestorians and Eutychians." I would remark farther, that if Pelagius's Creed, in the year 417, had so plainly obviated both the Nestorian and Eutychian heresy, before Nestorius or Eutyches was known; it may easily

[o] Hieronym. Oper. tom. v. p. 123. Bened. edit.
[p] Augustin. Oper. tom. v. Append. p. 388.
[q] Wall's Hist. of Inf. Bapt. p. 200.

be conceived that the Athanasian Creed might do the same thing, at or about the same time.

422. I might next show how St. Austin likewise has expressed himself in as strong terms against both those heresies, as the Athanasian Creed has done: but, because I shall have another occasion to cite the passages, where I draw out a select number of expressions *parallel* to those of the Creed; I may spare myself the trouble of doing it here.

426. I might go on to observe what passed in the case of Leporius, a man of the same principles, in the main, with Nestorius, but some years before him. His recantation treatise, (Libellus Satisfactionis,) supposed to be drawn up by St. Austin in the year 426, would furnish me with many full and strong expressions against the Nestorian principles, beyond any to be met with in the Athanasian Creed; so that there is no just argument to be drawn from any expressions in that Creed, for setting it so low as the Nestorian times.

431. I shall conclude this account with the recital of a Creed made about the same time, or in the same year that the Council of Ephesus was held against Nestorius. It is the Creed of John, Patriarch of Antioch, approved by Cyril of Alexandria, and thought sufficient to wipe off all suspicion of *Nestorianism* from the author of it. It runs thus: "We confess then that Jesus Christ our Lord, "the only-begotten Son of God, is *perfect God and per-* "*fect man*, of a *reasonable* soul and body; *born of the* "*Father before the worlds, as touching his Godhead;* the "*same* also in the end of days, for us and for our salva- "tion, (*born*) of the Virgin Mary, as *touching his manhood*, "consubstantial with us according to his manhood. But "there was an union made of *two natures*, on which ac- "count we profess *one Christ*, one Lord, *one Son*. Con- "formable to this sense of an union without confusion, "we acknowledge the holy Virgin as *mother of God*, "because that God the *Word* was incarnate and made

" man, and from the very conception united to himself a " temple which he had taken of her[r]."

Here we may observe several expressions nearly resembling those of the Athanasian Creed; but withal several others more *particular* and *explicit* against the Nestorian principles than that Creed is: *one Son*, and him *consubstantial with us*, in respect of his manhood; the Virgin, *mother of God*, and the like. Such is the constant strain and tenor of the Creeds, and Confessions, and Catholic writings, treating of the *incarnation*, at this time and after: as might be shown at large from Cassian about 431, and Vincentius in the year 434, and from Flavian, and Pope Leo I. and others before the Council of Chalcedon. We have therefore very great reason to believe, that the Athanasian Creed was drawn up either before the Nestorian controversy had made much noise in the world, or at least before the compiler had notice of it. The sum then of my argument is this; there is nothing in the Athanasian Creed but what might have been said, and had been said by Catholic writers before the time of Nestorius: but the Creed wants many of those *particular* and *critical* expressions, which came into use after that time: therefore, since the *internal* characters of the Creed suit exactly with the Apollinarian times, and not with the Nestorian, it ought to be placed somewhere between Apollinarius and Nestorius, not lower than 430, or 431 at the utmost. And it is some confirmation of what hath

[r] Confitemur igitur Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, Filium Dei unigenitum, *Deum perfectum et hominem perfectum*, ex anima rationali et corpore; ante sæcula quidem ex Patre natum secundum Deitatem: in fine vero dierum *eundem* propter nos et propter nostram salutem de Maria Virgine secundum humanitatem, *consubstantialem nobis* secundum humanitatem. *Duarum* vero *naturarum* unitio facta est; propter quam *unum Christum*, unum Dominum, *unum Filium* confitemur. Secundum hunc inconfusæ unionis intellectum, confitemur sanctam Virginem *Dei genitricem*, propter quod *Deus Verbum* incarnatus est et inhumanatus, et ex ipsa conceptione sibimet univit templum quod ex ipsa suscepit. *Johan. Antioch. Harduin.* tom. i. p. 1558.

been said, that Venantius Fortunatus, who lived in the Eutychian times, and commented upon this Creed about the year 570, as before observed, yet in his comment takes not the least notice of any part of this Creed being opposed to the errors of Nestorius or Eutyches, but only to those elder heresies of Sabellius, Arius, and Apollinarius; whom he specially makes mention of. I persuade myself therefore, that this Creed ought not to be placed lower than 430, or thereabout; and I have before shown why it should not be set higher than 420; so that now we have brought it within the compass of ten years; where we may let it rest a while, till we consider farther what *place*, or *country*, the Creed was most probably composed in; which may help us to settle the time of its date within somewhat stricter and narrower limits than before.

There is great reason to believe that this Creed was made in Gaul. The considerations which persuade us thereto are these following. 1. Its early reception in the Gallican Church, so far as appears, before all other churches. 2. The great esteem and regard *anciently* paid to it by the Gallican Councils and Bishops[s]. 3. The Creed's being first admitted into the Gallican Psalter, and first received in those countries where that Psalter was received, as in Spain, Germany, and England. As the Gallican churches delivered their Psalter to other churches, so is it reasonable to believe that the Creed was received from them likewise. 4. The oldest *version* we hear of is Gallican, in the time of Hincmar. 5. The oldest authors that make mention of it are likewise Gallican: for proof of which I refer to the *ancient testimonies* above. 6. The first that cite the words of it (as it seems) are likewise Gallican. I will here mention two; Avitus of

[s] Tanti namque apud Gallos Symbolum hoc fuit ut una cum Symbolo Apostolorum memoriæ commendari Presbyteris præcipiat Hincmarus idem in capitulis, *clericis omnibus* Synodus Augustodunensis. *Sirmond. Oper.* vol. ii. p. 978. Conf. Anthelm. p. 30.

Vienne in Gaul[t], and Cæsarius of Arles[u]: I have set their words in the margin. 7. The oldest commentator upon it, though an Italian by birth and education, had yet travelled into France, and was at length Bishop of Poictiers. 8. The *number* and *antiquity* of the manuscripts of this Creed found in France confirm the same thing: which has made several very learned men subscribe to this opinion[v], that the Athanasian Creed came first from Gaul. And it is certain, that no other country or church

[t] The words of Avitus Viennensis, who was Bishop in 490, died in 523.

De divinitate Spiritus Sancti, quem *nec factum* legimus, *nec creatum, nec genitum*——Nos vero Spiritum discimus *ex Patre et Filio procedere*——Sicut est proprium Spiritui Sancto *a Patre Filioque procedere*, istud Fides Catholica etiamsi renuentibus non persuaserit, in suæ tamen Disciplinæ Regula non excedit. *Sirmond. Op. Vid. Le Quien, Panopl. contr. Schism. Græc.* p. 241.

Non nisi ex eodem Symbolo, quod jam ante *receptum* esset, Avitus Viennensis alicubi scribebat De Divinitate Sp. S. &c. *Le Quien, Dissert. Damascen.* p. 98.

[u] The words of Cæsarius, who was Bishop in 503, died in 543.

Rogo et admoneo vos, fratres carissimi, ut *Quicunque vult salvus esse, Fidem* rectam et *Catholicam* discat, *firmiter teneat, inviolatamque conservet.*——*Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus et Spiritus Sanctus: sed tamen non tres Dii, sed unus Deus. Qualis Pater, talis Filius, talis et Spiritus Sanctus.* Attamen credat unusquisque fidelis quod *Filius æqualis est Patri secundum divinitatem, et minor est Patre secundum humanitatem* carnis, quam de nostro assumpsit. *Cæsar. Arelat. apud August. Op.* tom. v. App. p. 399.

N. B. The editors of St. Austin adjudge this to Cæsarius; as does also Oudinus. *Comment. de Script. Eccl.* vol. i. p. 1348.

[v] Cæterum cum ex allatis supra testimoniis videatur in Galliis primum celebrari cœpisse hoc Symbolum, haud abs re conjectant eruditi viri, in Galliis illud fuisse elucubratum. Quod idem forte suadeat antiquissimus ille in Galliis et in Anglia mos Symboli alternatim concinendi; itemque MSS. Gallicanorum copia et antiquitas. *Montfauc. Diatrib.* p. 726.

E Gallis primum prodiisse Symbolum Athanasianum animadvertimus, tum quod a Gallis scriptoribus ante omnes celebratum, a synodis episcopisque Galliarum receptum, et commendatum antiquitus fuerit, tum etiam quod Treviris in Galliarum metropoli illud lucubratum fuisse opinio increbuerit. Quapropter Pithœus, ac Vossius, aliique eruditissimi viri Gallum hominem Symboli parentem opinati sunt; Antelmius vero, hac potissimum ratione ductus, non Vigilium in Africa Episcopum, sed Vincentium Lirinensem opusculi hujus auctorem affirmavit. *Lud. Murator.* tom. ii. p. 229.

in the world has so fair, I may now say, so *clear* a pretence to it: many circumstances concur to make good their title, as we have already seen; and more will appear in my next chapter, when I come to inquire who was the *author*.

Let it be allowed then, for the present, that our Creed was originally Gallican, and made between 420 and 430: we may next consider, whether we cannot come a little nearer towards fixing the time of its composition. We must point out some season when St. Austin's works were known, and studied, and well esteemed of in Gaul; and when the circumstances of the place might the most probably give occasion for the compiling such a Creed. Now it is observable that about the year 426 St. Austin held a very close and intimate correspondence with the Gallican churches. Leporius had for some time spread false doctrine in Gaul, chiefly relating to the *incarnation*. His heresy was much the same with what Nestorius's was afterwards. The Gallican bishops censured him; and he was forced to quit his country, having given general offence to all there. He took his leave of Gaul, and passed over into Africa, with several others of the same party and principles: where lighting upon Aurelius, Bishop of Carthage, and St. Austin, he was by them brought to a sense of his error, and induced to sign a full recantation, called Libellus Satisfactionis; whereupon St. Austin, and Aurelius, and other African bishops became intercessors with the bishops of Gaul, in favour of Leporius, that he might be again received and restored by them. One can scarce imagine any more likely time, or more proper occasion, for the compiling such a Creed as the Athanasian is. All the lines and characters of it suit extremely well with the *place*, the *time*, the *occasion*, and other circumstances; which concur to persuade us that the Creed was, in all probability, composed in Gaul, some time between the year 426 and the year 430: so that now we are confined to the narrow compass of four

or five years, upon the most probable conjecture, and upon such evidences as a case of this nature can admit of, where more cannot be expected.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Author of the Creed.

IF we have hitherto gone upon sure grounds about the *time* and *place*, we cannot long be at a loss for the *author* of this Creed. Who were the most considerable men, and best qualified for such a work, at that time in Gaul? Antelmius will point out Vincentius Lirinensis. But I have several reasons to persuade me that it was not, or could not be Vincentius. No contemporary of his, nor any ancient writer, ever gives the least hint of his composing such a work. Antelmius supposes it to be after his Commonitory, that is, after 434; which if it had been, we should undoubtedly have found the Creed more particular and explicit against the Nestorian heresy: we should have read in it *Mother of God*, *one Son* only, and something of *God's* being *born*, *suffering*, *dying*, or the like; it cannot therefore be justly ascribed to Vincentius. Not to mention, that such a work appears to have been much fitter for a *bishop* of a church, than for a private *presbyter;* inasmuch as *bishops* generally were obliged to give an account of their faith, upon their first entrance upon the episcopate: and they had the privilege likewise of making Creeds, and Forms of Prayer, for their respective dioceses: for which reasons, *cæteris paribus*, this Creed ought rather to be ascribed to some *bishop* of that time than to an inferior presbyter. And who more likely to compose such a Creed than Hilary, Bishop of Arles, a celebrated man of that time, and of chief repute in the Gallican Church? His title to it will stand upon the following circumstances.

1. He was made Bishop in Gaul within the time mentioned, about the year 429. 2. He is allowed to have

been a man of great parts and capacity, of a neat wit, and elegant style for the age he lived in; insomuch that Livius, a poet, and a celebrated writer of that time, did not scruple to say, that if Austin had come after Hilary, he would have been judged his *inferior*[x]. 3. Gennadius's character of Hilary's writings, that they were *small tracts*[y], but *extremely fine*, suits well with our present supposition: but what most of all confirms and strengthens it, is what Honoratus of Marseilles, the writer of his life, tells us; that Hilary composed an admirable exposition [Symboli Expositio ambienda] of the Creed[z]. He calls it an Exposition of the Creed, (not a Creed,) which is the proper *title* for it, and more proper than that of Symbolum, or Creed, which it now bears. And so we find that it was but very rarely called Symbolum by the ancients; once, I think, by Hincmar, and never after for several centuries: and when it was, yet it was observed, by Thomas Aquinas, that that was not so proper a name for it, not being composed *per modum Symboli*, in the way of a Creed; as indeed it is not. What the more ancient and usual *titles* were may appear in one view in the tables above. Among others, we sometimes find the title of Expositio Catholicæ Fidei, or yet nearer, Expositio Symboli Apostolorum, An

[x] Quid plura dicam? Nisi dicendi pausa desuper eidem advenisset, sermonem finire non potuerat, tanta gratia exundante, et miraculo et stupore crescente, ut peritissimis desperationem tunc autoribus sæculi ejus inferret oratio: in tantum ut Livius temporis illius poeta, et autor insignis, publice proclamaret; *Si Augustinus post te fuisset, judicaretur inferior. Honoratus, in Vita S. Hilarii*, p. 740. edit. Quesnel.

[y] Ingenio vero immortali, aliqua et *parva* edidit, quæ *eruditæ animæ, et fidelis linguæ* indicio sunt; in quibus præcipue &c. *Gennad. de Hilario Arelat.* cap. lxix. p. 32.

[z] Gratia ejus ex his operibus, quæ eodem dicendi impetu concepit, genuit, ornavit, protulit, possit absque hæsitatione dignosci: Vita scilicet antistitis Honorati, Homiliæ in Totius Anni Festivitatibus expeditæ, Symboli Expositio ambienda, epistolarum vero tantus numerus, &c. *Honorat. Vit. Hilar.* p. 740.

N. B. There is some doubt whether Ravennius of Arles, successor to Hilary, or Honoratus of Marseilles be the author of this life: but there is good reason to ascribe it to the latter. See Quesnel, vol. ii. p. 730. and Antelmius, de veris Operibus Leon. M. p. 367.

Exposition of the Apostles' Creed, which is as proper a title as any, and not unlike to this of Honoratus. 4. I may farther observe, that this Hilary of Arles was a great admirer and follower of St. Austin[a], and had studied his writings; which may account for his often following St. Austin's thoughts in the compiling of the Creed, and sometimes his very *expressions*; and indeed forming the whole composition, in a manner, upon St. Austin's plan, both with respect to the *Trinity* and *Incarnation*. He did not indeed come heartily in to St. Austin's doctrine about Grace, Predestination, Free-will, &c. any more than the other Gallican bishops: but for other points, as Prosper observes, Hilary was entirely in Austin's sentiments. 5. Hence likewise we may account for the similitude of thoughts and expressions between Vincentius Lirinensis, and the author of the Creed; which Antelmius insists much upon to justify his ascribing it to Vincentius. Hilary and Vincentius were contemporaries and countrymen, both of the same monastery in the isle of Lerin, much about the same time: so that it is natural to suppose that they should fall into the like expressions, while treating on the same things; or that Vincentius might affect to copy from so great a man as Hilary, (first Abbot of Lerin, and then Archbishop of Arles,) when writing on the same subject. 6. As to the style of Hilary, though we have but little of his left to compare the Creed with, yet what there is answers very well to the idea one should have of a man that might be able to draw up such a piece. His life of the elder Honoratus, who was his predecessor in the see of Arles, is an excellent performance, and comes nothing short of the character he had raised for wit and eloquence. The style is clear and strong, short and sententious, abounding with antitheses, elegant turns, and

[a] Unum eorum præcipuæ auctoritatis, et spiritualium studiorum virum, Sanctum Hilarium, Arelatensem Episcopum, sciat beatitudo tua *admiratorem*, sectatoremque in *aliis omnibus* tuæ esse doctrinæ: et de hoc quod in querelam trahit, jam pridem apud sanctitatem tuam sensum suum per literas velle conferre. *Prosper ad Augustin. Ep.* CCXXV. p. 825. Bened. ed.

manly strokes of wit. He does but touch a little, in that piece, upon the subject of the *Trinity:* so that one cannot from thence discover how he would have expressed himself upon that head. Only, that little there is there, is very like to a paragraph in the Athanasian Creed, both for turn and expression. Speaking of Honoratus, or rather to him, in the way of a rhetorical apostrophe, he observes [b] how clear and expressive he had been in his discourses concerning the *Trinity* in the *Godhead;* making the *Persons* distinct, but co-uniting them in *Glory*, *Eternity*, and *Majesty*. Which may remind us of the words of the Athanasian Creed, "there is *one Person of the Father*, &c. "but the Godhead of the Father, and of the Son, and of "the Holy Ghost is all one, *the Glory equal, the Majesty* "*coeternal.*" However that be, this we may learn from it, how great a commendation it was, in Hilary's account, to be able to speak clearly and accurately upon the subject of the *Trinity*, and how ambitious he might be of so doing himself: and we know, from his *dying* instructions [c] to his friends about him, how much he had the subject at heart. These, I confess, are but little circumstances: yet they are of some weight along with others more considerable, and therefore ought not to be entirely omitted. What weighs most with me is, that he was, in his time, a man of the greatest authority in the Gallican Church [d], without

[b] Quotidianus siquidem in sincerissimis tractatibus confessionis Patris, ac Filii, ac Spiritus Sancti testis fuisti: nec facile tam exerte, tam lucide quisquam de Divinitatis Trinitate disseruit, cum eam *Personis* distingueres, et gloriæ (*gloria*) æternitate, ac majestate sociares. *Hilar. Vit. Honorat.* p. 770. Quesnel. ed.

[c] Among which this is one, and the first.

Fidem Trinitatis immobiliter retinete. *Vit. Hilar.* p. 747.

[d] Quesnel quotes this elogium of him, from Constantius Presbyter of the same time.

Illustrabatur hæc civitas Hilario sacerdote, multimoda virtute pretioso: erat enim *Fidei igneus torrens*, cælestis eloquii, et præceptionis divinæ operarius indefessus. *Quesnel*, p. 543.

To which may be added one line of his epitaph.

Gemma Sacerdotum, plebisque, orbisque Magister. *Quesnel, ibid.*

Tanta fuit ejus in dicendo vis, ut Silvius Eusebius, Domnulus, auctores

whose advice, or privity at least, such a Creed would hardly have passed; and that he actually was the author of *such a work* as this is, and which must either be this, or else is lost. This Creed has been sometimes ascribed to the elder Hilary of Poictiers, though neither the *diction*, nor the *matter*, nor the *manner* of it look any thing like his: only, it seems, this Creed in one manuscript was found tacked to some pieces of that Hilary. I pretend not to draw any argument from hence in favour of our Hilary: though had the manuscript been a very ancient one, or copied from one that was, (neither of which appears,) I should have thought it of some moment; since the similitude of names might possibly have occasioned it.

Having considered such reasons as seem to favour the conjecture about Hilary of Arles; it will next be proper to consider also what may be objected against it.

1. It may be objected, that this Hilary lived to the year 449, saw the rise, progress, and condemnation of the Nestorian heresy, and the beginning at least of the Eutychian. May it not therefore be reasonably presumed that, had he been to compile a Confession of Faith, he would have made it more *full* and *particular* against both those heresies than I have supposed the Creed to be? To this I answer, that the objection would be of weight, if I supposed this Creed to have been made by him in the last years of his life: but as I take it to have been made a little after his entrance upon his episcopate, (to be a rule to his clergy all his time, as well as to satisfy his colleagues of his own orthodoxy,) the objection affects not me. Admit the Creed to have been drawn up by him about the year 429 or 430; and then it is just what it should be, exactly suited to the circumstances of time and place: and as to his enlarging or altering it afterwards, upon the rise of the two heresies, it might not be in his power when once gone out of his hands: nor would it be

coævi, admiratione succensi in hæc verba proruperint: *Non doctrinam, non eloquentiam, sed nescio quid super homines consecutum.* *Natal. Alexand.* sec. v. cap. 4. art. 19. ex Honorati Vit. Hilar. cap. 11.

necessary, since both these heresies are sufficiently obviated in this Creed, though not so *explicitly* condemned as in many that came later.

2. It may be asked, how the author's name came to be so studiously concealed even by those that received and admired the Creed; and how it came to take at length the name of Athanasius, rather than of Hilary? I answer: this objection will equally lie against any other author assignable whatever, except Athanasius himself, whom we cannot, with any colour of reason, ascribe it to. It will be as easy to account for the studious concealment of the author's name, supposing it Hilary, as for any other, or perhaps easier. This Hilary had stoutly defended the rights of his see against Pope Leo's encroachments, in the matter of *appeals* and other branches of jurisdiction. This brought the good man under disfavour and disrepute; as must happen to the best of men when they have persons of greater figure and authority than themselves to contend with, however righteous and clear their cause may be. Besides this, Hilary had entertained a dislike to some of St. Austin's prevailing doctrines about *grace*, growing much in vogue; so that St. Austin's more zealous disciples had a pique against him on that account, and had the less value for his name. The way then to have this Creed pass current, and make it generally received, was to stifle as much as possible the name of the author, and to leave it to stand by its own intrinsic worth and weight. As to the name of Athanasius, I take it to have come thus. Upon the revival of the Arian controversy in Gaul, under the influence of the Burgundian kings, it was obvious to call one side Athanasians, and the other side Arians; and so also to name the orthodox faith the Athanasian Faith, as the other Arian. This Creed therefore, being a summary of the orthodox and Catholic Faith, might in process of time acquire the name of the Athanasian Faith, or Fides Athanasii, in opposition to the contrary scheme, which might as justly be called Fides Arii, or the Arian Faith. The equivocalness of the *title* gave a handle to

those that came after to understand it of a form of faith *composed* by Athanasius; just as the equivocal title of Apostolical given to the Roman Creed occasioned the mistake about its being made by the Apostles. This appears to me the most probable account of the whole matter: and it is very much confirmed by what we see of several tracts, wrote in the fifth and sixth centuries dialogue-wise, where Athanasius is made the mouth of the Catholic side, and Arius of his party, and Photinus of his: not meaning that Athanasius, Arius, and Photinus were really the speakers in those conferences, but the readers were to understand the Athanasian, Arian, and Photinian principles, as being there fairly represented under those leading names.

3. If it be asked farther, why this Creed was not cited during the Nestorian and Eutychian controversy, when there was so frequent occasion for it: I answer, partly because the Creed was not *particular* and *explicit* enough to have done much service; but chiefly, because the author had been eclipsed, and his reputation obscured by greater *names* than his, so that his authority had weighed little; and to produce it without a name would have signified less. This objection therefore, though it might be of great force in the question about Athanasius, is of no weight at all against our present supposition about Hilary of Arles.

These are all the objections which to me occur: and they seem to be so far from weakening the grounds upon which I proceed, that they rather tend to strengthen and confirm them. And though I do not pretend to strict certainty about the *author* of the Creed; yet I persuade myself that none that have been hitherto named have any fairer, or so fair a claim to it as the man I have mentioned. Not Athanasius, not Hilary of Poictiers, not Eusebius of Verceil, not Pope Anastasius I. nor any of that name; not Vincentius Lirinensis, nor Vigilius Tapsensis, nor Athanasius of Spire, nor Fortunatus, nor Bonifacius, nor any other that has been thought on. From the many

conjectures heretofore advanced by learned men, one may perceive that it has been judged to be a thing worth the inquiring after: and as others have taken the liberty of naming such *author* or *authors* as to them appeared most likely to have made the Creed, so have I, in my turn, not scrupling to add one more to the number.

The sum then of what I have presumed to advance upon probable conjecture, in a case which will not admit of full and perfect evidence, is this: that Hilary, once Abbot of Lerins, and next Bishop of Arles, about the year 430 composed the Exposition of Faith which now bears the name of the Athanasian Creed. It was drawn up for the use of the Gallican clergy, and especially for the diocese or province of Arles. It was esteemed by as many as were acquainted with it, as a valuable summary of the Christian Faith. It seems to have been in the hands of Vincentius, monk of Lerins, before 434, by what he has borrowed from it; and to have been cited in part by Avitus of Vienne, about the year 500, and by Cæsarius of Arles before the year 543. About the year 570, it became famous enough to be commented upon like the Lord's Prayer and Apostles' Creed, and together with them. All this while, and perhaps for several years lower, it had not yet acquired the name of the *Athanasian* Faith, but was simply styled *the Catholic Faith.* But before 670, Athanasius's admired name came in to recommend and adorn it; being in itself also an excellent system of the Athanasian principles of the *Trinity*[c] and *incarnation*, in opposition chiefly to Arians, Macedonians, and Apollinarians. The name of the Faith of Athanasius, in a while, occasioned the mistake of ascribing it to him,

[c] Romanæ ego Ecclesiæ quasi Symbolum, incerto autore, existimem, hinc Athanasii dictum et putatum quod dilucide Catholicam, ipsamque Athanasii Fidem (de *Trinitate*, maxime) complecteretur; cujus inter Catholicos sic spectata fides, ut ejus communio velut tessera Catholici esset; censereturque ejus condemnatio ipsa Nicænæ et Catholicæ Fidei ejuratio; uti se res habuit in Liberio Romano antistite &c. *Combefis. not. in Calec. Nov. Auctar. Patr.* tom. ii. p. 296.

as his composition. This gave it authority enough to be cited and appealed to as standard, in the disputes of the middle ages, between Greeks and Latins about the *procession:* and the same admired name, together with the intrinsic worth and value of the form itself, gave it credit enough to be received into the *public* Service in the western churches; first in France, next in Spain, soon after in Germany, England, Italy, and at length in Rome itself; while many other excellent Creeds drawn up in Councils, or recommended by Emperors, yet never arrived to any such honour and esteem as this hath done. The truly good and great author, (as I now suppose him,) though ill used by the then Pope of Rome, and not kindly treated, with respect to his memory, in after ages, has nevertheless been the mouth of all the western churches, and some eastern too, for a long tract of centuries, in celebrating the glories of the coeternal Trinity. And so may he ever continue, till the Christian churches can find out (which they will not easily do) a juster, or sounder, or more accurate form of faith than this is.

CHAP. IX.

The Creed itself in the Original Language with Parallel Passages from the Fathers.

MY design in this chapter is,

1. To exhibit the Creed in its native language, that is, in Latin, according to the most ancient and most correct copies. The *various lections* will be placed at the bottom, under the Creed: the manuscripts therein referred to shall be denoted by such names or marks as appear above in the table of manuscripts.

2. Opposite to the Creed, in another column, I place *parallel* passages, selected from authors that lived and wrote before 430, principally from St. Austin: and this with design to enforce and illustrate my main argument before insisted on; namely, that the Creed contains no-

thing but what had been asserted, in as full and express words as any words of the Creed are, by Church writers before the time specified.

3. I subjoin under these, at the bottom of the page, some farther select passages from Church writers before or after the time mentioned; partly to serve as *comments* upon some places of the Creed, and partly to show how some writers of the fifth century, Vincentius especially, expressed themselves on the same heads, that the reader may from thence judge whether they appear *prior* to the Creed, or the Creed *prior* to them.

I ought to ask my English reader's pardon for this part; which he may please to pass over, and to go on to the next chapter, intended chiefly for his satisfaction, and to make him some amends for the present interruption: for my design in subjoining an English commentary is to serve much the same purposes with what is here intended by the Latin; though not all of them, but as many as the nature of the thing will allow.

FIDES CATHOLICA.

1. Quicumque vult salvus esse, ante omnia opus est ut teneat Catholicam Fidem.

Loca parallela excerpta ex Variis; ante an. 430.

1. *Catholicæ disciplinæ majestate institutum est, ut accedentibus ad Religionem* Fides *persuadeatur* ante omnia. August. tom. viii. p. 64.

Hæc est Fides nostra, quoniam hæc est Fides recta, quæ etiam Catholica nuncupatur. Tom. viii. 729.

Variantes Lectiones.

1. (*salvus esse*) esse salvus. Cod. Ambros. et Fortunat. in MS. Ambros.

Excerpta ex Patribus.

1. Credamus ergo fratres: hoc est *primum* præceptum, hoc est *initium* religionis et vitæ nostræ, fixum habere cor in *fide*. *August.* tom. v. p. 195.

2. Quam nisi quisque integram inviolatamque servaverit, absque dubio in æternum peribit.

2. *Hæretici*——*Simplici Fide Catholica contenti esse nolunt; quæ* una *parvulis* salus *est.* August. tom. iv. p. 60.

3. Fides autem Catholica hæc est, ut unum Deum in Trinitate, et Trinitatem in Unitate veneremur:

3. Νῦν δὲ δίδασκε τοσοῦτον εἰδέναι μόνον· μονάδα ἐν τριάδι, καὶ τριάδα ἐν μονάδι προσκυνουμένην, παράδοξον ἔχουσαν ἁῦ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν ἕνωσιν. *Greg. Nazian.* Orat. xxiii. p. 422.

4. Neque confundentes Personas, neque Substantiam separantes.

4. *Et hæc omnia nec* confuse *unum sunt, nec* disjuncte *tria sunt.* Augustin. tom. ii. p. 609.

5. Alia est enim Persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritûs Sancti.

5. *Impietatem Sabellii declinantes, tres Personas expressas sub proprietate distinguimus* — Aliam *Patris,* aliam *Filii,* aliam *Spiritus Sancti*—Personam. Pelagii

2. (*quisque*) quis. Cod. Ambros. (*in violatamque*) inviolabilemque. Cod. San-germ. (*absque dubio*) deest in Cod. Reg. Paris. (*in æternum peribit*) peribit in æternum. San-germ.

2. Catholicorum hoc fere proprium, deposita sanctorum Patrum et commissa servare, damnare profanas novitates: et sicut dixit, et iterum dixit Apostolus: *si quis annunciaverit, præterquam quod acceptum est,* anathemare. *Vincent.* cap. xxxiv. p. 111.

3. Catholica Ecclesia unum Deum in Trinitatis plenitudine, et item Trinitatis æqualitatem in una Divinitate veneratur. *Vincent.* cap. xxii. et c. xviii.

4. Ut neque singularitas substantiæ Personarum confundat proprietatem, neque item Trinitatis distinctio unitatem separet Deitatis. *Vincent.* cap. 22.

5. (*alia Filii*) alia *Persona* Filii. Cod. Ambros. item Fortunat. (*alia Spiritûs*) alia *Persona* Sp. Sanct. Cod. Ambros.

5. Quia scilicet alia est Persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti. *Vincent.* cap. 19.

Symbol, p. 274. apud Lambec. Catal. Bibl. Vindob.

6. Sed Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, una est Divinitas, æqualis Gloria, coæterna Majestas.

6. *Confutantes Arium, unam eandemque dicimus Trinitatis esse substantiam.* Pelag. Symb.

Patris, et Filii et Spiritus Sancti unam Virtutem, unam Substantiam, unam Deitatem, unam Majestatem, unam Gloriam. August. tom. viii. p. 744.

7. Qualis Pater, talis Filius, talis et Spiritus Sanctus.

7. Qualis *est Pater secundum Substantiam,* talem *genuit Filium: et Spiritus Sanctus—est ejusdem et ipse Substantiæ cum Patre et Filio.* Faustini Fid.

8. Increatus Pater, increatus Filius, increatus et Spiritus Sanctus.

8. *Quicquid* ad seipsum *dicitur Deus, et de singulis personis* singulariter *dicitur,*

6. (*coæterna*) Codd. nonnulli habent *et* coæterna. Deest *et* in Cod. Ambros. et in Fortunat. et Brunon. aliisque multis.

6. Sed tamen Patris et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti non alia et alia, sed una eademque natura. *Vincent.* cap. 19.

7. (*talis et Spiritus Sanctus.*) Ita Codd. Ambros. Reg. Paris. C. C. C. C. 1. Cotton. 1. Jacob. 1. Fortunat. item Cæsarius Arelat. antiquissimus. MSS. recentiores, et editi omittunt *et.*

7. Qualis immensus est Pater, talis est et Filius, talis est Spiritus Sanctus. Et *Philastr. Hær.* li. p. 106. Conf. p. 178.

8. (*et Spiritus Sanctus.*) Deest vocula *et* in recentioribus codicibus: retinent plerique *antiquiores* hoc in loco, et similiter in subsequentibus, ante *Spiritus Sanctus.* Quæ lectio, opinor, vera est, ab autore Symboli profecta; scilicet, ad majorem emphasim, propter hæresim Macedonianam nondum penitus exstinctam, nostrum autem est Symbolum exhibere quale se primitus habuit.

8. Illud præcipue teneamus, quicquid *ad se* dicitur præstantissima illa et divina sublimitas, *substantialiter* dici; quod autem *ad aliquid* non *substantialiter*, sed *relative:* tantamque vim esse *ejusdem substantiæ* in Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto, ut quicquid de singulis ad scipsos dicitur, non *pluraliter* in summa, sed *singulariter* accipiatur. *Augustin.* tom. viii. p. 837.

et simul de ipsa Trinitate. August. tom. viii. p. 838.

9. Immensus Pater, immensus Filius, immensus et Spiritus Sanctus.

9. *Magnus Pater, magnus Filius, magnus Spiritus Sanctus.* August. tom. viii. p. 837.

10. Æternus Pater, æternus Filius, æternus et Spiritus Sanctus.

10. *Hoc et de* bonitate, *et de* æternitate, *et de* omnipotentia *Dei dictum sit.* August. ibid. p. 839.

Æternus Pater, coæternus Filius, coæternus Spiritus Sanctus. August. tom. v. p. 543.

11. Et tamen non tres æterni, sed unus æternus.

12. Sicut non tres increati, nec tres immensi, sed unus increatus, et unus immensus.

12. *Non tamen tres magni, sed unus magnus.* Aug. tom. viii. p. 837.

13. Similiter, Omnipotens Pater, Omnipotens Filius, Omnipotens et Spiritus Sanctus.

13. *Itaque Omnipotens Pater, Omnipotens Filius, Omnipotens Spiritus Sanctus.* Aug. de Trin. lib. v. cap. 8.

14. Et tamen non tres

14. *Nec tamen tres Om-*

12. (*unus increatus, et unus immensus.*) Unus immensus et unus increatus. Cod. Ambros.

12. Nec magnos tres dicimus, sed magnum unum, quia non participatione magnitudinis Deus magnus est, sed seipso magno magnus est, quia ipse sua est magnitudo. *August. de Trin.* lib. v. cap. 10.

13. Sed ne *duos Omnipotentes* intelligas præcavendum est: licet enim et Pater sit *Omnipotens*, et Filius, tamen *unus est Omnipotens*, sicut et unus est Deus, quia Patris et Filii *eadem omnipotentia* est, sicut et eadem Deitas. *Faustin.* p. 123.

14. (*Et tamen*) deest *tamen* in Cod. Ambros.

14. Sicut simul illi tres *unus Deus*, sic simul illi tres *unus omnipo-*

Omnipotentes, sed unus Omnipotens.

15. Ita Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus et Spiritus Sanctus.

16. Et tamen non tres Dii, sed unus est Deus.

17. Ita Dominus Pater, Dominus Filius, Dominus et Spiritus Sanctus.

18. Et tamen non tres Domini, sed unus est Dominus.

19. Quia sicut singillatim unamquamque Personam et Deum et Dominum confi-

nipotentes, sed unus Omnipotens. August. ibid.

15. *Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus Sanctus.* August. Trin. lib. viii. c. 1. et Serm. 105. p. 542. tom. v.

16. *Nec tamen tres Dii—sed unus Deus.* Aug. ibid.

17. *Sic et* Dominum *si quæras, singulum quemque respondeo*——August. tom. viii. p. 729.

18. *Sed simul omnes non tres Dominos Deos, sed unum Dominum Deum dico.* August. ibid.

19. *Cum de* singulis *quæritur, unusquisque eorum et Deus, et Omnipotens esse re-*

tens est, et *invisibilis unus*, Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus est. *Augustin.* tom. viii. p. 654. Vid. p. 865.

16. (*est Deus*) deest *est* in MS. Ambros.

16. *Unus Deus* propter *inseparabilem* Divinitatem; sicut *unus Omnipotens* propter *inseparabilem* Omnipotentiam. *August. de Civit. Dei*, p. 290.

In illa summa Trinitate, quæ incomparabiliter rebus omnibus antecellit, tanta est *inseparabilitas*, ut cum Trinitas hominum non possit dici *unus Homo*, illa *unus Deus* et dicatur et sit. *August. de Trin.* lib. xv. cap. 23.

18. (*est Dominus*) deest *est*. Cod. Ambros.

18. Non sunt enim duo Domini ubi *Dominatus unus* est; quia Pater in Filio, et Filius in Patre, et ideo *Dominus unus. Ambros. de Sp. S.* lib. iii. cap. 15. p. 686.

19. (*et Deum et Dominum*) Ita MS. Ambros. et MS. Oxon. Fortunat.

teri Christiana veritate compellimur; ita tres Deos, aut Dominos dicere Catholica religione prohibemur.

20. Pater a nullo est factus, nec creatus, nec genitus.

21. Filius a Patre solo est, non factus, nec creatus, sed genitus.

22. Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio, non factus, nec creatus, nec genitus est, sed procedens.

spondeatur; cum vero de omnibus simul, non tres Dii, vel tres Omnipotentes, sed unus Deus Omnipotens. August. de Civit. Dei, lib. xi. c. 24. p. 290.

20. *Dicimus Patrem Deum* de nullo. August. tom. v. p. 680.

Non enim habet de quo sit, aut ex quo procedat. Aug. tom. viii. p. 829.

21. *Filius* Patris solius—*hunc quippe de sua substantia* genuit, *non ex nihilo fecit.* Aug. Ep. 170. alias, 66.

22. De Filio *Spiritus Sanctus* procedere *reperitur.* August. de Trin. lib. xv. c. 17.

Neque natus est sicut uni-

rectissime. Cod. Fortunat. Ambros. aliique, tum MSS. tum impressi, habent *Deum* et *Dominum*. Brunonis Cod. et Coll. Joh. MS. *Deum ac Dominum*. San-germanensis, *Dominum et Deum*. Plerique editi, *Deum aut Dominum*. Quæ lectio, me judice, omnium pessima est. (*aut Dominos*) Ita plerique MSS. et editi: sed nonnulli, *ac* Dominos. (*prohibemur*) MS. Ambr. legit *prohibemus*: male.

22. (*sed procedens*) Cod. Ambros. adjecta habet ista; *Patri et Filio coæternus est.* Glossa, uti videtur, ex margine in textum immissa: nisi forte librarius verba illa ex Bachiarii Fide, quam simul descripserat, huc transtulerit; sive oscitanter, sive majoris elucidationis gratia. *Vid.*

22. Spiritus quoque Sanctus non, sicut creatura, ex nihilo est factus; sed sic a Patre Filioque procedit, ut nec a Filio, nec a Patre sit factus. *August.* ep. 170.

Τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα——οὔτε γεννητὸν οὔτε κτιστὸν——ἀλλ' ἐκ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον. *Epiphan.* p. 742.

genitus, neque factus, &c. Id. lib. v. c. 15. p. 841.

23. Unus ergo Pater, non tres Patres; unus Filius, non tres Filii; unus Spiritus Sanctus, non tres Spiritus Sancti.

23. *Unus est Pater, non duo vel tres; et unus Filius, non duo vel tres; et unus amborum Spiritus, non duo vel tres.* August. contr. Maxim. p. 729.

24. Et in hac Trinitate nihil prius aut posterius, nihil majus aut minus, sed totæ tres Personæ coæternæ sibi sunt, et coæquales.

24. *In hac Trinitate, non est aliud alio majus, aut minus.* August. tom. v. p. 948.

Nec enim prorsus aliquis in Trinitate gradus: nihil quod inferius, superiusve dici possit. Pelagii Symb.

25. Ita ut per omnia, sicut jam supra dictum est, et Unitas in Trinitate, et Trinitas in Unitate veneranda sit.

25. *Vid. supra, in articulo* 3.

26. Qui vult ergo salvus

26. *Vide supra, artic.* 2.

Bachiar. Fid. apud Murator. tom. ii. p. 16, 18.

23. Οὔτι οὖν τρεῖς πατέρες, οὔτι τρεῖς υἱοὶ, οὔτι τρεῖς παράκλητοι· ἀλλ' εἷς πατὴρ, καὶ εἷς υἱὸς, καὶ εἷς παράκλητος. *Pseud. Ignat. ad Philipp.* c. ii. p. 118. Cotel. ed. Vid. Epiphan. H. 69. p. 742.

24. (*Et in hac*) deest *et* in Cod. San-germ.

24. Increata et inæstimabilis Trinitas, quæ unius est æternitatis et gloriæ, nec tempus nec gradum vel posterioris recipit vel prioris. *Ambros. de Fid.* lib. iv. c. 11. p. 547.

25. Ita tota Deitas sui perfectione æqualis est, ut exceptis vocabulis quæ proprietatem indicant Personarum, quicquid de una Persona dicitur, de tribus dignissime possit intelligi. *Pelag. Symb.*

26. Si quis hanc Fidem non habet,

esse, ita de Trinitate sentiat.

27. Sed necessarium est ad æternam salutem, ut Incarnationem quoque Domini nostri Jesu Christi fideliter credat.

27. *Dominus autem manens cum discipulis per quadraginta dies, significare dignatus est quia per istud tempus* necessaria est omnibus Fides Incarnationis Christi; *quæ infirmis est necessaria.* August. Serm. 264. tom. v. p. 1077.

28. Est ergo Fides recta, ut credamus et confiteamur, quia Dominus noster Jesus Christus, Dei Filius, Deus pariter et Homo est.

28. *Proinde, Christus Jesus, Dei Filius, est et Deus et Homo.* August. Ench. tom. vi. p. 210.

29. Deus est ex substan-

29. *Deus ante omnia sæ-*

Catholicus dici non potest, quia Catholicam non tenet Fidem; et ideo alienus est ac profanus, et adversus veritatem rebellis Fides. *S. Ambros. apud Lambec. Catalog. Bibl. Vindob.* lib. ii. p. 268.

27. Ideo conversatio ipsius in carne post resurrectionem per quadraginta dies erat necessaria, ut demonstraret tam diu esse necessariam Fidem Incarnationis Christi quamdiu in ista vita docetur arca in diluvio fluctuare. *August.* tom. v. p. 1078.

28. (*confiteamur, quia*) Cod. Ambros. atque *editi* nonnulli legunt *quod.* Plures habent *quia.* (*Deus pariter et Homo est.*) Ita Codd. Bened. 1. Colbertin. Jacob. 1. et Fortunat. Ambros. et San-germ. legunt, *et Deus pariter et Homo est.* Editi, *Deus et homo est.*

29. (*ex substantia*) Colbertin. *de substantia:* et infra, *de substantia matris.* (*Homo*) Ambros. Cod. legit *et Homo est.* Fortunat. *et Homo.* Post,

29. Idem ex Patre ante sæcula genitus, idem in sæculo ex matre generatus. *Vincent.* c. 19.

tia Patris ante sæcula genitus: Homo ex Substantia Matris in sæculo natus.

30. Perfectus Deus, perfectus Homo ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens.

31. Æqualis Patri secundum Divinitatem: minor Patre secundum Humanitatem.

32. Qui licet Deus sit et Homo, non duo tamen, sed unus est Christus.

cula: Homo in nostro sæculo—unus Dei Filius, idemque Hominis Filius. August. ibid.

30. *Confitemur in Christo unam esse Filii personam, ut dicamus duas esse* perfectas *atque integras substantias, id est,* Deitatis, *et* Humanitatis *quæ ex anima continetur et corpore.* Pelag. Symb.

31. *Æqualem Patri secundum Divinitatem, minorem autem Patre secundum carnem, hoc est, secundum Hominem.* Aug. Epist. 137. p. 406.

32. *Agnoscamus geminam substantiam Christi; divinam scilicet qua æqualis est Patri, humanam qua major est Pater: utrumque autem simul* non duo, sed unus est

Matris, San-germ. Cod. habet. *in sæculo genitus perfectus Homo.*

30. (*rationali*) *rationabili.* Codd. Ambros. Colbert. et San-germ.

30. Adversus Arium, veram et perfectam *Verbi* Divinitatem; adversus Apollinarem, perfectam Hominis in Christo defendimus veritatem. *August. Op.* tom. v. Append. p. 391.

Perfectus Deus, perfectus Homo: in Deo summa divinitas, in Homine plena humanitas: quippe quæ animam simul habeat et carnem. *Vincent.* c. 19.

31. (*minor Patre*) *minor Patri.* Colb.

32. Deest *et* Colb.

32. *Caro* Christus, et *anima* Christus, et *Verbum* Christus: nec tamen tria hæc tres Christi, sed unus Christus. *August. in Johan.* p. 612.

33. Unus autem, non conversione Divinitatis in carnem, sed adsumptione Humanitatis in Deum.

34. Unus omnino, non confusione Substantiæ, sed unitate Personæ.

35. Nam sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est Homo; ita Deus et Homo unus est Christus.

36. Qui passus est pro

Christus. Aug. Tract. in Joh. p. 699.

33. *Verbum caro factum est, a Divinitate carne suscepta, non in carnem Divinitate mutata.* August. Enchirid. c. 35.

34. *Idem Deus qui Homo, et qui Deus idem Homo: non confusione naturæ, sed unitate Personæ.* Aug. tom. v. p. 885.

35. *Sicut enim unus est Homo anima rationalis et caro; sic unus est Christus Deus et Homo.* Aug. Tract. in Joh. p. 699.

36. *Descendit ad inferna,*

33. (*in carnem*) *in carne.* MSS. Ambros. Colbert. San-germ. aliique plurimi, et vetusti. Habent etiam *in Deo*, pro, *in Deum.* At multi etiam Codices, cum Fortunati Cod. Ambrosiano, receptam lectionem præferunt; quæ utique præferenda videtur. Cod. San-germ. pro *conversione* habet *conversatione.* Cod. Colbert. totam hanc pericopen sic exhibet; *Unus autem, non ex eo quod sit in carne conversa Divinitas, sed quia est in Deo adsumpta dignanter humanitas.*

34. (*Unus omnino*) *unus Christus est.* Colbert.

35. (*Nam sicut* &c.) Totum omittit Cod. Colbertinus. Scilicet, uti credo, ne *simile* illud in erroris sui patrocinium arriperent Monophysitæ. (*rationalis*) *rationabilis.* Ambros.

36. (*Qui passus est pro salute no-*

33. Nemo ergo credat Dei Filium *conversum* et commutatum esse in Hominis Filium; sed potius credamus, et non consumpta divina, et perfecte assumpta humana substantia, manentem Dei Filium factum Hominis Filium. *August.* tom. v. p. 887.

Deus ergo Hominem assumsit, Homo in Deum transivit: non naturæ versibilitate, sicut Apollinaristæ dicunt, sed Dei dignatione. *Gennad. Eccl. Dogm.* c. 2.

34. Unus autem, non——Divinitatis et humanitatis confusione, sed unitate Personæ. *Vincent. Lir.* c. xix. p. 58.

36. Quis ergo, nisi infidelis, ne-

salute nostra, descendit ad inferos, tertia die resurrexit a mortuis.

37. Adscendit ad cœlos, sedet ad dexteram Patris; inde venturus judicare vivos et mortuos.

38. Ad cujus adventum omnes homines resurgere habent cum corporibus suis, et reddituri sunt de factis propriis rationem.

39. Et qui bona egerunt,

tertia die resurrexit a mortuis. Symb. Aquileiæ, apud Ruffin.

37. *Ascendit ad cœlos, sedet ad dexteram Patris; inde venturus judicare vivos et mortuos.* Symb. Roman. Vet.

38. *Resurrectionem etiam carnis confitemur et credimus, ut dicamus nos in eadem qua nunc sumus veritate membrorum esse reparandos.* Pelag. Symb.

39. *Et procedent qui bona*

stra) Qui secundum fidem nostram passus et mortuus. Colbert.

(*ad inferos*) *ad infernos.* Cod. San-germ. *ad inferna.* Fortunat. MS. Oxon. *ad inferna descendens.* Cod. Colbertin.

(*tertia die*) deest in Cod. Ambros. San-germ. Cotton. 1. Jacob. 1. (*resurrexit*) surrexit: Cod. Ambros. Fortunat.

37. (*sedet*) *sedit.* Cod. Ambr. (*dexteram Patris*) Ita Codd. Ambros. et Fortunat. et Symb. Roman. Vet. *dexteram Patris Omnipotentis.* Cod. San-germ. *dextram Omnipotentis.* Cod. Brunonis, *dexteram Dei Patris sedet, sicut vobis in Symbolo traditum est.* Cod. Colbert. *dexteram Dei Patris Omnipotentis.* Codd. recentiores, cum excusis.

38. (*resurgere habent cum corporibus suis, et*) desunt in Cod. Ambros. Colbertinus legit; *ad cujus adventum erunt omnes homines sine dubio in suis corporibus resurrecturi.* Sed nihil mutamus.

39. (*egerunt*) egerint. Cod. Ambros. Totum hunc articulum sic legit

gaverit fuisse *apud inferos* Christum?——

Quamobrem teneamus firmissime quod fides habet fundatissima auctoritate firmatum——et cætera quæ de illo testatissima veritate conscripta sunt; in quibus etiam hoc est, quod *apud inferos fuit. August.* ep. clxiv. p. 574, 578.

38. Si id resurgere dicitur quod cadit, caro ergo nostra in veritate resurget, sicut in veritate cadit. Et non secundum Origenem, immutatio corporum erit &c. *Gennad. Eccl. Dogmat.* c. 5.

39. Post resurrectionem et judicium, non credamus restitutionem

ibunt in vitam æternam, qui vero mala, in ignem æternum.

fecerunt, in resurrectionem vitæ, qui vero mala egerunt in resurrectionem judicii. Joh. v. 28.

Ibunt hi in supplicium æternum, justi autem in vitam æternam. Matt. xxv. 46.

40. Hæc est Fides Catholica, quam nisi quisque fideliter, firmiterque crediderit, salvus esse non poterit.

40. *Cavete, dilectissimi, ne quis vos ab* Ecclesiæ Catholicæ *Fide ac unitate seducat. Qui enim vobis aliter evangelizaverit præterquam quod accepistis, anathema sit.* Aug. tom. v. p. 592.

Colbertinus; *Ut qui bona egerunt, eant in vitam æternam; qui mala, in ignem æternum.*

(*qui vero*) Cod. Ambros. et Cotton. 1. omittunt *vere*. Codices nonnulli legunt, *et qui vero:* alii, *et qui mala.*

40. (*quisque*) Cod. Ambros. *unusquisque.* Colbertinus pergit: *Hæc est Fides sancta et catholica, quam omnis homo, qui ad vitam æternam pervenire desiderat, scire integre debet, et fideliter custodire.*

futuram, sicut Origenes delirat, ut dæmones vel impii homines post tormenta quasi suppliciis expurgati, vel *illi* in *angelicam* qua creati sunt redeant dignitatem, vel *isti* justorum societate donentur. *Gennad. ibid.* c. 9.

40. Ὁ ταῦτα πιστεύσας ὡς ἔχει, ὡς γεγένηται, μακάριος· ὁ ταῦτα μὴ πιστεύων ἐναγὴς οὐχ ἧττον τῶν τὸν κύριον σταυρωσάντων. *Pseud. Ignat. ad Philipp.* p. 118.

CHAP. X.

A Commentary on the Athanasian Creed[a].

1. *WHOSOEVER will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic Faith.*

By the words, *before all things*, is meant *in the first place*. Faith goes before *practice;* and is therefore *first* in *order*, though *practice* may be, comparatively, more considerable, and *first* in *value*, as the *end* is above the *means*.

2. *Which Faith except every one do keep whole*[b] *and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly.*

Which faith, that is, the *Catholic Faith* before spoken of, which is another name for the *true* and *right* faith as taught in *Scripture;* called *Catholic*, or *universal*, as being held by the *universal* Church of Christ, against which the *gates of hell* shall never *prevail*. The meaning then is, that every one is obliged, under pain of *damnation*, to preserve, as far as in him lies, the *true* and *right* faith, in opposition to those that endeavour to *corrupt* it either by taking from it, or adding to it. That men shall perish eternally for *unbelief*, for *rejecting* the faith in the lump,

[a] In the Primmer of 1539, and another of 1555, where the version is made from the Latin, and joined with the Popish Service of that time, the English title of the Creed was, The Symbole or Crede of the great Doctour Athanasius, dayly red in the Church.

In King Edward's Prayer Book, A. D. 1549. it is barely entitled, This Confession of our Christian Faith: and it was ordered to be *song*, or *sayed*, upon six feasts in the year. At the revisal of the Common Prayer, in 1552, it was appointed to be used on several feasts in the year, the whole number thirteen. But the *title* still continued the same, till the last review under Charles the Second; when were added thereto, *commonly called the Creed of St. Athanasius:* from which time the running title has been S. Athanasius's Creed, as before *Quicunque vult*, in our Prayer Books.

[b] In King Edward's Prayer Books, and so down to the year 1627, *holy* was read for what is now *whole*. Which I suppose was intended for *wholly:* as one may reasonably imagine from Queen Elizabeth's of 1561, where it is *wholy;* and from the metrical version, which plainly meant *wholly*, by *holy*, answering to *undefiledly:* and it is certain that *holy* was the ancient spelling for what we now write *wholly*.

cannot be doubted; when it is expressly said, (Mark xvi. 16.) "He that believeth not shall be damned:" and as to rejecting any particular branch, or article of it, it must of consequence be a sin against the *whole;* against *truth* and *peace*, and therefore *damnable* in its own nature, as all *wilful* sins are without repentance. As to the allowances to be made for *invincible* ignorance, prejudice, or other unavoidable infirmities; as they will be pleadable in the case of any other sin, so may they, and will they also be pleadable in this: but it was foreign to the purpose of the Creed, to take notice of it in this case *particularly*, when it is *common* to all cases of like nature, and is always *supposed* and *understood*, though not specially mentioned.

3. *And the Catholic Faith is this; That we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity.*

One of the principal branches of the Catholic Faith, and which is of nearest concernment, (since our *worship* depends upon it, and the main body of the Christian religion is bound up in it,) is the doctrine of a *Trinity* in *Unity*, of *three Persons* and *one God*, recommended in our baptism as the object of our *faith*, *hope*, and *worship*. He that takes upon him to corrupt or deprave this most fundamental part of a Christian's faith cannot be *innocent;* it being his bounden duty to maintain and preserve it, as he will answer it another day.

4. *Neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the Substance.*

Here would be no need of these particular cautions, or critical terms, in relation to this point, had men been content with the plain primitive faith in its native simplicity. But as there have been a set of men, called Sabellians, who have erroneously taught, that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are all *one Person*, who was incarnate, and *suffered*, and rose again; making the *Father* (and Holy Ghost) to have *suffered*, as well as the *Son*, (from thence called *Patripassians*,) hence it becomes necessary to caution every pious Christian against *confounding* the Per-

sons, as those men have done. And as there have been others, particularly the Arians, who have pretended very falsely, that the three Persons are *three substances*, and of *different* kinds, *divided* from each other, one being *before* the other, existing when the other two were not, as also being *present* where the other two are not present; these false and dangerous tenets having been spread abroad, it is become necessary to give a caution against *dividing the substance*, as these have done, very much to the detriment of sobriety and truth.

5. *For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost.*

The Sabellians therefore were extremely to blame in *confounding* the Persons, and running them into one, taking away the *distinction* of Persons plainly taught in Scripture.

6. *But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one, the Glory equal, the Majesty coeternal.*

The Arians therefore were equally to blame for *dividing* the *substance* and *Godhead*, in the manner before hinted. To be a little more particular on this head, we may go on to open and explain this *Unity* of Godhead, *equality* of *Glory*, and *coeternity* of Majesty.

7. *Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost.*

That is, as to their *substance* and *Godhead*, there is no difference or inequality amongst them; though there is a difference in respect of some *personal* acts and properties, as shall be observed in its place. In real *dignity* and *perfection* they are *equal* and *undivided*, as in the instances here following.

8. *The Father uncreate, the Son uncreate, and the Holy Ghost uncreate.*

These three Persons were never brought into being by the will of another; they are no *creatures*, nor *changeable*, as creatures are; they are all infinitely removed from *dependence* or *precarious* existence, one as much as another,

and every one as much as any one: they exist in the highest and most emphatical sense of existing, which is called *necessary existence*, opposed to *contingent* or *precarious* existence. In a word; every Person must, and cannot but exist; and all must exist together, having the same unchangeable perfections.

9. *The Father incomprehensible, the Son incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost incomprehensible.*

These words are not a just translation of the Latin original, though containing as true and just a proposition as the Latin words do. *Immensus* signifies *omnipresent*, rather than *incomprehensible* in the modern sense of incomprehensible. But if by *incomprehensible* be understood, not to be comprehended within any bounds, it will then answer to the Latin pretty nearly. The translator here followed the Greek copy [c], taking perhaps the Greek to be the *original* language wherein the Creed was written. However, some Latins have understood by *immensus, incomprehensible* [d], in such a sense as has been hinted.

10. *The Father eternal, the Son eternal, and the Holy Ghost eternal.*

None of the Persons ever began to be, nor shall ever cease to be; they always were, they always will be, and must be; the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.

11. *And yet they are not three eternals, but one eternal.*

Some account ought to be given of this manner of speaking, because it often occurs in the Creed, and may

[c] There are two printed Greek copies, which read ἀκαταλήπτος, Stephens's, first printed by Bryling, and Baifius's, first printed by Genebrard: which two copies are in the main one. Our translators, in 1548, could have seen none but Bryling's, that is, Stephens's copy. The Constantinopolitan copy published by Genebrard reads ἄπειρος; the Palatine copy, by Felckman, ἄμετρος. The Saxon, French, and old English versions, exactly follow the Latin original. As does also the Primmer of 1539, set forth by John Bishop of Rochester; and the other later one of 1555, by C. Pole. The first has *unmeasurable*, (where we have *incomprehensible*,) the other has *without measure*.

[d] *Immensus Pater:* non mole, sed potestate omnia concludente. Vel immensus, id est, *incomprehensibilis*. *Abaelard. in Symb. Athanas.* p. 368.

be thought most apt to offend the malicious, or to mislead the unwary. The way of speaking came in a little after the middle of the fourth century, and then only into the Latin Church; for the Greeks never used it, but taught the *same* things under a *different* form of expression. What Greeks and Latins both intended was, that as the three Persons are *one substance* and *one God*, so every *divine* perfection, and every *substantial* attribute, belonging to any one Person, is *common* to all; and there is nothing *peculiar* to any one but the divine *relations:* to the Father, *paternity*, and whatever it implies or carries with it; to the Son, *filiation*; to the Holy Ghost, *procession*. In this account, *eternity*, *immensity*, *omnipotence*, and the like, being substantial attributes, are common to all the three Persons; who have therefore *one eternity*, *one immensity*, *one omnipotence*, and so on, as *one substance* and *one Godhead:* thus far Greeks and Latins agreed both in *doctrine* and *expression*. But the Latins, building hereupon, thought it very allowable to go a little farther, (which the Greeks did not,) and to express the same thing by saying, of the three Persons, that they are *one eternal*, *one immense*, *one omnipotent*, *one holy*, *one uncreated*, &c. And this was the current language at the making, and before the making of this Creed. The Arians were the sole occasion of introducing both kinds of expression, which must therefore be interpreted accordingly. *Two* things were designed by them: one, to obviate the Arian tenet, that the three Persons were differing in *kind*, and in *degree*, as being of *unequal* perfections; the other, to obviate the Arian charge, or calumny, upon the Church, as making *three Gods*. In regard to the former, when the Catholics speak of *one Divinity*, they intend *equal* Divinity, not Divinities differing in *kind* or *degree:* and in regard to the latter, they further mean *undivided* and *inseparable* Divinity, not *many* Divinities. The true meaning then, and the full meaning of the expressions of the Creed will be very clear and obvious. The three Persons are *equal* in duration, and *undivided* too; one eternity (one,

because *undivided*, and inseparable) is *common* to all, and therefore they are not *three eternals*, but *one eternal*.

The oldest writers who have used this way of expression, are, so far as I have observed, Ambrose, Faustinus, and Austin: and their meaning in it is very plain and certain from the places themselves where they make use of it. Fulgentius, who came not long after them, sometimes falls into the same manner of expression[e]; but sparingly, as if he either did not fully attend to it, or had some scruple about it: for his general way is to say, "not three eternal Gods, but one eternal God[f]," instead of the other in the Creed; and so in the like cases. Which indeed is a very insipid and dull way of expressing it, and if applied to every article in the Athanasian Creed, would make it a very flat composition in comparison to what it is. It is true, that all at length resolves into this, that the three Persons are *not three Gods*, but *one God:* this is the ground and foundation, and the other is the superstructure. But then it is a fine and elegant, as well as a solid superstructure; improving the thought, and carrying on a train of new and distinct propositions, and not merely a jejune and sapless repetition of the same thing.

[e] *Relativa* nomina Trinitatem faciunt, *essentialia* vero nullo modo triplicantur. Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus Sanctus. Bonus Pater, bonus Filius, bonus Spiritus Sanctus. Pius Pater, pius Filius, pius Spiritus Sanctus. Justus Pater, justus Filius, justus et Spiritus Sanctus. Omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius, omnipotens et Spiritus Sanctus. Et tamen non dicimus nec *tres Deos*, nec *tres bonos*, nec *tres pios*, nec *tres justos*, nec *tres omnipotentes*, sed unum Deum, bonum, pium, justum, omnipotentem, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum. *Fulgent. de Trin.* c. ii p. 330.

[f] Æternus est sine initio Pater, æternus est sine initio Filius, æternus est sine initio Spiritus Sanctus: nec tamen tres *Dii* æterni sed unus æternus *Deus*. *Fulgent. ad Ferrand.* p. 234.

Immensus est Pater, sed immensus est Filius, et immensus est et Spiritus Sanctus: nec tamen tres *Dii* immensi, sed unus *Deus* immensus. *Fulgent. ibid.* p. 232.

Omnipotens est Pater; sed omnipotens est Filius, omnipotens est Spiritus Sanctus: nec tamen tres *Dii* omnipotentes, sed unus *Deus* omnipotens est Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus. *Fulgent. ibid.*

12. *As also there are not three incomprehensibles, nor three uncreated; but one uncreated, and one incomprehensible*[s].

Not three incomprehensibles, &c. as not differing either in *kind* or *degree* of incomprehensibility, nor yet *divided* in those perfections: but one incomprehensible, and one uncreated, one as to the *kind* and *degree* of those attributes, or perfections; and one in *number* too, as much as *union* and *inseparability*, infinitely close and perfect, can be conceived to make, or do really make *one*.

13. *So likewise the Father is Almighty, the Son Almighty, and the Holy Ghost Almighty.*

Equally Almighty every one, without any *difference* or *inequality* in *kind* or *degree*.

14. *And yet they are not three Almighties, but one Almighty.*

One omnipotence, or almightiness, is common to all three: one in *kind* as being of *equal* extent, and equally reaching over all; and one also in *number*, because of the inseparable *union* among the three, in the inward perfection, and outward exercise, or operation.

15. *So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God.*

The whole three Persons equally *divine*, and enjoying every perfection belonging to the Godhead.

16. *And yet they are not three Gods, but one God.*

Because the *Godhead*, or *Divinity*, which belongs to one, belongs to all: the same in *kind* because of the equality, and the same in *number* because inseparably one.

17. *So likewise the Father is Lord, the Son Lord, and the Holy Ghost Lord.*

[s] Here again, one may perceive what copy our translators followed, namely, Bryling's Greek copy. All the other copies, Greek and Latin, place the words in a different order: *not three uncreated, nor three incomprehensibles, but one uncreated*, &c. Only the Ambrosian Latin copy reads, *not three uncreated, nor three incomprehensibles, (immense,) but one incomprehensible (immense) and one uncreated.*

Having the same right of *dominion*, and of *equal* dominion; and equally exercising it, when and where they please.

18. *And yet not three Lords, but one Lord.*

Because one dominion is *common* to all three, jointly possessing, and jointly exercising every branch of it; undividedly and inseparably bearing supreme rule over all.

19. *For like as we are compelled by the Christian verity to acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord; so are we forbidden by the Catholic religion to say, There be three Gods or three Lords.*

That is to say, the whole foundation of what hath been before taught rests upon this, that the same Christian *verity*, or *truth*, laid down in Scripture, obliges us to acknowledge every Person distinctly considered to be *God* and *Lord;* and at the same time to reject the notion of *three Gods* or *three Lords:* which being so, all that has been here taught must of course be admitted as true, right, and just. And now, having considered the *equality* and *union* of the three sacred Persons, it may next be proper to consider their *distinction*, as it is set forth to us in Scripture by the several *personal* characters belonging to the *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*.

20. *The Father is made of none, neither created, nor begotten.*

Were I at liberty to make conjectural emendations, I would here read, *Pater a nullo est: neque factus, nec* &c. *The Father is of none: neither made nor created,* &c. And thus the next article (*The Son is of the Father* alone) would better answer, and the whole would be more elegant. But having met with no copy[h] to countenance

[h] Lazarus Baifius's copy, in Genebrard, reads ὁ πατὴρ ἀπ' οὐδενός ἐστι. But then it entirely omits ποιητὸς, which, as is plain from what follows in the Creed, ought not to be omitted. Had the copy run thus, ἀπ' οὐδενός ἐστι, οὔτε μὴν ποιητὸς, οὔτε κτιστὸς &c. it would have answered my meaning. Indeed, the first Greek copy in Labbe's Councils, and third in Montfaucon, run in such a way as I suppose: but then I take them to have been patched up from several distinct copies, at the pleasure of the editor or editors: and none of the Latin copies will warrant such a reading.

such a correction; I must not pretend to it, lest it should appear like correcting the *author*. However, the sense is very plain and obvious. All the three *negatives* here predicated of the Father amount to this one, that he is absolutely *of none:* this is his peculiar property, his distinguishing character, to be *first* in *order*, and the *head* of every thing; to whom even the *Son* and Holy Ghost are referred, but diversly and in different manner.

21. *The Son is of the Father alone; not made, nor created, but begotten.*

The Son is here said to be of the Father *alone*, in contradistinction to the Holy Ghost, to be named after, who is not of the Father *alone*, but of *both*. The Greeks that struck out the words, *and of the Son*, below, and left the word *alone* here, were not aware of it. This conduct of theirs betrayed a shortness of thought, and at the same time served to show that the Latins had not been *interpolators* of the Creed, but that the Greeks had been *curtailers*. It must however be owned, that the Greeks who drew up that form which Bishop Usher printed from Junius, were wise enough to observe how this matter stood; and therefore struck out the word *alone* here, as well as *and of the Son*, below.

22. *The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son; neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.*

The peculiar and distinguishing character of the Holy Ghost is to *proceed*, and to proceed both from *Father and Son*. Indeed, the Son and Holy Ghost are both *of the Father*, but in a different manner, to us inexplicable; one by the way of *generation*, the other by *procession*, though the word *procession*, in a lax sense, has been sometimes applied to either. However, to proceed *from the Father* and *the Son*, or, as the Greeks will needlessly cavil, *from the Father* by *the Son;* that is peculiar to the *Holy Ghost*. The Greeks and Latins have had many and tedious disputes about the *procession*. One thing is observable, that though the *ancients*, appealed to by both parties, have often said that the Holy Ghost proceeds *from the Father*,

without mentioning the *Son*, yet they never said that he proceeded from the Father *alone;* so that the *modern* Greeks have certainly innovated in that article, in *expression* at least, if not in real sense and meaning. As to the Latins, they have this to plead, that none of the *ancients* ever condemned their doctrine; that *many* of them have expressly asserted it; that the Oriental churches themselves rather condemn their taking upon them to add any thing to a Creed formed in a *general council*, than the *doctrine* itself; that those Greek churches that charge their doctrine as heresy, yet are forced to admit much the same thing, only in different words; and that Scripture itself is plain that the Holy Ghost proceeds at least *by the Son*, if not *from him;* which yet amounts to the same thing.

I should here observe, that some time before the compiling of this Creed, the usual Catholic way of speaking of the Holy Ghost was to say, that he was *nec genitus, nec ingenitus*, neither *begotten* nor *unbegotten*, while this Creed by barely denying him to be *begotten*, seems to leave room to think that he is *unbegotten*. This raised a scruple in the minds of some, here in England, concerning that part of the Creed, above seven hundred years ago; as we learn from Abbo Floriacensis of that time. For Gregory's Synodicon admitted here, as well as this Creed, had the very expression concerning the Holy Ghost, *nec ingenitus, nec genitus*. It might have been easy to end the dispute, only by distinguishing upon the *equivocal* meaning of the word *ingenitus*. It had been taken from the Greek ἀγένητος, which signified not barely *unbegotten*, but absolutely *underived:* in this sense the Holy Ghost could not be said to be *ingenitus*. But if it barely means *not begotten*, it may be applied to him, as it is in the Creed. The whole difficulty then arose only from the scantiness of the Latin tongue, in not affording a single word which should fully express the Greek, ἀγένητος, *unoriginate*. *Ingenitus* might tolerably do it; but the word was more commonly taken in a narrower construction. Peter

Abelard has hit off the whole difficulty very clearly; whose words therefore I have thrown into the margin [i].

23. *So there is one Father, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; one Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts.*

Whether this paragraph be borrowed from St. Austin, or from an elder writer under the name of Ignatius, I know not. The foundation of it was laid in 1 Cor. viii. 6. "One God the Father," and "one Lord Jesus Christ;" to which it was usual to add, after reciting it, *and one Holy Ghost*, to complete the whole number of the divine Persons. The intent and purport of the words, in this Creed, is to set forth the *distinction* of the three *Persons*, and their several *offices* and *characters:* that there is *one Father*, and that he *alone* is *unoriginate*, is *first Person*, is *Head*, &c. and neither the *Son* nor *Holy Ghost* have any share in these titles or characters, to make three *Unoriginates*, three *Heads*, &c. That there is *one Son*, and he alone *begotten*, and afterwards *incarnate*, &c. which *characters* and *offices* belong not to the other two, but are *distinct*, and *appropriate* to one. And there is *one Holy Ghost*, whose *character* is to *proceed*, and whose *office* is to *sanctify*, which character and office are not to be ascribed, in the same sense, to the other two; for that would be *confounding* the personal characters and offices, and making *three Holy Ghosts*, instead of one.

24. *And in this Trinity, none is afore or after other; none is greater or less than another; but the whole three Persons are coeternal together, and coequal.*

The compiler of the Creed now returns to the *equality* and *unity* of the Persons; that he may at length sum up and throw into a short compass what he had said upon

[i] Solum itaque Patrem *ingenitum* dicimus, hoc est, a seipso non ab alio: unde Augustinus adversus Felicianum Arianum; *Patrem ingenitum dico, quia non processit ab altero.*——Aliud itaque dicere est Patrem *ingenitum*, aliud *non genitum*——Spiritus vero Sanctus ipse quoque est *non genitus*—Nec tamen ideo est *ingenitus*, cum ipse ab alio sit, tam a Patre scilicet quam a Filio procedens. Solus itaque Pater *ingenitus* dicitur, sicut solus Filius *genitus:* Spiritus vero Sanctus nec *genitus* est, nec *ingenitus*, sed, ut dictum est, *non genitus. Abaelard. Introd. ad Theolog.* lib. i. p. 983.

the *Trinity*, before he should pass on to the other great article, the *Incarnation*. When it is said, *none is afore or after other*, we are not to understand it of *order*; for the Father is *first*, the Son *second*, and the Holy Ghost *third* in order. Neither are we to understand it of *office*; for the Father is *supreme* in office, while the Son and Holy Ghost condescend to *inferior* offices. But we are to understand it, as the Creed itself explains it, of *duration* and of *dignity*; in which respect, none is *afore* or *after*, none *greater* or *less*, but the whole three *Persons coeternal* and *coequal*.

25. *So that in all things, as is aforesaid, the Unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity is to be worshipped.*

In all things, (*per omnia*,) *as is aforesaid*. One of the Greek copies tacks these words to the former article, making them run thus; *coequal in all things, as aforesaid*. Another Greek copy reads them thus, *coequal in all things: so that in all things, as is now said*, &c. Both interpret the *all things* of the coequality in *all things*. And indeed Venantius Fortunatus, in his comment, long before, seems to have understood *per omnia* in the same way, to signify that the Son is what the Father is, in all *essential* or *substantial* perfections. And it is favoured both by what goes before and after: for from speaking of the *coeternity* and *coequality*, the author proceeds to say, *So that* in all things, as aforesaid, *the Unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity is to be worshipped*; namely, on account of their perfect *coeternity* and *coequality*: to which he subjoins, *He therefore that will be saved*, &c. Wherefore I incline to the moderate opinion of those who think that the author here does not lay the stress upon every little nicety of explication[k] before given, but

[k] Le Quien's ingenuous and handsome reflection, upon the conduct of Pope Gregory the IXth's Legates, may deserve a recital here.

Quamquam non possum quin ingenue fatear nuncios apostolicos consultius facturos fuisse, si ab ejusmodi sententia pronuntianda sibi temperassent; *Qui credit Spiritum Sanctum non procedere ex Filio, in via perditionis est*: tunc quippe temporis Ecclesia Catholica in nulla synodo generali

upon the main doctrine, of a *coequal* and *coeternal* Trinity. Which is the very construction given by Hincmar, nine hundred years ago, or nearly [l]. And Wickliff's comment upon the same passage, when put into a modern dress, may appear not contemptible. " And so we conclude " here, as is before said, that there is both an Unity of " Godhead, and a Trinity of Persons; and that the Tri- " nity in this Unity is to be worshipped above all things; " and whosoever will be saved must thus think of the " Trinity, if not thus explicitly, (or in every particular,) " yet thus in the general, or implicitly."

26. *He therefore that will be saved, must thus think of the Trinity.*

Thus, as consisting of three Persons, *coeternal* and *coequal*, and all *one God;* distinct enough to be *three*, united enough to be *one;* distinct without division, united without confusion.

27. *Furthermore, it is necessary to everlasting salvation, that he also believe rightly* [m] *the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ.*

Much depends upon our having true and just sentiments of the *Incarnation*, in which the whole economy of our salvation is nearly concerned. To corrupt and deprave this doctrine is to defeat and frustrate, in a great measure, the Gospel of Christ which bringeth salvation: wherefore it is of great moment, of everlasting concernment to us, not to be guilty of doing it ourselves, nor to take part with those that do.

28. *For the right Faith is, that we believe and confess,*

hoc de capite judicium definitorium tulerat. *Panopl. contr. Schism. Græcor.* p. 360.

[l] Et in hac Trinitate nihil est prius, nihil posterius; nihil majus, aut minus; sed totæ tres Personæ coæternæ sibi sunt et coæquales: ita ut *per omnia*, et Unitas Deitatis in Trinitate Personarum, et Trinitas Personarum in Unitate Deitatis veneranda est. *Hincm. de non Trin. Deit.* tom. i. p. 540.

[m] Ὀρθῶς πιστεύσῃ. So Bryling's Greek copy. The Latin copies have *fideliter credat.* Some Greek copies read πιστῶς, or βεβαίως, though two, besides Bryling's, have also ὀρθῶς.

that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and Man.

There have been heretics who would not allow that our Saviour Christ was *man*, but in such a sense as a shadow, or a picture of a man, may be called a man: and there have been others who would not allow that Christ is *God*, but in such a sense as any *creature* whatever might be called or may be made a God. But all good Christians have ever abhorred those vile tenets, and conformably to Scripture, rightly and justly interpreted, have believed and confessed that Christ is both really God, and really man, one *God-man*.

29. *God, of the Substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds; and Man, of the Substance of his Mother, born in the world.*

We are forced to be thus particular and expressive, in the wording of this article, because of the many wiles, equivocations, and disguises of those who endeavour to corrupt the faith. The Arians make of Christ a *created* God, and call him *God* on account only of his *office*, and not of his *nature* or unchangeable substance. For this reason, we are obliged to be particular in expressing his *substance*, as being not *frail, mutable, perishing*, as the substance of creatures is, but eternal and unchangeable, and all one with the Father's. On the other hand, the Apollinarians and other heretics have pretended, either that Christ had no human body at all, or that he brought it with him from heaven, and took it not of the Virgin-Mother: we are therefore forced to be particular in this profession, that he was man *of the substance of his mother:* which, though it be not taught in *express* words, yet is very plainly the sense and meaning of holy Scripture on this article; and was never questioned, till conceited men came to pervert the true doctrine of sacred Writ, by false glosses and comments of their own.

30. *Perfect God, and perfect Man of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting.*

Here again, the perverseness of heretics has made it

necessary to guard the faith by strong and expressive words that cannot easily be eluded. Christ is *perfect God*, not such a *nominal* imperfect God as Arians and Photinians pretend. He is moreover *perfect man*, which it is necessary to insist upon against the Apollinarians, who pretended that he had a *human* body only without any *rational* soul; imagining the *Logos* to have supplied the place of the *rational* or *reasonable* soul: whereas in reality he had both *soul* and *body*, as all men have, and was therefore *perfect man*.

31. *Equal to the Father, as touching his Godhead: and inferior to the Father, as touching his Manhood.*

Which needs no comment.

32. *Who although he be God and Man, yet he is not two, but one Christ.*

This is said, to guard against calumny and misconstruction. For because the Church asserted *two natures* in Christ, whereby he is both *perfect God* and *perfect man*, the Apollinarians, having an hypothesis of their own to serve, pretended that this was making *two Christs*, a *divine Christ*, as to one nature, and a *human Christ* in the other: which was a vain thought, since both the natures joined in the one *God-man* make still but *one Christ*, both God and man.

33. *One, not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the Manhood into God.*

The Apollinarian way of making *one Christ* by confounding the two natures in one, and by subjecting the Godhead to *change*, is here condemned. There is no need of running these injudicious and absurd lengths, for solving the difficulty how the two natures make *one Christ:* he did not change his *divine* nature, or convert it into *flesh*, though he be said to have been *made flesh;* he took flesh upon him, he assumed human nature, took man into an union with God, and thus was he *one Christ*.

34. *One altogether, not by confusion of Substance, but by unity of Person.*

We are thus forced to distinguish, with the utmost

nicety and accuracy, to obviate the cavils and pretences of heretics. Christ then is *one altogether*, entirely one, though his two natures remain *distinct*. He is not one by *confounding* or *mingling* two natures or substances into one nature or substance, (as the Apollinarians pretended,) but by uniting them both in *one Person;* one I, one He, one Christ, as Scripture every where represents.

35. *For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man; so God and Man is one Christ.*

That is to say, there are two very distinct and different substances in man, a *body* and a *soul;* one material, the other immaterial, one mortal, the other immortal; and both these substances, nevertheless, make up but *one man*. Not by *confounding* or *mingling* those two different substances, (for they are entirely *distinct*, and *different*, and will ever remain so,) but by uniting them in *one Person*. Even so may the two distinct natures, *divine* and *human*, in Christ, make *one Person;* and this is really and truly the case in fact.

36. *Who suffered for our salvation, descended into hell, rose again the third day from the dead.*

The author having finished his explication of the great article of *God incarnate*, now goes on to other parts of the Creed, such as were commonly inserted in the Creeds before. The article of *the descent into hell* had not indeed, at this time, come into the Roman, otherwise called the Apostles' Creed: but it had been inserted in the Creed of Aquileia, and had been all along the standing doctrine of the Church. I shall leave it, as our Church has left it, without any particular interpretation; referring the reader to those who have commented on the Apostles' Creed, and particularly to the much admired author of *the history of it*, who hath exhausted the subject.

37. *He ascended into heaven, he sitteth on the right hand of the Father, God Almighty, from whence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead.*

These are all so many articles of the Roman Creed, and

probably taken from it: excepting only, that the words *God Almighty* appear not in the most ancient manuscripts; and, very probably, were not originally in this Creed, any more than in the ancient Roman.

38. *At whose coming all men shall rise again with their bodies, and shall give account for their own works.*

Here are two very expressive phrases, *all men*, all that have died, or shall die, to obviate the false opinion of a *partial* resurrection; and *with their bodies*, to obviate the notion of those, who either thought that the *soul* only should continue for ever, while the body should be left to perish, or that the *resurrection-body* should be quite of another *matter, form*, or *kind*, than what our bodies are here. I have hinted in my Latin notes above, that some words are wanting in the Ambrosian manuscript; and I may here observe farther, that in the words of the Creed, as they commonly run, there is not all the *accuracy* that might have been: for *all men* shall not rise, but only all that *die*. However, it seems that about that time there was some variety of sentiments in respect of that article, as we may learn from Gennadius[n]; which was owing to the different reading of 1 Cor. xv. 51. from whence probably arose some variation in the copies of this Creed. See Pearson on the Apostles' Creed, Artic. 7.

39. *And they that have done good shall go into life everlasting, and they that have done evil into everlasting fire.*

This is the express doctrine of Scripture, and appears

[n] Omnium hominum erit resurrectio: si omnium erit, ergo omnes moriuntur, ut mors ab Adam ducta omnibus filiis ejus dominetur, et maneat illud privilegium in Domino, quod de eo specialiter dicitur: *Non dabis sanctum tuum videre corruptionem.*——Hanc rationem, maxima patrum turba tradente, suscepimus. Verum quia sunt et alii, æque Catholici et eruditi viri, qui credunt, anima in corpore manente, mutandos ad incorruptionem et immortalitatem eos qui in adventu Domini *vivi* inveniendi sunt, et hoc eis reputari *pro resurrectione* ex mortuis, quod mortalitatem immutatione deponant, non morte; quolibet quis adquiescat modo, non est hæreticus, nisi ex contentione hæreticus siat. Sufficit enim in Ecclesiæ lege, carnis resurrectionem credere futuram de morte. *Gennad. Eccles. Dogm.* c. 7.

almost in the same words, John v. 28. Matt. xxv. 46. to say nothing of many other texts to the same effect. Yet this article, or rather these two articles, had not gained admittance into the Apostles' Creed so early as the fourth century, the latter of them not at all. But, I suppose, the opinion said to have been started by Origen, that wicked men, and even devils, after a certain revolution, should have their release and restoration, might make it the more necessary, or convenient at least, to insert these articles in the Creeds, and to express the punishment of the damned by the words *eternal fire:* for the Origenists, at that time, denied both the *eternity* of the *fire*, and also its *reality*, as appears from Orosius in St. Austin [o].

40. *This is the Catholic Faith, which except a man believe faithfully* [p], *he cannot be saved.*

This is to be understood, like all other such general propositions, with proper reserves, and qualifying constructions. As for instance, if after laying down a system of Christian morality, it be said, *This is the Christian practice, which except a man faithfully observe and follow, he cannot be saved*; it would be no more than right and just thus to say: but no one could be supposed hereby to exclude any such merciful abatements, or allowances, as shall be made for men's particular circumstances, weaknesses, frailties, ignorance, inability, or the like; or for their *sincere* intentions, and *honest* desires of knowing, and doing the whole will of God; accompanied with a *general* repentance of their *sins*, and a firm reliance upon God's mercy, through the sole merits of Christ Jesus. There can be no doubt, however, but that men are accountable for their *faith*, as well as for their *practice:* and

[o] Ignem sane æternum, quo peccatores puniantur, neque esse *ignem verum*, neque *æternum* prædicaverunt, dicentes dictum esse ignem propriæ conscientiæ punitionem, *æternum* autem, juxta etymologiam Græcam, non esse *perpetuum*, &c. *Epist. Orosii ad August. inter Aug. Op.* tom. viii. p. 607.

[p] Πιστῶς πιστεύσῃ. So Bryling's copy, which our translators followed.

The Latin copies have *fideliter, firmiterque crediderit.* And the other Greek copies, πιστῶς τι καὶ βιβαίως πιστεύσῃ. Or, ἐκ πίστεως βιβαίως πιστεύσῃ.

especially if they take upon them to instruct and direct others, trusting to their own strength and parts, against the united judgment and verdict of *whole churches* ancient and modern.

CHAP. XI.

The Church of England vindicated, both as to the receiving and retaining the Athanasian Creed.

THERE would be no occasion for this chapter, had not a late author[q] of name and character, out of his abundant zeal to promote *Arianism*, taken upon him to disparage this excellent form of faith; nay, and to apply, with some earnestness, to *the governors of our Church*, to get it laid aside. He thinks "it may well deserve the "most serious and deliberate consideration of the go- "vernors of the Church, whether it would not be more "advantageous to the true interest of the Christian reli- "gion, to retain only those more indisputable forms[q];" that is, to have this wholly taken away, or at least not imposed in our Articles or Liturgy. Then he subjoins his *reasons:* which because they may be presumed to be the closest and strongest that can be offered on that side, and because they have hitherto stood without any particular confutation on one hand, or retractation on the other, I shall here take upon me to answer them, as briefly as may be.

OBJECTION I.

The first is, that "this Creed is confessed not to be "Athanasius's, but the composition of an uncertain ob- "scure author, written in one of the darkest and most "ignorant ages of the Church; having never appeared "till about the year 800, nor been received in the Church "till so very late as about the year 1000."

ANSW. As to the *false facts* contained in this article, I

[q] Clarke's Script. Doctr. edit. 1st. p. 446, 447.

need only refer to the preceding sheets. As to the Creed being none of Athanasius's, which is certainly *true*, it is to be considered, that our Church receives it not upon the *authority* of its compiler, nor determines any thing about its *age* or *author:* but we receive it because the truth of the doctrines contained in it "may be proved by "most certain warrants of holy Scripture," as is expressly said in our eighth article. I may add, that the *early* and *general* reception of this Creed by Greeks and Latins, by all the western churches, not only before, but since the *Reformation*, must needs give it a much greater *authority* and *weight* than the single name of Athanasius could do, were it ever so justly to be set to it. Athanasius has left some Creeds and Confessions, undoubtedly his, which yet never have obtained the esteem and reputation that this hath done: because none of them are really of the same intrinsic value, nor capable of doing the like service in the Christian churches. The use of it is, to be a standing fence and preservative against the wiles and equivocations of most kinds of heretics. This was well understood by Luther, when he called it, *a bulwark to the Apostles' Creed*[r]; much to the same purpose with what has been above cited from Ludolphus Saxo[s]. And it was this and the like considerations that have all along made it to be of such high esteem among all the *reformed churches*, from the days of their great leader.

OBJECT. II.

The second reason assigned for laying this form aside

[r] Athanasii scilicet Symbolum est paulo prolixius, et ad confutandos Arianos hæreticos, aliquanto uberius declarat, et illustrat articulum alterum de divinitate Christi Jesu——estque hoc velut propugnaculum primi illius Apostolici Symboli. *Luther. de Trib. Symbol. Oper.* tom. vii. p. 138.

[s] Thus also Alexander of Hales, 100 years before Ludolphus.

Causa multiplicationis Symbolorum fuit triplex: *instructio fidei, veritatis explanatio, erroris exclusio.*——Erroris exclusio, propter hæreses multiplices pullulantes, causa fuit Symboli Athanasii, quod cantatur in prima. *Alexand. Alens.* part. iii. Q. 69. Membr. ii. p. 541. Johan. Januensis in his Catholicon, (an. 1286.) under *symbolum*, says the same thing.

is, " that it is so worded, as that many of the *common* " *people* cannot but be too apt to understand it in a sense " favouring either *Sabellianism* or *Tritheism.*"

ANSW. This objection is not particularly levelled against this Creed, but against all Creeds containing the doctrine of a *coeternal Trinity in Unity:* it is therefore an objection rather against the *faith* of the *Church,* (which those gentlemen endeavour constantly to run down, under the notion of *Sabellianism* or *Tritheism,*) than against this particular form of expressing it.

I may further add, that the *common people* will be in no danger of running either into *Sabellianism* or *Tritheism,* if they attend to the Creed *itself,* (which fully obviates and confutes both those heresies,) instead of listening to those who first industriously labour to *deceive* them into a false construction of the Creed, and then complain of the *common people's* being *too apt* to misunderstand it. This is not ingenuous nor upright dealing with the *common people.*

OBJECT. III.

A third reason is, that " there are in *this Creed* many " phrases, which——may seem to give *unbelievers* a need- " less advantage of objecting against religion; and among " *believers* themselves, cannot but to the *vulgar* have too " much the appearance of contradictions: and sometimes " (especially the damnatory clauses) have given offence " to the piousest and most learned men, insomuch as to " have been the principal reason of Mr. Chillingworth's " refusing to subscribe the XXXIX Articles."

ANSW. As to *unbelievers* and their *objections,* the *Church* has been always able and willing to answer them; sorry at the same time to find that any, who call themselves Christians, should join with the *unbelievers* in the same trifling objections, thereby giving the *unbelievers* a very *needless advantage,* and the most pernicious encouragement. As to *vulgar* believers, they suspect no *contradictions,* till some, who think themselves above the *vulgar,*

labour to create such a suspicion in them. Leave the *vulgar* to their *better* guides, and their true *orthodox* pastors, without endeavouring to *corrupt* or *seduce* them; and then all will be safe and easy.

As to Mr. Chillingworth, he had for a while, it is owned, some scruples upon him, about the *Fourth Commandment as appertaining to Christians*, and about the *damnatory clauses* in the Athanasian Creed; and therefore refused to *subscribe* for a time. This was in the year 1635. But within three years after, upon more mature consideration, he happily got over his difficulties, and *subscribed*, July the 20th, in the year 1638; as stands upon record in the Office of Sarum, where he was instituted Chancellor of the Church[t].

OBJECT. IV.

A fourth reason offered, not for laying aside this Creed, I suppose, but for the governors taking it into consideration, is, that "the preface to the book of Common Prayer "declares that particular forms of divine worship, and "rites and ceremonies appointed to be used therein, being "things in their own nature indifferent and alterable, "may, upon the various exigency of times and occasions, "be *changed or altered.*"

ANSW. No doubt but the Church may, if it be thought proper or expedient, throw out all the Creeds out of her *daily Service*, or *Articles*, and retain one only, in the *Office* of *Baptism*, as formerly. But, I suppose, the authors of the preface to the Book of Common Prayer had no thought of excluding any of the *three Creeds* amongst their *alterable forms* of worship, or *rites* and *ceremonies:*

[t] Ego Gulielmus Chillingworth, Clericus, in Artibus Magister, ad Cancellariatum Ecclesiæ Cathedralis Beatæ Mariæ Sarum, una cum Præbenda de Brinworth, alias Bricklesworth, in comitatu Northampton Petriburgensis diœceseos in eadem ecclesia fundata, et eidem Cancellariatui annexa, admittendus et instituendus, omnibus hisce Articulis, et singulis in eisdem contentis volens et ex animo subscribo, et consensum meum eisdem præbeo, vicesimo die Julii, 1638. *Gulielmus Chillingworth.*

nor will the revival of *Arianism* be ever looked upon as one of those *exigencies of times* that shall make it expedient to part with our Creeds; but a reason rather for retaining them the more firmly, or even for taking them in again, had any of them ever been unhappily thrown out.

OBJECT. V.

A further reason pleaded is, that "Scripture alone "is sufficient; that the primitive Church was very cau- "tious *about* multiplying Creeds; that the Council of "Ephesus forbad, under the penalty of an anathema, any "other Creed after that of Nice to be proposed or re- "ceived in the Church."

ANSW. The whole design and end of Creeds is to preserve the *rule of faith*, as contained in the holy Scriptures, and not in the *false* glosses and corrupt *inventions* of men[u]. And when endeavours are used to *poison* those fountains of truth by ill *comments* and forced constructions; *preservatives* must be thought on to keep the fountain *pure*, and the faith *sound* and *whole*.

As to the *primitive* churches, their constant way was to enlarge their Creeds in proportion to the growth of *heresies*; that so every *corruption* arising to the *faith* of *Christ* might have an immediate *remedy*: without which prudent and wise caution, the faith would have been lost, in a little time, through the wiles and artifices of subtle, intriguing men.

The Council of Ephesus made no order against *new Creeds*, that is, Creeds still more and more enlarged, if there should be occasion, but against a *new faith*, (ἑτέραν πίστιν,) a faith *different* from and *repugnant* to that of Nice, such as was offered by the Nestorians in that Council. This is the *literal* construction, and real *intended* meaning

[u] Οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔδοξεν ἀνθρώποις συνετίθη τὰ τῆς πίστεως· ἀλλ' ἐκ πάσης γραφῆς τὰ κεφαλαιώτατα συλλεχθέντα μίαν ἀναπληροῖ τὴν τῆς πίστεως διδασκαλίαν. *Cyrill. Catech. V.* c. 12. p. 78.

of that decree of the Ephesine Council[x]: though had they intended it against the receiving any *other form* but the Nicene; all that follows from it is, that they thought no more necessary at *that time;* or that *definitions* in councils, (as in the Council of Chalcedon afterwards,) or *condemnation* of heretical tenets might suffice, leaving the *baptismal* Creed (all Creeds were such at that time) just as was before. However, the practice of the Church afterwards, in *multiplying* Creeds as need required, at the same time that they acknowledged the Ephesine Council, shows fully how they understood it. Nay, the constant reception of the Constantinopolitan Creed (which is the Nicene *interpolated*, and yet was never understood to be excluded by the Ephesine Canon) shows plainly the sense of the Synod in that matter. It is to be noted, that the Ephesine Council, by Nicene Creed, meant the Nicene strictly so called[y], and which had already been *interpolated* by the Constantinopolitan Council.

Object. VI.

[z] Another plea offered is, that in the year 1689 many wise and good prelates of our own (commissioned to *review* and *correct* our Liturgy) "unanimously agreed, that

[x] Vid. Stephan. de Altimura (i. e. Le Quien) Panopliam contra Schism. Græc. p. 230, 158. et Dissertat. Damascen. p. 14, &c.

[y] Vid. Le Quien, ibid. p. 230. et Dissert. Damascen. p. 18.

[z] Since writing the above, I have received a copy of that very Rubrick, which I shall here add, for the information of the reader, and to put an end to all further dispute upon that head.

"Upon these Feasts, Christmas-Day, Easter-Day, Ascension-Day, Whit-"Sunday, Trinity-Sunday, and upon All-Saints, shall be said at Morning "Prayer, by the minister and people standing, instead of the Creed, com-"monly called the Apostles' Creed, this confession of our Christian faith, "commonly called the Creed of St. Athanasius: the articles of which ought "to be received and believed as being agreeable to the holy Scriptures. And "the condemning clauses are to be understood as relating only to those who "obstinately deny the substance of the Christian faith."

This, word for word, is the Rubrick as it was settled and finally agreed on by the commissioners in 1689, and as it stands in the *original* book now in the hands of my Lord Bishop of London. *Novemb.* 7, 1727.

" the use of the Athanasian Creed should no longer be " imposed."

ANSW. There may be reason to question the truth of this report. There are two accounts which I have seen of this matter; one of Dr. Nichols, the other of Dr. Calamy, which he received of a friend. Dr. Nichols's account runs thus: " Athanasius's Creed being disliked by " many, because of the *damnatory* clauses, it was left to " the *minister's* choice, either to use it, or to change it " for the Apostles' Creed[a]." Dr. Calamy's account is thus: " About the Athanasian Creed they came at last " to this conclusion: that lest the wholly rejecting it " should by unreasonable persons be imputed to them as " *Socinianism*, a Rubrick shall be made, setting forth or " declaring the *curses* denounced therein not to be re- " strained to every particular article, but intended against " those that deny the substance of the Christian religion " in general[b]." Now, from these two accounts compared, it may be reasonable to believe that those wise and good prelates had once drawn up a scheme to be debated and canvased, in which scheme it was proposed to leave every *minister* at liberty with respect to the Athanasian Creed: but, upon more mature consideration, *they came at last to this conclusion:* to impose the Creed as before, and to qualify the seeming harshness of the *damnatory* clauses by a softening Rubrick. They were therefore, at length, *unanimously agreed* still to *retain* and *impose* this Creed; quite contrary to the Objector's report. And indeed it must have appeared very astonishing in the eyes of all the *reformed* churches, Lutheran and Calvinist, (who have the greatest veneration for this Creed,) to have seen it wholly rejected by the English Clergy, when there had been no precedent before of any one church in Christendom that had done the like. All that ever re-

[a] Nicholsii Apparat. ad Defens. Eccl. Angl. p. 95.
[b] Calamy's Life of Baxter, vol. i. p. 455.

ceived it have constantly retained it, and still retain it. It is further to be considered, that what those very worthy prelates at that time intended, sprung from a just and becoming tenderness towards the Dissenters, because of their long *scruples* against the *damnatory* clauses: but there is not the same reason at this day. The wiser and more moderate part of the *dissenting ministers*[c] seem very well reconciled to the *damnatory* clauses, *modestly expounded;* as Dr. Wallis particularly has expounded them, *justly* and *truly*, as well as *modestly*. And I am confident the soberer Dissenters would not, at *this time*, wish to see so excellent and so useful a form of faith laid aside, only to serve the interests of our new Arians. However, since the *damnatory* clauses were the main difficulty, a better way might have been contrived than was then thought on; namely, to have preserved the whole Creed, except those clauses which are separable from it. But the best of all, as I humbly conceive, is what has prevailed, and still obtains, to let it stand as before; since the *damnatory* clauses have been often and sufficiently vindicated by the *Reformed* Churches abroad[d], as well as by our own here.

[c] This Creed, by whomsoever framed, hath been long received in the Church, and looked on as agreeable to the Scriptures, and an excellent explication of the Christian faith. Constantinople, Rome, and the *Reformed* Churches have owned it——our pious and excellent Mr. Baxter, in his Method of Theol. p. 123. speaks thus of it: "In a word, the damnatory sentences excepted, or "modestly expounded," (such a modest explication of the damnatory clauses see in Dr. Wallis, &c.) "I embrace the Creed commonly called Athana-"sius's, as the best explication of the Trinity." And in vol. ii. of his Works, p. 132. says he, "I unfeignedly account the doctrine of the Trinity, the sum "and kernel of the Christian religion, as expressed in our Baptism, and Atha-"nasius's Creed, the best explication of it I ever read." *Doctrine of the Trinity stated*, &c. *by some London Ministers*, p. 62, 63.

[d] Tentzelius, a Lutheran, is very smart upon this head against the Arminians, for their objecting to the *damnatory* sentences.

Verum injuste, atque impudenter accusant initium Symboli, quod pridem vindicarunt nostrates theologi. *Dannhawerus in Stylo vindice*, p. 200. Hulsemannus de Auxiliis Gratiæ, p. 218. Kromayerus in Theologia positivo polemica, p. 98, 99. et in Scrutinio Religionum, p. 205. aliique passim. Tentzel. p. 110. To these which Tentzelius has mentioned, I may add David

OBJECT. VII.

It is pleaded farther, mostly in the words of Bishop Taylor, that the "Apostles' Creed is the rule of faith," that this only is "necessary to baptism," that what was once "sufficient to bring men to heaven, must be so" now; that there is no occasion for being so *minute* and *particular* in the matter of Creeds; with more to the like purpose.

ANSW. 1. Dr. Taylor goes upon a false supposition that the Creed called the Apostles' was compiled by the Apostles.

2. He has another *false* presumption, appearing all the way in his reasonings on this head, that the Apostles' Creed has been always the *same* that it is now: whereas learned men know that it was not brought to its present entire form till after the year 600[e]; is nothing else but the baptismal Creed of one particular church, the Church of Rome, and designedly *short* for the ease of those who were to repeat it at baptism. Now when we are told of the Apostles' Creed containing all that is *necessary to salvation*, and *no more than is necessary;* we would gladly know whether it be meant of the *old short Roman Creed*[f], or of the *present one*, considerably *larger:* and if they intend the *old one*, why application is not made to our go-

Pareus, (a Calvinist,) in his comment upon this Creed, published at the end of Ursinus's Catechism, A.D. 1634, by Philip Pareus.

[e] I know not whether the words, *Maker of heaven and earth*, can be proved, by any *certain* authority, to have come into that Creed before the eighth century: for after the best searches I have been hitherto able to make, I can find no copy (to be depended upon) higher than that time, which has that clause.

[f] The old Roman (or Apostles') Creed was no more than this, as may be seen in Bishop Usher, de Symbol. p. 6 and 9.

"I believe in God the Father Almighty: and in Jesus Christ his only Son "our Lord; who was born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary; crucified under Pontius Pilate, and buried, rose again the third day from the "dead, ascended into heaven, sitteth at the right hand of the Father, from "whence he shall come to judge the quick and dead. And in the Holy Ghost, "the holy Church, the remission of sins, the resurrection of the body. "*Amen.*"

vernors to lay the *new one* aside, or to curtail and reduce it to its primitive size; by leaving out the Belief, or profession of God's being *Creator of heaven and earth*, and of Christ's being *dead*, and of his *descent into hell*, and of the Church being *Catholic*, and of the *communion of saints*, and *life everlasting*, as unnecessary articles of faith. For why may not that suffice *now*, which was *once* sufficient? Or how can any thing be *necessary* at this day, that was not so from the beginning?

3. To set this whole matter right, it ought to be considered, that Creeds were never intended to contain, as it were, *a certain quantity of faith*, as necessary to bring men to heaven, and no more than is necessary. Were this the case, all Creeds ought precisely to have consisted of an *equal* number of articles, and the *same individual* articles: whereas there are no two Creeds any where to be found which answer to such exactness. A plain argument that the Church, in forming of Creeds, early and late, went upon no such view, but upon quite another principle. The design of all was, to keep up as strictly as possible the whole *compages*, or *fabric* of the Christian faith as it stands in Scripture[g]: and if any *part* came to be attacked, they were then to bend all their cares to succour and relieve that part, in order still to secure the *whole*. Some few of the main *stamina*, or chief lines, were taken care of from the first, and made up the first Creeds: particularly the *doctrine* of the *Trinity* briefly hinted, and scarce any thing more, because the form of baptism led to it. As to other *Articles*, or larger explications of *this*, they came in occasionally, according as this or that part of the Christian faith seemed most to be endangered, and to require present relief. And as this varied in several countries or churches, (some being more disturbed than others, and some with one kind of heresy,

g Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐ πάντες δύνανται τὰς γραφὰς ἀναγινώσκειν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν ἰδιωτεία, τοὺς δὲ ἀσχολία τις ἐμποδίζει πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν· ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀμαθίας ἀπολέσθαι, ἐν ὀλίγοις τοῖς στίχοις τὸ πᾶν δόγμα τῆς πίστεως περιλαμβάνομεν. *Cyrill. Catech. V.* n. 12. p. 78.

others with another,) so the Creeds likewise varied; some insisting particularly upon this article, others upon that, as need required, and all still endeavouring to keep up and maintain one whole and entire system of the Christian faith, according to the true and full meaning of sacred Writ. There is nothing more in it than the very nature and circumstance of the thing necessarily leads to. I may illustrate the case a little farther by an easy parallel between matters of *faith* and matters of *practice*. The sum of Christian practice is contained in two brief rules; to *love God*, and *to love one's neighbour;* which comprehend all. No one needs more than this; nor indeed can there be any thing more. But then a perverse man may possibly understand by *God*, not the *true God*, the God of Jews and Christians, but some other of his own devising, or such as has been received by Pagans or heretics: and he may understand by *neighbour* one of his own *country* only, or *tribe*, or *sect*, or *family*. Well then, to obviate any such method of undermining *Christian practice*, it will be necessary to be a little more *particular* than barely to lay down in brief to *love God* and *one's neighbour:* we must add, the *true God*, the God of Jews and Christians, that very God and none else: and as to *neighbour*, we must insist upon it, that it means, not this or that *sect*, *tribe*, *party*, &c. but all mankind. And now our *rule* of *practice* begins to extend and enlarge itself beyond its primitive simplicity; but not without reason. To proceed a little farther: mistakes and perverse sentiments may arise in the interpreting the word *love*, so as thereby to evacuate and frustrate the primary and fundamental rule: to correct and remove which, it may be necessary still farther to *enlarge* the *rule* of *practice*, and to branch it out into many other particulars; which to mention would be needless. Now if such a method as this will of course be necessary to preserve the *essentials* of *practice;* let it not be thought strange if the like has been made use of to preserve the *essentials* of *faith*. There is the same reason and the

like occasion for both: and if due care be taken in both, to make all the branches hang naturally upon the primary and fundamental rules, and to adopt no *foreign* ones, as belonging thereunto when they really do not; then there is nothing in this whole affair but a just and prudent care about what most of all deserves it, and such as will be indispensably required in every faithful minister, or steward of the mysteries of God. To return to our point in hand: as more and more of the sacred truths, in process of time, came to be opposed, or brought in question; so Creeds have been enlarged in proportion; and an explicit profession of more and more articles required of every candidate for baptism. And because this was not security sufficient, since many might forget, or not know, or not attend to what they had professed in their baptism, (by themselves or by their sureties,) it was found highly expedient and necessary to insert one or more Creeds in the standing and daily Offices of the Church, to remind people of that faith which they had solemnly engaged to maintain, and to guard the unwary against the wily attempts of heretics to pervert them. This is the plain and true account of Creeds, and of their *use* in the Christian churches. And therefore, if any man would talk sense against the *use* of this or that Creed in any Church, he ought to show either that it contains such *truths* as no man ever did, or in all probability never will oppose, (which will be a good argument to prove the Creed *superfluous*,) or that it contains articles which are *not true*, or are at best *doubtful;* which will be a good argument to prove such a Creed *hurtful*. Now, as to the Athanasian form, it will hardly be thought *superfluous*, so long as there are any Arians, Photinians, Sabellians, Macedonians, Apollinarians, Nestorians, or Eutychians in this part of the world: and as to its being *hurtful*, that may then be proved when it can be shown that any of those forementioned *heresies* were no *heresies*, or have not been justly condemned.

If it be pleaded that the *vulgar*, knowing little of any

of those *heresies*, will therefore know as little of what the Creed means; and so to them it may be at least dry and insipid, if not wholly useless: to this I answer; that there are no kinds of *heretics* but hope to make the *vulgar* understand *their* tenets respectively, and to draw them aside from the *received* faith of the Church: and therefore it behoves the pastors of the Church to have a *standing* form, to guard the people against any such attempts. The *vulgar* will understand, in the general, and as far as is ordinarily to them necessary, the main doctrines of a *Trinity in Unity*, and of *God incarnate:* and as to particular explications, whenever they have occasion to look farther, they will find the *true ones* laid down in this Creed; which will be useful to prevent their being imposed upon at any time with *false* ones. If they never have occasion to go farther than generals, there is no hurt done to them by *abundant* caution: if they have, here is a direction ready for them to prevent mistakes. It is not pretended that all are capable of seeing through every nicety, or of perceiving the full intent and aim of every part of this form, and what it alludes to. But as many as are capable of being *set wrong* in any one branch, (by the subtlety of seducers,) are as capable of being *kept right* by this *rule* given them: and they will as easily understand *one side* of the question, as they will the *other*. The Christian churches throughout the world, ever since the multiplication of *heresies*, have thought it necessary to guard their people by some such forms as these in standing use amongst them. The Oriental churches, which receive not this Creed into their constant Offices, yet more than supply the want of it, either by other the like Creeds[h], or by their solemn stated Prayers in their Liturgies, wherein they express their *faith* as fully and particularly (or more so[i]) as this Creed does: and they are not so

[h] See the Creed of the Armenians in Sir P. Ricaut, p. 411, &c.

[i] See Ludolphus Histor. Æthiop. lib. iii. c. 5. and Renaudot's Orient. Liturg. passim.

much afraid of *puzzling* and *perplexing* the *vulgar* by doing it, as they are of *betraying* and *exposing* them to the attempts of seducers, should they not do it. For which reason also they frequently direct their prayers to God the *Son*, as well as to God the *Father*; being in that case more solicitous than the Latin churches have been, because they have been oftener disturbed by Arians, and other impugners of Christ's divinity[k].

Upon the whole, I look upon it as exceeding *useful*, and even *necessary*, for every church to have some such *form* as this, or something equivalent, open and common to all its members; that none may be led astray for want of proper caution, and previous instruction in what so nearly concerns the whole structure and fabric of the Christian faith[l]. As to this particular form, it has so long prevailed, and has so well answered the use intended, that, all things considered, there can be no sufficient reason for *changing* any part of it, much less for *laying* the whole *aside*. There are several other Creeds, very good ones, (though somewhat larger,) which, had they been made choice of for *common* use, might possibly have done as well. The Creeds I mean (of which there is a great number) drawn up after the Council of Chalcedon, and purposely contrived to obviate all the *heresies* that ever had infested the Christian Church. But those

[k] Nam cum omnes orationes Latini Canonis, ex vetustissima traditione, ad Deum *Patrem* dirigantur; in Oriente plures ad *Filium*: nempe, quia magis conflictata est Arianorum, et aliorum qui ejus divinitatem impugnabant, contentionibus Orientalis, quam Occidentalis Ecclesia. *Renaudot. de Orient. Liturg.* vol. i. p. 262.

[l] To this purpose speaks Johannes Pappus, in the name of the Lutheran churches, commenting on the Augsburg Confession.

Semper in Ecclesia scriptorum quorundam publicorum usus fuit, quibus doctrinæ divinitus revelatæ de certis capitibus summa comprehenderetur, et contra hæreticos, aliosque adversarios defenderetur. Talia scripta, licet perbrevia, sunt Symbola illa totius Ecclesiæ, omnium hominum consensu recepta, Apostolicum, Nicænum, Athanasianum. *Joan. Papp. Comm. in Confess. August.* fol. 2.

I take this upon the credit of Nic. Serarius, who quotes the passage from Pappus. *Serar. in Symb. Athanas.* p. 9. tom. 2.

that dislike this Creed would much more dislike the other; as being still more *particular* and *explicit* in regard to the Nestorian, Eutychian, and Monothelite heresies, and equally full and clear for the doctrine of the *Trinity*.

To conclude; as long as there shall be any men left to *oppose* the *doctrines* which this Creed contains, so long will it be *expedient*, and even *necessary* to continue the *use* of it, in order to preserve the rest: and, I suppose, when we have none remaining to find fault with the *doctrines*, there will be none to object against the *use* of the Creed, or so much as to wish to have it laid aside.

AN APPENDIX TO CHAPTER THE THIRD.

570. I INTIMATED above, p. 166. that Fortunatus's comment upon the Athanasian Creed, though before published, might deserve a second publication, and be made much more correct than it appears in Muratorius's second tome of Anecdota.

I have made frequent use of it in the preceding sheets: and now my design in reprinting it is, to let the reader see what the comment is which I so frequently refer to; that so he may judge for himself whether it really be what I suppose, and I think with good reason, a comment of the sixth century, and justly ascribed to Fortunatus. I have endeavoured to make it as correct as possible, by such helps as I could any where procure; which are as follow.

1. The printed copy of it, published by Muratorius from a manuscript of the Ambrosian library, about 600 years old.

2. A manuscript copy from Oxford, found among Franciscus Junius's manuscripts, which appears, by the

character, to be about 800 years old. As it is older than Muratorius's, so is it also more faithful; and though it has a great many faults both in the *orthography* and *syntax*, owing either to the ignorance of the *age* or of the *copyist*, yet it does not appear to have been *interpolated* like the other, or to have been industriously altered in any part.

3. Besides those two copies of the entire comment, I have had some assistance from such *parcels* of it as are to be met with in writers that have borrowed from it. Bruno's comment furnishes us with some parts which he had taken into his own. But there is, among the supposititious works ascribed to St. Austin, a treatise entitled Sermo de Symbolo[m], which has several scattered fragments of this very comment in it. The whole treatise is a *farrago*, or collection from several other writers; as Ruffinus, Cæsarius, Pope Gregory I. and Ivo Carnotensis. By the last mentioned, one may be assured that the *collection* is not older than the close of the eleventh century; it may be later. It will be serviceable however, so far as it goes, for restoring the true readings where our copies are corrupt; which is the use I make of it.

Nothing now remains but to lay before the learned reader Fortunatus's comment in its native language, and therewith to close up our inquiries concerning the Athanasian Creed.

The *various lections*, all that are properly such, are carefully noted at the bottom of the page; that so the reader may judge whether the *text* be what it should be, or correct it, if it appears otherwise. But I should hint, that there are several little variations in the Oxford manuscript, which I take no notice of, as not being properly *various lections*.

1. Such as are merely *orthographical*: as a permutation of letters; using *d* for *t*, in *capud* and *reliquid*, for *caput*

[m] Augustin. Oper. tom. vi. in Appendice, p. 278. ed. Bened.

and *reliquit; e* for *i*, in *trea* for *tria;* and *i* for *e*, in *calit* for *calet*, and the like: *o* for *u* in *servolis*, *p* for *b* in *optenit* for *obtinet; v* consonant for *b*, in *enarravit* for *enarrabit;* though such as this last is might be noted among *various lections*, in cases more disputable.

To this head may be referred some antique, and now obsolete spellings: *inmensus* for *immensus*, *inmortalis* for *immortalis*, *inlesus* for *illæsus*, *conlocavit* for *collocavit*, *dinoscitur* for *dignoscitur*, and the like.

2. *Active terminations* of verbs, for *passive:* as *finire* for *finiri*, *cogitare* for *cogitari;* though these may be referred to the former head, being only changing the letter *i* for the letter *e*. *Dominat* for *dominatur* I take notice of among the *various lections*.

3. Faults in the *formation* of *verbs:* as *abstuleret* for *tolleret*, *vivendos* for *viventes;* to which may be added *morsit* for *momordit*, having been long out of use.

4. *Manifest* faults in concord: as *humani carnis*, for *humanæ; eodem captivitate*, for *eâdem*. But where there can be any doubt of the construction, I mark such among the *various lections*, leaving the reader to judge of them.

These and other the like niceties are generally neglected in editions of authors; it being both needless and endless to note them. But I was willing to hint something of them in this place, because they may be of use to scholars for the making a judgment of the *value* of a manuscript; and sometimes of the *time* or *place;* as also of the *manner* how a copy was taken, whether by the *ear* or by the *eye*, from word of mouth, or merely from a *writing* laid before the copyist. Besides that if we can distinguish in the present case, as perhaps a good critic may, the *particularities* of the *author* from those of his *transcribers;* they may possibly afford some additional argument for the ascertaining the *author* of the comment.

EXPOSITIO FIDEI CATHOLICÆ FORTUNATI[a].

Scripta anno circiter 570.

QUICUNQUE *vult salvus esse*[b], *ante omnia opus est ut teneat Catholicam Fidem: quam nisi quisque integram, inviolatamque servaverit, absque dubio in æternum peribit*[c].

Fides dicitur credulitas, sive credentia[d]. [*Primo ergo omnium fides necessaria est, sicut Apostolica docet auctoritas dicens;* sine fide impossibile est placere Deo. *Constat enim neminem ad veram pervenire posse beatitudinem, nisi Deo placeat; et Deo neminem placere posse, nisi per fidem. Fides namque est bonorum omnium fundamentum, fides humanæ salutis initium. Sine hac nemo ad Filiorum Dei potest consortium pervenire; quia sine ipsa nec in hoc seculo quisquam justificationis consequitur gratiam, nec in futuro vitam possidebit æternam. Et si quis heic non ambulaverit per fidem, non perveniet ad speciem beatam Domini nostri Jesu Christi*[e].] Catholica universalis dicitur, id est, recta,

[a] Ita se habet titulus in Codice Muratorii. Aliter in Oxoniensi, viz. *Expositio in Fide Catholica:* pro *in Fidem Catholicam*, ex corrupta loquendi ratione apud Scriptores ætatis mediæ.

[b] *Esse salvus.* Cod. Murat.

[c] Posterior hæc Symboli clausula, incipiens a *quam nisi*, non habetur in Cod. Oxoniensi.

[d] Ita Cod. Oxon. prima hæc pericope deest in Murator. Conf. Brun. in Symb.

[e] Quæ uncinulis includuntur, non comparent in MS. Oxoniensi. Nec enim Fortunati videntur esse, sed Alcuini potius; apud quem eadem fere verbatim leguntur. (De Fid. Trin. lib. i. cap. 2. p. 707.) Alcuinus vero maximam partem mutuatus est a Fulgentio. (De Fid. ad. Petrum Prolog. p. 500. ed Paris.) Sed varia exemplaria varie sententiam claudunt. Fulgentius legit, *non perveniet ad speciem;* nec quicquam ultra. Alcuinus, *non perveniet ad speciem beatæ visionis Domini nostri Jesu Christi.* Ab utrisque abit lectio Muratorii.

quam Ecclesia universa[f] tenere debet. Ecclesia[g] dicitur congregatio Christianorum, sive conventus populorum. [*Non enim, sicut conventicula hæreticorum, in aliquibus regionum partibus coarctatur, sed per totum terrarum orbem dilatata diffunditur*[h].]

Ut unum Deum in Trinitate, et Trinitatem in Unitate veneremur: et credamus, et colamus, et confiteamur [*Trinitatem in Personis, unitatem in substantia. Hanc quoque Trinitatem Personarum, atque unitatem naturæ propheta Esaias revelatam sibi non tacuit, cum se dicit seraphim vidisse clamantia,* Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus, Dominus Deus Sabaoth. *Ubi prorsus in eo quod dicitur tertio* Sanctus, *Personarum Trinitatem; in eo vero quod semel dicimus* Dominus Deus Sabaoth, *divinæ naturæ cognoscimus unitatem*[i].]

Neque confundentes Personas: ut Sabellius errat, qui ipsum dicit esse Patrem in Persona quem et Filium, ipsum et Spiritum Sanctum. Non ergo confundentes Personas, quia tres omnino Personæ sunt[k]. Est enim gignens, genitus, et [l] procedens. *Gignens* est Pater, qui genuit Filium; Filius est *genitus*, quem genuit Pater; Spiritus Sanctus est *procedens*, quia a Patre et Filio procedit. Pater et Filius coæterni sibi sunt et coæquales; et cooperatores,

[f] *Universa Ecclesia*. Cod. Mur. et Brunonis.

[g] Cod. Muratorii habet *quippe*, post *Ecclesia:* quam voculam, utpote ineptam, saltem otiosam, expunximus, fide Cod. Oxoniensis. Conf. Brunon. in hoc loco.

[h] Uncis hic inclusa non habentur in Codice Oxoniensi. Verba nimirum sunt, non Fortunati, sed Isidori Hispal. *Orig.* lib. viii. cap. 1.

[i] Quæ uncis comprehensa hic legere est, non comparent in Codice Oxoniensi. Verba sunt Alcuini (de Trin. lib. i. cap. 3. p. 709.) in quo eadem plane, similique ordine invenias. Sunt porro eadem, uno vocabulo dempto, apud Fulgentium (de Fid. ad Petrum, p. 503.) ordine etiam tantum non eodem. Verba autem illa introductoria; (viz. *Trinitatem in Personis, unitatem in substantia*) non leguntur in Fulgentio, nec quidem in Alcuino. Interpolator ipse, uti videtur, ex proprio illa penu deprompta præmisit cæteris. Connexionis forte aliqualis conservandæ gratia.

[k] *Tres Personæ omnino sunt*, Murat.

[l] Deest *et* in Cod. Oxon.

sicut scriptum est; *Verbo Domini cœli firmati*[m] *sunt*, id est, a Filio Dei creati, *Spiritu*[n] *oris ejus, omnis virtus eorum.* Ubi sub singulari numero, *Spiritus*[o] *ejus* dicit[p], [unitatem substantiæ Deitatis ostendit; ubi sub plurali numero, *omnis virtus eorum* dicit[q],] Trinitatem Personarum aperte demonstrat, quia tres unum sunt, et unum tres.

Neque substantiam separantes: ut Arius garrit, qui sicut tres Personas esse dicit, sic et tres substantias esse mentitur[r]. Filium dicit minorem quam Patrem, et creaturam esse; Spiritum Sanctum adhuc minorem quam Filium, et Patri et Filio eum esse administratorem[s] adserit. Non ergo *substantiam separantes*, quia totæ tres Personæ in substantia Deitatis[t] unum sunt.

Alia est enim Persona Patris: quia Pater ingenitus est, eo quod a nullo est genitus. *Alia Persona Filii*, quia Filius a Patre solo est[u] genitus. *Alia Spiritus Sancti*, quia a Patre et Filio Spiritus Sanctus[x] procedens est.

Sed Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti una est Divinitas: id est, Deitas. *Æqualis Gloria:* id est, claritas. *Coæterna Majestas:* Majestas gloria est, claritas, sive potestas[y].

[m] *Formati.* Cod. Oxon. Vid. Symb. Damasi dictum (apud Hieronym. tom. v. p. 122.) unde hæc *noster*, mutatis mutandis, desumpsisse videtur.

[n] *Spiritus.* Cod. Oxon.

[o] Leg. *Spiritu*, uterque vero Codex habet *Spiritus.*

[p] *Dicitur.* Cod. Murat.

[q] Lacunam in Muratorio manifestam (quippe cum desint ea verba uncis inclusa) ex Codice Oxoniensi supplevimus. Scilicet, vox *dicit* proxime recurrens librarii oculos (uti fit) fefellit.

[r] Ita clare Cod. Oxon. Aliter Muratorius ex vitioso Codice; *quia tres Personas esse dicit, si et tres substantias esse mentitur.* Sensus impeditus, aut nullus.

[s] *Et Patris et Filii eum administratorem esse adserit.* Cod. Murat. Conf. Brunon.

[t] *Divinitatis.* Cod. Oxon.

[u] *A Patre est solo.* Cod. Oxon.

[x] Desunt *Spiritus Sanctus* in Cod. Murat. quæ tamen retinuimus, tum fide Cod. Oxoniensis, tum quia in antecedentibus *Pater*, et *Filius* bis ponuntur, sicut et hic *Sp. Sanctus.*

[y] Cod. Oxoniensis legit *claritatis, sive potestas.*

Qualis Pater, talis Filius, talis et Spiritus Sanctus. Id est, in Deitate, et Omnipotentia.

Increatus Pater, increatus Filius, increatus et Spiritus Sanctus. Id est, a nullo creatus [z].

Immensus Pater, immensus Filius, immensus et Spiritus Sanctus. Non est mensurabilis in sua natura, quia inlocalis est, [a] incircumscriptus, ubique totus, ubique præsens, ubique potens.

Æternus Pater, æternus Filius, æternus et Spiritus Sanctus. Id est, non tres æterni, sed in tribus Personis unus Deus æternus, qui sine initio, et sine fine æternus permanet.

Similiter Omnipotens Pater, Omnipotens Filius, Omnipotens et Spiritus Sanctus. Omnipotens dicitur, eo quod omnia potest, et omnium obtinet potestatem [b]. Ergo, si omnia potest, quid est quod non potest? Hoc non potest, quod Omnipotenti non competit posse [c]. Falli non potest, [quia veritas est; infirmari non potest,] quia sanitas est [d]; mori non potest, quia immortalis vita est; finiri non potest, quia infinitus et perennis est.

Ita, Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus et Spiritus Sanctus. [Deus nomen est potestatis, non proprietatis [e].] Proprium

[z] Cod. Oxoniensis legit *creati.*

[a] Muratorii exemplar insertum habet *et*, quod delendum esse censui, cum absit a Codice Oxon. et otiosum videatur.

[b] Fortunatus, in sua Exposit. Symb. Apostolici, hæc habet; *Omnipotens vero dicitur, eo quod omnia possit, et omnium obtinet potentatum.* ed. Basil. *obtineat potestatem.* ed. Lugd. Præluserat Ruffinus, in Symbolum.

[c] S. Bruno, hunc opinor locum præ oculis habens, his verbis utitur: *Ergo, si omnia potest, quid est quod non potest? Hoc non potest, quod non convenit omnipotenti posse.* Brun. in Symb. Athanas.

[d] Muratorius sententiam mancam, vitiatamque exhibet: *Falli non potest, quia Sanctus est;* omissis intermediis. Scilicet, vocabulum proxime repetitum describentis oculum delusit: et ne nullus inde eliceretur sensus, pro *sanitas* substitutum est *sanctus.* Hæc porro sibimet adoptavit S. Bruno, pauculis mutatis, vel interjectis, ad hunc modum: *Falli non potest, quia veritas et sapientia est; ægrotari aut infirmari non potest, quia sanitas est; mori non potest, quia immortalis est; finiri non potest, quia infinitus et perennis est.*

[e] Deest hæc clausula in Codice Murator. sed confer Symbolum Damasi

nomen est Patris *Pater;* et proprium nomen est [f] Filii *Filius;* et proprium nomen est Spiritus Sancti *Spiritus Sanctus.*

Ita, Dominus Pater, Dominus Filius, Dominus et Spiritus Sanctus. Dominus dicitur, eo quod omnia dominat, et omnium est Dominus dominator[g].

Quia sicut singillatim (id est, sicut distinctim[h]) *unamquamque Personam et* [i] *Deum et Dominum confiteri Christiana veritate compellimur.* Quia si me interrogaveris quid sit [k] Pater, ego respondebo; Deus, et Dominus. Similiter, si me interrogaveris [l] quid sit [m] Filius, ego dicam; Deus, et Dominus. Et si dicis[n], quid est Spiritus Sanctus? Ego dico[o]; Deus, et Dominus. Et in his tribus Personis, non tres Deos, nec tres Dominos, sed in [p] his tribus, sicut jam supra dictum est, [q] unum Deum, et unum Dominum confiteor.

Unus ergo Pater, non tres Patres: id est, quia [r] Pater semper Pater, nec aliquando Filius. *Unus Filius, non tres Filii:* id est, quia Filius semper Filius, nec aliquando

dictum, quod Gregorii Bœtici creditur, apud August. tom. v. p. 387. Append. item apud Hieronym. tom. v. p. 122.

[f] Deest *est.* Murator. Conf. Brun.

[g] *Dominat,* pro *dominatur,* et cum accusativo, ex vitiata inferioris ævi Latinitate, vel ex scribæ imperitia. Aliter Codex Muratorii, ex Isidori Origin. (lib. vii. cap. 1.) *Dominus dicitur, eo quod dominetur creaturæ cunctæ, vel quod creatura omnis dominatui ejus deserviat.*

[h] *Distinctum.* Oxon. *distincte.* Murat.

[i] Deest *et.* Cod. Murator.

[k] *Quid est.* Murator. Eandem sententiam expressit S. Bruno, his verbis; *Quia si me interrogaveris quid est Pater, ego respondeo; Deus, et Dominus.*

[l] *Et si me rogaveris.* Cod. Oxon.

[m] Est Murator. Locum sic exhibet S. Bruno; *Similiter, si interrogaveris quid est Filius, ego dico, Deus et Dominus.*

[n] *Dicas.* Murator.

[o] *Dicam.* Murator. Apud Brunonem sic legitur; *Et si dicis, quid est Spiritus Sanctus? Ego respondeo; Deus, et Dominus.*

[p] Deest *in.* Oxon.

[q] *Supra dixi.* Cod. Oxon. Sed Brunonis lectio Muratorii lectionem confirmat.

[r] Codex Oxon. pro *quia* habet *qui,* in hoc loco, et in duobus proxime sequentibus. Utrumlibet elegeris, eodem fere res redit.

Pater. *Unus Spiritus Sanctus, non tres Spiritus Sancti:* id est, quia Spiritus Sanctus semper est [s] Spiritus Sanctus, nec aliquando Filius, aut Pater. Hæc est proprietas Personarum.

Et in hac Trinitate nihil prius, aut posterius. Quia sicut nunquam Filius sine Patre, sic nunquam fuit Pater sine Filio, sic et nunquam fuit Pater et Filius sine Spiritu Sancto [t]. Coæterna ergo Trinitas, et inseparabilis Unitas, sine initio et sine fine [u].

Nihil majus, aut minus. Æqualitatem Personarum dicit, quia [x] Trinitas æqualis est, et una [y] Deitas, Apostolo docente [z], et dicente: *Per ea, quæ facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur;* et per creaturam Creator intelligitur, secundum has comparationes, et alias quamplures. Sol, candor, et calor, et tria sunt vocabula, et tria unum [a]. Quod candet, hoc calet, et quod calet, hoc candet: tria hæc vocabula res una esse dignoscitur [b]. Ita [c] Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, tres Personæ in Deitate, substantiâ [d] unum sunt; et individua unitas recte creditur. Item de terrenis, vena, fons, fluvius, tria sunt [e] vocabula, et tria unum [f] in

[s] In Cod. Oxon. deest *est.*

[t] Paulo aliter huncce locum expressit auctor Sermonis, inter Augustini opera (Append. tom. vi. p. 281.) *Quia sicut nunquam Pater sine Filio, nec Filius sine Patre; sic et nunquam fuit Pater, et Filius sine Spiritu Sancto.* Sed nihil mutandum contra fidem exemplarium.

[u] In Appendice prædicta, sic legitur: *Coæterna ergo est Sancta Trinitas* &c.

[x] *Sancta Trinitas.* Append.

[y] *Una est Deitas.* Append. *una Deitatis.* Oxon. male.

[z] In Cod. Oxoniensi, desunt illa *docente et.* Sed Append. lectionem Muratorii tuetur, alio tamen verborum ordine; *dicente, atque docente.*

[a] Ita Muratorius cum Appendice prædict. Aliter MS. Oxon. viz. *tria sunt nomina, et res una.* Quæ eodem recidunt.

[b] In Appendice sic se habent; *tria hæc vocabula res una cognoscitur.*

[c] *Et* post *ita.* Oxon.

[d] Codices habent *substantiæ,* (quod tamen in Appendice prædicta omittitur prorsus) et comma interponunt post *Personæ.* Prava interpunctio corrigenda est, et levicula mutatione legendum *substantiâ:* quod et vidit et monuit vir quidam amicissimus simul et perspicacissimus.

[e] Appendix legit *hæc,* non *sunt.* Oxon. *tria itemque sunt.*

[f] Oxoniensis, *res una.* Append. cum Muratorio, *unum.*

sua natura. Ita trium Personarum, Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, substantia et Deitas unum est [g].

Est ergo Fides recta, ut credamus et confiteamur, quia Dominus noster Jesus Christus [h]. Jesus Hebraïce, Latine Salvator dicitur. [Christus Græce, Latine unctus vocatur. Jesus ergo dicitur [i]] eo quod salvat populum: Christus, eo quod Spiritu Sancto divinitus sit [k] delibutus, sicut in ipsius Christi [l] Persona Esaias ait; *Spiritus Domini super me, propter quod unxit me*, &c. Ita et Psalmista de Christo Domino dicit, [m] *unxit te Deus, Deus tuus, oleo lætitiæ præ consortibus tuis.*

Dei Filius, Deus pariter et homo est. Filius a felicitate parentum dicitur: homo ab humo dicitur; id est, de humo [n] factus est.

Deus est [o] *ex substantia Patris ante sæcula genitus.* Id est, Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine, splendor de splendore, fortis de forti, virtus de virtute, vita de vita, æternitas de æternitate: per omnia, idem [p] quod Pater in divina substantia hoc est et [q] Filius. Deus enim [r] Pater Deum Filium genuit, non voluntate, neque necessitate, sed natura. Nec quæratur quomodo genuit Filium [s], quod et angeli nesciunt,

[g] Ita Murat. et Append. Oxoniensis legit, *substantia, Deitas una est.*

[h] Oxoniensis adjicit, *Dei Filius et homo est.* Inepte hoc loco, quod ex sequentibus patebit.

[i] Muratorii Codex omittit verba illa intermedia, uncis inclusa. Scilicet, illud *dicitur* proxime repetitum amanuensi hic iterum fraudi fuit.

[k] *Divinitus sit* desunt in Cod. Oxon.

[l] Deest *Christi*. Murator.

[m] Oxoniensis breviter, *Item in Psalmo, unxit* &c. Notandum porro, quod quædam habet Fortunatus noster, in commentario suo in Symbol. Apostol. hisce jam proxime descriptis perquam similia. Confer etiam Ruffin. in Symbol. inter Oper. Hieronym. (tom. v. p. 131.)

[n] *De humo terræ*. Murator.

[o] Non habetur *est* in Murat.

[p] Pro *idem, id est*. Murator.

[q] Deest *et* Cod. Oxon. His quoque gemina fere habes in Exposit. in Symbol. Apostolicum.

[r] Deest *enim* Cod. Oxon. Confer Symb. Damasi dictum.

[s] *Quomodo genitus sit, quod angeli*——Oxon. At Muratorii lectioni astipulatur Appendix ad Augustin. (tom. vi. p. 279.) et Fortunatus ipse, Expos. in Symb. Apostol.

prophetis est incognitum : unde [t] eximius propheta Esaias dicit; *Generationem ejus quis enarrabit?* Ac si diceret [u], angelorum nullus, prophetarum nemo [x]. Nec inenarrabilis, et inæstimabilis Deus [y] a servulis suis discutiendus est, sed fideliter credendus, [z] et pariter diligendus.

Et homo [a] *ex substantia matris, in sæculo natus.* Dei Filius, Verbum Patris, [b] caro factum. [c] Non quod Divinitas mutasset Deitatem, sed adsumpsit humanitatem. Hoc est, Verbum caro factum est, ex utero Virginis veram humanam carnem traxit. Et de utero virginali verus homo, sicut et verus Deus, est in sæculo natus, salva virginitatis gratia; [d] quia mater, quæ genuit, virgo ante partum, et virgo post partum permansit [e].

In sæculo. Id est, in isto sexto miliario, in quo nunc sumus, [*secula enim generationibus constant, et inde secula, quod sequantur; abeuntibus enim aliis, alia succedunt* [f].] "Deus et homo Christus Jesus, unus Dei Filius et ipse

[t] Unde *et isdem.* Cod. Murat. Conf. Fortunat. in Symb. Apostolicum.

[u] Muratorius habet *dixisset.*

[x] *Angelorum nemo, prophetarum nullus.* Cod. Oxon.

[y] Deest *Deus.* Oxon.

[z] Confer Fortunat. in Symb. Apostol. et Append. apud August. p. 279. et Ruffin. Symb.

[a] *Homo est.* Cod. Oxon.

[b] *Dei Filius, Verbum caro.* Murat. *Dei Filius Verbo Patris caro.* Cod. Oxon. Ex utrisque veram, opinor, lectionem restituimus.

[c] *Et non.* Cod. Murator. Expunximus illud *et*, fide Codicis Oxon.

[d] *Salva virginitatis gratia* desunt in Cod. Oxoniensi.

[e] Ita Cod. Oxon. Muratorius, *quia mater genuit, et virgo mansit ante partum, et post partum.*

[f] Non comparent in Codice Oxoniensi. Verba sunt Isidor. Orig. lib. v. cap. 38. Quæ sequuntur proxime, *Deus et homo* &c. usque ad *matris Filius*, desunt omnia in codice Muratorii: ex Oxoniensi solo descripta dedimus. Videntur mihi Fortunati re vera esse, sed librarii culpa (ut alia multa) mirum in modum vitiata; quæ quidem ex *conjectura* aliquatenus corrigere volui, ut Syntaxis saltem sibi constet, donec certiora, et meliora ex Codicibus (si forte supersint aliqui) eruantur. Cæterum, ut Fortunato nostro hæc ascribam, illud suadet maxime, quod in expositione sua in Symbolum Apostolicum gemina fere habet de *porta Virginis*, eisdemque ibi nonnullis phrasibus utitur quibus hic usus est. Confer Symbolum Ruffini, a quo solenne est *nostro* (quippe qui et ipse Aquileiæ olim doctrina Christiana initiatus fuerat) tum verba, tum sententias mutuari.

" Virginis Filius. Quia dum Deitas in utero Virginis hu-
" manitatem adsumpsit, et cum ea per portam Virginis
" integram, et illæsam, nascendo mundum ingressus est
" Virginis Filius; et hominem (*leg.* homo) quem adsum-
" sit, id (*leg.* idem) est Dei Filium (*leg.* Filius) sicut jam
" supra diximus; et Deitas et humanitas in Christo; et
" Dei Patris pariter et Virginis Matris Filius."

Perfectus Deus, perfectus homo. Id est, verus Deus, et verus homo. [g] *Ex anima rationali:* et non ut Apollinaris [h] hæreticus dixit primum, quasi Deitas pro anima fuisset in carne Christi; postea, cum per evangelicam auctoritatem fuisset [i] convictus, dixit: *Habuit quidem animam quæ vivificavit corpus, sed non rationalem.* [k] E contrario, dicit qui Catholice sentit; *ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens* [l]: id est, plenus homo, atque perfectus.

Æqualis Patri secundum Divinitatem; minor Patre secundum humanitatem. Id est, secundum formam servi quam adsumere dignatus est.

Qui licet [m] *Deus sit et homo, non duo tamen, sed unus est Christus.* Id est, duæ substantiæ in Christo, Deitas et humanitas, non duæ Personæ, sed una est Persona [n].

Unus autem, non conversione Divinitatis in carnem [o], *sed adsumptione humanitatis in Deum* [o]. Id est: non quod Divinitas, quæ immutabilis est, sit conversa in carnem [p]; sed ideo unus, eo quod humanitatem adsumsit, cœpit [q]

[g] Deest hæc clausula in Cod. Oxon. ob vocabulum repetitum.

[h] *Paulinaris.* Cod. Oxon. Lectio nata ex sermone simplici et plebeio.

[i] *Fuit.* Cod. Oxon.

[k] *Et e contrario iste dicit.* Murat. Delevimus illa *et*, atque *iste*—quæ sententiam turbant, fide Codicis Oxoniensis.

[l] *Subsistit.* Cod. Oxon.

[m] *Certe*, loco τοῦ *licet.* Cod. Oxon.

[n] *Est Persona* desunt in Cod. Oxon.

[o] Cod. Oxoniensis habet *carne*, et *Deo:* errore, uti credo, pervetusto, multisque et antiquissimis exemplaribus communi. Quod si verbis in commentario immediate sequentibus (ex Muratorii lectione) steterimus, Fortunatus ipse nobis auctor erit, ut et *Deum*, et *carnem*, pro genuina lectione habeamus.

[p] *Quæ immutabilis et inconvertibilis est, caro; sed* &c. Cod. Oxon.

[q] *Incipit.* Cod. Oxon.

esse quod non [r] erat, et non amisit quod erat; cœpit esse homo [s] quod antea non fuerat, non amisit Deitatem quæ incommutabilis in æternum permanet [t].

Unus omnino, non confusione substantiæ, sed unitate Personæ. Id est; Divinitas incommutabilis [u] cum homine, quem adsumere dignata [x] est, sicut scriptum est; *Verbum tuum, Domine, in æternum permanet.* Id est, Divinitas cum humanitate; ut diximus duas substantias unam Personam [y] esse in Christo: ut sicut ante adsumptionem [carnis, æterna fuit Trinitas, ita post adsumptionem [z]] humanæ naturæ, vera maneat Trinitas; ne propter adsumptionem humanæ carnis dicatur esse quaternitas, quod absit a Fidelium cordibus, vel sensibus, dici, aut cogitari, cum, ita [a] ut supradictum est, et Unitas in Trinitate, et Trinitas in Unitate veneranda sit.

Nam sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo; ita Deus et homo unus est Christus. Etsi Deus [b], Dei Filius, nostram luteam et mortalem carnem, nostræ redemptionis conditionem [c] adsumpserit, se tamen nullatenus [d] inquinavit, neque naturam Deitatis mutavit. Quia si sol, aut ignis aliquid immundum tetigerit, quod tangit purgat, et se nullatenus coinquinat: ita Deitas sarcinam quoque

[r] Deest *non*. Cod. Murat. male.

[s] Deest *homo* in Cod. Oxon. perperam, item, *incipit* pro *cœpit*.

[t] Muratorius legit, *quia incommutabilis in æternum permanet:* Cod. Oxoniensis, *quæ immutabilis in æternum permansit.* Ex utrisque tertiam lectionem confecimus; quæ, opinor, cæteris et venustior est, et aptior.

[u] *Immutabilis.* Cod. Oxon.

[x] *Dignatus.* Cod. Oxon.

[y] *Personam* perperam omittit Cod. Oxoniensis.

[z] Desunt in Codice Oxoniensi: prætermissa scilicet festinantis librarii incuria, ob vocem iteratam.

[a] Pro *cum ita*, habet cod. Oxon. *nisi ita*.

[b] Murator. Cod. omittit *Deus*.

[c] Cod. Oxoniensis, *nostri redemptionis conditionis adsumpsit.* Nescio an melius Muratorius; *nostram luteam, et mortalem carnem nostræ conditionis adsumserit.* Sed levi mutatione, recte incedunt omnia. *Conditio*, apud Scriptores quinti et sexti sæculi, est *servile* onus, opusve.

[d] Cod. Oxon. legit *se nullatenus.* Murator. *Sed tamen se nullatenus.* Noster vero in Exposit. in Symb. Apostol. in simili causa, hac utitur phrasi, *se tamen non inquinat.*

[e]nostræ humanitatis adsumpsit, se nequaquam coinquinavit, sed nostram naturam carnis, [f] quam adsumpsit, purgavit, et a maculis, et sordibus peccatorum, ac vitiorum expiavit: sicut Esaias ait; *Ipse infirmitates nostras accepit, et ægrotationes portavit.* Ad hoc secundum humanitatem natus est, ut infirmitates nostras acciperet, et ægrotationes portaret: non quod ipse infirmitates, vel ægrotationes in se haberet, quia salus mundi est; sed ut eas a nobis tolleret, dum suæ sacræ passionis gratia, et sacramento[g], chirographo adempto, redemptionem pariter et salutem animarum nobis condonaret.

Qui passus est pro salute nostra. Id est, secundum id quod pati potuit: quod est, secundum humanam naturam; nam secundum Divinitatem, Dei Filius impassibilis est.

Descendit ad inferos[h]. Ut [i] protoplastum Adam[k], et patriarchas, et prophetas, et omnes justos, qui pro originali peccato ibidem detinebantur, liberaret; et de [l] vinculis ipsius [m] peccati absolutos, de eadem captivitate, et [n] infernali [o] loco, suo sanguine redemptos, ad supernam patriam,

[e] Oxoniensis habet, *Deitas sarcinamque nostræ humanitatis adsumpsit, se nequaquam* &c. Muratorius hoc modo, *Deitas sarcinam, quam ex nostra humanitate adsumpsit, nequaquam coinquinavit.* Lectio frigida prorsus, et inepta. Juvat huc conferre quæ Fortunatus noster ad Symb. Apost. in eandem sententiam breviter dictavit.

" Quod vero Deus Majestatis de Maria in carne natus est, non est sordidatus
" nascendo de Virgine, qui non fuit pollutus hominem condens de pulvere.
" Denique sol, aut ignis, si lutum inspiciat, quod tetigerit purgat, et se ta-
" men non inquinat." Conf. Ruffin. Symb. p. 133.

[f] *Nostræ naturæ carnem.* Murat.

[g] Muratorius legit, *dum suæ sacræ passionis gratiam, et sacramenta:* nullo sensu. Oxoniensis, *dum suæ sacræ passionis gratiæ* (pro *gratiâ*) *ac Sacramento.*

[h] *Ad inferna.* Cod. Oxon. Q. annon vetustissima hæc fuerit lectio in Symbolo Athanasiano, sicut in Apostolico?

[i] *Qui,* loco τοῦ *ut.* Cod. Oxon. At Sermo de Symbolo, in Append. ad August. (tom. vi. p. 281.) legit, cum Muratorio, *ut.*

[k] *Adam protoplastum.* Append.

[l] *Et ut de.* Append.

[m] *Ipsius* deest. Append.

[n] Deest *et* Cod. Oxon.

[o] *Inferni.* Append.

et ad perpetuæ vitæ gaudia revocaret. Reliqui, [p] qui supra originale peccatum [q] principalia crimina [r] commiserunt, ut adserit Scriptura, in pœnali Tartaro remanserunt: sicut in Persona Christi dictum est per prophetam; *Ero mors tua, o Mors;* id est, morte sua Christus humani generis inimicam Mortem interfecit, et vitam dedit. *Ero morsus tuus, inferne.* Partim [s] momordit infernum, pro parte eorum quos liberavit: partem reliquit, pro parte eorum qui pro principalibus criminibus in tormentis remanserunt.

Surrexit a mortuis primogenitus mortuorum: et alibi Apostolus dicit; *Ipse primogenitus ex multis fratribus.* Id est, primus a mortuis resurrexit. *Et multa corpora* [t] *sanctorum dormientium cum eo surrexerunt,* sicut evangelica auctoritas [u] dicit: *Sed ipse, qui caput est, prius, deinde qui* [x] *membra sunt continuo.*

Postea *ascendit ad cœlos:* sicut Psalmista ait; *Ascendit* [y] *in altum, captivam duxit captivitatem:* id est, humanam naturam, quæ prius sub peccato venundata fuit, et captivata; eamque redemptam captivam [z] duxit in cœlestem altitudinem; et ad cœlestis Patriæ [a] regnum sempiternum, ubi antea non fuerat, eam [b] collocavit, in gloriam sempiternam.

Sedet ad dexteram Patris: id est, prosperitatem paternam, et in [c] eo honore, quod [d] Deus est.

[p] Muratorius habet *vero* post *reliqui.* Oxon. non agnoscit, nec Append.

[q] Ita legitur in Appendice. Oxoniensis, *supra originale peccato.* Muratorius, *supra originali peccato.*

[r] *Principalem culpam.* Append.

[s] Muratorius, et Oxoniensis, in utroque loco, *Partem.* Appendix, in utroque, *Partim.* Media mihi lectio maxime arridet.

[t] Deest *corpora* in Cod. Oxon.

[u] *In evangelica autoritate.* Cod. Oxon.

[x] *Quæ membra.* Cod. Oxon.

[y] *Ascendens.* Murator.

[z] Conf. tractatum anonymi apud Hieronym. tom. v. p. 130. et apud Augustin. tom. viii. p. 69. Append. et Isid. Hisp. p. 560. ed. Paris.

[a] *Cœlestem Patriam.* Cod. Oxon.

[b] *Et* pro *eam.* Murator.

[c] *In* deest. Cod. Oxon.

[d] Mallem *quo,* si per codices liceret; sed et *quod,* adverbialiter hic positum pro *quia,* sensum non incommodum præ se ferre videtur.

Inde venturus [c] *judicare vivos et mortuos.* Vivos dicit eos quos tunc adventus Dominicus in corpore viventes invenerit; [et mortuos, jam ante sepultos. Et aliter dicit[f],] vivos *justos*, et mortuos *peccatores*[g].

Ad cujus adventum omnes homines resurgere habent cum corporibus suis; et reddituri sunt de factis propriis rationem: et qui bona egerunt, ibunt in vitam æternam; qui vero mala, in ignem æternum. Hæc est Fides Catholica, quam nisi quisque fideliter, firmiterque crediderit, salvus esse non poterit.

[c] *Venturus est.* Murator.

[f] Quantum hic uncis includitur, omittit Codex Oxoniensis. Delusus est fortean librarius per binas literulas *it* bis positas: vel, simili errore deceptus, integram lineam præterierit, dum in proxime sequentem oculos conjecerat.

[g] Operæ pretium est pauca hic subjicere, quæ *noster* habet in expositione sua in Symb. Apostolicum. "*judicaturus vivos et mortuos.* Aliqui dicunt "vivos, justos; mortuos vero injustos: aut certe, vivos, quos in corpore in- "venerit adventus Dominicus, et mortuos, jam sepultos. Nos tamen intel- "ligamus vivos et mortuos, hoc est animas et corpora pariter judicanda." Confer Ruffin. Symb. p. 140. et Method. apud Phot. Cod. 234. p. 932. Isid. Pelus. epist. 222. lib. i. p. 64. Pseud. Ambros. de Trin. p. 331.

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AN

ANSWER

TO

SOME QUERIES

PRINTED AT EXON,

RELATING TO

THE ARIAN CONTROVERSY.

AN ANSWER

TO

SOME QUERIES.

QUERY I. Whether the term GOD in the singular number can be proved to be used, in any one place of the Scripture, to denote more Persons than one?

ANSW. 1. It is not necessary for the defenders of the received doctrine of a *coessential* Trinity to assert, that the term GOD, in the *singular number, can be proved to be used in Scripture to denote more Persons than one:* for as the Arians suppose *Father* and *Son* to be *two Gods*, though they are never called *two Gods*, or *Gods* in the plural number, through the whole Scripture: so the Catholics may as well suppose that *Father* and *Son* are *one God*, though the term GOD could not be proved to be used to denote more Persons than one. Or if it be said, that the Arians do not suppose *Father* and *Son* to be *two Gods*, whatever pleas they allege to clear themselves of *Ditheism* will as effectually clear the Catholics of *Tritheism;* so that the Catholics will stand at least upon as good a foot as the Arians.

2. It is not necessary even so much as to suppose that the term GOD is ever so used. For admitting that the term GOD in Scripture is always used to denote *one Person* only, all that follows is, that *one Person* only is spoken of, whenever the term GOD is used. Not that there are not other Persons *essentially* and *coeternally* included in him and with him. It may be the method of Scripture,

and generally is, when it speaks of GOD, to mean it of *one Person*, yet not *excluding*, but only abstracting from, the consideration of the other two Persons included in the same *Godhead*.

3. They may reasonably *suppose* it, after proof of their *general* doctrine, since the doctrine of a *coessential* Trinity of three Persons being divine, and being *one God*, is demonstrable from Scripture, (though too long a subject to be here considered,) we may reasonably *suppose*, that when GOD is spoken of, and neither the context nor any other circumstances do confine the signification of the word, in that place, to one Person only; I say we may reasonably *suppose*, that not one Person only, but all the three Persons are denoted by it. And,

4. They have moreover grounds for it from some particular texts. Gen. i. 26. one God is spoken of, and yet the words run, LET US (in the plural) *make*, and IN OUR *image*. Gen. iii. 22. *one Lord God* is spoken of, and yet it is said, "the man is become as one of US." The like may be observed of Gen. xi. 7. In Isaiah vi. 3. mention is made of the true God, the *Lord of hosts*, who, by confession of all, is the *Father;* and that the same *Lord of hosts* is also the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, appears from John xii. 40, 41. and Acts xxviii. 25, 26. which is also intimated even by the Prophet himself introducing the Lord speaking both in the singular and plural. "I heard the voice "of the Lord, saying, Whom shall I send, and who will "go for US?" Ver. 8.

QUERY 2. Whether we have not the same evidence from the Scripture, that *God* is *one Person*, that we have, that either the *Father*, or the *Son*, or the *Holy Ghost*, is *one Person*.

ANSW. We have the same evidence, that the word GOD is sometimes *used to denote one Person*, that we have, that either the Father, or Son, or Holy Ghost, is one Person. But to conclude from thence, that the word GOD always denotes one *divine Person* only, is just as if we should conclude, that the word *man* always denotes

one human person only, purely because it does so *sometimes*, or *most commonly*. It is desired by the Querist, that "some Scripture argument may be alleged to prove "any one of the Trinity to be one distinct Person, which "may not with equal evidence be applied to prove that "GOD is one distinct Person." I suppose the Querist means, that the personal characters, *I*, *thou*, *he*, if they prove any one of the TRINITY to be one distinct Person, do equally prove God to be one distinct Person. To which it is answered, that the personal characters, *I*, *thou*, *he*, do not certainly prove, that whatever they are applied to is *one Person*, and no more; for they are often applied in Scripture to a whole *city*, *tribe*, or *family*, or to the head of a family considered with his whole seed or race. But the personal characters are a good proof of *one distinct* Person, where there are not plain reasons to be given why we should believe they are to be understood of more. Now, since plain reasons may be given, why GOD is *more Persons than one*; and no plain reasons can be given why any *one of the Trinity* is more Persons than one; therefore it is, that the Scripture argument to prove *any one of the Trinity* to be *one Person* does not equally prove that GOD is *one Person*.

QUERY 3. Whether there be any one text of Scripture, which treats of the unity of God, and places it in any other *Person* than the *Father*? It is humbly desired, that some text may be alleged where it is said, the one God is the FATHER, SON, and HOLY GHOST.

ANSW. It is written, "Look unto me, and be ye saved, "all the ends of the earth: for I am God, and there is "none else. I have sworn by myself, the word is gone "out of my mouth in righteousness, and shall not return, "That unto me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall "swear." Isaiah xlv. 22, 23. Compare the New Testament. "We shall all stand before the judgment-seat of "Christ; for it is written, As I live, saith the Lord, every "knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess "to God." Rom. xiv. 10, 11. "At the name of Jesus

" every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things " in earth, and things under the earth; and that every " tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the " glory of God the Father." Phil. ii. 10, 11. The application of Isaiah xlv. 23. to Christ is manifest from these two passages of St. Paul. It is as manifest, that the Person spoken of in Isaiah is *the only God*, (" I am God, " and there is none else.") Therefore Scripture treating of the *unity* of God, places it in another Person besides the *Father*, namely, in *God the Son*. Again, it is plain, in the Old Testament, that the *unity* is placed in the *Jehovah:* but Christ is *Jehovah*, as may be proved from numerous passages, and is now generally confessed. Therefore the *unity* is not placed in the *Person* of the Father *only*, Isaiah vi. 1, 9. with John xii.

The Querist desires some texts where it is said, that the one God is *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost?*

This is no where said in one single text, but it is in many compared together. That *Jehovah* is the *one God*, and that the *one God* is *Jehovah*, is often said in the Old Testament: but the Father is *Jehovah*, the Son *Jehovah*, and the Holy Ghost *Jehovah;* therefore Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one *Jehovah*. Or the one God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Again; it may be proved from Scripture, that *God is one;* and from the same Scripture, that the Father is *God*, the Son is *God*, and the Holy Ghost is *God*. Therefore again, the one God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Compare Isaiah vi. 1, 9. with John xii. 40, 41. and Acts xxviii. 25, 26.

N. B. It is unreasonable to demand any particular text, where it is said, that these three are *one God:* unless our adversaries could produce a text, where it is said, that any two of them are called *two Gods*, or *Gods* in the plural. They pretend no more than Scripture consequences for their doctrine, not express Scripture: and they cannot prove their consequences, when we can ours.

QUERY 4. Whether the same arguments that prove the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to be *three distinct Per-*

sons, will not with equal strength conclude they are *three distinct Beings?*

ANSW. No; because all the arguments that prove the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to be *three distinct Persons*, prove *only* that they are *three distinct Persons*. Whether *intelligent being* and *person* are *reciprocal*, remains a question as much as ever: or whether three persons may not be one *individual being* is still a question, and must be so; neither can it be resolved at all either way, merely from the nature and reason of the thing itself, for want of a *certain principle of individuation*.

QUERY 5. Whether any man can properly be said to believe that *God* is *three Persons*, and but one intelligent Being, without having some notion of the *difference* he hereby makes between a *person* and an *intelligent being?*

ANSW. Any person may have this notion, that God is not *three separate Persons*, and therefore is not *three intelligent Beings:* but that God is three united Persons, and therefore *one intelligent Being*. The precise *difference* between the idea of a *divine Person*, and that of a *divine intelligent Being*, is, that a *divine Person* is not a *separate Being* independent of all other things. A *divine intelligent Being* is *separate* and *independent* of any thing. The one is *ens relativum*, the other *ens absolutum*. I may add further, that a man may believe the *omnipresence* of God, without having any distinct notion of the difference between God's being present, *in whole or in part*, with or without *extension;* and of the *divine prescience*, without having any clear notion of the difference between what *certainly will be* and what *certainly must be;* and of *eternity*, without having a clear notion of the difference between *succession* and an *eternal* NOW, and without being able to answer every minute or captious question which may be raised in a point so abstruse, and above human capacity. It is therefore no just objection against the doctrine of the TRINITY, that we are not able perfectly to explain the *modus* or *manner*, how *three Persons* are

one Being, or *one God*. It is sufficient to know, that the Persons are *distinct* and *real*, as any other *persons* are; but so united withal, as no other persons are or can be; and therefore they are not (like other persons) as many *beings* as persons, but *one being* only.

QUERY 6. Whether (if no difference can be assigned between an *intelligent being* and a *person*) it be not a contradiction to say, that God is *three Persons* and *one Being?* that is, whether it be not all one, as to say, he is *three Persons*, and but *one Person;* or *three Beings*, and but *one Being?*

ANSW. A difference has been assigned in the *answer* to the preceding Query. Nothing is properly called a *being*, but a *separate being*. Thus, those who suppose the *soul*, or the *divine Being* to be *extended*, do not call the *parts* of the *soul*, or of GOD, beings. This I mention, only to show the nature and usage of language, and what it would be by consent of mankind, on such or such suppositions, be they true or false. Now, since the *three Persons* are conceived to be more intimately united than the parts of any being (though they are not parts) are or can be; it is very right and just, not to call them *three Beings*, but *one Being*. A *separate* person is rightly called an *intelligent being*, because a *separate* person is a *separate being:* but a *person* considered as essentially adhering to, and united with another person, does with that other person make but *one being;* and therefore cannot properly be called a *being*, unless the word *being* admits of two senses: and yet then the one is *proper*, the other *improper*. The Querist therefore runs into a double *fallacy;* first, in making two senses of *being*, *proper* and *improper*, and arguing from one to the other: secondly, in confounding both together, as if they were really but one sense.

QUERY 7. Whether, if the *Father*, *Son*, and *Spirit* are but *one Being*, it is possible to hold, that the Being of the Son was incarnate, without holding that the *Being* of the *Father* and the *Spirit* was *incarnate?*

ANSW. The *Being of the Son* is an improper expression; because it supposes the Son to be a *Being*, (properly so called,) that is, a *separate Being*, which he is not. But *one Person*, the *Person* of the *Son* may be *incarnate*, and the Person of the *Father* or *Holy Ghost* at the same time not incarnate, without any contradiction, because *one person* is not *another person*. Yet it may be said, the *Godhead* is incarnate; *i. e.* the *divine Being*, as *personalized* in the Son, is incarnate in the *Person* of the Son. These philosophical niceties, in a point so *sublime* and *mysterious*, ought to be neglected and despised. Let any man tell us, whether the *Being* of God is present in heaven, and whether the *same Being* of God is *present* on earth; and let him inform us distinctly what he means by it. Let him say, whether God will be a day older to-morrow than he is to-day, and clear either the *affirmative* or *negative* of all appearance of contradiction. Let him determine whether God be *extended* or *not extended*, and disentangle either side of the question from all appearance of repugnancy. Let him unriddle the mysteries of *eternity*; acquaint us how *eternity* can be *past* unless it was once *present*, or how it could be ever *present* if it never *began*. But enough of this.

QUERY 8. Whether the *imposing side* can pretend that the consequence they draw from the *unity* of God, and from the *Father* and *Son's being severally called* GOD, is more clear and certain than the consequence which others draw from the same consideration?

ANSW. The *imposing side* (as he calls them) do not argue merely from the *Father* and *Son's being severally called* GOD; but from the Scriptures describing both one and the other to be GOD in such a sense as to have a right to be *adored*. Now, in this sense, there cannot be more Gods than one, consistently with the First Commandment, which excludes all but *one God* from religious service and adoration. Any God, after this *one God*, is no *God*, in any true and proper sense: but the Son is the one true God, because he is adorable, and God: and there

are not more true and more adorable Gods than one. This *consequence* they take to be *certain* and undeniable: but the consequence which *others* draw, *viz.* that *Father* and *Son* cannot be called *God* in the same sense of the word GOD, (for so it should have been expressed by the Querist,) has nothing at all to support it, because the exclusive term cannot be proved to have been intended in *opposition* to God the Son. Or if they be, they must exclude him entirely among the *nominal, fictitious* deities, which is absurd enough. And because those *emphatical* appellations of *one*, or *only* God, applied to the *Father*, are easily accounted for, by admitting a different *manner* of existence, or a *priority* of order, without any recourse to a *different sense* of the word GOD. Besides, the Scripture plainly shows by the *divine titles, attributes*, and *glory*, which it ascribes to God the Son, that he is God in the strict and proper sense, and not in any *lower* or *different* sense, as is pretended.

QUERY 9. Whether men being liable to mistake in drawing consequences, modesty should not teach the *imposing side* to be as forward to bear with their *brethren*, as they are to bear with the *imposers?*

ANSW. When it is once declared what is meant by *bearing with their brethren*, this Query may have a determinate answer. As to men's being *liable to mistake*, it is no argument against their being *certain* of many things; and if they be certain of such a truth, and that it is very important, all Christian and prudent methods must be used to maintain and preserve it.

QUERY 10. Whether it is not dangerous rashness to censure men as to their everlasting state, for not believing a doctrine which is not expressly declared in any one place in the Bible?

ANSW. There is no rashness at all in censuring men, as to their everlasting estate, for *disbelieving*, and especially for publicly opposing a doctrine *of so vast importance*, which is both *expressly* and by *necessary consequence* declared in *many places* of Scripture compared to-

gether. "If an angel from heaven preach any other Gos-
"pel unto you, than that which we have preached unto
"you, let him be accursed." Gal. i. 8.

QUERY 11. Whether they who say, the Son did know the *day and hour* of the last judgment, when he said expressly, that he did not; whether, I say, they do not make Christ to have been guilty of an *equivocation?* And whether such their assertion is not very dangerous, as tending to introduce, by his example, a practice which will destroy all credit among Christians?

ANSW. There was no *equivocation* in saying what was literally true, that the Son, as *Son of man*, did not know the *day and hour* of the last judgment. The context itself sufficiently limits his denial to his *human nature*. The Querist tells us, that, "according to this way of equivo-
"cating, a man (as one observes) may deny that he saw
"a thing which he actually saw; meaning, he did not
"see it with one eye, which he wilfully kept shut, while
"he beheld it with the other." But, as one observes, (see Mr. Boyse in his reply to that pretence of Mr. Emlyn's,) in answer to this idle stuff, there might be some colour for the pretence, if a man had two *visive powers*, or *two souls*, as well as *two eyes:* but since he has but one *visive power*, and *one soul*, which *one soul* sees, whether one eye only, or both be open, it would be a downright falsehood to say, I saw not a thing at all, because I saw it but with one eye. But the case is quite different, where there are two *knowing principles*, belonging to two different natures; one of which may *see* or *know*, while the other doth not *see* or *know;* and consequently it may be *denied* of one, which may be *affirmed* of the other. It could not indeed be *absolutely* and *indefinitely* denied of Christ, that he *knew the day:* neither is it so *denied* in Scripture, but in a *certain respect* only, which the reason of the thing and the very *context* determines it to: for it speaks not of the *Son of God* as such, but of the *Son of man*, or of *Christ* considered as *Son of man*.

QUERY 12. Whether, if the *Holy Spirit* be the *su-*

preme God, he must not have as much right to *give* the *Father*, as the *Father* can have to *give him?* And whether, upon this supposition, it can be proper for Christians to pray to the *Father* to *give* them his Holy Spirit?

ANSW. As to the *rights* and *privileges* among the *sacred Three;* they are best known to themselves. And who are we, that we should pretend to fathom the depths of the *divine nature*, or the *ineffable economy* of the three Persons? Scripture calls the *Spirit*, the Spirit of the *Father*, and not *vice versa*, and directs us to ask the Father to *give* his Spirit to us. This is sufficient for us to *know*, and is a direction to our practice.

QUERY 13. Whether it be an intolerable crime in ministers, and such as deserves *ejectment*, for them to hold, that Christ alone is the *King* of his Church? And that Christians are to receive his words *only*, as the *authentic rule* of their faith, without subjecting their faith to the *authoritative interpretations* of any men upon earth?

ANSW. This Query is too loose and general to admit of any close determinate answer. I shall only observe, that these gentlemen know at other times how to interpret the *alone King*, or *only Potentate*, so as to leave room for *subordinate* governors. And I know not any one that contends for more, or ever pretends to *equal* themselves to Christ. Arians, perhaps, or Socinians, having brought Christ down to the rank of *creatures*, or of *men*, may in time take upon them farther: but the Trinitarians will never be wanting in their honour to Christ, or the *alone King*, and the *alone God*, not exclusive of, but in conjunction with God the Father and the Holy Ghost; not abridging all or any of the three sacred Persons of the liberty of appointing subordinate ministers, rulers, or governors, to act under them, according to such rules, laws, and measures, as infinite wisdom shall see good and proper.

THE SCRIPTURES

AND

THE ARIANS

COMPARED

IN THEIR ACCOUNTS OF

GOD THE FATHER

AND

GOD THE SON:

BY WAY OF REJOINDER TO A PAMPHLET,

ENTITLED,

THE SCRIPTURE AND THE ATHANASIANS COMPARED,
&c.

IN TWO PARTS.

Let them be taken in the crafty wiliness that they have imagined.
Psalm x. 2.

THE SCRIPTURES

AND

THE ARIANS

COMPARED, &c.

PART I.

I SHALL lay before the reader the *plain* account of Scripture in one *column*, and the *true* account of what the modern Arian scheme is in the other: which I will endeavour to make as plain as any thing of that nature can be; and leave the reader to judge whether it be agreeable to Scripture or no, and so choose or refuse it after a rational and faithful examination.

SCRIPTURE.

There is but one GOD, one *adorable* GOD[a], *Jehovah*[b], and GOD of Israel. Before whom was there no GOD formed, neither will there be *after* him[c]. This one GOD will not give his

[a] Exod. xx. 3. Isa. xliv. 8. xlv. 5. 1 Cor. viii. 4. [b] Deut. vi. 4. Mark xii. 29. Isa. xlv. 21. xlii. 8. [c] Isa. xliii. 10.

ARIANISM.

Our modern Arians all *implicitly* or *consequentially* teach, some expressly say[a], that there are more GODS than one: two GODS at least, both of them *adorable*, and to be served with *religious* worship. One of the GODS is supposed to be *after*

[a] The Scriptures and Athanasians Compared, p. 4.

glory to *another*[d]; that is, will not allow any *other God* to claim the glory of being *adored*, either against him, or with him; being extremely *jealous*[e] of his honour, the honour of being served with *religious* worship, which both under the Old and New Testament was due to GOD alone[f], and by which his superlative MAJESTY and peerless perfections are to be acknowledged[g] through the whole creation.

the other in *duration*[b], and in every perfection. The *greater* GOD has given the *glory* of *religious* worship to the *lesser* GOD; thereby, so far, resigning up his *peculiar* privilege, and his *appropriate* honours: only the glory of being *underived*, which he *cannot* possibly give away if he would, he *will not*[c] (good reason why) part with at any rate. The *sacrifice* of *prayer* and *praise*, however, is *common* to *both* the GODS; who are accordingly to be honoured with the like *outward* acts of worship, to be made *higher* or *lower* worship by the worshipper's *inward intention*; and there are no *outward* acts left whereby common Christians may *visibly* distinguish the *supreme* GOD from the *inferior* GOD; though one be infinitely more excellent than the other; and though reason itself teaches that there ought to be as great a difference between the *outward* honours paid to *this* GOD and *that* GOD, as there is between *this* GOD and *that* GOD.

SCRIPTURE.

Our Lord JESUS CHRIST is LORD GOD[h], *Jehovah*[i],

ARIANISM.

Our Lord *Jesus Christ* is by no means *necessarily existing*[d],

[d] Isa. xlii. 8. xlviii. 11. [e] Exod. xx. 5. xxxiv. 14. [f] Matth. iv. 10. Rev. xix. 10. xxii. 9. [g] 2 Kings xix. 15. Isa. xl. 9, 10, &c. xlv. 5, 6, 7. Jer. x. 10, 11, &c. [h] Luke i. 16, 17. John xx. 28. [i] Compare Isa. vi. with

[b] Mr. Whiston plainly; the rest covertly. [c] Modest Plea, &c. Continued, p. 7. Reply to Dr. Waterland's Defence, p. 201. [d] Modest Plea, &c. p. 17, 217. Second Letter to Dr. Mangey, p. 27.

(a title expressing *necessary existence* and all perfection[k],) *True* GOD[l], *Great* GOD[m], and *Mighty* GOD[n], as well as the FATHER. He is moreover *Alpha* and *Omega*, the *Beginning* and the *Ending*, the *First* and the *Last*[o], which is expressive of unlimited *eternity*, and so understood when applied to GOD the FATHER, or to the one GOD of Israel[p]. He is also *the Lord, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty*[q], than which nothing higher or stronger can be said even of GOD the FATHER.

John xii. 41. Zech. xii. 10. with John xix. 37. Psalm cii. 25. with Heb. i. 10. Zech. xi. 12. with Matt. xxvii. 9, 10. Isa. xl. 3. with Mark i. 3. Hosea i. 7. with Luke ii. 11. [k] Exod. iii. 14. Isa. xlii. 8. xlv. 21. Mal. iii. 6. [l] 1 John v. 20. [m] Tit. ii. 13. [n] Isa. ix. 6. [o] Rev. i. 8, 17. xxii. 13. [p] Isa. xli. 4. xliv. 6. xlviii. 12. Rev. xxi. 6. [q] Rev. i. 8.

but *precarious* in existence, and *depending* entirely on the *good pleasure* of the *greater* GOD; who being of course *infinitely* above him, can, consequently, whenever he pleases, make *other Gods* as great, or greater than he is. And though CHRIST be styled JEHOVAH, it means only that he is *faithful to his promises*[e], or that he once *personated*[f] the true JEHOVAH; which any *inferior* angel might have done[g]. And though he be a *great* GOD, and a *true* GOD, and a *mighty* GOD; yet there is *another* GOD, a *greater* GOD, a *truer* [h] GOD, and a *mightier* GOD, by far, than he; to whose *good pleasure* and *free* appointment he owes all his greatness and *divinity*. And though the title of *First* and *Last*, &c. may signify an unlimited *eternity*, when applied to the FATHER, (if the FATHER'S eternity be any where revealed in the Old Testament, which is doubtful[i],) yet it must not, it shall not signify any such thing when applied to the SON. And though Rev. i. 8. has been understood by all the primitive churches

[e] Collection of Queries, p. 19. [f] The Scripture and Athanasians Compared, p. 5. Appeal to a Turk, &c. p. 89. [g] Reply to Dr. Waterland's Defence, p. 177. [h] Unity of GOD not Inconsistent, &c. p. 34. [i] Collection of Queries, p. 50.

of GOD the SON, and such application be favoured by the context; yet it shall be understood of the FATHER only; or, at least, shall bear a *subordinate* sense, if understood of the SON. For there are several *metaphysical* reasons about *derived* and *underived*, about *generation, causes, acts, will, individuals, identicals*, &c. which so require, and Scripture must yield to them.

SCRIPTURE.

Our Lord JESUS CHRIST was GOD before any *dominion commenced*, before any *creatures* existed, before the world was[r]. He is *over all* GOD *blessed for ever*[s]: and to him is ascribed glory, praise, and dominion *for ever and ever*[t], jointly also with the FATHER[v]. From whence it is evident, that as he was GOD before the *creation*, before any creature began, and consequently from *all eternity;* so he will be honoured as GOD to *all eternity*.

[r] John i. 1, 2, 3, 10. Coloss. i. 15, 16. [s] Rom. ix. 5. [t] 1 Pet. iv. 11. 2 Pet. iii. 18. Rev. i. 6. Heb. xiii. 21. Heb. i. 8. [v] Rev. v. 12, 13.

ARIANISM.

Some of the modern Arians say, that CHRIST is GOD, in the sense of *dominion:* others make his *exaltation*, after his rising from the dead, to be the sole *foundation of his personal Godhead*[k]. Others suppose his *personating* the FATHER to have been all that his *Godhead* meant before his incarnation[l]. All which accounts must appear miserably vain and presumptuous, as coming vastly short of what St. John has declared of him in respect of what he was antecedently to the *creation*. Sometimes therefore they are pleased to allow, that he was GOD *before the world was*, as being *partaker of divine power and glory*[m]. But then they tell us not what they

[k] Collection of Queries, p. 75. [l] Clarke's Scripture Doctrine, p. 73. edit. 2d. [m] Ibid. p. 240.

mean by it. Whatever it be, they suppose him to have been *really* stripped and *emptied* of that *glory*, that is, of all the *Godhead* he had of his own; that he sunk his *perfections*, his *power*, and his *wisdom* [n], when he became man; being then really *weaker* and *lower* than the *angels* [o]; so that he ceased, for a time, to be GOD, and wanted to be made a GOD again after his resurrection [p]: which *Godhead* then obtained, or regained, is to last no longer than his *mediatorial* kingdom; after the ceasing whereof, it seems, he is to lay down his *Godhead*, and never to be a GOD more to all eternity [q].

SCRIPTURE.

Our blessed LORD is described as having the *divine* attributes, the distinguishing marks and characters of the one true GOD supreme.

1. Knowledge of the heart. He knoweth the *hearts of all men* [w]. It is he that *searcheth the reins and the heart* [x]. He is a *discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart* [y].

2. Omniscience. There is *no creature but what is ma-*

[w] Acts i. 24. [x] Rev. ii. 23. [y] Heb. iv. 12.

ARIANISM.

The modern Arians are pleased to allow, in *words*, that *divine* attributes belong to CHRIST; meaning by *divine*, quite another thing than others mean in this case.

CHRIST is *omniscient*, they say, *relatively* [r]; that is, while

[n] Emlyn's Examination of Dr. Bennet, p. 15, 16. [o] Modest Plea, p. 93. Scripture and Athanasians Compared, p. 15. [p] Collect. of Queries, p. 75. Scripture and Athanasians Comp. p. 16. [q] Reply to Dr. W. by the Author of Unity, &c. p. 49. Scripture and Athanasians Compared, p. 16, 17, 22. Peirce's Western Inquis. p. 148, 149. [r] Collect. of Que-

nifest in his sight: all things are naked and opened to his eyes[z]. In him are *hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge*[a]. He knoweth *all things*[b].

3. Unchangeable eternity. He is *always the same*[c], *yesterday, to-day, and for ever*[d].

4. Omnipresence. He is Creator *of all things, and by him all things consist*[e]. He is worshipped by the *whole creation*[f]. He is *in the midst*[g] *of all that call upon him.*

5. Omnipotence. He can do all that the FATHER *doth*[h]. He and the FATHER are *one*[i]. He is *Almighty*[k].

[z] Heb. iv. 13. [a] Col. ii. 3. [b] John xvi. 30. xxi. 17. [c] Heb. i. 12. Rev. i. 8. [d] Heb. xiii. 13. [e] Col. i. 17. [f] Rev. v. 8. [g] Matt. v. 20. [h] John v. 19. [i] John x. 30. [k] Rev. i. 8.

ignorant[s] of much more than he knows, as he must be if *ignorant* at all: *eternal* also, provided he be not *coeternal*; that is, provided the FATHER be but *infinitely* (as he must be, if at all) more ancient than he: *omnipresent* also, but within *bounds: omnipotent*, but by the FATHER's power, not by his own: *unchangeable*, I think, they never directly say, but the contrary[t]; making his *generation* and *incarnation* arguments of his being subject to *change*. And, indeed, upon the whole, they suppose him the most *changeable* being in the universe, running through more, and more prodigious *changes*, than any other creature ever did, or will do.

They criticise away the force of the texts pleaded in favour of the *divine* attributes of CHRIST, till they leave themselves no Scripture-proof of the *divinity* of GOD the FATHER; none but what may be eluded by the same, or the like subtleties: as if they were resolved to give up every proof of the FATHER's real divinity, rather than admit any which

ries, p. 48. [s] Ibid. Unity of GOD not inconsistent, &c. p. 8. [t] Reply to Dr. Waterland's Defence, p. 271. Scripture and Athanasians Compared, p. 12, 13. Appeal to a Turk, &c. p. 145.

may happen to prove as much of GOD the SON. The strength of their objections against the *divine* attributes of CHRIST, consists chiefly in *metaphysical* speculations; that *generation* is an *act*, that every act implies *free choice*, that free choice argues *precarious* existence, and that precarious existence is a contradiction to *divine* attributes, strictly so called. Thus *vain philosophy* is brought in, to overrule the infallible word of GOD.

SCRIPTURE.

Our blessed LORD is *Creator*. He is the LORD *Jehovah*, who, in the beginning, *laid the foundations of the earth, and the heavens are the works of his hands*[l]. All things were created, not only *by him*[m], as the *efficient* cause, but also *for him*[n], as the *final* cause of all things; in whose glory they all center and terminate. In him likewise *do all things consist*. The whole universe, all worlds visible and invisible are upheld and sustained by him. He is therefore *Creator*, *Preserver*, and *Governor* of all worlds:

[l] Heb. i. 10. [m] John i. 3, 10, 11. 1 Cor. viii. 6. Ephes. iii. 9. Heb. i. 2. [n] Coloss. i. 16, 17.

ARIANISM.

The modern Arians pretend that CHRIST is an *instrument*[u] only in the work of creation; though they do not tell us what they mean by it, nor how it is possible to reconcile their notion to Heb. i. 10. Some of them suppose CHRIST an *inferior* Creator, making *two Creators* in like manner as *two* GODS; one of the *Creators* being himself a *creature*. Others scruple to allow CHRIST to be a *Creator*, saying only that GOD created all things *by him*, or *through him*; and they confusedly mutter several things about the prepositions *by* and *through*; never acquainting us what their precise notion is, nor showing how it is

[u] Modest Plea, p. 93. Unity of GOD not Inconsistent, &c. p. 26.

than which nothing more august or grand can be said of the one GOD supreme.

SCRIPTURE.

The Scriptures say, that *he that built all things is God*[o]; thereby supposing the work of *creating* to be a demonstration of the real *divinity* of the Person who created all things. St. Paul elsewhere intimates that the *creation* of the world is a visible and sensible proof of the *eternal power and Godhead* of its Maker[p]. Creation is every where, in Scripture, represented as a *divine* work, a work peculiar to GOD alone, setting forth his supreme excellency and unbounded perfections[q].

[o] Heb. iii. 4. [p] Rom. i. 20. [q] 2 Kings xix. 15. Job xxvi. 7, &c.

possible ever to make it consistent with those texts which so expressly ascribe *creative* powers to CHRIST. Whatever hand they suppose him to have had in *creating*, (which appears to be very little,) they imagine him afterwards *weak* enough to want the assistance of his *creatures*[x], weak enough to be *literally* inferior to the *angels*[y], weak enough to be *passible*[z] and *mutable*; and low enough to be literally *exalted*[a]; which yet they would think *blasphemy* to say of one that is *very GOD*.

ARIANISM.

The Arians pretend that the creating the whole universe is in itself no demonstration of *infinite* power, nor any certain argument of the *real* and *necessary* divinity of its maker[b]. It seems a *creature* might create the whole world, visible and invisible. Only, it is observable, that they are sometimes pleased to say, that the SON is *no creature*. No creature, yet *brought into existence*[c], as

[x] Modest Plea, p. 93. [y] Scripture and Athanasians Compared, p. 15. Appeal to a Turk, &c. p. 145. Modest Plea, ibid. [z] Collect. of Queries, p. 143. [a] Modest Plea, p. 97, 98. [b] Collect. of Queries, p. 58. Reply to Dr. Waterland's Defence, p. 249. Appeal to a Turk, &c. p. 120. [c] Collect. of Queries, p. 51.

And *the Gods that have not made the heavens and the earth, they shall perish from the earth*[r]. So that if CHRIST be *Creator*, there can be no reasonable doubt made of his real, eternal, and essential *Godhead:* or if he be not Creator, he cannot be GOD, cannot, upon the Scripture foot, be *adored* or *worshipped* as GOD with any degree of *religious* worship.

SCRIPTURE.

According to *Scripture* no one is to be worshipped who is not GOD by *nature*[s],

Psalm xcvi. 5. xix. 1. lxxxix. 11, 12. Isa. xl. 12, 26. xlii. 5. xliii. 1. xlv. 5, 6. [r] Jer. x. 11, 12. [s] Gal. iv. 8.

well as any creature; no creature, but yet *precarious* in existence, as well as any creature; no creature, but yet *dependent* on the *free-will* and *pleasure* of another, as much as any creature; no creature, but yet *ignorant* of much more than he knows, as well as any creature; no creature, but yet capable of *change* from strength to *weakness*, and from weakness to strength again, capable of being made *wiser*, and *happier*, and *better* in every respect, as well as any creature; no creature, but yet having nothing of his *own*, nothing but what he owes to the *gratuity* and *favour* of his Lord and Governor, as much as any creature. Such a *creature*, and *no creature*, they suppose *all things* to have been *created by*; and yet by *all things*, meaning only all *other* things, (for he could not have any hand in creating *himself*,) and by the words *created by*, meaning they know not what. This they call interpreting Scripture, and doing justice to common readers.

ARIANISM.

The modern Arians, after the Pagans and Papists, plead for *creature-worship*; for the *thing*, I mean, but they are frightened at the *name:* and whether to save themselves the

no *creature* but the *Creator* only[t]. From whence it is evident that there is no *middle* between *Creator* and *creature*, Creator and creature being opposites; so that a creature cannot be Creator, nor Creator a creature. Scripture knows nothing of *creature-worship*; nothing of *inferior*, *relative*, or *mediate* worship distinct from *divine*; nothing of *two worships*, of different *kinds*, either before the Gospel or after. The one fundamental rule of worship, from Genesis down to Revelations, is to worship GOD *alone*, the GOD of Israel, the *Jehovah*, the *Creator*, *Sustainer*, *Preserver* of all things. There was never any distinction made of *supreme* and *inferior* sacrifices, vows, oaths, prayers, prostrations. All *religious* worship is GOD's *peculiar*, all of the same nature, and of like import and significancy.

[t] Rom. i. 25.

trouble of answering the many plain and invincible reasons against *creature-worship*, or the *shame* of not being able to talk a word of sense on that head, they pretend[d], not to be pleading for *creature-worship*, all the while they are doing it. They call this kind of worship *inferior* and *mediate* worship: a thing that Scripture knows not of: and what was once sufficient to nonplus the *devil*, they can elude. Upon their principles, any Jew, formerly, might have eluded all the laws of the Old Testament against *idolatry*, might have *sacrificed* to *other* Gods (if supposed subordinate to the one *supreme*) without breaking the *First Commandment*, and without peril of *Polytheism*. They acquit the generality of the Pagans (as many as worshipped *one supreme* GOD) of *Polytheism*[e], or of the worship of many Gods: as they of consequence must, otherwise they condemn themselves. The Pagans then were not Polytheists, but *idolaters* only: and their *idolatry* consisted not in making *Idol-Gods*, but *Idol-Mediators*[f]. A thing which the

[d] Author of Unity, &c. His Reply to Dr. Waterland, p. 31. [e] Ibid. p. 17, 30. See also Reply to Dr. Waterland's Defence, p. 309. [f] Clarke, Script. Doctrine, p. 344, 2d edit. Author of Unity, &c. p. 30.

sacred penmen were never aware of; having constantly laid the charge *wrong* upon the setting up *Idol-Gods*, and never *Idol-Mediators*.

SCRIPTURE.

Christ is to be worshipped with religious worship by *men*[v], by *angels*[w], by *every creature*[x]; either *singly* and by himself, or *jointly* with the FATHER in the *same acts* of worship. He is therefore *God by nature*, and not by *office* only, appointment, or designation. The worship of him must of consequence stand upon the same foot whereon Scripture has founded all *religious* worship; upon his real and essential *divinity*, his being *God, Jehovah, Almighty*, &c. which he must be because he is *adorable;* and which if he be, then the worship of him comes within the reason, intent, and even the *letter* of the law about worship. And it is very observable how the *Scripture-rule* of worship exactly harmonizes with what the same Scripture teaches of the *divinity* of

[v] Acts vii. 59. ix. 14. John v. 23. Rev. v. 8. [w] Heb. i. 6. [x] Rev. v. 13.

ARIANISM.

The modern Arians teach, that CHRIST is made a GOD by *voluntary* appointment and designation; and are yet ridiculously forced to say, that he is GOD *by nature*[g], and *as truly as man is by nature truly man*[h]: GOD *by nature*, and *truly* GOD, without the *nature* of the *true* GOD; GOD *by nature*, but not *naturally*, or *necessarily* GOD; GOD *by nature*, but having his *nature* before his *dominion;* that is, before his *Godhead* commenced; and he is to continue, after his *dominion*, or *Godhead*, shall expire and be extinct: in a word, GOD *by nature*, as much as man is by nature man, and yet wanting the most *essential* character of GOD, which makes GOD to be GOD[i].

They found his *worship* on the power of *judging*, and his *mediatorial kingdom*[k], committed to him in time, and in time to cease. Neither his being

[g] Scripture and Athanasians Compared, p. 9. [h] Clarke's Replies, p. 81. [i] Ibid. p. 92. [k] Clarke's Scripture Doctrine, Propos. 48, 60, 61. Replies, p. 239.

GOD the SON. For, as on one hand, his claim of *worship* confirms the doctrine of his *divinity;* so, on the other hand, his *divine* titles and *attributes* confirm his claim of *worship:* and thus is Scripture uniform, consistent, and harmonious throughout.

GOD, before the world was, (John i. 1.) nor his being the *only-begotten,* nor his being *Creator* and *Sustainer* of all things, nor his laying the foundation of the *heavens* and the *earth;* none of these considerations are thought of sufficient weight to found his *worship* upon: but a late *office* of yesterday, and shortly to be laid down; that, and that only is made the foundation of *religious* worship, and such worship as, by all the Scripture accounts, is to continue for *ever and ever:* which they are pleased to understand of the *end of the world* only[1], though the *same phrase* or *phrases* which denote the *continuance* of the FATHER'S worship, are used likewise for the SON'S; and even in the same *common* doxology, jointly offered to both. Verily, *if these things are not absurdities, it is pity that they should look so like them.*

SCRIPTURE.

The Scriptures ever supposing but *one object* of worship, which is GOD *Supreme,* never give us any rules about *raising* or *lowering* the *intention* of the worshipper, to make the worship *supreme* or *inferior,* as occasion may require. What-

ARIANISM.

The Arians imagine, that the same *outward* acts of *religious worship* become *higher* or *lower,* according to the *intention* of the worshipper: which is following their own inventions, and putting the matter of *wor-*

[1] Author of Unity not Inconsistent. His Reply, p. 49.

ever may be said of a few *speculative* heads, or refined wits, the *vulgar*, it is to be feared, would never be capable of proportioning their *intentions* in such cases; but would often pay *subordinate* worship only, instead of *supreme*, which would be next to *blaspheming*, or *supreme* instead of *subordinate*, which would be *idolatry*.

Scripture never makes any distinction between *offering* and *terminating* worship; but supposes all worship to *terminate* where offered. GOD interprets all *image-worship*, and *creature-worship* to terminate on the *image*, or *creature*, notwithstanding any *intention* of the worshipper to *terminate* the worship in him. It is worshipping of the *idol*, the *image*, the *creature*, not the worshipping of GOD, in Scripture style. And indeed how can any act of *idolatry*, any *creature-worship* terminate upon GOD, who has absolutely prohibited it, who abhors and detests it? The reason of the thing shows that so it must be: for if worship be paid to an *inferior* object, be it *sovereign* or *inferior* worship, the abship on such a foot as must inevitably run the bulk of mankind either into *idolatry* on one hand, or *profaneness* on the other, as often as they mistake in the just and proper *elevation* of their thoughts or intentions.

They are teaching us also to *offer* worship here, and *terminate* there; which must likewise run the *vulgar* at least into inextricable labyrinths: as perhaps *terminating* the worship in the *inferior* object, when they ought not; or not *offering* when they ought. Besides, that for want of knowing precisely what worship is *inferior* and what *supreme*, what *mediate* and what *ultimate*, they will be often apt to mistake the one for the other: and hence will arise all imaginable *confusion* in sacred offices. In a word, their whole foundation is wrong, since no *inferior* worship can, without blasphemy, be supposed to *terminate* in the *supreme*, nor any *supreme* worship be made to fall upon the *medium*, without *idolatry*. Their *inferior* worship must be *ultimate*, and their *supreme* cannot be *mediate*: so that their two devised *distinctions* necessarily confound and destroy each other; and they must either not worship CHRIST at all, or worship him with *ultimate* wor-

surdity is manifest. If it be *sovereign*, then it is plainly *idolatry* to give any part of it to the *inferior* object: if it be *inferior*, it cannot *terminate* in the *supreme* object, who would be *affronted* and *dishonoured* thereby. It must therefore *terminate* in the *inferior* object: and thus a *creature* is honoured with *ultimate* worship, terminating where offered, which is, confessedly, *idolatry*.

SCRIPTURE.

The Scriptures assure us that CHRIST *increased in wisdom*[y], which is to be *literally* understood, as well as his increasing *in stature* is *literal*. He was, at times, afflicted with *grief:* his *soul* was *exceeding sorrowful*[z], and full of *trouble*[a], crying out in great *agonies*[b]. These and the like *weaknesses* and *infirmities* can never reasonably be supposed to suit with the divine *Logos;* who had *wisdom*, *strength*, and *power* sufficient to *create*, *sustain*, and *govern* all worlds. From these consi-

[y] Luke ii. 52. [z] Matth. xxvi. 38. Mark xiv. 34. [a] John xi. 33. xii. 27. xiii. 21. [b] Luke xxii. 44. Matth. xxvii. 46. Mark xv. 34.

ship, even upon their own principles.

ARIANISM.

Our modern Arians persuade themselves, that CHRIST had no *human soul*, but that the *Logos* supplied its place. Some [m] expressly say it; and as many others *mean* it, as bring a charge against the Athanasians of making *two Persons* in one CHRIST: which charge has been brought against us by most [n] of our modern Arians. They are therefore of opinion, that all the *high* things and all the *low* things, spoken in Scripture of CHRIST, meet in the one *Logos* clothed with *flesh*. He was once *wise* enough to *make*, or however to *frame* and *model* the whole universe, (ac-

[m] Whiston, Emlyn, &c. See also Answer to Peirce's Inquisition, p. 34, 35. [n] Morgan, Jackson, Author of the Appeal, &c. and others.

derations, besides sundry others, the Christian churches have ever firmly believed, that, besides the *Logos*, or divine nature, there was also a *human soul* in CHRIST; which, together with the *Logos* and a human body, made up the whole Person of CHRIST.

cording to some of them,) as well as to support and govern it when made. But upon his taking *flesh*, his *wisdom* and his extraordinary *abilities* departed from him[o]. He became a *child*, a child in *understanding* as well as *stature*; falling, as it were, into a profound lethargy, and suspension of thought. By slow and insensible degrees, he again began to recover; his dormant faculties revived, and thus he *increased in wisdom*; growing up, first, to the perfection of *a wise man*, but not yet arrived to the pitch of an *angel*[p]. In process of time, he became *wise* enough, and of sufficient ability to be made a GOD of, once more: *His honour and his brightness returned unto him, he was established in his kingdom, and excellent majesty was added unto him.* So saith the Scripture of Nebuchadnezzar, (Dan. iv. 36.) who, if this account be true, was (with reverence be it spoken) none of the least eminent, or least considerable types of CHRIST. But this is not all; the worst is to come. This *mighty* GOD (according to

[o] Emlyn's Examination of Dr. Bennet, p. 15. See also Appeal to a Turk, &c. p. 145. [p] Modest Plea, p. 93. The Scriptures and Athanasians Compared, p. 15. Appeal to a Turk, &c. p. 145.

those gentlemen) is at last to lay down, or surrender his *Godhead* and *mightiness*, that is, his *kingdom*; all the kingdom they allow him to have[q]. His *worship*, his *divine* honours and robes of majesty are to continue with him no longer than to the *end of the world*[r]. It seems, when his friends and followers are to receive their *crowns*, to have and to hold to all eternity, he is to lose and forfeit his. They must *increase*, but he must *decrease*: they are to grow up, he is to grow down, and sink out of *Godhead*. A shocking thought! to as many as have any just regard for *sacred Writ*, any love or veneration for their *blessed* LORD; and have not lost the grace of *discernment*, and the *spirit* of a *sound mind*, by affecting to be *wiser* than all the churches of GOD.

[q] The Scripture and Athanasians, &c. p. 16, 17, 22. Reply to Dr. W. by the Author of Unity, &c. p. 49. Peirce's Western Inquisition, p. 148, 149. [r] Reply to Dr. Waterland, by the Author of the Unity, &c. p. 49.

Judge for yourselves what is RIGHT.

PART II.

IN the former part, I have taken the like method as the *writer* of the *pamphlet* had done. Only there is this difference, that whereas he has often charged the Athanasians with things which they neither hold, nor can by any *certain* consequence be proved upon them; I have took care to charge the Arians with nothing but what some or other of them *expressly* maintain, or else what may be fixed upon them by clear and evident *consequence*.

My design, in this Second Part, is to give the common reader a few useful hints, such as may serve to prevent his being imposed upon by the writer of the *pamphlet*, whom I am here answering. I shall throw what I have to say under two heads: one shall contain short *remarks* upon his six *preliminary propositions;* the other shall be some brief *strictures* upon his two ingenious *columns*.

I. His first *proposition* is intended to prove, that there is but one *infinite Person*, (whom he styles a *Being*,) namely, GOD the FATHER. His Old Testament texts prove, that JEHOVAH (that is, as we say, FATHER, SON, and HOLY GHOST) is the *only* GOD, and knows no *equal*. The New Testament texts prove, that the FATHER is sometimes styled, by way of eminence, the *one* or *only* GOD; which no man questions.

II. His second *proposition* is to prove, that GOD the FATHER has some titles *common* to him with *men;* such as *Potentate*, *King*, *Lord*, *Saviour*, &c. And that when they are applied to him, they are to be understood in the *highest* and most *absolute* sense. This, I think, he has well proved. And it may pass for a true, but trifling *proposition*.

III. His *third* is to prove, that the name GOD is likewise *common* to GOD the FATHER, *angels*, and *men;* which is true also. But he forgot to observe, that the

word GOD is not applied to *angels* or *men* in a *proper* sense, (as the name of *Potentate*, *King*, or *Lord* may) but in a loose, figurative, *improper* sense only.

IV. His *fourth* is to show, that the FATHER has some characteristics annexed to the name GOD, which determine him to be the *first Cause*. He is the *high* GOD, *most high* GOD, &c. In proof hereof, he produces about fourteen passages of the Old Testament, which certainly prove all that they prove of the JEHOVAH, or GOD of Israel, in opposition to *nominal* or *reputed* Gods; not of the FATHER only, in opposition to the SON, who is himself JEHOVAH as well as the FATHER. He has also three texts out of the New Testament, which undoubtedly prove, that the FATHER is GOD *Most High*, or GOD *Supreme*, (which is equally true of GOD the SON, Rom. ix. 5.) above all *reputed* or *nominal* Gods: but it is not proved that he has any *real*, any *true*, any *adorable* God besides him, or under him.

V. His *fifth* is designed to *reconcile* two *contradictory* propositions, that there are *more* GODS *than one*, and *not more* GODS *than one;* where he comes off very indifferently. For his intent is to intimate, that there are more *adorable Gods*, more *true Gods* than one; which is directly repugnant to the Scripture doctrine of *one* GOD. There are many *reputed* or *nominal* Gods; that is very certain. But more *adorable Gods* than one, neither *Law* nor *Gospel* can bear.

VI. His *sixth proposition* carries on the same design with the *fifth*, to make FATHER and SON two *adorable* GODS, and to teach us to serve the *creature* besides the *Creator*, and to pay our homage and acknowledgments to one that by *nature* is no GOD. It will be hard to persuade any into those measures who have the use of their Bibles; which will teach them the contrary, quite through from Genesis down to the Revelations.

Brief Strictures upon his two Columns.

Page 6, he cites some *texts* to prove, that the FATHER alone, *exclusive* of the SON, is the *only* GOD, or *only true* GOD: which the texts neither say nor mean. For the same Scriptures assert, that the SON is GOD, *True* GOD, *Great* GOD, JEHOVAH, *Almighty*, &c. as well as the FATHER. Therefore the *exclusive* terms could never be intended in *opposition* to GOD the SON, but to *idols*, or pretended *deities*.

Page 7, he makes a dull harangue about *person* and *essence*; instead of showing, that FATHER, SON, and HOLY GHOST may not be or are not *one* GOD. This is a *Scriptural* doctrine, independent of the names of *person* or *essence*, and such as was fully believed and taught, for a century and more, before ever those *terms* came in. Not but that those *terms* are useful, in opposition to the *wiles* and *equivocations* of heretics, which were the first occasion of them: nor are they difficult to understand, whenever considered without prejudice and with an honest mind. But it is enough for common Christians to believe, that FATHER, SON, and HOLY GHOST are all equally *divine*, that *one* is not *another*, nor all together *three* GODS, but *one* GOD: one GOD, into whom we have been *baptized*, and whom we are ever to serve, worship, and adore, with all our heart, mind, and might.

Page 8, he insists much upon the *personal pronouns*, *I, thou, he:* which can never be proved to be constantly applied in Scripture, to none but *single* persons. Besides, that the arguments from the *pronouns*, at most, can prove no more than this; that it is the Scripture way to speak but of *one Person* at a time, (be it FATHER, or SON, or HOLY GHOST,) under the title of GOD, LORD, JEHOVAH, &c. tacitly considering the other two Persons as *united to*, or *comprehended in*, that one Person spoken of: which, if it be the case, is so far from proving that all the three are not one GOD, that it is rather a confirmation of it, that they really are. But we have examples where *one*

GOD, or LORD *of hosts*, is mentioned, and yet the expressions are *plural* as to the *Persons*. "GOD said, Let *us* "make man in *our* image," Gen. i. 26. "GOD cre- "ated man in his own image, in the image of GOD," ver. 27. GOD creates, while more *Persons* than one create: and it is GOD's *image*, which is the image of *more* Persons than one: therefore more Persons than one are included in GOD there mentioned. The like may be shown of the one LORD *of hosts* mentioned Isa. vi. 3. compared with verse the 8th, and with John xii. 41. and Acts xxviii. 25, 26.

In page 9, he represents it as a strange thing, that the SON should be "that very GOD whose Son he is: "the image, and that which he is the image of." This kind of banter and abuse runs through his whole performance. It is observable, that the force of the cavil lies only in the *expression*. Say, that the SON, a distinct Person, is *united* in *substance* and *Godhead* with GOD the FATHER; and there is no appearance of absurdity in it. Say, that the SON is personally distinct from the FATHER, and yet one GOD with him; and there is nothing strange or shocking in it. But say, *that he is that very* GOD *whose Son he is*, or *that very thing of which he is the image;* and here begins to appear something harsh and odd. What is the reason? Because the words sound as if the SON were the FATHER himself; were *distinct* and *not distinct* at the same time. The Arian notion, of GOD's being but *one Person*, is first insinuated in the phrase, *that very* GOD whose Son he is; and next the Athanasian is feigned to join his notion (inconsistent with the other) thereto: and thus he is made to say things that he never meant. The sophistry lies wholly in the artificial blending of *ideas*. The SON is not *that very Person* whose *Son* he is, nor *that very Person* whose *image* he is: but he is *one* GOD with him; a name *common* to more Persons than one.

Page 10, he takes notice, that GOD *led Jacob* alone, *yet by the hands of Moses and Aaron:* and GOD *created the heavens* alone, *yet* by JESUS CHRIST. He should

have added, that if GOD the FATHER be True GOD *alone*, yet it is to be understood, *together with* JESUS CHRIST. The word *alone*, in such instances, is not intended in *opposition* to GOD the SON, but to others: and *exclusive* terms are not always to be interpreted with the utmost rigour.

Page 11, 12, he pretends that CHRIST, before his incarnation, was GOD's *angel*, and *messenger*, and *servant*. He cannot prove *servant* at all; nor *angel*, or *messenger*, from any parts of Scripture but what, in the very same places, declare him to be *Ho Theos*, GOD absolutely, *Jehovah*, LORD GOD, *Almighty* GOD, &c. From whence it is plain, that the name of *angel* concerns only his *office*, not his *nature;* and is an argument only of the SON's voluntary condescension to transact matters between GOD the FATHER and mankind.

Page 12, 13, he has some wise reasonings against the SON's glory being *eclipsed* in the incarnation. He asks, how it could be *eclipsed* from men, who "then beheld his "glory more than ever?" By his argument, if the first time a man sees the *sun* at all, it should be under a *cloud*, or an *eclipse;* it is therefore under no *cloud*, nor under any *eclipse* to that man. In short, though men "beheld his "glory more than ever," yet even then his glory was shrouded under the *veil* of flesh, and did not shine out to the full; which if it had, no *mortal* could have looked against it.

Page 12th and 13th, he labours to confound *real* and *essential*, with *outward* and *accidental* glory: and he is marvellously subtile and profound on that head. The short answer is, that one kind of *glory* can never be *increased* or *diminished*, either in FATHER or SON: the other kind of *glory* may admit, and has admitted of *increase* or *diminution*, both in FATHER and SON, and will so again hereafter.

His cavils (p. 13.) about *two Persons* in CHRIST are built on nothing but his own mistakes of the definition and meaning of the word *person*.

His reasoning about *even* and *odd* (p. 14.) is *odd* enough; to answer a jest with a jest.

Page 15, he has some speculations about CHRIST's being exalted to the *universal dominion of all worlds*, (a likely charge, indeed, for any *creature* to sustain,) and becoming a *Mighty* GOD: as if he had not been as *Mighty* when he *made* the worlds, and when *he laid the foundations of the heavens and the earth.*

Page 16, he observes, that Scripture says nothing of *two kingdoms* of CHRIST. But the Scriptures do speak of a *kingdom* which is to cease at the day of judgment, (1 Cor. xv.) and of a *kingdom* which shall not cease, nor ever have an end, Isa. ix. 7. Dan. xii. 13. Luke i. 33. Heb. i. 8. How to make one kingdom of *both* may be as difficult, perhaps, as to make the same number *even* and *odd*.

Page 17, he pretends, that the SON is to be *honoured*, only because the FATHER hath *made him* universal Governor of heaven and earth. How is it then that he was GOD, LORD, and *Creator*, before the world was? Are not these things as considerable as any thing that came after? And how is it that he is to be *honoured*, together with the FATHER, and with the same acts of worship, (Rev. v. 13.) to all *eternity*; even after he shall have laid down this *universal kingdom* and *government*, according to our wise author? Surely, if the *sole* foundation of his *honour* ceases, his *honours* should cease with it.

Page 19, he observes, that *the Disciples and* GOD *are one*. I know not whether his *understanding* here failed him most, or his *eye-sight*. How does he read the text? "That they all may be one—that they also may be one in "us," John xvii. 21. Not that *they* and *we* may be *one*, not that *they* may be *one with us*; but only, one with each other *in us*.

These few *Strictures* may be sufficient to show, that the author is not to be depended on, in his representations or reasonings. I designed *brevity*, and therefore I

pass over his other fallacies and misconstructions: which are either stale things, such as have been abundantly answered over and over by better hands; or else are too mean and trifling to have been either *objected* on one side, or *answered* on the other, by any that have well studied this controversy.

FIVE LETTERS

TO

MR. STAUNTON.

FIVE LETTERS

TO

MR. STAUNTON.

LETTER I.

SIR,

ABOUT eight weeks ago, I had the favour of a letter from you, together with some papers relating to the subject of the Trinity. I have had no time since, more than to give them a cursory reading. But my month of waiting being September, when, probably, the Prince or young Princesses might be, as usual, at Hampton Court; I thought I might then take an opportunity of waiting upon you, and discoursing with you, before I enter into any epistolary correspondence. I am yet uncertain where the court will be in September. If you can inform yourself where the King's chaplains must wait the next month, I shall be obliged to you for acquainting me with it.

My hands, you must be sensible, are pretty full at present, in maintaining the Catholic cause (allow me so to call it) against the Arians; who seem to be now the most prevailing sect of the Anti-Trinitarians, Socinianism being almost grown obsolete amongst us. Your scheme seems to me to be Socinian in the main; only taking in the preexistence of Christ's human soul, excluding him from worship, and interpreting some texts in the Sabellian way, and not after Socinus. I know not whether my leisure will permit me to examine all the grounds upon which you go, and to give a particular answer to every difficulty you have to urge. But if, upon discoursing with you, the controversy, so far as concerns you, may be shortened,

and reduced to two or three points which are most material; I may perhaps find time hereafter to give you my thoughts upon them in writing. You will consider, in the mean while, that you are as much concerned to answer, I mean to yourself, the reasons which I have given for my persuasion, as to require answers to those reasons, which seem to you to favour your principles. The reasons, for instance, which I have given against the Sabellian construction of the first chapter of St. John, are of equal force against yours. And my arguments to prove Christ to be properly Creator, (not to mention several others to prove his Divinity, drawn from his titles, and attributes, and from the form of baptism,) directly strike at your hypothesis, as much as at the Arian. There are many great objections, as you see, lying against your principles; and there are some, not contemptible, against mine also. Weigh both equally, and balance them one against another: this will be the true method to form a right judgment. I believe you to be as sincere and impartial in your inquiries as most men are; making allowance for such prejudices as are often apt to steal upon any of us, without our perceiving it. I wonder a little how one that talks so well about suspending assent where there is not sufficient evidence, can prevail with himself to think that there is any prescription for your scheme of 500 years before the commencement of my scheme. The proof of this fact can never be made good. The contrary is plain and evident. I am in hopes that I have mistook your meaning: if I have, I ask your pardon. I shall add nothing more at present, but my thanks to you for your very civil manner of writing to me; assuring you that so far as my leisure, abilities, or opportunities permit, I shall be ever ready to give you the best satisfaction I can in any thing relating to this controversy; being,

SIR,

Your most humble Servant,

DAN. WATERLAND.

Magd. Coll. Aug. 9, 1720.

LETTER II.

SIR,

I CAN now acquaint you, that I shall not be in waiting at Kensington before the 16th of September. I intended to be there at the beginning of the month; but my wife being ill, I have wrote to my brother chaplains to take care of the first fortnight: and they will be so kind as to do it. I shall be very glad to see you at Kensington any time after the 16th. There are lodgings provided for the chaplains, as I well know, having so found it the last year. The lodgings are in or near the square: which is all that I remember of them.

I thank you for the favour of your last, and again ask your pardon for mistaking your meaning. I shall think my time there very agreeably and usefully spent in friendly debates upon so important a subject. Not that I think either of us shall be able thoroughly to discuss the main question, in a verbal conference, and without books at hand. But we may settle some preliminaries; may throw out several things as agreed on between both; and so prepare the way for a short and clear examination of the matter in debate, to be done afterwards by way of letter. In the interim, I am, with very true and sincere respect,

SIR,

Your most humble Servant,

DAN. WATERLAND.

Magd. Coll. Aug. 30, 1720.

LETTER III.

SIR,

I HAVE had the favour of two letters from you, and am not unmindful of the promise I made to enter into an epistolary correspondence with you, as far as my leisure

may permit, and provided the dispute may be brought into a narrow compass. I might reasonably decline all private conference, having sufficiently done my part in this controversy, till some or other shall undertake, in the same public way, to confute what I have publicly asserted. Yet since you have been pleased to apply yourself to me, with much civility, and with an air of strict sincerity, entreating me not to think it too great a task, though in respect of a single soul, to take particular notice of what you have publicly and privately advanced upon the subject; I shall not scruple to comply with your desires, so far as may be sufficient to answer the end intended.

The points which, after our conference at Kensington, I promised to go upon, were these: 1. The interpretation of the first of St. John. 2. The question whether Christ be Creator. 3. The point of worship. Under these three is contained all that is material; and upon these the main of the controversy turns. I must insist upon it with you, as a preliminary article, that you confine yourself, for the present at least, within these bounds; avoiding all wanderings and unnecessary diversions, attending to one point only at a time, and contentedly suffering it to be distinctly and fully debated, before we proceed to any new one. You are first to be upon the defensive, and to bear the part of a respondent. You shall have your turn to object afterwards (if we continue our correspondence) what you please to my scheme; but, for the present, you are only to defend your own.

These things premised, I shall now begin with your interpretation of St. John. You construe the words Θεὸς ἦν ὁ Λόγος, *God was reason or wisdom.* To which I object as follows:

1. The article ὁ before Λόγος, and the want of the article ὁ before Θεὸς, make one presumption against your interpretation. Please to observe St. John's manner of expressing himself elsewhere, ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστὶν, "God is "love," twice, 1 John iv. 8, 16. ὁ Θεὸς φῶς ἐστι, "God is "light," 1 John i. 5. Now these are just such propo-

sitions as that of yours, *God was wisdom:* wherefore had St. John intended it, he would have expressed it thus; ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἦν. This observation is of weight, not only because of St. John's manner of expressing himself, but also because the Greek idiom requires it. See Erasmus's comment upon the place, who was a good judge in such matters.

2. Another objection against your interpretation is this, that the Λόγος is the principal subject, the theme which the Apostle took to discourse on. He is there showing what the Λόγος was, not what God the Father was. The Λόγος was in the beginning, the Λόγος was with God, the world was made by the same Λόγος, and so on. The whole first fourteen verses are, in a manner, little else but a description of the several powers and attributes of the Λόγος. Wherefore it is more natural and consonant to understand that the Apostle intended to tell us that the Λόγος was God, than *vice versa:* since the Apostle was recounting the attributes of the Λόγος, his principal theme, not the attributes of God the Father.

3. I must not forget to add, that all antiquity has construed the words as we do. Now, whether you consider the ancients as the properest judges of the idiom of the language in or near their own times; or whether you consider them as faithful conveyers of the Apostle's meaning, (some having been his immediate disciples, as Ignatius; others having conversed with those that had been,) either way, the verdict of the ancients, especially in so noted and so important a passage of Scripture, ought to be of great weight, and indeed decisive; unless there appeared (as there does none) some plain reason or necessity, in text or context, for another construction. You seem indeed to lay some stress upon this consideration, that, in our way, we construe the words *backwards*. But this is slight. Would you call it construing *backwards*, if we rendered the first sentence, (ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος,) "The Word "was in the beginning?" It is not construing backwards, to render πνεῦμα ὁ Θεὸς, "God is spirit:" John iv. 24. or

to render μάρτυς γάρ μου ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς, "God is my witness:" Rom. i. 9. Multitude of like examples may be given, where the different idioms of languages require that the sense should run under a different order of the words.

Your other observation, borrowed from Bishop Pearson, that the Evangelist makes "the last word of the former "sentence the first of that which follows," appears to be of very little moment. By this rule, the second verse should have begun with ὁ Λόγος instead of οὗτος. Or if you answer this by saying, that still οὗτος refers to the last word preceding, then by the same rule δι' αὐτοῦ, in the third verse, should refer to τὸν Θεὸν preceding. But enough of fancies: let us rather attend to dry criticism and strict reasoning.

I proceed to your construction of δι' αὐτοῦ, *by it, or according to it, as in or by an exemplar*. It is sufficient here to observe, that this construction is ungrammatical. The preposition διὰ cannot bear any such sense. The English particle *by* is indeed sometimes so used, but I want some example of any such use of the Greek διά. Give me one, at least, out of Scripture: or I shall be content if you can produce me any either in sacred or profane writer.

Mr. Norris's speculations upon this head I am well acquainted with. They may pass for pretty fancies, and that is all. Allowing the thing itself be true, yet it neither can be made appear that John has here asserted it, nor was Mr. Norris himself sanguine enough to affirm that he ever intended it. See his preface to part i. p. 14. Add to this, that the *ideal world* is nobody knows what. Strip it of flight and figure, and there is no more in it than this, that God knew all things before he made them: but the modus of it infinitely surpasses all created understanding. If we come to plain good sense, we can conceive nothing of God, but what is either substance or attribute. The *ideal world*, in your hypothesis, must either be the substance of God the Father, that is, God himself, or only some attribute of him. You make it to be his *reason*, or his *wisdom*, and therefore must of consequence suppose it

an attribute; and so you say in your first letter, though in the same place you observe that it is "of the substance of "God," the meaning of which I should be glad to know distinctly. To me there appears no medium between an *attribute* of God, and God himself. You suppose *wisdom* to be an *attribute*, not God himself precisely considered; and accordingly you say *by it*, not *by him:* so that, at length, allowing only for a small difference in words, your hypothesis falls in with the Sabellian scheme, and I have already confuted it in my first Sermon. However, I shall not scruple to make a little more particular application of what I have there said to your hypothesis.

I argue thus. Either you must understand by the Λόγος, God the Father himself, or an attribute of God the Father: but neither of these suppositions can be reconciled to St. John's Gospel, therefore your scheme falls. If you understand by the Λόγος, God the Father, try if you can make sense of verse the 1st, 2d, and 14th; if you understand any *attribute* of him, as you seem to do, I object as follows.

1. The *Logos* was *with God*, πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. What accurate writer would not rather have said of an attribute, that it was ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, *in God?* And yet πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν is again repeated.

2. St. John lays some stress upon the *Logos's* being *in the beginning* with God. He repeats, he inculcates it. What need of this, if the *Logos* means only God's wisdom? Can any man doubt whether God was always wise? But there might be some doubt whether any other Person was in the beginning with God the Father; and therefore, if a Person be meant, we see the reason of the Evangelist's repeating it, and laying a stress upon it.

3. The pronoun οὗτος (verse the 2d) put by itself, and beginning a sentence, seems rather to denote a Person than an attribute, and to be more justly rendered *he* than *it*. I know not whether any the like instance can be given of οὗτος put absolutely and beginning a sentence, and not denoting a person.

4. Verse the 8th, "He (John the Baptist) was not that "light." The *he* here, of whom this is denied, plainly refers to some other *he*, of whom the thing is affirmed. How would it sound to say, *he was not*, but *it* (an attribute of God) *was that light?*

5. Proceed to verse the 11th, and read it in your way, thus: *It came unto its own, and its own received it not.* Where is the sense or the propriety?

6. Go on to verse the 12th. *But as many as received it, to them it gave power to become the sons of God.* Is not the sense flat, and the sentence very odd and unnatural?

7. Lastly, consider verse the 14th. *The Logos* (an attribute of God the Father) *was made flesh, and it tabernacled amongst us, and we beheld its glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father*, &c. Now, how comes *wisdom* or *reason* to be the *only begotten* of the Father, more than *power*, or *goodness*, or any other attribute?

8. St. John in his Revelations seems to have determined, that ὁ Λόγος is the name of a Person, not an *attribute*, the Person of Jesus Christ: Rev. xix. 13.

These are the principal difficulties against your scheme, which at present occur to me. Be pleased to answer them severally and distinctly, or give them up as unanswerable. In the interim, I rest,

SIR,

Your faithful Friend,

And humble Servant,

DAN. WATERLAND.

Magd. Coll. Oct. 27, 1720.

LETTER IV.

SIR,

I RECEIVED a letter from you, containing some exceptions to the evidence and reasons which I offered against your interpretation of the first chapter of St. John.

Your exceptions, or pleas, I shall examine one by one; and then leave you to judge of what weight they ought to be: charitably believing that you will not industriously deceive your own soul.

1. To my critical reasons, your general answer is, that you are illiterate, and pretend not to criticism.

But this plea will be of no service in the case. You correct the English translation, and indeed all the versions that ever were, appealing to the original itself. I show you from the idiom of the language, from the Apostle's manner of expressing himself elsewhere, and from his principal drift and design through the chapter, that you misconstrue the original, and that the words cannot bear your sense. Now either you are obliged to answer these reasons, or else to own frankly, that you have taken upon you to judge in a point you understand not, have been confident without grounds, and pronounced in the dark. Consider well what St. Peter has observed, namely, that the unlearned and unstable wrest the Scriptures to their own destruction, 2 Pet. iii. 16. How know you but this may be your own case, while against the idiom of the tongue, the author's manner of expression, as well as against the wisest and ablest judges ancient or modern, you wrest a passage of such importance to a new and strange meaning?

I do not doubt but an *illiterate* man may be capable of understanding the Gospel: and I hope you are capable of understanding the passage of St. John in the vulgar sense, as well as in any new invented one of your own.

2. To my argument drawn from the sentiments of antiquity, you except, that *if the sense of a text can be fixed*, any different sense of Fathers against it is of no weight.

But what is this to the purpose? Have you *fixed* the sense of the text, that is, *ascertained* it? So far from it, that you have hardly the shadow of a reason, from text or context, to support it. On the contrary, it is rather *fixed* to another sense, as I have shown you, and given you reasons which you are not able to answer.

3. You plead that the five first verses are a train of progressive propositions, and that generally the predicate of the former is the subject of the succeeding.

I answer, that your rule fails in the very two first propositions, for ὁ Λόγος is the subject in both. It fails again in verse the 2d, where, by your rule, it should have been ὁ Λόγος, instead of οὗτος. Your rule is again broke in verse the 3d, where δι' αὐτοῦ should, by that rule, refer to Θεὸν going before. But enough of fancies.

4. To my argument drawn from St. John's making the *Logos* his principal theme, and his intending to tell us, not what God the Father was, but what the *Logos* was: to this you except, that the Apostle's declaring the *Logos* to be an attribute of God, is declaring what the *Logos* is, and is therefore consonant to the Apostle's design. I answer,

You do not here carefully distinguish between *subject* and *predicate*. When we say, *God is reason*, God is the subject, and *reason* is predicated of him. But when we say, the *Logos is God*, the *Logos* is the subject, and that he is God, is predicated of the *Logos*. Now St. John's scope and design, which runs through the first fourteen verses, is to predicate of the *Logos*, not to predicate of God the Father: wherefore I must still insist upon it, that the Apostle's drift all along is against your construction.

5. You conceive that you have some strength and countenance from the 5th verse, which you desire me to account for. Please to compare John iii. 36. v. 40. x. 10. v. 25, 26. vi. 33, &c. xiv. 11. and especially John viii. 12. xi. 25. Col. iii. 3, 4. You will find Christ to have been the life and light of the world, as being the Author and Fountain of the resurrection, and the Giver of life eternal. Not a word do you meet with about the *ideal world*, which, whether it be a truth or no, has no foundation in Scripture, but is borrowed from the Platonic philosophy.

6. You pass some high commendations on Mr. Norris, reflecting not very kindly (I am sure, without Mr. Norris's good leave) on the clergy in general.

I readily allow all you can say in commendation of that good man. But will you abide by his authority in every thing? If you will, our dispute will be at an end. But it is in vain to contend by authorities instead of reasons. How many authorities might I produce against your sentiments, particularly against your construction of St. John! The whole Christian world, in a manner, from the beginning downwards to this day, not to mention that Mr. Norris, in the main, is of my side of the question, and interprets the Λόγος of a distinct Person, not of God the Father, or any attribute of him.

7. You except to my notion of an *attribute*, and (without understanding what you say) call it Sabellian. My notion of an attribute is the same that all Divines, whether Sabellian or others, have ever had of it. Power, wisdom, goodness, are attributes of God, not his substance precisely considered: in like manner, as reason is a property of something rational, not the very thing itself precisely considered. They are abstract partial ideas, and are not the very same with the notion of the substance itself. For if you say that power is the substance, and wisdom the substance, and goodness the substance, precisely considered; then power is goodness, and both together are wisdom; and wisdom is omnipresence, &c. and there is no difference between one attribute and another, nor any sense in saying that the substance of God is wise, good, powerful, &c. because it will be only saying, that the substance is substance.

8. You take hold of Bishop Pearson's saying, that God is an attribute of the Λόγος. But it is plain that the Bishop there used the word *attribute* in an improper sense, for *predicate*; meaning only that Θεὸς was predicated of the Λόγος, or, in plain English, that it is there said of the Λόγος, that he was God.

When you speak of wisdom, power, and goodness being *coessential and consubstantial*, you use words either without a meaning, or with a meaning peculiar to your-

self. *Things* are with one another *coessential* or *consubstantial*, not properties, nor abstract notions.

As to my rendering John iv. 24. I have the same right to render πνεῦμα *Spirit*, (not a Spirit,) as our translators had to render πνεύματι, in the same verse, *Spirit*, not a Spirit. But that by the way only, having little relation to our present dispute.

As to the preposition διὰ, neither you nor Mr. Norris has given any instance of its ever being used in the exemplary sense. The rest is of no moment.

Thus, Sir, I have, I think, considered every exception in your letter that appears to have any weight. As you are pleased to apply to me under the character of a *Ductor Dubitantium*, so I have endeavoured to answer every the least scruple, that so you may the more readily come into those reasons which I before offered, and which return now upon you in their full force. I beg leave to assure you, that I offer you nothing but what appears to me plain good sense, and sound reason, and such as has weight with myself as much as I desire it may have with you. I sincerely wish you a right judgment in all things, and remain,

Your Friend and Servant,

DAN. WATERLAND.

Magd. Coll. Nov. 13, 1720.

LETTER V.

SIR,

I GAVE you time to consider upon what I had before offered, that you might at length give up what you could no longer maintain. It was with me a preliminary article, that we should not run from point to point, to make a rambling and fruitless dispute of it; without settling and clearing any thing. I will not undertake to go through the obscurer parts of the controversy with you, while I

find you so unwilling to apprehend plain things. It would be endless for me to explain my meaning every time you mistake it: for every explanation will still want a farther explanation, and so on *ad infinitum*. I have neither leisure nor inclination to proceed in this way; nor do I see to what purpose it is. I have showed my willingness, upon your own earnest request, to serve you in this controversy; but despair of any success in it. The civilest way now is, to break off a correspondence which can serve to no good end. You are well pleased with your own opinions, and I as well satisfied with mine. Which of us has the most reason, we shall both know another day. I am,

SIR,

Your Friend and Servant,

DAN. WATERLAND.

Magd. Coll. Dec. 25, 1720.

A

DISSERTATION

UPON THE

ARGUMENT *A PRIORI*

For proving the Existence of a

FIRST CAUSE:

IN A LETTER TO MR. LAW.

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SIR,

WHEN I last had the pleasure of your conversation, in company with one or two more ingenious friends, I remember we soon fell to asking each other, what news from the republic of letters; what fresh pamphlets stirring; what works, relating either to *religion* or *science*, had appeared lately, or were soon likely to appear. Hereupon several things were mentioned, and passed off in discourse: but what we happened more particularly to dwell upon, was the consideration of some metaphysical pieces concerning the proving the existence of a Deity *a priori*, (as the Schools term it,) that is to say, from some supposed *antecedent* necessity, considered as a *ground*, or *reason*, or *foundation*, or *internal cause*, or *formal cause* of the Divine existence. And here, if I remember, we were inquisitive to know, what those scholastic terms *imported*, and whether the thought contained in them was entirely *new*, a recent product of the eighteenth century; as also what weight or solidity there was in it: and if there were none, whether it portended any detriment to *religion* or *science*, and might be worth the opposing or confuting. Upon the

debating and canvassing the particulars now mentioned, my opinion then was, and I am since more and more confirmed in the same, that those who have appeared as advocates for that argument *a priori*, seem to have had no clear notion of the thing itself, or of the terms they make use of; that the *thought* however was not a *new thought*, though perhaps it might be justly called a *new tenet*, as having been constantly exploded for many centuries upwards, and never once maintained by *metaphysicians* or *divines*; that moreover it was absolutely untenable, yea and carried its own confutation along with it, as soon as understood; and lastly, that such principles might be prejudicial, in some measure, both to *religion* and *science*, if they should happen to prevail; and that consequently it would be doing good service to both, if due care were taken, in a proper manner, to prevent their growth.

With these sentiments (which seemed also to be pretty nearly the common sentiments of all then present) I departed from you at that time. And no sooner was I returned to my books, and had some vacant leisure on my hands, but I thought of throwing out what occurred to me on those heads into paper, digesting it into a kind of dissertation, which I here send you for your perusal, and which I leave entirely to your disposal. The method, which I have chalked out for myself, in the essay here following, is;

I. To give some *historical* account of what the most eminent *metaphysicians* and *divines* have taught, so far as concerns the point in question.
II. To consider the *argumentative* part, in order to take off the ambiguity of *words*, and thereby to prevent confusion of ideas.
III. To examine into the *tendency* of the new tenets, with respect either to *religion* or *science*.

These three heads will furnish out so many distinct sections or chapters.

CHAP. I.

Containing an Historical View *of what Metaphysicians or Divines have formerly taught, so far as concerns the Argument* a priori *for the Divine Existence.*

I SHALL begin with two ancient Theists, both of the same time, or nearly, and both declaring against the possibility of demonstrating *a priori* the existence of a Deity, or first Cause. One of them was a *Christian Divine*, and the other an acute *Pagan Philosopher.*

The Christian Divine was Clemens of Alexandria, who flourished about A. D. 192. He expresses himself thus in Dr. Cudworth's [a] translation:

"God is the most difficult thing of all to be discoursed "of: because, since the *principle* of every thing is hard "to find out, the *first* and most *ancient* principle of all, "which was the cause to all other things of their being "*made*, [*and of their continuance after they were made*,] "must needs be the hardest of all to be declared or mani-"fested.—But neither can [God] be apprehended by any "*demonstrative* science: for such science is from things "*before* [in order of nature] and more knowable; whereas "nothing can exist *before* that which is altogether un-"made [b] [or self-existent.]"

The other ancient Theist is Alexander Aphrodisiensis, a celebrated Peripatetic, who flourished between A. D. 199 and 211 [c]. After he had proposed an argument for the existence of a first Cause, drawn from the consideration of *motion*, according to the Aristotelic principles, he proceeds to observe as follows: "This argument [or proof] is

[a] Cudworth Intellect. Syst. p. 716.

[b] Ναὶ μὴν ὁ δυσμιταχειριστότατος περὶ θεοῦ λόγος οὗτός ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς πράγματος δυσεύρετος, πάντως που ἡ πρώτη καὶ περισβυτάτη ἀρχὴ δύσδεικτος, ἥτις τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αἰτία τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γινομένοις εἶναι.——Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμῃ λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται· τοῦ δὲ ἀγενήτου οὐδὲν προϋπάρχει. *Clem. Alex.* p. 696. edit. Oxon.

[c] See an account of him in Fabricius, Bibl. Græc. lib. iv. cap. 25. p. 62.

" in the way of *analysis* only, it being not possible that " there should be a [strict] *demonstration* of the *first prin-* " *ciple* of all: wherefore we must here fetch our begin- " ning from things that are *after* it, and *manifest*, and " thence by way of *analysis* ascend to the proof of that " *first nature* which was before them[d]." So Dr. Cudworth renders the passage: and the reflection or comment, which he makes upon what has here been quoted from these two ancient Theists is in these words: " The " true meaning of those ancient Theists, who denied that " there could be any *demonstration* of a *God*, was only " this, that the existence of a God could not be demon- " strated *a priori*, himself being the *first Cause* of all " things."

Such were the sentiments of *metaphysicians* and *divines* at that time, founded upon plain and cogent reason, such as must equally hold at all times, and such as seem to evince, not that the existence of a *first Cause* may be demonstrated *a priori*, but rather that it is really demonstrable *a priori*, if not self-evident, that no such proof can be made, being indeed contradictory and impossible, repugnant to the very nature or notion of a *first* Cause. But I shall speak to the *argumentative* part afterwards: I am now upon the *historical*. It is certain that the *Fathers* of the Church, Greek or Latin, never admitted any such proof *a priori* of the divine existence, but either directly or indirectly, either expressly or implicitly, condemned it all along. It would be tedious to enter into a particular detail of their sentiments, in relation to the proof of the existence: I shall content myself with one general observation, that they had not so much as the *terms* or *phrases* of *necessary existence*, or *necessity of existence*, but utterly rejected the very name of *necessity*, as not applicable to the *Deity* at all, understanding it constantly in its ancient,

[d] Ἡ διῖξις κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόντε τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι· ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τι καὶ φανερῶν ἀρξαμένους, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμφωνίαν ἀναλύσει χρωμένους συστῆσαι τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν. *Aphrodis. Physic. Schol.* lib. i. cap. 1.

proper, *compulsive* sense[e]. Now it is very well known, that the supposed proof *a priori*, lately contended for, is built in a manner entirely upon the word *necessity*, and instantly sinks without it. For, put *immutable*, or *natural*, or *independent*, or *emphatical* existence, (according to the ancient way,) instead of *necessary* existence, or *necessity* of existence, and then it is certain that the very *medium* of the whole argument drops and vanishes, and there is not so much as any colour or appearance of the proof left. I say then, since it is undoubted fact that the *Fathers* all along admitted of no such terms as *necessary*, or *necessity*, in this case, but rejected them as not applicable either to the Divine *existence* or *attributes;* it is very plain, that they therewith rejected any such pretended argument *a priori* as has been since raised from those *terms*.

To show how late it was before *necessity* gained admittance in the Church, and became, as it were, christianized, with respect to our present subject, I may observe that Archbishop Anselm[f] of the eleventh and twelfth century, yea and Alexander Hales[g] of the thirteenth, were yet

[e] See my Second Defence, vol. iii. Qu. viii. p. 236, &c. Preface to Sermons, vol. ii.

[f] Deus nihil facit *necessitate*, quia nullo modo *cogitur* aut *prohibetur* aliquid facere. Et cum dicimus Deum aliquid facere quasi *necessitate* vitandæ inhonestatis, quam utique non timet, potius intelligendum est quod facit *necessitate* servandæ honestatis: quæ scilicet *necessitas* non est aliud quam *immutabilitas* honestatis ejus, quam a seipso et non ab alio habet; et idcirco *improprie* dicitur necessitas. *Anselm. Opp.* tom. iii. p. 55.

[g] Ad aliud vero quod objicitur de *necessitate* bonitatis, dicendum est quod nomen *necessitatis* non congrue hic dicitur de Deo. Unde Anselm. *In Deo nulla cadit necessitas.* Necessitas enim videtur dicere *coactionem.* Sed nec est *necessitas utilitatis* a parte sua, sicut habitum est in præcedente autoritate. Si vero dicatur *necessitas congruitatis*, sive *idoneitatis*, sicut tangitur in quadam authoritate, tunc potest dici quod ex *necessitate* bonitatis condidit res. Non tamen videtur congruere quod dicatur *ex necessitate naturæ:* licet enim sit idem bonitas quod natura ejus, tamen si diceretur *ex necessitate naturæ*, videretur poni talis *necessitas* qualis est in rebus naturalibus. In rebus enim naturalibus ignis ex *necessitate naturæ* generat ignem, et homo hominem: non sic autem est cum creaturæ fiunt a Deo. *Alex. Alens.* part. ii. p. 15.

N. B. This author flourished about 1230, died 1245. Albertus Magnus, who flourished about 1260, and died in 1280, made no scruple of applying the

scrupulous of making use of the term, and were very tender of applying it to the Divine *acts* or *attributes*, except it were with great caution, awe, and reserve; at the same time owning the word to be both harsh and improper. And as to applying it to the Divine *existence*, I do not find that they ventured upon it at all; though others frequently did it afterwards in the decline of the thirteenth century, and downwards, when Aristotle's Metaphysics, translated into barbarous Latin, and the Arabian philosophy, (of Avicen, Averroes, and Algazel,) had paved the way for it[h].

Let us see however how this matter stood after those improper terms were brought in, and softened into a qualified sense; whether any Schoolmen or others (now they might seem to have some handle for it) ever attempted to draw out any such argument *a priori* for the existence of a first Cause, and to commend the same as true and solid reasoning. I would here observe by the way, that the Schoolmen, though they deservedly lie under a disrepute for their excesses in many things, may yet be justly looked upon as carrying great authority with them in a point of this nature, where they had no bias to mislead them, (being inclined to the side of *Theism*,) and where a question turned upon a right understanding of *technical* terms or phrases, and a thorough acquaintance with *logic* and *metaphysics*; being a matter of pure abstract reasoning. They were undoubtedly great masters in that way: for "where they argued barely upon the principles of rea-

word *necessary* or *necessity* (in a sober but new sense) to the Divine *essence* or *existence*: and it is very plain that he learned that language from Aristotle's philosophy, to which he refers for his sense of those terms. See Albert. Mag. Comment. in lib. i. Sentent. Dist. 6. Opp. vol. xiv. p. 121. edit. Lugd.

[h] Quievit autem et siluit philosophia Aristotelis, pro majori parte,——usque post tempora Mahometi, quando Avicenna et Averroes et cæteri revocaverunt philosophiam Aristotelis in lucem plenam expositionis. Et licet alia logicalia et quædam alia translata fuerunt per Boetium de Græco, tamen tempore Michaelis Scoti, qui annis Dom. 1230. transactis apparuit, deferens librorum Aristotelis partes aliquas, &c. remagnificata est philosophia Aristotelis apud Latinos. *Rog. Bacon*, p. 37. Conf. p. 45, 262, 420.

" son," as a very judicious writer observes, " they have often " done exceeding well, and have improved natural reason " to an uncommon height[i]." And I will venture to add, that if the sharpest wits of these later days shall undertake, upon their own stock, to furnish out a new scheme of *school divinity*, or *metaphysical theology*, it will be a long while, perhaps some centuries, before they arrive to such perfection in some part as many of the Schoolmen arrived to; unless they shall be content within a while to take those despised Schoolmen into consultation with them, and to extract the best things from them. This I hint by the way, in order to remove prejudices, with respect to my citing (as I am now going to do) Schoolmen in this cause; though I intend not to cite them only, but other the most judicious and learned *divines* and *metaphysicians*, who have come after them, and have entirely agreed in this article with them. However, as I have already intimated, the Schoolmen are most certainly proper judges within their own province, and in a point of *school divinity:* and this which we are now upon is very plainly such, as the pretended argument *a priori* proceeds altogether upon *scholastic* terms, and is managed in a *scholastic* way, and therefore must at length stand or fall by *scholastic* principles and *scholastic* reasonings. These things premised, I may now proceed in the *historical view*, according to order of time, beginning from those days when *necessary existence*, with other the like terms or phrases, had gotten some footing in the Christian theology.

A. D. 1260. ALBERTUS MAGNUS.

Albertus, surnamed the Great, on account of his great learning and abilities, was one of the most considerable among the *divines* or *metaphysicians* of the age he lived in. He was one of the first (I mean among Christian writers) that took upon him to give God the *metaphysical* title of a *necessary* Being. Yet he presumed not to found any argument *a priori* for the existence upon it, but denied

[i] Reflections upon Learning, p. 217, 227.

expressly, or in words equivalent, that any argument of that kind could be made. He allows, that upon the foot of mere natural light, God may be known *a posteriori* by the *creatures*, and no otherwise[k]: for he admits it as a true principle, that a *philosopher* can search out God no other way than by the *creatures*, as a *cause* is known from the *effect*[l]. Which amounts to the same with saying, that philosophy affords no proof *a priori*.

A. D. 1270. THOMAS AQUINAS.

From the master or preceptor I may next descend to the scholar, who was almost twenty years younger than Albertus, but died some years before him, namely, in the year 1274. I need say nothing of the fame or the abilities of Aquinas, surnamed (according to the fashion of those times) the Angelical Doctor. He frequently enough makes use of the phrases of *necessary* Being, or *necessity* of *existing*, but yet never builds any argument *a priori* for the existence upon it, but constantly maintains, that every proof of the existence is *a posteriori*, from the effects. In one place he writes thus, "There are two kinds of *demon-* "*stration*. The first is by the *cause*, and has its name "from showing *why* the thing is, and it proceeds upon "something *simply prior*. The second is by the *effect*, "and has its name from showing *that* the thing is, and it "proceeds upon things *prior* with *respect to us*.—Now the "existence of God, as it is not knowable *in itself*, is de-"monstrable *to us* by the *effects* to us known[m]." That is to say, the existence of God cannot be demonstrated *a*

[k] Posita creatura tanquam *effectu* Dei, necesse est Deum creatorem poni: et sic *a posteriori* ex creatura potest Deus cognosci. *Albert. Magn. in* lib. i. *Sentent.* dist. iii. Opp. tom. xiv. p. 66.

[l] Philosophus non investigat eum in philosophia nisi per *creaturas*, sicut causam per effectum. *Ibid.* p. 55.

[m] Duplex est demonstratio. Una quæ est per *causam*, et dicitur *propter quid*; et hæc est per *priora simpliciter*: alia est per *effectum*, et dicitur demonstratio *quia*; et hæc est per ea quæ sunt priora *quoad nos*.——Unde Deum esse secundum quod non est *per se* notum, *quoad nos* demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos. *Aquin. Summ.* q. ii. art. 2. p. 14. edit. Lugd. 1588.

priori, but *a posteriori* only: and so the title of that article explains it[n], in some editions of his Sum. In another work, Aquinas maintains the same thing in words somewhat different, thus: "In arguments brought to prove the "*existence* of the Deity, it is not proper to argue from the "*Divine essence*, or from *what he is*, but instead thereof to "argue from the *effects*, like as in the demonstrations *a* "*posteriori:* and from some such *effect* is the name of "*God* taken[o]." I use a little liberty in rendering his words, to make his sense appear the clearer. It is very plain from both the passages here cited, that he utterly rejected all arguments *a priori* for the proving the *existence* of a Deity. Yet I shall not conceal from you, that he elsewhere argues from *necessary existence* to the *eternity* of the divine Being[p]; which may be thought to be arguing *a priori:* I will not say, that it is not arguing *a priori:* but then it is not arguing from *attribute* to *existence*, but from one attribute to another, from existence and one or more attributes before proved, to an attribute not yet proved; which is a fair and just way of reasoning, and may perhaps not improperly be called arguing *a priori;* though some would scruple the giving it that title. However, as to this by-point, I shall have occasion to say more in the sequel, and so may dismiss it for the present, and proceed in my method.

A.D. 1276. ROGER BACON.

Roger Bacon, of the order of Friars Minor, was a person

[n] Deum esse, quamvis non *a priori*, *a posteriori* tamen demonstrari potest ex aliquo ejus notiori nobis *effectu*. *Aquin. Summ.* q. ii. art. 2. p. 4. edit. Paris. 1615.

[o] In rationibus autem in quibus demonstratur Deum esse, non oportet assumi pro medio divinam essentiam, sive quidditatem, sed loco quidditatis accipitur pro medio *effectus*, sicut accidit in demonstrationibus *quia;* et ex hujusmodi effectu sumitur ratio hujus nominis *Deus*. *Aquin. Summ. contr. Gentiles*, lib. i. cap. 12. p. 14. edit. Lugd. 1587.

[p] Oportet ponere aliquod *primum necessarium* quod est *per seipsum* necessarium; et hoc est Deus, cum sit *prima causa* ut dictum est: igitur Deus *æternus* est cum omne *necessarium per se*, sit æternum. *Aquin. contr. Gentil.* lib. i. cap. 14. p. 21.

of strong parts and clear judgment, and had perhaps a greater compass of erudition than any other of that age. He was styled the *admirable* Doctor, after the way of giving titles at that time. It will not be improper to show what his judgment was upon the present question, as he occasionally delivered it. "In *metaphysics* there can be "no *demonstration* made but by arguing from the *effect:* "because things *spiritual* are discovered by the *sensible* "*effects*, and the *Creator* by the creature, as is manifest "in that science [q]." From which words it is plain that he rejects all pretence to arguing *a priori* in the question of the *existence*, and allows of nothing in that case, but the proofs *a posteriori* only.

A.D. 1290. RICHARDUS DE MEDIA VILLA.

Richard of Middleton was a man famous in his time, dignified with the title of the *solid* Doctor. His determination of the question about proving the existence *a priori* is clear and full; as here follows: "There is one kind of "demonstration *propter quid*, [from *antecedent* reason,] in "which what belongs to the subject is demonstrated by "its *cause:* and there is another kind of demonstration "*quia*, [from subsequent reason,] in which the cause is "demonstrated by the *effect*. In the former way of de- "monstration, I say, we cannot demonstrate the existence "of God, because the Divine existence has no *cause* prior "to found such proof of the existence upon: but in the "latter way of proof from the *effect*, I assert that we can "demonstrate the existence of the Deity by variety of "arguments [r]." Here we may observe, as likewise in the

[q] In metaphysicis non potest fieri demonstratio nisi per effectum: quoniam inveniuntur spiritualia per corporales effectus, et Creator per creaturam, sicut patet in illa scientia. *Rog. Bacon. Opus majus.* p. 62. edit. Jebb. 1733.

[r] Est quædam demonstratio *propter quid*, qua demonstratur passio de subjecto *per causam:* et est quædam demonstratio *quia*, in qua demonstratur causa per *effectum*. Loquendo de prima demonstratione, dico, quod non possumus *demonstrare* Deum esse, quia *esse Dei* causam non habet, per quam possimus ipsum demonstrare de Deo: loquendo de demonstratione quæ est per

three authorities before cited; that it was not through haste, oversight, or forgetfulness, that they avoided arguing *a priori* in that instance, but through deep consideration and judgment. They had all thought of the thing, and very deliberately rejected it, as amounting to a palpable absurdity, making a cause *prior* to the *first*.

I may further take notice, that this author has besides, a whole chapter about the conceivable or notional *order* of the Divine attributes well worth the perusal, for the right understanding how, or in what sense, one may be said to argue *a priori* from *existence* to *attributes*, or from *attribute* to *attribute*. I shall cite some parts of that chapter for a specimen[s]: but the whole deserves a reader's careful notice, for the solid judgment appearing in it. The sum is, that the Divine *existence* is considered in the first place, and after that, the *attributes* in their most natural order of conception. And when they are so placed or ranked, we may argue from them in that *order*; and such arguing may, without impropriety, be styled arguing *a priori*, as

effectum, sic dico quod possumus demonstrare Deum esse multipliciter. *Rich. de Med. Vill. in IV. Libr. Sentent.* lib. i. dist. 3. q. 3. p. 41.

[s] Non est inconveniens ponere quod inter divina attributa sit aliquis ordo *secundum rationem* intelligendi, in quantum intellectus noster *priorem* conceptionem de uno facit quam de alio. Unde prius in nostra ratione intelligendi est *divinum esse* quam aliquod *attributum* ejus, et *intelligere* quam *velle*, et attributa respicientia *intellectum* priusquam respicientia *voluntatem*.——inter suas perfectiones *priores* sunt, in nostra ratione intelligendi, illæ quæ respiciunt ipsum in quantum est *essentia*, quam illæ quæ respiciunt ipsum in quantum est *vita*: et inter primas, prior est *unitas*, secunda *simplicitas*; communior est enim ratio unitatis quam simplicitatis: omnis enim simplex unum est, sed non convertitur, &c.——Ratio summæ *simplicitatis* et *unitatis* sunt in divina essentia ratio *infinitatis*: et ista tria, ratio *immutabilitatis*; et immutabilitas cum prædictis, sunt ratio *æternitatis*. Unde inferius per divinæ essentiæ *simplicitatem* probabitur in divina essentia esse *infinitas*, et per divinam *simplicitatem* et *infinitatem*, *immutabilitas*, et per immutabilitatem *æternitas*. Inter perfectiones etiam quæ conveniunt Deo in quantum est *vita*, priores sunt illæ, in nostra ratione intelligendi, quæ respiciunt *ipsum intelligere*, quam illæ quæ respiciunt *ipsum velle*; et inter primas, prior *veritas* quam *sapientia*.——Inter perfectiones quæ respiciunt divinum *velle*, prima est *bonitas*, secunda *misericordia*, tertia *justitia*. *Ricard. de Med. Vill.* lib. i. dist. 2. qu. 4. p. 32, 33.

arguing from something *antecedent*, in natural order of conception, to something *subsequent* in conception to it. I know not whether the judicious author has marshalled the attributes with the utmost exactness, or has assigned to every one of them its most proper place: but he appears to have determined very right in the main point, and to have digested every thing with a kind of masterly hand. Had those matters been considered always with the like care and judgment, there could have been no room for arguing *a priori* to the existence at all, nor for arguing to any *attribute* from any thing conceived as *antecedent*, in order of nature, to the existence. But *existence* and some *attributes* may rationally be conceived as *antecedent*, in order of nature, to *other* attributes: and this kind of arguing *a priori*, which is reasonable, ought not to be confounded with the other, which is manifestly ὕστερον πρότερον, and palpably absurd. But I pass on.

A. D. 1301. JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS.

Johannes Duns, surnamed Scotus, and dignified with the title of *Doctor Subtilis*, was considerable enough to support a kind of rivalship against Thomas Aquinas, and to be founder of a new sect or division among the Schoolmen. However, their difference in other points makes their authority the greater as to those articles in which they agree: and it is certain that both Thomists and Scotists do agree in condemning and rejecting all argumentation *a priori* in proof of the *existence* of a first Cause, as manifestly absurd. Scotus declares in express words, that it is not possible for us to demonstrate as from a cause, or antecedent principle, [*propter quid*] the *existence* of an infinite Being, but that we may demonstrate it *a posteriori*, [demonstratione *quia*] from effects, namely from the *creatures*[t]. He further observes and proves, that the first

[t] De ente infinito non potest demonstrari esse *propter quid* quantum ad nos (licet ex natura terminorum propositio esset demonstrabilis *propter quid*) sed quantum ad nos propositio est demonstrabilis demonstratione *quia*, ex creaturis. *Scot. in Libr. Sentent.* lib. i. dist. 2. qu. 2. p. 28.

Cause is absolutely *uncaused*, having neither *external* nor *internal* cause; neither *efficient*, nor *final*, nor *material*, nor *formal*, and consequently none at all. His reasoning is indeed wrapped up in a most wretched style, and very barbarous Latin: but it may perhaps be thrown into intelligible English, and will be found to contain excellent sense. It runs thus: "[u] If the first Cause is above any "*efficient* cause, it must of consequence be absolutely *un-* "*caused*, since it cannot have any other kind of cause, as "*final*, or *material*, or *formal*. As to *final* cause, that it "cannot have any such, is proved thus: inasmuch as it "has no *efficient* cause, it follows of course that it can "have no *final*: because a *final* cause is no more than a "*metaphorical* cause, moving the *efficient* to act; nor does "the existence of the thing so caused essentially depend "upon it, as prior to it, in any other view. Now nothing "can be justly looked upon as a cause in itself, unless the "thing caused essentially depends upon it as prior to it; "[which cannot be said of a final cause.]

"As to the other two consequences before hinted, (that "if a being has no *efficient* cause, it can have neither *ma-* "*terial* nor *formal*,) they follow of course, and are proved "at the same time: because whatever is without any *ex-* "*ternal* cause, must of consequence be without any *in-* "*ternal* one. An *external* cause carries with it a *perfect* "causality, which is more than an *internal* cause does; "for an *internal* cause carries *imperfection* along with it,

[u] Si illud primum est *ineffectibile*, ergo erit *incausabile*; quia non *finibile*, nec *materiabile*, nec *formabile*. Probatur prima consequentia, videlicet quod si est *ineffectibile* ergo non est *finibile*, quia causa *finalis* non causat, nisi quia metaphorice movet ipsum *efficiens* ad efficiendum: nam non alio modo dependet ab ipso essentialiter entitas finiti, ut *a priore*. Nihil autem est causa *per se*, nisi ut ab ipso tanquam *a priore* essentialiter dependet causatum.

Duæ autem aliæ consequentiæ (videlicet, quod si est *ineffectibile*, ergo *immateriabile* et non *formabile*) probantur simul: quia cujus non est causa *extrinseca*, ejus non est causa *intrinseca*. Quia causalitas causæ *extrinsecæ* dicit perfectionem sine imperfectione: causalitas autem causæ *intrinsecæ* necessario requirit *imperfectionem* annexam, quia causa intrinseca est *pars* causati. Ergo, ratio causæ *extrinsecæ* est naturaliter *prior* ratione causæ *intrinsecæ*: negato ergo priore, negatur posterius. *Scot. ibid.* p. 30.

" as being only a *part* of the thing caused. Wherefore if " there be no room, as in this case, for an *external* cause, " which naturally is *prior* to the internal, much less can " there be any for the *internal* cause, which presupposes " the other." I have been forced to render the passage paraphrastically, to make the sense clear, and to do justice to the argument contained in it. It amounts to a demonstration, that a *first cause* must be absolutely, and in every view, *uncaused*. And I judged it worth the noting, because it has been sometimes suggested, that though absolute *necessity* cannot be deemed a cause of a first cause *by way of efficient cause*, yet it may *by way of formal cause* be the ground of that existence[x]. Duns Scotus has here effectually confuted or obviated any such thought, by observing, that every *formal*, every *internal* cause is but a *part*, or a *partial* conception of the thing itself, *presupposing* the thing, and therefore properly not prior in conception to it, nor the cause of it.

He has a second argument in the same place, to enforce the former, and it is to this effect: that *internal* or *intrinsic* causes owe their very nature and being as *causes*, or as *constituent* causes, to some *external* efficient; for they are not causes *in themselves*, but by the external *agent* which makes them such[y]. Therefore where there is no external *efficient* cause, there can be no *internal* cause properly so called. The force of the argument, as I understand it, lies here: that *matter* and *form* (called *internal* causes) are, in *themselves* considered, no more than constituent *parts* of the compound, not *causes* of it. It is their supposed relation to some external *agency*, which alone makes them carry an idea of *causality* along with them. If therefore we suppose all external *agency* or *efficiency* to be away (as we must in this case, respecting the divine Being which

[x] See Dr. Clarke's Answer to the Sixth Letter, p. 33. edit. 6th.

[y] Aliter probantur eædem consequentiæ: quia causæ *intrinsecæ* sunt causatæ ab *extrinseca*, vel secundum *esse* earum, vel in quantum *causant* compositum, vel utroque modo. Quia causæ intrinsecæ non *seipsis*, sine *agente*, causant compositum, vel constituunt. *Scot. ibid.* p. 30.

has no *efficient* cause,) the very idea of *causality*, as to any *internal* cause, ceases and vanishes at once; it cannot be considered as a *cause* at all[z]. Wherefore, any being that is above having any *efficient* cause is much more above any other kind of *cause*, is absolutely *uncaused;* which was the thing to be proved.

A. D. 1591. GREGORIUS DE VALENTIA.

This writer, in his Commentaries upon Aquinas's Sum, expresses himself fully and clearly to our purpose. "The "existence of God cannot be evidently shown *a priori:* "in this point *all are agreed.* For the existence of the "Deity admits of no *cause* whereby it should be demon- "strated *a priori.* Neither can it be demonstrated from "the Divine *essence*, considered as prior in *conception.* 1. "Because the *existence* of a being ought not to be proved "by the *essence* of that being, since the question of the "*existence* [whether any thing is] must precede the other "question concerning the *essence*, [what it is,] as Aquinas "rightly observes. 2. Besides, the essence of God is not "sufficiently known to us[a]."

Here it is observable, that this author looked upon it as a ruled point, a thing *universally agreed to*, that there

[z] The argument may receive some light from a passage in Durandus, relating to this head.

Quod compositum ex *materia* et *forma* causam habeat, patet; habet enim duas causas *intrinsecas*, scilicet, *materiam* et *formam*, ex quibus componitur: habet etiam causam *efficientem*, quia unio materiæ et formæ fit per *agens* quod introducit formam in materia. Unde *philosophus*, 8. *Metaphysicæ*, cum quæreret quare ex *materia* et *forma* fit unum, dicit, quod non est aliqua causa, nisi *unum principium* motus, quod est *causa agens*. *Durand.* lib. i. dist. 8. qu. 4. fol. 3. edit. Paris.

[a] Deum esse non potest evidenter demonstrari *a priori:* de hac inter omnes convenit. Nam *Dei esse* nullam habet *causam* per quam *a priori* demonstrari possit: neque etiam id potest demonstrari per *essentiam* et *quidditatem* Dei, tanquam per aliquid prius secundum rationem. 1. Quia *esse* rei non debet demonstrari per *quidditatem* rei, cum quæstio *an sit* prior sit quæstione *quid sit;* ut recte D. Thom. &c. 2. Nam quidditas Dei non satis est nobis nota. *Gregor. de Valent.* tom. i. disp. 1. qu. 2. p. 59. edit. Lugd.

neither was nor could be any demonstration *a priori* of the existence of God. It may be observed also by the way, that the phrase of *demonstratio a priori* was now become a more familiar phrase than formerly. The elder writers which I have cited, used to call it *demonstratio propter quid*, answering to the Greek δι' ὅτι. Both signify a proof drawn from some prior *cause*, or from something naturally, or in the natural order of conception, *antecedent* to the thing demonstrated by it[b]. *A posteriori* is just the reverse[c].

A. D. 1600. VASQUEZ.

Gabriel Vasquez, another eminent Schoolman of that time, declares his sentiments to the same purpose; that there can be no demonstration *a priori* of the existence of a Deity, but *a posteriori* only[d].

A. D. 1614. SUAREZ.

Suarez, the famous Schoolman and Jesuit, deserves a more particular consideration, because he really had a strong inclination to make out something that should look like an argument *a priori*, or however should (for ostentation sake, I suppose) be set forth with that *name:* for, in reality, he expressly and absolutely condemned all reasoning *a priori* to the *existence* of a Deity, as others before him had done; and yet by a kind of artificial turn, by interpreting the proof of the *unity* so as to amount to the same with the proof of a *Deity*, he conceived he had done the *thing*, only by changing of *names*. But let us observe how he managed the whole affair: we shall see afterwards what censures were passed upon it by the ju-

[b] Demonstratio *a priori* ea est qua probatur effectus per *causam*, sive proximam sive remotam, aut probatur conclusio per aliquod *prius*, sive sit *causa*, sive *antecedens* tantum. *Chauvin. Lexic.* p. 170.

[c] Demonstratio *a posteriori* dicitur illa, qua vel probatur causa per *effectum*, vel conclusio per aliquod *posterius*, sive sit effectus sive consequens. *Chauvin. ibid.*

[d] Deum esse, non potest *a priori* demonstrari: *a posteriori* tamen et per *effectus* demonstrari potest. *Vasq.* q. ii. art. 2. p. 60.

dicious, though it was mostly a difference in *words*. He states the main question thus: "Whether the existence of "God may in some sort [or in some sense] be demon- "strated *a priori*[e]:" and he determines in the affirmative. The whole tenor of his reasoning is as here follows. [f] "We are first to premise, that, absolutely speaking, the "existence of God *cannot be proved a priori;* as well be- "cause God has *no cause* of his existence whereby it "should be proved *a priori*, as also because if he had, yet "we have no such exact and perfect knowledge of God "as might enable us to trace him up (if I may so speak) "to his own proper principles. To which purpose Dio-

[e] Utrum aliquo modo possit *a priori* demonstrari Deum esse. *Suarez. Metaphys.* tom. ii. disp. 29. sect. 3. p. 28.

[f] Supponendum est, simpliciter loquendo non posse demonstrari *a priori* Deum esse; quia neque Deus habet *causam* sui esse, per quam *a priori* demonstratur, neque si haberet, ita exacte et perfecte a nobis cognoscitur Deus, ut ex propriis principiis (ut sic dicam) illum assequamur. Quo sensu dixit Dionysius, capite septimo *de divinis nominibus*, nos non posse Deum ex propria natura cognoscere.

Quanquam vero hoc ita sit, nihilominus postquam *a posteriori* aliquid de Deo demonstratum sit, possumus ex *uno attributo* demonstrare a priori *aliud:* ut si ex *immensitate, v. g.* concludamus *localem immutabilitatem.* Suppono enim ad ratiocinandum *a priori*, modo humano, sufficere distinctionem *rationis* inter attributa.

Resolutio quæstionis. Ad hunc ergo modum dicendum est: Demonstrato *a posteriori* Deum esse ens *necessarium* et *a se*, ex hoc attributo posse *a priori* demonstrari, præter illud non posse esse *aliud* ens *necessariam* et *a se*, et consequenter demonstrari *Deum* esse.

Dices, Ergo ex *quidditate* Dei cognita, demonstratur Deum esse, quia *quidditas* Dei est quod sit ens *necessarium* et *a se:* hoc autem plane repugnat, quia quæstio *Quid est* supponit quæstionem *An est;* ut recte ad hoc propositum notavit divus Thomas. Part. i. q. 2. art. 2. ad secund.

Respondeo, Formaliter ac proprie loquendo, non demonstrari *esse Dei* per *quidditatem* Dei ut sic, quod recte argumentum probat; sed ex quodam *attributo* (quod re ipsa est essentia Dei, a nobis autem abstractius concipitur ut *modus* entis non-causati) colligi *aliud attributum*, et ita concludi illud ens esse *Deum.* Unde ad concludendum hoc modo, esse *Deum*, sub ratione *Dei*, supponitur esse probatum, dari ens quoddam per se *necessarium*, nimirum ex *effectibus* ejus, et ex negatione processus in infinitum. Atque ita quod primum de hoc ente probatur est *esse;* deinde esse ab intrinseco *necessarium;* hinc esse *unicum* in tali ratione ac modo essendi; ideoque esse *Deum.* Atque in hunc modum prius aliquo modo definitur quæstio *An est*, quam *Quid est. Suarez, ibid.* p. 28.

" nysius (in his seventh chapter of the *divine names*) ob-
" serves, that *we cannot know God according to his proper*
" *nature.*

" But though that be so as I have here said, yet not-
" withstanding, after we have once demonstrated *a poste-*
" *riori* something concerning God, we may go on to de-
" monstrate *a priori* one *attribute* from another: as for
" instance, when we infer *unchangeableness of place* from
" the *omnipresence* before proved. I suppose all the while,
" that a *notional* distinction of the Divine *attributes* (after
" an human way of conception) is foundation sufficient
" for reasoning *a priori.*

" Now, for the resolution of the *question,* I proceed
" thus: having demonstrated *a posteriori,* that God is a
" *necessary* and *self-existent* Being, we may be able to
" prove *a priori* from this attribute, [of *necessary exist-*
" *ence,*] that there cannot be *another* necessary and self-
" existent being besides that one; from whence it fol-
" lows, that that Being is *God.*

" You will object, that this is proving the *existence* of
" God from the *essence* of God before known, (for it is
" supposed that the *essence* of God is, that he is a *neces-*
" *sary* and *self-existent* Being,) which is plainly repug-
" nant; since the question *what he is* presupposes the
" other question *whether he exists;* as St. Thomas [Aqui-
" nas] has justly observed on this head. Part i. qu. 2.
" art. 2.

" I answer, that strictly and properly speaking, we in-
" fer not the existence of God from his *essence,* consider-
" ed as such, (which the objection justly excepts to,) but
" from one certain *attribute* (which though really identi-
" fied with the essence, is yet conceived abstractedly by
" us as a *mode* of the Being *uncaused*) we deduce *another*
" *attribute;* and so we at length prove that that Being is
" *God.* Wherefore in order to prove in this way that
" *there is a God,* precisely considered as *God,* we suppose
" it proved beforehand, that there is a certain Being *ne-*
" *cessary* in himself; proved namely from his *effects,* and

" from the *absurdity* of an *infinite* progression. So the " first thing we prove of this Being is, that *he exists;* the " next, that he is *necessarily existing;* then, that he is the " *only one* existing in such a way; and so of consequence " he is *God.* And thus, after some sort, we do first de- " termine *whether he exists,* and next the other question, " *what he is.*"

Thus far the acute and learned Suarez; of whom I have many things to observe, before I go on to other writers; 1. That he appears to have been *ambitious* to make out something that should be *called* an argument *a priori*, and was probably *able* to do *as much* in it as any one before or after him can justly be presumed to be. 2. That the *method* which he took for it, proving first something *a posteriori*, and then proceeding to argue *a priori* for the rest, is very like to that which others have taken since. 3. That he differs however from those later advocates for the argument *a priori* in the main thing of all, and determines expressly against their notion, that *necessity* can be conceived *antecedent* to existence. He looked upon that as flat *absurdity* and *self-contradiction*, utterly repugnant to the nature of a *first Cause;* and so he made no use of *antecedent* necessity, or *internal* cause, or *formal* reason, ground, or foundation, in proving his point: he was too knowing a *logician* and *metaphysician*, to offer any thing of that kind. 4. All that he admits is, that after the *existence* and one or more *attributes* have been proved *a posteriori*, we may then proceed to argue *a priori* for the rest: not from *antecedent* necessity, not from any thing conceived as *prior*, in order of nature, to the *existence* itself; but from the *existence* and one *attribute* or more considered as before proved, and as *prior* in conception to all the rest. 5. One thing Suarez was very *singular* in, and upon that the whole stress of his cause lies, so far as concerns the making out an argument *a priori* for the *existence* of *God:* he would have it *supposed* that God is not proved to be *God*, till the *unity* is prov-

ed; and so he suspends, as it were, the proof of a *Deity* upon the proof of the *unity*. This was an ingenious thought, but too weak to bear. For in that way there could be no room for the question whether *God* be *one*, since the very *name* would imply it: besides, it is universally allowed, that the proof of the *existence* of a *Deity* is both clearer and stronger than any proof of the *unity*, and is sufficiently determined and settled in the first place, before the consideration of the *unity* comes in at all. When we have proved, for instance, that there is an *intelligent, eternal, self-existent* Being, (one or more,) which is most easily proved from our *own existence;* we have then competently proved that *there is a God*, though we have not yet proved or considered every *attribute* that belongs to him. Such has been the way of *divines* and *metaphysicians*, first to prove the existence of a *Deity*, under that confuse general conception; and next to proceed to the proof of the *unity* and other *attributes* in due place and order: and it is not reasonable to suggest, that if a man should fail in the proof of the *unity*, or of some other Divine *attribute*, (for the reason is the same in all,) that he has therefore failed in his proof of a *Deity*. That would be going against rule, and risking the whole for a part; and, in short, resting the proof of a Deity (the plainest thing in the world) upon very obscure conditions, very unequal terms. But we shall have more of this matter in the sequel, as we take in other later writers, who have directly or indirectly passed their censures upon Suarez for his excesses on this head. 6. Upon the whole, one may observe, that this pretended proof of a *Deity*, as drawn *a priori*, is rather a fetch, or a subtilty of that great man, than any thing solid; a *nominal* proof, rather than a *real* one; or an affected manner of miscalling things by wrong names.

A. D. 1610. CHRISTOPH. GILLIUS.

Contemporary with Suarez lived Christopher Gillius, a

Spanish Divine and Jesuit, one of a subtle wit and penetrating genius. He has a pretty large chapter[g], spent entirely upon our present question. He takes notice, that there were not wanting some of that time who contended that the *existence* of a Deity might be proved *a priori*[h]. He had Suarez in his eye, as is plain enough, (though he does not name him,) because, a little after, he quotes the very words which Suarez had made use of in that argument. He mentions also Scotus, and some of his followers, as aiming at the like conclusion in a more far-fetched and roundabout way[i]; allowing, that if God should extraordinarily or supernaturally *infuse* some higher degrees of knowledge, then some kind of proof *a priori* (however fruitless, and superseded by such *illumination*) might be made from it. See how solicitous and industrious some have been in searching for every appearance of a proof *a priori*, as much as others have been in searching for *the philosopher's stone*, or for *the squaring* of the *circle*, or the like, and with the like success.

Our judicious author first observes, that all pretences of any formal demonstration of that kind had been utterly exploded[k] by the judicious; particularly by Albertus

[g] Gillii Commentationes Theologicæ de Essentia et Unitate Dei, lib. i. tract. 8. c. 4. p. 391—396.

[h] Non desunt *recentiores*, qui affirmant esse demonstrabilem *a priore*, etiam respectu viatorum, si non per se primo, saltem posita cognitione Dei acquisita per discursum: quoniam, inquiunt, postquam ex creaturis convincitur Deum esse *ens necessarium*, et *a se*, et *unum*, necessario concluditur *a priore* hunc esse Deum, &c. *Ibid.* p. 391.

[i] Alio modo eandem conclusionem tuetur Scotus in I. dist. 2. qu. 2. Cum Scotistis interpretibus ibidem: Ochamus in I. dist. 3. qu. 4. lit. F. Gabriel. qu. 4. conclus. 3. Rubionius, dist. 2. qu. 1. art. 2. concl. 4. Nam quamvis existiment de lege ordinaria non haberi a nobis demonstrationem *propter quid*, hujus propositionis *Deus est*; censent tamen fieri posse ut demonstretur, si Deus *infunderet* alicui notitiam evidentem eorundem terminorum, vel saltem termini *Dei*, &c. p. 391.

[k] Propositio, *Deus est*, sub neutra acceptatione ex prædictis, est viatoribus de lege formaliter demonstrabilis *a priore*. Hæc est Alberti in Summa, tract. iii. qu. 17. Henrici in Summa, art. xxii. qu. 4. Richardi, in I. dist. 3. art. 1. qu. 1. Scoti, in I. dist. 2. qu. 2. et quodlibeto 7. Lyrani in Sapient. xiii. Gaspa Casalii, lib. i. de Quadripart. justit. cap. xvi. conclus. 2. Et est

Magnus, and Henricus de Gandavo, and Richardus de Media Villa, and Scotus, and Lyra, and Gasp. Casalius, and many others referred to elsewhere[l]: so that it might be justly looked upon as a ruled point, that no proper demonstration *a priori* could be made of the Divine *existence;* all such attempts at length resolving either into some *petitio principii*, or some *equivocation* of terms, or other the like fallacy, or foreign subtilty.

He proceeds to examine the question with the utmost strictness and nicety, traversing it through all its mazes, and unravelling every ambiguity and subtile intricacy, whereby some had endeavoured to support what they would call a demonstration *a priori* in that case; and showing that none of them sufficiently answered the purpose, or came up to the point[m]. From whence we may remark, that Suarez's attempts that way were not approved by the most judicious Divines of his own time, but were condemned by the generality, and even by those of his own order, (for Gillius was a Jesuit,) and that *soon* after: for as his Metaphysics had first appeared in 1600, so this censure of Gillius was finished and licensed in 1606, though not published before 1610.

de mente doctorum quos referam cap. seq. num. 7. Qui omnes non agnoscunt demonstrationem *Dei* nisi ex *creaturis*.—Notitia vero sumpta ex creaturis non potest esse *a priore*, ut patet. *Gillius, ibid.* p. 392. conf. p. 394.

[l] Gillius, c. v. p. 400.

[m] Ex his constat firmum non esse fundamentum sententiæ asserentis demonstrari Deum esse *a priore* per rationem *necessitatis*, quoniam non est radix attributorum habentium ordinem ad creaturas: et quamvis esset, cum ipsa non cognoscatur a nobis *a priore*, vel ex terminis evidenter conjuncta cum Deo sub ratione illa attributalis fieri nequit ut eadem demonstratio sit formalis *a priore*.—Primum initium illius demonstrationis sumitur ex cognitione *creaturarum*,—resolvitur in principia cognita ex *posteriore*, et ideo demonstratio non constat formaliter *ex primis*.—Quodnam petò est *ens*, de quo primum probatur *esse?* Ipsene est *Deus*, an vero *ens necessarium?* Si *Deus*, totus discursus sequens erit superfluus, quoniam procedit ad probandum id quod *supponitur* probatum: si *ens necessarium*, aut sumitur secundum absolutam et omnimodam necessitatem, et tunc hoc ipso *supponitur* esse necessarium ab intrinseco; aut, &c.—Ita patet ex illo principio, *ens necessarium est*, nullo modo demonstrari posse *a priore* hanc propos. *Deus est*. *Gillius*, p. 396.

A. D. 1615. ESTIUS.

At the same time with Gillius lived the learned Estius, who delivered his sentiments of the present question in the manner here following. [n] "As there are, among *logicians*, two kinds of *demonstration*, one demonstrating "the effect from the *causes*, and the other, the cause "from the *effects*; it is manifest, that the *existence* of a "*Deity* cannot be proved in the former way of demonstration, since no *cause* in any kind can be assigned either of *God*, or of his *existing*. But it may be demonstrated in the latter way, as St. Thomas [Aquinas] "rightly judges, (I. q. 2. art. 2, 3.) and as the Schoolmen upon this *distinction* do *universally* teach."

A. D. 1627. JOHANNES PUTEANUS.

This writer expresses his judgment in the terms here following [o].

[n] Cum duplex sit apud dialecticos demonstratio, alia quæ ex *causis* effectum, alia quæ contra ex *effectis* causam monstrat; manifestum est, priori demonstrationis modo non posse doceri Deum esse, cum nec *Dei* nec ejus *existentiæ* possit in *ullo genere* causa proferri. Potest autem demonstrari posteriori modo, quemadmodum recte S. Thom. I. qu. 2. art. 2. et 3. Et in universum scholastici circa hanc distinctionem tradunt. *Estius in Libr. Sentent. Comm.* tom. i. p. 4.

So Cardinal Lugo also, a little later in the same age. Dico tertio, *Deum esse*, non est demonstrabile *a priori*. Sic cum Sancto Thoma, cæteri fere doctores, et latissime Gillius. *Lug.* lib. i. disp. 14. c. 2. s. 8.

[o] Licet *existentia* Deitatis nequeat demonstrari *a priori*, concedendum tamen est de *quibusdam attributis* divinis, quod possint demonstrari *a priori*.

1. Prima pars conclusionis ex eo innotescit, quod demonstratio quælibet *a priori* consurgat ex *causis* vel *veris*, vel certe *virtualibus*, aut, quod idem est, ex *ratione aliqua priori*. Existentiæ autem divinæ *nullæ sunt causæ*, nec *veræ*, nec *virtuales*, nec *ratio prior*: hæc enim includitur in conceptu formali *essentiæ* divinæ, et quidem ita, ut impossibile sit concipere *essentiam* divinam quin concipiatur *existens*. Est enim essentia divina ens *simpliciter necessarium*; repugnat autem enti simpliciter necessario, non habere *existentiam*: definitur enim hoc communiter, *id quod ita est ut non esse nequeat*.

2. Posterior vero pars constat ex eo, quod *æternitas* demonstretur per *immutabilitatem*, hoc modo: *Omne immutabile est æternum; Deus est immutabilis: ergo, Deus est æternus. Ubiquitas* etiam divina demonstratur com-

" Though the existence of a Deity cannot be demon-
" strated *a priori*, yet it must be allowed, that as to some
" of the Divine *attributes*, they may be demonstrated *a*
" *priori*.

" 1. As to the first particular, it is plain from hence;
" that every proof *a priori* proceeds by *causes* either *real*
" or *virtual*, or, which comes to the same, by *some prior*
" *reason;* but of the *Divine* existence there are no *causes* real
" or virtual, nor any *prior reason:* for *existence* is included
" in the formal conception of the *Divine essence*, insomuch
" that it is impossible to conceive the Divine essence but
" as *existing*. The Divine essence is *being* simply *neces-*
" *sary:* now it is contradictory to the notion of being
" simply *necessary*, not to have *existence;* for it is usually
" defined, as *that which so exists that it cannot but exist*.

" 2. As to the second particular, it is manifest from
" hence, that *eternity* is demonstrated from *immutability*
" in this manner: *Every thing immutable is eternal: God*
" *is immutable: therefore God is eternal.* In like man-
" ner, the Divine *ubiquity* is commonly proved from the
" *immensity*. And so in many other cases."

The author here well distinguishes between arguing *a priori* from *existence* and *attributes* already proved, to other attributes, and arguing *a priori* from attributes, or from any thing else, to the *existence* itself. The one he allows as just and rational, the other he rejects as manifestly absurd: and so far he is certainly right. Some indeed may scruple to call it arguing *a priori*, when a man argues from *attribute* to *attribute;* conceiving that it should rather be styled arguing *ex absurdo*, and that nothing short of a *real* (as opposed to *notional*) priority is sufficient to denominate or constitute an argument *a priori*. But that I take to be a fruitless nicety, and such is not worth the insisting upon; for at last it will terminate in a dispute about *words*. It is sufficient, that there is nothing *prior* to the *existence*, no not so much as in order

muniter per *immensitatem*; et sic in aliis multis. *Joan. Putean. Opp.* tom. i. part. 1. qu. 3. p. 24.

of nature, or notion, or conception; and so all arguing *a priori*, as to that case, is for ever excluded. But as to the other case, the manner of arguing is undoubtedly right, whatever *name* we give to it: and there seems to be no just objection against calling it *a priori*, so long as the *existence* is looked upon as always *first* in conception, and that the most *natural* order of conception be followed in arguing from *attribute* to *attribute*, and the process be not made too *arbitrary* [p].

A. D. 1642. RODERICUS DE ARRIAGA.

This acute metaphysician and divine delivers his sentiments as follows: "The *being* or *existence* of God cannot "be demonstrated *a priori*. So St. Thomas, Albertus, "Durandus; and of our order (of Jesuits) Valentia, Mo-"lina, Suarez, and Vasquez, whom Tanner mentions and "follows [q]." After this, he enters minutely into the merits of the question, assigning his reasons why the *existence* cannot be proved *a priori:* which being much the same with those before mentioned, I choose, for brevity sake, to omit them, and proceed. Only, I may observe, that here are three authors, Durandus, Molina, and Tanner, beyond what I have quoted upon the question: and it is further observable, that he takes in Suarez amongst

[p] Richardus de Media Villa, in a chapter before referred to, observes well to this purpose, that the *order* of the attributes ought not to be settled in an *arbitrary* manner, but as *reason* requires.

Nec loquor hic *de ordine* qui tantum est ex parte *voluntatis* (quia tali ordine posset, in nostra ratione intelligendi, quandoque unum esse *prius*, quandoque *posterius*, sicut *placeret* nobis) sed loquor de ordine qui est in conceptionibus nostri intellectus intelligentis divina *attributa* secundum illum ordinem secundum quem *magis sunt apta nata* intelligi: et sic intelligendo divinas perfectiones, est talis *ordo* ex parte nostra. Prius enim, secundum rationem intelligendi, intelligimus *divinum esse*, quam aliquam ejus perfectionem; secundo, suum *intelligere;* tertio, suum *velle*. *Ricard. de Med. Vill.* lib. i. p. 32.

[q] Prima conclusio, Deum *esse*, seu *existere*, non potest demonstrari *a priori*. Ita D. Thomas, Albertus, Durandus: et e nostris, Valentia, Molina, Suarez, et Vasquez, quos refert et sequitur Tannerus loco citato. *Roderic. de Arriag.* tom. i. p. 30.

them, as one that had declared against the argument *a priori;* as indeed he *really* had, though *verbally* he might seem to differ, as I have before hinted. So *universal* hitherto had been the agreement of *metaphysicians* and *divines* in this article.

A. D. 1644. DIONYSIUS PETAVIUS.

The very learned Petavius is but short upon this question, mentioning it transiently, as it came in his way: but he is too considerable a person to be omitted in this recital. He takes notice, that the *existence* of a *Deity* is not to be proved from any thing *prior* or *antecedent*, but from *effects* only, and *a posteriori;* and from the *absurdities* which lie against the contrary persuasion[r].

A. D. 1652. NATHANAEL CULVERWELL.

I shall now mention a Protestant writer of our own, of some note in his time. He was Fellow of Emanuel College in Cambridge. In his book, entitled, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, he occasionally drops a few words to our purpose: "There can "be no demonstration of him [God] *a priore;* for he is "the *first Cause:* and all demonstrations fetched from "such *effects* as flow from him, they do only show you "that he is; they do not open and display the Divine es-"sence[s]," &c.

A. D. 1658. BISHOP BARLOW.

A more considerable writer of our own, so far as concerns the present question, was Thomas Barlow, then Fellow of Queen's College, Oxon. and afterwards (A. D.

[r] Verum hæc iisque similia tum nos commoverent, si probationum id genus ageretur quod ex *antecedentibus* et *prioribus* ducitur, ac *demonstrationem* et *scientiam* parit: ejusmodi enim locum in Deo non habent.—Nihilominus ex *effectis* et iis quæ *posteriora* sunt, atque etiam iis ex *incommodis* et *absurdis* quæ in contradicentium altera parte cernuntur, argumenta licet colligere, quibus Deus esse monstretur. *Petav. Dogm. Theolog.* tom. i. lib. 1. c. 1. p. 2, 3.

[s] Culverwell, p. 212.

1675.) Bishop of Lincoln. He published some Metaphysical Exercises, wherein he discovers great learning, and no less acuteness. The edition of 1658, which I follow, is the second edition. I shall produce his sentiments at large, because he entered deep into the question, viewed it on every side, and withal passed his censure (though rather too severe) upon the learned Suarez.

He writes thus: "Our knowledge of God, arising "from the light of nature, is not *a priori*, and δι' ὅτι. "The reason is, because then God could not be *eternal*, "if there were any principle *prior* to God: for *eternity*, "in the very notion of it, excludes any *prior* principle. "Consequently, if God be eternal, there cannot be any "*prior* principle whereby he may be known *a priori*.— "Were there any principle by which God might be "known *a priori*, then, 1. God would not be the *first* "Original and *first Cause*, as having by the supposition "another *cause prior* to him.—2. That supposed *antece-* "*dent* principle, by which the existence of God should "be proved, must be either *external*, (of the *final* or *effi-* "*cient* kind,) or else *internal*, of the *material* or *formal* "kind. Now it cannot be of the *final* kind, because "God is the *chief end*, and there cannot be any *higher* "final cause, whereby to demonstrate *a priori* the exist- "ence of God. It cannot be of the *efficient* kind; be- "cause if God had any antecedent *efficient* cause, then "God would be an *effect*, &c.—Neither can it be said, "that such prior cause is either *material* or *formal:* for "the perfect *simplicity* of the Divine nature admits not of "any such *causes*, as is self-evident: consequently there "is no room for any *cause* whereby to demonstrate *a pri-* "*ori* the existence of a Deity [t]."

[t] Hæc nostra de Deo cognitio, a lumine naturali orta, non est *a priori* et δι' ὅτι. Ratio est, quia sic Deus non esset *æternus*, modo esset aliquod principium Deo *prius:* ipsa enim *æternitas* intrinseca dicit negationem principii; et per consequens, si Deus sit æternus, non potest esse aliquod principium *prius*, per quod *a priori* cognoscetur.—Si esset aliquod principium quo Deum *a priori* cognosceremus; tum, 1. Deus non esset principium *primum*

Our learned author here enters into the heart of the question, and reasons his way through, like a knowing and judicious man. Only he seems rather too short as to what concerns the two internal *causes*, called *material* and *formal*: but that brevity of his may be competently supplied from what has been said above, under Duns Scotus. I proceed to observe how he animadverts upon Suarez.

" I am aware, that Suarez is of opinion, that we may, " in some sort, demonstrate *a priori* the existence of a " Deity: not by the *essence* of God as such, but by some " certain *attribute* which is *really* the essence of God, " only considered by us, in an abstract way, as a *mode* " of the uncaused Being. But, to say the truth, I ap- " prove not this *bold* assertion of the learned Jesuit. " Because it is a manifest contradiction to say, that the " *existence* of God can be proved *a priori* from any at- " tribute whatever, when every attribute, *as such*, in the " very notion of *it*, denotes something *posterior* to the " *essence* of which it is the *attribute*. For if the at- " tribute be *really* distinct, [from the essence,] then it " is *really* subsequent to it: or if it be only *notion-* " *ally* distinct, (which is the case in the *divine* Being,) " then it is likewise *notionally* subsequent to the *es-* " *sence*, whose attribute it is conceived to be. It is not " possible so much as to imagine any *attribute* but what " *presupposes* some *essence* whose attribute it is. Conse- " quently our knowledge of God's existence is *a poste-* " *riori* only: and of that kind are all the demonstrations

et *causa prima*, utpote qua alia causa esset *prior*.—2. Principium *prius* ex quo probari possit *a priori* Deum esse, vel erit *externum* (*finale* vel *efficiens*) vel *internum*, scil. *materiale* vel *formale*. Non *primum*, quia cum Deus sit *finis ultimus*, non possit esse causa *finalis prior*, per quam demonstrari possit διὰ ὅτι Deum esse. Non *secundum*, quia si Deus habuisset causam *efficientem* priorem, tum Deus esset *effectus*, &c.—Nec dici possit, quod illa causa sit *materialis*, aut *formalis*, summa Dei *simplicitas* tales causas non admittit, ut manifestum est: et per consequens non est *causa ulla*, per quam *a priori* demonstrari possit esse Deum. *Barlow, Exercit. Metaph.* iv. p. 28.

"brought by metaphysicians and schoolmen[u]." The learned author here argues the point against Suarez with great strength and acuteness: only he seems to fix an opinion upon Suarez which never was his: for Suarez himself plainly disowned any such arguing *a priori* for the existence, in that crude and gross sense which Barlow appears to take it in, while he is disputing against it. All that Suarez really meant, as I have before hinted, was, that the *unity* might be proved *a priori*, after having proved the existence *a posteriori:* and such proof of the *unity* he improperly called, or erroneously conceived to be, proving the existence of *God a priori*, inasmuch as God should not be deemed to be *God*, till proved to be *one*. Our author afterwards very well confutes that peculiar fancy, which Suarez and some few others had countenanced in that article: I say, our author well confutes that notion by observing, that the *existence* of a *Deity* is sufficiently proved, as soon as an *infinite, eternal, uncreated, independent* (he should have added *intelligent*) *Being* is proved; and that the question of the *unity* comes not properly in till afterwards[x]. Valentia had effectually

[u] Novi quod Suarez putat, nos posse aliquo modo *a priori* demonstrari Deum esse: non per *quidditatem* Dei, ut sic, sed ex quodam *attributo* quod reipsa est *essentia* Dei, a nobis autem abstractius consideratur ut modus entis non causati, &c. Sed ut quod res est dicam, non probo hoc docti Jesuitæ audax pronuntiatum. Quia manifeste implicat Deum esse demonstrari posse *a priori* per attributum quodcunque, cum attributum omne, qua tale, intrinseca dicit aliquid *essentia* illa *posterius* cujus est attributum.—Nam si sit attributum *re* distinctum, tum *re vera* est posterius; si sit attributum solum *ratione* distinctum (quod in *divinis* accedit) tum est etiam *ratione* essentia posterius, cujus attributum concipitur: cum attributum nec fingi posset quin *præsupponitur* essentia aliqua cujus est attributum. Et per consequens *Deum esse* non nisi *a posteriori* cognoscimus: tales enim sunt demonstrationes *omnes* a metaphysicis et scholasticis adducta ad ostendendum Deum esse; ut videre est apud Fran. Suarez. Metaph. p. ii. disp. 29. sect. 2. num. 1, 2, 3, 4. 5. Aquin. contra Gent. lib. i. c. 13. p. 11. et Ferrariens. ibid. Nazarium in I. P. qu. 2. art. 3. et apud Aquin. I. P. qu. 2. art. 3. et commentatores. *Barlow, ibid.* p. 129, 130. conf. p. 165, 186.

[x] Hoc dato, quod non ostendunt Deum esse *unum*, tamen et adhuc erunt argumenta prædicta satis valida, et in demonstrationem thesis antedictæ valitura: quia in præsenti hoc solum demonstrandum suscepimus, nempe esse aliquod ens quod *Deum* dicimus, *infinitum, æternum, increatum*, et *inde-*

obviated that pretence of Suarez, some time before, in what he had said against Cajetan, who had been beforehand with Suarez in that piece of subtilty [y].

One thing further I would observe of Barlow, before I dismiss him, that he was very scrupulous as to admitting that any of the Divine *attributes* might be demonstrated *a priori*. For though he allowed the way of arguing from one attribute before proved, to another not proved, and makes use of it himself more than once; yet considering that the *attributes* are in *reality* (however *notionally* distinguished) identified with the *essence*, he apprehended such reasoning could not justly be accounted reasoning *a priori* [z], since the Divine essence could not be conceived *prior* to itself. There is certainly weight in the sugges-

pendens. Sed an hoc ens *unum* sit aut *multiplex*, alterius est loci et quæsiti opus demonstrare. *Barlow, Exercit.* iv. p. 161.

[y] In proposito igitur, cum *Dei* nomen audimus, communiter solemus concipere imperfecte et confuse, vel *primam causam*, vel *primum movens*, vel alia quæ rationes Thomæ concludunt. Quamobrem rationes ejusmodi, quæ scilicet probant esse aliquod *primum movens, efficiens*, &c. etsi non probant *quid*, et *quale* illud sit, scilicet *immateriale, infinitum, unum* numero, &c. satis tamen probant *Deum* esse. Illa enim alia probare, pertinet ad quæstionem de *natura* et *quidditate* divina, et probantur etiam non admodum difficulter, constituta jam veritate *divinæ entitatis*, juxta quæstionem *an est*. Atque hinc fit quod D. Thomas non nisi post expeditam hanc quæstionem *an est*, disputat de *unitate, simplicitate, æternitate*, et aliis ejusmodi perfectionibus divinis, ut videbimus in sequentibus quæstionibus. Quocirca cum Cajetanus hic negat, probari *per se* his rationibus D. Thomæ, Deum esse, eo quod non probatur illis Dei *unitas* et *infinitas*; et concedit tantum, id probari *per accidens*, (ut scilicet ejusmodi rationes concludunt esse quædam prædicata quæ ei rei veritate soli Deo conveniunt,) non satis distinxisse videtur inter quæstionem *an est*, et *quid est*. *Greg. de Valent.* tom. i. p. 64.

[z] Fateor Suarezium et *scholasticos* usitate affirmare *æternitatem* (ut et alia nonnulla *attributa* Dei) demonstrari posse *a priori*, et admittere medium *ratione* prius; ita ut illud *medium* licet *in re ipsa* non sit æternitate prius, tamen quoad modum nostrum *concipiendi*, imperfectum possit esse prius. Sed, ut quod sentio libere proferam, minutias has scholasticas non probo, et tutius esse judico, et Deo dignius, si de Deo et perfectionibus suis loquamur *prout sunt*, non prout ab intellectu nostro fingantur. Et sic rectius dices *æternitatem a priori demonstrari non posse*, quia in *re ipsa* ita est prout affirmatur, quam *æternitatem posse a priori demonstrari*, cum in *re ipsa* non ita fit, nec esse possit medium ullum *in re prius*, ut supra demonstravimus. *Barlow, Exercit.* v. p. 187.

tion. But the point is not worth the contesting, as I have before intimated, since it will terminate only in a dispute about *words* or *names*. That it is reasonable and right to argue from *existence* and *attributes* proved, to other attributes not proved, is agreed on all hands: and whether such arguing shall be called reasoning *ab absurdo*, or *a priori*, is not very material. I have hinted above, under what restrictions or cautions I conceive it may be justly termed reasoning *a priori*. But whatever way this by-point, of slight consideration in the main, be determined, the other more material question concerning the arguing *a priori* for the existence, (or for any of the attributes from any thing considered as *antecedent* to the *existence*,) is no way affected by it. For such kind of arguing will undoubtedly be still condemned as wrong, in every view, and in every construction, and upon every the most favourable supposition that can with any colour of reason be made for it.

A. D. 1662. FRANCISCUS BONÆ SPEI.

This author likewise declares his judgment, that there can be no demonstration *a priori* of the *existence* of God, and further testifies, that it was then a settled point amongst *all*, about which there was no dispute[a].

A. D. 1678. DR. CUDWORTH.

Dr. Cudworth's judgment in this article cannot but be of great weight, as he was a person of eminent learning and abilities, a Protestant writer, and therefore the less apt to take any thing implicitly from the Popish Schoolmen; extremely desirous besides, to draw together every plausible argument, that could with any show of reason be urged for the existence of a Deity, and to make the utmost improvement of them. Notwithstanding all which he frankly declares, in his preface to his great work, his

[a] Dico, Deum existere demonstrari non potest demonstratione *a priori*: ita *omnes* communiter. *Franc. Bon. Sp.* disp. i. dub. 2.

judgment against the argument *a priori*, in these remarkable words: "We do therein also *demonstrate* the absolute impossibility of all *Atheism*, and the actual existence of a God: we say, demonstrate; not *a priori*, which is *impossible* and *contradictious*, but by necessary inference from principles altogether undeniable[b]."

In the book itself he has a great deal more to the same purpose, part of which has been cited above; and for the rest I am content to refer the reader to the pages where he will find it[c].

A. D. 1683. LE BLANC.

Le Blanc is another Protestant writer, of great learning and judgment, who freely declares his sentiments against the possibility of demonstrating *a priori* the existence of God. He does it nearly in the same words[d] with Estius above cited; though without taking notice from whom he borrowed them.

A. D. 1690. ARCHBISHOP TILLOTSON.

This great and good Prelate seems to have thought, that neither the *existence* nor the *attributes* of God could be demonstrated *a priori*, falling in with the sentiments of Bishop Barlow, mentioned above. He expresses himself in these words, speaking of the Divine *spirituality*: "This "is not to be proved by way of *demonstration*, (for there "is nothing *before* God, or which can be a *cause* of him,) "but by way of *conviction*, by showing the absurdity of "the contrary[e]."

Again, speaking of the Divine *immensity*, he says, "I "have told you formerly, there being nothing *before* God,

[b] Cudworth's Intellect. Syst. preface.

[c] Cudworth, book i. ch. iv. p. 715, 716.

[d] Cum duplex sit demonstratio apud dialecticos, altera quæ ex *causis* effectum, altera vero quæ contra ex *effectis* causam monstrat, manifestum est, priori demonstrationis modo non posse doceri Deum esse, cum nec *Dei* nec ejus *existentiæ* possit in ullo genere *causa* proferri: sed demonstrari potest posteriori modo, nimirum ex *effectis*. *Le Blanc, Thes.* p. 91.

[e] Tillotson, vol. ii. serm. 100. p. 671. fourth edit.

" nor any *cause* of his being, his perfections cannot be " proved by way of *demonstration*, but of *conviction*, by " showing the *absurdity* of the contrary[f]." He repeats the same observation afterwards, applying it to the Divine *eternity*[g]. In a popular discourse, he avoided the Latin and scholastic phrase *a priori*. But it is very plain from his manner of expressing himself, that he meant the same as to say, there could be no demonstration *a priori*, either of the *existence* or *attributes* of the Deity: and that as to the *attributes* in particular, the way of reasoning by a *reductio ad absurdum* was the best we could have, the utmost we could come up to. Indeed, the reducing the contrary persuasion to a flat *absurdity* is a kind of *demonstration*, and such as the mathematicians themselves frequently make use of: but then it must be owned, that it is the *lowest* kind of *demonstration*, (as not *directly* and *immediately* inferring the thing to be proved[h],) and comes not up to the perfection of the direct *ostensive* demonstration *a posteriori*, much less to the demonstration *a priori*. It is a good and sufficient proof, but not the highest kind of proof; sufficient for *conviction*, but not amounting to *demonstration* emphatically so called: which is what our judicious Prelate had an eye to, in the distinction which he thrice made use of.

A. D. 1712. MR. HUMPHREY DITTON.

I shall close this historical account with a very good writer and close reasoner, Mr. Humphrey Ditton, who appeared after the time that the *new* tenet of an argument *a priori* had been offered to the world. He either knew not of it, or was not aware of its force: for he determines as the whole stream of *metaphysicians* and *divines* had before done, " that our demonstrations of the

[f] Tillotson, vol. ii. serm. 101. p. 678. fourth edit.
[g] Ibid. serm. 102. p. 683.
[h] See Ditton on the Resurrection of Christ, p. 135.

" *existence* of a God, are *all of them* ὅτι, and *a posteriori*, " as proceeding from the effects[1]."

Now, to sum up the amount of this Historical View, it appears at length, that as to the point of demonstrating *a priori* the existence of a Deity, it is no *new thought*, but very *ancient*, and what has been turned and tried every way, and very maturely considered time after time, and as often rejected and thrown aside as contradictory and absurd; by men of the brightest parts and coolest judgment, and men no way *prejudiced* against it, but sincerely disposed to accept it, and make use of it, if it had been capable of serving. It has been frequently and seriously considered by persons of different times and tempers, parties and professions; by *ancients* and *moderns*, by *philosophers* and *divines*, by *Pagans* and *Christians*, by *Fathers* and *Schoolmen*, by *Realists* and *Nominalists*, by *Thomists* and *Scotists*, by *Romanists* and *Reformed*; and by all of them, as it were, with one voice, condemned and exploded. One shall scarce meet with so clear and so universal an agreement for the reception of any article, as there appears to have been for the non-reception of this, among persons every way well qualified to judge of it, and fitly disposed for judging right, and having all the light before them which any one can now have, or which ever could be necessary for determining the point, to the entire satisfaction of the *common reason* of mankind. Besides those whom I have mentioned, (to which many more of like kind might be added,) as *expressly* rejecting all demonstration *a priori* in respect of the Divine *existence*, great numbers might be further mentioned, who *tacitly* disregarded it, and made no use of it in proving the *existence* when occasion offered: and they also may be justly looked upon, for the most part, as witnesses against it, since they could not well be totally ignorant of it, nor unwilling to take it in and make the best of it, were it

[1] See Ditton on the Resurrection of Christ, p. 134.

really of any force. For what man of discernment would not prefer an *ostensive* demonstration, where it can be had, before any other of a less perfect kind? Or who would not choose an argument *a priori* to come at his conclusion by, rather than be content to work his way by *effects* only, which, in comparison, is feeling in the dark? Yet such is the method that the ablest and wisest men have taken, aiming no higher: Bishop Ward for instance, in his treatise of the *existence* and *attributes*, and Bishop Wilkins in his, and Bishop Pearson on the same subject, and Dr. Barrow, and Mr. Locke, and Mr. Wollaston; besides a great many more: men that could not have failed to take in the argument *a priori*, had they not been persuaded that there was no soundness, no solidity in it.

If now it should be asked, of what use or service this Historical View can be, in a point of pure reasoning, and not depending at all upon *authorities;* I answer, that it may be serviceable for several good ends and purposes.

1. As it is not merely *historical*, but in part *argumentative* also; as discovering the *reasons* upon which wise men before us have proceeded in forming their judgment upon the question in hand: and possibly those *reasons* may meet with the more favourable attention and reception, on account of the hands they come from. For *demonstration* itself must often be content to borrow all its *relative* force from the instrument of conveyance.

2. It is of use in all questions which have before passed through many hands, and have been often and carefully considered, to look back to what others have thought and determined upon them. For it may reasonably be presumed, in such cases, that the point has been carried to as great perfection as it is capable of, since the extent of *human reason*, in all ages where the light is equal, is very nearly the same. Besides, it seldom happens, that a single person, who takes upon him to go on *proprio marte*, without consulting others, will be able at once to view the argument on all sides, or to be aware of every difficulty which may occur in it. *Plus vident oculi quam ocu-*

lus: In a multitude of counsellors there is safety. I am aware that sometimes attending too much to others may forestall a man's own better judgment, or cramp a good invention. But then, on the other hand, the following one's own thoughts too much, disregarding what others have said or written, is often a means to make a man self-conceited and superficial. The way therefore to avoid both extremes, is to try first, how far we can go with our own unassisted inquiries, upon any question of pure abstract reasoning; and afterwards to compare what we have done, with what others have done in the same kind before us.

3. To such as choose to be led by *authority* and *great names*, in points of an abstruse nature, (which they have neither inclination nor leisure to inquire closely into,) it is of use to know on what side the *authority* and the *great names* really are, ancient and modern. And it may reasonably be presumed, that *truth* is with them; unless some fair account can be given, how it came to pass that so many wise and great men, so well prepared to make a true judgment, and so fitly disposed for it, should notwithstanding widely mistake in it.

However, I mention not these things as if any *authority* ought to prevail over clear and cogent *reason*, or as if the question now in hand wanted any *authority* at all to decide or determine it. The same *reasons* which obtained formerly are of equal force now, and are never the worse for the wearing, as time can never alter eternal truths. I proceed therefore to examine this question over again, (as if it had never been debated or considered before,) and to see how it will now stand at the bar of sober and impartial *reason*.

CHAP. II.

Considering the Merits of the Debate about the Argument a priori.

HERE it will be proper to show, but as briefly as may be, 1. That the supposed argument *a priori* is very *loose*

and *precarious*, having nothing in a manner to stand upon, except it be an ill use made of *equivocal* terms or phrases. 2. That it is, moreover, when fully understood, palpably *wrong* and *absurd*. 3. That the several *pleas* or *excuses* invented for it, are fallacious, and of no real weight.

1. I would observe, that the supposed argument *a priori* is at the best very *loose* and *precarious*, having nothing to stand upon, but an abuse of *equivocal* terms or phrases. The whole seems to amount to little more than the ringing of changes upon the word *necessity;* as shall be seen presently. But because that word is capable of *many* senses, and consequently apt to usher in *many* fallacies; it will be proper here to note the *various* acceptations of that *instrument* of delusion.

Necessity is but of modern date (comparatively speaking) in our language. It comes from the Latin *necessitas;* which, though otherwise *ancient* enough, yet seems to have been brought but late into our present subject[i]. I know not what good the Schools did by introducing it, or by substituting the improper and ambiguous phrases of *necessary existence*, or *necessity* of *existence*, instead of the more ancient and more proper expressions; such as *natural* existence, or *emphatical* existence; or such as *eternal, immutable, unmade, independent, permanent*, and the like. The *new* word *necessity*, as here applied, and as opposed to *precarious* or *contingent*, affords no *new* idea beyond the other, but is apt to excite false conceptions, and to promote false reasoning. But since the mischief is already done, as to the *introducing* this improper Pagan term into Christian theology, and it is now too late to undo it; the only way left to provide against the misapprehensions arising from it, is to *distinguish*, as carefully as we can, the *several* senses which have been commonly affixed to the words *necessary* or *necessity*. The most comprehensive division of *necessity* is into four kinds; *logical, moral,*

[i] See above, p. 396, 397, 398.

physical, and *metaphysical*. Let us take those kinds singly in their order, and minutely examine what they mean.

(1.) *Logical* necessity is, where it is an express contradiction to say the contrary [k]. Which resolves into this, that the *same idea*, under different terms, or expressions, is still the *same idea*, and necessarily *agrees* with itself. Thus there is a *necessity* that *man* should be *rational*, as rationality is implied in the general *idea* of *man*. Not that there is any *physical* necessity that this or that man should be so, (for he may cease to be *rational*, or to exist at all,) but there is a *logical* necessity, that the *definition* should agree to the thing *defined*, and that the *idea* expressed by the word *man* should be what it is, while supposed to be so. This kind of *necessity* is otherwise called *necessity* of *predication*; importing an *ideal* and undeniable *connection* between *subject* and *predicate* [l]. As if man is said to be *rational*, or to be an *animal*. To the head of *logical necessity* is to be referred what the Schools call *necessitas consequentis*, and likewise *necessitas consequentiæ*, expressing the indissoluble *connection* between *premises* and *conclusion* [m]; that is, again, between one idea and another, or between proposition and proposition, or one part of a proposition and another part. In short, *logical necessity* is nothing else but a name for the supposed inviolable *connection* between *idea* and *idea*, or between *proposition* and *proposition*, or between *subject* and *predicate*.

(2.) *Moral necessity* imports a *connection*, but not so

[k] Necessarium *logicum* est, cum ex terminis repugnat non esse. Sic *necessarium* est, hominem esse rationalem. *Chauvin*. p. 435.

[l] Necessarium in *prædicando* dicitur, quando datur *necessitas* enuntiationis, seu in enuntiatione. Pendet a *connectione* necessaria *prædicati* cum *subjecto*; id est, ex insolubili harum partium nexu, adeo ut prædicatum non possit negari de subjecto: ut cum dicitur, *Homo est animal*. *Chauvin*. p. 435.

[m] See Chauvin. ibid.

constant and invariable, between *end* and *means*[n]. As when we say, there is a *necessity* of temperance to preserve health; or if it be said, that man is under a *moral* necessity of doing his duty, as it is a *means* to happiness, his chief *end*. It is called *moral*, in opposition to *physical*, which comes next to be mentioned. If any man is violently forced or compelled to any thing, he is then under a *physical* necessity, and so far ceases to be a *moral* agent.

(3.) *Physical necessity* imports an inviolable *connection* between natural *causes* and *effects*[o]. This is often called *absolute* necessity, in opposition to *moral*, which is not *absolute*, but *conditional*, or *hypothetical*, or liable to some exceptions or limitations. It is called *causal* necessity, when intended to express what influence the *cause* will have in producing the effect: as there is a *causal* necessity for the appearing of light when the sun is risen. An *antecedent* necessity, or a necessity *a priori*, denotes the same thing. But a necessity *a posteriori* is a name intended to express what reference the *effect* has to some cause or causes: as if there are things *made*, there is a *necessity* of a *maker*. There cannot be *motion* without a *mover*; nor external *light* without a luminous substance.

(4.) The fourth kind of necessity is *metaphysical*, and imports *immutable* existence proper to God only[p]. It is opposed to *mutable*, *precarious*, *contingent*, *dependent* existence. It is the same with what Dr. Cudworth somewhere calls a *necessary schesis* to existence, expressing the inseparable *connection* between the *existence* and the *subject* of it, between *existence* and *essence*. Creatures are considered as coming from *nonexistence*, and as being liable to lose the *existence* which they enjoy; therefore their

[n] Necessarium *morale* est id sine quo, quamvis absolute fieri possit effectus, nunquam tamen, vel raro fit. *Chauvin. ibid.*

[o] Necessarium *physicum* est, quod ex *causis* naturalibus tale est: ut necessaria est eclipsis solaris ex interpositione lunæ. *Chauv. ibid.*

[p] Necessarium *metaphysicum* est quod immutabiliter existit: ut Deus. *Chauvin. ibid.* p. 435.

existence is *precarious* and *perishable*. But the Deity never wanted *existence*, never can cease to exist; therefore his existence is *immutable*, *unperishable*, *firm*, *stable*, and *enduring* (independently) from everlasting to everlasting. This permanency of being is considered as a *mode* of existence, *presupposing* existence, as *modal* being always supposes *pure* being[q]. It may be called *modal* necessity, as expressing that perfect *manner* of existence proper to the Deity: God's *manner* of existing is above all chance, change, or failure. This *modal* necessity, or self-sufficiency, ought to be carefully distinguished from *causal* before mentioned, *metaphysical* from *physical*. Causal necessity is *antecedent*, *effective*, *operative*; modal is *posterior* and *subsequent*, in order of nature and conception, to the *existence* or existing subject, whereof it is the *mode*, and to which it is referred up as to its source or center, its *substratum* or support.

Having thus competently explained the several kinds of *necessity*, I have one thing to observe of them, that the idea of some sort of firm *connection* runs through them all; and that is the proper general import of the name *necessity*. Connection of *mental* or *verbal* propositions, or of their respective *parts*, makes up the idea of *logical* necessity. Connection of *end* and *means* makes up the idea of *moral* necessity. Connection of *causes* and *effects* is *physical*. And connection of *existence* and *essence* is *metaphysical* necessity. This last is what our present ar-

[q] *Necessarium* dicitur illud quod *non potest non esse, aut aliter se habere*. Quocunque autem modo definiatur vel describatur, duo importat. Quia, quod non potest non esse dicit *esse*; et præterea negat *desitionem* in esse. Quod vero dicit rem sese aliter habere non posse, rem *præsupponit* esse, eamque existere ait cum *modo* immutabilitatis. Adeo ut *necessarium* formaliter debeat explicari per remotionem *mutabilitatis*, idque ad oppositionem *contingentiæ*. *Chauvin.* p. 434.

Necessitas accipitur pro vehementia essendi illius quod per se et primo est *necesse esse*, quod est Deus, et sic proprie definiri non potest. Describitur tamen et notificatur utcunque, et hoc melius per *affirmationem* quam *negationem*; scilicet per *vehementiam* et *firmitatem* essendi, quam per *impossibilitatem* seu *non-possibilitatem* non essendi. *Bradwardin. de Causa Dei*, p. 678.

gument is solely concerned in. It has been sometimes styled *simple* or *absolute* necessity, as opposed to *relative*. For though *physical* necessity may also be called *absolute*, as opposed to *limited* or *conditional*, (as before hinted,) it is not *absolute* as opposed to *relative*; because it stands in the *relation* between causes and effects. But metaphysical necessity has no *relation* to any thing extraneous to the subject of it; it subsists only in the Divine *essence*, considered as inseparably connected with its own *existence*. This is that pure, simple, absolute, transcendental *necessity*, which the later *schoolmen* and *metaphysicians* speak of.

These things premised, I may now proceed to inquire what the argument *a priori* (as it is called) has to stand upon, or how it is supported. The way of coming at it is first to prove *a posteriori* the *existence* of an *independent* Being, thus: *Something now is, therefore something has existed from all eternity*; therefore some one *unchangeable* and *independent* Being, one at least; therefore there is some one *self-existent* or *necessarily existing* Being. [r] Thus far is right and well, for the coming at *necessary existence* in the way of arguing *a posteriori*. Call it *necessity* of *existence*, and then that *necessity* imports a *mode* of the existence before proved, *subsequent*, in order of nature and conception, to the *existence*, and referred up to the *subject* of it. This *modal* necessity is a *property* of the independent Being, denoting his immutable permanency, his infinite stability. But it happens, that the word *necessity* often stands for *causal* and *physical* necessity, (very different from *modal* and *metaphysical*,) and so here begins the first double. The *subsequent* necessity is soon after dropped, and *antecedent* necessity is slipped upon us in its room. Under the cover of an ambiguous name, the *idea* which we began with is first changed for another, altogether new and foreign, and then enters the argument *a priori* with all its train. There is now con-

[r] See Dr. Clarke's Demonstration, &c. prop. 1, 2, 3.

ceived I know not what *antecedent* necessity, and internal *cause*, and *prior* reason, *ground*, and *foundation* of the independent Being; and all built upon nothing but the *equivocation* of a word, or a quick *transition* made from *necessity*, considered in the *modal* and *proper* sense, to *necessity* taken in a *causal* and *foreign* meaning. This "necessity," it is said, must be "antecedent, in the natural order of our ideas, to our supposition of its being[s]." Why must it be *antecedent?* No necessity had been proved before, but what was conceived *subsequent* (in the natural order of our ideas) to the *existence* of the independent Being, being a *mode* of it, and referred up to it: why then must it be *antecedent?* There is no reason at all for it; unless it be that an argument *a priori* required such an *antecedency*, and would drop without it. The supposed *antecedency* in this case appears to be all fancy and fiction, not collected from what went before, by any regular deduction, but *arbitrarily* fetched in, under the umbrage and protection of an *equivocal* name. Put but *immutability* of existence, or *independence*, or *durability*, instead of *necessity* of existence, (which really signifies no more than the other,) and then it will be presently seen how the notion of *antecedency* drops and disappears: which makes it plain, that the notion is here false and foreign, not deducible from any regular train of *ideas*, but brought in, at all adventures, only because the technical term *necessity* admits of *two* senses, and is a serviceable word for the sinking one *idea* and bringing up *another*.

But to favour this new notion of *antecedency*, (so arbitrarily introduced,) it is added, "This necessity must *antecedently* force itself upon us whether we will or no, "even while we are endeavouring to suppose that no such "being exists. For example; when we are endeavouring "to suppose, that there is *no being* in the universe that "exists *necessarily*, we always find in our minds, (besides "the foregoing demonstration of something being *self-*

[s] Clarke, ibid. p. 14. sixth edit.

" *existent*, from the *impossibility* of every thing's being " *dependent*,) we always find in our minds, I say, some " ideas, as of *infinity* and *eternity*; which to remove, that " is, to suppose no being, no substance in the universe, " to which these attributes, or *modes* of existence, are " necessarily inherent, is a contradiction in the very terms. " For modes and attributes exist only by the existence of " the *substance* to which they belong[t]."

In answer to this paragraph, I may observe briefly, 1. That there is no arguing from *ideal* to *real* existence; unless it could first be shown, that such *ideas* must have their *objective realities*, and cannot be accounted for, as they pass *within*, except it be by supposing such and such *real* existence, *ad extra*, to answer them. 2. Allowing that we find such *ideas* in our minds, and that they *antecedently* force themselves upon us, this proves no more than a kind of order of *antecedency* in our conceptions, but does not prove any real *antecedency* with respect to the Divine *existence*, as if that were preceded by something *prior* in order of nature to it. 3. Whatever necessity we may find ourselves under as to *conceiving* or *imagining* thus or thus; yet we are under no antecedent necessity of *believing* that these *conceptions* or *imaginations* do infer the existence of a Deity, till it be regularly *proved* to us, or till it can be clearly shown what certain *connection* there is between *ideas* and *realities*, between *thoughts* and *things*. 4. If such certain *connection* could be proved, yet such proof would not amount to a demonstration *a priori*, being that the process of such an argument is altogether *a posteriori*, from *effects* to *causes*, from things *posterior* to something *antecedent*. For the process runs thus: we have such and such *ideas*, which ideas must have *objective realities* as their cause or ground; and those objective realities, or *real attributes*, must have their *subject*, as all *modes* and *attributes* have: and thus at length by this *analysis*, or in the way of *ascent*, we come up to a

[t] Clarke, ibid. p. 15.

first Cause, which is *antecedent*, in order of nature, to every *mode* and *attribute* supposed to inhere in it, and to belong to it. So that, even in this way, we can never arrive to any thing which can be justly conceived *prior* or *antecedent*, in order of nature, to the *existence* of a first Cause. It appears then, that *antecedent* necessity is very *arbitrarily* introduced into this subject, having no regular chain of reasoning, no proper connection of ideas, nor indeed any thing, but an *equivocation* upon the word *necessity*, to support or countenance it.

I would next take notice, that the *use* made afterwards of this *antecedent* necessity is altogether as *arbitrary* and *fanciful* as the introducing it. The *uses* it is made to serve are, to prove the *eternity*[v], *omnipresence*[w], and *unity*[x] of the self-existent Being. And here it is observable, that necessity is furnished with *epithets* (all in the *arbitrary* way) just as the occasion requires; *epithets* suitable to the points to be proved. When it is to prove the *eternity*, then it is to be styled "absolute, not depending on any "thing external, always unalterably the same[y]." When it is to prove the *infinity*, or the *omnipresence*, then it is characterized as being again *absolute* in itself, and "not "depending on any outward cause;" and now it must be *every where*, as well as *always*, unalterably the same; having no relation to *time*, or *place*, or *any thing else*[z]. But when it is to serve for proof of the *unity*, then it is to be *simple*, and *uniform*, and *universal*, without any possible *difference*, *difformity*, or *variety* whatsoever[a]. That is to say, it shall be what the demonstrator pleases to make it, that he may adapt it variously to the various purposes he intended by it. The neater and shorter way would have been, to have denominated it at once an *absolute, omnimodous, all-perfect* necessity; and then not only *eternity*, and *omnipresence*, and *unity*, but infinite *wisdom*, *power*, and *goodness*, and every *perfection* whatever might have

[v] Demonstrat. p. 39. [w] Ibid. p. 41. [x] Ibid. p. 44.
[y] Ibid. p. 39. [z] Ibid. p. 41. [a] Ibid. p. 44.

been instantly inferred from it. For it might have been pleaded, that such *necessity* had no relation to one perfection more than to another, being *uniform* and *universal*, extending equally to *all*, and *operating*[b] as much with respect to *every* perfection, as to *any*, having nothing to *limit* it, nothing to *control* it. This reasoning appears equally clear and forcible with the other: and both are alike weak and precarious, having no solid foundation of reason to rest upon; nothing but an obscure unintelligible principle, floating in the mind, and managed at pleasure, to make some *appearance* of *demonstration* in a way wherein none can be had, or to cover a *petitio principii*, which yet betrays itself immediately in every instance.

I have hitherto been observing, that the pretended *antecedent* necessity is arbitrarily *introduced*, and then as arbitrarily *carried on:* and now I am only to remark farther, that it is, at length, as arbitrarily *dismissed*. For indeed there is as much reason for going on with it *in infinitum*, as for taking it in at all: and there is no more reason for stopping at *one* fresh antecedent necessity, than for stopping at *five hundred;* nor any more reason for stopping there, than for going on *infinitely*. If every thing that *exists*, and every *circumstance* of it, must have a *reason a priori*, why it *is*, rather than *not*[c], (a supposition which the argument *a priori* is built upon,) then the *antecedent* necessity itself must have a reason *a priori* to fix and determine it, and that another, and so on infinitely. Wherefore if we admit but one *antecedent* necessity as *prior*, in order of nature, to the *first Cause*, there is no reason at all for stopping at the first remove, or for dismissing the notion of an *antecedent* necessity so soon, or at all. The same thought, the same suggestion, will come over again at every new advance higher in the series of *antecedent* necessities: for every one of them will want a *new* ground, a new *internal cause*, a new *antecedent necessity*, to determine its being; and all for the same reason as the *first*

[b] See Letters, p. 19, 34.

[c] Ibid. p. 33.

Cause was supposed to want one. Therefore, I say, it is perfectly *arbitrary* and *unaccountable*, to make a full pause at one single *antecedent* necessity, and not to continue and carry on necessities higher and higher, without number and without end. Thus much may suffice for exposing the *precarious* and fanciful nature of the pretended proof *a priori*.

2. But I proceed farther to observe, that it is not only *precarious*, but manifestly *absurd*. It is demonstrable *a priori*, that there neither is nor can be any proof *a priori* of the existence of a *first Cause*, because there is no cause *prior* to the *first*[d]. But, to be a little more distinct and particular, imagine something *prior* or *antecedent*, in order of nature or conception, to the *first Cause*, what must that *something* be? There are but three possible suppositions, and all of them flatly contradictory and absurd. Suppose either the *substance* itself, or some *property* of that substance, or something *extrinsic* to both, to be that *antecedent* ground, reason, or foundation, prior in conception to the *first Cause*: they are every one of them uncapable and incompetent for it.

(1.) To begin with the last of them, a *principle extrinsic*. One would think by the turn of the argument, in several passages where it is handled, that the *antecedent* necessity were considered as something *extrinsic* to the first Cause: particularly where it is represented as *operating*[e] every where, and always, so as to make the divine Being *eternal* and *omnipresent*, or the like. And indeed if the words carry any *idea* at all in them, and any *force* of argument, they must be so understood; just as we understand them of any external cause producing its effect. But, as an

[d] Hæc propositio *Deus est*, non habet *medium* terminum quo *a priore* demonstretur.—Non potest dari medium desumptum a *causa extrinseca*, nam *Deus est*, a seipso, independens omnino ab alia re: non potest etiam sumi medium a *causa materiali intrinseca*, nam hoc non cadit in Deum: non a *formali*, nam in Deitate non est ulla ratio formalis prior *ipso esse divino*, quæ nostro modo intelligendi sit ratio cur Deus sit. *Gillius*, p. 386.

[e] Letters, p. 19, 34.

extrinsic principle is *absurd* in itself, and is besides expressly rejected [f] by the advocates for the proof *a priori*, I need not here say a word more of it.

(2.) Take we then next the *substance* itself, and consider whether that can be conceived as *prior* or *antecedent* to itself. It is very plain that it cannot: and so much also is confessed on all hands [g], and therefore we may dismiss this article, and proceed.

(3.) The only remaining supposition is, that some *attribute* or *property* of the self-existent Being may be conceived *antecedent*, in order of nature, to the same Being. But that is, if possible, still more *absurd* than the last preceding. An *attribute* is *attributed* to its subject as its ground and support; and a *property*, in the very notion of it, is *proper* to the substance whereunto it belongs, and *subsequent* in order of nature and conception to it. An *antecedent* attribute, or property, is as great a solecism, and almost as flat a contradiction, as an *antecedent subsequency*, or a *subsequent antecedency*, understood in the same sense, and same respect. Every property, or attribute, as such, *presupposes* its subject, and cannot be understood otherwise. To make the property *antecedent* is inverting the natural order, and confounding the idea; and, in short, is denying it to be what it is. The truth of what is here said is so glaring and forcible, that it sometimes extorts the assent even of those who upon other occasions affect to gainsay it. It is confessed, that "the "scholastic way of proving the *existence* of the self-ex- "istent Being from the absolute *perfection* of his nature, "is ὕστερον πρότερον· for, [*N. B.*] all or any perfections *pre-* "*suppose* existence; which is *petitio principii* [h]." If therefore properties, modes, or attributes in God, be considered as *perfections*, (and it is certain they must,) then by this account they must all or any of them *presuppose* existence. Indeed, it is immediately added, in the same place,

[f] Letters, p. 32. [g] Letters, p. 33, 40. Demonstration, &c. p. 21.
[h] Letters, p. 33.

" that bare necessity of existence does not presuppose, " but infer, existence." That is to say, if such necessity be supposed to be a principle *extrinsic:* but if it be a *mode* or *property*, it must *presuppose* the existence of its subject, as certainly and as evidently as it is a *mode* or a *property*. It might perhaps *a posteriori* infer the existence of its subject, as effects may infer a cause: but to *infer* in the other way *a priori*, is altogether as impossible as that a *triangle* should be a *square;* which is joining repugnant ideas together.

In another place, it is observed by the same learned author, " that the idea of *space* (as also of *time* or *dura-* " *tion*) is an idea of a certain quality or relation, which " not being itself a *substance*, [*N. B.*] necessarily *presup-* " *poses* a substance, without which it could not exist[i]." Now if the *necessity* spoken of be a *property* or *mode*, and not a *substance*, it must, for the very same reason, necessarily *presuppose* a substance without which it could not exist. So true it is, that a *mode*, or *property*, cannot be conceived *antecedent* in order of nature to its *subject*, without running into a flat absurdity, and the greatest confusion of ideas imaginable.

The sum then is, that, to make out an argument *a priori*, there must be a *cause*, or however a *priority* or *antecedency*, brought in to argue upon, and to draw an *inference* from, to the *existence* of a Deity: and yet no sooner is the idea of *cause*, or *priority*, or *antecedency* (though in conception only) introduced, but we immediately subvert the idea of a *property*, and of a *first Cause*. It is a vain thing to insist one while upon the *antecedency*, for the sake of the pretended *demonstration*, and then presently to drop it, by retreating to the idea of a *property*, for the sake of warding off insuperable objections. Either there is no *antecedency* in this case at all, to form the *argument* upon; or, if there be, the *antecedent* principle is no *property*, but a principle *extrinsic*. So then either the

[i] Letters, p. 25.

antecedency must drop, and the *argument a priori* drop with it: or if the *antecedency* be kept up, the idea of a *property* is destroyed instantly, and we are yet to seek for a *first Cause*. Turn we the thing which way we will, the presumed argument *a priori* is all over contradictory and absurd. It is not merely abstruse or unintelligible, but plainly and clearly repugnant to reason, and to itself. It is tacking together disjointed and incompatible ideas, which can never stand together, but must inevitably clash and destroy one another. However, as there is no cause whatever so defenceless and destitute, but that something or other may be pleaded for it, and a skilful advocate may lay colours upon any thing: so it is here. A very ingenious defence has been drawn up for the argument *a priori*, in which we have the spirit and quintessence of what the cause can afford[k]. A just reply was made to it some time after[l], by a very good hand, which might save me the labour of saying any thing more to it: but perhaps it may be of service to have the same things represented in different lights; or if it be only abridging what has been said before more at large, even that perhaps may not be altogether without its use. I proceed then,

3. To examine the several *pleas* or *excuses* invented for the support of the argument *a priori*, in order to show that they are none of them sufficient for the purposes intended. I shall break the discourse into so many distinct *parts*, or *pleas*, for the distinct and methodical conception of the subject.

PLEA I.

"Though it is indeed most evident, that no *thing*, no "*being* can be *prior* to that Being which is the *first Cause* "and *original* of all things; yet there must be in nature "a *ground* or *reason*, a permanent ground or reason, of

[k] Answer to the Seventh Letter, p. 40, &c.

[l] Dr. Gretton's Review of the Argument *a priori*. Printed for B. Lintot, A. D. 1726. See also Concio ad Clerum, upon the same subject, and by the same author. Cantabrigiæ, 1732.

" the *existence* of the first Cause: otherwise its existence " would be owing to, and depend upon, *mere chance* [m]."
To which I answer,

(1.) If by *ground* or *reason* be meant a *cause*, the idea of it is repugnant to the notion of a *first Cause*, which must be absolutely *uncaused*, both with respect to itself and to every thing else. But if by *ground* or *reason* be meant only a ground or reason for *asserting* such existence, that we may readily admit, as meaning only that there is a reason *a posteriori* whereby we prove the truth of the thing that so it is. *Reason* and *ground* are softer names in this case than *cause* is, and may sometimes serve to hide the *absurdity* which appears at once upon the naming of a *cause* prior to the *first*. It may, or rather must be allowed, that there is *a reason for every existence*, a reason of one kind or other, either *a priori* or else *a posteriori*: but it is nevertheless certain, that there is not a reason *a priori* for every thing, because there must be a *first* in the ascending line; as also, on the other hand, there is not a reason *a posteriori* for every thing, because there must be a *last* in the order of descent [n].

(2.) Though the *uncaused* Being has neither *ground* nor *cause* to determine its existence, yet it is not *owing to*, or *dependent* upon, *mere chance*, because it is not *owing* or *dependent* at all, but entirely *underived* and *independent*. If the force of the objection lies in this, that unless the existence be *dependent* on something, it cannot be *firm* and *stable*; this amounts to saying, that a *first* cause, or an *independent* existence, is a contradictory notion in it-

[m] Answer to the Seventh Letter, p. 40.

[n] Observa, multas veritates posse *a priori* et *posteriori* simul demonstrari: ut v. g. esse *admirativum*, demonstratur *a priori* per rationale, *a posteriori* vero per risibile. Alias vero esse veritates quæ tantum vel *a priori*, vel *a posteriori* demonstrari possunt: quia cum necessario sistendum sit in aliquo *primo conceptu*, ante quem non sit alius, inde fit, illum non posse demonstrari *a priori*, quia *nullam* habet *causam* sui: e contrario vero etiam sistendum sit in *aliquo ultimo*, post quem non sit alius, inde rursus sequitur, illum non posse demonstrari *a posteriori*, quia (ut supponimus) nihil habet *posterius* se. *Roderic. de Arriag. Curs. Philos.* p. 222.

self. It is certain, that if the existence be *dependent* on any thing, it is not the *firmer*, but may be the more *precarious* for being so. The highest possible *stability* is to be absolutely *independent*, absolutely *uncaused:* this is the strongest security against all possible *chances* or *failures:* and therefore it never can be allowed, that assigning it a *cause*, a *ground*, or *foundation*, is *fixing* the existence; when the supposing it to have no *cause*, no *ground*, &c. nor to *need* any, is really the top perfection of being, the very highest and best thing that we can either say or conceive of it.

(3.) But supposing that there might yet remain some *difficulty* in our scheme, (as difficulties there must be in conceiving *eternity*, and in searching the *mysterious* nature and existence of the *unsearchable* Being,) yet if the difficulty be rather *shifted* than taken away, by the expedient here proposed, or if *absurdities* be brought in instead of *difficulties*, how then are we at all relieved by it, or the better for it? That such is the case here, is plain at first sight. For what if we go on to assign a *cause*, a *ground*, or a *foundation* for the *first Cause*, it is but going one step farther, and there the same *difficulty* occurs as before, besides several new ones. That *cause*, that *ground*, that *foundation*, that *antecedent* necessity (or whatever else we call it) will still want another *cause*, another *ground*, another *foundation*, another *antecedent* necessity to fix and support it; or else, by the same reasoning, its existence will be *owing to*, and *dependent upon*, *mere chance*[o]. If we still go higher up, to a second or a third remove, or to as many more as we can think on, the same difficulty will haunt us all the way in the wandering progress, and we shall never find rest for the sole of our foot, till we return to the place where we first stepped aside, till we come back to the *first Cause* of all things, and there terminate our inquiries. They that attempt to move but one step higher, are sure to involve themselves in inextricable

[o] See Dr. Gretton's Review, p. 15.

mazes, and are doubly to blame: first, for inventing a cause *prior* to the *first*, or a reason *higher* than the *highest*; and next, for making that newly-invented support (according to their own argument) owe its existence to mere *chance*. Let the discerning readers therefore judge upon the whole, who it is that makes the Divine existence *contingent* and *precarious*, they or we.

PLEA II.

"The existence of the first Cause is *necessary*, necessary "*absolutely* and in itself; and therefore *that necessity* is "*a priori*, and, in order of nature, the *ground* or *reason* of "its existence[p]." To which I reply,

(1.) It is allowed that the existence of the first Cause is *necessary*, not *contingent*: and because that *necessity* is only a *mode* of the *presupposed* existence, therefore it is not *a priori*, or, in order of nature, an *antecedent* ground or reason, but it is *subsequent* and *posterior*, in order of nature and conception, to that whereof it is the *mode*: for all *modes*, as such, are *subsequent* to their *subject*, which is the *ground* and *support* of them.

(2.) Necessity *absolute* (in the *metaphysical* sense, as here used,) is a contradiction to the notion of *antecedent* ground, or *cause*, having no *relation* [q] to any thing of that kind. It imports an inviolable *connection* between the *essence* and the *existence* in a being *uncaused* and *independent*. To make connection the *ground* and *reason* of the *existence*, either means that the essence is the ground of *itself*, or means nothing, amounting only to so many words of amusement.

PLEA III.

"That which exists *necessarily* (or in the idea of which "*existence* and *necessity* are inseparably and necessarily "*connected*) must either therefore be necessary because it

[p] Answer to Seventh Letter, p. 41.

[q] See above, p. 431, 432.

" *exists*, or else it must therefore exist, because its exist-
" ence is *necessary*[r]." I answer,

(1.) It is improper to say, that *existence* and *necessity* are *connected:* for since *necessity*, as here applied, imports nothing but *connection*, it amounts to saying, that *existence* and *connection* are so *connected;* whereas, in truth and propriety, the *existence* and the *essence* are what are here supposed to be *connected.* But all the confusion arises from want of distinguishing between *causal* and *modal*, between *physical* and *metaphysical* necessity.

(2.) We do not say, that the first Cause is therefore *necessary* because it *exists*, (for then every thing *existing* would be necessary,) but rather, because it exists in *such a manner*, exists *independently*. Not that *independency* is properly the *cause* of *necessary existence*, or *vice versa*, (for both are but names or expressions for one and the same property or perfection,) but all resolves into this, that God is *what* he is, and such as we prove him, *a posteriori*, to be. We can go no higher than to say, that his nature is *such*, that he exists *independently*, *immutably*, *necessarily*, as opposed to *contingency*. It is wrong to ask for a *wherefore* in this case: it is supposing no *first Cause* at all. The *plea* sets out upon a false principle, that a *therefore* must be given in every instance assignable, or a reason *a priori* admitted. We have done with reasons *a priori*, as soon as we are arrived to the top of all existence. For as in abstract *necessary* truths, the highest pitch we can come up to is, that the *same idea is the same idea*, or every idea *is what it is;* so in our running up to the top of *real* existence, (as opposed to *ideal*,) the highest pinnacle of all is, that the *same being is the same being*, or *is what it is*. Such then is the nature or perfection of the Deity, that he exists *independently*. To assign a *cause* for that existence, is to make it *less;* it is to suppose it *dependent* on something else: it is destroying with one hand what we build with the other.

[r] Answer to Seventh Letter, p. 41.

We pretend not therefore to give a reason *a priori* why God exists *necessarily*, (for if such reason could be given, it would sink the idea of *necessary* instead of raising it,) but we assign reasons *a posteriori* why we believe and maintain it; which is giving the τὸ ὅτι, not the τὸ διότι, and is all that can be or ought to be given in this case, as is self-evident.

(3.) But suppose we should attempt to go higher up beyond the *first* Cause, to something conceived *prior* or *antecedent* to it, will not the same difficulty recur in every stage of the progression? The same dilemma is applicable to the next higher cause, and to every other, *in infinitum*. For it may still be pleaded, that such *antecedent ground* must either be necessary because it exists, or else must therefore exist because its existence is *necessary*; and so the mind is again set afloat, without stay or anchor, in an endless pursuit after more and more *antecedent* absolute *necessities*.

PLEA IV.

"The *eternity* of God can no otherwise be proved, than "by considering *a priori* the nature of a necessary or "self-existent Cause.——That the first Cause has existed "*from eternity*, and shall exist *to eternity*, cannot be proved "from the *temporary phenomena*, but must be demon-"strated from the intrinsic nature of *necessary existence*." I answer,

(1.) The question here is not, by what *other* ways the *eternity* can be proved, but whether it can be proved in this. Be the other proofs, which proceed *a posteriori*, ever so lame or insufficient, their *defects* will be of no service for the healing the *absurdities* of this: so the plea is foreign, and wide of the purpose; unless the design were to plead for the *usefulness* of a proof, which cannot be shown to be a *proof*.

(2.) The suggestion here offered is not *true*, especially as to God's existing *from eternity*. The natural, regular, and indeed the common way, has been to prove the *eter-*

nity before the *necessary existence;* and that is the very way which the author himself took to come at *necessary existence*[s]*:* and no one has better answered this *plea* than *himself* hath done in another place[t].

(3.) If any one were first to prove the *existence* and an *attribute* or two more, and then proceed to demonstrate the *eternity* from the *existence*, &c. before proved, such a method of arguing *a priori* we should not except to, neither do we condemn it[v]. All that we object to is the imagining any *ground*, *cause*, or *necessity*, (or whatever it be called,) *antecedent*, in order of nature, to the *existence*. One attribute may perhaps rationally be considered as *prior* in conception to another, and *existence* as prior to all[w]: therefore the way of arguing *a priori* from *exist-*

[s] Demonstration, prop. ii. p. 11.

[t] "Not to *philosophers* only, but even to the *meanest capacities*, are there "obvious arguments in *reason*, to *prove clearly* the necessity of this Divine "perfection, [*eternity*,] and to set it before them in a practical and useful "light. For since it is in some degree a perfection *to be;* and a greater de- "gree of that perfection to *continue in being:* it is evident, when we con- "ceive of God the *most perfect* Being, we must conceive him to be *infinite* "in this *perfection* also, as well as in others.

"Again: it is evident even to the meanest capacity, which considers things "at all; that he who first gave being to all *other* things, could not possibly "have any *beginning* himself, and must therefore necessarily have existed "*from all eternity:* and that he who hath already existed *from all eternity*, "independently, and *of himself*, cannot possibly be liable to be deprived of "his *being*, and must therefore necessarily exist for an eternity to come." *Clarke's Posthumous Sermons*, vol. i. p. 80.

[v] The Schoolmen have often taken that method of proving the *eternity*, understanding it to be arguing *a priori:* and it seems that it may properly enough be so styled; though some would scruple to give it that name, because there is no *real order* among the attributes. (See Bp. Barlow on this head, Exercit. iv. p. 183, &c.) But if there may be an order of *conception*, it suffices: and that there may appears very plainly. See Richard. de Media Vill. who handles this question at large, lib. i. distinct. 2. quæst. iv. p. 32. And Gillius, lib. ii. tr. 2. c. 9. p. 538.

[w] Vera *superiora* sunt, quæ in solo *Deo* consistunt; ut Deus est *potens*, *sapiens*, atque *bonus*. Horum autem hæc quidem sunt quodammodo *posteriora* naturaliter, hæc *priora*. Posterius enim est Deum *velle*, quam *cognoscere;* et *cognoscere* quam *esse: esse* enim naturaliter hæc præcedit, et universaliter omnia talia *attributa*. *Bradwardin. in Causa Dei*, lib. i. cap. 12. p. 201.

ence and *attributes* before proved, to other attributes not yet proved, we may allow of as a rational and just procedure. We distinguish here between arguing *a priori* to attributes, and arguing in like manner to *existence*.

(4.) It is self-evident that nothing can be proved by a *repugnant* notion of *antecedent* necessity, conceived *prior* to the existence: and therefore *eternity*, both *a parte ante* and *a parte post*, must either be proved some other way, or not at all. That it may be proved in another way, and without the help of *antecedent* necessity, (proved, I say, *a posteriori*, yea, and perhaps *a priori* also,) is abundantly manifest from the many excellent treatises which have handled that point at large; and St. Paul himself has testified the same thing; namely, that the *temporary phenomena* are sufficient to make men *clearly see* the *eternal* power and Godhead of their Creator, and to render them *inexcusable* in their disbelief of it, or disregard to it[x].

PLEA V.

"If the first Cause exists absolutely without any *ground* "or *reason* of existence, it might as possibly in times "past, *without any reason*, have not existed; and may as "possibly in times to come, *without any reason*, cease to "exist. Can it be proved *a posteriori*, that the first Cause "of all things will exist to-morrow? Or can it be proved "any otherwise than by showing that *necessity* is a *certain* "ground of *future*, as well as of *present* existence[y]?" I answer,

(1.) By asking, what must be the *certain* ground of that *necessity's* existing? Or how will it be proved that that *prior* necessity will *exist to-morrow*, unless it be by assigning another necessity, and so on infinitely[a]? This kind of reasoning, if it proves any thing, proves that there neither is nor can be a *first Cause:* and so it is choosing

[x] Rom. i. 20.

[y] Answer to Seventh Letter, p. 42.

[z] See Dr. Gretton's Review, p. 74.

to admit a manifest *absurdity*, only to avoid an appearing *difficulty*.

(2.) To answer more directly, it is not possible in the nature of things to have any higher or stronger security as to the *first Cause's* existing *to-morrow* than this; that he never had any *cause*, *ground*, or *support* of his existence, never *needed* any, being *independent* and *self-sufficient*[a], the prop and stay, the *ground* and *foundation* of all existences. If indeed he himself were to have any *ground*, *foundation*, or *cause* of his being, we might then have some handle for doubting whether his relation to that ground might continue, or how long it might subsist: but when he is above and beyond all *grounds* and *causes*, we have all the reason in the world to believe, that he is infinitely secure from *change*, is independently the same, "yesterday, to-day, and for ever." It is very odd to think of *ascertaining* his existence by assigning him a *prior cause*, which is the only way to unsettle it, and to make it less certain than it is: but it is a great confirmation of the *truth* of our doctrine in this particular, that every argument formed against it is at length found to stand on its side, and to make for it.

PLEA VI.

"When atheistical writers affirm, that the material "universe, and every existing substance in particular, was "eternal, absolutely *without* any *ground* or *reason* of ex- "istence, can this assertion be confuted by him who shall "himself affirm that God was eternal absolutely, without "any *ground* or *reason* of existence[b]?"

Answ. Yes, very easily, by showing, that what those men foolishly ascribe to the *material universe* (subject to innu-

[a] Nam, quod est *a se*, et non *ab alio*, non habet principium durationis. Cum enim in seipso habet sufficiens principium existendi, et existat per *essentiam*, concipi nequit non-existens antequam existat; atque adeo non habet principium durationis. Præterea, id quod non est *ab alio*, non habet in suo esse admistam *potentiam* ad *non esse*; ac proinde non est vertibile in *non esse*, atque adeo est æternum. *Gillius*, p. 1032.

[b] Answer to a Seventh Letter, p. 43.

merable changes and imperfections [c]) does and can belong only to some *unchangeable*, *independent* Being, whose existence we can demonstrate *a posteriori*. It is his privilege, and his only, to be above all *ground* or *antecedent* reason of existence, to be absolutely *uncaused*, being indeed the *first Cause*. But those *atheistical* writers, most certainly, never can be solidly confuted by one that shall assert a cause *prior* to the *first*: because it is, in effect, denying any *first Cause* at all, and maintaining an *endless* progression; which is what every *Atheist* would readily come into: not to mention how easy it were for them to play with *antecedent* necessity, (an arbitrary principle,) adapting the same to their own schemes [d].

PLEA VII.

"The *infinity*, or *immensity*, or *omnipresence* of God "can no otherwise be proved, than by considering *a priori* "the nature of a *necessary* or *self-existent* Cause.——That "this Author of nature is himself absolutely *immense* or "*infinite*, cannot be proved from the *finite* phenomena, "but must be demonstrated from the intrinsic nature of "a *necessary existence* [e]." To which I rejoin;

(1.) From *antecedent* necessity, or from any thing *prior* to a first Cause, (a notion self-contradictory and palpably absurd,) nothing at all can be proved. So then whatever becomes of other proofs for the *immensity*, it is certain and manifest, that nothing can be done with this, which is no proof at all.

(2.) As to *necessary existence*, soberly and justly understood in the *modal* sense, and as *subsequent* in order of nature to its *subject*, (amounting to the same with *independent*, *immutable*, or *infinitely* durable existence,) we have nothing to object against *arguing* from it, so far as it may carry us, or against calling it arguing *a priori*, as

[c] See Wollaston, p. 76.
[d] See Dr. Gretton, p. 21, 22, 23, &c.
[e] Answer to the Seventh Letter, p. 43.

it is inferring one or more *attributes* from *existence* and some attribute or attributes before proved. This is quite another thing from the *argument a priori* contended for, and ought to be carefully distinguished from it: we find no fault with any one's arguing from attribute to attribute; but what we blame is, the arguing from a supposed *ground, foundation,* or internal *cause* of existence, to either existence or attribute.

(3.) As to *immensity,* or *omnipresence,* if the *finite phenomena* are sufficient to prove that it extends to all *real* existence, it suffices: no one, after that, will scruple to admit as large an *infinity* as can be desired, though the proof be not drawn out in mood and figure. Mischief is often done by pretending to strict and rigorous *demonstrations,* where we have no occasion for them, and where the subject is too sublime to go far in, with clear and distinct ideas. Such attempts serve only to make that become matter of *question,* which before was *unquestionable,* while standing only on *reasonable* presumption or *moral* proof.

PLEA VIII.

"If the first Cause exists, absolutely without any "*ground* or *reason* of existence, it may as possibly be "*finite* as *infinite;* it may as possibly be *limited* as *im*-"*mense*[f]." I answer,

This is repetition of the same argument a little diversified, and so has been sufficiently answered in the articles preceding. But I may briefly observe, that the supposed *ground* or *reason* is so far from securing us that the *first Cause* shall not be *finite* or *limited,* that it seems to endanger it the more, by making it *dependent* upon a *ground,* and subject to a *prior* causality. Besides, what shall secure that *ground* itself from being *finite* and *limited?* Must it be another *ground,* and then another, and so on infinitely? Such reasoning destroys itself[g]. And how are we at all

[f] Answer to the Seventh Letter, p. 43.

[g] See the plea strongly retorted in Dr. Gretton's Review, p. 80.

the wiser for being told, that the absolute necessity must be *every where*, or that it must operate *every where* alike[h]? If a *petitio principii* were allowable, it were better to say (and it is as easily said) that the *independent* first Cause must be *every where*, and in *all places* alike; for this is sense at least, if it does not amount to a *proof:* while the other is as much a *petitio principii*, (for who knows *how* or *where* such imaginary cause must operate?) and besides is talking either without *ideas*, or with *contradictory* ideas, as has been often shown. To be short, our *physical*, *moral*, or *scriptural* proofs of the *omnipresence* are *clear* enough, and *full* enough, to answer all intents and purposes, and to satisfy every reasonable mind[i]; as the author allows elsewhere[k].

PLEA IX.

"The *unity* of God, (which, I think, has always been "allowed to be a principle of *natural* religion: otherwise "St. Paul could not justly have blamed the heathen as *in-* "*excusable* in that they did not retain God in their know- "ledge, &c.) the *unity* of God, I say, can no otherwise "be demonstrated, than by considering *a priori* the nature "of a *necessary* or *self-existent* Cause.—That this supreme "Author and Governor of this nature, or of these pheno- "mena, is the supreme Author and Governor of *universal* "*nature*, cannot be proved by us from our partial and im-

[h] Letters, p. 13. Demonstrat. p. 41.

[i] See Bp. Barlow, Exercitat. vi. p. 283, &c. Bp. Wilkins, Nat. Relig. p. 117, &c.

[k] "It cannot but be evident, even to the *meanest* capacity, upon careful "consideration, that he who *made* all things, as he could not but be *before* "the things that he made, so it is not possible but he must be *present* also "with the things that he made and governs. For things could not be *made* "without the *actual presence* of the power that made them; nor can things "ever be *governed* with any certainty, unless the wisdom that governs them "be *present* with them. Whatever arguments therefore prove the *being* of "God, and his *unerring providence*, must all be understood to prove equally "likewise his *actual* omnipresence." *Clarke, Posth. Sermons*, vol. i. Serm. 8. p. 173.

" perfect knowledge of a *few* phenomena, in that *small* " *part* of the universe which comes within the reach of " our senses, but must be demonstrated from the intrinsic " nature of *necessary existence*[l]." To all which I reply distinctly, as follows.

(1.) It looks not well to make the *unity* a principle of *natural* religion, and at the same time to declare that there is no proof of it from *natural* reason, excepting only this pretended proof *a priori;* which, by the confession of its greatest advocates, is not *capable* of being understood but by a *few*, and those very *attentive* minds, never to be made *obvious* to the *generality* of men[m]; which moreover has been as *universally rejected* by the *learned* who have thought of it, as it has been totally *unknown* to the *vulgar* in all past ages; and which, lastly, is not only an *inconclusive* argument for the *unity*, or for any thing else, but demonstrably *absurd.* If *natural* religion affords no other argument of the *unity* but this now mentioned, it is evident that the *unity* is no *principle* of it.

(2.) It looks still worse to plead St. Paul's authority in this case, who if he thought of the *unity* at all, in the texts cited or referred to, yet certainly had no view to this argument *a priori*, as rendering the heathen *inexcusable.* For how could they be *inexcusable* for not seeing what none but a *few*, and not without very *attentive* minds, can see, what can never be *obvious* to the *generality*, what the wisest and most thoughtful men have constantly rejected as *absurd*, and what plainly and inevitably is so? If St. Paul had any view at all to the proofs of the *unity* in that place, (which is questionable[n],) it was to such only as may be drawn *a posteriori*, (from the *few* phenomena in our *system*, or from *tradition*,) which the plea rejects as *no proofs*[o]. Therefore St. Paul's authority is very impro-

[l] Answer to a Seventh Letter, p. 44.

[m] Answer to a Sixth Letter, p. 32.

[n] See Dr. Gretton, p. 84.

[o] But the learned author elsewhere allows them to be *sufficient*, and so in effect has obviated or answered this plea himself. His words are:

perly alleged to give shelter or countenance to the argument *a priori*.

(3.) Men may be very blameable for not admitting the *unity*, though it be supposed that they have only *moral presumption* or *traditional* proofs of it; because the *greater probability* ought to determine their judgment, and because it is unquestionable matter of duty, in *dubious* cases, to take the *safer* side. There was plain reason for receiving and worshipping *one* God, while there was no apparent reason at all for worshipping *many*, but rather the contrary. Therefore the heathen were blameable in admitting a *plurality*; and yet much more so for admitting *such* a plurality as they did; which St. Paul chiefly alludes to, condemning their *creature worship* [p] as altogether *inexcusable*.

(4.) A distinction should have been made, as in some former articles, between the different ways of arguing *a priori*. It is not amiss to argue for the *unity* from the *existence*, and some one *attribute* or *attributes* (as *omnipotence*, *immensity*, *independence*, &c.) before proved; nor should we scruple the propriety of calling it an argument *a priori*: but as to any arguing from *antecedent* necessity, or from any *ground*, *cause*, or *reason*, considered as *prior* to the existence, (which is the way of arguing now contended for,) that is what we can never admit of. Such *antecedent*

"The plain connection of one thing upon another, through the whole material universe, through all parts of the earth, and in the visible heavens; the disposition of the air, and sea, and winds; the motions of the sun, moon, and stars; and the useful vicissitudes of seasons, for the regular production of the various fruits of the earth; have always been *sufficient* to make it *evidently appear*, even to *mean* capacities, (had they not been perpetually *prejudiced* by wrong instruction,) that all things are under the direction of *one power*, under the dominion of *one God*, to whom the whole universe is uniformly subject. And in fact,——the *wisest* and *best* men, in all *heathen* nations, have ever seen, and in good measure maintained, this great truth.——But it is with *greater clearness* from all appearance of doubt, and with *greater assurance* of *authority*, confirming the dictate of reason, that the *Scripture* sets forth to us this first principle of religion." *Clarke, Posth. Serm.* vol. i. Serm. 2. p. 29, 30.

[p] Rom. i. 23, 24, 25. compare Gal. iv. 8.

absolute *necessity* carries no more idea with it than antecedent absolute *nonentity;* unless it means a *cause* prior to the *first*, which is infinitely absurd.

(5.) Allowing that the *natural* proofs of the *unity* are probable only, not *demonstrative*, and that upon the foot of mere reason it is a tenet rather to be reckoned among the *pia credibilia*, than as a *demonstrated* truth; this is saying no more than what several very wise and good men have made no scruple to confess[q]: and if such be really the case, we are the more obliged to *Scripture* for *ascertaining* to us that great truth, as well as for placing it in a clear and just light. *Demonstrations* (strictly so called) are very good things where they are to be had: but when we cannot come at them, strong *probabilities* may properly supply their place. It is certain, that the bulk of mankind are not fitted for *metaphysical* or mathematical *demonstrations;* nor was it ever intended that *moral* or *theological* matters should be governed by them. Blessed are they, who having neither had *ocular* nor other *demonstration*, but moral *probabilities* only, have yet *believed*. Such con-

[q] The learned John Gerhard, and John Vossius, cite Gabriel Biel to this purpose, adding their own reflections upon what Biel had said.

Sed Biel (I. Sant. dist. 2. qu. 10. art. 3.) statuit quod tantum *unum* esse Deum, sit *creditum*, et *non-demonstratum* ratione naturali nobis in via possibili. Id nos ita interpretamur; etiamsi ex *naturæ libro* rationes *non contemnendæ* pro *unitate* divinæ essentiæ asserenda erui possint, eas tamen ad fidei πληροφορίαν cordibus nostris ingenerandam, non satis efficaces esse. Ergo mens prius confirmanda est ex *verbo Dei*, et illustribus testimoniis in quibus se Deus generi humano patefecit: postea utiliter potest addi consideratio *philosophicarum* demonstrationum. *Gerhard. Loc. Comm.* tom. i. p. 106.

Dissentit Gabriel Biel, qui ante annos hosce 140 Tubingensi Gymnasio præfuit. Is censet *probabiles* magis rationes esse quam *evidentes* et *certas*.—— Verum esto sane, ut solæ non sint ἀποδεικτικαί: at magnum iis pondus addit *traditio* vetus; tum autem quod argumenta isthæc, si non prorsus ἀποδεικτικὰ, saltem usque adeo *probabilia* sint, ut τῆς πολυθείας patroni nihil ullius momenti adferre valeant, cur plusquam unum statuere Deum potius conveniat. *Voss. De Idololatr.* lib. i. cap. 2. p. 6.

Note: There were several other Schoolmen, besides Biel, who would not allow that the *unity* could be demonstrated: see them numbered up in Gillius, lib. ii. tract. 3. cap. 7. p. 575.

duct is justly accounted rational in *secular* affairs of greatest moment; and it ought to be so accounted in *religious* also. The adversaries may have a crafty design in requiring more than is *necessary*, and perhaps more than our *faculties* can reach to; and it may often be exposing a good cause, and giving the common enemies a needless advantage, to enter the lists with them upon such *unequal* terms. But this I hint by the way only, and pass on.

PLEA X.

"If the first Cause exists absolutely without any *ground* "or *reason* of existence, it is altogether as possible, and "as probable, and as reasonable to suppose, that there "may, *without* any *reason*, exist *numberless* finite, inde-"pendent, coexistent first Causes—in different parts of the "immense universe, as that there should, *without any* "*reason*, exist *one only*, infinite, immense, omnipresent "first Cause, Author and Governor of the whole[r]." To which it may be replied:

(1.) That this amounts to saying, that unless there be a cause *prior* to the *first*, (for a reason *a priori* means a *cause*,) there may as well be *numberless* first Causes as *one:* which is directly arguing, as usual, against the very name and notion of a *first Cause*. But though a first Cause may or must be allowed to be *mysterious* and *incomprehensible*, yet it should not be thus constantly treated as an *impossible* or *contradictory* idea. If there is any such thing as a *first Cause*, it must be *uncaused*, and can have no reason *a priori* for it. Therefore to what purpose is it to dispute how *many* first Causes there might be, when if this way of reasoning be just and conclusive, there could not be so much as *one?*

(2.) The question about the *number* of first Causes can never be determined by taking in *antecedent* necessity; because the same difficulty will always recur, *toties quoties*, about the *number* of antecedent necessities. For if every

[r] Answer to Seventh Letter, p. 44, 45.

one of them, in the long progression, has not *another* to fix and determine it, there will still be the like danger of *numberless* antecedent *necessities*[s], or reasons *a priori*, at every remove higher, *in infinitum*.

(3.) Scripture has very plainly and fully determined the question: and both *tradition* and *reason* are on the same side. For though there is not perhaps strict *demonstration*, yet there are fair *probabilities*, (as before hinted,) both in the *moral* and *metaphysical* way, well known to Divines; and there is no colour of reason for the contrary side. These are sufficient to build a *rational* belief upon: and with these we ought to rest content.

PLEA XI.

" To argue *a priori* concerning the existence and attri-
" butes of the first Cause is *no absurdity:* for, though no
" *thing*, no *being* can indeed be *prior* to the *first* Cause,
" yet arguments may and must be drawn from the nature
" and consequences of that necessity by which the first
" Cause exists[t]."

Answ. It is allowed, that arguments may or must be drawn from the nature and consequences of *that necessity by which the first Cause exists*, but not from the nature and consequences of *that necessity by which the first Cause does not exist*. Now the first Cause (if it be proper to say it exists by any necessity) exists by a *modal*, not a *causal* necessity; by a *metaphysical* necessity, not a *physical;* by a necessity *subsequent* in order of nature to the *existence*, (whereof it is the *mode*,) not by any *antecedent* necessity. Therefore let us keep to the idea of *modal* necessity, (meaning *permanency*, *stability*, *noncontingency*, *independency*, *immutability*, and the like;) I say, let us keep closely to that idea of *modal* necessity, without changing it into *causal;* and then, if any *arguments* can be justly drawn from the nature and *consequences* of it, let them be

[s] See Gretton's Review, p. 90.
[t] Answer to the Seventh Letter, p. 45.

admitted. But it is very certain and self-evident, that no arguments can be drawn *a priori* to the *existence*, from a *mode* of the same existence, *subsequent* and *posterior*, in conception, to it.

PLEA XII.

" Mathematical *necessary* truths are usually demon-
" strated *a priori*, and yet nothing is *prior* to truths eter-
" nally necessary. To confine therefore the *use* of the
" *term* to argumentations about such things only as have
" other things *prior* to them in *time*, is only quibbling
" about the signification of *words*."

Answ. No one goes about to *confine* the notion of *priority* to priority in *time* only: it is allowed, that there is a priority of *order*, or of *nature*, or of *conception*, where there is no priority in *time*. But it is insisted upon, that there is nothing at all *prior* to the existence of the *first* Cause, in *any sense* of priority whatever; nothing *prior* to it so much as in *conception*, or *order* of *nature*; and therefore there is no arguing *a priori* at all in that case. The insisting upon this is not *quibbling* about *words*, but reasoning justly and soberly about *things*, and things of the greatest *consequence*. The fundamental doctrine of a *first Cause* is directly concerned in it, and several other very important articles hang upon it.

(2.) As to mathematical *necessary* truths, they may be demonstrated *a priori*, as long as there is any other truth *prior* in *conception*, or order of nature, to them: but when once we ascend up to *first* principles or *axioms*, which have no truths *prior* in conception, there is then no more arguing *a priori*, no ascending up *higher* in the scale of ideas, or in the chain of truths[u]. In like manner, as to *real* existences there is a *first*, which is at the top of that scale; and we can go no *higher* than to the *highest*. There all reasoning *a priori* ceases, or ought to do so; because there is no existence *prior*, in order of nature or of concep-

[u] See Dr. Gretton's Review, p. 95.

tion, to argue from; no possible *causality*, no imaginable *antecedency* to build such reasoning upon. There all our searches must terminate; there our aspiring and wearied thoughts take rest. And though an *uncaused* Being is an unfathomable abyss, and we can scarce forbear asking childishly, *how* and *why*, or for *what reason* it exists, and must exist? yet our recollected thoughts must tell us, that such questions are improper and impertinent, and resolve only into a fond conception or contradictory notion of something still *higher* than the *highest*, and *prior* to the *first*.

PLEA XIII.

"To the objection, that an *attribute* cannot be the "*ground* or *reason* of the *existence* of the *substance* itself, "(which is always, on the contrary, the *support* of the "*attributes*,) I answer, that in strictness of speech, *neces-* "*sity* of *existence* is not an *attribute* in the sense that at- "tributes are *properly* so styled; but it is (*sui generis*) the "*ground* or *foundation* of *existence* both of the *substance* "and of all the attributes[x]."

Answ. The sum of this evasive plea is, that *necessity* of existence (since it is absurd to make an attribute *antecedent*) must be a kind of *attribute* which is no attribute *properly* speaking; an attribute *sui generis*, a privileged attribute, not subject to the ordinary rules and laws, to which all attributes, *as such*, must be subject: a *postulatum* too large and too arbitrary to be granted by any man that will not be content to take sound for sense, or words and syllables for ideas. Either let this admired *necessity* be called an *attribute*, and acknowledged to be *subsequent* to its *subject*, and then there is an end of the argument *a priori:* or if it must be *antecedent*, for the sake of the argument, let it be called (what it is supposed confusely to be) a *principle extrinsic*, and so it will import a *cause prior* to the *first*. One of these titles it must wear: for there is

[x] Answer to Seventh Letter, p. 46.

no breaking the horns of the dilemma; that the said necessity must either be *subsequent* as an attribute, or else a principle *extrinsic*, if it be supposed *antecedent*. The truth is, strictly speaking, *necessity* in this case is not the attribute, but *necessary existence* is; and the *necessity* considered abstractedly, or by itself, is the *mode* of such existence, expressing the *manner* or *perfection* of it. Now certainly, if every *attribute*, in the very notion of it, is *subsequent* to the *substance* whereby it is *supported*; a *mode*, which is still one remove farther off, and so much the more *subsequent*, in order of nature and conception, can never be looked upon as *antecedent*, in any view whatever.

PLEA XIV.

"Thus, in other instances, *immensity* is not an *attribute* "in the sense that *wisdom*, *power*, and the like, are strictly "so called, but it is (*sui generis*) a *mode of existence* both "of the *substance* and of *all the attributes*. In like man-"ner, *eternity* is not an *attribute* or *property* in the sense "that other attributes, inhering in the substance, and sup-"ported by it, are properly so called, but it is (*sui generis*) "the *duration* of the existence both of the *substance* and "of *all the attributes*."

(1.) The design of this plea is to intimate, that attributes may be distinguished into several kinds; which is not disputed. Nevertheless all attributes agree in that which makes or denominates them to be *attributes*; namely, in being *attributed* to some *subject* considered as their *support*, and of course *antecedent* in conception to them.

(2.) As to *immensity* and *eternity*, considered either as *attributes* of the Divine Being, or as *modes* to other attributes, they are under one conception *subsequent* to the *substance*, and under the other conception *subsequent* both to the *substance* and *attributes*; that is to say, still *more subsequent*. And such also is the case of *necessity*, as abstracted from existence, it is a *mode* of existence, and so it

is *doubly* subsequent under that formality; which the author himself seems to have been sensible of, and therefore was afraid of calling it a *mode* of existence, though he allows it of the other two.

PLEA XV.

"Attributes or properties, strictly so called, cannot be "predicated one of another: *wisdom* cannot be properly "said to be *powerful*, or *power* to be *wise*. But *immensity* "is a *mode* of existence both of the Divine *substance* and "of all the *attributes*. And *necessity* is the *ground*, or "*reason*, or *foundation* of existence, both of the Divine "substance, and of all the attributes[y]."

Answ. (1.) Existence being *common* to whatever is, no doubt but it may be *predicated* both of the *substance* and the *attributes:* and as *necessity* in this case is a *mode* of the existence, and ought to have been called so as well as *immensity*, and is predicated even of existence, it must of course be predicated of every Divine attribute, because the *existence* which it goes along with, and adheres to, is so predicated. But to infer from thence, that *necessity*, a *mode* of being, is a *ground*, or *reason*, or *foundation* of being, is jumping to a *conclusion* without any *premises;* yea and *against* the premises; because a *mode* of existence *presupposes* existence. To be short, all those words, *ground*, *reason*, *foundation*, internal *cause*, and the like, are only so much foreign language, fetched from another subject, and improperly brought in here; *sounds* and *syllables* only, if they do not mean a *cause prior* to the *first;* flat *contradiction* and palpable *absurdity*, if they do. But the word *necessity* seems to carry a kind of a charm in it to deceive the eye or to beguile the fancy, while by a subtile sort of *leger de main* it steals away the *true* idea intrusted with it, and returns you a counterfeit for it.

[y] Answer to Seventh Letter, p. 46.

CHAP. III.

Briefly intimating the hurtful *Tendency of insisting so much upon the pretended Argument* a priori, *both with regard to* Religion *and* Science.

IT would not be worth the time or the pains, to confute any *false* notion, were there no *harm* in it, or if it no way tended, directly or indirectly, to the prejudice of the world. But whatever hurts *religion* or *science*, hurts the *public* of course; and that these *new* principles are of ill tendency, in that respect, will appear from diverse considerations, which come now to be mentioned.

1. It may be of ill consequence to rest any *important* and unquestionable truth upon *precarious* principles, too weak to support it. It tends to *expose*, rather than to *serve* the cause so pleaded; to render it *suspected*, rather than to bring *credit* to it; and to give the adversaries a handle for ridicule or triumph. One would not indeed altogether discourage any religious and well meant endeavours to strike *new* light into an important subject, and to confirm established truths by additional topics, or supplemental reinforcements. Were it not for the attempts of that kind, made by lively and enterprising geniuses, time after time, we should, no doubt, have wanted many considerable improvements both in *philosophy* and *theology*, which we rejoice in at this day: and were there not scope given for essays or trials which may happen to fail, (as all cannot hit,) we should scarce have field large enough for those that might be approved, and stand. Nevertheless in truths which have already passed through an infinite number of hands, (such as is the *existence* of a *Deity*,) there is the less occasion for looking after *new* topics. Probably, there are no *new* ones now to be thought on, after the utmost stretch of human faculties has been long exercised upon the subject; but those that appear *new* will be commonly found no other than old exploded speculations. Thus it happened to Des Cartes, who seems to have va-

lued himself for the inventing a *new* argument for the *existence;* and he had several admirers and followers, for a time, of considerable name and figure, who closed in with it, conceiving it to be firm and solid. But within a while it was suspected to be no better than a *paralogism;* and not only so, but was found to have been of *ancient* date too, as early as Anselm, and confuted afterwards by Thomas Aquinas[a], and others, and at length dropped by all, because it had been weighed in the balance, and proved wanting. So it will rarely happen, that any *new* thought can be offered upon a subject so trite and well nigh exhausted: or, if there should be any *new* topic invented, it will probably be found much short in value and efficacy of the more common ones, which have been of long standing. The *commonest* arguments, in such cases, may be justly looked upon as the *best;* because they have been proved and tried, and have survived many others of inferior note, by reason of their known weight and significancy above the rest. *Opinionum commenta delet dies, naturæ judicia confirmat.* For the maintaining of doctrines, which have been universally received in all places and times, there is more need of *judgment* than *invention*, in making choice of the *best* proofs that had been before offered, rather than offering *new* ones; which will not come up to the other, but are likely to fail upon trial, however they may please for a while by their *novelty*. The more important a cause is, the more need of caution: because there is a particular reverence due to such a cause, and the risk is the greater, if it be made to lean on quirk and subtilty, upon weak and sandy foundations. Now there cannot be a more important cause than the cause of *Theism;* neither can we any where more dangerously give a loose to fancy, than upon that head.

[a] Vid. Parker, Disputat. de Deo, p. 567. Conf. Gillius, lib. i. tract. 8. c. 3. p. 385, &c.

In Gillius may be seen a list of those Schoolmen who adhered to Anselm in that argument; as also a recital of others who appeared against it, and confuted it.

2. It is still worse to rest such a cause upon principles, which are not only too *weak* to bear it, but which also in their obvious natural tendency threaten to *overturn* it: such is really the case with respect to the argument *a priori;* which is so far from establishing the *existence* of a *first Cause*, (the point aimed at,) that it proceeds upon such premises as admit no *first Cause* at all. The *pleas* made for it directly strike at the very notion of a *first Cause*, proving (if they proved any thing) that there can be no such thing as a being *uncaused*. This has been observed over and over in the preceding chapter; and so I need only refer back thither for the proof of what I here say. Such an argument therefore, however piously intended, and offered with very upright views, yet cannot but be looked upon as an argument of pernicious tendency: and every true lover of *Theism*, who perceives where such reasoning terminates, cannot be too jealous of it. When Des Cartes proposed a new argument (as it was thought) for the existence of a *Deity*, all the hurt of it was, that it fell short of the point, and disserved the cause, only by resting it upon what would not bear: but this other argument, besides its being *inconclusive* for the purpose aimed at, is attended with this further inconvenience, that it proceeds upon principles, which run directly cross to it, and which make it impracticable to prove any *first Cause* at all. For if every cause must have a *cause*, (which is the *maxim* it sets out with, and proceeds upon all the way,) the consequence is inevitable, that there can be no *first Cause*. It is highly proper to declare against so pernicious a maxim, which can tend only to *undermine* the proofs of a *Deity*, instead of *improving* them.

3. There is another circumstance in this matter which deserves consideration, namely, that this pretended demonstration is not only offered as a proof, but is zealously insisted on, and highly magnified above the many solid and standing demonstrations which have hitherto been received and approved by the *common reason* of mankind; as if it were not sufficient to give us a *paralogism* for *demon-*

stration, but every other *demonstration* (justly and properly so called) must be undervalued and slighted in comparison. For instance, it is alleged that the arguments *a posteriori* (though the best that we have) for the Divine *eternity* and *omnipresence* are short of *proof:* which is not *true*, even in the strictest sense of *demonstrative* proof: and if it were true, yet so long as there is other *sufficient* proof, (such as every reasonable man must readily acquiesce in,) it should not be slightingly spoken of; neither should it be suggested that those attributes *cannot be proved.* The *moral* proofs, after all, if not so strictly *demonstrative* as the *metaphysical*, are yet better suited to common capacities, and apter to persuade the bulk of mankind[b]; and are therefore of more extensive *use*, and consequently of more intrinsic *value* than the other. However that be, it is certainly of ill consequence to *depreciate* the solidest arguments hitherto urged in proof of the *existence*, for the sake only of *magnifying* a flight of fancy. When an *imaginary* proof is thus advanced as a *real* one, and not only so, but *superior* to all others, it then becomes more and more *dangerous*, as doing great disservice to the cause of God and religion[c].

[b] "The proof *a posteriori* is level to all men's capacities: because there "is an endless *gradation* of *wise* and *useful* phenomena of nature, from the "most *obvious* to the most *abstruse;* which afford (at least a *moral* and "*reasonable*) proof of the being of God, to the several capacities of all un- "prejudiced men, who have any probity of mind. And this is what, I sup- "pose, God expects (as a *moral* Governor) that moral agents should be de- "termined by." *Answer to Sixth Letter*, p. 31, 32.

"The proof *a priori* is—— capable of being understood by only a *few at-* "*tentive* minds; because it is of use only against *learned* and *metaphysical* "difficulties." *Ibid.*

[c] What Mr. Locke says, in relation to another sophistical argument for the *existence*, once contended for by the Cartesians, is very applicable in this case:

"It is an ill way of establishing this truth, and silencing Atheists, to lay "the whole stress of so important a point upon that sole foundation——and "out of an over fondness of that darling invention cashier, or at least en- "deavour to invalidate, all other arguments, and forbid us to hearken to "those proofs, as being weak or fallacious, which our *own existence* and "the *sensible parts* of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our

4. I must farther remark, that this argument *a priori*, or some appendages of it, look not very favourably towards *revealed* religion, particularly as to the article of the *Trinity;* as hath been observed at large by a learned hand[d], and need not here be repeated. This is an additional evidence of the *mischievous* tendency of those false *metaphysics*, which as they do in one view sap the first and fundamental article of *natural* religion, by destroying the notion of a *First Cause;* so do they, in another view, strike at some of the prime fundamentals of the Gospel.

5. Add to this, the mischief done to *true philosophy*, by adopting one *absurd* principle, which may probably draw after it many other, (as one error leads to more,) or may introduce a fallacious way of reasoning, such as may affect *science* in general. For example: in order to maintain *antecedent* necessity, the ideas of *infinity* and *eternity* are fetched in as *antecedently* forcing themselves upon us[e]; and it is supposed to be *intuitively* evident[f], that those *ideas* have their objective realities *ad extra*. Then *space* and *time* are advanced, as amounting to the same with *infinity* and *eternity*, and are supposed really to exist *ad extra*, and as *certainly* as that *twice two* makes *four:* whereupon they are exalted into *modes*, or *attributes*, or *properties* of the *Divine substance*[g], and God himself is imagined to be the *substratum* of both[h]. Besides all which, the idea of a *necessarily existing* Being is made to be the idea of a Being, the supposition of whose not existing is an *express contradiction:* and *necessity* is interpreted a *plain impossibility*, or *implying a contradiction*, to suppose the contrary, like the relation of equality be-

" thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand " them." *Locke, Hum. Understand.* book iv. chap. 10. sect. 7. Letter i. to Stillingfleet, p. 112.

[d] Dr. Gretton's Preface to his Review, p. 5, 6, &c.

[e] Demonstration, p. 15.

[f] Demonstration, p. 15. Letters, p. 34.

[g] Demonstration, p. 15. Letters, p. 15, 16, 20, 35.

[h] Letters, p. 20, 24.

tween twice *two* and *four*[i]. Nay it is further said; "If "I have in my mind an idea of a thing, and cannot possi- "bly in *my imagination* take away the idea of that thing "as actually existing, any more than I can change or "take away the idea of the equality of *twice two* to *four*, "the *certainty* of the *existence* of that thing is the same, "and stands on the same foundation as the certainty "of the other relation[k]." It is said further, "that *ab- "solute necessity* (that is, *antecedent*) is the cause of the "unalterable proportion between twice *two* and *four*[l]." Now it is more than probable, that this whole train of suppositions, or assertions, brought in as part of the retinue to wait upon the *argument a priori*, is little else but a train of error and false reasoning. It would be tedious to enter into a large examination of every particular, but I shall make a few strictures upon each.

1. As to the ideas of *infinity* and *eternity*, considered as *antecedently* forcing themselves upon us, there is no truth in it, if it means forcing themselves upon our *reason*, and extorting *assent*. Perhaps they may in some sense force themselves upon the *imagination*, (like many other fancies, or waking dreams,) but as to *believing* that the ideas of *infinity* and *eternity* have objective realities *ad extra*, we are not *forced* to it, *antecedently* or otherwise, till *rational* conviction shall render us *certain* of it.

2. As to the ideas of *space* and *time*, they are not the same ideas with those of *immensity* and *eternity*, but are constantly thought of and spoken of in a very different manner. *Immensity* and *eternity* are considered as *attributes* of something, and spoken of accordingly: whereas *space* and *time* are conceived and spoken after the manner of *substances;* as several other abstract general ideas (*nature, fortune, death*, &c.) are. *Immense immensity* is an improper expression, is blunder and solecism: but *immense space* carries no impropriety in the expression;

[i] Demonstration, p. 16, 18, 19.
[k] Ibid. p. 20.
[l] Letters, p. 33.

which shows that the *ideas* are *different*. So again, *eternal eternity* is mere solecism: but *time eternal* (in the large sense of *time*) is a proper expression. *Space* and *time* are considered not as being themselves *properties*, but as being invested with properties: that is, they are considered after the manner of *substances*, as many other abstract ideas are. And because it is certain, that they are not *substances*, (much less can they be *attributes*,) they are, most probably, nothing else but general abstract ideas, *common measures* and *receptacles* formed by the mind, for the better lodgment, rangement, and adjustment of our other ideas.

3. As to existence *ad extra*, it is not to be proved by strength of *imagination*, but by *reasons* proper to the case. So it cannot be justly pretended, that we have *intuitive* evidence. We know and feel our own existence, and from thence can *demonstrate* the existence of God. I say, *demonstrate:* for our knowledge of God here is *demonstrative* only, not *intuitive*, as will be shown hereafter. We neither *see* nor *feel* space or time as existing *ad extra:* we contemplate nothing but our own *ideas:* and from ideas *within*, to realities *without*, there is no immediate consequence to be drawn; but whatever we may draw, justly, must be worked out by deduction and inference, and perhaps a long chain of reasoning, before we can come at *certainty* as to real *external* existence.

4. To pretend, that our *ideas within* are as necessarily connected with *actual* existence *without*, as the ideas of *twice two* and *four*, is mistaking *imagination* for *reason*, and *association* of ideas for *connection*. That *twice two* is equal to *four*, is as certain as that *the same idea* is *the same idea:* and the *connection* of the idea of *equality* is plain and certain. This is only pronouncing upon the relations of *ideas* with each other, and so far we cannot be mistaken, having a *clear* and *distinct* perception of such relations: but *ideal existence* is not necessarily *connected* with *real existence*, like as *idea* with *idea;* and therefore the comparison here made is wide and foreign. There is

no resemblance between the two cases, but they are as different as possible from each other, as much as *fancy* and *fiction* from *truth* and *reason*.

5. To make God the *substratum* of space and time (which really are not *attributes* or *properties*, nor ever spoken of as such) is mere *solecism* and *impropriety* of expression; a certain mark of as great an error in thought. Not to mention many other just objections which lie against the gross notion of an *extended* or *expanded* Deity.

6. *Necessary existence* is inaccurately and preposterously explained by *impossibility of non-existence:* for the *affirmative* is in order of nature *prior* to the *negative*[m]; and, strictly speaking, the existence is not *necessary*, because non-existence is *impossible;* but on the reverse, non-existence is impossible, because existence, in that instance, is *necessary*, or infinitely *permanent*[n]. The *negative* truth in this case resolves into its correspondent *affirmative*, as into its *principle*, from which it is deduced.

7. In the making the idea of a *necessarily existing* Being to be the idea of one whose *non-existence* is an *express contradiction*, there appears to be a twofold confusion; one between *physical* and *logical* necessity; another between a contradiction *a priori* and a contradiction *a posteriori*. There is in a *necessarily existing* Being a *physical*

[m] At vero *necessitas* describi vel intelligi haudquaquam potest absque ratione ipsius *esse:* nam *necessarium* est, *quod non potest non esse*. Quare ipsum *esse* prius est ratione *necessitatis*. *Gillius*, lib. i. tract. 8. cap. 4. p. 396.

[n] Necessarium nequaquam recte per *possibile*, nec per *impossibile* definitur; nihil enim recte definitur per aliquid *posterius* eo, sicut secundo *Post.* et septimo *Metaph.* demonstratur; sed utrumque istorum est *posterius* necessario. Non ergo recte definitur *necessarium* per hoc quod *non est possibile non esse*, vel per hoc quod *impossibile est non esse*. Ideoque *Avicen.* 1. Metaph. 5. reprobat definitiones antiquorum de *necessario*, *possibili*, et *impossibili*, eo quod definiebant illa per se invicem *circulando;* ut patet de definitionibus quas ibi recitat ab antiquis, dicitque id quod ex his tribus dignius est intelligi, est *necesse esse;* quoniam *necesse esse* significat vehementiam essendi, *esse* vero notius est quam *non esse: esse* enim cognoscitur per se, *non esse* vero per *esse*. *Bradwardine, De Causa Dei*, p. 204.

impossibility of non-existence: which is not the same thing with a *logical* repugnancy, referring to our *ideas* as *contradictory* and *repugnant*. Those two things are distinct, and ought not to have been confounded[o].

A contradiction *a priori* is, when we perceive from the idea of such a *cause*, that it is a contradiction for that cause not to produce such an effect. There is no such contradiction as this comes to in the supposition of the non-existence of a Deity: for we see not *a priori* why he must be; we see no *cause* of it; but, on the contrary, we perceive, that he is absolutely *uncaused*.

But *a posteriori* we find it resolve at length into a *contradiction*, to suppose that no *First Cause* exists: it is a contradiction to our ideas of *cause* and *effect*: for *effects* must have a *cause*, and if something now exists, something always existed, something *independent*; for from *nothing* could arise *nothing*. This kind of contradiction *a posteriori* we admit; not the other *a priori*, which is *fiction* only, though much has been built upon it.

8. As to absolute (antecedent) *necessity's* being the cause of the unalterable proportion between twice *two* and *four*, it is all a mistake. There is no *antecedency* in the case. *First* principles and axioms shine by their own light, have nothing *antecedent* to demonstrate them by, are perceived by *intuition*, not *demonstration*; and resolve only into this, that *every thing is what it is*, or *the same idea is the same idea*. The idea of *equality* is the idea of *equality*, and the idea of *twice two* is the idea of *twice two*, and the idea of *four* the idea of *four*: and, as soon as ever the *terms* expressing those ideas are understood, the proposition is admitted of course, requiring no *antecedent* necessity to ascertain it, no *cause* to fix it: it is above all *causes*, being *intuitively*, not *demonstrably* discerned. But enough has been said to show how the erroneous notion of the argument *a priori* has served to usher in a great

[o] See Dr. Gretton upon the distinction between *logical* and *physical* reason. Review, p. 69.

deal of confusion and false reasoning in other articles hanging upon it, or ministering to it: so that the letting in that one false principle cannot but tend to the detriment of *science* in general; which I undertook to show.

And now, to look back to what has been observed in these papers concerning the pretended demonstration *a priori*, the sum is as follows: that the thought is in some sense *old* enough, having been suggested, considered, and rejected by the judicious fifteen hundred years ago: that it has been frequently taken notice of since by the schoolmen and others; and drawn out into public light, but always like a *criminal*, in order to be *condemned:* that though attempts have been made in favour of something under the *name* of an argument *a priori*, yet as to the gross sense of it, in which it is now contended for, (*viz.* as an *antecedent* ground, reason, foundation, internal cause of the Deity,) it appears not to have met with any professed patrons before the eighteenth century; when probably what former ages had been doing was not remembered, or not duly attended to: that the new countenance given to a notion that had been so long and universally exploded, brought it into some degree of credit and repute, before it was understood: that as soon as it came to be more minutely looked into, it began presently to decline, and to sink as it formerly used to do: that it is now found to carry in it such insuperable absurdities, as must of course be a bar to its reception in an inquisitive and discerning age: that, lastly, it seems to promise no good to *religion* or *science*, while sapping the fundamental articles of one, and crossing the established principles of the other.

This appears to me to be a *true* report and *fair* account of what concerns the argument *a priori*, after the most attentive and impartial inquiries I have hitherto been able to make into it.

END OF VOL. IV.