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
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
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MEMOIRS  
OF  
PRINCE METTERNICH

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*FIFTH VOLUME*





MEMOIRS  
OF  
PRINCE METTERNICH  
1830-1835

EDITED BY  
PRINCE RICHARD METTERNICH

*THE PAPERS CLASSIFIED AND ARRANGED BY M. A. de KLINKOWSTRÖM*

TRANSLATED BY GERARD W. SMITH, M.A.




VOL. V.

LONDON  
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1882

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## TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.




IN the present volume of Prince Metternich's Memoirs certain omissions have been made, where the original deals with such of the internal affairs of Austria as have no interest out of the Austrian Empire. Occasionally also, where the same subject is more than once treated of in almost identical terms, the repetition has been avoided in the translation.

It has not been thought necessary, as a rule, to call the reader's attention to each omission as it occurs, but in a few cases where ambiguity might otherwise result the necessary reference has been given in a note. It is believed that nothing has been omitted which would either be of interest to the general reader or would serve to illustrate the public career or the personal character of Prince Metternich.

G. W. S.





## PREFATORY REMARKS BY THE EDITOR.

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THE family and private correspondence of Prince Metternich, which served the reader as a guide through Books IV., V., and VI., ceases with the year 1829. Nearly all those near and dear friends of the late Chancellor's, with whom he kept up a familiar interchange of ideas, were torn from him in quick succession by death. With Gentz, who died in June, 1832, and who, for several years before his death, had ceased to render aught but 'imaginary' services, one of the most important of this friendly band of correspondents disappears. Neumann, indeed, lives on, but the correspondence with this trusted friend is only of a desultory character, and is concerned too exclusively with purely business matters for its contents to be available for the purpose of our biography. To all this must be added that the life of the Chancellor now moves in quieter channels. Neither Congresses nor other affairs of great moment necessitate his undertaking long journeys, or being absent for long together from the family circle, and the opportunities for writing to those left behind naturally become fewer.

On January 30, 1831, Prince Metternich contracted marriage, for the third time, with Countess Melanie Zichy-Ferraris. With this event, a fresh source becomes available for the work: the 'Diary of the Princess

Melanie.' ' Beginning with the year 1820, and continued from day to day until within a short time of her death in 1853, the ' Diary ' occupies thirty stout, closely-written volumes. We avail ourselves of this copious and most valuable source, from the wedding-day onwards, as marking the date when the writer takes her place at the Chancellor's side as his faithful partner and companion, a character which enables her to speak more authoritatively than any other witness could do on everything connected with her husband's life. Were it permissible to lay before the world, as in a poem, the confessions of a beautiful soul, how willingly could we allow the reader to gaze freely upon these pages, intended by the writer merely as a record for her own use. Unfortunately, there is much that we are compelled to keep back ; but in all that we do not keep back, we have been careful to give the exact words of the original. The time has not yet come to open this sealed book. Princess Melanie moved in the highest society of Vienna. Birth and education, beauty and intellect, contributed to qualify the wife of the Chancellor, in a pre-eminent degree, for the part she was called upon to play in the great world. Undoubtedly it was owing, in great part, to the brilliantly gifted Princess Melanie that, side by side with the Cabinet of the Chancellor, the *salon* of the Princess grew to be a centre whence emanated, during so long a period, the impulse by which the policy of the world was regulated, and that the influence exerted by the Princess Melanie was, and continues to be looked upon by contemporaries and *epigoni* as an historical fact, is vouched for by the circumstance that the gifted wife shared, and still shares, with her husband the favour or obloquy of different parties. Quick to observe and form a judgment upon all that passed before her eyes, she allowed free play to her

skilful pen to set down each thought as it arose in her mind. But the Princess wrote only for herself. She would have been the last to believe that the secrets of her inmost thoughts and feelings, which she confided to paper, might one day be divulged to the outer world.

While the 'Diary' of the Princess Melanie affords a fund of biographical notices, and gives us an insight into the domestic life of the Prince, we were fortunate enough to have at our command an authority for the political activity of the Chancellor, in the complete series of the confidential letters written by the latter to the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, Count Apponyi, between the years 1831 and 1848. After the July revolution, Paris formed, in a still greater degree than had previously been the case, the centre of the political movement of Europe. The Conservative policy of the Chancellor was occupied especially with this centre. Every important event that took place upon the European stage was discussed by him in the letters to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris. The correspondence thus forms a complete epitome of the Chancellor's political activity during those eighteen years, and reflects the views of the Prince on political events of the utmost diversity, grouped together within the smallest possible compass. This correspondence, taken in conjunction with the 'Diary,' enables us, as no other authorities could have done, to present an uninterrupted view of Prince Metternich's life in the Cabinet and in the family circle during the whole of this period. We have, therefore, taken care that these letters, arranged according to their respective years, and under the heading of 'On the Political Events of the Day,' should follow immediately after the 'Diary.'

A few remarks on the classification of the letters may not be out of place here. The communications of



the Chancellor to the more important foreign Embassies were, as a rule, of four kinds : (1) *Official instructions*, (2) *Reserved despatches*, (3) *Secret despatches*, and (4) *Private letters* of the most confidential nature. These last, destined merely for the perusal of the Ambassador or envoy, sum up, as a rule, the contents of the despatch, convey confidential intimations and decisions, and frequently give expression to the latest and most characteristic ideas of the Chancellor. The confidential letters to the Ambassador, Count Apponyi, of which we are now speaking, are all comprised among the confidential letters forming the fourth category, which were arranged by the late Chancellor himself during his voluntary exile in Brussels in 1850. Whenever a reference occurs in any of the letters to 'the despatch of this date,' a letter belonging to one of the first three categories is meant.

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BOOK VII.



THE JULY REVOLUTION AND ITS IMMEDIATE  
CONSEQUENCES,

*From its outbreak to the death of the Emperor Francis.*

1830—1835.





1830.

*THE CONDITION OF FRANCE.*

Three confidential letters of Metternich's to Apponyi in Paris, from April 14 to June 10, 1830.

953. *Vienna, April 14, 1830.*—I confess to you that I am far from being able to form to myself a satisfactory idea of the truth in the situation of men and things in France. I know well that the King who has the *will*, ought also to have the *power* to do much. Now it appears that Charles X. has the *will*; the question is whether he will continue to remain equally firm, and whether the instruments of his will will be capable of choosing the proper means.

I am, in fact, convinced that the Prince de Polignac is too deeply engaged in the work of restoration, not to foresee clearly the result of the course he is pursuing. A government which has both the will and the intention to act is very strong, and if moreover it takes its stand on its just rights, it ought to succeed. Thus, after your last interview, with the Prince de Polignac, the future of France inspires me with more than mere hopes.

It is on the ground of the Charter that the Government ought to take up its position; it is this ground that it ought to defend, and on this ground I look upon it as unassailable. To give it up to the enemy would be a serious error, and if it is a question of interpreting the law, it is assuredly the one who has given it on

whom that right devolves, not the one who has received it. If former administrations had known how to accomplish this task, the situation of affairs would be very different from what it is at the present time.

954. *May 9.*—My appearance on the banks of the Rhine (Johannisberg) must inevitably furnish a subject for calumny to faction. The *Journal des Débats* will be the first to denounce my journey as being connected with some occurrence in France. It will be the same with your journey; you will be set down as the enemy of M. de Polignac, and I shall be the one to dictate what that minister is to do. We shall have then either to combine our movements differently, or, according to circumstances, give up what would nevertheless in every way suit me.

You will have learnt through the French Cabinet that the Porte has agreed to the arrangements of the allies in regard to Greece.\* The Sultan has acted wisely; which does not alter the fact that the allies have committed grave political wrongs. The Reis-Effendi expressed himself on the subject to Mr. Gordon in a way that does as much honour to the religion as the intelligence of the Divan. For once, it is not the wearers of the turban who have been the barbarians.

955. *Johannisberg, June 5.*—The fate of royalty in France and the repose of Europe are being played out at this moment like a hand at *écarté*. Whoever turns up the king will be the one to mark the point and win the game, for both sides are, at this moment, equally balanced.

What confusion at Paris and London! Looking on

\* The three allied Powers of England, France, and Russia had come to an agreement in the Conference-Protocol of February 4, 1830, that Greece should be declared an independent State, free from obligation of tribute, and should have a king of her own.—ED.



from a distance, one would say they were a couple of mad-houses. No doubt it strikes you less from your being on the stage, while I on my mountain am in the first tier of boxes. What is still in store for us? God knows all, but for my part I declare that I am in a state of sheer bewilderment. *Fiat voluntas tua.* That is all a sensible man can say!\*

Your reports afford the most painful interest; the various questions of which they treat are of the most serious nature, and the solution of them is wrapped in a profound mist. I have always a great dislike to enter upon subjects in which I do not see my way clearly; but how far stronger must this impression necessarily become, where questions vital for a great empire are at stake, and when, above all, I cannot resist a feeling which is almost conviction that the French Government, engaged as it is in the most daring enterprises, does not see how things are likely to turn out eventually, any more clearly than I do myself!

At this moment two vast enterprises demand attention, which, though essentially distinct, unite nevertheless in aiming at a single object: it is impossible to designate by any other term the attitude of avowed hostility taken up by the French Ministry towards the elective chamber,—and the Algerian enterprise.† In order to obtain a definite idea of the essential difference between the two questions, it is sufficient to consider the most striking peculiarities of each. The struggle with

\* Writing to Prince Esterhazy in London, on the same day, Metternich says: 'I take a very gloomy view of the general condition of things. In France, affairs have become solely a question of persons. Things are no longer aught but a pretext employed by the factions to gain their own ends. M. de Polignac ventures much. It is to be hoped he will succeed; but who can answer for it?'—ED.

† France had, on April 20, declared war against the Dey of Algiers.—ED.



faction may have been a matter of necessity (and I am ready to believe that such has, in fact, been the case), whereas the expedition against Algiers is voluntary. The former is a matter of administration, the latter one of politics. Both have been conceived with the idea of saving the royal Government ; the Algerian expedition may possibly succeed—and in a material point of view I have no doubt it will succeed—but the Government will perish all the same, unless it consults other means for its safety ; the affair of the elections may fall through—and it would much surprise me if it succeeded—but the political question would still remain as a most dangerous complication. In a word, everything in France is at stake—everything is in a state of acute crisis. I have long had a presentiment of the existence of danger, and seen it gradually increasing ; for a long time, too, I have thought it my duty to call the serious attention of the principal Courts to this subject. The Cabinets have paid no attention to me. Some of them have been living in a state of dangerous security ; others have dreaded, by taking it into consideration, to evoke an evil which in my opinion was already there. Now, there is no longer room for counsels ; Europe is reduced to a most undignified *rôle*—that of a dangerous waiting upon events. The Court which, beyond all comparison, has the most to reproach itself with, is that of London. It alone, to whom everything was possible, has done nothing which could be said in the smallest degree to bear the character of a useful prevision. Between great States the means of repression is—war. But will England be willing to go to war ? I do not think so. Will she allow the consummation of what must necessarily be the result of the French expedition ? Such renunciation appears to me extremely difficult. I

have reached a point where I am no longer able to foresee anything, to calculate anything. Whenever a collected mind finds itself reduced to such a condition as that, things must have come to a wretched pass indeed!

A few days previous to my departure from Vienna, Lord Cowley acquainted me with the latest correspondence between his Cabinet and Lord Stuart. The last document was an instruction from Lord Aberdeen to that ambassador, under date of May 4, and you have felt the effects of it in the subsequent attitude of your colleague towards the French Government. By these instructions, Lord Stuart was directed to declare to Prince Polignac 'that the British Cabinet recognised the right and the duty of making itself acquainted explicitly with the views of France on all the possible consequences of her enterprise.' The despatch of Lord Aberdeen concluded by declaring that in the event of such explanation not being instantly given, the consequences of the refusal, whatever might be their nature, would fall upon the Cabinet of His Most Christian Majesty. The Prince de Polignac will have made the only answer open to him; he will have repeated that France will hold herself in readiness to come to an explanation with her allies. This is not what England wants, nor what she can rest contented with, and yet it is the only answer which the French minister can possibly have made. The English demand certainly rests on strong grounds, but it should have been made six months ago; in other words, at the proper time, when the question had been put by us before the English ministers, and was apparently treated by them with the utmost indifference. Even supposing they were not convinced that the French Government was

thoroughly decided in favour of the enterprise, the fact would still remain inexplicable.

Shortly before Lord Cowley's communication, M. de Rayneval had received despatches from his Court with instructions to desire us to transmit to you full authority to take part in any deliberations hereafter arising out of the Algerian question. I replied to the ambassador that you would receive directions from us on the subject.

These directions cannot but be very simple: if you should be invited by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to join with him and your colleagues for the purpose of a general deliberation, you will not hesitate to respond to this appeal.

In the matter in question, one object especially claims our attention, viz., the maintenance of a good understanding among the maritime Powers.

In the Algerian affair we have no other interests than those which are shared with us by all the other States: the abolition of piracy with that of slavery; the introduction of a more settled state of things in Algiers—all this we can look upon as being of real and general advantage. Whatever, as the result of great French successes, goes beyond these objects, must lead to political complications. But here England is pledged to take up a prominent position; and as our amicable relations with that Power are thoroughly natural on our part, it is in the order of things that, in the present complication, we should above all consult the interests of Great Britain. It would be desirable that upon every point which might come to be submitted to general consideration, the Courts of Vienna and London should be able mutually to consult and take measures in a sincere and friendly spirit.

You may announce to the Prince de Polignac, verbally and confidentially, that you have been authorised, should occasion require, to join him and your colleagues for the purpose of considering such overtures as his Excellency may have to make to you. You will add that the sole direction possible has been given you as a rule for your general guidance; viz., to bring to the consideration of every subject a spirit of entire impartiality and at the same time of frank conciliation for those interests which, to the great regret of your Court, might afford cause of divergence. You will express yourself in the same tenor to Lord Stuart and your colleagues of Russia and Prussia. To enjoin on you to avoid, in your attitude generally, anything which might convey the impression of over-eagerness, appears to me quite needless.

As for the English Ambassador, you may inform him that it is with him you will always be prepared, in preference, to come to an understanding.

The assembling of a Conference appears to me, however, still very problematical. The more the French Cabinet desire to have recourse to it, the less will that of Great Britain be, in all probability, prepared to enter on a general discussion of questions which it may justly consider as being peculiarly English.\*

\* The expedition, as is known, ended with the capitulation of Algiers on July 5, 1830.—ED.

*AN UNDERSTANDING OF METTERNICH'S WITH  
NESSELRODE AT CARLSBAD.*

*Metternich to the Emperor Francis (Report), Königswart,  
July 31, 1830.*

**956.** I arrived at Carlsbad on July 27, and remained there four-and-twenty hours, in order to put myself in communication with Count Nesselrode.

Count Nesselrode was shy and shrank from meeting me. As, however, I received him with an entire absence of constraint, and proceeded to lay before him, with carefully regulated precision, the points I had proposed to myself to touch upon, concluding by addressing to him the reproaches which his political conduct has for years past deserved, his shyness disappeared, and, compelled to place himself on his defence, he soon had to admit the insufficiency of his weapons. The most conspicuous proof he gave of this was his descending to denials which did not hold good.

As every question, however complicated, depends in the last result on some one basis, I have deduced from my conversations with Count Nesselrode the following corollaries which, to my mind, are irrefragable.

From the beginning of the Eastern question, there existed a conspiracy among Russian statesmen to involve the Emperor, their master, in a far-reaching complication with the Porte. In their efforts to attain this end they stopped short at nothing.



Many aims lay at the foundation of this project. The liberal sentiment which sought to divert the mind of the Emperor Alexander from the monarchical bias which it had taken in the latter years of his life, and thence created new interests; the circumstance that both the individuals at the head of the Cabinet were foreigners (one of them was actually a Corfiote demagogue, and the other a semi-liberal of non-Russian nationality); the spirit of the Russian people, so prone to be easily stirred up when a question arises of employing force against those weaker than itself—all these circumstances so combined to embarrass Count Nesselrode, that he took the course usually adopted by weak minds, and which consists in following the stream, and swimming down it without regard to the voice of conscience, until they either drown or find some means or other to save themselves.

In this picture is contained, moreover, the key to what has happened. We have seen the Emperor Alexander, to whom, in spite of many splendid gifts of mind and disposition, a sound judgment was denied, enter, from the year 1823, on a course of fatal vacillation. More than forsaken by his own people, misled as to the true state of affairs, and exposed to the most threatening dangers in the internal concerns of his kingdom, he knew not on what course to decide. Capodistria and a few other individuals could do whatever they liked; the Emperor had no longer a voice in anything, and Count Nesselrode swam with the stream. With us he could no longer work in harmony, and I, in particular, appeared to him like the sting of conscience. This is proved by the very words he himself used: '*Ce que dans l'affaire orientale il y a de plus heureux, c'est qu'elle est finie.*' This short sentence is the severest

judgment on an undertaking, in which, if he did not originate it, he was at last deeply implicated as an accessory.

I began my first conversation with the Count by acquainting him with Count Apponyi's latest communication from Paris, respecting the conferences held by Prince Polignac on the Brazilian transaction. He entirely concurred with my own views.

I then passed to other questions of the day, and always with the same result. I concluded this part of the subject with an exposition of my views on the condition of France. Against these, once more, he could advance nothing.

When we had got thus far, I observed to him, in a tone of jesting surprise, how strange it must appear, that two men, each of whom was at the same time at the head of a Cabinet, should think alike in every detail, yet to all appearance differ so widely from each other, in the political attitude of their respective Courts! To this he could make no reply.

His first silence appeared to me the most favourable moment for coming out with direct complaints.

'I have,' said I, 'a great reproach to make against you, and this reproach is the more serious, in that it relates to you in your twofold quality of man and minister. What! you who had been the mover and stay of my long and useful relations with the late Emperor—you could actually give way to the faction which had worked in vain for several years to break this very bond—a bond on which to a great extent depended the peace of Europe, and the internal tranquillity of the States composing it?'

Here Count Nesselrode interrupted me eagerly, asserting that this blame did not attach to him; on the

contrary, his liveliest endeavour had always been exerted in just the contrary direction. As a voucher for this, he could adduce the work which he had laid before the new Emperor on his accession, the aim of which had been to bring together in a true picture the events of the time subsequent to the year 1815, and thus leave to that monarch the choice of the way to be pursued ; 'in this picture,' he added, 'you play the foremost part, and my zealous endeavour has been to give a prominent place to the distinguished services rendered by you in the years 1820, 1821, and 1823.'

'That,' I answered, 'establishes only more clearly one fact, and that is, the weakness of your position. If, as I do not for a moment doubt, you laid a picture of the kind before the Emperor Nicholas, he at any rate attached no credence to it.'

Count Nesselrode endeavoured to make me understand that this had not been entirely the case ; that many minor circumstances and so on had influenced the Emperor.

'The excuse,' I answered, 'is weak ; either you are minister or you are not minister ; no one who is incapable of moulding the events submitted to his action comes up, in my view, to what I understand by the term minister. I regard as such that man only who, like the commander-in-chief, can direct the battle.'

Here Count Nesselrode was silent once more.

'The second reproach,' I continued, 'which I make against you, is the flood-way which, by your deviation from the only correct political principles, you have afforded to the enemies of order. Things cannot go on so ; you and Russia would be the first to fall a sacrifice.'



Count Nesselrode assured me, at this point, that he was fully sensible of the dangers now imminent.

Thus far I have carried on my conference at Carlsbad. On August 10, Count Nesselrode comes to Franzensbad, which will bring him into my immediate neighbourhood. He will go through the course of treatment there. Meanwhile events are maturing in France and England, and both will give me the opportunity of carrying on the work in hand. My own view, founded on a thorough acquaintance with the man, is that I shall win over Count Nesselrode's mind. Even so, however, only a negative good will have been attained. The positive good will be brought about by necessity.\*

\* At the time Metternich was writing the last words of the report, the looked-for moment of 'necessity' had, unknown to him, already arrived. It is a noteworthy historical coincidence, that the conversation between the two old friends, who had not met again since the autumn of 1823, took place almost at the very hour when the storm, before whose might the legitimate throne of France crumbled into ruins, broke loose in Paris. It was with the impression of that event, so world-wide in its effects, still fresh on their minds, that the two Chancellors joined hands in Carlsbad over an alliance between Austria and Russia, which was thenceforward to suffer no serious interruption. The document immediately following (No. 957), bears, like the preceding, the identical date of July 31. Both reports were written on the same day, and the arrival at Königswart of the tidings announcing the outbreak of the July revolution in Paris, falls within the short interval of their composition.—ED.

**OUTBREAK OF THE JULY REVOLUTION IN  
PARIS.**

Five reports of Prince Metternich's to the Emperor Francis, from July 1 to August 5, with an Imperial Resolution of August 9, 1830.

957. *Königswart, July 31, 1830.*—Before the arrival of the present respectful report, the news from Paris of the 26th instant will have already reached your Majesty. Up to this time only the *Moniteur* of that date has come into my hands, and that very speedily by way of Frankfort.\* I am looking forward every hour to the arrival of a courier from Count Apponyi.

The two measures taken by the Government, viz., the suspension of the freedom of the Press, not merely for the daily political journals, but even any publication of less than twenty pages; the heavy penalties denounced against those who infringe the decrees, and more than this, the dissolution of the new Chamber of Deputies only recently elected, are of a nature not to *solve* but *cut through* the matters and questions in dispute. The King has thrown down the gage to Liberalism. Will the latter take it up? That is the first question. If it determines to do so, what will be the issue of the struggle? Time alone can give the answer to both questions. In any other country than France I should not ask the former; but in France, where everything—even to the sharpest contradictions—is possible, it is quite another matter. There nothing can be foreseen,

\* The *Moniteur* of that date contains the well-known royal decrees.—ED.

because the proceedings of the parties may just as easily turn out to be mere pretence as earnest.

Thus much is certain, that victory is now possible for one only of the contending parties. Should the Liberals behave with moderation they will show such proofs of weakness, that the victory of the Government may already be reckoned upon, if only they are successful in maintaining the seats and positions of their members.

Thus much may be anticipated, but the result must be waited for. Even if things end in a really severe conflict, the ministerial statement, as given in the *Moniteur* of July 26, will ever remain a manifesto of the utmost utility. It does not contain a single sentence which we ourselves—and with us all rational people—might not have enunciated as fundamental truths. That such truths should be sent out into the world, and that by a Government which so long disowned them, is a great event, come what may!

The month of August will be a great month! It may be said of it in any case, *Novus ab integro nascitur ordo!*

**958.** *Königswart, August 1.*—At this moment when, beyond the tenor of the royal decrees, nothing is yet known to me of the great measure proclaimed by the French Government on July 26, it has occurred to me that it might not be without interest to attempt an analysis, however imperfect, of the measures themselves.

The first of these—the suspension of the freedom of the Press—falls into two divisions.

In regard to periodical publications no censorship exists. The measure in force involves a far greater hardship: newspaper proprietors, editors and printers must obtain the consent of the Government before

setting up the paper; they may then publish it, but only under daily danger of having the newspaper suppressed and the concession withdrawn.

To any print of less than twenty sheets the censorship applies. This has been borrowed from the Carlsbad decrees.

The measure, so far as journals and newspapers are concerned, can only be provisional; indeed, without some modification, no journalistic undertaking could be kept going; here the censorship must come in as the most natural means for attaining the desired end.

The Election law is entirely new, and is very similar in its provisions to that which Napoleon had enacted. Will these good intentions, of which the Government have given such strong and determined proof, carry the day? This, I am convinced, is what no one can tell.

959. *Königswart, August 4, 5, Midnight.*—I have just received the enclosed newspaper from Frankfort. Its contents show that the Revolution, and one too of the extremest type, has won the day in Paris.

This fact proves two things: first, that the Ministry erred in the choice of means; secondly, that I was right when, more than two years back, I called the attention of the Cabinets to the threatening condition of things. Unhappily my words were thrown away.

I perceive the moment has arrived for me to regard the sensation which my unexpected return to Vienna must inevitably excite as of no moment, compared with the necessity for my putting myself near your Majesty.

I have made my arrangements so as to have one more conversation with Count Nesselrode,\* and then

\* Count Nesselrode was at this time at Carlsbad, distant only a few hours from Königswart (see No. 955).—ED.

set out on my journey for Vienna. I hope to arrive there on the 10th or 12th of the current month.

I have apprised Count Kolowrat of what has befallen in France, and summoned him to repair to Vienna likewise. The moment is too weighty and concerns too deeply all the relations of the State for anyone to delay hastening to his post. I hope he will obey the summons.

What are the consequences that the catastrophe of the day may not, or I might say, cannot but have on the immediate and even the more distant future? The side to which we must turn our attention without delay is Italy. It is thither that the revolutionary impulse will unquestionably tend to spread.

The fact of the real Jacobites, both old and new, being at the head of the revolt involves rather an element of good than one of great evil. These people are not popular in France, but they are feared; and in that country fear does more than everything else put together, though that only for the moment.

960. *Königswart, August 5.*—May it please your Majesty to receive herewith a recent communication from Baron Münch which has just reached me, together with a letter from Count Apponyi to the former.

This letter puts things in a somewhat clearer light. The Duke of Orleans has put himself at the head of the revolt; so that the latter has for the moment a leader. The King is still with the army. How long will things remain thus, and what form will the end take? The occurrence bears in many respects the stamp of the English Revolution of 1688.

I have made no change in my travelling arrangements, and shall accordingly, as I had this night the honour of informing your Majesty, set out from here



early to-morrow for Vienna, stopping at Carlsbad in order to have an interview there with Count Nesselrode. I hope to arrive at Vienna on the 10th instant.

961. *Königswart, August 5.*—In accordance with my respectful report of to-day, I have the honour to lay before your Majesty a communication from Count Buol, which has just arrived from Baden, near Carlsruhe. The report itself, and still more the Strasbourg newspaper accompanying it, contains a number of details which prove only too surely that the downfall of things at Paris is well-nigh complete.

All the men who have been placed in office belong to the extreme left. There is not a single respectable citizen among them ; the victory thus remains with the Radicals, as will always be the case in an open struggle between the parties.

The subjects which I shall select for discussion at my interview with Count Nesselrode to-morrow, relate principally to the measure which seems to me of the most pressing importance ; the ways and means, namely, by which *a basis of union between the Great Powers, and in especial the old Quadruple Alliance, might be found, and the aim of which must be to give unity to their resolutions and proceedings.*

The thing is difficult, but it is of all others the most urgent.\*

\* In the interview with Nesselrode, which took place at Carlsbad on the following day, the desired basis of union was quickly found, and forthwith agreed upon. Metternich gave it expression in a few words which he wrote down on a small piece of paper, and with which Nesselrode fully concurred. These words ran as follows : 'To adopt for the general basis of our conduct not in any way to interfere in the internal disputes of France, but, on the other hand, to permit no violation on the part of the French Government either of the material interests of Europe, as established and guaranteed by general transactions, or of the internal peace of the various States composing it. 'This brief summary of the attitude to be maintained by Austria and Russia towards the July Revolution continued thence-

That which you say at the end of this report, is what I had in my mind before you wrote to me about it. There must be unity in our principles, our plans, and our mode of carrying them out ; and to effect this, a basis of union between the Great Powers must be re-established. How to carry this into effect is the most urgent problem which you have to solve.

FRANCIS.

Baden, August 9, 1830.

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forward, with the concurrence of Prussia, to be the guiding principle in the policy of the three allied Powers of the North. In diplomatic language, the note thus jotted down on a scrap of paper was called, in allusion to the circumstances under which it originated, the *Chiffon de Carlsbad*. See No. 974.—ED.

*RECOGNITION OF THE NEW FRENCH  
GOVERNMENT ON THE PART OF AUSTRIA.*

- 962-964. Three interviews of Metternich's with General Belliard, ambassador of King Louis Philippe, of August 27, August 30, and September 8, 1830, from autograph notes by Metternich.
965. King Louis Philippe to the Emperor Francis (Letter), Paris, August 19, 1830.
966. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, September 12, 1830.

*First Interview of August 27, 1830.*

962. General Belliard arrived here the night of August 26-27, and found the ambassador, Count de Rayneval, no longer there, he having set out the day before for Paris. He appears to have been disappointed at this. He applied to the first secretary of the Embassy, who requested me, on the morning of the 27th, to name the hour at which I could see the General. I invited him to call on me at two in the afternoon.

The General, accompanied by M. de Schwebel, presented himself at the appointed time, and I received them together.

General Belliard began the conversation by discharging the mission with which he informed me he was entrusted. 'The new King,' said he, 'has sent me to his Imperial and Royal Majesty, to transmit to him a letter on his behalf (No. 965). His Majesty has commanded me to add to his written words a verbal assurance of the sentiments of most sincere friendship which he feels for the Emperor, and at the same time his



firm desire to maintain with him the most intimate relations of peace and mutual good will. I have further been commanded to declare in the name of his Majesty, and in the most solemn manner, that the new Government desires nothing but the maintenance of peace in Europe ; that it is prepared to respect and will continue to respect all the treaties ; that it does not and will not look for any extension of territory, and that its most earnest desire is not to find itself called upon to undertake the legitimate defence of its rights and domains.

‘ With this assurance I have to couple a second, viz., that the wishes of the Government are not limited to this object alone ; it is equally anxious to see the internal peace of the States preserved ; it will, for its part, not only do nothing which might tend to disturb that repose, but will employ every means to prevent turbulent spirits being hurried into excesses, by reason of any calculation which they might erroneously found on support to be derived from it. On this point, Prince, I am even commanded to inform you that the King has resisted entreaties which have reached him from many sides on this subject. His Majesty will continue to resist them ; nay, more—agents have at once been despatched by the Government to exhort the disturbers of the public repose not to expose themselves to defeat by counting on any support from him.’

At the conclusion of this address, General Belliard offered me the copy of the letter of which he was the bearer. I refused to receive it.

‘ I find myself compelled,’ said I to him, ‘ before taking any steps, to inform the Emperor of your arrival, and obtain his Majesty’s commands. What I have no hesitation in at once stating to you, is that the Emperor, true to the same rules of wisdom and reason

which are ever the guiding principles of his thoughts and determinations, will never permit himself, in circumstances so deplorable, I will even say so disastrous, to be led by a policy of sentiment. His Majesty has no intention, either now or hereafter, of mixing himself up in the affairs of your great and unhappy country ; on the other hand, his Majesty has no idea of allowing the new Government to intermeddle with his affairs. His Majesty has consistently respected and will continue to respect the sanctity of treaties ; he recognises in them the sole basis for the maintenance of political repose ; and he is deeply convinced that in this all the European Powers are animated by one and the same thought.

‘The minister,’ I added, ‘has for the moment nothing further to say to you ; Prince Metternich, however, can chat with an old acquaintance.’

‘In what you have just told me as to the dispositions of the new Government, there is nothing whatever to cause me surprise. There is a rule which never deceives those who follow it, and which consists in founding all calculations on the basis of interests. The foremost interest of every Government is that of consolidation and preservation. Men on arriving at power naturally desire its maintenance ; but it is not in the paths of disturbance that this is found possible. Rest assured, therefore, that I entertain no doubt as to the reality of what you tell me are the dispositions of the new Government ; but that does not cover the whole question. Will the Government be able to enforce what it wishes ? My mind is quite made up on this point.’

The General replied that the doubt I had just expressed to him was worthy of a statesman, and that

he was happily in a position to dissipate it. 'You have just seen a first act of authority on the King's part. You have read his proclamation. The effect of the Royal utterances has been complete ; numerous gatherings had once more been formed ; there needed nothing more to disperse them than the mere posting of the proclamation. The vast majority in France desire peace at home and abroad. It is in reliance on this majority, and by placing himself at its head, that the King will be able to keep what is really equivalent to engagements entered into by him. The last Government fell because it had neither the power nor the skill to strike root in France. This will not be the case with the new Government.'

'It appears to me,' said I to the General, 'that you have not grasped the nature and real meaning of my words : I will proceed to make them more clear.'

'I have known you as one of the most zealous adherents of the man who was, beyond all question, the prototype of power. Of two alternatives I can only admit one ; either the character of Mgr. le Duc d'Orleans comes up to that of Napoleon in strength, or else falls below it, for to exceed it seems to me beyond the bounds of nature. Now, intimately acquainted as you were with Napoleon, do you believe that, placed in the position of the present Government, he would have considered himself in possession of the requisite means for governing, or, what comes to the same thing, would have considered himself in a condition to assure his throne and the maintenance of internal tranquillity in France ? Can that which Napoleon would not have recognised as sufficient be justly looked upon by the new Government as capable of affording it secure pledges of existence ?'

To this question General Belliard made the only reply open to him. He was silent, and after a moment's reflection said to me: 'Things are changed, Prince; France is no longer the France of the past, and she must be governed by new methods.'

Not feeling called upon to evoke a polemical discussion, I let the conversation drop at this point, once more telling the General that I would take the commands of his Imperial Majesty, and communicate them to him.

*Second Conversation of August 30, 1830.\**

**963.** This discussion, which was carried on in terms of the utmost propriety, gave me the opportunity of becoming acquainted with a particular circumstance, of the details of which I had hitherto been ignorant.

'There are in France,' said General Belliard to me, 'men who would like to get a Republic; the most remarkable among the number—and out of Paris especially it is small—must be known to you; I will therefore dispense with naming them to you. At the moment when the Duke of Orleans had been proclaimed by the Chamber Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, he wrote to General La Fayette, who was organising a commune at the Hôtel de Ville in imitation of those of republican memory. The General made no reply whatever to it. The Duke subsequently addressed two more letters to him, with a like result. When the Chamber came to pay its respects to the Lieutenant-General, the Duke informed the deputies of what had just happened, and imparted to them his determination to go in person and unattended to the Hôtel de Ville.'

\* The first part of this conversation is in substance a repetition of the former one.—TR.



‘It was only at the urgent request of the deputies that he permitted them to accompany him. An immense crowd lined the road from the Palais Royal to the Hôtel de Ville. From the starting-point to the Place de Grève, the Duke was received by this crowd with the warmest demonstrations of joy and devotion. But the people who filled the Place de Grève presented a very different appearance ; their attitude was sullen, even threatening. Little by little, the enthusiasm of the crowd which accompanied the Duke and his suite communicated itself to the Place de Grève, and before the Prince had dismounted, the cries of “Long live the Lieutenant-General” became unanimous. Proceeding then to the council-chamber, the Duke took General La Fayette by the arm, and led him to the balcony ; there he embraced him, and it was all over with the Republic.’

‘The circumstance,’ I interrupted, ‘testifies to the Duke of Orleans’s deportment. A kiss is a slight exertion to stifle a Republic with ; but do you really think you can attach the same weight to all the kisses which may hereafter be given ? would you attach to them the weight of guarantees ?’

The General burst out laughing, and there the discussion ended.

I rose, and he thereupon asked me, with some embarrassment, whether the honour of paying his respects to the Emperor would be denied him much longer ? I replied, that not having yet received his Majesty’s commands, it was not for me to anticipate them.

‘Do not regard me, Prince,’ replied the General, ‘as being impatient. I know what is demanded of me from the honour of him I represent ; I can well believe, on the other hand, that there are many interests which

have to be consulted by you. *Among them I include guarantees to be demanded from us.*

I took the General at his word, and congratulated him on his foresight.\*

*Third Conversation of September 8, 1830.*

964. The Emperor having signed the answer to the letter of which General Belliard had been the bearer, I handed it to the latter this evening; and on this occasion the following conversation took place between us:

‘You are about to return to Paris,’ observed I to him, ‘and I hope that you have understood me. I have had the honour of conversing with you on two separate occasions, on the grave circumstances of the moment; but desirous as I am that no uncertainty should be left on your mind in regard to the actual intentions of the Austrian Cabinet, I hold it my duty to summarise, in a few words, the whole truth as it presents itself to us.

\* Between this and the following conversation with General Belliard, Count Metternich, on September 1, wrote the following note to Count Nesselrode, then in Vienna, and preparing for his return to St. Petersburg:

‘I shall put off General Belliard’s audience for two or three days yet; beyond that I cannot go because of our public. Decisions definitely taken and clearly expressed are the only ones which can properly be supported by public opinion. The latter resembles a ship in the midst of the tempest: some direction or other must be given to it, and the best is always to be found in a course which may be openly avowed. The opinion of all reasonable men with you—and happily their number is very great—is in perfect harmony with the system agreed upon personally by us at Carlsbad. It is the only reasonable one, I will go so far as to say the only one possible for civilised States.

‘But, after all, the thought I secretly cherish is that ancient Europe is at the beginning of the end. My determination being to perish with it, I shall know how to do my duty; nor is this my motto only—it is that of the Emperor too. New Europe, on the other hand, has not as yet even begun its existence, and between the end and the beginning there will be a chaos.

‘I heartily congratulate myself, my dear Count, on the fortunate circumstance of our meeting. Personal contact is what no other kind of relations can replace.’—ED.

‘The Emperor abhors what has recently taken place in France; in doing so, he is not indulging a preference for any particular form of Government, or for any particular system. . . . The Emperor’s deep, irresistible feeling is that the present order of things in France cannot last.

‘His Imperial Majesty is equally convinced that the head of the Government and his ministers ought not to hide this truth from themselves, but should at once anxiously set to work to discover by what means they may maintain themselves for the longest time possible. These means they can only find in a return to those rules and principles on which all Governments rest. Then, leaving out of account their origin, they will find a course of action open to them which they can follow in common with all the European Governments; preservation is what all desire; fools alone aim at destruction.

‘It is this conviction which, in the Emperor’s opinion, can alone vindicate the decision at which he has just arrived. There are times and circumstances in which the actual good is impossible; wisdom then suggests that Governments, like men, should adhere to what is the least of evils. The Emperor, in taking the course you see him now follow, has consulted this rule; he sees behind the phantom of a Government in France nothing but the most pronounced anarchy. His Imperial Majesty has been unwilling to have to reproach himself with favouring anarchy.

‘Let your Government maintain its footing; let it advance on a practical path; we ask for nothing better.

‘What we were able to do for it, we have done; the only duty which it remains for us to fulfil towards

ourselves and Europe, is that of guarding against the errors into which it might have the misfortune to fall or to be seduced. We shall never permit of encroachments on its part; it will encounter us and Europe wherever it tries to exercise a system of propaganda. As for policy, Austria frames none, and the circumstances of the case are assuredly not favourable for forming one. Our policy is exclusively confined to the maintenance of treaties and of the public repose.'

. . . The General assured me that he would give the King a faithful and particular account of our interviews, and that he was certain beforehand of not telling him anything which he was not prepared to hear.\*

*King Louis Philippe to the Emperor Francis (Letter),  
Paris, August 19, 1830.*

965. *Monsieur mon Frère, Cousin, et Beau-Frère,*—  
I announce my accession to the throne to your Imperial and Royal Majesty by the letter which Lieutenant-General Count Belliard will present to you in my name; but it is needful I should speak to your Majesty, with entire confidence, on the results of a catastrophe which I would so gladly have averted.

For a long time past it has been a matter of regret to me that King Charles X. and his Government did not follow a course better adapted to accord with the hopes and expectations of the nation. I was far, however, from foreseeing the stupendous events which have recently taken place, and I went so far as to believe that in default of that frank and loyal temper in the spirit of

\* With the view of putting the whole matter in as clear a light as possible, we here subjoin the letter from King Louis Philippe to the Emperor Francis, with the transmission of which General Belliard had been entrusted.—ED.



the Charter and the genius of our institutions, which it was so difficult to obtain, a little prudence and moderation would have sufficed to enable the Government to go on for a long time as it was doing. But since the 8th of August, 1829, the new composition of the Ministry had greatly alarmed me. I observed the degree to which that composition roused the suspicion and dislike of the nation, and I was uneasy, in common with the whole of France, as to the measures we might expect from it. Nevertheless, attachment to the laws and love of order have made such progress in France that the opposition to the Ministry would in all probability not have over-stepped parliamentary limits had not this very Ministry, in its madness, given the fatal signal to do so, by the most imprudent and audacious violation of the Charter, and the abolition of all the guarantees of our liberties, to defend which there is not a single Frenchman who would hesitate to shed his blood. No excess has stained this terrible struggle; still it could hardly fail to shake to some extent our social fabric, while the very exaltation of men's minds, at the same time that it kept them from anything like disorder, hurried them into attempting to realise political theories which would have plunged France, and perhaps Europe, into great calamities. It was in this state of things, Sire, that all hopes were turned towards me.

The vanquished themselves looked upon me as necessary to their safety. I was all the more so, perhaps, lest the victors should have allowed their victory to degenerate. I have therefore accepted this noble and difficult task, laying aside all the personal considerations which united to make me wish to be exempted from it, from the feeling that the least hesi-

tation on my part might compromise the future of France and the repose of our neighbours which it is so important for us to insure. The title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, which left everything open, aroused a dangerous distrust. It was necessary without delay to pass out of a provisional state of things, not only in order to inspire the necessary confidence, but to save that Charter the preservation of which is so important, and which would have been gravely compromised had not men's minds been quickly satisfied and reassured. It will not escape your Majesty's perspicuity or deep wisdom, that, in order to attain this salutary end, it is highly desirable that what has taken place in Paris should be regarded in its true light, and that Europe, justly appreciating the motives which have guided me, should bestow on my Government the confidence it has a right to inspire. I would beg your Majesty not to lose sight of the fact that so long as Charles X. reigned over France, I was one of his most obedient and loyal subjects, and that it was only when I saw the action of the laws paralysed and the exercise of the Royal authority reduced to a nullity, that I thought it my duty to give way to the wish of the nation by accepting the throne to which I was called. The ties of family and relationship which unite me to your Majesty will only increase my desire to see the goodwill happily existing between our States strengthened and confirmed. These, Sire, are my sincere sentiments, and I venture to believe that you will deign to share them.

I beg your Majesty to accept, etc., etc.

*Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, September 12,  
1830.*

966. I took the opportunity offered by the return of General Belliard to Paris to write to you. I have still, however, nearly everything to tell you to complete what is essential for you to know.

The gaze of the impartial and enlightened observer rests at the present time upon a world in ruins. Nothing at present existing in France can endure, for everything lacks a basis and support, while everything yet standing outside the kingdom is exposed to the liability of attack. There is no need to take into consideration an armed attack on the part of France. The persons there likely to give the signal for political warfare have neither the time to think of it nor the power to carry it into execution. The reflections contained in your last reports on this subject are perfectly just. I go still further, and admit, without fear of being mistaken, that the new Government dreads a rupture with the Powers far more than the latter would have reason to apprehend it. The most obvious proof of the difficulty of its situation lies in the very fear it cherishes on this point. It perceives the incompatibility existing between it and the repose of Europe, and aspires to become what it never can become, a guarantee for the peace of the world ! The real difference between the situation in France during the last few years and that now existing, lies in this : that the Revolution now shows itself openly, whereas at *that* time it was still covered by a light veil.

Your credentials, Count, have not yet been sent, for the two following reasons : in the first place, there is a rumour current that the new French Government

wished to do away with the ambassadors on economical grounds ; in the second place, we should like to know something of whom they are likely to send us.\*

Be pleased to express yourself frankly on both these matters to Count Molé, and to use the utmost simplicity in placing the two questions before him.

The decisions which it caused us most trouble to arrive at have been taken ; henceforward we pursue a course free from all reserve.

. . . You will place yourself in direct communication with the Cabinet, and look upon yourself as in the position occupied by the representatives of the Powers in the interval of transition from one reign to the next.

\* Marshal Maison was sent as the French ambassador to Vienna. The question was thus set at rest, and Apponyi received his credentials as Austrian ambassador at the Court of Louis Philippe.—ED.

*THE INSURRECTION IN THE NETHERLANDS.*

967. Metternich to Wessenberg (Instruction), Presburg, October 3, 1830.  
 968. Metternich to the Emperor Francis (Report), Vienna, October 11, 1830.  
 969. Metternich to Esterhazy in London, Presburg, October 21, 1830.  
 970. Metternich to Esterhazy in London, Presburg, October 21, 1830.  
 971. Metternich to Wessenberg at the Hague, Presburg, October 21,  
 1830.

967. His Majesty, having deemed it expedient to recall the Count de Mier from the post he now holds, has chosen your Excellency to replace him as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Court of his Majesty the King of the Netherlands.\*

Our whole attention is concentrated on the events of the day, among which the kingdom of the Netherlands occupies only too prominent a position. One keenly debated question to which those events have given rise, is the separation of the Belgian provinces from the ancient provinces of Holland—a separation eagerly demanded by a large proportion of the Belgian people. This question lends a fresh importance to the mission with which your Excellency is intrusted, and affords the principal subject of the instructions yet remaining for me to give you.

The *full* and *complete* union of the Belgian provinces with the ancient provinces of Holland having been guaranteed by the Allied Powers under the Treaty of

\* In consequence of this recall, Wessenberg, who had withdrawn from the public service since 1819, once more entered on a diplomatic career.—  
 ED.



July 21, 1814, and the conditions laid down by them for this union forming an integral part of the fundamental law of the kingdom, the King of the Netherlands is necessarily under strict obligations on this point. His minister has in consequence, as your Excellency will see by the enclosed document, recently applied to the Cabinets of the Powers signatory to the Treaties of 1814 and 1815, with a view of taking joint action with them in regard to the modifications which, under the circumstances, it might be necessary to apply to the fundamental law, and particularly to the stipulations above-mentioned.

The Powers signatory to the treaties on which depends the constitution of the kingdom of the Netherlands, being now called upon to take into consideration the situation of the kingdom and the peculiar position of the King, can have but two objects to keep in view, viz. :

1. The imperative necessity of arresting the progress of the revolutionary spirit in a country like Belgium, so fruitful in the elements of disorder, and so exposed to the influence of the dominant party in France.

2. The importance, based upon the general interest, of not weakening the system of defence established at the price of so many sacrifices between the Rhine and the North Sea.

It is before all indispensable to keep clear and independent of French influence any innovation which it may prove inevitable to make. There can be no question that the chief cause of the perplexities by which the Government is now beset, is to be looked for in the antipathy existing between the Belgian people and the Dutch. This antipathy is founded on the diversity of commercial, agricultural, and other interests between

the two parts of the kingdom, and on the opposition between the religious principles of their inhabitants; it has also been kept alive by mistakes on the part of the Government as conspicuous as they are to be regretted; but it is none the less probable that had it not been for the recent catastrophe in France, and the action taken by the agents of the revolutionary faction in that country, the occurrences in Belgium would never have assumed the seditious character of an insurrection. If any doubt could exist on this point, the French Government would itself have dispelled it by the tone it has assumed in regard to the disturbances in Belgium, and its declaration beforehand that it could permit of no foreign intervention in the case of any revolution in the kingdom of the Netherlands. The faction which has just triumphed in France sees in the Belgian people not only an accomplice but also a possible support, in case of need, against foreign Powers. There can be no doubt that it would hold the same language in regard to Piedmont, if unhappily that country were to follow the example of Belgium.

The position of the Powers invited by the Government of the Netherlands to assist it in its efforts to stem the torrent of the Revolution, is assuredly one of great delicacy. Their part lies in consenting to the modification of the stipulations signed under the Treaty of July 21, 1814, so far as may be judged necessary or useful for facilitating the course taken by the Government, at the same time that it affords the latter a support against revolutionary faction. It is to be anticipated that the agitators in France will look with dislike on any such understanding between the Government of the Netherlands and the Allied Powers. It is not with the assistance of the latter that they would like to see a



constitutional king once more firmly seated on his throne. The great problem will be to prevent the changes which are inevitable from assuming the appearance of concessions extorted by force, and to keep up the appearance at least of sovereign will. All depends on this. It is to be hoped, moreover, that the enlightened portion of the Belgian nation, taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of a separation, will itself aid the Government in its efforts to render it as little prejudicial as possible to sovereignty, and in confining it to regulations relating to the internal administration, the liberty of worship, and possibly a more accurate redistribution in the national representation. It is easy to foresee that any concession made beyond these limits, far from obliterating the antipathy between the different peoples of the kingdom, will serve only to pave the way for a total separation—an event to which France looks forward with impatience. It is this consideration which leads us to direct our attention to the defensive system of the kingdom of the Netherlands, and that military line, the establishment of which formed the object principally kept in view by the Allied Powers, in the union of the Belgian provinces with Holland. The maintenance and defence of this line, bound up as they are with the general interests of Europe, are a burden which can only be shared in common by all the provinces of the kingdom, and consequently any modification of the present *régime* which would compromise that system of defence on the French frontiers, must be looked upon as inadmissible.

In view of the gravity of the circumstances, and the urgent necessity of arriving at a decision, your Excellency is authorised, without previously consulting your Court, to accept without hesitation any invitation

on the part of the Government of the Netherlands, to come to an understanding with them, in concert with your colleagues, as to the introduction of the modifications above-mentioned, and the form in which they should be embodied.

*Metternich to the Emperor Francis (Report), Vienna, October 11, 1830.*

968. . . I shall not be able to set out from here till early on Wednesday, as the duty devolves on me of sending off several despatches, which cannot be ready before to-morrow evening.\*

The burning question of the day is that of the Netherlands. A courier sent here by the King was the bearer of a letter to your Majesty, accompanied by a request to the Cabinet *to despatch an army forthwith to the Netherlands, already looked upon as lost.* A similar demand has been forwarded to the Courts of London, Berlin, and St. Petersburg.

I have just received tidings from Berlin, also by courier, of the arrival there of a similar demand, which naturally puts them in great perplexity. I shall have the honour of bringing your Majesty all these despatches, and at the same time indicating how, in my opinion, they ought to be dealt with. The demand of the King of the Netherlands for *material aid* from Austria is most ill-considered.

For my part I am convinced that all is lost in the Netherlands. The best and, in fact, the only thing to do, is to bring that country into such relations with the

\* The Emperor Francis had, during the sittings of the Hungarian Diet, taken up his residence at Presburg, where Prince Metternich also resided with occasional intervals.—ED.

Crown of Holland as will prevent its complete incorporation with France.

*Metternich to Esterhazy in London, Presburg,  
October 21, 1830.*

969. . . A question of enormous difficulty has just been opened up by the Belgian insurrection. Although as yet totally uninformed of the course likely to be pursued by the British Cabinet, which more than any other is called upon to give judgment on a question presenting so many cardinal points of contact with the political system of England, we have nevertheless found it impossible, in face of the application made to us by the King of the Netherlands, to defer making known our sentiments in regard to that Prince.

The King of the Netherlands has instructed his ambassador at Vienna to acquaint us with the contents of a secret despatch, in which his Majesty declares that his only object in appealing to Austria for military assistance was to avoid any semblance of a want of uniformity in the statement of his wishes to the allies, though aware, as he admits, that any display of military force in the Netherlands on the part of Austria was impracticable. In this the King has not deceived himself; but the Emperor, on his side, will never hesitate to lend his moral support to the Courts who are nearer to the scene of operations, and who, for that very reason, would alone be in a position to act. What his Imperial Majesty thus concedes, in conformity with that principle of solidarity on which he considers the only remaining hopes of safety to be based, he demands in return from his allies, in the event of armed interference being necessitated in Italy by events tending to subvert peace in that country.

The Emperor, Prince, will never admit the principle of *non-intervention*, in face of the persistent activity of the revolutionary propaganda. His Imperial Majesty recognises it not only as his right, but also his duty, to lend to every lawful authority attacked by the common enemy every kind of assistance which circumstances may permit him to employ. That a similar declaration can be put forward, without reserve, by the British Government we do not believe, and we fully admit that, in the interests of that very principle of preservation common to the Allied Powers, the latter must beware of compromising the safety of the social order, by too sedulous an endeavour to obtain absolute uniformity in the application of that principle.

The cry of the day is, *Fraternity among nations*, and we know what faction understands by 'nation' and 'fraternity.' Our power does not extend to destroying all that is so fatal in this watchword to the tranquillity of nations; but it ought to act as a warning to us, and make us fully sensible of the folly of laying down the only weapons we yet possess, and abandoning to the outcries of the disturbers of the world an irrefragable principle of justice, which has hitherto saved Europe from the universal shipwreck with which she has so long been threatened.

I submit the present despatch to your discretion, Prince, to be used as you shall see fit, in your explanations with the British Ministry. . . . If we would not miss the path which alone can conduct us to the end we have in view, the following, as it seems to us, are the two conditions we must start from :

1. The establishment of a firm and complete solidarity among the Powers on the basis of mutual



preservation, or, what comes to the same thing, on the basis of their former auspicious union.

2. The distribution of the several parts which, in virtue of this moral solidarity, each of the Allied Powers may be called upon to play.

May theories and abstractions give way to sound, practical good sense ! Let us leave all that to the new Liberal School, and only borrow from them that identification of the end with the means, that indefatigable activity which they have employed with such effect in the pursuit of their pernicious designs ! Let us oppose a union of Government and the real people to that apocryphal fraternity which the enemies of peace and order are seeking everywhere to establish between the mighty revolutionary power and the proletariat of all times !

*Metternich to Esterhazy in London, Presburg,  
October 21, 1830.*

970. . . The compromise proposed by the British Cabinet relative to the settlement of the Belgian difficulty, does not differ fundamentally from the one we had ourselves thought of ; not that we look upon it as the best, but because, after maturely taking into consideration, on the one hand, the actual state of things in Belgium, on the other, the powers and dispositions of the two States more directly or even solely called upon to undertake an immediate armed intervention, we have been driven to the conclusion that it is the most practical measure to adopt.

If our ideas so far are in harmony with those of the Duke of Wellington, we cannot but deeply regret, on the other hand, the method, I had almost said the absence of method, which has marked his proceedings.

We are also of opinion that the French Government cannot be excluded from participating in the debates relative to the pacification of Belgium, but we had a right to expect that the British Cabinet would not put France so prominently forward, and that at least Lord Aberdeen would have been instructed to postpone any steps on the part of the English Government at Paris, till such time as it should have consulted with the representatives of the Allied Courts at London, on the plan the English Cabinet proposes to follow.

The reports which reach us from France are unanimous as to the dismay caused there by the bare idea of a breach with England. How deeply is it to be regretted that the Cabinet of all others in a position to throw a solid weight into the scale of the maintenance of general tranquillity, is not conscious of its own power. This deplorable circumstance is doubtless to be explained by the want of foresight and of that true political inspiration, so essentially *preventive*, which in England is generally conspicuous by its absence; but the fact is none the less to be regretted.

*Metternich to Wessenberg at the Hague, Presburg,  
October 21, 1830.*

971. . . The instructions, Baron, you took with you from here (No. 968) no longer correspond adequately to the present posture of affairs in the kingdom of the Netherlands. At that time the possibility of an arrangement involving nothing more than the separation of the administration, properly so called, of the two divisions of the kingdom, was open to our consideration.

The actual separation of the two divisions of the kingdom has now been pronounced by the States-General.

The King has sent the Prince of Orange to Antwerp, furnished with the most ample powers.

The Court of London has in view a negotiation, in which the Allied Courts and France are to take part.

. . . You will be pleased, Baron, to keep in mind the following points of view, and look upon them as the invariable rule for the guidance of your conduct :

1. In the shipwreck lately experienced by the King of the Netherlands, the endeavour must be to save whatever can be saved, as well in the interests of his crown as in those of the maintenance of the equilibrium established by the great European treaties. To aim at what can by no possibility succeed, would be to lose time of the utmost value for the public welfare. Both his Majesty and the Powers should therefore confine their thoughts solely to the practical means of success.

2. We consider as coming within this scope anything that has for its object :

(*a.*) To assure to the creation of the Powers the weight of a counterpoise to the ambitious views of France, and to prevent Belgium, whether by its formal incorporation with France or an independence which would be purely nominal, from forming part of the political territory of that Power ;

(*b.*) To settle the future relations of the two parts hitherto one and indivisible, of the kingdom of the Netherlands, on bases calculated to assure as far as may be the internal tranquillity of those parts, and to establish natural ties between them.

3. The application of these principles being impossible without a frank, earnest, and impartial deliberation on the part of the Allied Powers, France, and his Majesty the King of Holland himself, and a conference forming the only means for arriving at an understand-



ing, your Excellency will take part in any deliberation which may be held on the subject at the Hague. Should a conference be formed at London, you will be no less careful, Baron, to identify yourself as closely as possible with the line of action taken by your colleagues of Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia. In conjunction with them you will advantageously establish and regulate your relations with the French ambassador.

To these short maxims must our supplementary instruction be confined, the only one in our power to give you. . . . If there is nothing left for me to tell you as to the judgment we have formed on the past, it is the same with the hopes we entertain for the future.

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*ORLOFF'S MISSION TO THE IMPERIAL COURT  
AT PRESBURG.\**

972. A memoir by Metternich for Count Orloff, dated Vienna, October 6, 1830.
973. Metternich to Ficquelmont at St. Petersburg, Vienna, October 13, 1830.
974. Metternich to Ficquelmont at St. Petersburg (confidential despatch), Vienna, October 13, 1830.

**972.** At no epoch of modern history has the framework of society been beset with greater dangers than have attended the recent convulsion in France. The true, nay, I do not hesitate to say, the last anchor of safety still left for Europe, is to be found in an understanding between the Great Powers, founded on the conservative bases of their great and auspicious alliance.

Although no understanding was come to between the principal Powers of Europe in the first moments following upon the downfall of the reigning house in France, perfect unanimity was displayed by the monarchs in the attitude they adopted towards it. There remains, therefore, only to confirm the prospects of the future by a wise prevision and united moral action on their part. Our ideas on the subject relate to the following points :

1. The extraordinary influence exercised by the Revolution of July over men's minds, far beyond the

\* The ostensible object of this mission was to assist at the festivities attendant on the coronation of the Crown Prince, Archduke Ferdinand, as King of Hungary, and thus publicly testify to the lively sympathy felt by the Russian Emperor on an occasion so auspicious for the whole Austrian monarchy.—ED.

boundaries of France, is shown by what happens every day.

This influence is, for several reasons, far more decisive than that of the Revolution of 1789 was or could be. What methods have not been employed, since that now remote epoch, to beguile the masses in every state! The entire generation has been brought up in the dogmas of Liberalism; too young to have witnessed the disasters of the past, the new generation has been led to consider public order, established only at the cost of gigantic efforts, as the natural consequence of a previous revolution, directed solely against hateful abuses, the relics of barbarous times!

Again, what a difference between the action of the old, absurd propaganda, and the network which sectaries, wiser in their generation, have long been contriving to spread over the whole face of Europe!

2. While admitting these mournful truths, we must not, on the other hand, allow ourselves to be cast down by the existing evil. The great bulk of the population, the mass which is, as a rule, inert, the people, properly so called, is threatened by the events of the day, in its most real and vital interests. Everywhere its gaze is fixed on the Power which is hindered and thwarted at every step by the men who have acquired a pernicious influence over the middle-class of society. Well-combined measures, consistent regularity in action, and above all, the clearest demonstration of the existence of an active feeling of solidarity between the Governments—such are the indispensable conditions of any system which should seek to reconstruct the fabric of social order, shaken, as it is, to its foundations.

3. So thoroughly are the agitators convinced of this truth that the new French Government, that plaything

of disorganising factions, has quickly recognised that the maintenance of its tottering power, and even of its feeble existence, depends almost entirely on *foreign Powers remaining isolated*.

What the Government of the Revolution fears, we should cherish; what it rejects, we should adopt.

Europe must be regarded at the present time as divided into four masses:

(a.) France, together with the partizans of faction in every country.

(b.) The continent to the east of France, including the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Italian Peninsula.

(c.) Spain and Portugal.

(d.) England.

Whatever difference may exist in the position of the different Governments of Europe, and the forces at their disposal, all must nevertheless consider themselves as united by a common interest, that of their own preservation. The difference between them can relate only to the amount of readiness each may display in pledging themselves to lend assistance in case of need, and the possibility of rendering such assistance to those who may require it.

From this point of view, the English Government stands in a peculiar position, and one that is all the more beset with difficulty in that it is full of contradictions. Prepared, as it is, to resist not only any encroachments by France on the kingdom of the Netherlands, but all such revolutionary pretensions as might tend to the separation of countries united by treaties, the British Government would doubtless experience much difficulty in interfering, to any purpose, on behalf of other parts of the European continent.

But are the Powers which possess greater latitude of action to suffer their efforts to be frustrated, because the British Government may find itself hampered in arriving at such decision as it may deem salutary? There is nothing to indicate the necessity of such a course; for, short of a complete reversal of the system so nobly followed by England in more than one epoch fraught with danger to Europe, the Government of that country, however it may be hindered by special considerations from pronouncing in favour of such measures of safety, will never go so far as to oppose them.

In pursuing this train of argument, the great Eastern mass is the first to call for notice, and to this we must now direct our attention.

This mass consists of :

- (a.) The two great Imperial Courts and Prussia.
- (b.) The Germanic Federal Body.
- (c.) The Kingdom of the Netherlands.
- (d.) The Helvetic Body.
- (e.) The various Italian Principalities.

The union of the three Great Powers, once unmistakably demonstrated, will involve that of the remaining States.

This union, to be effective, can only be founded on the well-known bases of the ancient Alliance, and the spirit of the transactions of 1814, 1815, and 1818, with an exceptional reference, in special cases, to those of 1821 and 1823.

4. The *guarantee of territories* rests on the decision of the Congress of Vienna.

To renew this guarantee would be essentially to weaken it. It would be necessary either to exclude France from such an undertaking, or invite her to take part in affirming the renewal. In the former case,



political engagements would have to be broken which she is still bound to respect; in the latter, she would acquire the right of making conditions, the first of which would undoubtedly be that of the renunciation on the part of the Powers to the right of intervention.

A recurrence to the guarantee of 1815 is all that is requisite.

In regard to another guarantee, that, namely, of reciprocal aid in maintaining internal tranquillity, the members composing what we call the Eastern mass present noticeable differences. The three Great Powers have hitherto been able to disregard, and can in future continue to disregard, any reciprocal guarantee; their community of interests, and the unanimity prevailing among their respective monarchs, afford all they can require.

The fundamental legislation of the Germanic Federation rests on the basis of the guarantee, and consequently on mutual aid in case of need.

Switzerland has in her favour the guarantee of her perpetual neutrality. She could only lose the support of the Powers in the event of her permitting that neutrality to be violated or her soil becoming a hotbed of revolutionary agitation.

There remain the Netherlands and the Italian States. These divisions being so peculiarly exposed, demand our special attention.

5. The questions arising out of the above considerations, which seem to us deserving of serious attention, are the following:

(*a.*) The demonstration of the unalterable determination of the allies to take their stand on the bases of their ancient alliance.

(*b.*) The most effective means whereby the smaller

Courts may be induced, in a spirit of confidence, to adhere to the course of action laid down by the Great Powers.

As to the first point, it will be necessary to consider how and under what form the demonstration of the solidarity of the Powers can best be effected. Meanwhile, the declarations concurrently addressed to France have already contributed to the carrying out of the first of these requirements. These declarations are known to the smaller Courts, and we believe that, in their own interests, they will have taken note of them.

The requisite steps have already been taken by Austria for attaining the second of these objects, both by calling the attention of the Germanic Diet to the protective laws of the Federation, and by addressing declarations of the most precise character to the Italian princes.

But these steps require to be sanctioned by the demonstration of entire approval on the part of the other great Allied Courts. It will be a question of extending the same care to the kingdom of the Netherlands.

There is one consideration which appears to us to be of the greatest importance, and this is, the immense difference, both as regards its initiation and its consequences, which will always be involved in any assistance lent to a State by a neighbouring Power, acting on its own impulse, and in its own interests, and that resulting from a solidarity openly avowed by the Powers.

In the considerations we have here briefly discussed, we have not yet touched on the possibility of a war actually breaking out between France and her neighbours. France, situated as she now is, can have no thought of undertaking an aggressive war; but there is none the less a danger of political warfare. This may



take place either in consequence of the assistance which the Powers may feel called upon to lend to smaller States, or through some disturbance in the interior of France, even more widespread in its effects than those which have previously broken out in that unhappy country. When anarchy comes to a head in any great State, it inevitably leads it to internal or external war; sometimes to both scourges at once.

The event of war, although, in our opinion, ranking only second among probable contingencies, should nevertheless not be left out of view by the foremost guardians of the general tranquillity; that honourable part to which the Allied Powers have devoted themselves, in the true spirit which animates their union.

With regard to so important an object, only one measure seems to us, for the moment, feasible; and this is, for the three Great Continental Powers to reckon up their military forces, to put them as far as may be in a state of readiness for immediate action, and to determine the point on which, in case of need, they could most easily be concentrated in one compact body, fit to be launched in any direction where its presence would be most required.

*Metternich to Ficquelmont in St. Petersburg, Vienna,  
October 13, 1830.*

**973.** General Orloff left Presburg on the 6th instant, and Vienna on the morning of the 9th.

It would be superfluous to enter into all the details of his mission; my mind tells me that he carries with him a conviction as profound as our own, of the existence of a conformity as auspicious as it is complete, in the ideas, aims, and determination of our respective monarchs.

During the whole of his stay, General Orloff showed himself worthy of the reputation which had preceded him hither. The noble frankness with which he entered into the discussion necessitated a corresponding tone in my explanations to him. Both of us were thus actuated by the sole desire of arriving at a mutual understanding, and I feel, for my part, that this object was attained.

In order to assist the General in the task of making his august master unreservedly acquainted with the ideas of our own, I have drawn out, in a statement of which I have the honour to transmit you herewith a copy (No. 972), what strikes us most in the present disastrous condition of things, indicating at the same time the hope we distinctly entertain of a wise and correct attitude on the part of the Powers.

If any chance of safety still remains for Europe, it is our profound conviction that it can only be found in the course we have indicated.

I still have briefly to bring before your Excellency the judgment we have formed on the situation of the various parts of Europe, which are most exposed, from their geographical position, to the dangers emanating from that central hotbed of all evil—I mean France.

The revolution in the Netherlands is accomplished. The King has no further means of resisting what has, in great measure, been brought about by himself. Holland will remain faithful to him, and his Majesty will have a guarantee of her fidelity in the national hatred borne by this part of his kingdom to that which has just effected its separation. The state of things we now see in Belgium has long been preparing ; it is the premeditated work of factions whose cause has been served only too well by the Government.

The political side of this question is of the most serious nature, and I shall handle it in a work, which, considering the critical circumstances of the case, will further demand special consideration on the part of the Emperor.

Nothing is at once sadder and more curious to observe than the condition of Germany.

In that country the majority of the States have been undermined by Liberalism. Revolts have broken out in various directions. The north of Germany was the first to be attacked by them, a fact explained by the passion for reforms more prevalent, as a rule, among the bulk of the peoples forming that portion of the Federation, than those of the south. Not one of these revolts, however, but has been imported, like some article of commerce, from the great centre of all revolutionary movements.

Italy is still quiet, but it would be dangerous to allow ourselves to be deceived by a tranquillity which is more apparent than real. Two causes are at work to influence the condition of affairs in that part of the world. The first is the cowardice inherent in the inhabitants of the Peninsula; the second, the absence of directions from the supreme revolutionary tribunal of Paris. Your Excellency will see by my despatch of to-day what line of action we have adopted in regard to those countries.

In this picture, Ambassador, there is no exaggeration; on the contrary, everything is in strict conformity with truth. The truth is quite mournful enough, without its being necessary to paint it in more vivid colours for the sake of bringing it into clearer relief.

*Metternich to Ficquelmont in St. Petersburg (confidential despatch), Vienna, October 13, 1830.*

974. I have waited till the end of Count Orloff's stay, to send you the present despatch.

I must go back a little, in order to give you a clear idea of our attitude at the present critical juncture.\*

. . . The day after my arrival at Königswart, I received, by way of Frankfort, the decrees of the 25th July. This decided me at once to rejoin the Emperor, and the fifth day after my arrival at home, I once more set out in the direction of Carlsbad, with the purpose of meeting the Vice-Chancellor.

I found him in a state of astonishment impossible to describe. Strongly disposed to attribute the whole calamity merely to the downfall of the Martignac Ministry and the action taken by Prince Polignac, he nevertheless could not but admit the inference that a shock, such as had just precipitated the throne of the Bourbons, could only be the last result of forces which had long been at work. Incapable of really forming a clear idea of this terrible calamity, and aroused by the event even from a long slumber of distrust, and a repose deeply imbued with Liberal tendencies, it appeared to me a task of little difficulty to induce him to adopt many of my views. A *plenum* discharges itself easily into a *vacuum*.

Of two propositions, however, which I made to the Vice-Chancellor, I could only induce him to accept one. A statement of it is to be found in what we are now accustomed to call the *chiffon de Carlsbad*,† that feeble,

\* For an account of the earlier interview with Nesselrode, which follows, see No. 956.—TR.

† See note to No. 961.

but correct enunciation of principles. My second proposition related to the method in which those principles should be demonstrated by the Courts. With this view, I proposed that we should mutually agree not to take any steps for recognising the new order of things in France, until an understanding had been arrived at on the subject between our Court and those of Russia and Prussia, and I suggested Berlin (since that capital is the easiest of access) as the centre at which the concert would have to be arranged. Count Nesselrode protested vigorously against this idea, and in fact against that of any formal understanding between our Courts. The arguments on which he based his reluctance were all drawn from the opinion he had formed on the decision of the Emperor Nicholas, to abstain entirely from any interference in foreign affairs. 'Rest assured,' said he to me, 'that the Emperor will never fire a single shot, shed one drop of Russian blood, or spend one half-penny, to redeem the errors that have been committed in France.'

I replied that so far as that went, the Emperor of Austria thought exactly like the Emperor of Russia.

All this proves that what has taken place in France at first impressed the Emperor quite differently from his Minister; it is thus quite clear that the latter had no notion previously of his master's ideas.

I was about to send off a courier to you with these opinions, and directions to enter into ulterior explanations with the Russian Cabinet, when we were informed of the unexpected arrival of Count Orloff. I at once, without hesitation, determined to await this Ambassador, before sending you detailed instruction. Certain beforehand of the course you would pursue, I felt it would be needless to lay down rules for your conduct which you



could not fail to have anticipated: on the contrary, I indulged the thought how greatly it would be for our advantage to leave the initiative to the Emperor Nicholas in the grave questions of the day. The basis laid down and expounded at Carlsbad, seemed to me sufficient to satisfy all requirements to begin with, until such time as Count Orloff's language should have enabled me to form a definite judgment on the moral attitude of the Emperor of Russia.

One of the General's favourite ideas seems to be that of an interview between the two Emperors. 'You will become,' said he to me, 'my master's trusted friend; he does not know you, because there are men who have hitherto had very good reasons for fearing a close acquaintance with you on the Emperor's part.' I gave him to understand that any idea of an interview would depend entirely on circumstances and a favourable opportunity.

The arrival of Marshal Diebitsch had put the Prussian Cabinet into a great fright. The attitude assumed by the garrison of Berlin during the four days of a rising, the exact nature of which is still unknown, and a continually growing sense of great and imperative necessities, resulted in exercising a salutary influence on the minds of the Ministry. The Marshal's conduct has been marked throughout by firmness, tact, and discretion. General Orloff observed to me one day, 'See how one is mistaken; the Emperor, in sending me to Vienna, thought he was entrusting me with the mission of difficulty, whereas it has fallen to the Marshal's share.'

The one great point, the paramount object at this moment, is the creation of a real solidarity between the Powers, and that is not possible unless the Courts



arrange a common centre in which to deliberate daily. In speaking, however, of a central point, I do not exclude conferences in places pointed out by some special requirement. I admit, for instance, that any profitable discussion on the lamentable Belgian difficulty could only be held at the Hague or in London.

*OUTBREAK OF THE POLISH REVOLUTION.*

75. Metternich to the Emperor Francis (report), Vienna, December 5, 1830.  
 976. Metternich to Trauttmansdorff in Berlin, Vienna, December 15, 1830.  
 977. Metternich to the Emperor Francis (report), Vienna, December 18, 1830.  
 978. Circular despatch to the Ambassadors at Rome, Naples, and Florence, and the Governors of Milan and Venice, Vienna, December 24, 1830.  
 979. Metternich to Trauttmansdorff in Berlin, Vienna, December 25, 1830.

975. Count Sedlnitzky has already had the honour of submitting to your Majesty the announcement, received this day from Lemberg, of the *discovery* of a revolutionary plot at Warsaw.

I have this moment received the enclosed report of the *chargé-d'affaires* at Cracow, containing the first news of a revolution, which *broke out* on the evening of November 29, in Warsaw.\*

How much of all this is true? That is the next thing to find out; but in these times one must always expect the worst.

*Metternich to Trauttmansdorff in Berlin, Vienna,  
 December 15, 1830.*

976. I avail myself of the departure of a courier despatched by Baron Maltzahn to forward you the present despatch.

\* On that day the pupils of the Military School broke into the Belvedere Palace, in order to get possession of the Grand Duke Constantine, dead or alive. They forcibly broke through all opposition, but found the apartments of the Grand Duke empty, he having taken refuge with the Russian troops. The Polish troops were for the most part disaffected. Even the townspeople sympathised with the insurgents, and the crowd took possession of the arms at the arsenal, the doors of which had been burst open. The Russian troops withdrew from the city.

The reports addressed by that Ambassador to his Court, subsequent to our having been informed of the Polish insurrection, cannot have failed to give the Prussian Cabinet an accurate idea of the impression produced on us by this fresh disaster, and the measures which the Emperor has deemed it his duty to take at so serious a juncture.

Within a few days we shall have in Galicia itself and upon the frontiers of that province, a force of more than fifty thousand men.

Up to this moment no movement has taken place among the inhabitants of Galicia. You will perceive however, from our having collected the troops above mentioned, that we consider ourselves exposed to the possibility of internal disturbance.

We are as yet unable to pronounce an opinion on the causes which have led to the Warsaw revolution. Various reasons, however, combine to induce us to admit that it may have originated from certain unforeseen circumstances, instead of being the result of a boldly preconceived and carefully arranged plan. The most striking figure of the day, the Dictator Chlopicki, has long been pointed out to us as a dangerous man, and one endued with the qualities of a party leader. Is he the one who has secretly prepared and directed the outbreak? Will he be able to maintain his position? Time alone will show.

The real question underlying the matter is the *morale* of the Russian army.

I look upon it as a fact of the greatest importance that our Court and that of Berlin have determined upon following the same line of conduct; occupying thus a similar position, the two Courts, between whom a good

understanding has hitherto so happily reigned, will assuredly find no difficulty in fulfilling this task.

*Metternich to the Emperor Francis (report), Vienna,  
December 18, 1830.*

977. I have the honour to submit to your Majesty, without loss of time, the reports which have reached me this evening, by courier, from Warsaw, Cracow, and Lemberg. From their contents I draw decidedly favourable inferences, which I found on the following short propositions:

In Warsaw, the revolution is at a stand-still, and a revolution which stands still contradicts its own nature. The Dictator wishes to introduce order where there is only room for ungoverned violence. Revolution is incompatible with order and moderation.

From Cracow there is no news; thus, on the long line from Warsaw to Cracow nothing is to be seen but peaceful levies of troops or men joining the colours. This stamps the outbreak and its consequences as a political war.

Count Lobkowitz pledges his word there will be no outbreak in Galicia. No hostile bands will penetrate into your Majesty's territory. This is an unavoidable error on the Dictator's part, but it is none the less to our advantage. Orders have been given to carry out the Governor's wishes in every respect; your Majesty has therefore done all that was incumbent on you.

Of the probability of the Lithuanian army remaining loyal Count Lobkowitz can form no opinion. The fact of the Grand Duke having thrown himself upon its protection seems to me, at any rate, to prove that he must count upon its fidelity.

*A circular despatch from Metternich to the Austrian Ambassadors in Italy, and the two Governors of Milan and Venice, Vienna, December 24, 1830.*

**978.** Affairs in Poland begin to be more intelligible than they could possibly be during the first moments of the outbreak. Every day and every fresh fact goes to prove that the rising of the 29th November was the attempt of a mob of students and the cadets of the Military School, and that the insurrection would never have degenerated into a revolution had measures, which the fidelity of the troops rendered not only possible but easy, been taken at the right moment. Much of the blame seems to lie at the door of the Grand Duke, whom public opinion censures as having failed in resolution.

The condition and organisation of the kingdom of Poland have, on their part, quickly and inevitably reduced the revolution to a mere political question, a quarrel to be fought out between Poland and Russia. It has thus become a matter of necessity for patriotic enthusiasm seriously to estimate the relative strength of the two contending parties. The Russian provinces once belonging to Poland not having joined the revolt, the result of this numerical calculation is not in favour of the insurgent kingdom.

Lithuania, Volhynia, Galicia, and the Grand Duchy of Posen not only continue to enjoy perfect tranquillity, but, up to this moment, not a single insurrectionary symptom has appeared.

It was not till the evening of December 7 that the Emperor of Russia received the first tidings of the outbreak at Warsaw. As our official reports do not go beyond that date, we take from a private letter, emanat-

ing from good authority, the following account of the first impression which the revolution made on his Imperial Majesty.

On the 8th December, St. George's Day, the Emperor Nicholas personally communicated the tidings of the outbreak at Warsaw to his army, making use of the following terms :

'The Poles, whom we had looked upon and treated as brothers, are assassinating ours. Shall we permit this? I rely on you, on your patriotism. You may trust in me! The Emperor Alexander declared that he would not lay down his arms so long as an enemy remained in the country, and the nation kept the pledge. I declare that I will not sheathe my sword so long as this blood remains unavenged. Peace to those who wish peace; death to rebels and assassins!'

The first troops despatched towards the western frontiers of the Empire, in pursuance of previous dispositions, exceed a hundred and fifty thousand men. They are distributed in six corps, and are in a condition to undertake operations against the kingdom of Poland before the 15th January. The Emperor has apparently given orders that the army should be reinforced by nearly a hundred thousand men. We may therefore look for great events in that quarter during the next month. One or other of two alternatives must take place; either the leaders of the revolution (leaders who have been improvised, like the revolution itself) will throw themselves on the monarch's generosity, or Poland will be exposed to the horrors of war. There is the third alternative of the revolution spreading, but in the present posture of affairs this appears the least probable of all.

I leave it to your own judgment to decide how you



can make the best use of what I have told you by way of antidote to the host of absurd rumours and stories deliberately invented by party spirit, and which will not fail to make their way into the Italian Peninsula.

*Metternich to Trauttmansdorff in Berlin, Vienna,  
December 25, 1830.*

979. The courier despatched by Count Ficquelmont on the 14th instant, and to whom you entrusted your letter of the 21st, arrived here in the course of last night. This is the first news which has come direct from St. Petersburg subsequent to the Polish revolution.

I will reply to our Ambassador without delay, and send the courier by way of Berlin.

The moral attitude of the Emperor Nicholas appears to us to be excellent. To unite unshaken firmness with wisdom in the choice of measures and vigour in carrying them out, is all that should or could be demanded of the monarch and the man. The justice of the cause which his Imperial Majesty is called upon to defend is patent; the most audacious theories could not vindicate what has recently occurred in Poland, and the thesis that insurrection is the most sacred of duties not as yet forming part of the code of civilisation, except with those who have already employed that fictitious principle, or those who seek to make capital out of it, a moral force of very decided character ought, in so flagrant a case as the present, to come to the support of the material force which the Emperor will be enabled to employ for the maintenance of his just rights. The news that reaches us from Warsaw and Cracow tends to prove to us that the opinion which the Cabinet of Berlin is

beginning to form of the revolution, both as regards its outbreak and its progress, is entirely correct. We take the same view of things as they do in Prussia. The kingdom of Poland, from its first creation, has appeared to us neither more nor less than a powder-magazine. A spark must have reached it sooner or later ; therefore, when we heard of the explosion, the one feeling we did not experience was that of surprise. During the first moments we were in uncertainty as to the exact nature of the occurrence. Each day and each fresh fact shows us more clearly that the fruit has been plucked before it was ripe.

*LOUIS PHILIPPE, KING OF THE FRENCH.\**

980. Louis Philippe has just ended his career.

I have been in too many and various relations with him not to be able to form some estimate of his character ; an estimate, as it seems to me, justified by the events of his life.

Louis Philippe, with many undeniable good qualities, had faults which were not counteracted by his education. On the contrary, they were stimulated and developed by those whose special task it should have been to withdraw the children of Philippe Egalité from the influence, never wholly obliterated, which the example of their father and the anomalous condition of France at that time, could not fail to exercise upon them.

This prince had inherited, together with the name of Orleans, that captious spirit of opposition to the reigning branch of the House of Bourbon, which during the last century distinguished the Orleans family.

As he was born in 1773, the same cotemporary influences affected us both ; nor was there a single incident of his life that escaped my notice. I was in correspondence with him when he wished to enter the Imperial army in 1809, in order to fight against Napoleon.

\* A Note by Metternich, written shortly after Louis Philippe's death (26th August, 1850).—ED.

1831.

*EXTRACTS FROM THE PRINCESS MELANIE'S  
DIARY.*

*Biographical Notices.*

981. Vienna (from January 30 to August 2).  
982. Residence at Baden and Schönbrunn (from August 5 to November 4).  
983. Return to the capital (from November 7 to December 31).

*Vienna.*

981. Marriage and honeymoon. Reception by the Emperor. Thalberg. Insurrections in Italy. Birthday of the Emperor. Home topics. News from France and Italy. Gentz. Mazzuchelli. Apprehensions of war. Conversation with Maison. Affairs in the Papal States. France and Turkey. Dwernicki's infringement of neutrality. The Prince's birthday. Schuster. The Prince's memoirs. Physical sufferings. Domestic happiness. The Prince's revenge. Devotional exercises. Critical days. At Baden. Cholera. Gentz and the Prince's memoirs. Blowing bubbles. Projected removal to Baden. Despatch for the King of Prussia. Louis Philippe's speech from the throne.

981. *Vienna, January 30, my wedding-day.*—I began the day by confessing to Father Schmitt; afterwards we all received the communion with my father in the Schottencapelle. Clement came in the morning and brought me my diamonds, which are charming and beautifully set. We dined at Clement's at six with Adela and Wilhelm Taxis, after which I dressed, putting on the lace-trimmed dress, diamonds, veil, and myrtle-flowers, which Aunt Lichnowsky sent me from Graz. This attention touched me deeply. A number of people had come to see me. I begged my parents for their blessing, and then we proceeded to the Nuncio's, where

the whole family were assembled. There were more than ninety persons. The Nuncio, who married us, delivered a very fine discourse. The ceremony did not last too long; in short, everything went off as well as could be. We were scarcely at home when all Vienna made its appearance; our rooms were full to overflowing. I did my best to make a good impression on all, and everyone was most kind to me. We supped *en famille*; afterwards mamma accompanied me to my new house. I was touched by Clement's extraordinary kindness, his thoughtfulness, his thankfulness and love. God grant me all I require to make him happy!

*February 1.*—I went with Flora,\* at eleven o'clock, to the Emperor, who received me with touching kindness. He spoke much of Clement, begged me to make him happy, and naturally bestowed great praise on him, saying repeatedly, 'He forgives all his enemies and never cherishes any ill-feeling against them.' He went on to speak with the utmost approval of my choice, and said the kindest things to me.

*February 5.*—We went to a musical entertainment at Louis Széchényi's house. Young Thalberg, the adopted son, as it is called, of Prince Dietrichstein, played the clavier. He has incredible talent, a most pleasing execution and wonderful readiness. . . . Louis Széchényi ended with short German songs, which greatly delighted Leontine.

*February 12.*—Clement was awoke by half-a-dozen couriers, who brought bad news from Italy. Ferrara and Bologna are already in open revolt. Clam came to breakfast; he had just arrived from Italy, where he had passed through Mantua, and seen the Duke. The latter was fully resolved to defend himself and hold his own. At

\* Flora, Countess Wr̄bna, *née* Kagenegg.—ED.

four, I had to be in readiness to receive forty-four members of the Diplomatic Corps ; not one was forgotten. I put forth my best endeavours to do honour to my reputation as a good wife, but did not altogether succeed to my own satisfaction. The Nuncio drank to the health of our good Emperor, who was waited on by a deputation of the townspeople this morning, asking permission to play beneath his windows, and to pass in procession through the city shouting *vivat*, in order that they might see him. The Emperor replied that he could not permit this to take place in the city, as no regiment had a similar privilege ; but that if they would station themselves at St. Stephen's Square, he would drive thither in his carriage. The shouts that greeted him were as hearty as they were unanimous.

*February 17.*—To-day I breakfasted alone with Clement for the first time since my marriage. He spoke much on business, and initiated me into all his views and plans. I was astounded at my excessive ignorance. I should like to get to understand him at the first word, to be of use to him in every way, to follow his discussions, and be able to enter into them myself ; in a word, I should like to be more than merely a loving wife, which is certainly a far too easy task. Gentz interrupted our conversation.

*March 2.*—Clement told me he was satisfied with the news from Paris, as the Ministry had admitted, in answer to his last important despatch, that it was quite permissible for Austria to interfere in the affairs of Italy, and not give in to the false principle of non-intervention ; a sure proof that France, so far from desiring war, dreads it. This news did not come to him officially, but he is very pleased at it.

*March 11.*—Clement works a great deal. I was



with him for a moment, and if I could have my own way, should always be leaning over his shoulder, to see how he writes his despatches—it is wonderfully entrancing. In the evening he talked in the most interesting manner over the events of the day, and continued the conversation when we were alone. What a wonderful man he is! God preserve him to me and to the world!

*March 18.*—Gentz and Clement are more than ever disturbed at what is going on in the world. I delight in hearing them talk together, for the former, with all his whims, has a fund of wit, which is never at a loss. In England, things seem to be going rather badly; and the worst of it is that my poor Clement, after having been at the utmost pains to devise a plan embracing the only means of safety open to us, finds no one to support him, but is thwarted at every turn.

*March 21.*—I dined at home with General Mazzuchelli, who was very entertaining. He is uncommonly droll, and of an excitable, amiable disposition. He spoke earnestly about Italy, whence he has just come. According to him the Piedmontese army is not to be trusted, and I am quite of the same opinion.

*March 30.*—I found Clement sad and thoughtful; things in France give him great anxiety, and he anticipates war. I cannot tell how it is, but in the depth of my heart I do not feel any anxiety; I feel God will have pity on us. The conversation this evening turned on battles, and the various effects produced by cannon-balls. This discussion was hardly calculated to impress the mind with the prospect of a peaceful future.

*April 2.*—Maison had a long conversation with Clement. He admits to the full our superiority at the present moment, and laments the follies which have

been perpetrated in his own country. His own wish is they should give up their warlike projects there, but he believes there is no real likelihood of it. He has as yet received no formal despatches from Paris, but expects them at any moment. They are sure to contain threats for us, should we fail to respond to the proposal at once to withdraw our troops from the Papal States, and, *in concert with France*, guarantee the freedom and tranquillity of the Pope. Things once set in order in Italy, and the Pope reinstated in all his rights, our presence there is no longer needful, and we should only conflict with France in the event of her making common cause with a *new* revolution in Italy. In this way, and with God's blessing on my husband's wise and honest plans, we shall obtain a peace which will assure his fame for all time, for it required more than wisdom to attain this end.

*April 4.*—We have good news. By a despatch from Paris, Clement learns that even before the receipt of our last despatches, the Ministry were taking lower ground, and seeking to allay the irritation which they feared might have been aroused on our part by their arrogant tone. At any rate I have the satisfaction of perceiving clearly that we imbue them with proper respect, and that they are decidedly moderating their pretensions. Our position is a splendid one, while they stand exposed on every side and in the eyes of all Europe.

*April 14.*—I was with Clement for an hour, and read some papers out to him. Among them were some important despatches from Constantinople. They announce that France has declared to Turkey her intention of making war upon Russia and Austria, and her expectation that the Porte will place itself entirely on her side and declare war immediately against both Powers. The

Turks, however, are cunning, and replied that they were accustomed to look upon such intimations from French Ambassadors as exaggerations. Their reputation seems made.

*April 18.*—Clement received a gracious note from the Emperor, conferring on him the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stephen, set in diamonds, for the successful termination of affairs in Italy. This mark of recognition gives him little pleasure, since, as he says, it will be looked upon with disapproval by so many.

*April 23.*—My breakfast-hour passed in the most agreeable manner. Clement and Gentz discussed the mistakes that were made when Stadion, Cobenzl and Colloredo had the management of affairs. The poison of the Revolution was even then spreading among us. All Clement said was of the highest interest, and I should like to write down each of his words. He told me, however, that all these facts were mentioned in his memoirs, which would shortly be put into my hands. If one could only find time to talk with him!

*April 25.*—After mass I went into the garden to prepare for a festivity for Clement on the 15th. Two pieces have been chosen, and the players appointed. They want me to take one of the parts, and I will do so if I can. The theatre is in the garden; the place is excellently adapted for a small festivity. God grant that everything go well and give him pleasure! I shall have music—in short, everything that may ensure him a cheerful evening.

*May 6.*—Clement was with me a moment to say that Dwernicki had laid down his arms; while fighting with the Russians he had passed over into our territory. He and his Poles and five thousand Russians with them were disarmed at the same time, and remained under

guard. The Russians were sent back over the frontier ; it is now, however, thought that this affair will\* soon be over.

*May 14.*—This evening I had a really ridiculous number of people. I give no names, for the whole town was there, so that I really felt quite confused. They brought Clement congratulations for his birthday to-morrow. I had stupidly forgotten to order a supper, which had at least this advantage, that all the guests went away very early. All my festive plans and surprises for Clement vanished into air. I had nothing for him but simple congratulations, though indeed they came straight from a loving heart. But he made me feel, with the most touching kindness, that he needed nothing beyond myself to make him happy.

*May 21.*—Clement was seized with the idea of going to the Leopoldstadt theatre to see Schuster. We enjoyed ourselves very much, and after returning home had very few visitors, and none of those troublesome ones, so that Clement felt in the humour to talk on all kinds of subjects. He spoke much of Napoleon, and the three interviews he had with him, each of which lasted seven hours. He also returned to the subject of his memoirs, which he wishes one day to give to the world. He has, he declares, entrusted their revision to Gentz, who, however, has always shown an unwillingness to undertake the task. It is absolutely needful that I should myself take up the work with zeal and interest, and, should it be needful, induce Gentz to assist me.

*June 3.*—Clement is inconsolable at my condition, and about Marenzeller.\* He will not take him away from me, because he knows I am an enthusiast for a system he has a horror of; but it makes him very

\* A homœopathic physician.



miserable to know that anyone he loves is in such hands. I beg him to give me another physician, if he will only cease to torment himself, for that is what really makes life unhappy. Marenzeller is much inclined to think I may be in an interesting condition, and this opinion, indefinite as it is, gives me patience to wait and to take as much care of myself as possible. May God listen to my wishes and prayers, more particularly as this will complete Clement's happiness and give me a fresh claim on his love!

*June 6.*—This morning I saw my family; afterwards Richard came to me. Clement also came and had a long talk with me, kind and thoughtful as usual. He cannot pass a moment with me without speaking of serious things, of the business with which he is occupied; in a word, of everything that interests him so deeply, and his confidence touches me. In the evening came the Princess Kaunitz and a few gentlemen, among whom was Marmont. He had a long conversation with Clement about the fortifications and towers of Linz. I found I could not do better than go to bed, and was very much astonished to see Clement come up so late. He kept from me that he had had a severe fright, and that little Richard had been attacked by croup.

*June 7.*—Thank God, the child is going on well!

*June 20.*—A young Frenchman, editor of the *Journal des Débats* has arrived here. He is a bitter opponent of my husband and of his policy. Clement invited him at once to dinner; that is so like his way of revenging himself!

*June 30.*—I confessed to Father Schmitt, who administered the communion to me at his own house, as he considered the weather too bad to permit of my going to the church. He had a long talk with me; he is so

struck by my husband's uncommon goodness, and trusts God may bless and prosper him in all things. I felt constrained to this exercise of devotion, because I wished to offer up my thanks to God for the new blessing He vouchsafes me. Clement was waiting for me at home; we breakfasted together, and he had a very interesting conversation with Gentz.

*July 1.*—In spite of a fearful storm, Clement and I set out, at eleven o'clock, on the way to Baden. My husband wished to speak to the Emperor. In political affairs, he can look nowhere without finding cause for anxiety. One really does not see in what way things are to take a more favourable turn. We are threatened with terrible crises, and I see no outlet. Clement was with the Emperor till three. The events which are impending inspire Clement with mournful forebodings for me and everything he holds dear. May God preserve us from the misfortunes which threaten us! My poor husband was so kind, so loving and tender. For my part, I thank God that he finds in me a consolation for so many griefs and anxieties.

*July 4.*—The cholera is raging violently in Hungary. Clement was very uneasy. This terrible scourge, coming upon us as it does at the very moment when our efforts were exclusively demanded to make head against the moral cholera, is a fearful addition to our anxieties. At Pesth they have taken away the bridge of boats, in order to cut off all communication. A cordon is to be drawn throughout the whole of Hungary.

*July 7.*—Clement had a highly interesting conversation with Gentz on the condition of France and England, who are now making common cause together. Russia and Prussia are very much astonished to see



themselves deceived by England, upon whom they counted more than upon us. God have mercy upon our ancient Europe, for it is in terrible case.

*July 9.*—The accounts of the cholera in Hungary are less alarming; people are even beginning to think it was not the cholera at all.

*July 11.*—I talked with Gentz about my husband's memoirs; I want him to assist me with them. No one but he can help him to get through this difficult task. Gentz, however, will not assent to this, as he fears it will give him too much to do. He says it would be necessary to devote one's whole life to the work, and he has not the requisite strength; the day's duties tire him too much for him to think of fresh ones.

*July 19.*—I had a walk with Clement in the Belvedere. He told me what it was proposed to do in the event of the cholera reaching here. There are two alternatives: the Emperor is either to shut himself up in some castle—Schönbrunn, for instance, or the Belvedere—taking such persons of his Court as it is absolutely needful he should have with him, or else he is to set off with those same persons, God knows whither!

*July 20.*—Clement went very early to the Emperor, who held a conference on the cholera and the affairs of Hungary. The rising at Pesth was more serious than people suppose. It is a very sad story.

*July 23.*—Clement played with Richard, and was so well amused that at last he took to blowing soap-bubbles with Gentz, which means something nowadays. I found time to copy out a few fragments of his memoirs; afterwards we dined with Tatistscheff at Lady Cowley's at Weinhaus.

*July 25.*—Clement and I set out at eleven for Baden; the weather was very hot, but fine. We read

some very favourable despatches, which had just arrived from Paris and London. Clement then asked me how I should like to pass a few weeks at Baden. I am much pleased with this proposal, for, with the weather a little cooler there than in town, his hours of work will be better arranged, and he will be able to have his evenings free. We had scarcely arrived when Clement went off to the Emperor, who pressed him strongly to take up his residence at Baden. We started to return at eight, and I was thoroughly tired when we got back to Vienna. Luckily we had no visitors.

*July 29.*—Clement read me a very interesting despatch.\*

*July 30.*—Clement read me King Louis Philippe's speech at the opening of the Chambers—weak and destitute of character, but full of arrogance towards Austria. Here is one sentence: 'In accordance with my demand, the Austrian troops have evacuated Italy,' and so on. It is really pitiable.

### *Residence at Baden and Schönbrunn.*

982. Removal to Baden. The Belgian question. Approach of the cholera. Conversation with the Empress. Young Leykam. Residence at Schönbrunn. Speeches by Périer and others. Ficquelmont. Conversion of the Emperor Nicholas. Zamoyski. Russo-Polish affairs. Outbreak of cholera. End of the Polish insurrection. Good news from Berlin. Anniversary. Murder of Capodistria. Visit to the Empress.

982. *Baden, August 5.*—We dined very early with mamma, and then set out for Baden, Clement and I in our close carriage, the children following. We found the house we had taken very comfortable and fairly large. We made a beginning in setting things straight,

\* See No. 1016.

which so tired me that I only had strength to throw myself on the sofa, while Clement read the papers.

*August 10.*—Clement read a splendid despatch on the new Belgian question, which he is sending to Berlin. The King of Holland has determined to march against the Belgians. The latter, however, applied for assistance to the French, who intend sending them twenty to thirty thousand men. The confusion deepens from day to day, but perhaps it must reach its height before order can be re-established.

*August 12.*—The cholera comes nearer and nearer, and the Emperor, they say, has determined to take up his residence for the next few weeks at Schönbrunn. In these mournful times there is really not a moment's rest for anyone.

The Empress sent to say she wished to see me. She wished, she told me, to talk with some one who, like herself, was grieved and troubled at events of the most distressing nature. She spoke for a long time about politics, then of the cholera and the effects likely to result from the measures taken by us. Then she went on to speak at length of my household affairs, and Clement, whom, as she said, I made so happy. She appears depressed and even shattered; you can see she would gladly do a great deal of good, but does not know how to set about it.

*August 17.*—I passed the morning in writing, and dined with Clement, Edward Lichnowsky, and young Anatole Leykam. Clement is having the latter educated by Klinkowström, and intends to send him for the holidays, and while the cholera is about, to his mother. She is at Lucca. He is fifteen, and appears to be a very nice lad. He wants to be a soldier, but Clement will not hear of it for at least two years to come.

*Schönbrunn, August 19.*—We went to Schönbrunn to look at our future abode. I read Clement some of the speeches of Périer, Sebastiani, &c., all of them very violent against Austria. Apponyi remonstrated earnestly with Périer on his speech, but the latter replied, as they invariably do, that they were obliged to speak so in presence of a nation so difficult to govern as theirs, and that they had none but the most loyal and honourable intentions towards the Allied Powers, &c., &c.

*August 21.*—I began the day by reading some excellent despatches from St. Petersburg. Ficquelmont is a man of great merit; he sees things as they are, and represents them in the clearest manner—not a word too much or too little. Clement told me he had long ago declared, in his will, that Ficquelmont was the only man who could replace him. He has just drawn up a sketch of the present situation in Russia, which is truly remarkable. The moment has arrived when the Emperor Nicholas sees the full extent of his error. It consisted in his holding aloof from the Cabinet of Vienna, and entering into closer relations with that of London. We must hope this somewhat late conversion will give a more favourable turn to things.

*September 1.*—Clement's time is much taken up with a Count Zamoyski, who came here with the intention of begging the Emperor to intercede on behalf of the Poles. This request was refused. Clement took the utmost pains to impress on him that the only reasonable course was submission. To-day, he came back with the request that the Emperor would demand from Russia the confirmation of certain exclusive privileges for the Poles, in the event of the latter submitting. Clement assured him the Emperor would never prescribe laws to an ally in favour of his rebellious subjects, but still counselled



submission, adding that the Emperor would not object to declare publicly that he had counselled submission, with the object of influencing the more ardent spirits among the Poles. It ended in the Count's having an interview at Clement's house with Tatistscheff, who sent him, under escort of Gerway, to the Russian headquarters for the purpose of treating with Paskiewitsch. Here once more we play a very noble part. We put a stop to much bloodshed, and prevent the Russians incurring the danger of losing a battle, the result of which might influence the whole of Europe. We thus gain the thanks of both sides. Clement was greatly pleased with the whole affair.

*September 14.*—The cholera broke out in the night with great violence, and many deaths are already reported. The Emperor seems determined not to seclude himself. This means more peril yet for Clement!

*September 15.*—Clement held a conference here. When he left me to go to Vienna, I felt a fresh pang; it is terrible to be parted at such a moment! God help us!

*September 24.*—Clement had a long talk with Gentz and Senfft over German affairs, which now occupy his attention exclusively. It was feared the Poles would make a fresh resistance, as their army had once more assembled after the taking of Warsaw. Ramorino's corps, however, the only one of much importance, threw itself upon our territory and there laid down their arms. The whole thing is thus at an end.

*September 29.*—Clement had a long talk with me about a very favourable despatch from Berlin, which he has just received. It appears from it that the King places himself entirely on his side, which justifies a hope that the German questions may be taken up with some

chance of success. At the present moment this is very important.

*October 16.*—It is a year to-day since Clement held the conversation with me that decided my fate.

*November 2.*—Clement heard this evening that Capodistria had been murdered in Greece, and by the very men he had spent his life in protecting.

*November 4.*—There is talk of our returning to Vienna on Monday, which gives me the greatest pleasure. Clement and I paid a visit to the Empress. She spoke a great deal of the Emperor, saying that whenever he spoke of his subjects it was with tears in his eyes, and that his heart is entirely with them. Clement then spoke of him in a manner that touched me deeply. He related many incidents of the war, and described the dangers to which the Emperor exposed himself at every moment. Altogether it was a most interesting visit.

### *Return to Vienna.*

983. Reception of the Emperor at Vienna. Gentz. The Duchess of Abrantés and Madame Récamier. End of the Italian revolution. Anniversary.

983. *Vienna, November 17.*—The Emperor arrived at nine from Schönbrunn, in order to take up his residence here for the winter. He was received with acclamation by an immense concourse of people.

*November 25.*—Clement was very preoccupied during breakfast. Things seem to be taking a very unfavourable turn in Hungary.

*November 27.*—Clement showed me a letter from Prince Wittgenstein to Gentz, from which it appears that the latter is in the habit of telling all his friends



abroad that Clement no longer does any work, and that he (Gentz) is obliged to attend to business of every kind single-handed. I confess I did think he was at least loyal and upright. I am astonished at Clement, who, although he knows all these things, remains friendly with people who deprive him of the only solace he finds in public life—the esteem and recognition of those who, like him, pursue what is right.

*December 19.*—I passed a very pleasant hour this morning. Clement talked about the memoirs of the Duchess of Abrantès. They are not very interesting, and yet the authoress, like Madame Récamier, will go down to posterity as an eminent woman, a character capable of great deeds and grand conceptions. Those, however, who, like Clement, know them intimately, are well aware that they only availed themselves of great occurrences to acquire a certain renown, by beguiling the idle moments of the eminent men of their day. The Duchess of Abrantès joined to seductive manners and an attractive exterior a pleasant and engaging disposition. Madame Récamier was merely beautiful; and had the reputation, in her time, of being, in plain terms, stupid. She has now thrown herself entirely into the arms of religion, which apparently, however, does not prevent her standing in very close intimacy with Chateaubriand. This connection itself acquired her a factitious renown, for it was said a man like Chateaubriand would never devote himself to a woman wholly without intellect. Clement related many remarkable anecdotes of both these women.

*December 31.*—We supped at midnight and exchanged good wishes for the new year. I confess this anniversary becomes more painful to me every year. May God long preserve me my good, kind Clement, and

illuminate him with His divine light; may He have pity on our old, worn-out world, and give me strength to make those around me happy. May God bless my child, that it may be worthy of Him, and may He turn from me everything that might injure those I love. May God have pity on the unfortunate, and make me duly thankful for His mercy.

*ON THE POLITICAL EVENTS OF THE DAY.*

Extracts from Metternich's confidential Letters to Apponyi in Paris, from January 3 to December 27, 1831 ; in two parts.

I.

984. Austrian policy. Moral and political peace. The Polish revolution. 985. Probable choice of the Duke of Leuchtenberg as King of the Belgians. French policy and the Italian propaganda. 986. Rising at Modena. Demand that the Duke of Modena shall recognise King Louis Philippe. Entry of the Austrians into Modena. 987. Austria's armaments. Regenerated France. 988. Victory at Prague. Reinforcement of Ferrara. Louis Bonaparte's sons at the head of the Roman revolution. 989. The French Cabinet and the Italian insurrection. General Frimont. Instruction. Sébastiani on the Bonapartists. 990. Activity of the Paris Committees. Non-intervention. The Pope and the King of Naples threatened by French agents. 991. Reconstruction of the French Ministry. Character of the Italian revolutionists. Progress of the Polish revolt. General Skrzynecki. Emperor Nicholas. 992. Austria's action in Italy. Alleged convention between the Pope and Austria. 993. Half-heartedness of the revolt in Bologna. General remarks. 994. Reply of the Papal Secretary of State to Sainte Aulaire. M. Denois at Milan. Evacuation of the Papal States by the Austrian troops. 995. Sir Robert Gordon. General Guilleminot. French intrigues with the Porte. Reply of the Turkish Ministers. Quick termination of the Italian revolution.

*Metternich to Apponyi.*

984. *Vienna, January 3, 1831.*—M. Sébastiani must do me the justice to admit that I speak clearly. What we desire is *peace*—moral and political peace ; for closely as the two are generally connected, they are, at the present moment, more inseparable than ever. Moreover, our desire is shared in an equal degree by the Cabinets of St. Petersburg and Berlin. The French Government is lost if it be carried away into desiring

anything else, and I am sincerely convinced of the straightforwardness of its assurances on this point.

This is what the affairs of Poland reduce themselves to :

The kingdom of Poland, established and organised as it was by the Emperor Alexander, was sure, sooner or later, to experience a crisis. Thus the saying of Charles X., on first arriving at Paris, '*Rien n'est changé, il n'y a qu'un Français de plus*, applies, with a slight alteration, to what took place at Warsaw at the end of November—'*Rien n'est changé, il n'y a qu'un Russe de moins !*'

I look upon Chlopicki as the dictator of the capitulation. The result will show whether my opinion in regard to him is correct. Poland, at the present moment, is divided into two parts. The young are possessed by a lofty enthusiasm ; everyone above thirty regards the attempt solely as a failure, and therefore as a misfortune.

Between the 15th and 20th instant over 150,000 men will be in readiness to undertake the conquest. At this moment the Polish army cannot possibly number more than 50,000 to 60,000 men. Unless something extraordinary happen, the result cannot be doubtful.

985. *January* 18.—A rumour has suddenly sprung up at Munich of the Belgian Congress having fixed their choice on the Duke of Leuchtenberg. The rumour is probably a party manœuvre. As, however, anything is possible in this world, does the French Government remain firm in its determination not to have a *Bonaparte* for neighbour ? In my judgment, it would be quite right ; for otherwise the Orleans dynasty would have to look to itself ! Has it never occurred to anyone at Paris to give us credit for our circumspection in regard

to Napoleon II.? We really ought to get some credit for this ; not that we look for anything of the sort—still it is due to us from those who only take into their calculations what is likely to be to their advantage, without any regard whatever for the interests of others!

Let the propaganda be held in check—let Italy remain undisturbed : this is what we demand of the 18th January, 1831 ; and the demand is not an unreasonable one.

**986.** *February* 15.—You will have passed some anxious days between the arrival at Paris of the tidings of the insurrection at Modena and in the Romagna, and the present despatch. You will see by its contents that, while we recognise the importance of what has happened, our determination is fully taken.

You will be pleased to inform General Sébastiani that we have explicitly called upon the Duke of Modena to recognise King Louis Philippe at once. The day we come to his assistance we must at least find him prepared to adhere strictly to our line of policy.

I hasten the departure of the present courier, in order to prevent the entry of our troops into the territory of Modena becoming known in Paris before my having spoken of it to you.

**987.** We are arming to the teeth, and I beg you to be reassured as to our measures. Nowhere does there exist a more sincere desire than here to avoid war, but, if there is no means of avoiding it, we shall prosecute it with the requisite energy.

The most admirable spirit prevails among the army and the whole population. The perverted element it contains is bewildered by all that followed upon the *glorious* days ! The only little difference between these people and myself is confined to the fact that the events



of July have brought matters to the pass I was sure they would reach, whereas simpletons thought the contrary.

What confusion in that France which was to be regenerated by its written Charter ! Truly, if there still be anyone not an open enemy of order, who reckons on any good to be derived from it, he must be set down as deficient in sense.

988. *March 9.*—I send you yesterday's *Observer*, which contains the most authentic news from Poland. The battle of the 25th February was very severe, the lamentable part of it being the massacre of so many brave soldiers for a cause materially untenable.\*

I much doubt whether Warsaw will stand out against a bombardment. I have news direct from that town up to March 2. No fighting had taken place since February 25. The Vistula was still frozen over, but too slightly to admit of crossing the ice.

You may hear at any moment that our troops have entered Modena, and that the garrison of Ferrara has been reinforced.

Meanwhile the Bonapartes proclaim the suspension of the temporal power of the Pope.

The sons of Louis Bonaparte are at the head of the insurgents, who wish to gain the capital. They are provided with considerable sums of money.

989. *March 12.*—Your reports of the 1st to the 3rd inclusive agree perfectly with General Sébastiani's despatch of March 5. If there is any perceptible difference, it is that the terms of that Minister's despatch, and above all the language of the Ambassador, are of a

\* The loss of the Russians at the siege of Prague was set down in the official report as four or five thousand killed and wounded ; that of the Poles was far in excess.—ED.



*humbler* character than the words which were addressed to you.

This singular humility can only depend on one out of three causes. Either the French Minister felt himself, on March 5, in a very difficult and dangerous position ; or he continued to give himself up to the flattering delusion that, out of exaggerated respect for the position of the French Government, we should indefinitely postpone taking any steps to put down the Italian insurrections ; or, lastly, he may possibly have hoped to keep us back by inspiring us with a blind confidence in the efficacy of his benevolent words. None of these suppositions would be well founded.

General Frimont, constitutionally disposed to caution and delay, committed the great mistake of not immediately executing the provisional orders entrusted to him. He deferred to the views and opinions, always of the most short-sighted character, of our civil authorities in Lombardy. Yielding however, at length, to our urgent remonstrances, he commenced active operations against Modena on the 5th instant, and Ferrara the 6th, while he will enter Parma about the 11th or 12th. His operations against Bologna, which must be looked upon as the seat of the revolt, must be regulated on the spot itself. At the same moment that we operate against Bologna, we shall blockade Ancona by sea.

I beg you, in this matter, to keep to the wise and prudent course you have hitherto pursued. In a word, repeat again and again what you have already said as to the imperative necessity of putting a stop, within the shortest possible interval, to disorder in Italy.

We run no risk in accepting the offer of advice, to be given to the Holy Father by the French Ambassador. Count Lützow is a man of resolution, and has a wonder-

ful perception of how much is possible or impossible ; the result will be that the views of the French Cabinet, so far as they are practical, may be looked upon as shared by both courts, while, if infected by a contrary spirit, they will be rejected both by our Ambassador and the Holy Father.

Piedmont is still tranquil, and the Government is convinced of the goodwill of its army.

Private letters of the 4th, received by Marshal Maison, and read by him to me, depict the state of things at Paris in the most gloomy colours. I do not see how a crisis can be avoided ; the Government must either triumph over disorder or succumb. If M. Sébastiani pretends to attach little importance to the Bonapartist faction, he either says what is not true, or deceives himself grossly.

990. *March 16.*—The reports from Ferrara, Modena, Florence, and every other quarter, unanimously give expression to the opinion that the whole Italian revolution is *due solely to the action of the Paris Committees based on the assertion of the principle of non-intervention.* The signal for rising was given by the agents of the Central Committee, who asserted at the same time that the principle of non-intervention had been recognised by all the Powers, and in especial by Austria, and that in the event of our not keeping faith, France would put a stop to our operations.

The passage of the Po by our troops having destroyed the phantasmagoria, panic at once seized on the conspirators, who form but a small number out of a fearful or indifferent majority. You will see by the official reports the celerity with which the ringleaders retreat in every direction. One would wager the whole business would break up at the mere approach of danger.

The instantaneous flight of the Central Provisional Government of Bologna, the moment it heard of our presence on the Modenese territory, is sufficient to show the sort of stuff these men are made of.

Whenever a village is in revolt, one or more Frenchmen are to be found at the head of the insurrection. The diplomatic agents at Turin and Rome use the same language as the revolutionary agents of the clubs ; the most striking instance of the application of the principle of *non-intervention* is to be found by putting together the two following facts.

The Holy Father, at the time he determined to apply to us for aid, and when he had signified his intention to the Cabinets of Paris and London, also informed the diplomatic body of his decision. M. Bellocq declared that he would look upon this proceeding as *a violation of the principle of non-intervention*, and consequently as a declaration of war against France.

At the same time the Holy Father requested the King of Naples to sell him three thousand muskets to arm the people of Rome in their own defence. M. de Latour-Maubourg declared this would be equivalent to *a violation of the principle of non-intervention*, and threatened an advance of the French troops on Naples.

So it seems the Pope may neither *defend himself* nor *invoke assistance*. At this rate the triumph of anarchy would be assured.

991. *March 21.*—It will cause you no surprise to learn the satisfaction we feel at the recomposition of the French Ministry.\*

\* Casimir Périer, Minister of the Interior and President of the Council ; Baron Louis, Exchequer ; Barthe, Justice ; Montalivet, Education ; D'Argout, Trade ; De Rigny, Marine ; Marshal Soult, War ; Count Sébastiani, Foreign Affairs.

It has a heavy task before it, but the hopes of all good men go with it. The Powers will have no difficulty in coming to an understanding with a Cabinet that has a definite policy; it is only in the case of a fluctuating policy that harmony becomes impossible. The hopes, I will even say the feelings, of all the Governments alike are unanimous as to the necessity of peace, yet nothing is less like peace than the position in which things, as a whole, stand at present.

In this view, and for the sake of the common interest, we extend our hand to the Cabinet of Palais-Royal; let it meet us half-way.

Nothing can be viler than the Italian Revolution. It subsists on the scum of the country, the Universities, and above all, the instigation and support of the French propaganda.

We have news of the latest date from Poland. The operations of Marshal Diebitsch have been delayed somewhat by the state of the roads and the rivers. The temper of the army, and still more, of the Polish population, has undergone a complete change since the affair of February 25. The supreme command entrusted to General Skrzynecki has not proved a success. To place generals of talent and long-standing under the command of a man who, at the opening of the campaign, was no more than a colonel, is very unreasonable, and the most exalted patriotism gives way before individual ambition. Then again, the townspeople in Warsaw have to submit to immense sacrifices, and the ill-feeling grows stronger among the people as well as among the military.

On the other hand, the Emperor Nicholas exhibits the greatest calmness and gentleness. He continues to comport himself as *King of Poland*, and carries out the character in all he does.



992. *March 28.*—You cannot too earnestly assure M. Périer that we desire solely the maintenance of peace ; which means for us, as for all other States, external and internal peace. He who desires the one must desire the other ; none but fools or knaves can dispute that principle.

You can also assure M. Périer that we shall be far more eager to evacuate the Papal States, when once internal peace is established and confirmed, than we have been to sweep out the vermin with which they swarmed.

You will see by Count Liützow's report that M. Bellocq demanded of the Cardinal Secretary of State what convention had been concluded between the Holy Father and us, and that the reply of the latter was: *None*. Such is, in fact, the case. The Pope applied to the Emperor for assistance, and his Imperial Majesty answered the appeal. There you have the convention, and the whole convention. The rumour of a treaty of occupation for several years, of the payment of sums of money, etc., had been disseminated by the Revolutionists at Rome itself, and some were credulous enough to believe it. This is how contemporary history is generally written. No, my dear Count, if France desires war, she will make it; but it will be only because she is also desirous of the overthrow of all social and political order, not excepting that of Louis Philippe's throne. Therein lies the solution of the dilemma.

993. *March 29.*—Reports which have reached me to-day from Bologna prove more clearly than ever that the Revolution in that part of his Holiness's domains has taken no root.

The world will discover in the cowardice exhibited by the braggarts of Bologna a fresh proof as to the actual

importance of certain revolutions. Honest men, in every country, will feel encouraged to resist that feeble minority whose sole strength is derived from the impunity afforded them by the majority. I am greatly deceived if the bulk of the French people take any interest in a disorderly mob who can only threaten and run away!

994. *April 12.*—The Pope has annulled all that Cardinal Benvenuti has done,\* and given plenty of promises instead. I have just received the note addressed by the Cardinal Secretary of State to M. Sainte-Aulaire, in reply to that of the Ambassador protesting against the appeal addressed to us by the Holy Father. The reply is somewhat lengthy, like all Italian State-papers, but it is perfectly correct, frank and dignified. It puts our conduct and our disinterestedness in the most honourable light.

You can say to M. Sébastiani that I shall keep in mind what he says as to the awkwardness of at once recalling M. Denois, but let him seize the earliest opportunity of taking that useful political step. M. Denois will not have his *exequatur*, but he will not be driven from his post. Make M. Périer understand how seriously the cordial relations existing between the two countries will be endangered, so long as France persists in maintaining a political agent at Milan. Let her have a consul there, if she insists on it, although Milan is not a commercial centre; but for her to have a diplomatic agent there, a man who is always trying to establish political relations with a governor who knows absolutely nothing beyond what concerns his office, is a

\* Antonio Benvenuti, Cardinal-Legate in Ancona, had fled thence at the outbreak of the Revolution, but being overtaken at Osimo, purchased his freedom by subscribing to all the concessions demanded by Colonel Armandi. These concessions were rejected at Rome on April 5.



measure which can only end in dangerous complications.

The evacuation of the Papal States is proceeding. The Pope will find considerable difficulty in providing garrisons sufficient for the bare maintenance of public order. But we have no longer anything to do with the matter; the Pope must make his own terms with the Ambassadors at Rome.

995. *April 13.*—The inquiries made by Sir Robert Gordon fully confirm the first tidings which reached the diplomatic body, in regard to General Guilleminot's proceedings with the Divan. The following are the terms of an instruction which that Ambassador had the imprudence to transmit to his dragoman, and which the latter placed in the hands of the Sultan's Ministers—a way of proceeding common in Constantinople, and having all the significance of an official act.

In this instruction the following points are laid down by the French Ambassador :

1. A war between France, Russia and Austria is inevitable, seeing that the principles held by the two latter Courts are in direct conflict with those of France.

2. In this war England will either remain neutral or else side with France.

3. The French Ambassador invites the Porte, in the name of his Government, to take such measures as may be necessary to recover and confirm its independence; failing which, should the Sultan espouse a cause opposed to the principles professed by the French nation, the Porte would vainly seek to avoid the loss and detriment which would necessarily accrue to it in case of war.

The reply of the Turkish Ministers appears to have been couched in the most loyal and prudent terms, and

to other members of the diplomatic body they expressed their hearty contempt for the policy of the French revolutionary Government, a policy which, as one of them observed, had no other aim but to dethrone kings and ruin nations.

This fresh exposure of the singular duplicity which characterises French diplomacy cannot fail to make a great sensation in London. Let us thank Heaven for having aided us to bring matters in Italy to so prompt a termination. The course followed by us on this occasion has been the right one, in fact, the only one it was possible for us to take without compromising our present and our future prospects.

## II.

996. Attitude of the French Cabinet. Chateaubriand permitted to go to Venice. Elections in France. 997. Apprehensions of Périer in regard to the military preparations of Austria. 998. Apprehended interference of England and France in the Polish question. 999. Affairs of Germany. The Royalists in France. Chateaubriand. Genoude. Lamennais. 1000. Resolutions of the London Conference.

### *Metternich to Apponyi.*

996. *Vienna, June 3, 1831.*—It is essential that the Polish affair should be brought to an end, for it is arousing terrible agitation in men's minds. A national cause defended with vigour and self-denial always excites 'public feeling,' and, at a time like the present, it would have been well could the Polish question have been avoided altogether.

My despatch of this date relates to subjects of the deepest importance.\* On the course things take at Paris will depend all the prospects of the future. If

\* See Nos. 1007 and 1008.

the French Government is acting in good faith, it will find that what we propose is truth applied to the needs of the moment ; I will even go further, and say that our proposition contains nothing which lies beyond the reach of the French Government, if it is a Government, and not a revolutionary phantasmagoria, tinged with a few monarchical colours ; there would be no use in our applying to a merely imaginary entity ; in explaining ourselves, as we do, we furnish a proof to the French Cabinet that we take it for that which we wish it to be. We desire to preserve political peace, because it will lend the Governments strength to put down faction. The French Government ought to desire it too, for the factions love it as little as they do us, and they will show all the less regard for it, since it is weaker than us.

You informed me, in one of your last despatches, that M. Chateaubriand wished to settle at Venice.

We have no objection to make, and if you have the means of letting him know that it rests only with himself to go there, you may do so. It will rest with you to send him a passport. As M. Chateaubriand has given himself out as my personal enemy, and takes every occasion to demonstrate the fact, I ask for nothing better than to revenge myself by doing him a kindness. I shall be delighted if his residence at Venice afford him that repose which the faults of his character have prevented his enjoying to any extent in any of the places where he has hitherto resided.

The fate of France and the question of political peace will be decided by the elections. If these elections result in bringing into the Chamber a similar majority to the last, the present Cabinet may hope to re-vindicate its authority ; on the contrary supposition, the Demo-

cratic majority will overthrow Louis Philippe's throne and reduce it to a mere presidency. Then the activity of the factions will at once be directed into foreign channels, and war will be inevitable.

I shall shortly send a courier for London, by way of Paris, in order that you may see from the despatches the view we take on the Belgian question. I cannot at present enter into details, for before anything can be done we must be in harmony with Prussia. Our one desire is that the matter should *end*. Each day longer it lasts is a day of misfortune.

997. *June 27.*—I trust the explicit terms of the reply I send you to-day, in reference to the anxiety expressed to you by M. Casimir Périer respecting the military preparations of Austria, will suffice to prove to him that no regard has been paid to truth in the reports which have been addressed to the French Government.\*

998. It is to be hoped matters in Poland will take a decisive turn in the course of the next month.

The Russian armies have reached their full strength, and the loss of Diebitsch † can hardly be counted as a misfortune. Should the Russians not have entered Warsaw by the time the French Chambers open, the political situation would grow far more complicated. France and England would throw themselves between the two. Marshal Maison and Lord Cowley have received instructions to take steps here in regard to the matter of Dwernicki's corps. I know what instructions have been sent from London; those from Paris will probably be identical. I shall continue to send a suitable answer, and there will be little difficulty in composing it.

\* See No. 1014.

† Field-marshal Diebitsch died on June 10, of cholera, at his headquarters, at Kleczowo.



999. We are at the present moment much occupied with the affairs of Germany. That country is a prey to frightful disorders. The Princes, owing to their having followed the counsels of Liberalism, and induced the idea that they were carrying on their rule with a democracy, have reduced their power to zero. Happily, the *Confederation* exists, and we are about to put it in motion.

The battle will not be an easy one to win, but take place it must, otherwise Germany is lost. As I have no communication on the matter to send to Paris, I will not enlarge upon it to you until things are more matured. The attitude of the Royalists in France confirms a truth I have long held, viz., that the real malady under which France is labouring, is madness. Folly, after taking possession of things, has spread to men's minds. God preserve the social body from legitimists like Chateaubriand, Genoude, and their fellows!

I consider that these men are as much enemies in my camp as Lamennais is in that of Catholicism. That will not hinder this mob of fanatics from doing much injury to the quasi-royalty which at present exists, but it will turn to the advantage of the *Revolution*. As this is the real enemy, I shall never turn either French Royalist or French Catholic of the school of 1831.

1000. *December 27.*—I beg you to read my despatch of this date to the Russian Ambassador with the utmost care.\* You will invite him, on my behalf, to

\* By way of settling the Belgian-Dutch dispute, the London Conference had, in October, issued a definite demand to both belligerents to accept the treaty of peace which it had drawn up in twenty-four articles. The demand having been acceded to on the part of King Leopold, the representatives of the five Powers, on November 15, subscribed the treaty as binding likewise on the King of Holland. The latter, however, refused his consent, and the ratification of the treaty was accordingly postponed by



give his earnest consideration to the following points, which form the basis of our action in the Belgian question :

1. We look on the whole affair as a complication of the very worst kind.

2. The Plenipotentiaries of the three Courts have committed an error, lamentable in whichever way we regard it, in allowing themselves to be induced to *sign a treaty*.

3. The King of the Netherlands has played a conspicuously dangerous game throughout the negotiation. He is actuated by hopes of the good results that may accrue from time. But I am convinced he deceives himself in such hopes, nor can they in any way influence the position of the Powers. The Belgian difficulty exists, and a solution must be found for it as soon as possible.

4. The principle put forward by the Prussian Cabinet that the treaty could have no value until ratified by the five signatory Powers, is one that cannot be disputed. But the compromise proposed by the same Power, to consider the treaty of November 15 as a *preliminary resolution*, seems to me, on the other hand, impracticable.

We propose that the five Cabinets should *defer the ratification of the treaty of November 15*, and devote their earnest endeavours, meanwhile, to effect a reconciliation between the two parties.

It is impossible for us to make any definite proposal before knowing what may have taken place in London, in consequence of the information which will have reached them of the Emperor of Russia's positive refusal to consent to anything whatever before the King of the

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Austria, Russia, and Prussia.—ED. The substance of the despatch will be found in No. 1022.—TR.

Netherlands. But unless I am utterly mistaken, our idea is adapted to meet every contingency, and if the King of the Belgians were to complain, his voice would lose its weight the moment the five Courts had pronounced in favour of a uniform course to be adopted by them all.

I address myself to Count Pozzo because I doubt not he takes the same view of this *endless* discussion as myself. It is impossible the French Ministers can avoid a feeling of dismay at the turn it has just assumed, and they may therefore be disposed to listen to good advice. It is evident to me that not a shadow of difference really exists in the feelings or opinions of the three Courts relative to the Belgian affair, although it is difficult for them to resist a prejudice to the contrary. This is owing simply to the distance by which they are separated. Another question to which the Cabinets must soon devote their serious attention is the moral anarchy which reigns in Switzerland. I have already spoken to you on the subject, and shall return to it immediately. If, as I have no doubt will be the case, the Roman question is shortly settled, the moment will be favourable for turning our attention to Switzerland.



*ELECTION OF GREGORY XVI. TO THE PAPACY.*

1001. Metternich to Lützow in Rome, Vienna, February 12, 1831.

**1001.** Your last reports announce the elevation of Cardinal Capellari to the Papacy.

There is no need, Count, for me to assure you that no choice could have given greater pleasure to our august master than that which the Sacred College has just made.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the satisfaction we experience at his elevation is due particularly to the fact of Gregory XVI. belonging, by his birth, to Austria. A sovereign pontiff like himself knows too well—and we are too just to wish him ever to forget it—that as a temporal prince his affections belong, above all, to his people ; and that, as head of the Church, the faithful, without distinction of nation, are all his children. Free, therefore, as we are from all selfish considerations, if there were one thing in the present circumstance on which we might congratulate ourselves it would be the striking proof it affords us of the recognition accorded by the Sacred College to the pure and disinterested wishes of our Court, as well as to the virtues of him whom it has just elevated to the Papacy, by recognising both alike as guarantees, before which party spirit, with all its unjust prejudices, must remain dumb.

*OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION IN MODENA AND  
THE STATES OF THE CHURCH, AND ITS  
BONAPARTIST ORIGIN.*

1002. Historical sketch of the revolutionary movements in Modena and the Papal States. 1003. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, February 15, 1831. 1004. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, February 15, 1831. 1005. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, February 19, 1831. 1006. Joseph Bonaparte to Metternich (letter), Point Breve, October 9, 1830 (enclosed in No. 1005).

**1002.** Italy, undisturbed up to the beginning of February, has at length paid its tribute to the revolutionary principle. The Duchy of Modena and the Papal States have been the first to raise the standard of revolt.

At Modena the Government was informed of a conspiracy directed against the person of the Duke ; he was warned that the plot was to be carried into effect on Thursday, February 5, and precautionary measures were in consequence taken. And, in fact, about seven in the evening firing was heard at several points, and the conspirators—strangers, for the most part, to the city of Modena—directed their steps in silence to the Menotti mansion. The Duke of Modena could count upon the devotion and fidelity of the troops, and accordingly, after having garrisoned the citadel with a force strong enough to guard it from surprise, his Royal Highness sent forward a detachment of dragoons and pioneers, who silently surrounded the house. As soon as the investment was complete, the conspirators were summoned to surrender ; but their only reply was to open a brisk fire from all

the windows. The dragoons and pioneers fired in their turn, and endeavoured to break in the door. A company of a line battalion came to their assistance, but the conspirators kept up their fire. The Duke of Modena now arrived in person on the spot, and again summoned the rebels to surrender, but the latter only continuing to fire, his Royal Highness ordered the cannon to open fire upon the house. The walls were just threatening to fall in, when the conspirators cried out, '*Misericordia e vita in dono!*' The Archduke's answer was, '*Con rebelli non tratto!*' The conspirators then surrendered at discretion to the number of forty-four.

The population of Modena had stood quite aloof from this attempt, but the conspiracy had some widespread ramifications in many cities and villages of the Duchy. An attempt had been made some days before at Reggio, but it was put down by the troops; from the 4th that city was in open revolt. At Sassuolo and Carpi the conspirators reckoned many adherents, who took up arms against the troops; but they were perplexed at not seeing the signal agreed upon with the Modenese conspirators, and were unable to prevent the arrest of several implicated persons. The Duke of Modena hearing, however, that the revolutionary spirit was spreading in the country places, and had broken out at Mirandola, Bastiglia, and particularly at Reggio, and being further aware that Bologna and the Romagna were about to rise, his Royal Highness felt that his forces were too few to make head against the storm, and retired to Mantua with his family. He had, meanwhile, assigned the several regiments the most favourable positions in the direction of the Austrian frontiers, where they were to await the arrival of adequate reinforcements. On the 6th everything was quiet in Modena, but it appears that at other points in the Duchy they



had endeavoured to organise a so-called Provisional Government '*degli Stati Estensi*.'

The revolution at Modena is no isolated fact ; it is an episode in the vast conspiracy which embraces the whole of Italy.

At Bologna the conspiracy broke out an hour after the election of Gregory XVI. was made known. The Pro-Legate was forced to give way, and a Provisional Government, consisting of Count Pepoli (son-in-law of Murat), MM. Confalonieri, Bevilacqua, Ocioli, Vicini, and Salviani, was organised, and mounted the tricolour cockade (red, green, and white). Ferrara hastened to follow their example : the Pontifical troops were disarmed and replaced by a National Guard, while the Pro-Legate was deposed. The Revolution is spreading in the Romagna, which rose at once in revolt and formed a Government, in which Count Rasponi, another son-in-law of Murat, figures. The conspirators despatched messengers to Ravenna and Forli, and the Revolutionary troops are marching on Ancona.

Modena, which had kept tranquil after the departure of the Duke, was again thrown into revolt by a Bolognese troop led by Count Pepoli. The great majority of the population have conveyed to the Duke their wishes for his immediate return.

Such are the events that have taken place in those countries. This vast network of conspiracy, which has been weaving in France for some time back, bears the visible impress of Bonapartism. The plan, as far as we yet know, is to deprive the Pope of his temporal power, and to form a kingdom of Italy under the Constitutional King of Rome. The new dynasty is already provided, as is proved by the proclamation which has been so freely spread in the north and centre of Italy.

*Metternich to Apponyi, in Paris, Vienna,  
February 15, 1831.*

**1003.** There is nothing *Italian* in the measures by which the revolts have been accomplished. The Italian Revolution is a Bonapartist Revolution supported by the party of anarchy in France.

We have long, Count, devoted our special attention to the designs of the Bonapartist faction, and unless we shut our eyes to the most conclusive proofs, we are certainly under no error in regard to them. The position of the Emperor our master and his Cabinet is a most peculiar one. The bases upon which our Government rests must win for us the confidence of the friends of legitimacy; the ties of relationship between the Imperial family and the late Napoleon obtain us that of the adherents of the former French Empire. The son of Napoleon is living at Vienna; the adherents of the father, in turning their eyes to him, must naturally raise them to the grandfather.

We know the movement in Italy is a Bonapartist one. We are resolved to resist it. The Emperor owes so much to his empire, and to all that is yet left standing in Europe. By this determination we at the same time render the most signal service to King Louis Philippe. If, on the simplest showing, there was an incompatibility between his existence and that of a subordinate member of the Bonapartist family on a throne contiguous to weak and feeble France, how much more real does that incompatibility become in view of an Italy placed beneath the sceptre of Napoleon II.! Yet this is the direct object of the party of anarchy, against which we are still struggling.

We have never recognised the so-called principle of non-intervention, and we never will give in to it.

What we ask of the French Government is not to hamper protective measures on our part in cases where they are imposed on us by the most urgent considerations.

We enter into the most solemn engagement with it, and with all the European Courts, that no policy of political ambition, of territorial aggrandisement, nor of selfish predominance, shall ever form the motive-spring of our conduct ; nothing short of a formal requisition on the part of legally constituted authorities shall induce us to take measures adapted to confirm the complete independence of those authorities. In a word, we shall do nothing but what we consider it our bounden duty to do, in accordance with the most approved principles of international law.

The French Government will be exposed to moral attacks on the part of those who are the enemies of order. It will have to show a firm front against them, or else afford the world a proof that it is but the ægis behind which the faction that is the sworn foe of the general tranquillity may take shelter. We hold that party to be as inveterate a foe of its existence as it is of ours ; two bodies attacked by a similar disease ought to contend with or at least resist it, each according to its capacity and means. The manner here counts for nothing.

Our enemy is anarchy ; our friends those who oppose it. If the day should come when we are driven into our last entrenchments, or reduced to choose among the evils with which we are threatened by anarchy, we shall have to choose the one which offers the least direct detriment to our own existence ; and the means lie ready to our hand.

Here, Ambassador, you have a full and ample confession. It is frank and complete. It should be listened to by those who, under penalty of their own destruction, ought to be the friends of our cause—for that cause is, in reality, their own. Never has the civilised world offered such a spectacle as is to be seen at the present time ; ordinary remedies no longer apply to a state of things which is totally beyond the range of ordinary combinations. The question for every Government, and in especial our own, is whether it shall live or perish. We offer life to all who have the desire or the power to live ; we shall know how to contend against extinction to our latest breath.

*Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, February 15, 1831.*

1004. I authorise you to read the reserved despatch (No. 1003) to General Sébastiani, and to the King himself, should you see any signs of hesitation in the course pursued by the Cabinet. What we ask of it is *not to declare against us, and not to assist the Italian Revolutionists*. Our geographical position hinders France from striking any actual blow against us, unless, indeed, she declare war against Sardinia or the Germanic Confederation. The present Government will do neither one nor the other ; it will be powerless for good, but will not openly countenance what is evil.

The Sardinian States were still quiet so late as the 10th of this month. It will not do to reckon on a continuance of this state of things.

I will send you by the first courier (and they will succeed one another very rapidly) some curious proofs of the earnestness with which the Bonapartists are intriguing in our midst.

*Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, February 19, 1831.*

1005. Referring to my secret despatch of the 15th instant (No. 1004), I have the honour to transmit to you the documents\* I promised, which prove beyond a doubt, not only the extent to which the members of the Bonaparte family are pushing their intrigues, but the excessive eagerness they displayed in making overtures to us, at the close of the Revolution of the last days of July. There is little need for me to tell you that *no reply whatever has been made to these overtures.*

*Joseph Napoleon Bonaparte to Metternich (letter); Point Breve, October 9, 1830.*

(Enclosed in No. 1005.)

1006. *Monsieur*, it is now ten years ago that a Duke de Brindisi (?) introduced himself to me in my retreat, as the bearer of a communication from you; since then, M. David Parish has spoken to me of the kindly feelings entertained by you for me and for my family. To the former verbal communication I replied in suitable terms; I begged M. Parish to convey my thanks to you, and have waited till time should give me the opportunity to avail myself of your kindness. That opportunity has now come, and I address myself directly

\* Among the documents enclosed are three letters from Joseph Bonaparte, one of which is to the Emperor Francis, a second to the Empress Maria Louise, Duchess of Parma, and the third to Prince Metternich; the latter we append (No. 1006). Besides this, the enclosures also contain some reports from the Austrian Ambassador at Florence, from which it appears that the Prince of Canino had intended to come to Vienna, to support the elevation of the Duke of Reichstadt to the throne of France, but that, with the full concurrence of Metternich, he had been refused a passport.—ED.



to you with the request that you will transmit my letter\* to his Imperial and Royal Majesty, and at the same time consider the observations suggested to me by the circumstances of the moment, which render it my duty to neglect nothing that may be of advantage to the son of my brother, the grandson of his Majesty the Emperor, to the welfare of France, the tranquillity of Europe, and even to that of France, if all these things be compatible. That they are, *Monsieur*, perfectly compatible at the present time, I am as firmly convinced, as that Napoleon II., restored to the aspirations of the French, can alone bring about all these auspicious results. I offer my services to act as his guide ; the happiness of my country, the peace of the world, shall be the noble objects of my ambition.

Napoleon II., entering France under the national colours, and guided by a man whose entire love and devotion to his country are well known, is the only person who can hinder the usurpation of the Duke of Orleans, who, having been called to the throne neither by right of succession nor by the distinct and legitimate expression of the national will, can only maintain himself in power by flattering every party in turn, and yielding to the one that offers him the greatest chance of success, at the cost of whatever means. Napoleon would prevent republican agitations from making head in France, Italy, Spain and Germany. Napoleon, Emperor of the French, would be bound, by ties of gratitude, affection and political interests, to Austria,

\* In this letter occurs the following sentence : 'Sire, if you entrust to me my brother's son, that son who on his deathbed he declared should follow my advice to re-enter France, I guarantee the success of the enterprise ; unaided, and with the tricolour scarf, Napoleon II. shall be proclaimed.'

the only continental state with whom he would stand in a similar connection.

The branches of the House of Spain and Naples could offer no opposition to the views of the French and Austrian Cabinets when thus united; Italy would remain firm in her allegiance; Germany would prove no source of danger; the new King of England would gladly efface, by a recognition of Napoleon II., the shame incurred by the Government of his country through its conduct to the dying Emperor Napoleon; the successor of Alexander cannot be insensible of the regret manifested, towards the end of his life, by that Prince, for having been instrumental to the scheme of recalling the Bourbons into France; Prussia cannot be desirous of a new revolution in France, knowing as she does that she would be the first to feel the effects of it, and the other Powers cannot have forgotten her conduct during the first war of the Revolution.

M. le Comte Athanase d'Otrante,\* should he be fortunate enough to obtain a meeting with you, will enter fully into any explanations you may desire. I have full and entire confidence in his good intentions and capacity.

Accept, Monsieur, my esteem and high consideration.

Your Highness's affectionate servant,

JOSEPH NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

\* A son of Fouché, Duke of Otranto (died at Trieste, 1820). There is no doubt that the mission here spoken of has some connection with an occurrence which Prokesch (*My Relations with the Duke of Reichstadt*) and Montbel (*Le Duc de Reichstadt*) mention in their memoirs. According to their accounts, there existed a Bonapartist conspiracy, the plan of which was fully matured, to lead the Duke of Reichstadt in triumph to Paris, as soon as Prince Metternich could be induced to allow Napoleon's son to 'escape' from Vienna. We have no further documentary evidence to attest a fact which the above communications render very probable; but, in any case, the leading part assigned by Prokesch and Montbel to Fouché in the execution of the plan, is based upon a decided error, for the famous ex-minister of Napoleon had then been dead for ten years.—ED.

*ON FRANCE'S PROPOSAL FOR A GENERAL  
DISARMAMENT.*

1007. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, June 3, 1831. 1008.  
Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, June 3, 1831.

1007. It appears from one of your reports of May 11, that Count Sébastiani had imparted to your Excellency and Baron Werther his ideas as to the possibility of a reciprocal disarmament, on the part of the Courts of France, Austria, and Prussia, on the ground of a mutual understanding.

On May 22, the President of the Council and Count Sébastiani invited you, conjointly with your colleagues of England, Prussia, and Russia, to a conference on the above subject. The Ambassadors expressed 'the lively satisfaction with which the proposition was sure to be received by their respective Governments, and the readiness they would show in forwarding a measure to which the earnest hopes of each had constantly been directed, and in regard to which the Courts of Austria and Prussia had already made confidential overtures to the French Cabinet.'

This reply, Ambassador, has met with the entire concurrence of our august master, and his Imperial Majesty, convinced as he is of the importance of the deliberations proposed by the French Ministers, has commanded me to forward you, without delay, the instructions requisite to facilitate its progress and ensure its success.

In all our explanations and dealings with the Government of King Louis Philippe, we have consistently shown a frank and straightforward spirit, which could leave no doubt as to our intentions. As we have now to deal with a subject of the deepest importance, we are determined to continue to act in the same spirit.

But as 'disarmament' is a complicated idea, requiring to be strictly defined, we deem it necessary, first of all, to inform you of the meaning we attach to the term on the present occasion.

In considering the means which would exempt the Powers from the necessity of keeping up forces disproportionate to the ordinary resources of their respective countries, we must fix our attention alike on the *material* inconvenience and the *moral* danger of a similar state of things, and the proposed disarmament must necessarily apply a remedy to both the one and the other.

In order to attain this twofold object the Courts must afford the world a demonstration of their uniformity of opinion upon the fundamental bases of any possible peace. These bases, in our opinion, are the following :

1. The political independence of every legally-recognised Government; in other words, the liberty it should of right enjoy, to adopt, in its internal administration and in its relations with other States, such system as it may deem best adapted to the interests of its own preservation, safety, and tranquillity, without detriment to the rights of others.

2. The maintenance of all existing treaties, except in so far as they may be abrogated or modified by a mutual understanding between the contracting parties.

3. The firm determination of the Powers to affirm,

through their regard for these principles, the relations of peace and goodwill existing among them, and under the ægis of which the internal peace of the States, and all the blessings attending it, can alone flourish.

By starting from these bases, the Powers would be able to declare :

That actuated by a single desire, and a sincere intention of observing, and causing to be observed, the above-mentioned principles, as being the only ones capable of maintaining and guaranteeing the general peace, and desirous of relieving the people from the burdens which would naturally weigh upon them, from an aimless augmentation of their military forces,

They have determined :

1. That from the signing of this declaration they will put a stop to measures aiming at extraordinary armaments, and reduce their armies to their ordinary peace footing.

2. That any display of military force beyond this scale, unless called for by some special, imminent, and unforeseen danger, shall henceforth take place only in the way of combination among the Powers against one of their number, who, by a departure from the above-named bases, should violate the peace of Europe.

3. That, nevertheless, no steps shall be taken towards such general armament, until every attempt to preserve peace, by mutual explanations and concessions, shall have been exhausted.

Such, Ambassador, are the views of our Cabinet relative to the conditions essential to any possible understanding on the question of disarmament.



*Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, June 3, 1831.*

1008. The preceding despatch is drawn up in such terms as to permit you to make use of it in treating with the French Cabinet. I have reserved for the present one some remarks of a more delicate nature, which you will only be able to impart to your colleagues of Russia and Prussia.

The general position of things is most precarious ; for every evil some remedy must be found ; you know that I am not among the number of those who despair lightly of the public welfare, yet my mind tells me that the dangers far outweigh the chances of safety.

The confession, however, once made, you will not, Ambassador, question either the zeal which I shall continue to expend in the search for means to save what has not yet perished, nor my determination to die within the breach, in defence of the cause of legitimacy.

Will the French Cabinet admit the moral side of the question? Were it to do so, it will afford us a fresh proof of its good faith. To our mind, that is the *principal* side of the question, of which *material disarmament*, or *the return to a peace-footing on the part of the Powers*, is but the simple and natural *consequence*.

I must confine myself to brief remarks to demonstrate to you the accuracy of my distinction. To do this, I have only to refer to facts.

The *material* military strength of France consists of a *garde nationale* for sedentary or active service, in addition to the troops of the line.

The reduction proposed by the French Cabinet can only apply to the regular army.

The military forces of all the other Powers consist

purely of the latter element, for in Prussia, as in Austria, the *Landwehr* forms part of the regular army.

Granting a similar diminution in the number of troops, France will always be disproportionately armed in comparison with the other Powers. But as the *garde nationale* is mostly devoted to the defence merely of their native soil, let us leave it out of consideration, although the history of the Republic and the Empire has taught us that this same civic guard is a reserve always at hand to swell the ranks of offensive warfare. It appears to me impossible to arrive at any understanding on the declaration of the maintenance of a certain *fixed number* of troops. Such a measure would be at once vexatious and useless. It would be vexatious, because it would demand a reciprocal control ; it would be useless, because such a control is impossible.

In order to terminate the discussion, the fact we shall have to consider, in the projected concert among the Powers, is *the return to a peace-footing, consequent on the cessation of armaments.*

But, Ambassador, what else can this reduction of armaments to a peace-footing be than the result of a *state of moral peace*? This, then, is what we must endeavour to introduce ; the other will follow of itself. I believe that so far as the object is attainable at all in the present condition of France, it will be attained by adopting the course indicated in the preceding despatch.

I say, *so far as the object is attainable*, for no arrangement entered into with a Government such as that of Louis Philippe can be looked upon as final.

There are two elements in France, essentially opposed to one another, which could not be amalgamated by the most refined art so as to present a compact and solid mass.

*The royal throne surrounded by republican institutions* is an unmeaning expression, a monstrous entity bereft of vitality, an abstraction which all the endeavours of its authors and partizans can never succeed in investing with a body. A perpetual struggle between these two hostile elements must be the inevitable consequence of such a conception; but this conception has assumed the proportions of a fact; the throne so lamentably constructed, *the throne that is no more than a wooden seat without even a piece of velvet to cover it*, politically speaking represents France; with this throne exclusively are we forced to treat, therefore let us cling to the remains of royalty it still possesses.

The idea of disarmament is either the expression on the part of the French Government of a due appreciation of the risk to which it would be exposed by the outburst which the parties hostile to its existence wish to evoke at all hazards, or it is an overture made to the Powers; let us assume the former of these hypotheses, let us work it out, and see all the good we can extract from it.

Anarchy would, in the present condition of things, be the formidable auxiliary of France in the event of attacks from without; let us not provoke its wrath. Let us place ourselves on a peace-footing; but let not its admission be the extinction of the last resources of established authority, to the letting loose of all the elements of disorder. If anarchy should come and attack us, let us hold ourselves in readiness to resist it; but let us aid the royal throne to put down *republican institutions and their terrible consequences*, if the French Government does really wish to be assisted.

You will agree with MM. Pozzo and Werther upon a uniform course to be pursued by the representatives of the *three Courts* towards the English Ambassador. In

the present instance, the interests of that Power are clearly in harmony with those of the continental Courts. England, whatever her internal condition, can never have any wish to aid France in carrying out schemes which would threaten the equilibrium of Europe, and tend to smooth the path of a rival power in its pursuit of a system of conquest, and the extension of its influence over the destinies of the world. Nothing could be more desirable than the most perfect harmony among the *four ancient allies*. Let it be our endeavour to establish it, and to give it as much weight as possible ; but in order to attain this salutary object, we must never forget that the position of the British Cabinet differs, in very many respects, from that of the *three allies*, and that the latter cannot subordinate all the requirements of their policy to objections which may appear insurmountable to the *fourth* member of the alliance.\*

\* See also Nos. 1020 and 1021.

*THE QUESTION OF THE EVACUATION OF THE  
PAPAL STATES BY THE AUSTRIAN TROOPS.*

1009. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, June 3, 1831.

1009. I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency copies of the last reports of our Ambassador at Rome, and of my despatch to him of May 22.

I will sum up the chief issues of the Roman Question in the following points :

A revolution had broken out in the Papal States ; we suppressed it by lending the Holy Father that material aid which he had not at his own disposal.

The moment the immediate object of our action was attained, we eagerly joined the other Great Powers in endeavouring to impress on the Sovereign Pontiff the choice of such measures as were best adapted for the moral pacification of the provinces lately in revolt, and the confirmation of their future tranquillity.

The small number of troops still in garrison at Ancona and Bologna has been placed by his Imperial Majesty at the disposal of a central council, consisting of members of the Pontifical Government and the representatives of the five Courts at the Holy See.

In pursuance of a resolution passed at this Council, Ancona was evacuated on the 15th May. In view of the imminence of the danger, and the certainty that a too precipitate retirement of the only serviceable troops would have exposed the peaceable inhabitants of several



cities, which are still in a very disturbed state, to the speedy renewal of scenes of disorder and anarchy, it was further decided that the retirement of our troops should be effected gradually, and that in pursuance of the orders given, they should be concentrated on June 15 at Bologna.

The rapidity with which the flame of insurrection has spread, not merely from country to country, and city to city, but from club to club, is enough to prove to every impartial spectator that the revolution was evoked solely by a propaganda foreign to the country it invaded, and that it would have failed to find there a single champion to embrace its cause, had he not felt himself to be exempt from personal sacrifice and placed beneath the ægis of certain impunity.

The very character of this singular Revolution indicates the course which it would be most advantageous for the Pontifical Government and the Courts friendly to it to take.

At Paris, as at Vienna, there is a conviction that the Sovereign Pontiff must receive aid, if the tranquillity of his States is to be assured. Their evacuation by our troops cannot be more eagerly desired by the French Cabinet than it is by our own; but the support afforded to the tranquillity of the Roman States by the mere presence of an armed force of proved fidelity, needs to be replaced by that which is equally effective as a guarantee for the Pontifical Government. This support must be looked for in a frank declaration of the Powers, and the terms of a declaration which would satisfy our wishes are to be found stated in our letter to Count Lützow.

I believe I have indicated to our Ambassador at Rome the manner in which such a declaration could best be made. It would rest with the Holy Father to

invite it. In answer to his request, the representatives of the Powers would record, in notes simultaneously drawn up, but uniform in tenor, '*the fixed determination of their respective Courts to maintain, in its fullest extent, the temporal power of the Pope, and to defend the same against every revolutionary attack.*'

A declaration to this effect, to which the Pontifical Government would give the requisite publicity, would be calculated to allay the excitement which the authors of all the disorder in Europe set themselves, with such lamentable success, to foment in the Papal States. These conditions once fulfilled, it is clear to us that the prolonged occupation of Bologna by our troops would not only be purposeless, but that the complete evacuation of the Legations would be compensated for by a pledge of tranquillity more efficacious than the presence of our soldiers.

In regard to the administrative interests of the Roman States, we entreat the French Cabinet to leave to the enlightened zeal of the representatives of the Courts at Rome, the task of urging on reforms through the proper channels. They can only be treated successfully on the spot. Nothing is in itself more difficult than to give advice to a Government, particularly one situated as that of Rome now is. The pontifical Government has made an immense mistake in omitting to take advantage of the fifteen years of peace it has enjoyed, to regulate the various branches of the administration, especially in the Legations.

*ALARMING INCIDENTS IN ITALY.*

1010. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, June 4, 1831. 1011. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, June 4, 1831. 1012. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, June 4, 1831. 1013. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, July 6, 1831.

1010. In despatching a courier to you yesterday evening, I did not foresee that I should be under the necessity of sending another so soon afterwards.

In the course of this morning we received the enclosed reports from Rome and Bologna.\*

I bring them to your notice; their contents will render it needless for me to enter into details.

It is the will of the Emperor that you should apply without loss of time to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, requesting him to arrange a conference between yourself, the Ambassadors of Great Britain and Russia, and the Prussian Envoy.

In this conference you will communicate the reports I send you, and couple with them the following observations:

The Emperor, our august master, desires the pre-

\* The facts communicated by these reports were: a demand by France, couched in very peremptory terms, for the deposition of the Archbishop of Paris, and the recall of the Nuncio Lambruschini; the anchoring of two French frigates in the harbour of Civita Vecchia; the expected arrival of a French squadron in Adriatic waters; and the despatch to Bologna of a French agent, in the person of the *chargé d'affaires* at Parma, Count Saint Priest, who was making himself conspicuous by using menacing language against Austria, and proclaiming the necessity of the speedy withdrawal of the Austrian troops, as the only alternative to imminent war.—ED.

servation of peace, and his Imperial Majesty is convinced that his wishes are shared by the other Powers. The meaning attached by our august master to the term 'peace' is clearly and precisely laid down in the despatch of June 3 (No. 1009). The same despatch also contains the fullest particulars as to the evacuation of the Papal States by our troops. The facts, however, contained in the reports from Rome and Bologna are of such a nature, that if things go on in the same way, the Revolution must inevitably be excited anew in the Roman States; and the Emperor is as fully determined to resist it the second time, as he was at the time of its first outbreak.

It is not by fine phrases that the peace of Europe can be assured; proposals contradicted by facts, incitements to revolt in a quarter where the fierce activity of the determined opponents of all legal order is so plainly at work, quickly reduce to nothing what is, after all, only an empty phrase.

You have express orders, Ambassador, to acquaint us immediately with the results of the steps you take in this matter. You will also despatch a courier direct to Count Lützow, with the results of the deliberations of the conference, on the assembling of which you will insist without delay.

*Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna,  
June 4, 1831.*

**1011.** Before conferring with the French Ministers, you will be pleased to come to an understanding with your colleagues, without, however, losing a moment's time.

In considering the courses open to the French Cabinet, two suppositions are admissible.

The first is that, in expressing its pacific views, that Cabinet is only seeking to gain time to complete its preparations for war, and that in the interval it is organising revolutionary outbreaks in Italy, which, at a given moment, it would be in a position to support by military reinforcements. The sea being open to the French Government, it would be easy for it to throw upon the coast a sufficient number of troops to serve as the nucleus for the formation of a national force. Its ranks would quickly be swelled by the host of Italian refugees now in France.

The second supposition is that the French Cabinet, sacrificing every other consideration to calculations of its Parliamentary position, especially at the opening of a new session, and desirous that Bologna should be evacuated before that day, is surrendering itself to its hopes with an ardour which blinds it to the imprudence of the means it is adopting.

We are willing, Ambassador, to allow the second supposition to occupy the foremost place in our consideration. If our judgment errs in being unwilling to reckon M. Casimir Périer among the anarchists, we could, even in that case, still only continue to pursue the same course.

If M. Périer thinks that any *intimidation* is needful to induce us to withdraw the last division of our troops from the Legations, he deceives himself; the Emperor would never be influenced by such a feeling. He does not desire war, but he will accept it, if the means of avoiding it are exhausted; the one thing in which he will never acquiesce is anarchy in Italy; the latter may establish itself in that country on the ruins of the Aus-



trian power, but never with the consent of our august master.

The question of war is thus bound up with that of the Révolution, and if the French Government encourage anarchy in Italy, it will not be Austria but France who desires war. In this dilemma, right is entirely on our side, and not to uphold it would be to place ourselves under the vassalage of France ; but the Emperor will never place himself under the vassalage of any Power.

By acting as it has done lately the French Cabinet will always endanger peace ; its conduct is marked, moreover, by a want of straightforwardness. It would have been more consistent with the honour befitting the Government of a great Power if, in establishing a centre of deliberation at Rome, and inviting the representatives of the Powers at Paris to confer together and address directions in common to their colleagues in that capital, it had placed before those who were invited to support its policy the plan of operations it proposed to follow. We much doubt whether your Excellency or any of the Ambassadors would have sanctioned the appearance of vessels at Civita Vecchia, or the mission of M. Alexis de Saint Priest to Bologna, or any of the dealings of that agent with the revolutionists in the Legations.

Be pleased, Ambassador, to invite your colleagues to lend their active support to the object of the present despatch.

*Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna,  
June 4, 1831.*

**1012.** In urging you to confer with your colleagues on the course to be adopted towards the French Cabinet with the view of guarding against the threatened out-

break in Italy, it is our particular desire that you enter into relations of the closest character with the Russian Ambassador.

The Emperor of Russia pursues a line of policy identical with our own; the instructions given by his Imperial Majesty to Count Pozzo include a zealous support to be tendered to the cause of all the lawful Powers whom we are defending in Italy. We therefore count especially on a frank understanding between your Excellency and that Ambassador.

*Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna,  
July 6, 1831.*

**1013.** I have considered, with the attention due to the gravity of the subject, the explanations which have passed between yourself and Count Pozzo, on the subject of my despatch of June 4 (Nos. 1010-1012), and have no objection to make against the changes which you have introduced into the text of my instructions.

There is one point, however, to which I wish once more to call your earnest attention, and as to which I invite you to come to an understanding with Count Pozzo. I refer to *the determination of the Emperor to respond to future appeals of the Holy Father for fresh aid, which his Holiness might be justified by certain circumstances in demanding.*

We have no idea of denying the existence of such a determination, for it has been taken. It is a necessity we must face, whatever be the consequences.

Keep nothing back in reference to the Emperor's decision, which, in fact, is not unknown to the French Cabinet, and which I have explained again to-day to

Marshal Maison, without meeting any opposition on his part. The only point on which you will have carefully to insist, is that the *determination* of his Imperial Majesty is not malevolently to be misconstrued into a *wish*. Our decision relates purely to a contingency, the realisation of which we should consider as in the last degree lamentable and unfortunate.

*ALARMING RUMOURS OF WAR PREPARATIONS  
ON THE PART OF AUSTRIA.*

1014. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, June 27, 1831.

**1014.** I have bestowed particular attention on your Excellency's reports of June 13-18, in which you give an account of the observations addressed to you on the subject of the Austrian armaments by Count Sébastiani and the President of the Council.

Not only have I no hesitation in enabling you to fulfil your promise to bring before those Ministers, without delay, explanations from us on the subject, but I feel a real satisfaction in seizing an opportunity which has come to me unsought, to instruct you to put forward what seems to us a most simple explanation of the matter.

Austria has armed, but it was not she who set the example.

Immediately after the events which took place at the end of July last, the Emperor gave orders that the ordinary garrisons in his provinces beyond the Alps should be reinforced. The motives which urged his Imperial Majesty to this measure were evident, and there is the less need to recapitulate them because you yourself were the means of bringing the French Cabinet to take a just view of them.

It seems to me just as needless to mention here the immense armaments successively decreed by France.

Apart from a Civic Guard of a million and a half of men, the regular army has been raised to its full war-footing. The Emperor then did what all the Powers held it their duty to do : he placed his own army on its full peace-footing, and gave orders to call out the first battalions of the *Landwehr*, which, in our military organisation, form part of the troops of the line.

The French Government can, without difficulty, estimate the strength of the Austrian army. In order to do so it has only to reckon up the number of the battalions and squadrons composing it. A company contains 180 men, and a squadron 150 horses. Owing to our system of quartering troops, the men, to be available, do not require to be kept under arms, thus forming a burden on the State treasury ; a very short space of time is sufficient to enable them to join the colours. Our cavalry has been at its full strength since 1829. The army is thus ready at a moment's notice to undertake any duty it might be called upon to perform.

The distribution of our army should also be perfectly well known to the French Government. It knows the number of troops we have had in our Italian provinces for some months past. In spite of what may have been reported by inaccurate informants, their number has not been increased latterly. His Imperial Majesty, true to his duties towards the Germanic Confederation, has stationed his contingent in the German provinces of his empire. An army corps of 60,000 men is charged with the preservation of public health and safety in Galicia.

The artillery and train have not been strengthened ; their *matériel* remains always the same. The number required for duty in the Lombard-Venetian kingdom, and to form the Federal contingent, is complete.

Such, Ambassador, is the literal truth, and if any-



thing could surprise us, it is not the fact of its being known, but the errors which I have found stated in your reports. These errors I proceed to correct.\*

After this plain statement, I should not hesitate to ask the French Government whether the statements whose falsity I have just shown, found their way to it from the Governments of *Munich, Carlsruhe or Dresden*, did I not know the only source whence they could have been derived. It is the men who are pledged to the *progressionist party* in Bavaria, Saxony and the Grand Duchy of Baden, the authors of the *offensive neutrality* in Switzerland, and the factions in Italy, who busy themselves in sanctioning rumours that fall in with their subversive views.

The question, Ambassador, the real question does not lie in the fact of armaments : it lies where we sought it, among the directions addressed to you by us on the 3rd instant (No. 1009). Armies are at their full strength everywhere, and nowhere—owing to the French military organisation—to a greater extent or at a more ruinous cost than in France. In Austria, as in Prussia, owing to their different organisation, the armies, in order to be available, do not require to press with their full burden on the State treasury. The evil of a position like the present lies in the lamentable facilities it affords to parties to abuse it for their own ends. This evil is recognised in the countries of Europe that are least disturbed ; how much more deeply, then, must it affect the Government of a state which is a prey to intense agitation.

This explanation, Ambassador, appears to me to exhaust the subject. Should there be anything the

\* Some details here follow as to alleged movements and dispositions of the Austrian troops in the Tyrol and elsewhere.—TR.

French Ministers still desire, or any question they would like to address to us, be pleased to invite them to make it known to us with the utmost frankness. In our political attitude there is nothing hidden ; on the contrary, everything can be said openly, for our views are unconditionally conservative.

The Emperor has no desire to make material conquests, and it is just as far from his views to extend his moral influence beyond the limits of sound policy. Austria is a great state placed geographically in a central position. States thus situated are, by their very nature, pledged, in preference, to a system of wise defence. Such is the aim of our policy ; the factious might endeavour to make us change our course, but we should not be actuated by their motives.

*WITHDRAWAL OF THE AUSTRIAN TROOPS FROM  
BOLOGNA.*

1015. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, July 31, 1831.

**1015.** The fresh demands made by the representatives of the Powers at the Papal Court, in reference to the evacuation of Bologna, in pursuance of the communications received from their colleagues at Paris, dated June 18, determined the Pontifical Government, which had acceded to every proposition relative to the amnesty, to proclaim the administrative reforms which there had so far been time to arrange, and to declare by a simultaneous note addressed by Cardinal Bernetti on July 3rd to the Ambassadors of Austria and France, that it consented to the withdrawal of our troops, unconditionally and apart from any guarantee for the temporal authority of the Holy See and the tranquillity of its States on the part of France. This step once taken, Count Lützow could no longer refuse to accede to M. Sainte-Aulaire's request, and in virtue of the powers confided to him he gave the order of departure to the general in command of our garrison at Bologna. Acting in a perfectly honourable and straightforward manner, he did not hesitate, even before receiving express authority from us to do so, to fix the date of departure, in accordance with the wish of the French Government, for the 15th July, instead of the 20th, as agreed upon at the Paris Conference.

This conduct on the part of our Ambassador, who

has acted thoroughly in the spirit of his Cabinet, affords the most complete proof of our sincere desire to support unreservedly the interests of the French Government, in every way which would show our appreciation of the difficulties of its position.

Count Lützow, true to his instructions, made a declaration, the copy of which you will find enclosed,\* and to which the Russian Minister gave his unreserved assent. The Prussian Minister declared, in general terms, the interest felt by his Court in favour of the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See; but subsequent instructions from his Government have enabled him to take up exactly the same ground as ourselves. Mr. Brooke Taylor is, as you know, obliged to abstain from any official transaction with the Court of Rome.

As for M. de Sainte-Aulaire, that Ambassador confined himself to a vague and dilatory answer, which apparently makes the guarantee of France dependent on the proclamation of a system of administrative and judicial institutions for the Papal States, and, in some measure, on the approbation accorded to those institutions on the part of the French Chambers. There is doubtless no need for me to insist, either on your own account or that of the French Cabinet, on the impropriety of choosing similar expressions. The Holy Father, an independent sovereign, has already introduced salutary reforms into his administrations and announced others of the like character, which only require time for their realisation; and he has attended to most of the counsels tendered to him by the representatives of the five Powers

\* The purport of the declaration was as follows: 'The Emperor permits the undersigned to declare that his Majesty guarantees the integrity of the States placed under the authority of the Holy See by the stipulations of 1815, including the maintenance, in its fullest extent, of the temporal power of the Holy See.'—ED.

in the note\* which they jointly drew up. What, however, most plainly shows the real worth of the Ambassador's scruples is the King's Speech at the opening of the Chambers, which alludes in terms of unreserved approbation to the ameliorations assured to the Papal States, and which induce the hope that their tranquillity will no longer be disturbed.

We doubt not, Ambassador, that the French Ministry will perceive the justice of these observations, and consequently feel disposed to adopt, in its relations with the Pontifical Government, the same frank and unreserved attitude which we have displayed towards France.

\* In this note (dated May 21, 1831) the representatives of the five Powers suggested various internal reforms, which were to apply not only to the parts where revolts had arisen, but to the whole of the Papal States.—ED.



*ON THE NECESSITY OF THE UNION OF THE  
THREE NORTHERN POWERS.*

1016. Metternich to Werner in Teplitz,\* Vienna, July 31, 1831.

**1016.** You tell me his Majesty the King of Prussia wishes to learn my views as to the realisation of the idea which has so often occupied our attention in the course of this eventful year—the necessity of a closer understanding between Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

This request, which appeals to me with all the authority of a command, I will endeavour to fulfil to the best of my ability, and with the same frankness it has always been my duty and my pleasure to use, in my personal intercourse with his Majesty.

Permit me first, however, to glance at the past, since that alone can teach us the true needs of the present.

The old Quadruple Alliance of 1813, and to which France was admitted in 1818, had, from the beginning of 1826, come to be nothing more than a mere phrase. It had practically ceased to exist when there occurred the outbreak which led to the overthrow of the French throne in the July of the past year. The effect of that event upon Europe was as though a dyke had suddenly burst. The revolutionary flood spread over States which

\* In order to keep up close relations with the Prussian Court, Baron Werner, Councillor to the Austrian Embassy at Berlin, had been sent to Teplitz, where King Frederick William III. had taken up his residence for some weeks, for the purpose of taking the waters.—ED.

were prepared beforehand for the reception of its waters. Only here and there, where, in the interval of deceptive tranquillity, the pernicious machinations of the authors of the Revolution had been more or less kept in check by the wisdom of the Governments, were a few States to be found with sufficient freedom of action to at least concert measures of resistance.

I was in Bohemia when tidings reached me of the speedy triumph of the Revolution, and I at once determined to avail myself of the immediate vicinity of the Russian Vice-Chancellor to consult with him on the measures which seemed to me indispensable for the general safety.\*

His Majesty the King of Prussia is in full possession of the proposals made by me to Count Nesselrode in the early days of August. They comprised:

1. The establishment of a uniform policy to be pursued towards the French Government as newly constituted.

2. The immediate establishment of a common centre in which the three Courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia might deliberate, not only on the general course of their policy, but its application to particular cases. I proposed Berlin, as occupying the most central position between St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Paris.

Count Nesselrode accepted the first half of my proposal; the second he would not hear of, or even bring it *ad referendum* before his master.

The first injurious result of this misunderstanding between the three Cabinets was the *separate* recognition of the new order of things in France. It was made by Austria and Prussia in nearly the same words and at the same moment; Russia hesitated, and proof was thus

\* See *Chiffon de Carlsbad*, in the note to No. 961.

afforded to the adverse party, ever on the watch to detect it, that a permanent understanding no longer existed among the old allies.

The French revolutionary Government loudly proclaimed the principle of non-intervention. The Belgian, Polish, and Italian Revolutions were the immediate consequence, on the one side, of the enunciation of a false principle, which directly encouraged every revolt; on the other, of the silence of the Great Powers, a silence which was looked upon by the credulous majority as a recognition of the principle, and was universally given out *as such* by the instigators of the evil.

Things were in this position, when the deep conviction of the urgency of the case led us, some months back, to lift up our voice once more in favour of *an understanding between the three Courts*, and this time at St. Petersburg, as it was thence that the opposition had come in the first instance.

Count Nesselrode again declined the proposal; later on, and after repeated representations on the subject, the necessity of an understanding was no longer denied by the Russian Cabinet, which, however, proposed London as the place where deliberations should be carried on.

Really to correspond with the actual state of things, the Russian proposal should have turned on the endeavour to *renew* the Quadruple Alliance in London. For to seek to build on what does not exist is folly. The result of the more logical proposal would have been the same; the then English Government would have shown itself as little disposed to a *renewal* of the old alliance as to the resumption of the salutary principles of that alliance, which it had repudiated.

Meanwhile, the necessity of a close understanding

between the three Cabinets has every day become clearer. To state its aim clearly needs only the following consideration.

The Revolutionary party is thoroughly united; it takes no account of political boundaries or difference of race. *The overthrow of every legally constituted authority, without reference to its merits, origin, or requirements, is the aim of its endeavours; unresting progress the means it employs to that end.*

Owing to its origin, the existing French Government rests on the basis of the Revolution; and as the latter has no creative power, the popular throne must always be the sport of anarchy. But even assuming the possibility of its permanence, one danger will always remain in full force, and this is the necessity imposed on well-regulated States, whose power rests on an entirely different basis, of *daily making such sacrifices with the view of maintaining a tolerable Ministry in France, as undermine the very foundations of kingdoms and thrones and degrade them in public opinion.*

This evil cannot, in the present state of things, be altogether disregarded, but it can be modified. For this, only one remedy suggests itself to us, and that is; 'the most intimate understanding among the three monarchs as to the principles they intend henceforward to support; the manner in which those principles should be applied in special cases; and lastly, the terms in which they may feel called upon to enunciate to the European public the principles which form the rule of their policy.'

Had the understanding we so earnestly desire but taken place among the three Powers, at the outset of the new revolutionary period, how different might have been the result of the Belgian, Polish, and Italian Revo-

lutions ; the Russian manifesto\* would not have served as an excuse for the French armaments ; the smaller States would have known round what Central Power they might rally in time of need ; the hopes founded by the party of anarchy on the want of a complete unity among the leading Powers, and the courage engendered in it by that delusion, would, finally, not exercise such a prejudicial influence on the public mind, as is now unfortunately only too much the case.

That which, owing to a mistake which cannot sufficiently be deplored, does not at present exist, must be called into being, and for this nothing more is needed than the firm determination of the three monarchs. It depends on them, and them only, to agree quietly among themselves upon a place in which matters demanding joint deliberations and joint determinations may be thoroughly and connectedly treated, without loss of time.

In the present posture of affairs, I would propose Vienna as the place best adapted for a common centre. If his Majesty the King will empower his Ambassador at this Court to discuss the matter with me and a representative of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, and come to some common agreement, the result will prove that a way may yet be found to save from the present universal shipwreck what has not been irrevocably destroyed by previous convulsions. I have taken preparatory steps to this object through the last courier despatched to St. Petersburg. If the idea meets with support then from the side of Prussia, I have no doubts as to its realisation . . . .

\* A reference, doubtless, to the manifesto issued by the Emperor Nicholas, at Peterhoff, on August 11, 1830. By this, notwithstanding the conclusion of the war with the Ottoman Porte, it was declared needful, and enacted that an extraordinary levy of recruits should be held throughout the kingdom.—ED.



*THE  
CHOICE OF PRINCE LEOPOLD OF SAXE-COBURG  
AS KING OF THE BELGIANS.*

1017. Metternich to Trauttmansdorff in Berlin, Vienna, September 5, 1831.

1017. M. d'Hooghvorst has just arrived here, charged with the duty of announcing to the Emperor the accession of Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg to the throne of Belgium.\*

Our august master empowered me to receive him, but at the same time to inform him that his Imperial Majesty would not formally recognise the new King until the Belgian struggle had unmistakably terminated ; in other words, until the pacification had reached a stage when the recognition could also be made by his Majesty the King of Holland.

Thereupon M. d'Hooghvorst asked my advice as to how he should act under circumstances which had not been provided for in his instructions. We agreed that he should go to Ischl, in Upper Austria, and there await instructions from his Court.

The manner of the Belgian Ambassador was most friendly throughout the interview. He was even more open than I had a right to expect.

\* After the independence of Belgium had been pronounced by the London Conference, of January 20, the Belgian Congress, on June 4, chose Prince Leopold as King of the Belgians. On June 26, Leopold declared his readiness to accept the offer.—ED.

After carefully exonerating himself from any personal participation in the Revolution, he depicted, in the most gloomy colours, its origin, progress, and consequences.

He said to me among other things: 'The Belgian Revolution is the result of several errors on the part of the Dutch Government, the most serious of which I hold to have been the facility with which the King allowed the scum of the French Revolutionists to settle in our cities, and the protection he afforded them. They it was who, supported by a small fraction of the inhabitants, perpetrated the revolt. Even now, Belgium is not revolutionary. The nation is attached to its soil; it longs only for repose and the cessation of the disorders under which it groans; we had material prosperity; what it needed was not to disturb our moral equilibrium.

'The King of Holland,' he added, 'was misinformed as to the real condition of things; if he had attempted his enterprise fifteen days sooner, he would have entered Brussels and Ghent without striking a blow, and been hailed as King by the whole nation. But things have undergone a great change since the arrival of the new King. Till then, it seemed very doubtful whether there would ever be one at all. Everyone was longing for the end, and this would have come with the entry of the Dutch.'

I beg you to inform M. Ancillon of all these facts.

*FRESH DISTURBANCES IN GREECE.*

1018. Metternich to Ficquelmont in St. Petersburg (letter), Vienna, September 11, 1831.

1018. As I send off the present despatch, the post from Constantinople of August 25 has just come in. It brings particulars concerning the hazardous situation of the Greek Government.\*

All that has happened is, in our opinion, the natural consequence of the trilateral enterprise; in other words, of the want of unity in the enterprise itself, and the singular participation of three Governments in a work as to the conditions and results of which they were utterly disagreed.

What these radical errors failed to effect was completed by the occurrences of last year, occurrences which had for their immediate result to dissolve *de facto* a monstrous alliance, leaving nothing beyond the *name*.

A fact of more importance is what may be the effect upon the Russian Court of the disorder now too plainly prevailing in the affairs of Greece. France has in her favour the fact of her troops being on the spot, and her revolutionary influence. Will the three Courts be able to come to an understanding upon the means of securing the tranquillity so urgently needed by the country they unite to protect? This may reasonably be doubted.

I confine myself to-day to these few remarks, which I jot down in haste.

\* These communications relate to outrages by the Hydriotes, who had taken possession of the Government shipping and the naval arsenal at Poros.—ED.

*THE CAPITULATION OF WARSAW.*

1019. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, September 18, 1831.

1019. The surrender of Warsaw ought to form an epoch in the history of the time. This event, the earliest tidings of which reached us through a report of our Consul-General, which appeared in the *Observer* of the 14th,\* should bring to an end the great drama which has occupied the attention of Europe for the last nine months, nourished the revolutionary spirit universally prevailing, and paralysed any chance which existed of doing good.

During all this time the eyes of the Poles have been directed towards Austria. The consistent manner in which our Court has always conducted its proceedings towards Poland; the frank straightforwardness of its policy; the well-known personal character of the Emperor—all this has justly given us a special claim to the confidence of the Poles. While France, in a state of revolution, and England, on the brink of it, have received the public homage of the revolted Poles, the hopes of the whole nation have constantly turned upon us.

I do not know as yet whether Count Zamoyiski†

\* According to the *Observer* of that date, a capitulation was signed on the morning of September 8, after a furious attack on Warsaw, which lasted two days. By this the Polish troops were allowed to withdraw to Prague, and the Russians immediately took possession of Warsaw.—ED.

† Andreas Count Zamoyiski, a nephew of Prince Czartoryski, was sent by his uncle to Vienna, in the first half of August, on a special mission, the

arrived at the Russian headquarters in time to take an active part in the settlement of the affair ; but I should think not. At any rate, the motto of ' unconditional submission ' was first mooted here.

I inform you, Ambassador, of these facts, because they will serve to complete the history of the day.

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object of which was : (1) to once more bring forward the question of an independent Poland under the rule of an Imperial Prince of the House of Hapsburg ; (2) to induce Austria to interfere in favour of Poland ; lastly, failing in both these objects, (3) to negotiate with the view of obtaining, on the part of the Austrian Government, a written document spontaneously advising the Poles to submit. As Count Zamoyski agreed, in the end, that the advice should be given without any conditions being attached to it, Prince Metternich furnished him with an official letter, written to that effect, and addressed to him personally. This letter the Polish Ambassador took with him to the Russian headquarters. In the meantime Warsaw had surrendered.—ED.



*FRANCE'S PROPOSAL FOR DISARMAMENT  
ACCEPTED BY AUSTRIA.\**

1020. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, October 28, 1831. 1021.  
Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, October 28, 1831.

1020. It is with heartfelt satisfaction that I am enabled to assure you of his Imperial Majesty's entire approval of the course pursued by you in the important question forming the subject of the conference to which your colleagues were invited, on September 29th, by the French Ministers.

Not only has the Emperor no objection to make to the draught of a protocol proposed to you by Count Sébastiani, but it completely embodies his own ideas on the subject.†

You will therefore, Ambassador, regard yourself as

\* See Nos. 1007 and 1008.

† This draught, submitted by Apponyi with report of October 2, runs as follows: 'The undersigned (the Plenipotentiaries of the five Great Powers in Paris) . . . with a view to ensure the general tranquillity and relieve the nations of the burden imposed on them by extraordinary armaments, have perceived with lively satisfaction, after an attentive consideration of the present state of Europe, that the relations of harmony and goodwill happily prevailing among the Powers and based on the independence of the various States *as well as on the unalterable principle of the maintenance of treaties*, render possible, at the present time, the adoption of a measure which has long been earnestly desired by their respective Governments, viz., a general disarmament. Consequently, and by virtue of the powers with which they are entrusted, the undersigned have agreed:

'(1) That the land and naval forces of France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia shall be reduced to their ordinary peace footing.

(2) That the necessary measures for carrying out the disarmament shall begin on January 1, 1832, and be completed by May 1 of the same year.'

—ED.

authorised to append your signature to the draught of the protocol.

*Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna,  
October 28, 1831.*

**1021.** You will find in the preceding despatch (No. 1020) all we have to say in answer to the French Cabinet in reference to the proposal for disarmament. The manner in which the proposal has been made proves that the position on which we took our stand on the 3rd of June last (Nos. 1007 and 1008) was correct.

Matters standing thus, it nevertheless appears to us of interest to glance at the change effected by this measure in the relative position of the Governments.

The French Government has two motives for inviting disarmament. The inadequacy of its finances to meet the immense and continuous strain made upon them by the maintenance of an army out of all proportion to its political needs, and the serious dangers, for a Ministry that *aims at stability*, necessarily involved in the existence of an armed force far more liable to be influenced by the parties who distract the country than by the shadow of royal authority. Only the first of these considerations applies to the allied Powers; accordingly, whether armed or disarmed, they are in a better position than the revolutionary Power.

This argument, which may be held to be indisputable, applies equally to the moral effect sure to be exercised by the fact of disarmament on Governments so dissimilarly situated. The French Ministry, in submitting to a law of necessity, no doubt hopes at the same time to make a strong bid for public opinion. But if it flatters itself on the score of this advantage, as

I doubt not it does, it deceives itself. The revolution disarmed is a revolution without vitality. The bulk of the French ratepayers will doubtless feel contented at the prospect of a diminution in the immense burdens which weigh upon them ; but between a feeling of this kind and that repose on which alone the general welfare can be based, the interval is nowhere greater than in a country torn, like France, by party spirit and party intrigues. The weakest side of Louis Philippe's Government is the impossibility by which it is beset of ever departing from a negative attitude, while the factions opposing it are clear and decided in their aims. King Louis Philippe will not, by the mere fact of disarming, acquire a spark the more of the vitality he lacks. The protocol, on being made public, will draw down virulent attacks upon his Government, and the immense majority of persons in France will unite in blaming the signal weakness of a Cabinet which, oblivious of what it owes to its country, follows in the wake of the Holy Alliance. Not a single voice, out of the Ministry, will be raised in favour of the measure, and what weight they exercise on public opinion, we are all aware. The bulk of the ratepayers will be pleased at having less to pay, but the burdens which will continue to be laid upon them will soon efface a feeling of satisfaction which rests merely on a negation.

With the monarchs the case is quite different. The principle underlying disarmament forms the key of their whole policy ; in the course they habitually pursue there will be nothing to disavow, nothing to change. It is a question of restoring things to a peace-footing ; so far as concerns ourselves, we are already on a peace-footing, in fact, we have never abandoned it. In our despatch of the 3rd June last, we showed the impossibility of

going upon a numerical estimate of the forces of the different States. The French Ministers would seem to be aware of this truth, in putting forward the indisputable fact, that their pledge will have to consist in the *trust* they can repose in the monarchs, in the same way as the *budget will be a check* in the hands of the Powers, in regard to the existence of the French army. The whole question will be set at rest then, and then only, when the protocol proposed by the French Cabinet is signed and made public.

Should anything still remain demanding consideration, it would be for the same Cabinet to bring it to our notice. We shall not hold out against the admission of any questions of form which may further the general tranquillity, for it can only be a question of *form*, when the matter itself presents nothing which may be turned to account.

*THE TREATY OF NOVEMBER 15, 1831, BETWEEN  
THE FIVE GREAT POWERS AND BELGIUM.*

1022. A Memoir by Metternich, dated December 4, on the Treaty of November 15, 1831.

1023. Metternich to Ficquelmont in St. Petersburg, Vienna, December 29, 1831.

**1022.** Several irregularities call for remark in the conclusion of the treaty signed at London, on the 15th November last, by the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia, on the one side, and the plenipotentiary of the new King of the Belgians on the other. The representatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia have addressed to their respective Courts a justificatory memoir on the subject of this treaty, which, being now submitted to the Sovereigns for ratification, demands a most careful consideration on the part of the Allied Courts. This consideration must be directed to the three following points :

1. Without being furnished with the full special powers, the exercise of which is assumed in the preamble, the plenipotentiaries have entered into a contract with a new State, whose political existence is, by that very fact, recognised and created, without the concurrence of the Sovereign to whom it had been assigned by former treaties.

2. The treaty fixes the international relations of that State with Holland, without the consent of the King of the Netherlands, and accords the guarantee



of the Powers for the execution of these arrangements in favour of Belgium.

3. Finally, it disposes, by virtue of the powers entrusted to the plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia by the Diet of the Germanic Confederation, of a part of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, without the condition which was attached to the aforesaid powers being fulfilled, and without the reservation, expressly stipulated for by the Confederation, of a ratification on the part of the latter.

As to 1. The London Conference was formed with the object of arranging, by the united counsels and good offices of the five Powers, the difficulties presented by the Belgian question at its outset. Such were, primarily, the object and the limits of the powers entrusted to the plenipotentiaries.

Their proceedings acquired the character of a mediation from the moment Holland consented to the separation of the two countries, and the existence of a Belgian Government was, as a consequence, admitted.

Owing to the events which took place in August, the Conference was induced, by the paramount consideration of avoiding war, to take upon itself to arbitrate on the questions in dispute between the two parties, and its award was embodied in the twenty-four articles annexed to the protocol of October 15, which were offered to the acceptance of Holland and Belgium, in terms the absolute and imperative character of which was justified by the same consideration. The fiftieth protocol fortified this summons with positive threats in regard to Holland, by calling for the employment of coercive measures against her, in order to prevent the renewal of hostilities. Finally, the Conference had declared, in the notes accompanying the communication

of the twenty-four articles, that the same articles, once accepted by one or other of the parties, would have the validity and significance of a solemn convention ; and when the Belgian Government signified its acceptance, the Conference was no doubt bound, when recording it, to repeat its former declaration in the most decided terms. There, however, its collective powers, whether as council of mediation, or, in some sort, of arbitration, ceased, as did also the utmost authority which the Powers could be held to have delegated to their plenipotentiaries for conducting and concluding the negotiation.

As to 2. The plenipotentiaries endeavoured, in their justificatory memoir, to make it evident that the provisions of the twenty-four articles were one and all conceived in the interests of Holland, or at least in the spirit of the declarations previously made by the King of the Netherlands. But whatever be the value of their work in this respect—and so far as it is the award of an arbitration, it has already received the sanction of the Powers—the result of the treaty concluded with Belgium nevertheless presents itself under a very serious aspect, when we take into account the obligation it imposes on the contracting Powers, in default of the acquiescence of Holland, to guarantee the execution of the twenty-four articles, as stipulated in Article XXV.

As to 3. Austria and Prussia are peculiarly responsible to the Germanic Confederation for the fulfilment of the conditions under which their plenipotentiaries were authorised by the Frankfurt Diet to accede, through the medium of an exchange, to the partial cession of the territory of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. These conditions, as stated in the resolution come to by the Diet, on September 29, make express mention of the

consent of the Grand Duke and the reservation of a ratification on the part of the Confederation. And although the arrangements to be entered into between the King of Holland and the Diet, as well as the agnates of the House of Nassau, form the special subject matter of Article V. of the treaty, this stipulation will only come into effect through the accession of the King of the Netherlands, whereas the actual treaty concluded with Belgium renders the cession of a part of the Grand Duchy at once obligatory for the Powers.

*Metternich to Ficquelmont in St. Petersburg, Vienna,  
December 29, 1831.*

**1023.** . . . The Belgian affair is regarded by our august master with the utmost abhorrence ; however the truth may be disguised, it starts with countenancing a rebellion.

But since the affair exists as a mournful reality, it must be taken in hand and brought to the least unfavourable conclusion possible.

The Courts which think alike on this subject—and I place in that category those of Russia, Prussia, and our own—have to resist those influences, the effect of which is to delay the progress of the negotiation ; these influences are the position of the French Government, the errors into which the British Cabinet allows itself to be seduced, and finally the unyielding, calculating obstinacy of the King of the Netherlands.

Of these three conditions, the last alone is capable of being influenced by the three Courts ; whatever be their moral influence, they will never succeed in modifying in the least degree the position of the French Government or the mistaken policy of the English Cabinet.

The King of the Netherlands is acting upon a scheme of ideas and interests directly at variance with those on which the political forecasts of the three Courts are based. He would like whatever they do not like ; he hopes for what they dread ; and he reckons on the advantages which time may bring, when every day lost must assume, in the eyes of the three Courts, the proportions of a danger for the public cause.

We go with our close allies in upholding *non-ratification*, and have, with this view, decided to *defer* taking any steps for a time ; not that we admit for a moment that the twenty-four articles could in any case, without undergoing alterations, acquire the validity of a definite treaty, but because we foresee that this course leaves a chance open for reconciling the two rival parties. But to enable this reconciliation to take place, the three Cabinets must take steps to do away with any ideas that may prevail at the Hague as to the King's chances of success, in a direction where it would really be idle to expect it ; I mean in the general disturbance of all order which his Majesty the King of the Netherlands desires, and against which the efforts of his natural allies are persistently directed.

1831.

*EXTRACTS FROM THE PRINCESS MELANIE'S  
DIARY.*

*Biographical Notices.*

1024. Vienna (from January 1 to July 24).  
1025. Residence at Baden (from July 26 to September 16).  
1026. Return to the capital (from September 17 to December 31).

*Vienna.*

1024. Diplomatic dinner. Clam's mission to Berlin. Official vexations. The Prince's policy. Anniversary. Condition of the Papal States. Confusion in London. Birth of a daughter. The Ancona affair. The Emperor Nicholas. Despatches for St. Petersburg. Critical aspect of the political situation. The Duchess de Berry. Change of Ministry in England. Lamennais. Experiments in physics at the University. Lamb and Baumhauer. Pauline Borghese. Portrait of the Princess, by Daffinger. Death of the Hofrath Gentz. Rising in Paris. Fanny Elssler. Paul Esterhazy. Werner. Proposed meeting between the Monarchs. Christening of the Archduke Ferdinand Max. The Queen of Bavaria. The German booksellers and the freedom of the Press. Death of the Duke of Reichstadt. Present from Maria Louisa.

1024. *Vienna, January 1.*—All our people came with their good wishes for the new year, and poor Clement had to receive the whole Imperial Chancery.

About three o'clock I had to dress for our great dinner. Forty-seven members of the diplomatic corps were invited. As Frau von Tatistscheff was ill and Madame Maison had not been presented at Court, Clement took in Baroness Tettenborn, the eldest of the ladies present. Tatistscheff and the Nuncio sat on either side of me; the dinner was long and wearisome.



*January 10.*—Clement had to go to the Emperor at ten o'clock, to be present at a conference relating to Clam's mission to Berlin. Its object is the organisation of the army of the German Confederation. It is to be in readiness, in case anarchy should break out in France, and the confusion spread itself thence abroad till the peace of Europe is once more endangered. The outlook is terrible.

*January 19.*—Clement had a talk with me about his Parisian despatches. Apponyi committed the mistake of allowing himself to be influenced by Pozzo, and not declaring openly that we would come to the assistance of the Papal troops, so soon as they should require it, in order to put an end to the disturbances in Italy. The plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers, without waiting for the consent of their respective Courts, held a conference for the purpose of passing resolutions on the Italian difficulty. This destroys all our plans. Clement is overwhelmed with work, his nerves are affected, and he is sick of finding work continually accumulate on his hands, owing to the mistakes of his Ambassadors. But with all this he treats them with a patience truly angelical, makes excuses for them, and sets to work to counteract the results of their errors.

*January 29.*—I stayed with Clement while he wrote a most interesting despatch to St. Petersburg. It touches me to see the pleasure it gives him to talk with me on business, read me what he writes, give me information, and see me, over and over again, in a position to judge of the wisdom, conscientiousness, and uprightness of his policy in their fullest extent. I wish the whole world could see them, so that it might learn to know him.

*January 30.*—To-day it is just a year since I have

been Clement's ; God grant I may yet live many such years with him !

*January 31.*—The entry of our troops into Bologna, as unexpected as it was useless, may cause Périer's downfall ; and were it not for the want of discipline among the Papal troops, they might have carried through the whole affair without help, and quenched the revolution in Italy once for all. We are tired of playing the sorry part of the Papal police, and some general agreement must be arrived at to strengthen the Papal power and put a stop to these perpetual internal crises. I could only wonder anew at the spirit and wisdom displayed by my husband. With that uprightness and rectitude which are his distinguishing qualities, he knows how to make allowances for all parties, and point out to them the only way by which the world may be conducted into safety.

*February 11.*—The news from London formed the subject of our conversation at breakfast. The Conference will not see that, in order to bring the Belgian difficulty to a conclusion, an understanding must first of all be come to with the King of Holland. The plenipotentiaries get more and more bewildered every day, and it is difficult to understand how business can be carried on in such a way.

*February 12.*—The Emperor's birthday. May God preserve our Emperor for many years yet ; this is my prayer for ourselves and for the whole of Europe.

*February 16.*—News have arrived from Italy. Disturbances took place in Ravenna, which once more render our interference necessary.

*March 19.*—My diary has been broken off for three weeks, and in the interval God has bestowed on me great blessing and abundant happiness, mingled with

much trouble and anxiety, for in this world unmixed happiness falls to the lot of no one.

On the 27th, at five o'clock, I gave birth to a strong, healthy girl. May God preserve it to me! I confess to having been sorry for the moment that it was not a boy, for which I had longed so earnestly. But I must not murmur against Providence, which knows far better than I do what is best for me, and I am now convinced that it was sent in mercy by Heaven. For my heart still cherishes feelings which must be stifled, and maternal love is stronger than reason. Clement received my child with a feeling of thankfulness that touched me deeply. It is true he would have preferred a boy, but he is fully prepared to love my daughter, and I pray that in time to come she may contribute to his happiness.

My little Melanie, who has beautiful blue eyes, which she opened at the moment she came into the world, was baptised on the evening of the 27th. Paulina von Württemberg was her godmother.

*April 8.*—I occupied myself with the children and then went to Clement, with whom I read Ficquelmont's last despatches, which are very interesting. The Emperor Nicholas goes hand in hand with us in everything. He now feels the necessity of acting with prudence, and not allowing himself to be carried away by the first impulses of a fervid temperament. He admires the way in which we acted in the Ancona affair, and directs all his Ambassadors to make common cause with our own.

*April 10.*—Clement read Gentz his despatches from St. Petersburg; his language is open and straightforward. He gives a true sketch of the course things are now taking in the world. He begs the Emperor Nicholas not to deviate from the course he is now pur-

suing, and lays great stress on the fact that the Allied Courts should be fully agreed on every point. By this means they will be as strong as their adversaries, who take care to act in harmony, the better to carry out their nefarious designs.

*April 17.*—Clement was with the Emperor, in order to be present at a military conference. Clam is once more to be sent to Berlin, in order to put everything in readiness for the contingency of a war with France.

*April 23.*—I had a conversation with Gentz. He explained to me the precarious state of his health, and described the pleasure he had felt at receiving a note from Clement yesterday, stating that the Reform Bill had been read a second time.

*April 28 to May 3.*—On Sunday, April 29, the ceremony took place at Court of the installation of Chotek as Archbishop of Olmütz. Afterwards Clement went to a dinner at Mittrowsky's.

In politics, matters are every day assuming a more critical aspect. Casimir Périer has become deranged in mind from an attack of the cholera. He was taken ill when it first broke out. Besides this, Clement showed me private letters announcing the departure of the Duchess de Berry from Massa. It appears that she is about to enter France at the head of a considerable party, and that her enterprise has something tangible to rest upon. Within a few days the whole of France may be in a blaze. I tremble at the thought, and yet it is a crisis that sooner or later must be faced. The question is now with whom the victory will rest. Clement is more closely occupied than ever, but retains complete composure. He only begged me to get better, as he was unable to give himself unreservedly to business while he knew I was unwell; he said that caused him



far more anxiety than having to unravel the most troublesome political complications.

*May 12.*—Clement received intelligence of the capture of the Duchess de Berry.

*May 15.*—The children brought Clement their congratulations. Richard made a pretty speech, and my little one was dressed in pink, which became her beautifully.

*May 16.*—I passed the morning, as usual, with my family. Clement had received two important items of intelligence. First, it was not the Duchess de Berry whom the French Government had succeeded in capturing, but some person unknown, who appears to be a maid-in-waiting. Secondly, the Reform Bill has not passed in the Upper House, which may lead to a change of Ministry.

*May 17.*—Clement received intelligence this morning of the change of Ministry in England. The King had only the choice of nominating twenty new peers or dismissing the Ministry. He chose the latter alternative.

*May 19.*—After dinner I accompanied Clement to his study, and there read an atrocious letter written by Lamennais to one of his friends, to the effect that he was at the head of a revolutionary Republican party. He unfolds his plans in the most horrible manner, and says that Clement had written to Father X., to express his satisfaction with the book which the latter had written against him—a fact, however, added the writer, which would not prevent him (Clement), together with all monarchical countries that still maintained their existence, from speedily falling a victim to the tempest of Freedom which he was about to let loose over the whole world. May Heaven sooner or later bring these wretches to ruin!



*May 22.*—Clement came with depressing news. Wellington was unable to form a Tory Ministry, and Lord Grey is once more at the head of the Government.

*May 25.*—Clement went with Marmont to the University, to be present at some experiments in physics and magnetism. He returned home very late, and naturally much pleased. In the evening we went to the Kärntnerthor theatre to see 'Zampa,' a French opera, by Herold, which had been much talked about.

*June 3.*—I passed the early part of the evening with Clement. It is always a pleasure to me to see him. He spoke to me about his affairs when he should be gone. This kind of conversation distresses me and gives rise to the most painful thoughts. Then came my Sunday evening. I had a very pleasant chat with Lamb; his originality interests me. Then we drew Herr von Baumhauer into conversation, a Dutch gentleman, Director-General of Finance for the Dutch Indies in Java. He appears to be a very well-informed man, and really interesting. Clement had a long talk with me about Paulina Borghese and her unaccountable frivolity.

*June 7.*—Directly after breakfast Clement went with me to Daffinger's, to inspect my portrait. It will be a great success.

*June 8.*—The physician who is attending Gentz, a Herr Frank, was at our house. He lamented greatly that the patient would no longer take the remedies prescribed by his physicians, adding that he would answer with his life for our old friend's recovery if he would only follow his prescriptions. Accordingly I was urged to write to him, begging him to take great care of himself. I did so, and Clement also went to see him, but found him very low and much weaker than

when he had last seen him. I fancy he was wrongly treated when he first fell ill.

*June 9.*—My first thought on awaking was of poor Gentz. Clement came to me with the news that this old friend had passed away at nine o'clock, just as I was thinking of him. I therefore determined to go to confession to-day, and pray God to have mercy on him.

Gentz's affairs and the preparations for his funeral, give Clement much occupation of a mournful kind. He feels deeply the fresh loss he has sustained.\* All those in whose society he took a special delight are gone, and he finds himself sadly isolated.

*June 10.*—Poor Gentz was buried this evening in the churchyard at Währing. A Protestant clergyman performed the ceremony, and gave a very beautiful address. Clement will have a memorial put up in his memory. The poor man lies in his grave now, and already there are very few who still bestow a thought upon him. Few miss him, no one mourns for him, and yet there is no one to replace him.

*June 11.*—Joëlon brought very interesting news from Paris. A rising took place there, similar in its character to that of the 'glorious' days of July. To all appearance, the position of the Government was much strengthened by this occurrence.†

*June 13.*—At eleven, I had to go to Daffinger, Clement accompanying me. He is very pleased with my portrait.

\* Metternich writes on the subject to Prokesch, on June 15, 1832: 'A rare combination of the most marked talent and of true genius has gone down into the grave with the deceased. The place he took can never be filled, and although for some years past Gentz only nominally assisted me, I feel his loss in many most important respects.' (From 'Count Prokesch-Osten's Remains,' 1881, vol. ii. p. 118).

† See 'The June Rising in Paris,' No. 1062.

*June 14.*—We took Richard to the theatre to see the ballet of 'The Carnival of Venice.' Richard was highly delighted at the whole performance; Fanny Elssler in particular riveted his attention. I found her much altered, with a certain expression of sadness, at least so it seemed to me. In the evening we had one or two visitors, among others, Paul Esterhazy, who always cheers Clement up.

*June 28.*—My breakfast now is soon got through. Since Gentz's death, Clement is hardly ever present at it. This is a real loss to me.

*June 29.*—Paul Esterhazy, Senfft, and Werner, who were called in to replace Gentz, came during breakfast. Clement read some papers which Werner had brought from Berlin.

I put in order the collection of prints belonging to Clement; there are some splendid examples among them. He is very much taken up with the idea of an interview which is to take place between our Emperor, the Emperor Nicholas, and the King of Prussia. Teplitz had been chosen as a place of meeting, but the cholera having broken out in Bohemia will no doubt alter this arrangement. I am very sorry about it, because Clement had hoped to pay a visit to his estates in the country about the same time. He also proposes to go to Linz about the 20th instant, in order to confer with the Emperor before the latter comes to Vienna. He is going to take me with him, which would be delightful, did not the idea of leaving my little daughter sometimes occur to me.

*July 6.*—We heard that the Archduchess Sophia safely gave birth to a second boy this morning.

*July 7.*—I was in attendance on the Queen of Hungary, with the Countess Illyésházy, Diamantine Potocka,

Countess Sedlnitzky, Adela Keglevich, and Countess Wrbna, *née* Erdödy. The new Archbishop Milde performed the baptismal ceremony. It lasted a long while, and the heat was frightful. The Crown Prince was godfather, and the boy received the names of Ferdinand Maximilian Joseph Maria.

I had myself introduced to the Queen of Bavaria by her first lady of the bed-chamber, which proved to be a kindness on my part, as the Queen was very pleased to find somebody among the guests to talk to; no one seemingly feeling disposed to be introduced to her. I had a long conversation with her, and found her exceedingly like our Archduchess Sophia, even in the gestures she uses; she says the same things in the same manner. Maria Louisa sent to my husband to say she wished to see him, so that we only got home by two o'clock.

*July 16.*—The Duke of Reichstadt has been unconscious since yesterday evening.

*July 21.*—Clement received a very interesting communication to-day. The German booksellers applied to him with the request that he would use all his influence to put an end to the freedom of the press in Germany. Their trade had come down to such a low ebb that they were all on the point of becoming bankrupt. The only remedy, they declared, lay in putting a stop to the license of the press.

*July 22.*—The Duke of Reichstadt died at half-past four this morning.\*

*July 24.*—Clement received a kind, affecting letter from Maria Louisa, presenting him with a wash-handstand which belonged to Napoleon, and had been bequeathed by Princess Pauline Borghese to the Duke of

\* See No. 1041.

Reichstadt. Clement will send this souvenir to Königswart, to whose museum it will form a valuable addition.

*Residence in Baden.*

1025. Montbel's History of the Duke of Reichstadt. Reindl's attempt on the King of Hungary's life. Enthusiastic reception of the Emperor Francis. Gentz's false friends. The Archbishop of Vienna. Lobkowitz. Napoleon and Pozzo. Charles X.

1025. *Baden, July 26.*—Clement is very much occupied with a work that will prove of far more than ordinary interest. He has commissioned Montbel, an ex-Minister of Charles X., to write the life of the Duke of Reichstadt, and supplies him with all the facts requisite to make it interesting and complete. It will be well written, and there is something peculiarly fascinating in the idea of one of Charles X.'s Ministers undertaking to write for the public an account of the short life of that unfortunate youth. Clement told me some very remarkable facts about him. The Emperor was always fond of him; he found him quick and merry, and took pleasure in having him with him. When the little Prince was between eight and ten years old, he said to the Emperor, 'I remember that in my earliest childhood I had pages, and people used to call me the King of Rome; what was that for, grandpapa?' The Emperor replied, 'That, my child, was a title they gave you, as does sometimes happen. You will hear some day, you know, of my titles; you are King of Rome just in the same way as I am King of Jerusalem; one has as much truth in it as the other.' When Maison came to Vienna, they wanted the Duke of Reichstadt to go to him, as he had done with the other Ambassadors. Upon this he ran off to the Emperor and told him 'he had visited all



the Ambassadors of the Kings of France, as he was fully prepared to pay his respects to legitimate sovereigns; but as for Louis Philippe's representative, he would certainly not go near him since the former had less right to the throne of France than he had himself, and he saw no reason why he should pay any deference to a usurper.'

*August 7.*—I stayed with Clement in order to read old despatches written by Prince Charles Schwarzenberg when Ambassador in Paris. They also describe the Court life of Maria Louisa and are all extremely interesting.

*August 9.*—I had hardly risen when I heard a terrible story. A pensioned captain named Reindl, a man of bad character, had begged the King of Hungary for 900 florins to pay his debts, and defray his maintenance. As he only received 100 florins he followed the King about for several days. As the latter was going for a walk this morning with his chamberlain, Salis, the man followed him as far as the last house in the direction of the Helenenthal. He had not attracted anyone's notice, but suddenly he fired a pistol at the King, who was a few paces from him. The weapon was not properly loaded, so that the bullet only bruised the King slightly. The latter proceeded on his way, saying he would himself go to his father and his wife, in case the news should cause them too great alarm. Meantime a gardener of Rollet the surgeon had thrown himself upon the man, who is tall and powerful; he drew a second pistol and was about to shoot the gardener, but the latter cried out that whether he fired or not he would not let him go. The miscreant, seeing a vine-dresser and a few other persons hurrying to the spot, fired the pistol at himself; but it appears that it too was improperly loaded, for the

bullet stuck in the roof of his mouth. Upon his being searched they found a kind of will upon him, and another document bearing his signature. He was asked whether he had not been aware he would be hanged if caught. He answered in the affirmative, adding that as he had made up his mind to die, it was all the same to him whether he killed himself or were hanged. Clement found the King going on as favourably as possible; they put him on ice poultices, but he experienced no pain whatever.

*August 12.*—I dined with Sedlnitzky, Hardegg, and Prokesch, who arrived to-day from Rome. We then went for a walk in the Helenenthal, where Strauss and Gyulai's regimental band received the Emperor with the National Anthem, and the crowd burst out into loud and enthusiastic acclamations. The Thal was very gay and the weather beautiful, and it was a real pleasure to us to see and hear it all. We were in the theatre where the Emperor was again greeted with acclamations.

*August 14.*—Montbel brought Clement the preface to his short 'Memoir of the Duke of Reichstadt.' My husband was much pleased with it.

*August 15.*—Clement received news from London, which are good so far as concerns Portugal. It is to be hoped the cause of Dom Miguel will triumph, for the party of Dom Pedro appears to be very weak and already greatly discouraged.

*August 20.*—Baron Loë, Prokesch, and Alfred Schönburg dined with us. After dinner our talk turned on Gentz, and I could not help blaming the conduct of his so-called friends, who made it their life-long endeavour to get him to converse with them on public affairs, in which they hoped to profit by his experience, and then

during the last years of his life left him completely in the lurch, so that he died utterly lonely.

The Archbishop of Vienna paid us a visit. He appears to be an excellent man, gentle and kind. I walked out with Clement, and we saw the place where the King had been wounded.

*August 21.*—Clement had a conversation with me about Lobkowitz. The Emperor has already informed him that he can no longer remain Governor of Galicia, that office being destined for the Archduke Ferdinand. The Emperor, however, who cannot bear to do anyone an injury, speaks of a place in the Exchequer, which appears to meet his inclinations.

*September 12.*—We finished up the evening with the Meyendorffs and Brockhausen. Clement spoke of Napoleon, describing how he used to laugh at all who were afraid of him. He also spoke of his hatred of Pozzo, whom he detested, for the reason especially that the latter always maintained his family, which as everyone knows is of Corsican origin, to be much more ancient than that of the Bonapartes.

*September 16.*—Everyone is taken up with the affair of Charles X., who wishes to take up his residence in Austria. Clement thinks Austerlitz would be the most suitable place in every respect, but it appears they are not agreed upon the subject. They would prefer Graz to Brünn. With the Emperor and all who take the trouble to think a little, his coming gives room for some uneasiness. It is self-evident that it will cause us some embarrassment.

*Return to the Capital.*

1026. Senfft. Reception of *savants*. Homœopathy. St. Paul. Dinner at Laxenburg. Projected meeting at Teplitz. Mercy. The Emperor and Pozzo. The Dauphiness and Mademoiselle. Professor Aldini. The Spanish succession. The new Nuncio. Lord Palmerston. The Franco-Belgian affair. The Archduchess Rainer. Mistaken identity of Count Andrassy. Lamb. Conversation of the Prince with the Emperor. Jarcke. Touching personal trait of the Emperor. The Empress. The Improvisatore Langenschwarz. Indisposition of the Prince. Illness of the King of Hungary.

1026. *Vienna, September 17.*—Clement no longer has anyone to talk to of a morning. Senfft, the only one who was left him, goes to Florence as Ambassador.

*September 21.*—Clement had a conference yesterday with Tatistscheff, Brockhausen, and Lamb, as to Charles X.'s coming here. It is already causing much inconvenience. To-day he breakfasted with me at eight o'clock in order that he might be present at the Natural Science *séance*. In the turmoil of his official life, this forms a kind of mental recreation for my husband.

*September 22.*—Tatistscheff, Pozzo, Gourieff, Brockhausen, Meyendorff, Clement Hügel, Paul Esterhazy, and Alfred Schönburg dined with us. I had scarcely time to see my children, when the *savants* were announced. They were already waiting in the drawing-room. There was as yet no one present who could introduce them or whose place it was to do so, and so we found ourselves in the presence of all these gentlemen without knowing one of them. At last things got gradually into train, and to please me Professor Jäger undertook to do the honours of the house. I had so thoroughly determined to be pleasant and agreeable with the whole of this company of wearisome *savants*, that I took the utmost pains to accomplish this object.

I had a word for each ; sometimes it was the bad weather, more often botany ; but above all my repartees with the doctors about homœopathy, which were often highly amusing. The gentlemen were delighted with me, and compared me to every goddess in the mythology.

Clement enjoyed his *soirée* very much ; the *savants* find him not only agreeable, but versatile to an unusual degree, and thoroughly well informed. This gratifies and interests him.

*September 23.*—Pozzo and Clement had a most interesting conversation on the Catholic religion as compared with other faiths. They quoted St. Paul, who is my husband's hero and model. He reads him eagerly for the sake of gaining instruction.

*September 25.*—Mamma, Leontine, Herminia, and Victoria Odescalchi, accompanied by some gentlemen, went at noon to Laxenburg, where the Emperor gave a great dinner to the *savants*. I went there at one with Clement and Sedlnitzky. Riedel had been entrusted with the arrangements, and the dinner took the form of a grand and magnificent festivity. A tent had been erected, in which three tables were set up, capable of holding 500 persons. There were flowers in abundance, the lighting was splendid and the whole had a magnificent effect.

The Emperor's health was drunk with immense enthusiasm.

Clement did not get home till eight o'clock, and could not find words to convey the impression made by the banquet on all who had been present.

*September 27.*—Clement had promised to go out with me, but while he was trying to escape from some one in his study, he fell into the hands of Tatistscheff and Pozzo who were awaiting him with me. They



wanted to know what course Austria was going to take in the Belgian question, as they had heard a few hours previously from Herr von Loë that the King of Prussia had declared he would enter Belgium, unless King Leopold accepted the proposals of Holland. Clement, who had received no diplomatic communications on the subject, declined to enter into the question, which made them very angry. Tatistscheff took the opportunity, when Clement was called away by Montbel, to explain the matter to me and vent his vexation on my husband. He asked me in jest what my diplomatic heart said to me on the subject. I told him laughingly, I thought neither Prussia nor ourselves would stir in the matter, and I think I am right.

*September 30.*—Clement has a plan which causes me much anxiety. He has just heard that the King of Prussia is about to spend a fortnight at Teplitz, and intends shortly to set out to pay him a visit. He will meet Ancillon and Clam there, and even Lord Durham. The latter has been sent by Palmerston to St. Petersburg and Berlin, but he is not allowed to come to Vienna, as Palmerston fears Clement may tell him some home-truths.

*October 1.*—Senfft came for a short talk with Clement. We are greatly to be pitied at the present moment. Mercy is very mechanical in his work ; he knows nothing beyond his duty, which he certainly fulfils ; but has nothing in him to cheer and stimulate a mind weighed down by the cares of business. Senfft goes shortly to Florence, and then my poor husband will be quite sad and lonely.

*October 3.*—Clement requested the Emperor to bestow the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stephen on Pozzo, and to give it him with his own hands. The

Emperor, however, sent the order to my husband, for him to deliver it to Pozzo, saying, 'he did not like him, and would only do for him what was right; he could not say he gave it him willingly, for it would be untrue.' Clement presented the order to Pozzo, who was greatly delighted with it.

*October 7.*—Emily Széchényi and Henrietta Odescalchi came, in order to be present at the Dauphiness's reception. Clement was there before dinner in uniform; he wore the Order of the Holy Ghost, in order not to seem wanting in attention on his part. On arriving at Court, I was much surprised to find a woman who showed more traces of beauty than I had expected, but faded and bent. Mademoiselle, daughter of the Duchess of Berry, was at her side; she is thirteen years old and charming. She chats very agreeably, and has the art of saying things very prettily. She appears to be much attached to her aunt, a proof to my mind that the Dauphiness has lost the acerbity by which she was formerly characterised. We remained there until ten o'clock.

*October 8.*—Clement had Tatistscheff, Pozzo, Gourieff and Gagarin to have a final conference with him, and, I may say, receive his instructions before setting out for their respective destinations. He wants to initiate Gourieff in Italian affairs before he sets out for Rome, and to do the same in regard to German affairs for Gagarin, who goes to Munich.

*October 9.*—I gave a grand farewell dinner in honour of the Russian diplomatists, at which Tatistscheff, Pozzo, Gagarin, Gourieff, Apraxin, Meyendorff, Maltzahn, Brockhausen, and others were present. Clement Hügel stayed a considerable time, in order to aid us in entertaining the Duke of Fitzjames, who has just arrived

from Paris. He stayed until that tiresome Professor Aldini had nearly plagued us to death with his invention for protecting the person against fire. The old Italian is an inveterate talker, who bores everyone and whom it is impossible to get rid of.

*October 10.*—I read aloud several very interesting English letters to Clement. He confided to me under the seal of secrecy that Brunetti\* had seized the opportunity of the King of Spain's improved state of health to represent to him the danger to which he would expose his whole kingdom, by leaving the question of succession unsettled. The King determined to alter his will at once, and to put aside the new order of succession, which he had introduced for the sake of his daughter, in favour of the old established order, which provides for every contingency. What Brunetti has thus accomplished is of the utmost value and importance.

*October 12.*—Madame d'Agoult, maid of honour to the Duchess of Angoulême, (the Dauphiness), came to see us. Clement informed her that the Emperor, on the refusal of the Archbishop of Olmütz to relinquish the Castle of Kremsier to the royal family, had given Hradschin, in Prague, up to them for the winter. This news gave the Dauphiness great pleasure, and Madame d'Agoult wrote me a charming letter, thanking Clement, in the name of the Dauphiness, for his exertions in the matter.

*October 16.*—I begged Clement to come out walking with me, in order to divert his mind a little. Pilat and Audlan dined with us. Afterwards the new Nuncio, Ostini, came to introduce himself to me. He is a man of much kindness, intellectual and well versed in affairs ; a very good thing for us, since the Cardinal,

\* Austrian Ambassador at Madrid.—ED.

who is just leaving us, was rather a hindrance than a help. Clement received intelligence of the change of Ministry in France. Broglie has at length accepted office.

*October 17.*—I passed the evening with Clement, to whom I read a document of great significance for cotemporary politics. It is a despatch by Lord Palmerston on the affairs of Germany, in which he emphatically censures the severe measures passed by the Federal Diet, as well as the manner in which the German Princes have been compelled to assent to enactments which threaten to give rise to weighty complications on the part of the various populations. Clement is occupied with an answer, or rather with notes, which he will append to each section of this famous document and communicate to the Diet. This is a labour of love for him, as it enables him to give free expression to his opinions.\*

*October 18.*—Clement received despatches from Teplitz. The King wishes to have his opinion on an affair of great intricacy. The French want to put an end to the Belgian question by occupying the citadel of Antwerp, which would only add to the confusion without bringing the solution a step nearer. As, however, they dread opposition to this on the part of the Prussians, they propose to them to transfer their troops to Liége and Luxemburg. This proposal appears to me very suspicious, and there is no doubt they have some secret design which they wish to conceal by throwing dust in people's eyes.

*October 19.*—Immediately after mass, Clement took me to Schönbrunn. He went to the Emperor, in order to lay before him his views on the Prussian question.

\* See Nos. 1069-1070.



What a wonderful man he is ; yesterday evening he devoted his whole attention to the matter without, however, allowing himself to form any judgment upon it. He slept the whole night as quietly as a child that is untroubled by a single care, and on awaking early this morning, with his ideas perfectly clear, had merely to write an excellent despatch in which he discussed the subject from every point of view, and clearly pointed out all the measures it would be necessary to take at this critical moment.

*October 27.*—I visited the Archduchess Rainer, whom I found to be less beautiful than had been reported, but very amiable. I was struck with the unaffected way in which she speaks on every subject, without being fastidious in her choice of expressions, which, in a stranger, strikes one as almost offensive. She presented her two daughters to me, one of whom is eleven, the other ten years old ; both very tall. The whole domestic life of the family is marked by the utmost simplicity ; no trace of pride is visible either in their conversation or manners.

*October 31.*—Clement received despatches from London, from which it appears that the Belgian difficulty will be settled without involving an appeal to war, as we were told was only too probable. It appears that the King of Holland, foreseeing the calamitous result, shows more signs of yielding.

*November 2.*—Andrassy arrived from London and Paris, and visited me before breakfast. Clement had a talk with him about the sensation he made in London, where he was taken for his brother. We read in all the papers that Prince Metternich's brother was travelling under the name of a Count Andrassy, charged with a special mission, and that all the Ministers and Amba-



sadors of foreign Powers were hanging on his lips, &c. Andrassy told us it was owing to this craze that he was everywhere received with the highest distinction in England. He comes back delighted with London, and disgusted with everything he has seen in France.

*November 5.*—I was very unpleasantly undeceived by the intelligence which reached Clement, that the plenipotentiaries had rejected the latest proposals of the King of Holland, that the treaty between France and England was signed, the Conference broken up, and the French resolved to put their idea of attacking Antwerp into execution.

We were among the guests at a dinner given by Bodenhausen, in honour of the Duke of Brunswick. Our hosts gave us a peculiarly cordial reception. Bodenhausen gave the precedence to me, and I went in on the Duke of Brunswick's arm ; then came my husband with our hostess ; Tettenborn took in Frau Molerus ; and Lamb, Leontine. He was charmed with her, and indeed this was the first time he learned to know her, for he does not trouble himself to talk to people he meets, unless constrained to do so by circumstances. Yet he is a man capable of displaying great amiability.

*November 10.*—Clement received despatches from Berlin. The King of Holland has now made concessions, and it is to be hoped that, unless folly has reached its highest point, the French and English will accept them.

*November 13.*—Clement described a really touching conversation he had had with the Emperor. The latter said how he prayed God, above all, to preserve Clement to him, 'for without you I don't know how to undertake anything.' Clement explained to the Emperor that without him he could no longer hope to do any good,

and that all his energies would fail; the Emperor, he added, was doubly necessary to him, because the former's uprightness and discernment always came in to influence his ideas. May God preserve them both, for in truth, one of them, bereft of the other, cannot save the world.

*November 21.*—I read out to Clement despatches just arrived from London. The *Times* and the *Globe* contained most insolent articles against Austria and the Emperor, which made Clement very angry. He will certainly not allow the matter to rest as it is.

*November 25.*—We had Herr Jarcke to dinner, the editor of the Berlin *Weekly Political News*, who was summoned hither partially to take Gentz's place.\*

*November 27.*—A touching story was told us of our Emperor. During his stay at Schönbrunn, as he was walking through Hietzing, he saw them burying a poor man, who was accompanied to the grave only by the two men carrying the coffin and a priest. The Emperor said to his Adjutant Appel, 'We will follow this poor fellow; he is so deserted.' Thereupon he threw the first handful of earth on the poor man's coffin. Our Emperor does not belong to the Liberal party, but this trait shows in what light he regards the meanest of his subjects.

*December 5.*—I paid a visit to our Empress, who was more amiable than ever to-day. She talked a little about politics among other things, and has a terrible dread of war. If, she said, God were to put us to this

\* In regard to the acquisition of Jarcke, Metternich wrote as follows, about this time, to Neumann in London: 'I enclose a letter written by an excellent man, whom I have retained as a *political writer*. He is a Gentz *in miniature*. With this reservation I look upon him as far more practical than his predecessor, especially if we think of what poor Gentz had become in the last two years of his life. I know no political writer who is more thoroughly enlightened than M. Jarcke; he wields an excellent pen, and his ideas are always to the point and perfectly correct.—ED.

trial, she knew two women who would be terribly anxious and unhappy ; for our husbands, she added, were no longer young, and it was not the bullets, but the fatigue we had to fear for them. The Empress wished Charles X. and his family could have chosen some other place for their residence than Prague ; she is exceedingly anxious to go to Bohemia next year, and reproaches herself with having allowed the Emperor to let eight years pass without going into that part of the country. Clement confided to me that Charles X. would certainly go to Laybach in the spring, but that no one must know anything about it.

*December 20.*—I had to receive a number of people, whom I had invited to hear the German improvisatore Langenschwarz. He astonished me, for I had never heard an improvisatore before. He had the destruction of Pompeii given him as a subject. He turned it into a Catholic city, upon which he delivered a discourse under three heads, often repeating the same rhymes and making bad verses ; still I was delighted with the whole thing.

*December 22.*—I was busy with a scheme for celebrating the Emperor's birthday. It will not do to give another tedious dinner, and so Clement has the idea of a ball. But an ordinary dress-ball would not be brilliant enough, and a ball in uniform is tedious. I think therefore a masked-ball would just hit the right mean, and the Imperial family might make a splendid ceremony of it. We must talk it over with the Queen.

*December 25.*—Clement continues in a nervous state, and feels a little poorly.

*December 26.*—I was with Clement again in order to read something to him ; he does not feel ill, but nervous and agitated.

*December 27.*—Clement will not leave his bed ; he says it is nothing but a hemorrhoidal attack, and that he knows he can get no relief from it except by lying in bed a few days. I remained with him the whole evening ; mamma, Caroline, Sedlnitzky, and Clement Hügel also came to see him.

*December 28.*—Clement felt much better, and wanted to get up ; I dissented, however, as he still looked weak, ill, and nervous.

The King of Hungary, who, according to the physicians, was to have died last night, has suddenly got better, and completely regained his health.

*December 29.*—Pepi Esterhazy came to dinner, and brought us Montbel's book on the Duke of Reichstadt. I read it aloud to Clement ; it is extremely interesting.\*

*December 30.*—The King feels himself in such good health, that he sent to inquire after Clement. The latter too is getting somewhat better, and inclined to get up.

*December 31.*—We remained at home in order to have supper with mamma, who had stayed with Clement, and to embrace each other at midnight. It was a sad beginning for the new year ; may God keep us from all unhappiness throughout its whole course !

\* A few days later on, Prince Metternich wrote about this book to Baron Neumann, in London, in the following terms : ' You will find traces of my influence on the author in every part of the book, which has not for its express object to render homage to the elder branch of the Bourbons ; that part has necessarily been reserved for M. de Montbel, and it has been in good hands. But the far-reaching political views, *and especially all that relates to Bonapartism*, is written *under my direction*. As every party feels itself aggrieved by the truth, and M. de Montbel has *written nothing but what is true*, it is natural that at a time like the present, a work such as the one in question should be lost amid the mass of errors everywhere prevailing and party hatred.' This avowal of the Chancellor's enhances the historical value of Montbel's work, especially in all that relates to Bonapartism. In especial, we may infer from it that the affair to which we alluded further back (page 109), and which we quoted on the authority of this well-known author, is, in the main, authentic.—ED.



*ON THE POLITICAL EVENTS OF THE DAY.*

Extracts from confidential Letters from Metternich to Apponyi in Paris,  
from January 8 to December 25, 1832. In two parts.

I.

1027. Deplorable position of the London Conference. 1028. The King of Prussia and the English Cabinet. 1029. Conferences and their dangers. Position of the French Cabinet. 1030. Orloff's mission to the Hague. 1031. The Ancona affair and its consequences. Conversation with Marshal Maison. 1032. Attitude of the Powers in reference to the Ancona affair. 1033. Circular of the French Government to their agents in Italy. 1034. Captain Gallois' proclamation. 1035. Behaviour of General Cubières at Ancona. Captain Gallois' brother expelled from Vienna. 1036. Effect produced by the Ancona affair in England and in Italy. 1037. Landing of the Duchess of Berry on the south coast of France. The Duke of Modena. The Revolution in Europe. Affairs in Germany. 1038. The Hambach banquet. Fresh incidents at Ancona. 1039. Approaching end of the Duke of Reichstadt. A letter from Louis Bonaparte. The ringleaders to be expelled from Ancona.

1027. *January 8.*—I have an idea that M. Casimir Périer will experience less difficulty in extricating the London Conference from the deplorable position in which it now finds itself, than the English Ministers, for the simple reason that the head of the French Ministry has all the qualities that constitute a statesman, whereas the members of the present English Administration seem to me less gifted in this respect.

A grave difficulty lies before us ; it must be overcome. There is but one way of effecting this, and it lies in what we propose. The English idea of letting *three* ratify the work of *five* is impracticable. It is much simpler for *all five to put off the ratification*, with the view of *remaining five*, than to endeavour to force on a solution between



three only, or two only, which is something totally different from an agreement among all five. I understand how the incident may give rise to Parliamentary difficulties; but they seem to me by no means insurmountable, if the French and English Ministers will only act with sincerity in the matter. Let them take into account facts, and facts only, and let them frankly admit that if differences of judgment may exist among the Powers on questions of form, none exist or ever will exist on the real questions at stake in the Belgian affair, or, God willing, in any other affair.

For M. Périer to be able to say this, he must first of all be firmly convinced that all the Powers are unanimously agreed on the question of maintaining political peace. Now that Minister can have no doubt as to what are the decisions of Austria and Prussia; he can at most only be in doubt as to those of the Emperor of Russia, for in Russia the Emperor alone counts for anything. Well then, let M. Périer believe me when I tell him—I who know the true ideas of that monarch as well as I know those of our own—that he need not be in doubt for a single moment as to the Emperor Nicholas's *desire for the preservation of peace*, and for nothing but that.

Situated as I am at such a distance, it is only prudence on my part to allow for every contingency. Thus I foresee the possibility of a determination on the part of England and France to proceed to the exchange of their ratifications with King Leopold. In this case, however much I regretted it, I should see no reason for breaking up the London Conference.

It would continue its labours with the object of inducing the King of the Netherlands to accept the arrangement agreed upon among the five Powers. It is to this object that the thoughts of all ought now to be

directed, and as King William is the man of all others most difficult to manage, the Cabinets will at the same time have to try and discover *some course by which they may dispense with the King of Holland's consent.*

1028. *January 13.*—I have received despatches from Berlin to-day, which convince me that the King is highly incensed with the English Cabinet. The Prussian Cabinet has made mistakes, but it has always acted in good faith. This is what the King feels, for straightforwardness is his characteristic quality. The explanations into which he has entered with the English Ministers are very decided, but they prove that the King never had the least intention of playing anyone false. The views he lays down are absolutely identical with our own. He has just written a letter to the King of Holland, which will leave nothing to be desired at Paris and London. He has also adopted at St. Petersburg a course which is thoroughly reasonable, and which promises to bring the Belgian question to a conclusion. If the Conference had but adopted the same course, the object would have been attained long ago. I pity the individuals who took part in that Conference, although I look on them with mixed feelings. The Emperor's representatives were put in the background, and M. de Wessenberg, while displaying that fund of information which he alone possessed among all his colleagues, made the mistake of not keeping sufficiently to a definite line of policy. The case is different with the representatives of Russia and Prussia, especially the latter; they did nothing but humour the British Cabinet, without paying the least regard to the principles or reputation of their Courts.

1029. *January 25.*—I beg you, my dear Count, always to keep in mind my advice to you to avoid most

carefully, on every occasion, decisions arrived at through a *Conference*.

The idea of Conferences originated with me. I introduced it into public affairs as early as 1813, and it retained all its primitive significance as long as the ancient Alliance was in full force. From the time Liberalism gained the upper hand in France and England, this kind of meeting began to degenerate. A most striking proof of this was afforded by the *trilateral* Conference. For a Conference among Powers to do any good, *the object for which it has been called together must first of all be clearly defined, and its correctness ascertained.* In the next place, a proper direction must be given to it, otherwise its deliberations speedily end in the veriest anarchy. This is what happened at London, where the want of precision in the ideas of the British Cabinet communicated itself to the whole Conference.

The same difficulty would not exist at Paris, but the contrary danger would quickly assert itself. M. Périer is quite capable of conducting a Conference, but his position will always compel him to subordinate the course of its deliberations to the exigencies of the situation; and this course will lie in the direction of that *golden mean* which is no mean at all; for it is an attempted compromise between the temper of the Right and the temper of the Left, and these two are mutually destructive of one another.

My views as to the position of the Government in France grow more gloomy every day. It is not in the midst of a chorus of calumnies, half-truths, and fabrications that a Government can maintain its position, be it where it may, and least of all in France. M. Périer must feel this, for he has plenty of matter-of-fact in his composition, and he does his best to keep up this

abominable concern ; but he will succumb to the difficulties of the task.

1030. *February 22.*—I imagine that when the news reaches Paris of the step taken by the Emperor of Russia in sending Count Orloff to the Hague and London, they will feel more confidence than is apparent in M. Périer's despatch to Marshal Maison. This step is a decided and conclusive one. Thanks to it, we may yet possibly be enabled to *finish off* the whole business. The King of Holland must be compelled to say *yes* or *no*. If he says *yes*, there is an end of the whole affair ; if he says *no*, his consent must be dispensed with and set aside. In that case the King will say *yes*. Such is Count Orloff's mission, and it is skilfully conceived.

1031. *February 29.*—You will easily perceive, after perusing my despatch of to-day, that I am unwilling to enter on a serious discussion of the inexplicable affair at Ancona, until I am in possession of fuller details.\*

The case admits of only two suppositions : either M. Périer has deceived the Powers, or he has been very badly served by the men to whom he has entrusted the conduct of the expedition. In the absence of complete information, I incline to the second alternative.

I sent yesterday for the French Ambassador. I had three days previously read him my despatch of February 22 for Paris (No. 1051). In the course of our conversation I had made him sensible with what extreme regret I had seen his Cabinet commit an error from which no good could possibly accrue. I had gone so far as to explain myself on the subject with warmth.

Yesterday I received him with the greatest calmness.

\* On the night of February 22–23, a French army corps under General Cubières landed in the harbour of Ancona, and laid siege to the town, a step against which the Papal Government protested energetically but in vain. For fuller details see Nos. 1049–1055.—ED.



‘You reproached me,’ said I to him, ‘two days ago, with taking up a question warmly which in principle you condemned with me. To-day you see me collected; the fact is an index of my character. I am uneasy so long as I am condemned to play the mournful part of a prophet; when the event has once come to pass, I am composed. At the present moment facts speak for themselves, but I admit to you frankly they had not entered into my calculations, which were based on possibilities. What has just taken place goes far beyond anything I could have anticipated. Read and let your mind be at rest. I will not intrude a single remark which might embarrass you; only read.’

The Marshal, after having read it, exclaimed that it was contrary to the views of his Government, that the fact was inexplicable, and that it called for a severe punishment on those who had been to blame for it, &c., &c.

I repeated to him that, far from calling on him for explanations, I had to declare the hour was not yet arrived for the Emperor’s Minister to discuss the affair with the French Ambassador. It would be impossible to admit that, previous to the arrival of the present courier, M. Périer had not had it in his power to enter into explanations with you and your colleagues on the proceedings at Anconà.

Whatever latitude a Power may display in its proceedings, such latitude can never be pushed so far as to lead to acts of folly being committed from mere thoughtlessness. If the French Government desires war, it would be foolish to begin with the *Pope*. This is a case where the sublime is not within a step of the ridiculous; the latter stands out alone.

1032. I send you for your private information the



enclosed report, which has been addressed to his Court by M. de Bunsen on the subject of the events of January 23, and the effect produced by them on the Court of Rome and the French Ambassador. Baron Bunsen is an intimate personal friend of the latter, and the record he gives of his impressions may therefore be depended upon as trustworthy.

The accounts taken together go to prove that what actually took place was the work of men who found themselves called upon by unforeseen circumstances to preside over its execution. This only reflects the greater blame on the Ministers who could choose men so little fitted for carrying out an operation already beset with difficulties.

You will see by the enclosed report, forwarded by Captain Bandiera to Trieste, on March 3, what impressions he brought away from Ancona. Everything contained in this report is undoubtedly true, yet I am free to confess that the French Government never in the least contemplated what has taken place. How could M. Périer deceive himself so grossly as to what was practicable, and what impracticable, as to think that he could send out a mob of *sans-culottes* and yet prevent them from behaving in a revolutionary manner? As a matter of fact, the condition of the land and naval forces is so wretched as to excite the pity of their Italian friends and brothers. I have seen letters from correspondents on the spot which exclaim loudly on the subject.

It would be impossible for me to describe the effect produced by the occurrences of the day on the public here. The position of the Cabinet becomes more difficult in proportion as the indignation increases. It is still worse at Berlin, where the streets resound with cries for war.

You cannot display too much seriousness in dealing with the subject. One of two alternatives must be admitted ; either M. Périer will feel the gravity of the situation or he will not. In the first case, seriousness on your part will be perfectly appropriate ; in the second, it will enhance the extreme moderation of your behaviour, a moderation which extends so far as to seek out the only available means for enabling the French Government to palliate the grossness of its error.

The proceedings of the *English Government* are to the full as incomprehensible as those of the *French Cabinet* ; still, between the two, England is more to be calculated upon than France.

**1033.** *March 9.*—The circular which has just been addressed by the French Cabinet to its agents in Italy is a monument of diplomatic stupidity, and gives evidence of an extraordinary want of tact.

The French Government establishes a new principle ; the principle of *intervention in everything*, which is thus in direct contradiction with the principle of non-intervention, which has been the political programme of France since 1830. If non-intervention was folly, the new political code is a menace. Neither the one nor the other will ever acquire the force of law in the code of nations.

The French circular, however, will have two useful results : the first is, the inference which the Italian Liberals will draw from it that the French Government is false to them and their expectations ; the second lies in the fact, that, at every favourable opportunity, any independent Government will have the right of employing it for its own ends, at the cost of those who first enunciated and applied the principle, with all its attendant consequences. *Be pleased, should the necessity arise, to*

*avail yourself of it immediately in reference to our military measures.*

1034. The courier was about to start when Captain Bauer arrived, and handed me your reports of March 2.

I am surprised that at that date the occurrences at Ancona were still unknown at Paris. Count Bombelles must have written to you on the 26th or 27th from Turin. Young Bertin de Vaux was despatched from Ancona, on the 23rd, by Captain Gallois, with orders to transmit the news by telegraph from Lyons to Paris. On the very day of Captain Bauer's departure, or the next day at latest, the bombshell must have fallen on M. Périer's head.

When you come to read over your reports of March 2, you will imagine you have been dreaming on learning the events which have given such a flat contradiction to the *dreams* of the French Cabinet. This makes the reports only the more valuable to us, since the very magnitude of the faults on one side enhances the rectitude of the other.

Show Captain Gallois' *proclamation* to MM. Périer and De Rigny. Tell them the French troops are composed of nothing but fanatical Jacobins. The heads of the French Administration know nothing of the men they have to deal with. As the above proclamation has been *printed*, I have also shown it to Marshal Maison, *as having been sent me from Ancona*. He has forwarded it to Paris, but M. Périer will hardly make a boast of it. You must therefore make a point of mentioning it to him.

The more ready we are, as a public duty, to lend a helping hand to the French Government, the more are we bound to point out its errors. They must be demonstrated in the most striking manner; only in this

way it may perhaps be possible to exercise a salutary influence on its future conduct.

Seek an opportunity of convincing the King how deeply our august master feels himself personally hurt *by the political motive of the expedition put forward by his Cabinet*, and what constraint his Imperial Majesty has been compelled to exercise over himself, in order to keep within the limits of strict moderation, to which everyone of our proceedings bears testimony.

1035. *March 21.*—According to the latest intelligence from Ancona, General Cubières is at length endeavouring to induce his companions in arms to moderate their tone a little. This does not put a stop to the disorder, for that is inherent in the nature of the expedition and the men of whom it is composed. God knows what will come of it all. The result so far is the total loss of that confidence which the Cabinets had so fully extended to the President personally. His last speech from the tribune contains an enunciation of principles of such a nature that it is impossible to speak of them shortly. I remarked to Marshal Maison, to whom I first showed it, ‘Read, and do not ask me what I think of it. M. Périer is a Pagan, and I am a Christian; it is thus impossible for us to discuss religious questions. The question is to know how we are to manage to live together.’

Gallois, whom we have just sent away from here, went to take leave of the French Embassy before setting out. The Marshal would not see him; he then addressed himself to M. de Latour-Maubourg, and this was the speech he made to the latter, as related to me by the Ambassador:

‘I have come to take leave of you, for the Austrians are sending me away from here. I have nothing to say



against that ; they play their part, as I play mine. You, gentlemen, who pursue the golden mean, have also your own parts to play, as I, for my part, perform that of a Republican. I am on my way to France, and I shall do my utmost to put down the Government I abhor. There is no quarrel between you and me ; it is between the parties in France. One or other will gain the day ; if it happen to be mine, I shall know how to convince you that I harbour no ill-will for the neglect I have experienced from the Embassy of my country. Adieu.'

The Marshal observed to me, ' And it is to a man like that that I have to give a passport !' I pointed out to him that the post of Ambassador to the throne of July was not altogether a sinecure !

I believe many a hero of that time would give much to be able to go back from what he did.

**1036.** *March 23.*—Unless appearances be deceptive, the Ancona farce would seem to have met with no success in England. The language held here by the Ambassador, and the last instructions received by him, at least prove that the affair has not been taken as lightly as M. Périer perhaps flattered himself would be the case. With a Cabinet constituted like that of London, it is, nevertheless, impossible to reckon on anything beforehand. Be pleased to watch carefully the course pursued by Lord Granville, for, in the long-run, what that Ambassador says or does has more interest for us than what reaches us from London. Diplomatic *phrases* have lost much of their importance since the *facts* that have taken place at Ancona.

Two things closely concern us. First, that we should be informed as accurately as possible whether new armaments are being despatched to Italy. Secondly,



that England should be kept informed of all that takes place there.

The actual result which the occurrences at Ancona have so far produced on men's minds in Italy, is to have greatly inspired the extreme revolutionists, left the less turbulent in suspense, and disgusted those who retain any idea of decency. The want of discipline among the French troops, their tone and conduct, fail to inspire any confidence. When the declarations from Paris reach the spot, the prospects of the expedition will not be improved.

1037. *May* 14.—I have received your letter of the 4th inst., and can understand the painful position in which the King and Queen are placed, owing to the Duchess of Berry's enterprise.\* I apprise you, in one of my despatches of this date, that if we had our choice, we could wish that Princess were sent to Edinburgh. This, in fact, would be the best thing that could be done. She has an unfortunate propensity to allow herself to be influenced by flatterers, who, by playing upon her affections, perfectly natural as they are, excite and carry her beyond herself. These same men have exasperated her against us to an extraordinary degree. In the eyes of conspirators, Vienna is the prototype of perdition; and to listen to them, it is *ambitious Austria* whom it would be well to bring to her senses. If you hear it said that the Duke of Modena played a part in the Duchess of Berry's affair, do not believe a word of it. To be sure, that Prince is not the best of rulers, but he does not proffer advice, for he would be afraid to incur the risk of having it thrust upon him. He has extended hospitality to the Duchess, and he has thought fit to do

\* The landing of the Duchess of Berry and some of her adherents, including Marshal Bourmont, on the south coast of France (April 24).—ED.

so in the teeth of the revolutionists. His ideas have never extended beyond this ; and if the Duchess had requested his advice, it would have been of a negative character, for such is his temperament. He is one of those men who say *no* to everything one asks of them.

The French Cabinet will derive but slight advantage from this abortive enterprise. The Revolution alone will profit by it.

France, in 1832, resembles, in many respects, France at the beginning of the Great Revolution. If there be a difference between the two epochs, it is perceptible only in the want of combustible matter offered to sustain the flames. Morally, I see no difference except in the degree of intensity ; there is lassitude instead of a mighty enthusiasm.

At any rate, there exists in Europe only one affair of any moment, and that is the Revolution. This is the one question which must never be lost sight of, and it is for the rulers not to allow themselves to be entrapped by the snares laid for them by the factions, with the object of withdrawing their attention from the real danger, viz., the Revolution. You are aware how deeply that fact has occupied my attention during some years past, and that I did not wait for the events of 1830 to verify it. If the *glorious days* effected any change in the current of affairs, it was that the majority of the Courts, I will even say one and all of them, were induced to assimilate their policy to ours. I have no complaint to make on the subject at the present moment. Unhappily, the dawn has been long in breaking, and its light now falls, in every direction, on buildings which have been terribly shattered.

The affair which, for the moment, exclusively demands our attention, is that of Germany. You may look

for results from it shortly. The important thing is that the French Government should not thwart the action of the Princes, who find themselves compelled to face the alternative either to *govern* or *perish*. It is, indeed, a strange contradiction to see Governments require to be taught that their duty is to govern. But such is the case in Germany, and facts must always be regarded as they actually exist, for to act otherwise is to misapply the remedy to the evil. *The Confederation* is about to take up the position it ought to have occupied long ago, and which it is no fault of ours that it did not occupy sooner. The latest directions received by M. de Werther, and which I have indicated to you as being common to you both, bear upon this point. Every day brings us some proof or other that the French diplomatic agents are endeavouring to intimidate the Princes, with the object of deterring them from having recourse to the only means of safety. I beg you, my dear Count, to come to an understanding with your Prussian colleague as to the necessity of thoroughly ventilating the subject, and frustrating a scheme which could only advance the cause of the Propaganda. The two German Powers and the Confederate States will let nothing stand in the way of the course they are pursuing.

**1038.** *June 6.*—You will have learnt from the *Gazette*, or possibly through the envoys of the German Courts, about the Hambach scandal.\* To our mind, it has the significance of a first attempt of Radicalism to

\* On the 27th May, a meeting took place at the Castle of Hambach, in Rhenish Bavaria, the invitations to which had been issued by the editor of the *Westbote*, a Herr Siebenpfeiffer. Thousands took part in the festival, political speeches were delivered, and the colours black, red, and gold appeared for the first time as the badge of the German nation. It ended in the arrest of the originator of the meeting and a few others who had made themselves prominent by seditious speeches.—ED.

*display itself in its bare deformity.* Count Münch will set out in a few days for Frankfort. The Diet are unanimous as to the course they intend to take; it was to attain this object that we waited.

The German banquet, presided over by the *hero of the two worlds*,\* is worthy of attention. I think no further demonstration is needed of the existence at Paris of a general revolutionary centre and its connivance with the German agitators. Never has the Propaganda made a more shameless or open avowal of its schemes and hopes.

I doubt not that the French Government will repudiate any complicity with the agitators. By so doing it will promote its own cause; but the fact nevertheless remains, that it is difficult to live side by side with such a hotbed of perpetual disturbances as France has now become.

The scenes that take place at Ancona are most lamentable. Only one course is open to the French Cabinet, and that is the one we have long pointed out to it: it must, at all risks, expel from that city, until lately the most peaceful in the Papal States, the small band of seditious persons who, under the ægis of a foreign garrison, commit every kind of crime. You informed us, not long ago, that Count Sébastiani had promised to give orders to that effect. If this has not yet been done, insist, if only for the honour of France, that at least no further delay should take place. I fully understand all the difficulties of the position in which the Government is placed, but the extreme gravity of the evil far outweighs all these difficulties put together;

\* The *German* Republicans in Paris celebrated the day of the Hambach festival (May 27) by a great banquet, which was held in the Bois de Vincennes, under the presidency of Lafayette.—ED.



the Government is, therefore, more interested than anyone else in overcoming them. The scenes of disorder are so many attempts directed against the throne of July ; it is at Ancona and several other places that are sharpened the daggers which are destined to strike at a distance !

The two remarks made to you by Count Sébastiani have no practical value, and are refuted by our very proposition. A *pragmatic sanction* includes the idea and the fact of stability. A pragmatic sanction is not instituted for *a single reign, but for all reigns to come*. It must, of necessity, involve fundamental laws, and this is exactly what we pointed out. I do not believe the French Government will prove obstinate, and even if it should, it would gain nothing by it, while disorder would gain a great deal. We shall not go back from our fixed determination. We know how to make concessions when it is only a question of the means to be employed, or a point which does not exceed the bounds of a sound policy ; but the case at once becomes quite different when principles are concerned. Our behaviour at the time of the unfortunate Ancona expedition testifies to the former of these truths ; our behaviour in regard to the other question will serve as a testimony to the second.

1039. *June 21.*—In one of my despatches of this date, I give you some particulars as to the condition of the Duke of Reichstadt. I look upon his dissolution as imminent. His illness is pulmonary consumption of the most pronounced character ; and if this disease spares no age, its operation is rapid at one-and-twenty.\*

\* On the 7th June Prince Metternich sent word as follows to the Emperor at Trieste : ‘ The condition of the Prince is unhappily what might be expected from his illness. His weakness continues to increase with the progress of his disease, and I see no possible hope of recovery.’—ED.



I beg you to call the attention of King Louis Philippe to the person who is *to succeed* the Duke of Reichstadt. I use the word *succeed*, because in the Bonapartist hierarchy there is a succession, which is openly avowed and respected by the party.

The youthful Louis Bonaparte is a man involved in the network of conspiracies pursued by the various sectaries; he is not, like the Duke of Reichstadt, placed under the safeguard of the Emperor's principles. The day the Duke dies he will consider himself called upon to become the head of the French Republic.\*

1040. *June 21.*—I cannot too earnestly impress on you to follow up the Ancona affair with the utmost determination.

This complication will inevitably lead to revolutionary scandals in all the domains of the Holy Father unless vigorous measures are taken by the French Government.

\* We append a letter from Prince Louis Bonaparte to the Duke of Reichstadt. The letter is dated 'Arenenberg, near Constance, July 12, 1832,' and runs word for word as follows :

'MY DEAR COUSIN,—We have for some time past felt the greatest anxiety about your illness; I apply to everyone to obtain news of your health, and the uncertainty in which I am left by indirect reports causes me the greatest uneasiness. If you were aware of the depth of our attachment for you, if you knew how devoted we are to you, you would have some idea of our grief at not being in direct relations with one whom we have been brought up to cherish as the relation, and honour as the son of the Emperor Napoleon.

'Ah! if the presence of your father's nephew could in any way cheer you, if the ministrations of a friend who bears the same name as yourself could in any degree alleviate your sufferings, it would be the height of my hopes to be able to be of some use to one who is the object of my whole affection.

'I trust that my letter may fall into the hands of compassionate persons, who will pity my distress, and not prevent my hopes for your recovery and the expression of my tender attachment from finding their way to you.

'Adieu, my dear cousin, and believe always in the lasting friendship of your affectionate cousin,

'LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.'

O

The most efficacious of all would be the evacuation of Ancona and the maintenance of our troops *in the name of the five Powers*. I cannot venture to propose this measure ; I believe I am right in supposing that M. de Sainte-Aulaire has done so. Do not make direct mention of it, but receive the proposal graciously, should it be made to you even tentatively. I doubt, however, whether King Louis Philippe can feel himself in a position to go so far as this.

In default of anything better, there remains the expulsion of the agitators. This is *indispensable*, and to fail to give orders for its execution would be to avow complicity with the Italian Revolution.

The *Carbonari* after procuring respect for themselves, dagger in hand, have constituted themselves an actual authority. They govern in Ancona ; that is to say, they usurp the place there of a regular authority. The Romagna and the rest of the Roman provinces abound with their emissaries and their insurrectionary appeals. All this takes place *before the eyes of the French garrison*.

Do not be too cautious in your representations, or if need be, your expressions. Let them be severe.

## II.

1041. The Frankfort Decrees of June 28, and their significance. Death of the Duke of Reichstadt. 1042. Reception of the Dauphiness at Vienna. 1043. Position of the French Cabinet. Consequence of the operation against Antwerp. 1044. The Duchess of Berry. The Duchess of Angoulême. 1045. Seymour's correspondence on Roman affairs. Arrest of the Duchess of Berry. 1046. The Antwerp melodrama. 1047. The Soutl Ministry and its difficulties. Marshal Gérard's report. 1048. Recall of the Roman exiles.

*Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, August 4, 1832.*

1041. I address an important despatch to you, which will, nevertheless, tell you nothing you did not know.\*

Apart from my desire to convince the French Government of our fixed determination to let nothing stand in the way of the duties we owe to the Confederation, I thought it necessary to seize this opportunity to acquaint the French Cabinet with the real nature of the decrees of June 28.† I am firmly convinced that there is not a political writer in Paris who really knows what passed at Frankfort, for not one of them is acquainted with the Federal legislation. The *omniscience* of the journalists is a very unreliable source whence to derive trustworthy information.

The surprise is general, for of late years the *Federal Diet* had entirely faded from men's minds; when a man who is thought to be dead speaks, attention is aroused in a far more marked degree than if he had been known to be alive, and I am convinced the French Government has all along looked upon the Confederation as defunct, quite as much as the frequenters of the reading-rooms.

\* See No. 1065.—ED.

† Refers to the resolution passed by the Germanic Diet on that date. See No. 1063.—ED.

There can be no doubt as to the extreme importance of the decrees of the 28th of June. To assert that they involve the *mediatisation* of the German Sovereigns is nothing better than sheer folly: in that case, the Sovereigns must have mediatised themselves, an object to which they are as little inclined to devote themselves as the would-be defenders of that sovereignty are zealous to attain it.

The French Government has had the opportunity latterly of making acquaintance with the leaders of the Revolutionary party in Germany. These men are, beyond a doubt, far more the enemies of Louis Philippe than of ourselves. Lost as they are in dreams of popular ascendancy and led astray by extreme theories, what they dislike above all is the golden mean. Their triumph in Germany would be equivalent to an attack of the most serious nature against this so-called golden mean, which, in fact, is nothing more than the application of the dogmas of preservation to the conditions of destruction. I am therefore convinced that the French Government eagerly desires the triumph of the Federal laws; it does not venture to express such a feeling openly, but it exists all the same.

The Emperor is deeply affected by the loss of the Duke of Reichstadt. When I broke the death to him he merely answered: 'I look upon the Duke's death as a blessing for him. Whether it be detrimental or otherwise to the public good I do not know. As for myself, I shall ever lament the loss of my grandson.'\*

\* The Emperor was absent from Vienna at the time of the Duke of Reichstadt's death, and was at Persenbeug when he received intelligence of the sad event from Prince Metternich. The latter had visited the Duke shortly before his decease. 'It was a heartrending sight,' writes Metternich to the Emperor on July 22; 'I never remember to have seen a more mournful picture of decay. The post-mortem examination will show that I was not deceived as to the nature of his disease.'—ED.

1042. *September 26.*—The Dauphiness will be received at Vienna by the Emperor. His Imperial Majesty cannot refuse her this, and the daughter of France, whom the Convention had entrusted to our august master, can certainly not be treated with less consideration now than she was then. She will divide her time between Vienna and Schönbrunn until the moment comes for her to rejoin Charles X. in his future retreat. I put you in possession of these facts in order that you may be in a position to explain them, if called upon to do so.

The great thing will be to be careful to make it understood that the whole affair has nothing to do with politics, but that we are actuated solely by feelings of honour and duty. The whole question confines itself to this ; be careful, therefore, not to deviate from these limits.

1043. *October 8.*—It would be exceedingly difficult for me to write anything to you beyond what is contained in my despatch of this date. Indeed, what could I possibly tell you at a moment of such utter confusion that those who should naturally be inclined to pursue a strict and moderate line of action are the first to be ignorant in what direction they are tending? Such is distinctly the position of the French Government, which no longer has any idea what it is or whither it is drifting. It is not for us to predict what it will come to.

The invasion of Belgium by French troops will never be acquiesced in by the independent Powers ; the united action of the *five Courts* will, in that case, be at an end. The siege and capture of the citadel of Antwerp bring the *tariff question* no nearer to a solution ; the withdrawal of the French troops following on the capture of the citadel will not put an end to the just re-



sentment of his Majesty the King of Holland. The whole conception of the plan is thus defective, and the phrases put forward to sustain it purely illusory, as indeed they necessarily must be.

Is a proof of this fact still required? Here it is. According to the scheme propounded by the French Government, the task they have to accomplish includes a march from Lille to Antwerp direct; the siege and capture of the citadel by the French troops unassisted, and their immediate withdrawal when the conquered town has been given up to the King of the Belgians. In this plan everything is foreseen, even to the fifteen days the siege is to last; only one thing has not been foreseen, but that is the principal one after all—I mean the action which will be taken by *Holland*.

Is it probable, I ask, is it even possible that King William should remain a passive spectator of the siege of the citadel before the screen which the Belgian troops are no doubt destined to form in front of the Dutch army? If he does not submit to such a sacrifice, involving as it does those feelings of nationality, honour and justice so dear to a prince jealous of his dignity and a vigorous nation up in arms, what will happen? Will France give Belgium up to the uncertainties of a direct conflict? Will she lend her support? In the first case, the struggle will clearly be in favour of Holland; in the second, a great inequality of position will be the result, tending to the detriment of that Power. But let us not waste time in seriously discussing a plan which is absurd, if it does not tend to a general war, and culpable, if it has that end in view. We have seen the whole of Europe set in a blaze by causes of far less magnitude than what will inevitably be the result of the Antwerp expedition. The twenty-five years of war which have

just elapsed abound in proofs of the fact. What we have to do, therefore, is not to deliberate on the possible results of a conception that is either false or dangerous, but rather to endeavour to estimate the significance of the conception itself, and to make sure whether it spring from an inconceivable thoughtlessness or be the result of some deep-laid scheme. Of the two, I feel bound, until in possession of further details, to consider the first hypothesis as coming nearest to the truth.

But, my dear Count, admitting this hypothesis, I find in it a direct motive for impressing on you the necessity of treating the present complication with the utmost seriousness. When a friend is on the point of committing an indiscretion, it is a point of duty to warn him, and direct his attention to the consequences of his ill-advised plans. The French Cabinet can claim nothing more from the other Courts but that they should maintain friendly relations with it; any attempt to induce them to renounce the calculations of pure reason and adopt the tone of flattery, concession and complaisance, would be a mistake on the part of that Cabinet, which could not fail to be productive of disastrous consequences.

The Powers can do no more than preach *the maintenance of general peace*, and testify by their attitude to the *reality of their desire*. This is what they have done since the Revolution of July; this is what they continue to do, and France should not seek to weaken their endeavours by crude conceptions, the effects of which would not fail to make themselves felt.

I send you this fine sermon with the view of inducing you, in your interviews with the King and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to act in accordance with the principles of a *sound criticism*. Let the language of the

representatives of the three Courts be uniform in this respect.

On reading over my despatch, a new argument of great importance has occurred to me.

The French Cabinet is perpetually claiming consideration from the other Powers *on the score of its peculiar position*, and it finds it expedient to extend this claim to considerations of a higher kind.

In conceding the separation of Belgium from Holland, the Powers who had consolidated the two countries into one have exhausted all the means in their power for showing their conciliatory temper towards the new Government of France. To seek to push this system of conciliation beyond due bounds, and extend its application to all the consequences of the separation between the two countries, down to the regulation of a *tariff*, is simply to make a laughing-stock of everybody! Now the Powers neither desire war without reasonable cause, nor peace at any price. It is for the French Cabinet to grasp this truth and not abuse their forbearance.

**1044.** *October 30.*—All the King's wishes in regard to the Duchess of Berry meet with the Emperor's concurrence. She must be saved in spite of herself, and the only means of saving her is by compelling her to leave France. This end once attained she must be restored to her family.

But though both Princes are agreed on the essential point, the Emperor could never be induced to take upon himself the moral responsibility of a guardianship of any kind. The proposal could not even be received by him; rather than this, he would refuse to allow the Duchess to enter Austria. I know the Emperor, and the King will do me the honour of taking my word for it.

1045. *November 23.*—Another serious difficulty has just arisen, owing to the publication of Mr. Seymour's\* correspondence on the eve of his departure from Rome. Apart from the impropriety of a publication of this kind, the event (for such it is) has a significance of its own. The effect of this promulgation of the ideas of the British Cabinet will undoubtedly be to arouse the revolutionary instinct in the Papal States, and consequently throughout the whole Peninsula. Nowhere is the true condition of these countries less understood than in England; it is a bold step to lend any support whatever to parties made up of such elements, and the boldness in this case can only arise from ignorance. It is impossible to foresee what effects a Radical escapade of this kind will have on the tranquillity of Italy, and, as a natural consequence, that of Europe! Our position is taken; nothing can alter it, for it depends on the very conditions of our existence. Never will we give in to the theories of the *Times*, and if we had to make good our words on twenty battle-fields we should not hesitate a moment. We institute no propaganda in support of our Conservative principles; we have, therefore, the right to expect in return that the reformers should act in the same spirit towards ourselves and all those who think as we do! But such hopes are purely theoretical, and as we confine ourselves to facts, I look for no good results. I shall shortly have occasion to speak to you more at length on this important subject. I am profoundly convinced that the ideas of the French Government are more in accordance with our own on this point than they could possibly be with those of the adherents of

\* The English representative at the Conference in Rome; he published his diplomatic correspondence with the Austrian Ambassador, Count Lützow.—ED.



universal reform, and this is the view I shall impress on Marshal Maison.

1046. *November 27.*—The operations against Antwerp are proceeding; they form quite a melodrama, and would be very effective on the boards. But the world's interests are more important than those of a theatre, where the tinsel can never have anything more than a factitious worth. The expedition will bear fruits, which those who have plucked them will not find it so easy to swallow. The real difficulties of the two Cabinets will begin with the conclusion of the enterprise. Kept within the limits assigned to it by the treaty of October 22, this expedition is actually devoid of any practical aim; it will simply end in mere sound, like a clap of thunder unaccompanied by lightning. If it goes beyond the limits laid down in the treaty, it will turn out to have been only the prelude, the antecedent conditions of a new affair, the full import of which cannot be foreseen.

The piece which is being played is a curious one, and deserves to be followed with the closest attention from the first scene to the last.

1047. *December 19.*—My despatches of this date are not wanting in candour, and I furnish you with subjects for explanations and conversations, which it would be well for you to hold with the Duke de Broglie.\*

If I am not deceived, I admit that that Minister and several of his colleagues would gladly stem the Revolution if they could; that is to say, they would like to break all the weapons in the revolutionary arsenal which are a source of danger to the throne of July, preserving only such as would be of service to it, or which seemed

\* In the Soult Ministry, which took office on October 11, Broglie occupied the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thiers was Minister of the Interior, and Guizot Minister of Instruction.—ED.



so in their estimation. Admitting this hypothesis, we shall not permit ourselves to be under any illusion as to the difficulties attending the application of so utopian an idea. To assert that they mean to uphold the throne of July and that they have no intention of aiding the Revolution, is to confuse two ideas diametrically opposed to each other. I can the more easily conceive that the French Ministers have very little idea of the insuperable difficulty of their enterprise, seeing that error has a natural attraction for the *doctrinaires*; but the fact only gives me one more reason for admitting without hesitation that such a project as I have just described does actually exist. Since I regard it as the principle which actuates the conduct and policy of the present French Ministry, it is right that I should regulate the course of our own Cabinet accordingly.

France is divided into parties, and the logical inference is that the party at the head of which the Government is placed, is furthest removed from the truth. The sovereignty of the people forms the new order of things. The Royalists, contesting as they do the validity of this principle, know exactly what they want, and avow it openly. The Republicans admit the principle and look for all those consequences which naturally spring from it; in this they are right. The adherents of the golden mean would fain reduce the results of the three days to the dimensions of a mere *révolution de palais*; they are in the wrong, and nothing short of a counter-revolution—in other words, nothing but the overthrow of the so-called sovereignty of the people, will put them in the right. How is it that in spite of the evident weakness of the position of the Government, the latter is nevertheless not without a certain element of strength? It derives this strength

from the disinclination which has taken possession of the vast majority of the nation for change of any kind; from the indifference felt by this same predominant class for polemical discussion; from the longing, lastly, all but universal, in favour of stability and material repose!

I consider this to be the only true picture of the actual facts. It gives an accurate sketch of the political situation of France at the end of 1832.

The Paris newspapers which have just reached us publish Marshal Gérard's report of the 7th of December. This report contains a sentence which will make an epoch in the history of the world! The Marshal aspires 'to make the garrison of the citadel of Antwerp *prisoners of war*, in order that he may thus have at his disposal *hostages for the surrender of the other places* which he has to demand, or *for the compulsory assent of King William to a general peace!*' If I were not copying these expressions word for word from an unexceptionable original, my mind would refuse to believe it possible that a commander-in-chief, entrusted with a military operation of the kind, could ever have conceived ideas so utterly devoid of common sense, or that a Government should take no trouble to see that such expressions were omitted in the published reports! It would seem impossible, at first sight, to admit the existence of *prisoners of war* when there is *no war at all*, or when, at any rate, the Government which Marshal Gérard serves *refuses to admit that it is at war*. But let that oversight pass unchallenged; if I were in the Marshal's place I should probably myself be at a loss to decide whether the men against whom I was directing my batteries were enemies or friends—the expressions in question become none the more intelligible. How long is it since a captured garrison have been or could possibly be

liable to be detained as hostages for the surrender of other places? And what has the captive garrison to do with the political decisions of his Majesty the King of Holland? Will Marshal Gérard have the garrison of the citadel shot or hanged if the officers in command of the forts at Lille and Liefkenshœk do not at once capitulate, or the King of Holland refuses to sign the twenty-four articles on the spot? And if Marshal Gérard puts his philanthropic schemes into execution, will the officers in command of the two forts and his Majesty the King look on quietly? Never, no, never has such folly been uttered, and what is worse, *published!* Do not let the matter drop; inscribe it on the list of the explanations which you will have to demand from M. de Broglie. Among the numerous answers he will have to give you, this will, perhaps, not be the least difficult for him to make. French Public Law is not unlike a parody on the 'Law of Nations;' is reform beginning to take up the question of the rights and usages of war?

1048. *December 25.*—Marshal Maison had recently received instructions to request the support of our Cabinet in endeavouring to obtain from the Holy Father the recall of those Roman subjects to whom the portal of their native country still remained closed. I came to an understanding with the Ambassador on this point, and explained to him the reasons which forbade our countenancing such a request. These reasons are briefly the following: In the first place, we think it right to reserve such an appeal for the time when the Papal territory is evacuated, and thus afford his Holiness an opportunity of showing clemency of his own accord.

Secondly, the refugees have requested their Roman friends to petition for their recall, with the object either

of meeting with a refusal from the Sovereign Pontiff, or finding an opportunity of forwarding *the great work* by returning to their country. It is plain that we have to choose between two evils, and we decide for the lesser of the two. A few outcries more or less on the part of the Liberals will occasion us no concern.

Be pleased, my dear Count, to read this letter to the Duke de Broglie.

*OCCUPATION OF ANCONA BY THE FRENCH.*

1049. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, February 10, 1832.  
 1050. Abstract of a conversation of Metternich with Maison. dated February 17, 1832.  
 1051. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, February 22, 1832.  
 1052. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, March 9, 1832.  
 1053. Metternich to Neumann in London, Vienna, March 21, 1832.  
 1054. Metternich to Lützow in Rome, Vienna, April 3, 1832.  
 1055. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, May 3, 1832.

1049. Marshal Maison called to communicate to me two despatches which his courier had brought him the evening before. As he was previously acquainted with the contents of my despatch of January 31,\* the Ambassador was the less eager to inform me of their contents, inasmuch as he could not but be aware that the determination of his Cabinet to send a regiment to Ancona was most inopportune at the present juncture.

Accordingly, the explanations that took place between us did not carry us very far. The Marshal had approved of the views expressed in the despatch of January 31. Had he done the same with regard to the one he had just received, he would have contradicted his own words, and his zeal for the public service does not go so far as this.

The sole argument on which the Marshal relied was

\* This despatch contained the announcement of the occupation of the Legations by Austrian troops, who were only to remain until the organisation of the Papal troops should be completed. It also expressed a wish that the French Government would support the proposal which had been made to the Pope to enlist Swiss soldiers, and facilitate the carrying out of that measure.—ED.



the difficulties attending the position of the French Ministry. I had no difficulty in demonstrating to him, that of all the arguments open to him, this was the very worst he could have used.

‘ You will always find us,’ said I to him, ‘ ready to show every consideration for M. Périer’s position as Minister, so long as we believe that by so doing we promote the cause of order. We could not extend this consideration to every possible case that might occur, especially were the President to desert that cause. We are friends with M. Périer so long as he is firm; when he is weak he is no longer anything to us. Men are always weak when they act in a way contrary to what they themselves ought to consider just and reasonable. M. Périer has too much common sense not to perceive the difficulties which would inevitably result from his rash determination; that determination is opposed to the actual facts and requirements of the moment. If it were a question of the *occupation* of the Roman States, I could understand the motives which induced him to wish to take part in such occupation by sending thither a detachment of French troops; although even in that case, it appears to me the President’s argument would not be any the sounder. But far from this being the case, it is the *evacuation* of the Roman States that is in question. But to think of combining this with the despatch of troops! Is it your wish that we should remain in the Papal States? In that case you will have acted rightly, for we shall certainly remain until you go. Is it your wish that we should go? Then do not come. Is it your wish that we should come back? We shall do so, if you disembark troops after we are gone. Now think the matter well over, and endeavour to find any reasonable grounds for upholding the resolution which your Cabinet has taken *ab irato*.’

The Marshal did not attempt to do so ; he told me he flattered himself that our despatch of January 31 would have induced the French Government to revoke its decision. I assured him that I did not think so ; that M. Périer would have to reply to the captious questions of members in the Chamber, and that, the words once spoken, action would follow as a necessary consequence. 'But from this consequence,' said I, 'another will follow, a consequence I regret beforehand for the President's own sake. He will have lent his countenance to a farce ; to go to Ancona merely to retreat from it immediately is an error, and if, in order to shift the blame off his own shoulders, he were ever to allow himself to try and make it appear that our departure was due to the appearance of a French expeditionary force, he would compel us to give his statements a public disclaimer. Our operations in the Roman States have in no case been actuated by *political* considerations ; your own, on the other hand, are conspicuously of that character ; consequently, the remedy you have chosen is unsuitable for the evil to which you wish to apply it. There is only one way of assimilating things that are incongruous, and that is, to change their nature ; in order to do this, you would have to avow yourselves the friends of revolt and the patrons of anarchy.'

The Ambassador protested that such could never become the intention of his Government.

'Not the intention,' I replied, 'but what really amounts to the same thing. What that is, it is now realising ; for it only needs the decision which I look upon as already formed by your Cabinet, to raise the hopes of the factious. M. Périer is betraying his own convictions and his own cause, in order to advance that of the Central Committee. He is doing just what they

would have him do, and this concession may lead him eventually to great lengths.'

The Marshal asked me in what terms I wished him to write to Paris. I begged him to say that, before entering into any explanations, I must wait for an answer to my despatch of January 31; that meanwhile I would continue to devote my attention to the terms of the evacuation, and that as soon as the document had received the Emperor's sanction, it should be despatched to Rome and its contents communicated to you.

*Abstract of a Conversation between Metternich and Maison,  
dated February 17, 1832.*

1050. Marshal Maison came to see me to-day (February 17), a few moments after the arrival of a courier whom his Government had despatched on the 11th. He read me a communication from M. Périer, in which that Minister informs him that the project of despatching a squadron, destined to land troops at Ancona, was on the point of being carried out. The Ambassador is instructed to announce the fact to the Imperial Cabinet, and the despatch, which is very short, contains only the following passages :

An assurance that the French troops will evacuate the Papal States the moment the Imperial troops withdraw ;

An assurance that the object of their being despatched is simply to aid in the pacification of the States of the Holy See, and that the choice of the General appointed to command them is a sufficient guarantee for their behaviour. The name of the General is not mentioned ;

A hope that the Imperial Court will put no obstacles in the way of the expedition.

When he had finished reading the despatch, the Ambassador asked me what reply he should send to his Court.

I expressed myself to him in the following terms :

‘In explaining to you my sentiments as to the nature and significance of the measure which you have just told me is on the point of being carried into execution, I can only repeat what I had the honour of telling you before. Of the measure itself only one estimate can be formed ; it is an unfortunate conception, and can never be crowned with success.

‘I am struck by the word *obstacles* which occurs in M. Périer’s despatch. These can only be of two kinds ; moral obstacles and material obstacles. The former lie at the door of the French Government. We have already expressed our unreserved opinion as to the manner in which that measure has been conceived ; we shall therefore waste no more words on that point, for we are not fond of empty phrases. As for material obstacles, I know of no others, as between two Powers, than war. We shall not declare war against you in this instance. What we shall do, is to redouble our precautionary measures, in order that we may not lose the fruits of our efforts in favour of the pacification of the Papal States ; this result we are desirous of attaining, and in seeking to do so, we shall let nothing stand in our way.’

I added that the Emperor, who always, and before everything else, respects the sovereign rights of independent States, will look upon the entry of the French troops into Ancona or any other part of the States of the Church, as a question to be settled between France and the Holy See : the possible results of the appearance of the tricolor flag in Italy may concern us. This, it



appears to me, is the only light in which these questions can be regarded.

The Ambassador told me that he had received information from Paris to the effect that the matter had been arranged between his Government and the Holy Father. I assured him that our latest information from Rome gave us reason to believe just the contrary.

‘What do you wish me to write?’

‘Nothing,’ I replied, ‘or else what I have just told you. I am shortly expecting the arrival of despatches from our Ambassador at Paris. Your Cabinet owes us a reply to our overtures of January 31, and until that reply is forthcoming, we are not in a condition to give any answer. I have nothing to tell you to-day beyond what I have already said.’

*Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna,  
February 22, 1832.*

1051. The evacuation of the Papal States cannot take place yet; things there are by no means in a settled state; still less are they sufficiently organised to permit of our letting it take place.

The judicial and administrative laws decreed and promulgated by the Holy Father are good, and to the efforts of the Sovereign in that direction no blame or reproach can possibly attach. These laws ought now to be published and put into execution. For this purpose an armed force is required sufficiently strong to maintain public tranquillity. Were we to withdraw from the Legations before the most indispensable means of repression had been organised and put in force, the day of the evacuation would perforce become the eve of that of our return.



I invite you to discuss, in concert with your colleagues, the following considerations :

Of two alternatives one must be admitted: either the French expedition will kindle the flame of revolution in Italy, or it will not produce the effect which the factious French, Italians, and Europeans undoubtedly expect from it.

On the first hypothesis, future contingencies are beyond the sphere of your calculations.

On the second hypothesis, we must again admit two alternatives :

First, that the French Government has no ulterior motives in despatching its troops ;

Secondly, that their despatch marks only the first step in a scheme of policy, the aims of which would exceed the limits of a mere measure of parliamentary expediency.

In the first case, one thing is absolutely essential, and this is that the French troops should withdraw on the same day that our own do so. The object of their coming being simply to occupy Ancona so long as we continue to occupy the Legations, this point can hardly be disputed, but still it should be placed beyond a doubt.

In the second case, the policy of the French Cabinet will have had for its aim to make it appear that we were playing the part of repression, while it poses as a peacemaker, using only legitimate means to effect its purpose, and the champion of tutelary laws.

We shall never permit a scheme of this nature to be put into execution, and in order to checkmate it, it is essential that you should lay particular stress on two passages in my accompanying despatch of this date, which perfectly define the points on which it is necessary to insist, in especial the passage in which we emphatically

renounce all idea of a protectorate over the States of the Church, and that in which we admit as a settled and understood thing their simultaneous evacuation.

In order to complete the opposition to the views of France, admitting they are probable or possible, it is essential that the declarations made by the diplomatic body at Rome, under date of the 12th of January last,\* *be regarded and expressly upheld as the last intervention of the Powers in the administrative affairs of the Sovereign Pontiff.* The four notes have and should continue to have the validity of a final settlement in regard to these questions.

*Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, March 9, 1832.*

**1052.** The inexcusable attack on Ancona† has produced on the Sovereign Pontiff the effect which might have been expected, and which it will produce on other Governments without exception.

The fatal complication which has just been let loose upon Europe, as the fruits of a conception wholly deplorable in its origin, has naturally inspired our august master with the most anxious reflections as to the course demanded of him.

The first official notification made by the French Ambassador at Rome has based the whole conception and aims of the Ancona expedition on motives absolutely insulting to our Court. To admit that his Holiness could ever stand in need of foreign support and the pro-

\* On that date, the representatives of Austria, France, Russia and Prussia, each independently signified their assent, by a written declaration, to the laws and administrative measures drawn up by the Papal Government for promulgation in the States of the Church.—ED.

† As already above mentioned, 1,500 French troops under General Cubières landed at Ancona on the morning of February 23. They took possession of the town, disarmed the Papal garrison, deposed the authorities, and demanded the surrender of the citadel.—ED.

tection of a third Power in order to feel reassured as to the intentions of the Emperor towards his sovereign rights and the integrity of his States, can only be, in principle, to admit that his Imperial Majesty has concealed beneath the mask of a shameless hypocrisy, ideas of material conquest and designs detrimental to the indisputable sovereign rights of the Holy See, rights consecrated by the sanction of so many existing treaties, and which have only recently been confirmed in the most solemn manner by that very monarch, on whom the diplomatic agents of France thus venture to lay the imputation of a barefaced duplicity.

This question becomes for Austria a question of honour, and from this point of view the French Government must keenly regret that it was ever raised by its agents in Italy, without any consideration of the consequences it might entail. But there is a still wider point of view from which it must be considered.

The events of February 23 are a direct attack on the sovereignty of the Holy Father. These events, Ambassador, will be judged by Europe. Under circumstances of such gravity, the Emperor knows how to suppress his personal feelings. Although deeply struck by the difference between the straightforward tone adopted quite recently by King Louis Philippe towards his Ambassador at Paris, when speaking to him of the occupation of Ancona, and the insulting insinuations against Austria indulged in by his agents in Italy, he turns his attention from the hateful and gratuitous terms of those insinuations in order to bestow it more completely on the general good and interest. I have before observed that his Imperial Majesty will not allow himself to be provoked into a war with the King of the French by an enterprise, the whole conception of which has so pain-

fully outraged his tenderest feelings. Conscious of his integrity, the Emperor takes his stand among the Governments who feel shocked at the occupation of Ancona by main force. We do not resign the hope of before long finding the French Government itself among their number.

We must wait for news from Paris to throw light upon the matter. Meanwhile, his Imperial Majesty will not allow a circumstance he so deeply regrets to divert him from the task he has laid down for himself, in the endeavour to restore internal tranquillity to the Papal States.

This, Ambassador, is the line you will be pleased to take in your explanations to the French Cabinet.

*Metternich to Neumann in London, Vienna,  
March 21, 1832.*

**1053.** The course things are taking in Italy realises our worst expectations.

Never was a political crime of the most flagrant character committed with greater thoughtlessness; each day, with the deeds it brings forth, testifies anew to the lawless conduct of the French expeditionary force.

What the Emperor desires is the re-establishment of the internal tranquillity of Italy, and he must necessarily desire the means that conduce to that end. These means are not to be found in caresses lavished on the dregs of the Italian population or on miserable sectaries influenced by views of personal interest or ambition; they are not to be found in the introduction of the tri-colour flag into the Peninsula; in the fanaticism of political passions, or the prospect of an approaching struggle between French dreams of aggrandisement



which actually exist, and the ambition falsely attributed to Austria. They are to be found in the removal of these possibilities, and in the conversion to their former allegiance of peoples who must, above all, be governed if they are not to cut each other's throats and present once more to Europe the spectacle of those interminable struggles which existed, throughout the Middle Ages, among nearly all the larger cities of Italy. We are convinced that the renewal of such disorders would find a Power quite ready to take upon itself the task of restoring order by means of conquest. As that Power is not Austria, we must be permitted to abstain from promoting the evil in order to be spared the employment of the remedy. In these few words is contained an accurate sketch of our policy in regard to Italy.

These explanations, Baron, are not put forward as a manifesto against the present French Government. We know that Government thoroughly, its intentions and capabilities, its strength and weakness. We are well aware for exactly how much of the present complication it is responsible, and how much not. It is responsible for the miscalculation which led it to believe that it could, without creating the most serious embarrassments, carry out the rashest enterprise which could possibly have been conceived by a Government occupying such a position as that of the King of the French. What it is not responsible for, but the consequences of which it must none the less bear, is the conduct of those to whom it has entrusted the execution of this inconceivable enterprise.

The manifesto appeals to the whole of France, to those thirty millions of men who are so ready to change throne, Government, and laws, with a facility which is only paralleled by their persistency in clinging to the



ambitious ideas which from the time of Francis I., Louis XIV., and Napoleon, France has never ceased to entertain in regard to Italy.

Sir F. Lamb acquainted me, some days back, with the latest instructions which have been transmitted to Mr. Seymour. The perusal of this document confirmed me in the belief which the earliest instructions given to that agent had already induced me to entertain as certain, viz., that in England little is thought of *the legislative measures which the Sovereign Pontiff has decreed and published; measures which are in strict conformity with the engagements contracted by that Sovereign with the Powers in 1831.*

All the demands that Mr. Seymour was instructed to make on the subject have long since been fulfilled by His Holiness. On the other hand, nothing has been carried out in the Legations, where the factions have taken care to prevent even the publication of the new laws or the most useful and proper enactments. *These were the laws and enactments* to which the representatives of the four Courts at Rome, with a full knowledge of the facts, gave their sanction on the 12th of January last.

We earnestly beg the British Cabinet not to be led away, in considering this thorny and weighty question, by the insinuations of the Italian Liberals. All their allegations are based simply on what is false, or else are but a mask used by them to conceal their real ideas. In fact, what the factions in the Legations want, is not to get good laws, but to shake off the Pontifical rule. As, however, their hopes are inconsistent with the general interests of Europe, this handful of men must resign themselves to obey. They will find neither Europe as a whole, nor any State taken individually,

inclined to forward their personal views at the expense of the general political repose, and the internal tranquillity of the various States.

I desire you to explain yourself unreservedly to Lord Palmerston on this important subject. It depends on the course taken by the British Government whether the pacification of Italy will present reasonable chances of success or insurmountable difficulties, after the endless complications to which the presence of the French in the Peninsula will inevitably give rise.

*Metternich to Lützow in Rome, Vienna, April 3, 1832.*

1054. The Ancona affair is the logical expression of the *golden mean*, that doctrine which always couples a vast amount of thoughtlessness with a grain of reason, a want of consideration with an act of weakness, and a denial with an affirmation. This affair is a symptom of the malady which is ravaging the world; it proves, by the clearest evidence, what are the real tendencies of situations abounding in contradictions; lastly, it gauges the moral and material calibre of the Government of the *glorious days*, and proves what the authority of the Powers really amounts to.

You can have no reason to doubt that the enterprise of M. Périer is among the number of those that have ended in failure; but as, under the dispensation of the golden mean, the for and against always go together, you must know that it has nevertheless succeeded. M. Casimir Périer wished to make a bid for public opinion—and failed; he wished to flatter the national *amour propre* of the French—and in this he has succeeded. The Ancona enterprise forms a fitting sequel to the expeditions to Navarino and Algiers; they belong to that class of facts

which are not remarked on at the time, but which remain in the memory as acts of violence; and as violence has something in it not unpleasing to the masses, the remembrance remains, because it flatters the passions. M. Périer has perceived, and he no longer blinds himself to the fact, that he could only extricate himself from the affair by certain acts of humility; he consoles himself for this necessity by the concessions which he extorts from his adversaries. To compel the whole of Europe to tolerate a criminal act, is to show the strength of its author. Such is M. Périer's reasoning, and he would make no secret of it to a friend who shared his inmost confidence.

For my part, my profession of faith is no less frank. I acknowledge that the Powers have no means of punishing this act; I acknowledge that the Ancona affair is a bagatelle compared with the injuries inflicted by the events of 1830 upon the sole basis on which the social fabric can securely rest. The remedy which it was found impossible to apply to the principal evil ought not to be employed against a slight symptom of that evil. The day of retribution is not yet come, and the Ancona complication is not the field on which the issue must be decided. Convinced as I am of these truths, and perfectly agreed in my own mind, I declare myself satisfied with the course which this affair is taking, and my satisfaction is based on this indisputable fact that, in this complication, France is radically wrong, while we are in the right; that the French Government is open to a grave charge of inconsistency, while we are entirely free from blame on that score; lastly, that the results of M. Périer's criminal enterprise will not altogether correspond to the hopes which that Minister had certainly permitted himself to entertain beforehand.

*Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, May 3, 1832.*

1055. The arrangement concluded between the Holy See and the French Government in regard to the Ancona expedition has once more placed the question of the pacification of the Legations on its proper footing.\* I have already informed you that so soon as we are in a position to do so, we shall not hesitate to bring before the Court of Rome and the other Powers, who are interested in the confirmation of the general order and tranquillity, the Emperor's views as to the methods by which these benefits can best be ensured to countries which have suffered so cruelly from the intrigues of faction, and which, by their geographical position, exercise some influence for good or bad on the stability of his own Empire.

I shall treat this important subject with all the frankness and impartiality which his Imperial Majesty is invariably accustomed to bring to the discussion of all moral or political interests.

The States of the Church are made up of several parts which, in many important respects, present great diversity in the conditions of their existence, and, as a natural consequence, in the temper of their inhabitants.

\* This understanding took place on April 16, 1832, and consisted of ten stipulations which were accepted by the French Government. By one of these, the Papal Government declared its readiness to permit the further temporary occupation of Ancona by the French troops. The most important of these stipulations, which were also approved by Prince Metternich, were, that the troops disembarked should be placed under the immediate command of the French Ambassador in Rome; that they were not to be reinforced; that no fortifications of any kind were to be undertaken; that there was to be no interference with the Papal administration; that the Papal standard should be hoisted on the walls of Ancona; and that the withdrawal of the French troops should take place simultaneously with that of the Austrian troops.—ED.



Among others, the Legations present, in this respect, the most marked variations. Among the causes which have exercised the most important influence on the moral condition of these provinces, and to which may be attributed the agitation so prevalent among them, we would point out the following: The great number of privileges they enjoyed until the levelling influence of the Revolution passed over them; their annexation to the kingdom of Italy; their resubjection to the Papal rule; and the grave mistake committed by that Government in leaving them for a considerable lapse of time deprived of any settled system of legislation; lastly, their position as border States, a position which would admit of their being incorporated with other neighbouring States, in the same way as they now form an integral part of the Roman State.

In questions of a complicated character, some one leading idea always stands out which serves to connect the scattered elements of which they are composed.

Thus, in the subject under discussion, the chief cause of discontent must be looked for in *the aversion felt by the higher classes of the population in the Legations for the Papal rule.*

We attach a special importance to the establishment of this truth, for it is only by admitting it that we shall be able to arrive at a solution of the difficulty in any degree commensurate with the gravity of the interests involved.

The Powers on whom it devolves to watch over the interests of peace in Europe, are not called upon to consider the inclinations or dislikes of particular provinces in regard to the political body of which they form a part.

Apart from the fact that such sentimental considera-



tions do not come within their province, the moment they attempted to act otherwise, a fresh and never-ending source of confusion would be added to the numberless causes of disturbance already existing, until at length the whole social fabric would find itself rapidly approaching the verge of a frightful anarchy. The Powers should therefore, in the interests of their own and the public welfare, recognise as the invariable rule of their political conduct *respect for existing treaties*, of which the territorial limitation of the various States forms the *chief and essential basis*.

The Emperor, for his part, declares and will continue to declare that his policy rests on this basis.

He declares that the Legations must remain in subjection to the sovereignty of the Holy See, and this once for all decides the question for him.

The principal Powers of Europe only a few months back openly made a declaration which was in strict conformity with that principle. The first aspiration of the Romagnese cannot be fulfilled; it can therefore never form a subject for discussion among the Powers.

As component parts of the Papal States, the Legations must be restored to tranquillity. The means for attaining this object have necessarily been sought in the only available direction; on the one hand, in a recurrence to the respect due to the sovereign authority; on the other, in laws and administrative measures adapted to the real needs of the country.\*

Such, Ambassador, are the principles which have guided us from the time we first interfered on behalf of the Sovereign Pontiff; they still form the exclusive goal of our efforts.

\* See Nos. 1059-1061.

*RATIFICATION BY AUSTRIA OF THE BELGIAN-  
DUTCH TREATY OF NOVEMBER 15, 1831.*

1056. Metternich to Wessenberg in London, Vienna, March 21, 1832.  
1057. Metternich to Wessenberg in London, Vienna, March 21, 1832.  
1058. Metternich to Wessenberg in London, Vienna, April 16, 1832.

**1056.** We have just heard, by despatches from the Hague of the 10th instant :

That His Majesty the King of the Netherlands has at last made up his mind to recognise the political separation and independence of Belgium, and also the new Sovereign of that country ;

That the King, nevertheless, objects to accept the twenty-four articles of October 15, and that his Cabinet intends making a proposition to the Conference to the effect that his Majesty should be dispensed from signing the treaty of November 15 with the five Powers, the King at the same time being prepared to enter without delay, under their auspices, into negotiations with Belgium for the conclusion of a distinct treaty, comprising the twenty-four articles with such modifications as the Powers may be disposed to admit and obtain from Belgium.

By this declaration the chief consideration which has, up to the present time, induced us to defer ratifying the treaty of November 15 ceases to operate. The King of the Netherlands having assented to the fundamental stipulation of the treaty, the only question remaining is

how to remove the difficulties arising from his objections to several of the clauses in the treaty itself.

We have, therefore, no hesitation in according our assent to the above proposition.

*Metternich to Wessenberg in London, Vienna,  
March 21, 1832.*

1057. The preceding despatch clearly and accurately defines the position of our Court in reference to the Belgian affair.

Nothing now hinders the Emperor, our august master, from empowering his plenipotentiaries, under certain reservations, the details of which were enclosed in the preceding despatch, to proceed to exchange ratifications with the Belgian plenipotentiary.

These reservations are based on plain and equitable considerations, and accordingly need no justification.

The reservation relating to the rights of the Germanic Confederation could not, by its very nature, be omitted without a manifest breach of faith on the part of the Emperor towards the Confederation, of which he is the foremost member, and the Diet of which is presided over by his representative. If we feel ourselves justified in calling upon other Governments to respect the rights of our own Empire, we shall lose no opportunity of showing that we know how to respect those of others.

A second reservation in favour of the carrying out of certain contingent modifications seemed necessary, if we did not wish to lay ourselves open to a charge of bad faith or inconsistency. In fact, it was only in this way that we found it possible to proceed to the ratifica-

tion of a treaty which had been concluded with such lamentable haste.

In the last place, our plenipotentiaries are directed not to effect the ratification except in conjunction with the Prussian plenipotentiary. This reservation depends on several grave political considerations.

In conclusion, Baron, I have still to indicate to you the following course of action:

The English and French Cabinets, after making parliamentary capital out of the Belgian affair, and the unfortunate proceedings connected with it, have latterly permitted themselves to extend a political significance to that fact.

M. Casimir Périer, who now finds himself placed in a most difficult position by what has taken place at Ancona, has thought fit quite recently to confide to Count Apponyi that, if the ratifications of the treaty of November 15 had been exchanged at the appointed time, *he would never have dreamed of the expedition to Italy*. The English Ministers, on their side, do not affect to conceal that, under the same circumstances, *they would not have shown the same readiness in lending their support to the expedition*.

Both proceedings alike show a singular disregard of political caution. The Belgian question has all along been treated as one intimately affecting the general interest. There is certainly not a single Austrian interest which could ever have induced his Imperial Majesty to take part in the settlement of a dispute which had so little direct concern for him. If the Courts of Great Britain and France, who undoubtedly had many important interests of their own to consult in the matter, and who, nevertheless, mismanaged the whole affair, now think good to inflict punishment on a

great independent Power, because it did not feel itself in a position to give a blind support to certain parliamentary exigencies of their Ministers, both Cabinets have at once been guilty of a political wrong and betrayed a want of prudence, the consequences of which may be disastrous. In seeking to punish Austria, they have at the same time attacked the whole of Europe, for the interests of the two are in this case identical.

In acquainting Lord Palmerston with the contents of the preceding despatch, you will be pleased, Baron, to add the following remarks :

Had the Emperor consulted merely his personal interests, and those considerations which habitually regulate his conduct, he would have had no hesitation, on being informed of the signing of the treaty of November 15, in declaring that he would only recognise the stipulations of the said treaty on their being accepted by the King of the Netherlands, acting as the chief person concerned ; that even now, his Imperial Majesty would have delayed the ratification until satisfied that his Majesty the King of the Netherlands had fully made up his mind on the subject ; that, at both periods alike, the Emperor was desirous, as far as in him lay, of showing every consideration for the parliamentary exigencies of the British Cabinet ; that in January last he declared his adhesion, in principle, to the validity of the treaty which he now formally ratifies ; that his Imperial Majesty could not but feel regret at seeing the British Cabinet so eagerly give in its adhesion to the disastrous scheme of the French Government ; that, the thing being now done, and there being no longer any doubt as to the results of the Ancona affair, the Emperor looks to the British Government unhesitatingly to declare its sympathy, in this unfortu-



nate complication, with the cause which his Majesty defends with such entire disinterestedness and complete self-abnegation.

*Metternich to Wessenberg in London, Vienna,  
April 16, 1832.*

1058. Your report of April 6 affords fresh testimony of the fact that in London they still persist in their erroneous course.

Never have the Cabinets of Vienna, Berlin, or St. Petersburg gone so far as to frame their calculations, in the matter of the ratifications, on the success or failure of the Reform Bill. The desire of the three Courts has been, and still is, to *see the Belgian question concluded*; and the more eagerly they have been and are desirous of this *conclusion*, the keener is their regret to see a course pursued in London which, far from being likely to lead the parties concerned to such a consummation, has necessarily removed them farther from it; to such a degree, in fact, that what in London they have come to call the *end*, is, in our opinion, really nothing more than *the beginning of the second part of the affair*. After fourteen months of quibbling, the question has come round to the point it started from, with this difference only, that the English and French Cabinets will be compelled to add important amendments to stipulations to which they previously gave their unconditional sanction!

But everything, Baron, has a cause, and the cause of a phase so unheard-of in the annals of diplomacy as that which the Belgian affair has now assumed, is nothing more or less than the difficulties arising from the essentially false positions in which the French and

English Administrations are now involved. Both are actuated by the one aim of keeping themselves in power. There would be nothing extraordinary in this, if the basis on which the existence of both Cabinets rests were different to what it actually is. The French Government, like the British Government, plays the desperate game of Revolution. If there be a difference between the play of the two Cabinets, it is this, that M. Périer speculates on a rise, while Lord Grey speculates on a fall. Thus the close connection existing between them rests solely on the one wish which they share in common, which is, that the Bourse on which their speculations depend should not be closed; this condition, with the immediate consequences resulting from it, once granted, their asserted friendship is no more than an empty phrase, an assertion resting on no practical basis, and the name of which can be found in any dictionary. This name is not to be expressed by the term *alliance*, but far more accurately by that of *complicity*.

I have availed myself of a leisure hour to address the present despatch to you. Such opportunities rarely present themselves, and I shall not regret having devoted one of them to you, if it affords you the means of impressing the minds of English Ministers with the idea that, instead of basing their calculations as to the course likely to be pursued by the Continental Powers, on notions derived from parliamentary expediency, they ought simply to believe that those Powers pursue a straightforward and honourable policy, in which underhand dealings find no place.

*PROPOSALS OF AUSTRIA IN REFERENCE TO THE  
GOVERNMENT OF THE PAPAL STATES.*

1059. Metternich to Lützow in Rome, Vienna, April 21, 1832.

1060. Metternich to Lützow in Rome, Vienna, May 19, 1832.

1061. Metternich to Lützow in Rome, Vienna, June 29, 1832.

**1059.** An object of the highest importance, and which we have no hesitation in saying ought to be one of the first to engage the special attention of the Sovereign Pontiff, and the monarchs who are in friendly relations with him, is *the determining of the measures adapted to ensure the future tranquillity of the Roman Legations, by the application of a principle of stability.*

The Cardinal Secretary of State, in his note of June 5, 1831, to the French Ambassador, has exactly defined what is wanted. This note concludes with the following words: '*La osservanza fedele e la stabilità delle leggi avranno garantiggia in opportune istituzioni conservatrici*;' a guarantee of the kind is absolutely essential.

The crying evil of the day, the moral disease which is kept alive by the efforts of the factious, conceals itself beneath the hypocritical mask of *a progressive amelioration in the laws.* Strictly speaking this idea of amelioration is not a peculiar growth of our own time. It forms the basis of all legislation, but if it is not to turn into a treacherous weapon, or become an unmeaning expression, amelioration in the laws, as in everything else, is not and cannot be realised save by adopting

*fixed and inviolable bases* for legislation. It is only, in fact, laws that already exist which can be said to be capable of amelioration; to alter the laws is not the same thing as to ameliorate them; for it amounts to the destruction of the existing law and the institution of a fresh legislation. Of all the evils that can afflict a state, the most pernicious is the subversion of those laws on which the interests of a nation are based, and with which its customs are bound up. Where legislation is defective, or presents omissions, the defective laws must be replaced by others, and the omissions must be rectified; this is what the Sovereign Pontiff has been desirous of doing in regard to the Legations, and that duty once fulfilled, it is for the interest of the State that the benefit should be maintained. It is the privilege attending a benefit of this kind that it paves the way for further improvements; Pope Gregory XVI. has taken the first step, he has instituted laws; it remains for his Holiness and his successors on the Pontifical throne to leave the good to make its own way. The first condition of success is to be looked for *in the stability* of the laws; this condition, therefore, the legislator must keep in view, if he would consult both the prosperity of his people and his own glory.

In your report of the 10th March last, you have indicated the true method for attaining the end we have in view. We avail ourselves of your scheme. Be pleased, Ambassador, to enter upon the subject with the Pontifical Government and to try and induce it to entertain the proposal.

For this purpose start from the following bases:

- (1.) The Legislation of 1831 should be declared permanent;
- (2.) For this purpose, a distinction must be made

between the fundamental laws and the regulative part of Gregory XVI.'s great work ;

(3.) The former must be embodied in a pragmatic sanction, which the Cardinals will confirm by oath, in conformity with the custom of the Sacred College in the case of all other pragmatic sanctions.

When an enactment to the above effect has been drawn up in the name of the Holy Father, and put into definite form, it should be communicated to the representatives of the Courts who were formerly apprised of the laws promulgated in 1831. The Courts should take cognisance of this, as of the former communication.

In this way only will it be found possible to bring the question of the day to a practical and truly satisfactory issue. The official statement addressed by the Court of Rome to the monarchs should bear the character of a *sovereign decision*, and the moment chosen for its publication should be that in which his Holiness demands the evacuation of his provinces within a fixed and definite time.

In this way, the full and complete independence of the Sovereign will be preserved, and anything which could in the smallest degree compromise it, obviated. Another advantage will be, that the provinces will be deprived of all excuse for appealing or having recourse to the Powers, whether to aid them in effecting their political separation from the Pontifical State or obtaining new laws. Where stability is no longer in any danger, the spirit of change ends by giving way to calculations of material interest. This is the end to which the well-meant efforts of the Roman Government must tend, and it is for the Powers who are the real friends of the Holy Chair to afford it the requisite aid and assistance to enable it to do of itself what no one else can do for it.



*Metternich to Liützow in Rome, Vienna, May 19, 1832.*

1060. The time is so prolific in events, that a few days' interval in a correspondence suffice to mark a whole period. Such is, in sober truth, the case in regard to more than one change of relative position that has taken place since the date of my last despatches to you.

Events of the utmost gravity have occurred in France and England, which will necessarily exercise an important influence on the internal condition of those two States.

The sudden and unexpected removal of M. Casimir Périer from the helm of affairs\* has just been followed by the unfortunate enterprise of the Duchess of Berry. The former of these facts compromises the position of the Government in an extraordinary degree, for it has but an artificial existence. The latter cannot possibly turn out to the advantage of its authors, and it puts the finishing stroke to the precarious position of the said Government. If, behind the *golden mean*, there were a strong and compact monarchical party, which would, for that very reason, be in a position to enter upon the inheritance of those whom it wishes to dispossess, the enterprise of the Duchess of Berry would have had in it something grand and heroic. But the case being totally different, the enterprise can only have disastrous results. Such, at least, is our opinion, and the course of events will soon show whether it is correct.

The fall of the English Ministry is an event of wide-reaching significance.† As the time in which we live is

\* Casimir Périer died of cholera on May 16. The King nominated Montalivet to succeed him as Minister of the Interior.—ED.

† Owing to the refusal of the King to name new peers, the Grey Ministry resigned, and Wellington was entrusted with the formation of a new Ministry.—ED.

a period of weakness and confusion, it is impossible to foresee to what complications this occurrence may give rise. The new Ministry will be taken from the ranks of the moderate party; and this very circumstance will deprive it of the requisite strength for restoring immediate tranquillity to the various countries which are agitated by revolt, and the political existence of which is shaken to its base. Although there is some analogy between the situation of England and that of France, a marked difference, nevertheless, exists in the internal condition of the two Powers. In England, revolution only begins as yet to threaten; if it has made some progress in men's minds it has not yet overturned the existing order of things; whereas in France, there is nothing left for the Revolution to destroy but the results of its own labours.

I enter with you, Ambassador, into these grave questions, because I doubt not they will excite a lively interest in the country where you now reside.

There is nothing in this but what is quite simple and natural, and yet at the same time it is certain that the rival parties in Italy will attach an exaggerated importance to what has taken place in France and England as tending to their advantage or disadvantage.

So long as these speculations are confined merely to the parties, you will not be called upon to take part in them directly. But the important thing to guard against is, lest the Papal Government should be so far imposed upon as to let its conduct be influenced by calculations resting on no solid foundation.

Still, Ambassador, the fact remains that, taking the general state of affairs as it now stands, we find it present one consideration on which we may reasonably base our calculations. The position, in fact, of the

French and English Governments affords the Sovereign Pontiff an opportunity for *regulating his affairs*, of which he would be wise to avail himself. It is a fortunate circumstance, and one which his Holiness should know how to profit by. The disorder now reigning in both countries will either result in the re-establishment of order, or it will lead to yet greater disorder. If the first hypothesis be realised, any degree of order which the Court of Rome may have succeeded in introducing into its own affairs will be for its advantage; on the second hypothesis, any disorder which broke out abroad would find an ally in that still reigning in the Legations, until the whole of Italy would run the risk of being convulsed. Looked at in this light, the question becomes a clear and practical one, and its application could not be entrusted to better hands than your own.

I authorise you to make use of the present despatch in whatever way you may think best, in discussing the matter with the Pontifical Court and your Russian and Prussian colleagues.

Assure these two last in the plainest terms, that in the Roman affair, as in every other, there exists among the three Cabinets the most complete uniformity of views and principles. The present moment is one of the utmost gravity; it is a crisis the more in that great crisis through which society has so long been passing. The closest and most unreserved union among those who have the same interests to defend is absolutely essential.

The position of the French Ambassador, as also that of Mr. Seymour, will necessarily be affected by that of their respective Governments. I should not be surprised if M. de Sainte-Aulaire took a higher tone, since perplexity often induces people to bluster. The Roman

Government must not allow itself to be deceived by this change of tone, should it occur.

The French Ambassador will soon lose the support of Mr. Seymour. If England stops short in her Radical policy, her former support will be a thing of the past.

*Metternich to Lütfow in Rome, Vienna, June 29, 1832.*

**1061.** Among the numerous difficulties to which the position of the countries under Papal rule daily give rise, there is no question that the most insuperable of all is connected with the fact that the Government has no idea how to govern, and that those of its provinces where the greatest agitation prevails are more particularly affected by a concurrence of unfortunate circumstances, of which some are attributable to the said Government, while others are independent of it and removed from its sphere of action.

The Roman State, in common with the whole of Italy, suffers from the direct influence of the *general malady*. If it assumes a different form in the various parts of the Peninsula, the reason is to be sought in local circumstances and conditions of Government.

The *general malady* acts with greater effect on the Legations than the Marches, for the former are more predisposed to it and liable to develop it than the latter. This, then, is the first cause which must never be lost sight of when the affairs of Bologna are in question, and from this point of view the formation and regulation of the administration of that city come rather into the domain of general politics.

If the Court of Rome so little understands the art of governing its peoples, the Cabinet is not more advanced in comprehending those delicate distinctions which



carry such weight in political matters. The very reasons which induced me to draw up the present paper are a mournful testimony of the fact.

The Holy Father and the Cardinal Secretary of State do not in the least doubt that, by the latest overtures addressed by them to your Excellency, they have actually placed themselves at our point of view. The Sovereign Pontiff has made laws for the government of the Legations; he wishes to give stability to those laws. *We wish for nothing better so far as concerns the Legations*, for it leaves nothing further to be desired by those provinces which we could by any possibility admit.

But the question cannot be looked upon as settled by what takes place between *the Sovereign and his subjects*. The *political question* still remains to be settled among the Powers taken collectively; between Austria and France in their individual capacity; between the Sovereign Pontiff and the five Courts; finally, and in the last result, between the moral and political independence of the Court of Rome and the antagonistic claims of France—*claims* to the predominance in Italy which she does not openly avow, but which none the less exercise a permanent influence on the conduct of her Government towards the Holy See and all the smaller States.

We are thus absolutely compelled to submit all these questions to the tribunal of our own judgment, and carefully to discriminate between what in them appertains exclusively to the Holy See and what falls within the sphere of politics. In the present instance the distinction is not hard to draw; *legislation* comes directly within the province of the Sovereign Pontiff, the *method* which the latter ought to adopt *in order to bring about the withdrawal of the foreign troops* is a question for politics.

The legislative part of the question includes the



framing and carrying out of the laws, and providing for their stability ; the political part reduces itself to a demand and an acceptance.

What we have to ask of the Holy Father in reference to the first part of the question will be fulfilled on the day that sees the laws promulgated and declared to be permanent. Meanwhile we appeal to the promise made to us by the Sovereign Pontiff, '*that a declaration to that effect, and conceived in that spirit, should assuredly be made.*'

What we have still to demand of him so far as the *political* side of the question is concerned, is not to permit the Papal Cabinet to deprive itself, by any rash and ill-considered step, of the means of confirming the future tranquillity of its States, and thereby ensuring its full and complete political independence. As the only means which seems to us at all adapted to promote two such important interests consists in adopting the course proposed by ourselves, but which is little understood at Rome, we refrain from reopening that negotiation until such time as we shall deem fit.

*THE JUNE RISING IN PARIS.*

1062. Metternich to Lützow in Rome, Vienna, June 15, 1832.

**1062.** Events prolific in consequences succeed one another with a rapidity which proves to what a degree society is convulsed.

Our news from Paris, at the moment of my writing to you, goes back as far as the 7th instant inclusive. I give the precise date, because every day, nay, every hour, may effect an alteration in the tendency and significance of events, and consequently in the position of the Government, as well as that of the parties.

Paris has been declared in a state of siege by the Government. It is a vigorous proceeding, the sequel of measures no less energetic which the French Government found itself compelled to take. Forced to choose between death and life, it showed no hesitation; it struck with determination, and the general lassitude, the aversion for anarchy which forms so marked a feature in the majority of the French people, including the capital, came in to support authority. Such will always be the case where a Government knows how to assert itself, and uphold its lawful authority by adequate means of repression.

If the legitimate Government had only been capable of acting as it should have done in the month of July, 1830; if, at that epoch, it had not failed in the most ordinary foresight and prudence, Charles X. would still

be reigning, and Europe would not be a prey to the frightful anarchy now everywhere prevailing.

There is no question that a combination of the Carlist and Republican parties, for the avowed purpose of overthrowing the throne of July, laid the train for these events, to which the absurd enterprise of the Duchess of Berry did but apply the match. This enterprise has resulted in a manner entirely contrary to the expectations of the Duchess. She will have imparted to Louis Philippe precisely the vitality in which he was lacking, and established him firmly on a throne which, up to this moment, did not rest on any solid basis.

Placed as we are beyond the reach of illusions, impervious to idle dreams, but forming an accurate judgment on things and events, we ought to face the facts, weigh them well, and regulate our course accordingly.

In a position such as France now occupies, the triumph of the lawful authority actually amounts to no more than a moment's *breathing-space*. France is in too disturbed a state for the success of the Government to induce any hope that the end of the Revolution to which it owes its existence is at hand. The elements of which it is composed are not sufficiently stable to justify this hope. All will depend on the course pursued by the King of the French. Will he know how to summon to his aid the only available means for upholding his power? Will he be capable of ruling on definite principles, without which Government is impossible? Will he have the requisite strength, courage, and intelligence for establishing his power on such a firm basis as will enable him to appeal to *the legitimate need of repose felt by the public*? The solution to this grave question can only be given by time. Meanwhile what is certain is

that the defeat of the Republican party will exercise a marked influence on the members of that party scattered over the whole of Europe. The centre whence all orders emanate, the directing Committee sitting at Paris, will find itself hampered in action; the result of this will be to induce hesitation among the foreign sectaries, which will render it easier for the Governments to agree on the adoption of those measures which alone hold out to them any hope of safety.

Western Germany has lately been the theatre of scandalous scenes which do not fall short of those with which England and France have long made the world familiar. These scenes do not as yet amount to revolution, but they are its immediate precursors, and they contain all the elements of which it is made up. The Confederation is about to act, and the occurrences at Paris present a favourable opening for its efforts. The President of the Federal Diet sets out from Vienna this very day, and he takes with him all the needful instructions for advancing the good cause. We were unwilling to settle upon a definite course of action, until we felt sure it would be supported by the unanimous vote of the Diet. With this object, our first step was to come to a full and cordial understanding with the Court of Berlin. The two Courts, entirely at one both in their aims and determinations, addressed themselves to all the German Governments, and assured as they now are of a complete unanimity, lawful authority is about to bid defiance to the Revolution. You will have no hesitation in recognising the moment as well-chosen; the scenes which have recently occurred ought to be in our favour; after the demonstrations that have taken place there is no longer any room for doubt; the truth of the facts has been proved by indisputable evidence;

the means for putting our plans into execution are in readiness; everything, in short, indicates that the contest should begin, and begun it soon will be.

The dangers which now threaten States are not confined to one or other of them only; the risk is common to them all alike, and if there be any difference, it is due merely to the internal organisation or the geographical position of the several States.

That which bears the name of Government in France, that Power which has lately acted as it behoves authority to act, contains, we are firmly persuaded, no elements of stability. The throne of July is devoid of any solid foundation, and it is only kept from falling by extraneous support. The parties, by their very daring and want of foresight, serve sometimes to support what they are attempting to overthrow, and the most recent events afford a fresh instance of this. But the efforts made by Governments situated like that of the throne of July cannot last; they speedily, and in spite of themselves, exceed the limits of what is lawful, or they give way. In the one case as in the other, their inherent weakness only comes out into stronger light. The immediate result of the present position of affairs, if the triumph of the French Government holds good, will be an interval of more or less length, which foreign Governments should be wise to turn to profit, by establishing the internal order and tranquillity of their own realms on a surer basis. I called your attention to this necessity the moment there appeared some prospect of the triumph of the Tory party in England; I once more approach the subject with the same convictions. What appeared to us at that time in the light of a necessity, appears to us exactly in the same way now, under a different combination of circumstances. More than this; we do not



confound the consequences which might result from the triumph of monarchical principles in England, with the similar triumph of Royalty in France. The former would present advantages which it would be in vain to hope for from the latter; for the conditions of existence are not identical in both cases. What, therefore, seemed to us advantageous at the time of the fall of the Grey Ministry in England, seems to us to be absolutely essential now.

*THE SIX ARTICLES OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL  
DIET.*

1063. A Memoir on the Six Articles.\*

1064. Metternich to Neumann in London, Vienna, June 24, 1832.

1065. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Baden, August 4, 1832.

**1063.** The proposed Articles are :

Article I. ' Since, in accordance with Article LVII. of the Final Act of Vienna, the whole authority must be vested in the head of the State, and the Sovereign, by the constitution of the country, is only dependent on the co-operation of the States in the *exercise* of certain definite rights, it follows that not only is a German Sovereign, as a member of the Confederation, justified in rejecting any petition of the States which would conflict with such limitation, but that the *obligation* so to do is inferred in the very purpose for which the Confederation was constituted.'

Article II. ' Since, likewise according to the tenor of the aforesaid Article LVII. of the Final Act, and the inferences therefrom deducible which are expressed in Article LVIII., the States shall have no power to refuse to any German Sovereign the requisite means for carrying on the Government agreeably with the obligations

\* Sent with a circular despatch of April 12, 1832, to each of the German Courts.—ED.

The Memoir has been omitted, as its substance is completely embodied in Nos. 1064, 1065, and 1069. The Six Articles therein proposed by Metternich for acceptance by the German Courts, and given above, were afterwards ratified by the Diet. See note at end of present number.—TR.

he owes to the Confederation and the constitution of the country, it follows, that should a case arise in which an Assembly of the States, in voting the requisite supplies for carrying on the Government, were to endeavour, by direct or indirect means, to extort compliance with requests or proposals of an entirely different character, such cases shall be reckoned among those calling for the application of Articles XXV. and XXVI. of the Final Act.'

Article III. 'The internal legislation of the States belonging to the German Confederation, shall in no case be such as to do prejudice to the objects of the Confederation, as set forth in Article II. of the Federal Act, and Article I. of the Final Act, nor shall it be such as to obstruct the due fulfilment of any other obligations which the Confederation shall, by its constitution, be entitled to demand, especially those pertaining to the payment of contributions in money.'

Article IV. 'In order to secure the dignity and prerogatives of the Confederation, and the Assembly by which it is represented, from attacks of any kind, yet at the same time facilitate the working of the constitutional relations existing between the separate Governments and their States, a commission shall be appointed by the Diet for this very purpose, which shall make it their constant and special aim to take cognisance of all legislative measures enacted by the separate States of the Confederation; to scrutinise all such measures and proposals as shall conflict with the obligations due to the Confederation itself, or with the sovereign rights guaranteed by its stipulations; and to bring the result of their investigations before the Assembly of the Diet, which shall, accordingly, should it deem the matter deserving of further inquiry, invite explanations from the Governments concerned.'

Article V. ' Since, in accordance with Article LIX. of the Final Act of Vienna, in all cases where the Constitution permits of publicity being given to the proceedings of the representative Assemblies, such right of free publication must not be pushed so far, either as regards the measures themselves, or their promulgation by the Press, as to endanger the repose of the particular State or of Germany as a whole; and seeing that provision has to be made for the same in the course of public business; it follows likewise that all the members of the Confederation are under mutual obligation to one another to protect the Confederation from attacks in the Legislative Assemblies, and duly to decree and put in operation, each so far as it is enabled by its internal constitution, such measures as shall be best suited to check the recurrence of the same.'

Article VI. ' Since, by Article XVII. of the Final Act, it is the duty of the Federal Assembly to uphold the true meaning of the Federal Act and the stipulations therein contained, and to expound the same in conformity with the object of the Confederation should any doubt arise as to their interpretation; it follows necessarily that such interpretation, to be authoritative, appertains solely and exclusively to the Germanic Confederation, which exercises that right through its constitutional organ, the Federal Assembly.'\*

\* By terms of the Protocol of the twenty-second sitting of the Germanic Federal Diet of the 28th June, 1832, the above proposals were accepted in their entirety, and unanimously passed as resolutions. Article IV. alone was, at the instance of Bavaria, modified to the effect that the Commission which the Diet were to appoint was, for the present, to be nominated for six years.—Ed.

*Metternich to Neumann in London, Vienna,  
June 24, 1832.*

**1064.** The position of the German Governments has at all times deservedly engaged our anxious care and attention.

Germany has long suffered from the evil which is now spread over the whole of Europe. In some sense, the evil may be said to have been in existence there previous to the outbreak in France of 1789. The sect of the *Illuminati*, the first *Radical* association, owed its existence, long before that time, to the weakness of the Bavarian Government and the complicity of several men who were among its members from the first. This sect, in spite of all endeavours on the part of the same Government to put it down by the severest measures of repression, has never ceased to exist from that time forward, and has assumed in turn, according to circumstances and the requirements of the moment, the names of *Tugendbund*, *Burschenschaft*, &c.

Several Princes have committed the unpardonable error of giving their States institutions copied from those of France. This error they followed up by a second, in preserving, side by side with the new institutions, the *Dienst-Pragmatik* (Pragmatic of Service), an institution of great efficacy under the laws of the old German Empire, but absolutely incompatible with institutions of a different character. The modern representative system, which makes Ministers responsible *to the nation* for the acts of the Government, necessarily demands that the *employés* should be removable at will; in the German constitutional States, the Ministers are *responsible* and the *employés* of all classes are *not removable*.



Thence the Governments have no longer the means of enforcing obedience among their own agents, and experience shows that in these countries obedience still exists among the people, but that it has long since disappeared among those who form the intermediate class between the throne and the people. If to all this we add the extraordinary influence exercised by the Universities at all times in Germany, the respect which was paid to those learned bodies, and the extraordinary privileges which they never ceased to enjoy, it is evident that nothing more was needed than the liberty of the Press and the right of public discussion, to reduce the German States to the condition in which we now find them.

I have entered into these details with a view to presenting, in as brief a space as possible, a sketch which it may be well to bring before the English Cabinet. That Cabinet, engrossed by very different cares, has no means of forming an accurate judgment on the condition of things in Germany, and yet the fate which awaits this part of the Continent will decide that of the whole of Europe.

Our action upon the Confederation, as, in fact, any influence which the Emperor permits himself to exert on foreign political bodies, has consistently been confined within strictly lawful limits. Austria is a member of the Confederation. As such she holds the foremost place in it, and her representative acts as President of the Diet. Like Prussia, Bavaria, &c., she has only a single vote.

Our constant endeavour has been to maintain order in the proceedings of this central body, and to preach *Justice* and *Strength* to the German Courts. The evil which has been done and which has reached such a

pitch of intensity, is none of our doing. It is the result of the grave errors into which the German Governments have fallen, and is partly owing to their want of judgment. When this defeat is aggravated by a vicious system of legislation, it becomes difficult to uphold and ensure public order. If this be the case at all times, what far greater proportions does the danger threaten to assume, in face of the examples which France continues to set before Germany, and an influence so potent as that of the Directing Committee has become since the Revolution of 1830! The affiliation between the German sectaries and those of Paris is no longer a mystery; it was celebrated by a public banquet, under the presidency of General Lafayette, on the same day that the Hambach scandal came upon the Governments like a final trump of warning. The question which the latter have to decide is, whether they shall continue to exist or yield to inevitable ruin. The German Princes who have been most blind hitherto have now opened their eyes to their true position, and are firmly resolved not to let themselves be beguiled into taking the course which foolish or perfidious advisers had marked out for them.

They applied to us. The Emperor, convinced as he had been for a long time of the existence of the danger, had foreseen this contingency. A full understanding had been come to with the King of Prussia, and the two monarchs have shown no hesitation as to the means to be employed. The complementary Act of 1820 contained all that was requisite. The German Governments have had their attention called to laws which already existed, and it is these which are about to be set in motion at Frankfort.

You will find, Baron, in the documents enclosed, ample information as to the course affairs are about to

take at the Diet. That course is clear and decided ; in adopting it there will be no need to have recourse to exceptional laws or measures ; there is nothing in it against which an objection could be raised, and its effects should be proportionably great.

Be pleased to put these facts before Lord Palmerston in a friendly way. I should be loath to take up his time, occupied as he is by other pressing cares, by inviting his attention to legislative details, to which, moreover, the fullest publicity will shortly be given. It is from a political point of view that the British Cabinet should be interested in the success of the undertaking. The question to be settled reduces itself to this ; whether Germany is to remain an independent country, or whether she is to be absorbed into the French Revolution and so become dependent on France. If the members of the Confederation only know how to do their duty, their triumph is assured, for it will be at the same time the triumph of patriotism and true liberty.

*Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Baden, August 4, 1832.*

1065. I send you, Ambassador, herewith enclosed, the copy of a despatch which I addressed to London on June 24 (No. 1064). It represents faithfully the spirit in which the measures adopted by the Diet were conceived and drawn up. The decrees of 28th June last have struck a decided blow at the evil. If any doubt were possible on this point, the furious outcry which the measures have called forth from the Revolutionary party would be sufficient to dissipate it. The factions spread nothing but falsehoods. None of the attacks which have as yet been directed against the decrees by the French, English, and German papers

which espouse the Radical cause are supported by a single fact. Their accusations are completely unfounded; the laws of the Confederation were not framed with a view to restrict the independence of the various States, nor are they now about to be applied with that object; on the contrary, their sole aim is to ensure the sovereignty and independence of all the parts which make up the great Federal body politic.

After this plain and circumstantial statement, it remains, Ambassador, for me to give you our answer as to the wish expressed to you by Count Sébastiani. Our explanation on this point will be clear and precise.

The French Government is apprehensive lest the Austrian and Prussian troops might be in a position to approach too near the frontiers of that kingdom. The grounds of its apprehension are plain, and we share its political scruples in this respect. It is just because both Courts have the same object in view, and are alike actuated by the desire to obviate or remove difficulties, that the French Cabinet ought to attach the utmost importance to the success of the resolutions passed at Frankfort. Without these measures a frightful anarchy would inevitably have spread into the German territories bordering on France. The German Republic was eager to extend its hand to the French Republic, the right of both Republics being reserved to quarrel at a later date over the acquisition of the former German territories annexed to France, and of the left bank of the Rhine re-ceded to Germany.

We may be permitted to hope that the danger has been removed for the present, and with it any danger that might have accrued from repressive measures on the part of the Federal forces. If the French Government only continue firmly to pursue a wise and straightfor-

ward line of policy, it will at once promote its own cause and the interests of the general tranquillity and political peace.

Should the flames of revolution extend to any part of Germany whatsoever, the Emperor will know how to fulfil the duties demanded from him as a member of the Confederation. He will not go beyond such duties, but he will fulfil them to the letter.

It is clear that politics do not enter into this question at all. It is a question simply of preserving the existence of States, the fate of which is closely bound up with that of our own Empire. Should the French or any other Government feel itself called upon at any time to guard against the attacks of the same evil by which its existence is equally threatened, its measures would cause us no uneasiness and would give rise to no feelings of political jealousy on our part. What we are ready to grant to others, we claim equally for ourselves; the claim is a just one, and it contains the Emperor's whole policy.

Be pleased to acquaint the French Ministry with the contents of the present despatch and its enclosure.



*WITHDRAWAL OF ENGLAND FROM  
THE CONFERENCE OF THE FIVE GREAT POWERS  
IN ROME.*

1066. Metternich to Neumann in London, Baden, July 30, 1832.

1067. Metternich to Neumann in London, Vienna, December, 1832.

1066. The questions relating to Italy, like all those which are now claiming the attention of the Powers, present two sides. They have a *political* side, and they have a second side which I can characterise by no other term than *revolutionary*, without, however, wishing to make the word a vehicle for discussing the importance or non-importance of the various theories of public administration by which the social body is at present distracted.

The English Cabinet would not continue to maintain the opinions it has so often avowed to us in regard to the course we have taken in Roman affairs, if the motive which has induced it to withdraw from further participation in them were connected with the existence of any difference of opinion between the two Courts *in their political views*. The motives of the withdrawal\* must therefore be sought in another direction, and admitting that it arises from a conviction that the adoption of a wider system of concession on the part of the Sovereign Pontiff towards that portion of his subjects who demand

\* The English Plenipotentiary at the Conference in Rome (Mr. Seymour) was recalled, in consequence of England's refusing any longer to take part in the deliberations on the Roman question.—ED.

reforms and innovations, would be the only means of ensuring the internal tranquillity of the Papal States, we are too sincere not to recognise a noteworthy difference between the view taken by the British Cabinet of the condition of affairs in the Roman State, and the judgment we have ourselves formed on the subject.

Our opinion in regard to the concessions demanded from the Governments is as follows: As a general rule, we reject the system of concessions; for if, on the one side, we recognise the duty of a Government to obviate, by the wisdom of its conduct and by just and reasonable actions, any necessity for concession at all, we cannot logically consider a Government and its subjects as engaged in a perpetual conflict of opposing interests; on the contrary, we admit the existence of a complete and permanent union between the interests of the throne and those of the nation, and we must therefore refuse to characterise the introduction of good laws and the establishment of a good administration as *concessions*.

It was in accordance with a similar system that the Emperor, in 1831, advised those reforms in the Papal States which his Holiness actually endeavoured to carry out.

Events have subsequently altered the position of the Sovereign Pontiff, not only with regard to the Powers but in reference to his own subjects. The violent occupation of Ancona by an armed force has brought his Holiness face to face with an important political question. The efforts unceasingly made by our Cabinet to bring about the best solution possible of so unfortunate an enterprise have not proved unavailing. Public opinion, and that too in England, has done us full justice in this respect. Conscious as we are of our integrity, the principle which forms the invariable rule of our conduct,

we have nevertheless been gratified by this token of general approbation.

The idea of basing a claim for *concessions* on this condition of things has been, and ever will be, viewed with dislike by the Emperor. If his Majesty consistently refused to allow the name of *concessions* to the measures passed by the Sovereign Pontiff previous to the revolt of 1832, so far from subsequently demanding fresh ones on the part of that Sovereign, it would have seemed to him only natural that the Pope should revoke those he had already made. But as the laws promulgated by his Holiness did not bear that character, the Emperor could not but insist, as he will continue to insist, on their being carried out in their entirety.

I think that these explanations, with those which I gave to Sir Frederick Lamb, fully set forth the *principle* on which we have acted in the matter.

But there is still another side on which the question of the reforms in the Roman State is open to consideration; I refer to the utility of certain reforms, and the choice of the favourable moment for carrying out those, the utility of which has been recognised.

It is here that a difference of opinion is perceptible between the British Cabinet and our own.

Reduced to its simplest terms, the difference between the two Cabinets relates to the question of the secularisation of the Papal Administration, and two points indicated by me to Sir Frederick Lamb.\*

As regards the first of these questions, we recognise the *impossibility* of the Sovereign Pontiff doing more

\* These two points were : (1) The admission of the principle of popular election as the basis of the Communal and Provincial Councils ; (2) the formation of a Council of State, composed of lay members, side by side with the Sacred College, or rather in opposition to it.—ED.

than he has already done, in declaring '*laymen eligible for holding posts in the Administration,*' a position from which they were excluded by custom, from time immemorial. Every country and every political body has to submit to impossibilities of this nature. The *Emancipation of the Catholics* was declared by the British Parliament; but, in spite of its constitutional omnipotence the Parliament could not have *excluded Protestants* from the exercise of their political rights. This is because the Parliament is Protestant. The Roman Government is an ecclesiastical Government; it had the power of excluding laymen from certain posts, and, in the same way, of declaring them eligible for those posts. It did not come within the range of its authority to exclude ecclesiastics from holding public posts. I do not use the word *priest* here, for it is possible to be in the Church (an ecclesiastic) without being a priest. By the *admission of laymen* to those public posts for which they were ineligible before, not because any law excluded them, but owing to the force of custom, the reasonable object of our wishes has been attained. So much so, that the only logical objection that could still be made, would lie in the question whether the head of the Catholic Church ought at the same time to be a temporal Sovereign. On this we will only remark that this *secularisation* is exactly what would deprive the Pope of his temporal power, a deprivation eagerly desired by the Revolutionary faction all the while they pretend to be merely demanding the secularisation of the Administration.

As to the measures recommended by the Conference of 1831, and rejected by the Pope, we frankly admit that we cannot but recognise the weight of the powerful motives which dictated his Holiness's refusal. The

force of those motives is now recognised even by those Powers who had insisted most strongly on the former proposition.

It is with sincere feelings of regret that the Emperor sees the English Government withdraw from further participation in Roman affairs. Its only result will be to induce the Emperor to redouble his efforts to bring the matter to as thorough and satisfactory a conclusion as possible.

Be pleased to acquaint Lord Palmerston with the contents of the present despatch, and assure him that nothing could have been more painful for me than to have to enter into such an explanation as the present with a Cabinet whose foremost and most enduring political interests are so closely bound up with those of our own Empire. The British Cabinet has apprised us of its ideas and its determination; we have felt it our duty to meet it with equal frankness on our side.

*Metternich to Neumann in London, Vienna,  
December, 1832.*

1067. Long experience had accustomed the Emperor to reckon upon the friendship of England, and his Cabinet to frame their calculations on the uniformity of political interests existing between both Empires.

If, on the other hand, we admit that a difference may exist between the British Cabinet and our own, in our manner of estimating special questions, we are not equally ready to admit that such difference could extend to those grand results which are kept in view by every regular Government, as well in its own interests as those of the general social tranquillity. Relying on this ground of confidence, we do not hesitate to call the



special attention of the Chief Secretary of State to the immense amount of difficulties and even dangers which would infallibly arise from the course pursued by the British Cabinet, if it were to hold out hopes of its support to the progressionists in other countries. The exiled Radicals now reckon far more on the support of England than that of France, and they recommend their accomplices to be *patient* so far as *action* is concerned, but *energetic in revolutionary efforts*. The line you must take, in all discussions on the subject with the English Ministers, is to oppose practice to theory. To all the arguments they may bring forward in support of their ideas as to the improvement of the social system in the Roman States, you may oppose one truth; that, *in the advice given by us to the Papal Court, we have gone to the farthest point at which the temporal existence of the Sovereign Pontiff would be compatible with the demands of the innovators*. That point once reached, there occurs the question of the emancipation of the provinces now under his rule; a question the consideration of which would involve the utmost difficulty, as well as the utmost danger, at any time, but above all in our own. It would be a serious question for all the Powers, and especially for the King of Great Britain. If Lord Palmerston does not or will not understand this fact, if he forgets that his master has over five million of zealous Catholic subjects, we are powerless to convince him to the contrary; but what we can do is to oppose the revolutionary endeavours of the British Cabinet, under whatever pretext and in whatever form they may be made. *We make the maintenance of public tranquillity in Italy a question of our own existence; and we openly avow our intention of so doing.*

*CHOICE OF PRINCE OTHO OF BAVARIA AS KING  
OF GREECE.*

1068. Metternich to Baron Gise, Bavarian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Munich, Baden, August 11, 1832.

1068. I hastened to hand to the Emperor the letter from the King enclosed in your Excellency's despatch of July 29, together with the convention concluded and signed at London on May 7, by the representatives of the Courts of Bavaria, England, France, and Russia, in virtue of which his Royal Highness Prince Otho of Bavaria is called upon to ascend the new throne of Greece.

You are aware, Baron, that the Emperor has taken no part whatever in this transaction, but as his Majesty has been directly informed by the Ottoman Porte that it recognises the independence of Greece, his Imperial Majesty has no hesitation in informing the King that nothing stands in the way of his recognising the new Christian kingdom recently established in the East by the Courts of England, France, and Russia, and that he has the more pleasure in so doing, that Prince Otho has been chosen to occupy the new throne. The goodwill which the youthful Prince is justly entitled to claim from the Emperor, and the friendship existing between his Imperial Majesty and the King, his august brother-in-law, are the best guarantees for the future relations of the Austrian Court with the new Greek Government.

*PALMERSTON'S INTERVENTION  
IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE GERMANIC  
CONFEDERATION.*

1069. Metternich to Neumann in London, Vienna, October 31, 1832.

1070. Metternich to Neumann in London, Vienna, October 31, 1832.

**1069.** Lord Palmerston, on the 7th September last, addressed a despatch to Sir Frederick Lamb, which that Ambassador has been instructed to communicate to us. It concerns the affairs of Germany.

‘Great Britain,’ says the Chief Secretary of State, ‘is one of the contracting parties to the Treaty of Vienna, of which the settlement of Germany forms one of the leading features. Moreover, the British Government is united by ties of friendship with the German States; consequently anything that tends either to upset that settlement and thus endanger the general tranquillity, or to be essentially detrimental to the well-being of those States, must claim the earnest attention of the King’s Government.’

‘The British Government,’ the Chief Secretary of State goes on to say, ‘believes he is fulfilling an important public duty in calling attention to this fact, and he is at the same time convinced that a frank expression of his opinion will be accepted by the Austrian Government as no uncertain testimony of the intentions of his Government.’

The despatch concludes with the following passages: ‘It is asserted that the influence exercised by Austria

on the Diet is such as her power authorises her to exercise; it is believed that the chief aim of her policy is the maintenance of peace, and that what she especially dreads is any violent commotion in Europe. Consequently, the King's Government earnestly begs the Imperial Cabinet to use its influence to put a check on the inconsiderate zeal of the Diet, and to hinder the adoption of measures the results of which would only too probably be violent commotion and war.'

The history of every age affords proofs of the invariable disposition of our Court to receive with the utmost readiness the frank expression of their opinion from friendly Cabinets, particularly that of his Britannic Majesty. It is well known, in short, that the Imperial Cabinet is always ready to meet the confidence and sincerity of other Courts with confidence and sincerity. Only considerations of exceptional importance, therefore, could raise any doubts in our mind as to the spirit in which we should meet such communications. The present is one of those cases in which certain weighty considerations make it incumbent upon us to preserve a certain reticence, which shall nevertheless be frank as far as it goes.

The impression we gather from a profound study of Lord Palmerston's despatch of September 7, is that the English Cabinet apparently takes a very inaccurate view of Austria's position in the Germanic Confederation, and the real significance of the decrees of the 28th June last.\*

The Confederation consists of the ruling Princes of Germany, and of four free cities invested with all the rights of sovereignty. (Article I. of the Federal Act of June 8, 1815.)

\* See 'The Six Articles of the Germanic Diet,' No. 1063.—ED.

All the members of the Confederation are alike possessed of the same rights : all are alike under the obligation to maintain inviolably the Act constituting their union. (Article III. of the above Act.)

The affairs of the Confederation are entrusted to a Federal Diet, in which all the members composing it have the right of voting through their plenipotentiaries, whether individually or collectively. (Article IV.)

Finally, the object of the Confederation is clearly defined by Article II. of the Federal Act. 'Its object,' it is there stated, 'is the maintenance of the external and internal security of Germany, and of the independence and inviolability of the Federal States.'

Article XIII. is conceived in the following terms : 'There shall be Assemblies of the States in all the countries of the Confederation.'

Article X. declares : 'The first object to be treated by the Diet, after its opening, shall be the framing of the fundamental laws of the Confederation and its organic institutions, in reference to its external, military, and internal relations.'

The Final Act of Vienna, passed in 1820, fulfilled this object.

By Article XI. of the Federal Act, the members of the Confederation pledge themselves to lend one another reciprocal support against any attack directed against one or other of the Federal States. They reserve to themselves the right of forming alliances, but they bind themselves, on the other hand, not to enter into any engagement which would be detrimental to the security of the Confederation or the States composing it.

In these articles is contained the most accurate definition of the *Germanic Confederation*, and the rights and obligations of the members composing it.



By Article V., Austria is called upon to preside at the Federal Diet. Her representative at the Diet does, in fact, preside over it. The Confederation of 1815 thus differs essentially from the Rhenish Confederation, which was based on the protection of the Emperor of the French; in the Germanic Confederation none of the members possess exceptional rights beyond the others. Austria, like Prussia, Bavaria, and eight other States, has but a single vote at the Diet; six collective votes, in addition to these eleven individual votes, form the total seventeen votes of that Assembly. An appeal made to Austria carries with it, therefore, no more weight than if it were addressed to any State of the Confederation possessing, like Austria, only a single vote, or to those of its members who are called upon to vote collectively.

If the Austrian Empire possesses unquestionably greater material strength than the other Confederated States, her legal authority in the Confederation does not for that reason exceed the limits imposed on that of all the other members of that great political body; and if the voice of the Emperor carries weight with it in Germany, the reason must be sought, not in his material strength, but the deep respect professed by his Imperial Majesty for the rights of others, and his scrupulous fidelity in fulfilling his obligations towards his Federal allies.

The events of the time afford numerous proofs of these facts. The Decrees of June 28 were *unanimously accepted by the members of the Confederation*; there must therefore have been a general and unanimous feeling of their necessity, which has not, however, led the Diet to transgress the bounds of strict legality. The Confederation being fortunate enough to possess a complete system of legislation, the Diet has not felt itself im-

pelled to enlarge their application; it has merely recalled to the memory of Germany laws which had been forgotten or despised by the factions; and if Article IV. of the Decrees of June 28 has called forth the following remarks from Lord Palmerston in his despatch of September 7, 'But whatever be the explanations, &c., it is certain there are grounds for fearing *that if the authority constituted within the Diet itself*, in virtue of its decrees, were to exercise to their fullest extent the powers with which it is invested, the constitutional rights of the smaller States and their political independence might come to be gravely compromised——' there is evidently some error in the view taken by the British Cabinet of the powers of the Commission established by the aforesaid Article IV., as well as in the judgment it forms on the objects which come within the scope of that Commission.

The Confederation, like every other political body, has duties to perform towards itself, and the foremost of those duties is to watch over its own preservation. The Commissions formed by the Diet from among its own number are invested neither with legislative nor executive powers. They have merely to fulfil the special task entrusted to them; this task may vary in its nature, but the labours of the Commission are invariably confined to drawing up reports for consideration by the Diet on the special object entrusted to it.

Articles LVII. and LVIII. of the Final Act of 1820 have laid down the limits beyond which the Assemblies of the various States composing the Germanic Confederation cannot go without encroaching on its rights and compromising its existence; it was with the object of calling the attention of the Diet to the possible violation of the rights of the Confederation, that that Assembly

decreed the formation of a Commission. If sovereign omnipotence in the abstract is chimerical for any Sovereign, parliamentary omnipotence in States bound together by one and the same political tie is a claim equally untenable. Even the political omnipotence of the British Government, though recognised in theory by law, could never go so far as to break through treaties in force with a foreign country. The case would be far worse if the members of the Confederation were to allow themselves to violate the engagements into which they have entered with it.

The Diet, in ratifying Article IV. of the June Decrees, simply had in view to give stability to the solemn engagements into which the members of the Confederation had entered with each other and with the whole of Europe, that they would *establish an indissoluble Federal bond*. (Article I. of the Federal Act.) If factious voices were to be raised against a decree, the sole aim of which is to secure to the Diet the means of fulfilling the important object we have just indicated, they would prove that the outcry was raised expressly against the existence of the Federal bond; and this being the case, how could the Federal Sovereigns be blamed for seeking to uphold what their avowed adversaries wished to destroy, viz., their own sovereignty and the existence of the Federal bond.

In making these explanations, Baron, we have not been actuated by any idea of defending the rights of the Confederation or justifying any of its acts. That does not fall within our province. But the British Cabinet having signified to us its desire that we should use our influence in Germany to moderate the zeal of the Diet, we have thought it well to point out to it the limit within which the influence it is good enough to attribute

to us is confined, and to leave no doubt on its mind as to our entire concurrence in the decrees of the Diet.

A careful examination of the laws on which the Confederation is based and by which its conduct is regulated, ought, moreover, to suffice to allay any anxiety which might be felt by the British Cabinet as to the effects likely to be produced by the latest decrees of the Diet. Experience, moreover, has already justified the foresight of the German Governments. Take, for instance, the grave danger by which the internal tranquillity of certain parts of the Confederation was only quite recently threatened, owing to the machinations of a foreign propaganda, aided by the intrigues of a swarm of German Radicals; has there been any recurrence of this, even for a single instant, since the publication of the decrees of the Diet? On the contrary, not only have the voices of the immense majority in Germany been raised in favour of the decrees, but, if any regret has been expressed, it was that the decrees were not published sooner.

Such, Baron, are the actual facts of the case; anything brought forward to disprove them would be romance.

*Metternich to Neumann in London, Vienna,*  
*October 31, 1832.*

1070. Referring to my preceding despatch (No. 1069), I have still some words to add on a question of some importance.

There is a notable difference between *principles* and *positions*, a difference which makes itself felt more keenly every day between the Governments of Great Britain and Austria. This being the case, it would be wise for



the two Powers to estimate that influence rightly, and not to allow it to carry more than its just weight.

There could hardly be any marked difference of opinion between ourselves and England in regard to purely *political* questions. Such differences, therefore, as from time to time occur between the two Courts must be looked for under the head of *moral* difficulties.

The principle of Conservation forms the basis of the internal and external policy of Austria. Our own existence and the peace of Europe are closely bound up with the maintenance of this principle. We are, therefore, compelled to uphold it, and we do, in fact, uphold it. But this principle, like all true principles, would gain nothing by being carried to extremes, and we have shown how sensible we are of this by adhering to just and practical rules of conduct. Those, therefore, who accuse Austria of invariably following a reactionary course or a policy opposed to all rational progress, either do not really know her or consciously allow themselves to calumniate her. We are well aware of the requirements of the time, but we are also aware how much there is in that idea which is false and chimerical. The moral influence we exert on foreign countries, and more particularly the influence we are supposed by the British Cabinet to exert on the Confederation, must be chiefly attributed to our well-known respect for the rights and independence of other States.

We are accused by England of rejecting the system of *concession*, and of proceeding only in the paths of *repression*.

The notion that we have any predilection for a system of *repression* is a mistaken one. Our real system is this :

We do not follow a system of *repression* as opposed



to a system of *concession*; we simply follow a system of *prevention* in order that we may not be compelled to follow one of *repression*. I have already touched upon this question in treating of affairs in Italy; if I recur to it again, it is because the British Government appears to be just as mistaken in its estimate of what is taking place in Germany.

We are firmly convinced that any *concession* a Government may be induced to make strikes at the very basis of its existence. Legislative and administrative measures which are essentially good in themselves, are not and cannot be, in the strict sense of the word, *concessions*. They are one and all merely *acts on the part of the Government tending to progressive amelioration, measures of plain justice and prudence*. *Concessions*, properly so-called, can only have to do with *rights of sovereignty*; with what in England are called the *prerogatives of the Crown*. This truth once admitted, it becomes perfectly clear that *concessions can only be made by a sovereign at the expense of the capital of his own existence*.

Looked at more attentively, there is an evident analogy between our *system of prevention* and the English *system of concessions*. What there is no doubt of is that both systems may be compelled to fall back upon *repression*; with this difference, however, that in our own, *repression* has an undiminished power to support it, while in the contrary system, it can only be exercised by a *power which is already on the wane*. By the adherents of both systems alike *repression* is only looked upon as a most painful necessity, which they are so far from desiring to put in force, that they would willingly avoid it if they could.

Now I am quite ready to admit that the British Government has every right to pursue a system which

may either appear to it the best in itself, or as dictated to it by special circumstances. We shall never claim the right of criticising the course which it may feel bound to pursue in this respect. But what we do ask of it is that it should unreservedly grant the same freedom to us. Principles of Government are like religious dogmas. Any discussion about them is often dangerous and always useless. The wisdom of a Government should consist in living in peace and harmony; and the surest way to attain this object is carefully to avoid all those subjects of discussion on which agreement is hopeless, and as carefully to seek out those objects in which all have a common interest. What we especially desire, the British Government also desires. Let us then unite in a common effort to promote peace and the preservation of everything that exists by lawful authority. One of the essential conditions of a body thus constituted is that it is ever progressing towards good; it is not stationary, for this would involve retrogression, which is opposed to the nature of a properly constituted body.

I authorise you to read the present despatch to Lord Palmerston, apologising at the same time for the abstract nature of the subjects of which it treats. They do not, in fact, come within the range of ordinary diplomatic correspondence. My excuse must be that I sincerely desired to facilitate the good understanding between the two Powers, by endeavouring to clear away misapprehensions arising from one-sided views, which might have stood in the way of that happy consummation.

*THE ANGLO-FRENCH COERCIVE MEASURES  
AGAINST HOLLAND.*

1071. Metternich to Schwarzenberg\* in Berlin, Vienna, October 13, 1832.  
1072. Metternich to Trauttmansdorff in Berlin, Vienna, December 8, 1832.

**1071.** The Belgian affair has reached a highly critical stage. The French and English Cabinets have been carried away by a great movement. All that was most erroneous and reprehensible in the mode of conducting the affair from the very beginning, now threatens to fall with its whole weight upon the Cabinets more directly compromised. The French Government, on its part, subordinates all higher considerations to its internal difficulties, and the British Government does not disdain to play the part of second to its accomplice. In such a labyrinth, calculations of sound diplomacy and considerations of equity fall alike into abeyance; the three Continental Courts, unfortunately harnessed to this detestable chariot, find themselves dragged along in spite of their efforts and compelled to choose between following the two others in their mistaken course, or ostentatiously throwing off the last ties which still unite the great Powers in the avowed aim of maintaining political tranquillity; thus each day brings things nearer to the verge of an abyss, the depths of which it is beyond human wisdom to fathom.

\* Prince Felix Schwarzenberg filled the post of Austrian Ambassador at Berlin during the temporary leave of absence of Count Trauttmansdorff.—ED.

From the last reports of our plenipotentiaries and the tenor of the protocol of October 1, we gather that there is a certain hesitation on the part of the British Cabinet to resort at once to extreme coercive measures. In this protocol no mention occurs of the French operation against Antwerp. But it would, in our opinion, be nothing less than sheer self-deception to admit any other possibility than that the English Cabinet will be led on, in one way or another, to accede to the most exaggerated demands on the part of France.

It is plain to us that King Louis Philippe and his council are aware of and thoroughly appreciate the weakness of the English Ministers. Only the complete information they possessed on this head could have induced the French Cabinet to conceive and openly avow a course of action which must at first have appeared to every impartial spectator as unreasonable in itself as it was certainly opposed to the views and interests of England. The event proves that the French Ministers played a sure game, and I fear the sequel will only make the mournful fact more apparent.

In this phase of the Belgian affair, we cannot, Prince, do better than maintain our present attitude. Let us reduce the question to its simplest terms.

The five great Powers nominated plenipotentiaries in order to form a Council, the object of which, in the first place, was to intervene in the difference which arose between Belgium and Holland, and, at a later period, to arrange a separation between the two countries.

In every council composed of equals, the majority has the sole right of deciding questions, and the minority is bound to vote and act with it.

As a matter of fact, this is just what has happened in London, in the case in question, up to the present

moment. The plenipotentiaries of the three Courts have unquestionably exceeded their powers in more than one instance ; it also admits of as little doubt that they did not abstain from voting on the protocols, and that all the decisions of the Conference have been taken in the name of the majority, if not by a unanimous vote.

At the present moment, things present themselves under a new aspect. Two Cabinets have announced to the three other Courts their fixed intention of following a course of action dependent on considerations affecting only themselves. As it would be neither just nor compatible with the dignity of the three Powers to surrender their dependent will and judgment to the dictation of the two other Cabinets, we have deemed it incumbent upon us to lay down the following proposition: *That the carrying out of any decision adopted by the two Cabinets exclusively ought to impel the three Courts to adopt a uniform course, and induce them henceforward to form but a single, compact and indissoluble whole.*

This declaration, like the circumstance which has called it forth, involves neither *the dissolution of the Conference nor any action on the part of the three Courts* forming the majority in the Council *inimical* to the two others who are in the minority. It merely gives expression to a fact which the three Courts should have no hesitation in stating ; by not stating it, they would place themselves in such a subordinate position, even in the eyes of the two others, that the demands of these last would soon exceed all bounds, and what the monarchs desired to avoid would infallibly be realised within a very short space of time.

Truth sooner or later always comes to light, and such has proved to be the case within the heart of the



Conference itself. This time, the plenipotentiaries of the three Courts did not sign without being duly empowered to do so, as they had done on the 15th November last, an act which would have carried with it all the weight of a *conclusum*. *The two camps formed themselves spontaneously*; two Powers made a proposal; the representatives of the three other Courts took this proposal *ad referendum*, and the force of circumstances compelled those representatives to look out for some common centre whence to obtain information and instructions. Our formula of October 15\* thus fitted in with the actual facts of the case, all but simultaneously, at London itself.

*The principle of the union of the three Courts* is now *de facto* established. *Allies* find themselves confronted by *accomplices*; the former have right on their side, and reason must pronounce in their favour as well.

In pursuance of this system, we recognise before everything else the necessity of at once requesting our allies seriously to take into account the real nature of the questions calling for their decision. A short analysis will suffice to explain to them our ideas on the subject.

The three Courts cannot possibly refuse to admit the following facts as certain :

(1.) The Belgian affair has become well-nigh in-

\* According to Protocol No. 70 of the London Conference, the formal declaration of October 1, which the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia presented to the plenipotentiaries of England and France, was substantially to the following effect : that the former were not empowered to demand from the Government of the Netherlands the partial execution of a treaty to which their assent was not yet given ; that in the event of coercive measures being adopted by the French and English Governments, they would take no part in the same, but that, on the contrary, they placed their hope of an equitable settlement on a fresh and final appeal of their three Courts to the King of the Netherlands.—ED.

soluble by the ordinary methods of negotiation, owing to three causes :

The utterly mistaken course it has pursued;

The concessions which the French and English Ministers are constantly prepared to make to the exigencies of their parliamentary position, and the difficulties of their respective situations in their own countries ;

The calculations upon which—whether rightly or wrongly it matters little—the King of the Netherlands bases his resistance.

(2.) Any affair in which all the methods of negotiation have been exhausted ought to be given up, or else it should be treated by methods which go beyond the limits of a mere negotiation. The present affair has evidently reached this point ; its solution must be left to the two contending parties, and consequently to the arbitrament of their arms, or the Courts which have hitherto intervened in the matter must continue their intervention in order to prevent its definite settlement from bringing on an actual conflict between the two States interested.

(3.) The latest proceedings of the Conference prove that the Courts of England and France are determined not to give up the idea of intervention ; so much so, in fact, that it seems likely they will resort to coercive measures, in the event of the three other Courts refusing to take part in measures of a similar character, and it is this state of things that claims the most serious attention from the latter.

A distinction must be made between the choice of coercive measures and the method of applying them. There are gentle measures, and measures of more or less severity ; there are measures again the effects of

which operate directly on the principals, and others the influence and effects of which extend themselves over a wider sphere; lastly, there are measures the consequences of which cannot fail to make themselves felt in the vast sphere of general politics. The lesson to be learnt from these facts is the strict necessity which prudence enjoins on the Powers of bringing the keenest scrutiny to bear upon the measures proposed by the two Cabinets, and estimating the chances to which they commit the two rival parties, the five intervening Powers, and, as a consequence, the whole of Europe.

The first measures proposed by the English and French Cabinets at the sitting of October 1 are simply of a pecuniary nature. The maritime measures appear to be kept in reserve for the second period.

The former of these measures has just been accepted by his Majesty the King of Prussia. The vote of the Austrian and Russian plenipotentiaries will have been given in support of that of the Prussian plenipotentiary.

The three Courts have already made a declaration beforehand that they could offer no opposition to a blockade. We are persuaded that the pecuniary measures will fail to produce any effect upon the King of the Netherlands. We are unable to give any positive opinion as to whether it will be the same in regard to the blockade.

But admitting that both measures may fail to produce any effect, a question arises as to the employment of further coercive measures.

It is here, Prince, that the difficulty begins—a difficulty which we feel it quite beyond our power to solve by our ourselves, but for the solution of which we entreat our close allies not to deprive us of their co-operation.

The following considerations may not be wholly useless for throwing light upon the question.

There are two kinds of definite denunciatory measures, which present a natural gradation.

The former belong to diplomacy; the latter are war.

The Courts may, in certain given cases, break off their diplomatic relations with the party who, in their opinion, has been guilty of repeated acts of wrong; they can isolate him so as to place him as it were under the ban of Europe. Finally, they can impose conditions upon him, with the alternative that should these not be accepted, they would consider themselves as severally at war with him; war may either be undertaken by several Powers acting in concert or by deputy.

In such a system as this there is nothing which violates the law of nations; what does essentially violate that law is the scheme now put forward by the French Cabinet of an expedition against Antwerp, and its occupation by main force with the object of forthwith making it over to the Belgians.

This proposal cannot conduce to the purpose it is intended to serve, since its operation does not affect the object which should be kept in view. Its method is defective, since the natural, we will go so far as to say the necessary and inevitable, consequences of this expedition against Antwerp will be an immediate war between Holland and Belgium.

Can the three Courts by any possibility consent to an enterprise of this nature? We think not, for apart from the material consequences of the measure, the moral considerations involved in its execution are one and all of a nature to lower the dignity of the monarchs and to compromise the peace of Europe.

But what course can or ought to be taken by the



three Courts? They ought either to withdraw from the Conference, or, if they still permit their plenipotentiaries to take part in its sittings, lay down for themselves and their representatives a limit beyond which the latter must not go. This line must not be drawn between *peace* and *war*, but it must necessarily be drawn between *assent*, *toleration*, or *disavowal*. Unless we are deceived, this course, once adopted by the three Cabinets, will lend force not to the views of the English Ministers, for passion blinds men, but to the national interests of England, distinct as they are, in the Belgian question, from those of France. The exaggerated care displayed by the plenipotentiaries of the three Courts to prevent a general war and an alliance between France and England, is undoubtedly among the causes which led to the errors of which they have been guilty. If fear be an evil counsellor, the semblance of fear is productive of still more disastrous effects. This is what has contributed to impel the Governments of France and England to enter upon a course full of danger, in spite of their being far less in a position to think seriously of an offensive war than those of any other great State.

I proceed to sum up the substance of the present paper in a few words :

A close and avowed agreement among the three Courts in the Belgian affair ;

A demonstration that any moral disunion, and not less any material disunion, which might arise at any time among the five Courts, in reference to this affair, would be the work of the minority ;

A firm determination on the part of the three monarchs not to give their assent to any enterprise undertaken by the two maritime Powers for purely fanciful considerations or for the sake of effect ;



Lastly, a general deliberation among the three Courts as to the material attitude they should decide to adopt in view of such future contingencies as might arise in the Belgian affair from the action of the two other Powers.

In this course, Prince, lie the only chances of public safety yet remaining. A firm and correct attitude on the part of the great political Powers has never yet failed of its effect, and should it turn out otherwise in the immediate future, this would only prove that Europe has actually reached that stage of madness when force alone can yet save those who have done all they could to curb its abuses.\*

*Metternich to Trauttmansdorff in Berlin, Vienna,  
December 8, 1832.*

1072. I have allowed several days to elapse before devoting myself to the present paper, from a feeling that it was impossible to give it the completeness it demands.

At the present moment, when the Antwerp business is in full course; when the London Conference has virtually ceased to exist; when a Prussian army of observation is stationed in the direction of the Meuse, and destined to remain there provisionally, it becomes possible to draw a line between the past and the state of things at present existing; it is open to us, too, to take a glance at the future, and to form some opinion as to

\* As is well known, England and France concluded a separate treaty on the 14th October, the object of which was to compel Holland to accept the Treaty of Peace of November 15, by means of a combined attack by sea and land. The Dutch ports were blockaded, and a French army under Marshal Gérard besieged the citadel of Antwerp. General Chassé, who was in command of the place, capitulated December 23, whereupon the French army withdrew from Belgium.—ED.

the attitude which it would be proper for the three Courts henceforward to adopt.

We may be permitted to take up the latter question, and express our ideas on the subject with that candour and absence of reserve which so happily characterise the relations existing between the three monarchs and their Cabinets.

The *Belgian question*, that question which has been occupying the five Courts for more than two years, and which ought, by one means or another, to have been settled in a few weeks, will not have advanced a step nearer to its solution by the results, whatever they may be, of the French expedition against Antwerp. Whether, in short, the citadel be taken within a short time or the siege be unusually protracted, the *affair* itself will have got no further. *Every practical consideration renders it incumbent upon us to establish this fact*; for if it be possible and even probable that this insane enterprise may give rise to complications which it is impossible to define accurately beforehand, it is no less true that those complications will belong rather to the episode of which the Belgian affair forms only the background, than to the principal affair itself.

*The Belgian affair must be looked upon as temporarily in abeyance.* This fact once clearly laid down and unanimously admitted, it will be open to the three Courts *definitely to settle upon the attitude they should respectively adopt in the matter of the future pacification, when circumstances permit of their once more taking part in it.*

In order to attain this end it is necessary, to begin with, that the three Courts should disengage themselves from the trammels of the past. For this purpose they must severally determine:

(1.) To establish a complete solidarity among themselves both of understanding and action.

(2.) Not to assign to their plenipotentiaries, in future negotiations, a position as prominent as they allowed themselves to be drawn on to assume when the Conference first began its labours.

We consider the former of these objects as definitely settled, and as the second requires only to be developed *in order to be put in practice to good purpose*, we may be permitted to enter into some explanations on the subject.

The attitude to be assumed by the three Cabinets when the original question comes on for re-discussion must be considered under a twofold aspect: the principles from which the question sets out and the direction to be given to it.

If the former of these objects is to be carried out to any good purpose, it is absolutely necessary that some centre should be chosen where all preliminaries could be settled among the three Courts. Here must be elaborated and fixed the basis of the instructions to be given to the plenipotentiaries, and hence too, consequently, must emanate the directions which are to regulate their conduct on essential points.

We have already more than once expressed our opinion on the necessity of in future eschewing once and for always the form of a conference similar to that which has for two years sat at London, and we shall at once apply that prohibition to the Belgian affair, when it once more comes on for discussion.

In order to make our ideas on the subject clearer, we shall endeavour accurately to define the appreciable difference which, in our opinion, exists between a *conference* and a *negotiation* as carried on under its old and

well-recognised forms, as well as the serious and far-reaching difficulties which a *conference* involves, difficulties which find no place in a negotiation as ordinarily understood.

The establishment of a *Conference*, a form entirely new to diplomacy, and which was employed for the first time in the Greek question, naturally carries with it the idea of some sort of *constituted authority*. The consequences of the existence of an authority of this nature are obvious. Every duly constituted political body requires a considerable aggregate of well-defined rights to maintain its position, and if these rights be not at once conceded to it, it will appropriate them of its own accord. Thus, in a very little time, we saw the London Conference assume more importance and disregard the authority of the very Powers it represented. For our own part, we have the impression of our plenipotentiaries having ceased to belong to us; at the same time we had the idea that it would have been impossible to obviate or check the inevitable consequences of that difficulty, for which neither the Cabinet nor anyone individually was to blame, without risking the total obstruction of the business entrusted to the Conference, or endangering our own and the general interest. To this painful fact must be added other considerations no less serious and fraught with dangerous consequences. Corporate bodies soon come to establish special interests of their own; they live by antecedents and special rules. Their judgment on general questions is always biased by calculations relating to those interests. For a corporation to prosper in its undertakings, it is essential that it should in every case have at its disposal such executive powers as are indispensable for carrying out those enterprises and assuring their success. Now,



what *executive powers* could the London Conference have had at its disposal?—that Conference which, beguiled by stress of circumstances into false conceptions and extreme measures, would have required, successfully to carry out its schemes, to have at its disposal the material forces of the five Powers, including those of the whole Germanic Confederation;—that Conference which, in order to complete its work, would have needed to be invested with sufficient authority to hold in check the preponderating influence of one Power, and set another in motion at its own pleasure !

The moment it became a question of employing force, it became necessary for two Courts to withdraw from the Conference, and thus break up its unity. The moment this took place, the *Conference, that status in statu in Europe, instantly dissolved into air.*

*It must no longer be the original Conference that takes up the question anew. A negotiation must be established under the forms sanctioned by long usage. As regards the place in which the negotiation ought to be established, that question, too, appears to me to depend on equally well-established rules.*

The most advantageous point to fix upon for a negotiation is that which offers the readiest facilities for dealing with the matter in hand. In the present instance, the Hague would undoubtedly be the most eligible place.

Should any reasons whatever stand in the way of that capital being chosen, no time should be lost in indicating a third place, and in that case the first consideration should be the relative distances between the various points from which instructions would have to be sent.

London is an eccentric point. Moreover, the



presence of the English Cabinet places the representatives of the other Courts in a subordinate position as regards the plenipotentiary of that Power. This consideration is rendered all the more important from the fact that the English Cabinet is of all others most unobservant of sound political principles, and that the contiguity of Paris and London exercises a particularly pernicious influence on the conduct of affairs in the latter capital. We think that *Aix-la-Chapelle* would be the most suitable spot for the meeting of the plenipotentiaries of the five Courts and those of the Netherlands and Belgium.

Finally, in the event of the Courts of Great Britain and France *absolutely* refusing to remove the future negotiation from London, it appears to us that the three monarchs ought to declare their readiness to take part in it anew, but expressly on the following conditions :

(1.) That the proceedings should no longer be carried on under the form of the Conference, as previously constituted, but under the express reservation that the plenipotentiaries of all the Courts alike should stand on precisely the same footing ;

(2.) That, as a consequence of such a decision, the plenipotentiaries be furnished with special instructions and full formal powers ;

(3.) That the plenipotentiaries should make it their first care to agree upon the method best adapted to bring to as speedy a conclusion as possible the pacification entrusted to their hands.

It is plain, Count, that the result of the above measure would be *regular conferences* ; and our mind recognises a very clear distinction between a *duly-constituted body, styling itself the Conference, and a meeting of negotiators conferring together*. In the first instance, the

Conference is *the thing*; in the second, *conferences* are merely *the means*. At London, the negotiations were carried on *between the Conference and the plenipotentiaries of the two principal parties*; they will have to be established in future *between those same parties, subject to the intervention of the plenipotentiaries deputed for that purpose by the five Powers*. In this difference of position lies the key to the seventy protocols, those chaotic, contradictory and compromising results, which were purely useless to all who had the misfortune to assist in their concoction.

A difficulty seems here to present itself, and that is how the Belgian and Dutch plenipotentiaries are to be brought together; but is not this difficulty present in every negotiation concerning a cession of territory? *Belligerents* negotiate, though they are far from being on terms of peace and friendship with each other, and though we are among the first to recognise a fundamental distinction between *two belligerent Sovereigns* and *a Sovereign and his revolted subjects*, we are none the less ready to admit that, the King of Holland having virtually admitted the separation not only in name but in principle, and the interposing Courts having recognised the new King of the Belgians, the question is one which may, on the whole, be treated by the ordinary methods.

A point of not less importance to decide is the arrangement of a centre where the three Courts may confer together. We have already addressed a request to our allies on this point, and given our voice in favour of Berlin.

If the Prussian Cabinet would set down its views on all these various points on paper, we should welcome with real gratitude any scheme it had to propose. There will be ample time for the three Courts to think over and finally decide upon their future course. But in

order to prevent any mistake, nothing more is needed than that the representatives of the Courts of Austria and Prussia at London should without delay receive instructions to consider themselves as no longer authorised to take part in any proceedings relating to the Belgian affair without special directions. What the three Courts have at least a right to expect from the two Courts, who by their isolated action have broken up the unanimity of the Conference, is a fresh invitation to take part with them in an attempt to bring to a conclusion the affair held by them in abeyance. In the answer to be given to such invitation the three Courts might embody the decision they had arrived at as to the new method of carrying on the negotiation.

*THE POLICY OF DELAY.*

1073. Metternich to Bombelles in Turin (confidential letter), Vienna, December 27, 1832.

1073. The practical truth, the only truth applicable to the situation of the moment, is the necessity of *waiting for events to develop themselves*. I know, no one better, all the objections that it is possible to bring forward against this proposition. The first objection is this: is it a wise proceeding to reduce the Powers to a position, so to speak, of passivity, a position fraught with more danger to themselves and the public weal than the contrary course would have been?

The answer to this objection is easily found: *It is impossible to act otherwise!* Let a Power but try to depart from its expectant attitude and it will hasten once more to return to it if there yet be time, and its attempt has not ended in destroying its most indispensable means of resistance. The evil inherent in this position does not apply only to the defenders of lawful authority and the good cause; it more than applies equally to their adversaries; it weighs upon them more heavily, for *time* is the most dangerous enemy for those who have but an ephemeral existence. There are only two remedies by which the present disturbed state of things can be put an end to: that of force and that of weakness. The former is war; the latter, the extinction of the evil in the centres whence it derives its nourish-

ment. A calm attitude on the part of foreign Powers favours the latter of these alternatives ; I look upon its success as very doubtful, if not altogether improbable. But as the only means of promoting it lies in keeping to the course now being pursued by the Powers, it would be useless to attempt to take action in any other direction save in so far as an opportunity might offer of preventing mistakes on their part. The possibility, then, opens up a wider field for consideration, which it is accordingly worth while to explore.

In the moral situation in which France is now placed, the greatest fault the Powers could commit would be to *attack* that country. An offensive war directed against France would double its material means and throw the Government forcibly in the direction *of the left*. Were the nation not so weary of anarchy as is actually the case, the risk would be less great ; anarchy is not a good defensive arm, but who could answer for its not ending by overrunning everything ? For my part, I think it very probable that the result would be a closer union between the nation and the Government, and not the fall of the latter. I have, I must admit, a very poor opinion of La Vendée and the South, impulsive as they are and doubtless ever ready to lend themselves to any sudden movement, but utterly unamenable to regular organisation, in any useful sense of the word. A few thousands of partisans massacring one another, form no barrier to the masses rising in arms to defend their hearths when attacked.

Thus, *defensive war* could alone be undertaken by the Powers with any chance of success. The greater this chance, the less would the French Government be disposed to hazard an offensive war. But, it may be asked, might it not be compelled by the force of circum-



stances beyond its control to risk, so to speak, the chances of war, in spite of itself? That is a question I could certainly not take upon myself to decide; but I carefully guard myself from denying the possibility that it might happen any day. *We do not lose sight of this possibility for a moment.* Be pleased to understand this statement in the same sense as ourselves; for it is possible to regard an object with looks of fear or of calm assurance, and we are not accessible to the former of those emotions.

You will find in this short sketch the most accurate description of our political attitude. All that we say, declare, or do takes its origin from that attitude. Compare it with the facts and you will not doubt the truth of this assertion.

All is covered with a veil at the opening of the new year. What fate awaits the French Government? what I have already said is sufficient to show you my complete ignorance on that point.

What will be the fate of the Grey Ministry? The elections, apparently, ensure it a majority in the House of Commons. But how far will an estimate formed in reference to men hold good when the time comes to apply it to things?

I say nothing to you about the Alliance between the two Liberal Administrations. It is an absurdity. In the event of an offensive war on the part of the Powers, it might prove a cause of embarrassment, and we live at a time when the difference between embarrassment and danger is hardly appreciable. What the result might be in the event of a defensive war, I care not. In that case, I foresee an England of no account or united with her natural allies.

What conclusion then must we draw? I perceive that sound reason counsels the maintenance of our present attitude. I should be false to my convictions if I went beyond that, and in making the admission I recognise the insufficiency of my means.

1833.

*EXTRACTS FROM THE PRINCESS MELANIE'S  
DIARY.*

*Biographical Notices.*

1074. Vienna (from January 2 to June 10).  
 1075. Residence at Meidling and Königswart (from June 11 to August 4).  
 1076. Teplitz (from August 7 to August 17).  
 1077. Münchengrätz (from September 4 to September 20).  
 1078. Return to Vienna by way of Prague (from September 21 to December 26).

*Vienna.*

1074. Thiers and the Italian refugees. Sébastiani. Portrait of the Prince. Schulenburg. The Ingelheim family. Diplomatic sensitiveness. The Archduchess Sophia. Hungarian affairs. Celebration of the Emperor's birthday. Ball. Retrospects. Conversation with the Nuncio. Gift from the Pope. Snuff-box for Pilat. The Duke of Bordeaux. 'Lumpazivagabundus.' Birth of a son. Sainte-Aulaire. The Prince's sixtieth birthday. Death of little Clement.

1074. *Vienna, January 2.*—Clement is well, although he has slept badly. He did not, however, leave his room. Montbel came to dinner; his book on the Duke of Reichstadt is very interesting, but rather too sententious.

*January 6.*—I breakfasted in my husband's cabinet. He read me some excellent despatches which he is sending to Berlin. M. Thiers, the present Minister of the Interior at Paris, informs Clement that the Italian refugees have entered into a plot to assassinate Louis Philippe, and this defender of freedom and of the noble causes of the Polish, German, and Italian refugees,

who has hitherto rejected all overtures on our part, made with a view of putting a stop to the nefarious designs of these people—here is this very man eagerly demanding of us that we should protect the life—of all others!—of King Louis Philippe! General Sébastiani, late Minister for Foreign Affairs, and now travelling in Italy, was also in danger of being murdered by the very persons whom he had hitherto taken into his head to protect, and was only too glad to avail himself of the assistance of the obscure Austrians, without whose police he would have been assassinated.

*January 17.*—The portrait of my husband, which was presented to me by the King of England, has at length arrived, after having been eight months on the way. I am really delighted with it! The head is very fine, the rest only sketched in.

*January 20.*—I passed the early hours of the evening with Clement, who related to me a number of diplomatic anecdotes. The late Minister Schulenburg is a regular plague with his perpetual tales and gossip; he puts the whole diplomatic corps into confusion.

*January 21.*—The Ingelheim family has arrived here. They were our nearest neighbours at Johannisberg, and always show the kindest regard for Clement and my children, when they visit the Rhine. Clement helped me to welcome our guests, and we immediately asked them to dinner.

*January 25.*—Clement told me that a downright commotion had been excited among the young diplomatists on the occasion of my Monday's ball, to which only a limited circle had been invited. They held a meeting, to consult whether, after such an affront, they should continue to visit at our house. Herr von Uechtritz put himself at their head. Their indig-

nation does not affect me in the least, but it gave me the opportunity of speaking seriously to Clement about introducing some method into our entertainments, in order to put some bounds to the excessive pretensions of the diplomatic corps. We intend to receive company every Sunday, as usual, and to hold a diplomatic *soirée* every Wednesday. On the remaining days, we reserve to ourselves the liberty of asking whom we like.

I dined rather earlier, as at half-past five I had to go to the Archduchess Sophia. I had requested an audience of her, in order to invite her to my ball. The Archduchess led me to her children. The Archduke Francis is very charming, talks a great deal, laughs and skips about, and appears lively and intelligent. The Archduchess takes such pleasure in the society of her children, that it does one good to see it.

*February 11.*—All that one hears about the Hungarian Diet is terrible. My poor countrymen are really out of their senses; they little know what frightful mischief they are preparing. The Emperor is grieved and depressed to the last degree when he is spoken to on the subject. I do not think the evil as menacing as they say, but everything that happens makes it worse. The Emperor was desirous of being present at the banquet which he gives to-morrow to the deputies who have come to offer him their congratulations. As, however, he understood that they intended to propose a political toast to him, he determined not to go. It will, however, produce a very unfavourable impression on those who are unaware what good grounds there are for the abstention.

*February 12.*—I was awoken by the thunder of the cannon during the high mass for the Emperor; poor Clement had to get up earlier, as all the members of the



Imperial Chancery and the diplomatic corps had assembled at the house, for the purpose of paying their congratulations to his Majesty. I did not get up till three o'clock, when I set about making the necessary preparations for the evening. We dined alone; the children were at my parents', as our house was in too great a state of confusion to be able to accommodate the whole family. By half-past eight the guests began to come, and gradually the rooms filled to such an extent that literally I could not get near the Archduchess. I at length succeeded in leading her into the green drawing-room, whence she was carried off for the polonaise. Clement led out the Queen of Hungary, the King followed with me, then came the Palatine with the Archduchess Sophia, and the remaining Archdukes joined in. The Archduchess left at half-past eleven. The ball really went off beautifully in every way.

*February 16.*—Clement had a very interesting conversation with Alfred Potocki, Lamb, and Sedlnitzky. It was about Fouché, the various plots of that schemer, and Napoleon, who at length became acquainted with the former's intrigues. Clement likes to talk about all these incidents, which once had such significance and were kept in such secrecy, but now belong to the domain of history, and show with what uprightness and good faith we have always acted, a fact which no one is in a better position to judge of than myself.

*February 19.*—I had a long conversation with the Nuncio, in reference to a wish which I hardly dared to cherish in my inmost heart, which is that his Holiness would stand godfather to my child, a favour which would make me happier than I can express, but which I could never bring myself to ask in my own person. The Nuncio replied that he would take the matter upon him-

self and find means to carry it through. I made the further request that my son, if God gave me one, should receive the name of Clement Gregory, as I wish my little one to be the first among my husband's children to bear his name. The Nuncio quite understood me, and manifested the most friendly sympathy in the matter.

*March 7.*—The altar presented by the Pope to Clement, to be put up at Königswart, has arrived. It is packed in twenty-one chests, but must, unfortunately, be sent on at once, so that it cannot be looked at here. The Nuncio handed the Pope's noble briefs to Clement. There is, first, the very touching letter accompanying the gift, and then the most complete indulgences attached to the altar. The latter consists of marble and porphyry of the basilica of St. Paul, and contains the remains of a little saint named Boniface, who died as a martyr at five years old. These relics are preserved in an urn. Clement is delighted with this magnificent gift.

I sent for Daffinger, whom I wish to paint a portrait of my husband for Pilat and set it in a golden snuff-box. This, I hope, will give him pleasure, and indeed he deserves it.

*March 30.*—Windischgrätz paid us a visit after dinner. He has just been promoted to be Lieutenant-general. He comes from Prague, where, he tells us, the young Duke of Bordeaux is very popular. They say this young Prince is highly gifted in every respect.

*April 8.*—After breakfast I had a long conversation with Dostal, my husband's steward. I must take the management of affairs more into my own hands. It will be difficult to bring things into order, but I hope at least to put some stop to the mismanagement.

*April 15.*—As Clement had a little leisure, we went to see a new and very pretty piece at the *Wieden*, called

'Lumpazivagabundus.' Carl, Scholz, and Nestroy, our three best comic actors, played together and acted remarkably well. We enjoyed ourselves immensely.

*April 21.*—Clement, who had passed the night in his own room, came in just after my boy was born. It is very small, but lively and healthy. I never saw Clement so pleased; it quite did one good to see him. His delight was so great that he had not a moment to be anxious about me.

*April 22.*—Papa has come and stood as godfather to the little one. He received the names of Clement, Francis, Ferdinand, Lothair, Gregory, Boniface.

*May 5.*—I left my room for the first time to go to my boudoir. I took the opportunity of taking a good look at my little Clement. He is really very small, but looks healthy. I do not share in the general opinion which will have it that he is good-looking; to my eyes he is hideous, and resembles my poor brother Joseph; to make up for it, Melanie is prettier than ever.

*May 12.*—Clement brought Sainte-Aulaire to see me this morning. He is very distinguished-looking, has fine manners, and appears to belong to the old school.

*May 15.*—To-day Clement reaches his sixtieth year. May God long preserve him for the happiness of us all! Richard made a beautiful speech in French, but Melanie would not even stammer 'dear papa,' although this would not have been more than she could manage.

*May 27.*—My husband was aroused at night with the news that little Clement was ill. Marenzeller was summoned at three o'clock; at five the child's breathing grew difficult, and it had an attack of croup. Clement had Götz sent for, and he agreed with Marenzeller that it was nothing, and that the little one was about to have influenza. Clement woke me with this news at nine.

*June 10.*—What a fearful week ! my heart was torn with the most agonising pangs a mother can feel ! I saw my poor child dying, his face overspread with the pallor of death—at three o'clock I no longer had a son . . . . Poor Clement is so utterly dejected that I must try to cheer him up—so I shall want courage for both. When I begged him not to grieve too much, as it might injure his health, he replied that he was too much accustomed to sorrow for him to have any fear of its making him ill.

*Residence at Meidling and Königswart.*

1075. Arrival at Meidling. Conversation with Sainte-Aulaire. Departure. On the journey. Königswart. Föhrich. Baron Binder. The Queen of Würtemberg. Maison and Tatistscheff.

1075. *Meidling, June 11.*—I passed the whole morning in making preparations for our change of residence. We arrived at Meidling in the evening.

*June 17.*—Count Sainte-Aulaire wanted to prove to me that a statesman, to do any good, must be under the influence of a woman. I explained to him very decidedly that we took quite the contrary view here, and that apparently we were right, inasmuch as with us affairs are conducted far more successfully than with them. I added that, with us, women never interfered in such matters ; that their husbands sometimes communicated to them things which were claiming their attention ; that in such cases they were attentive listeners, but that any views they might express had no weight in determining a question, and that no one dreamed of asking their advice. This, I asserted, was a far more trustworthy means for discovering the right course, since a true statesman should never allow him-



self to be influenced by impulse and passion, nay, he should never even expose himself to their influence, a thing which, with women, would be unavoidable.

*July 15.*—Clement had to go to Baden to see the Emperor.

*July 16.*—The children, that is, Leontine and Herminia, set off at seven o'clock this morning. To-morrow at the same hour I shall be on my way too. This going away is dreadful! My little Melanie is so tender and loving now! What a blow it is to me to part with her! When I blessed her this evening, after putting her to bed, the thought of leaving her for so long a time gave my heart a fresh pang, and I passed nearly the whole night shedding bitter tears.

*On the Journey, July 17.*—I rose at half-past six. We set out on our journey very slowly. As Clement chatted and expressed his pleasure at his respite from work, and this excursion, I felt comforted. We dined with Felicia Hoyos at Horn, and arrived at Schwarzenau by nine o'clock, where we wrote and read, while they prepared our beds.

*Königswart, July 19.*—After a very fatiguing journey we arrived at ten in the evening at Königswart. Clement showed me over the whole *château*. The staircase is very pretty, the rooms good and comfortable. As, however, he arranged everything himself and gave up his own rooms to me, there was nothing tolerable left for him.

*July 20.*—Clement was hardly awake, when we had to get up in order to inspect everything that interested him. Three small rooms are set apart for the servants; Clement seized upon one to do his writing in, which I did not like at all, for it looked just as if he were not worth the trouble of attending to, and he were only stay-



ing there temporarily. One of the great beauties of the *château* is the chapel. The altar which Pope Gregory XVI. presented to Clement is very fine. After breakfast came the officials to introduce themselves and pay their respects. They give one a favourable impression of them, and appear to be much attached to Clement. After dinner Clement showed me the whole place, and then we went to the museum. It contains some really interesting things, glasses and goblets which are family heirlooms, and medallions of great value. Clement enriched it with some beautiful objects. The evening closed with a game of draughts. My poor husband is so happy, and enjoys his little bit of freedom so thoroughly. One could be so happy, if life were not an ever unsatisfied longing!

*July 21.*—The members of the Imperial Chancery, De Pont, Sieber, Reymond and Werner, have arrived. We were obliged to hear mass in the official residence, as the chapel is not ready yet. I then took a walk with Clement. I read despatches from Paris and London aloud to him. He shrinks from work, and tries to enjoy his freedom to the utmost. We passed the evening in the company of the above named gentlemen, and in playing draughts, another thing in which Clement finds great amusement.

*July 23.*—The Queen of Würtemberg, who is staying at Marienbad, has invited Clement and myself to dinner, which is a great honour, but a somewhat burdensome one.

*July 24.*—After walking the whole morning with Clement, who had the architect Nobile with him, and showed him all his buildings, I repeated my rosary. Clement brought me some sketches by a young painter, who is now in Prague. He is of humble extraction,

and Clement had him educated. His name is Führich, and he paints the most charming things. This young man has made a sketch for a large painting representing the Coming of the Messiah, and the Foundation of the Church.\* It is superb and striking, but still more touching is the impression it all makes on Clement—for he was so penetrated by the depth of thought and earnestness displayed by the young painter that his eyes filled with tears as he endeavoured to explain each form. May God keep and preserve this kindly and pious spirit!

*July 25.*—Bernstorff was our guest at dinner. Baron Binder, the Imperial Commissioner of Woods, whom Clement invited, in order to ask his advice as to his forests at Plass and Königswart, also acquainted him with what he had observed on the journey. It appears he is very pleased with what has been done, and finds our people capable and conscientious.

*July 26.*—I passed the morning in making preparations for the reception of the Queen of Würtemberg, who signified her intention of dining with us. Afterwards I had a long walk with Clement and Tatistscheff.

The Queen was most amiable to everyone and very friendly with me. Clement took her round the garden, but unfortunately only showed her the least pleasing aspects. It was half-past six by the time she had seen the chapel and everything else worth seeing, when she took leave of us most graciously.

*July 29.*—Clement has made up the quarrel between Marshal Maison and Tatistscheff; that is to say, the

\* The work here spoken of is undoubtedly the eleven pen-and-ink sketches, representing 'Christ's Triumph,' which *Meister Führich* etched later on (1854). It was published by Mayer and Co. of Munich. The original plates are now in the possession of G. Manz of Regensburg. The eleven plates may be said together to form a 'large picture.'—ED.

former paid the Ambassador a visit, which the latter duly returned before dinner, and since then they have met on friendly terms. We passed the evening with our two Ambassadors. They talked together in a very friendly way.

*Teplitz.*

1076. Teplitz. The society there. Princess Liegnitz. Prince Charles of Mecklenburg and Ancillon. Alexander von Humboldt. The battle-field of Culm. Meeting at Theresienstadt. Departure from Teplitz.

1076. *Teplitz, August 7.*—We are very comfortably settled here. We have a large sitting-room and two bedrooms, one for ourselves, the second for our maid. Our hotel is the Prince de Ligny. Clement was with the King. After mass we all went into the park, and there we found Clement; the King, who is become very stout; his wife, the Princess von Leignitz, who is very pretty but inclined to embonpoint; M. Ancillon; Prince Wittgenstein; Alexander von Humboldt, and Prince Charles of Mecklenburg—not to mention General Witzleben and many others.

The Princess Liegnitz has a certain dignity. She has not the air of a Queen, but there is no mistaking she is a Princess, for everyone addresses her with respect, which she acknowledges with condescension.

I dined with Clement and Leontine at Clary's. A number of guests were invited. I sat between Prince Charles of Mecklenburg and M. Ancillon, so that I had to be content with fine phrases while one succulent dish after another went by me. Both my neighbours like to hear themselves talk, and are most fastidious in their choice of expression. I already have my own way of conversing with them. When I talk to Ancillon, I hang upon his

lips, and give full expansion to his ideas, and the more I develop them the more he feels himself flattered, holds his head higher, and is pleased with me because I show I can appreciate him. He is a doctrinaire who conducts public affairs as he used formerly to deliver his discourses, with an eye solely to the effect which will be produced by the turns of speech which he saves up for the conclusion. Prince Charles cannot endure him. He is a soldier, full of spirit, and defiant of danger, and attaches no weight to Ancillon's apprehensions. And yet this Prince, whose qualities and aims excite admiration, is in his turn a fine speaker and likes to hear himself talk—a weakness which, to all appearance, is epidemic in Prussia. I say nothing of Alexander von Humboldt, but simply let him speak for himself. The only way of listening to him is quietly to endure the torrent of words in which he pours forth the abundant stores of his knowledge. My acquaintance with these gentlemen was at first a source of amusement to me. Since, however, we agreed to find one another mutually charming—I did not find it so amusing.

Tatistscheff told me the Emperor of Russia had deferred his journey, and would not be here till the 7th or 8th September. This means that I shall be deprived for four weeks yet of the happiness of seeing my child—a thought which drives me to distraction.

*August 9.*—Clement and I rose at seven. It was the day of the meeting. The Emperor was to leave Theresienstadt and go to Lobositz, where Clement wished to meet him at ten. Then an audience was granted to Marshal Maison.

My husband's return was delayed. He had found the King unwell. We went together to the *réunion*, at



which the King and Princess Liegnitz were not present. The children, however, danced to their heart's content. The whole of the evening at Clary's was taken up by the conversation of Alexander von Humboldt, who, when he once begins, never leaves off for a moment.

*August 10.*—After we had dined at the *château*, I went with Clement and the children to Culm, where we went over the battle-field. I was shown the height where Prince Charles Schwarzenberg and my husband stood, the one where Vandamme made his stand and was taken prisoner, and the place where 8,000 Russians fought to the last, so that there were only 3,000 left alive, when Colloredo, whose path I could distinctly trace out, effected his splendid march. We also saw the monument which the King of Prussia erected in memory of those of his soldiers who had fallen on the field of battle, as also the one set up by the Bohemian army to Colloredo, which is very beautiful.

*August 14.*—Clement set out at seven o'clock in the morning to meet the Emperor at Theresienstadt, where the meeting with the King of Prussia and the other notabilities took place. He came back rather late, and satisfied with the result.

*August 16.*—Clement passed the whole of the morning with the King, with whom he got on well. He gave me a very satisfactory account of his interview. May God bless all these endeavours for the general good! By Clement's desire, I was present at the *réunion*, where I saw not only the King but the Crown Prince, who had just come. We passed the evening with Clary, after taking leave of the King, the Princess Liegnitz, &c. I paid court to Ancillon in every possible way. I begged him to give me *ideas*, which I proceeded



to spin out in interminable phrases. They found an echo in his heart, and he repaid me in kind. The Crown Prince and Prince Charles of Mecklenburg were also present. Clement remained with the King and Ancillon, and got from him what he wanted. The journey therefore did not turn out useless.

*Münchengrätz.*

1077. Münchengrätz. Dinner at Court. Conversation with the Emperor Francis. A match at billiards. The Grand Duchess of Weimar. Conversation with the Empress. The Emperor Nicholas keeps everyone waiting. The Emperor Francis as a draughtsman. Arrival of the Emperor Nicholas. Orloff. Character of the Emperor of Russia. His suite. Ancillon. The Crown Prince of Prussia. Visit of the Emperor Nicholas to the Princess. Entertainments at the Court and at home. The Emperor Nicholas's hussar regiment. Departure from Münchengrätz.

1077. *Münchengrätz, September 4.*—By three o'clock we arrived at Münchengrätz, a very small and filthy town. Our quarters are on the whole tolerable. We have a small house at our disposal, in which we are alone. It contains two sitting-rooms, a study for Clement and a bedroom, all fairly comfortable, but very cold. We arranged our small room as well as circumstances permitted; then we gave Ficquelmont, who had a long talk with my husband, a cup of tea.

*September 5.*—At half-past one we went to the *château*, their Majesties having asked us to dinner. The Empress was very friendly, and the Emperor so kindly and pleasant, that it really moved me to tears. He made me sit by him at dinner, and was pleased and cheerful and really wonderfully kind. We remained at the *château* until five, as the Emperor and Empress got interested in conversation.

*September 6.*—The weather being tolerably fine, we had a short walk and then went to the *château*. The Emperor was again as kind and cordial as possible. He spoke to me of Clement, as he so frequently does, saying, 'He is better than I; he never gets out of temper, and never bears a grudge against his bitterest foe; I am not so good as that.' After dinner he played a *kriegspartie*\* at billiards with us. Clement, Binder, Frau von Wehfeldt, and General Crenneville played together; the Emperor, Appel, Felix Schwarzenberg, Countess Lazansky and I formed the other side. Naturally, we lost twice, as the others were too much for us. The Emperor was highly diverted with it all.

I passed the evening in writing, reading, and prayer; later on Ficquelmont and the members of the Imperial Chancery and Felix Schwarzenberg came to supper. Nothing is yet known about the Emperor Nicholas, but the Grand Duchess and Duke of Weimar arrived about nine.

*September 7.*—The Court dinner did not take place till three. We had previously had to pay our respects to the Grand Duchess. She is very stiff, and speaks well, but always in a formal way. Our visit was a very short one. The Emperor, who had the Grand Duchess's First Lady of the Bedchamber for his neighbour, said to my husband, 'What dreadful people they are; here they have taken your wife away from me and put the old lady by me instead.' After dinner we again filled up the interval with a game of billiards. I returned home rather late, and at a quarter past seven we had to go to the *château* again, to be present at a *soirée* given in honour of the Grand Duchess. Clement talked much

\* A game frequently played in Germany, for which there is no English equivalent.—TR.

and upon scientific subjects, which interested the Empress. The Emperor came at nine and proposed that we should go and have supper. He was much surprised to see covers laid for only four persons, and laughed heartily at the mistake. The Empress, however, appeared to be displeased. We did not take it to heart, and returned home with Count Waldstein and his wife and a few gentlemen.

*September 8.*—Count Nesselrode and Prince Suwaroff arrived this evening. There is news at last of the Emperor Nicholas ; he was unable to embark at Cronstadt, owing to the violence of the weather. Much time was thus lost, and at length he determined to return to St. Petersburg and take the land route. It took him but five days to reach Schwedt, which appears to me incredible. In any case he cannot be here before the tenth.

We dined at Court. Countess Waldstein sat beside the Emperor, which the latter told Clement he hoped I should not feel offended at. Yet I am sorry for it, because it precludes me from talking to him, a thing I always greatly enjoy. Nesselrode was one of the guests; he bears a great resemblance to Ludwig Jablonowski. After dinner we played billiards, a game of which the Emperor is always very fond. The Empress took me aside, as she wished to speak to me. She told me she was aware what an admiration I had for the Emperor ; she had told him so, and he felt very proud and flattered by it. She also told me that the Archduchess Sophia wrote to her from Vienna that society there was very envious of the preference shown by the Emperor for the Prague ladies. I replied that I had allowed a similar complaint to escape me, and that I too envied them the privilege of being able to approach him, whereas he never gave us a chance at Vienna of seeing him. The Empress re-

marked that she wished I would say so openly, as she was always reproaching the Emperor with the same thing herself; but his reply always was, that in Vienna he was restrained by the bonds of etiquette. The evening was a long one, as the guests stayed to supper. Nevertheless, we had visits from Nesselrode, Ficquelmont, and other gentlemen.

*September 10.*—Our Emperor set out at eight in the morning to meet the Emperor Nicholas. I went with Brockhausen and Litta to an eminence, where they had posted cannon. As three o'clock drew near we set out on our return homeward, as we had to dine at Court at four. Suddenly the thunder of cannon was heard, and we hastened to reach the entrance of the *château*. The carriage-and-six met us. We were exerting ourselves to get a glimpse of the Emperor, when to our great astonishment we saw Appel, who called out to us: 'The Emperor is not coming.' He added that a courier had just informed him the Emperor would not be here till the next morning, and that our Emperor was returning with the Grand Duchess. We dined at the Court; I sat next the Emperor, who was in excellent spirits, and drew a small lion for me on the programme containing the pieces played during dinner. I told him I should preserve it for my children.\* He answered: 'I will do something better than that for them.' I was really enchanted by his kindness. The Empress is somewhat vexed at their needlessly keeping the Emperor so long waiting, and she certainly is right. To-day we are excused from the *soirée*.

At last, at half-past six, Chotek came to the Emperor to tell him the Emperor Nicholas was close at hand. All

\* The drawing, representing the Bohemian lion, accompanies the Diary.—ED.



the Russians had felt to the last degree disappointed when they heard the Emperor had turned back, and everyone had hoped he would resume his journey. Clement went to him at once to try and induce him to do so, and he had the great kindness to put himself in motion once more. Half an hour after this incredible fuss and commotion, both at length arrived together. I was not present at the meeting. They say the two Emperors repeatedly embraced each other. My husband was at Court, and the Emperor of Russia said to him: 'I am come to put myself under the command of my chief. I look to you,' he added, 'to give me a hint when I make any mistake.' In short, his demeanour made the most favourable impression on everybody. At nine, I supped at the Marshal's table, where I saw Tatistscheff, Orloff, and others. It is wonderful what a change comes over the Russians when they find themselves in the presence of their master. They feel themselves under constraint, and become proud all at once, which gives rise to considerable comment. At the present moment, Orloff is the favourite; he stands high in honour, and accordingly everyone envies him as though he were a kind of god.

After supper, these gentlemen came to us. Ficquelmont, Nesselrode, Tatistscheff and Orloff made a hand at whist. Clement, Felix Schwarzenberg, Brockhausen and I played *quinze*. Nesselrode stayed till half-past one talking to Clement. It is decided that Ancillon is not to come, but the Crown Prince of Prussia arrives tomorrow. This gives rise to some apprehension on the part of the public, whereas this meeting is of an entirely pacific character, and will serve the interests of peace.

*September 11.*—Clement gave himself up to business. I dined at three at the Imperial table. Everyone had



come out in their best to do honour to the name-day of the Emperor Alexander's eldest son. I went early to the *château*, hoping that the Empress would present me; instead of which I found the Emperor of Russia in the dining-hall, surrounded by a number of Russians. I tried to slip away, but he stopped me. He remarked that he had known my mother, and said a number of other kind things to me. After dinner we played billiards, and he said he should place himself under my command. His expression, however, is serious and his demeanour cold, only warming when he is familiar with Orloff, who treats him just like a brother. He is also on a very friendly footing with Prince Suwaroff. I notice that Tatistscheff has been put quite in the back-ground since the Emperor has been here. Nesselrode also appears to be among the number of those who are badly treated, or at least taken no account of. All this is so different to what is customary with us, that it gives rise to much talk. I returned home with Nesselrode and Tatistscheff, who had to speak to Clement. We passed the evening at Court. The Emperor of Russia showed us a likeness of the Empress.

*September 12.*—The Crown Prince of Prussia, who arrived yesterday evening, passed two hours with Clement. I dined at Court. They had made the Sovereign's table smaller, the suite being distributed. There were only fifteen at our table. After dinner, Clement talked for such a long time with the Emperor of Russia that there was no time for billiards. The Emperor is very angry with Ancillon. He had wished to select him to come here, in order to take part in the deliberations. The latter, however, after making every kind of excuse, at length declared it would be beneath the dignity of Prussia to send him here. The Emperor

Nicholas was so enraged at this that it made him ill. The result has been that the Crown Prince came in person. He fully appreciates the difficulty of his position, and is emphatically desirous of the Minister's presence here, as the only man capable of properly conducting the affairs of Prussia. The Emperor of Russia, who is always actuated by the sincerest motives, still wishes Ancillon should come, in spite of the displeasure he felt at the latter's behaviour at Schwedt. But it is certain he will not be induced to come.

The Emperor Nicholas had notified to me that he would pay me a visit. This put me into the greatest perplexity, as our small lodging is not fit to receive him in. But he soon put an end to all difficulties himself. This man, who appeared to me so stiff, was friendly and cheerful. He received me with a shake of the hand, rebuked me for coming forward to greet him, and then entered into conversation in the kindest manner. The conversation turned chiefly on Louis Philippe and Maison, and we exchanged views on both of them quite unreservedly. The Emperor stayed some time, and his visit left the most pleasant impression behind it. Later on we went to the theatre; they played 'The Servant of Two Masters' and another piece, which I had seen played at the Duchess of Sagan's by General Witt, Fräulein Müller, and Korn. The actors do not rise above mediocrity. After supper the Russians assembled at our house. Orloff is merry and full of fun, and greatly diverts Clement. He told us the Emperor had been much pleased with his visit to us; he was astonished at my husband's cheerfulness, and much enjoyed the hours he had passed here. Clement is satisfied with the course things have taken, and repeats to me, at every opportunity,

how happy he is at having me with him. Thank God for it!

*September 14.*—The two Emperors, the Crown Prince of Prussia, the Grand Duke of Weimar, and the Duke of Nassau went stag-hunting. Clement did not leave his Cabinet, so I took a tolerably long walk with Chotek. We dined with the Sovereigns, who kept us waiting for awhile, as the hunt lasted a long time. At dinner, I sat next to the Duke of Nassau. Afterwards we played several sets of *kriegspartie*. The Emperor of Russia was very pleasant and played extremely well. He is exceedingly prepossessing in manner.

*September 15.*—The weather was bad, but the Sovereigns were present in uniform at a sort of Church parade. They reviewed the Jägers, who afterwards went through some slight manœuvres. Clement shuts himself up in his cabinet and works continuously. We dined with Tatistscheff. Nesselrode, Prince Wolkonski, Orloff, Medem, and Herr von Chreptowitch, Nesselrode's son-in-law, were among the guests. After supping at the Marshal's table, we returned home. Our guests did not play whist, as Nesselrode was missing. The Russians gave us details of the Emperor Alexander's death; the conversation then passed to politics.

*September 16.*—A great review was held, at which everyone was present. I remained the whole day almost alone. We dined with all the diplomatists at the Marshal's table. On reaching home, Windischgrätz paid me a visit and told me about his manœuvres, which make a great demand on his time. He told me the Emperor Nicholas was so delighted with Lato Wrbona's Hussar regiment, which he had seen going through some manœuvres, that it would be only proper to present

him with it ; but it must be done this evening. As he had been unable to speak to Clement, who was shut up with Nesselrode, he had come, he said, to ask me to take this matter in hand. I spoke about it to Clement, who at once laid it before the Emperor. Meanwhile, I waited in the Empress's room. The Grand Duchess overwhelmed me with kindness, and the Emperor Nicholas was very pleasant. He also expressed himself repeatedly in the warmest terms of praise of the Hussar regiment. Our Emperor came at nine, took him aside, and told him that he presented him with the regiment. The Emperor Nicholas fell upon his neck, embraced him like a child, and could not master his excessive joy. He sent at once to the regimental tailors, to have a uniform made for him, and gave orders that it should be ready by the morning—which appears to me impossible. He presented Windischgrätz with the Grand Cross of the Order of Alexander Newski; Prince Reuss and the commanding officer, Salhausen, with the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Anne; and all the subaltern officers with the Cross of a Commander. Everyone is charmed. All the Russians came to me, and the whole conversation turned on the Emperor's delight.

*September 17.*—We dined at Court. I had on my golden diadem, with which the Emperor Nicholas was so pleased that he ordered one exactly similar for the Empress. After dinner we played billiards; I had the Emperor Nicholas for partner. We played very well, and won three games.

*September 19.*—The Emperor Nicholas put his regiment through its manœuvres. The Duke of Nassau came and had a long conversation with me, after which we all assembled at the Imperial table, thirty-three



persons, I think, in all. The Empress embraced me, and said she was extremely glad to see me there. Orloff and all the Russians came to take leave of me. The former said the Emperor was very sorry not to have seen me again to beg for my good wishes before entering upon his journey; he had, however, to take leave of so many persons that it was impossible for him to pay me a visit. The Emperor started at midnight.

*September 20.*—I heard the Emperor set off at seven this morning. His departure was announced by the thunder of cannon. Clement was busy. Later on I had a walk with him and Nesselrode, and at five all who were still left at Münchengrätz assembled at our house, from Tatistscheff down to the officers of the Hussar regiment. Clement went to see Ficquelmont, who is unwell. I stayed at home, and prayed and read. Nesselrode, Herr von Chreptowitch, Tatistscheff and I played a hand at whist later on. Herr von Brunnow had a conversation with Clement. So the time went on till midnight. I lay down to rest with a feeling of thankfulness to God that this was the last night to be passed at Münchengrätz.

*Return to Vienna by way of Prague.*

1078. Arrival at Prague. The Duke of Bordeaux. Arrival at Vienna. First separation. Signature of the resolutions of Münchengrätz. Count Sándor's suit. Neumann. Prussian officers. Herr von Cetto.

**1078.** *Prague, September 21.*—We set out at eight o'clock in a pouring rain. Clement intends going for a few days to Linz, since he fears that he will be obliged, later on, to spend three weeks in Prague on account of German affairs. We reached Prague at three.

*September 22.*—We went to Buschtiehrad, distant



two hours from Prague. It rained, and the road was frightful. During this rough journey I read Clement despatches from London, and at last, by five o'clock, we reached our destination. We saw Charles X. He is better looking than I had pictured him to myself, perhaps because I had only known him as yet from caricatures. He received me very kindly, and introduced me to the little Duke, who is most charming. He is beautiful, sturdy, and speaks in the prettiest manner. Clement calls him 'an enviable child.'

*September 23.*—Clement had an unusual amount of work to do. Blacas robbed him of an hour. A number of Frenchmen wanted to assemble on the 29th of the month for the purpose of celebrating the majority of Henry V. Some expedient was in request by which Charles X. might be induced to go away for a time, and so be removed from all this hubbub. A letter from Montbel afforded this opportunity quite naturally. The Duchess of Berry has acquiesced in everything that the King requested. Her marriage certificate is deposited in Rome. Montbel has gone to fetch her; she comes later than she intended, and the King, with the Duke of Bordeaux, goes to meet her at Klagenfurt. They will remain there long enough to allow the day to pass by, on which all the intrigues of the false Royalists are to come to light.

*Vienna, September 29.*—We set off on the 24th from Prague.

*October 10.*—I passed the evening with Clement, who had a great deal to do. The courier from Berlin has not arrived, and it is not known whether Ancillon has signed the resolutions which were agreed upon at Münchengrätz. Meanwhile, he has lost time which is irreparable, and which is sufficient to prove to the

French and English that the three Powers are not fully unanimous.

*October 12.*—Clement rose betimes, in order to set out for Linz. I breakfasted with him, but he was so depressed that I could not say good-bye to him as I should have wished to. It distressed me deeply to see him set off without me. For the first time since my marriage I am separated from him. Happily it will not be for long; still I cannot say how much it grieves me.

*October 17.*—I received two letters from my dear Clement; in one of them he said he should arrive before five.

*October 19.*—Clement received despatches from Berlin. The resolutions of Münchengrätz are at length signed in due form.

*October 26.*—Clement spoke to me a great deal about Prague, whither he will have to go on account of the German Conferences.

*November 3.*—Clement sent for me to tell me Sándor had been to him to ask for Leontine's hand; his reply was, he was surprised Sándor should apply to him in such haste, but that he thanked him for this proof of confidence. He was not, however, fond of *dead* sons-in-law, and therefore was sorry to see him risking his life every day. He was, as a rule, no friend to break-neck escapades, and did not wish his son-in-law to get a reputation for them. He therefore advised him to go away from Vienna for a certain time, and then, if he gave no occasion for people to talk of him, he might renew his suit. He (Clement), however, could make no promise as to what his answer would be to that request, &c., &c. Sándor was moved to tears, and went away almost satisfied.

*November 6.*—Clement spoke to Leontine about his

interview with Sándor, and after breakfast she came to me to tell me more than enough to convince me that she looks upon herself as engaged to Sándor.

*November 9.*—Neumann came to breakfast with us. Clement told him Lord Palmerston was unwilling he should return to London, and complained of the interviews he had had with Bourmont, when that General was preparing to set out for Portugal.

*November 29.*—We had a grand dinner in honour of six Prussian officers just arrived from Italy, where they have been present at all the manœuvres. They are delighted with everything they saw there, as well as with the reception they everywhere met with. We had invited several of our own military friends, so that twenty persons sat down to table.

*December 26.*—I passed an hour with Clement, who read something over with Prokesch. In the evening I had visitors, among others, Herr von Cetto, the Bavarian Ambassador. Clement always avails himself of his being present to express his views unreservedly on the present situation, pretending all the while not to know that the Ambassador belongs to the party of progress.

*ON THE POLITICAL EVENTS OF THE DAY.*

Extracts from confidential Letters of Metternich's to Apponyi and Hügel in Paris, from January 26 to December 30, 1833. In two parts.

I.

1079. Progress of the Belgian-Dutch question. Palmerston's peculiar attitude. Character of the English Cabinet. Talleyrand. 1080. The Turco-Egyptian conflict. 1081. Signature of the convention at Constantinople. 1082. Admiral Roussin. 1083. Apponyi's conversation with De Broglie on German affairs. 1084. De Broglie's views on Spain and Switzerland. 1085. Despatch of troops from Mayence to Frankfort. 1086. Despatch of troops to the Tyrol.

*Metternich to Apponyi.*

1079. *Vienna, January 26.*—I have had a long experience in affairs ; my mind is not obscured by prejudices in regard to men and things ; I understand with the facility given by the most ordinary common sense ; well, gifted as I am with all these faculties and facilities, the course taken by the Belgian affair passes my comprehension.\* I can no longer make anything out of it ; my mind refuses to work upon it, and if duty did not forbid my doing so, I should abandon it to the mercy of the winds and the waves rather than continue to have anything to do with it. It has come to affect me with inexpressible disgust.

In the latest communications of Lord Palmerston, there is no trace of any spirit of opposition or distrust *so far as concerns us* ; nay more, the spirit by which

\* See No. 1092.

these communications are pervaded is of a contrary kind. They are evidently meant by that Minister to serve the purpose of a parliamentary statement. He addresses questions to me on twenty different things, which, as between himself and me, are needless; he wishes, by submitting his despatch to Parliament, to show the House the manner in which the Belgian affair has been conducted. I have not only nothing to object to this project, I am even ready to promote it; but it concerns me to know whether, when others besides myself say *good-morning* to Lord Palmerston, he replies with a justification implying that he has understood them to say *good-night* to him. The inquiry may be one of curiosity, of necessity if you will, but M. de Broglie can shed light upon it for me by a simple *yes* or *no*.

But there is one point independent of this question, and which, in my opinion, it is necessary we should find out; and this is whether the French Cabinet has expressed its approval or disapproval of the latest decision of Prince Talleyrand and Lord Palmerston in regard to the counter-declaration of the King of the Netherlands. By acting as they have not hesitated to do, the two plenipotentiaries have once more given up the whole settlement of the Belgian question into the hands of the King of the Netherlands. The two negotiators behave as though they were in the pay of the party who wished indefinitely to protract the final settlement of the Belgian-Dutch dispute. *Never*, no, never has a negotiation been conducted like the one in question. Folly has narrower limits than bad faith; I am compelled in spite of myself to regard the latter as the element which has predominated in the conduct of the affair. Lord Palmerston is somewhat *naïve* in



politics; moreover, he is a violent partizan; he is the puppet of Prince Talleyrand, and it is plain that the latter does not desire the termination of a negotiation which, so long as it lasts, is equivalent, for him, to a bond between the two maritime Powers.

The unfortunate proceedings of General Pozzo at London are due, unless I am deceived, to mere rashness on his part. No letter from St. Petersburg has anything in it to induce us to suppose that the Emperor had so much as thought beforehand of such a proceeding. What is certain, is that the English Ministers are astounded at the General's appearance on the scene; it is as if they had seen the head of Medusa.

Affairs are nothing more, in the last result, than the reflection of the men entrusted with their management. I know of none worse than those who compose the English Administration. Presumption and *naïveté*, audacity and hesitation, form the distinctive features of Lord Palmerston. Lord Grey is feeble and carries no weight. The rest of the Cabinet consists of Liberal politicians more or less incapable of seizing or following out a sound practical idea. Such are the men side by side with whom the aged Talleyrand has gone to fight his last battles. He has introduced into the conduct of affairs a confusion, the idea of which could have originated with none but himself, as he alone was capable of manipulating its results. And it is with an England in this state that Europe is condemned to act! The country which, after England, will be the greatest sufferer by it, is France. War will be the inevitable result of all these errors and provocations; and the day it breaks out, since nothing is more real than war, it is not those who have openly pursued a practical line of policy upon whom the contest will fall most severely.

1080. *February 21.*—The East has once more presented an opening to the political action of France which the latter has hastened to make the most of in its usual way. The feebleness of idea no less than the material weakness which characterises the Divan, had lent themselves to the pernicious scheme. To play a part, and to play it at the expense of a great Power, was an idea captivating alike to the French Ministers and their agents. Accordingly they have spared no efforts to make the leading position at Constantinople their own, and at the same time eradicate any influence possessed there by Russia or even Austria. As for England, she has once more been treated as the present Ministry deserves. It was an easy task for the French Cabinet to lead that of London blindly whither it would.

You will see by the enclosed documents, which are for your *private information only*, what immense strides the French intrigue has made at the expense of the very safety of the Porte. Events have put an end to this muddle. M. de Varennes had pledged his word so positively that Ibrahim Pacha would *obey him*, that the day when the former, instead of halting at his commands, advanced upon Constantinople, the idle boastings of the *chargé d'affaires* were exposed for what they were worth. The combined action of the two Imperial Courts could not then fail to meet with success; the course they adopted was a wise and impartial one, and free from all ulterior motives; we had taken the initiative, and it was to the combined representations of the two Courts that Mehemet Ali was forced to give way. Such is the plain unvarnished truth of the whole matter.

I venture to flatter myself that England will see the necessity of no longer acting apart from us in the

Egyptian question.\* In this way, France will be compelled, on her part, to join us or pursue an isolated policy. In the one case, as in the other, she will not play the part which her *amour propre* had suggested as being open to her, and which she had already begun to carry into effect.

1081. *March* 18.—I have no very clear idea of the effect which will have been produced upon the French Cabinet by the signature of the Convention at Constantinople.† The desire for predominance will have been satisfied, but what will the consequences be?

The Egyptian difficulty would have been settled at once, had the French Government but assimilated its policy to that of the three other Courts. But the golden mean has no idea of anything simple; whatever is so, naturally, must needs be altered and re-altered and distorted in every possible way, and among them all there is not one which is of the least use, either for itself, or for others!

I presume the short announcement of the *signature of peace*, which we inserted in the *Observer*, has caused some surprise at Paris.

You will see by one of the documents I send you to-day the motives which have actuated me in all I have done. Should M. de Broglie at any time mention the subject to you, express yourself to him in the same terms as I have used to M. de Bussierre.

In my despatches I have forgotten one argument which is not without weight. Can France think that she has any interests to serve in involving the Sultan in a quarrel with the Empire of Russia? As such a supposition is inadmissible, how is it Admiral Roussin could *compel the Divan to inflict a rebuff on that Sovereign?* It

\* See No. 1093.

† See Nos. 1095 and 1096.

is a strange way of helping one's friends, to compromise them in order to gratify our inordinate self-love.

The Russian fleet had already received orders to leave the Bosphorus. It was with a full knowledge of this fact that Admiral Roussin thought fit to demand its departure as a condition of the protection of France, and, good heavens! what a France!

1082. Wrong-doing always leads to confusion, and what frightful confusion reigns at the present moment! The Turco-Egyptian affair—that detestable business, which every reasonable Power ought to be glad to have nothing to do with, unless specially compelled to interfere in it by the exigencies of its position—had been placed upon as favourable a footing as was possible, after the mission of General Murawieff.

The flagrant danger for Constantinople was removed; the means of material succour were on their way; what must Admiral Roussin do? By co-operating in what had been done, he would have completed the good work, *the only one possible*; instead of which, he upset all the good results that had been gained, in order to substitute in their stead a piece of bravado which has had small success at Alexandria, and which the insolent expressions of the *Journal des Débats*, and the less bitter but equally absurd proclamation of the Ministerial Press, will never succeed in elevating into an effectual means of succour for the Sultan! We shall see now what will be done by *the arbiters of the destinies of the East* (an official and historical phrase). I send you, enclosed, some documents which will enable you to prove to M. de Broglie on which side the error and wrong-doing lie. Where is the Emperor of Russia's greed of conquest? If this greed does not exist, M. de Broglie will find out that the strain France is now making upon the capital of her



honour and her reason is too severe for the mere sake of satisfying a voluntary or involuntary prejudice, in other words a crime or an error.

How will the French Ministers extricate themselves from the abominable position in which they have placed themselves from sheer thoughtlessness?

The English Ministers are much worse than the 'golden mean,' whether considered as a whole, or in detail. I think, however, that the new position of things in the Levant will give them food for reflection. What will come of all this complication? God knows! and as I am not God, I confess the matter is beyond me.

**1083.** I have read with interest the report you sent me, in your private letter of April 12, of an interview you had with M. de Broglie, in which that Minister touched upon the situation of Germany.

M. de Broglie asked you if you believed in a revolution, and showed you that he was not uneasy as to the attitude of the French Government; he concluded by expressing to you his conviction that nothing short of an outbreak abroad would give the Republicans the support they require to embolden them to attempt a rising at Paris. I have no hesitation in letting you know my ideas on these three questions.

The word *revolution* is one which, since the events of the last few years, it has become rather difficult to define; its meaning varies in the mouths of those who utter it.

In what sense does M. de Broglie speak of a revolution in Germany? Does he mean the overthrow of existing Governments, and the fusion of the various members composing the Confederation into a Republic one and indivisible? In that case, I reply that a revolution of that nature undoubtedly occupies the thoughts



of a great number of agitators, but that its execution will present many difficulties to those who undertake the great enterprise. *I do not fear it, because I am not afraid of a contest that is openly waged.* In contests of this kind, cannon hold the foremost place, and the immense majority of the German peoples will lend their support to the Governments. The most experienced general can never ensure the issue of a battle beforehand; but if, after comparing his own numbers and resources with those of the enemy, he finds the advantage to be on his side, he will not hesitate to offer battle.

Does M. de Broglie apply the term *revolution* to that disorder in the minds of men which leads to disorder in affairs? In that case, I reply that a revolution of that nature is more or less at work in Germany. If it has not attained its maximum development, that benefit is directly due to the wise decrees of the 28th June last.\* It may possibly receive augmentation from certain partial outbreaks, in regard to which the German Governments are unanimously resolved to show no quarter.

The Confederation is a legally constituted body, and it will know how to make its rights respected.

I am entirely of the same way of thinking as the Duke de Broglie, as regards the second and third propositions. I think nothing short of a successful foreign revolution could lend the French Radical party sufficient strength to overthrow the Government. If, as I am ready to admit, the French Government attaches great and lively interest to the preservation of peace abroad, it ought to do all in its power to promote that interest, and to this end there is only one means that I

\* See the Six Articles of the Germanic Diet, No. 1063.—ED.

know of, and this is, that it should do nothing to countenance the opinion that it is ready to become the abettor and patron of revolutionary attempts beyond its frontiers. It can only attain this end by refusing any longer to countenance those insurrectionary centres established in France, which are a direct encouragement to the factions, and by ceasing to confound *political* questions with those measures of simple *preservation*, which the Governments find themselves compelled to adopt for their own safety.

The position I have just laid down involves no reproach on my part against the present French Administration. The men composing it have already done much that merits approbation; a fact no one can be more ready to acknowledge than myself; for I yield to no one in forming a calm and impartial judgment on the actual position of any particular Government. I know all the difficulties by which the French Ministers must necessarily find themselves beset. I know that it is far more difficult to arrest the progress of a revolution than to abstain altogether from attempting one. I am aware that no Government can pursue a firm and undeviating course when it is exposed daily to the influence of such dissolvent conditions as the freedom of the Press, the demagogic elements inherent in fundamental laws—in a word, the disorder prevailing in the ideas of a whole nation. I am aware of all this, and it is for that very reason that I can all the more appreciate anything approaching an attempt to *re-establish public tranquillity*.

What is certain is, that the propaganda is a weapon no less formidable to France than to her neighbours. The Lafayettes, Cabets, Odilon Barrots, and their fellows, wish, sooner or later, to see France in a state of

anarchy; they make use of foreign countries to serve their ends, and if all their efforts tend ostensibly in this direction, they do not, for all that, lose sight of the direct object they have in view.

From all this one truth is clear, a truth I have been preaching from the house-tops for a very long time past, and that is, that there exists among Governments, whatever their character, a solidarity of interests which can only be ignored at their common expense, or that of the particular Government which is blind enough not to see the need of such solidarity, and shape its course accordingly.

Such, my dear Count, is my profession of faith; a profession which, as you know, has served to regulate my conduct in all the circumstances, great or small, which have come within the sphere of my action, since Europe entered upon the path of *progress*. What I understand by the word is also well known to you.

I leave you entirely at liberty to enter into explanations in this sense with the Duke de Broglie. Unless I am deceived he will think as I do.

1084. *May 3.*—M. de Broglie has had a conversation with you on the approaching ceremony of the taking of the oath of allegiance in Spain, and on the affairs of Switzerland. As regards the first, all is said, so far as we are concerned, when I have told you that we look upon it as an affair of Spanish home-politics.\* You are aware that we never meddle in matters of this kind, and if the immediate future suggests a difficulty to us, it is confined exclusively to the directions to be

\* This refers to the refusal of Don Carlos to take the oath of allegiance to Isabella, and the former's protest against that enactment of the King, which excluded him and his male descendants from the Spanish succession, in favour of the female line.—ED.

given to M. de Brunetti for regulating his conduct, so that nothing he might do or not do should take the least semblance of any interference on our part in an affair which we consider in no way concerns us.

It is a great satisfaction to me to find that, in one point at least, the Duke de Broglie's opinion coincides with my own ; and that is the merit of the men who at this moment compose the Spanish Cabinet. The Duke de Broglie takes a view that is at once just and reasonable when he expresses the wish that public order, as at present existing, should be maintained in Spain, and it would inevitably be overthrown on the day when the so-called Liberal party in that kingdom prevailed against the wise, moderate, and conservative views of MM. de Zea and Ofalia.

But while unhesitatingly attaching to the words of the Minister for Foreign Affairs all the weight they deserve, I cannot help asking myself how it is that the French Cabinet does nothing to arrest the revolutionary fervour to which Mr. Stratford Canning abandons himself in all his proceedings at Madrid? How could the French Ambassador lend his support, if only with a caution that has not escaped our notice, to attempts which, if crowned with success, would inevitably result in the downfall of Spain, and a state of open revolution, accompanied by all the horrors of civil war? We fail to see the connection between what we recognise as the plain interests of the French Government and the course—as we think inexplicable and opposed to sound policy—which we see pursued by the representative of the British Cabinet at Madrid. The only practical means which can be afforded to Spain of extricating herself with the least danger possible from the painful position in which she is now placed, is to leave her to



herself. Any foreign interference will bring on a catastrophe in that kingdom, the pernicious consequences of which will extend far beyond her own frontiers. The Spanish character admits of no compromises; a *Liberal* Spain is a word void of meaning. Spain will always be either fervently monarchical or distinctly Radical. The two parties are face to face, and both will find active sympathisers in the great neighbouring State. The French Government therefore has but one interest to serve, that of the tranquillity of Spain. That interest is at the same time a European one, and the interests of Great Britain lie plainly in the same direction. If personal views or political prejudices should for the moment lead the English Ministers astray, would the French Government do well to support them?

This question naturally leads me to examine the situation of affairs in Switzerland, on which subject the Duke de Broglie has likewise explained his views to you. If I understand that Minister aright, I think I am justified in admitting that he is no more disposed to patronise the *pretended* reforms which the revolutionary faction are desirous of applying to the fundamental compact of Switzerland, than we are or could be, on our part. Any difference therefore which might arise between the two Cabinets would be confined to the judgment they passed on the dangers of the moment. According to the notions of the French Cabinet, the revolutionary movement in that country has not made so much progress as we suppose.

I confess to you frankly that we are too near to the scene of events, too well informed of what goes on there, and too much interested in being so, to be otherwise than convinced of the accuracy of our ideas on the subject.



We know that the schemes and projects of the more impatient of the Swiss revolutionists have, up to the present time, not been crowned with that easy and complete success with which they had flattered themselves ; but we know just as well that unless some adequate remedy be brought to bear without delay on the progress of the evil that has taken possession of Switzerland, that evil will soon have attained the height to which the impatience of the Reformers had dreamed they could inflame it at the first attempt.

That remedy, the only adequate one we know of, consists in a complete uniformity of attitude on the part of the chief Powers, a uniformity we have never ceased to demand from them, but which unfortunately has not existed hitherto. Is not the proof of this mournful fact only too plainly to be found in the very different views held by M. de Broglie and myself in regard to the very existence of danger in the present situation of things in Switzerland ? That country needs to be tranquillised, and this can only be effected by the frank moral concurrence of the Powers. It is a matter of importance to the States bordering on Switzerland, that that country should not become a hot-bed of revolution, and of all Governments it is that of France which would be the first to find itself assailed by the lava and scoriæ which the new volcano would vomit forth !

I have no hesitation in putting you in a position to lay these truths before M. de Broglie. Let the French Government face the reality ; let it take us frankly for what we are ; above all, let it be under no illusions as to what we wish. We wish that public tranquillity should be confirmed, or, what is more consonant to the actual needs of the day, re-established. So long as revolution only occupied men's minds, the arena was a

vast one, and it was possible for utopias to fade away like smoke. This is no longer the case. Ideas have taken shape, and attempts now deal with realities. This state of things must quickly cease, or anarchy will break into open flames. Determined not to perish with our arms folded, we shall fight against it, for we prefer to conquer or to die sword in hand. But what we desire above all is to see the Governments pursue a wise and bold course, having for its exclusive aim the suppression of the evil. What Government could be so far its own foe as not to wish what we wish? We know not a single one.

1085. *May 9.*—M. de Bussierre has read me a despatch addressed to him by M. de Broglie, relating to the recent events at Frankfurt,\* and more particularly the despatch of the troops withdrawn from Mayence to maintain tranquillity in the former city. I have declared to M. de Bussierre that it is entirely out of our power to discuss the question with France.

I shall make no secret from you of the surprise which the proceeding of the French Government has caused me. The interest of maintaining tranquillity in the States bordering on France belongs as much to the French Government as it possibly can to us; and whoever wishes the thing must wish the means!

In the despatch under consideration, the necessity of the measure adopted by the Germanic Diet, and even the competence of the latter to act, are called in question; the supposition that the city of Frankfurt has protested against the assistance afforded it by the Diet is therein

\* On April 3, two armed bands, among whom were many foreign students, attacked the guard-house, shot down the sentinels, engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle with the military, and liberated the prisoners. A similar attack on the artillery barracks was attended with the same result.—ED.

established; and it concludes with the request that the measures be withdrawn as soon as possible.

In what I have just quoted to you, there is nothing but what I am compelled to contradict. The Diet has acted within its clearly-defined rights, and in accordance with the strictest interpretation of the law. The magistrate of Frankfurt has not protested against his arrest. Peace is not yet re-established, unless the momentary discouragement that has seized upon the agitators, from the failure of their first attempt, be hailed as the return of a settled order of things. Every day throws fresh light on the great network of conspiracy covering Western Germany, and the results, I greatly fear, will prove that audacious attempts will not be confined to the single rising at Frankfurt. I can give the Duke de Broglie no information on this point; it is natural he should know as much about it as I do, and I even wish that, in the interests of his own country as well as those of the general welfare, he may have access to fuller sources of information than we ourselves possess. The French Government would run great risks were it to know nothing of what went on directly under its eyes!

I say only these few words to you, for the subject does not lend itself to an official correspondence. The German Governments begin to be more clear-sighted than they have proved hitherto; I cannot think of even one whose eyes would not be completely opened. They are impressed with the necessity of taking their stand firmly on the Federal basis; they will not allow anything to divert them from this. Let us hope their efforts will be crowned with success; France equally with Austria, I will even say France in a greater degree than Austria, will be sensible of the benefit of *an abortive revolution*.

Our persistent efforts will invariably be directed to this generally beneficial aim.

**1086.** *May 9.*—We are at this moment sending 6,000 to 7,000 men as reinforcements to the Tyrol, with the view of lending our Federal allies a support which they can employ as they think best. We shall listen to no representations in regard to our Federal obligations. If the French Government thinks to live a day the longer because of Germany being in a state of revolution, nay, if it thinks it is going to live for ever on this condition, Germany will none the less always give it the same answer, ‘Die, or if you will have it, let us fight!’ I beg you not to take the initiative in discussing any of these questions with M. de Broglie. We draw a strict line between domestic affairs and political affairs, and as we acquiesce in the right of the French Government to take steps for its own preservation, even by laws of an exceptional character, and that without previously asking our consent or advice—just as it would refuse subsequently to take either blame or approbation from us—and as it is perfectly right in so doing, a similar privilege pertains to every independent State; and one does not cease to be independent by being a neighbour.

Such is the situation and such the rule of the Confederation. If, however, M. de Broglie enters upon the discussion of such questions with you, intrench yourself strongly under shelter of the principles I have just laid down. They are as old as human society itself, and all the doctrines that ever have been, are, or shall be will never succeed in doing away with them.

## II.

1087. Meeting between the Emperor Francis and King Frederick William III. at Theresienstadt. Complete harmony between the two Cabinets. Diplomatic personages at Teplitz. 1088. Motives of their presence. M. Bresson. Scheme for a meeting between the two Emperors. 1089. Realisation of the scheme. 1090. Gathering of Royalists at Prague to celebrate the majority of Henri V. De Broglie's attitude in reference to the resolutions of Münchengrätz. Talleyrand's views on the Eastern question.

*Metternich to Hügel.\**

1087. *Teplitz, August 16, 1833.*—I arrived here from Königswart on the 8th instant. Owing to a slight indisposition which detained the Emperor at Theresienstadt, and at the same time deferred the meeting of his Imperial Majesty with the King of Prussia, I am obliged to prolong my stay here until to-morrow. I shall be at Königswart again the day after to-morrow, and remain there till the end of the month.

The interview between the two monarchs took place the day before yesterday at Theresienstadt. The King of Prussia returned on the afternoon of the same day to Teplitz, where his Majesty reckons on remaining till the 25th or 26th instant, when he will return to Berlin. Their Majesties had not met each other for ten years; they felt the liveliest satisfaction at being once more enabled to exchange the mutual assurance of that old and inviolable friendship which, all through the long series of momentous events with which their reign has been thickly sown, has been the surest pledge of the well-being of their respective monarchies!

\* Count Apponyi was absent on leave from Paris, whither he did not return until December. During this time, the duties of Ambassador were fulfilled by Baron Clement Hügel, to whom the following four letters are addressed.—ED.



I met here with M. Ancillon, whom, again, I had not seen for a number of years, especially since his entry upon the high sphere of office. The fresh conviction I carry away with me of the perfect uniformity of views existing between our Cabinet and that of his Majesty the King of Prussia, is not the fact which assumes the greatest interest for me, after my recent stay here. My conviction was too deep to require any further confirmation, and when a truth is so well founded, it certainly needs no fresh assurances to corroborate it. What really gave me the greatest pleasure was to see old friends once more.

There is no lack of diplomatic personages at Teplitz. Marshal Maison, whom I had already received as a guest in the country, whither he had come to pay me a visit during his stay at Carlsbad ; M. Bresson, and Lord Minto are here. The Marshal having signified his desire of paying his respects to the Emperor, his Imperial Majesty received him yesterday at Theresienstadt, which he left to-day for Prague.

**1088.** *August 16.*—The presence of so many French and English diplomatists at Teplitz is certainly not the result of chance. Being convinced of the importance attaching to the meeting between the two Monarchs and their Ministers, and uneasy—as is always the case with those who find themselves in a false position—the French and English envoys have received instructions to place themselves within reach of penetrating the supposed mystery. Their journey hither for that purpose will have been a pure waste of time.

Where no mystery exists it would be extremely difficult to see through it. The two Monarchs and their Cabinets have been so closely and so long united, that a personal meeting between them could supply nothing to

strengthen the sentiment. Those whose interest it is to confer on matters of this kind, do not choose public promenades or the assembly-rooms of a watering-place to air them in. The diplomatists will have learnt nothing from their travels, and if, by way of making up for their pardonable ignorance, they should report mere suppositions to their respective Courts, denials would quickly follow to show their futility.

I have come to a complete understanding with the Prussian Cabinet as to the measures best adapted for rescuing Germany from the dangers in which her proximity to so many countries a prey to revolution threaten to involve her. I cherish the hope that, in this respect, our efforts will not be thrown away.

I have made the acquaintance of M. Bresson,\* and have no doubt that he has already reported to his Government a long conversation, which a meeting in the public promenade gave me the opportunity of holding with him, in the presence of Marshal Maison and M. Ancillon. I have got wind of the impression it left upon him, and if he has reported it faithfully, it must have served to convince M. de Broglie that the difference of locality and position has no influence on my language.

The storm at Teplitz—for everything wears that aspect in the eyes of the 'golden mean'—will pass by without the thunderbolt having fallen. An event of a similar nature is in preparation, and is likely to cause a still deeper dismay at Paris and London. The Emperor Nicholas has just announced to us his approaching arrival. His Imperial Majesty will have an interview with the Emperor, our august master, at some point on the Bohemian frontier. He will see the King of Prussia either on his arrival or on his return to Russia.

\* The French Ambassador at Berlin.—ED.

I confide this fact to you *under seal of the deepest secrecy*. My reason for keeping the circumstance a secret is, that our ideas on the subject not yet being completely matured, we are at present prevented from speaking of it openly, and that we are not fond of mystery where there is nothing in question that is not simple and straightforward. My only thought, therefore, in now telling you of it is, that it may enable you to regulate your language when the occurrence comes to be talked about by the public, before the arrival of the ostensible despatch which I shall not fail to address to you on the subject. . . .

The rumour of the Emperor of Russia's arrival has occupied the newspapers for some time; it has already formed the subject of much diplomatic correspondence. The real truth is that it is only just now the monarchs know anything about it.

1089. *Königsward, August 30.*—Before this despatch reaches you, General Pozzo will have received instructions from his Court to enter into explanations as to the journey of the Emperor of Russia. The Vice-Chancellor's despatch having been communicated to us, it only remains for me to direct you to repeat to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the words used by the Russian Ambassador, in order to attach to the meeting of the two Emperors the sole meaning it has, or indeed could have, and put a stop to the hateful interpretations which party-spirit persistently endeavours to apply to the acts of the two Governments. Still, the more exaggerated these interpretations, the more will they be falsified by the event.

For a long time past the monarchs have been desirous of seeing each other, but the realisation of their mutual wish has hitherto been found impracticable, owing to im-

pediments which it did not rest with them to overcome. The journey that our august master is at this moment making in Bohemia has afforded his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia an opportunity of which he thought it well to avail himself. The matter had long been publicly talked of before anything was settled in regard to it; for, as I have just said, we were not sure, until this moment, that the Emperor Nicholas would take this journey, and a courier, who left St. Petersburg on the 18th August, has just arrived with the information that he reckoned upon embarking on the 27th of that month. The Emperor, our august master, informs me that he intends going early in September to Friedland,\* where he will await the arrival of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, between the 5th and 7th of that month.

1090. *Vienna, October 1.*—I beg you to use the utmost frankness in your explanations to the King on the Prague affair.† I had an interview yesterday with Count Sainte-Aulaire, in which I spoke with the frankness and *abandon* to which conversation lends itself so much more easily than writing. I did not conceal from him the feeling which had been produced in the Emperor's mind by the arrival at Prague of so large a number of men belonging to a particular party. This is what I said to him:

I believe your Government might have prevented the departure of these travellers; it must therefore have had a special reason for not using the means at its disposal. What that reason was I can guess. It will

\* Local considerations led to the choice of Münchengrätz instead of Friedland, and there the two Emperors took up their quarters in Count W...  
 † *W...*—ED.

...st gathering at Prague to celebrate the majority of



have put the case thus : there are only two alternatives ; either Charles X. will resolutely keep his ground and reply to the congratulations of these visitors—in which case he will afford the French Government an excuse for taking severe measures against these men and lodging a complaint against the exiled family at Prague—or Charles X. will refuse to have anything to do with them ; in which case he will put the finishing stroke to Royalism. Both alternatives may have appeared desirable to the French Government, and it would therefore naturally look upon them as admissible. As we are not here concerned with the different parties in France, my complaint will not bear upon that point ; I confine it to a question of lofty political morality. Austria has, with the assent, I will even say on the solicitation, of the French Government, received the exiled Royal Family under her protection ; you can but congratulate yourselves on the line of conduct we thought proper to pursue ; on what principle do we deserve to have our tranquillity disturbed ? You name certain Royalists belonging to the party of disorder, and you provide some of them with passports to enable them to throw themselves into our country. What would you say of us if we were to imitate your conduct by sending among you the agitators who gave us trouble at home ? To say the least of it, it is a singular mode of proceeding.'

M. de Sainte-Aulaire asked me whether it would not have been in our power to refuse them admission at the frontier.

' You would then,' I replied, ' throw upon us the burden of acting the French police ? We have enough to do with our own. To-morrow you will be lodging a complaint with me, if we refuse admission within the



frontiers to some commercial traveller, and yet you would have had us turn back certain individuals who were furnished with papers in due form? I can only repeat to you that sound policy disdains such a proceeding as that.'

This is the position I desire you to take up in your interviews with the King and the Duke de Broglie, should he wish to discuss the subject.

1091. *December 30.*—Among other numerous acts of folly committed by the French Ministers, I must mention the contemptible, the Machiavellian course recently pursued by the Duke de Broglie in reference to the resolutions of Münchengrätz. There is a certain art in knowing how to conceal the truth, but downright falsehood forms no part of it. If a man feels there is something he ought to say, he must be able to say it openly, for merely to pretend one has said a certain thing, is by no means equivalent to having actually said it. Why could not the Duke de Broglie frankly indicate Piedmont as included among the number of the States coming within the radius he excludes? It was because he wished to avoid calling forth a categorical answer. But, wishing as he did to avoid an answer of that sort, why did he slip the word in behind our backs? Did it not strike him that the fact might possibly be brought to our ears? Does he then really think that the Government of the 'golden mean' is beloved, that it has confidants entirely devoted to it, and that all the Courts of the second and third rank form the body of its clients? What is to be said of a Minister who so grossly deceives himself?\*

\* The matter above referred to is briefly as follows: Baron Hügel, who at that time acted as ambassador at Paris, had a conversation with the Duke de Broglie in reference to the meeting of the two Emperors at Münchengrätz (see No. 1098), in which the latter declared, amongst other things,

In regard to this subject generally, keep closely to the instructions I give you ; say nothing unless you are attacked, but if you are attacked, answer as I have answered ; in other words, *firmly and to the point*. There are questions in regard to which capitulation is impossible ; the revolutions to which we may be exposed will call forth our action ; we admit the possibility of the French Government not tolerating it ; *in that case we shall accept war*.

When a course has once been decided upon, as is the case with ourselves, of what use are words ? War is the consequence of revolutions ; the best advice that can be given to those who do not wish to have the consequences is that they should take precautions to remove the cause, and in the actual situation of things in Europe, *not to excite revolutions is to prevent them*.

The vast majority of peoples is weary of disorder, and the benefit may be turned to advantage by the 'golden mean ;' if it has the talent and the power to do so, we shall sincerely congratulate it. Our views are perfectly clear and straightforward, so that there can be no difficulty in understanding us.

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that France would only take exception to the policy of intervention agreed upon by the three allied Courts, in the event of the principle being actively applied in the case of Switzerland or Belgium, since France neither could nor would permit of any interference on the part of a foreign Power in the affairs of those two countries. Baron Hügel gave particulars of what had passed to Prince Metternich, and the latter made them known to Count Sainte-Aulaire. When, in reading the report, Metternich came to the passage where mention was made of the two places excepted, Sainte-Aulaire interrupted him with the remark that Hügel's report was not accurate, that Broglie must undoubtedly have made mention of a third place, viz., Piedmont, and that Austria might rest assured that the moment she attempted any intervention in that country, she would encounter a French army there. In his circular, despatched to his own diplomatic agents, dated Paris, November 4, De Broglie openly speaks not only of Switzerland and Belgium, but Piedmont, as the countries to which France would not permit of the principle of intervention being applied.—E.D.

The views of Prince Talleyrand on Eastern affairs are far sounder than those of the English Ministers. London is one vast centre of general conflagration. You will shortly be able to convince yourself that we are directing our engines upon that point.



*RESUMPTION OF THE BELGIAN-DUTCH  
NEGOTIATION.*

1092. A Memoir by Metternich, dated Vienna, January 18, 1833.

1092. I. General view of the subject.

The Cabinet of Vienna has no remarks to offer on the course pursued by the Conference that it has not said and repeated over and over again in its diplomatic correspondence with the four mediating Courts. At this moment it must content itself with taking up the matter at the point it has now reached as a necessary consequence of the separate action of the two maritime Courts, the capture of the citadel of Antwerp, and the withdrawal of the French army to its own territory.

The affair having reached this stage, the following consequences may be deduced from it :

A treaty exists (that of November 15) which has been ratified purely and simply by the two maritime Courts and the King of the Belgians—with reservations by the Courts of Austria and Prussia. This treaty, taking into account the declaration attached by the Court of Russia to its act of ratification, in addition to the same reservations as had been made by the two other Continental Courts, and considering the coercive measures adopted by England and France, has no longer any but a discretionary obligation for his Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

The King of the Netherlands, without ever having

given his adhesion to the treaty of November 15, has nevertheless continued, up to the moment the Conference was broken up by the two maritime Courts, to negotiate on the terms of the said treaty. He has virtually consented to the principle of the separation between Belgium and Holland, and has explicitly accepted the territorial limitation of the two States henceforth to be separated one from the other.

The coercive measures employed against his Majesty the King of the Netherlands could not therefore but have reference solely to the settlement of certain questions of detail; and, in fact, the declarations of the two maritime Courts, if strictly analysed, will be found to have borne reference merely to questions of this nature.

Such being the undoubted state of the case, it follows that a notable difference exists in the attitude of the several Courts relative to the Belgian affair.

Two of their number, viz., France and England, are bound to the King of the Belgians by the terms of a definite treaty concluded with that Prince.

Two other Courts, viz., Austria and Prussia, are bound by certain clauses of the treaty of November 15, and free in regard to certain of its conditions.

Russia may still be considered as *morally* committed to the principle of the separation of the two countries and the clauses arranging for the settlement of their frontier; but owing to the employment of coercive measures on the part of the two maritime Courts, against which she formally protested, coupling with the said protestation the clause cancelling her ratification, that Power has recovered complete *diplomatic* liberty.

His Majesty the King of the Netherlands is free in the choice of his diplomatic attitude.



## II. Consequences of this position of things.

Of two alternatives, one : either his Majesty the King of the Netherlands will accept the propositions which have just been submitted to him by the two maritime Courts, or he will refuse to accept them. If he accepts them the whole matter is virtually at an end. If he does not accept them the matter will be no further advanced than it was on the 22nd October last. A fresh negotiation will have to be entered upon, and brought to a conclusion, or else Europe will, in spite of itself, remain in a state of tension in regard to the Belgian-Dutch question, which by its inevitable consequences must lead, sooner or later, to a rupture between the Powers.

*To these considerations it may be added that a negotiation opened and carried on after the same methods and within the same channels as the last, which brought the Belgian affair to a deadlock, from which it has been unable to escape in the course of the two years which have just elapsed, cannot possibly result in a peaceful solution.*

This conviction is held so firmly at Vienna, that, rather than embark on a course so opposed to his wishes, his Imperial Majesty would prefer to hold himself aloof from any direct participation in the future negotiation. The conscience of his Imperial Majesty and the political attitude of his Empire, would derive from this decision a satisfaction which the contrary course could not offer.

Nevertheless, the Emperor does not hesitate to couple with this declaration the expression of his profound conviction that it is of the last importance for the general welfare that the Belgian question should be brought to a definite conclusion as speedily as possible, and his

Majesty sees only one means to the attainment of this end, viz., *the resumption of the common negotiation under reservations which will render its success possible.*

### III. On the Method of Negotiation.

We start, to begin with, from the necessity of a *complete uniformity of attitude on the part of the three continental Courts.*

The question, if it is ever to arrive at a real solution, unquestionably demands the concurrence of the foremost Powers. Russia can no more afford than Prussia or Austria to stand aloof from an arrangement which, on any other supposition, could only become the subject of perpetual complications and compromises. The very fact of the Emperor of Russia again consenting to take part in the question, untrammelled as he is by any diplomatic engagement, will of itself throw an undoubted weight into the scale of a regular negotiation.

Granting that that monarch decides upon adopting this course, it only remains to determine the points which are to form a common basis for the three Courts in the negotiation.

These points may be enumerated as the following :

(1.) The negotiation must not, as at first, take the form of a *Conference among the plenipotentiaries of the five Courts*, entrusted with the task of negotiating alternately and separately with Holland and Belgium ; but it must bear the character of an assembly of Dutch, Belgian, French, English, Prussian, Russian, and Austrian plenipotentiaries ;

(2.) The future negotiation must, by mutual agreement between the two contending parties and the mediating Powers, start from the bases of the treaty of November 15, by which the *separation and territorial*

*limitation* of the two countries was agreed upon. It will really therefore only have to deal with the settlement of the questions relating to the navigation of the Scheldt, the Syndicate, and the land-routes ;

(3.) For the definite settlement of the question of Luxemburg, a plenipotentiary designated *ad hoc* by the Germanic Confederation must be called upon to take part in the final arrangement, unless the Confederation *expressly* and *formally* depute the plenipotentiaries of the two great German Powers to represent them ; in this case the plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia would act *explicitly as delegates of the Federal Diet*.

(4.) Before entering upon the negotiation the three Courts will declare :

(a.) That they take for granted the conditions imposed on his Majesty the King of the Netherlands will not be more oppressive than those to which they have already formally assented ;

(b.) That, in the event of any Power wishing to employ force in order to constrain the King of the Netherlands to subscribe to conditions which had not been freely accepted by that Prince, and invading the territory of Holland, the three continental Courts would at once withdraw from the negotiation, reserving to themselves at the same time the right of taking measures to guarantee the territory of Holland and the peace of Europe from any attack ;

(5.) To enable them to take part in the negotiation, the three Courts consider as an indispensable preliminary condition a fresh invitation, issued by his Majesty the King of the Netherlands to the five Courts, to renew the negotiation.

(6.) The plenipotentiaries will be furnished with

special instructions and full formal powers, beyond which they shall not go.\*

\* In consequence of the preliminary convention agreed upon on May 21, 1833, between the Courts of England and France on the one hand, and the King of the Netherlands on the other, whereby on the understanding of a complete suspension of all coercive measures, and the re-establishment of the *status quo ante* (November, 1832), an armistice was arranged between Holland and Belgium until a definite treaty should be concluded, the London Conference renewed negotiations, with the co-operation of the Courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, with a view to the definite conclusion of the aforesaid treaty between Holland and Belgium. This, as is well known, was not effected until the 29th April, 1839.—ED.

*THE PRESERVATION OF TURKEY.*

1093. Metternich to Neumann in London, Vienna, February 15, 1833.

1093. The British Cabinet starts from the principle that anything which affects the existence of the Ottoman Empire must acquire a special importance in our eyes. In this it is not mistaken; but we will go further, and assert that in questions concerning the Levant, England can have no interests which clash with those of Austria. The two Cabinets should therefore find no difficulty in agreeing upon the measures they may feel themselves called upon to take in furtherance of their common interests. Happily these interests are at the same time those of the Porte itself.

The existence and preservation of the Ottoman Porte, whatever anomalies it may present in many respects with Christian civilization, are a common benefit for Europe, and in especial a political necessity for Austria. The vast countries over which the name of the Sultan still holds sway, more perhaps as a formula than an effective Power, would necessarily become, by the downfall of his throne, the scene of a frightful anarchy or the prey of foreign conquest. Both alternatives are fraught with conditions more or less compromising to the peace of the world. It can, therefore, come within the views of no Power to form utopias for itself on this subject; rather it concerns both their own and the general interest to follow a practical line of policy.



Among all the Powers of the first order there are but two which, by following a line of policy as dangerous as it would be erroneous, and allowing themselves to be led away by a spirit of infatuation or conquest, could hope to advance their individual interests at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Those Powers are Russia and France.

A long and profound study of the fundamental ideas of our powerful neighbour has led us to the conviction that the Emperor of Russia follows too enlightened a policy, and is too well acquainted with the needs of his own Empire and the situation of Europe, not to see the inopportuneness of indulging in views of aggrandisement at the expense of a feeble neighbour, whose preservation is far more essential to the interests of his own Empire than its degradation or destruction could possibly be. I know that our confidence on this subject is not shared by all the Cabinets; I know, too, that it cannot easily be reconciled with the line of policy which for more than a century has regulated the conduct of the Russian Government; but it is precisely because we are not fond of yielding lightly to impressions which events only too often tend to falsify that we have taken care to devote strict and special attention to the grounds on which our confidence is based. Coming as it does from us, the Power most interested in ascertaining its truth, and not given to judge with culpable thoughtlessness or precipitancy, this certainly should inspire confidence in an ancient ally, whom we not only have no motives for deceiving, but, on the contrary, every reason for inducing to act in harmony with us.

But although we acquit Russia of being actuated by any aggressive views in regard to the Ottoman Empire, we cannot look with the same complacency on the policy

pursued by France. That country is certainly imbued with the necessity of guarding against or preventing the downfall of the Ottoman Empire; but she none the less abandons herself to schemes which sound policy cannot reconcile with that sentiment. But the English Ministers have nothing to learn from us on this subject that they do not know better already. If the question of Egypt is an Austrian question, it is undoubtedly in a still greater degree an English question.

Admitting all this, it appears evident to us that if there is one political interest which the Courts of Austria, Great Britain, Russia, and France have in common, it is unquestionably that of *the preservation of the Sultan's throne*; on the other hand, it is no less evident that among these same Powers there exist differences of opinion in reference to this question; which, while they tend to unite the first three Courts in a common policy, incline the fourth to pursue a special and independent line of its own.

The attitude which, judging from what Lord Palmerston said to you, his Court will take in this affair, is, we think, well calculated to promote its favourable termination, so far as that is now possible.

The moment the Emperor learnt that Colonel Campbell had been sent to Alexandria with instructions to put himself in relation with our agent in Egypt, and concert with him a common line of action, his Imperial Majesty deemed it his duty to afford the new English Consul-General a more efficacious support. Lieutenant-Colonel Prokesch is about to start for Egypt, and instructions have been given him to second in every way the wise endeavours of the British Cabinet.\* That officer has been chosen not only as possessing useful

\* See No. 1094.—ED.

qualifications for the post but a personal acquaintance with Mehemet Ali.

Sir Frederick Lamb has spoken to me of a report from Mr. Mandeville, which mentions that the Sultan, immediately on receiving Ibrahim Pacha's answer, had requested the despatch of some Russian vessels. Is this the fact? As neither the Internuncius nor the French *chargé d'affaires* refers to the matter in their despatches, I am naturally disposed to doubt it. Whatever the real truth of the matter, the arrival of a few vessels of the Sebastopol squadron can be nothing more than a measure of precaution in reference to the Asiatic coast of the Hellespont and the Dardanelles, which lie at the mercy of the Egyptians. In another way, the fact of the vessels being demanded would argue that the French intrigues have received a check, owing to the scant success of M. de Varenne's dealings with Ibrahim Pacha.

The latter, if I am not deceived, will not advance before receiving express commands to that effect from his father, which will be influenced by the recent terms of accommodation offered by the Sultan. The projects of Mehemet Ali do not *as yet* extend so far as the overthrow of the throne of Constantinople; if forced on by circumstances, that rebel would not spare the person of Mahmoud, but his plans lie in a more prudent direction. The consolidation of his own power still occupies the Viceroy. This object once assured, his views may enlarge themselves. However this may be, our care must for the moment be directed solely to the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. The means to that result must be looked for in the accord which we consider as established between the English Cabinet and our own, an accord which derives strength from our knowledge

that the Emperor of Russia's views are in complete uniformity with our own. I also have hopes that the understanding between the other great Powers may eventually lead France to depart from her policy of isolation.

*CONFLICT OF THE PORTE WITH MEHEMET ALI.*

1094. Metternich to Prokesch\* (Instruction) Vienna, February 23, 1833.

1094. You will already have been put in possession of the details of the unfortunate conflict between the Viceroy of Egypt and the Sultan.

It is plain that the matter is in reality nothing more or less than a revolt of Mehemet Ali against his lawful Sovereign. The causes of this revolt are of various kinds, but whatever their origin, it is the Viceroy with whom the fault lies, and we have not shrunk from making our views on the matter known to him. The Emperor's well-known principles, the numerous Austrian interests which are directly involved in the revolt, and the possible dangers which may arise therefrom for the general repose of Europe, make it a point of duty with his Majesty not to remain an idle spectator of events.

But while we condemn the revolt of Mehemet Ali, we have at the same time recommended the Sultan to proceed with the utmost moderation in his endeavours to bring about a settlement with his powerful vassal. This moderation is rendered necessary by the deplorable condition to which his Government is reduced.

The time that has elapsed since the first successes of the Egyptians has enabled us to become acquainted

\* Prokesch, as appears from No. 1093, had been sent on a special mission to Alexandria.—ED.



with the ideas of the principal Powers of Europe on the grave complication of the moment.

I authorise you to start with the assumption that the views of the Russian and English Governments are identical with our own in this question.

France, moreover, has recently expressed herself in a sense favourable to our view of the matter, so far as the preservation of the Ottoman Empire is concerned.

You are, however, only too well acquainted with the line of policy pursued by France, so to speak, at all times and under the most various *régimes* in regard to Egypt, to be surprised at the course pursued by the Cabinet of the Tuileries in regard to the Egyptian revolt. We do not accuse that Power of having excited Mehemet Ali to rebel; but had not France continuously assisted him in every way, the Pacha would have possessed neither the requisite strength nor daring to throw himself into an enterprise which, while its success might have appeared probable from the weakness of the Porte, would necessarily be sure to involve him in grave complications with more than one Power of the first rank.

France looks upon Egypt as a conquest which sooner or later must be hers, and the well-known saying of Napoleon: 'That the Mediterranean is destined by nature to be a French lake,' has certainly lost none of its significance in the eyes of the present Government. This tendency is counterbalanced by the political interest which, in so many important regards, France has in the preservation of the Ottoman throne. Placed between these contradictory dilemmas, the Cabinet of the Tuileries flatters the two rivals and aspires to play the part of protector and mediator in their quarrels. The proposition recently made to the British Cabinet

by the French Government, to join it in a common *mediation*, is a consequence of the system to which we have just alluded.

If the well-known principle of our Court were not opposed to our recognising it as at any time our duty to come forward as *mediators* between a legitimate Government and its revolted subjects, there would be powerful motives, based upon a sound and enlightened policy, to prevent our choosing that form for putting an end to the conflict.

We desire the most speedy settlement of the difference between Mehemet Ali and the Porte. The Sultan has declared his readiness to make concessions to the former. You will have to make it your constant care to induce the Viceroy not to push his pretensions too far. Avoid carefully in your conduct the least thing that would give your action the complexion of a *mediation*, in the diplomatic sense of the term. Nor, again, are we *neutral* in anything relating to the pacification. The Emperor is a friend of the Sultan's; he is not a friend of the Viceroy's. Nevertheless the friendship of our august master for the Ottoman monarch is by no means blind; his Imperial Majesty is well aware of the situation of the Porte; he is under no illusions as to the amount of forces of all kinds now at the disposal of the Pacha of Egypt. We are ready to give the Divan all the good advice that an enlightened friendship can suggest; the only advice we have to give Mehemet Ali is to submit.

It would be impossible for me, at the present moment, to give you more detailed instructions.

*THE ROUSSIN AFFAIR.*

1095. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, March 18, 1833.

1096. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, March 18, 1833.

**1095.** By a report entrusted to a courier of the English Embassy, the Internuntius had informed us, under date of February 24, that a transaction had been concluded on the 21st between Admiral Roussin and the Divan.\*

The Emperor of Russia proffered his aid to the Sultan at the moment when the latter was threatened by the gravest danger to which he had ever been exposed. In what spirit, and with what purpose, were these offers made? Does the Russian monarch aim at the ruin or prostration of the Ottoman Empire? Does he meditate indemnifying himself for his temporary services by concessions which, in the long-run, would have the effect of so prostrating it? This question, Ambassador, is of deep importance, and I do not hesitate to say that Austria is as much interested in its solution as the Porte itself, for no other Power has so great an interest as Austria in the existence of the Ottoman

\* Admiral Roussin was sent as Ambassador with full powers to Constantinople. The terms of the transaction alluded to between the French representative and the Porte were as follows: the former pledged his word that he would induce Mehemet Ali to tender his submission on receiving in fief Acca, Naplus, Jerusalem, and Tripoli; the Porte agreeing, in its turn, to reject the assistance of Russia, and accordingly to demand the recall of the Russian fleet then at anchor before Bujukdere. On March 8, Mehemet Ali refused to accept the proffered conditions.—ED.

throne. We could not therefore but consider ourselves as specially called upon to weigh the dangers of the moment, with all their attendant risks, and when a Cabinet, which, whatever the contradictory judgments passed upon its habitual conduct, has assuredly never in times of the greatest difficulty deserved the reproach of *heedlessness*, has declared itself to be sufficiently well informed to be confident of what it asserts, it appears to us that other Cabinets have no right to abandon themselves to doubts which endanger the common cause.

Nevertheless, this is what has just happened. It is plain that Admiral Roussin allowed himself to be influenced by doubts ; for, in a case where the Powers all desire the same object, and the danger presses, it is impossible to admit that a Cabinet should seek to compromise that very object, through the mere promptings of political jealousy. There are influences based on circumstances so irresistible that it would be idle to seek to deny or oppose them. Among them must be reckoned the influence necessarily exerted on neighbouring States by any great political body. If the Emperor, our august master, had had within reach of Constantinople the same material means for protecting the existence of the Ottoman throne as the Emperor Nicholas has just placed at the disposal of the Sultan, his Majesty would never have hesitated for an instant to respond to any appeal for assistance addressed to him by the Divan ; and if, in this case, we had encountered open opposition from the new French Ambassador at Constantinople, such as has just been displayed in regard to Russia, what should we have thought of such opposition ? and what, finally, would the French Government say if the Powers were to prohibit it from in any way showing the interest it takes in the welfare of the Otto-

man Empire? There are circumstances, Ambassador, in which explanations between Cabinets cannot be too frank ; confronted as they are by dangers which threaten to disturb the public repose, their position is too difficult not to make it desirable that they should shun collisions.

According to the intelligence of February 26, Ibrahim Pacha paid no attention to his father's orders, or else his orders contemplated no more than making him momentarily abandon his march upon Scutari. He has just gained possession of Smyrna without striking a blow. Will Admiral Roussin be able to make the conqueror obey him?—and should this question be answered in the negative, what means would France think fit to employ for fulfilling the engagement contracted by her Ambassador with the Divan? These questions, Ambassador, are of far-reaching import ; they embrace many eventualities for the future, and when we find them raised because a diplomatic act was drawn up providing for the instant dismissal of a succour that was eagerly claimed on one side, and granted in kindness and good faith on the other : and what is more, demanding the recall of a squadron which was only waiting for a favourable wind to set sail—we have a right to lament a likelihood of complications arising, detrimental to the common cause, useless for the end proposed, and compromising to the very interests of the cause it is intended to serve.

*Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna,  
March 18, 1833.*

1096. The incident to which the convention of February 21 has given rise, is of a similar character to



those which have, in every instance, marked the proceedings of the Government of July. This convention has the same moral significance as the Ancona and Antwerp affairs ; it is of a piece with the part France played, and continues to play, in the Belgian-Dutch question, and in the Swiss, Spanish, and Portuguese difficulties. Everywhere we find the same principles, the same boastful spirit, the same inordinate desire on the part of the French Government to engross, at whatever cost, the leading position in the questions of the day.

In sending you the accompanying ostensible despatch, I feel I am discharging a debt of conscience. In defending the cause of sound policy, we defend at the same time that of the Emperor of Russia and our own. The Emperor, our august master, has declared his concurrence in the course followed by the Emperor of Russia ; those who mistrust the motives of that monarch must charge our Court with being either his accomplice or his dupe. We repel both suppositions with equal disdain.

By the English courier despatched from Constantinople on February 24, Admiral Roussin has addressed a confidential letter to Marshal Maison, who informs me that his colleague did not feel easy as to the bold stroke *which he had risked on his own responsibility*. The Marshal gave me to understand that he disapproved of his colleague's conduct. Whatever view the French Cabinet may take of it, it will not disavow its own Ambassador, for it could not do so without compromising itself in more ways than one. What it may do perhaps is to represent Admiral Roussin to the Court of Russia as having acted without its authority. Will the Emperor Nicholas be in the mood to rest satisfied with

such an excuse? if he does accept it, it will be one proof the more of his earnest desire to restore tranquillity in the Levant within the shortest possible time; but on this hypothesis, the one doubtless most favourable to the Sultan's interests—which have been espoused by the French Government in such a way as to hurt so many other susceptibilities without corresponding useful results—will the fault committed by the Ambassador be the less glaring?

Of two alternatives one: either the French Government sincerely desires the restoration of peace in the Levant, or it does not desire it. On the first of these hypotheses, it has just been guilty of a serious error; admitting the second, it appears to us that it has not at this moment all the necessary means at its disposal for risking a contest which might assume a serious complexion in countries so remote. It is not *France* that will save the Ottoman monarch by acting as she has done and placing that Sovereign in a subordinate position; she will but have satisfied her own ambition and degraded the Sultan even lower in the eyes of his own people than he is at present. All this is false in principle and stamped with the intolerable arrogance of the Government which is, in reality, the weakest in Christendom.

Explain yourself, Ambassador, to M. de Broglie with the utmost frankness. Everything that has reference to the Ottoman Empire, everything relating to the real or presumable views of Russia, whether favourable or detrimental to the existence of that Empire, concerns us far more directly than it does France. If the impartiality that forms the basis of our whole political conduct induces us to admit the claim of France to a direct interest in the affairs of the East, we should cease

to be impartial did we concede her right to claim the first place in that respect. That right we not only refuse to recognise on her part, but we claim it explicitly on our own account, or, if we must say so, on our own responsibility.\*

\* The Turco-Egyptian dispute ended, as is well known, with the Firman of Amnesty granted by the Porte on May 4, by the terms of which the sentence of outlawry in force against Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim was revoked, the former receiving, in addition to his Pachaliks of Egypt and Crete, those of Syria and Palestine, the latter that of Adana, in Asia Minor.—ED.

*THE SITUATION IN WURTEMBERG.*

1097. Metternich to Schönburg in Stuttgart, Vienna, May 24, 1833.

1097. His Majesty has bestowed on the various communications lately addressed to us by your Excellency in reference to the views and wishes of the King of Würtemberg all the attention which they in every respect deserve.

The King wishes for assistance; the Emperor, in accordance with his principles, is always ready to afford his Federal allies such assistance as it is in his power to bestow. But while acknowledging the evils with which so many German Princes are beset, and the consequent necessity of assisting them, we must not forget that this leads to another and not less important question, viz., *the means by which that assistance may best be rendered.*

In order to found our views on this highly important question on a firm basis, we must, in my opinion, begin by laying down the following principles:

(1.) The painful and dangerous position in which the South German Governments now find themselves, may be considered from two points of view: the *general* position of the Governments, taken as a whole, and the *special* positions of the individual Governments.

The internal repose of all the States alike is menaced by the existence of a faction inimical to them, and which has assumed frightful dimensions. This evil is in itself constant and invariable, and if it appears to assume

various forms, the reason is to be sought in the varying characteristics of the individuals it attacks. Owing to the unsoundness of their modern constitutions, and in part to the immense number of mistakes made by the Administrations in times past, the South German States are peculiarly susceptible to this evil, and at the same time the least capable of throwing it off.

(2.) But while we admit that some States are more liable to be attacked by the evil than others, we admit no distinctions as to the necessity devolving on all Governments to put down the evil by every means at their disposal. The issue at stake is the salvation of the first of all goods—*property, the right of possession both in a material and moral sense*; the contest in reality lies between those who *have* and those who *wish to have*. The faction, after long pretending to stand forward as the defender of *legality*, has at length been compelled to throw off the mask of its own accord.

But turning merely to the *practical* side of the question, *the vindication of the existing law*, we find the greatest diversity prevailing in the internal condition of the various States. In States supposed to bear a pre-eminently *constitutional* character, the power of the Government is only too much enfeebled, and in cases where it is needful to employ force the rulers have scarcely any other means of opposing their chambers than by a resort to paltry legal quibbles or the application of laws of an avowedly exceptional character; and such laws are by their very nature a most pernicious expedient, and more than anything else betray the weakness of the State organism.

(3.) Two kinds of dangers threaten the South German States, or rather a single danger which displays itself under two forms,



The former relates to legislation, the latter to street revolts.

Of the two, the former is unquestionably the most difficult to deal with, as it presents no opening for the employment of forcible repression.

The latter only then becomes the more dangerous when the *revolt* has already assumed the character of a *revolution*; and this could only be brought about by extreme moral and material weakness on the part of a Government, or through the dissemination of revolutionary ideas which had made their way even to the masses. We may at least hope that *Germany* has not yet sunk so low as that! I say deliberately *Germany*; for should there ever be a State whose means of self-preservation were absolutely exhausted, there still remains, in the second instance, an appeal to the power—hitherto exerted to so small an extent—of the *Confederation*.

(4.) I purposely designate the assistance afforded by the Confederation as a means to be resorted to *in the second instance*, because as such only can it properly be regarded or utilised. The Confederation cannot *rule* for its members, otherwise it could not be a Confederation composed of sovereign members. There is a wide difference between a *Confederation of States* and a *Federal State*. At this moment the contemplated revolution in Switzerland hinges on a confusion between the two terms. The whole can and should afford assistance to the several parts, but the assistance of the Confederation can never be regarded as a means to be resorted to in the first instance.

This undeniable principle applies to both forms alike of the danger now imminent.

In reference to its application to the legislative

difficulty, I may be permitted to offer the following remarks :

Governments act wisely only when their conduct is regulated by law. In the new constitutional States not only are there unavoidable *lacunæ* in the legislative system, but, what is far more pernicious in its consequences—for *lacunæ* can be filled up—there can be no doubt that the system on which the constitutions are framed is essentially impracticable. Nevertheless, the constitutions exist, and my firm conviction is that they are about as likely to last centuries or perhaps decades, as to be shattered at a single blow.

Coincident with the introduction of the new Constitutions was the rise of the so-called *constitutional opposition*. It became the rule everywhere to give way to this opposition, and the result to which the system of daily concessions led within a few years, is now plainly before us. The Government occupy the ground which the opposition yielded step by step in order to take their stand on the basis of pure demagogism, a basis which, in a legal (not a logical) aspect, is as opposed to constitutionalism as *republicanism* can be to *monarchy*.

On the field which the demagogic opposition have thus abandoned, though they may not admit it in so many words, the Governments must hasten to set up their banner ; from that ground they must not venture to stir, but take their stand, in readiness to repel every attack. Here the principle comes into play that, in its moral significance, defence is stronger than offence. Experience will soon testify that only two chances remain. Either the opposition will give way, or it will take up an attitude of open resistance. In the first case, the time will have come for the Princes to take into consideration the *lacunæ* I have mentioned, and

introduce a salutary reform into the very principles of their several constitutions.

I consider the following as matters on which reform is indispensable :

(1.) The proved incompatibility of the *Dienst Pragmatik* with the representative system.

(2.) The publication of the measures passed in the representative assemblies instead of the *decrees of the Diet*.

(3.) The abeyance of the censorship over the political Press.

These three evils once removed, how different would be the state of things as regards legislation ; and if a thorough reform of the Universities be added, how different, in a moral aspect, would be the condition of Germany !

Should the Opposition push matters to extremity, nothing remains for the Governments but to withstand them in reliance on the whole strength of the Confederation. The suppression of *revolts* induced by the spread of the propaganda would again, in the first instance, rest with the individual Governments. In the second resort, they have the whole strength of the Confederation at hand to fall back upon.

In these few words, I think I have given, so far as was possible, a brief outline of our views on the subject.

*THE MEETING BETWEEN THE MONARCHS AT  
MÜNCHENGRÄTZ AND ITS RESULTS.*

1098. Metternich to Hügel in Paris, Vienna, October 22, 1833.

1099. Treaty between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, dated Berlin, October 13, 1833, against non-intervention (enclosed in No. 1098).

**1098.** You have good reason to be surprised at the silence I have observed towards the Embassy at Paris as to the results of our stay at Münchengrätz. The reason for this silence is explained by the following circumstances—circumstances as independent of our wishes as they are of our control, and the existence of which is a subject of real regret to us.

The facts are these; I confide them to you under the seal of secrecy :

The delay attending the Emperor of Russia's arrival in Bohemia disarranged the plans of the King of Prussia. That Sovereign had purposely delayed his arrival at Teplitz, and he protracted his stay there as long as possible; but his Imperial Majesty not having been able to set out from St. Petersburg till the end of August, the meeting between the three monarchs must have clashed with the Magdeburg and Berlin reviews; and you know what a review means in Prussia, that has been *arranged and announced beforehand*. The King returned to Berlin, and saw the Emperor of Russia as he passed through Schwedt. These facts require no explanation, but one circumstance which has inevitably given rise to consequences much to be regretted, was

that it proved impossible to overcome M. Ancillon's reluctance to return to Bohemia, and personally take part in the labours of the two Imperial Cabinets in his character of head of the Prussian Cabinet. This reluctance sprang from the weakness of character which distinguishes M. Ancillon, as well as from certain unfortunate singularities in his ways of thinking. That Minister is eminently of a timid disposition, and continually haunted by a fear of compromising himself. With these sentiments he aspired to play the part of censor in the proceedings at Münchengrätz, and at the same time secure himself such a position as would enable him to exercise that control conjointly with Count Bernstorff.

Counts Nesselrode and Ficquelmont then received instructions from their respective Emperors to proceed to Berlin. They took with them the resolutions of Münchengrätz, and not till after the most arduous labours, extending over more than three weeks, did they finally succeed in effecting their object. The Prussian Cabinet joined the Imperial Courts, and the sole difference between the results of the meeting at Berlin and the resolutions passed in Bohemia consists of a change in the form. The three Courts have contracted a formal engagement relative to their determination henceforth to oppose any application of the false and dangerous principle of *non-intervention*. This engagement is contained in the enclosed act, which was drawn up at Münchengrätz and signed at Berlin (No. 1099). The two Imperial Cabinets would have preferred that this act had been communicated *word for word* as it stood, and merely accompanied by a despatch calling attention thereto. The Prussian Cabinet, on the other hand, insisted that the communication should be confined to



the tenor of the act signed at Berlin. We gave way, in order to have the matter settled, although it went against our conviction of the inutility of the new form. The two Imperial Courts felt it advisable to give way to Prussia in certain matters of detail, since the end they had principally in view has been attained; *that Power now stands pledged to act in concert with them.*

This is what the Prussian Ministers would, in reality, gladly have avoided. They have not entirely forgotten the former policy of their Court, and in 1833 they once more found a difficulty in making up their mind to deprive themselves of the possibility of a return to the dangerous courses of 1796. The way which might have led thither is now stopped, and the aim of the two Emperors is thus attained.

It is a matter of misfortune that the moral attitude of the Prussian Court presents a mixture of *power* and *impotence*. Prussia counts among the Powers of the first rank without really being one; forming a kind of *golden mean* between the Courts of the first and second rank; she claims a share in the duties of the predominant Powers, and her geographical configuration, together with the absence of certain essential internal resources, thrusts her back into the second rank. These material conditions give rise to daily quarrels in the Cabinet, which are inflamed by the temper of its present head. M. Ancillon finds it difficult to forget what he has been throughout the whole course of his life. A preacher and professor, he is unable to descend from the pulpit, where words reign supreme, and take his stand in the arena of the Cabinet, where *action* is demanded. Contradiction annoys and irritates him, while controversy accords with the whole previous bent of his mind. The diplomacy of the Prussian Cabinet

testifies only too truly to this frame of mind ; it abounds to overflowing with declamations and demonstrations, but it hardly ever arrives at a conclusion. M. Ancillon's despatches teem with rhetorical phrases, but they exhaust only a small part of the practical side of any question ; and yet Empires can much more easily afford to dispense with the first than the second ! Nevertheless a great object has been achieved, and we must set the benefit thus attained against many a useless regret.

I feel it right to add one more observation here, which must serve to convince the Russian Ambassador that the resolutions of Münchengrätz rest on the surest basis which diplomatic labours can possibly have ; viz., the frank conviction of those who framed them ; and never was conviction more unanimous than that now existing between the two Emperors and their respective Cabinets.

If we scrutinise the events of 1830, and the consequences which up to this moment have resulted from them, with a strict but impartial glance, we shall find it impossible to look upon them as anything else than *a recurrence of the Revolution of 1789*. One feature that is always met with in a recurrent evil is its identity with the original evil ; but a notable distinction is nevertheless apparent in the objects upon which it is summoned to exercise its ravages. The slightest reference to the events of recent times is sufficient to afford the conviction that such, at least, is the case with the Revolution of 1830, as compared with that of 1789. In the earlier Revolution, the universal impression we derive is that of strength ; the later one as conspicuously bears the stamp of weakness. In 1789, the throne was effete,

and the Revolution full of the sap and vigour of youth; in 1830, the throne could only point to an existence of fifteen years, and all the revolutionary elements were effete. But for the faults committed by Louis XVIII. and Charles X., the Revolution of 1830 would never have exceeded the dimensions of a revolt, and its triumphs, easy as they were, have not succeeded in elevating it into anything more than a *révolution de palais*. The present usurpation is characterised by effeminacy; Louis Philippe would not have maintained himself a single month on Napoleon's throne, even supposing he had ever mounted it. Doctrines and ambitious aspirations are not enough to ensure stability to the Government of an Empire so agitated. The real Revolution, the Revolution aimed at by the leaders of the Republican party, is the irreconcilable enemy of the throne of the 7th August. That throne has created nothing, for it has not the power to create anything; all it can do is to maintain its own position. It resembles worthless lamps, which only light up the vessels containing them, or light that gives out no heat. Its existence is emphatically a negative one; it maintains its position, for everything must occupy some place or other, and two things cannot occupy the same place; the only vitality it can boast of lies in the minds of the men whose endeavours are fixed on the one object of discovering means to prop up its existence.

I repeat, the throne of the 7th August has created nothing and will create nothing, for disorder is opposed to creativeness, and it has no other elements at its disposal than those which emanate from disorder or lead to it. Thus all the efforts of the French Government

are persistently directed to *weakening foreign countries*. In the results of that policy it hopes to find the means for its own existence and preservation. The existence of thrones, and even that of any Governments which derive their strength from the sanction of time, seems in its eyes a standing menace to the stability of its own existence; feeling its own weakness, it would fain be surrounded by Governments either paralytic or newly created, but feeble as that of 1830. In default of being able to create anything, it has been forced to content itself with an *invention*, and the only result it has been able to produce is the so-called principle of *non-intervention*. As this invention is the only one produced by the head-quarters of the propaganda, the two Imperial Cabinets made it their first care, to the exclusion of all others, to examine into its precise importance, and they feel constrained to declare that the pretended principle is no more than a word without definite sense, a phrase devoid of practical meaning; that it is, in reality, a *negation*, to which there exists no corresponding affirmation in public law. What, in fact, is the right of intervention but the simple exercise of a faculty, the employment of which is involved in the free initiative of every independent State? Therefore the Act drawn up at Münchengrätz, and signed at Berlin on October 15, is simply the embodiment, in the simplest terms, of those principles of the law of nations which are least open to dispute.

What course will the French Government take in reference to the announcement of the principles which the Powers are invariably resolved to follow? It is not for us to answer that question; but the 'golden mean' will find itself under the necessity of declaring



either for or against the principles forming the basis of the decision of the three Courts. If it declare *for* them, it will deviate from its present line of policy ; if it declare *against* them, we shall not affect to discuss the question with it, but we shall await it, should the necessity arise, on a field of battle, where it will be compelled to take the offensive.

I do not, however, believe that the French Cabinet is at present prepared to provoke a quarrel on the question of non-intervention. If I am not deceived, it has abandoned this *topic* and taken up that of *rayons d'influence*, which in reality aims at the same object. As the three Courts have no more intention of admitting the new invention than the original one, and the two formulas are identical in aim, you will not allow yourself to be led astray by a possible change of language on the part of M. de Broglie. Should he consent to renounce the principle of non-intervention in favour of that of *rayons d'influence*, you will pay no attention to what he says, but take your stand on the fixed determination of your Court to uphold the most entire liberty of political action as applicable to any independent State, without regard to imaginary rays which are but Machiavelism put into practice. Indeed I find it rather difficult to believe that M. de Broglie will oppose aught but a dignified silence to your communications, a silence which the theory enjoins upon the initiated when they do not know what to say. The position of affairs in Spain will prove a serious impediment to the theory ; the latter stops short at the frontiers of France, and between the two neighbouring countries there will still be Pyrenees for a long time to come.

Such, Baron, is the line of reasoning we have pur-



sued, and we are convinced it would have been a mistake on our part to deviate from it.\*

\* Besides the stipulations immediately following, some special compacts were agreed upon at Münchengrätz between Austria and Russia. In reference to Turkey, both Powers mutually pledged themselves 'to persevere in the resolution taken by them to maintain the existence of the Ottoman Empire under the reigning dynasty (Article II.) ; to oppose any combination which should menace the independence of the sovereign authority in Turkey, whether by the establishment of a temporary regency, or a complete change of dynasty.' In reference to Poland, the understanding between both Powers was essentially to the following effect : 'The Courts of Austria and Russia, closely united by the general transactions of the years 1814, 1815, 1818, and 1819, recognise that the mutual guarantee arising therefrom for their respective States, is more especially applicable to the provinces of which Poland was composed in 1772. In consequence, they mutually guarantee the tranquil and peaceable possession of those provinces.—ED.



*TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA, AND  
RUSSIA, DATED BERLIN, OCTOBER 15, AGAINST  
NON-INTERVENTION.*

(Enclosed in No. 1098.)

1099. Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia and the Emperor of all the Russias, taking into account the dangers by which the order of things established in Europe by public law and by treaties (especially those of the year 1815) continues to be menaced, being unanimously resolved to uphold the system of conservation which constitutes the invariable basis of their policy, and profoundly convinced that the mutual support afforded to Governments by one another is necessary to the maintenance of the independence of States and the rights which spring therefrom, in the interest of general peace in Europe, have agreed, by common consent, to record in a formal act the decisions which the high contracting parties have laid down with the view of attaining this salutary end. In consequence, their Majesties aforesaid have named as their plenipotentiaries :

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, the *Sieur* Charles Louis, Count Ficquelmont, &c., &c. ;

His Majesty the King of Prussia, the *Sieur* Frederick Ancillon, &c., &c. ;

His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the *Sieur* Charles Robert, Count Nesselrode, &c., &c. ;

Who, after exchanging their full powers, which have been found correct and in due form, have settled and signed the stipulations following :

Article I. The Courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia recognise the right of every independent Sovereign to summon to his assistance, whether in the internal or external difficulties of his country, any other independent Sovereign whom he shall deem best able to assist him, and the right of the latter to grant or refuse such assistance according to his interest or convenience. They also declare that, in a case where such assistance be given, no Power not invoked or summoned by the threatened State has the right to interfere, whether for the purpose of thwarting the assistance thus claimed and granted or of acting in a contrary sense.

Article II. In the event of material assistance having been claimed from one of the three Courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and any Power seeking to oppose it by force of arms, the three Courts would consider any act of hostility undertaken with this view as directed against each of themselves. They will accordingly take prompt measures to repel any such aggression.

Article III. The present Articles shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Berlin within the space of six weeks, or sooner, if may be.

Separate Article. The three contracting Powers pledge themselves reciprocally to keep the Articles signed this day secret, and to make no use of them whatsoever until the moment when events shall render their application necessary, and the three Powers shall decide among themselves to give cognisance of them, as occasion require.

376 TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA, AND RUSSIA.

The present separate Article, having the same force and validity as the Articles signed this day, shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Berlin, simultaneously with those of the aforesaid act.

*COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONTEST FOR  
THE SUCCESSION IN SPAIN AFTER THE DEATH  
OF FERDINAND VII.\**

1100. Metternich's conversation with M. de Campuzano, the Spanish Ambassador, from a memorandum dated October 28, 1833.  
1101. Metternich to Count Senfft in Florence, Vienna, November 1, 1833.

1100. On October 28, M. de Campuzano called to inform me that he had just received his new credentials, and to beg me to obtain him an audience with the Emperor, at which he might have the honour of presenting them to his Majesty. I invited him to leave it on my desk, and at the same time felt it my duty not to conceal from him that the Emperor, before granting him the audience he requested, would certainly consult with the Emperor Nicholas and King Frederick William, his august allies, as to the course to be pursued in regard to Spain, under present circumstances, seeing that, in the interests of that Power itself it was desirable that the three monarchs should act in concert. M. de Campuzano admitted that he had expected a similar answer on my part, but that, nevertheless, he could not help regretting the painful impression it would produce upon his Court ; he added, that he feared the fact of his audience being delayed would weaken the ministerial position of M. de Zea, who felt that, by the sincerity of his conduct, and the purity of his principles, he had acquired sufficient title to the confidence of the Cabinets

\* King Ferdinand VII. died on the 29th September, 1833.--ED.



of the Continental Powers to justify him in hoping that they would not refuse him their support under such difficult circumstances, and where it was so much needed. I agreed with M. de Campuzano as to the weight of his last observation, and did not hesitate to tell him that no one could possibly do more justice than I did to the eminent qualities of M. de Zea, and the noble efforts he had hitherto been making to give a monarchical bias to the course of his administration; that the manifesto of October 3, issued by the Queen Regent, afforded a fresh proof of the fact highly honourable to that Minister; but that nevertheless it was impossible to avoid a fear that, considering the political system pursued by that Princess in the internal administration of Spain prior to M. de Zea's admission to the Council, that Minister would meet with almost insurmountable difficulties in successfully pursuing the course he had marked out for himself, placed, above all, as he was, between the extreme parties who appeared animated by a similar animosity against him; that should M. de Zea, as there was only too much ground to fear, succumb shortly to their united efforts, and find himself forced to relinquish the direction of affairs to a Ministry formed by the leaders of the party of movement in Spain, it would then turn out that the Continental Powers, by hastening their decision, had laid themselves, as it were, under the obligation to sanction by their recognition an order of things which was as contrary to their interests as to their principles. M. de Campuzano, without admitting the probability of this hypothesis, still could not deny its possibility. 'Let us see,' I then said to him, 'whether in the interests of M. de Zea, we should not do better to suspend our decision, informing him at the same time, with perfect frankness, of the motives that induce

us to do so, and whether we do not afford him a truer support by making the recognition of the young Queen dependent, as it were, on his retention in the Ministry; whereas, if we hurried on our recognition, the enemies of that Minister, no longer having any motive for sparing him, would in all probability unite their efforts to hasten his downfall.'

M. de Campuzano admitted the justice of my remark, and promised me to communicate it to M. de Zea; but suddenly breaking off the discussion we were carrying on, he addressed the following question to me: 'Will you recognise the Infant Don Carlos?' 'My answer,' I replied, 'is that Austria will no more recognise the Infant Don Carlos than she will the Queen Isabella. Austria does not pretend to assert a right to pronounce between the pragmatic sanctions of Philip V. and Ferdinand VII. She is firmly resolved in no case to make it a question of persons; but, should the change in the law of succession in Spain end by bringing about the triumph of the revolution in that country, Austria would then unquestionably have the right to refuse to recognise an order of things there which would be diametrically opposed to her dearest interests and the principles on which her existence is based.'

Here my interview with M. de Campuzano ended.

*Metternich to Count Senfft in Florence, Vienna,  
November 1, 1833.*

1101. . . . In bringing the enclosed *résumé* to the notice of his Imperial Highness the Grand Duke and Count Fossombroni, you may at the same time assure them that we shall make a point of informing the Court of Tuscany of any ulterior steps the Emperor may take,

when his Majesty shall have been made acquainted with the intentions of his august allies.

As for England, this is what they send me from London, under date of October 24. Lord Palmerston thought that, the regency of Queen Christina being lawfully and actually established, the English Government ought no longer to defer entering into the ordinary diplomatic relations with her; that nevertheless, while recognising the new Government in Spain, the English Government only considered itself as temporarily bound, reserving the right to act according to circumstances, should Don Carlos succeed in gaining possession of the throne, inasmuch as England could only consent to regard this dynastic dispute as a domestic concern.

1834.

*EXTRACTS FROM THE PRINCESS MELANIE'S  
DIARY.*

*Biographical Notices.*

1102. Vienna (from January 1 to July 2).  
1103. Excursion to Carlbürg and residence at Baden (from July 5 to September 7).  
1104. Return to Vienna (from September 11 to December 31).

*Vienna.*

1102. The German Conferences. Ball at Sainte-Aulaire's. The Princess's crown. The opening speech. The Prince's relations with the Emperor. Conversation with Sainte-Aulaire. Ball at the Countess Rasumowski's. Ball at Court. The Archduke Francis. Memorial for Charles Edward of Scotland. Indisposition of the Prince. Sainte-Aulaire appeased. Death of the Duke of Würtemberg. Börne's Parisian letters. The Princess's birthday. Pauline von Würtemberg. Herr von Reitzenstein. Indisposition of the Emperor. The Princess's crown in the *Quotidienne*. Anderson. Sainte-Aulaire and the Princess once more. Presents from the Archduke of Tuscany. A new discovery. Mademoiselle Sainte-Aulaire. Zedlitz. Change of Ministry in Paris. Baroness Talleyrand. Diplomatic pretensions. Jubilee. How the Prince came to be nominated Minister in 1809. The Prince's sixty-first birthday. Garden-party. Death of Lafayette. Chateaubriand and Lamennais. Purchase of a house at Baden. Article on the Prince in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*. Departure of the German plenipotentiaries. Dommayer's. Don Carlos. Gratifying news from Switzerland.

1102. *Vienna, January 1.*—The year 1833 was a very sad and painful one. God's will be done; but may He in His mercy help us for the time to come!

*January 5.*—This evening I had a number of visitors—Frau von Beroldingen and all the Germans, who were in full force, for even Herr von Alvensleben has arrived.

Things seem to be going better with M. Ancillon. When some of the party were gone, the conversation turned upon poor Gentz. I tried to defend his memory to the best of my ability, for I am not ashamed to confess I really feel very sorry about him.

*January 6.*—All the Germans dined with us. Clement talked to them all individually, and is very pleased with them. May God prosper this great and difficult undertaking!

*January 8.*—Clement observed to me yesterday that he wished I would dance; that I did not look as if I were fifty. All this is very embarrassing and disagreeable to me. At the present time I am not in the least inclined for dancing.

The heat at Sainte-Aulaire's ball was something frightful; the rooms were hardly bearable. The Archduchess and the whole Court were there. I was very much put out because I overheard M. de Viel Castel, one of the French gentlemen who are staying here, remark to Leontine the ball was such a beautiful one you might imagine it were being given at Paris instead of Vienna. Leontine gave him far too polite an answer, and this put me out of temper for the rest of the evening. I had undertaken to act the part of a *garde de dames*, and had on a very heavy dress; I was, therefore, unable to fulfil my promise to Clement to take part at least nominally in the dancing.

*January 9.*—Brockhausen and Alvensleben dined with us. After that I had to go to a private Court ball, which was much more beautiful than the one of yesterday. I was struck, however, with the entire absence of beautiful faces. Twenty of the circle are missing, most of whom are in mourning. This produces a very sad impression. Everyone was talking this evening of the



answer I gave, on the 1st of January, to M. Sainte-Aulaire. I had on a kind of diamond crown, and he observed to me, 'Why, Princess, your head is adorned with a crown!' I answered quite quietly, 'Why not? It belongs to me; if it were not my own property I should not wear it.' This reply was quickly caught up, and all the Archdukes talked to me about it. This is very disagreeable to me, as it will soon get to the ears of the public, and Clement will be vexed with me.

*January 10.*—I passed an hour with Clement, and read the wonderful speech which is destined for the opening of the German Conferences.\* It is a composition worthy of him—eloquent, and instinct throughout with the most exalted sentiments. You hear the Emperor's voice mingling with his own, and in conjunction they form a godlike force indeed, which may yet save the world! Without them, without their joint endeavours, universal ruin would follow. The Emperor read the speech this morning, and was enraptured and touched by it. No one who is unable to follow each movement, each word of my husband's, is in a position to judge of that exalted spirit. This man, who always acts independently, who conducts affairs unaided, who appears to stand in need of no one to enable him to effect his purpose, cherishes the conviction that the secret of his power consists in his placing himself beneath his Sovereign's protection. If, on any particular occasion, it should be requisite to take up a noble position—if there be a question of some trait of sincerity or magnanimity—he puts the Emperor first, and he alone is named. In him, I repeat, he concentrates all his powers, to him he refers every impulse, without taking the smallest credit to himself. The world will never know either of their

\* See Nos. 1125—1127.

characters, for to comprehend them one must follow in their footsteps day by day.

*January 11.*—This evening I received a note from Sainte-Aulaire, requesting an interview and formal explanation, which surprised me greatly. I showed the note to my husband, who told me to reply stating that I would receive him at any hour he liked to name, and that I rejoiced in the opportunity thus afforded me of enjoying the pleasure of a conversation with him. My ball came to an end at ten, after which I still had a few visitors. I lay down to rest. Clement returned once more to the subject of the Ambassador's note, and I felt comforted on perceiving that my husband took the matter upon himself, and was quite prepared to defend me. On mature reflection, it can only be the story of *the crown* that he wishes to revert to.

*January 12.*—I must say I felt very anxious at the prospect of my interview with M. Sainte-Aulaire. I was to have breakfasted with Lazi Odescalchi, but gave it up in order to be in readiness to receive the Ambassador. At last, at half-past twelve, he presented himself with a very serious face. I observed that he looked to me as if he had come with hostile intent, and that I was prepared for a combat of life or death. He coldly replied that he had not come to joke on serious matters. I rang the bell to send for my husband, who at once came. M. Sainte-Aulaire then repeated, with visible agitation, the reply I had given to him on New Year's Day. People had come to him on all sides, he went on to say, to tell him I had boasted of this insulting expression, and had even added, 'I have said things of quite another kind to him as well.' I did not suffer my composure to be disturbed for a single moment. I told him I could not deny having said, with intentional em-

phasis, that if the crown on my head did not belong to me I would not wear it; but that I had not repeated the expression openly, in the first place, because there was no opportunity for so doing, but secondly because, although I had very little sympathy with his Government and all connected with it, it would never have entered into my head personally to hurt the feelings of himself, his wife, or his children, whom I looked upon as good and honourable. I had not, however, I went on to say, the same feeling in regard to the other members of his Embassy, and did not for a moment doubt that those people had invented these stories in order to estrange us; and I advised him to close his ears to all this tittle-tattle, which his spies would be sure to make it their business to report to him. I said all this to him quite simply. He seemed disconcerted and altogether taken aback, and ended by begging my pardon for having brought a charge against me which appeared to be unfounded. He went on to admit he had been misinformed, and was now in some perplexity as to the account he should send to Paris of the matter, which had roused such a commotion. He begged my husband to write to Apponyi on the subject, in the terms which he had written down for that purpose. I keep the paper as an interesting memorial.\*

*January 13.*—Clement held his first German conference, which lasted a long time. He is very pleased with all the representatives, and convinced that he will be able to secure the happiest results.

All the German representatives dined with us. I afterwards took the children, and even Clement, to a ball given by the Countess Léon Rasumowski. It went off very well and pleasantly. The French Amba-

\* See Metternich's letter to Apponyi, No. 1105.

salor came up to me with his pleasantest expression of countenance. I bade him beware of those persons whom it would vex to see us on such amicable terms, the result of which would be more tale-bearing. He assured me, however, that he would never believe one of them in future, and that it would be impossible for him ever to doubt me again.

*January 14.*—I am in despair at the way in which those important matters of dressing, diamonds, &c., rob me of a part of my time. Clement took a short walk with me, and then I had to go in good time to Court, as I had undertaken to act as lady of the bed-chamber for a *bal paré*, and was in attendance on the Queen.

The Court ball was magnificent, but overcrowded. There was quite a profusion of rich uniforms, and the dresses blazed with diamonds. It was a beautiful sight, and delighted me on account of the strangers.

I will describe my dress, as I shall doubtless afterwards feel astonished that I could ever have permitted myself to appear in such a peculiar costume. I had chosen a head-dress consisting of two bands of red velvet, set with diamonds. It gave me the appearance of a Jewess, but became me well and had a very good effect. The little Archduke Francis, who is four years old, was taken to the gallery, and on seeing the room so crowded, broke out into screams of delight. He called to his father and mother and attracted everyone's attention to him.

*January 17.*—Clement felt unwell. He was slightly feverish, and stayed in bed. I found him depressed, and as everything easily alarms me, especially when it concerns him, I was in a terrible state of anxiety. I remained with him, in spite of several persons being present, who had come to speak to him on business.



In the evening I read Clement an article from the *Revue de Paris* on the history of Charles Edward of Scotland. He told me he had induced George IV. to have a memorial set up to that Prince—and as he related the circumstance, he burst into such a violent fit of weeping that it quite terrified me. He had been so melancholy through the whole day that it went to my heart. Still, as I perceived that he was anxious not to give way to his emotion, and tried to master it in every way, I continued to read on with outward composure, although with a bleeding heart. Gradually he recovered himself, and his skin became cooler, but I felt my own emotion increase more and more.

Clement fell asleep at ten. I too lay down to rest, but could not sleep. I was so afraid of some illness! may God shield me from such a sorrow!

*January 18.*—Clement has slept well; he felt better, but stayed in bed. I passed the morning in reading aloud to him.

*January 19.*—We were almost awoke by a note from M. Sainte-Aulaire to my husband, about my diadem once more. Clement takes the matter into his own hands, and as he has numerous other things to vex him besides, it grieves me greatly to be the cause of his being troubled by fresh ones.

Clement felt better and got up. His looks did not please me; his voice was weak and altered; it was plain that he was not quite himself yet, and this gives me a constant feeling of anxiety. He began his day's work by answering Sainte-Aulaire's note, and then devoted himself to business as usual.

The thought of the visit which Sainte-Aulaire had signified his intention of paying my husband at eight o'clock distressed me terribly. I feared the interview



would irritate and excite him, perhaps do him injury and end by making him angry with me. However, Clement came back quite pleased and cheered. Sainte-Aulaire's anger was quite appeased. He told my husband it was plain people had wished to estrange us, and begged him to let the matter rest where it was. Indeed, Sainte-Aulaire became so confidential that he opened his whole heart to my husband. He took leave of him with a request not to be angry with him, for he knew his own weakness, and could not endure the false and disagreeable position in which he was daily placed; Clement must assist him with his advice, and help him to be patient and considerate. It took a load from my heart to hear all this.

Clement told me it was his wish I should not recur to the subject again with the Ambassador.

*January 22.*—A letter, dated Wiesbaden, from Baron Salis, Adjutant to the Duke of Würtemberg, brings Clement news that his brother-in-law is suffering from intermittent fever; his strength appears to be exhausted, and the physicians feared there would be no chance of saving his life if a third attack came on.

*January 25.*—Prince Hohenlohe, Adjutant to the Duke of Würtemberg, has brought us word of the death of the latter. He died on the 20th. He says Pauline is calm, but overcome by deep grief.

*January 26.*—I passed the earlier part of the evening with Clement, to whom I read Börne's 'Parisian Letters' aloud. They are naturally as malicious as ever, but there is an extravagant *diablerie* in the style, which is also uncommonly witty.

*January 28.*—Richard was in bed, and therefore did not make me any speech on my birthday; to make up for this, my little girl delighted me with two long

speeches, one in German and one in Italian. Clement made me a present of two magnificent emerald earrings, and said the most touching and tender things to me.

*January 29.*—Clement showed me a letter from Pauline Würtemberg. The poor woman seems to be in despair. She begs us to find her a house in the capital. So it seems she wants to come here, but she does not speak as if her mind were quite made up. She is always changing her plans.

*January 31.*—Clement was very pleased with the results of the Conference on the question of the Press. He said the Baden representative, Herr von Reitzenstein, had spoken exceedingly well.

*February 27.*—My husband was with the Emperor this morning; he really had to force his way into his presence, for Stiff has kept him shut up for over a fortnight now, on account of a mere cold, which, thank God, does not seem to threaten the least danger; still, everyone is kept away from him, except the Empress, who tends him with the utmost care, seeing to the smallest details herself. No living being has yet seen him. This has given rise to all kinds of rumours and suppositions.

*February 28.*—The weather keeps warm. Clement went with the children and myself into the garden. There is a red rhododendron in bloom there which is quite remarkable, and Clement naturally takes great pride in it.

Nugent, Marmont, Binder, and D'Aspre shut themselves up with Clement, in order to read the Preface to one of Eugène Sue's romances.\* It is a remarkable

\* Perhaps the great preface of November 15, 1833, prefixed to Sue's romance of 'La Vigie de Koat-Ven.'—ED.

work, for no one ever drew a truer picture of the world as it is.

*March 3.*—Clement told me that the fatal story of my crown was in to-day's *Quotidienne*; the way in which it is told makes it unintelligible.

No member of the French Embassy came near us, which seemed to me only natural. However, it occasioned some surprise, and several persons spoke to me about the article in the *Quotidienne*. This surprised me, for how could anyone have seen it? As the evening drew to a close, I suffered much uneasiness at seeing Clement engaged in a *tête-à-tête* with a person wholly unknown to me, but whom I was told was an American. He turned out, however, to be quite a harmless kind of person, whose accounts of his native land were most interesting. I believe his name is Anderson.

*March 4.*—Emily came while I was at breakfast with Clement. She spoke very strongly against a theatrical representation which they wish to get up for the benefit of the Benevolent Ladies' Association, *i.e.* for the good of the poor. Henrietta, who only a few days ago became patroness of the fund, is highly delighted at the idea of the proceeds which the representation will bring in. Clement cannot bear the idea of ladies acting comedies, especially in public; he would therefore never allow me to take a part. He spoke to me of the whole undertaking in such a way as prevents my even patronising it; this I am very sorry for, as it will furnish only too good a pretext for that ill-feeling which is so rife in Vienna.

*March 5.*—The Emperor has placed the Schönbrunn Theatre at Henrietta's disposal for the proposed representation. Czernin seems to be furious about it.

The Sainte-Aulaires were at my Wednesday recep-

tion, which went off with such *éclat* that it was enough to turn one's head. The Ambassador had informed Clement of a despatch which he had felt it his duty to send to M. de Broglie, and in which he gave the history of the crown from his own point of view, asserting most warmly that he would never have put up with an insult to his King; not content with this, he added that the Princess Metternich was animated by a very unfriendly feeling towards the French Government. Clement made him see how absurd it was to represent a lady as being the opponent of any Government whatever, and advised him in his (the Ambassador's) own interest, to leave out that part of the despatch. He did so, but in the evening had a long conversation with Clement, in which he tried to prove to him that in reality it was the women who conducted State affairs, and that it was impossible to believe that Prince Metternich's wife did not exercise an immense influence over the affairs of the world !\*

*March 6.*—The pictures and statues sent by the Grand Duke of Tuscany to my husband arrived to-day. Accordingly, we set about unpacking them with the

\* On Sainte-Aulaire's showing Prince Metternich a draught of the despatch in question, the Chancellor returned it with the following remarks: 'I entirely concur, my dear Ambassador, in the course you have taken. I would merely suggest to you to omit the words underlined in the following sentence of your despatch: "*the Princess, whose opinions are inimical to the French Government,* but whose character is frank and sincere."

'I make this remark in your interest no less than my own and that of the public welfare, and consequently therefore in the interests of truth. If women exercise no influence on affairs—and that principle certainly holds good with us—it is attaching too much importance to a woman to assert that her *enmity* can have any weight as opposed to a *Government*. The words *enmity* and *Government* seem to me, therefore, to stand too near together. You will say all that truth requires, and in my opinion all that it is needful to say, by omitting the words I have underlined.

'Such are my own ideas. I submit them freely to your judgment, to be dealt with as you please.'—ED.



greatest care. First, there are two large pictures in *pietra dura*, which they say are extremely valuable, although I do not altogether like the look of them; then comes the statue of a little girl playing with a turtle-dove.

*March 18.*—M. Ancillon, who arrived yesterday, Alvensleben, Brockhausen, Binder, and a few others, dined with us. Marmont was there too; he was highly delighted with Ancillon.

*March 25.*—Ancillon, Alvensleben, Brockhausen and Neumann dined with us. I passed the early part of the evening with Clement; he was busy writing, as Neumann has to set off for Frankfurt. I am very sorry he is going away, for we shall miss him greatly.

*April 2.*—We had a dinner at Tatistscheff's in honour of Ancillon.

Clement read us an article from an English Review, in which a very interesting new discovery is described. It seems the American ash will paralyse all the vital powers, and completely stupefy rattlesnakes. If the fact receives confirmation, it is a remarkable discovery.

*April 3.*—We dined at Sainte-Aulaire's with Ancillon, Lutteroth and his wife, Pepi Esterhazy, the Sainte-Aulaire family, and La Rochefoucauld. We found ourselves *en famille*. The Ambassador's younger daughter is the intimate friend of all the *savants* in Vienna and the whole of Europe; she is in continual correspondence with Sismondi and Lamartine; she is now the confidential friend of Herr von Hauer, who shows her all his compositions. Herr von Zedlitz planted himself at her side, and devoted his whole attention to her. The elder daughter is the betrothed bride of Herr von Langsdorff, Secretary to the Embassy at Constantinople. He will



come in a few weeks to be married to her, at which the whole family are greatly pleased.

*April 7.*—Countess Lanckoronska came to see me, and during her visit my little Melanie put herself into a downright passion because something or other had been refused her. I punished her well, and when she had cried for some time she quieted down, and I took her with Richard to the *Prater*. Clement was with us, and let the children amuse themselves in the *Wurstelprater*. The Panorama of Paris and the conjurors were not forgotten.

*April 9.*—The French Ambassador was in a state of great anxiety about a change of Ministry in Paris. The Duke de Broglie has tendered his resignation, and no one knows who will take his place.

*April 24.*—We had the *savant*, Herr Balbi, and Clement Hügel to dinner. The former has been appointed to a post in our statistical department, and is greatly delighted at his success, which cost Clement a good deal of trouble to obtain.

*April 26.*—Leontine and Herminia, who knew that Clement had a German Conference this evening, dragged me, against my will, to the theatre. On my return home I had a visit from a Baroness Talleyrand, who knew Clement intimately at Paris, and stood in friendly relations with the unfortunate Marie Antoinette.

*April 30.*—We had a dinner at Sainte-Aulaire's, to which sixty-five guests sat down. It was in honour of Louis Philippe's name-day. The Ambassador had a difficulty with all the Ministers of the Diplomatic Corps; they complained, in an official note signed by all of them, of their wives not having been invited to the dinner. This absurd pretension certainly does not redound to the credit of these gentlemen. However,

not a single Minister's wife was to be seen there, and after dinner there were very few visitors.

*May 6.*—When we were alone, Clement told me that all the *employés* under him wished to avail themselves of the present year, the twenty-fifth of his Ministerial career, in order to present him with a medal or some other mark of their esteem. I feel touched at the thought. He was led, on this occasion, to speak of the way in which he came to be nominated in 1809. I had so often heard it said that he had spoken disparagingly of Stadion, and contrived to gain the Emperor's confidence at his expense, that I came at last to believe it. He now explained to me that Stadion, alarmed at the unfavourable turn things were taking, and convinced that it would be impossible for him to carry on the war, had signified to the Emperor his intention of resigning. The Emperor refused to accept it, as it would have been difficult for him at such a moment to find anyone to succeed him. It was Stadion himself who suggested Clement, who was then at Znaim. At that time he declined the offer, being, as he said, mistrustful of his ability to undertake so difficult a task at such a juncture. Besides this, two possible alternatives occurred to him, with either of which he would have been unwilling to begin his Ministry. There was, first, a probability of peace being concluded on the most shameful terms—and he would not have cared to begin his career under such auspices; secondly, the war might end gloriously, and be followed by a peace of the most honourable kind—and in that case he would have shrunk from depriving another of a success with which he himself had nothing to do. He therefore declined, on July 5, 1809, the title of Minister for Foreign Affairs, promising the Emperor to stand by Stadion as a true

friend and adviser, until some opportunity occurred of making a change, which, in fact, took place in August or November of the same year. My husband is not capable of distorting facts, as no one is in a better position to assert than myself. I lament every day that I cannot put down in writing the things I see and hear, and which would give posterity a true conception of the heart and character of this great man. May God preserve him and put his enemies to shame!

*May 15.*—To-day is my husband's sixty-first birthday. May God yet send him a number of happy and peaceful years, shield him from all misfortune, and finally permit him to enjoy that rest which he has truly never known perfectly here! God grant my prayer! The ordinary congratulations were got over very early. The children recited verses in several different languages. Richard offered congratulations in French and Italian, and Melanie stammered one in German, which she followed up with some well-recited French verses.

I gave up any attempt at paying visits, and confined myself to dining with Clement and the children at mamma's. His birthday made so little demand upon his time that he had made all kinds of plans for the evening; at last I explained to him that he must receive the members of the German Conference in the garden. I begged mamma to take him there, and at half-past five betook myself in person to the field of battle, where a great deal still remained to be done. The guests arrived very punctually. I received them in front of the old house, which was covered by a decoration. On the grass, a Turkish tent had been set up; on either side were tea-tables, and the beautiful dresses made the scene very gay. Two military bands were stationed

near the house, and played in turn. When Clement had come, we waited till half-past seven, and then went into the pavilion. In the tent, a very pretty theatre had been set up, and here comic scenes were represented by Scholz, Nestroy, and Fritz Fürstenberg. It was very amusing, and obtained general applause. In the *salon* several good pieces of music were performed, in which Mazzuchelli, Fräulein Jasdin, Gabrielli, and Montenegro principally took part.

Buol had arranged a gipsy camp, in which the gipsies danced, sang, and carried on all kinds of pastimes. It was lighted up with Bengal fire. On another grass-plot were crowds of shepherds and shepherdesses, who sang and danced—a very pretty sight. All the company were enraptured, and that too in real earnest and not out of mere compliment. We only lingered for a moment in the conservatories, to look at the pelargonias, which were just in full bloom. The way through the avenue was lighted up by various coloured lamps. A crowd of warriors, amazons, nymphs, and sylphs, came to meet us, in the midst of whom appeared Scholz, seated in a small car and dressed as Amor. He presented a bouquet and declaimed some verses. It was amusing and in good taste, as I had taken care it should be. The entertainment closed with some very beautiful fireworks in front of the pavilion, and a charming military dance performed by children. Everyone was enraptured, and I was overwhelmed with the most flattering eulogiums. Clement, too, was pleased, because the strangers were astonished at the spectacle which had been afforded them. The children, however, who can never have enough of anything, kept dancing and springing about in the wildest way imaginable, and I returned home at midnight tired out.



*May 28.*—Lafayette is dead—too late for the world. I am disgusted to see the *Moniteur* pronounce a eulogy over him, although I am accustomed to the innumerable follies which the present Government is not ashamed to countenance.

I was with Clement a long time; we read a number of newspapers. The *Tribune* gives a remarkable saying of Chateaubriand's on Lamennais's book, the '*Paroles d'un Croyant.*' He said it was '1789 making his Easter confession.'

*June 2.*—Buol told me he was thinking of selling his house at Baden; the price was 28,000 florins, and he wished to know whether we would not think of becoming the purchasers. I replied laughingly that I had only 10,000 florins, upon which he observed, it would be sufficient, as I could let the 18,000 florins stand over for the time, and pay him back by degrees. I spoke to Clement of the scheme, and he was so pleased at the idea that he made me write to Buol at once to say the bargain was concluded. I thus found myself all at once in possession of this house, almost without knowing it. It redoubled my pleasure to see Clement so pleased.

*June 4.*—Tatistscheff came in the evening to take leave of Clement. He sets off this evening for St. Petersburg.

*June 7.*—Clement takes salt baths; God grant they may do him good! I do not like his looks, and his voice is weak. All this gives me the greatest uneasiness. He went off at noon to one of the sittings of the Conference, and did not come back till four o'clock. Later on, there was another sitting, which lasted till one p.m.

*June 10.*—We found an article on Clement in to-



day's *Allgemeine Zeitung*, which interested me. I fancy it must have been written by one of the German plenipotentiaries.

*June 12.*—I dined with all the Germans in town. Herr von Beroldingen goes away this evening. I confess a weight will be lifted from my heart when they are all gone. Each of them made me a farewell speech, which I answered as well as I could.

*June 20.*—I passed the evening with Clement. He is working rather less hard than usual, which is good for his health. The Ambassadors too being all gone gives him more freedom.

*June 26.*—We dined in the garden with Puschkin, his brother Urussoff, Andlau and Windischgrätz. Our guests spoke of a ball which was to be held at Hietzing this evening for charitable purposes. To my great surprise, Clement took it into his head to go there. We found Dommayer's *restaurant* lighted up most brilliantly; there was an excellent band, and the dancing *salon* was crowded. The dancers could hardly find room to move; there were some remarkable figures among them. All Vienna was there, and we stayed till eleven o'clock.

*June 27.*—Nobile came to dinner, bringing his plans. The small house which Clement intends to build will be charming. God grant I may long enjoy living in it with him! It does me good to see how this building scheme occupies his attention.

*June 29.*—Clement received news from London, announcing the arrival of Don Carlos at Portsmouth and stating he had rejected all overtures. He declares that he is the only heir presumptive to the Spanish throne, and that he will never renounce his own or his children's rights; he is, however, firmly resolved never to accept subsidies from England or any other Power.

He is unwilling to put himself under an obligation to anybody, except those followers who have remained true to his cause, and have thus acquired the right of doing him kindness, till such time as he shall be in a position to requite their services.

*July 1.*—Clement has had most gratifying intelligence from Switzerland; he has obtained a glorious triumph there, of which he is exceedingly proud.\* A general satisfaction reigned at our Chancery when the news came.

*July 2.*—Clement decided this morning that we should set out on Saturday, in order to spend the following Sunday and Monday at Carlburg, proceeding to Baden on Tuesday.

*Excursion to Carlburg and Residence in Baden.*

1103. Departure for Carlburg and Baden. Arrival at Carlburg. Marienau. Domestic plans. Don Carlos. Change of Ministry in England. Dom Pedro. Sainte-Aulaire. Count Hoyos's conversation with the Emperor. Varnhagen. The Emperor's present to Richard. Görres' 'Maid of Orleans'—The Siebenbürgen Diet. Namyk Pacha.

1103. *Carlburg, July 5.*—I was ready to start at six o'clock, and, I must admit, very impatient; but Clement was not ready, and there were twenty people waiting to see him.

At last we set out. It was very hot, and as Richard and Melanie sat on my knee nearly the whole way, I got very tired. As we had not started till nine o'clock, we did not arrive at Carlburg till three.\* We had been in

\* This refers to the measures taken by the Swiss Government to guard against the abuse of the right of asylum. In his note of June 24, the President of the *Vorort* Zürich gave the Austrian Ambassador the most express assurances on the subject.—ED.

† Carlburg was an estate at that time belonging to Princess Melanie's father.—ED.

hopes no one would know of our arrival, and I was beginning to enjoy the thought of the pleasant surprise. Unfortunately, however, a talkative postilion had told papa we should start from Vienna at five, and get to Carlburg about eleven, as the horses were ordered, &c., &c. So instead of taking them by surprise, we found they had been expecting us in vain for some hours.

*July 7.*—Clement went with papa to Marienau. He came back very pleased with his excursion and the fine works that Wittmann had carried out for the Archduke Charles. Marienau must be well worth seeing; it was formerly a swampy, barren tract; but canals having been cut through it, the vegetation is now splendid.

*July 8.*—Clement wishes to take papa with him to Königswart; he intends to stay there three weeks in August, and in the meantime would like us all to stay at Carlburg together. This plan gives my parents great pleasure.

*Baden, July 9.*—We arrived here at four o'clock.

*July 11.*—Clement took me to the *Krainerhütte*; we walked a good way on foot. With this terrible heat, however, I shall soon get weary.

*July 14.*—Clement was much taken up to-day with the news of Don Carlos having fled from England. It is kept a profound secret, and he is supposed to be ill in London. I fear this undertaking will be an entire failure—a counterpart to the Duchess of Berry's.

*July 15.*—Clement went to Schönbrunn to-day to see the Emperor. The latter's condition leaves nothing to be desired. Clement had found time to make a number of purchases for my house—an attention which touches me deeply.

*July 16.*—Neumann writes to my husband to say he had seen the Queen of England, on her way to Saxony

with her family. She told Neumann things could not go on much longer in England as they were doing, and that the days of the Ministry were numbered.

*July 17.*—Clement was present at a Conference on Hungarian affairs. Our guests at dinner were Revicky, Nadasdy, Mailath, Gerway, and Herr von Cetto, who wished to collect information as to the arrival of the Crown Prince of Bavaria, which was to take place within the next few days.

On returning home, Clement found news awaiting him of the resignation of the English Ministry. It is not yet known who will succeed Lord Grey and Lord Palmerston. This news is very important. Clement dreads that the Government may fall into still worse hands. I think, on the contrary, it is the beginning of a better state of things, which Heaven intends to bestow upon us.

*July 20.*—Clement confided to me, under the promise of profound secrecy, that Don Carlos had secretly left London, passed through Paris, and arrived safely in Spain, where he meditates striking a decisive blow. Clement fears this enterprise will fail.

*July 23.*—The news from Paris describes the consternation into which the sudden departure and arrival of Don Carlos has plunged the King and the Ministry.

The English Ministry is not yet formed, but it is believed Lord Melbourne will be Prime Minister. It will still contain plenty of evil elements, but it is hoped this mixed Ministry will pave the way for the return of the Tories. God grant it! Dom Pedro is said to be very ill, indeed dying. All these events are highly important, and may bring forth great changes.

*July 26.*—The news of Don Carlos's arrival in Spain has caused a great and universal sensation.



*July 27.*—Sainte-Aulaire was very uneasy at the news concerning Don Carlos; a fortnight ago he went to Ischl, observing to Clement that he saw nothing to prevent his going away, as at that moment there was a lull in politics, and no change of importance was to be apprehended. During his absence, nothing of the sort occurred except the resignation of the English Ministry and the arrival of Don Carlos in Spain. To-day my husband informed him that Marshal Soult had given in his resignation.\*

*July 28.*—Hoyos paid us a visit this evening, and told Clement how much he had been affected by a conversation he had held with the Emperor, who had spoken to him of nothing else but my husband. He said he had never believed it possible the Emperor could cherish such warm and hearty affection for anyone as he did for Clement.

*August 9.*—Herr von Varnhagen, husband of the Jewess Rahel, with whom Gentz kept up a lively correspondence, dined with us. The other guests were Hardegg, Neumann, Clement Hügel, and Pepi Esterhazy. He has the reputation of being a very talented man.

*August 11.*—Stift is very contented with Richard's progress. This evening the fever had almost gone. The Emperor gave Clement a porcelain cup, which he commissioned him to hand to Richard. This affected my

\* On July 18, Marshal Gérard succeeded Marshal Soult as Minister of War and President of the Council. The principal reason of Soult's resignation was the divisions that arose in the Ministry on the question of the Government of Algiers. Louis Philippe expressed himself to Pozzo di Borgo on the subject of Soult's resignation in the following terms: 'I cannot help regretting it; he had excellent qualities—among others, that of never courting popularity. If he had only been able to get on with his colleagues he might have remained in office; unfortunately, he himself rendered this impossible.'—ED.



poor husband to tears. He could not speak to me of the Emperor without deep emotion, and after the latter's kindness to Richard, I can well understand my husband's feelings of gratitude.

*August 14.*—Clement read a new book aloud to me, Görres' 'Maid of Orleans.' Görres, from being an abominable Jacobin, has become one of the best men in the world. This book clearly proves it, and the tears came into Clement's eyes as he read.

*August 18.*—Clement held a conference on the Siebenbürgen difficulty.\* He thinks he will have to give up his travelling schemes, in the first place, because of this difficulty, which unhappily is taking a very unfavourable turn; and secondly, in prospect of the arrival of the Crown Prince of Bavaria. I am pleased at this for my own sake, for I shrank from this long separation; still, I am sorry to see my poor husband have to give up a pleasure he would so much have enjoyed, and which would have afforded him a distraction so necessary to his health.

*August 27.*—Clement came back from Vienna with all kinds of plans for the house on the Rennweg.

*September 7.*—Maurojeni and Namyk Pacha dined with us. The latter had travelled a good deal during the two years since we last saw him. He has become wonderfully civilised, and is now a thorough European in his manners. He returns to London as Ambassador. He brought a dozen young people with him to Vienna, six of whom are to be educated here and six in Paris. Clement intends to devote great attention to them, so that those entrusted to our care may receive a sound

\* The Siebenbürgen Diet had taken up an attitude of such marked opposition, that it was shortly afterwards dissolved.—ED.

moral training, and such a general education as may do us honour.

*Return to the Capital.*

1104. Homœopathic treatment. Steam-engine. An anniversary. Birth of a son. Betrothal of the Princess Leontine. The Tory Cabinet. Palmerston's note. Concert at Court. Mournful close of the year.

1104. *Vienna, September 11.*—Clement was a little poorly to-day. I am giving him homœopathic treatment, and he sees that the powders take effect; this occasions him surprise, and he now follows the treatment with the earnest desire of really testing its true worth.

*September 14.*—Clement took me to the *Prater*, in order to see a steam-engine which Ferländer has brought over here. I had come with the strongest prejudice against this invention, which I had an idea was dangerous, but now that I have seen this wonderful piece of English work, I am delighted with it.

*September 15.*—Clement asked Paul Esterhazy to become godfather to my next child, should God send me a boy. He was overjoyed at the proposal.

*October 2.*—Clement told me, on awaking, he felt very poorly and feverish, and would stay in bed. I was at first very uneasy about it, but at length convinced myself it was merely the effects of a cold, such as I had myself suffered from the previous day. And in fact he soon began to feel much better, and about five went to his study.

*October 7.*—To-day it is twenty-five years since Clement first became Minister. I had hoped, this very day, to come down and present him with a son; that would have been a recompense for all the grief he has

suffered. The Imperial Chancery begged permission to come and present their congratulations to him. At twelve, Mercy made his appearance at the head of the whole department, and delivered a speech which must have been very fine and touching. Clement said, in his reply, that the five-and-twenty years which had just elapsed had brought with them much sorrow and misfortune; he had found a powerful support in these gentlemen, and he begged they would continue to second his efforts with the same zeal and perseverance as they had hitherto shown, &c., &c. Both speech and reply made, so I am told, a deep and favourable impression.\* My children had heard of the celebration that was going forward, and did their best on their part.

At half-past four I was in the *salon* in readiness to receive the visitors. Paul Esterhazy, at the head of our foreign diplomatists now resident in Vienna, delivered a speech which greatly impressed me—my husband's reply, however, went even deeper to my heart. May God bless these excellent men, who endeavour to lighten his difficult task, and know how to appreciate his efforts at their true worth!

*November 20.*—God and His Holy Mother be praised for the great blessing they have vouchsafed to me! I feel so contented and happy—so unutterably thankful, and can only pray for the continuance of the rest and happiness which Heaven bestows upon me. On the 14th October, at five o'clock in the afternoon, I gave birth to a fine, strong boy. My sisters hastened to my husband with the joyful news, which gave him as much pleasure as myself. The child was baptized on the

\* The Austrian Ambassadors and Envoys presented the Chancellor, on this occasion, with a commemorative medal, which is now preserved in the Königswart Museum.—ED.

following day. Leontine had had a beautiful altar erected in the blue *salon*. Paul Esterhazy stood god-father. I had wished to have the child christened Lothair, but Clement observed to me that he had such a predilection for St. Paul, that he would like to have a son of that name; accordingly he received the names of Paul, Clement, Lothair, Francis, Maria.

My sister-in-law Pauline came the fourth week after my confinement. I found her kind, friendly, and unaffected, and had several very important things to talk to her about. There were the children for one thing, especially Leontine. She thinks seriously of marrying Sandor, who has often urged the point, and she must now make up her mind. Clement had a long conversation with Sandor, which completely satisfied him. The latter came at a very early hour; after speaking with him and Clement I left them alone together, and the result of the conversation was that the 'yes' was spoken.

*November 29.*—The resignation of Lords Grey and Melbourne, who make way for a Tory Cabinet which seems to enjoy the approbation of all parties, takes place under the happiest auspices, and Clement is relieved to see Wellington quietly take the Administration of affairs into his own hands without seeking to direct them himself; for it is said he will take Peel into the Ministry, which is not yet formed. Palmerston, on laying down office, wrote a remarkable note to Strangways, the English Ambassador here, which runs somewhat as follows: 'We are out! The Whigs have made way for their opponents, and the Duke of Wellington is entrusted with the formation of a Cabinet. Show this note at once to Prince Metternich, who will never have heard a better piece of news in his life than that he has

got rid of me.' Clement gave a noble and dignified reply.\*

*December 9.*—After dinner Clement despatched a courier for St. Petersburg. Tatistscheff came in the evening and had a long conversation with him on a scheme of his Emperor's. The latter wishes to have an interview with our Emperor next September and to bring the Empress with him.

*December 22.*—After dinner I had to go to Court, as the Emperor had invited us to a concert. He told Clement he might come, if he did not find it too wearisome, and bring me with him; adding, 'I am delighted at the thought of seeing your wife once more.' We found only the Court, which, however, forms a pretty numerous circle. The Emperor spoke to me very kindly. The concert was not particularly entertaining, but happily did not last long. Thalberg, who played the clavier most beautifully, beguiled the remainder of the evening, which went somewhat slowly. The Archduchess Sophia looked very beautiful and was also most kind; she assured me she had prayed for me during my confinement.

*December 26.*—Clement awoke with severe rheumatic pains, and stayed a long time in bed. Jäger ordered him a bath.

*December 28.*—Clement still continues poorly, but got up and worked in his cabinet. I waited on him. He is so kind and good, and so thankful for the least service I can render him. We dined alone. During the first part of the evening, he dictated despatches to me, which gave me the greatest pleasure.

*December 31.*—The day passed very sadly for me. Clement is troubled with his rheumatism, and remained

\* See No. 1130.



in bed the whole day. He was very poorly early in the morning and had to have poultices on. I left him alone as little as possible, and found a real happiness in being useful to him. I spent the midnight hour in invoking the blessing of Heaven upon my children and husband, who lay sleeping quietly. I thanked God for His innumerable benefits, and prayed earnestly that He would preserve what He had vouchsafed to me, and bestow His grace upon my family, my husband and my children. Amen !

*ON THE POLITICAL EVENTS OF THE DAY.*

Extracts from confidential letters from Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, from January 12 to December 24, 1834. In two parts.

I.

1105. The Princess's crown. 1106. The Duchess of Berry a prisoner in Austria or not? 1107. Conversation with Sainte-Aulaire on the contingency of the dissolution of the Porte. 1108. The political horizon begins to clear. 1109. Irruption of Polish insurgents out of Switzerland into Piedmont. *Giovane Italia*. 1110. The Echelles affair. Justification of the meeting between the Emperors at Münchengrätz. The German Committee in Paris. Börne and Heine. A moral cordon round Switzerland. 1111. Ministerial crisis in Paris. Rumigny's behaviour in Switzerland. 1112. Scenes at Brussels. 1113. Movement in Galicia. Disturbances at Lyons and Paris. Speech of Thiers on the German Congress. 1114. Conversation between Louis Philippe and Prince Paul Esterhazy. Meaning of the term 'Republic' in France. The Quadruple Alliance. 1115. Arrival of the English squadron off Nauplia.

*Metternich to Apponyi.*

1105. *Vienna, January 12, 1834.*—You may have heard about the *political scene* which is reported to have taken place between the French Ambassador and the Princess Metternich.

As we live at a time when the gossip of drawing-rooms easily reaches the ear of the public through the newspapers, I send you the actual facts. If by chance you should hear them spoken of, be pleased to bring the present letter to the King's notice. This seems to me the only proper and useful course to take. You know what I think of idle gossip, and I have no doubt the King looks upon it in the same light.\*

\* See for the details, 'The Princess Melanie's Diary,' p. 363.—ED.

1106. *January 20.*—I assume that an article in the *Gazette de France* of the 27th and 28th instant, under the heading of ‘Madame,’ will have attracted your attention as it necessarily has our own. It is evidently put forward informally by that section which daily asserts itself in the bosom of the Royalist party in France, that section which, in my opinion, can be characterised by no better term than *White Radicals*.

Little disposed as he is to pay any attention to the attacks which the factious, whatever their colour, are pleased to direct against his person, the Emperor is only sensible of what concerns his honour. Accordingly, on the above article being brought to his notice, the Emperor immediately directed me to transmit the enclosed document to the Duchess of Berry, through M. de Saint-Priest, who happened to be at Vienna. The Duchess was not long in forwarding the reply which I likewise enclose herewith.\*

It is the Emperor’s wish that you read both these

\* The following is the full text of the document above referred to : ‘Oral declaration made by Prince Metternich to Count Saint-Priest, on January 5, 1834. The Emperor having seen an article in the *Gazette de France*, of the 27th and 28th December, 1833, under the heading of “Madame,” desires to ascertain, for certain, whether the contents of that article represent the sentiments of the Duchess of Berry or not ; in other words, whether her Royal Highness *considers herself a prisoner in the Austrian dominions, or as merely enjoying an asylum afforded her within them at her own request.* The Emperor has no intention that his Government should enter into a dispute with journalists, for the purpose of disproving a low calumny. He would consider any such proceeding as beneath his dignity. He prefers on this, as on all other occasions, to come straight to the point, and, in accordance with this determination, he has to request that, if the Duchess of Berry does not share the sentiments expressed by the *Gazette de France*, her Royal Highness will address a letter to his Imperial Majesty, containing a formal denial of the slanderous insinuation put forward by that journal. But if, on the other hand, her Royal Highness should share the sentiment expressed by that paper, his Imperial Majesty hereby offers her the full option of quitting the Austrian dominions.’ The reply called forth by this letter gave an explicit denial to the article in the *Gazette*.—Ed.

letters to the King. His Majesty, of whose sentiments we are well aware, will find in them fresh proofs of the loyal sincerity of his Imperial Majesty.

**1107.** *January 21.*—M. Sainte-Aulaire asked me the other day how we should act if, after we had exhausted all possible means of preserving the Porte, it were to fall to pieces.

‘What I should then wish,’ I replied, ‘would be a frank understanding among the Powers. Austria will be prepared to take part in such an understanding, on the express condition that every possible means for preserving *that which exists* has been exhausted, and that not a single Power, beginning with our own, dream of seizing the spoils of that which it had been found impossible to preserve in its present form.’

Should M. de Broglie address a similar question to you, answer him in the above sense.

**1108.** *January 27.*—The political horizon begins to get clearer. The bare truth is that there is not a single *political affair* in Europe, and I mean by *affairs* those which are such by reason of their intrinsic importance. For instance, the preservation of the Turkish Empire is an affair; the *Russo-Turkish Question* is not one; it only needs to be looked firmly in the face to vanish into air. This is what I think things are now coming to. The ground once cleared of the prejudices with which, till quite recently, it was choked up, there will be room for its wise cultivation, and we shall always be found ready for that kind of work.

**1109.** *February 6.*—I beg you to attach a serious importance to the news from Switzerland.\*

The enterprise in question is the work of *Giovane*

\* This refers to the irruption of armed Polish insurgents from Switzerland into Piedmont.—ED.

*Italia*, which looks upon the land law itself as a foolish dream, in comparison with the goal to which it undertakes to lead the human race! The dregs of the whole population of Europe are the promoters of the great work, and it is not with its leaders that the President of the Council of the King of the French can afford to exchange blandishments.

I indulge the hope that obstacles may have occurred to hinder the carrying out of this criminal enterprise, or that it may possibly fail altogether. But even if this should be so, in other words, if the right spirit animating the Sardinian troops and the Savoyard populations should fail to answer to the wishes of the *cosmopolitan* conspirators, will there not still remain the necessity of taking measures to prevent the repose of a peaceful State and the tranquillity of Europe from being put, at every opportunity, to so cruel a test?

I repose too much confidence in the good sense of the French Cabinet, and its feeling of what is due to itself, to entertain any doubts of your finding it animated by excellent intentions. But there are some cases so glaring that they call not merely for good intentions but for action; and this is precisely the request we have to make to the French Government. We are close upon spring, the season when the spirits effervesce naturally, and the most venturous enterprises are invariably undertaken. Prudence therefore counsels us to be prepared for agitation. If the Revolutionists are so united why should not the Governments emulate them in this respect?

**1110.** *February 13.*—The Echelles affair will no doubt have been regarded by the French Government as a deplorable event.\* It would have experienced a

\* About fifty persons, chiefly Savoyards, armed with muskets and under the command of two officers, set out from Voreppe, where they had



defeat, had it been concerned in the attempt, and as I do not believe in any direct complicity, the fact merely remains painful for those whom it proves to be wanting in the power to govern. There can be no question that if the Government still subsists in France, it does so in reliance upon the strength afforded it by those who may any day, on one pretext or another, withdraw from it their support.

Things cannot much longer exist on their present footing. France is free to govern in the way she pleases, but she cannot be allowed to serve as the focus for a universal conflagration. It is the July Revolution that has made Switzerland what she is ; that unhappy country no longer possesses a Government, whether central or cantonal. What governs there is the clubs, and they consist of all the human dregs of Europe ; a singular method indeed of aiding a *friendly* State, to infect it with this poison !

Join your colleagues in maintaining the argument which I have just laid down for you. The events which occurred at the beginning of this month so completely justify the measures which resulted from the meeting between the monarchs last summer, that you will have ample grounds for going upon. No longer rest satisfied with a mere denial of the facts ; we only speak of what we know ; we invent nothing. If the French police are ignorant of a great number of things, that is no reason why we should ignore them too ; if it feigns ignorance, there is nothing to induce us to play the part of dupes.

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assembled, and proceeded with loud cries of *Giovane Italia* to Echelles. Here they issued Republican proclamations, seized upon a customs-office, and took prisoners some Sardinian carabinieri. They also attempted to penetrate to Chambéry, but this was frustrated by a company of Sardinian troops. They fled to Entre-deux-Guiers, where the mayor of that place had them disarmed.—ED.

I do not know whether you devote any attention to the vile German literature which has made its headquarters at Paris. If you are unacquainted with *Börne's Letters*, buy them, and make MM. de Broglie and d'Argout read certain passages in the fifth and sixth volumes, which treat of the French Government.

Heine is about to publish a new work which will go to the greatest lengths possible. All these people are members of the German *Committee*, which is so called because it forms, in reality, a centre of Government.

What the French Government cannot or will not do in its own country, we shall *compel* Switzerland to do in the Confederation.

The heads of the various Governments are weary of punishing their subjects for crimes introduced from abroad. Quarantine against the Eastern plague has long been known to civilisation; we shall draw a moral sanitary cordon round Switzerland, and we shall see whether the Swiss nation or Europe will be the ones to suffer most from it.

1111. *April 12.*—The Ministerial crisis in Paris is in itself a very bad thing. Whatever be its result, it will have proved how little stability there is in the Governmental machine, and, from this point of view, the close of a session, followed by a general election, is the most unfortunate combination that could have occurred.\* Here we are at the 12th April; so late

\* On April 9, Prince Metternich wrote the following note to Sainte-Aulaire on the Ministerial crisis in France: 'A banker has just brought me a letter from Paris, containing the news I gave you yesterday. According to the writer, the resignation of the Duke de Broglie was irrevocable; they spoke of Molé, or yourself, as his successor, in which case Molé would come to Vienna, or De Rigny, with Haxo in the place of Sault. As neither you nor I shall exercise any influence on the nominations, I give you the news as it arrives. What I ask of you is, to remain at Vienna, or come Minister; and what I should ask of Molé, were he to be chosen,

therefore as the 6th, M. de Broglie's successor cannot have been chosen. The difficulty experienced in reconstituting the Ministry is alone sufficient to show the true position of the Government.

M. de Rumigny\* is playing a very mischievous game in Switzerland. Instead of trying to accommodate matters, he is basing his conduct of affairs on the principle of political jealousy. There is, properly speaking, no question of diplomacy in the demands addressed to the Helvetic Confederation by the adjoining States. These demands relate purely to *social* questions, to nothing more, but also to nothing less. If the French Cabinet thinks to base its political influence upon the support it offers to the anti-social factions, it is simply going straight to destruction. Explain this very clearly to King Louis Philippe; there is not the least doubt he will understand it, but will he act accordingly? I do not venture to anticipate the answer to this question.

1112. *April 18.*—The scenes that take place at Brussels † are lamentable, for they throw such discredit on the Government as to induce more than a suspicion of its complicity with revolutionists and plunderers. The excuses put forward by the Ministry are weak, for if they exonerate the Government from complicity, they proclaim its impotence, and a Government that is impotent ceases to deserve the name. It is plain that the

would be not to invent any more principles, but to rest satisfied with those that have governed society for four thousand years, and have, therefore, acquired some title to its confidence.

‘All this, my dear Ambassador, is bad, as everything is that affords no basis for calculations.’—ED.

\* French Ambassador in Switzerland.—ED.

† The publication of the subscription lists for the redemption of the Duke of Orange's horses, had given rise, early in April, to excesses on the part of the Brussels populace, in the course of which several houses were plundered.—ED.

Ministers aimed at showing the impotence of the Orange party, but to prove their own weakness at the same time was to be guilty of a blunder of the grossest description. The result of all this seems to be that the only party which really possesses any power is the party of anarchy !

But we are as yet only at the beginning of *active* attempts. Before anything can be done we must await their approaching development.

1113. *April 19.*—I speak to you in my despatch of this date of the important discoveries we have made in Galicia.\* Before very long we shall be able to speak openly, and the world will then once more do us the justice to admit that it is not so easy to make dupes of us. The 4th of May next was the day fixed, ever since last autumn, for the general outbreak of a revolution which was at once to attack the high places of Government and convulse the lower strata of society. The universal revolution, which the Paris Committees have been preparing for a number of years past, required, to enable it to succeed, an active, warlike force. This it has found in the Polish refugees, who have been welcomed everywhere as heroes. At the proper time, I will furnish you with data enough to open the eyes of the least observant, and then many masks will be torn off.

I should be sorry for the French Government to believe that the prospects of the future had been assured by the battles of Lyons and Paris.† The

\* In this despatch Prince Metternich writes : ' We hold in our hands thousands of the threads of this vast conspiracy, which can all be traced to Paris. In the circuit of Galicia alone, nearly eighty agents of the French and Polish Central Committees have fallen into the hands of justice. Their admissions are conclusive, and they will receive confirmation from the arrests that will shortly follow in other countries.'—ED.

† A rising of the workmen of Lyons, which lasted from the 5th to the



Radicals will not be induced to give up their attempts so easily.

M. de Broglie's policy was bad enough. Will M. de Rigny do any better? I know of no sillier discussion than took place between some Radicals in the Chamber and M. Thiers, in reference to the German Congress. What Cabinet ever thought of declaring itself the natural protector of the *petty* Princes? The Ministry that endeavours to conciliate Princes by characterising them as *petty*, is like an adventurer who, after being persistently rejected by eligible ladies, styles himself the lover by right of *plain* women; so clumsy a gallant may be quite sure beforehand that no woman will ever receive his advances.

1114. *June 4.*—Prince Esterhazy will doubtless have spoken to you of a most interesting conversation he has had with King Louis Philippe.\* What I beg

15th April. Republican risings simultaneously broke out at Paris, Grenoble, Toulon, and Nîmes.—ED.

\* This conversation took place on May 23, at Neuilly. Prince Esterhazy, who was in Paris at the time, and had waited upon the King, reported it at full length. King Louis Philippe expressed himself unreservedly to the Austrian Ambassador on the difficulties of his position, and declared himself perfectly willing to give his adherence to the views of the three allied Northern Powers; but for this, he said, time must be allowed him. He deplored the mistakes that had been committed by Charles X., who, instead of persevering in a firm defensive attitude, had resorted to a feebly offensive one, which could not but lead to the downfall of the throne. He next proceeded to speak of himself. 'I know,' so ran his words, according to Esterhazy's report, 'I know that my conduct is severely judged. I ought not to have accepted what was offered me, or have done so for the benefit of the legitimate line of succession. Such a judgment, however, can only be founded on a radically mistaken notion of the true facts of the case. It was as little in my power to have the Duke of Bordeaux recognised, as to arrest the course of yonder sun, whose rays are shining down upon us. People are also mistaken in supposing that my popularity, and the enthusiastic longings I inspired, were of such a nature as to permit me to make the attempt. The issue of the struggle between the Monarchy and the Republic was very uncertain; Lafayette himself had refused to come to an understanding with me, and I had not even seen



you to insist upon is, that *I do not dread the Republic more than it is to be dreaded*; a fact contradicted by the King, who *apparently* does not fear it *at all*. In order to make myself clearly understood, I need only tell you that I mean by *anarchy*, the *Republic*. I know very well that *the Republic*—in other words a Republican

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him, except at the Hôtel de Ville, where I said to him that, since he had not been willing to come and see me, I had felt no hesitation in paying him the first visit. It must be borne in mind,' continued the King, 'that there was no choice between the Republic and myself, and that, in fact, if I had retired to the Château of Eu, whither I had already sent on my horses, the Republic would actually have been proclaimed, and this would have been tantamount to an immediate foreign war, a war which the Belgian Revolution—which, on this supposition, would have broken out much sooner—and the entry of a French army into that country, would infallibly have brought on. At such a moment I had neither the opportunity nor the leisure for mature reflection. Still, I admit that the hope of staving off, by my personal intervention, the frightful disasters and incalculable dangers which were threatening the civilised world, together with the thought that the Great Powers of Europe would lend me their support in an endeavour, the success of which could not but intimately affect themselves, were the sole motives that constrained me to embark on an enterprise of the kind. The previous Government had not taken any root: it had not succeeded in creating for itself any force, whether moral or material, and I have myself been compelled to create a basis, without which no Government can subsist. The results attained, without any wish on my part to exaggerate their importance, are nevertheless undeniable, and what you saw yesterday affords a proof of my statement.' (The reference is to Lafayette's funeral on May 22.) 'The Republican party is evidently verging to its fall, and while guarding against its secret plots and machinations, it behoves us not to exaggerate its importance in public opinion by showing for it that dread which it is really not in a position to inspire. Nothing could be more reassuring than the spirit displayed by the troops and the National Guard, especially at Paris. As for the army, the same spirit unquestionably prevails among all the regiments. As for the National Guard, that of Paris is admirable; but the same can hardly be said of that of Lyons, and the prolonged resistance that occurred in that city is only to be attributed to the necessary precaution of not putting it forward too prominently at first, as well as to the diminution in the garrison, arising from the last reduction. The vast majority of the nation undoubtedly desires the maintenance of internal tranquillity, and all the middle classes are strongly in its favour. It may be conceded that the danger arising from Republican tendencies, to which Prince Metternich attaches too marked an importance, diminishes from day to day. . . .' This last remark is the point referred to above in Prince Metternich's letter.—ED.

Government affording the prospect of stability—is not what is in store for France, but *anarchy* under the colours of the Republic, for no one will ever *proclaim anarchy*. This is what threatens the present Government, which depends on merely negative forces, in particular the fear of the masses.

I do not trouble you with any explanations in reference to the famous treaty of the Quadruple Alliance. I am not in a position to take the initiative in the matter; not that I should not have more than one complaint to make against the transaction, but because anything I could say to you would necessarily cast aspersion on a political combination, which, from all appearances, ought to bring forth bitter fruits for its very authors. Besides, there are cases in which blame only serves to fan the flame which prudence would have us quench. Moreover the text of the treaties has not yet been communicated to us, and until the time comes for us to explain ourselves, we will rest satisfied with appealing to the terms used by King Louis Philippe in first approaching the subject with Prince Esterhazy\*—terms which read rather like an excuse than a boast.

\* In the conversation of May 23, alluded to above, Esterhazy, in his report to Metternich, speaks on the subject as follows: ‘The King naturally recurred to the question of the Quadruple Treaty. He said that, seeing England resolved to act, and even seeking his aid to extricate herself from the awkward position in which she was placed, he had not rejected the application, and that he thought it best, even in the public interest, not to leave England unrestricted liberty of action. That, nevertheless, he was firmly resolved not to interfere in the affairs of Spain; and that, although the proposition of sending troops thither had received the support of more than one member of the Council, he had persistently refused to listen to it; that on this point he had been warmly supported by Marshal Soult, who, on his part, had been pressed to despatch ten thousand men. “Neither ten thousand, nor five thousand, nor a hundred,” said the Marshal; “I was in Spain too long a time to give the King such advice.”

‘I know,’ continued the King, ‘that Prince Metternich gave it as his opinion to M. Sainte-Aulaire, that I should have done better to declare

If the King or his Ministers should seek to lead the conversation to this subject, before you have received more detailed instructions from me, be pleased to point out to them that silence is often more expressive than a mere explanation.

The French foreign diplomatic agents assume to discover in this new bond, between the two maritime Powers, a counterpoise to the understanding which took place last year between the three monarchs.

This expression is borrowed from the Revolutionary newspapers, which allow no occasion to pass of endeavouring to foment differences among the Powers. It has no practical significance, for the fact that the French and English Cabinets take every opportunity to uphold Revolutionary principles in opposition to the Conservative principles professed by the Continental Powers is no new one, and dates further back than the signing of the Quadruple treaty in London. But there is no doubt whatever that this transaction will give rise to grave difficulties for all the contracting parties, and this circumstance alone is sufficient to prevent the union just established among the four Powers from presenting itself to the Continental Courts as a subject for jealousy, the level to which the spirit of party and bravado would fain degrade it.

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myself in favour of Don Carlos and espouse his cause. Although this assertion evinces his ordinary perspicacity, and even coincides to some extent with my own impressions on the subject ; although, moreover, I am ready to admit that so far as concerns the question of right and the interest attaching, in my case, to the succession of the male line, Prince Metternich is substantially right, yet there is a practical difficulty arising from the total absence of the necessary personal qualities in Don Carlos, who would otherwise have found no difficulty in being at once proclaimed King of Spain. For, in fact, if he had succeeded, and had actually been proclaimed King in any single province, the question would have been different, and my own line of conduct would likewise have differed. . . .’ See also No. 1128.—ED.

1115. *June 12.*—I have just received a report from Corfu, dated May 26, by which I learn the arrival of the English fleet off Nauplia and the rumours which prevail there as to the object with which it set sail from Malta.

We attach no more importance to these rumours than the mere fact of their existence, and this fact we cannot but think is much to be regretted. The despatch of a considerable squadron from the harbour of Malta; the fact of its sailing towards the Levant; the silence preserved as to its destination; the rumour, accredited by the officers of the squadron itself, of its approaching junction with a French naval force; finally, the destination assigned to these united forces by some, and not denied by others—all this forms a cluster of facts which cannot but agitate men's minds, and produce effects all the more vexatious and dangerous that they are beyond the control of the various Cabinets.

## II.

1116. Scheme for a marriage between Queen Maria da Gloria and the Duke of Leuchtenberg. Dom Pedro. The Bonapartists and Louis Bonaparte. 1117. The Iberian Peninsula as the head-quarters of the revolution. Don Carlos. Count Alcudia's mission. 1118. Louis Philippe's policy in Spain. 1119. The Trades Unions in Berne. Count Rumigny. 1120. Professor Schnell. 1121. Louis Philippe and his Ministers. 1122. The French Foreign Department. Proposed visit of the Duke of Orleans to Vienna. 1123. Prospect of Talleyrand being sent to Vienna. 1124. The new English Ministry. Talleyrand's refusal of the post of Ambassador at Vienna.

### *Metternich to Apponyi.*

1116. *Vienna, September 11, 1834.*—Among the objects worthy to claim the attention of all those who are capable of estimating the significance of events, it would be impossible for me not to include the contin-



gency of a marriage between the Duke of Leuchtenberg and Doña Maria. Dom Pedro prosecutes the idea of this marriage with avidity, and the English Government regards it with equal favour.

I have already explained the course which it seems to me his own interests call upon Louis Philippe to follow in regard to Don Carlos. The King, while admitting my views to be, in principle, correct, has thought fit to adopt the contrary course. The same rule holds good in regard to Dom Pedro. That adventurous spirit will yet give plenty of trouble to the two Powers who have helped him to his present position, and who, in so doing, committed the gross error of not breaking the instrument after they had thought proper to make use of it. There is a great amount of confusion in this mode of proceeding, and it is impossible to conceive what motives could have led France and England to act as they have done. As for me, I frankly confess my inability to guess.

Bonapartism once transplanted into Portugal, and placed under the protection of Dom Pedro, you will see that spectre once more assume a body. Bonapartism represents a certain element in the universal disorder; it would be nothing were the social body less agitated than it is. It possesses the advantage of furnishing kings and presidents whom the Revolutionists put up for sale in the market-place; and if they find few purchasers, it is still difficult to understand how Governments like those of France and England can lend themselves to smoothing the way for them.

The Duke of Leuchtenberg would, as King of Portugal, attract a portion of the sect to him; the young Louis Bonaparte is seeking to secure himself the patronage of another section, for Bonapartism embraces a very wide



superficies ; it extends from military despotism down to the Society of the Friends of the People.

1117. *September 17.*—You will see that one of my despatches of this date\* supplies the information you were anxious to obtain as to the attitude of the several Courts in regard to the affairs of Spain. •

In this despatch I have spoken as fully as I could, consistently with prudence.

Nothing is more difficult than to decide what course the Cabinets ought to pursue in a complication where the material conditions are entirely against them. Weigh carefully what I tell you in my statement of this date, and you will be just as wise and just as ignorant as I am myself.

The Revolution was perfectly right to select the Iberian Peninsula as the place in which to establish its head-quarters. Covered by France and flanked by England, it may consider itself placed there under powerful protection. My mind reduces questions to their simplest terms, but those terms are fraught with the destinies of an entire world.

We have not lost a moment in endeavouring to furnish material assistance ; but these succours arrive but slowly as it is, and they will cease to arrive at all on the day which reveals the source from whence they came. *It must therefore be religiously kept a secret from everyone.* M. d'Alcudia is here ;† I find no difficulty in coming to an understanding with him, for he is one of the sensible and straightforward ones. He thinks with me on all points of vital importance, especially that of not mingling Spanish Carlism with French Legitimacy.

\* See No. 1129.

† Count Alcudia had been sent to Vienna on a secret mission to represent the interests of Don Carlos.—ED.

But we are 400 leagues distant from the frontiers of Spain, and 600 from St. Petersburg; 200 from Berlin, 400 from Naples, and 300 from the Hague! When it comes to moving a machine of which the levers are so long, and when the support on which the levers rest is as weak as Don Carlos unquestionably is, affairs begin to drag, and impatience does not make them go any the quicker; it even clogs the mechanism.

I feel that up to the present moment we have done all it was possible to do, and no one knows better than myself how little that is. But the fault is not ours; it lies in the things themselves.

The quarter from which we know nothing at present is St. Petersburg; the rest are in full accord with each other, and, so far as concerns that first of material needs, money, in full activity.

**1118.** *October 6.*—I have read your report of September 22 with the greatest interest. I consider it as exactly describing the real ideas of King Louis Philippe. He thinks as you say, in regard to Spanish affairs, for he could not possibly take any other view of them than he does. Where the truth is so plain as to present itself with irresistible power, a keen and practical mind like Louis Philippe's cannot fail to be impressed with it at once.

The only question now for the King of the French is purely and simply to know from which side he may expect the greatest dangers; is it from the side of Radical reform—tantamount to the complete triumph of the Revolution—or from the side of the moribund monarchy?

Here there is no difficulty in deciding the question; in fact its solution is easy; the King and his Ministers must have arrived at the same conclusion concerning it,

*in their own minds*; if they *act* differently, the reason is, that the King cannot make terms with the Radical Revolution, while his Ministers are among the number of those who, in the last resort, are capable of making terms with any revolution that is successful. In a country where the framework of society has already crumbled into dust, and the legislative machine is organised in such a way as daily to make that dust more impalpable, while it is called upon at the same time to furnish the materials of construction, men and things could not stand otherwise than we now see them in France.

**1119.** *October* 18.—I commend the Berne affair\* to your notice, in order that it may not assume the proportions of one, for, to speak frankly, that is what we desire.

The various statements which I now transmit to you in reference to the course pursued by the Emperor, will be amply sufficient to convince you how paternal and moderate are the Emperor's views. If the wretched Bernese Government makes common cause with the enemy of the people in Switzerland and other countries; if it thinks proper to afford protection to attempts against the social body—attempts which at the same time are an insult to common sense—the least that wise and prudent Governments can do is to withdraw their subjects from the centre of contagion. Such a measure has nothing to do with *politics*; it is a mere act of *self-preservation*. Be pleased to take the utmost pains to make this truth understood at Paris. I am

\* The Governments of Austria and several other German States had found themselves compelled to issue the most stringent prohibition against artisans from their respective States taking up their residence in the Canton of Berne, as the Bernese Government extended great toleration to the revolutionary proceedings of the Trades Unions in that district.—ED.

apprehensive that too much importance may be attached there to the views which the French Ambassador in Switzerland must be trying to inculcate, in consequence of the false position in which he has placed himself with every party in Switzerland--a regular political Bedlam, both legislative and moral. M. de Rumigny, who thinks that because he plays at politics, all the rest of the world must needs do so too, is mistaken so far as we are concerned. I am anxious the same thing should not happen at Paris.

**1120.** *October 18.*—Between the part they have to play as Radicals and their functions as rulers, the Bernese agitators are in sore perplexity. Recent intelligence from Berne, derived from an unimpeachable source, leaves no doubt upon that point. Professor Schnell lately had the leaders of the German Committee brought before him, in order to exhort them not to create another scandal like that of the 28th July last,\* *not that the thing was not all very well in itself*, but it involved the Government in inextricable difficulties, and besides, exposed it to the risk of being overthrown by *those citizens who were less enlightened than himself and his friends!* M. Tavel, M. de Rumigny's intimate friend, has used the same language to the heads of the club.

Not one of our own workmen is implicated in these proceedings; a rare example of the good sense which animates our people. Our information as to the proceedings of the agitators is accurate, because our own people help us to check them.

**1121.** *November 2.*—I make a great and just distinction between King Louis Philippe and his Ministers.

\* At a banquet held by the Society of Naturalists at Lucerne (July 28), a Dr. Troxler, in proposing a certain toast, inveighed against foreign sovereigns in terms of such vulgar abuse, that he was turned out of the room.—ED.



He can only occupy *one position*; they are quite willing to accommodate themselves to *any position*, provided it brings them in money, consideration, and influence. The King is therefore bound to be *Conservative*, whether he will or no. What I could wish were that he should convince himself once for all that if there are various methods of self-preservation, there is one infallible way by which any Government may destroy itself, and that is to coquet with the Radical faction. Louis Philippe deems it his duty to oppose this faction at home and encourage it abroad. In this he is completely wrong. Whenever and wherever Radicalism triumphs, it is a common misfortune for all Governments, of whatever stamp they may be.

1122. *December 1.*—I have never felt less need to send you detailed instructions, than in the present situation of affairs, men and things. You, like myself, can at present only play the part of a spectator.

However things turn out in England, whether Wellington and the Conservative party keep their ground, or fall before the onset of the Radicals (for there will be no question of the Whigs for a long time to come), Louis Philippe will have to make up his mind which he will have—the end of the French Revolution, or the beginning of the general revolution in Europe.

I address you to-day on the subject of the French Foreign Department and its abominable proceedings.\* The reason is, that by a happy chance I have succeeded in obtaining important information on the subject. Rest assured that the department preaches and upholds the Revolution in every quarter, and that anything the

\* In the new French Ministry which was constituted on November 18, under the presidency of Marshal Mortier, Vice-Admiral de Rigny undertook the direction of foreign affairs. — ED.



King or his Ministers may assert to the contrary is only to mislead you. Marshal Maison is the only instance I know of a French Minister, who, during the ten days he was in office, did not claim to have guided the destinies of the world: perhaps too I should say the same of General Bernard during his brief spell of three days. If things go on at this rate in France, a man will have to be born Minister, to have held office for any considerable period.

At the present moment, however, my attention is not directed to France, but England, for what passes there in the course of the next few months will exercise a decisive influence on events in Europe.

M. de Talley, among the last despatches addressed to him at Vienna previously to the dissolution of the Ministry which has just resumed office, addressed a *compte-rendu* to M. Sainte-Aulaire, in which he informed him, under the seal of secrecy, that Mgr. the Duke of Orleans wished to travel; that he intended to visit those countries where he was certain of being well received; that Vienna appeared to him to offer the greatest attractions and facilities for intercourse, considering his near relationship to the Imperial family; that he would come if he could be assured of a gracious reception; that he would not be one of the contrary supposition.

If I mention the matter to you at all, it is only that you may appear to know nothing about it, should the King at any time recur to the subject. You must not be so far from giving your personal opinion as to the manner in which his Imperial Majesty is wont to receive foreign Princes who come to visit him.

M. Sainte-Aulaire sees in this projected excursion more than a mere desire to see foreign Princes. He has already had several Archduchesses to provide

for,' he observed to me, ' why will you not bestow one of them upon us ?' I pretended not to see the point of his allusion.

All these schemes imply a vast amount of thoughtlessness, and I think, in all conscience, Louis Philippe would do well not to hurry on his plans before they have had time to mature.

**1123.** *December 14.*—M. de Sainte-Aulaire had already been directly informed of the change of destination which, it seems, is destined for him. He does not like it, but he will obey. I find it somewhat difficult to believe that M. de Talleyrand will have the courage to undertake a journey to Vienna; should it prove otherwise, I shall have nothing to object against his coming. Of all diplomatists, M. de Talleyrand is the one with whom I should have least difficulty in coming to an understanding on many subjects, and the one whom I should be least afraid of, in cases where we found it impossible to agree. I have had such a number of transactions with him that it would be inexcusable in me not to know him well, as he, on his part, must know me well. M. de Talleyrand, as a man and a thinker, faithfully represents *France* as she is, whereas the greater number of those who represent their country abroad, often represent merely some party, very often merely themselves.

**1124.** *December 24.*—I send you *sub volanti* the despatch I address to M. de Hummelauer.

Be pleased to peruse it and not to delay the courier. Read what I say about English affairs, but communicate nothing in my despatches to any of your colleagues. This refers chiefly to those passages having reference to Spain. My purpose is to sound the dispositions of the Duke of Wellington, and such an undertaking can only

be crowned with success by approaching the subject as directly as possible. Assuredly no one was ever placed in a more difficult position than the Duke, and therefore too much consideration cannot be shown in dealing with it.\*

Madame de Dino wrote lately to Prince Esterhazy informing him of Talleyrand's determination to withdraw entirely from public life. She says the post at Vienna had been twice offered him, but that he had refused it, partly on account of his age and infirmities, partly in consideration of the fact that he was afraid of furnishing his detractors with too much food for calumny, by proceeding to the very country where he had contributed to ensure the triumph of Legitimacy, to uphold the contrary principle—a country, moreover, in which the Bourbon family had found protection—settled too, as he would be, in a city where the Dauphiness is a frequent visitor. In spite of these fine phrases, I believe M. Talleyrand's idea is no longer to do anything, or to expend his last energies in England, if things there take a turn he approves of.

\* The day after, Metternich wrote to Sainte-Aulaire as follows: 'All one can say of the new English Ministry is, that it is there; the fate of England will be decided at the hustings. The one point I feel certain about is, that I cannot conceive how it will be possible to form a new Ministry should the present one fall. Three parties exert an influence over the elections: the Tories, the Whigs, and the Radicals. If there were only two parties, the numerical preponderance of one or other of them would decide the contest; but as the Whigs are half Conservatives and half Radicals, and these subdivisions throw their weight now into one scale and now into the other, since they have against them both the Tories and the Radicals, the result is a confusion which will be set straight heaven knows how.'

The new Tory Ministry, thus far, was composed as follows: Peel, Prime Minister; Wellington, Foreign Secretary; Goulbourn, Home Secretary; Wharnclyffe, Lord Privy Seal; Baring, President of the Board of Trade; Aberdeen, First Lord of the Admiralty; Lyndhurst, Lord Chancellor.—ED.

*CONFERENCES OF GERMAN MINISTERS AT  
VIENNA.*

1125. Metternich's opening speech of January 13, 1834.  
 1126. Metternich's concluding speech of June 12, 1834.  
 1127. King Frederick William III., of Prussia, to Metternich (letter),  
 Berlin, June 25, 1834.

1125. The plenipotentiaries of the Sovereign Princes and Free States of the Germanic Confederation are to-day assembled for the third time, to deliberate on the most important questions affecting Germany, and for the third time it is my privilege to take part as a representative in the proceedings of this solemn assembly. On this, as on former occasions, I cherish the calm conviction that this meeting will in its turn conduce to the happiness and lasting welfare of our common fatherland; and twice, at least, my confidence has not been misplaced.

You will have already perceived, from the invitations\* which his Majesty the Emperor issued, in conjunction with his Majesty the King of Prussia, to the various German Cabinets, that the task with which we have to deal is of a different nature to that which occupied the German Cabinets in earlier deliberations. When we met together in 1815, the problem before us was how to institute the Confederation and secure it a commanding position among the other European Powers. In 1820, our task lay in imparting comprehensiveness and stability

\* These had been sent the previous year, in the form of a circular despatch.—TR.

to the Confederation, and defining the fundamental principles that were to guide it. To-day we have to consider how the Confederation and its members may best be upheld; we have to look the dangers which menace the Confederation and the separate German States firmly in the face; and having done so, to take into full and careful consideration the remedy which, in these dangerous and stormy times, the interests of self-preservation and regard for the welfare of the German peoples call upon each individual Government and the Confederation in its collective capacity to apply.

In these words I have described the difficult task which is to form the subject of our Conferences.

. . . I shall now proceed, by command of his Majesty the Emperor, to lay before this honourable Assembly, without reserve or hesitation, the truth and the whole truth in regard to the state of things in Germany, as they appear to his Majesty.

In 1815, the German Princes, including also the Free States, combined themselves into a permanent Confederation, the aim of which is to maintain the security of Germany at home and abroad, and at the same time the independence and integrity of the several German States.

This association forms internally a community of mutually independent States, with equal reciprocal treaty-rights and treaty-obligations; in its external relations it is a collective body forming a single political whole.

In the same solemn Act, which constitutes the Germanic Confederation, and which all the members alike bound themselves to hold inviolable, the German Princes have declared that there should be representative institutions in all the States of the Confederation.



At the same time it was open to every sovereign Prince to treat the subject as an affair of internal administration.

Whether this system of popular representation was suited to the German character ; how far it is in accordance with the meaning of Article XIII., which expressly promises representative institutions ; how far it conflicts with pre-existing rights and relations ; finally, whether it sufficiently recognises the inalienable supremacy of the sovereign authority—into all these questions I need not here enter. It is sufficient for my present purpose to mention the important results to which the introduction of the system has, in most cases, given rise. The turbulence of the times has given birth to a party whom repeated concessions, if not the actual indulgence of all their demands, have emboldened to an extraordinary degree. Inimical to every kind of authority, because it fancies itself to be the depositary of all sovereign power, it maintains, in the midst of general political peace, an internal war ; it corrupts the minds and dispositions of the people, corrupts the youth, deludes even those of riper years, introduces trouble and discord into all the public and private relations of life, deliberately incites the populations to cherish a systematic distrust of their lawful rulers, and preaches the destruction and annihilation of all that exists. This is the party which has contrived to adapt to its own purposes the forms of the constitutions lately introduced into Germany. Whether it pursue this ostensibly lawful, but slower and surer method, or have recourse to open revolt, its object is always the same. Acting on a definite plan, it was at first content with making itself a definite position in the Legislative Chambers, in opposition to the Government. Gradually its plans extended ; the position already

achieved must be strengthened by every available means; the next step was to confine the sovereign authority within the narrowest possible limits; and so at last it came to be contended that the actual sovereignty should no longer be vested in the supreme head of the State, but that the constitutional authority should be transferred to the control of the Legislative Assemblies. And, as a matter of fact, we must not try to conceal from ourselves that here and there this party has, unfortunately, more or less succeeded in attaining its end, and that, unless some effectual means can be found to prevent the stream from overflowing its banks, and arrest the mighty progress of advancing faction, within a short time even the very shadow of monarchical authority may vanish from the grasp of several of the Princes.

His Majesty the Emperor is convinced that in the state of things just described—the misguided attempts of faction to supersede the monarchical principle by the modern idea of the sovereignty of the people—must be sought the mainspring of that disorder which gathers strength from day to day, and the underlying motive of the attacks which with ever-increasing audacity are being directed, in many a German State, against the sovereign rights of the Princes. All the other phenomena, however striking they may be, and whatever the degree of apprehension they may excite, his Majesty the Emperor considers to be no more than the inevitable consequences of the predominance which that pernicious theory has already assumed in Germany over the monarchical principle. For in every country, where circumstances favoured it, the same faction has made use of the political Press, in order to spread its doctrines by pamphlets, newspapers, and publications of every kind,

and incite the populace to revolt against all right, law, and existing order. It has availed itself everywhere of the publicity given to the transactions of the Legislative Assemblies, to vent its revolutionary spirit in repeated reproaches against everything emanating from lawful authority; it has everywhere endeavoured to win over the young, so susceptible to all new influences, to its theories, and even to employ them actively as tools for the accomplishment of its nefarious designs; lastly, it has adopted the expedient of calling in question the claim of the middle classes to any acquired privileges and rights of property, and at the same time attracting the lower classes to its way of thinking, by encouraging them in the belief that property of every kind is destined sooner or later to become their booty.

. . . It would be foreign to the purpose of this address, to consider whether more stringent measures might not have been taken by the several Governments, either individually or collectively, to prevent the evil from spreading at first; we have now only to ask ourselves how the dangers may be arrested by which the Confederation and its separate members are actually threatened.

. . . His Majesty is firmly convinced that the remedy can only be sought and obtained by keeping in view the twofold position of the German Princes; first, as sovereign, independent rulers; secondly, as members of the Confederation. This, in one word, is the question which, in all amity and goodwill, in all harmony and confidence, must be openly and unreservedly discussed, if this honourable Assembly is to render its constituents a good account of the results of our deliberations.

His Imperial Majesty begs to assure this honourable Assembly that it has his best wishes for the success of

its labours, and convinced as he is that this feeling is fully reciprocated by his Federal allies, he finds in this sentiment the surest pledge that we shall one and all take to heart the great lessons of the time and apply them for the profit and advantage of our common fatherland.\*

*Metternich's concluding Speech on June 12, 1834.*

**1126.** At this moment, when the final results of our Conferences are about to be embodied in a protocol, I trust I may be permitted by this honourable Assembly to cast a glance backward upon the high and weighty matters which have occupied our attention during the last five months, and the results that have been accomplished by our labours.

We are all agreed that the dangers by which our common fatherland is threatened are the mournful result of far-reaching events in the past, which no one can now undo, the fruit of lamentable errors which have affected whole generations, and altogether the effects of causes the blame of which attaches to another time than our

\* The Conferences, which were held under the presidency of the Chancellor, assisted by Count Münch-Bellinghausen, President of the Frankfurt Diet, lasted from the 13th January to the 12th June. Representatives from Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, and the other States of the Confederation also attended. The business was divided among five committees. The first had to take into consideration the *Co-operation of the Estates in the exercise of the sovereign right*; the second, the *Publication of the transactions of the Legislative Assemblies*; the third, the *Schools and Universities systems*; the fourth, the *Question of the Press*; the fifth, the *Relations of the internal legislation in each State to that of the Confederation*. The Final Protocol of June 12 contains the results of the Conferences in sixty Articles. Some of these (Articles III.-XIV., relating to the institution of the Court of Arbitration) were, in consequence of representations to a similar effect from the several States of the Confederation, passed at a meeting of the Diet on October 30, 1834, and forthwith promulgated; the remaining articles served for the present merely as a guide to regulate the instructions given by the several German Governments to their representatives at the Diet.—ED.



own. Who could now be credulous enough to believe that human wisdom could, in the space of a few months, utterly eradicate and remove all traces of an evil, which is unfortunately connected with so far-reaching and complicated a history? We must console ourselves, however, with the thought that everything has been done that human faculties could achieve under the given circumstances; nay more, that a way has been discovered and opened up, which, if only it be steadfastly followed, is adapted not only to lead us out of the labyrinth of dangers and difficulties that now threaten, but to guide us henceforward into a better path of law, order, and true freedom.

This hope is founded upon two organisations which I may characterise as the cardinal points upon which the decisions of this Conference hinge. The first of these is the institution of the *Courts of Arbitration*.

While the representative system tends naturally in the direction of the sovereign power of the democratic representative assemblies, and seeks in the unlimited responsibility of the Ministers a means to wrest the virtual power of the State from the hands of the rulers, precisely where matters of the utmost importance are in question—and thus virtually inverts the natural order of things—our Court of Arbitration restores them once more to their natural relations. Henceforward it will not rest with the Estates to wrest the meaning of the Constitution to their own liking; or to be judges in their own cause, in the event of the ruler attempting to oppose their wishes, or act in a manner which they think reprehensible. Nor is the proposed remedy obnoxious to the reproach of initiating or sanctioning a system of unjust or arbitrary government on the part of the rulers; on the contrary, whenever disputes arise between the



Estates and the Sovereign, men of proved impartiality will decide as arbitrators according to their sense of right, or, if definite rules be wanting, according to the nature of the case. Thus in future, where once the arbitrary will of demagogic subjects threatened to overwhelm the monarchical principle, the decision will rest with a higher judicial authority, whose members nevertheless, in virtue of the Federal relations subsisting among the sovereign German Princes and Free States, owe their existence to the free choice of the Federal members. The sovereignty of the rulers and the guarantee of their privileges claimed by the Estates receive in this way due recognition; and while, on the one hand, it is to be hoped all the nobler elements of public opinion in Germany will thankfully welcome this institution, it must be remembered, on the other hand, that the future of Germany lies in the hands of the rulers; for to their wisdom and integrity is confided the choice of *impartial* arbitrators.

The second organisation I have alluded to is closely bound up with the first, and provides for the due and proper administration of the revenue in the various States of the Confederation, in view of the hostile endeavours of the party of anarchy.

The theory of the representative system puts it in the power of the representatives of the people, by means of a *single* vote, to paralyse the whole public administration. Much the same thing has occurred in the German Legislative Assemblies, where the folly or perversity of a persistent Opposition threatens to fall back upon this unconstitutional mode of defence whenever the Anti-Monarchical section fail to get exactly what they choose to demand. Misdemeanours of this kind are, for the future, put a stop to. Article XXI. of our Final Protocol provides that in a case where the Estates and the Sovereign

cannot come to terms upon the Budget, recourse shall be had to a court of arbitration, and empowers the Sovereign, should this lawful method of redress meet with wilful obstruction or rejection on the part of the Estates, to proceed to levy the supplies previously granted. The new advantages accruing from this ordinance to the Governments who were placed by these unseemly denunciations at the mercy of their Estates, are too evident to require further demonstration. A powerful and decided impulse has been given by it to the cause of law and order, and in this path they may continue to advance, unchecked by misguided opposition on the part of the Estates.

The remaining resolutions and measures that group themselves around the main results of our deliberations, merely embody in general terms the views of the several Governments on the best methods of preserving order in Germany where it still remains intact, or restoring it where destroyed. . . .

Before we bring our sitting to a close, there still remains one agreeable duty for me to perform; and this is to express on the Emperor's behalf his full recognition of your labours in these deliberations, crowned as they have been with such brilliant success, together with my own feelings of heartfelt gratitude for the numerous marks of confidence shown me, and which have served so essentially to promote and facilitate our common endeavours. Your best and highest reward will consist in the consciousness of having accomplished, by your patient and enlightened endeavours, a work the beneficial influence of which will be felt throughout the whole of Germany.

*King Frederick William III., of Prussia, to Metternich  
(Letter), Berlin, June 25. 1834.*

**1127.** *Mein Herr Fürst von Metternich.*—Now that the Ministerial Conferences at Vienna are closed, and I have been able to acquaint myself thoroughly with their results, as embodied in the Final Protocol, I cannot refrain from expressing to you how rejoiced I am at the result of a work as difficult as it was important. The first idea of a general consultation among all the German Cabinets to consider the means best adapted to secure the tranquillity and independence of Germany, originated with you; on this great occasion, Prussia and Austria—as I trust may always be the case—went hand in hand; this beneficial idea took a practical shape, and has since borne good fruits. The Conference has, by its decisions, given greater independence to the individual States of the Confederation, and put them in a better position to resist revolutionary attacks; while at the same time it imparts more consistency and uniformity to the Federal Assembly in carrying out the rights and obligations belonging to it in its legislative capacity. This uniformity is the more useful and beneficial, that it springs from the unanimity of all the German Cabinets; and the proof of this unanimity and public spirit which have been brought to light by the Vienna Conferences, will add considerably to the moral influence of the Confederation and raise it higher in European estimation. How greatly, Prince, you have contributed to bring about this unanimity, by the thoughtful and intelligent zeal which you have displayed in guiding and controlling the deliberations throughout, could not remain unknown to me; and I feel it nothing less than a duty to thank

you most emphatically on my own behalf for all you have done. You have thereby acquired new claims to the respect of our common fatherland, and strengthened and sustained your well-founded title to rank as one of the foremost statesmen of past or modern times.

May God preserve you to the Emperor, your master, to Germany and to Europe ! With this heart-felt wish, accept the assurance of the distinguished consideration with which I beg to remain, *mein Herr Fürst von Metternich*,

Affectionately yours,

FREDERICK WILLIAM.

*QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE BETWEEN ENGLAND,  
FRANCE, SPAIN, AND PORTUGAL.*

1128. Metternich to Ficquelmont in St. Petersburg, Baden, September 3, 1834.

**1128.** The French *chargé d'affaires* called upon me yesterday to inform me of the four articles signed at London on the 18th August last.\*

After having read them, I replied to M. de la Rochefoucauld that, separated as I was from the Emperor, I could enter into no official explanations on the subject, but that it enabled me at the same time to give my personal opinion on the articles in question with all the more freedom.

‘Article I. gives France nothing that she did not possess before as a sovereign and independent Power. You gain nothing by it, and it destroys your liberty of action.

‘Article II. suggests the same considerations with

° A treaty of Quadruple Alliance among the four Powers had been concluded at London, on April 22, 1834, with the view of expelling Dom Miguel from Portugal and Don Carlos from Spain. The results were the defeat of Dom Miguel at Thomar, and the capitulation of Evora, by the terms of which Dom Miguel renounced his pretensions to the throne (May 26); although he afterwards issued a formal protest against the arrangement, from Genoa (July 16). In addition to this (public) treaty of alliance, the representatives of the four Powers signed at London, on August 18, the further articles, to which allusion is made in the above despatch. By these, France undertook to prevent any assistance reaching the Spanish insurgents by way of the French frontier (Article I.); England, to supply arms, and, in case of need, naval forces (Article II.); and Portugal, to lend such assistance generally as should be agreed upon (Article III.).—ED.



regard to England, but it leaves that Power greater liberty of action than France. I do not see what you gain by it.

‘Article III. will give many others besides myself the means of judging what amount of confidence the Government of Queen Christina has in its own ability to exist. In short, if it ratifies the article, I shall infer that it feels itself doomed; if it refuses to ratify the article, it will act wisely for its own interests, but its refusal will be the severest condemnation of the wisdom of the stipulation. Moreover, so far as France is concerned, there is another consideration which makes me wonder what could have induced King Louis Philippe to consent to such an article being drawn up. Don Pedro has troops on which he can more or less rely; he has also some foreign corps which threaten from day to day to overthrow him. He will never send the former to the assistance of Queen Christina, and the latter, even supposing they should succeed in expelling Don Carlos from the soil of Spain, will not lose a moment in aiding the Spanish *comuneros* to set up the standard of the Republic beyond the Pyrenees. Is it the intention of the King of the French to furnish the French Republic with a rallying-point in Spain?’

M. de la Rochefoucauld was silent, probably because he did not know what to reply.

This sketch, Ambassador, will show you exactly what I think of the treaty; I believe it to be nothing less than a danger for the whole world, including first and foremost those who framed it.

*THE ATTITUDE OF THE THREE NORTHERN  
POWERS TOWARDS DON CARLOS.*

1129. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, September 17, 1834.

**1129.** The Spanish question occupies the first place among all the complications of the day, both because it involves important principles, and because its solution embraces the future. The moral side of the question need not therefore detain us long. Queen Isabella embodies the Revolution in its most dangerous form; Don Carlos represents the monarchical principle at strife with undisguised revolution. When, however, we come to look at the material side of the question, we find ourselves face to face with very great difficulties.

1. The unfortunate pragmatic of Ferdinand VII. took the Powers as it were by surprise. King Louis Philippe appeared likely to pursue the policy which would certainly have been most in accordance with his own interests. Under these circumstances, the three great Powers refused to look upon the Spanish question as *one of persons*, or to pronounce any opinion as to the title of the respective claimants to the throne.

2. Don Carlos, by withdrawing to Portugal and refusing to quit that kingdom when first summoned to do so, decided the fate of Dom Miguel. By acting in this way he was guilty of a great fault. He has committed another by throwing himself into Spain without the necessary means for striking a great blow in that

country immediately on his arrival, and failing to inform the Powers of his determination beforehand.

3. The unexpected arrival of Don Carlos in Spain at once made it necessary for the Powers to consider carefully what course they should pursue. If the maturity demanded by decisions of this kind forbids their being quickly carried into execution, the great distance by which the Cabinets are separated adds still more to the delay. Convinced as we were of these truths, we felt that the importance of the cause imperatively called for the recognition of a two-fold distinction in the succours which it undoubtedly demanded of us, and accordingly we at once took measures to supply, (*a*) prompt material succours; (*b*) political and moral succours.

In pursuance of this plan, we have lost no time in opening a subscription to provide Don Carlos with *pecuniary assistance*. This object will shortly be fully attained; it is already in a fair way to being so.

Arms have been forwarded to him, but we do not yet know whether they have reached him. The rigorous blockade established by the two maritime Powers render it difficult to ensure these succours arriving at their destination. We hope, however, that they may not be stopped altogether.

4. So far as the moral support is concerned, what the Carlists eagerly demand of us is *the recognition of Don Carlos*.

The Cabinets, Ambassador, must proceed in a more circumspect manner. The recognition embraces two periods; the present and the future.

As regards *the present*, nothing is easier than to utter the word. We have not recognised Queen Isabella, and as every country must have a Government, and the Powers will certainly never recognise the Iberian Re-

in fact there is little doubt upon whom the choice of the Powers would fall. We do not disguise our conviction of the fact that the recognition of Don Carlos, openly proclaimed by the Allied Powers, would be an inestimable moral support to the cause of that Prince. What we cannot undertake to decide is the effect it would produce in the two maritime Powers, and more particularly the influence it would exercise upon the King of the French. Would not that influence be sufficiently powerful to compel Louis Philippe, either through consideration of his own interests, or the effect such a proclamation would produce on his Council, and the revolutionary parties in France, to depart from the temporising policy he has hitherto maintained in regard to the Infant?

As regards the Powers, the question involves considerations of a far graver nature. What will the Powers do, what have they made up their minds to do, in the event of Don Carlos being expelled from his kingdom after having been recognised by them as King? Will they uphold him? and if so, what means will they employ? And if they do not uphold him, what would be the consequences, on this hypothesis, of the proof which they would thereby afford, in the sight of an observant Europe, that the protection of the two maritime Powers is more favourable to royal pretenders than that of the three Courts whom it is the fashion to designate as the Northern Powers?

*PALMERSTON'S RESIGNATION.*

1130. Metternich to Hummelauer, *chargé d'affaires* in London, Vienna, November 29, 1834.

1130. The same day on which I received your report of November 15, Mr. Strangway received a note from Lord Palmerston, dated the 16th, which he permitted me to read. Its contents are as nearly as possible as follows: 'We are out; the Duke of Wellington is Prime Minister and entrusted with the formation of the Cabinet. To-morrow we shall give up the seals into the King's hands; I have no time to tell you more, occupied as I am with putting my affairs in order. Ever yours, &c. P.S.—Lose no time in taking this note to Prince Metternich. I am convinced he will never in his life have been more overjoyed than when he reads it, and that I shall never have seemed so agreeable to him as now that I am bidding him good-bye!'

After having read this brief note, I asked Mr. Strangway whether he would reply to his former chief? On his replying in the affirmative, I said to him: 'Tell Lord Palmerston that in the course of my diplomatic relations with him, I have often had occasion to regret the facility with which he allowed himself to be deceived in men and things. His latest assertion rests, like so many others, on a mistake. A sensible man can only experience a feeling of joy in regard to events whose full significance he is in a position to estimate; now, as I am



not at the present moment in a condition to do this, Lord Palmerston is wrong in choosing the expressions he did. If, instead of the word *joy* he had made use of the word *hope*, he would not have been wrong. In the course of a long career,' I added, 'it is very unusual to come across an entirely new and unprecedented incident; the strange manner in which Lord Palmerston takes leave of me affords a testimony to the fact. When Viscount Chateaubriand withdrew from the Ministry in 1824, he addressed a note couched in a similar laconic strain to the French Ambassador at that time accredited to the Court of Vienna. But if the two missives are identical in character, the positions occupied by their respective writers are by no means analogous. Then it was only a question of the retirement of a single individual, now it is a question of the transition from one system to another. In the former case it was open to me to experience a personal feeling of satisfaction or regret, whereas now I must wait for a future day before I can express my sentiments.'

I send you this anecdote not so much for its intrinsic importance, but as a fresh testimony to the existence of much that is odious and inexplicable in the mind and character of the late Secretary of State.

. . . Whatever turn things take in England, there is but one principle and one line of conduct for the new Administration to follow. '*The Government must take the question of reform into its own hands.*' Words susceptible of more than one meaning are always a source of great danger, for they may be used as watchwords by any party to gain its own ends at the expense of the common welfare. *Reform* is one of these words; taken in its true sense it means the *remedy against abuses*, and it cannot reasonably bear any other sense. *Reform* is the

contrary of *destruction*; and in sound logic, the word *reform* is even synonymous with *reparation*. The Whigs, with their thoughtlessness and arrogance, have proclaimed reform without defining what they mean by it; Radicalism has accepted it and attached its own meaning to the term. Led on, in the pursuit of their enterprise, far beyond the exact limits they had laid down for themselves, the Whigs advanced in full force only to fade away like a cloud. Then at last the nation, finding itself attacked in its most divergent interests, awoke; for that which the Radical leaders will doubtless call the *slumber* of the nation, is in sober reality its *awakening*. Three years ago, this was not the case. Let the men who now find themselves at the helm of the State *take firm hold on the truth*; let them take the question of reform into their own hands, and apply it with wisdom, vigour, and discernment, to *old* abuses as well as to *new*; to those that really exist, not to those so-called abuses that are merely put forward as a pretext by the enemies of the public weal—let them do all this, and success will crown their noble endeavour. . .\*

\* The Whig Ministry, which had been dismissed by the King on his own initiative, five months later (April, 1835) again resumed the management of affairs, with Lord Melbourne as Prime Minister, and Lord Palmerston as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.—ED.



1835.

*EXTRACTS FROM THE PRINCESS MELANIE'S  
DIARY.*

*Biographical Notices.*

1131. Vienna (from February 25 to March 14).

*Vienna.*

1131. Illness of the Emperor. Sympathy of the people. Preparations for the end. The Emperor dictates his will. Death of the Emperor Francis. Accession of the Emperor Ferdinand. Organisation of the Government. Mission of Prince William to Vienna. Letter to Ficquelmont. The Empress Caroline Augusta on the Emperor Francis.

1131. *Vienna, February 25.*—I was terribly startled this morning to hear from Clement that the Emperor was dangerously ill. At eight they bled him. It seems that inflammation of the lungs has set in. I was deeply shocked; more particularly at the thought that Clement could have kept so important a circumstance from me for a whole day, though it must have been a source of so much trouble and anxiety to him. This robs me of all feeling of confidence, and makes me dread that he is always keeping from me things that must give him the greatest pain. Stifft was here; he finds the Emperor's condition as favourable as it could be. Clement soothes me when I get anxious; but I am in a continual state of agitated suspense. It pained me deeply when Podstatzky came to tell me that the Prince of Bavaria could not come this evening, for I gathered from what he said

they were very anxious at Court. As I am accustomed to see Clement make the best of things, I was in the greatest distress.

I was in despair at having arranged to give a ball this evening; as, however, Stiffé wrote to Clement to say the Emperor was as well as could be expected, I resigned myself to receive my guests with what courage I could.

*February 26.*—What a terrible awaking I had at ten! I sent for Clement. I was told he was not in; the Emperor, they said, was in a very sad state; he had received the sacrament at eight, and was so weak that it was scarcely possible for him to live through the day. At last, by noon, Clement returned. He told me the Emperor was much better; during the night he had suffered from fever and occasional difficulty in breathing, and had been bled; he had been very uneasy, and asked to receive the sacrament. Stiffé tried to make him give up the idea; Bishop Wagner (the Emperor's confessor) declared that he saw no grounds for uneasiness in the patient's condition; he would not, he said, give him extreme unction, and regarded this morning's ceremony as nothing more than confession and communion, which had been asked for by the Emperor. The Empress was relieved, seeing him free from agitation and quite different from what he had been during the night. The Archbishop wished to appoint a public intercession; the question was warmly debated, as also whether the theatres and other places of amusement should be closed. The latter proposition was carried into effect, and, thank God, so far at least everything went off well. During the day the improvement was kept up. I passed the evening with Clement; he is working without intermission, for he has to communicate with all the diploma-

tists of the world and attend, at this moment, to the politics of all Europe.

It is touching to see the heart-felt sympathy shown by the people for the Emperor. There is a general feeling of hatred against the Siebenbürgen people, who, they say, are to blame for the Emperor's illness. The people seem as if they would like to tear them in pieces. Everyone is in dismay, and, thank Heaven, there is no one who does not appreciate that which God threatens to take from us. A number of people have come to obtain news of the Emperor, and they wander about mournfully in all directions. This is indeed a terrible moment! I went to bed, but could not sleep, for I was continually on the watch to hear if anyone were coming to call Clement. Happily he slept well.

*February 27.*—This morning's report was favourable. The Emperor slept for six hours, and his condition was so greatly improved that everyone was astonished. The previous evening he had been bled a little and slept much better. Günter, who had been called in, declared the illness to be inflammation of the liver, and added that all the symptoms were favourable. They sought to relieve our anxiety in every way.

It is a good thing for the world, at this moment, that all, whether good or bad, look to Clement and seek his protection and advice. It is marvellous what courage he displays, and how he seems to think of everything.

*February 28.*—At seven they brought us terrible news. The fever is increasing. The Emperor passed a very bad night; in short, we see death approaching. Taaffe sent for Clement. He came from Court, and had heard there that the Emperor had sent for Martin, his secretary, in order to dictate to him his last will. Cle-



ment went at once to the Emperor, and came back at two. He regards him as lost! Stifft declares that nothing more can be done. Clement is really working at the Emperor's grave, for he looks on the catastrophe as having virtually taken place. Never did I see such calmness and resignation, such energy as his! He is filled with wonder at the Empress, who behaves admirably. He has spoken with Wagner, Hoyos, and Sedlnitzky; in short, everyone looks to him for support. At two, I went to the Burgcapelle to pray, and on returning, heard that a consultation was taking place. Wolf, Fischer, and Wierer were called in. I hope that the latter, at least, may be illuminated by the Holy Ghost. Clement was present at the consultation. On returning he brought us cheering news; Wierer says there are more grounds for hope than anxiety; he finds him remarkably vigorous; and declares that it is a severe illness, but that there is no immediate danger. In short, we all begin to breathe again, after having this morning given up all hope. I confess my poor Clement fills me with the deepest concern, and that I am terribly anxious about him, for agitation of this kind is unbearable. May God have pity on us!

*March 1.*—This morning's report is a fairly good one. Our revered Emperor had passed a tolerably quiet night. My people told me the cook had yesterday put into the lottery, with the following numbers: No. 12 (the Emperor having been born on the 12th February); 43 (to-day being the forty-third anniversary of his accession); and 67 (his age). The tickets cost her 30 kreutzers, and this morning she has won 2,800 florins. We looked upon this as a good omen, and Clement wrote about it to the Empress, who showed the note to our good Emperor.

At four, the report announced an accession of fever. Clement went at once to the palace, where a consultation took place. I went to the Burgcapelle to pray, and then had a talk with Clement. Baroness Sturmfeder, whom I met with the little Archduke, appeared to me very anxious, and this distresses me. At the consultation it was determined that severe bleeding was necessary, and they took eight ounces of blood from him. Heavens! what terrible treatment!

In the afternoon the Empress sent for Clement to be present at a further consultation. They bled the Emperor once more, and from that moment he was doomed. He had a long conversation with the King; afterwards he sent for the whole family, and blessed all his children, including the little Archduke Francis. He was conscious up to the last moment. Clement did not come home till six in the morning, when he told us all was not yet over, but they were only waiting for the terrible moment of dissolution, the news of which must shortly fall upon the world like a thunderclap. My poor husband was scarcely returned when he was recalled by two messengers. The whole Imperial family were gathered round the dying Emperor. The Empress, and indeed all of them, behaved admirably. At a quarter to one, the Emperor Francis, our common father, was dead! Clement came home at three. Never shall I forget this night! The Emperor died, as he had lived, a saint. He died quite calmly, and without suffering. The Empress did not leave him for a moment. As Clement left to come home, she still lingered at the death-bed of one whom she had so tenderly loved and cherished. Why do we survive such terrible moments! At last the day has come, which I have dreaded ever since I could think. I feel so utterly crushed that all I

can think of is to pray God to take pity upon us, the whole monarchy, and the world! Poor Clement! he possesses a moral fortitude which is beyond my comprehension!

*March 2.*—Clement went very early this morning to wait upon the new Emperor. He managed, however, to get a few hours' sleep. He possesses wonderful fortitude. I was overwhelmed with visitors. People came to me to pour forth their laments, and to reiterate to me, each in a different key, that Clement must endeavour to keep together all that yet remained of this poor monarchy by taking the whole Government into his own hands, and so on. In short, everyone had something to say.

Clement came home at three. He was deeply touched by the behaviour of the Emperor Ferdinand. The latter threw himself into his arms, with all the trusting confidence of a son for a father, and besought him not to forsake him in this terrible moment. Our good Empress behaved like an angel; she put his father's will into the Emperor's hands, and impressed on him the duty of always acting in accordance with his father's wishes. The proclamations of the new Emperor have appeared and produced an excellent impression on the people. The funds rose at once in an extraordinary manner. Clement showed me the Emperor's will. It covers six sheets of paper written in pencil in his own hand. What would not I give to be able to keep only a single letter of that writing! The Empress handed the new Emperor the document in which the Emperor Francis commits into his hands the heavy task of Government; exhorts him to live in unity with his family, to follow the advice of the Archduke Ludwig, and above all to lean in everything upon Prince Mettr-

nich, 'my truest servant and best friend.' All these things touch Clement to the heart. His fortitude breaks down when he gives way to his emotion.

*March 4.*—I prayed beside the bier of my good Emperor. He is quite disfigured. I feel almost angry to see him surrounded by so little outward pomp; they say it is the custom, and that the same simplicity has been observed in the case of every Emperor before him. The press in front of the Schweizerthor was terrible, on account of the crowd who were waiting to see the Emperor lying in state.

*March 5.*—Clement works without intermission. He has just organised a new form of Administration and arranged a deliberative Council, consisting of himself, Archduke Ludwig, and Count Kolowrat. He hopes that everything will get into the right track, as everyone appears eager to do their best.

Clement has asked Hügel to compile him extracts from the diplomatic records, so as to bring before the Emperor some general idea of the course of foreign affairs.

*March 6.*—The Princess Kinsky was sent by the Archduchess Sophia to bring Clement some of our good Emperor's hair. Clement was moved to tears at this mark of attention. The Princess spoke of my husband's merits in a way that it did me good to hear. They feel at Court how necessary he is to them.

*March 10.*—Clement has had news from Berlin. The King was in the last degree grieved and shocked to hear of the death of our beloved Emperor. He was desirous of at once furnishing Europe with a proof of his sentiments towards the son of the late Emperor, and has chosen his son, Prince William, to undertake this mission. The latter comes to-morrow.



*March 11.*—Clement read me a letter he was sending to Ficquelmont. There was one passage which gives in brief the story of his whole life. Since I was with him, I have tried to put down in a few words what he said. I could not resist transcribing the passage, in order that I might never forget it. Here is the line of conduct he consistently pursued in his relations with the Emperor Francis, and that he will continue to pursue to the end ! it is wonderful.

‘I shall employ my abilities with that moderation and sound practical sense which you know me to possess ; unfettered by any considerations of self, and without the least thought of straining after outward effect of any sort—things I abhor, and to which are attributable the frequent failures of men who do not think as I do. My duty consists in promoting the good and not appropriating any of the merit to myself. Everything must be placed to the credit of the Sovereign, as everything actually rests with him. I have to tender him my advice, but it is for him to act upon it.’

*March 14.*—In the evening, when we were once more alone together, Clement told me that the Empress-mother had sent for him this morning, and had a long conversation with him. She ended by giving him something to read which she had composed herself—a simple, indescribably touching account of the Emperor’s last moments. She went on to speak for a long time of the numberless virtues of the deceased. She mentioned in especial his humility. He had often observed, she said, how much it surprised him to find people wanted to make him out a great man. ‘And yet,’ he would say, ‘I am only a simple, straightforward man, and should never have risen into notice. Now they make fuss enough about me ; but I know the reason well enough.’



Metternich puts down anything that is particularly good or clever to me. I know this, that if he survives me, and I make a great figure in history, it will all be owing to Metternich !'

But I say no to this ; he was a great man—a great monarch. As Clement related all this to me, tears of the deepest tenderness and sorrow poured from his eyes. What a pity it is so little time is still left him to write the history of *his Emperor*, a task to which he would gladly have dedicated his whole life.

*ON THE POLITICAL EVENTS OF THE DAY.*

Extracts from Metternich's confidential letters to Apponyi in Paris, from January 9 to March 14, 1835.

1132. Confidential communication from Sir Frederick Lamb. 1133. The proposed visit of the French Princes to Vienna. Insignificance of the French Ministers. 1134. Journey of the Emperor Francis in May. The Duke of Orleans' visit put off. Sainte-Aulaire the originator of the project. 1135. Idea of the Duke of Orleans' visit again revived. 1136. Illness of the Emperor Francis. 1137. Death of the Emperor Francis.

*Metternich to Apponyi.*

1132. *Vienna, January 9, 1835.*—I do not doubt that my despatches of this date will afford you matter of interest—the one I especially address to you, no less than the one I merely send for your inspection. In them, I treat fully of two questions ; that of Spain, and that of Switzerland.\* What led me to enter into explanations with the Duke of Wellington in regard to the first of these affairs, was the information brought to my notice by Sir Frederick Lamb as to certain *secret* commissions with which King Louis Philippe entrusted him for the Duke, on the eve of his departure for London.

\* For the Spanish question see No. 1138 ; as regards Switzerland, we confine ourselves to a single extract from the despatch alluded to, as it describes in a few words Metternich's attitude in regard to Switzerland. Metternich is addressing Sainte-Aulaire :

‘ We are pursuing no special line of policy in Switzerland ; all we demand of that country is that it should remain quiet and not compel us by wilful agitation to cast uneasy looks in its direction ; only let your Court do as much, only let it forbid its Ambassador to do what we refrain from doing, and we shall have nothing more to ask either of Switzerland or of you.’—ED.

You will, naturally, pretend to have no knowledge of any of these facts ; I tell you of them because it is well you should know the intense anxiety which the King evidently feels. Be pleased to discuss the subject with him in the sense of my despatches to yourself and M. Hummelauer, without losing sight for a moment of the fact that neither of those despatches is supposed to have anything to do with the account of my last interview with M. Sainte-Aulaire, or the information for which I am indebted to Sir Frederick Lamb.

**1133.** *February 3.*—At Paris, they never see things except under a single aspect, and if that takes their fancy, they take action accordingly, without paying any heed to the reverse of the medal. The contemplated journey of the Duke of Orleans is an undertaking involving great risk and most unfortunately timed. He will be received everywhere, and especially at Vienna, as befits the son of the King of the French, with whom Austria is at peace. To expect more than this, is to court disappointment, and to believe in the possibility of a marriage with us is to court disappointment over again. Our experiences have been of too melancholy a character for us to be able to forget them so soon, and I know of no Archduchess who would lend herself to the experiment for a third time. But none of this checks the swift play of French thought ; that which is not present to its apprehension, it regards as no longer existing ; what surprises me most in the present case is, that should the experiment fail—as it will fail—it will react with most compromising effect on the Royal Family.

But this side of the question does not in the least concern us. The Emperor will receive the Duke of Orleans, as I have all along said. He will not receive him in the second half of May, for his Majesty will then

be setting out for a long excursion, which will take him as far as the Tyrol. He will not return to Vienna until the autumn, for immediately the excursion is over the Court will go straight to Baden. Except for serious political impediments, I reckon upon living on my estates during the months of July and August, and if possible at Johannisberg. Vienna will therefore be completely deserted and a very dull place of sojourn for foreign princes.

Madame de Dino wrote to the Duchess of Sagan by your courier on purpose to announce to her the journey of the French Princes. M. Sainte-Aulaire, Madame de Dino says, has so extolled the merits of the Duchess at the Tuileries, that she is begged *to take the Princes under her care!* Madame de Sagan had the good sense to bring her sister's letter straight to me, and we agreed that she should not mention its contents to anyone.

I foresee great difficulties for the French Ministers, not on account of the wretched financial matters which now occupy the Chamber, but as a consequence of their patent insignificance and their total lack of intrinsic worth. I am profoundly convinced that it is only the King's aptitude for governing that has kept things going up to this moment. He has known how to identify himself with the negations which form the elements of public opinion in France, and he has judged accurately.

**1134.** *February 25.*—I trust that my letter to you of this date will put a stop to the contemplated journey *for this year*, and time gained is something gained. What is it the King does and must desire? He must be desirous of smoothing away the inequalities inherent in the new French dynasty, which rests on a basis totally opposed to that of the other reigning houses. Now this is a miracle which time alone can effect, and to seek to

anticipate it is not always in the power of man. M. Sainte-Aulaire starts from the supposition that if we did not like the idea of the Prince's visit, *we should say so*. It is to form but a poor judgment of the political attitude of a sensible Cabinet to believe that it could make any avowal of the kind; besides, it is false to say *we do not like the idea of it*; we do not *desire* it, and that is all. The reasonable thing would be for them to take the same view at Paris as we do at Vienna.

There is nothing at all like enmity or even discourtesy underlying this idea; it is the result of mature reflection, and is based purely on a consideration of the fact that inconveniences and unpleasantnesses might arise which the factious would undoubtedly not be slow in turning to their own advantages—and their advantage is not that of either Vienna or Paris.

However, it rests with the King to do what he thinks best. We have never yet said to a prince: Do not come.

**1135.** *February 25.*—According to what you told me, the Duke of Orleans is averse to leave Paris before the close of the Session, and, in our opinion, his Royal Highness is quite right. His journey, in whichever direction it led him, more especially if it brought him to Vienna, would infallibly be remarked upon by the periodical Press and the anti-dynastic Opposition in the Chamber. If Cabinets can afford to despise the attacks of the Press, they cannot show the same indifference to parliamentary debates. The Prince who is on his travels, and the Court to which he goes, may be placed in a really awkward position; and this is a thing which it is always well to avoid, for the same reasons that induce an adversary to bring it about.



The Emperor, on his return, will take up his residence at Baden. This would not be a propitious moment for the Duke of Orleans to visit Austria, and as we are merely chatting together as friends, I have no hesitation in telling you why. If his Royal Highness stays at Baden, it will look as if he wished to avoid the capital, or as if the Emperor were unwilling to do the honours of the capital to him. At Baden the Emperor leads the life of a plain private person, and his establishment itself is so unpretending that I would certainly not exchange my own for that of his Majesty; he takes the baths regularly and follows a strict regimen. Thus his Majesty would have either to forego his cure, or place the Duke in a false position. It would be well to avoid these unpleasantnesses.

Be pleased, my dear Count, to submit my letters to the King. The final decision must rest with him.

**1136.** *February 26.*—I am delighted to be able to add a further piece of good news to my despatch of this date. I enclose a note which I have just received from the Emperor's chief physician, by which you will see that the third day of his Majesty's illness is far more favourable than the second had been.

It was the Emperor who asked that the sacrament should be administered to him. The doctors had not thought of it.

As I am convinced the Queen takes the liveliest interest in the state of the august patient, I beg you to assure her Majesty that what I tell you is the exact truth.

**1137.** *March 14.*—What a cruel blow has Providence thought fit to inflict on us! Inscrutable and adorable as its decrees are, there is nothing for men but

to bow their heads and obey. Therefore, I have not lost a single moment in grieving over a misfortune which it was beyond human agency to avert. My time and abilities have been employed in the service of the new monarch and the State, in the direction best adapted to promote the interests of both.

The monarchy affords, at this moment, an imposing spectacle. It is impossible to praise too highly the universal calm and confidence prevailing among all classes of the nation. The feeling is founded on the certainty that no innovations in policy or principle will take place under the new reign.

The attitude maintained by Vienna and the whole country is such as to strike all foreigners with amazement. You yourself, my dear Count, could you be transported hither, would experience the same impression. All goes on as if nothing had happened, and this happy result is unquestionably due to the character of the new monarch and the good sense which characterises our peoples.

Do your utmost to induce Louis Philippe to abstain from sending any of his sons to us at present. Reasons enough will naturally suggest themselves to you in the affliction which has befallen the Imperial family. Let the King allow the new Emperor a short breathing-space.

I am delighted to think M. Sainte-Aulaire is speedily about to return to us. Nothing more is wanted to show the amicable spirit animating the French Court.

We are shortly about to send persons of distinction to the great Courts, to give formal notification of the accession of the new monarch. The Court of France will be among the number, and I have every reason to

believe that his Majesty's choice will fall on the Prince of Schönburg. The other persons as yet appointed are Prince Louis of Liechtenstein for London; Prince Adolphus of Schwarzenberg for Berlin, and Prince Charles of Liechtenstein (the General) for St. Petersburg.

*THE POLICY OF THE TWO WESTERN POWERS  
IN SPAIN.*

1138. Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, Vienna, January 8, 1835.

1139. Metternich to Hummelauer in London, Vienna, January 8, 1835.

**1138.** . . . M. Sainte-Aulaire asked me what he should say to the King as to my opinion on the affairs of Spain.\* I thanked him for asking me the question, and assured him that my answer would be as brief as it was to the point. 'I see no reason for changing my views so long as the external circumstances of the case are likely to remain unchanged. Spain is, and always will be, divided into two parties, the religious and monarchical party, and the revolutionary and irreligious party. Don Carlos unquestionably represents the former; the Queen's name is used by the latter as a standard round which to rally, and a cloak to veil their designs; and her personal influence consequently goes for nothing in the great and deplorable struggle by which the kingdom is torn. If she is wise there is only one line of policy for France to pursue towards Spain; we follow the same line ourselves in regard to the Porte. When a great Power has for its neighbour, on the only side on which it is liable to attack, a feeble State which it can neither make its ally nor look to for succour, all that can be desired by the greater Power is that its

\* Sainte-Aulaire was about to start for Paris, and the conversation alluded to took place on occasion of his farewell visit to the Chancellor.—  
ED.

weaker neighbour should not be in a position to do it any injury. Spain monarchical—in other words, Spain under the Government of Don Carlos, could never be a source of danger to France, whereas the triumph of the revolutionary faction would infallibly affect her most injuriously both as regards her internal and external relations. In principle, Louis Philippe has admitted that he thinks as I do, but that his hands are tied by the decisions of his Council and the engagements into which he had previously entered.'

'But,' interrupted M. Sainte-Aulaire, 'admitting the restrictions by which the King is bound, what would you advise him to do?'

'Let us,' I replied, 'look at things as they are. You have signed a treaty, and you have had the prudence to confine yourselves within the bounds of a strict neutrality: well, then, remain neutral; and in order that you may really be so, forbid your Government to render one party the assistance you deny the other, or that you take care shall not reach it. When the two parties are reduced to fall back upon their own resources, or to rely on such as both are alike in a position to obtain, their relative strength will become plain to the eyes of the most indifferent observer, and the Powers will then be entitled, in their own interests as well as those of Spain, to demand that an end should be put to the struggle. In this scheme, all is clear and justifiable before the tribunal of reason and sound policy. I have still a parting advice to give you, and this is, to come to an understanding with the present English Cabinet on the scheme I have just laid down. You will find it more reasonable and less prejudiced than its predecessor; and from my knowledge of the Duke of Wellington, I



am certain he is as fully convinced as myself how dangerous it would be to seek to impose on a great nation a Government it does not desire, and the success of which could certainly not be assured by any foreign Power.'

M. de Sainte-Aulaire endeavoured to prove to me that his Government was, in fact, virtually pursuing the policy I had described; that it was observing a strict neutrality, and that nothing would induce it to withdraw from that position.

I explained, however, to M. Sainte-Aulaire that in this he was mistaken, and that we were well aware his Government was continually sending arms, ammunition, money, and even officers to the army of Queen Christina. I added, that, although I was under no illusion in regard to the material forces at the disposal of Don Carlos, I still concluded they must be superior to those of his adversary, otherwise the French Government would not lend their assistance to Queen Christina.

M. de Sainte-Aulaire admitted that this was probably true. For my part, I assured him that I was not mistaken, and I begged him to repeat exactly what I had said to the King his master.

*Metternich to Hummelauer in London, Vienna,  
January 8, 1835.*

**1139.** . . . I cannot better reply to your report of December 26 than by sending you the enclosed extract of a secret despatch which I am to-day sending to Count Apponyi (No. 1138). I authorise you to inform the Duke of Wellington, in confidence, of its contents; he

will learn from it the secret explanations which, from the beginning of the deplorable Spanish complication, have been and are still taking place between me and King Louis Philippe. . . .

In the Spanish question, it is evident that for King Louis Philippe two interests are at stake: the safety of his Government and of his dynasty; and it is precisely because the members of the French Ministry care little for the first and still less for the second, that there exists such a difference of opinion between the King and his Council.

But whatever the motives by which the King was actuated, I am forced to admit that they were of a far less revolutionary character than those which influenced the English Ministers, and I know for certain that had not Louis Philippe firmly refused to go the extreme lengths to which Lord Palmerston was desirous of urging him, the treaty of April 22 would have been of a far more serious character than it actually is. But indeed, from any reasonable point of view, it is difficult to conceive what could have induced the Courts of France and England to tie their hands by entering into such a treaty at all. Two Courts that could act as they have done must have been thoroughly ill-advised in the policy they pursued, and I am certain the Duke of Wellington is as firmly convinced of the fact as myself.

All that I shall permit myself at the present moment is to call his Grace's serious attention to the immense advantage there would be in withdrawing King Louis Philippe, as far as is possible humanly speaking, from the false line of policy which the revolutionary tendencies of his own Ministers and the last English Administration have induced him to follow. The King of the

French fears that the throne of July might be compromised by the triumph of Don Carlos, which his Ministers persist in representing to him as a dangerous instance of a *restoration*. This might be the case, if Ferdinand VII. had been driven from the throne and there were a question of restoring him; but what is there in common between such a state of things and the struggle now being carried on between the two pretenders to the Spanish throne, in whatever way it be decided, unless indeed the susceptibilities of the revolutionary spirit should attempt to obstruct the triumph of the monarchical principle represented by Don Carlos? But if this is the conviction of the French Ministers I am sure it is not shared by King Louis Philippe himself; and least of all that either that Prince or his Ministers could openly avow it, even if it were what they really thought.

I know that King Louis Philippe would regard with the utmost favour the prospect of a marriage between the son of Don Carlos and the young Queen Isabella. But this proposition, undoubtedly the simplest that could be put forward, offers only one practicable prospect of success. The question that would first have to be decided is, whether it would be the Prince of the Asturias as such, or the Prince in the capacity of King of Spain—supposing Don Carlos to have abdicated in his favour—who was to marry the Infanta Doña Isabella, or whether it were intended to marry the young Queen to the Infant, son of Don Carlos. I admit as a supposition, that, under either form, the pacification of Spain would be rendered easier. But only under the first form could the pacification be profitable or durable, for by adopting that form alone would it be possible to

uphold the principle of conservation and overthrow the principle of revolution.

We attach particular importance to the principle of conservation in the case of Spain, because the consequences which its abandonment would entail on Europe would be incalculable.

*DEATH OF THE EMPEROR FRANCIS.*

1140. Confidential circular despatch from Metternich to the Austrian Ambassadors at foreign Courts, Vienna, March 12, 1835.

1141. Metternich to Ficquelmont in St. Petersburg (confidential letter), Vienna, March 12, 1835.

**1140.** If the reign and the whole life of the Emperor are destined to fill pages in history deserving the study of men who are called upon to govern ; if it is impossible to doubt that the goodness of heart, the spirit of justice, and the deep wisdom which have marked all the acts of this long and glorious reign, will assuredly be appreciated as they deserve by all good men, still it is only by being on the spot that it is possible to realise the impulse by which all alike are animated, the conservative instinct which finds such frank expression throughout the whole nation ; the respect felt by classes as by individuals for the unalterable stability of men and things as they were established and left at his death by the revered Sovereign, whom the people have never ceased to recognise by the name of *father* : the only title the Emperor Francis was ever desirous to claim, and the only one which could ever have satisfied his heart.

The Emperor Francis died as he had lived. His last thoughts bore the impress of rectitude and simplicity, and were concerned far more with the interests of the country than his own. It was thus that, in the night of February 27-28, in the midst of an aggravated attack of his malady, he worked for four hours, some-



times writing down with his own hand, sometimes dictating his last wishes. He has drawn up a will, regulating every private affair of importance, and in which, rising to the dignity of his vocation as a Sovereign, he has incorporated the article which the Emperor Ferdinand would have considered it a breach of faith towards the legatees not to publish in its complete form.

The dying monarch who bequeaths his love to his people, his gratitude to his army and the servants who served him so well in the State, has listened to the voice of his heart, the voice which, throughout the course of his long life, has been so powerful, and which, now that he is dead, will ensure him the pious gratitude of those whom it has been his lot, under Providence, to govern for so long a period—and what a period!

In a letter addressed to his son, the Emperor has laid down, under the form of counsels, the principles which have served as the basis and guide of his own Government. I feel it my duty to transcribe here certain passages of this remarkable document, which, in a few words, contains a complete code of governmental legislation :

*' Disturb nothing in the foundations of the edifice of the State.*

*' Govern, and change nothing. Take your firm and unshaken stand upon the principles, by adhering steadfastly to which I have not only guided the monarchy through the tempests of the most difficult times, but ensured to it the high position which belongs to it of right, and which it occupies in the world.*

*' Respect all lawful rights, and then you may justly claim the reverence due to your own rights as a Sovereign.*

*'Maintain harmony in the family, and look upon it as one of the highest blessings.'*\*

These, sir, are the principles which the new monarch will invariably follow.

You are authorised to bring this despatch to the notice, &c., &c.

*Metternich to Ficquelmont at St. Petersburg (Confidential Letter), Vienna, March 12, 1835.*

**1141.** Let us say nothing of our feelings, but let our only thought be how we can best fulfil our duty! Thus must a letter from me to you begin, for you loved the monarch whom fate has taken from us as I loved him myself; you knew him as I knew him, and he, who knew all his friends, appreciated you at your true worth, as he did me the honour to appreciate my entire devotion to his person and the cause which was the cause of his whole life as it was of my own! Were I to enter with you into the subject of our great grief, of our personal sorrow, we should launch into a theme to which there would be no end. I am deeply impressed with a sense of the duties devolving on me; they are arduous, but, nevertheless, I shall know how to fulfil them.

We are beginning to learn the impression which the Emperor's death has made in the most remote parts of

\* The same document also contains the following passages among others :

*'Repose in Prince Metternich, my truest servant and friend, that confidence which I have bestowed upon him through the course of so many years.*

*'Decide no question relating to public affairs or to persons, without first hearing what he has to say. And I call upon him, in his turn, to act towards you with the same rectitude and devotion which he has always exhibited to myself.—FRANCIS.'*

the Empire. It differs in no respect from that of which we have been witnesses in the capital. Thus it is that the good seed sown during his long reign by the wise Prince whose loss we deplore, covers all the fields, while the tares dare not show themselves for fear of being cut down.

From my profound acquaintance with the true position of the country, my anxiety respecting the transition from one reign to another, has been persistently directed less to the monarchy than abroad. Here, the way in which the blow was dealt by Heaven; the suddenness of the event, and the opportunity granted us of announcing at once the catastrophe and the unshaken stability of the Government, will serve as a counterpoise to the danger. It is in the nature of faction to wish to do a great deal, and to make no preparations beforehand *against the favourable moment*; we have been enabled to forestall them, and my fears on this head are greatly relieved.

I can assure you of one thing, and that is, that everyone here, beginning with the Emperor, with the Imperial family—without a single exception—down to the meanest citizens, is doing his duty. The Archdukes are showing an admirable example of unity and of zeal for the public welfare. The Emperor Francis has commended me to his son in terms that go to my heart as no others could have done—calling me his tried and faithful servant and friend; the successor knows me as his father did; I shall continue to do my duty as I have done throughout my long and arduous career. May God be ever at hand to assist us, and we shall know how to serve a cause which is at the same time His, for God and truth are one!

Prince William of Prussia arrived here on the night

of the 10th-11th. He was the bearer of condolences worthy of the King his father, and which told us only what we knew before. As long as the union between the three monarchs exists, there will be a chance of safety for the world, and as I know of no malign power which could invalidate this union, *the gates of Hell shall not prevail!*

Be pleased to assure the Emperor Nicholas of my entire devotion, and beg him to continue to bestow on me his entire confidence. I shall always know how to deserve it.\*

\* On the part of Russia, Count Orloff was sent with a message of condolence to Vienna. He was the bearer of a letter from the Emperor Nicholas to Prince Metternich, which ran as follows: 'I have received, Prince, with lively emotion, the letter by which you inform me of the last instructions of my august friend and ally, his late Majesty the Emperor Francis. They will be sacred for me. The assurances of which Count Orloff will be the exponent, will emphatically attest how firmly I am resolved to fulfil, in their widest extent, the engagements I contracted at Münchengrätz. The memory of that time will never be effaced from my mind. This is only another way, Prince, of expressing to you the importance which I shall never cease to attach to the services which you are called upon, I trust, to render for a long time to come, to the cause of order and Royalty; and of assuring you at the same time of the constancy of those sentiments of high esteem which I have always entertained for you.—

' NICHOLAS.

'St. Petersburg, March 1, 1835.'

END OF THE FIFTH VOLUME.





