

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ON

ST PAUL'S EPISTLES

TO THE PHILIPPIANS, TO TITUS, AND THE FIRST TO TIMOTHY.

(IN CONTINUATION OF THE WORK OF OLSHAUSEN.)

BY

LIC. AUGUST WIESINGER.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY THE

REV. JOHN FULTON, A.M., GARVALD.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

THE EPISTLE TO THE PHILIPPIANS.

INTRODUCTION.

Page

§ 1. Of the Church at Philippi, . . . 1
§ 2. The occasion and contents of the Epistle, . . 4
§ 3. The time and place of composition, . . 6
§ 4. Genuineness and Integrity of the Epistle.
1. Genuineness, ... 8
2. Integrity, ... 22
§ 5. Literature, ... 24

EXPOSITION OF THE EPISTLE TO THE PHILIPPIANS.

§ 1. Inscription and thanksgiving for their stedfastness in the faith, ... 25
§ 2. The Apostle's statement respecting himself, . 37
§ 3. The Apostle's earnest wish with respect to the Church, 50
§ 4. Announcement of his intention to send Timothy, and of his having sent back Epaphroditus, . . 84
§ 5. Warning against the possibility of being led away, . 90
§ 6. Concluding exhortations to particular individuals, and to the Church at large. Expression of thanks. Salutations, 123

THE PASTORAL EPISTLES.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

ON THE GENUINENESS OF THE PASTORAL EPISTLES.

§ 1. The Problem, ... 147
§ 2. The external testimonies, . . . 149

Page

§ 3. Solution of the Problem on the supposition of their being not genuine. Their genuineness impugned and defended, 150
§ 4. Attempt at the solution of the Problem on the supposition of the genuineness of the Epistles, . . . 190
§ 5. Literature, ... 241

THE EPISTLE TO TITUS.

INTRODUCTION.

I. The historical testimonies of the Epistle concerning itself, 243
II. Critical objections, ... 253

EXPOSITION OF THE EPISTLE TO TITUS.

§ 1. Inscription and Salutation, ... 257
§ 2. Instructions in regard to the appointment of Presbyters, 266
§ 3. What Titus is to teach in opposition to the false Teachers, and how he is to act, ... 297
§ 4 Personal matters. Salutations. Conclusion, . 337
Appendix to the Introduction to the foregoing Epistle, 339

THE FIRST EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. Timothy, ... 345
§ 2. Occasion, design, and contents of the Epistle, . 346
§ 3. The time and place of composition, . . 348
§ 4. Genuineness, ... 355

EXPOSITION OF THE FIRST EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.

§ 1. Inscription and charge given to Titus, in opposition to those who teach otherwise, ... 359
§ 2. Directions to Timothy with regard to the regulation of the Church. A. regarding Public Worship, . . 391
§ 3. Directions to Timothy with regard to the regulation of the Church. B. Regarding the offices of Presbyter and Deacon, 410

Page

§ 4. Admonitions addressed to Timothy as Teacher in the prospect of the future falling away, . . . 430

§ 5. Directions to Timothy with respect to his conduct towards the members of the Church, according to the distinctions of age, sex, and position within the Church, . . 473

§ 6. Instructions to Timothy with regard to Slaves. Warning against the desire to become rich after the manner of those who teach otherwise. Charge to be addressed to the rich. Concluding exhortation, . . . 509

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. OF THE CHURCH AT PHILIPPI.

We shall let Olshausen himself speak here, and shall only, where it appears necessary, supplement what he has written with some additional remarks.[1]

The city of Philippi lay in Macedonia near to the Thracian boundary, having for its haven a neck of sea, on which stood Neapolis. It bore anciently the name of *Κρηνίδες*, fountain-city; but about 358 A.C. Philip of Macedon enlarged it, and called it after his own name. At a later period the Triumviri fought near this city the famous battle, in which they gained the victory over the Republicans. As a result of that battle Roman colonists settled at Philippi, which becoming a Roman colony, received the *jus Italicum*. (Comp. on this and on the expression *πρώτη πόλις*, which is applied by Luke to the city Philippi, the remarks in the Commentary on Acts xvi. 12.)[2] In that city, also, continues

1 The introduction to this epistle, and that also to the Pastoral epistles, is from Olshausen's own pen, and was left in a state of complete readiness for the press.

2 I perfectly agree with what Olshausen remarks there on the *πρώτη πόλις*. It could not be called the chief city on the ground, to which reference is there made, that in that particular district, where Philippi lay, Amphipolis held such a place—comp. Liv. xlv. 29. Equally groundless is the other opinion, that Philippi received the appellation on account of its peculiar privileges. The intention and meaning of this epistle admit, in my judgment, of being perfectly determined from the order of the narrative in Acts. It had already been intimated—xvi. 6, 7—that the course which the proclamation of the Gospel should take, was of divine direction. In ver. 9 the vision is related in which a man out of Macedonia calls on the apostle to "come over and help them;" and in ver. 10, we are told of the apostle's straightway purposing to go into Macedonia. What, then, is more natural than that in the report of the journey at ver. 12, and thence to Philippi, *ἥτις ἐστὶ πρώτη τῆς μερίδος τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλις, κολώνια*, we should think of its geographical position, and in connection with that should perceive a reference to the fulfilment of the call in ver. 9. Even the "thence," and the pronoun (*ἥτις*, ut quae) point to that. So, after Van Til, in particular Rettig, Quaest. Philipp. Giss. 1831, Van Hengel p. 6.

Olshausen, lived some Jews, who had there an oratory (no synagogue.)[1] This small Jewish community was increased by some proselytes, and it was among these first that Christianity diffused itself.

Paul came to Philippi on his second mission tour, somewhere about the year 53. It was the first city of Europe in which he preached the Gospel. The first person who gave heed to the preaching of the apostle, was a seller of purple, by name Lydia, belonging to Thyatira, who received baptism with all her house. A female slave, who had a spirit of soothsaying, gave rise to the occasion which led the apostle soon again to leave Philippi. For, when Paul expelled the spirit, the owner of the slave, who had employed her soothsaying to his own account, raised an outcry against him. He was beaten and thrown into the prison, the jailor of which he converted with all his house. He was soon, however, set at liberty again, with a request that he would leave the city. Afterwards, we find the apostle again at Philippi, only when he was on his way back from Greece. (Acts xx. 6.) But there is good ground for believing that on his going thither the apostle had made a stay there, though probably but a short one (Acts xx. 2), as is also supposed by Van Hengel.

According to our epistle the church in Philippi had exhibited the Christian life with remarkable purity. The apostle says much good of it, and commends it more highly than almost any other church (ch. i. 3—8, iv. 1.) On its part also, it hung with strong and lively affection on its teacher, whom it endeavoured to succour by contributions of money, and for that purpose sent Epaphroditus to Rome, where he was in chains. This Paul received as an expression of their sincere love, and most thankfully acknowledged (iv. 10—18; 2 Cor. xi. 8, 9.) From this posture of affairs in Philippi, and the occasion of the epistle, being a letter of thanks for the support ministered to him by the church, an explanation is afforded how this epistle, more perhaps than any other of Paul, should possess so entirely an epistolary character, full of warm and friendly feeling. It naturally arose from the general relation of

and Winer Rëal-Wört. That the expression was literally correct in this view of it, since Neapolis was reckoned to belong to Thrace, see Van Hengel, Introd. p. 4.

1 Van Hengel, however, may be quite right in saying, that the expression in Acts xvi. 13, *οὗ ἐνομίζετο προσευχὴ εἶναί* says nothing of an oratory, but only, as also Luther translates: where they were wont to pray.

Paul, as an apostle, and the special teacher of the Philippians, that exhortations should not be wanting; but throughout the whole epistle Paul gives utterance to his personal feelings, speaks freely of himself and of his operations, as well as of his personal relation to the Lord, and his striving after perfection. So Olshausen. And certainly, more than any particular statements regarding the condition of the church, the tone of the whole epistle shows how much reason the apostle had to be satisfied with the Philippian church generally. A near and intimate relation had been formed between him and this church, such as scarcely existed in the case of any other. He was not merely its apostle and teacher, as in the case of other churches, but a tie of personal sympathy and affection bound the two most closely together. This is what everywhere discovers itself to us in perusing the epistle, and what also throws the clearest light on the state of the church itself.

The supposition of Eichhorn, Rheinwald, and others, continues Olshausen, that Judaizing and Gnostic heretics had been at work at Philippi, is destitute of all semblance of truth. Judaizing heretics, like those who had been busy among the Galatians, are certainly described in Phil. iii. 2, ss., but not as if they were actually located in Philippi, or had obtained any influence among the Christians there. Paul warns them against the itinerant Judaists, who, he was well aware, would endeavour also at Philippi to undermine his labours. Not the least trace, however, of Gnosticising heretics is to be found in our epistle. No doubt, the apostle warns the disciples (i. 27, ss.) very urgently and at some length against spiritual pride, and presents before them the Redeemer as an example of deep humility; but there is an utter want of the more specific traits, which might justify us in regarding this discourse as directed against Gnostic presumption. The only actual evil to which the epistle bears distinct testimony, is that certain jarrings appear to have sprung up in the church (ii. 2, ss., iv. 2.) These would probably be occasioned by the ignorance of some members of the church, and hence the apostle enjoined at such length the cultivation of a spirit of humility. According to Olshausen, therefore, we have here to do with a purely practical aberration—and such undoubtedly was the case. Let us listen to him farther.

This view of the state of the church at Philippi has been suc-

cessfully applied against the various false representations, by Schinz in his treatise on the Christian church at Philippi (Zurich 1833.) But when Schinz, at the close of his treatise, on the ground that the church at Philippi was infested by no heretical teachers, would prove that it was composed entirely of converted heathens, without any intermixture of Jewish Christians, he seems to go too far. The learned author, indeed, justly remarks that in the epistle to the Philippians no reference is made to the Old Testament. This indicates, he thinks, that the Christians at Philippi were of heathen origin; but the conclusion, as appears to me, is not sufficiently grounded. According to the teaching of the apostle Paul the Old Testament was not merely for Jews and Jewish Christians, but also for the heathen and converts from among them. The Philippians must, besides, as proselytes, which they must have been according to Schinz's view, have been acquainted with the Scriptures of the Old Testament. Hence, we may fairly regard the want of citations from the Old Testament in this epistle as accidental.

But even granting that all the Christians at Philippi were born heathen, this would still not suffice to explain the freedom of the church there from false doctrines; for the Gentile Christians might as readily have been misled as the Jewish; nay, in so far as regards the Gnostic tendencies, as they manifested themselves in Colosse, they were even more liable to deception, as they could not be so firmly settled in those fundamental views, which the others had received with their mother's milk. We can ascribe the excellent condition of the youthful community of the apostle only to the fidelity of its members, and to their preservation from seducers.

§ 2. THE OCCASION AND CONTENTS OF THE EPISTLE.

There can be no doubt as to the occasion of the epistle and its immediate object; the contents of the epistle render both abundantly plain (iv. 10—20.) In its immediate design it was a letter of thanks from the apostle to the church at Philippi for the support ministered to the apostle through Epaphroditus. The apostle gave this letter of love to the person who brought the gift, as he was going to return (ii. 25, ss), which served, at the same time, as a testimonial to him. With the expression of his thankfulness the

apostle couples reports concerning himself, as was due to a people, who had given him such a proof of their profound fellow-feeling by the gift of love they had sent him. But he addresses also a word of exhortation and warning to them; for however satisfactory might be the condition of the church as a whole, there still could not fail to be shortcomings in the Christian life among them, and dangers flowing in upon them from without. And it is possible he may have learned as much from Epaphroditus respecting the church. These are the essential component parts of our epistle, very naturally and simply arising out of the existing relations.

After the introduction, i. 1—11, follow first of all the apostle's reports concerning himself, 12—26. Then comes a word of exhortation to the church, i. 27—ii. 18, followed up by the section ii. 19—30, in which the apostle shews how he also in point of fact was caring for the church. He next adds a double warning, to which he was passing over at the close of the preceding section, iii. 1—iv. 1. Some special admonitions are then given, iv. 2—9, after which he expresses his gratitude for the gift that had been sent, 10—20. Salutations and the usual benediction form the conclusion, 21—23. How naturally these particular parts of the epistle adhere together, how clear and easy the connection and progress of thought is, throughout the entire epistle, I deem it unnecessary to exhibit farther here, as it will be made to appear in the exposition itself. There being nothing in the object of the epistle to bias its particular parts, and force it out of its proper unity, this unity only discovers itself the more palpably in the tone and method pursued. Not only the circumstance of the epistle resting upon the ground of a close personal relation, indicating and expressing in all its parts the heart-felt love of the apostle to this spiritual community, so that it appears more than other epistles a genuine outpouring of cordial affection, and carries the stamp of familiarity; not only does this personal bearing of the epistle in general, which suits its character so well as a letter of thanks, give to it an impression of unity, but there is one thing especially which may be regarded as the key note of the epistle, which is ever and anon struck, and pervades the whole: the feeling of joy with which the heart of the apostle was filled, and to which he sought also to raise his dear Philippians. This shows itself even outwardly in the frequent occurrence of the χαίρω and χαίρετε, but still more in the profound

and earnest considerations he addresses to them. The "I rejoice," in i. 18, is the result of what he had written concerning himself; and the exhortation in i. 27—ii. 18, stands in a subordinate relation to the joy. With a call to rejoice, he commences anew at iii. 1, while again at the close, iv. 4, he exhorts the whole church to rejoice.

§ 3. THE TIME AND PLACE OF COMPOSITION.

We point here, in the first instance, to what Olshausen has written in his commentary on the epistle to the Ephesians, Introd. § 3. He justly maintains, that the epistle to the Philippians, on account of the similarity of the relations under which it was composed, cannot in respect to time have been far separate from the periods to which those to the Ephesians, Colossians, and Philemon, belong.

In the serial connexion also of these four epistles, there exists a proof that the epistle to the Collosians and that to Philemon were composed about the same time; then, that the epistle to the Ephesians was written at the most some weeks later; and that finally comes the epistle to the Philippians, composed in the latter period of the apostle's imprisonment, as the three others were during the earlier. This supposition in respect to the epistle to the Philippians is justly grounded on the passages i. 12, ss., ii. 26, ss.; according to which the apostle had already spent a considerable time in the place of his imprisonment, and was able to mark the fruit of his labours. Further also, upon ii. 24, where it is said that he would soon come to them, while the distant hope of this is only for the first time expressed in Philem. 22. And one might add, on the probable supposition of Epaphroditus (Phil. ii. 25) being the same person that is called Epaphras in Col. i. 17, iv. 12, Philem. 23, that since he was the carrier of the epistle to Philippi, the later composition of this epistle is indicated, as compared with those in which he is spoken of as present.

Where now was the place of composition? Apart from the supposition of Œder (de tempore et loco epistolæ at Philippenses scriptae, 1731), who ascribes it to the one and a half year's sojourn of the apostle in Corinth, which is disposed of by the single fact that Paul suffered no imprisonment during that time, a double path

lies open: either to suppose that the period of imprisonment was that in Cæsarea (Acts xxiii. 23, ss.), or that it was the time of the first Roman imprisonment, (Acts xxviii. 16, ss.) The latter is the view of most recent interpreters (Bertholdt, Hug, Rheinwald, Flatt, De Wette, Matthies, Meyer, Neander, etc.), as it is also the tradition of the church, comp. the passages in Hölemann (p. 11), and the subscription at the end of the epistle.

It was ascribed to the Cæsarean imprisonment, first by Dr Paulus (in a Programme of 1799, and in the Theol. Lit.-Bl. Zu. Allg. Kchztg. 1834, No. 140), and afterwards by Böttger (Beiträge Gött, 1837). Böttger argues there with much learning and acuteness from the judicial treatment of prisoners at Rome, that Paul could not have been detained long at Rome; at the most five days. But on the other side, see Neander's just and important remark (History of Planting, &c., 4th ed. i. p. 469), that the delay of five or ten days did not refer to the continuance of the judicial procedure, but to the objection against the appeal (=literae dimissoriae); that it indicated nothing as to the delay of the procedure. Farther, Böttger seeks to prove the agreement of the Acts with this event, and to invalidate the data, which have usually been regarded as decisive in the epistle to the Philippians, for referring it to the period of the Roman imprisonment. These are the passages, i. 13, and iv. 22, where the discourse is of a *πραιτώριον*, and an *οἰκία Καίσαρος*. Böttger has certainly proved, that these expressions are not conclusive in behalf of Rome, but were also applicable to palaces of the emperor out of Rome, as, in particular, we read of the *πραιτώριον* of Herod, in Acts xxiii. 35; and, as Olshausen remarks there, the epistles elsewhere present too few determinate points of contact for deciding. But as regards the close of the Acts, I must entirely accord with Olshausen, that it does not square with Böttger's supposition of an imprisonment of a few days. Neander justly remarks, in the place referred to above, that we cannot imagine, if, as Böttger maintains, the apostle's liberation lay between ch. xxviii. 16, and v. 23, Luke should have failed to notice it. And what must the words xxviii. 30, 31, "And he abode two whole years in his own hired house, and received all that came in unto him, no one forbidding him," indicate, if not the still advantageous position of the apostle, notwithstanding his continued imprisonment? Must these words be understood of the contrast, as

Böttger supposes, between the rest which Paul now enjoyed, and the storms of his past life? The notices in the Acts, therefore, do not here withdraw us from the historical grounds for the composition of the four closely connected epistles. We may add that Aristarchus and Lucas, according to Acts xxvii. 2, were with the apostle in Rome, and we also find them both actually with him in Col. iv. 10, Philem. ver. 24; further, that Paul, according to Eph. vi. 19, 20, had freedom to preach the gospel; still farther, that, according to i. 12. ss. of our epistle, important results had sprung from his imprisonment, as also that the apostle expected the last decision of his cause to issue either in life or death (i. 20), yet with a confident anticipatation of his obtaining his pardon and being able soon again to visit the Philippians (i. 25, 26; ii. 24). Putting all these circumstances together, one cannot wonder, that neither Olshausen, nor the more recent expositors, such as De Wette, Meyer, and also Neander, (in his history of the Planting, etc.,) should have dissented from the view of Böttger, and should have adhered to the tradition of the church.

The composition of the epistle consequently falls, according to the common reckoning, in the year 62 or 63.

§ 4. GENUINENESS AND INTEGRITY OF THE EPISTLE.

1. GENUINENESS.

Olshausen could still say, the epistle to the Philippians belongs to the few writings of the New Testament, whose genuineness has never been called in question. But since then D. Baur (in his Paulus, the apostle of Jesus Christ, Stuttg. 1845), has extended his attacks against the New Testament writings also to this epistle—without, however, having yet entered on the particular field. Schwegler (Nachapostolisches Zeitalter, 1846, II. p. 133—135), reckons all the more recent commentators among the defenders of the epistle, and Lünemann and Brückner have vindicated it in separate productions (Pauli ad Phil. ep. contra Baurium defendit Lünemann, Gott 1847, and Brückner: ep a Phil. Paulo auctori vindicata contra Baurium. Lps. 1848.) So also Meyer in the critical remarks of his commentary, p. 61, etc. The epistle is so well ac-

credited by the testimonies of ecclesiastical antiquity,[1] (see these in Rheinwald, p. 42. ss., Hölemann, p. 32, ss.), the matter and tone of the epistle give so little ground for suspicion as to any false design, the whole epistle bears, according to the general judgment, so thoroughly the impress of the Pauline spirit, that its authenticity must be regarded as unquestionable, if that of any one can be so. What possible grounds, then, can Baur have had for calling in question the general opinion? There are three points chiefly, which he reckons unfavourable to the epistle. 1. The epistle moves in the circle of Gnostic ideas and expressions, and in such a manner, as not to oppose, but rather to coincide with them. The leading passage referred to in proof of this is ch. ii. 5, ss. "Being in the form of God," etc. This, according to Baur, could only be said with respect to the ideas of the Gnostics; and on no other supposition than that Gnostic ἁρπαγμός of the Valentinian Sophia, which with all might would press into the nature of the Eternal Father, and so descends from the Pleroma into the Kenoma (Iren. adv. haer. I. 2, 2; I. 4, 1), can the passage admit of any proper explanation. What is said there in a speculative sense of a metaphysical procession, may here, through a spiritual application, be transferred to the moral procedure of Jesus Christ, though without denoting what was an object of sense. So the expressions "in the likeness of men," and "being formed in fashion as a man," admit only of a docetic meaning. Finally, the ἐπουρανίων —ἐπιγείων—καταχθονίων, through which the power and dominion of Christ are extended alike to the three regions, the heavenly, the earthly, and the subterannean, these also are genuine Gnostic terms.

I must here, in order not to be tedious, refer to the commentary on the particular verses. It is there shown in respect to the chief passage ii. 5—8, that it can only be understood as speaking, after the manner of John, of the incarnation, the ἐνσάρκωσις of the Logos; and that the form of existence before and after is expressed by the contrast of that which he did not and that which he did wish. Is there still reason, on the supposition of this mode of explanation, with the allegation of Baur of its being here only a moral refraining from the ἁρπαγμός (though such is impossible, because it makes no sense), to say that Christ could not before his

[1] Polyc. ep. ad. Phil. cap. i. 11, Marc. in Epip. haer. 42; Tert. contra Marc. v. 19; de praeser. 36 Canon, in Muratori. in Origen, in Euseb. Besides these testimonies, there are citations in Iren. adv. haer. iv. 18; Clem. Alex. paed. i. 107; Tert. de resur. c. 23; etc.

moral probation have wished to arrogate to himself what he could only attain through his probation? Whence, then, could Baur know that that ἴσα θεῷ εἶναι must be the reward only of his moral probation? According to the apostle, it equally stood in the power of him of whom he speaks, ἴσα τῷ θεῷ εἶναι and ἑαυτὸν κενοῦν. What determined him to choose the latter was the principle of self-denying love which the Philippians are called to take for their example. But it is objected, how then could it be said that Christ would not lay hold of what, according to this view, he already had?[1] Let us only place ourselves in the sort of position indicated in the passage. Christ himself is represented as an example of self-denying love, and this is shown in the circumstance that under two possibilities he chooses and brings into reality that which love determines him to adopt. But in every real choice and determination, wherein one has to consider about the exchange of an old state for a new one, is it not the fact that the earlier one, which already belongs to me, must appear as given up, and, in the event of my deciding for it, I lay hold of it anew? And does not the expression οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο in this way admit of a satisfactory explanation? See further the Com. on the passage. Or, is it alleged that in this pre-existent condition of Christ, a doctrine not properly Pauline is introduced? Omitting the epistles, which Baur deems not genuine, let only the following passages be compared: 2 Cor. viii. 9, 1 Cor. viii. 6, 1 Cor. xv. 47, all of which cannot, without great arbitrariness, be referred to the historical Christ, as they express themselves. Comp. Lünemann,

1 I cannot go along with Lünemann and Brückner in their view of the ἴσα τῷ θεῷ εἶναι, however much I rejoice in being able to concur with them in the general import of the passage. Both believe, that the fundamental error of Baur lies in this, that he understands one and the same thing by the ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ εἶναι, and the ἴσα τῷ θεῷ εἶναι. They, therefore, make an essential distinction between the two expressions, and would find in the former the thought, that Christ, although he was in a divine form, still had not wished to have a κυριότης in himself, as God has. Lünemann, p. 11: potiri autem potuisset hoc existendi vel vivendi modo, quo ipse vivit Deus, si noluisset se submittere atque servire Deo Deique consiliis, sed potius regnare voluisset aeque ac regnat ipse Deus, subjectus nemini. To the like effect Brückner, p. 28. Nor do I believe that for the sake of the contrast the apostle would have said anything so incredible of Christ. For that Christ could desire the κυρίοτης, ver. 11, only in the way of self-denial, is to be understood of itself. But even while he desires this κυρίοτης, he does not ascend to a higher dignity than his pre-existent one; whereas, according to Brückner and Lünemann, a still higher dignity was withheld from the λόγος ἄσαρκος, which he has reached by Lünemann's express declaration, as λόγος ἔνσαρκος.

p. 8, ss., and the lengthened discussion of this point in Brückner in the Appendix, p. 84, etc.

But how comes the apostle by the expression, *οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο*? It is certainly to be found nowhere else in his writings. But is it of so very peculiar a character that one can only explain it by a reference to the history of that Gnostic *ἅρπαγμα*? The sense of the passage requires that there should be an expression for indicating that Christ did not choose divine glory, as if he had looked simply upon his own. Has the *ἁρπαγμὸν* there something strange about it, since, according to the connection, it is presented as the relatively selfish idea? And does the reference, then, to the Gnostic theosophy explain the expression? What has the expression employed in our passage to do with the history of that *ἅρπαγμα*? As little as the Gnosis knows of a being *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ* in the sense of our passage, of a being *ἴσα τῷ θεῷ* (*ἴσα* being taken as an adverb), as little does it also know properly of a *ἑαυτὸν κενοῦν*. Have all these designations, then, not a uniformly New Testament, nay Pauline impress? How does *μορφὴ θεοῦ* essentially differ from that *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ* in 2 Cor. iv. 4? Has not the *ἐκένωσε ἑαυτὸν* a substantial parallel in the *ἐπτώχευσε* of 2 Cor. viii. 9? Is the expression *κενοῦν* not used often enough elsewhere by the apostle (Rom. iv. 14; 1 Cor. i. 17, etc.) to account for its use here, where it is so perfectly in place? How can one say that the author moves in the circle of Gnostic ideas and expressions, when neither the ideas of the author nor his expressions are to be found in the Gnostics, but are quite homogeneous to the author's own manner of thought and expression, as appears elsewhere in his writings?

The expressions just referred to, however, are not the only ones of their kind; and in the case of an author who moves in the circle of Gnostic ideas, such was to have been expected. The words, *ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος*, *κ.τ.λ.* in ii. 7 must also be Gnostic, because those in ver. 10, "every knee of the heavenly, earthly, and subterraneous (beings)," are Docetic, and most thoroughly and purely Gnostic. Now, we have all the traces of Gnosticism that occur in our epistle, nothing of that description being found in the remaining parts of it!

In regard to the latter passage, it is shown in the exposition that

here the "Gnostic" idea of the descent into hell is not to be thought of (as if this idea, too, were exclusively Gnostic, because it is to be met with in Marcion!) For the meaning of *καχθόνιοι* see the exposition, and in respect to the *ἐποιράνιοι* Brückner justly points to the passages 1 Cor. xv. 24—28, Rom. viii. 38, 39, which speak of the all-embracing power of Christ. Brückner also expressly assures us, p. 35, that the thought under this precise expression never occurs in the Gnostics.

As to the other expression, *ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος*, which Baur would have to contain a Docetic meaning, we are not to be entangled by what Lünemann and Brückner bring into notice, that Christ was different from all other men in this respect, that he was conscious of no sin (2 Cor. v. 21); for the idea of the *ἄνθρωπος* does not include that of sin. Sin is rather to be regarded as an accident of human nature; hence also in other passages, such as Rom. v. 15, 1 Cor. xv. 21, Paul denotes Christ unconditionally *ἄνθρωπος*. Baur also maintains with some reason that the passage Rom. viii. 3, in which God is said to have sent his Son "in the likeness of sinful flesh," cannot be reckoned parallel to the one before us. Neither, however, does it prove, as Baur supposes, that the expression in the present passage is Docetic, inasmuch as the *likeness* which in the Son must, as to its idea, be viewed in regard to the *sinful flesh*, is in Phil. ii. 7, extended to humanity at large. For there is ground enough for a thought, on account of which the author, who in another connection could never have hesitated to say *ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος*, should here have said precisely *ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γ*. And that ground is, that in the passage he does not speak either of the divine or the human nature, but simply of the divine and human form of existence or life. Baur has certainly and very strangely overlooked this when he says, "Were he already God, wherefore should he first become what he already was?" etc. We reply, there is as little previously of a being God, as afterwards of a being man; but as before the discourse was only of a divine form of being, in which Christ was, previous to his humiliation, so afterwards it can only be of a form of manifestation belonging to him, which is designated by "his taking the form of a servant," being "in the likeness of men," and "found in fashion as a man."

To desire that the writer had simply said ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος, were nothing else than to wish that he had expressed himself less accurately than he has done.

The *second* series of objections raised by Baur against the genuineness of our epistle, refers to the composition of it in general. Tender and pleasing as the thoughts and sentiments are which are expressed in it, the epistle still suffers from a monotonous repetition, from the want of a deep internal connection, and from a certain poverty of thought. The absence, too, of a sufficient occasion to draw forth such a communication, and of a distinctly announced aim and train of thought, is a circumstance that must also be taken into account. Its polemical character gives the impression, as if it existed only on this account, such being the general character of Paul's epistles. But it is deficient in the freshness and naturalness which distinguish these, and in the objective nature of the relations indicated. So, in particular, in the passage iii. 18. The expression κύνες in iii. 2 is coarse; strained and unnatural the contrast between κατατομή and περιτομή, introduced merely to give the apostle an opportunity to speak of himself. Then, iii. 2, ss., is just a copy of 2 Cor. xi. 18. How universally known are the things which the apostle relates here of the circumstances of his life! The expression "righteousness in the law" is not Pauline. The whole is flat and uninteresting. But especially does it awaken suspicion, that it never comes clearly out what had moved the apostle to write the epistle. In iv. 10, ss., indeed, an occasion is mentioned in connection with a present which the Philippians had sent to Rome for the apostle's support. But the passage iv. 15, according to which the apostle had repeatedly received support from the church at Philippi, involves a contradiction with the apostle's statement in 1 Cor. ix. 15, "I have used none of these things," namely, those which belonged to living off the gospel. A certain limitation, indeed, is given to this assertion of the apostle by the admission, in 2 Cor. xi. 9, that during his abode at Corinth brethren from Macedonia had ministered to his necessities. But in Phil. iv. 15, the matter is represented as if it had been an arrangement subsisting from the beginning, as if the apostle had to make a sort of reckoning with the Philippians as to giving and receiving. One can scarcely avoid the supposition, that the author had the passage 2 Cor. xi. 9 before his eyes, and drew too much from it. The men-

tion presently after of the contributions previously received betrays the false apostle. Paul would have indicated more plainly the contribution mentioned in ver. 15, by which is to be understood that sent to Corinth according to 2 Cor. xi. 9; and would not have mentioned last, in ver. 16, the contributions he had received at an earlier period. It is also stumbling, that, according to ver. 16, the apostle's sojourn in Thessalonica is spoken of as much longer than the history in the Acts would lead us to suppose. From what was said at ch. iv. 10, ss., upon the occasion of the epistle, there is good reason to suppose that we have only a feigned situation before us.

It is not without due consideration that I have exhibited at length this second series of Baur's objections, for I hope the reader, who has them here clearly before him, that he may himself judge of them, will excuse me from meeting them one by one. This has also been undertaken by others, and executed in a creditable manner, as in the productions of Lünemann and Brückner. I simply remark, that Baur has pronounced his condemnatory judgment on this epistle, accusing it of monotony, poverty of thought, and want of a profound internal connection, without any proper foundation. If respect is had to the subject matter of the epistle, where is there to be found any thing like monotonous repetition and poverty of thought? How clearly do the several parts of the epistle divide themselves from each other (comp. § 2), and how characteristic is the treatment that is given to each of these! Only let us not ourselves mix what in the epistle is divided. Thus, how very differently are his personal opponents in Rome described in ch. i. 15, ss., from the enemies of whom he warns his readers in ch. iii. 2, ss.! How plainly, again, are these distinguished from the persons named in ch. iii. 18, ss.? And we have still again others before us in ch. i. 28. How new and peculiar is the representation given of his position and his experience in prison, when compared with what is found in the other epistles! How completely does ch. ii. 19—30 transport us into the circumstances of the apostle, and provide for us solutions in regard to his most particular references? The epistle is quite remarkable for its great variety of matter; and the description given of the state of things then existing is so precise, that one can scarcely understand for what purpose the author of the epistle, supposing him to have been a writer of the second century, should have entered with such detail into the apostle's relations at

Rome, and specified, for example, with such cordiality the love of Epaphroditus, as is done by the apostle in ch. ii. 25, ss. Or, must the monotony consist in this, that the apostle repeatedly speaks of his joy, and calls on his readers to rejoice? There is certainly repetition here, but of such a kind as can easily be perceived to have arisen from the fulness of the heart, out of which the words proceeded.

The reproach of monotony, however, and of poverty of thought, though raised against the whole epistle, must be understood as directed chiefly against the polemical part, and more particularly the passage at the commencement of ch. iii. Fault is expressly found with it, at least for its flatness and feebleness. The passage can only be an infelicitous copy of 2 Cor. xi. 18.

Dr Baur pounces at once on "speaking the same things" (*τὰ αὐτὰ γράφειν*) in ch. iii. 1, as betraying the author's own sense of poverty of thought. But in reality the difficulty which these words occasion to the expositor, arises from the circumstance that it is not easy to find anything in the preceding context of a similar kind; so that many expositors have been led to look out of the epistle altogether, and to suppose a reference to some earlier oral expressions or a previous epistle. We, who have only this epistle before us, can have little reason to complain of monotony and poverty of thought, so far as this expression is concerned. And then the polemical passage itself, which follows ver. 2, the copy of 2 Cor. xi. 18! Who can deny that the passage has a strong resemblance with the one before us? But who, on the other hand, can wonder that this should be the case, since, on both occasions, the apostle has the same opponents in his eye? and, in opposition to them, handles the same subject? Is it not also natural to the apostle, when he comes to speak elsewhere of this fleshly privilege (comp. Rom. xi. 1), so to do it, as to specify in detail the particular points belonging to it? And then, with all the resemblance that our passage bears to the other, what diversity also! It does, indeed, require proof, that the one passage is only an infelicitous copy of the other. Baur lays stress, with this view, on the *dogs* in ver. 2, and still more on the *κατατομή* (concision) with its contrast *περιτομή* (circumcision), in ver. 3. The expression dogs is not fine, and in that Baur is quite right; but neither is "ministers of Satan" in 1 Cor. xi. 15, as others have already noticed. And how could it

then be proved that the apostle had not himself used that very common word, that only an imitator of the passage in Corinthians had done so? As regards the other two expressions, Lünemann justly points to Gal. v. 11, 12, where the apostle in a manner quite similar places an ἀποκόψονται over against περιτομή. Still, however, Dr Baur takes offence at Christians being called the true, the Jews the false circumcision. But this is not really the sentiment of the passage. The apostle does not speak of Jews, and say, that their circumcision is a false one. He only says, that the circumcision of which the opponents were making a boast, was of no more value than a mere cutting of the flesh of one's body. And have we not in Rom. ii. 25, ss., a "circumcision becoming uncircumcision," and "an uncircumcision being reckoned for circumcision?" Have we not also in ver. 28, 29 a similar thought, though introduced with a different respect? And this "unnatural" contrast must have been brought in merely to give the apostle an opportunity to speak of himself! It is not true, however, that the opportunity is thus sought; for it is by a new turn in the discourse that he comes, at ver. 4, to speak of himself, and in doing so, allows the contrast entirely to drop. I refer to my exposition of the passage; and merely remark here, that if there is a single passage in the epistle that bears the genuine Pauline impress, it is the one before us. So far from the discourse being made violently to assume a personal form, it is in the simplest and most impressive manner, that the apostle shews in his own person the vanity of that confidence in the flesh. And is not the exposition in ver. 7—14 worthy of the apostle?

We shall at present only notice farther what has been alleged by Baur in regard to the occasion of the epistle. In its primary occasion and design we have shewn it to be a letter of thanks from the apostle, which naturally led him to give his readers some notices respecting himself, and address to them such admonitions as they might then need. And the composition of the epistle seems perfectly to accord with this supposition. What criticism has to say against it has already been mentioned above. But does 1 Cor. ix. 15 really contain any thing opposed to the declaration of the apostle in Phil. iv. 15, 16, that the Philippians had repeatedly sent money to support him? Baur himself adduces a case from 2 Cor. xi. 9, "that which was lacking to me the brethren from Macedonia sup-

plied." But *one* time, he would have us think, is *no* time; whereas this passage should have convinced him of the error of his exposition of 1 Cor. ix. 15. For, the apostle does not speak there at all, of his not having received support from any church whatever, but only of the manner in which he had acted toward the Corinthians —comp. ver. 11, ss. And if any doubt might still remain of the passage, should it not be completely removed by 2 Cor. xi. 8, "I robbed other churches, taking wages of them, to do you service?" When Baur farther speaks, at ch. iv. 15, of a plan contrived from the beginning, when he charges the pseudo-apostle with an unchronological enumeration of the pecuniary contributions, or a too indefinite description of the gifts sent after him to Corinth, and at last would have it, that in ver. 16, Thessalonica was misplaced out of Macedonia; the whole of his averments are mere fabrications, which vanish partly under the right exposition of the passages, and partly from the consideration that this pseudo-apostle might have known as well as the apostle himself, and (since according to Baur he had 2 Cor. xi. 9 before him), he must have known, that the Philippians had sent a gift to the apostle at Corinth, and which formed part of the supplies they ministered to his wants.

All that Baur has as yet brought against the genuineness of our epistle proves on closer investigation to be so untenable, so utterly worthless, that it remains incomprehensible, how on such grounds he should have come forth on a critical undertaking against the epistle; unless the *third* part of the considerations urged by him should provide some solution of the matter. We shall not err, if we hold, that the name of Clemens in ch. iv. 3, with which Baur places in connection the persons in Cæsar's household in ver. 22, bears the blame of the whole undertaking. Since neither history, says Baur, nor tradition knows of any other Clemens, it must be the same who is elsewhere placed in the closest fellowship with the apostle Peter, the first bishop of the church at Rome. Tradition has reported of this person, that he was a relative of the imperial house. (Comp. the Clementine Homilies IV. 7: *ἀνὴρ πρὸς γένους Τιβερίου Καίσαρος*.) Now, this Clemens not only belongs to tradition, but the piece of history out of which it grew, abundantly shews that the apostle himself could not have known this Clemens. The *fundus fabulæ* is that Flavius Clemens, who is made known to us by Suetonius, Dio Cassius, and Eusebius, who was a

relative of Domitian, and was put to death by this emperor on account of his ἀθεότης. To refer to the epistle of the Roman Clemens, in proof that there really was an apostolical Clemens different from that other, is improper, since the prefixed name of Clemens does not prove that the apostle wrote of the Clemens in the Christian tradition. But how, then, could this Flavius Clemens of Domitian's time have been called the fellow-worker of the apostle? It was only an author, who lived after the apostolic times, that could place him in such a relation to the apostle Paul, living at a period when that Clemens had become the well-known Clemens of the Roman tradition. And from this point the whole purport of the epistle must receive a new light. Now is first explained what is reported in ch. i. 12 of the προκοπὴ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, which calls forth the internal feeling of joy, that discovers itself throughout the whole epistle. From the preponderance of this feeling of joy, it is to be understood how the author should have ascribed to the apostle the hope of a speedy deliverance (ch. ii. 24.) Still, however, the well-known end of the apostle flits before the eyes of the later author, and hence the hesitancy of mind between life and death, which appears in such passages as ch. i. 20—24. The design of the author, which led him to place the Roman Clemens, Peter's genuine disciple, beside the apostle Paul as a fellow-worker, was to form a new bond of harmonious relationship between the two apostles, as representatives of the Jewish and heathen-Christian tendencies; and it is the proper scope of the epistle to put the real aim of the apostle Paul in its fair and proper light. In conclusion, reference is made to the anachronism in the designations "bishops and deacons" at the commencement of the epistle, and to the persons called so enigmatically Euodia and Syntyche, together with the "dear yoke-fellow" in iv. 3, as proofs against the genuineness of the epistle.

In regard to the chief point, the spurious character of the epistle would certainly be obvious, if it could be proved that the *fundus fabulæ*, in respect to the Roman Clemens, was the Flavius Clemens of Roman history; and, secondly, that the Clemens of our epistle is the same person as the one mentioned in the Christian tradition. But what is Baur's proof for the first of these positions? He compares what Suetonius, Dio Cassius, Eusebius, have said of that Flavius Clemens, the husband of Domitilla, with the Clemens

of the Clementine homilies. In both we have before us a man who was allied to the imperial family, who became a Christian, and whose wife, according to one report, and, according to another, his mother and brothers, were obliged to leave Rome. But even here in this last particular a difference apparently comes out, and one that becomes still greater when we ask regarding the leaving, on what account it was that the persons in question must go away from Rome. Domitilla was banished by Domitian to Pandateria; the mother and the brothers of the Clementine Clemens left Rome in consequence of a dream, and withdrew to Athens. Besides, that Flavius Clemens was a near relative of Domitian, but this other was a distant one of Tiberius. What could be the reason of the Clementines departing so far from the *fundus fabulæ*? Why did they not allow him to continue a near relative of Domitian, robbing him of such an honour, and thereby departing from the usual custom of traditional embellishment? But let us leave the Clemens of the Clementine homilies; let us grant, that in one point of view that Flavius Clemens may have been the *fundus fabulæ*; are we on this account necessitated to admit that the well-known Clemens of the ecclesiastical tradition is at once to be identified with the same? to be a mere product of traditional embellishment? No one thinks of letting the apostle Peter, because of such traditional embellishment in the Clementines, sink into the condition of a traditional man; and why should it be done any more with that Clemens? Between him and the Clementine one there is still a wide distinction. Where is it said, in all that Dionysius of Corinth, Irenæus, Tertullian, Clemens of Alexandria, Eusebius, have reported of that Clemens, that he stood in any relationship to the family of Cæsar? Does not Eusebius know how to distinguish between him and Flavius, with whom also he was sufficiently acquainted? (H. E. III. 18, 2.) Must Dionysius, about the middle of the second century, and those other Fathers at the end of the second and the beginning of the third, have already so far erred as to make a Roman bishop out of that Roman consul, whom, according to Suetonius, the emperor repente ex *tenuissima suspicione* tantum non in ipso ejus consulatu interemit? A bishop, too, who in the name of the church at Rome wrote a letter to the Corinthians, which it was customary to read even in the second century in the public meetings of the Corinthian church? The

mere name, however, Baur asserts, does not prove the epistle to have been written by the Clemens of tradition. But was it still not written by a Clemens? Why should it not, then, be the one so well known? Neither history nor tradition, according to Baur himself, knows of any other. Or, must the name of Clemens have been feigned which is written on the epistle? Or, must it have been really an epistle from the church at Rome to that at Corinth, which first in the way of tradition was ascribed to that Clemens, though he never lived as the tradition reports him to have done? How can such a thing be conceived possible with an epistle, written in the name of the church at Rome, and from the first held in such high estimation? How also could it be conceived in respect to the testimony of Dionysius, the bishop of that very church to which the epistle was addressed, and at a time so near the period of its production (somewhere about fifty years later) ?—And let us see if the Roman Clemens can after all serve as a facsimile of the Flavius Clemens referred to. Baur maintains that the death of this Clemens had excited a great stir among the Romans, on account of the dreadful disturbances that followed it; whence its great importance in the Christian traditional records may more easily be understood. But why then in these records is nothing said of the death of Clemens? They are silent about the very thing to which he owed his greatness. A mere tradition of the fourth century would have it to be known that he died as a martyr.

But even with the Clemens of Christian tradition, to use the language of Baur, the Clemens of the epistle before us does not coincide. For this Clemens was not to be sought at Rome, but at Philippi; and, even if he may have been the same person who afterwards became bishop at Rome, still it is not as that Roman Clemens that he is introduced and spoken of here. So that the ground on which the salutation from those of Cæsar's household is connected with him for the purpose of establishing his relationship to the imperial family, falls entirely away. Indeed, it is on this account also an arbitrary supposition, because the expression—ἐκ τῆς Καίσαρος οἰκίας—does not necessarily denote relatives of the emperor, but may as well at least mean the servants of his household. —Our epistle, then, has certainly lost again the clear light which it has received from the Clemens of Baur. All that he can adduce in

support of a disciple of Peter under that name, and a fellow-worker of Paul, is ch. iv. 3, where he is put in a series with other fellow-workers, and nothing more is said of him than of the women and the rest who had laboured together with the apostle. There is no special salutation to him in ch. iv. 22. Who can fail to perceive that this Clemens must have played an entirely different part in the epistle to give even the appearance of plausibility to Baur's hypothesis! Or do we first really need this hypothesis, in order to render explicable what is said of the furtherance of the Gospel in ch. i. 12, and of the apostle's joyful state of mind, in which he would have his readers to sympathise with him? Were it not, on the contrary, inexplicable, why should the author not make the apostle say what properly is the ground of his joy, if it could only have been thoroughly understood by a reference to Clemens? But the words, "in all the prætorium and all other places," do not point to Clemens; nor does the joy, of which the apostle speaks in ch. i. 18, refer to the entrance which the Gospel found here or there, but to the circumstance that Christ was everywhere preached. Still less has the χαίρειν of the apostle in the other passages this restricted reference. If only we confine ourselves to the supposition that the relations were such as the epistle describes, is not every thing then clear and in agreement with itself? Do not obscurity and confusion come in only with Baur's hypothesis? The division of mind between life and death in ch. i. 21—24, which Baur presses in support of his view, is explained by the apostle himself, when he represents the difficulty of choice as arising from the twofold respect he had, first to himself, and then to the interest of the churches. It is not correct to say, that his mind was divided between living and dying; for he knew it to be certain that he should continue in life. And when in ch. ii. 17 he puts the case of his going to be sacrificed, every one knows, that with such a supposition nothing was said in regard to its actually taking place. But when Baur asks, whether such a dividedness of mind in a matter that so deeply concerned the cause of the Gospel, were not much less suitable for the apostle, than for an author who already had before him as a matter of fact the end of the apostle, apparently so inappropriate to the great objects of his mission:— we can set against it, and with more right, the counter question, how should this author, who, according to Baur, had the end of

the apostle before him in this very imprisonment as a matter of fact, have come to represent the apostle as confidently assuring himself of a deliverance from it ?

In conclusion, Baur has pointed to the mention of bishops and deacons in ch. i. 1 as an anachronism. I deem it unnecessary to go into this point here, as it has been investigated in the Introduction to the pastoral epistles, where the untenableness of such an objection is rendered manifest. How far, finally, there is any ground for objecting to the mode of naming Euodia and Syntyche, and introducing the still rarer *σύζυγος*, will be shown in the exposition. It is more probable, from the other contents of the epistle, to suppose that the two names belong to two women, and that the *σύζυγος* had been a worthy fellow-labourer of the apostle, than that the Eudoxia represented the Jewish-Christian, and Syntyche the heathen-Christian party, and that the dear yoke-fellow was, after the Clementine homilies, a designation of the apostle Peter. So Schwegler in his Nachapost. Zeitalter II. p. 135. I refer farther, in respect to the genuineness of the epistle, to the short but excellent remarks of Neander in his work already noticed, and to Meyer's Commentary.

2. INTEGRITY.

If we have felt it our duty to dwell longer on the discussion of the genuineness of the epistle, we can be the shorter on this second point. The question, with which we have here to do, and which Heinrichs (N. T. ed. Koppe, vol. vii. Proleg.) was the first to bring upon the field, though the subject has since been prosecuted by others, is this —whether the epistle be one whole, as we now have it in our hands ; or, whether it has been formed into a whole by some strange hand, out of two epistles of the apostle to the Philippians—according to Heinrichs embracing respectively a wider and a narrower circle, and according to D. Paulus the one addressed to the church, the other to the bishops and deacons.

The only appearance of support that can be brought from the epistle itself for this later hypothesis, is the passage ch. iii. 1. But does this hypothesis solve the difficulties connected with it ? Does not Heinrichs' surprise, that the apostle after the

salutation-formula, as he regards it (*τὸ λοιπὸν χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ*), should commence anew, rest upon a pure misunderstanding of these words? And does he not himself deprive his hypothesis of all support by viewing the next words ("to write the same things to you, to me indeed is not grievous," &c.) without respect to any connection with the other epistle, and seeking to find the emphasis in *γράφειν*, and reverting to some earlier *oral* declarations of the apostle? Without attempting here to settle anything as to the correct meaning of the verse, we must still allow, that the other hypothesis of Grotius, Krause, Hoog, Rheinwald, according to which the apostle meant to conclude with *τὸ λοιπὸν κ. τ. λ.*, but afterwards added the remainder of the epistle, affords as probable a solution of the difficulty—though, as we shall see, there is no necessity even for resorting to this supposition.—Support has also been sought for the hypothesis of two epistles, an exoteric and esoteric, by referring to the passage in Polycarp's ep. ad. Phil. c. 3, *ὅς* (namely Paul) *καὶ ἀπὼν ὑμῖν ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολάς*. We certainly cannot, on the opposite side, refer to the other passage in Polycarp, c. 11, qui estis in principio epistolæ ejus, as has already been remarked by Van Hengel, and on still juster grounds by Meyer in his commentary. But what reason have we for concluding, if the plural *ἐπιστολάς* is to be urged, that the epistle was composed of two separate epistles, and not rather that Paul may have previously written other letters to the Philippians in connection with the supplies they sent him? It is clear that the hypothesis rests on very weak grounds. And how utterly contemptible is the proof brought from other parts of the epistle! How completely groundless is the supposition of an exoteric and an esoteric portion in the epistle drawn from the occurrence of the word *τέλειοι* in ch. iii. 15? How little does the matter of the epistle accord with this? How unworthy of the apostle are the reasons, on account of which he must have uttered, what is said of the Jewish adversaries in iii. 2, of the presents in iv. 10, on Euodia and Syntyche in iv. 2, if it was not uttered in respect to the church in general? How little can any one explain, how so arbitrary a combination of two epistles should through violent inversions have been effected? But all this has already been shewn at length by others; see Krause, An epist. ad. Phil. in duas epp. . . dispescenda sit, Schott Einl. p. 283; Hemsen, as referred to, p. 680—694; Rheinwald,

p. 45—55 ; Hölemann, p. 34—44 ; Matthies, Einl. p. 23, &c. I perfectly agree with Credner, Van Hengel, and others, that the whole hypothesis deserves to fall into oblivion.

§ 5. LITERATURE.

At full length in Rheinwald, Comm. p. 235—242 ; Hölemann, p. 54—59.—As special preparations for the epistle we may here mention, Storr diss. exeg. in ep. ad Phil. Tub. 1783 ; J. G. Am Ende, Pauli Ap. ad Phil. ep. Viteb. 1798 ; J. F. Krause, observ. crit. exeg. Regiom. 1810 ; Rheinwald, Comm. on the ep. to the Phil. 1827 ; Flatt's prelections, 1829 ; Matthies' exposition, 1835 ; Van Hengel's Comm. perpet. in ep. Phil. 1838 ; Hölemann, do. 1839 ; A. Rilliet, Comm. sur l' epitre de l' ap. P. aux Phil. Gen. 1841 ; De Wette's exeget. Handbuch, 1847 ; Meyer, Krit-exeget. 9 Abtheil. 1. Hülfte, 1847. Treatises are also to be found on particular parts, such as Passavant's Versuch einer Prakt. Auslegung, Basel, 1834.

EXPOSITION

OF THE

EPISTLE TO THE PHILIPPIANS.

§ 1. INSCRIPTION AND THANKSGIVING FOR THEIR STEDFASTNESS IN THE FAITH.

(i. 1—11.)

Ver. 1. Paul and Timotheus, the servants of Jesus Christ, to all the saints in Christ Jesus which are at Philippi, with the overseers and deacons," &c.

As in others of his epistles (1 Cor. i. 1, 2 Cor. i. 1, Col. i. 1, Thess. i. 1, 2 Thess. i. 1, Philem. 1) one or several persons are named along with the apostle in the inscription, so here we find the name of Timothy, which indeed oftenest occurs in this connection. This implies, in the first place, that the person so named was present with the apostle, and, in the second place, that he stood in a somewhat close relation to those to whom the epistle was addressed; it also implies that he sympathised with the apostle in the sentiments expressed in the epistle, and in his solicitudes and prayers in behalf of those to whom it was written. We are not however to suppose that the person so named had any share in the writing of the epistle, as is evident from the constant use throughout of the first person singular, i. 3, and passages such as ii. 19. This last passage affords proof at the same time of the warm regard which Timothy felt towards the church at Philippi, in the planting of which he indeed assisted the apostle, as appears from Acts xvi. 17. Besides the naming of Timothy here is all the more appropriate, as the epistle announces his speedy arrival

amongst the Philippians. Whether he acted as penman of the epistle must remain undetermined.

By the phrase *servants of Jesus Christ* the apostle designates himself in common with Timothy, whilst in Col. i. 1 he designates himself as an apostle, and Timothy as his brother. We may certainly infer from this that the apostle had no occasion to vindicate his apostolical authority to the church at Philippi, and that the omission of his official designation here was therefore not merely accidental. And how well does this agree with the contents of the epistle, which represents the congregation as resting on the foundation of a close personal relationship to the apostle, and which was immediately occasioned by his having to send his thanks for a favour he had received from them. There is no ground for supposing that, in naming Timothy along with himself, the apostle wished to procure for him the same honour that would be given to himself. *To all the saints in Christ Jesus.* To these the inscription and salutation are addressed, *saints* through their fellowship with Christ. On τοῖς ἁγίοις compare Rom. i. 7, where Olshausen well observes that, with reference to the New Testament church, the idea contained in this word is, the impartation of a new and higher principle of life. That which makes them holy is their fellowship with Christ; by means of this are they sanctified, and sin in its principle is overcome within them, although their victory over it in reality is but gradual.

That emphasis is intended to be laid on the word *all,* is plain from the repetition of this word 1, 4, 7, 8. But those commentators go too far who suppose that the apostle had particularly in his mind either those referred to in ii. 3, who were shewing a spirit of strife, or those perhaps who had not contributed anything to the gift that was sent to him, and that he used this expression purposely to include them, and in order to make no difference. It is rather to be regarded as simply an expression of affection, which is the view that Meyer also takes of it. The ἐπίσκοποι and διάκονει are in this passage alone particularly named by the apostle. How little reason there is for doubting the existence of such office-bearers in the apostolic time is shewn in the *Introduction to the Pastoral Epistles.* The manifest identity in this passage between the ἐπίσκοποί and the πρεσβυτεροι, and the fact of several ἐπίσκοποί being indicated, are unmistakeable marks of the apostolic era.

The special notice of these office-bearers in this epistle is striking. It has been explained by supposing that they had been specially instrumental in collecting the contributions which had been transmitted to the apostle, and for which he returns thanks in this epistle. Meyer thinks this a probable explanation. But on this supposition might we not reasonably expect that the apostle would have made a more distinct acknowledgment of the services rendered by these office-bearers? Besides, the passage at 2 Cor. viii. 9 gives no countenance to this conjecture. Shall we not rather look for the real reason in the circumstances of the church? It is plain that, with all the strength and sincerity of its faith, the church at Philippi was in danger of division through the vainglory of some of its members. And as, on the one hand, the existence of office-bearers in a congregation presupposes a certain measure of the "unity of the faith," so that we are not surprised to find no particular reference to such office-bearers in those epistles, the design of which is to lead to a right apprehension of the truth, and unity of the faith, so, on the other hand, where there is any tendency to the undue assumption of importance on the part of the individual, no more effective check can be applied than the special acknowledgment of those who bear office in the church. That such a tendency existed in the Philippian church is clear, and hence the particular mention of the bishops and deacons. Compare also ii. 29.

Ver. 2. Grace be with you, &c. The apostle's usual salutation, upon which see the excellent observations of Olshausen on Rom. i. 7.

Ver. 3—11. In which the apostle's feelings toward the church are expressed in hearty thanksgiving to God on their behalf, 2—5, confidence that the good work will be carried on in them, 6—8, and earnest prayers for them, 9—11.

Ver. 3. As in his other epistles (with the exception of that to the Galatians), so in this the apostle sets out by giving thanks to God for what he finds to be good and praiseworthy in the church at Philippi. *I thank my God upon every remembrance of you.* In the expression *my God* he gives the reader a glance into his own near relation to God. Fellowship with God, although resting on one and the same basis for all, yet takes a particular form in the case of each individual, according to the particular experiences

which he derives from this fellowship, and which entitle him to call the God of all *his* God. And when is this consciousness of special relationship to God more felt than in the exercise of prayer ?

Upon every remembrance of you. I see no reason to interpret this as Meyer and the most of commentators do, by *every time* that I remember you. The apostle says much more than this ; he means that the remembrance of them in all their circumstances in their every relation constrains him to give thanks to God. The word *μνεία*, when used as here by itself, and without *ποιεισθαί*, signifies not *mention*, but *remembrance.*

Ver. 4. The words of this verse are differently connected. Some expositors are for regarding the words *always in every prayer of mine for you all*, as nothing more than explanatory of the words *upon every remembrance of you.* This, however, is inadmissible, as we have seen that the latter phrase does not mean *every time* I remember you, chiefly, however, because then the additional phrase *for you all* would be quite inappropriate. For with what propriety could the apostle say, that as often as he prays for them all he remembers them ? We shall obtain a much better meaning if we join *πάντοτε* with *εὐχαριστῶ*, and other passages confirm this rendering, for example, 1 Cor. i. 4, Col. i. 3, 1 Thess. i. 2, 2 Thess. i. 3.) Thus the apostle will say that every time he remembers them he gives thanks ; and the meaning of *παντοτε* is rendered more apparent by what follows, viz. *in every prayer of mine for you all.* (Comp. Col. i. 3, 1 Thess. i. 2.) The phrase *for you all*, in which the tenderness of the apostle's regard for every member of the church finds expression, is not to be joined to what follows. It serves as a limitation to the words preceding, viz., in *every prayer of mine*, comp. with this Col. i. 3, 1 Thess. i. 2, where the apostle says only, *praying for you*, and *praying always for you.* It is altogether wrong to separate the words *for you all* from their connection with what goes before and what follows, and to join them with *I give thanks.* Compare Meyer against this view. The sense of this passage then, as far as we have yet proceeded, is that the apostle never prays for them without giving thanks to God on the remembrance of them. But his feelings toward this church are such as constrain him to say in addition to this, that he prays for them *with joy.* Such intercessions coming from a joyful

heart lead naturally to thanksgiving, and may be said to form the ground of the εὐχαρίστῶ in ver. 3. (The article in τὴν δέησίν points back to the preceding δεησίς.)

Ver. 5. In this verse the apostle states more particularly what that was for which he gave thanks to God in his every prayer for them. Ἐπί is therefore to be joined with εὐχαρίστῶ, not as has been recently maintained by Van Hengel and De Wette, with δέησιν, for then there would be no specific statement of what was the subject of the apostle's thanks, and the words *from the first day until now* would have no proper meaning. As the apostle in other passages, where he expresses thanks, generally specifies the subject of his thanksgiving, so here he gives thanks to God *for their fellowship* in the gospel from the first day until now. It is self-evident that κοινωνία εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον is not the same as τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, and cannot be rendered by quod participes facti estis evangelii, to which ἄχρι τοῦ νῦν would not correspond. The connection betwixt εἰς and κοινωνεῖν is certainly not so close as to warrant our taking εἰς to be a circumlocution for the genitive. We shall therefore with the most of modern expositors have to translate the phrase, *for your fellowship in reference to the gospel.* Here a double meaning is possible, according as εἰς εὐαγγέλιον is connected more or less strictly with κοινωνία. In the latter case κοινωνία will express that fellowship of faith and love, that sweet concord, as Meyer expresses it, in which the Philippians were united to one another, while εἰς εὐαγγέλιον determines more strictly the nature of that fellowship, a fellowship, namely, "the centre point of which was the gospel." Against this view, the omission of the article before εἰς εὐαγγέλιον seems to me to be conclusive. As the words stand, they must be closely connected so as to form one idea. Comp. Winer, § 19, 2, p. 155. Besides, it appears to me not consistent with other passages of the epistle, that the apostle should first and foremost acknowledge with thankfulness to God, the unity and mutual love of the church at Philippi. Comp. i. 27, ii. 1, iv. 2. Meyer, in support of the view which we here controvert, refers to verse 9, where the expression *your love*, according to him, means the same thing as *your fellowship*. But is it so clear that that expression in the 9th verse means their love toward one another? If, on the other hand, we connect εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον with κοινωνία more closely, so as to express one idea, then this fellow-

ship will mean, not that of the Philippians with one another, but their fellowship with all those who have the interests of the gospel at heart, who earnestly desire its increase and success. And this active interest in what pertained to the furtherance of the gospel, flowing from their deep and warm attachment to it, was precisely what distinguished the Christians at Philippi from the very beginning. The apostle had a fresh proof of this, in the gift which they sent to him, and which occasioned his particular allusion to this feature in their character, but the words he here employs are not to be confined in their application to that which occasioned them, nor in general to any pecuniary offerings. The Philippians brought whatever they had of Christianity into the service of the gospel. Chrysostom and Theophylact have given substantially the true meaning of this passage, *ὅτι κοινωνοί μου γίνεσθε, καὶ συμμερισταὶ τῶν ἐπί τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ πόνων.* So also Van Hengel and others. In this interpretation, *μετ' ἐμοῦ* needs not to be supplied, ss Meyer has objected with reference to a similar interpretation brought forward by others. For the apostle does not thank God for their fellowship with himself so much as for their belonging to the fellowship of those who are concerned for the furtherance of the gospel. According to this view, nothing needs to be supplied. In Gal. ii. 9, and Acts ii. 42, the word *κοινωνία* will be found in the same signification as here. And for *εἰς τὸ εναγγέλιον* in the sense of, furtherance of the gospel, see ver. 12, and 1 Cor. ix. 14. Thus does the apostle render thanks for their fellowship in the gospel, but he adds that this fellowship had existed from the first day of their having received the gospel until the present time. How different from this was his experience in regard to other churches! In the words *ἄχρι τοῦ νῦν* there is a reference to the fresh proof of this which he had just received, in the gift that was transmitted to him. These words *from the first day until now*, so appropriate when taken in connection with *your fellowship*, become tame and meaningless, if with Meyer and others we connect them with *being confident*, ver. 6, or with *I give thanks*, ver. 3. Rheinwald and Van Hengel are also of this opinion. The absence of the article will not prove such a view of the passage to be correct. Compare for example ver. 26

Ver. 6—8. The apostle's confidence with regard to them Ver. 6. The apostle is led by the words he had just used, viz.,

until now, to look forward from the present to the end of their course. He thanks God for what he had seen in them up till the present time, ἄχρι τοῦ νῦν, and as to what will happen betwixt the present and the final issue ἄχρις ἡμέρας Χριστοῦ Ἰ. he declares his confidence, a confidence which mingles with and deepens the thankfulness of his heart on their behalf. His *confidence* is not to be regarded as the moving cause of his thankfulness, but only as an accompanying circumstance; πεποιθώς means, *whilst I confidently hope*. The phrase, *this very thing*, sets forth that what was the ground of his giving thanks was also the subject-matter of his assured hope. This subject matter is here, however, spoken of in general as *a good work*. And the divine agency in bringing it about is held up to view, as the apostle's confidence was based on this divine causality, not on the feeble will of man. The apostle then expresses the confidence he felt with regard to the subject-matter of the thanksgiving, viz,, that God who had begun a good work in the Philippians would also carry it on to perfection. The beginning of a good work in them through God's grace is to him the pledge of its completion. (On αὐτὸ τοῦτο placed before ὅτι, see Winer's Gramm. 5th Ed. § 23, 5, page 186: Ἐναρχεῖσθαι besides in this passage occurs in Gal. iii. 3. On the unimportant difference betwixt Ἐναρχεῖσθαι and the simple verb, see Van Hengel or Matthies. Ἐν ὑμῖν means *in you* in animis vestris, as the phrase υπερ παντων υμων in the following verse proves. So Meyer and others. God then will carry forward to the end any good work which he has begun, and the end, the absolute in contrast with the relative *until now*, is *the day of Jesus Christ*. There can be no question as to what is meant by this expression in the sense in which it is generally used by the apostle. It is the day in which Christ will be revealed in his glory, the day of his coming. This day, whether it be near or distant, is to all, to the dead as to the living, the decisive day. (See ver. 10.) This passage does not necessarily imply the nearness of Christ's coming, as Meyer and others suppose.

Ver. 7. How the apostle for himself (ἐμοί) arrives at this assured hope concerning them we are now informed in verses 7 and 8. It springs from the love he bears to them, which, according to its nature, *to hope all things* (1 Cor. xiii. 7) cannot but give rise to such a hope. The apostle says that to *think this of them* is

meet for him, i.e. suitable to the personal relation in which he stands to them. As this verse is to be explanatory of the preceding (on καθώς, in this sense, see Winer, § 57, 4, p. 526), the words τοῦτο φρονεῖν must refer to the confident hope there expressed, and points out the source whence it sprung without its being necessary with Van Hengel to translate this phrase by *appetere*. As the love of the apostle embraces every member of the church, so also does his confident hope. Hence he says ὑπερ πάντον ὑμῶν, compare this with ver. 8.

He now proceeds to state wherefore it is that he entertains such an assured hope regarding them: *because I have you in my heart.* It has been doubted whether με or ὑμᾶς is here to be considered as the subject, but the position of the words settles this point; and the concluding words of this verse and the 8th verse, in which the apostle calls God to witness his love to the church, clearly show that the common rendering is the right one (comp. Winer, § 45, 6, p. 382, Matthies, Van Hengel, and others.) The apostle bears them in his heart, and hence for himself personally he cannot but cherish such a confident hope regarding them as he has expressed. But it is not merely his love to them in the general sense of the term that necessitates his entertaining such a hope in regard to them: this love has a special character still more nearly related to such a hope, arising from its being love to those who have received grace along with himself to contend and to suffer for the gospel. It is difficult to say whether this participation with him in grace, on the part of the Philippians, is to be regarded as real, or as ideal, and arising from their sympathy with the apostle. A comparison with ver. 27—30, favours the former supposition; on the other hand, the immediate context seems to me rather to require that this participation should be understood as consisting in sympathetic love. Hence will appear why the apostle regarded it as a duty of love to cherish such a feeling as he expresses above toward them all. The stedfastness of their attachment to the apostle in every thing that concerned him, and their being thereby made partakers with him in the grace of suffering for the gospel, explains why he considered it as *meet for him*, as an obligation laid upon him by love, to cherish such a confident persuasion regarding them. According to this interpretation, the words ἔν τε τοῖς δεσμοῖς must be construed with συγκοινωνούς μου, and not with εχειν.

That the apostle considers it as a gift of divine grace, to suffer and to strive for the Gospel, will appear by a comparison with verse 29. The context also of this passage confirms the same view. In the words *ἔν τε τοῖς δεσμοῖς μου κ. τ. λ.*, the apostle represents his own state, as on the one hand a state of suffering, and on the other of active exertion, for the cause of the Gospel, the latter again as manifesting itself in the twofold form of *defence* and *confirmation*.—(*Τοῦ εὐαγγ* belongs of course to both nouns, as the article shews. And both—the defence, namely, and confirmation of the Gospel—refer, not merely to the judicial process which led to the imprisonment of the apostle, but describe what was his constant aim and employment during his imprisonment. In *συγκοινωνούς μου συν* is to be connected with *μου*. The repetition of *ὑμᾶς* in *πάντας ὑμᾶς*, partly on account of *πάντας*, partly by way of resumption, explains itself.

Ver. 8. The apostle has just been assuring the Philippians, that he bears them in his heart as partakers with him of grace, and in confirmation of this, he now takes God to witness how *greatly he longed after them all, in the bowels of Jesus Christ*. This latter clause points back to the expression *συγκοινωνούς*, in which he set forth the moving cause of his love; accordingly his ardent longing after them all consists not in the merely natural outgoing of his heart's affections toward them, but springs from a higher source. It is the love of Christ, the love which Christ bears to his own, it is this that the apostle bears in his bosom, and that awakens within him such longing after the Philippians. (Compare Bengel: in Paulo non Paulus vivit sed Christus quare Paulus in Jesu movetur visceribus. (*Μάρτυς γάρ κ. τ. λ.* Compare Rom. i. 9, also a similar phrase in 1 Thess. ii. 5. Chrysostom's remark is certainly striking: *οὐχ ὡς απίστουμενος μάρτυρα καλεῖ τὸν θεὸν ἀλλ' ἐκ πολλῆς διαθέσεως κ.τ.λ.*—The word *ὡς* is properly rendered by quantopere. *ἐπιποθῶ* is not love, but longing, ii. 26, and Rom. i. 11, 2 Cor. ix. 14, 1 Thess. iii. 6. The *ἐπι* does not strengthen the meaning of the simple verb, but denotes the direction in which it tends. Comp. Winer, § 30, 10, p. 233.—*σπλάγχνα*, a well-known Hebraism, רַחֲמִים; Winer, § 3, p. 39.)

Ver. 9—11. The apostle's prayer for his readers.

Vers. 1—8 contain what the apostle has to acknowledge in the Philippians with thanks to God, what good persuasion regarding them

connects itself with these thanks, and what motives he finds even in his own personal relation to them, to the cherishing of such a persuasion. But along with the good which they have, there is also a deficiency. And how could the love of the apostle, who bears in him the heart of Christ, pass over this deficiency in silence? Therefore in ver. 9—11 the apostle's love leads him to pray, that in addition to the good which they have, they may also obtain that which is still awanting to them. The good which they have, is denoted by *your love*, whilst this, their love, is described as deficient in *knowledge* and in *power of discernment*, a deficiency which must also of necessity operate injuriously on their progress in holiness.

When we attend to the words of the apostle, one by one, we are first of all struck with the expression *this I pray*, following immediately upon the foregoing assurance of his affectionate longing after them all, and thus with peculiar propriety making the prayer that follows to have the appearance of being the outgoing of the most ardent love. The word *this*, points with emphasis to the contents of the prayer. The prayer itself is, *that your love may abound yet more and more in knowledge*, &c. *Your love*—The apostle thus denotes the distinguishing excellence of this church. As, at ver. 5, where the apostle describes what he thankfully acknowledges in the Philippians by, *your fellowship in the Gospel*, &c., we have not been able to agree with those who would understand by that, the love-fellowship of the Philippians with one another, and, as at ver. 7, we have seen in the fact of their being partakers in grace with the apostle, the strongest motive to the love he bears them, so here, where the apostle notes what was good in them, in order along with this to point to what was still awanting, we shall have to understand by the expression *your love*, not the mutual love of the Philippians, nor even their love to the apostle, but that love which manifests itself in their *fellowship in the Gospel*, and in their being *partakers* with the apostle. It is rather the love that has been awakened in them through the preaching of the Gospel, which has regard first of all to the Lord, but then along with him, to all that belongs to him and to his service, the root of the Christian life; and it is therefore worthy of notice, that the apostle does not mention knowledge as something distinct from love, in which they were deficient, but rather specifies the want of this

knowledge as a relative defect in their love itself, and prays on their behalf that their love may abound more in this respect. *Yet more and more* (so he prays), is their love to become rich in knowledge; since they cannot be supposed to be altogether without knowledge; but all depends on their having that measure of knowledge, short of which love will become the sport of every impulse of the heart, and lead to perversities, of which we may easily find examples enough in every age. Comp. Ephes. iii. 18, 19, and in our epistle iii. 8—10, and the remarks there made. Their love is to increase, *ἐν ἐπιγνώσει καὶ πάσῃ, αἰσθήσει.* The word *αἴσθησις*, which has several meanings, can in this passage, from its being joined with *ἐπίγνωσις*, and from the whole context, have no other meaning than perception by the internal sense. (Comp. Passow and H. U.) Therefore also in the Septuagint = דַּעַת, Prov. i. 4, and other passages. While the *ἐπίγνωσις* leads to a profound knowledge of the Gospel, *αἴσθησις* will give the right spiritual perception of the object every time it is presented by experience. Both are necessary to love, in order to its being able rightly to discriminate *δοκιμάζειν τὰ διαφέροντα*; the latter can less be spared. I perfectly agree with Meyer in his interpretation of this phrase. The end to be attained by this increase, is marked by the words *εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμὰς τὰ διαφέροντα*,—that ye may prove, *i.e.* be in a condition to prove the things that differ, namely, what is right and what is wrong. Comp. Rom. ii. 18; xii. 2; 1 Thess. v. 20. So the most of commentators; but Meyer thus, "that ye may approve of what is excellent," owing to the context, which however gives no occasion for such a view. For why may not the power of rightly proving, as we must here regard it, be distinguished as the end of knowledge, and *sincerity* as the result of this proving, *love* being pre-supposed in the whole? (*Περισσεύειν ἐν* is "to abound in," and *ἐν* means neither "through," nor "in communion with;" nor does it denote "the manner and way," as De Wette will have it, "because love as such cannot know." For it is not love as such, that is here spoken of, but the love of the Philippians. Comp. passages such as Rom xv. 13; 2 Cor. iii. 9, viii. 7; Col. ii. 7; against which those adduced by De Wette prove nothing.)

Ver. 10. The end which the apostle has in view, as that to be attained by this increase in the power of moral discernment is, the

fruit which it is to produce in the disposition and life, namely, sincerity and blamelessness for the day of Christ. We have here to notice the same practical aim which meets us everywhere in the pastoral epistles, as opposed to a course of conduct morally unfruitful. (*Εἰλικρινεῖς* pure, from *εἴλη* and *κρίνω*. Comp. 1 Cor. v. 8; 2 Cor. i. 12, ii. 17. *Ἀπρόσκοποι* without offence, in the passive sense, equivalent to blameless; so again in Acts xxiv. 16; differently 1 Cor. x. 32. Van Hengel and Meyer will make it out to be used in an active sense here, but this is far from being the case.—*Εἰς ἡμέραν* marks the *destination*, "for the day of Christ," as the decisive day, comp. ver. 6 then ii. 16; Ephes. iv. 30, and other passages; consequently it is different from *ἄχρις*.)

Ver. 11. They are to be sincere and without offence for the day of final decision; but they can be so, only by being filled with the fruit of righteousness. The negative side always implies the positive, a principle which is of great importance for the Christian life. By *καρπὸς δικαιοσύνης*, as in the case of other words similarly connected, such as *καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματος*, Gal. v. 22, *τοῦ φωτός*, Ephes. v. 9, must be understood fruit of righteousness, in the sense of *product* thereof; and *δικαιοσύνη* does not express so much the justificatio, as rather the new moral habitus of the man, which is given along with it, and in which he "bears fruit unto God in newness of the spirit," Rom. vii. 5. Comp. Meyer, who refers, for this view of *δικαιοσύνη*, to Eph. v. 9, Rom. vi. 13, 18, xiv. 17, and other passages. The apostle adds: *which are by Jesus Christ*, since this fruit, along with the ground from which it springs, is a communication of the life of Christ to his own. I am the vine, ye are the branches, John xv. 5; Gal. ii. 20. Silvestres sumus oleastri et inutiles, donec in Christum sumus insiti qui viva sua radice frugiferas arbores nos reddit, says Calvin. *Εἰς δόξαν καὶ ἔπαινον θεοῦ*, "to the honour and praise of God," to be connected with *πεπληρωμένοι*. Comp. 1 Cor. x. 31; Eph. i. 6, and other passages. (The reading *καρπὸν—τὸν διὰ κ.τ.λ.*, deserves, according to critical authorities, unlimited preference to the other, *καρπῶν—τῶν*. On the accusative, comp. Winer, § 32, 5, p. 261.)

§ 2. THE APOSTLE'S STATEMENT RESPECTING HIMSELF.

(Ch. i. 12—26.)

The first topic to which the apostle passes after this exordium is,—to give the Philippians information concerning himself, the apostle who is in bonds for the sake of the gospel. How characteristic of the apostle is every feature in this description! In the accounts which he gives, how do we see his own individual concerns, taking a subordinate place to the great work of his life. If only Christ is preached *therein I rejoice, yea and will rejoice.* For himself personally, it is all one whether Christ be magnified by his life or by his death. The sudden transition to these accounts about himself induces us to suppose, that what he writes is in answer to a question that had been addressed to him. How could we suppose it otherwise, than that the church which sends an offering for the support of the imprisoned apostle should wish to receive information regarding him. This information, together with thanks for the gift of love which he had received, is to be carried to them by Epaphroditus their messenger. Already in ver. 5 and ver. 7, we have seen how great an interest the Philippians took in the apostle, and even the relation there expressed, renders it natural that the apostle should forthwith communicate to them information about himself.

He begins in ver. 12—18 by telling them what unexpected results, favourable to the spread of the gospel, had been brought about by his imprisonment. In the first place, the reason of his imprisonment, and through this, Christ, had become known in the Praetorium and in other places; and then, greater boldness had thereby been gained in preaching the gospel. That some were actuated by motives hostile to himself in preaching the gospel, can neither now or in future, disturb his joy, in that Christ is preached—*I therein do rejoice, yea and will rejoice.* Then (ver. 19—24) he tells them, that his welfare does not depend on the life or the death of the body, for life to him is Christ, and death bears him hence to Christ. His heart decides for the latter, as it longs to be with Christ, but his regard for the welfare of others leads him to desire life. And life, as he foresees with certainty, ver. 25, 26, will be

appointed to him. He will abide with them for the furtherance and joy of their faith, and will again see them.

Ver. 12. The sum of what the apostle has to communicate to his readers, is contained in the words: *the things which happened unto me have fallen out rather unto the furtherance of the gospel.* His present condition, meaning his imprisonment and what belongs to it, has conduced rather to the advancement of the gospel, *i.e.* to its being publicly made known; (*μᾶλλον* in opposition to the anxiety which such circumstances might have occasioned. Winer, § 36, 3, p. 279.) (With *προκοπή*, progress, furtherance, comp. ver. 25, and 1 Tim. iv. 15. *Ἐληλυθεν* = cessit, Acts xix. 27; Sap. xv. 5.)

Ver. 13. As a beneficial result of his imprisonment, the apostle first of all states that his bonds had become manifest in Christ. The words *φανερους ἐν* **X.** are to be strictly connected, for in this lies the advancement of the gospel, not that his imprisonment had become known, but that it had become known *in Christ, i.e.* in its connection with Christ, in which it has its cause. The fruit of it is,—Christ is preached. Thus, he writes, are his bonds become manifest *ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ πραιτωρίῳ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς πᾶσι.* If we have otherwise no reason to depart from the supposition that the apostle writes during his imprisonmont at Rome, then *πραιτώριον* must mean *the camp of the Praetorians* (comp. Suet. Tib. 37), *not the imperial palace* which in iv. 22 is denoted by *οἰκία Καίσαρος*. Acts xxviii. 16, ss., explains how in this place Paul's bonds could become manifest in Christ. So also Olshausen, who, in addition to this, observes, that the imperial palace in Rome is never called praetorium. (On the literature of this subject, see Hölemann, p. 45, Meyer, p. 21, and our remarks on iv. 22.) ***Καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς πᾶσι*** must therefore mean, all the rest not belonging to the Praetorium. If, as we have seen, the emphasis lies on the words *in Christ,* then the idea intended to be conveyed will not be as is generally explained, that all who are in Rome hear of his imprisoment, and the cause of it, but that to all, first, in the Praetorium, then also beyond it, who *do* hear of his imprisonment, the cause of it will be manifest.

Ver. 14. A further benefit to the cause of the gospel, arising from his imprisonment, is mentioned in this verse. "The greater part of the brethren, trusting in the Lord by my bonds are only

rendered more bold to speak the word." By *ἀδελφοι* are to be understood, fellow labourers with the apostle. *Ἐν κυρίῳ* is, with Winer (§ 19, 2, p. 157), (who refers us to Gal. v. 10, 2 Thess. iii. 4), Meyer and others, to be connected not with *ἀδελφῶν*, but with *πεποιθότας*, " where alone it has its true meaning." Their confidence flows from fellowship with the Lord. But the bonds of the apostle are the object of their confidence, not merely as furnishing an encouraging example of steadfastness, but, as Meyer explains, in that they present a " real testimony to the entire truth, efficacy, and excellence of the gospel."—*Περισσοτέρως*, only " so much the more;" not "more than formerly," but, in connection with the *furtherance* caused by his imprisonment, more than when I was not imprisoned. So also Meyer. *Περισσοτέρως* is to be connected with *τολμᾷν*, which stands next to it.

Ver. 15, ss. *Some indeed preach Christ of envy.* The apostle proceeds to inform his readers of a painful circumstance connected with the preaching of the gospel which he has had to experience. These *some* cannot be part of the brethren mentioned ver. 14 ; such a view is opposed by the very expression *τινές* (not *οἱ μέν*), and also by the *καί* which points back to what goes before, comp. Van Hengel on this passage. What kind of opponents then are here meant ? Let us here take a general view of what we are directly told regarding them in ver. 15—18. Their motives are, envy of the apostle, contentiousness and intrigue, motives of a personal nature, as is evident also from their opposites, *good will, and love,* and proceeding from an insincere state of mind (*οὐχ ἁγνῶς*, which is here to be understood not of the contents of their preaching, but of their own disposition). Their aim was, like their motives, also personal, (*supposing to add affliction to my bonds.*) Nevertheless (ver. 18), the apostle rejoices also in their preaching ; even although they make use of this as an instrument of hostility against himself. But this joy of the apostle would be inexplicable if the gospel were not preached by them in its integrity, a supposition that will not consist with the view generally taken, and adopted also by De Wette and Meyer, that these opponents were Judaizing Christians. The apostle mentions no other difference with respect to the preaching of Christ, than is implied in the words *whether in pretence or in truth,* and all that we are told of the motives and objects of these opponents is of so personal a na-

ture as to shut us up to the conclusion, that it is not Judaizing Christians that are here spoken of, but such as preach Christ, agreeing indeed with the apostle in doctrine, but from personal enmity seeking to damage him by their preaching. Comp. Van Hengel, p. 69 : atque hoc ipsum . . non de hominibus sumendum est, qui superstitionem Judaeorum cum doctrina Christiana confuderunt. Here, then, is a feature that will but ill agree with the ideal picture of the apostolic church which many form to themselves. (On *διὰ φθόνον* comp. Winer § 53, c. p. 475.) In opposition to the first mentioned *τινές* the apostle mentions others, of whom he says that they preach Christ *of good will*. *Εὐδοκία*, as the opposite of *διὰ φθόνον καὶ ἔριν*, means *good will toward the apostle*. This view is also most agreeable to what follows (ver. 16.) So also Meyer. By these *τινές* are to be understood those indicated in ver. 14, collectively and individually, as Meyer has established, in opposition to Van Hengel. Fritzsche, in his commentary on the Romans ii. p. 372, has referred to this signification of *εὐδοκία*.

Vers. 16, 17. Here we have a more particular description of these two kinds of preachers; and they are mentioned in an inverted order : *οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἀγάπης* corresponding to the last mentioned *τινές*, and ver. 17, *οἱ δε ἐξ ἐριθείας* corresponding to the first mentioned. Each of these phrases, *οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἀγάπης*, and its opposite *οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἐριθείας*, is to be considered as *subject* of the sentence, which is of itself apparent in the second member, but must on that account also be supposed in the first. With this designation of the subject, the apostle connects what he has said before regarding them. He, however, adds something more particular respecting their motives,—*οἱ μὲν ἔξ ἀγάπης*, sub. *ὄντες* (comp. Rom. ii. 8 ; Gal. iii. 7), " those who are actuated by love in preaching Christ" (supplied from ver. 15), because they know *that I am set for the defence of the gospel*. On the sense of these words there exists some difference of opinion. Some explain them thus : because they see me hindered in the exercise of my apostolic office and seek to assist me. Others : because they acknowledge and love me as one called of God to the defence of the gospel, and see in my imprisonment a catastrophe ordained of God and fraught with benefit to the interests of the gospel. So De Wette. First of all, it will be acknowledged, that *ἀπολογία* here must have the same meaning as at ver. 7, consequently, that it does not mark out any part of the general

idea implied in the apostolic office, or indicate anything at all respecting the nature of that office. Then, it is not to be overlooked that the emphasis in any case must rest on the words, *for the defence of the gospel*, even although we should translate κεῖμαι, "I lie in bonds." (Van Hengel : in miseria.) For it is not the κεῖμαι which the one party know, and the other do not, or will not know, comp. ver. 17. Hence that interpretation will of itself fall to the ground, which makes the motive of their preaching to consist in the apostle's being hindered from exercising his apostolic office ; the motive can only be, as De Wette points out, that they recognise in the apostle the defender of the gospel. How entirely inappropriate would the expression of the apostle be, according to the other view. Κεῖμαι will mean as at Luke ii. 34 ; 1 Thess. iii. 3 ; 1 Tim. i. 9 : "I am appointed," "ordained ;" since, as Meyer well observes, the signification of *lying in chains*, which, κεῖμαι may admit of, comp. Passow's Lex. and De Wette, does not correspond to the actual situation of Paul.

Ver. 17. The other class, οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἐριθείας—the contentious (Fritzsche on Romans i. p. 143.) They preach Christ not with a pure design, οὐχ ἁγνῶς ; which, as before observed, is to be understood, not of the subject-matter of their preaching, but of the feelings by which they were actuated. What is true proceeds in their case from an insincere and false heart, as appears from the participle that follows, οἰόμενοι, which is exegetical of the οὐχ ἁγνῶς, "in that they think" (or imagine, ver. 18) to add affliction to his bonds. This *affliction* does not signify *inward trouble* (comp. ver. 18, ss.) ; but that they sought to make the apostle's outward condition worse, though it was bad enough already, (τοῖς δεσμοῖς μου.) De Wette is of opinion that they did this by representing him amongst the Jews as an enemy to the law. Meyer takes a similar view. But would the apostle have characterised this as *preaching Christ*? If these preachers, as we have already shown, are to be regarded as merely personal opponents, ambitious men, and therefore envious of the apostle, then must we abide by the opinion that by spreading the gospel they sought to inflame the hatred of his enemies, not precisely that of Nero, but probably that of the Jews, against Paul, and thereby to aggravate his trouble. It remains to be observed critically that the transposition of ver. 16 and 17, according to which the οἱ ἐξ ἐριθείας would be placed

first, is with reason rejected by most critics, since Griesbach, according to Codd. A.B.D.E.F.G. and others (comp. Tischendorf on this passage.) This reading also makes the connection with ver. 18 to be more regular. Instead of ἐγείρειν, D.***E.K., &c., have ἐπιφέρειν, whilst A.B.D.*F.G. decide for ἐγείρειν.

Ver. 18. These opponents, though they might succeed outwardly in their design (they do not, however, even thus succeed, ver. 27), are altogether unsuccessful in so far as the mind of the apostle is concerned, which is bent on the single object of desire, that Christ may be preached, no matter what private ends may mingle with the performance of this work. *Τί γάρ* asks the apostle (comp. Rom. iii. 3.) Render, not, *for how?* referring back to ver. 12, but *how now?* The negative answer is involved in the question, and does not need to be expressed. The affirmative answer is given in πλήν, equivalent to,—if only Christ is preached παντὶ τρόπῳ, and the πᾶς τρόπος is more exactly defined by εἴτε—εἴτε; be it in pretence or in truth. De Wette, although he makes out these opponents to be Judaizers, yet acknowledges, and Meyer also agrees with him in this, that there is here no reference to the doctrines which these persons taught, and tries to account for the mildness with which the apostle speaks of them by the fact, that they were not perverting a church that had been founded by him, and that the apostle, in the condition in which he then was, could not but see the importance of the gospel being spread, even in its Judaized form. That this was not the feeling of the apostle is plainly evident from iii. 2, ss. And the epistle to the Romans abundantly proves that the perversion of the church at Rome was not a matter of inferior concern to him. How double-tongued must the apostle also have appeared to the Philippians, when they compared his opinion of these same opponents in this passage, with that which he expresses at iii. 2, ss. One must see into what difficulties the view we are controverting lands us, especially as—(this De Wette also acknowledges)—it is not Christian teachers with an unprejudiced leaning towards Judaism (so Rilliet and Müller), but Judaists of the crassest kind, bitter enemies of the apostle, that are here to be supposed. If it be said, that adherents of Paul could not have wrought in opposition to him, this is true only to the extent, that they could not have done this *as* adherents of Paul. But this passage points only to the personal motives by which they were

actuated, viz. ambition, and, as proceeding from this, envy, together with a spirit of strife and contention. It will require to be proven that there could not be then, as well as now, men who seek their own honour in the preaching of the gospel (comp. ii. 21), and whose hearts are far from the truth which their lips utter.

The apostle proceeds to say, *I therein do rejoice, yea, and will rejoice.* He rejoices now that in every way Christ is preached; but he will also rejoice in this in time to come, despite the machinations of his enemies. (*Ἀλλά* connects with the following train of thought.) This profound feeling of joy which pervades the entire epistle is not only not disturbed by the doings of his enemies, but rather heightened, in so far as they preach Christ. It is the heart of the apostle into which we here look.

Ver. 19. The apostle has just said that his opponents shall not rob him of his joy for the future also, *yea, I will rejoice;* and he here farther confirms this sentiment, in such a way, however, as to leave undetermined what his future destiny shall be, and whether his opponents shall accomplish their purpose (to add affliction) or not. He only knows so much, that what is mentioned at ver. 18 shall conduce to his salvation, be it life or death that is appointed to him; his salvation, and therefore his joy, depends as little on the one as on the other. He himself knows not which of the two he shall choose. In so far as he is individually concerned, he desires to depart; for the sake of others, and, first, chiefly his readers, must he desire to live still longer. How assured then is the apostle of his *ἀλλὰ καὶ χαρήσομαι.* But he knows also, ver. 25 (where he drops the uncertainty purposely maintained in what goes before) that the *ἀναγκαιότερον* will appear, and that he shall continue to live for their advantage; upon this, however, his *χαρήσομαι* does not depend.

By the *this* in ver. 19 can only be meant what in ver. 18 is expressed by *in this;* viz. the preaching of Christ in every way, even *in pretence.* It were quite arbitrary to make it refer back to ver. 17. So also Meyer thinks, in opposition to De Wette and others —this preaching in pretence shall also turn to his salvation. On *ἀποβ.* comp. Luke xxi. 13, often used in the Septuagint. Ver. 20 tells us in what this salvation consists. This salvation is, however, to be obtained through the instrumentality of the prayers of the Philippians, and the supply of the Spirit of Jesus Christ.

Meyer is for taking the latter clause as dependent on the τῆς ὑμῶν, so that the *supply of the Spirit* is procured by the Philippians, and he refers in support of this to the omission of the article. But Winer, whom he quotes, lays it down, § 18, 5, p. 148, that here in the second principal word the repetition of the article is not necessary, as the two nouns are also separated from each other by their accompanying genitives. Intercession on his behalf, is the one means, the supply of the Spirit of Christ the other, through which the apostle is to obtain that salvation. We cannot but observe how highly the apostle here estimates the power of intercessory prayer, when he himself makes his own salvation to be dependent upon it. As regards ἐπιχορηγία τοῦ πνεύματος, we may with reason abide by the interpretation which Gal. iii. 5 suggests, according to which τοῦ πνεύματος is the object of ἐπιχορηγία. (On the term ἐπιχορηγία, taken from the *choragi*, whence it comes to mean a *great expense*, see Winer on Gal. iii. 5 ; Harless on Ephes. iv. 16.) To say that the expression, in the view we have taken of it, implies the absence of the Spirit, and could therefore not be used with reference to the apostle, were just as unreasonable as to argue in the same way from the expression in Acts vii. 55, πλήρης τοῦ πνεύματος. Those commentators who consider the prayers, and the supply of the Spirit as cause and effect, are right in so far as that the prayers of the Philippians could have, in the general, no other import than this. But the ἐπιχορηγία appears here as an independent member, and therefore not as the effect of the prayers.

Ver. 20. This expectation which the apostle here expresses, harmonises with an accompanying hope whereby it is confirmed. *According to my earnest expectation and my hope*, &c.—ἀποκαραδοκία occurs, besides, at Rom. viii. 19 ; is derived from ἀπό and καραδοκεω, capite erecto specto, and means, earnest expectation. According to my anxious expectation and hope." The expectation is founded on the hope. Both tend to this, that in nothing (comp. ver. 28, ἐν μηδενί) he will be ashamed, but that as always, so also now, Christ shall be magnified in his body. According to this firm hope, he knows that which he expresses at ver. 19.—Αἰσχύνεσθαι means here as generally, to be ashamed, *i.e.* " to fail in reaching that on which one places the glory, honour, and end of his life" (De Wette.) And this end is to him Christ ; hence its opposite is, *Christ shall be magnified*. This meaning of αἰσχύ-

νεσθαι appears from the common use of the term ; in the Septuagint equivalent to בּוֹשׁ, Ps. xxxiv. 4, iv. 29, and other passages ; in the New Testament Rom. ix, 33, 2 Cor. x. 8 ; also from the connection with what precedes, and the contrast with what follows (*μεγαλυνθήσεται*), so that all interpretations are to be rejected which rest on the translation, "I shall not have to be ashamed either of my own conduct, or that of others, or the circumstances," &c.—*But Christ shall be magnified in my body.* If his opponents could accomplish this,—that Christ should not be magnified in him, then would the apostle's joy and salvation be frustrated ; but this they cannot effect ; since life and death (which is the worst that can happen to the apostle) are only different ways of bringing about this magnifying of Christ in him (*εἴτε διὰ ζωῆς εἴτε διὰ θανάτου.*) From this last phrase the meaning of *ἐν τῷ σώματι* is self evident. It is the life or death of the body that is here spoken of. (On *μεγαλυνθήσεται*, comp. Luke i. 46, Acts x. 46, and other passages, with Phil. i. 11. Rilliet's view of this word, as expressive of the *increase of Christ in* the apostle, according to Gal. ii. 20, is rendered impossible by the *ἐν σώματι.*) The phrase *ἐν πάσῃ, παῤῥησίᾳ* now only remains to be considered. It belongs evidently to the antithesis with *οὐκ αἰσχυνθήσομαι* (Meyer and others), and the meaning would be quite clear if the sentence was taken in an active form, thus, "I shall magnify Christ *ἐν πάσῃ παῤῥησίᾳ ;*" this makes the meaning in the passive form quite plain ; only, I conceive that those commentators have erred who adhere to the signification *candour*, which does not suit the *διὰ θανάτου.* Rather, it is *joyfulness*, as for example Eph. iii. 12, Heb. iii. 6, and other passages. Comp. Harless on the passage first adduced. In the *πάσῃ*, Meyer with reason finds an antithetical reference to the preceding *ἐν οὐδενί.* Against Hölemann's view, according to which *παῤῥησία* describes the *candid preaching* of the teachers mentioned at ver. 15 seqq., comp. Meyer.

Ver. 21 enters on the confirmation of the latter clause of the preceding verse, *whether by life or by death.* For the magnifying of Christ, and as connected therewith for his own salvation, it is all one whether life or death shall befall the apostle ; *since for me*, he says, *to live is Christ and to die is gain.* Be it that the apostle has yet longer to live, then for him (*ἐμοί* with emphasis) to live is Christ, *i.e.* his life is entirely consecrated to the service of Christ, to the preaching

of Christ, as Bengel observes: quicquid vivo, Christum vivo; comp. Gal. ii. 20. Be it that he must die, then to die is to him also Christ, nay more, by comparison with the other it is *gain* (comp. ver. 23), for, his longing wish is to *be with Christ*. Only the expression κέρδος here calls for explanation. From its close relation to μεγαλυνθήσεται we expect an explanation of *how* Christ is to be magnified by the apostle's death; but κέρδος strictly gives no such explanation. Meyer indeed explains it thus: "in the assurance of that gain the apostle will suffer death with joyful courage, and his death will conduce to the magnifying of Christ." But this interpretation only makes more manifest what we miss in the word κέρδος, Corn. Müller has felt the difficulty, and therefore supposed that the apostle intended to say: et si mihi moriendum est, morior Christo; ita etiam morte mea Christus celebratur, at the same time, that he did not use in this expression a figure of speech, but allowed himself to be overcome, by the thought of the *gain* that would thereby accrue to him. The words which follow, (ver. 22) besides, do not well agree with the interpretation that has hitherto prevailed. It is not at all clear, why the apostle compares the two events in respect of their desirableness. It appears to me, that expositors up till this time have had too little regard to the emphasis implied, in the placing of the ἐμοι at the beginning of the clause. This arrangement is not explained by the connexion with ver. 20, but only by that with ver. 19. The hostile preaching of his opponents can in so far as the apostle is personally concerned (μοί), only turn to his salvation, according to the firmly cherished hope (ver. 20), that Christ will be magnified in him whether by life or by death; *since to him personally it is all one* whether he should live or die, whether Christ should be magnified by his life or by his death. That is, in so far as he is personally concerned, a matter of perfect indifference to him. For him to live is Christ, and for him, as an individual, to die is still more preferable, and only a regard to the *fruit of his labour* keeps him from preferring death. How could it then be otherwise, than that even what his opponents undertook in opposition to him should issue in his salvation, if Christ is even thereby magnified in him, and if he, in so far as he is individually concerned, is quite as willing that Christ should be magnified by his death as by his life, nay, considers death the more preferable. (Comp. Acts

xx. 24,) Thus is the position of ἐμοί explained, the meaning of κέρδος is clear, and the connection with what follows intelligible, whilst otherwise it appears quite uncalled for, that the apostle should deliberate with himself, what he should choose, seeing that this has no connection with the μεγαλυνθήσεται.

Ver. 22. The apostle has just signified that relatively to himself, death is the more desirable. Opposed to this, however, is another consideration arising from his calling, which he proceeds to state. *But if to live in the flesh, this is the fruit of the labour, then I know not what I shall choose.* Up to this point it is all one to the apostle whether he shall magnify Christ by his life or by his death, only the fruit which his apostolical labour produces, keeps him from choosing death. What a Christian readiness for death is here, and along with this, what an apostolic love and devotedness! To come to particulars, it is to be borne in mind that the more strict limitation of the word ζῆν, used already before, by ἐν σαρκί, is occasioned by κέρδος, as Meyer and De Wette are also of opinion. Death is gain only in consequence of a higher life to which it conducts. The apostle joins the ζῆν ἐν σαρκί emphatically with τοῦτο, so as to form one idea, and thus aims at giving prominence to this *subject*, equivalent to: if to live in the flesh, if *this* is a condition of the fruit. But he immediately adds καρπός ἔργου corresponding to, but not signifying the same as κέρδος. (Comp. ver. 23, 24.) By ἔργον is naturally to be understood, his apostolical labour. (On καρπός comp. Rom. i. 13, ἔργου as at ver. 11, δικαιοσυνης gen. subj.)

With regard to the words that follow, καὶ τί, &c., there is room for a difference of opinion as to whether they are to be taken as a subsequent member of the sentence, or whether we are to suppose an *aposiopesis*. Beza's explanation, which makes εἰ to mean "whether," and καὶ τί to be dependent on οὐ γνωρίζω, apart from the harshness of the construction, does not agree with the sentiment expressed at ver. 24. The true way, I conceive, is, with the most recent commentators, to take καὶ τί, &c., as a subsequent member of the sentence. Of this καί in the *apodosis* we had a parallel instance in 2 Cor. ii. 2. (The rest of the examples adduced here by Van Hengel appear to me to be not appropriate.) But it is proper to observe, that in both examples the subsequent member is not expressed in the form originally intended. For as

in the passage 2 Cor. ii. 2 the subsequent member in its simple form would be, "then there is none to make me glad," instead of which the question is asked, "who then is there," &c, so here also, those who suppose that there is an *aposiopesis*,—for example, non œgre fero (Müller),—are right, in so far as that the apostle did not at first intend to make the subsequent member of the form *καὶ τί*; but, instead of saying something like non œgro fero, and then expressing the result by: *τί αἱρήσομαι οὐ γνωρίζω*, he immediately forms the subsequent member with these words, and *καί* serves then the purpose, as De Wette also remarks, of quickly introducing the question. (On *τί*, instead of *πότερον*, see Winer, § 25, 1 Anm. p. 194. On the future, *αἱρήσομαι* for the conjunctive, § 42, 4, b. p. 346.)

Ver. 23. The apostle has just said, that he does not decide what he shall choose. It is not the reason of this that he here gives (for *δέ* is the true reading, not *γάρ*, as is abundantly proved), but he lets his readers get a glance into his heart, in which the personal desire to be with Christ comes into conflict with his regard to them, and therefore brings up again the *οὐ γνωρίζω* of the preceding verse. It is the positive side of the *οὐ γνωρίζω* with which the representation of his inward experience is to make us acquainted. —*Συνέχομαι δε*, the emphasis lies on this expression; *δέ*, however, is not simply transitive, as Meyer maintains, but means "rather." For *συνέχομαι*, the signification "to be held in straits," much more, *angor*, will not suffice; comp. ver. 21, and the words that follow. It means "I am held," teneor (Van Hengel), or still better, according to De Wette, "rather am I held fast of both" (comp. Luke xii. 50; 2 Cor. v. 14.) The *τῶν δύο* refers to what goes before. He is held fast of death, inasmuch as his (*τήν*) desire is towards departing, and (epexegetically) being with Christ. (*Ἀναλῦσαι*, comp. *ἀνάλυσις*, 2 Tim. iv. 6, properly signifies *to loose cable*, *i.e.* to depart, Luke xii. 36.) The phrase, *to be with Christ* (comp. 2 Cor. v. 8; Heb. xii. 23; Acts vii. 59), implies that, immediately upon death, a new and more complete life-fellowship with Christ begins in the soul of man, a *being at home with the Lord*, as it is called in the first of the passages above adduced. A comforting thought this amid the bitterness of death. It is evident from the whole scope of the passage that the apostle speaks there only of death, and not of the coming of Christ. Comp. Meyer, p. 36, who strik-

ingly observes, that the New Testament view of the coming of Christ finds no development here, but rather falls into the background; against which see i. 7; iii. 20, seq. *Πολλῷ γὰρ μᾶλλον κρεῖσσον*; these words explain this desire of the apostle. (On *μᾶλλον* with the compar., Winer § 36, 3, Obs. 1, p. 281.)

Ver. 24. This verse is closely connected in meaning with the last sentence, ver. 23; it would be more strictly logical to make it refer to *συνέχομαι*. The consideration of what is profitable for others stands opposed to the apostle's longing desire in so far as he is personally concerned; the *ἀναγκαιότερον δι' ὑμᾶς* to the *κρεῖσσον*. These expressions mutually explain each other; both have a relative signification. (*Ἀναγκαιοτερον*, which Van Hengel renders "too necessary," may perhaps be the less accurate expression; *ἐπιμένειν* corresponds to the *ἀναλῦσαι*.)

Vers. 25, 26. Whatever uncertainty the apostle might feel as to what he should choose, he expresses himself with the utmost confidence as to what is to befall him. There is certainly nothing said, in what goes before, of the apostle's state of mind being one of wavering and indecision, such as Dr Bauer discovers here, and characterizes as improper. Rather does the apostle seek by the distinction here made to prove, that for himself he is equally prepared for life and for death. On the contrary, then, the utmost resoluteness of mind is expressed, as he is equally prepared for both events. What the apostle has characterized as more needful, namely, his abiding, will take place; *μενῶ καὶ* (as consequence), *συμπαραμενῶ* (corresponding to the *δι' ὑμᾶς*; it does not include the sense of "seeing again"); and just on the fact of its being *more needful*, is his assurance founded; *τοῦτο πεποιθὼς οἶδα*. The *τοῦτο* here is to be understood as relating to what goes before (so also Meyer and De Wette explain it), and not to be taken in connection with *πεποιθὼς*, as pre-indicative of the subject matter of *οἶδα*. The fruit of his remaining together with them alive, is to be the advancement and joy of their faith; which may be regarded as an explication of the *δι' ὑμᾶς* (ver. 24). The genitive *πίστεως* depends on *προκοπήν* as well as on *χαράν*; it is the subjective genitive; the faith itself is to advance and to rejoice. This however is not to be merely in consequence of the happy issue of his imprisonment, for this would not correspond to the phrase, *it is more needful for you*, immediately preceding; but in so far as

life, and *abiding with them*, is, to the apostle, equivalent to—*Christ*.—(On προκοπη comp. 1 Tim. iv 15, according to which προκ. ὑμῶν may certainly be taken also separately, as Van Hengel does.)

Ver. 26. As at vv. 9 and 10 first εἰς, then ἵνα denotes the end aimed at, so also here.—The end here is, that their glorying in Christ may be increased for him, by his return again to them. Meyer has rightly apprehended the sense and scope of the passage, only I would not regard καύχημα here, any more than at 1 Cor. v. 6, as meaning materies gloriandi, but *glorying*. This glorying will increase in consequence of the progress and joy of faith already mentioned, from which it is self-evident that ἐν Χριστῷ determines *the mode* of the increase. (Meyer.) For what is all increase of faith, else than inward fellowship with him? *In me*, denotes the the *object*, in whom their glorying is to increase (ἐν ἐμοί is therefore not to be connected with καύχημα alone.) Διά points to the *means* of this increase, viz., the return of the apostle to them, in so far as their faith was to be thereby advanced, and carried forward to full joyfulness.

With reference to the apostle's hope of being emancipated from prison, and returning again to the church, compare Philem. xxii., and mark the climax from ἐλπίζω to οἶδα. Meyer, with reason, assigns its full force to οἶδα, in opposition to those who would here admit only a probabiliter sperare; but when he goes on to say, that along with this it must be acknowledged that the event did not correspond to this assurance, and yet is not led to found upon this the supposition of a second imprisonment, we cannot but think, in opposition to him, that this passage taken by itself does confirm such a supposition.

§ 3. THE APOSTLE'S EARNEST WISH WITH RESPECT TO THE CHURCH.

(Chap. i. 27—ii. 18.)

Joyful is the apostle's Christianity, in spite of all oppression and enmity; joyful also is theirs to be, and the apostle's present condition will issue in making it so. But this joyfulness, to which they are to attain, has a condition annexed to it on the side of the

Philippians. This condition, a condition of a twofold nature, they must fulfil if they are to arrive at such joy. This is set forth in the apostle's earnest request contained in the present section. For, the exhortation contained in this section, is to be viewed as an earnest personal request on the part of the apostle. Comp. i. 27; ii. 1, seq; ii. 16—18. His own joy, his own credit depends on it. This will account for the reference to himself, and the motives of a personal nature, which we find in these admonitions, comp. i. 30; ii. 1, 2. We must not omit to notice here, the ardent love of the apostle towards the church, with which he, the stronger, would lift up the weaker to his own level, and would fain make them partners with him in his confirmation, and the joy resulting therefrom.

Vers. 27—30 contain the condition of true joyfulness of faith (of which the apostle himself is the pattern, i. 19, seq., and to which they also are to attain, i. 26, 27), in its one aspect. It is stated first of all, in general, as, *having a conversation becoming the Gospel of Christ*; since from Christ all joy proceeds. And such a *conversation*, is to display itself in their *standing fast in one spirit*, which is necessary on the one side against their *adversaries*, ver. 30, and on the other, in their relation to one another, if they are to *strive together for the faith*. They, too, have to do with adversaries, as well as the apostle; in their right deportment towards these they have an evident *token of salvation*, like the apostle who knows, ver. 19, *that this shall turn to his salvation*. It is, as is expressly said, ver. 30, the same *conflict*, and the apostle's trial and confirmation in this *conflict*, furnish a true pattern for them, as delineated in the preceding verses.

Ver. 27. The word *μόνον* (Gal. ii. 10, v. 13) introduces that, upon which all depends, as the sole, but also the indispensable condition of *the coming to them again* for the joy of their faith, mentioned at vv. 25 and 26. This one condition, however, comprises within itself a fulness of obligations. It is *ἀξίως τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τοῦ Χριστοῦ πολιτεύεσθαι*. (Expressions similar to this are found at Col. i. 10; *ἀξίως τοῦ κυρίου*, Eph. iv. 1, *ἀξίως τῆς κλήσεως περιπατεῖν*.) In *πολιτεύεσθαι* he represents them as citizens of the kingdom of God upon earth, who take from Christ their fundamental law in the gospel (comp. Acts xxiii. 1, and Meyer's Note); and he is led to this representation, by having in his mind (as Meyer ob-

serves), that church-life (*gemende leben*) which is conformable to the gospel. They are to conduct themselves in a manner worthy of this their fundamental law, (*νόμος*, not certainly to be understood in the Old Testament sense), in order that the apostle, whether he come or be absent, may hear this of them—viz., that they stand in one spirit, striving unanimously for the faith of the gospel, &c. *Εἴτε ἐλθών* supposes the case mentioned at ver. 26 in the words, *by my coming*. This therefore stands first. But the apostle desires to hear this of them in the other case also. The apostle is not speaking here of his deliverance or non-deliverance from his imprisonment, for his deliverance is already presupposed. The term *ἀκούσω* has given rise to needless difficulties; it serves for each of the two supposed cases. (Comp. Meyer.) The view which I take of the meaning of the words that follow, has already been expressed in the paraphrase given above. I agree with Meyer here throughout, with this exception, that the *συν* in *συναθλοῦντες* refers to the apostle. In iv. 3 *μοί* is expressly added. But here, where the apostle is viewing the Philippians as "*a society of Christians*,"—where the expressions, *in one spirit, with one mind*, emphatically enjoin unity and concord *amongst them*,—and where *they*, is the *subject* of the sentence (*στήκετε*, &c.), the reference of *συν* to the apostle seems to me quite inadmissible. With reference to the words *στήκετε* (stand fast), *συναθλοῦντες*—*πτυρόμενοι*; the figures which they respectively involve, will be apparent to every one. De Wette and Meyer have with reason understood the *ἐν ἑνὶ πνευματι*, not of the *Holy Ghost*, but as a church may have *μιὰ ψυχή*, so also may it have *ἓν πνεύμα*, a common spirit. In support of this more general signification of *πνεῦμα*, Storr has with reason referred to 1 Cor. iv. 21; 1 Peter iii. 4; and those passages which Van Hengel (who, with Matthies and Rheinwald, take the expression to mean the *Holy Spirit*) quotes against this interpretation, are of a very questionable kind. So at 1 Cor. xii. 13, the expression *εἰς ἓν πνεῦμα* could scarcely be explained otherwise than here. "At the same time it is self-evident to the Christian consciousness that this unity of the human spirit is the effect of the Holy Spirit's working." (Meyer.) On *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή*, see Olshausen on Acts iv. 32, and farther on in this epistle, ii. 2. This unity of spirit in belief and in feeling, and the harmony of soul that springs from it, is

brought prominently forward by the apostle as a fruit of the ἀξίως πολιτεύεσθαι, since, for the Philippians every thing depended upon this, in the conflict with their adversaries. For then only can the battle be successfully fought, when unity prevails among those who are on the same side. Then the one strengthens the other, and the one shields the other, the weak are borne up by the strong, and the strong gain in courage and in confidence by the concord that binds all together. Even the caricature of true unity of mind and soul, a self-formed *esprit du corps*, what a power it has! What ought our church to be, what might it be, were it but to attest this uniting power of the divine spirit! But how far is it still from that condition, to which the apostle ascribes the capability of carrying on a successful struggle.

Ver. 28. *And in nothing terrified by your adversaries.* They are to stand fast without letting themselves be terrified in any one thing by their adversaries. The term πτύρεσθαι is generally used of *horses* who *take fright*. The word is suitable to the metaphor of an open contest. With regard to these *adversaries*, De Wette and Meyer are agreed that they were not Judaists, or malicious false teachers in general, but rather such as were not Christians, enemies of the gospel in general, which is already indicated in the expression *striving together in the faith of the gospel*, but still more clearly at vers. 29 and 30; comp. infra. That there was no lack of such adversaries in Philippi, may be inferred from what befel the apostle himself when there, Acts xvi. 11, seq., and in the neighbourhood, xvii. 5, ss. Comp. also 2 Cor. ii. 14—17. Whether or not they were Jews (ἀπειθοῦντες Ἰουδαῖοι) must be left undecided. The probability is, however, that they were. In what follows we take the reading, with Tischendorf, according to Codd. A.B.C.D*F.G. to be ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς . . . . ὑμῖν δὲ. (In favour of the latter clause are Codd. D.***E.F.I.K., &c., and several versions.) The sense is, "stand fast and let nothing terrify you, as this is (a ground of encouragement)—to them, an evident token of perdition, but to you of salvation, and that of God; for to you the grace is given on the account of Christ, not only to believe on him, but also to suffer for him," &c. Ἥτις (a familiar instance of attraction) refers to the preceding *subject* μὴ πτύρομενοι, as is proved by the connexion with ver. 29, πάσχειν, and is to be explained by "which stedfastness amid all the sufferings that shall

overtake them." This is to them, viz. the adversaries, an ἔνδειξις ἀπωλείας (on ἔνδειξις comp. Rom. iii. 25 ; 2 Cor. viii. 24) ὑμῖν δὲ σωτηρίας. The sense in which the apostle ordinarily uses the terms ἀπώλεια and σωτηρία, determines how they are to be understood here ; comp. 1 Cor. i. 18 and other passages. It is not the issue of the conflict on this side of time that is meant, but the final issue. *And that of God.* "These words strengthen the encouragement which was intended by ἥτις, &c., so that τοῦτο is not to be arbitrarily limited to the second half of ἥτις," &c. (Meyer.) So Van Hengel and De Wette. Those engaged in this conflict, says the apostle, have (although the presentiment may not always be felt on both sides) a token foreshowing the ultimate issue, and that, a token given by God himself, and therefore infallible, namely, the stedfastness of the Christian, by which all the terrors of a hostile world, and even those of death itself, shall be put to shame. Whether the world acknowledges the pre-indicative token or not, will not affect the sentiment here expressed. Similar expressions will be found in Rom. viii. 17, 2 Tim. ii. 2, and elsewhere.—The apostle in the next verse more exactly shows to what extent there is, in this unaffrighted stedfastness of the Christian, such a token of God *for him*, as well as for his adversaries.

Ver. 29. *For to you it is given*, &c. De Wette says, that this and the following verse contain *motives* to stedfastness, as if any exhortation went before. The apostle only expresses what he desires to hear concerning them. Meyer's interpretation also, as I conceive, suffers in clearness because he understands the ὅτι, &c., merely as confirmatory of the καὶ τοῦτο ἀπὸ θεοῦ, and not (as we do) as an explanation of the whole sentence, ἀπὸ θεοῦ not excluded. The construction of the passage will not justify the view which Meyer takes, for the subject would of necessity have to be brought forward, at least not ὑμῖν but ἐχαρίσθη would have to be placed first. Or is the position of ὑμῖν really to be accounted for by the sentiment which Meyer finds here, "as it is *you* to whom the favour is given, so it is certain that that token proceeds from God, who would not otherwise have bestowed upon you that double favour ?" On the other hand, all becomes clear and simple, when ὅτι is taken as illustrative of the whole sentence preceding. Ἐχαρίσθη then means, in reference to ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, "And even *the power given of grace to suffer for Christ*, (for that is the idea), as the positive

element implied in the *μὴ πτυρέσθαι*, is the evident token given of God as well of the *ἀπώλεια* as the *σωτηρία*." A sentiment this which needs no farther justification; the history of every martyr illustrates it. The construction of the sentence becomes quite apparent by the resumption of the *τὸ ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ*, at *τὸ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ*. The apostle is just about to say, *for to you is the grace given to suffer for Christ;* but he interposes the additional words, *not only to believe on him*, in order to make still more clear what that is, in which the *ἔνδειξις* consists. The surprise of many commentators, at suffering being represented as a gift of grace, has essentially nothing to do with this passage, since to suffer *for Christ* or for his sake is quite another thing; and for what else do we honour the Christian martyr but for this highest manifestation of grace in him, which has made him strong to suffer for Christ, and to yield up everything temporal, for the sake of that which is eternal?

Ver 30. *Having the same conflict which ye saw in me and now hear to be in me.* In these words the apostle directs them for their comfort and encouragement to his own example, as they had seen it and now hear of it. It is no strange thing then, that befalls them, but the same as has befallen him. With him may they comfort themselves, but from him also may they learn how to conduct themselves in this conflict. *Ἔχοντες*, "*in that you have the same conflict*," is not used in place of the dative, and to be connected with *ὑμῖν ἐχαρίσθη* (so Meyer); but to be connected with *πάσχειν*, as Matthies and Van Hengel explain it, referring to Eph. ii. 18, iv. 2. (Comp. Winer, § 64, II. 2, p. 620.) The *οἷον εἴδετε* (for this, not *ἴδετε*, is the true reading), *ἐν ἐμοί* refers to what befel the apostle at Philippi (Acts xvi. 22, ss.; 1 Thes. ii. 2.) *Καὶ νῦν ἀκούετε*. These words afford additional evidence in favour of the view we have taken regarding the opponents of the apostle, delineated at ver. 15, ss. For nothing is here said of a conflict with false teachers, on the part of the Philippians. This conflict denotes persecution directed against the person, with its attendant sufferings. Hence Meyer, who does not agree with us in our view of the opponents, ver. 15, finds himself under the necessity of making *τὸν αὐτὸν ἀγῶνα* refer to ver. 7, thus overlooking all that the apostle has immediately before communicated regarding himself *τὰ κατ' ἐμέ*, and by ver. 26 and 27 has placed in a connexion so close with that what he says to the Philippians with

respect to them. (*Ἐν ἐμοί* is "in me" as subject. Comp. Acts iv. 2.)

Chap. ii. 1—18. Hitherto, the apostle has expressed what he wishes to hear of the Philippians, with regard to their conduct towards their adversaries. *Formally* there is no exhortation given to them, but *in substance*, a most urgent one. He now proceeds, in the second part of this section to show them how, on the other hand, their conduct one towards another must be characterized, if they are to be qualified for such a bold striving for the faith in one spirit, and are to attain to the full joy of faith. First and foremost, they must be of one mind amongst themselves. To such a unanimity, however, only humble, self-denying love can lead, of which they had before them a high example in the incarnate, but just on account of such self-denying love, the exalted Christ. So ought they to work out their salvation, not in pride and a spirit of self-conceit, but with fear and trembling, remembering that it is not they, but God who works to will and to do, and to do all so as to fulfil their high calling as lights of the world, for a rejoicing to the apostle in the day of the Lord. Nay, though his priestly labour amongst them should cost him his life, still he rejoices, and they are to rejoice with him. Thus the end returns to the beginning. *How* they were to attain to such joy (ver. 25, 26) was the point from which the exhortation set out, and the conclusion is, that both they and the apostle attain to this joy even in the case of his death.

Ver. 1. The apostle specifies the *standing* in *one spirit* as the condition of a successful contest. But this was the very thing in which the church at Philippi was still defective. Therefore the apostle now conjures them to fulfil this condition in their conduct one towards another. He however closely connects this exhortation with ver. 30. (So Meyer, De Wette, on ver. 27.) Of the motives, ver. 1, by which the apostle conjures his readers to give heed to his admonition, and their arrangement, different views are taken. First of all, it is certain that the first and third members have this in common, that, as Meyer expresses it, they indicate the objective principle of the Christian life (*ἐν Χριστῷ—πνεύματος*), whilst the second and fourth mark, the corresponding *subjective* principle (*ἀγάπης—σπλάγχνα, οἰκτιρμοι.*) Thus the verse divides itself into two parts, each having two members. But these two parts are contra-distinguished from each other again by this,

that the first denotes what proceeds from the apostle, the second that which is to exist on the part of the readers, to whom the admonition is addressed, as the motive to obedience. For I can on no account consent to the interpretation of Meyer, who, because of ver. 2, would consider all the four terms, as denoting what is to exist on the part of the Philippians. Does it appear from what goes before, and what follows, that it is the apostle who needs encouragement from them, and not rather they, who need admonition from him? One might be inclined to refer *παραμύθιον ἀγάπης* to the Philippians. But there is also no reason for this, as the apostle, whose fundamental tone of mind is joy (vers. 18, 19), has not represented himself as standing in need of consolation from them, but seeks rather to elevate them to his joy. Therefore he says, ver. 2, *fulfil ye my joy*. And, with reference to the expression in the fourth member, *if any bowels and mercies*, De Wette has already well remarked that the apostle does not here lay claim to their compassion on account of his present condition, except in so far as "he would be unhappy through their want of unanimity." Thus then must we abide by the opinion, that the *παράκλησις*, as also the *παραμύθιον*, proceed from the apostle, whilst the two following members, denote that which is to exist among the Philippians. *Παράμυθιον*, however, does not signify, as is generally understood, "comfort," but "persuasion," *winning persuasion of love*. The kind persuasion of love, is placed over against the earnest admonition in Christ. (It is evident that in both clauses, as also in the succeeding clauses of the verse, *ἐστί* is to be supplied. This expression, *if there is*, is besides to be understood in a general sense, not, with Meyer, to be explained, "if there is amongst you." Why should the apostle not have expressed this, if such was his meaning? Rather, "the Philippians are on their part to attest the existence of all this to which the apostle so earnestly exhorts them." Doubtless the apostle has at the same time the Philippians in his mind, but he expresses the idea in a general form. On *ἐν Χριστῷ*, compare our remarks at i. 26. The exhortation is thereby characterized as one which, both in respect of its matter and form, is based upon Christ. Wahl correctly expresses it, quam dat conjunctio cum Christo. On *παράκλησις* comp. Rom. xii. 8; 1 Cor. xiv. 3; 1 Thess. ii. 3, and other passages. On *παραμύθιον* 1 Thess. ii. 11. A parallel passage to this is found at Rom. xv. 30.)

If any fellowship of the Spirit, if any bowels and mercies, namely, on the part of those admonished. By κοινωνία πνεύματος the apostle denotes, that which we found at i. 5—7 to be the characteristic excellence of the Church at Philippi. What a strong challenge then is addressed to them in these words! The meaning of the words, I understand to be, as Van Hengel expresses it, si per communem Spiritum sanctum quædam animorum conjunctio est; literally, if there is a fellowship of the spirit, "in virtue of which the prayers of the one find an echo in the hearts of the others." (De Wette.) Πνεῦμα I understand in the same sense as above, i. 27. To this *fellowship*, the apostle, so far as his relation to the Philippians was concerned, could well appeal. (Comp. i. 5, sqq.) I am induced to think, that the expression here does not signify "fellowship with the Spirit of God, or participation in Him," since all the remaining clauses, involve the idea of the relation of the Philippians one to another. And how remote would the connexion be, betwixt the existence of such *a fellowship with the Spirit of God*, and the exhortation that follows,—*fulfil ye my joy*. No,—this expression also, must contain a motive derived from the relation of those who are exhorted to him who exhorts. In other passages, as 2 Cor. xiii. 13, the expression, "fellowship of the Holy Spirit," *may* signify *participation in the Holy Spirit*, but here the context is against this meaning. Εἴ τινα σπλάγχνα, &c., "if there is heartfelt love and compassion," as proof of the κοινωνία already mentioned. (With σπλάγχνα comp. i. 8; οἰκτιρμοί as at Rom. xii. 1; 2 Cor. i. 3, and other passages. On the plural, see Winer, § 27, 3, p. 203. On the conditional sense of these words, see supra. The reading τις for τινα, though strongly confirmed, is yet, according to Winer and others, to be regarded as an error of the transcriber, § 35, 1, p. 273.)

Ver. 2. *Fulfil ye my joy that ye be like minded*, &c. He gives them to understand, that this alone is wanting to fill up the measure of his joy. (Comp. John iii. 29; 2 Cor. x. 6, and other passages.) And ought not the Philippians to give heed to his request? Can we imagine an exhortation and entreaty more urgent, than that which the apostle here addresses to them? (Comp. i. 4.) They are to fulfil his joy by being like-minded. Ἵνα is not, with Meyer, to be taken as signifying *the purpose or end*, nor with Van Hengel as referring to an omitted ταύτην, but in a weak-

ened sense, on which comp. Winer, xlv. 9, p. 391. The *τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν* (comp. iii. 15; iv. 2; Rom. xii. 16; xv. 5) is then more exactly defined by the participles that follow, as consisting in the *same love* which penetrates all, and unites all, and a *unanimous* (comp. supra *μιᾷ ψυχῇ*) striving after the one object common to all (unum habentes ad quod adspirent omnes per totam vitam—Van Hengel.) For *σύμψυχοι* is not, as Meyer also has perceived, to be taken as an independent clause, but to be connected with *φρονοῦντες*; as thus not only do the several clauses of the verse become more elegantly proportioned to one another, but, principally, *τὸ ἕν φρονοῦντες* affords a more suitable accessory explanation of the *τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν*; for *σύμψυχοι τὸ ἕν φρονεῖν* is a resolution of the *τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν* into its constituent parts.

Ver. 3 and 4 point out the special obstacles that lie in the way of this *τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν*, and show what reason the apostle had in the social condition of the church at Philippi, to press so earnestly the exhortation to unity. It is not divisions in the church that are here to be understood, but a striving on the part of individuals, hurtful to unity, to make themselves important. And the improper motives that lead to this are here specified. (Comp. supra, i. 5.) Their common source was *selfishness*, as this is always to be found along with a want of humility and self-denying love; and this selfishness was displayed in *strife* and *vain glory*.

Ver. 3. *Μηδὲν κατὰ ἐριθείαν ἢ κενοδοξίαν* (*scil.* *φρονοῦντες* or *ποιοῦντες*, Winer, § 66, 2, p. 658.) The apostle proceeds with his exhortation, and sets in opposition to the *positive* elements of the unanimity which he is inculcating, those *negative* characteristics which the circumstances of the church suggested. "*Willing nothing from party spirit and vain ambition,*" so the apostle exhorts. On *κατά*, Winer, § 53, p. 478. With *ἐριθεία*, comp. supra 1, 17.—*Κενοδοξία* is found only here. Comp. for what remains, Gal. v. 26. The exact sense of these words is rendered perfectly clear by the following *ἀλλά*, *q. d.*, "but by virtue of humility, each esteeming others better than himself." On the dative, *τῇ ταπ.* Winer, § 31, 3, p. 245. The article is used, because, according to Meyer, the word denotes a species—"through the virtue of humility." We learn from what is here said, that there were those in the church, who, from a want of humility, pushed

themselves forward and sought to make themselves important. Instead of turning their eyes, as humility would teach, upon *their own failings* and the *excellencies of others*, instead of seeing their own faults as a beam in the eye, those of others as a mote, whereby alone it were possible candidly to place others above themselves, they sought to get the acknowledgment of their own excellencies, which could not but end in uncharitableness towards others. The apostle is therefore speaking here, not of divisions in doctrine, but rather (as is also indicated at i. 9) of a false activity and forwardness, of which zeal for the good cause was made to serve as the excuse. So also De Wette, p. 194, says, "it was emulation and pride in the service of virtue,"—and Meyer, p. 47.

Ver. 4. The second negative characteristic relates to this want of love, which is coupled with pride, often with the pride of a pretended Christianity. *Μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστοι σκοποῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἑτέρων ἕκαστοι*—(for this we hold with Tischendorf to be the true reading, not *ἕκαστος* in both clauses, nor *σκοπεῖτε*)—"not every one looking to his own, but every one also to the things of others." *Σκοπεῖν* like *ζητεῖν*, ii. 21; 1 Cor. x. 24, 33, xiii. 5. From the signification which *σκοπεῖν* bears at iii. 17, and other passages, as well as from the connexion with what precedes, commentators have been induced to explain *τὰ ἑαυτῶν* and *τὰ ἑτέρων*, "*his own excellencies* and *those of others*," a view which Meyer and De Wette have rightly rejected. In that case the *καὶ* would have been quite superfluous. Rather, the apostle as he enjoins humility before, now enjoins on his readers the true self-denying love of their neighbour. A regardless pursuit of one's own interests is already separation in principle. True unity and concord can flourish only there, where every one looks not merely to himself and his own, but also to the things of others; in other words, only where love reigns, that love which is described in 1 Cor. xiii. 4—7. The words *καὶ τὰ ἑτέρων* by which the apostle softens the severity of his injunction in its expression (comp. Winer. § 59, 8, Obs., p. 583) are worthy of notice, when taken into comparison with 1 Cor. x. 23, and those similar passages where no such *καὶ* is used. One sees from this, that the apostle only aims at divesting their otherwise laudable exertions to distinguish themselves, of what is selfish in them. (Comp. also on iv. 2.)

Ver. 6—11. CHRIST AS THE EXAMPLE OF SELF-DENYING LOVE.[1] The apostle has particularized humility and self-denying love as the conditions of true unity. He is now briefly to illustrate what he has said on these by an example, the example of Jesus Christ. In him they are to learn of what mind they must be, in order to attain to the *τὸ ἀυτὸ φρονεῖν*, for He is the highest example of *self-denial*, without which there is no humility and no love. It is not. however one of these only, but both, that are set before them in the example of Christ, in their union and all pervading influence. From his example, too, they are at the same time to learn how this state of mind alone (the opposite of their *strife* and *vain glory*) confers worth in the eye of God,—how the way to exaltation and glory is that of self-humiliation in lowly sacrificing love. Comp. Matth. xviii., 1 sqq.

Ver. 5. *Τοῦτο γὰρ φρονείσθω ἐν ὑμῖν ὁ καὶ ἐν X. Ἰ.—Γάρ* is not found in the manuscripts of best authority, A.B.C. in 17. 37, in several versions, nor in the Fathers, and has therefore been cancelled by Lachmann and Tischendorf. Notwithstanding, Meyer may be right in retaining it. (See his crit. obs.) It will then have an explicative force. There is also some doubt as to the reading *φρονείσθω*, for which most manuscripts have *φρονεῖτε* (A.B.C.*D.E.F.G. and others.) The internal evidence is in favour of *φρονείσθω*, as *ὃ καὶ ἐν X. Ἰ.* is not suitable to *φρονεῖτε*.—*Ἐν ὑμῖν* can, on account of the following *ἐν X. Ἰ.* signify only "in you," not "among you." *Καὶ*, before *ἐν X. Ἰ.*, is not, as Van Hengel explains, "cum maxime," but indicates the *identity* of disposition that is to be between the Philippians and Christ. At *ἐν X. Ἰ.*, *ἐφρονήθε* is to be supplied. We must here look more particularly at the *subject* of the verses that follow (6—8), and the *object* of ver. 9, seqq. *Ἐν X. Ἰ.*, says the apostle, *ὅς*, &c. It cannot be denied in opposition to De Wette that "the historical

1 On the extensive literature connected with this passage, comp. Keil (opusc ac ed. Goldhorn. Lips., 1821) Hölemann a. a. O, p. 124. Of most recent date the following are adduced by Meyer, viz. Kraussold in der Annalen der ges. Theologie. 1835, II., p. 273, seqq. Stein in den Stud. u. Krit. 1837, p. 165, seqq. Philippi der thätige Gehorsam Christi. Berl., 1841. As belonging to an earlier period may be named, H. Morus opp. theol., p. 67, seqq. Kesler observ. in ep. P. ad. Phil. u. Thesauro novo, ex. Mus. Hasaei et Ikenii tom. II., p. 947, seq. Schultens, sylloge. diss. Philol. Exeg. tom. I., p. 443, seq. Martini in Gabler's Journal für Anserl, theol. Lit. IV., p. 34, seqq. Von Ammon. Magazin. für Christliche prediger II. 1, p. 7, seqq. Tittmann op. theol., p. 642, seq: principally however the commentation by Keil first adduced.)

Christ" is the *subject*, and it is also true, that vv. 8—11 plainly speak of the Christ who was on the earth, and was exalted to heaven. But we should proceed too hastily were we to build upon this the assumption, that these verses *can only* represent an action of the "historical Christ," or more exactly of the λόγος ἔνσαρκος, and must be interpreted in accordance with this assumption. Here it will suffice to refer to such passages as Col. i. 13, where neither υἱὸς τῆς ἀγάπης αὐτοῦ, according to the true interpretation of υἱὸς, nor λόγος ἄσαρκος is the *subject*, and yet it is said, ver. 15, ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως; ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα; and then again, ver. 18, καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν ἡ κεφαλὴ τοῦ σώματος. Similarly, Heb. i. 1, sqq., 2 Cor. viii. 9. We see there that things are said concerning the "historical Christ" without any change of the *subject* which relate partly to his pre-human, partly to his human state, and that which was consequent upon it. So that the specifying of the *subject*, does not determine beforehand the sense of what follows, but leaves us at liberty in this respect, and needs not lead us astray, although, in what follows, we should find something belonging not merely to the human but also to the pre-human state of the person here designated by the words Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς. Comp. also Meyer, p. 46. "The name Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς is all the more proper, as the person designated was to be represented not merely with reference to his pre-human glory, but at the same time also with reference to his human abasement and consequent exaltation." But these observations are not intended to anticipate the interpretation of the passage which alone must decide the matter.

Ver. 6. "Ος ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων, &c. On the *signification* of the word μορφή we find the more recent commentators pretty much at one; on the application of its meaning, however, there is great diversity of opinion. How could there be any reasonable doubt as to the signification of the word? Its derivation (from μάρπτω), its identity with the Latin forma (by transposition of the letters, Passow's Lex.), its use in profane literature (comp. on this, Van Hengel, p. 141 s.), as in all the passages of the New Testament in which μορφή itself or any word derived from it occurs, show, that μορφή is equivalent to neither οὐσία or φύσις, nor to status or conditio, but to *form, figure, outline;* in general, it denotes the external appearance and representation, consequently, just the very opposite

of *οὐσια*, in so far as this denotes what lies beneath the form, and comes to be represented in it. The signification *οὐσία* is besides rejected by the context; as, at ver. 7 with reference to the *μορφή θεοῦ* it is said *ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν*, which certainly cannot be the case in respect of his divine nature. We can have little difficulty, at the same time, in determining the more exact sense of *μορφή θεοῦ*. At Col. i. 15, Christ (as the son of God's love) is called the *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου*; at 2 Cor. iv. 4, *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ*; at Heb. i. 3, the *υἱὸς ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ*. What in our passage is denoted by *μορφή τοῦ θεοῦ*, is there denoted by *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ*, only that the latter expression places the person spoken of, in a more strictly defined relation to *ὁ θεός* as his image; whilst that in our passage is not intended primarily to indicate anything regarding his relation to *ὁ θεός*, but to describe the glory of that state of existence out of which he passed to enter into that of the *μορφὴ δούλου*. One has only to keep in view the contrast in the words *μορφὴν δούλου λαβών* in order to understand why the apostle does not here designate Christ *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ*; for, could he say, *ὃς εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ ὤν . . . . ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν εἰκόνα δούλου λαβών*? Would not the latter idea, already unsuitable in itself, be perfectly unintelligible in reference to *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ*.—The most of commentators are thus far agreed, that *μορφή* properly signifies "form," "figure," and that consequently it implies a form of existence on the part of the *subject* named; and that the expression *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ* contains a similar idea. So Keil, Matthies, Van Hengel, De Wette, Meyer. But their views take different directions whenever the question is asked, *when* this *being in the form of God* took place. Van Hengel, up till this point, at one with us, answers, Christus in hac terra, quanquam poterat, gloriosus esse noluit. Similarly De Wette,—"Christ when he entered on his Messianic career had the divine glory (potentially) in himself, and might have made manifestation of it in his life." Others, on the contrary, as for example Meyer, think that Christ's pre-human state of existence is here represented. Quite as various are also of necessity the views held on the question—what is specifically signified by the *μορφὴ θεοῦ*? Those who regard the *λόγος ἄσαρκος* as the *subject*, have a sufficient explanation in the *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ* and similar passages; those, on the other hand, who regard the incarnate Christ as the *subject*, can explain it only

by the δόξα, of which John speaks ch. i. 11, ii. 14, or by the passage in John xiv. 9: *He who seeth me seeth the Father*, and others to the same effect; and they will associate with this the proofs of his divinity in his words and works, especially his miracles, or his beatitas and gloria divina. For in what else but this could his μορφὴ θεοῦ consist during his life upon earth? The course pursued by De Wette most evidently shews that there is no escape from this signification of μορφή if it is referred to the λόγος ἔνσαρκος. After having rightly explained μορφή as equivalent to εἰκών, and maintained (in opposition to the interpretation that would refer the expression to all manifestations of divine majesty in the life of Christ), that ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ, &c. must precede his historical career, on account of ver. 7, he can yet understand nothing else by the μορφὴ θεοῦ than the grace and truth (John i. 14), the power of working miracles, the beatitas which belonged to Christ. And does it better the case when he tells us that this μορφή has not preceded the earthly, but the historical career of our Lord? Or rather does not this explanation give up the result arrived at, with reference to the signification of the word μορφή, and lose sight of the affinity betwixt the expressions μορφή and εἰκὼν? Compare only those passages in which Christ is called εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ, and see whether a similar signification can be applied to them, or rather whether the expression is not in every instance used either of his state of existence before he was upon the earth (as 2 Cor. iv. 4), or after he left it.[1] And is "the kindred idea" contained in μορφὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ (form of God), to be explained by a reference to "grace and truth," by a reference to "revelations of divine majesty" in words and works, or to the beatitas? We have already seen in what direction the signification of the word μορφή, as also the analogy of the expression εἰκὼν would lead us. Only the unwarrantable assumption, that because of the designation of the *subject* Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς it must be the "historical Christ" that is spoken of in ver. 6, and the false comparison with the expression δόξα in John i. 14; ii. 11 (differently, yet connected with these, John xvii. 5), can have led the commentators to forget their own signification of the word

1 Even at 1 Cor. xi. 7, where it is said of the man in distinction from the woman, that he is εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ, the reference to the outward appearance is clear.

μορφή, in its application to μορφή θεοῦ, and to give up its connection with εἰκὼν. We have further to show, that the explanation we have given is justified by what follows. I have only to observe here that ὑπάρχων is to be construed as an imperfect, and the participle to be resolved by "although." What Meyer says against this, seems to me unfounded, as it was, so to speak, natural to suppose, that he who was in the divine form, should be *equal with God*. Comp. Matth. xxi. 46; 1 Cor. ix. 21, &c. Winer, § 46, 12, p. 413.

Who, although he was in the form of God, οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ. Let us inquire, first, what is meant by ἴσα θεῷ εἶναι, and then what we are to understand by ἁρπαγμόν. To the former of these questions the later interpreters give a unanimous reply, which we take as so much gained. It signifies æqualiter Deo esse, so that ἴσα as an adverb joined with εἶναι, specifies the condition of the person spoken of. (Comp. Van Hengel, p. 144; Winer, § 27, 3, p. 204, and others.) The expression is certainly not quite synonymous with ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ, for then, as Van Hengel and De Wette have already remarked, simply τοῦτο would have been used, and Meyer, too, although he thinks that both expressions have the same *real* signification, finds this difference betwixt them, that the first marks the state of Christ according to the form of his appearance, the second according to his nature. And certainly when we look at the connexion with what follows, (viz., ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε, which is the opposite of οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶνα ἴσα τῳ θεῷ, whilst, at the same time, that of which he emptied himself can only be the μορφή, as the subsequent clause μορφὴν δούλου λαβών proves), it is evident that the ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχειν and the ἴσα θεῷ εἶναι cannot be separated from one another. Brückner and Lünemann (comp. the Introd. § 4), have found in the latter expression, something entirely different from the former. Lünemann understands the sense of the passage thus—Christ, although he was in the form of God, did not wish to grasp at a κυριότης, such as belongs to God, and which he could only have seized by not willing to subordinate himself to the Father. Similarly, Brückner. But apart from the sentiment itself, which must be explained and defined by its opposite (for taken by itself it expresses what is superfluous, nay, inconceivable)—how is this view to agree with the ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε, of which they themselves say that it must refer

to the μορφὴ θεοῦ, because no one can empty himself of that which does not belong to him (the κυριότης) ? If the two expressions are so entirely different, as they feel under the necessity of maintaining, in opposition to Baur, how can the sentiment:—he would not appropriate to himself the κυριότης, suit that which stands opposed to it, and which refers to the entirely different μορφή. To interpose an *ultro* were quite abitrary. We shall therefore be able to make out no other difference than that between the "form of God," and the "divine condition," forma Dei and conditio Divina ; neither of which, however, can be conceived of separately from the other. We shall also again find in vv. 7 and 8 the antitheses to both, in the expressions "form of a man" and "human condition," and the ἴσα τῷ θεῷ εἶναι becomes intelligible, from having as its antithesis not merely the ἐκένωσε, but also what follows (ἐταπείνωσεν.) The sense of the words then is—quum in forma Dei esset non arripiendum sibi dixit conditione divina uti.—We have still farther to enquire what is meant by οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο. This must be ascertained from the signification of the word ἁρπαγμα by itself, and also from its opposition to what follows, viz., ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν, &c. With regard to the former point, we are glad to be able to regard it as an established result, that ἁρπαγμός does not properly signify *praeda* or *res rapta*, but *raptus*, *i.e.*, *actio rapiendi*. (Comp. the excellent investigation into this word by Van Hengel, p. 145.) This appears both from the nature of the termination in μος (not μα), and from the single passage in profane literature, where the word occurs besides. (Plut. de puerorum educatione, p. 120.) Another question, however is, whether, as Van Hengel supposes, ἁρπαγμός may not by metonyme signify the res quae actionis causa est, according to which the term would then of course take the signification, not of *res rapta*, but of *res arripienda*, and the sense would be, as Van Hengel has already expressed it, rem non duxit, quam suam faceret, cum sua non esset. In this view he is supported by Müller, De Wette, Lünemann Brückner, the last of whom adduces several examples, a. a. Q., p. 19, in which substantives ending in μα, (for example δίωγμα), take the usual signification of those ending in μος, and, vice versa, substantives in μος, (for example χρησιμός), specify not the action, but the object of it. The expression under consideration, will thus coincide with the more common ἁρπαγμα ἡγεῖσθαι or ποιεῖσ-

θαι (Heb. vii. 11, 20; viii. 7), and the Latin *praedam ducere*, if only we do not associate with this the idea of something already taken as prey, which, as Bruckner has observed, a. a. Q., it is not necessary we should. Meyer, however, has not assented to the supposition of a metonyme here, but explains thus:—he held the being equal with God as no robbery, that is, he did not consider the equality with God which he had, to be such a relation as is implied in the seizing of a prey, or to consist in the seizure of a possession that belonged to others. And when we ask what is to be understood by this possession belonging to others, Meyer replies,—he would have emptied others by the ἁρπαγμός. Who then are these others? and what possession have they of which Christ, by his being equal with God, would not rob them, and whilst it did not belong to him, make it his own property? Would he then, had he not become man, have taken anything from men that was their possession, or have emptied them? And does this interpretation of οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο correspond exactly, as Meyer maintains, to the *looking not on every man on his own things, but also on the things of others?* Are these two things not totally different—not to take his possession from another, and not to look upon one's own, but also on the things of others? The idea in itself is already strange, and quite as strange is it that the apostle should urge the Philippians to self-denying love, by telling them that Christ did not consider his being equal with God as the seizure of a possession belonging to another. Neither also does it suit the antithesis in ver. 7, as we shall afterwards see. This attempt of Meyer's then to adhere to the original signification of actio in ἁρπαγμος, as we must agree with him in everything else, can only confirm us in our interpretation of the οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο—*he did not consider the being equal with God to be a thing that he must seize for himself.* With this, all those renderings of the words fall to the ground, which make ἁρπαγμός to sig-signify *res rapta*, for example,—Christ did not regard the being equal with God as a thing usurped; or, he willed not obstinately to retain it as a robber his prey; or, he willed not to bear it in triumphal shew, as a victor his spoils, &c. (Comp. Meyer, p. 51.)

We have still to consider the antithetical expression ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε. There can be no doubt as to the exact meaning of these words. Κενοῦν is "to empty, to strip," "to rob," so

De Wette, expoliare; and that of which he divested himself can, from the context, only be the *μορφή* mentioned before, (as the subsequent clause *μορφὴν δούλου λαβών* also shows), not—at least formally—the *ἴσα εἶναι*, this being represented as the thing that was not to be forcibly taken by him. If, however, *ἀλλ'* is antithetical to *οὐχ—ἡγήσατο*, it will appear, as has already been observed, how little substantial difference, there is, between *ἴσα εἶναι* and *ἐν μορφῇ ὑπάρχειν*. The antithesis then to what goes before is, *but he emptied*, or as we might even translate it, *he robbed himself*. How then, according to this, must we render the words, *οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο*? Will it suffice to render them thus:—Christ did not consider the being equal with God as a usurpation? or, he would not make a demonstration of it as a spoil? Or, will Bruckner and Lünemann's explanation suffice:—he did not strive after the honour of the *κυρίοτης*? Must they not insert an *ultro* in order to suit the antithesis? (Comp. supra.) And is the case otherwise with Meyer's interpretation when he explains thus:—instead of the *ἁρπαγμός* by which he would have emptied others, he has emptied (or robbed) himself of the *μορφή*; whilst he had before shown that the object which it was possible for Christ to have seized was a possession belonging to others. Thus is introduced an opposition betwixt *others* and *his own person*, which is not to be found in the context. Rather, we shall have to say that, if the *ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε* is to be regarded as purely antithetical, the only idea that can correspond to it will be, *he has wished to seize nothing;* and if it be acknowledged, that it is the *μορφή* of which he divests himself, then must there be something similar to this in that which corresponds to it, viz. that which he wishes not to seize possession of. Our interpretation fully agrees with this purely antithetical relation. He would not rob (seize possession of), corresponds to the positive, he robbed himself; and to the *μορφή* of which he robs himself, corresponds our interpretation of *ἴσα εἶναι*, which is *really* included in the *μορφή*, and which is rendered all the more intelligible by having its antithetical counterpart not merely in the *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε*, but also in what follows, *ἐταπείνωσεν*, &c.

So far as I can see, the only objections that could be brought against the interpretation of ver. 6 here given, are the two following; first, how, in general, is the idea implied in *ἁρπαγμός* admissible here, which Van Hengel has rightly determined, as actio, qua

quis aperte quod suum non est suum facit, and, as connected with this, secondly, how can it be said of that which Christ already had (in so far as *ἴσα τῷ θεῷ* is included in the *μορφή*), that he wished not to seize possession of it. Both of these objections appear to me to be removed by one consideration. If we look particularly at the antithesis expressed in *ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν*, whereby his becoming man is represented, it will appear that by the *οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο* only the corresponding negative, the not becoming man, can be denied, which, expressed in a positive form, was for him *ἴσα τῷ θεῷ εἶναι*. He, however, in his self-denying love, willed not the one (*μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῶν σκοποῦντες*, ver. 4), but he willed the other, *ἑαυτὸν ἐκενωσε—εταπείνωσεν ἑαυτὸν γενόμενος ὑπήκοος*, &c. It is not natural then that the apostle who conceives of Christ as in the act of decision should say—*οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο*, just as if the question at issue related to the giving up of a possession? When I decide for anything, do I not by that decision take possession of the thing anew, although it may not really have been given up by me? And may it not in the other case, when I decide for the giving up of a possession, be said with equal propriety—I did not think myself under the necessity of seizing it? The expression *ἁρπαγμός* in itself, however, is explained partly by the consideration that *the being equal with God* would have appeared at least relatively, and connexion with what goes before, as a *looking to his own things*, and partly, in that it would have been opposed to the eternal decree of God's love, and to this extent a taking possession, of what in consequence of that decree did not belong to him. (Comp. *μορφὴν δούλου*, ver. 7, *ὑπήκοος*, ver. 8.)

Ver. 7. *Ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε*, &c. The proper division of the members of the sentence is that, according to which, *ἡγήσατο* is rendered more definite by *ὑπάρχων*, *ἐκένωσε* by *λαβών*, and *γενόμενος*, and *ἐταπείνωσε* by the two participles *εὑρεθείς* and *γενόμενος*. It is evident, how fully the several members of the sentence correspond to one another, even in the particular attributive ideas. So Keil, Van Hengel, and others. On the other hand de Wette and Meyer more recently, have joined *καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθείς ὡς ἄνθρωπος* with *ἐκένωσε* as its third attributive explanation, because it expresses something similar to the two which precede it. There is certainly room for difference of opinion on

this point, but it appears to me that ἐκένωσε is already sufficiently defined, by the two participles λαβών and γενόμενος. Then what De Wette says is true—that ἐταπείνωσε refers to the manner of action and conduct of Christ as man, ἐκένωσε, with its defining and explaining clauses *being presupposed;* but the propriety of this expression depends, on what is thus presupposed being represented by the καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος; finally, ἐταπείνωσε, which, according to De Wette and Meyer's view, would stand without any connexion, has in it something startling, and all the more so on account of what it presupposes being in the preceding clause.

On the sense of ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε, all that is necessary has already been said in connexion with ver. 6. Could there, however, be still any doubt as to the meaning of ἐκένωσε in its opposition to οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο, it would be removed by the explanatory clause μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, which sets forth the manner of this ἐκένωσε. This additional clause tells us that he has *emptied* or robbed himself, in that he has taken upon him the *form of a servant.* The *form of God* which he has, is laid aside, and the *form of a servant* is assumed. How can this be explained by—humilem ac tenuem se gessit, or by κατα κρύπτειν? What we are to understand, however, by *taking the form of a servant* is then more definitely explained by the clause that follows, namely, *was made in the likeness of men,* an explanation which is not co-ordinate with, but subordinate to the preceding clause. The form of a servant takes the place of the form of God, inasmuch as he has entered on the condition of likeness to men. This is the unmistakeable sense of the words, as fixed both by the signification of the particular terms, and by the antithesis to ver. 6. But how now comports this obvious sense of the passage, with the interpretation which already at ver. 6 makes the subject to be Christ in his incarnate state? We have before observed, that already the expression, *being in the form of God,* cannot be explained in accordance with this view, without doing violence to the language, in that it is said to express the same thing, as the δόξα of which John speaks, ch. i. 14, (not however that of which he speaks, ch. xvii. 5, which alone is agreeable to the signification of the word μορφή.) But how, besides, does the antithesis at ver. 7 agree with this view? Ἐκένωσε as the Aorist

expresses of course *an act*, that must be referred to the *life of the incarnate* Christ. But the δόξα of which John speaks, ch. i. 14, as De Wette himself has remarked, irradiated the whole course of his life. What then becomes of—*he emptied himself, taking upon him the form of a servant?* What of—*he was made in the likeness of men?* Has he not then appeared from *the beginning* in the *likeness of men?* De Wette, who considers Christ in his human state as the *subject* also at ver. 6, has justly acknowledged this, and in reply to it remarked:—that the *being in the form of God*, on account of the antithesis, cannot be understood of the appearance of the divine majesty throughout the whole life of Christ, but must have preceded, though not his life upon earth, yet his historical career. And he himself refers to the period of Christ's public appearance after his baptism, as the time when this *empting himself, and taking upon him the form of a servant*, &c., took place. "Christ had," he adds by way of explanation, "when he entered on his Messianic career, the divine glory potentially in himself, and might have devoted himself to the manifestation of this in his life; but as it did not enter into the object of his redemption work, that he should from the very beginning receive divine honour, so," &c. And is this what we are to understand by the words—*he emptied himself, taking upon him the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men?* Where is any *emptying* here? Had he not this divine glory potentially in himself, afterwards as well as before. Where also is the antithesis between, *being in the form of God*, and *taking upon him the form of a servant*, if all that is meant by the first is "the grace and truth, John i. 14, and all the moral attributes of God, Col. ii. 9," &c.? And, in short, are we to regard the *taking upon him the form of a servant*, and the *being made in the likeness of men*, and also what De Wette connects with these, *the being found in fashion as a man*, as having taken place at the baptism of Christ, as the consequence of his not wishing to assume to himself divine honour, and as a more specific statement of what is contained in the words—he emptied himself of this (glory), (of which indeed potentially he did not empty himself)? What then are we to make of the preceding period of Christ's life, from his birth onwards to his baptism? Had he no *form of a servant*, no *likeness of men*, during that period?

It will thus be seen, in what difficulties the interpretation is in-

volved, which already at ver. 6 makes the incarnate Christ to be the *subject*, instead of understanding ver. 7 antithetically to ver. 6, of the act of the incarnation itself. These difficulties do not belong to the peculiar view of this or that interpreter, but to the general principle itself, on which they all proceed. On this very account, however, there is reason to hope, that gradually it will come to be regarded as a fixed result of interpretation, that this classical passage treats of Christ's becoming man, and not of what was done by him as man. Olshausen, so far as can be gathered from his brief hints on this passage, seems to be inclined to the latter view.

To come to particulars in ver. 7 ; *μορφὴν δούλου λαβών*, as denoting the *manner* of the *ἐκένωσε*, tells us that this *κένωσις* in its positive side, consisted in Christ's having taken upon him the outward appearance of a servant. By *δούλου*, however, nothing more is meant than, (as the farther explanation in the following clause *ἐν ὁμοιώματι* shows) that his appearance was that of a *man*. Why the term *δούλου* has been used to express this, is explained by the antithesis to *μορφὴ θεοῦ*. The *form of a servant* takes the place of *the form of God*, when he takes upon him the human form. Nothing is here said of his relation to other men, it is only his relation to God that is expressed. The idea of a mean, despised man is not implied in the expression ; the word *δούλου* is used only to convey a just idea, of the degree of the *κενοῦν*. It has been already observed that *ἐν ὁμ. ανθρ. γεν.* is an accessory explanation of the participle that precedes. In this way does he take upon him the form of a servant, namely, by entering into the condition of the *likeness of men*. There is a reference in the words to the *ἴσα τῷ θεῷ*. As the form of a servant takes the place of the form of God, so the condition of *the likeness of men*, comes in place of that of *equality with God*. On *γενόμενος*, comp. Winer, § 52, a. p. 463. By *ἐν ὁμ*, the condition into which he enters is specified. *Γενόμενος*, however, is not nasci ; *ὁμοίωμα* means, as usual, *likeness*. Comp. Rom. i. 23, v. 14, vi. 5, but especially the passage viii. 3, *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*.—*Ἀνθρώπων* is here used by the apostle to express, that Christ shared in general with men in their likeness, that he entered with them into their condition.—On the expressions *ὁμοίωμα* and *ὡς ἄνθρωπος*, Docetic opinions have by some been founded. Comp. in the Introd. against Baur. The reason of the expression is not to be sought

in a reference to the sinlessness of Christ; for against such a view, as Bauer has shown, might be adduced the passage Rom. viii. 3, inasmuch as, being a man and being a sinner do not, in idea, coincide; therefore Christ is, without limitation, called *ἄνθρωπος*, Rom. v. 15; 1 Cor. xiii. 21; 1 Tim. 25. The true reason is explained by the context itself; in so far as it is the different forms of appearance and conditions, of one and the same person, that are here spoken of. It is not the laying aside of the divine nature, nor even the assumption of the human, that is here spoken of, but that Christ's forma and conditio was, first of a divine kind and then of a human. Both the one and the other, are forms of appearance and condition in him, who does not give up the identity of his divine nature, whilst he *becomes* man, and is on that very account such a man as no other is; *διὰ το μὴ ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι.* Theophylact. quoted by Meyer on this passage.

Ver. 8. ***Καὶ σχήματι***, &c. On the connexion of this participial sentence with *ἐταπείνωσεν*, see the beginning of note on ver. 7. The difference in sense, between this and the preceding verse has been justly expressed by Van Hengel in the words—duo enim, ut puto, diversa hic tradit Paulus, et quamnam vivendi rationem (properly, only a form of appearance) Christus inierit .... et quo modo hanc vivendi rationem ad mortem usque persecutus sit.—By *ἐκένωσε*, with its explanatory clause, is denoted the form of existence opposed to the *μορφὴ θεοῦ* into which he passed; by *ἐταπείνωσε* and its explanatory clause *γενόμενος*, &c., is described his conduct as man. Both, however, are placed over against ver. 5, as the corresponding positive side of what is there said. *Ἐταπείνωσε*, then, far from being the same as *ἐκένωσε*, denotes the humiliation which *ἐκένωσε* already presupposes, and it is just this presupposition that is expressed in the words *καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος*, immediately before the *ἐταπείνωσεν*. These words, however, are not to be considered as just the sum of what is said at ver. 7, rather, with the *εὑρεθεὶς* a new idea is introduced, namely, that what the senses of others perceived in him, testified to the reality of his human form of being. (Comp. 1 John i. 1, sq.)—*Σχῆμα* is the habitus, according to Bengel: cultus, vestitus, victus, gestus, sermones et actiones. Comp. Van Hengel, p. 151, who quotes from Euripides the words *μορφῆς σχῆμα ἀγρίας* and *ταὐτὰ μορφῆς σχήματα*, which throw so much light on our

passage. On *ὡς*, see note on *ὁμοίωματι* above. The dative *σχήματι* implies "with respect to." See Winer, § 31, 3, p. 244.

Being found as a man in the presence of men, he humbled himself, in that he became obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross. *Ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτόν*, as the act of his self-denying love. The antithesis is *ὑψόω*, 2 Cor. xi. 7 ; Matt. xviii. 4 ; xxiv. 12. In what this *ἐταπείνωσεν* consisted, we learn from the explanatory clause *γενόμενος ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου*, &c. For, *μέχρι θανάτου* is with reason to be connected with *γενόμενος ὑπήκοος*. *Γενόμενος ὑπήκοος* by itself would not be sufficiently specific, whilst, by connecting the *μέχρι θανάτου* with *ἐταπείνωσεν*, we disturb the regularity according to which the several members of the sentence are arranged. His self-humiliation then consisted in this, that he became obedient unto death; not merely in a humble disposition of heart. He did not, however, become obedient to the law, Gal. iv. 4, as Olshausen also is of opinion. Obedience to the law neither laid him under obligation to die, nor did that obedience bring death to him; rather, he was above the law. That obedience, the highest proof of which was his death, was obedience to God; to which already the expression *δούλου* in the preceding verse points, as also what follows, *διὸ καὶ ὁ θεός*, &c. In this obedience did he submit to be baptized; by it he overcame temptation, by it was he guided in all the intimations of his public life, in it did he sustain the agony of the garden, and he was obedient even unto death. Comp. Heb. v. 8 (*ἔμαθεν ἀφ' ὧν ἔπαθεν ὑπακοήν*) ; Rom. v. 19.—*Μέχρι* denotes not the duration, but the degree of his obedience, as Heb. xii. 4 ; 2 Tim. ii. 9, &c. On the increasing force of *δέ*, see Winer, § 57, 4, 6, p. 521, and Meyer on this passage. On *θανάτου δὲ σταύρου* as a curse-expiating death, see Deut. xxi. 23 ; Gal. iii. 13 ; Heb. xii. 2.

Vers. 9—11. *The exaltation of Christ as the result of his self-denial.* The Philippians are further to learn from the example of Christ how, only that disposition of mind which his example sets before them, vv. 6—8 (and not the selfish striving to assert their own importance), will lead to joy and honour. Comp. Matt. xviii. 4 ; xxiii. 12. *Διὸ καὶ*, &c. By *διὸ* (not quo facto) the exaltation on which he enters, is described as a recompense for his humiliation in obedience to God. The idea of recompense is already confirmed by the expression *ὑπήκοος*, comp. Heb. ii. 9. This exaltation is

denoted by *ὑπερύψωσε*, as the opposite of *ἐταπείνωσεν*, ver. 8. The apostle says *ὑπερύψωσε* (though the antithesis to *ἐταπείνωσε* is simply *ὑψοῦν*), because he is exalted *above every other*. Comp. Ephes. i. 21, sq., and the subsequent words *τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα*, which are illustrative of the *ὑπερύψωσε*. Quam antea is not to be understood. Neither is there in the *ὑπερ—* any local reference, as for example to the heavens, as is evident from what follows; although in such passages as Eph. i. 20; Heb. xii. 2, &c., such a reference must be understood. Comp. also John xvii. 5; Heb. ii. 9. On the *καὶ* accompanying *διὸ*, which is not, as Van Hengel takes it, to be connected with *ὁ θεός*, comp. Meyer. It denotes the near connexion of the cause with the consequence, as at Rom. i. 24, iv. 22, &c. The *ὑπερύψωσε* is more fully explained by the words that follow, *καὶ ἐχαρίσατο*, &c. *Ἐχαρίσατο*, the same as at i. 29, corresponding to the relation, according to which Christ prays, John xvii. 5, *glorify me*, &c. It is here, however, to be remembered that he has attained to such glory, not merely in so far as he was already a person ere he became man, for in this case the *ἐχαρίσατο* would be unintelligible; but that he, as this Jesus, has been exalted to the fellowship of the divine glory, and therefore this name, the name Jesus, has been made a name above every name.

The words that follow tell us what God hath given him, *τὸ ὄνομα τὸ*, &c. This reading is, with Lachmann, according to A.B.C., to be preferred to that which omits the article. Comp. besides, Winer, § 19, 4, p. 160. With regard to the expression *ὄνομα*, there can be no longer any doubt, (after Van Hengel's investigation of it in connection with this passage, compared with Harless on Eph. i. 21), that in itself it signifies not dignity, honour, and the like, but simply name. Comp. here especially Heb. i. 4. So also De Wette and Meyer. What name is meant does not need to be first learned from Rom. i. 4; Acts ii. 36 (*κύριον αὐτὸν καὶ Χριστὸν ἐποίησε τοῦτον τὸν Ἰησοῦν.*) Ver. 10 tells us expressly that it is the name of Jesus, and, ver. 11, what we are to associate with this name, viz., that he is *κύριος*. The high dignity to which he has attained, is henceforth to be connected with his name; the name Jesus has become the designation of him, who was exalted from the deepest abasement to the highest glory. God then hath given to him this name, not from respect to what is stated at Matt.

i. 21, but, in that he hath exalted him. Comp. Heb. i. 4. On *τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα* comp. Eph. i. 21 ; Heb. i. 4.

Ver. 10. His exaltation above all (*ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα*) has for its object, that all should bow the knee before him. The words *ἐπουρανίων—ἐπιγείων—καταχθονίων* are not to be directly connected with *πᾶν γόνυ*, but are to be understood as an explanation of the totality expressed by *πᾶν γόνυ*, which is thus described in its local relations. To understand this universal expression as including only man, explaining *ἐπουρ.* of the *πανήγυρις πρωτοτόκων*, Heb. xii 22, 23, *ἐπιγ.* of the living, and *καταχθ.* of the dead, were at variance with the universality of the expression *τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα* at ver. 9, especially as compared with Eph. i. 21. By the *ἐπουράνιοι* must be meant, in the first place, the angels, who are generally described as inhabitants of heaven ; the *ἐπίγειοι* are, (in contradistinction to the class just mentioned), men ; whilst by those mentioned in the third term, we may presume that a new class are meant, viz., demons, in connexion with which the passages 2 Peter ii. 4 ; Jude 6, are to be referred to. In what manner those last mentioned are to be conceived of as bowing the knee is explained in such passages as Jam. ii. 19. The most of recent commentators, as also Olshausen, understand *ἐπίγειοι* and *καταχθόνιοι* of the dead, something in the same way as at Rom. xiv. 9, where, however, the sentiment is different, in so far as it is not the universality of the homage paid to Jesus that is there spoken of. The expression *καταχθόνιος* occurs only here. On *γόνυ κάμψῃ* as a mark of divine honour, comp. Rom. xiv. 11, xi. 4 ; Eph. iii. 14. The passage at Rom. xiv. 11 informs us at the same time of what is wont to be too little considered, namely, that what is here said of the end contemplated in the exaltation of Christ, *that every knee should bow*, &c., is not to be conceived of as immediately taking place, but only as the final result of the *κυριότης*. Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 25, 26. Those knees which till then were not willingly bowed to him, shall then be forced to bow. In this passage, as well as in that from Romans, there is an evident reference to Is. xlv. 23. The word of the Old Testament, has obtained its more special meaning and application in the New.

On *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ* there are some excellent observations by Van Hengel on this passage, also by Harless on Eph. v. 20. " In itself," observes Harless, " the meaning of this form of expres-

sion is every where the same, it changes only according to the difference of the idea contained in the verb with which it is connected, from it must be inferred in what relation the name of Jesus occurs as connected with any event or action." According then to the interpretation given above, not only will the *voluntary* confession of his name be the reason and occasion of bowing the knee, but *every* confession of his name (ver. 11), be it made in fear or in love. Comp. Acts iv. 12 ; 1 Cor. vi. 11 ; 1 Pet. iv. 14 ; Col. iii. 17, &c.

Ver. 11. *And every tongue;* as universal as *every knee.* The confession of the tongue that Jesus is Lord, corresponds to the bowing of the knee. The tongue expresses that at which the knee bows (ἐν ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ). Ἐξομολογεῖσθαι is stronger and more earnest than ὁμολογεῖσθαι. Their confession is κύριος Ἰ. Χ. Every one will notice the emphasis implied in the placing of κύριος before *I. X.* Comp. besides at ver. 9.—*To the glory of God the Father*, is not to be considered as the subject matter of the confession, but to be connected with *shall confess,* as expressing, that such a confession redounds to the glory of the Father, who has exalted the Son to this κυριότης. In opposition to Van Hengel and De Wette, who think that the Son is not here represented as an object of worship, but only that in his name as Mediator every prayer is to be addressed to God,—Corn. Müller and Meyer have already justly observed, that the context in general, which treats of the honour done to Jesus, is against such a view, and also that ἐπουρανίων (of the angels) does not agree with it. To this it may be added, that Jesus is not here acknowledged as Mediator, but as Lord, and that, the true interpretation of this passage, as also Rom. xiv. 11 and Is. xlv. 23, show, that it is not a willing acknowledgment of Jesus that is here spoken of, but a universal acknowledgment, which can only be the final result of the κυριότης of Jesus Christ.

Ver. 12—18. The apostle now engrafts on the example of Christ, a comprehensive and pointed exhortation, having a retrospective reference to ver. 2—4.

Ver. 12. Ὥστε, as a definitive inference from the foregoing, (comp. Winer, § 42, 5, p. 348, and the examples there adduced), not, however, as De Wette thinks, from all the exhortations from i. 27, sq., nor even from ii. 2—4, but from what immediately precedes,

namely, the example of Christ. Here again, however, it is not as an inference from the *obedience* of Christ, as Meyer supposes, for then this obedience, ver. 8 and 12, would no longer be a merely subordinate idea; but rather as an inference from the principal idea in what goes before, namely, that Christ has attained to his glory only by the way of self-denial. Therefore ought they to lay aside that proud, vain, and self-secure disposition (the *ἐρίθεια* and *κενοδοξία* opposed to *ταπεινοφροσύνη*), and seek to work out their salvation *with fear and trembling*, the opposite of that false security. Thus explained, the retrospective reference to the exhortation at ver. 2—4, as also the inference from what directly goes before, appears to me unmistakeable. But the apostle, before expressing this exhortation, inserts the words, *as ye have always obeyed not as in my presence only, but now much more in my absence.* In order to open up the way for his exhortation, the apostle reminds the Philippians of their conduct hitherto, their obedience toward him; they are still to continue true to the character they have hitherto sustained. In the subsequent member of the sentence, however, beginning with *μὴ ὡς* where *οὕτως* is left out, the apostle, at the same time, does away with the mistaken notion (*ὡς*) that his exhortation is to apply only to the case of his presence with them; rather should they during his absence, do what he desires of them even in a much higher degree. It will be seen that the two antitheses of *πάντοτε* and *νῦν* and of *παρουσία* and *ἀπουσία* are blended into one. By the *παρουσία* can only be meant, a future presence in opposition to the foregoing *πάντοτε*. The idea is similar to that at ver 27: *εἴτε ἐλθὼν . . . εἴτε ἀπων*. But why does he say, *much more in my absence?* Because, as I apprehend, in the absence of the apostle, the care of their salvation would rest with themselves alone, comp. ver. 25. According to the explanation here given, not *θεῷ* but *ἐμοί* is to be supplied at *ὑπηκούσατε*. The connexion of *μὴ ὡς* with *ὑπηκούσατε* does not any longer require refutation. Comp. Van Hengel, p. 168.—Ὡς is not here a particle of comparison (to this the position of the *μόνον* after *ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ μου* is not agreeable), but indicates a supposition which the apostle seeks to remove; comp. Rom. ix. 32; Gal. iii. 16; Eph. vi. 5, &c.—On *μετὰ φόβου καὶ τρόμου*, comp. 1 Cor. ii. 3; 2 Cor. vii. 15; Eph. vi. 5. It is, as Meyer well explains, the fear of not doing the thing sufficiently, therefore, an anxious conscientiousness

proceeding from humility, the opposite of that arrogant security referred to in ver. 3. 4. *Work out your own salvation.* This is to be their aim—the salvation of their souls. Thus will that vain-striving after a false greatness disappear of itself, when salvation becomes their only aim. On ἑαυτῶν, for the pronoun of the second person, comp. Winer, § 22. 5, p. 174. It is wrong to take ἑαυτῶν for ἀλλήλων, comp. Van Hengel, p. 171. Κατεργάζεσθαι is more than ἐργάζεσθαι, viz. to complete, perficere.

Ver. 13. If we have rightly understood ver. 12, then is ver. 13 in its relation to ver. 12, not to be viewed as an encouragement, or consolation; but the exhortation addressed to the Philippians to work out their salvation *with fear and trembling* is further enforced by the consideration here presented to them, that it is not they, but God who gives them to will and to do, whereby all self-glorying is removed, all ground for seeking to display their own importance is taken away. For ver. 13, regarded as an encouragement or consolation, would imply that those to whom it was addressed were inclined to despond. Such, however, does not appear to have been the case with the Philippians; rather did their strivings after self-importance betray their conviction that there was no danger of their salvation,—that their safety was a thing evident of itself. How little also does this view which supposes the persons here addressed to have been anxious, desponding spirits, agree with the verse immediately following, especially if the *murmurings* there mentioned are, according to the most of commentators, to be understood as murmurings against God. *For it is God,* &c. The opposite of this is,—*not you.* Comp. Luke xxii. 28; John vi. 63, &c. The apostle says that God works *both* to will and to do. By the ἐνεργεῖν which God works is, of course, not meant the same as κατεργάζεσθαι, which the Philippians are desired to do, ver. 12; but ἐνεργεῖν is the power of action given along with the θέλειν, and without which the latter cannot be carried into effect. It is evident, however, from ver. 12, that this ἐνεργεῖν and θέλειν which God works, is not all that is necessary in order to the completion of the work there spoken of. Olshausen justly observes that this passage on the one side is most conclusive against Pelagianism, whilst on the other side, from its connexion with ver. 12, it plainly shows, how far removed the apostle is from the doctrine of a compelling grace. Man,

it is true, has *positively* power to do nothing, he has power, however, to oppose God.—The additional clause *of his good pleasure* shows again how little room there is for self-exaltation; for it is God's own gracious will alone on which his working in the heart depends. *Εὐδοκία* as at i. 15. Comp. also Harless on Eph. i. 5.—*Ὑπέρ* is "on account of" = in virtue of. Comp. Winer, § 51, 1, p. 459.

Ver. 14. *Do all things without murmurings and disputings;* all that you have to do without any restriction. Yet it is evident from the foregoing (work out your own salvation, ver. 12), what it is that the apostle especially alludes to. *Without murmurings*, comp. 1 Pet. iv. 9. Neither this passage nor that in Peter, requires that this murmuring be understood as a murmuring against God. There is rather here, as at ver. 12, a retrospective reference to those deficiencies in the Philippians indicated at vv. 3, 4, and accordingly, it is their murmurings *against one another* that are here to be understood. Comp. also Acts vi. 1. The *διαλογισμοι* are for the same reason, not *doubts*, but *disputations*. Although the word does not generally occur in the New Testament in this sense, it is still a common usage with profane writers, and *διαλογίζομαι* at Mark ix. 33, 34 can be taken only in this sense. I have yet to state as my principal reason for the interpretation of ver. 12—14 given above, that I do not understand how the apostle, in an exhortation of so definitive a character as is implied in the *ὥστε* which introduces it, should come to mention things quite apart from the foregoing exhortations.

Ver. 15. De Wette and Meyer, and also Tischendorf, in his latest edition, adhere to the reading, *γένησθε*, according to Codd. B.C.D.***E.**J.K., &c., instead of *ἦτε*, which is supported by A.D.*E.*F.G., the Vulgate, and Church Fathers. They also prefer *ἀμώμητα* to *ἄμωμα*. *Μέσον* is however the true reading, according to Codd. A.B.C.D.*F.G., &c., and not *ἐν μέσῳ*. The apostle at ver. 15 reminds his readers of their destination, to be *blameless* and *harmless*. They can only become so however, in the way pointed out to them at ver. 14. But the apostle, whilst he sets this aim before them, has especially in view that part of their vocation which consists in their position, relatively to the surrounding world. They are to become *ἄμεμπτοι* and *ἀκέραιοι*. *Ἄμεμπτος* is one in whom there is nothing to blame (iii. 6; Luke iv. 6; 1 Thess. iii.

13; Heb. viii. 7); *ἀκέραιος* (from *κεράννυμι*), properly, *unmixed*, hence *pure* (Matth. x. 16; Rom. xvi. 19); the former, as Meyer observes, denotes moral integrity in its outward manifestation, the latter, in its intrinsic nature. Farther: *the sons of God without rebuke in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation.* They are already the sons of God through the spirit of adoption; *ἀμώμητα*, however, denotes what they are still to become, viz., blameless and unrebukeable children of God. This expression (occurring besides, only at 2 Pet. iii. 14) sums up by way of climax the foregoing predicates, on account of its being placed over against the following words *μέσον*, &c., irreproachable children of God *in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation.* On *μέσον* treated as a preposition, see Winer, § 58, 6, p. 554. *Γενεά* rightly explained by Wahl, de aetatis alicujus hominibus. *Σκολίος*, properly *crooked*, used also by the profane writers in the sense of moral obliquity. Comp. Acts ii. 40. *Διεστραμμένος*, *perverse*, comp. Matth. xvii. 17; Luke ix. 41, &c. In the designation of the children of God by *ἀμώμητα*, as also in that of the world, the apostle has had in his mind the passage in Deut. xxxii. 5, only, that it is there said even of Israel דּוֹר עִקֵּשׁ וּפְתַלְתֹּל. *Among whom ye appear as lights in the world.* In these words the apostle brings before them, not what they are to begin to be, but what they already are, in order that they may become what they still are not. *Ἐν ὅις*, with respect to the sense, to be referred to *γενεά*. *Φαίνεσθε*, according to general usage, is not to be translated ye *shine, give light*, as in this case the active is always used, (also in a metaphorical sense, John i. 5, v. 35); but *ye appear.* So also Meyer. *Ὡς φωστῆρες ἐν κόσμῳ.* The words *ἐν κόσμω* are not to be connected with *φαίνεσθε*, but belong to *φωστῆρες*; nor is *φαίνονται* to be supplied, but *φωστῆρες ἐν κόσμω* are to be construed together; as luminaries in the world, as stars on the earth do they stand, in the midst of a perverse generation. Comp. Matt. v. 14. The light, however, which they shed has not its source in them, but only proceeds from them in that they hold forth the word of life.

Ver. 16. *Holding forth the word of life.* On the connexion between light and life, comp. John i. 5; *the life was the light of men.*—*Ἐπέχειν* cannot signify *to attend to*, for in this sense it is joined with a dative. Comp. 1 Tim. iv. 6; Acts iii. 5. Others

render it, *to hold fast* (Hesychius, κρατοῦντες), without any certain grammatical analogy; others, *to possess*. It appears to me most suitable to keep by the common signification of the word, viz. *to hold forth*, to *offer*,—as also many commentators do. The sense of the words connected with φαίνεσθε will then be—"You appear as luminaries in the world, inasmuch as you (by being Christians) hold up before the world the word of life." The fulfilment of this their high calling, is to be to the apostle *for a rejoicing in the day of Christ*. Comp. our remarks on ch. i. 10. The cause of his rejoicing is set forth in the words ὅτι, &c. Εἰς κενόν means, *without fruit, without success*, 2 Cor. vi. 1; Gal. ii. 2; 1 Thess. iii. 5. Ἔδραμον, a figurative representation of his apostolic work; ἐκοπίασα, the literal representation of the same, with especial reference to the labour which it implied.

Vers. 17 and 18 are not to be separated from the foregoing, and joined to the following section, ver. 19—30, as De Wette has done. According to De Wette, who in this follows Storr and Flatt, ver. 17 is to be connected with i. 26, and ἀλλά forms an antithesis to i. 25; i. 27—ii. 16 contains only a subordinate train of thought, and the subject of the communications respecting the apostle's condition, as a prisoner, is again resumed at ii. 17. To this it is to be objected, that such a direct reference of ἀλλά back to i. 25 would be harsh in the extreme, chiefly, however, that it is altogether wrong to say that the apostle resumes at ii. 17 his communications about his own circumstances. Even in vv. 19—30, as we shall afterwards see, there are no such communications. The true way, is to regard vv. 17 and 18 as still belonging to this section, and ver. 19 as beginning a new one. The whole exhortation from i. 27 onwards, presupposes the hope expressed at vv. 25 and 26, that the apostle will abide in the flesh and again visit the church; chiefly, however, as Meyer has justly observed, does the hope that the apostle shall continue in life, and see the fruit of his labour amongst the Philippians, lie beneath the words of ver. 16; for indeed ver. 15 is presupposed in ver. 16. In the ἀλλ' εἰ καί the apostle lays aside for a moment this representation of what is to befall him, in order to say that in the other case too, that namely of death, he joys and rejoices with them, and they are to do the same. The joy which accrues to him, as also to them, from the fulfilment of his exhortation, is not conditionally dependent on the

continuance of his life. As the entire hortatory passage from i. 27 onwards, originated in this, viz. how the true *joy of faith* mentioned at ver. 25 was to be arrived at, so now too the apostle, after having exhorted his readers, and as he hopes not in vain, closes with *I rejoice*, and with the call addressed to the Philippians, *rejoice ye*, even in the case of his hope of continuing in life not being fulfilled.—The connection of the thought in ver. 17 cannot, as I think, be apprehended from the antithetical reference to ver. 16 alone; we are not, however, therefore at liberty, with De Wette, to place the ἀλλά in opposition to ver. 25. De Wette and Meyer have already shown, that ver. 17 is not to be viewed as the contrary supposition to the hope said to be expressed in ver. 16, that he will live to see the coming of Christ.

Σπένδομαι as at 2 Tim. iv. 6, "I am poured out as a drink-offering," comp. Numbers xxviii. 7, xv. 4, sq., and also Winer, R.W.B., on Trankopfer. Ἐπί is differently rendered according as θυσία is taken to mean the sacrifice itself, or the act of sacrificing. The former may, according to the general usage, be the more probable, notwithstanding of the following λειτουργίᾳ which Paul adds, in order to describe this sacrifice as one offered by him. Thus, ἐπί will signify "to," not "upon;" because the drink offering was not poured upon the sacrifice. Meyer makes it "in," as he understands θυσία to describe the action. Τῆς πίστεως ὑμῶν depends on θυσίᾳ, as on λειτουργίᾳ. The figure is the following—The faith of the Philippians is the sacrifice—the apostle, the priest who offers this sacrifice—he himself is the drink offering, inasmuch as his blood is poured out to this sacrifice.—λειτουργία, "priestly service," Luke i. 23; Heb. viii. 6, &c. In this case also, says the apostle, *I joy and rejoice with you all.* Some suggest as the reason of his joy, that his death will conduce to the advancement of the Gospel; others say, that his being made an offering is to him a joyful thought. But both of these views seem to me to withhold its proper force from ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ, according to which, the sense can only be, that also in this case (viz., of his being offered up), something of the effect supposed to follow in the other case will be brought about. It is the *joy of faith*, spoken of in i. 19, i. 25, and the condition of which (μόνον, ver. 27) is, obedience to the foregoing exhortation. The apostle's meaning then is, that should the opposite event fall out, and he have to yield up his life as a sacrifire for them, he yet

rejoices. His death makes no change in this joy. *And I rejoice with you all;* for then they too shall have attained to the true joy of faith. Meyer and others maintain that *συγχαίρω* means "gratulor," a sense which it certainly has in profane writers, but never in the New Testament, and especially in the writings of the apostle.

Ver. 18. The word *συγχαίρω* certainly implies, that the apostle's readers will rejoice also in the event of his being offered as a sacrifice. And by how much the less suitable it might appear for them to rejoice in this case, by so much the more reason has the apostle emphatically to exhort them to do this. Similarly, Van Hengel, p. 187.— *Τὸ αὐτό* I render with De Wette and others "in like manner." The idea which Meyer expresses, that the Philippians are here called upon to rejoice at the apostle's being offered for them, finds nothing to recommend it, at least in i. 22, xxiv. 25.

§ 4. ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS INTENTION TO SEND TIMOTHY, AND OF HIS HAVING SENT BACK EPAPHRODITUS.

(Chap. ii. 19—30.)

This section is not to be viewed as a return to the communications broken off at i. 26, but is rather to be connected with that which immediately precedes. The apostle having exhorted the Philippians to a right conduct in the meantime, his return to them being presupposed, now expresses what he further intends to do, in his affectionate care for the church. He purposes to send Timothy to them (why him particularly we are told at vv. 20—22), who is to convey to them more special information concerning him; still the hope of returning again to them himself, expressed at i. 25—26, is not, therefore, given up, ver. 24. Further, he sends back to them with this epistle, Epaphroditus their messenger, (who had become dear to him), in accordance with his own desire after his recovery from sickness, whom the apostle recommends to their cordial reception and esteem (as he does all of his class), on account of the service of love which he rendered to him, vv. 25—30.

Ver. 19. *But I trust in the Lord Jesus.* *Ἐλπίζω*, as at ver. 23, since the execution of his purpose connects itself with a favourable change in his own situation. This hope rests in the Lord Jesus, and will, therefore, be fulfilled. On the relation of Timothy to the

church, see on i. 1, and afterwards on ver. 22. The *ταχέως* is explained by ver. 23. *Ὑμῖν*, not the dat. comm., but as Meyer explains, "relation in general." The object of the apostle is, to get more particular information through Timothy, concerning the state of the church, so that his mind may thereby be set at rest. *Εὐψυχω*, "I am of good comfort;" *κἀγώ* implies, "as you may be of good comfort, in consequence of the information about me in this epistle." Such passages as i. 27, iii. 1, sq., iv. 2, sq., inform us what it was that caused the apostle uneasiness in thinking of them.

Ver. 20—22 mention the reason why he sends Timothy (and even his going depends on contingencies), and no other. He has besides him, no one like-minded (viz., with the apostle), who will sincerely care for their state. *Ὅστις*, "of such a character as will," &c. *Γνησίως* properly "genuinely," "sincerely," *i. e.* with complete devotedness, in contrast with that which is merely seeming, and behind which is a regard to selfish interest. Comp. ver. 21. *Μεριμνήσει*, properly in the future, with reference to the event of his being sent.

Ver. 21. The *οἱ πάντες γὰρ*, &c., corresponds to the *οὐδένα ἔχω* as its positive side, and from its reference to *οὐδένα*, can only be rendered "they all," they all seek their own, not the things of Jesus Christ. To insert a *more*, would just be as improper as to take *οἱ πάντες* for *οἱ πολλοί* and the like. But there is certainly a restriction of this expression in the context itself, as in the *οὐδένα* and *οἱ πάντες*, only those can be included, who might in general be eligible for this mission. It is also not to be overlooked, how high the qualification which the apostle looks for in those whom he would send, as indicated in the word *like-minded*, with reference to his own affectionate care for the church. This consideration ought to modify the idea we might otherwise associate with what is said at ver. 21. So much, however, must still be allowed, viz., that those here referred to, did not place the things of Christ above every personal interest, as the apostle did, comp. i. 16, sq. It is not to be supposed that they were the same persons as are mentioned in i. 15, 17, for how could these have come to be considered only in connection with this mission? On the contrary, i. 14 contains a reference to such *ἀδελφοί* as were wanting

in boldness for the preaching of the Gospel. All that can be gathered from history on this point is, that of those named in the epistle to the Colossians, and in that to Philemon, only Aristarchus and Jesus Justus (*οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς*, Col. i. 11) with Demas and Luke, could still have been with the apostle, it being supposed that this epistle was written subsequently to these. When with reference to Demas we compare 2 Tim. iv. 10, and further, consider that those first-named as *being of the circumcision*, would not be thought so suitable for being sent to a church composed almost entirely of Gentiles, only Luke will then remain. But with respect to him, as he certainly had been with the apostle at Philippi (comp. Acts xvi. 10, sq.), and yet no notice is taken of him throughout the whole epistle, not even at iv. 21, the conjecture is well founded that he was not present with the apostle when the epistle was written, as also De Wette and Meyer suppose. This historical reference has not indeed led us to any positive result, but it has at least proved that the apostle's words, ver. 20, 21, do not apply to any of those of his fellow-labourers in reference to whom they would have excited our surprise.

Ver. 22. If in the others there is no complete devotedness to be looked for, on the other hand, the proof of Timothy is known to the Philippians, from their own experience. Acts xvi. 1, sq. *Γινώσκετε*, regarded as the imperative, does not agree with what follows. On *δοκιμή*, indoles spectata, comp. Rom. v. 4; 2 Cor. ii. 9, ix. 13. In what this proof consisted, we are told in the words that follow, *ὅτι*, &c. The expression, *as a son with the father*, indicates that quality of character by which Timothy had approved himself; it implies, disinterested devotedness. *Εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον* is, "for the cause of the Gospel." On the oratio variata in *πατρί* and *σὺν ἐμοί*, comp. Winer, § 64, iii. 1, p. 626.

Ver. 23. This verse concludes what is said regarding Timothy, and points back to ver. 19. The *ταχέως* of ver. 19 is here explained: *as soon as I shall see how it will go with me.* The apostle will only wait to see how his future lot shall be determined. On the form *ἀφίδω*, see Winer, § 5, 1, c. Anm. p. 53. The word occurs also in the Sept. at Jon. iv. 5, and signifies to "see from afar," "to wait for," prospicere.

Ver. 24. The apostle does not, however, give up the prospect of

his own arrival amongst them. The δέ corresponds to the μέν, ver. 23. On ἐν κυρίῳ, comp. ii. 19. On the hope here expressed, i. 25, 26; Phil. 22.

Ver. 25—30. The sending back of Epaphroditus has nothing in common with the object of Timothy's mission. So that, De Wette does not give the true scope of the passage when he understands the apostle to mean, "As it is not certain either that I shall see you myself, or that I shall send Timothy, I have deemed it necessary, &c." The reason of Epaphroditus being sent is represented in ver. 26 and 28 as arising out of merely personal circumstances. Nothing farther is known of Epaphroditus, beyond the notice that is here taken of him. It cannot be proved with any certainty, that he is the same person as the Epaphras named in Col. i. 7, iv. 12; Phil. 23. Comp. Winer R.W.B. on Epaphras. There is nothing decidedly against this conjecture in our epistle, as he might be the bearer of the contribution to the support of the apostle from the Philippians, without belonging to their church. In the following predicates the apostle describes him, as well in his relation to him as to them (μου—ὑμῶν δέ). These are his recommendation. The first three form a climax—brother (in the Lord)—my companion in labour—in struggles and dangers. Phil. 2; 2 Tim. ii. 3, sq.—Ὑμῶν δέ ἀπόστολον. The expression in its general signification, viz., "deputy," occurs at 2 Cor. viii. 23. How could he be called the apostle of the Philippians? Comp. 1 Cor. ix. 1—3. The word ὑμῶν standing foremost, as the antithesis to the preceding part of the verse, extends to the λειτουργὸν τῆς χρείας μου, as ver. 30 also proves. Λειτουργός as λειτουργεω, Rom. xv. 27, and λειτουργία, 2 Cor. ix. 12, and in a subsequent passage in this epistle, ii. 30, is to be taken in its wider signification, viz., "servant." Χρεία means "want," not, the thing wanted. The λειτουργὸν, &c., explains the ἀπόστολον.

Ver. 26. This verse tells us why the apostle thought it necessary to send back Epaphroditus, namely, because he (Epaphroditus) *longed after the Philippians, and was in heaviness because that they had heard that he was sick.* On the ἦν with the participle, see Winer, § 46, 11, p. 411.—Ἀδημονῶν, comp. Matth. xxvi. 37; Mark xiv. 33 (from ἀδέω to be satiated, to be disgusted with a thing.)

Ver. 27. The apostle confirms the intelligence they had received;

for indeed he was sick, nigh unto death, but God had mercy on him, and not on him only, but on me also, that I might not have sorrow upon sorrow. By the *sorrow* to which a fresh sorrow would have been added, but for the recovery of Epaphroditus, the most of expositors rightly understand, his condition as a prisoner; comp. ver. 28, from which we see that the apostle has still sorrow, although it is not increased on account of Epaphroditus.—*Παραπλήσιον* may be understood either, with Meyer, as an adverb of comparison, or (which is more agreeable to ver. 30) as a prepositional adverb, signifying "near to." Comp. Winer, § 58, 6, p. 554. That *λύπην ἐπὶ λύπην*, and not *λύπῃ*, is the true reading, is fully proved.

Ver. 28. In such circumstances he hastened the execution of his purpose to send him back, in order that they seeing him again, or rather, seeing him might again have joy, and he have less sorrow. On *ἰδόντες*, which does not depend on *χαρῆτε*, comp. Winer, § 46, 1 ** p. 396. On *πάλιν* connected with *χαρῆτε*, see Meyer on this passage. *Ἀλυπότερος*, in so far as the anxiety of the Philippians regarding Epaphroditus is *sorrow* to the apostle, it ceases so soon as they again rejoice.

Ver. 29, 30. The recommendation of Epaphroditus to their Christian reception. Receive him then—according to my intention—*ἐν κυρίῳ*, as it becomes Christians, with every mark of joy, and hold such men in honour. This general form which the apostle gives to his injunction, may perhaps be regarded as bearing out what we have remarked on the words *ἐπισκόποις* and *διακόνοις*, ch. i. 1. Comp. also ii. 3. The tendency to overvalue self, has for its reverse side the tendency to undervalue others. Ver. 30 represents as the ground of such a recommendation, the service rendered by Epaphroditus to the cause of Christ, for which the church owes him special thanks. It has been much disputed whether *παραβουλευσάμενος* or *παραβολευσαμενος* is the true reading. Tischendorf has in his latest edition again received into the text the former, according to Codd. C.J.G., and the Fathers; whilst Griesbach, Lachmann, Scholz, Göschen, Matthies, Winer, De Wette, and Meyer, decide in favour of *παραβολευσάμενος*, which has the preponderating authority of A B.D.E.F.G., &c. Neither the one nor the other is found in profane writers; *παραβουλευσάμενος*, however, occurs in the Fathers, which may explain how this reading

has arisen out of the other, while the other can only be regarded as an error of transcription (Van Hengel.) The formation of the word (*παράβολον εἶναι*) as Winer, § 16, 1, p. 104, has shown by other examples, argues nothing against it. In the profane writers *παραβάλλεσθαι* occurs in this sense, both with the accusative, for example, *ἐμὴν ψυχήν* "to stake my life upon it," and also though more rarely with the dative, (as in this passage,) which then denotes "with regard to." Winer, § 31, 3, p. 244.—For fixing the sense of this verse, it is chiefly necessary to keep in view that clause, which informs us that the danger to which Epaphroditus exposed himself, was occasioned by the fulfilment of the commission which he had received from the Philippians. In that clause, *ἵνα*, &c. (which must be connected with *παραβολευσαμενος*) *τὸ ὑμῶν ὑστέρημα* is to be rendered: "What was awanting on your part"—*ὑμῶν* being taken subjectively as at 2 Cor. viii. 14, ix. 12, xi. 9. Meyer understands it as denoting that which was awanting, as in 1 Cor. xvi. 17, *ὑμέτερον*, which appears to me not to suit the following genitive. He renders thus—"you have failed in rendering pecuniary assistance." What was lacking on their part, may be seen by reference to such passages as 1 Cor. xvi. 18; Phil. xiii., namely, the *personal service*, as Luther renders it, "that he might serve me in your stead." It will not do to understand by *ὑστέρημα*, the *conveyance of the gift*, as that which was lacking on the part of the Philippians, for this in itself cannot be considered as exposing the life to danger. The expression is more probably to be understood as implying, on the part of Epaphroditus, a self-forgetting, self-sacrificing zeal in the service of the apostle, which occasioned the illness that brought him nigh unto death. Still nothing can be said with certainty on the point. On the other hand, there can be no doubt as to the sense of the words, *for the work of Christ*; in their connection with *ἵνα* they can, at least directly, only be understood to signify that the service which he rendered to the apostle, was undertaken *for the work of Christ*. That Epaphroditus was also active in teaching, may be inferred from ii. 25.

§ 5. WARNING AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING LED AWAY.

(Ch. iii. 1—iv. 1.)

The apostle has already said what lay nearest to his heart. He now addresses himself to the conclusion, in which he once more calls upon them to *rejoice*, and specially to *rejoice in the Lord;* for he has still to warn them against those who would deprive them of this joy, and who would do so in a twofold way. On the one hand, danger threatens them from the Judaizing false teachers, on the other, from the contaminating example of those whose conversation is immoral. The apostle warns them against the former in vv. 1—16, against the latter in vv. 17—21, and then closes this section ch. iv. 1 with the comprehensive exhortation to stand fast in the Lord, in the way in which he has directed them. We proceed to the more particular examination of these topics as they are successively brought before us in this chapter.

Ver. 1. *Τὸ λοιπόν*, the well known form of expression denoting the transition to the conclusion; "what yet remains," what the readers have still to attend to, in addition to that which has been already said. Comp. 2 Cor. xiii. 11; Eph. vi. 10; 1 Thess. iv. 1; 2 Thess. iii. 1, and in this epistle ch. iv. 8. What yet remains is, however, nothing different from what he has already said to them, viz. *χαίρετε*. It is the key-note of the epistle which he once more strikes, it is the *one*, in which *all* that he has still to say is comprehended. It appears to me that the apostle designedly places before the following warning, this *χαίρετε*, and especially *χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ*, rejoice in the Lord, with that joy which has its source and its element in Him, which is had only in fellowship with Him. For, the *χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ* comprehends that which is represented in the words *στήκετε ἐν κυρίῳ*, iv. 1, as lying at the foundation of the following exhortation. I see no reason, therefore, to suppose that the apostle immediately loses sight of the conclusion introduced at ver. 1. Why may not the warning which follows be considered as a part of that which still remains to be said? That much still remained to be said, or rather that what remained has been said at such length, does not argue against this. May it not be the same here as at 1 Thess. iv. 1?—The view which regards *τὸ λοιπὸν*, &c., as the

conclusion to what goes before, is forbidden by the true signification of τὸ λοιπόν. Many hold it to be inadmissible that the apostle in τὸ λοιπόν passes to the conclusion, because he has not yet thanked the Philippians for the gift which they had transmitted to him. As if the τὸ λοιπόν necessarily excludes the insertion of thanksgiving! On the evidence which some have thought to find in this passage in favour of the supposition that two epistles are joined together, comp. Introd. § 4, B. It is not necessary, on the one hand, to suppose that the apostle added what follows after an interruption, or that he introduces a pause after χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ. And just as little reason is there, with De Wette, to consider the χαίρετε (as at iv. 4, 1 Thess. v. 16,) as an exhortation standing by itself. For the cases compared are not analogous. This exhortation, unless connected with what precedes and what follows, would obscure the train of thought throughout the entire epistle, which is otherwise so clear. If the view which we have stated above, according to which, the χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ is purposely placed before the warning that follows, is rejected as improbable, then we can only say with Meyer, that the conclusion to which the apostle addressed himself at ver. 1 was immediately waived, because another topic had come into his mind, which must be disposed of ere he should conclude.

If we have rightly apprehended the sense of the τὸ λοιπόν χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ with which the apostle here begins anew, then the difficulty will be removed from the words that immediately follow; *to write the same things to me indeed is not grievous, but for you it is safe.* It is well-known that expositors are divided as to whether these words refer to what goes before or to what follows. In the latter case, either passages have been sought in the preceding portion of the epistle, which are supposed to contain warnings similar to those here given, as i. 15, xvi. 27, sq. (so Lünemann recently), or it has been suggested that the apostle alludes to oral statements which he had made, and which he now repeats in writing, so that emphasis is to be placed on the word *write* (which, however, the context in no way indicates, comp. Van Hengel, Lünemann, and Meyer on this passage), or, finally, epistles of the apostle that have been lost are here called into service, which are supposed to have contained such warnings against false teachers. The last of these hypotheses might be reckoned the most probable

if, in general, there were any occasion for such a hypothesis; and in confirmation of it, the testimony of Polycarp might be appealed to, ad Phil. 3: ὅς καὶ ἀπὼν ὑμῖν ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολάς, as Meyer has done, although, it is doubtful whether this testimony may not be greatly weakened, by the words occurring at cap. 11: qui estis in principio epistolae ejus. But it must at least be acknowledged that it is not the apostle's custom, to refer in this manner to epistles formerly written by him. (Van Hengel, p. 210). We have already stated the objection to the second hypothesis, and, with regard to the first, it cannot but be acknowledged that those passages which can by any chance be appealed to, bear only a very general resemblance, and that it could scarcely be deemed appropriate for the apostle to justify their repetition by the words, *to me indeed it is not grievous but for you it is safe* (Van Hengel, p. 211). And this will appear still more true if, as has been seen above, i. 15, 16 is to be understood not of Judaizing, but of purely personal opponents of the apostle. If we now turn to the other supposition, according to which τὰ αὐτά is referred to the words immediately preceding, and in favour of which, not a few commentators, as Bengel, Storr, Matthies, Van Hengel, Rilliet, have decided, it will be seen at the first glance, that the fact of the χαίρειν having been already repeatedly spoken of, confirms this view. The apostle has at i. 18 denoted his own predominant feeling by the word *joy;* by the expression *joy of faith*, he denotes the object at which the Philippians are to aim. The entire section i. 27—ii. 18, takes (through the *only*, i. 27) the form of an answer to the question, how this joy of faith is to be arrived at. The conclusion, ii. 17, 18, evidently turns back to this point of departure (on which comp. the exposition), and he closes expressly with the words *joy and rejoice with me.* And now when the apostle, having with these words closed his exhortation, sets out anew, iii. 1, with the word *rejoice,* and adds, *to write the same things*, &c., is it not most natural to refer the *same things* here spoken of, to these words? What has hitherto been objected to this interpretation does not, as I apprehend, affect the explanation we have given. For the objection,—that αὐτά cannot apply to χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ and the references to what goes before connected with this expression (comp. Van Hengel, p. 211, sq.), and that, if such were the case, τὸ αὐτό would be used, has been satisfactorily replied to by Meyer (p. 83) although

he is in other respects opposed to our view. The objection that ii. 18 treats of quite a different *χαίρειν*, and that "up to this point no call to Christian joyfulness in general has been addressed to the Philippians," loses its force when viewed in connection with the explanation we have given of what goes before, whilst it might with reason be urged against the most of interpretations. The only remaining source whence an objection has been drawn, is the expression *ἀσφαλές*, which is said not to be suitable to the exhortation *χαίρετε*, but only to a warning against danger. But does this objection affect our interpretation, when this very *χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ* (on the significance of *κυρίῳ* here added we have already remarked above) forms the introduction to the warning against falling away from the Lord? Could the apostle, in order to explain what might seem strange in his beginning with *τὸ λοιπόν*, and yet calling upon them again to *rejoice*, not appropriately say—"do not wonder that I write this to you once more, it does not awaken doubt in me (commonly, me non piget, Meyer, better, 'doubtful'), but it conduces to your safety." He thus signifies by the word *ἀσφαλές* his object in again addressing to them the injunction *χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ*. I can see no serious difficulty in this.

Ver. 2. Here follows the motive that has induced the apostle again to call upon his readers to *rejoice in the Lord;* namely, the danger that threatens them from those who do not *rejoice in Christ*, but have their confidence in the *flesh*. In opposition to them, he exhorts the Philippians to *rejoice in the Lord*. That the perversion is not to be conceived of as having already gained ground, but only as having been possible, see on this our remarks in the Introduction, and chiefly the work by Schinz there cited.—This circumstance will with difficulty be reconciled to the view, that the apostle had previously addressed an epistle to the church, "which was professedly, and with all the energy of the apostle, as yet unrestrained in his labours, occupied with the Judaizing teachers, in something of the same style as the epistle to the Galatians," Meyer. In such a case it must be supposed that, as in the church at Galatia, the perverting influence of the false teachers was already manifest; a supposition which is not borne out by this epistle, in so far as it makes us acquainted with the state of the church. It has moreover been thought that the tone of severity which cha-

racterizes the following passage, is so much at variance with the gentle and cordial spirit that pervades the rest of the epistle, and especially, that it differs so much from the manner in which at i. 15, sq. he speaks of the Judaizing teachers, as to warrant our identifying it with the tone of that supposed epistle, from which the following passage has been partly taken. But the transcription of passages or expressions from another epistle, the tone of which did not agree with this, would also have something strange in it. And then, that the sharp and severe style in which he writes against the Judaists, may yet be accompanied with an affectionate and familiar manner towards the church, we shall afterwards see when at ver. 18, sq., he directs his address to the church. When this passage, however, is compared with i. 15, sq., the difference in style which is so manifest, ought to lead to the conclusion that in that place, not Judaizing opponents are meant, but opponents of a different kind; otherwise, the joy which the apostle there expresses in their preaching of Christ, could not be reconciled with the manner in which he expresses himself in this passage. Comp. supra. *Βλέπετε τοὺς κύνας.* The apostle here warns his readers of a danger already known to them, whether we suppose it to have been in the church itself or in its neighbourhood, that such Judaists sought to gain access. They are to keep these false teachers in view, in order rightly to learn their character. By thus looking at them, they will learn what they ought to think of them, and that they ought to beware of them. *Βλέπετε* itself does not, however, mean "beware," on which see Winer, § 32, 1, p. 256, but "look at" in order to learn. So 1 Cor. x. 18. Similarly *σκοπεῖν*, Rom. xvi. 17. The expression *τοὺς κύνας* is not so much to be understood in the sense in which it is generally used by profane writers, as denoting "bold and impudent men," as in its Scriptural sense, according to which it denotes "impure men," who have no part in what is holy; therefore a term of reproach commonly applied by the Jews to the Gentiles. So also the most recent commentators.

Βλέπετε τοὺς κακοὺς ἐργάτας. On the emphasis implied in the repetition, see Winer, § 67, 2, C. p. 692. On *τοὺς κακοὺς ἐργάτας*, compare the corresponding *δόλιοι ἐργάται*, 2 Cor. xi. 13. Finally, the expression *τὴν κατατομήν* describes the opponents specifically as Judaizing teachers of the law, who insisted on the

circumcision of the Gentiles, and with this, on the acknowledgment of the whole law. The apostle calls them κατατομήν "the concision," not περιτομήν (the abstract for the concrete), to signify that their περιτομή, to which they attach so much value, has no higher meaning, that it is nothing but a mangling of the flesh, and therefore more a defect than an advantage. On this play upon words, see Winer, § 62, 2, p. 602. Similarly, Gal. v. 11, 12. The antithesis at ver. 3, in the words, *having no confidence in the flesh*, shows, wherefore the apostle designates the περιτομή of these opponents as a mere *cutting* without any higher signification. He would not have thus characterized the circumcision of the Old Testament in itself (comp. Rom. ix. 4, sq.); any more than he ever expected of Jews who became Christians, that they would give up the observance of the law. What was his opinion, as also that of the rest of the apostles, on this subject, we learn from Acts xv. 6, sq., compared with Gal. 2.[1] If only the observance of the Old Testament law were kept in subordination to the truth declared in Acts xv. 11, *we believe, that through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, we shall be saved even as they*, then might the Jew who had become a Christian, always remain faithful to the law of his fathers. Nay the apostle himself acted on this principle in his own conduct, as is proved by the account of his vow, Acts xviii. 18, of his purification, Acts xxi. 26, and also of the circumcision of Timothy, Acts xvi. 3; notwithstanding of all the earnestness with which he contends against the imposition of the law as a condition of salvation. Baur is therefore wrong when he maintains that in this passage the Christians are described as the true περιτομή, the Jews as the false κατατομὴ. The circumcision of the Jews becomes a κατατομή only because, instead of rejoicing in Christ, they put confidence in the flesh, as is shown at ver. 3. And equally mistaken is Baur also in supposing that the difference *in quality* between true and false circumcision, is here expressed by the difference in *quantity* implied in the terms περιτομή and κατατομή. How can any one impute to the writer of this epistle such an absurdity as would be implied in his characterizing the circumcision of the Jews as κατατομή with reference to its quantity, in opposition to the *circumcision of the heart*, which is *made without hands*. The apostle rather gives his opponents the appellation κατατομή

1 Compare my dissertation de consensu locorum, Acts xv. et Gal. 2 Erl. 1847.

(which by no means has a greater quantitative force than περιτομή, as it signifies only cutting, "incision"), because he aims at representing that circumcision of the flesh in which they put so much confidence, as entirely worthless, as what it is viewed outwardly, *a mangling, a mutilation*, in which one has no cause to rejoice. Others are for taking κατατομή in an active sense, as already Theodoret has done, denoting that the opponents were aiming at cutting in pieces and destroying the church, which is plainly forbidden by the antithetical περιτομή, in the passive sense at ver. 3, as has already been observed by others.

Ver. 3. The apostle now explains why he designates his Jewish Christian opponents by κατατομή and not by περιτομή; *for we are the circumcision* (ἡ περιτομή), not the concision, *who worship God in the spirit* (the reading θεοῦ is satisfactorily established), *and rejoice in Christ Jesus, and have no confidence in the flesh.* In these few words is contained the sum of what the apostle says in the epistle to the Galatians in refutation of these opponents. This antithesis is, however, according to Baur, expressed by the apostle, not with the view of saying anything relating to the subject, but of affording him an opportunity of speaking about himself, as is the practice with the authors of pseudo-apostolical writings. But, in the first place, the apostle as yet says nothing of himself; but designates himself together with the entire church at Philippi, and without respect to any difference between Jews and Gentiles belonging to it, as the true περιτομή, in which the opposition between Jew and Gentile is done away with, so as distinctly to show that by κατατομή he does not mean the circumcision of the Jews. Compare similar passages at Rom. ii. 25—29, *circumcision of the heart,* Col. ii. 11, *in whom ye also are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands,* &c. and the Introduction, § 4. In addition to these, 1 Cor. vii. 19; Gal. iii. 28, v. 6, vi. 15, with respect to the difference between Jew and Gentile being done away with *in Christ;* which, however, does not imply that its continuance in time is abolished, any more than the continuance of such differences as are expressed in the words, *bond* and *free, male* and *female.* The words of ver. 3 contain in particular nothing difficult. According to the true reading πνεύματι θεοῦ, λατρεύω is *absolute,* as at Heb. ix. 9, x. 2; Acts xxvi. 7; Luke ii. 37. The dative is to be understood as the casus instrumentalis.

comp. Winer, § 31, 4, p. 245. *Πνεῦμα θεοῦ*, the new principle of life in opposition to all that which belongs to the natural man,—the *σάρξ*, which appears as the ungodly principle, in consequence of its opposition to the former. Comp. the similar passage at John iv 23, *they shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth*, and such passages as Heb. ix. 10, 14; Gal. iii. 3, &c. The expression *καυχώμενοι*, as at 1 Cor. i. 31, ii. 21—23; 2 Cor. x. 17, is explained by its being in opposition to those who rejoice in the flesh. What we are to understand by the words *rejoicing in Christ*, appears from the antithetical expression, *having no confidence in the flesh*; see also ver. 9. By the *σάρξ* in which these opponents place their confidence, is meant not merely circumcision, but all that the apostle mentions in vv. 5, 6.

Ver. 4. After the apostle has in ver. 3, placed the circumcision of his opponents as a mere cutting of the body, in opposition to the true circumcision, he proceeds in this and the following verses to combat them with their own weapons. He himself possesses all that to which they attach so much value, nevertheless, he has renounced it all for the sake of Christ.—The *καίπερ ἐγὼ ἔχων* is closely connected with the *οὐκ ἐν σαρκὶ πεποιθότες*, and qualifies it especally with respect to the apostle himself, who is included in the *ἡμεῖς* of ver. 3. It is not because he is without such advantages that he puts no trust in them, but notwithstanding of his possessing them, in as great a measure as any one can do. The participle *ἔχων* is to be construed with the *ἐσμεν* of ver. 3.—*Ἔχων πεποίθησιν καὶ ἐν σαρκί*; that the apostle does not really cherish any such confident trust, is evident both from the foregoing *οὐ πεποιθότες*, and the following *δοκεῖ πεποιθέναι*. (Compare on *πεποίθησις*, Harless on Eph. iii. 12.) It has therefore been supposed, according to Beza, that *πεποίθησιν* is to be understood as expressing by metonyme the *ground of confidence*, or, that *ἔχων* is to be taken as equivalent to *ἔχειν δυνάμενος*, or, (Van Hengel) that it is intended to refer to what is past. The true way is given by Meyer, who on *ἔχων* observes, "confidence in carnal advantages is here regarded as a possession, which Paul although he makes no use of it, still has, and which he can bring into notice when anything is to be gained by it." On the other hand, I am inclined to understand the *δοκεῖ* in the words that follow, as expressive of what one thinks of oneself, as at 1 Cor. iii. 18, viii. 2,

xiv. 37; Gal. vi. 3, rather than of what others think of him (equivalent to "appear," "are found," comp. Gal. ii. 6, 9), not, however, as implying the πεποιθέναι, but only the possession of outward advantages. At ἐγὼ μᾶλλον, δοκῶ is to be supplied; comp. ὑπερ ἐγὼ, 2 Cor. xi. 23. Thus does the apostle match himself with those false teachers, becoming a fool with them (as he expresses it, 2 Cor. xi. 17.)

Ver. 5, 6. In proof of the assertion in ἐγὼ μᾶλλον, the apostle here enumerates the particular grounds of confidence, in which the Jews trusted. We are not, however, to look for a μᾶλλον ἐγὼ in every single particular, as this is not necessary in order to the proof of the assertion. The first advantage of this kind is περιτομῇ ὀκταήμερος—this is the true reading, not περιτομῆ, for reasons of a grammatical kind, comp. Winer, § 31, 3, p. 244, where also see on the dative, denoting "with reference to." The *eighth day* (comp. Lev. xii. 3), the mark of the native Jew, as distinguished from the proselyte. According to the remark made above on ἐγὼ μὰλλον, it is not to be inferred with certainty, that those Jewish-Christian opponents were partly proselytes. The apostle enumerates all such advantages as belong to himself, and the ἐγὼ μᾶλλον is to be inferred from the whole taken together, not from each particular. In censum nunc venit splendor natalium, as Van Hengel expresses it. To this belong three particulars. Of *the stock of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin*, an *Hebrew of the Hebrews*, the first of which denotes the gens, the second, the *tribe*, the third the *parents* from which he is descended. Comp. the similar passages at 2 Cor. xi. 22; Rom. xi. 1. On *Israel*, as the designation of the people in their theocratic relation, see Harless on Eph. ii. 12. Others render, "of the race of Israel, *i.e.* Jacob." We learn from history that the *tribe of Benjamin* was held in honour. Ἑβραῖος, not with reference to the *language*, as at Acts vi. 1, but, as De Wette explains, "denoting extraction from purely Jewish parents," in so far as Ἑβραῖος is expressive of the *natural*, not of the *theocratic* distinction of the Jews from other nations. Then follow three other particulars, each of which is related to the other, for they represent in different aspects a life blameless in the eyes of those teachers of the law. Meyer distinguishes this as the apostle's theocratic individuality. Κατά expresses in each case the particular reference, thus, *as touching the law, a Pharisee*, Acts

xxii. 3, xxvi. 5, not "according to, or conformable to the law." To take *νόμος* as equivalent to *αἵρεσις*, would be contrary to the *usus linguæ* of the apostle, as well as unsuitable to the connexion, as it is the apostle's position with reference to the law that is here spoken of. He belongs to the *sect* whose acknowledged distinction is, the observance of the law. *Concerning zeal a persecutor of the church.* *Κατά* is not to be understood otherwise here than in the preceding clause. *Διώκων*, used substantively. That which the apostle elsewhere characterizes as his greatest sin, 1 Cor. xv. 8, 9; 1 Tim. i. 13, sq., must have been reckoned by those opponents a ground of boasting; and he here mentions it as an honour, although ironically, and looking at it for the moment in the light in which they regard it. The last particular, *κατὰ δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐν νόμῳ*, with respect to the (entire) righteousness which is founded in the law, irreprehensible; namely, according to the judgment of men. It has been already observed how differently the apostle himself judges. *Δικαιοσύνη ἐν νόμῳ*, must not be understood (with De Wette) as denoting, righteousness under the law. The passages to which de Wette refers are different from the present, inasmuch as in them persons are spoken of who are *ἐν νόμῳ*. This idea of a righteousness founded on the law, is said by Baur to be not Pauline!

Ver. 7. The apostle having shown how he is superior to all his opponents, even when measured by their own standard, proceeds to say—*but what things soever were gain to me, those I have counted loss for Christ.* Thus does he in his own person represent the position of his opponents to be such, as that what passes with them for gain is to be really counted as loss. The *ἅτινα* "whatsoever," includes both the foregoing and all such like advantages, and is emphatical, as the following *ταῦτα* shows. *Μοί*, is not merely to be taken as the dative denoting the *opinion* which the apostle then entertained; but as Meyer explains, "in his former state, *κατὰ σάρκα*, they were really gain to him." *Κέρδη* plur. ob rerum varietatem (Van Hengel.) *Ἥγημαι* as actio plane praeterita quae per effectus suos durat; the antithesis to it is at ver. 8, *ἡγοῦμαι*. The expression *for Christ* is explained by the apostle himself at vv. 8, 9, in the words, *that I may win Christ*, &c. The ground of his counting all things but loss, and not gain, lies *in Christ*, for in this his loss consists, that they kept him away from Christ. We

may see from Rom. vii. 7, &c., how erroneous it is, to impute the workings of the law in consequence of human corruption to the law itself, and to include in the ἅτινα the *law itself*, instead of the apostle's position with regard to the law.

Ver. 8.—The apostle places ἡγοῦμαι in contrast with ἥγημαι; as then, so now also, whatever his opponents may say. Ἀλλὰ μὲν οὖν (not μενοῦνγε) equivalent to imo, vero, Winer, § 57, 4, p. 521. Πάντα is that which was denoted at ver. 7 by ἅτινα, so that the antithesis lies not in the πάντα (Rilliet), but in the ἡγοῦμαι, before which also καί stands. The present tense expresses more pointedly, the opposition to that false doctrine, which would require the converted Gentiles to supplement their Christianity with Judaism. Further, the apostle counts all but loss *for the excellency*, &c. Διὰ τὸ ὑπερέχον as a substantive (not for τὴν ὑπερεχοῦσαν) in order to give greater prominence to the idea implied in it. The excellency on account of which all appears as loss, lies in the object of knowledge, Christ Jesus. The nature of this knowledge, we learn from vv. 9, 10; it is a knowledge which presupposes *believing fellowship with Him*, and *suffering the loss of all things*. Only in this sense does it correspond with the antithesis in ἥγημαι and ἡγοῦμαι. The apostle adds *my Lord*, under the constraining influence of grateful love. The expressions διὰ τὸν Χριστόν and διὰ τὸ ὑπερέχον are further explained in what follows—first, διὰ τὸν Χριστόν; this, however, has significance only when considered as that which the other presupposes. In order to explain, how this knowledge of Christ makes him determine always to count all things but loss, he shows at vv. 8, 10, that it rests on fellowship with Christ; the essential pre-requisite to which is, not the righteousness of the law but the righteousness which is through faith in him. To arrive at this knowledge then, all self-glorying must be renounced. Accordingly, the τοῦ γνῶναι of ver. 10 is no other than that mentioned at ver. 8, and the second half of ver. 8, and ver. 9 indicates *that*, without which such a γνῶναι is not possible. Thus do we understand why the apostle, in the words, *for whom I am deprived of all things*, returns to the idea at ver. 7, and, corresponding to the expression of that idea in ver. 8 now adds, *and do count them but dung*. Ἐζημιώθην must not be understood as having a middle signification (I have deprived myself) on account of the connexion with ver. 7, but may well enough be taken in a passive sense, as

indeed it usually is (I have been deprived.) It is the consequence of the ἥγημαι ζημίαν, and the expression is therefore still stronger. The words *and do count,* are not to be separated from *for whom,* and *for whom I have suffered the loss of all things* to be taken as a parenthetic clause, as appears from the connexion already stated. This relative clause would, in that case, be useless, and what follows would not appear as an explanation of the διὰ τὸ ὑπερέχον, but would introduce a *further reason* for the ἡγοῦμαι, whilst, as ver. 10 shows, no further reason is given, but only the explanation of the διὰ τὸ ὑπερέχον.—Σκύβαλα, a strong expression for ζημία, equivalent to "refuse," a common derivation from κυσὶ βαλεῖν, see Passow.) The end for which the apostle *suffers the loss* of all things, and *counts them but dung,* is then stated in the words, *that I may win Christ,* in which accordingly we have the explanation of the *for whom,* as also of the *for Christ,* at ver. 7. For his sake, *i.e.* to gain him, I have been deprived of all things, and do count them always as dross. The expression κερδήσω is explained by the antithesis with ζημιωθῆναι; Christ comes as gain, in the place of the loss he has suffered.

Ver. 9. The words ἵνα Χριστὸν κερδήσω evidently correspond more to ἐζημιώθην than to ἡγοῦμαι, unless, with Van Hengel and others, we understand κερδαίνειν as expressive of a growing possession which would involve an idea that we can hardly ascribe to the apostle; for this κερδαίνειν is *fully realized* by attaining to the righteousness of faith, and entering into fellowship with Christ, ver. 9. (The μορφοῦσθαι at Gal. iv. 19, is a different idea.) If the first expression corresponds more to ἐζημιώθην, the καὶ ἐυρεθῶ ἐν αὐτῷ, on the other hand, corresponds more to ἡγοῦμαι. It is quite evident, that this εὑρεθῆναι is not equivalent to εἶναι. On the other side, as De Wette remarks, it adequately represents *the being actually found,* and it is therefore not necessary to suppose in εὑρεθῶ any allusion to the great day of judgment. De Wette and Meyer, have justly stated as reasons why μὴ ἔχων should not be immediately connected with εὑρεθῶ ut deprehendar . . . . non habere, (Van Hengel) "that ἐν αὐτῷ and διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ do not go together, and thus the significance of the εὑρεθῶ ἐν αὐτῷ, taken by itself, would be lost." Μὴ ἔχων is rather to be understood, as introducing a more specific statement of what is implied in the εὑρεθῶ ἐν αὐτῷ. On μή, Winer, § 59,

4, B, p. 561. In order rightly to understand the following words, ver. 9, it is of chief importance to keep in view, as De Wette has shown, the twofold signification of *δικαίοσυνην* as connected with *ἐμήν*, and *τὴν ἐκ νόμου*. By *ἐμήν*, the apostle denotes one's own righteousness wrought out by himself, as Rom. x. 3, *τὴν ἰδίαν δικαίοσυνην*. The opposite of this, as the passage just cited shows, is *ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ δικαίοσυνη*, or, as it is here expressed, *τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ δικαίοσυνην*, whilst to the *τὴν ἐκ νόμου* is opposed the *τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ*. I connect, however, the *ἐπί τῇ πίστει* at the close, with the last *δικαίοσυνη*, as denoting the foundation on which this *δικαίοσυνη θεοῦ* in the individual rests, whilst in *διὰ πίστεως*, faith is represented in its *objective* aspect, as the means by which that righteousness is appropriated, corresponding to the *ἐκ νόμου*. The *τήν ἐκ θεοῦ δικαίοσυνην ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει*, taken as one idea, forms then the antithesis to *ἐμὴν δικαίοσυνην*; it is not a righteousness proceeding from the individual who possesses it, but from God, and belonging to the individual only in so far as it rests on the foundation of faith, as its subjective condition. It will be seen that this interpretation fully brings out the antithetical relation of the several clauses to one another.—*Ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει* is most simply rendered, as Meyer does, by "on the ground of faith," which, however, requires *ἔχων* to be supplied after *ἀλλά*. But in this case would not *ἔχων* be repeated? And is not the omission of the article justified by this, namely, that *ἐπὶ πίστει* completes the idea which stands opposed to the *ἐμὴ δικαίοσυνη*? The examples adduced by Winer, § 19, 2, p. 155, amply justify this. Compare also Harless on Ephes. i. 15.—Against the interpretations "on account of faith," or "on the condition of faith," nothing can be objected grammatically, but it seems the most natural way to understand *ἐπὶ πίστει* in immediate connection with *δικαίοσυνην*, as we have done. So also Olshausen. As parallel passages on this subject, comp. Rom. iii. 21, 22, ix. 32, x. 3, 5, 6, &c., especially on the idea of righteousness proceeding from God, such passages as iii. 26. God is the *δικαιῶν τὸν ἐκ πίστεως*, iv. 5, &c.

Ver. 10. *Τοῦ γνῶναι αὐτόν*. Not to speak of the ungrammatical connection of this clause with *ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει* (against which comp. Meyer and Van Hengel), it is understood either as parallel to the *ἵνα*, ver. 8, or as dependant on *εὑρεθῶ*, or finally, as further explicative

of the relation expressed in μὴ ἔχων, ver. 9. If we have rightly apprehended the train of thought from ver. 8 to ver. 10, then the first of these interpretations falls of itself to the ground, as *it* implies that there is no train of thought, and for this reason it presents no adequate parallel, as Meyer has also observed. There is room for doubt as to whether the clause should be connected with εὑρεθῶ or with μὴ ἔχων (so Meyer), and it is all one which we adopt so far as regards the idea conveyed, as in connection with εὑρεθῶ, it must still be understood as expressing the relation which is more exactly determined by the μὴ ἔχων, as the fellowship of faith. If τοῦ depends on εὑρεθῶ, which appears to me more natural than to regard it as a by-clause having an explicative force, then the construction will be entirely similar to that at Rom. vi. 6, where also, on a clause beginning with ἵνα, denoting "end or aim," a new one is made to depend with τοῦ and the infinitive. The following is the idea intended to be expressed: "the apostle gives up all, in order that, through the righteousness of faith (which requires as its condition this renunciation of what belongs to self), he may be found in Christ, so as in consequence of this fellowship to know what is stated in ver. 10." So, at Ephes. iii. 18, the *being rooted in love* is represented as that which knowledge presupposes. Thus, as Meyer has also observed, the τοῦ γνῶναι explains the origin of the knowledge mentioned at ver. 8, and from this its origin, it appears why the apostle esteems all but loss for its sake; but this *knowledge* is still more exactly defined in respect of its object, so as to manifest its excellency, in comparison with which every thing else disappears. That I may know him, says the apostle, and the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, in that I am made conformable to his death. This is a knowledge which is not possible without being *in him;* no mere speculative knowledge, but the experimental knowledge and appropriation of Christ, a knowledge which makes us like to him who is known, and which reaches its perfection only when we shall see him as he is, 1 John iii. 18. To know him (αὐτὸν), is the apostle's aim in renouncing all that belongs to himself, in virtue of the believing fellowship with him of which this self-renunciation is the condition. This αὐτον, however, he now further explains from these two points of view, viz. his exaltation and his humiliation. In this twofold aspect the apostle aims at appropriating Christ to himself, and, renouncing all that belongs to himself, at being entirely transformed

into his image. The end, however, which he has in view in this transformation, is stated at ver. 11; it is the *resurrection of the dead* to which he would attain. For this very reason, the experience of *the power of Christ's resurrection* spoken of at ver. 10 cannot mean the same thing as the ἐξανάστασις mentioned at ver. 11; as εἴπως (si forte, if by any means) always denotes something that is not included in what precedes, but is indicated as the object to be attained. With this experience of the power of the resurrection, the other clauses, *and the fellowship*, &c, would also not correspond. The apostle rather denotes an experience belonging to the present life. What is that knowledge of Christ, however, which he means, must be ascertained, on the one hand, from the connexion with *I count all things but loss*, ver. 8, and, on the other, from the following criteria, first, that this knowledge presupposes a believing fellowship with Christ, secondly, that the intended fruit of this knowledge is the actual resurrection, and finally, that it is to be the object at which the apostle and his readers are constantly to aim, ver. 12. The apostle, therefore, cannot be understood as seeking to know *that power, (which the resurrection of Christ has*, not *by which he was raised up)* the experience of which is already implied in regeneration, or that *fellowship of sufferings* which is connected with it, and of which Col. ii. 12 treats. For they are presupposed in the γνῶναι. As little can he mean the experience of this power in his own resurrection, as the end to be attained through this experience. What kind of experience then of the power of the resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, lies between these two extremes? The life of the apostle himself must furnish the answer. And does not this present *both* to our view, as well the power of the resurrection of Christ, as the form of his sufferings? *I live, yet not I*, he says of himself at Gal. ii. 20, *but Christ liveth in me.* Comp. also Phil. iv. 13. *I die daily*, he says again at 1 Cor. xv. 31, again 2 Cor. ii. 14, *thanks be unto God which always causeth us to triumph in Christ. Always bearing about in the body the death of Jesus, that the life also of Christ may be manifested in our body*, 2 Cor. iv. 10, sq. To these also belong, those passages in which he founds exhortations on the resurrection of Christ, with whom we are risen; *even so we also should walk in newness of life*, Rom. vi. 4, or *if ye then be risen with Christ, seek those things which are above.* Col. iii. 1. If the

apostle, by *the power of the resurrection*, means that power which he aims at experiencing in himself, by the renunciation of all that belongs to the old man, and the flesh, so as to attain to the object indicated at ver. 11, then by the *fellowship*, &c., he means a second experience, at which he aims as the indispensable condition of the first, and this experience, viz., the fellowship of his sufferings is further explained in the words, *being made conformable to his death* (referring to γνῶναι, Col. i. 10; Ephes. iii. 18, iv. 2), as a being actually made like to him. That this expression *fellowship of his sufferings*, is not to be confounded with such expressions as *we are buried with him*, Rom. vi. 4, appears from what goes before. Rather, as the life of the Christian is to be a progressive manifestation of the resurrection of Christ, so in his life also is the other side, viz., the form of Christ's sufferings, to be manifested. De Wette well observes that, "as there is no resurrection without death, so neither also without suffering." Comp. Rom. viii. 17; 2 Tim. ii. 11. The passages above cited will show, how this aspect of Christ was manifested in the life of the apostle. There is no necessity for supposing in the words, *being made conformable*, &c., any special prospective allusion to the martyrdom of the apostle. The expression is quite intelligible without this; comp. 2 Cor. iv. 10. (Whether συμμορφούμενος or συμμορφιζόμενος, which is supported by A.B.D.* versions and Church Fathers, be the true reading is of little consequence, as the sense is not affected.) It needs scarcely be shown, that the explanation we have given fully meets the conditions of the context as stated above. De Wette has justly rejected those interpretations that would explain the power of the resurrection by, "the apostle's peace of mind," or "the hope of his own resurrection." But Meyer's interpretation also, according to which the apostle means by this power *the pledge of justification*, appears to me (if τοῦ γνῶναι, &c., is taken as explicative of the *knowledge* mentioned at ver. 8) to be too narrow, and not to correspond with the believing fellowship already presupposed at ver. 9. Is any such pledge of justification needed at this stage, and not rather implied in the believing fellowship already existing? Moreover, this view does not place the *power of the resurrection* in any true relation to the *fellowship of suffering*. How can the certainty of justification and the fellowship of his sufferings be connected together and

both be regarded as exegetical of *αὐτον*? Is it not natural and necessary, that if, by the *fellowship of sufferings* we understand that aspect of Paul's life which corresponds to the sufferings of his Lord, then by the experience of the *power of the resurrection* we should also understand the corresponding representation and appropriation of this in his life? We do not therefore take this to mean the moral awakening spoken of at Col. ii. 12, but that manifestation of the *life* as also of the *death of Jesus*, of which the apostle speaks 2 Cor. x. 4, and which he denotes as something abiding (*πάντοτε . . . περιφέροντες.*) This life, or rather the striving after it, in which Christ represents himself, and the perfection of which is denoted at Rom. viii. 29, by *συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*, is the condition of attaining to the end indicated at ver. 11.

Ver. 11. On *εἴπως* si forte, see on ver. 10. Here, it denotes a humble striving after, as opposed to a false security. *Καταντήσω* here, as at 2 Macc. vi. 14; Acts xxvi. 7; Eph. iv. 13, figuratively denotes "the attaining of something," literally "to go down to." Van Hengel improperly limits its signification to time or place: si forte perveniam ad tempus hujus eventi. The *ἐξανάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν* is (in this passage only) substantially equivalent to *ἀνάστασις*; *ἐξ*, serves to more vividly represent the idea, as it denotes the terminus a quo. What the apostle means by this expression, may be ascertained from such passages as Luke xx. 34, 35, compared with 1 Thes. iv. 16; Luke xiv. 14, 15.

Ver. 12—14. The apostle here guards against a misapprehension, that might be occasioned by what he has just said at ver. 7—11. He does this, not from polemical considerations with reference to the false teachers, but for the sake of the Philippians, that they might learn of him to think humbly of themselves, and lay aside that conceit of Christian perfection spoken of at vv. 2, 3. Comp. especially vv. 13, 15. *Not that I have already attained, or am already perfect*, &c. In order to determine *what* the apostle has not yet attained, we must, first of all, inquire what is said in the preceding verses, with regard to which this misunderstanding was possible. Now this cannot be the *resurrection of the dead* mentioned at ver. 11, for the apostle himself has represented this as an object to which he looks forward as future, and after which he strives. So that there could be no necessity, for his

guarding them against the misconception that he had already attained it. That to which the *οὐκ ἔλαβον* refers, can only be the *τὸ ὑπερέχον τῆς γνώσεως*, ver. 8, or as it is expressed at ver. 10, *γνῶναι αὐτόν*. The idea that the apostle has renounced all, in order to attain a superabundant good, might certainly be so misunderstood as to imply that he had already attained it, and it is this misunderstanding (as if the perfection mentioned at ver. 10 were already realized in him) which he here wards off. In the expression *ἐλαβον*, the figure of a contest in a race already passes through the apostle's mind, but it is distinctly brought forward in what follows. The *object* of this *ἔλαβον* is not the *βραβεῖον* supplied from ver. 14; it is rather to be supplied from what goes before, viz., that moral perfection which is indicated in the *γνῶναι*, ver. 10. This is confirmed by the explanatory words that follow, viz., *or am already perfect*, which denote the result of the having attained (comp. Winer, § 41, 5, p. 319), and do not mean, "to be at the mark," but "to be morally perfect," which alone agrees with the common usage of the word. (Comp. Van Hengel, p. 240.) Therefore also the gloss *ἤ ἤδη δεδικαίωμαι* for *ἢ ἤδη τετελείωμαι* is, in respect of the sense, perfectly correct. *Διώκω δὲ*, the apostle here carries out the metaphor taken from a race, *εἰ καὶ καταλάβω ἐφ' ᾧ*, &c. The *object* of the *καταλαβεῖν* is the same as that of the *ἔλαβον*. The *καταλάβω* is stronger than the simple *ἐλαβον*. *Καί* is, with De Wette, to be referred to the *καί* of the following clause. It is difficult to determine the sense of the ambiguous *ἐφ' ᾧ*. Grammatically, it may mean, "in which condition," "wherefore," "because," "to which." The most natural way is, with De Wette and others (the same as at Luke v. 25), to take *ἐφ' ᾧ* as equivalent to *τοῦτο ἐφ' ᾧ*, and so to construe it as that *τοῦτο* shall be the *object* of *καταλάβω*: "if also I may lay hold of that, to which I also was laid hold of by Christ." Comp. moreover, Winer, § 52, c. p. 469, sq., who prefers the signification "to which," Meyer renders it "because." *Ἐπί* in a similar connection as denoting that to which a person or thing is destined or appointed, 1 Thess. iv. 7; Ephes. ii. 10, &c.; Winer, a. a. O. p. 470. The figure involved in the *κατελήφθην* is the same as that in the *καταλάβω*. So in Plato Tim. p. 38, D.: *καταλαμβάνουσι καὶ καταλαμβάνονται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων*. The apostle has been overtaken and laid hold of in the course of his departure from

Christ, namely, at his conversion. De Wette rightly observes, that the expression is selected in accordance with the idea of a reciprocal action; comp. Gal. iv. 9; 1 Cor. xiii. 12.—The sentiment expressed in the verse as a whole, namely, that there is no *attaining*, but merely a *following after in order to attain*, is of special importance for the Christian life. That perfection, in virtue of which our whole life is to become conformable to Christ, is a mark of which every one falls short. The fellowship with Christ in the righteousness of faith, ver. 9, or the being apprehended of Christ, ver. 12, is, so far from being the goal at which we may repose, only the foundation on which our striving after that perfection is to rest; the entire leavening of the man by the power of fellowship with the dead and risen Lord, *that* is the goal.

Ver. 13 shows that the apostle, in what he has just said, has in view his readers and their conduct (ii. 2—4); hence, not merely the emphatical repetition of the thought, but also the special address to them ἀδελφοί, and the ἐγώ, the opposite of which is not, *others* who may have this idea of the apostle, but *others* who seem to have this idea of themselves. As ver. 13 corresponds to the first half of ver. 12, so at ver. 14, the other half, viz., the διώκω δέ, is further expanded. The sentiment already expressed is not simply repeated, but is more strictly defined, so that, as Meyer justly observes, ver. 13 brings into prominence the element of *self-esteem*, whilst ver. 14 more strictly explains the διώκω, both with respect to what lies behind, and to the mark that is set before.—Ἐν δέ supply ποιῶ (Winer, § 66, III. b. p. 676.) Meyer supplies πόιῶν, so that the participles following are exegetical of it; but in the ἕν the apostle had doubtless in his mind the principal idea διώκω, and not its subordinate explanations. On the inadmissibility of other supplementary expressions, or the connexion with διώκω itself, see Meyer. The right way of following after the mark is stated in the words τὰ μὲν ὀπίσω—ἐπεκτεινόμενος. It consists in forgetting that which is behind, and stretching forward to that which is before. The ἐπεκτείνεσθαι represents the racer stretching forward in his anxiety to reach the goal. The τὰ ὀπίσω and the τὰ ἔμπροσθεν denote, the former those stages of the course that have already been passed over, and the latter, those that have yet to be passed over; the τὰ ἔμπροσθεν does not therefore mean the gaol itself. As it is the

striving after Christian perfection that is spoken of at ver. 12, the right explanation of *τὰ ὀπίσω* and *τὰ ἔμπροσθεν* must be, " the progress in this that has already been made, and that which yet remains to be made. The former is not to be the object of our contemplation and self-complacent regard, but the mind is entirely to be directed towards that which is yet to be attained, as a racer thinks not of the way that is behind, but of that which lies yet before him. It is not suitable to the context to refer the *τὰ ὀπίσω* to those things indicated at ver. 7, sq., as having been renounced by the apostle. What belongs to the *flesh*, as De Wette rightly observes, lies *without* the limits of the course here represented, and cannot be considered as a part of it. That must already have been renounced, ere the race begins, to which the apostle here alludes. This alone agrees with the context; for the apostle places this forgetting the things that are behind, in opposition to the vain fancy of Christian perfection. Thus, he says, he presses toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus: (*κατὰ σκοπόν*, Winer, § 53 d. p. 475, versus.) That the prize (*βραβεῖον* as 1 Cor. ix. 24) is here placed as the *object* of the *διώκειν*, is no reason why *βραβεῖον* should be supplied also at ver. 12. *There* it is the goal itself that is meant, *here* it is the prize of victory that beckons to the goal, *the incorruptible crown*, 1 Cor. ix. 25, or *the crown of righteousness*, 2 Tim. iv. 8, or *the crown of life*, Jam. i. 12; Acts ii. 10, *of glory*, 1 Pet. v. 4.—The apostle himself further explains this *βραβεῖον* in the words, *high calling of God in Christ Jesus*. The *ἡ ἄνω κλῆσις* here is the same as the *κλῆσις ἐπουράνιος* at Heb. iii. 1. So also Col. iii. 2, *τὰ ἄνω* opposed to *τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς*. Comp. also Gal. iv. 26 with Heb. xii. 22. This *κλῆσις* is thus represented not merely as coming from above, still less am I inclined with Meyer to admit that there is in the *ἄνω* a reference to the special *calling* of the apostle, (against which comp. Heb. iii. 1); but the nature of this *calling* is described in general as an *heavenly*, quae ad coelum pertinet, and, as is well observed by Van Hengel, the apostle, " following out the metaphor, distinguishes his calling from that by which the runners in the race, were wont to be called by the arbiters of the contest." Similarly 1 Cor. ix. 21. If then, the *calling* in general is characterized as an heavenly, it is no tautology, but rather a more particular description of it, when it is further represented as proceeding from God (1 Thess. ii. 12), and

as confirmed in Christ Jesus. For I unhesitatingly connect ἐν X. Ἰ. with κλήσεως (comp. Winer, § 19, 2, p. 155), not with διώκω (comp. 1 Cor. vii. 22; 2 Pet. v. 10, &c.) By the κλῆσις, however, I understand (what it usually denotes) the act of calling, not that to which one is called, of which latter signification 2 Thess. i. 11, to which De Wette refers, is no proof.

Vv. 15, 16. The apostle now addresses to his readers the exhortation τοῦτο φρονῶμεν, *to be thus minded*, as the inference from the foregoing views (οὖν), whilst at the same time he supposes the case of the ἑτέρως φρονεῖν, and expresses his hope with regard to this case, with the limitation, however, contained in ver. 16. The interpretation of this passage varies both with respect to the more definite meaning of τοῦτο φρονῶμεν, and consequently with respect to the εἴ τι ἑτέρως φρονεῖτε, in that some, as Schinz, Meyer, and others, understand by this, the disposition to think humbly of ourselves and constantly to press forward, expressed in vv. 12—14, whilst others understand by it all that is said from ver. 4 onwards (so Hölemann, Matthies, and others), or at least from ver. 8 onwards (so De Wette) as descriptive of that disposition of mind which ought to be cultivated; others again refer τοῦτο specially to βραβεῖον, ver. 14. And there is no less difference of opinion in regard to the interpretation of ver. 16, where some explain the εἰς ὃ ἐφθάσαμεν by *high moral attainments*, others by *high attainments in Christian knowledge*. To the former belong Schinz, Van Hengel, and Meyer; to the latter the majority, Rheinwald, Matthies, Hölemann, De Wette.

The apostle introduces his exhortation by the words ὅσοι οὖν τέλειοι. We may therefore look for a definitive exhortation flowing from what goes before; but the οὖν may just as appropriately introduce an exhortation inferred from the *whole* of the preceding context, as one specially referring to that disposition of mind delineated in vv. 12—14, as consisting in a humble opinion of self, and a restless pressing forward. The objection which Meyer urges against the former view, viz., that only at ver. 12 does the apostle first aim his address at the peculiar circumstances of the church itself, is not conclusive; for at whom else but the church is that aimed which, at ver. 4—11, is said against the false teachers? The right interpretation of the ὅσοι τέλειοι will help to the settlement of this point. The apostle, in the word ὅσοι, leaves it to the

judgment of the readers to decide, whether or not they belong to the class of the τέλειοι; or rather it is a call addressed to them all to show that they are τέλειοι. But what are we to understand by τέλειοι? There can be no doubt that it is not equivalent to τετελείωμαι, for, the apostle has just said of himself, that he is not what that word implies. It is generally explained as being the opposite of νήπιοι, 1 Cor. ii. 6, iii. 1, xiv. 20; Heb. v. 13, 14; but, whilst in all these passages the antithesis has respect to *knowledge*, it is allowed that it here refers *to moral perfection*, to the ethical life, which of itself presupposes a corresponding proportion of practical intelligence. And it must certainly be acknowledged that the context forbids our referring the τέλειοι to *knowledge*. But how? Would the apostle, who has just been guarding the Philippians against self-esteem, and exhorting them to forget what is behind, *i.e.* the progress already made, and, ii. 3, to esteem others better than themselves, now call upon those whose great failing was a conceit of their moral attainments, to consider themselves as τέλειοι in a moral point of view? This he could do only ironically, as if he said—"You who think yourselves to be *perfect* shew that you are so, and shew it by your humility," but the form of expression employed by the apostle, in which he addresses the call to himself in common with them, is conclusive against this. If, on the other hand, the moral perfection denoted by τέλειοι, is understood as consisting specially in a humble estimation of self, and a restless pressing forward, then the τοῦτο φρονῶμεν is purely tautological. Comp. Meyer on τοῦτο φρονῶμεν. Τέλειοι is therefore not to be explained as the opposite of νήπιοι in the sense of "those less advanced in moral attainments," for in this sense, the apostle would characterize neither himself nor others as τέλειοι; nor would he call upon any to cherish the opinion of themselves that they are τέλειοι, in comparison with others. Rather, at 1 Cor. ii. 6, τέλειοι does not denote those more proficient in respect of knowledge, as compared with the less proficient; but those are said to be τέλειοι to whom the preaching of the gospel is *wisdom*, which is also the case with the νήπιοι, whilst to the opposite class this preaching is *foolishness*, which does not apply to the νήπιοι ἐν Χριστῷ, so that τέλειος is there used as equivalent to πνευμα-

τικός, ii. 15.[1] As τέλειοι then does not there mean the opposite of "less proficient," so neither does it here. A Christian can be designated τέλειος in a moral point of view, and called to consider himself as such, *not* on account of his own moral attainments in which he excels others; for this is not to be the object of his regard (forgetting, &c., ver. 14), but solely on account of that moral nature which he receives through fellowship with Christ; this, he is to possess as a Christian, and on the ground of this may he be called upon (as the apostle here calls upon thePhilippians) to press forward in pursuit of higher moral attainments. The expression, however, is selected with a view to its connexion with the τετελειῶσθαι, which the apostle has used without any figure at ver. 12. Just as the ἅγιον εἶναι is itself the strongest obligation to the ἁγιασμός, so the τέλειον εἶναι of the Christian, (comp. Passow, on the proper signification of the term, viz., "one who has reached his mark"), is the strongest call to strive after the τελειοῦσθαι; and thus does the apostle call upon his readers, if they are aiming as being otherwise τέλειοι, to strive after the τελειοῦσθαι in the way pointed out by him. What is here denoted by τέλειος may be ascertained from ver. 9, in which is stated, the pre-requisite to the appropriation of Christ mentioned in ver. 10; this appropriation of Christ is, as we have seen, the mark spoken of at ver. 12, the attainment of which brings along with it the gaining of the prize. The τοῦτο φρονῶμεν then, is certainly to be referred to what immediately goes before, which the apostle has marked as the *one thing* after which he strives; but in this is included the principal idea in vv. 8—11, as appears from this,—that vv. 12—14 only aim at preventing a misapprehension of that idea, and setting forth the proper way in which the *striving* mentioned at ver. 10 is to be conducted. When the apostle then says at ver. 15 *let us be thus minded*, we are certainly to understand what is stated at vv. 13 and 14, as to the right way in which this striving is to be conducted, but not, however, to the exclusion of all reference to vv. 8—11, as if the Philippians did not need to be *exhorted to strive*, as well as to be told in *what manner* they ought to strive. Such a restriction, not to speak of the right interpretation of the τέλοιοι,

[1] This passage is indeed generally explained in a different way, but, as I think, improperly, expositors having allowed themselves without reason to be led away from the interpretation given above, by the ὡς νηπίοις, iii. 1.

would also not agree with what immediately follows.—*Καὶ εἴ τι ἑτέρως φρονεῖτε*, &c. With reference to the *φρονεῖν* just mentioned, the apostle supposes the possible case, of his readers being in any one respect otherwise minded. He does not say *ἕτερον*, for he cannot suppose any radical difference of mind amongst them, but only that along with a fundamental sameness of mind there may yet exist in the one or other respect, a difference with regard to the *manner* of this *φρονεῖν*, by which is meant the striving after the mark. The context does not furnish more particular information as to what differences the apostle had in view. But in striking harmony with this passage is the apostle's prayer, i. 9, that the love of the Philippian church may increase in all knowledge and judgment. With regard to such differences the apostle expresses the hope, *God will reveal even this unto you*. The *καὶ τοῦτο* cannot of course refer to the *τοῦτο φρονῶμεν*, but only to the *εἴ τι*; in this case also will a true revelation be given to them, as in the other, with respect to which they already have (*καὶ*) this revelation. The apostle then does not himself instruct them on these points of difference, but confides in the power of the Spirit, who teaches all things and leads into all truth, that he will supply their deficiency in right knowledge, which lies at the foundation of the *ἑτέρως φρονεῖν*, and will reveal the corresponding knowledge. For *ἀποκαλύψει* is to be understood of a knowledge to be imparted, comp. Eph. i. 17. There can therefore have been no essential differences, but only such as vanish on a more profound acquaintance with the revealed word of truth.—We have already observed, that to restrict the *τοῦτο φρονῶμεν* to the right method of pressing forward, would not agree with what follows. For in this case the *εἴ τι ἑτέρως φρονεῖτε* could only be explained of a way of pressing forward, different from that described, a way therefore not characterised by a humble esteem of self, and a restless pressing forward. So Meyer, p. 105: "if in any respect ye are otherwise minded, viz., deviate from the way indicated in the *τοῦτο φρονῶμεν*." And Schinz explains, "if you take yourselves to be perfect," which indeed is just what Meyer's explanation amounts to with this difference—that he (Schinz) rightly understands the *τι* by which, according to this view, the idea is limited to the one or the other respect, viz., of *humble* or of *ceaseless* striving. And are we to suppose that the apostle here alludes to those who would not

strive humbly and ceaselessly, and yet does not in this case exhort them to humility, and zeal in the pursuit of moral perfection, but refers them to a revelation from God as if this were the thing which they principally needed? How does this correspond with what the apostle says at ii. 1, sq., where he so earnestly guards them against their conceit of moral perfection as the fountain of all discord?

Ver. 16. The apostle hopes that in the case of their being *otherwise minded*, God will lead them to right knowledge also in this. *But*, he proceeds, *whereto we have attained, let us walk by the same*, &c. The πλὴν *yet, however*, (comp. Passow) contains a limitation of the hope just expressed; it states the condition upon which alone he can cherish this hope in regard to them, and this condition is,—faithful adherence to that whereto they have already attained, and such an adherence as displays itself in the conduct. Commentators are here, as has been already observed, divided in opinion; some, explaining the ἐφθάσαμεν of a progress in morality, others of attainments in knowledge. The former view seems to be supported by what Meyer has shown, viz., that ἐφθάσαμεν is correlative with στοιχεῖν, and forms with it a connected figure, the one denoting that point in the course which has been reached, the other, τῷ. ἀ. στοι., holding on in the direction by pursuing which, that point was reached; so that if we explain στοιχεῖν of moral conduct, εἰς ὅ. εφθ. must mean the same. But στοιχεῖν in itself denotes merely *conduct*, not *moral conduct*, and the τῷ αὐτῷ must determine what kind of conduct is here meant. So at Rom. iv. 12, στοιχεῖν is used of walking in the footsteps of faith, and at Gal. vi. 16 of walking according to a rule. If τῷ αὐτῷ is, from what goes before, to be understood of *knowledge*, then it will mean, to walk conformably to this knowledge (to conduct oneself conformably thereto in all things, in thought, word, and deed.) The knowledge attained, is represented as the point which all have reached; according to this then, all who have attained to it are farther to walk. The apostle says στοιχεῖν, not merely, "hold fast," because in opposition to the ἑτέρως φρονεῖν, all depends on their seeing that the knowledge they have already gained grows in power and vitality, for only thus can they come to the hoped-for revelation.—Again, in opposition to the view according to which ἐφθάσαμεν denotes moral attainments, as De Wette has already remarked, it may be urged that πλὴν εἰς ὅ ἐφθάσαμεν

must, on account of the antithesis, belong to the same class of ideas as *ἀποκάλυψις*, and can therefore only denote a certain degree of knowledge, for it is not to be overlooked that the Aorist *ἐφθάσαμεν* forms an antithesis with the Future *ἀποκαλύψει*. And what adequate sense can, according to that view, be assigned to *εἰς ὅ ἐφθάσαμεν*? *Εἰς ὅ* cannot, as Meyer himself acknowledges, signify the point which is common to all, to which all have attained in the scale of moral perfection, but must be conceived of as a line with reference to which the individuals occupy a position more before or behind—a meaning quite opposed to the simple idea conveyed in *εἰς ὅ ἐφθάσαμεν*. And when can the *ἐφθάσαμεν* be said to have taken place? Side by side with the striving in the same way is the *ἑτέρως φρονεῖν*, which does not take the same direction. How are the Philippians to know what lies in the same direction, and belongs to the *ἐφθάσαμέν* in their course of conduct, and what does not? And with what propriety could it then be said that, leaving out of sight that in which they differed, they should pursue the direction that was common to them all, on which they had all entered? That would be even in the case of there being no *ἑτέρως φρονεῖν*, a very unsafe rule; for the sin that cleaves to every one, and makes him indolent, prevents his moral strivings from taking a purely upward direction (*τὰ ἄνα ζητεῖτε*, Col. iii. 1.) No individual Christian's course of life can be regarded as a line moving upwards without deviation, all depending on the direction once taken being undeviatingly pursued; there is rather required a fixed rule by which that direction may be regulated, and this rule is the knowledge that has been acquired, indicated by *ὅ ἐφθάσαμεν* (the word of the Scripture) through which the Spirit leads ever further into the truth on the condition of its being faithfully held fast, and guides the individual in his progress through life in the right path. —Others render *πλήν* by "interim" (Winer, § 57, 4, Anm. p. 522), which makes no sensible difference in the connexion of the thought. *Φθάνειν εἰς*, as at Rom. ix. 31, to "attain to something," "to reach it." On the the Inf. *στοιχεῖν*, for the Imperative, of the second person, see Winer, § 45, 7, p. 384. Against the connection with *ἀποκαλύψει*, as also the connection of the whole sentence with ver. 17, see Meyer's remarks. Finally, with respect to the reading, the words *κανόνι τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν* are by the united voice of the most recent critics pronounced to be spurious. They

are not found in A.B. 17, 67**, in several translations, and the Fathers. The reason of their interpolation appears from Gal. vi. 16, Phil. ii. 2, and their spuriousness is confirmed by the uncertainty of the order in which they are placed. They are glosses intended for explanation, of which *τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν* was first inserted, according to D.*F.G., *κανόνι* having been afterwards added.

Ver. 17—iv. 1. To the foregoing exhortation, in which the Philippians are enjoined to be of the same mind, and to strive in the same manner with the apostle, and if in any thing there is any difference, are earnestly exhorted faithfully to carry out in their conduct the knowledge to which they have attained, the apostle now adds another injunction (having reference chiefly to the last point, viz., the *στοιχεῖν*), which, like the foregoing, is addressed to the readers from regard to the perverting example of others. And as in the foregoing exhortation he warns them against the influence of Judaistic false doctrine in moving them away from the right mark, and misleading them as to the right manner of striving after it, so here, it is the worldly mindedness, and the immoral courses of others, against the contaminating example of which he warns them, and in opposition to which he reminds them of their heavenly calling. This transition is very similar to that at Gal. v. 13, sq., where also with the warning against Judaistic teaching of the law, the apostle connects that against immoral conduct; there, however, this latter warning is not given with reference to the Judaizing opponents, as if any such influence were to be feared from them, but rather with reference to the very opposite standpoint, that, viz. of the *ἐλευθερία*, which was abused so as to be an *occasion to the flesh*. And in the passage before us too, it does not seem as if the bad example of sensuality in disposition and immorality in practice, were to be charged against those Pharisaical Jewish-Christians mentioned before, which is the view that up till very recently has been held by almost all commentators, but has been rejected by De Wette, Meyer, and others. Not that the designation, *enemies of the cross*, which the apostle applies to them, is inconsistent with this view; comp. Gal. v. 11, vi. 12, sq., where this also is said of those Judaizing Christians, that they themselves do not observe the law. But the view, according to which the opponents here described are the same as those mentioned before,

renders the manner in which the apostle introduces them to notice, ver. 18, unintelligible, for this evidently suits far better the case of a *new class* of persons, than of those already mentioned and to be farther described. Why should the apostle not have referred to the persons already mentioned, and, besides, have given prominence to the fact, that such a licentious conduct connects itself with their false doctrine, notwithstanding of all their boasting about the law? But we find nothing of this sort, not a word of reference to false doctrine, but only the imputation of earthly mindedness, and walking after the flesh. And the very way in which the apostle speaks of them, with the deepest pain, that wrings tears from him, induces us to think that he must allude not principally to such as had gone astray in doctrine, but to such as had sunk back into earthliness and sin, in the way described at Gal. v. 13, sq. We find also in the Corinthian church those who abused the Christian freedom, the *πάντα μοι ἔξεστι*, by making it an excuse for the sins of the flesh, 1 Cor. vi. 12. We have only to add to this, the obdurate rejection of the apostle's warning and admonition to complete the picture of men such as are described in the passage before us. Persons of this description must have been, if not in Philippi itself, yet in its neighbourhood, as the apostle has repeatedly occasion to warn the Philippians against them.—The view is altogether wrong, that the apostle here alludes to heathen.

Ver. 17. *Συμμιμηταί μου γίνεσθε*, similarly 1 Cor. iv. 16, *μιμηταί μου γ*. Accordingly the sense here will be: "be ye imitators of me," not "imitators of Christ with me," which is not contained in the words. The *συμ*, however, will not signify "you altogether," but according to the words that follow, "you along with others who are my imitators, who so (*οὕτως*) walk in this way of following my example; for those others be forthwith denotes in the words, *Mark them who walk so*. They are to imitate him and those who walk in the same mind with him, or more correctly, they are to imitate him along with others who do so, and to mark those others in respect of their imitation of him. Of the words that follow, *καθὼς*, &c., "inasmuch as you have a pattern in us," Meyer has given the true interpretation in opposition to that hitherto received, as he does not refer *καθὼς* to *οὕτως* as a particle of comparison, but takes it as the common *argumentative* "as," "inasmuch as," so that the two foregoing injunctions are thereby

confirmed. This view is also countenanced by the change of the number in ἡμᾶς, whilst in the other case the singular, corresponding to the μου, would be used, as also ἔχετε for ἔχουσι; against this the singular τύπον proves nothing, as Meyer remarks, the many being included in the one. (On τύπον comp. 1 Thess. i. 7; 2 Thess. iii. 9; 1 Tim. iv. 12; Titus ii. 7; 1 Pet. v. 3.)

Ver. 17 is now confirmed by ver. 18. The reason of his referring them to his example, and the conduct of those like-minded with him is, that there are many whose example they are not at liberty to follow. *For many walk*, &c. Περιπατοῦσι here can only be taken in the same sense as in the preceding verse (therefore not as at 1 Pet. v. 8.) Some are for supplying κακῶς, ἑτέρως, or the like without reason; but I am as little inclined to suppose with Meyer that the apostle has here expressed himself in the way he originally intended. He intended certainly more particularly to describe the *conduct* of the persons here referred to, in opposition to the οὕτω περιπατοῦντες, and not originally to describe the *persons*, as the antithesis would require. This is plain from the word περιπατοῦσι, which would be deprived of its proper force if taken as equivalent to εἰσί; but by the *relative* clause which follows, and which refers to the *persons*, he is led to describe the persons, to which is subjoined also a description of their conduct. He therefore drops the περιπατοῦσι, in the description of the *persons*. So also De Wette and others.—The words *I have told you often* allude to former oral communications. There is as little necessity, after what has been said, for connecting them with iii. 2 as with i. 15, ii. 21. As the examples mentioned ver. 17 were held up before the whole church, and consequently did not belong to it, so also these *many*. Comp. our remarks supra. But why does the apostle *now* say *even weeping?* To this Chrysostom has already well replied, ὅτι ἐπέτεινε τὸ κακόν. The words ἐχθροὶ τοῦ σταυροῦ are properly in apposition to πολλοί, which enters into the construction of the relative clause. Winer, § 48, p. 424. The article τούς points emphatically to the persons meant,—*they*, the well-known enemies of the cross. The characteristic, *enemies of the cross*, gives no certain solution of the question whether Judaists, or immoral men generally are meant. According to the marks elsewhere given, it is to be understood of those who, from their earthly and carnal mind, are naturally the enemies of the cross, which requires of them that

they crucify the flesh with its affections and lusts. Comp. Gal. vi. 14. The more special characteristics are stated ver. 14. The most fearful of them stands first—whose end (*τὸ τέλος*, as 2 Cor. xi. 15) is destruction, whose god is the belly (comp. Rom. vi. 18; 1 Cor. xv, 32), and whose glory is in their shame, *i.e.*, consists in that of which they have to be ashamed, comp 2 Cor. iv. 2; spoken generally, and therefore not to be understood exclusively of sensuality. Meyer rightly observes that *ἡ δόξα* is to be regarded as *subjective*, and *αἰσχύνη* as *objective*, viewed in the light of true moral relations. For it is not properly Antinomianism that we are here to understand as meant, which makes sin a virtue, and which would have been combated in quite a different way; still *ἡ δόξα* shows that they sought even their honour in that which the apostle stamps as *αἰσχύνη*, which, if it cannot be called Antinomianism properly, is only thus to be explained, viz., that they abused a Christian truth by making it an excuse for their moral laxity, similarly to what is said at Gal. v. 13, sq.; 1 Cor. vi. 12, sq. He concludes with the comprehensive characteristic, *who mind earthly things*, in which he denotes the root of this immorality of character, which leads to destruction. The nominative, as exclamation. Mark xii. 38–40, comp. Winer, § 30, 2 Anm. 2, p. 211: they who are earthly minded!

Vv. 20, 21. The apostle has in vv. 18 and 19 stated the reasons why he exhorted his readers to become imitators of him, and attentively to observe those who follow his example. With what reason, however, he points to himself and to those like minded with him he further shews *really* in vv. 20 and 21. I say *really*, since *formally* ver. 20 certainly refers to ver 19, otherwise the apostle would have written not *γάρ* but simply δέ. The connection is, as Winer § 57, 8, p. 532, has given it; *γάρ* closely connects with *οἱ τὰ ἐπίγεια φρονοῦντες*. For our conversation is in heaven (therefore do I warn you against them—and, we add, you have in us a right example.) *Ἡμῶν* will accordingly refer to the foregoing *ἡμᾶς*, the examples mentioned at ver. 17. We now learn from what follows how far their example is a true one: for our *πολίτευμα* is in heaven, as opposed to the *τὰ ἐπίγεια φρονεῖν*. The antithesis to the disposition denoted by the last words is properly another disposition of an opposite nature, or a *subjective* characteristic generally; with this, however, the *objective* interpretation

of *πολίτευμα* as "community" will not correspond. Therefore others: "conduct," in accordance with the *πολιτεύεσθαι*, i. 27; against which Van Hengel has remarked that we are not at liberty to take *πολίτευμα* as identical with *ἀναστροφή*, that *ὑπάρχει* does not agree well with this interpretation, and that according to it an *ὡς* or some such word must be supplied; which I would be inclined rather to express thus—that the representation of the *ἐν οὐρανοῖς* as something present, does not correspond with the immediately following *ἐξ οὗ* according to which it appears as something remote. Hence Van Hengel renders thus: nostra enim, quam hic sequamur, vivendi ratio in coelis est; according to which, vivendi ratio no longer signifies the conduct itself, but the law, and the constitution, agreeably to which one lives. There is nothing against this in the word *ὑπάρχει*, as Meyer maintains, since the present retains its signification, but this view is not agreeable to our interpretation of *ἡμῶν*, which we understand as referring to the examples mentioned ver. 17; for they are not examples in so far as they have in heaven their vivendi ratio, which they ought to follow, but only in so far as they really follow it. The translation according to this view would be—"for our law and our constitution is in heaven," but this presents us again with a purely objective characteristic, which corresponds neither with the *τύπος* nor with the antithesis to *φρονεῖν*. It seems therefore most advisable to return to the explanation first adopted by Luther, namely, "citizenship." *Πολίτευμα* = *πολιτεία*, Acts xxii. 28, a signification which connects closely enough with the *πολιτεύεσθαι*, i. 27, and satisfies all the demands of the context. To this effect is the similar passage in Philo, (comp. Van Hengel, p. 260), where *ἐν ᾧ πολιτεύονται* is antithetically opposed to *ἐν ᾧ πορῴκησαν*, and is thus explained, *πατρίδα μὲν τὸν οὐράνιον χῶρον . . . . νομίζουσαι*. The word *πολίτευμα* occurs only here, while *πολιτεύεσθαι* is found besides i. 27 at Acts xxiii. 1.—*Ἐξ οὗ* in what follows is "unde," Winer, § 21, 2, p. 165. The *καί* denotes the expectation, as a state of mind corresponding to the character just described; *ἀπεκδέχομαι* ad finem usque perseveranter exspecto, Rom. viii. 19; 1 Cor. i. 7, &c. *Σωτήρ* designates the *κύριος Ἰησοῦς* as the future Saviour. The salvation here meant is that final *redemption* of which we read in Luke xxi. 28; Rom. viii. 23, and which in this very passage is more specially described in ver. 21 as that final act of the Lord in which he will

exalt his own people from the life in the flesh to the fellowship of his glorified life, also in a bodily respect. *Κύριον*, an apt appellation, both with reference to the foregoing *πολίτευμα*, and also to what follows regarded as the proof of his *κυριότης*. Render: "from whence we also expect as the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ." Ver. 21 contains the hope connected with the coming of the Lord, peculiar to the Christian as a citizen of heaven, and which must act as a motive leading him to purify himself of all pollution of the flesh and of the spirit, comp. 2 Cor. vi. 17—vii. 1; it is the transformation of the body of his low estate, so as to be similar to Christ's glorified body, a hope which is founded on the power of the expected *κύριος*. On *μετασχηματίσει*, comp. *σχῆμα* ii. 8, and 2 Cor. xi. 13, 14; 1 Cor. iv. 6; the identity of the body is denoted by the expression itself. The *πῶς*, with respect to the dead is shown, 1 Cor. xv. 35, sq., with respect to the living, xv. 51—53. With *σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως*, comp. *σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, Rom. vii. 24; it is the body belonging to our state of abasement, in which that state represents itself. *Ἡμῶν* is to be connected with *ταπεινώσις*, as afterwards *αὐτοῦ* with *δόξα*, both are *states* to which the body belongs, not merely circumlocutions for the adjective, comp. Winer, § 30, 2, 6, p. 215.

In the term *ταπεινώσις*, the idea of *becoming* lowly is not to be urged; comp. Luke i. 48; Jam. i. 10; nor is it to be associated, for the sake of the antithetical reference to *ἐχθροὶ τοῦ σταυροῦ*, with the *παθήματα τοῦ Χριστοῦ* with oppression and persecution, as Meyer thinks, for it were an arbitrary limitation of *ἐχθροί τοῦ σταυροῦ* to confine it to those only who would expose themselves to no such troubles (see above), and again, because this interpretation does not correspond with the antithesis in *ταπεινώσις ἡμῶν* and *δόξα αὐτοῦ*. That which we suffer for his sake is participation in his suffering, not *our* *ταπεινώσις* in opposition to *his* *δόξα*, comp. above ver. 10; 2 Cor. iii. 10; Gal. ii. 20, vi. 17. The body of our *ταπεινώσις*, in opposition to the body of his *δόξα*, is rather the body in so far as it still belongs to the *flesh, the body of the flesh*, Col. i. 22; *the body of death*, Rom. vii. 24; or the *natural body* as opposed to the *spiritual body*, 1 Cor. xv. 44. The words *εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι αὐτό* are an interpolation, the insertion of which is easily accounted for by the following *σύμμορφον*. On the pregnancy of the expression, *μετασχηματίσει σύμμορφον*, "he

will transform it so as to be like in form," &c., in which *σύμμορφον* indicates the result of the *μετασ.* see Winer, § 66, III. h., p. 680. *Τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ*, as opposed to the body *τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν*, needs no farther explanation ; it is the *σῶμα πνευματικόν*, the attainment of which is the last aim of the hope of faith. Comp. ver. 11 and 1 Cor. xv. 49. With this is attained, what at Rom. viii. 29 is described as that to which we are predestinated, *συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*. We learn from 1 Cor. iii. 18, in what way the believer is already here below changed *unto the same image from glory to glory ;* this change is connected with the condition of *beholding the glory of the Lord,* with the operations of the Spirit through the word, and even in its highest degree, does not rise above the sphere of personal fellowship of faith ; on the other hand, in the case before us, the body of the man will also experience the transforming operation of the Spirit, and so the whole man will be received into the fellowship of the spiritual life. This last hope rests, however, as the apostle adds, on the *power* of the expected *κύριος*. He will do it, through the efficacy of his power also to subdue all things unto himself. With the expression *κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ δύνασθαι αὐτόν*, comp. Eph. iv. 30, *κ. τ. ἐ. τῆς δυνάμεως*, which means the same thing. Potentia arbor, efficacia fructus, says Calvin on this passage ; for *ἐνέργεια* is efficacious power, actual efficacy. The following *καὶ*, as forming a climax with *μετασχηματίσει*, means "not that only, but also." With reference to the sentiment, comp. 1 Cor. xv. 25, 26 ; Ps. cx. 1, viii. 7. The expression points back to the prophecy contained in these passages of the Old Testament, the fulfilment of which we are to recognise in this exercise of power on the part of the Lord Jesus Christ. His *κυριότης* will then have reached its aim, but with this also its termination. God will then be *all in all,* 1 Cor. xv. 28.

Chap. iv. 1. The apostle here concludes with a comprehensive exhortation introduced by *ὥστε*, as at ii. 12 ; 1 Cor. xv. 28. *Ὥστε* introduces an inference from the immediately foregoing expectation ; I am however inclined to consider the exhortation here given not merely as connected with vv. 17—21, but with the whole preceding section from iii. 1, just as at ii. 12 ; 1 Cor. xv. 58. For the words, *so stand fast in the Lord,* may be regarded as applying, as well to what the apostle has said against *teaching*, as to what

he has said against *walking* otherwise than he has inculcated, and in both cases the apostle has suggested the same hope as the motive to a right conduct, ver. 11, ver. 20, sq. As has been already remarked, this conclusion corresponds with the commencement, *rejoice in the Lord*. The love with which the apostle seeks to draw the church to a striving and a conduct like his own, appears also here in the manner in which he addresses it. With ἐπιπόθητοι, which occurs only here, comp. i. 8. *Joy and crown*, 1 Thess. ii. 19, where however the designation is given with reference to the coming of Christ, inasmuch as then its truth and reality will appear. Here it refers to the present, as at 1 Cor. ix. 2, 3. *So stand fast*, not "as you now do," for this would contradict what goes before, but "as I have exhorted." *In the Lord*, as i. 27, *in one spirit*, Christ as the element of their spiritual life.

§ 6. CONCLUDING EXHORTATIONS TO PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS, AND TO THE CHURCH AT LARGE. EXPRESSION OF THANKS. SALUTATIONS.

(Ch. iv. 2—23.)

The series of exhortations that now follows (vv. 2—9) addressed partly to particular individuals (2, 3), partly to the church at large (4—9), is quite in the manner of the apostle (comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 13, sq.; 2 Cor. xiii. 11; Gal. v. 26, sq., &c.) Then follows (vv. 10—20) the expression of thanks for the contribution to his maintenance which they had transmitted, and which was the principal occasion of his writing this epistle. Salutations and a benediction form, as usual, the conclusion.

Vv. 2, 3. The apostle here first of all addresses to certain individuals the same word of counsel as at ii. 2 he has so earnestly urged on all without exception, namely, that they be of the same mind. And he gives charge to a third individual to be helpful to them in this, while he acknowledges with praise the merit of these persons in their efforts for the advancement of the gospel. Euodias and Syntyche, to whom the exhortation to unity is addressed, are otherwise unknown to us. Baur's suggestion (see the critical part of the Introd.) that, on account of the exhortation to unity,

two parties rather than two persons are to be understood as meant, must, in order to have even the semblance of truth, at least rest on the appellative signification of the names, or on some such ground. And is it to be said of both *parties*, " they laboured with me in the gospel with Clement also," &c.? The Jewish, as also the Gentile-Christian party in Philippi—for so has Schwegler fully expressed the idea of his predecessor—have then assisted the apostle in his labours, and besides, Clement and the rest of the fellow-labourers, who were probably neither Jewish nor Gentile-Christians; for they could not have been strict Judaists who laboured with the apostle in the gospel. Such an idea in connection with this passage can be entertained only by one who has already brought it along with him, and even then it might be seen that it is not at all suitable.—We shall therefore have to rest contented with the common interpretation, that two women are here meant, such as had gained themselves credit in the work of spreading the gospel, of whom we have specimens not merely in Priscilla, Rom. xvi. 3, but also in the women named in Rom. xvi. 12, as we learn also from xvi. 1 that there were deaconesses. I do not think, however, that we have reason to suppose the persons here named to have been deaconesses, partly because nothing is here said of their taking any part in church affairs, and also because what they are commended for with respect to the past is, from the expression here used, to be considered as a work having an immediate reference to the propagation of the gospel, which was not the business of the deacon as such. The repetition of the παρακαλῶ serves not merely ad vehementiam affectus significandam, but to denote that the exhortation is addressed to the one as well as to the other. Τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν are the words used in the exhortation addressed to the church at large, ii. 2, and it is natural to suppose, with Schinz and De Wette, that the same motives that are there stated as the ground of discord are here also to be understood. And this view is confirmed by ver. 3, where the apostle acknowledges not merely *their* equal merit, but also that of all the rest, which is only to be explained by the supposition that the display of these merits on the part of individuals themselves had given occasion to strife. The words *in the Lord,* mark the unanimity here enjoined as one founded on fellowship with the Lord.—The apostle beseeches a third person whom he addresses as σύζυγε γνήσιε to assist in the

work of bringing about unanimity, which is more easily effected through the mediation of a third party. *Ναί* (for this is the true reading, not *καί*) = "yea," as confirmation of the foregoing counsel, "I beseech you also—interest yourself in them, as those who have laboured with me in the gospel." The expression *σύζυγος*, properly "joined to the same yoke," hence "partner," "fellow labourer," occurs only here, though the figure from *ζυγός* is common in various applications. We find *ἑτεροζυγεῖν* at 2 Cor. vi. 14. There is therefore at least nothing surprising in the use of this otherwise common word by the apostle. Bengel has already observed with reason (comp. Brückner, a. a., Q. p. 74) that the expression, generally by profane writers used of marriage, implies more and denotes a closer relation than *συνεργός*, and on this account might the apostle select it in addressing the person here referred to. As to the question who the person is whom the apostle here addresses, to this all imaginable answers have been given. It is the wife of the apostle say some, misled by a false interpretation of 1 Cor. ix. 5, comp. 1 Cor. vii. 7, or according to others, it is the husband of one of the women, and so forth. Those opinions are alone worthy of notice according to which the person here addressed is either Epaphroditus, or a person set over the church at Philippi, into whose hands the epistle was probably first put, or that according to which *σύζυγε* is treated as a proper name, the appellative signification of which is indicated by *γνήσιε*, of the same nature as the play on the name Onesimus, which occurs at Philem. 11. There is least to be said in favour of the first view, for it is scarcely to be supposed that the apostle would address by letter Epaphroditus, who was still with him, and who is not included among those for whom the epistle was intended (comp. also ii. 25—30.) The second is the most probable, unless it be thought preferable to take *σύζυγε* as a proper name, a view which was not unknown to Chrysostom, and has most recently been adopted by Meyer. What Van Hengel has objected to it is without weight. *Συλλαμβάνοι αὐταῖς*, properly "to lay hold of with the hand," hence "to be helpful to," namely, to the promotion of the *αὐτὸ φρονεῖν*, so Luke v. 7. *Αἵτινες* render "ut quae," "as those who," intended to serve as a recommendation of them. *Συνήθλησαν* as at i. 27. *Ἐν τῷ εὐαγγ.* as the object of their active exertion. *With Clement also*, &c. It was all the more necessary to acknowledge the merit of all,

as an unbecoming assertion and display of their own merits on the part of individuals had been the cause of dissension. There can be no doubt that *μετά* is to be connected with *συνήθλησαν*, for not only is this connection grammatically the most proper, while it brings out clearly the aim of this clause, but also because the idea that would otherwise be brought out would be a strange one, namely, that besides the person designated as *σύζυγος*, all the rest of the apostle's fellow labourers are to be helpful to those women in restoring unity, a sense which would also, as Meyer observes, make it difficult to explain why the apostle adds the words, *whose names are in the book of life.* That this Clement was a Philippian, or rather is here represented as a person dwelling in Philippi, cannot be questioned. Therefore all those conclusions fall of themselves to the ground, which Baur has drawn from the mention of Clemens in this passage, even on the supposition most favourable to his view, that this Clemens was the same person as Clemens Romanus, since he is not here mentioned as such. Comp. further the critical Introd. *Whose names are*, &c., a familiar expression denoting the certainty of their future blessedness, comp. on Luke x. 20; Rev. xiii. 8, xvii. 8; Exod. xxxii. 32; Is. iv. 3; Ezek. xiii. 9; Ps. lxix. 29; Dan. xii. 1.

Vv. 4—9. The apostle now again addresses the church at large. Again, he strikes the key note of the epistle, calling upon them all to *rejoice,* and with this the special exhortations that follow (on till ver. 7) stand in close connexion. These exhortations are summarily contained in a concluding one in vv. 8, 9. *Rejoice in the Lord*, iii. 1. *Again I say*—he cannot say this often and emphatically enough; indeed he has included all his exhortations in this word *rejoice;* comp. our remarks on i. 27; ii. 17, 18; iii. 1.—Ver. 5, *τὸ ἐπιεικές* used substantively=*ἐπιεικία* does not mean "becoming conduct," nor "modesty," but according to constant usage in the New Testament=lenitas, "gentleness," pliability, comp. Acts xxiv. 4; 2 Cor. x. 1; 1 Tim. iii. 3; Tit. iii. 2 (in the two last passages it stands beside *ἄμαχος*); Jam. iii. 17 (beside *εἰρηνική*); 1 Pet. ii. 18. *Unto all men:* Meyer well explains—"let no man come to know anything different of you—experience in you anything of an opposite character." Such gentleness is the fruit of joy; the exhortation, however, has doubtless reference to the peculiar state of the church; and we may with safety connect it with the *ἐρίθεια*

which he finds fault with in them, 2, 3, only that here, gentleness and a yielding disposition are enjoined upon them, not merely in regard to their intercourse one with another, but generally. The words, *the Lord is nigh*, are not to be connected with what follows, (as vv. 6 and 7 contain no further allusion to this hope of the second coming,) but as is also most natural in itself, with what goes before. The internal connexion is obvious; namely, what can dispose to gentleness more than the thought that the Lord is nigh, whose gentleness we desire to experience in ourselves? That ὁ κύριος does not denote God, but Christ, is evident from the common use of the expression in the epistles, comp. Winer, § 18, 1, Anm. p. 141, and the outline there given on this subject. Nor are the words to be understood of the "assisting presence of God," Ps. cxlv. 18; for if ἐγγύς is to be so explained, it must be understood of *Christ* being thus present, which is contradicted by the words of iii. 20, ἀπεκδεχόμεθα κύριον, and by the following πρὸς τὸν θεόν. Against this is also the independent position of the ὁ κύριος ἐγγύς. Quite differently, Ps. xxxiv. 19 and cxlvi. 18. Ἐγγύς, with respect to *time*, as Rom. xiii. 11; Rev. i. 3, xxii. 10. The passages i. 6, 23, ii. 17, iii. 11, xx. 4, 5, mutually supplement one another, and show that the apostle conceives of the day of the coming of Christ as nigh, even although he does not confidently hope that he himself will live to witness it. Olshausen has also acknowledged the interpretation here given as the right one, and refers to 1 Pet. iv. 7; 1 John ii. 18; Jam. v. 8. This hope of the coming of Christ as nigh rests on the word of Christ himself. Matth. xvi. 28; Mar. ix. 1. Nor has this hope been falsified, if we are right in regarding the destruction of Jerusalem as the beginning of the judgment; comp. on this, Hoffmann's excellent investigation of the prophecy in Matth. ch. xxiv. and its fulfilment. Nordl. 1841., ii. p. 274, sq. The injunction, *be careful for nothing*, is connected with the χαίρετε, as that which is to allay what might disturb this joy. Μηδέν is the accusative of the object, "about nothing," the antithesis is in the following ἐν παντί. This injunction does not forbid active exertion, ii. 20, but faintheartedness arising from the consciousness of one's own inability, and the want of trust in the help of God. Such care is not to be got rid of by contemplating our own power, (on the contrary we ought ever to grow in the knowledge of our own insufficiency), but only by a

confidential committal of ourselves to Him who *careth for us* 1 Pet. v. 7. And this trust is to express itself in prayer, in which the heart always anew unburdens itself of that which may become a care to it, or has already become so. Therefore the apostle goes on to say, *but in everything*, &c. *Ἐν παντί*, "in everything" (Ephes. v. 24, and vi. 18), as opposed to those who seek help of the Lord only in the season of difficulty; the true Christian knows his need of this help in everything, and seeks it. *Τῇ προσευχῇ καὶ τῇ δεήσει*, the repetition of the article shows that the two terms are independent of each other (Winer, § 18, 5, p. 146, sq.); the distinction between them is, that the former denotes the *form*, the latter the *import*, the former *prayer* generally, the latter *supplication*. Comp. Olshausen on Ephes. vi. 18, and Harless, who rightly observes, "*δέησις*, is *entreaty*, *προσευχῇ*, *prayer*, *i.e.* *προσευχή* has, from use, been invested with the idea of a res sacra, *δέησις* not." In everything then, says the apostle, by corresponding prayer and supplication with thanksgiving, make your desires known unto God. Their *desires* are to be *expressed*, for only then will the heart be unburdened, and they are to be expressed with *thanksgiving*; the prayer for new supplies of grace is always to be connected with thanksgiving for those already received. We have an example of such a prayer in that of Jacob, Ex xxxix. 9, sq. At the same time, the *expression* of the desires of the heart has a purifying effect on them, which every praying person experiences in himself. It strips prayer of what is selfish in those desires. *Αἰτήματα* cannot mean here, requests as expressed, as Luke xxiii. 24; 1 John v. 15, but what you have to ask, desideria vestra. The *πρὸς* in *πρὸς τὸν θεόν* denotes the direction: "towards God." In ver. 7 we have the result of such prayer, in which the heart commits its requests to the Lord; it is the peace of God which the heart of the suppliant receives. The expositor finds it difficult to give an explanation of words such as those of ver. 7. Their beauty lies in the impression which they produce as a whole, and which rightly affects every susceptible mind according to its individual tone of feeling. The *peace of God* here is not the same as *peace with God*, Rom. v. 1, and to be understood of the peace of reconciliation, nor is it right to understand *peace* as expressing the *peaceableness* of their mutual intercourse. Both of these interpretations must appear unsuitable to what goes before, if it is acknowledged,

as it universally is, that the *καί* has a consecutive force. The latter of the two which is given by Meyer has this against it, that it makes the *being careful* to have been the ground of the dissension among the Philippians, whilst from what we know with certainty, and what Meyer himself acknowledges, it was just a spiritual conceit springing from a false security that was the ground of this. And can the additional words, *which passeth all understanding*, be explained of the incomprehensible efficacy of a peaceable disposition? De Wette, and Winer in his latest edition, have given the true meaning (Winer, § 30, 1 Anm., p. 213.) The *εἰρήνη τοῦ θεοῦ* (genitive of the subject, as at Col. iii. 15, comp. also John xiv. 27, Rom. i. 7, &c.) is the peace of soul wrought by God, and more immediately in contrast with the heart tormented with care, as at John xiv. 27, it is opposed to the *being troubled* and *being afraid*. Reconciliation with God is doubtless, as De Wette also observes, the enduring foundation of all peace of mind. *Rest* of mind is a more negative idea that corresponds but little to the expression *peace of God*, which latter is rather to be considered as a power ruling in the heart (Col. iii. 15.) Meyer's assertion, however, that *εἰρήνη* never occurs in this sense, but always denotes the relation to others, to God or to men, is based on a too narrow interpretation of other passages. Compare only the passages cited above from John, and then xvi. 33, to say nothing of passages more liable to be disputed. And the same remark seems to me to apply to the assertion which is here also made, that *ὁ θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης* always designates God as the author of concord. This peace which proceeds from God, and which fills the heart, is further described as a blessing which passeth all knowledge. *Νοῦς* here denotes the capacity of knowledge. Comp. Harless on Eph. iv. 17, p. 400. This passage is similar to Eph. iii. 19. Meyer has with reason referred to the *all*, in reply to De Wette, who thinks that it is only the doubting perplexed understanding that is meant. I cannot conceive, however, how the efficacy of this peace only should he incomprehensible, and not the peace itself. The apostle then promises to his readers a blessing, the magnitude of which the understanding cannot grasp. The idea that the apostle cannot himself give this blessing is not here expressed, but is evident of itself. This superabundant blessing of peace from God is further described as a power which keeps the heart and mind, and

retains it in fellowship with Jesus Christ. *Φρουρήσει* is to be construed as a pure future. The following *ἐν* connects most suitably with *φρουρήσει*, comp. Gal. iii. 23, where it is connected with *ὑπό* and 1 Pet. i. 5, with *εἰς*. So Chrysostom: *ὥστε μένειν καί μὴ ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτοῦ τῆς πίστεως*. This is also confirmed by a comparison with 2 Cor. xi. 3. The *φρουρήσει* is to be understood in its general sense. The peace spoken of guards the heart from everything that would withdraw it from fellowship with Christ, let it come from within or from without. *Where* its protecting power is experienced is set forth in the words *καρδίας* and *νοήματα*. The *καρδία* needs this protection above all, for as it is the centre of the natural, so is it also the centre of all spiritual life in man. Thence proceed evil thoughts, Matt. xv. 19, there also, however, is the fountain of the new life, Rom. x. 10. Not only his feeling and will, but his thought has its centre there. Further, as *νοῦς* denotes the whole spiritual *habitus* of the man, the *νοήματα* refer as well to his thoughts as to his disposition and his will. They are the issues of the *καρδία*, denoting his thoughts and his volitions together. So 2 Cor. iii. 14, *ἐπωρώθη τὰ νοήματα*, and ver. 15, *κάλυμμα ἐπί τὴν καρδίαν κεῖται*, where the connexion of the one with the other is evident. If *καρδία* denotes the personal centre of all spiritual life, then *νοήματα* refers to the expressions of this; in reference to both, the peace of God will be a protecting power. There is just as little reason for restricting the *νοήματα* to the thoughts as there is for applying the *καρδία* exclusively to the feelings and the will. Comp. Meyer.

Ver. 8, 9. The apostle brings these practical exhortations to a close by summarily stating whatever else, besides the things specially mentioned, vv. 4—7, they were diligently to strive after. Accordingly the *τὸ λοιπόν* is to be understood only in relation to these exhortations, not as a resumption of the *τὸ λοιπόν* at iii. 1. The words of this verse do not contain any express opposition of that which God does (ver. 7), to that which still remains for man to do. But they plainly involve the idea that the blessing specified in ver. 7 manifests its presence by the diligent striving after what is mentioned in ver. 8, and only thereby as it seems is the possession of it to be secured. Comp. ver. 9. Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honourable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever

things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, they are to think on these things. *Λογίζεσθε* is not merely equivalent to *φρονεῖν*, for *πράσσετε*, ver. 9, shews plainly in *what manner* they are to think of these things. Every one will feel the emphasis implied in the repetition of the *ὅσα* before each predicate. The entire compass of Christian morality is here designed to be presented before them. It is not different objects, but one and the same moral nature, which the apostle here denotes in its various relations. The first four predicates denote this moral nature in itself, the two last, according to the moral sentiments of approbation which it elicits. *Ἀληθῆ* signifies what is "morally true," as at 1 Cor. v. 8, where it is joined with *εἰλικρίνεια* (sincerity), which stands in antithesis with *κακία* and *πονηρία*. So also Eph. iv. 21, where Harless observes: "The good is always at the same time the true, the evil is always at the same time the untrue." *Σεμνά* occurs besides here, only in the pastoral epistles, and signifies "honourable, respectable." *Δίκαια* in its general signification, "honest, according to law," as at Eph. iv. 24. In like manner is *ἁγνά* to be understood as generally characteristic of the moral nature, not chaste in the special sense; it is equivalent to *pure*, as at 2 Cor. vi 6, vii. 11; Jam. iii. 17; Tim. v. 22, &c. *Προσφιλῆ* is rightly rendered by Meyer, "lovely, that which conciliates love. That which in its own nature is amiable, is moral also in the Christian sense." Meyer also remarks in opposition to the interpretation (grammatically true), that would explain this term of "a kind manner and conduct towards others," that it does not suit the context in which we find no *special virtues* enumerated. The word occurs only in this passage in the New Testament, elsewhere in Sir. iv. 8, xx. 13; it is found often in profane writers. Lastly, *εὔφημα*, which Luther well renders, "that which sounds well, has a good report," according to the original signification of the word. It also occurs only here. The following *εἴ τις*, &c., does not specify other virtues, but sums up the foregoing, so that *ἀρετή* recapitulates the first-mentioned, and *ἔπαινος* the last-mentioned predicates. *Ἀρετή*, "virtue," a word, as is well known, of rare occurrence in the New Testament. As a predicate, viewed in reference to man, it is found again only at 2 Pet. i. 5. With reference to God, 1 Pet. ii. 9; 2 Pet. i. 3. The choice of the expression in this passage is

explained by the object which the apostle had in view, namely, to denote the moral nature in its objective aspect, after the most general form in which it was possible to do so. Ver. 9 forms a parallel with ver. 8. What the apostle has mentioned before as that which they were to strive after, he here farther characterizes as the very thing which they had learned and received from him, and had seen and heard in his example. This they are to do, and the God of peace shall be with them. The first *καί* signifies "also," the others simply "and." *Learned* and *received* refer to the instruction they had received from him, the two other verbs refer to the example he had set before them. On *ἐν ἐμοί*, comp. Winer, § 52, a. 3, p. 462. *And the God*, &c., these words show that what was stated as implied in ver. 8, was indeed present to the mind of the apostle. The peace spoken of in ver. 7 can be guarded and secured only by the conduct described in ver. 7 and 8. The *peace* here is the same as at ver. 7. *Καί* has here as at ver. 7 a consecutive sense. When the apostle sets himself forth as an example, he does so in the consciousness of what he has said at iii. 13, 14, 20, 21.

Ver. 10—20. In this passage, we have the apostle's expression of thanks for the contribution he had received for the supply of his necessities. With no less dignity than warmth of affection, does he here express his joy on account of the token of love which had come from the church. Not so much, however, as a relief to his necessities, was their gift welcome to him, 11—13, but rather as a fresh token of that relation of mutual communication in which they had been closely knit to each other from the first, and in consequence of which he does not look at the gift as such, so much as at the benefit which would accrue from such gifts to those who gave them, 14—17. He has now abundance in consequence of their gift, which he represents as a sacrifice well-pleasing to God, and for which he promises to them a rich return from his God, 18—19; then follows an ascription of praise to this God, ver. 20.

Ver. 10. *But I rejoiced in the Lord greatly*, &c., the apostle thus begins, *δέ* marking the transition to something new; *ἐν κυρίῳ*, as at ii. 10, 29, &c. Every event of his experience stands in his view in relation to Christ, and takes from Christ its character and form. The words that follow, denote the subject of his

joy, ὅτι, &c, "that now" (not, *now at last*, comp. De Wette) ye have again flourished in your care for me. The connexion of the infinitive here is somewhat loose, comp. Winer, § 45, 3, Anm. p. 375, who explains "with reference to" "as concerning," and solves the construction by supplying ὥστε. It is a still simpler method to understand ἀνεθάλετε as transitive, which is justified by the usage of the LXX. (Ezek. xxvii. 24), and the Apocrypha (Sir. i. 18, xi. 22); "that you have let your care for me flourish," so De Wette. I, however, prefer the former mode, on account of what follows, in which the ἀναθάλλειν is represented as not having been dependent on the will of the Philippians. On the form ἀνεθάλετε, comp. Winer, § 15, p. 98. But I do not agree with Meyer and others, in understanding ἀναθάλλειν (a metaphorical expression derived from a tree growing green again) of the worldly circumstances of the Philippians, not only because φρονεῖν has no connection with this, but also because then the following ἐφ' ᾧ, &c., as De Wette justly observes, would be very much without an object. Besides, the idea that the apostle rejoices in the improvement of their temporal circumstances, has nothing in itself to recommend it. It were then not so much their *disposition* in which he rejoices, as their *ability* to assist him. The apostle rather says: he rejoices that their Christian life has gained a new ornament, by which he understands this proof of their sympathetic care for him. I do not see that there is any want of delicacy in this expression of joy. Moreover, it were quite in accordance with the context, if the words could be so understood as to imply a charge against the Philippians, since, in order to prevent the misunderstanding that any imputation against them is implied, the apostle immediately adds, *wherein ye were also careful*, &c.—Ἐφ' ᾧ is elsewhere used by the apostle always as neuter; we are therefore not at liberty to understand it otherwise here, and to refer the pronoun to ἐμοῦ, but must either separate τὸ ὑπέρ ἐμοῦ from φρονεῖν, as Bengel and Meyer do, and refer ἐφ' ᾧ to the first, or refer it to the entire phrase τὸ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ φρονεῖν. The latter certainly has *this* strange in it, that a φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ φρονεῖν results from it, which Meyer characterises as a logical absurdity. But, in whatever way we take it, the first φρονεῖν is not the same in sense as the second; in the former case it is a care for the apostle which has realised itself in an actual contribution to his necessities, in the latter case it is a care

without any actual manifestation, a *care* to which *a want of opportunity* stands opposed. Might the apostle not well enough say, viewing the first φρονεῖν as the *proof* of their care for him: such an actually manifested care for me was the object of your care? And, if the relative ᾧ refers to the τὸ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ alone, why should he not have written simply ὅ, which would correspond better with the ἠκαιρεῖσθε than ἐφ' ᾧ? Besides, this interpretation gives an undue emphasis to the τὸ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ apart from the φρονεῖν. I regard, therefore, the common reference of the ἐφ' ᾧ as the preferable. The words *wherein ye were also careful* are designed to prevent the misunderstanding that the apostle intended to say:—their care for him had not existed before. This care was previously felt (the emphasis lies on the imperfect, by which the opposition between the past and the present is expressed); but *ye lacked opportunity*. Those who understand the word ἀνεθάλετε to refer to the temporal circumstances or means of the Philippians, explain ἀκαιρεῖσθαι as its antithesis, and as denoting an unfavourable state of their worldly means, a view which, grammatically considered, is certainly well founded. If, on the other hand, we have found this signification of ἀνεθάλετε to be not suitable, then must ἠκαιρεῖσθαι also be understood in its general signification as denoting the unfavourableness of circumstances generally. The further specification of whether it be the *means* themselves, or the *opportunity of sending* them that is meant thus remains a matter of conjecture. The expression belongs to the later Greek, and occurs only here.

Ver. 11. The apostle has just said that he greatly rejoiced because of the proof they had given of their care for him. He will not, however, be understood as saying this from a feeling of pressing want. Οὐχ ὅτι as at iii. 12. Καθ' ὑστέρησιν, "on account of want, because I suffer want" (comp. Winer, § 53, d. p. 478), in which he does not deny the fact of his being in want, but merely that his being in want was the cause of his expressing himself as he had done. Such a motive finds no place in him, for, he goes on to say, I (with emphasis) have learned in whatever circumstances I am, therein to find my satisfaction. In the same sense, ἀρκούμενοι, τοῖς παροῦσιν, Heb. xiii. 5. Αὐτάρκης as αὐτάρκεια has a different sense according as it denotes the outward condition or the inward feeling. Comp. 2 Cor. ix. 8 with 1 Tim. vi. 6. Αὐτάρκεια here denotes the "feeling," and it can have no other than the

sense already indicated ; it is not, as Meyer understands it, " to be sufficient to myself," in other words, " not to need the assistance of others," a thing which never can be learned, and which does not depend on the state of feeling. On *ἔμαθον* comp. Heb. v. 8. The school in which the apostle had learned this contentment was, his life. He does not, however, in this praise his own strength, but the strength of Christ, comp. ver. 13.—*Ἐν οἷς εἰμί*, not merely the circumstances in which he then was, but in which he might be at any other time. On the indicat. of the Pres., comp. Winer, § 43, 3, p. 354. Ver. 12. *Οἶδα καὶ*, &c., *δέ* is not the true reading. The apostle now further describes the art of contentment. It consists in knowing how to accommodate oneself to the most opposite circumstances, how to find a sufficiency in every situation, instead of regarding a certain state as the condition of this sufficiency. *Οἶδα* as the consequence of having *learned*—" I know"—by which is meant a practical knowledge, as is plain from ver. 13. *Καὶ ταπεινοῦσθαι—καὶ περισσεύειν*, the proper antithesis would be *ὑψοῦσθαι ;* the apostle, however, expresses the antithesis which he had more especially in view. He knows how to bear abasement as well as abundance, *i.e.*, in rebus exiguis patienter me gerere rebus abundantibus cum modo uti (Grotius.) From *οἶδα* he proceeds by way of climax to *μεμύημαι ;* " I am initiated," " admitted to the mysteries," an expression which implies that the art of which the apostle speaks is not so easy or so directly accessible to all as might be supposed. As this verb is usually connected with the accusative or dative, many are for connecting *ἐν παντὶ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν* not with *μεμύημαι*, but take the phrase in the same sense as above : *ἐν οἷς εἰμί* = in whatsoever state, and then join the following infinitives closely with *μεμύημαι*. But as the following infinitives themselves only indicate the different states, they must be regarded as exegetical of the *ἐν πᾶσιν*. Besides it could not with logical strictness be said : in every state I am initiated both to be full and to suffer hunger, &c. I prefer therefore to abide by the connexion with *μεμύημαι*, and to view the infinitives as explanatory.

Ver. 13. *I can do all things*, he continues. The *πάντα* is to be understood in its widest sense, and is dependent on *ἰσχύω*, as Gal. v. 6 ; James v. 16. *Ἰσχύω* not *οἶδα* again, from which we perceive that it is not a mere knowledge but an art that is meant,

the necessary strength for which the apostle draws not from himself but from him who makes him strong. In and through fellowship with him the apostle is strong. *Ἐνδυναμόω*, as here, Eph. vi. 10; Acts ix. 22; Rom. iv. 20; 1 Tim. i. 12; 2 Tim. ii. 1, iv. 17. *Χριστῷ* is omitted in A.B.D.* d. e., &c., and is doubtless a gloss from 1 Tim. i. 12.

Ver. 14. Notwithstanding ye have done well, in that ye have taken part with me in my affliction. Calvin traces the connexion well: cavet ne fortiter loquendo contemsisse ipsorum beneficium videatur. This verse supplies the positive to the *οὐχ ὅτι*, ver. 11, and thus indicates the proper ground of the apostle's great joy, ver. 10, namely, that they show an active sympathy with him in his affliction, and share his burden along with him. By his *affliction*, however, is to be understood his entire state at that time. On *συγκοινωνεῖν* see Eph. v. 11. *Καλῶς ποιεῖν* with Partic. as 2 Pet. i. 19, &c. Comp. Winer, § 46, 1, Anm. p. 398.

Ver. 15, 16. The apostle now reminds his readers that such a relation of *mutual communication* had existed between them and him from the beginning, a relation in which he stood to no other church but that of the Philippians. There is in these words at once a complimentary acknowledgment of the love of the church to him, and an expression of grateful love on the part of the apostle. An emphasis of feeling therefore rests on *ye Philippians*, as at 2 Cor. vi. 11. Ye, too, as well as I, he says, know that in the beginning of the gospel (*i.e.* in the beginning of the gospel's being spread amongst you, i. 5—12), when I was gone from Macedonia no church entered into fellowship with me, as to giving and receiving but you only. The words *when I was gone*, &c., fix more definitely the point of time indicated by *in the beginning*, &c. *Ἐξῆλθον* is to be taken as pluperfect, on which see Winer, § 41, 5, p. 318. The apostle alludes to the assistance mentioned in 2 Cor. xi. 9. Others interpret thus, "when I departed," by which the time specified in Acts xvii. 14 would be denoted. But if the contributions mentioned in ver. 16 as having been sent to Thessalonica, are not themselves to be meant, (a supposition which is inadmissible both on account of the *καὶ* and also because the gifts repeatedly sent to Thessalonica cannot be alluded to in connexion with the words, *when I departed*, &c.), it is at the same time scarcely to be supposed that among the circumstances noted

in the Acts as connected with the apostle's departure from Macedonia, there was still another contribution, sent by the distant church in Philippi, which was not included in those sent to Thessalonica. It has appeared surprising that the apostle should accordingly notice, in ver. 15, the contribution in Corinth, which was later, and should afterwards, in ver. 16, notice that which was earlier in point of time. The same difficulty presents itself only in another form, in connexion with the interpretation of ἐξῆλθον as the common aorist; for here also the question arises, wherefore does the apostle mention, in ver. 16, that which is the earlier in point of time? The answer which is wont to be given in the former case—that the apostle mentions first that which was the most considerable, is not at all satisfactory, chiefly because ver. 16, with ὅτι (not "that," but "for,") is not simply an addition to, but serves to illustrate and confirm, ver. 15. And still more difficult must it be in the other case, to assign the reason why the apostle did not adhere to the order of time, and mention first the contributions sent to Thessalonica, and then those sent on his departure from Macedonia.—If we bear in mind that ver. 16 stands in a subordinate relation to ver. 15, it will then appear certain that the apostle intends only to adduce the first-mentioned contribution (when I departed) as the one specially bearing on the object he has in view in this passage. With this contribution which the church sent after him a great distance (when I had departed from Macedonia), did the relation at present subsisting betweeen the apostle and them first connect itself, as the fruit of which he also regards the present gift sent to him at Rome. And the following verse (ver. 16) then serves to illustrate the fact that they entered into such a connexion with the apostle: for even before I had departed from Macedonia, even in Thessalonica, ye have repeatedly sent to my necessities. The words, *even in Thessalonica*, will thus be antithetical with, *when I had departed from Macedonia*. This explanation removes the difficulty started above.—Εἰς λόγον. I think with De Wette and Meyer, the rendering "in regard to" unsuitable, on account of the context; the words which follow, and εἰς λόγον ὑμῶν of ver. 17 require that λόγος be taken in the sense of "account," in which it also occurs in Matth. xviii. 23 and elsewhere. So in Cic. Lael. 16: ratio datorum et acceptorum. Δόσις καὶ λῆψις, "giving and receiving"=מַשָּׂא וּמַתָּן, Sir. xli. 19.

If we suppose the figure to be taken from books of accounts in which are inserted the expenditure and receipts, it will not do to set the *giving* to the side of the Philippians, the *receiving* to the side of the apostle. For in an account book one does not insert what he himself gives and the other receives, but what he gives and receives. Besides, the expression, "giving and receiving," would then be without any object, in so far as it implies nothing more than is expressed at Rom. xii. 13, by the simple phrase, *he communicated to my need.* Rather, as Meyer well observes, must the expression :—you have communicated with me in reference to the account of giving and receiving—be understood of a mutual account keeping; the apostle, (as also the Philippians,) takes account of giving and receiving. Ver. 17, "to your account," also leads to this interpretation. "In the account of the Philippians, remarks Meyer, the column for the *receivings* would be indeed empty, as, in Paul's account, would be that for the *givings.*" But if this be true, does not the expression, *giving and receiving*, become meaningless, and could the apostle have said with any reason: they have entered with one another into the relation of reciprocal giving and receiving, if the Philippians could think of nothing which they might regard as *received* by them? And why should they not think of the spiritual gifts which they had received from the apostle? The apostle certainly does not characterize what they received from him as spiritual, in contradiction to that which they gave him as pertaining to the body; it was not his object to make any such distinction; all that he means to say is, that a relation of mutual communication of reciprocal giving and receiving has subsisted between him and the Philippians from the beginning. The idea contained in the 17th verse is also analogous to this view. That ὅτι is not "that," but "for," so that it is not merely a continuation of the ὅτι of ver. 15, but ver. 16 is the confirmation of what goes before, De Wette and Meyer have acknowledged, because, as the latter observes,—not merely a gratuitous reversal of the order of time would result from the other supposition, but also because the contents of ver. 16 would not logically correspond with the words, *ye also know.* Ὅτι, according to Meyer, confirms the early period fixed in ver. 15 by one still earlier. But it is not evident, according to his interpretation, why the words, *even in Thessalonica*, serve only as a confirmation of ver. 15, and are not rather to be considered as

co-ordinate with it, and placed before the ὅτε ἐξῆλθον.—The name of the place may be connected grammatically with ἐπέμψατε (comp. Meyer), but as it thus stands in antithesis with the ὅτε ἐξῆλθον, I prefer with De Wette to connect it with μοι, without, however, supplying ὄντι. *Once and again* gives prominence to the repetition. Εἰς τὴν χρείαν (merely τὴν χρείαν is not the true reading, also not μου, but μοι), means, "to my necessity," to its supply. Ἐπέμψατε, absolute as Acts xi. 29.

Ver. 17. The apostle here again (as above, ver. 11), guards his readers against mistaking his meaning, by supposing that he is mainly concerned about the gift in itself. That which he seeks, is rather the fruit or profit which redounds from such a gift to the donors, in so far, namely, as any such gift draws after it a rich recompense. This future recompense is the *fruit* which, on every fresh proof of their love, abounds to their account, (following out the figure in ver. 15.) It is therefore not so much his own interest as that of his benefactors which he has in view. Comp. ver. 19. Ἐπιζητῶ is not studiose quaero, but quaero, ἐπί denoting the direction, see on ἐπιποθῶ, i. 8. Πλεονάζω, as at Rom. v. 20, vi. 2; 2 Cor. iv. 15; 2 Thess. i. 3, "to increase," is to be connected with εἰς, although this connection occurs nowhere else (2 Thess. i. 3 ?) Comp. Meyer. Others connect with ἐπιζητῶ.

Ver. 18—20. The apostle, turning back to the circumstance that occasioned what he has just said, declares, that in consequence of their gift he has abundance, promises to them a rich recompense from God, and concludes with an ascription of praise to him from whom such recompense is to be looked for. Ver. 18. But I have all. Ἀπέχω, as at Philem. xv.; Matth. vi. 2, &c., (comp. Winer, § 41, 4, b. Anm., p. 318 (antithetical with ἐπιζητεῖν, ver. 17: so that nothing more remains for me to wish; therefore, not a certification of his having received what was sent. *And abound*, a stronger expression than the preceding, his abundance being the result of their assistance. Still stronger, *I am full*, having received, &c. *The things sent by you* are characterised as a pleasing sacrifice offered to God. Τῷ θεῷ belongs to all the parts of the apposition. Ὀσμὴ εὐωδίας describes the sacrifice in respect of its efficacy, as a sweet smelling odour. It is the רֵיחַ־נִיחוֹחַ of the Old Testament, Lev. i. 9, 13, &c., comp. Eph. v. 2. This is predicated only of free-will offerings (קָרְבָּן). On this New Testament view of a sacrifice,

which has of late been again justly brought into prominence, and its practical importance held forth, compare such passages as Rom. xii. 1; 1 Pet. ii. 5; Heb. xiii. 16; Phil. ii. 17.—Ver. 19. De Wette correctly: advancing from the idea of acceptability to that of recompense. On *my God*, comp. i 3. God recompenses what is done to him, as his God. *Πληρώσει*, with reference to *πεπλήρωμαι*, ver. 18, loses in force if not viewed as a pure Fut.; the apostle makes an express promise. The promise is differently understood, some explaining *πᾶσαν χρείαν* of bodily, others of spiritual wants, and others of both. It is scarcely possible to settle this point on grammatical grounds or from the context. For *χρεία* in itself, as De Wette has observed in opposition to Van Hengel, decides as little for the reference to the bodily, comp. Eph. iv. 29, as *πλοῦτος*, to the spiritual necessities. Still, from the signification of *χρεία* at ver. 16 and the parallel, 2 Cor. ix. 8—11, to which De Wette has already referred, I also am inclined to regard the reference to the bodily need as the more natural, and in no case would we be at liberty to exclude this. Meyer understands every want both of a bodily and spiritual kind, but refers *πληρώσει* not to the earthly recompense, but to the recompense in the kingdom of the Messiah, for which he finds conclusive ground in the *ἐν δόξῃ* which is to be viewed as instrumental, dependent on *πληρώσει*, and denoting the Messianic glory. But this idea of the Messianic glory is warranted neither by the indefinite expression *ἐν δοξῃ*, nor by *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰ.*, which, according to Meyer himself, expresses nothing more than the causal confirmation of the promise. And if the apostle says of himself, *πεπλήρωμαι*, why should he in *πληρώσει* refer his readers to the day of the second coming for the supply of their every want? He does not do this in 2 Cor. ix. 8, sq.; and the Lord himself does not refer his people to a period beyond the present life for the supply of their every want, Matth. vi. 33. *Ἐν δόξῃ* as also *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰ.* belongs to *πληρώσει*. The former either designates the object with which God satisfies there need (Eph. v. 18; Col. iv. 12, &c.), or denotes the manner of this satisfaction. *Ἐν δόξῃ* is however no fitting expression for the object corresponding to every need, (especially if by *χρεία* are understood, wants pertaining to the body), and would, in this case, have certainly been more exactly defined. All the passages cited above, in which *πληροῦν* occurs with *ἐν*, have a clearly de-

fined object. Quite differently again 2 Cor. ix. 8. We can therefore understand ἐν δόξῃ only as denoting the way and manner in which God will supply every want ; in glory, according to his riches. Against the connection of ἐν δόξῃ with πλοῦτον, Meyer has justly observed, that it is not to be overlooked why the apostle has not adhered to the usual expression, and written τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ. Finally, the words ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰ. show wherein this πληρώσει has its ground ; they are therefore not to be rendered in communione Christi, as the verb to which they belong does not denote a human action; what Muskulus says is however substantially true: this supply is to be looked for by them only in so far as they abide in Christ, *i.e.* in the faith and religion of Christ. (Van Hengel, p. 32C.)

Ver. 20. The thought of the glorious recompense from God calls forth the ascription of praise to God. Comp. Eph. iii. 20 ; Rom. xi. 36. At ἡ δόξα supply εἴη. Comp. Harless on Eph. iii. 20 : "the glory that belongs to God is ascribed to Him, and that for ever and ever, or through all ages." Comp. Gal. i. 5 ; 1 Tim. i. 17 ; 2 Tim. iv. 18, &c., comp. Olshausen on Eph. iii. 21 ; and Harless on αἰών, Eph. ii. 2.

Ver. 21—23. Salutations and benediction. *Salute every saint*, applies to the whole church ; it is a mutual greeting, as at Rom. xvi. 16 ; 1 Cor. xvi. 20 ; 2 Cor. xiii. 12, where *one another* is used. Similarly 1 Thes. v. 25, *all the brethren*. In all these passages the words *with a holy kiss*, instead of, as here, *in Christ Jesus*, mark the Christian character of the salutation, a salutation which derives its significance from the consciousness of fellowship with Christ. So Rom. xvi. 22 ; 1 Cor. xvi. 19. Meyer has with reason rejected the connexion of ἅγιον with ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰ. The expression *every saint*, not *all the saints*, denotes that each individual is specially saluted. *The brethren which are with me*, as distinguished from *all the saints*, ver. 22, denote the inner circle of the apostle's acquaintance, those mentioned i. 14, from which also those indicated ii. 20 need not be excluded ; for there is no reason to suppose that a salutation might not be sent from them. He then sends a salutation, ver. 22, from all the saints at Rome, chiefly from those that are of Cæsar's household, οἱ ἐκ τῆς Καίσαρος οἰκίας. The ambiguity of these words appears in the variety

of interpretations assigned to them. Some understand, relations of the emperor, others, servants of the emperor, others, inhabitants of a house belonging to the emperor. Of the utmost importance for the settlement of this point, is the question whether the *οἰκία καίσαρος* here is the same as the *πραιτώριον* i. 13. If they are identical, then *οἰκία Καίσαρος* cannot mean the imperial palace in Rome, which is never called *πραιτώριον*, but palatium. But neither can we well suppose the prätorium in Rome to be meant, as it is most improbable that this would be called *ἡ Καίσαρος οἰκία* in Rome itself, where the emperor lived. This difficulty does not attach certainly to the view taken by Böttger, according to which *ἡ Καίσαρος οἰκία* is the palace of Herod in Cæsarea, which, after the death of Herod Agrippa the elder, had become, like every other royal house an *οἰκία Καίσαρος*, and was used as a *πραιτώριον* (Acts xxiii. 35.) This *οἰκία*, as the only one of the kind in Cæsarea, might properly enough be designated *ἡ Καίσορος οἰκία*. But, apart from his other reasons in proof of this epistle's having been written in Cæsarea (on which see Introd.) Böttger has not proven, and will not be able to prove, that *πραιτώριον*, i. 13, and *ἡ Καίσαρος οἰκία* here, are necessarily the same. Allowing that we are justified in maintaining that this epistle was written from Rome, we may without much hesitation abide by the opinion that *ἡ Καίσαρος οἰκία* is different from the praetorium, i. 13, and denotes the imperial palace, whilst by the *οἱ ἐκ τῆς Καίσαρος οἰκίας* are most probably meant servants belonging to the emperor's household, with whom the apostle had come into contact through his residence in the praetorium. There is little probability in itself of relations being meant (comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 15), besides the absence of all historical ground for such a supposition, and also, that had such been the case, it would have been brought into greater prominence. Matthies' view that praetorians in Rome are meant, is disproved in what has been said. That procurators in Cæsarea are meant (Rill.) is already contradicted by the plural, apart altogether from the question with regard to Cæsarea. For what remains on this subject comp. Böttgers' learned treatise, in his Beiträgen ii. p. 47, sq. Olshausen is also in favour of the view here developed. Why they of Cæsar's household should be mentioned as *especially* saluting the Christians at Philippi, cannot be determined. That the

apostle aimed at encouraging the Philippians, as Chrysostom supposes, is not a sufficient explanation, as he could not send such a salutation except in consequence of an actual commission.

Ver. 23. The apostle concludes with the usual benediction: the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Comp. Rom. xvi. 24; 1 Cor. 16, 23, &c. Manuscripts of some authority read, *τοῦ πνεύματος*, instead of *πάντων*, and Lachmann and Tischendorff have received the former into the text. The form here has then most resemblance to that at Gal. vi. 18.

THE PASTORAL EPISTLES.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

ON THE GENUINENESS OF THE PASTORAL EPISTLES.

§ 1. THE PROBLEM.

Although the second epistle to Timothy is different in its scope and aim from the other two so-called Pastoral Epistles, inasmuch as it does not treat of the order and government of a church, but relates entirely to the person of the evangelist Timothy, we yet join the three writings here together, as they possess in common a peculiar character, which distinguishes them from all the other epistles of the apostle, and on account of which, in relation to these others, they may be viewed as forming one epistle. Who could pass from the perusal of the other epistles of Paul to these, without being struck with this peculiarity? In the three epistles, we find errors of a similar kind combated, to which we may indeed find analogies here and there in the other epistles of the apostle, but which stand out here in a breadth and a significance such as they have in none of the others. The case is similar with regard to what we find in these epistles (the second to Timothy excepted, which offered no occasion for such a topic), respecting ecclesiastical institutions. To this also we may easily find analogies in the other epistles, and in the Acts of the Apostles, but the defined and comprehensive form in which the subject appears here, creates a degree of surprise. In addition to this, what will perhaps appear most striking in these epistles, is a peculiarity of language, which shows itself not merely in the use of new terms for new appear-

ances, but also in new and uncommon expressions to denote what is familiar. Nay, these epistles are even distinguished by a peculiarity in their style and composition. To him who has still in his thoughts the dialectics of the epistles to the Romans and the Galatians, or the oratorical fullness of that to the Ephesians, the style of these epistles—not merely of the first, but of all of them—cannot but appear strange. And even when compared with other epistles, to which they are much more nearly related, as, for example, with that to the Philippians, and especially that to Philemon, a marked difference will be observed. How loosely are the sentences connected, what a strangely sententious form of expression prevails here! Thoughts and instructions of a general nature, follow in quick succession precepts of the most special kind, but at the same time of a universal value. It is also acknowledged that the language of the Pastoral Epistles is most pure, most free from hebraisms. And finally, with respect to the circumstances of time and place amid which these epistles would seem to have been written, we find ourselves here also on unknown and strange ground, in as far as regards the other epistles, and even the Acts of the Apostles. The statement made in the first epistle, i. 3, does not correspond to what is said in Acts xx. 1 respecting the apostle Paul, although we are most readily led to seek in that passage the explanation of the statement. The second epistle to Timothy lets us know, indeed, that it was written during an imprisonment of the apostle, but what difficulties beset us, if we fix it as having been written during his imprisonment at Rome, of which we are informed in the Acts of the Apostles, and give it a place among the other epistles which proceeded from this imprisonment! And, lastly, the epistle to Titus—here every trace of history is entirely lost.

This peculiarity, which we have pointed out as distinguishing the Pastoral Epistles, must be acknowledged in the very outset. There lies here therefore at the threshold of these epistles (as even the most decided advocates for their genuineness must acknowledge), a real problem that requires solution; and the question can only be, whether such a solution is given in the results of the most recent criticism, or whether we have to seek it in another way, and how far it is attainable.

§ 2. THE EXTERNAL TESTIMONIES.[1]

Ere we set foot on the shifting ground of criticism, it may be well to call to mind the testimonies afforded by ecclesiastical antiquity in favour of these epistles. We pass over the references to these epistles, which it is supposed are to be found in Clemens Romanus and Ignatius, and notice, first of all, the passage in Polycarp ad Phil. cap. 4, comp. with 1 Tim. vi. 7, 10, and cap. 12, comp. with 1 Tim. ii. 1, 2. Further, the passage in Theophilus of Antioch ad Autol. III. 24, comp. with 1 Tim. ii. 2. Then those in Athenagoras, in which he alludes to 1 Tim. v. 1, 2, and 1 Tim. vi. 16. In addition to these, Justin Martyr, in Eusebius (h. e. 3, 22), comp. with 1 Tim. vi. 20 ; lastly, the unmistakeable testimonies to the genuineness of these epistles to be found in Irenæus, Clemens of Alexandria, and Tertullian. The heretics, too, appear as witnesses for these epistles. Comp. in Hug (Einl. 1, p. 54, sq.) the passages from Theodotus, comp. with 1 Tim. ii. 5 ; from Heracleon, comp. with 2 Tim. ii. 13 ; from Tertullian as quoting from heretics, comp. with 1 Tim. vi. 20 ; 2 Tim. i. 14, ii. 2. Tatian has acknowledged at least the epistle to Titus ; and it is not difficult to account for his having rejected the two others (comp. Bauer, a. a. Q. p. 136) ; nor is it more difficult to show why Marcion stumbled at all the three, and kept them out of his canon. Dr Baur himself acknowledges, p. 139, that although Marcion might have admitted the epistle to Titus, as well as Tatian, he yet could not have made out the second to Timothy to be at all consistent with his opinions, except on the supposition of interpolations, whilst, by acknowledging the first to Timothy, he would clearly have condemned himself. Comp., moreover, Baumgarten, a. a. Q., p. 33, sq., and Hug, Einl. 1, p. 56—70. Without at present entering on the objections that may have been raised against certain of the testimonies here adduced (comp. Böttger, a. a. Q., p. 199), we may safely assert, that these epistles are inferior to none of the other epistles of Paul in historical proof, and that long before the close of the

1 Comp. on this subject for details, Bauer, die s. g. Pastoralbriefe. Stuttg. u. Tüb. 1835, p. 136—142, and on the other side, Baumgarten, die Aechtheit der Pastoralbriefe, &c., 1837, p. 27—40. Böttger, Beiträge zur hist. krit. Einl. 1838, V. Abth. p. 199—204. Matthies Erklarung der pastoralbriefe, p. 4—16.

second century they had, in consequence of these testimonies, obtained the full acknowledgment of the church.

§ 3. SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM ON THE SUPPOSITION OF THEIR BEING NOT GENUINE. THEIR GENUINENESS IMPUGNED, AND DEFENDED.[1]

It is well known that Schleiermacher was the first, who in his critical dissertation on the so-called first epistle of Paul to Timothy, Berl. 1807, directed an attack against one of these epistles, viz. the first epistle to Timothy. The two others he acknowledged to be genuine, and made use of them principally as the basis of his attack on the first. His arguments against its genuineness are founded partly on the peculiarity of its language, partly (although this he regarded as of secondary importance) on historical difficulties, and lastly, on the plan and composition of the epistle, which he held to be unworthy of the apostle. The result of his critical investigation has not failed to exercise a mighty influence, as may still be seen in the opinions expressed on the first epistle, by Usteri (in der. Einl. zur Entw. des Paulinschen Lehrbegriffs, p. 2), by Neander (ueber das apostolische Zeitalter, i. 539), and by Lücke (Stud. u. Krit. 1834, p. 764.) Ere long, however, as was to be expected from the cognate character of these epistles, even in a grammatical point of view (which Schleiermacher himself acknowledges a. a. Q. p. 27,) the suspicion of spuriousness was extended to them all. This was done first by Eichhorn, in his Introduction to the New Testament (Leipsic 1812), then by De Wette, Lehrbuch der hist. crit. Einl. (Berl. 1830); Schott. Isag. (Jen. 1830), and Schrader, der ap. Paulus (Leipsic 1830.) Credner, in his Introduction, sought to give a new turn to this critical question, in that he acknowledged the epistle of Titus alone to be genuine, while at the same time he professed to find in the other two epistles certain portions that were genuine. But the previous criticism had arrived at the fixed conclusion that the three epistles must stand or fall together; and Credner himself has again given up this view. The most recent opponent of the genuineness, Dr Baur: die s. g. Pastoralbriefe des ap. Paulus (1835), we find directing his attack against the

1 See this subject historically treated in Matthies, p. 16, sq.

three epistles, and also De Wette in his most recent statements on this subject in his exeg. Handbuch. Bd. 2, 5 Th. If the attack on the genuineness has been thus from time to time renewed ever since it was first opened, there has also been no lack of able defenders from the commencement. Against Schleiermacher there appeared in the lists H. Planck (Bemerkungen ueber den ersten Paul. Brief an den Tim. (Gött. 1808), Wegscheider, (der erste Brief, &c., Gött 1810), Beckhaus (spec. observ. de voc. ἅπ λεγ. &c., Lingae 1810) for the genuineness of the first epistle; and when the attack was directed against all the three, their defence was undertaken by Suskind in Bengel's Archiv. fur Theol. I. 2; Bertholdt, in his Einl. 6 Th. Hug. Einl. 2 Th.; Feelmoser, Einl.; Heydenreich die Pastoralbriefe; Guerike, Beit. zur. hist. crit. Einl. Halle 1828; Curtius de tempore, quo prior I. ad T. ep. ex. sit; Böhl on the date and pauline character of the epistles to Tim. and Tit.; Hemsen, der. ap. Paul.; Flatt, in his lectures on the epistles of Paul to Tim. and Tit. Mack. comm. ueber die Pastoralbriefe; Baumgarten die Aechtheit der Pastoralbriefe Berl. 1837; Böttger Beiträge zur hist. crit. Einl. IV. u. V. Abth. Gött 1737; and finally, Matthies, Erklärung der Pastoralbriefe. Greifsw. 1840. In considering this question, we may fairly view it only in the position which it now occupies as represented by Dr Baur and De Wette's most recent attacks, and the replies which these have called forth from Baumgarten, Böttger, and Matthies. We shall therefore, first of all, have to bring forward and examine the grounds on which the most recent criticism denies the authenticity of these epistles. But this criticism does not present us with merely negative results. It is well known that in its latest form, as represented by Dr Baur, it boasts of not abiding by merely negative results, but of building up by positive criticism what has been destroyed by negative; by assigning their real historical place to those particular compositions that have been shown to be spurious. With reference to this criticism all will depend on the question, whether it has really succeeded in discovering another place for these epistles, to which they unmistakeably belong. Must we answer this question in the affirmative, then nothing further remains for us but to rest contented, well or ill, with this critical result; if the reverse be the case, then the question with us will be, how the Pauline origin of these epistles may be vindicated in spite of the acknowledged differences between them

and the other epistles of the apostle. Dr Baur, in his work on the apostle Paul, p. 492—499, has summed up in the four following points, his arguments against the genuineness of these epistles, and in favour of their having been written in the second century, corresponding to the more detailed statement of these in his treatise already named, "die so genanute Pastoralbriefe." 1. The heretics of the Pastoral Epistles are the Gnostics of the second century; 2, That which relates in these epistles to the government and external institutions of the church points in its historical connexion, and also considered in itself, to a later period; 3, The impossibility of discovering a single passage having reference to the writing of these epistles, in the history of the apostle's life, with which we are familar; 4, Add to all this, that we find in these epistles viewed separately, so much that is peculiar and unpauline, both in the language and in many of the conceptions and views. De Wette's criticism differs from Baur's, chiefly in that it does not go beyond the negative stand point. For, that De Wette has made a conjecture with respect to the origin of these epistles a. a. Q. p. 119, falls not to be considered here. In regard to particulars, he differs somewhat from Baur on the first point, p. 120. He acknowledges, indeed, that the main scope of all the three epistles is, the controversy against the heretics; but he by no means recognises in these heretics, the Marcionites, as Baur does, nor does he feel warranted, owing to the weight of external evidence for the existence of these epistles, in assigning their origin to a period so late as after the middle of the second century. He supposes their date to be about the end of the first century; and that they were written by one who was either directly or indirectly a disciple of the apostle. De Wette does not agree with Baur in the very point which the latter represents as his principal argument. Nor does he quite agree with him also in the second of the above mentioned points; though he finds the traces of a later date. On the other hand, he lays most weight on the impossibility of accounting for these epistles in an historical respect, which falls in with the third of the above points, and scarcely less, on the exegetical difficulties which come under Baur's fourth point,—but which De Wette has presented more in detail, by a larger induction of particulars. Under these difficulties he includes not only the peculiarity in language (comp. 116, 117), and in composition, in conceptions, and views,

but also the unsuitableness of their contents to the state of things, to the design of the epistle, &c. The objections which De Wette here urges, can for the most part be considered only in the exposition of each epistle by itself; in regard to the other three points we shall be chargeable with no oversight, if we keep Baur's arguments principally in view, in the order in which they have been stated.

I. Baur's first argument against the genuineness of these epistles is, that the heretics therein refuted are the Gnostics of the second century. This statement contains both a negative and a positive criticism; if therefore it is to be viewed as historically proven, we must expect these two things to be shown—first, that at the period to which these epistles, according to their own showing, belong, there neither were, nor could be any forms of error against which that portion of their contents under consideration might be directed; and, second, that what is said with respect to heretics fully corresponds with the Gnostics of the second century. For it must of course be acknowledged, that although certain allusions in these epistles should correspond with particular features in the Gnosis of the second century,—as for example, what is said of the fables and genealogies,—it is still far from being proven that the epistles actually belong to this century. I am here touching a point of great importance, as opposed to this criticism of the Pastoral Epistles, and which the advocates for their genuineness, Baumgarten, Böttger, and Matthies, have not failed to bring forward. These have all remarked it as strange, that Dr Baur, who, in his work on the Christian Gnosis, has so well shown that the elements of the Gnostic systems were already in existence before the time of Christ, namely, in Judaism, should, in this critical investigation, hurry so quickly over the period, in which according to his own representation must lie that series of intermediate links which are necessarily presupposed in the Gnostic systems of the second century. These systems, and as it appears these alone, are held to be what corresponds with the characteristics contained in these epistles. We will not, in opposition to this, insist, as Matthies has done, on the fact that the representations given in the Pastoral Epistles of the superior spirits, have a loose and unconnected form; as to this it might be justly replied by Baur, that it was not to be expected of the writer of the Pastoral Epistles, that in order to refute the Gnostics, he

should have to delineate their systems. We shall afterwards have an opportunity of more exactly delineating the character of the heretics according to the representation given in these epistles; meantime we have to notice it as a defect in the criticism to which we are opposed, (even on the supposition of its being right in the explanation it gives of the characteristic references in these epistles), that in its attention to the positive, it has entirely omitted the negative side, according to which it is to be proved that errors existing in the apostle's time cannot be referred to. Such a criticism can only yield problematical results. The critic hastens with the point which he wishes to establish, to reach ground that is historically sure; he lays historical data beneath what is uncertain and shifting, in order to give it a fixed historical form, and then he imagines that the result deserves, on account of this historical aspect which it has acquired, to be preferred to a view that has fewer points of connection with historical data. But how easily may he be mistaken, if—as in the case before us—the allusions on which the criticism is founded are indefinite and capable of various explanation; and if, as is also the case here, the time to which the point in question according to its own showing belongs, is one which historically is dark and uncertain. Baur himself concedes, that between the matured Gnostic systems of the second century and the first beginning of the Gnosis, a series of intermediate links must be allowed to have intervened, the discovery of which will still occupy history long enough. We confess, however, that all this would be of trifling importance, if the criticism in question had succeeded in proving beyond contradiction, from the characteristic features which the writer of the Pastoral Epistles gives of the error he refutes, that this error is none other than the Gnosis of the second century with which history acquaints us.

The proof of this is made to rest on the following points. It is said that the heretics of the Pastoral Epistles, as distinguished from those who are combated in the epistles of the apostle acknowledged to be genuine, have already the entire complexion and physiognomy of the later heretics. The epistles themselves are said to refer us to a later date (comp. 1 Tim. iv. 2; 2 Tim. iii. 1, iv. 3.) The fables and genealogies of which they speak, are said to be those of Valentinian; the Antinomianism which they refute, that of Marcion. It is held that they give prominence to

the universality of the divine grace in opposition to the Gnostics; and oppose the Gnostic aversion to the creation; and that every doubt as to the Gnostics being meant, should be removed from our minds when we read at the close of the first epistle, of *oppositions of science* (γνώσεως) *falsely so called*, along with which in particular a passage in Eusebius, cited from Hegesippus (h. e. 3, 22) is produced for consideration. In addition to this, the doxologies, formulas, and many expressions are said to have a Gnostic cast—see 1 Tim. i. 17, vi. 15, iii. 16, &c. The representation which is given of the heretics, is said to be purposely neither too general nor too special. The heretics named are fictitious persons. Nor, lastly, among the characteristics of this heresy is the Marcionitic doctrine of the resurrection wanting. Comp. Baur on the so-called Pastoral Epistles, p. 1—39.

Against the assertion, maintained with great learning and acuteness in the work already named, that in the heretics of the Pastoral Epistles we may everywhere trace the well-known features of the Gnosis, nothing of any weight according to Dr Baur has as yet been brought; and he appeals farther to the accordant testimony of De Wette, that the heresy refuted in the Pastoral Epistles is no other than the Gnosis known to us from history. But, does not De Wette expressly say (a. a. Q. p. 120), that the allusions to Marcion are by no means certain, and that the evidences from the second century for the existence of the Pastoral Epistles, requires that an earlier date be assigned to them, somewhere about the end of the first century? The very chief reason, the positive proof which Baur has undertaken to give, is not acknowledged by De Wette. And with respect to the assertion, that nothing of moment has been brought against Baur's view, we must here gratefully call to mind especially what has been produced by Baumgarten and Böttger.

We now proceed, first of all, to consider more particularly those characteristics which are said to belong to the Gnostics of the second century. The first of these is set forth in the words μῦθοι and γενεαλογίαι, which occur together in 1 Tim. i. 4. We read of the μῦθοι alone in 2 Tim. iv. 4; 1 Tim. iv. 7; Tit. i. 14; where they are characterised as opposed to *the truth*, as *profane* and *old wives'* fables, and in the passage last adduced, as *Jewish* fables. The *genealogies* are mentioned at Tit. iii. 9 along with *foolish questions, contentions*, and *strivings about the law*. (Comp. Baur, die, s.q.,

pp. 11.) The first question here then is, whether these *fables* and *genealogies* must necessarily be explained of fantastic fictions respecting the world of spirits. Neander has denied this in reference to the genealogies mentioned in the epistle to Titus (Pflanzung, &c., I. 545), and maintained that from the context they are rather to be referred to the common Jewish genealogies. Baur himself has referred to Dähne, who is strongly of opinion that by the genealogies at 1 Tim. i. 4 are meant genealogical investigations in Philo's sense, but he disputes the historical vindication of this view, on the ground that the proofs on which it rests are found in the Gnostic systems. Böttger too has assented to this last signification of the γενεαλογίαι, and I think besides that the contents of the epistles do most favour this signification. Baur has not entered particularly on the interpretation of these terms; he only states as an objection to Neander's view, according to which pneumatologies similar to those of the later gnosticism are meant, that it is deficient in historical proof; and then shows how exactly the doctrine of the Gnostics is characterised in the expressions *fables* and *genealogies*. This assertion no one will contradict. But there remains some obscurity in the epithet *Jewish*, applied to these fables; as, in the fable of the Valentinians concerning the fall of the Enthymesis or Achamoth out of the pleroma, to which reference is supposed to be made, no one will discern anything specifically Jewish, even though it be probable that Jewish Christians were the founders of the Valentinian and the Ophitian sects. It is said, farther, that the epithet γραώδης was peculiarly applicable to this fable as the Sophia-Achamoth is there represented as an old woman; but the expression μῦθος γραώδης cannot rightly be explained of a fable which treats of an old woman, but of one which befits an old woman. It deserves also to be mentioned that the expression *genealogies* is by no means a usual designation of the doctrine of aeons; and Baur produces only one passage from Tertullian in which the expression receives its more definite meaning from being joined with aeones.—Comp., moreover, § 4, and the commentary.

Again, we are told that the Antinomianism which is opposed in these epistles is of a Gnostic description, and specifically that of the Marcionites. The passage 1 Tim. i. 6—11 is meant. Already, it is said, do the words of ver. 8, καλὸς ὁ νόμος sufficiently show that it is only Marcionites that are here spoken of; and that only

on the supposition of the words being directed against these heretics can the distinctions which he there lays down concerning the law have a suitable meaning. It will belong to the exposition to show how these words have a suitable meaning when viewed as opposed generally to a wrong application of the law; meantime, against the interpretation just mentioned, it may be well to call to mind with Böttger, a. a. Q. p. 122, that according to the usage of the apostle the phrase *οἴδαμεν ὅτι καλὸς νόμος* must not be understood as expressive of opposition, but rather of assent. As Böttger justly says, "he accedes to the assertion, but duly qualifies it;" referring also for examples of the same usage to Rom. vii. 14, 1 Cor. viii. 1, and citing Baur's own explanation of the latter of these passages, "as is evident from the *οἴδαμεν* which expresses assent," (die Christl. Gnosis, p. 90, 92.) But no one who is without prejudice will fail to see how completely the explanation under discussion falls to pieces when viewed in connection with the expression *νομοδιδάσκαλοι*, ver. 7, by which the apostle designates his opponents. For that this expression is not used ironically (the only remaining way of accounting for it) to designate such as will know nothing of the law, is evident from the *θέλοντες εἶναι νομοδιδάσκαλοι*, from which it appears that they gave themselves out for this. And are we then to believe that the Marcionites gave themselves out as being teachers of the law?—Comp. Baumgarten, p. 32; Böttger, p. 119.

Further, we are told that these epistles give a prominent place to the doctrine of the universality of the divine grace, in opposition to the Gnostics. On turning to the passages on which this assertion is made to rest, 1 Tim. ii. 3, iv. 10, vi. 13, ii. 11, we find the doctrine (acknowledged to be Pauline) of the all-embracing grace of God in Christ, stated in a purely positive form, without any express reference to opponents. And are we to regard these statements, which are made in so general a form, as to apply to every possible error in respect to them, as specially directed against Marcion? Nay, as regards the principal passage, 1 Tim. ii. 3, is it not clear from the connexion with what precedes, why the universality of grace comes to be spoken of? And just as little do the other passages require, that in order to their explanation we should suppose them to contain a refutation of this particular heresy. And on the supposition that they did, we must certainly allow that Clemens of Alexandria knew much better how to refute

the heresy which holds that a portion of mankind are by nature incapable of blessedness, when he appealed to man's moral freedom of will, than the writer of this epistle; as that universal divine will, which he opposes to this heresy, is represented by him as connected with the performance of certain subjective conditions on the part of man. Baur seems to feel this himself, as he observes, that this element which enters into the idea of the moral freedom of the will has not been overlooked in these epistles, as appears in their frequent exhortations to zeal for good works, and especially in 2 Tim. ii. 20, sq. We shall afterwards show the reason of these exhortations; but it is difficult to see how the assertion, that the doctrine of grace is held forth in these epistles in opposition to Marcion, is at all confirmed by the statement that practical exhortations are given in other passages.—Comp. Baumgarten, p. 54, sq.

Farther, there is a passage referred to, 1 Tim. iv. 3, in which it is said, the allusion to the Gnostics is clear as the light of day; in which we read of the heretics, that they forbid to marry and command to abstain from meats, which God hath created to be received with thanksgiving of them that believe and know the truth; for every creature of God is good, and not to be refused if it be received with thanksgiving, for it is sanctified by the word of God and prayer. To this also belongs Tit. i. 14. All this is made to apply to heretics, whose doctrine consists in a dualistic view of the world and of life, such as we find among the Gnostics, and in its most defined form in Marcion. "Their abstinence from meats," says Baur, "must have had its source in a certain feeling of dislike and abhorrence, which they cherished towards the creation of God, as towards something unclean." (Baur, p. 21, sq.) Now it is not to be denied that there are here traces of an asceticism which goes far beyond the Jewish prohibitions of meats. But we can also fully assent to everything else that is said by Baur, without being obliged to refer the date of the epistle to the second century, if only the epistle to the Romans maintain its place in the first, (I argue ex concessis); for in that epistle we find even, according to Baur's own view, allusions to the same Gnostic dislike towards the creation. (Paulus, p. 390.) "All this," says Baur there, "is in favour of the supposition that already among the Jewish Christians at Rome there existed a dualistic view of the world, very closely allied in its root to the Ebionitism of a later

period; which is the less to be wondered at as this dualism in reference to civil life stands in a very natural connexion with that view which sees in the life of nature an impure and demoniacal principle, awakening dislike and abhorrence." (Comp. Rom. xiv. 14—20.) Baumgarten has already with good reason pointed out this inconsistency. Baur, indeed, has attempted to explain it in his work on the origin of Episcopacy, p. 32, by showing that there is a wide distance from the first germ of a certain form of error to its actual existence and extensive propagation, and especially from certain practical views affecting life, to theoretically developed systems, and to the last step of a reaction which was begun without the full consciousness of its ultimate consequences. Accordingly he endeavours to show that from the germ which appeared in the church at Rome a system might indeed spring such as that exemplified in the pseudo-Clementine homilies, but by no means such as the Valentinian and Marcionitic, as is proved by the opposition in which the former stands to the two latter, both in the *fables* and *genealogies*, and also in the dualistic view of the world. But however true these remarks are in themselves, the inconsistency in regard to the point in question does not seem to be thereby removed. For, in order to this it must first be proved that the dualistically ascetic view of the world in these epistles is represented as a developed system in comparison with that in the epistle to the Romans. For what remains, comp. the commentary, where it will be shewn that the Gnostic dualistic view of the world cannot at all be meant.

The only remaining point which we will notice, in order not to overstep the limits assigned to us, is that on which Baur seems to lay the greatest stress. It is the words of 1 Tim. vi. 20; *ἐκτρεπόμενος τὰς βεβήλους κενοφωνίας καὶ ἀντιθέσεις τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως*, principally the concluding words. Here, it is said, we have an evident reference to Marcion, capable of being demonstrated from history. We will not insist on the fact that this reference has lost much of the ground on which it rests, from its being impossible that those *νομοδιδάσκαλοι*, mentioned in the first chapter, can be Marcionites. But even taking the passage by itself, it must above all appear remarkable that the writer, who as Baur himself shows, purposely gives the characteristics of the heretics in such a way as not to be too special, in order not to betray himself by

anachronisms as a pseudo-apostle, should not shrink here from marking the doctrine of Marcion by its most "appropriate name" (Baur, p. 26.) It may be said, however, that the author has here forgotten his part. But *must* we after all refer the expression *oppositions of science falsely so called* to the *oppositions* of Marcion? By no means, replies Matthies, and refers justly to the term ἀντιδιατιθέμενοι in 2 Tim. ii. 25. And Baur in his review of this commentary (Jahrbb. für wissensch. Kritik 1841, No. 12), has brought nothing against this, but acknowledges that it would be correct enough if we had otherwise no occasion to refer the expression to the Gnostic systems. But we have hitherto in reality found no occasion to understand a reference to the Gnostic systems, in the sense that they alone can be meant. What Baur there adds by way of restriction, namely, that it nevertheless remains strange that the heretics should have expressed their contradictions in such definite antithetical assertions, rests on the supposition of a collection of *oppositions* similar to that of the Marcionites, of which the passage under discussion says nothing, as we would then have to suppose for the same reason a similar collection of *vain babblings*. For what remains, comp. Baumgarten, p. 69. We have here, however, still further to justify our position. The passage in Eusebius, h. e. 3, 32, cited from Hegesippus, is said to contain a double testimony against the genuineness of these epistles. For first there is found in that passage the peculiar expression ψευδώνυμος γνῶσις; and even the ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν has there its parallel in the expression ἑτεροδιδάσκαλοι, and there too a ὑγιὴς κανὼν τοῦ σωτηρίου κηρύγματος is spoken of; and secondly, Hegesippus there says expressly, that the ψευδώνυμος γνῶσις first openly showed itself after there was none surviving of the circle of the apostles, With respect to the latter point we refer to the competent judgment of Neander, a. a. Q. p. 539: "As there was an unhistorical tendency, proceeding from a dogmatic interest, which sought to place the originators of all heresies in the apostolic era; so there was also a tendency still more unhistorical, the result also of a dogmatic interest (as is manifest in all the accounts of Hegesippus) to make it appear, that the church had, up till a certain period, continued quite pure, and that no heresy broke out until after the removal of the apostles." Besides, Hegesippus in the passage quoted does not

deny that the heretics were already in existence (ἐν ἀδήλῳ που σκότει φωλεύοντων); but only says, that they now first appeared γυμνῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ. Nay, as Thiersch has shown, we have not even the words of Hegesippus before us, but those of Eusebius, in which he obscures a simple statement of Hegesippus; in the passage iv. 22, where we have really to do with Hegesippus, we learn that he dates the outbreak of Gnosticism after the death of James. Here, he sees "the beginning of that chain of heresies," the last links of which he finds in the sects founded in his own time,—the Marcionites, Carpocratians, Valentinians, Basilidians, and Saturninians." If by this statement of Hegesippus is meant, that the apostolic age remained free from every kind of heresy, even from such as are noticed in 1 Cor. xv., or in the epistle to the Colossians, then we have nothing to say to it; but if he fixes the beginning of the subsequent Gnosticism to the time after the death of James, then our view of the heretics of the Pastoral Epistles remains quite unassailed, comp. § 4. With respect to the other point, namely, of the same expressions being used by Hegesippus as are found in the first epistle to Timothy, the supposition, that Hegesippus the Ebionite may not have shunned to employ expressions that occur in an epistle of Paul, without any direct reference to this epistle, is at least not so improbable as that any argument can be founded on it against the genuineness of this epistle. On the opposite hypothesis, that a disciple of Paul had the words of Hegesippus in view, the same difficulty presents itself on the other side.

We notice only another characteristic, which it is said must belong to the Gnostics of the second century. The apostle, to show what these *profane babblings* will lead to, adduces the examples of Hymeneus and Philetus, 2 Tim. ii. 18, *who concerning the truth have erred, saying that the resurrection is past already.* Here, it is said, reference is made to a wide-spread error of which, if it had already existed in the apostle's time, some further trace must have come down to us. But how do we know that it was already wide-spread? The words, *their word will eat as a canker*, if indeed they are to be understood of the outward spread of this error, represent this as prospective, and the examples adduced of Hymeneus and Philetus are the best proof that this error has not the character of a wide-spread heresy, but is to be regarded as the excrescence of vain disputation on the part of certain individuals

who are named on this very account. That the sect of the Marcionites cannot be meant, as Baur maintains, is already plain from the fact, that this doctrine was one of their standing characteristics, while here it is only said, that it had developed itself from the *κενοφωνίαις*, in the case of certain persons who are named. And can it seem at all surprising, that even in the apostle's time some should have fallen into this error, which is so closely connected with a spiritualistic view of the doctrine in question. We see how this doctrine offended the Sadducees, as also the Gentile Christians at Corinth, and the philosophic audience of the apostle at Athens. And if, moreover, we suppose that there were Jewish Christians in the apostolic era, who held dualistic notions, such as Baur maintains were held by those at Rome, we will not be surprised at its having entered into the minds of certain individuals, that the Christian doctrine of the resurrection would receive its right place, if they maintained *that it was past already ;* and we can then also feel a satisfaction in finding a clear trace of this error in this epistle. For what remains, see Böttger's learned notices (p. 170) concerning the Therapeutae, the Essenes, the ancient Ophites, and his observations on the meaning of a resurrection already past. Here then, also, we can find no unmistakeable reference to Marcion.

It would lead us too far to attempt to throw light on the other particular characteristics which Baur notices in support of his assertion. There are still the doxologies and formulas occurring in these epistles, as 1 Tim. i. 17, vi. 15, 16 ; further, expressions such as *φανερουσθαι*, *ἐπιφάνεια*, 1 Tim. iii. 16 ; 2 Tim. i. 9, &c., *θεὸς σωτήρ*, 1 Tim. i. 1, &c. ; further, the christological representations, 1 Tim. ii. 5, iii. 16, then the expressions *φῶς ἀπρόσιτον*, *ἀόρατος*, *ἄφθαρτος ἀφθαρσία ἀθανασία πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων ἐκλεκτοὶ ἄγγελοι*, the prominence given to the *χρηστότης* and *φιλανθρωπία τοῦ θεοῦ*, all represented as traces of the Gnostic period. Not indeed that the writer in these expressions opposes the Gnostics, but that he has adopted involuntarily their ideas and language. However, in the passage 1 Tim. iii. 16, according to Baur's interpretation, the author must have deliberately expressed himself in a Gnostic form ; as there are there six clauses, every two of which form an antithesis, in as far as the one member has more a Gnostic, the other more an anti-Gnostic cast. A strange

method certainly of refuting Gnosticism, which is yet said to have been the chief object of this false apostle.—Finally, it is said that the heretics named in the epistles show themselves to be fictitious. Baur has not troubled himself much with the proof of this point, so as to make it evident that he lays no particular weight upon it. And with regard to the doxologies and other expressions, he repeatedly acknowledges, that what he has adduced furnishes no strong proof. He finds nothing that is unpauline in any of them; nor can it have escaped his observation, how many representations and designations may be found in Scripture, and even in the writings of Paul, from which the expressions in question might be derived, or at least explained, without having recourse to the help of a Gnostic style of language and conception, as also Baumgarten and Böttger have shown. We shall have an opportunity in commenting on the particular passages of saying what we deem necessary.

If now we inquire to what result we have been led by the investigation of the main features which are said to belong to the Gnosis of the second century, we find that it can only be the same as that to which De Wette, Neander, Rothe, Matthies, Baumgarten, and Böttger, have come; who, in spite of the criticism of Dr Baur, supported as it is by the most comprehensive learning, have not been convinced of the justness of his conclusion. They all more or less point to this, that "the germ of a Judaizing Gnosticism, or a Judaizing theosophic-ascetical tendency, such as shows itself in the two epistles to Timothy, must *a priori* be presupposed as existing at this period; as the heresies of the second century point back to such a tendency gradually evolving itself out of Judaism" (Neander, p. 439.) To the same effect, Rothe considers the heretics of the Pastoral Epistles as being an indispensable intervening link already pre-supposed *a priori*. (Aufänge der chr. k. I. 322.) So also Böttger, p. 211. Comp. also Thiersch in his Herstellung des hist. Standpunkts für die Kritik, p. 249. When we go back to the origin of Gnosticism, as Baur has traced it out in his work on this subject (p. 36—38), and learn that the first elements of this were already formed within the sphere of the Jews' religious history; farther, that Christianity could not first call forth this speculative philosophy of religion, although it could not but be immediately drawn into its circle wherever it came into

contact with it; when we add to this, that Baur himself finds in the γνῶσις of the first epistle to the Corinthians, viii. 1, sq., an idea at least closely allied with the later Gnosticism,—that he already ascribes to the Jewish Christians at Rome a dualistic view of the world of a Gnostic kind,—that he recognizes in the epistle to the Colossians an example of the manner in which Essaism in particular united itself with Christianity, but in this connexion generally produced a new form of the Gnosis,—that he further supposes a series of intervening links, by which the Gnosticism of a later period is traced to its first elements: the question presses itself upon us, why is no place to be found in the apostolical era for the heresy of the Pastoral Epistles, and can they not be one of those necessary intermediate links for which they give themselves out? We receive for answer:—that would be a Gnosticismus ante Gnosticos, which is just in other words, that in the Pastoral Epistles we have before us the fully developed, wide-spread, heresies of the second century, otherwise Rothe's suggestion must certainly be admitted as valid, that we have also in the epistle to the Colossians Gnostics ante gnosticismum; and "among the Jewish Christians of the earliest period there are many indications which lead to the conclusion, that all these Jewish Christians of the earliest period bore more or less an Ebionitic stamp, and had an element of Gnosticism which they derived from Essaism" (Baur Ursprung des Epesc. p. 123.) All will depend then on our being able to prove also positively, that there is nothing inconceivable in such heretics as those of the Pastoral Epistles having existed in the apostolic time; on which, see § 4, and the Commentary.

We now add only one or two general remarks on Baur's view of the heretics of the Pastoral Epistles. Dr Baur has maintained that the *general* delineation which is given of the heretics, already transfers us to a time subsequent to that of the apostles; inasmuch as they do not appear as the apostles' personal opponents, but come into collision with the settled faith of the church, and are designated by the name αἱρετικὸς ἄνθρωπος, Tit. iii. 11, which was not applicable in this sense in the apostolic time. Comp. also 1 Tim. i. 19, *who concerning faith have made shipwreck*, and similar passages. The heresy, it is said, is here represented as a wide-spreading evil, and the opposition between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, comes clearly out in expressions such as if *there be any other thing*

that is contrary to sound doctrine, 1 Tim. i. 10, &c. We shall afterwards see that the apostle does not here speak of heterodoxy and orthodoxy in the sense which we attach to the words; but of an unhealthy, unprofitable tendency to speculations and pursuits which are destitute of moral fruit, as opposed to the spirit of practical morality that belongs to Christianity. Böttger rightly observes, that there is much more said of heterodoxy and orthodoxy in such a passage as Gal. i. 6—9. The term *αἱρετικός* too can cause no serious offence, so long as *αἱρέσεις* retains its place in 1 Cor. xi. 19. Comp. the interpretation of the passage. It has already been sufficiently noticed by others, how uncertain is the criterion which is founded on the assertion, that the opponents with whom the apostle deals are always represented as contradicting his own personal authority, while those of the Pastoral Epistles come into collision with the faith of the church (*concerning faith have made shipwreck—oppose the truth*, are the expressions referred to.) (Baumgarten, p. 47. Böttger, p. 113.) We however acknowledge fully, that the perverse tendency to be taken up with vain fancies and controversies about words which is rebuked in these epistles, was widely extended, but we do not admit that this points to a period posterior to that of the apostles. Baur also brings forward that the epistles themselves refer us to a later date. 1 Tim. iv. 1; 2 Tim. iii. 1. But, far from our being constrained by this to the adoption of Baur's view, it is just the point where may be clearly seen, with what injustice Baur has brought together all that is said in these epistles respecting corruptions of, and apostacy from the faith on the part of some, with reference both to the present and the future,—has set it down as features of one and the same wide-spread heresy, and transferred it to the Gnosticism of the second century.

We shall not pursue this further, but rather proceed to set over against these general remarks of Baur's, certain others, that we may see which view has the more on its side on the principles of probability,—that namely, which finds the heretics of the Pastoral Epistles in the Gnostics of the second century, or our own, which gives credit to the testimony of these epistles themselves. Let it be supposed that a pseudo apostle refutes the Gnostics of the second century. This man was, of course, a child of his age, a contemporary of Justin Martyr, Polycarp, Athenagoras, Theophilus of

Antioch, Irenæus, perhaps also of Tertullian and Clemens of Alexandria. We might here with good reason remark, as has already been often done, that it were assuredly strange to find just the very writings of the second century that are spurious—to which by hypothesis these epistles belong—so far surpassing in their spirit, and in their intrinsic value, every other production of mind confessedly belonging to that period. This must be acknowledged by all with respect to these epistles generally, whatever particular exceptions may be made. But we confine ourselves to the refutation of the heretics, of which we have specimens before us belonging to this period by several of those named above. How marked a difference must appear to every one! While the so-called heretics of the Pastoral Epistles belong to the fellowship of the church, and of some only it is said that they are fallen away from the faith, and such as were excluded from church fellowship are expressly named; those Gnostic sects, to which these epistles are held to refer, are, on the contrary, represented as all of them out of the fellowship of the church, and as declared enemies. Could a pseudo-apostle of the second century, whose main object was to combat those heretics, concede to them such a position that he might have more the appearance of being an apostle? And then, how the writer has been able to divest himself of all the influences of his time, its language, its style of thinking and representing! If an Irenæus and Tertullian appeal against the heretics, above all to the general tradition of the church, must it not have been most natural for a pseudo-apostle of that time to make the apostle speak of the higher certainty of the doctrine declared by him, of his agreement with the rest of the apostles, &c. While they direct their attacks on this controversy against the blasphemous doctrines of the Gnostics—chiefly of the Marcionites—concerning the Creator of the world, and insist on the unity of the Old and New Testaments, we find no trace of this in these epistles. See on this point Thiersch, p. 255. This writer says justly, although in a different connexion: "at all events we have in this the most direct of all proofs, that in the New Testament there lie before us the documents of a stage in the controversy with the Gnosis quite different from all later stages." And how do these epistles actually combat the Gnostics of the second century? They were written, it is said, because Paul's own epistles could not be made available for this

object; as, "the heretics made them out to be chiefly favourable to their opinions without finding anything which they were compelled to acknowledge as a direct testimony against them" (Baur.) "How naturally must it have suggested itself, to represent the apostle by means of writings appearing then for the first time, as saying directly and with immediate reference to those opponents, what was not said in his writings already known with the distinctness that was to be desired" (Baur.) Where then is the direct testimony in these epistles—where are the immediate references to these opponents? The beginning of 1 Timothy is the principal passage adduced, i. 3—11. But what says the author there? It is enjoined not to give heed to fables and endless genealogies, for they only minister to controversy, instead of leading to the things that make for salvation. And so in all these epistles together, the sum of what is urged against the so-called heresy is, a warning against empty talk, useless contention—a conduct tending not to the advancement of the Christian spirit, but to its hindrance, morally unfruitful and unsound, which in several instances had led to a total departure from the faith (comp. 1 Tim. i. 19, 20; 2 Tim. ii. 16—18.) Besides this, and distinct from it, there are certain forms of error specified which were to appear in the future, the beginnings of which were already showing themselves (1 Tim. iv. 1; 2 Tim. iii. 1, sq.) Are we to suppose what is inconceivable, that the whole argument against the Gnostics is contained in these two passages? And have we here any direct testimony against these heretics? If the whole argument indeed be here, then must we acknowledge it to be seriously defective. No—the origin of these epistles is not made clear to us in the way pointed out by this criticism, and the manner altogether in which the error referred to in these epistles is refuted, has nothing of the form which we would expect it to have in the circumstances supposed by this criticism. Even Baur himself, as Böttger observes, has admitted the unsuitableness of two of these epistles for their object—the refutation, namely, of the Gnostics—when he says (p. 136), "Marcion, as well as Tatian (who, it is well known, highly esteemed it), might have admitted the epistle to Titus; in the second epistle to Timothy, however, he must at least have taken offence at the two passages, ii. 8, 18." There was no necessity then for any forged epistle, since all that is contained in

these two passages, as Bottger has also observed, is found as well and even better stated in Rom. i. 3, and 1 Cor. xv.

II. The second class of arguments adduced by Dr Baur includes "whatever in these epistles relates to the government and external institutions of the church." "This point stands in close and intimate connexion with the foregoing. The Gnostics, as the first heretics properly so called, gave the first impulse to the formation of an episcopal government." Yet, considered in itself, this fixed organization of the church, as we have it before us in the Pastoral Epistles, is, we are told, sufficiently fitted to awaken doubt and hesitation (Baur, Paulus, p. 495.) According to Baur, the constitution of the church, as it appears in these epistles, is characterised by a hierarchical tendency quite remote from the Christianity of Paul; and the same is perceptible in the principles he lays down with regard to the treatment of heretics. Further, the institution for the widows is also to be viewed in the same light; and then the command that women shall not teach, which is said to be pointedly directed against the Marcionites; then what is said regarding the female sex, 1 Tim. ii. 13—15, in connexion with what is said respecting widows. Finally, the injunction to a married life is to be regarded as having reference to the practice of the church. Here also may be included those expressions which Baur notices in the fourth section of his work as unpauline, such as *laying on of hands*, 2 Tim. i. 6; then such expressions as he alleges do not correspond to the apostolic time, as, *the husband of one wife*, Tit. i. 6; *the wife of one man*, 1 Tim. v. 9; *desire the office of a bishop*, 1 Tim. iii. 1; and that no *neophyte* be made a *bishop*, ver. 6; so also 1 Tim. iii. 13, where deacons are said to *purchase for themselves an honourable post*, and then what is said respecting the presbyters, v. 17, 19, indicating the transition to the later ideas connected with the office of presbyter; then also the charge to *lay hands suddenly on no man*, as the mark of a later period; finally, the expressions, *witnessed a good confession*, and *Christ Jesus who witnessed before Pontius Pilate*, 1 Tim. vi. 12, 13, are said to bear the stamp of a later period. With all this De Wette for the most part agrees, chiefly instancing the institution for widows, the *desiring the office of a bishop*, &c., as traces of a later state of things in the church, a. a. 1, Q., p. 118. He too explains the directions as to the appointment of

office-bearers in the church, Tit. i. 5, sq.; 1 Tim. iii. 1, sq., and the "remarkable" counsel, 2 Tim. ii. 2, by a reference to the interests of the hierarchy. All this, however, according to him, falls within the period towards the end of the first century, which makes a considerable modification.

We have already fully acknowledged (§ 1) the problem which presents itself on a comparison of these with the other epistles of Paul. The question here is, whether Dr Baur has not represented this problem as more difficult than we find it to be on a comparison with what is known to us, and whether we can admit the solution of it which he has given. There are two points on which the decision of this question must rest; viz., the organization of the church through *ἐπίσκοποι* and *διάκονοι*, which comes strongly into notice, and the institution for widows.

Now with regard to the *ἐπίσκοποι* and *διάκονοι* of the Pastoral epistles, we are quite at one with Baur in this—that the appearance of heretical tendencies in the church was that which chiefly led to an insight into the necessity of settled ecclesiastical organization. We find this connection indicated in these epistles themselves, as Baur also observes (comp. Tit. i. 5—10.) When Baur proceeds to say, "The Gnostics (namely, of the second century), as the first heretics, gave the first impulse to the establishment of an episcopal constitution"—this does not at all affect our position; for before the appearance of these Gnostics, there were heretical elements in great abundance. How otherwise could Baur himself urge as an objection, that there were opponents and heretics in Corinth and Galatia, and yet that the apostle, although the occasion equally demanded it with respect to them, gives no admonitions relating to bishops and deacons. The maxim cessante causa cessat effectus, is not applicable to this case according to Baur's own acknowledgment. Yet, let it be supposed that only the Gnostics of the second century could have given the first impulse to the settlement of an episcopal constitution, it may be proved, and Baur himself also admits, that in the Pastoral Epistles there is no mention of episcopal government in the sense which belonged to that expression in the second century. That Baur has in reality made this concession, we shall afterwards show, when we come to examine the view which he has submitted respecting the relation between the *ἐπίσκοποι* and *πρεσβύτεροι*.

The second thing we have to mention against Baur's view, is, that he either entirely leaves out of sight or arbitrarily rejects as unhistorical, those analogies which we cannot fail to observe, bearing on the ecclesiastical organization so prominently brought before us in these epistles, on a comparison of them with the rest of Paul's epistles, and the accounts we have elsewhere in the Acts of the Apostles. He has said nothing on the appointment of deacons, as related in Acts, chap. vi. And is it not critical caprice to set aside the account in Acts xiv. 23 regarding the appointment of presbyters, and the passage Phil. i. 1, by saying that these data are far too isolated? What are we to say then of the presbyters in the church at Jerusalem, Acts xi. 30, xv. 2, 4, 6, 22, 23, xvi. 4, xxi. 18, in the church at Ephesus, xx. 17, in the Epistle of James v. 14, and in 1 Pet. v. 1, 5? Are these merely isolated data? With these before us, can it be maintained: "that all official relations of this kind lie quite beyond the sphere of the apostle?" Have we not here already "standing offices?" But we turn to the epistles "confessedly genuine," in order to see whether "we can find in those epistles nothing analogous offering itself for comparison." Baur himself adduces the passages 1 Cor. xii. 28, the *κυβερνήσεις*, the gifts of church government, the *ἀντιλήψεις*, the gifts of various services, such as the care of the alms, the care of the sick, and has nothing to object to this signification of the words; he notices Rom. xii. 6, sq., the gifts of *διακονία*, *διδασκαλία*, also the *προϊστάμενος*, in addition to which we may reckon Eph. vi. 11, *some apostles, some prophets, some preachers, some pastors and teachers*, and 1 Thess. v. 12, *those that labour among you and have the rule* (*προϊσταμένους*) *over you*, &c., as undisputed passages. And yet in those "genuine" epistles is to be found according to Baur nothing analogous, nothing even presenting itself for comparison; and all relations of the kind brought before us in the Pastoral Epistles are entirely out of the sphere of the apostle. It is true, indeed, that in the passages just quoted it is *χαρίσματα* that are enumerated; but does not the very point of view from which these appointments for the service of the church are there regarded show, why not so much the external regulation as the internal gifts corresponding to this are prominently noticed. And yet, what else can the *προϊστάμενος* be than what we are accustomed to regard as meant by

the πρεσβύτερος? Of what use was the gift of *government* if the person endowed had no sphere for the exercise of his gift? That some of these gifts found no outward corresponding sphere in a settled and everywhere similar church service, was to be expected from the very nature of the gifts themselves, and can prove nothing here against the existence of presbyters and deacons, as it is not the enumeration of the "settled and permanent relations" in the churches, but of "gifts" that is intended to be given. Thus we see that in those epistles of the apostle "acknowledged to be genuine" there are direct analogies to the church government with which we are made acquainted in the Pastoral Epistles; and that from what we find in the Acts of the Apostles, as well as in several of the epistles which harmonize with what is there stated, we may infer that this church government was a generally existing state of things. And how *a priori* could we suppose it otherwise than that some form of church regulation would be adopted from the very beginning? The individual Christian did not surely live for himself, but as a member of a society? How could such a society subsist without an arrangement and direction, it matters not what may be our opinion as to the origin and the first form of this? Not to speak of a later period in the history of the church, we cannot imagine a Christian congregation at any time to have existed without some form of direction or superintendence. Baur fully agrees with us in this, and he himself declares, in his work on the origin of Episcopacy, that we must associate a "certain oversight and superintendence" with the very first rise of a Christian congregation. According to his view, those who had first taken the decisive step of embracing Christianity acquired a preponderating authority, and became the "presidents" of the congregations as they were formed. "Thus were the πρεσβύτεροι—as indeed even in the Pastoral Epistles the one point of view always passes over into the other—at once the presidents of the congregations and the eldest in point of age," (p. 86.) "The ἀπαρχαί then were the first bishops and deacons," (p. 87.) Whether it was not rather age and fitness otherwise (as the pastoral epistles show on Baur's own admission to have been the case in regard to the former) on account of which an individual was raised to the office of ἐπίσκοπος—whether with Rothe we consider these presbyters as having formed a college—or with Baur, each one as having been a little bishop, is here quite the

same for our purpose; all that we urge is, that Baur accounts for the existence of presbyters as it were *a priori*, and admits that "this was the natural course of things necessarily brought about by the circumscribed state of things in the church during its earliest period." We may then maintain without fear of contradiction that there must have been from the commencement presidents of congregations, and that it is capable of proof that there actually were such, as we have seen above. The existence of such presidents does not lie beyond the time of the apostle; and even although the epistles to the Romans, the Corinthians, and the Galatians were silent on the subject, this would be no proof of their not having existed. Indeed it could not have been otherwise; "the natural course of things" led to this. And we now find what Baur says (p. 89) to be quite intelligible—"that the Pastoral Epistles represent the constitution of the church rather as already established than as being first introduced." The question now still more appears to be that which from the commencement we have laid down as the problem for investigation, viz., why is so little said in the other epistles respecting such office-bearers, notwithstanding that there is no doubt of their having existed, while in the Pastoral Epistles they are brought so prominently into notice?

We have thus endeavoured to reduce the question to its true position; and it is here, therefore, that we first encounter the real punctum siliens of the criticism to which we are opposed. If hitherto, so far as we have followed it, that criticism has laboured by the setting aside of all analogies, to render difficult a solution of the question by which the authenticity of these epistles might be established, and yet in the end has been necessitated to admit the existence of church government by persons who presided over the congregations; its object now is to lay stress on the strong way in which this ecclesiastical organization is brought forward in these epistles, and chiefly to show that it has a hierarchical tendency. It is alleged to be improbable, "that the apostle himself should have made the introduction and consolidation of church government a special object of his apostolical care." And further, the relation of the ἐπίσκοποι to the πρεσβύτεροι is said to discover already a hierarchical tendency of the monarchical form, which is also said to be reflected in the rule laid down for the treatment of heretics. By an investigation into the relation between the πρεσ-

βύτεροι and *ἐπίσκοποι*, Baur (p. 80—86) attempts to prove "that both in their sphere were the same with the later bishops." "Whatever, *therefore*, in the Pastoral Epistles is arranged or enjoined with respect to these for founding and establishing the ecclesiastical organization, has nothing else for its object than the furtherance of this monarchical constitution of the church which at a later period was by way of distinction connected with the name of the *ἐπίσκοποι*." "And is it probable, that this monarchical constitution of the church which is so entirely unknown to the genuine epistles of the apostle—at least so far! as that nowhere in these is any significance attached to it—should have become to the same apostle (be it at a later period) a matter of so much importance as that the sanctioning of it should have been his principal aim, in these so-called Pastoral Epistles?" (p. 86.) "It appears to me that this points to a later period, when in the church at Rome the Petrine Jewish-Christian element had gained the decided preponderance over the Pauline Christian." And then are adduced certain proofs of the early manifestation of the hierarchical tendency in this church. The letters of Ignatius are also brought forward; but in these the connection of all the members with the bishop is spoken of in a manner quite different from that of the Pastoral Epistles, which we may be allowed to add makes the very difference in question.

We must give especial consideration to what is here said, for it is the sinew of this discussion. The *ἐπίσκοποι* and *πρεσβύτεροι* were presidents over small individual congregations from the very commencement, even in the period of the first formation of Christian congregations (Baur on Episcopacy, p. 86.) There were no colleges of presbyters formed, but individuals put themselves at the head of the congregations, and were like petty bishops in the later sense of the word. Thus a "monarchical constitution is, according to Baur, to be supposed as existing from the first," a "monarchical constitution" which was formed by "the natural course of things" wherever congregations were formed. "Whatever, therefore" (this is the inference drawn from the proofs adduced on the other side) "is arranged and enjoined in the Pastoral Epistles with respect to the presbyters and bishops, for the settling and confirming of the ecclesiastical organism, has nothing else for its object than this monarchical constitution which was afterwards by

way of distinction associated with the name of the ἐπίσκοποι. Is it then probable that this monarchical constitution of the church which is so *entirely* unknown to the genuine epistles of the apostle—at least *in so far* as that nowhere in these is any kind of significance attached to it—should have become to the same apostle—(be it at a later period) a matter of so much importance, &c." We ask here—if in general these Pastoral Epistles contain arrangements with respect to presbyters and bishops,—what else *can* they have for their object than the monarchical constitution, if this, according to Baur's representation, was the original and the only constitution? And how can it be inferred from the fact of their insisting on a *monarchical* constitution, that they display a *hierarchical* tendency, or that their object is to give prominence to the Petrine Jewish-Christian element above the Pauline-Christian? The natural course of things is said to have placed these bishops and deacons at the head of congregations from the very first, and thus to have led to a monarchical constitution. Why then must the Pastoral Epistles in particular, "because they represent this constitution as already existing rather than as being first introduced," be supposed to have in view the monarchical constitution "which was afterwards specially connected with the name of the ἐπίσκοποι," and to betray the predominance of the Petrine Jewish-Christian element? "In the same light we are to regard the πρεσβύτεροι of the church at Jerusalem, frequently mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles," p. 85, that is, as denoting the same monarchical constitution which afterwards took its name from the ἐπίσκοπος. And if it be true that the apostle Paul appointed presbyters, he too has had in view the same monarchical constitution at the head of which the ἐπίσκοπος was afterwards placed. How then can it be asked—"Is it probable that this monarchical constitution of the church, of which we find nothing in the genuine epistles of the apostle, should afterwards have appeared to him so important a matter." The question can only be—whether church government in general has ever seemed to him of so much importance, as that he should deem it necessary to give to his assistants whom he charged with the order and government of the congregations, such directions as we read of in these epistles. If he gave any such, they must have tended towards the formation of a monarchical constitution, to which, according to Baur, "the natural course of things" had given birth. It is

the same then whether it were a monarchical or a democratical constitution. And if there is any trace at all of church government in the "genuine" epistles of the apostle, it must point to the monarchical form, if in general it be supposed that this was the original form, as Baur maintains. There can no proof, therefore, of a hierarchical tendency in the Pastoral Epistles be drawn from the fact, that the arrangements which they enjoin with respect to bishops and deacons accord with the monarchical form of government. And if the monarchical constitution in these epistles gives no proof of a hierarchical tendency, neither also does "the earnest manner in which they speak of ecclesiastical regulations and persons," for the question just recurs,—is that which is earnestly enjoined of a hierarchical nature? Can it be ascertained even in a very partial way, by what particular marks the hierarchical tendency displayed itself in the second century? Baur only proves that in Rome at an early period such a tendency had developed itself, but not that the traces of this development are to be seen in the injunctions and regulations of these epistles. He adduces the epistles of Ignatius from the second century as an evidence of the rising Romish hierarchy. But on comparing these with what we find in the Pastoral Epistles on the subject of church government, we first become really aware how remote these epistles are from the tendency ascribed to them, and how truly all that they contain on that subject bears the stamp of primitiveness. Baur observes with reference to this, that the principal ecclesiastical office-bearers mentioned in the Pastoral Epistles are the same with those in the Ignatian letters. But very little weight can be attached to this, when we find that the ἐπίσκοπος and πρεσβύτερος are quite a different thing in the Ignatian epistles; the ἐπίσκοπος is there separated from the πρεσβύτερος, and the latter has become the member of a college of presbyters. We have there the very reverse of the constitution which, according to Baur, is to be regarded as the original one, and as still to be recognised in the Pastoral Epistles. For while, according to Dr Baur, the πρεσβύτερος (= ἐπίσκοπος) was originally in his own sphere a small bishop in the later sense of the word—(although along with this it must of necessity be supposed, that in certain cases, when the individual congregations, say for example in Corinth, formed a whole, there was a common government which could issue only from the

college formed by the single petty bishops, so that we have here a collegial element besides and above the monarchical maintained by Baur)—the reverse was the case in the second century when the ἐπίσκοπος (that is, the monarchical element) was placed at the head, and under him the college of presbyters. It is at this period, in my opinion, that we can first speak with any propriety of a monarchical constitution; while previous to this, even granting the origin of the πρεσβύτερος and the sphere of operation to have been such as Dr Baur represents it, a collegial action must of necessity be supposed as having been the culminating point of the constitution chiefly in larger congregations, such as that in Jerusalem; unless it be maintained, that such a congregation did not properly form a whole, but an aggregate made up of several particular congregations, with their petty bishops, each of whom might act as he pleased. When we look at the accounts given in the Acts of the Apostles respecting the church in Jerusalem, we find that a collegial action on the part of the presbyters there, can as little be questioned as that the congregation there formed a whole, the various particular congregations (if there were such) disappearing under this unity.

We see then how small the resemblance that obtains between the ecclesiastical constitution of the first period, and the monarcho-episcopal of the second century, according to Baur's own representation. But it is now time to examine more closely this representation itself, according to which the first πρεσβύτεροι were petty bishops, and upon which our respected opponent founds his assertion of a monarchical constitution having existed from the first. What evidence have we for this view? It is not proved—as Baur himself admits—by passages such as Acts xiv. 23; Tit. i. 5, which speak of the ordination of presbyters (in the plural) in each city. "The natural course of things," according to which the first converts, and those in whose houses the congregations assembled, became presbyters eo ipso, is in reality the only proof to which we are referred. Now we will not deny that the fact of belonging to the "first fruits," perhaps also the other circumstance gave a kind of claim to the oversight, if only these early converts and house owners were otherwise able and qualified persons; which is certainly not implied in one's having been amongst the first who were converted, or in his having opened his house for Christian

assemblies. That however is all to which we are allowed to give any weight, according to the view under consideration. We are not, however, thereby relieved of the main question, namely—whether the thing took this course of itself, or whether such first fruits and house-owners, if they were otherwise qualified persons, were *appointed* to the office of presbyters. The name πρεσβύτερος seems to oppose the view, according to which presbyters became such merely in the natural course of things; for this name points to another element as the ground of the office, namely, age; and that is sufficiently explained neither by the character of the "first fruits," as such, nor of the house-owners. This then—age—must have been the first thing looked at in the origin of presbyters, or in their designation. This, however, could not possibly come about of itself, as indeed Baur's representation of the natural course of things shows, but pre-supposes a principle that was generally acted upon in the Christian congregations, in accordance with which the eldest, supposing them to be qualified, were placed at the head. And those passages to which the opposite view appeals, as in the epistle of Clement to the Corinthians, declare, indeed expressly, that the bishops and deacons did not enter on their offices of themselves, but were chosen. If, however, it be said here that these first presbyters and deacons *were* the "first fruits," we have already acknowledged that this was an element. And as the name πρεσβύτερος, so also does all historical tradition oppose the view under consideration. Not merely that with respect to the deacons, we have in Acts, ch. vi., the account of their appointment, and with this an analogy to the appointment of presbyters; but in Acts xiv. 23, we are told in the most distinct terms the very same thing with respect to the presbyters, viz., that they were ordained; and the other view can only be maintained by the arbitrary rejection of this passage. With this, however, we have at the same time a new argument, against the view which represents the constitution of the first Christian church to have been monarchical. For if in each of the smaller spheres of the united congregations the presbyter or bishop did not of himself assume the lead, how are we to suppose that the apostle gave its own presbyter to each of such small individual congregations? How comes it, then, as has already been made out, that, if such a united congregation consisting of smaller ones really formed a whole, as Baur also

acknowledges, we may not dispense with the supposition of a collegial co-operation on the part of the individual presbyters. If, however, we must allow the constitution of the larger congregations to have been like that of the church at Jerusalem, I do not see why we may not suppose that the smaller ones also were organized after its model, as soon only as the competent number of members was made up. Thus we are of necessity shut up to the view which is commonly taken of the first management of the congregations by a plurality of presbyters, and must totally contradict the supposition of a monarcho-episcopal constitution. Comp. Neander, Ap. Zeitalter I. p. 253, 254, 262, 264.

So much the more considerable does the difference thus appear, between the form of church government as traced in these epistles, and the monarchical of the second century. Let any one only look at these epistles, and say whether they do no not bear a perfect impression of what has just been described as the constitution of the church in the apostolical time. How far removed are they, according to Baur's own words, from the manner in which the epistles of Ignatius speak of the dignity and importance of the heads of the church, and the connexion of all the members of the congregation with them, as the indispensable condition of salvation! There is here as yet no difference observable between the πρεσβύτερος and the ἐπίσκοπος, just as at Acts xx. 17, 28; Phil. i. 1. And not only can no such difference be observed in the name (as is likewise the case at a later period in Clemens Romanus, and Polycarp); but also in itself, the office of the ἐπίσκοπος and the πρεσβύτερος is one and the same (Baur die. s. g. Past. p. 81.) Indeed so much do the Pastoral Epistles reveal of the ground and origin of these official relations, that the one point of view (that, namely, of age in the expression πρεσβύτερος) is always merging into the other," (Ursprung, &c., p. 86.) And all this is to be explained thus—the author, mindful of the difference of times, designs only to characterize the first elements of the later church government as apostolical institutions. How inconceivable! Already had the ἐπίσκοπος raised himself above the presbyters with a claim to superior authority; precisely in this does the hierarchical tendency of the second century concentrate itself; and this pretended apostle who writes in furtherance of the Romish hierarchical tendency nullifies this distinction, inasmuch as he again places the ἐπίσκοπος and πρεσβύ-

τερος on exactly the same level. What could have been said more directly at variance with that hierarchical tendency, than that the ἐπίσκοπος was originally entirely the same with the πρεσβύτερος? And what else does the writer say calculated to advance the hierarchical aim? "Does he represent the monarchical principle as originally involved in the idea of the πρεσβύτεροι;" he yet thereby in no way farthers the peculiar interests of the hierarchy of his time. It must then be supposed, that in his time it was still held in doubt whether there had been from the commencement appointed presbyters and bishops; which Baur will not maintain, as he himself says, that "at a later period no Christian congregation could be conceived of without a president regularly appointed from its first commencement." (Past. p. 86.) And that later period is just the one of which we speak, (Ap. Paul, p. 12.)

When, finally, Baur thinks that a hierarchical state of things shows itself in the prescribed mode of treating a *man that is an heretic*, Tit. iii. 10, this is sufficiently explained by what has been said above on the opposition of orthodoxy and heterodoxy; especially as in regard to this passage it is acknowledged, "that one might only wonder why the author does not pronounce upon him the formal ecclesiastical sentence." The ἀνάθεμα ἔστω of the apostle Paul is of course hierarchical. Comp. Neander, ap. Zeitalter I. p. 546.

We are at liberty then to affirm as the result of this investigation, that the ecclesiastical arrangements in the Pastoral Epistles with respect to the ἐπίσκοποι (and διάκονοι), present nothing which does not correspond to the apostolical time, and nothing which refers to the second century. See also on this, Böttger, p. 35—64, and Baumgarten, p. 84—90.

The *second* main point adduced to prove that these epistles belong to the second century, in so far as regards ecclesiastical arrangements, is the widow's institution. Now it is certainly acknowledged (comp. Baur, p. 49), that by the writers of the second century widows are distinguished in the same way, and are placed side by side with the higher ecclesiastical functionaries; and likewise we find in the New Testament no farther trace of an enrolment, or of any such distinction of widows. Meanwhile we learn from Acts vi. 1, sq., that the widows were from the very beginning in particular an object of care to the congregations, just as it is also natural to be-

lieve—from the principle on which presbyters were chosen as implied in the expression πρεσβύτερος—that the πρεσβύτιδες were also distinguished with especial honour, if they were worthy of it. The latter point in particular seems to me to give the clue to the explanation of the fact, that in the earliest period the *widows not under threescore years old* were placed along with the presbyters as church functionaries. But it is not merely this institution in itself (the historical impossibility of which in the apostolic time cannot be maintained *a priori*) which, according to Baur, declares against the genuineness of these epistles, but chiefly the circumstance that by the "νεωτέρας χήρας," ver. 11, and the νεωτέρας, ver. 14, are to be understood virgins; which decidedly points to the second century. This assertion of our opponent, however, is exegetically altogether untenable; in proof of which, for the sake of brevity, we refer to the commentary, where also the difficulties with which he attempts to surround the common intrepretation find their solution. Here we would only observe, that it cannot so much as be shown that in the second century it was customary to receive virgins also into the number of the church widows, and accordingly under the name χῆραι to understand also virgins, as is said to be the case in the passage under consideration. Baur too says only "that this may with great probability be supposed." But the passage from Tertullian de velandis virginibus, c. 9, bears directly against his view, seeing that Tertullian there characterises it as "miraculum ne dixerum monstrum" that such a thing should once take place. The other passage to which we are referred, that, namely, in Ignatius to the Smyrnaens, c. 13, ἀσπάζομαι τοὺς ὄικους τῶν ἀδελφῶν μου σὺν γυναιξί καὶ τέκνοις καὶ τὰς παρθένους τὰς λεγομένας χήρας, appears certainly to have the meaning that is attached to it. But even though we may not object to this meaning on critical grounds, still, as it presents what is so altogether singular, it is natural to remember that the term παρθένοι was also frequently used to denote such as were widows indeed; and that it may here, with Böttger, be understood in that sense according to the principle: ἡ χήρα διὰ σωφροσύνης αὖθις παρθένος. The clause τὰς λεγομένας χήρας would then be a more special explanation of the expression παρθένους, and this would then be selected on purpose, in so far as the idea of bereavement and sorrow lies in the χρήα. Still, however that may be, it belongs to

our opponent at all events, in the first place, to prove that in the passage 1 Tim. v. 11, the χήρα signifies a παρθένος in the proper sense. Baur has subsequently objected to our view on the ground that, according to it, what is said ver. 11—14 must apply to all widows under sixty years. But does it then suit better to make it apply to all virgins under sixty years? Comp. also here Baumgarten, p. 67; Böttger, p. 65. How little the injunction to marry contained in this passage, in the circumstances supposed at ver. 11—13, is at variance with the opinion of the apostle as expressed in 1 Cor. vii. we have already hinted above; there is as little need therefore of supposing, in order to the explanation of this passage, that it is directed against the celibacy of the Marcionites, as that it presents a pseudo-Clementine view of marriage. In like manner, I cannot see how we are under the necessity of supposing in the words ii. 11, *I do not suffer a woman to teach*, an allusion to the improprieties of the Marcionites; as the apostle might have the same inducement to mention here that it did not become a woman to make a public appearance, as he had in regard to the church at Corinth (1 Cor. xi. 5, sq.; xiv. 34), or to the church at Ephesus. Those only who have been led on other grounds to question their apostolical origin, can be led to seek such allusions in the words. With regard to the passage 1 Tim. ii. 13—15, at which also Baur takes offence, and which he thinks is allied to the pseudo-Clementine view, we refer to the commentary; where also will be considered the particular points enumerated above as brought forward by Baur. There too we shall have the most fitting opportunity of dealing with the particular objections that still remain, such as the mention of Timothy's mother and grandmother (2 Tim. i.), the military comparison (2 Tim. ii. 3, sq.), *my gospel* (ii. 8), &c.

III. "A further step in the criticism of the Pastoral Epistles is, the impossibility of finding a single passage in the history of the apostle's life with which we are acquainted, on which we can rest the supposition of their having been written by him;" or in the words of De Wette, "their historical unaccountableness." I fully admit this impossibility and historical unaccountableness, if it be held to be necessary, that we should find a place for these epistles among the events and circumstances of that period of the apostle's life with which we are made acquainted in the Acts of the Apostles, and in the rest of the epistles; and the latest attempts by Böttger

and Matthies to find a passage that will correspond, within this period, are also in my view " new proofs of this assertion." I fully admit the justice of what De Wette affirms, that the internal affinity which obtains between these epistles in form and substance, " shuts up the advocate for their genuineness to the supposition that they were all written about the same time," and have no hesitation—following the example of Usher, Mill, Pearson, Clericus, Paley, who are followed by the most of the later advocates for the genuineness, such as Heydenreich, Böhl, Guerike, Neander, Rothe, &c. (comp. Baumgarten, p. 196)—in maintaining, that the first epistle to Timothy and the epistle to Titus were written during the period between the first and a second imprisonment at Rome, while the second epistle to Timothy was written during this second imprisonment. And that not merely, because I cannot suppose that the second epistle to Timothy was written about the same time with the epistle to the Ephesians, and the other epistles of the first imprisonment at Rome, but also because the circumstances of time and place given in the epistles themselves, especially the second, require this supposition ; on which the introduction to the particular epistles is to be compared. This position is not affected by all that De Wette and Baur's criticism brings, against the possibility of finding a place for these epistles in " the history of the apostle with which we are acquainted ;" and we have to meet only those objections that are brought against the supposition of their having been written before and during a second imprisonment at Rome.

Among these objections, that which calls in question the fact of a second imprisonment is chiefly to be noticed. Without entering here on a new investigation of this much controverted question, it may be stated as the result of the investigation hitherto made, that probability is opposed to probability. If we compare what Baur says on this subject (der ap. Paulus, p. 231), we find that not a single historical statement can be brought against our supposition, but only the improbability that the apostle should have been liberated from his first imprisonment. But is not this improbability—if we keep out of view the second epistle to Timothy, as we may reasonably do—fully counterbalanced when we find the apostle himself, in his epistles written during the first confinement, repeatedly expressing the hope, nay the assurance, of obtaining his liberty, and again visiting the churches in Asia Minor and Macedonia ?

Phil. i. 25, ss., ii. 24 ; Philem. 22. And the testimony of Clemens that the apostle had come *ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα τῆς δύσεως*,—it being said before that he had become a herald, *ἔν τε τῇ ἀνατολῇ καὶ ἐν τῇ δύσει*, and had taught righteousness, *ὅλον τὸν κόσμον*, on which immediately follow the words *καὶ ἐπί τὸ τέρμα τῆς δύσεως ἐλθών*, so that by the *τέρμα* we must understand the limit of the aforementioned *δύσις*, which, together with the *ἀνατολή*, makes out *ὅλον τὸν κόσμον* (the oratorical character of the passage can make no change here),—this testimony leans at all events towards our view, even reckoning merely according to probability. Nor will it do to explain *τὸ τέρμα τῆς δύσεως*—contrary to its connexion with the foregoing objective, geographical statements—of a subjective *τέρμα* of the apostle, and translate the phrase by the insertion of the pronoun *ἑαυτοῦ*, which in this case were inadmissible, thus: to his limit in the west, namely Rome. (The passage in Ignatius, where he speaks of the apostle's rising and falling, should not rightly be cited here.) And further, the testimony of Dionysius of Corinth, in Eusebius h. e. 2, 25, and that of Eusebius, h. e. 2, 22, lend so much weight to our supposition, that it cannot all at once be referred to the airy region of mere hypothesis. Comp. Böhl, a. a. Q. p. 91, ss. I can, therefore, from the deepest conviction assent to what Neander has said on this question a. a. Q., p. 528, as also to the observations he has made on the views of Schenkel, Ernesti, and Schrader. Comp. also Baumgarten, p. 196, sq. ; Credner, Einl. I. p. 316, sq. If then our view has at least so much claim to probability as opposed to the other, the question can only be how far this view may be vindicated and confirmed by the contents of the epistles themselves ; on which see infra. There also, the objections that have been raised by De Wette against this supposition, chiefly on the ground of certain passages in the epistles, will be fully considered. Let it suffice here to say, that these epistles are not "historically unaccountable," so long as it cannot be shown that the supposition of a second imprisonment is historically untenable; and that such a supposition stands opposed to its rejection, with an equal or a higher claim to probability, and is no mere fancy, but has historical data on which to rest.

IV. The last argument against the genuineness of the Pastoral Epistles, is drawn from what is alleged to be "peculiar and unpauline in these epistles when considered separately ; both with re-

spect to the language and also to many of the ideas and views." Baur has specified several examples of this in his work on the Pastoral Epistles, p. 97—135. De Wette's criticism is, however, especially full on this point. See in his Handbook a. a. Q. p. 116, ss., where he gives a complete enumeration of the peculiarities in the language of these epistles, then directs attention to the peculiarity in style, and finally to what is singular in the ideas and views which they contain. Along with this is also to be taken his assertion respecting the unsuitableness of their contents to the state of things, and to the professed object which they have in view; in short, all that belongs to what he has characterized as the "exegetical unaccountableness" of these epistles. It is quite evident that we cannot go further into these arguments here, but must leave their refutation to the exposition of the epistles themselves. In this it will be shown that the contents of the epistles, the circumstances such as they are historically supposed to have been, amid which the epistles themselves give out that they were written, *do* correspond to the state of things as well as to the object aimed at. The peculiarity in ideas, in expression as well as in style, has already been fully admitted. But if, as the exposition must likewise show, we can find nothing unpauline, in the sense that Paul could not have so expressed himself, and so written, then we just come back to the question already indicated above—how is it to be explained that precisely in these epistles such peculiarities occur? on which comp. § 4.

Let us, in conclusion, take another glance at the account of the origin of these epistles, as this is represented by the latest criticism. De Wette has satisfied himself with starting the conjecture, that the three epistles are to be ascribed to one and the same author, and that a disciple of Paul, who at the period when Gnosticism had begun to prevail, thought that it would tend to the quiet and confirmation of the faithful if he were to put into the mouth of his master, partly predictions of the disturbing phenomenon, partly warnings against the new errors, partly refutations of these (comp. a. a. Q., p. 119, ss.) As, in respect to his negative criticism, the denial of the genuineness of these epistles is quite independent of the correctness of the positive account which he gives of their origin, but which he does not farther confirm, we shall lay it aside and examine rather the representation given by Baur, which,

if it can be proved to be untenable, a doubt will be thrown over the entire result of this criticism.

As the result of his investigations regarding the heretics of the Pastoral Epistles and the ecclesiastical institutions of which we have an account there, it has already been stated, that the origin of these epistles is laid in the second half of the second century. We learn, farther, that they had their origin in the church at Rome, where the authority of the apostle Paul was assailed from two quarters; by the Marcionites on the one side, who sought to class the apostle with themselves, and on the other by the Jewish Christians there, who sought on that very account to make out that Paul was a false apostle. Some one belonging to the followers of Paul, of whom there was also a party there, resisted this injury done to the apostle. And as the epistles of the apostle were not available for the refutation of the Marcionites, he represented him as saying in writings which then for the first time appeared, what could not be found said with the distinctness that was to be desired in his writings that were already known. Thus was produced the second epistle to Timothy, for which the author fortunately enough chose the period of the imprisonment as the historical basis, and thus succeeded in imparting considerable colouring and life to his epistle. Meanwhile the epistle seems not to have met the existing necessity—at least we must suppose so, for Baur does not enlighten us further on this point; there appeared, therefore, the epistle to Titus and the first epistle to Timothy, proceeding from other authors, but having the same object. As, however, the most plausible historical ground had already been preoccupied by the epistle that was first written, these latter made even no pretence to any historical connexion with the life of the apostle. Besides the polemical aim against the Marcionites, and that with respect to the Jewish-Christians, to substitute amongst them the true picture of the apostle Paul for the Marcionitic caricature, and thus to unite Jewish and Gentile-Christians more with each other—besides these aims, the cause of the hierarchy is represented in these epistles in the rules which they lay down regarding the ecclesiastical office-bearers. "That those who were opposed to writings which then all at once appeared with the claim to such (apostolical) authority, should contradict their authority, was naturally to be expected." And it was also to be expected, we would

add, that the Jewish Christians who were to be gained over would likewise oppose their claim. "At all events there would be no harm in making the attempt, and why should it be so much wondered at that this attempt succeeded?" "That which might be of so much service (namely, against the Gnostics and in favour of the hierarchy) was held really to be what it professed to be."

Here we have in brief the account of the origin of these epistles and their acknowledgment. Apart from the consideration that we have proved the allusions to heretics of the second century, and to hierarchical aims and interests of this period, to be untenable—even when we view this account from its own premises, enough still remains that is inconceivable.—This point is admirably treated by Baumgarten, p. 90—103, as also by Böttger, a. a. Q. p. 178—198.

Already against the alleged cause of the origin of these writings, namely, the necessity that was felt of having epistles of apostolical authority containing direct arguments against those heretics, Baumgarten has justly stated as an objection that the church teachers by no means gave up the already extant epistles of the apostle Paul, and considered them as useless in contending with those heretics; and secondly, that "the early champions of the church found what the Scripture wanted in means of proof fully compensated by tradition, which indeed they regarded as the real strength of their argument, of which Baumgarten has given satisfactory evidence, p. 93. Still less can we conceive of the manner in which this undertaking was carried out. The aim to combat Gnosticism, chiefly the system of Marcion, with which a conciliatory and Romish-hierarchical aim was at the same time conjoined, is said to have first of all produced the second epistle to Timothy. How does this correspond to what has been premised with regard to its origin? Baur himself, as has been already observed, acknowledges that Marcion might have admitted the epistle with the exception of two passages, ii. 8, 18, which contain nothing that may not also be found in the epistles of Paul that are confessedly genuine. There is not a single trace of a hierarchical tendency in the epistle; the passage ii. 2 is the only one having even the appearance of this, which Baur can adduce; in so far, that it discovers a care that extends more widely and stretches into the future. And what is there in it that bears the marks of an Irenæan tendency? Let any one read the epistle, which treats throughout of the person of Timothy,

addresses to him paternal counsels not to be ashamed of the gospel or of the imprisoned apostle, to hold fast the sound doctrine, and to guard against vain contention, and to fulfil well his calling as an evangelist, which finally addresses to him the invitation to come and visit the apostle in his imprisonment; let any one read this epistle, and say whether it is not altogether unintelligible on the supposition of its being a controversial writing against the Marcionites put into the mouth of the apostle. The only remaining conjecture is, that the pseudo-apostle, in his endeavour to impart colouring and life to the epistle by means of historical details, quite lost sight of his proper subject; but it is difficult to tell how this criticism is able to discover that the epistle should be, what it in reality is not. The comparative failure of the first (this criticism goes on to show), makes it the less wonderful that a second should apply himself to the same task with the hope of excelling his predecessor. "It would not suit," however, to address the epistle to Timothy a second time; nor could "he represent the apostle who in the former epistle has his martyrdom in near prospect, as writing again during his imprisonment." Thus arose the epistle to Titus, which, however, for the very same reason as the first epistle to Timothy, was left without any even apparent points of contact with the life of the apostle. No one will satisfactorily show, why for this reason these epistles should have remained without any such points of connexion. The remainder of the apostle's life offered still scope for these. Why should the writer of these epistles have hesitated to connect them with it, and thus to invest them with the appearance of historical truth? Why should they purposely in their fabrications have placed themselves in collision with what was then known and believed regarding the life of the apostle, and thus have awakened suspicion against themselves?

And the epistles themselves—do they correspond to those tendencies? Dr Baur himself finds so few direct arguments against, and immediate allusions to, Marcion in the epistle to Titus, as to lead him to acknowledge, that "Marcion might with as much reason as Tatian have admitted the epistle to Titus" (p. 139.) As to the alleged conciliatory aim of the epistles—this is not borne out, as Böttger also remarks, p. 186, by the fact that the writer chiefly indicates Jewish Christians as the originators of the errors which he combats. Besides, almost the greatest part of the epistle, the

injunctions in chap. ii. and iii., embracing all the members belonging to the fellowship of the church must, from the point of view which this criticism takes up, be unintelligible. The same is the case with respect to the first epistle to Timothy. Here too "there is a very comprehensive injunction, embracing as much as possible all the relations of life," which deviates from the object assigned to the epistle by this criticism. It would moreover be still matter of surprise, even although all the alleged references to Marcion were conceded, that this polemical aim finds in so few passages any more definite expression; and that even these few passages fail to touch precisely the chief point of difference between the system of Marcion and the doctrine of the church, and overlook that which is principally kept in view by all the ecclesiastical opponents of Marcion. Let any one but compare for example the representation which Baur himself has given (die Christl-Gnosis, p. 313, ss.), of the mode in which the pseudo-Clementines opposed Marcion. (Comp. also Baumgarten, p. 96.) The writer of the epistle however, it is alleged, unhesitatingly refers to the *oppositions* of Marcion in chap. vi. 20. But what should have kept him from specially noticing, at least in the form of a prediction, that fundamental error—that the supreme God is not the creator of the world? And then, what a confused idea does this criticism present to us, of a writer, who, himself entangled with Marcionitic ideas, has recourse to the extreme expedient of writing a pretendedly apostolical epistle in order to confute Marcion, and then in iii. 16 purposely compounds the *μυστήριον εὐσεβείας* from a mixture of Gnostic and antignostic ingredients! But, finally, the success of this imposture would also be unaccountable. The epistles are said to have appeared in the second half of the second century; at a time then when the genuine epistles of the apostle had long been in use in the church, and when there already existed several collections of them. Comp. Thiersch, a. a. Q., p. 323, ss. All at once, three epistles come forth with the claim to apostolical authority, the principal aim of which is said to be the refutation of the Gnostics. And these enemies of the church offer no opposition to this claim, although so much importance was wont to be laid by them on agreement with the writings of the canon. In the shortest possible time these epistles receive the universal acknowledgment of the church; since, "that which might be put to so good a pur-

pose, was held really to be what it claimed to be." In other words, the bishops, together with their congregations, laid aside all conscientiousness and honesty, qualities for which we are wont honourably to distinguish the church of that age; and as if all acted on a secret understanding, not a doubt is expressed as to the genuineness of these epistles! And could then these epistles be really of so much service? What use could be made of one epistle which Marcion as well as Tatian might have acknowledged; of another, which he might have made his own on the supposition of two passages having been interpolated; and of a third, the polemical allusions in which, as we have already seen and shall farther see, might be perfectly understood although there had been no Marcion? And did these epistles, from that time forward, become the chief weapons against Gnosticism? We have already shown, that the early champions of the church against this enemy, rather appealed to the universal tradition of the church. Besides, they found nothing in these epistles which they could direct against the fundamental error of Marcion which they chiefly combated. Nay, so little did the church know why it was pleased to sanction the forgery of these epistles, and how they were to be of service to it, that one of Marcion's principal antagonists, Tertullian, cannot comprehend for what reason Marcion did not receive these epistles into his canon, as he admitted the epistle to Philemon which is likewise addressed to a single individual. Comp. on the moral character of the church at this period, Thiersch, a. a. Q., p. 323, ss., and especially on the question under discussion, the excellent investigation by Baumgarten, p. 99—103.

In spite then of the present state of the critical question as to the genuineness of these epistles, I think myself at liberty, after the investigation here made, to express the opinion that the solution of this problem offered by the latest criticism is in no way satisfactory, and carries along with it difficulties, compared with which the real difficulties that arise on the supposition of the apostolical origin of these epistles appear to be insignificant. The result thus gained leads us back to the question—how we are to explain the peculiarity of these epistles, supposing them to be authentic? It will be our endeavour in the following section to indicate some points generally, the vindication of which can indeed only be furnished by the exposition of the epistles themselves.

§ 4. ATTEMPT AT THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM ON THE SUPPOSITION OF THE GENUINENESS OF THE EPISTLES.

How then are we to explain the problem stated above in § 1 as arising out of the peculiarity of these epistles, viz., their acknowledged difference from the rest of Paul's epistles—on the supposition of their genuineness? We will look chiefly at the heretics noticed in these epistles. Let us inquire then first, what do we specially know concerning these heretics from the Pastoral Epistles; and then, secondly, let us see how the information there given accords with what is otherwise known to us on this subject.

1. With regard then to the first point, viz., the delineation of the heretics, it must be acknowledged, that the errors which are brought before us in the two epistles to Timothy, as well as in that to Titus, are essentially the same. Meanwhile, ere we enter further on this point, a circumstance must be noticed which the critics have arbitrarily kept out of view. It must, namely, be exactly determined (if we would ascertain what is to be learned from these epistles concerning the heretics), what errors are there noticed as already existing, what are indicated as future, and again what is there represented as an error that is more prevalent, and what, on the other hand, as one that is peculiar only to a few. These points may be ascertained with considerable exactness from the epistles themselves. The epistle to Titus speaks only of an error that had already at that time become prevalent, and was far spread. On the other hand, the first epistle to Timothy—besides that more prevalent error, in which, as we shall afterwards see, we may recognize one that is closely related to that in the epistle to Titus—points distinctly to errors that are distinguishable from the more general one. Thus, at i. 20, Hymenaeus and Alexander are named as persons who have made shipwreck of their faith, and gone the length even of blasphemy; but who for this reason had been excommunicated from the church. They are clearly not to be put in the same category with those whom Timothy is enjoined i. 3, ss. to oppose; for these, together with their adherents, are within the pale of the church. Further, the passage, iv. 1, speaks of phenomena that were future, although the beginnings of these had already commenced to show themselves. What is there said of

doctrines of devils, of *forbidding to marry*, of *abstaining from meats*, is therefore not to be all at once put down as a characteristic of the more widely-prevalent error, which is combated by the apostle as one already present. For it would indeed be in the highest degree strange, were the writer to represent those characteristics which distinguished the heretics then existing, such as the *fables* and *genealogies*, as belonging to future heretics. The same distinction between the present and the future is also to be found in the second epistle to Timothy. Reference is there made to that error which was then existing and more widely spread, in the same expressions as in the first epistle to Timothy and in that to Titus. On the other hand, at ii. 17, s., in like manner as at 1 Tim. i. 19, 20, single individuals,—Hymenaeus and Philetus are again expressly named, as those in whom might be seen what *profane and vain babblings* would lead to. Of them it is said that they have so far erred from the truth as to maintain, that the resurrection is past already. Now, is it not pure caprice, to transfer what is here predicated of some (who were addicted certainly to that more general error implied in the *vain babblings*) as the particular result of their vain unsanctified talk, to that more widely spread tendency to indulge in empty questions of controversy, and to make this a criterion of the heretics who are combated in the Pastoral Epistles? We have likewise in this epistle a distinct reference to what is to happen at a future period, iii. 1, ss., with which, however, is connected a reference to the present, iii. 6—9, 13. But the seducers described in this passage as already present must not, any more than those mentioned at ii. 17, be thrown together into one with all those to whom the *foolish talk*, *fables*, *genealogies*, *questions*, &c., are elsewhere to be applied. The characteristics of these show plainly that they form a special class, although in disposition and general character (iii. 8) they may correspond to those elsewhere mentioned. The passage, iv. 3, in like manner points distinctly to the future; however, this passage has, in reference to our present object, no farther significance, owing to its generality.

The critics on the other side have, all at once, effaced these lines of separation that are drawn in the epistles themselves. Whether the epistles speak of what is present or of what is future, of errors peculiar to some, or of a more wide-spread perversion, all are brought together as lines of one and the same picture, that,

namely, which the Gnosticism of the second century presents to our view. But wherefore then, it may justly be asked, does the writer make such a distinction? If the error implied in maintaining that the resurrection is past already, as well as the *fables* and *genealogies*, be a characteristic feature of the Gnosticism of Marcion, for what object then is this error represented not as a general feature of the tendency which is combated in these epistles, but as the special error of some? In opposition to the course pursued by this criticism, which is founded on the pre-supposition that it is dealing with the production of a pseudo apostle, who, in order not to betray himself, speaks of the present as if it were the future (although one cannot see why he should represent as the special error of some, what was common to the whole tendency which he combats),—in opposition to this arbitrary course, which is founded on the supposition of the epistles being spurious, we would call attention to, and urge the importance of these distinctions made by the writer. And we maintain accordingly, that the errors noticed above as special aberrations from the truth, partly peculiar to certain individuals, or to a certain defined class of heretics, partly in their full development belonging to the future, must, first of all, be acknowledged as something special, and may not all at once be included among the characteristics of the error represented in the epistles as at that time prevalent.

In what, then, did this prevalent error consist? In the epistle to Titus, where this one alone comes into notice, it is characterized, i. 10, by the words, *there are many unruly and vain talkers and deceivers, specially they of the circumcision.* Its constituent parts are at i. 14, said to be *Jewish fables and commandments of men;* its origin, i. 15, 16, an impure disposition; finally, it is characterized, iii. 9, by *foolish questions, genealogies, contentions, strivings about the law*, &c., and these things are described as unprofitable and vain. Titus himself is warned against having anything to do with these, and in opposition to this error he is enjoined to hold fast the *sound doctrine*, that is, the doctrine which tends to godliness, and to give prominence to whatever is according to this. We lay it down as a result of the exegetical investigation to which we refer, that the error combated in the epistle to Titus appears throughout not as a heresy properly so called; we find nothing there of a dogmatical opposition betwixt

true and false doctrine; rather, it is the opposition betwixt a knowledge directed towards things that are unfruitful in a moral point of view and the sound doctrine, that everywhere meets us in that epistle. The whole manner in which the hostile tendency is there characterized, while in opposition to it all stress is laid on a christianly moral conduct,—as also the warning given to Titus himself not to meddle with it,—the designations given to it, such as *unprofitable and foolish*,—in short, the entire contents of the epistle show that it is not an opposition of a dogmatic kind, a heresy properly so called, of which it treats, but rather certain perversities as well of a theoretical as a practical kind, which are to be viewed as proceeding chiefly from Jewish Christians (not, however, from the common Judaizing opponents), and which in themselves did not directly contradict the faith, but which might easily lead to a falling away from the faith. But in the two epistles to Timothy, the case is not different with respect to the so-called wide-spread heresy which is said to be found there, apart from the special heresies to which some had arrived who had set out from the general tendency. The very first expression for this error, viz., ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν, denotes,—as we may see from vi. 3, where this expression is explained by, *not consenting to sound words and to the doctrine which is according to godliness*,—not a heresy properly, but precisely the same error as in the epistle to Titus. We find also further at i. 4, the *fables* and *the genealogies* again with the epithet *endless*, then also the *questions*; and here, too, just as there, these fables and genealogies are said to raise disputes rather than to minister to godly edifying, and therefore not to promote faith, and love which proceeds from faith, i. 5. The same fundamental state of mind is here attributed to the seducers as there, i. 6, namely, the want of a good conscience and of faith. The expression *vain jangling* occurs here, i. 6, as well as there. Here also, in like manner, importance is attached to the requirements of the law, i. 7, ss.; here also the *sound doctrine* is opposed to error, i. 10. Timothy is here warned, as Titus is there, against *profane and old wives' fables*, iv. 7, and in opposition to these, the practical side of Christianity is prominently set forth. We have already spoken above of the passage vi. 3, s.; we would only notice here further, how, in opposition to the *sound doctrine*, the conduct of the adversaries is represented as a *doting about*

questions and strifes of words, whereof cometh envy, strife, &c., and reference is made, vi. 5, to their state of mind (men of corrupt mind) as well as to the same special motive of avarice mentioned in Tit. i. 11. And Timothy himself is once more warned against *profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science falsely so called*, vi. 20, s., as the error is here designated. Let us take in connection with this, what the second epistle to Timothy furnishes on the same subject. In ii. 14, Timothy is enjoined to warn them against *striving about words to no profit*, &c. He himself is exhorted, ver. 16, *to shun profane and vain babblings, for they increase unto more ungodliness;* and Hymenaeus and Philetus are adduced as examples of this. In ii. 22 he is exhorted to maintain a Christian character and conduct, and as the opposite of this, to avoid *foolish and unlearned questions, knowing that they do gender strife*, ver. 23; upon which follows that passage iii. 6, already cited above, in which a class of men are pourtrayed clearly enough to be distinguished from those described in other places. Already this simple collection of passages shows, that the error referred to in these two epistles (keeping out of view one or two passages, which of themselves bear that they are descriptions of special errors beside that more general one) corresponds in its main points with that in the epistle to Titus; and our exegetical investigation leads us here also, to the result, that it is no heresy that is there spoken of, but errors which lead away from the object of all true knowledge, and create empty disputations, which not only have no good influence on morality—on the contrary, they are fraught with moral evils of all sorts (vi. 4)—but also, might easily lead to an entire apostacy from the faith, as is manifest from certain examples that are specified. The proof of this cannot be given at greater length here, but must be left to the exposition. We would only refer here to Schleiermacher's observations, a. a. Q. p. 83, ss., which coincide with what we have said.

We shall rather endeavour here to determine more exactly the nature of this error, in order with this to connect the question, whether the existence of such an error in the time of the apostles is a thing inconceivable. It may be regarded as conclusively settled that these errors were of a Jewish kind. In support of this are Tit. i. 10, *chiefly they of the circumcision*; i. 14, *Jewish fables and commandments of men;* and also 1 Tim. i. 7, *wishing to be*

teachers of the law. With regard to the *fables* mentioned i. 4 and iv. 7, we learn from the epistle to Titus that they were of Jewish origin. The same is shown in 1 Tim. vi. 5 compared with Tit. i. 11. But to this we must add that it is not the common Jewish opponents with whom the apostle has here to do; this is not the case, even in those passages in which at first sight it might appear so, as in Tit. i. 14, *commandments of men*, with which iii. 9, *strivings about the law*, is to be compared, and principally in Tim. i. 6, ss. Doubtless the commandments which these teachers of the law held forth, had reference to the νόμος of the Old Testament; but what they wished was not such a recognition of the authority of the law, as that, for example, which is alluded to in the epistle to the Galatians. Schleiermacher, as I am convinced, is quite right when he observes that the manner in which the apostle combats those well-known Jewish Christians, i. 7—11, in no way accords with his usual manner, and fails in that which is precisely most essential; and Baumgarten's assertion that this is supplied afterwards at vv. 12—17 is evidently a mere make-shift. Comp. the commentary. And how little this view has to rest upon otherwise, will appear from the passages brought together above, in which this error that had become prevalent is characterized and refuted. Neither does it correspond with such expressions as the *sound doctrine*, or *the truth which is according to godliness*, or *the doctrine according to godliness*, which are opposed to the error in question. Such expressions can only be opposed to a pursuit which produces no moral fruit in the life and conversation. This view, moreover, does not agree with the figure conveyed in the expressions, *unsoundness, and soundness in the faith*, nor with the common designation of this pursuit as unprofitable, vain, unfruitful; as little does it agree with the constant reference that is made to the moral shortcomings of those who represent this movement, or, finally, with the repeated reference to the fact, that a total apostacy from the faith may so easily result from it, and the repeated charge addressed to Timothy and Titus, not to have anything to do with these profane and foolish disputations. All this may with perfect certainty be drawn from the epistles; but the investigation becomes difficult, when it is attempted more particularly to follow out this description of the errors, which in their general aspect is so marked, and to inquire into their more specific

details. The most of the terms by which they are designated give us the idea merely of an empty talking, a profitless contention about things which are morally fruitless, as they are destitute of all higher interest of a religious kind. Such are the expressions, *vain talkers, teaching things which profit not, questions, foolish questions, strifes, teach another doctrine, strifes of words, perverse disputings, vain babblings.* By how much the more distinctly these expressions,—both in themselves, and in the explanations which they receive from the kindred passages—designate the error in question in its general character, by so much the more useless are they in so far as regards our obtaining from them special details. On the other hand, however, we find certain more special characteristics, which, as it appears, can furnish the desired information. These are,—*commandments of men*, &c., Tit. i. 14, *strivings about the law*, iii. 9, with which is to be compared, *teachers of the law*, 1 Tim. i. 7, ss. These expressions at least intimate, that it was attempted to connect those foolish disputations with the Old Testament law, that the distinction betwixt clean and unclean was insisted on (Tit. i. 15), and even that a perverted application was made of the moral law of the Old Testament (1 Tim. i. 6.) Compare what has already been said above with regard to this, and the exposition. The precepts of a pretendedly higher morality, than the common Christian morality seemed to be, were urged on the authority of the Old Testament, and prescriptions of an ascetic kind were insisted on. Of still greater importance, however, it is considered, for determining the special character of this error, are those designations of it which we have in the expressions *fables*, 1 Tim. i. 4, *Jewish fables*, Tit. i. 14, *profane and old wives fables*, 1 Tim. iv. 7; further, in *genealogies*, Tit. iii. 9, *endless genealogies*, 1 Tim. i. 4, along with which also is taken the expression *oppositions of science falsely so called*, 1 Tim. vi. 20. These expressions, especially *endless genealogies*, indicate certainly something special. But as we have no information from any other source regarding the errors combated in these epistles, it could not fail to happen, that these designations should be applied to the most various historical phenomena. With regard especially to the last of these expressions, some adhering to the most literal signification of the word, understand it of genealogical registers, especially those of the Messiah.

Others explain it of heathen theogonies, the descents of the cabbalistic Sephiroth, or Essenian genealogies of angels, or allegorizing genealogies, such as those in Philo, finally of this Gnostic successive emanations of spirits, to which Tertullian and Irenæus refer.[1] The one class of interpreters, accordingly, understand merely the loose and crude beginnings of the later Gnosticism as designated, while the other think they find in the same expressions this Gnosticism itself, with its successions of emanations. Comp. De Wette, p. 11.

It must here, first of all, be asked, what result do we obtain from the exegetical examination of these terms? The words *μῦθοι* and *γενεαλογίαι* in themselves, according to their common use elsewhere in the New Testament, 2 Pet. i. 16, 2 Tim. iv. 4, Heb. vii. 6, are not difficult to determine. By the former are to be understood, mere fabrications in opposition to the certain truth, (it matters not here whether in the form of stories merely, or of doctrines also),[2] by the latter are to be understood chiefly, genealogical registers. Comp. the exposition. (It is not here denied, that the latter expression might very properly be used to denote series of emanations of spirits, were such, in general, to be understood as meant.) Further, the epithet *Ἰουδαϊκοί* joined to *μῦθοι* intimates, that these fables were of Jewish origin; the epithets *βέβηλοι* and *γραώδεις* that they were profane and insipid; the epithet *ἀπέραντοι* joined to *γενεαλογίαι* that these researches might be spun out to an endless length. The close connection between the *μῦθοι* and the *γενεαλογίαι*, is further to be attended to. On comparing Tit. i. 14 with iii. 8, in both of which there occurs a summary designation of the prevailing errors, it is evident, that in the first passage the *fables* include the *genealogies*, and in the second, where genealogies only are mentioned, the fables are at the same time to be understood. In the passage 1 Tim. i. 4, both expressions stand together, and the *αἵτινες* must there at all events be applied also to the *μῦθοι*; otherwise nothing would be said of these at all. We shall thus not be wrong in coming to the conclusion, that both go hand in hand. But with these, *the strivings about the law* also are always closely connected, Tit. i. 14; 1 Tim. i.

1 Tert. Contra Valent. 3, dubitabit ne has esse fabulas et genealogias quas Paulus ap damnare praevenit. De praescr. heret. cap. 33, Iren. adv. haer. libr. 1.

2 Theodoret understands it as referring to the *δευτέρωσις* the *Ἰουδαϊκὴ ἑρμηνεία*, with which Ignat. ep. ad Magn. c. 8 is to be compared. Comp. also on 1 Tim. iv. 7.

3, 6, ss.; so that we cannot but be confirmed in the view, that the errors here referred to are of a Jewish kind, which aimed at a connexion with the Old Testament, and which offered Old Testament genealogies decked out with fables, as well as legal prescriptions drawn from the Old Testament, to those who sought a higher knowledge and a higher sanctity, just because they had not the true knowledge and the true morality. We are still farther confirmed in this supposition, when we look at the context of the passages where those designations occur in which we have a general representation of the errors in question. It must be left to the exposition to show, that neither Tit. i. 14, nor iii. 8, nor 1 Tim. i. 3, ss., nor iv. 7, speak of a heresy in the proper sense of the term; that the *fables* and *genealogies* are not to be viewed in this light, but only in the light of a tendency that was foolish, morally unfruitful, and that might possibly lead to an entire apostacy from the faith. And this, to my mind, is so clearly and convincingly the result to be drawn from the whole contents of the epistles, as was already observed above, that I cannot, on purely exegetical grounds, acquiesce in the opinion most recently adopted so generally,—that by the μῦθοι and γενεαλογίαι are to be understood, fictions relating to the world of spirits, and Gnostic pneumatologies.[1] This view rests not so much on what is said in these epistles, as on the close parallel to be found in the epistle to the Colossians. But, let only a comparison be made of the manner in which these epistles handle the error to which they refer, with the manner that pervades the epistle to the Colossians. Even so far as the error is of a legal kind, the manner in which it is refuted in these epistles, is obviously quite different from that in the epistle to the Colossians. We do not find in them, as in the epistle to the Colossians, (herein I must entirely agree with Dr Baur) any reference to the inferior position of Judaism and the higher one of Christianity. "The heretics at Colosse," so Dr Baur thinks, and rightly, "must be much more akin to the common Judaists, than the heretics of whom the Pastoral Epistles treat." With respect, moreover, to the μῦθοι and γενεαλογίαι, there is really nothing at all in the Pastoral

1 Schleiermacher (p. 83) says of the γενεαλ. 1 Tim. i. 4: "They are not even once represented as something opposed to Christianity, but only as something unprofitable and insidious." On Tit. iii. 9, he says, "They are so defined by the context as to make it impossible for any one even to imagine that they are to be understood of the descent of Gnostic aeons (p. 84.)

Epistles, that reminds us of the manner in which the apostle combats the error referred to in the epistle to the Colossians. It is not indeed to be looked for, that the apostle should always combat the same error with the same weapons; but that these epistles should contain not even anything of the manner in which the apostle in the Epistle to the Colossians opposes the false notions about angels, must certainly strike every unprejudiced mind, especially if the error is held to have already proceeded so far as that regular genealogies of angels were constructed, which can only be supposed in connexion with an extensively developed theosophy. In the Epistle to the Colossians there is no trace of genealogies or anything similar; and nothing of the kind can be shown even with respect to the Essenes, with whom the Colossian heresy is said to be nearly connected. (Comp. Schleiermacher, p. 85; Baur die s. g., Past., p. 81.) How are we to suppose that the apostle has nothing more to say against such an error—an error which we are under the necessity of viewing as intimately connected with the Gnosticism of the second century, and which consequently could not be a thing so entirely harmless and uninsidious—than merely what is implied in such designations as vain talking, unprofitable controversies, strifes of words, &c.? Must we allow him so small a measure of acuteness and foresight, as that he could not see farther into an error, which manifestly carried in it the beginnings of the Gnosticism of the second century; and therefore satisfied himself with pointing to the moral deficiencies of its originators, to their avarice, to the evil consequences of such disputations, inasmuch as they excite hatred, strife, &c. How little would then be implied in the opposition of the *sound doctrine* to this error, how little hold would be taken of the root of the evil, emphasis being laid on the moral side of Christianity, while the error itself remains untouched? No! So long as we hold by the opinion that Paul was the author of these epistles, we must suppose that here also he followed his usual practice of seizing the mischief by its roots, and placing the corresponding truth, in opposition to the lie upon which the error was built.[1] The error, then, that is opposed in these epistles cannot

1 Schleiermacher, p. 86: "I do not even mention the Gnostics, whom some have thought to be referred to here; as it is too manifest that Paul would have spoken against them, at least more severely, than he does in this incidental notice." The difficulty which he finds in the designation ἑτεροδιδασκαλία disappears of itself on a comparison with i. 6, 3.

have been a heresy properly so called, but only (as is evident from the manner in which the apostle characterizes it) an unprofitable knowledge directed to empty, fruitless subjects, and destitute of the power of godliness; against which nothing better could be said, than just that one should avoid such a profitless pursuit, and direct one's regard to things from which a power of godliness will proceed, else there will be the danger of falling away entirely from the faith, inasmuch as such pursuits tend to harden the heart, as has already been shown in the case of several. It was thus quite proper in the apostle to allude to the moral and religious deficiencies of men, who made use of their secret wisdom as a means of bringing gain to themselves; it was not necessary, on the other hand, that he should refute their absurdities. The view which we here advocate is, as is well known, a very ancient one. Chrysostom brings it forward, although not to the exclusion of every other, then also Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact, &c.; at a later period, especially Schöttgen, Wolf; then Storr, Flatt, Wegscheider, Leo; only that they differ in opinion as to the purpose which these genealogies were designed to serve. To me, however, it is of great importance that Neander also, in reference to the epistle to Titus, thus expresses himself: "The term γενεαλ. in the epistle to Titus, without further explanation, and in the connexion in which it stands, cannot be supposed to mean anything of the kind (namely a doctrine of emanations); but we are rather induced to explain it of the common Jewish genealogies, although we are not able to determine more exactly for what purpose these were used." By μῦθοι, however, he thinks, are to be understood rabbinical fables, whether derived from a rabbinical tradition or from arbitrary interpretations of the Old Testament. Now, as we have already seen, so great is the accordance between the epistles to Timothy and the epistle to Titus, in reference to this form of error (laying out of view for the present the more special errors which are there noticed), and the mode of its treatment here and there, that I venture confidently to maintain that if, in the epistle to Titus, by genealogies are meant Jewish family registers, it is impossible that these can mean anything else in the epistles to Timothy; altogether apart from the consideration that the argumentation of the apostle in these epistles appears aimless if we are to suppose that he refers to Gnostic emanations. A further authority for my view I find in Dähne (Theol. Studien. u.

Krit. 1833, p. 1008), who also thinks that genealogies in the proper sense are meant, and in particular those of an allegorizing kind, as in Philo. Finally, I rejoice to find that I am perfectly at one with the learned Thiersch, who in his work already more than once referred to (Versuch zur Herstellung, &c., p. 274), thus writes: "those genealogies must have been genealogies of Jewish families, and along with the *old wives fables* that are placed beside them, and the subtle questions about the law, must have been the subject of earnest concern and controversy among the Jewish Christians—a supposition which is confirmed by the connexion, and which, ere it is rejected, must be shown to be historically inadmissible and inconceivable."—But why then have the majority of the more recent critics departed from this, so natural and so old an interpretation? We have already spoken of Schleiermacher's opinion as agreeing with that which we advocate. On comparing Mack, Matthies, De Wette, Neander, all of whom explain the term in question of pneuumatologies similar to those of the later Gnosticism, the chief objection which we find urged against our view is, that researches such as those we have supposed, could find no countenance or acceptance among Gentile Christians (Neander, a. a. Q., p. 541.) Our Lord himself, observes Mack further, did not find fault with the Jews for taking themselves up with genealogies; why then should the apostle have held them to be so dangerous, nay, to be directly contrary to the true doctrine? (the latter is a view which exegetically is altogether untenable.) "In short," says Matthies, "the genealogies, in the sense just spoken of, come far too little into contact with the sphere of Christian ideas and Christian morals, to account for their having been made the subject of special warning" (p. 166.) But in these objections too little regard is had to the close connexion allowed by the commentators to obtain, between the *genealogies* and the fables the *controversies about the law* and the *teachers of the law.* This connexion itself shows, that it is not merely the drawing out of genealogical registers for Jewish families that is meant. It is apparent that beyond this, a trading in magic was carried on through the medium of these, that they were extolled as a higher wisdom, as means to the attainment of a higher moral perfection, and were employed as an instrument of gain (Tit. i. 11; 1 Tim. vi. 5.) All this will not correspond to the γενεαλογίαι, if by this is merely to be understood, the construction of Jewish family registers. We must

rather suppose that they included a deeper gnosis, (the γνῶσις *falsely so called,* against which Timothy is warned.) We shall not then be surprised at the Gentile Christians being interested in these, any more than at the warning which is addressed to Timothy and Titus. Moreover, it must be observed that we are not at liberty to suppose, that the influence which these things had acquired over the Christian churches was greater than it really was, as has been done especially with reference to the first epistle to Timothy; for the epistle itself gives no warrant for this, (i. 3, *that thou mightest charge some,* &c.), in as far as it refers to the error which it treats of in common with the epistle to Titus; and what was sufficient at Crete to bring about the error combated by the apostle is adequate also in the first epistle to Timothy. The only objection that might be urged against our view is, that it is not historically confirmed to the extent that might be desired. But it is at least as much so as the opposite view, that, namely, of Gnostic successions of emanations. Philo's allegorical treatment of the Mosaic genealogies furnishes something analogous, to which we might appeal with as much reason as the opposite view appeals to the Colossian heresy, comp. Böttger, a. a. Q., p. 142. And at a later period we find instances of a Gnostic treatment of genealogies (just as that view finds these in the Gnostic systems of the second century, comp. Baur, a. a. Q., p. 14), in the progress towards which, we might regard the characteristics of our epistles as the intermediate steps, with as much reason as the opposite view finds in its series of emanations, the germ of the later Gnosis. But the designation of the error in our epistles, as mere talk, &c., forbids our identifying it with those later appearances. They are too far removed from what we find here. All will depend, then, on whether the view we have given is exegetically well founded. And in this case it can be no proper criterion by which to test the correctness of this view,—a view that relates to a period in connection with which we have few, and in the matter before us no additional documents,—to inquire, whether it be historically demonstrable. That which is presupposed in general in errors of the kind—we refer not merely to the *genealogies* but also to the *fables,* &c.—may be sufficiently demonstrated, namely, that previous to the spread of the gnosis in the second century, there existed already a Jewish and a Jewish-Christian gnosis. With respect to the former, we knew of no one to whom we could refer as having more

directly substantiated this, than Dr Baur in his work on the Christian gnosis (p. 36—38.) Comp. § 3. Especially does the Cabbala here come into notice, the elements of which, as is acknowledged, were already in existence at that period. But with regard also to the Jewish-Christian gnosis, Dr Baur makes such admissions, that the existence of this before the second century can appear only as something quite natural. Thus when, for example, he maintains (a. a. Q. p. 50) that Christianity, wherever it came into contact with this speculative philosophy of religion, could not but be also immediately drawn into its sphere; comp. in Böttger, p. 175, 208, ss., 213. Not merely do the Jewish-Christians referred to in the epistle to the Romans betray, according to Baur, a dualistic view of the world; the strongest proof of the existence of a Jewish-Christian gnosis must always be the epistle to the Colossians, with its φιλοσοφία. With it are then to be classed the two epistles to Timothy, not merely in so far as they treat of those errors hitherto described, but as they present to us at the same time the beginnings of the later gnosis in its various tendencies with express reference to the future, towards which these present appearances point. To this belong the passages already adduced, 1 Tim. i. 19, 20; 2 Tim. ii. 16—18; 1 Tim. iv. 1; 2 Tim. iii. 1, ss. The first of these passages does not afford any more special mark of the error that is meant; the second, however, plainly points to a spiritualistic tendency. The third of the passages adduced clearly discovers the original form of asceticism; the last, the immoral antinomian tendency, which was connected with magic. How the traces of this gnosis may be further followed out in the rest of the epistles of the New Testament, may be seen by referring to Thiersch, a. a. Q., p. 236; Rothe, die aufange der Christl. Kirche, p. 320, ss.; Neander, a. a. Q. II., p. 261, ss., 638, ss.

We shall again, in the investigation of those passages, have to recur to the question whether these Gnostic errors, partly of a spiritualistically ascetic, and partly of an antinomian character, noticed in certain passages of the two epistles to Timothy, may not be conceived to have existed in the time of the apostle. Here let us refer only to one other point, the importance of which Baur also fully acknowledges; it is in the passage Acts xx. 29, 30, where the apostle Paul, addressing the elders of the Ephesian church, whom he had sent for to meet him at Miletus, says, "For I know

this, that after my departing shall grievous wolves come in among you, not sparing the flock; also of your own selves shall men arise speaking perverse things to draw away disciples after them." "Only one prop, as it appears to me," so Dr Baur expresses himself, "could the defence of the apostolical origin of the pastoral epistles still have upon which to rest. I mean the farewell address. . . . . Here we find the eye of the apostle, directed towards the same state of things as meets us in the Pastoral Epistles in its more definite form. . . . . And indeed he sees the danger to be at no great distance. But with regard to the whole of this farewell address, it is but too apparent—at least I cannot help thinking so concerning it—that it was written after the event. . . . . It appears to me, indeed, even when I overlook its character as an address written post eventum, one of the most direct testimonies against the genuineness of these epistles." "It cannot be supposed that the apostle should have transferred the charge of combating the heretics, from himself to those persons who were set over the Ephesian church, if in reality he had afterwards come to devote three special epistles mainly to this subject." "Let it be supposed, however, that the apostle was mistaken, it would still be impossible to find a period when these epistles could have been written, if, as apostolical, they must in any way be brought to correspond with the farewell address in Miletus" (a. a. Q., p. 92, ss.) With regard to this critical difficulty, we may here refer to Neander I., p. 475, s., and Böttger, a. a. Q., p. 216, ss. The words *not knowing*, &c., Acts xx. 22, may be opposed to what is said respecting the certainty with which the apostle foresaw his future fate. That in the prospect of the threatening dangers, he earnestly charges the elders, as the shepherds of the flock, with the care of the church, surely involves no serious difficulty. But the only real difficulty,—that the apostle, according to the Pastoral Epistles, must have gone again to Ephesus, notwithstanding that in his address to the elders he appears to bid them farewell for ever,—can but induce us to suppose, that the οἶδα of the apostle was not fulfilled in its entire compass (comp. infra.) As long as the genuineness of this farewell address is unshaken, we have, according to Baur's own admission, the necessary point of connexion for the heretical appearances of these epistles. They set before us the most proximate fulfilment of those memorable farewell words; that fulfilment itself, pointing to a still more

perilous future, which, according to the testimony of the later epistles of the New Testament, and chiefly of the Apocalypse, did not fail to come to pass.

Before bringing to a close this investigation concerning the heretics of the Pastoral Epistles, I owe it to my readers to state Olshausen's view, as he himself refers to this subject in his introduction to the epistle to the Colossians, and gives his opinion to the following effect. "It must be shown," he observes, "how such heresies may be supposed to have existed in the apostolic age. Already in the epistle to the Romans, chap. xiv., we find a remarkable description of Judaizing ascetics." In the first epistle to the Corinthians also, Olshausen understands by the *οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, a Gnostic party. Further, he appeals to the epistle to the Colossians. "However much these heretics of the epistle to the Colossians may have in common with those in the Pastoral Epistles, there may still be perceived a considerable difference between them. The Colossians entertained false notions regarding the person of Christ, side by side with whom they placed angels, to whom they likewise dedicated a species of worship, ii. 18. Accordingly, Paul sets himself in the epistle to the Colossians to prove the doctrine of the divine nature of Christ, i. 15, ss. We find nothing of this kind in the heretics of the Pastoral Epistles. These are rather represented as having doubts as to the real humanity of Christ. According to that principle, namely, that matter (*ὕλη*) is the source of sin, these, like the later Docetists, seem to have held that the union of Christ the Son of God with a coarse human body was inadmissible. Paul, therefore, always brings into prominence in these epistles the humanity of Christ, 1 Tim. ii. 5; iii. 16; 2 Tim. ii. 8. Quite the same we find in 1 John. A farther gnostic tendency meets us in the second epistle of Peter, and in that of Jude, to which also the Apocalypse corresponds, where men are described who, setting out from gnostic principles, had sunk into the depths of moral laxity. According to these testimonies we must say, that the Pastoral Epistles contain nothing at variance with them in the representation of the heretics which we find there; rather, it becomes apparent that in the New Testament itself, may be found already the germs of all those tendencies which in the second century were developed into sects. If, accordingly, we must reject Baur's view as altogether inadmissible, the difficult question still arises—to what influence are we to trace

the origin of these heresies. First of all, to a Judaizing influence; and here a threefold way may be supposed: 1, we might derive this influence from the sect of the Essenes and Therapeutae; or 2, from the Ebionites; or 3, from the Cabbalistic sources." Against the first supposition, Olshausen urges the seclusion of these sects. If, however, it is supposed that, not indeed Essenians, but a certain general Essenian influence was spread into a wider sphere, then less objection could be made to this view; but in this form it would correspond with the second supposition, which traces these heresies to the influence of the Ebionites. Against this influence, however, according to Olshausen, may be adduced the view expressed in 1 Tim. iv. 3 on the subject of marriage. There remains then only the third way, according to which these heresies were derived from Jewish Cabbalistic ideas,—which is adopted by Vitringa, Grotius, Wolf, Schöttgen, Herder, Kleuker, Schneckenburgher (Studien, &c., 1832), Osiander (über die Col. Irrlehrer, Tub. Zeitschrift, 1836), Steiger (Col., p. 90), Baumgarten (against Baur, p. 170, ss.) The Cabbala seems to have been the originating principle of the heresies in the epistle to the Colossians, as well as in the Pastoral Epistles. That this originating principle might have various developments, will at once appear when it is taken into account, that the principles were capable of various interpretations. "There was at that time a fluctuating movement in the principles; especially does this show itself in the asceticism, in which the most complete extremes issued from the same principles. Notwithstanding that the prohibition of marriage and celibacy were most opposed to the Jewish spirit, yet even this might very easily be arrived at, if only it were supposed that matter is evil. And already do we find approximations to this among the Therapeutae. Philo. II. 633; Jos. Antt. XVIII. 1, 5; Bell. J. II. 8, 2; Plin. H. N. V. 15." With regard to the μῦθοι and γενεαλογίαι in particular, Olshausen agrees in opinion with the most of the later critics, and accordingly understands by the μῦθοι narrations concerning the aeons, and by the latter, the successions of emanations of these aeons.

Looking then at the result of this investigation in regard to the genuineness of the epistles, we deem ourselves at liberty to affirm: that what is wont to be characterized as the wide-spread heresy of the Pastoral Epistles, when more closely examined, does not appear

as properly a heresy at all; but as an unprofitable pursuit taking its rise in particular among Jewish Christians, the historical possibility of which cannot be denied, as long as the existence of a Jewish Gnosis at that period must be universally admitted. But, even within the sphere of the New Testament, we find also so many traces of real heresies of a Gnostic description, both such as foreshadowed these heresies, and such as were consequent upon them, that a reference to them in several passages of the two epistles to Timothy ought not in the least to create surprise; and all that is necessary with reference to these heretical appearances is to show, how easily we might adduce from history what is closely analogous to them; and then in respect to the particular instances, reference would have to be made to the exposition of the passages concerned. Those other opinions noticed above, as held on the subject of the *genealogies*, as well as Buxtorf's view, according to which conclusiones, or Harduin's, according to which etymologies are to be understood as meant, I do not think it necessary expressly to refute, as they, one and all, may be considered to be given up. Heydenreich, Mack, and Matthies, have stated all that is necessary in opposition to them, in connection with the appropriate passages.

2. We proceed now to the second point which has been employed as a means of assailing the genuineness of the epistles, namely, the ecclesiastical institutions, as represented in the Pastoral Epistles. Here it might suffice for our object to refer to the critical investigation in § 3, in which we have endeavoured to show, that the church-organization delineated in these epistles is demonstrably apostolical, and fully harmonizes with the hints on this subject to be found elsewhere in the New Testament. It has there also been shown, that the alleged hierarchical tendency of the epistles is a pure fiction, for this reason, even if there were no other, that the constitution which they enjoin is the original one, and therefore the objection of a hierarchical tendency must apply to this constitution from its first existence; chiefly, however, is the groundlessness of this assertion proven by a comparison with those institutions of the second century, beneath which such a tendency in reality lay.

We shall here only further direct attention to some marks which confirm our assertion, that the ecclesiastical institutions noticed in these epistles belong to the apostolic age, and which contradict the

supposition that these epistles have a later date. To these belongs not merely the fact already adverted to, and fully acknowledged by those on the other side—the identity, namely, of the office designated equally by the terms πρεσβύτερος and ἐπίσκοπος, the entire absence of anything like the prominent distinction of any single person (Neander, a. a. Q. 1, 254), a circumstance which of itself is sufficient to make it appear as a thing inconceivable, that these epistles were written in the second century, and with a hierarchical aim. (Comp. § 3.) I farther take into consideration here, the absence of all reference to the deaconship in the epistle to Titus. One cannot see how a writer of the second century should here pass over in silence the office of the deacon, whilst he speaks of this subject with so much earnestness and minuteness in the first epistle to Timothy. The already settled ecclesiastical institutions of his time, would surely have induced him to make mention of this office, which also was handed down from the time of the apostles, when he was aiming at the confirmation of the church government. On the other hand, the absence of all reference to the deaconship is, on the supposition of the genuineness of these epistles, not only accountable, but is also a striking mark, from which we obtain a deep insight into the nature of this office, in its distinction from the office of the presbyter. The deaconship, namely, as will have to be shown under the appropriate passages, stands in no way on the same level with that office. Called into existence from a necessity inherent in the very nature of church order and government, it does not at all form the subject of consideration in the epistle to Titus, which treats simply of the setting up of an ecclesiastical connexion. How different is the case in the first epistle to Timothy, which treats not of the first introduction of a church connexion, but of conducting in a proper spirit and manner the already existing organization. Whilst we plainly see in all this the primitive stamp of the apostolic church government, we, at the same time, perceive in these epistles certain traces, which, although faithful to this primitive impress, do yet point to the later period in the history of apostolic labour, to which the epistles belong. Thus, both in respect to the ecclesiastical institutions, and also to the heresy, these epistles find a suitable place in the very midst of the appearances that come within the compass of the New Testament. The criticism to which we are

opposed, has found the marks of a period subsequent to that of the apostles, in the manner in which the office-bearers and their appointment are spoken of; thus, for example, in the expression ὀρέγεσθαι ἐπισκοπῆς, in the emphasis that is laid on moral qualities generally as pre-requisite to ordination, and especially in such expressions as *husband of one wife, neophyte*, &c. We can perceive in all these (comp. the exposition) nothing that is necessarily post-apostolical; we must certainly, however, claim these as the manifest indications of a later apostolic period. We cannot but say, that both the epistle to Titus and the two epistles to Timothy imply the previous existence of Christianity for some length of time; on this supposition too, however, all that has been referred to, may be completely understood and historically vindicated. There is still another circumstance in which we may discern the later period, namely, the comparative disappearance of the χαρίσματα; from this too we may infer, that Christianity had been already of some considerable time standing. The mighty impulse communicated to the minds of men on the introduction of Christianity had already assumed a more fixed and regular character; the new relations which were formed had become more settled; and along with the free movement of the spirit in the charismata, the regular office had also been elevated to its real importance. And there is here still a feature which especially deserves our regard, and to which Neander has, with the same view, already directed attention (a. a. Q. I. p. 263, ss.) In the first epistle to Timothy ii. 2, v. 17, and in Tit. i. 9, it is required of the presbyter, that he be apt to teach. "It was not till a later period," justly observes Neander, "when the pure gospel had to contend with manifold hostile errors, as was the case especially in the latter stage of the apostle Paul's labours—it was not till this critical period that the same apostle considered it necessary to unite the two offices of the church teachers (have we authority for supposing that there was an office of this kind as distinct from that of the ἐπίσκοπος?) and the church presidents more closely with each other, and to take heed that such should be appointed to preside over the congregations as were at the same time capable by their teaching, of preserving them from the infection of error, of confirming them in the pure doctrine, and confuting the enemies, Tit. i. 9. And accordingly he counts those presbyters who also laboured in teaching, to be especially

worthy of honour. Who does not also recollect here the passage in Acts xx. 28, ss., so conclusive in regard to the heretics of the Pastoral Epistles, where the apostle charges the presbyters with the duty of defending the church against the coming dangers? Dr Baur has acknowledged the weight of this passage, notwithstanding of his being on the opposite side (Past. p. 92.) And let it also be observed, that just as with respect to the heretics we have in the Apocalypse the representation of a more advanced state of things, so also with reference to the office-bearers. "When, however, John in the Apocalypse addresses his epistle to the ἄγγελος, it is evident that in each of these congregations one—the eldest—stood pre-eminent above the rest, so that already had the constitution, subsequent to the apostolic time, been introduced in a twofold way, with respect, namely, to the relation of the ἐπίσκοπος to the πρεσβυτήριον, and with respect to the united organization of congregations with one person at their head" (extract from the Zeitschr. für prot. und Kirche 1849, p. 144, ss.) Thus then do we see, that in this respect also the Pastoral Epistles completely correspond in their contents to the historical place that must be assigned to them if they are genuine, and thereby attest their own genuineness.

But it is further urged by way of objection, that we cannot suppose that the apostle should have spoken so fully and so earnestly on church government. Those indeed who discover in this church government, on which so much emphasis is laid, the victory of the Jewish Christian, Petrine element over the Pauline, must think so, and must regard as well founded, the alleged want of a church organization in the spirit and character of the Christianity of Paul; we have (§ 3) no reason for such an opinion. This whole question presents itself to us in this form: can we conceive it possible, that the apostle Paul should at any time have made the order and government of churches the subject of his earnest regard? Or more exactly still: are we at liberty to predicate of the apostle, that he perceived and valued the importance of church organization in order to the continuance of the Christian church? If so, then we need not be surprised at the earnestness with which in these epistles he treats of ecclesiastical institutions. But why, it is asked, does the apostle, in these epistles particularly, insist with such earnestness and emphasis on church institutions. Granted, that there is a connexion between heresies and the development of

church government, it will still have to be explained, say our opponents, how in other epistles, where the apostle also combats heresies, this point is not brought forward, as for example in the epistles to the Corinthians and the epistle to the Galatians. It remains then, say they, for the advocates of the genuineness to show a special necessity in this case. We observe, in reply, that this reasoning can only be maintained by the rejection of the passage Acts xx. 17, ss. "Here we see the apostle's eye (according to Baur, p. 92) already directed to the same state of things, as meets us in a more definite form in the Pastoral Epistles. The most powerful protection from, and resistance to, this danger that threatened the church is expected, as in the Pastoral Epistles, from those who were set over the church; and it was chiefly with this view that the apostle sent for them to meet him at Miletus, in order to commit this charge to them in the most earnest manner, before taking leave of that scene of his previous labours. This address seems therefore to prove most clearly that what forms the principal contents, and the principal design of the Pastoral Epistles, was even at that time within the sphere of the apostle's vision." So Dr Baur expresses himself, and we know of nothing that could be said in addition to this for our purpose; we will only further call attention to Acts xiv. 23, where we have an account of the appointment of presbyters by the apostle. That passage not merely shows, that the apostle elsewhere than in the Pastoral Epistles made church-government the subject of his most earnest concern; but it can also show why, in the Pastoral Epistles, this subject comes so much into the foreground. Dr Baur has himself unintentionally indicated this in the words quoted above: that the apostle commits this charge in the most pressing terms to those who presided over the church, *before taking leave of that scene of his past labours;* and further, in that he says, that the apostle here, as in the Pastoral Epistles, expects at the hands of those who were set over the church, the most powerful protection from, and resistance to, *a danger which threatened the church.* We have already adverted to the fact that the office could then only acquire its full significance and efficiency, when things had begun to assume a settled form. What could be effected by office-bearers whose power rested solely on the obedience of faith, so long as faith itself had not yet found a settled place in the heart, as in the epistle to the Galatians,—so long as the very

continuance of Christianity was placed in doubt, or when, as in the epistle to the Corinthians, the church was rent by factions which endangered the apostolical authority of the apostle? In circumstances such as these, the very principle was assailed, on the acknowledgment of which the whole efficiency of the elders appointed by the apostle depended. The church in Galatia must first be brought to the obedience of the faith, the factions in the church at Corinth must first be removed, ere the influence of office can with any propriety be spoken of. In this way do we account for no further mention being made of office-bearers in those epistles. Altogether different is the case when the danger of being led away threatens a Christian, or as it is said, a Pauline-Christian church already standing. Here, that which the efficiency of the office presupposes is already acknowledged. It is thus natural that the apostle should look for the strongest protection against this danger which threatened the church, from those who were set over it. From what other quarter should he have looked for this? And wherefore was the office of presbyter instituted, if such an end was not to be served by it? It was therefore the danger arising from errors which threatened the church, that induced the apostle, in the Acts of the Apostles, as well as in the Pastoral Epistles, to lay so much stress on church-government. (In the second epistle to Timothy we do not find anything of this kind, which is easily accounted for.) In the epistle to Titus we find substantially the same state of things. Here indeed we find no church regularly formed, but nothing more is required, than just that the existing materials be brought together and united around the office, in order to form a Christian, a Pauline-Christian church. And although the newly-formed church is as yet threatened by no heresy in the proper sense of the word, it is in danger from an unsound tendency, which those who are to be set over it must oppose with sound doctrine, just as heresy must be opposed with the truth. If, as many commentators think, Christianity in the island of Crete was, at the time when the epistle was written, exposed to danger from the influence of Judaism in some such way as we find in the epistle to the Galatians, then assuredly, the apostle would have aimed chiefly at destroying this Judaistic tendency, in order to make those who were infected with such an error Christians, before he would give them a church government. There is

yet another circumstance, however, to be noticed, to which Dr Baur has likewise referred. The apostle, before quitting the scene of his past labours, and just because he takes his leave not knowing what is to befall him, most earnestly charges the elders of the church at Ephesus to resist the impending danger. "Can the genuineness of these epistles, as their ablest advocates suppose, be upheld only on the supposition that the apostle Paul was imprisoned a second time at Rome," (Baur, p. 93) and do they consequently all of them belong to the latest period of his labours—we have in this circumstance an additional light thrown upon the matter in question. As the apostle on his departure from the Ephesian church charges the presbyters with its protection and defence, so we observe in these, the last of the apostle's epistles, written just before the period of his final departure, a concern for the interests of the church, reaching into the future, and passing from his own person and from personalities generally to the office and the office-bearers. And it is worthy of notice that in the epistle to the Philippians, the last of all with the exception of the Pastoral Epistles, the apostle makes special mention of the bishops and deacons, although his earnest request with respect to this church, flowing from the tender affection which he bore to all its members, was not addressed merely to the office-bearers, but to all without distinction, (i. 3, 7, 8; iv. 21.) Looking then (if only by way of supposition) at the historical place which the epistle to Titus and the first epistle to Timothy assert for themselves, I do not see what reason there is to stumble at the prominent place given to the office-bearers of the church in these epistles. And if Titus in Crete and Timothy in Ephesus were charged with the conduct and government of the church, it becomes quite plain, why precisely in these epistles so much should be said, and said so emphatically, on the subject of church government; and only then can any objection be reasonably urged against this, when other epistles of the apostle can be shewn in which he had a similar inducement to speak of the constitution of the church. Here then also, by a careful examination of the circumstances, and by a comparison with what we learn from other sources, the difficulty, § 1, finds a satisfactory solution.

3. With respect to the third of the points above mentioned, namely, the date of the epistles, it has already been shown, § 3, that for the disposal of this a period will always remain, the historical reality

of which does not need to be postulated merely for the sake of the Pastoral Epistles—for Hug supposes a second imprisonment at Rome without placing the Pastoral Epistles in the period thus gained—but which may rather be confirmed by indications contained in passages of the New Testament, and by historical testimonies from the age immediately subsequent to that of the apostles. Again, in the special introduction to the respective epistles, it will be found, that neither in regard to the epistle to Titus nor the other two epistles, is the supposition of their having been written within the period embraced by the Acts of the Apostles and the rest of the epistles, at all tenable. From these two premises it clearly follows, that the epistles, if they are to be regarded as genuine, can only be placed in the period between the first and the second imprisonment at Rome. To the period between the first and second imprisonment belong the epistle to Titus and the first to Timothy; while the second to Timothy belongs to the time of the second imprisonment. We here only give a brief statement of the results arrived at in the investigation connected with the separate epistles, because we regard the agreement of the several epistles with each other in the data which they furnish, as well as with what is otherwise known, as a testimony in favour of our supposition with respect to the date of the epistles, and consequently in favour of their genuineness. The epistle to Titus informs us that the apostle, after what we have supposed to be his liberation from the first imprisonment, (according to Hug in the year 64), and before the breaking out of the persecution by Nero, had been in Crete; that he had left Titus there, and had given him instructions to come to him at Nicopolis, where he intended to pass the winter. If then we must at all events suppose that the apostle's release from imprisonment at Rome took place during the first half of the year—it is all one which year, comp. Hug. II. p. 276—it follows that Titus' stay in Crete must have extended to the corresponding period of at least half a year, namely, till winter; it being supposed that the apostle went to Crete immediately after his liberation. Without bringing his work there to a conclusion (Tit. i. 5) he hastened forwards; and we learn nothing farther of his subsequent progress from the epistle, except that at the setting in of winter he was to be found at Nicopolis (which Nicopolis is meant the epistle does not inform us.) How strikingly now do the data of the two epistles to Timothy corres-

pond to this! Here we meet the apostle, not on his way from west to east, but from east to west. We find him according to the statements of the first epistle on his way from Lesser Asia to Macedonia, i. 3 (whether he was even with Timothy in Ephesus cannot be said with certainty), with the hope, however, of yet revisiting Ephesus; from the statements of the second epistle we learn, that he had pursued his journey (we say nothing at present of Miletus) by Troas, where he left some of his effects behind him, to Macedonia (which fully harmonizes with the purpose expressed in the first epistle, to go from Macedonia to Ephesus), from thence to Greece, and we find him again a prisoner at Rome when this epistle was written. When we remember that the apostle, according to what is stated in the epistle to Titus, intended to spend the winter in Nicopolis, we find a complete harmony in the circumstances connected with this journey, not merely in regard to time—for that the apostle hastened forwards in Lesser Asia, as well as in Crete, we learn from the first epistle to Timothy—but also in regard to place, if we may understand the Nicopolis in Epirus to be the Nicopolis to which the apostle betook himself on the setting in of winter, in order to pursue his journey to Rome in the beginning of spring, as soon as the sea might again be navigated. We are here reminded of 1 Cor. xvi. 6, where the apostle purposes to spend the winter in Corinth, in order to pursue his journey by sea (Acts xx. 3), from thence to Jerusalem (Acts xix. 21.) The harmony is apparent also in the circumstance that Titus really was with the apostle in Rome, (comp. 2 Tim. iv. 10.) We will not attach so much importance to this harmony as to hold that of itself it forms a proof; but it is at all events worthy of notice how easily and naturally all these circumstances correspond to each other. Not less in favour of our supposition is also the harmony with statements to be found in other places. We learn from the epistle to the Philippians i. 25—27, ii. 24, and from that to Philemon, ver. 22, that the apostle towards the end of his imprisonment at Rome, which lasted two years, purposed to go both to Macedonia and to Asia Minor. If the apostle was indeed set at liberty, we cannot but suppose that he would in the first place visit these districts. In our epistles we find him really there; and it may here appear to be a circumstance of some importance, that the object of his stay in Lesser Asia seems to have had reference

not merely to Ephesus (the words of 1 Tim. i. 3, may be perfectly understood without supposing Paul to have been in Ephesus, and wherefore otherwise does he commit to Timothy the charge of governing the church and protecting it from error?) but also, as may be gathered from the epistle to Philemon, to the district of country for which this epistle was designed. The subscription too of the epistle (from Laodicea), which appears to rest on tradition, as it is in no way authenticated by the epistle itself, leads to the same conclusion. In accordance with our supposition, the apostle's visit to Crete may appear to be explained by his journey to Rome, in the course of which he touched at Crete (Acts xxvii. 7),—and how natural would it have been to mention that the apostle had preached the gospel here before if this had really been the case. And even the haste with which he pursued this whole journey by Crete, through Asia Minor, Macedonia, Greece, may be accounted for by the intention which the apostle so decidedly expresses in Rom. xv. 24, to go to Spain. With this also agrees the circumstance, that Mark, who, according to Col. iv. 10, had gone to Lesser Asia, is to come again to the apostle at Rome (2 Tim. iv. 11), along with Timothy, who is supposed latterly to have gone from Rome to Philippi, and from thence might easily pass to Ephesus. What remains to be said on these points will be found in the special introduction to the respective epistles. We have brought together these particulars, not so much as separate arguments for our position, but rather with the view of showing how well every thing corresponds, supposing our position to be the true one, how the three epistles harmonize with each other in the representation which they give of the apostle's journey, and how what we learn from other sources, is implied and presupposed in the statements of the epistles. But, moreover, the peculiar contents, as well as the form of these epistles, will not easily be accounted for, on the supposition of any other date than that which we have assigned to them. With respect to the former we have already observed how, in various ways, these epistles bear the stamp of a later, nay of the latest period in the life and labours of the apostle; how especially what we find in the Pastoral Epistles with reference to the heretics, and the ecclesiastical institutions, points to such a period; how the statements on both these subjects, evidently belong to a state of things occupying a place between what meets us in the earlier epistles of

the apostle, and the latest epistles of the New Testament, especially in the Apocalypse. We would only refer here to what has been said above on this part of our subject. One other point, however, we must bring forward, to which indeed we attach the greatest weight in connection with this question. Not only do we maintain that these epistles, from the nature of their contents, belong to a later period than the rest of the epistles of Paul, but also that from their contents and their form—especially the latter—they belong all to the same period. The most recent critics on the other side have more thoroughly perceived this, than has been done by the latest advocates for the genuineness. "The same or similar polemical references in these epistles," observes De Wette with perfect justice, "and their peculiar phraseology, constrain the defender of their genuineness to the supposition that they were all written about the same time" (p. 118.) And to the same effect, Dr Baur thinks that the genuineness of the epistles could only be maintained by presupposing a second imprisonment at Rome (p. 93.) If this were founded on the *contents* of the epistles alone, then it might be said in reply: that it is by no means so difficult to conceive that the same errors which at a later period appeared in Ephesus, had already shown themselves in Crete several years before; that the apostle had occasion, in the epistle which had reference to Crete, to speak of the presbyters just as much as afterwards in his epistle to Timothy; and that the same circumstances also would account for the precepts of a moral kind, which occur in connexion with the reference to the teaching of other doctrines. All this expressed in so general a form seems true enough, and sounds well. But let only these epistles be compared first with each other, and then jointly with the rest of the apostle's epistles. What an agreement in the one case, what a difference in the other! And will it then be maintained, that the epistle to the Romans was written nearly contemporarily with the epistle to Titus and the first to Timothy; and that between these two and the last to Timothy, the epistles to the Ephesians, to the Colossians, and Philemon, were indited, as Matthies supposes? But, as Matthies has aptly observed (p. 592), the second epistle to Timothy presupposes an entirely different state of things from the first, and shows a different aim—wherein then the agreement? De Wette has performed the praiseworthy task of drawing out a comprehen-

sive view of the phraseology peculiar to the Pastoral Epistles. Now let any one but look at this assemblage of peculiar formulas and words, many of which also express peculiar ideas, and say how this phenomenon is to be explained on the supposition that the epistles were not written at one period, but that a number of other epistles came between them, in which we find no trace of this peculiarity. And this peculiarity extends not merely to particular expressions, but also to the style, as De Wette shows (p. 117), and even to the ideas and views (comp. De Wette, p. 117.) We have only to refer to such instances as the designation of piety by εὐσέβεια, the expression *sound doctrine*, &c. This close affinity of the Pastoral Epistles to one another, which *imparts to them the character of a single epistle as compared with the others*, cannot be accounted for merely by the fact that they are epistles addressed to private persons, or to fellow teachers with the apostle, or that in all of them the same circumstances had to be spoken of (this, to say nothing further, does not hold with reference to the second epistle to Timothy); it can only be explained by supposing that these epistles were indited at one and the same time, when the apostle's mind was occupied with the thoughts therein expressed, and when, so to speak, a certain mould had been formed in his mind, in which were cast his views and designations, and indeed his whole treatment of the subjects occurring in the epistles, and the stamp of which we find even in the second epistle to Timothy, as the result of its having been written at the same period, although in many respects it differs from the others. We have here then the same phenomenon, as we find in the epistle to the Ephesians, compared with that to the Colossians. Comp. Harless on the Ephesians, Intro. p. 70. But how could this contemporariness, so altogether indispensable, be explained, except by our hypothesis with regard to the date of the epistles, which we have found confirmed from other sources? Böttger, well aware of the importance of this point, and overlooking the supposition of a second imprisonment, has yet sought to assign a contemporary date to these epistles; but the critical process which he has brought to bear upon the text it is to be hoped will not find acknowledgment, else I know not to what pass Scripture criticism will come. Every other hypothesis must renounce this contemporariness, without which the close affinity that pervades these epistles cannot be

rightly explained. If the apostle's liberation from imprisonment at Rome is not admitted, then the epistle to Titus, and the first to Timothy, which represent the apostle as in a state of freedom, can have been written only before his imprisonment in Jerusalem, whatever be the special date that is assigned to them; and the second epistle to Timothy (leaving out of sight Böttger's view that it was written in Cæsarea) only during the Roman imprisonment, it may have been at the beginning or at the end of it. And what an insuperable difficulty does Acts xx. 18, ss., oppose to this view in its every aspect! How little do the contents of the first epistle to Timothy, agree with the farewell address at Miletus, if that epistle is to be considered as having been written before this address was delivered! Every unprejudiced mind will view the matter in entirely the reverse way, and recognise in the first epistle to Timothy, the beginning of the fulfilment of the apostle's prediction in that address. Dr Baur thinks it "impossible that the epistles can have been written previous to that farewell address," and in this he is perfectly right. "The apostle," he continues, "must have been liberated from imprisonment in order to his being able to write them, but the parting address at Miletus most decidedly contradicts this supposition (p. 95.) We have already noticed this contradiction, and in connexion with it have admitted a difficulty, that, namely, which arises from the fact that the apostle, if the Pastoral Epistles are genuine, must have again visited these countries, whilst in that address he seems to take his departure from them never to return again. We will not urge, by way of explaining this, that there is no necessity for supposing that Paul was in Ephesus from what is said in the first epistle to Timothy, or farther, that his intention to go from Macedonia to Ephesus (1 Tim. iii. 14, 15) seems not to have been carried into effect. We will rather take the most unfavourable view of the case, and suppose that the apostle was mistaken in this respect in his knowledge of the future; shall we on this account reject the Pastoral Epistles as spurious, if they are otherwise proven to be genuine? "Infallible foreknowledge," observes Neander (p. 476), "belongs not to the marks of a genuine apostle, and from Paul's own words, ver. 22, the opposite rather may be inferred. He himself speaks in a somewhat uncertain manner as to his future destiny. Comp. also Acts xiv. 7; xx. 3; 2 Cor. i. 15, ii. 12. If the address in question be

but closely examined, it will be found that it does not say all that it is held to say by those on the other side. The apostle does not see himself already bound in the spirit; the words δεδεμένος τῷ πνεύματι cannot possibly be made to imply this, whatever be the interpretation we give to τῷ πνεύματι, whether "bound in the spirit" (Meyer), or "bound by the spirit" (Calvin), or "bound with respect to my spirit"—in every case the δεδεμένος must contain the reason of the πορεύομαι, and, on account of the words that follow, τὰ συναντήσοντά μοι μὴ εἰδὼς, &c., (in which the apostle appeals not to what he himself knows, but to what is known by another) cannot be understood in the sense expressed by Dr Baur: "seeing myself in the spirit already bound, I go to Jerusalem not knowing what will befall me there, except that the Holy Ghost witnesses by others," &c. How are μὴ εἰδώς and πλήν to be reconciled with this interpretation? Just as little is the apostle "now about to finish his course," ver. 24; he only explains, why in spite of all those unfavourable predictions he goes to Jerusalem, following the leadings of the Spirit; because, namely, his life, in so far as he himself and his own interests are concerned, is not so dear to him (comp. on Phil. i. 21) as to prevent him from finishing his course, *i.e.* as is shown by the words that follow, from carrying out and fulfilling the work to which he has been officially called, that of *testifying to the gospel.* "The value which I set on my life does not restrain me from fulfilling my course, *i.e.* my ministration," (Meyer on this passage.) The apostle, then, says that he is ready to yield up his life if that should conduce to the fulfilment of his calling; but he does not say that he is already about to die. The apostle does not speak of what he himself knows till ver. 25; in what goes before this it is μὴ εἰδώς. These words of ver. 25 must certainly be understood to mean that the apostle would never again see any of those who were then present; for the ὑμεῖς πάντες cannot possibly be so explained as to make the apostle say that *all*—as opposed to some—shall not see his face again. The apostle not merely hears in the predictions of the Spirit that bonds await him; but apart from this, his aims are now more directed towards Rome (Acts xix. 21; Rom. i. 10; xv. 23), and even towards the most distant west (Rom. xv. 24), *having no more place in these parts*—as he wrote to the Christians at Rome shortly before entering on this journey, in the course of which we find him at Miletus In

no case then could he hope soon, if ever, to return to these districts, and this thought might be expressed in the words of ver. 25. Let it also be borne in mind further, that the difficulty with which we are now dealing, belongs not to the Pastoral Epistles alone, but also to the epistle to the Philippians and that to Philemon, both of which represent the apostle as having the prospect of returning from Rome to the east. The difficulty extends likewise to the epistle to the Colossians (which may be said to be interwoven with the epistle to Philemon), and then also to the epistle to the Ephesians. For, if the epistle to the Philippians was the last that was written during that imprisonment, and was subsequent to the epistle to Philemon, then the promise in Phil. ii. 24 stands of course in connexion with the intention expressed in Philem. ver. 22. Who would ever think of rejecting these epistles as spurious on account of the *οἶδα* in Acts xx. 25? The difficulty is however just the same in reference to the Pastoral Epistles; the purpose which the apostle there expresses, we here find carried into effect. And the address at Miletus contradicts our epistles just in the same way as it does those others. I think that this must restrain all who hold the genuineness of the epistle to the Philippians, and that to Philemon, as conclusively settled, from rejecting the Pastoral Epistles on account of this circumstance.

I will only add here that Olshausen also expresses himself to the effect, that the supposition of a second Roman imprisonment is the only way in which the genuineness of the Pastoral Epistles can be proved. "This concession alone can solve the serious difficulties. So much progress at least has been made by the critical question. This supposition, however, does not appear as merely arbitrary, but as a supplement to the history of the apostle, in confirmation of which not a little may be adduced from history indicating that such was the fact. For, 1, the Acts of the Apostles is not complete in its communications; 2, it ends without bringing the life of the apostle down to its close; of course then it needs a supplement; 3, all that we are informed concerning the accusation of Paul, seems in no way to imply that he would be sentenced to death. He has the privilege of moving about, not at all in strict confinement. As we certainly know that Paul suffered martyrdom, it is in the highest degree probable, that his capital accusation was quite a different one from that under which we find him in his first imprisonment. 4, We are informed by credible authorities that Paul also visited

Spain; by Clemens Romanus (εἰς τέρμα τῆς δύσεως ἐλθών), by Hieronymus on Is. xi. 14, Cyrill of Jerusalem, Katech. 17." Compare Olshausen's observations in the Stud. und Krit. 138. The most of those who have recently examined the point have arrived at the same result, comp. above, § 3.[1] Special difficulties that may still attend this historical arrangement of the epistles, will find consideration in the exposition of the epistles themselves.

4. We now proceed to the fourth of the points noticed above as furnishing an argument against the Pastoral Epistles, with the view of giving it a fuller investigation here, so far as this can be done in a general way. We mean the alleged unaccountableness of these epistles on exegetical grounds, as distinct from that on historical grounds which we have just considered. We have here, as has been already observed, principally to deal with De Wette, who has given all diligence to establish this objection in every way. We must of course leave it to the exposition of the respective epistles to show, that they are quite in keeping with the state of things which they bring before us, that they correspond to the object they have in view and to the relation of the writer to those to whom they were addressed, and that the exceptions that have been taken to each of the epistles severally in these respects are without foundation. What we here intend to discuss, are the objections that have been urged against the epistles on the ground of the grammatical and religious character common to them as a whole, comp. in De Wette, p. 116, ss. As the most recent negative criticism in this respect also treats the three epistles as one, and has almost entirely withdrawn from Schleiermacher's suspicions against the first epistle to Timothy in particular,[2] so do we also treat them in our defence. The three epistles must, in regard to this objection also, in our view stand or fall together.

We have already fully acknowledged in § 1 the critical difficulty

1 Harless has also expressed himself decidedly to the same effect. Epheserbrief, Einl. p. 61.

2 "No one who is acquainted with the more recent investigations since Schleiermacher, and finds almost all critics unanimous in the opinion that these three epistles in respect to their contents, their form, and their entire peculiarity, are not to be separated from each other, can suppose that in point of composition there is so marked a superiority in the two other epistles over the first," Baur p. 78. "Schleiermacher has certainly exaggerated the more unfavourable characteristics of the first epistle to Timothy," De Wette, p. 119. De Wette himself however gives an inferior place to the first epistle to Timothy as compared with the two others. But in his view they must stand or fall together.

that presents itself here. But we shall find here also that on a closer examination, what at first seems strange becomes less so, nay, becomes quite accountable. These epistles, says De Wette, differ from all the rest of Paul's epistles in a peculiar phraseology, which is common either to all the three or at least to two; and he follows up this assertion with a long list of these peculiar words and phrases. The same process which Schleiermacher brought to bear against the first epistle to Timothy, is thus extended to the three epistles. But how uncertain the result of such a process is, in a numerical respect, has been already ably demonstrated by Planck, in a comparison made by him in opposition to Schleiermacher, of the peculiar expressions to be found in other epistles with those in the first epistle to Timothy, in regard to their number. He shows that in the first epistle to Timothy there are eighty-one ἅπαξ λεγόμενα, in the second sixty-three, and in the epistle to Titus forty-four; but that in the epistle to the Philippians there are fifty-four, in the epistle to the Galatians fifty-seven, and in the epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians together 143. It is thus evident that, in a purely numerical point of view, the Pastoral Epistles appear by no means in a disadvantageous light. But from this nothing farther can be inferred, than that the difference in phraseology is not in itself conclusive against the genuineness of these epistles. How, too, should this be possible? We shall not go so far as Planck, who asserts that the apostle had no rhetorically developed style of language; but we would simply ask, what right have we to suppose, that in ten or eleven other epistles which we possess of the apostle's writings, his whole stock of words lies before us? Do not the last epistles of the apostle (keeping the Pastoral Epistles out of view), contain an abundant supply of new words not before used by him? If then, in these epistles, which in their having been addressed to churches, as well as in their aim and contents, bear a much greater affinity to the rest, we yet find so great a difference, how much more accountable is this in the Pastoral Epistles which differ from all the others—with the exception of the short epistle to Timothy—in being addressed not to congregations but to individuals, and these fellow teachers with the apostle, and in being partly, (that to Titus and the first to Timothy), quite of the nature of official letters. May we not expect *a priori*, that in these epistles a new class of words will appear, when we find this in every one even of

the epistles that are otherwise homogeneous? Of still greater importance, however, is another circumstance which falls to be noticed here. These epistles, as we have already seen, and as the criticism to which we are opposed is wont most to insist upon, bring before us in detail, forms of the religious life altogether new, and errors, the like of which do not occur in the other epistles. These new things, if they are to be called by their names, must of necessity give rise to new designations. And if now these epistles treat of the institutions of the church, and contain directions to Titus and Timothy for the right management of the affairs of the church, topics which we find handled in none of the other epistles, how could it be otherwise, than that new expressions should occur in connexion with these subjects? Besides, if these epistles collectively belong to a later period than all the rest, and all of them to about the same period, what ground is there *a priori* for surprise at finding that they are closely related to each other, and differ considerably from the rest, especially as they all refer to matters which till then were unknown? There is no reason then for our being perplexed by the occurrence of new expressions and formulas. Still, however, all will depend on the character of this peculiar phraseology. One could imagine that a single ἅπαξ λεγόμενον of a decidedly later origin might occur, and this would certainly weigh more against the genuineness than a long catalogue of peculiar expressions, which Paul does not elsewhere use, but which, in so far as the idea or the grammatical usage is concerned, he might have employed. The criticism to which we are opposed has made too lax a use of the term "unpauline." It has not adduced a single instance of an expression which can be said to be unpauline in the sense that Paul could not have used it, however numerous may be the instances of words which he does not actually use. Keeping, then, these general remarks in view, when we turn to what De Wette has characterised as the peculiar phraseology of the Pastoral Epistles, we at once find a series of expressions, the occurrence of which may be simply explained by the circumstance that these epistles allude to matters such as we do not find spoken of in the other epistles. He adduces μῦθοι, γενεαλογίαι, ζητήσεις, ματαιολογία, ματαιολόγος, κενοφωνίαι, λογομαχίαι, λογομαχεῖν. In regard to some of these expressions it will be evident at the first glance, that they owe their existence to the peculiarity of the things to which the epistles refer. What proof

can be drawn from the occurrence of *μῦθοι* and *γενεαλογίαι*, if these were the very things with which the Jewish Christians carried on their trade in magic? As well might we on grammatical grounds, stumble at the occurrence of *εἰδωλόθυτον* in the first epistle to the Corinthians alone, where indeed it occurs six times; or at finding the expression *εἰδωλεῖον* only in that epistle, or *ἐθελοθρησκεία*, *ἐμβατεύω* only in the epistle to the Colossians. But such expressions also as *ζητήσεις*, *ματαιολογία*, and the rest, may be explained without violence by the nature of those appearances against which they were directed. This, as we have seen, is the chief characteristic of the mode in which the apostle combats the errors with which he deals in these epistles—namely, that he almost entirely abstains from a serious refutation of the things brought forward by those seducers who were destitute of all moral earnestness, and just concisely warns against them as empty talk, profitless controversy, vain disputation, whilst he directs to those subjects that are indeed worthy of being known, and will conduct to godliness. What expressions could be more appropriate for this end than just those selected, such as *μωραὶ ζητήσεις*, *ματαιολογία*, *κενοφωνίαι λογομαχίαι*? Thus when the historical element is justly apprehended, every stumblingblock disappears, whether arising from the manner in which the apostle combats the error, or the expressions he employs. And may we not point to parallels to these expressions in other epistles of the apostle? Are not *μωρολογία*, Eph. v. 4, *πιθανολογία*, Col. ii. 4, *χρηστολογία*, Rom. xvi. 18, *κενοδοξία*, Phil. ii. 3, all words formed in quite a similar manner; whilst the first two are similar designations also with respect to the sense. Might we not justly refer, as others have already done, for *ματαιολογία*, to 1. Cor. iii. 20; Rom. i. 21, for *κενοφωνία*, to Eph. v. 6, for *ζητήσεις* to the *συζητητής* at 1 Cor. i. 20? But the influence of the specific error which is combated in the Pastoral Epistles, extends to the phraseology of these epistles much more than might be believed at first sight. The terms *ὑγιής* and *ὑγιαίνειν*—along with that to which they stand opposed, namely, *νοσεῖν*—are adduced as peculiar, in so far as they are employed to denote the true doctrine, and surprise has been expressed that the apostle, although he combats heresies in others of his epistles, yet employs these expressions only here, and here so often. But this surprise proceeds from overlooking just the principal thing that ought to be kept in view, namely, that we do not

find in these epistles, as many commentators suppose, the opposition of true and false doctrine, but the opposition of an unsound and a sound Christianity. The apostle characterizes as diseased the Christianity of those who give themselves up to profitless things, that are destitute of all moral fruitfulness, and he warns them of the danger of entirely falling away; on the contrary, he characterizes as sound, the Christianity of those who direct their regards to *the truth which is according to godliness*, or as he is wont concisely to express it, the ὑγιαίνουσα διδασκαλία. We shall find no more appropriate designation for this kind of error in the other epistles of the apostle. With this too is connected the frequent use of εὐσέβεια in the Pastoral Epistles, an expression which the apostle employs no where else; on which we have said what is necessary in connection with Tit. i. 1. In like manner, the frequent use of σώφρων with its derivatives, is explained by taking into account that the apostle, in delineating Christianity as opposed to a morally unsound course of conduct, lays all stress on the disposition and conduct of its professors. Where does the apostle in any other place describe Christianity in its application to individuals, and that according to the distinctions of sex, age, and rank? And on turning to Phil. iv. 8—a passage which comes nearest to that in which σώφρων occurs, inasmuch as the apostle there aims at giving an exhaustive designation of the idea of Christian morality—we find several expressions which do not occur any where else, or occur but seldom, such as ἁγνός and σεμνός so often found in these epistles, and προσφιλής, εὔφημος, ἀρετή not found at all in any other place. The circumstances which naturally led to the use of the expression σώφρων by the apostle will be adverted to in the exposition of Tit. i. 8. The epithets βέβηλος γραώδης ἀπαίδευτος (the two latter occurring only once) are also adduced. But their occurrence is also explained by the relation they bear to the errors that are combated. If they were things of a foolish and insipid character to which the persons alluded to gave themselves up, then the use of these words, which belonged to the usus linguae of that period (comp. also here the passages in which they occur), is no proof that the epistles were not written by the apostle. Further, the expressions προσέχειν, ἀποτρέπεσθαι, ἐκτρέπεσθαι, περίστασθαι, παραιτεῖσθαι, ἀστοχεῖν, τυφοῦσθαι are adduced. But these expressions also do all of them refer to the errors opposed

in these epistles, as Böhl also justly observes to the same effect, that the peculiarity in the language of the Pastoral Epistles, almost wholly relates to the designation of the evangelical doctrine on the one hand, and of the errors on the other. The first of these expressions occurs elsewhere in the sense in which it is adduced as peculiar to these epistles; comp. on Tit. i. 14. *Ἀποτρέπεσθαι ἐκτρέπεσθαι* and the remaining expressions are found certainly only here; for in Heb. xii. 13, *ἐκτρέπεσθαι* has a different signification; comp. De Wette on the passage. But there is nothing in the words themselves to prevent our supposing that the apostle might have used them; and the reason of his not using them elsewhere, is just that he does not elsewhere combat error by repelling it in the same summary way. The passage Rom. xvi. 18 might be mentioned as containing an expression which has some resemblance to it; *καὶ ἐκκλίνατε ἀπ' αὐτῶν*. This expression is quite as peculiar to this passage, as those of a similar kind in our epistles; only, at Rom. iii. 12, the expression occurs again without *ἀπό*. If the apostle then in that passage uses the expression *ἐκκλίνειν ἀπό*, why may he not here also have used expressions which we do not find elsewhere in his writings? In like manner we find at Gal. i. 6 *μετατίθεσθαι ἀπό*, which does not thus occur elsewhere. The case is the same in regard to the expression *περίστασθαι*, which in the signification in which it is here used is not at all an uncommon word; comp. Passow. With *παραιτεῖσθαι* might be compared Heb. xii. 19, 25, and Acts xxv. 11. And what objection can be made to the expression *ἀστοχέω*, farther than that it does not occur elsewhere, which might also be said of *σαλευθῆναι ἀπό* occuring only at 2 Thess. ii. 2, *μετακινεῖσθαι ἀπό* only at Col. i. 23, *ἐκπίπτειν τινός* only at Gal. v. 4; especially as (like the preceding term *ἐκτρέπεσθαι*) the word stands in express connection with *τὸ τέλος*, 1 Tim. i. 5, 6? How similar to it is the elsewhere occurring expression *στοιχεῖν*, Rom. iv. 12; Gal. vi. 16? Finally, with reference to the expression *τυφοῦσθαι* we might place against it the expression *φυσιοῦσθαι*, which, with the exception of Col. ii. 8, is found only in the epistles to the Corinthians, and occurs there no fewer than six times. Other expressions on which stress is also laid, such as *διαβεβαιοῦσθαι περί τινος*, *ὑπομιμνήσκειν*, are occasioned by the epistles having been addressed to fellow teachers of the apostle, on whom he enjoins

what they are to do ; as Böttger has already observed. With respect to the former of these expressions, it may be observed that *βέβαιος, βεβαιόω, βεβαίωσις*, are frequently used by the apostle ; while the latter will suggest the *ἀναμιμνήσκω* of 1 Cor. iv. 17, which also occurs at 2 Tim. i. 6 in proximity to the other. De Wette, moreover, adduces the unusual formulas of salutation *χάρις, ἔλεος, εἰρήνη*, which occur in 1 Tim. i. 2 ; 2 Tim. i. 2 ; (that in Tit. i. 4 is spurious.) This formula, however, is not a peculiarity which universally belongs to the Pastoral Epistles, for we find there the more common along with the more uncommon formula. Further *θεὸς σωτήρ*. It were easy to show that the idea is not unpauline ; comp. on Tit. i. 3. This concise expression of the idea becomes accountable on the hypothesis that these epistles belong to a later period, as has been already observed by a critic ; and an imitator of the apostle would naturally have avoided this. Lastly, the formula *πιστὸς ὁ λόγος* corresponding to the *ἀμήν* (comp. on Tit. iii. 8) is used by the apostle only here. Did it occur only once, no one would have anything to say against it ; and I take its more frequent occurrence to be just as accidental as the frequent occurrence of *μὴ πλανᾶσθε* in the first epistle to the Corinthians, whilst it is found elsewhere only at Gal. vi. 7. The expression doubtless involves an antithetical reference to the uncertain human opinions of the seducers, comp. Tit. i. 9 ; although it is also used in a general way, as at 1 Tim. iii. 1. In such matters, I think full allowance ought to be made for a writer's individuality. If we are right in supposing that these epistles were written about the same time, and if we are constrained to acknowledge that they bear such an affinity to one another as imparts to them the character of one epistle in comparison with the rest, then, in the frequent occurrence of one and the same expression, we have just the same phenomenon that meets us in the other epistles, as for example when we find the word *ζηλόω* occurring five times in the epistles to the Corinthians, although it occurs besides only in Gal. iv. 17, 18, or when we find *φυσιοῦσθαι* six times in the epistles to the Corinthians, and only once besides, in Col. ii. 18. But a closer comparison of the usus linguae in the other epistles of Paul, with that in the Pastoral Epistles, would doubtless bring to light many expressions which are specifically Pauline, and which, except in those epistles and in the Pastoral, occur no where else. We adduce for

the sake of example only such expressions as *ἐνδείκνυσθαι*, Tit. ii. 10, which in the New Testament is used by the apostle alone, but by him frequently; together with *ἔνδειξις* and *ἔνδειγμα*, which are used only by him. In like manner *ἀνακαίνωσις* and *ἀνακαινόω ἀνακαινίζω* are used only by Paul; comp. Tit. iii. 5. Again *ἀναμιμνήσκω*, 2 Tim. i. 6, occurs besides in the New Testament only at 1 Cor. iv. 17. So *νουθετεῖν* and *νουθεσία* used only by the apostle (in Acts xx. 31 it is the apostle who speaks), and by him eight times in all, is found at Tit. iii. 10; also *ἐπιταγή*, *μνεία*, *πλάζω*, found only in the other epistles of Paul, and there repeatedly. In like manner *ἀποτόμως*, *φρεναπατάω*, comp. with Tit. i. 10, and *ἀφορμή*. For the explanation of the other expressions adduced by De Wette, *ἐπιφάνεια* instead of *παρουσία*, *δεσπότης* instead of *κύριος*, I refer to the passages in which they occur. Besides these expressions, which are common to the three epistles, or to two of them, others of a peculiar kind, which occur in each of the epistles respectively, will be attended to in the exposition. These general remarks are intended only to show, that the difference in phraseology observable in these epistles by no means proves that which is sought to be proved by it. We have seen that regard being had to the following circumstances, namely, that these epistles allude to new forms of error, that they are addressed to fellow-teachers of the apostle, that in regard to their contents they bear a strong affinity to one another, and that they were written nearly contemporarily—the peculiarity of their phraseology is easily accounted for, and in comparison with the other epistles of the apostle, offers no inexplicable enigma. The criticism which has failed to show in the case of any one of those words, that the apostle might not have used it, ought at least to point out, what Pauline expressions should have been chosen in place of the "unpauline" ones, and how a forger should happen to prove false to the original precisely in those things in which a successful imitation would have displayed the smallest art, as, for example, in those formulas of salutation. But how unsuccessful has Schleiermacher been in his attempt to fulfil the former of these obligations, when he takes *ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν*, 1 Tim. i. 3, to be identical with *ἄλλον Ἰησοῦν κηρύσσειν*, 2 Cor. xi. 4, and thinks that the apostle would never have expressed himself in such a round about way if he had known the *ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν*.

In reply to this it is enough to refer to 1 Tim. vi. 3. Comp. on 1 Tim. i. 3.—That the language of the Pastoral Epistles is purer Greek than that of the other epistles, arises plainly from the circumstance, that the apostle does not here treat of doctrinal subjects.

It is not, however, merely the diction of the Pastoral Epistles that is alleged to be unpauline, but also the style as a whole, the composition of the epistles. De Wette remarks as a peculiarity common to them all, that they deal much in common-places, and that even what is intended to serve for the refutation of error or for instruction, is given in a general form; with which also is to be connected the further peculiarity, that after such digressions or general instructions, a return, or a conclusion and resting point, is generally sought in an exhortation or an application in some form, addressed to the party who is to receive the epistle. In order to understand what De Wette means by the common places so frequently occurring in these epistles, we may refer to such passages as Tit. ii. 11—15 or iii. 3—8. We must leave it to the exposition to show, with reference both to this passage and to the remaining passages of the same kind, whether it is a digression or a common-place that is expressed, and not rather a truth which stands in close connexion with the foregoing exhortation, as that by which it is confirmed, and which on this account is strongly urged on the party to whom the epistle is addressed, as on one who ought to conduct himself in accordance with this general truth. It is certainly true, however, that in these epistles the special and the general follow each other in close succession, and also that the particular subjects are for the most part treated in a general way, and that even what is said in the way of refutation or of instruction is presented in a general form. It is this, namely, the sententious character of the epistles, in which they differ from the others. And with this sententiousness which characterizes the particular sentences, the manner in which these are put together stands closely connected. It is evident at first sight that these epistles for the most part contain no artificially-constructed periods, but sentences connected in a simple form. Sentence follows sentence in the simplest connexion, often in no connexion; and this want of any apparent connexion frequently appears also in the transitions, where with the connecting link of a

relative or a *καί*, something follows quite remote from what goes before. This difference in the style of composition, can fail to be perceived by no one who passes from the reading of the other epistles to these. How is the apostle elsewhere wont to interweave the special with the general, how lively and impressive is his style, how full of special allusions, and the context how closely connected, and how full of the finest reciprocal references! Whilst, in the case of the other epistles of Paul, the expositor cannot in general mistake the right meaning if he but carefully considers the context; in the Pastoral Epistles, on the contrary, he is often deserted by the context, as well in respect to the meaning of particular words as to the whole thought, and left to form his opinion from the general usage of the language and the general analogy of the apostle's peculiar sphere of thought; and in like manner in determining the connexion (this applies especially to the first epistle to Timothy) he is very much left to the resources of his own judgment. How is this dissimilarity to be explained? If we have referred in a general way to the other epistles of Paul in order to make this dissimilarity apparent, we must also, on the other hand, refer to them in our endeavour to account for it. And whilst it cannot be denied that there is a certain similarity between the Pastoral Epistles and the others, it must also be acknowledged how great a difference there is between them. Schleiermacher, with special reference to the first epistle to Timothy, gives prominence to the objection that it is entirely wanting in specialities, that in it everything wears a general and undefined aspect, and appears unfixed, as if hovering in the air rather than resting on the firm ground of a really existing state of things. But he is not inclined to undertake from a comparison with the rest of Paul's epistles in respect to their style, to prove that this epistle cannot be of a Pauline origin, for, he says, this dissimilarity might be of trifling significance, inasmuch as these epistles (the other epistles of Paul) *are of so very various a character*, that there might easily have been one other differing in a peculiar way from all the rest. Leaving out of view that Schleiermacher would have found it difficult to prove the style of the first epistle to be unpauline, so long as the two others are acknowledged to be Pauline, we accept as perfectly true his remark as to the other epistles of Paul being various in their character, and we unhesitatingly bring it forward in behalf

of the three epistles. How different, in spite of the fundamental similarity already alluded to, is the dialectic character of the epistles to the Romans and to the Galatians, from the oratorical style of the epistle to the Ephesians, and this again from the epistle to the Philippians, which approaches nearest to the purely epistolary style, or from the first epistle to the Corinthians, which also has more of the same character. We are then entitled to ask, whether there could not be other epistles still, which might differ again from all the rest in a peculiar way? Still, however, very little is accomplished by this appeal to a mere abstract possibility. Much more will depend on our being able to show, why precisely these epistles differ from the others in this particular manner. Importance has been given to the circumstance, that from all appearances (?) the apostle wrote these epistles with his own hand, instead of dictating them to an amanuensis. (Comp. Rothe, a. a. O., p. 322.) But the epistle to the Galatians was also written by the apostle with his own hand (comp. on vi. 11); and, even although it were shown that this was the case in regard to these epistles, no definite conclusion could be drawn from the influence of this circumstance, which is different in the case of different individuals. On the other hand, I fully agree with Rothe when he explains the discrepancy in style, by the essential difference in the situation of one and the same writer, who at one time sends a didactic writing to an entire church, and at another writes a confidential letter to a disciple and a friend who is of the same mind with himself, and not intended to be publicly read, inasmuch as it rather contains hints than enlarges on any topic. I also agree with him, when he further refers to the difference which the diversity of subject could not fail to produce. Let but any one look at the first of these circumstances brought forward by Rothe, and he will have to admit in general, that there is nothing surprising in the simplicity of style and laxity of connexion which characterise these epistles. One has only to turn to a remark such as that made in 1 Tim. vi. 23, in order to see how little the writer was concerned about a skilful plan and an elaborate execution. How strange beside such a remark would the skilful dialectic of the epistle to the Romans look, or that of the epistle to the Galatians, or the style of the epistle to the Ephesians, if otherwise the subject might admit of such. But the style of the epistle is to be explained, not

merely by its confidential character, as addressed to a pupil between whom and the apostle there existed a most intimate mutual understanding. It is moreover to be taken into consideration, especially in regard to the first epistle to Timothy and the epistle to Titus, that they are official letters, a point of view in which already Schleiermacher has placed them both, although even in this point of view he refuses to acknowledge the Pauline origin of the former. The second epistle to Timothy, though not an official letter, is still so closely related to those others in its contents (namely the references which we find in it to the office of Timothy), as well as in the time when it was indited, as sufficiently to account for the similarity of style in so far as that exists. The character of these epistles, as epistles of an official character, must, however, be insisted on chiefly on this account, because if there is any epistle that is written in a familiar and confidential tone, it is that to the Philippians, which, although addressed to a church, is essentially indebted, both for its matter and form, to the close personal relation that subsisted between the apostle and the church. There is besides it the epistle to Philemon, which, although not addressed to a church, yet, like the epistle to the Philippians, stands much farther from our epistles than near to the rest. Precisely by this circumstance, I apprehend, is the peculiarity in style to be chiefly accounted for. This may be made plain by examples. Let but a comparison be made between what the apostle writes to Titus on the subject of slaves, for the purpose of directing Titus in his conduct towards these, with those passages in Paul's epistles in which the same point is elsewhere handled (comp. on Tit. ii. 9, 10), and it will at once be perceived, what a difference of style is occasioned by the circumstance, that the apostle does not here directly speak to the slaves. It is essentially the same thing that is prescribed in those other passages, but how is the injunction there enforced by reasons entering into the particulars of the subject, whilst everything is held forth that may encourage and stimulate to a faithful performance of duty! Is it to be expected that the apostle should speak to Titus in the same way as if he had the slaves themselves before him? Is it not enough that he concisely states the points to Titus to which he is to refer, leaving to him the enforcement of these and everything else connected with them? Now it is just to this we are to trace that peculiarity which is characterized as the indefiniteness, the vague

generality of the Pastoral Epistles as compared with the others; a peculiarity which need not surprise, inasmuch as it is based on the character of the epistles. Certainly if those commentators were right, who suppose that these epistles were only nominally addressed to Timothy and Titus, and were really intended as public writings for the churches, then this style might reasonably create surprise, and perhaps it would have to be acknowledged, as has been maintained, that not much could have been learned from them. But when, on the other hand, we regard these epistles as official communications, and consequently that which was written to Titus as intended concisely to state to him the points to which his attention is to be directed, we have then a satisfactory explanation of the style, and we perceive the suitableness of this style to the object aimed at. For almost the whole epistle is written in the manner we have shown in this particular instance. The requisite qualifications of a presbyter are stated in chap. i. with the same brevity; in this way also is the error characterized, not so much in the way of furnishing a refutation of it, as of indicating to Titus the points which he is to keep in view. This is self-evident in regard to the remaining portion of this epistle in chap. ii. and chap. iii. How should the style be dialectical, or oratorical, or even elaborate to the same extent for example as the epistle to the Philippians or that to Philemon, when all that was aimed at was just to state to Titus what was necessary in a concise form, the result of which is, that the epistle as a whole, owing to the variety of its contents, has a summary, sententious, asynthetic appearance? The case, however, is different with respect to the much-abused first epistle to Timothy. This will be evident at the first glance, in regard to the parties to which it alludes in common with the epistle to Titus; so chiefly in chap. iii. The apostle treats more fully and with less of summariness the point that is spoken of in chap. ii.; but here also in my opinion, the style approaches perceptibly nearer to that of the epistle which, as might be maintained *a priori*, must bear the greatest resemblance to the Pastoral Epistles whensoever the apostle more especially enters on one point or another, namely, the first epistle to the Corinthians, in those places where the circumstances of the church are spoken of, as in chap. xi. 14—34, ss., passages which are also related to one another in their special contents. The same applies to chap. v., in so far as this treats some-

what at large of the institution for widows; whereas the style of chap. iv. and v. again has more of the sententious character. The second epistle to Timothy is both in form and matter cognate with the first, although in it much less of that generality and vagueness, as it is called, can be shown. Thus, considered generally, the style of these epistles, in so far as it is peculiar, cannot be assailed; it may clearly enough be vindicated, by a reference to their design and their contents. That, also which has been specially characterized by De Wette as a peculiarity of composition, appears to me to be already accounted for by these general considerations, the peculiarity, namely, which consists, as De Wette expresses it, in the writer's digressing from what belongs to the subject of the epistle to so-called common-places, and returning from such a digression to an exhortation. How natural is it, for example, in Tit. ii. 10, that the apostle should merge the special injunctions (which he does not here enforce one by one because he is not addressing the church), in the mention of the fundamental truth on which all Christian morality rests, and should then return to Titus with the exhortation: *These things speak and exhort*, &c. These fundamental truths form, as it were, resting-places on which the heart of the apostle fondly leans, and where it delights to tarry; the exhortation, however, by which they are followed up, addressed to the receiver of the epistle, shows that he never loses sight of the object he has in view in referring to these truths. And how easily may it be explained, that such fundamental truths addressed to Timothy or Titus, are not further opened up in an official letter? comp. Planck, a. a. O., p. 232.

We have hitherto been looking only at those portions of the Pastoral Epistles, in which may be perceived a style different from that of the rest of Paul's epistles. We now proceed to add, in support of their Pauline origin, that particular portions, and especially those the contents of which are kindred to what we find in other epistles, discover a genuine Pauline style. As examples of this, let but the two doctrinal passages be read which occur in the epistle to Titus ii. 11—14 and iii. 2—7. I think the style of these passages must remind every reader of the apostle, even though in other passages he may not be able to recognize him. Schleiermacher has already remarked, how much the introduction ch. i. 1—3 resembles generally that in the epistle to the Romans, or the epistle to the Gala

tians. In 1 Tim. i. 3, ss. we find a passage, which of all the New Testament writers can be ascribed only to the apostle Paul; comp. on the passage. We have already spoken of the similarity in style, between the second and fifth chapters and certain portions of the first epistle to the Corinthians. How close the resemblance between the introduction to 2 Tim. ch. i. 3, ss., and that to the epistle to the Romans, many have already observed. This circumstance —namely, that these epistles approach nearer in style to the rest of the epistles, in those passages in which the contents are of a kindred nature, while on the other hand, they differ most from them in those places, where their specific contents and aim come most into prominence—is certainly the most favourable testimony to their genuineness, since it explains the difference of style in a way which leaves the Pauline origin unassailed. If these observations are true, all will then depend on the question, how this peculiar style is managed in these epistles. The strongest testimony has been given by the critics on the other side, to the method and clearness of the epistle to Titus; less is said in favour of the second epistle to Timothy, in which De Wette finds at least here and there the absence of a good grammatical and logical connexion; and least of all in favour of the first epistle to Timothy, in which Schleiermacher has been able to find no intelligible connexion at all. De Wette, however, thinks Schleiermacher's assertion exaggerated (p. 119); Baur is not inclined to acknowledge any decided superiority in the other two epistles as compared with this one, and admits that this epistle also as a whole, is not wanting in unity and in the development of a definite idea (p. 77.) So think the representatives of the most recent criticism, and from these opinions we may infer that, granting a difference of style as arising out of a difference of circumstances, these epistles after all do not appear in so unfavourable a light. Baumgarten is the last who has come forward against Schleiermacher, in the defence of the first epistle to Timothy, in this point in which it has been assailed, comp. a. a. Q., p. 205—264, and Planck, a. a. Q., p. 116, ss. We shall give special heed to this point in the exposition.

Schleiermacher has gone still farther in his objections to the first epistle to Timothy, inasmuch as he denies to it the character of a didactic epistle in general (p. 128, ss.) It is no real epistle at all, he contends, but only a writing in this form, forged with considerable

awkwardness. The explanations he has given respecting the nature of the didactic epistle, and its possible forms, are most worthy of perusal. But he is justly charged with the inconsistency implied in vindicating the genuineness of the epistle to Titus, and the second epistle to Timothy, from this same point of view (p. 141—152.) That the disfavour with which he has treated the first epistle to Timothy is unjust, and that the epistle, when viewed in the same light as that in which he regards the epistle to Titus, namely, as an official letter addressed by the apostle to a confidential disciple and fellow teacher, may be explained just as easily as it, has already been shown by Planck, p. 105, ss., and is no longer denied by any critic.

Finally, with respect to the peculiarity in ideas and views belonging to these epistles, which De Wette has also ably set forth, as seen from his point of view, p. 117, we shall omit here what refers only to special passages, and direct our attention to what may be said to be common to these epistles. De Wette brings forward as illustrations of this peculiarity, that the writer employs the term *εὐσέβεια* to denote Christian piety, and so often enjoins virtue under the term *σωφροσύνη ;* and he observes, that this stands in connexion with the predominating tendency to regard life from a moral point of view (by the *διδασκαλία ὑγ.* De Wette understands the doctrine of morality),—with the frequent injunction and recommendation of good works,—with the view that error is connected with an evil, and the true faith with a good conscience,—with a vindication of moral merit which stands almost in contradiction to the Pauline doctrine of grace,—with the defence of the law, according to which it is admitted that the law may be used on a merely moral footing (which he remarks in reference to 1 Tim. i. 8, ss.) On the other hand, the doctrinal element of Christianity comes prominently forward, in the frequent expression *διδασκαλία* and the like, in the abstract view which is taken of the atonement (Tit. ii. 11, s. ; iii. 4), in the value that is attached to the holy Scripture. And with this abstract view is connected a universalism, which indeed is not in itself unpauline, but which does not appear in the same polemical relation as we find it in Paul's writings, for example in Rom. iii. 29. Now, while it must be acknowledged that with some exceptions, which we shall have to state, these characteristics have been ably selected and set forth

by De Wette, it will yet be found that this peculiarity does not necessitate the supposition of another author, but only of other circumstances with reference to the subject of morality, than those which the apostle has before him in his other writings. It is wrong to take the expression διδασκαλία ὑγ. all at once to mean the doctrine of morality. De Wette himself has truly observed on Tit. i. 9, that the expression denotes the same thing as ἀλήθεια ἡ κατ' εὐσέβειαν, Tit. i. 1, consequently not the doctrine of morality, but the Christian doctrine which leads to piety. It is the opposite of the ματαιολογία and the ζητήσεις, which produce no moral fruit. That good works are recommended is in itself not unpauline. In Rom. xii. 17 he exhorts the Christians thus: *taking care to do things of good report in the sight of all men;* and in Ephes. ii. 10; Col. i. 10, thus: *being created anew unto good works . . . . . that we should walk in them.* "These are," as Harless observes on this passage, "the works which the apostle views as the sound fruits of the tree that has been again restored (Col. i. 10); these alone he calls ἀγαθά, καλά; all the legal performances of self-righteousness on the other hand, lie under the curse, (Gal. iii. 10.)" As De Wette himself acknowledges farther, that the Pauline doctrine of grace is to be found in these epistles, 2 Tim. i. 9, Tit. iii. 5, it is difficult to see what can be inferred from this circumstance against their Pauline origin. The frequency of this injunction (to good works) is certainly not to be denied, but as will afterwards be seen neither does it want a sufficient reason. Although, according to Wette, in such passages as 2 Tim. iv. 8, 1 Tim. ii. 15, iii. 13, iv. 8, vi. 18, ss., the apostle seems to teach a doctrine of grace no where else inculcated by him, that, namely, of moral meritoriousness, as belonging even to the individual himself, yet the consideration of these passages respectively, will show that they contain no doctrine which the apostle does not teach elsewhere, for example in Rom. ii. 6, ss., *who will render to every man according to his deeds; to them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life,* &c. Further, the admission that a moral use may be made of the law, 1 Tim. i. 8, in the case of the ἀνόμοις, &c., cannot at all be regarded as unpauline, when it is compared with such passages as Gal. ii. 19, iii. 23; Rom. v. 20, &c. How otherwise can the *lawless, the disobedient, and the profane*

be helped, but by the law first of all accomplishing its design upon them, of leading them to the *knowledge of sin*? Comp. Usteri, a. a. Q. p. 65—75. Moreover, the special polemical reference in which the apostle in this passage speaks of the design of the law, is well worthy of consideration; comp. the exposition. When again it is characterized as a peculiarity in the views of the writer, that he connects error with a bad, and the true faith with a good conscience, we would say in reply, that this is rather to be regarded as a peculiarity in the errors which he combats, than in the writer's mode of viewing them; inasmuch as these errors take their rise from men who, just because they wanted the moral energy which is requisite for the apprehension as well as for the preservation of the simple Christian truth, turned aside into those devious by-paths of a mystic Gnosis and asceticism, and sought to propagate their wisdom, not from conviction, or in a spirit of moral earnestness, but for the sake of gain. And this accounts for the same view not being urged in the same degree, against the ordinary Judaistic opponents of the apostle; although we find something resembling this in passages such as Gal. vi. 12, ss. Finally, with respect to what is further urged, namely, that a universalism is found in these epistles which, though Pauline in itself, is yet not expressed by Paul in the same polemical connexion—all will depend on whether this universalism is in place in the passages concerned; on which see the exposition. On the other hand, we acquiesce in the truth of De Wette's remarks, that in these epistles the view of life in its moral relations comes into prominence, that good works are frequently recommended, and that, on the other hand, the doctrinal element of Christianity is brought prominently forward in the frequently recurring *διδασκαλία* and the like, (I do not see why the view of the atonement, which we find in Tit. ii. 11, iii. 4, 2 Tim. i. 10, can be said to be abstract, inasmuch as the subject is there treated in a general way; comp. on this what has been said above). Here, however, it must be observed first of all, that this mode of conception and expression on these topics must by no means be regarded as merely accidental, or in general as having its ground in the individuality of the writer; for he very plainly shows, what is his design in the selection of the expression *εὐσέβεια* or *διδασκαλία*. Compare only Tit. i. 2, where the writer in the very outset designates himself in the inscription as *ἀπόστολος κατ' ἐπίγ-*

νωσιν ἀληθείας τῆς κατ' εὐσέβειαν ; or the passage chap. ii. 1, where Titus is enjoined in opposition to the *ματαιολογοι*, to speak the things that become sound doctrine, *ἃ πρέπει τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ ;* or 1 Tim. vi. 3, where the *ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν* is explained negatively by *μὴ προσέρχεσθαι ὑγιαίνουσι λόγοις*, and this again by *τῇ κατ' εὐσέβειαν διδασκαλίᾳ.* It can therefore be scarcely doubted, that this style of viewing and presenting the Christian truth, chiefly with regard to its moral influence, as truth which is according to godliness; as well as the weight that is given in general throughout these epistles to the practical side of Christianity, stands in close antithetical connection with the nature of the errors which are opposed. If, however, the one element—the moral—is presented in its totality, this necessitates that the other—the doctrinal—should also be presented more in its abstract form. The true doctrine, is justly placed in opposition to the profitless science of the opponents, which produces no moral fruit. Not to repeat here what has been already said, we refer to the remarks made above on the so-called heretics. In general, however, it must be acknowledged that the danger grew always the longer the greater, lest Christianity should be treated as a matter of science, to meet which, a reference to its moral requirements was especially needed. This was a danger most likely to spring up with the longer and by degrees familiar continuance of Christianity ; and the history of a later age shows but too plainly, how this danger was not without its consequences.

We here bring our critical investigation to a close. It may be that a more discerning eye, shall perceive much of what has been here adduced in behalf of the genuineness of the epistles to be untenable, but so much at least must be acknowledged by every unprejudiced reader, namely, that the critical problem which lies before us finds an easier and a more natural solution in the way pointed out by us, than in that which is followed by the criticism on the other side ; and that what remains yet unaccounted for, is as nothing when compared with the enormous difficulties, in which the result offered by that criticism is involved. We would also, in conclusion, merely call to mind (comp. § 2) how considerable is the weight which is laid in the scale of the genuineness of these epistles, by the external testimonies, according to which the Pastoral Epistles belong to the most favoured, so

much so, that De Wette himself shows it to be impossible that they could have been written after the middle of the second century, p. 120.

§ 5. LITERATURE.

Olshausen has adduced (vol. i., Intro. § 9) those exegetical works which embrace the whole New Testament. The homilies of Chrysostom, the exposition of Theodoret and of Jerome, the ἐξηγήσεις of Oecumenius, and the ἑρμηνεία of Theophylact, extend also to these epistles. As belonging to the period of the Reformation, is first of all to be named Luther: Scholia et sermones in I. Jo. atque annott. in ep. Pauli (priorem) ad Tim. et Tit. ed. Bruns., Lub. 1797. Then Melancthon: Enarratio ep. 1 ad Tim., et duorum capp. secundae. Wittenb. 1561. And chiefly Calvin in his Comment. on the whole epistles of Paul. Ed. by Tholuck, Berl. 1834.

As belonging to the later and the most recent time, may be mentioned, Conr. Vorstii: Comm. in Omnes, epp. ap. exc. II. ad Tim. ad Tit. ad Philem. et ad Hebr. 1631. Benson: Paraphrastical explanations of, and observations on several books of the New Testament. J. D. Michaelis: Paraphrasis und Anm. ueber die Briefe Pauli an die Gal. Eph. Phil. Col. Thess. den Tim. Tit. und Philem., Gött. 1750 u 1769. Heinrichs: Im Koppe'schen Bibelwerk. 7 Bd. Gott. 1798. 2 Aufl. 1828. Especially, Heydenreich: Die Pastoralbriefe Pauli erläutert 2 Bde. Hadam. 1826. Then J. F. by Flatt: Vorlesungen ueber die Br. P. an Tim. u. Tit. herausgegeben von Kling Tüb. 1831. The Catholic commentator Mack: Comm. ueber die Pastoralbriefe, Tub. 1836. Matthies: Erklär der Pastoralbriefe Mit bes. Beziehung auf Authentie und Ort and Zeit der Abfassung, Greifsw. 1840. De Wette in s. Kurzgefassten Handbuch Bd. 2. Th. 5. 2 Aufl. Leipz. 1847. Huthers: Pastoralbriefe, as continuation of the commentary by Meyer.

Mosheim has expounded only the two epistles to Tim.: Erklärung der beiden Briefe P. an den Tim., Hamburgh, 1755. Wegscheider only the first: der erste Brief des ap. P. an den Tim., neu uebers. und erklärt, Gött., 1810. Then G. E. Leo. Pauli ep. 1

ad Tim.. graece cum perp comm. Lips. 1837. On the second epistle to Tim.: J. Broechner Commentatio de ep. II. ad Tim. Copenh., 1829. On the epistle to Titus: Kuinoel explic. ep. P. ad Tit. commentatt. theol. ed. a Velthusen, Ruperto et Kuinoel. Vol. i., 292. The literature of these epistles is given still more fully in Matthies, p. 49, ss. Winer, Handbuch der theol. Literatur. Works on special points, such as the authenticity, &c., are noticed at the places in which these points are treated.

THE EPISTLE TO TITUS.

INTRODUCTION.

I. THE HISTORICAL TESTIMONIES OF THE EPISTLE CONCERNING ITSELF.

1. The *receiver of the epistle* is distinctly named in i. 4. It is Titus, the well-known assistant of the apostle Paul. His name is nowhere mentioned in the Acts ; but we learn from Gal. ii. 3 that he was a Gentile by birth, and that he remained uncircumcised. We do not hear of him again till the occasion of Paul's stay at Ephesus, and then, that he was sent by the apostle as a deputy to Corinth about a collection (2 Cor. vii. 14 ; xii. 28.) On his return thence, he met with the apostle in Macedonia (2 Cor. ii. 13 ; vii. 5, s.) From thence he was sent again to Corinth, as the bearer of the second epistle (2 Cor. viii. 6, 18, ss.) Upon this follow the data furnished by the Pastoral Epistles (2 Tim. iv. 10, his journey to Dalmatia, and Tit. i. 5 ; iii. 12.) According to the statements contained in the epistle addressed to him, he had been left by the apostle in Crete to settle the affairs of the church, and to act as teacher (evangelist.) He was not a bishop or an archbishop in Crete, but he laboured there as an evangelist, the peculiar circumstances requiring that he should direct his energies chiefly against prevailing corruptions ; and he received a special commission to ordain presbyters, so as to form an outward union of the Christians there into a Christian society. Chap. iii. 12 of this epistle plainly intimates that another would soon relieve him, and says, that he was to join the apostle at Nicopolis. Tradition makes him out to have been bishop of Crete ; on which, and in the literature connected with this, compare Winer's RWB. on Titus, and Bohl, p. 105—120.

According to the plain inscription of the epistle, i. 4, we must consider it as settled, that it was designed for Titus, and not for the church or for the church along with him. The form as well as the contents of the epistle accord only with this supposition. With regard to the former, in addition to the address itself, we need only to refer to i. 5, 13; ii. 1, 6, 7, 15; iii. 1, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15. Everywhere it is Titus, and Titus alone, who is addressed; nowhere do we find any direct reference to the church; when there is any such reference it is always indirect, through Titus. And, with regard to the contents, it is justly observed, that i. 12, s. does not agree with the epistles having been intended for the church. The moral precepts, also, would in this case have been stated differently. The apostle would not have satisfied himself with a simple enumeration of the things enjoined; on which compare the exposition at ii. 12. This mode of treating his subject, in contradistinction to that of other epistles in which the apostle addresses himself directly to the church (the comparison may be made especially in connection with ii. 12, see exposition), is suitable only to Titus; and this circumstance, which has been urged as an objection against the epistle, is precisely an argument for its genuineness, on which also more is said in the exposition and in the general introduction. That what the apostle says in ch. i. 2, 3, by way of more definitely naming, not of attesting his office, contains nothing against our view of the epistle's having been intended for Titus alone, and that ii. 15, iii. 15, likewise contain nothing against this, we must leave it to the exposition to show.

2. The *condition of the Christians in Crete*, which was the *occasion* at once of Titus' having been left behind, and of his receiving this apostolical letter, finds a sufficient explanation in the epistle, if we do not allow ourselves to be misled by a preconceived opinion. Even the negative criticism directs attention to the fact, that we are not at liberty to suppose that Christianity was first planted there by the apostle. To this supposition, indeed, the contents of the epistle, which was written shortly after the apostle's departure from Crete (comp. on i. 5), and which presupposes that Christianity had been longer in existence there, do not correspond. But what is there to hinder us from supposing, that the apostle was not the first to make known Christianity there, but found it already existing? (Comp. on i. 5.) And he found there not merely the seed

of Christianity, but along with and intermingled with it, much that was corrupt, which took its rise especially from the Jewish Christians (i. 10.) This element is not treated as a doctrinal heresy, but, on the one hand, as a science occupied with unsubstantial things, and having in it no principle of godliness, on the other, as a leaning to the commandments of men, which are likewise destitute of moral influence, and which spring from the moral deficiencies of their authors. It was not after the apostle's departure, which was just shortly before this epistle was written, that these corruptions first showed themselves; for the apostle, as we may see from the epistle, knows them from personal observation. He himself had had openly to combat them, and what still remained to be done in regard to them formed part of those things that were wanting which Titus was fully to set in order. We may gather, besides, from the epistle, that as yet the Christians had not been united into a church. The apostle himself had not been able to ordain presbyters, so that Titus' commission was to establish church order and government. It is remarkable that in this epistle no mention is made of deacons. It is plain from this, that the deaconal office was non-essential in comparison with that of the presbyter, as indeed it owed its existence to a necessity which the progress of time evolved (Acts vi. 1.)

3. The *contents* of the epistle result simply and naturally from these circumstances which occasioned it. The design of the apostle is to instruct Titus in reference both to the setting up of church government through presbyters, and to his labours as an evangelist in opposition to the prevailing errors. After an introduction, i. 1—4, in which the apostle designates his office with specific reference to the errors that were to be combated, he proceeds to the subject of the ordination of presbyters, and lays down the qualifications which Titus is specially to look for in this work. They are moral qualifications, and a firm adherence to the faithful word and sound doctrine, as the apostle characterizes the apostolic doctrine, in opposition to a vain and morally fruitless tendency, 5—10. The necessity of these qualifications is then shown by a reference to the prevailing corruptions. Then follows what Titus is to teach, in opposition to the errors of the seducers. He is above all to lay stress on moral conduct, and in a series of predicates, ii. 1—10, those moral qualities which he is to commend, are set forth with respect to the distinctions of sex, age, and rank. The reason and

confirmation of this moral conduct is then given, vv. 11—15. But the Cretans need also to be reminded how they should conduct themselves toward magistrates, and those who were not Christians generally. This is concisely stated, iii. 1—2, and it is then confirmed by the consideration of how little reason the Christian has to exalt himself above those who are not Christians, 3—7. On this follows an exhortation addressed to Titus himself, as to what he is to teach and what he is to let alone, and how he is personally to act towards those who cause division by their perversity, 8—11. The epistle concludes with the mention of some personal matters, with salutations, and the usual benediction. De Wette, with the impartiality for which he is so much to be commended, speaks highly of the clearness and method of this epistle. Still he thinks that the instructions there given to Titus, as well with respect to the appointment of presbyters, as with respect to that which is to form the subject matter of his teaching, are too general and universally known, and therefore not worthy of being addressed to one who was a helper of the apostle. Compare on this the exposition of the appropriate passages.

4. With regard, finally, to the *time* when, and the *place* where, the epistle was written, as also to the historical circumstances connected with it in general, the epistle itself informs us that it was written soon after the departure of the apostle from Crete. Further, that the apostle intends to pass the ensuing winter in Nicopolis, and Titus is to join him there; from which, of course, it does not follow that the apostle writes from Nicopolis, as the subscription would lead us to believe. From the circumstance that Apollos is at Crete and is invited to come to the apostle, it may at least be inferred that the epistle was not written till after the apostle's acquaintance with Apollos, consequently not till after Acts xviii. 24, ss. (De Wette.) These are the data furnished by the epistle itself on this point. But when was the apostle in Crete? Which Nicopolis is meant? When was the epistle written?

The epistle itself says nothing in reply to these questions. We must therefore seek their solution by comparing and combining the data which history furnishes. The Acts of the Apostles, as is well known, mentions only one visit made by the apostle to Crete, xxvii. 7, ss., on the occasion of his passage from Caesarea to Rome; and indeed some of the learned have believed that this was the

time, when the apostle's stay in Crete mentioned in the epistle took place. I deem it superfluous anew to refute in this investigation, views which have long since been refuted, and which in more recent times have found no new advocate, and refer therefore in regard to this hypothesis to Böhl's conclusive remarks against it, p. 123, ss., Matthies, p. 190. If the Acts of the Apostles give no further positive information on this subject, they, on the other hand, by their acknowledged incompleteness, furnish all the more free scope for hypotheses. I merely notice the view taken by L. Capellus,—that the apostle in his second missionary tour through Syria and Celicia (Acts xv. 41), made an excursion thence to Crete; against which Böhl, p. 125, ss., Matthies, p. 191, s. Further, the hypothesis of J. D. Michaelis and others, according to which the apostle, during his stay of a year and a half at Corinth, preached the gospel at Crete (Acts xviii. 1, ss.), is also satisfactorily refuted by Böhl, p. 126, Matthies, p. 191. The circumstance mentioned above,—that on account of Apollos, iii. 13, the epistle cannot have been written previous to what we read at Acts xviii. 24, ss.,—is decisive against these views. They have besides found no other advocate in more recent times. On the other hand, the view which now comes to be mentioned, namely, that the apostle visited Crete with Titus on the occasion of his return from Corinth to Syria (Acts xviii. 18, 19), and wrote the epistle from Ephesus, has more recently found influential advocates in Hug, Hemsen, and others. But against it likewise may be urged the circumstance just noticed, that it was not till after this that Apollos became a Christian, and still later that he entered into connection with the apostle. In no case then could the epistle have been written during the stay in Ephesus, of which we have an account in Acts xviii. 19—22 (comp. Böhl, p. 137), but must have been written at a later period, after the apostle had been in Jerusalem and Antioch, had passed through Galatia and Phrygia, and returned to Ephesus (Acts xix. 1, ss.) But we cannot place, even in this period, the commencement of the relation that afterwards subsisted between Paul and Apollos, according to the account in the Acts of the Apostles (Böhl, p. 138), and then, too (a point which Böhl does not notice), so long an interval between the apostle's departure from Crete and the writing of the epistle, cannot be reconciled with the statement of the epistle itself. For it is to be regarded

as a settled point, that the epistle cannot have been written long after the apostle's departure from Crete. How little does this view consist also with the intention to spend the winter at Nicopolis; for the idea of his spending the winter at that Nicopolis, which is situated between Antioch and Tarsus, is not to be entertained; and how many hypotheses must be had recourse to in order to make it harmonize with the accounts about Titus in the second epistle to the Corinthians? Comp. Böhl, a. a. Q. And how little, in fine, this view agrees with all the personal references in the epistle to Titus, as well in respect to what is not said as to what is said, has been shown by Matthies, p. 191, 192. This view will hardly find a new advocate, as indeed it does not occur among those most recently put forth. A step farther on in the life of the apostle has been taken by Schmidt (Einl. ins Neue Test., i. p. 265) and others, inasmuch as he makes out the apostle's stay in Ephesus, of which we have an account in Acts xix. 10, xx. 31, to have been the period, in the course of which the apostle visited Crete and wrote the epistle. Böhl, p. 141; Matthies, p. 192, ss. But the same difficulty encounters this hypothesis,—that Apollos was already in Corinth, Acts xix. 1; and also, that although the accounts in the Acts of the Apostles do not exclude the supposition of such an intermediate journey, it is still impossible to show how the spending the winter at Nicopolis corresponds to these circumstances. This hypothesis also requires us to admit that Titus did not go to Nicopolis, but met the apostle again at Ephesus, whence he was deputed to Corinth; and it may also be objected to it, that nothing is known to us of Tychicus previous to what we read of him in Acts xx. 4. We shall thus have to advance still farther forwards in the life of the apostle. The sole remaining conjecture that is possible,—if it is to be supposed that the apostle visited Crete during the period of his history comprehended by the Acts of the Apostles,—is, that this visit took place before or during the second stay at Achaia, consequently in the period referred to in Acts xx. 1—3. So Baronius, Lightfoot, Lardner, Hammond, and others, with the most recent commentator on the Pastoral Epistles,—Matthies. We shall therefore enter more particularly into this view as it is represented by Matthies. According to it, the apostle visited Crete during his three months' stay in Greece, left Titus there, and wrote the epistle before his departure

for Jerusalem, either from Nicopolis or some place in the neighbourhood. The apostle had gone to Nicopolis in Epirus on account of the plots of the Jews against him, with the view of returning thence through Macedonia to Jerusalem. It must be conceded to this hypothesis, that it partly corresponds to the persons named in the epistle, in connexion with what is otherwise known regarding them, Matthies, p. 201, s. For both Titus and Tychicus were along with the apostle at the same time in Greece, and 1 Cor. xvi. 12 shows this also to have been probable of Apollos, although nothing depends on this in his case, for it is not necessary to suppose that he went to Crete along with the apostle. It is also true that Titus is not named in Acts xx. 4, 5, along with the others. This, however, is all that can be said in behalf of this view. In everything else it depends for its truth (as Dr Baur has already observed against Matthies) on the indefiniteness of the accounts in the Acts of the Apostles, which give us no further information regarding the apostle's stay in Greece than is contained in the words xx. 2, 3, *He went into Greece, and there abode three months. And when the Jews laid wait for him as he was about to sail into Syria, he purposed to return through Macedonia.* It must certainly be acknowledged that Luke does not relate with exactness, if the apostle during these three months of which the historian says that he spent them in Greece, visited Crete and preached the gospel there. Matthies himself must also admit that the period of three months is short for the stay in Greece and in Crete together. It is indeed true that the apostle writes in 2 Cor. x. 16, that he purposes to preach the gospel in the regions beyond Achaia; but we have only to call to mind Acts xix. 21, and those passages in the epistle to the Romans already cited, in which he expresses his intention to come to Rome, in order to have no doubt that Crete was not the place referred to. Further, the Nicopolis in Epirus, where the apostle intends to winter, will not correspond to this view, unless violence be done to the words of the Acts of the Apostles, already quoted. According to these words, the plan of his return to Jerusalem was already formed, and it was to be by sea, when the plots of the Jews compel him to take the land route through Macedonia, which he does forthwith, and in which those named in vv. 4 and 5 give him a convoy as far as Asia, they again continuing their journey from Philippi to Troas by land, the

apostle, on the other hand, making the same journey by sea, and again meeting his companions at Troas. How can we imagine that the apostle on this journey should have passed over to the western coast of Epirus, to Nicopolis? And that with the intention of passing the winter there? While his travelling companions go before him to Troas, can he have passed the winter at Nicopolis and yet have met them at Troas? But according to Matthies, the apostle only passed some weeks of the winter at Nicopolis, and proceeded forwards on his journey earlier than he anticipated, when he wrote the epistle from Nicopolis or some place in the neighbourhood. He went then to Nicopolis with the intention of passing the winter there. And from thence he writes to Titus instructing him how he is to fulfil the commission given to him; so that he reckons on Titus' staying for some length of time in Crete. Then he purposes to send Artemas or Tychicus, and not till after their arrival is Titus to come to the apostle at Nicopolis. The apostle then must have intended to remain at Nicopolis at least so long as was necessary for all this to be done, while his travelling companions are already on their way to Troas, where he is to meet them. How is this conceivable? And further, the apostle intends to send Tychicus to Crete; the same who, according to Matthies, is represented as having, along with several others, accompanied the apostle from Greece, and gone before him to Troas at his own suggestion, while the apostle, owing to the plots that were formed against him, goes to Nicopolis, and writes this epistle from Nicopolis or some place near it, after Tychicus had already set out on his journey to Troas before him, at the apostle's own suggestion. That is a manifest contradiction. In general, however, the statement in the Acts does not warrant the supposition that the apostle's companions set out before him, and Matthies must rather have recourse to the conjecture, that the whole company intended to pass the winter at Nicopolis. (Compare Meyer on the passage.) But the hypothesis now under consideration is untenable also in a chronological point of view. The expression, *I have determined to winter*, Tit. iii. 12, if not unduly refined upon, must be regarded as having been written before the winter set in; comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 6. If now, as Matthies maintains, the apostle passed only a few weeks at Nicopolis, is it possible that, notwithstanding of the haste with which he makes this journey to Jerusalem, he should not reach

Philippi till Easter? (Acts xx. 6.) And leaving this out of view, can it be deemed probable that the apostle should prepare to journey from Corinth to Syria by sea at the setting in of winter? Does he not say in 1 Cor. xvi. 6, that he intends to spend the winter in Corinth? And what hinders our supposing that he did this, as it does not appear that the plots of the Jews had given any cause for fear until he was about to set sail (*μέλλοντι ἀνάγεσθαι*)? If this was the case, then we can understand how he should arrive, at Philippi at Easter. But we do not need to lay any stress on probabilities; we have already seen that this hypothesis is involved in impossibilities and contradictions. Böttger has put forth quite a new view regarding the time of Paul's stay at Crete, and the date of this epistle a. a. Q. Abth. 4, p. 1—12. According to it the apostle was not once merely, but twice at Crete. First, in the period referred to in Acts xviii. 11, during the first stay in Achaia, then in that of Acts xix. 22, 23, during his from two to three years' stay at Ephesus; and he was even on the point of visiting Crete once more on his return from Greece to Jerusalem, when pirates hired by the Jews showed themselves and compelled him to take another direction. Titus was dismissed in a boat or second ship (?) to Crete, with parting words to this effect, "Set in order what is still wanting in the churches at Crete: as soon as I effect my escape I will write to you." The apostle then went by Messenia and Elis to Epirus. From that place he writes to Titus, and remains there until Titus has set in order the churches in Crete, and comes to him to Nicopolis, although "his journey is towards Macedonia," and he is in great haste still to arrive at Jerusalem in proper time for the feast of Pentecost. This view unites in itself the difficulties of several others, and falls to pieces on Tit. i. 5, according to which the apostle was with Titus at Crete; nor does it agree any better than those before mentioned with the simple account in Acts xx. 3, 4. For *μέλλοντι ἀνάγεσθαι* does not surely mean: at the moment when the apostle was about to reach the high sea? And *ἐγένετο γνώμη τοῦ ὑποστρέφειν διὰ Μακεδονίας* does not surely imply: the apostle had sailed to Epirus in order to pass the winter there, and afterwards to return through Macedonia. But it certainly implies: that he chose to perform the journey by land rather than by sea.

But against all these views, which would bring the apostle's visit

to Crete and the date of the epistle within the period described by the Acts of the Apostles, might be urged, not merely the circumstance that it were strange to find in Acts xxvii. 7, ss., no mention made of Christians in Crete, if indeed the apostle had laboured there before and Titus had set churches in order. I lay no particular stress on that; but it appears to me that the close kindred relation which the Pastoral Epistles bear to one another in form and matter, would remain unaccountable in spite of all that Hemsen says to the contrary, if the epistle to Titus were separated from the others by any considerable period of time; as De Wette also admits. Comp. the General Introduction. And what special objection can be drawn from the epistle itself, against the supposition of its having been written during the period between the first and second imprisonment (the possibility of a second imprisonment being once granted)? In regard to the persons named in the epistle, no contradiction could be discovered; the apostle had already been long acquainted with Apollos; and, with the manner in which Tychicus is mentioned, Ephes. vi. 22, Col. iv. 7, correspond. The apostle's return to the east is rendered certain by Phil. i. 25, ii. 24; Philem. 22. The visit to Crete then finds a natural occasion in Acts xxvii. 7, ss. Matthies, a decided opponent of this view, thinks, that a journey comprehending such a circuit from east to west must have been fruitful in events; the period between the first and second imprisonment was that on which the distresses of the Christians were severer than they had ever been; and yet no word of all this is found in the epistle. But the reason of this appears at once, if the apostle after he was liberated was along with Titus in Crete. All that he had to communicate on these subjects would thus have been told to Titus before. If, however, as I am constrained to think, on the ground of the passages in the epistle to the Philippians and in the epistle to Philemon, the apostle went to Crete immediately after being liberated, and not first of all to Spain, he would then have nothing to tell about a journey extending from east to west. Is the epistle, moreover, from beginning to end, purely an official communication designed to give the necessary instructions and hints to Titus in a concise form; what place is there in it for such accounts as those to which Matthies refers? Comp. here also what is said in the General Introduction. When, how-

ever, Matthies goes on to say, that the planting of the Cretan churches, the place from which the epistle was written, as well as the apostle's stay (in Nicopolis ?), must remain in deep obscurity, we would refer in reply to the General Introduction, where it has been shown how fully on our hypothesis all the data of the Pastoral Epistles harmonize with each other.[1]

II. CRITICAL OBJECTIONS.

Those which are urged specially against this epistle, and in particular against its historical intimations, are the following (comp. De Wette, p. 1, ss., of his commentary.)

1. The epistle can find no place in the history of the apostle's life; in reply to which all that is necessary has been said in the General Introduction.

2. It is said to have been written shortly after the planting of the churches in Crete, and before they were fully settled. But with this do not agree the complaints which we find in the epistle of the number of heretics in Crete, and their pernicious influence (i. 10, s.), insomuch that even in the choice of a presbyter it was to be a question, whether he held fast the true doctrine (i. 9.) "How could such a reaction be formed so speedily in the bosom of the Cretan Christianity ? If, however, it be supposed that those heretics were strangers who had forced themselves in on the church, they must at least have plied their disorderly course for some length of time, so that the epistle could not have been written shortly after the planting of Christianity in the island." To this we reply, that De Wette himself shows that Christianity cannot have been planted for the first time in Crete shortly before by the apostle. It is thus quite unnecessary to suppose that such a reaction was formed so speedily ; it may have been formed long before. The conjecture is also unnecessary, that strangers intruded themselves on the church, who yet must have pursued their disorderly course for some length of time, according to which the epistle cannot have been written shortly after the planting of Christianity in the island. It is true that it was not written shortly after the planting of Christianity ; for the apostle did not plant

1 Compare the appendix at the conclusion of the epistle.

it, but found it already there. His epistle, which was written shortly after his departure from Crete, was not therefore written shortly after the planting of Christianity there, and the "heresy" did not first make its appearance after his departure; on the contrary, the apostle knows it from personal observation, from having seen it for some length of time, as even De Wette maintains, p. 2. Moreover, nothing is said in the epistle of a heresy properly so called. It is evident then, that in order to the removal of these objections, the critics who urge them need only to give credit to the statements of the epistle itself, which they themselves acknowledge, against their supposition that it was the apostle who planted Christianity in Crete, for which there is no foundation in the epistle.

3. The great success which is said to have attended the apostle in Crete, implies such a measure of receptivity for the gospel on the part of the inhabitants, as gives an appearance of injustice to the charge brought against the Cretans in i. 12, s., as to their depraved disposition, a charge too founded on foreign testimony. For the same reason the absence of all joyful and thankful acknowledgment on the part of the apostle seems strange. In the epistle to the Galatians, although the first part is not written in a tone of grateful acknowledgment, there are still not wanting many kind and confidential expressions. To this we reply: that this epistle, unlike that to the Galatians, was not addressed to the church. If this had been the case, then doubtless it would have contained expressions of the same nature. Chiefly however: from what source do we learn of the great success which Paul had at Crete? The epistle says nothing of this; it does not represent the spread of the gospel there as the work of the apostle at all. On the contrary, the apostle had there observed grievous corruptions in the Christian life, as De Wette himself admits, and was not able entirely to put them down during his stay; wherefore he left Titus behind to set in order what was still wanting. The whole objection rests besides on the unfounded supposition, that the apostle, during his short stay in Crete, was the first to plant Christianity there, and that at the same time he spread it over the entire island. If this was not the case, then may the charge against the national character of the Cretans have been well enough founded, a charge which we find confirmed, too, from other sources. There appears the utmost

propriety in the apostle's making this charge to rest on foreign testimony, that, namely, of a poet who was regarded by themselves as a prophet. Comp. the exposition. Here then also the critics have only to give up their supposition, and the truth follows.

4. But the moral and ecclesiastical state of the Cretan Christians, implies that Christianity must have existed for a greater length of time there; in proof of which reference is most justly made to the words of i. 6, *having believing children*, and to the moral qualifications that are elsewhere laid down there. To this we have nothing to say, but thankfully to accept it as an acknowledgment of our assertion. The critics have not been able even in the remotest degree to prove that it cannot have been so, and that the apostle must have been the first who carried the news of the gospel to Crete; comp. Acts ii. 11, and on i. 5 of this epistle.

5. It is remarkable, as the epistle was written soon after the apostle had been in Crete, that we find in it not a single allusion to what he experienced and did there, &c. Quite different is the case in 1 Thess. To this objection also what has been already said applies, viz., that the apostle does not write to the Cretans. If this had been the case, then probably such allusions would not have been wanting. The critics who urge this objection must first show, that it was necessary for the apostle to speak of these things to Titus, who had been in Crete at the same time with himself, and had seen and heard everything along with him.

6. It is objected that the epistle does not answer its end, or correspond to the relation between the writer and the receiver. What is said as to the qualifications to be looked for in the choice of presbyters is self-evident. The same may be said of the other point, namely, the refutation of the heretics. As on the one hand, they themselves are indistinctly characterized, so on the other nothing is said in opposition to them which might serve as a suitable refutation. This end is not served by what is said in i. 15 on things pure and impure, or by the superficial moral rules in ii. 1—10, coupled with the reference to the practical spirit of Christianity ii. 11—14. Such are the objections made by the critics, who here and there also make trifling admissions. With regard to the charge that i. 5—9, ii. 1—3, is too general and self-evident, we have endeavoured to reply to it in the exposition. Further, that the moral precepts in ii. 1, ss., are superficial, and not founded on any principle, is, when viewed in the light of vv. 11—14,

altogether incorrect. In general it is a strange method, to aim at establishing conclusions regarding the genuineness of an epistle, on the ground of its containing what is otherwise known or unknown. That method alone can be the just one, according to which it is inquired, whether the contents of the epistle correspond to the state of things with which it deals. If this state of things render it necessary to lay an emphasis on things that may be already known, no one surely is entitled to take offence at the fact of their being already known. We would only add that Schleiermacher (Sendschreiber, p. 195) acknowledges how characteristic are the precepts in the epistle to Titus, according to the distinctions of sex and age. Comp. what is said on this point in the exposition. Here then also we have to do with the arbitrary suppositions of the critics, which they have only to sacrifice to the real contents of the epistle, in order to come at the truth, but which in reality they hold fast in opposition to these. Again it is said that the heretics are indistinctly characterized. We have already seen, and the exposition will further show, what a distinct picture is drawn in this epistle of the corruptions of the Cretan Christians. If, however, it is Gnostics similar to those of the second century (De Wette), or even these themselves (Baur) that are meant, then we freely confess that they are not only indistinctly but *very* indistinctly characterized. It is, moreover, remarkable that De Wette should here say that the heretics are "indistinctly" characterized, after he had said before that the apostle wrote concerning them with "a knowledge which pre-supposed a lengthened observation of them," (p. 2.) A similar reply is farther to be made to the objection, that this epistle contains nothing in opposition to these heretics that might serve as an apt refutation of their errors, and that this desideratum is not supplied by the "superficial and familiar moral precepts," in ii. 1—10; iii. 1, s. This opinion is founded on the erroneous supposition that the Pastoral Epistles aim at refuting a dogmatical system. What the apostle says on "the heresy," is more by way of characterizing than of refuting it; besides, ii. 1, ss. is not in the remotest way intended to serve as a refutation of heresies. Here also are manifest the false suppositions. The epistle becomes altogether unintelligible on the supposition of its having been written in the second century for the purpose of combating the Gnostics and promoting hierarchical tendencies, on which comp. the General Introduction, § 3.

EXPOSITION

OF THE

EPISTLE TO TITUS.

§ 1. INSCRIPTION AND SALUTATION.

(Chap. i. 1—4.)

The inscription and salutation remind us of the apostle's usual manner. He designates himself by his apostolical office, whence flows his authority to give the instructions and exhortations that follow. He then names the person to whom the epistle is addressed, with a reference to the relation in which he stands to him, and ends with the usual apostolical salutation. The commencement of this epistle bears a close resemblance to that of the epistle to the Romans, and the epistle to the Galatians, inasmuch as in these epistles also the designation ἀπόστολος is more exactly defined. And it may be inferred from this that here also, as in these epistles, the more full and definitive representation of the apostle's apostolic office, stands in closest connexion with the design of the epistle, and is as it were a comprehensive index to its contents. But while the commencement of this epistle, bears as a whole a common stamp as compared with that of these other epistles, there appears in it at the same time along with this similarity, the peculiarity which belongs to the contents, and consequently also to the form of this epistle; and that in a manner so easy, and yet so decided, as to be altogether unaccountable on the supposition of its having proceeded from an imitator of the apostle's epistles, who had any wish to conceal himself. For what could have been easier and more natural, than for an imitator to avoid such peculiarities as

servant of God, God our Saviour, Christ our Saviour, and in these also to adhere to the pattern which was presented to him in the rest of the apostle's epistles?

Ver. 1. *Paul, a servant of God, and an apostle of Jesus Christ,* &c. Δοῦλος θεοῦ here, in the same sense as in Acts xvi. 17, Rev. i. 1, xv. 3. x. 7, &c., not as in 1 Pet. ii. 16, Rev. vii. 3, &c. It is the more general designation of the office, which finds its special expression in what follows, namely, ἀπόστολος, &c. Hence Calvin justly observes: he thus descends from the genus to the species. The two predicates by which the apostle here designates himself, occur nowhere else in the same connexion. Even the expression *servant of God,* is not used by the apostle elsewhere in this particular sense; although we find *servant of Jesus Christ* in Rom. i. 1, Gal. i. 10, Phil. i. 1, as the more general form of his official designation, and also as designating the relation in which the Christian as such stands to Christ as his *Lord,* 1 Cor. vii. 22, Eph. vi. 6; in both these passages, however, the context gives special occasion to this appellation. Rom. i. 1 has most similarity to this passage, inasmuch as there the apostle first represents himself generally as the *servant of Jesus Christ,* and then in like manner adds the more special designation, *called to be an apostle.* If it was his design in this passage to represent his office in its twofold aspect, with reference both to *God* and to *Christ,* we find the complete counterpart of this in Rom. i. 1, where, with reference to the former, he calls himself *servant,* with reference to the latter, *apostle.* It may be said with truth that the apostle must thus express himself according to his usual manner. But it may still be asked, why he here in particular designates his office according to this twofold aspect. To this it has been answered that he has already in his eye the Jewish opponents, in opposition to whom he aims at establishing his own authority and that of Titus; or he so characterizes himself on account of the church, and in order that by this appeal to his own dignity and authority, more weight and value might be imparted to the arrangements of Titus, as one who was commissioned by him. But the epistle was not written for the church, and much less for the opponents, so as to give any occasion for confirming his authority and that of Titus; it was written only to and for Titus, with reference to whom there was no necessity for any such attestation of the apostle's official standing. It might

indeed be supposed, nevertheless, that the thought of those Jewish teachers called forth in the apostle's mind the consciousness, that as he was an apostle of Jesus Christ, so was he also and therewith a servant of God; and thus, while he refers to his calling, in which the exhortations that follow have their ground, he calls himself *a servant of God* as well as an *apostle of Jesus Christ*. But are we not here within the sphere which belongs to a writer's individuality, and where explanation finds its limits? Who will venture to explain the reason why the apostle designates himself in Rom. i. 1, by *servant of Jesus Christ*, in 1 Cor. i. 1, by *called to be an apostle*, in 2 Cor. i. 1, by *apostle*? (Δέ after ἀπόστολος is not to be understood as expressing opposition, but serves merely to introduce something different, Winer, § 57, 4, p. 520.) On the other hand, the design of the following expressions by which the ἀπόστολος is more exactly defined, is plainly manifest: *according to the faith of God's elect*, &c. We have already noticed the similarity here to Rom. i. 1, ss., Gal, i. 1, ss. The relation of these words to the subsequent contents of the epistle is not to be mistaken. The end of his apostolic office is described in these words, as the bringing about of faith in the elect of God, and the knowledge of the truth, whilst the subject matter of his preaching, with which he was entrusted, according to the commandment of God our Saviour, is described as the hope of eternal life, which God that cannot lie, promised before the world began, but hath in his own time manifested his word through the preaching which is committed to the apostle. The manner in which the apostle here more exactly defines his office, can only be understood by viewing it in opposition to those whose knowledge was not directed to the truth that leads to godliness, and whose doctrine had not for its essential contents the hope of eternal life. Accordingly we find errors of this kind really represented in the epistle, i. 10—16, iii. 8—11. And besides these particular passages which directly refer to those corruptions, the whole epistle is just an efflux and evidence of the apostolic calling, which has for its end the faith of the elect, and the knowledge of the truth according to godliness, while its doctrine has the hope of eternal life for its essential import. On the construction of vv. 1—3, which proceed without interruption, see Winer, § 64, 1, 2, p. 614. To come to particulars, it is to be observed that κατὰ πίστιν . . . . . καὶ ἐπίγνωσιν do not mean "according to, or in

conformity with" the faith and the knowledge. The faith and knowledge of individuals, are not the rule or measure of the apostle's office. The only true rendering of *κατὰ* is " for, to, destined for." Comp. Winer, § 53, d. p. 479 ; 2 Tim. i. 1 ; 2 Cor. xi. 6. It occurs nowhere else in connexion with *ἀπόστολος*. On the absence of the article with the following nouns, *πίστιν ἐπίγνωσιν ἐκλεκτῶν*, comp. Winer, § 18, 2 b. p. 142, with *θεοῦ*, § 18, 1 Anm. p. 138, with *ἀλήθεια*, ibid. p. 136, s.—*Κατὰ πίστιν ἐκλεκτῶν θεοῦ*.—The expression *ἐκλεκτοί* is transferred from the Old Testament Israel to that under the New Testament dispensation ; comp. Deut. xiv. 2, 20 ; Ps. cv. 43, cvi. 5, &c., בְּחִירֵי יְהוָה. This designation has its ground not in anything belonging to those who are thus distinguished, but in the eternal act of the divine will, the *πρόθεσις*, Rom. v. 28, or *ἰδία πρόθεσις*, 2 Tim. i. 9, in virtue of which they are fore-ordained in Christ to salvation. How the predestination is realized in time is shown in Rom. viii. 30, compared with Luke xviii. 7 ; Rom. viii. 33 ; Col. iii. 12, &c. Matthies observes on this expression, that the difficulty in the way of taking *κατά* as a final preposition is shewn by this, namely, that *ἐκλεκτοί* must then either be understood of those who are not Christians, but are to be brought to the faith according to the divine decree, or if it be understood of Christians, that *κατά* requires an extension of the sense, namely, " for the furtherance of the faith of the elect." But *κατά* means generally, " for, to." The sense is : the faith of the elect is aimed at.—*Ἐκλεκτοί*, however,—which, as the parallel member, *εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν*, &c., proves, is to be taken quite generally, not with reference to certain individuals—signifies neither Christians nor not Christians, but such as are chosen of God to salvation. The faith of the elect of God is the destination of the apostle's office ; it is all one whether the *κλῆσις* has already taken effect in them or not. For, that his apostolical office hath this end and design also with regard to those who are already Christians, is plain from Phil. i. 5, &c. De Wette's supposition of a *prolepsis*, in support of which he adduces 2 Tim. ii. 10, Acts xiii. 48, is therefore unnecessary. The first of these passages is in regard to this point quite the same with the present, and the second shows, how all faith on the part of individuals rests on the divine fore-ordination, which manifests itself in their becoming believers ; so that they do not become *elect* by their faith, but become believers be-

cause they are *elect*. Comp. Eph. i. 4, and on the whole subject Rom. i. 5. When, moreover, we consider the reference to the peculiar error combated in the epistle, in this more full and exact representation of the apostolical office, which comes out especially in the parallel clause *καὶ ἐπίγνωσιν*, &c., we cannot help thinking that this expression also, *elect of God*, is used in opposition to those whose *faith* rested on no such *election of God*.—***Καὶ ἐπίγνωσιν***, &c.; in these words the apostle denotes the second thing at which his office aims. By this *ἐπίγνωσις* is meant a knowledge resting on faith, and penetrating ever farther and farther into the truth. Comp. Phil. i. 9. For *ἐπίγνωσις* is, as Wahl observes: Plena et accurata cognitio. Comp. on *ἐπίγνωσις*, Harless on Eph. i. 17, p. 95, s. On *ἀλήθεια*, the Christian truth, comp. Eph. i. 13. This *truth* is more exactly defined in the words which follow, as a truth which leads to godliness. On the article coming after the noun in *ἀληθείας*, comp. Winer, § 19, 4, p. 159. It is the opposite of a knowledge which has not to do with the truth that leads to godliness, but that leads away from this, i. 11; i. 16, &c. ***Κατά***, as before, comp. 1 Tim. vi. 3. Here also Matthies is for taking *κατά* in the sense of "conformable to," although he understands by *ἀλήθεια* the evangelical truth, as if the godliness to which this truth alone can lead, were a rule lying beyond it. ***Ἐυσέβεια*** is not used by the apostle except in the Pastoral Epistles; it is found, however, in Acts iii. 12, 2 Pet. i. 3, 6, and in other places. On the other hand we find *ἐυσεβεῖν* in an address by the apostle, Acts xvii. 22; and in like manner *ἐυσεβής*, Acts xxii. 12; *ἀσεβής*, Rom. iv. 5, v. 6; *ἀσέβεια*, Rom. i. 18, xi. 26. If the apostle had to combat in the Pastoral Epistles an error which tended to *ἀσέβεια* (2 Tim. ii. 16), as is abundantly evident from the representation which is given of the opponents therein referred to, it is easy to account for the frequent occurrence of the term *ἐυσέβεια* in these epistles; it thus belongs to those expressions, the use of which is at once explained, by a reference to the state of things which the apostle had in his eye. And what was more natural than that the apostle who, at Rom. iv. 5, v. 6, denotes the state of men previous to conversion by the term *ἀσεβής*, should use the term *ἐυσέβεια* in opposition to those errors which result in a knowledge morally unfruitful, and lead away from a moral course, when he is laying stress on the moral aspect of Christianity, seeing

that this term denotes the opposite of that which he expresses by *ἀσεβής* and *ἀσέβεια* (Rom. i. 18), and which he here finds fault with in his opponents? If *ἀσέβεια*, as the reverse of the *ἐυσέβεια* here used, is a Pauline expression, then *ἐυσέβεια* cannot, as De Wette maintains, be an unpauline expression and idea; and its use in these epistles is fully accounted for by the reference to the errors which are combated. Or, should the apostle have used the expressions *θεῷ λατρεύειν* or *δουλεύειν*, in opposition to the morally unfruitful, or rather altogether immoral course of those *ματαιολόγοι*; expressions which De Wette says he might have used, but which would only by possibility have conveyed his meaning, inasmuch as De Wette himself admits, that no expression can be found in the other epistles to denote that which the apostle had to say in the given circumstances? On the idea implied in *ἐυσέβεια*, comp. ii. 11, 12; 1 Tim. i. 5.

Ver. 2. *In hope of eternal life*, &c. These words, as De Wette has already observed, are to be understood neither as more exactly determining the *godliness*, nor the *truth* which leads to *godliness*. For what proper sense do the words receive from Matthies' explanation: "the truth which is conformable to piety derives its permanence from the hope of eternal life?" Is not the *ἀλήθεια* represented as the objective truth; on which the by-clause *ἡ κατ' ἐυσέβειαν* can make no alteration? But scarcely even can these words be connected with *ἀπόστολος*, for in this case the coordinate position of the *ἐπί* with the *κατά*, would have been signified by a *δέ* or in some such way. It only remains then with De Wette to connect *ἐπ' ἐλπίδι* with the whole sentence *κατὰ πίστιν*, &c., or with the second member, *καὶ ἐπίγνωσιν*. The latter seems to me the more natural. The apostle has just said what that is, which is the aim of his office, namely, the faith of the elect, and the knowledge of the truth according to godliness; and he might have mentioned as a third thing at which the apostolical office aims, the hope of eternal life. But he prefers, after having in the words, *truth which leads to godliness*, more exactly determined the subject matter of this knowledge, to mention the third thing likewise in its relation to the knowledge thus determined; it is a knowledge the subject matter of which is that *truth*, and the ground and condition of which is the hope of eternal life, by which it is borne up and directed. *Ἐπί* I take in the sense "on or with;" comp.

Winer, § 52, c. p. 469. Olshausen, as denoting the "end," "towards the hope." On the idea expressed in *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* compare iii. 7. There lies in the words *ἐπ' ἐλπίδι*, a further opposition to that vain talking, i. 10; iii. 9, which discovers nothing of this hope of eternal life. Very little weight will be given to what De Wette here observes, namely, that the apostle never makes *eternal life* the subject of hope, and of Old Testament prophecies. Is not this eternal life represented as the end of all our striving in Rom. ii. 7, Gal. vi. 8, &c., as the sum of that which Christ hath obtained for us, Rom. v. 21, vi. 23? Why then may he not represent it here as the object of Christian hope, and as the sum of all the divine promises? The single passage, Rom. vi. 23, the gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord, is of itself sufficient to justify this. The apostle then characterizes this *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*—for the *ἥν* refers to it—as the subject of promise by the infallible God, *πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων*. *Ἐπηγγείλατο* in the sense of promise, as used elsewhere by the apostle, Rom. iv. 29; Gal. iii. 19. *Ἀψευδής* only here; with respect to the idea, comp. Heb. vi. 18; Rom. iii. 4, xi. 29; 1 Cor. i. 9. *Πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνιών* may denote either what has been before all time, as in 2 Tim. i. 9 = *πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων*, 1 Cor. ii. 7, or what has been done before everlasting, *i.e.* very ancient times. This indeterminateness has its ground, in the absence of the article being possible in each of the two cases. The sense of the passage is therefore not all at once to be determined by a comparison with 2 Tim. i. 9, 10, and Rom. xvi. 25, where *χρόνοι αἰώνιοι* occurs, but solely from the context. We have in the passage a double antithesis composed of *ἐπηγγείλατο* and *ἐφανέρωσε*, and of *χρόνων αἰωνίων* and *καιροῖς ἰδίοις*. Now, if the last expression does not necessitate our supposing as its opposite that which has preceded all time, the first expression is decidedly against such an interpretation; for the term *ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι* can by no means be used to denote a promise of eternal life made before all time, and recourse must then be had to the grammatically incorrect rendering: promittere decrevit (Heydenreich.) It may be so explained in 2 Tim. i. 9 (comp. the exposition), but, while *δοθεῖσαν* in that passage may correspond to this act before all time, *ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι* does not; and the same is the case with the analogous passages Eph. iii. 9, the mystery which *was hid* in God, *ἀπό τῶν αἰώνων*, Rom. xvi. 25, the mystery which was *kept secret*, *χρόνοις αἰωνίοις*,

1 Cor. ii. 7; Col. i. 26; Eph. i. 4, *hath chosen* us in him, *πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου*. All these passages, as they agree with 2 Tim. i. 9, so they as directly contradict the sentiment that the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* was before all time the subject of a divine promise; for then a *mystery sealed* or *hid in God*, *ἀπό τῶν αἰώνων*, would be impossible. So also De Wette. Olshausen, on the other hand, appears to understand the expression of the divine decree, as he refers to Eph. iii. 11; 2 Tim. i. 9; De Wette, on the contrary, refers justly to Luke i. 70; Rom. i. 2. The expression *ἀπ' αἰῶνος* in the former of these passages has substantially the same sense as the clause in our passage. It corresponds to the aim of the passage, which is to represent that which is now revealed as a thing long before promised, to refer it with Grotius to the earliest promises of salvation, which is here denoted by *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*. The whole by-clause, however, has undoubtedly for its object to bring into view the greatness and importance of that which is now made manifest, inasmuch as it forms the essential subject matter of the apostle's preaching, and must form also, as the *hope of eternal life*, the fundamental tone of mind in the Christian, ii. 13.

Ver. 3. *Hath manifested.* The strict antithesis to this is the expression *hid* in Col. i. 26, &c., which is perceptible in every other modification of this antithesis, comp. Rom. xvi. 25, 26; 2 Tim. i. 9, 10. Thus in our passage the thing promised is relatively *hid*, and the fulfilment of the promise is the *manifestation* of that which was hid, the full revelation of the thing promised. That *φανεροῦν* in the same connexion as here is a familiar expression of the apostle, is shown by the passages above cited. *Καιροῖς ἰδίοις—καιρός* properly "measure," consequently not synonymous with the preceding *χρόνος*, but denoting the right point of time; *καιροί*, the seasonable times, comp. Meyer on Acts i. 7. *Ἰδίοις*, with retrospective reference to the subject, namely, God, denoting the times appointed by him, Acts i. 7; 1 Tim. vi. 15. The word is here used in its original signification, from which its other meanings, "fit, adapted to," have been derived. On the sense of the whole expression comp. Gal. iv. 4. *Τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ* here takes the place of the *ἣν* in the preceding verse. It will be seen at once why the apostle changes the object or rather its designation: eternal life is still in respect of its appearance a thing future, and is revealed only as *λόγος*. From this it follows that the *eternal life* is to be under-

stood as specifically included in the *word*, Rom. vi. 23 ; comp. Winer, § 64, II. 1, p. 616. It is therefore incorrect to understand the expression τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ as standing in opposition to ζωὴ αἰώνιος. But this *word*, it is added, is revealed ἐν κηρύγματι, by which is to be understood the apostolical annunciation quite generally, in the form of an annunciation of salvation ; so κήρυγμα, 1 Tim. iv. 17 ; 1 Cor. i. 21.—*Which is committed to me*, the apostle adds this to express, that that eternal life long since promised, and now manifested, is the subject matter of his preaching. On the construction of ἐπιστεύθην, comp. Gal. ii. 7 ; 1 Cor. ix. 7. Winer, § 32, 5, p. 261. *According to the commandment of God*, &c., in like manner, Rom. xvi. 26 ; 2 Cor. viii. 8 ; 1 Cor. vii. 6, 25. The more common expression in this connexion, namely, *according to the will of God*, is found also in the Pastoral Epistles, 2 Tim. i. 1. To *God*, the appellation *our Saviour* is added. The same designation of God is found in Luke i. 47, and Jude 25, and frequently in the Septuagint, as the translation of the Hebrew יְשׁוּעָה, יֵשַׁע and the like, Ps. xxiv. 5 ; Is. xii. 2, xlv. 15, 21 ; then also in Sir. li. 1, comp. Wahl ; in the Pastoral Epistles, 1 Tim. i. 1, ii. 3, iv. 10 ; Tit. ii. 10, iii. 4 ; in like manner it is often used of Christ, Tit. i. 4, ii. 13, iii. 6 ; 2 Tim. i. 10 ; as also elsewhere in the epistles of the apostle, Eph. v. 23 ; Phil. iii. 20 ; and likewise in John iv. 42 ; Acts v. 31 ; 2 Pet. i. 1, &c. The Pastoral Epistles then contain the ordinary use of the word in common with the other epistles of Paul, the more extraordinary use as applied to God, at least in common with the New Testament writings, and the usage of the Old Testament. The idea itself expressed by the word is altogether Pauline ; comp. 2 Cor. v. 19 : *God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself*, &c. How then should the expression itself, or the frequent use of it in the Pastoral Epistles (it occurs in all six times) prove anything against their genuineness ? Are we to regard it as an evidence of the spuriousness of the epistle to the Philippians, that the term συναθλέω occurs only there, and occurs there several times ? Comp. besides the General Introduction.[1]

1 De Wette considers what is said in this inscription, vv. 2 and 3, by way of confirming the apostle's official authority, to be unsuitable, on the supposition of its having been intended for Timothy. But according to the interpretation given above, vv. 2 and 3 are not to be viewed as intended to confirm, but rather to characterize the apostolic

Ver. 4. The person is here designated to whom the epistle is addressed: to Titus mine own son, &c. It is therefore very arbitrary to suppose all at once that the epistle was written for the church. The benediction at the conclusion by no means requires this supposition, comp. infra. The contents of the epistle too, as we shall see, accord only with the view of its having been addressed to Titus i. 12, ss., *son*, comp. 1 Cor. iv. 17; Philem. x., points to the conversion of Titus through the instrumentality of the apostle. *Γνήσιος*, genuine, comp. Phil. iv. 3; on the whole expression see 1 Tim. i. 2. *According to the common faith*, not of Titus alone, but of all Christians. He is a genuine son in virtue of the common faith. Chrysostom's remark is substantially correct, *τῷ κατὰ τὴν πίστιν εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀδελφότητα ἠνίξατο*, but corresponding less closely to the idea of the apostle, inasmuch as the *κατὰ* serves to more exactly determine the preceding expression. De Wette's opinion, however, that *κατὰ τ. π.* is not a suitable expression, inasmuch as it corresponds rather to *ἀδελφός*, is without foundation. Might not the father in a corporeal sense designate his child by *γνήσιον τέκνον κατὰ κοινὸν αἷμα*, with as much propriety as the brother designates his brother by *γνήσιον ἀδελφὸν κατὰ κοινὸν αἷμα*? Upon this follows the usual apostolical salutation. *Ἔλεος*, which we find in 1 Tim. i. 2, 2 Tim. i. 2, is spurious in this passage, according to C.**D.E.F.G., &c., comp, Tischendorf. The clause *our Saviour*, added to *Jesus Christ*, is peculiar to this passage, for in 1 Tim i. 2, 2 Tim. i. 2, the common expression *our Lord* is used. On *χάρις*, &c., comp. Olshausen on Rom. i. 7.

§ 2. INSTRUCTIONS IN REGARD TO THE APPOINTMENT OF PRESBYTERS.

(Chap. i. 5—16.)

The apostle begins by reminding Titus of the commission given him to ordain presbyters, ver. 5, he then in vv. 6—8 specifies the

office in a manner corresponding to the contents of the epistle. That the writer designates himself as an apostle, cannot appear unsuitable in an epistle, which as an official communication is, from beginning to end, an expression of apostolic authority.

qualifications of a presbyter in a moral point of view, then with respect to doctrine, ver. 9, and confirms the necessity of these qualifications, vv. 10—16, by a reference to the circumstances of the Cretan Christians, which demand on the part of the presbyter a decided adherence to the true and sound doctrine, and an energetic application of it.

Ver. 5. The apostle enters forthwith in medias res, as at Gal. i. 6. For this cause have I left thee in Crete, that thou mightest set in order what is yet wanting, and appoint elders in every city (from city to city) as I had instructed thee. De Wette thinks that the words seem to imply, that Paul now for the first time makes Titus aware of his object in leaving him in Crete. This is quite groundless already on account of the words, *as I had instructed thee;* but also apart from this. For when the apostle sets himself to give Titus further directions as to the execution of the commission which he had received, what more natural than that he should state in the outset the commission itself, as the theme, so to speak, of what follows? The assertion is therefore well founded, which critics have urged strongly for a negative purpose, namely, that the epistle was written soon after the apostle's departure from Crete; since it is presupposed that Titus had not yet fulfilled the commission given to him. But the difficulties which are built on this fact, have their ground properly not in the fact itself, that the epistle was written shortly after the apostle's departure, but in the false premises that Christianity was first planted and propagated in Crete by the apostle during his stay there; while the contents of the epistle compel us to suppose that Christianity had already existed in Crete for some length of time. Is there any necessity then for maintaining, that because this epistle presents unmistakeable traces of an earlier existence of Christianity in Crete, it can therefore not be genuine? Is it then inconceivable that, as in so many other places (Acts viii. 4, ss., ix. 31, ss., xi. 19, ss.), in Phoenicia, Cyprus, Antioch, so also in Crete, the gospel was first announced not by an apostle, but by some other instrumentality, which was followed up by apostolic agency, purifying, confirming, uniting, and setting in order the elements already existing? It is certain that the number of Jews in Crete was very large, as may be seen from i. 10 compared with Acts xi. 19. And do we not read in Acts ii. 11 that Cretans were present at the Pentecostal miracle? Might not

the seed of Christianity have been transplanted to Crete at that time, while by means of the subsequent intercourse of the Jews of that island with Jerusalem, and the proximity to Greece, it might have been further spread? How far these hypotheses may be true is to us a matter of indifference; so much at least is thereby shown, that the traces of Christianity's having existed in Crete for some length of time, can furnish no decisive evidence against the genuineness of this epistle. In what way, however, the special objections which critics have brought forward, are removed by this the true view of the case which the epistle itself presents to us, has been already shown in the Introduction, and will be further confirmed in the exposition of particular passages.

We suppose then that the apostle, on his arrival at Crete, found Christianity already planted and propagated there. But beside the truth, and connected with it, he found also many corruptions springing chiefly from Jewish-Christians; much idle talking, foolish disputation on subjects having nothing in common with the morally renewing and quickening power of the truth; much that was morally lax and altogether immoral in conduct. The *faith* was there, but there was a want of *soundness in the faith.* In like manner, in consequence of the absence of apostolic guidance hitherto, there was a want of all church order and government. The apostle during his short stay set himself to remedy these defects, and to advance the Christianity of Crete both in respect of its external form and internal nature. His work, however, was not fully accomplished when he had to leave the island. He, therefore, left Titus behind not as bishop or as archbishop, but, if we may use an expression belonging to a later period, as apostolical delegate, that he might set in order what still was wanting, and in particular ordain presbyters from city to city. For we may well suppose, that it was not the outward organization of a church which the apostle had first of all seen to be wanting in Crete, but that he had sought chiefly to improve the Christianity itself which he found there, so that the former was for the most part what he had left over to Titus. For the most part—for that this did not exhaust his commission, is evident from i. 13, chap. ii. and iii. The apostle wrote this epistle in order to give him instructions as to the manner in which he should fulfil his commission. It has indeed been thought strange, that the apostle should have written

such an epistle to Titus so soon after having left Crete, and that he did not say to Titus by word of mouth what he found necessary, before his departure. We may confidently, however, leave this objection to itself, if only the contents of the epistle itself are found to be appropriate, and to correspond to the state of things that existed.

For this cause I left thee, &c.: thus the apostle begins. Instead of *κατέλιπον*, the reading *ἀπέλιπον* is confirmed by preponderating authorities. The words, *for this cause*, point emphatically to the following sentence which states the object for which Titus was left behind. This is denoted by the words, *that thou mightest set in order*. Here also the reading wavers between *ἐπιδιορθώσῃ* as middle, and *ἐπιδιορθώσῃς*, which is supported by A.D.*E., &c. Lachmann has decided for the latter, and Tischendorf in his latest edition for the former. On grammatical grounds, the active is certainly to be preferred, comp. § 39, 6, p. 299. Nothing in reply to the question, what did the apostle himself accomplish, can be obtained from the expression *τὰ λείποντα* in itself. It only says: Titus is to bring completely into order what it was not possible for the apostle to set in order. The following *καὶ* brings into prominence one of those things that were wanting, and which Titus was to set in order, namely, a church government. To introduce such a church order, after the pattern of other Christian churches (1 Tim. iv. 14), is the first and the chief part of Titus' commission. From city to city (*κατὰ πόλιν*, Acts xv. 21, &c.), where Christians are to be found (*κατ' ἐκκλησίαν*, Acts xiv. 23), is he to appoint presbyters, as the apostle on leaving Crete had instructed him (*διὰ τάσσομαι* found elsewhere in 1 Cor. vii. 17, xi. 31.) De Wette observes quite correctly in regard to the *ὡς*, that it refers not merely to the *that*, but also to the *how*, which latter is farther laid down in the statement of the qualifications which are to belong to those who are to be chosen as office-bearers, *καθίστημι*, properly to "set down," = "to appoint." So frequently Luke xii. 14; Acts vii. 10, &c. Compare chiefly Acts vi. 3, where the same expression is used of the deacons who are to be appointed. The expression throws no light on the question whether this appointment of presbyters was to be done with or without the co-operation of the church. In the passage last adduced, the term *καθιστάναι* expresses an act common to the apostle and the church. In the

passage Acts xiv. 23 we read χειροτονήσαντες αὐτοῖς πρεσβυτέρους, which, compared with 2 Cor. viii. 16, represents the idea of a co-operation on the part of the church as the more probable, although it does not necessitate such a supposition, comp. Acts x. 41. Baur has sought to make out, that the expression κατὰ πόλιν πρεσβυτέρους is favourable to his view, inasmuch as every church, here every πόλις, had but one president or ἐπίσκοπος, not several, while he says, that we are not warranted in understanding the plural (presbyters), otherwise than of the collective idea which lies in the κατὰ πόλιν. On the contrary, however, we must say, that the apostle would have expressed himself very inaccurately if the sense of the words were, that only one elder was to be appointed in every city. The very expression κατὰ πόλιν—in every single city—obliges us to apply the plural (presbyters) to the individual city, as also Matthies has admitted, who refers justly to Acts xv. 21. That the expression πρεσβύτεροι designates the same office as ἐπίσκοποι (comp. ver. 7), is acknowledged by all who *can* acknowledge it. Compare the General Introduction and Matthies' dissertation on the subject, p. 78, ss. With regard to the difference between the two terms, we cannot but fully agree with Baur when he says, that ἐπίσκοπος designates the representative of the same office in his relation to the church, as indeed the expression itself intimates, and as we learn with certainty from passages such as Acts xx. 17, compared with ver. 28; 1 Pet. v. 1, 2. He is also quite right when referring to 1 Pet. v. 1 and 1 Tim v. 19, he maintains that πρεσβύτερος was used when the collegial relation of the presbyters was spoken of. But for what reason was πρεσβύτερος used in this case? Clearly, as may be seen from the expression itself, which indicates the ground upon which persons were to be chosen to this office, because πρεσβύτερος designates the office with respect to the honour which it implies, whilst ἐπίσκοπος points rather to its duties, as consisting in the oversight of the flock entrusted to the bearer of the office. The reason then why πρεσβύτερους is the designation employed in this passage is, that it treats quite generally of the setting up of this office, of the

1 Comp. Neander, a. a. O., p. 252: πρεσβύτεροι, the appellation borrowed from Judaism, of those who were appointed to preside over churches, and more especially designating the honour of the office; ἐπίσκοποι, the Greek name, more especially designating the duties of the office.

appointment of persons who are to take this place of pre-eminence as elders, while afterwards, at ver. 7, ἐπίσκοπος is used, because mention is there made of those qualities which are requisite in a presbyter with reference to the church over which he is placed, in order to his being able rightly to perform the duties which his office devolves upon him. With reference to the whole passage, the words of Chrysostom may properly find a place here: "thou seest here a soul free from all envy, everywhere seeking the welfare of the disciples, and not concerned whether that should be accomplished by himself or by another." This passage, as indeed the whole epistle, clearly proves the importance of the outward government of the church. From the condition of the Christians in Crete, as described in this epistle, may be plainly perceived the danger that grows out of the absence of an external form of church life. In place of the certain word that has been objectively given (the faithful word according to the teaching), the subjective element comes into prominence in the *unruly* and *vain talkers;* and the spiritually healing, morally cleansing, and sanctifying power of the gospel, is enfeebled wherever the office of Christian discipline is not exercised. Or, again, do not vv. 9 and 10 show plainly, that the apostle, in the appointment of presbyters, aimed at putting a salutary check to the spread of idle speculation, and of that moral unsoundness which ever goes along with it? But we learn as clearly also from the present passage, that the external organization of the church pre-supposes a certain measure of Christian knowledge and feeling in the church. It was not the apostle's first object when he came to Crete, although he doubtless found Christians there already, all at once to form them into churches and to give them elders. This work was left over to Titus. As little, however, did he wait until all the evils which affected the Christianity of the Cretans were removed; but after the commencement of a right Christian feeling and life had been made in the several places, he caused presbyters to be appointed, in order that through the power of the office, what was still unsound might be carried forward to perfect soundness of the faith.

Ver. 6—8. The apostle now mentions the qualifications of a presbyter, first of all, in a moral point of view. Ver. 6 contains the chief qualifications, and these are represented as just the particular details of the general direction already given to Titus; for

the words, εἴ τις, &c., can be understood only in their connexion with what immediately precedes; comp. Matthies. Ver. 7 is then a confirmatory explanation of ver. 6. Qualifications with respect to the presbyter's own person, and with respect to those belonging to him, are specified in ver. 6. In the former respect, it is required that he be *blameless* and *the husband of one wife*. Ἀνέγκλητος, one against whom no charge can be brought; so 1 Cor. i. 8; Col. i. 22; 1 Tim. iii. 10. The word again occurs in ver. 7, where it is confirmed by the expression *as the steward of God*, while in vv. 7 and 8 its import is explained. Now this first word lets us see, what in the apostle's estimate was mainly to be looked to. It is the moral estimation in which the person to be selected was held, the reputation which he had amongst men, on which above all he lays stress. For an efficient discharge of the duties of the office can be conceived of only on the supposition of a good reputation. De Wette expresses his astonishment that Titus should be enjoined to have respect first of all to outward unblameableness, and then to other moral qualities, in part equally external; he thinks that Titus ought before all to have preferred such as had approved themselves to him, or to the apostle, to be especially zealous, devotedly believing, warm and animated in their attachment to the gospel. What is here said is, according to De Wette, so very self-evident, as that it could be of very little assistance to Titus. But are not those which De Wette thinks would have been the suitable qualifications, just as self-evident, and even more so? It appears to me that here also the reasoning implied in this objection sets out from false premises, inasmuch as it is supposed that Christianity was first settled in Crete by the apostle, while according to the admissions of the critics themselves the epistle teaches the contrary, and again, inasmuch as a mistaken view is entertained of the special necessities of the Christians in Crete, and the consequent requisites to be sought for in a presbyter. Moreover, considered in itself there appears to me to be great wisdom in the apostle's requiring, that in the selection of a man for the office of presbyter, particular regard should be had to the moral estimation in which he is held in the sphere over which he is to preside; and while Titus would most naturally look out for such as had shown themselves to be faithful and zealous adherents of the gospel, the apostle's injunction reminds him to have respect

also to the moral reputation in which the persons to be chosen are held, by the churches which are to be formed. Let us consider further, however, the state of things in Crete. The Christian life there was unsound in a twofold respect, in respect, namely, of morality, and also in respect of doctrine. What then was more necessary than that those whose vocation it was to counteract these evils, should in the first place be themselves pure and blameless in a moral point of view, so as to be able to rebuke others (i. 13), and then that they should be firm adherents of the sure doctrine, and be free from the infection of that idle speculation and disputation which so much prevailed? The apostle, however, requires both, ver. 5—9. Add to all, finally, this,—that Christianity had already existed in Crete for some length of time, so that an opinion might, and indeed must already have been formed, respecting the Christian disposition and conduct of individuals,—and the objection of the critics disappears of itself, for even De Wette admits, that on the supposition of Christianity's having been of some time's standing in Crete, the qualifications here specified might be such as would be most suitable to an ecclesiastical office.—Chrysostom has already well expressed the sense of the apostolic injunctions thus: "he desires that the person who rules may give no handle to those over whom he is to rule; wherefore he says, if any one be blameless," &c. It is in like manner only from this point of view, namely, the regard which is had to the moral estimation in which the person to be chosen is held by the church, that we can explain the qualification that comes next, *the husband of one wife*. Not as if this in itself were one of the principal marks of morality, or as if the contrary were a mark of an immoral disposition—for how many must there have been to whom this criterion could not at all be applied—but here again it is the reference noticed above, which leads the apostle to lay precisely on this circumstance so great stress, that he will even have those who do not possess this qualification, to be unhesitatingly excluded from the office of a presbyter. With respect to the sense of the words *husband of one wife*, we do not deem it necessary to show, that it is not here required that a presbyter should be married. Against this the μιᾶς is decisive, which cannot be here put for the indefinite article, comp. Winer, § 17, 4, Anm. 3**, p. 126; altogether apart from the view which the apostle elsewhere expresses (comp. 1 Cor. vii. 1, 7, 8,

37, 40.) Still less can it be meant to express that a married man is not to be excluded,—for those qualifications are here enumerated which one *must* have in order to be fit for becoming a presbyter. It is also quite evident that the words are not to be understood as referring to conjugal fidelity. On the other hand, the view is certainly grammatically correct, which explains the expression of having more than one wife at the same time. Thôse who take this view appeal to Rom. vii. 1, ss. ; 1 Cor. vii. 8, 9, 39, in which the apostle permits a second marriage, and with which the present passage would not agree if it were understood to refer to second marriage ; and farther, to the fact that polygamy strictly so called prevailed at that time among the Jews, and that this practice might easily pass over to the Gentile-Christians in Crete, through the pernicious influence of the Jews, very many of whom, it is well known, were living there. (Jos. Antt. XVII. 1, 2 ; Justin. M. dial. c. Tryph. § 134, ed. Col.) So Calvin, Beza, Heinrichs, Schleiermacher. Notwithstanding, however, that the apostle permits second marriage in general,—though he at the same time gives the preference to the unmarried state,—it does not follow that the present passage cannot be intended to forbid second marriage in a presbyter. Although the Christian as such may be under no obligation to abstain from second marriage, this may yet with the utmost propriety be required as a requisite qualification in him who, as presbyter, is to preside over a church, from a regard to his reputation in the church, and even also from regard to the heathen (that the word may not be blasphemed.) And that the having been married only once, in opposition to second marriage, was considered as a mark of higher moral strictness and firmness, appears from Luke ii. 36, 37, and from all the ancient ecclesiastical writers, as Heydenreich has proved with reference to Athenag. Leg. pro Christ., p. 37 ; Theoph. ad Autol. III., p. 127, ed. Col. ; Minuc. Felix Octav. Tertull. ad ux. 1, 7 ; exhort. cast. c. 7 ; de monag. c. 12 ; Orig. c. Celsum III., p. 141. The same view of second marriage is found in the ancient heathen writers, as De Wette observes, and Heydenreich in p. 169 of his commentary ; comp. also Mack on the passage, and Böttger V., p. 78, s. With regard to the other reason brought forward in support of the view that this passage refers to polygamy, the objection will certainly not hold, that if polygamy were meant, the prohibition would then be applicable to all Chris-

tians; for the μὴ ὀργίλον, another of the presbyter's qualifications, is equally applicable to all Christians. But are we to believe that the apostle thought it necessary to mention this among the first things to Titus, that no one living in polygamy should be appointed as a presbyter? We know of no single case of the kind among the Christians. Quite decisive, however, against this interpretation, and in favour of that which takes the words to be directed against deuterogamy, as Heydenreich, Mack, Matthies, and others have already observed, is the passage 1 Tim. v. 9, where the expression ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς γυνή cannot possibly be understood as the opposite of having more than one husband at the same time. In both places it is ecclesiastical distinction that is spoken of, and in both places the having been but once married is specified as a condition of this. The words of 1 Tim. iii. 2, 12, are thus to be understood in the same sense as this passage. This circumstance belongs to the ἐγκράτεια, ver. 8, and it is required not of all, but of those who are to have the oversight of churches, as a proof of moral strictness; and the reason of its being required lies in the moral estimate in which second marriage was held, to which we have already referred above. To this also correspond the views and practice of ecclesiastical antiquity, to which Tertullian has borne testimony de monag. c. 12, who as a Montanist was addicted to the view that second marriage was inadmissible in the case of all without distinction, and brings as an objection against the Catholic view, "that they say the apostle has permitted second marriage, because he has bound under the yoke of monogamy those only who hold office in the church." Comp. Heydenreich, p. 166, s. "Such as were living in second or third marriage were not admitted to the pastoral office," p. 168, ss.

If in regard to the qualification expressed in the word *blameless*, and the others laid down in vv. 5—8, the objection is urged that they are too general and self evident, we have, on the contrary, in that which we have just been considering, one of a very special nature. But this very circumstance has been laid hold of as a mark of the spuriousness of the epistle. The requirement is too positive, observes De Wette; and Baur, appealing to passages in writings of the second century, partly those adduced above, and partly others of a similar import, finds in this circumstance a new confirmation

of his view respecting the origin of the Pastoral Epistles about this period. For every one will concede to him against Schleiermacher, that there is no ground for understanding the expression in question in first Timothy differently from here. Dr Baur refers us to the circumstances of that period, in which such a number and variety of notions on the subject of marriage were put in circulation by Gnostics and Montanists on the one hand, and their opponents on the other. It was therefore natural, he says, that the writers of these epistles should not overlook this so important a question of the time, but in accordance with their mediating aim, should express a conciliatory opinion also on this question, to the effect, namely, that second marriage is not to be forbidden in the case of Christians generally, but in the case of the office-bearers, to whom this prohibition was first of all applied, and, for the furtherance of the ecclesiastical system which these epistles aimed at confirming, could not but be ever more and more strictly applied. (P. 112—120 die s. q. Pastoralbriefe.) Here again is confirmed, what we found it necessary to state in the General Introduction in opposition to Baur's whole reasoning, namely, that in the induction of positive evidence for the origin of these epistles in the second century, the negative proof that they do not correspond to the period to which they claim to belong, is neglected. Is it then so inconceivable, that the apostle who prescribes second marriage for those who cannot contain, because it is better to marry than to burn, 1 Cor. vii. 9, should require of presbyters such a degree of continence as is implied in their not living in second marriage? Is it to be said that the Christian view which prevailed in the second century on the subject of second marriage, and which in the Shepherd of Hermas, in Athenagoras, in Tertullian, and others (comp. Baur, p. 117), goes the length of an entire prohibition of deuterogamy in every case without exception, stands in no connexion with the first century, and specially with the apostolic era? Do not the catholic writers of the second century, according to the passage cited above from Tertullian, appeal expressly to the apostle? For what remains on this point, I refer to the General Introduction, in which is shown also in particular, how little ground there is for speaking of the hierarchical aim of this epistle. Comp. also on this subject, Böttger V., p. 76, ss. I would also here cite a passage from Chrysostom, which places this matter in its proper point of

view: "Although second marriage may not be prohibited by the law, still it is a thing against which much may be said."

A further desideratum in a presbyter, not with respect to his own person, but with respect to those belonging to him, is specified in the words *having faithful children*. That πιστά is not to be taken in the merely external sense of belonging to the Christian church, is evident from the apostle's usual manner of speaking, and is shown by the following words, *not accused*, &c. Πιστός, as at Eph. i. 1; Col. i. 2. We find the same requisition in 1 Tim. iii. 4, where it is confirmed in the following verse: for if a man know not how to rule his own house, how shall he take care of the church of God. These are simple things; but the wisdom which they display consists just in this, that the significance of these simple things is rightly appreciated. The expression *not accused*, shows again the apostle's point of view. Chrysostom observes: "the apostle does not merely say that they are not to be licentious, but that they are not even to be accused of this,—not to have an ill report." Ἀσωτία, licentiousness; in like manner, Eph. v. 18; 1 Pet. iv. 4; Luke xv. 13. Comp. on the first passage Harless's investigation into the signification of the word, Ἀνυπότακτος, insubordinate, 1 Tim. iii. 4, opposed to ἐν ὑποταγῇ, Heb. ii. 9. The objection which is made to rest on this requisite, namely, that it presupposes the previous existence of Christianity in Crete for some length of time, can, after what has already been said, present no difficulty. Μή here, as in the following characteristics, because the idea of an efficient bishop is expressed, Winer, § 69, 4 Anm., p. 566.

In ver. 6 the apostle reminds Titus of the direction already given to him, and urges it anew. Then follows in ver. 7, the reason of his requiring that a presbyter should have the qualification already expressed in the word *blameless*, which may be said to comprehend in itself every other: δεῖ γὰρ, &c., says the apostle. The emphasis rests on the word δεῖ; the apostle points at the necessity implied in the relation conformably to which this requisite is laid down. This relation is however indicated in the expression ἐπίσκοπος; the presbyter, in so far as he is overseer, shepherd of the flock, must be open to no objection, if he is to guide the flock. Thus the change of the designation from πρεσβύτερος to ἐπίσκοπος is explained; comp. above, ver. 5. The apostle still brings into prominence the idea implied in ἐπίσκοπος, in the words that follow:

as the steward of God. Θεοῦ emphatically placed before; as God's steward. He is God's steward, inasmuch as the house of God, *i.e.* the church, is entrusted to his management. It is wrong to take this as equivalent to the expression of 1 Cor. iv. 1, *steward of the mysteries of God;* for the ὡς in its reference to ἐπίσκοπος can only express the idea already implied in the word ἐπίσκοπος, that he is steward of the house, which, according to 1 Tim. iii. 5, is the *church of the living God.* Comp. on this use of οἶκος, 1 Pet. iv. 17; Heb. iii. 2, 5, 6, x. 21; and the Hebrew בֵּית יְהוָה, Num. xii. 7; Hos. viii. 1, as also the metaphor frequently used by the apostle, *temple of God,* 1 Cor. iii. 16, vi. 19; 2 Cor. vi. 16; Eph. ii. 21; and οἰκοδομή, 1 Cor. iii. 9; 2 Cor. v. 1; Eph. ii. 21. The import of the general term *blameless,* is then unfolded in the following specific qualities, in which there is an unmistakable reference to the vices that were prevalent in Crete; comp. ver. 12, and Winer, RWB., on Crete. He is not to be αὐθάδης, properly qui sibi ipse placet; occurring also in 2 Pet. i. 10, and in the Sept. where it is used for עַז, Gen. xlix. 37, יְהִיר (proud, arrogant), Prov. xxi. 24 (comp. Wahl.) It denotes a self-loving, imperious, violent disposition. Ὀργίλος found only here, iracundus. Μὴ πάροινον here, and 1 Tim. iii. 3, vinolentus. In 1 Tim. iii. 8, this is expressed by *not given to much wine.* The word includes at the same time the signification, " impudent, insolent." *No striker,* in the same connexion, 1 Tim. iii. 3, which shows plainly the intended connexion with the preceding. *Not given to filthy lucre,* also at 1 Tim. iii. 8. The same quality is enjoined upon bishops at 1 Pet. v. 2; where αἰσχροκερδῶς stands in opposition to προθύμως; to be understood not of disreputable trafficking apart from the office, but of base eagerness after gain in the office, as we learn from ver. 11; 1 Tim. vi. 5; 1 Tim. iii. 3; and 1 Pet. v. 2. Comp. De Wette. That disposition and manner of conduct are meant, which make of the *living of the gospel* an affair of gain. An injunction especially necessary for Cretans. In ver. 8 the opposite qualities are specified. They are, however, only the same qualities viewed positively. *A lover of hospitality,* the opposite of *given to filthy lucre,* so at 1 Tim. iii. 2; 1 Pet. iv. 9. *Hospitality* is likewise enjoined upon all Christians in Rom. xii. 13; Heb. xiii. 2, compared with 3 John 5; a virtue for the injunction of which there were special reasons in the circumstances of the time. Φιλά-

γαθος only here, loving what is good and those who are good, comp. Passow; not specifically benevolent, but as opposed generally to the corrupt tendencies before mentioned. *Sober, just, holy, temperate*—thus the apostle continues to designate the substantial elements of personal character positively, in opposition to the negative characteristics before specified. The word σώφρων,—as also σωφροσύνη, σωφρόνως, σωφρονέω, σωφρονίζω, σωφρονισμός,—has been found fault with by the critics. Σώφρων certainly occurs only in the Pastoral Epistles, three times in this epistle, and in 1 Tim. iii. 2, in the same connexion as in this passage. Σωφρόνως, σωφρονίζω, σωφρονισμός, occur, each once in these epistles, comp. Tit. iii. 12, ii. 4; 2 Tim. i. 7; on the other hand, we find σωφρονέω and σωφροσύνη besides Tit. ii. 6, 1 Tim. ii. 9, 15, in many other passages, as,—the former in Mark v. 15; Luke viii. 35; Rom. xii. 3; 2 Cor. v. 13; 1 Pet. iv. 6,—the latter in Acts xxvi. 25. Φρήν used by Paul only in 1 Cor. xiv. 20, where it occurs twice; besides ἄφρων, ἀφροσύνη, in several passages, and ἄφρων in a moral sense, comp. Eph. v. 17, and Harless on the passage. Already it is evident from this collation of passages, how little reason there is for finding anything perplexing in the use of the word in these epistles. And when we consider further, that as the critics themselves admit, greater stress is laid on the moral side of Christianity in these than in the other epistles, inasmuch as the circumstances of the church required this, the reason of this expression being more frequently used becomes self-evident. In the second epistle to Timothy, where the circumstances are different, we find only σωφρονισμός in one passage. Böttger V., p. 5, correctly observes, that "the expression σωφρών is in strict connexion with the metaphor then before the apostle's mind, of soundness and unsoundness in religious knowledge and religious conduct. For σώφρων = σῶς φρεσίν just denotes the sanitas mentis,—and this, both in opposition to μαίνεσθαι, comp. σωφροσύνη, Acts xxvi. 25, consequently in an intellectual respect, and in opposition to desires and passions as a malady affecting man's moral nature. In this passage, it is opposed to the passionateness expressed in the ὀργίλος, and the following term as such, while φιλάγαθος is opposed in general to the objects there specified, towards which the propensity is directed; it therefore means "discreet, sober." *Just, holy*, both ideas are also elsewhere connected by the apostle, comp. Eph. iv.

24 ; 1 Thess. ii. 10. On the signification of ὅσιος, neither " pious," nor " devoted to God," but pure, holy, as a personal quality, see Harless on Eph. iv. 24. Δίκαιος also will thus not be the designation of the special virtue of justice toward others, a sense which in itself is not suitable to the context, but is to be understood in a general sense of moral probity, as afterwards at ii. 12; Eph. iv. 24 ; 1 Thess. ii. 10. The expressions *lover of what is good*, &c., are not intended to designate special and particular virtues, but to set forth in its various aspects that fundamental state of mind and heart which is right. Comp. on Phil. iv. 8, 9. The explanation : " just towards men, pious towards God," must therefore be rejected. Ἐγκρατῆ used only here, and in this connexion referring not merely to the sexual, but to the passions generally ; Chrysostom : " one who has his passions under command." It is he who has himself in his own power, continens ; the word in its reference particularly to the lusts and desires, contains a more special idea than σώφρων.

Ver. 9—16. The qualification of an ἐπίσκοπος with respect to doctrine, and confirmation of this by a reference to the state of things in Crete.—Ver. 9. The enumeration of the requisite qualifications in a positive form, leads the apostle beyond what the antithesis would have required, inasmuch as he forthwith adds the qualities which a bishop must have with respect to doctrine. Chrysostom : τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εὕροι τις ἄν—ὃ δὲ μάλιστα χαρακτηρίζει τὸν διδάσκαλον τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ δύνασθαι κατηχεῖν τὸν λόγον.—*Holding fast the faithful word*, &c. Ἀντέχεσθαι, similarly Matt. vi. 24 ; Luke xvi. 13, of adherence to a master ; by the apostle in 1 Thess. v. 14, in the sense " taking care of." The radical signification in the construction with the genitive is, " to hold fast by" = " to abide by." So in Herodotus I. 134, ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς ἀρετῆς, comp. Passow. On the frequent use of the word in the Septuagint, see Wahl. Τοῦ κατὰ τὴν διδαχὴν πιστοῦ λόγου is not to be understood as expressing two co-ordinate properties of the λόγος ; but the κατὰ τὴν διδαχὴν more exactly determines the λόγος. Still the κατά may be variously rendered. Calvin, = " for, to," as i. 1 ; others in the general signification = " with respect to," from which certainly would result the suitable sense : " sure with respect to the instruction," *i.e.* the λόγος is described as a sure rule for those who are to teach. But neither of

these significations correspond to the right explanation of *πιστός*, by which is denoted the credibility of the *word*, according to iii. 8 ; 1 Tim. i. 15, iii. 1, iv. 9 ; Rev. xxi. 5, xxii. 6 ; hence Calvin has been led into the mistake of taking *πιστός* = utilis. We shall therefore have to abide by the signification "according to, conformable to," so that *κατὰ διδαχὴν* denotes the ground of the credibility, in so far, namely, as the *word* rests on the apostolic *teaching*. This characteristic forms an antithesis to the immediately following *ματαιολογία*, which does not abide by the sound doctrine, *teaching things which they ought not*, ver. 11. *Ὁ λόγος*, without any further explanation, is used elsewhere by the apostle also to designate the Christian doctrine, Gal. vi. 6 ; Phil. i. 14 ; Col. iv. 8 ; 1 Thess. i. 6. The design of this qualification is then given, *ἵνα*, &c. He is to be able both to admonish with the sound doctrine, and also to refute the gainsayers ; and only then is he qualified for both of these ends, when he has to insist, not on a mere subjective opinion, but on a word delivered to him, and credible because thus delivered to him. *Παρακαλεῖν* denotes one part of his function as a teacher, in connexion with the following *in the sound doctrine*. The *ἐν* shows that *παρακαλεῖν* here signifies not "to comfort," but "to admonish." *Ἡ διδασκαλία ἡ ὑγιαίνουσα* is another expression which critics have put into their index prohibitorum. *Διδασκαλία* is often used by the apostle, Rom. xii. 7, xv. 4 ; Eph. iv. 14 ; Col. ii. 22, to signify both the teaching and the doctrine itself in which instruction is given, as a comparison of the passages cited will show. It has the same twofold signification frequently in the Pastoral Epistles, 1 Tim. i. 10, iv. 1, 6, 13, 16, v. 17, vi. 1, 3 ; 2 Tim. iii. 10, iv. 3 Tit. ; i. 9, ii. 1, 7, 10 ; here as also at ii. 1 it means the doctrine. There is therefore here as yet nothing unpauline. With regard to *ὑγιαίνουσα*, this expression and *ὑγιής* in the sense in which it is here used, occurs only in the Pastoral Epistles, and in them very often, 1 Tim. i. 10, vi. 3 ; 2 Tim. i. 13, iv. 3 ; especially in this epistle, i. 9, 13, ii. 1, 2, ii. 7 (*ὑγιής*), partly in connexion with *λόγος* or *λόγοι*, and partly with *πίστις*. In like manner the opposite of this occurs in the metaphor : *νοσεῖν περὶ ζητήσεις*, 1 Tim. vi. 4, where also the *ζητήσεις* are opposed to the *λόγος* and the *διδασκαλία*, as the *νοσεῖν* to the *ὑγιαίνειν* ; to this belongs also the expression *γάγγραινα*, 2 Tim. ii. 17. De Wette rightly refers for an explanation

to 1 Tim. iv. 6, *the good doctrine*, 1 Tim. vi. 3, *the doctrine according to godliness;* especially however would we refer in connexion with this passage to the words in the opening of the epistle, *the truth which leads to godliness*. Already may we infer from this expression in which the apostle more exactly defines his apostolic office, as also from the frequent recurrence of the expression in this epistle, that it is not one chosen by the apostle at random, and for which any other might be substituted from any of the rest of his epistles. And the critics are then only warranted in characterizing this expression as unpauline, when they are able to point out one corresponding to it from the other epistles, which might take the place of that which has been selected in this passage. So long as they are unable to do this, we must maintain that the apostle himself, even were he not the writer, would have had recourse in this case, to an expression which we do not find elsewhere in his writings. It is just in such an expression as that of this passage, and in its recurrence throughout the Pastoral Epistles, that we clearly see how the peculiar phraseology of these epistles is so closely connected with the state of things which the writer has in his eye. We refer here to what has been already said in the General Introduction. Has the apostle in his eye a state of things in the church, the peculiarity of which consists in a knowledge directed to useless subjects, to *fables* and *commandments of men*, ver. 14, iii. 9, which bear no fruit of moral improvement,—a state of things not indeed implying any open warfare against the truth, but such a placing in the back ground of what is essential, as results in the loss of that power of godliness which lies in the truth, and in a gradual falling away on the part of individuals from the faith—what designation then could be more suitable, than that which is here selected, and which is derived from the comparison with bodily health and sickness? Sound doctrine, *i.e.*, the truth which leads to godliness, i. 1, or *the doctrine which leads to godliness*, 1 Tim. vi. 3, is necessary in order that those infected with the spiritual malady of vain speculation and moral apathy, may be again restored, and brought to the true soundness of the faith. Moreover, De Wette is wrong when he explains the expression *sound doctrine* of moral doctrine; it is rather the Christian doctrine viewed as a doctrine which produces the fruits of godliness, and is opposed to those *questions*

which bear no such fruit, as is evident from 1 Tim. vi. 4. Thus the expression is fully vindicated, as the adequate designation of a new state of things in the church of the apostolic era. We learn also from the other epistles of Paul how easily he could command new expressions when such were necessary. Comp. also on this the General Introduction.

A bishop must be able to admonish with the sound doctrine, and secondly to contradict the gainsayers, inasmuch as he himself stands on the sure ground of the wholesome doctrine. For he would have to deal with a contentious and refractory people in Crete, as is added in ver. 10 by way of confirming the necessity of such qualifications; for there are many unruly and vain talkers and deceivers, chiefly they of the circumcision, whose mouths must be stopped. *Καί* before *ἀνυπότακτοι* is not found in A C. and others. Tischendorf has received it again on the authority of D.E.F.G.I.K., &c., and justly, comp. De Wette. There are many and unruly *ματαιολόγοι* and *φρεναπάται*. The former expression occurs again in an abstract form at 1 Tim. i. 6; similar designations of the corruption which is assailed, such as *foolish questions, empty babblings*, &c, occur often. It is not, however, to be said with De Wette, that the heresy is *characterized* as vain talking, for this overlooks what is specific in the expression; it is not a heresy that is spoken of, but merely a vain talking. What is the import of this *ματαιολογία* we learn from i. 14, iii. 9. *Φρεναπάτης* only here, but *φρεναπατᾷν* is found in Gal. vi. 3. Both expressions denote the evil, the cure of which can be wrought only by the *doctrine* mentioned before. The next words tell us from what source this evil chiefly proceeds: *chiefly they of the circumcision*, comp. with ver. 14. We learn from Josephus and Philo that great numbers of Jews were at that time living in Crete. Comp. Winer, RWB. on Crete. Those here alluded to are not to be conceived of as standing outside of the Christian circle, but as Jewish Christians, who do not abide by the simple truth of the gospel, but mingle with it their own ingredients, and thus obscure the truth and hinder their own moral progress. They have, however, had some success in spreading their errors among the Gentile-Christians; hence *μάλιστα*.

Ver. 11. *Whose mouths must be stopped:* *ἐπιστομίζειν* is found only here, os obturo, to muzzle; in sense = *ἐλέγχειν*, ver.

9. Their pernicious influence is described in what follows: who subvert whole houses teaching things which they ought not, for filthy lucre's sake. *Ἀνατρέπω* = everto, here and in 2 Tim. ii. 18; in this passage it is a figure corresponding to *οἴκους*. The other passage shows in what sense the word is to be taken, inasmuch as the *object* of it is there stated to be—*the faith of some.* This is the effect of their talking,—it leads of itself even further from *faith* and *godliness*, comp. 2 Tim. ii. 16. If, on the other hand, this *vain talking* and *vain babbling*, together with the things mentioned in ver. 14 and in iii. 9 were in decided opposition to the truth, a heresy strictly so-called, and not rather a being taken up with things which do not lead to salvation, and which are destitute of all moral efficacy, then it is impossible to conceive how even a forger should have addressed to Titus iii. 9, and repeatedly to Timothy i. 6—20, ii. 2—16, &c., the admonition not to meddle with these things. This were conceivable only on the supposition that these things had a harmless appearance, but at the same time might lead gradually away from the true foundation of faith and life. De Wette also coincides in this view of the matter, inasmuch as he observes that the expression, *things which they ought not*, but vaguely defines the heresy; an expression, however, all the more suitable if what has just been said is true. On *μή* beside *ὅς* comp. Winer, § 59, 5, c. p. 566, 1 Tim. v. 13. *For the sake of filthy lucre*, comp. above on *αἰσχροκερδῆ* and 1 Tim. vi. 5—10. This motive which is imputed to these opponents, as well as the entire description and confutation of them, shows that we have not here the same hostile principle of Judaism which we find in the epistle to the Galatians, in the epistles to the Corinthians, and in that to the Philippians. There,—Jewish-Christians are described whose zeal for the law made them the enemies of the apostle, here, people whose object is gain, and who seek to make those ingredients with which they disfigure the Christian truth, and which they give out for wisdom, subservient to their own selfish interests. We find the same thing described in 1 Tim. i. 6, where the expression *vain talking* is farther explained by the words, *wishing to be teachers of the law*, ver. 7. Comp. also *the contentions about the law*, Tit. iii. 9 and i. 14.

Ver. 12. One of them, their own prophet has said, the Cretans, &c. One of the three citations from heathen poets which we meet

with in the apostle's writings. We have a complete hexameter in this passage. Comp. Winer, § 68, p. 704. The other citations are to be found in Acts xvii. 28 ; 1 Cor. xv. 33. The poet whose words are cited is Epimenides of Gnossus in Crete, who flourished in the sixth century before Christ, and they are said to be taken from a writing of his *περὶ χρησμῶν*. The beginning of the verse *Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται* is found also in Callimachus the Cyrenaean, who flourished in the third century before Christ,—in his hymn in Jov. v. 8, where the charge of lying refers to the circumstance that the Cretans showed Jupiter's tomb in their island ; and Theodoret has therefore considered the words as cited from him, the incorrectness of which has already been shown by Jerome and Epiphanius. Comp. Matthies against this view. The words designate the well-known national character of the Cretans, such as it is described by many other profane writers, comp. Winer RWB. on Crete. *Κρητίζειν* was used synonymously with *ψεύδεσθαι*, in the same way as *κορινθιάζειν* = scortari. *Κακὰ θηρία* denotes their wildness, rudeness, covetousness, cunning. *Γαστέρες ἀργαί*, for they had the reputation of being drunkards, licentious, idlers ; *the tarrying long at the wine* was regarded by them as an accomplishment, comp. ii. 3 ; Hug Einl. ii. p. 298, s. The critics introduce several objections here. They find, that inasmuch as the words *one of themselves* refer exclusively to the preceding *they of the circumcision*, the application of the verse is far-fetched and unsuitable, since it can be applied properly only to Cretans, while here it is applied to native Jews (comp. Baur die so. g. Pastoralbriefe, p. 121.) De Wette himself has defended the author of the epistle from this charge of impropriety, inasmuch as he shows that it is altogether unnecessary to impute such an absurdity to him ; and he observes quite correctly that the indefinite reference in the words *one of themselves*, applies to the Cretans *not in so far as they were heretics, but as they gave consent to such*, which idea is already involved in the expression *whole houses*, and *μὴ προσέχοντες*, ver. 14. So Böttger, a. a. Q. V. p. 21 : "what Paul says from ver. 12 onwards, refers to those who may have been led away by the heretics, and characterizes them as persons whom it would not be at all difficult to lead away. The expression *whole houses* forms the transition from the heretics to the church." Böttger shows also how natural it was for the apostle to say *one of*

themselves, not *one of the Cretans*, in order to avoid repetition, seeing that he had in his mind the proverb which begins with *the Cretans*. Accordingly, ver. 12 is to be taken not so much as a confirmation of the preceding, but rather as a reason for what follows; still I am not inclined to make so pointed a distinction, between the false teachers and those whom they led away as Böttger does, who maintains that ἐλέγχειν cannot apply to heretics, against which, however, are ver. 9, 10, iii. 10; as indeed the expression heretics in general is not quite suitable. A further objection is brought by the critics against the designati n of Epimenides as a prophet. "It almost appears," says Baur, "as if the writer has called the poet a prophet, in order that he may regard his saying as a prophetical reference to these very heretics *of the circumcision*, as if they had been especially meant." That must certainly appear to the critics on the other side the most probable view, for with this they have something from which they may set out. Thus they can proceed further to say: "a writer who, like the author of these epistles, does not write from the actual state of things before him, but must first create his material, naturally seizes hold of everything that may serve his purpose . . . inasmuch as here, however, where he was speaking of heretics, he thought it necessary to bring in the anti-Judaism of the apostle, so much the more infelicitous was the application of that verse in such a connexion." But, according to Baur, the object of the writer of this epistle was to gain over the Jewish-Christian party. What inducement then had he to introduce here the anti-Judaism of the apostle. That Epimenides was really reputed to be a prophet in ancient times, we learn from various authorities. Plut. Solon. c. 12. Plato legg. 1, 642. Cicero de divin. 1, 18 (vaticinans per furorem.) "Whether the apostle himself also held Epimenides for a prophet," observes Matthies justly, "is quite another and a different point," and, "if heathen idols are loosely termed *gods*, surely the apostle might, without doing violence to Christian piety, give to an important heathen personage the name of *prophet*, which was generally assigned to him." The context, however, shows plainly why the apostle adheres to the appellation which the Cretans assigned to Epimenides. "If he stood so high in their estimation, then must a saying of his have come to them with authority," as Böttger rightly observes, p. 22. On the expression ὁ ἴδιος αὐτῶν προ. comp. Winer, § 22, 7,

p. 178; the pronoun expresses only the idea of "belonging to," the ἴδιος makes the antithesis: their own poet, not a strange one. Finally, the critics find the charge here brought against the Cretans to be unjust (De Wette, p. 2—10), since the apostle seems to have had so much success in his labours amongst them, on which see the Introduction. The apostle, however, is just saying here, that precisely on account of this national character Christianity in Crete was exposed to great danger.

Ver. 13. This testimony is true, the apostle adds, wherefore rebuke them sharply that they may be sound in the faith, &c. Ver. 13, according to De Wette, applies not to the heretics, but to those whom they had seduced into error, or as I would be inclined to express it,—it designates the persons meant as those who had been led away, but who themselves might again be the means of leading others away, comp. Matthies. The word *wherefore* shows plainly the reference of ver. 12 to what follows. Because that is true set them right. The expression δι' ἣν αἰτίαν occurs again only in 2 Tim. i. 6, 12; and Heb. ii. 11. The apostle here drops the reference to the bishops who were to be appointed, and lays on Titus himself the charge of applying the proper remedy. Thus the term ἔλεγχε forms the natural transition to the further exhortation addressed to Titus, ii. 1, ss. Ἔλεγχε, as at i. 9, is set them right with reprehension; and he is to set them right *sharply*: the nature of the people requires this. A hint this, worthy of being well considered in a practical point of view! This word (ἀποτόμως) is also found in other epistles of the apostle, and is used only by him. As an adverb it occurs again in 2 Cor. 13, 10,—as a substantive, Rom. xi. 22; in the latter passage it stands opposed to χρηστότης, in the former it is characterized as a means to edification. Sharpness and severity are but the other side of love itself, when the wounds can be healed only by cutting. "Sharply, because such persons could not be brought down by gentleness; inflict, therefore, he says, a heavier stroke," Chrysostom. The object of this procedure is then stated—*that they may be sound in the faith*. There is no reason for taking ἵνα here as equivalent to ὅτι. It expresses the same thing as is expressed by εἰς οἰκοδομήν in 2 Cor. xiii. 10; only the apostle adheres to the metaphor employed in ver. 9. They are, so to speak, infected with the malady of *vain questions*, &c., 1 Tim. vi. 4, comp. with Tit. iii. 9. "Plainly not

heretics," observes De Wette also here, and Matthies is quite right when he says, that the words *in the faith* express precisely the thing in which, as unhealthy persons, they need restoration. "For their faith was infected with the heresy,—their evangelical nature partly corrupted; ἐν, however, is not = διά, but denotes the element of life in which they may rejoice in perfect health, if only their faith is emptied of all foreign and morbid ingredients." It is evident from this, how entirely different the state of things here from what we find for example in the epistle to the Galatians, where the apostle addresses those who had been led away in the words, *ye are removed unto another gospel*, i. 6, and again, *Christ is made of none effect to you*, v. 4. We have not here an error of the kind described in these passages,—a doctrine opposed directly to the gospel and the faith,—but an *unsoundness in the faith*, and in *the truth which is according to godliness*, as the apostle indicates in the very outset of the epistle.

But the apostle himself proceeds, in ver. 14, to explain more fully what he means by this *unsoundness*, by describing the malady of which the Cretan Christians must be cured. It is plain from ver. 6—9 that the apostle does not intend to say, that all without exception have been infected with this malady. Not giving heed to Jewish fables and commandments of men that turn from the truth. On προσέχειν, comp, Winer, § 66, 7 a., p. 668; νοῦν is not to be supplied, as in 1 Tim. i. 4, iv. 1, and elsewhere; Heb. ii. 1; Acts viii. 6, 16, 14. For the more general use of the word, 1 Tim. iii. 8, iv. 13, comp. Heb. vii. 13. These *fables* are mentioned also in 1 Tim. i. 4, iv. 7; 2 Tim. iv. 4. In the passage first cited it occurs along with *endless genealogies*, with which Tit. iii. 9 is to be compared, where in like manner genealogies are specified as the subject with which these opponents employ themselves. In that passage also we find *the questions* and *strivings about the law* which are mentioned in Tit. iii. 9 in the same connexion, comp. i. 4, 7, vi. 4. *Vain talking* is also specified there, in connexion with these errors, i. 6. We find there also the same thing placed in opposition to these errors, namely, *soundness*, as associated with the true doctrine, 1 Tim. i. 10, vi. 3 (νοσεῖν occurs ver. 4),—and the same stress laid on the practical side of Christianity of which we have an indication in the frequent use of the word *godliness, godly*, 1 Tim. ii. 2, iii. 16, iv. 7, vi. 3, 6, 11. And the second epistle to

Timothy partakes also in proportion of these peculiarities. Everywhere do we find this error traced to the same state of mind as its source, comp. Tit. i. 15, 16; 1 Tim. i. 19, vi. 5, &c., to the same governing motive, Tit. i. 11; 1 Tim. vi. 9; and described as leading to the same result, Tit. i. 11, 13; 1 Tim. i. 4, vi. 4; 2 Tim. ii. 14, ss., ii. 23. In short, there can be no question that by these fables, together with the genealogies and the more indefinite designations such as questions, vain talking, strifes of words, &c., one and the same error is to be understood, as indeed the most of expositions proceed upon this understanding. If now we look more particularly at the passage under consideration, it is manifest, as has already been observed, that the *not giving heed to Jewish fables*, together with what follows, denotes the malady with which the Christianity of the Cretans was infected, and of which they must be cured in order to come to *soundness in the faith*. The opposite of these errors is the *sound doctrine*, as we learn from ver. 13 and ii. 1. That by this *doctrine*, however, nothing else can be understood than *the doctrine according to godliness*, 1 Tim. vi. 3, or as it is called in our epistle, i. 1, *the truth which is according to godliness*, is admitted by De Wette, and is in itself quite evident. Thus the *fables*, as also the *commandments of men*, are designated here only as things which do not tend to godliness, which do not promote true piety. And quite the same thing is predicated of them in 1 Tim. i. 4, *which minister questions rather than godly edifying in faith*. Titus as well as Timothy is admonished not to meddle with these things; comp. 1 Tim. i. 7, vi. 20; 2 Tim. ii. 16, 23, with Tit. iii. 9; and the being taken up with these things is everywhere described, not as what is directly opposed to the Christian truth, but as a tendency which is vain and fruitless, not productive of true godliness but rather gradually leading away from the truth which tends to godliness, and from the faith. Comp. iii. 9 of this epistle with 1 Tim. i. 4, iv. 7, vi. 4, 21; 2 Tim. ii. 14, 16, 17, 23. Commentators generally have paid too little attention to the circumstances here noticed,—inasmuch as they have characterized this error all at once as a heresy,—and the critics to whom we have referred still less. How weak and pointless would be such designations as profitless, unfruitful, if errors directly opposed to the truth are meant? How could the apostle warn even Timothy and Titus against it if it were a heresy strictly

so called, and not rather things which appear to be harmless, but which are in themselves useless and vain, and from being unfavourable to moral earnestness become dangerous to the faith? And not merely in the case of the apostle, but even in the case of a forger of the second century, whose aim was to refute Gnosticism, such designations of the heresies to which he was opposed would be quite unaccountable; unaccountable that he should even for a moment think of warning Timothy and Titus against participating in such heresies, that he should characterize these heresies themselves only as something profitless, and represent the falling away from the faith only as something to which they might possibly lead; while the controversialists of the second century consider them as in themselves apostacy, and even as blasphemy. We refer on this to the General Introduction. In regard to the passage before us, it is sufficient for us to have shown, on the one hand, that by the fables and the other kindred characteristics by which the errors combated in the three epistles are described, one and the same thing is meant, and on the other, that the point of view in which these fables are presented is not that of a heresy, but of a tendency unfavourable to true godliness and to soundness in the faith. So much in particular with reference to the passage before us; and that the case is not otherwise with reference to the other passages will be shown in the exposition. With regard to the expression *μῦθοι* itself, which besides in the Pastoral Epistles occurs only in 2 Pet. i. 16, it is here sufficiently determined by its being opposed to the *faithful word*, &c., ver. 9, and by its connexion with *commandments of men*, and must denote that which is not to be depended on, which wants a sure foundation. Still more pointed is 2 Tim. iv. 4, where *μῦθοι* are opposed to *ἀλήθεια*; similarly 1 Tim. i. 4, where *προσέχειν μύθοις* serves more exactly to define *ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν*, and in like manner 1 Tim. iv. 7, where the *μῦθοι* stand opposed to the *λόγοι τῆς πίστεως καὶ τῆς καλῆς διδασκαλίας*. To this also corresponds the use of the word in 2 Pet. i. 16, where *following cunningly devised fables* is opposed to *being eye-witnesses* of the event referred to. With respect farther to the contents of these *fables*, it is quite evident that they must have pertained to religion, for how otherwise could soundness in the faith be opposed to them, or how could they result in apostacy from the faith? A more particular description of them, however, cannot be obtained from the

epistles, except that we may suppose the fables to have been closely connected with the genealogies on the authority of 1 Tim. i. 4, where they occur together, and Tit. iii. 9, where in the enumeration of the characteristics of the general error to which they belong, the *fables* are not mentioned, but the *genealogies* are put in place of them. We learn only further from 1 Tim. iv. 7, that they were *profane* and *old wives' fables* (comp. the exposition), and from the passage before us that they were of Jewish origin and character, like the *commandments of men* with which they are connected; a designation which certainly corresponds but little to the Valentinian system, the entire character of which, according to Baur's own representation, rather denies than betrays its Jewish origin (Gnosis, p. 122.) Thus from the passage before us, taken in connection with the kindred passages in the other epistles, we can only obtain certain general marks from which to draw the special signification of *μῦθοι*. These alone form the sure results of the exegesis; every thing farther must be the result of historical research, and we refer therefore to the General Introduction, § 4.—Along with the *fables* the apostle also mentions *the commandments of men, who turn away from the truth,* as a source of unsoundness, comp. iii. 9. So also 1 Tim. i. 7, *wishing to be teachers of the law,* iv. 8, *bodily exercise*—(iv. 3 goes farther.) The expression, *commandments of men,* implies an antithesis to the *commandments of God,* whose place they usurp, comp. Matt. xv. 9; Mark vii. 7; Col. ii. 22. That also which in its nature and import is godly, may by a perverted application become the *commandments of men. Men who turn away from the truth, ἀποστρεφομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν.* The verb in an active signification, also in Rom. xi. 26, and the same as here, Heb. xii. 25. The middle in a transitive signification, hence the accus. Comp. Winer, § 39, 2, p. 293. With respect to the sense Matthies well observes, "they turn away from the truth in so far as . . . . . they let the revealed word of truth disappear amid their selfish degenerate tendencies." Here also it is no direct warfare against the truth that is spoken of. We learn from vv. 15 and 16 to what these commandments referred, namely, to the distinction between clean and unclean, with which we naturally associate the prohibitions in regard to food, and whatever else belongs to a *bodily exercise.* But it is not the common Jewish stand-point that is here meant, according to which injury was done to the faith by giving an undue

place and prominence to the law: this is evident from the expression *commandments of men*, and not to speak of this, from the whole manner in which the apostle opposes the error; and it has also been declared by Neander, and even by his opponent Baur (die s. g. Pastoralbriefe, p. 22, ss.), while De Wette understands by it not simply the Mosaic prohibitions with regard to food, but the traditional additions and exaggerations which these underwent. As these seducers thought to improve the Christian truth in an intellectual respect by their additions, so would they also promote its perfection in an ethical respect by their commandments, while in reality by the one as well as by the other, they hindered the true soundness in the faith. Here also we have nothing mainly and directly opposed to the *faith*, as is evident from the connexion with the preceding, and also from the admonition addressed to Titus iii. 9, not to meddle with these *controversies about the law*, and the designation of these as *profitless* and *vain*. I must therefore coincide with Baur, when he maintains (p. 230), that the opponents in this passage bear much less of the common Judaistic character than the Colossian heretics, and that the manner in which they are opposed here is quite different from that in the epistle to the Colossians, where the apostle by no means fails to refer to the inferior position of Judaism as compared with the higher one of Christianity. But what right has Baur all at once to throw this passage and 1 Tim. iv. 3, together, when the expression, *latter times*, in that passage points at what is to happen at a future period, and forbids (as he himself maintains), our connecting it with earlier and already existing heretics, such as were those in Colosse? Does the same expression not also forbid our connecting it with cotemporary errors, as would be the case were we to connect it with Tit. i. 14? And how little does it agree with the contents of our epistle to assert, that it differs from that to the Colossians, inasmuch as the error which is opposed in the latter, is by no means such a radical contradiction of Christianity, destitute of all truth, as we find in the former? For where is there a single trace of any such radical contradiction to Christianity in our epistle? Quite the contrary is the case. Nowhere does the epistle point at any fundamental opposition to the truth, it speaks only of corruptions which promote neither the knowledge of that on which all depends, nor true godliness, but rather lead away from

these. If, however, the characteristics of the heretics in this epistle are to be regarded as applicable to Marcion, and to him alone, then indeed must we attribute to them a dualistic view of the world, such as belongs to Gnosticism, together with a dislike of the Creator of the world, opinions to which such epithets as *profitless* and *vain*, as well as the warning addressed to Titus against meddling with such things, are as far from being suitable, as is the opposition to it implied in the *sound doctrine*, i. 9, ii. 1. And even then it must still be shown, that the characteristics can correspond only to Marcion. For had not the Jewish-Christians at Rome, according to Baur's own representation, a dualistic notion with reference to the world quite kindred in its root to the later Ebionitism? Or might it be objected, as Baur has done, to this analogous case, that there is a wide interval between the germ and the theoretically developed system? But where do we find such a system in this epistle? *All things are pure*, says the apostle in opposition to these commandments of men, and he says just the same in Rom. xiv. 20. And how shall it be proved with reference to the church at Rome, that the germ which was then present in it grew into a system, such as that of the pseudo-Clementine homilies; and yet, on the other hand, that from what is said in our epistle, more especially as to the ascetic principles of the opponents, only a Marcionetic system could result, "chiefly because," as Baur maintains, "the notions with respect to the world entertained by the writer of the Clementine homilies, bears quite the character of the Marcionitic dualism?" (Christ. Gnosis, p. 325.) We would simply say, with reference to the degree of asceticism which we find represented in this passage, that even although it should be regarded as going beyond the mere insisting on the Mosaical prohibitions of meats, we can point to analogous manifestations in the apostolic time, such as those described in the fourteenth chapter of Romans, and in the epistle to the Colossians; comp. the Commentary.

Ver. 15. This ascetic tendency which places the distinction of clean and unclean in the things themselves, and consequently in the use of these finds a hindrance or a furtherance to moral perfection, is opposed by the apostle in the assertion, that the distinction does not lie in the things themselves, but in the disposition of him who uses them. Where that is pure, then all is pure; in the other case,

nothing is pure. The phrase *πάντα καθαρά* (for *μέν* is to be cancelled according to A.C.D.*E.*F.*G., &c.) is found also at Rom. xiv. 20. The sentiment in itself is the same, the connexion however in which it is there used is different. There, it is an acknowledgment of the truth which those whom the apostle is setting right bring forward in their defence, and the *but* which follows, places in opposition to this truth the other, which in consequence of it was forgotten by them. It would be wrong to transfer this reference to the passage before us, and here also to take the *all things are pure*, as an acknowledgment on the part of the apostle, according to which he combats a false view of Christian freedom. Against this is the expression, *commandments of men*, and the form in which he opposes the error, as we may see clearly by comparing the passage in Romans with 1 Cor. vi. 12, x. 23; for were we to suppose that the following *but* introduces the apostle's own view, which he places in opposition to the admission just made, it will at once be perceived that the *but* introduces no such sentiment as could be placed in opposition to the phrase immediately preceding. Quite as mistaken is the view which explains the *all things* to mean the errors of the opponents, according to which the apostle would say, that these do not injure the pure; against this view De Wette and Matthies have said all that is necessary. By the *πάντα* (here as universal as at Rom. xiv. 20, and 1 Cor. ii. 12) can only be understood the entire range of those things to which the distinction between pure and impure can be applied; still, as De Wette remarks with truth, it is not actions, but the materials of action that are meant. *Pure*, in opposition to the view which finds something impure in the things themselves, so that their use has something polluting in it. The words of Rom. xiv. 20 will serve to explain those now before us. And we learn from Acts x. 14, xi. 8, how closely connected such a view was with the Old Testament stand point, so that we need no Gnostic aversion to the creation in order to its explanation. *Τοῖς καθαροῖς*, not the dative of estimation, "in the estimation of the pure," but "pure for them in the use," as the antithesis shows. It is also shown in the antithetical terms *defiled* and *unbelieving*, the latter of which is explanatory of the former, what kind of purity is meant,—that purity, namely, of mind and heart which proceeds from faith. It is arbitrary to assign to the word the signification of "free from prejudice," as is done by

De Wette, although in 1 Cor. x. 26, 1 Tim. iv. 4, knowledge is mentioned as a condition of the state expressed in the term *καθαρός*; comp. Rom. xiv. 14. As to the pure all things are pure, so to the defiled and the unbelieving nothing is pure, *i.e.* the impurity of their mind is reflected from the things with which they come into contact: "all things become to them the materials of sin." (De Wette.) On *μεμιαμμένοις* instead of *μεμιασμένοις*, Winer, § 15, p. 99. The word commonly used to express Levitical purity, John xviii. 28, and in the Septuagint, is here transferred to the state of mind, comp. Heb. xii. 15; Jude 8. On this very account perhaps is the designation *unbelieving* added, which determines the sense of the preceding expression to be, the impurity of unbelief. That the apostle has here in his eye the authors of those *commandments* (ver. 14) we learn from the following words, *but*, &c., which refer specially to them. These words declare in a positive form why nothing is pure to the *defiled* and the *unbelieving*; this, however, is stated not in the form of a reason, but simply as the opposite of what precedes, as in 1 Cor. xv. 10, *ἀλλά* also is used, where, however, the sentiment might quite as well be applied in a causal form. "But their mind and conscience is defiled." The defilement which already exists within them communicates itself to every thing with which they come into contact; even the purest thing thus becomes impure. By *νοῦς* the apostle denotes not merely the understanding, but the entire mental habitus = sense; *συνείδησις*, however, is conscience, the moral consciousness of my thoughts and feelings, and manner of conduct in their relation to the law. It is a standing feature of the errors combated in the Pastoral Epistles, that they have their source in a defiled conscience, a depraved mind, 1 Tim. i. 19, iii. 9, vi. 5. Such a state of mind has no relish for the simple truth of the gospel, and therefore leads into those by-paths of error; for the reception of the Christian truth, as well as the maintenance of it, requires a certain moral integrity which is not to be found in persons of this description.

Their moral deficiency is described in ver. 16. They are men who are entirely wanting in moral earnestness, and in all power for what is good. "They profess that they know God, but in works they deny it, being abominable and disobedient, and unto every good work reprobate." After *ἀρνοῦνται* supply *εἰδέναι*; compare on the expression ii. 12; 1 Tim. v. 8; 2 Tim. ii. 12, iii. 5, and elsewhere,

1 John ii. 22, 23 ; Luke xxii. 57, &c. That it does not elsewhere occur in the apostle's writings is indeed true, but no one will therefore hold the sentiment to be unpauline. *Βδελυκτοί* only here, in the Sept. used for תּוֹעֵבָה, does not designate the seducers as idolators, but, in its connexion with the following general predicates, denotes their moral abandonment, which is such as to make them an abomination. The expression, however, is not selected without a reference to the foregoing ; while they lay stress on the contracting of *abomination* from outward things, they themselves are *abominable*, comp. Rom. ii. 22, and Lev. xi. 10, 13, ss. *Disobedient*, as at iii. 3, namely, towards God ; compare with Eph. ii. 2, v. 6. *Ἀδόκιμος* = reprobus, here as elsewhere in a passive signification, 2 Tim. iii. 8 ; Rom. i. 28 ; 1 Cor. ix. 27, &c. The critics have also much to object to in this passage "on the heretics," ver. 10—16. They find that the heretics themselves are indistinctly characterized (so De Wette, Einl. p. 3) ; this, however, will not agree with what De Wette himself says in the page immediately before, that the apostle warns Titus against the heretics, "from a knowledge which implies a lengthened observation of them." Further, it is alleged that nothing is said in opposition to them by the apostle that might serve as an adequate refutation of their errors. But only on the supposition that we find here the forms of the later gnosis already distinctly stamped, can the designation, as also the refutation, of the errors appear to be inadequate. That without this supposition, a distinct view of the error of these opponents in its original source, its manifestations, and its results, may be obtained from this passage, has, we hope, been satisfactorily shown in the exposition. Nor do I know what more suitable confutation could have been given of those who, themselves inwardly impure, lay stress on a certain outward purity, than that which the apostle has given in ver. 15. If it is difficult for us to determine with certainty the sense of this or that expression, such a difficulty is at once accounted for by the fact, that the apostle was writing to Titus, who knew well what the apostle meant, and for whom the indications which he gives as to the real source of the error were amply sufficient.

§ 3. WHAT TITUS IS TO TEACH IN OPPOSITION TO THE FALSE TEACHERS, AND HOW HE IS TO ACT.

(Ch. ii. 1—iii. 11.)

A. In reference to the right deportment of Christians, and that according to sex, age, and rank. (Ch. ii. 1—15.)

The apostle now lays down what Titus is to teach, in opposition to the vain, unprofitable talk, the contents of which are specified at ver. 14 as fables and commandments of men, and to which belongs no morally regenerating influence. He states it summarily in ver. 1 as *the things which become sound doctrine*, an expression which could not be selected in opposition to a cardinal heresy, but only in opposition to a doctrine which is destitute of the fruits of godliness. The apostle farther explains in ver. 2—10; what he means by *the things which become*, &c., inasmuch as he there prescribes to Titus how he is to exhort the aged men in the church, ver. 2, then ver. 3 the aged women, in order that through their instrumentality the younger persons of their sex may be directed to what is good. Then ver. 6, how he is to exhort young men, where also the apostle, ver. 7 and 8, interposes an admonition to Titus, to show himself a pattern in conformity to his calling. Then ver. 9 and 10, what is necessary for slaves, in order that they may adorn the doctrine of God. From these injunctions intended for individuals, according to sex, age, and rank, the apostle then, ver. 11, reverts to the great truth on which the foregoing exhortations are founded (γάρ), namely, that the end for which the divine grace hath been manifested in regard to all is, that we might begin and carry forward a new godly life here below, in the expectation of the glorious appearing of Him, who designed by his death to purchase a peculiar people for himself, zealous of good works. This then Titus is to urge in every way on those under his care, and not to give himself any concern about his youth. Thus the apostle concludes, in order, at iii. 1, to pass to a new admonition bearing on a different relation, that, namely, in which Christians stand to magistrates.

Ver. 1. But speak thou, says the apostle to Titus, what becomes the sound doctrine. Titus, in opposition to the seducers described

before and their doings, is to speak what becomes the sound doctrine. *Ἃ πρέπει* cannot denote the true doctrine itself in opposition to the error, but only what is conformable to the sound doctrine which leads to godliness; it is, as is plain from what follows, the right moral deportment as founded in the facts of the gospel plan of salvation (ver. 11) that is meant. We perceive also here, that they are not errors of a dogmatical kind which the apostle refutes, for all that he brings forward of this kind (ver. 11; iii. 3, ss.) has but a subordinate relation to the moral precepts which are laid down, and is brought forward only to confirm these. If then Titus, in opposition to the prevailing error, is to urge with all his might the moral requirements of Christianity, and to enjoin a moral conduct corresponding to the sound doctrine, it is clear that the main and essential characteristic of that error must have been its moral unfruitfulness, and its tendency to divert from strenuous efforts after holiness by leading its followers to take themselves up with profitless questions. The critics, however, do not allow themselves to be disturbed by this in their suppositions with regard to heresies, but rather put forward the objection (comp. De Wette's Comm. p. 14), that one would look for a fundamental principle to be opposed to the heresy (said indeed to be but vaguely described), instead of which, however, there follow only certain moral precepts (for as also in 1 Tim. i. 10, the *sound doctrine* is viewed in its moral aspect), to which, moreover, the heretics themselves would assuredly have also subscribed. It is evident from such expressions, how by their groundless pre-suppositions they have made it impossible for them to come to the right understanding of the epistle, and at the same time, that they give testimony to the correctness of our view by acknowledging, that in the passage before us nothing is said in opposition to a dogmatical error, but only to a tendency that was vain and fruitless in a moral point of view. When, further, it is objected, that the opponents would assuredly have also subscribed to the moral precepts that are laid down, here again an entirely false point of view is taken up. For the apostle does not confute the opponents with these precepts, but he tells Titus what he is to insist on, namely, on a conduct becoming the gospel, a conduct the real nature of which he further shows with reference to the natural distinctions of sex, age, and rank. It is not said that those opponents had denied the rightness

of these moral precepts, but only that it is necessary in opposition to them to turn away the attention from the false direction towards subjects morally unprofitable, and to lead to a manifestation of faith in a corresponding moral conduct. Calvin says well: "besides, he therefore deals more in exhortations, because those who were intent on useless questions needed chiefly to be re-called to the study of a holy and honest life; for there is nothing that will more effectually allay the wandering curiosity of men, than their being brought to recognize those duties in which they ought to exercise themselves."

Ver. 2. The apostle now begins with his moral injunctions for the aged. *That the aged men be sober*, &c. On *πρεσβύτας* comp. Philm. 9; Luke i. 18, denoting merely the age, and therefore to be distinguished from *πρεσβύτερος*, the official designation. *Νηφαλίους*, "sober" in the proper sense of the term, comp. i. 7; ii. 3 is found also in 1 Tim. iii. 2, 11; *σεμνούς*, besides in the Pastoral Epistles, occurs only in Phil. iv. 8, "dignified." *Σώφρονας*, "steady, discreet," comp. on i. 8. *Ὑγιαίνοντας*, &c., sound with respect to faith, love, patience. The expression comprehensively denotes that moral perfection which we are warranted to expect chiefly in a *πρεσβύτης*. If *patience* is used here in place of *hope* (comp. 1 Cor. xiii. 13), it is with the view of giving prominence to that moral energy, in virtue of which the Christian stands fast, comp. 1 Thess. i. 3, in which both are connected. Chrysostom: "the apostle has well said *in patience*, for this is especially suitable to old men." On the connexion between *love* and *patience* comp. 1 Cor. xiii. 7. De Wette's remark is unfounded, that *ὑγιαίν.* in reference to *τῇ ἀγάπῃ* and *τῇ ὑπομονῇ* is an inaccurate expression for: fruitful in love, strong in patience. *Ὑγιαίνων* denotes the man who is as he ought to be, in a normal condition in every respect.

Ver. 3. *The aged women likewise*, &c. A similar character is required in them, hence *likewise*, which places them side by side with the *aged men*. *Κατάστημα* used by the profane writers and elsewhere (Ign. ad Trall. c. 3), not merely of the dress, but of the whole deportment. *Ἱεροπρεπεῖς* only here, conveniens hominibus Deo sacris (Wahl), is explained by 1 Tim. ii. 10, *which becometh women professing godliness*, Eph. v. 3, *as becometh saints*. Their priestly calling should manifest itself in their whole conduct.

Jerome: "that their very gait and motions, their countenance, their speech, their silence, may carry in them a certain dignity of sacred beauty." *Not slanderers, not given to much wine*, faults of which the first is frequent in this class, the second doubtless bears reference to the national character of the people. Not slanderers, 1 Tim. iii. 11, not given to much wine,—not indulging the inclination for wine. Similarly 1 Tim. iii. 8, comp. with 2 Pet. ii. 19. Further, *καλοδιδασκάλους* only here, honestatis magistrae; not by public addresses (1 Tim. ii. 12; 1 Cor. xiv. 34), but by private admonition and the example of their conduct, in order that through their instrumentality the young women might be directed to what is good.

Ver. 4. *Ἵνα σωφρονίζωσι* (Tischendorf, *σωφρονίζουσι*, according to A.F.G.H., comp. Winer, § 42, 1, p. 335) *τὰς νέας*. *Σωφρονίζειν* only here = to set right. The following infinitives depend on *σωφρονίζωσι*, although the following *σώφρονας* may certainly seem strange according to this view of the construction; hence many commentators are rather for taking these infinitives as dependent on *λάλει*, ver. 1. Against this, however, is the infinitive *εἶναι*, which in this case would better be wanting, and also that the following special characteristics are more suitable to young wives (by *νέας* are to be understood married women), and, lastly, that in reference to these too little would be said in proportion. It is doubtless not by chance merely that the apostle gives directions for the younger women to be taught by the elder, and not directly by Titus, which also Chrysostom and others have noticed. They are to be directed to love their husbands and children, for in this lies the foundation of all domestic happiness; further, to be modest, chaste, keepers at home, kind, obedient to their husbands. If *σωφρονίζειν* comprehends all the following characteristics, then in its more general signification of "to set right," it must be understood as = *νουθετεῖν* or *παιδεύειν*, as Theophylact explains it. *Σώφρονας* is then "discreet, judiciously modest." (Matthies.) *Ἁγνός* in its more special signification = chaste. *Οἰκουρούς* (according to C.D.***H.I.K., &c., and *οἰκουργούς* according to A.C.D.*F.G.; the latter occurs nowhere else = active in household affairs.) Hesychius, *οἰκουρός· ὁ φροντίζων τὰ τοῦ οἴκου καὶ φυλάττων· οὖρος γὰρ ὁ φύλαξ λέγεται*; comp. 1 Tim. v. 13; Pro. vii. 11. *Ἀγαθάς* is not to be connected with *οἰκουρούς*, as the latter is already

a complete idea in itself; but = "kind," as Matt. xx. 15; 1 Pet. ii. 18; Rom. v. 7. Heydenreich: "their thriftiness must not degenerate into avarice." *Subject to their husbands*, Eph. v. 22; Col. iii. 18, &c. Ἴδιος ἀνήρ, husband, comp. Winer, § 22, 7, p. 178. *That the word of God be not blasphemed*, comp. ver. 8 and 10; 1 Tim. v. 14, vi. 1; Rom. ii. 24. Theophylact: "unless we are virtuous blasphemy will come through us to the faith." Chrysostom connects with this especially the case of a Christian wife having a heathen husband. An unnecessary limitation, as the comparison with other passages shows.

Ver. 6. The apostle now turns to the younger men. They stand opposed to the πρεσβύτας, ver. 2, just as the νέαι to the πρεσβύτιδες, ver. 3. Young unmarried women are therefore not to be included in the νεωτέρους; for that the νέαι, ver. 4, are spoken of in close connexion with the πρεσβύτιδες, is accounted for by the relation which is to subsist between them as teachers and taught, and can therefore not be brought as a proof against this arrangement. The apostle sums up in the word σωφρονεῖν every duty to which they are to be admonished. Calvin: bene compositos, et rationi obtemperantes. Chrysostom: "nothing is so hard and difficult at this age as to overcome pleasures and follies."

Ver. 7. To this class Titus himself belongs (comp. ver. 15), and therefore the apostle here interposes an admonition to him, to show himself a pattern of good works. The apostle thus gives us to understand that all teaching and exhortation are useless, unless the teacher's example confirm and enforce his word. Titus is to show himself in every respect a pattern of good works. On περί as denoting the objects about which an action is conversant = "in respect to, see Winer, § 53, i. p. 482; comp. 1 Tim. i. 19; 2 Tim. iii. 8, and also elsewhere, Phil. ii. 23; Luke x. 41, &c. On the middle παρεχόμενος connected with the reflex pronoun, see Winer, § 39, 6, p. 298.—Καλῶν ἔργων, as ver. 14, iii. 8—14; 1 Tim. v. 10—25, vi. 18, and ἔργα ἀγαθά, 1 Tim. ii. 10; 2 Tim. ii. 21; Tit. iii. 1. "A characteristic of the Pastoral Epistles," observes De Wette on this expression; he himself however refers to Eph. ii. 20: *created anew in Christ Jesus unto good works*, where we find quite the same expression and idea,—for by these good works are to be understood, as Matthies expresses it, the attestation of

evangelical life. It is the manifestation of that in the life, which the apostle denotes in ver. 1 by *ἃ πρέπει* as the import of his admonitions. Comp. General Introduction, § 4. The only thing then in regard to this expression, that is peculiar to the Pastoral Epistles, is the more frequent use of it. But when we consider the nature of the error to which opposition is made in these epistles, the more frequent use of this expression will be fully accounted for; comp., moreover, *καλοποιεῖν*, in 2 Thess. iii. 13—*Τύπος*, used in like manner of the apostle in Phil. iii. 17, comp. the comment. Then follow the words: *ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ ἀδιαφθορίαν* (the older and more authorized reading *ἀφθορίαν* signifies the same thing), *καὶ σεμνότητα*, &c. In order to the right understanding of these words, it must not be overlooked that they set forth that in which Titus is to show himself a pattern of his own instructions to others. Further, that *διδασκαλία* may signify as well the doctrine in which instruction is given as the teaching itself, we have seen at ver. 9. It will therefore not do to connect *ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ* with the immediately preceding, according to which the sense would be: Titus is to show himself in every department of his teaching a pattern of good works. This limitation of the example to the teaching, yields no suitable sense, and the words can give no other sense in this connexion. If, then, Titus is to show himself in all respects as a pattern, then in the words, *in doctrine*, the special sphere of his vocation is brought into prominence, after the foregoing expression *περὶ πάντα* had set forth in a general form all things in which he is to be a pattern. As well generally as specially in his official calling is he to show himself a pattern. *Uncorruptness* is, however, not to be understood as expressing a quality of the doctrine, but a personal quality, for this is required by the idea of the *τύπος*, and also by the quality expressed in the word following, namely, *gravity*. *Ἀφθορία* signifies, therefore, not purity of doctrine, but sincerity of mind in teaching, and is to be compared with 2 Cor. xi. 3, *lest your minds should be corrupted* (*φθαρῇ*) *from the simplicity that is in Christ*. *Σεμνότης* will thus mean a dignified seriousness in setting forth the Christian truth. The end sought to be gained is, that the learners may, through his instructions, be penetrated with the personal sincerity,—"which is concerned only about the communication of the pure truth" (Heydenreich)—and the deep seriousness of

the teacher. Thus does he who teaches show himself a *pattern* in his teaching; the truth and power of that which he makes known is perceived in his own person. The verb παρεχόμενος is to be connected with these substantives, as also with the following λόγον ὑγιῆ, comp. Acts xix .24; Col. iv. 1.

Ver. 8. If our interpretation is so far correct, then can λόγον ὑγιῆ not be understood of private conversation, as Calvin explains it: sanus sermo ad communem vitam et privata colloquia refertur. After the foregoing expression *in doctrine*, which transfers us to the sphere of Titus' official calling, a new characteristic would certainly be requisite, in contradistinction to it, in order to intimate that the λόγος does not also belong to it. But neither can λόγος ὑγιής be understood to mean the sound Christian doctrine, for this would not correspond to ἀκατάγνωστος and the reference to τύπος; rather, λόγος ὑγιής and ἀκατάγνωστος in close connexion with the preceding, are meant to designate the qualities and character of the discourse, *sincerity* and *seriousness* in the speaker being presupposed: it will be sound speech that cannot be condemned. Ἀκατάγνωστος only here, comp. κατεγνωσμένος, Gal. ii. 11. The apostle now adds, as at vers. 5 and 10, the design of all this, it is that the enemy may be ashamed, having no evil thing to say of us. Περὶ ἡμῶν, not περὶ ὑμῶν, is certainly the true reading according to critical authorities; it is likewise more suitable that the apostle should here place himself in the same category with Titus when he is speaking of the διδασκαλία. It is difficult to say with certainty whether the Christian or the heathen opponents are to be understood as referred to in the expression, *he that is of the contrary part*,—for the apostle must certainly have had in his mind either the one class or the other. In the case of the former being meant, reference is made to i. 9, 2 Tim. ii. 25 (Heydenreich), and in favour of the latter, the analogy in vers. 5 and 10, and 1 Tim. v. 14 is appealed to (De Wette.) It appears to me from the whole context, in which Titus is enjoined to teach and to labour in opposition to the false seducers (comp. ii. 1), and also from the apostle's placing himself here in the same category with Titus, to be more natural to refer the expression to these opponents. If Titus oppose them without being, as he is here admonished to be, a pattern in his whole deportment, he will then not escape their malicious retorts. Ἐντραπέσθαι, literally to be turned in upon themselves

= "be ashamed," 1 Cor. iv. 14, 2 Thess, iii. 14, &c. φαῦλος, comp. John iii. 20, v. 29; Jam. iii. 16; Rom. ix. 11.

Ver. 9, 10. The construction interrupted in vers. 7 and 8 is now without any further notice continued; the infinitives, therefore, are dependent on παρακάλει, ver 6. The apostle gives here also special injunctions to be addressed to slaves, as in Eph. vi. 5, ss., Col. iii. 22; 1 Tim. vi. 1, ss.; 1 Cor. vii. 21; comp. also 1 Pet. ii. 18. The reason of these repeated exhortations is plain enough. In no rank was the high idea of Christian freedom and equality more in danger of being misapplied, than in that of the slave, which indeed appeared to be a direct contradiction of this idea. Hence the apostle's sentiments on the subject of their emancipation, 1 Cor. vii. 21, hence the ever recurring exhortation to *subjection* and *obedience*. And indeed whether the master was a heathen or a Christian, in either case it was natural for the slave who had become a Christian to forget his place, and to seek either to exalt himself above his master, or to put himself on a level with him. Thus in this passage also the first thing that is enjoined is *subjection to their masters*. Ἴδιος δεσπότης, like ἴδιος ἀνήρ, ii. 5. Δεσπότης, not κύριος, as in 1 Pet. ii. 18. Still more is required of them in the words following: ἐν πᾶσιν εὐαρέστους εἶναι to be complaisant in everything. The word is often used by the apostle, Rom. xii. 1, 14, 18, &c. It denotes that zeal in the discharge of duty which does even more than is required, that service which anticipates the command, and seeks in everything to gain the goodwill of the master. Not answering again (Rom x. 21), not purloining (literally not putting anything apart for themselves), Acts v. 2, 3, but showing all good fidelity. On πιστις, comp. Rom. iii. 3. Ἐνδεικνυμένους—a word often used by the apostle, and only by him. Ἀγαθήν, the apostle adds this in opposition to a service which aims merely at a good appearance; comp. the passages adduced above, Eph. vi. 5, ss.; Col. iii. 22, ss. There also the apostle again in ἵνα points at the obligation of Christians to give testimony to the gospel in their conduct. "For the heathen," says Chrysostom, "do not judge of the Christian's doctrines from the doctrine, but from his actions and life." "That they may adorn the doctrine of our Saviour God in all things." The ἐν πᾶσι answers to the πᾶσαν. Their conduct is an ornament to the doctrine, inasmuch as it reveals the power of godliness that lies in it.

Our Saviour God—this appellation of its author at once denotes the essential import of the doctrine, and points at the ground of the obligation to such a conduct, which is then further explained in what follows. There is therefore here no reason for surprise at this circumlocution for the gospel.

Ver. 11—14. In these verses we have the further explanation of the ground of obligation to such a deportment. The connexion is this: the appearance of the grace of God has for its end the sanctification of men. Some understand the words of ver. 11, *for the grace of God hath appeared*, &c., as confirmatory of all that precedes from ver. 1 onwards, others only from ver. 9 onwards. It appears to me the most natural way to refer them to the sentiment immediately preceding, in which is already contained the reference to the ground of the obligation to adorn the doctrine by a holy walk. The explanation itself, however, is not to be understood as having special reference to the *slaves*, but is expressed in a general form, and refers equally to all, so that substantially we have here the confirmation of all the foregoing exhortations from ver. 1 onwards. "For the grace of God which bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men, teaching them," &c. Ἐπεφάνη, so again at iii. 4; comp. Luke i. 79, *to give light* to them that are in darkness (Isa. ix. 2; lx. 1, ss.), Col. i. 26. The use of the word in Acts xxvii. 20, shows from what the metaphor is taken. Similar passages are Rom. xiii. 12, 1 Thess. v. 5, 8, where the time of the appearance of this grace is denoted by *the day*. A comparison with these passages shows at the same time that the appearing of the grace of God is not to be referred exclusively to the incarnation; but rather (with De Wette and Matthies) to the whole work of redemption, "the highest cause of which lies in the grace of God." Ἡ σωτήριος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις. Tischendorf has retained the article, according to C***D***E.I.K., &c., rightly, as I apprehend, although contrary to other authorities likewise weighty; for the emphasis in the sentiment rests not on σωτήριος but on *teaching*, which is to be closely connected with *hath appeared*. Σωτήριος without the article would obscure the otherwise clear connexion. The term is then all the more expressive, as an appositional designation of the χάρις. The apostle does not speak of the teaching power of the grace of God without specifying the essential import of this grace, upon which this teaching power rests. The ἡ σωτή-

ριος points back to the σωτήρ, ver. 10, as also the clause πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, to the universality of this grace as contemplated in the foregoing exhortations, ver. 1, ss. There is no ground for supposing that the apostle here, as it were, in passing, takes a side glance at Jewish or even at Gnostic particularism. If the apostle had such adversaries in his eye, he would oppose them in quite a different way. The critics only betray the insufficiency of their means of proof, when in their induction of passages, they include those from which a polemical aim is so remote as it is from the passage before us. Matthies is also of this opinion, p. 132. On the connexion of πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, whether with ἐπεφάνη, or with σωτήριος, or with both, there is a difference of opinion among commentators. The connexion with σωτήριος is alone conformable to the context, for connected with ἐπεφάνη it is quite aimless and obstructive. For what has πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις to do with παιδεύουσα ἡμᾶς? On σωτήριος, comp. Eph. vi. 17.

The discipline which the appearing grace of God exercises, is described in ver. 12, teaching us that, denying the ungodly nature, we should live orderly, righteously, and godly, in this present time; ver. 13, in expectation of the blessed hope and appearance of the glory of the great God and our Saviour. Παιδεύουσα, says the apostle; grace exercises discipline, it cannot be received until its disciplining power is experienced (comp. Heb. xii. 6, 7; 1 Cor. xi. 32.) Its aim is then stated both negatively and positively. For ἵνα is here to be understood in its *final* signification. The negative side, as that which is pre-supposed in the positive, is denoted by ἀρνησάμενοι. On ἀρνεῖσθαι, comp. what has been said on i. 15. Θανατοῦν, θανατοῦσθαι is used similarly by the apostle in Rom. viii. 13, vii. 4. Ἀρνεῖσθαι, the opposite of ὁμολογοῦν, i. 16, is a denial in heart and deed. Luke ix. 23; Rev. ii. 13, may be compared as passages analogous to this; and besides 1 Tim. v. 8; 2 Tim. iii. 5. Τὴν ἀσέβειαν (comp. on κατ' εὐσέβειαν, i. 1) designates the condition of the unconverted in its most fundamental aspect as separation from God, which has for its reverse side a cleaving to the world, and to that which is in the world: *worldly lusts*, as it is here expressed. Κοσμικός occurs besides only in Heb. ix. 1, as denoting what belongs to earth. 1 John ii. 15, 16, may be considered as a comment on this passage, *love not the world, neither the things that are in the world*; and then *all*

that is in the world is described as the *lust of the flesh*, &c. The worldly lusts are the lusts which are directed to the *things that are in the world*. Comp. Gal. v. 16; Eph. ii. 3. In contrast with this condition of the man, who is not yet walking in the light of grace, it is said farther *that we may live soberly, righteously, and godly*. Σωφρόνως, in opposition to the lusts which had the mastery over him before, comp. on i. 8. Δικαίως denotes, in general, the right conduct conformably to the law of God; εὐσεβῶς, in opposition to ἀσέβεια, the right conduct in its deepest source,—godliness. The sum of Christian morality is here set forth in its fundamental aspects; the limits of its various spheres are, however, not marked off here, as many commentators imagine, so as that σωφρόνως denotes virtue as regards ourselves, δικαίως as regards our fellow-creatures, and εὐσεβῶς as respects God. Σωφρόνως can with as little propriety be referred merely to one's self as δικαίως merely to others, and by εὐσεβῶς is also denoted the whole sphere of the Christian life. Comp. Matthies on the passage. Ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι, the apostle adds this in opposition to what follows, which refers to the αἰὼν μέλλων, comp. 1 Cor. i. 20, iii. 18, 19.

Ver. 13. Looking for, &c. As in ver. 2, the words *in hope of eternal life* serve more exactly to determine the preceding, so here the words *looking for*, &c., ver. 13, serve the same purpose, comp. Phil. iii. 20, 21. There lies in this expectation an antidote to the *worldly lusts*, and a stimulus to live in the present time, conformably to this expectation. Προσδέχεσθαι as usual in the signification, "expect," Luke ii. 25, 38; Mark xv. 43. The object of this expectation the apostle denotes by *blessed hope and appearing*, &c. Ἐλπίς is consequently to be taken in an objective sense (as in Rom. viii. 24; Col. i. 5), and to be connected with the following genitive τῆς δόξης. Προσδοκάω connected with ἐλπίς is in like manner found in the Sept. Job ii. 9. The apostle calls this hope μακαρίαν (an expression elsewhere used by the apostle, Rom. iv. 7, 8; 1 Cor. vii. 40), inasmuch as it brings the expected blessedness. The words following tell us what is meant by this hope in the expectation of which we are to live. On the expression ἐπιφάνεια, comp. ver. 11. We have thus a double *appearance*, an appearance of grace (ver. 11), as the ground and source of all new life, and an appearance of glory as the end and aim of the

former. De Wette has given a place in his critical index to ἐπιφάνεια as being instead of παρουσία, 1 Tim. vi. 14; 2 Tim. iv. 1, 8; Tit. ii. 13. But do we not find also in 2 Thess. ii. 8, the expression, τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ τῆς παρουσίας, from which we may infer both that ἐπιφανεία differs from παρουσία, inasmuch as it refers to the visibility of Christ's coming, and also that the expression is elsewhere used by the apostle with reference to the coming of Christ? As regards the interpretation of the following words τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, the question is, whether *the great God and our Saviour* are to be taken as predicates of one and the same person, namely, Jesus Christ, or whether two different subjects are meant: God (the Father) and Jesus Christ. In favour of the former—that one subject is meant, are the most of the Fathers, and many of the more recent commentators, as Mack, Matthies, Usteri; the latter view, however, has its representatives also among the Fathers, as Ambrose,—and Grotius, Wetstein, Heinrichs, De Wette, have acquiesced in this view, while others are doubtful. Olshausen has expressed himself in favour of the former view, which refers both predicates to Christ. Winer has shown (§ 18, 5, Anm. p. 148) that the question cannot be decided on grammatical grounds. It has indeed been maintained that the article must be repeated before σωτῆρος ἡμῶν, if by this expression a new subject is designated; in reply to which again, it has been justly said, that σωτῆρος, because defined by the genitive ἡμῶν, does not require the article, and that the absence of it may be shown in cases quite similar to the present, 2 Thess. i. 12; 2 Pet. i. 1; Jud. iv. These passages also prove, that in case the words σωτήρος ἡμῶν apply to a second subject, it is not necessary that Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ should be placed before them. But it is difficult also from the context, to obtain a decided reason either for the one or the other view. For, to the objection against the view that one subject is meant,—namely, that on account of ver. 14, the appellation, *great God*, cannot be applied to Christ,—what Heydenreich has already observed is a sufficient reply, namely, that Christ is also represented as *Saviour*, and in this respect the words of ver. 14, *he gave himself*, could be predicated of him. And the objection has just as little weight, that if Christ were the subject of both predicates, σωτήρος, according to the apostle's usual manner, must have been placed before μεγ.

θεοῦ; against which, in like manner, Heydenreich has said what is necessary. On the other hand, what is said against applying μεγ. θεοῦ to God the Father,—namely, that it is not the appearance of the majesty of God, but of Jesus Christ, that is represented as the object of hope for the day of the second coming,—in so far as it denies the possibility of such an application, has no weight; for the advocates of this view, as De Wette, have justly referred to the fact, that according to passages such as Matth. xvi. 27; Mark viii. 38, "Christ appears in the glory (*i.e.* the majesty and omnipotence) of the Father, and at the same time in his own glory (Matth. xxv. 31), and consequently that his appearance may be represented as at once the appearance of the glory of God, and of his own glory. If, however, with this so much must be granted, that the glory in which Christ appears can be described as the *glory of God*, it must still remain a striking fact, that God and Christ are here placed in an equal relation to this *glory* of the future appearance. It is in reality Christ himself who will then appear *in the glory of his Father*, not God himself, as, in this case, quite different relations to the *glory* would be expressed by the genitive in this passage. Matthies has indicated the same thing, when he says (p. 139), that if both subjects were to be connected with the ἐπιφάνεια, then in order to be grammatico-logically correct, instead of καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν, it would have to be ἐν σωτῆρι ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, or τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν ἐν τῇ δόξῃ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ. The way in which this is sought to be evaded, namely, by explaining ἐπιφ. τῆς δόξης of that manifestation of glory in which Christians shall at a future time take part, is too great a misconception of the idea implied in ἐπιφάνεια, and too great a departure from the objective sense of the passage, to find much acceptance. But still more important than this, is the consideration derived from the accustomed style of the apostle, according to which we nowhere else find this hope spoken of without its being referred to Christ, while ἐπιφάνεια, as also παρουσία, is never used of the Father, but only of the Son, also in the Pastoral Epistles, 1 Tim. vi. 14; 2 Tim. iv. 1, 8. This circumstance alone appears to Olshausen to be decisive. It is also to be considered how natural it must have been for the apostle—if, contrary to the general usage, he here meant to name two subjects—distinctly to indicate this, while, on the contrary, the expression which he employs must always be

most naturally understood of one subject; further, that the context affords no reason at all why God should be named besides Christ in reference to the ἐπιφάνεια; that in ver. 14 there is no reference to the *great God;* and, finally, that the epithet μεγαλόυ is no where else used in reference to God (the Father), and that its application to θεός here can be much more easily explained on the supposition that it is Christ who is denoted by θεός. ("God the Father too did not need the exalting and laudatory epithet μέγας; this rather refers to Christ," "Usteri Paul. Lehrb. 5, Aufl. p. 326; and Olshausen refers to 1 John v. 20, *the true God.*) It will therefore be the more natural way to understand the words *great God* of Christ. In proof of there being nothing in the doctrinal system of Paul to contradict this view, I refer to Usteri a. a. Q. 324, ss., and Olshausen on Rom. ix. 5.—The expression, *great God*, occurring no where in the New Testament, but frequently in the Old, comp. Deut. vii. 21, x. 17, &c., is warranted by the context, which refers to the glory of his appearance, in like manner as the expression *true God* in John v. 20. On δόξης Calvin well observes: gloriam Dei interpretor non tantum, qua in se ipse gloriosus erit, sed qua tunc se quoquoversus diffundet, ut omnes electos suos ejus faciat participes.

Vv. 14, 15. "Who hath given himself for us, that he might redeem us from all unrighteousness, and purify us to himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works. These things teach and exhort, and rebuke with all authoritativeness. Let no one despise thee."—On the connexion of the relative sentence, ver. 14, De Wette justly observes, that the atoning work of Christ already indicated in the words *the grace that bringeth salvation*, and in which lies the power to teach, is here supplementarily recalled to mind. And it is just this teaching element in the saving grace, which is here brought into prominence and explained. He has given himself—ἔδωκεν emphatically, Olshausen—namely, in his atoning death; comp. Gal. i. 4, ii. 20; Eph. v. 2, v. 25, &c., where διδόναι and παραδιδόναι in like manner occurs. That he might redeem us, comp. Matth. xx. 28; Mark x. 45; *to give his life a ransom*, and the commentary on the passage and 1 Tim. ii. 6; λυτροῦσθαι, as here, 1 Pet. i. 18; Luke xxiv. 21. That from which he has redeemed us is the ἀνομια (comp. ver. 12, denying ungodliness), in bondage to which we were till then, Rom. i. 24. The

context shows, why the state from which we are redeemed is described as a state of *unrighteousness*; the moral servitude implied in a right Christian conduct, is placed in opposition to the bondage of unrighteousness. The whole expression, however, will only then be fully understood, when the real force which lies in the word *ἀνομία*, as used by the apostle, is taken into view. *Ἀνομία* denotes the essence of sin, comp. 1 John iii. 4; *sin is the transgression of the law* (*ἀνομία.*) That he might purify unto himself a peculiar people. On *καθαρίσῃ*, 1 Cor. vii. 1; Eph. v. 26; Heb. ix. 14. Both *λυτροῦσθαι* and *καθαρίζειν* denote the permanent result of his giving himself to the death, and correspond to the *παιδεύουσα* above. Comp. on the idea the commentary on Rom. iii. 21, 25. *Λαὸν περιούσιον* must be understood as the accus. of the predicate: that he might purify us to himself for, &c. *Περιούσιος* only here, similarly 1 Pet. ii. 9: *λαὸν εἰς περιποίησιν* correspond to the Heb. עַם סְגֻלָּה, which the Septuagint renders by this expression. On the derivation and signification of the word see Winer, § 16, 3, p. 108; as *ἐπιούσιος* from *ἐπιοῦσα*, so *περιούσιος* from *περιοῦσα*. Not merely proprius, as Winer says; Wahl and De Wette rightly, peculiaris = peculiar; Theodoret: *οἰκεῖος*, in which lies the accessary idea of being separated to the service of God. Comp. Harless on Eph. i. 14— diligent in good works. *Ζηλωτής* here the same as in 1 Cor. xiv. 12. It occurs besides often in connexion with *νόμου*, Gal. i. 14; Acts xxi. 20, &c. So also *ζηλόω* in the same sense as here used only by the apostle, 1 Cor. xiii. 21. On *good works*, comp. on ii. 7. When De Wette says that it is not the atonement but moral cleansing that is here spoken of, he is right only in so far as that here the atonement is represented in respect to its moral efficacy. For how can the words, *he gave himself for us*, in which lies the ground of all moral renovation, be otherwise understood than of the atoning death of Christ?— Ver. 15, pointing back to ver. 1, shows plainly that the apostle concludes with this verse in order to pass on to something new. But the apostle exhorts Titus here not merely to *speak* (ver. 1), but to *exhort* (ver. 6) and to *rebuke;* Titus is to labour for the bringing about of this moral renovation, in each of these forms, that of the simple address, of exhortation, of rebuke. *Ταῦτα* is, with De Wette, to be immediately connected with *λάλει*. With all authoritativeness; corresponding to this is the word *sharply*

i. 13 ; it means with all the authority of his office. Chrysostom : "Both with authority and with all power." The word ἐπιταγή is used by Paul, besides in the Pastoral Epistles, only in the epistle to the Romans and in those to the Corinthians. The next words, *let no one despise thee*, in which Titus is enjoined to conduct himself in a firm and vigorous manner, follow naturally upon the preceding, *with all authority*. Calvin and many others think that in these words "he addresses the people rather than Titus;" a view quite unfounded, in favour of which, as already observed, nothing can be found elsewhere in the epistle, and which is here also unnecessary. Olshausen has also taken this erroneous view. De Wette renders rightly: speak so as to command respect, as 1 Tim. iv. 12, where the additional words *but be a pattern*, leave us in no doubt as to the meaning. Περιφρονεῖν, to look over one = "to despise," found only here ; elsewhere καταφρονεῖν.

At the close of this section of the epistle, we would advert again to the critical judgment which De Wette has pronounced upon it. He by no means overlooks the clearness and excellent method of this section, but he maintains that there is nothing in it which could serve as an adequate confutation of the adversaries. But it is to be borne in mind that it was not written for the confutation of the adversaries, but for the purpose of letting Titus know what he was to insist on, namely, on the evidencing of faith in the conduct, on a practical Christianity, and with this view are set before him the exhortations he was to make according to the distinctions of sex, age, and rank, with a regard to the prevailing errors. But De Wette farther pronounces the moral precepts here laid down to be superficial, not founded on any general principle, and the reference to the moral spirit of Christianity to be like the foregoing, so general and aimless as to make it appear that the Cretans had as yet understood nothing of practical Christianity. Moreover, these well-known precepts and practical truths are pronounced to be peculiarly unsuitable, as addressed to one who was a helper of the apostle. To all these objections it is a sufficient reply to point to the real state of the matter. We have seen from chap. i. of the epistle that the Cretans had not indeed fallen away from the faith, nor become addicted to any cardinal heresy which contradicted the true faith, but that their Christianity was morbid and infirm, inasmuch as there prevailed among them a foolish and profitless ten-

dency to occupy themselves with things which had nothing to do with the kernel of the doctrine of salvation, and which therefore produced no moral fruit in the life. In opposition to such errors, what else can the apostle do but direct Titus to insist on the right moral conduct, on the display of the fruits of the truth in godliness, both in old and young? How a godly old age should show itself in man and woman, how those who are younger should adorn the gospel in their walk, and how also, in an especial manner, the genuine Christian spirit should display itself in those who are slaves—these are the points which are simply and plainly set before Titus, in a series of characteristics which no one will maintain to be in any respect unsuitable, or to fail in marking the very thing that is necessary in the different relations with which they are connected. (Comp. Schleiermacher, p. 195.) The apostle would certainly have put these exhortations in another form if they had been addressed directly to the church. Not that he would then have had reason to say what was less known and familiar. We can plainly infer this from the passage which treats of slaves, to which, as cited above, we have several parallels in the other epistles of the apostle. Is what he addresses to slaves in Col. iii. 22, ss; Eph. vi. 5, ss., at all materially different from what we find here? The *subjection* which is enjoined is there certainly explained more particularly as to its proper form, the injunction is more enforced by motives according to its particular aspects, but are we then to expect that the apostle should write to Titus in exactly the same manner as if he were directly addressing the slaves? Is it not enough that he specifies those qualities upon which he is to lay stress? Precisely in this difference do we recognize a recommendation of this epistle, as in it the difference of circumstances is clearly reflected. The objection of superficiality will therefore not disturb us, so long as it is not shown, that the moral precepts here laid down do not substantially correspond to the state of things to which they relate: for, that the rules laid down are not more particularly examined and enforced by motives in the same manner as in Col. iii. 22, ss., and in other places where the apostle addresses himself directly to those who are admonished, is not a proof of superficiality, but is to be accounted for by the difference of circumstances. That they are familiar and well known things is just what we should expect, when they are regarded from the right

point of view. For to what else could those be admonished who had deviated from the right moral track, than just to true morality? And such an admonition can contain nothing new, but can only aim at holding out for reflection what is old and long since known. And if, accordingly, the apostle wished to say something more to Titus than merely in general, that he should have a regard to moral conduct,—and to indicate in particular some of the special points to which his attention should be directed, he could say nothing else than what he has in reality said, if this indeed was the thing that was needed. These moral precepts are, in fine, held to be not founded on any principle. But what other principle should they or could they have, than that which is given in ver. 11, ss., the reference, namely, to the great truth, that our moral renovation is founded on the sacrifice of Christ, and is binding upon us as his people? The apostle dwells with delight on this truth; that is true, but just on this account the passage is no common place, but in its entire connexion is closely related to what precedes. If it be said, however, that Titus knew this already, and did not require to have it written to him, I should only like to know how much might be expunged from the rest of Paul's epistles on the application of the same test. Do we not find the same in Phil. iii. 20; 2 Cor. v. 18—21; 1 Pet. i. 18, as we find here?

B. What Titus is to teach with regard to the right conduct of Christians towards the world, along with a word of exhortation to him on his position in reference to the prevailing errors.

Chap. iii. 1—11. The apostle having shown in chap. ii. what is the conduct which becomes the members of a Christian church, and that according to the distinctions of age, sex, and rank, now opens with a new series of exhortations having reference to the deportment of Christians in general, towards the magistracy and towards those who are not Christians generally, ver. 1 and 2. In order to show them how little cause they have to exalt themselves, he reminds them of their state previous to their becoming Christians, and how they owe it not to their own merit, but solely to the mercy of God, that it has been better with them. Vv. 3—7. This Titus is emphatically to hold up before them, and upon this he is to insist, that they now walk worthy of the gospel; on the other hand, he is not to meddle with that foolish and pro-

fitless talk which was prevalent, vv. 8—9. A man that is an heretic he is to shun after a repeated admonition, and to leave him over to the fate which he has chosen for himself, vv. 10 and 11.

Ver. 1. Put them in mind, the apostle writes farther, to be subject to magistrates and powers, to obey, to be ready to every good work. Ὑπομίμνησκε occurs again at 2 Tim. ii. 14, but besides also in five passages of the New Testament; this word also has been put into the index prohibitorum. What more suitable word could the apostle have chosen, when his object was to remind them anew of something which they ought to have remembered, but which they seem to have forgotten? Could the apostle use ἀναμιμνήσκειν, 1 Cor. iv. 17, 2 Cor. vii. 15, and not also ὑπομιμνήσκειν? comp. also Böttger, p. 4, who rightly observes that ὑπομιμνησκειν in the sense which it has in the Pastoral Epistles, denotes what is the business of the teacher, and in a transitive signification expressing an injunction as here, could be used only in reference to a teacher.—How easily the opposition of Christianity to heathenism, might lead to a false view with regard to the relation of Christians to the heathen magistracy, we learn from Rom. xiii. 1, ss., 1 Pet. ii. 13, ss., where it is prominently shown that obedience to God requires subjection to such ordinances of man; comp. also 1 Tim. ii. 1, ss. When to this we add that a people like those of Crete (comp. Hug. Einl. II., p. 299) must from their very nature have been of a rebellious disposition, and that the Jews of that period, of whom many were then living in Crete, shared with them in this, we shall not find it necessary, in order to be able to explain the apostle's admonition, to suppose, with Olshausen, that heretics were spreading false views of the Christian freedom. Ἀρχαί and ἐξουσίαι here connected as in Luke xii. 11; the difference is that between magistracies and powers. Πειθαρχεῖν must with De Wette be taken as grammatically independent. Ὑποτάσσεσθαι denotes their proper position with regard to the powers, πειθαρχεῖν the obligation to obedience resulting therefrom. And it is *willing* obedience which the apostle requires: *be ready to every good work.* These words are to be connected still with the preceding, and refer to the magistracy. It is of course implied that the magistracy requires good works, comp. Rom. xiii. 3; 1 Pet ii. 14, s. The idea that obedience is not to

be rendered to what is evil is therefore not intended, and does not belong to the context, comp. Matthies.

With ver. 2, the apostle passes to the subject of a right deportment towards those who are not Christians generally, as the newly introduced object—*no man*—shows. "To speak evil of no man, not to be quarrelsome, gentle, showing all (possible) meekness towards all men." The reference to those who are not Christians generally, as is noticed also by De Wette, comes into view especially in the last words. *Βλασφημεῖν* (properly *βλάπτειν τὴν φήμην τινὸς*, Wahl) according to Theodoret = *μηδένα ἀγορεύειν κακῶς*. Olshausen is for referring it to the magistrates, against which are the words, *no one*. The word is elsewhere used by the apostle, Rom. iii. 8, xiv. 16; 1 Cor. iv. 13, &c. *Ἄμαχος* occurs again only at 1 Tit. iii. 3. *Ἐπιεικεῖς*, comp. on Phil. iv. 5, derived from *εἰκός*, yielding, gentle, mild. On *πραότης*, 2 Cor. x. 1, as here in connection with *ἐπιεικεία*, 1 Cor. iv. 21, as the opposite of severity = mansuetudo erga alios, comp. Winer on Gal. v. 22; Harless on Eph. iv. 2; Tholuck. zur Bergpr., p. 82, s. *To all men*—these epistles give prominence not merely to the universality of grace which the critics have held up, but also to the right deportment of Christians towards all men, comp. 1 Tim. ii. 1, s. On *ἐνδεικνυμένους*, comp. chap. ii. 10.

Ver. 3. Here follows, as confirming the propriety of the conduct here required towards those who are not Christians, a reference to the fact that the Christian himself was formerly in the same state of ungodliness as those who are not Christians are now, and that he owes his deliverance from this state not to his own merit. This reference gives us plainly to perceive, that the Cretan Christians thought they found in their Christianity a reason for looking down on those who were not Christians, and imagined that they owed no debt of love to them. Indeed when Christianity becomes an external affair of mere knowledge, it is quite natural that the false conceit should go hand in hand with it, that the man who possesses the truth thereby stands on an elevation above others.—"For we also were once foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving diverse lusts and pleasures, living in malice and envy, hateful, hating one another." Such a picture does the apostle hold up before them of their former state. In their uncharitable contempt of their neighbour, they seem to have quite forgotten that it is their own previous character

which they now find in those who are not Christians, and on account of which they despise them. Chrysostom : " therefore despise no one, he says, for such wast thou." In the successive clauses of this verse we mark the progress from that which is the inward source to the outward expression, and its consequences. *Ἦμεν* with emphasis forwards : we were *ποτέ*, the antithesis is in ver. 4, *ὅτε δέ*. We have here the well-known Pauline anthithesis of *ποτέ* and *νῦν*, comp. Rom. xi. 30 ; Eph. ii. 2, 11, 13, v. 8 ; Col. i. 21 ; iii. 7, 8 ; the two angles of the Pauline system. With this passage as a whole, chiefly that cited from the epistle to the Ephesians is to be compared. *Καὶ ἡμεῖς* = we too, as those before mentioned still are. This *καὶ* shows plainly what is the apostle's object in referring to their former condition, namely, to show how little reason the Christian has to look down upon those who have not yet attained to the possession of the blessings of salvation. As to the reference of *ἡμεῖς* there has been some difference of opinion. The context decides the point, from which we find that it is the difference between Christians and not Christians, that is here spoken of. It is otherwise in Eph. ii. 3, where the contrast is drawn between Jews and heathen. The apostle then means himself, together with all who are now converted, chiefly with reference to the Cretans, comp. i. 11. On the other hand we may learn from Eph. ii. 3, how little hesitation the apostle had in predicating what he here says in ver. 3 of the former condition of the converted Jews, not less than of that of the Gentile Christians. *Ἀνόητοι* denotes the state of man as destitute of the true knowledge of God = *ἄγνοια*, Eph. iv. 18, the result of his own fault, Rom. i. 18, ss. *Ἀπειθεῖς*, disobedient, in this general description of course not to be explained of disobedience towards magistrates (so Heydenreich), but towards God, comp. i. 16, and Rom. xi. 30 ; Eph. ii. 2 ; Col. iii. 6. So in like manner in Eph. iv. 18, along with the *ἄγνοια*, the darkening of the understanding, is mentioned the *blindness of the heart*. *Πλανώμενοι* scil. *ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας*, where by the *ἀλήθεια* is to be understood not abstract truth merely, but also the sum of what is morally good ; hence *πλανώμενοι* is not the same as *ἀνόητοι*, but denotes the result of the two first predicates, and has the same signification with *πλάνη*, Eph. iv. 14 ; Rom. i. 27. Compare Harless on the former passage. We find a similar sentiment in Eph. iv. 18, *alienated from the life of God, through the ignorance*

that is in them because of the blindness of their heart. With special reference to the term, comp. Jas. v. 19, 20; Heb. v. 2. The words following describe the further consequences of this state, *serving divers lusts and pleasures*, &c., comp. Eph. ii. 3; on δουλεύειν comp. chiefly Rom. vi. 6. The term denotes the power which sin acquires over men, by which it makes them slaves. On ἡδοναί De Wette remarks, that it is not Pauline, which is true in so far as that the word is accidentally not to be found in the other epistles, but every epistle of the apostle contains words that are not Pauline in this sense. Comp. Luke viii. 14; Jam. iv. 1, 3; 2 Pet. ii. 13. The word denotes the voluptates carnis. With as much reason might De Wette have said that ποικίλαις is not Pauline, as it is to be found only in the epistle to the Hebrews. *Living in malice and envy.* The meaning of κακία is explained by its connection with φθόνῳ; it is the same as in Eph. iv. 31 (where special manifestations of it are denoted in the preceding words), and Col. iii. 8 = malignitas. Significat hoc verbo animi pravitatem, quae humanitati et aequitati est opposita, et malignitas vulgo nuncupatur. Calvin cited by Harless on Eph iv. 31. Διάγοντες = "living in," occurring again only at 1 Tim. ii. 2, connected with βίον. The two last predicates are to be taken together as forming an antithesis, and denoting the consequences resulting from what is said immediately before: hateful, hating one another —to be understood of a reciprocal deportment, Rom. i. 29; Gal. v. 15. It would be unsuitable to suppose here any reference to the relation between Jews and Gentiles, of which nothing is said. So once (ποτέ.)

Ver. 4—7. To this he now proceeds to place in opposition a ὅτε δέ, not, however, with the view of giving a description of the new state introduced by the ὅτε, in contrast with the former, but according to the connexion, to shew how little reason the Cretans have to be proud of themselves. It is through the *kindness* and *love* of God that they have been saved, not in consequence of their own merit, but solely in virtue of his compassion, through the work of salvation and the efficacy of baptism. When the connexion is rightly considered, the objections which have been brought also against this part of the epistle fall of themselves to the ground. It then appears quite evident, for what reason *the kindness* and *love of the Saviour-God* are mentioned so emphatically in con-

nection with the work of salvation, without our needing to have recourseto Marcion's God of love in order to account for it. Further, the words, *not by works of righteousness which we have done*, are then explained, and the only thing that appears inexplicable, is that such an expositor as De Wette should stumble at them. Finally, it is then evident why precisely the saving efficacy of baptism is brought prominently forward. When, however, says the apostle, the kindness and philanthropy of our Saviour-God appeared, he saved us not on account of works in righteousness which we had done, but in virtue of his mercy through the bath of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which he has shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour, that being justified by his grace we should become heirs according to the hope of eternal life.

Ver. 4. As is clear from the connexion given above, Heydenreich incorrectly traces the scope of the passage when he says :— Now however the grace of God manifested towards us in Christ, lays us under obligation to cultivate other and worthier dispositions. As if we were transferred back to ch. ii. 11.—The apostle's object is merely to show, how little the Christian is at liberty to exalt himself above him who is not a Christian ; inasmuch as he was formerly himself nothing better, and has become better not through any merit of his own.—With respect to the construction, when the connexion is rightly apprehended, according to which it is not the introduction of salvation in general, but the change that has passed upon individuals that is here described, there can be no question that the accessary clause already begins with the words *not by works*, &c. It is therefore superfluous to recur, with Matthies, to the grounds of the Pauline system of doctrine. *But when —of God*, the anterior clause, is intended only to denote what is necessarily pre-supposed in *he saved us*. The salvation must first be there, before the individuals can enter on the possession of it. That *kindness and love* answer here to the idea more commonly expressed in the word *grace*, is quite correct. Substantially the same thing is expressed here as at ii. 11 by the *grace of God which bringeth salvation*. It is however easy to see why the apostle expresses himself differently here. His object is to show how little the Christian can speak of his own merit, in comparing himself with those who are not Christians ; hence in the very out-

set, and still more pointedly in what immediately follows, the prominence which is given to the goodness and benevolence of God, in which alone lies the ground of the appearance of salvation in general, as in regard to the individuals who partake of it—it lies in the saving mercy of God. De Wette himself has shown that the use of the expression χρηστότης is altogether Pauline, by referring to Rom. xi. 22, Eph. ii. 7, where the word occurs in the same connexion. On the relation of the χρηστότης to the χάρις the passage last cited throws light, inasmuch as the χρηστότης is there adduced as the proof of the χάρις. Comp. Harless on the passage. The same applies to the φιλανθρωπία. The divine χάρις manifests itself in the form of kindness and philanthropy. These expressions are all the more suitable here, as in ver. 3 the natural condition is described in its entire wretchedness. The expression φιλανθρωπία (Acts xxviii. 2) occurs nowhere else. As a parallel to the thing expressed by the word De Wette adduces John iii. 16; he might have adduced from the epistles of the apostle those passages which we have already cited, if such had been necessary. On the expression ἐπιφάνη all that is necessary has been said at ii. 11; on σωτῆρος θεοῦ at i. 3. Baur would like to recognize in the tracing back of the atonement to the kindness and benevolence of God, an accordance with the Marcionitic phraseology, against which Bottger, a. a. Q. p. 105, refers to Rom. viii. 31—39; v. 8, ss; ii. 4, and the passages already quoted above.

Ver. 5. . . . . he has saved us not in consequence of (= on account of) "works wrought by us in righteousness," as De Wette renders. On ἔξ comp. Winer, § 51, under ἐκ. p. 441. The words τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἐν δ. are placed in their true light by De Wette's translation just quoted, and his explanation: "not, as Matthies thinks, of works appearing in the form of the δικαιοσύνη, for ἐν δικ. like ἐν θεῷ, John iii. 21, denotes the state of mind and feeling in which these works are done." Comp. on Phil. i. 11, *fruits of righteousness;* Winer, § 52, ἐν. p. 466. We find the same exclusion of man's works of righteousness, in Eph. ii. 8, 9, *by grace ye are saved . . . not of works.* De Wette thinks the sentiment unsuitable in both passages, as it is the sinful state of those who were formerly heathen, that is spoken of before. This is quite true, in so far as, from the foregoing description, their not having

been saved on account of their own works was *self-evident*. But the apostle nevertheless expressly declares it, and he must have had a special reason for doing so; and this reason is plain enough; he aims, namely, at strongly representing the saving grace as free and undeserved, by expressing it in a negative (*οὐκ*, &c.) as well as in a positive form. The emphasis in the sentiment of this passage rests indeed entirely on the *not*. It is a very abstract logic that will stumble at this. Harless, on Eph. ii. 9, does not seem to have even imagined that any such objection could be raised. We learn from the passages adduced by him, how truly Pauline this antithesis is, Rom. iii. 20, iv. 2; Gal. ii. 16, iii. 2; Phil. iii. 9. How much importance the apostle attaches to this "unsuitable" exclusion of man's works, appears from the words immediately following, *ὧν ἐποιήσαμεν ἡμεῖς* (quae nos fecissemus.) *We*, as opposed to, *his mercy*. The true cause of our salvation already indicated negatively, and thus expressed with all emphasis, is given in the words *κατ' αὐτοῦ ἔλεον*. On *κατά*, Winer, § 53, d., p. 479. By virtue of his mercy he has saved us, comp. 1 Pet. i. 3. On *ἔλεος*, Rom. ix. 23, xi. 31; Eph. ii. 4; Gal. vi. 16. It denotes the *ground* of salvation in these passages. Here it denotes the *means* of salvation in the case of individuals, after the kindness and philanthropy of God has already been manifested in the objective facts of the gospel. It is therefore self-evident, that the apostle cannot here be speaking of those facts connected with the gospel, upon which hangs the possibility of salvation for individuals, but only of the means by which God brings the individual into a state of salvation,—how he introduces him to the possession of those redemption blessings which are already objectively present. And here again the connexion, according to which it is only the part which God performs in our salvation that is held up to view, does not admit of that being mentioned which is required on the part of man, as the subjective instrument or condition of his entrance on salvation. Hence it is not said, *διὰ τῆς πίστεως* (Eph. ii. 8, comp. with Phil. iii. 9, *ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει*, and Harless on the former passage), for the apostle's aim here is not to describe the new state of the man, but to point to the act and saving agency of God in regard to the individual by which the new state is brought about, and which shows more than any thing else, that this new state does not rest on man's merit or on his doing. And what act of God's saving

mercy towards the individual could this be, other than baptism, through which the man is planted into the fellowship of the Three One God, which is a putting off of the body of the flesh (*σῶμα τῆς σαρκός*, (Col. ii. 11), and a putting on of Christ (*Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε*, Gal. iii. 27), in short—which, as it is described in our passage, is a bath of regeneration? It is this which transfers the man from the state described in ver. 3, to the new life of the Spirit, it is the sure foundation upon which, in regard to the individual, rests all farther increase in the life of the Spirit. Thus we understand why it is, that baptism is here referred to as the means of salvation. And this the apostle designates by *λουτρόν παλιγγενεσίαι, bath of regeneration:* for it will scarcely be necessary to refute the view, according to which we are to regard this as merely a metaphorical expression, a view which is also applied to Eph. v. 26. Comp., moreover, what Harless says against it on the passage adduced. With regard to the passage before us, Heydenreich has already said all that is necessary, p. 329, ss., when in opposition to all those views, according to which *λουτρόν* is held to be a metaphorical description of the change that has taken place, or to denote the Divine Spirit himself, and the purifying, renewing, and exalting power of this Spirit, or the abundant communication of the Spirit, or the Christian doctrine—he urges with truth, that the regeneration and renewal which the Spirit of God effects are sufficiently denoted by the words *παλιγγ.* and *ἀνακ.*, that the Spirit of God himself, and his gracious influence, are never denoted by *λουτρόν*, and that the agent in our renewal is by *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* plainly enough distinguished from his agency, (the *παλιγγ.* and *ἀνακ.*), and the instrument he employs, *λουτρόν*. He farther observes with perfect justice, that *λουτρόν* is anything but a suitable emblem of the abundant communication of the divine gifts of grace, or the sanctifying influence of the Divine Spirit; a bath can only be the symbol of cleansing, not of the abundant overflowing of certain blessings; and if reference be made to *ἐξέχεε*, ver. 6, as explaining the *λουτρόν* (Teller), it must still be said, that a bath and the outpouring of a rich overflowing fullness of strength and blessing, are plainly quite different ideas. Finally, to represent the doctrine of Christ as *λουτρόν*, were a metaphor quite foreign to the New Testament. Enough has been said for the refutation of these interpretations, although in a grammatical point of view much

more might be said. But it must create surprise, to find Matthies still saying: if by λουτρόν we understand not so much a mere play upon the idea of baptism, as rather the express designation of the outward act of baptism (?), then must the whole passage appear indistinct and self-contradictory, from the confusion of the material element with the spiritual principle of life, while yet Paul himself repeatedly places the true signification of baptism in the symbolical reference to Christ, and the evangelical renewal of the life (Rom. vi. 3, ss.) But how then will Matthies remove this indistinct commingling of the material element and the spiritual principle of life, seeing that it is plainly said of baptism, ἵνα αὐτὴν ἁγιάσῃ καθαρίσας τῷ λουτρῷ τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν ῥήματι? Is λουτρόν τοῦ ὕδατος here also a "bath of the Spirit?" Comp. Harless' excellent interpretation of this passage. And if the symbolical reference will suffice for such passages as Rom. vi. 4; Gal. iii. 27; Col. ii. 11, will it also suffice for 1 Pet. iii. 21, where of the βάπτισμα it is said: σώζει . . . . συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα εἰς θεόν (comp. Hofmann, Weiss. und Erfüllung, II. p. 234), and John iii. 3—5, *except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God?* Or rather do not these passages place before us that very "commingling of the material element with the spiritual," in which the Christian church has, in conformity with the Scripture, from the very beginning recognized the essence of the "outward act of baptism," and according to which the Christian doctrine has stamped it? Matthies says, there can be no doubt that by λουτρόν is to be understood the bath in the sense of moral cleansing, as in regeneration and renewal the washing away of, or the freeing from all untruth and sin, forms the most essential element. To this we would simply say, that the expression παλιγγενεσία, as also ἀνακαίνωσις, has so little to do with the figure of washing away, that it appears quite unintelligible how the apostle should have fallen upon such a comparison, if he had not in his mind a certain λουτρόν, namely, baptism, the substantial effect of which is this παλιγγενεσία. And how inconsistent is it with the clear context (the aim of which is to show how little reason the Christian has to boast on comparing himself with those who are not Christians, seeing that it is the mercy of God alone that hath saved him) to speak, as Matthies goes on to do, of the free self-determination with which

every individual has to subject himself to this "purifying and quickening bath of the Spirit," whilst along with this he yet sees a reference to baptism, on the ground that the idea of baptism points to this, namely, that the life of the baptized person must bring to completion in itself the moral purifying process of expiation! and sanctification. Thus far the words of the passage before us are explained as certainly referring to baptism! Having stated my view of the passage in general, it remains only now to confirm it by a reference to particulars. The apostle denotes the instrument of the salvation which is founded on the mercy of God by *λουτρόν παλιγγενεσίας καὶ ἀνακαινώσεως ἁγίου πνεύματος*. What grounds we have for taking *λουτρόν* in its literal and not in its metaphorical sense, are shown by the unsuitableness of the metaphor, and also by passages such as Eph. v. 20, *τῷ λουτρῷ τοῦ ὕδατος*; Hebr. x. 22, *λελουμένοι τὸ σῶμα ὕδατι καθαρῷ*; John. iii. 5, *ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος*; 1 John v. 6, *δι' ὕδατος καὶ αἵματος*, comp. with ver. 8; and finally, from passages such as 1 Pet. iii. 21, where baptism is likewise described as the means of salvation, and indeed in general from everything that we know on the subject of baptism from Scripture, comp. Hofmann, a. a. Q., II. p. 233—236. How indefinite and ambiguous is the relation expressed by the genitive, is shown by Winer, § 30, p. 211, ss., chiefly p. 215. Thus the similar expression *βάπτισμα μετανοίας* can, from the nature of the thing itself, be explained only of baptism which binds to repentance, and, taken by itself, the expression in the passage before us admits of a similar meaning. The relation of the genitive can be determined only from the context, and from a comparison with what we learn elsewhere concerning this *λουτρόν*. With regard next to *παλιγγενεσία*, it occurs again only at Matth. xix. 28, and there it denotes the restoration of all things. Here, on the other hand, it is substantially the same as the *being born from above*, or *of the Spirit*, or *of God*, John iii. 3, s. To this belongs also the *πάλιν ὠδίνω*, Gal. iv. 19, and all those passages which speak of adoption, Gal. iv. 6, &c. The old man dies, the body of the flesh is put off, Col. ii. 11, and Christ is put on instead, Gal. iii. 27. "He who offers himself for baptism, desires a relation to God in which Christ is, what formerly was the body of the flesh, and the spirit of Christ, what hitherto has been the sin dwelling in the flesh. He purposes no longer to wear the garment of that nature which con-

si ts in sinful inclination to what is evil, but to put on Christ, the new man." Hofmann, a. a. Q. If this is the idea implied in the *παλιγγενεσία* which is connected with this *λουτρόν*, there can then be no doubt as to the reference in the words *καὶ ἀνακ.*, &c. They cannot denote a second means of salvation along with the first, a view in favour of which nothing can be said also on grammatical grounds (the repetition of the *διά* is not warranted by critical authority), nor can they denote a second effect of the *λουτρόν* different from the first (we suppose for the present that this is the relation implied in the genitive); the words can only be an explanation of the expression immediately preceding. For what else can be meant by *ἀνακαίνωσις πν. ἁγ.* = the renewal proceeding from the Spirit of God, answering to the *putting on the new man*, Eph. iv. 24 = putting on Christ, Gal. iii. 27,—what else can be meant by this expression, than just the new birth of the man denoted by the word immediately preceding? Both expressions then are equally designations of the *λουτρόν*, but the latter more specially defines the former. So also Olshausen: *ἀνακαίνωσις* is the process, when the new man is created; and this takes place in the *παλιγγενεσία*. *Ἀνακαίνωσις* is used by the apostle only again at Rom. xii. 2, as also *ἀνακαινόω* and *ἀνακαινίζω* are used only by him, but by him frequently. On the thing denoted by the word, comp. Eph. iv. 23; Col. iii. 10; Gal. vi. 15; 2 Cor. v. 17. It is evident that *πνεύματος ἁγιοῦ* denotes the causa efficiens.—We have supposed, in the course of this investigation, that the relation of the genitive *παλιγ.* and *ἀνακ.* to *λουτρόν* is expressed thus: a bath which brings about this regeneration and renewing. The simple consideration of what is said concerning this regeneration and renewal, namely, that it is not the work of man but of the Holy Spirit, shows that *λουτρόν παλιγγ.* cannot, like *βάπτισμα μετανοίας*, signify: a bath which binds to regeneration as a duty. The same is shown by the context of the passage, which speaks of God's saving mercy, and describes the *λουτρόν παλιγγ.* as the means of this salvation proceeding from him. But equally unsuitable to the context is the view taken by De Wette and others, according to which the relation of the genitive is to be expressed thus: a bath which represents the allegorical regeneration. For the means of the salvation which proceeds only from God, cannot be an *allegorical representation* of the means of salvation; and just because *λουτρόν*

denotes this means, if it be a settled point that λουτρόν refers to baptism, as De Wette acknowledges it to be, then must this baptism itself be understood as the means of salvation, and the genitive can consequently denote only that real connexion of the λουτρόν with the παλιγγ. ; and that the rest of the passages which treat of baptism confirm this result, has already been shown, and reference has been made on this part of the subject to Hofmann. We are therefore not at liberty to doubt that the ancient view held by the church, according to which baptism is here denoted, and its explanation of the nature and efficacy of baptism as founded on this passage, are alone to be regarded as exegetically confirmed ; since a metaphorical explanation is already in itself inadmissible, and is shown to be altogether untenable by a comparison with similar passages ; and if once a reference to baptism is admitted, there can only be supposed such a real connexion as we have shown between it and the regeneration and renewing of the Holy Spirit.—Another question started by Olshausen in the observations now lying before me, is, how far what is here said on the subject of baptism applies to the baptism of infants. The propriety of such an application may be contested, in so far as the apostle here speaks of himself and of those who share with him in the new life of the Spirit. In spite of this, however, as this passage represents baptism as the saving act of God, and therefore altogether in its objective aspect, it may give some insight into the grounds upon which infant baptism may be vindicated. The passage speaks not of a doing of man, but a doing of God upon man in baptism ; and the question, therefore, takes this form : 1, whether the child to be baptized needs such a saving act ; and 2, whether he is susceptible of it. There can be no doubt as to the answer which Scripture gives to the former of these questions. And if this is a settled point, then a doubt can scarcely be entertained with regard to the other. Just as a sinful state (the body of the flesh) may exist prior to the exercise of will on the part of the individual, which makes him to stand in need of the saving act, so also must the opposite state in which the dominion of sin is removed, be one which may be supposed to exist prior to the development of personal consciousness. Just as in the unbaptized person there may be, and really is, a sinful state previous to the development of personal consciousness, so, in like manner, in the same person a state of sanctification may take place,

and will take place, if he is transplanted into the sanctifying fellowship of the Spirit of Jesus Christ. We have but to distinguish between the operation of the Spirit on the person of the man,—on his consciousness and will,—and his operation on the foundation of life in the man,—the region of the unconscious, on which his personal life rests. It is only as an influence wrought, not through the medium of consciousness, but on the foundation of life, the nature of the man, in contradistinction to his person, that original sin can be understood, or the mental resemblance often so unmistakable between parents and children ; and as an efficacy of the same kind also, must we regard what the apostle says as to the sanctifying influence of parents on their children (1 Cor. vii. 14, comp. Neander a. a. Q., I., p. 282, s.) And can we conceive of a real redemption of the man from the dominion of sin which dwells in him,—in his flesh,—and keeps his personal will in bondage, Rom. vii. 23, otherwise than through an influence on this nature, so that a really new life-power, the power of the *spirit of regeneration*, opposes the *law in the members*, and destroys the dominion of sin ? And can the efficacy of the sacrament, as distinguished from the word, be otherwise understood ? There will, indeed, always be a difference between the baptism of the grown up person and that of the infant. In the former case, a personal desire of salvation and a personal acquiescence in all that is performed in baptism in the person baptized is presupposed, and only in this case will baptism have for its result a full *regeneration and renewing of the Holy Spirit.* In the latter case, there is the need of salvation, but neither personal desire for it nor acquiescence in the act performed in baptism on the baptized person ; accordingly, the effect will also be different. The effect will be a power of the sanctifying spirit coming into opposition to the dominion of sin dwelling in the flesh, which, however, will only then issue in a regeneration and renewing, in a real ἄνω γεννηθῆναι of the man, when he lets the power of this spirit manifest itself with his growing consciousness, and when by an act of his own will he appropriates what has been done to him. Olshausen points to this when he observes, " Baptism is thus treated in the same way as regeneration itself. In this way also the dogmatic theologians of our church interpreted the passage. They, however, fell into a confusion of ideas really distinct. They referred this sentiment, without hesitation, also to infant baptism, and sup-

posed that regeneration took place also in unconscious children. But the New Testament knows nothing of infant baptism. Nor can a man be born again without consciousness. But the theologians understood by the regeneration of children only the forgiveness of original sin, not the dominion over sin. In this sense regeneration is not used in the New Testament. In children, confirmation is regeneration."

Ver. 6. *Οὗ ἐξέχεεν* (Aorist.) The *οὗ* (attraction = *ὅ*) refers of course not to *λουτρόν* but to *πνεύμα*. The apostle has yet to say how this regenerating and renewing operation of the Spirit has been obtained, and he does this by pointing to the mediation of Jesus Christ our Saviour, through whom this Spirit has been abundantly poured out. Regeneration is thus described as a work of the Triune God, and the different relations of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to this work are clearly denoted. To understand by *ἐφ' ἡμᾶς* others than were before meant by this expression, is against the context, which in no way indicates such a change, and requires that *ἐξέχεε* be referred to the operation of the Spirit just mentioned. I cannot, therefore, with Olshausen, perceive any reference here to the day of Pentecost, in so far as the communication of the Spirit had then reference not to the apostles alone, but was a communication for the church in all times. To the same effect De Wette also says: from this spirit of Christianity as a whole does the conversion of individuals proceed. He is certainly right when he adds: it is not the communication of the Spirit to individuals after baptism that is here spoken of, for not until ver. 7 is justification mentioned as the consequence of regeneration. Ver. 7 shows rather, that the act of God denoted by *ἐξέχεε* coincides in point of time with the *ἔσωσε διὰ λυτροῦ*.—Matthies justly observes, that while Christ is represented as the objective mediatory power, faith is placed beside it as the subjective instrumental condition. *Πλουσίως* not in contrast with the Old Testament, but with reference to the mighty operation of this Spirit, ver. 5, comp. with ver. 3. The same expression is found in Col. iii. 16; 2 Pet. i. 1; 1 Tim. vi. 17. It is agreed by all the more recent commentators, that the words *διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* cannot, with Bengel and Flatt, be connected with *ἔσωσε*, which has its own *διά* already, but only with *ἐξέχεε*. The new life-power which shows itself efficacious in baptism, is obtained through the mediation of Christ. The words

our Saviour, as above, ver. 4, in connection with θέος, need no explanation here, where the saving act of God and Jesus Christ is spoken of.

Ver. 7. The design of the *pouring out abundantly*, &c., is stated in this verse. Others (De Wette) understand ἵνα as expressing the aim of ἔσωσε, an unnecessary harshness, in which the exegetical relation of ver. 6 and 7 to ver. 5 is overlooked, and ἐξέχεε deprived of the more exact determination which is necessary to it, while ἔσωσε needs not to be thus determined. Ἐκείνου also, which is thus made to refer to God, is in this immediate connexion with θεὸς ἔσωσε unsuitable.—If then ἐξέχεε and ἔσωσε coincide in the manner stated above, the words *being justified by his grace* will not, as many think, denote something following upon the communication of the Spirit in baptism—for how can this be conceived of as separate from regeneration?—but, as the participle also indicates, must be understood as expressing the consummation of the afore-mentioned operation of the Spirit, which then is what is pre-supposed in the final end of all the saving agency of God, namely, the attainment of eternal life. Δικαιωθέντες is therefore used here in the same sense as it commonly is by the apostle; comp. for example Rom. viii. 30, a passage which distinctly shows, that in the δικαιοῦν the saving act of God in the individual is consummated, upon which consequently follows the δοξάζειν, just in the same way as we maintain it to be here with reference to ver. 5. *This*, however, we learn plainly enough from the passage before us, namely, that the state denoted by δικαιωθείς is not merely one of outward acquittal from the guilt of sin, as indeed the evangelical church has never taught, and that it cannot be conceived of apart from an inward transformation of the man, which indeed is already pre-supposed in the condition of faith. The Catholic commentator, Mack, is therefore in this passage needlessly angry at the doctrine of our church as limiting the *righteousness* before God to the non-imputation of sin; while he himself finds here the catholic doctrine of sanctification through the gracious assistance of God, against which Matthies has said all that is requisite. Only in this would I be inclined to disagree with Matthies, namely, that he understands διὰ λυτροῦ, &c. to denote the active process in the development of the evangelical life; δικαιωθέντες, on the other hand, to denote the relation formed once for all

in his inmost being between the Christian and God. He here forgets that all the progressive holiness of the man, rests precisely on the act performed but once, of the *συνταφῆναι* and *ἐγερθῆναι*, as a fixed and settled relation, which is clearly shown in Rom. vi. 2, ss.; and Mack is right, in so far as he recognizes in the being born again, and on the other hand in the being justified, expressions which apply to one and the same thing.—In *τῇ ἐκείνου χάριτι*, almost all the more recent commentators refer *ἐκείνου* to *θεός*. The sense is then as Chrysostom concisely states it: *πάλιν χάριτι, οὐκ ὀφειλῇ*, in the sense of ver. 5. So also Olshausen. Comp. Gal. ii. 16; Ephes. ii. 8, &c. This construction appears to me to be suitable neither to the train of thought nor to the *ἐκείνου*. For it were unnatural to refer *ἐκεῖνος* to the principal subject, to which reference was made just before in *ἐξέχεε*. And would it not correspond much more with the exegetical relation in which vv. 6 and 7 stand to ver. 5, to refer *ἐκείνου* to the Spirit, whose operation is described in the words preceding according to its objective mediation, and here according to its final purpose, so that the *being justified by grace* is the consummation of the Spirit's work described in ver. 5? *Ἐκείνου* would then be used, because reference was made not to Christ, but to the more remote *πνεῦμα*, and by *χάριτι*, the grace of the Holy Spirit, would then be denoted that work of the Spirit described in ver. 5. So also Heydenreich. The purpose of this outpouring with respect to its final aim, is then given in the words *that we should be made heirs*, &c. The Old Testament allusion in this often-occurring expression (Gal. iii. 18; Eph. i. 11, 14; Col. iii. 24, &c.), is acknowledged, comp. Harless on Eph. i. 11. That which to the Israel of the Old Testament was the land of promise, is to that of the new covenant the *life eternal*. *Κατ' ἐλπίδα* (= "according to hope," *i. e.*, in the way of hope, Winer, § 53, d. p. 478), which is not to be connected with *ζωῆς αἰῶν*, is added in order to express that the inheritance is not immediately to be entered upon. Rom. viii. 24, s. On the Pauline character of the sentiment, comp. i. 2. That *ζωῆς αἰωνίου* is nowhere else used by the apostle in connection either with *κληρονόμος* or with *ἐλπίς*, as De Wette observes, is of little consequence, for one can see no reason why he might not have connected it with both just in the same way as *ἐλπὶς σωτηρίας* (1 Thess. v. 8), and *κληρονόμος τῆς ἐπαγγελίας* or *δικαιοσύνης*

(Hebr. vi. 17, xi. 7) are connected. That this reference to the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, had in the eye of the apostle an especial significance in regard to the Cretans, see on i. 2. It has already been observed that vv. 3—7 present a cursory view of the whole work of redemption.

Ver. 8—11. These verses can be rightly understood only when viewed as containing a special admonition to Titus, in reference to the work he has to do in Crete in opposition to the prevailing errors. Ver. 8 tells him what he is to pursue; ver. 9, what he is to avoid; ver. 10 and 11 how he is to deal with an incorrigible heretic. They do not, as De Wette maintains, repeat in a different form and aspect what is said in vv. 4—7, namely, in the form of a practical motive, and with the view of reverting to the train of thought in ver. 1. The apostle rather is done with what is to be enjoined on the Cretans, and deals now with Titus. That which the apostle has just said concerning the saving act of the unmerited mercy of God, through the bath of regeneration, to a living hope of eternal life, is to be constantly affirmed by Titus to his hearers. Thus the moral fruit will not fail to appear; but on the other hand he is, &c., ver. 9. How little also does the form of the preceding, comp. with 11—15, correspond to such an application of the sentiment as that which De Wette assigns to it; and why the same thing again?

Faithful is the word = *πιστὸς ὁ λόγος*, a formula certainly peculiar to the Pastoral Epistles, 1 Tim. i. 15, iii. 1, iv. 9; 2 Tim. ii. 11, now pointing with emphasis at what goes before, and now at what follows; here at ver. 4—8 the sum of the whole doctrine of salvation. This phrase answers to the *ἀμήν* used at the beginning or the end of an address which is intended to be spoken with emphasis, comp. Rom. i. 25; Gal. i. v; Eph. iii. 21; and 2 Cor. i 20. Its occurrence in the three epistles belongs to the indices, which show them to have been written about the same time. "And I will that thou insist strongly on these things, so that the believers in God may be careful to maintain good works." The *περὶ τούτων* refers to the points contained in the *λόγος*. *Διαβεβαιοῦσθαι* = "assure strongly," occurring again only at 1 Tim. i. 7, is used also by profane writers. On the other hand, *βέβαιος*, *βεβαιόω*, *βεβαίωσις* is one of the apostle's familiar words, Rom. iv. 16 (Heb. ii. 2); Rom. xv. 8; 1 Cor. i. 6 (Heb. ii. 3); Phil. i. 7 (Heb. vi.

16) where connexions quite similar occur, although not with *περί*. The unpauline character of the expression which De Wette likewise notices, is therefore of very small importance. The fruit of this *διαβεβαιοῦσθαι* is then denoted by the *ἵνα*. We have here the same sentiment as in i. 9 is denoted by *the sound doctrine*. Such doctrine the apostle means to say has in it a power of godliness (i. 1, the truth which leads to godliness), produces the fruits of morality. In reference to the contrast which the apostle here has in his eye, Calvin well says on the word *φροντίζωσι* which occurs only here: ita vult eos studium suum curamque huc applicare, et videtur apostolus, quum dicit: *φροντίζωσιν*, eleganter alludere ad inanes eorum contemplationes, qui sine fructu et extra vitam philosophantur. Only thus is the use of this expression here to be explained. On *καλῶν ἔργων* see i. 2. The *οἱ τῷ θεῷ πεπιστευκότες* are not those who have become believers in God, but "those to whom God has given faith," namely, in the gospel, as the *word of God*, i. 3; comp. Acts xvi. 34. There are, therefore, no grounds in the expression itself for limiting it to the gentile Christians; besides the distinguishing appellation of the true God in contrast with idols (1 Thess. i. 9) is wanting here, as De Wette and Matthies have already observed in opposition to Mack; nor are the actual circumstances in favour of this supposition, as a large portion of the population in Crete consisted of Jews, amongst whom the gospel had likewise found acceptance, and through whom doubtless it had been first introduced, as is proved also by the errors which proceeded from them, i. 10. *Προΐστασθαι* occurring again in the same sense at ver. 14, literally "to stand before" (Rom. xii. 8; 1 Thess. v. 12), from which easily arises the signification in the passage = "to care for," to manage, to be intent on a thing. So frequently in the classical writers, Passow. "This is good and profitable for men." It appears that the article before *καλά* must be cancelled according to preponderating critical authorities, comp. Tischendorf; it is difficult, however, to account for its insertion. De Wette, in opposition to Theophylact, Grotius, Heydenreich, Matthies, refers the *ταῦτα*, not correctly as I apprehend, to the doctrines, on the ground that to refer it to *ἔργα* would cause tautology. *Καλὰ ἔργα* does not however denote the works as *becoming* in men, which is what we are to understand by *καλὰ ἀνθρώποις*. Nor could *καλὰ ἀνθρώποις* be said with propriety of

the contents of the doctrine, the περὶ τούτων. If again it referred to διαβεβαιοῦσθαι, it would be τοῦτο. We must therefore abide by what is grammatically the most natural reference; that, namely, to ἔργα. The following words show for what reason he enjoins this on Titus. Titus is to insist on this doctrine, because from it proceeds what is good and profitable; he is not to meddle, ver. 9, with *foolish questions:* for they are *profitless and vain.*

Ver. 9. "But avoid foolish questions, and genealogies, and contentions, and strivings about the law; for they are profitless and vain." The *foolish questions* stand in contrast with the *sound doctrine* which produces moral fruit; μῶράς chiefly points however to the insipid contents of these ζητήσεις, by which are to be understood, not contentions (these are the ἔρεις afterwards mentioned, but questions of discussion, as 1 Tim. i. 4, vi. 4; 2 Tim. ii. 23; comp. i. 10, ματαιολόγοι. As belonging to the class of these *questions*, the καί gives a specific prominence to the *genealogies*, which we find again mentioned in 1 Tim. i. 4 in connection with *fables*. In chap. i. 4 of our epistle only the *fables* are mentioned, here only the *genealogies*, and in 1 Tim. i. 4 both are mentioned together, from which we may infer with considerable certainty that they were nearly related to each other. The conjectures of expositors have been quite as numerons on the subject of the *genealogies*, as they have been on the *fables*. The exegetical expositor must, however, abide by what he obtains from the natural signification of the word according to its general use in the profane writers, as also its use in Heb. vii. 6, and see whether the context is against this signification. The context, then, places the genealogies in opposition to a doctrine which produces moral fruit, and comprehends them under the class of *foolish questions*, the contents of which are foolish, and which, in a moral point of view, are fruitless and vain. There is no trace in the immediate context of a heresy, an opposition of true to false doctrine, and it has already been sufficiently made out that the remaining contents of the epistle point at nothing of the kind. If now we compare the passage in 1 Tim. i. 4, we find there the genealogies described as *endless*, an expression which is far too indefinite to admit of our determining anything with certainty respecting the import of the genealogies. The clause which follows, however, fully confirms

the view furnished by the epistle, that it is no heresy properly so called, but a foolish, morally fruitless pursuit that is spoken of; for how otherwise could it be said, that they (the genealogies) minister questions rather than promote fruitful knowledge, and opposition be made to them (ver. 5) from a purely practical point of view? Everything plainly indicates that things are meant which are in themselves vain, and therefore without moral efficacy. But to this most natural result to which we are led by the signification of the word, and with which the context and the contents of the epistle harmonize, it is objected that the error which gave rise to these genealogies cannot be explained, if something of the nature of Jewish family registers are to be understood by them, nor can it be shown how the Gentile Christians should have taken any interest in them. But the genealogies were not the only subject of these vain pursuits; and at all events we must suppose, as indeed the *fables* prove, that there was a special mode of treating this subject. See, besides, the General Introduction. The apostle further specifies the things which Titus is to shun in the words following: *and contentions and strifes about the law.* The ἔρεις (not to be connected with *νομικάς*, as De Wette observes, against Heydenreich, and Baur, with whom Olshausen agrees), are to be viewed as the effects of the *questions*, comp. vi. 4; 2 Tim. ii. 23; they are the contentions of these men among themselves proceeding from their obstinateness of opinion. The following *strifes about the law* are a specific form of these *contentions*, just as the *genealogies* are in relation to *the questions*. In order to determine what is meant by these strifes about the law, it will be necessary to attend chiefly to i. 14, where, as the constituent parts of the error, are mentioned *commandments of men*, along with *fables*. Here then, where likewise the prevailing errors are referred to, we are not at liberty to understand by *strifes about the law*, as Mack thinks, strifes about whether the Gnostic doctrines of spirits have a foundation in the Old Testament, or generally about the law being binding or not binding, which De Wette, along with Baur, thinks probable in reference to 1 Tim. i. 7, but on the authority of the passage already referred to, in which we find nothing of Antinomianism—strifes about the authority and confirmation of the *commandments*, i. 14, as Matthies also is of opinion. So much then may be inferred from this designation in the passage before us, namely, that those *commandments* spoken

of in i. 14, although going beyond the law, nevertheless sought to connect themselves with the law, and to confirm themselves by it. *Περίστασθαι* = "to go out of the way," "to shun," occurs again only at 2 Tim. ii. 16. The word is used in the same signification also in profane literature.—*For they are profitless and vain*, corresponding to, *these things are good and profitable*, ver. 8; *μάταιος*, "empty" vacuus, in respect to their import, used elsewhere by the apostle in the same sense, 1 Cor. iii. 20.

Ver. 10. Ver. 9 informs Titus how he is to act in reference to the errors; this verse gives him an injunction as to his conduct towards persons who, by separating themselves, cause divisions. "Avoid an heretical man after a first and second admonition." In determining what is to be understood by *αἱρετικος ἄνθρωπος*, we are by no means at liberty all at once to fix on the later signification of the word, and then to maintain that the word had not this signification until the Gnostics were distinguished as the first heretics, and from this to infer the spuriousness of the epistles as Baur does. De Wette also observes that this is a later word and a later idea; that *αἵρεσις* is never used by Paul in reference to doctrine, comp. 1 Cor. xi. 19; Gal. v. 20; certainly, however, 2 Pet. ii. 1. But the question precisely is, whether it is a later idea? We must first of all examine in what sense the apostle elsewhere uses the word *αἵρεσις*; and if it must be admitted that the word in those passages where it occurs, does not refer to doctrine, and does not signify heresies in the later sense of the term, it will farther have to be asked whether by *αἱρετικός* here we are to understand anything different from one who causes divisions (*αἱρεσείς*, in the apostle's sense of the term), or is addicted to these. We have already seen how little the epistle speaks of heresies, or fundamental errors; and the idea implied in *αἱρετίκος* must be judged of, according to what we know concerning the errors of the Christians in Crete. If then we do not proceed arbitrarily we must say, that *αἱρετίκος* denotes, according to the *usus linguae* one who gives rise to divisions in the church; and it may be inferred from what we find in the epistle, that he does this by separations and errors such as are described in iii. 9, i. 14. Thus we have no later idea, but only a word which indeed the apostle does not use elsewhere, but which by a simple formation is derived as an adjective from the *αἵ-*

ρεσις, with which he is familiar; a form of derivation of which we find many examples in the apostle's writings, comp. Böttger, a. a. O., p. 115. In reference to any such person, who causes division and discord, Titus is enjoined once and a second time to make the attempt to set him right. He is not to contend with him, but to admonish him, to bring home to him a sense of his error. *Νουθεσία* as also *νουθετεῖν* used only by the apostle, and by him frequently; for it is the apostle who uses it in Acts xx. 31, and it denotes the earnest admonition directed to the heart, comp. Harless, a. a. O. 522. He is to seek to gain back such individuals; which of course does not exclude their being *rebuked* and *silenced* (i. 11) qua seducers. If this attempt repeated has proved in vain, he is then to avoid them. The word *παραιτεῖσθαι*, literally to excuse one's self from anything = "to avoid," cannot be understood of exclusion from church fellowship; according to the context, it signifies nothing farther than: personally to have nothing more to do with them, to let them go. The expression, besides in the Pastoral Epistles, is found in Heb. xii. 25.

Ver. 11. This verse gives the reason why he is henceforth to avoid him: inasmuch as thou knowest (of course not beforehand, but in consequence of these unsuccessful attempts to recover him), that such an one is perverted and sinneth, being condemned by himself. *Ἐξέστραπται* only here, in the Sept. Deut. xxxii. 20; Jer. ii. 21, for תַּהְפֻּכוֹת דָּם = perverseness; in profane writers, to invert, so that what is uppermost comes to be undermost, or to turn round, to change his disposition; comp. Passow. Baur, in order to make it out to be more appropriate in reference to a heretic, observes that it is more suitable to the context and to the signification of the word to render: such a one has turned away from us, and is gone out from the fellowship of the faithful; in support of which he appeals to Deut. xxxii. 20. I do not understand how *ἐκ*, not *ἀποστέφεσθαι*, can be made to have this signification; and further, this signification is demonstrably contrary to the *usus linguae*, nor does it occur in this sense in the Septuagint, as a comparison with Jer. ii. 21 shows, where indeed the Septuagint gives an inaccurate rendering, but yet, as לִי stands expressly along with נֶהְפָּכְתְּ, the words could in no case mean what Baur under-

stands by the expression ἐξέστρ. As little does the following word ἁμαρτάνει convey a more special designation of the heretic; he sins qua αἱρετίκος by causing divisions, while he is αὐτοκατάκριτος = "condemned by himself." In this word and not in the ἁμαρτάνει lies the reason why Titus is to leave him to himself. Chrysostom well explains the sense: οὐκ ἔχει εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐδεὶς εἶπεν. ὅταν οὖν μετὰ τὴν παραίνεσιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπιμένῃ αὐτοκατάριτος γίνεται. He has judged himself inasmuch as he rejects the warning and sins with knowledge. What could be effected by further admonition? Nothing is said of his shutting himself out from fellowship. Comp. moreover the General Introduction, § 3, on Baur's objections against the genuineness founded on this passage.

§ 4. PERSONAL MATTERS. SALUTATIONS. CONCLUSION.

Passing to matters of a personal kind, the apostle charges Titus to come to him at Nicopolis; not, however, before he has sent to him either Artemas or Tychicus; but after that speedily. To Nicopolis, for there he has determined to pass the winter (comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 6.) The sending of one or other of those two who are named, seems to have had for its object that the person sent should take Titus's place in Crete, as his departure was to depend on the arrival of the person sent. Artemas is unknown to us. Tychicus is, in Acts xx. 4, called Lysanius. He was with the apostle during the first, and, if our view is correct, also during the second imprisonment at Rome, and was sent twice by him from Rome to Lesser Asia, Col. iv. 7, 8; Eph. vi. 21; 2 Tim. iv. 12. The first passage speaks of him in such a manner as to make it appear that he was fully qualified for being Titus' successor in Crete. Tradition says that he was at last bishop of Chalcedon in Bithynia. Comp. Winer's R.W.B. Several towns bore the name of Nicopolis, one in Epirus, one in Nestus in Thrace (which is the one meant in the subscription of the epistle), one in Cilicia, &c., comp. De Wette. Which is meant here, can be decided only by comparing and combining the data which bear on the point, comp. the Introduction. *Κέκρικα*: "I have determined," frequently used by the apostle, 1 Cor. v. 3; 2 Cor. ii. 1. The παραχειμάσαι leads us to suppose that the winter was drawing near when the apostle wrote.

Ver. 13. Others who are already with Titus he is to send speedily, *i.e.* to fit them out for the journey that nothing may be wanting to them. The *ἵνα* does not refer to *σπουδαίως*, but to *προπέμπειν* in the sense we have assigned to it; comp. 3 John vi. Zenas is unknown to us. His by-name, *νομικός* = *γραμματεύς* (Matth. xxii. 35), may have remained with him from an earlier period, according to which he must have been a Jewish Christian. Others understand *νομίκος* of the civil law = "lawyer," which is certainly preferable to the other, as the retaining of the name *νομίκος* in the first sense by a Pauline Christian is not probable. Apollos is known to us, comp. Acts xviii. 24; 1 Cor. i. 12, iii. 4, ss., xvi. 12, and Winer's R.W.B. *Ἵνα*, &c., an imitator of the apostle could hardly have fallen upon such observations.

Ver. 14. "And withal let our's also learn to exercise themselves carefully in good works for the supply of necessary wants." The sense of the verse is differently determined, according as by *ἡμέτεροι* the Cretan Christians, or the persons named immediately before, Zenas and Apollos, are understood to be meant. In the latter case the apostle would say: let them by the labour of their hands earn something like himself (the apostle), for the time of need. So Grotius and others. I cannot agree with this explanation, as it would assign to the words *καλῶν ἔργων προΐστασθαι* quite a different sense from that in which they were used in ver. 8; again because *καί* cannot refer to the apostle, but only to Titus, with whom the *ἡμέτεροι* are placed on a level, and further because *ἵνα μὴ ὦσιν ἄκαρποι*, according to its general use, 1 Cor. xiv. 14; Eph. v. 11, would also in itself be far too strong an expression, and because it cannot be presupposed that all understood, like Paul, a trade by which they could everywhere earn for themselves a maintenance. It will be better, therefore, to understand the words as containing an admonition to benevolence which might here have an opportunity of manifesting itself. What in the preceding verse he requests from Titus, he here makes the business of all. *Good works* would then refer chiefly to benevolence, which is represented as the *fruit* of faith. So also Olshausen. *Εἰς τὰς χρείας* as Phil. iv. 16 (De Wette.) The admonition is all the more appropriate in that these journeys were of great importance for the spread of Christianity; comp. on *φιλόξενος*, i. 8.

In ver. 15 follow salutations from all who were with the apostle, and from the apostle to all who are with Titus, who are united with the apostle by the love that is in the faith. The expression, *who love us in the faith*, is chosen from a regard to the circumstances, according to which he could not expect this of all. Love is represented as having its root in faith, this again as the bond of fellowship. The short benediction (as in Col. iv. 18), *grace be with you all*, is no proof that the epistle was addressed to the church. "It only implied the fellowship of Titus with all Christians there." De Wette, and similarly Matthies. Ἀμήν is a later addition.

APPENDIX TO THE INTRODUCTION TO THE FOREGOING EPISTLE.

I find from the most recent researches[1] into the question as to the date of the epistle to Titus, that it will be necessary to add the following observations, in order to complete what has already been given in the Introduction. There are some views of this question which have not received consideration there, and by refuting which the view which we have developed may be still further confirmed. Chiefly, however, does Wieseler's view of this subject, which he has been at so much pains to establish, demand our attention.—With reference to those hypotheses which have been already refuted in the Introduction, I rejoice to find that in the rejection of these I am supported by Wieseler (p. 329, ss.), and by Huther's investigations. The latter entirely coincides with me in the result to which he has come, inasmuch as he fixes the journey to Crete, and the writing of the epistle, to the period subsequent[2] to the first imprisonment at Rome; while the latter denies that the apostle was liberated from this imprisonment, and maintains that the writ-

[1] Wieseler, Chronologie des apost. Zeitalters, Gött. 1848. Huther, Comm. Einl. p. 17—22.

[2] Compare his fuller investigation of this critical problem of a second imprisonment, p. 27, s.

ing of the epistle, together with the journey to Crete, took place during the from two to three years' stay of the apostle in Ephesus. —But the hypothesis started by Credner, and adopted by Neudecker, namely, that Paul (Acts xviii. 23) made an intermediate journey from Galatia and Phrygia, by Crete, to Corinth—has not been noticed in the Introduction. Wieseler justly refers against this view to Acts xix. 1, xviii. 21.—As regards the misplacing of the events in question in the period specified in Acts xx. 1—5, the view as represented by Matthies, that the apostle made the journey to Crete from Greece, has already in the Introduction been pretty fully considered (comp. also Wieseler, p. 337, ss.); on the other hand, the hypothesis, according to which the apostle's journey to Crete and the writing of the epistle, took place before his arrival in Greece, but not till after the completion of Titus' twofold mission to Corinth (so Theodoret, Baronius, Lightfoot, and others), has not been specially examined. What Wieseler and Huther say in opposition to it, is much to the point, namely, that in this case Titus, in spite of 2 Cor. ix. 4, 5, must after his second mission to Corinth have returned thence again to Macedonia to the apostle, and that Paul must have twice passed through Greece, namely, on his way going to Crete, and on his way back to Macedonia. (Wieseler, p. 342.) "What a journeying hither and thither without a plan, would this imply on the part of the apostle . . . . at a time when, from the intelligence which Titus brought respecting the state of affairs in the churches of Achaia, the apostle was filled with the greatest joy." So Wieseler. But Wieseler's own view, according to which the journey in question and the writing of the epistle, fall within the period of the apostle's stay in Ephesus, and previous to his journey to Greece (Acts xix. 1), will also scarcely admit of being maintained, as Huther has shown. We have already mentioned several things in opposition to this view, without having before us Wieseler's acute statement and defence of it. We shall here again look at it, and if this—certainly the most plausible of all the views which date the journey in question before the Roman imprisonment—is found to be incapable of proof, we shall then abide still more confidently by the view which we have taken. —His hypothesis is as follows: After having laboured somewhere about two years in Ephesus, the apostle went thence on a visitation-

journey first to Macedonia (1 Tim. i. 3), and then to Corinth, and having been invited when there to visit Crete by the Christians who were dispersed through that island, he returned by Crete, where he left Titus behind him, to Ephesus, where he remained until his stay of almost three years was completed. . . . The epistle to Titus was written not long after his return to Ephesus, . . . after the first epistle to the Corinthians, . . . soon after Easter, 57, A.D.," p. 347—355. With regard to this hypothesis, the following doubts suggest themselves. 1. Granted that that second journey of the apostle to Corinth, of which we have no account in the Acts of the Apostles, but which is supposed on the authority of the notices in the second epistle to the Corinthians (xiii. 1, 2, ii. 1, xii. 14, 21), took place within the period of the apostle's stay in Ephesus, there are yet great difficulties in the way of placing it so far on towards the end of that stay as is here supposed. Paul is said to have written the epistle to Titus soon after his return, before he had written the first epistle to the Corinthians; the journey, however, was not made till after he had been about two years in Ephesus. Is it not then in the highest degree strange, that the first epistle to the Corinthians should contain throughout no allusion to his having been shortly before present among them, but should refer all the particulars of which he speaks to accounts which he had received from others, or through communications by letter, and nowhere to his own observation, i. 11 (v. 1), vii. 8, viii. 1, xi. 18, xii. 1? Can we suppose that things in Corinth had so turned out during the few months that had elapsed since the apostle was there? How unaccountable is the passage, v. 9, where Paul refers to an epistle that has been lost, and the words in iv. 18, *ὡς μὴ ἐρχομένου*, if we are to believe that the apostle was shortly before in Corinth? 2. Wieseler must suppose that Titus, notwithstanding of the instructions given to him in the epistle, was soon called away again and sent to Corinth, consequently that he did not fulfil his mission in Crete (compare against this in Wieseler on the first epistle to Timothy, p. 291), and that the apostle changed his purpose intimated in iii. 12 of causing Titus to meet him at Nicopolis; for, according to this hypothesis, Titus comes again to the apostle at Macedonia, after he had performed his mission to Corinth. 3. That the apostle intended to winter in Nicopolis on his way to Corinth is in itself hardly credible (almost as little as that he

twice passed through Greece to Macedonia), and decidedly contradicts the passage, 1 Cor. xvi. 6, where the apostle writes *πρὸς ὑμᾶς . . . . παραμενῶ ἤ καὶ παραχειμάσω.* For if, as Wieseler admits, the gospel had not yet been preached in Nicopolis, it is then impossible to understand by the *ὑμᾶς*, Nicopolis. And even although, as Wieseler urges, the two epistles were not written exclusively to the congregations in Corinth, there can yet be no doubt that in the word *ὑμᾶς* the apostle has chiefly Corinth in his mind, and not the people of Nicopolis. The learned observation that Nicopolis was at that time reckoned as belonging to Achaia, can decide nothing against what we have said (comp Huther.) 4. There remains almost no time for Corinth and its neighbourhood (upon which, notwithstanding, the apostle's mind must chiefly have been fixed, as appears from the two epistles to the Corinthians), if Paul spends the winter months in Nicopolis in Epirus, and leaves Corinth in the beginning of March. Or it must be supposed (as Wieseler in fact does), that the apostle did not remain over the winter in Nicopolis according to Tit. iii. 12, but left for Corinth during the winter.—To these objections are to be added all those which are derived from the later form of church life, of church doctrine and discipline, which we find in this epistle. And the most serious of all is, that in the separation of the second epistle to Timothy from the two others (which this hypothesis of necessity implies), its kindred relation to these remains unaccountable; and the writing of other epistles about the same time by the apostle so different in their phraseology, style, and ideas, remains a mystery. Compare the General Introduction. With regard to the positive reasons by which Wieseler has sought to support his view, namely, that Titus was already at that time about the apostle (Acts xviii. 22; Gal. ii. 1), that Apollos was already personally known to him (according to 1 Cor. xvi. 12), that the same may be supposed of Tychicus (according to Acts xx. 4), nay that in respect to him it is even probable that he accompanied Titus, to whom he was sent (iii. 12), on his journey to Corinth—all these will not outweigh the difficulties we have stated, even if we should concede all the data upon which they rest. Especially the circumstance on which Wieseler lays great stress—that Tychicus seems to have accompanied Titus to Corinth—rather in my opinion contradicts the passage iii. 12; for this passage is doubtless much more correctly

understood of loosing Titus from Crete by one of the persons there named supplying his place, than in the way Wieseler explains it. The difficulties arising from Nicopolis have already been stated (chiefly suggested by 1 Cor. xvi. 6.) The conjecture that Paul could have preached the gospel in Nicopolis only during the supposed period, must of necessity remain uncertain; and also the passages Rom. xv. 19 and 23 can, in the face of these difficulties, and owing to their generality, by no means prove that Paul must at that time have already been in Nicopolis.

THE FIRST EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. TIMOTHY.

Timothy is named as the receiver of the epistle, i. 2, iii. 14. It was intended for him alone, not for the church at the same time, as this would contradict what is plainly said in the inscription, while it would be inconsistent with the character of the epistle as an official letter, and with the whole import of it; on iv. 12 see the exposition. As to his personal history we learn from passages in the New Testament that Lycaonia was his native country—whether Lystra (De Wette) or Derbe (Wieseler) was his birth-place is undetermined—that his father was a Greek, and his mother a Jewess who had embraced Christianity (Acts xvi. 1—3.) His mother's name was Eunice, his grandmother's Lois (2 Tim. i. 5.) From this last passage compared with iii. 15, we may infer that Timothy had enjoyed the benefit of a pious education on the side of his mother. Already at the time of the apostle's second stay in that district, do we find him mentioned as a *disciple* who had a good report of the brethren (Acts xvi. 1, 2.) After he had allowed himself to be circumcised (Acts xvi. 3), and had been set apart with the laying on of hands to the work of an evangelist (1 Tim. i. 18, iv. 14, vi. 12; 2 Tim. i. 6, ii. 2), he joined the apostle on his journey through Lesser Asia and Macedonia, followed him to Rome, after having remained behind in Berea (Acts xvii. 14—16), was deputed thence by the apostle to

Thessalonica, and returned to him at Corinth (Acts xviii. 5; 1 Thess. iii. 6.) We find him at a later period in Ephesus again with the apostle, from whence he was sent to Macedonia and Cornith (Acts xix. 22; 1 Cor. iv. 17, xiv. 10, 11.) The second epistle to the Corinthians does not expressly say that he had actually been there. But we find him again with the apostle in Macedonia (2 Cor. i. 1), and he went with him to Corinth (Rom. xiv. 21.) He was one of the apostle's travelling companions on his return thence, and he went forward along with several others from Philippi to Troas (Acts xx. 4, ss.) According to Phil. ii. 19—23, he was to have gone to Philippi. According to our epistle, he abode in Ephesus (i. 3), having being charged by the apostle with the care of the affairs of the church there. In Heb. xiii. 23, we have another historical notice concerning him, to which however no certain place can be assigned. Tradition makes him out to have been the first bishop of Ephesus, and to have suffered martyrdom there under Domitian. More will be found in Böhl, p. 22, ss. Comp Winer's RWB. The passages in which the apostle speaks of Timothy are 1 Cor. iv. 17; xvi. 10, 11; Phil. ii. 19—23; 1 Thess. iii. 1—6; they show what love he bare to him, and what confidence he reposed in him. In the apostle's epistles, he is oftenest named along with the apostle in the inscription, 2 Cor. i. 1; Phil. i. 1; Col. i. 1; 1 Thess. i. 1; 2 Thess. i. 1; Philem. i., which is also a testimony in his favour.

§ 2. OCCASION, DESIGN, AND CONTENTS OF THE EPISTLE.

Timothy had been left by the apostle in Ephesus, with the special charge of opposing a false form of Christian doctrine and Christian life which was manifesting itself there, and of giving heed to the settlement and administration of the church. As the apostle foresees the possibility of his return being delayed, he is induced to give instructions to his substitute for guiding him in his conduct, chiefly with respect to this charge (iii. 14, 15.) But the design of the epistle is not limited to this its proximate occasion. The apostle has also words of admonition and warning to address to Timothy the *evangelist;* he sets before him what is incumbent on him as a good servant of Jesus Christ, both with reference to

himself as an individual, and to the church, and gives him the necessary hints for his guidance in the discharge of these obligations. When we take this extended view of the design of the epistle, we shall not merely find that its contents correspond to this design when viewed as a whole, but we shall perceive also a regular method in the plan of the epistle, and in the succession of its particular parts. The epistle accordingly divides itself into two parts. The first of these contains the instructions given to assist Timothy in the fulfilment of his temporary commission; ch. i. 3, 15. More particularly, ch. i. treats of the false teaching against which Timothy is to be on his guard; ch. ii. and iii. of the administration of the church;—in ch. ii., namely, are given directions with respect to the assemblies of the church, in ch. iii. for ordination to church offices. The second part, which extends from iii. 15 to the end, contains instructions bearing on Timothy's calling as an evangelist, setting before him what is incumbent upon him in this respect. The conclusion of ch. iii. forms the transition to the future falling away from the faith described in ch. iv., which makes it the duty of Timothy as a teacher of the gospel all the more faithfully to hold fast the apostolical doctrine, and to make a conscientious improvement of the gifts bestowed on him (ch. iv.) In ch. 5, Timothy is farther instructed how he is to deal with the particular members of the church, according to the distinctions of sex, age, and according to other differences (in which from the nature of the case it cannot be expected that the line of distinction should be drawn between Timothy's position as representative of the apostle, and as an evangelist.) Finally, in ch. vi., special injunctions are given him with respect to slaves, and with respect to the rich. The transition to this last point is made by a warning addressed to Timothy as an individual, against the desire to be rich, a warning which the apostle is induced to give from a regard to the character and pursuits of the false seducers.

The conclusion stands by itself, ver. 20—22, and contains a reiterated comprehensive warning against that secret science which is referred to in other parts of the epistle. For the confirmation and further expansion of this, see the interpretation.

§ 3. THE TIME AND PLACE OF COMPOSITION.

The historical circumstances under which the epistle according to its own statements was written, are the following. The apostle had gone from Ephesus to Macedonia, and had left Timothy to conduct the affairs of the Ephesian church until he himself should return, which he hoped would not be long, but which might possibly be delayed. The church was already fully organized. It had not only presbyters and deacons; but also an institution for widows belonging to the church. Already a *νεόφυτος* was ineligible to the office of a bishop, and in general, a Christian test was applied in the appointment to any office, and to any ecclesiastical distinction, v. 9, ss. A corrupt tendency to vain speculation, and a false asceticism, had prominently appeared in the church, which in the case of some had even led to a complete apostacy from the faith; the present already displayed the germ of an error which threatened the future with danger (iv. 1, ss.) From these circumstances it will appear that the date of the epistle must belong to the later, nay, I might say to the latest period of the apostle's history. It will be difficult to prove that the existence of Christianity for two or three years is sufficient to explain the qualifications laid down in chap. iii. to be looked for in the appointment of ecclesiastical office-bearers, the rules laid down in chap. v. regarding widows, and the experiences of which we have there an account, as also the warnings pervading the entire epistle against false teaching and error. Can this epistle have been written before the farewell address at Miletum to the Ephesian presbyters, in which the apostle warns against a danger, not that was already present, but which threatened the future; or before the epistle to the Ephesians, which contains no trace of the errors here pourtrayed, while the apostle himself represents these errors as the beginning of a falling away from the faith which was progressively to develope itself? We would here further recall to mind what has been said in the General Introduction, namely, that what the epistle contains respecting the prevailing errors, as well as the ecclesiastical institutions, indicates its place to be in the midst of the earlier appearances of this kind, and the latest within the apostolic era; that we find everywhere

the marks of Christianity having been in existence for some length of time, and its presence having become familiar, as, for example, in the disappearance of the charismata, and the qualification of *aptness to teach* being required in the presbyter—although the total impression made by the epistle in this respect is much more striking when we compare it with the epistles to the Corinthians, or with that to the Romans, in proximity to which some would place it.

Meanwhile we proceed to consider those hypotheses which attempt to bring our epistle within the period comprehended by the Acts of the Apostles, without the supposition of the apostle's liberation from his imprisonment at Rome, to which we feel ourselves driven. We pass over Calvin's conjecture, who fixes the writing of the epistle even to the period subsequent to the apostle's first stay in Ephesus (Acts xviii. 19; compare against it Wieseler, p. 290); we omit also that of Dr Paulus, that the epistle was written from the apostle's imprisonment at Caesarea, an hypothesis which creates for itself the necessary facts, and can only be maintained by an arbitrary exegesis (comp. against it Böhl, p. 202, ss.; Matthies, p. 449, ss.; Wieseler, p. 302; Huther, p. 15, s.) Nor shall we do more than mention Schneckenbürgher and Böttger's view, which rests on the change of προσμεῖναι to προσμείνας, as we deny at the very outset their right to such an emendation against the unanimity of the codd. and the clear sense of the words (comp. Wieseler, p. 303.) There will thus remain for more particular examination, three hypotheses, of which the first fixes the date of the epistle to the period described in Acts xx. 1, 2 (held by many ancient and modern commentators as Theodoret, Hug, Hemsen, &c.), the second makes the epistle to have been written during a journey undertaken by the apostle from Ephesus, in the period of his from two to three years' stay there (so Mosheim, who supposes the journey in question to have taken place at the commencement of this stay, Schrader, and last of all, Wieseler, who places it at the end of this stay); finally, the third explains the circumstances mentioned in Acts xx. 3—5, as marking the most appropriate period for the writing of the epistle (so Bertholdt and Matthies.)

Of these hypotheses the first has seemingly the best connexion with the Acts of the Apostles, for in Acts xx. 1 we read that the apostle went on a journey from Ephesus to Macedonia; when more

closely examined, however, it is found to be the most untenable. The grounds on which it is opposed, and which have already been adduced by Schleiermacher, Böhl, Mack, Matthies, Huther, Wieseler, &c., may be summed up in the following: The supposition that Timothy, on the apostle's departure from Ephesus, was left behind with the charge of conducting the Ephesian churches, contradicts the accounts in the Acts of the Apostles, and the notices in the two epistles to the Corinthians. According to Acts xix. 21—23, Timothy had been sent to Macedonia, and from thence to go to Corinth (1 Cor. iv. 17) at the time when the apostle was purposing to set out on his own journey. It must therefore be supposed that, notwithstanding of the insurrection caused by Demetrius, the apostle's departure was delayed so long, that Timothy was able to perform a journey over Macedonia to Corinth, there execute his commission, and return again to the apostle at Ephesus before he set out. Timothy—whom the apostle, in his first epistle to the Corinthians, supposes to be not yet in Corinth (xvi. 10)—must have returned to the apostle at Ephesus by the time of Pentecost (xvi. 8), while the epistle was not written till about the time of the Passover (v. 6—8; comp. Meyer.) But if it be supposed that this period is not too short, or that Timothy did not actually go to Corinth, this hypothesis is still inconsistent with 2 Cor. i. 1, according to which Timothy did not remain in Ephesus, but stayed with the apostle in Macedonia, and was with him likewise during his short stay in Greece, and accompanied him on his return thence (Rom. xvi. 21; Acts xx. 4.) The apostle further writes, 1 Tim. iii. 14, that he intends shortly to return to Ephesus. But according to Acts xx. 3; 1 Cor. xvi. 5, ss.; Acts xix. 21, he has the fixed purpose of journeying over Macedonia to Greece, and thence to Jerusalem, as also he expresses himself to the same effect again in the second epistle to the Corinthians (xiii. 1), written from Macedonia, and in Rom. xv. 25, ss. Nay, so little does the apostle think at that time of a return to Ephesus, that afterwards when he is induced by the plots of the Jews against him to change his original plan of going from Greece to Syria by sea, and is thus obliged to come near to Ephesus, he sails past it, and only gives directions for the presbyters to meet him at Miletum (Acts xx. 16.) On these grounds alone this hypothesis is untenable, altogether apart from the internal improbability of the state of things

which it compels us to suppose (on which see Schleiermacher, p. 115, ss.), and from all the criteria of the epistle, which present us with a form of the Christian life belonging to a much later period of the apostolic era.

The third of the hypotheses above stated, is surrounded with difficulties scarcely less serious, as has already been shown by Mack, Huther, Wieseler, against Matthies, its most recent advocate, after Bertholdt had led the way. According to this hypothesis Paul had sent Timothy forward to Ephesus shortly before he set out on his journey back from Achaia to Jerusalem (Acts xx. 3, ss.), with a verbal commission, intending to be there soon also himself, but not being quite certain that he should accomplish this, he therefore embraced the first favourable opportunity of writing this epistle from some place in Achaia or Macedonia, in order to give Timothy instructions how to act in the interval, only a short time, perhaps only a few weeks later than the epistle to Titus was written, which Matthies likewise places in the same period. Against this view as defended by Matthies are the following considerations—1, That it rests on an unwarrantable interpretation of the passage 1 Tim. i. 3 (according to the opinion of De Wette, Winer, Huther, Wieseler (comp. on the passage), in which πορευόμενος is made to refer, not to the apostle but to Timothy. This interpretation is not made use of by Bertholdt, for he refers these words to the journey alluded to in Acts xx. 1, 2; but still the difficulty arises, why Timothy did not then remain in Ephesus, and why the apostle, after having been a considerable time in company with Timothy, as is the case here, should have referred to the commission which he then received. 2. The account of the journey in Acts xx. 4, 5, is inconsistent with this hypothesis, for according to it Timothy was not sent forward, but went in company with the apostle, and was parted from him only from Philippi to Troas, and thence to Assos. Matthies' view, therefore, contradicts this account. It must rather be supposed, as Huther observes, that the apostle did not send Timothy to Ephesus till later, possibly from Troas, and that he sent the epistle immediately after him, a supposition, however, which is not very conceivable. 3. How little accordance is there between the purpose of the apostle as expressed in iii. 14, iv. 13 of this epistle, ere long to come to Ephesus, and Acts xx. 16, where it is said, "For Paul had determined to sail past Ephesus because he would not spend

the time in Asia." Nor can this have been his original purpose, as Acts xx. 3 shows. (Wieseler, p. 294, s.) 4. And how strange must it appear, that in Acts xx. 16 no mention whatever is made of Titus? 5. And in general, what need was there of an epistle, seeing that Timothy had been with the apostle shortly before, and that the epistle itself gives no ground for supposing that any new information regarding the church at Ephesus had come to him, which induced him to write? 6. What is predicted in Acts xx. 29, 30, concerning a future error, does not consist with this hypothesis. In short, as Baur has justly observed against this hypothesis, "nothing agrees with it."

The second of the above mentioned hypothesis, which lays the apostle's journey to Macedonia, and the writing of the epistle, in the period of his from two three years' stay in Ephesus, and in particular towards the end of this period, has most in its favour so long as we look merely at the external historical data. This is Wieseler's view, and he has developed and defended it with great acuteness. With him agree Mosheim and Schrader, in so far as that they also place the journey in question in the period of the apostle's stay at Ephesus; but the form which they have given to this hypothesis is altogether untenable, in proof of which we would here for the sake of brevity refer to what Wieseler has said against it, p. 295, ss. His own view is as follows (comp. p. 316). "The first epistle to Timothy was written by Paul, certainly during his three years' stay at Ephesus (Acts xix.), previous to the writing of the epistle to the Corinthians, which has not been preserved, and the existing first epistle,—on the occasion of an intermediate journey not recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, either in Macedonia or Achaia, in the years 54–57, most probably, however, in the last year of his stay at Ephesus, A.D. 56." To this view it has been objected, as appears to me justly, by Huther: 1. That even were it admitted that the apostle had made a second journey to Corinth during the period of his stay in Ephesus, it would still be very doubtful that he was in Corinth shortly before the writing of the first epistle to Corinthians, as he could then have had no occasion for writing; which (referring to what has already been said in the Introduction to the epistle to Titus) I would rather express thus—that the absence of all allusions to this visit in the epistle written shortly after, is strange. 2. Huther observes, that in spite of the

safe position attempted to be taken by Wieseler, Acts xx. 29, 30, is still opposed to his view, inasmuch as there the error is spoken of as something altogether future. Wieseler's assertion that εἰς ὑμᾶς in that passage refers only to the presbyters, while the error was already present in the church, contradicts the context vv. 28 and 29, and is in itself scarcely conceivable: the apostle must have in this case expressed himself quite differently. (Comp. Titus i. 9, ss.) "And surely," says Huther justly, "Paul would not have passed over the existence of such errors in Ephesus without notice, if he knew the danger with which the church was threatened to be so great that he had thought it necessary before this, to give Timothy such earnest instructions with respect to these errors." The danger which threatened the future is represented as the progressive development of present appearances (Acts xx. 29; 1 Tim. iv. 1, ss.) It is therefore strange that the epistle to the Ephesians, which, according to Wieseler, was intended for Ephesus, contains no trace of the errors mentioned in our epistle. 3. Huther observes, that the entire character of the epistle does not correspond to the view that Paul was separated from Timothy only for a short time, and that immediately on his return he sent him away, as the instructions in the epistle imply a longer period of labour on the part of Timothy. Certainly, as the apostle must have left Ephesus again not long after his return thither (not longer than from the time of the Passover to that of the Pentecost, as the sea journey from Achaia by Crete to Ephesus could not have been undertaken long before the former of these periods), there appears something strange in the sending away of Timothy to Corinth, and thus withdrawing him from his important labours in Ephesus. But to this we have to add in general, that the objections which have already been expressed in the Introduction to the epistle to Titus, are applicable here also, against this supposed journey made by the apostle towards the end of his stay at Ephesus, if it is to be taken as identical with the journey to Crete, as Wieseler must suppose it to be. Wieseler has indeed endeavoured to obviate the objections arising from the already far advanced external organization of the church which meets us in this epistle. He remarks that, after the apostle had laboured between two and three years in Ephesus, it was quite possible for presbyters and deacons to have been appointed, which we will not gainsay; we will

also suppose that his observation accounts for what is said as to the exclusion of a νεόφυτος from the office of bishop; but it can scarcely be conceived, that in the course of this period a widow's institution could have come to be established, or that the apostle should have already had such experiences in reference to this institution as are expressed in 1 Tim. v. 11. We have already sufficiently shown elsewhere, how the entire form of Christian life which meets us in this epistle, as well as the character of the errors combated in it, points to a later date, and how the separation of the second epistle to Timothy from the first, which the above hypothesis implies, is unfavourable to its truth.

We see then that none of the hypotheses which we have just mentioned is without weighty difficulties, and we cannot but feel ourselves confirmed by this negative proof in the view, that this epistle also belongs to the period subsequent to the first imprisonment at Rome, and more particularly between the first and second. This is the view which is most commonly taken, next to that which regards Acts xx. 1 as the period in question. So Theophylact, Oecumenius. This view also has given rise to the subscription of the epistle, *from Laodicea*, which the Peschito also has. What conception we are to form of the course taken by the apostle in his journey after his liberation, to which 1 Tim. i. 3 refers, has already been shown in the General Introduction; in like manner, what points of connexion are elsewhere to be found in other epistles. What has been there said in reference to the passages Philem. 22 and Phil. ii. 24, that when the apostle was liberated he returned to the east, remains intact, even after Wieseler's statement to the contrary (p. 299.) As a special objection drawn from our epistle, against the supposition of so late a date, reference is made to the word νεότης applied to Timothy; comp., in reply to this, the Commentary on iv. 12; the little experience which Timothy had in the administration and regulation of the affairs of a Christian church is also to be considered. Timothy then for the first time was placed in such a position; compare the remarks by Hug II. p. 330, ss. (4 Aufl.) And how, on the supposition that the instructions addressed to Timothy can be accounted for only by his youthful inexperience, shall we explain what is said regarding him in 1 Thess. iii. 1, 2; 1 Cor. iv. 17?

Nothing certain can be said as to the place where this epistle

was written. The most probable supposition, however, is, that it was written from some place in Macedonia.

§ 4. GENUINENESS.

We have endeavoured, in the critical introduction to the Pastoral Epistles, to obviate those objections which apply to the three epistles together. We have here still to attend only to those doubts that have been raised with regard to this epistle in particular. It is alleged that the epistle is *historically* inexplicable, even although its date should be placed in the period subsequent to the first imprisonment at Rome; for it is inconsistent with so late a date that Timothy should be represented as a young man; against which comp. the Commentary on iv. 12.—The same inference is drawn from the absence of all allusions to that imprisonment, and the journeys following upon it, with the events which happened to the apostle in the course of these. But if, after his liberation and after those journeys, the apostle was personally in Timothy's company (i. 3), it is difficult to see why he should communicate to him by letter what he might long before have done by word of mouth. Moreover this epistle is a purely official letter, and therefore in the least degree adapted for such communications.—But it is also alleged that *exegetically* the epistle is unaccountable, inasmuch as, A, it does not correspond to its professed and conceivable ends. *a.* From the object which was had in view in leaving Timothy in Ephesus, as stated i. 3, we are led to expect a special refutation of the errors of the false teachers; but this entirely fails.—To this we reply, that it is not to be expected that the apostle should enter more particularly than he has done, into things which he has concisely characterized as empty talk, mere word-strife and insipidity. That he repeatedly reverts to these things, and expresses himself regarding them in such a variety of ways, is easily explained, as the exposition shows. *b.* It is objected that, according to the professed design of the epistle, iii. 15, we are led to expect a treasury of seasonable and weighty directions and counsels as to the administration of a church; but we do not find this. In reply to this, we have to say, that the sense of iii. 15 must be determined by the preceding context, and the question

can then only be, whether ch. iii. like ch. ii. corresponds to its design, namely, to give Timothy the necessary guidance in these particular points. This question we may unhesitatingly venture to answer in the affirmative ; comp. the Commentary. *c.* We might well suppose, it is alleged, that Paul even in an official letter to Timothy would, over and above what pertained to the business in hand, have much to say to Timothy himself, by way of instructing and quickening him ; but all that is to be found in the epistle of this nature, either places on too low a level one who was the apostle's assistant (i. 18, s., iv. 7, ss., 12, ss., vi. 11, ss.), or else is too general and even of little use for ordinary Christians (iv. 7, ss., 12, ss. ; v. 23, vi. 11.) In reply to this, we have to say, that on consulting the passages here adduced, it will be found that they contain an admonition to Timothy faithfully to fulfil his calling, or to maintain a holy conversation, such as becomes a Christian ; or as v. 23, vi. 11, they refer to special things. Moreover, these admonitions have a special ground when viewed in opposition to the pursuits and character of the false teachers. Let it be supposed that those pursuits, with the secret wisdom about which they were conversant, and their harmless appearance, might have attractions even for Timothy, and that he, as we learn chiefly from the second epistle, was not quite free from a leaning towards what was earthly —and I do not see how the possibility of such having been the case can be denied—then do these admonitions become very intelligible. It will be a much more difficult task for those critics who suppose that the epistle was written at a later period to explain, how a pseudo apostle should address exhortations to Timothy so "unworthy" of him, especially if the writer had in his eye the Gnostic heresies of a later period, and thought it necessary to warn Timothy against participating in them.—B. As what is said with respect to Timothy is alleged not to correspond to the position and character of a helper of the apostle, and to bear out the close relation that subsisted between him and the apostle, expressed in i. 2. 18, iv. 6, v. 23, still less than in the second epistle (here it is not taken into consideration that the epistle is a business communication, the aim of which is concisely to state what is necessary), so it is further said, that it entirely fails in allusions to the church which stood in so interesting a relation to the apostle, comp. Acts xx. 18, ss. But in this objection it is forgotten, that the epistle

was not addressed to the church (comp. on this the Introduction to the epistle to Titus.) In so far as Timothy was concerned, there was no occasion for such allusions in an epistle of this character, as also no passage in the epistle can be specified where it can be said that such ought to have been introduced. Finally, apart from these historical references, the epistle is held even as a literary production to deny the apostle for its author, in its want of all groundwork and connexion ; in reply to which, we would simply refer to the exposition, where it has been our endeavour to show the unreasonableness of this charge.

EXPOSITION

OF THE

FIRST EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.

§ 1. INSCRIPTION AND CHARGE GIVEN TO TITUS, IN OPPOSITION TO THOSE WHO TEACH OTHERWISE.

(Chap. i. 1—20.)

The inscription and salutation of the epistle, i. 1, 2, are after the common form in the epistles of Paul. We do not find here the predicate *apostle* more specially determined, as we found it in Tit. i. 1, comp. with Rom. i. 1, ss. ; Gal. i. 1, ss., where it forms an index to the import of the epistle. The writer here simply designates himself as an *apostle of Jesus Christ* (which is not done on account of the church ; comp. on Tit. i. 1, and 2 Tim. i. 1, where such a reference cannot be supposed),—refers to the divine authority of his office, names the person to whom the epistle is addressed, and then adds the usual salutation at the beginning of his epistle, deriving it from *θεὸς πατήρ* (*ὑμῶν* to be cancelled) *καὶ Χριστοῦ*, &c. Comp. 2 Cor. xi ; Eph. i. 1 ; Col. i. 1. With this similarity, however, we find in this epistle, as in the other two Pastoral Epistles, what is peculiar. Instead of the common expression, *by the will of God*, in those passages which we have adduced, and which are otherwise similar, we find here as in Tit. i. 3, the words, *according to the commandment of God our Saviour ;* on the other hand, 2 Tim. i. 1 retains the more common form of expression. It is further peculiar to this epistle, that the words *and Christ Jesus* are added to the expression

according to the commandment of God our Saviour, (the correct reading is not *κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, but simply *καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ*, comp. Tischendorf's Critical Observations.) Further, the designation of Christ Jesus in this passage as *our hope* is also peculiar to this epistle. Finally, in the benediction, between the *grace and peace* he has inserted *mercy*, which is found nowhere else, except in 2 Tim. i. 2. In the passage Tit. i. 4 it is not genuine. The peculiarity in this epistle, then, does not consist in the use of these expressions in themselves. The single expression *God our Saviour* excepted, which, however, contains a thoroughly Pauline idea (comp. on Tit. i. 3), all the rest are used elsewhere by the apostle, although not precisely in the same place, namely, in the inscription of an epistle. On the expression, *according to the commandment of God*, compare Rom. xvi. 26, and our remarks on Tit. i. 3; with respect to the words *Christ Jesus*, added to, *according to the commandment of God*, comp. Gal. i. 1, and Rom. i. 5; in the former passage the writer designates himself as *an apostle by Jesus Christ and God the Father*, in the latter we read *by whom* (namely, by Jesus Christ) *we have received grace and apostleship*. The only striking thing in our passage appears to be the circumstance, that the apostle has already in the very commencement called himself an apostle of Jesus Christ. This is no tautology, however, when it is considered that the words, *according to the commandment*, &c., are explanatory of the preceding, *apostle of Christ Jesus*, and it is warranted by the farther addition of the words, *our hope* to *Christ Jesus*, besides that we find what is nearly analogous to it in Rom. i. 1, comp. with ver. 5. The expression, *our hope*—in which Christ is designated as the foundation of our hope, as in Tit. i. 2 its object is denoted by *eternal life*—has its parallel in Col. i. 27, with which also Eph. ii. 24 is to be compared. And with respect to the word *mercy*, it is found connected with *peace* as a benediction, also in Gal. vi. 16, comp. also 2 John iii.; Jude 2. We have already shown in the Introduction to the epistle to Titus what weight is to be attached to these peculiarities in a critical point of view. They are much more inexplicable in the case of an imitator of the apostle who had any wish to conceal himself, and who might so easily have adhered to the apostle's usual manner, than in the case of the apostle, whom we are not at liberty to make so dependent on his accustomed manner of expression, as

that instead of *by the will* he could not have written *according to the commandment*, or instead of *grace and peace—grace, mercy, and peace*. The former of these instances needs no farther explanation; the latter, viewed in connection with the words *God our Saviour* and *our hope*, plainly reflects the apostle's state of mind, as being one in which these ideas were uppermost, so that the choice of the expressions, as in Tit. i. 1, 2, either stands in direct connection with the import of the epistle, or is of a general nature, as in the case before us, where the expressions *God our Saviour, our hope—mercy* —show in what frame the writer's mind was, without its being necessary that, as in the epistle to Titus, I should endeavour to point out any more special reference to the design of the epistle. On comparing the expression *our hope* here, with Tit. i. 2, it seems to imply a more immediate reference to those false teachers who set aside this hope. It may suffice also to show by a reference to such passages as i. 12, ss., ii. 3, iii. 16, iv. 9, 10, vi. 12, ss., how the ideas indicated in the expressions under consideration pervade the epistle, and often come into prominence. Everywhere we find these great thoughts breaking forth, and the apostle's mind dwelling upon them with delight as resting-places.—For this reason I am not inclined to agree with Olshausen, who finds in the expression *Saviour*, as well as in *hope* and *mercy*, a special reference to the apostle's situation in his imprisonment, comp. also Baumgarten, p. 232, ss. Have we not the expression *Saviour* and something corresponding to *our hope*, also at the beginning of the epistle to Titus? And does this epistle contain elsewhere a single reference to the apostle's situation? Instead of the words *in the faith*, denoting the ground and element of this relation in which Timothy stands to Paul, we have in Tit. i. 4 the words, *according to the common faith*. Here, as there, the preposition is to be connected with the compound idea expressed in *genuine son*, comp. on Tit. i. 4, and Winer, § 19, 2, p. 157. De Wette and others are for connecting *in the faith*, only with *son*. Some have sought to explain the addition of the word *mercy*, which denotes the condescending mercy of God in contrast with our weakness and unworthiness (comp. Matthies on Tit. i. 4), by the reference to the *mediator* in the benediction, as it is peculiar to Paul to regard the office of a Christian teacher as a gift of *God's mercy*, 1 Cor. vii. 25; 2 Cor. iv. 1; 1 Tim. i. 16. It may be so, although Gal. vi. 16 does not

confirm this view. At all events it is an expression of that with which the mind of the apostle shows itself to be filled in the whole epistle, and a proof of the apostle's warm affection for Timothy. *Καὶ τοῦτο ἀπὸ πολλῆς φιλοστοργίας*, observes Chrysostom. For what remains I refer to Tit i. 1—4, where we have explained anything else that needs explanation.

Ver. 3—20. The apostle forthwith proceeds, as in the epistle to Titus, without further introduction to the subject itself. Timothy is reminded of the design of his being left in Ephesus, namely, to oppose the corrupt tendency there to things which only minister strife, but do not promote Christian feeling and Christian life. The end, the attainment of which ought ever to be kept in view, is love out of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned. But this fundamental characteristic is wanting in those teachers of other things, and hence the excrescences of empty talk which are to be seen in those who set up for being teachers of the law, without knowing what they are about. For the law is not designed for the upright, but to rebuke vices, in confirmation of which the apostle appeals to the gospel committed to him, the certainty of which he has experienced in himself. Thus, on the ground of this gospel, at the same time also, however, on the ground of the prophecies which went before on Timothy, he admonishes him to fight the good fight in order that he may be able to maintain faith and a good conscience, the latter of which, if it be wanting, the warning examples of others teach him what will be the result.

Ver. 3. *Καθώς*—the apostle begins the sentence with a *protasis*, but we look in vain for the *apodosis*, which to correspond with *καθὼς παρεκάλεσα—Μακεδ.* would have to run thus, *οὕτω καὶ νῦν παρακαλῶ ἵνα*, &c. It will be apparent from this construction of the period, how similar in form and substance the apodosis must be to the protasis, and how almost necessary it was that the apostle should substantially express in the protasis *as I besought thee*, &c., that to which he is now about to admonish Timothy anew. Thus we actually find that the protasis, in which the commission that had been given to Timothy is more particularly stated, vv. 3 and 4, and not only so, but in which also the error is opposed by the corresponding truth, and thereupon the farther characteristics of the errors against which Timothy is to guard, are mentioned along with their refutation, vv. 6—10, which gives occasion for the refer-

ence to the gospel which the apostle is called to promulgate—that this protasis absorbs the apodosis, and properly contains what, according to the apostle's original conception, the latter ought to have expressed, Comp. Winer, § 64, 2, p. 614 : "There is here properly an anacolouthon, inasmuch as Paul intended to write *καθὼς παρεκάλεσα—Μακ. οὕτω καὶ νῦν παρακαλῶ, ἵνα*, &c. While he brings the object of the *παρεκ.* within the protasis, the apodosis disappears." I do not think, however, that the occasion of the anacolouthon is to be sought in the *ἵνα παραγγ.* ; but further on in ver. 5, which appears to me to be confirmed by Tit. i. 5, ss., and also by the circumstance that if the idea had been so simply conceived, no adequate reason could be given for the change. How frequently these anacoloutha occur in Paul's writings is shewn by Winer, a. a. Q., pp. 615—619, where reference is made to several examples of the kind. So also Olshausen. To what extent, moreover, the apodosis discovers itself again in ver. 18, if not in form at least in substance, is shown in our remarks on that verse. The other constructions that have been proposed with the view of making out a formal apodosis, as, for example, that the apodosis begins with *ἵνα παραγγ.*, or that *προσμεῖναι* is an imperative, or that *καθώς* is merely a transition-particle, or that vv. 5—17 forms a single parenthesis, have already been all justly rejected by Winer. In like manner Schneckenburgher and Böttger's change of *προσμεῖναι* into *προσμείνας*, which entirely fails in critical authority, and causes an unnatural position of the words, has justly met with no countenance.—As I besought thee (De Wette : "not commanded. The apostle does not command his helper, comp. 2 Cor. viii. 6, ix. 5, xii. 18") to remain in Ephesus when I went to Macedonia, that thou mightest forbid certain people from teaching otherwise, and giving heed to fables and endless genealogies, which minister discussions rather than the saving dispensation of God in the faith —thus the apostle sets out, vv. 3 and 4. This commencement reminds us of the epistle to Timothy in a two-fold respect. Here, as also in that epistle, the introduction expressing the apostle's thanksgiving, which is usual elsewhere, with the exception of the epistle to the Galatians, is wanting ; and in both epistles the apostle begins by calling to mind a commission which had been given, and for the fulfilment of which the epistle gives further directions Already, then, may we infer from this commencement

of the epistle, if the writer is true to himself in the other parts of it, that this, like the epistle to Titus, is, to use Schleiermacher's expression, an official letter, and, like it, was designed only for the person named in the inscription. This, as has already been observed in reference to the epistle to Titus, will account for the absence of an expression of thanks in the introduction, as also for the absence of all allusions to the first imprisonment (if the epistle was written subsequent to this) during which Timothy was with the apostle. All this is quite different in the second epistle to Timothy, the peculiarity of which has been more justly apprehended by Schleiermacher than by many of the more recent commentators, when he says of that epistle that it is altogether of the confidential and friendly kind, and with respect to the contents, observes that it has nothing else in common with the first to Timothy than merely the personal relation of the apostle to his disciple, and is not intended to give directions as to the proper regulation of a church; and that the second epistle to Timothy and that to Titus, have in regard to their contents no similarity whatever. This distinction shows itself at once in the introduction (as 1 Tim. i. 3, ss., comp. with the commencement of the two other epistles, proves), and discovers an author who knows well what he writes.

Προσμεῖναι ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, πορευόμενος εἰς M. De Wette has already observed that *πορευόμενος* cannot with Matthies be referred to Timothy instead of Paul, and be rendered: when going to Macedonia to remain in Ephesus. This is grammatically impossible (comp. Winer, § 45, 2, p. 371, against De Wette, who thinks this connexion possible), and yields no proper sense. Quite as arbitrary is it, as every one will perceive (comp. likewise De Wette) to connect *πορευόμενος* with what follows, and to supply: so I entreat thee now, on thy journey to Macedonia, to remain, &c. There is no other way but to apply the word to the apostle. The journey, therefore, mentioned in Acts xx. 1, on the occasion of which Timothy did not remain in Ephesus, but rather went before the apostle to Macedonia, Acts xix. 22, cannot be here referred to, as might be shown by many other reasons; comp. the Introd. The words following state the object for which the apostle left Timothy behind when he himself went to Macedonia,—*that thou mightest forbid*, &c. *Παραγγέλλειν*, as here also 1 Cor. vii. 10, xi. 17; 1 Thess.

iv. 11 ; 2 Thess. iii. 4, 6, 10, 12, with the following μή = "to forbid." Τισί = certain people, whom the apostle will not further designate ; Timothy knows them already. We find the same indefinite expression also in ver. 6, 19, iv. 1, &c. He is to forbid the ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν as well as the προσέχειν μύθοις, &c.,—"to teach otherwise and to give heed to such doctrines." So Theodoret : τούτους μὲν ἐπιστομίζειν . . . . . τοῖς δέ γε ἄλλοις παρακελεύεσθαι τῇ τούτων μὴ προσέχειν ἀδολεσχίᾳ.—With regard to ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν, at which the critics from Schleiermacher downwards have stumbled so much, and which occurs again only at vi. 3, it is quite evident from the latter passage, as Schleiermacher himself observes, that the expression can only mean : to teach what deviates from the *sound doctrine ;* for this interpretation is placed beyond doubt by the following words in that verse, *and consent not to wholesome words, and the doctrines which leads to godliness.* This passage, however, gives us more information about the ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν than Schleiermacher finds in it, else he would not have gone on to say, that Paul elsewhere from not knowing the suitable word, helps himself out with the roundabout expression ἄλλον Ἰησοῦν κηρύσσειν, 2 Cor. xi. 4 ; ἕτερον εὐαγγέλλιον,[1] Gal. i. 6, viii. 9. In the negative clause *and consents not*, &c., which is explanatory of the preceding, that from which these teachers deviate is expressed first, by *wholesome words*, and then by *the doctrine which leads to godliness*, both of which are substantially the same thing, in proof of which I refer to Tit. i. 9, and our interpretation, as also that of De Wette. Ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν denotes the teaching of things which lie aside of this doctrine according to godliness, or truth according to godliness, Tit. i. 1. In the epistle to Titus we have found it uniformly confirmed, that it is not a heresy properly so called that is here spoken of, or a doctrine dogmatically false in direct opposition to the true ; and the same conviction is pressed upon us here in the word ἑτεροδιδ. as compared with vi. 3. Hence the use of this word by the apostle here, a word which properly signifies to "teach otherwise," not "to teach false doctrine," is fully vindicated, and the circumlocution mentioned by Schleiermacher *to preach another Jesus*, &c.,

1 Huther agrees with Schleiermacher, only that he finds no accessary idea of a hierarchical kind in the word.

does not answer to it. With reference to the formation of the word, Planck, in the work already noticed, has, in opposition to Schleiermacher, referred to the expression καλοδιδάσκαλος, Tit. ii. 3, according to which the apostle might easily form the word ἑτεροδιδάσκαλος, from which again the verb in our passage is derived in the regular manner. And are not the expressions ἑτερόγλωσσος and ἑτεροζυγεῖν closely analogous? From these analogous expressions an inference may be drawn rather for, than against the use of this word by the apostle. Olshausen and others have shown rightly, why it is ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν and not simply ἑτεροδιδάσκειν,—because, namely, the former expression involves the idea of making a business of teaching otherwise = to play the ἑτεροδιδάσκαλος. On Baur's critical doubts about this word comp. the General Introduction.

Ver. 4. *Not to give heed.* On προσέχειν comp. Tit. i. 14. Olshausen says rightly, that the injunction not to give heed to such doctrines is aptly connected with the foregoing. We may also gather from this verse what that was, in which this ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν consisted. *Fables* and *endless genealogies* are said to be the things to which the persons referred to (τινές) are not to give heed. We have already met with the word μῦθοι at Tit. i. 14, and there it was connected with the epithet *Jewish*, it occurs besides again at 1 Tim. iv. 7, and 2 Tim. iv. 4. The latter passage speaks of the future, and in so far does not belong to our present purpose. In the former passage these *fables* are characterized as *profane* and *old wives'*, or insipid fables. Any more direct and special information as to their contents is as little to be obtained from this epistle, as from that to Titus. On the other hand, what clue may be found in the epistles, and especially in the epistle to Titus, for farther determining this, and how much reason we have for believing that one and the same error is meant, has already been shown on Tit. i. 9. The case is similar with regard to the *genealogies*, which are named again only at Tit. iii. 9, and the connexion of which with the fables (comp. on Tit. i. 14, and iii. 9), as also with the *strifes about the law*, can scarcely be questioned (comp. on the same passages, and also on 1 Tim. iv. 7.) We were accordingly induced to understand things of a Jewish character and origin as meant in all these expressions which throw

any light on the constituent elements of these fables.[1] The genealogies, which at Tit. iii. 9 have no designative epithet, are here called *endless* (not aimless), Tob. xxxvi. 26; 3 Macc. ii 9. Things are meant which may be spun out to an endless extent. The words following contain the reason of the warning against these things, *which minister*, &c. The reading *οἰκονομίαν* is so strongly confirmed, in comparison with the other, *οἰκοδομίαν* D*** and *οἰκοδομήν* D*, &c. (comp Tischendorf), that we are not at liberty to yield it up from the convenience of the latter. If we inquire what is meant by *ζητήσεις*, we shall find that the expression is not to be taken differently here from vi. 4; 2 Tim. ii. 23; Tit. iii. 9, in all of which passages it denotes not strife, but questions of controversy, as the result of which are mentioned in these very passages, *contentions, strifes.* The epithet *foolish* applied to these questions in 2 Tim. ii. 23; Tit. iii. 9, is not necessary here any more than at vi. 4, as that to which they are opposed plainly shows of what nature these questions are. On *παρέχειν* comp. Gal. vi. 17; we must not lose sight of the original signification of the word, namely, "to hold out anything towards any one" (comp. vi. 17), if we would understand the *ἤ* which is annexed to it. These genealogies hold out only questions, and material always for disputation. *Μᾶλλον ἤ* intimates what ought to be held forth, namely, instead of the *questions* the *dispensation of God which is in faith. Οἰκονομία θεοῦ ἡ ἐν πίστει.* This expression is taken to mean either the gracious efficiency of God in the faith, or the efficiency of a steward of the house of God in the faith (to be awakened or promoted.) But the idea that the doctrine is to hold forth, to afford (or in whatever sense *παρέχειν* may be taken) the gracious efficiency of God, appears to me as unsuitable and as unwarranted by the usage of the apostle, as the other signification is remote from the context. For how can *οἰκονομία τοῦ θεοῦ* signify the efficiency of a steward of God, seeing that it is not an *οἰκονόμος* that is spoken of, but fables and genealogies, against giving heed to which, a warning is given, because they do not afford this *οἰκονομία*? What else then can be understood by *οἰκον. θεοῦ* than that which ought to be the import of all Christian doctrine, namely, the dispensation of God for salvation, "which has its means and its re-

1 Huther explains *μῦθοι* and *γενεαλ.* of the Gnostic doctrine of Aeons. Comm. z. N.T.V. 1.

alization in faith" (De Wette)? So also Neander a. a. Q. I. p. 541, "the dispensation of God for the salvation of man."[1] With this interpretation the constant use of the expression in Paul's writings agrees (Eph. i. 10, iii. 2; Col. i. 25); it everywhere signifies a dispensation devised by God. I cannot see how, as De Wette maintains, the *παρέχουσι* does not suit this interpretation: these things, says the apostle, hold out questions, not that which ought to be the import of the doctrine, they afford a fruitless exercise for the understanding but not for the heart. The expression *which is in faith* evidently stands in opposition to the *questions*. Olshausen also thus understands the sense of the passage; only, he further supposes that *οἰκονομία τοῦ θεοῦ* is used by metonyme to express what it brings to pass, namely, the progress of the life of faith. If the apostle had intended to say this he would doubtless have used *οἰκοδομήν* or the like.

Ver. 5. "But the aim of the exhortation is love out of a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned." These words are not to be understood as a resumption of the *ἵνα παραγγειλῃς*, ver. 3, nor as the beginning of a new train of thought, but as occasioned by ver. 4, and as standing in an adversative relation to this verse (*δε*.) The otherwise abrupt transition from ver. 4 to ver. 5 were inconsistent with the circumstance that the flow of the ideas causes an anacolouthon (comp. on ver. 3.) The apostle specifies the aim of the exhortation, with the view of showing how far the things of which he speaks in ver. 4 deviate from this aim. This aim is love out of a pure heart, &c. How remote from this are those *fables* and *genealogies* with their subtle speculations, which take the place of the dispensation of God which is in faith! This love which is the aim of all precept rests on the foundation of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned, while those *questions* have nothing to do with that which is the subject matter of faith. How indeed can love which has its root in faith proceed from them? In order then to understand the connexion, two things must be taken into consideration, namely, the opposition of that which *is in faith* to the questions which exercise the understanding merely, and the stress which the apostle lays on the source out of which alone *love* can spring. A measuring line is

1 I rejoice to find that I coincide with Huther.

here supplied, as Matthies justly observes, to Timothy and to every other. *Τὸ τέλος* according to the common analogous use of the word, Rom. vi. 21, 22; 2 Cor. xi. 15; Phil. iii. 19, signifies neither "sum" nor "perfection," but simply "aim." *Παραγγελλία*, as *παραγγέλλω*, has always the definite sense of "precept, injunction," as often as it is used by the apostle, or elsewhere in the New Testament (comp. on *παραγγελλία*, 1 Thess. iv. 2.) It is therefore to be taken neither as a designation of the objective doctrine = *εὐαγγέλιον*, nor of the Mosaic law = *ὁ νόμος*, of which nothing is said here, nor of the law of Christian morality; but it is as elsewhere "precept, exhortation" in the wider sense, "practical doctrine as the principal part of the *sound doctrine* in opposition to the *fables*," as De Wette righly explains it referring to iv. 11, v. 7, vi. 13, 17. The apostle selects the expression with the view of specifying the end to which all doctrine should tend in those who are instructed, and to the attainment of which all doctrine should admonish. The doctrine which has this practical aim becomes of itself *παραγγελλία*. So also Olshausen, "The highest aim of all the labour of the Christian preacher should be a practical one, namely, to call forth true love." Such love, however, springs only from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned. *Ἀγάπη* (without the article, comp. Winer, § 18, 1, p. 137) denotes the sum of the moral conduct of a Christian, comp. Rom. xiii. 10: *love is the fulfilling of the law*, Gal. v. 6.

On *καρδία* comp. Phil. iv. 7; on *καθαρὰ καρδία*, comp. Matth. v. 8, and Olshausen on the passage; 1 Pet. i. 21; 2 Tim. ii. 22. Purity of heart can only be the result of a previous purifying, comp. Acts xv. 9: *purifying their hearts by faith.* With the *pure heart* is then necessarily connected the second thing which the apostle mentions as pre-supposed in all true love, viz., the *συνείδησις ἀγαθή*, comp. iii. 9; 2 Tim. i. 3; or *καλή*, Hebr. xiii. 18. It is the conscience which knows that its guilt is removed, and that it is reconciled to God, 1 Pet. iii. 21; since, as De Wette truly says, a conscience unreconciled to God and man cannot love purely, because it cannot believe.[1]—That only is true love which springs from a conscience that has experienced the power of divine love,—that has been kindled at divine love. The third thing ne-

1 Huther rejects the idea of reconciliation here, and understands *συν. ἀγ.* generally as the consciousness of inward harmony with the divine will.

cessary to true love is, *faith unfeigned;* in which words the apostle names the new life-power that dwells in such a heart and conscience. The pure heart and good conscience is, with respect to its quality, to be viewed as springing from faith, observes Olshausen. It is *faith* which makes the *evil conscience* good, and which purifies the heart (Acts xv. 9); but it does this only when it is itself *unfeigned.* Where a good conscience is lost, there also does *faith* disappear, i. 19, and in its place comes, not unbelief, but a mere pretended faith, and talking (ver. 6), such as the apostle everywhere represents as a characteristic feature of the opponents who are combated in the Pastoral Epistles.—'Ανυπόκριτος in the same sense as it is elsewhere used by the apostle, Rom. xii. 9; 2 Cor. vi. 6. Comp. also Jam. iii. 17; 1 Pet. i. 22.—If we look back on what the apostle here says regarding the errors which Timothy is to check, according to the interpretation we have given, we find the same characteristics as in the epistle to Titus. As in that epistle it is evidently not a dogmatical heresy that is spoken of, but errors which lead away from the truth that tends to godliness, and which belong to the sphere of unprofitable questions that cause only strife and contention, so also is it in this epistle. This is shown by the right interpretation of ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν, by the reason which is given for the warning against those *questions*, and by the practical end of all admonition being placed in opposition to them.

As ver. 5 stands in an adversative relation to ver. 4, so at the same time it forms the transition to ver. 6 and the following verses, which give additional characteristics of those errors. The apostle proceeds to say, that from the want of a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned, certain persons have turned aside to vain talking. Schleiermacher indeed thinks the writer here makes but an awkward return from the digression in ver. 5, when he represents this,—namely, that those opponents could not attain to that which is the effect of the true doctrine,—as the reason why they had turned aside to vain talking. The writer here betrays, according to Schleiermacher, the utmost incapacity to make a return from a slight digression. But ver. 5 is, in our opinion, no digression. And is there any room for finding fault with the sentiment, that those seducers were wanting in that fundamental state of mind, from which alone can proceed that which is

the aim of all Christian precept, namely, love, and that therefore they swerved from this aim, and became *foolish talkers?* This is indeed just the way in which the subject is treated everywhere in these epistles, comp. vi. 5; 2 Tim. iii. 8; Tit. i. 15. Schleiermacher seems in what he says to have referred the *from which*, ver. 6, not merely to the three things last mentioned, but also to the *love*, in regard to which De Wette also was in doubt. But even although we had not those parallel passages from which we learn that it is not the want of love, but the want of faith and a good conscience, from which the *foolish talking* proceeds, we yet could not refer the ὧν to ἀγάπη, as the expression εἰς ματαιολογίαν plainly designates a false aim in opposition to the true, which is denoted by ἀγάπη. Ἀστοχεῖν only in the Pastoral Epistles, vi. 21; 2 Tim. ii. 18. Ἐκτρέπεσθαι, "to swerve from," v. 15; 2 Tim. iv. 4 (Heb. xii. 13.) Both expressions, as Mack rightly observes, are suggested by the τέλος. Ματαιολογία, as Tit. i. 9, ματαιολόγοι. What kind of vain talk the apostle means we now learn from ver. 7.

Ver. 7. Desiring to be teachers of the law, without understanding either what they say or whereof they affirm. As at Tit. i. 14, besides the *fables*, also *commandments of men* are mentioned, and as at Tit. iii. 9, along with the *genealogies* are mentioned *strifes about the law*, so here also, with the fables and genealogies is connected the vain talk of those who affect to be teachers of the law. The expression νομοδιδάσκαλοι, which occurs only here, as also γραμματεύς only at 1 Cor. i. 20, reminds us too much of the usual signification of the term elsewhere (Luke v. 17; Acts v. 34), to admit of our assigning any other to it here. The sense then is: they desire to be in their way what the doctors of the law are among the Jewish people. That we are not to understand real teachers of the law is plain from the expression θέλοντες. Nor will the characteristic here given suit, as applied to the common Judaizing opponents; and Schleiermacher seems to me to have reason for the objections which he has made to this passage, on the supposition that it refers to these well-known opponents.[1] He

[1] Huther also is of opinion, that the persons here meant did not maintain the obligation of the law in the same manner as the Pharisaical Jewish-Christians, but that in their allegorical interpretations of the law, they claimed to themselves that knowledge of the law which entitled them to impose arbitrary commands.

is surprised, and justly so, that these teachers of the law are not described as different from the genealogists and fablers, ver. 4, but that, on the contrary, the two passages are connected by the expression *ματαιολογία*, ver. 6. And he might have added that *ματαιολογία* itself is but a very weak designation of that Judaizing tendency, and one that never occurs. Further, he misses a climax here justly; for it has not escaped Schleiermacher to perceive, that those errors named in ver. 4 appear much less dangerous than that Judaizing tendency. He says with truth, "that for Paul, the introduction of the law was a much greater evil than he describes the fables and genealogies to be. And how differently does Paul elsewhere oppose the giving of an undue prominence to the law? There is not a single argument given here for a Pauline confutation of the Judaizers." In all this Schleiermacher appears to me to be perfectly right, and the reference to Gal. v. 23, *against such there is no law*, in reply to him, to be quite pointless; for the fundamental difference in the manner in which the refutation is conducted there from here is not thereby removed. But another question suggests itself, whether the supposition from which Schleiermacher and his opponents set out is well founded, namely, that this passage applies to that well-known Judaizing tendency; whether the very way in which Paul characterizes and refutes the tendency here opposed does not compel us to depart from that supposition, instead of making it the ground upon which objections against the passage are made to rest? When we look to the manner in which the persons here alluded to are said to have come to their vain talk, ver. 6,—to the expression *ματαιολογία*,—to the *μὴ νοοῦντες*, as also to the opposition in vv. 8—10, we can scarcely fail to be convinced that quite a different class of opponents are meant than the common Judaists; they are men such as those described in Tit. i. 14, 15, of whom it is there said that they turn away from the truth . . . . that their mind and conscience is defiled. We found, in expounding that passage, that the common Judaists could not be meant. Can it be otherwise in the passage before us when there is so great a similarity in the errors described? Does not the expression *from which some having turned aside* indicate the same fundamental state of mind as the descriptions which we have just cited from the epistle to Titus? And does not the same word *ματαιολογία* here, and in Tit. i. 10,

show the similarity in the error described? And do not the words, *to the pure all things are pure*, answer in a certain measure to the *not understanding what they say*, &c., in the former of which expressions the apostle gives it to be understood, that those seducers, while they seek a higher moral perfection in such *commandments*, show that they are not *pure* but *defiled*. Certainly those who are here meant, like the well-known Judaizers, gave prominence to the law, otherwise the apostle could not go on to say by way of concession in ver. 8, *we know that the law is good*, nor could he describe them as those who wished to be teachers of the law; but the manner in which, and the end for which they gave prominence to the law, must have been different from that of the Judaizers, otherwise the apostle would have refuted their error in a different way. What remains to be said will result from the particular consideration of the passage. *Desiring to be teachers of the law*, says the apostle,—they would be such, but they are not. And why not, we learn from the words following, *not understanding*, &c. It could not have been maintained of the common Judaists that they knew not what they said. The expression answers only to those who do not really aim at what their words declare, who do not see through the real tendency of that which they affirm. On the change of the relative to the interrogative see Winer, § 25, 1, p. 194. In the ἅ and περὶ τίνων De Wette does not understand different objects, as περί τινος διαβεβ., comp. Tit. iii. 8, does not signify "to put forth confirmatory assertions concerning anything," but "to confirm anything." But what signification is then to be given to περι? Others therefore (for example Leo) rightly explain the first member of the subjective assertions, the second of the object itself about which these assertions are made. So also Huther.

Vv. 8—10. "But we know that the law is good if one use it agreeably to its design." The sentence is not antithetical to the assertion of these teachers of the law, according to which they taught that the law is not good, as Baur understands it, while he views it as opposed to the Marcionitic rejection of the law; the sentence rather concedes this assertion to the opponents, but adds a limitation (ἐάν) in connexion with which alone it is true, and the neglect of which leads to the error. On this concessive sense of οἴδαμεν ὅτι, comp. Rom. vii. 14; 1 Cor. viii. 1. How little Baur's interpretation consists with the appellation *teachers of the law*, has

already been shown in the General Introduction. Against this view De Wette also justly draws attention to the circumstance, that ver. 4, comp. with Tit. i. 14, shows that it is not Judaizers who are spoken of. The limitation which the apostle annexes to the assertion, *the law is good*, namely, *if a man use it lawfully*, shows that it is not of the law itself, but of the use of it that he speaks. The law is good if a man know how to use it. By τις the apostle understands "him who will teach," as Bengel has already observed. Νομίμως, as the law itself desires to be used, "agreeably to the design of the law." But we learn from ver. 9, first negatively, and then positively, what the design of the law is, which he must know who will rightly use it. He must know and consider that it is not designed for the δίκαιος.[1] The negative sentence must doubtless contain the error, to the charge of which those teachers of the law exposed themselves. Consequently, they acted as if the law were designed for the righteous man; they thought it necessary to improve the gospel by the law, they set up requirements which involved a recurrence to the law, in order by the fulfilment of these to lead to a higher stage of moral perfection. The expression *bodily exercise*, iv. 8, points at such a tendency, which is there spoken of in connexion with the fables, and the same appears on comparing Tit. i. 14. And, if we are not mistaken in placing these fables and genealogies in connexion with the legal tendency, it would seem to follow that this tendency did not consist in simply giving prominence to the Mosaic law, but in such an application of the law as connected itself with pretensions to a more profound wisdom, through which a higher moral perfection was attainable than by a simple adherence to the gospel. With this interpretation the positive statement of the design of the law fully agrees, and it alone will explain why the apostle here enumerates a series of the worst vices which the law is designed to punish. It fares with those teachers of the law that, while they would be wise, they become fools; while they boast of a higher wisdom and a higher morality, they really bring themselves down to the level of the ἄνομοι. For this very reason the apostle says of them, that *they know not what they say nor whereof they affirm*.—On κεῖσθαι in the signification, "to be ordained, appointed," comp. Luke

1 Multum de hoc Pauli loco disputatum essse tempore restauratorum sacrorum ab Agricola . . . . notum est. Leo.

ii. 34; Phil. i. 16; 1 Thess. iii. 3. On *νόμος*, without the article, Winer, § 18, 1., p. 137. *Δίκαιος* has here its exact opposite in what follows, according to which it cannot be understood of the justified person = *δικαιωθείς*, but in the sense which it often has = honest, virtuous, which indeed he only can be who is justified, and who has received the new life of the spirit. Comp. on the whole subject, Gal. v. 18, 23; Rom. vi. 14. Then follow as opposed to *δικαίῳ*, the general terms, *ἀνόμοις δὲ καὶ ἀνυποτάκτοις*. On *ἄνομος*, comp. Tit. ii. 14. *Ἀνυπότακτος*, as the effect of obstinacy, occurs only in the Pastoral Epistles in this sense; similar to it is the term *ἀπειθεῖς* often used by the apostle. As these two terms are connected with each other, so also are the two following, *ἀσεβέσι καὶ ἁμαρτωλοῖς*, and in like manner *ἀνοσίοις καὶ βεβήλοις*. On *ἀσεβής*, comp. Tit. ii. 12. *Ἁμαρτωλός* here denotes the open sinner. On *ἀνόσιος*, Tit. i. 8. *Βεβηλος*, Heb. xii. 16, unholy, impure. From these general terms, the apostle passes to special crimes and vices which the law is designed to restrain. He purposely names the worst crimes and vices, in order thus to expose the folly of those who make the observance of the law to be binding upon Christians, and thereby fancy that a special superiority belongs to them. "The law is designed for murderers of fathers and murderers of mothers, for manslayers, for whoremongers, for them that defile themselves with mankind, for menstealers (comp. Ex. xxi. 16; Deut. xxiv. 7), for liars, for perjured persons, and whatsoever is contrary to sound doctrine." With regard to the first three of these terms, Schleiermacher remarks that they are all foreign to the New Testament, and also, that Paul is not wont to name such vices in such a connexion. These remarks remind us anew of how differently the apostle goes to work, when he elsewhere opposes the Judaizers. And what proper sense can we attach to what the apostle here says, when viewed as directed against the Judaizers, namely, that the law is not designed for the *righteous*, but for the *lawless*? The apostle surely cannot intend to say: in reference to the *lawless*, &c., those Judaizers are right in their way of enforcing the observance of the law, but not in reference to the righteous. The entire distinction between the *δίκαιος* and the *ἄνομος*, as it is here given, has not the slightest reference to the question of dispute between the apostle and those opponents. For as they could not be supposed to insist on the *righteousness*

by the law only in reference to the δίκαιος, as little would the apostle desire that they should do this in respect to the ἄνομοι. On the contrary, all becomes plain, when we suppose that the apostle has in his eye, those who regarded the law as a means by which Christians were to attain a still higher moral perfection. In opposition to such, nothing more suitable could be said than just what the apostle here says, namely, that the law is quite good, only they must know that it is not designed for the righteous, as they think, but for the lawless, &c. These the law is designed to restrain. "And if there be any other thing that is contrary to sound doctrine," the apostle adds. On ὑγ. διδ., comp. Tit. i. 9, and Leo on the present passage. The apostle having already purposely named the most flagrant crimes and vices, now sums up everything else that is contrary to the doctrine which leads to godliness, in the words, *if there be any*, &c. Moreover, the expression here reminds us so strongly of the charge which the apostle brings elsewhere against these errors, namely, that they are wanting in the principle of morality, and consequently in the fruits of morality, that one might be inclined to suppose the apostle intends to say ironically: these teachers of the law ought certainly to use the law; enough will be found in them for the law to deal with. Comp. Tit. i. 15, &c.

Ver. 11. In testimony of what he has just said, namely, that the law is not designed for the virtuous, but for the lawless, the apostle appeals to *his* gospel, which has been intrusted to him. The critics have thought this appeal to his gospel to be altogether unnecessary, and regard this as an illustration of how the pseudo-apostle always seeks occasion to make the apostle speak of himself. But the words, *with which I was intrusted*, show that the writer has in view a certain contrast; the gospel, as De Wette says, with which he is intrusted is, in reference to the manner in which it teaches that the law should be used, characterized as Pauline, in contrast with that of these *teachers of the law*. Thus is removed all ground for regarding what the apostle here says of himself as a merely casual expression. Κατά cannot be connected with τῇ ὑγ. διδασκαλίᾳ (Leo), were it for no other reason than that the article is wantiug, and also that it would make an altogether superfluous and tautological explanation. As little is it to be connected with ἀντίκειται, which is already sufficiently determined by—*the*

sound doctrine. It is rather in testimony of what he has said, ver. 9, respecting the design of the law, that he here appeals to his gospel. So also Huther. "In reality," says De Wette, "the sentiment in ver. 9 is Pauline (comp. Rom. vi. 14; Gal. v. 18), the apostle, however would not thus have opposed these teachers of the law, but rather with the statement, that we can be justified only through faith. The writer takes up an Irenaean stand-point, between the friends of the law and the Pauline party." The first of these remarks is just as true, as the second is harmless in regard to our position. The apostle is not dealing with those who contest the doctrine of justification by faith, but with such as in addition to faith, prescribe for the δίκαιος certain requirements of a pretendedly higher morality, for which they appeal to the Old Testament. Τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς δόξης: "gospel of the glory of God," the import of which is this glory, 2 Cor. iv. 4. This glory is here, as elsewhere represented, as revealed to the world in Jesus Christ (Rom. ix. 23; Eph. i. 17, iii. 16.) The designation, τῆς δόξης, as also the epithet μακαρίου, is selected with the view of giving prominence to the preponderating value of the gospel, in opposition to that legal error; it is the revelation of the glory of him who is blessed. The revelation of his glory will therefore be rich in blessings. Μακάριος applied to God also at vi. 15; for what remains, comp. on Tit. ii. 13. On ὅ ἐπιστεύθην, Winer, § 40, 1, p. 301, a construction frequently used by the apostle, and only by him.

Ver. 12. The apostle has appealed to the gospel which was committed to his trust, in opposition to those teachers of the law. In ver. 12, ss., he enters more fully into the manner in which this trust was committed to him, in order thus to show what certainty he has of the truth of the gospel,—the certainty, namely, of a personal experience, in virtue of which he who was a blasphemer and a persecutor, was transformed into a minister of Jesus Christ. The apostle, however, following the impulse of his heart, clothes the idea in the form of a thanksgiving. Baumgarten has traced the scope of the passage otherwise, a. a. Q. p. 224, in opposition to Schleiermacher, who finds here a total want of connection. The apostle, according to Baumgarten, speaks of himself, in so far as in his case, the peculiar nature of the gospel, namely, that it is designed precisely for the salvation of sinners and transgressors of the law,

was convincingly manifested. The question to which no reply is given in vv. 9 and 10, namely, how are transgressors of the law to attain to righteousness, is here answered. This interpretation, however, will hold only when vv. 9 and 10 are viewed as opposed to the common Judaistic tendency. And even apart from this, ver. 12 appears to me to stand in so close a connection with the emphatic words of the preceding verse *which was committed to my trust*, that it can only be understood as a farther explanation of these words. And how can the words, *but I obtained mercy because I did it in ignorance*, agree with the above view? Doubtless the apostle intends to show, how in his own person, in his own history, the import of the gospel is strikingly represented, and how the entire forbearance of divine love has been manifested in the mercy which he obtained, and has thus made him a pattern to all who should hereafter believe. But are we to regard this as supplementary to the doctrine stated before respecting the design of the law? There is surely nothing in these words about the law or its design. Nay, the apostle's conversion is in the least degree fitted to show the relation of the law to faith; for it was not a knowledge of his sins wrought in him by the law that brought him to Christ. This, however, must be the case with any one, in order to his being able to show by his example, how the transgressors of the law may be led by the law itself to the righteousness in Christ Jesus, how the law is a *schoolmaster to bring us to Christ.*[1] *Καί* before *χάριν ἔχω*, which is not found in A.F.G., &c., has perhaps rightly been retained by Tischendorf according to D.I.K. &c. And I thank Christ Jesus our Lord who hath enabled me, that he counted me faithful, appointing me to the ministry, although I was before a blasphemer and a persecutor and injurious, says the apostle, in explanation of the words *which was committed to my trust*, ver. 11. *Christ who hath enabled me*,—inasmuch as the strength for the ministry to which the Lord hath appointed him, proceeds not from himself, but from the Lord who hath called him to this ministry; the apostle, as Matthies well observes, repels the supposition, that "at the time when he was called, the strength for the ministry was already present in him, and was only acknowledged by the Lord." On *ἐνδυναμόω* (a genuine Pauline word) comp. on Phil. iv. 13.

1 Huther: the apostle dwells till ver. 17 on the grace experienced by him, in such a manner, however, as to make it most clearly manifest, that the gospel committed to his trust is a *gospel of the glory of the blessed God.*

The ground of his thanks is expressed in the words, *that he counted me faithful*, which are further explained by the following *putting*, &c., for this latter is just the actual proof of what is said in the words, *he counted me faithful*. *Faithful* (comp. 1 Cor. iv. 2), is the quality which is required of *a steward of God*, the strength is given by the Lord. On the whole expression comp. 1 Cor. vii. 25. In like manner the expression θέμενος εἰς has its parallel in 1 Thess. vi. 9; comp. also Acts xiii. 47. On διακονίαν, in its wider signification, comp. Rom. xi. 13; Eph. iii. 8; Col. i. 23.

Ver. 13. The apostle now describes his former condition in the words, *who was before a blasphemer and a persecutor and injurious*. The reading is τὸ πρότερον, not τόν, according to A.D.*F.G., &c. These strong expressions are designed to give effect to the contrast with the foregoing, *putting me into the ministry*. In this way, by so powerful an experience of the transforming grace of the Lord, did he become a *minister* of Christ, from being a *blasphemer* and a *persecutor*. On βλάσφημος comp. Acts xxvi. 11; on διώκτης, at which Schleiermacher has stumbled, passages such as Gal. i. 13; on ὑβριστήν, Matth. xxii. 6, &c. The last expression forms a climax with the foregoing, in so far as it denotes an injurious act which proceeds from arrogance and contempt of others. On the participle θέμενος, not equivalent to the infinitive, comp. Winer, § 46, 1, p. 399. "But I obtained mercy because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." These words are not intended as a palliation of his conduct, but only to show, that there was that in him upon which mercy might take hold, how it was possible for mercy to be shown to him. Mack well observes, that "the words of Christ, Matt. xii. 31, s., were confirmed in the apostle, that every sin and blasphemy, even that against the Son, may be forgiven, so long as there is no blasphemy against the Spirit." *I obtained mercy;* this expression points to the fact denoted by, *was committed to my trust*, ver. 11, and *counted me faithful, putting*, &c. By this the apostle is assured that he has obtained mercy. The expression, *I obtained mercy*, is selected with reference to the condition described in ver. 13, from which compassionating grace has rescued him. When the apostle says, *I obtained mercy because I did it ignorantly in unbelief*, he does not mean that he had a claim to such mercy, as

if with ὅτι a sufficient reason for the bestowal of mercy were expressed; he only explains how it was possible that such a sinner could obtain mercy, Acts iii. 17. The positive ground of mercy being shown to him, lies solely in the compassion of God, Tit. iii. 5. The ground of the *ignorance* lies in the *unbelief*, which implies that this ignorance is by no means unaccompanied with guilt. But there is still a great difference between the conduct which the apostle here describes, to which he was led by an honest zeal for the law, and that of which we read in Luke xi. 52; Matth. xii. 32, where the conduct described proceeds from an indelible enmity against whatsoever is of God, and a wilful striving against the spirit of God. In this case grace must become a compelling power in order to be able to save.

Ver. 14. "And the grace of our Lord was exceeding abundant with faith and love in Christ Jesus." The apostle here places in opposition to the state just described, ver. 13, the new state, namely, that of grace, which magnifies itself in his life and labours, and which has adorned these with faith and love in Christ Jesus, *i.e.* love which has its root in him. Faith and love are described as the result of grace; when grace magnifies itself in a man, it brings faith and love along with it. *The love which is in Christ Jesus*, Olshausen remarks, is not the love which Christ has and exercises, but that which he gives to men. Its being joined with *faith* necessitates this interpretation. *Faith* and *love* form the antithesis to *unbelief*, ver. 13, comp. with ver. 6. The expression ὑπερπλεονάζω only here = was exceeding abundant, not to be taken in a comparative sense; compare passages such as Rom. v. 20, vi. 1; 2 Cor. iv. 15, where πλεονάζειν occurs, with passages such as 2 Cor. vii. 4; 2 Thess. i. 3, where words similarly compounded occur. That the humility as well as the greatness of the apostle is here expressed, as it is also elsewhere, has been observed by Mack, who refers to Phil. i. 21, ii. 1; 2 Cor. x. 5, 23—29; Gal. iv. 19.

Ver. 15. The apostle has just described how the power of saving love manifested itself in him. Thus from his own experience he can testify what he here says: assuredly true and worthy of all acceptance is the assertion, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, of whom, he adds, I am chief. Πιστὸς ὁ λόγος, comp. on Tit. iii. 8. Ἀποδοχή, as also ἀπόδεκτος, (the former occurring again at iv. 9, the latter ii. 3, v. 4), only in this epistle.

On the other hand, the apostle uses elsewhere δεκτός and εὐπρόσδεκτος, Phil. iv. 18; 2 Cor. vi. 2; Rom. xv. 31, &c.; comp., besides, Acts ii. 41, *they that gladly received the word* (ἀποδεξάμενοι τὸν λόγον.) On the use of the word by the classical writers, see Leo on the passage. On πᾶσα ἀποδοχή, like πᾶσα χαρά, full joy, Winer, § 17, 10, p. 132. On *Christ Jesus* as the subject of what follows, comp. Phil. ii. 5, s. Ἐρχεσθαι εἰς κόσμον, with definite allusion to the pre-existence of Christ. It is the substance of what is contained in the gospel committed to his trust, which the apostle here compresses into these words as the experience of his own life; comp. Matth. xviii. 11; Luke, xix. 10, "Of whom I am the chief." Some have thought this expression too strong, and endeavoured to soften it by pointing to the omission of the article (against which De Wette justly refers to Matth. x. 2, xxii. 38), or to the present tense, εἰμί, according to which it applies only to the saved sinner. But ὤν refers not to saved sinners, but to sinners in general. All these limitations come into collision with ver. 16, the entire signification of which rests on this πρῶτος in its full sense. The apostle also speaks elsewhere of his former life in the same manner; comp. Eph. iii. 8; 1 Cor. xv. 8, 9, where he states as the reason of his humiliation: *because I persecuted the church of God.* So here where the apostle calls himself πρῶτον, we are to associate this with what he says in ver. 13, nor are we to be hindered from this by the words, *I obtained pardon because I did it ignorantly*, &c., comp. above. Only to this reference of the πρῶτος to ver. 13,—the outward act,—corresponds also what he says of himself, ver. 16. It is the conduct of the apostle in itself, viewed by him apart from its mitigating circumstances, which constrains him to make use of this expression regarding himself.

Ver. 16. *Howbeit for this cause I obtained mercy*, as above at ver. 14, antithetical with the apostle's judgment concerning himself. Although the chief of sinners, I yet obtained pardon for this cause—pointing forward emphatically to the ἵνα—that in me the chief (for πρῶτος is not to be taken differently here from before), Christ Jesus might show his entire forbearance, for a pattern to those who should hereafter repose their believing trust in him to life everlasting. The whole passage indicates how entirely in earnest the apostle was in the πρῶτος ἐγώ. Only thus can he see in his having obtained mercy, the entire riches of the divine forbearance, and

hold it up as a consoling pattern to all who shall hereafter believe, even to the greatest sinners. "A real miracle of the love of Jesus Christ to sinners," Olshausen. *Μαχροθυμία*, some think it necessary, without reason to understand this word in the sense, "magnanimity." But does not the long-suffering of the divine love which follows the sinner appear in the conversion of Paul. On *τὴν ἅπασαν* (so Tischendorf) *μακροθυμίαν*, comp. Winer, § 17, 10, p. 133. *Ὑποτύπωσις* (only again at 2 Tim. i. 13) = *τύπος*, 1 Cor. x. 6, 11; Phil. iii. 17, &c., or *ὑπόδειγμα*, John xiii. 15; 2 Pet. ii. 6, &c. The common interpretation is, "that I may be a pattern," better thus, "that this proof of his long suffering may be a pattern; and perhaps for this very reason it is *ὑπότυπωσις*, and not *τύπος*. The less frequent connexion *πιστεύειν ἐπί* (Rom. ix. 33, x. 11; Pet. ii. 6; [Matth. xxvii. 42]) represents Christ as the foundation on which faith rests. *To life everlasting*, this again is the mark which all true faith has, and keeps in its eye; comp. on Tit. i. 2.

Ver. 17. The consideration of that which, as a pattern to all who should afterwards believe, has been done in the apostle, and has made him an enduring monument of the saving long-suffering of Christ, constrains him to the ascription of praise which he here makes, and with which he closes the explanation of the above *ὅ ἐπιστεύθην ἐγώ* in the same way as it was begun. Such expressions of adoration, says Schleiermacher, are found for the most part only where a subject somewhat fully treated is brought to a termination, and shown in a light convincingly clear; so Rom. xi.; 1 Cor. xv.; 2 Cor. ix. 15; Eph. iii. 21, &c. I would have thought that both of these things might be predicated of the passage before us. The train of thought to which the *ὅ ἐπιστεύθην ἐγώ* gave occasion is brought to a conclusion, and it is made out in a manner convincingly clear that he is warranted in saying that of himself. "And can any one," asks Baumgarten justly, "imagine a more suitable conclusion. The apostle has not merely in a general form declared the counsel of God for the salvation of men, with which his whole soul was filled, but he has brought this subject as near as possible to his own person and his own experience; he has held himself forth as a living announcement of the truth, his history as a type of the gospel." *Τῷ δὲ βασιλεῖ τῶν αἰώνων* occurs nowhere else in the New Testament. The same expression, however, is found in Tob. xiii. 6, 10, and מַלְכוּת כָּל־עֹלָמִים, Ps. cxlv. 13.

Parallel expressions beyond the Bible, both from the Christian and the ante-Christian period, have been collected by Böttger, on this passage and on vi. 15, a. a., Q., p. 97. Olshausen remarks that it is doubtful what signification ought to be given to *αἰῶνες*, whether it is to be understood as denoting the sum of the ages = eternity, thus, king of eternity, or as equivalent to "world," which developes itself in time, as Heb. i. 2, xi. 3, comp. on *αἰών*, Harless on Eph. p. 143. De Wette also wavers between the two significations. It appears to me better that *αἰῶνες* should be taken in the same sense as afterwards in *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων = πάντας αἰῶνας* (comp. on Phil. iv. 20.) He is a king of the ages, which together make up the idea of eternity, as His kingdom (comp. Ps. cxlv. 13) is an everlasting kingdom. Huther takes *αἰῶνες* = world, as Heb. i. 2, xi. 3. To this the apostle is led by the foregoing expression, ver. 16, *εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον*, with which the expression in ver. 17 is immediately connected, as also the rest of the epithets in this verse represent God, not so much in his relation to the world as in the infinite fulness and majesty of his being. Honour and praise are due to Him, the king of the ages, the immortal, invisible, the only God; for He it is in whom all fulness dwells, who has come nigh to us in Christ Jesus to save us. It is altogether wrong, therefore, to refer the doxology to Christ; the epithet *invisible* ought to have been decisive against this. On *ἀφθάρτῳ*, comp. Rom. i. 23; on *ἀοράτῳ*, Col. i. 15; Heb. xi. 27; Rom. i. 20. *Μόνῳ θεῷ*, not *μόνῳ σοφῷ θεῷ*, which has A.D.*F.G., &c., against it, and appears to be a gloss from Rom. xvi. 27, as also Jude 25. *Ἀμήν* is also added elsewhere in the same way (Gal. i. 5; Phil. iv. 20, &c.) For what remains, comp. on Phil. iv. 20. Dr Baur thinks that the epithets here applied to God are of a Gnostic cast. The parallel passages to which we have referred show how little necessity there is for such an opinion.

Ver. 18. The apostle, after this explanation of the *ὃ ἐπιστεύθην ἐγώ* upon which his heart has poured itself forth in an ascription of praise to God, now turns again to Timothy, comp. ver. 3. We have seen how in that verse there was a *protasis* without an *apodosis*. Have we not the apodosis here, if not formally, at least substantially? Let us in the first place inquire to what the *ταύτην τὴν παραγγελίαν* refers? It cannot be referred to the immediately-foregoing *faithful saying*, for *παραγγελία*, as we have seen, de-

notes an injunction or *charge*, and what we read in ver. 15 and the context is not given in the form of a *charge*. It will not even do to refer the ταυτην τ. π. directly to παραγγειλῃς, ver. 3, or παραγγελίας, ver. 5, as De Wette has shown; for against the former it is to be observed that the import of the *charge* is there definitely stated in the words, *forbid some to teach otherwise*, against the latter, that it is not *a certain* injunction or charge, but precept *in general* that is spoken of in ver. 5. Thus the ταύτην τὴν π. can be explained only as pointing to the following ἵνα (so also Huther), where it is to be observed that the form of the sentence beginning with ἵνα has been modified by the words, *according to the prophecies which went before on thee*, to which it is referred. The apostle therefore writes thus: this charge I commit to thee, my son Timothy, according to the prophecies which went before on thee, that thou dost war in them the good warfare. Without the κατά in the foregoing clause, the apostle would have said: that thou dost war the good warfare, in which the substance of the *charge* is given (ἵνα in a weakened signification.) But what else can the good warfare be which Timothy is to war, than the fulfilling of his calling? And the apostle has set before him in ver. 3, ss., what is the duty which his calling actually imposes upon him. The idea, therefore, which must have been expressed in the apodosis if it had been given, is found here, although in a more general form. Next to a regular apodosis, we could imagine no better form for the conclusion than that which we have here. Although the direct reference of ταύτην τὴν π. back to ver. 3, ss., is impossible, still, as Schleiermacher himself has perceived, the παραγγελία carries us back to the *faith* and *good conscience* in ver. 5, and reminds us that it is here we are to seek the substance of the apodosis to the καθώς, ver. 3. So also Olshausen: "Paul resumes in substance what is said at ver. 3, ss." He, however, explains the παραγγελία also here of the special commission to oppose the heretics. And does the writer of the epistle really, as Schleiermacher maintains, leap back in ver. 18 to the old subject? He has already, in ver. 8, ss., shown in opposition to the teachers of the law, what is the right use of the law, and referred in testimony of this to the gospel committed to his trust, and proved that he has the assurance of his own experience to produce for the truth of this gospel. How naturally then is this followed up with

the injunction to Timothy (so well founded, in as far as the apostle is concerned, before whose eyes the certainty as well as the glory of this gospel has been presented) to war the good warfare, to do what he is taught to do in vv. 3—10? Similarly also Heydenreich: in virtue of this my office, which has been committed to me, who was once a persecutor, but who obtained mercy of the Lord, vv. 13—16, I charge thee, &c. The apostle, however, mentions at the same time an additional ground of obligation which Timothy has in his own person to war the good warfare of his calling, in the words, *according to the prophecies*, &c. He reminds him of the prophecies that have been spoken in regard to him, and charges him according to these to see that they are fulfilled in him, by warring the good warfare ἐν αὐταῖς. We see here that whatever might have the effect of stirring up Timothy to a faithful performance of his duty is held up before him. On παρατίθεμαι comp. Matth. xiii. 24, 31; Acts vii. 23; 2 Tim. ii. 2. Κατά has been regarded without any reason as a hyperbaton; it belongs really to παρατίθεμαι; in what way it belongs to στρατεύῃ is shown by ἐν αὐταῖς. By προαγούσας προφητείας are denoted antecedent or preceding prophecies, comp. Heb. vii. 18; ἐπὶ σέ is to be connected with προφ. On the subject, comp. iv. 14, from which we may gather that on the occasion of *the laying on of the hands of the presbytery*, such words were spoken concerning him as indicated what was to be expected of him. So also Olshausen and Huther; but it is not his ordination to his office that is spoken of. I am not inclined to regard the good report which, according to Acts xvi. 2, Timothy had of all the brethren in Lystra and Iconium as indentical with these *prophecies*, comp. Acts vi. 3, &c. The occurrence referred to is to be conceived of as similar to that of which we have an account in Acts xiii. 1, where we find the *prophecy* and *laying on of hands* conjoined. For what remains comp. iv. 14 and 2 Tim. i. 6. It is true that nothing is recorded in the Acts of the Apostles of these prophecies in reference to Timothy. But what can be inferred from this? As well might we suppose a discrepancy to exist between 2 Tim. i. 6 and 1 Tim. iv. 14. Compare also Gal. ii. 2 with Acts xv. 1, the former of which passages speaks of a *revelation*, while the latter says nothing of this. This passage also supplies us with an argument against Schleiermacher, to prove that the apostle elsewhere also appeals to such a revela-

tion. In reply, however, to the objection that it was not the apostle's custom to pay regard to prophecies when he himself had to act, in support of which Schleiermacher refers to Acts xxi. 11, ss., Baumgarten has already observed justly, that the prophecy cited from Acts xxi. 11 contains nothing at all about what Paul should do or not do, and has referred with reason to Paul's opinion concerning prophecy, 1 Cor. xii. 10; Eph. iv. 11; 1 Cor. xiv. 1.— *Ἐν αὐταῖς* is rendered by De Wette, "in the strength of," better "in, with," armed as it were with these. On *στρατεύεσθαι τὴν κ. στρατείαν*, comp. 2 Cor. x. 4; Eph. vi. 14; 1 Thess. v. 8; and on 2 Tim. ii. 3—5. It is not his conduct as an individual, but rather in his official character, which is here meant. Chrysostom: *διατὶ καλεῖ στρατείαν τὸ πρᾶγμα; δῆλῶν ὅτι πόλεμος ἐγήγερται σφοδρὸς πᾶσι μὲν μάλιστα δὲ τῷ διδάσκάλῳ. Στρατεία*, as Huther observes, means properly "military service," not merely "fight."

Ver. 19. All fitness for this military service, however, stands connected with the character and state of the individual engaged in it. That which the teacher seeks to bring about in others, he must himself have, and hold fast; hence the apostle adds, "holding faith and a good conscience," which he has mentioned above, ver. 5, as the fundamental condition of all Christian being and striving. He is to hold faith and a good conscience (*ἔχων* not holding fast = *κατέχων*, as if it would escape from him; to which the expression *ἀπωσάμενοι* does not correspond); for the examples of Hymeneus and Alexander show how it will go with those who put these away from them. The *good conscience* is represented as the condition and ground of faith. The sentiment, observes Olshausen, is in a practical point of view of the greatest importance, that the loss of a good conscience will cause shipwreck of faith. The state of faith depends on the inmost tendency of the soul in man; the consciousness of sin kills the germ of faith in man. *Ἥν* refers of course only to *ἀγ. συνείδ.* The expression *ἀπωσάμενοι*, "having cast off," denotes a wilful act. Bengel rightly shows the reason of this, when he says: they have cast it from them, as a troublesome monitor. The expression already points to the *ἐναυάγησαν*, according to which the good conscience is to be conceived of as the anchor of faith. It is found also in a metaphorical sense at Rom. xi. 1, 2; Acts vii. 39, xiii. 46; Prov. xxiii. 23; Hos.

iv. 6; Ezek. xliii. 9. Conscience is a power in man which contradicts him when he acts in opposition to it; according to which the expression ἀπωσ. involves nothing unsuitable (against Schleiermacher.) The consequence of this *casting off* is the *making shipwreck of faith.* Περὶ, " with respect to," Winer, § 53, i. p. 483. It is well known how frequently this metaphor was applied in the ancient church, according to which the course of faith was represented by navigation.

Ver. 20. As examples of this class, Hymeneus and Alexander are named, who in this way have come not merely to the loss of faith, but have even gone the length of blasphemy, and upon whom, therefore, the apostle was compelled to exercise his apostolical power of rebuke. In 1 Cor. v. 5, we find a parallel to this conduct on the part of the apostle. Olshausen remarks on this, that the idea of excommunication certainly lies in it, but so as that out of the church of Christ we are to conceive of the kingdom and power of Satan (Acts xxvi. 18); he who is excluded from it becomes thereby the prey of Satanic power. A comparison with 1 Cor. v., however, suggests the question whether something still more special is not to be understood in our present passage. There, it is added, that the giving over to Satan is to operate not only spiritually but also physically. This implies that severe sufferings, disease, and the like, should come upon the person excommunicated, which should have the effect of bringing him to reflection, in order that his soul might be saved. Here also the salvation of the persons concerned is the end which the apostle has in view. Nothing is here said of any reference to bodily sufferings; but although all the church doctors explain this formula in our passage as being also a formula of excommunication, we yet do not find that it was ever used as such, but always ἀνάθεμα ἔστω. It seems as if the church has supposed that this phrase involved an apostolical prerogative (comp. Acts v.)—Παιδεύω denotes here, as at 1 Cor. xi. 32; 2 Cor. vi. 9, &c., to instruct by discipline. Βλασφημεῖν can, in accordance with the context, be referred only to speaking evil of that which is divine, comp. vi. 1, and 2 Pet. ii. 10; Jude 8. Hymeneus and Alexander are the persons in whom Timothy may see an example of what the apostle has just maintained. Whether the fact itself to which reference is here made, was already known to Timothy or not, is of no importance for the apostle's object. But the manner

in which the reference is made, shows, that the individuals must at all events have been known to him. Whether both are to be conceived of as belonging to Ephesus cannot be determined with certainty, as this also was irrelevant to the apostle's object. The former name occurs also at 2 Tim. ii. 17, in connexion with Philetus, where these two are adduced as examples to show how the "vain talking" tends ever more and more to ungodliness, and has even carried them the length of maintaining that the resurrection is past already. That what is there said is quite consistent with what we read in the passage before us, on the supposition that one and the same person is meant, and that the doctrine, *the resurrection is past already*, must be congenial to one who has an evil conscience, needs no farther showing. The connexion with Philetus is no proof against the identity of the person, for it might easily be the case that Alexander did not participate with him in that special heresy, as he did in the moral aberration which lay beneath it. Hence, the most of commentators, Olshausen among the number, have maintained the identity of the person, while Mosheim has denied it. Comp. on 2 Tim. ii. 17. With regard to Alexander, we meet this name also again at 2 Tim. iv. 14, where the individual referred to appears as a personal adversary of the apostle, and Timothy is warned against him. He has there the by-name ὁ χαλκεύς, by which it is intended to distinguish him from another of the same name. He is not there described as having been shut out from the church, without however our being able to say that he was not, for on this latter supposition also, his conduct towards the apostle and the warning against him may be explained. Just as little is he described as a heretic. Many commentators, doubtless with reason, identify him with the person named in Acts xix. 23, and distinguish him from the one mentioned in our passage; while others again, as Olshausen, recognize three of this name, and understand a different person in each of the three passages. The whole question is one merely of probability. If accordingly we decide for the identity of the Hymenæus named here and at 2 Tim. ii. 17, and against that of the Alexander likewise named twice, the possibility of its being otherwise in reference to the former, must still be acknowledged. It seems therefore all the more surprising that the criticism to which we are opposed lays so much stress for its purposes on these names. Thus De Wette, on the supposition that the Hymenæus mentioned

in the first and second epistle to Timothy, is the same person, seeks to prove, from the difference in the circumstances referred to in each instance, the earlier date of the second epistle to Timothy, and thereby the spuriousness of all the Pastoral Epistles. But if the circumstances cannot in reality be reconciled with the supposition that one and the same person is meant, there remains still the possible supposition that different persons are meant. To this it has been objected that, apart from the improbability which lies in the sameness of the name, Paul would in this case have held up to the Hymeneus of the second epistle that of the first as a warning example. But this objection rests on the untenable supposition, that the Hymeneus of the second epistle was himself to be warned, whereas he is only adduced as an example for Timothy, to show him whether that vain talking tends, in which case any such allusion to the Hymeneus of the first epistle would have been quite superfluous. And when it is further objected by Schleiermacher against two persons being meant, that in this case the person second-named must have been distinguished from the first by some by-name,—to this it may reasonably be replied, that the one is sufficiently distinguished from the other, by being named in connexion with his companion in error. In addition to this, it cannot at all be proven that either in the one place or the other it is persons in Ephesus who are spoken of. This cannot be inferred from the fact that they are named as examples, as indeed generally the critics have paid too little attention to this circumstance, that the persons named are only meant to serve as examples. And if it were really the case, as those critics maintain, that the author of the first epistle had the second in his eye, and " thought it necessary to make it appear as if the heresy had made progress such as would be sufficiently accounted for by what is said in the second epistle," why should he have separated Hymeneus and Philetus, who are there named together, and have placed Hymeneus along with Alexander, as he must surely have observed the different connection in which the latter is mentioned in 2 Tim. ii. 17 ? Will the answer which Dr Baur gives to this question be held sufficient, namely, that in 1 Tim. i. 20, Hymeneus stands at the same time for the Philetus named with and after him ? We have here one of those cases in which favour for the author or prejudice against him obtains free scope, because nothing can be evidently proven. For this very reason, however,

the question can never be one of any advantage to the critics on the other side. Before leaving this section, we have still to look at the principal attack which has been directed against it by Schleiermacher. According to the introduction, ver. 3, says Schleiermacher, it is the writer's intention to give directions to Timothy as to his conduct towards the heretics. But no such directions are to be found; with the exception of vv. 3—11 and vv. 19 and 20, nothing is said about heretics at all till we come to chap. iv. 1; up to this place the writer has lost sight of his object. But even in chap. iv. 1 he cannot be said to have resumed it, for he speaks there of heretics who are to be expected at a later period. In ver. 7, indeed, he seems to speak of excrescences in doctrine already present, and in like manner in vi. 3—5, 20, passages which, as regards their sense, we find exactly repeated, but which give no other instruction to Timothy than merely that he is to have nothing to do with those hereties. Thus the introduction does not correspond to the body of the epistle, and what is said of the heretics forms, when compared with the rest of the epistle, but a very insignificant part of it. In reply to all this we would say, that, keeping in view particularly chap. i., it is principally to be borne in mind that the introduction, ver. 3, in which Timothy is reminded of the object of his having been left in Ephesus, is by no means to be regarded as the theme of the whole epistle, as may be seen indeed from the epistle itself, iii. 14. That which was the *principal* part of Timothy's commission in the position in which he was left in Ephesus, is also, of course, the principal subject of the writing which was addressed to him. But what necessity is there for supposing, that the epistle was written *solely* for the purpose of giving him instructions on this subject? As, over and above his special commission to oppose those who taught otherwise, Timothy was charged also with the settlement and administration of the church, as well as with the general duties of an evangelist, we find accordingly that the epistle treats of all these things. The only question then is, whether the section which professes to give instructions to Timothy on that part of his charge which has reference to the unsound doctrine, or rather which professes merely to remind him of this charge, is in reality what the introduction, *as I besought thee*, &c., warrants us to expect. And who can doubt that it is so, if it be kept in view that the apodosis to ver. 3 is absorbed in the pro-

tasis, and that in this latter therefore is to be sought what the apostle has to say on the subject to Timothy? We find the errors which Timothy is to ward off not merely designated in a general way in vv. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, but that which is erroneous in them is in vv. 4 and 5 especially noticed. The source whence they spring is shown in ver. 6; in vv. 7—11 a species of the general error is more fully entered into, and Timothy is referred to the gospel which the apostle promulgates with the assurance of his own experience. In ver. 18 the apostle, referring to this gospel, and the prophecies which had gone before respecting Timothy, admonishes him to fight the good fight of his calling, in order to which he must take good heed to himself, and maintain that state of soul the loss of which brings along with it the loss of faith. All this is certainly no refutation of heresies in the strict sense, nor does it profess to be this; it is, however, a renewed statement of the charge which had been given to Timothy, and an advice as to the right way of fulfilling this charge. And this is all that the introduction warrants us reasonably to expect. In fine, those who, like Schleiermacher, hold the epistle to Titus to be genuine, need not stumble at the way in which the apostle treats this subject here, for it is quite the same as in that epistle, and all that is peculiar to our passage is the anacolouthon, as an unprejudiced comparison will show.

§ 2. DIRECTIONS TO TIMOTHY WITH REGARD TO THE REGULATION OF THE CHURCH.

A. REGARDING PUBLIC WORSHIP.

(Chap. ii. 1—15.)

Along with the commission which Timothy as the representative of the apostle in Ephesus received, to oppose those who sought to mislead the church by their fruitless pursuits, another was conjoined, namely, to take charge of the regulation and administration of the church. The apostle passes in chap. ii. to this part of the commission given to Timothy, in order to furnish him with directions regarding it, and, first of all, he gives him injunctions with respect to the assemblies for public worship. These, however, are not of

a merely general kind, as if the church were to be begun *ab ovo*, but refer to special points which the state of the church leads him to suggest. The first direction of this kind is, that the prayers of the church be made for all men, and in particular also for magistrates, this duty being implied in the universality of the design and application of Christianity, which finds its expression in his calling to be the apostle of the Gentiles, ver. 1—7. Then, what is the right internal as well as external preparation for prayer, which it becomes the man and also the woman to make, ver. 8—10. Lastly, the special injunction that the woman make no public appearance, but find her vocation in the discharge of her conjugal and domestic duties, ver. 11—15.

Ver. 1. *I exhort therefore,* &c.; the apostle thus begins to give instructions respecting *public* prayer, for it is of this that he is speaking, as ver. 8—11 show. It is maintained that the *therefore* has no logical connexion with the preceding. Baumgarten proposes to supply this connexion by observing, that either Timothy is instructed how and what he is to do, in opposition to such destroyers as are mentioned in ver. 20, or it may be that the reference to the church predominates, and in this case it is shown what is to be done in the church, in order to protect it from these destroyers. Both of these inferences, however, are ultimately conjoined, in confirmation of which he refers to iv. 16. Against this view, it is first of all to be noticed, that those named in i. 20 are not represented as destroyers of the church, but as individual examples of a falling away from the faith. Further, that chap. ii. shows throughout no such opposition to chap. i. The opposition which Baumgarten makes out here is found in Tit. ii. 1; but a comparison will show that our passage does not admit of being interpreted in the same way. Olshausen also has rejected Baumgarten's view of this passage. The words, *I exhort therefore*, are rather, as Matthies has already observed, to be placed in connexion with ver. 18. This special direction which the apostle here gives, rests on that general admonition in ver. 18, which is confirmed by what precedes. So also Leo. Reference has justly been made to 2 Tim. ii. 1 for this οὖν, in opposition to Schleiermacher. Olshausen, differently. He finds the link of connexion in βλασφημεῖν, ver. 20, which he understands to mean—speaking evil of the magistracy. As the destruction of Jerusalem drew near,

observes Olshausen, we find that all the Jews were seized with delusive dreams of freedom, with which also those Ephesian Judaists were infected. In opposition to these, Paul gives prominence to the injunction that prayer be made for all men, especially also for magistrates. But who could feel warranted in making *βλασφημεῖν*, which is only incidentally introduced, the transition-idea to chap. ii., even could it be proved to have this special reference?—The apostle says, *first of all* (which is not with Luther to be connected with *be made*, but with *I exhort*), not to signify that the injunction which follows in itself deserves this place,—but there are special reasons which induce him to give it the first place here. The apostle aims at denoting prayer in its every aspect, when he says, *ποιεῖσθαι δεήσεις, προσευχὰς, ἐντεύξεις, εὐχαριστίας*. On *δέησις* and *προσευχή*, comp. Phil. iv. 6. *Ἔντευξις* only again at iv. 5, from which passage we learn, that the term does not in itself denote specially "intercessions," which also is not involved in the word (*ἐντυχάνω* = adeo aliquem); comp. Book of Wisdom viii. 21; xvi. 28; chiefly, however, Rom. viii. 27, 34; Heb. vii. 25. It is plain from these passages, that *ἐντυγχάνειν* signifies to come in to any one, and as regards another, as well for, as against him, and so also *ἔντευξις*, which (comp. Wahl) occurs in the profane writers in the same sense as here (Diod. Sic. xvi. 25; Jos. Antt. xv. 3, 8.) It obtains here through the following *ὑπέρ* the signification of intercession for some one. The word itself is therefore not chargeable with the offence which Schleiermacher takes at it, who calls it a "fine" word. To the *intercessions* are added *thanksgivings*. In this also is their Christian love to show itself, namely, in giving thanks for the good that happens to others. These various expressions cannot be better rendered than they have been in Luther's translation, according to which the difference between them is given in the words themselves. It is not the import of the prayers by which they are to be distinguished, for *ἔντευξις* does not mean precisely a prayer for the aversion of evil (iv. 5), and as little does *δέησις*, to which this signification has in like manner been assigned, while *προσευχή* is made to mean prayer that good may be obtained (contrary to Jam. v. 16, 17.) The design of the apostle in this accumulation of expressions, is only to inculcate prayer in its every form, according to all the relations implied in it; they are to *ask*, as the

expression of need with reference to God, they are to *pray*, and then, by way of climax they are to come near to God asking. As examples of such an accumulation, the following passages have already been adduced by others, Gal. v. 19—21 ; 2 Cor. vi. 4, ss., &c. Similarly Huther, who observes that the first term expresses the idea of one's own insufficiency, the second that of devotion, and the third that of childlike confidence.—*For all men*, as Tit. iii. 1—3. This admonition to pray for all men, has doubtless the same reference here as there ; it is designed for such as pretended, on the ground of their superiority as Christians, to have the right of looking down on all who were not such, as a mass of perdition. The ὑπέρ is to be connected with all the afore-mentioned species of prayer.

Ver. 2. *For kings*, &c. On the reason of this injunction so oft repeated in the apostolical epistles, comp. on Tit. iii. 1. It is plain from ver. 3, ss., that here also the injunction is occasioned by a false view of the relation in which the Christian stands to the magistracy, as heathen, and therefore hostile. *For kings*—the expression is quite general, without any definite reference to the then Roman emperor. They are to pray for kings, it is all one who they are. It is a permanent ordinance. Baur finds in the plural a reference to the emperor and his associates in the government, as this relation was common in the time of Antonine. The writer would thus have forgotten his part. But not only for kings is prayer to be made, it is to be made for all who are ἐν ὑπεροχῇ, *i.e.*, who have any share in magisterial authority (comp. Rom. xiii. 1.) The word ὑπεροχή, in its general signification, is used by the apostle only again at 1 Cor. ii. 1. The object or end of the prayer for magistrates, not its import, is then given in the words which follow : That we may live a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and decency. The ἵνα cannot denote the contents of the prayer, for that which one supplicates for the magistracy cannot be, that the suppliant himself may have a quiet life ; it is evident also from the sentence introduced by ἵνα, that the import of the prayer cannot have been the conversion of the magistrates. It is the blessing which the suppliants are to expect in answer to their prayers, that is here stated by the apostle. The blessing which the magistracy obtains from their prayers will for them bear the fruit of a quiet, peaceable life. This follows from the design of all government,

Rom. xiii. 3, ss.; if it is blessed in the fulfilment of this end, namely, the restraining of the bad and the advancement of the good, then does the subject necessarily enjoy the blessing of a quiet and peaceable life. The interpretation, "that there may be no insurrection amongst us," is unsuitable, and the other, "that the magistrates, convinced of our respectful deportment, may let us live in peace," is unworthy. Can that be the blessing and this the object of the prayer? The purely subjective interpretation of Heydenreich, "in order by prayer to cherish a quiet, peaceably submissive public spirit," is also to be rejected, as De Wette has done. On ἤμερος and ἡσύχιος Olshausen remarks, that the former signifies "not troubled from without," the latter "from within," 1 Pet. iii. 4. Leo, following Titmann, takes the former in an active, the latter in a passive sense. On ἤμερος (only here), Winer, p. 706. Βίον διάγειν, to spend life, stronger than ἄγειν, comp. Tit. iii. 3. Ἐν πάσῃ εὐσεβεια, &c., Luther well renders, "in all godliness and propriety of conduct." On σεμν. Tit. ii. 2, 7, = honestas. De Wette explains the passage rightly when he says that this is the ultimate end, and depends on outward peace as its condition. —On the direction here given to pray for magistrates, Olshausen observes that the accounts in Josephus of the time immediately preceding the destruction of Jerusalem, throw a remarkable light on this command to pray for all. It was already enjoined in the Old Testament that the Jews should pray also for their heathen rulers, comp. Jer. xxix. 7; Ezra vi. 10. The Jews adhered to this custom. Augustus decreed that a lamb should be offered daily for him in the temple. This practice lasted till near the time of the destruction of Jerusalem. The Zealots, however, looked upon it as an act of idolatry, and required that the offering should cease, Jos. de bell. Jud. II. 17. The duty which the apostle here inculcates was particularly observed by the ancient Christians, of which Heydenreich has adduced proofs, p. 126. Comp. also on Rom. xiii. 1.

Ver. 3. This command to intercede for all men is now confirmed by a reference to the divine will. Mack arbitrarily explains ver. 2 as a parenthesis. The true explanation is, that the apostle in these confirmatory words, returns to the injunction in its general form, without any special reference to rulers, which has already been made in ver. 2; and this appears from the relative clause,

ver. 4, *who will have all men*, &c. For this, he says, is good, and acceptable before our Saviour God. *Καλόν* is to be connected with *ἐνώπιον*, comp. 2 Cor. viii. 21. On *ἀπόδεκτος*, comp. what is said on *ἀπόδοχή* in i. 15. The apposition to *θεός*, which is purposely placed first, has an evident reference to the import of the clause, as ver. 4 shows:—who will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. He who is our Saviour wills that all should be saved; and therefore it is acceptable to him that we should pray for all men. On *θεὸς σωτήρ*, comp. Tit. i. 3.

Ver. 4. *Ὅς* contains the confirmation of the preceding. *Πάντας ἀνθρώπους* is emphatically placed first, because what is meant to be confirmed is, that for all men prayer should be made. If God entertains this merciful design towards all men, then have we no right to make distinctions which would shut out a portion of men. Our prayers must correspond to God's gracious design towards all men, and must be co-extensive with it. The question suggests itself, whether this confirmatory clause, which points out, in this gracious purpose of God, the reason of the obligation to pray for all men, renders it necessary to suppose that the apostle has meant by the *δέησις*, &c., prayer especially for the conversion of all men. Ver. 1, especially the term *εὐχαριστίας*, does not indicate this, nor does ver. 2, where, as appears from the concluding words, the conversion of the magistrates is not to be understood as especially meant. Thus the apostle here also, in the clause which begins with *ὅς*, aims at confirming the duty of prayer, not specially for the conversion of all men, but of prayer generally, as an obligation of love toward all men, in the fulfilment of which, however, prayer for the salvation of their souls will always have the chief place.—The critics have found in the prominence which is given to the universality of the grace of God, a polemical allusion to the Gnostics. In our passage this idea stands in close connexion with the direction to make intercessions for all men, and thus vindicates itself. And then, that the sentiment is Pauline needs no farther demonstration, comp. only Rom. i. 5, v. 18, xi. 32, &c. On *πάντας ἀνθρώπους* comp. with respect to the article Winer, § 17, 10, b. p. 133; Rom. v. 12, &c. "It is the many expressed universally according to all the individuals which compose it." Not *σῶσαι*, as for example in Tit. iii. 5, but agreeably

to the context *σωθῆναι*, in so far as intercession is here spoken of as the mediatrix of the divine grace. *Σωθῆναι* denotes the general, the ultimate end which is aimed at, *καὶ εἰς ἐπίγν.* &c., the immediate end as the means of attaining to the other. (Huther finds it more natural to understand *σωθῆναι* of salvation from sin and untruth, and the *ἐπίγν. τῆς. ἀλ.* as the end aimed at.) There is therefore no *ὕστερον πρότερον*, comp. Winer, § 65, 4, Anm. p. 637. *Καί* = and in consequence of this. On *ἐπίγ.* stronger than *γνῶσις* = recognition, comp. Phil. i 9.

Ver. 5 and 6. The idea that God will have all men to be saved, is now itself confirmed by a new *γάρ*. One idea follows another other here in close connexion. We have here before us the apostle quite as we are accustomed to see him elsewhere. The reason of this lies in the fact, that he is here moving in the same sphere of doctrinal disquisition, in which his manner is so well known to us throughout the other epistles. "For there is one God, one mediator also between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, ver. 6, who gave himself as a ransom for all which is to be testified in its time." The confirmation of *πάντας*, ver. 4, lies in the emphatic *εἷς*; one God, one Mediator, also there is; wherefore the one God is the God of all, the one Mediator between God and man is the mediator of all men. The universality of the divine grace is only the other side of the oneness of God, and the oneness of the mediator. The same idea lies beneath the words of the apostle in Acts xvii. 26. Comp. also Rom. iii. 29; Eph. iv. 5, 6, &c. It is therefore harsh and unnecessary to understand *γάρ*, ver. 5, not as confirmatory of ver. 4, but as a second reason for the injunction to pray for all co-ordinate with that in ver. 4. *One God*, and therefore the *God of all;* as such, he cannot save the one, and let the other be lost. And as there is one God, so is there also but one mediator between God and men; the one is therefore the mediator for all. The words *one Mediator also* are added; for it is the saving grace of God in Christ that is spoken of in ver. 4: it must be designed for all, if there is but one God and one Mediator. "The idea of Mediator," observes De Wette, as also before him Schleiermacher, "refers to that of a mutual covenant (Hebr. viii. 6, ix. 15, xii. 24), which is only indirectly implied in the work of redemption alluded to in ver. 6; consequently the writer seems to have borrowed it from those passages." As regards first of all the Pauline

character of the expression, we have but to call to mind Gal. iii. 19, 20 apart from those passages in the epistle to the Hebrews, and passages such as Col. ii. 14; 2 Cor. v. 19, &c., where we find not indeed the expression, but the same idea. And is not the use of the expression in our passage vindicated by this,—that the *all men* and *one God* are placed over against each other, and Christ is represented expressly as the *Mediator between God and men*? Must then διαθήκη be expressly used in order to its being possible for μεσίτης to be used?—Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων without the article, comp. in regard to the former, Winer, § 18, 1, p. 138. It is wanting in the second, because it is not intended to designate the totality, but to place the two ideas over against each other. The one Mediator is designated as the *man Christ Jesus*. Wherefore ἄνθρωπος? Theodoret has already given the right answer: ἄνθρωπον δὲ τὸν Χριστὸν ὠνόμασεν ἐπειδὴ μεσίτην ἐκάλεσεν· ἐνανθρωπήσας γὰρ ἐμεσίτευσεν; ; comp. Heb. ii. 14, iv. 15. When Baur observes here, that if Christ is named in opposition to the *one God* (but he is also called *Mediator*), he cannot at the same time be God, and that when in iii. 16 divinity is notwithstanding predicated of Christ, this only betrays the crude conceptions of the writer, into which he falls in consequence of intending in the one passage to oppose Docetism, while yet in the other he adheres to the Gnostic maxim: God is manifest in Christ,—Olshausen replies to this, by pointing to those passages in which Paul also gives prominence to the humanity of Christ, and in like manner as here names Christ along with the *one God*, 1 Cor. viii. 6; Rom. v. 15, so that the charge of indistinctness falls upon the apostle himself. So also Baumgarten. Compare besides the Critical Introduction.—The mediatory agency of Christ is then in ver. 6 more particularly described in the words—*who hath given himself*, &c. On ὁ δούς comp. on Tit. ii. 14. Ἀντίλυτρον only here, elsewhere λύτρον; comp, on Tit. ii. 14. Schleiermacher has himself referred to the Pauline ἀντιμισθία, Rom. i. 27; 2 Cor. vi. 13, although he stumbles at ἀντίλυτρον on account of the redundant ἀντι. But what is there redundant in the expression, when it is considered that in the ἀντι the writer aims at giving prominence to the reciprocal reference of this λύτρον? Compare also ἀντάλλαγμα, Matth. xvi. 26. Schleiermacher's opinion that the expression should be referred to the words, *come to the knowledge of the truth*, is altogether without

reason, as also the objection that the language of the writer is indefinite, and without an object, for that *σωθῆναι* and not the other is the principal idea, is shown by the right interpretation of ver. 4, as also by the words *our Saviour* added to God, ver. 3, and by the sentiment of ver. 5 itself, in which Christ is represented as *Mediator*. Why has Schleiermacher not carried out here the comparison with the epistle to the Hebrews? Heb. ix. 13, ss.—*Τὸ μαρτύριον*, &c. On the construction, Winer, § 48, 1, p. 422; comp. Rom. xii. 1. The *τὸ μαρτ.* is to be taken as the accusative, and in apposition with the preceding clause. The article is almost demonstrative, *i.e.* "that which is to be testified of," (De Wette.) *Μαρτύριον* as also elsewhere by Paul, 1 Cor. i. 6, ii. 1; 2 Thess. i. 10. On *καιροῖς ἰδίοις*, Tit. i. 3; Gal. vi. 9, iv. 4. We shall therefore have to understand "these fine words" not as may be most convenient to one (Schleiermacher), but according to the usage of Paul in other passages.

Ver. 7. We do not see here "how very miserably the writer returns to the same path, and cannot refrain from alluding to himself already again as if he were Paul;" but we see how the apostle refers to himself as a teacher of the Gentiles, in order to prove the universality of the Divine grace, just as at i. 12, he designates himself in his conversion, as an announcement of the gospel. "For which I was appointed a herald and an apostle. I speak the truth and lie not—a teacher of the Gentiles in the faith and in the truth." On *ἐτέθην*, comp. on i. 12. On *κήρυξ*, 1 Cor. ix. 27, xv. 11; Tit. i. 3. On the whole subject, 2 Tim. i. 11; Eph. iii. 1—12; Col. i. 23. *I speak the truth*, &c., (comp. Rom. ix. 1) the apostle adds by way of asseveration (*ἐν Χριστῷ* is a gloss from Rom. ix. 1.) In so far as Timothy was concerned, such an asseveration was not necessary; it has respect, however, not to Timothy, but to the subject. The confirmatory reference of the words to the preceding induces him to affirm this with all emphasis. The protestation itself, as at Rom. ix. 1, stands before what is to be affirmed, namely, that he is a *teacher of the Gentiles*, by which the foregoing predicates are, agreeably to the connexion, to be more exactly determined. It cannot be otherwise explained why the protestation should have been inserted between them, and the context evidently shows, that the whole stress of this affirmation rests on the words, *teacher of the Gentiles*. De Wette understands the

words *ἐν πίστει καὶ ἀληθείᾳ* subjectively, and renders, "in truth and verity;" so also Leo = *πιστὸς καὶ ἀληθινός*. But it is not from the apostle's own personal truth and verity we can perceive that the universal grace of God manifests itself in his calling; it is rather from this,—that he is a teacher of the Gentiles in the right faith and in the truth. The reading *ἐν πνεύματι*, instead of *ἐν πίστει*, has not much in its favour, either internally or externally. The context shows why *ἐν ἀληθείᾳ* is added to *ἐν πίστει*: it is the faith which is the truth. On the absence of the article, Winer, § 18, I. p. 137.[1]

Ver. 8. "What now are we to think of ver. 8, ss.?" asks Schleiermacher. "If he intends to return to the subject which he has already left, then must we suppose that he purposes now to enter into particulars, and to show what becomes men and women in prayer. But of the men nothing at all new is said, except what is implied in the words *in every place*, which, however, have nothing special in them. Of the women, indeed, things are said which are special enough, but such as in no way concerns prayer alone. And in general it is difficult to refer any part of ver. 9 only to prayer. It sounds best to make ver. 8 a pause, and to refer the *ὡσάντως*, ver. 9, back to *παρακαλῶ*, ver. 1; but against this is the clear connexion between ver. 8 and ver. 9 in the *τοὺς ἄνδρας* and *τὰς γυναῖκας*, nor would ver. 12, *αὐθεντεῖν ἀνδρός*, with the subsequent verses dependent upon it, suit this view. Nothing, therefore, remains but to suppose that the author, on returning to his subject in ver. 8, makes special mention of the men, because he wished also to speak of the women in connexion with prayer; now, however, 1 Pet. iii. came to his mind, and with its assistance he brings everything into the order which it would admit of." Now, it must be admitted, that in ver. 8, *I will, therefore*, &c., the writer returns to the direction at ver. 1; in like manner, that ver. 9, on account of the clearly-expressed opposition of *men* and *women* (vers. 8 and 9), cannot be the beginning of a new section, against which also would be the term *ὡσαύτως*. But on the other hand, there is no reason for regarding ver. 11 also in the light of a direction for prayer, for this is not merely wanting in all external connexion, but also the *μανθανέτω* shows plainly that the apostle is speaking of something else. Baumgarten also adheres to this

[1] Huther understands *ἐν* to denote the sphere: in faith (subjectively), in truth (as the objective good.)

view. Olshausen, on the contrary, thinks he finds the key to the right understanding of the passage, in the separation of ver. 8 from ver. 9; he understands ver. 9 as the beginning of quite a new injunction to women on the subject of modesty, and accordingly, that only *βούλομαι* is to be supplied at *ὡσαύτως*. He goes on to show, that the reason of this separate mention of the men and the women is explained by the circumstance, that those Judaizing heretics sought to extend their theories of freedom also to the emancipation of women, as Dr Baur has observed; only, that this was not confined to the Marcionites. We find the same at 1 Cor. xi. 5, ss., xiv. 34, (from which it is evident that any reference to Judaizing heretics is superfluous), and this is a thing which might easily take place, as women also were endowed with the *χαρίσματα*, Acts xxi. 9; Joel iii. 1. Paul says then, that the women are not to suppress their gifts, but to use them in a manner becoming their sex; so Olshausen. But apart from the circumstance that nothing is here said about gifts, Schleiermacher, in opposition to the above view, might have insisted on the force of the *ὡσαύτως*, which always supposes a *similarity* in the subject-matter, as also on the opposition of *men* to *women* in ver. 8 and ver. 9. It cannot be conceived why prayer should be urged as a duty on men exclusively, which would be the case if ver. 9 were taken as the beginning of a new section.—In the words *I will therefore* the writer turns back to the directions on prayer in ver. 1. There it was stated quite generally that *prayer should be made*, the principal thing in addition to this being *for all men*, which is confirmed in vv. 3—6. In resuming this subject here, the apostle looks at it in another aspect, doubtless in this also, as in the first exhortation, yielding to the inducement of special circumstances; he here treats of the manner in which, generally, prayer should be made, the right demeanour in the discharge of this duty. The words in ver. 1, *that supplications be made*, are in this aspect farther explained, according to the difference of sex. He has in this respect something different to say to the men from what he has to say to the women. We find in ver. 8 what applies to the men. "I will now (= I appoint) that the men pray in every place, lifting up holy hands without wrath and disputation." The term *προσεύχεσθαι* placed in front, as De Wette well observes, resumes the previous subject, and on it the emphasis is to be laid. Some have thought that the emphasis is intended to be placed on,—*the*

men, and the idea is that only men are to conduct prayer; they alone are to pray in the public assemblies, not the women, 1 Cor. xi. 4, 14, 15. But προσεύχεσθαι may be used with reference to the whole congregation, and as in ver. 9 we do not find it said of the women that they are to be silent, as the antithesis would require, we must therefore understand προσεύχεσθαι not as meaning to pray before others, but in its general signification, which alone corresponds to ver. 9. For what we read in ver. 12, *I suffer not a woman to teach*, has no reference to this passage. In the words, *in every place*, it is chiefly to be observed, that it is public prayer, and not secret prayer, that is spoken of. Some have thought it necessary to suppose a polemical allusion in these words to the limitation of prayer by the Jews to the temple or the synagogue, which is not even historically tenable, and which, as addressed to a Christian church which had been for a long time in existence, would have no significance. The words, *in every place*, are not to be understood (as also Mack and Matthies are of opinion) as exclusively referring to the prayers of the men, but belong to the whole passage. In every place where prayer is made, it is to be made in the manner prescribed in the following instructions. *In every place*, however, certainly refers to the different places of meeting. The qualifications which are required now follow. "Lifting up holy hands." On ὅσιος, holy, pure, unstained by vice, comp. on Tit. i. 8. On the form, Winer, § 11, 1, p. 79. On the expression, Ps. xxiv. 4. On ἐπαίρειν, 1 Kings viii. 23; Ps. cxl. 2, &c. So also in the profane writers, Virgil Aen. 1. v. 92, Hor. carm. iii. 23, v. 1 (Mack). *Without wrath and disputation*—doubtless refers to circumstances peculiar to the church, comp. 1 Cor. xi 2, ss. Διαλογισμός is rightly understood by the majority of the more recent commentators not as = doubt, but = disputation, comp. on Phil. iii. 14. The connection with ὀργῆς leads to this interpretation. It is not to be explained of the conduct of Christians towards those who are not Christians, but of their conduct towards one another. If now we call to mind Schleiermacher's objection against ver. 8, namely, that nothing new is said in it except what is implied in the words *in every place*, we find that it no longer has any force. We have seen that something new is certainly introduced, namely, the right deportment in prayer, and that sufficient instructions are furnished on this head, if we do not go out from the false supposi-

tion that the apostle must of necessity treat the subject in all its bearings, but rather suppose, what is so natural, that his instructions have reference to those points in which the church was specially deficient. I do not see what further fault can be found with ver. 8, if it is so understood.

Ver. 9, 10. The τοὺς ἄνδρας in ver. 8 leads us to expect its opposite γυναῖκας. In ver. 9 follows what applies to the women in distinction from the men, in the same respect in which the men are spoken of, ver. 8. The opposition itself, therefore, which relates at the same time to a similarity, as well as the particle ὡσαύτως, obliges us to understand what is said of the women, as an injunction with reference to their conduct in prayer. This, however, is precisely the difficulty which Schleiermacher finds here, that ver. 9 by no means treats of prayer only; nay, that in general it will not do to refer any part of ver. 9 to prayer at all. We shall first of all attend more particularly to the import of vv. 9, 10. On ὡσαύτως what is necessary has already been said; comp. Tit. ii. 3, 6; 1 Tim. iii. 8, 11, v. 25; Rom. viii. 26; 1 Cor. xi. 25. Βούλομαι is to be supplied from ver. 8; but what the apostle here enjoins must be related in its import to what is said in ver. 8. Upon this follows not indeed προσεύχεσθαι, but κοσμεῖν. But the construction of the sentence itself shows that the apostle had not κοσμεῖν in his mind from the first, for κοσμεῖν finds its proper antithesis in the following ἀλλά, ver. 10, and the connection of κοσμεῖν with ἐν καταστολῇ κοσμίῳ, does not seem quite suitable, as De Wette has already observed. To the same effect also is the circumstance, that ἑαυτάς does not come in till after κοσμεῖν, showing that this latter term is to be connected with what follows. Thus we have, at all events, good grounds for supplying προσεύχεσθαι from the preceding, and for connecting with it the words ἐν κατ. κοσμ. &c., so that this special injunction as to the conduct of the women in prayer corresponds to that which is given to the men in the words *lifting up holy hands*, &c. This verse, then, from its very beginning, refers to prayer, and what is said of the women in vv. 9 10, is to be understood as referring primarily to public prayer, although, of course, it applies also to other circumstances, and chiefly to public worship in general. The sole difficulty in the structure of the sentence then lies in the asyndetic infinitive κοσμεῖν. Had it been the participle, then all foundation for the doubts of

the critics would have been removed. But have we not examples enough elsewhere of a similar change in the construction? How easily might the apostle, in his design to bring prominently out the right deportment on which everything depends, exchange the participial construction for the infinitive; just as he elsewhere uses the finite verb instead of proceeding in the participial construction; comp. in Winer, § 64, 2 b. p. 622. De Wette has similarly explained the structure of the passage, and thus removed the difficulties which Schleiermacher has found in it. Huther supplies only *βούλομαι*, and connects *γυναῖκας* directly with *κοσμεῖν*.—*Καταστολή* similarly *ἐν καταστήματι ἱεροπρεπεῖς*, Tit. ii. 3. In the profane writers it has the signification of a becoming conduct, and to this more general signification = *habitus*, we are also apparently led by Jos. de bell. Jud. II. 8, 4. The majority of commentators, however, understand here the apparel. Also Passow Lex. The context furnishes too little to determine the point. *Κόσμιος* only again iii. 2 = decorus, becoming. *Μετὰ αἰδοῦς*, &c., with shamefacedness and modesty.[1] Comp. on *σωφρ.*, Tit. i. 8 and ii. 2, 5. That by *καταστολή* is meant the outward *habitus* is evident from the following negative clause, *not with broidered hair*, &c. The infinitive *κοσμεῖν* is dependent on *βούλομαι*: that they adorn themselves not with broidered hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly array, but (ver. 10), which becometh women who profess godliness, with good works. The *ὅ πρέπει* is thus put parenthetically, and *δι' ἔργων ἀγ.* is to be connected with *κοσμεῖν*, which, as De Wette observes, is suitable enough, as good works are an indirect ornament. Winer also thus understands the passage, § 23, 2. Anm. p. 183; while others (Mack, Matthies) explain *ὅ* by *ἐν τούτῳ ὅ*, and connect *δι' ἔργ. ἀγ.* with *ἐπαγγ.* to which therefore the signification of *ἐπαγγ.* = profiteri does not correspond (De Wette.) Of the signification there can be no doubt, according to the context, and a comparison with vi. 21. We find, moreover, in the Pastoral Epistles the word also in the signification in which it is elsewhere used by the apostle; comp. Tit. i. 2. On *good works*, comp. Eph. ii. 10. On the entire passage, comp. 1 Cor. xi. 2, ss.; 1 Pet. iii. 3, ss.

Ver. 11—15. We learn from these verses that besides the fondness for exterior adornment which showed itself even in the public

1 Xen. Cyr. VIII. 1, 11: *διήρει δὲ αἰδὼ καὶ σωφροσύην τῇ δὲ ὡς τοὺς μὲν αἰδομένους τὰ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ αἰσχρὰ φεύγοντας τοὺς δὲ σώφρονας καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ*, (Leo.)

assemblies for prayer, the apostle had still another kindred fault to censure in the women of the church, namely, their putting themselves forward in consequence of mistaking the proper sphere assigned to them. This displayed itself in their coming forward to teach in the public assemblies, and thus usurping an authority over the man. To this also we find a parallel in the first epistle to the Corinthians (xiv. 34), which has this in common with our epistle and that to Titus, that it throws light on the state of the church in regard to morals and discipline; it cannot therefore be maintained with certainty that this public appearance on the part of the woman stands in connection with the so-called heresies which the apostle combats. The passage 2 Tim. iii. 6, ss. affords no proof of this. A reference to 1 Cor. xi. 5, xiv. 34, will suffice, in opposition to Baur's anti-Marcionitic interpretation of the passage, for our present passage contains nothing more than may be found in those passages. That the apostle, in this epistle, where he has in view the state of things in the Ephesian church, repeats in substance the injunctions which had before been given to the church in Corinth, without noticing any cause which had led him to do this, has certainly nothing surprising in it. Doubtless the cause was known to Timothy. Comp. the General Introduction.

Vers. 11, 12. *Γυνή* not *γυναῖκες*; thus the form of the expression, as well as the absence of all connection, shows, that the apostle passes on to something new, which is also self-evident in the words, *learn to be in silence.* There is here an antithesis in every word. *In silence*, opposed to drawing attention to themselves by a public appearance. Even the putting of questions by the woman in the public assembly is rebuked by the apostle, 1 Cor. xiv. 35. *Let her learn* as opposed to *teach. In all subjection*, in opposition to *usurping authority over the man*, 1 Cor. xiv. 34. *Being in subjection* is in that passage represented as the proper position of the woman, which of itself excludes the *teaching* in public assemblies; but not of course teaching in general, Acts xviii. 26. Instead of the reading *γυναικὶ δὲ διδ.* A.D.F.G., &c., offer the other, which is also on internal grounds to be preferred: *διδάσκειν δὲ γυναικὶ*, &c. That the apostle says here, *I do not permit*, and not as in 1 Cor. xiv. 33, 36, *it is not permitted*, which Schleiermacher has thought strange, scarcely needs vindication; for the words *let them be silent*, and *as the law also saith*, which the apostle uses

in that passage, are, as Baumgarten has already observed, in no way milder. *Nor to bear authority over the man:* these words are not to be understood generally, but in relation to what goes before, namely, the speaking in public assemblies, as 1 Cor. xiv. 34, also shows, where *to speak* has for its opposite *to be in subjection*, or as it is in our present passage *to be in silence.* So also De Wette. *Αὐθεντεῖν*, Hesychius: *ἐξουσιάζειν*. The word occurs nowhere else; comp. Winer, § 2, p. 28. At *εἶναι ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ* supply *βούλομαι* or some such word, as at 1 Cor. xiv. 34.

Ver. 13, 14. "Consider now," says Schleiermacher, "how the following, vv. 13—15, can ever be said to be pauline?" Neither the stress which is here laid on the priority of creation, nor the imputation of the first sin to Eve in contradistinction to Adam, can Schleiermacher regard as coming from the man who penned 1 Cor. xi. and the epistle to the Romans (v. 12, ss.) As confirmatory then of the injunction, that the woman must not teach publicly, nor usurp authority over the man, but must conduct herself quietly in the public worhip, the apostle proceeds to say that Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived and fell into transgression. The word *ἐπλάσθη* is used by the apostle in the same sense only again at Rom. ix. 20.[1] The priority of creation belonging to the man is adduced not merely as a probable (De Wette), but as an evident subordination proof of the woman to the man,—for the context requires this. We find also in 1 Cor xi. 8 the words, *for the man is not of the woman but the woman of the man,* used by the apostle to confirm a sentiment similar to that in the passage before us, namely, *that the woman is the glory of the man,* according to which the woman is placed under the man as *the image and glory of God.* We have therefore no ground for surprise, that the same man who wrote these words should also be the author of the passage before us. For that the apostle in 1 Cor xi. 11 corrects himself by the word *πλήν*, and retracts the reasons stated before, is evidently false. *Πλήν* is rather only a caution against a possible misinterpretation of his words; comp. Meyer on the passage. It must first be proved that the view which the apostle here expresses is in itself untenable, ere it can be found fault with. We

1 Huther: it occurs in the Sept. Gen. ii. 7, in the same sense as here, from which passage the apostle has here borrowed.

have no such parallel to the other reason which is here adduced by the apostle: *and Adam was not deceived*, &c. It is rather thought that the passage is contradicted by Rom. v. 12, ss., inasmuch as there all sin is traced to the *transgression of Adam*. And nothing certainly could be said against this, if in our passage it were declared that Adam had not sinned. But the *being deceived* is evidently to be distinguished from "sinning," as in respect to Eve it is said immediately after, that she *was in transgression* as the consequence of *being deceived*. It is therefore equally contrary to the sense of the passage as it is arbitrary, to supply πρῶτος at ἠπατήθη, from which would arise the sense, that Eve was first deceived, and then also the man in the same way. The expression *was deceived*, in the specific sense which it obtains from its reference to the history of the fall, applies only to the woman; comp. also De Wette. It is only the beginning of sin to which the apostle here particularly looks, and this certainly belongs to the woman who allowed herself to be led into sin by the serpent, while this can be directly denied of the man. Compare only what is narrated in Gen. iii. 12 respecting the introduction of sin, and the order in which the punishment was declared against the parties concerned, and it will be found exactly to agree with what the apostle here says. The connection at Rom. v. 12, ss. is quite different. There the apostle is speaking of how sin was brought into the world by the first sin, how the sin and death of the race were thus brought about; and in this case it is the sin of the man, as the passage itself shows, through which the first sin has become the sin of the race. So also De Wette on this passage: "There is no contradiction, inasmuch as there Adam is regarded as the head of sinning humanity, and no reference is made to the part which the woman acted." I also can see nothing here either contradictory to what the apostle elsewhere teaches, or in itself untenable, if only the historical account which we have of the fall is received as true. In Gen. iii. 16 we find precisely the same sentiment, namely, the subjection of the woman as the consequence of her infatuation. So also in our passage; not as Bengel renders: facilius decepta facilius decipit; for it is not the capacity or incapacity of the woman that is spoken of, but her position in consequence of sin. On γίνεσθαι ἐν, "to fall into a state," Phil. ii. 7; 1 Thess. ii. 5, &c. Instead of ἀπατηθεῖσα the stronger compound ἐξαπατηθεῖσα is the true

reading according to preponderating authorities. *Ιυνή* must not on account of ver. 15 be taken generically, but can only be understood of Eve in contradistinction to Adam. The generic signification which it receives in ver. 15 is evidently to be explained by this,—that the position of the man and the woman with relation to each other is derived from Adam and Eve as their types.

Ver. 15. "Think you indeed," asks Schleiermacher, "that Paul, when he wrote 1 Cor. vii., was of the opinion, that the salvation of the female sex depended on child-bearing?" No—we confidently answer, nor does our passage say this. Even though we should understand *διά* in the sense "through," still do the words, *if they abide*, &c., show that the writer makes the salvation of the female sex to depend on the condition of faith. But we are not under the necessity of taking *διά* to denote the means of the salvation spoken of. We find *διά* elsewhere used to denote the circumstances amid which anything takes place, comp. Winer, § 51, p. 454, both with transitive and intransitive verbs; thus the passage before us may be rendered: the woman will be saved in child-bearing if they continue, &c. Nay, it seems to me that *διά* cannot well be understood otherwise; for as in the term *σώθησεται* the salvation of the woman is represented as not brought about by herself, it would not correspond to this to understand *διά* as denoting purely the means by which this is brought about. But neither would it be suitable for another reason. *Child-bearing* evidently denotes the sphere which properly belongs to the woman, and thus stands in opposition to the sphere of public teaching, which she enters upon only by usurpation. If, then, child-bearing is here to be understood as the means of salvation, then we are required by the antithesis also to understand, that the teaching in public was regarded as a means of salvation, which certainly was never imagined either by the apostle or by those women. The apostle then adds the words, *through child-bearing*, with no other object than just to point out to the woman her proper sphere of duty, and in particular how this position has been asigned to her in consequence of the fall, Gen. iii. 16. In this sphere to which God has appointed her, not in one of active duty for the advancement of the kingdom of God to which she is not called, and which contradicts the position asigned to her by God, will she be saved under the conditions which are the same in all. De Wette has thought that *σωθήσεται* here does not admit

of being taken in its common acceptation, but that it includes in a positive sense the reward, in like manner as *βαθμός*, iii. 13, *θεμέλιος*, vi. 19, in support of which he refers to Phil. i. 19 and 1 Tim. iv. 15. He thinks that the idea in the writer's mind is that of the reward which the woman may earn for herself; although shut out from the office of public teaching she is not without compensation,—the discharge of her duties as a mother is the way by which she may earn for herself merit and reward. All this arises from understanding *διά* as denoting the means, for which we see no necessity. The context also is against it. For the expression, *but she shall be saved*, evidently stands opposed to, *was in transgression*. And the apostle says, *she shall be saved*, not for the purpose of consoling the women on account of their sin, but of showing them the way by which they may attain to the mark reached by every Christian; they have simply to abide within the sphere assigned to them (Gen. iii. 16.) The emphasis lies on *διά τῆς τεκνογονίας*. But the apostle adds, *if they continue*, &c., to prevent the misunderstanding that this of itself could effect anything. *Μείνωσι* in respect to the sense refers to *γυνή*, not to *τέκνα*, which proceed from the *τεκνογ.*, "while *γυνή* stands for women in general."—Winer, § 47, 1, p. 415. The conduct of the children could not in such a way be made a condition of the mother's salvation. Corresponding to i. 5, the apostle here mentions *faith* and *love* as the fundamental conditions of salvation. The special reference in our passage induces him to add the words, *in holiness with discretion*. *Ἁγιασμός*, not specially castitas, but holiness, as Rom. vi. 19, 22, &c. *Σωφροσύνη*, comp. on Tit. i. 8, denotes what befits the mens sana, doubtless not without a retrospective reference to the presuming forwardness which is rebuked in ver. 11. With regard to the contradiction which some have found in this passage (on account of the *διά τῆς τεκνογ.*) with 1 Cor. vii. 7, ss., 25, ss., 38, ss., comp. on v. 14.

§ 2. DIRECTIONS TO TIMOTHY WITH REGARD TO THE REGULATION OF THE CHURCH.

B. REGARDING THE OFFICES OF PRESBYTER AND DEACON.

(Chap. iii. 1—13.)

The writer now turns to another department of the regulation of the church. He states in vv. 1—7 the qualifications of the bishops,—in vv. 8—13 those of the deacons and deaconesses. The connection here is simple and clear, and even Schleiermacher gives the writer credit for having preserved the connection uninterrupted throughout these thirteen verses.—In this section our epistle bears most similarity to that to Titus, comp. i. 6, ss. Some have allowed themselves to be betrayed by this similarity into the supposition that Timothy's commission, like that of Titus, was to set up for the first time church government in Ephesus, according to which our epistle must have been written previous to the event of which we have an account in Acts xx. 17, ss. "This supposition," observes Schleiermacher with truth, "is clearly wrong, and is an idea which has just been transferred from the epistle to Titus to this epistle. We find nothing in the epistle in favour of it, all that we find here is, directions as to what is to be done when any one deserves to be promoted to an office of the church. These directions then are given in case a vacancy should occur, or the number of office-bearers should require to be increased, or if you will, in reference to the churches in process of formation in the neighbourhood of the chief city." The existence of presbyters, as De Wette observes, even of presbyters who taught, v. 17, 19, is presupposed, and a church which had an institution for widows in connection with it, must, beyond question, have been fully organized. Even Neander's conjecture (p. 540), does not appear to me well founded, namely, that such disorders had arisen in the church as rendered a new organization necessary in many respects, the deposition of many who had hitherto presided over churches, and the appointment of others. For I neither think myself justified by what is said of the false teachers in supposing that they exercised such a disturbing influence, nor do I find any trace of directions having respect to

a new organization, nor anything about the deposition of presbyters and deacons. Paul writes, as we learn from iii. 15, for the purpose of letting Timothy know how he is to conduct himself in the house of God, *i. e.*, as the immediate context shows, how he is to act in the appointment of ecclesiastical office-bearers,—and why not also what he is to require of those who have been already ordained? These directions, as we find in iii. 14, 15, are given with the view of making provision for a period of an uncertain length, it may be longer or shorter according to circumstances. What ground for surprise, then, is there in the fact, that instructions are given to Timothy with reference to this subject also, which is of so great importance to the prosperity of the church?—Do these remarks suffice to show, that we have before us in this epistle a writer, of whom it must be admitted, in comparing this with the epistle to Titus, that he keeps in view the historical difference in the circumstances peculiar to each, there still, however, remains another point in connection with this which requires consideration, namely, that only in this epistle is anything said of deacons, while in the epistle to Titus no mention is made of them. As the epistle to Titus deals with those who, although they had long been Christians, had not yet been formed into a church, so, on the other hand, our epistle has to do with a church which had been long in existence, and was fully organized. The former therefore treats of the setting up of the office, without which, church-fellowship cannot subsist, that, namely, of the presbyter; in our present epistle, on the contrary, the office of deacon also as well as an institution for widows has been already called into existence, by the wants which have become felt in the course of a longer continuance. This circumstance, as has already been noticed in connection with the epistle to Titus, is of great importance to a right understanding of the nature of the diaconate, which must by no means be placed on a level with the office of presbyter, and regarded as equally necessary and universal with it. I would refer to the excellent observations on this subject in the Zeitschrift für Protest. u. Kirche, Sept. 1849, p. 140, ss., where it is said with truth, "There were only two offices for the administration of the Christian church—1, the apostolic, for the administration of the whole; 2, the presbyterial, for the individual congregations. The diaconate which was called forth by a necessity (Acts vi. 1), was by no means an essential part of the

ecclesiastical constitution. What we at present need is the *service* of the deacon, not the *office*."

With respect now to the qualifications required of a presbyter, as also of a deacon, it is alleged that here also, as in the epistle to Titus, instead of a treasury of striking and weighty directions, we find only such qualifications as any one might have suggested, with the exception of two, those, namely, in ver. 2 and ver. 6; comp. De Wette, p. 61. He has not mentioned here what other qualifications he would have expected, as he has done in the epistle to Titus. Instructions and counsels "for the management of the church" we have no right to expect, for the words of iii. 1, *if any one desire the office of a bishop*, intimate that it is ordination and the qualifications for it that are spoken of. The only fault then that can be found is, that other qualifications have not been mentioned. But was it necessary for the apostle at this stage to tell Timothy, as De Wette thinks he should have told Titus, to look out for enthusiastic adherents of the gospel, who were warm and zealous in the faith? I apprehend that this must have been self-evident to Timothy if anything was. Or are we to maintain, that the apostle ought to have taken more into consideration the measure of Christian knowledge, gifts of teaching, &c.? But we have no right all at once to suppose, that the presbyter of the first Christian church was necessarily a teacher, although it may have become him to be *apt to teach*, iii. 2; v. 17. It appears to me that great wisdom lies beneath the moderate character of the qualifications here specified. What safer criterion could be applied to the candidate for the presbyter's office than just the nature of his life hitherto, and the Christian influence which he exercises in the circle of his family? And what can be of greater moment in him who is to preside over others and to enlighten them, than the opinion which they entertain of him and his moral integrity, especially in those things in regard to which the state of the church will devolve upon him the duty of making a vigorous opposition to them? In the present state of the church, if the ordination of presbyters were treated of, it would be necessary first of all to require that he who is to preside over a Christian congregation should profess the faith of the church to which this congregation belongs; but, apart from this, what other qualifications could be more suitable than those here enumerated, in so far as these require, that he who is to rule

others must first have proved that he knows how to rule himself and those immediately belonging to him? Moreover, the criticism to which we are opposed itself admits that in vv. 2 and 6 (and why not also ver. 7?) qualifications are named which every one could not suggest. With regard to particulars, see the interpretation and the remarks at the conclusion, ver. 7.

Ver. 1. *It is a faithful saying*, as at i. 15, comp. on Tit. iii. 8, does not belong to what precedes, because, as Mack observes, when this formula refers to what goes before, it never stands separated in this way from what it belongs to. Besides, what immediately precedes has not enough of the character of a universal proposition to render this formula suitable as applied to it. Neander (I., p. 539) characterizes the sudden transition here as unpauline. The passage makes no other impression upon me in this respect than 1 Cor. vi. 1, 12, vii. 1, &c. The abruptness of the transition is just a proof that the apostle enters upon a new subject with the perfect consciousness of its being so. On the πιστὸς ὁ λόγος, De Wette observes that it here introduces not, as elsewhere, a maxim of faith, but a maxim of experience. But I would hesitate to call what follows a maxim of experience, for if the apostle had farther confirmed the saying, he would assuredly have done so by a reference to doctrine; it rests, therefore, on a basis of doctrine, and on this very account the formula πιστὸς ὁ λόγος need not surprise. The reading ἀνθρώπινος instead of πιστός deserves no consideration. The saying which the formula introduces runs thus: *if one desire the office of a bishop he desires a good work.* On ἐπισκοπή, comp. Acts i. 20 = the office of an overseer. That πρεσβύτερος and ἐπίσκοπος originally denoted the same offices of the church has already been shown on Tit. i. 5, and in the General Introduction. The expression ὀρέγεσθαι, properly "to stretch one's self out," besides at vi. 10, occurs again only at Heb. xi. 16, and the corresponding ὄρεξις is used by the apostle only again at Rom. i. 27. It is by no means necessary to understand καλὸν ἔργον—as Schleiermacher does out of prejudice—to denote res bona; it signifies, as usual, "a good work." For we may well suppose that the ἔργον here expresses some duty to be performed, as it refers to ἐπισκοπή, which denotes the official duties belonging to an ἐπίσκοπος. He who aims at such official duties desires a good work; the phrase is, therefore, substantially the

same as in Phil. i. 6, 1 Thess. v. 18, and in other passages of the Pastoral Epistles. That such a thing was known at that time as striving for the office of a bishop is generally doubted by the critics. But if from the very first, the bishops were chosen, and did not assume the office of themselves, one cannot see how, after a ten years' existence of Christianity in Ephesus, the desire may not have been entertained by many to take part in the administration of the church as bishops. Comp. Jam. iii. 1 (Baumgarten.) There is nothing either in the expression *ὀρέγεσθαι* in itself, or in *καλοῦ ἔργου*, as Matthies has already observed, to render necessary the supposition of there having been any ambitious rivalry and competition for the office. If the apostle had had in view such as were not called, and whom he would keep back from the office, he would certainly have used a different epithet, such as *δυσκόλου*, or some other pointing to the responsibility connected with it, ver. 2, ss. Here follow the personal qualifications for this office, vv. 2—7, which almost entirely coincide with those mentioned in Tit. i. 6, ss.; we refer therefore to that passage for the exposition, and notice here only what is peculiar to our present passage. On the whole subject, see on ver. 7. *Δεῖ οὖν*, thus the apostle begins, these words being placed emphatically before what follows, just as the *δεῖ γάρ* in Tit. i. 7. *Οὖν* as an inference from *καλοῦ ἔργου*, and not merely as connecting what follows with the preceding. The excellence and dignity of the office do not consist with moral turpitude on the part of the office-bearer. *Ἀνεπίλημπτον*, properly, "one against whom nothing can be laid," occurs only in our epistle, comp. however *ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι* in Luke xx. 20. The word is not unusual elsewhere, comp. Wahl. Passow. And Planck well observes, that the term *ἄμωμος*, to which Schleiermacher refers, is used by the apostle likewise only in the two contemporary epistles to the Ephesians and the Colossians, and in these occurs several times. We may learn from this predicate being placed first, what is the true point of view from which the whole passage should be considered; comp. on Tit. i. 6. We find here, as there, that the stress is laid on the moral repute in which the person to be chosen is held among those over whom he is to preside. He must stand pure and blameless, free especially from the reigning vices, if he is to be able rightly to fulfil the duties of his office. Here also, as in the passage in Titus to which we have referred,

it appears to me that the emphasis which is laid on the qualification, *husband of one wife*, is to be explained by the regard which is had to the prevailing opinions on morality. Comp. on Tit. Olshausen is also of the same opinion. On the import of this qualification, which can be explained only of second marriage, as Olshausen also thinks, Schleiermacher's prejudice against our epistle, as Dr Baur has already observed, becomes very glaring. In Tit. i. 6, according to Schleiermacher, we have no reason to understand the words otherwise than of polygamy, properly so called; here, on the other hand, they must, on account of v. 9, be understood of deuterogamy. The latter assertion is certainly correct; but if the words are to be so understood here, there can be no reason for explaining them differently in Tit. i. 6; and if the necessity of explaining the words of second marriage in our epistle is to be taken as a mark of spuriousness, this applies to the epistle to Titus, as well as to the first epistle to Timothy (Baur, p. 115.) We have already said all that is necessary on this subject in connection with the corresponding passage on Titus. The farther qualifications which are mentioned, and which for the most part are of a more external kind, are also to be explained from the same point of view, and with reference to the prevailing faults and vices. *Νηφάλιος* is taken in a metaphorical sense by some, so Chrysostom, *νηφάλιον, τουτέστι διορατικὸν μυρίους ἔχοντα πάντοτε ὀφθαλμούς*, &c., and Theodoret. But we do not find it used any where else in this special reference to the office, comp. ver. 11; Tit. ii. 2; rather in the metaphorical sense it would be "sober = prudent, discreet, in the general sense" (Matthies). In ver 11, compared with Tit. ii. 3, the term is certainly to be understood in its literal sense, yet it appears to me more natural to understand it here in the sense of spiritual sobriety, especially as in ver. 3 we find the qualification, *not given to wine*. Olshausen differently. On *σώφρων*, Tit. i. 8. *Κόσμιος* occurs here again only at ii. 9: *καὶ φθέγματι καὶ σχήματι καὶ βλέμματι καὶ βαδίσματι· ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦ σώματος φαίνεσθαι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς σωφροσύνην*, Theodoret; thus = steady, well-behaved. *Φιλόξενος*, as in Tit. i. 8. *Διδακτικός* corresponding to the qualification in Tit. i. 9; the word again occurs only in Tim. ii. 24. In what respects we may regard this as a feature which points to a late period of the apostle's labours, comp. the General Introduction, § 4. I do not see what

objections can be brought against the qualifications of a bishop mentioned in ver. 2, when regarded from the point of view which we have shown above as that in which they ought to be regarded. Taken together they present the picture of a worthy overseer.

In the negative qualifications which follow in ver. 3, and which might appear to have too much of a merely external and self-evident character, it will be perceived that there is a reference to prevailing faults which are therefore particularly specified, as is also the case in the epistle to Titus i. 7: *not given to wine, no striker*—the second as the consequence of the first. There is no necessity to understand by πλήκτης, a fighter, it denotes here only one who is given to quarrelling and scolding; comp. Passow. Πάροινος with the accessary signification of "impudent," one who gives offence when under intoxication. Μὴ αἰσχροκερδῆ is a gloss. The qualifications ἐπιεικῆ and ἄμαχον are placed in opposition to μὴ πλήκτην, comp. on Tit. iii. 2. *Not covetous* belongs to the series of predicates introduced by the particle *not*, and is therefore not to be joined with those forming the contrast introduced by *but*. The expression occurs again in Heb. xiii. 5.

Vv. 4, 5. Besides the moral qualities which have respect to himself personally, regard is also to be had, as in Tit. i. 6, to his character relatively to those belonging to him,—his qualities as the head of a family. The Christian influence which he is able to exercise in his own house will show to what extent a successful influence on the house of God may be expected from him. *His own* is therefore to be understood in opposition to the house of God; comp. ver. 15. Οἶκος comprehends all the members of his house, also his servants; comp. ver. 12. It is added specifically, *having his children in subjection*, &c. Ἔχοντα here is explained by some as = holding, and in this case, the words μετὰ πάσης σεμνότητος are referred to the father. So Wegscheider, Heydenreich, and Matthies. Others, as Leo, Mack, De Wette, understand ἔχοντα as = having, and refer μετά to the children. The parallel passage in Tit. i. 6 is in favour of the latter, against which neither the expression σεμνότης nor the μετά—not ἐν—is decisive, as De Wette remarks, appealing to ii. 2, ii. 15, vi. 6. Ἔχοντα is then the consequence of *ruling well*, and σεμνότης, propriety of conduct, as in ii. 2, denotes the fruit in which his influence is to be perceived.

Ver. 5 shows why this particular quality deserves a special consideration, by an inference a minori ad majus. How shall he who knows not how to rule his own house take care of the church of God? It is plain that the apostle here places on the same footing the capacity for both of these duties, that, namely, of ruling one's own house, and taking care of the church. That which qualifies for ruling one's own house qualifies also for an efficient discharge of official duties. Hence the inference from the one to the other. The office only gives a wider sphere of active duty, but it is the same energy of a Christianly moral character that must be brought into exercise here, as in the narrower sphere of the family. The exact opposite of the idea here expressed is, the abstract separation between the office and the person Δέ, "the sentence is parenthetically opposed to the ruling well his own house," Winer, § 57, 8, p. 531. The antithesis to ἴδιος is here clearly expressed by *church of God*, comp. with ver. 15. Ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, again at Luke x. 34, 35.

Ver. 6. Two qualifications are mentioned in vers. 6 and 7 which do not occur in the epistle to Titus—μὴ νεόφυτον, still dependent on the δεῖ, ver. 2, and also, that the person to be chosen must have a good report of those that are without the Christian church. The word νεόφυτος, which became a standing expression in the later ecclesiastical usage, is found only here in the New Testament; literally it means recently planted, in the Sept. The figure, used of the νεοκατήχητος (Chrysostom), or νεοβάπτιστος (Theophylact), naturally suggests passages such as 1 Cor. iii. 6, s.; ἐγὼ ἐφύτευσα, according to which the Christian church is represented as a planting of God; comp. 1 Cor. iii. 9; Rom. vi. 5, xi. 7. We have therefore not much reason for being surprised at the word before us when the apostle designates his own apostolical labour by the word φυτεύειν. But there is greater reason for surprise, says Schleiermacher, at the requirement itself; for how could Paul contrive to make no νεοτελής a bishop in any of those many churches which he often planted hastily one after another on a journey. This might have been possible, he says, twenty years later. Why then may it not have been so ten years later? And what the apostle writes to Timothy with special reference to Ephesus, where Christianity had existed for some length of time, is not to be held as an inviolable rule for all cases. Matthies has already expressed himself to the same effect, and referred to the circumstance that this particular

rule is wanting in the epistle to Titus. "But," replies De Wette, "the rules are laid down in quite a general form." They will therefore apply everywhere where the circumstances are the same. It is well known that the church adhered to the rule here prescribed, comp. Canon Ap. 80. Why a neophyte is not to be made a bishop is shown in the words which follow, *ἵνα μὴ τυφωθεὶς*, &c. The expression *τυφοῦσθαι*, from *τῦφος*, smoke, vapour, = fastus, Pol. xvi. 22, 4; 3 Macc. iii. 18 (Wahl), literally, surrounded with fog, only again at vi. 4, and 2 Tim. iii. 4. Huther renders it "stupid pride," and refers to vi. 4. It occurs elsewhere in this sense; comp. Passow, and what is said in the General Introduction, § 4. In the following words, *εἰς κρίμα διαβόλου*, the comparison of ver. 7, and 2 Tim. ii. 26, makes it certain, that by *ὁ διάβολος* is to be understood not the calumniator in general, but the calumniator *κατ' ἐξοχήν* = הַשָּׂטָן. Comp. also Harless on Eph. iv. 27; "*ὁ διάβολος* is used by the apostle only as an appellation of the devil." *Κρίμα* never occurs in the sense of "accusation," in which some would take it here, understanding *τοῦ διαβόλου* as the genitive of the subject, but always denotes causa, or decretum, or judicium. Here it can denote only the last of these. In this case *τοῦ διαβ.* is not to be taken as the genitive of the subject, for *κρίνειν* is not an affair belonging to the *διάβολος*, but as many of the older and more recent commentators have done (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Bengel, Heydenreich, Leo, Mack), it is to be understood in an objective sense, against which the fact of *τοῦ διαβ.* being used subjectively in ver. 7 is not decisive, as De Wette maintains it to be. It is the same judgment in consequence of the same fall; comp. 2 Pet. ii. 4; Jude 6. So also Olshausen. The omission of the article, which Matthies brings as an objection, is explained as in many other passages, by the more special determination of the term in the words which follow, Winer, § 18, 2 b. p. 142. *Κρίμα* not differently here from Rom. ii. 2, iii. 8, xiii. 2; Gal. v. 10. In the passage Rom. iii. 8, *κρίμα* is in the same manner as here, connected with the genitive of the object. Huther understands *τοῦ διαβόλου* on account of ver. 7 as the genitive of the subject.

Ver. 7. Another special qualification, likewise mentioned only here, is the good reputation among those without the church. In the epistle to Titus (chap. ii.), it is urged as a duty on all the

members of the church to commend the gospel by their conduct; but no special application of this injunction is made to the ἐπίσκοπος. Αὐτόν is to be cancelled according to critical authorities (comp. Tischendorf.) *To have a good report;* the apostle ascertained this with respect to Timothy himself ere he connected himself with him, Acts xvi. 2. Καί introduces the new quality which must still be added to those already enumerated. Οἱ ἔξωθεν—elsewhere οἱ ἔξω (1 Cor. v. 12, s.; Col. iv. 5; 1 Thess. iv. 12), is used by the apostle; the same expression as we have here is found also in Luke xi. 39, s.; 1 Pet. iii. 3 (De Wette.) This rule is also explained by a ἵνα μή. "Lest he should fall into reproach, and into the snare of the devil." Εἰς not being repeated, might lead us to suppose that ὀνειδισμός is also to be connected with τοῦ διαβ., according to which the devil is represented as the author of the reproaches which are brought against the bishop, especially, as the context shows, by *those that are without.* But this circumstance is not decisive, and the ἐμπέσῃ which is interposed, renders the independent construction of ὀνειδισμός more natural. It would also be difficult to point to a passage where, in like manner as here, the devil is represented as the immediate author of that which is done by others. There is some difficulty connected with the more exact determination of the sense of the following words, namely, παγὶς τοῦ διαβ., and the relation of these words to ὀνειδισμός. Is the *reproach* itself the *snare?* Or is the *reproach* the occasion of *falling into the snare?* Or are both to be taken as independent—the reproach and the snare? Against the first is the general usage of the expression, according to which a subjective state is always denoted by it, 2 Tim. ii. 6; also 1 Tim. vi. 9. The apostle describes one who has passed out of his former life of sin, and is therefore no longer in the snare of the devil, inasmuch as he speaks of a *falling into the snare.* If now, such an one is calumniated in consequence of his previous life, he does not, eo ipso, fall again into the snare, if he is not thereby led away from the new life of the spirit. Thus the reproach is not itself the *snare.* But the third of the above explanations, that, namely, according to which both are to be taken as independent of each other, will also not admit of being vindicated. For the close connection in which they stand will not consist with it. Ὀνειδισμός will therefore have to be understood as the *possible occasion* of falling into the snare.

It is not, however, the vexation produced by the reproach (Heydenreich), nor the revenge thereby awakened (Grotius), which leads into the snare, but the *reproach* itself, the continual upbraiding with former sins. This indeed may, in the case of one who has been truly converted, have the effect of leading to a more zealous striving after holiness; but it may easily also have the contrary effect, of leading him who finds himself pursued and surrounded by his former sins and stripped of his reputation, to become in the end morally indolent, to give himself over to his former sins, and to become as bad really as is his reputation. Quid enim spei restat, si nullius peccati pudor? (Calvin.) It is this case, so easily possible, which the apostle has here in his eye. The connection with ὀνειδισμός is less regarded in Theodoret's explanation, which is followed by Matthies: ὁ γὰρ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνοις πλείστην ἔχων πρὸ τῆς χειροτονίας διαβολὴν ἐπονείδιστος ἔσται καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνείδεσι περιβαλεῖ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν προτέραν ὅτι τάχιστα παλινδρομήσει παρονομίαν, τοῦ διαβόλου πάντα πρὸς τοῦτο μηχανωμένου. So also Olshausen, who gives especial prominence to the circumstance of the possibility of being led away.— If now we review the order in which the qualifications of a bishop are enumerated, we find that in ver. 2 are mentioned those positive moral qualities of the most general description which it becomes a bishop to have; in ver. 3 the faults from which he must be free; and in vv. 4, 5, and 6, certain other rules are given which have a special reference to the choice of a bishop. Our epistle has much in common with that to Titus, and yet, as a comparison will show, it is quite free and independent. We have already spoken of the objection, that we have here for the most part only moral qualities of a general kind, and but few which refer specially to the ἐπίσκοπος. I would add here only Olshausen's explanation of this point, who observes, that the objection may be obviated by the following considerations: 1, that the description of the bishop bears an antithetical reference to the character of the heretics; 2, that the apostle pre-supposes, in those persons who fill offices of the church, the peculiar gifts which they need as secured through the χαρίσματα. That this was in the apostle's mind is evident from 1 Tim. iv. 14. I think, with Neander, that there may be perceived in the epistle a falling back of the χαρίσματα to a considerable extent, on account of which the choice of the office-bearer would be more

difficult. The apostle, as I apprehend, takes for granted the presence of true faith in the bishop, or rather he desires, at the same time, the evidence of this in the life. Moreover, it may be shown, that beneath those moral qualifications also that are of a more general kind, there lies a special reference to the *bishop*. There is a special reason, for example, that a bishop should be *unblameable;* the qualification, *husband of one wife*, professedly implies a special reference to the bishop, for this is not required of all. And do not νηφάλιος (spiritually sober), σώφρων, κόσμιος, denote qualities such as especially befit a bishop, who would unite in himself moderation and respect, outwardly as well as inwardly? Why a bishop should in an especial manner be *given to hospitality* will at once appear from the circumstances of the earliest period of the church. *Apt to teach*, also applies to him, qua ἐπίσκοπος. On ver. 3 comp. above. And in vv. 4—7 we have solely qualifications which bear a special reference to the bishop, or rather to him who is to fill an office in the church, as we shall afterwards find the same also required of the deacon.

Ver. 8, ss. Here follow, in like manner, the qualifications of a deacon. "But what say you to this," asks Schleiermacher, "that this epistle makes two descriptions out of the one in the epistle of Titus, one of the bishop and another of the deacon?" We say, in the first place, that we have no difficulty in understanding why, in the epistle which has regard to the circumstances of the church in Ephesus which had already been in existence for some length of time, mention should be made, not merely of presbyters, but also of deacons; and we consider this circumstance as a favourable mark of the genuineness of the epistle. Comp. above and the General Introduction. We say further, that there also, as well as in what precedes, the writer shows himself to be in great measure independent of the epistle to Titus; and we have by no means a mere duplicate of the description in Tit. i. 6, ss. For that the deacon as well as the bishop must be free from the prevailing vices of intemperance and avarice, seems very natural, and that from him as a servant of the church it should be required, that he be the *husband of one wife*, and be able to rule well his own house, cannot surprise us, after what has already been said on these qualities. In addition to these, however, we find several other things required of the deacon which are neither a repetition

of what is said with reference to the bishop here, nor of what is said at Tit. i. 6. But how far the qualifications of a deacon here given are suitable will be shown in the exposition, and at the conclusion of the section.

In Acts vi. 1, ss., we find the necessary information as to the origin of the diaconal office, its name, and its sphere of duty. We see there plainly, that this office owes its origin to a necessity which first arose with the extension of the Christian church; hence it is that no mention is made of it in the epistle to Titus; comp. what has already been said on this point above. With respect to the *name*, although it does not occur in that passage in the Acts of the Apostles, its origin is doubtless to be traced to the expressions *διακονεῖν τραπέζαις*, and *διακονία* in vv. 1 and 2. The *sphere* of this office is also marked out in its being distinguished from the *διακονία τοῦ λόγου* and *προσευχή*, ver. 4, as consisting in the care of the poor, with which also the care of the sick and of strangers came gradually to be connected. Comp. on the subject Winer's RWB., in which also will be found the further literature connected with it, and Neander apostol. Zeitalter I. p. 47, ss. The name *διάκονος* occurs again in the New Testament only at Phil. i. 1, and Rom. xvi. 1, in the latter passage as an appellation of Phœbe, hence = deaconess.—Among the qualifications here enumerated, that of moral propriety of conduct in general, stands first (Tit. ii. 2.) The apostle does not mean by this, a qualification having a characteristic reference to the deacon; he only means to say, that he who is to fill the office of a deacon in the church must, above all, be a true Christian, whose moral conduct bears testimony to his Christianity. He then mentions certain prevailing vices from which a deacon must be free. Two of these are the same as have already been specified in ver. 3, with reference to the bishop, namely, *not given to much wine, not covetous*. So also Tit. i. 7. On *προσέχειν* = "to be given to," see on Tit. i. 14. Before these two, however, stands one qualification at which the critics have stumbled so much—*μὴ διλόγους*. The word nowhere else occurs in the New Testament, nor is it found in the Septuagint. The sense of *repetition*, in which it is used by Diodorus Siculus and Xenophon, is not suitable here. On the other hand, the analogous expression, *δίψυχος*, which we find in Jam. i. 8, iv. 8, and the still more kindred expression, *δίγλωσσος*, in the Septuagint, Prov. xi.

13, may be referred to. *Μὴ διλόγους τουτέστι· μὴ ὑπούλους μηδὲ δολερούς*, observes Chrysostom—*μὴ ἕτερα μὲν τούτῳ ἕτερα δὲ ἐκείνῳ λέγοντας*, Theodoret. The prominence which is given to this quality is to be explained by the extensive personal intercourse which the deacon would have with the members of the church; comp. Mack. on ver. 8.

Ver. 9. The apostle farther requires of deacons that they hold the mystery of the faith in a pure conscience; comp. i. 19. In the expression, *mystery of the faith*,—as the similar one, *mystery of godliness* ver. 6 shows,—*faith* is to be understood subjectively: in quo fidem collocamus, Wahl.) So also De Wette. On *μυστήριον* comp. Rom. xvi. 25; Eph. iii. 3; Col. i. 26, 27, &c. Comp. Harless p. 35: *mystery*, inasmuch as it was known by no man until God himself revealed it. But Harless admits (p. 510, on Eph. v. 32,) that the word has still another signification, according to which, the idea of mystery refers not merely to the manner of its revelation, but to the thing itself. In this latter sense it must be understood in iii. 16, (comp.); therefore also in the same sense here. So Planck, Leo. Schleiermacher has remarked on this passage, that the deacons were precisely those who had least to do with the *mystery of the faith*. However, this qualification is not to be understood as implying that the preaching of the gospel was the vocation of the deacon as such, (although Stephen and Philip were also evangelists, this was in no way connected with their office as deacons,) but as a qualification which is required of every Christian, especially of those who undertake an office in the church; comp. i. 5. The emphasis rests on the words, *in a pure conscience*, which are to be understood, as De Wette has already observed, in a general sense, not with special reference to the fulfilment of the office.

Ver. 10. But these also, continues the writer, must first be proved, then may they serve, (administer the office of a deacon), if they are blameless. (Huther: *καὶ*—*δέ* as the connecting particle.) The trial to which the future deacon was to be subjected, consisted not in a period of probation, but in a previous inquiry as to whether the requisite qualifications, laid down by the apostle, were found in him, as is evident from the expression, *being blameless*, which denotes the result of the inquiry. In the later practice of the church the trial was made by the presbytery, (Constitt. ap. viii. 4); comp.

De Wette. Agreeably to the position which Timothy occupied, it was principally his duty to take care that unworthy persons should not be admitted; on the disappearance of such an office as he exercised, the duty naturally devolved on the presbytery.

Ver. 11. *Even so must the women*, &c. What women are here meant? Christian women in general cannot be meant in this connection. The view also which Mack and Wieseler (p. 309), have most recently defended, namely, that it is the wives of the superintendents and deacons that are meant, contradicts the order, according to which the rules which refer to the ἐπίσκοπος are ended at ver. 7, as ver. 8 shows, and at ver. 12 the deacons are again spoken of. Agreeably to the context, the expression must be understood either of the wives of the deacons, or of deaconesses. The latter view is taken by Chrysostom, Theophylact, and others, most recently by De Wette, while Matthies, and also Olshausen, understand the wives of the deacons as meant. So also Huther. But it is difficult to see why special rules should be laid down with respect to these, and not also with respect to the wives of the overseers, unless it be supposed that the wives of the deacons were deaconesses. Again, if it is the wives of the deacons that are meant, the omission of the αὐτῶν is strange, as well as the particle ὡσαύτως, which the apostle uses in the same way, as here also in ver. 8, and elsewhere in ii. 9; Tit. i. 3, 6, to denote the transition to rules for another class of persons. Further, although the repetition of διάκονοι, ver. 12, is not surprising even on the supposition that by γυναῖκες are meant the wives of the deacons, seeing that the subject required to be named anew after the γυναῖκες, yet the construction as a whole, is strange. For, as ver. 12 still speaks of the domestic relations of the deacon, any rule regarding their wives would have found a much more suitable place here in relation to the deacon himself, since it is altogether unsuitable that such should stand by itself, and without any reference to the deacon. I am not inclined, however, to lay any weight on the expression, *faithful in all things*, as is done by De Wette and others, who oppose the application of the words to the wives of the deacons; for even although deaconesses were meant, this characteristic could still not be referred to fidelity in the discharge of the duties of their office, but must be understood as a condition of their being appointed to office. When to this it is added, that the apostle could not, from a regard to perspi-

cuity, employ the word διάκονος here, which he uses of the deaconesses in Rom. xvi. 1; further, that it may be presumed there were deaconesses in Ephesus, and that no mention is made of them at all (not even in chap. v.) if they are not meant here; that on the supposition of deaconesses being meant, chap. iii. embraces in due proportion all the persons in the service of the church,—when these things are taken together it will scarcely admit of a doubt, tha γυναῖκες is here to be understood of deaconesses. The apostle having specified the moral qualifications of a deacon, is led by the homogeneousness of the office to connect with these such as are proper to deaconesses. Here also he puts σεμνάς first, as in ver. 8 with respect to the deacons; the μὴ διαβόλους answers to the μὴ διλόγους, and is certainly more suitable to the female sex (Tit. ii. 3.) Then follows *sober*, corresponding to *not given to much wine*, ver. 8, and therefore to be understood here of sobriety in the literal sense, comp. Tit. iii. 2. Lastly, the *faithful in all things* is a comprehensive expression, answering to the *not covetous*, &c., so that it is evident the apostle demands the same qualifications in regard to the female deacons, only with the partial modifications arising from their sex. And it is just this circumstance,—namely, that the qualifications are substantially the same,—which has led the apostle to mention the female deacons in this place. In ver. 12 he turns again to the male deacons, and in respect to their household relations lays down the same conditions as he has laid down in the epistle to Titus with respect to the bishop; and here also, in ii. 2, 4, conditions which apply to every one who would fill an office in the church.—The expression, *faithful in all things*, observes De Wette, against Matthies, may suitably be limited to the various duties of the deaconesses. But it is the conditions prerequisite to the appointment to the office that are here spoken of, and therefore this limitation is not at all necessary. The being faithful in all things rather appears to me to be a summary expression, substantially answering to the *not greedy of filthy lucre*, ver. 8, and to what is said in ver. 9; "faithful in all the things of life as well as of faith," is what is meant.

On ver. 12 comp. ver. 2 and 4. Schleiermacher's doubts arising from the shock which the connection suffers in ver. 11, might now be regarded as disappearing of themselves, although he thinks that the interruption is not so great if only deaconesses are not

understood as meant. If now we review the qualifications here prescribed with reference to the deacons, it must certainly be admitted that here, in like manner as in vv. 1—7, it is not so much the specific qualities of a deacon that are given, as the description of a Christian in general, such as must first be presupposed, especially in him who would undertake the office of a deacon. Planck has already observed rightly, that the apostle intends rather to mention the qualities which are to be looked for as the first condition of receiving office, than the special qualifications for the discharge of the duties of the office. As in general, in the Pastoral Epistles, emphasis is laid on the practical side of Christianity, in opposition to the so-called heretics, the same is also manifest here, whether it be, as Olshausen thinks, that the apostle takes for granted the possession of the *χάρισμα*, or whether it be that on the comparative withdrawal of the "gifts," he thinks that the safest criterion of future efficiency in the office is to be sought in the previous moral character of the person to be elected; it being presupposed that he was in other respects the man for the office, upon which the apostle says nothing further, because it must have appeared self-evident to Timothy that no one was to be made a deacon who possessed neither the disposition nor the talent for the peculiar duties of such an office. Nor is there much difference between what we find here and in Acts vi. *Wherefore, brethren, look ye out among you seven men of honest report,* say the apostles to the church, and thus, just as is done in our epistle, they give the first place to the general qualification of a good reputation, ver. 3. The expression, *full of the Holy Ghost,* also involves no special reference to the office; such a reference is apparent only in the qualification *full of wisdom;* and afterwards, in ver. 5, it is expressly said of Stephen that he was a *man full of faith and of the Holy Ghost,* by which, in like manner, no special qualification for the *διακονεῖν* is denoted. But with reference specially to the qualities mentioned in our epistle, it would not be difficult to point out also in them the reason why they are particularly required of a deacon. It is certainly not accidental merely, that in the case of the deacon less weight is laid on personal dignity than in the case of the bishop (comp. ver. 3, *κόσμιος*); it is enough for him that he be *σεμνός*; the *μὴ διλόγους*, also, is thought by Schleiermacher to be suitable, comp. above. The *holding the*

mystery of the faith, &c., when rightly understood, expresses only the qualification of a true faith having its root in the heart, in opposition to the merely pretended faith of those who taught otherwise. How could the deacon, whose whole work was to spring from true love to God and the brethren, be wanting in a true faith, without which a true love is not conceivable! The apostle, as Schleiermacher thinks, might certainly have added the qualifications expressed by the terms, *hospitable, a lover of good, just*. But how much would still have to be said besides, if the apostle had aimed at enumerating everything! It suffices him to lay down, in general, the qualification of moral propriety of conduct, with special allusion to the prevailing vices, and that of faith having its root in a pure conscience. And it may certainly be supposed that those who were found blameless in respect to the things mentioned, would not be deficient in those qualities referred to by Schleiermacher, nor in others equally important.

That qualifications so high are required in a deacon, is now confirmed in ver. 13, by a reference to the importance of this office, as shewn in the great personal success which a deacon, who has used his office well, may hope to reap; so also De Wette. *Οἱ γὰρ καλῶς διακονήσαντες*—the apostle then has in view the termination of the official course, as appears from his using the aorist; he represents the fruit which results to the deacon from a good service. This fruit he denotes by the words, *they purchase for themselves a good step and great boldness*, &c. If it is steadily kept in view, that the apostle intends here to specify the final reward which will assuredly accrue to every one who has administered the office well, it will be seen that he cannot mean by this, promotion to the higher office of a presbyter. Apart from the moral value of such a motive, the *καλόν* does not correspond well to it, as it would seem to imply that the office of a deacon was not also a good degree of honour, if indeed *βαθμός* is to be taken at all in this sense. We would expect, at least in this case, that the idea should have a comparative form. Nor does the aorist *διακονήσαντες* agree with this interpretation, since it represents the *περιποιοῦνται* as the result of the completed *διακονεῖν*. Farther, it is not to be conceived that the apostle holds out to every deacon the prospect of promotion to the office of a presbyter, and that, as the certain reward of his service, not to say that the idea of the offices, and their relation to each

other, which lies at the foundation of this view, is entirely unapostolical; comp. Mack on the passage, who justly refers against this view to passages such as 1 Cor. xii. 4—11; Rom. xii. 7, ss. "We find that even in the second century, the idea of moving upwards in the offices of the church is as yet unknown," Olshausen. And how unsuitable would the connection be, between this reference to the higher place of honour in the church which is to be attained, and the words *great boldness*, &c. Quite as inconsistent with the context of the passages, which points to the final reward to be obtained by him who faithfully discharges the duties of his office,—is that other view founded on a purely internal signification given to the expression *καλὸν βαθμὸν περιποιοῦνται*, and substantially the opposite of the preceding, according to which the expression is understood of a progress in the faith. Is it likely that the apostle should confirm the high qualifications which he lays down by saying, that the faithful fulfilment of the office brings along with it an increase of faith? The following *πολλὴν παῤῥησίαν* to which reference is made with *seeming* justice in support of the internal signification assigned to *βαθμόν*, is, as we shall afterwards see, quite to a different effect, and how different also is the idea in the kindred passage, vi. 19, *that they may lay hold on eternal life!* How unsuitable also to the expression in our passage is such an interpretation of a merely internal kind, and how little does its generality warrant our limiting it to faith! With more apparent correctness therefore have others—most recently Mack and Matthies, and also Olshausen[1]—explained the expression as denoting the influential position in the church which those only attain who use the office of a deacon well. The apostle is supposed, according to this interpretation, to have the welfare of the church in view in the qualifications which he lays down for the deacon. He prescribes qualifications of so high an order, it is said, because a deacon who has served well gains an influential position; much therefore (so we are to supply) of the welfare of the church depends on him. But in regard to this interpretation, the first thing that strikes one must be, that the reference to the church is not more clearly expressed in the passage; then the words *βαθμὸν ἑαυτοῖς*, &c., speak first of all of a reward for good service which the deacon himself is to ob-

1 Also Huther: he understands by *βαθμός* the estimation in which the person is held in the church, by *παῤῥησία* the joyous and confident freedom.

tain. Nor, as De Wette also observes, will the words, *and much boldness in the faith*, agree with this interpretation (comp. infra), and least of all the words, *they who have used well the office of a deacon*, according to which the apostle would say that he prescribes such high qualifications, because those deacons who fulfil their office well gain an influential position in the church; as if the apostle did not prescribe those qualifications because they are necessary in order to a faithful discharge of the duties of the office, but on account of the influence which such a fulfilment draws after it. If, however, it is said that the apostle intends to express the idea, that he prescribes conditions so strict because *only* one who has served well acquires authority and influence in the church, it will at once be perceived that this idea takes its rise from the arbitrarily inserted "only," and even then would the words, *they who have fulfilled the office of a deacon well*, remain unintelligible, for the apostle would in that case have used the present, as Mack and Matthies have done in their interpretation, with more propriety than the aorist which represents the βαθμὸν, &c., as the final result of the fulfilment of the office. If accordingly the passage can be understood neither of ecclesiastical preferment, nor of progress in the faith, nor finally, of ecclesiastical authority in general, the only interpretation which remains is that according to which καλὸν βαθμὸν denotes the result of a faithful performance of official duty in the personal salvation of the deacon; as modifications of this view again, some, as already Theodoret, understand by καλὸν βαθμὸν a high degree of blessedness, others a good hope of this; so De Wette following Heinrich. The καλ. βαθ. περιπ. then, denotes the sure final gain for every one who has served well; the aorist has thus its proper force; and the additional clause, *much boldness*, &c., agrees with this. For De Wette has already rightly observed, that παῤῥησία cannot signify candour in the statement of the Christian doctrine, as Heydenreich will have it, but as Mack and similarly also Matthies think, a firm standing forth for the truth and against error, as πίστις cannot be understood objectively either of the doctrine of faith or the things of faith, but only subjectively of that upon which the παῤῥησία rests. Παῤῥησία is rightly understood only in the sense of 1 John iii. 21; Heb. iv. 16: "confidence toward God," and hence that explanation of καλὸς βαθμὸς alone is correct which has been last adduced; and, in particular, De Wette prefers the latter mo-

dification of this view, according to which it is not a high degree of blessedness, but a good expectancy of this that is spoken of; in support of which he refers to the parallel passage, vi. 19. I entirely agree with De Wette in his opinion. *Παῤῥησία* denotes (comp. Harless on the Ephesians, p. 303) "the feeling of freedom and joyfulness entertained towards another person, especially one who acts as a judge." Such joyfulness which springs from faith, even the faith that results from fellowship with Christ, is the certain final gain of him who has administered the office of a deacon well. How unsuitable would this accessary clause be, if the apostle had already promised before a high degree of blessedness to the deacon; how suitable, on the other hand, does it appear, when *καλὸς βαθμὸς* denotes the good position towards God, so that *καὶ πολλήν*, &c., explains this indefinite expression in its subjective aspect. *Βαθμός*, properly step, threshold, &c., denotes here figuratively the degree of worth which one has obtained in the eye of God. The connection of the verb *περιποιεῖσθαι* (which does not correspond to the figure) with *βαθμός* is explained by the metaphorical use of the expression *βαθμός*. The word *περιποιεῖσθαι* occurs again only in Acts xx. 28, and is there used by the apostle; besides frequently *περιποίησις*, 1 Thess. v. 9; 2 Thess. ii. 14; Eph. i. 14; also Heb. x. 39, and in the New Testament only again at 1 Pet. ii. 9, so that we are at liberty to regard it as a genuine Pauline expression. On *ἑαυτοῖς*, along with the middle, comp. Winer, § 39, 6, p. 298.

§ 4. ADMONITIONS ADDRESSED TO TIMOTHY AS TEACHER IN THE PROSPECT OF THE FUTURE FALLING AWAY.

(Chap. iii. 14—iv. 16.)

The writer has here evidently arrived at a conclusion. What he has written is to serve as a rule to Timothy for his conduct in the office of representative of the apostle, which has been temporarily committed to him, in case the apostle himself should not so soon return to Ephesus. Instructions are given to Timothy to aid him in the fulfilment of the special commission which he undertook on being left behind in Ephesus. What the apostle now farther writes to him is therefore not instructions precisely of the same

kind. They are rather directions of a more general kind, as to how Timothy is to fulfil in general the vocation undertaken by him of a *servant of Jesus Christ*, ver. 6; although in these also, as was to be expected, the apostle keeps in view the special circumstances of Timothy. The point, therefore, which is treated of here is, what use Timothy is to make of the "gift" which has actually been committed to him, ver. 14. The transition to this lies in the designation of the *house of God* as the *church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth*, ver. 15, and in the mention of the *mystery of godliness*, ver. 16. With this is immediately connected what is said in iv. 1, ss., where the apostle, pointing to the falling away from the faith which threatens the future, vv. 1—5, shows Timothy what is his duty as a faithful servant of Jesus Christ in the prospect of such a danger, vv. 6—11, and how he is to perform this duty chiefly in his present circumstances, vv. 12—16. For it is of course understood, that Timothy is not to neglect his general calling as an evangelist in attending to his special commission, nor to allow the gift which has been committed to him to be useless. It is not therefore without reason, and merely because the writer has a liking to the theme (De Wette), that he comes again, in iv. 1, to speak anew of the heretics; nor are they the same heretics as the former, but others, and as such are expressly designated. The mention of these, however, forms the basis of the farther admonitions addressed to Timothy.

Ver. 14. "After the writer has maintained a connection throughout thirteen verses, the absence of such connection appears now all the more glaring, and we stumble now at almost every word," Schleiermacher, p. 196. At the words, *these things write I unto thee* we see no reason to stumble; as the conclusion of the preceding, they have, as we have seen, their appropriate place. Nor is there anything to stumble at in the following words, *hoping to come to thee sooner*. For Schleiermacher's opinion, that the apostle, at the time when he wrote the epistle, could not possibly entertain the purpose of coming to Ephesus, rests on the false supposition that the epistle was written at the period of which we have an account in Acts xx. 1; on which, comp. the Introd. But it is very strange to find him maintaining, that if the apostle actually had this purpose, then the most of the instructions given in this epistle were unnecessary, seeing that the apostle himself

says, *but if I should be delayed that thou mayest know*, &c.; the participle ἐλπίζων is, as the context shows, to be resolved thus, "although I hope;" comp. Winer, § 36, 3, p. 280. Τάχιον (other codd. have ἐν τάχει, which on internal grounds is the more improbable), is properly the comparative; the apostle hopes to come to him sooner than is presupposed in the instructions given to him, not, certainly, on account of ταῦτα, sooner than my epistle arrives. On the historical circumstances comp. the Introd.

Ver. 15. The apostle, however, foresees it also to be possible that he may remain longer away; hence he says, but if I delay that thou mayest know how thou oughtest to behave thyself in the house of God, &c. On οἶκος θεοῦ taken from the Old Testament (see Wahl), comp. 1 Cor. iii. 9, 16; 2 Cor. vi. 16; Eph. ii. 22; Heb. x. 21. On ἀναστρέφεσθαι, to walk, here = to conduct one's self, 2 Cor. i. 12; Eph. Heb. ii. 3; x. 33, xiii. 18. Schleiermacher has characterized this whole expression as not sufficiently appropriate to the instructions which have been given; comp. against this Heb. xiii. 18, and let it also be considered, that the general term ἀναστρεφέσθαι receives through its connection with ἐν οἴκῳ θεοῦ a definite reference to one who has been intrusted with superintendence and government in this house, (Heb. iii. 2, 5.) The accessary clause too, *which is the church*, &c., shows that the apostle in the words πῶς δεῖ—ἀναστρέφεσθαι means, not the duty of maintaining a consistent conduct as it applies to every Christian, but the special obligations resting on Timothy in consequence of the commission which he had undertaken. So also Olshausen: ἀναστρ. used of Timothy's conduct in the office. According to Huther σέ is not to be supplied, but ἀναστρ. is used quite generally. The words, *which is the church of the living God*, &c., also form at once the conclusion of the foregoing—inasmuch as they hold up before Timothy the greatness and importance of his office as *a servant of the house which is the church*, &c.,—and the transition to what follows, as is apparent chiefly in the words, *pillar and ground of the truth*. Therefore ἥτις is to be taken not merely as the simple relative, but as having a confirmatory reference to the preceding: as that which is, &c. The apostle designates the *house of God* as *the church of the living God*. What De Wette here observes is true, namely, that the concrete idea of the Ephesian church is extended to the universal idea of the church in general. The labour which is directed

towards a particular church, is service in the one great house of God to which every individual church belongs as a part, and every individual Christian as a stone of the building. In the expression, *church of the liviny God* (the Old Testament קְהַל יְהוָה), this *house of God* is designated according to its internal glory. On the expression ἐκκλησία comp. Olshausen on Matt. xvi. 18; 1 Cor. i. 2. The epithet *living* applied to *God*, the Heb. אֵל חַי, is explained by such passages as Acts xiv. 15; 2 Cor. vi. 16; 1 Thess. i. 9, &c.; it is the opposite of the θεοὶ νεκροὶ, μάταιοι, and the εἴδωλα. On the import of the relation expressed by the genitive, comp. the passage already adduced, 2 Cor. vi. 16: *for ye are the temple of the living God, as God hath said—I will dwell in them, and walk in them, and I will be their God. Pillar and ground of the truth.* These words are interpreted by some (till the 16th century by all, and by many of the more recent commentators, as Mack, Matthies, De Wette) as predicated of the *church*, by others (first of all in the Basle editions of the New Testament 1540, 1545, then by Bengel, Mosheim, Heinrichs, Wegscheider, Heydenreich, Flatt), as predicated of the *mystery of godliness*.[1] In the latter case, the words must be taken as the beginning of the following section (as already Bengel has done, and Olshausen also adopts this view), and would thus have a similar abruptness to the words iii. 4, *it is a faithful saying*, viewed as referring to the preceding. In this case the objection loses its force, namely, that if the words are to be understood as predicate of the following *mystery of godliness*, there is a want not merely of logical but also of grammatical connection. The ancient division of the chapters, too, makes a new section to begin with ver. 16 (comp. De Wette); and certainly it would suit better to take the words *pillar*, &c., as belonging to the new section, if, in general, the words could be fitly interpreted as predicate of the *mystery*. Schleiermacher indeed thinks, that it were very strange to name a particular truth such as is that which follows,—the pillar of all truth,—but against this De Wette maintains with good reason, that the words *pillar*, &c., form an appropriate predicate to *mystery*, since the historical Christ (ver. 16) is in reality the foundation of the Christian truth. He is not,

1 Comp. Mack on the passage, who traces this view to the principles of the Reformation, though Luther, Calvin, and Beza, are of opinion, that Protestantism comes into collision with this designation of the church; on which infra.

however, defending this interpretation. But it must be admitted that Schleiermacher is perfectly right in his other remark—that grammatically, two predicates such as *pillar* and *ground* do not well stand in the same series with the third epithet which is expressed by an adjective, *confessedly great*, and every writer would say: for the pillar of all truth is this confessedly great mystery, &c. De Wette quite agrees with Schleiermacher in this, and also refers to the grammatical difficulty implied in a weighty predicate, such as *pillar and ground*, being followed by a much weaker one, such as *confessedly great*.—If accordingly we adhere to the old interpretation, then the words *pillar and ground of the truth* are the predicate of *house of God*, which is designated as *the church of the living God*. So also Huther.—We find the word στῦλος used by the apostle in the same metaphorical sense again at Gal. ii. 9; it occurs besides in Rev. iii. 12. Wahl rightly: omne id, cui ut primario et prae ceteris insigni innititur aliquid. Thus in the passage first adduced, three of the apostles are called στῦλοι, as those upon whom the continuance of the Jewish Christian church depended; here the church is styled *pillar of the truth*, inasmuch as the continuance of this truth, its historical existence as Christian truth, rests on this—that there is a church which supports and preserves the word of truth. Without a church there would be no Christian truth on the earth; on the existence of the former rests therefore the existence of the latter upon earth. In it alone is truth, out of it error and lies; he who is devoted to the truth belongs eo ipso to the church, he who rejects it thereby shuts himself out of the church; comp. Mack, p. 281. Some have been embarrassed by the idea here expressed, on comparing it with other passages in which the apostle represents Christ as the alone ground of the truth; comp. 1 Cor. iii. 11, &c., in which the church is represented not as bearing up the truth, but rather as borne up by the truth, and the truth not as needing the church in order to its existence, but, on the contrary, the church as needing the truth in order to its existence. This arises, as Baumgarten (p. 246) has already aptly observed, from confounding the truth as it is in itself, with the truth as it is acknowledged in the world. In the former respect, "it needs no pillar, but supports itself;" in the latter, it certainly needs the church as its pillar, as its bearer and preserver. The greatness and importance of Timothy's calling are

designed to be held up to him in the representation of the excellence of the *house* in which he serves; and this excellence which belongs to the church is represented by the apostle in opposition to the threatening heresy which he has already in his eye as consisting in this—that the church upon earth has the calling to preserve within itself the sure truth for the world, to secure its continuance on the earth. The choice of the metaphor is to be explained by the opposition which it implies to the heresy afterwards spoken of. This vocation the church has had and exercised from the beginning, and will continue to have and to exercise as surely as it is the church of the living God, and has the promise that even the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. It has and exercises this, however, not merely in so far as it rests, but because of, and in virtue of its resting on the everlasting foundation (1 Cor. iii. 11), which is Jesus Christ. It is the support of the truth for the world, just because it is itself borne up by the truth which rests on itself, and is sure; and Mack is quite right when he says (p. 286), that words to the following effect are not to be supplied: namely, "if and in as far as the truth is present in it," which would divest what the apostle says of all meaning, and make him, while he seems to say something of the church, really to say nothing. The apostle knows nothing of a *church* which has not the truth, or which has it only in part. But the catholic commentator clearly shows the restraints of his confession, when he all at once transfers what the apostle says of *the church of the living God*, to the historical idea of his own church, and so finds in this passage a New Testament proof (perhaps a prophecy?) of its infallibility. It is not historical descent that makes a church to be a church, but, as Mack himself admits (p. 286, Anm. 1), this only—that it has the truth for its foundation; and it is not a church in the true sense precisely in proportion as it is wanting in the ground of the truth —a test from which no historical appearance calling itself a church, or even "the church," can withdraw itself. Ἑδραίωμα, "a firm stay, foundation," forms a climax with στῦλος. The word used only here, similar to θεμέλιος, 2 Tim. ii. 19, has no parallel in the New Testament usage except in the word ἑδραῖος, used only by Paul, and by him three times. An objection against the interpretation of this passage which we have adopted, has been founded on the alleged inelegance of expression implied in designating the

οἶκος θεοῦ as στῦλος and ἑδραίωμα; but when it is observed that the literal expression *church* precedes the new metaphors, and that in both metaphors there is a different allusion, the impropriety will not appear so great. Mack has already referred to 1 Cor. iii. 9, *God's husbandry, God's building,* although the case is not quite parallel.

Ver. 16. "And confessedly great is the mystery of godliness, &c." says the apostle, and he proceeds to unfold the contents of this mystery. We have already seen, that the transition to the following section lies in the designation of the church as *the pillar and ground of the truth;* for if we regard these words as referring to what precedes, we can see no immediate occasion for such a designation of the church, as Schleiermacher also has remarked. If now the apostle, in the view of what he has further to say, joins the predicates *pillar and ground of the truth* with what goes before, we shall be at no loss, with Schleiermacher, as to the connection of our verse with what precedes and what follows, but may consider the words, *and confessedly great,* &c., as the description of the *truth* which is committed to the church as a treasure to be guarded by it. It is the design of the apostle to show Timothy the excellence of that *house* in which he is a servant, and what could be more suitable to this design than that the *truth* which has its historical existence in the church should be represented in its inherent greatness? "The stay and fortress of the truth is the church; and (the καί stands first with emphasis[1]), confessedly great is this truth whose supporter she is." Ὁμολογουμένως μέγα—says the apostle, *i.e.,* without contradiction great, confessedly great, so as not to be doubted,—of course only among those to whom this μυστ. is a revealed mystery. The word ὁμ. occurs only here in the New Testament, but often in the profane writers, Josephus and others. Compare further on the interpretation of the idea, infra on ὅς. *The mystery of godliness*—the apostle here styles that truth a mystery accessible only to piety (comp. on ver. 9), in opposition to the error in regard to which, because it is wanting in piety, this is a sealed mystery (iv. 2.) Even in the case of godliness, this mystery, although *revealed,* yet *surpasses all knowledge;* and this designation seems to me to be selected

1 Huther understands the καί as bringing forward into prominence the predicate which follows.

here, chiefly from regard to the wondrous excellence, embracing heaven and earth, of him who is the essential import of this mystery. Compare on this sense of *μυστήριον*, Eph. v. 32, (and Harless on the passage), then Eph. iii. 19, comp. with ver. 18, where we are conducted to a more profound understanding of this mystery. The apostle proceeds forthwith to unfold the constituent parts of this acknowledged mystery of godliness. Here, however, we encounter a critical difficulty in the first word.[1] The reading wavers between *ὅς*, *θεός*, *ὅ*. *Ὅ* has least in its favour, of which Tischendorf says: *ὅ* (quod Latinos ad *ὅς* non *θεός* lectionem conformasse patet) D* Vulg. it. pp. lat. pl. (*i.e.* omnes exc. Hier.) Nor has this reading anything in favour of it on internal grounds, for that Christ himself should be called the mystery of godliness (Col. i. 27 is to a different effect) is just as improbable as that without this reference he should be denoted by the neuter *ὅ*. On *θεός* Tischendorf observes: *θεός* (*i.e.* ΘC pro OC) D.***I.K. al. fere. omn. (= almost all manuscripts) Arab. polygl. Slav., Did., Chr., Thdrt., Euthal., Maced. (who, however, is charged with having changed *ὅς* into *θεός*), Dam., Theoph., Oec. Praeterea lectioni *θεός* favere putantur Ign. (ad Eph. xix. *θεοῦ* [sed Syrus *υἱοῦ* pro *θεοῦ*, cf. Bunsen de epp. Ign. Hamb. 1847, p. 82] *ἀνθρωπίνως φανερουμένου*), Constitt., Hipp., Thaum., s. potius Apollin. ap. Phot. On *ὅς*: A.*C.* (de utroque cf. excurs. meum ad 1 Tim iii. 16, Prol. ad Cod. Ephr., p. 39, ss.) F.G. 17.73.181 item codd. Liberati. Vict. Tunun. Hincmari (affirmantium quippe Macedonium sub Anastasio imp. *ὅς* in *θεός* mutasse), item goth. Syr. post. s. Syr. post. in margine. cop. sah, item Cyr. Theod. Mopv. Epiph. (bis) Pseudo-Chrys., item Gelas. cyzic. s. Mac. Hier. ap. Gelas. in actis conc. Nic. ii. 23; item Hier. Porro *ὅς* s. *ὅ* habent Syr. ar. erp. aeth. armen. Praeterea *ὅς* lectioni favere videntur Barnab. Theodot. Just. (?) ad Diogn. Clem. ap. Oec. Orig. Orig. interpr. Greg. Nyss. Bas. Nestor. apud Arn. jun. Did. The weight of the external evidence leans to the side of *ὅς*, in favour of which Griesbach, Lachmann, Tischendorf, De Wette, Matthies, and also Olshausen, have decided; while *θεός*

[1] Baumgarten: Vindiciae vocis *θεός*. 1 Tim. iii. 16. Hal. Mgd. 1754. Patriccii vind. voc. *θεός*, 1 Tim. iii. 16. Argentor 1777. Schulzii Programma de Myst. . . . ad 1 Tim iii. 16; Hal. 1782. Michael Weber: Crisis loci Paul. 1 Tim. iii. 14—6. Lips., 1784 (in Leo, p. 32)

has been defended by Matthäi, Heydenreich, Leo, Mack, and others. Apart from the external testimonies, it is urged in favour of the reading θεός that it avoids the difficulties of the other reading, and is altogether suitable to the connexion which stands in need of a definite *subject*. That Christ is styled θεός by the apostle cannot cause surprise. So most recently Leo Excurs. I. p. 74, ss., Heydenreich on the passage and Mack. No similar passage certainly can be shown in which the apostle has given the appellation θεός to the subject as becoming incarnate (comp. Phil. ii. 5); meanwhile comp. on Tit. ii. 13. That, however, which is alleged to be most in favour of this reading, namely, the facility of its interpretation, seems rather to be against it. For if θεός was the original reading, then the origin of the other difficult readings is just as unaccountable as, on the other hand, the origin of θεός as a marginal gloss is easily accounted for on the supposition that ὅς was the original reading. How could it be conceived that any one should, in place of the definite θεός, have put a ὅς, which having no definite reference would be used in so peculiar a manner here? The case of Macedonius, who is said to have changed ὅς into θεός, is no proof of this, but rather proves the reverse (against Mack), namely, that ὅς is the original reading. And it is remarkable, if θεός was indeed the original reading, that this passage was not made use of in the Arian and later controversies (comp. Mack, p. 295.) But the contents of the various clauses of the verse, *was justified in the Spirit, seen of angels, preached among the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up into glory*—as others, and most recently De Wette, have observed, will not correspond to the subject θεός. For when Heydenreich, in reply to this, says, that these clauses must not be referred to θεός by itself, but to θεός ὅς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, he does not thereby solve the difficulty, but rather acknowledges it, as it is not the θεός manifested in the flesh that is the subject, but all the clauses, the first not excepted, have an equal reference to the θεός. We are accordingly at liberty to maintain, that if the reading ὅς will but afford an intelligible interpretation, it is decidedly to be preferred. We do not certainly think that ὅς can be taken as Matthies takes it (comp. De Wette) to signify ecce! est qui! One—who, &c. The passages to which he refers in support of this are quite of a different kind, inasmuch as in them only the demonstrative is omitted, Rom. ii. 23; 1 Cor.

vii. 37; John i. 46, iii. 34; 1 John i. 3. But even the omission of the demonstrative we shall find to be not applicable here, either in the way of ὅυτος having to be supplied at ἐδικαιώθη, or of the apodosis being quite left out; for, against the former, it is urged with reason by the advocates of the reading θεός, that the text contains no indication of such a construction, but rather indicates that all the small clauses stand in a like relation to the subject, and, in general, that no reason can be shown why the apostle should have placed, *was manifested in the flesh*, in the protasis, and all the others in the apodosis; to which is also to be added, that the words, *was preached among the Gentiles, believed on in the world*, would not at all be suitable to the context if the apodosis begins with, *was justified*, &c., (comp. Mack, p. 294.) Against the other supposition—that the apodosis is entirely left out—is the circumstance, that it is difficult to see what idea this apodosis could have contained (comp. Mack.) The only remaining supposition, then, is, that ὅς bears reference to a subject not named, for which also De Wette has decided. The merely relative designation of the subject by ὅς may then be most naturally explained by supposing that the apostle makes use of words taken from another source in order to represent the mystery of godliness, words which perhaps he found in a hymn (or in a formula of confession), in which he could take it for granted that the *subject* was known.[1] So also Winer, § 66, 1, 3, p. 660.[2] Perhaps the words *great mystery*, with which the apostle introduces what follows, are borrowed from some such source, and the word *confessedly* is employed to give notice that the apostle is citing words in which the greatness of this mystery is acknowledged and celebrated in the church. We are not, however, therefore at liberty to translate ὁμολογουμένως "according to the hymn," as Mack does contrary to the ordinary usage. Already Grotius, then Paulus, Heydenreich, Mack, De Wette, and others, have regarded the 16th verse in the light of a quotation from such a source as has already been hinted. In proof that hymns were then used, reference is made to Eph. v. 19 (comp., however, Harless on the passage), and Col. iii. 16; then also the account of Pliny I. x. ep. 97: quod essent

[1] Olshausen is for referring ὅς, in respect to the sense, to μυστήριον, and appeals to Col. i. 27, where the apostle calls Christ himself μυστήριον. Comp. supra.

[2] And Huther.

soliti stato die ante lumen convenire carmenque Christo quasi Deo dicere secum invicem, and the statement in Eusebius (h. e. l. V. cap. 28) : *ψαλμοὶ καὶ ᾠδαὶ ἀδελφῶν ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πιστῶν γραφεῖσαι τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸν Χριστὸν ὑμνοῦσι θεολογοῦντες*. With respect to the form, Mack justly observes that the short unconnected sentences in which the words are similarly arranged, and the number of syllables almost equal, while the ideas are antithetically related, are so suitable to religious hymns, that we find all these characteristics in a series of later hymns used by the Greek and Latin church. When we look particularly at the separate clauses in which is represented the mysterious excellence of him who is the essential import of this great mystery, it will be evident, as others have already noticed, that they form parallel clauses, of which every two are a connected pair, and form an antithesis turning upon the opposition of heaven to earth, and so placed as that the order of the antithesis is reversed in each new pair of clauses :—flesh and spirit—angels and nations—world and heavenly glory. It will also at once be perceived that there is a correspondence between the first and the last clause—was manifested in the flesh—was received up into glory.

If now, we descend from these general observations to particulars, we find that the first member *ὅς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί* presents no difficulty. By *ὅς* is meant Jesus Christ, whom the apostle elsewhere also represents as the subject of predicates which extend beyond his earthly existence, comp. on Phil. ii. 5, 6. The sense of the whole clause is the same as John i. 14, *the word became flesh;* 1 John iv. 2, *Jesus Christ, who has come in the flesh;* Phil. ii. 7, *who was in the likeness of man.* He who before was concealed is become manifest, so that he can be seen, nay touched (John i. 14 ; 1 John i. 1, ss.) Dr Baur discovers in the use of the expressions *φανεροῦσθαι, ἐπιφαίνεισθαι, ἐπιφάνεια*, a mode of conception that has an affinity to Gnosticism. Comp. against this, on *ἐπιφαίν* Tit. ii. 11 ; and on *ἐπιφάνεια*, Tit. ii. 13. With respect to *φανεροῦσθαι*, comp. Rom. iii. 21, xvi. 26 ; Col. i. 26 (Heb. ix. 8), in all of which passages the expression is used with reference to the appearance of salvation in Christ. In Col. iii. 4 it is used with reference to the person of Christ himself, not indeed, as here, of the first coming of Christ, but of his second coming ; it is clearly, however, only accidental that it does not occur with reference to the person of Christ in his first coming. We find the ex-

pression repeatedly used in precisely the same manner as here by the apostle John, in the same epistle in which he combats the Gnostic denial of the truth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh (1 John iii. 5, 8); and how often is the same expression used of the revelation of the love of God in Christ, the δόξα the ζωή! How little ground then is there for the alleged resemblance which is found in these epistles to the Gnostic view of the subject of the incarnation in the passage before us, and in 2 Tim. i. 9, iv. 1, 8; Tit. ii. 11, iii. 4! Finally, the objection urged by Dr Baur,—that there is a doctrinal contradiction between 1 Tim ii. 4 and the present passage, inasmuch as there Christ is represented as a mere man,—has been obviated by the remarks we have made on that passage. De Wette, also, has rejected this supposition of a contradiction (p. 86.)—*Ἐν σαρκί*, antithetical with the following *ἐν πνεύματι*; it designates the one side of his being, the visible, human, in opposition to the divine (comp. Harless, p. 162, s.); he took on him the human nature in its weakness (Rom. viii. 3, he was sent *in the likeness of sinful flesh.*) Over against this clause, in the description of the great mystery, stands the following *ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι.* When we attend to the antithesis in *ἐν σαρκί*, and observe further, how in the two following pairs the two members always correspond, it will be evident that every explanation of these words must be rejected, which would make *ἐν πνεύματι* = "through the spirit, by virtue of the spirit," and would then interpret accordingly. *Πνεῦμα* can denote here only the *θεῖον* in him, in opposition to the *σάρξ* in him, and *ἐν*, not "through" but as before only "in." So also Olshausen. The great mystery of godliness is here represented by the wondrous union of opposite things in his person, namely, of the human and the divine life. He was *justified in the Spirit*,—the other side of his being, which is opposed to the *flesh*. The meaning of the expression *ἐδικαιώθη* can, it is evident, be only this—that he who is manifested in the flesh is shown at the same time in his higher nature, the other side of his being (comp. the similar passage in Rom. i. 3, 4.) Why *ἐδικαιώθη*? The general signification of the expression is, justus declaratus est. How is it to be applied here? Certainly not in the sense in which it is commonly used by the apostle, as opposed to

[1] Huther: the spiritual principle of life dwelling in him, but at the sametime emanating from him.

guilt and punishment, Rom ii. 13, iii. 26, &c., but in the sense in which we find it in Rom. iii. 4; Matt. xi. 19; Luke vii. 35, where the expression is used of God, or of *wisdom*, to signify the opposite of being mistaken or misapprehended. The apostle here says, *was justified*, in opposition to the state described in the words, *was manifested in the flesh*; in opposition to this state of humiliation which exposed him to misapprehension (comp. John vi. 41, 42, vii. 27), he was justified *in the Spirit*. So already Mack and others. Wherein then consisted this being justified in the Spirit? The true answer is—in all that by which his higher origin was made known, in the revelation of that *glory* which is spoken of in John i. 14, *we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth*, and which was manifested in his words (Matt. vii. 29; John vii. 46, &c.), in his works (John ii. 11, iii. 2, xiv. 11), and in the events of his life, above all in the resurrection (Rom. i. 4; Acts ii. 36, &c.) To make it consist in the last of these alone, or in the miracles alone, or the baptism, or the fulfilment of prophecies, is according to the context quite arbitrary. The interpretation which associates it with the operation of the Spirit after his outpouring (John xvi. 8—16) comes into collision with the right understanding of ἐν of the πνεῦμα, of the antithetical relation between the first and second member in this pair of clauses, and the train of thought expressed in the two following.

From the wonderful *manifestation* in flesh and in Spirit of him who is the substance of this great mystery, the description now advances to the equally wonderful circumstance of *his being made known*, in which a similar antithesis shews itself—*was seen of angels—preached among the nations*, Col. i. 27. To explain ἄγγελοι either of the apostles (Heydenreich, Leo, and others), or of the bad angels, and accordingly to connect this part of the description either with the appearances after the resurrection, or the descent into hell, is contrary to the usage of the word. The former of these views is also inconsistent with the antethitical relation which prevails throughout all the pairs of sentences. With as little propriety can the reverse signification be attached to ὤφθη ἀγγέλοις—angels appeared to him (Matt. iv. 11; Luke xxii. 43.) Mack gives the sense of the words thus, appealing to Heb. i. 6, 7, ss., ii. 9—"Christ appeared to angels as their commander, in which the apostle would represent the exaltation

of Christ above all angels." But where is there anything said of dominion and exaltation above the angels? How little we are justified in thus extending the meaning of ὤφθη is shown by the antithetical clause, was *preached among the nations.* He was seen by the one—proclaimed to the others. And how little does that interpretation correspond to the train of thought from the first pair of clauses to the third (comp. infra.)! How forced would be the connexion of the ideas! (comp. Mack, p. 292, and against him Matthies, p. 320.) Moreover, those passages in the epistle to the Hebrews that have been referred to, as well as Eph. iv. 8; Col. ii. 15, do not tell us that Christ after his ascension was presented to the angels as their commander. Ὤφθη ἀγγ. can only signify the making known of Christ among the angels, and corresponds to the preaching of him among the nations. So already Chrysostom, "Angels saw the Son of God with us not having seen him before," and Theodoret, "they saw him incarnate." Comp. passages such as Eph. iii. 8, and 10; 1 Pet. i. 12.[1] As showing the relation which the work of redemption bears also to the celestial powers, compare such passages as Eph. i. 20—23; Col. i. 15, ss., ii. 10, 15; they, however, do not express the idea of our passage, but belong rather to the third pair of clauses. When Mack observes that the interpretation—the celestial spirits saw his work upon earth—is arbitrary and opposed to the context, according to which the words are all to be taken in their literal sense, we would say in reply, that this does not affect our view, for it was not his work which the angels saw, but himself made flesh, and that as literally as the literal sense of the words, *preached among the nations.* The ὤφθη had certainly already taken place upon earth, but the description in this verse has nothing to do with that; it aims at representing the mysterious antithesis as denoted by flesh—spirit; angels—nations; world—glory; the gradation in the thought lies in the words *manifested, seen, preached,* and then *believed, received up,* and is evidently more of a material than a chronological kind.—After he who is the import of this mystery was manifested, he was preached, and in consequence of the preaching is believed on—his reception upon earth, to which his reception in heaven then forms the antithesis.—We have yet to notice the absence of the article with ἀγγέλοις (comp.

1 Huther understands the expression of the ascent into heaven, with which the last clause is at variance.

Winer, § 18, 1 Anm. p. 141, s.), therefore not "the angels," but "angels;" it is the opposition of angels and nations that is aimed at, for in this opposition lies the *great mystery*. *Preached among the nations.* The expression ἔθνη quite generally, as in Matth. xxviii. 19, not in contradistinction to the Jewish people. What the angels came to know by seeing, these learn through preaching. He is a new message to the one class as well as to the other; and precisely in this union of heaven and earth in his person, in this wondrous unity formed of things most opposite lies the mystery.

The first member of the third antithesis now naturally comes after the last clause—*he was believed on in the world* as the consequence of being *preached* (comp. Winer, § 40, 1, p. 301; 2 Thess. i. 10; 1 John iv. 16); *in the world*—by which is to be understood, as opposed to the *glory*, the ungodly world, the world lying in wickedness (1 John ii. 15, ss.) Thus he found a reception in the world, a place in it so to speak. To this reception in the world is now antithetically opposed the next member,—*he was received up into glory*,—where he now sits enthroned at the right hand of God. On ἐν with verbs of motion, comp. Winer, § 54, 4, p. 490. According to De Wette, this is not to be understood of the historical ascension of Christ, of which we have an account in Mark and Luke, but of a celestial event. It was to be expected that De Wette, who had already referred the being *seen of angels* to a scene beyond the reach of sensible observation,—the counterpart to the descent into hell,—should not be well able to understand the being *received up into glory* of the ascension, but only of another occurrence which took place in heaven. But this very necessity of referring the clear words, *he was received up into glory*, to something else than the ascension of Christ, is a proof that the interpretation which is given to the words, *seen of angels*, is incorrect. The view which we take of the words does not compel us to go beyond the historical event of the ascension, which indeed could not be more appropriately described (comp. Mark xvi. 19, *he was received up into heaven, and sat down*, &c.; Acts i. 11, *he who is taken up from you into heaven*; Luke xxiv. 51.) And if this be not what is meant, what other ἀναλαφθῆναι ἐν δόξῃ is conceivable? Our interpretation maintains the suitable antithesis in the two

[1] The same remark applies also to Huther.

clauses, the one of which expresses Christ's glorification in the world, the other in heaven; there, as also here, he has a place as king of an empire, which embraces heaven and earth. How clear are thus the antitheses in each of the three pairs of clauses by which this great mystery of godliness is represented! How simple and apparent is thus the progress from *was manifested* to *was received up*. How obscure, on the contrary, does everything become, when with De Wette we suppose the being *seen of angels* to refer to a scene in heaven, and the being *received up into glory* to another celestial event! Dr Baur has denied that there is any logical connection in the sentences as they follow each other; on the other hand, he discovers a Gnostic complexion in the expressions ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πν. and ὤφθη ἀγγέλοις; in which case his being at a loss to find any logical connection is quite as accountable as it is conclusive against his interpretation. Meanwhile, Dr Baur has still made the attempt to introduce some clearness into the connection, by supposing that every two of the six clauses form an antithesis thus—that the one has more of a Gnostic, the other more of an anti-Gnostic cast. What a strange picture do we thus obtain of a writer, who, in order to combat Gnosticism, forges epistles, because every other means of effecting this object seems insufficient, and then by each of these clauses seeks as much as possible to satisfy both the orthodox and the Gnostic party;" comp. on this the General Introduction. Moreover, this will only explain the arrangement of the sentences in pairs, not the logical progress in the ideas expressed by the six clauses; finally, however, as we have seen from the exposition, we are not under the necessity of going beyond the Pauline sphere of ideas, and of having recourse to the help of Gnosticism in order to explain the words. It is still objected by Schleiermacher, "that an enumeration such as this should also be arranged in historical order." But it is not a mere enumeration of successive incidents which we have here, but a representation of the *great mystery* of faith. And what can be said against the order which is followed in this representation, which begins with the revelation of the Saviour, and advances to his being made known, and thence to his being glorified? We have still another of Schleiermacher's objections to consider. "If Paul had written ver. 16 as an introduction to what follows, with the view of laying down the cardinal doctrine from which the seducers would deviate,

then must we reasonably expect that the subsequent description will harmonize with this; what follows, however, contains nothing in any degree opposed to the import of ver. 16." This objection contains already a false supposition. For it is not the apostle's design in ver. 16 to represent merely the cardinal doctrine from which the seducers would deviate, but rather the great mystery of all piety, of which the church is the bearer. In opposition to this great thesis, so to speak,—though it is not properly stated as the thesis of what follows, but rather as the continuation of the στῦλος, &c.,—the writer places as its antithesis, in an equally general form, the words iv. 1: *Now the Spirit speaketh expressly that some shall depart from the faith;* for this sentence is evidently the principal one, and all that follows is just the further explication of it; comp. De Wette, p. 88, who admits that the heretics are not directly but only secondarily mentioned. I regard it therefore as superfluous, nay as trifling, when we look to the comprehensiveness of this description of the great mystery, to attempt to point out in its particular clauses, the allusion to future heresies. If the apostle had intended any such definite correspondence, it would doubtless have been made more apparent, chiefly in the characteristics mentioned in iv. 2, ss. But it is rather his design to give a positive representation of the truth which is the confession of the church, with which is then contrasted the future falling away from the faith (iv. 1.) This positive statement of the truth, however, includes in it on every side the opposition to the error.

Chap. iv. 1. In opposition then to this description of the great mystery of godliness, the apostle places the prediction of the threatened falling away from the faith (δέ.) "But the Spirit speaketh expressly that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith." The expression ῥητῶς (only here = with express words, distinctly,) as also the whole tenor of the passage shows, that the apostle refers to predictions of the Spirit lying before him. It is the general prophecy of a future falling away such as was declared by our Lord himself in Matt. xxiv. 11, ss. 24, and by the apostle in 2 Thess. ii. 3, ss., in allusion to the prophecy of the Old Testament, (Dan. vii. 25, viii. 23, ss., xi. 30, ss.; comp. Hofmannn, a. a. Q. ii. p. 291, ss.), which the writer has here in his eye. Comp. also 1 John ii. 18; 2 Pet. iii. 3; Jude 18. Others again, (so also Ols-

hausen) are for understanding a prediction which was uttered by the prophets of that period, and refer in support of this view to Acts xi. 28, xiii. 2, xx. 23, xxi. 11. The prophecy, however, in as far as regards its general import, had been made long before, but the special application of it which is made in this passage proceeds evidently from the apostle, whose eye, enlightened by the Spirit, discerns in the present the beginnings of the apostacy which is to come to full manifestation in the future. It is thus clear, that the writer uses the expression *ἐν ὑστέροις καιροῖς* looking forward from the time at which he writes, and we shall find also in what follows that we have not before us the words of a prediction made by another, but the interpretation and application of this by the apostle himself. *Καιρός* is used here quite as appropriately as in 2 Cor vi. 2; 1 Thess. ii. 17; 1 Cor. vii. 5, as Planck has already observed against Schleiermacher. The words, *some shall fall away*, &c., in which the general import of that prediction is expressed, form the proper antithesis to what goes before, iii. 15, 16; it is not then the heresy itself which is here placed in opposition to what is there said, but the falling away from the faith of the church as described in iii. 16, in consequence of heresies; comp. above. On *ἀφίστασθαι*, comp. Heb. iii. 12. The apostle himself now more particularly describes how such a falling away would be brought about, and he does this with express reference to the appearances of the present, which indicate beforehand the nature of the future falling away. *Giving heed to seducing spirits and doctrines of devils.* *Προσέχειν* as at i. 4; Tit. i. 14. It is not merely an unhealthy Christianity, such as we have been dealing with hitherto, but the entire falling away from the faith, which is to be the result of this *προσέχειν*. In accordance with this, the expressions *πνεύματα πλανα—διδασκαλίαι δαιμονίων* are much stronger than those which have been hitherto used by the apostle, to designate the appearances of the present. On *πνεύματα* it has already been rightly observed by De Wette, that the expression denotes neither the teachers who are first spoken of in ver. 2, nor their doctrines, but the manifestations of the *πνεῦμα τῆς πλάνης* in opposition to the *πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας*, 1 John iv. 6 and iv. 2, ss.; 1 Cor. xii. 10, xiv. 12—32. *Πλάνος*, leading astray, as in 2 Cor. vi. 8. The words *διδασκαλίαις δαιμονίων* will then signify not doctrines concerning demons, but proceeding from demons; the

former interpretation would, moreover, stand in no connection with the rest of the passage; comp. also, Winer, § 30, 1, p. 213; with respect to the expression comp. 2 Cor. xi. 15, *the servants of Satan.*[1] The following words, ἐν ὑποκρίσει ψευδολόγων do not admit of being connected with διδασκαλίαις, for then the words would stand as a more definite explanation of δαιμονίων, which is inadmissible, inasmuch as men cannot be understood by the expression, or else διδασκαλίαις must be repeated, as De Wette observes. We shall therefore have to connect the words with the proximate verb προσέχοντες, and understand them as denoting the cause of that *giving heed*, &c., and as a description of the seducers, not of those who fall away, to whom neither the expression *hypocrisy* nor *speaking lies* would be suitable; as also the words, *having their conscience seared*, &c., remind us of similar characteristics of the seducers in Tit. i. 15; 1 Tim. i. 6, vi. 5, &c. That which allures to apostacy is the pretended show of sanctity which, however, stands in glaring contrast with the inward character of these seducers; hence the expression *hypocrisy*. Ψευδόλογοι, a designation of heretics properly so-called, therefore a stronger expression than ματαιολόγοι, Tit. i. 10; 1 Tim. i. 6. Κεκαυτηριασμένων τὴν ἰδ. συν. = such as are branded in their own conscience; Wahl rightly, qui sauciam sclerum conscientia habent mentem. The expression, which is borrowed from the branding of criminals, is not with Theodoret to be explained of the callousness of conscience, which can only be considered as an accident of the branding; but points primarily to the permanent defacement and degradation of their inner nature, of which they themselves are conscious in consequence of sins which they have committed against their better knowledge and conscience. The ἰδίαν is not, as De Wette thinks, without emphasis, but indicates the contrast between their own inward character and their professed design to lead others to true holiness. The characteristic expressed in the words, *having their conscience branded*, &c., explains the *hypocrisy*, for, as Calvin well observes, malae conscientiae . . . . semper ad hypocrisin . . . . confugiunt. It at the same time furnishes the key to the right understanding of the error as it is described in ver. 3. It lets us

1 Olshausen observes that a man never stands isolated: if the Divine Spirit do not lead him, the evil spirit will; hence the heretics are here represented as inspirations of the evil spirit.

see the false spiritualism of these lying teachers, as just the reverse side of their manner of thought and action till then devoted to sensuality. Their own inward impurity is reflected in their eyes in the world without them, and hence their asceticism. Comp. on the whole subject Tit. i. 15. The apostle now specifies particular features by which these future heretics will be identified, and these features are of a practical kind, not merely because they fall most under observation, but because in them is most apparent the glaring contradiction between them and the real inward condition of those hypocritical seducers. What the apostle here states as the characteristics of these seducers,—not as the emuneration of their errors,—stands in fitting connexion with the appearances of the present, and is represented as an aggravation of these. We shall therefore have to look for the analogies to these not apart from, but in the phenomena which the Pastoral Epistles themselves lay before us as already present. *Κωλυόντων γαμεῖν, ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων*, he says. (On the connection of the *απεχ.* with *κωλυόντων*, comp. Winer, § 66, iii. f. p. 678. For the latter infinitive we must take *κελευόντων* out of *κωλυόντων*, which is = *κελευόντων μή*.) We have seen it to be the characteristic of the error combated in the Pastoral Epistles, that a morally unfruitful, pretendedly higher wisdom was connected with commandments which were to lead to a supposed higher perfection. This perverted ascetical tendency meets us most plainly in Tit. i. 14, 15, in which passage the apostle, in like manner as here, places in opposition to the seducers the maxim—*to the pure all things are pure.* From the resemblance which in general prevails between the errors as they are described in the epistle to Titus, and as they are described in our epistle (comp. the General Introduction), there can scarcely be a doubt, but that what is said of those errors is also applicable to the errors represented in our epistle as present. Besides vv. 6 and 8 of this chapter refer to an ascetical tendency existing at the time (comp. Baur a. a. O. p. 25) ; and in passages such as i. 6, ss., (comp. the interpretation), 2 Tim. ii. 18, the root of such an asceticism is evidently shown to be a false spirituality. It can therefore not surprise us, when the apostle, foreseeing the future in the present, represents the *abstaining from meats* as a mark of the future apostacy. Was it true—even though the statements of the epistles elsewhere be differently applied—that this special error had already clearly enough come into notice ; then

might we rather wonder why the apostle places it in the future, did we not consider, that substantially nothing depends on whether the heresy in question did not come fully out till a future period, as it is only the fruit of this, namely, the falling away, which the apostle represents as future. We can certainly point to nothing in the epistles specially analogous to the *forbidding to marry*, but so much at least must be acknowledged, that such an error lies in the same direction with a view which transfers inward impurity to the external world. The ascetical tendency as it at present existed had not yet reached this stage in its development according to the traces which we have of it in these epistles; but does not the co-existence at a later period of these two errors which the apostle here names, as we find them in Marcion, the Encratites, and the Manicheans, prove their internal connexion, and fully bear out the apostle's prediction? This union of the two errors, in the opinions of Marcion and his followers, is the result indeed of their Gnostico-dualistic view of the world; but must we suppose this to have been already in existence, in order to understand the prediction of the writer? In the manner in which he mentions these errors v. 3, ss. he does not betray in the least degree, that he derives them from this Gnostico-dualistic view, nay, the separation of clean and unclean had a direct point of connexion with the Old Testament laws regarding meats. And if we look to the nature of the thing itself, we may with reason maintain, that nothing was more likely than that the false spiritualism which made ethical perfection to consist in abstinence from outward things should reckon marriage among these things, and that too without its being derived from any Gnostic view of the world, or aversion to the creation. Where might we more naturally look for a misunderstanding of the Christian view of the opposition between flesh and spirit than in the ideas concerning marriage? And how plausible a ground has the prohibition of marriage to rest upon in the words of our Lord himself (Matth. xix. 10, ss.), and such expressions of the apostle as we find repeated in 1 Cor. vii.? Only think, for example, of an Origen!

Did then appearances of the kind described in our passage, even apart from what we read in the Pastoral Epistles, lie so far out of the apostle's sphere of vision as to make his words unintelligible when applied to his own time, and to necessitate our supposing

that a contemporary of Marcion was the author. We have certainly not the common Judaistic opponents of the apostle before us in this passage; but neither are the heretics of the epistle to the Colossians, with their *philosophy* and their asceticism, the common Judaists, although they stand more nearly related to them than do those in our passage. These Colossian heretics afford a striking parallel to the ascetic tendency described in our epistles (comp. especially Col. ii. 16, ss., and Steiger on the passage.) And have we not in the Essenes, and Therapeutae, as also in the Ebionites, kindred examples of an asceticism connecting itself with the Old Testament, but extending far beyond its prohibitions of meats, just as we have already found to be the case in regard to the error combated in these epistles? And what objection could Dr Baur make, even though a Gnostic view of the world could be shown to belong to the heretics described in our passage, when he himself frankly acknowledges that such a view prevailed among the Jewish Christians at Rome? With regard to the other feature, namely, the *forbidding to marry*, we may reasonably refer, in order to prove in a general way that this error was not so remote from the apostolic period (for it does not appear from the Pastoral Epistles to have as yet assumed a decided form) to chap. vii. of the first epistle to the Corinthians, which, especially in the beginning, and then in vv. 28 and 36, shows plainly that the apostle is refuting spiritualistic doubts regarding marriage. Still more to our purpose, however, is it, to refer likewise to those sects in whom this error appeared in connexion with Jewish perversities,—to the Essenes and Theraputae, of whose contempt of marriage we have accounts in Philo II. 633; Jos. Antt. 18, 1, 5; Bell. Jud. 2, 8, 2. Additional literary notices, both with respect to the *abstaining from meats*, and the *forbidding to marry*, will be found in Böttger, a. a. O. p. 146, ss.

In opposition to this false asceticism, which the apostle sees from the tokens of the present to be coming, he goes on to say: *which God hath created*, &c. We are here to mark the close connexion of these words, which are evidently the apostle's own, with the preceding. As the characteristic features of the heretics, ver. 2, are entirely founded on those mentioned elsewhere in the Pastoral Epistles as belonging to the seducers already existing, and are just these in a more aggravated form, so in the manner in which the words before us are connected with the preceding, we may perceive

that the apostle is not quoting the words of a prophecy uttered by another, but has himself sketched the characteristics of the future heretics on the ground plan afforded by that general prediction (comp. on ver. 1.) That which the apostle here places in opposition to them, is not a reference to the inferior position of Judaism, nor is it the refutation of a Gnostico-dualistic view of the world, such as we should expect from an anti-Gnostic writer of the second century (comp. the General Introduction, § 3), but it is a reference to the design of the creation, which can be fulfilled only by a thankful enjoyment of the meats which God hath created. "Which God hath created to be enjoyed with thanksgiving by believers, and such as have known the truth." The end for which meats exist then is, according to the apostle, to be enjoyed; this enjoyment, however, supposing it to be in other respects the true enjoyment, has a condition attached to it in the *with thanksgiving*. The words, *to be enjoyed with thanksgiving*, stand opposed to the error implied in *abstaining from meats*. This true enjoyment by which the design of the Creator is fulfilled can be experienced only by believers and (epexegetically) those who have known the truth. These words involve an opposition of a twofold kind, namely, in the first place, to the inferior position of Judaism, which has not yet penetrated to the full knowledge of the truth (Acts x. 10, ss.), which, however, as the context shows, is not what is here referred to,—and in the second place, to the transcendental position of the heretics, who make the superiority of their *knowledge* and their higher moral perfection to consist in abstinence from meats, which is what the apostle here refers to. That the apostle intends not to deny that meats were created for all men, is self-evident; here, however, he shows only who they are in whom the design of the creation is really fulfilled. On *μετάληψις* (only here), comp. the use of *μεταλαμβάνειν*, Acts, ii. 46, xxvii. 33; on *ἐπεγ.*, what is said at Phil. i. 9 on *ἐπίγνωσις*. *Τοῖς πιστοῖς* is simply the dative of destination.

Ver. 4. The words, *to be received with thanksgiving*, are now, in vv. 4 and 5, farther confirmed. It is not, however, the natural cleanness of the meats as what God hath created, to which the apostle here attaches importance; he rather represents the being *good*, as dependent on the being received with thankfulness. What the apostle here maintains, in confirmation of the preceding,

is the perfectly equal fitness and lawfulness of every creature of God in respect of enjoyment, under the condition of thanksgiving in the enjoyment; for, (ver. 5), it is sanctified through the word of God and prayer. In regard to the Old Testament stand-point, it is the same truth which is here recognized as that which was disclosed to Peter through the vision, Acts, x. 11—16; but it does not stand here in definite opposition to the Old Testament. Nor does it need any proof,—for it is universally admitted,—that the apostle would oppose this Judaism in a different manner; not to speak of the *forbidding to marry*, in connexion with *abstaining from meats*, ver. 3, features which do not admit of being asssociated with the common pharisaical Judaism. But we have already hinted how little vv. 4 and 5 are suited to refute the Gnostic dislike to the creation. How should nothing more have been said in this case, than that not in the abstinence from, but in the thankful enjoyment of meats, is the purpose of the Creator fulfilled, seeing that the point in dispute must have been, whether God is the Creator? It would, at least, have been something to the purpose if he had even said, what he says at 1 Cor. x. 25, *the earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof*. Such a sentiment would have had far more of an anti-Gnostic cast than the *every creature is good* in our passage, with the condition which is attached to it, *if it be received with thanksgiving*, and the *for it is sanctified*, &c. What is there in these expressions more anti-Gnostic than in the words, *nothing is unclean of itself*, &c., Rom. xiv. 14, or *all things are pure*, Rom xiv. 20? And what opposition to the Gnostic dualism is implied in making the *good* to be dependent on the *thanksgiving*? Finally, Dr Baur's critical notices, drawn from the period of the Gnosis, p. 24, ss., serve well the purpose of letting us see the later form of these errors.—The apostle has still to justify his assertion that meats are intended to be enjoyed with thanksgiving. He does this in the verse before us, by placing in opposition to the arbitrary distinctions made by the heretics in meats, the maxim that every creature is good, and not to be refused, if it be received with thanksgiving. He does not say *καθαρόν*, as at Rom. xiv. 20, or *κοινόν*, as xiv. 14; for he here speaks in opposition to the opinion of the heretics, who, in regard to the enjoyment of the things in question, maintain that they are *οὐ καλόν—ἀπόβλητον*. He, however, limits his own assertion by the conditional clause, *if it be received with thanksgiving*, which is

confirmatory of the *with thanksgiving* in the preceding verse. This clause is therefore to be closely connected with the preceding—*good, and nothing to be refused.* It is not two different things that are here adduced—the natural purity and the receiving with thanksgiving—but the first under the condition of the second. On κτίσμα (comp. Jam. i. 11), for which Schleiermacher will have κτίσις, according to the Pauline usage, Planck has already remarked, that Paul uses ὀφείλημα at Rom. iv. 4, and ὀφειλή everywhere else, Rom. xiii. 7; 1 Cor. vii. 3; περίσσευμα at 2 Cor. viii. 14, but generally περισσεία, Rom. v. 17; 2 Cor. viii. 2, x. 15; πόμα at 1 Cor. x. 4, usually πόσις, Rom. xiv. 17; Col. ii. 16; προσκοπή at 2 Cor. vi. 3, usually πρόσκομμα, Rom. ix. 32, 33, xiv. 13—20; 1 Cor. viii. 9, &c. Schleiermacher's objection to ἀπόβλητος is obviated by what has already been remarked in regard to this word. It may, moreover, be said in reply to it, with Planck, that κοινός, which Schleirmacher would have expected from the apostle if he had been the author, occurs only once in this sense, Rom. xiv 14, and ἀκάθαρτος, which Schleiermacher also adduces, not at all. On λαμβανόμενον, comp. John xix. 30; Acts ix. 19; Matt. xv. 23. On resolving the participle by "if,' as at iii. 10, vi. 8, comp. Winer, § 46, 12, p. 413.

Ver. 5. That the apostle did not intend in the words, *if it be received with thanksgiving*, to express a merely accessary idea, and that we are not, as many expositors do, to take the sentence, *every creature of God is good* by itself, as that which the apostle places in opposition to the heretics, and expressive of the natural purity of the creature as opposed to the assertion of the malignancy of matter, is evident from ver. 5, in which we are told that the creature becomes *good* precisely in consequence of the *thanksgiving*. 'For it is sanctified (every creature) by the word of God and prayer." *Is sanctified,* says the apostle. Does he in this expression teach, that there is a natural impurity in the creature which must be removed by the word of God and prayer? That would be in manifest contradiction to what he declares to be his conviction in Rom. xiv. 14, *I know and am persuaded . . . that there is nothing unclean of itself; but to him that esteemeth anything to be unclean, to him it is uncleun.* But the apostle says nothing inconsistent with this in our passage. And this is the place where we must meet the question,—why does the apostle, in

the whole of this passage, lay such emphasis on the *with thanksgiving*, or more definitely still, as we find the question already set before us in ver. 5, what meaning are we to attach to this expression, ἁγιάζεται? Let us look, first of all, at the means through which this ἁγ. is effected, namely, through the word and prayer. The context, according to which the whole sentence, ver. 5, stands as an analytic confirmation of ver. 4 (γάρ), compels us to take *by the word*, &c., as explanatory of *with thanksgiving*, ver. 4. For, that everything is good and not to be rejected, if it is enjoyed with thanksgiving, can only be confirmed by showing, how the *with thanksgiving* brings along with it the being *good*. This relation of ver. 5 to ver. 4 is still further confirmed by this—namely, that ἁγιάζεται, like the present λαμβανόμενον in the preceding verse, is evidently to be understood in reference to every time when meats are enjoyed; for this is the very thing to be proved, namely, that meats are then good when they are *enjoyed with thanksgiving*. Although—even apart from this connexion—the present tense in ἁγίαζεται is sufficient of itself to forbid our interpreting it of a sanctification of the creature for the enjoyment once for all; and, in like manner, so much is certain with regard to the ἐντεύξεως, that by it can be meant only the ever-repeated prayer. What then are we to understand by the διὰ λόγου θεοῦ, which is connected with the ἐντεύξεως, and depends with it on one and the same preposition, which is not repeated? If we explain this expression of the saying uttered once for all recorded in Gen. i. 29, ix. 4, as Mack does,—and similarly Matthies only without this definite allusion,—then the confirmatory relation to ver. 4 is destroyed, for this would clearly leave unexplained, why in the enjoyment anything should depend on *thanksgiving*. It would also deprive ver. 4 of its meaning, which ver. 5 is intended to explain; for then, instead of the *being received with thanksgiving*, something else would be introduced as determining the being *good;* it contradicts, in fine, the present tense in ἁγ., and the union of things so diverse under the preposition διά.[1] The same difficulties meet the interpretation which explains λόγος θεοῦ of the Christian doctrine in general. For is not the Old Testament with its commandments about meats also λόγος θεοῦ? How necessary, then, to have

[1] The view can of course find no acceptance which refers λόγος θεοῦ to the creative word, Gen. i. 1, as the subject spoken of is the *sanctification* of what is already created.

given a more definite appellation for the Christian doctrine? And according to this interpretation ἁγιάζεσθαι must be understood either very indefinitely, or in a double sense, on the one hand, in reference to the *word of God*, on the other, in reference to *prayer;* and how little does it correspond to the present tense in ἁγ., which, in reference to *prayer*, must be regarded as expressing what actually takes place, and is repeated on every enjoyment? Least of all, however, as in the former instances, and in precisely the same way, will this interpretation correspond to the connexion with the preceding. Either must *every creature is good* be taken by itself as expressive of the natural purity of every creature of God, and *if it be received*, &c., only as an accessary limitation—and then the καλόν would need no further confirmation through ἁγιάζεται, for it is already pure; nor would *if it be received*, &c., obtain any such confirmation in ver. 5, for *by the word* would then refer to something quite different. Or again—and this alone is the right way—we must regard, *if it be received with thanksgiving*, as the condition on which the καλόν depends, in which case the λόγος θεοῦ can be nothing substantially different from the *thanksgiving*. This has also been rightly understood by De Wette, and therefore, in contradiction to his own interpretation of the preceding, according to which, the apostle, in opposition to the doctrine of the malignancy of matter, asserts its purity, he has understood the words of ver. 5, not of the objective ground of this purity, but of a permanent sanctification of the creature through prayer, which presents certainly a strange succession of ideas. For, in opposition to the Gnostic malignity of matter, the creature is first of all called good ("good or pure," p. 90, &c.) Then again, it is immediately said to be not pure, in opposition to the Gnostic malignancy of matter—for the purity ("in contrast with the malignancy of matter maintained by the Gnostics," De Wette,) is connected with the condition of the creature *being received with thanksgiving*. The writer then must himself have been half a Gnostic. If the *thanksgiving* was wanting, then matter remained malignant, but when this was present, then "all impurity was removed," as ver. 5 is held to teach. For such absurdities, the pseudo-apostle must submit to be characterized as one "who did not rise to the abstraction," that "every thing is pure also without this condition." The real state of the case is, that the expositor

lands himself in these absurdities, by supposing that the writer is here combating the doctrine of the Gnostic malignancy of matter, when he has not this in his mind at all; for if he had, he would make no such conditions as is expressed in, *if it be received with thankfulness*, nor would he have said, *it is sanctified by the word of God and prayer*, but would have expressed himself in quite a different manner. But De Wette is quite right when he regards it as certain, that λόγος θεοῦ stands in a confirmatory relation to the preceding, *if it be received with thankfulness*, and maintains that that can only signify the word of God expressed in prayer, whether it be that the writer regarded prayer as consisting in words from the Scriptures, or regarded the suppliants as filled with the Spirit and thereby as organs of the divine word, in favour of which latter, reference might be made with Bretschneider to Sir. xlviii. 2; 1 Kings xvii. 1. The latter is, however, not the correct view, for although the word which a prophet speaks as commissioned of God is so named, it is no proof in the case before us; but the former,—only we must guard against a too outward apprehension of prayer as consisting in a λόγος θεοῦ. All prayer, indeed, grows out of God's word, and substantially consists in it, even although it should not be composed precisely of Scripture words, or consist of a Psalm, which, for example, would not be the case in the ancient prayer at meat, Constitt. ap. vii. 49, (in Heydenreich.) The simplest interpretation of λόγος θεοῦ is certainly that given by Wahl, Leo, and others = oratio ad Deum facta. But it cannot be received on grammatical grounds, for ἀγάπη, or φόβος τοῦ θεοῦ, are examples of quite a different kind.[1] Καὶ ἐντεύξεως the apostle adds. He does not repeat the preposition; it is therefore not his object to distinguish the two ideas as independent of each other, which he must have done if he had intended in λόγος θεοῦ to denote a reason quite different from prayer, and consisting in a divine utterance or a divine ordination (comp. Winer, § liv. 7, p. 497.) It is therefore also on this ground more correct to take λόγος and ἐντεύξις as one principal idea. On ἐντεύξις properly aditus, comp. 1 Tim. ii. 1; it signifies not a species of prayer defined according to its import, but prayer in so far as it is a coming near to God, whether it be in the form of thanksgiving or of supplication.

[1] Huther also agrees with the interpretation here given. Commentar. z. N. T., V. 1.

The principal idea then expressed by *thanksgiving* is separated into the two elements of *the word of God* and *prayer*, and this analysis, if it is to be of any use, must be intended to make more apparent the sanctifying efficacy of the *thanksgiving* Now it is plain that λόγος θεοῦ is a designation of prayer according to its general import (the specific form of thanksgiving does not come into notice here) in its objective aspect, while ἐντεύξις points to the subjective side, namely, that it is a coming near to God. As then it is the relation of prayer to God, in its contents as well as in its form, which is here indicated, so also that for which prayer is made, or as it is here specially, that for which thanksgiving is made, is regarded in this relation, and this relation in which it is thus placed through prayer is, that which the apostle here describes as having a sanctifying influence, and as consecrating for enjoyment. The opposite of such a separation and consecration is certainly not a Gnostic malignancy of matter, nay, not even such a natural uncleanness of the thing to be enjoyed as would make it to be *unclean in itself* (against which Rom xiv. 14; 1 Cor. x. 26; Matth. xv. 11), as this ἁγιάζεσθαι applies not merely to what is unclean in the Old Testament point of view, but to *every creature*. It is rather opposed to that view which regards every creature as unholy and profane, on account of its being a part of the κτίσις which is burdened with a curse, which is subject to *vanity* and the *bondage of corruption* (Rom. viii. 19, ss.) It is profane, and needs sanctification in so far as it is opposed to the life from above, the new life of the Spirit in which the Christian stands. And this purification it receives for the enjoyment, through the sanctifying relation of the prayer to God which is uttered over it. The *corruptible* does not indeed thereby become *incorruptible* (Matth. xv. 17), just as the *body of death*, though it be sanctified through the new life of the Spirit, does not thereby become a *body of immortality;* but it is brought out of its naturally alien position with reference to that which is of the Spirit, into its true relation to the new life. For an analogy to that which the apostle has here in his mind, we have but to look to the holy sacrament of the supper, in which the thanksgiving prayer clearly implies such a *sanctification* as we have here. The apostle, however, will have a *sanctification* not merely in the use of the creature connected with this ordinance, but in every use of

it. Comp. 1 Cor. x. 31: *Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God.* And again, ver. 30: *why am I evil spoken of for that for which I give thanks?* Thus, by a more minute investigation of the words of our passage, we are led quite away from the allusion to a dualistic view of the world peculiar to Gnosticism. What we have here is substantially the same as what the apostle expresses in Tit. i. 15 by the words —*to the pure all things are pure, but to the defiled and the unbelieving nothing is pure;* and our passage only shows in addition, how in the case of the Christian, external things = meats, are, through his thanksgiving, received into the sanctifying relation to God in which he stands; so that the sanctifying influence of his inner life extends to outward things, while in the case of those others who boast of their *faith* and *wisdom*, the external world is, and remains, the mirror of their inward impurity. The apostle does not enter on a special refutation of the *forbidding to marry*. What he has said as to the misapprehension of the design of the creation in reference to *meats* may easily be applied also to this error; and then this error belonged to a period more remote from the present, as we find it noticed nowhere else in the epistles.

Ver. 6. The mention of the prophecy of a future falling away forms the basis of the following admonitions to Timothy. That the future and the present are here mixed up with each other in a very unsatisfactory way, as Schleiermacher maintains, is without foundation, for ver. 1—5 refer quite as clearly to the future as ver. 6, ss. do to the present. The description of that which threatens the future is designed to let Timothy know what it is necessary he should do in the present, and because the future was in its beginnings already present, and was future only in its more aggravated form, it is easily understood, why the truth which stands opposed to the future error in its full development, should have prominence given to it already in the present. What is there more unpauline in the transition here than in the similar one at 2 Tim. iii. 5? Or more unsatisfactory than 1 John iv. 3, ii. 18?—*Ταῦτα τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς ὑποτιθέμενος*, &c. Commentators differ in opinion as to the reference of *ταῦτα*. From the expression *ὑποτιθέμενος* (to put anything under the foot or into the hand of another, then to advise, admonish, also to instruct generally, comp. Passow; in the New Testament only here; comp. however Rom. xvi. 4) so much

only can be determined, that it cannot refer to anything already known, consequently not to ver. 16, *confessedly great is the mystery*, &c., as Heinrichs thinks, who arbitrarily makes iv. 1—5 to be parenthetical. But neither can ταῦτα refer to iii. 16; iv. 5; or to iv. 1—5, not so much because iv. 1, ss. does not stand in direct opposition to iii. 16, as De Wette has observed with respect to the former, comp. above; but rather on account of the clause that follows, namely, *thou shalt be a good servant*, &c., and on account of the connexion as traced above, according to which the mention and description of the future falling away is the basis of the admonitions which follow. The threatening danger lays on Timothy, as a good servant, the charge of making a vigorous resistance; this, however, cannot consist merely in the communication of the fact that such a falling away threatens to come, but in holding forth the truth which is opposed to those errors, as the apostle has correctly expressed it in vv. 4 and 5. This must appear still more on considering the following words, *nourished up*, &c., and those of ver. 7 (comp. below).[1] Scheliermacher has also seen it to be most natural to refer ταῦτα to vv. 4 and 5; only, he thinks that there was no need of mentioning the future falling away as the foundation of the instruction, vv. 4 and 5, inasmuch as it was already opposed to the errors then existing. As if it must not have been the strongest inducement to Timothy to resist the already existing beginnings of evil with all the power of the truth, to show him the danger that was to grow out of these beginnings! "If thou lay these things before the brethren, thou shalt be a good servant of Jesus Christ, who is nourished up in the words of faith and of the good doctrine to which thou hast attained." Διάκονος, in its general signification, as 2 Cor. iii. 6, vi. 4, &c. Ἐντρεφόμενος (comp. Winer, § 46, 5) is not put for the Perfect, but is properly the Present, and shows that the *words*, &c., are to be a permanent means of nourishment and culture to Timothy." Comp. ver. 12, and 2 Tim iii. 15. The expression occurs only here. Timothy would not show himself to be such a *servant*, &c., by repeating the prophecy which has just been mentioned by the apostle, but by

1 So already Scheliermacher p. 204: "If it (ταῦτα) refers to 1—3, then you can understand by the words ταῦτα ὑπ. nothing else than 'if thou dost diligently urge the warning against the future apostacy,' thou shalt be a good servant, &c., which indeed is as jejune as can be, and with which the following words (ἐντρεφ.) in particular do not at all agree."

counteracting the danger through the word of truth. *And of the good doctrine*—the apostle adds epexegetically, as the more special designation of the Christian doctrine in opposition to that error which, in respect to its contents, is characterized by the expressions *fables, genealogies*, and *commandments of men*, and which Timothy is charged to counteract; similarly elsewhere the *sound doctrine*, comp. on Tit. i. 9; ii. 1; 1 Tim. i. 10, vi. 3. Even the words, *to which thou hast attained*, involve an admonition. Timothy is to remain faithful to that to which he has attained. *Παρακολ.* comp. with 2 Tim. iii. 10, used nowhere else by the apostle. Scheliermacher, in support of his critical views, wishes us not to forget to place 2 Tim. iii. 10, 14, beside ver. 6, which passages we can compare without seeing anything to stumble at; in like manner also 2 Tim. ii. 15, 16.

Ver. 7. The mention of the *καλ. διδ.* reminds the apostle of that *ματαιολογία* which is opposed to it, and he is led by the antithetical reference to what he has just been saying, to speak directly of it in ver. 7. If Timothy is to effect anything in his opposition to the present errors, he must himself remain free from their infection, and there follows accordingly, a pointed reference to those errors of the present, in their two-fold form of a false theoretical and a false practical tendency. In opposition to *the words of the good doctrine*, the apostle first of all places the *profane and old wives' fables* with which he is to have nothing to do. I do not comprehend how De Wette could say, it is perhaps the theosophic systems called just before *doctrines of devils* that are here meant. Was it then necessary that Timothy should be warned against these doctrines, which are described as future, and as running directly counter to the truth? And do not the fables here clearly point to the fables named in i. 4, as belonging to the present (comp. with Tit. i. 14), and which are nowhere else characterized as strictly a heresy? Comp. the General Introduction, and the remarks on the passages adduced. The difference of designation here tends, De Wette thinks, to mislead the reader, but in this he acknowledges the incorrectness of his own interpretation. How simple and clear, on the contrary, does the passage become, when the *fables* (together with the *genealogies* and *commandments of men*) are viewed in the manner we have done, as appearances of the present which have a harmless look, but which might possibly lead to a falling away,

and which will in the future increase so as to stand in direct opposition to the truth. Only then is it conceivable that Timothy, while he is admonished to labour in opposition to the danger of the future, is warned against those appearances of the present. On μῦθοι see on Tit. i. 14, and above at i. 4. These *Jewish fables* are here styled *profane and old wives.'* On the first epithet comp. i. 9; besides vi. 20; 2 Tim. ii. 16. The word occurs elsewhere only at Heb. xii. 16. If these *fables* (comp. i. 4, &c.,) were things which bore no moral fruit, which had nothing to do with the real subject-matter of faith, and did not promote true piety, then we can easily understand why this epithet, "profane, unholy," should be applied to them. And it is difficult to see why they may not have been, at the same time, silly and anile. Comp. Planck against Schleiermacher. Dr Baur has explained γραώδης μ. to mean a myth which treats of an old matron—the Sophia-Aehamoth—which, apart from every other consideration, contradicts the derivation of the word from εἶδος, for example, θεοειδής. And then, what an unsuitable epithet beside that of *profane*, would be that which characterized these fables as treating of an old woman. Would there be in this any reason for warning Timothy against them? And then this epithet would only apply to a certain definite myth, while those myths in general, as they are said to be *profane*, could not be also characterized as γραώδεις. Enough however has already been said to show, that it is not the myths of the gnosis in the second century that are here meant. The *genealogies* and *commandments* are not specially mentioned here; these things are all connected with each other, hence, elsewhere, even when it is intended to give a connected view of them, sometimes one, and sometimes another is passed over in the enumeration (comp. Tit. i. 14 with iii. 9.) On the expression παραιτοῦ = to forbid one's self, comp. on Tit. iii. 10. But Timothy is also warned against another danger which is closely connected with the one just mentioned; as the being taken up with fables leads away from the true objects of knowledge, so also, and at the same time, from *godliness;* comp. i. 4, ss.; Tit. i. 1, 2; ii. 1, &c. Nay these pursuits add to the claim of a higher wisdom, that of a higher morality, on the ground of a false relation to the law, Tit i. 14, iii. 9; 1 Tim. i. 6, ss. In opposition then to being occupied with the fables, Timothy is also especially warned against

this false practical tendency of an ascetic nature : *but exercise thyself unto godliness.* We have only to compare i. 4, 5, in order fully to understand this new admonition. We have the same transition only in the reverse order also in 2 Tim. ii. 22, 23. The expression γυμνάζειν comp. Heb. v. 14, xii. 11 ; 2 Pet. ii. 14 = exercise thyself unto, in behalf of godliness) is occasioned by the antithetical allusion to these errors, comp. ver. 8. Others (Lösner) think that the apostle has been led by the expression ἐντρέφεσθαι to the metaphor taken from the gymnasium, as we read in Euripedes Phoen. V. 397, γυμνασίοις ἐντραφῆναι. But ἐντρέφ. does not necessarily lead to this metaphor, and besides it is removed further back by the παραιτοῦ to which γυμν. forms the immediate antithesis. For the understanding of ἐυσέβεια De Wette refers us to vi. 11, 12 ; 2 Tim. ii. 22. Comp. also 1 Tim. i. 4, 5.

Ver. 8. The exhortation to *godliness*, which has its seat principally in the heart, but from this as its centre extends to the whole life of the man, is now in ver. 8 confirmed by the negative statement which the apostle had already in his eye when he wrote γυμν. ver 7. Opposed to that godliness which has its root in the heart and from thence diffuses a sanctifying influence over what is without, is the asceticism which aims at reaching the inward man through what is outward, or, in its most degenerate form, abides merely by what is outward. This is evidently the light in which the apostle views the opposition between ἐυσέβεια and σωματικὴ γυμνασία. He has not here, however, in his mind that extremely degenerate form of asceticism which he has described in ver. 3, but the appearances of the present ; for, only with respect to these, could Timothy be warned, who, as we learn also elsewhere, was not without a leaning to them (comp. v. 23.) Ἡ γὰρ σωματικὴ γυμνασία he says quite generally, therefore not naming special errors. The words πρὸς ὀλίγον ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος = is profitable unto little (the opposite of πρὸς πάντα) is the opinion which he pronounces upon this tendency as a whole, as opposed to the *exercise unto godliness* which has its seat in the inner man. If we keep in view that the apostle in the expression σωμ. γυμν. aims at denoting the substantial nature of this tendency, the fundamental idea of all asceticism, though it is occasioned by actual occurrences on account of which Timothy is warned, we shall then not be surprised with De Wette and others, to find him ascribing a certain

profit to this exercise, because, as De Wette adds, it belongs to the doctrines of devils, ver. 1, on which objection we do not need to say anything farther. How could the apostle have entirely rejected *σωματικὴ, γυμν.* to which fasting, refraining from marriage or from conjugal intercourse for a season, 1 Cor. vii. 5, &c. belong? But it is likewise easy to be accounted for that the apostle generally, and here in an especial manner, while he has the abuse of it in his eye, restricts the advantage of this bodily exercise to an *ὀλίγον* in comparison with the exercise of godliness, which is directed to faith, love, &c. Secondly, De Wette and others stumble at the contrast which is here made between *ἐυσέβεια* and *σωματ. γυμν.* and their respective results. The small profit which attends *bodily exercise* must, it is said, be also of a moral kind, and therefore belong to *godliness*. How can this then be placed in opposition to the other? Only the *πνευματικὴ. γυμν.* can be rightly opposed to the *σωματικη γυμν.*—But does not the *ἐυσέβεια*, which can be viewed only as something internal, form an apt antithesis to an exercise which refers to what is external, to the *σῶμα*? Regard is not to be had here to the good effects which may possibly flow from bodily exercise, and which belong to the sphere of *godliness*, but to the specific fundamental idea of asceticism as expressed by *σωμ. γυμν.* in its opposition to that heart-piety which sanctifies the life. *But godliness is profitable unto all things*, continues the apostle; and we no longer stumble at the contrast which is here made, for by this very contrast the sense of *ἐυσέβεια* here is determined as signifying what is internal, which also the word in itself implies. And the words *unto all things* are further explained and amplified in the following—*having the promise of life, the present and the future.* Godliness, therefore, comprehends also the small advantage to be derived from *bodily exercise*, as it is profitable unto all things. *Πάντα* is not, with Bengel, to be understood as meaning omnia in corpore et anima; for *πρὸς ὀλίγον* cannot be understood of an advantage for the body, inasmuch as asceticism has no regard to such an advantage, but to a moral perfection. Calvin well: Qui pietatem habet isti nihil deest, etiamsi careat istis adminiculis. There is therefore no ground for maintaining, with De Wette, that "at all events, the writer has thought and written indistinctly." The view of many of the ancient expositors, as Chrysostom and Theophylact, who, out of respect for asceticism, understood the *σωμ*

γυμν. of bodily gymnastic exercises, and with whom, in more recent times, Mack and De Wette have coincided, according to which there would be nothing more than a verbal connexion in the thought, as such a species of exercise in reference to Timothy could not be once conceived of—this view is already refuted as a mere make-shift, by the fact that pains are taken to show the possibility of an intelligible interpretation in accordance with it.[1]—The objection which Schleiermacher still brings against our passage, namely, that if he could suppose Paul to be the author, he would look for a more full description of the *exercise unto godliness*, is obviated by the remarks already made in the Gen. Introd., § 4. He who reads the epistle consecutively can, moreover, be in no doubt as to what the apostle means.—*Ζωῆς τῆς νῦν καὶ τῆς μελλούσης* explains the *πρὸς πάντα ὠφέλ.* The genitive denotes the import of the promise, comp. 2 Tim. i. 1 ; 1 John ii. 25. This *life* promised to godliness is separated into the two parts *ἡ νῦν καὶ ἡ μέλλουσα.* On the article comp. Winer, § 19, 4, p. 160. This construction, which, by means of the repetition of the article before *μελλ.*, represents the two parts as independent—as also the allusion to *πρὸς πάντα*—shows that it was not the apostle's intention to say : godliness has the promise of the life which is a present, and at the same time a future life (= *τῆς καὶ νῦν καὶ μελλούσης*) ; in which case *ἡ νῦν ζωή* would itself signify " the true life of godliness" (Matthies), or " the true life of blessedness" (Mack), while *ζωή ἡ νῦν*, as De Wette has already observed in opposition to these, is evidently intended to represent the reward or fruit of godliness. Thus *ζωή ἡ νῦν* can only be (comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 19) the present life in contradistinction to the *ἡ μέλλ.*, that which follows it. With the *ζωῆς τῆς νῦν* are then to be associated such promises as we find in Deut. iv. 40, v. 33 ; Matth. vi. 33, xix. 29 ; Mark x. 29 (comp. also Eph. vi. 2, ss.) It does not exhaust the import of the expression, as De Wette observes, to explain it merely of *bona et commoda hujus vitae*, as the proper rendering of the genitive shows (comp. above) ; it is rather to be understood of a long and happy life, as, Eph. vi. 2, ss. The sentiment receives its necessary limitation through the following *καὶ*

1 Huther also adheres to this interpretation; " the apostle sets in opposition to the *γυμναζειν* which he enjoins upon Timothy the *γυμνάζειν* which was practised with much earnestness among the Greeks, although it *profited but little.*"—It is, however, of Timothy, not of the Greeks, that the writer of the epistle is here speaking (*γάρ*).

τ. μ., as also through the point of view from which the Christian regards life as a whole. Harless aptly observes on the passage in Ephesians: "Thus then the Christian knows that the cross is his first good, the earthly blessing which God gives him in any measure, the second good in which he is to rejoice; or if he knows not this, then he must consider every earthly joy as a curse, which hinders him from participating in his best good."[1]

Ver. 9. This assertion with regard to *godliness*, by which the admonition to Timothy to exercise himself therein is confirmed, is now itself corroborated in the words: *it is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation*, comp. i. 15. The emphatical form in which this sentence is expressed, is explained by the prediction, ver. 3, ss., which forms the basis of the admonition, ver. 6, ss.; this is the true antidote to those ascetic errors.

Ver. 10. This certainty the apostle now further confirms by reminding Timothy of the fact, that they are borne up by it amid all their labour and suffering. For what else—is the sense of the verse—do we endure labour and reproach, than on account of this hope? And the more laborious and reproachful this apostolic calling is, the more strongly does it confirm this hope; as Baumgarten well observes. I prefer to take the εἰς τοῦτο as having reference to the following ὅτι, not as pointing back to the promise made with respect to godliness in ver. 8; in which latter case, the *life which is to come* is generally taken by itself, as the *life which now is* would not agree very well with *we labour*, and *suffer reproach*. The sentence appears to me thus to contain a more strict confirmation of the πιστὸς ὁ λόγος. Accordingly, εἰς τοῦτο is = "from regard to this that," not = "for this" (namely, for the *promise*.) **Καὶ κοπιῶμεν καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεθα**—not κοπιῶμεν without καὶ, and καὶ ἀγωνιζόμεθαι, the former of which is preferred by Tischendorf, though the latter reading has also weighty authorities in its favour (comp. in Tischendorf). **Ὀνειδιζόμεθα**, as passive, might seem strange in the connexion in which it here stands. It is a concise expression of the idea = we suffer it that we are reproached. **Κοπιάω** denotes the *laborious* work of the apostolic calling, a word frequently used by the apostle, 1 Cor. xv. 10; Gal. iv. 11; Phil. ii. 16, &c.

1 Huther differently: "For the present and future life." The idea would then be simple; but the question is, whether, contrary to common usage, the ζωή can here signify anything else than the object.

The perfect tense in *ἠλπίκαμεν* (comp. 1 Cor. xv. 19; 2 Cor. i. 10), "because we have set our hope," represents the hope in which their laborious calling rests, as the enduring result of the act of mind denoted by *ἠλπίκαμεν*. The expression *θεὸς ζῶν* does not indeed signify: the God who bestows that life mentioned in ver. 8; it doubtless, however, contains a retrospective reference to the promise of life, ver. 8. *Ἐπί* as at Rom. xv. 12. The accessary clause, *who is the Saviour*, &c., is expressed not from the point of view occupied by every Christian, but from that of those whose hope is to them an impelling motive to take labour and shame upon themselves in order that they may lead as many as possible to this *salvation*; this indeed is indicated by the words, *we both labour*, &c.[1] Schleiermacher has stumbled at the words *all men*, because, according to Paul, only *those who believe* can be saved unto life everlasting. But God is here, as elsewhere, called *Saviour*, because he has provided salvation for all (comp. i. 15, ii. 4), and has opened up to them the possibility of everlasting life. *Chiefly of them that believe* it is further said, inasmuch as only in them is the purpose accomplished; with which Gal. vi. 10, *especially to them who are of the household of faith*, is to be compared, as Baumgarten observes. De Wette thinks the word *μάλιστα* to be not quite suitable, —but what other word should have been used?

Ver. 11. That which the apostle has held up before Timothy as a certain truth, first of all, for his own individual reflection, is to be enjoined by Timothy upon others, and taught to them, (comp. on *παραγγ.* i. 3.)

Ver. 12. This last injunction leads the apostle again to a series of admonitions, in which he reminds Timothy how he is rightly to wait upon his calling as a teacher.—*Let no one despise thy youth* (comp. Tit. ii. 15), inasmuch as the fulfilment of the commission which has already been mentioned depends upon this as a condition. The exhortation is not addressed to the church;[2] but, as the following *ἀλλὰ τύπος γίνου* shows, to Timothy. He is by his conduct to make himself to be respected in spite of his youth. Some have stumbled at the *νεότης* here mentioned (comp. 2 Tim. ii. 23.) But others have already shown (comp., for example, Mack), that Timothy, according to the account in Acts xvi. 1—3,

[1] Huther, *ὅς ἐστι*, &c., for thus only can the hope of life be directed towards him.
[2] Huther: to the church.

was still young when he joined himself to the apostle; that between this time and the liberation from the Roman imprisonment, eleven years intervene, and therefore that Timothy might still be young; chiefly, however, that his position at that time must be taken into view; in relation to the presbyters of the church (comp. v. 1, *ὡς πατέρα*) reference might certainly be made with the utmost propriety to Timothy's youth. When he, a man of perhaps thirty to thirty-six years of age, ordained presbyters, iii. 1, ss.—or exhorted presbyters of sixty years, and even older, v. 1—or called them to account, v. 19, must not his youth have presented a contrast, especially as it was the custom to connect qualification for the government of the church with age as its condition; unless his personal conduct procured for him a respect which might have been denied to him on account of his youth? Comp. besides, 1 Cor. xvi. 11. On the construction of the words, *μηδείς σου τῆς νεότητος καταφρ.* comp. Winer, § 30, Q. p. 232. We might take the one genitive as genitive of the thing, and the other as that of the person, "which, however, is not necessary."—The following words show how Timothy is to secure such a respect for himself as may make his youth to be forgotten: *but be thou an example*, &c. He is to present in his own person a pattern of the believers, and that in speech, in conduct, in love, in faith, in purity. On *τύπος*, comp. Tit. ii. 7; Phil. iii. 17. *Λόγος*, in contradistinction to the *ἀναστροφή*, is word, speech in general. *In faith* and *in love* denote the moral principles from which all right conduct must proceed. As their result purity is denoted. *Ἁγνεία*, not specially "chastity," but purity generally, comp. 2 Cor. vi. 6, vii. 11, &c. On the omission of the article with the nouns, comp. Winer, § 18, 1, p. 136. *Ἐν πνεύματι* = in manifestation of the Spirit, is wanting in A.C.D.F.G. all. verss. pl. patt. Against Schleiermacher, who explains the transition to the *μηδείς σου*, &c., as an imitation of Tit. ii. 15, De Wette observes, that these and the following admonitions have a tolerably natural connexion with what goes before, as already from ver. 6 onwards, Timothy's conduct was spoken of.

Ver. 13. The apostle here urges him to the diligent exercise of his calling itself. Till I come (comp. iii. 14, ss.), he writes, attend to reading, exhortation, instruction. The practice of reading publicly the holy scriptures of the Old Testament had been transferred from the Jewish synagogue to the Christian assemblies; with the

ἀνάγνωσίς were connected (comp. the passages first adduced) the *λόγος παρακλήσεως* and the *διδασκαλία*. The former is the discourse addressed to the feelings and will of the hearers, the latter, to their understanding; both corresponding nearly to our *sermon*. Thus does Justin also describe generally (Apol. I. 67, ed. Oberth, comp. in Heydenreich, Mack) the Christian assemblies. It is impossible definitely to say, when the writings of the New Testament were joined to this *ἀνάγνωσις* of the Old Testament. Their publication, as we may gather from 1 Thess. v. 27, Col iv. 16, was effected by their being read before the church; but the question is, at what period this public reading became customary, for then only were they first annexed to those of the Old Testament, as the continuation of the canon. So much, at all events, we may suppose as certain, that the apostle had here only the scriptures of the Old Testament in his mind—comp. on this point Thiersch. a. a. O., p. 344, ss. It will not do to understand *παράκλησις* of private admonition, as the apostle could not intend to enjoin merely the *ἀνάγνωσις* on Timothy with reference to the public assemblies, and as it can be shown that the *παράκλησις* followed the *ἀνάγνωσις*. We shall therefore have to refer the third member also, the *διδασκαλία*, not to privata institutio, but likewise to public worship; for in this the *διδασκαλία* as distinct from the *παρακλήσις*, was certainly no less necessary. So also Olshausen. On the asyndeton, Winer, § 66, IV., p. 682.

Ver. 14. The foregoing positive exhortation is here again urged in its negative form. Timothy is not to let the gift that dwells in him—what gift is shown in ver. 13—lie unused. *Μὴ ἀμέλει*—Bengel well: negligit qui non exercit. The word *ἀμέλ.* also at Heb. ii. 3, viii. 9; Matth. xxii. 5; 2 Pet. i. 12. On *χάρισμα* Mack says with truth, that with the exception of 1 Pet. iv. 10, it is used only by Paul. Comp. on Rom. xii. 6, ss.; 1 Cor. xii. 4, ss.[1] It is the gift of the divine Spirit which is meant, that gift which qualifies him for the preaching of the gospel, for the *work of an evangelist* (2 Tim. iv. 5), and which he had to make use of at present in the service of a particular church. On the *ἐν σοί*, comp. 2 Tim. i. 6, where the gift is represented as a spark of the Spirit lying within him, the kindling of which depends on the will of him on whom the gift is bestowed. So here also the use of the *χάρισμα*

[1] On the charismata in general, comp. Neander, a. a. O. I. p. 232.

is made to depend on the will of Timothy. *Ὃ ἐδόθη*, &c. = "which was given thee through prophecy with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery." *Διὰ προφητείας* cannot be rendered, as Mack does, on the ground of i. 18, "on account of prophecyings," for what meaning would there be in—"on account of prophecyings which were connected with the laying on of hands, was the gift imparted to him?" The connexion of *μετὰ ἐπιθ.* with *διά* rather makes it necessary, as the laying on of hands is to be conceived of as the means (comp. 2 Tim. i. 6), to understand *διά* = through, by means of; and *διὰ—πρεσβυτερίου*, then, as De Wette also observes, denotes the whole process through which the communication of the gift was mediated. It is not characteristic enough of the *ἐπίθεσις τῶν*, &c., to understand *διά* merely = under, in. On *προφητ.* comp. at i. 18. With respect to the *laying on of hands*,[1] comp. Acts xiii. 3, where we read that hands were laid in prayer on the apostle Paul and Barnabas, by the prophets and teachers at Antioch, in order to separate them *for the work* to which they were called; Acts vi. 6, where we read that, in like manner, hands were laid in prayer by the apostles on the newly-elected deacons, in order to impart to them the gift of the Spirit for their ministry. It is in every case an appropriation of the gift of the Spirit in prayer through the instrumentality of others for a definite object, for a *work* which is undertaken, or a service which is entered upon, whether this service be marked out in a standing office or not. It cannot be directly proved whether this laying on of hands took place in the case of presbyters, but it is to be presumed a priori that it did, and passages such as Acts xiv. 23, xx. 28, strongly countenance the supposition. Not so closely connected with what we have here is that which we find in Acts viii. 17, xix. 6, comp. with Heb. vi. 2; for in these passages indeed it is a *laying on of hands* for the communication of the Spirit that is spoken of, not, however, for a definite sphere of duty, or a special calling, but for the general calling of the Christian, spontaneously to serve with that which he is and has, and to testify the new life of the Spirit. Comp. Hofmann a. a. O. II. p. 243.[2] This use of the

[1] Comp. Neander a. a. O. I. 267.

[2] This *ἐπιθεσις χειρῶν*, which in Heb. vi. 2 is represented as belonging to the *foundation* and the *first principles of the doctrine of Christ*, is that to which our confirmation does not correspond, but ought to correspond. What important results chiefly

laying on of hands belongs, it is well known, to the Old Testament; comp. here chiefly Num. xxvii. 18—20; Deut. xxxiv. 9; passages such as Gen. xlviii. 14; Matth. xix. 13. Mark xvi. 18, Luke xiii. 13, &c., belong only to the idea which lies at the foundation of the laying on of hands in general. *Τοῦ πρεσβυτηρίου*: the eldership of that district to which Timothy belonged laid hands on him (Acts xvi. 1, ss.) The gift of teaching, which is here referred to, was not needed by Timothy for the first time when he was left in Ephesus, but from the beginning onwards; comp. 2 Tim. i. 6, where, as also in the whole epistle, no mention is made of his temporary position in Ephesus. The expression is therefore not to be explained of a consecration to his special calling in Ephesus.[1] The term *πρεσβυτέριον* (comp. Luke xxii. 66; Acts xxii. 5) cannot be understood of a number of presbyters then assembled; this were inadmissible, both grammatically and historically. Historically—because the expression was fixed in its application to a united whole, as the passages adduced show (comp. also Plank, p. 41), and because, as has been shown in the Gen. Introd. § 8, the existence together of several Christian presbyters cannot be conceived of apart from a collegial union; grammatically—because a number of presbyters cannot, according to the idea of the thing, be called *πρεσβυτέριον*. Even De Wette observes, in opposition to Schleiermacher, on *πρεσβυτέριον*, "The institution and the name are, in my opinion, not to be suspected." So also Olshausen. He, in like manner, acknowledges that a comparison with 2 Tim. i. 6, in which the laying on of hands is ascribed to the apostle, presents a difficulty which can be removed in a natural way by the combination of both passages. It will at once be seen too, why in the passage in 2 Tim. the apostle especially directs the attention of Timothy to the part which he acted in the communication of the gift to him. Comp. the Commentary. We find a similar discrepancy in Gal. ii. 1, ss., comp. with Acts xv. 1, ss.; such differences necessarily arise from the difference of aim which a writer may have in describing the same thing at different times.

relating to our church as it at present exists, are connected with the right understanding of that which pertains to the *ἐπιθ. τ. χ.*, others have already shown, comp. Zeitschrift für Prot. W. K. B. 18, p. 1, ss. Bd. 19, h. 6 Dr Höfling das Sacram. der Taufe II. § 172, ss.

1 Huther is certainly wrong in explaining it of the introduction to office in Ephesus.

Ver. 15. *Ταῦτα μελέτα*, and still stronger *ἐν τούτοις ἴσθι*, continues the apostle, after referring to the gift imparted to Timothy, which we are to connect with ver. 12—14. *Μελετάω* is certainly not used by the apostle anywhere else, but it belongs to the New Testament usage, Acts iv. 25 ; Mark xiii. 11. The *ἐν τούτοις ἴσθι* is the Latin omnis or totus sum in aliqua re, "to be absorbed in a thing," so to speak. "That thy progress may be manifest to all." For *πᾶσι*, not *ἐν πᾶσι*, is the true reading, according to the critical authorities. The design of this additional clause appears from the above, *let no one despise thy youth*, ver. 12. *Προκοπή* only here and Phil. i. 12, 25 ; therefore specifically Pauline. The nature of the *progress* is determined by the reference to ver. 12—14.

Ver. 16. "Take heed unto thyself and unto the doctrine ; continue in it. The apostle sums up in these words what is said from ver. 12—15. Duo sunt curanda bono pastori, ut docendo invigilet et se ipsum purum custodiat, &c., Calvin. On *ἐπέχειν* comp. Luke xiv. 7 ; Acts iii. 5. *Ἐπιμένειν* occurs only with *ἐπί* in the sense, "to remain with any one," Acts xxviii. 14, in the writings of the apostle only with *πρός*, 1 Cor. xvi. 7, Gal. i. 18 ; on the other hand in a tropical sense, and with reference to things, it is also used elsewhere by the apostle, and only by him, Rom. vi. 1, xi. 22, 23 ; Col. i. 23. The expression must be understood in this latter sense here, for it is not persons that are spoken of by whom Timothy is to abide, but things to which he is to be entirely devoted ; comp. also 2 Tim. iii. 14. Thus also the indefinite *αὐτοῖς* as neuter, will have reference to the *ταῦτα . . . ἐν τούτοις*, ver. 15. "If thou doest this thou shalt save thyself and them that hear thee." One cannot comprehend why this, in reference to Timothy, is to be understood of a higher recompense, in reference to others, of the *σωτηρία* merely (De Wette.) The words intimate that it is the same *salvation* in regard to both, and the important truth is here conveyed, that faithfulness in his calling is for the teacher the condition of his own salvation, that in performing his duty to others he is at the same time caring for his own soul's salvation.

§ 5. DIRECTIONS TO TIMOTHY WITH RESPECT TO HIS CONDUCT TOWARDS THE MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH, ACCORDING TO THE DISTINCTIONS OF AGE, SEX, AND POSITION WITHIN THE CHURCH.

(Chap. v. 1—25.

This section, the contents of which may be summarily stated as above, consists of several parts. First of all, in vv. 1, 2, directions are shortly given to Timothy, how rightly to conduct himself towards the members of the church, according to the distinctions of age and sex. In vv. 3—16 the apostle treats more fully of how he is to act with regard to the widows, and more especially, in vv. 3—8, with regard to the widows in general, and in vv. 9—16 to those who are to receive the ecclesiastical distinction of the viduatus. In vv. 17—19 he treats of the *προεστῶτες πρεσβύτεροι* in contradistinction to those mentioned in i. 1. In vv. 20—25 of his conduct towards members of the church who fall into sin, their punishment and restoration, with which is interwoven an admonition to Timothy himself.

Vv. 1 and 2. Rebuke not a *πρεσβύτερος*—elderly person—but admonish him as a father; younger persons as brethren; *πρεσβύτερας*—elderly women—as mothers; younger as sisters, in all purity. On the connexion with the preceding, Leo well observes: quam supra scripsisset, nemini licere ex juventate Timothei ejus despiciendi occasionem sumere, nunc jam ipsum hortatur Timotheum, ut semper memor suae *νεότητος*; ita se gerat erga seniores uti revera deceat virum juniorem. That *πρεσβύτερος* here, as in Acts ii. 17, is not the official name, but merely the designation of age, is evident from its being opposed to *νεωτέρους* and *πρεσβύτερας*, as also from ver. 17, where presbyters properly so-called come first to be spoken of. The expression *ἐπιπλήσσειν*, properly to strike upon = "to rebuke sharply," only here. As it is a stronger expression than *ἐλέγχειν*, and *ἐπιτιμάω* is neither equivalent to it, nor is itself used oftener than once by the apostle (2 Tim. iv. 2), nothing remains of Schleiermacher's objection except that the word is just a *ἅπαξ. λεγ.*, like many other expressions in the other epistles, and a very appropriate word. The same applies, as Planck has already remarked, to his objections

against ὄντως, ver. 3, against ἔκγονα, ver. 4, which Schleiermacher himself sufficiently explains from the Septuagint. The παρακάλει ὡς πατέρα is opposed to ἐπιπλ. His zeal in the fulfilment of his office must not come into collision with the reverence due to age; and, with regard to those who are younger, must not lead to the violation of that equality which is not removed by his office. In accordance with the position which naturally belongs to him is the servant of Jesus Christ to fulfil his official duties, which have regard to the care of souls. The opposite of this is the κυριεύειν. The words *with all purity* are, with the most of commentators, to be referred specially to the last point. Chrysostom: μηδὲ ὑποψίαν, φησὶ, δῷς.

Vv. 3—16. OF THE WIDOWS. The passage is difficult, and is variously interpreted by different commentators. The principal difference consists in this—that some separate vv. 3—8 from ver. 9, ss., and regard the former section as containing directions of a more general kind with respect to the duties of widows in their every-day life, and according to their circumstances, the latter as containing instructions either as to their provision from the church, or their appointment as deaconesses. Others again understand vv. 3—16 as treating of widows in one and the same respect, and that in vv. 3—8, as well as in ver. 9, ss., rules are laid down with reference to the support which they are to receive from the church. Others again understand vv. 3—8 of the church provision, but ver. 9, ss., of the appointment of deaconesses. And how many various shades do these differences assume when we come to the interpretation of the particular parts! As representatives of the first view we would name here only Schleiermacher, Böttger, and Matthies, the two former of whom agree also in understanding ver. 9, ss., of the appointment of widows as deaconesses, while Matthies understands the passage primarily of their support. Planck, Baumgarten, and Neander may be named as representatives of the second view, which is also the one more commonly taken; while Mack has contended for the third of the opinions above adduced. I confess that I myself was formerly inclined to the second view, according to which vv. 3—16 treats of the support which the widows are to receive from the church; but a renewed investigation of the passage has led me to substantially the same view as that which De Wette gives, and which he prefaces by saying, that he thinks

he has, by means of it, made clear the interpretation of this difficult passage. So also Leo, Exc. ii. But chiefly does Mosheim deserve here to be gratefully mentioned, who has already given substantially the same explanation, and has so conclusively proved it that we cannot help wondering that it should ever have been rejected. The points from which the differences proceed are the interpretation of ver. 4 and ver. 9, *χήρα καταλεγέσθω*, &c.

Ver. 3. *Χήρας τίμα, τὰς ὄντως χήρας.* The apostle in these words passes to a new and special relation of life, while in vv. 1 and 2 he was dealing with the differences of age and sex,—only, however, in the case of the *παρακαλεῖν*; accordingly, here also, he does not give rules of life embracing the whole conduct. With the mention of the *χῆραι* comes immediately into view the special relation in which Timothy has to do with them—their need of support, comp. Acts vi. 1. We must not, however, conclude from vv. 1 and 2, as Schleiermacher and others following him have done, that because there the conduct of Timothy towards different persons is spoken of, here also *τιμάν* in reference to the widows can only be understood of his conduct in general, as consisting in the showing of that respect which is due to them. For, on the one hand, *μὴ ἐπιπλ.*, with that which is opposed to it—*παρακάλει*—cannot be said to denote Timothy's conduct in general, and on the other, the mention of the *χήραι* carries with it the special relation in which he stands towards them. The writer also in vv. 17, 19, 20, 22, and, finally, ver. 23, as well as here, passes suddenly to what is new. Chiefly, however, it is apparent from ver. 4 (comp. below), with which vv. 8, 16, 17 are to be compared, that *τιμάω* here must be taken in the definite sense of honouring by providing for. We do not say that *τιμάω* means precisely "to support," but that it signifies an honour which was to show itself in giving support to those on whom it was to be conferred, must have been self-evident to Timothy, in accordance with the relation in which he stood to them. Comp. Matt. xv. 4, 6; Acts xxviii. 10. Reference has already been made in connexion with this to Acts vi. 1. This care for the widows was transferred from the Jewish economy; comp. only Deut. xvi. 11, xiv. 29, xxiv. 17, 19; Ex. xxii. 22, ss., &c.; Winer, RWB., under *widow*. Then Ign. ad Polyc. c. 4, *χῆραι μὴ ἀμελείσθωσαν*. Just. M. Apol; 1 (al. 2), 67; *τὸ συλλεγόμενον παρὰ τῷ προεστῶτι ἀποτίθεται, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπικουρεῖ ὀρφα-*

νοῖς τε καὶ χήραις. (De Wette on the passage.) Τὰς ὄντως χήρας the apostle adds by way of more definitely describing the class of individuals of whom he speaks. Schleiermacher maintains that by this expression can only be understood widows of the right character; and he is quite right if his interpretation of τιμάν be the true one. But with that interpretation this assertion also falls to the ground. Not only is the manifest sense of ver. 16 against it, but chiefly vv. 4 and 5, from which we learn what the apostle means by ἡ ὄντως χήρα.

Ver. 4. The apostle proceeds: εἰ δέ τις χήρα, &c., but if any widow have children or descendants, they should first learn to show piety towards their own house, and to requite their parents, &c.—Τὰς ὄντως χήρας—the apostle has said before with emphasis. When now he proceeds to say: *but if any widow*, it is quite evident that these words stand opposed to the *widows indeed*. From this opposition, the idea implied in the *widow indeed* finds its explanation. But this opposition is overlooked when, with Schleiermacher, Matthies, and others, we find in vv. 4 and 5 a description of the *widow indeed* in these two circumstances, namely, that she has had children, and that she is destitute. Wherefore, then, the πρῶτον, which receives a sense from the context only through the antithetical relation to ver. 3? Why is not ἡ ὄντως χήρα the subject? And why in ver. 5 is it said, *but she that is a widow indeed*, implying opposition to what precedes, seeing that according to this interpretation ver. 4 also speaks of a *widow indeed*? Ἡ δὲ μεμονωμένη would then be the only thing in which there would be any opposition to ver. 4. And if the design is to describe the right widow, it is surely altogether incongruous to say, *let them first learn*, for as right widows they must already have learned this. And why then in ver. 5 ἤλπικεν and not the imperative as in ver. 4? It is no sufficient reason for this to say, that the writer has only now bethought him of the right construction. Moreover, it does not do, as we shall immediately see, to make the widows the subject of the μανθαν, as must be done in this interpretation. If, on the contrary, we understand the words, *but if any widow*, &c., as opposed to the *widow indeed*, and consequently as determining who is to be regarded as a widow and who is not, which seems to be required by the words ὄντως χήρα placed emphatically at the conclusion of ver. 3, then all is clear. Ver. 4 then

says that she is not such a *widow indeed* and needing support who has children or descendants; such a one is to be referred to her own family, who, ere it falls to Timothy to perform the duty expressed by the τιμάν, must first learn to show piety towards their own household. And in opposition to such a one is the *widow indeed*, ver. 5: she is, therefore, described as one quite desolate, who has no longer any to care for her, exactly as in ver. 16. Schleiermacher gives the true meaning of ἔκγονα when he applies to this passage the gloss of Hesychius ἔκγονα, τέκνα τέκνων; comp. p. 61. It has already been remarked that the subject of *let them learn* is not the widows, but the *children or descendants*. The proof of this lies in the antithetical relation of ver. 4 to ver. 3, not in the verb being plural, which might certainly be used also with reference to the εἴ τις χήρα, in so far as she represents a case that would frequently occur (although ii. 5 is somewhat different.) For, in opposition to the direction given to Timothy to support those who are widows indeed, it cannot be said: but such widows as have persons belonging to them ought to fulfil their duty towards them—but only, such widows ought to receive requiting love from them. Even though we should understand τιμάν quite generally of holding in respect, the antithesis requires that we take τέκνα as the subject. But as the widows could not be referred to their own families to receive this general respect, it is plain that even τιμάν must be understood in the sense we have given to it, as is shown also by the expression ἀμοιβὰς ἀποδιδόναι. According to our interpretation πρῶτον also receives its definite sense (comp. above); and, farther, the expression εὐσεβεῖν can only be understood of the obligation of children to show piety to their parents, not, vice versa, of parents towards their children. And how far-fetched must be the meaning assigned to the words, *and requite their parents*, if the widow is the subject, for then the only sense that can be given to the words is, that they are to requite the care which they have received from their parents by showing the same care towards their own children. And are we to suppose then that the widows in Ephesus were so forgetful of their duty, as that they required to be exhorted in this way to the first and most natural of all obligations! Εὐσεβεῖν denotes the pious disposition becoming a child which, also in old people, by virtue of the same religiously moral idea that connects the fourth command-

ment of the decalogue with the third, is so common in reference to parents. magistrates, and honourable persons in general; comp. Passow. Consequently it does not signify here: to be pious in reference to their own family, as those render who make the widows the subject; comp. Acts xvii. 23. But it is said that *τὸν ἴδον οἶκον* does not agree with our interpretation. As the writer, however, has no definite family relation in his eye (*children or descendants*) he was under the necessity of using a general expression, and then, as De Wette thinks, the expression *οἶκον* may also convey the idea that this *εὐσεβεῖν* denotes a thing of family feeling and family honour. *Τὸν ἴδιον* evidently stands in opposition to the relation in which the widow stands to the church from which she is to receive support, which is to her in a relative point of view —strange. On *πρόγονοι*, finally, which has likewise been found unsuitable, De Wette observes: "*πρόγ.* parents and grandfather and grandmother, is used of those who are still alive, Plat. legg. XI., p. 931, sqq. It is plural because used of mother or grandmother." The expression, *let them learn*, shows, moreover, that abuses in this respect had crept into the church, and that widows sought support from the church who had relations that were able to provide for them. *For this is acceptable before God*, comp. ii. 3, from which the *καλὸν καί* of the received version has been transferred into the text of our passage; comp. Tischendorf.

Ver. 5. De Wette says well: "*The widow indeed* is now spoken of, and that in special opposition to ver. 4, as one who is desolate; not, however, for the purpose of saying that she is to be "honoured" by the church (for this has already been said, ver. 3), but in order to bring into view the conditions under which this honour is to be given." The words, *but she who is a widow indeed*, can, in opposition to ver. 4, be understood only of her who is wholly bereft and destitute, not of the true widow who is what she should be; and *καὶ μεμονωμένη* is an epexegetical explanation of *ἡ ὄντως χήρα*. If, with Schleiermacher and others, we take *ἡ ὄντως χήρα* = the right widow (in respect to disposition and character) and *καὶ μεμονωμένη* not as an explanation but as an additional characteristic, we should then have the false antithesis, according to which the widow described in the preceding verse would be not a right widow in point of character, or rather the words *ἡ δὲ ὄντως χήρα* would form no antithesis at all, and this would only be

formed by the supplementary expression μεμον., which is logically impossible. It is objected to our interpretation, that if μεμον. were explanatory it would have the article. (Matthies.) And why should it not also have the article if μεμον. forms an additional characteristic? The reason why καὶ μεμον. is placed after ἡ δὲ ὄντως χήρα appears to me to be, that the writer wants to connect η ὄντως as before, immediately with χήρα, and not to place μεμον. directly beside ἡ ὄντως; but if μεμον. had been placed before instead of after, it would in no case have received the article, as it would have formed one and the same idea with ἡ ὄντως. But it is further objected to this interpretation (Leo), that the ὄντως χήρα could not have been opposed to the σπαταλῶσα, ver. 6, if ἡ ὄντως χήρα were not vidua pia et proba. In reply to this we have simply to say, that σπαταλῶσα, ver. 6, is not opposed to ἡ ὄντως χήρα, ver. 5, but to the ὄντως χήρα described in ver. 5, who hopes in God and continues in prayer. As ἡ δὲ ὄντως χήρα, ver. 5, is opposed to the widow, ver. 4, so ἡ δὲ σπατ. is opposed to the widow as described in ver. 5. But if the apostle meant to be connected with ἡ ὄντως χήρα only the idea of destitution, it is asked, how could he have added the words *trusteth in God and continueth*, &c., seeing that these apply to a widow not qua destitute, but qua a right widow? In reply to this reasoning it will suffice to refer to 1 Cor. vii. 33, 34: *he that is unmarried careth for the things that belong to the Lord . . . but he that is married careth for the things of the world.* As the apostle in that passage, viewing the work of one's life as determined by the circumstances of one's life says, *he careth for*—so in the passage before us, he says, *she trusteth in*, although he knows, ver. 6, that there are also such as *live in pleasure*. The work of an ὄντως χήρα, *i.e.* of one who is bereft and desolate, as determined by the removal of all that once bound her to life, is denoted by ἤλπικε, &c., and by the indicative form is represented as a thing which is self-evident. The design of ver. 5, however, as is also to be well considered, is not to farther explain the idea expressed in ὄντως χήρα, and to add another characteristic to that contained in ver. 4; for the idea in ὄντως χήρα has already been made sufficiently clear in ver. 4. Nor would it correspond to this, that ἤλπικε, &c., denotes what is self-evident in regard to every desolate widow, but ver. 5 would then rather have to be explained on the supposition

of its being opposed to such widows as are indeed desolate, but do not trust in God. But the design of ver. 5 is rather, as De Wette has already remarked, after it has been laid down in ver. 4, what is meant by a *widow indeed*, to specify the conditions under which the apostle lays on Timothy the charge *to honour those who are widows indeed*. "The condition," says De Wette rightly, not "the reason," for then, either the widow, ver. 5, must have been described in opposition to ver. 4 as standing in need of support, which is not the case, or ver. 5 must be viewed as affording an additional characteristic of the *widow indeed*, and must be understood of her worthiness, as a reason why she should receive support, against which what is necessary has already been said. What reason the apostle has for specifying this condition, appears from ver. 6, and from the injunction to Timothy: *these things give in charge that they may be blameless*.—Ἤλπικεν ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν, here the accus., above at iv. 10, the dative; see Winer, § 53, i., p. 485. The accus. denotes the direction of the mind towards God; the dative, on the other hand, denotes God as the being on whom the hope rests. On the perfect, comp. on iv. 10 and Winer, § 41, 4, p. 315. That ἤλπικεν ἐπὶ. θ. is not to be understood as limited to temporal provision, and thus, as opposed to ver. 4, is evident from what follows, and from the antithesis in ver. 6. Καὶ προσμένει—Leo well: nam ex fiducia in Deo sponte fluit ardor precum.[1] On the difference between δέησις and προσευχή = asking and prayer, comp. on Phil. iv. 6. On the repetition of the article, see Winer, § 18, 5, p. 148.

Ver. 6. In opposition, not to the ὄντως χήρα merely, but to the ὄντως χήρα as just described, the words of this verse are to be understood. *She who lives in pleasure is dead while she lives.* Quippe quae nec naturaliter jam nec spiritualiter frugi sit, as Bengal observes. On σπαταλάω, comp. Jam. v. 5. On the whole verse, Matth. viii. 22, &c. As the apostle does not in ver. 5 give an additional reason for giving support, so also is ver. 6 not to be regarded as containing a reason for withholding support, but rather as the negative side of that which the apostle looks for in a *widow indeed*, and which Timothy is to enjoin, ver. 7.

Ver. 7. Καὶ ταῦτα παράγγελλε (= command i. 3.) Ταῦτα

[1] Huther connects this aptly with the case of Anna. Luke ii. 37.

is referred to vv. 3—6, or to vv. 4—6, or to vv. 5 and 6. The last is the correct way, as De Wette has already observed. The connexion with ver. 8 certainly seems to be in favour of referring ταῦτα to vv. 4—6. It seems that if ταῦτα is extended to ver. 4, then the apostle might naturally go on to say in ver. 8: but if any one in spite of your command does not do this, &c. Then also the much stronger expression in ver. 8, in comparison with the *blameless*, ver. 7, would receive a more natural explanation, although De Wette does not admit this. Nevertheless it appears to me more suitable to refer ταῦτα only to vv. 5 and 6, and not to make the subject of ὅσι to consist of elements so different, namely, children, and descendants, and widows. The ταῦτα παραγγ. has then a much more definite reference, and shows plainly the design of what is said in vv. 5 and 6 respecting the *widow indeed*. It terminates at ver. 7, and the apostle in ver. 8 turns back to ver 4. The real widows are to be supported by you; those who are not real, by their own family. If they do not this (ver. 8), then, &c.

Ver. 8. "But if any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an unbeliever." It is now quite evident that τις, ver. 8, is not to be understood of the widow, but of those belonging to her, on which see ver. 4. The ἴδιοι and οἰκεῖοι differ from each other in the same way as relations in general from those of the same house in particular; of course there is no allusion here to the οἰκείους τῆς πίστεως, Gal. vi. 10, as is plain from the context, and from τῆς πίστεως not being added. Comp. Ephes. ii. 19: qui ad domum Dei pertinent, the inmates of his house; so here also in the natural sphere of bodily relationship. The sense of προνοεῖν is explained by ver. 4. The word is used again by the apostle only at Rom. xii. 17; 2 Cor. viii. 21. *Hath denied the faith*, namely, by his works, inasmuch as he practically disowns the obligation to love, which springs from the essence of faith, even in regard to those who are corporeally most nearly related to him. The Protestant expositor must heartily subscribe to what Mack here so aptly observes, "Faith, in the apostle's sense of the term, cannot exist without having love in it; for the subject-matter of faith is not a mere thing of the intellect, but the divine grace and truth to which he who believes yields up his mind, as he who loves yields up his heart (he who believes is eo ipso he who loves, and there-

fore yields not merely the mind but the heart: *for with the heart man believeth*, Rom. x. 10); the subject-matter of faith is also the object of love, &c." On *ἀρνεῖσθαι*, comp. on Tit. i. 16. On *ἀπίστου χείρων*, comp. Matth. v. 46, 47.

Ver. 9. The interpretation of this verse will determine that of the following passage vv. 9—16. Does the apostle still speak of widows here in the same point of view as in ver. 3, namely, with reference to the provision to be made for them, or does he here pass to something else with respect to widows, and if so, to what else? Each of the views that are here possible to be taken —and especially the first, according to which, ver. 9. ss., is to be understood in the same respect as ver. 3, ss., namely, of the provision to be made for the widows by the church, and which is found in Theodoret, Chrysostom (hom. in h. l.), Oecumenius, Theophylact, and Hieronymus (comp. De Wette)—has found its representatives in the most recent time, as has already been observed above. In the first place—to go at once into the principal question, whether something new begins here or not—every one must admit that the words *χήρα καταλ.* &c., have very much the appearance of being a transition to something new. We have found in vv. 3—8, which are evidently connected with each other, a close concatenation of the particular sentences even outwardly indicated; why is this all at once broken off here, seeing that if vv. 3—16 form a whole, vv. 3—8 contain the preliminary conditions of what is stated in ver. 9? Why is there no *οὖν*, or, better still, δέ in opposition to ver. 8? Why the sudden change of expression in *καταλεγέσθω*? Why is nothing more said about the *ὄντως χήρα*, if indeed vv. 3—8 were intended to explain what is meant by this, with a view to what is said in ver. 9? Further, if vv. 3—16 are to be understood of widows, only in reference to their being provided for by the church, why is there in ver. 5 a twofold criterion of their worthiness, and then again in vv. 9 and 10, and consisting of qualifications as independent of each other, as if they were not at all related? Would it not at least have been much more natural in this case, if with a *ἡ δὲ ὄντως χήρα* at the beginning of ver. 9, the result of vv. 4—8 had been summed up? And does not the expression *χήρα καταλεγέσθω* itself point to another purpose of this *enrolment*? For *χήρα καταλεγέσθω* is, as Winer shows, § 66, 4, p. 663, to be so construed as that *χήρα* is the predicate, and

nothing is to be supplied: "as widow let one be enrolled who is not under sixty years old." That the object of this enrolment was only the receiving support, is a mere presumption on the part of the commentators, and is not warranted by ver. 16 (see below.) If it can be proved from history that there was an enrolment of widows as such, that as widows they were promoted to a place of ecclesiastical distinction, then we would have to regard the passage before us as referring to this practice, but it is difficult to see why rich widows, who in other respects possessed the necessary qualifications, should have been excluded from this distinction. And can it be said that the qualifications themselves laid down in vv. 9 and 10 are suitable, on the supposition of their having reference to the receiving of support from the church? There are a thousand things against this, says Schleiermacher; and when his opponents, as Planck, Baumgarten, and others say in reply, that there is no necessity to understand that all of these qualifications together must have been possessed by every widow to be taken into the list, they forget the true point of view, namely, that it is not widows in general, but those who were needy, that are exclusively spoken of, and regarded from this point of view, the qualifications there laid down cannot but appear strange. And why then should the church fulfil the duty of charity only towards widows who were sixty years old? Might there not have been younger ones in a much more necessitous condition? And why only towards a widow who had been the *wife of one man?* Was the widow to whom this did not apply, but who in other respects was blameless, to receive no support? And similar questions might be put with reference to the having *brought up children*, and the qualifications that follow. But it may be said in a general way, that the apostle here makes the ecclesiastical support of such widows as were helpless and destitute to be dependent on their former conduct. Even in ver. 5 he does not do this. This were quite contrary to the spirit of Christian charity; and it would be pronounced foolish were any one in the present day, in the case of any similar institution in behalf of widows, to insist on the qualifications which the apostle has here laid down. And not only are vv. 9 and 10 inconsistent with this interpretation, but the following verses also—ver. 11, *but the younger widows refuse*, and ver. 14, *I will therefore that the younger widows marry:* for neither could the younger widows be

all at once refused, if the receiving of support is what is referred to, nor could they be reasonably enjoined to marry again, if thereby all prospect of support from the church should be withdrawn (*ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς γυνή*.) Nor, in what is said of the younger widows in these verses, is there the slightest indication of any want of the necessary means of subsistence on their part. Mosheim has already estimated aright the force of these considerations. In short—the subject must be regarded from still another point of view (as it has been also by defenders of this interpretation), that, namely, according to which the receiving of support from the church is considered as at the same time an honourable distinction. But these two points of view do not necessarily coincide. Not every widow who required support would eo ipso also merit ecclesiastical distinction; and not every widow, who stood in no need of support from the church, could on this ground be shut out from ecclesiastical distinction. There must have been reasons of one kind for receiving support, and of a different kind for receiving distinction in the church. What the former were, we learn from vv. 3—8, and what the latter, from ver. 9, ss. Thus the poor widow, or the widow who had become poor, might certainly be also promoted to a place of distinction in the church (a kind of *πρεσβυτέρα* beside the *πρεσβύτερος*); but she would then only receive support when she was, *ὄντως χήρα*. That history bears us out in supposing such an order of ecclesiastical widowhood to have existed, a *τάγμα χήρειον*, may be proved from the passages in Tertull. de vel. Virg. c. 9: Ad quam sedem (viduarum) praeter annos LX. non tantum univirae, *i.e.* nuptae aliquando, eliguntur, sed et matres et quidem educatrices filiorum; to this also probably belongs: Herm. Past. L. I. vis. 2 (Grapte autem commonebit viduas et orphanos), and in Lucian de Morte Peregrin. Op. III. 335, Reiz: *ἔωθεν μὲν ἐυθὺς ἦν ὁρᾶν παρὰ τῷ δεδμωτηρίῳ περιμένοντα γραΐδια χήρας τινὰς καὶ παιδία ὄρφανα*. Then Chrysos. hom. 31, in dio. N. T. loc; Epiph. haer. 79, 4, &c. These references are given most in detail by Mosheim, p. 452, ss., who also gives the literature of his own time on this subject, p. 451. Comp. also Baur a. a. O., p. 48, s.; Leo, a. a. O., and De Wette on the passage. We can certainly point to no other passage in the New Testament besides the one before us, which proves the existence of this institution for widows, or even of its first beginnings in the apostolic era. So much, however, may be inferred

from the passages adduced and similar passages, chiefly in Tertullian and Clemens of Alexandria,—that such an institution had already been long in existence at the end of the second century, and that it was universally traced back to the apostolical arrangement contained in the passage before us. And De Wette says: "It is not improbable that from the very beginning pious widows received a place in the church; but it betrays perhaps a somewhat later period, to find this already represented here as a regular office resting on a formal election." But surely if such a place of distinction as that referred to existed at any time, there must have been election to it. "It is to this description of widows in the earliest period of the church," (says the excellent Mosheim), "who in contradistinction to the others may be called the spiritual, who are also in the phraseology of the church called πρεσβύτιδες, presbyterae, presbyterissae, partly, because they were old and stricken in years, at least sixty years old according to the express testimony of Tertullian, partly, because they resembled the elders of the church in the respect paid to them and in certain parts of their office"—(Tertullian expressly says that their business was—ut experimentis omnium affectuum structae facile norint ceteras et consilio et solatio, and at least at a later period there was intrusted to them a kind of superintendence over the poor widows and orphans of the church, comp. the passages in Hermas and Lucian)—"it is to this description of widows, beyond all question, that the rules laid down by the apostle, which it is our object to explain, are to be understood as applying."[1] And who can help agreeing with him when he farther shows, how uncharitable and altogether impracticable the following qualifications are if they are to be viewed as conditions of receiving support from the church; how suitable, on the contrary, if regarded in the light in which he explains them.

With respect to the qualification, *not under sixty years old*,—if such ecclesiastical widows, presbyteresses, are meant, it is only necessary in order to understand this, to bear in mind, that even in electing to the office of a presbyter, age was the first condition, and that these widows doubtless from the very first, as Tertullian and others show in reference to a later period, were expected to exercise an influence on the younger persons of their sex. The context

1 Huther also has agreed with him.

itself, however, ver. 11, indicates another sufficiently definite reason for this, namely, that whoever was once enrolled as a widow was always to remain such, and not to degrade this honourable rank by a subsequent marriage; the apostle therefore fixes an age in which this was no longer to be feared. Does he, nevertheless, on the ground of what he had experienced, ver. 14, enjoin the younger widows to marry, he does not thereby exclude them, if they follow his advice, from the care of the church, but only from a distinction which indeed they did not deserve, if they were of the character which the apostle specifies in ver. 11, ss., as a reason for their marrying again. Another condition is given in the words *ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς γυνή*. On the meaning of this expression comp. on Tit. i. 6, and above on iii. 2—12. It can mean nothing else here than the univira, she who has been only once married. For, apart from polyandry in the proper sense of the term which cannot with any reason be supposed to be meant, we must either explain this sufficiently definite expression of conjugal fidelity in general, and separate *γεγον.* from the preceding to connect it with this, which would not do, or we must suppose a reference here to the singular case of a widow who has illegally separated herself from her husband and married again. According to this latter interpretation the expression *ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς γυνή* might include the widow who had been twice married, if only everything had been lawfully done. Such artificial and inconceivable explanations are not less opposed to the simple sense of the words and the context than to all ecclesiastical tradition on this point, on which what is said on Tit. i. 6 is to be compared. Why then—if the apostle is speaking here of special distinction in the church—might he not require as a qualification what appeared so necessary, if for no other reason than from a regard to the heathen (comp. what is said on Tit. i. 6, and here on ver. 14)? The reason of this qualification then entirely corresponds to the ground on which the same qualification is required in presbyters and deacons, iii. 2—12, and along with it belongs to the *ἀνέγκλητος* and *ἀνεπίλημπτος*, which denotes the chief point of view from which the apostle regards fitness for ecclesiastical distinction. In this respect then the widow stands on a level with the presbyter and deacon; but this is precisely a proof of the correctness of our interpretation; while, if the apostle were speaking here of poor widows who were to be supported, the qualification would be un-

suitable and contradictory to the *βούλομαι οὖν*, ver. 14. Comp. Tertull. ad. ex. i. 7 : praescriptio apostoli declarat, cum digamos non sinit praesidere, cum viduam allegi in ordinationem nisi univiram non concedit (De Wette.) Further, the following qualification fully corresponds to the interpretation just given : *ἐν ἔργοις καλοῖς μαρτυρουμένη*, not = through good works having a good report, but = in good works,—as the object or the sphere (Winer, § 52, a. 3, p. 462.) On *good works*, Tit. ii. 7, and the Gen. Introd. § 4. What Mosheim says on this is excellent, and proves the correctness of his interpretation : " The apostle lays weight on this, in order that such a widow may be publicly acknowledged as a godly person." In this also there is a correspondence to what is required of the presbyter; comp. on Tit. i. 6 ; Tim. iii. 2, ss. *Εἰ ἐτεκνοτρόφησε* can, as Leo observes, hardly be understood of the bringing up of her own children. The connexion with what precedes, as well as with what follows, shows that *ἐτεκνο.* must here be regarded as a *good work*. Such, however, is not the bringing up of one's own children in itself; in order to be so, some such word as *καλῶς* must be added ; comp. above, iii. 4, 12. That bringing up of children, then, which is here described as a *good work*, must be understood of the bringing up of strange children. This qualification must indeed be pronounced unsuitable in reference to widows needing support, but all the more suitable in reference to a place of distinction in the church. The same remark applies to the next qualification—*if she have lodged strangers*, and also to the two following—*if she have washed the saints' feet, if she have relieved the afflicted*, which latter, according to ver. 16 and the general usage, must be understood of ministering relief to poverty. And if it should be said, that in order to be hospitable and to take an interest in those who are in straitened circumstances, there is no necessity for being opulent, it must still be acknowledged that these qualifications are inexplicable when regarded as conditions of receiving support from the church, while they are self-evident when viewed in reference to a widow who is to attain a place of distinction in the church, and who is to give assistance by word and deed to others of her sex ; for it is first the proofs of a kind, humble, benevolent charity which the apostle here requires, and indeed proofs of such a nature as cannot be viewed in the light of a condition of church support, but only of

church distinction. With regard to the first of these qualifications, comp. the φιλόξενος which is required of him who is to be a presbyter, iii. 2 ; Tit. i. 8. The ἅγιοι here are the ξένοι ; in the conduct towards them they imitate the example of our Lord, according to John xiii. 14. The grammatical doubt which Schleiermacher has expressed with reference to ἐπήρκεσεν, he himself removes when he says, that the word is a ἅπαξ λεγ. ; and so also with the following word ἐπηκολούθησε. As an exhaustive summary of what precedes, the apostle adds : εἰ παντὶ ἔργῳ ἀγαθῷ ἐπηκολούθησε where ἐπακολουθεῖν is used in the same sense as διώκειν τὸ ἀγαθόν, 1 Thess. v. 15, &c. The word itself, though not in this particular application, occurs besides in Mark xvi. 20 ; 1 Pet. ii. 21.

We have still to consider the interpretation of our passage, which even already in Mosheim's time was the current one, and which has still many advocates—that, namely, according to which ver. 9, ss., treats of the appointing of widows as deaconesses. Principally Schleiermacher has again set up this interpretation, and he has been followed by Mack and Böttger. In supporting his view, Schleiermacher has satisfied himself with refuting that which explains the passage of receiving support from the church, and adducing as positive proof two passages which are evidently intended to bear against our interpretation : Sozom. vii. 16, comp. with Cod. Theod. L. xvi. Tit. ii. Lex. xxvii., and Basil. ep. can. c. 24. But Planck has already (a. a. O. p. 204, ss.) justly replied to the first of these references, that it only shows the interpretation which was at that time given to our passage, which was certainly the same as that which Schleiermacher has advocated, and to the second, that it is not at all applicable, and has been adduced only from a misunderstanding of the word διακονουμένην which occurs in it, and which does not mean : quae in diaconatum suscepta est. Schleiermacher has here gone out from the same false premise which Mosheim has objected to, namely, that if καταλέγεσθαι cannot be understood of enrolment in a poor's list, it must necessarily be explained of entering on the list as deacons, as if no third meaning were possible. It is farther taken for granted in this interpretation, that what the writers of the second and third century inform us concerning widows is all at once to be understood of deaconesses, as if widow and deaconess could

signify one and the same thing; and further, either then must all deaconesses have been widows, or virgins must also be called widows. "But the widows of the earliest church are quite different persons from the female ministers. In the fourth century the widows began to be confounded with the female ministers," observes Mosheim, as Bingham has already shown (Orig. Eccl. III. p. 109.) Further—"we can prove by incontestible testimonies, that in the earliest period of the church virgins were appointed as female ministers" (Mosheim. comp. Constitt. ap. VI. 18, &c.); but that virgins were called widows, is quite as incapable of being proved from history as it is inconceivable in itself (comp. the Gen. Introd. § 3, and Böttger a. a. O. p. 67, s.)

And now let us look again at our passage, and see whether we can understand deaconesses as spoken of in it. The expression: let one be entered on the list as a widow,—could only be understood of deaconesses if it had already been proved that *χήρα* and deaconesses are synonymous terms. Then, *not under threescore years old.* Is it to be supposed that the care of the poor and the sick should have been committed to persons so far advanced in years? Has not experience itself proved that this is a misunderstanding of the apostle's appointment, when we find the decree of the emperor Theodosius that all deaconesses must be sixty years old, which sprung out of this misunderstanding, immediately after abrogated by the synod of Chalcedon, and the age of the deaconesses reduced to forty years? Further, it can neither be believed nor proved that the deaconesses, to the number of whom also virgins belonged, should have been honoured for continuing in an unmarried state. Further, the *ἀργαί*, ver. 13, will not correspond to this interpretation; for as deaconesses it is to be supposed that they must have gone from house to house; if, on the other hand, the *καταλ.* were an honourable distinction in the sense in which we have taken it, then this *ἀργαί* can be much better understood, as it could devolve the duty of rendering only such friendly services as those for which widows of sixty years of age were well adapted. Finally, rules for deaconesses would have a much more appropriate place in chap. iii. than here, where the apostle's design is only to show how Timothy is to act towards the various members of the church, from whence the occasion arises to show what kind of widows are qualified for that place of honour

in the church. Moreover, the subject of deaconesses has already been handled in chap. iii. 12. To me, therefore, there remains no doubt that our passage treats neither of deaconesses nor of widows who need support. Mosheim has shown, p. 454, how it could happen that in the fourth century and later, the passage came to be understood of deaconesses, and to be applied without distinction to those ecclesiastical widows.

Ver. 11. "But younger widows refuse; for when they are become wanton against Christ they will marry." *Νεωτέρας*, as opposed to those in ver. 9, means widows under sixty years of age; and in like manner *παραιτοῦ* (comp. on Tit. iii. 10) as opposed to *καταλέγεσθαι*, signifies they are not to be entered on the list. The reason is—it is to be feared that they will marry again. *Γαμεῖν*, as 1 Cor. vii. 39, of marrying again. *They wish to marry*, as the consequence of *having become wanton against Christ.*—*Στρηνιάω*, properly: to be over-strong (from *στρῆνος*, strength); the Lat. luxuriari; and *κατα*—"against," as elsewhere *κατακαυχᾶσθαι* is used by the apostle, Rom. xi. 18. This wantonness is opposed to their duty towards Christ. The sense is given in the main correctly, though too strongly, by Jerome, in the words: quae fornicatae sunt in injuriam viri sui Christi. On *καταστρ.*, comp. Rev. xviii. 7, 9.

Ver. 12 shows what is implied in this *wishing to marry*: *ἔχουσαι κρίμα*, &c. *Κρίμα* signifies here also, as at iii. 6 (comp. on the passage) judicium; in wishing to marry they have brought upon themselves this judgment of God, so that it weighs like a load upon them, viz., that they have broken their first faith. The expression *πίστιν ἀθετεῖν* has already by the Fathers been explained to mean not the falling away from the faith, but the violation of a promise made not to marry again. *Πίστιν τὴν συνθήκην λέγει*, observes Chrysostom, and similarly others, comp. in De Wette, Heydenreich, &c; and so almost all the more recent expositors. The expression *ἀθετεῖν*, which is also used of something objectively fixed, and is generally found in this very connection (comp. Passow) as also the epithet *πρώτην*, and the connexion with ver. 11, confirm this view. If those widows did not bind themselves, either aloud or in silence, on their enrolment, to remain always widows, then their wish to marry again cannot be called a forsaking their first faith. But if they did this, then there can be no

question as to what is meant by *πρώτη πίστις*. And this qualification of not marrying again is already implied in the *ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς γυνή*. Leo well: viduae illae *γαμεῖν θέλουσαι* fidem dabant sponso. Sed quia ad ordinem viduarum ecclesiasticarum pertinebant, jam sponsae quasi erant, nimirum Christo. Hanc igitur fidem quam primum dederant Christo, nunc fallebant. Mosheim has shown that we are not here to understand an inviolable vow in the later sense.

Ver. 13. By way of confirming the *παραιτοῦ*, the apostle here mentions another thing to be feared in younger widows, namely, idleness with its natural consequences. There is some difficulty in the word *μανθάνουσι*, which cannot signify "they go prying about," but is to be connected either with *ἀργαί* or with *περιερχόμεναί*. The latter construction has this against it, that *μανθάνειν*, when connected with a partic. which refers to the subject, always signifies "to see into, to perceive," which is not suitable here, while the signification "to be wont" is connected with the præterite. It would therefore be grammatically more correct to connect *μανθάνουσι* with *ἀργαί*: they learn idleness inasmuch as they run about, &c. Comp. on this Winer, § 46, 1, p. 398.[1] It is certainly more natural, however, that the running about be represented as the consequence of idleness, than *vice versa* idleness as the consequence of running about. And is the *running about* so self-evident a characteristic of younger widows? It appears to me, therefore, more advisable to suppose, with De Wette, a less common use of *μανθάνειν* in connexion with the partic., and to render: but at the same time also being idle they learn to run about in the houses. The apostle, however, corrects himself,—he has still something to add to the *ἀργαί*: *καὶ φλύαροι καὶ περίεργοι λαλοῦσαι τὰ μὴ δέοντα*, the first two predicates describe the manner and way of the *περιέρχεσθαι*, the last still further explains the two preceding predicates. On *φλύαρος* comp. 3 John, ver. 10; on *περίεργος* Acts xix. 19, and by the apostle 2 Thess. iii. 11, *περιεργοζόμενος*. The latter expression is = male sedulus, mischievously busy, inconsiderately curious. The *λαλοῦσαι*, &c., is well explained by the remark of Theophylact's cited by Leo: "going about from house to house, they carry the affairs of this house to that, and of that to this—they tell the affairs of all to all."

[1] Huther connects it with *ἀργαί*.

Ver. 14. The younger widows are therefore to be rejected; but not only that; in such circumstances (*οὖν*) it is the apostle's will that they marry again, as a means of counteracting *idleness*, and as the best antidote to what is noticed in ver. 11; for—as confirming the *βούλομαι*—examples (ver. 15) show indeed that those are no mere fancied dangers which are connected with remaining single. Those who attend to the *οὖν*, ver. 14, and the *γάρ*, ver. 16, will see here no contradiction to what the apostle says 1 Cor. vii. 7, viii. 26, 32—34, 40; if there is any contradiction, it must be acknowledged that the very same is found in vv. 2 and 9 of this chapter as compared with the other verses adduced; for our passage says nothing else but what is said there. The universal form of the expression here used by the apostle corresponds to that of vv. 11 and 12, although, he would assuredly not deny, that there might be among the younger widows some of a different character. As in ver. 5 compared with ver. 6, so also here, the apostle specifies the consequences which naturally though not necessarily result from the circumstances. The apostle's injunction has thus its limitation in itself. "He does not impose a law, but points out a remedy to the younger widows," says Chrysostom. It is his will then that they marry again (*γαμεῖν*, as at ver. 11), bear children, superintend the house, and thus give no occasion to the adversary to speak reproachfully, such as would be given by the conduct described in vv. 11–13. *Τεκνογ.* as at ii. 15. *Οἰκοδεσποτεῖν*, a word belonging to the later Greek, occurring only here; but *οἰκοδεσπότης* is found frequently in the New Testament, comp. Winer, § 2, 1, p. 30; Schleiermacher, p. 62. If *οἰκουρεῖν* does not denote the same thing, and *οἰκοδεσπότης* is of frequent occurrence, is there anything surprising in the formation of the verb? And may not the occurrence of such latinized expressions as this, and *πρόκριμα* in ver. 21, warrant the supposition that the epistles were written after a considerable time's stay in Rome? By the *ὁ ἀντικείμενος*, *who speaks reproachfully*, we are not to understand the devil, on account of the additional clause *λοιδορίας χάριν* (comp. on iii. 7, ver. 15, as De Wette also observes, by no means requires this interpretation), but the adversary of Christianity (Phil. i. 28; Tit. ii. 8) among Jews and heathen. The clause *λοιδορίας χάριν* is to be explained of speaking against Christianity, not against the widows; comp. the similar passages vi. 1; Tit. ii. 5,

10. There is room for difference of opinion as to whether it should be connected with *ἀντικ.* or with *μηδ. αφ. διδ.* The latter appears to me the more proper: they are not to give to the adversary occasion to speak reproachfully. *Ἀφορμή* is again a word which is elsewhere used only by the apostle.

Ver. 15. For with some this has already been the case. "For some are already turned aside after Satan." These words being confirmatory of the preceding, must refer to such aberrations as were to be prevented by the injunction in ver. 14, *I will therefore;* this injunction, however, is represented as an antidote to the excess of the sexual passion, and the consequences of idleness. It is of such aberrations, therefore, not of a falling away from the faith or the doctrine in general, that we are to understand the expression *have turned aside.* On *ἐκτρέπω* comp. 1 Tim. i. 6, and Gen. Introd., § 4. *After Satan:* he is the seducer whose enticements they have followed through sensual lust.

Ver. 16 may at first sight appear to be a mere repetition of what is said in vv. 4 and 8. The context, however, as well as the words themselves, justify us in adopting a different interpretation. De Wette has already given it aright by directing attention to the fact, that the expression *τὶς πιστὸς ἢ πιστὴ ἔχει* denotes not merely the same relation as ver. 4, that, namely, of children and grandchildren to their parents and grandparents, but a wider relationship. To this also corresponds the term *ἐπαρκεῖν* as compared with *προνοεῖν*, see ver. 10; the position of the verse, however, will warrant our interpreting it with special reference to what is said concerning the ecclesiastical widows, either thus,—that the apostle gives this injunction, because younger widows sought, from motives of economy, to be received into the viduatus (De Wette), or thus—that the apostle would press this also with reference to the ecclesiastical widows, that the church was to be burdened with their support only in the case of there being no relative on whom any obligation rests to assist them. The reading *πιστὸς ἢ πιστή* in preference to the other, which omits *πιστὸς ἢ* (codd. A.C.F.G., 17, 47, &c.,) has been retained by Tischendorf with reason, in opposition to Griesbach and Lachmann; comp. De Wette. On *βαρείσθω*, comp. 2 Cor. i. 8, v. 4. With such widows the church is not to be burdened, in order that she may be in a condition to afford assistance to the real widows in the sense described, vv. 3—5.

Dr Baur has offered a solution entirely new of the difficulties contained in this section about the widows, v. 3—16, which has already in the Introduction, § 3, been considered in a historical point of view. Here we shall only, in addition, briefly show how little his interpretation can be justified in an exegetical point of view. He understands, vv. 3—8, of "holding widows in honour" in general, ver. 9, ss., of their support as ecclesiastical persons. The *τὰς ὄντως χήρας* are, according to him, real widows in opposition to merely so-called widows, *i.e.*, widows in the ecclesiastical sense, who might also be virgins. But the real widows are, according to vv. 4 and 5, either such as have children or such as are solitary. But in reply to this, we would observe that the meaning of *τὰς ὄντως χήρας* is shown by that to which it is opposed in ver. 4, and again in ver. 5; namely, only the widow who is quite desolate. Ver. 4 does not speak of an *ὄντως χῆρα*; but ver. 5 first speaks of this in opposition to ver. 4. Here, however, it will be seen that the opposition which Dr Baur has made between real and so-called widows is one which he himself has introduced. Ver. 9, then, according to him, describes a particular class of the *ὄντως χῆραι*, those, namely, to whom the *καταλεγεσθαι* was applicable, which of course implies that the widows were not ecclesiastical widows, as being *ὄντως χήραι*, or again, that they belonged to the *ὄντως χήραι* only as real, not as ecclesiastical widows. To this it may only be objected that it can by no means be maintained with certainty, that the apostle thought merely of the *ὄντως χῆραι* in the *καταλεγεσθαι* (*ὄντως* in the sense of ver. 5.) But is it not the merest petitio principii when it is further said, the ecclesiastical widows, vv. 9 and 10, differed from the *ὄντως χήραις* mentioned before, in so far as that to the former might belong such as were not really widows; whence is it that *χῆραι* obtains this ecclesiastical signification? Whence then does our opponent learn, that such widows might belong to those mentioned in ver. 9 as were not really widows (in his sense)? Does not Dr Baur clearly put his own presupposition into the words, and then bring it out again as the conclusion? Then again, the assertion that the *νεώτεραι χῆραι*, ver. 11, are widows in the ecclesiastical sense, and especially virgins, wherefore they are called simply *νεώτεραι* in ver. 14—floats entirely in the air, and has in the context not only nothing for it, but everything against it. For, if Dr Baur himself must admit,

that in the χήρα καταλεγέσθω the apostle has real widows in his eye (real in our opponent's sense of the word), and determines which of these are to be enrolled as ecclesiastical, so that they should be at the same time real and ecclesiastical, this does not in the least degree imply, that such as were not widows were also enrolled, but only that there were widows who were not enrolled. And when he says further: *but the younger widows refuse*, and thereby specifies those who are not to be enrolled, this can, according to the context, be understood only of the widows who are not to be enrolled, as what is said before is to be understood (according to Dr Baur's admission) of those who are to be enrolled. And how then could those who are not to be enrolled—if virgins are to be understood—be called χῆραι, seeing that the apostle will have them to be rejected? Only such νεώτεραι, then, can be meant as are already χῆραι, consequently only real widows, as the opposition to ver. 9, according to Baur's own interpretation of this verse, also requires. Baur must here, and at ver. 16, take for granted, according to his interpretation, that such virgins were ecclesiastical widows independent of the enrolment, and in spite of *being refused*. If, however, ver. 11 be rendered thus: "younger persons reject as widows," still by these younger persons could only be understood widows, from the opposition to ver. 9. And what then has Baur to object to our interpretation? That γαμεῖν, as used by the apostle, signifies to marry again, cannot be disputed. That the apostle could not have reasonably asked the widows to marry again if thereby they would be excluded from the καταλέγεσθαι, can be maintained only when ver. 9, ss., is incorrectly understood of ecclesiastical provision; but all difficulty disappears when the passage is understood of ecclesiastical distinction; comp. on ver. 9, s., and De Wette on ver. 14. And with respect to the difficulty arising from the circumstance that the apostle here enjoins marriage, if it is one, it belongs to Baur's interpretation (of virgins) as well as to our own. Comp., moreover, what has already been said on this above. Olshausen has interpreted vv. 3—8 of the ecclesiastical support of poor widows, ver. 9, ss., of the appointing of widows as deaconesses.

Vv. 17—19. Of how the presbyters are to be treated. If the widows spoken of in the verses immediately preceding are a kind of female presbyters, the transition here to the presbyters is then easy

and natural. It is quite evident that they are here spoken of in a different respect from chap. iii. The apostle mentions two things in which the right appreciation of the presbyter is to show itself: 1. *Let them be counted worthy of double honour*, ver. 17; and, 2. *Receive not an accusation against them but before*, &c., ver. 19. In ver. 17 it is said that the elders who rule well are to be counted worthy of double honour, especially those who labour in the word and doctrine. *Τιμή* here, in like manner as at ver. 3, is not to be understood merely of reward, stipendium; it is honour, but an honour which finds its expression in giving, as ver. 18 proves. There is no necessity then for taking *διπλῆς* in the most literal sense, and understanding by it a salary twice as large, as in the Constitt. ap. II. 28, &c., comp. Baur, p. 129; but the idea is: if a presbyter is already as such worthy of honour, this is doubly true of one who *rules well*. I regard, therefore, *the presbyter who rules well* as opposed not to the one who does not rule well, but to the presbyter as such. Has he a claim to *honour* already in virtue of his official standing, he has a double claim in the case which the apostle specifies. Thus also, the *μάλιστα*, &c., which comes after will distinguish between presbyter and presbyter. If the *presbyter who rules well* is interpreted as if opposed to the *presbyter* in the sense of ver. 1 as the designation of age, then either *καλῶς* would have no proper place here at all, or, if it has, it just introduces the same antithesis as we have supposed the words to imply; besides, the special signification of *τιμή* here, and at ver. 3, is opposed to such an interpretation; for nothing was said before of giving such *honour* to the presbyters (as the designation of age.) That the injunction to bestow such an honour does not indicate a post-apostolic period, may be seen from Gal. vi. 6; 1 Cor. ix. 14; 1 Thess. v. 12. This is especially to be given to the presbyters who labour in the word and doctrine. On *κοπίαω* comp. iv. 10; 1 Thess. v. 12. *Ἐν* denotes the object (Winer, § 52, a. p. 482); *word* and *doctrine* will therefore be designations of the object; *and in doctrine* is added epexegetically, to denote the *word* as the doctrine which is to be communicated. De Wette: "in word and doctrine—the former including every discourse, the latter denoting properly instruction." It is evident that the apostle here distinguishes between two kinds of *ruling presbyters*,—those who labour in the word and those who do not. Both are *ruling* presbyters, and from this it

already appears that it is not lay presbyters, as many have thought, that are here spoken of in contradistinction to clerical presbyters; for by προεστῶτες πρεσβύτεροι can be understood only presbyters merely as they are already known to us. It is therefore not at all necessary to look for still another special emphasis in κοπιῶντες: those who labour hard, in contradistinction to those who do not; for κοπιάω is here as elsewhere used to denote the laborious calling of the teacher in itself. Compare the remarks made by Rothe in opposition to this arbitrary distinction, a. a. O., p. 223, ss. If Dr Baur can perceive, in the circumstance of its being here represented as desirable that the presbyter should be at the same time a teacher, the transition to the presbyters of the later constitution in which teaching was the principal thing that belonged to the calling of the presbyter (Constitt. ap. III. 20), we, on the other hand, perceive in this circumstance (comp. on iii. 2; Tit. i. 9, and the Gen. Introd. § 4), with Neander, a mark of the later apostolic period (Nean. a. a. O. I., p. 259, ss.) And we have nothing to object to the remark, "that we must here already suppose the existence of a college of presbyters in one and the same large congregation;" nay, we see in this a proof of the correctness of our view (Gen. Introd., § 3.) But when Dr Baur further infers from these premises that, "although in these epistles the πρεσβύτερος, in respect of the office, is still identical with the ἐπίσκοπος," we must notwithstanding suppose here that there was a πρεσβύτερος besides the ἐπίσκοπος, and that the writer omitted to speak of the πρεσβύτερος along with the ἐπίσκοπος already in chap. iii. only because he would be able to speak of him in chap. v.,—we reply, that the latter assertion is altogether groundless, because chap. v. treats of ecclesiastical persons in quite a different respect from chap. iii. (where it is the qualifications for office that are spoken of), and that the whole reasoning consists again merely of taking for granted the thing to be proved. For, as little can it be inferred from the distinction which is made between presbyters who teach, and those who do not, as from the existence of a college of presbyters, that besides these there was an ἐπίσκοπος, "although in respect of his office identical with the presbyter."

Ver. 18. By way of confirming what he has said, the apostle now further refers to the words of the Old Testament, Deut. xxv. 4, just as he does at 1 Cor. ix. 9; comp. the Comm. on the passage. The

words, *and the labourer is worthy of his hire*, are nowhere to be found in the Old Testament, but we find the same maxim in Luke x. 7 and Matth. x. 10, with the difference only of τῆς προφῆς instead of μισθοῦ. That the apostle intends to denote by ἡ γραφή in our passage, something else than the Old Testament, is inconsistent with the fact, that this phrase is uniformly employed by the apostle to denote the Scriptures of the Old Testament, Rom. ix. 17; Gal. iii. 8, 22, &c. If he had intended to confirm this saying by an authority, he would have appealed, as in Acts xx. 35; 1 Cor. ix. 14, to *the Lord*, and not to the gospel of his helper, Luke, including this along with the Old Testament under ἡ γραφή, as if this gospel had already at that time been acknowledged as an integral portion of the γραφή. The words, *as the scripture saith*, are therefore not to be connected with this citation, and Calvin is right when he says, "he cites as it were a proverbial saying which common sense dictates to all. In the same manner as Christ also when he said the same thing, declared nothing more than a sentiment approved by the consent of all."

Ver. 19. The apostle here enjoins upon Timothy a further rule to be observed in his conduct towards the presbyters as distinguished from others: he is to receive no accusation against them except before two or three witnesses. According to the context, it can only be presbyters in the ecclesiastical sense that are spoken of. What the apostle here prescribes was already prescribed in the Old Testament, as a rule to be observed in judicial proceedings generally; comp. Deut. xvii. 6, xix. 15. On the application of this part of the law is founded the passage in 1 John v. 6, ss.; the apostle writes in 2 Cor. xiii. 1, that he will act on this principle, and that in every case (πᾶν ῥῆμα, &c.); and our Lord himself adverts to this scripture of the Old Testament in Matth. xviii. 16; John viii. 17.[1] "But," asks De Wette, "is Timothy not to observe the same rule of justice also in regard to the accusation of others?" I apprehend, that an accusation brought before Timothy cannot properly be placed in the same category with those to which that rule in Deut. xix. 15 extends. If what was necessary was not so much to punish in the judicial sense, as to admonish and set right, why ought not Timothy to receive the accusation also

[1] Huther thinks that the sense of the passage is this: Timothy is not to receive an accusation alone, but in the presence of others; of which Heb. x. 28 affords no proof.

without two or three witnesses. If, on the contrary, the accusation was of such a kind as to call for a judicial punishment, I do not think that the μὴ παραδέχου in our passage excludes the application of the Old Testament rule also in the case of others. Only, with reference to a presbyter, an accusation in general is then only to be received when several witnesses come forward against him. The presbyter when most faithful in the discharge of the duties of his office, and most earnest in his efforts to *convince the gainsayers* (Tit. i. 9), would precisely then be most exposed to false accusations on the part of such as thought themselves injured by him. How prejudicial to the dignity of the office, how obstructive to the efficient discharge of its duties, how paralysing to the zeal of those intrusted with it, how morally injurious to such accusers themselves, if they were listened to! And were not those presbyters men to whose christianly moral character the church in which they had lived, and from which they had been taken, must have borne a favourable testimony? How emphatically does the apostle insist on such a testimony (ἀνέγκλητος—ἀνεπίλημπτος, Tit. i. 6; 1 Tim. iii. 2, ss.)! It would have been both unwise and unjust to have made such a man the victim of the selfish accusations which any one might bring against him.—The pastor of our own day is certainly not the presbyter in the apostolical sense; not taken from the church itself over which he is called to preside, not approved by his previous life among the people, not marked out for the office by them as having been found worthy from the proof of his moral and Christian character, in general, called to the office far less (and indeed generally too little) from regard to his christianly moral qualities,—he cannot lay unqualified claim to the privilege implied in the rule laid down in our passage. On the other hand, it is not to be denied, that the office being substantially identical with that of the presbyter, there is still the same possibility of unjust accusations, and the same injury to the office, the accused, and the accusers, will follow in the case of such charges finding a ready hearing. These two things, then, must be taken into account,—on the one hand, the difference between that period and the present, on the other, the substantial sameness of the office,—in order rightly to estimate the manner in which this rule laid down by the apostle is to be applied in the present time. On παραδέχεσθαι, comp. similar compounds, Mark iv. 20; Acts xxii. 18,

In the former passage there is an express difference between *ἀκούειν* and *παραδέχεσθαι* (to enter into.) *Ἐκτὸς εἰ μή* used again by the apostle only at 1 Cor. xiv. 15, xv. 2; on the fulness of this expression, comp. Winer, § 67, 1. p. 687. On *ἐπί*, Winer, § 51, g. p. 450.

Ver. 20 treats of what is to be done to those members of the church who fall into sin. They are to be rebuked before all, that others also may fear. The words, *them that sin*, are not, as is generally done, and as Olshausen also does, to be referred to the presbyter, ver. 19, but are to be understood generally, of all members of the church who sin. In the former case the change of number would be unsuitable; we should expect rather that the apostle would say: but if he has sinned, or if he is convicted. And how should the apostle, who in ver. 19 has expressed so high an opinion of the presbyters, proceed forthwith to say in ver. 20: *them that sin*, &c.? And, at all events, had there been any such antithetical relation between ver. 19 and 20, the particle *δέ* would have been used; comp. other passages connected in this way, as 1—8, 9—15; vi. 1, s.; while this particle is always wanting where there is evidently a transition to something new, vv. 3, 9, 17, 19, 21, 22; vi. 1, 3, 17. Finally, as De Wette has already observed, ver. 22 is against this interpretation (comp. infra.) *Them that sin*, says the apostle without any limitation; such, however, lies in the nature of the thing; comp. Matth. xviii. 15—17 (only the last mentioned case comes here into consideration), 1 Cor. v. 9—13. As in the passage last adduced, so also in the one before us, it is not an immediate exclusion that is spoken of, but only a rebuke before the church—a public disclosure, and a conviction accompanied with a rebuke (comp. Harless on Eph. v. 11—13.) Not until this rebuke was not received (*if he shall neglect to hear*, Matth. xviii. 17), or produced no fruit, was the sinful person to be excluded, as those passages show. *Before all* and *others*, are therefore not to be understood of the assembly of the presbyters, but of the church. The moral effect of this rebuke with respect to all is, that they are to fear; the exhibition which is thus made of the judicial strictness of the law is designed to make an impression on their consciences, so that they may feel a salutary fear of their own sins, and may work out their salvation *with fear and trembling*.

Ver. 21. The reading here varies; still there can be no doubt that *κυρίου* is to be omitted before *Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ*, and that the true reading is not *πρόσκλησιν* but *πρόσκλισιν*; comp. Tischendorf, De Wette. The solemn protestation with which the observance of the rule just laid down is enjoined upon Timothy, is similar to that in 2 Tim. iv. 1. *Διαμαρτύρομαι* = obtestor, obsecro, to conjure with entreaty; comp. Luke xvi. 28; the word is used elsewhere by the apostle, 1 Thess. iv. 6; comp. also Eph. iv. 17, and Harless on the passage. The sense of the whole is, as Chrysostom observes: *μάρτυρα καλῶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ*, &c. They will testify against thee if thou actest contrary to what is enjoined upon thee. Bengel well: repraesentat Timotheo suo judicium extremum, in quo Deus revelabitur et Christus cum angelis coram conspicietur. This is the most natural interpretation of the additional words, *the elect angels*. Comp. Jos. B. J. II. 16, 4: *μαρτύρομαι . . . τοὺς ἱεροὺς ἀγγέλους θεοῦ*.[1] Schleiermacher was the first to stumble at this expression, *ἐκλεκτοὶ ἄγγελοι*, and he thinks it strange that the man who is so very zealous against the *genealogies* and profitless questions should here recognize special ranks of angels, as is evident from his using the article. Nothing, however, can be certainly inferred from the use of the article here, although Leo lays weight upon this; for if the writer intends to denote the entire company of the angels, he could not do this without the article; comp. Winer, § 18, 1, p. 141. The only question then will be, can *ἐκλεκτοὶ* be applied as an epithet to the angels generally, in contradistinction to other creatures, or only in contradistinction to other angels, whether it be to the *angels that fell*, 2 Pet. ii. 4, or only to those of a lower rank, which last view would be supported by passages such as 1 Thess. iv. 16; Eph. i. 21; Col. i. 16 (Leo, comp. also Harless, a. a. O., p. 112, s.) Against the latter interpretation as a whole, as it appears to me, it may be objected that, according to it, the epithet *ἐκλεκτοὶ* has no proper meaning. For if it is used to denote the good angels in opposition to the bad, it is then quite superfluous; for the *ἄγγελοι* are understood to be the good angels, without any such epithet; and in the other case it is difficult to see why only the angels of a higher rank should be taken as witnesses; chiefly,

[1] Huther: because the throne of God is encompassed by angels.

however, against this interpretation is the unsuitableness of the expression *ἐκλεκτῶν*, which is certainly not explained by a reference to the distinction indicated in Eph. i. 21, &c. Could a portion of the angels be designated as not *chosen*, according to the usual signification of this word? I therefore agree with those expositors who understand *ἐκλεκτοὶ* as a general epithet of all the angels, just as much so as *holy angels*, *angels of light*, &c.[1] Comp. Calvin: electos vocat angelos, non tantum ut a reprobis discernat, sed excellentiae causa, ut plus reverentiae habeat eorum testimonium. So also Bengel, Matthies, Böttger (p. 166); Olshausen, too, decides for this interpretation. With respect to the participation of angels in the events that take place on the earth, comp. Luke xv. 10; 1 Cor. iv. 9, &c. Baur's reference to the *ἡλικιῶται τοῦ σωτῆρος ἄγγελοι*, and the like, among the Gnostics, is accordingly altogether superfluous.—Thus the apostle conjures Timothy to observe this rule without prejudice, doing nothing from partiality. The *ταῦτα* is referred to, vv. 1—20, 17—20, vv. 19 and 20, and to ver. 20 alone. I refer to De Wette, who has defended the last interpretation in opposition to the others, and as it appears to me justly; for it is difficult to see why ver. 21 should have been placed between vv. 20 and 22, if what is said in ver. 20 needed no such emphatical enforcement. *Πρόκριμα* is the Latin praejudicium, properly what is fore-judged, a preconceived opinion, prejudice. According to Leo, it corresponds to *προκρίνειν τινά τινος*, and signifies *preference*, which would do well enough if it were *πρόκρισις*; but it cannot be proved that this signification belongs to *πρόκριμα*. Planck and others have already said what is necessary in opposition to Schleiermacher; comp. also our remarks on ver. 14. *Πρόσκλισις*, not *πρόσκλησις*, which scarcely yields any sense (comp. Leo, De Wette, Matthies,) occurs only here; comp., however, *προσεκλίθη*, Acts v. 36. *Κατὰ πρόσκλ.* = partium studio ductus, Wahl.

Ver. 22. "Lay hands suddenly on no man, and be not partaker of other men's sins. Keep thyself pure." On this follows the advice, ver. 23, *drink no longer water*, and in vv. 24 and 25, the statement that neither the sins nor the good works of men can remain hid. The connexion of the ideas—for some such there must

1 Also Huther: "The angels as objects of the divine love," 1 Pet. ii. 4.

be—is here difficult, and its discovery is left over entirely to the reader. No wonder that Schleiermacher, according to his general opinion of this epistle, finds here "an extraordinary confusion." With regard, first of all, to ver. 22, it cannot be understood of the ordination of presbyters. This would do only in the case of ver. 20 referring to the presbyters (comp. above); but even then it might be objected to this interpretation that such an injunction is not in its right place here, but belongs to chap. iii. (Baur), that there, in fact, what is necessary to be said respecting the conditions of appointing to office, has already been said, and more exactly than here, and that according to the qualifications there laid down the case here indicated in the words, *be not partaker*, &c., cannot well be supposed in reference to a presbyter, as De Wette has also observed. If the transition has already been made at ver. 20 from the presbyters to the members of the church generally, then ver. 22 can also only be understood of receiving into the Christian fellowship in general, or of restoring to this fellowship those who had fallen. I prefer the latter view, with De Wette, from regard to ver. 20, and on account of the *be not partaker*, &c. Ver. 20 does not indeed treat of exclusion from the church; but the ἔλεγξις there is the next step to this (comp. Matt. xviii. 17), and the words, *be not partaker*, &c., evidently find a more natural explanation in accordance with this supposition. Meanwhile I admit that I do not regard these reasons as cogent. Olshausen has assented to that interpretation of this verse, which is the most ancient, and which is still the common one, according to which it is understood of ordination. On the *laying on of hands*, comp. on iv. 14. According to the view which we have taken, it is to be supposed that this laying on of hands was repeated on the restoration of any one to church fellowship, which was certainly the practice at a later period; comp. the proofs of this in De Wette. Baur explains the passage principally of the restoration of heretics, of which he adduces examples from a later period which involve, however, no proof whatever against the apostolical character of our passage. On μὴ ταχέως Chrysostom observes: πολλάκις περισκεψάμενος καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάσας.—*Be not partaker:* Timothy adopts the sins which he overlooks, he becomes a partaker of these sins, inasmuch as he does not place himself towards them in the attitude of a rebuker. On the dative, comp. Winer, § 30, 8, p. 229, s. Σεαυτὸν

ἁγνὸν τήρει: here, as De Wette rightly observes, σεαυτὸν is placed first with emphasis; it forms the antithesis with, *be not partaker of other men's sins.* For this very reason the clause cannot be explained to mean: keep thyself pure from such sins, but: thyself keep pure; for in order to be able to rebuke the sins of others, Timothy must above all be pure himself. Thus the subject turns to the person of Timothy, as ver. 23 also shows; a circumstance which it is also of importance to observe in reference to ver. 24, s. Ἁγνός is therefore not to be taken in the special sense = chaste, but = pure, as at 2 Cor. vii. 11; vi. 6.

Ver. 23. The words, *keep thyself pure,* as addressed to Timothy personally, have prepared the way for the transition to what is said in this verse; but this "medicinal advice," nevertheless appears on this account very strange. What is there in the words *keep thyself pure,* that could lead the writer even by any association of ideas to this counsel? This association will be found to be not so remote when those passages are called to mind, iii. 3, 8, in which the apostle insists on moderation in the use of wine by a presbyter or deacon, chiefly, however, that which contains the warning against *bodily service,* iv. 8. Timothy may have been ascetically strict in this point to an improper degree; ver. 23 would thus be a limitation of the words, *keep thyself pure,* in ver. 22. With respect to abstinence from wine, one has only to call to mind the Nazarenes of the Old Testament, Num. vi. 1—21; the Essenes, Luke i. 15; Rom. xiv., in order easily to understand how there might be an ascetical tendency in this direction in the apostolic period; and we by no means, therefore, need to suppose in the words any opposition to the Gnostics of the second century (Baur.) Thus also does Olshausen understand the connexion, and so do many of the more ancient and more modern commentators, comp. Leo, De Wette. The passage, therefore, will not deserve to be characterized as "an awkwardly introduced particularity" (Schleiermacher.) Ὑδροποτέω, not aquam bibo, as Wahl, = ὕδωρ πίνειν, but, to be a water drinker = to drink only water, comp. Winer, § 59, 8, Anm. p. 584. On *use a little wine,* Chrysostom says: "as much as is needful for health, not for luxury." Timothy's state of body is assigned as the reason of this advice; for his stomach's sake and his frequent indispositions.

Ver. 24, s., follow again without any indication of the connexion.

Do they belong to the warning against making himself partaker of other men's sins, or to the *keep thyself pure*, and ver. 23 ? For the determination of this point, we have in what precedes no further clue than is given in the circumstance, that the apostle seems in the word σεαυτόν to have made the transition to the person of Timothy ; the point must therefore chiefly be determined by the sense of the verses themselves. The apostle specifies in ver. 24 two kinds of sins ; those which are *manifest* and those which *follow after ;* those which are manifest are further explained in the words *going before to judgment.* The opposition here then is, between sins that are open = going before, and sins that are hid = following after, as is evident also from ver. 25, where in like manner (ὡσαύτως), *the good works* are divided into those that are *manifest* and those that *are otherwise*, by which latter, as Schleiermacher has already observed, are not to be understood such as are the opposite of *good* but of manifest, so that of both kinds it is said, that they are brought to light ; those which are *manifest* are so already, and *those that are otherwise cannot be hid.* The sense, therefore, can only be this—the sins, as also the good works, cannot remain hid in the judgment, the only difference being that some (sins as well as good works) go before, others follow, or, according to ver. 25, some are before the eyes of all, others are not, but shall then be made manifest. Πρόδηλος only here and at Heb. vii. 14. One may judge whether the family to which the word belongs, δῆλος, &c., is in a great measure strange to the apostle (Schleiermacher) on comparing 1 Cor. xv. 27 ; Gal. iii. 11 ; 1 Cor. i. 11, iii. 13 ; Col. i. 8. That προ, as used by the apostle elsewhere, is never without meaning (Schleiermacher) may be true enough ; but that it must always, when used by him in these compounds, mean " before," is a groundless assertion ; comp. for example only προγράφω, Gal. iii. 1, προΐστημι, and the like. Moreover, many expositors are for taking πρόδηλος here in the sense " manifest beforehand," against which comp. De Wette on the passage. I agree with him in the opinion that πρόδηλος is here to be taken in the common acceptation as an intensified δῆλος, the same as at Heb. vii. 14 (the προ, intendens, in like manner as propalam.) For, looked at more closely, the word πρόδηλοι in the sense " open beforehand," *i.e.*, before the *judgment*, would give no suitable meaning, as the opposite of this would be " open afterwards," after the

judgment, which cannot be what is here meant. The apostle rather conceives of the *judgment* as the goal towards which all sins and good works are proceeding: some before their owner, others after him; some before the eyes of all, others hid; there, at the judgment, they come all to light, it matters not whether hitherto they have been open or hid. De Wette is therefore right in maintaining, that the opposition between *before* and *after* comes first in with προάγουσαι, and that the *judgment* denotes the point aimed at, not in respect of time, but of place. Προάγειν = to go before, as heralds; therefore = crying sins, which accuse their owner, or rather their slave. Τισί δὲ opposed to τινῶν: the other kind of sins. Of these he says, ἐπακολουθοῦσιν, an expression especially opposed to the προαγουσαι; in special reference to πρόδηλοι, it can therefore not mean, "open afterwards," as the opposition to προάγ. εἰς κρίσιν shows, but something like κρυπταί; if the apostle had used this expression, however, he must have here also added (comp. ver. 25) κρυβῆναι οὐ δύναται; but all this is concisely expressed in ἐπακολουθοῦσιν, sc., to judgment. These sins do not go beforehand, loudly accusing; but they come also to judgment; the difference is only, that they follow their owner. This not merely *is to be* so in the judgment, but *it is so*, according to the words of the apostle. How can it be here said, with De Wette, that observations are here made respecting the various ways in which one can perceive the actions of men? The apostle plainly says that in the κρίσις everything comes to light.

Ver. 25. This is fully evident from ver. 25. The particle ὡσαύτως places this other case of the good works on a level with the former. The same is true of these—the good works also are manifest, and those that are not, namely, not manifest, cannot remain hid. Some are already open to the eyes of all, others will be open. When this is to be, is shown by the relation of this verse to ver. 24—namely, in the κρίσις. And what is this κρίσις in which all good and evil works, all crying and secretly following sins, all open and hidden works of godliness come to light? The question thus put—and we are at liberty to put it in no other form—can be satisfactorily answered only by a reference to the divine judgment (the just judgment (κρίσις) of God, 2 Thess. i. 5.) So also Schleiermacher. On the other hand, the most of commentators, understanding ver. 22 to refer to the ordination of presbyters, take this

κρίσις to mean the trial preceding the election of these office-bearers.[1] Apart, however, from what has been said on ver. 22, κρίσις is an unsuitable expression for δοκιμάζειν (iii. 10), and it must first be shown that this word is so used in the New Testament. Further, the whole passage would then properly belong to the 3d chapter. Moreover, the general form in which the sentiment is expressed, is inconsistent with this interpretation; it is good works and sins in general that are spoken of (comp. ver. 25); how could it in this case be said that they go before to judgment, or follow after, if it is the trial previous to being chosen as presbyter that is meant? And do all sins and virtues really come to light in this trial? And what relation then has this idea,—namely, that all comes to light,—to the words, *lay hands suddenly on no man, be not partaker of other men's sins.* It does not intimate how Timothy is to act (De Wette); the relation must rather be traced, as Leo does, thus: it is shown how much need there is of circumspection and consideration in the laying on of hands, or with Mack: how the application of the necessary caution will protect the church from unworthy ministers. But Leo's interpretation is founded on an incorrect understanding of the τισι δὲ καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦσιν, which cannot mean (comp. above): admoti jam muneribus, quales revera sunt cognoscuntur; and so also is Mack's view, which assigns to the words this signification:—they follow after, so that they can remain hid only from precipitancy and frivolity, which, as De Wette has already observed, neither affords a definite antithesis to πρόδηλοι, nor corresponds to ver. 25 (comp. above.) De Wette's interpretation is not much better, according to which ver. 22 is explained of restoration to the fellowship of the church, and in reference to this, ver. 24 is understood of the moral judgment pronounced by the church; for, apart from every other consideration, it is not true that everything good as well as bad comes to light in this judgment, nor can it be seen what end the sentiment was designed to serve, as it contains neither a direction as to the right procedure, nor an admonition to caution. Hence also De Wette, instead of referring ἐπακολ. to εἰς κρίσιν—as that to which it is opposed, namely, προαγ. εἰς κρίσιν, shows he ought to do—takes

[1] Huther understands it of the judgment passed by others quite generally. The sense then will be: Timothy is to be cautious in reference to ver. 23.

[2] The passages adduced by Planck do not prove this.

it quite indefinitely: "there are some whose sins are known afterwards when they have passed over their (longer or shorter) way." What way then? According to the preceding, it can only be the way to the *κρίσις*. And how can *ἐπακολ.*, if it is not referred to the *κρίσις*, signify: they are afterwards known, seeing that, on the contrary, from its being opposed to *πρόδηλοι*, it can only mean: they are hid? And the whole of ver. 25 is superfluous on the supposition that it refers to the laying on of hands, ver. 22, in whatever sense this is taken. Can vv. 24 and 25 accordingly be understood only of the divine judgment, it may be asked in what connection does this stand with what precedes? The reasons for referring vv. 24 and 25 exclusively to ver. 22, *lay hands suddenly*, &c., fall to the ground when it is understood, that it is neither the trial for the election of presbyters, nor the moral judgment of the church, of which they speak. The words are to be referred, then, rather to Timothy himself, of whon the apostle has been led to speak. He has been admonished to keep himself from the sins of others as well as from his own sins. This admonition is then explained and enforced in vv. 24 and 25, in which it said, that there are not merely open but also hidden sins, as well as open and hidden good works; but the one class as well as the other is made manifest in the light of the judgment, only, that the one goes before as loud witnesses, the other as silent ones follows. Ver. 23 is indeed inserted between; but I do not venture to guess here at any more strict connexion; it could only be in this, that the apostle perceives even something impure beneath that ascetical *ὑδροποτεῖν*, which was practised by Timothy. Schleiermacher, who justly dissents from Theodoret with his *εἶτα τὸν περὶ τῆς χειροτονίας ἀναλαμβάνει λόγον* on ver. 24, s, and refers ver. 24, s., strictly to ver. 23, explains the sentiment thus:—the writer aims at consoling Timothy under his delicate health, by holding up before him the consideration, that all good works are not equally manifest through the rewards which they bring, but still that they cannot always remain hid. But wherefore then ver. 24? And not a word is here said of reward. And indeed the critical authorship is but too apparent in the entire explanation. Olshausen finds in ver. 24, s., the idea: that nothing in the man can be altogether hid; on a careful consideration it will appear; he is then for referring ver. 24 to the election of presbyters, and vv.

22 and 25 more to the person of Timothy, in which the apostle hints that he knows well how faithful and zealous Timothy is—a double reference which is certainly not admissible.

§ 6. INSTRUCTIONS TO TIMOTHY WITH REGARD TO SLAVES. WARNING AGAINST THE DESIRE TO BECOME RICH AFTER THE MANNER OF THOSE WHO TEACH OTHERWISE. CHARGE TO BE ADDRESSED TO THE RICH. CONCLUDING EXHORTATION.

(Chap. vi. 1—22.)

"In the last chapter again you have want of connexion in abundance," is the judgment expressed by Schleiermacher. On comparing chap. vi. with chap. v., so much at least is self-evident, that the directions which are there given to Timothy with regard to the different members of the church are here continued, and, in particular, that it is the distinctions of civil rank that are here specified; first of all, in vv. 1 and 2, that of the slaves, then, vv. 17—19, that of the rich. Between these, in vv. 3—16, stands what certainly at first sight seems strange, namely, a description of the doctrines of those who taught otherwise in their nature, their results, and their inmost source in the disposition of their authors, vv. 3—5. One feature only, however, is selected from the rest for further application and reflection to Timothy, namely, the avarice of these seducers, and Timothy is warned against this, vv. 6—10, while in vv. 11—16, he is exhorted to follow after everlasting possessions, and referred to the glorious appearing of the King of kings and Lord of lords who only hath immortality. Accordingly, vv. 3—16 may be viewed as a transition to ver. 17, ss., which go on to treat of the right use to be made of riches; the admonition to Timothy will thus be inserted here precisely in the same way as at Tit. ii. 6—9 though more fully, or, as immediately before, at v. 22 (the latter half), between that verse and vi. 1. The concluding exhortation, vi. 20—22, vindicates itself as a comprehensive summary of what lay nearest the heart of the writer. If we come to this epistle with not too high expectations respecting its method, and regard it as an official letter to a confidential helper of the apostle, in which he gives free expression to his feelings towards the person to whom he writes (comp. the General Introduction, § 4), we shall be very

well contented with such an arrangement as has been pointed out. With respect to the alleged unfortunate compilation from the epistle to Titus and the second to Timothy, it will suffice to refer, against Schleiermacher, to Planck, p. 217, ss.

Vv. 1 and 2. OF THE SLAVES. Comp. Tit. ii. 9 on the reason of this so frequently occurring exhortation in the epistles of the apostle. It shows itself, meanwhile, in the passage before us plainly enough. "As many under the yoke as are slaves"—thus De Wette rightly renders the words, taking δοῦλοι as the predicate; for the distinction cannot be intended to be drawn between such slaves as are under the yoke and such as are not. A slave is as such under the yoke; the expression therefore does not imply harsh treatment, for to this the following exhortation given in quite general terms would not correspond; nor can it in itself mark the distinction between such slaves as serve heathen and such as serve Christian masters. The expression is rather used by the apostle in opposition to the false ideas that were held on the subject of emancipation: whosoever is under the yoke is to conduct himself according to this his position. The term ζυγός used in this sense only here; comp., however, Lev. xxvi. 13, and especially the expressions ἑτεροζυγεῖν and σύζυγος used by the apostle, from which it will be seen that this figure is not strange to him. Of these the apostle says: they are to count their masters worthy of all honour, that the name of God and the doctrine be not blasphemed. One can easily conceive what danger there was, lest the Christian slave should inwardly exalt himself above his heathen master, and look down upon him. To meet this danger there is here required of him not merely outward subjection, but inward esteem; for this is the import of the expression; and from this feeling will spring spontaneously the right outward conduct Ἴδιος δεσπότης, in like manner as ἴδιος ἀνήρ = husband, comp. Winer, § 22, 7, p. 178. On the ἵνα μή, comp. Tit. ii. 5, in a positive form ii. 10. Ὄνομα θεοῦ: with reference to the confession of the Christian. These masters are not to have it in their power to say: what kind of god is the God of the Christians, if those who confess him, &c.

Ver. 2 now treats of Christian slaves under Christian masters, the apostle having had in his mind in ver. 1 Christian slaves under masters who were not Christian, as appears from the words, *that the*

name of God, &c. As to those a warning against exalting themselves above their masters is addressed, so to these is addressed with the same propriety, a warning against falsely placing themselves on a level with their masters. "Those, however, who have believing masters are not to despise them because they are brethren, but they are to serve them all the more, because they are faithful and beloved who receive the benefit." The sense of the whole then is: such slaves are not to see, in the fact of their masters being their brethren in Christ, a reason for despising them (for to place themselves on a level with those to whom they owe subjection is already to despise them); but they are rather to find in this circumstance a motive to serve the more, *i.e.*, to do all the more what their position as slaves lays upon them. It is represented as objectively true that *they are brethren*, but it is a false inference from this that they are to be despised; it rather follows that the slaves are to serve the more. Instead of despising them, they are rather all the more to serve them. *Μᾶλλον* in opposition to the preceding, and, as the following *ὅτι* shows, is not = "rather," but = "so much the more." On the sense of the following *ὅτι* there can hardly be any doubt. It must certainly be the intention of the apostle to show, in opposition to what precedes, how the truth expressed in *they are brethren* lays under obligation to precisely an opposite conduct (comp. Schleiermacher.) What sense can be obtained by explaining the *ὅτι*, &c., thus: because the slaves who are devoted to their duty are *faithful* and *beloved?* which in itself is a strange idea. Or thus: because the masters who are studious to bestow benefits are faithful and beloved? Or thus: because the masters who enjoy the favour = *χάρις* (= are fellow Christians), are faithful and beloved? And, if we descend to particulars, how much might be said against each of these interpretations? How does *εὐεργεσία* come to have the signification of *χάρις*? And why this strange circumlocution for the simple *κοινωνοὶ τῆς χάριτος*, which the words according to this interpretation ought to express, but which they in reality do not express? And, as regards the interpretation mentioned before this, can the expression *οἱ τῆς εὐεργ. ἀντιλ.* (= who are studious to bestow benefits) be all at once applied as a principle to all Christian masters? And must not then *εἰ* have been used instead of *ὅτι*? But *εἰ* could certainly not have been used; for the apostle

will not, assuredly, make the performance of duty on the part of the slaves to be dependent on any such condition, comp. De Wette, Mack. Commentators have allowed themselves to be misled by the expressions εὐεργεσία and ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι from the right interpretation, which is furnished by the context itself. Already Schleiermacher thinks we are not at liberty to suppose, that the expression εὐεργεσία is used of slaves towards their masters. But why not, if by this is to be understood a service all the more zealous as proceeding from Christian love to the master as one who is *a believer* and *beloved* (in the sense of Rom. i. 7, *beloved of God*)? De Wette says well, "the clause is parallel with the preceding, *because they are brethren* . . . . only the subject which is there suppressed is here expressed, and it is so with reference to the *service* which is to be done from a Christian motive (μᾶλλον), and which, as concisely denoted by εὐεργεσία, is delicately indicated instead of being plainly said: but they are the more to serve, and to perform their service with good will (Eph. vi. 7) as a benefit, because those to whom they perform it are believers and beloved." There is, moreover, in a grammatical point of view, nothing to hinder our taking εὐεργεσία in its general signification = "kind act," and thus referring it to the μᾶλλον δουλεύειν (comp. Passow.) The passage Acts iv. 9 is also no proof against this. Ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, however, occurs twice (Luke i. 54 and Acts xx. 35), with the genitive of the person, = to take care of, and in connexion with the genitive of the thing (for example, φιλοσοφίας) it generally signifies "to be diligently intent on a thing;" but the signification = participem esse, percipere, is, as De Wette remarks, perfectly consistent with the general use of the word = percipere by the senses (comp. Passow), and is confirmed by Elsner in a citation from Porph. de abstin. 1, 46: μήτε ἐσθίων πλειόνων ἡδονῶν ἀντιλήψεται. Or may we not suppose, that the apostle, glancing at the reciprocal relation subsisting between the master and the slave, and going back to the original signification of the compound verb, uses ἀντιλαμβανομενοι in the sense "to receive in return" in like manner as ἀντιάω (comp. Passow)? This is not so unlikely with Paul especially, who forms new compounds just as he needs them. The oft-recurring ταῦτα δίδασκε, comp. Tit. ii. 15; and iv. 11, iv. 7 of our epistle, reminds us that we have before us epistles addressed to fellow-teachers of the apostle.

Vv. 3—16. THOSE WHO TEACH OTHERWISE—THEIR EAGERNESS AFTER GAIN—WITH RESPECT TO WHOM TIMOTHY IS WARNED AND ADMONISHED. When we observe how the writer pauses at the words, *thinking that gain is godliness*, ver. 5, and directs against this the whole admonition that follows, we shall either have to suppose with the critics, that it happens to him as to those "who speak without motive and without call, and just because they have no definite aim, are not able to come to a conclusion" (Schleiermacher), and that therefore he is led by the words of ver. 5 to make this diatribe against avarice; or, on the other hand, that in connection with the δίδασκε, and in opposition to it, he adverts again to the teaching of other things, in order that while he pourtrays to Timothy its frightful form as a whole, he may single out and give prominence to one feature, that of the love of gain, and warn Timothy especially against it. The opinion which any one forms on this point will be determined by the impression which the epistle makes upon him as a whole.[1] If Paul is the writer, we may well conceive that ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖ,—as also De Wette and Leo observe,—stands in opposition to the foregoing δίδασκε, without having to suppose that the apostle in this loses sight of his proper object in the mention of the ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν. It is certainly the apostle's manner elsewhere to take up and pursue a word in this way, and yet at the same time not to lose the train of thought as a whole. Comp. Schleiermacher, p. 160, s. "If any one teach differently, and consent not to the sound words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the doctrine which leads to godliness, he is surrounded as with a fog, &c." Εἴ τις = "every one who;" a case is supposed which already exists in concreto, i. 3, ss. The apostle then has this definite form of the ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν in view, and not a teaching otherwise in general. The ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν is to the apostle quite a definite idea (comp. on i. 3); from which it is at once apparent, how he can with propriety in the apodosis of the sentence, which certainly begins with τετύφωται (De Wette), connect with the general and hypothetical protasis εἴ τις, &c., so

[1] Leo (p. 57) notices the apostle's manner towards the end of his epistles—solutiori ordine singula cumulare praecepta. But chap. vi. in no way differs in this respect from the other sections of the epistle; the particular points are there handled, ver. 1, 2; 3—16; 17, ss., just in the same manner as those in the preceding parts. Leo's remark, however, is certainly applicable to the Pastoral Epistles as a whole.

definite a description of the ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν according to its source and its results. That this source and these results do not correspond to "every imaginable heresy" (De Wette) is self-evident; the only question is, do they correspond to the definite thing which is denoted by ἕτεροδ. We are therefore not at liberty, with Mosheim and Heydenreich, to understand ἑτεροδ. in strict opposition to ταῦτα δίδασκε as a teaching of something different respecting this particular point (the slaves.) But that it is by no means "heresy" in general (De Wette) that is here spoken of, is evident from the following explanation of the ἑτεροδ. (comp. on i. 3): *and consents not to sound words*, &c. Προσέρχεσθαι = accedere, to assent to; comp. the proof for this signification of the word in Leo. Ὑγ. λόγοι = ὑγ. διδ. Tit. ii. 1; by this is not meant heresy (comp. the remark on Tit. i. 9, ii. 1, and on i. 3 of our epistle), but sound doctrine in opposition to that of the seducers, which is unsound through profitless science and moral weakness, as also De Wette himself admits, inasmuch as he takes the expression to be synonymous with ἡ κατ' εὐσέβειαν διδασκαλία. The opposition, therefore, is directly only that between a doctrine which leads to godliness and one which has in it no power of godliness. Comp. also the Gen. Introd. The very expression, *the doctrine which leads to godliness*, is unnecessarily added in our passage as a more special explanation of the preceding; comp. on the expression our observations on Tit. i. 1, ἀλήθεια ἡ κατ' εὐσέβειαν = quae ad pietatem ducet (Leo.)

Ver. 4. The *apodosis* begins with this verse, and not with ἀφίστασο, ver. 5; all ground for the latter supposition, so unnatural in itself, disappears when εἴ τις ἑτεροδ. is rightly interpreted. Compare, moreover, De Wette. Τετύφωται = he is surrounded with fog, comp. on iii. 6. This is further explained by μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος, and in a positive form ἀλλὰ νοσῶν, &c. De Wette gives rightly the connexion of the thought thus: he is encompassed with proud conceit, without at the same time understanding anything, &c. Such persons are wanting in the knowledge of the truth which leads to godliness, consequently in that knowledge which is wholesome; in its place come ζητήσεις, questions of controversy, and λογομαχίαι verbal altercations, which do not lead to godliness, and thereby to spiritual soundness; hence νοσεῖν. This metaphor, and particularly its use here, is explained by the peculiar form of

this ἑτεροδ., comp. the Gen. Introd. *Ζητήσεις*, controversial questions, comp. on Tit. iii. 9, and above, i. 4. *Λογομαχίαι* = verbal altercations, de verbis magis quam de rebus (Calvin); a controversy which can spring only from selfishness, and not from love to the truth, as the results also show. On *περί* as denoting the object about which, so to speak, anything moves = circa, comp. Winer, § 53, I. p. 483. Leo and De Wette are for understanding *νοσεῖν* = "to suffer in the mania for." The opposition to *ὑγ. διδασκαλία ὑγιαίνειν ἐν πίστει*, Tit. i. 13 does not point to such a meaning; the signification itself, however, is demonstrably correct. This is the state of mind belonging to those who teach otherwise. The consequences of their questions and word-strifes are then stated in the words that follow: *ἔξ ὧν γίνεται*, &c., = from which proceeds envy, dissension, slanders, evil suspicion, lasting contests of men of corrupt minds and destitute of the truth, who look upon godliness as gain. The identity of the persons here characterized with those elsewhere referred to in the epistles is evident from the features in this description, comp. the Gen. Introd., and on Tit. i. 14. By the *βλασφημίαι* are to be understood not blasphemies against God, but, as the other characteristics show, mutual slanders; in like manner the *ὑπόνοιαι πον.* are to be taken in the sense = malevolae de iis qui alias partes sequuntur . . . suspiciones (Leo.) The word occurs only here; *ὑπονοέω* frequently in the Acts of the Apostles.

Ver. 5. *Παραδιατριβαί* is the common reading; the best accredited (comp. Lachmann, Tischendorf) is *διαπαρατριβαί*. On the signification, comp. Winer, § 16, 4, B., p. 113: the former = useless disputations, the latter = lasting enmities, contests. That the latter also corresponds better to the context—inasmuch as vanae disputationes have already been denoted by λογομ. and it is strife that is spoken of in the context—has been shown by Leo in his excellent investigation of this word, p. 60. Olshausen too is of the opinion here preferred. The inmost source of these pursuits in the disposition of those men is then indicated in the words, *men of corrupt minds*, &c., substantially the same as in ver. 4, *he is proud*, &c. The description is the same as elsewhere, comp. on *διεφθ.*, Tit. i. 15; on *ἀπεστερημένων*, &c., above on i. 19; Tit. i. 14. This last predicate shows plainly that that teaching of other things, against which Timothy is warned,

did not emanate from those who from the first insisted on the Pharisaico-judaistic stand-point, but from those who, after they had come into the possession of the true knowledge, knew neither how to value nor preserve this possession, in consequence of their moral deficiency, and thus were led into the by-paths of a pretendedly deeper gnosis and higher ascetical holiness of which they then made a trade. And if they were Jewish Christians (Tit. i. 10, &c., comp. the Gen. Introd.), it was most natural that they should connect their secret wisdom with the Old Testament, after the manner of the Cabbala, the elements of which were already in existence at that time. The sense of the passage before us is—that such were inwardly already destitute of the truth, for the reception of which they had not enough of moral integrity; but it by no means follows from this, that their doctrines must therefore have been heresies properly so-called. How far this inward destitution had gone with them, is shown most clearly by the last feature in the description, namely, that they look upon and treat piety as a means of gain, comp. Tit. i. 11. How very striking here again is that which by many is always characterised as a defect, namely, that so little is said by way of refuting the *errors!* Here, nothing more is necessary than a description of this pursuit setting before us its source and its aim; comp. the Gen. Introd. This last feature it is which the apostle keeps in his eye, and which in my opinion he had in view from the first, only he could not refrain from holding up before Timothy a complete picture of this teaching against which he warns him. The last words of this verse, *ἀφίστασο ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων*, are suspicious; they are not found in A.D.*F.G. 17.67.**93. (comp. Tischendorf), and were accordingly added in order to mark the transition to the following warning in ver. 6. The plural also, *τῶν τοιούτων*, disturbs the connexion, as afterwards at ver. 6 only one feature is brought into prominence. The most recent critics have cancelled it.

In vv. 6—10 there follows the warning against such a *love of money;* which, as ver. 11 shows, is also specially applied to Timothy. It will be difficult to show how it could come into the mind of a later writer, a disciple of Paul, belonging to the first or the second century, to introduce into his forged epistle admonitions such as this addressed to Timothy, irradiated as he would be with the splendour of the apostolic time. The warning, however, and after-

wards the admonition, ver. 11, ss., is so tenderly and sparingly expressed, that one has but to suppose, that the apostle did not consider Timothy to be exalted above the reach of every temptation of this kind, in order to feel noway disturbed in the conviction of its apostolic origin. It is indeed not to be denied, that the second epistle to Timothy, amid all the tenderness of its admonitions, shows that there must have been on the part of Timothy a certain tendency to indolence and to shrinking from the conflict.

Ver. 6. Ἔστι δέ is opposed to the νομιζόντων, ver. 5; but it is *really*, &c.[1] But godliness with contentment is a great gain (= means of gain); accordingly, in opposition to the preceding, that godliness is meant which makes the heart contented, and which banishes from the heart the thirst for perishing treasures, inasmuch as it offers higher treasures, and just in so far as it does this is it great gain.[2] Leo cites similar sentiments to this from Seneca; this difference, however, is well to be observed, that there *contentment* in itself is called riches, here *godliness with contentment;* and thus the heart amid every outward want is then only truly rich, not merely when it feels no need of what it has not, but when it has that which exalts it above what it has not. On αὐτάρκεια mp.oe Phil. iv. 11.

In ver. 7 the words, *with contentment*, are confirmed by the sentiment, that of earthly treasures we can take nothing away with us from the earth. This sentiment is, however, itself represented as an inference from another certain truth, namely, that we have brought nothing with us into the world, Job. i. 21; Eccles. v. 14. Hamann, "the earth makes no soul rich." Δῆλον is wanting in several codd., A.F.G. 17; I think with De Wette that for the sake of the sense it should be received as genuine; Tischendorf also has again received it. For, the principal idea must certainly be, that we take nothing away with us; but without δῆλον this would appear as the reason of what goes before.

Ver. 8. "If, however, we have food and covering let us therewith be content." The ἔχοντες δέ is in opposition to the οὐδὲ ἔξεν.

1 Eleganter et non sine ironica correctione in contrarium sensum eadem verba retorquet. Calvin (Huther.)

2 De Wette thinks it wrong that the baseness implied in perverting what is holy into a means of gain is not expressly rebuked. If the apostle had been rebuking those adversaries, he would not have omitted this. But he is dealing with Timothy.

τι δυν. The expressions διατροφή and σκέπασμα are ἅπαξ λεγόμενα in the New Testament. Several commentators understand *dwelling* as included in the σκέπασμα; certainly with reason, comp. Leo. On the conjunctive which several codd. have here, comp. Winer, § 13, 1, p. 86.

Ver. 9. In opposition to the contented, ver. 8, the apostle goes on to say: but they who wish to be rich (βουλόμενοι, not θέλοντες; comp. Leo) fall into temptation and a snare, and many foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men in destruction and perdition. The πειρασμός, temptation to unjust gain, already in itself denotes a sinful state (James i. 14), which contradicts the command not to let ourselves be drawn away of lust. They do not stop, however, at the temptation merely, but go also into the snare, *the snare of the devil*, iii. 7; and the one sin becomes the fruitful parent of the others; with the one evil lust many others join themselves; for so are the ἐπιθυμίαι to be understood, as ver. 10 shows, in which the sense of these words is confirmed by *root of all evil*, &c. Ἀνόητοι—for this, and not ἀνόνητοι, must be taken as the true reading, comp. Tischendorf—and βλαβεραί, noxiae, are the epithets applied to these *lusts*, *foolish* and *noxious*, noxious, namely, to those who are ensnared by them; one has but to call to mind Eph. iv. 22, ἐπιθυμίαι τῆς ἀπάτης: they deceive unto death. But our passage itself explains the epithets in the words αἵτινες, &c., which sink (the word in its proper signification, Luke v. 7) men εἰς ὄλεθρον καὶ ἀπώλειαν. By this is not meant destruction in the moral sense (De Wette) for they are already in this, but destruction in the emphatic sense in which ἀπώλεια is elsewhere used by the apostle, Rom. ix. 22; Phil. i. 28, &c.; ὄλεθρος, however (used only by the apostle in the New Testament, 1 Cor. v. 5; 1 Thess. v. 3; 2 Thess. i. 9) denotes destruction in general (as well temporal as eternal, comp. the passages) to which the more definite idea of ἀπώλεια is added to make it stronger. Olshausen understands ὄλεθρος exclusively of temporal destruction.

Ver. 10. That these are the consequences of desiring to be rich is now confirmed, in like manner as at ver. 7, by a general, and as it would seem proverbially acknowledged truth: for the love of money is a root of all evil. When De Wette objects that an avaricious man may yet possess certain virtues, and also, that other lusts may quite destroy a man, he stretches the sense of the words too far:

for in these no more is said, than that a germ of all evil lies in the love of money, by which it is neither, on the one hand, maintained that all evil must manifest itself in every lover of money, nor, on the other hand, is it denied that there are other vices which likewise carry in them the beginnings of all evil. Fortunately, man is inconsistent also in evil. Ἧς τινες, &c. In proof of this sentiment, the apostle mentions examples of those whom the love of money has made to err from the faith. Much has been made of the impropriety in the connection of ἧς ὀρεγ., on the ground that the φιλαργυρία itself is an ὄρεξις. That the expression is incorrect—as ἧς refers only to the idea of *money* implied in the φιλαργυρία—is true; but it is strange that any attempt should be made to draw from this impropriety a proof against the Pauline origin of the epistle. Analogous examples, as Baumgarten has observed, are to be found in Rom. viii. 24; Acts xxiv. 15, where ἐλπίς denotes at one time the hope, at another the object of the hope. I think, with De Wette, against Leo and Matthies, that it is incorrect to take ὀρέγεσθαι (comp. iii. 1; Heb. xi. 16) = deditum esse. Ἀπεπλανήθησαν, &c. (comp. Mark xiii. 22), in a reflex signification; they are turned away from the faith. The open departure from the faith is to the apostle the strongest proof of that assertion. "And have pierced themselves through with many pains." By these pains are to be understood the gnawings of conscience, the harbingers of the future ἀπώλεια, ver. 9. The expression περιπείρω only here; the same figure occurs at Luke ii. 35. In the same manner as here it is used in Josephus, B. J. III. 7, 31; Diodor. Sic. &c., comp. Leo, Wahl.

Ver. 11. The writer now passes to the positive side of the subject—from the warning against desiring to be rich, to the exhortation to strive after the attainment of those possessions in which alone true riches consist. The Christian is not required, on the one hand, to renounce anything without having offered to him, on the other, a rich compensation; that which he gives up for the sake of Christ, he shall receive again in Him an hundredfold, Matth. xix. 29; Mark x. 30. This positive side forms the specific character of the Christian exhortation; comp. on ver. 6. But thou—the apostle thus turns to Timothy—O man of God, flee this, and follow after righteousness, piety, faith, love, patience, mildness. *But thou*, in opposition to *some*, ver. 10. The whole of the fol-

lowing exhortation, not merely ver. 11, but vv. 11—16, does not extend beyond what belongs to Christians in general, and accordingly has no reference to the special calling of Timothy. From this it will at once appear that the title which is here given to Timothy, *ἄνθρ. τοῦ θεοῦ*, which certainly stands in a real connexion with the following exhortation, is not to be referred to the official calling of Timothy, and in this sense to be placed along with the אִישׁ־אֱלֹהִים of the Old Testament (1 Sam. ix. 6, &c., comp. with 2 Pet. i. 21); this designation in reference to the prophet implies an allusion which is not applicable to the *διδάσκαλος*; the expression is not used differently here from 2 Tim. iii. 17, and its sense is given in such passages as Jam. i. 18: *ἀπεκύησαν ἡμᾶς*, &c. He who thus belongs to God as his *creature* cannot regard the earthly as his highest good; only the *man of this world* can do so. But it also follows from the above remark that *ταῦτα* in the words *ταῦτα φεῦγε* is not, as many think, to be referred to vv. 3—10, but specially to the above-mentioned *φιλαργυρία* together with its results, ver 10. The whole of the following exhortation, chiefly also vv. 15 and 16, shows that the apostle has this point in view (comp. infra), and ver. 17, ss., shows this in like manner, as De Wette has already observed. *Διώκω*—frequently used by the apostle in this sense, comp. on *ἐπακολουθέω*, v. 10. *Δικαιοσύνη* in the same general sense as *δικαίως*, Tit. ii. 12, where likewise *δικαίως* and *εὐσεβῶς* are connected; comp. on the passage. Special aspects of this are then denoted in the following characteristics: faith, love, patience (comp. on Tit. ii. 2), mildness, (= mansuetudo, comp. on Tit. iii. 2.) We have but to compare Matt. v. 5 in order to understand why these are here specially mentioned. *Φιλαργυρία* and *πραότης* cannot exist together. Instead of *πραότητα* A.F.G., &c., have *πραϋπάθειαν* which Tischendorf has adopted (= meekness.) On the omission of the article, Winer, § 18, 1, p. 137.

Ver. 12. "Fight the good fight of faith, lay hold on eternal life, to which thou art called and hast professed the good profession before many witnesses." Comp. 1 Cor. ix. 24, ss.; Phil. iii. 12, ss. If we have the same author before us here as in these passages, then here too he has in his mind the figure of the agonistic contests. Leo admits that in the preceding verses it is Christian striving in general that is spoken of, but he finds in ver. 12 a transition to

those qualities which more immediately belong to a minister of the church. I can see nothing of this, and the comparison of the passages just adduced, as also 2 Tim. iv. 7, likewise shows nothing of the kind, and by *ἐντολή*, ver. 14, is to be understood even according to Leo the Christian commandment in general. We have here therefore not to do with Timothy as an evangelist, but as an individual, as also De Wette perceives; only that he from his critical point of view draws from this another objection against the author, as if nothing of a purely personal nature could properly find a place in this epistle. At the expression *ἐπιλαβοῦ τῆς αἰων. ζ.*, Schleiermacher has taken offence on the two following grounds: 1, because Paul never uses the word elsewhere, and it occurs here twice in immediate succession,—to which we have already replied in the General Introduction with examples from other epistles; and 2, because it is strange to find the imperative in connection with *ζωῆς αἰωνίου*, inasmuch as eternal life can only be expected from God. This objection will disappear if only we keep in view the words, "in and through the fight;" for to him who faithfully fights, *eternal life* is sure as the crown of victory. Comp. Winer, § 44, 2, p. 363: "the *ἐπιλ. τῆς ζωῆς* is not represented as the result of the conflict, but as the thing which is to be striven after, and *ἐπιλ.* does not signify to obtain, to receive; the asyndeton is not without effect." In the expression *εἰς ἣν ἐκλήθης* (*καί* after *ἣν* is to be cancelled, comp. Tischendorf) the figure is not to be retained; it is quite the same here as at Phil. iii. 14 (comp. on the passage and De Wette on the present passage.) Leo and others are for referring *εἰς ἣν* also to what follows, but the reference would not be homogeneous, and the *ὡμολο.* does not need it. De Wette is therefore right when he says, that *καὶ ὡμολ.* is simply placed co-ordinately with the preceding. All that is necessary to account for the use of the expression *ὁμολογεῖν ὁμολογιαν* may be found in the writings of Paul, as Schleiermacher himself acknowledges; but the *καλὴ ὁμ.*, as he thinks, looks very strange. It must be supposed that the words *ὁμ. κ. ὁμ.*, as they stand so closely connected with the *ἐκλήθην*, denote a particular fact, as does also the expression *ὁμολογία Χριστοῦ*. This is unquestionably true; and he who does not wish to know more than can be known, may learn from the passages, i. 18, iv. 14, and 2 Tim. i. 4, to what fact he is to refer this *ὁμολογία*. Comp. Matthies, p. 417. In those

passages, it is true, only the laying of hands on Timothy and the prophecies concerning him are spoken of; the passage before us supplements those statements in precisely the same way as 2 Tim. i. 6 supplements 1 Tim. iv. 14, and this again 1 Tim. i. 18. If *there*, it is the calling of Timothy, and *here* his personal character and conduct which the apostle has especially in view, it will at once be evident, why here it is the ὁμολογία, and there the ἐπίθεσις and the προφητεία, which the apostle holds up before him. If due attention then be given to the difference in the context (comp. also Böttger a. a. O., p. 12, ss.), no reason will appear for going beyond the allusion which we find in other passages to Timothy's entrance on his official calling; no reason, therefore, for supposing any allusion to his baptism, still less to a confession made by him before his enemies in a time of persecution, to which indeed, apart from every other consideration, the expression ὁμ. τ. καλ. ὁμ. does not well correspond (comp. Leo and also De Wette.) If any one thinks that this expression "savours of a later date," he must just be allowed to think so; there is nothing in it at which any one can justly find reason to stumble. This confession is called *good*, not on account of the prompt courage with which Timothy made it, but on account of its import; it is the Christian confession as such that is meant;[1] only, this must not be supposed to imply any definite formula; comp. on the following verse, ver. 13. "The exhortation rises as in v. 21; 2 Tim. iv. 1, to a solemn protestation," De Wette. I give thee charge—the apostle writes—in the sight of God, who keeps all things alive, and Christ Jesus, who under Pontius Pilate witnessed the good confession, that thou keep the commandment without spot, unrebukeable, &c. It is of importance here to decide whether the reading is ζωογονοῦντος or ζωοποιοῦντος. The codd. A.D.F.G., &c., are in favour of the former (comp. Tischendorf); it is also easier evidently to account for the more common ζωοποιοῦντος having arisen out of ζωογονοῦντος, which occurs again only twice, Luke xvii. 33 and Acts vii. 19, than vice versa to account for the latter having arisen out of the former. Further, as ζωογονεῖν in the Scripture phraseology, both of the Old and New Testament (comp. Leo), is = vivum conservare, such a sense might seem to involve

1 So also Huther assigning its proper force to the article.

a difficulty when compared with Rom. iv. 17, &c. In fine, *τὰ πάντα* is also in favour of *ζωογονοῦντος*, for *ζωοποιεῖν τὰ πάντα* can nowhere be shown in the sense of raising to life. If, accordingly, we take the reading to be *ζωογονοῦντος τὰ πάντα*, we shall not find in the words an allusion to the resurrection, but only to the all-preserving power of God. The apostle here points Timothy to the present manifestation of the power and glory of God, as afterwards at ver. 14, ss., to the future revelation of this, in order to encourage him—the *man of God*—to the right conduct, ver. 14. He belongs to him who bears and preserves all; by him has he been called to eternal life on condition of faithfully fighting the fight of faith; how should he depart from him who is the Lord of all life, and turn again to that which is naught? Those who adopt the common reading *ζωοποιοῦντος* (De Wette and others), find in the words an encouragement not to shrink from death in the cause of Jesus Christ. But, as we have already seen, it is not the conduct of Timothy in his calling, that is here spoken of, comp. vv. 11—13, 14. We must rather therefore connect *ζωοτοιοῦντος τὰ πάντα* with the exhortation to lay hold on eternal life, ver. 12. Still less will that intrepretation do, if with Mack we take *ζωοπ.* = from whom is all life, and in whose hand the life of every creature stands; in which sense the other reading is decidedly to be preferred. *Καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ*, &c. These words also are variously interpreted. With respect, first of all, to the construction, De Wette has rightly shown in opposition to Mack and Matthies, that *τὴν καλὴν ὁμολογίαν* cannot be separated from *μαρτυρήσαντος* and connected with *παραγγέλλω*: 1, the verb does not correspond to this; 2, *τ. καλ. ὁμ.* has nothing pointing back to this verb; 3, nor does the following idea, expressed by the *ἐντολή*, which is not implied in the *ὁμολογία*, agree with this. We must therefore take *μαρτ.* and *την. κ. ὁμ.* together. What then is the sense? It has already been said of Timothy that he has made the good confession, and on the ground of this he is in ver. 12, as also in ver. 14, exhorted to the right conduct. He does not need therefore an example of a good confession, as is generally supposed in explanation of this passage, for what is required of him is not to confess, but on the ground of the confession made by him *to keep the commandment*. And is it to be supposed, asks Matthies, with reason, that what has just been ascribed to

Timothy, should now in so entirely similar a form be predicated of Christ? And why is not here also ὁμολογήσαντος and not μαρτυρήσαντος? Non differt μαρτυρεῖν την ὁμ. from ὁμολογεῖν τὴν ὁμ., observes Leo. But wherefore then the change? And where else shall we find μαρτυρεῖν synonymous with ὁμολογεῖν? The former is everywhere = to testify, to bear witness to the truth of a thing, the latter is always to confess, which has directly nothing to do with the truth or untruth of a thing, but only with its relation to the person confessing, its acknowledgment or rejection by the individual. Comp. only a passage such as Rom. x. 2, ix. 10, and it will at once be seen, how widely the two expressions are distinguishable from each other. Thus then the words τοῦ μαρτ. . . . τὴν καλὴν ὁμ. will mean not: "he has laid down a good confession," but, "testified, given testimony to its truth;" and Timothy who has laid down this good confession, is accordingly referred here to the certainty of this confession, in so far as Christ has given testimony to it. Thus by the ἡ καλὴ ὁμολογία, ver. 12 and ver. 14, is to be understood one and the same thing, namely, the Christian confession, which is in itself good.[1] On this also will depend the interpretation which is assigned to μαρτυρήσαντος ἐπὶ I. I., which according to the one view will be understood specially of the testimony of Christ before Pilate (John xviii. 35, ss.; Matth. xxvii. 11), according to the other, of the testimony to the truth in his sufferings and death, ἐπί = under (comp. for this, passages in De Wette); the second of these interpretations is accordingly to be preferred.

Ver. 14. Thus then Timothy—being reminded that it is the Lord of all life who hath called him, that it is a sure confession by which he hath bound himself—is exhorted *to keep the commandment without spot*, &c. We have as yet seen no reason to depart from the supposition founded on ver. 11, that it is not Timothy's calling which is here spoken of, but his personal conduct. How can ἐντολή here signify munus demandatum (Bretschneider), or the doctrine which is committed to him (De Wette), especially as the word is without any pronominal reference back to Timothy? And as this signification does not agree with the context, so neither is

1 Huther takes μαρτ. = ὁμολογεῖν, and understands by the ὁμολογία the confession which we find in John xviii. 37. He ought to have adhered to his interpretation of ver. 12.

it grammatically well founded: for in the passage John xii. 20, ἐντολή αὐτοῦ has the sense = "doctrine which has been laid down," only in virtue of its reference back to ver. 49. And in fine, τηρεῖν τὴν ἐντολήν has, according to constant usage, as Schleiermacher already observes (comp. Wahl on τηρεῖν), invariably the sense "to observe, to obey a command." There is no reason here for departing from this the usual signification. Ἐντολή then is not the Christian doctrine in general. but as Leo and others (Olshausen = all that Christ hath commanded) understand it = the Christian doctrine in its morally binding and disciplining aspect, Tit. ii. 11, as also 2 Pet. ii. 21, iii. 2, as νόμος for the Christian; comp. John xiii. 34.[1] "The exhortation then is confined to morality," urges De Wette as an objection; but that it should be so is precisely what the context requires. Ἄσπιλον and ἀνεπίλεπτον are not then, as many think,[2] to be connected with ἐντολήν as its predicates, but with σε, and denote the effect of *keeping the commandment*. This construction is sufficiently justified by the σε which which immediately precedes, and by the definite sense of τηρῆσαι τὴν ἐντολήν, while it by no means confuses the whole, as Schleiermacher thinks. For ἄσπιλος (vitii expers) Schleiermacher himself refers to Eph. v. 27; comp. besides James i. 27; 1 Pet. i. 19; 2 Pet. iii. 14. On ἀνεπίλημπτος see at iii. 2. *Until*, &c., a thoroughly Pauline connexion of ideas, comp. 1 Cor. i. 8; Phil. i. 6, 10, &c. Leo well: ultimum terminum ad quem usque Timotheo, ἡ ἐντολή, servanda sit, ponit apostolus; comp. on Phil. i. 6. On ἐπιφάνεια = παρουσία comp. on Tit. ii. 13, and 2 Thess. ii. 8.

In vv. 15 and 16 the apostle describes this future *appearing* as what God is to bring about, whose majesty and glorious riches are represented in the epithets which are added. On καιροῖς ἰδίοις comp. Tit. i. 3. Schleiermacher finds in the unusual form of expression ἐπιφ. δείξει a decided specimen of patchwork. But if ἐπιφάνεια, in contradistinction to παρουσία, gives especial prominence to the element of visibility in this revelation, why should the connexion with δείξει have an appearance of patchwork? What other word should have been used instead of δείξει? It is farther alleged by Schleiermacher, that such a description of God passing into a doxo-

1 So also Huther, = παραγγελία, i. 5.

2 Also Huther.

logy is not consistent with what precedes. I apprehend, however, that this description of God, as the only one who is glorious and rich, who alone hath immortality, carries in it plainly enough an antithetical reference to the eager striving after earthly riches which is censured in the preceding verses. To come to particulars, Schleiermacher thinks that the words of this passage are borrowed from a hymn, while Baur (p. 28) endeavours to show that we have here a gnostic form of expression. The former opinion, which Mack also expresses, we may leave undecided, as in a critical point of view it is inconsiderable; at all events, such a supposition has more in its favour in connection with the passage iii. 16 than here; comp. Matthies against it. In opposition to the other opinion, others have already proved that a reference to the gnostic style of expression is not necessary to the explanation of the predicates here used. On *μακάριος*, comp. on i. 11; Tit. ii. 13. Corresponding to that which God as in himself will be the *appearing* which he will at a future time show, and its results for those who *keep the commandment*. *Καὶ μόνος δυνάστης* is likewise designed to show the greatness and majesty of God, from whom the *ἐπιφ.* proceeds. The word *δυνάστης* is, in its general application, not foreign to the New Testament usage (Luke i. 52; Acts viii. 27); applied to God as here, it occurs at least in 2 Macc. iii. 24, xii. 15, xv. 23. The epithet *μόνος* is used in a similar way here to Rom. xvi. 27: *μόνῳ σοφῷ θεῷ*; Jude 25; Rev. xv. 4. He is *δυνάστος* in a way in which no other is. No one surely will maintain that it is necessary to suppose here any polemical allusion to the polytheism or dualism of the Gnostics. Expressions parallel to the following epithets, *βασιλεὺς τῶν βασιλευόντων, κύριος τῶν κυριευόντων* (comp. on i. 17), which determine more exactly the *μόνος δυν.* may be pointed out in the Old and New Testaments: Deut. x. 17; Ps. xcv. 3; 2 Macc. xiii. 4; 3 Macc. v. 35; Matt. v. 35; Rev. i. 5, xvii. 14, xix. 16. Comp. also passages such as Eph. i. 21, iii. 10; Col. i. 16; Rom. viii. 38; 1 Cor. xv. 24.

Ver. 16. *Who only hath immortality. Οὐσίᾳ γὰρ ἀθάνατος, οὐ μετουσίᾳ*, Theodoret. He is therefore the source of immortality to all who are partakers in it; out of him is *death*. (With reference to the Son, John v. 26.) On the relation which this predicate bears to the subject treated of in the context, see above. The idea is not expressed by the apostle in the same form any-

where else, but we certainly do not need the gnosis of the second century in order to its explanation. The expression *ἀθανασία* is used again by the apostle only at 1 Cor. xv. 33. The predicate which comes last expresses also the exceeding majesty of God: *φῶς οἰκῶν ἀπρόσιτον, ὅν*, &c., on which Theophylact observes: *ᾧ οὐδεὶς προσελθεῖν δύναται διὰ τὴν ἄγαν λαμπρότητα*, and Theophilus ad Autol., p. 72 (ed. Col.): *εἰ τῷ ἡλίῳ ἐλαχίστῳ ὄντι στοιχειῳ οὐ δύναται ἄνθρωπος ἀτενίσαι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν θέρμην καὶ δύναμιν· πῶς οὐχὶ μᾶλλον τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξῃ ἀνεκφράστῳ οὔσῃ ἄνθρωπος θνητὸς οὐ δύναται ἀντωπῆσαι* (cited by Heydenreich, p. 321.) Baur thinks that this expression bears a peculiar resemblance to the gnostic cast of conception; the designation, however, is derived from the Old Testament. comp. Ps. civ. 2; Ezek. i. 26, ss, and passages such as Eccles. vii. 26, and 1 John i. 5; Heb. i. 3; Col. i. 15. The words are not to be understood as merely intimating the incomprehensibleness of God, but agreeably to the context, as descriptive of his majesty, in respect of his essential nature, as the consequence of which is then specified in the relative clause the absolute invisibility of God. Mack is altogether wrong when he takes the words in connexion with *in due time*, and understands them of the unsearchableness of the divine counsels. Comp. on the relative clause, John i. 18; 1 John iv. 12. Further, Col. i. 15; Heb. xi. 27, where God is described as *ἀόρατος*. Our passage says nothing else than what we find in these passages. The last words of this verse form a doxology with which the apostle winds up this description of God: *to whom be honour and power everlasting*, comp. 1 Pet. iv. 11, v. 11; Rev. i. 6, v. 13; Jude 25. *Κράτος* is power in its application outwards, comp. Harless on Eph. i. 19; hence the connexion with *τιμή*.

Vv. 17—19. CONCERNING THE RICH. Some have considered the foregoing doxology as properly the conclusion of the epistle, and these verses, together with what follows, as a mere supplement. Without reason; for a doxology does not necessarily stand precisely at the conclusion of the whole epistle, as may be seen in i. 17; Rom. xi. 36, while ver. 17 stands in quite a natural connexion with ver. 5, ss.; from speaking of the desire to be rich the apostle proceeds to speak of those who are rich. Similarly already Schleiermacher, p. 227. Even the manner in which the apostle expresses himself in this passage shows that he has this connexion

in view. *Τοῖς πλουσίοις ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι* placed at the beginning of the sentence, evidently involve an opposition to another kind of riches (not, therefore to ver. 19, as De Wette thinks), those riches, namely, to which the apostle has directed the attention of Timothy in the preceding, where he reminds him of the *appearing* which the blessed God will in due time show. *Ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι* (comp. Winer, § 19, 2, p. 155) is to be connected with *τοῖς πλουσίοις*, so as to form one idea. Other MSS., D.E., some versions and church Fathers, have *τοῦ νῦν αἰῶνος*, comp. Tischendorf. The apostle now shows in a few brief sentences what disposition ought to be cherished by those who have riches, what use they ought to make of their riches, and the consequences of their making such use of them. In ver. 17 the apostle warns the rich against a twofold danger: against haughtiness (*ὑψηλοφρονεῖν* the opposite of *ταπεινοφροσύνη*, comp. Rom. xii. 20, *τὰ ὑψηλὰ φρονεῖν*), and against that which lies at the root of haughtiness, namely, trust in riches. *Μηδὲ ἠλπικέναι* (on the Perf. comp. iv. 10) *ἐπὶ πλούτου ἀδηλότητι*: the expression itself represents this trust as misplaced, in so far as it is trust in what is uncertain and changeable. On this mode of giving emphasis to an idea by means of the substantive comp. Winer, § 34, 2, p. 267. *Ἄδηλος* properly non manifestus—uncertain, insecure, occurs besides at Luke xi. 44, and is used by the apostle again only at 1 Cor. ix. 25, xiv. 8. Theodoret: "the possession of riches is indeed insecure, for now they accompany this person, and now they pass over to that, and that which has many masters is possessed by none." Confidence is rather to be placed and reposed in the living God (*τῷ ζῶντι* is certainly not genuine, comp. Tischendorf; instead of *ἐπὶ* as before, *ἐν* = upon, in) for he it is who giveth us all things (transfertur ejus officium ad divitias, si spes in iis locatur—Calvin) and who giveth them *εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν* for enjoyment, not that the heart may cleave to them.

Ver. 18. As the right use which is to be made of riches, Timothy is to enjoin the rich *to do good* (*ἀγαθοεργεῖν*, comp. Acts xiv 17 = *ἀγαθοποιεῖν*) to be rich in good works (a stronger expression than the foregoing, with allusion to the being *rich in this world*), liberal, ready to communicate (both expressions only here.) Some have understood the expression *κοινωνικός* to mean "social, affable," which is little suited to the foregoing predicates, and is against the *usus linguae*; comp. Rom. xii. 13, xv. 26; Gal. vi. 6; Heb-

xiii. 16. The signification "sympathising" (Matthies) in the sense which we generally attach to this word, cannot be justified grammatically, and, as connected with the foregoing predicates, is far too general an idea. Substantially, the two expressions run into each other—they express the same thing in different points of view: the former *εὐμεταδ.* applies more especially to one whose heart does not cleave to what he has, and who therefore gives easily and cheerfully; the latter *κοιν.* to one who gives what he has because another stands in need of it.

Ver. 19. Of such giving to others the giver himself enjoys the best fruits; he thereby lays past a treasure for himself (*ἑαυτοῖς θεμέλιον καλὸν εἰς τὸ μέλλον. Θεμέλιον* everywhere else signifies foundation, base; it is arbitrary to understand it as = *θέμα*, treasure, and still more so to substitute as an emendation *κειμήλιον* (Cleric.), or *θέμα λίαν καλόν* (L. Bos), as the reading does not in the least degree fluctuate. Schleiermacher indeed maintains, that "the apostle does not deal with metaphors in this confused manner." The expression, however, is not confused but only concise. The *foundation*, namely—which is the sure reversion to a future possession—is itself represented as a possession, and so connected with *ἀποθησαυρίζοντας*. De Wette rightly refers to iii. 13, *βαθμὸν ἑαυτοῖς καλὸν περιποιοῦνται*. On the whole passage comp. Luke xvi. 9. In order that—continues the apostle—("with their feet so to speak on this foundation," De Wette) they may lay hold on the true life. *Τῆς ὄντως* is, according to A.D.*E.*F.G., &c., decidedly to be preferred to the other reading, *τῆς αἰωνίου* as at ver. 12.

Ver. 20—22. CONCLUDING EXHORTATION AND BENEDICTION. Vv. 20 and 21 evidently stand as a comprehensive concluding exhortation, in which the main point is again brought into notice, similar examples of which we find in other epistles of the apostle (comp. for example 1 Cor. xvi. 13; 2 Cor. xiii. 11; Eph. vi. 10; Phil. iv. 4.) This main point which the apostle here again brings into notice, and earnestly enjoins on Timothy personally (O, Timothy) is—that he guard the doctrine which has been committed to him, and meddle not with the pursuits of those *ἑτεροδιδάσκαλοι*, which in the case of many have already led to an entire falling away from the faith. The principal clause is, *guard that which is committed to thy trust;* what

the apostle means by this, what danger he has here in view, is shown by the following explanatory words, *avoiding*, &c. What are we to understand as meant by παραθήκη (for this is the true reading, not παρακαταθήκη, Winer, § 16, 4, B., p. 113), which occurs again only in the passages 2 Tim. i. 12, 14? The signification of the word is clear = res deposita apud aliquem vel curae ejus tradita; comp. 1 Tim. i. 18; 2 Tim. ii. 2. By comparing the passages last adduced, in which we find the verb, having for its object ἐπαγγελία and ἃ ἤκουσας παρ' ἐμοῦ, it will at once be seen that here also, by the possession entrusted to Timothy, we are to understand the doctrine which he has been called to preach. The same may be inferred also from the opposition to the *science falsely so called*, which leads to a falling away from the faith, as also from the parallel passages, 2 Tim. i. 14. So the most of commentators, also Olshausen. De Wette (p. 32) has been led to another interpretation, inasmuch as he considers that 2 Tim. i. 12 furnishes the criterion according to which we are to determine the sense of our passage, and because he understands παραθήκη there to mean the apostolic office, he thinks that here, and in 2 Tim. i. 14, it denotes the office of evangelist. With this, however, neither does the φυλάσσειν well agree (comp. 2 Tim. iv. 5), nor does it yield a strict opposition to what is named afterwards, for this appears only when παραθήκη, in opposition to the gnosis falsely so called, is understood to denote the true doctrine, or as it is elsewhere called, *the sound doctrine*.[1] Comp. on this point what is said on these passages. Schleiermacher's opinion—that while at 2 Tim. i. 14 the meaning of παραθήκη is rendered plain enough by the context, the term is quite enigmatical here, and that it is impossible to know rightly what it is intended to mean—is refuted by what has been already said. There is much more appearance of a difficulty on comparing 1 Tim. i. 14 with ver. 12, than on comparing it with our passage. Timothy, then, according to our interpretation, is to guard the true doctrine as a possession committed to his trust (μὴ μειώσῃς· οὔκ ἐστι τὰ δά· τὰ ἀλλότρια ἐπιστεύθης· μηδὲν ἐλαττώδης—Chrysostom[2]), turning away from (= avoiding, Winer, § 39, ii.,

1 Huther also agrees with De Wette: Timothy is to guard the office, and he is to do this by avoiding the errors.

2 We may here also give a place to the memorable words of Vincentius Sirinensis

p. 293 ; comp. i. 6, v. 15 ; 2 Tim. iv. 4) profane talk and the oppositions of the gnosis falsely so called. On *βέβηλος*, 1 Tim. iv. 6. The expression *βέβ. κενοφ.* occurs again at 2 Tim. ii. 16. The reading *καινοφωνίας* is neither sufficiently authorized, nor is it to be preferred on internal grounds, for nowhere else does the writer indicate the novelty, but everywhere the emptiness and real nothingness of what was brought forward by the opponents. The expression *κενοφ.* (= empty talk, such as needs no refutation), points precisely to those errors which the apostle has already characterised and rejected as mere *strifes about words*, as *questions* which produce no moral fruit, as *foolish talking*. If then it be a settled point, that the *κενοφ.* refers to the pursuits of the *vain talkers*, which are censured elsewhere in this, as also in the other epistles—as indeed it is not at all conceivable that the apostle should at the conclusion of the epistle begin all at once to speak of something entirely new,—there can in this case be no doubt as to the meaning of the *ἀντιθέσεις τῆς ψ. λ.* It is evident that *κενοφ.* and *ἀντιθ.* as one article serves both, and both are therefore equally designated as *βέβηλοι*, can grammatically be considered only as forming together one whole, or rather, as *κενοφων.* is itself

on this passage in his Commonitorum, as already cited by Mack, p 395. O Timothee, inquit, depositum custodi, devitans profanas vocum novitates (see above.) O! Exclamatio ista et praescientia est pariter et caritatis. Praevidebat enim futuros, quos etiam praedolebat, errores.—Quid est "depositum custodi?" Custodi, inquit, propter fures, propter inimicos, ne dormientibus hominibus superseminent zizania super illud tritici bonum semen, quod seminaverat filius hominis in agro suo. "Depositum," inquit, "custodi." Quod est depositum? id est quod tibi creditum est non quod a te inventum; quod accepisti, non quod excogitasti; rem non ingenii sed doctrinae non usurpationis privatae, sed publicae traditionis; rem ad te perductam non a te prolatam, in qua non auctor debes esse sed custos, non institutor, sed sectator, non ducens, sed sequens. "Depositum," inquit, "custodi:" catholicae fidei talentum inviolatum illibatumque conserva. Quod tibi creditum est, hoc penes te maneat, hoc a te tradatur. Aurum accepisti, aurum redde. Nolo mihi pro aliis, alia subjicias. Nolo pro auro aut impudenter plumbum, aut fraudulenter aeramenta supponas. Nolo auri speciem, sed naturam plane. ... Sed forsitam dicit aliquis: Nullusne ergo in ecclesia Christi profectus habebitur religionis? Habeatur plane, et maximus . . . Sid ita tamen, ut vere profectus sit ille fidei non permutatio. Siquidem ad profectionem pertinet, ut in semetipsa una quaeque res amplificetur, ad permutationem vero, ut aliquid ex alio in aliud transvertatur. Crescat igitur oportet et multum vehementerque proficiat tam singulorum, quam omnium, tam unius hominis, tam totius ecclesiae aetatum ac seculorum gradibus intelligentia, scientia, sapientia; sed in suo duntaxat genere, in eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu, eademque sententia. Imitetur animarum religio rationem corporum, quae licet annorum processu numeros suos evolvant et explicent eadem tamen quae erant permanent, &c. (Given in full by Löhe in his work, "Ueber unsere kirchliche Lage," p. 28, s.)

a part of a whole, only as two designations of one subject (comp. Winer, § 18, 4, p. 145, s.); and we are warranted, therefore, in applying the *ἀντιθέσεις* to the Marcionitic antitheses (Baur), only in so far as these are spoken of in the foregoing parts of the epistle That which is spoken of, however, in the preceding parts of the epistle, and spoken of as something then present, is only a teaching of other things which, by its fables, and genealogies, and legal requirements, forms an *opposition* to the *sound doctrine*, inasmuch as it thereby leads away from the true objects of knowledge, and thus hinders faith from producing the fruits of morality, nay, in the case of many, leads to a falling away from the faith. These people are in Tit. i. 9 expressly characterized as *ἀντιλέγοντες* in ver. 10, as *ἀνυπότακτοι ματαιολόγοι* in 2 Tim. ii. 25, as *ἀντιδιατιθέμενοι*; why then may not their *ἀντιθέσεις* be here spoken of? *Ἀντιθέσεις* is not then any more than *κενοφωνίαι* the objective designation of the thing, but like *βέβηλ. κενοφ.* is an expression of the apostle's opinion regarding it, and thus involves the reason why he enjoins Timothy to avoid it. How heterogeneous would be these two expressions which are here placed together, if *ἀντιθέσεις* were a purely objective designation used by those traders in wisdom themselves. The following words, *τῆς ψευδ. γνώσεως*, are also against the interpretation, according to which the *ἀντιθέσεις* are to be understood of assertions definitely expressed in the form of antitheses. For as this genitive is grammatically to be connected also with *κενοφων* (Winer, p. 146, 3), we must in consequence suppose, that there were in like manner certain definite *κενοφωνίαι* of the gnosis falsely so called, which no one will for a moment imagine. In short, the exegetical investigation of this passage, as also the other parts of the epistle show, that we are not here to understand any allusion to the Marcionitic antitheses. I shall merely add, that it is difficult to explain how a forger in the second century should have fallen into the anachronism of respresenting the apostle as warning Timothy against the antitheses of Marcion; comp. on this and on Baur's view generally, the Gen. Introd., § 3 and 4. Olshausen also adopts the interpretation which we have here given, and likewise Matthies and De Wette,[1] who observes, that the apparent coin-

1 Also Wieseler: contrary assertions in reference to the *παραθήκη*. Huther differently: their dialectic reasoning against the evangelical doctrine. Rather might it be supposed to mean their mutual controversies.

cidence of this passage with the historical fact of the antitheses of Marcion between law and gospel, must not be so much insisted on as Baur does. Leo understands the expression as equivalent to *ζητήσεις*, questiones ad disputandum propositae. But why then was not this term used here also as elsewhere? And *ἀντιθέσεις* certainly implies more than that other term. Mack's interpretation = contradictions in which were sought to be represented particular doctrines of the common faith, has much more in its favour grammatically; but the other parts of the epistle contain no allusion to such antitheses, while the objective signification thus assigned to the word is forbidden by the context (comp. above.) The objection against our interpretation—that Timothy was not at liberty to avoid, but was under obligation to refute what contradicted the sound doctrine—has already been removed by De Wette when he says that the writer only intends to say here, as at iv. 7; 2 Tim. ii. 16, 23; Tit. iii. 9, that Timothy is not to adopt such errors, not to let himself be misled by them. With regard to *τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως*, which belongs to both the foregoing substantives, and denotes a (pretendedly) higher knowledge, which deserves not this name, and is therefore falsely so called, I perfectly agree with Dr Baur that *γνῶσις* here is the current name by which a certain tendency and manner of teaching then existing was designated. It is pre-supposed that the "heretics came forward under this name and publicly bore it." But how should this name create any surprise when we can "point out even already in the New Testament an idea very closely allied" to the later gnosis (Baur, chr. Gnosis, p. 90, ss., where he refers to 1 Cor. viii. 1, xii. 8, xiv. 6); when, further, we turn to Col. ii. 8, 18, 23, where we read of a *συλαγωγεῖν διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας*, &c., so that "the apostle, as Matthies justly observes, elsewhere also shows himself to be acquainted with this *γνῶσις*, not merely in its difference from the faith, but also in its opposition to it, *i.e.*, in the conceited subjectivity by which it was characterized;" chiefly, however, when we learn from the general import of this epistle and cognate passages in the other two, that the parties from whom this mischief proceeded, against which the apostle here warns Timothy, were Jews who trafficked in a secret wisdom of a pretendedly superior kind, and incongruously mixed with certain ascetical requirements? On what grounds did they look for money, if they had not a higher know-

ledge to offer, a science concealed from the multitude, accessible only to the initiated? What then could be more natural than that the apostle should characterize this γνῶσις as falsely so called—as indeed in the three epistles he designates the knowledge of those teachers of other things as foolish and profitless. (Not knowing what they say nor whereof they affirm, i. 7.) We are accordingly saved from the alternative which Dr Baur has put before us, either of supposing that the apostle had a purely prophetical glance into the time of Marcion, or of placing the composition of the epistle in that period. "The expression ψευδώνυμος γνῶσις was afterwards transferred to the Gnostics." Olshausen.

Ver. 21. The danger connected with these pursuits is now again held up before Timothy, inasmuch as the apostle here specifies the worst evil to which they can lead, and to which, in the case of several, they have led, namely, a complete aberration in respect of the faith. The words are properly rendered thus: "which some making a profession of are gone astray with respect to the faith." For the apostle does not mean to say that some make a profession of these things, and are in virtue of this gone astray in regard to the faith. Timothy knew already that several professed these things, and if these had already, in virtue of this profession, fallen away from the faith, then the warning here addressed to Timothy would be unintelligible, for the apostle will not surely suspect him of an open departure from the faith. We have already seen elsewhere that the apostle considers the being occupied with these things, not as in itself a falling away, but as the possible occasion of this, inasmuch as it weakens the conscience, and thus tends to bring about apostacy from the faith. Comp. on i. 3, ss., 19, &c., and the Gen. Introd., § 4. If this be so, it is again inconceivable that a forger in the second century should have expressed himself thus, and not rather have represented the profession of the Marcionitic Gnosis as directly and eo ipso apostacy. Ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι, as at ii. 10. Ἀστοχεῖν, as at i. 6. Περί = in respect of, comp. on i. 19.

Ver. 22. Ἡ χάρις μετὰ σοῦ, so Tischendorf according to D.E.I.K., &c. Lachmann, according to A.F.G., 17 versions, makes it μεθ' ὑμῶν, comp. 2 Tim. iv. 22; Tit. iii. 15. Even in the case of the latter reading being adopted as genuine,—though it bears distinctly the appearance of being an emendation,—nothing

could be inferred from it in proof of the epistle's having been addressed to the church along with Timothy; comp. on Tit. iii. 15. *Ἀμήν* is a later addition.

The subscription . . *from Laodicea* is derived as it appears from tradition. According to Wieseler indeed, p. 298, it has arisen from Col. iv. 16; which, however, appears very doubtful, as Theodoret knows nothing of this identification, and Theophylact is the first who notices it. The subscription deserves our notice, in so far as it proves the agreement of tradition with the opinion that there was a second imprisonment, as De Wette also acknowledges when he says: "The epistle is, according to the subscription, said to have been written from Laodicea, therefore probably after the first imprisonment, when the apostle visited Laodicea, which before his imprisonment was unknown to him" (Col. ii. 1.) On Laodicea, comp. Winer RWB. The designation *Πακατιανῆς* first arose in the 4th century; comp. Wieseler.

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

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