

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THE

WORKS

OF

THE REV. DANIEL WATERLAND, D.D.

FORMERLY

MASTER OF MAGDALENE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,

CANON OF WINDSOR,

AND

ARCHDEACON OF MIDDLESEX;

NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND ARRANGED.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,

A REVIEW

OF THE

AUTHOR'S LIFE AND WRITINGS,

BY

WILLIAM VAN MILDERT, D. D.

LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF.

VOL. II.

OXFORD,

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS.

MDCCCXXIII.

Clar. Press.

1. f. 29.

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EIGHT SERMONS

PREACHED AT THE

CATHEDRAL CHURCH OF ST. PAUL,

IN DEFENCE OF THE

DIVINITY OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST;

UPON THE

ENCOURAGEMENT GIVEN BY THE LADY MOYER,

AND AT THE

APPOINTMENT OF THE LORD BISHOP OF LONDON.

WITH A PREFACE,

Containing Remarks upon two late Pamphlets: one entitled, *Modest Plea &c. Continued &c.* the other, *Unity of God not inconsistent with the Divinity of Christ, &c.*

TO THE

RIGHT REVEREND FATHER IN GOD,

JOHN,

LORD BISHOP OF LONDON,

AND

ONE OF THE LORDS OF HIS MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL.

My Lord,

THE following Sermons, drawn up and preached under your Lordship's influence, in defence of that ancient faith which you have so seasonably and signally supported, have a natural claim and title to your Lordship's patronage. Their design is to show, that we follow not mere *human decisions*, or *words of men*, as hath been *slanderously reported*, but the infallible *word of God*; to which we appeal from the sentence and determination of any fallible men whatsoever. Nevertheless, it is great satisfaction to us to observe, that the Scripture evidences of our doctrine have, in all ages of the Church, appeared so full and clear, that the gene-

rality of wise and good men could not fail of coming into them. We think it no discredit, but a great advantage to our doctrine, that it is *ancient* and *Catholic*. If this be all that some mean, by objecting to us *human decisions*, we do not only acknowledge it, but glory in it. It has been the method of the wisest and best men, since the date of Christianity, to prefer *express Scripture*, or *certain consequences* from Scripture, before merely human and philosophical conjectures. *Human* but well grounded *decisions* have served to beat down the pride and vanity of *human* and ill grounded *conceits:* and hence it is that the faith of the ever blessed Trinity has constantly, and will, I trust, finally prevail over all opposition from men, whose strength and confidence is not in *Scripture*, but in *vain philosophy;* not in the *word of God*, but in I know not what dark and blind metaphysics, the words of men.

I gladly embrace this opportunity of joining in the public thanks to your Lordship, for the late memorable instance of your truly primitive and episcopal zeal against the adversaries of our common faith. The attempt to introduce, by a private authority, new forms of doxology, in opposition to those now in use, which are of long standing and great authority in the Church of Christ, is justly abhorred by all that have the honour of our blessed Lord and of our common Christianity near at heart. To ascribe *all* glory to the Father, in contempt of those other *forms* which give glory

to all the three Persons, is too plainly declaring in *facts* what is disowned in *words;* and is laying aside that *modesty* in *practice* which is pretended in *principle.* It was high time to give a check to such dangerous innovations; and to warn your faithful Clergy against such scandalous abuses. Present and future generations will be obliged to your Lordship for your pious cares and wise endeavours in this behalf; and for so eminent an example of an unshaken firmness in those principles which alone can make our Church glorious or kingdom happy. From which should we ever be so infatuated and abandoned as to start or swerve, (which God forbid,) we should, from being the purest and most justly celebrated Church in the world, become the meanest and the most contemptible of any, (if we could still be called a Church;) should expose ourselves inevitably to the just wrath and vengeance of Almighty God, and to the scorn and derision of all the Churches around us. That these and the like dangers and mischiefs may be effectually prevented or turned away from us, is the hearty prayer of,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient

and most humble Servant,

DANIEL WATERLAND.

PREFACE.

THE following Sermons may be looked upon as a Supplement to my Vindication of Christ's Divinity, before published. I intended them as such, avoiding *repetition* of the same things as much as I well could: or where I could not avoid bringing up again the same arguments, I have endeavoured to give them some farther light or strength; for the most part, enlarging upon what had been before but briefly hinted. I have entirely omitted the argument from *worship*, because I had distinctly and fully treated of it under Queries sixteenth and seventeenth. Some other arguments I have passed over, purely because I had not room for them. Those which I have taken and considered appear to me of as great weight as any; and more than sufficient to justify our belief in *Christ Jesus* as a *Divine* Person, *coequal* and *coeternal* with God the Father.

In my Vindication, &c. I was chiefly upon the *offensive*, against the adversaries of our common faith, demanding of them some clear and good proof of their pretensions in this momentous controversy; since they had hitherto produced nothing considerable enough to move any wise and good man to forsake that faith which has so *long* and so *universally* obtained, and with such visible marks of a *Divine* power accompanying it. They that undertake to alter the fundamental and universally received articles of the Christian faith, which may be traced up to the very infancy of Christianity, or as high as any records reach, ought to be well provided with *reasons* and *arguments* to make good such big pretences: otherwise they do but render their cause ridiculous, and expose their own

vanity. The presumption will always lie (especially in a point of this moment, in which it can hardly be supposed that God would ever have suffered his Church to be so long, so universally, and so lamentably deceived) on the side of *prescription* and long *possession:* and nothing less than clear and evident *demonstration* can have weight sufficient to bear up against it. This therefore is what I had reason to insist upon, and what I still demand of *our new guides*, if they hope to prevail any thing with considering men. I may farther demand of them to propose some other *scheme* opposite to the Catholic, and to clear it at least of all *considerable* objections. For if it appears that there are but three schemes, in the main, Arian, Socinian, and Catholic, one of which must be *true;* and that the two former are utterly repugnant to, or can neither of them be shown to be consistent with, the *whole* Scripture taken together; it will follow that the *third* is the *true one*, unless Scripture be inconsistent with itself; which is not to be supposed. This way of proving our point, though *indirect*, is notwithstanding *just* and *solid;* provided we can make it appear that neither the Arian nor Socinian (or what is nearly the same, Sabellian) *hypothesis* can tolerably account for several *Scripture texts*. But I have, in the following Sermons, chose, for the most part, to proceed more *directly*, giving the direct *Scripture proofs* of what has so long and so universally prevailed; that it may be seen that we have a great deal more than *prescription* or *possession* to plead for our principles. They are founded in the infallible word of God, fixed and rivetted in the very frame and constitution of the *Christian* religion. If our proofs of this, merely from Scripture, appear but *probable*, they are yet *more* and *better* than can be produced, merely from Scripture, for the contrary persuasion: and if what appears but *probably* to be taught in Scripture itself appears *certainly* to have been taught by the *primitive* and *Catholic* Church; such *probability*, so confirmed and strengthened, carries with it the force of *demonstration*. Not that I think our *Scripture proofs* to be barely

probable, though our cause would not suffer even by that supposition. I think them as clear and as strong as should be expected or desired in any case of this nature: and I know not whether the *Scripture proofs* of the *Divinity*, even of God the *Father*, his *eternal, immutable, necessary existence*, his *omniscience, omnipresence*, and other *Divine* attributes, might not be *eluded* and *frustrated* by such subtilties and artifices as are used to *elude* the Scripture proofs of the *Divinity* of God the Son.

It must however be allowed, that in all manner of controversy which depends upon interpretation of dead writings, he that undertakes to *prove* a point, or to *establish* a doctrine, lies under this disadvantage; that, as long as there appears any *possibility* of a different interpretation, an adversary may still demur, and demand farther evidence. Now, considering the great latitude and ambiguity of *words* and *phrases*, in all languages, (if a man would search into all the senses they are possibly capable of,) and that even the most full and *express* words may be often eluded by having recourse to tropes and figures, or to some other artificial turn of wit and criticism; I say, considering this, there may be always something or other plausibly urged against any thing almost whatever: but more especially if the point to be proved be of a *sublime, mysterious* nature; then, besides the advantage to be taken of words, there is farther ground of scruple or cavil from the thing itself. And here the *objector* has much the easier part, as it is always easier to puzzle, than to clear any thing; to darken and perplex, than to set things in a good light; to ask questions, than to answer them; to start difficulties, than to solve them. In a word, it is easier for the *objector* to show his *own ignorance*, and perhaps the *other's* too, than it is for either of them to be *perfectly knowing*, and able to extricate a subject out of all perplexity and doubtfulness. Hence it is that both Arians and Socinians have, for the most part, been content to *object* against the Catholic scheme, having talents very

proper for it, but they seldom undertake to defend and clear their *own:* or if they do, they soon see reason to repent it. When the Socinian is to prove that Christ is a *man* only, or an Arian that he is a *creature*, and that Scripture can bear no other *possible* interpretation, they come off so indifferently, and with such manifest marks of disadvantage, that they do but expose themselves to the pity or derision of their adversaries.

It was proper to observe this, in order to give the common reader a just idea of the state of the present controversy, and of the method and management of the *controvertists*, on either side. The way to judge rightly, either of it or them, is to compare things carefully together, and to observe how they perform their several parts; which are reducible to these three: 1. To prove and establish their own tenets; 2. To disprove those of the adversaries; 3. To object to, or weaken, the adversary's proofs.

For the purpose: what have the Catholics to produce from Scripture in proof of their principles? And what has either an Arian or Socinian to produce in proof of his? Take their evidences together, set them fairly one against another, and then judge of them. What have the Catholics to urge in order to *disprove* the Arian or Socinian scheme? And what again has either Arian or Socinian to plead in order to confute the Catholic doctrine? Let these respectively be balanced one against another, and let the impartial examiner judge which has the advantage upon the comparison. Lastly, let it be observed what the Catholics have to say, to weaken the proofs brought either for the Arian or Socinian hypothesis; and again, what the Arian and Socinian has to plead, to invalidate the proofs brought for the Catholic persuasion. Upon the whole, I may remark, that the most difficult task of all is to *establish* a *doctrine:* the next hardest is to *disprove* or *confute* any tenet; because that, in some cases, (where one of the two must be true,) is establishing the

contrary: the lowest and easiest part of all is to *object* against the adversary's *proofs*, or to puzzle a cause among weak readers.

These things being premised, I may now proceed to take notice of two late pamphlets, wrote by way of Answer to my Vindication of Christ's Divinity. The first of them, indeed, is very modestly and properly called, An Answer to Dr. Waterland's Queries, otherwise, Modest Plea &c. Continued, by an anonymous hand. I was surprised at it, because the Queries had received an answer long ago; and the world expected an answer to my Defence, not a *new* answer to the Queries. I will not say that the author was in hopes the common reader might not distinguish between an Answer to the Queries and an Answer to the Defence, but might be indifferently content with either; nor that he thought he might the more easily triumph over the Queries, after he had exposed them again naked and stripped of their guards and fences: I am unwilling to believe an author of any name or character, (as this seems to be,) could have any such low aims and little views as those mentioned. But I must observe, that the author, in his performance, is religiously observant of his *title:* for he brings up frequently the very same pretences which I had fully, largely, and distinctly answered in my Defence, without taking the least notice of what I had said: for his intent was not to answer my Defence, it seems, but my Queries. Whether this be a proper method to clear a dispute, and to do justice to common readers, I leave to any man to judge. But I am promised, in an advertisement at the end, a *large* and *particular answer* to my Defence, &c. which I shall wait for with great impatience, being desirous of nothing more than to see this controversy fairly and thoroughly discussed on both sides. In the mean while, I shall content myself with a few remarks upon this *late* Answer to my Queries, not thinking myself obliged to go so far out of my way, as to draw up any more *particular* reply to a nameless writer, and one who does not appear to have

any desire or design to have the point distinctly debated and cleared; but only to throw a mist before the readers, and to fence off all fair trial or examination.

1. I must observe, that the author does not offer any particular *scheme*, for fear, I suppose, of being called upon to defend it. Yet if he at all knows what he is doing, or what he is aiming at, it is the Arian scheme or none he has taken up with. There are but three possible suppositions of *God* the *Son*, considered as a real distinct Person. Either he is a *man* only, which to say is *Socinianism;* or he is more than man, but yet a *precarious dependent* being, depending as much on the will of the Father as any *creature* whatever, and consequently a *creature;* which to say is *Arianism*, and the whole of *Arianism*, however variously expressed or differently disguised: the third supposition is, that the Son is *necessarily existing*, *uncreated*, and properly *Divine*, which is the Catholic doctrine.

Now this writer is evidently no Socinian nor Sabellian; and from the whole tenor of his performance it is plain he is no Catholic, in the sense before given: it remains only that he is either an Arian, or else hangs between two, floating and fluctuating between Catholic and Arian; which is the most favourable opinion that can be conceived of him.

2. As this writer pretends not to maintain any particular scheme opposite to the Catholic doctrine, so it may be observed, that he constantly avoids coming to the pinch of the question between Catholics and Arians. He never so much as attempts any the least proof of God the Son's being a *creature;* never undertakes to justify *creature worship;* never endeavours to clear the *Arian scheme* of the difficulties which I had charged it with in several places of my Defence, vol. i. and particularly in p. 342. where I summed up the principal of them under five heads. He is so far from this, that he commonly turns *opponent*, though he had undertaken the part of *respondent;* and by his deep silence, in respect of the most considerable difficulties, seems *tacitly* to allow that they are not capable of

any just and solid answer. I had asked only a plain question, that I might come to the point in hand, "whether the same characteristics, especially such eminent "ones, can reasonably be understood of two distinct "beings, and of one infinite and independent; the other "dependent and finite?" Qu. 6. This gentleman desires to be excused from saying one word of *dependent* or *independent;* and calls it an *invidious insinuation*, to mention a syllable of *finite* and *infinite*, p. 13. This was coming to the *question*, and therefore the point was not to be touched. He runs off, and talks, somewhat confusedly, about some *prime, greatest, incommunicable* perfection, (*objecting* only, when it was his business to *respond*,) not telling me whether he means it of *necessarily existing*, or only of *unbegotten*. If he means it of the former, making *necessary existence* and *self-existence* the same thing, then I shall tell him, that he has no manner of ground for supposing that that perfection is not *common* both to Father and Son: and if that be also Dr. Clarke's notion of *self-existence*, I shall then observe, that the Doctor's *propositions* (particularly his 5th, 12th, 14th, 19th, 23d) are not so *innocent* as this writer would represent them, but are *unscriptural, false*, and *dangerous*. If he means it of *unbegotten*, I shall leave him to prove, at leisure, what real perfection, beyond a relation of order, or mode of existence, is contained in it. In the mean while, what becomes of the Query, which demanded a clear and determinate answer, whether the Son be *finite* or *infinite*, whether his existence be *precarious*, or *independent* on the *will* of any? A direct answer to this would soon have let our readers into the main debate, to be tried by Scripture, reason, and antiquity. I give this instance only for a *specimen* of the author's manner of *evading* and *shifting*, whenever he comes to the pinch of the question: the reader will observe many more such, in the perusal of the whole pamphlet. It is very plain then, that this writer never means to give us an opportunity of confuting his principles, if they happen to be contrary to ours; because he cares not to *own* them,

however invited or provoked to it. The most that he aims at is the safest, lowest, meanest part of a *disputant*, who happens to have a cause which he dares not confide in; and that is, to object, cavil, and find fault with something which he likes not, without ever so much as offering any thing better in its stead, or submitting what he has to propose to the examination and judgment of the learned.

3. It is worth observing what this writer says to the two main points in debate between the Catholics and the Arians, *viz.* the *consubstantiality* and *eternity* of God the Son. He speaks indeed of Dr. Clarke; but I suppose he, at the same time, gives us to understand what his own sentiments are. "There is nothing in any of the Doctor's "assertions, but what holds *equally* true upon *all* (the "possible) hypotheses concerning either the metaphy-"sical *substance* or *eternity* of the Son," p. 29. "All his "propositions are *equally* true and certain both from rea-"son and Scripture, *whatever* the *substance*, and how *un-"limited* soever the *duration* of the Son be," p. 67. See also p. 23, 24, 27, 28, 43, 51.

It is some satisfaction to us, that, as this gentleman pretends not to hold *any scheme* of his own, so neither does he attempt to *confute* ours. All that we insist on and contend for may be true and right, for any thing he has to say to the contrary; which is very obliging, especially considering that he speaks both for Dr. Clarke and himself. For though we have no reason to apprehend any thing from the Doctor's arguments, yet his very *name* and *character* may do our cause harm, among many, if it be thought that he has declared *plainly* against us. This writer charges me with "palpable and direct calumny," p. 28. for saying that Dr. Clarke every where denies the *consubstantiality*. Softer words might have done as well, in one that professes "not to render evil for evil, nor railing for "railing." I had certainly no intention to *calumniate* the Doctor; I gave my reasons for what I said, which have not been answered; I did not lay any thing to his charge more than what the Country Clergyman, and Mr. Emlyn,

and several others, who are thought the Doctor's friends, believed of him as well as I. I will not say what may be pleaded to make good the charge, from the Doctor's own books, from the whole drift and tenor of them, besides many particular passages, and what from this very piece wrote in his defence; nor how unaccountable his whole conduct relating to this controversy is on any other supposition; nor how needless it is to prove what hardly friend or foe makes any doubt of. Let it be so, that the Doctor has neither directly nor by necessary consequence denied either the *consubstantiality* or *eternity*. I am more willing to have it thought that the charge is false and groundless, than this author imagines; and gladly take this opportunity of acquainting the world that the Doctor has less to say against the *received* doctrine, than was once believed of him. I am always very averse to representing any man worse than he really is, especially such a man as Dr. Clarke, who may be a credit to our cause, as soon as it appears that he does not really differ from us.

I am very unwilling that any man of sense and learning should be thought an Arian, (Arians generally have been men of a different character;) and if it can be made appear either that the Doctor never was such, or has ceased to be such, upon farther views, (his own good sense leading him at length out of it,) I shall very heartily rejoice at it, and acknowledge my mistakes or misrepresentations with infinitely greater pleasure than I could ever be supposed to make them. If the Doctor has really denied no *consubstantiality* that either the Ante-Nicene Fathers or the Council of Nice intended, (as this author says he has not, p. 27, 28.) I am very glad of it, and desire no more than that the Doctor do *sincerely* acknowledge the same, and *abide* by it: and I hope that those who pretend to have the Doctor's authority to countenance them in their opposition to the *received doctrine*, (the same which the Ante-Nicene Fathers and Council of Nice taught,) will take *special* notice of it. What is it

then that the Doctor and we differ about? This author will tell us: the Doctor's "three hundred texts were "brought to prove a *subordination*, not in mere *position* "*or order of words*," &c. p. 40. "The Son must be *sub-* "*ordinate* to the Father in *real order of nature and dig-* "*nity*, and not in mere *position of words*," p. 29. "The "subordination of the Son—is not a subordination merely "*nominal*, consisting (according to Dr. Waterland) in "mere *position or order of words*—but it is a *real subordi-* "*nation* of the Son to the Father, in point of *authority* "*and dominion* over the universe. This is the main, the "true and only point," &c. p. 57, 58. Let us see then, if this *main*, this *true* and *only point* can be any way adjusted between us: for we are very desirous to have the learned Doctor on our side, as nearly as possible; or if he must be against us at last, the less the better, both for him and us. Perhaps the Doctor is with us in the main, only has happened unfortunately to mistake our principles; which is a very usual thing with disputants in most controversies. If he has the same notion which this author has, that D. Waterland makes the subordination to consist in "a mere position or order of words," it is a mistake indeed; and I cannot but wonder at his peculiar fancy. I always intended, always spoke of a *real* subordination: but then I considered the strict force and propriety of the word *subordination*, implying a difference of *order* only, while the *nature* is supposed *equal*. We do not say that things of a *lower* kind are *subordinate*, but *inferior*, to those of an *higher*. Brutes are not *subordinate*, but *inferior* to man; and *creatures* are not (in strict propriety) *subordinate*, but *inferior* to God. I allow all that is really, truly, and strictly *subordination*; excepting against nothing but *inferiority*, (which is more than *subordination*,) and *division* of substance, such as is between two *human* persons acting *subordinately* one to the other. But of this matter I had declared my mind fully and distinctly in my Defence, vol. i. p. 205, and therefore wonder the more, how I came to be so strangely mis-

understood by this *writer*. If the Doctor will be contented with a *real subordination*, (admitting no *inferiority*, no *inequality* of nature,) he and I need not differ. But if he carries the point one tittle farther, I desire to know what sense or meaning he can possibly have in it, without making the Son of God a *creature:* which if he does, I hope I shall no longer be charged with *calumny;* and that the Doctor will think himself obliged, not to *say*, or to *insinuate* it only, but to *prove* it (if possible) from *Scripture, reason*, or *antiquity*. There will be no occasion to stand upon any nicety of expression. We shall apprehend his meaning, if he pleases only to say plainly, that the Son is not *necessarily existing;* which may be a softer way of saying, that he is a *precarious* being; which is another phrase for *creature*. The Modest Pleader, indeed, has spoke out[a]; and a certain gentleman that calls himself *a seeker after truth*, and pretends to be in Dr. Clarke's interest, says, in the name of the whole party, that they *are not backward to express their* denial of Christ's *necessary existence;* but that they *avowedly maintain, with the most ancient Fathers*, (that is, so far as he knows any thing of the *Fathers*,) that the Son is not *necessarily existing*[b]. Had Dr. Clarke not been *backward* in saying this, or had he *avowedly* and plainly *maintained* it, it would have saved us some trouble: and I must then have insisted upon it, from that *single* consideration, that every tittle of what I charged him with was just and undeniable. He does indeed drop something very like it, (Reply, p. 230, 231.) but if that be really his meaning, (which however I charge him not with,) and if his *propositions* are to be interpreted accordingly; this author does very ill in pretending, that I have not attempted to refute the Doctor's *principal* propositions, when my whole book is directly levelled against that very tenet; and is (if I do not too much flatter myself) a full confutation of the Doctor's *principal* propo-

[a] Modest Plea, &c. p. 17, 217.

[b] Second Letter to Dr. Mangey, p. 27.

sitions, supposing he meant *necessarily existent* by *self-existent*. I was once of opinion (but let it pass for *conjecture* only) that the Doctor, having a mind to introduce the Arian heresy, thought to do it *obliquely*; not by calling the *Son* a *creature*, which is gross, but by denying his *necessary existence*[c], which comes to the same thing: and yet this was to be done *covertly*, under the name of *self-existence*; a word with two faces, one to oblige friends, the other to keep off adversaries. But this may be my *fancy* only. One thing however I must observe, that if the Doctor has any design against the *necessary existence* of the Son, he has not so much as one single text of Scripture to help him in it. He must be obliged to the *Fathers*, (whose verdict nevertheless he will not stand to,) even for so much as a *colour* to his pretences; as appears by his seventeenth proposition, which stands only on the *authority* of *Fathers*; though it is the most to his purpose of any that he has, and seems to come the nearest to the point in question. It will not be difficult to disable him from doing any thing with the *Fathers*: I have, in a great measure, obviated his pretences that way in my Defence of Query the eighth. It will be easy to show, that none of the *Fathers* looked upon God the Son as a *precarious being*, but asserted his *necessary existence*. This is certain and manifest even of those very *Fathers* who speak of a *voluntary generation*. We are not indeed to expect the word *necessary existence*, (a *school term*, and none of the most proper,) but the *thing* we shall find, in other words, fully and clearly asserted. This writer tells me, (p. 15.) that I have not been able to produce one single passage out of any one Ante-Nicene Father, wherein the Son is affirmed

[c] This very artifice was made use of by the ancient Arians, who being ashamed to call the Son a *creature*, contrived to say the same thing, in other words, by denying his *necessary existence*. Πῶς οὐ δείκνυται τούτων ἡ πολυκέφαλος πανουργία; ὅτι καταισχυνθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ λέγειν ποίημα καὶ κτίσμα, καὶ οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γεννηθῇ ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος, ἄλλως πάλιν κτίσμα λέγουσιν αὐτὸν εἶναι, βούλησιν προβαλλόμενοι, &c. *Athanas. Orat.* iii. p. 610.

to have *emaned*, or been *emitted* by *necessity* of *nature*. He might have said likewise, that I could not produce any one Post-Nicene Father affirming the Son to have *emaned*, or been emitted *by necessity* of *nature:* that is, they never express it in those *terms*. Ἀνάγκη in the Greek, and *necessitas* in the Latin, had not the same sense which the word *necessity* bears, when we say that God exists by *necessity of nature*. It shows but small acquaintance with *ecclesiastical* language, for Dr. Clarke to understand by ἀνάγκη φυσικὴ, and φύσεως ἀνάγκη, (Script. Doctr. p. 252, 253.) the same that we understand by *necessity of nature*. The Fathers understood by it outward *coaction*, *force*, or *compulsion;* and what we express by *necessity of nature*, they expressed by the word *nature: e. g.* God is *by nature* good, he *exists*, or is God, *by nature*, (φύσει, or κατὰ φύσιν,) generates a Son *by nature*, and so on, in opposition to *necessity*, which (in their sense) could not be ascribed to God at all[d]. Such as denied the Son's existing by *necessity of nature*, would, for the same reason, have denied likewise that God exists by *necessity of nature*. *Necessary generation*, (as we call it,) they expressed generally by Christ's being God *by nature*, or a Son *by nature*. Upon the whole, we may leave the Doctor either to give up the *Fathers*, or to abide by their authority, just as he pleases. If he gives them up, he has not one text of Scripture for his main *position*, (supposing it his,) that the Son is not *necessarily existent:* if he abides by the *authority* of the *Fathers*, they are, when rightly understood, plainly against him, (as may be easily made appear,) and

[d] Vid. Athanas. p. 611. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iv. cap. 9. p. 540. Damasc. de Fid. Orthod. lib. iii. cap. 14. p. 221. Hilar. de Synod. p. 1184. Basil. contr. Eun. ii. p. 56, 57. Cyrill. Thesaur. p. 53. August. de Trin. lib. xv. p. 993. Epiphan. Ancorat. n. 51.

See some other references in Petavius de Trin. lib. vi. cap. 8. p. 343. As to Ante-Nicene Fathers, if some of them supposed the *generation*, or προαίλευσις, of the Son to be properly *voluntary*, yet all of them supposed his *existence* to be *necessary*, (as we call it,) and expressed it in such terms as they expressed the *necessary existence* of the Father by.

can do him no service. But I return to the writer of the pamphlet.

4. He is pleased, in his Preface, to condemn the *method* which I have taken in this controversy. But, I suppose, little regard is to be had to the judgment of an *adversary*, who will be apt to *condemn* such a *method* as he was most afraid of, and commend such as might be most advantageous to his own cause. The *method* which he has chalked out for me is as follows. Either,

1. "To show that Dr. Clarke had mistaken or mis-"interpreted *all*, or at least the *principal* texts of Scrip-"ture which he has cited." Or,

2. "To examine the truth of *all*, or the *principal* of his "*propositions*."

I have, in effect, done this, though in my own *method*. But, however, the gentleman should consider, that many of the Doctor's *comments* and *propositions* are purely wide and foreign to the dispute; excepting only that the more *pernicious* an *error* is, so much the more necessary is it to mix a great deal of truth with it, to make it go down with the readers. Many more of the Doctor's *comments* and *propositions* are *general* or *ambiguous*, looking two ways; having properly no one meaning, because no *determinate* meaning. Such being the case, I took the short and plain way, which is always the best when a man has a cause he can confide in: and that was, to cut off impertinences, and to come to the *main question*, laying all the stress there. Whatever I met with, in the Doctor's books, that appeared to make the Son of God a *creature*, or a *precarious* being, or not *necessarily existing*, (for these are all the same, without any difference, more than lies in the syllables,) I endeavoured to confute; and I hope I have done it. The learned Doctor may now open himself; or he may let it alone if he pleases: it matters not what his tenets are, provided the true Catholic tenets be preserved and maintained. If he had any *ill meaning* in his *comments* or *propositions*, I have used my best endeavours to

prevent any *ill effects* it might have among some readers: if he had not, I am very glad of it, and have done no more than explained his doctrine for him to an *orthodox* sense; which he ought himself to have done long ago, if he really had no design against the *Catholic received* doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity. But enough of this.

I must here take notice of this gentleman's doctrine about *worship*; though it be rather obscurely intimated, than plainly expressed: the *innuendo way* of writing, as I take it, is the art of imposing upon the *vulgar*, at the same time preventing, as much as possible, the examination of the learned. All worship, he says, should "be to the "glory of God the Father," (p. 57.) Who doubts it? I hope the worship of the Son is to the "glory of God the Fa- "ther:" why then does this writer find fault? or what is it he has a mind to say, and is afraid to speak out, "to the "glory of God the Father?" Has he some secret and reserved meaning? So it seems, or else it will be very hard to make out the pertinency or consistency of his observations. He directs us (p. 64.) "to worship uniformly "the one God, the Father Almighty, even our Father "which is in heaven, through the intercession of his only "Son our Lord Jesus Christ, in the manner the Scripture "directs." Do not all Churches, and our own in particular, do it *uniformly*, and in the *manner the Scripture* directs? What is it then that the writer aims at? I could perhaps point out what it is that offends him. Is it not either that *direct worship* is paid to the Son at all; or that the *Son* is worshipped as *God?* But sure the author is not so *rash* or inconsiderate, as to advise us to any such *dangerous* innovation in worship, either to leave out the *Son* entirely, or not to worship him as *God*. What could a professed Eunomian or the rankest Socinian desire more? Can Dr. Clarke, (for, I suppose, he speaks for the Doctor and himself too,) can Dr. Clarke desire this? He that has not yet determined either against the *consubstantiality* or *eternity* of God the Son: he that has only a few scruples

about *subordination*, (owing to his mistake of Catholic principles, and his not attending to strict propriety of language,) hardly in the main differing from us, if this writer's pretences be *real* and *sincere;* would he have us *ungod* the Son in our *practice*, even before we see reason to alter our *principles?* or must we strike *Christ's Divinity* out of our public service, before we do it out of our *articles* of *faith?* It will be time enough for the Doctor to give this advice, after he has *declared* plainly against the *eternity* and *consubstantiality* of the Son; after he has not only declared against them, but *disproved* them, which he can never do; after he has made it as clear as the sun, that the *Christian world* have been in an error, have been *idolaters*, from the beginning downwards to this day. It is poor pretence to say that we are "not to build any prac-"tices, wherein the worship of God is immediately con-"cerned, upon *metaphysical speculations*, not mentioned "in Scripture," p. 64. The *Divinity* of *Christ* is a *Scripture truth*, as much as the *Divinity* of the *Father;* and one is no more a *metaphysical speculation* than the other. Besides that it is strangely improper and absurd to call these principles pure *speculations*, which are of so great importance for the regulating our *worship*, that we can neither omit to worship *Christ*, if they are true, without the greatest *impiety;* nor perform it, if they are false, without being guilty of *idolatry*. In short, there is no sense in what this writer here says, but upon the supposition that *Christ* is really a *creature;* and that the dispute only were whether a *creature* might, in any forced improper sense, be said to be *eternal*, or *consubstantial;* which indeed would be both a fruitless and an impertinent *speculation*, after giving up the whole point in debate. But it is farther pretended, (p. 65.) that we "should confine "ourselves to the clear and uncontroverted expressions of "Scripture concerning them (the Son and Holy Spirit) "and the honour due unto them; and this is undoubtedly, "upon all possible hypotheses, right and sufficient in

" practice." But let this writer tell us, whether, in his opinion, every thing *controverted* is to be set aside, or only what is *justly* controverted. The former would come properly enough from a Deist, who will make Scripture itself a *controverted* point; and an Atheist would still go farther. Let this gentleman show that the *Divinity*, or *direct worship* of Christ is *justly* controverted: till he has done this, he has said nothing. It is ridiculous to tell us, (if that be his meaning,) that to worship the Father only, leaving out the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, is sufficient, " upon all " possible hypotheses;" when upon the *hypothesis* that all the three Persons are *one God*, (which is something more than an *hypothesis*,) no one of the Persons can be entirely omitted without manifest iniquity and impiety. It is in vain to think of any expedients in this affair, while our doctrine stands unconfuted. There is no room left so much as for a *neutrality*, in the present case. For I will be bold to say, and bound to make it good, that, all circumstances considered, there can be no reasons sufficient to make a man *neuter* in this point, but what would be sufficient to determine him on the *opposite side*.

I shall here take leave of this writer, having occasionally remarked upon some passages of his, by way of *note* to my Sermons; and designing, God willing, to consider every thing material (if I have here omitted any thing) hereafter; when I am favoured with a *large and particular answer* to my Defence of some Queries.

There is another writer who, in a sixpenny pamphlet, has drawn his pen against me. It is entitled, The Unity of God not inconsistent with the Divinity of Christ: (nominal *Divinity* he means:) being Remarks on the Passages in Dr. Waterland's Vindication &c. relating to the Unity of God, and to the Object of Worship.

The author is a grave, sober writer; and ingenuously speaks his mind, without any doublings or disguises. It is a satisfaction to any man, who has no concern for any thing but *truth*, to have such an adversary to deal with;

for then it is soon seen what we have to do. Much time, much trouble, much wrangling is saved: we presently enter into the merits of the cause, for the ease and benefit of the reader. This writer takes the *Arian hypothesis:* for he supposes the Son to have been a *distinct Spirit;* (p. 7.) to have been *God's instrument in the creation;* (p. 26.) not to be *true God;* (p. 34.) to have been *ignorant* of the day of judgment, considered in his highest capacity, *i. e.* as the *second Person of the Trinity.* (p. 8.) Having seen his drift and design, let us next examine his performance. He does not undertake to show that the *received* doctrine *cannot* be true; or that his own (*i. e.* the Arian) *must be* true; one of which I might reasonably have expected of him, since he pretends to have drawn up *an answer to the main parts* of my Vindication &c. But he is content to show (so far as he is able) that his doctrine *may be* true, notwithstanding one or two arguments which I have made use of against it. In a word, he undertakes to prove that *some* of my arguments against *Arianism* are not conclusive. With what success, I come now to show; after taking notice to the reader, that, supposing he had really done what he intended, it does not follow that the Arian doctrine *must be* true, nor that there are not arguments enough to prove it *cannot* be true; but only that I have used an argument or two, which *alone* are not sufficient for my purpose. One considerable objection against the Arian scheme is, that it stands in opposition to the *first and great commandment;* introducing *two Gods*, and *two objects of worship;* not only against Scripture, but also against the unanimous sense of the *Christian Church* from the beginning, and of the *Jewish Church* before; which together are the safest and best comment we can have upon Scripture. This is one considerable objection, among many, against *Arianism;* and is what this *writer* has undertook to answer. He applies himself particularly to the *English* and *unlearned* reader, (p. 4.) whom he hopes to satisfy; the

rather, I suppose, because the argument is *learned*, and must lose much of its force and strength on our side, when stripped of its additional advantages from *history* and *antiquity:* besides that the *unlearned* reader (especially in this controversy) may be easily imposed upon by little *turns* and *fallacies;* such as have been tried, and examined, and despised, long ago, by those that have been thoroughly read and conversant in these matters. But to proceed to what I design, by way of remark upon this writer and his performance: the sum of what he pretends to is contained in the following particulars.

1. That we have no sufficient grounds for charging the Arian doctrine with the belief or worship of two Gods.

2. Nor for our own doctrine that Father and Son are *one God.*

3. That we have no certain warrant for appropriating every kind and degree of *religious* worship to God alone.

4. That *mediatorial* worship may be due to Christ, though not *true* God, or *supreme* God.

5. That Dr. Waterland has, in effect, given up the main of what the Arians contend for.

These several particulars (containing his sense, though, for brevity and perspicuity, expressed in my own words) must be examined in their order.

1. He pretends, first, that we have no sufficient grounds for charging the Arian doctrine with the belief or worship of *two Gods.* He has a particular fancy of his own, that the phrase *two Gods* signifies *two supreme independent Gods,* p. 32. And that a *supreme God* and a *subordinate God* are not *two Gods,* p. 34. I shall, first, examine his reasons for this; and, next, endeavour to convince him that it is neither true in itself, nor would answer his purpose, if it really were true.

He observes, from Matt. vi. 24. that *two masters* do not there mean a *supreme* and a *subordinate* master, but *two coordinate* or *independent* masters, p. 32. He could not have pitched upon an instance less to his purpose.

It may appear somewhat harsh to put *God* and *mammon* so much upon the level, as to suppose them two *coordinate* or *independent* masters: but, waving that, it is very plain that the text is meant of two *opposite* or *disagreeing* masters, whether *coordinate* or *subordinate*. If two *coordinate* masters agreed perfectly together, it would be as easy to *serve* both as one. If this text be any rule for the *common* way of speaking, two *coordinate* or *independent* masters (provided they were but wise enough and good enough to agree constantly in every thing) could not be justly called *two masters*. The Trinitarian Tritheists, if there be any such, will, I suppose, be very thankful to our author for this discovery. Upon the hardest supposition that can be made, the doctrine of the Trinity, upon these principles, will stand perfectly clear of *Tritheism*: so that if the author has any way served his own cause, he has at the same time been extremely kind to his adversaries. But what hinders this text from being at all serviceable either to one or the other is, that the *expression* here, in St. Matthew, is somewhat particular and unusual; and can by no means be made a rule of speech, against the more general and current use of language.

This writer endeavours, next, to find some instances of a *sovereign and a subordinate king*, which together were not, or are not, *two kings*. He instances in David and Solomon; who were not, that I know of, each of them a *king* at the same time. He proceeds farther to the instance of Pharaoh and Joseph; that is, of a *king* and *no king*: and he instances in a king of Great Britain and a lord lieutenant of Ireland; that is, again, a *king* and *no king*: so hard a matter is it any where to meet with two that are *kings*, and yet are not *two kings*.

He observes, next, that "one Saviour, one Master, one "Potentate, one Father, one Lord, one Shepherd, &c. "signify one supreme *Saviour*, *Potentate*, *Master*, &c. "and so *two Gods* must necessarily signify two supreme "Gods," p. 33. But, for any thing he knows, "one

" Saviour, one Master, one Potentate, &c." may as well signify one *heavenly*, or one *adorable*, or one *necessarily existent Saviour*, *Master*, *Potentate*, &c. one, in some distinguishing, *emphatical* sense, whatever it be; yet not excluding what essentially belongs to that one. Our blessed Lord is *one Lord*, (1 Cor. viii. 6.) and yet I hardly believe our author will construe it *one supreme Lord*, or one Lord in the *highest* sense. He is also our *Saviour*, emphatically and eminently so styled; yet this writer will not from thence conclude that he is *supreme* Saviour, and all others (suppose the *Father* himself) *subordinate* to him. This author therefore has taken a very uncertain and fallible rule for the interpreting of *emphatical* appellations. Besides that if *one God* signifies one *supreme* God; then, since all but the *supreme* God are excluded from being *Gods*, in any religious sense, the consequence is, that an inferior *God* is *no God;* not that a supreme and an inferior *God* (were they really each of them a *God*) are not *two* Gods. This gentleman then, we see, is very far from proving his point. We may, in the next place, consider, whether it be not capable of a clear confutation.

I had before argued that *one God* and *another God* make *two Gods*, or else one of them is *no God*, contrary to the supposition: which reasoning is so plain and strong, that I thought it might be trusted with the meanest reader. But this *serious* gentleman (I know not why, except it be that he is not used to consider this controversy) suspects it all to be *banter*, p. 36. I will offer one argument more, which perhaps may take with him. The Pagans, though they professed generally (as is well known to the learned) *one only supreme God*, looking upon all the rest as *subordinate* ministers of the *one supreme*, yet stand charged with *Polytheism* by the Jews, by the ancient Christians, by the common consent of mankind. Thus Jupiter and Mercury (though one was supposed a *subordinate minister* of the other) were, by the

Lycaonians, spoken of in the *plural* number as *gods;* that is, *two gods*, Acts xiv. 11, 12. And this has been the common way of speaking, in all writers I have met with, sacred or profane, ancient or modern.

But what if the customary usage of language had been otherwise; does this writer imagine that the dispute is only about a *name?* If the changing of a *name* would set all right, I do not know any man of sense that would contend about such a trifle. To extricate this matter, *Polytheism* may be considered either in a stricter or a larger sense: it may either signify the belief of more *Gods* than one, in the *proper* sense of *necessarily existing, supreme*, &c. (in which sense there have been few, very few Polytheists; the Pagans themselves, generally, were not Polytheists in this sense;) or it may signify the receiving more Gods than one, in respect of *religious worship*, whatever opinion of those Gods they may otherwise have. It is this kind of *Polytheism* which the *first commandment* has chiefly respect to: and it is the same that Pagans, Arians, and Socinians, stand justly charged with. Should any man alter the *name*, the *thing* would be the same still. For suppose we should not call it *Polytheism*, it would not appear at all the better, under the name of *idolatry;* which it really is, as well as *Polytheism*. I must observe farther, that though the Arians or Socinians, or other such Polytheists, do not *believe* in two *supreme* Gods, and so, in that respect, are not *speculative Tritheists*, or *Ditheists;* yet by paying *worship*, religious worship, (the *incommunicable* honour due to the *supreme* God only,) to two Gods, they do by *construction* and *implication*, though not in *intention*, make *two supreme Gods;* and consequently are *practical Ditheists*, at least, even in the highest and strictest sense of *Ditheism*.—Thus much may suffice for the first particular. This *author* has not cleared the *Arian doctrine* from the charge of receiving *two Gods:* nor if he had, would his cause be at all the better by changing the name from *Polytheism*, or *Ditheism*, to that of *idolatry*.

Not to mention that, upon his principles, it is the easiest thing in the world for the Catholics, admitting a subordination of order, to get perfectly clear of *Tritheism*, which is the *grand* objection[e]: besides that, in his way of explaining the *exclusive* terms, the Catholics will easily answer every text he can bring to prove the Father *only* to be the *true God:* for it is only saying that he is so *emphatically*, or *unoriginately*, and the *Son* may be *true God* and *necessarily existing* notwithstanding: so that if this writer has at all weakened *one* of our arguments against the Arians, he has, at the same time, very kindly cut the sinews of *all*, or however of the most considerable arguments of the Arians against us; and so has really *disserved* his own cause, more than he has *served* it.

2. The second particular which I propose to examine, is his pretence that "we have not sufficient grounds to "conclude that Father and Son are one God." He does not undertake to examine or confute all we have to urge upon that head: but so much only as we urge by way of proof[f] of Christ's *Divinity*. We are used to plead thus: *the Father is God, and the Son God, and yet God is one: therefore Father and Son are one God.* This is the argument (though rather too briefly expressed) which he labours to confute for many pages together. We are now to see how he has performed.

He observes that God is the *only Saviour*, Othniel also a *Saviour;* and yet *God* and *Othniel* are not *one Saviour*,

[e] Just and wise is the reflection of a judicious Father on this head, in the following words. Μήτι τὸ τῆς τριθειΐας ἴγκλημα αἰσχυνθῆς, ἵως ἂν καὶ ἄλλος κινδυνύῃ τὴν θεῖαν. ἢ γὰρ συνίλυσας, ἢ συνηπόρησας, ἢ ὁ μὲν ἐναυάγησι μετὰ τῶν λογισμῶν καὶ θειότητα, σοὶ δὲ παρίμεινι θειότης, καὶ εἰ ὁ λόγος ἠσθένησι, κρεῖσσον καμεῖν ἐν τοῖς λογισμοῖς μετὰ τῆς ὁδηγίας τοῦ πνεύματος, ἢ προσχείρως ἀσιβῆσαι, τὴν ῥαστώνην διώκοντα. *Greg. Nazianz. Orat.* xxiii. p. 422.

[f] N. B. Every argument which proves Christ to be God in the *strict sense*, proves him to be the *one God*, since God is one. But in that way Christ's *Divinity* is presupposed; and his being the *one God* inferred afterwards. The argument from *worship* proceeds differently, proving Christ to be God in the *strict sense*, because he is the one true *adorable* God.

p. 17. Again, God *only* is *holy*, a *Bishop* must be *holy*; and yet *God* and a *Bishop* are not *one holy being*, p. 19. God *only* is *Master*, some men are *masters*, and yet *God* and an earthly *master* are not *one master*. These things he delivers *seriously*, without the least air of *banter*; and goes on, in the simplicity of his heart, with the like instances to the number of *twenty-eight*, as he observes, p. 30. I am very willing to take his word without counting them; nay, and to add two or three more to the number. For God is *one*, and *Moses* was *God*; and yet *God* and *Moses* were not *one God*. God is *one*, and the *Devil* is *God*, (2 Cor. iv. 4.) and yet *God* and the *Devil* are not *one being*. *Angels* are gods, and *magistrates* gods; and yet God with his *angels*, or with *magistrates*, does not make *one being*. This is so plain, that even the Trinitarians (blind as they are thought) both see and confess it: which had the author considered, he might have saved himself some trouble, and as much waste of time. The short of the case is this: though there be *gods many*, and *lords many*, yet there is but one God and Lord to be honoured with *religious* worship: now Christ is God and Lord, in such a sense as to be honoured with *religious* worship; therefore Christ is the *one God*. The premises I have proved in my Defence, vol. i. Qu. 16, 17. The conclusion makes itself. This is the Catholic argument, which I leave the gentleman once more to exercise his thoughts upon; desiring him, particularly, to answer my reasons against any *inferior* or *subordinate*, but *adorable* Gods. I easily perceive now, why he did not understand a plain question which I asked: *where did the Scripture* give any intimation of *two true Gods?* See what he says to it, p. 34. I know but *one God* that is to be *worshipped*; that one God is the *true God*; more *adorable* Gods than one are, by necessary construction and implication, more *true Gods*.

3. The third particular which this writer insists upon (in *sense*, I mean, not in *terms*) is, that we have no suf-

ficient warrant for appropriating all kinds and degrees of *religious* or *divine* worship to the true God only. Here indeed lies the very pinch of the argument. For if all *religious* worship be not *appropriate* to the *one true God*, the Arians (so far as I apprehend) are not justly chargeable with *idolatry* or *Polytheism*, for worshipping a *creature;* neither is our argument from *worship* alone sufficient to prove that Father and Son are *one God*. I have (in my Defence, vol. i. Qu. 16.) shown at large, that all *acts* of *religious* worship are, in *Scripture*, appropriated to the *one true God*, in opposition to *creature-worship*. I have to Scripture added the concurring sentiments of the primitive Christians. I might have added the sentiments likewise of the ancient and later Jews, to the same purpose; which, however, the reader may find collected in Dr. Cudworth[s]. This argument has been learnedly and accurately handled by many great men (particularly by Bp. Stillingfleet) against the Papists. As the point is of great concernment, so the evidence appears every way answerable to it. Greater or stronger proofs cannot be expected, or reasonably desired, in a thing of this nature, than *express Scripture*, confirmed by the concurring sentiments both of the Jews before Christianity, and the Christian Church from the beginning; not to mention what may be farther pleaded from the nature and reason of the thing itself. This writer, on the other hand, has little or nothing of weight to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses. He does indeed give us his *own* sentiments, or rather *wishes:* for if you ask for proof, he has none. He first falls to *conjecture* (p. 39.) how *he thinks* this matter of *worship* might stand: that is, supposing he had had the direction of an affair, which an all-wise God has took into his own hands. He tells us how it might be reasonable (that is, supposing he is *wise* enough to dictate to *God*) to ask pardon of *Christ*, or any other blessings, and to thank him for them

[s] Cudworth, Intellect. Syst. p. 465, &c.

upon his *hypothesis, i. e.* supposing *Christ* to be no more than a *creature.* All this is only guessing, presumptuous guessing. P. 52. he lays down his whole doctrine concerning *worship* in these three particulars: 1. That all our *worship* terminate upon the one supreme God. 2. That it be not offered to other Gods; any farther than our worshipping of *them* is really a worshipping of *him,* as redounding to his *glory.* 3. That it be not offered to other Gods, (that is his sense,) any farther than the *supreme* God has *commanded.*

1. As to the first rule it is *groundless* and *insignificant. Groundless,* because he can produce no Scripture proof of it. We can easily show that *God alone* is to be worshipped: where is it said that all worship, whether offered to *God* or *creatures,* must *terminate* upon *God?* He pleads, (p. 51.) that the priests *serve* the tabernacle, (Heb. xiii. 10.) which *service* of theirs *terminated* upon God. But let him show that *serving* there bears such a sense, as when we are said to *serve* God; or that the priests *worshipped* the tabernacle; and then the instance may appear more to the purpose. He pleads farther, that though we are to serve God *only,* yet we are allowed to *serve* others also, p. 51. Therefore, I suppose, though we are to worship God *only,* yet we may be allowed to *worship* others also. But when we are ordered to *serve* God only, *religious* service, not every kind of service, is intended; which *religious* service is not to be paid to *creatures,* Rom. i. 25. not to those that "by nature are no Gods," Gal. iv. 8. Having shown then that this first rule of our author's is *groundless,* I must next observe that it is *trifling* and *insignificant.* The very Papists and Pagans, in their grossest *idolatry* or *image-worship,* keep up to this rule. They *terminate,* at least *intentionally,* all their worship upon the one supreme God.

2. This gentleman's second rule for worship is, that it must not be offered to other Gods, any farther than our worshipping of them is really worshipping of the *supreme*

God, as redounding to his *glory*. But who can assure us that any worship of the *creature* is really worshipping of *God;* or that it does or can *redound* to God's *glory?* Are we better judges of what is properly the *worshipping of God*, or of what is most for his glory, than God himself is? If this gentleman can prove that any *creature-worship* is really the *worshipping of God*, or that it *redounds to God's glory*, he will then do something. I mention not, that both Popish and Pagan idolaters pretend, that all their worship is really the worshipping of the one supreme God, and redounds to his glory. But Divine wisdom seems to have fixed the affair of *worship* upon quite another foot, as it were on purpose to cut off all such pretences of men, *wise* in their *own conceits*.

3. The last rule laid down by this *writer*, is, that worship be not offered to *others*, any farther than the *supreme* God has *commanded*. This is a safe and a good rule; and I wish that this gentleman, and such others, would abide by it. It is evident from the whole tenor of Scripture, that God has not only *not commanded*, but absolutely *prohibited*, all *creature-worship;* and laid it down as a fundamental rule, that *God alone* is to be worshipped, because he is *God*, in opposition to all that do not stand possessed of those excellencies and perfections which belong to God. If therefore this rule be good, as it certainly is, all *creature-worship* is for ever precluded by it. I proceed to,

4. A fourth particular maintained by this writer, *viz.* that *mediatorial* worship may belong to Christ, though not *true* God, or *supreme* God. But he has not proved that there is any such thing as *mediatorial* worship, distinct from *Divine*. If *Christ* our Mediator is worshipped, it is because he is *God* as well as *man*, a *Divine* Mediator. This *writer* cannot prove that Christ's *mediatorial* office is the *ground* and *foundation* of the worship which we are commanded to pay him: but it may, on the contrary, be proved that it is not. As to what he pretends from John v. 22, 23. I refer the reader to my Defence of Qu. 19. vol. i. which this gentleman should have an-

swered, instead of repeating an old objection. As to Phil. ii. 9, 10, 11. I refer to my fifth Sermon, and to my Defence of Qu. 18. vol. i. p. 189, &c. where I shew that these and the like pretences are calculated only for the Socinian hypothesis; and come very absurdly from the pen of an Arian. As to Rev. i. 5, 6. and v. 12. I refer to my Defence, vol. i. p. 195, 196. which this gentleman has attempted to answer in part, but has not done it. I had said, "that the *essential* dignity of Christ's "Person is really the ground and foundation of honour "and esteem, (and consequently of *worship*, the *highest* "*expression* of both,) which ought always to bear pro-"portion to the intrinsic excellency of the object," (Defence, vol. i. p. 196.) To this he replies, "that if we take "*worship* to signify *prayer* and *thanksgiving*, then my *as-"sertion* is *plainly false:* for the essential dignity of "Christ's Person is not the *ground* on which his title to "*prayer* and *thanksgiving* is founded." To which I rejoin, that *prayer* and *thanksgiving*, considered merely under the notion of *asking a favour*, or *giving thanks* for it, (as this gentleman seems to understand them,) do not suppose any *Divine* excellency in the person we *ask of*, or *give thanks* to: for we may ask a favour of a man or an *angel*, present with us, and *give thanks* to them for what they have done. But *prayer* and *thanksgiving*, in the *religious* sense, considered as *acts* of *worship*, suppose *Divine* excellency in the object we address to, God having commanded all *worship*, properly such, to be paid to God alone, making it thereby *incommunicable* to any *creature*. In a word then, *prayer* and *thanksgiving*, under one consideration, are founded in kindnesses to be received, or already received: but considered as parts of *religious worship*, they carry in them the same significancy which *sacrifice* or any other instance of *religious* worship does; are outward marks and expressions of that *honour* which belongs to God only, and are therefore *founded* in the *essential* dignity of the person to whom this *honour* is paid. This writer observes justly enough, (p. 43.) "that

" there would be no obligation either to *prayer* or *thanks-*
" *giving*, if God did not exercise a providence over the
" world; and from thence he infers, (p. 44.) that God's
" government of the world is the *foundation* of this kind
" of *worship*." This may be true, in a certain sense, and very consistent with what I had said, according as *prayer* and *thanksgiving* may be taken under different conceptions. I considered them under such precise formality, as *expressions* or *marks* of honour: and that my reasoning was just, is capable of being proved, even with the evidence of *demonstration*. I shall make it out *distinctly*, step by step, as follows. There is no reason why I should esteem or think any thing thus or thus *excellent*, but because it really is so; therefore the *intrinsic* excellency of the thing is the sole *foundation* of all just *value* or *esteem*. Inward *honour* is a mental acknowledgment of that *esteem* which I have of, or bear towards, the thing so esteemed, and consequently rests upon the *same foundation: worship*, considered as an *outward expression* or *mark* of that honour, (as it must be considered when once *appropriated* to the one only greatest and most excellent Being[h],) rests upon the same *foundation* that the *honour* does: *prayer* and *thanksgiving*, considered as parts of *religious worship*, (and

[h] I shall endeavour to illustrate this matter for the sake of common readers. We read in Daniel, chap. vi. of a law made that no *petition* should be offered to any one for *thirty days*, save to the *king* only, under pain of high treason. By that law *petitions*, for such a time, were *appropriated* to the *crown*, became ensigns of *royal* dignity and majesty, and acknowledgments of *sovereignty* in the person to whom they should be offered. Should any subject, for that time, have made a *petition* to any but the *king*, and have pleaded that the person to whom he made it was capable of *obliging* him, and upon that *foundation* (the sole foundation of all *petitions*) he had *petitioned* him; he would presently have been told, that the receiving a *petition* was a privilege of the *crown*, and went along with the *throne*; that there could not now be any *legal* foundation for it, but the *royalty* of the person to whom it should be offered. Now, put for *royalty*, *Divine perfections*; and for *petitions*, *religious prayer* and *thanksgiving*; which are *appropriated*, not for *thirty days*, but for ever, to God; and it will appear that the only *lawful* foundation of *religious prayer* and *thanksgiving*, considered as parts of *worship*, is the *Divinity*, *i. e.* the *intrinsic excellency* of the object.

consequently as *marks* and *expressions* of that highest honour, which is appropriate to the greatest and best of Beings,) has the *same foundation* which all *worship* has; that is, which *honour* has; that is, which *esteem* has; that is, the *intrinsic excellency of the object:* which was to be proved. There is no answering this, but either by denying *prayer* and *thanksgiving* to be parts of *religious* worship; or by shewing that all *worship* is not *appropriate* to God. Thus far I have proceeded in observing, that this *writer* has not been able to make good his position, that the worship of Christ is founded on his *mediatorial* office. The *contrary* may be proved from two plain reasons.

1. That the only Scriptural foundation of any *religious* worship, is the *Divinity* of the person to be adored, in opposition to all *creature-worship;* as I have formerly proved in my Defence, &c. vol. i. Qu. 16. And it is worth observing, how naturally and how easily this falls in with the *commands* to worship *Christ;* since the same Scriptures, which declare him to be *adorable*, describe him also as *God;* and, together with the *name*, ascribe to him likewise those *Divine perfections* which make up and form the *idea* signified by so august and venerable a name.

2. That the *mediatorial* office will cease at the day of judgment, and therefore cannot be the *foundation* of that *worship* which will continue beyond it; even for ever and ever, as Christ's worship will. See Rom. ix. 5. Heb. xiii. 21. 1 Pet. iv. 11. 2 Pet. iii. 18. Rev. i. 5, 6. v. 12, 13.

This gentleman demands of me a plain Scripture text, where it is said that Christ is to be worshipped as being *God, equal to the Father.* But to this I answer, that Scripture supposes men to have common sense; and therefore when Scripture has laid down *one only* rule and *foundation* of worship, and it appears from the same Scripture that *Christ* is to be *worshipped;* there is no need of any thing farther, the rest follows of course. Besides, that though Scripture has not in *express* terms said, that

he is to be worshipped on that particular account; yet, since Scripture has asserted the *equality* of the Son to the Father, in more places than one, and his right to *worship* too; a very little logic will suffice to shew what relation these two things must have to each other.

5. A fifth particular maintained by this writer, though it concerns myself more than the cause, I am now to take notice of. "Dr. Waterland," he says (p. 54.) "has, in one "passage, given up both points" (*viz.* that the Son is God in a lower sense of the word *God*, and is to be worshipped only as *Mediator*) "to us." But where have I said either, or any thing like it? I have given nothing up, that I know of, which can do this *writer*, or his *cause*, any service. I have said, that the Father is *primarily* and *eminently* God, *Creator*, and *object of worship:* which he may be, without supposing him to be God in any *higher* or any *different* sense of the word *God*, *Creator*, &c. A different *manner* or *order* of existing or operating may, in many cases, be sufficient to ground an *emphasis* upon, (as might be proved by plain instances,) without recurring to a *higher* and *lower* sense of the words. As to the allowing of a *subordination*, it is so far from inferring a *lower* sense of the word *God*, &c. that, in strict propriety of speech, it implies the contrary; as I have before observed more at large.

Having thus examined and answered the most material pretences which this *writer* insists upon, in favour of *Arianism*, or in opposition to the Catholic doctrine, I might now take my leave of him. But it may be proper first to say something to a pretended *contradiction*, which not only he, (p. 6.) but the Modest Pleader also, (p. 48.) has been pleased to charge me with; as it is usual with many to think every thing *contradictory* which they cannot readily reconcile.

My words are, (Defence, vol. i. &c. p. 248.) "Each "divine Person is an *individual* intelligent agent: but as "subsisting in one undivided substance, they are all to-"gether, *in that respect*, but one undivided intelligent

" agent." This, they tell me, is to say, that *three persons are one person.* But, if they please to think again, they will find it is no more than saying, that *person*, and *undivided intelligent agent*, are not *reciprocal. Undivided*, or *individual*, intelligent agent, like the phrase *individual being*, may admit of a stricter and a larger sense. When this writer is able to fix a *certain principle of individuation*, he may then perhaps have something of colour for the charge of *contradiction.* See this matter more distinctly and fully explained in my Defence, &c. vol. i. p. 122.

I have detained my reader long enough, I fear too long, in the Preface. But I was willing, having this fresh opportunity of appearing in public, to take some notice of those two pamphlets, (the only ones that deserved it,) which had objected to my Vindication of Christ's Divinity, vol. iv. If I have, either through *haste*, or through a desire of *brevity*, slipped over any thing of real weight, or that may create any scruple or difficulty with impartial and considering men; I shall, when apprised of it, (if God permit,) carefully and fully examine and discuss that, and whatever else falls within the compass of what I have undertaken, namely, the point of *Christ's real Divinity*, in opposition to the *pretended Divinity* maintained by the Arians.

I should just observe to the reader, that some of the Sermons, as they appear in print, are somewhat longer than when preached. The three last especially are so, which I was obliged to shorten in the preaching, passing over several pages, for fear of keeping the audience too long. Some *notes* I have here and there added at the bottom, since the Sermons were delivered; though much the greater part were prepared before. I thought it very proper to intermix all along with Scripture, the testimonies of the *ancients*, as the best comments upon it. The reader will be the better satisfied in having a view of both together; and our adversaries may perhaps see cause to abate of their unreasonable and unaccountable boasts that way, when it appears from so many plain and clear

proofs, that their pretences to antiquity are groundless, and their faith *novel* as it is *false*.

I cannot here forget to mention my obligations to the Reverend Dr. Knight, of St. Sepulchre's, London; whose great learning and judgment are equal to his singular modesty and ingenuity; and to whose judicious observations it is owing, that the following Sermons appear more correct, and may, I hope, be more useful, than they would otherwise have been.

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Christ God in the strict and proper sense:

OR

CHRIST'S DIVINITY

ASSERTED

FROM JOHN I. 1.

The first Sermon preached Sept. 9, 1719.

JOHN i. 1.

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.

SAINT John the beloved Disciple, the undoubted author of this Gospel which bears his name, was the youngest of the Apostles, and survived the rest many years. He saw so much the more of the state of Christianity, and of the progress it made under two persecutions; the first by Nero, the second by Domitian. Under the latter, he himself had inevitably suffered, had not God miraculously preserved him. After this, he was banished into Patmos, a little island in the Archipelago; and, during his retirement there, was favoured, in a particular manner, with *revelations* from heaven; which he committed to writing, and left behind him for the benefit of the Church. After a year or two's exile, it pleased God to call him forth again to Ephesus, his usual seat of residence; and there he passed the short remainder of his days, being then ninety years old, in the most divine and comfortable employment; taking upon him the charge of the churches

of Christ, those especially of the Lesser Asia. As there must be *heresies* at all times, (infinite wisdom permitting them for great ends and reasons,) so were there not wanting, even in the times of the Apostles, some denying the *divinity*, others the *humanity* of our blessed Lord, and both for the same reason; being offended at the great and unsearchable mystery of *God incarnate*. The tares had been sown by Simon Magus, Cerinthus, and others; and were grown up to a great height before St. John's death. This made it the more necessary for him to write his *Gospel;* which accordingly he undertook at the request of the bishops of Asia, and the brethren of the neighbouring provinces. But first he appointed solemn fasting and prayer for the divine blessing and assistance in it; after which being more fully instructed and more plentifully inspired, he thus began his lofty theme. "In the beginning was the WORD, and the "WORD was with God, and the WORD was God. The "same was in the beginning with God. All things were "made by him, and without him was not any thing "made that was made." In these few words, and those that follow in that chapter, the good Apostle has not only confuted most of the heresies then on foot, but has obviated as many as should thereafter rise up in opposition to the *divinity*, *personality*, or *incarnation* of the Son of God: points of the greatest concernment to all Christians, but which nevertheless (through the perverseness of men's wits, and their proneness to take wrong measures of divine things) have been a *stone of stumbling*, and a *rock of offence* to the *disputers of this world*, in former and in latter ages. This first chapter of St. John (as I said) is alone sufficient, with reasonable men, to end all disputes upon those heads. The words are plain, and the sense clear when carefully looked into; and it is for that very reason that they have been more tampered with, than any in the whole Scriptures. For, when the obvious and natural meaning of a text happens to stand in the way of an *hypothesis*, or preconceived opinion, pains must

be taken to darken the evidence, and to perplex the proofs which make against it. My design is briefly to enumerate the several interpretations which have been given of this chapter, to remark upon them as far as is needful, and to establish the only true one. They are reducible to four; which I may call Sabellian, Socinian, Arian, and Catholic. I shall explain them in their order. To begin with the first.

1. Under the Sabellian interpretation I include all that belongs to men of Sabellian principles, whether before or after the times of Sabellius, who lived about the middle of the third century. The Sabellians deny the Λόγος, or WORD, whereof St. John speaks, to be any *real* or *substantial* thing, distinct from the Person of God the Father. They understand by the *Word*, either some *attribute, power*, or *operation* inherent and permanent in the Father; or else some transient *voice, sound*, and the like. How they came into these and the like fancies, I shall show presently, after I have premised a few things about the name of the Λόγος, or WORD, which St. John uses. I do not design any historical account of the use of the term among Jews or Gentiles; being happily prevented, in that part, by a late excellent sermon of a very worthy and learned Prelate[a]. But I must observe that the Greek Λόγος, which we render WORD, may signify either *inward* thought, or *outward* speech. And it has with good reason been supposed by the Catholic writers, that the design of this name was to intimate that the relation of Father and Son bears some resemblance and analogy to that of *thought*, or of *speech* to the mind[b]. For example: as thought is *coeval* with the mind; so the Son is *coeval* with the Father[c]. As thought is closely united to, proceeds from, and yet remains in the mind; so also may

[a] Bishop of Litchfield and Coventry. Sermon before the King.

[b] Λόγος δὲ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὡς πρὸς νοῦν λόγος. οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ ἀπαθὲς τῆς γεννήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ συναφὲς, καὶ τὸ ἐξαγγελτικόν——Greg. Naz. Orat. xxxvi. p. 590. Vid. etiam Basil. Hom. 15. Petav. de Trin. p. 743.

[c] Vid. Dionys. Alex. apud Athanas. p. 259.

we understand that the Son is in the bosom of the Father, proceeding from him, yet never divided or separate, but remaining in him and with him. As to *speech*, it is properly the *interpreter* of the mind; and so, in this respect also, there is some resemblance and analogy, the Son being as it were *interpreter* and *revealer* of the unknown Father to the world [d]. Some of the [e] ancient Catholic writers joining both these notions together, have considered them as applicable to the Son at different times, and in different capacities. Before the world was made, while he yet existed alone with the Father, (always including the Holy Ghost,) they supposed he might best be compared to *silent thought* resting in the mind,

[d] Ob hoc *Verbum* nuncupatur, quia ex proprio divino ore processit, et nihil Pater sine eo aut jussit, aut fecit. *Pseud. Ambros. de Fid. Orth.* cap. vi. p. 353. ed. Bened.

Δύναται δὲ καὶ ὁ λόγος υἱὸς εἶναι παρὰ τῷ ἀπαγγέλλειν τὰ κρύφια τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκείνου, ἀνάλογον τῷ καλουμένῳ υἱῷ, λόγῳ νοῦ συγχάνοντος· ὡς γὰρ ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν λόγος Ἄγγελός ἐστι τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ ὁρωμένων, οὕτως ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος ἐγνωκὼς τὸν πατέρα——ἀποκαλύπτει ὃν ἔγνω πατέρα. *Orig. Comm. in Joh.* p. 41. Vid. et Just. Mart. Dial. p. 358. Iren. lib. ii. cap. 30. p. 163.

[e] Theophilus Bishop of Antioch, where he speaks of the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικὸς (p. 129.) is thus to be understood. Tertullian, in his piece against Praxeas, has a great deal to the same purpose. Athenagoras, Tatian, and Hippolytus, though more obscurely, seem to have intended the same. And even Origen himself had adopted the like notion, as may appear from the following passages.

Ἐὰν ἐπιμελῶς ἐξετάζωμεν αὐτοῦ πάσας τὰς ἐπινοίας, μόνον κατὰ τὸ εἶναι σοφία ἀρχή ἐστι.——ὡς εἴπειν ἄν τινα τεθαρρηκότως πρεσβύτερον πάντων τῶν ἐπινουμένων ταῖς ὀνομασίαις τοῦ πρωτοτόκου πάσης κτίσεώς ἐστιν ἡ σοφία. *Orig. in Joh.* p. 19.

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος——ἀρχὴ δὲ μετὰ μαρτυριῶν τῶν ἐκ τῶν παροιμιῶν ἀποδέδοται εἰρῆσθαι ἡ σοφία, καὶ ἔστι προεπινουμένη ἡ σοφία τοῦ αὐτὴν ἀπαγγέλλοντος λόγου, νοητέον τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ, τουτέστι τῇ σοφίᾳ, αἰεὶ εἶναι. *Orig. in Joh.* p. 43. Compare p. 59.

Afterwards Origen uses an argument to prove that the λόγος has a real substance, and adds in conclusion: Ὁ λόγος——ἐν ἀρχῇ τῇ σοφίᾳ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχων, p. 44. Which words are remarkable, and worth comparing with Tertullian's upon the same subject, where he says: Jam in usu est nostrorum, per simplicitatem interpretationis, sermonem dicere in primordio apud Deum fuisse, cum magis rationem competat antiquiorem haberi; quia non sermonalis a principio, sed rationalis Deus etiam ante principium, et quia ipse quoque sermo ratione consistens, priorem eam ut *substantiam suam* ostendat. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* cap. v.

and which in Greek is called Λόγος ἐνδιάθετος. But when he afterwards came to create the world, and to reveal both himself and his Father, then he might more properly be compared to *outward speech*, or a word spoken forth, which the Greeks express by λόγος προφορικός. And thus it is, that the same writers sometimes speak of the Λόγος, or WORD, being both *eternal*, and in *time:* eternal in one capacity, not so in the other. For as *thought* must be considered previous to speech, so the Λόγος, or WORD, under one consideration might be conceived more ancient than under the other.

Thus far the Catholics, sober men, carried on the parallel; and there was no harm in it, while they kept close to the rule of faith, and within the bounds of sobriety. But the Sabellian heretics did not stop there. They pursued the parallel still farther, till they left the Λόγος, or WORD, no distinct personality. They observed that *inward thought* was no real substantial thing, distinct from the mind itself; and that *outward speech* was but a *voice* or *sound*, nothing fixed, real, and permanent: and from hence they took occasion to misinterpret the Apostle very widely; as if the WORD, which he speaks of, were nothing really distinct from the Father, not a second Person, any more than a man's *thought*, or *word*, is another person from the man. This kind of construction was openly received and propagated by [f] Photinus, about the middle of the fourth century; by Paul of [g] Samosata, almost a century before him; by [h] Sabellius and Noëtus earlier than he; and by [i] Praxeas still higher up, about the end of the second century; and [k] probably by some other *here-*

[f] Hilar. p. 789, 1048, 1179. Ambros. de Fid. lib. i. cap. 8.

[g] Epiphan. Hæres. lxv. p. 608, 609.

[h] Epiphan. Hæres. lxv. p. 608.

[i] Tertull. contr. Prax. c. vii. viii.

[k] Vid. Clem. Alexandr. Strom. p. 646. Iren. p. 130, 132, 157, 158.

N. B. The notion of a λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικὸς, in this heretical sense, is justly condemned by all the Fathers. Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Ambrose, and other Catholics censured it as smartly as the Council of Sirmium, Euse-

tics before him. What remains of it at this day is to be met with chiefly among the Socinians; those of them, I mean, who have refined upon their master Socinus, in this particular; and are more properly Photinians, or Sabellians. A [k] celebrated writer abroad has openly espoused this Photinian notion in part; disguising it a little under the name *reason*, answering pretty nearly to the heretical sense of the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, or *inward thought*: so that now the Sabellian interpretation, after the latest improvements, runs thus.

"In the beginning was *Reason*, and *Reason* was in God, "and *Reason* was God himself. It was in God from the "beginning, before the world was: for whatever is in na- "ture was made with the highest *Reason*, neither is there "that single thing that was made without *Reason*."

But against this, or any other the like Sabellian construction of the first chapter of St. John, many unanswerable reasons have been urged both by *ancients* and *moderns*.

1. As first, St. John does not say that the WORD was [l] Θεῖος, a *divine Word*, which might have favoured the Sabellian sense, but Θεὸς, God; thereby strongly denoting a *real* Person. A man's *word*, or *thought*, is not called *man*; nor would the *Word* or *Wisdom* of God be called God, if a mere attribute or operation only was intended, and not a real Person. Or if it be said, that it does denote a Person, the same Person that was before spoken of as God, in the same verse; then how can the other words

bius, or the Arians. Vid. Orig. in Joh. p. 24. in Jerem. p. 184. Euseb. contr. Marc. p. 120. de Laud. Const. c. 12. Cyril. Hierosol. Catech. iv. c. 5. p. 50. Athanas. Expos. Fid. p. 99. Orat. ii. p. 503. Basil. Hom. xxvii. p. 602. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iv. cap. 7. Ignat. Epist. Interpolat. ad Magnes. c. 8. Some even of the Arians, after they came to make a distinction of a twofold λόγος, adopted, in part, this very Sabellian notion. Vid. Athanas. p. 503, 282, 260. Cyril. Alex. in Joh. lib. i. p. 30. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iv. c. 7.

[k] Le Clerc. Comment. in Joh. i. 1.

[l] Vid. Euseb. contr. Marcel. p. 83. Tertull. contr. Prax. p. 504. Epiph. Hæres. lxv. p. 609. *Deus* erat Verbum cessat Sonus vocis——*Res* est, non *Sonus; natura*, non *Sermo; Deus*, non *inanitas* est. *Hilar.* p. 796.

stand, that he was *with God?* He cannot be supposed the self-same Person *with* whom he was. [m] *With God*, plainly signifies the same as *with the Father*, (see 1 Joh. i. 2.) who is God. The Apostle can never be supposed to mean that the *Father* was *with* the *Father;* the *Word* therefore, if it denotes a Person at all, must be understood of another Person. But that it denotes a Person will appear farther.

2. For it is not said that the WORD, or REASON, was *in* God, as might be proper of an attribute, &c. but *with* God; which is another *personal* character [n].

3. It is said that all things were *made by* the *Word:* which (as appears from other texts) comes to the same as to say, that the WORD made all things: which is a farther confirmation that a real thing is intended by the WORD, not an attribute only [o].

4. The Apostle observes (v. 8.) of John the Baptist, that *he* (ἐκεῖνος) was not that Light, intimating thereby that he had been speaking of a *Person* before, who really was; and therefore from hence also it appears that the WORD is something real.

5. It is said (ver. 11.) of the WORD, that "he came "unto his own, and his own received him not." This is good sense, and sounds well. But to say that *Reason*, the attribute, came unto its own, and its own received it not, has hardly either sense or propriety.

6. The WORD is represented (ver. 14.) as the *only-begotten* of the Father; which again is *personal.* For if *begotten* may be a proper expression, concerning an *attribute* or *property;* yet *only-begotten* is not, unless God has no more attributes than one. The characters therefore being

[m] Εἰ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν, οὐχ ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ πρὸς ὃν ἦν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ πρὸς ὃν ἦν ἐστι λόγος. *Epiphan. Hæres.* lxv. p. 609.

[n] Verbum erat *apud* Deum. Nunquid audieras *in* Deo, ut Sermonem reconditæ cogitationis acciperes?——non *in* altero esse, sed *cum* altero prædicatur. *Hilar.* p. 796.

[o] Fecit enim et ipse, quæ facta sunt per illum. Quale est ut *nihil* sit ipse *sine quo nihil factum est?* Ut inanis solida, et vacuus plena, et incorporalis corporalia sit operatus? *Tertull. contr. Prax.* c. 7. Comp. Phœbad. p. 304.

thus plainly *personal*, and no necessity appearing why we should have recourse to figure, the *literal* interpretation is undoubtedly preferable.

7. I may add, lastly, that St. John in his *Revelations* expressly applies the name of Λόγος, or WORD, to Christ Jesus. "His name," saith he, "is called the WORD of "God," Rev. xix. 13.

These reasons are abundantly sufficient to convince us, that St. John intended not any *attribute* or *operation* by the WORD, but a *real*, *living*, *substantial* thing or person, distinct from the Father: and so the Church of Christ from the beginning has constantly understood it. So much for the Sabellian interpretation of this chapter.

2. The next that offers itself is the Socinian, properly so called; never espoused by *Heretic* or *Catholic*; never so much as thought of, at least not heard of, before the days of Socinus. He supposes St. John to have intended a *real* Person, by the *Word*, viz. the man Christ Jesus. His interpretation then is to this effect.

"*In the beginning* of the Gospel, was the man Christ "Jesus, otherwise called the WORD. He was *with God*, "having been taken up into heaven before he entered on "his ministry. And he *was God*, having the office, ho- "nour, and title of a God conferred upon him, after his "resurrection. *The same was in the beginning* of the Gos- "pel *with God*. *All things* belonging to the Gospel-state "were reformed and renewed by him: and without him "was there not any thing reformed or renewed."

A construction so manifestly forced and foreign, as this is, carries its own confutation along with it. It serves only to show what contempt the heads of a sect generally have, not only of the rest of mankind, but even of their own disciples; while they can thus unmercifully impose the wildest conceits imaginable upon them. To do the later Socinians justice, they have, I think, for the most part given up this violent interpretation; and, instead of it, have rather closed in with the Sabellian construction, which is more ingenious and plausible, and serves their

hypothesis as well. Neither of them will answer to the truth of the sacred Writ: they are both no other than the device of man, and must equally come to nought.

I proceed to the Arian interpretation, which appears better than either of the former, as coming nearer to the true one; and it is for that [p] very reason the most insinuating and dangerous of any.

3. The Arian construction, invented probably before, but first openly espoused and propagated in the beginning of the fourth century, is as follows.

"In the beginning of all things, before ever the earth "or the world was made, there existed a very glorious "and excellent creature, (since called the WORD,) the "Oracle of God, and Revealer of his will. That excellent "Person, the first whom God of his own good pleasure "and free choice gave being to, was *with God* the Fa- "ther; and he *was God*, another God, an *inferior* God, "infinitely inferior; but yet *truly* God, as being *truly* "partaker of *divine* glory *then*, and fore-ordained to have "*true* dominion and authority in God's own time. God "employed him as an *instrument*, or under agent, in "framing and fashioning the world of *inferior* creatures; "and approved of his services so well, as to do nothing "without him."

This is the sum of the Arian interpretation, as nearly as I could draw it, out of the most general principles of the sect. For it must be observed that there never was a sect so divided and various, so unsettled and fluctuating in their principles as they. The reason of it is this; they take a kind of middle way between Catholics and Socinians, which admits of so great a latitude, that they know not where to fix. The Catholics looking upon the Son as essentially *God* in one capacity, and as *man* in another,

[p] Vinci illi vel facile possunt, vel facile vitari, quorum prima propositione omne consilium pectoris proditur. At vero hi (Ariani) quibus multa nobiscum paria sunt, facile possunt innoxias mentes, et Soli Deo deditas, fraudulenta societate percutere, dum malorum suorum virus per bona nostra defendunt. *Pseud. Ambros. de Fid. Orthodoxa*, cap. i. p. 347. ed. Bened.

easily know what may be proper to ascribe to him, in this or in that respect. The Socinians believing him to be *man* only, can as easily come to a resolution in the particulars of their scheme. But the Arians supposing him a *creature* at large, and not knowing the several degrees of perfection on this side *infinite*, are always in uncertainty; not being able to determine how much or how little it may be proper to ascribe to the Son of God: and hence it is that they could never unite together in any one fixed and certain set of principles; but have been always wavering, various, and unconstant; and must ever be so to the world's end. But this by the way: having laid before you the Arian interpretation, nothing now remains but to offer to you the Catholic sense of this chapter, which I mean to explain, and defend; and that will be the same thing with confuting the Arian.

4. The Catholic construction, at length, is this.

" *In the beginning*, before there was any *creature*, (con-
" sequently from all eternity,) the WORD existed; and the
" WORD was no *distant* separate *power*, estranged from
" God, or unacquainted with him, but he was *with God*,
" and himself also [q] *very God;* not *another God*, but an-
" other *Person* only, of the same nature, substance, and
" Godhead. *All things were created by him*, &c."

This I presume to call the Catholic and truly *primitive* interpretation of the first verse of this chapter: and what time your patience will farther allow me, shall be taken up in asserting and maintaining it. St. John has here called the WORD, *God*. In what sense, is the question.

[q] Dei Verbum, imo magis ipse Deus. *Iren.* p. 132.

[r] Ἐν γὰρ ἄμφω ὁ Θεός· ὅτι ἐστιν, ἐν ἀρχῇ ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ· καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. *Clem. Alex.* p. 135.

Alium autem quomodo accipere debeas, jam professus sum. *Personæ*, non *substantiæ* nomine; ad distinctionem, non ad divisionem. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* p. 506. Hunc didicimus Filium Dei esse, et Deum dictum ex unitate substantiæ. *Tertull. Apolog.* c. 21.

Εἰ δὲ οὖν ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν, Θεὸς ὤν, τί οὖν φήσειεν ἄν τις δύο λέγειν Θεούς; Δύο μὲν ἐκ ἑρῶ Θεὼς ἀλλ' ἢ ἕνα, πρόσωπα δὲ δύο, &c. *Hippol. contr. Noët.* c. xiv. p. 15.

The context, and circumstances, and other collateral evidences must at length decide it. I shall first inquire,

1. What kind of idea, or notion, Scripture and Christian antiquity give us of one that is *truly* and *really* God. And

2. Shall consider what reasons we have to believe that St. John here calls the Λόγος, or WORD, God, in the same sense, or in conformity to that idea.

I. I shall inquire what kind of *idea*, or notion, Scripture and Christian antiquity give us of one that is *really* and *truly* God. If we trace this matter through the Old Testament, we shall find that the *Scripture-notion* of a Person that is *truly* God, and should be received as such, includes in it *power* and *might* irresistible[r]; perfect *knowledge* and consummate *wisdom*[s], *eternity*[t], *immutability*[u], and *omnipresence*[x]; *creative* powers[y]; *supremacy*, *independence*, and *necessary existence*[z]. These are the distinguishing characters under which God was pleased to make himself known: and it is upon these accounts that he, in opposition to all other Gods, claims to be received and honoured as God. These therefore are what make up the *Scripture-idea* of a Person who is *truly*, *really*, and *strictly* God. And if Scripture has thus informed us what properties, attributes, and perfections, must be supposed to meet in one that is *truly* and *properly* God, our own reason must tell us, that these *attributes*, &c. must have a *subject*, and this subject we call *substance:* and therefore the *Scripture-notion* of God, is that of an eternal, immutable, omnipresent, omniscient, almighty *substance.* If it be pretended that these are the characters of a *supreme*

[r] Deut. iii. 24. vii. 19. x. 17. xxxii. 39. 1 Chron. xxix. 11. Job ix. 4. xii. 16. xlii. 2. Isa. xxvi. 4. xlii. 5.

[s] Job xxxvi. 4. xxxvii. 16. Dan. ii. 20.

[t] Psal. xciii. 2. Job xxxvi. 26. Gen. xxi. 33. Deut. xxxiii. 27. Isa. lvii. 15.

[u] Mal. iii. 6.

[x] Deut. iv. 7. Psal. cxxxix. 7, &c. Jer. xxiii. 23, 24.

[y] 2 Kings xix. 15. Job xxvi. xxxviii. Psal. viii. 4. Isa. xlv. 7, 18. Jer. x. 12.

[z] Exod. iii. 14.

God only, and not of every Person that is *true* God; I answer that *supremacy* (*negatively* [a] considered in opposition to any *superior nature*) is one of the characters belonging to any Person that is *truly* God, as much as *omnipotence, omniscience,* or any other; and consequently he is not *truly* God, in the Scripture-notion of God, who is not *supreme* God. This is the Scripture-notion of one that is *truly* God; and thus it stood when St. John wrote his Gospel.

Let us next inquire, whether the same notion obtained in the Christian Church after St. John wrote.

Justin Martyr, a very early and excellent writer, within forty or fifty years of St. John, observes, that [b] God alone is *necessarily existing* and *immutable,* (or *incorruptible,*) and that for this very reason he is God; thereby intimating that without such perfections he could not be God.

Irenæus, another early and judicious writer, almost contemporary with Justin, expresses himself more fully and clearly upon the same head; observing that [c] no Person that has any *superior* can be justly called *God;* nor any thing that has been created, or ever began to exist. The same Irenæus has a whole [d] chapter to prove that the Old Testament, or New, never gave the title of *God,* absolutely and definitively, to any one that is not *truly* God.

[a] I say, *negatively;* because *positive* supremacy over others could not commence till the *creation.*

[b] Μόνος γὰρ ἀγέννητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος Θεὸς, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Θεός ἐστι. *Justin. Dial.* p. 21. Jebb.

[c] Qui enim super se habet aliquem superiorem, hic neque Deus neque rex magnus dici potest. Lib. iv. cap. ii. p. 229.

Quæcunque autem initium sumpserunt, et dissolutionem possunt percipere, et subjecta sunt, et indigent ejus qui se fecit, necesse est omnimodo uti differens vocabulum habeant apud eos etiam, qui vel modicum sensum in discernendo talia habent: ita ut is quidem qui omnia fecerit cum verbo suo, juste dicatur Deus et Dominus solus; quæ autem facta sunt, non jam ejusdem vocabuli participabilia esse, neque juste id vocabulum sumere debere, quod est Creatoris. *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. viii. p. 183.

[d] Lib. iii. cap. 6.

Tertullian (in the beginning of the third century, or sooner, within a hundred years, or very nearly, of St. John) observes, that the word [c] *God* does not, like *Lord*, signify *dominion* or *power* only, but *substance;* that none but the *eternal uncreated substance* can justly be called *God*; that an *inferior* God is a contradiction in terms.

These testimonies are sufficient to show (without adding any more) how the word *God* was taken and generally understood by the Christian Church, soon after the Apostle's time; and therefore very probably, in the Apostle's time also. Now let us proceed to consider

II. What reasons we have to believe that St. John, in his first chapter, calls the WORD *God*, in the same sense, in conformity to that *idea* which Scripture hath given us of one that is *truly* God; and which the primitive writers also appear plainly to have embraced.

1. This alone is a strong presumption, in favour of our interpretation, that the Scriptures *before*, and the Christian Church *after*, espouse this notion. Would St. John have called the WORD, God, in the manner that he does, without guard or caution, had he not intended it in the strict sense, which Scripture itself so much favours, and in which the generality, at least, would be most apt to take it? Had he meant it in a lower sense, it might have been very proper to have inserted a qualifying clause to prevent any mistake or misconstruction; which yet he is so far from doing, (as we shall see presently,) that he has put together with it many circumstances, all tending to convince us that he used the word in the strict sense, as Scripture had done *before*, and the Christian Church did *after*. For

[c] *Deus* substantiæ ipsius nomen, id est *Divinitatis; Dominus* vero non substantiæ, sed potestatis, &c. *Tertull. contr. Hermog.* p. 234.

Deus jam vocari obtinuit substantia cui ascribo. Hanc invenies solam innatam, infectam; solam æternam, et universitatis conditricem——nega Deum quem dicis deteriorem: nega summum magnum, quem credis minorem. *Adv. Marc.* lib. i. cap. 6, 7. p. 368.

2. It is observable, that the Apostle does not say, in the beginning God *created* the WORD, (as the style runs in the first chapter of Genesis, and might have been properly used here, had he intended to signify that the WORD was God, in an inferior or improper sense:) but instead of that, he only says that the WORD *was*[f]; intimating that he existed before any thing was *created*, consequently from all eternity: for whatever existed before any thing was *created*, was no *creature*, as is manifest of itself; and if no *creature*, eternal. This is farther confirmed from the Apostle's repeating it in the next verse, "The same was in "the beginning with God." It is not improbable that the Apostle might intend this in opposition to Cerinthus, who believed the Δημιουργὸς, or *Creator*, to be separate and estranged from God[g]. Nothing can be more directly levelled against that doctrine than this assertion of St. John's, that the WORD, who was *Creator* of the world, was *from* the *beginning*, or always, *with God*. But to proceed:

3. Another argument of St. John's intending the word *God* in the strict sense, may be drawn from the time whereof he is speaking. It was before the *creation;* he was *then* God. It is not said, that he was *appointed* God over the things that should be afterwards created. No; he was God before the world was. Our adversaries sometimes tell us of a *throne*, a power of *judging*, a *regal* au-

[f] Παρὰ δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ συνεῖναι τῷ πατρὶ, λέγεται, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. οὐ γὰρ ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. καὶ ταυτὸν ῥῆμα, τὸ ἦν, τοῦ λόγου κατηγορεῖται, ὅτι ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν, καὶ ὅτι πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἦν, οὔτε τῆς ἀρχῆς χωριζόμενος, οὔτε τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπολειπόμενος. Καὶ πάλιν οὔτε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀρχῇ γινόμενος ἐν ἀρχῇ, οὔτε ἀπὸ τῷ μὴ συγχάνειν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἐπὶ τῷ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι γινόμενος. πρὸ γὰρ πάντος χρόνου καὶ αἰῶνος, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. *Orig. in Joh.* p. 45.

Οὐκ ἦν γὰρ ὅτε ἀρχὴ ἄλογος ἦν. διὸ λέγεται ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος. *Ibid.* p. 66.

Vid. etiam Athanas. p. 526. Hilar. p. 795. Chrysost. in Joh. p. 25. and other testimonies collected in Suicer. Thesaur. under Ἀρχὴ, and Petav. 147, 417.

[g] Iren. lib. iii. cap. 11. p. 188. lib. i. cap. 26. p. 105. Tertull. de Præscript. Hæret. Append. p. 221. Epiphan. Hæres. xxviii. p. 110.

thority belonging to the Son: and that therefore he is *God;* and they observe[h] (as they think, shrewdly, but in truth very weakly) that the *Holy Ghost* has therefore none of that title, as having no regal dominion, &c. And when, in answer to this, we say farther, that the Son was *Jehovah*, God, and Lord, under the Old Testament; they reply, that he was then ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ, acting in the name and Person of God, and therefore *styled* God. Admitting all this, (which is mostly fiction,) yet what will they do with this text of St. John? Here it is plain, that the Son was God before any *dominion* over the creatures commenced; before he acted as *representative* of the Father, or was ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ, in that low fictitious sense: how was he God before the creation? Here they have little left to say, but that "he was partaker of divine power and "glory with and from the Father[i]." From hence then we see, that *dominion* alone is not sufficient to account for the Son's being *God;* not to mention that the *Holy Ghost* might have been called *God* in Scripture, as having been "partaker of divine power and glory with and from the "Father," as well as the Son; so that that pretence about the *Holy Ghost* and this solution hang not well together. To such straits and inconsistencies are men reduced by bringing their *hypotheses* with them to interpret Scripture by, instead of making Scripture the rule of their faith. But to conclude this article: since then neither *dominion*, (on account of which princes and magistrates have been sometimes called *Gods*,) nor *vicegerency*, nor any thing of like kind, will account for the WORD's being called *God* by St. John in this place: and since our adversaries themselves appear to be very sensible that their principles, which serve to help them out at other times, fail them here; and that they are forced rather to say any thing, however slight or trifling, than to be wholly silent: this alone is a strong presumption on our side of

[h] See Script. Doctr. p. 264. 2d edit.
[i] Script. Doctr. p. 240. 2d edit.

the question, where the solution is so easy and natural, and entirely consistent with our other principles.

4. Another circumstance, confirming our interpretation of this passage of St. John, is, that "all things" are there said to have been "made by him;" and, to be more emphatical, that "without him was not any thing made that "was made." I shall not here insist upon the dignity of the Son as *Creator*, (the distinguishing character of the *one true God*,) designing that for a distinct head of argument another time: all the use I shall make of it at present is to observe, that it is not said, all *other* things were made by him, but *all things* absolutely; wherefore he himself cannot, according to the letter, be supposed of the number of the things *made*, unless he made himself, which is absurd: and since nothing was made or created but by and through him, it is but reasonable to infer that every *creature* whatever is a *creature* of the *Son's* as well as of the *Father's;* and therefore certainly the Son is not a *creature* at all.

5. A farther circumstance favouring our sense is, that the WORD is called *God*, in the very same verse, wherein the Father is mentioned as *God*, and undoubtedly in the strict and proper sense. And how shall any the most judicious reader be ever able to understand language, if in the same verse and same sentence, the same word should stand for two ideas, or bear two senses widely different and scarce akin to each other? and that too, not only without any guard or caution, or any notice given of the change of ideas; but also with such circumstances as give no suspicion of any change, but all tending to confirm us the more that the same idea is still kept up, and applied equally to Father and Son. It has been objected that the Father is ὁ Θεὸς, God with the article, the Son only Θεὸς, God without the article. But every body knows that the addition or omission of an article is no certain proof of any change at all in the sense of a word; besides that the word Θεὸς, *God*, is used in the strict sense, though without the article, several times in this chapter. The

sacred penmen were not so critical about articles; neither can we imagine that a point of this moment should have been left so unguarded, with nothing to direct us but I know not what blind and dark conjectures of the use of articles; concerning which we have no certain rules either for Scripture, or for any other writings. The word Θεὸς, *God*, is frequently used without the article to signify the *true God:* and it is used with the article (2 Cor. iv. 4.) where it is supposed by most interpreters to be meant of the *Devil:* so little account is there to be made of articles. But enough of this. It is farther pretended, that ὁ Θεὸς, *God*, applied to the Father, may stand for *Jehovah*, which is the *proper* name of a *Person*, and that therefore *God* and *God*, in the text, cannot bear the same sense, unless both be one and the same Person *Jehovah*. But in answer to this, it is sufficient to say, that it can never be proved that *Jehovah* is a *proper* name of any Person, but as that Person is considered as having *independent* or *necessary* existence: and then the name must be *common* to as many persons as exist *necessarily*, or *independently;* independently on the *will* or *free choice* of any. Besides that it is certain that the name belongs equally to Father or Son, (as I shall show presently,) and therefore St. John might intend that the Father is *Jehovah*, and the Son *Jehovah* too, and both in the same sense; while at the same time, by his telling us that one was *with the other*, he has sufficiently signified that they are not the *same Person;* but that *Jehovah* is a name *proper* indeed to one substance, or one Godhead, but *common* to more Persons than one. I proceed then,

6. To observe, that St. John did look upon God the Son as the true *Jehovah;* and this alone is an irrefragable argument of St. John's meaning in the text before us. I shall first show the fact, and next make good my inference from it. The fact may be proved first from chapter xii. verse 41. of this very Gospel. The words are: "These "things said Esaias when he saw his glory," (meaning Christ's glory) "and spake of him." Now the place of

Esaias referred to is chapter the sixth, which begins thus:

"I saw also the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and "lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it "stood the Seraphims——And one cried unto another "and said, Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts, the "whole earth is full of his glory." Here we are to observe, that the Lord, which Esaias saw in his vision, was the *Jehovah*, and Lord of Hosts, which is of the same signification with *Lord God Almighty*. Him it was, and his *glory*, which the Prophet saw. And that this was Christ, and that glory Christ's glory, St. John has before testified; and therefore certain it is that God the Son is, in St. John's account, the *Jehovah*, and *Lord God Almighty*. This reasoning is in itself plain and strong; and is besides farther confirmed by the [k] concurring sentiments of many Catholic writers.

A [l] late writer endeavouring to elude the force of this text, devises this construction, that the Prophet, in beholding the glory of God the Father, revealing the coming of Christ, he then *saw* (that is *foresaw*) the glory of Christ. But admitting that *saw* may signify *foresaw*, (which however is a very needless supposition, since it is certain that our blessed Lord had as much *glory* with the Father before the world was, as ever he had after, Joh. xvii. 5.) yet what occasion is there to suppose the *Father's glory* to have been principally spoken of, when St. John says plainly it was *Christ's* glory, and that the Prophet spake of him, viz. Christ? It is indeed said, that Christ shall come "in the glory of his Father." (Matt. xvi. 27.) But it is also said, that "he shall come in his own glory;" (Matth. xxv. 31. Luke ix. 26.) "and sit in the throne of

[k] Eusebius in loc. Athanasius, p. 877, 889. Hilar. Trin. lib. v. cap. 33. p. 873. Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. v. p. 115. Hieronymus in loc. Epiphan. Ancorat. p. 15, 13. Jobius apud Phot. p. 605. Cyril. Hierosol. Catech. xiv. p. 202. Ambros. de Fid. lib. i. c. 12. p. 141. ed. Bened. Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. l. ii. p. 488.

[l] Script. Doctr. p. 93. 2d edit.

"his *own* glory." (Matt. xix. 28.) If then the Prophet saw indeed the glory of the *Father* also, it is because the glory of both is one; and if the Father be the *Lord of Hosts*, whom the Prophet saw, it is because the Father and Son are one *Lord of Hosts:* for it is as certain as words can make it, from what St. John says, that the Son's glory was seen; and that he was the *Jehovah* of whom the Prophet spake. If the Father was so too, we have a full and strong proof, not only of the Son's being *Jehovah*, but of the Father and Son both being comprehended under the same one *Jehovah:* and so indeed [m] several of the ancient Fathers have interpreted it. But that is not what I insist upon now, my argument not requiring it. It is sufficient for me, that the Prophet *saw*, or *foresaw* (no great matter which) the glory of *Jehovah*, or *Lord of Hosts;* and it was the *Jehovah*, or *Lord of Hosts*, that the Prophet spake of. That is, as St. John interprets it, he saw the glory of *Christ*, and spake of him: Christ therefore is *Jehovah* and *Lord of Hosts;* which was to be proved.

There is a second passage in this very Gospel, which proves the same thing. It is John xix. 37. "Another "Scripture saith, They shall look on him whom they "have pierced." The Scripture referred to is Zech. xii. 10. where the Lord (*Jehovah*) is introduced saying, "They "shall look upon ME, whom they have pierced." The Person pierced is *Jehovah*, and the same Person is *Christ:* wherefore, by necessary construction and implication, Christ is *Jehovah*. The *fact* being thus plain and clear, we are next to consider the inference from it. The import of the name *Jehovah* (according to the best *critics*, ancient and modern) is eternal, immutable, necessary existence. The Greek ὁ ὤν, or τὸ ὄν, taken from it, or answering to it, has been interpreted to the same sense by Jews, Gentiles, and Christians [n]. It would be tedious here

[m] Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nyssen, Ambrose, Jerome, Epiphanius, before referred to.

[n] Vid. Petav. Dogm. Theolog. vol. i. lib. 1. c. 6.

to enter any farther into the detail of that matter. It shall suffice to observe how the *one true God* insists upon his being *Jehovah*, in opposition to all other gods, glorying, in a manner, and triumphing in it, as the distinguishing character by which he would be known to be infinitely superior to all the gods of the nations.

"I am the Lord, (*Jehovah*,) that is my name, and my "glory will I not give to another," Isa. xlii. 8. "Against "all the gods of Egypt I will execute judgment: I am "the Lord, (*Jehovah*,)" Exod. xii. 12. "Who hath told "it from time to time? have not I the Lord, (*Jehovah?*) "and there is no God else besides me; a just God, and a "Saviour; there *is* none besides me," Isa. xlv. 21. "I "am the Lord, (*Jehovah*,) the God of all flesh: is there "any thing too hard for me?" Jer. xxxii. 27. "I am the "Lord, (*Jehovah*,) I change not," Mal. iii. 6. "I am the "Lord, (*Jehovah*,) and there is none else: I form the "light and create darkness——I the Lord (*Jehovah*) do "all these things," Isa. xlv. 6, 7. I forbear to add more texts. These are enough for a specimen. There is no giving a full and complete idea of this matter, without transcribing a great part of the Old Testament. Now since the title of *Jehovah* is, in Scripture, a principal note of distinction by which the true God was pleased to manifest himself, and to set forth his own superior excellency in opposition to all pretended deities; and since St. John has given us to understand, that Christ is *Jehovah*, or *Lord of Hosts*, and consequently possessed of all those distinguishing powers and perfections which go along with that title; the consequence is evident and undeniable, that when the same St. John tells us that the WORD was *God*, he intended no *nominal* or *inferior* Deity, but *God* in the true, strict, and proper sense, eternal and immutable, of the same power, nature, and perfections with God the Father. I shall now briefly sum up the parti-

Appendix to the Considerations on Mr. Whiston's Histor. Pref. p. 101. and part ii. p. 2, 3, &c.

culars of the argument, that we may the more easily take into one view the whole strength and force of it.

The Apostle has here told us, in a very solemn manner, in the very entrance upon his Gospel, that the Λόγος, or WORD, was *God;* the very mention whereof, according to the Scripture-idea of God, and the prevailing notions of those who lived in and near St. John's time, carries with it, in its first and most natural conception, all that is good, great, or excellent: and so every unprejudiced man, upon the first reading or hearing the Apostle's words, would be apt to understand him. He has inserted no guard or caution to prevent any such construction; but, on the contrary, has hardly omitted any thing that might tend to confirm and enforce it. The WORD was *God* before he had any *dominion*, before he had acted as *representative* of the Father; God, *in the beginning*, before the world was, before there was any creature; God, by whom the world was made, and to whom every creature owed its existence; who coming into the world, came unto his *own*, who is *Jehovah* and *Lord of Hosts*, the same as Κύριος παντοκράτωρ, the *Lord Almighty*, and God over all: in such a sense, and with these circumstances, the WORD is called *God*, in the very same verse where mention also is made of the *Father*, with whom he was, and who is there called *God*, in the strict and proper sense: all this put together amounts to a demonstration, that the Apostle intended no *nominal* or *inferior* God by the WORD, but the *true* and *living* God, one with the Father, coessential and coeternal. Thus the first Christians understood it; and thus the Catholic Church has believed: and this is the faith which we ought evermore earnestly to contend for, as being "once delivered to the saints."

I entreat your patience but a little farther, just to take notice of a late pretence of an Arian writer[o].

The Jews, says he, and Gentiles believed in *one God*, understanding it of *one Person* only: our Saviour and his

[o] Modest Plea, Postscript, p. 318.

Apostles taught that Christ was the Son of *that one God:* when therefore Christ is also styled *God,* those among whom he was first so styled, would naturally understand it in the *subordinate* sense, as the word *Elohim* in the Hebrew, Θεὸς in the Greek, and *God* in the English frequently signifies.

This is the argument, and in this, the author says, "the sum of the whole controversy is briefly comprised." If this be really the case, the controversy may be brought to a short and clear issue. By *subordinate* sense of the word *God,* the gentleman means such a sense in which *creatures* may be *gods,* and have been called *gods.* I hope I have sufficiently shewn that St. John could never intend any such low sense, nor be so understood by any man of ordinary attention, or common discernment. As to the question, how it would be understood by those who first heard it, it has been already determined by plain evidence of fact. It appears certainly to have been understood in the strict and proper sense, as high as Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Irenæus, Athenagoras, that is, within sixty or seventy years of St. John's writing: and I will venture to add Ignatius [p], which brings it up to the very time: for Ignatius had been well acquainted with St. John himself, having been once his [q] disciple.

As to Jews or Gentiles, whatever short or imperfect notions they had of *God,* (though it is a disputable point, whether they did not both admit of some plurality in the Deity,) they are to come to Christians to be more fully instructed; and we are not to be taught by them, how we are to understand a clear and plain Gospel. Hard must be our case indeed, if we are to be sent to Jews or Pagans to learn Christianity. However, Jews and Gentiles both

[p] Ὃς πρὸ αἰώνων παρὰ πατρὶ ἦν, καὶ ἐν τέλει ἐφάνη. *Ignat. ad Magn.* cap. vi. p. 22.

Ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ λόγος ἀΐδιος, οὐκ ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών. cap. viii. p. 23.

Εἷς ἰατρός ἐστιν, σαρκικός τε καὶ πνευματικὸς, γεννητὸς καὶ ἀγέννητος, ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενος Θεός. *Ad Ephes.* cap. vii. p. 14.

[q] Act. Martyr. S. Ignat. cap. iii. p. 49.

(as many as came over to Christianity, and did not side with *heretics*) then at least corrected (or rather filled up what was wanting in) their ideas of the divine Unity, by their faith in, and profession of one holy, undivided, and coeternal Trinity. We have seen then, first, how St. John ought to have been understood; and next, how he actually was understood by sober men, and those that were the most competent judges of his meaning. What can be desired more to cut off all farther controversy in this article?

To conclude: The Sabellians at this day, as well as formerly, are a standing evidence of the strength and force of those two or three first verses of St. John's Gospel. For as they reject the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity in Unity, only because they think it repugnant to *reason;* so they reject also the Arian *hypothesis*, because they take it to be repugnant to *Scripture*, and particularly to the first chapter of St. John. They are sensible how absurd it is to suppose so much to be said of a *creature*, and said in that manner, and with those circumstances; and therefore they interpret the whole of God the *Father* himself. Thus they get over one difficulty, but unhappily split upon another; and the Arians have as plainly the advantage in the point of *personality*, as the other have in respect of the *divinity* of the WORD. Happy might it be for both, if, laying aside prejudice, they would contentedly submit their *fancies* to God's *written Word;* interpreting it according to its most obvious and natural meaning, without laboured subtilties, and artificial glosses: remembering always that, in case of doubt, there is no safer guide to take with us, than the concurring judgment of the *ancients;* nor any more dangerous than warmth of imagination, or a love of novelties.

Christ properly Creator:

OR

CHRIST'S DIVINITY

PROVED FROM CREATION.

The second Sermon preached October 7, 1719.

JOHN i. 3.

All things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made.

I HAVE before took notice of these words of the Apostle, but so far only as was necessary to give some light to the words going before, whereof I was then discoursing. My design now is, to consider them distinctly, as containing a farther argument, independent of the former, to prove the real, essential divinity of our blessed Lord, "by whom all things were made, *and without whom* was "not any thing made that was made." I have, in my former discourse, intimated the various interpretations given of this chapter, under the names of Socinian, Sabellian, Arian, and Catholic, suitably to their respective schemes. Accordingly, these words of the Apostle, in passing through those several hands, have been shaped and fashioned into so many several constructions; though one only can be the true one. The Socinian will tell us, that all things belonging to the Gospel-state were regulated and modelled by the man Christ Jesus; that the *moral world* was reformed and rectified by him; and that

the Apostle is not here speaking of a *proper*, but a *metaphorical* creation. Next comes the Sabellian, who thinks that the text is meant of the creation of the *natural* world, and all things in it; but then, not by the man Christ Jesus, nor by any Person *really* distinct from God the Father: all things were made by *reason* or *wisdom*, figuratively put for God himself; so that the Apostle intended not here any *real* Person besides God the Father: thus far the Sabellian. After him succeeds the Arian, who admits of a *proper creation* of the *natural*, not the *moral* world; and admits also of a distinct Person, viz. the Λόγος, or WORD, himself a *creature:* and he does not deny him any hand or concern at all in the creation; but endeavours only to detract from him, more or less, with great uncertainty. For, as I have before observed, that sort of men are always fluctuating, hovering, and doubtful, not knowing where to fix upon any certain set of principles. Sometimes [a] you will find them pretending that God the Son, properly speaking, did not *make* or *create* any thing at all; but that the *Father* only was *Creator*, through him. At other times [b] they will not scruple to allow that the Son, by his own *inherent* power, created all things *out of nothing;* which is carrying the point as high as any the soundest Catholic can carry it: only they add, by way of lessening, that this was at the *command* of the Father, who had *appointed* him *Creator;* which however might bear a sound and good sense. Betwixt these extremities of high and low (if I may so call them) amongst the Arians, there is a middle way, and that also with a latitude: some think it enough for the Son to have *created* some things only (suppose, what be-

[a] Πολλάκις γὰρ ἀκήκοά τινας λίγοντας ὅτι ὁ υἱὸς ἐποίησεν οὐδὲν, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγίνετο τὰ γινόμενα. *Epiph. Ancorat.* p. 33.

[b] Antequam faceret universa, omnium futurorum Deus et Dominus, Rex et Creator erat constitutus. Voluntate et præcepto (*Dei et Patris sui*) cœlestia et terrestria, visibilia et invisibilia, corpora et spiritus, *ex nullis exstantibus*, ut essent, *sua virtute* fecit. *Serm. Arianorum* apud Aug. tom. viii. p. 622. ed. Bened.

longs to one system): others again (understanding by *creating*, modelling only) apprehend it sufficient, if he did but *frame*, *model*, or *digest* what was already *created* to his hand: others lastly, admitting both, yet say, it was not by his *own* power, but the *power* of the Father, always present with him: or that he had learned the art of *creating* by being bred up under the Father; which was the profane and wanton suggestion of Asterius, an Arian sophist of the fourth century [c]. There is no end of fancies and conjectures, when men are once got out of the plain and open way of truth. I shall not undertake particularly and severally to confute the three *hypotheses*, and the interpretations built upon them: but I shall proceed to lay down the Catholic construction; which if I can maintain and defend, the other drop of course. The Catholic doctrine is this: that the Son, together with the Father, (always including the Holy Ghost,) was the *efficient* Cause of all things, the Creator and Framer of men and angels, of principalities and powers, of the whole universe. I shall therefore, in my following discourse, undertake these three things.

I. I shall endeavour to show that God the Son, a distinct Person from God the Father, is strictly and properly *efficient* Cause and Creator of all things.

II. I shall consider the force of the argument arising from it, in favour of Christ's divinity.

III. I shall draw some suitable inferences from the whole.

I. I shall endeavour to show that God the Son, a distinct Person from God the Father, is strictly and properly *efficient* Cause and *Creator* of all things. And here I shall distinctly consider what light we may have in this matter from the New Testament, and what from the Old, and what additional confirmation from the declared sentiments of the primitive and Catholic Church.

1. To begin with the New Testament; and first with

[c] Athanas. Orat. ii. 496.

the very words of the text: "All things were made by "him, and without him was not any thing made that "was made." I have, in a former discourse, asserted the *distinct personality* of the Λόγος, or WORD; showing that the Sabellian interpretation of this chapter will by no means bear: I shall occasionally take notice of the Sabellian pretences in relation to other texts, as I come to treat of them. For the clearer understanding of the text now under consideration, we may observe, that Cerinthus and other heretics (against whose pernicious principles St. John is reasonably believed to have wrote his Gospel) had made a distinction between the *upper* and *lower* world, pretending they had not one Author. Hence, very probably, it is, that the Apostle expresses himself so particularly and emphatically in these words, (which might otherwise look like tautology,) "and without him "was not any thing made that was made." He had first told us, *affirmatively*, that all things were made by the WORD; then he repeats, as it were, the same thing over again, but *negatively*, that nothing was made without him: that is, we are not to except any part of the creation, not the *invisible* things above, which the *heretics* pretended to distinguish from the other: all things, *visible* and *invisible;* all, without exception, were made by the WORD. I must here observe, that, after the Arian controversy arose, the Catholics made good use of the latter part of this text especially, which is so very expressive and emphatical. The Arian principle is, that the Son was the first thing that God had made; and that God made him, ἀμεσιτεύτως, *immediately* by himself, without the intervention of any other person. Against this, the Catholics pleaded that nothing was made without the intervention of the Son; the Apostle having emphatically declared, that "without him was not any thing made that "was made:" there was therefore nothing made ἀμεσιτεύτως, *immediately* by the Father, without the intervention and concurrence of the Son. Consequently, the Son was not *made* at all, since it is absurd to imagine

that he *intervened* or concurred to the *making* of himself; which would be the same as to say, that he existed before he existed, or was *prior* to himself. But I pass on to what I design. "All things were made by him," signifies the same, as that he made all things. Thus the [d] ancients have unanimously interpreted it, and the idiom of the language will undoubtedly bear it[e]. We find the phrase of δι' αὐτοῦ, or δι' οὗ, τὰ πάντα, *by whom are all things*, nearly the same with what St. John here says of the Son, twice applied to the Father himself, (Rom. xi. 36. Heb. ii. 10.) which effectually takes off any pretence the Arians can have, merely from the force of the preposition διὰ, as if it were intended as a note of inferiority, when it is nothing more than a note of distinction. When Father and Son are joined together, (as 1 Cor. viii. 6.) *of whom* is indeed applied to the Father, and *by whom* to the Son, to signify at once the unity of operation and distinction of Persons, and withal some priority of order, as the Father is the fountain of all, and first in conception, whenever we think of the Deity. This is all that can be reasonably inferred from the Scripture-usage of the *prepositions:* especially if it be considered that under the same latitude of expression, as *all things* are said to be *of* the Father, so likewise *all things* are said to be *by* the Son; consequently the operation of one is of equal extent with the operation of the other, and indeed is but one work of both. *All things* then are *made by* the *Son*, but in conjunction with the Father; and the Father hath made

[d] Οὗτος γάρ ἐστιν ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν, &c. *Just. Dial.* p. 331.
Πρὸς αὐτοῦ γὰρ, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐγένετο. *Athenag.* p. 38.
Verbum Dei *per quod* omnia facta sunt, et quoniam mundus proprius ipsius et *per ipsum* factus est, voluntate Patris—mundi enim *Factor* vere Verbum Dei est. *Iren.* p. 315.
Fecit enim et ipse quæ facta sunt *per illum*. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* p. 504.
Verbum autem hoc illud est quod in sua venit, et sui eum non receperunt. Mundus enim *per eum* factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit.———Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo veniens in hunc mundum, in *sua* venit, cum homo nullum *fecerit* mundum? *Novat.* cap. xiii. p. 714, 715.

[e] See Petavius de Trin. lib. vii. cap. 17. p. 431.

nothing but in and by the Son. This appears to be the true and full sense of the text in St. John, whereof I am now treating; and it is confirmed by other passages of the New Testament, which I shall take in their order. There is one occurring in the same chapter, a few verses lower. "He was in the world, and the world was made "by him, and the world knew him not: he came unto "his own, and his own received him not." ver. 10, 11. Some have thought that by *his own*, in this place, is meant only *his own* people, the Jews, as being of his kindred according to the flesh. But this can never be the meaning of it. The Evangelist is here speaking of the Λόγος, or WORD, antecedently considered, and now coming to those who were *his own* before he came to them, before he took flesh upon him. The words immediately preceding, viz. "the world was made by him, and the "world knew him not," make it probable that the Apostle was not then thinking of the Jews only, but of mankind in general. Besides this, it is worth the noting, that some *heretics*, in St. John's time probably, as well as after, had a conceit that the Creator of this lower world was separate and distant from the supreme God, and that Christ came not into a world of *his own* making, but into one that belonged to another. Now in opposition to these and the like chimerical fancies, the Apostle informs us, that the same Creator (that is, Christ in conjunction with the Father) made every thing; and that therefore when he came into the world, he came *unto* his *own*, his own house and workmanship, this world being by right of creation his. This construction is what Irenæus, a very ancient writer, gives of the text[f]. The like construction is given of it by[g] Clemens of Alexandria, Hippolytus, and Novatian, writers of the second and third centuries. Some who interpret the text of the Jews, yet do not give this

[f] Iren. p. 188, 315, 316.

[g] Clem. Alex. p. 882. Hippolyt. contr. Noët. cap. xii. p. 14. Novatian. cap. 13.

for the reason, that the Jews were his *own*, as being *akin to him according to the flesh;* but as they were his *peculium* [h], his *chosen* people, and as he was in a more eminent manner their God: and so Cyril of Jerusalem seems to understand it [i]. Taking the text either of these ways, it affords us an argument of the Son's being properly *Creator*. For if it be understood of the *world* in general, then it is manifest from the words immediately preceding, that the τὰ ἴδια refers to his right of creation, and that the world is called his *own* in that respect. Or if it be understood of the Jews, it will prove thus much, that they were his *own*, as they were *his* people, and he *their* God; and it will appear from the Old Testament, that the God of Israel was the Maker of the world, the same that *created Jacob*, and *formed Israel*, (Is. xliii. 1.) and none else. If it be said, that the Jews may here be called his *own*, as he was their promised *Messiah*, their *Saviour* and *Redeemer;* that construction seems to be the least probable of any: first, because he was equally the Saviour of *mankind*, and therefore there is no reason why the Jews should be called his *own* in that respect. And secondly, because, admitting they might be called his *own* in that respect, yet it could not have been so properly said of them, antecedently to the work of redemption, before he had bought them at the price of his blood, and thereby made them his *own*. I conclude therefore from this passage, that whether it means the *world* or the *Jews*, they were his *own* in some higher respect; and that could be no other but as he was their *Creator*.

The next Scripture I shall cite shall be out of the Revelation, the work of the same Apostle whose words I have been considering. Our blessed Lord is there called the Ἀρχὴ, "the beginning" (that is, [k] author or efficient

[h] See Deut. lii. 9.

[i] Cyril. Catech. xii. p. 152, 312. Ox. ed.

[k] Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τῆς κτίσεως ἡ προπαρατικὴ αἰτία καὶ ἄπτιστος. *Andr. Cæsar.* in loc. p. 20.

Non ideo se principium creaturæ dicit, quod ipse sit creatura, sed quod ab

cause) "of the creation of God," Rev. iii. 14. This I mention as the most probable construction of the place, suitable to what I have before observed from St. John's Gospel. Otherwise, I think, nothing can, with any certainty, be proved from this passage alone; the word Ἀρχὴ (which we render *beginning*) being a word of great latitude, and capable of many senses. The *ancients* may afford us some light in this matter; not that I find this text particularly explained or quoted by any of the earlier writers: but it is frequent with them to apply the name Ἀρχὴ to God the Son; and they give this account of it: [1] he existed of and from the Father before all things; he made all things; and he governs all things: and therefore is the Ἀρχὴ, the *head*, or *beginning* of all things, or of the whole *creation*. This, I presume, may serve as the best comment we can meet with upon this text in the Revelation. I shall now proceed to other texts of more clear and certain meaning: 1 Cor. viii. 6. "To us there "is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and "we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are "all things, and we by him." Before I come to the argument which I intend from this text, I may just take notice that here we find Father and Son equally opposed to the *gods many*, and *lords many*. There is but one Lord to us, viz. *Jesus Christ*. Is then the Father (who also is the Lord "by whom are all things," Rom. xi. 34, 36.) excluded among the *lords many?* God forbid. But Father and Son are one *Lord*. So likewise to us there is but *one God*, viz. the Father. Is then the Son excluded among the *gods many?* the Son, who, as the same St. Paul

ipso omnia sint creata, ut puta architectus fecit domum. *Berengaud. in loc.* p. 511.

[1] Ἡ τῶν ὅλων Ἀρχὴ ἥτις ἀπεικόνισται μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου πρώτη καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων τετύπωκεν δὲ τὰ μεθ' ἑαυτὴν ἅπαντα γινόμενα. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* i. p. 669.

Οὗτος λέγεται Ἀρχὴ ὅτι ἄρχει, καὶ κυριεύει πάντων δι' αὐτοῦ διδημιουργημένων. *Theoph. Antioch.* lib. 2.

Vid. Coloss. i. 18.

testifies, is "over all God blessed for ever?" (Rom. ix. 5.) No, certainly: but Father and Son are *one God*. Thus, and thus only, can St. Paul's reasoning in that chapter be made to hang together: or otherwise he himself has infallibly shown us that there are *to us* two Gods and two Lords, at the same time that he intended to prove (see ver. 4.) that *to us* there is but *one God*, and *one Lord*. The truth is, St. Paul has not only hereby insinuated to us, that Father and Son are one God and one Lord; but he has likewise intimated the reason why, or on what account they are one. It is because all things whatsoever arise or flow from both. There is nothing *of* the Father, but *by* the Son; nor any thing *by* the Son, but what is also *of* the Father: so that the original of all creatures is referred up to both, as to one individual fountain and cause of their existence. The Father does not make one thing, and the Son another; but what the Father creates, the Son creates, for *all things* are by the Son. Hence it is manifest, that God the Son is *Creator* and *author* of *all things*, as well as the *Father;* nor would the Apostle have used the same latitude of expression in respect of both, (without any the least guard, caution, or exception,) had he not so understood it[m]. I find an ancient writer, under the name of Ignatius, though certainly later than Ignatius, concluding from this very text that the [n] Son of God *created* all things. Whoever the author was, the reasoning is true and just, agreeable to other

[m] Omnia enim per Filium ex nihilo substiterunt: et ad Deum *ex quo* omnia, ad Filium vero *per quem* omnia Apostolus retulit. Et non invenio quid differat, cum per utrumque opus sit virtutis ejusdem. Si enim ad universitatis substantiam proprium ac sufficiens creaturis esset quod *ex Deo* sunt; quid habuit necessitatis memorasse, quod quæ *ex Deo* sunt *per Christum* sint, nisi quod unum idem est, *per Christum* esse, et *ex Deo* esse? *Hilar. Trin.* lib. viii. c. 38. p. 970.

[n] Πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως, καὶ Θεὸς λόγος· καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποίησε τὰ πάντα. λέγει γὰρ ὁ ἀπόστολος. εἷς Θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ, ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα· καὶ εἷς Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα. *Ignat. adscript. Epist. ad Tars.* c. iv. p. 106. Cotel.

Vid. etiam Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. xxi. Athanas. Orat. i. contr. Arian. p. 124. Cyril. Hierosol. Catech. x.

Scriptures, and to the unanimous sentiments of the primitive Church. Some amongst us of late have affected very much to say, that all things were created *through* the Son, rather than *by* the Son. But they do not tell us the meaning of their quaint distinction between *by* and *through;* nor indeed are they able, in the present case, to make sense of it. Whether they say *through* or *by*, *all* comes to the same thing, that the Father is Creator by the *operation* of the Son: that is, both *work* together, ("my Father worketh hitherto, and I work; what things "soever he doth, these also doth the Son likewise," Joh. v. 17, 19.) The operation is *undivided*, and the *work* one: ° one creation, and one Creator in all. But more of this in the sequel.

The next passage in order is Ephes. iii. 9. "God who "created all things, by Jesus Christ." The sense of this must be the same with the former, and needs not any farther comment. The last words, "by Jesus Christ," are observed to have been wanting in the most ancient copies; and are therefore probably presumed to be an addition to the text. If so, then this text is nothing to our present purpose. I shall only remark, that when this text is away, there will be but one left, in the whole Scripture, where that particular form of expression is used, of *God's making the world by the Son.* And that is Heb. i. 2. "By whom also he made the worlds."

The other places, which make mention of the Son's creating all things, run in a somewhat different style; saying only, that the world, or all things, were *made by him;* not that *God made* them through, or by him: which different way of expressing the same thing is worth the observing, to keep us from two extremes; that we may not so interpret *God's* making all things *by the Son*, as to exclude the Son from being properly *Creator;* nor so interpret the Son's making all things, as to forget that he

° Μὴ εἶναι ἄλλα Χριστοῦ δημιουργήματα, καὶ ἄλλα πατρός. μία γὰρ ἡ πάντων δημιουργία. τοῦ πατρὸς διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ πεποιηκότος. *Cyril. Catech.* xi. p. 143.

is a *Son*, and as such refers all to the Father, as the *Head* and *Fountain* of the Son himself[P].

I pass on to a famous passage in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Colossians, which runs thus.

"Who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born "of every creature: for by him were all things created, "that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and "invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or "principalities, or powers, all things were created by "him, and for him. And he is before all things, and by "him all things consist." (Coloss. i. 15, 16, 17.) Strong, lively, and magnificent expressions; plainly intended of a *Person*, the Son of God just before mentioned, (ver. 13.) so that here is no room for any Sabellian pretences; of a Person *preexisting* before the world began, so that here is as little left for the Socinian; lastly of a Person who was before all creatures, and made all creatures, which is enough to silence the Arians. The last particular I am principally obliged to speak to. In the Greek we have two expressions, ἐν αὐτῷ and δι' αὐτοῦ, *in him*, and *by him*, were all things created; and also εἰς αὐτὸν, *for him*; the same expression which we find used of God the Father, probably, (Rom. xi. 36.) and is there rendered *to him*. So now we have found εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα, as before δι' αὐτῦ τὰ πάντα, equally applied to Father and Son: such expressions, so indifferently applied to either, have a meaning;

P The anonymous writer of *Modest Plea, &c. continued*, pretends that this concession of the Father's being *Head* and *Fountain*, &c. overturns our whole scheme. (p. 39.) But he does not attempt to show how. Dr. Clarke and his adherents have been called upon more than once, to make good their consequence from *subordination* of order to *inferiority* of *nature*. (See my Defence, &c. vol. i. p. 212, 214, 317.) But this writer, contenting himself with throwing in two or three expressions, as *explanatory* of the Father's being *Head* and *Fountain*, (which are really not *explanatory*, but a manifest perverting of the sense,) drops the point which it concerned him to speak to. The objection from *subordination*, long ago despised out of the mouth of Eunomius, will not grow considerable merely by being repeated, without any thing new to enforce it.

and did not drop by chance from inspired writers. But to consider the passage more distinctly.

In respect of the words, "first-born of every creature," our translation comes not up to the force, or meaning, of the original [q]. It should have been, *born* (or begotten) *before the whole creation* [r]; as is manifest from the context, which gives the reason why he is said to be πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως. It is because he is "before all things," and because by *him* were all things created. So that this very passage, which, as it stands in our translation, may seem to suppose the Son one of the creatures, does, when rightly understood, clearly exempt him from the number of creatures. He was before all created being, and consequently was himself *uncreated*, existing with the Father from all eternity. But this by the way only, the better to

[q] Μόνος ἰδίως υἱὸς τῷ Θεῷ γεγέννηται, λόγος αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχων καὶ πρωτότοκος καὶ δύναμις. *Justin. Mart.* Ap. i. p. 46.

Πρωτότοκος τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ Θεῷ ἐστι. *Ibid.* p. 101. Ὃς καὶ λόγος πρωτότοκος ὢν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Θεὸς ὑπάρχει. *Ibid.* p. 123. Θεοῦ δὲ, ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι τέκνον πρωτότοκον τῶν ὅλων κτισμάτων. *Dial.* p. 364. Πρωτότοκον τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ πρὸ πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων. *Ibid.* p. 295. Τοῦτο τῷ ὄντι ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς προβληθὲν γέννημα, πρὸ πάντων τῶν ποιημάτων συνῆν τῷ πατρί. *Ibid.* p. 187. Πρὸ πάντων ἁπλῶς τῶν κτισμάτων. *Ibid.* p. 375.

It is observable that Justin never says πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων κτισμάτων, but, simply and absolutely, before *all* creatures, clearly exempting the Son from the number of *creatures*.

Πρῶτον γέννημα εἶναι τῷ πατρὶ, οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον, &c. *Athenag.* p. 38.

Πρὸ γὰρ τὸ γένεσθαι, τοῦτον εἶχε σύμβουλον, ἑαυτοῦ νῷ καὶ φρονήσει ὄντα· ὁπότε δὲ ἠθέλησεν ὁ Θεὸς ποιῆσαι ὅσα ἐβουλεύσατο, τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησε προφορικὸν, πρωτότοκον πάσης κτίσεως, &c. *Theoph. Antioch.* p. 129.

Primogenitus conditionis, ut Sermo Creatoris per quem omnia facta sunt. ——Quomodo ante omnia, si non primogenitus conditionis, si non Sermo Creatoris? *Tertull. contr. Marc.* lib. v. p. 486.

Primogenitus omnis creaturæ——quoniam secundum divinitatem ante omnem creaturam ex Patre Deus Sermo processit. *Novat.* c. 16.

Πρωτότοκον πάσης κτίσεως, τὸν πρὸ αἰώνων εὐδοκίᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα, οὐ κτισθέντα. *Constit. Apostol.* l. vii. c. 41.

These passages are sufficient to show how πρωτότοκος was understood by the earliest Christian writers. If the reader desires to see it still farther explained, he cannot consult a better than the great Athanasius. *Orat.* ii. *contr. Arian.* p. 530, &c.

[r] See Joh. i. 30. πρῶτός μου ἦν.

introduce what I have to observe farther from this passage. Creation is here ascribed to the Son in very full, clear, and expressive terms. "All things:" not sublunary things only, not this inferior system, but "all things," whether above or below, "that are in heaven, and that "are in earth:" not inanimate things only, or the inhabitants of this globe, but also what is remote and distant; all things *visible* and *invisible;* and not only all rational creatures of an inferior rank and order, but the very highest orders of angels or archangels: whether there be *thrones* or *dominions, principalities* or *powers;* they are all created *in* and *by* him: not only so, but *for him*, or *to him;* he is the *final* as well as *efficient* Cause; as much as to say, that they are made for his service and for his glory, the ultimate end of their creation. And that it may not be suspected, that they have their dependance upon another, and not upon him; or that in him they do not *live* and *move* and hold *their being;* the Apostle adds farther, that "by him all things consist." He is not *Creator* only once, but *perpetual* Creator, being the *Sustainer* and *Preserver* of the whole universe.

Is this the description of a *creature?* or can any thing be said higher or stronger even of God the Father, to signify his being properly *Creator* and *Preserver* of the world[s]?

[s] The author of *Modest Plea, &c. continued*, is pleased to say, (p. 36.) that it is a "mean thing to confound the unlearned reader with the ambi-"guity of the terms *Creator* and *Preserver*." I hope he had not considered how plainly the Scripture has taught, what he thinks it so *mean* to say; nor how frequent it was with the early Fathers, as high as the second century, to apply those very titles expressly to God the Son. This was the constant Catholic language, insomuch that the old Arians, and even Eunomius himself (see Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. ii. p. 58.) did not refuse to style the Son *Creator*. Other Arians scrupled not to say, "Christum colimus ut Creatorem," (vide Maxim. apud August. p. 663. ed. Bened.) *We worship Christ as Creator*. If this writer had but as honourable thoughts of God the Son, as the generality of the ancient Arians had, he could not find fault with these or the like expressions: if he has not, I leave him to reflect how *mean* a thing it is to pretend to exceed even the most refined *Arianism*, and at the same time to admit the grossest.

I go on to Heb. i. 2. where it is said "by whom "(Christ) he (God) made the worlds:" to which is subjoined that he is ἀπαύγασμα, the "brightness (or effulgency) of his glory, and the express image of his person, and upholdeth all things by the word of his "power," ver. 3. which I shall leave without farther comment, to be interpreted from what hath been said before, that I may the sooner come to another passage in the same chapter, so full and strong that all the wit of man can devise no way to elude it.

"Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation "of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thine "hands. They shall perish; but thou remainest: and "they all shall wax old as doth a garment; and as a vesture shalt thou fold them up, and they shall be changed: "but thou art the same, and thy years shall not fail."

In the first place we may observe, that here the Sabellian pretences are fully obviated. The characters are all plainly *personal*, both in this chapter, and in the Psalm from whence this is quoted. The Socinian subtilties about the renovation of the moral world, are as light and empty as the other: the words are as express as the first chapter of Genesis, for the material earth and heavens: besides that it can never be explained how the *new creation* and *moral* world shall "wax old as doth a garment," or be "folded up as a vesture," or be *changed* and *perish*. The Arian can deal no better with this passage, than either of the two former. It is the *Jehovah*, and God of Israel, who is here spoken of, as is plain from the Psalm whence this is taken, and it is now applied by the sacred writer to Christ. The *heavens* are here said to have been the "works "of his hands," and he it was (it is not said, another *through* him) that "laid the foundation of the earth." Here are none of the *prepositions* ἐν, or διὰ, *by*, or *through*, to criticise upon. Those pretences, however serviceable at other times, can have no place here. If therefore either plain and strong words have any sense, or Scripture any weight, God the Son is and must be *Creator*, properly

and strictly so, maugre all the endeavours of weak and vain men to the contrary.

Seeing then that this passage is so full and clear, that neither Socinians, Sabellians, nor Arians, can any way work it into any of their schemes, what must be done next? [t] Some of them have been willing to think, and bold enough to say, that these four verses were fraudulently added, and were not originally a part of this Epistle. But all the *copies* and ancient *versions* of this Epistle retain these four verses: so that any pretence of forgery or interpolation does but expose the man that makes it, and the cause that needs it. The last pretence is, that this passage is intended of God the Father, and not of Christ. But the whole context, and the whole scope and drift of the author, in citing these verses, are sufficient to confute that conceit [u]: nor would any one, that has not an *hypothesis* to serve, ever suspect that the words were intended of any other but *Christ*, to whom they are so manifestly applied. Thus was the passage understood (and never otherwise that I know of) in the fourth and fifth centuries, and cited in proof of Christ's being properly *Creator;* not only by [x] Athanasius, Ambrose, Austin, Chrysostom, and Cyril of Alexandria, but by the elder Cyril too, who has been generally thought a very moderate man, and not much a favourer of Athanasius, though he retained the same faith. But enough of this. From what hath been said it appears now plainly and undeniably, that God the Son is properly Creator of the world. It was he that "laid the foundation of the earth," and the "heavens are the works of his hands." If there be any doubt in respect of the other texts, as not being full and explicit enough, there can be none in respect of this: so

[t] Judgment of the Fathers, p. 30.

[u] See Defence of some Queries, vol. i. p. 67.

[x] Athanas. tom. i. p. 440, 461, 685. tom. ii. p. 10. Chrysost. in Joh. p. 44. Cyril. Alexand. Thesaur. p. 126, 205. Cyril. Hierosol. Cateches. p. 221. Pseudo-Justin. p. 296. ed. Sylburg. Ambros. de Fid. l. v. c. 2. Augustin. contr. Maxim. l. ii. p. 741. Greg. Nyss. contr. Eun. l. iv. p. 542.

that, at length, we see Scripture itself has put an end to the disputes about the *prepositions* ἐν and διὰ, *in*, *by*, or *through*, and shows that all the criticisms of our adversaries about them, if intended to prove that God the Son is not properly Creator, are groundless and false. But if any thing else be intended, they are not pertinent to the cause in hand.

I may here observe to you farther, by the way, that those gentlemen who retreat to that subterfuge, that they may appear at least to have something to say, do not themselves know distinctly what they mean by it. Is it that God made the world by Christ, as he "wrought "special miracles by the hands of Paul?" (Acts xix. 11.) Is the *Father* in such a sense the *efficient*, and the Son the *ministering* Cause? They do not, [y] they dare not say it. For, besides this plain text, out of the Epistle to the Hebrews, directly against it, they cannot but know that the *whole* Catholic Church, down from Barnabas, (that is, from the days of the Apostles,) were of another mind; that even Origen and Eusebius, their two favourite authors, would condemn them; and that the soberer Arians themselves were so far *orthodox*, as to allow a proper *efficiency* to the Son, in the work of creation, Scripture and tradition running clear and strong for it. Since therefore a *proper* efficiency must be admitted, what can they pretend next? That the Son's efficiency reached not so far, was not of the same *extent*, as the *Father's?* But here Scripture, *express* Scripture, comes in, and precludes every pretence of this nature. "*All things* were made by him," says St. John, (John i. 3.) not a single thing without him: *all things*, says St. Paul, (Eph. iii. 9.) and again, *all things by* the Son, the *same*, and therefore *as many*

[y] Dr. Clarke, indeed, says, (Script. Doctr. p. 269. 2d. ed.) that the Son created the world *by the power of the Father:* but he does not deny that he created it *by his own power:* that would be too plainly running counter to Scripture and the whole Catholic Church; and betraying meaner thoughts of Christ than the generality of the ancient Arians appear to have had. See above, p. 25.

things as *of* the Father, (1 Cor. viii. 6.) and again, " all " things visible and invisible" &c. Coloss. i. 16. If therefore a *proper* efficiency, and of the same *extent*, must be allowed, what will our adversaries allege farther to lessen it? Will they say that it is not the same in *kind?* that the *Father*, for example, *created;* the *Son* only *framed* or *modelled?* But neither will this pretence serve any better than the former: for then it would not have been said that the Father *made* or *created* the world, or all things, by his Son, but *framed* and *modelled* only. And yet we have every word applied in this case, that can be supposed to carry any weight or significancy; πάντα ἐγένετο, says St. John, all things were *made*, not *framed* or *modelled* only. Or if κτίζειν, to *create*, be stronger, πάντα ἐκτίσθη, all things were *created*, twice over by St. Paul, Coloss. i. 16. Or if ποιεῖν be imagined to signify something more, we have that word also, δι' ὃ τοὺς αἰῶνας ἐποίησεν, " by whom also he made the worlds," Heb. i. 2.

If then the Son's efficiency be *proper*, and of the same *extent*, and of the same *kind* with the *Father's*, let our adversaries tell us what they would have next? They will say still, the Son is *subordinate*. Right; and so long as they take the other considerations along with it, that he is *efficient* in a *proper* sense, in the same *kind*, and in the same *extent*, as the Father is, we shall not dispute the point of *subordination* with them. The Father is *primarily* Creator, as the first in order, the Son *secondarily*, as second in order; and they are both one *Creator*, as they are one in *nature*, in *power*, and in *operation*. This is the Catholic faith, which was before *Arianism;* and will be after it.

Thus far I have proceeded in the proof of my position from the *New Testament:* and there is no farther need of any other. But since the *ancients* have also made use of several texts of the *Old Testament*, it will be proper to take a short view of them also; not so much to confirm what has been before proved and wants no confirmation, as to explain and illustrate it something farther, and withal

to give us a clearer idea of the sentiments of the primitive writers on this head.

In the first chapter of Genesis, ver. 26, God is introduced, speaking in the *plural* number, "Let US make "man in OUR image, after OUR likeness." This text has been understood of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, (or at least of Father and Son,) by the whole stream of Christian writers, down from the times of the Apostles. The Christians were not singular in thinking that the text intimated a *plurality*. The Jews before, and after, believed so too, as appears from Philo, and Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho the Jew; only they interpreted the text of God and his angels, which the Christians understood of the Persons of the Trinity. Justin Martyr and others made very good use of it against the Jews, observing how absurd it was to suppose that angels could be joined in that manner with God the Father, and be able to create man, or any thing.

Thus far at least we may infer from their manner of using this text, and their reasonings upon it, that the Christian Church, in general, believed Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to create, as it were, in concert, and every Person of the Trinity to be properly Creator.

This will appear farther from another text of the Old Testament, which they cite very frequently, to the same purpose. It is Psalm xxxiii. 6. "By the word of the Lord "were the heavens made, and all the hosts of them by "the breath of his mouth:" or, as it may be understood, by his WORD, and by his SPIRIT. This they interpreted of the Λόγος, or WORD, which St. John speaks of, and of the Holy Ghost. Which interpretation [z] obtained

[z] Theoph. Antioch. p. 21. Ox. ed. Irenæus, p. 98, 183. ed. Bened. Hippolyt. contr. Noët. cap. xii. p. 14. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. vii. p. 503. Origen. in Joh. p. 43. Euseb. Præp. Evan. lib. vii. cap. 12. lib. xi. cap. 14. in Ps. p. 125. Athanas. p. 694. Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. iii. p. 82, 110. Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xliv. p. 714. Epiph. Ancorat. p. 29. Pseudo-Justin. Expos. Fid. p. 296. Sylb. ed. Pseud-Ambros. de Symb. Apost. lib. vi. p. 324. ed. Bened.

very early in the second century, and was generally received afterwards. It must indeed be presumed that those early writers would not have entirely founded any doctrine of that moment on texts so very capable of another construction. But having already imbibed the principles of Christianity from the New Testament and Catholic tradition, they easily believed that those texts intended such a sense, when they knew from other evidences, that that sense was a truth, whether taught there or no.

Here again I must observe, that whether the text of the Psalms proves any thing or nothing to the point in hand, its being used formerly, in favour of such a doctrine, shows that that doctrine was then received, and was the faith of the Church.

There are two texts more out of Psalms, which I may put together, being both of the same import and significancy. Ps. xxxiii. 9. "He spake, and it was done; he "commanded, and it stood fast." The other is Ps. cxlviii. 5. "He commanded, and they were created."

These the [a] ancients understood of the three Persons; the Father being supposed to issue out his orders or commands for the creation, and the Son and Holy Ghost to execute or fulfil them. This notion [b] obtained among the Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene writers; and seems to have been grounded chiefly upon those two passages out of the Psalms, and some expressions in the first chapter of Genesis [c]. What led the Fathers to take the more notice of those places, was the singular use they might be of in their disputes with Jews and heretics. The Jews denied

[a] Irenæus, p. 118, 183, 169, 288. Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 845. Orig. in Joh. p. 18, 61. Contr. Cels. p. 63, 317, 79. Euseb. Præpar. Evang. lib. vii. cap. 12. in Psal. p. 125. Athanas. p. 216, 499. Cyril. Catech. xi. p. 143, 147. Hilar. de Trin. lib. iv. p. 837.

[b] Irenæus, lib. iv. cap. 38. p. 285. Hippolytus contr. Noët. p. 16. Basil. de Sp. Sanct. cap. 16. Cyril. Hierosol. p. 146. Ox. ed. Hilar. p. 325, 837, 840, Athanas. p. 216, 499. See others cited in Petav. lib. ii. c. 7. p. 141.

[c] Vid. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. xii. p. 506. Hilar. de Trin. lib. iv. p. 836. Athanas. Orat. ii. p. 499.

the *divinity*, or rather the distinct personality of the Λόγος, or WORD. They were not to be confuted out of the New Testament, (which was of no authority with the Jews,) but out of the Old, which both sides equally admitted. Hence it became the more necessary to search the Old Testament for proofs of the *divinity* or distinct *personality* of Christ. Now it was thought that no person would be introduced as giving out *orders* or *commands* to *himself*, but that such expressions denoted a *plurality* of persons. Who then could these other Persons be that received the commands? They could not be *angels* or *archangels:* why? because the *orders* were such as no angels could execute [d]. They were orders to *create* man, and the whole universe. None less than God's own Son and Holy Spirit could be equal to such a charge. There are therefore two divine Persons, or at least one, besides the Father. This was their argument from the Old Testament against the Jews. They had, besides, almost the like occasion to make use of the very same argument against heretics; against the Sabellians especially, and sometimes Arians. For, as many as had a mind to prove

[d] Οὐ γὰρ, ὅπερ ἡ παρ' ὑμῖν λεγομένη αἵρεσις δογματίζει, φαίην ἂν ἐγὼ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἢ οἱ ἐκείνης διδάσκαλοι ἀποδεῖξαι δύνανται, ὅτι ἀγγέλοις ἔλεγεν, ἢ ὅτι ἀγγέλων ποίημα ἦν τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἀνθρώπειον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο τὸ τῷ ὄντι ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς προβλητὸν γέννημα, πρὸ πάντων τῶν ποιημάτων συνῆν τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ τούτῳ ὁ πατὴρ προσομιλεῖ (fort. προσωμίλει.) *Just. Dial.* p. 187. Jebb.

——Tantus Deus, et ipse est qui per semetipsum constituit et elegit et adornavit, et continet omnia———Non ergo angeli fecerunt nos nec nos plasmaverunt, nec angeli potuerunt imaginem facere Dei; nec alius quis præter *verbum* Domini, nec virtus longe absistens a Patre universorum. Nec enim indigebat horum Deus ad faciendum quæ ipse prædefinierat fieri, quasi ipse suas non haberet manus. Adest enim ei semper *Verbum* et *Sapientia*, *Filius et Spiritus*, per quos, et in quibus omnia libere et sponte fecit, ad quos et loquitur dicens, *Faciamus hominem*, &c. *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 20. p. 253.

Nihil in totum Diabolus invenitur fecisse, videlicet cum et ipse *creatura* sit Dei, quemadmodum et reliqui *angeli*. *Iren.* p. 288.

Εἰ γὰρ ἐνετείλατο ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ ἐκτίσθη τὰ δημιουργήματα, τίς ἂν κατὰ τὸ ἀρέσκον τῷ προφητικῷ πνεύματι, εἶη ὁ τὴν τηλικαύτην τοῦ πατρὸς ἐντολὴν ἐκπληρῶσαι δυνηθείς, ἢ ὁ (ἵν' οὕτως ἐνομάσω) ἔμψυχος λόγος καὶ ἀλήθεια τυγχάνων; *Orig. contr. Cels.* lib. ii. p. 63.

that the Person of the Father, and he only, was God, were wont to plead that Moses and the Prophets knew of no other *real* Person that was God besides him; quoting Deut. vi. 4. ("Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one "Lord:") and other passages of the Old Testament of like import. Had this pretence been true, it would not have weakened the belief of a Trinity of Persons, founded upon a fuller and clearer discovery made by the Gospel. But they thought there were *sufficient* (though in some measure *obscure*) intimations given of a plurality of *real* Persons in the Old Testament; and accordingly they alleged those texts which I have mentioned, and abundance more too tedious to recite; insisting upon it, that Moses and the Prophets had asserted a plurality of *divine* Persons; and that, notwithstanding their doctrine of the Unity of God, they had actually applied the titles of *God*, *Lord*, *Jehovah*, &c. to more Persons than one; and that it was not the Father singly, but he, and his Son, and Holy Spirit, that *created* the world. The last particular (as I have before observed) they inferred from the texts which I have here cited out of the Psalms, and from others of like import. I have dwelt the longer upon this matter, because some persons, upon their first reading of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, (meeting with those passages where the Father is said to have *commanded*, and the Son to have *executed* his *orders*,) are apt either to be offended at them, or to draw strange conclusions from them: not considering that such men as Athanasius, Basil, and Cyril, made no scruple of them, understanding very well what such expressions meant at that time, and with what view they were intended[e]. The patrons of *Arianism* will never be able to serve their cause at all by them. They would indeed gladly infer, that since the Father is introduced as *commanding*, and the Son as *fulfilling*, that therefore the Son was supposed of an *inferior* nature to the

[e] See the meaning of them clearly opened and explained by Athanasius. *Orat.* ii. p. 499.

Father. But if they please to take a view of the whole argument, as it stands in the primitive writers, they will find that the very contrary is the truth. For the argument is this: the *Father* is represented in Scripture as giving out *commands* for the *creation* of the universe: no inferior *person*, no *angel* or *archangel*, no [f] *creature* whatever, could be *equal* to the office, or able to execute those *commands:* therefore there must be some other Person or Persons, distinct from the Father, and superior to all *creatures;* and those are his *Son*, and his *Holy Spirit*. Thus we see, that the primitive writers proceeded upon a supposition directly opposite to what the Arians pretend: for had they supposed the Son and Holy Ghost to be *creatures*, there had been no force at all in their argument; nor could they, in that way, have proved that there was any *Son* or *Holy Ghost* at all. But admitting that the work of creation was too big for any *creature*, and admitting at the same time that there were other Persons, besides the Father, who *created* the world; the consequence is very clear, that there are more *divine uncreated* Persons than one; and thus the doctrine of a *coeternal* Trinity is established.

I must entreat you to observe, that I do not take upon me to maintain the whole premises, which those ancient writers went upon. I think the argument from those texts is barely *probable:* I do not apprehend that a *plurality* of Persons can *certainly* be inferred, merely from such *forms* of expression, where the *Father* is said to have *commanded*, and things were *created*. The *style* is not *improper* or *unsuitable*, as I humbly conceive, though the Father were supposed the only Person concerned in creating. It is a handsome way of expressing that to *will* or to *do* is with God one and the same thing. All that I intend is, that the *Fathers*, who made use of that way of reasoning, believed that God the Son was properly *Creator* (otherwise there is neither force nor perti-

[f] See the quotations from Irenæus especially.

nency in their argument) and properly *divine*. As to the argument itself, they had no need of it, but in occasional disputes, where it might be of some service, *ad homines* at least; or where the New Testament proofs, on which they chiefly grounded their doctrine, could not be admitted at all.

I shall now just give you a brief summary of the doctrine of the primitive Church, in this article, and then take my leave of you for this time. They believed that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were distinct Persons, and all jointly concerned in the creation of the world; not as *many* Creators, but as *one* Creator; not dividing the work into parts, but as concurring in the whole, and in every part. Man, and every man, was supposed the creature of the whole Trinity; and so also the universe, and every part of the universe, was believed to be the creature of all, there being no creatures of the *Father's* but what were likewise creatures of the *Son* and of the *Holy Ghost*. Yet they admitted some distinction in the manner of operation, reserving to the Father, as *first* Person, some sort of preeminence in every thing. He was *primarily* considered as *Creator* by the operation of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; but without excluding them from a proper *efficiency*. So far from it, that they chose rather to represent the *Father* as *willing* or *designing*, and the two other Persons as *acting* and *executing;* contributing, as it were, but in subordination to one Head, to the beginning, the growth, and the perfection of every work. They ventured no farther, nor was it proper to indulge imagination in a matter so sublime, and above the comprehension of men or angels. It is sufficient to know, that the creation was the effect of three Persons, whose operations were undivided, as their nature and essence is; and whose powers, perfections, and glory are one. But I must not anticipate what more properly belongs to my second head of discourse.

Having shown from Scripture, that God the Son is strictly and properly *Creator* of men, of angels, and of the

whole universe, I am next to consider the force of the argument deducible from it, in favour of Christ's *divinity*. But the first part having already taken up the full time allowable in discourses of this nature, I must be content to defer the remainder to another opportunity.

Christ properly Creator:

OR

CHRIST'S DIVINITY

PROVED FROM CREATION.

The third Sermon preached November 4, 1719.

JOHN i. 3.

All things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made.

IN discoursing on these words, I proposed three things:

1. To show that God the Son, a distinct Person from God the Father, is strictly and properly *Creator*, and *efficient* Cause of all things.

2. To consider the force of the argument arising from it, in favour of Christ's divinity.

3. To make some reflections and observations upon the whole, for our farther improvement.

I had then no more time than was necessary to be taken up in making good my first position: which, I hope, I have clearly shown to be founded in express words of Scripture, and confirmed all along by the unanimous suffrage of Catholic antiquity. The two remaining parts I reserved for the subject-matter of our present meditations. I proceed then to my second general head of discourse.

II. To consider the force of the argument, in respect of Christ's divinity, contained in this; that he is properly

Creator of men, of angels, of all things. I shall consider it under three views, debating the point distinctly, from the *reason* of the thing, from *Scripture*, and from *antiquity*.

1. From the *reason* of the thing. I shall not here treat of the subject in the *scholastic* way; which would afford but dry entertainment: besides that, the argument would suffer by it, and lose much of its force and efficacy. There is sometimes in moral probabilities an irresistible strength, little short of the strictest demonstration. There is something so affecting and sensible under them, that they cannot fail of making their way into every well-disposed and ingenuous mind: and so it often happens that they do as infallibly (and more agreeably) win over our assent, as demonstration can force it. To come to the business in hand: God the Son is *Creator* of all things. On that foundation I am to proceed: and when I say *Creator*, I include *Sustainer* and *Preserver*. Let us then distinctly consider him:

1. As *Creator* of man.
2. As *Creator* of the earth, and of all things in it.
3. As *Creator* of the heavens, with all their host.
4. As *Creator* of angels and archangels, thrones and dominions, principalities and powers, which live, and move, and have their being from, and in, the Son of God.

I do not heighten or rhetoricate at all, in these particulars. They are no more than strict and close comment upon Coloss. i. 16. and Heb. i. 10. only branching out into parts what is there couched and comprised in few words.

1. First then, let us consider our blessed Lord as *Creator* of *man*, of all men living quite round the globe; of all that have lived and died from Adam down to this day. I leave it to the *anatomists* and *physiologists* to describe the wonderful mechanism and exquisite workmanship of the human body: the erect posture, the figure and shape, the size and stature, the structure and use of

every part, and the symmetry of the whole; which carry in them uncontestable proofs of the skill, and the contrivance, and the consummate wisdom of him that made us. How many lectures might be read upon the fabric of the eye, the texture of the brain, the configuration of the muscles, and disposition of the nerves, or glands; all bearing testimony to the power and greatness of the Son of God; of whom we may now say, that "he hath set "the members every one of them in the body, as it hath "pleased him;" and hath so "tempered the body to-"gether," as admirably to answer all the wise ends and purposes designed by him. The same wisdom, which is visible in every single *individual*, reaches at the same time to the whole *species* round the globe. All are supported, sustained, and actuated by God the Son, in "whom all things consist." He is equally present to all, supplying motion, nutriment, and strength to every individual, extending his providential care to the ends of the earth, and in one comprehensive view grasping the whole system. For,

2. We are to consider him as *Creator* of the terraqueous globe, the earth and all things in it. He "has laid "the foundations thereof," divided it into sea and land, garnished it with plants, trees, and flowers, stocked it with living creatures for the use of man, and plentifully furnished it with the most grateful and unexpressible variety. Every herb that grows, every spire of grass that springs up, every creeping thing that moveth upon the face of the earth, proclaims the wisdom of its *Maker*, sounds forth the praises of the *Son of God*. I may here apply the words of the Psalmist, which, whether meant of Father or Son, are certainly applicable to both. "Praise "the Lord from the earth, ye dragons, and all deeps: "fire, and hail; snow, and vapours; stormy wind fulfilling "his word: mountains, and all hills; fruitful trees, and all "cedars: beasts, and all cattle; creeping things, and flying "fowl: kings of the earth, and all people; princes, and all "judges of the earth: both young men, and maidens; old

" men, and children: let them praise the name of the " Lord: for his name alone is excellent; his glory is above " the earth and heaven." Psalm cxlviii. It would lead me too far off from my purpose to consider, or to enumerate, the many legible characters of a wisdom and power nothing short of *divine*, which are every where discoverable within and without this earth whereon we live. These I leave to the naturalists to describe. No man that considers its stupendous size, or bulk alone, but must think it a work too august and great for any thing less than a *divine* architect. We have often triumphed over atheists upon this head, alleging that no *power* or *wisdom* less than infinite could be equal to the task. The very same topics, to such as believe the Scriptures, may be as justly urged for the *divinity* of God the Son. It was his hand that made all these things, and by his power they are sustained and held together. And yet these are little things, and as nothing in comparison. For,

3. We are thirdly to consider, that the *heavens* also are the " works of his hands." That huge and vast compass, that immense region of æther, and therein the sun, with its planetary chorus dancing round it, the fixed stars, (perhaps suns too, with their planets rolling about them,) whatever modern much improved astronomy has discovered, or whatever yet farther discoveries future ages may bring to light; all things *visible* and *invisible* have the Son of God for their *Creator*, *Sustainer*, and *Preserver*. If we survey the magnitude of the heavenly bodies, some smaller, most vastly bigger than our own globe, all of an amazing size and greatness; if we consider the nice proportion of their distances, the regularity of their situations, the harmony of their courses, and uniformity of all their motions; they cannot but raise in us an idea of the infinite power, wisdom, and greatness of him that made them. This is a theme of very wide extent, and has been often and excellently handled in defence of our common religion, against the *atheists* and *sceptics* of our age, or nation. It is with pleasure I observe, that

the same topics (only taking in those Scriptures which they and we own) will almost equally serve against Arians or Socinians, or any that presume to deny the *divinity* of God the Son. It is clear from the Sacred Writ, that he "created" all things, and that by him "all things "consist:" and therefore it is evident, that all the marks of wisdom, power, or majesty, discoverable in this grand palace, and august structure of the universe, are so many arguments of his *divinity*, and proclaim him to be the eternal and omnipotent God. I have one particular more to urge under this head. Hitherto I have been speaking of sun, moon, and stars, prodigiously great, but yet *inanimate* bodies; and creatures less perfect than we ourselves are, who make a part, though the lowest part, of the *rational* creation. We are farther to consider,

4. That the very *angels* themselves, the top, surely, of the *creation*, those bright intelligences, and glorious ministers of the court of heaven, are the creatures and workmanship of the Son of God. Whether they be *thrones* or *dominions*, *principalities* or *powers*, they were all *created*, not only *by* him, but *for* him. *Myriads* of those heavenly spirits are continually serving and praising him. To him they owe their perfections, their strength, their glory, their life, their very being; and on him they depend for their support and sustenance. I shall proceed no farther: I have said enough. I leave it to any man of plain good sense, and common discernment, to pass a judgment, whether, supposing these facts be true, (and they are true, if plain Scripture be so,) any longer doubt can be made of the real and essential *divinity* of the Son of God. If any one tells me, after all, that this does not amount to strict *demonstration*, because we cannot make a certain estimate of the *scale* of being, nor define peremptorily what degrees of perfection there may be short of infinite; I say, if any one urges this, I should allow that there is not what may be called strict *demonstration*: but it is demonstration that the evidence is such as ought to convince every wise and considerate man; and such as

ought to have the same effect upon the mind as a thousand *demonstrations*. There are many things not capable of strict *demonstration;* and yet so evident and undoubted, that a man would forfeit the very character of sobriety and common sense, that should seriously make the least question of them. I might mention, for instance, the *existence* of the world about us; which good philosophers have thought not capable of strict *demonstration*. But a man would hardly be supposed well in his wits, that should seriously entertain any the least doubt or suspicion concerning it. His eyes, his ears, and all his senses bear testimony to the truth and certainty of it: and if it be not strictly demonstrable in the *rational* way, yet this is demonstrable, that the nature and circumstances of man are such, that he both may and must believe it. The same, in a great measure, I am persuaded, is the case which I have been mentioning. For, allowing the first position, that the Son of God is properly *Creator* of men, of angels, and of the universe; there is no man that attends to it, and considers it in its full latitude, but must come to this conclusion, that the Son of God is no *creature*, nor any thing less than the eternal and infinite God. So much for my first head of argument, from the *nature* and *reason* of the thing itself. My second head of argument is from *Scripture-texts*.

2. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the same who had told us, in his first chapter, that the Son had "laid the foundation of the earth," and that the "hea-"vens were the works of his hands;" I say, the same author observes, ch. iii. ver. 4. that "he that built all "things is God;" thus establishing the very conclusion which we are seeking after, as he had before done the premises. This, considered as a general maxim, must be applicable to the particular instance of God the Son, if it was he that "built all things," as hath been proved: nay, it is reasonable to believe that the Apostle intended it particularly of God the Son. This construction is very suitable to the argument which the author was upon, in

that chapter; and to the high things spoken of the *Son* in chapter the first: there is nothing in the context but what extremely favours and confirms it; except it be that, verse the sixth, it is said, "Christ as a Son over his "own house," intimating as if he was not that Person before spoken of, (who is called *God*, ver. 4.) but *Son* of that Person. But to this it may be replied, that the author was here setting forth the preference of *Christ* above Moses: the comparison was between those two persons only. How the *Person* of the *Father* came in here, is not easy to account: but understanding it of the Person of the Son, the sense is clear, the argument proper and pertinent. As to his being called *God* in the fourth verse, and *Son* in the sixth, it was very proper and significant, because he is so *God*, as withal to be Son of God, or God of God.

I proceed now to another text, Rom. i. 20. "The in- "visible things of him from the creation of the world are "clearly seen, being understood by the things that are "made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that "they are without excuse." If then, as the Apostle here testifies, the work of *creation* proclaims the eternity and divinity of its *Creator*, it will follow from thence, that God the Son as *Creator* must be *eternal*, and strictly divine. I am sensible that St. Paul's argument may be taken under another view. For it may mean, not that the magnificence or greatness of the work proves that every *Creator* must be *eternal*, or *God*; but that there must be one eternal first Cause of all things; otherwise there would be a progress of causes, one higher than another, *in infinitum*, which is absurd. The first construction I take to be the more probable, as it is more obvious to common capacities, and as the argument in that view strikes the more sensibly, being such as few could miss of; and therefore the Gentiles were *without excuse*, for not attending to it. However this be, I lay no great stress upon it, designing a more general, and, I think, more convincing argument out of Scripture, than I have

hitherto mentioned; which is this: that the work of *creation* is every where represented as the certain mark and characteristic of the true God. It is the favourite topic which God is pleased to insist most upon, whenever he would either distinguish his own peculiar majesty and power, above and beyond all the gods of the nations, or when he would excite in his people the highest idea possible, suitable to his transcendent excellency and peerless perfections. Numberless are the texts of the Old Testament, which might be cited to this purpose. I shall single out as many as may serve to give a due light and force to the present argument.

Hezekiah, in his prayer to God, thus expresses himself. "O Lord God of Israel, which dwellest between "the cherubims, thou art the God, even thou alone, of "all the kingdoms of the earth." Then follows the reason why he is so eminently distinguished, and so infinitely superior to all others. "Thou hast made heaven and "earth." 2 Kings xix. 15.

Job, describing the supereminent majesty of the one true God, thus elegantly sets it forth. "He stretcheth "out the north over the empty place, and hangeth the "earth upon nothing. He bindeth up the waters in his "thick clouds; and the cloud is not rent under them—— "The pillars of heaven tremble, and are astonished at his "reproof. He divideth the sea with his power.——By his "Spirit he hath garnished the heavens; his hand hath "formed the crooked serpent." Job xxvi. 7, &c.

In the Psalms we meet with a great deal to the same purpose. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and "the firmament showeth his handywork," Ps. xix. 1. "All the gods of the nations are idols: but the Lord "made the heavens." Ps. xcvi. 5. "The heavens are "thine, the earth also is thine: as for the world and the "fulness thereof, thou hast founded them. The north and "the south, thou hast created them." Ps. lxxxix. 11, 12.

More to the same effect occurs perpetually in the Prophets. I shall cite a few examples only. "Lift up your

" eyes on high, and behold who hath created these " things, that bringeth out their host by number," &c. Isa. xl. 26. " Who hath measured the waters in the " hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the " span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a " measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the " hills in a balance?" Isa. xl. 12. " Thus saith God the " Lord, he that created the heavens, and stretched them " out; he that spread forth the earth, and that which " cometh out of it," &c. Isa. xlii. 5. " Thus saith the " Lord that created thee, O Jacob, and he that formed " thee, O Israel," Isa. xliii. 1. So again; " I am the Lord, " and there is none else. I form the light, and create " darkness." Isa. xlv. 6, 7. " I have made the earth, " and created man upon it: I, even my hands, have " stretched out the heavens, and all their host have I " commanded." Isa. xlv. 12. " Thus shall ye say unto " them, The gods that have not made the heavens and the " earth, even they shall perish from the earth, and from " under these heavens. He hath made the earth by his " power, he hath established the world by his wisdom, " and hath stretched out the heavens by his discretion." Jer. x. 11, 12.

It would be tedious to add more texts. These are sufficient to show what a particular stress and emphasis is laid upon God's being *Creator* of all things. It is the distinguishing character of the one true God; and whenever Scripture intended to raise in men's minds such esteem and veneration as they ought to have for the supreme God of Israel, nothing higher or greater could be said than this, that he had created the universe, had " laid " the foundations of the earth," and that the " heavens " were the works of his hands." (See Psal. cii. 25, 26.) This is farther confirmed from the New Testament, Rom. i. 25. where St. Paul directs us to worship the *Creator*, in opposition to all *creature-worship*. From whence it is plain that the Apostle supposes the *Creator*, or Person creating, to be no *creature*, but God " blessed for ever:"

from whence also, by the way, we may remark, that Scripture knows no *medium* between *God* and *creature*, but includes all things and all persons whatever under that distinction; as does also antiquity unanimously, and all sound philosophy, and the common sense and reason of mankind. But to proceed.

Seeing then that the title of *Creator* is thus magnificently and elegantly set forth in holy Scripture, as the distinguishing mark of eminency, the epitome of all perfection, and the sure and certain character of *true* Divinity: if nothing higher or stronger can be thought on, to raise in us the most sublime, awful, and exalted idea of the supreme God of Israel; and if the Son of God be plainly and evidently set forth to us under this same high character: if he created all things, *visible* and *invisible;* if he "laid the foundations of the earth," and if the "heavens "are the works of his hands:" if these be the premises, let any man of common abilities, that has not his faculties fore-closed, or is not steeled against conviction, be left to draw the conclusion. To say of God the Son, that he is the Maker of the world, of the kinds in it, as well as of the grand palace itself, (as a late ingenious author[a] expresses it,) is to say as *much* and as *high* of him, as it is possible to say or to *conceive* of any other person, however named: because the whole that we can naturally know or apprehend of God, his powers or perfections, is only what we can infer from his work of *creation*. Hence it is, that Socinians and Sabellians have joined with the Catholics in condemning the Arians for making two or more *creators*, the same in effect with two eternal *gods:* and since there is no way of avoiding it, but either by saying that Father and Son are *one Creator*, or else denying the Son to be *Creator* at all; those gentlemen have chose the *latter*, rather than part with their main principle, that the "unity of God is an unity of "Person." But then they manifestly run counter to

[a] Mr. Nye, Explication of the Divine Unity, p. 91.

Scripture, which evidently makes the Son of God *Creator*, as I have before shown.

3. I proceed now, thirdly, to inquire into the sentiments of the *ancients* upon this head; whether they thought it did not exceed the power of a *creature* to create any thing, or whether the work of creating was not looked upon as a work properly *divine*, belonging to *God* only. It does not appear that any, except *heretics*, ever dogmatically [b] ascribed the work of *creation*, or any part of it, to any *creature*.

Simon Magus, borrowing his sentiments from the Platonic philosophy, did not scruple to assert, even in the times of the Apostles, that this lower world was made by [c] angels. After him, [d] Menander, [e] Saturninus, [f] Basilides, [g] Carpocrates, [h] Cerinthus, with the infamous crew of Gnostics, taught the same, or very nearly the same doctrine; and this within the first century. Cerdo and Marcion of the second century have been thought by some to have asserted the same principles in the main, differing rather in words, than in *reality* [i]. The Valentinians also were so far in the sentiments of the Gnostics, as to ascribe the creation of the lower world to a *creature* of their own devising, whom they called Demiurgus, or *Creator*. These wild and vain conceits were utterly detested by the sober Catholics; who would not so much as hear of any angel or archangel's creating the world, or any part of it; but ascribed it wholly to the joint operation of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. It appears to have been a rule and maxim of the Church, in Irenæus's time [k], and probably all along, that no *creature*

[b] Origen indeed seems to have indulged some fanciful conjectures that way, in some of his looser writings, if they be his. (See Comm. in Joh. p. 42, 43.) But in his more accurate and certainly genuine works, nothing appears of it, but the contrary.

[c] Irenæus, lib. i. cap. 23. p. 99. [d] Ibid. p. 100. [e] Ibid.
[f] Ibid. p. 101. [g] Ibid. p. 103. [h] Ibid. p. 105.
[i] Vid. Dissert. Præv. ad Iren. et Bened. p. 70.
[k] Nihil enim in totum Diabolus invenitur fecisse, videlicet cum et ipse

whatever could have any hand in *creating*; but that *creating* was an indisputable mark of a *divine immutable* nature. These principles seem to have obtained constantly in the Church long before the Nicene Council. No sooner did the Arian controversy arise, but the Catholics, upon their old principles, charged the Arians with great inconsistency, as making a *creature* of the Son of God, and yet admitting him to be *Creator*. They scrupled not to tell them, that this was copying after Valentinus, and reviving the principles of the Gnostics: that it was confounding the ideas of *Creator* and *creature*, and was all over contradictory and repugnant. No argument bore harder upon the Arians than this, as appears by the perplexity and confusion they were in upon it; not being able to come to any fixed and certain resolution in it. Scripture and Catholic tradition appeared clear, full, and strong for the Son's being properly and strictly Framer and Maker of the world; and there were but few in comparison that durst go such lengths as openly to deny it: on the other hand, to make a *creature-creator*, was in a manner unheard of, except among *heretics*, and was, besides, harsh and shocking even to common sense [1].

To soften this matter, the Arians, many of them, would not own that they held the Son to be a *creature;* which was pretence only, and playing with words: for had they

Creatura sit Dei, quemadmodum et reliqui angeli. Omnia enim fecit Deus, quemadmodum et David ait: *Quoniam ipse dixit et facta sunt; ipse præcepit et creata sunt.* Psal. cxlviii. 5. Iren. lib. iv. cap. 41. p. 288.

Et hoc Deus ab homine differt, quoniam Deus quidem facit, homo autem fit: et quidem qui facit semper idem est. *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 12. p. 240.

That this was likewise the sense of all antiquity appears from hence, that all the *Fathers*, where they declare against *creature-worship*, do at the same time declare for the worship of the *Creator:* constantly opposing *Creator* and *creature* to each other, in such a manner as shows plainly that they thought there was no *medium* between, and that *creation* belonged to *God* alone, not to any *creature.*

See Athenagoras, p. 56. Tertull. Apolog. c. 17. Clem. Alex. p. 55, 59. Origen. contr. Cels. p. 158, 375.

[1] Quis auctorem inter opera sua deputet, ut videatur id esse quod fecit? *Ambros. de Fid.* lib. i. cap. 5. p. 450.

not only *verbally*, but *really* intended that the Son was no creature, they and the Catholics could have had no farther dispute. But this was a contrivance to dissemble an absurdity too gross to be owned, and to disguise a difficulty which they could not answer. They had, besides, many little arts and subterfuges, to lessen and undervalue the Son's part or province in the work of creation, such as I have mentioned and confuted above; the same that are made use of by their successors at this day. But all would not do: Scripture was plain and clear, and tradition full and strong; and was not to be bore down by little quirks and subtilties. In fine, truth prevailed, *Arianism* daily lost ground; and this very argument, from the Son's concern in the work of creation, contributed, as much as any other, to sink it. The strength of it has been often tried since. The Socinians, who at the beginning were most of them Arians, were soon sensible of this difficulty. They knew not what to make of two *Creators* upon the Arian scheme, nor how to avoid it, if the texts were to be understood *literally* of a *proper* creation: and this, very probably, was one main reason of their giving the Arian scheme up, and running in with the Photinian *hypothesis*, which looked more defensible. They observed that the texts, which speak of the Son's being *Creator*, were few in comparison; and therefore thought, they might be able to deal with them; being never at a loss for some subtile and surprising meaning for any text in the Scripture which made against them. Their device, at length, was to interpret every text of a *metaphorical* creation: and so they left the Arians to shift as they could, resting themselves upon a new bottom. Yet this could not hold long, though supported and set off with all the advantages of wit and criticism. Several of the acutest and ablest of the Unitarians grew dissatisfied with it, and began themselves to feel the force of, and to close in with, the arguments of the Trinitarians against it. The result was, the preferring the old Sabellian before the late Socinian construction: and yet

that is as manifestly unscriptural, false, and groundless, as either Socinian or Arian. But thus do men rove and range about, after they have once forsaken the truth, and have given themselves up to the conduct of their private fancies, instead of adhering to God's written word, and to the most faithful guide, for the interpretation of it, the *primitive* and Catholic Church. I thought it not improper to hint thus much of the history of the argument whereof I have been discoursing. It has lost no weight or strength all the time: for truth is always the same. The variety of methods thought on to elude it, only confirm it so much the more. I doubt not but the Unitarians, of every denomination, are very sensible, that our interpretation of Scripture, so far as concerns this point, is the most easy, obvious, and natural, and most agreeable to the *letter* of the inspired writers: only they have some scruples about *three and one*, and know not how to digest *three* Persons that create, and yet but *one Creator*. There is all the difficulty: and so they choose to follow *philosophical conjectures*, (which they call *reason*,) rather than the dictates of *true* and *sound* reason, which will tell us, that we ought not to be wise beyond what is written, nor put a *violent* construction on any passages, where there is no necessity for it, nor leave a safe and plain rule, to follow our own wanderings. But enough of this. I have now finished, in a great measure, what I designed, having explained and vindicated the argument for Christ's *divinity* drawn from the consideration of his being *Creator* of the world. In a former discourse I endeavoured to maintain the premises; and now in this, to make good the conclusion. The sum of it is this: God the Son is Creator of the universe: the Creator of the universe is strictly and truly God: therefore God the Son is strictly and truly, or *essentially* God, which was to be proved. It remains now only, in the third and last place,

III. To make some reflections and observations upon the whole.

1. Having before shown the truth and certainty of our principles, give me leave, in conclusion, to recommend them farther from their plainness and simplicity. The Arians were never more perplexed about any thing, than in accounting for God's taking in a *creature* to be his agent and operator in making the world [m]. What? make one creature in order to make others? Why might he not rather have made all creatures, as well as one, and reserved the sole glory of so great and so stupendous a work, as that of creating, to his own self? Did he want the assistance of an inferior being? Or was not his own will and *fiat* sufficient to give birth to all things? Besides, did he cease to work after he made the Son, leaving it to a *creature* of his own to have, in a manner, the honour of doing of every thing else, and to be the *immediate* agent and manager in all things, both in heaven and earth? These were tenets which appeared very harsh and strange, and were not *naturally*, scarce *tolerably*, accounted for on the Arian hypothesis. But, upon the Catholic scheme, all is easy, expedite, and clear. The Son is of the same nature and substance with the Father; so nearly allied, so closely united, that nothing could be the work of *one*, without being at the same time the work of *both:* hence it was, that the Son was *Joint-Creator* with the Father, that "all things were made by "him," and nothing without him. It was not [n] possible for them either to *act*, or to *exist* separately; and therefore it is, that the work of creation is in Scripture attributed to both. This is an easy and natural account of the whole thing; and besides very agreeable to Scripture. "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." John v. 17.

[m] Vid. Athan. Orat. ii. p. 496.

[n] Οὐκ ἠδύνατο μὴ δι' αὐτοῦ γινέσθαι τὰ δημιουργήματα· καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ φῶς τῷ ἀπαυγάσματι τὰ πάντα φωτίζει, καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἀπαυγάσματος οὐκ ἄν τι φωτισθείη. οὕτω καὶ ὁ πατὴρ, ὡς διὰ χειρὸς, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἰργάσατο τὰ πάντα, &c. *Athan. Orat.* ii. p. 498.

Comp. Cyril. Alex. Comm. in Joh. i. 3. p. 45.

"What things soever he doth, these also doth the Son "likewise." John v. 19.

2. Another thing which recommends our principles is, their great consistency with each other, and with the principles of the Catholic Church, in this article especially, from the very beginning. When the Arians first broached their *heresy*, they had some plausible things to urge, particularly in respect of the *generation* of the Son, which was their principal topic, and which they most delighted to dwell upon. But then they took but a partial and superficial view of things, and knew not how to work up a consistent scheme. The Church had all along set forth God the Son as *Framer*, *Creator*, *Maker*, nay, and *Sustainer* too, of all things, in subordination to the Father. The *subordination* looked well on the Arian side; but *Creator* and *Preserver* were strange attributes to be applied to a *creature*. This alone was sufficient to show, that the Catholic Church had never gone upon Arian principles; having so unanimously and so expressly ascribed *creative* powers to the Son of God; and not only so, but had supposed him Inspector and Governor of the whole universe[o], extending his power and presence through the whole compass of being. That the fact was really thus, besides many other evidences, one might reasonably infer from the works of Eusebius alone; of whom I may venture to say, that he never would have ascribed more power, dignity, or perfection to the Son of God, than the plain force of Scripture and Catholic tradition obliged him to. This man, though a favourer of the Arians, (of the *men* at least, if not of their *cause*,) yet every where says many high and great things of the Son's creating and governing the whole universe, such as any man of plain sense must think can belong to no *creature*, but to God only.

In his oration before the Emperor Constantine he de-

[o] Iren. p. 190, 315. Clem. Alex. p. 123, 273, 831. Tertull. adv. Prax. cap. xxiii. p. 514. Origen. contr. Cels. p. 63, 164, 239. in Johan. p. 122, 128. Novat. cap. 14.

scribes God the Son, under the most endearing and magnificent characters imaginable. "He is the omnipotent "Lord and Governor of the whole universe, the framer "and disposer of all things, who is above all, and through "all, and in all; pervading and permeating all things both "above and below, earthly and heavenly, visible and in-"visible. It is he that formed and brought into regu-"larity the confused *chaos*, made it habitable and plea-"surable, adorned it with trees, plants, and flowers, stored "the sea with fishes, and the land with variety of ani-"mals, supporting, preserving, and sustaining them all. "It is he that gave the sun its light, and who directs the "courses of the stars; who is superintendent every where, "and steers the whole universe. To him the very angels "owe their life, their light, their knowledge, or whatever "excellencies and perfections they stand possessed of. In "a word, he is set forth as operator and manager, direc-"tor and supervisor over all the works of God, shedding "his rich blessings, and distributing his bounties through "the whole creation." This is Eusebius's account of God the Son, as it lies scattered through that oration P. A great deal too much for any Arian to say, and more than can be tolerably accounted for, upon any other than Catholic principles. I shall not here pass any positive judgment upon Eusebius, about whom the learned world has been so much divided. I shall only say, that if he was an Arian at the bottom, he was the most inconsistent one that ever was. He ought either to have been much more of an Arian than he appears to have been, or no Arian at all. He ascribed so much to God the Son, that he hardly left any thing peculiar to the Father, but a kind of nominal greatness and majesty, as it were to be above and beyond the world. In short, he describes him, as it were, sitting in his throne of state, and looking on, and God the Son as acting and performing every thing. Atha-

P Vid. Euseb. de Laud. Constant. p. 501, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, &c.

nasius's account of this matter appears much more rational and consistent. For indeed it is by no means reconcileable with good sense, and the truth and reason of things, to allow so much to God the Son as Eusebius did, and not to allow him every thing which Athanasius, with other Catholics at that time (as the Catholic Church had all along) ascribed to him. It was a weak thing to pretend to honour the Son of God by halves. A *creature* or no *creature*, was the question. The Arians innovated in making the Son a *creature*, and yet were minded to keep up, in other respects, the same honours and acknowledgments which had been paid him before. This was trifling and inconsistent. The Catholics were wiser men. They preserved the same honour and respect which had been formerly paid to God the Son; but withal, carefully looked after the foundation of it; that so they might be able not only to do their duty, but to give a reason also for the doing it. This was acting with thought and judgment; in which they appear to have been as much superior to their adversaries, all along, as in true piety, probity, and sincerity. But,

3dly and lastly, I would observe to you, what I before hinted, that while we acknowledge the Son of God to be *Creator*, we acknowledge him a *Son* also: the *second* only, not the *first* Person of the Trinity. The Father therefore is *primarily* Creator, as Father. He is first in conception, whenever we speak of the divine nature. And hence it is that he is said to create *by the Son*, and he is *eminently* and *emphatically* represented in the Creeds, as *Maker of heaven and earth*, the Son having another title, more peculiar to him, that of *Redeemer*. The Nicene Creed (as do many other ancient Creeds) takes notice of the *world's* being *made* by the Son; but yet so that he did not make the worlds *by the Father*, but the Father *by him*. This is the constant language of antiquity, always keeping up some preeminence of *order*, as proper to the *first* Person, along with the true essential divinity of the other two. This distinction of *order*, consistent with a *parity* of *na-*

ture, they learned from Scripture, and inviolably maintained. For thus they thought that, by referring all things to one *Head* and *Fountain*, they should preserve the unity, along with the distinction; and consistently teach a *plurality* of Persons in *one Godhead*, as we do at this day. There can be no such thing as *Tritheism*, upon the principles of the ancient Church, so long as a proper Sonship and subordination is allowed: for therein consists the relation, the alliance, the strict union of the Persons, while they are considered, as I may say, of the same stock, and included in each other. But take away that relation and alliance, either by supposing three independent separate principles, or by making two of the Persons *creatures*, and consequently of a different nature from the other; and then immediately commences either *Tritheism*, strictly so called, or Gentile *Polytheism*. So that the Catholic doctrine is the only security against a *plurality* of Gods; unless we take our last refuge in *Sabellianism*, which is utterly repugnant to the whole tenor of Scripture, and to the doctrine of the universal Church. "Now to God the "Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three Persons and one "God, be all honour and glory, power and dominion, "henceforth and for evermore." Amen.

The Scripture-Unity not an Unity of Person:

OR

THE DIVINE UNITY

STATED AND CLEARED.

The fourth Sermon preached December 2, 1719.

MARK xii. 29.

Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν Κύριος εἷς ἐστι.

Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord.

MY design in taking this text is to inquire into the *Scripture-notion* of the *Divine Unity:* a point very necessary to be stated and cleared, in order to a right understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity. I was once inclinable to defer the treating of it some time longer; thinking it most suitable to the rules of strict method to throw it off to the *last part* of what I intend upon this subject. But I considered, that while I am asserting the divinity of more Persons than one, the thought will, in a manner, perpetually occur, how it can be consistent with the Scripture-account of the Divine Unity: and many may be impatient to have that point settled before we go farther. Upon this consideration, I thought it advisable to postpone this matter no longer, choosing rather to break in upon the rules of strict method, than to suffer a prejudice to lie upon the minds of any, which might so easily be removed. I shall therefore now fall directly to the business of the Unity.

The words which I have chosen to discourse on appear first in Deuteronomy, chap. vi. ver. 4. from whence they are cited by our blessed Lord, and thereby made a doctrine of the Gospel, as before of the Law. "Hear, "O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord." I think it proper, in the entrance, to take notice, that the original word in the Hebrew for *Lord*, is *Jehovah*, (according to our now customary way of reading and pronouncing it;) and if we put *Jehovah*, instead of *Lord*, into the English text, it will then run thus: *Jehovah our God is one Jehovah*. The use which I intend of this will appear presently.

There are three several constructions of this one short sentence. The differences betwixt them may appear slight, but are really of moment in this controversy, as will be seen in the sequel. The Anti-Trinitarians of all sorts have here an interest to serve in making the word *Jehovah* to be nothing more than the *proper name* of one Person only. It is for this reason chiefly they contrive to change the obvious, natural order and construction of the words: for otherwise indeed, upon their *hypothesis*, they would scarce be sense. Suppose it were said, David, our king, is one David; or Abraham, our father, is one Abraham; what sense would there be in it? And yet this sentence, *Jehovah our God is one Jehovah*, supposing *Jehovah* to be merely a *proper name*, will be just such another saying, and is too flat and insipid a sense to be suffered to pass upon the sacred writings. This our adversaries are sensible of, and therefore, to salve their *hypothesis*, they make bold with the order and construction of the words two ways; which I shall here previously take notice of and examine, and then proceed to lay down the third construction, which is the only true one.

1. The first way is, to turn the sentence thus: *Jehovah is our God, Jehovah only*. Here you see, in this form, *Jehovah* may be a *proper name*, and the words are good sense too: and so, they think, both points are secured. But the objection against it is, that the words

here in St. Mark (and indeed those in Deuteronomy) will not bear that construction. For then the words should have been thus: Κύριός ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, Κύριος μόνος, which is very different from what we find, and is quite another proposition.

2. A second way of construing the words is thus: *Jehovah our God, even Jehovah, is one Person.* Here again you will observe, that *Jehovah* may be understood as a *proper name*, which is thought a great point gained; and a greater than that is intended by interpreting *one*, one Person. So there are thought to be two ends served at once. But it will be easy to defeat them both; which we shall see presently, as soon as we come to assert and explain the true construction of the place. I shall here only examine a pretence which is [a] made from Zechariah xiv. 9. in favour of this fanciful interpretation. The verse runs thus in our translation: "And the Lord shall be "King over all the earth: in that day shall there be one "Lord, and his name one."

Here it is thought that the truer rendering of the latter part should be thus; *The Lord* (or Jehovah) *shall be one, and his name one.* That is, say they, The Lord shall be *one Person.* It is somewhat strange that they do not add likewise, that his name shall be *one thing*, to answer to the other. It requires no great acumen to perceive that the attribute of *one* is applied to *Jehovah* in the same manner as it is to the *name;* and so it is εἷς, or *unus*, in the masculine gender, when applied to *Lord;* ἓν, or *unum*, in the neuter gender, when applied to *name.* And it is evident that the meaning only is, that as there shall not be many names, but *one* name acknowledged in that day over all the earth; so there shall not be many lords, but *one* Lord, or *one Jehovah*, *one* only received as such. This consideration alone is sufficient to confute the surmise, as if the *Prophet* was here concerned about *Unity* of *Person*, or intended any thing like it. He certainly meant no more

[a] See Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 2. ed. 2. Modest Plea, p. 133.

than that the *Jehovah*, who has the sole right of dominion over all, will then appear so in fact, and be received, among his subjects, as the only God and Lord, reigning without a rival. He will be *one*, in opposition to any *different* gods or lords, and acknowledged as one Head, uniting all under him. This is the sense of the place, as is clear from the context [a]. For the text is not speaking of what God is in himself, being in that respect always the same; but of what he should be in respect of his *reception* in the world, when he should be generally acknowledged, and have no rival set up in opposition to him. The other construction, which would force *Unity* of *Person* out of this passage, take it which way we will, is scarce sense. For is it thus? *Jehovah* will in that day become one Person, which he was not before? This is, at first sight, ridiculous. Or, is it that *Jehovah* will then be *acknowledged* to be *one Person?* This is almost as absurd as the other. For, probably, those that did not receive the God of Israel as their God, yet might have thought him to be *one Person*, all along. This was not the point; but they were to acknowledge him so *one*, as not to presume to set up any rival power against him. The Prophet had something else at heart than either Unity of *substance*, or *Person*. Ἔσται Κύριος εἷς: "There shall be one "Lord" (as our version rightly renders it) both for Jew and Gentile. The expression is much such another as νόμος εἷς ἔσται, (Numb. ix. 14.) "There shall be one law to "him that is home born, and to him that sojourneth "among you:" You shall not be under *different* rules or laws, but one and the same shall be for all. In like manner the Prophet predicts that Jew and Gentile shall not have *different* gods or lords, but one and the same God and Lord shall rule over both. Having shown then that the second interpretation is as groundless as the first,

3. I proceed to lay down the third, which is the true one. *The Lord our God is the sole Lord, or the only God:*

[a] Vid. etiam cap. xiii. ver. 2.

in opposition to *gods many*, and *lords many*, whether *supreme* or *inferior*. Thus the Scribe, to whom our Lord spake, and whom he commends as answering so far discreetly, understood it. "There is one God, and there is "none other but he." This shows that *Jehovah* was here equivalent to Θεὸς, or *God*. Some of the ancient versions, instead of *one Lord*, render it, *one God:* as do also some of the [b] primitive Fathers; none of them (so far as I have observed) either considering *Jehovah* in this place as a proper name of one Person only, or ever bringing this text to prove that God is but *one Person*. This they understood, and this only; that there is but one *God*, one *Lord*, and one *Jehovah;* not two *Gods*, two *Lords*, or two *Jehovahs*.

If it be asked, who, or what Person is intended by "the "Lord our God" in the text, it seems most reasonable and natural to understand it of *God* the *Father;* not exclusive of, but abstracting from the consideration of, the other two Persons. The Scribe perhaps understood it in the *exclusive* sense; exclusive of all other Persons. Our Lord commends him as answering *discreetly*, in acknowledging one God; but intimates withal, that he was not yet come to perfection: he wanted something farther, he was "not far from the kingdom of God." One thing that he wanted was to acknowledge the Son to be God and Lord, as well as the Father: and it is pretty remarkable that both the Evangelists, St. Matthew and St. Mark, after relating this conference of our Saviour with the Scribe, immediately subjoin the history of our Saviour's putting a question to the Pharisees, how the Messiah could be both David's Son and David's Lord, quoting that passage of Psal. cx. 1. "The Lord said unto my "Lord," &c. It is no improbable conjecture of a [c] *judi-*

[b] Irenæus, lib. v. cap. 22. p. 319. Cyprian. de Orat. Domin. p. 151, 172. Ambros. de Fid. lib. i. cap. 1, 2. p. 445, 448. ed. Bened.

[c] Dominus ipse præcipuum mandatum legis in *unius Domini* confessione et dilectione docens esse, non suo ad Scribam, sed Prophetæ testimonio

cious Father, that our blessed Saviour thereby intended to correct the Jewish construction of Deuteron. vi. 4. and to intimate, as far as was proper at that time, that the Father is not εἷς Κύριος, *one Lord*, in such a sense as to exclude the Son, who is also Κύριος, or *Lord*, and *tacitly* included, as often as the Father is styled the only *God*, or *Lord*. But it is now time to consider more distinctly and fully the doctrine contained in the text, which I shall endeavour thus:

1. By inquiring, under what *salvos*, and qualifying considerations, we may reasonably understand the general doctrine of God the Father's being the *only true God*, or *Lord*.

2. By considering what we may justly infer from it, and what use we are to make of it.

I. I shall inquire, under what *salvos*, or qualifying considerations, we may reasonably understand the general doctrine of God the Father's being the *only true God*, or *Lord*.

The texts seem, at first view, to exclude all other persons whatever, from being *divine* in the same sense; and also from having any right or title to *religious* worship, or any degree of it. The texts run in the *personal* character; "I am the Lord thy God:" and generally [d] in the *singular* number; *I*, not *we;* or *he*, not *they*. And then the practical doctrine founded thereupon is to pay to that *Person*, not *supreme* worship only, but *all* worship; not our *highest* religious service, but our *whole* religious service; reserving no part nor degree of it to any other. If therefore the doctrine is to be interpreted up to the utmost rigour in both its parts, the *Father* only is God, in any strict or proper sense; and every part and degree of *religious* service is to be paid to him *solely*. But how

usus est, esse *se Dominum*.——Dominum *unum* ita ex lege docens, ut se quoque *Dominum*, Propheta teste, confirmat. *Hilar.* p. 1001.

[d] I say *generally*, not always; because there are some instances of plural expressions: Gen. i. 1, 26. iii. 5, 22. xi. 7. xx. 13. xxxv. 7. Deut. iv. 7. Eccl. xii. 1. Jos. xxiv. 19. Isa. vi. 8.

can we be Christians if we say this? or how is it possible to reconcile it with other plain Scriptures? There must be some abatement, some favourable allowance of construction, in one part or other, to make Scripture consistent; and the difficulty is to know where we are to settle this necessary latitude of interpretation, so as neither to do violence to the *letter*, nor defeat the *intent* of the inspired writers. There have been two ways thought on to compromise this matter. I shall mention that first, which is the least likely to do us any service, that I may come with the greater advantage to the other, which will appear to be not only the best, but the only way of reconciling the difficulty, after we have seen that the first will not bear.

1. The first way is to suppose that the words *Lord* and *God* admit of a *higher* and a *lower* sense; so that the texts which declare the Father the *one God*, are to be understood to mean one only *supreme* God, leaving room for *inferior* and *subordinate* gods besides him: and so also worship must be understood to be of two kinds, *sovereign* and inferior; and that the *supreme* God claims only *sovereign*, not *all* religious worship to himself.

But against this way of reconciling there appear to be many insuperable objections. It is not only against the *letter*, but the very intent and design of the sacred writings. For, not to mention that Scripture no where tells us of *two true*, i. e. *two adorable*, Gods, or of two religious worships, *sovereign* and *inferior*; the very end and design of all the texts relating to the Unity seems to have been to preclude *inferior* gods, and them especially; there being less danger of men's running into the notion of many *supremes*. Besides the general drift and purport of those texts, there are some particular texts still more express and decisive. "There is no God before me," says the one God, "neither shall there be any after me:" and yet every *inferior* God must be *after* the supreme[e]. "The

[e] Quis ergo hoc dicit, Pater an Filius? Si Filius, *Ante me*, inquit, *non fuit*

" gods that have not made the heavens and the earth, " even they shall perish from the earth." Jerem. x. 11. And yet it is never to be supposed that any *inferior* god can be *Creator*, which is the distinguishing character of the one *supreme* God; consequently, every *inferior* god shall *perish* and come to nothing[f]. Besides, every *inferior* god must of course be supposed a *creature* of the *great* God. But St. Paul has expressly cautioned us against serving the " creature more than (or besides) the Crea- " tor," and against serving those that " by nature are no " gods." Farther than this, it is as clear as words can make it, that the *great God* has claimed to himself *all* sacrifice, without distinction of *sovereign* and *inferior*, our *whole* religious service, and *whole* confidence[g]. To suppose the contrary, would have been to leave room for the greatest confusion in worship imaginable, and would not have been the way to root out, but to establish, *idolatry*. Add to this, that the distinction of a twofold sense in the word *God*, will not help us out of the difficulty: because we have all the reason in the world to believe that another Person, besides the *Father*, is called *God*, in the same sense, in the same Scriptures; and therefore this solution of the difficulty will not bear; but we must of course look out for another.

2. The other way then is, to suppose that the *exclusive* terms of *one*, *only*, or the like, may admit of some latitude of construction; and that, so long as the full intent and meaning of the declarations of the Unity is in this way answered, all is safe and secure. That this is the very truth of the case, I shall now proceed to show at large.

alius Deus: Si Pater, *Post me*, inquit, *non erit:* hic priorem, ille posteriorem non habet. *Ambros. de Fid.* lib. i. cap. 8. p. 454.

Εἰ γὰρ Θεὸς μὲν ὁ υἱὸς, πᾶν δὲ μετὰ τὸν πατέρα Θεὸς οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ μὴ μετὰ τὸν πατέρα, τὸν υἱὸν εἶναι ὁ λόγος μαρτύρεται. ——Εἴ τις ἦν μετὰ τὸν Θεόν ἐστι, κτίσις τοῦτο, καὶ οὐ Θεὸς, διὰ τῶν ἱερημένων ἐυρίσκεται. *Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom.* iv. p. 575.

[f] See Cudworth's Comment on this text, p. 545.

[g] See my Vindication of Christ's Divinity, vol. i. Qu. 16.

God the Father may be, and is, very reasonably and justly styled the *one* or *only* God, without excluding every other Person; particularly, without excluding the *Son* from the one true *Godhead*. It is a rule and maxim, and may be proved by many instances in sacred and profane writings, that *exclusive* terms are not to be interpreted with the utmost rigour, so as to leave no room for *tacit* exceptions, such as reason and good sense will easily supply. It may be sometimes needless or impertinent to mention every exception; and often wiser or better not to do it, but to leave them to the intelligent reader.

Thus for instance it is said, "No one knoweth the Fa- "ther but the Son, and no one knoweth the Son but the "Father." (Matt. xi. 27.) If we should here interpret the *exclusive* terms with the utmost strictness, it must follow that the Father does not know himself, nor the Son himself. But no man of common sense can think so of either; and therefore there was no occasion for any further guard or exception.

So again it is said, that "the things of God knoweth "no one, but the Spirit of God," (1 Cor. ii. 11.) as before, (in Matt. xi. 27.) "No one knoweth the Father but the "Son." Now, if we understand the *exclusive* terms with the utmost strictness, it must follow from one passage, that the *Holy Ghost* knows more of the Father than the *Son* does; and from the other, that the *Son* knows more of the Father than the *Holy Ghost* does: which are propositions directly repugnant. But the truth is, here was no opposition intended to *Son* or *Holy Ghost* in either place; but to *creatures* only.

In like manner it is said, in the Revelations, of the Son of God, that "he had a name written, that no one (οὐδεὶς) "knew, but he himself;" (Rev. xix. 12.) which, if the *exclusive* term is to be strictly understood, makes the *Father* himself ignorant of what was known to the *Son*.

St. Paul says, "I determined not to know any thing "among you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified,"

1 Cor. ii. 2. If this be rigorously interpreted up to the letter, St. Paul must have been contented to be ignorant of God the *Father*, and of many the most important articles of the Christian religion. But it is obvious to common sense, that such expressions are to be qualified both from the reason of the thing, and from other Scriptures. These instances are sufficient to show that *exclusive* terms may, and in several cases must, admit of a favourable construction. Now to come to the point in hand. I shall first show, directly and plainly, that God the Son was not intended to be excluded at all, by the texts which proclaim the Father the *one God;* and next, give some reasons why there was no occasion to make any particular exception or *salvo*, on that account; or why it was better not to do it. First, let us compare texts with texts.

Isa. xliv. 24. we read thus: "I am the Lord that mak-"eth all things; that stretcheth forth the heavens *alone*, "and spreadeth abroad the earth by myself." Now here, according to the rigour of construction, one should suppose the Father (if it is indeed to be understood of the *Father*) to have been *by himself* when he made the world, and that no other Person had any hand in creating, or was so much as with him when he did it. And yet certain it is from other Scriptures, as I have shown formerly, that God the Son was not only with him, but assisted also in the work of creation. But it was needless for the Prophet to take any notice of the *Son's* concern in it, while he was only considering the *true God* in opposition to *other gods;* besides that the time was not yet come for the distinct and clear revelation of *God* the *Son*. So again we find it said, probably in respect of the Father, "Thou only "knowest the hearts of all the children of men," (1 Kings viii. 39.) and it is not said, Thou only knowest *originally*, or in the most *perfect* manner, but, Thou only *knowest*, simply and absolutely. And yet evident it is, from other places of Scripture, that not the *Father* only, but the *Son* also must then have known the hearts of all the children

of men[h]; and it may be certainly inferred from his being *Creator* of all men from the beginning.

We read (Ps. lxxxiii. 18.) "Thou, whose name alone "is *Jehovah*," supposed to be meant of God the Father. If the exclusive term is there to be rigorously understood, no other Person but the Father has the title or name of *Jehovah*. And yet certain it is, from other Scriptures, that the *Son* is *another* Person, and that the name *Jehovah* is also his name. But it was needless, or would have been foreign, to have inserted any particular caution or exception, while the Psalmist was considering only the true God, in opposition to other gods, or to the gods of the nations. God the Father (probably) says, Isa. xliii. 11. "I, even I, am the Lord, and besides me there is no Sa- "viour." And yet no man of sense that reads the Bible can believe, that the intent was to exclude our *blessed Saviour* from being *properly* such, as well as the Father. It is said also, (Isa. ii. 11, 17.) that "the Lord *alone* shall "be exalted in that day." Suppose this be meant of God the *Father;* yet no one, who considers either the context, or reason of the thing, or other Scriptures, can imagine that this was designed to exclude *God* the *Son* from being *exalted;* or that it was intended in opposition to any thing but *idols* in particular, or *creatures* in general. It would be easy to illustrate this matter by more examples of the like nature: but these already given are, I am persuaded, sufficient to show that, whether it be said that the *Father is the only God*, or whether it were said that *the Father only is God*, (which expression would be stronger,) the exclusive term *only* need not be supposed to affect the Son at all; but he may still be *tacitly* understood: and there was no necessity for any express caution in the case, the reason of the thing sufficiently showing it afterwards. When therefore we read of the Father's being the *one God*, we are to understand it of the Father *singly*, not *exclusively;* of the *Father*, but in conjunction

[h] Joh. ii. 24. xvi. 30. Acts i. 24. Heb. iv. 12. Rev. ii. 3.

still with the Son: not that we mean by the term *Father*, both Father and Son, but we consider the Father singly, in such cases, abstracting from the consideration of God the Son, not excluding him from partaking of the same Godhead. This then appears to be matter of fact, that God the Son is not excluded, but always *tacitly* understood in those expressions of the *Unity*, which we meet with in Scripture. The same is true of any other expressions of the like nature, as if the Father be said to be the alone *good*, the only *wise*, the only *potentate*, or only having *immortality*; they are not intended in opposition to God the Son, or Holy Ghost, (who being so nearly allied to, so much one with the Father, are *tacitly* to be understood as partaking of every perfection which is ascribed to the Father,) but in opposition to *creatures*, or *other* gods; in opposition to every thing *extra Patrem*, every thing not contained in him, or not inseparably included with him. This I observe, on supposition that those texts are meant of the *Father:* but perhaps the word *God* in those places is to be understood in the *indefinite* sense, abstracting from the particular consideration of *this* or *that* person; in like manner as the word *man* often stands, not for any particular *human* person, but the whole species, or *human* nature: *man* is frail, *man* is mortal, or the like. I say the word *God* may be thus understood; and since the doctrine of the Trinity is demonstrable from other Scriptures, we have great reason to believe that this is the true and real meaning of the word *God*, as often as the context or other circumstances do not confine its signification and intent to one Person only. It remains now only to account for the manner of speaking. For it may be asked, why, when it is said, suppose by the Father, "I am the Lord, and there is none else," it may be asked why there might not have been added, *except my Son and Holy Spirit*, or some other saving clause of like kind? To this it may be answered,

1. That it was needless.
2. That it might have been hurtful.

1. It was needless. None of those declarations concerning the *unity* of *God*, and the worship due to *God* alone, were made at the beginning, or before *idolatry* was grown into practice. Their intent and design was to be a remedy against it, and to root it out of the world. Those declarations were then so understood, as it was intended they should be, in opposition to all *other gods*, all that were plainly *opposite* to, or *different* from, the one *God* of Israel. Thus the end of them was fully answered; and there was no occasion explicitly to mention the Person of the *Son*, before the proper time came to reveal his distinct Person and character fully and clearly to the world. After he was come, it was still as needless to insert any such saving clauses; because the revealing his nature, and character, and personal perfections, was equivalent thereto, and were interpretatively so many qualifying clauses or exceptions; the reason of the thing showing that he must be supposed as included always, without any *special* proviso for it. Thus, for instance, if the Father claims all worship, homage, and adoration to himself, because *Jehovah*, because *Creator*, *Sustainer*, and *Preserver* of all things; and if it appears afterwards, that the Son also is *Jehovah*, *Creator*, *Sustainer*, and *Preserver* of all things; it is manifest that the worship of the Son comes within the reason, intent, and letter of the law about *worship*; and therefore it cannot, by any man of sense, be supposed to exclude him from it. There is no need of any *special salvo* to include a person, whom parity of reason shows to be included of course. So if it is said, that the Father is the only *God* or *Lord*, without any express caution or *salvo*, we might be apt to think it somewhat strange to hear of any other person who is *God* and *Lord* also: but when we find that this other Person is so nearly related, as a *Son* to a *Father*; that he and his Father *are one*; that he who has *seen* one, has therein *seen* the other also; that he is in the *bosom* of the Father, and as intimate to him as *thought* to the *mind*; that all things which the Father hath are the Son's; and that

what things soever the Father doth, those also doth the Son likewise: when we find them represented as "one "temple," (Rev. xxi. 22.) and as having but "one "throne," (Rev. xxii. 1.) and making "one light," (Rev. xxi. 23.) and that he is in the Father, and the Father in him: when we observe the same titles, the same operations, the same attributes, the same glory, &c. ascribed to both in holy Scripture: when these and the like considerations have been duly weighed, must it not look strangely impertinent to demand any exception, or *special salvo*, as often as the Father is styled the *only God?* The Scriptures suppose men to have the use of their reason, and that therefore there was no need to make express mention of the Son, whenever the Father is declared to be the *only God;* Father and Son being so much *one*, that asserting it of either is implicitly asserting the same of both [h]. And hence it may appear,

2. That particular exceptions and cautions in this case were not only needless, but might have been hurtful. Had the *first commandment* run thus; Thou shalt have no other gods besides me, *except my Son*, it had been plainly making the Son *another* God [i], which was not the intent of Scripture, nor suitable to the truth and reason of the thing. The union and intimacy between Father and Son is such, that they are not *two Gods*, but *one God*. This was the *idea* which Scripture was to insinuate along with the distinction of Persons, and which it has every where carefully kept up. What may be thought an *omission* in the case, is really an *advantage;* and the want of an exception in respect of *God* the *Son*, or *Holy Ghost*,

[h] Εἴ τις ἵνα λίγοι Θεὸν, ἀλλ' οὐ δίχα τοῦ ἰδίου γεννήματος ἐννοήσει ποτὲ τὸν πατέρα, οὔτε μὲν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ προχεομένου πνεύματος, ὅ καὶ ἐστὶν ἴδιον αὐτοῦ. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ εἰπὼν ἄνθρωπον, πάντη τι καὶ πάντως διαμεμνήσεται καὶ τῶν ἐνόντων οὐσιωδῶς αὐτῷ, ἃ προσπεφυκότα μὲν ἄνθρωπον ἀποτελεῖ, οὐκ ἐνόντα δὲ, οὐκέτι κατὰ τὸν ἴσον, &c. *Cyril. Alex. contr. Julian.* lib. viii. p. 264.

[i] Atquin si nominasset illum, separasset, ita dicens, Alius præter me non est, nisi Filius meus. *Alium* enim etiam Filium fecisset, quem de aliis excepisset. *Tert. Prax.* cap. xviii.

is an argument to us that their unity is too strict and intimate to admit of it. A late [k] writer upon these words in Deuteronomy, "I, even I, am he, and there is no God "with me," (Deut. xxxii. 39.) observes, that it is not said, *except it be in the same essence*, but absolutely, *there is no God*. He might have observed also, that it is not said, *except it be in subordination to me*, or, *except such inferior gods as are by my appointment;* but absolutely, *there is no God*. To answer more directly: it is very true that Scripture has not mentioned any such exception, because it would have been improper, not to say absurd, to do it. The design was to teach us that there is *no other* God, besides the God of Israel. Had he said there is no other God, *except it be in the same essence*, it had been the same as to say, there is no other God, except *one*, who is not *another* God. But the objector here supposes that two divine Persons in the same essence are *two Gods*, which is supposing the thing in question. The contrary appears from this very text. For let us admit that it was said, in the person of the Father, "I, even I, am he, and there is "no God with me:" it is certain that God the Son was then *with* him, and that he was *God* before the foundation of the world, John i. 1. And yet there was *no God*, that is, no *other* God with him, as appears from this text: consequently the Son is not *another* God, but the same God; and therefore two divine Persons having the same essence, (as we are able to prove those two to have,) are not two Gods, but one God.

I have hitherto been observing the Scripture-manner of speaking in this article of the *unity*, and have shown how easy it is to account for it upon Catholic principles. I shall just take notice farther, that the primitive writers of the Church follow the same style exactly. We shall frequently find them giving the title of *one* or *only* God, to the *Father*, in such a manner, that if we looked no

[k] Modest Plea, &c. p. 133.

farther, we might be apt to imagine that they thought of no other person's being God but the *Father*. And yet perhaps, within a few pages or lines, we shall meet with as full and strong expressions of the *divinity* of the Son, as any are, or can be; that he is *God*, *true God*, *God of the Jews*, and the like. These seeming contrarieties they sometimes leave without any guard or explication, presuming that no Christian, who had been but tolerably instructed, could mistake the meaning. At other times, upon occasion, they are more particular and explicit, showing how reconcileable and perfectly consistent with each other, these things are. They give us to understand that the *exclusive* terms affect not the Son at all; that they are often meant in opposition to *idols* only; that at the most they exclude only *other* gods, and not the *Son* who is the *same* and [l] not *another* God, nor indeed *another* Person in such a sense as *separate divided* persons are *other* persons. They are *distinct* only, not *separate;* and therefore, in a qualified sense, the Son is very *self* of the Father, as Irenæus expresses it, and as later Fathers, ἄλλος ἑαυτὸς, *alter idem*, or *alius idem*, another self, another same; distinct and yet not different, one with the Father, and undivided from him. From these and the like hints and illustrations, we easily understand what either the ancient creeds or primitive Church-writers mean by styling the Father, the *one*, or *only* God [m]; a title which they sometimes apply to the

[l] Igitur unus Deus Pater, et *alius* absque eo non est: quod ipse inferens, non Filium negat, sed *alium Deum*. Cæterum *alius* a Patre Filius non est. *Tert. contr. Prax.* cap. xviii. p. 510.

Non ergo *alius* erat qui cognoscebatur, et *alius* qui dicebat, *Nemo cognoscit Patrem;* sed unus et idem, omnia subjiciente ei Patre, et ab omnibus accipiens testimonium, quoniam vere homo, et vere Deus. *Iren.* p. 234, 235.

[m] It is worth observing, how little stress the *ancients* laid upon the *exclusive* terms.

Clemens Alex. calls the Son the *only* Judge, p. 99. and *only* God, p. 84.

Origen calls the *Son* the *only* Lord. *Contr. Cels.* p. 389.

Cyril of Jerusalem calls him the *only* King, p. 223.

Eusebius

Son also, but seldom, and sparingly. The reason is this: the Father is, as it were, the top of Unity, the head and fountain of all: he is first in our conception of God, and therefore whether we speak of the *almighty* God, or the *eternal* God, or the *all-knowing* God, (and the reason is the same for the *only* God, *unity* being an attribute of the Godhead like *omnipotence, eternity,* &c.) we primarily and principally mean the *Father,* tacitly including the other two Persons.

This is more decent, proper, and suitable, than to have fixed these names, titles, or attributes principally upon either of the other two Persons, tacitly including the *Father.* The nature of language and customary way of speaking required that they should be thus generally fixed upon one of the Persons, and we are directed to which by the very name of *Father,* denoting some kind of *priority* of *order,* such as we cannot perfectly understand; but a confuse, general perception of it, is sufficient to all the purposes of faith or worship. In strictness, the *one God* is the whole *Trinity:* but we must be content to speak as the customary use of language will bear. Our *ideas* of *person* are plainly taken from our conceptions of *human* persons, and from them transferred to other subjects, though they do not strictly answer in every circumstance. Properly speaking, *he* and *him* are no more

Eusebius understands, Psal. lxxxvi. 10. "God alone," &c. and Isa. xliv. 24. where it is said, that "he stretcheth forth the heavens ALONE," of God the Son.

Baruch iii. 35. "This is our God, and there shall none other be ac- "counted of in comparison of him," is by Cyprian (*Test.* lib. ii. cap. 6.) and by Lactantius (*Epit.* p. 116.) understood of God the Son: as it is also by the later Fathers in general.

Micah vii. 18. "Who is a God like unto thee?" &c. is also by early writers understood of God the Son.

So also Isa. xliv. 6. and Isa. xlv. 14, 15. See my Defence, &c. vol. i. p. 20, 21, &c.

Now had the *ancients* acknowledged any such force of the *exclusive* terms, as is insisted on by some *moderns,* the *Father* himself must have been thereby excluded from being *Judge, Lord, King,* or *God.*

applicable to a *divine* Person, than *she* or *her:* but we have no *third* way of denoting a person; and so of the two, we choose the best, and custom familiarizes it to us. In like manner, when we would speak of *God*, we have but three ways of expressing our thoughts, and none of them without some inconvenience. To say *it*, or *that*, meaning that thing or substance, would sound low and flat; and it is the way of speaking which we have, in a manner, appropriated to *inanimate* or *irrational* beings. To say *he*, or *him*, ordinarily [n] carries in it the *idea* of *one Person* only, and is therefore inconvenient on that account, as not taking in all that we apprehend of the one true God. To say *they*, or *them*, would appear as if the Persons were *divided* and *separate*, like other persons, and might sound as if the three Persons were *three gods*. Of those three ways, the best and least offensive is that which has been generally taken, as well in Scripture, as in ecclesiastical writings: which is to say, *he*, or *him*, speaking of God, and meaning it of *one Person*, principally, yet not *excluding*, but *tacitly* comprehending the other two, as partakers of the same Godhead. And since it was thus necessary to fix upon *one Person*, who should be *primarily* considered as God, it must of

[n] I say *ordinarily*, not constantly: and therefore the argument drawn from the *personal* characters, *I, thou, thee, he, him*, applied to God, is very weak and inconclusive against a *plurality* of Persons. We often find in Scripture the personal characters of *thou, thee, he, him*, applied to a whole *family, tribe*, or *people*, collectively considered; (see Exod. xiii. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13. Numb. xxii. 5, 6. xxiii. 9. Deut. i. 21, 31. iv. 9, 10. xi. 15. xviii. 2. Josh. xvii. 15. 1 Sam. xv. 3.) and at other times we find some things applied to the *head* of a family, which belong not strictly to him alone, but to him and his whole seed. (See Gen. xii. 2, 3. xiii. 17. xviii. 18. xlviii. 19, 20. xlix. 4, 8, &c.) Why then may not the like expressions be used of God the Father, the head and fountain of the other two divine Persons, which yet strictly are not to be understood of *him alone*, but of him *considered with his Son and Holy Spirit*, who are infinitely more united to him, than any earthly progeny is, or can be, to their head?

This argument is *a fortiori*, and there is more than *parity* of *reason* to be pleaded in favour of this manner of speaking, with relation to the Persons of the *undivided* Trinity.

course be the *Father*, who revealed his own *Person* first to the world, and was known under that character before either the *Son* or *Holy Ghost* were distinctly and fully revealed; who has still the character of *Father*, as Head and Fountain of all, and is generally first in our conception, when we speak of *God* absolutely, without particularly specifying any Person of the Godhead. Yet I must observe to you, that it is far from being certain that the *Father*, or any particular Person, is always meant, whenever the word *God* is used absolutely in Scripture. For, as I before hinted, no good reason can be given why the word *God* may not be used in a large indefinite sense, not denoting any particular Person, just as the word *man* is often used in Scripture, not denoting any particular man, but man in general, or man indefinitely. (Gen. vi. 3, 7. viii. 21. ix. 6. Deut. viii. 3. 1 Sam. xvi. 7. Job iv. 17. v. 7. Psal. lvi. 11. lxxviii. 25. xc. 3. cxviii. 6, 8. Hos. xi. 9. Matt. iv. 4. Luke iv. 4. xviii. 4. 1 Thess. iv. 8. 1 Tim. ii. 5. Tit. iii. 4.) As the word *man* sometimes stands for the whole *species*; sometimes indefinitely for any *individual* of the species, without determining which; and sometimes for this or that particular man: so, by way of analogy, or imperfect resemblance, the word *God* may sometimes signify all the divine Persons; sometimes any Person of the three indefinitely, without determining which; and sometimes one particular Person, either Father, Son, or Holy Ghost. From what hath been said, I am willing to hope we may now sufficiently understand in what sense, and under what restrictions, the Father is set forth in Scripture or antiquity, as the *one* or *only* God. I proceed now,

II. To consider what we may reasonably and fairly infer from the Scripture-declarations of the *unity*. Of this very briefly; that I may not trespass (as I fear I already have) too long upon your patience.

1. We may certainly infer from them, that they absolutely exclude all *rival* or *anti-gods*, set up in opposition

to God the Father; consequently all *idols*, and all the *gods* of the *heathen* nations.

2. We may farther infer, that they do as certainly exclude all such gods as the Marcionites, or others, pretended to be besides, or superior to, the Creator and God of Israel.

3. We may also reasonably infer, that they exclude all things or persons whatsoever, that are *separate* from, or *aliene* to; that are not necessarily included in, and comprehended with, God the Father: briefly, they exclude all *other* gods; consequently they exclude all *creatures:* for since all *creatures* are *posterior* in time, and *different* in nature, they are *adventitious* and *extraneous;* they are not *necessarily* included in God the Father; he was without them, and may be again, if he pleases: if they are *gods* in any sense, they are *other* gods, not the *same* god with God the Father; and so stand excluded from having the name or title of *God*, in any *proper* or *religious* sense; and from receiving any kind, part, or degree of our *religious* homage, worship, or adoration. Socinians and Arians have split upon this absurdity, supposing the Son to be a *creature* only, and yet receiving him as God, *another God* besides the Father; which is *Polytheism* and *Gentilism*, condemned by Scripture, and all Catholic antiquity. The Arians, ancient and modern, have appeared so sensible of it, that they never durst openly profess it; being reduced to this hard and truly pitiable case, to receive, in reality, into their *creed*, what they are ashamed to express in *terms*[o].

[o] Consequens est, inquam, ut aut non colatis Christum, aut non *unum* Deum colatis, sed *duos*. Ad hoc tu respondere conatus, multum quidem locutus es, asserens quod et Christum *Deum* colatis: sed *duos Deos* a vobis coli, quamvis non negaveris, tamen non ausus es confiteri. Sensisti enim, *duos Deos esse colendos*, Christianas aures ferre non posse. O quam de proximo te corrigeres, si timeres *credere* quod *dicere* timuisti! cum enim clamet Apostolus, "corde creditur ad justitiam, ore confessio fiat ad salu-"tem:" si *ad justitiam* putes pertinere quod *credis*, cur hoc *ad salutem*

They are used to insist much upon the force of the *exclusive* terms, when they have a mind to exclude the *Person* of the Son from being *one God* with the Father. But they entirely forget that the *exclusive* terms have any force at all, when they imagine that they do not so much as exclude *creatures* from being gods, but leave room for *other* gods, for *two gods*, or *three gods*, and as many objects of worship. Thus they appear to "strain at a gnat" while they can "swallow a camel;" and use arguments against the Catholics, which recoil more strongly upon themselves. They are forced, in their turn [p], to plead that the *exclusive* terms are intended chiefly in opposition to *idols* and *false-gods;* and that they do not exclude *Christ* from being *true God*, and true object of worship: which is unsaying all that they had before asserted, and is unravelling their own argument, so far as concerns the bare necessary force of the *exclusive* terms. For if they do not exclude *creatures* (*strangers* and *aliens*, in comparison) from being *true gods*, much less can they be supposed necessarily to exclude God's own Son, of the same nature, and duration, and perfections with himself, (if the thing be possible,) from being *true God* with him, and *one God* with him. This then must be argued from other topics, and not from any supposed necessary force of the *exclusive* terms. To conclude, we may observe that Scripture and antiquity often tell us of God and God, but never of *two Gods;* Creator and Creator, but never *two Creators;* Saviour and Saviour, but never *two Saviours*; Lord and Lord, but never *two Lords;* Judge and Judge, but never *two Judges;* King and King, but never *two Kings*. These things are easily accounted for upon Catholic principles; Father and Son are *one Creator*,

etiam ore non *confiteris?* Si autem *duos Deos* colendos *ad salutem* non pertinet *confiteri*, sine dubio nec *ad justitiam* pertinet *credere*. Vid. *Augustin. contr. Maxim.* lib. i. p. 677, 678.

[p] See Clarke's Reply, p. 50, 69. Vid. et Crell. de uno Deo Patre, sect. i. cap. 1.

one Saviour, one Lord, one Judge, one King, and one God, because their operations, attributes, powers, and perfections (and consequently the substance of both) are one. "To Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, all honour and glory "be now and for ever." Amen.

Christ's Divinity proved from his Coequality with the Father:

OR

EQUALITY OF CHRIST

WITH THE FATHER.

The fifth Sermon preached January 6, 17$\frac{19}{20}$.

PHIL. ii. 5—11.

Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.

THERE have been great disputes between the Catholics and Arians about this passage; both sides claiming it as their own, and as directly favouring their respective principles. They have neither of them been content to be on the *defensive* only, in respect of this, as in several other texts; but, interpreting the words differently, and taking them under contrary views, they urge them

against each other, and appeal to them as *decisive* both ways, according to their respective tenets and persuasions. My design is to inquire carefully into the meaning of so remarkable a passage, and to fix it, where it ought to lie, on the Catholic side. It will be proper to take along with us the scope and intent of the Apostle in it, as a sure mark to direct us to the true and genuine sense of it. The two verses immediately preceding those of the text run thus: "Let nothing be done through "strife or vain-glory; but in lowliness of mind let each "esteem other better than themselves. Look not every "man on his own things, but every man also on the "things of others." Then follows; "Let this mind be "in you, which was also in Christ Jesus," &c. The Apostle proposes Christ as a perfect pattern and example of the virtue or virtues which he had been recommending. And what were they? Humility, modesty, philanthropy, in opposition to vain-glory, ostentation, and self-seeking. He exhorts the Philippians to good-nature and tenderness, to wave all little niceties and punctilios of ceremony, and to be willing to sacrifice their reputation or honour, upon occasion, to the glory of God and the good of others. Thus far by way of preliminary. Now let us proceed to the instance given, as a powerful motive to incite them to put on that happy temper of mind. It is the example of Christ Jesus: "Who being in the form "of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: "but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him "the form of a servant," and so on. Here, every word almost will require a minute and particular discussion. We must therefore be content to advance slowly, that we may clear our way as we go, and at length sum up the whole in a short paraphrase, concluding with a few brief observations upon it. And this is all the order, or method, that I propose to observe in my following discourse.

I begin with the words, "Who being in the form of "God," ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ. We do not meet with this phrase

elsewhere in Scripture. But there are two passages, one in the Epistle to the Colossians, the other in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which are near akin to it, and may help to direct us to the true sense of it. Our blessed Lord is by our Apostle styled the "image of the invisible God," (Coloss. i. 15.) There is not much difference betwixt εἰκὼν and μορφὴ, betwixt *image* and *form:* and therefore, probably, the Apostle might intend the same thing by being "in the form of God," and being "the image of "the invisible God." Now, as to the meaning of Christ's being the "image of the invisible God," it is well explained by the words immediately there following: πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως: "born (or begotten) before every "creature;" that is, as he was "Son of God" before the creation of the world. Thus was he the "image of God," bearing his figure and resemblance, as truly, fully, and perfectly, as a "son of man" has all the features, lineaments, and perfections belonging to the nature of man. And thus *antiquity* [a] has constantly understood Christ to be the "image of God," as he is God's *Son.* In the Epistle to the Hebrews, chap. i. we find our blessed Lord described under the character of *Son* of God, and "heir "of all things, by whom *God* made the worlds," ver. 2.

[a] In effigie et imagine, qua *Filius* Patris, vere Dei prædicatus est. *Tertull. contr. Marc.* lib. v. cap. 20. p. 486.

Εἰ ἔστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, ἀόρατος εἰκὼν—τῆς ἀπατονομάστου, καὶ ἀφθίγκτου ὑποστάσεως τοῦ πατρὸς εἰκὼν, ὁ χαρακτὴρ, λόγος, &c. *Origen. apud Athan.* tom. i. p. 233.

Τὴν πατρικὴν ἰμφίεσιαν ἀκριβῶς πίφυκε σώζειν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς, τὴν κατὰ πάντα ὁμοιότητα αὐτοῦ ἐκ φύσεως ἀπομαξάμενος, καὶ ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκὼν τοῦ πατρὸς τυγχάνων, καὶ τοῦ πρωτοτύπου ἔκτυπος χαρακτήρ, *Alexand. Theod. E. H.* lib. i. cap. 4. p. 15.

As to Post-Nicene writers, see Petavius, who has collected their testimonies, and who gives his judgment of all in these words:

Porro ex vi et nativa conditione productionis suæ hoc imaginem habere, ut auctorem repræsentet: adeoque *Verbum εἰκόνα*, et imaginem ideo nominari, quoniam ita procedit a Patre, ut eum necessario exprimat, antiqui omnes Theologi demonstrant; qui *imaginem* dici *Verbum* Dei asserunt, *quatenus a Patre gignitur. Petav. de Trin.* lib. vi. cap. 5. p. 326.

And immediately after, he is said to be the ἀπαύγασμα, the *shining forth* of his Father's *glory*, and the "express "image of his person," as we render it; or, as others think the more probable construction to be, *of his substance*[b]. This is a farther confirmation, that those expressions of *image* or *form* of God relate to Christ's *sonship* or *filiation*, whereby he is, as it were, the exact copy or resemblance of God the Father, in respect of his divine nature, being as truly *God of God*, in that capacity, as he is *man of man* in another. Thus, as before said, the Ante-Nicene as well as Post-Nicene writers understood the *phrases* of Christ's being the *image of God*, and *express image of his hypostasis:* and not only so, but the very words of the text, his being "in the form of God," were by them[c] believed to signify his being *God*, or *God of God*, or *Son of God;* all amounting to the same thing. This construction agrees also perfectly well with the con-

[b] Vide Petav. de Trin. lib. vi. cap. 6. per totum.

Τῆς θείας φύσιως ἀπαύγασμα καὶ χαρακτήρ. *Origen. contr. Cels.* p. 342.

Compare the parallel expressions in the apocryphal book of Wisdom.

Ἀτμὶς τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμιως· ἀπόῤῥοια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης εἰλικρινής· Ἀπαύγασμα φωτὸς ἀϊδίου· ἔσοπτρον ἀκηλίδωτον τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐνεργείας· εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ. Cap. vii. ver. 25, 26.

[c] Æque non erit *Deus* Christus vere, si nec homo vere fuit *in effigie* hominis constitutus—quod si in effigie et imagine, qua *Filius Patris*, vere Dei prædicatus est, etiam in effigie et imagine hominis, qua *Filius hominis*, vere hominem inventum. *Tertul. contr. Marc.* lib. v. cap. 20. p. 486.

Ὁ μονογενὴς τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος, Θεὸς ὑπάρχων ἐκ Θεοῦ, κενόωσεν ἑαυτὸν, &c. *Hippolytus*, vol. ii. p. 29. Fabric. ed.

Θεὸς μὲν κενώσας ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ. *Conc. Antioch. Labb.* vol. i. p. 848.

Ἡ δὲ μορφὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ ὁ λόγος μετ' αὐτοῦ Θεὸς, καὶ υἱὸς Θεοῦ. *Dionys. Alex. contr. Paul. Samosat.* p. 853. Labb.

Quamvis esset in *forma Dei*, non est rapinam arbitratus æqualem se Deo esse. Quamvis enim *se ex Deo Patre Deum* esse meminisset, nunquam, &c. *Novat. de Trin.* c. 17.

Ipse a Patre exaltatus sit, quia se in terris *Sermo* et *Virtus*, et *Sapientia* Dei Patris humiliavit. *Cypr. de Unitat. Eccl.* p. 118. ed. Ox.

The sentiments of Post-Nicene Fathers are well known, and need not be mentioned.

text, which no other does. For the phrase of μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, "taking upon him the form of a servant," is plainly meant of his taking upon him *human nature*, becoming thereby a *servant* of God in that capacity. The Apostle himself interprets the "form of a servant" by the words immediately following, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος, that is, being *made in the likeness of man;* which is the same with being *really* and *truly* man: being in the *form of man*, as Son of man, in like manner as he was before said to have been in the *form of God*, as Son of God. The [d] ancients have constantly interpreted the "form of a servant" in the sense which I have mentioned. *Human nature* was that "form of a servant" which our Lord assumed, and he became a servant by becoming man. The construction then now given of the words, ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ, being agreeable to the context, as well as to the literal grammatical signification of the words; and being besides countenanced by parallel places of Scripture, and received by the ancients in general, it is certainly preferable to any other; and we need not look out farther for a meaning, when we have so great reason to believe that this is the true and the only true one that can be assigned. Yet I must not conceal from you, that there is another interpretation, which has been taken up of late, and much contended for by some of the Arian persuasion. I must observe to you, in the way of preliminary, that all the appearances of God, under the Old Testament, were supposed by the ancients to have been in and by God the Son. It was he that called himself God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and all along headed and conducted the people of the Jews. This notion, so far, is just, and the fact true, and it is of very good use against the Socinians especially; and, I may add, against the Arians also, when rightly understood. But some amongst us, mistaking this

[d] Herm. Pastor. Simil. v. cap. 2. Clem. Alexandr. p. 251. Origen. in Joh. p. 34. Hippolyt. vol. ii. p. 2, 3, 29. Novat. cap. 17. Euseb. in Psalm. p. 616. Hilar. in Psalm. p. 325. ed. Bened. Athanas. Orat. i. p. 447. ed. Bened. Cyril. Hierosol. p. 322. ed. Ox.

matter, have been pleased to speak of those appearances, or transactions, of the Son of God, as being little more than what any *angel* or *archangel* might have been capable of sustaining. They call it *personating* God, acting *in his name*, and speaking his words. And thus they understand that our Lord was, before his incarnation, ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ, "in the form of God," being God's *legate*, *vicegerent*, or *representative*. But against this there lie these following objections:

1. That this construction of ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ is perfectly *precarious*. They cannot name any ancient Catholic writer that ever so understood it, nor bring any parallel text of Scripture to countenance it.

2. In the next place, the very supposition itself of Christ's *personating* God, in any such low sense, is a mere fancy and fiction, unsupported by Scripture or Catholic antiquity. The primitive writers who speak of it understood that our blessed Lord did not barely *personate* God, but was himself *really* God, and spoke in his *own* name, as well as the *Father's;* being himself Lord and God, &c. as coeternal and coessential Son of the Father[c]. So that this interpretation of "form of God," so far as there is any thing of truth in it, will at length resolve into the very same which I have before given.

3. Admitting (but not granting) that God the Son *personated* the Father in any such low sense as is pretended, (though our adversaries cannot show that he ever said, *I am God the Father*, as he might have said upon their *hypothesis*, which is worth observing,) yet that cannot be the meaning of ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ in the text; for this plain reason: because St. Paul going about to magnify the great condescension of God the Son, from the highest pinnacle of glory (if I may so speak) to the lowest instance of contempt and ignominy, would certainly begin with the mention of what he was in his highest capacity. Now his *personating* the Father is nothing so honourable

[c] See my Defence, &c. vol. i. Query 2. p. 25, &c.

a circumstance, as what St. John speaks of in the first chapter of his Gospel, or what St. Paul himself has observed, (Coloss. i. 15, 16.) His being *God* from the beginning, and *maker of the world*, are of much higher import than *personating* God, which any angel might do, in such a low sense as is here pretended. If then the *Apostle's* argument did require that he should begin with the highest instance of perfection belonging to the Son, and if there be really a *higher* than is contained in this circumstance of *personating* God, (supposing it any thing more than a fiction,) it is a demonstration that St. Paul did not intend ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ (" in the form of God") in any such low sense, as would only lessen the miracle of Christ's condescension, and weaken the force of the Apostle's argument. So much for this. Having settled the meaning of the phrase, ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ, signifying as much as *God of God*, or essentially *divine*, we may next proceed to the following words: " thought it not robbery " to be equal with God."

The phrase, οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο, occurs not any where else in Scripture, nor, so far as I can find, in any profane writer; (for there is a difference between ἅρπαγμα and ἁρπαγμός[f];) so that all the light we can have into it must be from the grammatical meaning of the word, and from ancient versions, and from ecclesiastical writers, and the context. Our Translators have rendered the words *literally*, and indeed very justly. It will not however be amiss to inquire what may be fairly pleaded for their interpretation. " Thought it not robbery to be equal " with God." The ancientest versions of the New Testament favour this rendering; the Greek and Latin Fathers, from the fourth century downwards, do as plainly countenance it. Nay, Tertullian[g], of the second or third cen-

[f] Vid. Wooton. Præfat. ad Clem. Rom. p. 187.

[g] *Sermo* enim *Deus*, qui in effigie Dei constitutus, non rapinam existimavit pariari Deo. *Tertull.* p. 329.

Deus erat *Sermo*——Hic certe est qui in effigie Dei constitutus, non rapinam existimavit esse se æqualem Deo. *Ibid.* p. 504.

tury, seems to have understood it in the same sense. The words will, in strict *propriety*, bear it; and not only so, but more naturally and properly than any other. Let us then put the sense together, and see how it will stand. "Who being Son of God, and therefore essentially God, "*thought it not robbery*, that is, knew that he did not "wrongfully or unreasonably assume *to be equal with* "*God:* but, notwithstanding, was pleased to *make* him-"self *of no reputation*," &c. The Apostle having before told us that the Son was really God (which I have shown to be the meaning of "being in the form of God") might very justly add, that he was "equal with God;" which is only explanatory of what he had said, and more emphatically expressing the dignity and majesty of that Person, whose condescension he was going to illustrate. The phrase, εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ, admits of no construction so naturally as this, "to be equal with God[h]." The force of it lies in the word εἶναι. For, whatever instances may be brought of the use of the word ἴσα, it can never be shown that εἶναι ἴσα signifies any thing so naturally as to be *equal to*, or *equal with*. What confirms this construction is, that the ancients[i] frequently infer the *equality* of the Son with the Father, from his being the "Son of God," or the "image of God;" either of which comes to the same sense with St. Paul's "form of God." And why might not St. Paul make the same just inference from the same premises, since it flows so naturally from them, and was very pertinent to the argument on which he was treating? The most considerable objection against it is from the particle ἀλλὰ, following after; which some think should rather have been ἀλλ' ὅμως; or the like. But this piece of

[h] See Pearson on the Creed, Art. II. p. 123.

[i] Et bene qui dixit ipsum immensum Patrem in Filio mensuratum: mensura enim Patris Filius, quoniam et capit eum. *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 4. p. 231.

Ὁ θεῖος λόγος, ὁ φανερώτατος ὄντως θεὸς, ὁ τῷ Δεσπότῃ τῶν ὅλων ἐξισωθείς· ὅτι ἦν υἱὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ. *Clem. Alex.* p. 86. ed. Ox.

Ἵν', εἰκὼν αὐτὸς τυγχάνων τοῦ ἀοράτου Θεοῦ, καὶ ἐν τῷ μεγέθει σώζῃ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ πατρός· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' ἦν εἶναι σύμμετρον (ἵν' οὕτως ὀνομάσω) καὶ καλὴν εἰκόνα τῷ ἀοράτου Θεῷ, μὴ καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους παρισᾶσαν τὴν εἰκόνα. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 323.

criticism is easily got over: it is frequent[k] for the sacred writers to have the word ἀλλὰ instead of ἀλλ' ὅμως, signifying *howbeit*, or *nevertheless:* and so indeed our Translators should have rendered it here, agreeably to their rendering of the words preceding. I shall give two or three instances out of St. Paul's own writings. 1 Cor. ix. 12. "If "others be partakers of this power over you, are not we "rather? Nevertheless" (ἀλλὰ in the Greek) "we have "not used this power." So again, Rom. v. 13, 14. "Sin "is not imputed when there is no law: nevertheless (ἀλλὰ "again) death reigned from Adam to Moses." There is therefore no sufficient ground for laying aside this construction on account of the *particle;* which may, and often does, signify the same as *nevertheless, howbeit, notwithstanding*, &c. Thus far I have been pleading for that sense of the words which appears in our English version. The sum of the plea is, that it is *literal* and *grammatical;* agrees with the oldest versions; is countenanced by Tertullian in the beginning of the third century, and by the Catholic Fathers in general[l] after the Nicene Council; is very pertinent to the Apostle's argument, and there is no objection of weight from the context against it. If this construction be admitted, the Apostle's reasoning, so far, will run thus: "Who being essentially God, as Son "of God, knew that he was rightfully and naturally *equal*

[k] Gen. xl. 15. 2 Chron. xxx. 11. Isa. xlix. 15. Matth. xxiv. 6. Mark ix. 13, 22. x. 43. xiii. 7, 20, 24. xiv. 29, 36. Luke xvi. 30. xxi. 9. Joh. xi. 11, 16. xvi. 7. Acts vii. 47. 2 Cor. v. 16. vii. 6. xii. 16. Coloss. ii. 5. 2 Tim. i. 12. 2 Pet. iii. 14. 1 Tim. i. 16. Rev. ii. 4, 6.

[l] I may give one or two for a specimen.

Quid est "non rapinam arbitratus est esse se æqualem Deo?" Non usurpavit æqualitatem Dei, sed erat in illa in qua natus erat. *August. Tract. in Joh.* 17.

Non quasi rapinam habebat æqualitatem cum Patre, quam in substantia sui, tanquam Deus et Dominus possidebat. *Ambros. de Fid.* lib. ii. c. 8.

Non alienum arbitratus est, esse quod natus est. *Aug. contr. Max.* p 681.

Manens enim in forma Dei, non vi aliqua sibi ac rapina, id quod erat, præsumendum existimavit, scilicet ut Deo esset æqualis. Erat enim in Dei forma, nihilque ei ex ejus gloria deerat, in cujus forma manebat; sed formam servi sui per humilitatem accepit, &c. *Hilar. in Psalm.* p. 325. ed. Bened.

" with God, and could not be said to usurp or arrogate in " respect to what was his *own*. Nevertheless he made " himself of no *reputation*, appearing and acting much " below his dignity, taking upon him human nature, &c." It must be owned that some of the Ante-Nicene writers interpreted the words differently. Origen [m], understanding the whole passage, as it seems, of the man *Christ Jesus*, (whose *soul* he supposed to have *preexisted*,) interprets the phrase, οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο, &c. *did not assume*, or *covet to be honoured as God*. And this construction he was led into from this consideration, that the Λόγος, or *divine nature* of Christ, could not be capable of any proper *exaltation*. Novatian [n] understands the passage of the Λόγος, or *divine nature*, and makes the sense to be, that Christ did not pretend to an absolute equality with God the Father, considering himself as *second* only, or as *Son* of the Father. The churches of Lyons and Vienne (in a letter recorded by Eusebius [o]) seem to understand it thus, that our Lord did not assume to himself, as he justly might have done, to be honoured as God, but waved his privilege, and declined all ostentation of his glory, for a pattern to, and for the good of others. The three interpretations now mentioned are different from each other, and all of them reconcileable with Catholic principles. Origen's, though singular, is very safe, for one that would be only upon the *defensive*, in respect of this text, against the Arians. Novatian's may serve either way; because, while he denies only such an *equality* as no Catholic contends for, he asserts the true *equality of nature* between Father and Son [p]. The third interpretation is too loose

[m] Origen. in Joh. p. 34, 413. He seems to be of the same opinion in his book against Celsus. See p. 167, 168, 172.

[n] Novatian. de Trin. c. 17.

[o] Euseb. E. Hist. lib. v. cap. 2.

[p] Phœbadius of the fourth century, a zealous defender of the Catholic doctrine against the Arians, yet scruples not to interpret this text nearly in the same way with Novatian.

Hic Sermo, *cum in forma Dei esset*, sapientia et ratione, et spiritus ratione, et spiritus virtute constructus, hoc est, totam vim Dei possidens, *non*

and general to make any thing of on either side: only this is observable of them all, that they construe the words οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο &c. not as a part of the *preceding character of Christ's greatness*, but as part of the *consequent account of his humiliation*, so far contrary to the interpretation which I have before been pleading for. You may have observed, from what has been already hinted, that, taking the words *as a part of the consequent account of Christ's humiliation*, they are still capable of a very good meaning, and no way favourable, but contradictory, to the Arian hypothesis. For let the sense of the passage appear as follows:

"Who being essentially God, (and consequently having a rightful claim to be honoured equally with God,) yet did not covet or desire to be so honoured, did not insist upon his right; but, for the greater glory of God, and for the good of others, chose rather (in the particular instance of his incarnation) to wave his pretensions, and, in appearance, to recede from them." This way of paraphrasing the words takes off the objection about the particle ἀλλὰ, and answers to that sense of the phrase, οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο, which Origen, Novatian, and the churches of Lyons, &c. took it in; and withal secures the main point which we insist on from this text, namely, the *equality*, the *essential* equality of the Son to the Father. In fine, either sense of the phrase, οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο, will suit very well with Catholic principles; but it is the latter only that can be any way drawn to favour the

se Deo Patri adæquavit, sed formam servi accipiens humiliavit se usque ad mortem. Induerat enim quod servire, quod mori possit. *Phœbad. contr. Arian. Bibl. Patr.* tom. iv. p. 304.

Cyril also of Alexandria seems, in one place, to have understood the words οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο, as part of the consequent account of Christ's humiliation.

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ὅλων σωτὴρ καὶ Κύριος, καίτοι μετὸν αὐτῷ τὸ ἐν μορφῇ καὶ ἰσότητι τῇ κατὰ πᾶν ὁτιοῦν ὁρᾶσθαι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, καὶ τοῖς τῆς θεότητος ἐναβρύνεσθαι θάκοις, οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν, &c. *Cyril. Alex. contr. Jul.* lib. vi. p. 195.

Arians: which indeed is the true reason why they contend so much for it. As to the two interpretations which I have given, the first, agreeing with our English version, seems to me preferable. It has been, in a manner, the standing interpretation for 1300 years. It has given indeed great uneasiness to the Arians; but they were never yet able, nor ever will be, to confute it. I pass on to the next words. "But made himself of no reputation, and "took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in "the likeness of men." Which words should have been turned thus: *Nevertheless he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men.* This rendering is not only more exact and conformable to the *original*, but also more suitable to the rendering of the words preceding. When our Lord is said to have "made himself of no reputation," or to have *emptied himself*, which signifies much the same, we are not to suppose that he [q] lost any thing which he had before; or that he ceased to be in the *form of God*, by taking on him the *form of man*. No: he had the same *essential* glory, the same *real* dignity, which he ever had, but among men concealed it; appeared not in majesty and glory like to God, but divested himself of every daz-

[q] Εἰ δὲ καὶ σῶμα θνητὸν καὶ ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀναλαβὼν ὁ ἀθάνατος θεὸς λόγος, δοκεῖ τῷ Κέλσῳ ἀλλάττεσθαι καὶ μεταπλάττεσθαι· μανθανέτω ὅτι ὁ λόγος, ὑδὲν μὲν πάσχει ὧν πάσχει τὸ σῶμα, ἢ ἡ ψυχή. συγκαταβαίνων δὲ &c. *Origen. contr. Cels.* p. 170.

Non amittens quod erat, sed accipiens quod non erat. *Aust. in Joh.* Tract. 17.

Ἐσμίκρυνεν αὐτοῦ τὴν θεότητα. *Euseb.* lib. i. cap. 13.

Nam etsi apostolus semetipsum exinanisse dicit, formam servi suscipiendo, non utique sic exinanitum accipimus ut aliud quam quod fuerat idem spiritus fieret: sed ut, seposito interim majestatis suæ honore, humanum corpus indueret, quo suscepto, salus gentium fieret. Ut enim sol cum nube tegitur, claritas ejus comprimitur, non cæcatur; et lumen illud quod toto orbe diffusum claro splendore cuncta perfundit, parvo admodum obstaculo nubis includitur, non aufertur: sic et homo ille quem Dominus Jesus Salvatorque noster, id est, Deus, Deique Filius induit, Deum tamen in illo non intercepit, sed abscondit. *Pseud-Ambros. de Fid. Orthod.* cap. viii. p. 355. ed. Bened.

zling appearance, and every outward mark of majesty and greatness, [r] condescending to appear, and act, and converse as a man, like unto us in all things, sin only excepted. In this sense it is that our Lord *emptied* himself. He came not with any pomp and ostentation of greatness, he laid aside his Godlike majesty, and disrobed himself, as it were, of all outward glories, becoming a man, a miserable man, and in that nature suffering, bleeding, and dying for us. "Wherefore God hath also highly exalted "him." Here we must make a pause, and inquire diligently what this *exaltation* means. One that is *truly* Son of God, and in a *proper* sense God, cannot be properly *exalted;* that is, cannot be preferred to any higher or better state than he ever enjoyed, nor receive any improvement of, or accession to, his essential dignity, glory, or happiness. Hence it is, that as many of the ancients as have understood the text of a *proper* exaltation, have interpreted it of the *human* only, and not the *divine* nature of Christ. This is true of the Ante-Nicene, as well as Post-Nicene writers, which appears from Origen [s] and Hippolytus [t]: and I do not know of any direct testimony to the contrary. So that here again the Arians, understanding it of a *proper* exaltation to a better state, and of Christ considered in his *highest* capacity, run counter to the doctrine of the ancients before the Nicene Council, in a very material article respecting this controversy.

[r] Τὸ σκῆπτρον τῆς μεγαλωσύνης τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ Κύριος ἡμῶν Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς οὐκ ἦλθεν ἐν κόμπῳ ἀλαζονίας οὐδὲ ὑπερηφανίας, καίπερ δυνάμενος· ἀλλὰ ταπεινοφρονῶν, καθὼς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐλάλησεν. *Clem. Rom. Ep.* cap. xvi. p. 70.

Αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἀφθάρτῳ αὐτοῦ δόξῃ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐλθεῖν ἠδύνατο· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς οὐδεπώποτε τὸ μέγεθος τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ βαστάζειν ἠδυνάμεθα. *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 38. p. 284.

Ὅστις ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ὤν, διὰ τοὺς κολληθέντας τῇ σαρκὶ καὶ γενομένους ὅπερ σάρξ, ἐγένετο σάρξ, ἵνα χωρηθῇ ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ δυναμένων αὐτὸν βλέπειν καθὸ λόγος ἦν, καὶ πρὸς Θεὸν ἦν, καὶ Θεὸς ἦν. *Orig. contr. Cels.* lib. vi. p. 322.

[s] Ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν, ὁ Θεὸς λόγος οὐκ ἐπιδέχετο τὸ ὑπερυψωθῆναι. *Orig. in Joh.* p. 413. Huet.

[t] Ὑπερυψοῦσθαι λέγεται, καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔχων, διὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον μονογενές, &c. *Hippolyt. Fragm.* vol. ii. p. 29. Fabric.

The ancients were certainly in the right not to admit of any proper exaltation, in the sense before given, in respect of the *divine* nature of Christ. For, as [u] Athanasius and other Catholics well argue in this case, how could he, that was *with* God, and in the *bosom* of the *Father*, be *exalted*, or become *higher* than he always was? How could the Giver and Dispenser of all *graces* receive any thing as a matter of *grace* or *favour?* How could he be then said to have attained the privilege of being *adored*, who had long before been *adored* both by men and *angels?* He who was God from the beginning, who had glory with the Father "before the world was," who is himself the "Lord of glory," and Creator and Preserver of all things, was infinitely too high, too great, and too divine, to receive any accession to his dignity, any real increase either of perfection or glory. Thus far is very right; and therefore, if a *proper* exaltation, in that sense, be intended, it can only be meant of Christ as *God-man*, receiving those honours and titles, in his human or mediatorial capacity, which he had always enjoyed in another. And thus the [x] ancients, for the most part, have understood Christ's *exaltation* to be no more than a kind of new *investiture*, upon his new and late *condescension;* and his having those rights, titles, and honours confirmed to him as *God-man*, which as *God* he never wanted. This, in the main, is true and right; and is a good account, in part, of what was in fact. But there is some reason to think, that it is not precisely and accurately the meaning of this text. For if the *exaltation* be meant only of the *human* nature, it is more natural to suppose that St. Paul would not here have spoken of the condescension of the *Logos*, but would rather have told us only

[u] Athanas. Op. tom. i. p. 445, &c.

[x] Εἰ δὲ ὑψοῦσθαι λέγεται, καὶ ἐν τάξει χαρίσματος τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα δίχεσθαι, εἰς ἐκεῖνο δηλονότι μετὰ σαρκὸς ἐπανάγεται, εἰς ὅπερ ἦν καὶ δίχα σαρκός. *Cyril. Alex. Thesaur.* p. 130.

Vid. etiam Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. Orat. v. p. 597. Athanas. aliosque.

what the *man* Christ Jesus had done, how humbly and how righteously Christ had demeaned himself in that capacity, and how God had rewarded his services. And thus it is that [y] Hermas, a very early writer of the first century, represents this matter. [z] An ancient commentator upon this text gives several reasons why the *exaltation* here spoken of is not, cannot be intended of the *Man* only, but of Christ in his *whole* Person. "1. Because "if Christ be *God* as well as *Man*, then all the time from "his incarnation he must have had, along with his hu- "manity, all that pertains to God; and therefore could "not afterwards properly *receive* what he had before "2. Supposing that he wanted any thing in respect of "his manhood, yet why should the Father be said to "give what he himself, as God, could easily supply? "3. The things mentioned as given to Christ are too "high and great for the man to receive, unless the hu- "man nature be supposed to be *divine*, which is absurd: "or if it be supposed to have been made *God* by adop-

[y] Adhibito itaque *Filio*, quem carum et hæredem habebat, et amicis quos in consilio advocabat, indicat ea quæ *servo suo* facienda mandasset, quæ præterea ille fecisset. At illi protinus gratulati sunt *servo illi*, quod tam plenum testimonium Domini sui assecutus fuisset. Ait deinde illis: Ego quidem *huic servo* libertatem promisi, si custodisset mandatum meum quod dederam, et custodivit illud, et præterea opus bonum adjecit in vineam, quod mihi quam plurimum placuit. Pro hoc igitur opere quod fecit, volo eum *Filio* meo facere cohæredem; quoniam cum sensisset quod esset bonum, non omisit sed fecit illud. *Herm. Simil.* v. p. 104. Coteler.

[z] Quibusdam tamen videtur homini donatum esse nomen: quod est super omne nomen quod nullo genere, nulla ratione convenit. Si enim Christus Dei Filius idem ipse et homo est, non poterat Deus homo factus, sed manens Deus, his egere quæ habebat: aut si secundum quod homo erat, his egebat quæ Dei sunt, ipse sibi Dei Filius Deus dedisset quæ deerant ei juxta quod homo erat.—Neque caro hoc posset effici quod est Deus. Sed forte ut adoptione Deus esset: et hic color est. Incipiet enim ex parte Deus verus esse Christus, et ex parte adoptivus, aut duo Dii: sed aliud Scriptura significat. Illi enim donatum significat, qui se exinanivit, qui formam servi accepit, qui in similitudinem hominis factus est homo, qui patri obedivit. Si Homo Deo Patri obedivit, quid magnum est quod dixit Apostolus? Sed hoc magnum dicit, quia cum æqualis esset obedivit. *Pseud-Ambros.* in loc. p. 255.

" tion, then either Christ is God partly by nature and " partly by adoption, or the two natures are two Gods. " 4. It appears from the text, that the *exaltation* belongs " to the same nature which *condescended* and emptied it- " self. And what nature was that but the Divine na- " ture? Or what great matter would it have been for the " Apostle to have told us, that a *man* did not pretend to " be *equal* with God, or was obedient to God?"

There is a great deal of weight in the reasonings of this author, which made him at length [a] conclude, that the text does not speak of any *proper exaltation*, or new accession to any thing, but of the more illustrious *manifestation* of him, for the solemn proclaiming him to be what he always was. And this, indeed, I take to be true in part, though not the full meaning of the text before us. Though the absolute, *essential* dignity of our blessed Lord was always the same, and in respect of which he was ever *equal* with God, yet his *relative* dignity towards us, founded in the obligations we have received from him, never so signally appeared as in that amazing and astonishing instance of condescension and goodness, his becoming man, and dying for us. We were hereby " bought " with a price," becoming *servants* to Christ, and Christ a *Lord* to us, in a peculiar sense [b], and under a *new* and

[a] Hoc ergo natus accepit, ut post crucem manifestaretur quid a Patre dum generaretur acceperit.

[b] 1 Cor. vi. 20. vii. 22, 23. 1 Pet. i. 19.

Εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ Χριστὸς καὶ ἀπέθανε καὶ ἀνέστη καὶ ἀνέζησεν, ἵνα καὶ νεκρῶν καὶ ζώντων κυριεύσῃ. Rom. xiv. 9.

Invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis, et impassibilis passibilis, et Verbum homo, universa in semetipsum recapitulans: uti sicut in supercœlestibus et spiritalibus, et invisibilibus princeps est Verbum Dei; sic in visibilibus, et corporalibus principatum habeat, in semetipsum primatum assumens, et apponens semetipsum caput Ecclesiæ, universa attrahat ad semetipsum apto in tempore. *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 16. p. 206.

Accipiens omnium potestatem, quando Verbum caro factum est, ut quemadmodum in cœlis principatum habuit Verbum Dei, sic et in terra haberet principatum, quoniam homo justus, " qui peccatum non fecit, nec inventus " est dolus in ore ejus;" principatum autem habeat eorum quæ sunt terra,

special title. Upon this occasion, and on this account, it pleased God, in the most solemn and pompous manner to proclaim the high dignity of God the Son, to reinforce his rightful claim of homage, and to command heaven and earth, angels and men, to pay him all honour, reverence, and adoration suitable to the dignity of so great, so good, so divine a Person as the Son of God. He had lately run through an unparalleled work of mercy, had redeemed mankind and triumphed over death and hell: upon this, his *divinity* is recognized, and his high worth proclaimed. We may observe how, under the Old Testament, it pleased God often to insist upon what great things he had done (though many of them slight in comparison to the work of redemption) in order to move the persons concerned to receive him as *God*. So he tells Abram, "I am the Lord that brought thee out of Ur "of the Chaldees." Gen. xv. 7. And to the children of Israel he says: "I will take you to me for a people, and "I will be to you a God: and ye shall know that I am "the Lord your God, which bringeth you out from "under the burdens of the Egyptians." Exod. vi. 7. And again, "I am the Lord thy God, which have brought "thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of "bondage. Thou shalt have no other Gods before me." Exod. xx. 2, 3. Or when it pleased God to speak any thing higher, of what he had done, he reminded his peo-

ipse primogenitus mortuorum factus: et ut viderent omnia, quemadmodum prædiximus, suum regem, &c. *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 20. p. 253.

Per omnem venit ætatem, et infantibus infans factus. Sanctificans infantes: in parvulis parvulus——in juvenibus juvenis, exemplum juvenibus fiens, et sanctificans Domino. Sic et senior in senioribus, ut sit perfectus magister in omnibus——deinde et usque ad mortem pervenit ut sit "primo-"genitus ex mortuis, ipse primatum tenens in omnibus," princeps vitæ, prior omnium, precedens omnes. *Iren.* p. 147, 148.

The sense of all this is very distinctly expressed by Hippolytus.

Ὃς ἐπουρανίων, καὶ ἐπιγείων, καὶ καταχθονίων βασιλεὺς καὶ κριτὴς πάντων ἀποδέδεικται. ἐπουρανίων μὲν ὅτι λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς πρὸ πάντων γεγεννημένος ἦν· ἐπιγείων δὲ, ὅτι ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐγεννήθη, ἀναπλάσσων δι' ἑαυτοῦ τὸν Ἀδάμ· καταχθονίων δὲ, ὅτι καὶ ἐκ νεκροῖς κατελογίσθη—διὰ θανάτου τὸν θάνατον νικῶν. *Hippol. de Antichrist.* cap. xxvi. p. 15. Fabric.

ple of his being their *Creator* and *Redeemer*. "Thus "saith the Lord that created thee, O Jacob, and he that "formed thee, O Israel, Fear not: for I have redeemed "thee, I have called thee by my name; thou art mine." Isa. xliii. 1. We see from hence, how even God the Father asserted his claim to the homage and adoration of his people, from the good and great things he had done for them. Not that he was not *God* and *Lord* before, but because the obligations laid upon them were apt to strike the more powerfully, and to bring the consideration of their duty towards him close and home to their hearts. To apply this to our present purpose; you may please to consider that after God the Son had shown such amazing and astonishing acts of goodness towards mankind, then was it proper to celebrate his name to the utmost, to recognize the dignity and majesty of his Person, and to recommend him to the world, as their God and Lord, with all imaginable advantage, with such endearing circumstances as could not but affect, ravish, and astonish every pious and ingenuous mind. And thus I understand the words, "wherefore God also hath highly exalted "him." That is; on account of the great work of redemption, so full of love and goodness, so astonishing and so endearing, God hath remarkably proclaimed his dignity, and set forth his glory; commanding all men hereupon to acknowledge him their *God* and *Lord;* their *Lord* always, but now more especially, by a new and distinct claim, as their *Saviour*, and *Deliverer*, and only *Redeemer* [c]. As to the sense of the word *exalted*, nothing

[c] *God* the *Father* had remained as *glorious* as now he is, although he had never *created* the world; for the *creation* gave much, even all they had, to things created, it gave nothing unto God, who was in *being* infinite: yet if God had created nothing, the *attribute* of *Creator* could have had no *real ground*, it had been no *real attribute*. In like manner, suppose the *Son of God* had never condescended to take our nature upon him, he had remained as *glorious* in his nature and person as now he is; yet not glorified for, or by, this *title* or *attribute* of *incarnation*. Or suppose he had not "humbled "himself unto death"——he had remained as *glorious* in his nature and person, and in the *attribute* of *incarnation*, as now he is; but without these

is more frequent in Scripture, than such as I have here given. I shall mention only two or three examples, referring to a Concordance for the rest.

"He is my God—and I will exalt him." Exod. xv. 2. "Exalted be the God of the rock of my salvation." 2 Sam. xxii. 47. "Let the God of my salvation be exalted." Psal. xviii. 46. "Be thou exalted, Lord, in "thine own strength." Psal. xxi. 13. "Thou art my "God, and I will praise thee; thou art my God, and I "will exalt thee." Psal. cxviii. 28. "The Lord alone "shall be exalted in that day." Isa. ii. 11, 17. These (besides many other instances of like kind) are enough to justify this interpretation of the word *exalted*[d]. Besides that I would have it observed, that the word, in the original, is not ὕψωσε, but ὑπερύψωσε[e]. The former very probably would have been used, had the Apostle intended only a proper local exaltation of the man Christ Jesus, to the right hand of God. Farther; the immediate words following confirm this sense of the word. For, how is Christ *exalted?* God "hath given him a name "which is above every name." That is, he has extolled and magnified his name, above all names. Thus was the

glorious attributes of being "our Lord and Redeemer," and of being the "fountain of grace, and salvation unto us." All these are *real attributes*, and suppose a *real ground* or foundation; and that was, "his humbling "himself unto death, even the death of the cross." Nor are these attributes only *real* but more *glorious*, both in respect of God the Father, who was pleased to give his only Son for us; and in respect of God the Son, who was pleased to pay our ransom by his humiliation, than the *attribute* of *creation* is. The *Son of God* then, not the *Son of David only*, hath been *exalted* since his death, to be our *Lord*, by a *new* and *real* title, by the title of *redemption* and *salvation*. *Jackson on the Creed*, vol. iii. lib. ii. cap. 3. p. 316. See also *Bull. Prim. Trad.* p. 39, 40.

[d] Ὁ Θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσε. ναί· ὁ Θεὸς γὰρ λέγει τῷ Θεῷ μου Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ διὰ Δαβίδ, Ὑψώθητι ἐπὶ τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἡ δόξα σου.—— Ἐδόξασεν αὐτὸν ὁ πατὴρ· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ἐδόξασε τὸν πατέρα, &c. *Dionys. Ascript. Epist. contr. Samosat.* p. 881. Labb.

[e] Σὺ εἶ Κύριος ὁ ὕψιστος ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν, σφόδρα ὑπερυψώθης ὑπὲρ πάντας τοὺς Θεούς. Psal. xcvi. 9.

Αἰνῶ καὶ ὑπερυψῶ καὶ δοξάζω τὸν βασιλέα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. Dan. iv. 34.

Son of God *exalted*, or *glorified*, for the great things he had done, and dignified (if I may so speak) with a very high and honourable title, (too big for any *creature* to have merited, or for any thing less than himself to wear,) that of *Redeemer* and *Preserver* of man, and *Lord* of the whole universe. After the Apostle had taught us the great and supereminent dignity of God the Son, it was very proper to add, "to the glory of God the Father," that we might not be so entirely taken up with admiring and reverencing the excellency and perfections of God the Son, as to forget that he is a *Son* still, referring all to God the *Father*[f]; whose *glory* it is to have had always with him, and "rejoicing always before him," so great and so *divine* a Son, equal to himself, the express image, the perfect transcript and adequate resemblance of his Person[g]. I may just observe to you the strict accuracy of the Apostle's expression "God the Father:" not *God*, absolutely, nor *God his Father*, as some affect to speak, but "God the Father;" intimating that the Son is God also, and therefore, for distinction sake, he adds, "the Fa-"ther," expressing it thus, to the "glory of God the "Father."

I have at length run through the text, explaining the particulars of it in their order. I shall now subjoin a summary view of the whole, in a paraphrase conformable to the explication before given.

"Ver. 3, 4. Be ye not *vain-glorious*, or *selfish*, but be "willing to stoop and condescend even beneath your-"selves, in some instances, for the glory of God and the "good of others.

[f] *Æqualem* ergo Patri credite Filium: sed tamen *de Patre* Filium, Patrem vero non *de Filio*. *Origo* apud illum, *æqualitas* apud istum——genuit autem Pater *æqualem* sibi, et totum quicquid est Filius, habet *de Patre*, quod autem Deus Pater est non habet *de Filio*. Itaque dicimus Patrem Deum *de nullo*, Filium Deum *de Deo*. *Augustin. Serm.* 140. tom. v. p. 681.

[g] Σίζομέν γε τὸν πατέρα, θαυμάζοντες αὐτοῦ τὸν υἱὸν, λόγον, καὶ σοφίαν, καὶ ἀλήθειαν, καὶ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ πάντα, ἅπερ ἶναι μεμαθήκαμεν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸν γεννηθέντα ἀπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου πατρός. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 387.

"Ver. 5. Let this mind be in you, which was also in "Christ Jesus:

"Ver. 6. Who, though Son of God, and, as such, "rightfully and really *equal* with God;

"Ver. 7. Yet notwithstanding chose, in the instance "of his incarnation, to *hide* his *majesty*, and to *veil* his "*glories*, under the garb of *humanity;* being content to "become a man, and thereby a *servant* to God, though "by nature a *Son*, and *Lord of all.*

"Ver. 8. And having taken upon himself the nature "and condition of a man, he submitted yet farther, even "to death itself; and that too in the most ignominious "circumstances, nailed to a cross.

"Ver. 9. This amazing and astonishing instance of "condescension, love, and goodness, God the Father "himself has most remarkably approved; and has there-"upon more solemnly and more illustriously proclaimed "the supereminent dignity of *God the Son*, who had me-"rited so highly of men.

"Ver. 10, 11. Commanding all persons to honour, "worship, and adore him, as *God* and *Lord;* and under "the new and special title of *Redeemer*, to the glory of "God the *Father*, whose *Son* he is; their honour *insepa-"rable*, and their glory *one*."

This appears to be the most natural and obvious meaning of this celebrated passage, consonant to Scripture, and to the principles of the primitive and Catholic Church. I should now make some reflections upon the whole, but have scarce room barely to hint them for your leisure thoughts to improve.

Let the Socinians or Arians make as great a matter as they please of a *man's*, or of a *creature's* becoming a *servant* to God; we shall think it a still greater and more marvellous condescension, for one that was above every thing *servile*, himself *equal* to God, to condescend as he did.

Let them magnify his merits and performances, done for his *own* sake, to arrive at such an immense glory

above all *other* creatures; we shall look upon them as more noble, more disinterested, and truly *divine*, if done for *others* only, by one that was himself too great to receive any recompence.

Let them value it as an extraordinary piece of condescension, that he did not lay claim to what he had no right to; we shall think it more pious and more decent to say, that he quitted his right, and receded from his just pretensions.

Let them honour him as their *Lord*, made as it were but of yesterday; we shall honour him as *Lord* and *God* from the beginning; the *Creator* first, and now, at last, *Redeemer* of man.

Let them, lastly, look upon him as a *servant* still, a servant at least to God, (as all *creatures* are[u];) while we, with *angels* and *archangels*, with things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth, believe and confess that Jesus Christ is no *servant*, but Lord and God, to the glory of God the Father. "To whom with "the Holy Ghost, all honour, and praise, might, ma- "jesty, power, and dominion, be ascribed now and for "ever." Amen.

[u] Εἴ τι γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἢ ἄκτιστος φύσις ἐστὶν, ἢ κτιστή. ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἄκτιστος, δεσποτικὴ καὶ πάσης ἀνάγκης ἐλευθέρα· ἡ δὲ κτιστὴ, δουλικὴ καὶ νόμοις δεσποτικοῖς ὑπομένη. *Pseudo-Just. Exp. Fid.*

Divine Titles ascribed to Christ in Holy Scripture:

OR

CHRIST'S DIVINITY

PROVED FROM HIS TITLES.

The sixth Sermon preached February 3, $17\frac{19}{20}$.

JOHN xvi. 15.

All things that the Father hath are mine: therefore said I, that he shall take of mine, and shall show it unto you.

THESE are the words of our blessed Saviour, speaking of the *Spirit of Truth*, otherwise styled the "Spirit of "God [a]," and "Spirit of the living God [b]," and "Spirit "of the Father [c]," and "Spirit of the Lord [d];" and sometimes the "Spirit of Christ [e]," and "Spirit of Je- "sus [f]," and emphatically "the Spirit [g]," but most commonly the "Holy Spirit," or "Holy Ghost," who is the third Person of the ever blessed and adorable Trinity. Our Lord had intimated, in the verses foregoing, that this di-

[a] Matt. iii. 16. Rom. viii. 9, 14. xv. 19. 1 Cor. ii. 10, 11, 14. iii. 16. vi. 11. Eph. iv. 30. 1 Pet. iv. 14.

[b] 2 Cor. iii. 3.

[c] Matt. x. 20. Eph. iii. 14, 16.

[d] Acts v. 9. viii. 39. 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18.

[e] Rom. viii. 9. Gal. iv. 6. 1 Pet. i. 11.

[f] Acts xvi. 7. See Mill upon this place. Phil. i. 19.

[g] Luke iv. 14. John iii. 8. vii. 39. Acts ii. 4. viii. 29. x. 19. Rom. xv. 30.

vine Person, the *Spirit of Truth*, should shortly come upon the disciples, and "guide them into all truth;" (ver. 13.) "For," says our blessed Saviour, "he shall "not speak of himself;" that is, not of himself *alone*, separate from, or independent of, every other person[h], but "whatsoever he shall hear," (that is, *know* in an ineffable manner, by his intimate union and communion in all things with Father and Son,) "that shall he speak: "and he will show you things to come. He shall glo- "rify me, for he shall receive of mine[i], and shall show it "unto you." ver. 14. That is, whatever influences he shall shed, whatever truths he shall reveal, whatever miracles he shall perform, they will be all so many manifestations of my glory, as coming from me, acting and speaking in and by the "Spirit of God." Then follow the words of the text. "All things that the Father hath "are mine: therefore said I, that he shall take of mine, "and shall show it unto you."

As much as to say, Think it not strange that I ascribe to myself the operations and influences of the "Spirit of "God," or "Spirit of the Father," with the *glory* of them: for though these things do indeed of right belong to the *Father*, whose *Spirit* he is; yet this is very consistent with my claim, because "all that the Father hath "is mine:" his power is my power, his works my works, his *Spirit* my *Spirit;* our perfections common,

[h] "Non enim loquetur a semetipso." Hoc est, non sine me et sine meo et Patris arbitrio: quia inseparabilis a mea et Patris est voluntate; quia non ex se est, sed ex Patre et me est: hoc enim ipsum quod subsistit et loquitur, a Patre et me illi est. *Didym. apud Hieron.* vol. iv. pag. 514. ed. Bened.

[i] "De meo sumet," inquit, sicut ipse de Patris. Ita connexus Patris in Filio, et Filii in Paracleto, tres efficit cohærentes, alterum ex altero: qui tres *unum* sint, non *unus;* quomodo dictum est, "Ego et Pater unum "sumus;" ad substantiæ unitatem, non ad numeri singularitatem. *Tertul. contr. Prax.* cap. xxv.

Ὁ πατὴρ δι' υἱοῦ σὺν ἁγίῳ πνεύματι τὰ πάντα χαρίζεται. οὐκ ἄλλα πατρὸς χαρίσματα, καὶ ἄλλα υἱοῦ, καὶ ἄλλα ἁγίου πνεύματος. μία γὰρ ἡ σωτηρία, μία ἡ δύναμις, μία ἡ πίστις. *Cyril. Hieros. Catech.* xvi. p. 236. Ox. ed.

our nature equal, and our glory one[k]. This is the most natural and obvious meaning of the text, consonant to other Scriptures, and to Catholic antiquity; as shall be shown in the sequel. The text might lead me to discourse on the *divinity* of the *Holy Ghost*, as well as of the *Son:* but having hitherto confined myself to the single point of *Christ's divinity*, that I might the more fully and distinctly treat of it; I shall for the same reason do so still, and occasionally only touch upon the other, as it may fall in my way, or may be subservient to my main point. The words now under consideration will afford two distinct arguments of the *divinity* of God the Son; one *particular* and *special*, the other more *general.*

1. The first, which I call *particular* and *special*, is contained in this, that the operations, gifts, and graces of the *Spirit of God* with the *glory* of them, are ascribed to *Christ.*

2. The second, which I call *general*, lies in the *general* reason given as the foundation of the former; that "all "things that the Father hath," our Saviour attributes to himself, and challenges as his *own.* Of these in their order.

I. We are to observe, that the operations, gifts, and graces of the *Spirit of God*, with the *glory* of them, are ascribed to *Christ;* "He shall receive of mine, and "shall show it unto you." He shall *glorify* me: the *glory* of whatsoever shall be *done* or *taught* by the Holy Spirit, our Lord ascribes to himself, as being (in conjunction with the Father) the author and fountain of it. The context indeed mentions only the Spirit's *teaching;* but the reason is the same for whatever should be *done* by the Holy *Spirit* of God, who is also the *Spirit* of *Christ:* and therefore the miraculous works of the *Holy Ghost* are expressly ascribed to *Christ* by St. Peter, Acts

[k] Licet a Patre procedat Spiritus veritatis, et det illis Deus Spiritum Sanctum petentibus se: tamen quia "omnia quæ habet Pater mea sunt," et ipse Spiritus Patris meus est, et de meo accipiet. *Didym. de Spir. Sanct. apud Hieron.* tom. iv. p. 516.

ii. 33. "Being by the right hand of God exalted, and "having received of the Father the promise of the Holy "Ghost, he hath shed forth this which ye now see and "hear." When therefore our Lord says, "he shall re-"ceive of mine, and shall show it unto you," it is but reasonable to understand it of every operation, gift, or influence of the *Holy Spirit*, (of whatever kind it were,) showered down upon the Apostles. All were derived from Christ; to him therefore (in conjunction with the *Father* and the *Holy Ghost*) is the *glory* of them to be ascribed, as is plain from the words, "he shall glorify "me," ver. 14.

Now, if the Holy Ghost himself be a *divine* Person, and one with God the Father, and *adored* together with him, as the Catholic Church has all along taught[l], and Scripture itself has sufficiently intimated; then we have here a clear and irresistible proof of the *divinity* of Christ, who, as appears from this text, is at least *equal* to, or in some sense *greater* than the *Holy Ghost*[m]. But because the *divinity* of the Holy Ghost is what our adversaries will no more admit than they will the other, and it would be here too great a digression for me to enter into the proof of it; I must be content to wave that point, and consider only whether, or how far, our argument may be conceived to stand independent of it.

The Person of the *Holy Ghost* is described in Scripture as the immediate author and worker of miracles[n]; and

[l] Justin. Mart. Apol. i. cap. 16. Athenagoras, p. 40, 96. Irenæus, lib. iv. cap. 37. Clem. Alex. p. 1020. ed. Ox. Tertullian, contr. Prax. cap. ix. xiii. xxv. Hippolytus contr. Noët. cap. xii. Origen. apud Basil. de Sp. S. p. 219. in Joh. p. 124. Cyprian. Ep. ad Jubajan. p. 203.

[m] Si a Christo accepit quæ nuntiet, major ergo jam Paracleto Christus est: quoniam nec Paracletus a Christo acciperet nisi minor Christo esset. Minor autem Christo Paracletus Christum etiam *Deum* esse hoc ipso probat a quo accepit quæ nuntiat; ut *testimonium Christi divinitatis grande sit*, dum minor Christo Paracletus repertus, ab illo sumit quæ cæteris tradit. *Novat. de Trin.* cap. xxiv.

[n] Acts ii. 4, 45, 46. Rom. xv. 19. 1 Cor. ii. 4, 5. xii. 4, 8, 11. xiv. 2. Heb. ii. 4.

even of those done by our Lord himself[o]; the Conductor of *Christ Jesus* in his *human* capacity, during his state of humiliation here upon earth[p]; the Inspirer of the Prophets and Apostles[q]; the Searcher of all hearts, and the Comforter of good Christians in difficulties[r]. To *lie* to him is the same thing as to *lie* unto God[s]. *Blasphemy* against him is unpardonable[t]. To resist him is the same thing as to resist God[u]. He is in God, and knows the mind of God as perfectly as a man knows his own mind; and that in respect of *all things*, even the *deep things* of God[x]. Men's bodies are his *temple*[y], and, by being his *temple*, are the *temple* of God[z]. He is joined with God the Father and Son, in the solemn form of baptism[a]; in religious oaths, and in invocations for grace and peace[b]; in the same common operations[c]; in the same authoritative mission and vocation of persons into the ministry[d]; and he is joined with the Father in the same common mission, even of the *Son* himself[e]: in a word, he is *Lord*[f] (or *Jehovah*) and *God*[g], and Lord of Hosts[h]. This is a brief summary of what the Scriptures have taught us of the person, character, and offices of the *Holy Ghost*. Exceptions may be made (though of no great weight) to some particulars, which I have not here time to consider. The least that can be inferred from them, and what the Arians themselves will not scruple to admit, is, that the

[o] Matt. xii. 18. Acts x. 38.
[p] Matt. iv. 1. xii. 18. Luke iv. 1. John i. 32. iii. 34. Acts i. 2.
[q] See the proofs in Clarke's Script. Doctr. cap. iii. sect. 2.
[r] See Script. Doctr. cap. iv. sect. 3.
[s] Acts v. 3, 4. [t] Matt. xii. 31, 32. [u] Acts vii. 51.
[x] 1 Cor. ii. 10, 11. [y] 1 Cor. vi. 19.
[z] 1 Cor. iii. 16. Eph. ii. 21, 22.
[a] Matt. xxviii. 19.
[b] 2 Cor. xiii. 14. Rev. i. 4, 5. Rom. ix. 1.
[c] 1 Cor. xii. 4—7, &c.
[d] Acts xiii. 2. Compare Hos. ii. 23. Acts ix. 15.
[e] Isa. xlviii. 16.
[f] Compare Exod. xxxiv. 34. with 2 Cor. iii. 17.
[g] Acts v. 3, 4.
[h] Compare Isa. vi. with Acts xxviii. 25, 26.

Holy Ghost is a Person of very high eminence, dignity, and majesty; much superior to any *angel* or *archangel*, or any other person whatsoever, excepting only *God the Father*, and his Son *Christ Jesus*. Let it then be considered, that however great and glorious, however mighty and powerful, however wise and knowing, however venerable and adorable this Person is, and however intimate with, and united to, God the Father, whose Spirit he is; yet all that he is, and all that he does, is to be referred to Christ, as the author and fountain of it. He claims the *glory* of all, because all is his. Now if we consider the infinite distance there is between *God* and the very highest of his *creatures*, and how arrogant it must appear in any *creature* to make a claim of this kind and value, a claim upon God's *own* Spirit, a claim of *glory* (though in strictness *glory* can be due to God alone) as having a hand in all his works, and, as it were, assisting and influencing the very "Spirit of the Father:" I say, if we consider this, and at the same time reflect that our blessed Lord (who was the most perfect pattern of humility, meekness, and modesty) has really made this claim, and has been thus *familiar* with Almighty God; what can we think less than this, that our blessed Lord is infinitely superior to all *creatures*, and consequently is himself really, truly, and essentially God, coequal and coeternal with God the Father[i]? Thus, and thus only, can his claim be justified, and his pretensions reconciled to the Scriptures, or to the truth and reason of things: which will appear farther, if we consider,

II. Secondly, the *general* reason, upon which our blessed Lord founds his *particular* claim. "All things "that the Father hath are mine." All things; and therefore the very highest of all, namely, those specified in that chapter. And indeed it is but reasonable, and

[i] Neque enim de *creaturis* sumebat Spiritus Sanctus, qui *Dei Spiritus* est; ut ex his videatur accipere, quia ea omnia Dei sunt. *Hilar. de Trin.* lib. ix. p. 1033.

even necessary to suppose, that one who could justly ascribe so much to himself, must be in all respects equal to the Father, excepting only (what the text intimates in the very name of *Father*[k]) that he is not another *Father*, but *Son* of the Father. This clearly accounts for his ascribing to himself all the influences, gifts, and graces of God's *Holy Spirit*, and the *glory* of them. For if God the Son hath all things that the Father hath, then hath he all the attributes and perfections belonging to the Father; the same power, rights, and privileges; the same honour and glory; and, in a word, the same *nature, substance*, and *Godhead*. Then, indeed, every *divine* work is his work; the *Spirit* of the Father is also his *Spirit;* the operations of the *Holy Ghost* must, of course, be the operations of Father and Son too; and the glory of every thing must be referred to both, as to one common author and fountain thereof. On these principles, the sense of the whole passage is easy, expedite, and clear; and very consonant to our blessed Lord's account of himself in other places of this Gospel: particularly where he says, "What things soever he" (the Father) "doth, these "also doth the Son likewise," John v. 19. "I and my "Father are one," John x. 30. "He that hath seen me "hath seen the Father—I am in the Father, and the Fa- "ther in me," John xiv. 9, 10. "Glorify me with thine "own self, with the glory which I had with thee before "the world was," John xvii. 5. "All mine are thine, "and thine are mine, and I am glorified in them," John

[k] Διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ἀκριβῶς εἴρηκεν, ὅσα ἔχει ὁ πατὴρ, ἵνα καὶ ὧδε λίγων τὸν πατέρα, μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πατὴρ νομισθῇ· οὐ γὰρ εἴρηκεν ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ πατὴρ, ἀλλ' ὅσα ἔχει ὁ πατήρ. *Athanas. Op.* vol. i. p. 107. ed. Bened.

Procul hinc absint dialecticorum tendiculæ et sophismata a veritate pellantur: quæ occasionem impietatis ex pia prædicatione capientia, dicunt: *Ergo et Pater est Filius, et Filius Pater.* Si enim dixisset, "Omnia "quæcunque habet *Deus*, mea sunt," haberet impietas occasionem confingendi, et verisimile videretur mendacium. Cum vero dixerit, "Omnia quæ "habet *Pater*, mea sunt;" *Patris* nomine se *Filium* declaravit; *Paternitatem*, qui *Filius* erat, non usurpavit. *Didym. de Sp. S. Hieron.* tom. iv. p. 516. ed. Bened.

xvii. 10. These are very high and strong expressions, confirming that sense of the text which I have given, and which prevailed in the Christian Church (as appears from Tertullian above cited) before the Council of Nice, as well as after[l]. But my design is next to proceed to other Scriptures which expressly ascribe the same high titles, powers, and perfections to the Son which they do to the Father; therein justifying, or rather more fully and particularly declaring what our Lord had but briefly intimated in the words, "All things that the Father hath "are mine." My method shall be,

1. To show that the *divine titles* are ascribed to the Son in Holy Scripture: and,

2. That the *divine attributes* are also applied to him.

3. To sum up the force of the argument, and to obviate such *general* objections as tend to weaken our conclusion.

I. The *divine titles* ascribed to the Son in Holy Scripture are as follow; *God, God with us, Lord God, true God, great God, mighty God, God over all blessed for evermore, Jehovah, Almighty, Lord of glory, King of kings, and Lord of lords, Alpha and Omega, the First and the Last.* Of these in their order.

As to the title of *God*, our adversaries are pleased to allow, that "the Person of the Son is in the New Testa-"ment" (and the Old Testament should not have been entirely omitted) "sometimes" (and why is it not said *frequently?*) "styled God[m]." But then we are told that it[n] is not "so much" (is it then at all?) "on account of "his metaphysical substance — as of his relative attri-"butes and divine authority," that he is *sometimes* styled God. But this is more than our adversaries know, or

[l] Athanasius, vol. i. p. 106. Hilarius de Trin. lib. ix. p. 1004. Didymus, Interpr. Hieron. Op. tom. iv. p. 516. Ambros. de Fid. lib. ii. cap. 4. p. 477. ed. Bened. Cyril. Alex. Thes. lib. ix. Augustin. contr. Maxim. lib. ii. p. 697, 706. ed. Bened. Cyril. Hieros. Cath. xvi. p. 236.

[m] See Clarke's Script. Doctr. Propos. xxiv. p. 263. 2d edit.

[n] Ibid. Propos. xxv. p. 263.

can give the least shadow of proof to countenance. The Son of God may be proved from Scripture to be *God*, in the strict and proper sense, after the very same way, and by the same kind of arguments, that the Father himself can be shown to be *God*, in the strict and proper sense. What is said about *metaphysical substance* (by which, it seems, is meant *abstract metaphysical substance*°) is trifling to the last degree. For undoubtedly the Trinitarians are not so destitute of common sense and understanding, as to take the *substance* of Father, or Son, to be an *abstract idea*; which is all the sense of an *abstract substance*. They certainly mean a *real*, *living*, *intelligent*, and infinitely *perfect* substance, existing *without*, necessarily existing. And when they say that the Son is *substantially* or *essentially* God, they intend to prevent *equivocations*, and to assert, that the Son is not of a fading perishing nature, as *creatures* are; no *precarious* being, depending on the *will* and *choice* of another, but truly *divine* and *necessarily-existing*. If this be admitted, we have no farther occasion to speak a word of *substance*; which, after all, is nothing more than another name for *being* or *thing*. And it must appear very strange, and savouring too much of delicacy or cavilling, that, if we are able to prove the Son to be *eternal*, *divine*, *necessarily-existing*, &c. we may not be allowed to say, that his *substance* is *eternal*, *divine*, &c. which is really neither more nor less than saying that *he* is so. Attributes and powers must have *something* to reside and inhere in, which *something* is what we call *substance*, and considered with *divine* attributes, *divine* substance, or *God*. And this is what Scripture means in calling the Son *God*; as we are able to prove from the same topics, and in the same way of reasoning, which another might make use of to prove the one *God* (or the God of the Jews) to be the *supreme*, *eternal*, and *immutable* God, against any Marcionite, Valentinian, Manichee, or other *heretic*, that should presume

° Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 342. 2d edit.

to deny it. Let those, who object to us the use of *metaphysics*, try if they can come at the proof of the *Father's* being *self-existent, underived, one simple, uncompounded, undivided, intelligent Agent*, &c. without entering into *metaphysics:* and let them from thence learn to distinguish between *false* metaphysics and *true;* and not presume to condemn both promiscuously. As to consequences, be they *metaphysical* or *physical, moral* or *religious*, it matters not, provided they are but *just* and *true:* which is the only thing to be inquired into. We are told, that "the Scripture, when it mentions God absolutely, and "by way of eminence, always means the Person of the "Father[p]." But this is an assertion not only void of proof, but impossible to be proved; and is besides contrary to all *antiquity*, as I have shown elsewhere[q]; and even to the sentiments of the ancient Arians; whom our modern Arians would be thought to come up to at least, though they really fall short of them, as well in this, as in many other instances. However, certain it is, that the Church of Christ, down from the very times of the Apostles, have been in nothing more unanimous than in styling the Son, *God:* and what they meant by that name, as applied to the Son, is well known to the learned from their *worship* of him, and their utter abhorrence of any *inferior* deities; from their arguing for the Son's divinity considered as a *Son*, of the *same nature* with his Father; from their similitudes and illustrations; from the *divine* titles, attributes, and perfections which they ascribed to him; and indeed from the whole tenor of their writings. This is a confirmation to us, that the Son of God, in Scripture, is so styled in the strict and proper sense of *uncreated, eternal*, and *necessarily-existing*.

Another *divine* title given to God the Son, in holy Scripture, is *God with us*, or *Emmanuel*[r]. Matt. i. 23.

[p] Clarke's Script. Doctr. Propos. xi.

[q] Defence of some Queries, vol. i. Qu. 2.

[r] Μεθ' ἡμῶν ὁ Θεός. God, by way of excellency, with the article ὁ prefixed.

A late writer[s] would insinuate that the word *God*, in this place of St. Matthew, *may be meant of the Father*. But the text is plain and full to the contrary. "Behold, a "Virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a Son, "and they shall call *his name* (the *Son's*, not the *Father's* "name) *Emmanuel*." Christ therefore is *Emmanuel*, or *God with us*. The same writer pretends that the name *Emmanuel* proves nothing more, in point of argument, than even the names of places, *Jehovah-Jireh*, *Jehovah-Shammah*, *Jehovah-Shalom*, *Jehovah-Nissi*, &c. But this Socinian surmise had been before sufficiently confuted by the learned and judicious Bishop Pearson[t]; whose reasonings upon this head should have been answered, instead of repeating a stale objection. I shall only take notice, that the early writers of the Christian Church constantly understood that Christ was really *God with us*, conformable to his name *Emmanuel*; and interpreted this text of St. Matthew as we do[u]. To proceed:

Another *divine title* given to God the Son in holy Scripture is that of *Lord God*, which answers to *Jehovah Elohim*, the incommunicable name of the one true God. The first text of the New Testament to our purpose is Luke i. 16, 17. "Many shall he" (viz. John the Baptist) "turn to the *Lord their God*, and he shall go before "him," &c. It is well observed by a late writer[x], that "these words (*the Lord their God*) are, in strictness of

[s] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 71. 2d ed.

[t] Pearson on the Creed, art. ii. p. 130.

[u] Diligenter igitur significavit Spiritus Sanctus per ea quæ dicta sunt generationem ejus quæ est ex Virgine, et *substantiam quoniam Deus*, (*Emmanuel* enim nomen hoc significat,) et manifestat quoniam homo, &c. *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 21. p. 217. ed. Bened. Vid. et p. 205, 212, 273.

Quod si *Emmanuel* nobiscum Deus est, Deus autem nobiscum Christus est, qui etiam in nobis est (quotquot enim Christum tincti estis, Christum induistis) tam proprius est Christus in significatione nominis, quod est *nobiscum Deus*, quam in sono nominis, quod est *Emmanuel*. *Tertul. contr. Marc.* lib. iii. cap. 12. p. 403. Vid. et contr. Prax. cap. 27. It. Novat. cap. 12. Cyprian. Testim. lib. i. cap. 6. p. 36. Euseb. Comment. in Isa. vii. 14. p. 381.

[x] Dr. Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 72. 2d ed.

" construction, immediately connected with the following " word, *him;* which must necessarily be understood of " *Christ.*" Now, since there is no apparent necessity in the case of receding from the *strictness of construction*, it is but reasonable to understand the words (*Lord their God*) of *Christ*. What confirms this construction is, that the same St. Luke, in the third chapter of his Gospel, speaks of John the Baptist's " crying in the wilderness, " Prepare ye the way of the Lord," chap. iii. 4. which answers to what he had observed chap. i. 16, 17. of John the Baptist's " going before him," that is, Christ, here called *Lord God*, as there the *Lord:* and this is farther confirmed from Malachi iii. 1. " Behold, I send my " messenger, and he shall prepare the way before me: " and the LORD, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to " his temple, even the messenger of the covenant," &c. And from verse the 76th of the first of St. Luke, where he, before whom John the Baptist was to go, is called the *Lord*. There is no reasonable doubt to be made, after the comparing these passages together, but that the *Lord* (Κύριος) in St. Luke thrice, and in Malachi once, is to be understood of the Person of *Christ*. Neither is this construction of St. Luke strange or new, being countenanced by Irenæus[y], an early Father of the second century. I pass on to other texts, which style the Son *Lord* and *God*. St. Thomas's confession, John xx. 28. " My Lord and my " God," is pertinent to our purpose. The application of this to *Christ* is so manifest of itself[z], and, besides, hardly now disputed, that I need not say more of it. Isa. xl. 10, 11. we read thus: " Behold, the Lord God will " come with strong hand, and his arm shall rule for him: " behold, his reward is with him, and his work before " him. He shall feed his flock like a shepherd," &c. This is to be understood of Christ, and his second advent

[y] Iren. lib. iii. cap. 10. p. 185.

[z] If any one doubt of it, he may consult Bishop Pearson on the Creed, art. ii. p. 131.

to judge the world; as Eusebius[a] well interprets it. The words, "his reward is with him," (comp. Rev. xxii. 12.) and, "he shall feed his flock like a shepherd," (comp. John x. 11.) are sufficient indications of the Person there intended. *Christ* therefore is *Lord God* in the Scripture-style, as well as the *Father*. As to the sentiments of the ancients, many testimonies might be cited, where they call the Son *God and Lord*, or *Lord and God:* but it will be sufficient to observe their application of several texts of the Old Testament to God the Son. For instance: Genesis iii. 8. "They heard the voice of the *Lord God* walk-"ing in the garden[b]." Gen. xxviii. 13. "I am the *Lord* "*God* of Abraham thy Father[c]." Exod. iii. 14. "The "*Lord God* of your Fathers[d]." Exod. xx. 2. "I am the "*Lord* thy *God*[e]:" and Hos. i. 7. "I will save them by "the *Lord* their *God*[f]." These, with many other like texts[g], were understood by the ancients in general, long before the Council of Nice, of God the Son. From whence it is evident, that the style and title of *Lord God* was thought to be very applicable to *God* the Son, and not peculiar or appropriate, in holy Scripture, to God the Father.

True God is another *divine title* belonging to the Son of God. "We are in him, that is true, even in (or by) "his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal "life[h]." 1 John v. 20. We have sufficient reason to believe that God the Son is here called "true God," and "eternal life." It is on all hands confessed that "eternal "life," in the style of St. John, (see 1 John i. 2.) is an

[a] Euseb. in loc. p. 509.

[b] Theoph. Antioch. p. 129. Tertul. contr. Prax. cap. 16.

[c] Just. Mart. p. 218. Clem. Alex. Pæd. lib. i. cap. 7. p. 131.

[d] Iren. lib. iii. cap. 6. lib. iv. cap. 5, 12. Just. Mart. Apol. i. p. 123. Ox. ed.

[e] Clem. Alex. Pæd. lib. i. cap. 7. p. 131.

[f] Novat. Trin. cap. 12.

[g] See Defence of some Queries, vol. i. Qu. 2. p. 20, &c.

[h] Οἴδαμεν δὲ ὅτι ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἥκει, καὶ δέδωκεν ἡμῖν διάνοιαν ἵνα γινώσκωμεν τὸν ἀληθινὸν (Θεόν). καί ἐσμεν ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ, ἐν τῷ υἱῷ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς, καὶ (ἡ) ζωὴ αἰώνιος. 1 Joh. v. 20.

epithet appropriate to the *Son*, and is to be understood of him in this very passage. And thus a late Arian writer[i] interprets the last words. "This is the *true God*, even "the *Father*; and this is the *way* that leads to him, even "*Jesus Christ*, who is the *way*, the *truth*, and the *life*;" understanding *eternal life* as another name for, or as appropriate to, the Person of *Jesus Christ*. But it is manifest that the pronoun *this* (οὗτος,) is the subject of both the predicates, *true God* and *eternal life*. To make good construction of it the other way, the sentence should have run, *This* (οὗτος) is the *true God*, and *that other* (ἐκεῖνος) *is eternal life*. But the words are, "This (person, οὗτος) *is* "*the* true God (ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς) and eternal life" (καὶ ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος.) There is no other subject of the latter predicate besides the οὗτος, *this*, going before. If it be said that the particle ἡ may stand for αὕτη, and so the sense be, *This is the way*, pointing as it were to *Jesus Christ* before mentioned; yet so the construction is very harsh and unnatural: besides that the particle ἡ is observed to have been wanting in the Alexandrian and several other manuscripts. Our interpretation therefore agrees much better than the other, with the words following after οὗτος, *this*. And I must observe farther, that it agrees also better with the words going before it. "We are in him that is true, "even *in* (or even *by*) his Son Jesus Christ." Then follows immediately οὗτος, *this*, this Person, immediately before mentioned, viz. *Jesus Christ*. For, allowing that a *pronoun* may sometimes refer to a remote *antecedent*, yet is it not so usual, nor so natural; neither should it be presumed to do so, without a manifest necessity. Having shown that the context plainly favours our construction, let us next examine the pretences on the contrary side.

It is said[k], that the *most* and *best* MSS. read τὸν ἀληθινὸν Θεὸν, *the true God*, instead of τὸν ἀληθινὸν, *him that is true:* and so the words will run thus: "We know that the Son

[i] Modest Plea, &c. p. 264.

[k] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 51. 2d ed.

" of God is come, and hath given us an understanding " that we may know the true God, (viz. the Father,) and " we are in him that is true, (the true God before spoken " of,) in (that is, *by*) his Son Jesus Christ. This is " the true God, and eternal life." But admitting this reading of the words, it is so far from confronting the sense before given, that it rather confirms it. For then it comes to this; that we are in the *true God*, viz. the Father, by *being in his Son*, because that Son is the *true God*. This construction is so far from being absurd or flat, that it is very expressive and significant; intimating that there is none so certain way of knowing the *true God*, as by a teacher who is himself *true God*; nor any other way of being reconciled to *God*, but by being united with one who is *God:* that the Son of God *alone* can be able to unite us to the *true God*, and that because he himself is *true God;* who by being incarnate could join the *divine* and *human* natures, God and man, in one. This kind of reasoning is very much insisted on by the ancient Fathers[1]; and upon this account the *divinity* of our blessed Lord was looked upon by them, as an article of the utmost importance to salvation. Now we see from whence they borrowed their notions, namely, from the Apostles, from St. John especially; who, as he began his Gospel with observing that the Father is *God*, and the Son *God*

[1] Ἀναπρεπῶς δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἡβιώνας. Πῶς δύνανται σωθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ τὴν σωτηρίαν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἐργασάμενος; ἢ πῶς ἄνθρωπος χωρήσει εἰς Θεὸν, εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἐχωρήθη εἰς ἄνθρωπον; *Iren.* p. 271.

Ἐδίδαξεν ἡμᾶς ὁ Κύριος, ὅτι Θεὸν εἰδέναι οὐδεὶς δύναται μὴ οὐχὶ Θεοῦ δοξάζοντος (leg. διδάξαντος) τυτέστιν, ἄνευ Θεοῦ μὴ γινώσκεσθαι τὸν Θεόν. *Ibid.* p. 234.

Εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἐδωρήσατο τὴν σωτηρίαν, οὐκ ἂν βεβαίως ἴσχομεν αὐτήν. καὶ εἰ μὴ συνηνώθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ Θεῷ, οὐκ ἂν ἠδυνήθη μετασχεῖν τῆς ἀφθαρσίας· ἔδει γὰρ τὸν μεσίτην Θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας πρὸς ἑκατέρους οἰκειότητος, εἰς φιλίαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους συναγαγεῖν. *Ibid.* p. 211.

See passages of like import with this last citation from Irenæus, in the authors following.

Tertullian, Apol. cap. 21. De Carn. Christi, cap. 5. De Resurr. cap. 63. Contr. Prax. cap. 28. Novatian, cap. 18, 19. Clemens Alex. p. 251. Origen. contr. Cels. p. 131. Hippolytus, vol. ii. p. 45. Cyprian. de Idol. Van. p. 15. Testim. p. 37. Lactantius, lib. iv. cap. 13, 25.

also; so he ended his Epistle, teaching us to believe in the Father, as the *true God*, and in the Son, as the *true God* too; which comes to the same with the other. Add to this, that St. John, very probably in his *Epistle*, as well as *Gospel*, (which were not wrote long after one another,) had a particular respect to the *heresies* then growing up, namely, of Cerinthus and the Ebionites [m], who, as they denied the *divinity* of our Saviour, so also denied any *divine Sonship*, antecedent to the birth of the Virgin. Hence it is that St. John so often inculcates, through this Epistle, the necessity of believing in the *Son*. "He that hath the Son hath life; and he that hath not "the Son of God hath not life," chap. v. ver. 12. (See also ver. 10, 11, 13. and chap. iii. ver. 23.) Now, what sort of *Son*, or *Son of God*, St. John must have meant, appears sufficiently from the first chapter of his Gospel: he was the *only-begotten* Logos, that was *with God*, and was *God*, and "by whom all things were made." Such a *Son of God* as this, the Cerinthians and Ebionites denied our Lord to be; believing him to be a *mere man*, that had no existence before he became man. Nothing therefore could be more directly levelled against those heresies than this very verse of St. John's Epistle, asserting at once Christ's *proper Sonship*, and his *true divinity;* which indeed amount to one and the same thing. These considerations put together abundantly make good our interpretation of this controverted text. But the author of

[m] Scripsit Evangelium, rogatus ab Asiæ Episcopis, adversus Cerinthum, aliosque hæreticos, et maxime tunc Ebionitarum dogma consurgens, qui asserunt, Christum ante Mariam non fuisse, unde et compulsus est *divinam* ejus *nativitatem* edicere. *Hieron. Catal. Script.* n. ix. p. 105.

Irenæus, before Jerome, testifies that St. John's Gospel was wrote particularly against the error of Cerinthus. *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 11.

The same Irenæus intimates, that St. John's Epistle pointed at the same *heresy*. Vid. Iren. lib. iii. cap. 16. p. 206. And Tertullian is still more particular in these words:

In Epistola, eos maxime Antichristos vocat, qui Christum negarent in carne venisse, et qui non putarent Jesum esse *Filium Dei:* illud Marcion, hoc Hebion vindicavit. *Tertull. Præscript. adv. Hæres.* cap. 33.

Scripture Doctrine[n] is pleased to censure our construction of this passage of St. John as *modern*. "Some moderns," he says, "refer this to Christ; but others, with all the "ancients, understand it of God the Father." It may be thought somewhat hard to have a construction censured as *modern*, which has undoubtedly prevailed in the Christian Church thirteen centuries upwards[o], if not higher. The Catholics of the fourth century cited it in this sense, without the least scruple, and without any intimation, so far as I can find, that it was ever otherwise understood. The Arians themselves, as seems very probable, admitted this construction[p]; or certain it is that many of them allowed that the Son was Θεὸς ἀληθινὸς, *true God*, (I suppose in virtue of this text, since they objected not against the *title* as *unscriptural*,) but they eluded the Catholic sense of it[q]. The Ante-Nicene Fathers probably understood the text just as the Post-Nicene Catholics did; only they had less occasion to cite it, having so many other texts, both of the Old and New Testament, to produce in proof of the Son's being *God;* which was the same with them as *true God*, the distinction between *God* and *true God* being hardly ever started before the Arian controversy. It is a very singular way of speaking, which the author of *Scripture Doctrine* makes use of, when he says, *all the ancients* understood this text of God the Father. Who would not imagine from hence, that some *one*, at least, of the *ancients* might be produced, interpreting the text as he pretends they did? Yet certain it is, that he cannot produce one. The fact is only this; that none of the writers of the three first centuries interpreted this text at all: from whence this author, I suppose, con-

[n] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 51. 2d ed.

[o] Athanasius, p. 99, 283, 558, 684, 888. Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. iv. p. 106. Didym. in loc. Cyril. Alex. Dial. 8. ad calc. Ambros. de Fid. lib. i. cap. 17. p. 467. Hieron. Not. in Is. p. 65. August. contr. Max. lib. ii. p. 705. Serm. cxl. p. 681.

[p] See Ambrose, Epist. Class. i. p. 791. ed. Bened.

[q] Theodor. Eccl. Hist. lib. i. p. 28.

cludes (if we may judge of him from a friend of his, without a name[r]) that the text must, in *course*, have been understood of the *Father*. This precarious, groundless inference (without letting his readers know that it is no more than an *inference*) he puts upon us as undoubted fact in *Scripture Doctrine;* which is greatly abusing his readers.

The sum then of what hath been pleaded for our interpretation of the passage is, that it is *literal* and *grammatical;* agreeable to the *context*, and to the doctrine of St. John in other places; that it suits perfectly well with the *analogy* of faith, and the undoubted principles of the *primitive* Church; that there is no one instance of any contrary interpretation of the text in all *antiquity*, but all that there are, are fully and clearly for it; that the objections against it are truly *modern*, and, besides, of little or no weight in themselves. Upon the whole, every reasonable man may be left to judge whether this or the other interpretation ought to be preferred. To proceed:

Another *divine title* given to the *Son*, in holy Scripture, is *great God*. "[s] Looking for that blessed hope, and the "glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour" (or, our great God and Saviour) "Jesus Christ." Tit. ii. 13. What we insist upon here is, that the titles of *great God and Saviour* are, in this passage, equally applied to *Christ*. Our adversaries themselves cannot but confess that the words will *grammatically* bear this construction[t]: and we have good reason to believe, that, all things considered, they can fairly bear no other. 1. Because of the omission of the article τοῦ before σωτῆρος, which, in strict propriety of language, should have been inserted, had the Apostle been speaking of two Persons; as the article *generally* is (though not *always*) in such cases, where different subjects are intended[u]: and it is observable, that the

[r] Modest Plea, &c. p. 261.

[s] Προσδεχόμενοι τὴν μακαρίαν ἐλπίδα, καὶ ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. *Tit.* ii. 13.

[t] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 77. 2d ed.

[u] Vid. M. Martin, Traité de la Relig. Revel. part iii. p. 262, &c.

Apostle goes on in speaking of *Christ* only, without a word of the *Father*, ver. 14. which makes it still the more probable that the *article* τοῦ would have been inserted, had he intended different persons. 2. Because ἐπιφάνεια, the *appearing*, is always [x], in the New Testament, ascribed to the Son alone, and never to the Father. For though it be said, Matt. xvi. 27. that "the Son of man shall come "or appear in the glory of his Father," yet it is no where in the New Testament said, that the Father shall *appear*, but the *Son* only. If it be replied, that it is not here said that the *great God*, or Father, shall *appear*, but his *glory* only; I answer, that ἐπιφάνεια τῆς δόξης does not necessarily signify the appearing of glory, but may properly signify the *glorious appearance*; as it is rightly rendered in our English version [y]. Against this construction of the text it is objected [z], that the title of *great God* is, in the Old and New Testament, the character of the *Father:* which, if true, does not prove that it may not, in this place, be the character of the *Son* too. But the fact is very uncertain, and may as easily be denied as asserted. As to the texts of the Old Testament, since there is nothing to distinguish whether they are meant of God the Father, or Son, or both, or of the whole Trinity, no certain argument can be drawn from them. The *God* of Israel is the *great God* there spoken of; and it is begging the question to interpret the passages of the *Father* only. As to the New Testament, there is but one single text cited to this purpose; and it is Rev. xix. 17. where (if that be the true reading) mention is made of the supper of the *great God;* which the objectors imagine to be spoken of the *Father*. But if it be considered that our blessed Saviour is styled "King of kings, and Lord of "lords," ver. 16. but a very little before the supper of the *great God* is mentioned; and that the *Apostle* goes on

[x] See 2 Thess. ii. 8. 1 Tim. vi. 14. 2 Tim. i. 10. iv. 1, 8.

[y] See Martin, Traité de la Relig. Revel. part iii. cap. 17. p. 271, &c.

[z] Clarke's Reply, p. 86. Modest Plea, &c. p. 250. Comp. True Script. Doctr. p. 26. and True Script. Doctr. continued, p. 84, &c.

speaking of *Christ* (not God the Father) described as sitting *on the horse*, ver. 19. comp. ver. 11. and as *slaying* those whose *flesh* was to be given to the *fowls*, ver. 21. that is, as *providing* that very *supper* which is called, ver. 17. "the supper of the great God," because of the *great God's providing or making it:* I say, if we lay these things together, we shall be inclined to think that this text of the Revelation, instead of answering the purpose of the objectors, is another evidence of the *Son's* being styled *great God;* and so helps to confirm our interpretation of the text in Titus, whereof we have been treating. We have seen then that there is no objection of weight to be made against our interpretation.

In confirmation of what hath been urged in favour of our construction of the place, I may observe farther, that [a] Basil, Gregory Nyssen, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, and Austin, of the fourth and fifth centuries, interpret the text as we do. And if we may judge of the Arians from Maximin, a celebrated Bishop amongst them of the fifth century, they also admitted the same interpretation [b]; so uncontested a thing was it at that time. We have the less reason to wonder at it, because the Ante-Nicene Catholics before, very probably, understood the text in the same sense. For we find [c] Clemens of Alexandria, of the second century, and [d] Hippolytus of the third, interpreting it in the same way: nor is there any instance in all antiquity, so far as appears, of any contrary or different interpretation. I shall only add, that the title of *great God* was without scruple applied to God the Son by the *ancients*, as appears from express testimonies [e],

[a] Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. iv. p. 107. Greg. Nyss. contr. Eun. p. 265. Epiphan. Ancor. p. 74. Chrysost. tom. i. hom. 30. p. 341. Hom. in Joh. p. 36.

[b] Vid. August. Oper. tom. viii. p. 656.

[c] Clem. Alex. p. 7. ed. Ox.

[d] Hippolytus de Antichristo, cap. lxiv. lxvii. p. 31, 33. Eabric. It may be doubted whether this piece be genuine.

[e] Clem. Alex. Pædag. lib. i. cap. 5. p. 112. Testament. Patriarch. Grab. Spic. vol. i. p. 156. Origen. contr. Cels. lib. vii. p. 342.

Origen's meaning is exceeding clear, that to say that *God* the *Word*, (as such,)

and as we may reasonably judge from Eusebius's[f] so applying it, had we no other testimonies for it.

Mighty God is another *divine title* given to God the Son in holy Scripture. "His name shall be called Won-"derful, Counsellor, The MIGHTY GOD," &c. Is. ix. 6. *El gibbor*, the same title which is given to the one supreme God of Israel, Is. x. 21. Besides that the Hebrew word *El*, as Jerome observes[g], is for the most part the proper title of the one true God. The LXX, as the same Jerome remarks[h] in rendering Is. ix. 6. have took a very unusual freedom. For, thinking it strange and harsh to apply the name of *God*, and *Mighty*, &c. to a person just before called a *child*, they chose rather to vary the sense, and to make a comment, instead of a translation, putting μεγάλης βουλῆς Ἄγγελος, *Angel of the great counsel*, instead of those other higher titles and epithets. But, more probably, the fault lay not in the LXX Interpreters, but in the Jews, who after Christ's time had corrupted some copies of the LXX. Certain it is that Irenæus, who was a professed admirer and follower of the version of the LXX, (looking upon it as an *inspired* performance[i],) yet quotes not this text of Isaiah, viz. ix. 6. according to the Septuagint, as it now is, or as it was, in some copies at least, in the time of St. Jerome, Eusebius, and even Justin Martyr[k]; but according to what it should be, and as it

such,) or *Truth*, or *Life*, &c. should die, is as much as to say, that the *great God* should die, or become a servant. The *Modest Pleader* therefore (*Modest Plea*, &c. p. 251.) mistakes this passage.

[f] Euseb. in Psalm. p. 629.

[g] *Deus* separatim, qui Hebraice *El* dicitur. Denique in consequentibus ubi legimus: "Tu es enim Deus et nesciebamus." Et iterum: "Ego sum "Deus, et non est alius præter me," et multa his similia, pro eo quod in Latino dicitur *Deus*, in Hebraice *El* scriptum est. *Hieron. Comm. in Is.* p. 85. ed. Bened.

[h] Qua nominum majestate perterritos LXX reor non esse ausos de *puero* dicere quod aperte *Deus* appellandus sit, et cætera: sed pro his sex nominibus posuisse quod in Hebraico non habetur *magni consilii Angelum*, &c. *Hieron.* ibid. p. 86.

[i] Vid. Iren. lib. iii. cap. 21. p. 215.

[k] See Dial. p. 229. ed. Jebb.

lies in the Hebrew text[l]; citing it in proof of the *divinity* of Christ. In like manner, Clemens of Alexandria, though equally an admirer of the Septuagint version[m], yet cites the same text of Isaiah, much after the same sense with Irenæus, and not according to the LXX[n]; drawing an argument from thence of the greatness, majesty, and essential *divinity*, of the Son of God. It is the less to be wondered at, if afterwards we but seldom meet with this text cited in proof of Christ's *divinity*, since the Septuagint, which the primitive fathers chiefly followed and quoted from, exhibited another sense of the passage. Yet we find it cited by Athanasius[o] (if that piece be his) and the elder Cyril[p], for that purpose. And there the verse is cited according to the Hebrew original; only taking in part of the LXX's translation: from whence one might suspect that there had been two versions of the same words, and both, by degrees, taken into the text, and tacked together. To what hath been said I shall only add, that the *mighty God*, spoken of Psal. l. 1. has been generally believed by the primitive fathers to be God the Son[q]. But there the words *mighty God* are the rendering of *El Elohim*, and signify *God of gods*; which however, in sense, are at least tantamount to the other.

[l] Vocatur nomen ejus admirabilis, consiliarius, Deus fortis. Deus fortis est, et inenarrabile habet genus. *Iren.* p. 273.

[m] Vid. Clem. Alex. Strom. i. p. 410.

[n] Θαυμαστὸς σύμβουλος, Θεὸς δυναστὴς, πατὴρ αἰώνιος——ὦ τῷ μεγάλου Θεοῦ· ὦ τῷ τελείου παιδίου· υἱὸς ἐν πατρὶ καὶ πατὴρ ἐν υἱῷ. *Clem. Alex. Pæd.* lib. i. p. 112.

Θεὸν ἰσχυρὸν, Θεὸν παιδίον κηρύττει. *Dionys. Alex. Epist. contr. Paul. Samos.* p. 852. Labb.

[o] Καλεῖται τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ μεγάλης βουλῆς Ἄγγελος, Θαυμαστὸς, σύμβουλος, Θεὸς ἰσχυρὸς, ἐξουσιαστὴς, ἄρχων εἰρήνης, πατὴρ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος. *Athan. de Incarn. contr. Arian.* cap. xxii. p. 889. Comp. Apost. Constit. lib. v. cap. 16. Pseud. Ignat. ad Antioch. cap. 3.

[p] Καλεῖται τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ μεγάλης βουλῆς τῆς τῷ πατρὸς Ἄγγελος, Θαυμαστὸς σύμβουλος, Θεὸς ἰσχυρὸς, &c.

Εἰ οὖν Θεὸς ἰσχυρὸς τοῦτο τὸ παιδίον, περὶ αὐτοῦ δῆλον εἴρηκε Δαυίδ. Ὀφθήσεται ὁ Θεὸς τῶν Θεῶν ἐν Σίων. *Psal.* lxxxiii. 8. *Cyril. Hierosol.* p. 332. Ox.

[q] See Iren. lib. iii. cap. 6. p. 180. Cyprian. adv. Jud. lib. ii. cap. 28. p. 48. et de Bon. Patient. p. 220. Euseb. in Psal. p. 209.

Another *divine title* ascribed to the Son in holy Scripture is, "over all God blessed for ever," Rom. ix. 5. That this is said of *Christ*, not of God the *Father*, appears from the whole context, and the very form[r] of expression. Ὁ ὢν naturally refers to the person of *Christ* immediately before spoken of: and the *antithesis*[s] between what he is according to the *flesh*, and what according to the *spirit*, requires it. Thus all the *ancients*, [t] Catholics and heretics, constantly understood the words, referring them to *Christ*, as here called "over all God blessed for ever." The author of *Scripture Doctrine* says, that "the word Θεὸς, *God, is* "wanting in many MSS[u]." But, I presume, Bp. Pearson and Dr. Mills, who both declare all the manuscripts have it[x], may be believed, till he produces his vouchers, or explains his meaning. The *reading* of the place being fixed and certain, and its reference to *Christ* no less certain[y], as well from the context itself, as from the constant, uniform sense of all antiquity, we may now proceed to consider the force and significancy of the phrase, "over "all God blessed for ever." Our blessed Lord is not only here called *God*, but God with a very high epithet, *over all*, ἐπὶ πάντων, the very same that is applied to the Father himself, Eph. iv. 6. and is there rendered *above all*. Besides this, there is the addition of εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, *blessed for ever:* which again is the very same that

[r] Comp. 2 Cor. xi. 31.

[s] Comp. Rom. i. 3, 4. See Grabe's Not. in Bull. Def. F. N. sect. ii. cap. 3.

[t] See the testimonies referred to in Dr. Mills. To which may be added Hippolytus contr. Noët. cap. vi. p. 10. ed. Fabric. vol. 2.

[u] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 75. 2d ed. Comp. Reply, p. 86. and Modest Plea, p. 142.

[x] The pretence of Erasmus from the fathers is vain; and as vain is that of Grotius from the Syriac translation, which hath in it the name of *God* expressly, as well as *all the copies of the original*, and all the rest of the translations. *Pearson on the Creed*, art. ii. p. 133.

Non tantum codd. omnino nulli omittunt Θεὸς, sed neque ipsa Syriaca versio. Verbo dicam lectionem hanc præferunt MSS. omnes. *Mills in locum.*

[y] Some have pretended to understand the words "over all God blessed," &c. of God the Father, whose pretences see confuted by Dr. Grabe in his Remarks on Mr. Whiston's Collection of Testimonies, p. 23, 24, &c.

St. Paul applies to the eternal *Creator*, Rom. i. 25. Add to this, that the title of *blessed*, as Bishop Pearson observes, "of itself elsewhere signifies the supreme God, "and was always used by the Jews to express that one "God of Israel[z]." In answer to our argument from this text, it is said, that if "Christ be God over all, yet it is "manifest that he is excepted, by communication of "whose divine power and supreme authority Christ is "God over all[a]." Without doubt, the *Father* is excepted out of the number of those things, *over* which the Son is God. No Catholic ever pretended otherwise. Those general expressions, *over all*, &c. leave room for such *tacit* exceptions as either other Scriptures or the reason of the thing shows, ought to be made. And this, we hope, will be remembered, in favour of the *Son* and *Holy Spirit*, as often as the Father is said to be *above all*, &c. that such expressions may not be strained beyond their just and proper meaning. As to what is hinted under the word *communication*, by way of lessening, it is hardly deserving notice. *Supreme power*, whether communicated or uncommunicated, is *supreme power:* and if the Son has it *communicated*, then certainly he has it; which is sufficient to our purpose. Only we must observe, that the text now under consideration says nothing of what is *communicated*, but of what *is:* ὁ ὤν, who *is*, not ὁ διατεταγμένος, who is *appointed*, over all, &c. It is very trifling in our adversaries to refer us to 1 Cor. xv. 27. where it is said, that "all things are put under" Christ: as if the force of our argument lay more in the words "over all," than in the words "God blessed for ever;" or as if Christ's *mediatorial kingdom*, commencing at the resurrection, can any way account for his being *God*, which he certainly was before the *creation*. See John i. 1. compared with Coloss. i. 15, 16, &c.

Another *divine title* given to the Son in holy Scripture

[z] Pearson on the Creed, art. ii. p. 133.

[a] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 75. 2d ed.

is *Jehovah*, the incommunicable name of the one true God. The fact I need not here prove, having done it elsewhere[b]; besides that it is readily confessed by our adversaries[c]. That the name *Jehovah* has reference to the *necessary existence* of the person so named in his *own right*, is acknowledged by the best critics, ancient and modern; and admitted even by our adversaries[d]. And since they have no good reason to suspect that the Son of God hath it not in his *own right*, we may have leave to infer that he is *necessarily existing*, as well as the Father. To this it is objected, that then there will be two *Jehovahs*, Father and Son[e]. To which it is answered, that two *necessarily existing* persons may as well be one *Jehovah*, as *one God:* and to assert the contrary is only taking for granted the main thing to be proved. It is farther pretended, that *Jehovah* is not the name of the *essence* or *substance*, but of the *person* whose it is. Had it been said of the *persons*, instead of the *person*, whose it is, we should have no occasion to differ: but to suppose it the name of one person *only*, is begging the question. *Jehovah* is the name of as many persons as are of the same *necessarily existing* substance; and is sometimes taken *essentially* and sometimes *personally*, in like manner as the name *God*. It is farther said, that *Jehovah* is the *name of a living person*, not of an *abstract substance*[f]. As if they, who suppose it the name of *three living persons*, were not as clear of this charge of making it the name of an *abstract substance*, as they who make it the name of *one* only. No one supposes it to be the name of an *abstract substance*, but the name of a *person*, or *persons*, expressing *his* or *their* substance considered as *necessarily existing*. Whatever *abstraction* there is, in this partial way of considering any

[b] Serm. i. p. 16, &c. Defence of Queries, vol. i. p. 41, 42.

[c] Clarke's Reply, p. 142, 163. Modest Plea, p. 21.

[d] See Clarke's Reply, p. 164. Comp. Script. Doctr. p. 264. 2d ed.

[e] See Modest Plea, &c. p. 274.

[f] See Modest Plea, &c. p. 293. See the same objection repeated, p. 160, 163, 252, 273, 274, 281.

thing, or things, under such precise formality, as *necessarily existing*, it holds equally, whether *Jehovah* be the name of one *person*, or more: for neither one *person* nor more are called *Jehovah*, ὁ ὢν, or τὸ ὄν, any otherwise considered than as *necessarily existing*. This being really the case, our adversaries, upon their *own hypothesis*, may as well suppose it the name of an *abstract substance*, as they may upon *ours*. For whenever they consider a person merely as *necessarily existing*, they do not, under the *same* notion, conceive him under a *different* notion; the same *idea* being neither more nor less than the same *idea*. They must in this case abstract from the *idea* of personality, and consider the person no farther than as the subject or *substratum* of that one property of *necessary existence:* and consequently they make *Jehovah*, thus precisely considered, the name of an *abstract substance*, as much as we: though, in strict propriety of language, neither they nor we do it at all. For, *abstract substance* is indeed solecism in speech; nothing being properly *abstract* except ideas. But I proceed:

Another *divine title* ascribed to God the Son, in holy Scripture, is *Almighty*, as we imperfectly render the Greek word, παντοκράτωρ. The most remarkable passage to our purpose is in the first chapter of the Apocalypse. "Be- "hold, he cometh with clouds; and every eye shall see "him, and they also which pierced him: and all kindreds "of the earth shall wail because of him. Even so, Amen. "I am Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and the Ending, "saith the Lord, which is, and which was, and which is "to come, the ALMIGHTY." Rev. i. 7, 8. All the ancients, both before and after the Council of Nice, understand this of God the Son[s]. This alone is a strong presumption in

[s] Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 17. Hippolyt. contr. Noët. cap. vi. p. 10. Fabric. Origen περὶ Ἀρχ. lib. i. cap. 2. Athanasius, p. 415, 554, 684, 762. ed. Bened. Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xxxv. p. 573. Phæbad. B. P. tom. 4. Ambros. de Fid. lib. ii. cap. 4. p. 476. Hieron. in Zech. ii. p. 1718. ed. Bened. Epiphan. vol. i. p. 488. ed. Petav. August. de Symb. ad Catech. lib. 2. Andr. Cæsariens. in loc. See my Defence, vol. i. p. 319, 320.

favour of our construction; especially when there is nothing in the context but what confirms it, rather than otherwise. The verse immediately preceding relates to *Christ*, who is to "come in the clouds," and whom every "eye shall see:" and the title of *Alpha* and *Omega* in the same verse is applied to *Christ* more than once in the Revelations [h]. A late writer, on the contrary, objects [i] that, ver. 4. of this chapter, the words, "he which is, and which "was, and which is to come," are used as the distinguishing character of the Person of the Father. He might as well argue that the words "Alpha and Omega, the Be-"ginning and the End," chap. xxi. 6. are used as the distinguishing character of the Person of the Father; and therefore that character cannot be applied to Christ in Rev. xxii. 13. or in Rev. i. 17. where *First* and *Last* amounts to the same. It is no strange thing to find the same *characters*, in the same Scriptures, applied both to Father and Son. It is what we assert and contend for, and from thence prove that Father and Son are equally *divine*. It is mere *petitio principii*, or, taking for granted the thing in question, to suppose that such characters are to *distinguish* the Father from the Son, only because they are applied to the Father. For we can more justly argue on the other side, that they are not distinguishing of the *Father*, as *Father*, because we find them equally applied both to Father and Son. Another objection is, that the *best manuscripts* read Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς, *the Lord God*, instead of ὁ Κύριος *the Lord:* which is not of great weight, since many other MSS. favour the present reading; besides that if all the MSS. had *Lord God* instead of *Lord*, it would be only a farther proof that Christ is *Lord God*, consonant to other Scriptures, and to all antiquity. Origen, Ambrose, and Jerome suppose *Lord God* to be in the text; and yet scruple not to understand it of *God* the

[h] Revel. i. 11, 17. ii. 8. xxii. 13. chap. i. ver. 17, and 18. the words are, ὁ πρῶτος, καὶ ὁ ἔσχατος, καὶ ὁ ζῶν, &c. *The living One:* comp. Numb. xiv. 21. καὶ ζῶν τὸ ὄνομά μου. Septuag.

[i] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 53. 2d ed.

Son; as indeed they had no reason for scruple. It is objected farther[k], that παντοκράτωρ, *Almighty, is always applied to the Father only, in the most ancient writers:* which is notoriously false in fact, as appears from their understanding this very text of the Son; besides other collateral evidences[l]. The last pretence is that the title of παντοκράτωρ, *Almighty*, is always elsewhere, in Scripture, applied to the Father only. To which I answer, 1st, that it is mere groundless presumption to suppose that as often as that title is applied to the one *God* in the Old Testament, it is applied to the *Father only:* since it may often be understood indifferently either of Father, or Son, or of the whole Trinity. And 2dly, that there are several texts of the Old Testament, which we have good reason to believe are to be understood particularly of God the Son. Psalm the xxivth has by the primitive Fathers[m] been interpreted of *Christ*. Now that Κύριος δυνάμεων, *Lord of hosts*, applied to Christ in that Psalm, is equivalent to Κύριος παντοκράτωρ, *Almighty*, appears from hence, that the LXX Interpreters render the same words indifferently by one or other, as is observed[n] by Ambrose and Jerome; and may be easily seen in a multitude of instances, by looking into Trommius's Concordance. Besides that St. John himself in his Apocalypse, iv. 8. allud-

[k] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 53. 2d ed.

[l] Justin. Mart. Application of Psalm xxiv. 10. Dial. p. 107. Jeb. Clem. Alex. p. 277, 647, 831. Tertullian. adv. Prax. cap. 17. Origen περὶ Ἀρχ. lib. i. cap. 2. Hippolyt. contr. Noët. vol. ii. p. 10. Fabric. Euseb. Demonstr. Evang. lib. vi. cap. 16. p. 281. Comp. Euseb. in Psalm. p. 417. Comm. in Isa. p. 374, 435.

[m] Justin Martyr. Dial. p. 197. Cyprian. adv. Jud. lib. ii. cap. 49. p. 49, 50. Origen in Matt. p. 438. Euseb. in loc. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iv. cap. 1. p. 523.

[n] Nam et hic sic positum plerique codices habent, quod *Dominus Sabaoth ipse sit Rex gloriæ:* Sabaoth autem interpretes alicubi *Dominum virtutum*, alicubi *Regem*, alicubi *Omnipotentem* interpretati sunt. *Ambros. de Fid.* lib. iv. cap. 1. p. 524. ed. Bened.

Sciendumque quia ubiquumque Septuaginta Interpretes *Dominum Virtutum*, et Dominum *Omnipotentem* expresserint, in Hebræo sit positum *Dominus Sabaoth. Hieron.* tom. iii. p. 519. Vid. etiam tom. iii. p. 1718.

ing to a passage of Isaiah, vi. 3. "Holy, holy, holy, is "the Lord of hosts;" instead of Κύριος δυνάμεων, (or σαβαὼθ,) "Lord of hosts;" puts Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς ὁ παντοκράτωρ, "Lord God Almighty." It may be proved likewise from Isa. vi. 5. compared with John xii. 41. (as I have formerly observed[o],) that our Saviour Christ is "Lord of hosts," that is, Κύριος παντοκράτωρ, or *Lord Almighty*. The same may be farther proved from Zech. ii. 8. as is noted by the learned Eusebius[p]; who is therein followed by Ambrose and Jerome. And a farther proof of the same thing may be evidently drawn from Zech. xii. 5, 10. compared with Joh. xix. 34, 37. These instances are sufficient to check the confidence of such as roundly affirm, without a syllable of proof, that the title of παντοκράτωρ, *Almighty*, is in holy Scripture applied always to the *Father only*.

As to the three remaining *divine titles* given to the *Son* in holy Scripture, I shall but just mention them, not having room to enlarge. He is called "the Lord of glory," 1 Cor. ii. 8; which if compared with the title of "King "of glory," Psalm xxiv. and the description there given, will appear to be a title of great weight and significancy. "King of kings and Lord of lords," is another *divine title* attributed to *Christ*, Rev. xvii. 14. xix. 16. This very title is made the distinguishing character of the one true God by St. Paul, in these words: "Who is the blessed and "only Potentate, the King of kings and Lord of lords," 1 Tim. vi. 15. The last *divine title* I intend to mention, and barely to mention, is that of "First and Last, Alpha "and Omega, the Beginning and the End," Rev. i. 17. xxii. 13. the same that is applied to the one supreme God, Isa. xli. 4. xliv. 6. and to God the Father, Rev. xxi. 6. The force of these expressions I have elsewhere[q] opened and explained, and need not here add any thing farther.

[o] Serm. i. p. 17, 18.

[p] Vid. Euseb. Demonstr. Evang. lib. vi. cap. 16. p. 281. Hieron. in loc. p. 1718. Ambros. de Fid. lib. ii. cap. 4. p. 476.

[q] See Defence of some Queries, vol. i. p. 80. and Chaldee Paraphrase upon Isa. xli. 4.

N. B. The

Thus far I have proceeded in recounting, explaining, and vindicating the several *divine titles* ascribed to God the Son in holy Scripture. *Particular* objections to this or that, I have took care to answer in their proper places: *general* objections against the whole, intended to weaken the conclusion we draw from them, shall be considered hereafter. But it will be proper, in the mean while, to take a view of the *divine attributes* applied, in Scripture, to our blessed Saviour. These therefore, if God permit, are to be the subject of discourse at our next meeting.

N. B. The anonymous author of ***Modest Plea continued***, p. 12. endeavours to elude the force of these texts. 1st, By referring to the words, " I am he " that liveth and was dead," &c. Rev. i. 17, 18. But he would have done well to have considered the force of ὁ ζῶν. See the first Letter to the Author of the History of Montanism, p. 92. 2dly, By referring to Rev. iii. 14. which I have explained Serm. ii. and which confirms the sense I had given of *Alpha* and *Omega*. 3dly, By remitting us to Rev. xiii. 16. which is no explication of the phrase of *First* and *Last*, but very wide and foreign. 4thly, By referring to Heb. xii. 2. which if it be a good comment upon Isa. xli. 4. xliv. 6. xlviii. 12. and Rev. i. 8. xxi. 6. then let it be also a just explication of the parallel texts, Rev. i. 11, 17. ii. 8. xxii. 13. But if the contrary be manifest in one case, we must have something more than mere conjectures and fancies, before we admit it in the other. The phrase *First* and *Last* expresses, 1st, the peerless majesty of God, who is he, the *true God*, Is. xli. 4. 2dly, Eternity. Comp. Isa. xliii. 10. 3dly, Supreme power, dignity, and glory. See Isa. xliv. 6, 7, 8. 4thly, Creation and government of all things. See Isa. xlviii. 12, &c.

Vid. M. Abbadie on the Divinity of Christ, p. 77, &c. 183.

Divine Attributes ascribed to Christ:

OR

CHRIST'S DIVINITY

PROVED FROM HIS ATTRIBUTES.

The seventh Sermon preached March 2, $17\frac{19}{20}$.

JOHN xvi. 15.

All things that the Father hath are mine: therefore said I, that he shall take of mine, and shall show it unto you.

IN a former discourse upon these words, I observed that they contained two arguments to prove the *divinity* of our blessed Lord: the *first* of which arises from this consideration, that the influences, gifts, and graces of *God's own Spirit*, with the *glory* of them, are ascribed to *Christ;* and the *second* is, that all things which the Father hath are by our blessed Lord claimed as his *own*. After a brief account of the first argument, I proceeded more at large to open and illustrate the second, proposing these three particulars:

1. To show that the *divine titles* are ascribed to the *Son* in holy Scripture.

2. To show that the *divine attributes* are likewise ascribed to him.

3. To sum up the force of the argument arising from thence, and to obviate such general objections as tend to weaken our conclusion.

I had then only time to go through the first of these three particulars; recounting the several *divine titles*, which

are in Scripture applied to God the Son, as well as to God the Father. I proceed now,

II. To show that the same *divine attributes* are likewise ascribed to both. I shall insist particularly upon four: *eternity*, *immutability*, *omniscience*, and *omnipresence*; of which in their order.

1. The Scripture-proofs of the *eternity* of God the Son are many and clear; and may be divided into two sorts, being either *implicit* and *indirect*, or *explicit* and *direct*. The implicit or indirect proofs I shall but briefly mention, as belonging to other parts of my design, and not so properly coming in here. If the Son be *God* in the strict and proper sense, as I have before shown, he is of course *eternal*. But this I pass over here, my design being now, not to prove him to be *eternal* because he is *God*, but to prove that he is *God* because he is *eternal*; founding thereupon a new and distinct argument of Christ's *divinity*.

I have before shown that Rev. i. 8. is to be understood of *God* the *Son*. And now I must observe, that that single text affords two arguments of his *eternity*. He is "Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and the Ending:" which is the very description given of the *eternity* of the one God of Israel[a]; and which our adversaries themselves would not scruple to interpret as we do, provided only they might be permitted to understand the text of God the *Father*. Besides this, the Son is also "he which is, "and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty." Our adversaries allow that these words denote *independent eternity*[b]. Only they are pleased, without any grounds for it, to understand them of *God* the *Father*; having beforehand settled it as a rule of interpretation with themselves, that every text of this kind shall be understood of *God* the *Father*; or else that the very same phrases, when applied to *God* the *Son*, shall lose their

[a] See my Defence, vol. i. p. 80. Serm. vi. p. 139, 140.

[b] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 264. 2d edit.

significancy, and bear a very different meaning from what they do when applied to *God* the *Father*.

The Son's being *Jehovah* is a farther proof of his *eternity*; that name expressing, as critics allow, *necessary existence*. Our adversaries would never scruple this construction of the name *Jehovah* [c], could they but find a way to confine the *name*, as they do the *thing*, to the Father only. But having an *hypothesis* to serve, and resolving that words shall not signify what they really do, any farther than is consistent with their preconceived opinions, they are forced either to deny that the name *Jehovah* signifies *necessary existence* at all, or at least to deny that it so signifies when applied to God the Son. Such is their *partiality* in this momentous cause, in which the honour of their *God* and *Saviour* is so nearly and deeply concerned. But I proceed. The *eternity* of God the Son is farther proved from his *creative powers*, which I have before explained and vindicated at large: and more directly from those passages of holy Scripture which declare him to have existed before all creatures [d]. For if he existed before any thing was *made*, he must of consequence be *unmade*, and therefore *eternal*.

There is a famous passage of the Prophet Micah relating to this head, which is too considerable to be omitted: "But thou, Bethlehem Ephratah, though thou be "little among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee "shall he come forth unto me that is to be Ruler in "Israel, whose goings forth have been from of old, from "everlasting." Mic. v. 2. Here is a plain description of

[c] See Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 88. 2d ed where he interprets ὁ ὤν and τὸ ὄν, the *self-existent Being*, or *Person*; and, to confound his readers, puts *self-existent* instead of *necessarily existing*. Compare Reply, p. 164. and Script. Doctr. p. 264. See also Modest Plea, p. 163. where the author admits that the word *Jehovah* alludes to *self-existence*, (he should have said *necessary existence*;) and tells us that it signifies *him, whose* that *essence is*, meaning the *Father* only; adding a weak reason or two, why the same name, when applied to God the Son, shall not signify the same thing, viz. *necessary existence*.

[d] John i. 3, 10. Coloss. i. 16. 1 Cor. viii. 6.

two *comings forth:* one when *Christ* should be born in Bethlehem; the other long before "from of old," and "from everlasting." This passage is a full and clear proof of *Christ's* preexistence before his birth of the Virgin, and a probable proof, at least, of an *eternal*[e] preexistence. Here are two expressions, "from of old," and "from everlasting;" the rendering of two Hebrew phrases, either of which singly does sometimes denote *eternity* in the strict sense[f], and therefore both together may be thought to do so much rather: especially if it be considered that here is no limitation of time intimated in the context; nor is there any deducible from the nature or reason of the thing itself. However, I pretend to call this construction of the passage no more than *probable;* since there is not ground sufficient for calling it *certain* and *indisputable.* Only this I may add, by way of remark, that whosoever should undertake to prove the *eternity* of God the Father from any *express* words, either of the Old or New Testament, would find his proof of it liable to the same difficulty and *uncertainty,* from the ambiguity of the Hebrew or Greek phrases used to denote *eternity.*

Another argument, of like kind with the former, to prove the *eternity* of God the Son, may be drawn from Solomon's description of *Wisdom,* Prov. viii. 22, 30. The Jews of old[g], and the Christian Church from the beginning, understood that passage of a *Person,* the *sub-*

[e] Cyril's note upon this text is worth observing: Μὴ οὖν πρόσιχε τῷ νῦν ἐκ τῆς Βηθλεὲμ, ἀλλὰ προσκύνει τὸν ἀϊδίως ἐκ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα. μὴ χρονικὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ καταδίξῃ τινὸς λέγοντος, ἀλλὰ ἄχρονον ἀρχὴν γίνωσκε τὸν πατέρα. *Cyrill. Catech.* xi. p. 145.

Αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ Χριστοῦ δύο ἔξοδοι, ἤγουν πρόοδοι, ἡ μὲν πρωΐας πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων ἐκ πατρὸς γινομένη, κατὰ τό· αἱ ἔξοδοι αὐτοῦ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, ἐξ ἡμερῶν αἰῶνος· ἡ δὲ ἑσπέρας, ἡ ἐκ παρθένου, ἥτις ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τῶν αἰώνων ἀπήντησεν. *Athanasii, Eusebii, et Cyrilli Fragm. in Psalm. apud Athan.* tom. i. p. 1256. ed. Bened. Vid. et Hieron. in loc. Epiphan. Ancor. p. 32. Euseb. Dem. Ev. lib. vii. cap. 2.

[f] For the first, see Psal. lv. 19. Hab. i. 12. For the second, Psal. xc. 2. xciii. 2.

[g] See Allix, Judgment of the Jewish Church.

stantial Wisdom of God[h], (either the WORD, or the *Holy Spirit*, but generally the former.) And this was no matter of dispute between the Catholics and Arians formerly; neither is it, as I conceive, at this day. The only dispute is, whether we are right in our interpreting the phrases, *from the beginning*, *from everlasting*, &c. (Prov. viii. 23.) of a strict eternity. It must be owned that our argument, so far as it is built merely upon the critical meaning of the phrases, and their usage in Scripture, amounts only to a strong probability; as in the text of Micah before spoken of. But it may receive some additional strength from several other considerations, which it may be proper to mention. *Wisdom* is here said to have been with the "Lord, in the beginning of his way, be-"fore his works of old;" (ver. 22.) that is, before the works of creation; before there were any creatures; consequently from all eternity. *Wisdom* is farther said to have been "by him, as one brought up with him;" (ver. 30.) which seems to be a very easy and natural description of two that had been always together coeternal with each other: which is farther confirmed from the following words, "and I was daily his delight, rejoicing "always before him;" (ver. 30.) intimating, as Origen has well observed[i], that the Father can no more be supposed to have been ever without the WORD, or Λόγος, (here signified under the name of WISDOM,) than he can be supposed to have ever wanted *joy* and *happiness*. But what most of all confirms us in this sentiment is, the *Son's* being here represented, as we are now to suppose, under the name and figure of *Wisdom;* intimating that

[h] Just. Mart. Dial. p. 184, 375. ed. Jebb. Iren. lib. iv. cap. 20. p. 253. Clem. Alex. p. 832. Tertull. contr. Herm. cap. xviii. contr. Prax. cap. vi. Origen. Comm. in Joh. p. 11, 17, 33, 36. Athenagoras, p. 40. Theoph. Antioch. p. 82.

[i] Οὐ θέμις ἐστὶν, οὐδὲ ἀκίνδυνον διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν ἡμῶν τὸ, ὅσον ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἀποστερεῖσθαι τὸν Θεὸν τοῦ ἀεὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ λόγου μονογενοῦς, σοφίας ὄντος ἢ προσίχαιρεν. οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀεὶ χαίρων νοηθήσεται. *Origen. apud Athanas. Decret. S. Nic.* p. 233.

he is as near to, and inseparable from, God the Father, as his own wisdom is; and consequently *coeternal*. This also is taken notice of by Origen; who from thence draws an argument for the *eternity* of the *Logos*, or *Word*[k].

What has been here said reminds me of some other arguments, near akin to that now mentioned, of the *eternity* of God the Son, drawn from the several names ascribed to him in holy Scripture: such as Λόγος, Δύναμις, Φῶς, Ἀλήθεια, Ζωὴ, that is, *Word*, *Power* of God, *Light*, *Truth*, *Life*, and the like. The ancients were of opinion that the *eternity* of God the Son was insinuated in those names[l]: that the Father could no more be without the

[k] Origen. Comm. in Joh. p. 43, 44. Comp. Pamph. Apolog. p. 230. ed. Bened. int. Op. Hieron. vol. v.

[l] Ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς, νοῦς ἀΐδιος ὤν, εἶχεν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν λόγον, ἀϊδίως λογικὸς ὤν. *Athen. Leg.* cap. x. p. 39.

Solus autem, quia nihil aliud extrinsecus præter illum. Ceterum, ne tunc quidem solus; habebat enim secum, quam habebat in semetipso; *Rationem* suam scilicet. *Rationalis* enim Deus, et *Ratio* in ipso prius; et ita ab ipso omnia. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* cap. iv. p. 503.

Καταναοίτω γὰρ ὁ τολμῶν καὶ λίγων, ἦν ποτὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ὁ υἱὸς, ὅτι ἐρεῖ καὶ τὸ. σοφία ποτὲ οὐκ ἦν, καὶ λόγος οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ζωὴ οὐκ ἦν. *Orig. apud Athanas.* tom. i. p. 233.

Αὐτῷ γὰρ πειθόμεθα τῷ εἰπόντι — Ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ Ἀλήθεια· καὶ οὐχ οὕτω τις ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἀνδράποδον, ὡς οἴεσθαι ὅτι ἡ τῆς Ἀληθείας οὐσία πρὸ τῶν χρόνων τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐπιφανείας οὐκ ἦν. *Origen. contr. Cels.* lib. viii. p. 386.

Αὐτὸς δὲ μόνος ὢν πολὺς ἦν, οὔτε γὰρ ἄλογος, οὔτε ἄσοφος, οὔτε ἀδύνατος, οὔτε ἀβούλευτος ἦν. *Hippolyt. contr. Noët.* cap. x. p. 13. Fabric.

Ἀεὶ δὲ ἦν, εἴ γε ἐν τῷ πατρί ἐστιν——καὶ εἰ λόγος, καὶ σοφία, καὶ δύναμις ὁ Χριστός.—ταῦτα δὲ δυνάμεις οὖσαι τοῦ Θεοῦ τυγχάνουσιν. εἰ τοίνυν γίγονεν ὁ υἱὸς, ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα· ἦν ἄρα καιρὸς, ὅτε χωρὶς τούτων ἦν ὁ Θεός. ἀτοπώτατον δὲ τοῦτο. *Dionys. Rom. apud Athan.* tom. i. p. 232.

Ἀεὶ τὸν Χριστὸν εἶναι, λόγον ὄντα, καὶ σοφίαν, καὶ δύναμιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τούτων ἄγνωος ὢν ὁ Θεὸς εἶτα ἐκαινοποιήσατο — ἀπαύγασμα δὲ ὢν φωτὸς ἀϊδίου, πάντως καὶ αὐτὸς ἀΐδιός ἐστιν.—ὄντος οὖν αἰωνίου τοῦ πατρὸς, αἰώνιος ὁ υἱός ἐστι, φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς ὤν —οὐδέ ἐστιν οὔτε ὁ νοῦς ἄλογος, οὔτε ἄνους ὁ λόγος. *Dionys. Alex. apud Athanas.* tom. i. p. 253, &c.

Τί δὲ οὐκ ἀνόσιον τὸ λίγειν, ποτὲ μὴ εἶναι τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν λίγουσαν—ἐγὼ ἤμην ἡ προσίχαιρεν. ἢ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ Θεοῦ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ποτέ. ἢ τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ ἠκρωτηριᾶσθαι ποτὲ, ἢ τὰ ἄλλα ἐξ ὧν ὁ υἱὸς γνωρίζεται καὶ ὁ πατὴρ χαρακτηρίζεται. τὸ γὰρ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης μὴ εἶναι λίγειν, συναναιρεῖ καὶ τὸ πρωτότυπον

Son, than without *thought*, or *power*, or *light*, or *truth*, or *life;* the Son being deciphered and figured under those names or characters, on purpose to express his near relation to the Father, and his *inseparable coeternity*. This argument of the primitive Catholic Fathers I am the more willing to take notice of, because it has been strangely, though perhaps undesignedly, misrepresented by some late writers [m]. We are told that to *argue*, as the ancients did, that the "Father considered without "the Son would be without reason and without wisdom, "is supposing the Son to be nothing but an attribute of "the Father." But this is grossly mistaking the sense of those primitive writers, who were no less men than Athenagoras, Tertullian, Origen, Hippolytus, Dionysius of Rome, with the other Dionysius of Alexandria, and Alexander Bishop of Alexandria: men that had not quite lost their senses when they wrote these things; most of them notoriously known to have been strenuous opposers of the Noëtian or Sabellian principle, which supposes the Son to be nothing more than an *attribute* of the *Father*. The truth is, these primitive writers did suppose, since the Son had the same names given him in Scripture that God's *attributes* have, (being called the *wisdom*, the *reason*, and the *power*, &c. of God,) that there was some meaning and significancy in those names: and they took it to be this; that the Son was near and dear unto the Father as his own *attributes; inseparable* from him, and *coeternal* with him. Some moderns may indeed assign other reasons for the *Son's* having those *names:* they may tell us that he is called the *wisdom* of God and the *power* of God, because "God's wisdom and power are mani-

φῶς, οὗ ἐστὶν ἀπαύγασμα. *Alexand. Alex. Epist. apud Theod.* lib. i. cap. 4. p. 13.

Πῶς δὲ, εἰ λόγος καὶ σοφία ἐστὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ υἱὸς, ἦν ποτὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν; ἴσον γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτοὺς λέγειν ἄλογον καὶ ἄσοφον ποτὲ τὸν Θεόν. *Id. apud Socr.* lib. i. cap. 6. p. 11.

[m] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 255, 257. 2d ed. Reply, p. 177. Modest Plea, &c. p. 308, 309.

"fested by him [n]." But then let them own that this is but *conjecture* at most, *novel* conjecture; and that the reason assigned by the primitive Fathers may be true, for any thing that appears to the contrary; nay, is much more likely to be true, considering how near many of those writers lived to the *apostolic* time, and how unanimous they were in those sentiments, and how suitable those sentiments are to the other high things said in Scripture of the Son of God: besides that these *names* and *characters* are not common to other things; not given to *prophets*, or *apostles*, nor to the very *angels*, (though God's *wisdom*, &c. is manifested by them,) but are, in a manner, peculiar to the Son of God. We find the Catholics afterwards, following the example of their predecessors, frequently insisting upon the same way of reasoning in proof of the Son's *eternity* [o]: which I the rather

[n] See Clarke's Reply, p. 173.

[o] Οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὅτε ἄλογος ἦν, οὐδὲ ἦν ὅτε οὐ πατὴρ, οὐδὲ ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἀληθὴς, ἢ ἄσοφος, ἢ ἀδύνατος, ἢ ζωῆς ἐνδεὴς, ἢ λαμπρότητος, ἢ ἀγαθότητος. *Greg. Nazianz. Orat.* xxxv. p. 574.

Ideo *Sapientia* Dei appellatur, ut nunquam Pater sine *Sapientia*, hoc est, sine Filio suo fuisse credatur. *Pseudo-Ambros. de Fide Orthod.* cap. ii. p. 349. Vid. Alexand. Ep. Encycl. apud Athanas. tom. i. p. 339. Athan. tom. i. p. 221, 416, 419, 423, 424, 428, 470, 500, 619. Phæbad. contr. Arian. p. 303. B. P. tom. iv. Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. lib. vii. p. 633, 634. Cyrill. Alex. de Trinit. p. 6. Op. tom. vi. Paris. Thesaur. lib. i. p. 23, 31.

N. B. Their way of reasoning from other *names* and *characters* of God the Son, clearly shows their meaning in the argument drawn from the absurdity of supposing the Father to be ἄλογος, ἄσοφος, &c. A few examples more will suffice, to leave with the *judicious*.

Πότε γὰρ εἶδέ τις φῶς χωρὶς τῆ ἀπαυγάσματος;—ἢ πῶς οὐ μαίνεται πλέον, ὁ πᾶν ἐνθυμούμενος ἄλογον καὶ ἄσοφόν ποτε τὸν Θεόν; τοιαῦτα γὰρ παραδείγματα, καὶ τοιαύτας τὰς εἰκόνας ἔθηκεν ἡ γραφὴ, ἵν' &c. *Athan.* p. 500. Compare p. 221, 416, 428. ὁ ὢν Θεὸς ἦν ποτε ἄλογος; καὶ φῶς ὢν ἀφεγγὴς ἦν. Compare p. 618. and p. 683.

Noli ergo credere quod fuerit momentum aliquod, quo fuerit sine *sapientia Deus*, aut sine *splendore lux*. *Ambros. de Fid.* lib. i. cap. 13. p. 460.

Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐπινοῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ, οὔτι ὑπόστασιν ἀχαρακτήριστον, οὔτι ἀλαμπῆ δόξαν, οὔτι ἄσοφον Θεὸν, οὐκ ἄχειρα δημιουργὸν, οὐκ ἄλογον ἀρχὴν, οὐκ ἄπαιδα πατέρα. *Gregor. Nyss. contr. Eunom. Orat.* vii. p. 634. Comp. p. 633.

Πότε

observe, because it is evident that those later writers especially were very far from supposing the Son to be nothing but an *attribute:* and indeed it is but misrepresentation, without so much as any probable ground, to charge it upon the Ante-Nicene writers; though they may sometimes have expressed themselves more briefly or obscurely on that head.

There is another argument of the Son's *eternity* insisted on by some, even of the Ante-Nicene Catholics [p], drawn from the consideration of the Son's being the *express image* of the Father's *Person*, according to Heb. i. 3. and consequently resembling him in every perfection, and particularly in his *eternity*, the prime perfection of all. But I proceed:

There is one passage more in the New Testament, which has been usually brought in proof of *Christ's* eternity. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, chap. vii. introduces Melchisedec as a type of *Christ*. Of him he says, that he had "no beginning of days, nor end of "life:" that is, no beginning nor ending of his priesthood is any where recorded. This is a typical representation of *Christ;* wherefore it seems that *Christ* must *really* have what the *type* was no more than a faint resemblance of, viz. an eternal existence without *beginning* and without *end*. That he shall never have *end of life*, is uncontested. If therefore to have *no end of life* imports a future eternity in the largest sense, it seems most natural to understand that to have *no beginning of days* must import *eternity* backwards in the largest sense also [q].

Πόσι οὖν ἦν ὁ πατὴρ χωρὶς τοῦ ἰδίου ἀπαυγάσματος; Πόσι οὐκ ἦν ἐν πατρὶ τὸ φῶς αὐτοῦ; *Cyrill. Alex. Thesaur.* lib. i. p. 21. Compare p. 23, 27, 28.

[p] Origen. apud Athanas. tom. i. p. 233. Alexand. Alex. apud Theod. lib. i. cap. 4. p. 17.

[q] Qui typum gerens Domini, et sine patre, et sine matre, et sine generationis enarratione, et sine initio, et sine fine describitur; ut ostenderet sempiternum Filium Dei in hunc mundum esse venturum, qui et *sine Patre* secundum incarnationem natus est, et *sine matre* secundum divinam generationem, et *sine enarratione generationis;* quia scriptum est, "Genera-

Thus far I have proceeded in the Scripture-proofs[r] of *Christ's eternity*, considered as distinct from the attribute of *immutability*; though in sound reasoning one implies the other, and to prove either is at the same time proving both. This being premised, I pass on,

2. To the more particular proof of his *immutability*. I shall not repeat the arguments from his being *Jehovah; Alpha and Omega; he which was, and which is, and which is to come*, or the like, equally proving both *eter-eternity*, and *independent* eternity, that is, *immutability*; because the force of those has been already considered. But there are two or three texts, before omitted, which I have reserved for this place, and shall now consider distinctly.

The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, opposing the *immutability* of Christ to the fading and perishing nature of the *heavens* and the *earth*, sets it forth thus in very expressive terms: "Thou, Lord, in the beginning "hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens "are the works of thine hands: they shall perish; but "THOU REMAINEST; and they all shall wax old as doth "a garment; and as a vesture shalt thou fold them up, "and they shall be CHANGED: but THOU ART THE "SAME, and thy years shall not fail." Heb. i. 10, 11, 12. This is the very description which the holy Psalmist gives us of the *immutability*, or unchangeable nature, of the only true eternal God. And since it is here, without any restriction or limitation, applied by the inspired writer to our Saviour Christ; we cannot reasonably understand it to mean any thing less here, than it does there.

"tionem autem ejus quis enarrabit?" *Ambros. de Fid.* lib. iii. cap. 11. p. 513.

[r] As to the sense of the most early Fathers in relation to *Christ's eternity*, I have occasionally shown it in part. For the rest, I refer the ingenuous and impartial reader to Bp. Bull's Collections and Observations on that head, in his Defensio Fid. Nic. which are abundantly sufficient to satisfy every ingenuous inquirer, that the *eternity* of God the Son was the constant doctrine of the Christian Church from the beginning, and that the contrary was always accounted *heresy*.

There cannot be any words devised more express or emphatical than these are: "They shall perish; but thou "remainest: they shall be changed; but thou art the "same[s]." The force of these expressions was well understood by the great Athanasius, and triumphantly urged against the Arians[t]. There is another passage out of the Epistle to the Hebrews of like import, declaring in strong terms the *immutability* of Christ. "Jesus Christ "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever." Heb. xiii. 8. Here is the phrase ὁ αὐτὸς, *the same*, again applied to the person of *Christ*, as before in chapter the first: and, besides, here is all time, *past, present*, and *to come*, taken in, to make the description still more full and complete. It may be best explained from a parallel text in the Revelations, by the character of, "which is, and which was, "and which is to come:" words which confessedly and undeniably denote eternal, unchangeable existence. What is there expressed by "is, was, and is to come," is here signified by "yesterday, to-day, and for ever." Thus was the text generally understood by Catholics of the fourth and fifth centuries[u], and frequently cited against the Arians. How the Arians replied to it *then*, we know not; unless we may make a judgment of it from what is said *now*. It is now pretended that the meaning of the text is only this; that "the doctrine of "Christ, once taught by the Apostles, ought to be pre-"served unchanged[x]." But, under favour, this is rather

[s] Origen quotes the words, σὺ δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς εἶ, several times, as a proof of the τὸ ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον, the unconvertible and immutable nature of God. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 17, 169, 318.

[t] Athanas. p. 440, 462, 685. ed. Bened. Vid. etiam Cyrill. Alexand. contr. Jul. lib. viii. p. 266.

[u] Alexand. Alex. apud Athanas. tom. i. p. 399. Athanasius, tom. i. p. 440, 453, 685. Gregor. Nazianz. Orat. xxxviii. p. 613. Ambros. de Fid. lib. v. cap. 1. p. 555. De Incarn. cap. vi. p. 716. Cyrill. Hierosol. Catech. xii. p. 156. Cyrill. Alex. de Rect. Fid. p. 47. De Incarn. Dial. p. 710.

[x] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 117. Reply, p. 169. Modest Plea, &c. p. 304.

the practical inference built upon the proposition of the text, than the proposition itself: for let us take in the whole context, which is as follows. "Remember them "which have the rule over you, who have spoken unto "you the word of God: whose faith follow, considering "the end of their conversation. Jesus Christ (is) the "same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. Be not carried "about with divers and strange doctrines; for it is a "good thing that the heart be established" &c. Now, whether the words have reference to those going before, viz. "considering the end of their conversation;" or to the words immediately following, viz. "Be not carried "about with divers and strange doctrines;" either way the sense is good, and the Apostle's argument pertinent. For upon the former supposition the sense will run thus: "Imitate your pastors, considering how great and how "divine a Person you thereby adhere to; one who is no "*created* or *mutable* Being, capable of failing in his own "person, or of disappointing you in your just expecta-"tions; but one that is *eternally* and *unchangeably* the "same[y]; whom therefore you may infallibly depend on, "in the final result of things." In this view the Apostle's sense is both just and pertinent, and is not much unlike to what is elsewhere said of God, that he is the Lord, and "changes not," Mal. iii. 6. and that "with "him there is no variableness, neither shadow of turn-"ing," Jam. i. 17. But if we understand this text with regard to the words immediately following, "Be not "carried about with divers and strange doctrines," still the sense is just and to the purpose: "Do not ye *change*, "for Jesus Christ never changes, being immutably and "essentially the same: endeavour to copy after him as "far as your imperfect natures will permit." Thus the precept and the example hang together, much after the same manner as in a text of St. Matthew: "Be ye there-"fore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is

[y] See True Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity continued, p. 206.

"perfect:" where an argument is drawn from the *natural* and *necessary* perfections of God, to induce us to some faint resemblance and imitation of them. Upon the whole, it appears that our interpretation of this text in the Hebrews is *literal;* which makes it preferable to any *figurative* construction, unless there were a necessity for it. It is also very agreeable to the scope and design of the author in that place, and to what he had before taught us, chap. i. ver. 12. of the same Epistle: it is farther countenanced by the Catholic Fathers, at least as high as the *fourth century;* and not contradicted by those before them: in fine, it is opposed only, or however chiefly, by those who, having an *hypothesis* to serve, like not the doctrine it contains; which doctrine nevertheless is set forth by other Scriptures, and confirmed by all antiquity[z]: and now let any man of common ingenuity be left to judge, which of the two interpretations offered be the true one. Having considered the Scripture-proofs of Christ's *eternity* and *immutability*, I proceed next to another of his divine attributes.

3. *Omniscience* is another *divine* attribute, ascribed in Scripture to our Saviour Christ. "Now we are sure "that thou knowest all things," said his disciples unto him, John xvi. 30. And again; "Lord, thou knowest "all things," (John xxi. 17.) said St. Peter, directing his discourse to Christ. The words in both places are general, without any limitation or reserve intimated in text or context: neither does the Evangelist, who recorded these sayings, any where insert any caution to prevent our understanding them in the highest and most

[z] The immutability of Christ is *implicitly* and *consequentially* asserted as often as the primitive writers assert the *eternity*, or *consubstantiality*, or *proper, emphatical* existence (which we now express by *necessary existence*) of God the Son; or declare him to be *God* in the strict sense, or no *creature:* so that direct and express testimonies of Christ's *immutability*, if they occur not so often, are less needful. But some there are, full and particular to that very point. Vid. Iren. lib. iii. cap. 8. p. 183. Tertullian. contr. Prax. cap. xxvii. Origen. contr. Cels. p. 169, 170.

unlimited sense. Thus far the presumption lies in favour of our construction: and I shall endeavour farther to show from other Scriptures, that those expressions ought to be understood in their utmost latitude; and shall withal examine and confute the Arian or Socinian pretences to the contrary.

That God the Son "knoweth all things," in the strictest sense, may be justly inferred from his being the "Searcher of the heart," and his knowledge of the "deep things of God." To be καρδιογνώστης, "Searcher "of the heart," is the peculiar and distinguishing character of the one true God; as appears from Jer. xvii. 10. "I the Lord search the heart, I try the reins." And from 1 Kings viii. 39. "Thou, even thou only knowest "the hearts of all the children of men." And from Acts xv. 8. "God which knoweth the hearts." Yet this very perfection our blessed Lord claims to himself: "I am "he," saith he, "that searcheth the reins and the heart," Rev. ii. 23. And St. John testifies of him, that "he "knew all men," John ii. 24. "knew what was in man," John ii. 25. And the disciples in their prayer to him (as seems most probable) say, "Thou, Lord, which know-"est the hearts of all men," Acts i. 24. This is farther confirmed from Heb. iv. 12, 13. "The WORD of God is "quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged "sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul "and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a dis-"cerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart: neither "is there any creature that is not manifest in his sight: "but all things are naked and opened unto the eyes of "him with whom we have to do." That this passage is to be understood of the Λόγος, or *Word*, that is, of *Christ*, I think need not be doubted: the characters are plainly *personal*, and the name of *Word* is appropriated to *Christ* by St. John, John i. 1. Rev. xix. 13; and the "sword," or "two-edged sword," is a figure often mentioned in the Revelations, where Christ is spoken of; Rev. i. 16. ii. 12, 16. xix. 15. This passage was under-

stood of *Christ*, both before and after the Council of Nice, by Catholic writers[a]: and the application of it to Christ is not, that I know of, scrupled by our modern Arians, any more than it appears to have been doubted of by their predecessors. Here then it is said of *Christ*, that "all things are naked" before him; that every creature is "manifest in his sight;" and that he is a "discerner "of the thoughts and intents of the heart:" strong and lively expressions of his *divine omniscience:* I know not whether any fuller or more significant can be produced out of the holy Scripture, in proof of the *omniscience* even of God the Father. To this may be added another celebrated text, Coloss. ii. 3. "In whom are hid all the "treasures of wisdom and knowledge." The author of *Scripture Doctrine* pretends, that it is *ambiguous* whether this refers to the *Father*, or to *Christ*. But if it certainly refers to either, there can be no reasonable doubt but it refers to *Christ*, immediately before mentioned. The words run thus: "The acknowledgment of the mystery "of God and the Father, and of Christ, (ἐν ᾧ,) in whom "are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." There may be some question whether the words ἐν ᾧ may not refer to μυστερίου, *mystery*, before spoken of; and so may not be properly rendered *in which*, instead of *in whom*. But if they be rightly rendered *in whom*, it is plain they must refer to the nearest antecedent, *Christ;* and in this interpreters are agreed. Origen, Hilary, and the ancient author of the *commentaries* under the name of St. Ambrose, refer the words to *Christ*. [b]The two latter, as also Cyril of Alexandria, draw an argument from them of the absolute *omniscience* of Christ. Clemens of Alex-

[a] Origen in Joh. p. 34. Athanas. tom. i. p. 503, 539. Serm. Maj. p. 6. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iv. cap. 7. p. 534. ed. Bened. Euseb. in Psalm. p. 189. Cyrill. Alex. Thesaur. p. 169. See also Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 116. 2d ed.

[b] Origen. Comm. in Matt. p. 209. Hilar. p. 1025, 1028. Pseudo-Ambros. in loc. Clem. Alex. p. 683, 694. Vid. et Cyrill. Alex. adv. Anthropomorph. p. 382.

andria twice cites the text: but whether he understood the words in dispute to relate to *mystery* going before, or to the person of *Christ*, is uncertain. It is observable, that four of the authors now mentioned read the words somewhat differently from the present *copies*[c]. As to the sense of the words, and their reference to Christ, we shall find but little reason to doubt, if we consider the general scope and drift of the Apostle in this Epistle; which was to set forth the excellency and dignity of *Christ*. This appears particularly from verses 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19, of the first chapter; and from the 9th verse of this very chapter, where we are told, that "in him dwelleth all "the fulness of the Godhead bodily." Well might the Apostle say, that "all the treasures of wisdom and "knowledge were in him, in *whom* all the fulness of the "Godhead *was also*." I know, our adversaries, whether Socinians or Arians, will endeavour to elude the force of this text, as well as of the other. But as the Apostle ushered it in with a very solemn caution, to "beware "lest any man spoil *us* through philosophy and vain de-"ceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of "the world, and not after Christ:" so let all true Christians beware, lest they be imposed upon by weak pretences, built upon false *philosophy*, and *vain deceit*; not upon sound and true reasoning. The author of *Scripture Doctrine* refers us[d] to John xiv. 10. "The Father that "dwelleth in me, he doeth the works." If he means that the Father's nature and Godhead so dwells and resides in *Christ*, as to make a full and entire communion of substance and of all perfections, insomuch that the Son shall therefore be *totus ex toto, perfectus ex perfecto*, very God of very God; then indeed this construction would not be amiss, being the same which Hilary and some other Catholics give of it. But, if he understands the *Father's*

[c] *Mystery of God in Christ*; so Clemens and Pseudo-Ambros. *Mystery in Christ*; Origen. *Mystery of God even Christ*; *Dei Christi*: Hilar.

[d] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 114. 2d ed.

in-dwelling in any lower sense, it would have come better from a Socinian, who would interpret the *fulness of the Godhead*, of the *Father* dwelling in the *man Christ Jesus*. It cannot easily be imagined that the Apostle, who in the first chapter of this Epistle had said so many high and great things of the inherent and personal dignity of the Son of God, as existing *before all things*, *creating*, *preserving*, and *sustaining* the whole universe, should now fall so low as to tell us, that he meant it not of any *inherent personal* dignity of the *Son*, but of the *Father* only: or if the Apostle had so intended it, why should not he have said plainly that the Father dwelt in him, a plain easy thing, instead of surprising us with so solemn and pompous an expression, (and that too after the ceremony of a preface to introduce it,) as that in him dwelt "all "the fulness of the Godhead bodily?"

The author of *Scripture Doctrine*, not confiding in his first explication, invents another, inconsistent with it, though he lets both stand together in the same page. "Fulness of Godhead" he interprets *fulness* of *divine power*, *dominion*, and *authority*: for so the word θεότης, *divinity*, he says, *signifies*; and elsewhere[e], *always signifies*. He is much mistaken in his remark upon the sense of θεότης, as might be shown by a hundred instances out of the best *ecclesiastical* writers; some of which I have referred to in another place[f], and upon another occasion. However, if θεότης *always* signifies *power*, *dominion*, and *authority*; then it *never* signifies the *Being* or *Person*, whose that *power*, *dominion*, or *authority* is: and therefore the text of St. John, xiv. 10. which speaks of the *Father's* (not the Father's *power*, *dominion*, &c.) *dwelling* in Christ, is very inconsistently put together with this other construction. But enough of this. As to the sense of the text, Col. ii. 9. we need not have recourse to any remote and far-fetched explications, when

[e] Reply, p. 283.

[f] Defence of some Queries, vol. i. p. 60, 279.

the natural and obvious construction of it is so near at hand. Whoever considers that the *Logos*, or *Word*, was *God*, and was *made flesh*, or was "God manifest in the "flesh[g]," (as St. Paul expresses it,) will easily believe that that was the great *mystery* which St. Paul had in his thoughts, when he told us that the *fulness* of the *Godhead* dwelt in Christ *bodily*. He had the more reason to usher this in with a prefatory caution against *philosophy* and *vain deceit*, because the mystery of *God incarnate* was what the *disputers* of this world were most of all offended at, and what none of the *heretics* of the earliest times would come into[h]. The Docetæ, a very early sect, denied the *humanity* of Christ, that they might still retain the belief of his *divinity;* while Cerinthus and the Ebionites denied his *divinity*, that they might still acknowledge his *humanity;* neither one nor other admitting the *divinity* and *humanity* together, because such an union and mixture of *God* and *man* appeared utterly repugnant to their *philosophy*. Both those heresies probably had their rise in the Apostles' times, and before St. Paul wrote this Epistle. And now we may understand what St. Paul meant by *fulness* of *Godhead*. The *divine nature*, the Λόγος, *full* and *perfect* God, assumed a body, took flesh upon him, or became incarnate. The "Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us," (in our nature,) "and of his *fulness* have we all received." John i. 14, 15, 16.

The construction which I have here given of this remarkable passage is not mine, but that of the primitive Catholic writers[i], as well before as after the Council of

[g] 1 Tim. iii. 16. As to Θεὸς in this text, and the agreement of the Greek copies in it, consult Bp. Pearson on the Creed, p. 128. and Mills in loc. Dr. Clarke's surmise, that all the Fathers read ὃς or ὅ, instead of Θεὸς, till the beginning of the sixth century, which he pretends to collect from the *tenor of their comments*, is without any grounds. See Greg. Nyssen. Orat. x. contr. Eunom. p. 693. where Θεὸς is read, and the *tenor of the comment* requires that reading.

[h] See my Defence of some Queries, vol. i. p. 239, 240.

[i] Διότι καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς παρθένου σῶμα, χωρῆσαν πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος

Nice. Now to return to the point which we were before upon: since it appears how high and great things the Apostle has said of *Christ*, in the two first chapters of this Epistle, we have the more reason to believe that he meant to ascribe absolute *omniscience* to him, when he said, that "in him are hid all the treasures of wisdom "and knowledge."

A farther proof of his *omniscience* may be drawn from his being indisputably equal in knowledge to the *Holy Spirit* of God; that Spirit which "searcheth all things," even the "deep things of God;" and who is as well acquainted with the mind of God, as a man is with his own heart and mind. I mention not other arguments of the Son's *omniscience*, deducible from his *creative* powers, and his being Preserver and Sustainer of the universe, and from the names of *Wisdom*, and *Truth* [k], given to him in holy Scripture; and from his intimate union with, and knowledge of, God the Father: these and the like considerations may serve still more and more to confirm us in the belief of it, and to render it less questionable with serious and considering men. I shall only add, that the Ante-Nicene Catholics were no strangers to this doctrine

σωματικῶς, τῇ θεότητι ἀτρέπτως ἥνωται, καὶ τεθεοποίηται· οὗ χάριν ὁ αὐτὸς Θεὸς καὶ Ἄνθρωπος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς προσφυτεύετο ἐν νόμῳ, &c. *Concil. Antioch. Epist. Labb.* tom. i. p. 848.

Εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι κατ' οὐσίαν ὅμοιος ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς, λείπει τι τῇ εἰκόνι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι πλήρης εἰκὼν, οὐδὲ τέλειον ἀπαύγασμα. πῶς οὖν ἀναγινώσκετε τὸ, ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς; *Athanas. de Synod.* p. 753. Comp. p. 556. ed. Bened.

Note, that the citation which Dr. Clarke (Script. Doctr. p. 114.) brings out of Athanasius, as if it had been his interpretation of this text, has no reference at all to it; as any one may see by looking into Athanasius, Epist. ad Philadelph. tom. i. p. 916.

Tantus est Filius quantus videbitur Pater: totus de toto, integer de integro, perfectus de perfecto, consummataque virtute: sicut Apostolus dicit ad Colossenses, in quo "omnis plenitudo Divinitatis corporaliter habitat." *Greg. Nazianz. Orat.* xlviii. ex versione Ruff. p. 733.

Vid. Hilar. p. 979, 983, 988, 1362. Epiphan. Ancorat. p. 95. contr. Hæres. p. 889. Exposit. Fid. Justin. Mart. ascript.

[k] Vid. Origen in Joh. p. 28. Didym. de Spir. Sanct. p. 515.

which I here maintain; but asserted it, many of them [l], as fully as I have done: none, so far as appears, ever presuming to oppose or contradict it. But there are some objections against the evidence I have produced, which come next to be considered. I shall confine myself to such pretences as have been lately revived, and artfully set off, by the author of *Scripture Doctrine*.

1. As to our Lord's being "Searcher of the hearts," he thinks [m] it may be accounted for from a passage of Clemens of Alexandria [n]; which he would gladly so interpret as to make Clemens say, that Christ is, by the *will of the Almighty*, Inspector of our hearts. But I have in another place [o] took notice how widely he has mistaken the sense of his author.

2. A second pretence [p] to invalidate our proofs of the Son's *omniscience*, is from John viii. 28. where our Lord says, "I do nothing of myself; but as my Father hath "*taught* me, I speak these things." The full meaning of which is no more than this, that God the Son is intimately united with the Father, never separate from him; and therefore neither acts nor speaks but in concert with him. Our blessed Saviour, speaking of his Father and himself, is pleased to take up with such expressions as are of common use with us: but they are to be soberly interpreted, suitably to the dignity of the subject. This

[l] See this made good in my Defence, &c. vol. i. p. 77, &c.

[m] Script. Doctr. p. 45, 118, 294.

[n] Τὸν Κύριον Ἰησοῦν τῷ παντοκρατορικῷ θελήματι ἐπίσκοπον τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν. *Strom.* iv. p. 611.

[o] Defence of some Queries, vol. i. p. 78.

N. B. Παντοκρατορικῷ θελήματι, in Clemens, does not signify *by the will of the Almighty*, as the Doctor construes it; but *by his sovereign, all-containing will.*

See parallel expressions in other authors. Μόνος δὲ ὁ Θεὸς περιέχει τῇ βουλήσει τὸ πᾶν. *Pseudo-Just. ad Orthod.* Qu. 11.

Immensus cum sit Deus, et mundi opifex, atque omnipotens, immensa et mundi opifice, atque *omnipotenti voluntate*, et effectu novo, potenter et efficaciter fecit ut omnis plenitudo, &c. *Fragm. Irenæi*, p. 342. ed. Bened. Comp. Clem. Alex. p. 647, 679.

[p] See Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 45, 138.

I observe, lest the word *taught*, taken from what is customary amongst men, should be apt to convey a low *idea*, when applied (though in a more refined and elevated sense) to the Persons of the ever blessed Trinity [q]. It is very certain that the Son has his knowledge, and every other perfection, from the Father, in the same sense as he hath also his nature or substance from the Father: but it should be considered, that after our blessed Lord had said, "The Son can do nothing of himself," (John v. 19.) he immediately added, "For what things soever he (the "Father) doth, these also doth the Son likewise." Let it then be acknowledged, that *the Son can* know *nothing of himself*, provided only that we add this consideration to it, that "what things soever the Father *knoweth*, these "also *knoweth* the Son likewise;" and then it will appear that those expressions, which the objectors lay hold on, are so far from denoting any imperfection in the Son's knowledge, that, on the contrary, they set forth the great and unmeasurable perfection of it, as being inseparably linked with, and indeed one and the same in extent and degree with, the *Father's*.

3. A third objection [r] against what we assert is taken from Rev. i. 1. "The revelation of Jesus Christ, which "God gave unto him." But this has no difficulty with any who consider that all the transactions of God the Father with mankind are *in* and *by Christ Jesus*. Every revelation of God is through Christ his Son, the Revealer and Interpreter of the otherwise unknown Father, and his

[q] *Dicere* autem et *loqui*, in Trinitate, non secundum consuetudinem nostram——accipiendum, sed juxta formam incorporalium naturarum——neque enim ignorante Filio (qui Sapientia et Veritas est) Pater suam nunciat voluntatem; cum omne quod loquitur sapiens verusque subsistens in sapientia habeat, et in substantia. *Loqui* ergo Patrem et *audire* Filium, vel e contrario, Filio loquente, *audire* Patrem, ejusdem naturæ in Patre et Filio, consensusque, significatio est. *Didym. de Spir. S.* p. 515. ed. Bened.

"Filius nihil a semetipso possit facere, nisi viderit Patrem facientem:" in sensu scilicet facientem. Pater enim sensu agit; Filius vero, qui in Patris sensu est, videns perficit. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* cap. 15.

[r] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 45, 172.

will, to men. This order and economy, observable in the Persons of the *sacred Trinity*, is what we ought humbly to adore and reverence, rather than pry too curiously into; lest, pretending to be "wise above what is written," we fall from our own steadfastness, and lose ourselves in inextricable mazes.

4. The last and most material objection against us is from Mark xiii. 32. "But of that day, and that hour, "knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in hea-"ven, neither the Son, but the Father." Or "Father only," as it is in Matt. xxiv. 36. which the author of *Scripture Doctrine* particularly taketh notice of[s]. He does not, in terms, declare whether this text be, in his opinion, a proof of God the Son's being *ignorant* of any thing; but is content to say[t], or insinuate, as from Irenæus, (though he mistranslates his author,) that the *Father is superior in knowledge*, and that he only has *perfect knowledge:* very suspicious and doubtful expressions, and left without guard or caution. But to come to the point: I am to show that these texts of St. Mark and St. Matthew prove nothing at all against the *perfect knowledge*, or strict *omniscience*, of the *divine nature* of Christ. It is not said, the *Son of God* knew not the day of judgment; but the *Son*, that is, the *Son of man*, as appears from the context in both the *Evangelists:* Matt. xxiv. 37, 39. Mark xiii. 26, 34. And it is well observed by Athanasius[u], that, after our Lord had mentioned the *angels* as not knowing that day, he did not add, *neither the Holy Ghost;* that it might still be considered, that if the *Holy Ghost* knew the day, well might also *God the Son* know it; and that therefore what is here said of the *Son*, relates to the *Son of man* only. It is objected by Crellius and others, that it could not with truth and sincerity be said of *Christ*, that he was *ignorant* of the day, if he knew it in any capacity; as it cannot be

[s] See Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 45, 132.
[t] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 133, 134.
[u] Athanas. tom. i. p. 593.

denied that man is *immortal*, so long as he is *immortal* in any respect or capacity. But to this I answer, that as it may be truly said of the *body* of man, that it is not *immortal*, though the *soul* be: so it may be truly said, that the *Son of man* was *not knowing*, though the *Son of God* knew every thing. Now, since *Christ* may speak of himself, either as *Son of God*, or as *Son of man*; it is not inconsistent with truth and sincerity for him to deny that he knew what he really did know in one capacity, while he was *ignorant* of it in another. Our Lord says in one place, "Now I am no more in the world," John xvii. 11. and in another place, "Ye have the poor always with "you, but me ye have not always," Matt. xxvi. 11. denying that he was, or should be, any longer present with his disciples: which can only be understood of his human nature and bodily presence; for in another respect he elsewhere says, "Lo, I am with you always," Matt. xxviii. 20. and, "If any man love me—my Father will "love him, and we will come unto him, and make our "abode with him," John xiv. 23. From hence we see that our blessed Lord might, without any breach of sincerity, *deny* that of himself considered in one capacity, which he could not have *denied* in another. He denies the knowledge of the day of judgment, but in respect of his *human nature;* in which respect also he is said to have "increased "in wisdom," Luke ii. 52. the divine *Logos* having with the human nature assumed the *ignorance* and other *infirmities* proper to it[x]. If it be objected that the *Son* is here placed after the *angels*, and that the *gradation* requires that we should understand the text of a nature *superior to angels;* it is easily answered, that the *Son* of *man's* union with the *Logos*, and the particular concern the *Son* of *man* has in the last judgment, are sufficient to account for the supposed *climax*, or *gradation*[y].

[x] See Mr. Boyse's very judicious account of this text, in answer to the pretences of Mr. Emlyn, who never thought fit to make any reply to that part.

[y] See Dr. Bennet on the Trinity, p. 154, &c.

Upon the whole then it appears, that our Lord might very sincerely and justly say, that he knew not the day or hour of the final judgment, understanding it of himself considered in his *human* capacity; though at the same time, in another respect, he could not be ignorant of any thing[z]. If it be pretended farther, that the *Son of God*, as such, and every other person whatever, is excluded, because of the words "Father only;" I answer, that the *exclusive* term *only* is not to be so strictly interpreted as to exclude what *essentially* belongs to the *Father*, and may be reckoned to him, as included in him, his WORD, or SPIRIT. It is said, Rev. xix. 12. of God the *Son*, that "he had a name written, which no *one* (οὐδεὶς) knew but "he himself." Now if it be reasonable and just to infer from thence, that the *Father* was *ignorant* of that *name;* then let it also be reasonable to infer from this place of St. Matthew, that the *Son* was *ignorant* of the day of *judgment:* or, if such inference be manifestly false and unjustifiable in one case, there must be something more than the bare force of the *exclusive* term to make it true or justifiable in the other.

From what hath been said it is manifest, that holy Scripture has by necessary consequence, and also in *express* terms, ascribed *omniscience* to the Son of God; and that the pretences against it are of no weight; being

z A *learned* gentleman has lately attempted a different solution of the difficulty arising from these texts; for which I heartily thank him. I do not dislike the proposing of several ways of coming to the same point: only I wish the author had been content with *recommending* one, without *condemning* another. He may please to consider, that we are upon the *defensive* only with regard to these two texts; that we prove the Son's *omniscience* from other texts; and that a *respondent*, as such, can never *beg the question:* not to mention that the distinction of the two natures, *divine* and *human*, is demonstrably plain from other Scriptures; that therefore our solution is very natural and obvious; that it must be admitted with regard to Luke ii. 52. (and why not in the other place?) and that if our Saviour's *dark* and *mystical* way of speaking be *sufficient* to justify even so hard a supposition as that seems to be which this gentleman goes upon, it will be *more than sufficient* to take off all scruple with respect to so easy and so unexceptionable a solution as ours is.

founded only on misinterpretation of texts, and misapplication of what relates to *Christ* in one capacity, to him considered in another.

3. I proceed, thirdly, to another *divine* attribute ascribed to *Christ* in holy Scripture, viz. *omnipresence*. The texts which prove it are these that follow. "Where two or "three are gathered together in my name, there am I in "the midst of them," Matt. xviii. 20. "Lo, I am with "you always, even unto the end of the world[a]," Matt. xxviii. 20. "By him all things consist," Col. i. 17. These texts demonstrate that our blessed Lord is present on earth, at the same time that he is also present in heaven; that his presence reaches to all the ends of the earth, to all men living quite round the globe, to the whole system of creatures; for "by him all things consist:" as much as to say, "In him they live, and move, and have their "being;" which is the most lively and emphatical description of the *omnipresence* of God. Christ's *omnipresence* is likewise intimated from the worship ordered to be paid him by men, by angels[b], by the whole creation[c]. The same thing may certainly be inferred from his being Creator of the universe. Hence it is that the ancients do, with one voice, declare for the *omnipresence* of God the Son[d]. Some of them indeed have been thought to have given into contrary sentiments, in their disputes with the Noëtians or Jews: but, upon careful inquiry, this appears to be only a groundless surmise; as is largely and solidly proved by the judicious and learned Bp. Bull[e].

It may perhaps be objected, that the Son's being present to all men, or even to all creatures, does not prove

[a] Vid. Origen. contr. Cels. p. 239. In Joh. p. 122, 128, 419.

[b] Heb. i. 6.

[c] Rev. v. 8.

Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo adest ubique invocatus, cum hæc *hominis* natura non sit, sed *Dei*, ut *adesse omni loco* possit? *Novat.* cap. 14.

[d] Just. Mart. Apol. ii. cap. 11. p. 27. ed. Ox. Irenæus, p. 190, 231, 315. ed. Bened. Clem. Alex. p. 711, 831, 840. ed. Ox. Tertull. adv. Prax. c. 23. Origen. contr. Cels. p. 239, 164. Hippolyt. Fragm. p. 45. vol. ii. Fabric.

[e] Bull. Defens. Fid. Nic. sect. iv. cap. 3.

his *omnipresence* in the largest and fullest sense. To which it is sufficient to reply, that though there is not any Scripture-proof of an absolute *omnipresence* of the Son, extending beyond the limits of the world into I know not what imaginary *extramundane* spaces, yet there is full proof of his *omnipresence* through the *whole creation:* which is, to all intents and purposes, the very same thing to us with *divine omnipresence;* and is as high as Scripture has any where carried the *omnipresence* even of God the *Father*. Thus far I have proceeded in the proof of the *divine attributes* ascribed in Scripture to our Saviour *Christ:* the *titles* I have recounted and vindicated in a former discourse. Nothing now remains but

III. To sum up the force of the general argument, and to obviate such general objections as are brought to weaken our conclusion. I have left myself but little room for this: indeed, much is not needful. If the premises stand, the conclusion makes itself. Every single *attribute* that hath been mentioned, every single *title*, almost, justifies the inference, that *Christ* is no *creature*, but truly and strictly *God:* all together make so full, so clear, so irrefragable a demonstration of it, that one might justly wonder how any, who retain the least regard or reverence towards the sacred Writ, can make any serious doubt of it. It cannot be shown that any one of those *names*, *titles*, *attributes*, and *essential properties* of God, was ever given, in this manner, and with those circumstances, to any *creature*. If one or two of them (as the name *God* for instance) might be *equivocal*, yet the rest are not so; and the *manner* and *circumstances*, wherewith they are ascribed to *Christ*, sufficiently determine the sense of them. If *titles* alone are not of weight sufficient, *attributes* come in to strengthen and confirm them; and if any scruples remain still, *creation* and *adoration* understood of, and attributed to *Christ*, render the proof still more irrefragable. The strength and number of the evidences concurring to establish Christ's *divinity*, when fewer and less considerable might have been sufficient, is very wonderful;

as if Divine Wisdom had purposely so ordered it, foreseeing what opposition would be made to it. Were it possible, by any quirk or subtlety, to elude every *single* evidence, yet the joint force of all together would be very considerable; because it is hardly to be imagined that, in an affair of this moment, God would ever have suffered so many plausible appearances, and specious presumptions, of a thing that is not, to stand in Scripture, for the *deception* even of *wise*, and *good*, and *conscientious* men. The *Jewish Church* were trained up to a sense of the *true God*, by those very *characters* which are applied to Christ. Upon those they formed their *idea* of the *divine* Being; and would have thought it *blasphemy* to have ascribed the same, though by way of *figure* only, (in so *serious* a concern,) to any *creature*. And not they only, but all mankind must allow, that none more expressive and significant characters of *God* can be devised, than several of those are which are applied to *Christ*. If we are mistaken in this matter, it is a mistake which the Christian world, by plain force of Scripture, has, in a manner, inevitably been led into. He must be a very weak man who can imagine, that the doctrine of the Trinity could ever have come in, or could have subsisted half a century, were it not for the plain and irresistible reasons for it, appearing in *holy Scripture*. How the matter now stands all the Christian world over (except a few Reclaimants) is very well known. If we run up fourteen hundred years higher, or thereabout, we find the body of the Bishops and Clergy, summoned from all parts to debate this very *question*, determining at length as we have done, and as much *deceived* (if we are deceived) as we are at this day. If we look sixty years higher, and may judge of the principles of the Church at that time, from those of the two celebrated Bishops of Alexandria and Rome, with their Clergy; we still find them lying under the same fatal *deception* that prevails now. Go up a hundred years higher, to the middle of the second century; still, all the way as we pass, we meet with plain marks and characters of the same *delusion*

(if it be any) overspreading the Church of *Christ*, at a time when *miracles* were not ceased, nor *revelations* uncommon. In short, when we have carried our searches up to the very *apostolic* age, we still observe manifest footsteps of the same *error* (if it be one) prevailing: nor can we find so much as one man of any considerable repute among Christians, whom we can certainly prove to have been free from it. Surely God had soon forsaken his *heritage*, and given up his Church to *strong delusions*, (that Church against which the *gates of hell shall* never *prevail*,) if we have been mistaken in these things. It appears however from hence, how powerful and forcible the Scripture evidences of Christ's *divinity* have ever been upon the minds of men: not the illiterate, unthinking, or injudicious; but the wisest, the most considerate, the brightest ornaments and the most eminent lights of the Christian Church. But our *adversaries* are men that can look up against all these evidences, and can harden their minds in opposition to them. Let us see what they have to plead, in order to fence off conviction, and to keep their wretched cause in any tolerable countenance, at this day.

1. To our argument, so far as respects the *divine titles* given to God the Son in holy Scripture, it is objected[f], that the highest titles of all, such as ὕψιστος, *the Most High*, or *Supreme*; παντοκράτωρ, the *Almighty*, or *Supreme over all*; εἷς Θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ πάντων, *the one God and Father of all*; εἷς Θεὸς ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα, *one God of whom are all things*; are never applied to the *Son* in Scripture. To which I answer, first, that if God the Son has not every *divine* title which is applied in Scripture to God the *Father*, yet he has more than enough to prove that he is *no creature*, but that he is truly, strictly, and essentially God: so that if any other high titles be ascribed to the *Father*, (not as *Father*, but as *God*;) those also, though not specially applied to the *Son* in Scripture, are virtually contained and necessarily included in those other that are *expressly*

[f] Modest Plea.

given him. I answer, secondly, that the title of παντοκράτωρ (*Almighty*) is expressly applied to God the Son in Scripture, as hath been shown[g]: and the sense of ὕψιστος (*Most High*, or *Supreme over all*) is plainly ascribed to him, Rom. ix. 5. And very probably the *title* itself in other Scriptures is applied to him[h], were it worth the while to insist upon a fruitless nicety, after so many and great proofs of what we maintain. As to the titles of *one God and Father of all*, and *one God the Father of whom are all things*, we should think it very strange indeed to find them applied to *God* the *Son;* because, taken all together, they are *personal* titles, peculiarly belonging to *God the Father*. It must appear very much for the advantage of our cause, that Scripture has so indifferently applied every *divine* title almost to *Father* and *Son*, as barely to leave no more than were proper or necessary to keep up the distinction of *Persons:* and it must appear as a standing monument against our adversaries, to their shame and confusion, that after we have given them every proof that can be requisite to show that the Son is strictly *God*, yet none shall be thought sufficient, unless it be a proof of what we pretend not, of *God the Son's* being the very same Person with *God the Father*. This indeed is the secret meaning of all the opposition made against us: here lies the mystery of their *heresy* in this one false principle; that the Son cannot be the *supreme God*, that is, not truly, strictly, and essentially God, unless he be the very *Person* of the Father. Upon this bottom rest both *Sabellianism* and *Arianism;* and this is what the advocates of both have, betwixt them, been labouring to prove now for fifteen hundred years, and have met with nothing but disappointment. To conclude this article: we readily allow that the title of *one God and Father of all* is no where applied, either in *Scripture* or *antiquity*, to God

[g] Serm. vi. p. 136.

[h] Psalm lxxxvii. 5. Vid. Tertull. contr. Prax. c. 27. Athanas. p. 889. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iii. cap. 2. p. 498. Psalm lxxxii. 18. Vid. Athan. p. 889. Ambros. p. 498. Luke i. 76. Vid. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iii. cap. 2. p. 498.

the Son; because the *Son* is not the *Father:* but the title of the *one God* we prove to belong to him, as often as we prove that he is *Lord* and *God, Jehovah, over all God blessed,* and the like; for Scripture acknowledges no more *Gods* than *one.* The title of *one God the Father of whom are all things,* may also be peculiar to the *Father*[i], because of the *personal* distinguishing characters, *Father,* and *of whom,* denoting some particular manner of *subsisting,* or *operating.* But if the Son be God, *by whom* are all things, he is *essentially,* though not *personally,* the same God with the *Father,* unless there be more Gods than one. But,

2. Another objection to our general argument drawn from the *titles* and *attributes* is, that they are ascribed to the Father in a *higher* and more *eminent manner* than to the Son[k]. This objection is so loosely and carelessly worded, that it is not easy to fix any certain sense to it. Would but the *objectors* say, in plain terms, that the titles of *God,* or *Jehovah,* or *Almighty,* when applied to the Son, do not signify truly and strictly *divine, necessarily existing, supreme over all,* as when applied to the Father,

[i] N. B. The author of *Modest Plea &c. continued* is so destitute of arguments from Scripture, that he is forced to *repeat* this text of the Corinthians (though nothing to his purpose) perpetually; and it is to serve for an *answer* almost to every thing. The Son is not *the one God of whom are all things,* says he, over and over. And what then? He is not that Person there styled the *one God,* and particularized by this character, *of whom are all things:* that is, the *Son* is not the *Father.* Who pretends that he is? But *he is the Lord and God by whom are all things.* The Father *singly* is not the *first cause* of all *creatures,* but Father and Son (including always the Holy Ghost) together; as appears from that very passage. See my second Sermon, p. 31, 32, &c. The author's mixing and blending *personal* and *essential* characters together, with too *artificial* a confusedness, may take with some readers; but is easily seen through by men of sense. There is no more in it than this; that the *Son* cannot be *God* in the proper and strict sense, because he is a *Son:* whereas the contrary is the truth; he is *God* because he is *God's proper* Son, of the *same nature* with him. This author will never prove that *unbegotten,* a *relative* character, is the proper notion of the word *God;* but *divine perfections,* wherever they really subsist, or in whatever *manner* they subsist, *unbegotten, begotten,* or *proceeding.*

[k] Modest Plea, p. 148.

we might readily know how to deal with them: or would they but say, that the attributes of *eternity, omniscience, omnipresence,* &c. when ascribed to the Son, signify no more than a *limited* duration, knowledge, presence, &c. we should thank them for speaking plain, and for giving us an opportunity of confuting what they have to plead for such rash and *blasphemous* assertions. But since they are pleased only to express themselves indefinitely and uncertainly, we can give them no *certain* answer more than this; that, supposing those *titles* or *attributes* to be ascribed in a more *emphatical* and *eminent* manner to the *Father,* as *first Person,* yet they are ascribed also to the *Son* in their utmost latitude and extent, and in the very *same sense; (omniscience* or *eternity* signifying neither more nor less than *omniscience* or *eternity,* whether applied to *one* or to the *other;*) and therefore the objection from the *more eminent* manner, according as it is understood, is either without *truth,* or without *weight.* The sum of all is only this, that the *Father* is *Father,* and the *Son* is *Son;* one *first* in *order,* the other *second.* Whatever consequences necessarily follow this *concession,* we are very ready to admit: and it would save us a great deal of trouble, if the *objectors* would but try the strength of their *philosophy,* and put the cause upon this single question, *Whether it were possible for God to have had a Son of the same nature, coequal and coeternal with him?* We shall be very ready to join issue with them upon this very point; and it seems to be both a fair and a short way of ending the controversy. But if they still delight in obscurity and darkness, declining a fair open examination of their tenets, running from the point in question, skreening themselves under general and ambiguous terms, insinuating what they will not say, and saying what they cannot prove: if this be the method they persist in, it will be easily seen that they seek not *truth,* but *lie in wait to deceive;* and are afraid of coming to the light, lest their *errors* should be made manifest.

Now to God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, be all glory for ever. Amen.

CHRIST'S DIVINITY

PROVED FROM

THE FORM OF BAPTISM.

The eighth Sermon preached April 6, 1720.

MATT. xxviii. 19.

Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.

THE text contains the solemn form of baptism prescribed by our blessed Lord himself, as a perpetual standing law to his Church. As soon as he had run through the great work of *redemption*, having completed his conquests over death and hell by his rising from the dead, he acquaints his disciples with the commencing of his *mediatorial* kingdom. "All power was given him both in hea-"ven and earth." Then was fulfilled the prophecy of the *royal Psalmist*, who, speaking in the person of God the Father, says, "Thou art my Son, this day have I be-"gotten thee. Ask of me, and I will give thee the hea-"then for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the "earth for thy possession," Ps. ii. 8. Our Lord having *redeemed* mankind, and thereby acquired a *new* and *special* claim to their homage and service, entered, as it were, and took possession of his purchased inheritance. The use he intended was, to bring *all nations*, now made his *own* by right of redemption, to the knowledge and worship of the true God. The honour of doing this was what

no *prophet* or *ambassador*, before him, was admitted to. It was reserved to the *fulness* of time, for the more illustrious manifestation and more pompous reception of the Son of God. And now, since Christ himself had undertaken to draw all men unto him, the first and principal thing which all the nations of the world were to have notice of, was the obligation they lay under to three Persons, of *high* character and distinction, and *related* to each other, called by the names of *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*. In this consisted the sum of Christianity: on this foundation were the Apostles to erect a Church all the world over. Here, if any where, a right understanding would be highly necessary; nor could any one err more dangerously or fundamentally, than in an article of so great importance. The text informs us of the commission given to the Apostles; and we need not doubt but that it was every where faithfully and punctually executed, both by them and their successors. We have sufficient proof of the matter of fact from Church writers[a] all along, and as high as Justin Martyr, who *lived* in or near the apostolic age, and *wrote* within forty years of it. It was then the constant practice of the Church to baptize in this

[a] Ἐπ' ὀνόματος γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων καὶ δεσπότου Θεοῦ, καὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ Πνεύματος ἁγίου, τὸ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τότε λουτρὸν ποιοῦνται. *Just. Apol.* i. cap. 79. p. 116. Ox. ed.

Potestatem Regenerationis in Deum dans Discipulis, dicebat eis: *Euntes docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti. Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 17. p. 208.

Novissime mandans ut tinguerent in *Patrem*, et *Filium*, et *Spiritum Sanctum*, non in unum: nam nec semel, sed ter, ad singula nomina, in Personas singulas tinguimur. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* cap. 26. Vid. etiam De Baptism. cap. 13.

Dominus enim post resurrectionem Discipulos suos mittens, quemadmodum baptizare deberent, instituit et docuit, dicens; *Data est mihi omnis potestas in cœlo et in terra: ite ergo, et docete gentes omnes, baptizantes eos in nomine Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti;* insinuat Trinitatem, cujus sacramento gentes baptizarentur. *Cypr.* Ep. lxxiii. p. 200. ed. Ox.

Quomodo ergo quidam dicunt foris extra ecclesiam, imo contra ecclesiam, modo in nomine Jesu Christi, ubicunque et quomodocunque gentilem baptizatum remissionem peccatorum consequi posse; quando ipse Christus gentes baptizari jubeat in plena et adunata Trinitate? *Cypr.* Ep. lxxiii. p 206.

form, pursuant to our Lord's commission; (a certain argument that this text of St. Matthew appeared in the *copies* then in use, as it is also now found in all the *copies*, and all the ancient *versions*;) and there is no just reason to suspect, but that baptism had been constantly administered in that very *form* from, and in, the times of the Apostles.

There is indeed some ground of scruple, (which the heretics [b] of former times laid hold on,) arising from the history of the Acts, which no where tells us of the Apostles baptizing *in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*; but mentions only their baptizing "in the name of "Jesus Christ [c]," or "in the name of the Lord Jesus [d]," or "in the name of the Lord [e]." St. Cyprian, in answer to this difficulty, seems to admit the matter of fact so far, that the Apostles did baptize some in the *name of Christ Jesus*; but *Jews* only; not *Gentiles*, whom, he thinks, the *commission* peculiarly respected, and whose circumstances were something different from those of the *Jews* [f]. Nevertheless it may be doubted, whether this was Cyprian's solution of the difficulty, or no; some passages [g] of the same epistle seeming to carry a contrary sense: and considering how unanimous most, if not all the other early writers [h] of the Church have been in denying the fact, that ever the Apostles baptized in any different form from what our Lord prescribed, one may incline to think that Cyprian was of the same judgment. The most pro-

[b] Vid. Cyprian. Epist. ad Jubaian. p. 205, 206. ad Pompei.

[c] Acts ii. 38. Comp. iii. 27.

[d] Acts viii. 16. xix. 5. Comp. Rom. vi. 3.

[e] Acts x. 48. xxii. 16.

[f] Alia enim fuit Judæorum sub Apostolis ratio, alia est Gentilium conditio. *Cypr. ad Jub.* Ep. lxxiii. p. 205.

[g] Jesu Christi mentionem fecit Petrus, (Act. ii. 38.) non quasi Pater omitteretur, sed ut Patri quoque Filius adjungeretur. *Cyprian.* ibid. p. 206.

[h] Some doubt has been made of St. Ambrose as to this particular; of which see the notes to the Benedictine edition, Ambros. de Sp. S. lib. i. cap. 3. p. 607. See also Mr. Bingham's Antiquities of the Christian Church, b. xi. cap. 3.

bable and most generally received account of this matter is, that the Apostles baptized all, both Jews and Gentiles, in the same form; "in the name of the Father, and of the "Son, and of the Holy Ghost;" and that when they are said to have baptized in the *name of Christ Jesus*, the meaning only is, that they baptized *into the faith and religion of Christ Jesus;* in that method, and according to that form, which our Lord himself had prescribed[i]. The Apostles administered Christ's, not John's baptism; that baptism which Christ had appointed: St. Luke expresses it briefly by baptizing "in the name of Christ;" not because it ran in his *name* only, but because it was instituted by his authority. Thus the practice of the Apostles is reconciled with the *commission* given them. As to the practice of the Christian Church after the Apostles, there can be no doubt of it, considering how many and how early records we have of it. The main thing now to be inquired into is, the meaning, intent, or purport of that solemn form, "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, "and of the Holy Ghost." Baptism had been an ancient custom of the Jews, long before our Saviour's appearance in the flesh[k]. It was by *baptism* that they admitted *proselytes* into their religion, entering them thereby into covenant with the *true God*, in opposition to all the gods of the nations. This very practice our blessed Lord took up, adapting it to the like purposes; only altering the *form* of it, now made to run in the name of the *Father, Son,* and *Holy Ghost*[l]. Had it run in the name of *Christ*

[i] Τὸ μὲν εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν βαπτισθῆναι, σημαίνει ἂν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐντολὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ βαπτισθῆναι· τουτέστιν, εἰς Πατέρα καὶ Υἱὸν καὶ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα. *Eulogius apud Phot.* cod. cclxxx. p. 1608.

In nomine *Jesu Christi* jussi sunt baptizari, (Act. ii. 38.) et tamen intelliguntur non baptizari nisi in *nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. August. contr. Maxim.* lib. ii. cap. 17. p. 715. See Bull, Op. Posth. p. 850, &c.

[k] See Mr. Wall's Introduction to his History of Infant Baptism.

[l] The Jews baptized proselytes *into the name of the Father;* that is, into the profession of God, whom they called by the name of *Father.*—It was proper among the Gentiles (to baptize) *in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,* that they might be hereby instructed in the

only, one might have imagined that *baptizing unto Christ* had been much of the same import with *baptizing unto Moses; Christ* being considered as the *minister* and *publisher* of the *Christian* religion, in like manner as Moses was of the *Mosaic* institution. But since the *Father* himself is one of the Persons specified, into whom the nations were to be baptized, *baptizing into* must here bear a much higher sense; viz. entering into covenant with a Person as *God*, professing *faith* in him as such, listing one's self into his *service*, and vowing all obedience and submission to him. This is the most natural and obvious import of this rite of initiation, this solemn form of baptizing "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of "the Holy Ghost:" i. e. into the *faith*, *service*, and *worship* of the holy Trinity, the one true God. That this is really the case I shall endeavour to show farther, both from the reason and nature of the thing itself, and from the testimonies of the *ancients*.

I. We may argue the point from the nature and reason of the thing itself, which may suggest to us the following considerations.

1. That the *nations* were to be baptized in the name of *three* Persons, in the *same manner*, and therefore very probably in the *same sense*, as in the name of *one*. Whatever honour, reverence, or regard is paid to the *Father*, in this solemn rite of initiation, the same may reasonably be supposed to be paid to all three. Is he recognized as the object of worship? So are the other two Persons likewise. Is he God and Lord over us? So are they. Are we his subjects, servants, soldiers listed under him? So are we equally listed under all. Are we hereby regenerated and made the temple of God the Father? So are we also regenerated unto the other two Persons, and are likewise made the temple of the *Son* and of the *Holy Ghost*. For what good reason can be given why the same out-

doctrine of the true God. Hear this, O Arian and Socinian. *Lightfoot. Op.* vol. ii. p. 275.

ward act, respecting all the three, shall not carry with it the same import and significancy? Or if there be any doubt or question of what it signifies, how can we better resolve it than from what is clear and plain, so far as respects the *Father;* inferring it of the other two Persons from analogy and parity of circumstances?

2. To confirm which we may consider, secondly, that in the very names of *Father* and *Son*, a near *relation, alliance*, and *unity* between *two* of the *Persons* mentioned is intimated; and parity of reason will infer the like for the *third*. It is not said, in the name of *God* and his *two faithful servants;* nor, into *God*, and *Christ*, and the *Holy Ghost;* which might have suggested a thought that one only of the three was *God:* but it is in the name of the *Father* and of the *Son*, (how equal and how familiar!) without any note of distinction more than that of a *personal* relation, carrying with it the *idea* of *sameness* of nature; as every *father* and *son*, among men, are of the *same human nature* with each other. It might therefore reasonably be presumed, from the wording of the very *form* of baptism, that the two first Persons named were equally *divine:* and the inference from thence would reach to the *divinity* of the *third*, to make all suitable and consistent. Besides that the epithet of *Holy*, and the name of *Ghost*, or *Spirit*, to which it is joined, could not but favour and countenance such an apprehension of him.

3. It may farther be considered, that a new religion was to be introduced and ushered in with this solemn form of words. The Gentiles were to be taught to turn from their *vanities to the living God*, to renounce their *idols* and *false gods*, and so to be baptized "in the name of the Father, "and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." What more natural or obvious thought could occur to them on this occasion, than that, instead of all their *deities*, whom they had before bowed down to, they were now to serve, worship, and adore *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, the only *true* and *living* God? What could they imagine from this pompous and solemn proclaiming of these three Persons,

in opposition to all other gods, but that these three had really that *divinity* which was presumed only with respect to the gods of the nations; and had a *natural* right to all that homage and service which men ought to pay to a *divine* Being? I may add, that the form running in the *name*, not *names* of those three, might insinuate that the *authority* of all the three was the *same*, their power equal, their Persons undivided, and their glory one[n].

4. Give me leave to observe farther, that nothing can appear more unreasonable or unnatural than to suppose that *God* and two *creatures* are here joined together in this so solemn rite of initiation into a new *religion*, into the service of the *living God*, in opposition to all *creature-worship*. Acts xiv. 15. Rom. i. 25. For, as no rational account can be given of the *Son* and *Holy Ghost's* being so indifferently joined with the *Father*, in so public an act, and of such high importance to the salvation of all men, unless it be that all men are required to have *faith* in, and to pay *worship* and *service* to them also, as well as to the Father: so neither can it be reasonably imagined that they are recommended to us in any such capacity, as Persons to be *believed* in, *served*, and *adored*, if they be *creatures* only, or if they be any thing else but the true and *living* God.

Thus far I have been arguing the point from the nature

[n] Ubi *unum nomen* audis, unus est Deus: sicut de semine Abrahæ dictum est, et exponit Paulus Apostolus: *in semine tuo benedicentur omnes gentes: non dixit, in seminibus, tanquam in multis, sed tanquam in uno, et semine tuo, quod est Christus.* Sicut ergo quia ubi non dicit in seminibus, docere te voluit Apostolus, quia unus est Christus: sic et hic cum dictum est *in nomine*, non *in nominibus*, quomodo ibi in semine, non in seminibus, probatur *unus Deus* Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus. *August. in Johan.* tract. 6.

Vid. Petav. de Trin. lib. ii. cap. 12. §. 8. cap. 14. §. 4, 5, 6.

Baptisma unum: eodem enim modo, et in Patrem, et in Filium, et in Spiritum Sanctum baptizamur, et ter mergimur, ut Trinitatis unum appareat sacramentum. Et non baptizamur in *nominibus* Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, sed in *uno nomine* quod intelligitur *Deus*. Et miror qua consequentia in uno vocabulo, eodem opere, et eodem sacramento, naturæ diversitatem, Arius, Macedonius, et Eunomius suspicentur. *Hieronym. Com. in Eph.* cap. iv. p. 362. ed. Bened.

and circumstances of the thing itself, without taking in what *Scripture* has revealed of the nature, character, and offices of the three Persons. That indeed would be the best comment upon the form of baptism: but it must be waved here, my design being to raise a distinct argument for the *divinity* of Christ from the *form of baptism*, considered by itself; only taking in such considerations as naturally arise from it, together with the sense of *antiquity* upon it, which I come next to examine.

II. Whatever uncertainty there may be in our reasonings on this head, (though the least that can in justice be said of them is, that they are extremely probable,) if they appear to be countenanced by the concurring sentiments of *antiquity*, they must then be owned to be of much greater force, and will the more readily be submitted to by all wise and considering men. The author of *Scripture Doctrine*[n] is very right in referring us to the sentiments of the *primitive Church* for the true meaning of this text of St. Matthew, containing the *form of baptism:* though he happens, as is usual with him, to give a very lame and crude account of *antiquity;* interpreting the form of baptism by the *Apostles' Creed*, (as he pretends,) and the *Creed* itself as he pleases. As to the *Apostles'* (that is, the Roman) *Creed*, and whether it be a *professed paraphrase* upon the text of St. Matthew, I shall say more in the sequel: in the interim it will be proper to inquire into the sentiments of the earliest writers, in respect of the true and full import of the *form of baptism*.

Justin Martyr is the oldest writer we have, that mentions the commission to baptize "in the name of the "Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."

[n] His words are: "How this text was universally understood in the pri-"mitive Church cannot be doubted, there being still extant a *professed para-*"*phrase* upon it, even the *Apostles' Creed*; which, from the earliest times of "Christianity, was, with little variation, in the several churches, the *Bap-*"*tismal Creed*, or *Profession of Faith*, which all Christians were taught, on "purpose that *they might understand what it was they were baptized into.*" *Clarke's Reply*, p. 204.

How he and the Christians of his time understood it, may be easily gathered from his writings. In his first *Apology*, he takes upon him to answer the charge of *atheism*, brought against the Christians by their heathen persecutors: and there he has these remarkable words. "We are called *Atheists*. And indeed we confess that "in respect of such *reputed* gods, we are *Atheists*: but "not in respect of the most true God, untainted with "evil, the Father of righteousness, and soberness, and of "other virtues. *Him*, and his *Son* that came from him, "(and who taught us and the host of other angels that "are *good*, being his followers and likened to him, these "things [o],) and the *Prophetic Spirit*, we worship and "adore, honouring them in spirit (in *reason*) and in "truth [p]." Here it is observable that Justin, in answer to the charge of *atheism*, shows both what and whom the Christians worshipped: not God the *Father* only, but the *Son* also, and the *Holy Ghost*. The worship of these three he opposes to the worship of the *reputed* gods of the Gentiles: a plain sign of his understanding *baptism* to be an entering into covenant with all the three; and engaging in the service, faith, and worship of them as *divine*: yet not as *three Gods*, (for all antiquity declare against it;) neither yet as *one God* and two *creatures*, (for that is contrary to the supposition of their being *divine*, besides that all antiquity, and Justin in particular, is against *creature-worship* [q]:) but as *one God*, the *Father*,

[o] See this passage justified, Bull. D. F. p. 70. Op. Posth. p. 962, 1037.

[p] Ἐνθένδε καὶ ἄθεοι κεκλήμεθα. καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν τῶν τοιούτων νομιζομένων θεῶν ἄθεοι εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τοῦ ἀληθεστάτου, καὶ πατρὸς δικαιωσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, ἀνεπιμίκτου τι κακίας θεοῦ. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνόν τι, καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ἐλθόντα, (καὶ διδάξαντα ἡμᾶς ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἑπομένων καὶ ἐξομοιουμένων ἀγαθῶν ἀγγέλων στρατὸν) πνεῦμά τε τὸ προφητικὸν σεβόμεθα, καὶ προσκυνοῦμεν, λόγῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ τιμῶντες. *Just. Apol.* i. cap. 6. p. 11, 12. Ox.

[q] Τὸν θεὸν μόνον δεῖ προσκυνεῖν. *Just. Apol.* i. cap. 21. Θεὸν μὲν μόνον προσκυνοῦμεν. *Ibid.* cap. 23. Since Justin declares so plainly for the *worship* of God alone, in the very same Apology where he declares likewise for the *worship* of the *three* Persons, it is manifest that he includes all the *three* in the *alone God*.

with his *Son* and *Holy Spirit*. Justin does again, in the same *Apology*[r], assert the *worship* of all the three Persons; mentioning a difference of *order*, not of *nature*, amongst them. From the whole it appears that, in Justin's account, the *God* of the Christians is *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost;* the same whereunto they are baptized.

Athenagoras, almost contemporary with Justin, is our next author; and he affords us still stronger and more express evidence of what I am contending for. In answer to the same charge of *atheism*, he breaks forth into this expression: "Who would not be astonished to hear us "called *Atheists*, who acknowledge the *Father* as God, "and the *Son* God, and the *Holy Ghost;* asserting their "union of power (or *power* of *union*) and distinction of "order[s]." Here again we may observe, that *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, are opposed to the *heathen deities;* and are also represented as distinct in respect of *order*, but in another respect *one;* and consequently not as *three Gods*, but as the *one God* of the Christians, instead of the heathen multiplicity. He makes the like answer elsewhere to the same charge of *atheism*, mentioning *Father* and *Son* as the *God* (not Gods) which the Christians worshipped[t]. From hence then we may very justly infer that the Christians, in his time, did not understand the words of the *form* of *baptism*, of *God* and *two creatures;* nor of one *supreme God* and two *inferior Gods:* but of three *divine* Persons, and all but *one God*.

About the same time with Athenagoras lived the author of a *profane dialogue*, ascribed to Lucian. Whatever doubt there may be about the *author*, there is little

[r] Justin. Apol. i. cap. xvi. p. 24.

[s] Τίς οὖν οὐκ ἂν ἀπορήσαι, λέγοντας Θεὸν πατέρα, καὶ υἱὸν Θεὸν, καὶ πνεῦμα ἅγιον, δυκνύντας αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ἑνώσει δύναμιν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τάξει διαίρεσιν, ἀκούσας ἀθέους καλουμένους. *Athenag. Legat.* cap. x. p. 40. Ox.

[t] Οὐκ ἰσμὲν ἄθεοι, Θεὸν ἄγοντες τὸν ποιητὴν τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς, καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγον. *Athenag.* cap. xxvi. p. 122.

Comp. cap. xi. p. 46. cap. xxii. p. 96.

or none about the *time* he lived in[u]; which was the *second century*, towards the middle of it. Whoever he was, he appears to have been well acquainted with the *Christian* tenets, though a professed Pagan. He introduces, in a jeering manner, a Christian catechizing an heathen; and, among other things, instructing his *catechumen* in the mystery of the Trinity. For to the question, *Whom he should swear by?* he that personates the *Christian* returns this answer: "By the God that reigns "on high, the great, the immortal and heavenly, with "the *Son* of the *Father*, and the *Spirit* proceeding from "the Father; one in three, and three in one: take these "for your Jupiter, imagine this to be your God[x]." Here we see what kind of instructions used to be given to *catechumens*, preparatory to baptism: for it is to those that this author, while he ridicules them, plainly alludes. Here we may observe what baptizing into the *three Persons* meant at that time. It was receiving those three as *divine*, and as *one supreme God*. It is not one *supreme God*, and two *inferior Gods*; but *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost* are represented as being in the place of the one supreme Jupiter, and being all together *one God*.

Pass we on, next, to other testimonies of the same thing, in *Christian* writers of the same century. Irenæus is our next in order, about the year 173. He no where gives us any professed paraphrase upon the *form* of *baptism*: but from the *creeds*[y] which he hath left us, with his interpretation of them; and from what he has occasionally said of the *three Persons*, it is very manifest that he (with the Church in his time) believed the *Son* and *Holy Ghost* to be inseparably united in the work of cre-

[u] Vid. Bull. Def. F. Nic. p. 73. Judic. p. 32. Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. lib. iv. cap. 16. p. 504.

[x] Τψιμέδοντα Θεὸν, μέγαν, ἄμβροτον, οὐρανίωνα, υἱὸν πατρὸς, πνεῦμα ἐκ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, ἓν ἐκ τριῶν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς τρία· ταῦτα νόμιζε Ζῆνα, τὸν δὲ ἡγοῦ Θεόν. *Lucian. Philopatr.* p. 770. Compare p. 774.

[y] Vid. Iren. lib. i. cap. 10. p. 48. lib. i. cap. 22. p. 98. lib. iii. cap. 3. p. 176.

ation, and so intimate with the Father as to make (in a manner) but *one self* and *one same* with him [z]. Hence then it appears how he and the Church in his time understood the *form* of *baptism:* not of one *God* and two *creatures* joined together; (for he makes Father and Son *one God*, and *expressly* denies the Son to be a creature [a], *implicitly* denying it also of the Holy Ghost;) but of three *divine* Persons inseparable from each other, the one God of the Christians.

Clemens of Alexandria, another excellent writer, contemporary with Irenæus, is a farther evidence of what we are pleading for. He gives us a kind of short *baptismal* creed, as it seems, in these words: "ONE Father of the "whole universe, and ONE WORD of the whole universe, "and the Holy Ghost ONE, the same every where [b]." Clemens in this passage attributes the same divine *omnipresence* to every Person of the sacred *Trinity;* which

[z] Fecit ea per *semetipsum;* hoc est, per *Verbum* et per *Sapientiam* suam. *Iren.* lib. ii. cap. 30. p. 163.

Fecit ea per *semetipsum;* hoc est, per *Verbum* et *Sapientiam* suam. Adest enim ei semper *Verbum* et *Sapientia*, Filius et Spiritus, per quos, et in quibus, omnia libere et sponte fecit. *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 20. p. 253.

Qui igitur a Prophetis adorabatur *Deus vivus*, hic est vivorum Deus, et *Verbum* ejus, qui et loquutus est Moysi, &c. — Ipse igitur *Christus cum Patre* vivorum est Deus, qui loquutus est Moysi, &c. *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 5. p. 232.

Cum sit unus et idem Deus Pater, et *Verbum* ejus, semper adsistens humano generi, &c. *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 28. p. 266.

Is quidem, qui omnia fecerit, cum *Verbo* suo juste dicatur Deus et Dominus solus. *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 8. p. 183.

Unus Deus Pater ostenditur, qui est *super omnia*, et *per omnia*, et *in omnibus*. *Super omnia* quidem *Pater* et ipse est caput Christi: *per omnia* autem *Verbum* et ipse est caput Ecclesiæ: *in omnibus* autem nobis *Spiritus*, &c. *Iren.* lib. v. cap. 18. p. 315.

Ὁ γεννητὸς καὶ πεπλασμένος ἄνθρωπος κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν ἀγεννήτου γίνεται Θεοῦ. τοῦ μὲν πατρὸς εὐδοκοῦντος καὶ κελεύοντος, τοῦ δὲ υἱοῦ πράσσοντος καὶ δημιουργοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ πνεύματος τρέφοντος καὶ αὔξοντος. *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 38. p. 285. See this last passage explained in my Defence, &c. vol. i. p. 310.

[a] Vid. Iren. p. 132, 153, 217. ed. Bened. See Defence of some Queries, vol. i. p. 293, 310.

[b] Εἷς μὲν ὁ τῶν ὅλων πατήρ· εἷς δὲ καὶ ὁ τῶν ὅλων λόγος· καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἓν, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ. *Clem. Alex.* p. 123.

therefore he took to be really *divine*, and not made up of *God* and *creature*. And to show you farther that he looked upon all the three as *one God*, we may cite another passage from him as follows: "Let us give thanks "to the only Father and Son, Son and Father, to the Son "our Teacher and Master, together with the Holy Ghost, "one in all respects; in whom are all things—to whom "be glory both now and for ever[c]." When he says of the three Persons, that they are in *all respects* (or entirely) *one*, he means that they are *one God*; as is plain from another passage, where, speaking of Father and Son as being *one*, he explains it by their being *one God*[d]. It is therefore exceeding clear that, according to this writer, *Christians* were supposed to be *baptized*, not into *God* and two *creatures*[e], but into Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three *divine* Persons, *one God*. Thus far for testimonies of the second century, all within less than one hundred years of the last of the Apostles.

I pass on to Tertullian, at the head of the *third century*. There can be no question made of his sentiments in the present case. He tells us plainly, that the *Father is God*, and *the Son God*, and the *Holy Ghost God*, and *every one singly God*[f], and *all together make one God*[g]. He says farther, that this doctrine is, in a manner, the prime article in the Gospel, the very *sum* and *substance* of Christianity[h]. Undoubtedly he understood the solemn

[c] Εὐχαριστῶν τῷ μόνῳ πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ, υἱῷ καὶ πατρὶ, παιδαγωγῷ καὶ διδασκάλῳ υἱῷ, σὺν καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι· πάντα τῷ ἑνί· ἐν ᾧ τὰ πάντα.—ᾧ ἡ δόξα καὶ νῦν, καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας. *Clem. Pæd.* lib. iii. p. 311.

[d] Ἓν γὰρ ἄμφω, ὁ Θεός. *Clem. Pæd.* lib. i. cap. 8. p. 135.

[e] This is farther manifest from Clemens's declaring for the worship of *God* only, protesting against all *creature-worship*; (see p. 55, 59, 809, 825.) and yet admitting the *worship* of all the three Persons, p. 84, 311, 851.

[f] Pater Deus, et Filius Deus, et Spiritus Sanctus Deus, et Deus unusquisque. *Tert. contr. Prax.* cap. 13.

[g] Pater et Filius et Spiritus, tres crediti unum Deum sistunt. *Ibid.* cap. 31.

[h] Ibid. cap. 31.

form of baptism to contain that doctrine which he teaches; and that being baptized in the name of *Father, Son,* and *Holy Ghost,* was receiving those three as *one God,* vowing all obedience, adoration, and homage to them as such. Indeed this writer, speaking of the *three Persons,* and the nature of Christian baptism, makes every Person equally the object of our faith and hope, the witness of our belief, and *surety* for our salvation[i].

Another celebrated writer, contemporary with Tertullian, is Hippolytus. He cites the very *form* of *baptism,* in his dispute against Noëtus, (as Tertullian also does against Praxeas,) in proof of the distinct *personality* of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; but expresses withal his sentiments of the *divinity* of each Person. The greatest part of the paragraph relating to this head, will be worth reciting. "If the WORD was with *God,* and himself "was *God,* some perhaps may object, What, does the "Apostle then make *two Gods?* No: I will not say *two* "Gods, but *one;* yet *two Persons.*—The Father one, but "the Persons two, because of the Son; and the *third* is "the *Holy Ghost.*—Their harmony in operation (or *ad-* "*ministration*) brings all up to one God, for God is one. "—The Father *above all,* the Son *through all,* the Holy "Ghost *in all.* We can no otherwise think of God as "one, but as believing *really* in the Father, and the Son, "and the Holy Ghost.—The *Word* of the Father, con- "scious of the economy (*of the three Persons,*) and that it "was the will of the Father to be thus (or *under this con-* "*ception*) honoured, and not otherwise, gave his dis- "ciples orders, after his resurrection, to this purpose: "'Go teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of "the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost:' signifying, that "whosoever should leave out any one of the three, should "come so far short of honouring God perfectly; for by

[i] Fides—obsignata in Patre, Filio, et Spiritu Sancto—habemus per benedictionem eosdem arbitros fidei, quos et sponsores salutis—sub tribus et testatio fidei, et sponsio salutis pignorentur, &c. *Tertull. de Baptism.* cap. 6.

" this *Trinity* the Father is honoured. The *Father* gave " orders (*for the creation*), the *Son* wrought (*in it*), and " the *Holy Ghost* manifested[k]." From this passage of Hippolytus we learn these things: that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three *real* Persons; that they are also *divine* Persons; and that they are not *three Gods*, but *one God*, by an ineffable union of power, presence, and operation. We learn also that this very doctrine, of such a *Trinity in Unity*, was intended by our Saviour in the *form of baptism*, and given in commission to his disciples, to be by them taught and inculcated as a matter of the utmost importance.

Our next author is Origen, who, speaking of *baptism*, says, " that it is, by virtue of the invocations there made, " the spring and fountain of spiritual graces, to every " one that dedicates himself to the *divinity* (or *Godhead*) " of the adorable Trinity[l]." All I have to observe upon

[k] Εἰ δὲ οὖν ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν, Θεὸς ὤν, τὶ οὖν φήσειν ἄν τις δύο λέγειν Θεούς; δύο μὲν οὐκ ἐρῶ Θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἢ ἵνα, πρόσωπα δὲ δύο — πατὴρ μὲν γὰρ εἷς, πρόσωπα δὲ δύο, ὅτι καὶ ὁ υἱὸς, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα. — Οἰκονομία συμφωνίας συνάγεται εἰς ἕνα Θεόν. εἷς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ Θεός.—ὁ ὢν πατὴρ ἐπὶ πάντων, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς διὰ πάντων, τὸ δὲ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἐν πᾶσιν. ἄλλως τι ἵνα Θεὸν νομίσαι μὴ δυνάμεθα, ἐὰν μὴ ὄντως πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι πιστεύσωμεν—γινώσκων οὖν ὁ πατρῶος λόγος τὴν οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρὸς, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως βούλεται δοξάζεσθαι ὁ πατὴρ ἢ οὕτως, ἀναστὰς παρέδωκεν τοῖς μαθηταῖς λέγων· πορευθέντες μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, βαπτίζοντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, διακρύων ὅτι πᾶς ὃς ἂν ἓν τι τούτων ἐκλίπῃ, τελείως Θεὸν οὐκ ἐδόξασεν. διὰ γὰρ τριάδος ταύτης πατὴρ δοξάζεται. πατὴρ γὰρ ἠθέλησεν, υἱὸς ἐποίησεν, πνεῦμα ἐφανέρωσεν. *Hippolyt. contr. Noët.* cap. xiv. p. 16. Fabric.

[l] Τῷ ἐμπεριέχοντι ἑαυτὸν τῇ θειότητι τῆς προσκυνητῆς τριάδος διὰ τῆς δυνάμεως τῶν ἐπικλήσεων, χαρισμάτων ἀρχὴν ἔχει καὶ πηγήν. *Origen. cit. apud Basil. de Spir. Sanct.* cap. 29.

This passage is something differently read in our present copies of Origen, though the sense is much the same.

Τῷ ἐμπεριέχοντι ἑαυτὸν τῇ θειότητι τῆς δυνάμεως τῶν τῆς προσκυνητῆς τριάδος ἐπικλήσεών ἐστιν ἡ χαρισμάτων θείων ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγή. *Orig. Comm. in Joh.* p. 124. ed. Huet.

Compare the following citations from Pamphilus's Apology:

Ex quibus omnibus discimus tantæ et auctoritatis et dignitatis substantiam Spiritus Sancti, ut salutare baptismum non aliter nisi excellentissimæ omnium Trinitatis auctoritate, id est, Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti cognominatione compleatur. — Nunquam utique in unitate Trinitatis, id est,

this passage of Origen is, 1st, That he supposes *baptism* to be a *dedicating* ourselves to the service and worship of the whole Trinity, θεότητι, or, as it is otherwise read, θειότητι, to the *Godhead*, strictly; or, at least, to the *divine majesty*, of the *adorable* Trinity. 2dly, That he supposes the spiritual graces or influences to descend from all the three Persons, by virtue of our *invocation* of them; which perhaps may mean only by virtue of their being solemnly *named*; or if it means more, our argument is so much the stronger. The sum is, that in baptism we recognize the *divinity* of every Person mentioned, and acknowledge our obligations of duty, and thankfulness, and adoration towards all: which cannot be made sense of, if one only of the three be supposed to be *God*, and the other two *creatures*.

I shall subjoin to these testimonies from the Ante-Nicene Fathers, a remarkable passage of St. Cyprian, of the third century. Arguing for the invalidity of heretical baptisms, he asks, How any person, so baptized, can be supposed to obtain remission of sins, and become the *temple of God?* For, says he, "of what God (*of which* "*of the divine Persons*) is he made the temple? Is it of "(*God*) the Creator? He cannot be so without believing "in him. Is it of Christ? Impossible that any one "should be his *temple* that *denies Christ to be God.* Is "it then of the Holy Ghost? But since those *three are* "*one*, how is it possible he should be at peace with the "*Holy Ghost*, while he is at enmity either with the *Fa*-"*ther* or the *Son*[m]?" From this passage of Cyprian we may remark the following particulars:

Dei Patris inconvertibilis, et Filii ejus, etiam ipse Spiritus Sanctus haberetur; nisi quia et ipse semper erat Spiritus Sanctus. *Pamph. Apolog.* p. 232. ed. Bened.

[m] Si baptizari quis apud hæreticos potuit; utique et remissam peccatorum consequi potuit. Si peccatorum remissam consecutus est, et sanctificatus est, et templum Dei factus est; quæro cujus Dei? Si *Creatoris*, non potuit qui in eum non credidit: si *Christi*, nec hujus fieri potest templum, qui *negat Deum Christum*: si *Spiritus Sancti*, cum *tres unum sint*, quomodo

1. That being baptized into *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, was being baptized into three *divine* Persons, or three Persons each of which is *God*.

2. That whoever is validly and savingly baptized, does thereby become the *temple* of each *divine* Person; and of consequence the *temple of God*.

3. The reason why such person is not said to become the temple of *Gods*, in the *plural*, but of *God*, in the *singular*, is because the *three are one*, or *one God;* as Cyprian clearly enough intimates, and his master Tertullian expressly asserts, as before shown.

4. That the denying *Christ* (and for the same reason any other of the Persons) to be *God*, is, in Cyprian's account, making the baptism of no effect: so nearly is the sacrament itself, and the salvation of the *recipient* concerned in the faith of the *divine* and *adorable* Trinity. Upon the whole it is manifest, that St. Cyprian understood the *form of baptism*, of three *divine* Persons, all *one God:* which is utterly repugnant to the faith of such as understand it of *God* and two *creatures*. To Cyprian's, I shall add the testimonies of two celebrated bishops of the same age, about the year 259; one of Rome, and the other of Alexandria.

Dionysius, Bishop of Rome, in a letter, (wrote, very probably, with the advice and consent of his clergy synodically convened,) very particularly explains the doctrine of the *Trinity*, as professed at that time. He calls it the most *august and venerable* doctrine of the Church; and the Trinity of Persons, the *divine Trinity*. He blames those who divide the *sacred Unity* into three *separate* hypostases, thereby making, in a manner, *three Gods;* being the opposite extreme to Sabellius, who made but *one Person*. At the same time he blames those as much, that presumed to make a *creature* of God the Son, and

Spiritus Sanctus placatus esse ei potest, qui aut Patris, aut Filii inimicus est? *Cypr. ad Jubaj.* Ep. lxxiii. p. 203. Comp. Concil. Carth. n. xxxix. p. 235.

censures it as *blasphemy* in a very high degree; understanding the word *creature* according to the common acceptation, and as all men of plain good sense have ever understood it. The sum of his doctrine he gives us in these words: "The divine *Logos* must of necessity be "united to the God of the universe; and the *Holy Ghost* "must abide and dwell in God; and the *divine Trinity* "must of necessity be conceived to be gathered together, "and collected, as it were, into *one head*, namely, into "the God of the universe, the Almighty[o]." From hence it is clear, that the Catholics of that time apprehended that they were baptized into the faith of three *divine* Persons, not of *God* and *two creatures;* and yet that those three were not *three Gods*, but by reason of their most intimate and ineffable relation to each other, and their union in one head, were *one God*. The other Dionysius briefly expresses the same thing thus: "We ex- "tend the *Unity*, without dividing it, into a *Trinity;* and "again, we contract the *Trinity*, without taking from it, "into *Unity*[p]." It may be rendered more briefly thus: "The undivided *Monad* we extend to a *Triad;* and "again, the undiminished *Triad* we collect into a *Mo-* "*nad*." It is very plain that those primitive Fathers did not answer the question, how *God is one*, as some moderns do, by leaving out the *Son* and the *Holy Ghost*, and placing the *Unity* in the *Father only:* but their way was to take in all the three Persons, and so to make up the *Monad* of the *undivided Triad*.

Having traced the sentiments of the earliest writers upon this head, I may now venture to say, with somewhat better reason than the author of *Scripture Doctrine*,

[o] Ἡνῶσθαι γὰρ ἀνάγκη τῷ Θεῷ τῶν ὅλων τὸν θεῖον λόγον. Ἐμφιλοχωρεῖν δὲ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαι δεῖ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα· ἤδη καὶ τὴν θείαν τριάδα εἰς ἕνα, ὥσπερ εἰς κορυφήν τινα, τὸν Θεὸν τῶν ὅλων τὸν παντοκράτορα λέγω, συγκεφαλαιοῦσθαί τε καὶ συνάγεσθαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. *Dionys. Rom. apud Athanas.* vol. i. p. 231.

[p] Ἡμεῖς εἴς τε τὴν τριάδα τὴν μονάδα πλατύνομεν ἀδιαίρετον, καὶ τὴν τριάδα πάλιν ἀμείωτον εἰς τὴν μονάδα συγκεφαλαιούμεθα. *Dionys. Alex. apud Athanas.* vol. i. p. 255.

that, "How this text" (of St. Matthew) "was universally "understood in the primitive Church cannot be doubted;" there being still extant so many writings of the ancients discovering their sentiments of it: which therefore may serve as the best *comment*, or *paraphrase*, not only upon that text, but upon the *Creeds* too, which ought to be interpreted by the same rule, as I shall show presently. I shall not add any testimonies of *Post-Nicene* Fathers, however many and weighty, because their sentiments are well known, and our adversaries will readily give them up to us in the present question [q]. I shall only observe, that the sense which I have given of the form of baptism was, in the fourth century, so well known and undisputed, that the Emperor Julian (called the Apostate) made it an argument against Christ and his religion [r], that whereas Moses and the Prophets had said, "Thou "shalt fear the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou "serve;" *Christ* in contradiction thereto (for so the Apostate pretended) had ordered his disciples to baptize "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the "Holy Ghost." Though from what hath been said I take the point I intended to have been sufficiently proved, yet it may not be improper to throw in two or three general remarks to confirm it still farther.

1. The first may be taken from the known custom of the primitive Church, in requiring the *competentes*, or candidates for baptism, first to make a solemn renunciation

[q] The Council of Constantinople, in the year 382, in their Synodical Epistle, speaking of the Nicene faith, do in the main express the sense of all the Post-Nicene Catholics as follows:

Ταύτην γὰρ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ διαστρέφουσι τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθοῦς πίστιως, συναρίσκειν δεῖ. ἣν μόλις ποτὲ πρεσβυτάτην τι οὖσαν, καὶ ἀκόλουθον τῷ βαπτίσματι, καὶ διδάσκουσαν ἡμᾶς πιστεύειν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος. δηλαδὴ θεότητός τε καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ οὐσίας μιᾶς τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος πιστευομένης, &c. *Theod. E. H.* lib. v. cap. 9. p. 210.

Particular testimonies of Post-Nicene Fathers may be seen collected in Petavius de Trin.

[r] Vid. Cyril. contr. Julian. lib. ix. p. 291, 294.

of *idolatry* and *false worship*[s], under the general title of the *Devil and all his pomps*, &c. and then immediately[t] after to profess their faith in, and adherence to, God the *Father, Son,* and *Holy Ghost.* A profession of faith was, from the beginning, always required of persons before baptism: we have plain examples of, and allusions to, something of that kind, even in Scripture itself[u]. Upon these instances the Christian Church proceeded. At first, very probably, the profession of faith went no farther than the minutes given in the form of baptism: but in a little time it came to be enlarged, as *heresies* or other incidents gave occasion. Tertullian derives it from immemorial custom, that the *answers* in baptism were somewhat enlarged beyond what Christ himself had expressly determined[x]. It is not improbable that he intended this of the enlarging of the *baptismal* profession, or creed, beyond that *form of baptism* which our Lord himself had prescribed; and which probably was, at first, the occasion and the subject-matter of the *baptismal creed,* as well as the rule and measure of it. This I offer only as conjecture. Certain however it is, that a profession of faith in, and adherence to, God the *Father, Son,* and *Holy Ghost,* immediately followed upon the *abrenunciation* of the *Devil,* &c. which is a confirmation to us, that as, on one hand, they renounced all idolatry and false gods; so their *aggregation,* (if I may so call it,) or joining of themselves to these three Persons, was intentionally receiving them as the true and only God.

2. I shall subjoin a second consideration, drawn from the principles and practices of the ancient heretics. No

[s] Quid erit summum atque præcipuum, in quo Diabolus et pompæ et angeli ejus censeantur, quam idololatria? *Tertull. de Spect.* cap. iv. p. 74.

See Bingham, Christian Antiquities, book xi. ch. 7.

[t] Vid. Cyril. Hieros. Catech. Mystag. i. p. 283. Apostol. Const. lib. vii. cap. 41.

[u] Acts viii. 12, 37. 1 Pet. iii. 21.

[x] Amplius aliquid respondentes quam Dominus in Evangelio determinavit. *Tertull. de Coron.* cap. iii. p. 102.

See Wall's Hist. of Infant Baptism, part ii. c. 9. p. 495.

sooner did they alter (many of them) or corrupt the true faith in the blessed Trinity, but they thought of altering the *form of baptism* likewise; lest it should appear inconsistent with their novel and pernicious tenets. This was remarkably seen in the Tritheists[y], and Praxeans[z], and Valentinians[a], who had all corrupted the true original faith in the Trinity. To conceal their shame and self-condemnation, and to propagate their erroneous principles, they innovated in the *form of baptism;* which was one of the best fences to the true faith, and a standing bar to most *heresies*. The like was afterwards practised by Eunomius, who was a thorough-paced Arian, but a man of shrewd parts, and who readily perceived that it might be an easier matter to bring the very *form of baptism* into disuse, (though that was very shocking too,) than to root out of men's minds the Catholic and only true sense of it. That *form* was as great an eyesore to him and his followers, as a Nicene or an Athanasian Creed, or as *Doxologies* and *Liturgies*, expressing the Catholic doctrine, are to some now. They were forced at length to alter the instituted and only regular *form of baptism* for others of their own devising; which might be more consistent with, or favourable to, their *novel* opinions. Sometimes they chose to baptize *in the name of the Father uncreate, the Son created by the Father, and the Holy Ghost created by the Son*[b]. At other times they were content, more briefly and with less offence, to baptize *into the death of Christ*[c]; or in the name of the *Father*, by *the Son*, in *the Holy Ghost*. All the while, it is observable that the Catholics never varied the *form;* nor so much as inserted, or added, any thing by way of explication, or in favour of their principles. Either

[y] Apostol. Can. 39.

[z] Vid. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 26. Pseudo-Ignat. Ep. ad Philip. cap. 1. Apost. Can. 50. cum Not. Cotel. et Bevereg.

[a] Vid. Iren. lib. i. cap. 2. p. 94.

[b] Vid. Epiphan. Hæres. 76.

[c] Socrat. E. H. lib. v. cap. 24. Theod. Hær. Fab. lib. iv. cap. 3.

it must be said that they had no need to do it, the *form* itself being so plainly and clearly on their side; or else that they were the more *pious* and *modest* men, and durst not attempt any the least innovation in a sacred law and institution of Christ. Our modern Arians [d] have not yet attempted, that I know of, to alter the *form of baptism:* but they hope to be able to disguise or elude the ancient Catholic sense of it. I know not whether it might provoke our *pity* or our *indignation* most, to find some endeavouring to run down the truly *primitive* interpretation of it, under the notion of *new scholastic hypotheses* [e]; and, at the same time, vending their own *novelties* and *heterodoxies* under the venerable name of *antiquity*. The pretence is, that the *Apostles' Creed* (as commonly called) is a *professed paraphrase* upon the *form of baptism*. And what if it were, would it do those gentlemen any service? Or is the faith therein contained any thing akin to theirs, or so much as consistent with it? But I shall beg leave to examine this pretence largely and distinctly once for all, and then conclude. It will be necessary to premise some things, first, of *Creeds* in general, and, secondly, of that *Creed* called the *Apostles'* in particular.

1. Of *Creeds* in general. It is a mistake to imagine that *Creeds* were, at first, intended to teach, in full and *explicit* terms, all that should be necessary to be believed by Christians. They were designed rather for hints and minutes of the main *credenda*, to be recited by *catechumens* before baptism: and they were purposely contrived short, that they might be the more easily retained in memory, and take up the less time in reciting. *Creeds*, very probably, at first, were so far from being *paraphrases* or *explications* of the form of baptism, (or of Scripture texts,) that they went no farther, or very little farther, than the

[d] Mr. Emlyn, indeed, is for laying *baptism* itself aside, among the *posterity* of *baptized Christians;* which is doing the business at once. (See his Tracts, p. 429, &c.) But I know not whether I am to reckon him in the number of the Arians.

[e] See Dr. Clarke's Reply, p. 205.

form itself, and wanted as much *explaining* and *paraphrasing*, in order to be rightly and distinctly understood, as any other words or forms could do. Hence it was that the *catechumens* were to be instructed in the *Creed*, previously to baptism, for many days together. Jerome says, for forty days [f]; and particularly mentions the doctrine of the *Trinity* as the subject-matter of instruction for all that time. [g] The author of the *Apostolical Constitutions* gives us a summary of what the *catechumens* were generally taught, previously to *baptism:* and among the heads of instruction there intimated, the first and principal relates to the doctrine of the *Trinity*. Cyril of Jerusalem has left us a whole course of *Catechetical* Lectures, which he drew up for the use of those that stood candidates for baptism: and there we find that he is very large and particular in explaining those parts of the *Creed*, which concern the nature, character, and offices of *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*. Creeds would have been of small use to *catechumens*, without this method of *preparatory* instructions: and yet it seems to have been solely for the use of such that *Creeds* were originally intended; being first used only in the *office of baptism*, and but by degrees taken in to make a part of the common and daily Liturgies of the Church [h]. From hence we see the reason why Creeds were no larger, nor more *explicit*; being but a kind of recapitulation of what the *catechumens* had been taught more at large, the main heads whereof were committed to memory, and publicly recited, and so became a *Creed*. A short summary of *credenda* might then be sufficient, after the *catechumens* had been fully and particularly instructed in the sense of every article. I shall observe farther, that as *Creeds* became gradually enlarged, it was rather by the addition of *new* articles, (*new* I mean with

[f] Consuetudo autem apud nos istiusmodi est, ut his qui baptizandi sunt, per quadraginta dies, publice tradamus sanctam et adorandam Trinitatem. *Hieron. ad Pammach. Epist.* xxxviii. p. 314.

[g] Apost. Const. lib. vii. cap. 39. p. 378. Cot.

[h] See Mr. Bingham's Christian Antiquities, book x. ch. 4. p. 117.

respect to the Creeds, and their insertion into them, though believed by the faithful from the beginning,) than by a more *explicit* opening of the older, except in some particular cases. The reason of which seems to be, that *explications* of former articles might ordinarily be left to the *catechists* to supply by way of catechetical instruction. It was sufficient for Creeds to have hinted what was most material, and to abound in *matter*, rather than in *words*, to answer the use intended. As *heresies* gave occasion, new articles were inserted in, or added to, the Creeds: not that they were originally of greater importance than any other articles omitted, but the opposition made to some doctrines rendered it the more necessary to insist upon an *explicit* belief and profession of them. To instance in the Jerusalem *Creed*, the oldest, it may be, of any that is extant[i]. The article of the *Trinity* was undoubtedly in it from the beginning, and perhaps none other; and that expressed thus briefly, "I believe in God "the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost." Baptism of repentance, remission of sins, Catholic Church, resurrection of the flesh, life everlasting, are so many *new* articles, probably, added afterwards, as there was occasion. The rest are insertions and explications, giving a more particular description of the nature, character, and offices of the three Persons of the ever blessed *Trinity:* and probably these additions and illustrations came in gradually, one after another, as occasion served, in opposition to the attempts of those that endeavoured to alter, mutilate, corrupt, or misrepresent the Catholic *faith*. Other particulars there omitted may be as necessary points of faith, as some there mentioned: but those were more particularly necessary to be insisted on, at that time and in those circumstances. Which I the rather hint, that Creeds may not be taken for complete catalogues of *fundamentals*, which they are not: (for indeed we shall hardly find two that have exactly the same articles, neither more nor less:)

[i] See Bull. Judic. p. 48, 56, &c.

but for such short *summaries* of the Christian faith, as were most proper to be inculcated before *baptism*, as an introduction to the right understanding and professing the whole of the Christian religion. I have not room to explain myself so largely upon this head as the thing deserves; but I shall give one example to illustrate the truth of the observation. The article of *life everlasting* was, very probably, wanting for some centuries in the Creeds of Rome and Aquileia[k]. Yet who can pretend to say, that that was not as *necessary* and *fundamental* an article of faith, as any is or can be? But its being so easy, and obvious to every Christian, and hardly at all disputed, might be the reason why, however *necessary* it was to believe it, it was not thought *necessary* to make any explicit mention of it in those Creeds. Having premised those few things of *Creeds* in general, I proceed next to the *Apostles' Creed* in particular.

2. It is well known to learned men, that the Creed, called the *Apostles'*, is no other than the *Roman* Creed. "It has obtained the name of the *Apostolic* Creed," as a learned and accurate author observes[l], "for no greater or "other reason than this: It was a custom to call those "churches in which any *Apostle* had personally taught, "especially if he had resided there any long time, or had "died there, *Apostolic* Churches. Of these there were a "great many in the eastern parts; Jerusalem, Corinth, "Ephesus, Antioch, &c. but in the western parts, none "but Rome.—So that any one that in the western parts "of the world spoke of the *Apostolic Church*, was sup-"posed to mean Rome—and so their *Bishop* came to be "called the *Apostolic* Bishop; their *see* the *Apostolic* see, "their *faith* the *Apostolic* faith, and, among the rest, the "*Creed* that they used the *Apostolic* Creed, now called "the *Apostles'*." The Creed then of the *Apostles* (as it is

[k] Vid. Voss. de Trib. Symb. Dissert. 1. Thes. xliii. p. 29. Fell. Not. in Epist. Cyprian. lxx. p. 190.

[l] Mr. Wall's Hist. of Infant Baptism, part ii. ch. 9. p. 507.

particularly called, though other Creeds might as justly have, and really have had the name of the *Apostles' Creed*) is certainly no other than the Creed of one particular Church, the Church of Rome; and is neither so old, (taken all together,) nor of so great authority as the Nicene Creed itself: it is but imposing on the unlearned reader to recommend it as a *professed paraphrase*, and the most early of any, upon the text of St. Matthew, when indeed it is no *professed paraphrase* at all; or if it be, there is still no reason to prefer it to other, as valuable and as ancient, Creeds, which have the articles of the *divinity* of the Son and Holy Spirit more full and express; or to the continued testimonies of Church writers, which, after all, make a better and a juster *paraphrase* upon the text of St. Matthew, than either the *Roman*, or any other *Creed*, or than all the Creeds put together. For, indeed, the early Creeds being designedly brief and concise, full of matter, contrived rather to take in many particulars, than to dwell much upon any one, it is not to be wondered at, if they be not so *explicit* in this or that article; especially considering that some Churches, particularly the Roman, were less infested with heresies than others, and therefore needed not so long a Creed; and considering farther, that whatever mistakes might otherwise have happened to arise, through the brevity and conciseness of the Creeds themselves, they were effectually prevented by previous *catechetical* instructions, explaining more distinctly and fully what was but briefly hinted in the Creeds. To conclude this head: as to the Roman Creed, there is no reason to lay any more stress upon it than upon the Creeds of Irenæus, Tertullian, or Origen; or the Creed of Jerusalem, &c. all of them, probably, as old or older than the Roman: nor is it to be expected that every Creed, or any Creed designed only for the *office of baptism*, should teach, in *explicit* terms, all that is necessary to be believed by Christians. Yet, after all, even the Roman (called the *Apostles'*) *Creed*, short as it is, when rightly understood, is diametrically opposite to the Arian principles; and, if

it must be called a *paraphrase*, is such a *paraphrase* on the text of St. Matthew, as sufficiently confirms the sense which I have given of it. Our Saviour Christ is, in the Roman Creed, characterized under the title of μονογενὴς, or *only-begotten* of the Father. The meaning of that title or character was well known to the compilers of that Creed, and to the primitive *catechists* of the Church, who would not fail to acquaint the *catechumens* with it. The ancients are unanimous in understanding Christ's *sonship* of his *divine nature*. To call him the *only-begotten*, or the *Son*, of God the Father, was, in their account, declaring him to be of the same nature with God the Father; as *truly God*, as the Son of man is *truly man*[m]. Hence therefore it is manifest that the Roman Creed, though briefly, yet fully sets forth the *divinity* of Christ, as has been shown more at large by Bishop Bull[n]. And the learned Stillingfleet, who well understood this matter, had good reason to say, "That although the *Apostles' Creed* "does not in express words declare the divinity of the "three Persons in the unity of the divine essence; yet "taking the *sense* of those articles as the *Christian Church* "understood them from the Apostles' times, then we "have as full and clear evidence of this doctrine, as we "have *that we received the Scriptures from them*[o]." If

[m] *Unigenitus* ut solus ex Deo genitus proprie de vulva cordis ipsius. *Tert. contr. Prax.* cap. 7.

Hunc ex Deo prolatum didicimus, et prolatione generatum, et idcirco Filium Dei et Deum dictum, ex unitate substantiæ. *Tertull. Apol.* cap. 21.

Πρωτότοκος ὢν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Θεὸς ὑπάρχει. *Just. Mart. Apol.* i. p. 123. Comp. Dial. p. 183, 184, 364, 371.

Ὁ θεῖος λόγος ὁ φανερώτατος ὄντως Θεὸς, ὁ τῷ Δεσπότῃ τῶν ὅλων ἐξισωθεὶς, ὅτι ἦν υἱὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ. *Clem. Alex.* p. 86.

Πρῶτον γέννημα εἶναι τῷ πατρὶ, οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον——ἐνὸς ὄντος τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ. *Athenag.* p. 38.

Θεὸς οὖν ὢν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἐκ Θεοῦ πεφυκὼς, &c. *Theoph. Antioch.* p. 130.

Ut enim præscripsit ipsa natura hominem credendum esse qui ex homine sit: ita eadem natura præscribit et Deum credendum esse qui ex Deo sit. *Novat.* cap. 11.

[n] Bull. Judic. Eccles. p. 36, &c.

[o] Stillingfleet on the Trinity, ch. ix. p. 229.

then we are to learn from the *Apostles' Creed* how the words of the *form of baptism* were *universally understood in the primitive Church*, we must understand the words of that form in the same sense as those articles of the Creed were *universally understood in the primitive Church*. For to pretend that the *form of baptism* is to be interpreted from the *Creed*, as understood by the *primitive* Church; and at the same time to put a *novel* construction upon the Creed itself, is such an affront to common sense, and such an abuse of the readers, as one shall seldom meet with among *men of letters*.

Upon the whole, these things are evident; 1. That the sense of the *primitive Church*, in the articles concerning *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, may be certainly known otherwise than from the *Creeds*. 2. That the *Creeds* themselves ought to be interpreted according to that sense so known, having been so understood from the beginning, or from the time of their compiling[p]. 3. That by laying of ancient testimonies together, and comparing of evidences, we have full and clear proof that the *primitive Church* never imagined *baptism* to run in the name of the *Father* only as God, and of the two other Persons as *creatures*; but in the name of three Persons, every one *God*, and all together the *one God* of Christians.

And now, my Christian brethren, what remains but to exhort and warn you, as you tender your everlasting salvation, to abide evermore in that *faith* whereunto you have been *baptized*, and which alone can give you any

[p] N. B. A late writer (Modest Plea, &c. continued, p. 54.) says, that Dr. W. (speaking of the Creeds) is forced to add, "as interpreted by those that recite "them;" and the reason of it, he says, is, "because the oldest Creeds men-"tion nothing of those matters," i. e. the *eternity* and *consubstantiality* of God the Son. To which I answer, 1. That I had good reason to refer to the primitive writings for the interpretation of Creeds; especially at this distance, when unlearned readers may the more easily be imposed upon by a *novel sense* put upon them. 2. That this writer betrays his ignorance of the *oldest Creeds*; which, if they do not *explicitly* declare those articles, yet all, or most of them, do it *implicitly*: Irenæus's, Tertullian's, Origen's, Jerusalem Creed, Apostles', &c.

reasonable confidence, or hope of assurance towards God. Remember those who have gone before you, the *Apostles* and primitive martyrs and confessors, "whose faith fol-"low, considering the end of their conversation. Jesus "Christ *is* the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. Be "not carried about with divers and strange doctrines, by "the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby "they lie in wait to deceive." What have they done, by reviving antiquated *heresies*, but disturbed the minds of the simple, raised confusion and distraction amongst many, and given a handle to *Libertines*, *Deists*, and *Atheists*, to insult and to *blaspheme?* What is there in *Arianism*, either of truth, or even of probability, to make us amends for these things? I mention not the daily inroads made upon *Christian simplicity* and *godly sincerity;* the wiles and artifices, dissimulation and disguises, by which it was at first promoted and propagated, and without which it cannot any where subsist. To this very day the patrons of it have no other way left, but to conceal and cover its *deformity* as much as possible; stifling of evidences that make against it, misrepresenting the truth of history, taking advantage of *ambiguous* terms, keeping off in *generals*, not daring so much as to own the certain and inevitable *consequences* of their principles, hardly the *principles* themselves; not trusting either to a fair, open, and regular examination, but shrinking always from the very point in question; opposing, objecting, cavilling perpetually against the *orthodox* scheme, but taking little or no care, either to *answer*, or so much as to *mention*, the main difficulties and inconsistencies visible in their own. For the truth of this I appeal to all who have been any thing curious observers of the rise, and progress, and present state of this *heresy* amongst us. They must not blame us for calling their doctrine *heresy*, which it really is, when they have the face so often to call ours *new scholastic hypotheses*, which it really is not. Names of *reproach* might have been spared on both sides, had not they began, and set us an example. Had they been contented modestly to pro-

pose their doubts, with their reasons for them; had they fairly and ingenuously set forth the arguments on our side of the question in their full strength, and then brought their own to set against them, and balance them; had they been willing to acknowledge, (what is undoubtedly true,) that we have many and great reasons, such as must weigh even with wise and good men, for what we believe and profess; much from Scripture, much from antiquity, and countenanced, now many centuries, by the sober and thinking part of the Christian world; had they freely owned this, giving at the same time their reasons on the other side, and leaving impartial men, after a fair and full hearing, to judge which should outweigh: I say, had they took this reasonable and ingenuous method, like *modest* inquirers after truth, I know not whether any fair and candid man would have condemned, or not have commended them for it. But when nothing less will serve the turn but misrepresenting us, as following only *new scholastic hypotheses;* when *antiquity* is searched only to pick out such passages as *seem* to make for one side, and much *art* used even to make them *seem* so; when our main strength from *Scripture* and from *antiquity* is, in a manner, totally concealed and disguised, and the principal objections and difficulties of their own scheme passed over in silence; the *orthodox*, all the while, being represented as a parcel of men overrun with prejudice and bigotry, preferring *human* and *modern decisions*, the *words of men*, before the infallible *word of God;* full of contradiction and absurdity, and bereft, in a manner, of common sense: I say, when this is the method which some please to take to revive an old *heresy*, such *rude attacks* upon our *common faith*, though we had less to say for it, are never to be justified; nor indeed are they capable of any kind excuse, when the men are so far from proving that we have been mistaken in this matter, that they dare not trust the merits of the cause to a fair, open, and calm hearing. They dare not venture to set their scheme in its true colours and naked simplicity against ours, fearing lest

impartial men should too plainly see what advantage we are sure to have upon a just comparison. It is *ungenerous* and *mean* in any cause, (in this it is *impious*,) not to suffer all that can justly be pleaded on the opposite side to appear in its full light and strength. What harm can there be in admitting what is *truth* and *fact*, suppose it relate either to *Scripture* or *antiquity?* Let the evidences be produced, at least; the *weight* of them may be considered afterwards. And what if *Arianism* should not happen to prevail in this so *fair* and *just* a method? How can it be remedied? Must it be obtruded upon us, true or false, right or wrong, with or without reason? If there really be not evidence sufficient for it, or if it must be overpowered by contrary evidence, then this we may certainly depend on, either that the Arian doctrine is *false*, or, at the lowest, that no man can be obliged to think it *true:* which consideration alone may be enough to satisfy any *conscientious* man in rejecting it, in its present circumstances.

To conclude all in a few words: one thing we may require and demand in the present case; that before we venture to *dethrone* our *God* and *Saviour*, by bringing him down to the rank of *creatures;* before we presume to abridge him of those *honours*, and that *worship*, which he has held in the Christian Church by a prescription of fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen hundred years; before we run upon what has hitherto been accounted *blasphemy*, *horrid* blasphemy, by the wisest, the greatest, and most eminent lights of the *Christian* Church, in former and in latter ages; before we disclaim our solemn vows in *baptism*, where we dedicated ourselves to the service and worship of *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, one God blessed for ever; before we go these lengths, let us, at least, have things fairly and impartially examined, in sincerity and singleness of heart; disguising nothing, nor smothering any evidences, but comparing things with things, Scripture with Scripture, reason with reason, and then balancing the whole account: let us know, in some mea-

sure, what we do, that we run not *blindfold* into our own certain *damnation.* In the mean while, it behoves us to retain *steadfastly,* what we have hitherto piously believed and professed, in the integrity of our hearts and minds. And may the *sacred Three,* to whom we once have so solemnly devoted all our services, accept of our sincere endeavours to preserve and keep up that *divine* honour, which has been hitherto (and we doubt not, *justly*) paid to each of them. *To the same most holy, undivided Trinity, God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, be all honour and glory, adoration and worship, in all churches of the saints, now and for evermore. Amen.*

AN

ANSWER

TO

DR. WHITBY'S REPLY:

BEING A

VINDICATION

OF THE

CHARGE OF FALLACIES, MISQUOTATIONS, MISCONSTRUCTIONS, MISREPRESENTATIONS,

&c.

Respecting his Book entitled

DISQUISITIONES MODESTÆ.

IN A LETTER TO DR. WHITBY.

SIR,

I HAVE read over your Reply, lately published. I perceive you are much disturbed at the freedom I took with you, in that part of my Defence which concerned you: and though you have, for several years last past, been acting the part of a *censor*, and a severe one too, (if we consider the *intention* rather than the *effect*,) upon many great, good, and learned men, ancient and modern; yet when it comes to be your own case to be animadverted upon, (however justly, and upon a necessary occasion,) you are not able to bear it with due temper of mind. I am very unwilling to give you any farther disturbance: and, indeed, were your Reply to be read only by *men of letters*, I should not have a thought of returning any answer to it. But since the controversy, about the ever blessed Trinity, is now spread among all kinds of readers, I have judged it necessary, in so momentous a cause, to take some notice of what you have done, for the sake of some well-meaning men who might otherwise happen to be imposed upon by it.

You divide your work into two parts, *defensive* and *offensive*: the *first*, to take off (so far as you are able) what I had charged you with; the *second*, to retort the *charge*, and to raise objections from antiquity, chiefly against the Catholic cause, which I have the honour to espouse.

My Answer, accordingly, if it shall be thought needful to carry it through, must consist of two parts: one to show that you have not been able to take off what I had charged you with; the other to make it appear that your objections against us are slight and trivial, not capable of doing our cause harm.

PART THE FIRST.

Which is to show that you have not been able to take off what I had charged upon you.

The *Charge* was contained under two heads.

1. General fallacies, running through your whole book, entitled Disquisitiones Modestæ.

2. Particular defects, viz. misquotations, misconstructions, misrepresentations, &c.

I do not add the epithets of *gross*, *egregious*, or the like, as you are pleased to do, (Reply, p. 100.) because, if I can prove the facts, the reader may be left to judge how *gross* or how *egregious* any *misconstructions*, *misrepresentations*, &c. are: and because those and the like epithets or decorations, are then only useful, when a writer lies under the unhappy necessity of endeavouring to make up in *words* what he wants of *proof*. But to come directly to the matter in hand, I must begin with the charge of *general* fallacies, which were three, and which I shall take in their order.

1. The first *general fallacy* charged upon you[a], was, your making *essence* and *person* to signify the same. One *individual* or *numerical* essence you every where interpret to a Sabellian sense; understanding by it one *individual Hypostasis* or *real* Person. In your Reply, you admit (p. 5.) that the *same numerical intellectual essence* is, with you, equivalent to *same person:* so that the *fact* charged upon you stands good, by your own confession.

Now then, let us see whether you have dealt fairly and justly with Bishop Bull. I observed what influence this one principle, or *postulatum*, of yours must have upon the state of the *general* question; and indeed upon your whole thread of reasoning quite through your book. For, if it appears that you have set out upon a false ground, you must of course blunder all the way, running into a perpetual *ignoratio elenchi*, (as the Schools call it,) that is,

[a] See my Defence, vol. i. p. 283.

disputing besides the *question:* which, under pretence and show of confuting Bishop Bull, is really nothing else but confuting an imagination of your own. The *question* with Bishop Bull was, whether the Ante-Nicene Fathers believed the Son to be of an *eternal, uncreated,* and strictly *divine* substance. But with you it is, whether they believed him to be the same *numerical intellectual essence* (that is, as you interpret it, *Person*) with the Father. Thus you have changed the very state of the *general* question, and must of course argue all along wide of the point. So, when you come to particular authors, you still pursue the same mistake that you began with. You state the question relating to Barnabas (Disquis. Mod. p. 7.) thus; *Whether* he makes Father and Son *one numerical essence:* which is the same with you, as to ask, whether he makes them the *same Person.* The question is stated the same way, in respect of Hermas [b], Clemens of Rome [c], Justin Martyr [d], and others. With this kind of grave impertinence you go on confuting Bishop Bull, without so much as attacking him; while the main weight and force of your reasonings (when they really have any) falls not upon any thing which he has asserted, but upon quite another thing, which you have been pleased to invent for him. It is now time to hear what you have to say in defence of this peculiar piece of management. Your *excuses* for it are reducible to three heads. 1st, That you did not know what Bishop Bull meant. 2dly, That you had interpreted *numerical essence* as all the present *orthodox* do, whose cause Bishop Bull is supposed to have espoused. 3dly, That *numerical essence* does and must signify what you pretend, and nothing else. Though I have not taken your own words, yet, I think, I have here given your full sense; and more distinctly and clearly than you have done. I am next to examine your *excuses,* one by one.

1. You did not know what Bishop Bull meant, or in

[b] Disquisit. Modest. p. 9. [c] Ibid. p. 12. [d] Ibid. p. 25.

what sense he maintajned the *consubstantiality*. So you pretend in your book[e], and repeat it in your Reply[f], that you are "not certain whether he" (the Bishop) "pleaded "for a *numerical* or *specific* unity of essence;" taking it for granted that every *numerical* Unity is such as you have described; and that there is no *medium* between *numerical*, in your sense, and *specific*; that is, no *medium* between *Sabellianism* and *Tritheism*. This indeed is the πρῶτον ψεῦδος, the prime falsehood which you set out with, and proceed upon; and which makes all your discourses on this head confused, and wide of the point. But of this more presently. As to Bishop Bull, if you had not sagacity enough to perceive what he meant, you might however *easily* and *certainly* have known, that he did *not mean* what you are pleased to put upon him; because he has plainly, frequently, and constantly denied *numerical Unity*, in the sense of *personal identity*. His intent was not to prove that the Fathers were Sabellians, (as your way of opposing him every where supposes,) but that they were not Arians. This you could not but know, if you know any thing: and therefore the method and way which you pitched upon, of writing against his book, was, to say the least of it, very unfair and disingenuous. You would have your readers believe that you have confuted the Bishop, when in reality, after granting you all that you have been able to prove, it is not to the purpose, is no *confutation* of what the Bishop has asserted, but of another *proposition* which the Bishop himself had disowned, as much as you can do. The charge therefore of *mistaking* the question stands good against you; and, what is more, *wilful* mistaking, since you could not be ignorant that Bishop Bull did not intend to assert *numerical Unity* in that sense wherein you oppose it. This is sufficient for me in defence of my *charge*. But for the clearer apprehension of Bishop Bull's meaning in relation to this matter, I will next cite you some of his own words.

[e] Modest. Disquis. p. 31. Præf. [f] Reply, p. 7.

As concerning the *specific* Unity of Persons in the "blessed Trinity, such as is the union of *supposita*, or "*persons*, among things created, (for instance, of three "men, Peter, Paul, and John, which are separate from "one another, and do not any way depend upon each "other as to their essence,) this the Fathers of the first "ages never dreamed of. They acknowledged a very "different union of the divine Persons, such as there is no "pattern of, no resemblance perfectly answering to it, "whereby to illustrate it, among created beings. They "explain the matter thus: that God the Father is, as I "said, the Head and Fountain of divinity, from whom "the Son and Holy Ghost are derived, but so derived as "not to be divided from the Father's Person, but they "are in the Father, and the Father in them, by a certain "περιχώρησις, or *inhabitation*, so called, as I have shown "at large. *Defens. Fid. Nic.* sect. iv. lib. 4. Petavius him-"self contends that from this περιχώρησις, *inhabitation*, a "*numerical* Unity may be inferred, *Petav.* lib. iv. cap. 16. "It is certainly manifest that this explication can no way "consist with the Arian *hypothesis:* and it is also mani-"fest that *Tritheism* is excluded by it, and the Unity of "the Godhead made consistent with a *real* distinction of "Persons."

Thus far Bishop Bull, in his answer to Gilbert Clarke[g]. He speaks much to the same purpose also in his Defence of the Nicene Faith[h]. "As to *numerical* Unity of sub-"stance of Father and Son, (which Huetius says was de-"nied by Origen,) I can make it evident that Origen ac-"knowledged that Unity as far as any of the earlier "Fathers, and even Athanasius himself acknowledged it: "that is, Origen believed the Father, Son, and Holy "Ghost, though *really* three Persons, yet to have no "divided or separate existence, (as three men have,) but "to be intimately united and conjoined one with another, "and to exist in each other, and (as I may so speak) to

[g] Bull, Posth. Works, p. 1004. [h] Bull. Def. Fid. Nic. p. 130.

" pervade and permeate one another by an ineffable περι-
" χώρησις, which the Schoolmen call *inhabitation:* from
" which *inhabitation*, Petavius asserts that a *numerical*
" Unity must necessarily be inferred."

From this account of Bishop Bull, it is evident that he neither admitted *specific* Unity, nor *numerical* in your sense: and therefore it was very artificial of you to say that you knew not which of the two he intended, as if he must have meant one, when it is so plain that he meant neither, but utterly denied both. He did indeed assert, as you see, *numerical* Unity, but not in your sense, not in the Sabellian sense of *personal identity*.

2. The second *excuse* you make for your impertinent manner of opposing Bishop Bull without contradicting him is, that you interpreted *numerical* essence as all the present *orthodox* do, whose cause Bishop Bull is supposed to espouse. So you tell us in the Preface to Modest Disquisitions[i], that you dispute against the *consubstantiality*, in no other than the *numerical* sense, as asserted by *all the orthodox*. Now, supposing it were certainly true, (as it is certainly false,) that all, who at present pass for *orthodox*, understood *numerical essence* in the same sense as you oppose it in; yet would it not be fair towards Bishop Bull, to put that sense upon him which he so fully and so constantly disowns and disclaims. All that you should have done in this case, should have been to have observed, that Bishop Bull's book is nothing to the purpose of the present *orthodox*, who are all Sabellians, inasmuch as he has only shown that the Fathers were not Arians, has not proved that they were Sabellians. And you might have took notice on this occasion, how weak and inconsistent all the *orthodox* are, in receiving and applauding Bishop Bull's book, a book which has proved nothing which can serve their purpose; a book which is so far from asserting *Sabellianism*, that is, *orthodoxy*, (as it is called,) that it rather stands in di-

[i] Whitby, Disq. Mod. p. 32. Præf. Reply, p. 4.

rect opposition to it. Now this would have been the fair open way, as well towards the present *orthodox*, as towards Bishop Bull. Towards the *latter*, because it is a certain truth that he has by no means served the cause of *Sabellianism*, or of *numerical* Unity, in your sense: towards the *former*, because it might have given them an opportunity of explaining themselves upon this head; and they might take their choice, either to give up Bishop Bull and all the Fathers at once, or else (which is most likely) declare what you say of them to be pure calumny and defamation. For my part, I make no doubt but it is a slander upon them; and that you will be found at length to understand as little of the *moderns*, as you do of the *ancients*. I have good reason for what I say, from one particular instance which I meet with in your Reply, p. 102. I am there represented, as having "departed from "the general received doctrine of the Church, from the "fourth century to this present age," for no other reason but for saying, I mean "a real person and no mode." Is it then really so, that all the *orthodox*, from the fourth century down to the present, have believed a *person* to be a *mode*, that is, in plain English, a *manner*; and three persons to be *three manners*? Believe it that can: I have a much better opinion, nay, certain knowledge of them. The Catholics indeed, down from the fourth (I may say from the first) century, have believed that there is no disparity of nature, no division of substance, no difference in any perfection between Father and Son; but that they are equally wise, equally infinite, equally perfect in all respects; differing only in this, that one is a Father, and the other a Son, one *unbegotten*, and the other *begotten*, as a third is *proceeding*: and these three different *manners* or *modes* of existence distinguish the persons one from another, perfectly alike and equal in all other respects. The phrase therefore of *modes of existing*, was not designed to denote the *persons* themselves, but their *distinguishing characters*. This is what Dr. South's authorities sufficiently prove, and all that they prove; and, I presume, all that he meant.

For, though you are pleased to quote him against me, he is expressly for me, where he utterly denies "[k] that the "three divine Persons are only three modes of the Deity." However that be, I take my accounts of the *ancients* from the *ancients* themselves. If you can find any one, I do not say of the fourth, but even of the sixth, or eighth century, to go no lower, laying it down for Catholic doctrine that a *person* is a *mode*, it will be kind to oblige us with the discovery. As to the *ancients*, I will be bound to answer for them, that what you say of them from the fourth century is pure invention and romance: and as to *moderns*, I am very inclinable to hope, I make no scruple to believe, that you have misreported them as much as you have done the other.

3. Your third and last *excuse* is, that *numerical essence* does and must signify what you pretend, and nothing else: and therefore it was right to fix it upon Bishop Bull, who must be supposed to maintain *numerical* Unity. This is your meaning, (Reply, p. 4.) though you seldom take care to express yourself clearly and distinctly. To this I answer first, that admitting that your sense of *numerical Unity* is the only true and proper sense of it; yet does it not follow, that you have any right to fix your sense upon Bishop Bull in contradiction to his declared sentiments. If any man has a mind to use words in an *improper* sense, provided he gives but sufficient notice of it, he should not be rigorously dealt with for it, or have a sense imposed upon him which he utterly disclaims. A fair and candid adversary, in such a case, should make allowance for *words*, and attend to the *thing*. To make the best of it, it is very unkind and unfair, industriously to mistake an author's meaning, in such a case, and to go about to confute what he certainly never intended to maintain; nay, what he is known to have denied and disclaimed. But to come a little closer to the point; How do you prove, after all, that yours is the only proper sense of *numerical?*

[k] South. Animadv. c. viii. p. 290, 291.

What if you should fail here, in the main point of all, wherein your great confidence lies, and for the sake of which you have raised all this dust upon Bishop Bull, and thrown scandal at large both upon ancients and moderns? It is very certain, that *numerical* or *individual* Unity has been and is maintained by Catholics, and Catholics that abhorred *Sabellianism*. Could you prove that your sense of *numerical essence* is the only *proper* sense, yet you can never prove that it is the *only* sense it has been used in: so that, at length, the dispute about it would be nothing more than a dispute about words.

But I will give you a plain reason why you can never prove your sense of the words to be the only *proper* sense: it is because you can never fix any *certain principle of individuation*. It is for want of this, that you can never assure me, that three *real* Persons may not be, or are not, one *numerical* or *individual* substance. In short, you know not, precisely, what it is that makes *one being*, or *one essence*, or *one substance*. Here your *metaphysics* are plainly defective; and this it is that renders all your speculations upon that head vain and fruitless. Tell me plainly, is the *divine substance* present in every place, in *whole* or in *part?* Is the *substance* which is present here upon earth, that very *individual numerical* substance which is present in heaven, or is it not? Your answer to these questions may perhaps suggest something to you, which may help you out of your difficulties relating to the *Trinity;* or else the sense of your inability to answer either, may teach you to be less confident in matters so much above you, and to confess your ignorance in things of this nature, as I freely do mine.

You tell us very solemnly, (p. 4.) repeating it several times, that the same *numerical essence* neither doth nor can signify any more than one *essence* in *number*. Which is only telling us, that the same *numerical essence* is the same *numerical essence*; aye, that it is: and who doubts it? or who is the wiser for these weighty discoveries? How shall I ever know, from thence, that three real Per-

sons may not be, or are not, one *numerical* substance, one being, one God? You will *suppose*, without doubt, that one *intellectual essence* and *one Person* are equivalent and *reciprocal*. And I, on the other hand, will *suppose* the contrary, and then we are just as we began. You have not proved, nor ever can prove, that three real Persons may not be properly called *one numerical* substance. If you have all along gone upon the supposition that they cannot, you have shown that you can mistake, that you can beg the question, that you can wander from the point in hand, can trifle much and prove little, and that is all.

The sum then of what I have pleaded to make good my *charge* of the first *general fallacy* is, that you have set out wrong, mistook the very point in question, pursued your mistake all along, and followed your own wanderings, instead of opposing Bishop Bull: that you have no *excuse* for understanding *numerical* essence as you do, either from Bishop Bull's book, who never so understands it, or from the Catholic sense of it, ancient or modern, which is different from yours, or from the *propriety* of the phrase itself; which may, for any thing you know, admit of another sense, and which you have no way of confuting but by *begging the question;* which is not *confuting*, but rather tacitly acknowledging that it is not capable of any confutation. So much for the first article: only here I must be so just to you as to observe, that you do not always wander from the point in question. You do sometimes, indeed often, attempt to prove that the Ante-Nicene Fathers were of those principles which were afterwards called Arian. So far is pertinent, and is directly opposing Bishop Bull. But then I must observe farther, that lest you should happen, at length, to fail in your first point of proving the *Fathers* to have been Arians, you reserve the other point, as what you can prove and can never fail of, namely, that they were not Sabellians: and this is what the result of your arguments generally comes to, after you have carried them on as far as they can go. The first point is what you seem most desirous of prov-

ing, were it possible to do it: but if you cannot do that, you are content however to prove the latter, rather than seem to have done nothing. I should here conclude this article, but that two or three incidental things should be taken notice of, which must come in here, or no where. I had observed [l]several *guards* which you had put in, in the general state of the question, as it were with design to secure a handsome retreat. You say, *all* the Ante-Nicene Fathers; when the *most*, or the *generality* might be sufficient. I had reason to observe this, because Bishop Bull had, in a manner, given up Lactantius: besides, that it is not necessary to assert that every writer (suppose Clemens of Rome, or Barnabas) has said enough in a short epistle, from whence it might certainly be inferred that their principles were the same with those of the Nicene *Fathers*. It is sufficient, if as many as speak plainly either way are on our side; and that none of the *earlier* writers contradict it, but are in the main favourable to us, and *probably*, if not *demonstrably*, ours. Another *guard* inserted was, *which we ascribe* to the Nicene Council, instead of, *which was asserted by the Nicene Council*. The reason I had to take notice of this is apparent from what hath been said. *Numerical* essence, rather than *same essence*, was another *guard:* and what use you make of it is visible enough. That this essence, the same *numerical* essence, (or *Person*, as you understand it,) was *communicated* to two other Persons, is what you demand to have proved: and you have some pretence for cavil at the word *communicated*. This I observed before: and your Reply[m] is, that what I "call a pretence to quarrel at the "word *communicated*, is indeed *arguments* produced against

[l] Defence, vol. i. p. 284. The general question is thus stated.

Whether *all* the Ante-Nicene Fathers professed the very same doctrine which *we ascribe* to the Nicene Council; that is, whether all acknowledged the same *numerical* essence of the Father to have been *communicated* to the Son and Holy Ghost, and that therefore both are one God in *number* with the Father. *Whitby, Proœm.* p. 2.

[m] Reply, p. 5.

" it, as it is stated by the Bishop, and which *I* durst not " meddle with nor pretend to answer." The reason of my not answering your cavils against the expression was, because it was foreign to my purpose, and because we were inquiring, whether Bishop Bull had truly and justly represented the *ancients*, not whether his doctrine (the same with the ancient doctrine) is liable to the charge of contradiction. If you are able to prove any thing of that kind (as you are not) against Bishop Bull, it will hold equally against the *ancients* and him too; and is of distinct consideration from the point which we are now upon. However, if our readers will pardon a small digression, I shall here examine those weighty *arguments*, which before, it seems, " I durst not meddle with."

You object, (Præf. p. 21.) " that the *communication* of " the Father's *essence* to a *Person* is inconceivable, because " the *Person* must be supposed to have it, to be a *Person*." This is nothing but cavilling at a popular way of expression. In strictness of speech, the Person of the Son is the very thing which is derived, communicated, generated; and the Father, in communicating his essence, generates the Person of the Son.

You object farther; " that if the same *numerical* essence " of the *Father* be *communicated*, then it is the same *nu-* " *merical* essence in both, only existing in a different " manner." To which I answer, if you mean by *numerical essence*, the same *numerical Person*, it is not *communicated* at all: for the *Person* of the Father only *communicates*, the Person of the Son is *communicated:* and these two *Persons*, or *Hypostases*, constitute the same *numerical* essence; which consequently, as personalized in the Son, is *begotten*, as personalized in the Father, *unbegotten*, that is, exists in a different manner. The two Persons exist after a different manner, which two Persons constitute one *numerical* essence; and therefore I admit that the same *numerical* essence does exist in a different manner in the two Persons.

You object also[n], that "the essence of the Father is "unbegotten, the essence of the Son begotten, therefore "both cannot be the same essence." That both cannot be the same *Hypostasis*, or *Person*, is very certain, for the reason which you give. But that two *Hypostases*, one unbegotten, the other begotten, may not constitute one substance, or essence, you have not shown. All these objections of yours turn only upon your mistaken sense of *numerical* essence, and amount to no more than a *petitio principii;* while you take for granted the thing in question, that there cannot be two real Persons in one *substance*, or *essence*. I can tell you of some, whose judgment you much rely on, who must, upon their principles, allow, that the same *numerical* substance is both greater and less than the same *numerical* substance; is remote and distant from the same *numerical* substance; is contained in and contains the same *numerical* substance. (See my Defence, vol. i. p. 211.) They must likewise admit of *being* and *being*, in the same *numerical* being; *substance* and *substance*, in the same *numerical* substance: as also *being* and *being*, where they cannot say *beings*, in the plural; *substance* and *substance*, where they cannot say *substances;* *essence* and *essence*, where they cannot say *essences*. (See my Defence, vol. i. p. 119, 120.) These things, perhaps, may appear new and strange to you; but if you please to consider them, they may be useful to convince you of your fundamental mistake in confining the phrase of *numerical substance* to one particular sense of your own; and may help to satisfy you that there is nothing absurd or contradictory in the supposition, that one and the same *numerical substance* may be both *begotten* and *unbegotten*. You may also please to consider that though the Catholics (especially after they came to express themselves accurately) would never, or very seldom, say, *two substances*, *two essences*, *two spirits*, *two lights*, *two wisdoms*, or *two*

[n] Præf. p. 21.

wills, any more than *two Gods* or *two Lords;* yet they never scrupled to say *substance of substance, essence of essence, spirit of spirit, light of light, wisdom of wisdom, will of will,* in like manner, as *God of God.* All which is to intimate that the union is not *numerical*, in the Sabellian, that is, in your sense : and yet it is *numerical* in another; insomuch that you cannot here speak of *substances*, or *essences*, in the plural, as you may of things *specifically* united, and no more.

You object farther[o], " that the same substance cannot " be subordinate to none in the Father, and yet subordi- " nate in the Son or Holy Ghost." Yes, it may, if three Persons can be one and the *same substance*, because these Persons may be *subordinate* one to another. Here, again, you suppose that three Persons cannot be one substance. And now, is not this shrewd arguing, thus perpetually to beg the question? You have one *turn of wit* more, and it is against *interior production*, which you pretend is such a " solid argument *as I* had the wit to leave unanswered." Reply, p. 6. This "interior production," you say[p], is "either " the production of something or nothing." Wonderful *solid!* Well, what if it be the production of *something?* For undoubtedly we do not mean it of a production of nothing, that is, of no production. Then you say it must be the production of something *new*, for a production is always of something *new*. *Solid* again! that an *eternal* production must be a production of something *new*. But you cannot conceive, it may be, *how* any *production* should be *eternal*. And what if you cannot conceive *how* any thing should be *eternal?* I expect a proof of you that it cannot be. Your *supposing* it cannot, will give me no satisfaction. I have now run through your little quirks and subtilties upon this head, which yet are not *yours*, but as old almost as the controversy; despised by men of sense all along, despised even by yourself thirty years ago; when,

[o] Disquisit. Mod. p. 23. Præf. [p] Ibid.

with honour to yourself, and to the satisfaction and benefit of others, you wrote in defence of that ancient faith, which now you revile and blaspheme.

But to conclude this article, though I have, in civility towards you, considered your arguments drawn from the *nature* and *reason* of the thing, yet I must repeat my observation, that we may have nothing to do with them, in our present inquiry relating to the *ancients;* because if they are of any weight, they are as much against the faith of the *ancients* themselves, as against Bishop Bull, who acknowledges no other *numerical* unity than the ancients acknowledged. Having made good my first *charge*, I proceed to a second.

II. A second *general fallacy*[q] was your arguing from the expressions of Arians (famous for dissembling and equivocating) to those of the Ante-Nicene writers; men of a very different stamp and character, and who were not under the like temptation of saying one thing and meaning another. I had observed that you had recourse to this *salvo*, or *fallacy*, in order to elude the force of some *high expressions* (in respect of the Son's divinity) which you met with in the Ante-Nicene writers. To this you reply, (p. 9.)

1. That it "is not fairly suggested, that you do this "when you *find some expressions run pretty high and* "*strong for the divinity of Christ:* for, in all the places "referred to, there is no expression of that nature but in "the last." If you please to look back to your Proœmium, (p. 4, 5.) you will there find that you have made use of the *fallacy* which I charge you with, as a general answer to invalidate the force of most, or all Bishop Bull's testimonies. You observe that the acknowledging of Christ to be "God of God," or "God before the worlds," was common to many who were utter enemies to the Nicene faith. You go on to prove this farther by the author of the Opus Imperfectum, which author you pronounce an

[q] See my Defence, vol. i. p. 226.

Arian. You proceed to observe from Bishop Bull himself, that the Arians scrupled not any of the Catholic forms of speech, save only the term *consubstantial.* They would say, for instance, that the Son was "begotten out "of the Father himself," and was "true God;" and they rejected with indignation the charge of making the Son a *creature.* Now, what could be your meaning in these remarks, but to insinuate to your reader, that let him meet with ever so *high expressions* of the Son's *divinity* among the Ante-Nicene writers; yet, unless they have the very word *consubstantial,* they might possibly, or probably, mean no more than the Arians did after by the same or the like expressions? This is the *fallacy* which I complained of, and which you often occasionally recur to, both in your book and prefaces, to weaken the force of Bishop Bull's authorities. [r] Some of the places where you do this, I referred to in my Defence, which the reader that has a mind to it may turn to; and I do not yet see that I have *suggested* any thing but what is both fair and true.

2. A second evasion you have in your Reply (p. 5.) is, that you said sometimes Arians and Semiarians, whereas I have represented you, as if you had said Arians only. I do not see that this is at all material. If either Arians or Semiarians used Catholic expressions without a Catholic meaning, they come so far under the same predicament of *dissembling* and *equivocating:* and that both were notoriously guilty of so doing, is clear from all history of those times. The Semiarians in particular were often charged with it, both by Catholics and Anomæans. You say, farther, that you likewise join mostly with them some of the Ante-Nicene Fathers. But you will never be able to show that those Ante-Nicene Fathers were of different principles from the Council of Nice: so that your joining them with the others was either foreign to the point, or supposing the very thing in question.

[r] Præf. Disquisit. Mod. p. 8, 9, 40, 90, 109, 153, 157.

3. You reply, thirdly, (p. 10.) that "sure it must be a "very uncharitable censure to pronounce of near a thou- "sand bishops convened at Antioch, Seleucia, Sirmium, "Ariminum, and elsewhere, that they were a pack of "*hypocrites* and *equivocating knaves*." To which I make answer, first, that I know not how you will be able to make out near your number. If you add the numbers of the several councils, you may probably reckon many of the same men twice or thrice over. Neither were the men that made up those *councils* all of them Arians. There were but eighty of the whole four hundred at Ariminum really Arians. So that probably three hundred and twenty were imposed upon by the rest, and the charge of *equivocating* lies upon the eighty only. And it is evident, not only from Athanasius, but also from Sulpicius Severus, and St. Jerome, and indeed from all the historians, and all the accounts we have of that Council, that the Arians at Ariminum carried their point by *equivocation* and *wile*; and that the Catholics, most of them, were imposed upon by *double entendres*. They went upon those *charitable* principles which you are pleased to recommend. They could not imagine there was so much latent insincerity and guile, under so many fine words and fair pretences from men of their own order.

2. I answer, secondly, that there may be some difference between charging men with *equivocation* and calling them *knaves*. There is a reverend Doctor, whom I scruple not to charge with *equivocating*. He says, in a preface[s], he has many things which hinder him from receding from the belief of Christ's *true divinity*: and it is well known what he once meant by Christ's *true divinity*, when he wrote a Tract[t] with that title in defence of it. Who would not charitably believe, from hence, that he still retained the same faith in the same *true divinity*? But see

[s] Ut verum fatear, multa sunt quæ me impediunt quo minus a sententia de *vera Christi Deitate* recederem, id solum contendo &c. *Whitby, Disq. Mod.* p. 3. Præf.

[t] Whitby, de vera Christi Deitate: *Tractatus*, ann. 1691.

what he means by Christ's *true divinity*, (*Disq. Mod.* p. 25[u].) where he commends Justin Martyr for maintaining Christ's *true divinity*, making this an argument of it, that Justin's sentiments were clearly opposite to the doctrine of the Nicene Council. Hence it is manifest that the Doctor *equivocates* in the phrase *true divinity*. The *fact* I maintain; but if from thence you will infer that he is an *equivocating knave*, remember that the *inference* is yours, and not mine.

4. You reply, fourthly, as from Sozomen, "that when "the Arians first appeared, many *bishops*, a considerable "number of the clergy, and no small part of the people—— "favoured his party; and that two synods convened at "Bithynia and Palestine, wrote to their brethren to com- "municate with those Arians, as being *orthodox*." And here you ask, "Were all those holy men and able judges, "those *synods*, *bishops*, *clerks*, and laity, a pack of *hypo-* "*critical* dissemblers and equivocating *knaves?*" No; I charitably believe otherwise. The *synods*, *bishops*, *clerks*, and laity, who received the Arians as *orthodox*, were not, probably, the *equivocating knaves*, (as you choose to express it,) but the Arians: who, by fair words and artful *confessions*, *appeared* to be what they were not, and so were received as *orthodox*. You will remember that the principal of those *holy men* and *able judges* that promoted Arius's interest in the Synod of Bithynia, was Eusebius of Nicomedia; the same man that afterwards professed [x] his assent and consent to the Nicene Creed, as the true Catholic faith; and excused his not consenting to the *anathematizing* of Arius upon this foot, that he thought Arius had been much misrepresented, and that he knew from Arius's own letters that he was not the man that

[u] Magnam admirationem mihi injecit iniqua eorum sententia, qui Justinum M. Christianæ fidei simplicitatem, in doctrina de Christi præ-existentia, *Veraque Deitate*, adulterasse suspicati sunt; quo Patrum nemo, (leg. *neminem*,) meo quidem judicio, vel *plura* vel *clariora adversus Synodi Nicænæ placita* docuisse, facile est demonstrare. *Whitby*, *Disq. Mod.* p. 25.

[x] Sozom. E. H. lib. ii. cap. 16. p. 378.

the *Council* took him to be. Now if Eusebius, the principal man of the Synod of Bithynia, was thus imposed upon by Arius's fair pretences, no doubt but he represented Arius's case to the Synod, as favourably as he himself had conceived of it: and then no wonder if a man was received as *orthodox*, who was really believed to be *orthodox*. If you think that Eusebius, all the while, knew that Arius was not *orthodox*, in my sense of the word; admitting that, yet he might, for any thing I know, represent him as such then, as well as he did after: if so, the only *equivocating knave* might be Eusebius of Nicomedia; the rest might be imposed upon by his representations and colourings. *Holy men* and *able judges* can judge no otherwise of facts but as they are reported: and how could it be remedied, if Arius happened to get good testimonials, though himself an ill man? But enough of this matter: as to the Arian custom of *equivocating*, and thereby imposing upon honest men, the fact being plain, I shall insist no longer upon it, only referring to a few authors[y] who give a summary account of it.

III. A third *general fallacy*, just hinted in my Defence, (p. 287.) was, your arguing against the faith of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, in respect of Christ's real divinity, from this topic; that they often distinguish *God* from *Christ*, and call the Father *God* absolutely.

Here again you complain of me for *unfair dealing*. But how, or wherein am I *unfair* towards you? You say (Reply, p. 11.) "that your first instance of this nature is "from the epistle of Clemens Romanus, where he con-"stantly separates (*distinguishes* you mean) *Jesus Christ* "from that God, whom he styles the true and only God, "but never once calls him God." If this answer be any thing pertinent, I suppose your meaning is, that your argument did not turn upon this, that *Christ* was distin-

[y] Bull. Def. Fid. Nic. p. 293. Cave's Life of Athanasius. Cave, Epist. Apolog. p. 96. Clerc. Epist. Crit. ii. p. 52.

guished from *God;* but upon these farther considerations, that *Christ* is *constantly* so distinguished by Clemens, and never once called *God.* You may, if you please, call all those considerations put together, one argument: but they appeared to me to be distinct and several. You observe [z] of Clemens, that *he perpetually distinguishes Christ from God,* (*Christum a Deo perpetuo distinguit.*) This was one consideration, or presumption in favour of your principles. A second you add immediately after, *Deum vero ne semel nuncupat, But he never calls Christ God.* You proceed to illustrate your first observation by such instances as these following; that Clemens wishes grace and peace to the Corinthians from *Almighty God,* by *Jesus Christ;* that he introduces (chap. xx.) the *great Creator* and *Lord of the Universe* distributing his blessings by *Jesus Christ;* that *Christ* was sent of *God,* chap. xlii. and that the Apostles had their commission by Christ from *God,* chap. xliii. Now to what purpose were these several instances produced, except you intended them as so many arguments against Clemens's believing Christ to be consubstantial with him whom alone he calls *God,* and from whom he distinguishes *Christ?* But I insist upon it, that there is no weight at all in this argument. Nothing has been more common with writers, who have fully believed the doctrine of a coeternal Trinity, than this manner of speaking; especially when they have been thinking on another subject, and had no occasion to speak of Christ's divinity. And what if Clemens, or Polycarp, or any other writer, in a short epistle, or tract, has spoke of the Father only, under the title of *God,* and of the Son as *Lord,* or *Saviour,* or *High-Priest?* How often might the same thing be observed in modern treatises, or sermons of very orthodox men? I see no consequence that can be justly drawn against our principles from these premises. And if Clemens called the Father the *only God,* or only *true*

[z] Disq. Mod. p. 16.

God, though that be a distinct argument from the former; yet neither does it prove any thing more than the other, as I have shown in another place[a].

But you refer me to some *collections* of yours in another book[b] from Origen; who, it seems, in his book against Celsus, *distinguishes* and *separates* (so you say, p. 12.) *Christ* from him who is *God above all;* and declares, in the name of the generality of Christians, that *Christ* is not *the God above all.* This is not pertinent to the point in hand, having no relation to the *fallacy* I charged you with, nor belonging to the book which I was animadverting upon. But that I may not stand upon niceties with you, I will give you an answer to this *new* pretence. It is very certain that Origen never intended to deny that *Christ* is *God above all;* because all Catholics[c], (I might say *heretics* too for the most part,) both before and after Origen's time, as well as Origen himself, understood Rom. ix. 5. of God the Son, there styled ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸς, or *God above all.* Yet there is a certain sense in which the ancients have denied Christ to be the *God above all;* namely, when so understood as to make Christ the very *Person of the Father*, as the Sabellians understood it[d], or to set him *above the Father*[e], or *above the Creator*[f] of the world, as some other *heretics* pretended. In this latter sense it is, that Origen denies the Son to be *God above all*; as he had reason to do, because it would have been denying his *subordination* and *sonship*, and inverting the order of the Persons, to have asserted that *Christ* was in any sense *above the Father*, or so *God above all*, as to have the *Creator*, or *Father*, subordinate to him.

Notwithstanding all this, Origen himself, in the very page before that which you refer to, asserts and maintains

[a] Sermon iv. vol. ii. [b] Præf. de S. Script. Interpr. p. 34, 35.

[c] See the testimonies in Mills; and my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 133.

[d] Vid. Apost. Constit. lib. vi. cap. 26. Pseud-Ignat. Ep. ad Tars. cap. 5. Ad Philip. cap. 7.

[e] Origen contr. Cels. p. 387. Basil. Epist. lxxviii. p. 892.

[f] Vid. Iren. p. 101, 106. edit. Bened. Origen in Matt. p. 476. Huet.

the Catholic doctrine in full and express terms, the very same doctrine that we contend for at this day. For, having objected to Celsus[g] the worship of *many Gods*, telling him that if he would be consistent with his principles, he should not talk of the kingdom of *God*, in the singular, but of *Gods*, in the plural; he then bethinks himself that the argument might be retorted upon Christians, as worshipping two Gods, viz. the *Father* and *Christ*. Here was the critical place; here, if any where, we shall see of what principles Origen was. Well, how does Origen get rid of the objection? Not by saying that the Father *only* is God, in a *proper* sense: not by saying that the Father is *supreme God*, and the Son *another* God under him. No; he was wiser than to make himself ridiculous to Jew and Gentile, by such a weak answer. But he solves the difficulty by asserting the *Unity* of Father and Son: and, after he had guarded his assertion from any Sabellian construction, he triumphantly closes up all in these words; "We therefore, as I have shown, worship "one God, the Father and Son[h]." Thus he at once cleared the Christian doctrine from *Polytheism*, and made good the charge against the Pagans.

From what hath been said it may appear, that Origen has denied no more than all Catholics deny, namely, that *the Father is subordinate to the Son;* and has asserted as much as any Catholic contends for. We do not say that *Christ* is that Person who is ordinarily and eminently styled *God above all;* nor that he is in any sense or respect *above* the *Creator*, or above *God* the *Father*, being subordinate to him; but we assert that he is essentially one God with him who is the *Father*, and, as such, is *God above all:* and this very doctrine is plainly Origen's, as well as ours. You have forced me into this digression, by making your objection in a wrong place; and there-

[g] Vid. Origen. p. 385, 386.

[h] Ἕνα οὖν θεὸν, ὡς ἀποδεδώκαμεν, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν διαπιστόμεθα. pag. 386.

fore let that be my excuse to the reader for it. Now I return.

I have run through the three *general fallacies* which I charged you with. Your feeble endeavours to take them off prove ineffectual: and they now return upon you with the greater force.

I am next to consider the *particular defects*. But, before I proceed farther, it will here be proper to remove a complaint of yours, which you repeat more than once: it is a complaint of my management and conduct relating to your book.

You tell me (p. 2.) that I "have not defended any of "the Bishop's arguments which you had produced and "answered; nor made any reply to those numerous ar- "guments which you produced from the Ante-Nicene "Fathers against mine and the Bishop's sentiments.—" In another place you say thus, (p. 57.) "He is obliged, "if he would indeed defend the Bishop, to invalidate and "refute the answers that I have given to all his argu- "ments, and to do this entirely, and not by culling out "two or three instances, and leaving all the rest in their "full strength; that being in all the other cases, to leave "the Bishop in the lurch."

By all this you seem to think that Bishop Bull's celebrated performance is in some danger of sinking in its character, if your Modest Disquisitions be not particularly answered, paragraph by paragraph; and that I ought to have paid so much respect to your *Work*, as either not to have meddled at all with it, or to have attended you all the way through it. Now, as to this matter, I will here frankly declare to you my real thoughts, in the following particulars.

1. In the first place, I am so far from apprehending any danger to Bishop Bull, and his cause, from your book, that I should never have given myself the trouble of remarking at all upon it, had it not been given out to English readers (who must take such things on trust) that Bishop Bull's famed piece would receive an answer,

such as should satisfy *all learned and unprejudiced persons*. I knew that a Latin book could do no harm, but among those that could read Latin: and such I thought might, for the most part, be very safely trusted, having Bishop Bull's book to compare with yours, which alone is sufficient to answer for itself, with men of any judgment. The danger was not from the *book* itself, but from the *reports* made of it: and it concerned me to take care that English readers might not be imposed upon; which was one principal motive of my doing what I did.

2. I considered farther, that this controversy being of all others the most nice and intricate, and in which it is the easiest for a writer, that has a mind to it, to confound and puzzle such readers as have not been conversant in it; I say, I considered that it might be useful even to some Latin readers to point out the principal flaws and fallacies in your performance, which when done, your whole book is in a manner answered; or however answered as far as is needful, to prevent any honest man's being imposed upon by it.

3. You will give me leave to tell you, with all due respect, (however frankly,) that a writer who begins, and proceeds as you do, has no reason to expect an answer paragraph by paragraph; because there is a shorter and much better way of dealing with authors that are not careful to write *pertinently*. Who, do you imagine, would be at the trouble of telling you a hundred times over, that this argument is good against the Sabellians, and in such a sense of *numerical essence* as is not to the purpose; but in Bishop Bull's sense, and in the true sense, the argument is of no weight at all? One short general answer is sufficient in such a case; and is in reality as long as the objection, which is only repetition of the same thing. Had you stated the *question* fairly, kept close to the point in hand, arguing *pertinently* at least, if not *solidly*, all along, directly opposing that, and that only, which Bishop Bull undertook to prove; then indeed it might have concerned us to attend upon you all the way through, and to

have defended the Bishop against your attacks. But when, instead of this, you set out upon a wrong foot, and wander wide and far from the mark you should have aimed at: when, instead of attacking Bishop Bull directly, you encounter for the most part a phantom of your own, and fight with your shadow: in such a case as this, we have no need to be solicitous about the Bishop. Those formidable preparations, which might be otherwise apt to strike terror into us, are happily diverted another way: all we have now left to do, is to stand by unconcerned, look on, and smile. These are my reasons, why I hold myself excused from making any more particular answer to your *numerous arguments*, as you are pleased to call them. You may give us leave to judge how far our cause may be endangered by what you have done: and if we who are friends to the Bishop and his cause, are in no pain about either, nor at all afraid of *leaving them in the lurch*, you may be very easy. Now I proceed to make good the particulars of the charge upon you: *misquotations, misconstructions, misrepresentations, reviving of old and trite objections, concealing the answers*, &c. These, I think, reach to about twenty particulars, which shall all be considered in the same order as laid down in my Defence.

I. I charged you[i] with a *misquotation*[k] of Polycarp's Doxology, recorded in the Epistle of the Church of Smyrna. You left out, as I said, the two most material words, σὺν αὐτῷ, on which the Bishop's argument chiefly depended. You acknowledge in your Reply (p. 13.) that you left those words out; and the reason you give is, because "they are neither in the edition of Bishop Usher, "nor of Cotelerius, from whom you cited the passage." This answer, give me leave to say, is more unkind to yourself than the *charge* I made. I had compared the different readings of the Doxology in the two editions, Eusebius's and Bishop Usher's. I considered, that if you

[i] See my Defence, vol. i. p. 287. [k] Disquisit. Mod. p. 22.

should pretend to follow Bishop Usher and Cotelerius, you had falsified in two places, changing μεθ' ὅ into δι' ὅ, and καὶ πνεύματι into ἐν πνεύματι, which are very material alterations. But if you should pretend to copy from Eusebius, there you had left out σὺν αὐτῷ. The latter being a sin of *omission* only, and more excusable than putting words into the text, I chose to fix the charge there where it might fall the lightest, and seem rather a slip than any ill design. I had another reason, why I was willing to charge it as an *omission* out of the text of Eusebius; and that was because Bishop Bull had followed Eusebius's copy. Now if you had a mind to take another reading from Usher and Cotelerius, you should have given notice that Bishop Bull had made use of a faulty copy, before you had triumphed over him; and should have observed that Usher's and Cotelerius's reading was the true one. But not a word do you say of this; and the reason of your deep silence, in this respect, is very evident. Bishop Bull's argument was strong and good, according to Eusebius's reading: and according to Usher's and Cotelerius's, it would have been still stronger and fuller. Since therefore neither of the *readings* would serve your purpose, you lay aside both, and invent a new one of your own[1]: and then you might securely insult over the learned Prelate, having a *text* and *comment* both of your own contriving.

But, you say, the words, "as they lie in Eusebius thus, δι' "αὐτοῦ σὺν αὐτῷ, (you mean δι' ὅ σὺν αὐτῷ,) want good sense, it "being improper to say *by the Son* be glory to the Father "*with* the Son." Be it *proper* or *improper*, you ought to cite passages of authors as you find them: besides that very wise men, ancient and modern, have judged the expression very *proper:* and it will be thought that the compilers of our *Communion Office*, who scrupled not to say *by*

[1] The readings of the passage.
Δι' οὗ σοι σὺν αὐτῷ, ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ. *Euseb. E. H.* lib. iv. cap. 15.
Δι' οὗ σοι, ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ. *Whitby, Disq. Mod.* p. 22.
Μεθ' οὗ σοι καὶ πνεύματι ἁγίῳ. *Usher, Coteler.*

whom, and with whom, &c. understood what *good sense* is, as well as the *Modest Inquirer*.

II. A second *misquotation*[m] I charged[n] upon you was of a passage in Athenagoras[o]. You was pleased to change πρὸς αὐτοῦ into πρὸς αὐτὸν, for no reason that I could see, but to make a weak insinuation against the *divinity* of God the Son. In your Reply (p. 13.) you say; "Now "this, I confess, is casually done, but (you mean *and*) "without design." But these *casual* slips have an ill appearance, especially in so noted a place as this of Athenagoras. You could not forget that this very πρὸς αὐτοῦ, in Athenagoras, is what we set a particular note and value upon, as showing that the ancients did not always say δι' αὐτοῦ only, in respect of the Son's part or office in the work of creation, but sometimes πρὸς αὐτοῦ, a phrase which may express the *efficient* cause, and is not liable to the same exceptions as the phrase δι' αὐτοῦ. Now, to falsify a testimony of this kind, though *casually*, betrays however great negligence or oscitancy. You observe that *ab eo tanquam exemplari*, serves as well your turn, as *ad eum tanquam exemplar*. That is, if we will allow you your construction. But you cannot make the former so easily, or so probably, out of πρὸς αὐτοῦ, as the latter, out of πρὸς αὐτόν: besides that by changing πρὸς αὐτοῦ into πρὸς αὐτὸν, you took from us one sense of the words which we might think it proper to insist upon, namely, that of an *efficient cause*. Πρὸς αὐτοῦ, if it may be construed your way, may also be construed another way, and perhaps more naturally: and therefore we take it not well to be deprived of any advantage which the text gives us. I must however observe, that whatever your design was from these words, they will not answer your purpose, even though we should admit your construction. For no consequence can be drawn against our principles, from the consideration of the Son's being the

[m] Whitby, Disq. Mod. p. 62.

[n] Defence, vol. i. p. 287.

[o] Πρὸς αὐτοῦ γὰρ, καὶ δι' αὐτῦ πάντα ἐγένετο. *Athen.* p. 38. Ox.

exemplar, after which *all things* were *made*; unless you can imagine that he was an *exemplar* to himself.

III. The third thing I charged you with [p], was a *misconstruction* [q] of a celebrated passage in Methodius [r]. The passage I had produced in my Defence, to prove the *eternal generation* of the Son, as Bishop Bull also had done [s]. You expressed yourself somewhat obscurely in answer to the Bishop. Only this was plain from your words, (*frustra præsule renitente,*) that you intended something opposite to the Bishop, and insinuated to your reader that this quotation of Methodius proved the very contrary to what the Bishop alleged it for. Now the Bishop had cited it in proof of the *consubstantiality* and *coeternity* of the Son: to which purposes it is indeed as full and clear as any can be desired. You are pleased however in your Reply (p. 15.) to object as follows.

1. That "to say that the Son of God was preexistent "before the ages in the heavens, is to say no more than all "the Arians and Semiarians have asserted, &c." But the force of the Bishop's argument and mine did not lie in the words πρὸ αἰώνων (though they are not without their weight [t], however the Arians or Semi-Arians might *equivocate,*) but in those other words of Methodius, that the *Son was, did not become, a Son;* that he had *no new filiation;* that *he is always the same;* and in Methodius's guarding against the supposition of a *temporal* generation, by his explaining it of a temporal *manifestation* only. Why do you overlook and conceal the main points wherein our argument consisted, and make reply only to that which neither Bishop Bull nor I laid any stress upon? But it was prudent, it may be, to pass over what could not be answered.

2. You object to us some other passages of Methodius

[p] Defence, vol. i. p. 288.
[q] Disquisit. Mod. p. 75, 76.
[r] Method. apud Phot. p. 960. See my Defence, vol. i. p. 102.
[s] Bull. Def. Fid. Nic. p. 164, 200.
[t] See my Defence, vol. i. p. 99, &c.

to confront ours with. He calls the Father ἄναρχος ἀρχὴ, *a principium, that had no beginning*. So you translate: might you not as well have rendered it, *a beginning that had no beginning?* But that would not have served your purpose; the true rendering is, a *principium* or *head*, that has no *principium* or *head*. But you had a mind to the words *no beginning*, to insinuate as if Methodius had said this of God the Father in contradistinction to God the Son, who *had a beginning*; though Methodius says no such thing. He says indeed that the Son is ἀρχὴ, a *principle* or *head*, after the Father: that is, the Son is the *fountain* of all things *after* the Father; not in *time*, but in *order;* the Father being always primarily considered as *Head* and *Father* of the Son. The sum then of what Methodius has there said, is that the *Son* has a *Father*, and that the *Father* has *none*. What Catholic would ever scruple to assert the same thing? No one ever doubted but that the Father alone was ἄναρχος, the Son not ἄναρχος in this sense [u].

3. You object, thirdly, the following *words*, (for I see not the *sense*,) "Methodius adds that these words might "be congruously applied to him, (the Son,) *In the begin-* "*ning God created the heaven and the earth;* and those "of Solomon, *The Lord created me the beginning of his* "*ways.*" Now what can an English reader make of these two passages, as you have represented them and tacked them together? From the last of them, I suppose, he is to understand that the Son was *created*, according to Methodius. But then what will he make of the text out of Genesis? Is he to understand that the Son was *created* with the heavens and the earth, in the *beginning?* So one might think, and you are very indifferent, I perceive, what your English reader may apprehend, provided you may but seem to have something to say, and something that may reflect dishonour on the Son of God. As to the

[u] Vid. Gregor. Naz. Orat. xxxv. p. 563. Damascen. de Fid. lib. i. cap. 11. p. 42.

passage in Genesis, Methodius interprets ἐν ἀρχῇ, (which we render *in the beginning*,) *in the Principle*; understanding by *Principle* God the Son, *in whom* all things were created, according to St. Paul, Coloss. i. 17. Now since, according to Methodius, all things whatever were *created* in the ἀρχῇ, *i. e.* in God the Son, it is plain that he exempts him from the number of *creatures*. As to the other text, out of Solomon's Proverbs, you have, without any ground or warrant from Methodius, rendered ἔκτισε *created*, instead of *appointed* or *constituted*. The meaning probably is, according to Methodius, that the Father *appointed*, or *constituted*, God the Son as the ἀρχὴ, the *principium*, *foundation*, or *head* over all *creatures*. This kind of construction of that place of the Proverbs, appears to have been known and received in the Church some time before Methodius; as is plain from Dionysius of Rome[x], his comment upon the text: which was afterwards countenanced by Eusebius[y], and other Catholic writers[z]. Athenagoras, much earlier than any of them, must have understood the text nearly in the same sense. For after he had declared expressly against the Son's being *made* or *created*, asserting his *procession* from the Father to be a kind of *substratum* or *support* for the world of creatures to subsist in, receiving from thence their proper forms, order, and perfection; he immediately cites this text out of the Proverbs, as confirming his sentiments[a]. To return to Methodius: he barely cites the text to prove that Christ was *prior* to the *creation*, and that

[x] Ἔκτισε γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἀκουσίον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίστησε τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γεγονόσιν ἔργοις, γεγονόσι δὲ δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ. *Dionys. Rom. apud Athanas.* p. 232.

[y] Ἀρχὴν δὲ τῶν ὅλων ὑπὸ κυρίου τοῦ αὐτοῦ πατρὸς κατασταγμένος· τοῦ ἔκτισεν ἐνταῦθ' ἀντὶ τοῦ κατέταξεν, ἢ κατέστησεν εἰρημένου. *Euseb. Eccl. Theol.* lib. iii. p. 151.

[z] Non enim ita *sapientiam* suam condidit, quasi aliquando sine *sapientia* fuerit——Hoc initium habeat *sapientia* Dei quod de Deo *processit* ad creanda omnia tam cælestia quam terrena; non quo cœperit esse in Deo. *Creata* est ergo *sapientia*, imo genita, non sibi quæ semper erat, sed his quæ ab ea fieri oportebat. *Pseud-Ambros. de Fid. Orth.* cap. ii. p. 349.

[a] Vid. Athenag. cap. x. p. 38, 39, 40.

all creatures had their subsistence in him. He is not so particular in explaining the sense of ἔκτισε, as Dionysius of Rome, or Eusebius: but it is more than probable that he understood it much in the same sense. Certain it is, that your construction of him is entirely unwarranted; and not only so, but contradictory to the author's known principles elsewhere. Upon the whole, you have not been able to answer Bishop Bull's citations out of Methodius, nor to make good your own pretences against Methodius's orthodoxy. Instead of taking off one *misconstruction* which I had charged you with, you have only added to it: and have been so far from acquitting yourself of your first offence, that you have more than doubled it.

IV. A fourth thing which I charged[b] upon you, was a misrepresentation and misconstruction[c] of a passage in Dr. Cave[d]. I blamed you for insinuating as if Dr. Cave had said or meant, that many or most of the Ante-Nicene Fathers were against the *divinity* and *eternity* of Christ. That you really intended to insinuate as much is confessed in your Reply, where you tell me (p. 26.) that "the "natural import of the words" (Dr. Cave's words) "contains a full confutation of the whole design of my book, "which is to prove that all the Ante-Nicene Fathers "maintained the consubstantiality of the Son with the "Father, and the eternal generation of the Son."

I have not mistaken then as to the matter of fact, that you really did *insinuate* what I had *charged* you with. That you was *to blame* for so doing, will easily be made appear as plainly as the other. Two things I before observed; 1st, That Dr. Cave's words ought not, without a manifest *necessity*, to have been interpreted to a sense directly opposite to his well known and often declared sentiments. 2d, That there was no such *manifest necessity* in the case before us; but rather some probable grounds,

[b] Defence of Queries, vol. i. p. 288.
[c] Whitby, Disquis. Mod. p. 97.
[d] Cave, Histor. Liter. vol. i. p. 112.

even from the passage itself, for interpreting Dr. Cave's words otherwise than you have done. Now as to Dr. Cave's real sentiments, relating to the faith of the Ante-Nicene writers, I appeal to the passages appearing in the *margin*[c]. You may there see that Dr. Cave looked upon the *eternity* of the Son as part of the Christian faith from the very *infancy* of the *Church;* that it had been *constantly* taught by the Catholic Fathers; and that none but mere strangers to *antiquity* could make any question of it: that the most effectual way to confute Arians, &c. is, after Scripture, to appeal to the *constant universal* consent of the *ancients*; with more to the same purpose. Is this the man whom you quote on your side? I may add that

[c] *Æternitatem* Filii, ejusque *σύνδρομον τῇ ἀρχῇ τὸ εἶναι* (quemadmodum non inscite loquitur Cyrillus Alexandrinus) *concurrentem cum paterno principio existentiam*, constanter docuisse Catholicos Patres, antiquitatis ecclesiasticæ rudis plane sit oportet qui nescire potest; nec pluribus jam probare opus est quod cumulate præstiterunt alii. Hanc ecclesiæ fidem ab ipsis *Christianismi primordiis* traditam, et *perpetuo conservatam*, omni quo potuerunt nisu totisque viribus oppugnarunt Ariani. *Cav. Diss.* 3. *ad Calc. Hist. Lit.* p. 79.

Liquet, non esse efficaciorem *hæreses* refutandi rationem, quam si post allegatam SS. Scripturæ auctoritatem, *constantem* et *universalem* veterum consensum ad partes nostras advocemus. Expertus est id Theodosius Imperator an. 383. quando Catholicos Episcopos cum Arianis, Macedonianis, Eunomianis, coacta synodo, confligere vellet; suadebat potius Nectario et Agellio, qui ipsum consuluerant, Sisinnius, ut interrogarent *hæreticos* istos num admitterent illos doctores atque interpretes Scripturarum, qui ante ecclesiæ dissidium floruissent. *Cav. Ep. Apolog.* p. 22. Vid. etiam p. 17.

Monebo tantum, in Patrum Scriptis Dogmata Philosophica a *fidei articulis* probe esse distinguenda. In his, S. Literis et Catholicæ traditioni strictius se alligant, et in REI SUMMA OMNES CONVENIUNT: in illis majori utuntur libertate, et opiniones sæpius adhibent quæ in philosophorum scholis ventilari solebant; quin et in explicandis fidei mysteriis quandoque voces e schola Platonica petitas admovent, sed ad Christianum sensum accommodatas. *Ibid.* p. 48.

Profiteatur (J. Clericus) se cum Ecclesia Catholica agnoscere, Deum esse essentia unum, Personis trinum, nempe Unitatem in Trinitate, et Trinitatem in unitate se colere ac venerari; credere se, *Jesum Christum* verum esse et *æternum* Dei Filium, Patri vero *ὁμοούσιον*, et *συναΐδιον*——tunc demum intelligemus fidem ejus in principibus his doctrinæ Christianæ capitibus, rectam esse, orthodoxam, et tam sacræ Scripturæ, quam *primæve antiquitati* congruam. *Cav. Ep. Apolog.* p. 107.

his *Apologetical Epistle* runs much upon this topic, to vindicate the primitive Fathers against such aspersions as you, among others, are too apt to throw upon them: and there needs nothing more to show that he was perfectly in my sentiments as to that particular, and directly opposite to yours. You may say, perhaps, that Dr. Cave was inconsistent with himself; and at different times, upon different occasions, asserted repugnant propositions. But, with submission, I think it a piece of justice due to every author, especially one that has bore a character in the learned world, to suppose otherwise of him, till it can be evidently made appear, that he has contradicted in one place what he had laid down in another. If there be any room left for a favourable and candid interpretation, it ought to be admitted. I before observed to you, that there was no *manifest necessity* of interpreting that passage of Dr. Cave, as you do. He recounted about seven errors of Lactantius, referring to others unnamed: and in *those*, he says, many of the *ancients* concurred with him. By *in those*, he might possibly mean in *some* or *other of them*, not in every *single* particular. To make it the more probable that he really meant no more, I observed that *de divinitate* stood as a distinct *article*, and might be construed *of the Deity*. Lactantius held very absurd notions of the *Deity*, as great errors as any could be. Could Dr. Cave take notice of many smaller slips, and never allude to those which were the greatest of all? And yet you cannot pretend to say that *many*, or indeed *any* of the primitive Fathers concurred with Lactantius in those errors concerning the *Deity*. From whence I justly concluded that the words *in quibus*, were not to be strictly understood of all and *singular* the errors noted.

To this you reply, that Lactantius says of God, that he is the Father of all things, "whose beginning cannot be "comprehended;" as if this were all that Lactantius had said. Does he not plainly assert that God *had a beginning*, and that he *made himself*[f]? You observe farther, that this

[f] Verum quia fieri non potest quin id quod sit, *aliquando esse cœperit;*

is fully explained by himself lib. ii. cap. 8. where he says, "God only who is not made, is from himself, as we "showed in the first book." And what if he speaks right here? Does it follow that he has not said what he really has said in another place? Besides, if you please to admit the same candour of interpreting one place by another, I can show you also where he has spoke very orthodoxly of God the Son[g]; and can as easily acquit him of the charge of *heresy* with respect to God the Son, as you can acquit him of the like charge in respect of God the Father. In a word, his *errors* and *contradictions* in both points are visible enough: and give me leave to think that Dr. Cave might see them; and might allude to one in the article *de divinitate*, and to the other in the words, *de æterna Filii existentia*. For, surely, otherwise he would not have put *de* and *de*, but would rather have expressed it as one article, thus; *de divinitate atque æterna existentia Filii*; and then have proceeded with another *de*, to a new article. Upon the whole, you can never make good your point from this passage of Dr. Cave, which is not only capable of a different construction from yours, but most naturally and most probably requires it.

You would insinuate (Reply, p. 30.) from another passage of Dr. Cave, where he is speaking of Origen, that Origen's *supposed* errors relating to the *Trinity* were not, in Dr. Cave's judgment, contrary to any "article of the "Church, or Apostolical traditions:" which again is doing that good man a second injury, instead of making satisfaction for the first. Dr. Cave does not say that his *supposed* errors relating to the *Trinity* were not contrary to "any article of the Church;" but only that many of Origen's censured opinions were not: and what sort of opinions Dr. Cave meant, he himself tells us in the very place referred to[h]; namely, "intricate questions that

consequens est ut, quando nihil ante eum fuerit, ipse ante omnia ex seipso sit procreatus.——*Deus ipse se fecit.* *Lactant.* lib. i. cap. 7. p. 32.

[g] Vid. Lactant. lib. iv. cap. 9.

[h] Histor. Liter. vol. i. p. 77.

" had been canvassed only in the schools of the philoso-
" phers, and some notions of his own invention that were
" *minus commodæ*, not so just or accurate as they should
" be." Now what is this to our present purpose? See the passages of Dr. Cave before cited, sufficiently showing that he thought the *doctrine* of the *Trinity* to be a fundamental " article of the Church," and an " apostoli-
" cal tradition." But I am weary of attending you through so many trifling pretences. To conclude this head: the most that can be made out of Dr. Cave's expressions, here or elsewhere, is no more than this, that some of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, in some places of their works, expressed themselves sometimes *improperly*, *incautiously*, or, it may be, now and then *dangerously*, in respect of the *doctrine* of the *Trinity*, before the meaning of terms was adjusted and settled; and those articles reduced to a more *certain* and more *accurate form* of expression. In the *sum* of the *matter*, in the *main doctrine*, the Ante-Nicene Fathers were agreed. This was Dr. Cave's real judgment; as may be seen by his own words before cited: and, I suppose, he may be allowed to be his own best interpreter. He was not only in those sentiments, but *zealous* for them, being a true lover and admirer of the primitive Fathers. How would the good man have been filled with indignation to have found his name and his authority made use of, to such purposes as you have done! But enough.

V. I charged[i] you farther as reporting falsely, that the titles of τοῦ παντὸς ποιητὴς, and τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸς, (that is, *Creator* or *Framer* of the universe,) were such as the writers of the *second century* always distinguished the *Father* from the *Son* by. I was indeed so tender in this point, as not absolutely to charge this *falsehood* upon you: but I observed that either this must have been your meaning, or else you had made a very trifling observation. Those words of yours on which I grounded my remark, I have

[i] Defence of Queries, vol. i. p. 290.

now thrown into the margin[k], for every Latin reader to judge of. You defend yourself (Reply, p. 16.) with these words: "The words of Athenagoras there cited are these; "*One unbegotten and eternal Maker of all things. By which* "*epithets*, &c. Now of these epithets thus joined, my "words are certainly true; nor had the Doctor any right to "separate what I had thus joined." One can hardly forbear smiling at this invented answer. If what you now pretend was really your meaning, how came you to say epithets, in the plural, rather than epithet, in the singular? Why did you distinguish the several epithets with commas? Again, why did you take such particular notice of *per quem*, *by whom*, which you say was attributed to the Son, to distinguish him from him that was *omnium opifex*, *Maker of all things*? Does not your sense here, and your sense in what went before, (as I have represented it,) answer to each other, like two tallies, exactly? I defy any man that reads your words in the Latin, to understand you otherwise. But if you will needs have it that you intended only to say that the epithet of "one unbe-"gotten and eternal Maker of all things," was *peculiar* to the Father, in the *second century*, you shall have the honour of making a shrewd observation, when you tell me in what *century* downwards to this day, that *epithet* has not been *peculiar* to the Father as much as then. I before left you the *alternative*, either of being found *trifling* in a peculiar manner, or making a *false report*; and so I do still. One might think, by what follows in your Reply to this article, that you had a mind to own the *report*, and to vindicate it from the charge of falsehood.

You say, Justin Martyr made a "difference between

[k] Ex quibus omnibus, ex Athenagoræ sententia, Deum illum unum quem Christiani prædicabant, non alium fuisse quam Deum ingenitum, æternum, τοῦ παντὸς ποιητὴν, τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸν, *omnium opificem*, liquet. Quibus epithetis istius sæculi Scriptores Deum Patrem a Filio semper distinguebant, Deumque Filium ab hoc omnium opifice ex eo distingui docuerunt, quod sit ille *per quem*, aut cujus ministerio Pater fecit omnia. *Whitby, Disq. Modest.* p. 60.

" the word ποιητὴς and δημιουργὸς;" and a little after, that " he always speaketh of the Son as being another, not " from the δημιουργὸς, the Builder, Framer, or Artificer, but " ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τοῦ παντὸς, or τῶν ὅλων, from the Maker " of all things," Reply, p. 17, 18. However that be, I showed you plainly, from three express testimonies [l], that Irenæus, of the same century with Justin, made no such difference. The Son is ποιητὴς τῶν πάντων, *Maker of all things*, according to Irenæus, over and over, in as full and strong words as the Father himself can be: so that your remark, as to the writers of the *second* century, has no truth in it. What you observe of Justin, is not strictly true. He tells us [m] indeed, that Plato made a difference between ποιητὴς and δημιουργὸς, understanding by the former one that *makes* a thing from nothing, and by the latter one that *frames* any thing out of *preexistent* matter. Justin takes notice of this, in order to show that Plato's inferior gods must be *corruptible*, upon Plato's own principles: for the *great God* is styled by Plato, not ποιητὴς, but δημιουργὸς of the other *Gods*. Consequently they were made of matter, which is corruptible, and therefore are *corruptible* themselves. What is this to the purpose we are upon? Or how does it appear that Justin himself always observed Plato's distinction? Besides that if he did, it is certain that Justin Martyr supposes God the Son to be ποιητὴς, or *Maker* of man, whom he calls the ποίημα, *creature* of Christ [n]. And there is no reason to doubt, but that he supposed him to be as truly ποιητὴς, *Maker* of all other things, according to the constant doctrine of the Church in that very century, as appears from Irenæus, Clemens of Alexandria, and others.

You go on, in pursuance of your first mistake, to observe, that " δημιουργὸς being of an inferior sense to that of " ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων, it is no wonder that the Fathers some-

[l] See my Defence, vol. i. p. 134, 135.
[m] Just. Mart. Paræn. p. 91. Ox. ed.
[n] Just. Mart. Dial. p. 187. Jeb.

" times give it to the Son under one of these distinctions, " where they say with Origen the Father is πρῶτος δημιουρ- " γὸς, the first or chief Worker, the Son is so in a secon- " dary sense." This is writing just as if you had never seen the Fathers. I repeat it, that Irenæus gives both those titles indifferently to God the Son, as do other Fathers after him; which you might have seen in my Defence, vol. i. p. 134. Yet you are loath to admit even so much as δημιουργὸς to have been applied to the Son, except with a distinction; *quoting*, I would say *misquoting*, Origen, to countenance your pretences. If you please to look again into Origen [o], the word is πρώτως, not πρῶτος, signifying not that the Father is the *first Worker*, as if there were *two workers*, but that he is *primarily* Creator. And, what ruins all your fine airy speculations at once, Origen, in that very place, asserts the Son ποιῆσαι (not δημιουργεῖν) τὸν κόσμον, to *make*, not *frame* only, the world: which is as much as if he had called him τοῦ κόσμου, or τῶν ὅλων ποιητής.

You quote Eusebius as styling the Father ἁπάντων δημιουργὸς, the Son αἴτιος δεύτερος. You should have remembered that the same Eusebius styles the Son ὁ μέγας τῶν ὅλων δημιουργός [p]. Had this been applied to the *Father* instead of the *Son*, what speculations might we not have expected upon the force of ὁ μέγας, the *great* Creator? You forget also that Eusebius scruples not to use the title of ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων, *Maker of all things*, speaking of the *Son;* as I observed in my Defence [q]. This is directly against you: and if there be some expressions in Eusebius which we neither approve nor vindicate; so there are many others that you cannot approve, or make consistent with your principles: quotations therefore from Eusebius will signify little on either side. What you

[o] Origen. contr. Cels. p. 317.
[p] Euseb. Eccl. H. lib. x. cap. 4. p. 316.
[q] Defence of Queries, vol. i. p. 134.

produce (Reply, p. 18.) out of Methodius has been solidly answered by Bishop Bull[r].

You next cite Tatian as *a true disciple of Justin Martyr*, saying, that "matter is produced ὑπὸ τοῦ πάντων δημι-"ουργοῦ, from the Maker of all things, but the Son was "ἑαυτῷ τὴν ὕλην δημιουργήσας, Worker of this matter." But sure the *disciple* was strangely forgetful of his *master's* distinction between ποιητὴς and δημιουργός: otherwise, when he was talking of God's *producing* matter, he should have styled him ποιητὴς, not δημιουργός. And you are as forgetful of what you had said but the page before: otherwise you should have made the Father no more than *Worker* of the matter, as well as the Son; because of the word δημιουργός. See how strangely you are bewildered in your observations, confuting and contradicting yourself. Nothing succeeds with you; and I will venture to predict that nothing will, so long as you are espousing the cause of *heresy*, in opposition to the faith of the Catholic Church.

VI. I charged you, sixthly, with three misrepresentations together: one relating to Basil, the other two to Athanasius[s]. Basil you represented as declaring against Unity of *essence*, where he *intended* nothing but against Unity of *Person*. To which you make answer, (p. 21.) that you "dived not into Basil's intentions, but cited his "words fairly, viz. that the Sabellian doctrine was cor-"rected by the word *consubstantial*." A pretty way this, to cite authors without considering whether they *intended* any thing to the purpose they are cited for, or no. You cited [t]Basil, to prove that two things *consubstantial* make *two essences*; whereas Basil meant no more than that they make two *Persons*. This you call *fairly citing his words*. You mean, I suppose, that you *fairly* transcribed his words, at the same time very *unfairly* perverting his sense.

As to Athanasius, I observed that you understood what he had said against the ὁμοιούσιον, as if it had been said

[r] Bull. Def. Fid. Nic. p. 165.
[s] See my Defence, vol. i. p. 290.
[t] Disquisit. Mod. p. 32. Præf.

against the ὁμοούσιον, betwixt which two that accurate Father always carefully distinguished. To this you reply, that you cited Athanasius to confirm this proposition, that " they who say the essence of the Son is like or equal to " that of the Father, do by that ascribe to him another " numerical essence from that of the Father." I perceive you do not yet understand a syllable of what Athanasius was speaking about. See his meaning explained in my Defence, vol. i. p. 290. Athanasius is so far from supposing *like* and *equal* to be equivalent, or even consistent, that he denies that essence to be *equal*, which is only *like*; and he is not observing that either an *equal* or a *like essence* must be another *numerical* essence, but that an essence which is only *like* to *divine*, must be an *inferior* essence. It is very strange, that after a key had been given you to that passage in Athanasius, you should still go on, as before, to confound yourself and your readers. As to the other *misrepresentation* of Athanasius, whom you suppose an assertor of *numerical identity*, (which is making him a Sabellian, according to your sense of *numerical*,) as to this charge upon you, you are pleased to say never a word. That therefore stands as it did.

VII. In the next place, I blamed you for representing Barnabas's epistle, ἐν νόθοις, interpreting it *spurious*, though that be not the sense of ἐν νόθοις, as it lies in Eusebius. To this you make answer, (p. 20.) that you " neither there " nor elsewhere interpret those words at all." This is another instance wherein you appear to be more unkind to yourself, than I had been to you. You declare, p. 19. of your Disquisitions, that Barnabas's epistle was by the *ancients* held for *spurious*. This false assertion appeared to have some *colour*, supposing that you interpret ἐν νόθοις in Eusebius, to mean *spurious:* but without that, you have made a *misreport* of the *ancients*, and have no pretence at all for it. Show me what *ancients*, or where they reckoned Barnabas's epistle *spurious*[u]. If you choose

[u] Certe quicquid de hac epistola dicant recentiores critici, eam Barnabæ

rather to have it thought that you have told us an untruth without any *colour* for it, than with any, be it so: I was willing to put the most *candid* construction upon the thing; and I shall do so still, if you will give me leave. For I observe, that after you had said [x] that Eusebius ranked this epistle ἐν νόθοις, you immediately subjoin these words, "Cotelerius confesses that he inclines to the opi-"nion of those who think it is not the Apostle's." Now, this is so very like commenting on the phrase, ἐν νόθοις, just going before, that hardly one reader in a hundred could ever suspect that you understood by ἐν νόθοις, any thing else but *spurious;* that is, falsely ascribed to Barnabas. In a word, it seems to me very much the same thing, whether you *interpret* a passage thus, or whether you lead your reader into such *interpretation:* the reader is equally deceived either way. However, if you insist upon it, that you neither *interpreted* the words at all, nor intended to lead your reader into any such *interpretation*, I acquiesce; provided only that you give us any tolerable account of your saying that this epistle was looked upon as *spurious* by the *ancients*.

VIII. The next thing which I found fault with [y] was, your partial account of the ancient *doxologies* [z]. To this you reply, (p. 19.) that you "freely acknowledge your "account of the primitive doxologies to be imperfect, as "wanting the *doxologies* of St. Paul and St. Jude, which "are the best rule and standard of doxologies." What? better than St. John's, or St. Peter's? But this it is to aim at wit. You may please to remember that we were not talking of the *Scripture-doxologies*, but of those which are to be met with in the writings of the Fathers. You had told us in your Disquisitions a notorious untruth, that the Fa-

nostro constanter ascribunt *veteres*. "Nemo certe fuit," inquit ὁ πανὺ Cestriensis noster, "qui *hanc* Epistolam Barnabæ non tribuerit; neque in ea "quidquam apparet, quod eam ætatem non ferat." *Cav. Histor. Literar.* vol. i. p. 11.

[x] Disq. Mod. p. 9.

[y] Defence of Queries, vol. i. p. 291.

[z] Disq. Mod. p. 23.

thers of the first and second century never used that form of *doxology* which has been especially called Catholic; but that the Arian form had obtained among the early Fathers. This *false* account I softly called a *partial* account; to be as tender of you as possible. It is well known that μετὰ or σὺν, in *doxologies*, is the same as if the particle καὶ be used to connect the Persons: and all such forms come under the name of Catholic, as opposed to such *forms* as have only διὰ or ἐν: because, though either of those forms may indifferently be used, and have been used by Catholics both in former and latter times: yet after the Arians had perverted one to an ill sense, the Catholics chose, for the most part, to make use of the other. Now of those called Catholic forms, I referred to Polycarp's [a], the Church of Smyrna's [b], and Clemens's of Alexandria [c], all within the two first centuries, and standing evidences of the *falsehood* of your report, supposing you meant that neither μετὰ, nor σὺν, nor καὶ, were applied in doxologies to the *Son* or *Holy Ghost*. Indeed, if any of them are applied to either of those two Persons, it is a contradiction to the Arian pretence that neither of them should be glorified *with* the Father, but the Father glorified *in* or *by* them. You tell me, by way of Reply, (p. 20.) "that the words of Polycarp, and the Church of Smyrna, "comparing the variation of copies, are certainly against "me." How *certainly?* I know of no *variation* there is with respect to the Church of Smyrna's: Eusebius's copy being but an abstract, wants the latter part of the epistle. As to the *variation* of Polycarp's, it cannot be pretended to make any thing *certain* against me, unless it be *certain* that Eusebius's reading be the better of the

[a] Μεθ' οὗ σοι καὶ πνεύματι ἁγίῳ ἡ δόξα, &c. *Polycarp.*

[b] Μεθ' οὗ δόξα τῷ Θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι. *Eccles. Smyrn.*

[c] Τῷ μόνῳ πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ, υἱῷ καὶ πατρὶ, παιδαγωγῷ καὶ διδασκάλῳ υἱῷ, σὺν καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι· πάντα τῷ ἑνὶ ἐν ᾧ τὰ πάντα. δι' ὃν τὰ πάντα ἓν, δι' ὃν τὸ ἀεί. οὗ μίλη πάντες. οὗ δόξα, αἰῶνες· πάντα τῷ ἀγαθῷ, πάντα τῷ καλῷ, πάντα τῷ σοφῷ, τῷ δικαίῳ τὰ πάντα· ᾧ ἡ δόξα καὶ νῦν καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας. *Clem. Alex. Pædag.* lib. iii. p. 311. Ox. ed.

two; which is by no means probable. Besides, that at the worst, σὺν is applied to the Son, even in Eusebius's copy: I suppose you do not insist upon the *variation* of your own contriving. Besides these, Clemens's *doxology* will still stand good against you, and St. Basil's testimony concerning the doxologies of the earlier centuries[d], though the doxologies produced by him reach no higher up than the beginning of the third. But the subject of *doxologies* having been accurately handled of late by others, I shall content myself with referring to their learned and useful tracts upon it[e].

IX. I censured your account of Justin Martyr, as being one continued misrepresentation[f]. I considered what I said; and shall now justify my censure. You are pleased, indeed, to put on a more than usual air of assurance upon this occasion. The *brightest evidence of truth* is what you pretend to, (p. 31.) You resolve to *vindicate* yourself from this *false imputation*, and to *make* me *sensible of my conduct*; that I have *very artificially, very falsely represented Justin Martyr*, (p. 31.) have been guilty of *pious frauds*, and *notorious artifice*, (p. 37.) such *artifice and fraud as you have seldom met with*, (ibid.) *A crowd of falsehoods* and *misrepresentations* you charge upon me, (p. 40.) Yet, after all these big words and fine flourishes, (the feeble vaunts of a desperate cause that needs them,) I will venture to refer the matter in dispute to any man of tolerable capacity, and moderate skill in the learned languages. I intimated in my Defence (vol. i. p. 306.) the drift and design of Justin Martyr's Dialogue, of that part which we are now principally concerned with. It was to show that there was a *divine Person*, one who was really God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and was not the *Father*, but was the *Logos*, or *Christ*. This account of Jus-

[d] Basil. de Sp. S. cap. xxix. p. 218, 222.

[e] Seasonable Review of Mr. Whiston's Account of primitive Doxologies. Second Review by the same hand.

Bishop of London's Letter defended. By a Believer.

[f] Defence of Queries, vol. i. p. 291.

tin I will first demonstrate to be true and right; and next show how easy it is to take off all your boasted *reasons*, or rather *cavils*, to the contrary.

1. Justin Martyr observes, in the beginning of his Dialogue[f], that the Christians acknowledged *no other God* than the Jews did. "There never will be, O Trypho, "nor ever was since the world began, *another God* (ἄλλος "Θεὸς) besides the *Maker* and *Disposer* of the universe: "nor do we imagine that ours is one God and yours "another; but it is one and the same, that brought your "Fathers out of Egypt with a mighty hand and stretched "out arm: nor do we rest our hopes in any other (for "there is none other) but in him whom you hope in, the "God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." From hence may be seen how far Justin is from asserting *two Gods*. There is not, according to him, nor ever was, nor will be, ἄλλος Θεὸς, *another God* besides the God of the Jews, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Thus far he and Trypho were agreed.

2. It was agreed likewise between Justin and Trypho, that one certain Person, the same that created the world, and who is often spoke of in the Old Testament, as *Creator* of the universe; who was owned by the Jews under that title, and by Christians more especially under the name of *Father;* I say, it was agreed that that Person was God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

3. Justin Martyr, over and above, asserts that *that Person* had another Person with him, a *real* and *proper* Son; which Son was also *God* and *Lord*, and God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. This was the chief matter in debate between Justin and Trypho; and upon which Justin Martyr spends many pages in his Dialogue, alluding to it also elsewhere. Now, the main point in dispute between you and me is, whether this was really Justin's meaning or no. I must prove every syllable of what I here assert; and therefore must dwell the longer upon

[f] Justin. Mart. Dial. p. 34. Jeb.

this article. Justin, I say, asserts *another Person, besides the Father*, to be really *God, God of Abraham*, &c. He maintains that ἄλλός ἐστι Θεὸς[g], or ἕτερος Θεὸς[h], *another is God*, which he elsewhere expresses by ἄλλος τὶς[i], *another who is God*, besides the Father; which comes to the same as *another Person* besides the Father. Instead of saying *Father*, he generally expresses it by the title of *Creator of all things*; the reason of which I conceive to be, that both he and Trypho received him under that notion; but under the notion of *Father*, in Justin's sense, he was not received by Trypho, the question betwixt them being chiefly this; whether he was a *Father* in a proper sense, that is, whether he had really a *Son*. Hence, I conceive, it is, that Justin so often denotes the *Father* by the title of *Maker of all things*, rather than by the title of *Father*. Yet he does sometimes make use of the title of *Father*, instead of the other. He says in one place, οὐχ ὁ πατὴρ ἦν[k], instead of saying, οὐχ ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων ἦν: which, though not so accurate while disputing with a Jew, serves however to show that those two titles were only different expressions denoting the same Person. Justin, in his first Apology, where he is again upon the same argument, styles the *Father*, ὁ πατὴρ τῶν ὅλων, *Father of all things*; in the same place censuring the Jews for not acknowledging that he had a *Son*[l], that is, not acknowledging him to be a *Father*, in a peculiar and *proper* sense. This I take notice of to confirm what I have already observed, that it was not proper for Justin, in dispute with a Jew, to call the *Father* by a title which the Jews did not own, but rather by another which was acknowledged on both sides; viz. *Maker of all things*, or however, *Father of all things*, not *Father* simply. To proceed: Justin asserts, and often inculcates, that this *Maker*, or *Father of all things*, has a *Son*[m], an *only-begotten Son*[n], begotten *before the crea-*

[g] Justin Martyr. Dial. p. 147, 163.
[h] Ibid. p. 158, 161, 164.
[i] Ibid. p. 161, 165.
[k] Ibid. p. 261.
[l] Just. Apol. i. p. 122.
[m] Justin. Mart. Dial. p. 296, 371.
[n] Ibid. p. 309.

tion[o], begotten of *himself*[p], (ἐκ Θεοῦ, and ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ,) without *abscission* or *division*[q], *strictly* and *properly*[r] (ἰδίως and κυρίως) a Son, and *really* (not *nominally*) distinct from him[s]. He asserts farther, and proves at large, that this very Son is really *God*, not *called* God only, but *is* God[t]: and Justin never says that he is God by *voluntary appointment*, or as *representative* of the Father; but as *Son of God*, he is *God*[u]. The same is God of the Jews, God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, according to Justin. This last particular is what you and I chiefly differ upon; and therefore I must be the more full and copious in the proof of it.

It is a rule and maxim with Justin, that God the Father never *appeared;* which, I suppose, I need not prove to you, because you yourself contend for it, and in the *title-page* of your Reply, recommend the determination of the Sirmian Synod in anathematizing any that should say, the *Father* appeared to Abraham. Please then to take notice, that Justin Martyr quotes [x]Exod. iii. 16. where it is said, "The Lord God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, "of Isaac, and of Jacob, appeared unto me, &c." These words Justin, upon his principles, must have understood of *Christ:* he was the Lord God, the God of Abraham, &c. who *appeared.* And indeed Justin quotes the text for that very purpose, to prove that Christ is *God.* Soon after he asks the company, whether they did not yet perceive that he who appeared to Moses had declared *himself* to be the God of Abraham[y], &c. This passage I before

[o] Justin. Mart. Dial. p. 183, 187, 295, 296, 364, 375, 395. Comp. Apol. i. p. 69, 90, 101, 123. Apol. ii. p. 13.

[p] Justin. Dial. p. 183. Apol. i. p. 44.

[q] Justin. Mart. Dial. p. 183, 373. Comp. Parænn. p. 127.

[r] Justin. Mart. Apol. i. p. 44, 46. Apol. ii. p. 13.

[s] Justin. Dial. p. 373.

[t] Ἔστι γὰρ λέγεται Θεὸς καὶ κύριος ἕτερος ὑπὸ τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν ὅλων, ὃς καὶ ἄγγελος καλεῖται. *Dial.* p. 161. Ἄγγελος καλούμενος καὶ Θεὸς ὑπάρχων, p. 187. Θεὸς καλεῖται, καὶ Θεός ἐστι γ ἔφαι, p. 176. Θεὸν ἰσχυρὸν γ προσκυνητὸν Χριστὸν ὄντα ἰδήλωσι, p. 231. Θεόν φησιν εἶναι, p. 367.

[u] Just. Mart. Dial. p. 364, 366, 371, 370. Apol. i. p. 123.

[x] Just. M. Dial. p. 178, 179. Comp. Dial. p. 366.

[y] Ὦ ἄνδρες νενοήκατε, λέγων, ὅτι ὃν λέγει Μωσῆς ἄγγελον, ἐν πυρὶ φλογὸς λελα-

cited in my Defence, (p. 27.) to prove that, according to Justin, *Christ himself* was God of Abraham. This you complain of, very ridiculously, (Reply, p. 37.) calling it a *piece of artifice*, and I know not what, as if I had *stopped* where I ought not; whereas it is impossible that Justin's words should have any other meaning than that which I have given: the following words in Justin are so far from confronting this sense, that they do nothing more than repeat and confirm the same thing. For after Justin had thus plainly asserted that Christ was *God* of Abraham, &c. proving it from the text in Exodus; Trypho objects, that possibly it might be an angel only that *appeared*, and *God* (that is, God the Father) might speak to Moses by that angel. To which Justin replies; "Admit that both "*God* and an *angel* were concerned in that *appearance* to "Moses, as has been proved from the text cited; yet, I "insist upon it, that the *Maker of all things* was not "the *God* (or that divine Person) who told Moses that *he* "*himself* was God of Abraham, and God of Isaac, and "God of Jacob; but it was he of whom I have proved "to you, that he appeared to Abraham, and to Jacob, "administering to the will of the Maker of all things[z]." Justin goes on to prove this from the absurdity of supposing that God the Father should appear in that manner: upon which Trypho is convinced that he that *appeared* to Abraham, and was called God and Lord, and was God, was not the *Maker of all things;* not God the Father, but another, who was also an *angel*. Then Justin proceeds to give farther proof, that none appeared to Moses in the bush but he only, who is called an *angel*, and is really God, namely, Christ the Son of God. To these testimonies I shall subjoin one more out of Justin's first Apology, which in English runs thus: "Now what was

ληπέναι αὐτῷ, οὗτος αὐτὸς Θεὸς ὢν σημαίνει τῷ Μωσεῖ, ὅτι αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς Ἀβραὰμ, καὶ Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ Ἰακώβ; *Just. Dial.* p. 179.

[z] Οὐχ ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων ἕτερος Θεὸς ὁ τῷ Μωσεῖ εἰπὼν αὐτὸν εἶναι Θεὸν Ἀβραὰμ, καὶ Θεὸν Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ Θεὸν Ἰακώβ, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀποδειχθεὶς ὑμῖν ὤφθαι τῷ Ἀβραὰμ καὶ τῷ Ἰακὼβ, τῇ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῶν ὅλων θελήσει ὑπηρετῶν. *Ibid.* p. 180.

" said to Moses out of the bush, I am the I AM, the God " of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Ja- " cob, and the God of thy fathers, denotes that they, " though dead, are still in being, and are *men of Christ* " *himself*[a]." In this passage, *Christ* is plainly asserted to be the ὁ ὢν, the *I am*, or God of the Jews, God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. By four express testimonies out of Justin, this momentous point is established; and the whole tenor of this Father's writings confirms it. The sum then of Justin's doctrine is this: That there is no other God besides the God of the Jews, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: that God the Father is God of the Jews, God of Abraham, &c. that there is *another* besides the Father, who is also God of the Jews, God of Abraham, &c. and this other is the *Logos*, or *Christ*, the *proper* and *only* Son of the Father, undivided and inseparable from him, though begotten of him. The conclusion from all is, that *Christ* is God, and yet not *another God* from the Father, but ἄλλος τὶς, another *Person* only[b]. This is Justin's true, genuine, certain doctrine, which being thus proved and fixed, all your pretences to the contrary drop at once. However, that I may not seem to neglect any thing you have to say, I shall briefly examine your objections, one by one.

1. One is, that Justin often speaks of Θεὸς ἕτερος παρὰ τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν ὅλων, *another God besides the Maker of all things*. But I have shown, from Justin's own interpretation, (besides that in strict propriety the words require no more,) that the meaning is only this, that there is ἄλλος τὶς, *another who is God;* besides him whom both sides acknowledged under the title of *Maker of all things;* that is, besides him whom Christians call the *Father*. Justin then meant only that there is *another Person* besides the

[a] Τὸ δὲ εἰρημένον ἐν βάτῳ τῷ Μωσεῖ, ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν ὁ Θεὸς Ἀβραὰμ, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Ἰακὼβ, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πατέρων σου, σημαντικὸν τοῦ καὶ ἀποθανόντας ἐκείνους μένειν, καὶ εἶναι αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἀνθρώπους. *Just. Apol.* i. p. 123. Ox.

[b] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 137, &c.

Father, who is also God. To this you except[c], that the word *Person*, or *Hypostasis*, was not known to Justin. And what if he uses not the *word*, might he not without the word assert the *thing*? Ἄλλος τὶς really signifies, and is rightly rendered, *another Person*. But you except farther, that Justin does not only say ἕτερος, *another*, but ἀριθμῷ ἕτερος, *another in number*; and how can Father and Son be *numerically* the same God, if they be *numerically differing*? To which I answer, that they are different Persons, *numerically* different: and that this was really Justin's sense is manifest from his opposing the word, ἀριθμῷ ἕτερον, *another thing in number*, to that which ὀνόματι μόνον ἀριθμεῖται, only differs *nominally*, not really[d]. He did not intend to say that Father and Son were *two Gods*, but only that they were more than *two names* of the same thing; as some *heretics* taught, before Sabellius. In this sense, none of the Post-Nicene writers ever denied that the Son is ἀριθμῷ ἕτερος, or ἕτερόν τι, *another*, or *another thing*, *really* distinct from the Father[e]. The same way of speaking you will find in the Church as low as Damascen[f]. But you say, (Mod. Disquis. p. 29.) that the Post-Nicene Fathers guarded their expressions by the word *hypostasis*, which Justin does not. And what if the disputes which happened after Justin's time made it necessary to guard such expressions, as having been used formerly without offence, came at length to be perverted to an ill meaning? There is nothing strange in this. It is well observed by the judicious and learned Du-Pin, speaking indeed of Theognostus, but the remark is applicable to others of the *ancients*, who may claim the like favour of interpretation. "Photius," says he, "has wrongfully "accused Theognostus to have erred concerning the di-

[c] Disquis. Mod. p. 29.

[d] Vid. Justin. Dial. p. 373.

[e] Basil. Ep. 300. p. 1070. Athan. Orat. iv. p. 619. Contr. Sabell. p. 41. Cyril. Alex. Thesaur. p. 60, 110. Ambr. de Fid. lib. iii. cap. 15. Greg. Nyss. Cat. Orat. cap. 1.

[f] Vid. Damascen. lib. i. cap. 6. lib. iii. cap. 6.

" vinity of the Son, upon the score of a few expressions " that did not agree with those of his own age; without " taking notice that though the ancients have spoken " differently as to this point, yet the foundation of the " doctrine was always the same; and that it is an horrid " injustice to require them to speak as nicely, and with as " much precaution, as those that lived after the birth and " condemnation of *heresies*." In a word, though Justin has not used the like *guards* with the Post-Nicene writers, since he had not the like occasions; yet his sense, without any such *guards*, is plain enough to any man that duly weighs and considers it.

2. You pretend from Justin, (Disq. Mod. p. 33.) that Christ is not *Maker of all things*. But this you can never prove out of Justin: for all that Justin meant, by distinguishing Christ from the *Maker of all things*, was only this, that Christ is not *that Person*, ordinarily and eminently styled *Maker of all things;* that is, he is not the *Father* himself, as some *heretics* pretended, and as the Jews in effect taught, by applying these texts to God the *Father*, which Justin interprets of God the Son.

3. You object that Christ does nothing of his *own power*. This is no where said by Justin of Christ, considered in his highest capacity. Justin indeed admits that both the *power* and *substance* of the Son is derived from the *Father*. But this is a different thing from saying that Christ did nothing by his *own power*. The Father's power is his power, Christ's *own* power.

4. You object (Disq. Mod. p. 30, 33.) that Christ is *no more than the chief power*, (πρώτη δύναμις,) *after the* chief God, μετὰ τὸν πρῶτον Θεόν. But Justin no where puts those words together as you have done. He does indeed say, that the Son is the *principal Power after* (that is, next in order to) *the Father of all things*[ε]: which is no more than to say, that he is the *next Person* to the Father, as all allow. What inference can you draw from thence

[ε] Justin. Martyr. Apol. i. p. 66.

against our principles? As to the words πρῶτος Θεὸς, *chief God*, it is Plato's expression, and, as such, cited by Justin[h].

5. You object that Christ "hath all that he hath from "the Father." This is true, and acknowledged by all Catholics, before and after the Nicene Council, from Justin[i] down to Damascen[k].

6. You object that, according to Justin, (Disq. p. 33.) "Christ could not be saved but by the help of God." This is spoke of *Christ*, in respect of his *humanity*; and brought in among the proofs of *Christ's* being a *man*[l]. And it was suitable to Christ's humble state on earth, for an example and lesson to other men, to refer all to God.

7. You object that Christ is "manifestly distinguished "from the God of Abraham." But this is manifestly false, in your sense of it. Christ is plainly *God of Abraham*, according to Justin; as hath been before shown. You may say, if you please, that the *Father* is distinguished from the *God of Abraham*; which is true, as he is distinguished from the *Son*, who is God of Abraham: in like manner, I presume, we may allow that the Son is distinguished from the *God of Abraham*, and leave you to make your utmost advantage of it. You observe, that when the Son is distinguished from the *God of Abraham*, there is added, "besides whom there is no other God." From thence you may learn, that though the Son be God of Abraham, as well as the *Father*, yet there are not *two Gods of Abraham:* the Son is not *another God of Abraham*, but another Person only.

8. You object farther, (Disq. Mod. p. 27, 33.) that Christ "would not suffer himself to be called good, "but remitted that title to the Father only[m]." You

[h] Justin. Apol. i. p. 114.

[i] Αἴτιος αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι, καὶ δυνατῷ, καὶ κυρίῳ, καὶ θεῷ. *Just. Dial.* p. 374.

[k] Πάντα ὅν ὅσα ἔχει ὁ υἱὸς καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔχει, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι. *Damasc. de Fid. Oth.* lib. i. cap. 10.

[l] Vid. Just. Mart. Dial. p. 298. Comp. 303.

[m] Ibid. p. 298.

should have added, as Justin does in the same place, that Christ was a "worm, and no man, the scorn of men, and "the outcast of the people:" and then the reader would have seen plainly what Justin was talking about.

9. You object that Christ is not "called God by Jus- "tin, on account of his having the Father's essence *com-* "*municated* to him, but because of his being begotten of "him before the creation:" that is, Justin has not said it in *terms*, though he has in *sense*. To be the *proper Son* of the Father, and to be *begotten* of him *inseparably*, and without *division*, (which is Justin's doctrine,) is the same thing as to have the nature or *essence of the Father communicated* to him. This is clear from Justin's similitudes and illustrations[n]. For, I suppose, one *fire* lighted of another, is of the *same nature* with that other: and thus it is, that the Nicene Fathers supposed the Son to be, as it were, *Light of Light;* intending thereby to signify his *consubstantiality*.

10. But you object, that the Son (according to Justin) "is God by the will of the Father." This might be understood in a good sense, had it been asserted by Justin. But the passage which you build this upon, does not say so much; as shall be shown in another place, and as I have before observed in my Defence, vol. i. p. 93.

11. But *Christ*, you say, is *subservient* to the will of the Father. And what if it pleased the second Person of the blessed Trinity to transact all matters between God the Father and mankind: be thankful for it, and make not yourself a judge of the divine and mysterious dispensations. I observed in my Defence, (vol. i. p. 205.) that one Person may be delegate to another, without being of an *inferior nature:* otherwise one man could not be delegate to another. This "thin piece of sophistry" you undertake to answer (Reply, p. 73.) in these words: "One man may "be delegate to another, because he is another *individuum* "of the same species, but different in his particular essence

[n] Vid. Justin. Dial. p. 183, 373.

"from him; but dares the Doctor say the second or "third Person thus differs from the first?" To which I reply, that, from your own confession, it is manifest that merely from *delegation* no argument can be drawn to *inferiority of nature;* which was the point I was upon, and which is sufficiently proved by that instance. As to the Persons differing from each other, as one man differs from another, I readily deny any such *difference* among the *divine* Persons: and I leave you to prove at leisure, that all *delegation* requires it. When you can do that, I shall submit to the charge of *sophistry:* in the mean time, please to suffer it to lie at your own door.

Having thus considered all, or however your most considerable pretences from Justin Martyr, and shown them to be weak and frivolous; I hope I may have leave once more to say, that your account of this *Father* is *one continued misrepresentation.* You have, under this article, took a great deal of pains to weaken the force of an argument which I had used in my Defence, vol. i. p. 20, &c. It would break my method too much here, to attend you in it; to show how you have left my main arguments and testimonies untouched, and have done little more than endeavoured to confront them with other testimonies; which, notwithstanding, when rightly understood, are nothing at all to the purpose. If the reader pleases but to consider and compare what I have said in my Defence, I am not apprehensive that your pretences can have much weight with him. However, if a proper occasion offers, and if need be, or if I have not sufficiently obviated them already, I may perhaps take some farther notice of them, either in a *second part* to this, or elsewhere, whenever my adversaries shall favour me with a large and particular examination of the whole piece. I shall now proceed, in my method, to another article of the *charge.*

X. The tenth thing which I charged you with (Defence, vol. i. p. 291.) was, that in your Disquisitions (p. 61.) you took occasion from the Latin version to misrepresent Athenagoras, insinuating from it that the Son is not like the

Father. Here you are so ingenuous as to plead guilty, and to give me leave to *triumph*, (Reply, p. 14.) but with this sting in it, that it is "the only argument I attempted "to answer." But whether that be so or no, our readers, I suppose, may be the properest judges; to whom I leave it, and proceed.

XI. I charged you farther (Defence, vol. i. p. 291, 292.) with another misconstruction of a passage in Athenagoras; a very famous one, and of singular use in this controversy. You appeared to me to construe the words οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον[o], *not as eternally generated;* which is a very new and peculiar construction. You deny the fact, as indeed you may well be ashamed to own it. But I shall literally translate that paragraph of your book, and then the reader may the more easily judge of it. "Hence it ap- "pears that Athenagoras, with the Christians of the same "age, believed the Father only to be Θεὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ "ἀΐδιον, *God unbegotten and eternal*, and the Son of God "the Father to be styled πρῶτον γέννημα, *the first offspring*, "οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον, not on the account of any eternal gene- "ration, properly so called, such as might constitute the "Son ζῶντα καὶ ὑφεστῶτα, *living and subsisting* by himself, "in or out of the Father; but because the Father, being "himself an eternal mind, had from eternity λόγον, *reason*, "in himself, ἀϊδίως λογικὸς ὢν, *being eternally rational*[p]." The reader must here observe, that as you intermix Greek with your sentences six times, in the same manner, so in five of them, the words immediately following the Greek are plainly intended as the construction, or interpretation of it. I had therefore good reason, from parity of circumstances, to take the words immediately following those Greek words, οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον, as your construction, or interpretation of them: especially since you begin with the *negative* particle, just as the Greek does. You

[o] Πρῶτον γέννημα εἶναι τῷ πατρὶ, οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον, ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς, νοῦς ἀΐδιος ὤν, εἶχεν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν λόγον ἀϊδίως λογικὸς ὤν. *Athenag.* cap. 10. p. 38.

[p] Whitby, Disquisit. Mod. p. 62.

seem to be so sensible of this yourself, that when in your Reply (p. 14.) you come to give your English reader a different turn of the passage, you are forced to leave the Greek words οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον quite out: for had they appeared here in your Reply, as they do in your Disquisitions, the reader would have seen at once that my censure was just. But let us, for argument sake, admit your plea, that you did not intend those words following Athenagoras's Greek, as an interpretation of it; do you consider how unaccountable a part you have acted in citing the words at all? They are words which we greatly value, and lay a stress upon, as being of irresistible force against the Arians. Ought you not, while you were pleading the cause of *Arianism* from this very passage, to have attempted some solution of the difficulty arising from those words, which so plainly stare you in the face? Sandius and Gilbert Clerke thought themselves obliged to say something, however weak and unsatisfactory; which was better than to attempt nothing at all. But what do you, if we are to take your own last thoughts upon it? You could not but know that these words, in their obvious natural meaning, are directly repugnant to the conclusion which you are aiming at; you see the very words, you transcribe them, and leave them as you find them, without any interpretation or solution. Now what is this but to show that you was aware of the objection, and was not able to answer it, nor so much as willing to endeavour it; and yet resolutely persist, even against conviction, to wrest and force the passage to your own meaning? I am persuaded you might more prudently have submitted to the first charge, than have took this way of getting rid of it. But it is frequent with you, for want of considering, to double the fault which you hoped to excuse; and for the avoiding of one difficulty, to run yourself into more and greater.

To conclude this article: if you intended an interpretation of Athenagoras's words, as I conceive you did, then you have, in the whole, misrepresented the author, but

with something of colour for it: if you did not, still you have, in the whole, misrepresented him, and without any colour for it. Either way, you have dealt unfairly with Athenagoras, and have endeavoured to impose upon your readers.

XII. The next thing I laid to your charge[q] was a ridiculous representation of [r] Tertullian; as if Tertullian believed two *angels* to be as much *one*, as God the Father and God the Son are. To this you reply, (p. 21.) that you "say nothing of what Tertullian believed: but only "from these words (*the Son of God is called God from "the Unity of substance, for God is a spirit*) *you* think it "evident, that Tertullian concludes hence the Unity of "the Father and the Son, that *they are both spirits*; "which two *angels* and two *demons* also are." Is there then no regard to be had to what an author is otherwise known to *believe?* Or is it fair and just to construe an *ambiguous* sentence (supposing this *ambiguous*, and not rather plain enough against you) in direct opposition to his certain undoubted principles? But what makes it the more unjust in this case is, that Tertullian, in that very paragraph, within a line or two of the words which you ground your remark upon, resolves the Unity of Father and Son into this; that they are *de Spiritu Spiritus, de Deo Deus, de Lumine Lumen; Spirit of Spirit, God of God, Light of Light*[s]. Can this be said of two *angels* or two *demons*, that they are *light of light*, or *spirit of spirit?* Have they any such relation to, or intimate conjunction with, each other, as is here plainly signified of Father and

[q] Defence, vol. i. p. 292. [r] Disq. Mod. p. 108.

[s] Et nos etiam *sermoni*, atque *rationi*, itemque *virtuti* per quæ omnia molitum Deum ediximus, *propriam substantiam spiritum* inscribimus, cui et sermo insit prænuntianti, et ratio adsit disponenti, et virtus præsit perficienti. Hunc ex Deo prolatum didicimus, et prolatione generatum, et idcirco Filium Dei et Deum dictum est unitate substantiæ. Nam et Deus Spiritus: et cum radius ex sole porrigitur, portio ex summa: sed sol erit in radio, quia solis est radius, nec separatur substantia sed extenditur. Ita *de Spiritu Spiritus*, et *de Deo Deus*, ut *Lumen de Lumine* accensum. *Tertull. Apol.* cap. xxi. p. 202, 203. Lugd.

Son? Well then, what is the result? You have misunderstood Tertullian, or rather perverted his meaning. He does not say that Father and Son are *one*, because *they are both spirits*; any more than he says they are one, because they are *both Gods;* nor would it be sufficient for one to be *Spirit*, and the other to be *Spirit*, or one to be *God*, and the other *God*, unless one were also *of the other*, inseparably united to him, and included in him. Tertullian indeed observes that God the Father is *Spirit*, as he had before observed of God the Son: and this was right, that so he might come to his conclusion, that they are *Spirit of Spirit;* which they could not be, unless each of them were *Spirit*. This therefore is mentioned, not because it makes them *one*, but because they could not be *one* without it. They must be *Spirit* and *Spirit*, to be *Spirit of Spirit:* but the latter contains more than the former; and it is into this that Tertullian resolves the formal reason of the Unity; or rather, both considerations are included in his notion of *Unity of substance*. This will appear from a bare literal rendering of his words. "We have learned that he (*God the Son*) is *prolated*, and "by his *prolation generated*, and *upon that score* he is "styled *Son of God*, and *God*, from *Unity of substance*. "For even God (*the Father*) is *Spirit:* and when a *ray* is "produced from the *sun*, a portion from the whole, the "*sun* is in the *ray*, because it is the *sun's ray;* and the "*substance is not separated*, but extended: in like manner, "here is *Spirit of Spirit*, and *God of God*, as *Light of* "*Light*." You see how Tertullian makes it necessary to *Unity of substance*, that the *substance* be not *separate:* and thus Father and Son are *one*, not merely because each of them is *Spirit*, but because both are *undivided* substance, or Spirit; *Spirit of Spirit*. When I wrote my Defence, I thought a hint might have been sufficient in things of this nature; little imagining I should ever have the trouble of explaining such matters as these, which appear by their own light, upon a bare inspection into the author.

XIII. In the next place, I charged you [t] with a misconstruction of a noted passage in Irenæus. To this you make no reply at all; wherefore it stands as before; and I have, I suppose, your tacit allowance to *triumph* here, as, in a former place, your *express* permission.

XIV. I found fault [u] with your representation [x] of Tertullian; as if that writer believed God the Son to have been, in his highest capacity, *ignorant of the day of judgment*. To this you make answer, (Reply, p. 22.) that you "only cite his express words without any descant "upon them." It is very true that you make no formal *descant* upon those very words; but both before and after, you are arguing, with all your might, against Tertullian's belief of the *eternity* and *consubstantiality*. I hope it is no affront to suppose that you had some meaning in bringing in the passages about the Son's *ignorance;* and that you would have your readers think them *pertinent*, at least, to the point in hand. The whole design of your book, and what goes before and after, in the same *section*, sufficiently show your intention in citing those passages; and are, interpretatively, a *descant* upon them. Your meaning and purport in it is so plain, that no reader can mistake it: wherefore your pretence now that you have made no descant upon the words, after you find that you are not able to defend your sense of them, is a very poor evasion. There were two citations from Tertullian about the Son's *ignorance*. I had shown that one of them plainly relates to Christ's *human* nature; and I might reasonably judge from thence the same thing of the other also, since both are of the same author. It is not therefore strictly true that I *answer nothing*, as you pretend, to the first citation: for, by answering one, I have, in effect, answered both. It was your business to prove that either of the passages were to be understood of Christ, in his highest capacity: but for want of proof, you are content

[t] Defence, vol. i. p. 293, 294.
[u] Ibid. p. 294.
[x] Disquis. Mod. p. 147.

to *insinuate* it only to your reader; and so you leave it with him, trusting to his weakness or partiality. However, instead of asking a proof of you, I gave you a proof of the contrary; demonstrating from the context, (especially from the words *exclamans quod se Deus reliquisset*, which Tertullian in express words interprets of the *human nature*,) that the supposed *ignorance* of Christ was understood by Tertullian of Christ's *humanity* only. Now you say (p. 22.) that "the words, *known only to the Father*, "exclude the Son in all capacities." Very well then; I had the good fortune to hit your meaning before, though you made no *descant* upon the words. As to your pretence from the term *only*, there is no ground for it. No man of any judgment, that is at all acquainted with Tertullian's way and manner of explaining the *exclusive* terms[y] relating to this subject, would ever draw any such inference from them. But you have a farther pretence, that "all the words preceding speak not of the Son of man, "but of the Son of God." The reason is, because he was to prove that the *Son of God* was really distinct from the *Father;* and that the *Father* was not *incarnate*, as the Praxeans pretended. He proves it unanswerably from this topic, among others; that in regard to the Son's *ignorance of the day of judgment*, Father and Son are plainly spoken of, as of *two Persons;* one as *knowing*, the other as not *knowing*, though in a certain respect only: wherefore the Father himself was not the *Person incarnate*, which was to be proved. In this view, Tertullian's argument is just and conclusive; and the text relating to the Son's *ignorance pertinently* alleged, though understood of Christ's *humanity*. This I observed before, and explained more at large in my Defence, vol. i. p. 295, 296, &c. You resolve, notwithstanding, to proceed in your own way, and to make a show of saying something, though you find yourself already foreclosed, and every objection obviated. You say thus: "From this mistake of Tertul-

[y] Vid. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 2, 5, 18, 19.

" lian's citing texts relating only to Christ's human na-
" ture, he saw this objection would arise, that the Fathers
" argued impertinently against the Sabellians." I did indeed foresee, that there might be some colour for such an *objection*, among those that take things upon the *first view*, without looking any farther. I proposed the *objection* fairly, and then fully answered it; as the reader may please to see in my Defence. And now, what have you to reply? I had said that Catholics and Sabellians both allowed that *God* was *incarnate*, and *that the main question* (that is, so far as concerns the *incarnation*, whereof I was speaking) *was, whether the Father himself made one Person with Christ's human nature, or no.* In answer hereto, you make a show of contradicting me without opposing me at all, except in one particular, wherein you are plainly mistaken. You run off for near a page together, telling us only trite things which every body knows, concerning the dispute between Catholics and Sabellians. If by *singular essence* be meant the same with *Hypostasis*, or *Person*, (as you understand it,) that indeed was the main article of dispute between Catholics and Sabellians, whether Father and Son were one and the same *Hypostasis*. But when the principles of each side were brought down to the particular case of the *incarnation*, then the main point in question was, whether the *Hypostasis* of the Father was *incarnate* or no. The Sabellians allowing but one *divine Hypostasis*, and yet admitting God to be *incarnate*, were of course obliged to assert it: and the Catholics, on the other hand, admitting more *divine Hypostases* than one, denied it. How the Catholics proved their point, I showed you distinctly; and you have nothing of moment to reply to it. Only you are pleased to acquaint us with an invention of your own, that the " Sabellians allowed in Jesus only flesh;
" and by the Spirit of Jesus they understood the God-
" head of the Father." But who, before yourself, ever reckoned it among the Sabellian tenets, that Christ had no *human soul?* It is very peculiar of you to cite Tertul-

lian in proof of it, on account of these words; *dicentes Filium carnem esse, id est hominem, id est Jesum; Patrem autem Spiritum, id est Deum:* when Tertullian, in the very passage, interprets *flesh* by *man*, and *Jesus;* and interprets *Spirit* by divine Spirit, or God. As to the belief of Christ's *human soul*, it was an established article of faith in Tertullian's time, as appears from several passages[z]; and before Tertullian, as is clear from Irenæus[a] and Justin Martyr[b]. How then comes it to pass, that none of the Catholics ever took notice of this error of the Sabellians, their denying a *human soul?* I mention not how the Sabellian *hypothesis* must have been very needlessly and stupidly clogged by such a tenet: for they could never have given any tolerable account of the Son's praying to the Father, of his increasing in wisdom, of his being afflicted and sore troubled, and crying out in his agonies and sufferings, without the supposition of a *human soul.* What? Was it only *walking flesh*, or *animated clay*, that did all this? Or was it the *Hypostasis* of the Father, the eternal God, as such, that did these things? You allow only these two; and not caring, it seems, how *stupid* and *senseless* you make all the Sabellians, one of these you must, of course, father upon them. It is true that they supposed the *Father* to have *suffered*, and they were therefore called *Patripassians:* that is, they supposed the *Father* to suffer (as we believe of the *Son*) in the *human* nature. But they were never so gross and wild in their imaginations as to suppose the *Godhead*, as such, to *suffer*, to be *sore troubled*, to be in *agonies*, to *cry out*, &c. And yet it is ridiculous to apply this to *flesh* only, without a *soul:* neither can it be reasonably imagined of the Sabellians, unless they believed of men in general, that they have no such thing as a *soul* distinct from the body. In short, their retreating at length to

[z] Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 16, 30. de Carn. Christi, cap. 10.
[a] Iren. lib. v. cap. 1. p. 292. ed. Bened.
[b] Justin. M. Apol. ii. p. 26. Ox.

this, that there were two *Hypostases*[c] in Christ, a *divine* and *human*, in order to solve the difficulties they were pressed with, sufficiently discovers their sentiments. For neither could that subterfuge do them any service, unless *Jesus* was supposed a distinct *Person;* nor could they be so weak as to imagine a *living carcase*, a body without a soul, to be a *person*. To conclude this article, the Sabellians, when they retired at length to that *salvo*, taking sanctuary in *two Hypostases*, understood one of them to be *God* the *Father*, the other, the *man Christ Jesus*[d]: which was afterwards the doctrine of Paul of Samosata, and of Photinus, who thus refined upon the Sabellian *heresy*. But I have been rather too long in confuting a pretence, which has nothing to countenance it in history; besides that it is plainly repugnant to good sense.

XV. The next thing I charged you with[e], was your pretending, falsely, that Bp. Bull had not shown that the Fathers of the *second century* resolved the *Unity* into the same principle with the Nicene Fathers. I observed that the Bishop had shown it, referring you to the place where[f]. You now say in your Reply, (p. 24.) "That "which the Bishop has done in that section is fully an- "swered and refuted, p. 197, 198." I have turned to those pages in your Disquisitions, and can see nothing like it; except it be your fancy, or *fiction*, that the Ante-Nicene Fathers, when they speak of the *Logos* as existing in the Father before his coming forth, mean it of an *attribute* only, and nothing *real*. This groundless surmise is at large confuted by Bishop Bull[g]: and give me leave also to refer you to what I have observed[h] on that head.

[c] Vid. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 27. Comp. Athanas. contr. Sabell. Gregal. p. 39. ed. Bened.

[d] See this expressly asserted in Athanasius, tom. ii. p. 39. before referred to.

[e] Defence, vol. i. p. 296.

[f] Bull. Def. Fid. Nic. sect. iv. cap. 4.

[g] Bull. Def. Fid. sect. iii. cap. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

[h] Defence, vol. i. p. 105, &c. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 146, &c.

What you add, relating to Clemens Romanus, is only *gratis dictum*, and wants to be proved.

XVI. I blamed you[i] farther for referring[k] to Basil, as an evidence that Gregory Thaumaturgus believed God the Son to be a *creature*. You tell me in your Reply, (p. 24.) that you "say nothing of his (Gregory's) faith." Please to look back to your Modest Disquisitions, and revise your own former thoughts, which run thus: "Lastly, it is to be noted that neither Gregory Thaumaturgus, "who, as St. Basil witnesseth, *depressed Christ into the "rank of creatures*, (*in creaturarum censum depressit*) nor "Dionysius of Alexandria, who, as the same (Basil) witnesseth, denied the *consubstantiality*, could have thought "rightly (*recte sentire potuisse*) of the proper eternity of "Christ." Is this saying nothing of Gregory's *faith?* though he *depressed* the Son into *the rank of creatures*, as you tell us he did; and though he could not *think* (i. e. *believe*) rightly of Christ's *proper eternity*, as you also say; yet you have said nothing of Gregory's *faith*. Ridiculous: you have said it, and quoted Basil for it; notwithstanding that Bishop Bull had demonstrated the contrary even from Basil himself; as I before observed, and you do not gainsay. And now, to use your own words, relating to this article, "let the reader judge where the "falsehood lies." Your repeating some things from Petavius and Huetius, upon this occasion, signifies little. Bp. Bull had considered, and answered what those two great men had said: and you come up again with the same baffled objections; though you are so sensible that they have been fully answered, that you have not a word to reply, but are forced *tacitly* to allow that Gregory's *faith* was right; however he happened to drop some suspected words, which were made an ill use of.

XVII. I charged you[l] with the revival of an old objection, which Bishop Bull had ingenuously set forth in its full force, and as fully answered[m].

[i] Defence, vol. i. p. 296.
[k] Mod. Disq. p. 84.
[l] Defence, vol. i. p. 296, &c.
[m] Bull. Def. Fid. N. p. 267.

To this you reply, (p. 25.) that you have fully confuted this pretended answer of the Bishop's, in your Dissertation *de Scriptur. Interpret.* p. 51, 52. and also in the place cited of your Mod. Disquis. p. 87, 88. I have turned to your Dissertation, and find what you point to in the Preface, p. 51, 52. There I meet with two or three exceptions, mostly wide of the point, and scarce deserving notice. We must suppose our readers acquainted with the argument we are upon, which it would be tedious to give at length: and now I will show you how slight your objections are.

1. First, you say, that the "appearance of Christ's "divine nature" (to the Patriarchs) "under human form, "did not make the Logos *another God* from the Father." No, certainly; nor did any of the Ante-Nicene writers pretend it: but if the *Logos appeared* in a certain manner and form, and the *Father* never *appeared* in any manner or form; the *Logos* is not the *Father:* which was the thing to be proved.

2. You object, that "certainly the divine nature of "Christ was in heaven, when it appeared on earth." Undoubtedly: and those very writers who represent the *Father* as being in heaven, and the *Son* as being on earth, yet acknowledge them both to be equally present every where: and they refer it to the οἰκονομία [n], that the two Persons are represented, as it were, in different places; one here, the other there.

3. You object, that "those ancients who looked upon "it as *impious* to ascribe to the Father such things as "they made no scruple of applying to the Son, *must* "*have thought* there was some difference between the "Father and Son in those respects." I answer, that they thought of no more difference than this, that one was a

[n] Habes Filium in terris, habes Patrem in cælis: non est separatio ista, sed *dispositio* divina. Cæterum scias Deum etiam intra abyssos esse, et ubique consistere, sed vi et potestate: Filium quoque ut individuum cum ipso ubique. Tamen in ipsa οἰκονομίᾳ Pater voluit Filium in terris haberi, se vero in cælis. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* cap. 2.

Father, and the other a *Son*; and that one was to be *incarnate*, and the other not. It would have been *impious* to ascribe to the Person of the *Father* what was proper to the Person of the *Son*; not only because the *Father* was never to be *sent*, nor to act a *ministerial* part, any more than he was to be *incarnate*; but also because the tendency of such pretences was to make Father and Son one *Hypostasis*, or *Person*, and was in reality to deny that there was any *Son* at all. Your citations from Tertullian and Justin Martyr are not pertinent, unless you supposed yourself to be arguing against Sabellians. Having done with your Dissertation, let us next come to Disquis. Modest. p. 87. There, I must observe, you have hardly one word to the purpose. All that you prove is, that Father and Son are not one *numerical essence*, in your sense; that is, they are not one *numerical Person*, which is readily allowed: as also that they have not one *numerical* will, power, &c. in your sense, though they have in another. *Voluntas de voluntate, potentia de potentia* is the Catholic doctrine, as much as *substantia de substantia*, or *Deus de Deo*. In short, if you would do any thing towards confuting Bishop Bull, you should answer the authorities which he brought, to prove that those very Ante-Nicene writers (who argued that it could not be the Father that *appeared*, and *descended*, and was found in a *place*) acknowledged, notwithstanding, that the *Son* was, in his own nature, *invisible* and *omnipresent*, as well as the Father; and that the same writers (some of them) expressly interpreted those *appearances*, &c. of the οἰκονομία, *economy*, or *dispensation*, which it pleased God the Son to run through; transacting all matters between God the Father, and the world of *creatures*. As to the οἰκονομία, and what Bishop Bull intends by it, the reader may see in his Defence of the Nicene Faith, (p. 10.) What you mean by denying it is very hard to conjecture, unless you have some weak evasion (Reply, p. 26.) in the words, "beginning from the fall of Adam:" for you say, and seem to lay some stress upon it, that "it began from

" the beginning of the creation." Does Bishop Bull deny that? See his own words in the margin[o]. But, it seems, you are to construe Bishop Bull's saying, that it was as " high as the fall of Adam," (in opposition to such as supposed it to commence at the *incarnation*, and no sooner,) as if he had said, it *began* from the fall of Adam: and this you are to do, only to find some pretence for contradicting Bishop Bull, and diverting the reader from the point in hand. I referred you (Defence, vol. i. p. 297.) to authors[p], ancient and modern, who asserted the οἰκονομία in Bishop Bull's sense. To which you have nothing of any moment to oppose; only you discover a great dissatisfaction that Bishop Bull had so well guarded his point, and vindicated his doctrine, that all your most pompous and plausible pretences fall before him.

XVIII. I charged you[q] with setting Clemens of Rome, and St. Paul, at variance; and yet giving the preference to Clemens, as " laying Christianity before us in its naked " simplicity." To this article you are pleased to say never a word.

XIX. I took notice also, in another place[r], of your sophistical way of reasoning against the belief of *mysteries*, or matters above comprehension. I called upon you (vol. i. p. 225, 226.) to explain your meaning, and to let us know distinctly, what there is in the doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity, to give you such offence, and to raise your zeal against it; whether it be that the doctrine is, in your judgment, *contradictory* to reason, or only *above reason*; or that it is *unscriptural* only, and no more: but to this also you vouchsafe no reply.

XX. I charged you farther (vol. i. p. 93.) with using a bad

[o] Deus Pater, quemadmodum per Filium suum mundum primitus condidit creavitque; ita per eundem Filium se deinceps mundo patefecit. *Bull. Def. F. N.* p. 10.

[p] Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 2, 3. Clem. Alex. p. 831, 955. ed. Ox. Tatian. cap. 8. ed. Ox. Hippol. contr. Noët. p. 12, 15. Fabric. Vales. Not. in Euseb. p. 5, 6, 90, 253.

[q] Defence, vol. i. p. 298. [r] Ibid. p. 218.

art, to serve a bad cause: which was the severest thing I had said of you, and which you had given me just occasion for; as I showed plainly in the place referred to. In apology for yourself, (Reply, p. 56.) you cite a passage of my Defence, (vol. i. p. 307.) where I say, "A writer is "not to be blamed, in some cases, for taking what is to "his purpose, and omitting the rest." To which give me leave to answer in my own words, as they follow in the same page; "But, as the case is here, the best, and in-"deed only light, to direct the reader to the true mean-"ing of what is cited, is left out." You say, your "de-"sign being only to prove from the words of Justin[s], that "Christ was God, κατὰ βυλὴν αὐτοῦ, *according to the will* "*of his Father*, what reason could you have to add that "he was also styled an angel?" But, do you not yet perceive that the question is, whether Christ be said to be God κατὰ βυλὴν αὐτοῦ, *according to the will of the Father*, in that place of Justin, or no? The words, literally rendered, run thus: "Who, according to his (the Fa-"ther's) will, is both God, being his Son, and an angel "as ministering to his Father's will." The meaning of the passage is not, as you represent it, that Christ is "God, by the will of the Father," (though even that might bear a good sense,) but that it pleased God that his Son, who was *God* already, as *God's Son*, should be an *angel* also. That he was *God*, was a necessary thing; but that he should be *both*, was not so. This I took to be the true sense of the passage. For Justin gives the reason why he was *God;* it was because he was *God's Son*. He resolves his *divinity* into *Sonship* here, as indeed every where; and *Sonship* into *communication of substance*, as I have observed above. Now let us consider what you had done with this passage. The Latin version runs thus:

[s] Τὸν κατὰ βυλὴν τὴν ἐκείνυ καὶ Θεὸν ὄντα, υἱὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄγγελον ἐκ τοῦ ὑπηρετεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ αὐτοῦ. *Dial.* p. 370.

Compare the words of Novatian:

Personæ autem Christi convenit, ut et Deus sit, quia Dei Filius; et angelus sit, quoniam paternæ dispositionis adnuntiator est. *Novat.* cap. 26.

Qui juxta voluntatem ejus, et Deus est, Filius quippe ipsius, et angelus ex eo quod sententiæ illius est administer. Instead whereof you give us this: *Qui ex voluntate ipsius, et Deus est et Filius ipsius.* Here, by putting in the particle *et* before *Filius*, and leaving out *et angelus*, you determine the words to your own sense, though capable of another sense as they lie in the author. This is what I had just reason to complain of, that you should take upon you to leave out, and put in, what you please, to tie the words down to your own meaning; when the words otherwise may, or rather must, bear a different construction, if you please to let them appear entire, and without any interpolation.

You say, (Reply, p. 56.) that you "had authority *from* "Justin's own words to do this." What? Had you authority from Justin's own words to change both his words and his sense? He does not say that Christ *was God, and a Son too by the will of the Father;* but that he was, according to the will of the Father, both God, as being his Son, and an angel. I insist upon it, that the meaning may be no more than this, that it pleased God that he who was already God, should not only be *God*, but an *angel* also; and that though it was owing to God's good pleasure, that he was *both*, yet it was necessary for him to be *one*, as he was partaker of the divine substance, being God's Son. You cite other passages of Justin, declaring that Christ was Θεὸς ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι τέκνον πρωτότοκον τῶν ὅλων κτισμάτων, *God as being born* (or begotten) *before all creatures:* and that he was Θεὸς, Θεοῦ υἱὸς ὑπάρχων, *God as being the Son of God.* Now these and the like passages make against you, as showing that Justin resolved Christ's *divinity* into his *Sonship*, that is, *communion* of *essence*, or *substance*[u], not into *voluntary appointment.* If it be objected that he was a *Son* κατὰ βελὴν according to Justin, and that therefore he must be God κατὰ βουλὴν, if he be

[t] Whitby, Disquisit. Mod. p. 32.

[u] Vid. Justin. Dial. p. 183, 373. Comp. Apol. i. p. 44, 46. Apol. ii. p. 13.

God as *God's Son;* I answer, that the consequence is not just. For while Justin understands the *Sonship* of a *temporal* and *voluntary* προέλευσις, or *coming forth*, he supposes the *Logos* not to have been ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, but from the very substance of the Father; and therefore he was *God*, as having ever existed before his *coming forth*, in and with the Father. In a word, he *came forth*, was not *created*, and therefore he is *God*. Had he been produced *from nothing*, as creatures are, he could not be God: but since he came forth as a *Son*, of the same divine substance with the Father, therefore he is *God*. This I take to be the true account of Justin's principles relating to this head; as also of all the other Fathers that speak of a *voluntary* generation. See my Defence, vol. i. Qu. viii. You see then, how wide a difference there is between your account of Justin and mine. I desire only to have Justin's text fairly represented as it is. To put in or leave out any thing here, and thereby to determine the sense against us, in so critical a place as this, is very unfair and unjust; and deserves the hardest names that I could give it. Let us have no tampering with texts. You may argue and reason for your sense of the passage, if you please; as I do also for mine. Only let our readers see plainly what the words of the author are. To do otherwise is corrupting the evidence, perverting judgment, and giving sentence before the cause comes to a fair hearing. This kind of management, especially in so weighty a cause, wherein the honour of our *God* and *Saviour* is so nearly concerned, is what I cannot account for: and if upon this occasion I expressed some wonder and astonishment, that any should be so "resolutely eager to ungod their Saviour, "as not to permit the cause to have a fair hearing;" I suppose it might become me much better in defence of my Saviour's honour, than those intemperate words of yours, "impudently false assertion," become you, in your blind zeal for your own.

I have now finished what I intended by way of answer to your *defensive* part. Upon the whole, it does not appear

to me, that, of all the things laid to your charge, whether *general fallacies* or *particular mistakes*, you have been able to take off so much as one. What you have done, or shall do, in the *offensive* way, may perhaps be considered hereafter. I think it best to *postpone* my *second part*, because you are still going on to supply me with new matter for it: and you have promised the public great things, to appear in due time. I am now pretty well acquainted with you; and may therefore presume to exhibit to the reader, or to yourself, a brief account of your chief materials, with which you are to work in this controversy, and upon which your cause is to subsist.

1. In the first place, you have a strong *presumption*, that "two or more persons cannot constitute one indivi- "dual or numerical being, substance, or essence." You produce testimonies of *Fathers* in great numbers, proving nothing but a *real* distinction; and by virtue of the *presumption* laid down, (which stands only upon *courtesy*,) you persuade yourself, that those testimonies are of some weight, and pertinently alleged, even against those who admit a *real* distinction, as much as the *Fathers* do.

2. In the second place, you have another strong *presumption*, that no kind of "subordination is or can be "consistent with such equality, or such union as we "maintain." Hereupon you produce a farther cloud of testimonies from the *ancients*, proving nothing but a *subordination:* which testimonies, by virtue of this your second *presumption*, (standing only upon *courtesy*, as the former,) are conceived to be of weight, and to be pertinently cited, even against those who readily admit of a *subordination*, in conformity with the ancient Fathers. From what I have observed here, and under the former article, you may perceive that, at least, nine parts in ten of your quotations are entirely wide of the point; and it may save you some trouble for the future, to be duly apprized of it.

3. Besides this, you have some expressions of Origen, chiefly from those pieces which are either not certainly

genuine, or not free from interpolation[x], or wrote in a problematical way[y], or not containing Origen's mature and riper thoughts; published perhaps without his consent, and such as he himself afterwards disapproved and repented of[z]. And those you urge against us, notwithstanding that we appeal chiefly to his book against Celsus, which is certainly Origen's, and which contains his most mature sentiments; and from whence it is demonstrable that Origen was no Arian, but plainly Anti-Arian[a].

4. You lay a very great stress upon Eusebius, as if he were to speak for all the Ante-Nicene writers: though we might more justly produce Athanasius (with respect to his two first tracts) as an Ante-Nicene writer; and his authority is, at least, as good as the others. Eusebius must be of little weight with us, wherever he is found to vary either from himself, or from the Catholics which lived in or before his time. Nothing can be more unfair than to represent antiquity through the glass of Eusebius, who has been so much suspected; besides that we can more certainly determine what the sentiments of the earlier writers were, (from their own works still extant,) than we can what Eusebius's were; whose writings are more doubtful and ambiguous; insomuch that the learned world have been more divided about him and his opinions, than about any other writer whatsoever.

5. Lastly, you bring up again, frequently, some concessions of Petavius and Huetius; such as they incautiously fell into, before this matter had been thoroughly canvassed, as it hath been since by Bishop Bull, and other great men. From that time, most of the learned men in Europe, *Romanists*[b] as well as *Protestants*, appear to have

[x] Vid. Ruffin. de Adulter. Librorum Origen. p. 240. ed. Bened. Huet. Origenian. p. 233.

[y] Vid. Pamph. Apolog. p. 221. ed. Bened. Phot. Cod. 117. Athanas. vol. i. p. 233.

[z] Vid. Hieron. de Error. Orig. ad Pammach. Ep. xli. p. 347. ed. Bened.

[a] Vid. Bull. Def. Fid. Nic. sect. ii. cap. 9.

[b] See Nelson's Life of Bishop Bull, p. 345, &c. 388.

the same sentiments of the Ante-Nicene *faith*, which Bishop Bull had. It is therefore now much out of time, and very disingenuous, to lay any great weight upon the judgment of Petavius or Huetius, however valuable and learned, since this matter has been much more accurately inquired into, than it had been at that time. Huetius has lived to see Bishop Bull's works, (as we may reasonably presume,) and cannot be ignorant how highly they have been valued abroad: yet we do not find that he has ever complained of any injury done him by the Bishop, or that he ever thought fit to vindicate himself, or his great oracle Petavius; to whose judgment (as he himself laments) he had once dearly paid too great a deference [c].

It may suffice, for the present, to have left these few general hints; by means of which an intelligent reader, without farther assistance from me, may readily discover the fallacy of your reasonings, and answer the most plausible objections you have to urge against the received doctrine of the blessed Trinity. If any thing more particular be necessary hereafter, I shall (with God's assistance) endeavour to do justice to the cause which I have taken in hand; and, as opportunity serves, shall proceed in detecting sophistry, laying open disguises, exposing misreports, misquotations, misconstructions, or any other engines of deceit, as long as there appears to me any probable danger from thence arising to honest well-meaning men, less acquainted with this momentous controversy. In the interim, I am with all due respect,

SIR,

Your most humble Servant.

[c] Vid. Huetii Comment. de Rebus ad illum pertinent, p. 70.

THE CASE

OF

ARIAN SUBSCRIPTION

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AND THE

SEVERAL PLEAS AND EXCUSES FOR IT PARTICULARLY EXAMINED AND CONFUTED.

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CHAP. I.

The occasion and design of these papers.

REMARKS have been lately published against a *clause* contained in a *bill* which had been brought into the House of Lords, for the more effectual suppressing of *blasphemy* and *profaneness*. It has been observed, among other things, that the *clause*, being intended as a *test* against *Arianism*, would be of little use or significancy as to the end designed by it; because those who are now understood to be Arians, are ready to subscribe any *test* of that kind, containing nothing more than is already contained in the XXXIX Articles. The *Remarker* takes notice, that those gentlemen make no scruple of subscribing to our Church's forms: it is their *avowed principle* that they may lawfully do it in their *own* sense, agreeably to what they call *Scripture*. This he proves from their declared sentiments, not only in common conversation, but in print; and from their constant practice of late years, since the year 1712.

If this be matter of fact, (as I am afraid it is,) it may be

high time to inquire, somewhat more particularly than hath been yet done, into the case of *subscription*. If instead of excusing a *fraudulent* subscription on the foot of *human infirmity*, (which yet is much too soft a name for it,) endeavours be used to defend it upon *principle*, and to support it by *rules of art*, it concerns every honest man to look about him. For what is there so vile or shameful, but may be set off with false colours, and have a plausible turn given it, by the help of quirks and subtilties? Many, without doubt, have been guilty of *prevaricating* with *state-oaths;* but nobody has been yet found sanguine enough to undertake the defence of it in print. Only *Church-subscriptions*, though of much the same sacred nature with the other, may be securely played with: and the plainest breach of sincerity and trust, in this case, shall find its advocates and defenders. It must indeed be owned, that the pretences for it have not been particularly confuted or examined. The reason is, because they looked more like a wanton exercise of wit and fancy, (though it is dangerous playing with sacred things,) than any serious design to convince the world of the justice of it. Besides that the foundations of *moral honesty* were thought so deeply rooted in the hearts of men, that every attempt against them must soon fall, and die of itself. However, because the pretences for what I call a *fraudulent* subscription had been recommended by a person of some character in the learned world; and might possibly gain ground among such as take things *implicitly*, upon the credit of any *great name;* I had once prepared a formal Answer to what had been advanced on that head: and I designed to publish it by way of introduction to my Defence. But, before my papers were quite wrought off, there appeared a second edition of *Scripture Doctrine*, &c. upon perusal whereof, I observed that the most offensive passage of the Introduction, relating to subscription, was left out: and besides that, all those strange and unaccountable interpretations of the Athanasian Creed, &c. (which had appeared in the *first edition*,) were also pru-

dently omitted; though those were all the author had to depend on for the justifying his subscription. Upon this, I was willing to hope that the learned Doctor had *given*, or was *giving* up his former principles, relating to subscription: and I thought it would be ungenerous now to attack him in his *weakest hold*, after he had himself betrayed a suspicion, at least, that he could no longer maintain it. Wherefore I contented myself with a short remark in my Preface, entering a *caveat* only, against any one's abusing the Doctor's name hereafter, or mispleading his authority, in the case of subscription. It was not long before a nameless writer of the party took me up for the charitable suggestion I had made in favour of the learned Doctor. That writer persisting in the Doctor's first sentiments, and being very unwilling to part with so valuable an authority, was pleased to oppose the conjecture I had made upon the Doctor's leaving out the passage in his Introduction. "I know not," says he, "for what reason "Dr. Clarke omitted those words; but, I believe, I may "say, it was not for the reason Dr. Waterland insinuates, "viz. *that such subscription is not justifiable;* because the "same thing is still asserted five or six times, at least, in "the Introduction as corrected in the new edition[a]." I am not of that gentleman's mind, in this particular. Nay, if it might not look vain, I would presume, after a competent acquaintance with the Doctor's books, to have seen a little farther into the turn of his thoughts, than perhaps that writer has done: and, with his good leave, I will still retain the same opinion of the Doctor's good sense and integrity so far, which I had when I wrote my Preface. I think I could give a tolerable account of the Doctor's not striking out every passage in his Introduction that looked that way: and likewise of his great reserve and caution, in not telling the world, plainly, that he had changed his mind. However, if I mistake, I am sure it is on the candid and charitable side; and on that

[a] Account of Pamphlets, &c. p. 17.

which must appear much more for the Doctor's honour, (with all men of sense,) than persisting in an *error* ever can be. That it is an error, and a very great one, I mean to show in these papers: and though I must, in appearance, carry on a dispute against the learned Doctor, because the *objections*, for the most part, must be produced in *his* words; yet I would be understood, in reality, to be rather disputing this point with the Doctor's disciples, who lay a greater stress upon what he has said, than himself now seems to do; thereby making his *first* thoughts *theirs*, after they have (as I charitably conceive) ceased to be *his*. I shall have no occasion to say any thing in defence of our excellent Church, as to her *requiring subscription;* and requiring it according to her *own* sense of holy Scripture. This part of the controversy has been judiciously cleared and settled by two very ingenious writers; Mr. Stebbing in his Rational Enquiry, and Mr. Rogers in his Discourse, and Review. My business is only to begin where they end, and to show that, as the Church requires subscription to her *own* interpretation of Scripture, so the subscriber is bound, in virtue of his subscription, to *that*, and *that* only: and if he knowingly subscribes in any sense *contrary* to, or *different* from, the sense of the *imposers;* he prevaricates, and commits a *fraud* in so doing. This is a cause of some moment: it is the cause of plainness and sincerity, in opposition to wiles and subtleties. It is in defence, not so much of *revealed*, as of *natural* religion; not of the fundamentals of *faith*, but of the principles of *moral* honesty: and every *heresy* in *morality* is of more pernicious consequence than *heresies* in points of *positive* religion. The security and honour of our Church are deeply concerned in this question. As to its *security*, every body sees what I mean: and as to the *honour* or *reputation* of our Church abroad, whenever we have been charged with *Socinianism* or *Popery*, or any other *monstrous* doctrines, we had no defence so ready at hand, or so just and satisfactory, as this; that our *subscriptions* were sufficient to wipe off all

slander and *calumny*. The good of the *State*, as well as of the *Church*, is likewise concerned in this question: because there can be no security against men's putting their own *private* senses upon the *public laws*, *oaths*, *injunctions*, *&c.* in contradiction to the sense of the *imposers*, if these principles about *Church subscription* should ever prevail amongst us. But of this, more will be said in the sequel. I designed only, at present, briefly to intimate the importance of the cause I am inquiring into; to invite the readers to the more careful examination of it. And I shall enter into the *merits* of it, as soon as I have laid down the principles of the men I am now concerned with, in order to let us into the true *state* of the *question*.

CHAP. II.

The general principles or sentiments of the modern Arians (some of them at least) concerning subscription *to our* public forms.

THE author of the *Remarks* observes, that "it is an "avowed principle among them, that these Articles" (the XXXIX Articles) "may lawfully and conscientiously be "subscribed in any sense in which they themselves, by "their own interpretation, *can* reconcile them to Scrip-"ture," (i. e. what they call Scripture; or their *own* sense of Scripture,) "without regard to the meaning and in-"tention, either of the persons who first compiled them, "or who now impose them." He says farther, that "this latitude was expressly asserted in the year 1712, "by a learned Doctor of divinity, in a book entitled, *The* "*Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity;* and was advanced on "purpose to justify their subscribing." It is very well that the doctrine can be dated no higher than the year 1712; as indeed it cannot; being entirely *new:* never heard of among *sober* casuists, at least, before that time. Now, the principal words of the author of *Scripture Doctrine* (as they stand in the Introduction to the *first edition*) are these: "It is plain that every person may reasonably

" agree to such forms," (our Church's forms, or of any other Protestant Church,) " whenever he can in any sense " at all reconcile them with Scripture;" i. e. his *own* sense of Scripture. It is observable that these words are *general;* and somewhat *ambiguous.* For the Doctor does not say, in any sense whereof the words are *capable,* and withal *consistent with Scripture,* but *consistent with Scripture* only: and if he speaks there of the forms in *general,* as he seems to do, he might possibly mean, that any man may agree to such forms when he can *any way* reconcile them: whether by giving *no assent* to passages irreconcileable, or whether by substituting *something* else in their room: and this would amount to subscribing *so far as is agreeable to Scripture.* I know, the Doctor has took pains to reconcile the particular passages in the *public forms* to his own *hypothesis;* from whence one might imagine that he takes every particular expression to be *capable* of a sense consistent with his scheme. But I know also, and shall show it in due time, that he has often given a *sense* of which the words he is there commenting upon are really not *capable:* which is substituting *something else* in the room of what he finds in our *forms,* to reconcile them to his *hypothesis.* And I do not remember that the Doctor has ever expressly said, that every single expression of the *public forms* is *capable* of a sense agreeable to what he calls Scripture. Wherefore I have thought that the Doctor's real meaning was to subscribe with this reservation, viz. *so far as is agreeable to Scripture;* though he chose to word it something differently, and less offensively, by saying, in *that sense wherein they are agreeable.* What confirms me in this suspicion is, that several of the Doctor's arguments for subscribing, serve equally for *one* or *other;* and will either justify both those kinds of reservation, or neither. However this matter be, as to the Doctor himself, it is certain that others of the *party* have expressed themselves clearly and distinctly on this head; and have condemned the way of subscribing with the reserve of, *so far as is agreeable to the Scripture;* resting

their cause entirely upon the other, viz. *in such sense wherein they are agreeable.*

The anonymous author of the *Essay on imposing and subscribing Articles*, after declaring his judgment (so far judging right) that they are not articles of *peace* only, but of *opinion;* proceeds to condemn the notion of subscribing *so far as is agreeable to Scripture;* insisting upon it, that the articles are *capable* of a *sense* in which they are *agreeable* to what he calls *Scripture:* and he pretends no more than this, that a man may honestly subscribe *in any sense of which the words are capable*[b], and withal *agreeable to Scripture.*

We are told in another tract, containing an *account of pamphlets* relating to the Trinitarian controversy, that subscribing the Articles *so far as they are agreeable to Scripture*, is very different from subscribing the same *in any sense agreeable to Scripture:* and that they defend only the *latter*, having "explicitly[c] condemned the "former." The sum then of what is pretended is this. It is first supposed that the Articles, &c. are *capable* of a sense agreeable to what they call Scripture: and then, and not till then, it is supposed they may be subscribed. Their defence of subscription then rests upon *two suppositions.*

1. That every expression in our public forms is *capable* of a sense consistent with the *new scheme.*

2. That their being *capable* of such a sense is enough; without regard had to the more plain, obvious, and natural signification of the *words* themselves, or to the *intention* of those who first compiled the forms, or who now impose them.

If *either* of these *suppositions* (much more if both) proves false or groundless, their whole defence of *Arian subscription* drops of course. I shall show,

1. That the sense of the compilers and imposers (where certainly known) must be *religiously* observed; even though the words were *capable* of another sense.

[b] Page 41. [c] Page 20.

2. That, whatever has been pretended, there are several expressions in the *public forms*, which are really not *capable* of any sense consistent with the Arian *hypothesis*, or *new scheme*.

CHAP. III.

That the sense of the compilers and imposers, when certainly known, (as in the present case it is,) is to be religiously observed by every subscriber, even though the words were capable of another sense.

BY *compilers*, I mean those that *composed* the *Creeds*, *Articles*, or other forms received by our Church. By *imposers*, I understand the governors in Church and State, for the time being. The sense of the *compilers*, barely considered, is not always to be observed; but so far only as the *natural* and *proper* signification of words, or the *intention* of the *imposers*, binds it upon us. The sense of the *compilers* and *imposers* may generally be presumed the same, (except in some very rare and particular cases,) and therefore I mention both, one giving light to the other. The rules and measures proper for *understanding* what that sense is, are and can be no other than the same which are proper for understanding of *oaths*, *laws*, *covenants*, or any *forms* or *writings* whatever: namely, the usual acceptation of words; the custom of speech at the time of their being written; the scope and intention of the writers, discoverable from the occasion, from the controversies then on foot, or from any other circumstances affording light into it. This is the true and only way to interpret rightly any *forms*, *books*, or *writings* whatever.

The pretences to the contrary shall be considered in their proper place: I shall now hasten to the proof of my first position, and shall be very brief in it; there being little occasion for proving so clear a point: what is most necessary is, to wipe off the dust that has been thrown upon it; and that shall be done in due time and place.

1. I argue, first, from the case of *oaths*. It is a settled

rule with casuists, that *oaths* are always to be taken in the sense of the *imposers:* the same is the case of solemn *leagues* or *covenants.* Without this principle, no faith, trust, or mutual confidence could be kept up amongst men. Now, *subscription* is much of the same nature with those; and must be conceived to carry much of the same obligation with it. It is a solemn and sacred *covenant* with the *Church,* or *government;* to be capable of such or such trusts upon certain conditions: which conditions are an unfeigned belief of those propositions, which come recommended in the *public forms.* To change these *propositions* for others, while we are plighting our faith to *these* only, (as is supposed in the very acceptance of trusts,) is manifestly a breach of covenant, and prevaricating with God and man. It is *pretending* one thing, and *meaning* another; it is professing *agreement* with the Church, and at the same time *disagreeing* with it: it is coming into trusts or privileges upon quite *different terms* from what the Church *intended;* and is, as one expresses it, not "entering in *by the* door of the sheepfold," but getting over it, as *thieves* and *robbers.*

2. To make it still plainer that such subscription is *fraudulent;* let it be considered what the ends and purposes *intended* by the ruling powers, in requiring subscription, are. They are expressed in our public *laws* and *canons* to this effect; that *pastors* may be *sound in the faith;* that no doctrines be publicly or privately taught but what the Church and State approve of; that all *diversity of opinions,* in respect of points determined, be *avoided*; that one *uniform scheme* of religion, one *harmonious form* of worship, (consonant to Scripture and primitive Christianity,) be constantly preserved among clergy and people. These are the main ends designed by subscription. But if subscribers may take the liberty of affixing their *own* sense to the public forms, in contradiction to the *known sense* of the imposers, all these ends are liable to be miserably defeated and frustrated. *Pastors,* instead of being *sound* in the *faith,* (which is but one,)

may have as many different faiths as they happen to have different wits, or inventions. Multiplicity of doctrines, opposite to each other, may be publicly taught and propagated: and, instead of any *uniform scheme* of religion, or *form* of *worship*, there may happen to be as many different and dissonant religions in the same church, or kingdom, as there are *pastors* or *parishes*. These being the natural consequences of that latitude of subscription now pleaded for, it is evident that such a latitude is a contradiction to the very end and design of all subscription; and is therefore *unrighteous*, and *full of deceit*.

3. I shall mention but one consideration more; and that is, the great scandal and pernicious influence of such a *fraudulent* practice. I cannot better express it than in the words of the late pious and excellent Mr. Nelson.

"I could heartily have now wished," says he, in a letter to Dr. Clarke, "that we of the laity had no such handle "ever given us, as this your last book hath afforded, as it "is to be feared, but to too many who think themselves "able to overturn any foundations whatever, if such a "method as you there propose be allowable with respect "to the most solemn acts and deeds of that Church and "community whereof we are members, and to substitute "what they please in their room[c]." He observes farther, (p. 19.) that "from a method of this nature, we are "threatened with the overturning of foundations both "sacred and civil." And (p. 21.) that "if the judges, and "others learned in the law, shall follow the same method "of interpreting the *laws* of the *land*, and accommodating the *civil oaths* and engagements, as Dr. Clarke "has taken in interpreting and accommodating the sense "of the Church, in her most authentic forms and declarations before God and man, and of the venerable Fathers "of the Catholic Church; there are many of opinion, that "every thing might easily be leaped over, and that no "establishment could be so strong as to last long:" and

[c] Page 15.

" who knows whereabouts his religion, liberty, or pro-
" perty may be, if such a latitude of interpretation be
" defensible as is avouched in Dr. Clarke's third part
" openly; and is therefore suspected in his first and se-
" cond?" Thus far Mr. Nelson. And there is so much strength of reason and plain good sense shown in what he says, that all the little distinctions, evasions, and subtilties pleaded on the other side can never shake it. These and the like considerations have ever deterred wise and good men from such a method. No conscientious *Protestant* would subscribe the Romish Catechism, or Pope Pius's Creed; no serious *Papist* would subscribe our *Articles;* no pious *Dissenter* would give his *assent* and *consent* to such parts of our public forms as he does not heartily approve of, in the plain and intended sense. Thousands have died martyrs to the maxims which I am now asserting; whose great and only misfortune it was not to have been acquainted with those *evasive arts* and *subtle distinctions*, which, it seems, might have preserved them. I come next to examine what those pretences and evasions are: and that they may lose nothing in the recital, they shall appear in the very words of their authors; and to every particular *plea* I shall return a particular *answer*.

CHAP. IV.

The several pleas *and* pretences *for subscribing, after the* new *method,* examined and confuted.

Plea I.

" The Protestant Churches require men to comply with
" their *forms* merely on account of their being agreeable
" to Scripture, and consequently *in such sense only* wherein
" they are agreeable to Scripture." *Clarke's Introd.* p. 20.

" That this is not highly reasonable among Protestants,
" and particularly in the Church of England; or that this
" hath been ever contradicted or censured by any *judg-*
" *ment* of the Church, I leave him (Bishop Potter) to
" prove." *Bishop of Bangor's Postscript*, p. 251.

ANSWER.

1. Before ever *Popery* was known, subscription to *creeds*, or other *forms*, has been required: and always in the sense of the *imposers*.

2. It is allowed that no man is by the Church required to subscribe *against* his *conscience*; or, what comes to the same, in a sense which he *thinks* not *agreeable to Scripture*. If that be any man's opinion with respect to the *sense* of our public forms, he ought not to subscribe at all.

3. The Church indeed requires men to comply with her forms, *merely on account of their being agreeable to Scripture:* and, for that very reason, must require subscription in her *own* sense; because that *only* sense is (according to her) *agreeable to Scripture*. It is a contradiction to suppose that any church requiring subscription to her *own explanations*, (as every church does,) should at the same time permit the *subscriber* to run counter to those *explanations*. For, since she looks upon her own *explanations* as the only *true sense* of Scripture, and requires subscription to the *true sense* of Scripture; she can never be presumed to allow *other explications* which are (in her judgment) *not agreeable to Scripture;* it being her principle to admit nothing but what is *agreeable to Scripture*. Whoever therefore does violence to the *public forms*, must be supposed (by that church whose forms those are) to do as much violence to *Scripture* itself; and consequently, such a church cannot admit of it. This *plea* then overthrows itself.

4. That it is reasonable for any *Protestant* church to require subscription in her *own sense*, is as certain as that it is reasonable to require subscription at all. For whatever church requires subscription, must require it in such a sense as that church believes to be the *true sense* of Scripture; and not in a sense which that church believes to be *false*. The sense therefore of the *imposers*, and none other, must be the sense which is required of the subscriber. The reason of the thing speaks it; and there

is no more occasion for any *declaration* of the *Church*, in this case, than there is for a *declaration* of the *State* in the case of *civil oaths*. For who knows not that men ought to be *sincere;* and not to *subscribe* or *swear* one thing, and *mean* another?

5. It is neither fair nor just to require any express *censure* or *judgment* of the ruling powers against a practice never begun till the year 1712; and which is too absurd in itself to need any formal prohibition. It was always presumed, and taken for granted, that the public forms should be understood as *intended* by the Church, and not *strained* or *wrested* to a foreign sense. King James the First, in his *proclamation* for the *authorizing an Uniformity of the Book of Common-Prayer*, hath these words; "Con-"cerning the service of God we were nice, or rather "jealous, that the public form thereof should be free, not "only from blame, but from suspicion; so as neither the "common adversary should have occasion *to wrest ought* "*therein contained, to other sense than the Church of Eng-*"*land intendeth;* nor any troublesome or ignorant person "of this Church be able to take the least *occasion of cavil* "*against it.*"

King Charles the First, in his Declaration prefixed to the Articles, *prohibits the least difference from the said Articles*, and expressly forbids the *affixing any new sense to any Article*. And it was the *resolution* of all the judges of England, [d] that Smith's subscription to the XXXIX Articles, with this addition, (*so far forth as the same were agreeable to the word of God,*) was not according to the statute of 13 Elizabeth. And one of the reasons given is, because the "act was made for avoiding of diversity of "opinions, &c. and by this addition the party might, by "his own private opinion, take some of them to be "against the word of God; and by this means diversity "of opinions should not be avoided, (which was the "scope of the statute,) and the very act itself made

[d] Coke Institut. iv. cap. 74. p. 324.

" touching subscription hereby of none effect." Now this reason, on which the *resolution* of the *judges* was chiefly founded, equally affects the *subscription* here pleaded for, and is equally strong against it. Wherefore it must be allowed that such subscription has been sufficiently *censured* and *condemned* by our *laws:* and that all *wresting or straining* of the public forms to any *new* or foreign sense, *different* from what the Church *intended*, is not only against the very end and design of all laws made for the establishing consent and uniformity of doctrine and worship, but has also been expressly prohibited by the ruling powers.

PLEA II.

" If tradition or custom, if carelessness or mistake, " either in the *compiler* or *receiver*, happen at any time to " put a sense upon any human forms, different from that " of the Scripture, which those very forms were intended " to explain, and which is at the same time declared to " be the only rule of truth; it is evident no man can be " bound to *understand* those forms in such sense; nay, " on the contrary, he is indispensably bound not to *under-* " *stand* or *receive* them in such a sense." *Clarke's Introd.* p. 21.

ANSWER.

This *plea* confounds two very distinct things; the rule for *understanding*, and the rule for *receiving* any forms. It should be proved that an Arian may not be obliged to *understand* the public forms in a sense contrary to what he calls *Scripture*, (or, what comes to the same, contrary to his own *hypothesis:*) but all that is really proved is this only; that he is not obliged to *receive* them in that sense, but obliged to the contrary; that is, to reject them, and not subscribe at all. The argument, reduced to a syllogistical form, would stand thus:

No man ought to *receive* any human forms in a sense repugnant to what he thinks Scripture.

But the *obvious* and *intended* sense of our public forms is a sense repugnant to what some think Scripture.

Therefore such persons ought not to *receive* them in their *obvious, intended* sense: neither indeed so to *understand* them.

Any young logician will readily perceive that here is more in the *conclusion* than there is in the *premises;* and that so much of the *conclusion* as is really just, is entirely besides the question: containing nothing but what nobody doubts of; viz. *that no man ought to subscribe against his conscience.*

Plea III.

"The sense in which any human forms appear to a "*man's self* to be consistent with Scripture, and not the "presumed meaning of the *compilers,* (*add,* or imposers,) "is to be the rule and measure of his *understanding* them. "This is both evident in reason, (because otherwise every "human government makes a new rule of faith,) and is "moreover, by all Protestants, agreed upon without con-"troversy in practice." *Clarke's Reply,* p. 34.

Answer.

The Doctor appears to have been in confusion here, as much as in the preceding; not distinguishing between the rule for *understanding* human forms, and the rule for *receiving.* We are first to consider what the true meaning and intent of the forms are: and this we are to judge of from the natural force of the words, and from the scope, drift, and design of the *compilers* or *imposers.* After this, we are to consider, by the *rule* of *Scripture,* whether we can *receive* them or no. If, upon such examination, it appears to us that the forms, according to the sense of the *imposers,* are agreeable to Scripture, we may safely subscribe; if otherwise, we must not do it for the world. What can be plainer?

As to the suggestion that, in this way, *every human government makes a new rule of faith;* it is mere fancy

and fiction. *Public determinations* (at least generally speaking) are more likely to keep close to the *rule of faith*, than *private conceits*. Scripture is still the same *rule of faith*, only under the prudent guard of *public explanations*, to obviate the wild uncertainty of *private expositions*. This is not paying more regard to *human forms* than to *Scripture;* but more regard to some *human explications*, than to other *human explications*; more regard to a select number of *wise* men, than to *conceited* opiniators: in a word, more regard to the most prudent and most effectual (though not *infallible*) method of preserving the sacred truths, than to another, which is so far from being *infallible* for the preserving of the true faith, that it is rather the surest means to destroy it. All *Protestant* churches have took into this approved way of securing, as far as possible, the *true sense* of Scripture, by *public* and *authorized* expositions. And this is paying the tenderest and most religious regard to the *rule of faith;* there being no safer or better way than this is to preserve it. But enough in answer to a weak suggestion; which, if it proves any thing, proves the *unlawfulness* of *imposing* any forms; not the *lawfulness* of subscribing in a sense different from that of the *imposers*.

PLEA IV.

"With respect to civil matters——there is lodged in "every government a legislative power——neither can "there in this case be any other rule by which to inter- "pret the law, but only by discovering, from the obvious "signification of words, what was in the whole the real "sense and intent of the legislators. But now in ecclesias- "tical matters——the case is very different. The Church "in matters of doctrine has no *legislative* power," &c. *Clarke's Reply*, p. 32.

ANSWER.

1. This is only amusement. What has *legislative power* to do in this question? If an *equal*, if an *inferior* proposes

me any articles to subscribe, I may indeed refuse subscription, (and so I may when proposed by *superiors*;) but if I submit to *subscribe*, I must do it in the sense of him that *articles* or *covenants* with me; and according to the *plain*, *usual*, and *literal* sense of the words.

Besides, what shall we think of *oaths* imposed by an *usurper*? May I *swear* to any thing, only because he has no *legislative* power over me? Here will be a fair way opened for any prevarication in *state oaths*, as often as any one questions the legality of the powers that impose them.

2. To answer a little more directly; subscription is required by the *legislative* powers: and there is just the same reason for attending to the sense of the *imposers*, in the matter of *subscription*, as in any *civil oaths*, *tests*, *laws*, or the like: and every objection against the one, is equally strong against the other also. The legislative powers in a Christian state are under the law of *right reason*, and also under the *law* of *Christianity*. Now, what if the *civil oaths*, *laws*, *tests*, &c. be thought contrary either to the dictates of *reason*, or to the *law* of *Christ*, which the *lawgivers* pretend to follow, and to conform to as their rule? Then, upon the principles of the subscribing Arians, any man may force and strain the *civil oaths*, *laws*, *tests*, &c. to his own *private* sense, contrary to the meaning of the ruling powers, in order to reconcile them to what he thinks *reason* or *Scripture*; that is, to his own principles, fancies, or conceits, whatever they be. The case is parallel in all circumstances affecting the present question; and the *plea* that is here used for the justifying a *fraudulent* subscription, with a very little change, will serve as well to justify a *fraudulent* taking of the civil *oaths* or *tests*; and so there will be an end of all trust or mutual confidence, so long as words are capable of being wrested or tortured into more senses than one.

PLEA V.

"Every man that (for the sake of peace and order)

" *assents to*, or *makes use of*, any such forms of human " appointment, is obliged to *reconcile* them with what " appears to him to be the doctrine of Scripture, and take " care to *understand* them in such a sense only, as is *con-* " *sistent* with that doctrine: otherwise he parts with his " Christianity for the sake of a civil and political reli- " gion." *Clarke's Reply*, p. 33.

ANSWER.

1. The same *plea* may serve for Papists, and persons disaffected to the government, whenever (for the sake of *peace* and *order*) they may be disposed fraudulently to take the oaths of *allegiance*, and *supremacy*, and *abjuration*. Those *oaths*, indeed, in their *literal* and *intended* sense, are directly repugnant to their sense of Scripture. But they are to take care to *understand* them in *such* a *sense only* as is consistent with their doctrines; otherwise, they part with *their Christianity* for the sake of a *civil* and *political religion*.

2. More directly I answer, secondly, that if any human forms, in their *obvious* and *intended* sense, appear not consistent with what some call *Scripture;* such persons ought not, for the sake of *peace* and *order*, neither yet for the sake of a *benefice* or *dignity*, nor for any consideration whatever, to *assent* to such forms. Nay, they are indispensably bound to refuse *assent* or *subscription* to such *forms;* otherwise they part with their *Christianity* for the sake of the *mammon* of this world; or, at best, for the sake of *peace* and *order;* which is " doing evil that good " may come," and is an abominable practice in the sight of God and man.

PLEA VI.

" Bishop Pearson saith, ' that whatever is delivered in " the Creed, we therefore believe, because it is contained " in the Scriptures; and consequently must so believe it " as it is contained there: whence all this Exposition of " the whole is nothing else but an illustration and proof

" of every particular part of the Creed by such Scriptures " as deliver the same, according to the true interpretation " of them.' *Exposition on the Creed*, p. 227.

" And the whole Church of England has made the like " declaration, in the sixth, the twentieth, and twenty-first " of the XXXIX Articles, before cited; and in the *eighth* " Article, which declares that the Creeds ought to be re- " ceived and believed, because (and consequently only *in* " *such sense wherein*) *they may be proved by most certain* " *warrants of holy Scripture.*" *Clarke's Introduct.*

ANSWER.

1. What Bishop Pearson has there said, relates to the article of Christ's *descent into hell;* the sense of which is left indefinite, and undetermined by our Church; and therefore this is not pertinent to the point in hand. To let us see how far that good and great Bishop was from countenancing any thing like what the Doctor pleads for, I may transcribe one paragraph from the preceding page, p. 226. " Wherefore being our *Church* hath *not* now " *imposed* that interpretation of St. Peter's words, which " before it intimated, being it hath not declared that as " the only place of Scripture to found the *descent into hell* " upon; being it hath alleged no other place to ground " it, and delivered no other explication to expound it; we " may with the greater liberty pass on to find out the " true meaning of this article, and to give our particular " judgment in it." Had the Bishop foreseen what ill use might possibly be made of his other words, he could not have guarded more particularly against it than he has here done. Wherefore it was very peculiar to cite him in favour of such a *subscription*, or such a *latitude*, as he would have utterly abhorred and detested.

2. As to the doctrine of the Church of England in her 6th, 8th, 20th, and 21st Articles, it is no more than this; that *nothing* is *to be received but what is agreeable to Scripture.* And for this very reason she requires subscription in her *own* sense, because she judges no other sense to be

agreeable to Scripture. If any judge otherwise, let them not *subscribe.* It is but shallow artifice of the pleaders for a *fraudulent* subscription, constantly to call their *interpretations* of Scripture, *Scripture;* and from thence to infer that the Church requires or permits subscription in *their* sense. The Church surely has as good a right to call her *interpretations* by the name of *Scripture;* and then her requiring subscription to *that only which is agreeable to Scripture,* is requiring subscription in her *own* sense of Scripture, and none else. Let the Arian sense of Scripture be *Scripture* to Arians: but then let them subscribe only to Arian *expositions;* which are nothing akin to those of our *Church.*

Plea VII.

"When in the *public forms* there be (as there gene-
"rally are) expressions which, at first sight, look diffe-
"rent ways; it cannot be but men must be allowed to
"interpret what is *obscure,* by that which seems to them
"more *plain* and *scriptural.*" *Clarke's Reply,* p. 33.

Answer.

What a fanciful representation is here of our *public forms*; as if they, either at *first sight,* or *at all,* looked towards *Arianism;* when the very strongest words which the wit of man can devise to exclude it, occur every where in our *public forms.* And it is so far from being *obscure* whether the *compilers* and *imposers* intended to exclude it, and to profess the Catholic doctrine up to the height, that it is demonstration they did *intend* it. This *plea* therefore has nothing to rest upon but a misrepresentation of *fact.*

If the meaning be, that the doctrines taught by our Church are *obscure,* that is, *mysterious,* and therefore they may claim a liberty of explaining them away, into what appears to them more *plain* and *scriptural;* I say, if that be the meaning of the *plea,* then it comes to this; that whenever any church imposes the belief of *mysteries,* a

subscriber may honestly substitute what he pleases instead of the *mystery;* or may make no *mystery* of it, by reducing it (contrary to the *intention* and *meaning* of the *imposers*) to something appearing to himself more *plain* and *scriptural.* Upon this foot it will be impossible for any church ever to secure the profession of any *mysterious* doctrine against secret meanings and subtle evasions: but men may subscribe to as many *mysteries* as they please, and still believe *none* of them.

Plea VIII.

"In the doctrine of the Trinity, I have no way cer-
"tainly to inform myself what is the sense of the Church.
"The words of the *first Article* are *capable* of at least
"*four* senses; and each of these senses is defended by
"learned divines of the Church.—The *four* senses I mean
"are these:

"1. That which makes the three Persons to be only
"*three modes* of one mind; which I call *Sabellianism.*

"2. That which makes the three Persons to be some-
"thing more than three modes of one mind, and yet *not*
"*three minds:* i. e. makes them to be *media* between
"*entia* and *non-entia,* something and nothing; which I
"call *nonsense.*

"3. That which makes the three Persons to be *three*
"*equal minds:* which I call *Tritheism.*

"4. That which makes them to be *unequal minds,* one
"independent and existing of itself, the other two deriv-
"ing their existence from the first:" (which the author should have called *Arianism.*) *Essay on Imposit.* p. 42, 43.

Answer.

This writer goes roundly to work; and gives us a specimen both of his *profound* sense and his *modesty.* He first throws dust upon the *Article,* and then complains that it is *dark* and *confused.* The *Article* is really capable of but *one sense;* and that sense none of the *four,* as he has represented them.

It is not *capable* of the *first* pretended *sense*. There is not a word of *three modes* either in the *Article*, or any where else in our *public forms*. The notion is neither *expressed* nor *implied* in the *Article*; and therefore cannot be the sense of it: nay, the notion is a contradiction to the very words of the Article. *Mode, mode,* and *mode,* will never amount to *substance:* but the Article plainly makes every *Person* to be *substance*, as invested with *power* and *eternity*, and as being of *one substance* with the other two Persons, and making therewith *one living and true God.*

The *second sense*, when rightly understood, is the true sense of the Article; but not as it lies under the ridiculous representation which this writer has made of it. The *sense* in it is the *Article's*, the *nonsense* is his *own*. The Article says not a word of a *medium* between *something* and *nothing:* but that the three Persons are neither *three modes* nor *three minds*, is indeed plain enough from the Article. Neither is there any *nonsense*, but a great deal both of *sense* and *truth*, in saying, that every Person is *substance*, and yet they are not *three substances;* every Person *mind*, and yet not *three minds;* every Person God, and yet not three Gods. The *union* is too close and intimate to admit of the *plural* expressions of *minds, substances, Gods*; which can belong only to *separate* Persons: three Persons so *united* as these are supposed to be, are *one substance, one mind, one being, one God*; and that in a very just and proper sense.

As to the third and fourth senses of *three minds* equal and unequal, which would imply *three substances*, the Article excludes them both; by making the three Persons *one substance* and *one God.* Upon the whole, it appears that the *first Article* is not *capable* of more senses than *one:* and yet if it were capable of *many* senses, unless the Arian sense were one of those *many*, this gentleman and his brethren could not, honestly and fairly, subscribe.

PLEA IX.

" Unless this liberty be allowed, nobody can subscribe " the Articles, Creeds, and Liturgy of the Church of " England at all. There are several things in these forms " which, if taken in the most *obvious* sense, contradict " one another: and therefore *some* of them must be un- " derstood in a sense which is not the *obvious* one. In " the doctrine of the Trinity, it is plain from Dr. Clarke's " Collection, chap. i. of the third part of his Scripture " Doctrine, that there are a great number of passages in " the Liturgy which in the *obvious* sense make for his " opinion: and therefore must by those who are of a dif- " ferent opinion be understood in a sense which is not the " *obvious* one." *Essay on Impos.* p. 43.

"I am sure it is no more a putting of violence upon " the expressions cited in chap. ii. of the third part, to " make them consistent with Scripture, and with the " expressions of the Liturgy cited in chap. i. than it is, " on the contrary, a putting of violence upon the Scrip- " ture and upon the expressions cited in chap. i. to make " them consistent with the expressions cited in chap. ii." *Clarke's Introduct.*

ANSWER.

We here meet with the utmost confidence in affirming a matter of fact, which every man's eyes and common sense may immediately discover to be *false*. The sum of the *plea* is, that there are many expressions in our *public forms*, which in their *obvious* sense contradict the *received* doctrine of the Trinity: and that those called *orthodox* must put as much *violence* upon one kind of expressions to reconcile them to their scheme, as the Arians must put upon others to reconcile them to theirs. The expressions which are supposed in their *obvious* sense to thwart the *received* doctrine, are such wherein the Father is eminently styled *God*, and sometimes *only God*, or such as intimate a *subordination* of two Persons to one.

Now the question will be, what sense of those passages

nas the best right and title to be called the *obvious* sense. Is it not that sense which has been in use and approved, in this *mystery*, for sixteen hundred years? Is it not that sense which was anciently taught and inculcated before baptism; *that* which all the churches in Christendom receive and approve; *that* which the *compilers* and *imposers* of our forms *certainly* intended; *that* which is so well known and has so long passed current, that nobody almost can mistake it; *that* which the words will not only *bear*, (as may be shown from innumerable instances in approved authors,) but which they really *require*, when considered together with what goes before or after them, or with other passages in our public forms? Is not *that* to be looked upon as the *obvious* sense of those passages, rather than another of *yesterday*, never before owned by our clergy or people, never suspected to be contained in our *forms*, never *subscribed* to, till very lately; a *new, strange, unheard of* sense, (so far as concerns our *public forms*,) and such as, if admitted, must make our *forms* nothing else but a confused heap and jumble of the most irreconcileable contradictions? These things considered, I must insist upon it, that the only *obvious* sense of those passages is the *received* prevailing sense of them: it being *obvious* to every man of common understanding, that *that*, and *that only*, was ever *intended* by our Church, or received by our *clergy;* or understood to be their *true sense*, by *Papist* or *Protestant, Dissenter* or *Churchman, native* or *foreigner*, from the year 1552 to the year 1712.

Our *public forms* have been well known to all the churches abroad, to all the learned in Europe. What man ever suspected, till now, that they were tainted with *Arianism*, or but looked that way? There is no need of putting *violence* upon any one passage to reconcile it to the *received* doctrine: all is easy and consistent throughout, formed entirely upon Catholic principles. Sometimes the Father is styled *only God*, oftener all *three:* sometimes two of the Persons are introduced in a subordination of *order* to the first; at other times their perfect

equality of *nature* is as fully and clearly professed. No one that has been tolerably instructed, can be at a loss for the meaning of these things. But as to the *violence* used by the Arian party in torturing our Creeds and Liturgy; it is such, I believe, as was never before practised with any words whatever. The old Arians would have detested such practices: the Ὁμοούσιον alone was such a stumbling-block to them, that very few could get over it; and they would never insert it in their Creeds. And yet they were artists in their way; and had carried the mystery of *equivocation* and *chicane* far beyond any thing that had been known in the Church in the ages before them. As to the *violence* which those gentlemen are forced to use with our Church's forms, it will appear more fully in the sequel. At present, I shall content myself with two observations, which may help to give the reader a just idea of the difference between the *orthodox* and them in this particular.

1. The first is, that what the *orthodox* subscribe to, in respect of the Trinity, is no more than what all Catholics, even the most zealous opposers of the Arians, were ever ready to profess, and in the same terms as we do. But (as I have already hinted) what our modern *Arians* subscribe, is what the ancient Arians would never have admitted. They abhorred the very name and thing of *consubstantiality, coequality, coeternity; one Godhead in three Persons*, or the like, which are all plainly laid down in our public forms. From hence it is manifest that the *violence* we are charged with would never have been thought any by our predecessors on the Catholic side: but the *violence* which we charge the Arians with is such as *their* predecessors would have allowed to be such.

2. Another observation is, that what the *orthodox* clergy *subscribe* to, they are ready also to profess from the press, or the pulpit, or in common discourse, which are all of a piece with their *subscription*; at least, generally speaking. They scruple not in sermons, in writings, in discourse, to give the title of *God* eminently, or of *only God*, to the

Father: nor to admit of such expressions as imply a *subordination* of order in the sacred Trinity. But the Arians, on the contrary, never use any expressions like to some which they subscribe to. They will never say from the *press*, or from the *pulpit*, or in common conversation, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are *one God*; that they are *coequal*, *coeternal*, &c. They allow of these expressions as often as they *subscribe;* but never else. They understand what such words mean in any other place but in our *public forms;* and they do not think they can *conscientiously* make use of them at other times, however *conscientiously* they may subscribe to them. Should any man of them, in a treatise, or sermon, throw out any such shocking assertions, (*shocking*, I mean, to them,) he would be looked upon as a *deserter* by the party; and a *betrayer* of the cause which he had undertaken to defend. But if he *subscribes* to them, and solemnly gives his *unfeigned assent* and *consent* thereto; this, it seems, and this only, is harmless and inoffensive.

I shall confirm what I have said by a remarkable instance. Dr. Clarke did but once declare, in a paper laid before the Bishops, that "the Son of God was eternally "begotten by the eternal incomprehensible power and "will of the Father;" (an expression nothing near so strong for a *coeternity* as forty others which he has subscribed to,) and his Arian friends could not bear it[e]. It occasioned a *real* and *sensible grief* amongst them. They looked upon it as *giving up* the cause, in a manner, and made broad hints of his being led by *corrupt nature* into a very culpable prevarication. See how easily those gentlemen can understand the force of words any where else but in our *forms;* and how carefully they guard against the *use* of such expressions, as they scruple not however to *subscribe* to. Let any man compare this conduct of the *Arians* with that of the *orthodox;* and he will plainly see, that the *former* are themselves *conscious* of the *vio-*

[e] See Apology for Dr. Clarke, p. 49, &c.

lence they put upon the *Church's* forms; while the latter are not conscious of any *violence*, on their side, at all.

PLEA X.

" By an induction of particular passages there are 186 " places wherein our *public forms* are clearly on his (Dr. " Clarke's) side; and 27 only which *seem* to differ from " him. Must not then the *smaller* number be reconciled " to the *greater?* Or, on the contrary, must the lesser " number, and the more *modern* phrases, be the standard " of doctrine, and the rule of interpreting the more *ancient* " phrases, and the *larger* number?" *Modest Plea*, p. 120.

ANSWER.

This is *pleasant* and *pretty*. Of the 186 pretended places, there is not one either *clearly* or *at all* on the Doctor's side, as to the *points* of *difference* between him and us. They are passages which may indeed be used by Arians (and so may they by Catholics) consistently with their principles. They are *capable* of different views, according to what they happen to be joined with. But as they stand in our *forms*, in company with other passages *express* and *full* for the Catholic doctrine, they can reasonably bear no other but the Catholic meaning. I think it not material to inquire into the truth and justice of this writer's calculation, founded only upon Dr. Clarke's arbitrary disposition of his *sections* or *paragraphs;* sometimes making one sentence a *distinct passage*, sometimes crowding many into one; and sometimes only *referring* to passages omitted. Let the number be as 186 to 27; those 27 do not only *seem*, but *are* directly opposite to the Doctor's principles, according to the *plain*, *literal*, and *natural* force of words, as well as the *known* sense of the *imposers*. The question then justly stated lies thus: Whether 186 passages which might (if the *compilers* and *imposers* had not *intended* them in a Catholic *sense*) have been indifferently claimed by either Catholic or Arian, should yield to 27, which are utterly

repugnant to *Arianism*, or the 27 to them. That is, whether those that can bear but *one* of the senses should yield to those that may fairly admit of either; or the contrary. Imagine 186 men to be *indifferent*, or but nearly indifferent, in any point of dispute; and 27 *resolute* on one side. Which is the way to reconcile them, and unite them all in one verdict? Is it to drag over the 27 by force of arms to what they are irreconcileably averse to? Or is it not rather to bring over the 186 to the 27, to whom they have little or no aversion, and to whose side they are no way disinclined? This latter, I think, is the proper and only method to promote harmony and concord in the whole. The *application* I trust with the ingenious; and here take my leave of this fanciful reasoning of the *Modest Pleader*.

Plea XI.

"The Article in the Apostles' Creed, concerning Christ's "*descent into hell*, is now universally understood in a "sense probably different from what the *composers* of the "Creed intended." *Clarke's Reply*, p. 34.

Answer.

How Christ's *descent into hell* was understood by the *composers* of the Creed is *uncertain:* neither is it certain that it is *universally* understood in any one sense. However that be, one thing is *certain*, that our Church has left that *Article* at large, intending a *latitude;* and indulging a *liberty* to subscribers to abound in their own sense. This is not the case of the Articles relating to the Trinity. Their sense is *fixed*, and bound upon the conscience of every subscriber by the *plain, natural* signification of the words: and by the *known intent* of the *compilers* and *imposers*. If it be asked from whence we are to learn what was the *intent* of the *imposers*, or how it may be *known*; I answer, first from plain words; and next, from history and observation, in the like manner as the *intent* and *scope* of any writer is to be known.

PLEA XII.

"The *damnatory* clauses in the Athanasian Creed are "now by very few understood in that sense which, in all "probability, the *compiler* of it in that very dark and "ignorant age designed to express." *Clarke's Reply*, p. 34.

ANSWER.

1. That the Athanasian Creed (so called) was composed in a "very dark and ignorant age," is more than the Doctor *knows*; and therefore should not be so positively affirmed by him. The Creed, however, has no signs or tokens of *darkness* or *ignorance*; but of great *accuracy* and *solid judgment*: and is the best exposition (for its compass) of the doctrines of the *Trinity* and *incarnation*, that we shall any where meet with.

2. Another thing which the Doctor affirms without *knowing*, is, that "few understand the *damnatory* clauses "in the sense of the compiler." Let any man show what sense it is most reasonable to understand them in; and the same reasons (if *good*) shall serve to show that that was the sense of the *compiler*. I know many have strained the *damnatory* clauses to an unreasonable rigour, on purpose to disparage the *Creed*: but they have not been able to prove that the *compiler* so intended it.

3. The *compiler's* sense being doubtful, and the *imposers* having left those *clauses* without any exposition; the *subscriber* is at liberty to understand them in such sense as the words will bear; and such as best answers the main intent and design of that Creed; and is most agreeable to Scripture and reason. This instance is nothing parallel to the case of the Articles concerning the *Trinity*; whose sense is *fixed* and *certain*, as before said. Fix, in like manner, the sense of the *damnatory* clauses; and it shall soon be proved that every *subscriber* ought to acquiesce in it.

PLEA XIII.

"The *procession* of the *Holy Ghost* set forth in the "Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, in one sense, is by Mr. "(*now* Dr.) Bennet, in his explication of his own sense "concerning that point, shown to be now understood *by* "*many* (without any suspicion of insincerity) in a diffe- "rent sense." *Clarke's Reply*, p. 34.

ANSWER.

1. This is only *argumentum ad hominem*, (to make the most of it,) and therefore is not sufficient.

2. The argument comes not up to the point in hand. Dr. Bennet was of opinion that our Church had determined nothing in this matter; otherwise he would not presume to interpret the *procession* in his own way. His words are; "If our Church had any where determined "this matter, and declared in what sense she understood "the *procession* in the Athanasian Creed, the case would "be altered[f]." And again: "Our Church never once "adds the epithet *eternal* to the word *procession;* nor has "she any one passage, that I know of, which may not "be as well understood of the temporal, as of the eternal "procession, either in her Liturgy, her Articles, or her "Homilies[g]." I am not of Dr. Bennet's mind in this particular; believing that the Church has *determined* the meaning of the *procession* in those Creeds; or rather, that the meaning is so plain, all things considered, as not to need any farther determining. However, it appears to be Dr. Bennet's principle, relating to *subscription*, that where the Church's sense may be known, that sense must be received; and that there is, in such a case, no latitude or liberty left to the *subscriber*. Upon this principle, he both does and must condemn Arian *subscription;* since both the *plain meaning* of words, and the *intent* of *compilers* and *imposers* exclude *Arianism*. And it is well known with what zeal and earnestness Dr. Bennet remonstrates[h]

[f] Page 292. [g] Page 293. [h] Bennet on the Trinity, p. 226.

against that *collusion* which he takes Dr. Clarke and his partizans to be guilty of, in the matter of *subscription*.

Plea XIV.

"The doctrines of *predestination* and *original sin*, are "at this day, by all eminent divines, (after the example "of Archbishop Laud, and of the learned Bishop Bull,) "understood in a sense which there is no appearance the "*composers* of the XXXIX Articles meant to teach; and "which there is all appearance the *composers* of the *Ho*-"*milies* intended should not be taught." *Clarke's Reply*, p. 34.

"I cannot condemn Archbishop Laud, Bishop Bull, "and others, who departed manifestly from the received "*sense*, not of *one*, but of *several* Articles; nor that *Decla*-"*ration* of King James I. (*read* Charles I.) by which he "openly patronized the subscribing the same Articles in "*several*, not only *different*, but *contradictory* senses: and "in effect declared it for the *honour* of the *Articles* that "this should be so; and that all should acquiesce in it "without mutual reproaches." *Lord Bishop of Bangor, Postscript*, p. 259.

Answer.

1. It hath often been pretended by the Calvinists that the *compilers* and *imposers* of the *Articles* &c. intended a sense different (with respect to *predestination* and *original* sin) from that which now generally prevails. But this pretence has been often and abundantly confuted by great men; and particularly by the learned Bishop Bull, in his Apology against Dr. Tully: where he has unanswerably vindicated the present doctrines from the *Articles*, *Liturgy*, *Catechism*, and *Homilies* of the Church of England[i].

2. A distinction should be made between such Articles

[i] See also Dr. Bennet on the 17th Article. Directions for studying, &c. p. 93, &c.

as, being formed in *general* terms, leave a latitude for private opinions; and such as, being otherwise formed, leave no such latitude. It is ridiculous to pretend that, because *some* articles are *general* or *indefinite*, and may admit of different explications, therefore *all* may, allowing that either Calvinist or Arminian may subscribe to the Articles, (the Articles being *general*, and the main points in dispute left undetermined,) would it not be weak to argue from thence, that both Papists and Protestants may likewise subscribe to the Articles of the Church of England? Now it is no less absurd to pretend that both Catholics and Arians may subscribe to our *forms;* some articles being as *full* and *strong tests* against *Arianism*, as others are against *Popery*.

3. It is not *fairly*, because not *truly*, suggested, that when men of different sentiments, as to *particular* explications, subscribe to the same *general* words, that they subscribe in *contradictory*, or even in *different* senses. Both subscribe to the same *general* proposition, and both in the *same sense;* only they differ in the *particulars* relating to it: which is not *differing* (at least, it need not be) about the *sense* of the *Article*, but about *particulars* not contained in the Article. For instance: let two persons assent to a *general* proposition, *This figure is a triangle;* one believing the *triangle* to be *equilateral*, the other believing its *sides to be unequal:* they are directly opposite in their sentiments, as to what kind of *triangle* it is: but in the *general* proposition, that *the figure is a triangle*, both agree, and in the *same sense*.

In like manner, imagine the article of *Predestination* (and the same may be said of any other in like circumstances) to be left in *general* terms. Both sides may *subscribe* to the same *general* proposition, and both in the *same sense:* which sense reaches not to the *particulars* in dispute. And if one believes predestination to be *absolute*, and the other *conditionate;* this is not (on the present supposition) differing about the *sense* of the *Article*, but in their respective *additions* to it.

4. It is very uncautiously and unaccurately said, that King Charles I. patronized the subscribing the same Articles either in *contradictory* or *different* senses. His order is, that every subscriber *submit* to the Article in the "plain and full meaning thereof," in the "literal and "grammatical sense." What? is the *plain and full meaning* more than *one* meaning? or is the *one plain and full meaning* two *contradictory* meanings? Could it be for the *honour* of the *Article* (or of the King) to say this? No: but the royal Declaration, by "plain and full meaning," understands the *general* meaning, which is but *one;* and to which all might reasonably *subscribe.* And he forbids any one's "putting his own sense or comment to be the "meaning of the Article," or to "affix any new sense" to it: that is, he forbids the changing a *general* proposition into a *particular;* he stands up for the *general proposition,* or for the *Article* itself; and prohibits *particular* meanings, as not belonging to the Article; nor being properly *explications* of it, but *additions* to it. This is the plain import of the *royal Declaration:* and it is both wise and just; free from any of those strange consequences, or inferences, which some would draw from it.

5. I must farther remark, that the present instance has no relation to the point in hand. The propositions concerning the holy Trinity, contained in our *public forms,* are not *general* or *indefinite,* but *special* and *determinate,* in the very points of difference between Catholics and Arians, (consubstantiality, coequality, coeternity, &c.) and that in as clear and strong words as any can be devised. This is the reason why the *subscriber* has no latitude left in this case; and why an Arian can claim no benefit from any *latitude* allowable in other Articles where circumstances are plainly different. And it must be thought a very peculiar way of reasoning to argue that, because a man may take a liberty where the *Church* and *State* have *allowed* it, therefore he may take the same liberty where they have *not allowed* it: which is all that this *plea* amounts to.

I cannot but observe from the disputes and clamours that have been raised about the 17th Article of our Church, what a tender regard has all along been paid to the point of the *subscription*; and how jealous men have been of any the least *appearance*, or *umbrage* of *prevarication*, in so serious and sacred a thing. What then must be said of those who plead for a *plain*, *open* prevarication, in a case which can admit of no dispute with any considering man, and has hardly so much as a *colour* left for it?

PLEA XV.

"That Article in the Nicene Creed (*of one substance* "*with the Father*) is now (through the ambiguity of the "Latin and English translation) by most men taken much "otherwise than the Council intended it. For the greater "part of modern Christians (if we may judge by the "writings of eminent divines) understand it (as if it had "been ταυτοούσιος) to signify *of one individual substance* "*with the Father*, whereas all learned men know that the "Greek word (ὁμοούσιος) never had any such signification, "and that the Council meant no such thing." *Clarke's Reply*, p. 35.

ANSWER.

Here is little more in this *plea* than a cavil upon the *double* meaning of the word *individual*; which has been sufficiently exposed in another place. It has also been shown that the doctrine of the Nicene Council is rightly enough understood by *modern Christians*; and that while the Doctor so magisterially censures the whole Christian world, in a manner, yet no one ever understood this matter less, or talked more crudely of it than the Doctor himself hath done, in this very page of his Reply. See my Defence, vol. i. p. 328. and Reply to Dr. Whitby, p. 212, &c. of this volume.

PLEA XVI.

"It becomes a sincere man (especially if he varies from "notions commonly received) to *declare plainly* in what "sense he understands any words of human institution;

" that his *inferiors* and *equals* may not be imposed upon " by him, and that his *superiors* may judge of such *de-* " *claration*." *Clarke's Reply*, p. 33.

" Dr. Clarke, of all men, could least be charged with " *collusion*, because he has *declared publicly* his opinions " in this matter." *Modest Plea*, p. 221.

ANSWER.

I have reserved this *plea* to the last, as being of a very different kind from the rest, and withal carrying a more plausible show of frankness and sincerity in it. Nevertheless, this, though it has an appearance of fairness, will by no means serve the purpose for which it is brought.

Suppose any disaffected persons in this kingdom should invent some strange, forced, unheard of interpretation of the *civil oaths*, to *elude* and *frustrate* the intent of them; and *declare* in print, that they themselves take the *oaths* in this *new* sense, advising their brethren to do the same; would such *declaration* be sufficient to salve their *honesty*, or to make them *righteous* in the sight of *God* or *man?* would they not be rather thought the more notoriously wicked, as not only venturing upon *perjury* themselves, but instructing and seducing others into the same crime?

Their giving notice of the *prevarication* would not be acquitting themselves of the guilt, but *proclaiming* it; and, in some respects, *increasing* it: as it would not only be doing an *ill thing*, but, what is worse, boasting of it, and teaching others to do the like. One dishonest act, or more, are not so dangerous or pernicious, as the laying down principles, and contriving *subtilties* and artificial *evasions*, whereby to undermine the very foundations of moral honesty.

I am not sensible that there is difference enough between this and the other case, to make one *innocent* and the other highly *criminal*. Nothing can be pleaded for it but the *presumed consent* of the *superiors*, after *declaration* made. But that no such *presumed consent* can have any

place in the matter of *subscription*, may appear from the reasons following.

1. Because *superiors* may often connive at, or tolerate *offences*: which are never the less *offences* for such *connivance*.

2. Because so long as our *superiors* continue the same *forms*, which clearly express such a sense, they must be presumed to *intend* the *same sense*, till they *declare* otherwise. And their permitting the same *forms* to stand is a much surer argument of their still *intending* the same thing, than their suffering an offender to escape, with impunity, can be of the contrary.

3. The expressions of our *Articles*, *Liturgies*, *Creeds*, and *Laws*, are all so *plain* and *full* for the *received* doctrine of the *Trinity*, and against the *new scheme*, that a man must have a very mean opinion either of the *understanding* or *integrity* of his *superiors*, to suppose that they can ever *allow* him to trifle at such a rate in so serious a matter as *subscription*. And it must be observed that our *superiors* speak by the *public forms*, as much as the *legislature* speaks by the *public laws*: and no sense can be *their* sense but the *plain*, *usual*, *literal* meaning of those *public forms*; till some as *public* and as *authentic* declaration alters the case.

If the *subscription* contended for be in itself *fraudulent*, as elusive of the *law*, a man's declaring, or giving notice of it, does not alter its nature, or make it *legal*. Suppose a man should *declare* that he subscribes only *so far as is agreeable to Scripture*; (a method disallowed by our *laws*, according to the unanimous resolution of all the *judges*, as before observed:) such *declaration* would never alter the nature of the *subscription*; but it would be as much against *law* as ever, notwithstanding: and, for that very reason, it would be unrighteous and dishonest. But I have also observed, that subscribing in any sense contrary to the *plain* force of words, and *known meaning* of the *imposers*, is equally *illegal* with the other: and therefore

neither can this be justified any more than the other. And since whatever is *illegal* is of course condemned by our *superiors*, who speak by the *public laws*, it is evident that our *superiors* condemn this kind of subscription; and consequently there is no pretence left for a *presumed consent*, unless our *superiors* can be presumed both to *allow* and *condemn* the very same thing at the same time.

4. I must add, that our *superiors* have, from time to time, (as there has been occasion,) sufficiently testified their disallowance of any attempts tending to undermine the Catholic *received* doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity. His present Majesty's *Directions*, at this very juncture, are yet fresh in our minds: where (to the general joy and satisfaction of the kingdom) he has signified his just resentments against those "impious tenets and doctrines "which have been of late advanced and maintained with "much boldness and openness, contrary to the great and "fundamental truths of the Christian religion, and particularly to the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed "TRINITY." And his royal command is, that "no "preacher presume to deliver any other doctrine——concerning the blessed TRINITY, *than what is* contained "in the holy Scriptures, and is agreeable to the three "Creeds, and the XXXIX Articles of religion." Now the 8th Article of our Church expressly affirms that the "three Creeds may be proved by most certain warrants "of holy Scripture." Whosoever therefore gives it out for *Scripture doctrine*, that "the one God always signifies "the Father;" or that "more Persons than one cannot "be, or are not, one God;" or that "God with any high "epithet always signifies the Father;" or that "the Son "or Holy Ghost is not God, Lord, Almighty, eternal, "uncreated, and incomprehensible, as much as the Father;" I say, whoever pretends *Scripture* for these, or the like positions, (positions plainly repugnant to the Athanasian Creed, which Creed may be proved from Scripture, according to Article the 8th,) does at the same time act in opposition to his *superiors*, who have enjoined

the observance of the *Creeds* and *Articles*. If it be said that such general *orders* or *directions* of *superiors* reach not to this particular case, as not containing any *formal prohibition* of those *newly-devised* senses put upon the Creeds and Articles; I answer, that there is no more occasion for a formal prohibition against perverting the *plain* sense of the *Creeds* or *Articles*, than there is for the like prohibition against perverting the sense of the *civil oaths*. All that have common understanding are supposed to know, that directing us to adhere to the *Creeds* and *Articles*, is directing us to adhere to their *true sense*, that being always *implied*. To pervert their true and certain sense, is not *adhering* to our Church's forms, but *contradicting* them: which, though it be done in an *insidious* way, and under the false name of explaining them; yet, in reality, means the same thing as the most direct and formal *opposition* to them. And however the disguise may be serviceable in the eyes of men, yet *conscience* is not a thing to be played with in that manner; neither will such vain pretences avail any thing in the sight of God. Subscribing in this method is really nothing else but *eluding* the whole design of the *laws*, and imposing upon the *ruling powers:* but it must be doubly rude, and absurd, at the same time, to *presume*, that any man can have their *consent* for it. So much for this.

I have now run through all the *pleas*, *pretences*, or *excuses* (*arguments* I will not call them) that I could any where meet with for the *new* method of subscribing. The reader is not to wonder at the *number* of them, which is an argument only of a *bad* cause. Had there been any *good reason* whereon to found it, there had been no need of running out into such multiplicity. But when men have once left the *plain* and *true* way to follow their own wanderings, *invention* is fruitful; and it is very easy always to have a great deal to say, after a man is gone beyond the rule of *speaking to the purpose*. I believe, I may now venture to affirm that the cause which those gentlemen have taken in hand, is one of the weakest that

was ever undertaken by wise men. False facts, groundless surmises, and inconclusive reasonings, are all that it has to subsist upon. And yet I have hitherto allowed them, for argument sake, one *supposition;* namely, that the expressions in our forms are *capable* of a sense consistent with their principles: and I have shown, notwithstanding, that their subscription is *fraudulent;* because repugnant to the more *plain* and *obvious* sense of the words, and the *known* intention of the *imposers.* But I must now examine the truth of that *supposition* which has been thus far allowed them: and if that also proves weak and groundless; there will then be nothing of colour or pretence left for that subscription; but the very men themselves who either use it, or plead for it, must be *self-condemned.* I shall therefore next examine how that case stands; not that I need put the issue of the cause upon it, (for it is a clear point that the subscription pleaded for is *unjustifiable,* though I allowed them the present supposition,) but *ex abundanti,* and to show how miserably weak, and destitute of all support, the opposite persuasion is, I may inquire whether even this their last refuge may not be taken from them.

CHAP. V.

That several expressions in our public forms *are really not* capable *of a sense consistent with the* Arian hypothesis, *or* new *scheme.*

IT must be owned that words are *arbitrary* signs of things; and so, in some sense, it may be said that the word *white* is *capable* of signifying *black,* and the word *light* might signify *darkness,* if the custom of speech had not otherwise determined. I suppose, those gentlemen will not extend their notion, of words being *capable* of their sense, thus far. They must have regard to *custom* of *speech,* to *use* of *language,* to common rules of *grammar* and *criticism,* in determining whether words be *capable* of such a sense or no. And whatever *forms* are *capable* of that sense which is contended for, must be conceived

capable of being *paraphrased* into that same sense, by putting other equivalent words into their place. By these rules and measures I shall proceed in the inquiry, whether the expressions of our *public forms* are *capable* of an Arian sense or no. Dr. Clarke has reduced the number of those which we chiefly insist on to 27. I shall single out some of them, following the order wherein they lie, in the first edition of *Scripture Doctrine*, together with Dr. Clarke's interpretation of them. I shall begin with the Athanasian Creed.

"Whosoever will be saved; before all things it is ne-
"cessary that he hold the Catholic faith.

"Which faith except every one do keep whole and
"undefiled; without doubt he shall perish everlastingly.

"And the Catholic faith is this, &c.

"He therefore that will be saved must thus think of
"the Trinity.

"This is the Catholic faith; which, except a man be-
"lieve faithfully, he cannot be saved."

These are what they call *damnatory* clauses: and it ought to be matter of serious inquiry, in *what sense* the gentlemen of the Arian persuasion can subscribe them, without subscribing their own *damnation*. The very lowest sense and import of those *damnatory* clauses has ever been conceived to intend thus much, that the *main doctrine* of the *Trinity* and *incarnation*, the doctrine of worshipping *one God in three Persons*, and *three Persons in one God*; and the doctrine of *perfect God* and *perfect man*, united in one *God-man*, are necessarily to be *believed* (or however *not disbelieved*) by all persons of years and discretion, (who have had the opportunity of being duly instructed,) under peril of eternal damnation. As the author of the Creed could not intend less than this, so neither can the words themselves import less. And yet there is just reason to question whether the advocates for the *new scheme* think it necessary to *worship* God the Son or God the Holy Ghost at all; it being a principle much contended for amongst them, *to direct their prayers*

uniformly to God the Father; [k] meaning, I suppose, to *him*, and to him *only:* and it is certain that they neither believe *three Persons* to be *one God;* nor *perfect God* (in the sense of the Creed) to be united personally with perfect man to make one *God-man*. Dr. Clarke, in his Comments, takes a great deal of pains to prove that *particular explications* of all or any part of the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be *necessary* to salvation. This proceeding of his would be right, if he had been teaching his followers to subscribe with this reserve, viz. *so far as is agreeable to what they think Scripture:* but since they are to subscribe in *some sense* whereof the words are *capable*, as well as agreeably to Scripture, his pains would have been better employed in showing how the *damnatory* clauses can be *capable* of a lower sense than that which has been given.

"We worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity." Here it is to be noted, that Dr. Clarke and his adherents always by *one God* understand God the Father only: and will never allow *two Persons* in *one God*, though the words of the Creed plainly include *three*. Let us see then how these words must be paraphrased, to make them consistent with their principles. It is thus:

"We worship one God (the Father) in Father, Son, and "Holy Ghost: and we worship Father, Son, and Holy "Ghost, in one God the Father. That is, by referring all "the worship to the Father ultimately, as to the one "supreme Head." Let us consider what can be made of this construction. It may be turned two ways: either thus, *We worship one Person in three Persons, and three Persons in one Person*, (which is flat enough, and scarce sense;) or else thus, *We worship one God, the Father, principally, worshipping three Persons; and we worship three Persons, worshipping one God, the Father, principally*. This indeed is sense; but such as no one ever did or ever would express in the words of the Creed. It is

[k] See Modest Plea, p. 177. Brief Answer to Dr. W. p. 64.

not said, *Unum Deum Patrem præcipue venerantes, Trinitatem veneremur; et Trinitatem venerantes unum Patrem præcipue veneremur:* but it is, *Unum Deum in Trinitate, et Trinitatem in Unitate veneremur.* ἕνα Θεὸν ἐν Τριάδι, καὶ Τριάδα ἐν μονάδι σέβωμεν. Plainly signifying, that the one God to be worshipped is the Trinity, and the Trinity to be worshipped is the one God. We may proceed to what follows.

"Neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the "substance. For there is one Person of the Father, an- "other of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost. But "the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy "Ghost is all one, &c." Here the meaning of the words is very plain, that the *Persons* must not be *confounded*, because Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are *distinct* Persons: nor the substance of the three Persons be *divided*, because the *Godhead* of the three is *all one*. To paraphrase the words, upon the Doctor's principles, they must run thus:

"*Neither confounding the Persons*, nor *dividing the* Fa- "ther's *substance:* for the three Persons are distinct, but "the *divinity* of the Son and Holy Ghost is no other "than what is communicated from the Father." By this paraphrase, the whole force of the sentence is broken and confused. Understanding *substance* of the three Persons, the whole is well connected: for here is a reason given why *their* substance is not *divided;* viz. because their *Godhead* is *one*. But what sense or connection is there in saying that the *Father's* substance is not divided; for, or because, the *divinity* of the Son, &c. is no other than what is communicated from him? No one would ever have expressed the Doctor's sense in those words of the Creed, or in that manner. Besides, the words *Godhead all one*, (*una divinitas*, μία θεότης,) applied here to three Persons, are of *known, certain* signification; denoting that the *substance* of the three is *one*, and that all are *one God*. So that if either the *coherence* of the sentence, or the *grammatical* sense of words, or their *constant* and *cus-*

tomary use in Church writers, be of any weight; the passage now before us is not *capable* of that sense which the Doctor would wrest it to; but must be construed in another: which other is likewise confirmed by the words following; "the glory equal, the majesty coeternal."

As to *glory equal*, the Doctor takes care to tell us, it must not be understood in the same sense as *coordinate beings* are *equal* to one another. Well, that we know: but what sense must the *subscriber* understand it in? The Doctor says, in "such a sense as he who derives his "essence or being from another, can be equal, &c." Well, but what if the *subscriber*, according to his Arian sense of *deriving being*, &c. thinks that the *glory* of the second and third Persons *can* be in *no sense* equal to that of the first; any more than the glory of a *creature* can be *equal* to the glory of the *Creator;* how then can he subscribe to these words, which are express for *equality* of *glory*, in some sense or other? The Doctor's last shift is, that it may be understood in such a sense as Christ is said to be ἴσος Θεῷ, (or ἴσα Θεῷ,) *as God*, or *equal with God*. But the Doctor's construction of ἴσα Θεῷ (Phil. ii. 6.) is no more than to be *honoured as Lord of all things*, that is, with honour *equal*, or *suitable* to such a *God*, or *Lord*, so exalted; not with honour *equal* to that which belongs to God the Father. But the *Creed* plainly makes the glory of each Person equal to the glory of any other Person: wherefore the words are not *capable* of such a sense as the Doctor has put upon ἴσα Θεῷ, but the *subscriber* is left to seek out for some other; or else to subscribe the words in *no sense* at all. The next words of the Creed are,

"Majesty coeternal." The word *coeternal* is of a *fixed* and *known* sense in ecclesiastical writers: never used to signify any thing less than *absolute* eternity, without beginning, and without end. How contradictory this sense is to the principles of the party, may be seen from the author of the Apology for Dr. Clarke, who says thus: "Though "the generation of the Son, and procession of the Holy

" Ghost may, in a sense, be said to be *eternal*, as they " were πρὸ πάντων and πρὸ αἰώνων, yet what is this to *the* " *absolute eternity* of a self-existent Being[1]?" We see what the Apologist thought of the great, the infinite disparity between the *eternity* of the Father, and the *eternity* of either of the other two Persons: nor did the Doctor in his answer to him disapprove of his sentiments; but rather (*tacitly* at least) acquiesced in them. How then can these gentlemen subscribe to the *coeternity* of the three Persons? The Doctor in his comments admits that the *second* and *third* Persons have *always* been with the *first*, which he explains by *before all ages*, and before *time*. If this comes up to a *coeternity*, it is well: if not, he does but deceive himself and his followers; for *coeternal* can bear but one sense, and can admit of no degrees, no difference in point of duration.

The reader should here observe the artful method of explaining away the sense of a *creed*, or of any other writing: not for the sake of learning it, (for it is not worth it,) but to be armed against it, and to prevent being imposed upon by it. When a word occurs, of a *fixed* sense, and which is not liked; the way is first to look out for another word that is *ambiguous*, which *may* bear the *same sense*, but *may* also bear another. Draw but a reader thus far to let slip the first word, and to take this other instead of it, and then the work is half done. Having a word with *two senses*, drop by degrees the sense you have no mind to, and take the other, still substituting other words which may come nearer and nearer to the sense you aim at; till at length, by several removes, you get quite off from the sense of the word you began with.

Thus in the present instance; from *coeternal*, a word of *fixed* sense, and rather too *high* for the Arian hypothesis, the learned Doctor puts " always with the Father;" which might indeed signify the same thing, but is how-

[1] Page 50, 51, 438.

ever *capable* of a *lower* sense: and to bring the sense gradually down, the Doctor next substitutes the phrase "before all ages," which again is *equivocal*, and does not sound quite so high as the former: then, to lower the sense still farther, he has another phrase, viz. "before time:" and *time*, in a *restrained* sense, may be said to have *commenced* with the *world*. So now he is got low enough, and the reader may be supposed, by these several steps, to have lost the sight of *coeternal*. But to pass on.

"Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is "the Holy Ghost." The Doctor's interpretation of it is; "*such* in all senses wherein he that derives his essence or "being from another, *can be such* as is he from whom he "derives it." Here again he leaves his *subscriber* in the dark. For what if he had said, *such* in all senses wherein a *creature* can be *such* as his *Creator?* which I am afraid is the true meaning of most of his disciples. This would come to the same as saying such in *no sense:* so that by this limitation, he takes away the plain force of the words; and teaches his followers to subscribe, not "in such sense "as the words are capable of:" but "so far as is agree-"able to what they call Scripture." The Creed is positive that the *second* and *third* Persons are *such* as the *first;* and immediately after specifies the respects in which they are *such*. *Such* in respect of their being *eternal; such* in respect of their being *uncreated; such* in respect of their being *incomprehensible, Almighty, God,* and *Lord*. That is, all the three Persons are *equally*, and in the same sense, *uncreated, eternal, incomprehensible, Almighty, God,* and *Lord*. This is plainly the doctrine of the Creed; the literal and grammatical sense of the words. Now, to qualify absolute propositions with reserves and limitations, in the manner the Doctor does, is not *explaining* their sense, but *contradicting* it. Neither can this be called subscribing in a sense of which the words are *capable*, but only "so far as is agreeable to what some call Scripture:" which rule of *subscribing* is condemned by those gentlemen.

" The Father uncreate, the Son uncreate, and the Holy " Ghost uncreate——And yet not three uncreated, but " one uncreated." The Doctor here teaches the subscriber to acknowledge every Person to be *uncreated*, (ἄκτιστος,) and yet, to say that there are not three *uncreated* (ἄκτιστοι) Persons, but *one uncreated Person;* which is a staring contradiction: besides, it is owning two of the Persons to be *creatures*, in some sense, which the Doctor at other times studiously avoids. But he was here in great straits; and was to venture upon any thing, rather than admit what he has the utmost aversion to, *three Persons* to be *one uncreated* Being, or God.

He has no possible way of reconciling the seeming *contradiction* contained in his comment, but by making a distinction between *derived uncreatedness*, and *underived uncreatedness:* which would have appeared so odd and fanciful, that he chose not to mention it in terms, but only to hint it in generals. What precludes this, and every other pretence of that kind, is, that the *Creed* plainly makes the *uncreatedness* of the second and third Persons to be *such as* the *Father's* is, that is, of the *same kind*, and to be understood in the *same sense*, there being no difference or distinction in that respect.

" The Father incomprehensible, the Son incomprehen- " sible, and the Holy Ghost incomprehensible——And " yet there are not three incomprehensibles, *but* one in- " comprehensible." The Doctor takes the same way with this as with the former passage; and runs into the like *contradiction* to avoid the admitting so shocking a thing to him, as the notion of three Persons being *one incomprehensible;* which is the *certain* meaning of the Creed. I shall say no more to this, but refer the reader to what I have observed upon the passage preceding.

" The Father eternal, the Son eternal, and the Holy " Ghost eternal. And yet they are not three eternals, but " one eternal." Here the words are so *express* for *three Persons* being *one eternal*, (which the Doctor can by no means bear,) that he had no way left but to change *they*

are not into *there are not:* without considering that the *subscriber* must give his *unfeigned assent* and *consent* to *they are not;* and must so read in the public congregation. Besides this inconvenience, which the Doctor seemed to be unapprised of; there is another which he was forced to run upon, (contrary to his usual caution,) and that was to say, " there are not three eternal Persons," hereby denying the *eternity* of two of them. And yet the *Creed*, more than once, *expressly* asserts the *coeternity* of all three; and besides plainly teaches that the eternity of the *second* and *third* Persons is *such as* the Father's is. Nor will the Doctor's distinction of a *derived* and *underived* eternity help him in this matter: for the sense of the word *eternity* has nothing to do with that distinction, being but *one*, and importing neither more nor less than *beginningless and endless* duration.

" The Father is Almighty, the Son Almighty, and the " Holy Ghost Almighty. And yet they are not three " Almighties, but one Almighty." Here the Doctor again changes *they are not* into *there are not:* thereby signifying that the *subscriber* cannot honestly assent to, or make use of, *they are not*; though he does not tell him how to avoid the doing of it, solemnly, and in the face of the public congregation.

I take no notice of the Doctor's choosing τρεῖς παντοδύναμοι, rather than τρεῖς παντοκράτορες, because he will claim the privilege of taking which he likes best: otherwise the Greek copies favour the latter as much as the former; and the Latin original is indifferent to either.

" The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy " Ghost is God. And yet they are not three Gods, but " one God." We have the same *collusion* again practised, in changing *they are not* into *there are not*, only for the sake of avoiding what the *Creed* mainly intends to teach, that the " three Persons are one God." I shall not here repeat what I have before said: but shall only observe an *omission* which the Doctor is guilty of, in not teaching the *subscriber* how to reconcile the contradiction of every

Person being *a God*, (for so it must be on his principles,) and yet not *three Gods*. For though there be but one *supreme God*, (upon the Doctor's hypothesis,) yet one supreme God, and two inferior Gods, are *three Gods*, in such a sense as neither Scripture nor antiquity can ever allow. The like might be said of the next paragraph, respecting *one Lord* and *three Lords*. I shall just take notice of a slight inconsistency of the Doctor, in explaining this paragraph. To account for the *Holy Ghost's* being here called *God*, he is forced to admit that he is represented in Scripture as "exercising divine power and "authority," p. 435. But if we turn back to Prop. xxv. p. 296. we are there told that the *Holy Ghost*, in the New Testament, is never expressly styled *God;* "because "*he* is no where represented as sitting upon a throne, or "exercising supreme dominion, &c." So that it seems the Doctor can make it out either way; that the Scripture has, or has not, given ground enough for styling the Holy Ghost *God*, just as occasion serves. But to pass on.

"In this Trinity, none is afore, or after other." (*Nihil prius aut posterius*——or, *Nemo primus aut postremus.* οὐδὲν πρῶτον ἢ ὕστερον. *aliter* οὐδεὶς πρῶτος ἢ ἔσχατος,) "but the "whole three Persons are coeternal." The *coeternity* could not be expressed in stronger words than is here done, both *positively* and *negatively*.

If the Doctor and his friends believe it, it is well: if not, it is very certain that they cannot honestly *subscribe*, even upon their own principles; for the words are not *capable* of any *lower* meaning.

"None is greater or less than another; but the whole "three Persons are——coequal."

The Doctor's comment upon the words *none is greater*, &c. is, that the *second* and *third* Persons are *every where* with the *first*, as they are *always*. I doubt not but the sole reason which led the Doctor into this *remote* and *strained* construction, was his apprehension that the phrase *every where*, like the word *always*, might help him to a *double entendre*, for the uses above mentioned.

But if *every where* be *capable* of two meanings, the words of the *Creed* are not so; "none greater or less:" and if they must be understood of *presence*, they can signify nothing lower than this; that all the three Persons are equally *omnipresent*.

I am content with this meaning; and if it be consistent with the Doctor's *hypothesis*, am very glad of it: or if it be not, then he must be conceived to advise the *subscriber* to subscribe in a sense of which the words are not *capable*.

After I had proceeded thus far, and had looked a little forwards, I was much surprised to find the Doctor interpreting *coequal* very differently from the words "none is "greater, &c." as if they did not both mean the same thing, first *negatively*, and then *positively* expressed. But the Doctor, it seems, stands by no rules of interpreting. They are "coequal" (says he *now*) "in such a sense as "one or more Persons can be equal to another (from "whom they derive their being) by a plenary communi-"cation of power, knowledge, dignity, &c." He has the like come-off for the words "equal to the Father as touch-"ing his Godhead;" that is, says he, equal "in such a "sense *as a derived being* can be." I have before observed something of this general *salvo*, for some other passages: and indeed it is such a sovereign salvo for every difficulty, that he need not have made use of any other. In reality, it comes to no more than this, that he admits the words, and the sense of them, so far as consistent with his *own hypothesis*, or his *own* sense of *deriving* being. In the same way, a man might *subscribe* to the decrees of the Council of Trent, or to every article of Pope Pius's Creed. For instance: I believe *saints may be worshipped*, but *in such a sense* as worship *can be* due to saints. I admit *transubstantiation*, but in *such a sense* as it *can be* consistent with Scripture and reason. I admit *prayers in an unknown tongue*, but *in such a sense* as can be reconciled with the 1 Cor. xiv. And thus we need not scruple any thing. Apply the same *salvo* to the *civil oaths*,

and it may serve as well there, to elude and frustrate them: and a man may swear to any king, without acknowledging his just right or title. It is but saying thus; I believe such a person to be the only *rightful* and *lawful* king of these realms, in *such a sense* as he *can be rightful* and *lawful*, upon my principles, &c. And what may not a man *swear*, or *subscribe* to in this loose method? Now in truth, though this kind of *collusion* is disguised by the words *such a sense*, as if there were a *certain sense*, in which the subscriber might fairly understand the words, consistent with his own *hypothesis;* yet it really amounts to no more than this, the subscribing *so far as is consistent with his own opinions*. For a man may make use of the same *salvo*, whether the words be *capable* of any *such sense*, or whether they be not. If they be *capable*, he is indeed bound up to *such sense:* if not, he is free, having subscribed to them no farther than they *can be* so understood; which perhaps may not be at all. I cannot but from hence observe, how unfairly and unjustly the very worthy and learned Bishop of Oxford has been treated for *confounding* (as is pretended) these two things: subscribing *so far as is agreeable to Scripture;* and subscribing *in such sense as is agreeable to Scripture*. For however distinct these two things may be in the *general*, they are really *confounded* by Dr. Clarke himself in this particular case, as I have often observed. Neither will he ever be able to defend the point of *subscription* upon the *latter* only, without taking in the *former* also. His talking of *such sense* seems only to be a *cover*, or plausible disguise, for *so far as*, (which has deceived his unwary followers who have not seen so deep into this matter as he;) and hence I conceive it is, that he has never *explicitly* condemned the subscribing with the reserve of *so far as is agreeable;* though others of the party, being ashamed to stand up for so unaccountable a latitude, have indeed plainly rejected it; not being aware of the need they should have of it. But to return to the Creed.

"God of the substance of the Father, begotten before

" the worlds; and man of the substance of his mother
" ——perfect God, and perfect man."

The Doctor did not think proper to take any notice of this passage. I know not how any words can be stronger for the Son's having the same *divine nature* with the Father, as much as he has the same *human nature* with his *mother: perfect God* and *perfect man*, having all that belongs to the *nature* of both. This is utterly repugnant to the Arian *hypothesis;* and can no more be reconciled with it, than light with darkness.

We may now take leave of the Creed, (called Athanasian,) and proceed to the Litany.

" O holy, blessed, and glorious Trinity, three Persons,
" and one God, have mercy, &c."

Here the three Persons are all together invoked, and under the style and title of *one God*, directly opposite to the Doctor's principles. The Doctor has no way to evade their force, but by understanding the title of *one God* to belong to the Father only. His sense is this:

" O holy, blessed, and glorious Trinity, three Persons,
" and one God, viz. the Father, have mercy, &c." This *collusion* the subscriber is to practise in his most solemn devotions: excluding two of the Persons from the *one Godhead* here, though he had addressed them both under the title of *God* in the two preceding petitions; and though the epithets, *holy*, *blessed*, and *glorious*, are equally attributed to all three, in the very same petition. If this be to " pray with the understanding," (as the Doctor pretends it is,) let it rather be the wish of every honest man to have *less understanding*, and *more grace* than to trifle in this manner with the tremendous Deity.

In the Collect for the third Sunday in Advent, we thus address our blessed Saviour.

" O Lord Jesu Christ——who livest and reignest with
" the Father and the Holy Spirit, ever one God, world
" without end." Any one, at first sight, may here see that the title of *one God*, is not attributed to the Father *only*, but to all the three Persons: contrary to the Doc-

tor's principles. The Doctor does not attempt to show that the words are *capable* of any other meaning. Only he draws up another *form* suitable to his own *hypothesis*, and little akin to the words in the *Collect;* substituting that in the room of the other. If the *subscriber* can content himself with such shuffling in his solemn prayers, let him look to it.

There is just such another passage in the conclusion of the Collect for Christmas-day, (which the Doctor has omitted,) and there is another in the Collect for the sixth Sunday after Epiphany, (which he has also omitted,) running thus:

"With thee, O Father, and thee, O Holy Ghost, he "(Christ) liveth and reigneth, ever one God, world with-"out end." Here, whether Christ alone, or all the three Persons, (and one of these it must be,) be called *one God;* it is equally repugnant to the Doctor's principles. And he cannot subscribe to this, "in such a sense as the words "will bear," (for they cannot *bear* his sense,) but only "so far as is consistent with his principles:" which is not assenting to the words of the prayer, but to something else of his own inventing. The like may be said of the Collects for Septuagesima, and the first Sunday in Lent, and Good Friday, twice, and Easter-day, and Ascension-day, and the Sunday after; all which the Doctor has omitted out of his *collection:* an omission indeed not worth the mentioning, were it not that the *Modest Pleader* has been pleased to object the smallness of the number 27, which, we see, might have been enlarged; and were it not an aggravation of the great sin of prevaricating with God and man, to consider how often it must be repeated in the yearly course of the prayers.

The Doctor takes notice of the Collect for Whitsunday, and shifts it off in a loose manner: and so passes on to Trinity-Sunday, dealing much the same way with that also. He omits the Collect for St. Matthew's day; which is more *express* and *full* against his principles than either of the two former. I shall pass over all the other places

in our Liturgy or Articles, except one, with which I shall shut up this *chapter*. It is the proper preface for Trinity-Sunday, in the Communion-Office, running thus:

"O Lord, Almighty, everlasting God; who art one "God, one Lord, not one only Person, but three Persons "in one substance. For that which we believe of the "glory of the Father, the same we believe of the Son, "and of the Holy Ghost, without any difference or in-"equality."

The Doctor here pleasantly says, that "there is no "passage in the whole Service so apt to be understood in "a wrong sense as this;" meaning, I suppose, so apt to be understood in the sense the Church intended, and so hard to be perverted to any other. And it must indeed be thought a very clear and full passage on the *orthodox* side, when a person of the Doctor's abilities, in this kind, and after he had worked his way through the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, (besides a great part of the Liturgy,) began at length to feel himself nonplused by it, and almost at the point of confessing it. His first endeavour was to perplex and puzzle the Church's sense; and next to introduce his own.

He pretends that the words "Lord, Almighty, ever-"lasting God," are *personal*, and must be understood of *one Person* only, though he cannot but know that every one of those words are used in the Athanasian Creed (to say nothing of the Liturgy) of all the three Persons taken together; and they are here expressly declared to belong, not to "one Person only," but to "three Persons in one "substance." The words, *who art*, he thinks, cannot be properly applied to more Persons than one. But that they are so applied here is manifest, and by those who were competent judges of propriety: and if he likes it not, why should he *subscribe?* When he comes to give us his own meaning, he never attempts to show (good reason why) in what sense, consistent with his principles, a subscriber may believe "three Persons in one sub-"stance," and that the same *glory* belongs to all, "with-

" out any difference or inequality." It would be trifling to take notice of what he endeavours to put upon a *subscriber*, in order to satisfy his conscience in one of the most serious and solemn things in the world. I can never give myself leave to think that he could at all satisfy himself in it, upon second and cooler thoughts. Indeed, I should ask the Doctor's pardon for dwelling so long upon those extravagant explications; which, I doubt not, he now heartily despises, as well as I. Neither ought they to be any longer imputed to him, who has expunged them, and cast them off, from the time his second edition has appeared. But since his disciples and followers are still proud of his *refuse*, and set a value upon his *trifles*, which he has too much sense to do himself; since they insist upon it that all the expressions of our *public forms* are, at least, *capable* of a sense consistent with their principles; and appeal, for proof of it, (having indeed nothing else to appeal to,) to the Doctor's performances on that head; in a word, since they have been pleased to rest the whole cause of *subscription* upon the Doctor's *explications*, it was necessary for me to take under examination those things upon which such a stress was laid; unless the Doctor himself would have been so kind (for which I should have heartily thanked him) as to speak more plainly in this matter than he has thought proper to do. One *half-sheet*, one small *advertisement* from his hand, to discountenance this kind of *subscription*, would have done the business at once, and have saved me the labour of doing any thing. The credit of his *name* was, in a manner, all it had to stand upon: and had he but pleased to take off the countenance of his *authority*, his *reasons* should have been left to stand or fall by themselves. But as the case now is, (and as the author of the Remarks observes,) that the whole party are gone after him, and still persist in the Doctor's *first* thoughts relating to *subscription*; neither has the Doctor took any sufficient care to reclaim them, or to bring them back; the cause is too important to wait his slow motions, or to be left any

longer in suspense. The glory of God, the honour of our most holy religion, and the security of Church and State, call for our best endeavours to root out, if possible, those false and pernicious principles, and to reestablish the matter of *subscription* upon its true and solid foundations. How far I have been able to contribute to so good an end, must be left to the reader's judgment. My design however was well aimed: and this is my apology for disturbing the learned Doctor, late, and unwillingly, on this head.

I shall now briefly sum up the particulars of what has been advanced above, for the reader's clearer apprehending of it, as well as the better retaining it.

1. The Church of England requires subscription, not to *words*, but *things;* to *propositions* contained in her public forms.

2. Subscribers are obliged, not to *silence* or *peace* only, but to a serious belief of what they subscribe to.

3. Subscribers must believe it true in that particular sense which the Church intended, (so far as that sense may be known,) for the Church can expect no less; the design being to preserve "one uniform tenor" of faith, to preclude "diversity of opinions," to have her *own explications*, and none other, (as to points determined,) taught and inculcated; and to tie men up from spreading or receiving doctrines contrary to the public determinations. These and the like ends cannot be at all answered by *subscription*, unless the subscriber give his *assent* to the Church's forms in the Church's sense; that is, in the sense of the *compilers* and *imposers*.

4. The sense of the *compilers* and *imposers* is to be judged of from the *plain*, *usual*, and *literal* signification of words; and from their intention, purpose, or design, however known: the rule for *understanding* the *public forms* being the same as for *understanding oaths*, *laws*, *injunctions*, or any other *forms* or writings whatever.

5. Where either the *words* themselves, or the *intention* (much more where both) is plain and evident; there the

sense of the *imposers* is fully known; and there is no room left for a *subscriber* (as such) to put any *contrary*, or *different* sense upon the public forms.

6. If words be capable of *several* meanings, but yet *certainly* exclude *this* or *that* particular meaning; a subscriber cannot honestly take the forms in *that* meaning which is *specially excluded*. For this would be subscribing against the sense of the Church at the same time that he professes his agreement with it.

7. It may be *certainly* known that any Arian sense of our public forms is such a sense as our Church *intended* to exclude, and has excluded, in as full and strong *positive* terms as the wit of man is able to devise. And all men of sense must allow, that when *compilers* and *imposers* have done the utmost they could, and as far as any words can reach, to express the Catholic doctrine of the *Trinity*; they may and must be supposed to mean that very doctrine which they have industriously laboured to express, and none other.

8. And that it may not be pretended by our modern Arians, that their sense is not Arian, (which nevertheless it certainly is,) it is farther evident, and hath been shown, that the main particulars of *their scheme* (call it what they please) is *specially excluded*, both by the plain words and undoubted *intention* of our public forms.

9. Therefore none of the advocates for the *new scheme* can fairly or honestly subscribe to our Church's *forms*, though they could invent a sense for them consistent with their own principles; it being evident that any such sense is contrary to our Church's sense, and to the intention of the *imposers*.

10. The *pleas* and *excuses* devised to justify the subscribing in a sense contrary to, or different from, the *known* sense of the *imposers*, being founded either on false presumptions or weak reasonings, are of no weight or significancy; but the Arian subscriber must be blameable for going counter to the *known sense* of the Church, even though the words were *capable* of another meaning.

11. Yet, upon examination, it appears that many expressions of our *public forms* are really not *capable* of any sense consistent with the *new scheme*. And therefore, if the patrons of it subscribe to their *own sense*, (as they must be conceived to do,) they subscribe to a sense which is *no sense* of our public forms at all, on any supposition.

12. The subscription therefore of those gentlemen, however glossed over with the pretence of subscribing "in "such sense as is agreeable to (what they call) Scrip-"ture," really amounts to no more than subscribing "so "far as is in their opinion agreeable to Scripture." Which way of subscribing not only defeats every end of subscription, and stands condemned by our *laws*, and by the *express* resolution of our *judges*, but is also absurd in itself; as leaving room for any prevarication whatever, in the matter of *oaths* or *tests*; and for subscribing the *Romish Confession*, or even the *Alcoran*, or any thing; and is moreover *explicitly* condemned, even by the generality of those who plead for *Arian subscription*.

A SUPPLEMENT

TO

THE CASE

OF

ARIAN SUBSCRIPTION

CONSIDERED:

IN ANSWER TO A LATE PAMPHLET,

ENTITLED

THE CASE OF SUBSCRIPTION TO THE XXXIX ARTICLES CONSIDERED.

A SUPPLEMENT

TO

THE CASE

OF

ARIAN SUBSCRIPTION

CONSIDERED.

WHEN I drew up the Case of Arian Subscription, &c. I was apprehensive that so plain a charge, and so home pressed, might exasperate the persons concerned; though I took care to treat them with all the mildness and tenderness that the subject would bear; confining myself to the reasoning part, naming no particular men but such as I was obliged to quote, and candidly exempting the principal man of them, that the charge might be as general and inoffensive as possible; falling rather upon the thing itself, than upon this or that particular person. If the argument be provoking, I cannot help it: the same objection lies against the detecting or reproving any *vice* or *immorality* whatever. It is the proper business of a *divine* to state *cases* of *conscience*, and to remonstrate against any growing corruptions in *practice*, and especially in *principles*. If Arian subscription be really *fraudulent* and *immoral*, (which no considering man can doubt of,) it may concern those gentlemen rather to testify their sincere *repentance*, than to acquaint the world with their causeless *resentments*. I shall here say nothing to the abusive flirts of the nameless author, who has been pleased

still to persist in the defence of Arian subscription; except it be to remind him, that those assuming strains very ill become either so *weak* a *cause*, or such a *guilty practice*. I was once inclinable to take no notice of so mean a pamphlet; concluding that I had said enough, when I had said enough for men of sense and common ingenuity; and it is often not advisable to press things to the utmost. But since this is a cause of very great moment, wherein the very foundations of *moral honesty*, as well as of *Christian sincerity*, are deeply concerned; I think it incumbent upon me to proceed somewhat farther in it: and if those gentlemen resolve to go on in maintaining an *open fraud* as long as it is possible to amuse or deceive, though only the weakest and most ignorant readers; I also must resolve (by God's assistance, and for God's glory) to go on in the defence of *sincerity* and *probity*, till the very meanest readers may sufficiently understand it. To come to the business.

The pamphlet lately published, is entitled, *The Case of Subscription to the XXXIX Articles considered; occasioned by Dr. Waterland's Case of Arian Subscription.* The author is but just, as well as modest, in not calling it an *answer* to mine: for indeed he has left the most material points untouched, without so much as attempting any thing like an answer. If you will take his bare word for it, the Articles of our Church, so far as concerns the Trinity, are *general*, *indefinite*, *undeterminate;* not *particular*, *special*, or *determinate*. He takes this for granted, and reasons all the way upon that supposition; which is very unaccountable: unless it were because I had *demonstrated* the contrary, beyond all reasonable reply; and so there was no other way left but to stifle the *evidence*, to protest against *fact*, and to bear the reader down with a *false* presumption. Such a management as this is, in effect, little else but a more untoward way of giving up the cause; where a man does the thing, but loses all the grace and credit of it by his manner of doing it. But let us see how he goes on to give some colour,

at least, to his pretences. I had pressed the Arian subscribers with the Athanasian Creed, the *Liturgy*, and the *Articles*, to prove that our Church was *particular* and *determinate* in the points disputed. Not a single word has this *writer* to show, either that the Athanasian Creed or *Liturgy* is not *determinate*, as I represented: and as to the *Articles*, he seems to make no account of any but the *first:* of which he often intimates, that he has some way of evading it, but he does not care to tell us what, for fear he should be found faultering even there, and lie open to rebuke for it. The *first Article* alone, is, I am very certain, more than he can fairly deal with: but I must remind him farther, that the 2d and 5th Articles do also require his consideration; and then there is the *eighth*, which, unfortunately for him, carries all the *three Creeds* in the bowels of it: creeds which, as the Article says, (and as this *writer* says, if he *subscribes* to it,) "ought thoroughly to be received and believed; for they "may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scrip-"ture."

Well then, we have the *Creeds* wrapped up in the *Articles*; and the subscriber must be content to take in all or none: let us next see to the *Liturgy*. This gentleman thinks he has a fetch for that: he subscribes not to the *truth* of every particular, but to the *use* only, and that "it contains nothing contrary to the word of God." Now, says he, "I must freely own that I see no con-"tradiction, no necessary absurdity, in the *use* of what a "man may wish to have in some things corrected[a]." I would be as favourable to this *writer* as possible. I do allow of his distinction, and that it may be proper and pertinent in some cases; but I can never allow that a man may *use* a solemn formal *lie* in his prayers, and often repeat it, under pretence that we may admit the *use* of some things which might be *corrected*. This is arguing from *gnats* to *camels*, and widening the rule beyond all

[a] Case of Subscription, &c. p. 46.

measure and proportion. This will best be understood in the sequel, when the reader comes to see what kind of things those are which this gentleman desires to *use*, without *believing* a syllable of them. I must observe farther, that the *subscriber* is tied up to believe that the Liturgy "contains nothing contrary to the word of God." Does not this pinch a little closer than this *writer* might wish? Has he nothing to object against any expressions in the *Liturgy*, but that they contain things seemingly contrary to *natural reason?* Have they nothing contrary to *Scripture*, to what he calls *Scripture?* I should be thankful to him for so obliging a concession. After all, I would advise this *writer* not to pretend to be wiser than Dr. Clarke. The Doctor had considered these matters much, and long: and I have not yet found any disciple of his that has endeavoured to *refine* upon him, but what has exposed himself in doing it. The wary Doctor was sensible that *Articles*, *Creeds*, and *Liturgy*, must all come into account, and all be reconciled (if possible) to his own *hypothesis*. He made no distinction between admitting the *truth* of this, and the *use* only of that; well knowing, that *truth* and *use* are coincident in a case of this high moment; and that he could not submit to the *use* of those prayers but in such a sense as he thought *true*. He took the only way of settling that matter for his purpose, had there really been any: but as *his* failed, the flaw in the architecture is never to be made up by common hands.

Having shown that *Creeds*, *Articles*, and *Liturgy*, must all come in, to determine in our present question; I would now proceed to cite passages from our *public forms*, and confront them with select sentences drawn from the writings of the *new sect*, that every common reader (for to such I now write) may have *ocular* demonstration of the truth of what I affirm, that the expressions of our *public forms* are *special*, *precise*, and *determinate* against the *new scheme*; not *general*, or *indefinite*, as this *writer* wishes, I can hardly say, *believes*. But I must first take notice of

a remark which he has page the 8th, that we are obliged to subscribe only the English Articles, not the Latin. I know not what uses he intends by it; though he intimates there may be some; keeping upon the reserve, as usual, when he suspects an advantage may be taken. Dr. Clarke, to do him justice, openly declared what evasions or salvos he had to justify his subscribing. He considered, I suppose, that without this, it would be subscribing with *mental reservations;* which is perfect *Jesuitism.* But this *writer,* perhaps, thinks there is no harm in it, that it is an innocent practice; and that so long as he can but invent some secret evasion to himself, he need have no concern about satisfying the world. To return to the matter in hand. As to the Articles, English and Latin, I may just observe, for the sake of such readers as are less acquainted with these things, *first,* that the Articles were passed, recorded, and ratified in the year 1562, and in Latin only. *Secondly,* that those Latin Articles were revised and corrected by the *Convocation* of 1571. *Thirdly,* that an authentic English translation was then made of the Latin Articles by the same *Convocation,* and the Latin and English adjusted as nearly as possible. *Fourthly,* that the Articles thus perfected in *both languages* were published the same year, and by the *royal* authority. *Fifthly,* subscription was required the same year to the English Articles, called the Articles of 1562, by the famous act of the 13th of Elizabeth[b].

These things considered, I might justly say, with Bishop Burnet[c], that the Latin and English are *both equally authentical.* Thus much however I may certainly infer, that if in any places the English version be ambiguous, where the Latin original is clear and determinate; the Latin ought to fix the more doubtful sense of the other, (as also *vice versa,*) it being evident that the *Convocation, Queen,* and *Parliament,* intended the same

[b] See the particulars proved at large in Dr. Bennet's Essay on the XXXIX Articles.

[c] Burnet, Preface to the Articles, p. 10.

sense in both. For instance, in Article the first, the three Persons are declared to be *of one substance;* in the Latin, *ejusdem essentiæ*, that is, *of the same essence:* from hence it is manifest, that *one substance* is equivalent to *same substance*, or *essence*. Again, in Article the second, the English version runs thus: "The Son, which is the *Word* of "the Father, begotten from everlasting of the Father, the "very and eternal God, of one substance with the Fa-"ther, &c." Now in the English, the words, "the very "and eternal God," may possibly be referred to the Father just before mentioned: but the Latin Article[d] plainly shows that the words are to be referred to God the Son, and could not have been intended of God the Father, in that place. From hence we see how useful it may be to compare the English and Latin together, in any doubtful cases: for there cannot be a more demonstrative proof than this is, (where it can be had,) of the true sense and meaning of *compilers* and *imposers*. And let this *writer* pretend what he pleases, when once the true and full sense of the *imposers* is *fixed* and *certain*, that very sense, and that only, is bound upon the *conscience* of every *subscriber*. This I have abundantly proved in my former papers: to which I shall only now add this plain reason; that, since words are designed to convey some *meaning*, if we take the liberty of playing upon words after the *meaning* is fixed and certain, there can be no security against *equivocation* and *wile*, in any *laws*, *oaths*, *contracts*, *covenants*, or any engagements whatever: all the ends and uses of speech will hereby be perverted; and there can be no such thing as faith, trust, or mutual confidence among men.

I proceed now to set before the reader the tenets of our *new guides*, in one *column*, with the tenets of our Church in another, opposite *column;* that from thence we may form a judgment of their agreement or disagree-

[d] Filius, qui est Verbum Patris, ab æterno a Patre genitus, verus et æternus Deus, ac Patri consubstantialis, &c. *Art. II.*

ment. I shall take my citations of the first *column* from Dr. Clarke and his professed disciples; not from Mr. Whiston and his, who are known to be less reserved, and who abhor this kind of fraudulent subscription as much as I do. I shall not scruple citing some passages out of the *first* edition of *Scripture Doctrine*, which are left out in the *second;* because, though the Doctor does not own them, yet his disciples must, till they either give better, or yield up the cause of subscription.

The Scripture doctrine of the Trinity, according to Dr. Clarke and his followers.	*The Scripture doctrine of the Trinity, according to the Church of England in her public forms.*
Doctor Clarke's scheme makes the Unity of the Son and Spirit with the Father to be only figurative, not (necessarily[c]) an *unity of essence, or individual substance*, but of *authority* and *consent*. *Modest Plea*, p. 7.	In the Unity of this Godhead there be three Persons *of one substance*. *Art.* 1. The Son——*of one substance* with the Father. *Art.* 2. The Holy Ghost *of one substance* with the Father and the Son. *Art.* 5. It may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture, (*Art.* 8.) that the Son is *of one substance with the Father*, (*Nic. Creed*,) and that he is *God of the substance of the Father;* and that we ought

[c] Note, that the two words, *necessarily* and *individual*, here stand for nothing but to *soften* the expression. *Necessarily* is of no moment, because the subscriber is to acknowledge that the doctrine *of one substance* is warranted by Scripture, and therefore *necessarily* to be believed. And as to *individual*, it signifies nothing here; the Doctor, it seems, denying all *unity of substance*, and admitting only *unity of authority* and *consent*.

The *Father alone* is, absolutely speaking, the *God of the universe. Clarke, Prop.* 8.

The Scripture, when it mentions the *one God*, or the *only God*, always means the supreme Person of the Father. *Clarke, Prop.* 9.

The Apostle says, *God is the Father*, which is the direct contradictory to your notion, whose definition of God is, that he is —— *the three Persons. Modest Plea*, p. 150.

Demonstration that *one God* is *one Person only* — otherwise impossible for one Person to be God. *Collect. of Queries*, p. 108.

There are *not* three *uncreated* Persons. *Clarke, Script. Doct.* p. 429. edit. 1.

The Father (or first Person) *alone* is self-existent, underived, unoriginated, in-

not to *confound the Persons*, nor *divide the substance. Athan. Creed.*

In the Unity of this Godhead there be three Persons. *Art.* 1.

It may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture, (*Art.* 8.) *that* the *Godhead* of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is *all one, that* they are not three Gods, but *one God. Ath. Creed.*

O holy, blessed, and glorious Trinity, *three Persons and one God. Lit.*

Nothing contrary to the word of God contained in this form.

O Lord, Almighty, everlasting God; who art one God, one Lord, *not one only Person*, but *three Persons* in one substance, &c. *Comm. Off.*

Ever one God world without end, *frequently applied to all the three Persons in our Church's Collects.*

It may be proved by most certain warrants, &c. (Art. 8.) *that* the Son is *uncreate*, and the Holy Ghost *uncreate:* the Son *not made, nor created:* the Holy Ghost

dependent, *made of none*[f], begotten of none, proceeding from none. *Mod. Plea*, p. 5.

If any thing, it is most natural to infer that he (the Son) *is not the very God*, because he is here so expressly contradistinguished from him.

The Word, when he appeared in the form of God, and as God, was *no more than the minister and angel of God. Mod. Plea*, p. 30.

It is *without any colour from Scripture*, that you affirm each of the three Persons to have the *same right of dominion. Mod. Plea*, p. 159.

When Dr. Clarke excepted *supremacy* and *independency*, he plainly, in reason

neither *made*, nor *created*. *Athan. Creed.*

One Lord Jesus Christ —— begotten, *not made*. *Nic. Creed.*

The Son——the *very* and *eternal God*. *Art.* 2.

Very God of very God. *Nicene Creed.*

The whole three Persons are coeternal together and *coequal*——*equal* to the Father as touching his *Godhead*. *Ath. Creed.*

It may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture, (*Art.* 8.) *that* such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost——the Father is *Lord*, the Son *Lord*, and the Holy Ghost *Lord*; and yet not three Lords, but *one Lord*. *Ath. Creed.*

There is but one living and true God, everlasting ——of *infinite* power, wis-

[f] Note, that the Father *alone* is here said to be *made of none*; which is directly saying that the other two Persons are *made*. I had observed the same of Dr. Clarke's fifth Proposition, but had it intimated to me, that the Doctor had put a *semicolon* at *independent*; to show that *alone* reached no farther, the rest being to be understood of *Father* without the restriction of *alone*. But, it seems, the *Modest Pleader* was not aware of the significancy of the *semicolon*, but puts a *comma* only: wherefore I may justly charge him with making two of the Persons *creatures*.

and consequence, excepted absolute [g] *infinite* powers, so that the objector might well have spared asking in the sixth Query, whether *infinite* perfection can be communicated to a *finite* being. *Collect. of Queries*, p. 57.

The divine attributes of the Son are *not individually the same* with those of the Father —— As to their *differing* as *finite* and *infinite*, there can be but one intelligent Being [h] absolutely *infinite* in all respects. *Collect. of Queries*, p. 54, 55.

God, when he is styled Father, must always be understood to be (αἰτία) a true and *proper Cause*[i], really and efficiently giving life: which consideration clearly removes the argument usually drawn from the *equality* between a Father and Son upon earth. *Clarke, Script. Doctr.* p. 239, 273. ed. 2d.

dom, and goodness——and in Unity of *this* Godhead there be three Persons of *one substance, power*, and *eternity*. *Art.* 1.

That which we believe of the glory of the Father, the same we believe of the *Son* and of the *Holy Ghost*, *without* any *difference* or *inequality*. *Comm. Office.*

It may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture, (*Art.* 8.) *that* the Son is God *of the substance* of the *Father*,—— and man *of the substance* of his *mother; perfect God* and perfect man. —— *Equal* to the Father as touching his Godhead. *Ath. Creed.*

[g] Note, the word *absolute* is only to soften the expression. The author, in reason and consequence, plainly intimates that the powers of the Son and Holy Ghost are not *infinite*, and that they are *finite* beings.

[h] Note, that *intelligent Being* is with this writer, and the whole party, equivalent to *person:* so that here two of the Persons are declared to be *finite* beings.

[i] Dr. Clarke's notion of a *true and proper cause* is of a person acting upon *choice*, or rather, *acting;* (for *acting*, with him, implies *choice:*) so that his meaning here is that the Father might *choose* whether the Son should *exist* or no. The latter part of the citation insinuates, that the Son is not as truly *equal in nature* to the Father, as one man is to another.

The Father *alone* perfect *in* himself. *Script. Doctr.* p. 273.

Necessary existence is as inconsistent with being *begotten*, as to have *no cause* of existence, and to have *a cause*. *Mod. Plea*, p. 17.

Self-existent, unoriginate, or underived, properly expressed by *necessary existence*. *Mod. Plea*, p. 216, 217.

The Son is *not self-existent*. *Clarke, Prop.* 12. Comp. *Reply*, 162, 230, 231.

—avowedly maintain, that the Son is *not necessarily existing*[k]. *Phileleuth, 2d Letter to Mangey*, p. 27.

An *angel might strengthen him*[l], who was now in that state of humiliation, made a little lower than the angels. *Modest Plea*, p. 93.

The grand principle (of Dr. Bennet) was, that the Word *is the very God*. When this was once established, it was rightly thence

The Son begotten, *not made*, of one substance with the Father. *Nic. Creed.*

The Son—*not made, nor created*, but begotten. *Ath. Creed.*

The Son——the *very* and *eternal God*. *Art.* 2.

Very God of very God. *Nic. Creed.*

It may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture, (*Art.* 8.) *that* the Son is *Almighty, perfect God,——equal to the Father*, as touching his Godhead.

The Son——the *very* and *eternal God*. *Art.* 2.

Very God of very God. *Nic. Creed.*

[k] N. B. To deny the Son's *necessary existence* is the same as to assert him to be a *precarious being*, depending as much on the *will* of the Father, for his *existence*, as any *creature* whatever, and therefore a *creature*.

[l] Note, this is said of the Son of God, even in his divine nature, and whole Person, nor does this author ever allow the distinction of *divine* and *human* nature, but rejects it, as implying a *division* of *person*. See page 97.

inferred, that *the Word cannot be exalted*——nay, this supposition will indeed justify those questions, *Was the very God exalted thereby? Is it not blasphemy to suppose it?*——Our Saviour was *highly exalted* as the reward of his sufferings——From the Doctor's principle, it is a just inference that the *Word never was exalted.* But on the other hand the Scriptures are clear, that he who was the *instrument* of his Father *in the work* of creation, yet had not a *kingdom*, and *judgment*, and *dominion*, then committed to him——but after his sufferings and death, &c. *Mod. Plea*, p. 97, 98.

This power and dominion to which Christ is advanced at the right hand of God, is not only *the highest character* and prerogative of his *Sonship*, spoken of in Scripture, but is the *foundation of his personal Godhead* and adoration. *Collect. of Queries*, p. 75.

The Son hath a relative omniscience communicated

The Son, which is the Word of the Father, *begotten from everlasting* of the Father, *the very and eternal God*, of *one substance* with the Father. *Art.* 2.

God, of the substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds. *Ath. Creed.*

Only-begotten Son of God, *begotten* of his Father *before all worlds, God of God, very God* of very God. *Nic. Creed.*

One living and true God, of *infinite* power and *wis-*

to him from the Father; I mean that he knoweth all things relating to the creation and government of the universe: but yet he himself confesseth, Matt. xxiv. 36, *of that day and hour*, &c. By which all the ancient Ante-Nicene writers[m] understand that our Lord, as the Λόγος, or Son of God, *did not then know the day of judgment. Collect. of Queries*, p. 48, 49. See also *Unity of God not inconsist.* p. 8.

There are not three eternal Persons. *Clarke, Script. Doctr.* p. 433. 1st ed.

The *eternity* of God the Father is revealed in the Old Testament—in the New Testament it is emphatically expressed, *Rom.* i. 20. But in neither is there *any mention of the Son's. Coll. of Queries*, p. 50.

The *Word* incarnate *passible* according to the express declaration of St. John and Saint Paul.—Whether they who—make only the *human nature* passible, do not show too little regard

dom: in the Unity of *this* Godhead there be three Persons, &c. *Art.* 1.

That which we believe of the glory of the Father, the same we believe of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, *without any difference*, or *inequality. Com. Off.*

It may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture (*Art.* 8.) that the Son is *eternal*, and that the whole three Persons are *co-eternal together*, and their *majesty coeternal*, and that they are *one eternal. Ath. Creed.*

One living and true God without body, parts, and *passions* (*impassibilis*)——in the Unity of *this Godhead* there be three Persons, &c. *Art.* 1.

The Son—the *very and*

[m] Note that this writer every where *professes* his agreement with the Ante-Nicene writers: and though he is entirely false in reporting *their* sentiments, yet it cannot be doubted but he here gives us his *own*.

to the plain evidence of Scripture? *Coll. of Queries*, p. 143.

eternal God—very God and very *man*. *Art*. 2.

If Dr. Clarke's scheme be right, it seems to follow ——that all worship ought to be directed to the Father through Christ: excepting only that such worship may be paid to Christ as Mediator, for which we have express warrants from examples in Scripture.

It may be proved by most certain warrants, &c. (*Art*. 8.) *that the Unity* in *Trinity*, and *the Trinity in Unity* is to be *worshipped*. *Ath. Creed*.

Absolutely supreme honour due to the *Person of the Father singly*, as being *alone* the supreme original author of all being and power. *Clarke, Prop*. 43.

O holy, blessed, and glorious Trinity, &c. *Lit*.

O Lord, Almighty, everlasting God, who art one God, one Lord, *not one only Person*, but *three Persons in one substance*, &c. *Com. Off*.

From this view of the doctrine of our Church, compared with that of our *new teachers*, it appears that they are entirely opposite to each other, and are no more to be reconciled than light and darkness. And yet I have not took the advantage of pursuing the doctrine of those gentlemen through its direct, immediate, and inevitable consequences, in order to make the contradiction between that and our Church's forms still more glaring and palpable. Nobody can doubt of their believing the Son and Holy Ghost to be *creatures*, if either Arius, or Eunomius, or even Mr. Whiston, ever believed it. They undeniably believe them to be what every body means by *creature*, in common speech and language. This is demonstrable, many ways, from their writings, and from those very passages which I have here selected.

1. If the Father *alone* be *made of none;* then it follows that the other two Persons are *made*, that is, are *creatures*. The premises are theirs, the conclusion makes itself.

2. If the Father alone be *necessarily existing*, (as those gentlemen expressly teach,) then is the *Son* a *precarious* being, which is only another name for *creature*. The same will follow of the *Holy Ghost*.

3. If the Son, even as Son of God, wanted an *angel* to *strengthen* him, he must of course be a *weak, frail* being, that is, a *creature*.

4. If the Son, as the Λόγος, or *Word*, was properly *exalted*, and in such a sense as cannot without *blasphemy* be asserted of the *very God*, (as these men teach,) then it is evident that the Son is an *imperfect* and *mutable* being, that is, a *creature*.

5. If God the Son was once *ignorant*, in his highest nature, (as these men teach,) and *ignorance* can belong to nothing but *creatures*, he must of consequence be a *creature*.

6. If neither the Son nor Holy Ghost is the *one true* God, but excluded from the *one true Godhead*, (as these men assert,) they must of course be *creatures* only.

7. If neither the Son nor Holy Ghost be the *one infinite Being*, nor have *infinite* powers, (as these men pretend,) they can be only *finite* beings; and every *finite* being is, of course, a *creature*.

8. If Christ's *exaltation*, after his resurrection, be the sole *foundation* of his *personal Godhead*, (as these men say,) then he was not *God* before that *exaltation;* nor since, in any just and proper sense, but a *creature* only.

9. If Christ be *passible*, in his highest nature, (as those men teach,) and nothing is *passible* but a *creature;* it evidently follows that he is a *creature*.

Thus may it be demonstrated, nine several ways, (and more might be added,) from their own writings, that the abettors of the *new scheme* make God the *Son*, (and so the *Holy Ghost* of course,) as very a *creature* as ever did Arius, or Eunomius, or any Arian whatever.

They must not here pretend to run into general declamations against charging men with *consequences* which they do not *own*. I allow such a plea to be reasonable in some cases, but not in this. For instance, when a Calvin-

ist is charged with the disbelief of God's *holiness, justice,* or *goodness;* or an Arminian with the disbelief of God's *prescience, sovereignty,* &c. both sides charging each other with *consequences* respectively, as if they were truly their tenets; such conduct on either side is justly condemned. But why justly condemned? Because it is certain that those *consequences,* which they draw for each other, are really not their *tenets;* since they, respectively, *disavow* and *abhor* any such *tenets;* and because they are, respectively, ready, upon every occasion, to declare their full and entire belief of those *attributes,* which they are said to deny; and would rather give up their main *hypothesis,* than be really guilty of any such *impiety* against God's perfections. But now as to the *consequences* which I charge upon our modern revivers of *Arianism,* let it be observed,

1. That they are many of them so direct, plain, and immediate from their *tenets,* that they are hardly so properly *consequences,* as the very *tenets* themselves, differently expressed.

2. Those gentlemen, when pressed with those consequences, give but too plain suspicion, that they both see and own them, and only *verbally* disclaim them. For they express no abhorrence or detestation of the supposition of the *Son* and Holy Ghost being *finite,* being *precarious* in their existence, being *dependent* on the *will* of another. Nor do they ever declare (except when they *subscribe*) that either of those two Persons is *infinitely perfect,* is strictly *omniscient,* is *all-sufficient,* or *independent,* as to *existence,* on the *will* of another. Instead of taking off the suspicious *consequences,* they do all they can to insinuate them into their readers; avoiding nothing but the name of *creature;* all the while inculcating the *thing.* And if they are farther pressed, they must at length allow, that they do admit the *Son* and *Holy Ghost* to be *creatures,* in our meaning, in the *common* meaning of *creature;* only in some particular meaning of their own, they think they may deny it, of the *Son,* hardly of the *Holy Ghost.*

For the Holy Ghost must be a *creature* with them, even upon their own definition of a *creature;* as being one of those beings brought into *existence* by the power of the Son of God, in subordination to the will and power of the Father[n]. I say then, since the *consequences*, wherewith we charge those gentlemen, are plain, certain, and irrefragable; since they are not able to show where they fail, or that they are no *consequences;* since they are not solicitous to ward them off by expressing any *abhorrence* of them, or by any acknowledgment of the *divine perfections* of the Son or Holy Ghost, in their full extent, as understood of the Father; since they appear only to avoid offensive *names*, in the mean while insinuating and inculcating, in other words, the very *things* with which we charge them: such being the case, it is just to charge them with those *consequences*, as being really their *tenets:* I say, *just*, in the way of *disputation;* as to *legal censure*, I concern not myself with it.

Having shown how opposite the *new scheme* is to our Church's doctrine, it may now be proper to represent, in its true colours, the case of Arian subscription; that every such person, when he presumes to *subscribe*, may understand how mean and vile a part he is therein acting. Let his own *real sentiments* be here specified, together with his *professions*, in the words of our Church, and his *evasions* to satisfy his conscience, in this *sacred* engagement.

" My faith is, that the three Persons are *three Beings*, " and *three substances;* two of them differing from the " first, as *finite* and *infinite:* yet I profess with *Article* " the 1st, that they are of *one substance*, (*ejusdem essen-* " *tiæ*,) because the words of *one substance* may either " signify I know not what, (see the Case, p. 40.) or " may be interpreted as Eusebius did the ὁμοούσιον, to " signify that *the Son and Holy Ghost have no likeness at* " *all to the things which are made*, (therefore *not made*,)

[n] See Collection of Queries, p. 60.

" *but are like the Father in every respect,* (see the Case, " p. 17.) therefore not differing *infinitely*, or as *finite* from " *infinite.*

" My faith is, that the Father *only*, in opposition to *all* " *other* Persons whatever, is *the very and eternal God;* " and consequently, that the Son is *not the very and eter-* " *nal God:* yet I make no scruple to profess, with *Ar-* " *ticle* the 2d, that *the Son is the very and eternal God:* " not the *same God*, but another God; two very and " eternal Gods, the *divinity* of the latter being *derived* " from the former.

" I believe that the *Holy Ghost* is no where set forth in " Scripture as God, and that he is not included in the one " *infinite* substance, but *finite* of course: yet I readily " profess with *Article* the 5th, that *the Holy Ghost is of* " *one substance, majesty, and glory, with the Father and* " *the Son, very and eternal God:* not the same *God*, but " another; in all, *three very and eternal Gods* [o]; by ineffa- " ble communication of divine powers and dignity from " one to the other two.

" My faith is, that to say, *God is three Persons*, is the " direct contradictory to the doctrine of St. Paul. Never- " theless, it may be *proved by most certain warrants of* " *holy Scripture*, that the *Godhead of the Father, of the* " *Son, and of the Holy Ghost is all one*, and that *they are* " *not three Gods, but one God.* This I scruple not to pro- " fess, because I can understand *there are not*, when I " read *they are not.*

" My faith is, that the *Creed* called *Athanasian*, com- " posed in *a very dark and ignorant age*, has affirmed " more than is *necessary*, and more than is *true* [p], accord- " ing to the compiler's sense: yet I willingly subscribe to " *Article* the 8th, asserting that it *ought throughly to be* " *received and believed*, and *may be proved by most certain*

[o] See my Defence, vol. i. p. 238, 239, 245, 247.

[p] See Clarke's Scripture Doctrine, p. 418. 1st edit. and my Case of Arian Subscription, p. 320, &c. of this volume.

" *warrants of holy Scripture;* because I hope, some way " or other, to wrest it to a meaning suitable to my own " *hypothesis.*

" I do not believe it at all *necessary* to *salvation,* to " *worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity;* or to " profess *perfect God and perfect man* [q] united in one Per- " son: yet I readily acknowledge, with *Article* the 8th, " that it *may be proved by most certain warrants of holy* " *Scripture,* that whosoever does not keep this faith " whole and undefiled, shall, without doubt, *perish ever-* " *lastingly.*

" My faith is, that there is but one Godhead supreme, " viz. the Godhead of the Father; and that the Godhead " of the Son is not the same Godhead, but inferior, and " the Godhead of the Holy Ghost still more inferior: yet " I willingly allow, with *Article* the 8th, that it *may be* " *proved by most certain warrants,* &c. that *the Godhead* " *of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is all* " *one,* the divinity of the two latter being derived from " the former.

" My faith is, that *there are not three eternal Persons,* " and that particularly as to the *eternity* of the Son, there " is *no mention* at all of it in *Scripture:* yet it may be " proved by most *certain warrants of holy Scripture,* that " *the whole three Persons are coeternal together;* that is, " so far as an existence before *times,* or *ages,* necessarily " implies *coeternal* [r].

" I do by no means allow that the three Persons are, " or can be, *one eternal:* yet I readily profess it *may be* " *proved,* &c. that *they are not three eternals, but one eter-* " *nal,* because I can put *there* for *they, tacitly* supposing " one, when I read the other.

" My faith is, that God the Son is *precarious* in his " existence, that he has *no foundation* of his personal " *Godhead,* but his *exaltation,* that he is no more than *an*

[q] See my Case of Arian Subscription, p. 320, &c. of this volume.
[r] See my Case of Arian Subscription, p. 323, &c. of this volume.

" *angel of God*, that an *angel* might *strengthen* him, that " he was once *ignorant* in his highest nature, and was " *properly exalted*, (all which it would be *blasphemy* to " ascribe to *the very God*, or to any thing but a *creature*, " according to the common acceptation of *creature*,) yet " I scruple not to assert that he is *very God of very God*, " and that he is *the very and eternal God*, neither *made*, " nor created; that is to say, neither made nor created by " *himself*[s], but by the Father only.

" My belief is, that to say, *three Persons are one God*, " is contrary to Scripture: yet I scruple not to declare " that the *Book of Common Prayer*, which frequently as- " serts and inculcates that very thing, *contains nothing* " *contrary to the word of God.*

" I do not believe that the Father, Son, and Holy " Ghost are *one God*; it is *contradictory* to St. Paul: yet " I am content to say, O holy, blessed, and glorious Tri- " nity, *three Persons and one God*, &c. And frequently, in " my yearly course of prayers, I call upon *all the three*, " under the style and title of *one God:* for, though it be " delivering a formal *lie*, before God and man, and in a " point of the highest consequence; yet I make no scru- " ple of it, because *I must freely own, that I see no con-* " *tradiction, no necessary absurdity, in the* use *of what a* " *man may wish to have in some things corrected.*

" To conclude, I do not believe that the *glory* of the " *Son*, or of the *Holy Ghost*, is any way comparable to " the glory of the Father: yet I scruple not to be the " mouth of the congregation, in saying, [t] *That which we* " *believe of the glory of the Father, the same we believe of* " *the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, without any difference* " *or inequality.* This solemn mockery, in the face of God " and man, may *lawfully be used;* because, again, I see " no absurdity in the *use* of what a man may wish to " have in some things corrected."

[s] See Collection of Queries, p. 60.

[t] See Case of Subscription to the XXXIX Articles, p. 46.

This representation of the import of Arian subscription, I take to be fully supported by what hath been above cited; though I have not every where used their very words; thinking it sufficient to give their *certain* sense. I might easily have drawn it out into a much greater length, but that I am unwilling to be tedious, and incline to think that the very meanest readers may now fully apprehend what a grimace and banter our Arian reconcilers make of their solemn *subscription*. Yet they stand up for it, even in printed books; as if the first elements of *sincerity* were almost lost; or *common sense* were extinct among us. This it is that has obliged me to be so particular, and to lay these things plain and open before the *eyes* of the readers, that they may even *see* how the case stands, almost without the pain of any thought or reflection.

I might here take leave of this *writer*, having abundantly confuted his confident assertion about the *generality*, or *latitude* of expression, supposed in our Church's doctrine of the *Trinity*. It is, now at least, clear and manifest, that the expressions of our *public forms* (so far as concerns the points in dispute) are *fixed*, *special*, and *determinate* as possible: nor could the wit of man invent any more particular or stronger expressions against the *new scheme*, than are already in our *Creeds*, *Liturgy*, and *Articles*.

This *writer's* main pretence being thus taken off, other occasional or incidental passages may deserve the less notice. But since I have begun, I shall now go through with him, and answer every little cavil, which may either seem to require it, or may give me an opportunity of farther illustrating any part of our present argument.

Object. "If the meaning of the Articles be in such a "sense one meaning, that they can be subscribed ho- "nestly only by such as agree in that one meaning; all, "or all but one, of those great men, Bp. Bull, Dr. Wallis, "South, Sherlock, Bennet, &c. must have been guilty, "&c." p. 5.

Answer. If this writer can show that any of those *great men* contradicted any point of doctrine plainly *determined* by our Church, as I have shown of him and his party; then I condemn those men, be they ever so considerable, as well as the Arian *subscribers:* but if they differed in ever so many questions relating to the *Trinity,* (as there may be a great many,) and none of those questions decided either way by our Church; their differing in such *undetermined* points does not affect their *subscription,* any more than their differing about the *inhabitants* of the *moon.* Let this gentleman show what positions of those great men plainly confront the positions of our Church; that so they may be condemned, as they ought to be, and their *subscription* with them. Or if this cannot be shown, how *impertinent* is the objection!

Object. "When any church requires subscription to "its own sense of particular passages of Scripture, which "do not contain the terms of salvation, and refuses com- "munion with those who cannot conform to that, it is "confessed that such a church does that which it ought "not to do," p. 5.

Answer. This is entirely foreign. *Subscription* is not a term of *lay-communion,* but of *ministerial conformity,* or *acceptance* of *trusts* and *privileges:* so that this gentleman here seems to have forgot what he was upon. Besides that, had the dispute really been about the terms of *communion,* his pretence is not *pertinent;* because the doctrine of a *coeternal Trinity* is really a *fundamental* Article, and such as our Church declares to be *necessary* to *salvation.*

Object. "The Articles are so composed, that some of "them are on all hands allowed to be left at large, the "composers intending a latitude, &c." p. 8.

Answer. I admitted this, in my papers before, and sufficiently showed how impertinent the plea is to the point in hand. Undoubtedly, it never was the intent of our Church to determine all *questions* relating to every subject whereof it treats. Yet she intended to determine, and has determined, *many questions;* particularly the main

questions between *Protestants* and *Papists*, between *Catholics* and *Arians*. When Franciscus a Sancta Clara[u] took upon him to reconcile our Articles to *Popery*; what did he else but play the *Jesuit*, and render himself ridiculous? The like has been since done by our Arian reconcilers, with as much wresting and straining, and with as little success. It might be diverting enough, (were not the thing too serious, and full of sad reflections,) to compare the *Papist* and the *Arian* together, and to observe which of them has been the greater master in this exercise of wit, and has found out the most ingenious and surprising comment upon an *Article*. Our Articles however will stand, in their own native light, in defiance to both; so long as gravity, sobriety, and manly thought shall be esteemed and valued above the little arts of equivocating, and playing upon words. The Articles are not *general*, so far as concerns our present debate; and we need not inquire farther. There is a *medium*, I suppose, between determining *all* questions, and determining *none*: one might justly wonder how this *writer* could be insensible of it, and fall into so unaccountable a way of reasoning.

Object. " We must have some *criteria* by which we " may judge which these particular Articles are, &c."

Answer. The *criteria*, in the present case, are *plain* words, not *capable* of an Arian meaning. In other cases, any *certain* indication of the *imposer's* meaning is a *criterion* to fix the sense of a proposition. When there are neither *plain* words, nor any other *certain* indication of the *imposer's* meaning; the Article, so far, is left at large, and the point left undetermined.

Object. " One man subscribes to the truth of this *gene-* " *ral* proposition, *in the Unity of this Godhead——there* " *be three Persons:* meaning by this, that each divine Per- " son is an *individual intelligent Agent*, but as subsisting

[u] The title is, *Expositio paraphrastica Articulorum Confessionis Anglicæ.* Published A. D. 1634.

" in one *undivided substance*, they are all together, *in that* " *respect*, but one *undivided intelligent Agent*.——Another " man, who does not understand this notion, nay, that " sees a *contradiction* in it, is convinced that each of the " three Persons is an intelligent Agent, whereof the Son " and Holy Ghost is subordinate to the Father: what " hinders that he cannot subscribe *honestly* and *fairly* to " the *general* proposition?" p. 12.

Answer. Here are several mistakes. In the first place, that *proposition* of the first Article is not *general*, but *special*, in respect of the Arian controversy. *This Godhead* plainly denotes the one divine nature, " the one liv- " ing and true God," before described in that Article. " In the Unity of this Godhead there be three Persons;" therefore the three Persons are the " one living and true " God;" directly contrary to the Arian doctrine, and to the *new scheme;* which is nothing else but *old Arianism* revived. As to the *explication* which this gentleman carps at, it is not properly an *explication* of the Article, (which meddles not at all with the question of *intelligent Agents*,) but it is determining a point relating to the subject, more *particularly* than the *Article* hath done; and this in answer to an *objection* raised out of men's over *curiosity* in those matters. I know no reason this *writer* has to find fault with that *solution*, more than this, that it fully answers an *objection* which the party are apt most to triumph in. *Intelligent Agent* is understood either of *Person*, or *Being*. *Unus intelligens Agens*, or *unum intelligens Agens*, may be equally rendered *one intelligent Agent:* the former signifying *intelligent Person*, the latter *intelligent Being*. In the former sense, every Person is an *intelligent Agent;* in the latter, all the three are *one intelligent Agent:* therefore *intelligent Agent* and *Person* are not reciprocal. He that teaches this doctrine *subscribes* honestly, because he believes *all* that the *Article* teaches; and besides, guards it from objections. But he that interprets the *Article* to mean no more than that there are *three Persons*, two of which are *subordinate* to one, is

worthy of censure: first, for giving us, at least, a *lame* interpretation, short of the true and full meaning of the Article: or, secondly, for doubling upon the word *subordinate*, understanding by it *inferior;* excluding the two Persons from the *one supreme Godhead*, and thereby running directly counter to the true sense of the Article, which *supposes* all the three to be the "one living and "true God," and *expressly* asserts that they are "of one "substance, power, and eternity." This *writer* may now be able to distinguish between an *honest* and a *fraudulent* subscriber; if he does but know the difference between one who fully believes the *whole* of what he *professes*, and one who either believes it but *in part*, or really *disbelieves* the greatest part of it.

Object. "Should any one arise, and declare those men "to be *prevaricators*——who differ from the doctrine he "lays down as *the meaning* of the Article; I ask, whether "this be not to *put his* own *sense or comment to be the* "meaning *of the Article?*——The fault which is con-"demned by the King's *Declaration*, and which King "Charles threatened with displeasure, was, the drawing "the Article aside *any* way or *either* way," p. 13, 14.

Answer. I perceive, this author knows little either of the history, design, or meaning of King Charles's Declaration. The design was to put a stop to the *quinquarticular* controversy, then warmly agitated. The King, to prevent or quiet those disputes, thought it the most prudent way to forbid either party's being more *particular* than the Articles themselves had been. And we find that, in fact, both sides were censured when they launched out beyond the *general* meaning of the Articles in that controversy; the *King* looking upon any meaning beyond the *general* one, to be a man's *own* meaning or sense, not the meaning or sense of the Article. What is this to the point we are upon, where the *meaning* was never thought to be *general* only, either by that *King*, or any other, or by any considering man else? He that declares and demonstrates the sense to be *special* and *determinate*, against

ancient or modern Arians, does not put his *own* sense upon the Articles, neither does he "draw the Articles "aside any way;" but he secures to the Articles their *own true* and certain meaning, and rescues them from the fraudulent comments of those who really "draw them "aside," and most notoriously pervert them. The royal *Declaration* orders every man to submit to the Article "in "the plain and full meaning thereof," which if it be understood to reach to our present case, (though the *King* seems to have had an eye *chiefly*, or *solely*, to quite another thing,) is a clear condemnation of this gentleman, and of every Arian subscriber.

Object. "When Mr. Rogers published his Comment "upon the Articles, his book, says Dr. Fuller, gave very "great offence, because he confined the Articles to too "narrow a meaning," p. 17.

Answer. Very right; and I take Mr. Rogers to have been blameable in so doing. But it is not said that Mr. Rogers confined *all* the Articles, or the Articles concerning the *Trinity*, to "too narrow a meaning:" nor can this *writer* show that we do it, in condemning the Arians as fraudulent subscribers.

Object. "Such a latitude of subscription was allowed "by the Council of Nice," p. 16.

Answer. The fact cannot be proved; but the contrary may, if there be a proper occasion. However, I have no need to insist upon it, at present, because our *Liturgy*, *Articles*, and *Athanasian Creed* are more particular and determinate than the Council of Nice: so that, now at least, the sense of the ὁμοούσιον is fixed and determined, to every subscriber, beyond all cavil or exception.

Object. "Had the compilers or imposers intended to "have been more determinate upon any point, they ought "to have been more *explicit* and *particular*," p. 17, 18.

Answer. I defy the wit of man to invent any expressions more *particular* and *explicit*, than many of those are, which appear in our *public forms*; so far as concerns the true faith in the Trinity in opposition to the Arian

doctrines. They have guarded against every thing but *equivocation, mental reservation,* and a violent *perverting* of their *certain* meaning. This is enough among men of *sense* and *probity,* which is always supposed. No laws, oaths, covenants, or contracts, can ever stand upon any other foot than this, that when they are plainly enough worded for every man to understand that will be *honest,* it is sufficient; though it were still possible for men of guile to *invent* some sinister meaning. I desire no other favour than to have our *public forms,* in this case, tried by the same rule.

I may observe, by the way, how unwarily this *writer* has furnished us with an argument (which his party perhaps may give him no thanks for) in behalf of our forefathers, for their *enlarging* of *Creeds.* He would have told them, even after the compiling of the Athanasian Creed, that "they ought *still* to have been more explicit "and particular," if they would secure the point they aimed at. I do not altogether differ from him, provided the thing *could* be done; and upon the supposition that we have been gradually departing, farther and farther, from the *primitive* plainness and *sincerity.* Nevertheless, I can hardly think of any additional security to what is already, except it were such as we have seen added to the *abjuration oath;* a caveat against any *equivocation, evasion,* or *mental reservation* whatsoever: which yet would not bind up those that can leap over any thing; (and *honest* men are the same, *without* it or *with* it;) only it might make them ashamed of ever appearing after, in defence of any *equivocating* practices.

Object. "Where a man does *all* that he is commanded "to do, and does it openly, and with all the circum-"stances enjoined, he cannot be taxed with any defect in, "or breach of, regard to his superiors," p. 18.

Answer. For the purpose; if a man takes the *abjuration oath,* openly, with all the circumstances enjoined, only *not believing* a syllable of it; he is, no doubt, very *faithful* to, very *observant* of, his *superiors.* There is only this

circumstance wanting, (which if it be not *enjoined*, is always *supposed* necessary, and to need no *enjoining*,) that the man be *sincere:* and this one defect turns all his pretended *regard* to his *superiors* into a direct *affront*, *rudeness*, and *iniquity* towards them.

Object. "He that thinks the general words, *Swear not* "*at all*, to be exclusive of *all* oaths, and he that thinks it "lawful to swear in *some* cases, can subscribe to, or give "an unfeigned assent to, St. Matthew's Gospel," p. 21.

Answer. But if either of them as certainly *knows* that his pretended sense of "Swear not at all," is not the true sense of *Christ*, as our Arian subscribers *know* that their sense of the Articles is not the true sense of our Church; such a Person in professing an unfeigned assent to St. Matthew's Gospel, would give himself the lie, and be guilty of a vile hypocrisy and prevarication. This *author* is forced to allow, in the next page, (p. 22.) that he and his party "take the propositions" (of our Church) "in a sense which they know *was not* the sense of the "compilers and imposers," p. 22.

Object. "If they" (the compilers and imposers) "hap-"pen so to have expressed themselves that their words "are consistent with Scripture, their propositions may be "assented to, though in a sense different from what they "were originally intended by the compilers."

Answer. They have not *happened* so to express themselves as that their words may be consistent with what this *writer* calls *Scripture;* any otherwise than as a man may *happen*, after using the plainest and strongest words that can be thought on to express his sense, to fall into ill hands that will industriously pervert it. This indeed may *happen*, in any *laws*, *oaths*, *contracts*, or *engagements* whatever, however cautiously worded: nor is there any security against it (as before said) but the common sense and probity of mankind; nor any *rule* to go by in such cases, if a liberty be once taken of running against the *known*, *certain* meaning of the *imposers*. Get loose from this, and the rest is wild confusion, endless playing upon

words, and making a jest and banter of all speech and language.

Object. " If their words are *fairly* capable of a Scrip-" ture meaning, then a man may subscribe to those words: " if they are not, it is not lawful to subscribe," p. 23.

Answer. By *Scripture meaning*, this *writer* understands his own *Arian* meaning. I readily rest the issue of the whole cause upon this very point. If the words of our Church's forms be *fairly capable* of such a meaning, it is lawful to subscribe. But it is evident as the light, that they are many of them neither *fairly*, nor *at all* capable of such a meaning as the *new scheme* requires; and therefore, by this gentleman's own confession, it is *not lawful* for him or his party to *subscribe*. Indeed, words are not *fairly* capable of a *false* sense, if we are any way *certain* of the *true* one; that is, of the sense *intended* by the *speaker* or *writer*. We cannot *fairly* misconstrue any words, if we are fully conscious of the *true* construction; though the words themselves might otherwise bear it. This I lay down as a rule of truth, which I think will hold in most, perhaps in all cases. But I have no occasion for it in the present dispute, because the words themselves are by no means capable of an *Arian* construction, consistent with *grammar*, or *custom* of *speech*. This I have abundantly proved in my former papers, (chapter the 5th,) and now again in these: and this *writer* himself appears to be sensible of it, with respect to the *Liturgy* and *Athanasian Creed*, at least, by his profound silence on that head; never attempting to confute that part, though the most material in our present controversy. When therefore this gentleman says, that he pleads not for *subscription* with such reserves as, " so far as is agree-" able to Scripture," he only betrays his want of reach. Dr. Clarke never yet *discarded* that principle, so far as I know, though his disciples have; and perhaps he is the wiser in not doing it. However, I never directly *charged* the Doctor with *holding* that principle, as this *writer* falsely pretends, page the 24th; but I showed that the

Doctor must have that, or nothing, to retreat to at length; and that he had expressed himself in such a manner as to create just suspicion that he really gave into it; having never expressly condemned it, and having used such arguments for *subscribing*, as will either justify *both* kinds of reservation, or neither.

Object. "It is a shallow artifice indeed, in controverted "points, to assume that a man's interpretations of Scrip- "ture are *Scripture*, and that his adversary's are not so: "but it is the artifice, *shallow* as it is, that runs through "the Doctor's book, and makes him treat his adversaries "with so much insolence," p. 25.

Answer. This *writer* appears here to have been much out of humour: the reason is, I had unravelled a piece of sophistry whereon a mighty stress was laid; which is very *provoking*. The *sophistry* was this:

"The Church of England permits the subscriber to "receive and believe whatever is agreeable to Scripture.

"We of the *new scheme* are ready to receive whatever "is agreeable to Scripture, as by us interpreted.

"Therefore the Church of England permits us to *sub-* "*scribe* in our own sense of Scripture."

The fallacy, I observed, lay here, that the Church of England, by *Scripture*, must mean her *own* sense of Scripture, as to points by her determined: and therefore the argument really concluded for the *Church's sense*, which they made to conclude for the *Arian* sense, though not the *Church's*. "The Church surely," said I, "has as good "a right to call her interpretations by the name of *Scrip-* "*ture*, as the Arians have to call theirs so; and then her "requiring subscription to 'that only which is agreeable "to Scripture,' is requiring subscription in her *own* sense "of Scripture, and none else. Let the *Arian* sense of "Scripture be *Scripture* to Arians; but then let them "subscribe only to *Arian* expositions; which are nothing "akin to those of our Church[x]."

[x] See my Case of Arian Subscription, p. 299, 300, of this volume.

Now, this *angry* gentleman, either not understanding (for what is so blind as *passion?*) what I was talking about, or industriously dissembling it, represents me as not allowing the Arians to call their *own* sense of Scripture *Scripture:* notwithstanding that I had allowed it, in full and express words. But I suffer them not to think that they subscribe according to the true intent and meaning of our Church, by subscribing to their *own* sense of Scripture, which is not the *Church's*, but *repugnant* to it. I suppose only that the *compilers* of our forms, and *imposers*, were not bereft of *common* sense, were not downright idiots; intending a *subscription* to bind men up, and at the same time leaving every man as much at liberty as if there were *no subscription.* They that can suppose the governors of Church and State so *weak* and *silly* as this comes to, must not take it amiss, if we remove the undeserved reproach from wise, great, and good men, and return it to the proper owners.

Object. "It is an unaccountable method of arguing, in "Dr. Waterland, that because *state oaths*, which are "contrived and penned without ambiguity, and on pur- "pose to guard against some particular things or persons, "ought not to be taken in any sense but that of the "*imposers*——that therefore subscriptions in cases which "are not parallel, are *fraudulent.* Such arguments are "only arguments of *calumny* and *slander;* and only prove "that he that urges such, wants nothing but power to "persecute," p. 19.

Answer. This gentleman is again pressed somewhere very hard, to make him forget his temper. I have told the world nothing but the plain truth, that the case of *oaths* and *subscriptions* is *parallel.* I now appeal to the passages above cited: and, let every reader judge whether they be not as directly opposite to the *new scheme*, as the *abjuration oath* itself is against a *Popish* successor; saving only the *caveat* in the close, against *equivocations.* Which *proviso*, however, is always to be understood (though not particularly expressed) in all *subscriptions, contracts, cove-*

nants, oaths, &c. Our *courts of justice* have not judged it necessary to add the like *caveat* upon the taking of every *oath,* because the age is not, at present, thought *wicked* enough to want it: what it may be in a while, if such loose principles as I am here confuting, prevail, I do not say. But to proceed: it will not be a harder matter to *elude* and *pervert* any *oath* whatever, than it is to evade the many strong expressions of our Church in favour of a *coequal* and *coeternal* Trinity. This is what the gentleman is so *angry* at, that he has no way to avoid the force of the argument but by a confident avowal of a *false* fact; as if our *public forms,* as well as *state oaths,* were not penned, in this case, *without ambiguity,* and on purpose to guard against *some particular things,* or *persons.* He that calls this plain argument *calumny* and *slander,* commits the very fault which he condemns, in calling *good, evil:* and as to the mean insinuation about *persecuting,* I suppose it needs no answer.

Object. " If the Archbishops and Bishops, or even the " *Legislature* itself, cannot determine what shall be judged " agreeable or disagreeable to the Articles, the *insolence* " of a private man must be intolerable, who shall presume " to dictate to others, and to charge men with *prevarica-* " *tion* and *fraudulent* subscription, &c." p. 32.

Answer. Softer words might have served as well, and have never hurt the argument, if it be any: the world will easily see the difference between *reasoning* and *railing.* I take not upon me to determine what the *Bishops* or *Legislature* may do: nor is it my province to make *authentic* interpretations *valid* in the *courts of law.* But, I humbly conceive, it lies within my compass to state a plain *case* of *conscience,* to detect *loose casuistry,* and to remonstrate against it. I know of no *insolence* there is in determining, that coequal signifies *coequal,* or coeternal *coeternal;* that *one God* does not signify *three Gods,* nor *one substance* three substances; or that the word *they* is something more than a different spelling for *there.* These and the like plain things *common sense* had determined

long ago; I only repeat: deciding for the *court* of *conscience*, not the *courts* of *justice*, as this gentleman, by mistake, seems to apprehend.

Object. "Dr. Waterland indeed refers us to the writers "of the time when the Articles were compiled——To "send a man to the writers of that time to know the "meaning of the Articles, when no man wrote by au- "thority, is to make those writers the standard of the "Church of England, and not its own words or declara- "tions." p. 34, 35.

Answer. It is pleasant to observe how this *author* strains to make me say something which he thinks he may tolerably answer, diverting the reader from the main point. I referred to the *scope* and *intention* of the writers[y], in order to know the meaning of their *writings;* which I hope is no unreasonable method: and I was there speaking of writings in general. But as to the particular case, now in hand, I no where *send a man* to the writers of that time; nor does so plain a matter require it. The words themselves are sufficient, and carry their own interpretation with them. I desire no farther *postulatum* than this, that our language has not been quite *reversed;* that *light* does not now signify *darkness*, or a *triangle* a *square.* I can wave abundance of niceties which might occur on the subject of *subscription*, and might be properly brought in, upon more doubtful cases. In the mean while, I may observe, that this *author's* argument is *ridiculous* enough, that the *writers* of the *time* may not be useful to discover the *scope* and *intention*, (suppose of a *law*, or an *article*,) because those *writers* were not *law-makers*, or men in *authority.* It is well for the *historians*, that they do not often meet with such hard measure.

Object. "Let Dr. Waterland vindicate the Arminians "from the charge of *unrighteousness* and *deceit*, and I "will venture then to acquit even his adversaries from "the same charge, by the same arguments.——All the

[y] See my Case of Subscription, p. 288 of this volume.

" world must own (*our Articles*) to be formed upon *Cal-*
" *vinistical* principles; and to have been deemed *Calvin-*
" *istical* Articles by our own Archbishops, and by whole
" Convocations in England and Ireland. —— Has that
" learned Bishop (Bull) proved unanswerably, that the
" sense of the compilers of our Articles was not *Calvin-*
" *istical?* It is one thing to say, that the Articles are so
" expressed, as not necessarily to oblige men to profess
" *Calvinism:* but it is another to say, that the sense of
" the compilers was not *Calvinistical.* Did Archbishop
" Whitgift know *the sense of the compilers of our Articles?*
" Did Archbishop Usher? Did our Universities in Whit-
" gift's times? Did the Irish Convocations which settled
" their Articles? Did our Divinity Professors in Queen
" Elizabeth's days?"

Answer. Before I come directly to the matter, I must observe that this *writer* here seriously delivers his persuasion, that our Articles are *Calvinistical*, and formed upon *Calvinistical* principles; at the same time, as I conceive, acknowledging himself an Arminian; which I suppose may be true of the rest of the party. If this be really the case, I must come upon them with a double charge of *prevaricating* in their subscription. The Calvinists, agreeably to their principles, have indeed often pretended that the Articles are *Calvinistical:* the Anti-Calvinists, on the other hand, have as constantly pleaded that the Articles are not *Calvinistical*, but rather *Anti-Calvinistical;* that they are not against them, but rather on their side. And thus the contending parties have gone on, endeavouring to justify their subscriptions, respectively, by their differing persuasions. But here, it seems, is a *new set of men*, believing the Articles to be *Calvinistical*, and subscribing in *Arminianism:* and they are the first that ever boasted of so unaccountable a conduct. To excuse one fault they commit another, heaping sin upon sin, and proclaiming their own condemnation. Let them get off from the charge as they can: as to others, who understand the nature of our Articles too well to think

them *Calvinistical*, they are very excusable in their avowal of *Arminianism*; so far as our divines do really avow it: for I know not that they have ever adopted the whole *Arminian* system. The historical hints given by this *writer* carry so little of argument in them, that if he has not a great deal more to urge, he will never be able to prove that our Articles are *Calvinistical*. When he speaks of *all the world's owning* it, he betrays nothing but his unacquaintedness with books and men. Has he never seen Dr. Bennet's Directions, or Bishop Bull's Apologia, or Heylin's Quinquarticular History, or Plaifere's Appello Evangelium, or Mountague's Appello Cæsarem, to name no more? Does *all the world* own that these *great men* were mistaken; or that they have not sufficiently shown that the pretence of the Calvinists is entirely groundless?

For my own part, I think it has been abundantly proved, that our *Articles*, *Liturgy*, &c. are not *Calvinistical*; but I have no need to insist upon the *negative*: let this *writer*, or any man else, prove the *affirmative*, that they are *Calvinistical*, as is pretended. What he means by whole Convocations in England, determining the Articles to be *Calvinistical*, I do not at all understand. When he tells me what *Convocations*, and when, the thing may be considered: in the mean while, let it pass for a slip of his pen. His other historical hints may be thrown into order of time, and in such order I shall here briefly consider them. His vouchers are,

1. Archbishop Whitgift.
2. Our Divinity Professors in Queen Elizabeth's days.
3. Our Universities in Whitgift's time.
4. The Irish Convocations.
5. Archbishop Usher.

These are the particulars of the evidence, hinted rather than produced, to prove that our Articles are *Calvinistical*, or formed upon Calvin's principles.

As to Archbishop Whitgift, the Universities, and their *professors*, they all fall within the same compass of time; and their judgment in this matter was discovered chiefly

in the year 1595: in the two famous cases of Mr. Barret and Dr. Baro. At that time *Calvinism* appears to have prevailed at Cambridge beyond what it had formerly done[z]. The seeds had been sown by Cartwright some time before, while he was Margaret Professor there; and the learned Whitaker, who was made Regius Professor in 1580, very much promoted and furthered their growth. Yet Dr. Baro, of *Anti-Calvinistical* principles, was *Professor* (Margaret Professor) before Whitaker, about 1571; and had for many years gone on in his *Lectures*, without any censure or disturbance. *Calvinism* however by degrees prevailing, and especially under the influence and authority of Whitaker, the opposite opinion, of course, lost ground. But there were several considerable men, notwithstanding, who approved not the *Calvinian* tenets; and among the rest, Mr. Barret, then Fellow of Caius College. In the year 1595, he took the freedom, in a Sermon *ad clerum*, to censure the *Calvinian* tenets, and even Calvin himself, very smartly. This gave offence to the *Vice-Chancellor* (or deputy Vice-Chancellor) and *Heads*, who proceeded against him, and forced him at length to sign a feigned *retractation*, which they had drawn up for him. It appears from the form of *retractation*, that the *Heads* who drew it up, or enjoined it, thought our 17th Article to favour them. Within a while, this matter was laid before Archbishop Whitgift, who, in a letter to the Lord Burghley, expresses his great dislike of the proceedings against Barret, for that some of the points which the *Heads* had caused him to *recant*, were "such as the best learned Protestants, then living, varied "in judgment upon; and that the most ancient and best "divines in the land were in the chiefest points in opinion, "against their resolutions,"[a] the resolutions of the *Heads*, in Barret's case. Hitherto then we have little reason to believe that our Articles favoured *Calvinism*, if Archbishop Whitgift was any judge of it. But besides this,

[z] See Mr. Strype's Life of Whitgift, p. 435. [a] Ibid. p. 450.

the Archbishop had sent a letter to the *Heads*, [b] wherein he tells them that in some points of Barret's Retractation, they had made him to affirm "that which was contrary "to the doctrine holden and expressed by many sound "and learned divines in the Church of England, and in "other churches likewise, men of best account; and that "which, for his own part, he thought to be false, and "contrary to the Scriptures. For the Scriptures were "plain, that God by his *absolute* will did not hate and "reject any man. There might be impiety in believing "the one; there could be none in believing the other. "Neither was it contrary to any *Article of religion*, esta-"blished by authority in this Church of England, but "rather agreeable thereto."

He goes on to ask, upon this and that point maintained by Barret, against "what Article of religion established "in this Church was it?" and some opinions of Barret which the Archbishop thought untrue, yet, he said, had no "article directly against them." Thus far the Archbishop. Next it is observable that Whitaker, in his Answer to the Archbishop [c], specified no *Article* of the Church to justify the proceedings against Barret. "For the points "of doctrine," saith he, "we are fully persuaded that "Mr. Barret hath taught untruth, if not against the *Ar-"ticles*, yet against the religion of our Church, publicly "received; and always held in her Majesty's reign, and "maintained in all sermons, disputations, and lectures." This plea of Whitaker's is false in fact, though he might not be aware of it. For, to say nothing of Harsnet's Sermon at St. Paul's Cross, in 1584, and of Hooker's at the Temple, in the year 1585, both condemning *absolute reprobation*; Dr. Baro, at Cambridge, had held *lectures*, preached *sermons*, and *determined* in the schools against the *Calvinian* tenets, for the space of fourteen or fifteen years before: as may be inferred from a letter of the

[b] See Strype, p. 440.

[c] See Strype's Appendix, p. 199.

Heads to the Lord Burghley, their Chancellor, extant in Heylin[d], bearing date March 8, 1595. But, however this matter be, it is observable, that though the *Heads* in Barret's case had appealed to Article the 17th, and the Archbishop had particularly demanded of them to make good their proceedings by any *Articles* of the Church; yet Dr. Whitaker then thought it the wisest and safest way to drop farther appeals to the *Articles*, and to rest his cause rather upon the *current doctrine* of divines. Now, though it were ever so true that *Calvinism* had obtained many years in the *pulpits*, and professors' *chairs*, it no more follows from thence that *Calvinism* was the doctrine laid down in our *Articles*, than that the Cartesian philosophy was there, for the time it prevailed. All that can be justly inferred from it, is, that the generality of our divines thought the *Calvinian* tenets to be *consistent* with our Articles; and they might mistake even in that also. But to proceed in the story of Barret.

The *Heads* of the University, afterwards, make their humble suit to the Archbishop, to favour and countenance their proceedings against Barret. [e] They allege that several positions of Barret were contrary to the *Articles*, *Catechisms*, and *Common Prayer*; but they neither specify those *positions*, nor at that time point to any *Article*, or particular passage of the *Catechisms* or *Common Prayer*; so that this general charge is of little or no moment. Some time after, Dr. Whitaker charged Barret upon the *Articles* of the Church, and particularly on the 11th, of *Justification*. But the Archbishop still declared that he did not yet perceive [f] how such a certain position of Barret's, which he had been charged with as impugning the *Articles*, did really differ from any Article of our Church. And as Dr. Whitaker had particularly charged him upon the Article of *Justification*, the Archbishop was not satisfied with it; but desired that farther inquiry might

[d] Heylin's Quinquarticular Hist. p. 624.
[e] See Strype, p. 450. [f] Ibid. p. 456.

be made of those points "wherein they thought he varied "from the book of Articles." [g] At last a favourable *retractation* was by the Archbishop appointed for Barret; and so this matter ended. From the whole proceedings nothing certain can be gathered as to any *Calvinism* being taught by our Articles. The Calvinists were willing to claim them, and made some pretences that way; but, at length, rather dropped than pursued it; not being able to make that point good, though often insisted on by the Archbishop.

It may be said, that the Archbishop however, upon this occasion, countenanced and authorized the Lambeth *Articles*, drawn up by Whitaker on the foot of *Calvinism*. This is very true, though it is not so certain that the Archbishop understood them in so strict a sense as Whitaker did: for that they were thought capable of a milder and softer construction, appears by Baro's orthodox explanation [h] of them, which he sent to the Archbishop, vindicating his own sentiments to be consonant to the doctrine of the Church of England, in her *avowed Articles*, and urging that the Lambeth Articles were not to be understood so as to thwart the *old* Articles of the Church[i]. However, admitting that the Archbishop was so far a *Calvinist*, at last, as really to countenance the Lambeth Articles in their most rigid sense; yet this does not prove that he thought the same doctrine to be taught in the *Articles* of our Church. For had that been the case, what occasion was there for drawing up nine *new* Articles? Might not the *old* ones have served for quieting all differences? It is plain from hence, that the *old* Articles were not thought sufficient to end the dispute, or to condemn the *Anti-Calvinists;* but *new ones* were devised to supply that defect: which *new ones* might indeed be thought, by some, *consistent* with the old ones; and that is all. We see however, that the Lambeth Articles, in

[g] Strype, p. 455.

[h] Strype's Append. p. 201. Vid. etiam Hist. Attic. Lamb.

[i] Strype's Life of Whitg. p. 466.

their strictest sense, appeared to others not very consistent with the doctrine of our Church. And it is well known that the *Queen* and *Court* disliked them[k], that they thought them destructive of *piety* and *government*; and the Archbishop, for countenancing them, narrowly escaped a *præmunire*.

I have but just touched upon Baro's prosecution, not thinking it necessary to relate that whole affair, which may be seen at large in our historians. He was an *Anti-Calvinist*, and had been so for many years in his sermons and lectures; was never called to account for it before the year 1595, then defended himself handsomely, and had the favour and countenance of Lord Burghley, who reprimanded the warm proceedings of the *Heads* against him, and told them that "as good and as ancient were "of another judgment," and that "they might punish "him, but it would be for well-doing[l]". This discountenance from Court stopped the prosecution; and Baro enjoyed his professorship some time longer, till his resignation of it.

Mr. Strype[m] mentions four considerable men of that University, that favoured Baro and his cause: Mr. Overal, Dr. Clayton, Mr. Harsnet, and Dr. Andrews. Overal succeeded Whitaker in the Regius Professorship soon after: so that I think the *writer* of the pamphlet had no occasion to boast of the *Divinity Professors* of that time. Baro, an *Anti-Calvinist*, was Margaret Professor before Whitaker was Regius: and the immediate successor to Whitaker was of the same sentiments, in the main, with Baro. Here I may take leave of Whitgift and the University in Queen Elizabeth's time. Nothing yet appears to make our Articles *Calvinistical*.

The next thing pretended is the Irish Convocations. The fact is this: *Calvinism* had got footing in Ireland before the year 1615. In that year they drew up a *con-*

[k] See the Letter to the Duke of Buckingham in Heylin's Life of Laud, p. 131. and Collier's Eccl. Hist. vol. ii. p. 734.

[l] Strype's Life of Whitgift, p. 473. [m] Ibid. p. 473.

fession of their *own*, (not approving of the English Articles,) and they inserted the Lambeth Articles into their *confession*. Dr. Usher, then a professed *Calvinist*, drew up the *confession*. I see nothing in this matter to prove our Articles *Calvinistical;* unless their being rejected by the *Calvinists* can amount to a proof of their being *Calvinistical*. In the year 1634, the Irish Convocation, with Usher, now Lord Primate, received the XXXIX Articles, without formally laying aside the Lambeth Articles. This shows that Archbishop Usher and the Convocation thought those two kinds of Articles *consistent:* which they might be, though there were not a syllable of *Calvinism* in ours, if they were not plainly *Anti-Calvinistical*. So that here is nothing like a proof of the pretended *Calvinism* in our Articles, either in the judgment of Usher, or of the Irish Convocations. Usher, some years after, renounced his *Calvinian* principles, as is well attested by three good hands: but I do not find that he therewith renounced our *Articles*.

Having thus answered every pretence of this *writer* for his imaginary *Calvinism;* I may now, *ex abundanti*, throw in a few brief remarks which seem to me to plead strongly on the opposite side.

It has been often pleaded by learned men, and I think well proved, that our Articles (in the year 1552) were not drawn up by Calvin's scheme, but, next to Scripture and antiquity, upon the platform of the moderate Lutherans, the Augustan Confession, Melancthon's Doctrine, and the Necessary Doctrine and Erudition of a Christian Man, compiled about nine years before the passing of our Articles, and by many of the same hands [n] that concurred with these in 1552. Our Articles therefore, in their original composition, were not *Calvinistical:* how they could come to be so afterwards, being still the same Articles, I cannot devise. I do not find that the *Calvinian* rigours had obtained here in King Edward's time, except among

[n] See Heylin's Quinqu. part ii. ch. 13. sect. 3.

the *Gospellers*, (as they were then called,) " who were a " scandal to the doctrine they professed," as Bishop Burnet[o] says of them; and who were often smartly reflected on by Hooper, and other the most judicious Reformers. There were some disputes upon those heads, among the *confessors* in prison, in Queen Mary's time[p]. But none of them yet appear to have run the lengths of *Calvinism* in all the *five points*. The refugees from Geneva, in Queen Elizabeth's days, began to propagate *Calvinism* pretty early; but it does not appear that they then claimed any countenance for it from our *Articles*; which still continued the same in those points after the revisal in 1562, and again in 1571. In the year 1572, the Calvinists themselves complain of some of our Bishops, as also of the *Articles*. The authors of the *Second Admonition*, as Plaifere[q] observes, do accuse some Bishops as suspected of the heresy of Pelagius, and say, " for free-will, not only " they are suspected, but others also: and indeed the " book of Articles of Christian religion speaketh very " dangerously of falling from grace, which is to be re- " formed, because it too much inclineth to their error." We have the like complaint of theirs, not long after, taken notice of by Dean Bridges[r], in the year 1587, whereby it appears that the *Calvinists* then made no difference between the *justified* falling away finally, and the *elected*: though the doctrine of our Church is plain that the *regenerate*, or justified, may so fall. But as to the *elect*, if that be strictly understood, it is a contradiction to say, they shall *finally* perish. The *Calvinists*, at that time, were very far from boasting of our *Articles* being clear on their side: they suspected the very contrary, being sensible how the doctrines of *universal redemption*, and of *departing from grace*, bore hard upon their scheme.

[o] Burnet, Hist. of the Reform. vol. ii. p. 107.
[p] Heylin, Quinqu. Hist. part viii. ch. 17.
[q] Plaifere, Appello Evang. part iii. ch. 10.
[r] Bridges, Defence of the Government established, &c. p. 1308.

In the years 1584 and 1585, we find Mr. Harsnet, and the judicious Hooker, both of them condemning the *Calvinistical* doctrine of *irrespective* reprobation; and both of them received and countenanced by Archbishop Whitgift.

In the year 1603, was the famous *Hampton-Court conference*. The *Calvinists* then moved that the *book* of *Articles* might be "explained in places obscure, and enlarged where some things were defective;" that the Lambeth *Articles* might be taken in, and that in the sixteenth Article, after the words, "depart from grace," might be added, "but not totally, nor finally;" which would have defeated the whole intent and meaning of the Articles[s]. It seems, the *Calvinists* were not yet confident of our Articles being plainly, or at all on their side; as indeed they had no reason. Yet nothing was done to satisfy their scruples, or to relieve their uneasiness on that account.

In the year 1618, our *divines*, at the Synod of Dort, had commission to insist upon the doctrine of *universal redemption*, as the doctrine of the Church of England, (though they were out-voted in it,) which one doctrine, pursued in its just consequences, is sufficient to overthrow the whole *Calvinian* system of the five points.

In the year 1624, Mr. Mountague (then Prebendary of Windsor) openly disclaimed the *Calvinistical* tenets, as being the positions of *private* doctors only, not of the Church in her *public* forms. His *Appello Cæsarem*, wrote in vindication thereof, was approved by King James; and Dr. White ordered to license it with this approbation; "that there was nothing contained in it but what was "agreeable to the public faith, doctrine, and discipline "established in the Church of England." This is a very considerable testimony that our Articles are not *Calvinistical*. And it is very observable, that when the *Commons*, the year after, drew up their charge against Moun-

[s] See Plaifere, Appello Evang. part iii. ch. 16.

tague[t], they could find no Article of the Church to ground their complaint upon (so far as concerned the *five points*) but the seventeenth: which yet they so understood as to make it, in sense, directly repugnant to Article the sixteenth. For they charge him with maintaining and affirming, in opposition to Article the seventeenth, "that "men justified may fall away and depart from the state "which once they had," and that "they may rise again, "and become new men possibly, but not certainly, nor "necessarily:" which is the plain and manifest doctrine of Article the sixteenth, which does not say *shall*, or *must* rise again, but *may* only; intimating plainly enough, that it is neither *certain* nor *necessary*.

Such as desire to see more of Mountague's case, may consult the historians of that time. I concern myself no farther than to relate such particulars as give light to the present question, about the sense of our Articles in the *five points*. And I would have it observed, that I am not inquiring whether *Calvinism* was the more prevailing doctrine of those times, but whether it was generally thought to be contained in, and professed by our *Articles*, or other *public* authorized forms of our Church. Many ran in with *Calvinism*, who did not pretend to find the *whole* of their doctrine in our *public* forms; nay, who suspected that our Articles were not only *defective* in those points, but even *contradictory*, in some measure, to them. This, I think, sufficiently appears from the complaints of the earlier Calvinists in Queen Elizabeth's time; from Whitaker's confession to Whitgift; from the conduct of the *Heads*, in Barret's case; and from the story of Baro; from Whitgift's procedure in the Lambeth Articles, and his frank confessions in favour of Barret; from Dr. Reynolds' proceedings at the *Hampton conference*, and the resolutions taken thereupon; and lastly, from the Irish Convocation of 1615, and from the case of Mountague.

I shall proceed a little farther into Charles the First's reign, and then conclude this article.

[t] See it in Collier's Eccl. Hist. vol. ii. p. 736, &c.

In the year 1626, the King put out a *Proclamation* to quiet the disputes on the *five points;* forbidding *new* opinions, and all *innovation* in the *doctrine* or discipline of the Church; commanding all to keep close to the *doctrine* and *discipline* established. This *Proclamation* seems to have been chiefly levelled against the Calvinists, who were then labouring to introduce *innovations* in *doctrine* and *discipline.*

In the year 1628, the King prefixed his famous *Declaration* to a new edition of the Articles: which *Declaration* was designed chiefly to bridle the Calvinists, but indeed to silence the *Predestinarian* controversy on both sides. The Calvinists made loud complaints against it: the King had confined them to the *general* meaning of the Articles, the *plain* and *full meaning;* had prohibited any *new sense,* and the *drawing the Article aside.* This they interpreted to be laying a *restraint* upon them from preaching the *saving* doctrines of God's free *grace,* in *election* and *predestination.* (See Collier, p. 747.) But why so, if *Calvinism* had been before incorporated into our *Articles;* or if it were not a *new sense,* and beside their *plain* and *full* meaning? This complaint, from that quarter, looks like a confession that our Articles were not, in themselves, *Calvinistical;* and that *Calvinism* could not be taught without introducing a *new sense,* and *drawing* the Articles *aside;* or however, not without being more *particular* than the *Articles* had been.

Soon after the King's *Declaration,* the *Commons* drew up a kind of *Anti-declaration,* "avowing" (as they say) "that sense of the Articles——which by the *public acts* "of the Church of England, and the general and *current* "*exposition* of the writers of our Church, had been de- "livered to us; rejecting the sense of the Jesuits and "Arminians."

For an answer to which, I refer the reader to Archbishop Laud's short Notes, or Scholia, upon this *Anti-declaration,* recorded by Heylin in his Life. I may observe that the *Commons* laid no claim to the *literal* or

grammatical meaning, in favour of *Calvinism;* and that they appealed only to *extrinsic* evidence: first, to the *public acts* of the Church, when there were really none such, properly so called; next to the *current exposition* of writers, wherein they appear not to have distinguished between the *current doctrine* of writers, and the *current exposition* of the Articles; as if it were necessary that the whole body of the *current divinity* should have been contained in our *Articles*. Besides that even the *current doctrine* was not entirely on the side of *Calvinism*. *Absolute reprobation* had been generally condemned all along by our most judicious divines: and the doctrines of *universal* redemption, and of *departing* from *grace*, as generally approved: which doctrines, if pursued in their consequences, (though many might not be aware of it,) tend to overthrow the *Calvinian* doctrines in the *five points*.

I may farther hint, that even the Article of *Predestination* has been vainly enough urged in favour of the *Calvinistical* tenets. For, not to mention the saving clause in the conclusion, or its saying nothing at all of *reprobation*, and nothing in favour of *absolute* predestination to life; there seems to be a plain distinction (as Plaifere[u] has well observed) in the Article itself, of two kinds of *predestination;* one of which is recommended to us, the other condemned. See that part of the Article in the margin[x]. Predestination rightly and piously considered, that is, considered (not *irrespectively*, not *absolutely*, but)

[u] Plaifere's Analysis of the 17th Article, p. 387, alias 198.

[x] As the *godly* consideration of *predestination, and our election in Christ*, is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ, mortifying the works of the flesh, and their earthly members, and drawing up their mind to high and heavenly things; as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm their faith of eternal salvation, to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their love towards God.

So, for curious and carnal persons, lacking the spirit of Christ, to have continually before their eyes *the sentence of God's predestination*, is a most dangerous downfall, whereby the Devil doth thrust them either into *desperation*, or into *wretchlessness of most unclean living*, (*impurissimæ vitæ securitatem*,) no less perilous than desperation.

with respect to faith *in Christ*, faith *working* by love, and persevering; such a predestination is a *sweet* and *comfortable* doctrine. But the sentence of God's predestination, (it is not here said *in Christ*, as before,) that sentence, *simply* or *absolutely* considered, (as *curious* and *carnal* persons are apt to consider it,) is a *most dangerous downfall*, leading either to *security* or *desperation*; as having no respect to foreseen *faith* and a *good life*, nor *depending* upon it, but *antecedent* in order to it. The Article then seems to speak of two subjects; first, of predestination *soberly understood* with respect to faith *in Christ*, which is wholesome doctrine; secondly, of predestination *simply* considered, which is a dangerous doctrine. And the latter part seems to be intended against those *Gospellers* whereof Bishop Burnet[y] speaks. Nor is it imaginable that any *true* and *sound* doctrine of the Gospel should, of itself, have any aptness to become a *downfall* even to *carnal* persons: but *carnal* persons are apt to *corrupt* a sound doctrine, and suit it to their own *lusts* and *passions*, thereby falsifying the truth. This doctrine, so *depraved* and *mistaken*, our Church condemns: that is, she condemns *absolute*, *irrespective* predestination, not the other. This appears to be the most probable construction of the seventeenth Article; for vindication whereof I shall refer to

[y] The doctrine of predestination having been generally taught by the Reformers, many of this sect (the *Gospellers*) began to make strange inferences from it; reckoning, that since every thing was decreed, and the decrees of God could not be frustrated, therefore men were to leave themselves to be carried by these decrees. This drew some into great *impiety of life*, and others into *desperation*. The Germans soon saw the ill effects of this doctrine. Luther changed his mind about it, and Melancthon openly writ against it. And since that time, the whole stream of the Lutheran churches has run the other way. But both Calvin and Bucer were still for maintaining the doctrine of these decrees; only they warned the people not to think much of them, since they were secrets which men could not penetrate into. But they did not so clearly show how these consequences did not flow from such opinions. Hooper and many other good writers did often dehort the people from entering into these curiosities; and a *caveat* to the same purpose was put afterwards into the Article of the Church about *Predestination*. *Burnet, Hist. of the Ref.* vol. ii. p. 107.

the margin[z], and to Plaifere before cited; who accordingly, in the close of his Analysis, appeals to *this very Article* of our Church, in favour of *conditionate* predestination. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to my purpose, if neither *absolute* nor *conditionate* be affirmed or denied in the Article; as hath been the opinion of many, and as I have been before (to prevent needless disputes) willing to allow. Let it be supposed that *Calvinism* is not directly *contrary* to the Articles; which is civil enough in all reason.

Now, to return to our *writer*. To justify Arminian subscription, I plead first, that the *words* themselves, of our *public* forms, do not determine on the side of *Calvin-*

[z] 1. De æterna prædestinatione recte erudiri ecclesiam summopere necessarium est: nam ut nulla doctrina uberiorem consolationem piis conscientiis afferre solet, quam doctrina prædestinationis *recte explicita*, ita nihil periculosius est quam *recta* prædestinationis *ratione* aberrare.

2. Nam qui a *vera* deflectit, in *præcipitium* fertur, unde se recipere non potest.

3. Sunt quidam, qui cum audiunt nostram salutem in Dei electione et proposito sitam esse, et *modum verum* haud observant, *somnia stoica*, et *fabulas Parcarum* fingunt.

4. *Modus* autem prædestinationis *verissimus* est, quem Paulus nobis commonstrat, cum ad Ephes. scribit, *Elegit nos in Christo*. In hoc modo, *conditio* fidei includitur, nam *cum fide* inserimur Christo, ejus membra efficimur, et ideo electi quia Christi membra sumus. *Hemmingius apud Plaif.*

Judicamus haud dubie *electos* esse eos, qui misericordiam propter Christum promissam *fide* apprehendunt, nec abjiciunt eam fiduciam ad extremum. *Melancth. loc. Theol. de Prædest.*

Here you see how you shall avoid the scrupulous and most dangerous question of the *predestination* of God: for, if thou wilt enquire into his councils, thy wit will deceive thee —— But if thou begin with Christ, &c. this *simple question* will not hurt thee——Christ is the Book of Life, and all that believe in him are of the same Book, and so are *chosen* to everlasting life; for only those are ordained that *believe*. *Latimer, Sermon on Septuages.* p. 214.

Bishop Bancroft, at the *Hampton Conference*, observes, that many grew libertines by relying too much on *predestination*; that this proposition, *If I shall be saved, I shall be saved*, is a *desperate* doctrine, a contradiction to orthodox belief; and that men ought not to rest their happiness on any *absolute*, irrespective decree; citing the latter part of the 17th Article relating to God's *general* promises. All which shows that he thought that Article rather to condemn, than favour *absolute* predestination.

ism: nor secondly, any *known* intention of *compilers* or *imposers:* nor thirdly, any *authentic* interpretation of our superiors. On the other hand, the presumption rather lies against *Calvinism,* from express words in some Articles, (as particularly the 16th and 31st, besides several other things in the *Catechism* and *Liturgy,*) from the *probable* construction of other Articles, from the *original* composition and design of the Articles, and from some considerable testimonies of our most judicious divines; besides the *confessions* of the more early Calvinists themselves. This *writer* has promised me to defend Arian subscription by the *same arguments,* p. 38. If it might not look too like insulting, I would now call upon him to make his words good.

The reader, I hope, will excuse the length of this part, which could not easily have been crowded into a shorter compass. I have omitted a great deal purely for the sake of brevity; and because I would not enter farther into a *distinct* controversy, than the *objection* necessarily required. I may now pass on.

Object. "Would an Arminian have expressed himself "in the language of the *Articles,* about *predestination* "and original *sin?*"

Answ. Would a Calvinist have expressed himself in the language of the Articles, about the *five points?* Compare the Lambeth Articles, or the decrees of the Synod of Dort, or the *Assembly's Confession;* and see whether they, or any of them, speak the moderate language of our Articles. As to *original sin,* I know not whether any of our considerable *Divines* go the lengths of the Arminians in that Article. As to *predestination,* Dr. Bennet[a] and Mr. Plaifere[b] have both appealed to Arminius himself, as teaching the very same doctrine with our 17th Article: which may well deserve this author's special notice. But it is enough for me, if the Article has but been expressed

[a] Bennet's Directions for Studying, &c. p. 95, &c.

[b] Plaifere, Appello Evang. p. 38. alias p. 27.

in the middle or moderate way, in such *general* terms as come not up either to *Calvinism* or *Arminianism:* which is a supposition I have been willing to admit, for the waving of all needless controversy; though I am rather of opinion that the Article leans to the *Anti-Calvinian* persuasion.

I have heard it objected to the *supposition* of the Article's being *general*, and *indifferent* to either side, that it would make the Article useless, as deciding and determining nothing. But I beg leave to observe that the Article may be exceeding useful, notwithstanding such a *supposition.*

1. To prevent the suspicion of our Church's running in with the *Gospellers* on one hand, or the *Pelagians* on the other; and so the Article is a fence against slander and calumny.

2. Supposing the Article to be *general* and *indefinite*, in respect of the controversy between Calvinists and Arminians; it is yet *special* and *determinate* against the opinion of Samuel Huber, who taught an universal election, (which in reality is *no election*,) and that all men by the death of Christ were brought into the state of grace and salvation. The Article confines the election to those that believe in Christ, and live up to that belief, persevering to the end.

The Article is also *special* and *determinate* against the opinion fathered upon Origen, that all men, even wicked men, and devils, shall at last be received to mercy. The Article is farther *special* and *determinate* against the Socinians, who deny God's *prescience* of future *contingents*, and admit no *special* predestination from all *eternity*. There may be other false opinions particularly condemned by this Article: but these now specified are enough to show the *use* of the *Article;* though we should suppose the main points, between Calvinists and Arminians, to be left *in medio*, undetermined.

Object. "I know of no obligation upon any one to "subscribe to this, that the *ideas* which the compilers of

" the 11th Article had of *justification* and *faith*, &c. were " consonant to the true *ideas* which were expressed by " these words in Scripture," p. 42.

Answer. The subscriber must assent to the *propositions* laid down by the *compilers* and *imposers;* which *propositions* are made up of *ideas:* and therefore, in subscribing to their *propositions*, we subscribe so far to their *ideas*. I do not say that we subscribe to any of their *private* sentiments or *ideas*, such as they have not expressed, or intended not to express, in the *public* forms. But their declared *public* sentiments contained in our forms, those, so far as we are *certain* of them, we subscribe to.

As to the meaning of the 11th Article, our Church refers us not to *Scripture*, (for such as disbelieve the Article might pretend Scripture,) but to the *Homily* delivering the Church's sense of Scripture, in regard to that Article.

Object. " There are a great many passages of Scripture " interpreted in the *Homilies;* but yet our Church no " where supposes, that whoever differs from its explica- " tions offers violence to Scripture itself," p. 44.

Answer. Neither do I suppose it, however this *writer* may love to mistake or misrepresent plain things. But wherever our Church has tied us up to the profession of any doctrine, the *subscriber*, as such, must interpret Scripture conformably to that doctrine, and not in opposition thereto. He must not, for instance, interpret Scripture in favour of *purgatory*, *infallibility*, *worship of saints*, or the like; at the same time condemning those *Popish* tenets by his subscription: neither must he interpret Scripture in favour of the Son's, or Holy Ghost's *inferiority*, *inequality*, &c. while he subscribes to their *coequality* and *coeternity*. He is tied up to the Church's sense of Scripture in all points determined by the Church, so far as to believe that her *explications* are, in the general, just and true; that whatever she proposes as *Scripture doctrine*, is *Scripture doctrine;* and that no sense of Scripture which runs counter to her *decisions* is the true

sense of Scripture, but a *violence* offered to Scripture. This is all I ever meant, or now mean, by our being bound up to the Church's *explications*.

Object. "No law requires any man to explain the "Articles by the *Liturgy*, or to subscribe the Articles in "the sense of the *Liturgic* expressions," p. 45.

Answer. The *law* of common sense obliges us to make the *Articles* and *Liturgy* consistent, at least, if we admit *both;* and to believe that *both*, in reality, mean the *same thing*, being established by the *same authority*.

Object. "The Articles may be general——the Liturgy "more special and determinate," p. 45.

Answer. This might have been the case; but in fact it is not; for the Athanasian Creed, contained in Article the 8th, to say nothing of other Articles, is as *special* and *determinate* as the *Liturgy* itself. The same *evasions* will not, it may be, indifferently serve for every expression to be met with in both: but a man that takes into that loose way, may, when his hand is in, find some *evasion* or other for any thing whatever. It seems to be purely accidental, that the Doctor appeared to be more confounded and nonplused in the *Liturgy*, than in the *Creeds* and *Articles:* invention will sometimes flag, and even the keenest wit cannot bear to be always kept upon the stretch.

Object. "What advantage, real advantage, would it "be to the Church of England to eject out of its com-"munion such men as Dr. W. plainly points at?" p. 46.

Answer. It is unfortunate for the men who are to new model our *divinity*, and to reform our *faith*, that they should betray, at every turn, a strange *confusion* of *thought* even in clear and plain things. This *writer* cannot distinguish between *ejecting*, and *not admitting;* nor between *Church-communion*, and *Church-trusts*. I said not a word about *ejecting* any man out of *communion:* I pleaded only against *admitting* any into *Church-trusts*, that must come in by *iniquity*, or not at all: and I am not sensible that I was either deceived in my reasoning, or out in my poli-

tics. However high an opinion this gentleman (or I) may have of the valuable abilities of the Arian subscribers; whatever advantage or credit we might propose, by having so considerable men amongst us; yet our misfortune is, that we cannot have them but by *sinful means*, and at the expence of *sincerity*; and we dare not promise ourselves any real, or lasting benefit from so notorious a breach of *God's commandments*. On the other hand, since I am here *publicly* called upon to declare what *advantage* it may be to us, to have a stop put to this *unrighteous* practice of *subscribing*, I shall briefly hint it in a few particulars.

1. It will be much for the *honour* of *God*, and of our most *holy religion*, to have no more such *offences* seen, or once named amongst us.

2. It will be taking away one great *reproach* from our *country*, heretofore famed for its gravity and good sense; and for breeding up *divines* and *casuists*, as judicious, solid, and accurate as any upon the face of the earth.

3. It may be much for the advantage of the common people, not to be under such guides as are themselves remarkably deficient in the first principles of morality and Christian simplicity; and who may be presumed the less qualified to direct the *consciences* of others, while so manifestly faulty in the conduct of their *own*.

4. It may be a farther advantage, for Christian people, to be under the care and guidance of none but *orthodox* teachers; such as will instruct them in the *fundamentals* of Christianity, and lead them in the way everlasting.

These are some of the *advantages* we may reasonably propose, along with God's blessing; which must be had in God's own way, and in the doing of what is just, honest, and upright. If there be any greater advantages on the other side, let this gentleman name them, and they shall be considered.

Object. "They disclaim *Arianism*; yet notwithstanding that, they are injuriously and unchristianly called "*Arians*," p. 46.

Answer. God forbid that we should ever demean our-

selves *injuriously* or *unchristianly* towards any man. Here is a mistake somewhere; and it is no hard matter to perceive where it lies. This gentleman should have said, that they disclaim the *name* of *Arianism:* they do indeed disclaim the *name*, but not the *thing*. We think ourselves as proper and as competent judges of what *Arianism* is, as others may be: and we cannot help judging, as long as we can read. When we have found the *thing*, being plain and sincere men, we immediately give the *name*. For the purpose; if we meet with any man teaching the doctrines of *purgatory*, *transubstantiation*, and other distinguishing badges of *Popery;* we never stay for his leave; but we have, upon such evidence, a very clear and undoubted right to call such a man a *Papist*, till he has purged himself of those positions. By the very same rule, we pretend to give the name of Arians to as many as we find the Arian tenets upon: and their denial of it signifies nothing, being only *protesting* against *fact*; which, in all parallel cases, is highly ridiculous. If they are Arians, and do not know it, they are indeed the more pitiable: but as their ignorance is no rule to those that know better; so we hope there is nothing *injurious* or *unchristian* in calling either men or things by their right names.

Object. "They are charged with *fraud* and *prevarica-*
"*tion*, because they subscribe: which is the severest
"reflection on their characters possible," p. 46.

Answer. All the *severity* lies in the *truth* and *evidence* of the *charge*. If the charge cannot be fully proved, the man that makes it is in reality the *sufferer*, by exposing himself. But I have took care to proceed upon none but the clearest and most evident grounds: and now I may lay claim to those gentlemen's *thanks*, for kindly showing them both their *sin* and their *danger*. Principles are valuable and precious, and must not be parted with, in compliment to any man's character. Besides, it is to be hoped that men of their education and abilities do not want to be told, that there are some things which they ought to be infinitely more tender of than of a shortlived

character, (built upon *self-flattery* and *delusive* shows,) and those are, the honour of God, the simplicity of the Gospel, and the salvation of men. One way still there is left, and indeed but one, whereby to retrieve their *characters;* which is to *repent*, and *amend*. If they will accept of this plain and frank admonition, it may not perhaps be altogether unserviceable to them: if not, let it stand as a testimony against them, for the benefit of others, lest they also fall into the same condemnation.

Object. "Men who have never wrote a word in the "Trinitarian controversy, who have had no *occasion*, no "*design* to write on that subject, yet are represented to "the world under the same *invidious name*. Is this the "conduct of a *Christian*, and a *Divine?*—What must "every man conclude when he sees the running title— "*The Case of Arian Subscription*, &c. and *Pleas for such* "*Subscription examined;* and yet the very first of these "pleas is partly taken out of the book of *one* who has "never written any thing about Arian subscription! Is "this becoming a *Protestant Divine?*" p. 47.

Answer. The reader, I hope, will excuse it, if for want of *arguments* to reply to, I am forced sometimes to condescend to take notice of mere *declamation*. This gentleman has before shown his over *officiousness* in defending Dr. Clarke against a *supposed* injury done him; though I dare be confident, the Dr. himself knows that I have not injured him at all. Now he is offering a helping hand to a person of an higher character and station in the Church; who, I doubt not, is too wise a man to think that I have any where failed in point of strict justice, or even of decency and respect towards him. My business was to examine every the most plausible *plea* that had been brought for that *subscription* which I condemn, under the name of Arian subscription. I never represented that person under the invidious name of an Arian; nor was it ever in my thoughts to do it. But it was my professed design, not to dissemble any thing that might look favourable to the cause of Arian subscription; not to con-

ceal either the *strongest pleas* or the *greatest names* that might appear to countenance it. And to me it seems that this *writer*, had it been his manner ever to weigh things with candour or judgment, might have thanked me for so *fair* and so *unexceptionable* a conduct; in allowing his cause all the *advantage* or *credit* that could possibly be given it. But enough: this gentleman should be advised, the next time he is disposed to stand up an advocate for greater men than himself, either to do it more *pertinently*, or to stay for their *commission:* otherwise he may happen, by his *officious* zeal and indiscreet conduct, to do them a *real* injury, while he is labouring to take off such as are purely *imaginary*.

Object. " The principles which the ingenious Dr. Ben-
" net contends for, are the same with those I have laid
" down," p. 49.

Answer. I am very glad to hear so much from this gentleman. To complete the character of a *careless* writer, he shall now be condemned out of his own mouth. Dr. Bennet's principle, relating to *subscription*, is to allow no liberty but where the *words themselves* do allow it, where they are *fairly capable* of such a sense as we take them in, " without doing violence to the words, or contradict-
" ing what our Church has elsewhere taught." I desire no more than this, in our present question. If this be our *writer's* principle, he has effectually condemned himself, and every Arian subscriber.

Let the reader only turn back, and review the passages above cited from our *public* forms; and then try whether it be possible to reconcile them *fairly*, and *without violence*, or indeed *at all*, to the *new scheme*. Now, since this gentleman has here bound himself to stand or fall by the same rule of subscription which Dr. Bennet contends for; I leave him to apply it at leisure: and as he has thereby entangled himself sufficiently, and beyond all recovery; it would be unmerciful, and even cruel, to press him closer.

It may not be here improper to cite Dr. Bennet's ap-

plication of his own rule, to this particular case; addressing himself to Dr. Clarke, in these words.

"As I am firmly persuaded, you are a person of so "great integrity, that you will not venture (notwith- "standing your attempt for explaining) to *repeat your* "*subscription*, &c. till you have altered your sentiments "touching these points, (which I pray God may be "speedily effected,) so I hope, none of those persons who "espouse your present sentiments will be influenced by "what you have written, to think your sense of those "passages *tolerable*. I really *tremble* at the apprehension "of that *guilt*, which such a *collusion* must *pollute* them "with: and I cannot but earnestly entreat you to *do what* "*lies in your power*, in the most *public* manner, for pre- "venting such an interpretation of our *Liturgy*, as must "(I fear) necessarily *lay waste the consciences* of the com- "pliers, and pave the way for a man's subscribing and "using such forms of devotion as thwart the sense of his "own mind." *Bennet on the Trin.* p. 265.

Thus far the ingenious Dr. Bennet, who, I suppose, well understands both his own *principle* and the *application* of it. Whether his rule and mine differ, is a question which concerns not our present debate: either of them effectually condemns Arian subscription. My rule appears to be rather the stricter of the two: it is this, that wherever we are *certain* of the *imposer's* meaning, that meaning we are bound up to, by our subscription. Perhaps, Dr. Bennet may think that we are never *certain* but where the *words themselves* necessarily require such a meaning. I think, there are some possible cases where we may be *certain*, though the *words themselves* might otherwise admit of *two senses;* and that the *imposers* in such cases have sufficiently done their parts, though there may be some *ambiguity* remaining in the expressions, so long as there is but any *certain* way left for a reasonable man to come at their *real* and *true* meaning. But I shall not dwell longer on this nicety, since our present debate about Arian subscription is in a great measure uncon-

cerned in it; and we need not go farther than the *words themselves* to confute and condemn it.

I shall conclude with the honest sentiments of Mr. Whiston, which are really and truly the same with my own: and his testimony, in this case, is the more considerable, because it comes from one, who lay under the same *temptation* with others, to prevaricate in this sacred engagement. His words in the first *Appendix* to his *fifth volume* are these:

"The great latitude Dr. Clarke allows, that every "person may reasonably agree to modern forms, under a "*Protestant* settlement, which owns the *Scripture* as the "rule of faith, *whenever he can in any sense at all* recon- "cile them with Scripture, if it be with a *declaration* how "he reconciles them; even though it be in a sense which "is owned to be plainly *forced*, and *unnatural;* seems to "me *not justifiable*, but *contradictory* to the direct *mean- "ing* and *design* of those *forms;* and of the most *per- "nicious* consequence in all *parallel* cases. Nor do I see, "at this rate, that the same liberty can be wholly denied "to a *Protestant*, as to the *Popish* doctrine and practices; "since there also, it is supposed that those *forms* are in- "tended to oblige men to nothing but what is agreeable "to *Christianity*.

"If to this observation the *Doctor* should reply, that "complying with the Church of Rome, and joining with "a *Protestant* Church, in the manner and with the *decla- "rations* he does, are quite different things on these two ac- "counts, (1.) Because the Church of Rome will not per- "mit any of her members to make such *declaration* con- "cerning her doctrines, but positively insists upon every "one's *implicit* submission to them, in the sense that "Church and her Councils receive them, without examin- "ing them by the rule of Scripture; and (2.) Because "many of the doctrines of the Church of Rome, such as "the invocation of the *Virgin Mary*, and of *saints*, &c. "with the worship of images, can in *no sense* be recon- "ciled, but are directly contrary to it, as setting up other

" *mediators* instead of *Christ*, and teaching men to apply " to such beings as have *no power or dominion* over them; " whereas the invocation of the Holy Ghost, and so of " the whole Trinity, as used in the Church of England, " (some of the most suspicious of all the things allowed " by him,) may be understood, and *declared*, to be only a " desiring him to bestow those gifts upon us, in *subordi-* " *nation* to the Father and the Son, which we are sure " from Scripture it is his *proper office*, and *in his power*, to " distribute: if, I say, the *Doctor* shall make this reply, " I must answer;

1. " That I doubt, our Church does not properly allow " her members to make any such *declarations*, as is here " intimated, but expects their submission *in that sense she* " *and her synods have imposed* her doctrines and devotions: " and though it be not under the notion of *implicit faith*, " and *without examination*, yet as acquiescing in *her judg-* " *ment*, interpreting the Scripture according to the *Arti-* " *cles* and *Creeds*, and submitting to her *authority* in *con-* " *troversies of faith.*

2. " That there are even in the Church of Rome few " or no such doctrines or practices, but persons *well dis-* " *posed to it* can, in *some sense or other*, reconcile them " with Scripture; or at least *think* they can, which is " here almost the same case, without dreaming of setting " up *other mediators* instead of *Christ*, or doubting of " some degree of *power* and *authority* in the beings so " invocated. So that if we, without all sacred or primi- " tive command or example, may follow our Church in " the invocation of the Holy Spirit, and so of the whole " Trinity, from some uncertain reasonings of our own, I " do not see how we can condemn the *Papists* for follow- " ing their own Church in the *invocation* of *angels*, nay, " hardly in that of *saints* also, and of the *Virgin Mary* " herself.

" Nor can any *explications* of *forms* directly against the " *known* sense of *words*, and of the *imposers*, be other

" than *protestatio contra factum;* and so wholly *unjusti-*
" *fiable.*

" Nor indeed, if this were somewhat tolerable in some
" particular cases of *small moment,* can it be at all so in
" the most *sacred Articles* and *Offices* of religion.

" If this way be allowable, *then is the offence of the*
" *cross ceased;* then the *martyrs* have commonly lost their
" lives without sufficient cause; and those Jews who would
" die rather than eat *swine's flesh,* and those Christians
" that would suffer the like punishment, rather than cast
" a little *incense* on the heathen *altars,* were very unfor-
" tunate, as having *suffered without necessity.*

" What will become of all *oaths, promises,* and *securi-*
" *ties* among men, if the plain real truth and meaning of
" words be no longer the measure of what we are to pro-
" fess, assert, or practise; but every one may, if he do
" but openly *declare* it, put his *own strained interpreta-*
" *tion,* as he pleases, upon them? Especially if this be to
" be allowed in the *most sacred matters* of all, the signing
" *Articles* of faith, the making *solemn confessions* of the
" same, and the offering up public *prayers, praises,* and
" *doxologies* to the *great God,* in the solemn *assemblies* of
" his worship. This, I own, I *dare not do,* at the *peril* of
" my *salvation:* and if I can no way be permitted to enjoy
" the benefit of *Christ's* holy ordinances in public, without
" what I own would be in myself *gross insincerity* and
" *prevarication,* I shall, I believe, think it my duty to aim
" to enjoy that benefit some other way, whatever *odium*
" or *sufferings* I may bring upon myself thereby."

I have transcribed this whole passage from Mr. Whiston, being full and clear to my purpose, unanswered, and unanswerable: and it may appear from hence that the hardest names which I have given to Arian subscription are in reality no severer than had been before given, by a known friend to the Arian cause: so that this *writer* may, with equal justice, charge Mr. Whiston also with *slander, calumny,* and *persecuting* principles, for his declaring such

subscription to be *gross insincerity* and *prevarication*. The pious and candid Mr. Nelson, and the very judicious and learned Bishop of Oxford had both expressed their abhorrence of it, before I wrote; as the anonymous author of the Case of Addressing, &c. has also done since. And indeed, who is there of any tolerable measure of *good sense*, or breathing any thing of the true spirit of *piety*, that does not utterly detest it?

I have now done with this *writer*, and, I hope, with this *cause* too: it is high time for those gentlemen, at length, to see their error, and correct it. They may succeed tolerably, for a while, in the *Trinitarian* controversy, which few, in comparison, understand thoroughly; and they may go on, for a season, in perverting *Scripture* and *Fathers*, without rebuke from the *generality*, who will not readily observe it, or be at the pains to search into it. But if they think to practise in like manner with our Articles and Liturgy, where every English reader can judge; or if they pretend to put off their *sophistry* in a *plain point* of *morality*, where every man, of any common discernment, can both detect and confute them; they will disoblige and disserve their own *characters* extremely; and will, at length, make but a very mean, not to say contemptible figure, in so wise and knowing an age. We did not indeed expect that any greater *geniuses* should rise up in the Arian cause, than had embarked in the same cause many ages upwards: but it was a reasonable presumption, that none would undertake the *reforming* of our *faith*, and the *new stamping* our whole system of *theology*, but such as would not (especially after notice given) betray a weakness and slowness of apprehension, even in the *plain* and *self-evident* principles of common honesty.

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